

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 does so in all deference to the much broader field of
3 view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full
4 awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is
5 limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan."

6 That was a premise to all my reports.

7 To answer your question about the war lords I would
8 merely read one paragraph of the report of my talk with the
9 Prime Minister at that time. That is the telegram of
10 September 6, 1941.

11 Mr. Gesell: Page 603, I think, is the one you quoted.

12 Mr. Grew: Page 605 of Foreign Relations.

13 "The report which the Prime Minister has received" --

14 Mr. Keefe (Interposing): Could I have the page again?

15 Mr. Grew: That is page 605 of Foreign Relations,

16 Volume II.

17 Mr. Keefe: I have it.

18 Mr. Grew: This is my report of the talk, of my con-
19 versations with the Prime Minister on September 6, 1941.
20 Paragraph No. 4 says:

21 "The report which the Prime Minister has received
22 from the Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter's conver-
23 sations with the President and the Secretary, have led the
24 Prime Minister to think that the Administration in Washington
25 entertains serious doubts as to the strength of the present

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2 cabinet, and that the Administration is not certain that
3 in the event that the Cabinet should adopt a peaceful pro-
4 gram it could successfully resist the attacks of opposing
5 elements.

6 "Prince Konoe told me that from the inception of the
7 informal talks in Washington he had received the strongest
8 concurrence from the responsible Chiefs of both the Army
9 and the Navy. Only today he had conferred with the Minister
10 of War who had promised to send a full general to accompany
11 the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President; the
12 Minister of the Navy had agreed that a full admiral should
13 accompany the Prime Minister.

14 "Prince Konoe added in confidence that he expected
15 that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral
16 Yoshida, a former minister of the Navy. In addition, the
17 Premier would be accompanied by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of
18 the Army and the Navy and other high ranking officers of
19 the armed services who are in entire accord with his aims.
20 He admitted that there are certain elements within the armed
21 forces who do not approve his policies, but he voiced the
22 conviction that since he had the full support of the respon-
23 sible Chiefs of the Army and Navy, it would be possible for
24 him to put down and control any opposition which might develop
25 among those elements."

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Mr. Keefe: Well, were you suggesting to our State Department and the President that it was your opinion that there should be a meeting between the President and Prince Konoe?

Mr. Grew: That appears in this record, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: You warmly recommended that, did you not?

Mr. Grew: From our point of view in Tokyo at that time.

Mr. Keefe: You felt Prince Konoe was a man inclined to peace, and that some good would come out of such conference?

Mr. Grew: I think all of us in the Embassy at that time -- when I say "all of us" I mean the senior officers, the military attache, naval attache, commercial attache, and all of the senior members of the Embassy believed it was a good gamble; that Knnoe had come to a position where he realized the dangerous situation in which his country had got itself, and he was trying to find a way out.

Now, whether he controlled the military elements or not is a question we can never answer. It is not susceptible to proof. We cannot do it.

Mr. Keefe: As a matter of fact, that meeting was never held?

Mr. Grew: That meeting was never held.

Mr. Keefe: The proposal was rejected here at Washington, was it not?

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2 Mr. Grew: Well, the proposal was never acted on.
3 Although you will find that in August -- let me see if I
4 can put my hand on it. This is in Foreign Relations, page
5 572. The record shows that on August 28, 1941, when Admiral
6 Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, had delivered to the President
7 a letter from Prince Konoe, the record shows:

8 "At the conclusion of the reading of the communication,
9 the President said to the Ambassador that he could say to
10 his government that he considered this note a step forward
11 and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would
12 be keenly interested in having three or four days with
13 Prince Konoe and again he mentioned Juneau."

14 He mentioned Juneau as the place of meeting.

15 Mr. Keefe: Do you know why the meeting was never
16 held?

17 Mr. Grew: No, sir. I think Mr. Hull has made that
18 amply clear in his statement. Mr. Hull felt that it would
19 be futile to go ahead with the meeting unless the basis had
20 been laid in advance in the Washington conversations.

21 Mr. Keefe: The futility of it appeared, according to
22 Mr. Hull's statement, right while these negotiations were
23 going on and Japan continued its unrepressed march of aggres-
24 sion.

25 Mr. Grew: That is perfectly true.

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2 Mr. Keefe: Right on and on, day by day.

3 Mr. Grew: That is perfectly true.

4 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Hull and the President continually
5 suggested if they were in earnest and if they were honest
6 about the peace they would put a stop to some of those things.

7 Isn't that the situation? But the war lords would not
8 do it; isn't that correct?

9 Mr. Grew: It is more of a story than that, Mr.
10 Congressman. It is a pretty complicated story. No one who
11 has not lived in Japan and understands the way things work
12 there could possibly understand it. I have tried to explain
13 one phase of it.

14 Mr. Keefe: You are making it pretty tough for me,
15 Mr. Grew, when you say nobody that did not live there can
16 possibly understand it. I am going to be in a hopeless situa-
17 tion, then, if that is the case.

18 Mr. Grew: The facts are these: At that time in
19 Japan there were two camps. There were the militarist war
20 leaders who were all out for expansion, and were carrying out
21 the plans, as you have just said, day after day, week after
22 week, steadily.

23 On the other hand, there were certain liberal-minded
24 statesmen who realized the position their country had got
25 into, realized the danger of war, and wanted to avert it, if

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2 they possibly could.

3 Now, anything that appeared on the records had to go
4 through the Foreign Office, which was always discredited by
5 the military people. The Foreign Office was full of young
6 officers, of extremist tendencies, many of them playing in
7 with the Germans, and anything that went on the record,
8 went through the Foreign Office, was promptly put through the
9 hands of the extremists, and the Germans were constantly
10 pressing, pressing to prevent any possibility of an understand-
11 ing with the United States. That was the reason for their fear
12 of formulas. That was the reason why I said in this telegram
13 that they never would be able to bring about a satisfactory
14 understanding in the conversations in Washington for the mere
15 fact that they were so spread on the record. They had good
16 reason to fear, because they were constantly trying to assassi-
17 nate Prince Konoé, and they very nearly did assassinate him
18 just at this time when four thugs jumped aboard his car with
19 daggers and tried to get at him, but failed. The former
20 prime minister was also attacked. His throat was cut and
21 he was out of the picture for many months thereafter. All
22 these statesmen who were not playing in with the military
23 were constantly under attack by the militarists. That is, I
24 think, a fundamental reason why they were afraid of formulas.

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2 Now Prince Konoye said to me, "If I can meet the President
3 face to face I will give him assurances, commitments which we
4 will honorably carry out. We cannot carry them out overnight,
5 but we will carry them out in as short a time as possible."

6 That is all on the record here, every bit of it. He said,
7 "A settlement of this kind will so electrify the Japanese
8 people, showing them that they can have what they want politi-
9 cally, economically, and socially, they can have security
10 without any more fighting," and they were tired out with the
11 China war, they were subject to the greatest economic sacri-
12 fices. Konoye said, "It will be accepted by the great mass
13 of the Japanese people, with the greatest satisfaction," and
14 he said, "I can guarantee that this will be carried out."

15 He said, "It can be carried out. It may take six months
16 or more, it will take some time, but we will take our troops
17 out of China, we will take our troops out of Indo-China.
18 Of course we have got to leave certain garrisons here and
19 there for the purpose of our own security."

20 I said at once when this statement was made, "What do
21 you mean by that?" He said, "I mean just the sort of thing
22 like you yourselves are doing, the British are doing. You
23 have garrisons in Peiping, in Tientsin, Shanghai, and so have
24 the British, and so have many other countries." He said,
25 "That is what we have in mind for the purposes of security."

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2 There is the story. Nobody in the world can prove that
3 even if Konoye had met the President and even if he had been
4 able to give satisfactory commitments that he could have
5 implemented them after he came back. That was definitely
6 in the control of the military. Nobody could answer that
7 question, and it cannot be answered today. It is not susceptible
8 to proof.

9 Mr. Keefe: At least the President and Mr. Hull doubted
10 his ability to implement any such suggestions with the military.

