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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**

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被告訊問調書

東京 一九四六年（昭和二十一年）四月二日

予東京國際軍事裁判所ソヴェート社會主義共和國聯邦側副檢  
事陸軍大佐エスヤールローゼンブリットハ通譯官陸軍少佐バシニコフスキーク  
カ下ニ被告トシテ下記者ヲ訊問セリ。

被告陳述

一、姓名 大島 浩

二、年令 一八八六年出生

三、拘引前携ハル職務、ベルリン駐在日本大使

四、所屬政黨 政黨ニ所屬セス

五、住所 東京巢鴨拘置所

虚偽通譯ヲ爲シタルトキトルベキ通譯者ノ責任トシテハソレニ関スル署名ヲ訊  
問調書ニ添附セラレタル

訊問ハ日本語ニヨリ行ハル

問 答

ドイツに於ケル貴下外交活動の白所ヲ述ベラレタイ。

予ハ一九二二年十月獨逸到着セリ一九二四年五月ベルリン駐在大使館附陸軍武官ニ任セラレタリ。一九三八年十月迄ソノ職ニ在リタリソノ後大使ニ任命セラレ一九三九年十月迄ソノ職ニ在リタリ以後退官シ又一九四一年二月ヨリ一九四五年五月迄再度ベルリン駐在大使タリ。

問 答

貴下、最后、官等級ハ

陸軍中將ナリ此ノ官等ヲ予ハ大使職ニ任命セラル直前受ケタリ。大使タル共ニ予ハ予備陸軍中將トサレタ。

問 答

日ソ關係ニ對スル貴下ノ觀點如何

一九二四年予ゲ陸軍武官職ニ就タ時ハ丁度滿洲事變ニ續ク時期デアッタ。シベリアノ狀況ハ不穩デアッタ。予ハ日ソ間ノ紛争ハ如何ナルモモコレヲ避クベキナルト個人的ニ考ヘテナタ。蓋シ吾々ハ滿洲ニ於ケル平穩ヲ必要トシテナタカラテアルソノ當時予ハソノグニキト陸軍武官、レメテエフト會ツタ。彼ハ後ニ陸軍中將ノ稱号ヲトリ參謀本部ニ勤務シタ。彼ハ私ガ吾々ハ滿洲平穩ヲ志シサネバナラヌト常ニ云ツテナタコトヲ保證スル旨デアリ予ハ彼ト中立地帯ノ設立及滿洲ニ於ケル紛争調整ニ關スル兩餘問題ト關シ會談ヲ交ハシタ。ソノ當時日本ニ於テハ貴下ニ極メテヨリ御存知デアラ

ソビエト聯邦と戦ヲ不可避ナモト考ヘルグループが在ワタノデア  
 アルコレイノハ予ハ噂ヲ知ワタレアルが予自身ハコノ見地ニ立タナ  
 カツタ

問 貴下活動中、貴下が個人的に日間戦ヲ不可避ナモト考  
 ヘタ時期ゴゾクカ。

答 予外交活動ノ全期間ヲ通ジテ予ハ滿洲ニ於ケル平和ヲ確  
 保スル爲メ日本ハソビエト聯邦ト友好關係ヲ維持セシメバ  
 ナラズトイフ見解ヲ持シテ居タ。

問 ソレハ對ソビエト聯邦共同鬪争ノ爲メ獨日軍事同盟  
 設立ニ組織的ニ向ケラレタ貴下活動ヲ何ニ依テ説明  
 セントスルカ解ラナイデハナイカ。

答 予ハ既ニ予活動凡テヲ通ジテ予ガ持シ来ッタ根本方針  
 ハ日露間友好關係保持方針デアリ而シテ獨日軍事  
 同盟締結ニ関スル予活動ハソビエト聯邦ト戦フニ至ラシ  
 メルトイフ方向デナク、戰ヲ避ケルトイフ方向ニ向ケラレテナク、獨  
 逸ト條約締結ノ方法ニ依リ吾々ソビエト聯邦ト戦フコト  
 ナカラント希ダ、ソノ後予ハソビエト聯邦ト中立條約締結  
 ノ積極的支持者デアッタシ爾後引續キテ中立條約ヲ

支持シテ、當事ルリンニ在リタ。貴國東京駐在大使スター

ニハ、保證サレル筈ナルガ予ハソウエト聯邦ト中立條約締  
結爲ニ辯ラナシタベルリン在住最初日本人デアッタ。

リヘントワ。プガ一九三九年八月ソウエト聯邦ヲ訪問シテ  
予ハ彼ニソウエト聯邦ト條約ヲ締結スル様勸告シタ。

問 從ツテ貴下ハ親ソ家デアッタトイフカ。

答 予ハ吾國ニトツテハソウエト聯邦ト戰ヲ避ケル方が有利デ  
アルト考ヘタ。予ハ自己ヲ親ソ家トハ呼ビ兼ネルガ然シテ予  
ノ態度ハソウエト聯邦ト友好關係保持ノ方向ニ向ケラ  
レニタタ。

問 一九三九一四十年ニ於ケル貴下外交活動ノ中絶ハ何ニヨリテ  
招来セラレタカ。

答 予外交活動中絶ハコノ時期ニ獨日間ノ關係が變化シ  
タコトニ依リ招来セラレタ。コノ時期ニ獨逸ハソウエト聯邦  
ト中立條約ヲ締結シテコトニ依リ獨逸ハ三國同盟ニ依  
リテ結ハレタ關係ヲ破ツタ。

問 ソレデハ貴下ガ外交官職ヨリ退イタハ一九三九年八月ノ獨ソ  
條約締結ニ關聯ガアルカ。

答

私が一九三九年外交官職ヨリ退いたハ獨逸ハソノ時ソノ外交方針ヲ激シク變更シ從フテ又予ガソレニ於テ實施シ来タ仕事ハ所期ノ効果ヲ治メ得ナカッタトイフコトニ關聯スルモノデアワタリソノ時予ハ直々ニ日本政府ニヒケテ日本政府ハ出来得ル限リ速カニソヴィエト聯邦ト中立條約ヲ締結セシメバナラヌナル旨打電シタ。予ハ更ニ次ノ事情ヲ附加シ度イソレハ獨逸ハカクモ激シクソノ日本ニ關スル政策ヲ變更シ且ソノコトニ就テ大使タル予ニ豫メ報知シテカワタリソノ爲予ヲ困難ニ立場ニ置キ予ハソノ後大使ノ職ニ留ルヲ得ナカッタトイデアリ。貴下ガベルリン駐在大使ノ地位ヨリ退イタコトハ貴下ガモスクワニ於テソヴィエト聯邦ノ仇トシテ又防共協定締結ニ際シ積極的ノ役割ヲ演ジタ人物トシテ有名デアワタリテソヴィエト社會主義共和國聯邦ノ側ニ組スル<sup>(味ニスル)</sup>獨逸ノ激シイ政策轉換ガ行ハレタ後貴下ヲベルリンニ殘スハ獨逸ニトワテエ合ハ悪イコトデアワタリトイフコトニ依リ招來サレタノデハナイカ。

問

答

答否ソノデハナイト予ハ考ヘル。當時予ハ獨逸ガソヴィエト聯邦ト不可侵條約ヲ締結スルノニ對シテ何ノ反對モナカッタ。予トシテハ日本ハ獨逸ノコノ態度ニ合同シ同ジクソヴィエト聯

問 邦ト同シヤウナ條約ヲ締結セネバナラヌト考ヘテ我外務省ニ行ケバ予ガ眞實ヲ述ベテナルコトノ證據ヲ發見シ得ル筈デアル其處ニ獨ソ不可侵條約締結ノ日ニ送ツテ電報ガ在ルニ違ヒテ、ソノ中デテハソウキト聯邦ト不可侵條約ヲ締結スルコトガ日本ニトツテ不可缺ナルコトニ就テ書イタ。

問 何が具體的ニ獨ソ條約締結後貴下ヲ大使トシテベルリンニ殘スラ不可能ニシタカ。

答 私ガ大使地位カラ退イタ原因ヲ理解スルタメハ或ル國ニ於ケル政策方針ノ變更ニ伴フテ當該國駐在ノ大使モツテ更迭セシレルトイフ日本ノ慣習ヲ知ル必要ガアルソノ際獨日問ニ對ソ軍事同盟締結關スル交渉が行ハレタ然ルニ獨逸ハ突然予ニ報告スルコトナク、全テノ以前ノ政策ノ敷ニイテ變更アルソウキト聯邦ト不可侵條約ヲ締結シタハアルコトニ對シ後予ハ大使地位ニ留ルニテハ出来カクテソレテ解職ヲ願ツテアル併シ本質ニ於テハ予ハ獨ソ不可侵條約締結ニ反對デハナクワテ、而シテ自身ソウキト聯邦ト不可侵條約締結ヲ日本政府ニ對シ主張シサヘシタ。

問 一九〇四年貴下ヘルリンニ於ケル外交活動ヘ復歸ハ何ニ依



リ招来セラレタカ。

答

三國同盟が締結セラレタコト又事實上予が以前表示セル政策へ復歸ガナサレタコトヨリ予ハ再び駐在大使復歸シタニテアル。

問

ソリ、ソレハ一九四〇年三國同盟締結後獨逸ガモソソウキート聯邦ヲ攻撃スル決心ヲシ對ソ鬪争ヲ目的トスル枢軸國家聯合ヲ結集シタコトト關聯スルノカ

答

本條約締結ノ當時ハ獨逸政治家ノヅキート友好ニ關スル言ク、保證ガマツタコト當時ノ獨關係改善ガ看取セラレタ。

問

予ハ公式保證ニテ、他方ハ現實政策ニテアル。次様ニ若干ノ事實ヲ想起セラレタイ。即チ一九四〇年七月十八日ヨロトル將軍ハレイヘンスハールニ國防部ノ將校ヲ集ムソノ席上最初ニソグキト聯邦攻撃計畫ノ作成任務ヲ課シタ。一九四〇年八月獨逸總司令部ハ事實上ノヅキート聯邦攻撃用ノ兵器庫ニテアル東方建設命令ヲ發シタ。貴下ハ勿論コレヲ知ワテイタカ

答

此等ノ事實ハ予ニ明ラカデナカッタ。何トナレバ此等ノ事實ハ一九四〇年ノコトニヨリ、當私ハ一九四一年一月七日ニベルリンニ再米ニタリテアルソノ當時予ノ實際活動ガ對ノ關係改善ノ方向ニ向

## 問 答

ケラレテオタニトノ證據トシテ一九四一年四月ソグット聯邦トノ不可  
 侵條約ガ締結セラル、近予ハ日本政府ニ對シテ獨逸並ニソグ  
 ート聯邦トノ條約締結ヲ根氣強ク主張シテオタトイフ事情  
 ヲ引用スルコトガ出来ルコトニ就テハ予ハ東京駐在ソグット  
 聯邦大使スマイニン、並ビニ東京駐在獨逸大使オトトニ語  
 夕、彼等ハ私ノ態度ガ日ノ關係、改善ノ方向ニ向ケラレテオタト  
 トラコトヲ保證シ得ル筈デアル。

一九三六年十月五日防共協定締結沿革ヲ語ラレ度イ。

一九三五年四月アワタカ予、許ニ獨逸航空機工場ハインケルノ  
 代表者ハツフ某ナル者ガ来タツタ。ハインケル工場ハ日本ハソカラ  
 航空機及他ノ航空機部品ヲ買ツテオタテ關係ガアツタ。  
 ハク氏ハ予ニ個人的ニ日本軍部ハ獨逸條約締結ヲ  
 如何ニ視テアルカラウカト尋ネタ。予ハ如何ナル條約ノ話シヲ  
 シテアルノウト尋ネタ。ハク氏ハ予ニ軍事防衛同盟ヲ考ヘ  
 ニ入レテアルト答ヘタ。予ハ彼ニソレハトモ不可能ヲアラウトイウ  
 私見ヲ開陳シタ。當時予ハ日獨軍事同盟、締結ハ  
 例ヘシレガ防禦的性質ノモノデアルモソレガ日本ガ歐洲  
 問題ニ容喙スルコトヲ不可避ニスル基トナルモノデ日本ニソレハ

不利ナモノデアルトウ意見デアワタ。ソ後モハツクハ獨日條約  
 締結可能性ニ就テ深ク探リ續ケタ。ソ時私ニ別規準、  
 即チ二國中何チ一國ガ露西亞ト戦フ場合ニ他ノ戦ハサル國ハ露  
 西亞ヲ援助シナイトウ。獨日條約ヲ締結スルコトハ出来ナイカトイフ  
 考カ浮ダ。予ガコト考ヘラ。ヒク氏ニ述ベトコロ。彼ハ日本ノ軍部  
 ハコレニ關シテドウ考ヘテキルカタ知リタイト私ニ願フタ。彼ノ軍ノ  
 意向ニ關心ヲ抱キタ。ハ日本ニ於テハ全テノ斯ク、如キ問題ニハ  
 先ツ第一ニ軍ガ携ハツタカテルソコテ予ハ個人的ニハツク氏ト  
 ノ會談ノ経緯ヲ私信中ニ述ベ參謀本部ニ照會シタ。ソコ  
 デ一九三五年十二月デアツカ。吾參謀本部ハ獨逸ニ於テソノ  
 様ニ條約爲ノ意見ガ在ルハ實際ノコトカドウカ及ビソノ條  
 約ニ獨逸軍部ハ如何ニ處スデアラウカラ明カニスルタメ若松陸  
 軍大佐ト部付將校ヲヘルシンニ派遣シタ。若松陸軍大佐  
 ハ予列希下ニリソントロフ及ビゾムベルフ陸軍大臣ト會  
 談シタ。此等ノ會談カラ若松陸軍大佐ハ獨逸政界並  
 ビ軍部ハソノ様ニ條約締結ニ傾イテアルトイフ結論ヲ得タ。  
 コレニ就テハ私ハ既ニ述ベタガ。是等ノ會談ノ際ニ條約代ニ  
 共產主義ト闘争ノタメノ防共協定ノ締結ガ獨逸人ニ提

議サレタ。獨逸ハソノ及共條約ニ英佛ソノ他多數ノ國ヲ引込  
 モツトシタ。勿論防共協定ノ締結ハ軍ノコトデアラハナク寧ロ政府  
 並ビニ外務省ノ問題ナル。然シ防共協定ノ考ヘガ若松陸  
 軍大佐ガ行ワタ交渉ノ過程ニ發言サレタモ、デアルカケニ彼ハ日  
 本ニ歸ルトソノ政府ニ申言シタ。ソノコトヲ意見ハ採擇セラレタ。  
 以上ノコトガ防共協定ノ締結ニ導イタデアル

問 獨逸ガ日本トノ防禦的ノミテ攻撃的ノ完全ノ軍事同盟  
 盟ヲ欲シトイフ様ニ態度ハテカワタカ。

答 左様ニ態度ハテカワタカ。

問 ソリ獨逸ハ防衛條約ノミヲ欲シタカ。

答 ハコク氏最初提案ハ實際防衛同盟ノ締結ニ歸着  
 スル。然シ既ニ先ニ述ベタ如ク予個人トシテハソレヲ日本ニトワテ  
 不利ナモ、デアルト考ヘ左様ニ提案ハ及對デアワタカ。

問 防共協定<sup>締結</sup>ニ際シ獨逸ハ如何ナル根本目的ヲ定メタカ

答 獨日が防共協定締結之際之定メタキ根本目的トシテハ共產主義ノ發展ヲ引止メントスル也ガアツタ。

問 本條約ハ具體的ニ如何ナル國々ヲ目標トシタノカ。

答 本協定ノ締結ニ際シテ先ヅ第一ニ露西亞ヲ考慮シ中一入ルル旨決定セラレタ。ソノ外ニ協定ハ他國ヲモ含メテ共產主義熱力ノ擴大隊防ヲ豫見シテナク。

問 普通ソノ種ノ條約ハ思想ニ對スルモノデアラキ具體的ニ國家ニ對スルモノデアアル。防共協定ハソノ又ヲソウイフト聯邦ニ對シテ向ケタモノト解シテヨイカ。

答 防共協定ハ總体トシテ具體的ニ露西亞ヲ目標トシタモノデアラキ。ソレハ概シテ共產主義ヲ目標トシタモノデアアル。併シテコノ協定カラ露獨間ニ戰爭勃發ノ場合ニ日本ハ露西亞ヲ援助スル義務ガナカフタトイフ結論ガ出ル。同様ニ獨逸ハ

