

Exhibit 2679

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

IIMURA, Minoru

According to the usual custom of our country, having sworn an oath in the attached sheet depose as follows:

I was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army at the same time that General Umezu was appointed Commander-in-Chief, on 7 September 1939, and held that post until October 1940. In October 1941, I was appointed Commander of the 5th Army, which had its headquarters in Tongan on the Manchoukuo-Soviet border, and there served under the command of General Umezu for two years, until October 1943.

- I. Our first duty as newly-appointed subordinates under General Umezu in September 1939 was to settle the Nomonhan Incident, according to Tokyo's instructions. Upon his appointment, General Umezu gave us instructions, the main points of which were as below:
- (1) Study withdrawal of the border guard line and other matters in order to prevent border troubles in future.
 - (2) All subordinates were to understand General Umezu's intentions well and were not allowed to deviate from his intentions.
 - (3) Subordinates were always to keep their commander-in-chief very

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well informed. When important matters were being investigated or planned the main points were to be reported to the commander-in-chief first, and then investigation in detail should be made. Plans were, even while in progress, to be reported to the commander-in-chief, and were to be gradually completed according to his instructions.

During the full year when I served as chief of staff all subordinates were completely under General Umezu's command concerning his above-mentioned policies. This complete control over his men by Umezu was not only over the but also extended down to all troops under his command. I believe this complete command by Umezu over his men was based upon his firm determination not to cause border troubles like the Nomonhan Incident.

Further, he gave attention to the expenditure of the special funds, which was very likely to be the cause of undesirable incidents, and he established regulations that use of more than ¥10,000 of the secret funds required approval of the commander-in-chief.

II. Umezu's Efforts in Preventing Border Troubles

(1) The "Border Guard Regulations of the Kwantung Army"

The "Border Guard Regulations" were made by the commander-in-chief and his subordinates together, being based on Umezu's instructions given upon his appointment and running parallel to the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident, in order to avoid border troubles.

I shall explain below concerning the "Border Guard Regulations" according to what I recall from my memory,

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- a. Complete prevention of border troubles was to be the principle.
- b. A Border Guard Line was to be established behind the border, except in places where the border was very clear, and troop activities were prohibited beyond the Border Guard Line.
- c. The area between the Border Guard Line and the border was to be made a non-militarized zone. Only patrol parties made up of very small numbers of men might be dispatched to the non-militarized zone, if any were required.
- d. A patrol party of course, and even troops stationed on or inside the Border Guard Line, were prohibited the use of arms except in case of absolute necessity for selfdefense. (Transfer of troops in case of border trouble might not be done without operation orders from the commander-in-chief; this was particularly explained at the time the "Border Guard Regulations" were ordered.)
- e. Even in case of illegal crossing of the border by Soviet planes, counter-attack by plane was strictly prohibited, though ground fire might be used.
- f. If an incident occurred on the border it was to be reported immediately to higher headquarters (including Kwantung Army Headquarters). Such reports were to be given priority over everything else.

As was mentioned above, the "Border Guard Regulations" were made according to Umezumi's intention, based upon current general conditions and Tokyo policy, to avoid any border troubles and keep peace in

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the north. Based on these "Border Guard Regulations", every field commander made his "border guard regulations" in detail. However, a field commander was not alone responsible for making these, but it was only permitted after close investigation by Umezu himself.

Umezu also made strong representations to the Manchoukuoan side concerning prevention of border troubles, since vacant places along the border--not guarded by the Japanese army-- were guarded by the Manchoukuoan police.

(2) Other Efforts of Umezu to Avoid Border Troubles

It was Umezu's firm determination from the time of his appointment to avoid border troubles in order to keep peace in the north. His determination was further strengthened, I believe, when the Emperor gave him advice concerning peace in the north at the time he went to Tokyo in December 1939.

The fact that there was not a border clash even once in his long term of five years in the Kwantung Army is clear evidence of this.

The Emperor's advice was conveyed to us at the office of the commander-in-chief and also at the Army Commanders conferences, in December 1939. Umezu used to have army commanders conferences once or twice a year. At every conference, including of course the first conference in October 1939, he called his men's attention to prevention of border troubles by saying: "A fire must be stopped while it is small. If border trouble unfortunately happens--though it should have been prevented beforehand-- it is desired that the army commander be on the spot to prevent expansion

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of the incident. I myself will go to the spot in order to settle it." The state of affairs concerning prevention of border trouble was always included in the reports of army commanders to the Army Commanders Conference. This situation was always true throughout my term as chief of staff, and also during my term as commander of the 5th Army under the command of Umezu after October 1941.

When I investigated the men's attitude toward prevention of border troubles immediately after reporting as commander of the 5th Army in October 1941, I recognized that the "Border Guard Regulations" had been very well brought home to every man; and a term "prevention of border trouble" was common among the men. All this was good evidence that Umezu's wishes had been well drilled into all men under his command. In addition to giving instructions, Umezu not only went himself, but also sent his staff-officers to the front whenever there were chances for inspection to see how his order was being carried out. I also inspected the eastern front many times.

Following the outbreak of the Pacific war, Umezu, realizing the necessity of keeping peace in the north, again issued written instructions to avoid border troubles, as well as inspecting the whole front line himself for the purpose of preventing trouble. I received this order at Tonan H.Q.

What I want to state further is Umezu's attitude toward reinforcement of the Kwantung Army while I was chief of staff. We subordinates were very much worried about the defence of Manchoukuo, as the troops had sustained losses and the real power of the Soviet had become clear, as it was right after the Nomonhan Incident, and we used to feel uneasiness just after the ice

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melted on the frontier rivers. Though we subordinates wanted reinforcement, Umezu would not permit our proposed reinforcement, saying, "We are in the middle of the China Incident and its settlement is most needed. At this time we should not ask Tokyo for reinforcement of the Kwantung Army; the shortage of man-power can be made up for by preventing border troubles and by strengthening border fortifications." One division (the 25th Division) was reinforced after the Nomonhan Incident, but this was not by Umezu's proposal.

After the outbreak of the Pacific war (I was then the commander of the 5th Army) a considerable number of men was taken away from the Kwantung Army, but Umezu told us that we should be glad to sacrifice man-power because of general conditions as a whole. At this time also we were uneasy because of the proportion between their strength and ours.

All I have stated above is, I believe, good evidence of Umezu's unchangeable, firm determination to keep peace in the north.

OATH

15 January 1947

Tokyo

I hereby swear that I shall state nothing but the truth according to my conscience, neither concealing nor adding anything.

(signed) IIMURA Minoru

I hereby certify that the above was duly sworn in my presence and signed at Tokyo, the same day.

(signed) MIYATA Mitsuo

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On this 15 day of Jan. 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, MIYATA, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place.

Witness: (signed) MIYATA, Mitsuo (seal)

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TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowlege and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke,

Tokyo, Japan

Date 12 May 1947