11 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

12 Mr. Keefe: Because they declined the invitation for the
13 conference.

14 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

15 Mr. Keefe: That is true, is it not?

16 Mr. Grew: Absolutely.

17 Mr. Keefe: All right. That is in answer to my question,
18 unless you have something further.

19 Mr. Grew: I just want to say once more everything I have
20 said today represents the point of view of one spot, our
21 Embassy in Tokyo, and we were deprived of a great deal of the
22 information which was available to the President and Mr. Hull.
23 We had none of the secret intercepts or telegrams, we had none
24 of the documents that have come into the State Department
25 from time to time, documents of a secret nature, so of course

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2 the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal
3 more information than we had available to us.

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4 Mr. Keefe: Am I to understand then, Mr. Grew, that from
5 the information available to you at the Embassy in Tokyo,
6 being denied the information contained in the intercepts and
7 all of the other information available here at Washington,
8 you were recommending that this meeting with Prince Konoye
9 be held and that it would be productive of some good?

10 Mr. Grew: Well, sir, to get the record straight on that --
11 and it is all on the record -- I better read you exactly what
12 was said here. This is the telegram of September 29:

13 "In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis
14 of the above observations which he has every reason to
15 regard as sound," - that was my analysis of the whole
16 situation at that time - "American objectives will not
17 be reached by insisting or continuing to insist during
18 the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the
19 sort of clear-cut, specific commitments which appear
20 in any final, formal convention or treaty. Unless a
21 reasonable amount of confidence is placed by the United
22 States in the professed sincerity of intention and good
23 faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters to mould
24 Japan's future policy upon the basic principles they
25 are ready to accept and then to adopt measures which

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2 gradually but loyally implement those principles, with
3 it understood that the United States will implement
4 its own commitment pari passu with the steps which
5 Japan takes, the Ambassador does not believe that a
6 new orientation can be successfully created in Japan
7 to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American
8 relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be
9 avoided in the Pacific."

10 I want to make clear the fact that I felt that, as far
11 as our economic measures went, we had great leverage there
12 and we were certainly not going to relax those measures, our
13 freezing measures, the abrogation of our treaty with Japan,
14 the embargoes, and so forth, unless and until we found Japan
15 was going to loyally implement whatever undertakings they
16 might tell us they would undertake. That was our opinion in
17 the Embassy at that time.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, on November 3, in your message
19 which is in evidence, you made this statement in paragraph 5,
(17) 20 and I am reading it:

21 "Please realize that in discussing the foregoing
22 grave and momentous subject I am out of touch with
23 the Administration's thoughts and intentions thereon
24 and it is far from my intention to imply that an un-
25 deliberated policy is being followed in Washington.

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It is equally far from my intentions for a single moment to advocate so-called 'appeasement' on the part of the United States or that our Government should in the slightest degree recede from the fundamental principles which it laid down as a basis for adjustment and conduct of international relations, including our relations with Japan. My purpose is only to insure against my country getting into war with Japan through any possible misconception of the capacity of Japan to rush headlong into a suicidal conflict with the United States. National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic.

"We need not be over-concerned by the present bellicose tone and substance of the Japanese press which has attacked the United States in recurrent waves of intensity during the past several years, but it would be shortsighted to underestimate Japan's obvious preparations for a program to be implemented if her alternative program for peace should fail. It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling with the exclusive purpose

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1 of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure
2 diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might
3 make war with the United States inevitable may come
4 with dramatic and dangerous suddenness."

5 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: In that same message, Mr. Grew, you obviously
7 must have had some knowledge of some statements that were
8 being made in speeches here in the United States about the
9 ability of the United States to knock the Jap Navy over in
10 24 hours, and all those sort of things. Those things had come
11 to your attention, had they not?

12 Mr. Grew: Some of them had, undoubtedly.

13 Mr. Keefe: Were you prompted, in sending this message
14 of November 3rd, to warn the State Department and perhaps the
15 American people that perhaps the Japanese were of a character
16 that had the capacity to strike suddenly and carry on war?
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18 Mr. Grew: Definitely.

19 Mr. Keefe: And that these statements that were being
20 made by them, and by speakers going around the country, as to
21 the impotence of Japan and its Navy were far from the truth?

22 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

23 Mr. Keefe: That was your information then?

24 Mr. Grew: That was my information then. But where you
25 say "Japanese" that is a pretty relative term. There are

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different kinds of Japanese.

Mr. Keefe: Now I do not want to be captious or capricious about it. I am referring to those things which would govern.

Mr. Grew: Yes, I agree with that 100 percent, with every word said in that telegram.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Grew: Of course, the situation, when that telegram was sent, was very different from the situation which obtained under the previous Cabinet in September.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Mr. Grew: That was in November, under the Tojo regime.

Mr. Keefe: When did the Konoye Cabinet form?

Mr. Grew: October 13, 1941.

Mr. Keefe: Shortly before you sent this telegram of November 3 that I read from.

Mr. Grew: I took about two weeks to size up the new situation. I was not quite sure what Tojo's policy was going to be. I had been assured he was going to try to keep on the conversations, going to do his best to come to an agreement with us, and all the rest of it. Frankly, I had my fingers crossed. I was waiting to size it up, and after I had sized it up I sent the telegram of November 3.

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact, the very fact that the Konoye Cabinet fell was an indication to you, was it not,

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Mr. Grew, that the militarists were continuing in full and complete control?

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Mr. Grew: At that time, absolutely, Mr. Congressman.

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But the point which was brought out in these telegrams is unless this meeting of the President took place the Konoye Cabinet would fall definitely.

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Mr. Keefe: The meeting did not take place and the Konoye Cabinet did fall?

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Mr. Grew: It did.

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Mr. Keefe: And who came in charge of the situation?

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Mr. Grew: General Tojo.

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Mr. Keefe: He was a militarist of the first order,

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wasn't he?

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Mr. Grew: He was.

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Mr. Keefe: And a bandit of the first order?

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Mr. Grew: I would say so.

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Mr. Keefe: He was in charge of running the show, wasn't he, from then on?

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Mr. Grew: Completely, he certainly was.

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Mr. Keefe: And he was not deterred by any economic sanctions, was he, after he came into control?

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Mr. Grew: Not for a moment.

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Mr. Keefe: No, and nobody was deterred before he came into control, so far as their actions disclosed?

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Mr. Grew: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, then, I want to get into another subject. The statement was made by you and by Secretary Hull that the presence of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor acted as a deterrent and had a deterrent effect. That was the language you used, "had a deterrent effect."

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Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Will you point out to me, for the purpose of this record, one single act in the program of the war lords of Japan which was deterred by the presence of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?

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Mr. Grew: Mr. Congressman, that is a very difficult question to answer. I do not think I could do it. I felt out there to withdraw the Fleet from Pearl Harbor would be a complete confession of weakness, and the Japanese might

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well have struck long before they did strike if we had done so. That is something we can never prove.

Mr. Keefe: You did not know, of course, when you came to that conclusion that due to the knowledge of the intercepts that we had, all of the information that was in the possession of the State Department here?

Mr. Grew: I did not know that.

Mr. Keefe: No. And of course we did not know either here, or in Washington, or in Japan, except by rumors that they had entered into an agreement to strike Pearl Harbor on December 7, as indicated by your message of January 27, 1941.

Mr. Grew: That is perfectly true.

Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Grew, your answer to my question is, as I interpret it, that you were of the opinion that to withdraw the Fleet would have been an indication of weakness on our part that might have stimulated the Japs to strike quicker than they did.

Mr. Grew: Quite possible.

Mr. Keefe: Do I so understand it?

Mr. Grew: That would be my interpretation.

Mr. Keefe: That was not an answer to my question. My question was: What act of the Japanese war lords, or the war government of Japan, was deterred by the fact that we had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor?

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2 Mr. Grew: I could not point to any specific act,
3 Mr. Congressman. As a matter of fact, this whole procedure
4 passed over a considerable period of time. The movement
5 of the Japanese expansionists into China and eventually
6 into Indochina did not take place overnight. It was going
7 on gradually. It stopped for a while and then moved
8 ahead for a while.