若シ露日間ニ戰ガ發生シタ場合ニモ露西亞ヲ援助スル義務ガナカフタ。

問 防共協定締結ノ交渉ハ日本側ノ誰カ行ヒ誰ガコノ條約ニ調印シタカ。

答 交渉ヲ行ヒコノ條約ニ調印シタハ獨逸駐在日本大使武者小路テアル。若松ガ防共協定締結ノ獨逸ノ提案ヲ日本軍部ニ上申シ軍部ハコレニ就テ政府ニ進言シタ。而シテコノ後ハ防共協定締結ニ關スル全テノ仕事ハ政府ニ依テ行ハレタ。政府機關ハ防共協定締結ニ關スル仕事ヲ一九三六年五月一日カラ始メタ。

問 一九四〇年九月ニテベルリンニ於ケル三國同盟締

結ノ経緯ヲ述ベラレ度イ。

答 予ハ當時ベルリン駐在大使デハナカッタデ一九四〇年九月  
二十七日以後ノ條約ニ直接ニ何ノ關係モナカッタ。併シ色々  
ノ人物トノ會話資料研究ヨリ予ニ明カテ處デハ本條約締  
結ニ關スル交渉ハ東京ニ於テ行ヒタガ。調印ソモハベルリンニ於  
テ行ヒタガ。コレヨリ先一九三八—一九三九年ニ日本獨逸伊太利  
間ニベルリンニ於テ軍事同盟締結ニ就テ、他ノ交渉カ行  
レタ。是等ノ交渉ハ一九三九年獨逸ガソヴェート聯邦ト  
不可侵條約ヲ締結シタ爲ニ世爲ニ終ツタ。

問 一九三八—一九三九年ノ日獨伊軍事同盟締結ニ就テノ交  
渉ノ経緯ヲ語ラレ度イ。

答 一九三八年日本ハ支那トノ軍事紛争ノ中ニアリ當時ノ  
日本ノ立場ハ容易トラザルモノデアッタ。

日本ハ支那事變ヲ外交的方途ニ依リ處理セントスル意  
向ヲ持ツタ。自己ノ政治的威信ヲ昂揚セシメタム。又  
同シク自己ヲ起リ得ベキ他國トノ紛争ヨリ安全ナラシムル  
タメニ(ソレハ當時日本軍ノ大部分ガ支那ニ在ッタダケニ日  
本ニトツテ全ク不可避デアッタ)日本政府ハ獨逸及伊太  
利ト軍事同盟ヲ締結スルニトウ考ヘ去シタ。一九三八年  
六月テアワタカ、予ノ許ニ日本參謀本部ヨリ獨逸ニ於  
テ日本トノ軍事同盟締結ノ可能性ヲ探ルヘキ任務  
ヲ予ニ課スル書類ガ到着シタ。ソノ同盟ノ機能ニ依リ  
若シソウイニート聯邦ガ日本ヲ攻撃シ来ル場合ニハ獨  
逸ハソウイニート聯邦ト開戦スル義務ヲ負ヒ反對ニソウイ

エートト聯邦が獨逸ヲ攻撃シ来ル場合ニ日本ハソヴェエト  
聯邦ト開戦スル義務ヲ負フノデアアル。

當時ノ大使館附陸軍武官デアツタマハ獨逸モコレ  
ニ類スル考ヲ持テアルカドウカヲ個人的探ル目的アリソベント  
ロフヲ訪問シタコソ際マハソベントロフニソ一日獨逸問  
條約締結ノ考ガ生ジタ。即チソノ權能ヨリ露西亞トノ  
紛争發生ノ場合ニ攻撃ヲ受ケタ國ハ援助ノ方式ニ就テ  
他ノ國ト相談スル義務ガアリ、第二國ハソノ援助ヲ攻撃  
ヲ受ケタ相鄰國ニ示サネバソラヌトイフ如キモノデアアル。丁度コノ時  
ソベントロフハ夏季休暇ニ去テシタ。彼ハ予ノ提案ニ就  
テ考慮スルト言ツタ。暫日ノ後ソベントロフガベルリンニ歸  
還シタ時吾々ハ再度會見シタ。而シテ彼ハ私ニ若シ軍事  
同盟ヲ結ブトシタラスレハ中途半端ヲ基礎ノ下ニテハナク  
完全ニ締結セネバソラヌト語ツタ。相談ノ義務トイフハ中  
途半端デアリ、ヒットラーモソノ種ノ中途半端ヲ條約ニハ  
反対デアアル。故ニ話ハソノ條約ノ權能ヨリ條約當時兩國  
ハ是等兩國中ノ一國ヲ攻撃シ来ッタ敵ト絶対無條件  
ニ開戦セネバソラヌトイフケ如キ完成セル防禦同盟ニ就テソ  
進行シ得ル。第二番目ソベントロフハ獨逸ハ對露西亞  
ノミニナラスソノ側カラ獨逸及日本ガ攻撃ヲ受ケルカモシレナイ  
米英佛ソノ他ノ如キ爾余ノ國家ニ對スル軍事同盟ヲ結  
ビ度又ト予ニ云ツタ。予ハ彼ニ本條約ノ露西亞ヲ除ク他ノ  
諸國ハ擴張ハ前記諸國ニ對スル我陸海軍ノ戰爭  
準備程度如何ニ懸ルト答ヘタ。予ハ彼ニカル條約ノ

擴張ハ日本ニトツテ最モ困難ナモノデアルト私ニハ思ハレルト答  
ヘタ。コレニ對シテリッペントロフハ予ニ獨逸ハ我<sup>日本</sup>方ニ不可能ナコトヲ  
要求シナイデアラウ。又類ス紛争發生ノ際ノ條約廢事兩  
國ノ操守ノ詳細ハ條約締結ノ後ニ審議スルコトガ出来ルデ  
アラウト答ヘタ。

次テリッペントロフハ予ニ日本陸軍ハコレニ類スル條約ニ對シ如  
何ニ處スルカヲ知り度イト願フタ。ソノ外ニリッペントロフハ五口ノ會  
話全テヲ完全ニ秘密ノ中ニ保ツト並ビコレニ就テ完全ニ秘密  
ヲ保テル方法デ日本軍部ニ傳ヘルトヲ依頼シタ。コノ當時ベルリ  
ニ日本勤務ノ笠原陸軍少將ケ居タ。彼ニ予ハ予ノリッペントロ  
フトノ會談ノ真相ニ就テ陸軍省並ビ參謀總長口頭テ報  
告スルヤウニ依頼シタ。笠原ハ七月ノ末ニベルリンカラミンガホル  
飛立テ其處カラ船デ日本ニ到リ八月ノ中旬ニコノ予ノリッペン  
トロフトノ會談ニ就テ陸軍大臣板垣並ビ參謀總長杉山  
大將ニ報告シタ。予ハ笠原陸軍少將ケ予ノ依頼ヲ陸軍省  
ノ指導者ニ報告シタコトヲ證スル電報ヲ受ケ取ツタ。全テノ人ガ  
斯クノ如キ條約締結ノ考ニ賛成シ、コノ問題ヲ當時近衛  
首相ノ定垣外相板垣陸相米内海相池田藏相ヨリ成ツテ予  
ト相會議ニ報告シタ。ト相會議ハ同ジク斯クノ如キ條約ノ目  
論員ニ賛成シ、參謀本部カラハ予ハコレノ條約ニ同スル會談ヲ續  
ケル併シ本軍軍同盟ノ基本的ニ露西亞ヲ目標トシ、獨逸  
ガ考慮ニ入レタ爾余ノ國家ハ條約中ニ第二次的ニ國トシテ



記されし様ニト提議セル電報ヲ受ケタ。電報ハ予ニ條約ノ基本的  
 使命ヲ明カニスベキ設長條項中ニ東亞及歐洲ニ於テ秩序  
 維持ノ任務ガ記載セルベキコト又條約中ニ米國ハ全然記  
 載セラレザルベキコトヲ提議シタ。ソノ外ニ電報ノ條約ニ依リ條約  
 上諸事兩國ノ國ニ煽動サレタルニ非ナル攻害ガナサレタ場合ニ一軍  
 事援助ノ義務ガ發生スル如キ條約ノ調製ノ獲得ニ努力スルコト  
 ヲ要求シタ。本條約ハ防衛的ナモノトシテ入圍セラレタ。九月ノ中旬  
 アソタケ空原少將ハ空路ベルリニ帰還シタ。獨逸ニ於テハ空原ガ  
 唯日本軍部タケコノ問題ニ同意見ヲ持ツテ来ルモノト豫期セラ  
 レテ升タ。併シ日本ニ於テハ斯カル條約ノ締結ハ非席ニ急ガレタ。トイ  
 フハ對支紛争ニ於テ日本ノ政治的地位ノヨリ速カナル強化ガ望マレ  
 又ソレ故ニ上記ノ問題ニ同意スル決定ハ既ニ政府ニ依テ採擇セラレタコト  
 ガ判ツタカラデアル。未ダ空原ガ帰還セサル前ニ予ハ日本政府ヨリ、  
 使節資格ヲ獨逸政府トコノ會談ヲ續行スルヤウト委任セラレタ。  
 予ハ個人的ニ種ノ會談ハ外交官ヨリモ職業軍人ニヨリタイガ  
 旨ク運ブトイフ見解ヲ持シ居タ。併シ結局予ハ大使トシテコノ會  
 談ヲ始メルノヲ政府ニ依リ余儀ナクセタ。一九三八年十月八日予ハ大使  
 ニ任命サレタ。コノ時カラ予ハ軍トノ關係ヲ強ヒテ絶タセラレタ。  
 大使ノ職ニ予ハ先任者東郷大使ガベルリニヲ本發シタ後一九  
 三八年十月末ニ就任シタ。  
 條約ノ第一草案ハ外務省法制部長ガウス氏ニ依リ日本政府  
 ノ見解ヲ彼ニ傳ヘラレタ後ニ編ミレタ。此ノ草案ノ内容ヲ私ニ電信  
 依リ日本ノ外務省ニ傳達シタ。コレハ恐ラク一九三八年十月終ニ

事デアララウ。私ハ長ク向返答ヲ受ケテカクテ私ハ繰返シテ請求  
シ外務省カラ次ノ内容ノ電報ニ依ル報知ヲ受ケタ

「條約ノ主要目標ハ露西亞ヲナケレバナラズ他ノ諸國ハ單ニ第二義  
的ノ意義ヲ持ツ止マラネバナラヌ草案ニ誤解ガ合ヒテ年ル同虜

報ニ我カ政府ハ以前ワルソ一駐在公使デアリ現在職ニ就クテ年ナ  
伊藤ヲ首班トスル特別ノ使節團ヲ伯林ヘ送ルニ決シタ旨示サレ

テ年夕一九一九年二月初伊藤ト共ニ伯林ヘ海軍大尉「アベ」ト  
中佐「タツミ」ガ到着シタ同時ニ伯林ヘ「ロ」駐在日本公使白鳥

ガ到着シタ。伊藤ヲ通ジテ我々ハ我カ政府訓令ヲ受取タ。此ノ  
訓令ハ次ノ如クモデアッタ。

「條約基本目標ハ露西亞ヲナケレバナラヌ他ノ諸國ハ第二義的  
ノ目標デアレバキデアリ他ノ諸國ニ對スル戦争ハ日本ガ参加スル事

ハ此等諸國ガ共產主義ニ居ヒタ場合ニ起リ得ル」  
伊藤ガモラシタ訓令ノ結果私ハ此訓令受領前迄トツテ未タ

態度ヲ變ヘネバナラナクナッタ。  
問 貴下訓令受領前態度ト如何ナルモデアッタカ。

答 私ハ獨逸側提議ニ同意デアッタ。今ヤ訓令受領ト共ニ私ハ  
日本ガ獨逸ニ攻撃セル他ノ諸國(露西亞を除ク)ニ對スル戦争ニ

参加スル義ヲ此等諸國ガ共產主義ニ居ヒテ年ル場合ニ  
ニ限リ負フ旨ノ條件ヲ附タ條約ノ秘密ヲ附録ノ正文ヲ條約

ノ基本ノ正文ト共ニ採択スルト付獨逸政府ト新ナル交渉  
ニ入ラネバナラナクナッタ。私ハ當時日本政府指令中ニ何カ誤解ガ

アルカモ知シト考ヘソレ故ニ私ハ白鳥ト共ニ此事ニ同意シテ日本外  
 務省ニ同合セ且又補助的條項ハ基本條約締結後ニ獨逸  
 ト審議ニ得ルトイフ我々見解ヲ示シテ置イタコトニ對スル返答ト  
 シテ我々政府ハ直ニ其ノ訓令ヲ變更シテ第三義的ト規定セラ  
 レル第三國(英國、佛蘭西其他)ノ何レカニ獨逸ヲ攻撃シタ場合  
 合日本其ノ國ニ對シテ直戰スルニ義務ナク單ニ獨逸ニ情報  
 燃料基地抵抗據点其他ヲ供與スル意味ニ於テ極力援助  
 スル義務ヲ負フヤウナ條約ヲ得ニトカケルヘキデアルトナシタ。新  
 訓令ハ基本的條約ノ正文ヲ變更マズニ置クコトヲ可能ニシ唯、  
 我々第三義的意義ヲ有スルト理解セラシル第三國側カラ同  
 盟國ガ挑発セラレシニ非サル攻撃ヲ蒙ル場合日本ガ其等諸  
 國ニ與フル義務ヲ援助ノ形成ニ同意シテ日獨伊三國間ニ覺書ヲ  
 交換スベキヲ現長ニシタ。此事同意シ私ハ獨逸政府ニ報告ニ向  
 政府ハ根本ニ於テコレニ同意シタ。併シテ獨逸政府ハ若シ覺書内  
 容ガ英國、佛蘭西其他諸國ニ決テ場合條約ガ全ク其ノ政治  
 的、道義的意義ヲ失フデアラウトノ故ヲ以テ日本ニ援助方式ニ同意スル  
 覺書ニ交換ハナスベキデナイ旨ヲ言明シタ。此故ニ獨逸ハ何等ノ  
 覺書ニ交換セズ條約締結後ニ於テ英國、佛蘭西其他諸  
 國(露西亞を除ク)ガ獨逸ヲ攻撃シタ場合日本、與フルベキ援助  
 助方式ヲ具體的ニ審議セニト提案シタ。日獨間ニ於ケル此意  
 見ノ相違ハ以後ノ交渉ヲシテ一個所ヨリ進展セザラシメ事  
 實上條約ハ一九三九年ニ締結カモトイフ結果ヲ来シタ。