9 Now, it is quite possible if we had withdrawn the
10 Fleet from Pearl Harbor that expansionist movement might
11 have gone a great deal faster than it did go. I cannot
12 tell you that. I do not know. But I think that is a fair
13 supposition.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, I must interpret the fact, Mr. Grew,
15 in the light of all the evidence that has been presented
16 here, and we now have before us the evidence taken from the
17 Jap files. Their story has been presented here by Admiral
18 Inglis. So we not only have the story as it existed here
19 in America, and at Tokyo, but we have the situation as it
20 existed as shown by the Jap files.

21 Now, as a matter of fact, the Fleet went out there
22 early in 1940, pursuant to regular plans for orderly maneuvers,
23 as testified to by Admiral Richardson, merely for the purpose
24 of maneuvers; its regular base being at San Diego, and
25 San Pedro, up at Long Beach.

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2 Now, when they concluded their maneuvers, the Fleet
3 went into Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Richardson thought they
4 ought to be brought back to their bases, and he received
5 information and instruction to issue a press release,
6 which was certainly contrary to his expressed opinion as
7 he gave it to us here, to issue a press release to the ef-
8 fect that the Fleet was being retained for a time at his
9 request, and being a Navy man he followed such instructions
10 and issued such a press release, for the benefit of the Japs,
11 I assume, and the Fleet remained there thereafter.

12 Now, you are not able, as the Ambassador being on the
13 ground in Tokyo, to give to this committee one single specific
14 instance of a case where the Japs were deterred from taking
15 any action as the result of that Fleet being there, except
16 the general statement that perhaps they might have infiltrated
17 into Indochina and down south a little faster than they did,
18 if the Fleet had not been out there. Is that the way I under-
19 stand you?

20 Mr. Grew: Congressman, it is utterly impossible, and
21 it would be utterly impossible for anybody to give one
22 specific instance, because that is not the way armies work.
23 They do not buck ahead all of a sudden, and you cannot put
24 your finger on it and say that was a specific instance, or
25 one specific step that might not be taken if we did not have

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2 the Fleet there. Those things move slowly over a period of
3 time. Nobody could give you one specific instance.

4 Mr. Keefe: Then it would be likewise quite impossible,
5 would it not, for anyone to say that the presence of the
6 Fleet in Pearl Harbor actually deterred the Japs at all?
7 If you cannot give any instances of where it did deter
8 them, it will be quite impossible to say that they were
9 deterred; isn't that true?

10 Mr. Grew: I do not believe anybody could answer that
11 question. You cannot possibly tell whether the presence
12 of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor did or did not slow up the
13 Japanese advance, whether they might have struck earlier than
14 they did, whether we were much less ready than we were. The
15 position I am taking is, from our point of view in Tokyo,
16 we had the feeling that the presence of the Fleet in Pearl
17 Harbor was a healthy thing, psychologically, and to with-
18 draw it would be a confession of weakness which would be
19 immediately taken up by the Japanese.

20 Mr. Keefe: I understand that thoroughly. I am not
21 attempting to be critical of your position in that regard,
22 or anybody else's. I am simply trying to get the facts of
23 this situation so I thoroughly understand them.

24 Now, as a matter of fact, did you know the condition
25 that the Fleet was in back in 1940 and 1941?

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2 Mr. Grew: I knew nothing whatsoever about the condition
3 of the Fleet.

4 Mr. Keefe: You assumed that the Fleet was ready for
5 action, did you not?

6 Mr. Grew: I did.

7 Mr. Keefe: Had you know that the Fleet was not pre-
8 pared for action, would you still have been of the opinion
9 that it would be a deterrent?

10 Mr. Grew: I am afraid that is a hypothetical question
11 which I find it very difficult to answer, Mr. Congressman.

12 Mr. Keefe: If you cannot answer, Mr. Grew, I will not
13 press you for an answer. Unless you feel that you can answer
14 it, I shall not press it.

15 Mr. Grew: I think I would prefer to pass that question.

16 Mr. Keefe: Very well.

17 Now, in answer to some questions by counsel, I believe,
18 in answer to some questions by my colleague, Mr. Gearhart,
19 there was quite an altercation as to the meaning of the
20 word "ultimatum." Both you and Mr. Hull were very positive
21 in your statements that the Jap message of November 20 con-
22 stituted an ultimatum. Do you recall giving that testimony?

23 Mr. Grew: I do not think I testified to that effect,
24 Mr. Congressman.

25 Mr. Keefe: Did you hear Mr. Hull so testify?

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2 Mr. Grew: I did, yes.

3 Mr. Keefe: It is in his statement, isn't it?

4 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: And it is the basis of his statement that
6 the November 20 message constituted an ultimatum. Did you
7 so conceive it to be an ultimatum?

8 Mr. Grew: Well, as for my personal views, Mr. Congressman,
9 I have never felt that any communication from one government
10 to another was an ultimatum if negotiations continued after
11 that notice was served.

12 Mr. Keefe: Then, Mr. Grew, you must be in complete lack
13 of agreement with Secretary Hull, because the facts clearly
14 evidence that subsequent to the delivery of the Jap note to
15 the Secretary of State, the note of the 20th of November,
16 negotiations continued right on, conference after conference
17 was held. You are aware of that, are you?

18 Mr. Grew: I am.

19 Mr. Keefe: Conferences were held not only with the
20 Japanese but they were held with the British. They were
21 held with the Dutch. They were held with the Chinese,
22 especially with relation to the proposed modus vivendi
23 proposal that the Japs had asked for.

24 Now, then, in view of those facts, and in view of your
25 interpretation of what an ultimatum is, are you prepared to

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2 say yourself that the message of November 20 was, in fact
3 an ultimatum?

4 Mr. Grew: I have not said so, but I will say this,
5 Mr. Congressman, that I think if there is any difference
6 of opinion between Mr. Hull and myself on that point, it is
7 a pretty technical point; it is a point as to what is meant
8 by the term "ultimatum." It would be very difficult for
9 people to differ as to the actual meaning of that particular
10 word.

11 Mr. Keefe: Have you read the note of the 20th of
12 November?

13 Mr. Grew: Yes, certainly.

14 Mr. Keefe: Did you find any language in it which
15 indicates that negotiations were to be broken off?

16 Mr. Grew: I do not think it depends on the language
17 in it so much as whether further negotiations continue after
18 the delivery of that note.

19 Mr. Keefe: Then the facts are clear, Mr. Grew, that
20 negotiations did continue. You know that, do you not?

21 Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

22 Mr. Keefe: They continued after the delivery of the
23 note?

24 Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

25 Mr. Keefe: And it resulted in our offering a counter-

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2 proposal on November 26.

3 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

4 Mr. Keefe: You are sure of that, are you not?

5 Mr. Grew: That is right.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, the statement has been made here
7 that over in Tokyo a friend of yours, high in the Govern-
8 ment circles, wrote you a letter in which he said that the
9 people of Japan, without knowledge as to what was in the
10 November 26 message, considered it to be an ultimatum,
11 and you construe that to be the policy of the controlled
12 press operating under the directions of the war lords to
13 not give the Japanese people the truth; is that correct?

14 Mr. Grew: Very definitely.

15 Mr. Keefe: To make them believe that we terminated
16 diplomatic relations?

17 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

18 Mr. Keefe: Do I so understand your testimony?

19 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

20 Mr. Keefe: Now, the record discloses -- and I now refer
21 to Exhibit 27, which I am advised is the first of the publi-
22 cation "Peace and War."

23 Mr. Grew: That is right.

24 Mr. Keefe: Published in 1942.

25 On page 137 of that short report there appears, beginning

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe


1
2 on page 135, and continuing over to page 138, a memorandum
3 entitled "United States Memorandum of November 26," and I
4 find this expression, a statement as to the handling of
5 this November 26 message to the Japanese Ambassador in this
6 language, and I quote from the top of page 136:

7 "On November 26, 1941, the Secretary of State handed
8 to the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu a proposed basis
9 for agreement between the United States and Japan."
10 This was the culmination of these negotiations that had
11 been going on between the 20th and 26th.

12 "In a statement accompanying the proposal, it was
13 said that the United States earnestly desired to afford
14 every opportunity for the continuation of discussions with
15 the Japanese Government; that the Japanese proposals of
16 November 20 conflicted in some respects with the fundamental
17 principles to which each government had declared it was
18 committed," and so forth.