此、ヤウニシテ事、一九三九年八月二十三日、独ソ不可侵條約締結  
迄、遷延シ其結果日独伊庫事同盟締結ニ因スル以後、文  
涉ハ決裂セシタ。

問、如何ナル内閣ニ依リ伯林へ伊藤ハ派遣セラレタカ。

答、伊藤ガ伯林へ差向ケラレタ當時日本ニ於テ政權ヲ握ツテ  
升タハ、近衛内閣ニアッタ。伊藤、伯林到着時迄平沼内  
閣ガ政權ヲ取リタ。

問、平沼ハ日独軍事同盟問題ニ如何ナル態度ヲ持シテ

升タカ、又彼ハ此條約ニ同意デアッタカ。

答、當時私、伯林ニ在リ此事ヲ明カニ承知セ、併シ彼ニ首相ト  
シテ明カニ本條約ニ同意デアッタ。

問、本條約締結ニ因ル交渉ノ期間中ニ於ケルソウエト聯邦ト  
ノ戦争ニ對シ平沼ハ如何ナル關係ガアルカ。

答、其ノ當時ソウエト聯邦ニ對スル戦争ニ對シ平沼ガ如何ナル關  
係ヲ有シタカ私ニ言ヒ難イ。

問、一九三九年八月二十三日以後平沼内閣ニ事實如何ナル理  
由テ総辭職ヲシタカ。

答、ソレハ日本ノ慣習テ若シ日本ノ政策ニ著シイ変更ガ生ジタ  
場合ソレ以前ニシテ迄、政ヲ束縛施シタノ働イタ人ハ辭職  
セネバナラヌトイフ事ガアルニ依ッテ説明アレ得ル

問、平沼及ビ彼ノ内閣ハソウエト聯邦ニ對スル戦争政策ヲ遂  
行シ、左称ナ戦争ヲ行フタメニドイツト同盟締結ヲ獲得  
シタトイフ向キニ貴下ノ言ヲ解シテ宜シイカソシテ、ドイツガ

ロニヤト不可侵條約ヲ結ビ、カクシテ、ロニヤニ對スル軍事同盟創  
建ノ日本ノ政策ガ失敗ニ歸シタトキ、平沼及ビソノ内閣ハ辭  
職セザルヲ得ナクナリタ。

答、私ハ平沼及ビソノ内閣ガロニヤトノ戦争政策ヲ行ハタトハ考ヘ

問、白鳥ノ辭任ノ原因ハ如何ナルモノカ。

答、白鳥ノ辭任モ、内閣ノ辭職ト同シ原因即チ政策ノ變

更ニ依ルモノデアル

問、貴下ハ一九四〇年、軍事同盟締結ニ関スル日独ノ交渉ノ  
更新ノ際、如何ナル役割ヲ演ジタカ

答、コレニ関シテハ私ハ何ノ關係モ持ツテ申サカッタ

向、貴下ハ東京ニ於ケル同、交渉ノ更新ニ、個人的影響ヲ與ヘナカッタ

答、私ハソレニ對シテ何等ノ影響モ與ヘナカッタ。只一九四〇年東京ニド

イツ公使シタメルガ到來シタ時、彼ハオットー大使ト共ニ、私ヲ來訪シ、

ドイツ政府ハ日本ト、三國條約締結ニ関スル交渉ヲ更新スル所存

デアルト私ニ語ツタ。私ハ彼ニ答ヘテ、私人トシテ私ハ此ノ事ニ容喙スル

コトハ出來ナイト云ヒ、松岡外務大臣ノ許ヘ行カレヨウ勸告シタ。數

日後私ハオットー大使ノ許ニ晚餐ノ席上、松岡ハ現在、同盟ヲ締結セズシテ

三國ノ任務ニ関スル共同宣言ニ止メルヤウ提言シテ、オットーイフコトヲ耳

ニシタ。個人的ニ私ハ、三國條約締結ニ関スル爾後ノ交渉ニ何等

向、一九四〇年ドイツトノ交渉更新ヲ松岡ガ決シタノハ、何ニヨリ齎ラサレタカ。

答、私ハソレニハ無關係デアリソレニ就テハ何モ申カナカッタ

問 三國條約ニ附属セル秘密協定ノ指定ハ如何ナルモデ  
アワタカ。

答 私人ソレニ就テハ何モ知ラヌ。ト云フノハ、ソレハ一九四〇年  
私ガ野ニ下ツテキタトキノ事デアルカラ。

問 併シ貴下ハソレニ就テ讀マレタカ

答 私人大使ニ任ゼラレテベルリンニ赴イタ時ニ初メ  
テ讀シタ。

問 貴下ガ三國條約ヲ知悉シタトキ、貴下ハ心中  
如何ナル印象ヲ受ケタカ。

答 私人初メテ、此ノ條約ヲ通讀シタトキ、條約ノ  
根本的意義ハアメリカト中立關係ヲ維持スルニト  
ニ存スルトイフ印象ヲ受ケタ。

問 貴下ハ條約附属ノ秘密協定ヲ讀マレタカ。  
答 讀シタ。

問 此ノ秘密協定ハ日本、ドイツ及びビクトリーニ対  
スル敵愾サレ又攻撃ノミナラズ、何レカノ側カラノ

攻撃ガ彼等ヲ脅威スルノミノ場合ニモ觸ルカ。

答 ソノ様ナ場合ハ協定ニヨツテ豫見サレシカッタ。一  
問 ソレデハ貴下ハ協定ヲヨク記憶シテヤナイノダ。

答 私人ソレニ對シテ直接ノ關係ヲ持ツテ居ナカッ  
タ。從テ私人ノ記憶中ニハソノ様ナ微細ナ事柄  
ハ殘ッテナイノダ。

問 何時、何ニ依ッテ貴下ハヒットラーノ勳章ヲ  
大鷲ヲ授與サレタカ。

答私ハ一九四一年十二月即チ米、日間ニ戦争ガ勃發シタ  
直後ニヒットラーカラ授與サレタノデアル。日本大  
使トシテ、ドイツニ於テ私、爲シタ仕事ニ對シテ授  
與サレタノデアル。

問 一体ヒットラーハ貴下ノ仕事ノ何ヲ高ク買ツタノカ。

答 此ノ褒賞ハ單ニ私ノ個人的ナ褒賞トシテノミノ意  
義ヲ持ツテオタノデハナカッタ。此レハ、一ツノオスチアデ、  
ソレニ依ツテ、ヒットラーノ日本ニ對スル態度ガ全体的  
ニ表現サレテオタノダ。

問 何時、誰カラ、如何ナル事情ノ下ニ貴下ハ一九四一年初

メテ、ソヴエト聯邦進撃ノヒットラーノ意圖ヲ知ツタカ。  
答 ドイツノソヴエト聯邦ト一戦ヲ始メル意圖ニ就  
テハ、私ハ一九四一年六月、初頭、初メテ知ツタ。

問 誰カラ

答 私ハソレニ就テヒットラーヨリ聞イタノダ。

問 テ、ソレ以前ニハ貴下ハソレニ就テ知ラナカッタノカ。

答 ソレ迄ハ私ハドイツノソヴエト聯邦ト戦争ヲ始  
メル意圖ニツイテハ確實ニ知ラナカッタ。

併シテ、私ハコノ事ニ関シテ疑惑ノ念ヲ抱イテ、  
何トナレバドイツ國內ノ事情ハ絶エズ、変化シテオ  
タカラ。

問 何時ソレテ一体東京ノ誰ニドイツガソヴエツ

ト聯邦政專ヲ意圖シテオトル旨、通シロシタカ。  
答 私ハソレニ就テハ六月ニ外務省へ通達シタ。

問 ソレハドイツノソ 聯攻東前ニ或ヒソノ後ニアツ  
タノカ。

答 私ハソレニ就テ戦争勃発前ニ通告シタ  
問 戦争勃発ノ途カ前ニカ。

答 私ハソノ前ニ東京ニ通告シ始メタ。然レ確  
實ナ資料ヲ持タナカクテ只國內ノ変換

スル情勢ニツイテノミ通達シテナク。然レ戦  
争ニ就イテハ私ハ全ク何物モ通達スルコト  
ガデキナカッタ。トイツノソ 聯邦進出ノ意思回

ソモノニ関シテハ私ハ只ヒットラーヨリソシヲ  
聞知シタトキニ通達シタノダ。ソレハ一九四一年

六月始メノコトデアッタ。  
問 貴下ハ何時ヨハルバロウサ『計畫』ニ就テ知ツ  
タカ。

答 私ハソノ呼稱ハ知ラヌ  
問 貴下ハ何時ソ 聯邦攻東ノ時日ニツイテ

聞知シタカ。  
答 時日ソモノハ私ハ戦争自体が始マル迄  
知ラナカッタ。

問 一月初頭ヒットラーが貴下ト命日談セシ  
際、彼、貴下ニ戦争ノ時日ニ関スル言ヲ  
述ズナカッタカ。

答 ヒットラーハ只次ノ如ク云ッタ。ロシヤハ絶エズ  
自己ノ戦力増強ヲ行フテナリ、ロシヤトノ戦ハ



避ケラレヌト、時日ニ就キテハ彼ハ何モ云ハナカク

。四月ノ末カ五月ノ始メ頃ト思フガ五口ガ大使

館員一人ガドイツ人ノ新聞記者ト、會談中

ソノドイツ人カラ次ノ様ナヌトヲ聞キ知ツタ。

即チドイツ政府若シクハソノ統帥部ハソ聯

ニ對スル戦争ヲ始メントシテオルト。

問 松岡ハ一九四一年四月ソルリニヨリモスク

ワヘ、旅行ノ際ニトウソノソ聯邦政專計畫

ニ関シ知ツテオカ。

答 松岡カラソレニ就キテ何モ聞カヌ。

問 一九四一年三月二十九日ソルリニ於ケル松

岡トリツグントロウプノ會見ノ際貴下ハ列

席ニテオカ。

答 リツグントロウプトノ最初ノ會見ノ際ハ

私ハ列席シタガリツグントロウプト松岡ノ間

ニハ数次ノ會見ガ行ハレ、他ノ會見ノ席

上ニハ私ハ居ラナカッタ。

問 松岡ハ貴下ニ列席シナカワタリツグ

ントロウプトノ数次ノ會見ニ関シ知ラセタカ。

答 松岡ハリツグントロウプトノ自分ノ會談

ニ就テ其基礎的ナ桌デハ私ニ通達シタガ、彼

ハソ聯邦トノ戦争ニ関シテハ私ニ何モ云ハナ

カッタ。

問 貴下ハセツトラート松岡ノ會見ノ際ハ列席

シタカ。

答 私ハ松岡トヒットラーノ最初ノ會見ニノミ  
列席シ爾後ノ會見ノ際ハ居ラナカッタ  
問 松岡ハヒットラート己レノ會談ニ関シ  
貴下ニ話シタカ

答 否 彼ハ私ニヒットラート自己ノ會談ニ就テ何モ知ラセナカッタ

問 一九四二年三月廿九日ノワシントンロップト松岡ノ會談ノ際ワシントン  
ロップハ「ソビエト」聯邦トノ形勢ガ不分明ナルカラ「モスクワ」トノ會談  
ニハ餘リ深入リセヌヤウニト松岡ニ中心告シ「ドイツ」武裝兵力ノ根  
幹ナル諸部隊ガソ聯邦トノ國境ニ集結セシ既ニソ聯邦政勢  
ノ準備ヲミテ中ル事ヲ明白ニ仄メカシタ。ワシントンロップハ亦松岡ニ  
告ゲテ「ドイツ」ハ數ヶ月間ニ赤軍ヲ破碎スルハ算テアルト云ハ  
貴下ハ此事ニ就テ何ヲ存ジテ中ルカ

答 私ハソノ事ニ就テハ何モ聞カヌ

問 「ワシントン」ロップハソノ時、獨乙トソ聯邦ノ間ノ紛争ハ全クアリ  
得ルモノトミテ見ラレル旨ヲロニシタカ

答 私ハソレニ就テ何モ聞カヌ

問 ツマリ貴下ハ一九四二年於ケル松岡ノベルリン滞在時ニ彼ハ  
貴下ニ獨乙トソ聯邦トノ間ニ戦争ガアルデアラウト言フ事ニ関  
シテ何モ話サナカッタト断言スルカ

答 然リ松岡ノベルリン滞在時ニ於テ彼ハ私ニ來ルベキ獨ソ戰ニ  
関シ又ソノ戦争ノ時日ニ関シ一言モ言ハナカッタ事ヲ確認スルモノ  
デアル。

問 貴下ハ松岡ガ一九四二年四月一日モスクワニ於テ中立條約ヲ締結シタ  
コトヲ如何ニ説明スルカ此ハ三国條約ニ背馳スルモノデハナイカ

答.私ハソノ聯邦トノ中立條約ハ三國條約ニ背馳スルモノガハイト思フ  
向然ラバ貴下ハソノ中立條約ノ締結ヲ以テ凡ソ日本ノ對外政策  
ノ轉換ト觀セズバテラヌトハ思ハヌイカ

答.独乙ハ既ニ一九三九年九月カラ日本ガ一九四二年四月ノ聯邦トノ  
中立條約締結時ヨリ實施シ始メタ政策ヲ行フヤウニシタリガ  
コノ事ハ多クハソノセントロップガ話シタリカ

向.貴下ハ松岡ヨリソノ聯邦トノ中立條約締結ノ眞ノ目的ニ関シテ  
如何ナル通告ヲ受ケテモタカ

答.松岡ハ私ニ此ノ條約ハ支那トノ紛争調停トイフ觀点カラ  
日本ニトツテ極メテ有利ナル旨ヲ告ゲタ日本テハ誰ガモソ  
聯邦トノ中立條約ガ日本ニトツテ益マルモノデアラウト言フ意見  
ヲ支持シテモタカ

向.日本ノ對ソ聯邦戰爭計畫ニ関シ貴下ハ何ヲ知ツテモタカ特ニ  
貴下ハ一九三七年一九三八年一九四〇年一九四一年ノ戰爭計畫ヲ知ツテ  
モタカ

答.當時私ハ「ヨーロッパ」ニ居リソノ計畫ニ関スル如何ナル情報モ持  
ツテモナカッタ。只噂ヲケテ聞キ知ツテモタカ

向.貴下ハ「カンチー」ト「エン」計畫ニ就テ何カ聞イテモタカ  
答.ソレニ就テハ私ハ何モ知ラナイ

向.独乙ノソノ聯邦攻撃後貴下ハ赤軍潰滅ノ時期ヲ如何ニ見積  
ツタカ又此ニ就テ貴下ハ東京ノ態度ヲ如何ニ決セントシタカ

答.私ハロシヤ軍ガソノナニ頑強ニ防衛スルトハ考ヘテモナカッタ。  
然レ私ハロシヤトノ戰爭ガドウ位ノ水ヲ續クデアラウカトイフ矣  
テハハッカリシタ觀念ハ持ツテモナカッタ。独乙側ハ何時ヲロシヤトノ

戦争終結の時期上考(テモルカト言フ突ニ関シテ私ハ度々彼等ニ訊  
 不タカ私ハ確タル事ヲ受ケテカクテアル私ノ東京(一)報告中ニ私ハ  
 「独ソ戦ノ推定ニ得ル如何ナル終結ノ時期モ決ミテ指示シナカク」

向一九四一年夏独乙ノ聯邦攻撃後東軍ガソ聯進出ノ戦陣準備  
 備ニ入ッタト言フ事ヲ貴下ハ存シテモルカ

答ソノ事ニ就テハ私ハ何モ知ラナイ。却ツテ独乙政府ハ日本ガソ聯  
 邦ニ對シテ何ノ行動ヲモ示サナイヲ絶エズ不満足思ッテモタト私  
 ハ考(ル)吾々ハ再ニソ聯邦ト吾々トノ関係ニ関スル独乙政府ノ  
 抗議ヲ受ケタリテアル。ドイツ政府ハ日本ガ「モスクワ」ニ自己ガ中  
 立條約ニ衷心實テアルトイフ突ノ保証ヲ予(タ)事ニ對シ抗議シタ。  
 其ノ后抗議ハ再ニ日本艦隊ガアメリカレ「ウラゴオストック」(一)軍  
 需物次々輸送ヲ強力ニ妨害シナカッタト言フコトニ觸シタ。