19 Then appears this on page 137:

20 "After the Japanese representatives had read the
21 document, Mr. Kurusu said that when this proposal of the
22 United States was reported to the Japanese Government that
23 Government would be likely to 'throw up its hands'; that
24 this response to the Japanese proposal could be interpreted
25 as tantamount to the end of the negotiations. The Japanese



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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 representatives then asked whether they could see the
3 President."

4 Now, there was an expression of opinion of the Japanese
5 envoy, expressed to the time the note was handed to him on
6 November 26, and before it had even been transmitted to
7 Japan, indicating that,- after reading it, on the day that
8 it was delivered to them, they considered it to be an ulti-
9 matum.

10 Do you so interpret that language?

11 Mr. Grew: Definitely not, Mr. Congressman. Do I
12 interpret the language of the Japanese envoys as themselves
13 having believed it to be an ultimatum?

14 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

15 Mr. Grew: That would appear to be clear from the record.

16 Mr. Keefe: All right. That is what I asked. As evi-
17 dence of the fact that subsequent to November 20 there were
18 continuing negotiations between the State Department and the
19 Japanese envoy, I refer to page 134 of Exhibit 27, after
20 the Japs had handed their proposal of the 20th to Mr. Hull,
21 and this appears:

22 "During a conversation on that same day with the Japanese
23 Ambassador, and Mr. Kurusu, Secretary Hull said that Japan
24 could at any moment put an end to the existing situation by
25 deciding upon an'all-out' peaceful course; that at any moment

Witness Grew

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1
2 Japan could bring to an end what Japan chose to call
3 'encirclement.'

4 "The Secretary said the people of the United States
5 believed that the purposes underlying our aid to China
6 were the same as those underlying our aid to Great Britain
7 and that there was a partnership between Hitler and Japan
8 aimed at enabling Hitler to take charge of one-half of the
9 world and Japan the other half.

10 "The existence of the Tripartite Pact and the continual
11 harping of Japan's leaders upon slogans of the Nazi type,
12 the Secretary said, served to strengthen this belief; what
13 was needed was the manifestation by Japan of a clear purpose
14 to pursue peaceful courses. He said that our people desired
15 to avoid a repetition in East Asia of what Hitler was doing in
16 Europe; that our people opposed the idea of a 'new order'
17 under military control.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 "In this conversation the Japanese representatives
3 reiterated that their Government was really desirous of
4 peace and that Japan had 'never pledged itself to a
5 policy of expansion.' Secretary Hull remarked that the
6 Chinese 'might have an answer to that point.'
7 With which I, parenthetically, agreed.

8 Then:

9 "During a conversation on November 22nd the
10 Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador
11 and Mr. Kurusu that he had called in representatives of
12 certain other governments concerned in the Far East
13 and that there had been a discussion of the question
14 whether there could be some relaxation of freezing;
15 there was a general feeling that the matter could be
16 settled if the Japanese could give some evidence of
17 peaceful intentions. The Secretary said that if the
18 United States and other countries should see Japan
19 pursuing a peaceful course there would be no question
20 about Japan's obtaining all of the materials she de-
21 sired."

22 Were you advised as Ambassador to Japan of these conver-
23 sations relating to this proposed modus vivendi?

24 Mr. Grew: I couldn't answer that question, Mr. Congressman,
25 without looking up the record. As I said before I was advised

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 of some of the conversations. In certain cases the records
3 were telegraphed out to me. I do not know that I was advised
4 of the records of all the conversations.

5 Mr. Keefe: What records would you have to go to?

6 Mr. Grew: Those are on file in the Department of State
7 available to counsel.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, of course, then these documents that
9 we have in evidence here, War and Peace, Foreign Relations and
10 your book, don't contain all the messages?

11 Mr. Grew: That I cannot tell you.

12 Mr. Keefe: Can you turn and find any evidence in your
13 book of any messages in reference to this modus vivendi proposi-
14 tion?

15 Mr. Grew: I don't recollect that there is anything there.
16 I don't think there is.

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, do you have any present recollection now,
18 Mr. Grew, that you were informed and knew about the negotiations?

19 Mr. Grew: I have no present recollection of that particular
20 point.

21 Mr. Keefe: Were you advised that before any settlement
22 of the relationships between the United States and Japan could
23 be accomplished that it was necessary to call in consultation
24 other powers that were interested -- Great Britain, the Dutch
25 and the Chinese?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Grew: Was I advised, you say, that it would be necessary to call them in?

3

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Mr. Keefe: Yes.

5

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Mr. Grew: No, sir, I certainly was not advised to that effect. I may have been advised after the meeting took place. I can't answer that question because, as I say, there were a great many such messages sent out to me, and I would have to check up the record to see whether that particular point was telegraphed to me or not.

10

11

Mr. Keefe: I believe you stated that you had no knowledge of the so-called ABCD agreement?

12

13

Mr. Grew: I had no knowledge of any such agreement.

14

15

Mr. Keefe: Have you been advised recently that there was such an agreement?

16

Mr. Grew: No, sir.

17

Mr. Keefe: Do you know anything about such an agreement?

18

Mr. Grew: I do not, sir.

19

20

Mr. Keefe: I call your attention to the fact that General Marshall testified with respect to that agreement when he was a witness before the Army Board of Inquiry, and I read this just to attempt to refresh your recollection, if it will.

21

22

23

The question was:

24

25

"Who constituted the military authorities representing the United States in entering into this agreement?"

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 And the agreement referred to is the one already read
3 into the record by the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Ferguson.

4 The answer is:

5 "The agreement was reached in the so-called American-
6 British-Dutch staff conversations held at Singapore in
7 April of 1941. United States Army officers participated
8 on my instructions and with the approval of the Secretary
9 of State.

10 "The participants were: Captain Purnell, U. S.
11 Navy, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet; Colonel
12 A. C. McBride, U.S. Army, Assistant Chief of Staff of the
13 Military Forces in the Philippines; Captain A. M. R. Allen,
14 U. S. Navy, the U. S. Naval Observer in Singapore;
15 Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Brink, U. S. Army, U. S.
16 Military Observer at Singapore."

17 Does General Marshall's testimony bring back any recollection
18 to you of the fact that there was such an agreement entered
19 into?

20 Mr. Grew: No, sir, it does not, and I do not think that
21 any report of that meeting which you just referred to came to
22 me in Tokyo, so far as I can now recollect.

23 Mr. Keefe: All right. Now, I want to ask a couple of
24 other questions in relation to your book and your diary.

25 Oh, before I get to that:

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Where is Mr. Dooman at the present time, who was formerly
3 the counsellor of the Embassy at Tokyo?

4 Mr. Grew: Mr. Dooman lives in Washington but he is away
5 for a few days. I think he will be back shortly but I don't
6 know when.

7 Mr. Keefe: What is his full name?

8 Mr. Grew: Eugene F. Dooman, D-o-o-m-a-n.

9 Mr. Keefe: Did he return with you at the time you were
10 exchanged and came back, which I believe was in July or
11 August of 1942?

12 Mr. Grew: Yes, we came back together.

13 Mr. Keefe: Is he presently occupying any position in
14 the State Department?

15 Mr. Grew: No, sir. He recently retired from the Foreign
16 Service and the State Department. He has now no official
17 position.

18 Mr. Keefe: He is in the same position that you are?

19 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir; exactly.

20 Mr. Keefe: Did he work with you when you became Under
21 Secretary of State?

22 Mr. Grew: Mr. Dooman, as I recollect it, when he came
23 back I think he was assigned to work in the Department of
24 State, shortly after we came back. I would have to check up
25 on that. But I had nothing to do with that because I was out

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 in the field speaking for the first year or year and a half.