向貴下ハ秋田ヲ知ッテモルカ

答左様ナ人物ハ存セヌ

向一九四一年九月ニ三日東京駐在ノドイツ武官ガドイツ国境ハ  
 料関長コナリス海軍大将ニ次ノ如ク報告シタ。即チ秋田トノ會  
 談ノ際彼(譯者註前述べドイツ武官)ハ秋田カラ對日戦ニアメリカガ参  
 加スル刺戟ヲ與ヘルヲメニハドイツロシヤ間ノ戦争ガ恰モ可能ナル  
 ト言フ事ヲ聞キ知ッタト。ソノ際ニハ日本ハ「ウラゴオストック」及「ブラゴ  
 ヲ」エシヤエンスク「攻撃手」諸準備ヲ強化スルヲテアル。貴下ハ此ニ就テ何  
 ヲ存シテモタカ

答私ハソレニ就テ何モ存セヌ

向一九四一年及二ノ後ニ於テ貴下ハ独乙ニ於ケル指導的外交官  
 及ビ軍人連ト日本ノ對ソ戦参加ニ就テ如何ナル意見ヲ行ツタカ

答一 大体一九四一年六月中頃 和的會談ノ際、リッペントロップハ私ニ日本軍モ對ソ戰ニ參加シテ不シイト言フドイツ軍ノ希望ニ関シ傳ヘル所アツタ。此ニ関シ私ハ豊田外務大臣ニ報告シタガ回答ハ得ラレナカッタ。コノ後 和的ノ談合デ、リッペントロップハ尙數回私ニ日本軍ハ對ソ戰ニ參加セヌノカト問フタ。此ラ和的ニ行ハレタ傾向ニ關シ私モ亦常ニ自己ノ政府ニ傳達シタ。只一度ガケ獨乙ハ公式ニ日本政府ニ對シテ日本ノ對ソ戰ニ參加ニ關スル提議ヲ差シ出シタ。ソレハ一九四二年七月ノ事デアツタ。此ニ對シ日本政府ハ否定的回答ヲナシタ。ソノ内容ハ日本ハソ聯邦ト戰フ事ハ出来ナイ何トナレバ日本ノ戦力ハ支那及ビ太平洋戰場ヲ精一杯ナラゲト、此ノ後ハモウ左様ニ提議ヲドイツハモウ々々ニ對シテナサナカッタ。

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向獨ソ戰ノ推移ニ関シテ貴下ハ自己ノ政府ハ態度ヲ如何ニ決シタカ答大體一九四一年ノ七月末カ八月初メニ私ハ獨軍ノ攻撃ノテムホカ、連クナツタ事ヲ知り如メタ。目標トシタ攻撃時期ハ保タレナカッタ。モスクワ及ビレニングラードハ彼等ノ計畫ニ豫見サレタ時期ニ奪取サレナカッタ。此ニ関シテ私ハ説明ヲ求メルタメ、リッペントロップノ許ヘ赴キ、彼ハ説明ヲ子ヘルタメ、ケイテルヲ招イタ。ソノケイテルガ私ニ述ボツテドイツ軍ノ攻撃ノテムホカ、連クナツタハ聯絡が大イニ緊縮サレ後方部隊及ビ諸科團ガ連レタ事ニ依ツテ惹起サレタモノデ、此ニ關聯シテ攻撃ノテムホカハ約三週間連レテホルト言フタ。事案ニ私ノ見タ所ハケイテルガソレニ就テ私ニ述ボツタヨリモ攻撃ノテムホカ、連滞ハモット著シイモノデアツタ。此ノ事カラ私ハドイツ軍ノ管目ニテホル困難ニ就テ結論ヲナシタ。然レ下ラ私ハ次ノ事ヲ卒直ニ述べヌバナラナイ。即チ私ハ獨乙軍ガ實際ニ蒙ルヤウナ敗北ヲ蒙ルトハ決シテ豫隊相ハシイカッタノテ、連ト。

既往ヲ顧ミテ私ハ現在次ノ事ヲ認メネバナラナイ即チドイツ軍内ノ諸  
 派能ニ就テ東京へ私ノ報告ハ既ニ當時ドイツ軍内ニアツタ實際ノ  
 色々困難ヲ充分反映シテ中ノカッタト然シ私ハ決シテ樂觀的ニテラ  
 ナッタ私ハ出来ルハ各客觀的ニ獨軍内ノ諸派能ヲ書カウトヤカメスター  
 クラードノ獨軍ノ敗北後私ハ公然ト日本政府ニドイツノ戰時派能ハ弛緩  
 シテホルル事ヲ通知シタ。

尚何故ソノ様ノ場合ニ貴下ハ自己ノ電報ニヨツテ實際上日本政府ヲ突  
 イテ對ソ戰ニ駆リ立テヨウトンタノカ

答私ノ電報中ニハ日本政府ヲ駆リテ對ソ戰ニ引レル可能性アル様ノ  
 情報ハ一切ナカッタ

(次頁へ續ク)

問

對ソ戰へ、日本参加ニツイテノ問題、貴下ハ東京カラ如何ナル指示ヲ何時有シタカ。

問答

私ハ一度モ左様ニ指示ハ持テカッタ。日本、獨ソ戰ニ中、ソ聯邦戰時狀態ニツイテノ情報ヲステ、ドイツヲ支援シタカ。

問答

如何ナル情報ヲモ日本ハドイツニ與ヘナカッタ。私ハドイツ外務省カラノ書類ヲ所持シテ平ル、ソレヲ見シバ一九四一年七月一日ニソソベントロップガモスクワ駐在日大

問答

使グドイツ外務省ニ送付シテ来タソ、朕ニ關スル情報ニ對シ東京駐在ドイツ大使ニソ、日本大使ニ對シテ感謝ノ意ヲ傳ヘル御要請シタコトガ明ラカデアル。ソベントロップハ東京駐在ドイツ大使ニ、今後モ同御ノ情報ヲモスクワ駐在ノ日本大使カラ受ケ取ルトガ不可能ク否カヲ調べルコトヲ委託シタ。貴下ハコレニ就テ何ヲ存シテ平ルカ。

答

私ハソレニ就テ何モ知ラナイ。私ヘルリニ在任中、左様ニ情報ハドイツ諸機關ニ渡ラセナカッタ。ソレヲ、電報ハ私ノ手ヲ經過シタ答テアルカ、ソ、御ノ電報ニテカッタ。

問

私ハソベントロップガ一九四一年七月一日、ベストファルヘ、旅行カラ寄セタ電報ヲ所持シテ平ル。彼ハオートー大使ニ次、如何書イテ平ル。此ノ機ヲ利用シテ、私ハモスクワ駐在日本大使ニ、彼ノ送付シタ電報報告ニ對シテ、感謝サレルヤウ請フ。吾々カ今後、此ノ御ノ御オマデロシヤカラニ、ニュースグ續テ入手来シバ、大變有難イ。日本大使ガ、モスクワカラ傳ヘル所ニ依リ、

ロシヤハ事實上全面的潰滅ノ前ニアル現在(ソレニ同スル報告ハ吾々ガ自身ノ目テ見ルト同時ニナカレドアル)

日本ガソノ戦争準備ヲ終ルルヤ直チニウラダオストツク及ビニベリア問題ヲ解決シナイトウフコトハ余ラ不可能ナドアルト

答 私ハソレニツイテハ何ス知ラヌ若シ私ガソレラノ情報ヲ傳達シ仲介シテ年々ナラバリツベントモ、私ニ感謝ノ意ヲ表明スベキデアル、然レニ彼ハソレヲ為サナカッタ

問 貴下ハベルリン日本大使館ノ出版物報告係トハ、ラヲ知ツテナルカ、知ツテナル彼ハ吾々大使館デ通譯トシテ働ク事ヲ彼ハ日本人ノ父ト

ドイツ人ノ母トノ間ニ生シタ混血見テドイツ教育ヲ受ケ大使館ト間係ニ最近吾々ハ彼ヲ、牙中間盜聽ニ使ツ事ヲ彼ハ吾々ノ所テ非公式ニ働ク事ヲ

問 秘密通信ヲ行フ上ニテハ、如何ニ職能ヲ果シテ事ヲカ

答 彼ハ、稱ナ職務ハ受ケナカッタ思フ、彼ハ直接ニ私ニ從屬セズ、私ノ部下ニ從屬シテ事ヲ

問 彼ハ誰ニ從屬シタノカ

答 彼ハ直接ニ本版局ニ從屬シテ事ヲ

問 誰カラ如何ニ方法ヨツテ貴方ハ、一九四一年ヨリ一九四五年ニ至ル向、ソノ戦時状態ニ關スル情報ヲ組織的ニ入手シタカ

答 ソノ情報ハ吾々大使館付武官ガドイツ陸軍者カラ入手シタ

問 貴下ニヨツテ、受ケトラシタ日本カラノ情報ニツイテ話シテナルダ、ソノ称ナ情報ハ私ニ殆ド受ケトラナカッタガ、或ハ極メテシカ

受ケトラナカッタ



問 貴下が日本ヨリ受ケル情報ノ性質ハ如何ナルモノデ  
アツタカ。

答 私ハ主トシテソヴィエツト聯邦ノ經濟的財政的狀態ニ  
関スル報道ヲ受ケタガ其ノ度毎ニ東京政府ハ常  
ニソヴィエト聯邦ノ財政狀態ハソレニ就イテ一般ニ考ヘラ  
テ其ノ程惡クナイ事ヲ強調シタモノデアツタ。

問 貴下ハ日本カラソヴィエツト軍隊ノ極東ヨリ西部戰  
線ヘ一轉送ニ関スル報告ヲ受ケタカ。

答 其ノヤウナ情報ハ私ハ大使トシテ必要トシナカッタ  
シ又受ケナカッタ。

問 ソレハ眞實デハナイコナハラハソヴィエト軍當局ニソ  
ヴエト聯邦ニ関スル情報報道ノ夥多ノ寫ヲ手交  
シタガソレハ貴下ガ單ニソヴィエト聯邦ノ東方諸州ニ  
於ケル撤收工業施設ノ分散配置ニ関シテノミナ  
ラス西部戰線ニ於ケルソヴィエト師団ノ數ニ関シテモ  
更ニ又極東カラ西部戰線ヘ兵団ノ移動ニ関シ  
テモ組織的ニ情報ヲ供給シテ其ノ事ヲ證明シテ其  
答 恐ラク斯カル報道ハ東京ヨリ派遣セラレタ我カノ  
大使館附武官ハ受ケタカモ知レ又私ハ大使トシテ左  
様ナ報道ハ受ケナカッタ。

問 大使館附武官ハ職務上貴下ト密接ニ連絡持  
ヌカ。

答 日本ニハ大使館附陸海軍武官ハ表面コソ大使館  
ノ構成員トナツテ其ルガ事毎具ハ大使ニ隸屬セズ直

接参謀本部ナリ軍令部ニ隷属スルトイフキマリガアル  
問 何故眞下ハ眞下ガ日本カラシテソウヴェト聯邦ニ関スル  
情報ヲ独逸当局ニ組織的ニ傳ヘタカ

答 私ハ決シテ責任ヲ回避セント欲スル者デハナイガ私ハ眞  
實ニ此ノ事關シテハ何モ関知シナイ。我方デハ直接独  
逸軍当局筋ト關係ヲ持ツ大使館附武官ガ之等  
ノ仕事ニ從事シテナク

問 誰ニ独逸駐在日本大使館附武官ハソウヴェト聯邦  
ニ関スル情報ヲ傳ヘタカ

答 私ハソウキリトハ誰ト彼ガ交渉ヲ持ツタカ知ラヌ、独  
逸駐在日本大使館附武官ハ戰時中最初坂西  
將軍デ後ニハ小松將軍デアッタ。之等西名ノ人々  
ハ彼等ガソ聯ニ就イテ何等カノ情報ヲ独逸  
軍當局ニ傳ヘテナルカドウカニ關シテ私ハ何モ  
語ラナカッタ

問 大使館武官ト如何ナル職務上ノ關係ニナラシ  
ハアツタカ

答 私ハソウシヨ知ラヌ、唯々彼ガ大使館附武官ノ或  
種ノ使命ヲモ亦果シ得トイフ事ヲ洞察ホシ  
得ルノミデアル

問 外務省ト日本参謀本部ニ依ツテ組織的ニ東京駐  
在独逸大使オットト東京駐在独逸大使館附  
武官トクシイナナルニ独ソ戰事ノ全期間中傳ヘテソ  
ウヴェト聯邦ノ現状ニ關スル情報ニ就イテ眞下ハ

何ヲ知ツテ可ルカ。

答私ニハ此ノ事ニ就イテハ何モ知ラサシ<sup>十</sup>カッタシ私ハソレニ就イテ何モ知ラヌ

同ハサン湖畔ニ於ケル日本ノソ聯攻撃ガ勃発シタ。一九三八年貴下ハ伯林日本大使館テ働イテ可タカ

答然リ私ハ其ノ全期間中大使館附武官<sup>三</sup>ニシタ

同貴下ハ此ノ事件ニ就イテ何ヲ知ツテ可ルカ

答如何ナル訓令ヲモ此ノ事ニ関シテハ私ハ自国政府ヨリ受ケズ如何ナル

任事ヲモ此ノ事ニ関シテナサナカッタ。

同貴下側テハ此ノ事件ニ就イテ独乙軍当局ト何事カノ交渉カ行

ハレタカ

答否

同一九三九年ハルビン<sup>三</sup>湖畔ニ於ケル日本ノ蒙古人民共和國トソツキエイト

聯邦軍隊ニ対スル攻撃ノ期間中貴下ハ独乙駐在日本大使館

テ働イテ可タカ

答私ハ当時伯林駐在日本大使館<sup>三</sup>ニシタ

同ハルビン<sup>三</sup>湖畔ニ於ケル此ノ攻撃ニ就イテ貴下ハ何ヲ知ツテ可ルカ

答私ハ大使館附武官陸軍少将河辺虎四郎カラ軍事状況ニ

関スル情報ヲ受ケタ

由ハルビンゴルの畔ニ於ケル日本ノ蒙古及ソヴィエト軍隊ニ対スル攻撃ヲ独乙

側ト協定ニテアツタカ

答ニテ中ナカッタ

同一九三九年一月三十一日ヒムラートノロシヤ問題ノミニ関シテノ會見ヲ貴

下ハナシタカ

答ヒムラート私ト會ヒタ事ハ極稀デアツタカ一九三九年一月三十一日私ハ既ニ

大使ヲアリ記憶スル限ニ於テハ既ニ此ノ職務ニ在リテ私ハ彼トハ會

ハナカッタロシヤノ事ニ関シ如何ナル交渉モ私ハヒムラート行ハナカッタ

米國側候事ニ依ル私ノ訊問ノ際ニヒムラート私トノ會談ノ記事

入りノ書類ガ私ニ提示サレタ此ノ書類ノ中ニ恰モヒムラートガ私ヲ訪シ

彼トノ會談ノ際私ガ恰モ獨乙諜報材料ト共同テ作成シタ戰爭ノ場合

ニロシヤカラコーカサストウクライナヲ引離ス計画ニ関聯シテ又爆彈ヲ

武装シタ十人ノ露人遊撃隊ヲコーカサスニ送ルコトニ就イテ回教徒運動ノ

利用ニ就イテ地球ニ依ルソヴィエト聯邦(ヒムラート)輸送ニ就イテ及ヒモトハヒムラート

デイルマニヤカラクリミヤヘ煽動タメノ文献ヲ送ル試ミガ成功ニナカッタ事ニ

就イテ彼ニ語ツタヤウニ記サレテアル此ノ書類ハ最初カラ最後迄偽デアル

左様ナシトヒムラート行ハナカッタ事ハ之ノ能デアツタ独乙ト同

様日本モンゴルト聯邦ニ関スル情報蒐集ニ七命自系露人ヲ利用シタ

此ノ二国間ノ協定ニ基キ日本ハ極東ハ獨乙ハ歐洲ノ情報ヲ担当シタ

コーカサスニ就イテハ日獨共同テ情報ヲ集メラレタ白系露人關係ノ

凡テノ仕事ハ大使館附武官ノ方針ニ従ツテ進メラレタ其ノ際大使館

附武官ノ局ノ構成中ニ此ノ仕事ノタメ特別ト要員ガ居リ彼等ハ形式ニ

ハ大使館附武官ニ隸屬シタが事實上ハ獨乙ニ行動シ己ガ行動ニ

開ニテハ直接参謀本部ノロシヤ班ニ対シテ責任ヲ持ツタリテアルガ参謀本部ニ對シテハ私ハ大使館附武官トシテ親屈シナカッタ一九三七年迄ハ我方ニ依リテ日露露人ノ組織編成サレタリハ僅リニ波蘭トフランスニ於テノミニテアルニ  
 五三七年四月伯林駐在大使館附武官局ノ構成中ニ曰井中佐ガ又彼ニ引續イテ「ミナキ」ガ入ッテ来タガ彼等ニハ今余日露露人ニ依ルロシヤニ關スル報道ノ蒐集ニ關スル仕事ガ異ヘラレタ私ハ勿論ソレガ形式上大使館附武官トシテノ私ニ親屈スル限リ凡ユル其ノ仕事ニ對シテ責任ヲ負フ事ナルニシテ線返ニテ申述セルガ彼等ハ全ク獨立ニテ仕事ヲナシ私トハ之ノ外ノ仕事ニ就イテ協定ヲシナカッタ私自身ハ一九三八年十月大使館附武官ノ職ヲ去ツク大使館附武官ノ職務ニ關係アル問題ニツイテ私ガ其ノ地位ヲ去ツテカラ四個月後ニ「ユラー」ガ會談ニ私ノ許ヲ訪シ得ルトハ眞實デナイ、ソレニ又概シテ「ユラー」ト私トノ會談ノ記事ハ凡テ始カラ終マテ全ク一擧「事」テアル

向一誰ヲ通ジテ貴下ハ獨乙側ト協力シテ「ユーカサス」ニ於ケル諜報蒐集活動ヲ行ツタカ

答我々ハ凡テノ仕事ヲ「マ」トト呼ガ日露露人ヲ通ジテ行ツタ

由亡余日露露人ノ中誰ト貴下ハ個人的交渉ヲ有シタカ

答誰トモ有シナカッタ

向ソ聯ニ對スル南爭ニモ余日露露人ヲ使用スルタメ如何ナル計畫ガ貴下ノ側ニハアツタカ

答我々ハ「ロシヤ」ニ關スル諜報蒐集ノタメノ「カ」ニ戰爭ノ際今迄ノ外ニ彼等ヲ利用スルノ可能性ヲ我々ハ研究スル積リテアツタ

向何時如何ニ又如何ナル方法デ此ノ計畫ハ實施セラレタカ

答我々ハ一九三八年此ノ問題ノ研究ヲ漸ク始メ一九三九年獨ソノ不の度

條約締結後直ニ其ノ仕事ニ従事スル事ヲ止メタ

向ドイツ駐在日大使館ハ「マリケンセ」湖地方ニ地所ヲ所有シテオカ

答然リ此地所ハ何トカイフ独ニ士官ノ名ヲ請負人ヲ通ジテ我々ニ

依ツテ入手セシメ此ノ購入ノタメノ金銭ハ白井中佐ヲ通ジテ手交セシメ

向貴下ハ此地所デ七金白系西露人ヲソ聯ニ対スル摩利行動ヲ行ハシムル

タメニ訓練シタカ

答「マリケンセ」ノ所有地ハ我々ハニ台ノ印刷料ヲ持ツハサ出版所ヲ開イテ

ソコテ「ユーカサス」ニ於テ且備活動ノタメノ文書ヲ印刷シタトイフ事ヲ私ハ

知ツテホル係シ私ハ此ノ事ヲ未知ニイト言フハ彼處テハ凡テノ仕事

ヲ白井中佐が指揮シテオタカラテアル

向誰ガ「マリケンセ」ノ所有地テ「ユーカサス」向ケ官價文書準備ノ仕事ヲシ

タカ

答白系西露人「テアル」單ニ彼等が彼處テ働イテオタカラテナカ或ハ其ノ所有

地ニ任ンデモオタカラカ私ハ明確ニハ知ラヌ又此等ノ白系西露人ハ全ク

墮落シタ連中「テアツタト」言ハネバ「又」彼等ハ予定セシタ仕事ニ対

スル金銭強請ノ「ミヨ」事トシタ此等ノ連中が「オウ」事ヲ「セ」ニ任ンテ

オウ「トイ」フ事ハ全ク認メル私ガ既ニ述ベタ如ク我々ハ五三九等ニ自

系西露人ニ関スル我々ノ仕事ヲ全ク厭シ「マリケンセ」ノ地面ハ大使館

附武官ガ明ラカニ棄却シタラシイガ此ニツイテハ確カニ私ハ知ラヌ

向一九四五等ノドイツ敗戦ヲ貴下ハドイツ外務省ト共ニ「オウ」撤收

シタカ

答然リ私ハ「バツ」ガステインニ撤收シタ

向何故ニ貴下ハ「オウ」撤收シタカ

答、最初ドイツ政府ハソレガ伯林ニ留ルコトヲ私ニ通知シタ、私ハ戦線  
 近接ノ状況下ニ於テ任事ガ出来ルヤウニ大使館ヲ準備スベク手配  
 シタ、然レ四月十三日私ハ外務省カラ伯林ヲ撤收スベキ旨ノ新ニ指令  
 ヲ受テタテ私ガソノ指令ノ理由ヲ問ウタトコロ「トウ」ガ必要ノ場合ハ  
 其ノ處カラ戦争指揮ヲ繼續スルヲメニ伯林カラ南設独ニ「飛行料  
 デ」赴ク積リテアルコトガ明ラカシメタ此ノ関係デ私ハ他ノ中ニ或ハ同盟  
 諸国大使館同様に伯林ヨリ保養地ガスタンニ「飛行料」ヲ赴イタ

証言ハ被告大島浩ノ言葉ヨリ速記セラシタ

訊問者在東京国際軍事裁判所ソウエイト聯報側

検事補佐官

大佐トーセンブリット(署名)

通訳 少佐バシコフスキイ(署名)

秘書兼速記者 クルジゴエフスカヤ(署名)

訊問開始ハ時三十分

訊問中断 十三時

訊問續行 十四時三十分

訊問終了 十六時四十分

書類、オ四二二一号  
署名書

東京市 一九四六年四月二十二日

ノ私、即チ下ニ署名セルクルジジエフスカヤ・ユリヤ  
ゲオルギエヴナハ在東京國際軍事裁判  
所、ソヴィエト聯邦側検事輔佐官  
大佐 ローゼンブリット・エス・ヤーニ対  
シ、秘書兼速記者トシテ被告大島  
浩ノ証言調書ヲ正確ニ速記シ且著  
通ノ文章ニ直ス長短カヲ有ス事ニ  
就クテ眞実ノ署名書ヲ提出スル  
ノ私ハ故意ニス不正確ノ調書作成ニ対  
シテハ露西亞社會主義聯邦、ソヴィエト  
共和國刑法典、オ十六條、オ百九十  
二條ニ依リ刑法上ノ主責任ヲ負フ旨  
ヲ告セラレタ。

ユ、ククジジエフスカヤ(署名)

署名書ヲ受領ス 在東京國際軍事裁判所ソヴィエト聯邦側

検事輔佐官 大佐 ローゼンブリット(署名)



書類四二二一号

署名書

東京市

一九四六年四月二十二日

私即千下ニ署名セル少佐パンコフスキイ

アレクセイ・アントノヴィッチハ私カ口頭

ノ陳述ヲ露語ニ訳スタメニ充分ナル程度

<sup>日本語</sup>通ジ且被告大島浩ノ証言ヲ正確ニ訳

スベキ義務ヲ負フ事ニ就イテ在東京國際

軍事裁判所ソヴエト聯邦側検事輔佐官

大佐ローゼンブリットニ対シ眞実ノ署名書ヲ提出スル

ノ私ハ故意ニ不正確ナル通譯ヲナス事ニ対シテハ露

西亜社會主義聯邦ソヴエト共和國刑法典ヲ九十二

條ニ依リ通譯者トシテ刑法上ノ責任ヲ負フベキ

ト旨ヲ告ヲ受ケタ

パンコフスキイ(署名)

署名書ヲ受領ス 在東京國際軍事裁判所ソヴエト聯邦側

検事輔佐官 大佐ローゼンブリット(署名)

Doc 4121

書類第四一三二號

證

余、平野英雄ハ余ガ露西亞語及ビ  
 日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ露  
 語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ対照ノ上  
 右ハ本書類ヲヒ眞實ニ且、正確ニ翻  
 訳セルモノナルヲ確証セルコトヲ茲ニ  
 証ス

昭和二十一年八月十三日

平野英雄



CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE AUG 5 - 1946

EVIDENTIARY DCC. NO. 4121

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. 776-A

BACKGROUND DCC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

*Exhibit # 776-A*

SIGNATURE L.B.

ROOM NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Oshima, Hiroshi

Minutes of interrogation of Oshima

Excerpts

The City of Tokyo.

April 22, 1946

I, Col. S. I. Rosenblit, Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with the Participation of Major Pashkovsky acting as interpreter interrogated the defendant who testified:

1. Surname, first name: Oshima Hiroshi
2. Post held before arrest: Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
3. Party membership: I was no member of political parties.
4. Domicile: Tokyo, Sugamo prison.

A certificate of the interpreter for being duly warned of the responsibility for false translation is attached to the minutes of interrogation.

The interrogation is conducted in Japanese.

-----

Question: What was the basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact?

Answer: The Basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact was to arrest the growth of communism.

Question: Specifically against what countries was this Pact directed?

Answer: When this pact was concluded Russia was meant in the first place. Moreover the Pact provided for the prevention of the spread of communist influence in other countries as well.

Question: Usually such Pacts are concluded not against ideas, but against a definite country. Are we correct if we say that the anti-Comintern Pact was directed against the Soviet Union?

Answer: The anti-Comintern Pact as a whole was not directed specifically against Russia. It was directed against communism in general. However it followed from the Pact that in case of Russo-German war Japan should not aid Russia, and also that Germany should not aid Russia in case of a Russo-Japanese war."

-----

Question: Describe the history of negotiations carried on in 1938-1939 concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

Answer: Approximately in June 1938 I received from the Japanese General Staff the documents which set before me a task of probing in Germany the possibility of concluding a military alliance with Japan in virtue of which Germany would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union in case the latter attacked Japan and vice versa that Japan would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union if the latter attacked Germany. In that time I was a military attache. At the beginning of July 1938 I visited Ribbentrop for the purpose of probing in a private manner whether Germany had any such intentions. I told Ribbentrop that I had an idea of concluding a consultative Pact between Japan and Germany, i.e. a Pact in virtue of which in case of conflict with Russia, the party which became subject to attack should consult the other party concerning the forms of aid the latter party should render to the party which became subject to attack. Just at that time Ribbentrop was leaving as he had his summer vacation. He told me that if a military alliance was to be concluded it should be a complete but not a halfway alliance. The obligation to hold consultations is a halfway obligation and Hitler was against such halfway Pacts and therefore we could talk only about a complete defensive alliance in virtue of which the contracting parties should without reservations enter into the war with the adversary which attacked one of the contracting parties.

Secondly Ribbentrop told me that Germany would like to have a military alliance directed not only against Russia but also against the other countries which might attack Germany and Japan, namely America, France, England, etc. I told him that the extension of that Pact to other countries, besides Russia, would depend on the degree of readiness of our army and

navy for the war against those states. I told him that such an extension of the Pact would be very difficult for Japan. To this Ribbentrop replied that Germany would not ask us to do the impossible, and that all the particulars of the behavior of the contracting parties in case of such a conflict could be discussed after the conclusion of the Pact. . . . I received a telegram confirming that major-general Kasahara forwarded my message to the leading military officers. All of them concurred in the idea of concluding such a Pact and reported to the council of five ministers which consisted then of Prime-Minister Kenoye, Foreign Minister Ugaki, War Minister Itagaki, Minister of the Navy Yonai and Minister of Finance Ikeda. The Council of five ministers also approved of the idea of concluding such a Pact, and I received a telegram from the General Staff offering me to continue the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Pact, but bearing in mind that, that the military alliance should be mainly directed against Russia and all other countries which Germany had in view should be mentioned in the Pact as minor objectives.

Through Ito we received an instruction from our government. The Basic idea of that instruction was as follows: "Russia should be the main objective mentioned in the treaty, all other countries should be minor objectives, and the entry of Japan into the war against other countries could take place only if those countries were infected with communism. . . ." The divergency of views between Japan and Germany led to further negotiations marking time, and practically the Pact was not concluded in 1939. This continued till the conclusion by Germany of a Pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939 as a result of which further negotiations concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy were discontinued. . . ."

-----

Question: How did you inform your Government as to the course of the German-Soviet war?

Answer: Approximately at the end of July or at the beginning of August 1941 I learned about the slowing up of the pace of the advance of the German army. The advance was not proceeding according to plan. Moscow and Leningrad were not taken according to the German plan. I asked information from Ribbentrop on that

subject. Ribbentrop invited Keitel to explain the matter. Keitel told me that the slowing up of the advance of the German army was caused by the excessive length of communications and rear units lagging behind, and that that was the reason why the pace of the advance of the German army was approximately three weeks behind plan.

-----  
Question: Do you know Nahara, press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin?

Answer: Yes, I do. He worked as interpreter in our Embassy. His father was Japanese, his mother German, he received German education, was connected with the Embassy and was lately used for radio interception work. He worked with us unofficially.

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The testimony was recorded from the words of the defendant, OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

Interrogated: Col Rosenblitt,  
Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR  
International Military Tribunal  
For the Far East.

Interpreter: Major Pashkovsky.

Secretary-  
Stenographer: Krjizevskaya.

Interrogation began : 08.30  
Interrogation was interrupted: 13.00  
Interrogation continued : 17.30  
Interrogation was over : 16.40

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. V. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: A. Kunin

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Excerpts

The City of Tokyo.

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Interpreter: Major Pashkovsky.

Secretary-  
Stenographer: Krjizevskaya.

Interrogation began	:	08.30
Interrogation was interrupted	:	13.00
Interrogation continued	:	17.30
Interrogation was over	:	16.40

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. V. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: A. Kunin

776A

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(Minutes of interrogation of Oshima)

Excerpts

The City of Tokyo.

April 22, 1946

I, Col. S. I. Rosenblit, Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with the Participation of Major Pashkovsky acting as interpreter interrogated the defendant who testified:

1. Surname, first name: Oshima Hiroshi
2. Post held before arrest: Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
3. Party membership: I was no member of political parties.
4. Domicile: Tokyo, Sugamo prison.

FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

A certificate of the interpreter for being duly warned of the responsibility for false translation is attached to the minutes of interrogation.

The interrogation is conducted in Japanese.

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Question: What was the basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact?

Answer: The Basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact was to arrest the growth of communism.

Question: Specifically against what countries was this Pact directed?

Answer: When this pact was concluded Russia was meant in the first place. Moreover the Pact provided for the prevention of the spread of communist influence in other countries as well.

Question: Usually such Pacts are concluded not against ideas, but against a definite country. Are we correct if we say that the anti-Comintern Pact was directed against the Soviet Union?

Answer: The anti-Comintern Pact as a whole was not directed specifically against Russia. It was directed against communism in general. However it followed from the Pact that in case of Russo-German war / Japan should not aid Russia, and also that Germany should not aid Russia in case of a Russo-Japanese war."