2
3 Mr. Keefe: Well now, reference was made this morning to
4 this report which you made setting forth the conversations
5 had between Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ohashi on February 14, 1941.
6 In transmitting that report you used this language:

7 "The presentation by Mr. Dooman of his impressions
8 of the position of the United States as gathered during
9 his recent furlough appeared to cause Mr. Ohashi
10 astonishment. Mr. Ohashi is, for a Japanese, extra-
11 ordinarily direct and sparing of words. Upon listening
12 attentively to what Mr. Dooman described as the philosophy
13 of the American position Mr. Ohashi remained perfectly
14 quiet for an appreciable space of time and then burst
15 forth with the question, 'Do you mean to say that if
16 Japan were to attack Singapore there would be a war
17 with the United States.' Mr. Dooman replied, 'The
18 logic of the situation would inevitably raise that
19 question.' Mr. Ohashi then left that subject and
20 adverted to the character of reports sent to London
21 by the British Ambassador. Circumstantial evidence
22 that Mr. Ohashi was affected by the interview was
23 given by Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister,
24 who called on Mr. Ohashi a few minutes after Mr.
25 Dooman left. Sir John, without being aware that Mr.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Dooman had just called on Mr. Ohashi, told me that he
2 found Mr. Ohashi greatly agitated and distrait.

3 "I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka, with whom I
4 have an appointment this morning, that the statements
5 made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Ohashi were made with my
6 prior knowledge and have my full approval."

7 Now, this incident has been known quite widely in diplo-
8 matic circles as the "Dooman Incident", has it not?

9 Mr. Grew: Well, I hadn't heard that term applied to it,
10 Mr. Congressman.

11 Mr. Keefe: It caused some astonishment in diplomatic
12 circles in Tokyo, did it not, when it came out?

13 Mr. Grew: I don't think it ever came out in public in
14 Tokyo, so far as I recollect. Those things very seldom did
15 come out. Is there any indication there that it did? I don't
16 think so. Sir John Latham, the Australian Minister, appears
17 to have known of it.

18 Mr. Keefe: Then you agreed at that time, when you sent
19 this message, that it was the considered policy of the United
20 States that if the Japs attacked Singapore we would go to war?

21 Mr. Grew: It is not a categorical statement to that
22 effect.

23 Mr. Keefe: I know it is not, but what did you mean?

24 Mr. Grew: I think that was pretty good doctrine to spread
25

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 to the Japanese at that time. I always held, during that
3 period, that only a display of force and the establishing of
4 the conviction among the Japanese that we intended to use it,
5 if necessary, would have any effect out there.

6 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Grew, if you will pardon me, I am not
7 attempting to place any false interpretation upon the language.
8 I could let it stand for itself. The words speak for themselves
9 as to just what was said. I am not in disagreement with you.
10 I hope you do not get that impression. The statement says
11 the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the question
12 as to whether or not we would go to war.

13 Now, do I understand you to say that the purpose of
14 Mr. Dooman making this statement to Mr. Ohashi, of which you
15 had prior knowledge and approval, was part of the program to
16 attempt to deter the Japs from the course they had set out on?

17 Mr. Grew: Congressman, no one is omniscient at any
18 one time, of course, but we in Tokyo had during those years
19 watched the impression created among the Japanese people as
20 to the attitude of the United States and the American people.

(3) 21 Whenever a speech by some prominent isolationist was
22 made in America that speech was generally emblazoned in
23 headlines in the Japanese press and very few other speeches
24 were ever allowed to be published.

25 Whenever there was a strike in the United States that

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 strike was emphasized in the Japanese press in order to convey
2 to the Japanese people that the American people were isolation-
3 ists and pacifists and secondly that we were completely dis-
4 united and would never be able to fight a total war.

5
6 Therefore I felt that on Mr. Dooman's coming back from
7 Washington it was pretty sound doctrine for him to speak as
8 he did speak. There was no precise threat there. There was
9 no categorical statement that we would or would not do this.
10 It was simply the general tone and substance of his talk which
11 I approved.

12 Mr. Keefe: Thank you, Mr. Grew, for that statement.

13 The fact is that Mr. Dooman was back here in the United
14 States during the campaign of 1940, wasn't he?

15 Mr. Grew: I believe so.

16 Mr. Keefe: That is when he was here; it says so in the
17 statement.

18 Mr. Grew: Yes.

19 Mr. Keefe: Now, were the speeches being printed in Japan
20 that were being made during this campaign, do you know?

21 Mr. Grew: I can't recollect any particular speech at
22 any time in particular, but in general that was the type of
23 thing which was being published in the Japanese press because,
24 apparently, the militarists wanted to give the Japanese people
25 the idea that we were timid, that we could easily be intimidated,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 and that if they showed enough force and power we would step
3 back.

4 Mr. Keefe: As I recall that campaign there were a great
5 many speeches made by people who never have been termed
6 isolationists, who were leading the people of America to
7 believe that we weren't going to go to war.

8 I recall Mr. Willkie making those speeches and I recall
9 the President making a speech in which he indicated that we
10 weren't going to war.

11 Were those speeches published in Japan?

12 Mr. Grew: I can't answer that question, Mr. Congressman.
13 I can't recollect what speeches were and what speeches were
14 not published.

15 Mr. Keefe: I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, whether or not
16 the purpose of Mr. Dooman having the conversation with Mr.
17 Ohashi was not to try to give him the impression that a lot
18 of this stuff that they had heard during this campaign did
19 not represent the real and true spirit of the people of America?

20 Mr. Grew: I think one of the purposes of Mr. Dooman's
21 talk was to create the impression that the American people
22 were not completely isolationist and pacifist as many of the
23 Japanese had been led to believe.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well now, when you came back finally from
25 Japan you brought with you a diary consisting, as I understand

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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it, of some 13 volumes; is that right?

Mr. Grew: I believe that is correct, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: And that is the diary which has been the subject of some discussion between you and the committee and Senator Brewster?

Mr. Grew: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Grew, after you came back with this diary of 13 volumes, will you state whether or not you submitted it to Colliers Weekly for publication; for publication by Colliers Weekly first?

Mr. Grew: I did not submit the entire diary to Colliers Weekly. I did submit parts of it having in mind the possibility of a series of articles but I later found that I could not write that series of articles and the whole thing was dropped.

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact -- and you can answer this or not, as you wish, Mr. Grew -- isn't it a fact that you did submit your diary to Colliers Weekly for the purpose of having it edited into a series of articles and that when it was submitted it was found that there had been passages cut out of the diary and Colliers Weekly was not interested in publishing the diary with those deleted portions taken out?

Mr. Grew: I don't recollect that. The whole diary was not submitted.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: What part was submitted?

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Mr. Grew: I can't recollect. Certain parts were submitted to one representative of Colliers Weekly to look over and see whether a series of articles would be worth while.

Mr. Keefe: Who was that man?

Mr. Grew: I can't recollect his name now. He is now dead. I think he died last year. But I can't remember his name.

Mr. Keefe: Was he not the Washington representative of Colliers Weekly, the man to whom you submitted the diary?

Mr. Grew: I don't think so.

The Chairman: I was trying to think of his name. I think I knew him.

Mr. Grew: I remember that he came down to meet me when we got off the Japanese ship to see if he could sign me up for a series of articles. I wasn't willing to sign up at that time but as he had taken that trouble I realized that if I was going to write anything for the magazines that Colliers Weekly had a reasonable priority. We looked over the ground and I finally decided that I did not want to write those articles at that time and the whole thing was dropped.

Mr. Keefe: Where were those conversations held, here in Washington?

Mr. Grew: Well, -- the talks about the diary?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Yes.

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Mr. Grew: I think so.

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Mr. Keefe: What volumes of your diary did you submit to him?

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Mr. Grew: I couldn't possibly tell you, Mr. Congressman. I wouldn't remember.

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Mr. Keefe: Do you wish to say that Colliers Weekly categorically did or did not refuse to publish an article because of the deletions which appeared in your diary?

11

Mr. Grew: I don't recollect any such decision now.

12

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Mr. Keefe: Well, would you say that that decision was not reached or that you just do not remember?

14

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Mr. Grew: I haven't thought of that incident. It is at least three years ago now. As far as I can recollect the matter Colliers never abandoned the idea completely. I think I just didn't go ahead with it. I don't recollect that Colliers definitely declined to publish. No, I don't recollect that.

17

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Mr. Keefe: Will you answer this question, please:

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21

Was it your intention to personally write the diary or did Colliers suggest that you go over it with an editorial writer that would shape up the material?

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Mr. Grew: I think the idea was that certain parts could be taken out and possibly an editorial writer might go over

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Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 them and write up something for me.

3 Mr. Keefe: Did you discuss the matter with any editorial
4 writer of *Colliers Weekly*?

5 Mr. Grew: Only in a very general way. We never got down
6 to details.

7 Mr. Keefe: What editorial writer of *Colliers* did you
8 discuss the matter with?

9 Mr. Grew: That was that gentleman whose name escapes me.
10 I can't recollect it. I believe he died last year. I can't
11 remember his name.

12 Mr. Keefe: What specific reason do you now ascribe for
13 failing to go on and having *Colliers* publish the diary?

14 Mr. Grew: Well, I can't remember exactly the reasons.
15 In the first place, I was exceedingly busy. I was making
16 speeches all over the country. And I dare say that at that
17 time I possibly was thinking of a book, in which case it
18 would have been better not to do a series of articles. I
19 think that was the idea, that I was proposing to bring out
20 this book and therefore that I did not wish to go ahead with
21 the articles.

22 Mr. Keefe: How many volumes of your diary did you turn
23 over to *Colliers* to inspect?

24 Mr. Grew: I don't remember whether I turned over the
25 actual volumes or not. I had copies of various parts of the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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diary which I think I showed them. Whether I showed them the volumes or not I don't know.

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Questions by Mr. Keefe

Witness Grew:

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Mr. Keefe: You just do not recall?

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Mr. Grew: No, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Well, then, after you decided, or it was decided, whatever the fact may be, that you were not going to have Collier's publish this series of articles, to whom did you next submit your material for publication?

8

9

Mr. Grew: To whom did I next submit my material for publication?

10

11

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

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Mr. Grew: I then decided to go ahead with the book and I decided to put it in the hands of Messrs. Simon & Schuster of New York and Mr. Quincy Howe, one of their foremost editors whom I knew personally, went over the diary with me and helped me pick --

16

17

Mr. Keefe: Now, you submitted your complete diary to Mr. Quincy Howe, did you not?

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Mr. Grew: At one time he had it, yes.

21

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Mr. Keefe: Yes. And he went through it for the purpose of editing this book, did he not?

23

24

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Mr. Grew: That is correct.

Mr. Keefe: And he prepared the material that went into this book, "Ten Years in Japan"?

Mr. Grew: No, he did not prepare it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, he put it together?

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr Keefe

2 Mr. Grew: Well, he made suggestions as to passages that
3 might be used and it was up to me to decide whether they
4 should be used or not. In the last analysis I had this con-
5 siderable amount of material and I decided what I wanted pub-
6 lished and what was published.

7 Mr. Keefe: Well, you supervised it, Mr. Grew, I think.

8 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

9 Mr. Keefe: He actually drew up a manuscript, did he
10 not?

11 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

12 Mr. Keefe: That is, under your supervision?

13 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

14 Mr. Keefe: And before publication could be had of that
15 manuscript it had to be taken down to the State Department
16 and cleared there, did it not?

17 Mr. Grew: As I said the other day, Mr. Congressman, in
18 wartime everything which is published by an officer of the
19 government is supposed to be considered by a Publication Com-
20 mittee which then existed in the Department of State.

21 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, I understand that, of course.
22 It is a simple question. It was submitted regardless of
23 reason, to the State Department?

24 Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

25 Mr. Keefe: And the reason was that we were at war and

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 they had a right to see what was being published.

3 Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

4 Mr. Keefe: Now, then, when this original manuscript
5 was prepared by Mr. Howe as the editor in charge of this,
6 working for you and for Simon & Schuster, it was submitted
7 to the State Department and there were suggestions for dele-
8 tions from this manuscript, were there not?

9 Mr. Grew: There we re.

10 Mr. Keefe: And a new manuscript was prepared with the
11 deletions?

12 Mr. Grew: I do not remember whether a new manuscript
13 was prepared or whether the original manuscript was simply
14 clipped. I dare say that the original manuscript was clipped
15 of the passages which I determined to cut out and that manu-
16 script was sent back to the publishers.

17 Mr. Keefe: Do you remember what the deletions were about?

18 Mr. Grew: Well, as I said the other day, they were about
19 a variety of things. Some of the deletions were taken out at
20 my own initiative because I had prepared more material than
21 could be comprised in the kind of book that my publishers
22 wished to bring out. Therefore, that material had to be
23 materially cutt down.

24 In fact, when the original manuscripts were prepared
25 there were a good many passages in there marked "out", to be

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

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considered as to whether there was room for them or not and, if so, whether they would fit in with the type of book I was going to publish. A good many of those passages I cut out myself.

It was suggested by the committee, and I remember no demand on their part at all, but suggested that certain passages might well be omitted because they might embarrass or possibly even injure or endanger individuals during war time, that they might be misinterpreted by foreign governments, passages of all kinds of natures which were cut out for one reason or another, but mostly of that kind.

Mr. Keefe: Do you remember, Mr. Grew, that after the second revision of this manuscript had been prepared that the story of the death march on Bataan was published in this country?

Mr. Grew: Well, I do not recollect the precise chronology of that. I remember very well that the story on the death march in Bataan was published in this country.

Mr. Keefe: And didn't the publication of that story precipitate the necessity for further revision of your manuscript and wasn't it revised after that story was published?

Mr. Grew: Not to my recollection whatsoever. I do not think that that had anything whatsoever to do with it.

Mr. Keefe: Well, do you want to state categorically that

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 it did not have anything to do with it?

3 Mr. Grew: No.

4 Mr. Keefe: Or that you just do not remember?

5 Mr. Grew: I frankly do not remember.

6 Mr. Keefe: All right.

7 Mr. Grew: I do not believe it had anything to do with it.

8 The Chairman: Did you finish your answer?

9 Mr. Keefe: I thought he said he had finished. Had you
10 finished?

11 Mr. Grew: I finished sir, yes.

12 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, now, in order to prepare this
13 book under those circumstances it was necessary at least for
14 Mr. Quincy Howe to have the benefit of reading your entire
15 diary, was it not?

16 Mr. Grew: He had the benefit of reading the diary, yes,
17 sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: And he is a reputable man, is he not?

19 Mr. Grew: He is a completely reputable man.

20 Mr. Keefe: And you would believe him, would you not?

21 Mr. Grew: I certainly would, otherwise I certainly would
22 not have intrusted the diary to him.

23 Mr. Keefe: Now, do you know how many other people in the
24 office of Simon & Schuster had access to your diary besides
25 Mr. Quincy Howe?

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Grew: I doubt very much if anybody did.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well, he was up in New York, wasn't he?

4 Mr. Grew: Mr. Howe was in New York, yes.

5 Mr. Keefe: And the diary was with him?

6 Mr. Grew: That is right.

7 Mr. Keefe: And you were here in Washington and out on
8 the road making speeches?

9 Mr. Grew: That is perfectly correct.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, you cannot say how many people could
11 have had access to this diary then, can you?

12 Mr. Grew: Well, I cannot tell you categorically but I
13 know that Mr. Quincy Howe is a man of such reputability that
14 he would not have for a moment left the diary in a position
15 where other people could have access to it.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, would you have any objections to Mr.
17 Howe testifying here as a witness as to the material that was
18 cut out of this manuscript?

19 Mr. Grew: Well, that comes right down, I think, to the
20 question originally brought up as to whether I am not within
21 my rights in claiming that the diary itself was of a personal
22 and private nature; that I have produced in my book the per-
23 tinent material which I think would be helpful to this com-
24 mittee; that I have looked through the diary for the months
25 preceding Pearl Harbor and have found nothing further that I

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 think would be pertinent to this committee.

3 The question arises on that basis if I am not justified
4 in regarding the rest of the diary as a personal and private
5 document. I feel very strongly on that point myself.

6 The Chairman: Well, the chair might suggest that regard-
7 less of Mr. Grew's attitude or his willingness or unwilling-
8 ness for Mr. Quincy Howe to testify about this personal
9 diary, it may be a matter, after all, for the committee to
10 determine whether it would call Mr. Howe to testify about
11 that.

12 Mr. Grew: Undoubtedly it would be, Mr. Chairman, yes.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the gentleman
14 from Wisconsin if he feels that Mr. Quincy Howe would shed
15 any light on the Pearl Harbor investigation and whether we
16 should call him as a witness?