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Question: Describe the history of negotiations carried on in 1938-1939 concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

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Answer: Approximately in June 1938 I received from the Japanese General Staff the documents which set before me a task of probing in Germany the possibility of concluding a military alliance with Japan in virtue of which Germany would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union in case the latter attacked Japan and vice versa that Japan would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union if the latter attacked Germany. In that time I was a military attache. At the beginning of July 1938 I visited Ribbentrop for the purpose of probing in a private manner whether Germany had any such intentions. I told Ribbentrop that I had an idea of concluding a consultative Pact between Japan and Germany, i.e. a Pact in virtue of which in case of conflict with Russia, the party which became subject to attack should consult the other party concerning the forms of aid the latter party should render to the party which became subject to attack. Just at that time Ribbentrop was leaving as he had his summer vacation. He told me that if a military alliance was to be concluded it should be a complete but not a halfway alliance. The obligation to hold consultations is a halfway obligation and Hitler was against such halfway Pacts and therefore we could talk only about a complete defensive alliance in virtue of which the contracting parties should without reservations enter into the war with the adversary which attacked one of the contracting parties.

Secondly Ribbentrop told me that Germany would like to have a military alliance directed not only against Russia but also against the other countries which might attack Germany and Japan, namely America, France, England, etc. I told him that the extension of that Pact to other countries, besides Russia, would depend on the degree of readiness of our army and

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navy for the war against those states. I told him that such an extension of the Pact would be very difficult for Japan. To this Ribbentrop replied that Germany would not ask us to do the impossible, and that all the particulars of the behavior of the contracting parties in case of such a conflict could be discussed after the conclusion of the Pact. . . . I received a telegram confirming that major-general Kasahara forwarded my message to the leading military officers. All of them concurred in the idea of concluding such a Pact and reported to the council of five ministers which consisted then of Prime-Minister Konoye, Foreign Minister Ugaki, War Minister Itagaki, Minister of the Navy Yonai and Minister of Finance Ikeda. The Council of five ministers also approved of the idea of concluding such a Pact, and I received a telegram from the General Staff offering me to continue the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Pact, but bearing in mind that, that the military alliance should be mainly directed against Russia and all other countries which Germany had in view should be mentioned in the Pact as minor objectives.

Through Ito we received an instruction from our government. The Basic idea of that instruction was as follows: "Russia should be the main objective mentioned in the treaty, all other countries should be minor objectives, and the entry of Japan into the war against other countries could take place only if those countries were infected with communism. . . ." The divergency of views between Japan and Germany led to further negotiations marking time, and practically the Pact was not concluded in 1939. This continued till the conclusion by Germany of a Pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939 as a result of which further negotiations concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy were discontinued. . . ."

Question: How did you inform your Government as to the course of the German-Soviet war?

Answer: Approximately at the end of July or at the beginning of August 1941 I learned about the slowing up of the pace of the advance of the German army. The advance was not proceeding according to plan. Moscow and Leningrad were not taken according to the German plan. I asked information from Ribbentrop on that

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subject. Ribbentrop invited Keitel to explain the matter. Keitel told me that the slowing up of the advance of the German army was caused by the excessive length of communications and rear units lagging behind, and that that was the reason why the pace of the advance of the German army was approximately three weeks behind plan.

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Question: Do you know Nahara, press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin?

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Answer: Yes, I do. He worked as interpreter in our Embassy. His father was Japanese, his mother German, he received German education, was connected with the Embassy and was lately used for radio interception work. He worked with us unofficially.

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The testimony was recorded from the words of the defendant,  
OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

Interrogated: Col Rosenblitt,  
Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR  
International Military Tribunal  
For the Far East.

Interpreter: Major Pashkovsky.

Secretary-  
Stenographer: Krjizevskaya.

Interrogation began : 08.30  
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Signature: A. Kunin

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 25 February 1946, 0930 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) Kido, Koichi  
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator  
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter  
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

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Q When we stopped the other day, we were talking about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA going to Germany, as written in your diary on February 1. What was it he told you as his reason for wanting to go to Germany at that particular time? You had a conversation with him on February 1. What reason did he give for going to Germany at that particular time?

A I remember that he went out there to make closer contact as a result of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

Q And was that the reason he gave you for wanting to go to Germany when you talked to him on these occasions in 1941?

A I don't remember the details but generally that is the extent of which I remember.

Q He, in his conversations with you, advocated closer relations with Japan and Germany and wanted to go there to foster that relationship?

A Yes, that is what I remember.

*Evid. Doc. 4139*

*Exhibit # 375*



- Q You mention on February 1 that MATSUOKA's program in those days was to try to conclude the China war in April and he then wanted to concentrate Japan's efforts towards the solution of the southern problem. Will you tell me what the southern problem was insofar as MATSUOKA's point-of-view was concerned?
- A MATSUOKA always talked freely of his future plans and he said upon returning from Germany, he will take up the matter of the China problem and upon solving the China problem, he thought to take up the southern problem. By the southern problem he meant the problem between Thailand and French Indo-China. Hitherto, because Japan acted as mediator and had greater power there, he thought to influence those reasons. *regions*
- Q In your diary, you write that MATSUOKA stated that the southern problem was the greatest problem that Japan had. I still don't comprehend just what MATSUOKA had in mind when he spoke of the southern problem. It certainly is much more than just the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China. What was the real southern problem in which MATSUOKA, as Foreign Minister of Japan, was interested in?
- A He intended to obtain a foothold in Thailand and French Indo-China and then expand Japanese influences into the southern regions and upon doing so, he foresaw a clash with British and American influence in that region.
- Q That was one of the reasons he was particularly interested in cooperating with Germany and Italy, in order to gain their assistance and bring about Japanese expansion in the South Pacific?
- A I believe it must have been so.
- Q He felt that in going South, Japan would run into opposition with the United States and Great Britain and in order to help put over the southern expansion program, it was the best policy for Japan to get the support of Germany and Italy in that regard? Is that a fair statement?
- A But MATSUOKA did not wish to go to the extent of using force to gain that end.
- Q How did he propose that a foothold be obtained in French Indo-China or in that vicinity in order that Japan might work out from there in expanding its influence.

- A I did not hear of any positive and concrete plan regarding that.
- Q You say he wanted to get a foothold? What did he have in mind by "foothold"?
- A I believe that he intended to obtain a dominant position there by acting as mediator.
- Q And in connection with the mediation, he wanted Japan to obtain the right to certain bases in French Indo-China for operational purposes?
- A Yes.
- Q MATSUOKA advocated that in those days? That was his theory of Japan's foreign policy. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Why did MATSUOKA feel that the southern problem was the greatest problem that Japan had? I think you said the other day - even greater than the China war.
- A Because a single mistake would cause war with England and the United States. That is why he considered it the greatest problem.
- Q Why was it that MATSUOKA, as Foreign Minister, felt Japan needed to expand in the South? What were his reasons for wanting Japan to expand in the South as distinguished from China.
- A I do not know Mr. MATSUOKA's feeling in regard to that. I only know his radical view-point.
- Q When you say "radical view-point", what do you have in mind?
- A Aggressiveness.
- Q He, as Foreign Minister advocated a policy or a program of expansion and the spreading of Japanese influence into China and also of the South. Is that right?
- A I believe so.
- Q Understand that when I am asking these questions, I am not implying that you personally advocated such a program. I am trying to find out the facts and the truth of the situation of what was going on.

- A This is another case where Mr. MATSUOKA expressed his opinion and future plans, as he always does and he isn't the type of person that would go into details. We did not take his words into serious consideration because we didn't think the China problem could be solved by April. We considered his saying as a dream.
- Q You mean that when he was mentioning the Southern problem in those days, you didn't take it very seriously?
- A No, not seriously. His assertion that the China problem can be solved by April was extremely unbelievable.
- Q You thought that was a little short to be able to settle up the China problem but there were many people in high office in Japan that felt Japan should expand its influence into the South Pacific, were there not?
- A Yes.
- Q When MATSUOKA stated that the Southern problem in the end was one of the most important problems Japan had, he was supported in that program by the military, was he not?
- A Yes, he had supporters among the military and among the Navy.
- Q In other words, our man we mentioned the other day, SATO, favored MATSUOKA's policy of expanding in the South Pacific, did he not?
- A I believe so. I do not know the facts.
- Q How about the Chief of Staff of the Army and Navy. What was their attitude with reference to the South Pacific in those days.
- A I don't believe the Navy at this time had any idea of operating in the Southern areas.
- Q How about the Army?
- A Because unless the Navy goes out there, the Army would not be able to operate so that matter has been more or less a source of controversy.
- Q In other words, the Army wanted the Navy to interest itself in the South Pacific and the Navy was holding back? Is that a true statement?

A I believe that was the situation at that time.

Q The Army felt that Japan should expand not only in China but also in the South Pacific, but the Navy was more conservative and had not adopted the expansionist philosophy to a great degree at that time?

A Yes.

Q What was there in the South Pacific that MATSUOKA and the Army leaders felt that Japan needed? Why was it necessary for Japan to expand in the South as distinguished from China?

A The matter of natural resources. Japan wanted to obtain rubber and oil and Malayan iron. If those resources were obtainable by peaceful means, she would never have resorted to war and the acuteness of those items was greatly felt and that became a problem.

Q Because of the long war that Japan was engaged in with China, Japan needed more and more oil, tin, iron and items of that type to fight a war with and the Army came to the conclusion that if they were going to fight this war successfully, she needed more raw materials?

A Yes.

Q And the Army decided to obtain these raw materials from such places as Malay, Sumatra, the Philippines and places of that type?

A Yes.

Q You say that the military group wanted to obtain those items peaceably, if possible. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q In other words, they also advocated if they couldn't be obtained peaceably, it would be necessary in the end for Japan to use force to get needed raw materials. Is that correct?

A Yes.

- Q MATSUOKA felt that way and what we are talking about was really the foreign policy of MATSUOKA with reference to the Southern Pacific?
- A Yes .
- Q And TOJO was of the same mind?
- A I believe so.
- Q You talked to him at different times in the spring of 1941. Didn't this question of raw materials and the Southern Pacific problem enter into your conversations? What did he say about it.?
- A At this time, I had no direct contact with TOJO.
- Q I don't mean on February 1, necessarily, but during the spring of 1941 you talked to TOJO several times, as mentioned in your diary.
- A At that time with TOJO, I was always talking over matters of Army personnel and personalities because he was then only a War Minister and I don't believe we spoke of other matters outside of that, although there may have been some exceptions. TOJO is very difficult to converse with because he would leave as soon as he expressed his own opinion.
- Q You mean you couldn't argue with the man. He was right and everybody else was wrong? Was that his general attitude?
- A Yes.
- Q He was a very strong-willed individual?
- A Yes, strong-willed.
- Q I can appreciate that but he no doubt had a definite opinion with reference to the Southern Pacific problem. What was that opinion. A man so opinionated as TOJO would have an idea on a subject such as that.
- A Because I did not speak to him directly, I did not know what type of an opinion he had. I believe he represented the Army's opinion.

- Q We can safely say, can we not, that in the early spring of 1941 the foreign policy of Japan as evidenced by the Government was to obtain necessary war materials in the Southern Pacific, peacefully, if possible, but if necessary by war?
- A Yes.
- Q One of the details of this plan to obtain raw materials was, as I understand it, to obtain some bases for operation in French Indo-China by negotiation, if possible. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Of course, the obtaining of mere bases in French Indo-China would not necessarily produce all this - raw materials - What was MATSUOKA's plan as to what should be done after these bases were obtained in French Indo-China?
- A I believe that the underlying plan at that time was to attack China from the South. This matter about resorting to war in order to get badly needed raw materials was only a contemplation of the military and not an actual plan. There were no concrete plans whatsoever in that respect.
- Q By that you mean the military leaders such as TOJO, the Chief of Staff, SUGIYAMA and SATO made statements indicating that "we have to have raw materials in the South if we are going to keep on fighting the war and one way or another, we have to get them". Is that about what was going on?
- A Yes, and they were thinking about it.
- Q Of course, MATSUOKA had in mind that by obtaining bases in French Indo-China to attack China, they would be valuable places of operation in the event it was necessary to fight a war in the South Pacific to get materials. Is that his theory?
- A That did not appear on the surface at that time, I do not know.
- Q Certainly, that would be a logical bit of reasoning, would it not?
- A I cannot say conclusively regarding that.

- Q MATSUOKA seemed to feel that this Southern problem was so important to Japan. What was his plan or theory as to how to obtain these raw materials in the South Pacific? How was he going to get them? What did he advocate doing?
- A He intended to negotiate. A year prior to this, KOBAYASHI went to Java and negotiated for oil but the oil was <sup>not</sup> delivered abundantly or sufficiently; therefore, this matter of oil was a great problem.
- Q In other words, the oil problem was becoming increasingly more important as war in China went on and on?
- A Yes.
- Q And it had to be solved by some means or other?
- A And the Navy was greatly concerned because if it was to operate, it needed plenty of oil and there wasn't any source of oil available.
- Q And what specific type of operations did the Navy need more oil for?
- A Even for the blockade of the China Coast, it was utilizing a tremendous amount of ships and oil.
- Q How did MATSUOKA propose to obtain supplies or needed materials from MALAY. What, if anything, did he do to obtain them?
- A He intended to negotiate for it.
- Q Were there any negotiations entered into with Malay for supplies ?
- A I believe there were individual negotiations being done quite a lot but no direct representative was sent as in the case of Java.
- Q How about the other countries in the South Pacific? Java belonged to the Dutch. Were there any definite negotiations with the Dutch in 1940. Were there any other negotiations with the South?
- A I have no special recollection other than that done individually.

- Q What did MATSUOKA have in mind when he said that "Without the solution of the Southern problem, the oil solution of the China problem cannot be attained,"?
- A That significance is not clear to me.
- Q He said that to you?
- A Yes.
- Q What do you think he had in mind when he implied that in order to solve the China problem, you would also have to solve what he called the "Southern problem"?
- A I believe it is one of his imagination. I cannot comprehend that.
- Q At least he was emphasizing he thought that the Southern problem was the most important problem that Japan had?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice on February 18, you talked with the Emperor about MATSUOKA's trip to Germany and expressed some concern about it. What was that conversation between you and the Emperor, in effect, on that occasion?
- A I told the Emperor that MATSUOKA is leaning too much toward Germany and that had a bad influence on Britain and America and it was greatly concerned by the people at large. He said that the Government should take measures of not letting MATSUOKA do everything his way. That is what I told the Emperor.
- Q What did the Emperor say with reference to that line of thinking?
- A The Emperor felt the same way about it.
- Q Did the Emperor or you do anything to try to dissuade MATSUOKA from going to Europe?
- A And so I phoned Prime Minister KONOYE to take into consideration MATSUOKA's tour at that time.
- Q What did you say to KONOYE, as near as you can remember?



- A Premier KONOYE agreed to this and he said that he cannot stop MATSUOKA's trip to foreign countries but he will be very cautious in respect to that because of the deleterious effect it has on Britain and America.
- Q Why couldn't he stop MATSUOKA from making the trip if he wanted to?
- A Because it was already decided that he will go to Germany and Germany has already been informed in that respect.
- Q Who decided he should go to Germany if there were people such as yourself, KONOYE and the Emperor who thought he should not go?
- A Because he had already been granted permission before these problems had arisen. His trip was decided in the latter part of January and the problems started arising in the middle of February.
- Q In other words, in January 1941, it was decided that MATSUOKA would make this trip to Germany, Italy and Russia? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And that was with the full consent and agreement of the Government, including the Emperor and KONOYE and all those concerned? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q What was there in the situation between January and February that caused the Emperor to feel differently about it?
- A At the time that his trip came about, MATSUOKA was saying that he was making a trip only for a matter of courtesy but later on he started talking about the southern problems and things like that so people began worrying about it. He is so outspoken and so self-confident that people were greatly concerned.
- Q In other words, between January and February 1941, MATSUOKA had become so outspoken in advocating Japanese expansion in the South that there came to be fear on the part of certain people that a trip to Germany would cause resentment in the United States and Britain. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q Was anything done to try to stop MATSUOKA from making these expansionist statements if there were leaders in the Government that were opposed to such a program?
- A I believe there were some in the Cabinet that cautioned him but I do not know concretely in that respect.
- Q Certainly the foreign policy is not determined exclusively by the Foreign Minister, is it?
- A No.
- Q And there would be others in the Government that would have a lot to say about what the final policy would be. What were they doing to curtail or limit the program that MATSUOKA was advocating openly?
- A Because MATSUOKA's assertions were so fantastic, it was very difficult to comprehend because this wasn't seriously taken as Government policy. It was very difficult to handle.
- Q But as you look back on it now, certainly what he was advocating in those days led Japan into this clash with Great Britain and the United States, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q I take it from what you say that in 1941 you felt that MATSUOKA was somewhat of a radical and advancing some rather radical ideas?
- A Upon assuming his post in the KONOYE Cabinet as Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA reshuffled the personnel in the Foreign ministry and replaced all those with Anglo-Saxon leanings; that is, those persons that were favorable to America and Great Britain.
- Q There are always two factions in a Government when you get a problem as big as this involved. Who were the others that sympathized with and sided in with MATSUOKA in those days in advocating this southern expansion? You told me some who were opposed to it, now who was in favor of it and lined up with him?
- A I don't believe that MATSUOKA had any supporters because even TOJO at the time that he quit got into a fight with MATSUOKA.
- Q But TOJO subscribed to the principles that it was necessary for Japan to obtain supplies in the Southern Pacific, didn't he?

- A But in the method of carrying it out, I believe there was great disagreement between TOJO and MATSUOKA. Therefore, in the Cabinet, MATSUOKA did not have any friends or supporters at the last stage.
- Q The Cabinet members other than the War Minister did not contemplate southern expansion? In other words, MATSUOKA and also the War Minister were thinking in terms of expansion into the South Pacific but the rest of the Cabinet were somewhat indifferent to it. Is that right and had no plan to that effect?
- A Yes.
- Q You also mentioned that there was a difference between MATSUOKA and the rest of the Cabinet with reference to the method as to how this expansion should be carried out. What was that difference. What did MATSUOKA advocate as to the method of getting supplies that was different as to how the rest of the Cabinet felt?
- A TOJO wanted immediately to mediate in solving the China incident but MATSUOKA vehemently opposed any connections or involvement with Britain and America. MATSUOKA was greatly distrustful toward any connections with Great Britain and America. While he was on a trip to Germany, the negotiations with America was conducted and he greatly was irked or ired by that. I believe that MATSUOKA wanted to do everything by himself. He had a grandiose illusion of himself.
- Q He was the leading opponent of good relations between Japan and the United States and Great Britain?
- A I meant that MATSUOKA would say that he was opposed to any war with America and Britain but he vigorously opposed any negotiations being conducted in his absence.
- Q He was an advocate of close relations with Germany and put up a strong front whenever the foreign policy with the United States was mentioned?
- A Yes.
- Q What was MATSUOKA's position in the Government immediately prior to his entry into the Second KONOYE Cabinet?
- A I believe he was President of the Manchurian Railway.

- Q Was there a change of attitude in the foreign policy of Japan towards the United States immediately after MATSUOKA became Foreign Minister?
- A I don't believe there was any particular change in its relations with America because of the character of MATSUOKA, Ambassador Grew of America and Ambassador Craigie of Great Britain did not trust MATSUOKA. I heard rumors to that effect.
- Q This Southern problem, so-called by MATSUOKA, was it discussed in Government circles and advocated to any degree at all prior to MATSUOKA coming into the Second KONOYE Cabinet or was it originated by him?
- A Such a problem did not exist prior to MATSUOKA's entry into the Cabinet.
- Q In other words you would say that the program for obtaining these raw materials from the Southern Pacific by one means or another came into existence during the Second KONOYE Cabinet under the leadership of MATSUOKA?
- A Yes .
- Q Had not the military leaders advocated obtaining such supplies prior to 1940 when the Second Konoye Cabinet was formed?
- A I do not remember any previous particular problem. Naturally it desired to obtain all those resources from the South.
- Q But you think the program came out into the open and was publicly advocated through MATSUOKA?
- A Yes, after the advent of MATSUOKA it became a public matter and also the time itself more or less entered into this problem. The situation became acute.
- Q In other words, the desperate situation in China tended to bring on the need for getting supplies in the Southern Pacific?
- A Yes.
- Q TOJO and MATSUOKA saw eye-to-eye with reference to getting these supplies from the Southern Pacific. They were in accord with this same policy of getting supplies from the Southern Pacific?
- A Yes.

- Q I think we could say that the military or the Army group generally sympathized or supported that foreign policy?
- A Yes .
- Q When was it, would you say that the Navy came around and agreed with that program?
- A The core of the Navy around the young officers became greatly concerned about the problem of oil and about the matter of America starting on a naval building program. They were highly fearful that the United States will attack Japan. Also the transfer of the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific greatly stimulated naval opinion. But the Japanese Navy's directing body was very calm at this time.
- Q The Government officials in Japan realized in those days, did they not, that the activities on the part of the United States were in protest against Japan's fighting in China. Isn't that right?
- A Yes, the Japanese Government was aware of that.
- Q Were there any people in the Japanese Government that advocated openly the ending of the China war and the withdrawal of troops from China in order to solve the problem and thereby improve relations with the United States and Great Britain?
- A Yes, that was the problem of the highest concern and that is why the KONOYE Cabinet started negotiations with America in order to settle the Chinese incident.
- Q Did anyone advocate the withdrawal of troops from China on the theory that Japan had wrongfully expanded into China in the first instance.
- A The nature of withdrawing troops from China was the greatest problem and the most difficult and it was the problem of the highest concern by KONOYE. The matter was to retain the face of the Army. It became apparent that the Army favored the ending of the China incident through mediation by America if the Army could retain its face. KONOYE favored the settlement of all the Pacific problems and then to take on the matters of details and small problems after having the settlement taken up on a large-scale. He favored settling the overall problem of the Pacific area and then settling the small problems. KONOYE's idea was to draft a Pacific Charter just like the Atlantic Charter that was drafted on the other side and with the Pacific Charter, KONOYE thought to settle the Pacific problems. President Roosevelt was agreeable to KONOYE's proposal and it was even intended that they would meet in

- A (Cont.) Alaskan waters but the Secretary of State was very cautious and he said that the details would have to be settled first and therefore the problems became difficult. And the unfortunate thing about the plan was at this time Japanese troops began to be poured into French Indo-China and I believe that America thought that Japan was obtaining time in order to pour in troops.
- Q Why was it that Japan caused these troops to go into French Indo-China when it was such an inopportune moment in the negotiations and thereby caused all these difficulties.
- A That is because the prerogatives of the Supreme Command is held separately by different organs and not under the supreme control of the Prime Minister and that is why everything became difficult.
- Q In other words, there wasn't a unanimity of opinion with KONOYE and the military insofar as trying to negotiate a settlement. The military didn't care while KONOYE wanted it settled.
- A Yes.
- Q Was there anyone in Japan in the early part of 1941 from the Emperor on down that took the position or agreed more or less with America and Great Britain that Japan had gone too far in China in trying to settle some little incidents that started the affairs and in so doing had violated the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, and; therefore, Japan was wrong in international law and should withdraw her troops and cease the violation of these treaties. Did anyone go so far as to agree with that situation and advocate such a solution.
- A There were no conclusive assertions to the effect that Japan was in the wrong because at that time there were over 200 incidents whereby Japanese nationals had been attacked in China and also the Chinese primary schools were teaching anti-Japanese sentiment in its text books and therefore Japan thought that she had to do something about it. She did not take on the attitude conclusively that Japan was in the wrong and Japan finally got to the stage where, if she can retain her face, she would be willing to settle the China incident

- Q Were there not any officials in Japan that appreciated the fact that it was perfectly natural for China to fight back when Japan had all those troops in China and there wasn't anything unusual about China teaching in the schools opposition to Japan when Japanese troops were on her soil?
- A Japan was aware of the fact that as long as she had troops in China, such incidents would occur so Japan wanted to withdraw her troops from China and start new friendly relations with China and that matter was specified clearly in the fundamental policy to China as given by Japan. This was fully realized by Japan. The leaders wanted to settle the problems in that way.
- Q But there was no one in high government office in Japan in those days that took the position that Japan had violated the treaties I mentioned, so far as the China war was concerned. They didn't go that far, is that right?
- A No, the matter of treaties did not enter into the picture because of the assertion of self-defense.
- Q In other words, the Japanese Government thought the self-defense theory answered all the treaty questions and that all that was being done by Japan in China was strictly self-defense?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the Emperor hold to that theory in those days that all the activities in China were a defensive measure.
- A The Emperor was greatly concerned about that because he was informed by the previous Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal MAKINO very fully on that matter and the Emperor acted accordingly to the explanations and the information given to him by the Government.
- Q What was it that the Lord Keeper, MAKINO, advised the Emperor with reference to the China situation?
- A Lord Keeper MAKINO informed the Emperor on the matter of treaties and the Manchurian incident.
- Q What did he tell him with reference to the treaties and the Manchurian incident?

- A As said before, Dr. TACHI was consulted on that matter and he said that may lead to a violation of the treaties but because the Government made excuses and gave contrary indications, the situation developed the way it did.
- Q What advice was given to the Emperor with reference to the violation of treaties sofar as the China War was concerned as distinguished from Manchuria?
- A On the China matter, Count MAKINO did not say anything.
- Q Who did advise the Emperor with reference to the treaty status in connection with the China War?
- A The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal at that time was YUSAWA.
- Q What did he tell the Emperor with reference to the treaty violation?
- A I did not hear anything.
- Q Did you discuss the treaty situation with the Emperor after you became Lord Keeper?
- A Because it was after all the things had progressed and developed, there had not been any particular conversation about it?
- Q What generally was said between you and the Emperor with reference to treaty violations?
- A The Emperor said he was greatly concerned because Japan wasn't respecting her treaties very much but because the treaties were not being respected throughout the world, it was very difficult but the Emperor said America is respecting treaties.
- Q And in what respect did the Emperor feel that Japan was not living up to her treaty?
- A Because since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Emperor personally felt that treaties were being violated.
- Q The truth of the matter is that intelligent people and conservative people, such as the Emperor and yourself, fully realized what was going on both in Manchuria and China was not strictly a self-defense operation. Is that true?



- A At the beginning, I believe it was a matter of self-defense but I believe it was utilized as a foothold for future development.
- Q Yes, I understand but you said the other day with reference to Manchuria, that you personally, and also the Emperor, felt in the early days that it was likely self-defense but there came a time in the Manchurian Incident when the expansion went so far that you fully realized it was no longer a matter of self-defense. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q Likewise, in the China incident. Assuming in the early days you again felt that the operation was one of self-defense - and the Emperor - certainly in 1941 there had been enough activity in China so that you and the Emperor again realized what was going on in China was not self-defense. Is that true?
- A I couldn't consider it as self-defense around 1941.
- Q And the Emperor felt that way about it, too?
- A The Emperor realized it, too, but the problem was how to settle the incident. The Emperor gave strong words for following the treaties to the letter and in the case of the fundamental treaty with China, the Emperor cautioned it must be followed strictly and adhered to. The Japanese Army in China did not favor that treaty and therefore the Emperor gave strong words in regard to the treaty that it must be adhered to and followed.
- Q In other words, you are stating then, that the Emperor advocated that the Nine-Power Treaty should be lived up to and that is really what the United States was advocating, was it not?
- A Yes.
- Q Then, it is hard for me to understand why the Emperor didn't take a more active part in trying to accomplish the result that apparently the leaders of the Nation agreed upon. Was it the Army that was preventing that from coming about?

- A In the February 26 incident, the Cabinet had a definite opinion regarding the incident, so the Emperor was able to take a firm stand but in the matter of self-defense, the Cabinet is dragged by the sentiment or the opinion of the Army and for that reason, the Emperor could not take a firm stand because the Cabinet is dissenting.
- Q I understand.
- A The source of trouble between China and Japan has always been in the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese soil and with the start of the China incident, it became apparent that complete withdrawal of Japanese troops must be effected.
- Q You stated a little while ago that the Army as a whole didn't like the Nine-Power Treaty. Is that right?
- A I believe so.
- Q Who was it in the Army, you recall, was particularly outspoken in opposition to the Nine-Power Treaty.
- A There weren't hardly any persons outspoken in that respect because the Army as a rule is not outspoken.
- Q How did you know that the Army didn't like the Nine-Power Treaty unless someone said something about it.
- A Because by judging the course of the Manchurian Incident, persons like MINAMI in the Kwantung Army did not favor the Nine-Power Treaty because if they did, such a thing would not have occurred.
- Q MATSUOKA did not favor the Nine-Power Treaty, did he?
- A His opinion is indiscernible. Because he went as Ambassador plenipotentiary in withdrawing from the League of Nations, I believe he was not favorable to the Nine-Power Treaty.
- Q The War Minister was opposed to the Nine-Power Treaty, wasn't he?
- A Because TOJO did not hold an important position during the Manchurian Incident, I do not know of his opinion.
- Q The Nine-Power Treaty was involved in the China War as well as the Manchurian War, wasn't it?

- A Such a feeling was not held in the China Incident.
- Q What do you mean by that. I do not understand you.
- A Because it was a self-defense matter.
- Q You feel personally there was more violation of the Nine-Power Treaty involved in the Manchurian campaign than there was in the China campaign?
- A Personally, I think so.
- Q You think that the China campaign was more near to self-defense than the Manchurian operation?
- A Yes. In the Manchurian incident, there was no organized resistance but in the China incident around Shanghai, the forces of CHIANG KAI SHEK was aggressive and so in the China incident, an actual war has taken shape.
- Q Let us look at your diary on February 24 where you refer to an audience with the Emperor with reference to the border dispute in Thailand and French Indo-China. What was the gist of that conversation on that occasion?
- A I have no accurate recollection.
- Q On February 26, what did Vice-Minister of the Navy, TOYODA, have to say about MATSUOKA's trip to Germany?
- A I remember Admiral TOYODA saying that a trip to Germany by MATSUOKA would have an unfavorable repercussion in Britain and America and so he inquired couldn't anything be done about it.
- Q In other words, he was opposed to the trip being made?
- A Yes. The Navy generally was opposed to it because the Navy was greatly concerned about the repercussion to Britain and America.
- Q Did he go so far as to say that the Navy felt, at that time, at least, that the United States and Britain were justified in opposing what was taking place in China?

- A The Navy just understood the position of America and I cannot say conclusively to what extent it supported American opposition.
- Q You think the Navy at that time desired to avoid war with the United States, if possible?
- A Yes.
- Q Was the attitude of the Army one of indifference? That is to say, they didn't wish war with the United States but if they had to fight a war with the United States it was all right with them?
- A The Army did not favor war with America. It was in the position that if America came on attacking, it could not avoid having battle with her.
- Q In other words, the Army wanted to settle the China incident in its own way and did not want interference from outsiders. Was that generally the attitude?
- A Yes.
- Q This Vice-Admiral ISHIHARA, mentioned on February 26. I take it this is a different man than the Kwantung Army general?
- A This is the same man.
- Q When I called him "Vice-Admiral", that was a mistake?
- A <sup>Yes</sup>  
~~No~~, he is a general.
- Q You mention his being placed on the waiting list. What happened with reference to General ISHIHARA in those days?
- A Because General ISHIHARA was disregarding military discipline, TOJO had him put on the retired list and TOJO put him on the retired list despite the close connection ISHIHARA had with the Ronin and the Rightists organizations. At first, it was felt to put him on the retired list would be impossible. Nevertheless, TOJO took a firm stand and put him on the retired list.