17 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Chairman, I object to those kinds
18 of interjections. I am acting in good faith.

19 The Chairman: The chair hopes that the committee will
20 not get into a discussion over Mr. Quincy Howe at this stage
21 of the proceeding, so go ahead, Congressman, with your in-
22 quiry.

23 Mr. Keefe: I am not asking foolish questions. I am
24 trying to ascertain some facts and pertinent facts, pertinent
25 to this inquiry.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 The Chairman: Go ahead.

3 Mr. Keefe: Who is Mr. Stanley Hornbeck?

4 Mr. Grew: Mr. Stanley Hornbeck from 1928 to 1937 was
5 Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in the Depart-
6 ment of State and in 1937 he was appointed political adviser
7 in the Department of State. He was later, some time in the
8 past year, made Ambassador to the Netherlands and so far as
9 I know he is now at The Hague.

10 Mr. Keefe: I would like to ask the counsel at this time
11 is it expected to call Mr. Hornbeck as a witness here?

12 Mr. Mitchell: He is not so far on our list of witnesses
13 and nobody has asked to have him placed on it.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, I am making that request very defin-
15 itely now, that I would like to have Mr. Hornbeck as a wit-
16 ness. He was in charge of the Far Eastern branch in the De-
17 partment of State all through these critical times, as I
18 understand it.

19 Mr. Grew: Well, he was Chief of the Far Eastern Divi-
20 sion, which handles Far Eastern affairs, only up to 1937 and
21 after that he was political adviser, although he was still
22 closely in touch with Far Eastern affairs.

23 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

24 Mr. Gesell: It may be of some help to the Congressman.
25 We have been trying to find out what Mr. Hornbeck's schedule

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Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

is. He is in Holland at the present time. We were hoping if he was planning to come to this country during the time the committee would be in session that we could consider his availability then.

Senator Brewster: Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it should be said in that connection that the committee have been assured that anyone anywhere in the world who could help in this situation would be available, so that I do not think it is material as to whether he is in Holland or not.

The Chairman: I have no doubt that if Mr. Hornbeck's testimony is desired here that he will be available even if he has to be brought back from Holland.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I conceive, Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon me, that Mr. Hornbeck is a very important witness in connection with the very things that we are going over and I think Mr. Grew will agree with that, that he ought to have plenty of information.

Mr. Grew: I agree completely.

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

The Chairman: All right.

Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact did you discuss Mr. Hornbeck at all in your diary?

Senator Lucas: Probably some Senators, too.

Mr. Keefe: That may be an unfair question. I will

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 withdraw it.

3 Mr. Grew: All right. As a matter of fact, I have no
4 recollection on that point, Mr. Congressman.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, I will try to refresh your recollection
6 at the proper time, which is not now. It will be at the
7 proper time, on many of these things, I assure you.

8 Now, here is one last question that I want to interro-
9 gate you on.

10 I have in my mind some place out of this mass of water-
11 ial that is hurled at you, it is hard to put your hands on
12 it immediately, that at a time prior to the outbreak of war
13 in Europe in 1939 there was a memoranda submitted to the
14 State Department with reference to a proposal made at that
15 time by Japan for a meeting of the Great Powers, quite a long
16 memorandum. I wonder whether you have knowledge of that pro-
17 posal of the Japanese.

18 Mr. Grew: Can you tell me, Mr. Congressman, whether
19 that proposal was made by Baron Hiramuna as Prime Minister?

20 Mr. Keefe: Well, it is a proposal that I am advised does
21 not appear in any of these documents but that is presently
22 in the archives of the State Department. It was a proposal
23 which embodied a proposal by the Japs for a conference of
24 the Great Powers to be held in an effort to try to avert the
25 outbreak of war in Europe. Do you recall that?

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Grew: I am inclined to believe that that may have
3 been a proposal which was made by Baron Hiramuna, then Prime
4 Minister of Japan, to Mr. Doonan when I was at home in the
5 United States on leave of absence in 1939 and he was charge
6 d'affaires. That is my impression. I think he could answer
7 that question better than I could.

8 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, right --

9 The Chairman: When was it?

10 Mr. Keefe: In 1939.

11 Senator Ferguson: Might I suggest that I brought that
12 question up yesterday and asked you about it? I had the
13 date of May or some time in 1939 and you were going to look
14 that up. I think it is the same thing that the Congressman
15 is talking about. That is the same point, is it?

16 Well, what he is asking refreshes my memory that it is
17 the same point. You have in the book here a memorandum but
18 not covering the particular point covered in the memorandum
19 that I had in mind. It was a specific proposal some time in
20 the spring of 1939 or summer, it was around in May.

21 Mr. Grew: Is there any indication in the record that
22 that proposal was made to me? Because I am inclined to
23 think it was a proposal which was made to Mr. --

24 Senator Ferguson: It may not have been made to you but
25 coming through the Embassy you would have notice of it if

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Keefe

2 Dooman knew about it.

3 Mr. Grew: I think that took place when I was absent. I
4 am not sure of it.

5 Senator Ferguson: I am sure you were in Tokyo in May
6 because the book indicates on page 1 of Volume II, in May
7 1939 it indicates that you were in Tokyo.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, it was in 1939.

9 Mr. Grew: Well, I will look into that also, Senator.
10 It is possible it is being looked into now, but if it is a
11 fact that this was a proposal made to Mr. Dooman while
12 charge d'affaires I might prefer to have him elaborate the
13 point than to try to do it myself, if it is agreeable to the
14 committee.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Counselor, on that point, is it
16 proposed to have Mr. Dooman called as a witness?

17 Mr. Gesell: He is not on the list of witnesses.

18 Mr. Keefe: Well, I would like to have him put on the
19 list because he is a very important witness.

20 The Chairman: Well, the chair would like to remind the
21 Senators that when the committee was discussing the addition
22 of other witnesses to those that were listed it was general-
23 ly understood that any member of the committee could suggest
24 to counsel and to the committee any additional witnesses on
25 any subject and that in some way the committee would consider

1 Witness Grew:

2 what the witness would testify to in order to determine
3 whether his testimony was material.

4 Now, that might be regarded as a technical point, but it
5 was discussed in the committee in executive session. I
6 think we might keep that in mind.

7 Mr. Keefe: Well, I have that in mind, Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman: Yes.

9 Mr. Keefe: But may I say this: I would not for one
10 moment ask to have someone called here who I did not feel
11 from the search and examination of the records that I have
12 made up to date could not throw relevant and pertinent light
13 upon this inquiry.

14 We have already talked about Mr. Dooman and the message
15 is in the record here, one of the messages.

16 Now, referring to the Senator from Michigan, he is re-
17 ferring to a very important communication that was sent to
18 the State Department, I believe, during the time that you
19 were on furlough, Mr. Grew, and while Mr. Dooman was in
20 charge of the Embassy in Japan.

21 Mr. Grew: That is probably so.

22 The Chairman: The chair is not suggesting anything to
23 the contrary of that.

24 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

1 Witness Grew:

2 Senator Brewster: Perhaps this is the appropriate time
3 to point out that there are many questions of procedure, the
4 calling of witnesses, the order of witnesses, which must be
5 determined from time to time.

6 I fully agree with the chairman that those questions
7 should be the subject of committee consideration and I think
8 it would be well if it were in a somewhat less public forum
9 than this, but as I must remind the chairman, we have not
10 been called together for the consideration of any questions
11 of this character for some time and the result has been that
12 the only way we can make suggestions is when the committee
13 is in public convention assembled.

14 The Chairman: The chair did not mean to suggest any ob-
15 jection in making these suggestions in public as to wit-
16 nesses, but we have a long list of witnesses who were ar-
17 ranged for by counsel through consultation with the committee
18 and the chair simply had in mind until we have made a little
19 more progress in exhausting the list which has already been
20 prepared and submitted to the committee, that we have ample
21 time to consider what other witnesses would be called later;
22 but, of course, the chair has no objection whatever to putting
23 Mr. Dooman's name on the list and having him called at some
24 appropriate time when he is here.

25 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the state-

1 Witness Grew:

2 ment. There are two things right now which it seems to me
3 invite consideration. One is the suggestion which has been
4 made to change the order of witnesses insofar as Mr. Hamil-
5 ton is concerned; and, second, in view of the announcement
6 regarding General Marshall I think that there should be im-
7 mediate consideration of whether or not, if he is to testify--

8 The Chairman: That is a --

9 Senator Brewster: May I finish?

10 The Chairman: Yes. I wanted to say something. General
11 Marshall is under consideration at the present time.

12 Senator Brewster: Fine.

13 The Chairman: We have got to consult with him as to when
14 he proposes to leave Washington.

15 Senator Brewster: I suggest this because I think that
16 is obviously an important matter. If General Marshall is
17 to leave shortly, I think we ought to suspend everything
18 on the order of the hearing.

19 The Chairman: That is being considered and General
20 Marshall is being consulted about it. All right, Mr. Keefe.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, Mr. Chairman, I have no further ques-
22 tions to ask at this time of Mr. Grew, but I would like to
23 suggest this to counsel: I would like to have him produce
24 and obtain, if possible, the message or memoranda prepared
25 by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1st, 1941. I understand that it

Witness Grew:

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2 is addressed to the Army and Navy and has reference to the
3 condition of the Army and Navy at that time. Will you
4 kindly see if that message can be obtained?

5 Mr. Mitchell: We have made a note of it.

6 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I make one request?

7 The Chairman: Wait until we get this one disposed of.
8 Counsel has made a note of it and that document will be
9 sought. Congressman Murphy?

10 Mr. Murphy: I would like to make a request of the Navy
11 to prepare a statement as to when we established the port
12 and base of Pearl Harbor and whether or not we continued
13 Pearl Harbor as our most important base in the Pacific after
14 December 7, 1941 until the present time for our fleet.

15 The Chairman: Mr. Gesell will take note of that.

16 Mr. Gesell: Yes.

17 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, is Captain Kramer on
18 the witness list?

19 The Chairman: At two different times.

20 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn I would
21 like to introduce into the record a series of five docu-
22 ments which were distributed to the committee two weeks ago,
23 between the dates of April and December 1941, reporting
24 conversations in South America held by Japanese represent-
25 atives with representatives of the governments of Peru,

Witness Grew:

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2 Brazil, Dominican Republic, Chile, and so forth, concerning
3 the attitude of those governments in the event Japan were
4 to declare war against the United States and I think this
5 series, which is all related, might be designated --

6 The Chairman: The committee and spectators will please
7 be in order. We have not yet recessed.

8 Mr. Gesell: I think this exhibit might be designated
9 31 for the record.

10 The Chairman: Those articles or exhibits will be filed
11 under documentation No. 31.

12 (THE DOCUMENT ABOVE REFERRED TO WAS MARKED
13 EXHIBIT NO. 31)

14 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

16 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, has there been a change
17 in the calling of witnesses for the near future?

18 The Chairman: The chair is not aware of any change.

19 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, I think there has been one
20 change indicated by our memorandum to the members of the
21 committee indicating that we had felt under the circum-
22 stances it more appropriate to call General Miles, Admiral
23 Wilkinson, Admiral Turner and General Gerow prior to calling
24 certain witnesses scheduled prior to those officers, who
25 were in subordinate positions, our thought being to call

1 the heads of the various units, war plans and intelligence
2 and then following them with the witnesses that have been
3 scheduled before.

4 We had also hoped that in view of the very detailed State
5 Department inquiry which we have had over the last few days
6 that we could dispense with calling Mr. Hamilton at this
7 time. Mr. Hamilton was originally scheduled when it was
8 thought that Mr. Hull would not be able to give as much time
9 as he has to the committee and before Mr. Grew and Mr. Welles
10 were added to the list of witnesses and we feel that those
11 responsible officials have been in the best position to cover
12 the matters of interest to the committee.

13 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I inquire then
14 what the new order will be so that we might prepare?

15 Mr. Gesell: As indicated in the memo handed to the com-
16 mittee at the end of last week, General Miles and Admiral
17 Wilkinson will be the next two witnesses, followed by Ad-
18 miral Turner and General Gerow.

19 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I would ask that if
20 there is to be a change in the order, recognizing the con-
21 secutive character of the presentation of the State Depart-
22 ment and the diplomatic corps, that it should be considered
23 by the committee. I think it is a matter of considerable
24 importance, the appropriate order in which witnesses are to
25 be called.

1 Witness Grew:

2 The Chairman: The chair will remind members of the com-
3 mittee that when the list of witnesses was originally sub-
4 mitted by counsel it was stated that it did not represent the
5 order in which they would appear and, also, counsel stated
6 that they would attempt to give the committee and the press
7 and the public two or three days notice of witnesses that
8 would appear on any given day. That course has up to now,
9 I think, been followed and the notice that we got at the end
10 of last week with respect to General Miles, Admiral Wilkin-
11 son and the others, as I understood it was in compliance with
12 that understanding.

13 Mr. Gesell: We have had this problem. I am sure the
14 members of the committee recognize this. We have had this
15 problem in scheduling witnesses: We have had to bring re-
16 sponsible officers in from active theatres and we are anx-
17 ious not to keep them in Washington any longer than neces-
18 sary, so that they can return to their posts.

19 Senator Brewster: You are not applying that to General
20 Miles, are you?

21 Mr. Gesell: No, I am not applying that to General Miles,
22 although I do not believe he is stationed here.

23 The Chairman: Are there any further questions that
24 counsel wish to ask Mr. Grew?

25 Senator Ferguson: I have a question that I spoke to him

1 Witness Grew:

2 about the --

3 The Chairman: I was speaking to the counsel first.

4 Mr. Gesell: No, Mr. Chairman.

5 The Chairman: Any other questions desired by members of
6 the committee?

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

8 Senator Brewster: I have one or two I would like to
9 ask.

10 The Chairman: Well, it is now after four o'clock. The
11 chair had hoped that we might finish with Mr. Grew today,
12 but it is entirely up to the committee whether it wants to
13 adjourn now or continue.

14 Senator Ferguson: I just have one question that I was
15 not able to find the citation for this morning and I have
16 it now.

17 The Chairman: Well, if we could finish --

18 Senator Brewster: I have two or three questions. I
19 do not know that they will take any extended time.

20 The Chairman: What is the wish of the committee about
21 proceeding?

22 Senator Ferguson: I move to proceed.

23 Senator Brewster: What is the position of Mr. Grew as
24 to returning in the morning?

25 Mr. Grew: I am entirely at the disposal of the com-

Witness Grew:

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2 mittee, Senator. I will be glad to come back.

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4 Senator Brewster: Well, I suggest this, that in view
5 of the very extended examination of Mr. Grew that he might
6 like to think the thing over a little himself and I am sure
7 perhaps some of the rest of us would and perhaps get our
8 questions in a form that would reduce rather than increase
9 the time. I personally prefer to adjourn.

9

10 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could I just suggest
11 one thing?

11

12 The Chairman: Yes, Senator.

12

13 Senator Ferguson: I would like to call attention to the
14 memorandum that was given to us on November 24th as follow-
15 ing the State Department, the next series. That did not in-
16 dicate, as I understand it, that Mr. Hamilton was not to
17 be called. Could I show that to counsel and ask if that is
18 the memorandum?

18

19 Mr. Gesell: That is the memorandum. I think I made
20 clear that our point with respect to Mr. Hamilton was one
21 that we were advancing to the committee at this time.

21

22 Senator Ferguson: Oh, at this particular moment?

22

23 Mr. Gesell: That is right.

23

24 Senator Brewster: Well, then there have been no previous
25 suggestions to the committee on that.

25

Mr. Gesell: That is right.

Witness Grew:

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2 The Chairman: Well, suppose we recess until ten o'clock
3 tomorrow morning. You be back at ten o'clock tomorrow morn-
4 ing, Mr. Grew.

5 Mr. Grew: I will be here with pleasure at ten o'clock
6 tomorrow morning.

7 The Chairman: I hope the committee can conclude with
8 you tomorrow.

9 (Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock P.M., Wednesday, Novem-
10 ber 28, 1945, an adjournment was taken until 10:00 o'clock
11 A.M., Thursday, November 29, 1945.)

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