- Q What had he done to violate military discipline?
- A It is a matter concerning the military only and therefore I do not know.
- Q Did he continue on the retired list, or did he later become active?
- A He is on the retired list ever since that.
- Q That is the same ISHIHARA that was an active General in the Manchurian campaign?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't he a sympathizer of and a supporter of the Chinese campaign?
- A He wasn't very favorable aggressively in regard to China. He was more or less for the stabilization and settlement of Manchuria in order to prepare ourselves for Russia. About three or four years after the Chinese Incident, he even advocated the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.
- Q And what reason did he give for advocating the withdrawal of troops?
- A Because he felt that with the present course of action, Japan would not be able to obtain the trust and confidence of the Chinese people and therefore would not be able to obtain the friendship of the Chinese.
- Q Well, was it because of that attitude on his part, he was put on the retired list? He was opposed to the consensus of opinion of the Army.
- A No, instead of that, I believe it was a matter of disregarding military discipline.
- Q On February 28 in your diary, what did MATSUOKA have to say with reference to the proposed negotiation of the French Indo-China dispute?

- A At this time, there has not been much progress in the mediation of the Thailand-French Indo-China dispute and for quite a while, the Emperor was not given any word of it so the Emperor inquired about the matter.
- Q Was MATSUOKA personally conducting the mediation of that dispute, he, individually?
- A A special representative, MATSUMIYA, was sent there and MATSUOKA was very active in Tokyo.
- Q Was this man a member of the Foreign Ministry?
- A Yes.
- Q As I understand it, MATSUOKA, in those days, told you that the main reason that he was advocating the settlement of that dispute was so that an effort might be made on the part of Japan to obtain bases for operation in order that China might be attacked from the South.
- A Yes.
- Q MATSUOKA told you that when you talked about it. Is that right? He told you that was the reason for the mediation and that was the policy of Japan?
- A Yes.
- Q On March 1, you had a conversation with Minister HIRANUMA with reference to a reform in the Imperial Rule Association. Do you remember what the proposed reform was?
- A At this time, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was being highly debated in the Diet and it was said that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was a public welfare association rather than a political party and HIRANUMA gave explanation to that effect but it was feared that the Diet might consider the Imperial Rule Assistance Association as a Fascistic or Nazi association, or that it may become so, but it actually was an organization which would bring the sentiment of the people to the Government and the sentiment of the Government to the people and act as a liaison. It was explained that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association will be constructed to that purpose of acting as a go-between between the Government and the people.
- Q Was that Premier KONOYE's theory of the Association?

- A This was the explanation by HIRANUMA because at this time, KONOYE was ill and in bed. Naturally, HIRANUMA explained under the orders of KONOYE.
- Q This Mr. KISHI that you mention on February 26. Was that the SHINSUKE KISHI who later became the Minister in the TOJO Cabinet?
- A Yes.
- Q Was he a Rightist?
- A No, he is not a Rightist. He was one of the most capable officials.
- Q Would you classify him in the conservative group?
- A He had a very progressive mind as a Government official.
- Q Was he a close friend of Premier TOJO?
- A No, I don't think he was an old friend of TOJO but probably he got to know him while in Manchuria because he was an official in Manchuria.
- Q Can we classify him as an expansionist?
- A No, I cannot consider him as an expansionist. I believe he wanted to expand without resorting to force.
- Q We mentioned several times this negotiation of the dispute in French Indo-China and MATSUOKA's plan of obtaining bases there. How did MATSUOKA propose to obtain these bases? Was it a condition precedent of negotiating the dispute that French Indo-China agreed that Japan have bases there?
- A No, rather than a precedent, I believe that was to be requested upon the success of the mediation.
- Q Did MATSUOKA discuss with these countries the desire on the part of Japan to have bases in advance of negotiating the dispute?
- A I do not know judging what happened then. I believe it was something that was concluded up later.
- Q Although MATSUOKA had that in mind, you don't think he disclosed Japan's policy in advance of negotiating the dispute?

- A That isn't clear to me.
- Q Well, after the dispute, was negotiated, as it was during the spring of 1941, how were these bases obtained in French Indo-China?
- A I believe that the Navy established bases there. I do not know the details.
- Q Do you know where they were?
- A I believe it was Camranh Bay.
- Q Was that in Southern French-Indo-China or in China?
- A I don't know <sup>geography</sup> ~~Java~~ very much. I do not know.
- Q Were the bases established by virtue of a treaty or an agreement between French Indo-China and Japan?
- A I believe so.
- Q Was there more than one base? How many were there?
- A I do not know in that respect.
- Q On March 4 in your diary, you discussed with the Emperor General HATA's opinions with reference to the Southern program. What did the Emperor tell you with reference to General HATA on that occasion?
- A This was a conversation had just before HATA departed as commanding chief of the China expeditionary force and I believe that he did not have any preparation whatsoever for solving the operation. He held the opinion that Japan must be very cautious in making excursions into southern regions.
- Q Was he opposed to having bases in French Indo-China from which to operate in China?
- A I do not know or have any recollection to that extent.
- Q But you think he took a position contrary to that of MATSUOKA insofar as the southern program was concerned?
- A Yes, I have recollection to that effect.



- Q Was he opposed to obtaining necessary oil and minerals and supplies from the southern region?
- A Naturally, he desired those things but he felt those things must be obtained by peaceful means.
- Q In other words, MATSUOKA and TOJO, in those days were talking in terms of obtaining these supplies peaceably, if possible, but by war, if necessary, and General HATA, before leaving for China, took the position they should be obtained peaceably but not by use of force. Is that right?
- A He felt that force must be taken very cautiously.
- Q Do you mean by that, he wasn't opposed to using force if Japan could get away with it?
- A He was practically opposed to it.
- Q And the leaders of the use of force in the South at this moment when you write in your diary were MATSUOKA and War Minister TOJO. Is that right?
- A I cannot say conclusively they were determined to use force at this time.
- Q But it was their statements with reference to the Southern Program that General HATA was opposed to, isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, it must have been generally known among Government circles that there was a faction that was advocating the use of force to get supplies in the South; otherwise General HATA couldn't have known about it to be opposed to it. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q So it was sufficiently well defined that it came up for discussion before the Emperor and General HATA expressed his opinion on the subject.
- A Yes.
- Q What was the Far Eastern Federation that you discussed with Mr. ANDO?
- A This was a federation advocated by Lt. General ISHIHARA. It was a federation composed of China, Manchukuo and Japan. Hitherto, the placement of China, Manchukuo and Japan in the

- A (Cont) same position was opposed by the military but lately General MUTO, the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, agreed to it and to establish a branch in Japan.
- Q What was it that these military generals were opposed to with respect to the Far Eastern Federation.
- A I believe that there were personal animosity because General ISHIHARA has been advocating that and also because it placed all the countries on the same equal footing ~~the same~~ as Japan.
- Q What was the Far Eastern Federation plan? What was its purpose?
- A It was for China, Manchukuo and Japan to federate and establish a large co-prosperity sphere in the Orient. This was closely connected with the theory of ISHIHARA for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.
- Q In other words, this plan would recognize the sovereignty of Manchukuo, China and Japan and they would deal with each other as sovereign and independent nations. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q The Army generally was opposed to recognizing the separate sovereignty of Manchukuo, and China and wanted to dominate those countries with Japanese influence?
- A Yes, the military had that tendency. The military did not like the fact that the Association or federation would make all the policies.
- Q What do you mean by that? What did the Army want?
- A The military were afraid that a body representing those three countries will be controlling everything rather than each of them being a sovereign and separate entity
- Q Was there actually a Far Eastern Federation in existence in those days by treaty or agreement between those three parties?
- A This is one of the things advocated by ISHIHARA and even in China there was an organization that was advocating the same thing. In Japan, there was a body which believed in it, too, but all these were just private - not a public or governmental organization.

- Q When they talk about establishing a branch of the federation at home, was there a federation in existence on the continent?
- A No, just a branch for the movement for creating such a federation.
- Q So, War Minister TOJO was very much opposed to this? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q When you say it might put him in an embarrassing position, why would it put TOJO in an embarrassing position for these generals to start such a movement in Japan?
- A Because TOJO hitherto has opposed such Far Eastern Federation but because his subordinates were agreeing to it, it was putting him in a very difficult position.
- Q Why was he opposed to recognizing the sovereignty of Manchukuo and China and dealing with them as sovereign nations?
- A He was not opposed to China and Manchukuo becoming sovereign nations and separate entities. He was opposed to the creation of an organ which would be separate from the three and which would be acting independently.
- Q Well, War Minister TOJO favored the continued combination of Manchukuo by Japan, didn't he?
- A The greatest concern of TOJO was that the supreme authority of the Emperor might be damaged or be limited by such a federation.
- Q This federation involved the creation of some sort of a central body that was going to control the affairs of these nations and he was opposed to that.
- A Yes.
- Q On March 6, Marquis, you mention talking to the Emperor about this Far Eastern Federation and he expressed his opinion. What were his views?
- A As written in the diary, I had a talk with the Aide-de-Camp and there has been no talk between the Emperor and the Aide-de-Camp at all.

Q You referred to the Emperor's opinions about the Far Eastern Federation, did you not? I see, by "His Majesty", you meant the Aide-de-Camp and I thought it was the Emperor when you referred to "His Majesty". What was the Aide-de-Camp's opinion about the Far Eastern Federation?

A I do not know. I have no accurate recollection of the Aide-de-Camp's opinion.

Q What was this Federation supposed to accomplish? What was the purpose of having this Federation? The central organization of the Federation was going to do what?

A This central organization of China, Manchuria and Japan was vigorously opposed by Japanese elements although it was greatly supported by many of the elements in China. This was advocated by ISHIHARA and was not an actual fact.

Q What was the purpose of the organization? What was the Government body going to do?

A I do not know of any program or plan offered by this organization but I believe that ISHIHARA thought to use this instrument for solving the China problem.

Q Who was Mr. OGAWA you mention in your diary?

A He is an old experienced politician. He has been very active in China affairs.

Q What was it he told you with reference to handling or manipulating the central government of China?

A A group of persons that were active in China affairs advocated direct negotiations with Chiang Kai Shek regime for settlement of the China problem. Persons like KAYANO was active in Hongkong to obtain that end. Hongkong at that time was a rendezvous of various persons of various nationals and factions.

Q On March 12, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA left for Germany. In your diary on March 7, you write about his having conferred with the Emperor before leaving. What instructions was MATSUOKA given by the Emperor or the Government with reference to his trip to Germany?

- A He had no orders whatsoever from the Emperor. He only had orders from the Government.
- Q What instructions did he receive from the Government?
- A I do not know.
- Q Didn't the Government have some general policy that it wanted MATSUOKA to carry out while he was in Germany?
- A I do not know because I did not hear anything about it. If it was something important or significant, I would have heard something about it from the Prime Minister but because I didn't, I don't think it was important. Because the public sentiment or outside sentiment was against it, I don't believe that MATSUOKA took along any concrete instructions with him.
- Q You don't think he was instructed to solicit financial or military aid from Germany in fighting the war with China?
- A I did not hear anything about it. Under the Japanese system, the Army would not allow any meddling by the Foreign Minister into military matters.
- Q If there was any military support to be obtained from Germany, that would be a matter of direct negotiation between the Army and Germany?
- A I believe that is so.
- Q What branch or division of the Army would normally conduct such negotiations with another power?
- A Generally, a military attache. At this time, General YAMASHITA was in Germany.
- Q You mean a military attache in the Foreign Office?
- A He was a special attache dispatched there.
- Q And would he be selected and sent by the Chief of Staff?
- A He was dispatched by the War Minister. I do not know if his position was with the Chief of Staff or Staff officers.
- Q In 1941, the early part of 1941, War Minister TOJO had dispatched YAMASHITA to Germany to exchange views and ideas on military matters?

- A I do not know what his objective was but he was nevertheless dispatched there.
- Q When did he go, approximately?
- A He was dispatched there before MATSUOKA was sent and then he came back after MATSUOKA came back.
- Q Well, he was there on official business for the War Ministry, was he not? He wasn't just vacationing there?
- A No, No.
- Q Didn't you ever learn what the purpose of his visit was?
- A No, I did not hear anything about it.
- Q Is it true there was very close cooperation between the military forces of Germany and Japan in those days?
- A I do not know how close contact they had but because of the military pact, I believe they were having some close connections.
- Q Were there some secret clauses to the Tripartite Pact which are not discussed in the main part of the agreement?
- A I did not hear anything about it.
- Q On March 13, you indicate the Emperor discussed with you the one-sided movement of the Army. What did he say?
- A I believe that the Emperor was greatly concerned about the military acting arbitrarily and doing everything as it pleased.
- Q Do you recall what particular arbitrary activities the Emperor had in mind?
- A I have no recollection as to that particular instance.
- Q The Emperor felt the Army was taking foreign policy into its own hands and resented that fact?
- A Yes, such occasions had come to light from time to time.
- Q On March 14, when you talked to the Aide-de-Camp concerning Germany, England and the Balkans, do you remember what he had to say?
- A I have no accurate recollection on that.

- Q ' What did you discuss with War Minister TOJO on March 17?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q Do you recall what his attitude or plans were about that time with reference to China?
- A TOJO did not speak to me of any such large problems. He only talked with me about personnel matters.
- Q Why was it he never discussed policy questions with you when other such individuals often did?
- A Because TOJO is very clear-cut on such a matter and he would not get himself involved on political matters with me.
- Q You mean he didn't care to discuss the pros and cons of a question? His mind was always made up and he wouldn't seek advice.
- A Even though he does want to talk on political matters with me, he usually talked upon it briefly and discontinued it. It is his nature.
- Q In his brief way, what did he express to you as to his attitude toward the China Incident in those days?
- A He was always talking about settling the China incident as quickly as possible but he never said anything as to how to do it.
- Q Did he have anything to say about the United State's position?
- A At this time, the Japanese-American negotiation wasn't being conducted and America was not in the picture at this time.
- Q (March 23) What were Mr. TOYODA's views towards China and the South Pacific?
- A TOYODA is Vice Minister of the Navy and he is a pacifist and he was greatly concerned about the situation.
- Q (March 25) I notice in the negotiation of the settlement of the border dispute in French Indo-China that it was agreed that a Japanese subject be made chairman of one of the prominent committees. What was this committee supposed to do and why was a Japanese subject picked for that position?

- A It means that a Japanese as a member of the Committee investigating the dispute was agreed upon by French Indo-China and Thailand?
- Q That was a matter of investigation, I see.
- A And this was a committee that was to determine the boundary between the two countries.
- Q In connection with the negotiation of this dispute, Japan started to negotiate with French Ind-China for economic and commercial rights in French Indo-China, didn't she?
- A Yes, as written later on, it wanted to negotiate on the commercial, trade and economic matters.
- Q And that was in order to obtain supplies with which to carry on the war with China?
- A Also to obtain rice in order to feed the Japanese population.
- Q On March 27 you refer to a conversation with War Minister TOJO concerning the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. What did he have to say about that?
- A I believe it was the reshuffling of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. I have no complete recollection as to other matters and because the Prime Minister also spoke to me of the same thing, I believe it was some important personnel reshuffling.
- Q On April 3, Prince KONOYE asked you to agree to the appointment of TOYODA as Minister of Commerce and SUZUKI as President of the Planning Board. Why did he ask your consent. Was that required before those appointments could be made?
- A KONOYE usually obtained my opinion on personnel matters because he was a good friend of mine and for that reason, he phone me up.
- Q It wasn't a legal requirement that you consent to such an appointment?
- A No.
- Q Why were these changes made in the Commerce Ministry and the Planning Board at that particular time?



A Who was the Minister of Commerce and Industry?

Q SAKONJI, I believe.

A I believe that KOBAYASHI was the Minister of Commerce and industry. I believe that KOBAYASHI was having trouble with his Vice Minister KISHI and because of that, he was in a difficult position and KOBAYASHI was also having difficulties in the Diet.

Q Generally speaking, what were his troubles. What were they about?

A His trouble was purely personal. I believe he wanted to resign because of those personal troubles.

Q This General SUZUKI that was appointed to the Planning Board was the same SUZUKI that was a Lt. Colonel back in the Kwantung days?

A Yes.

Q The Planning Board was a very important board during war time, was it not? What are its functions, generally?

A It was an organization which pools all the resources and then allocates it to various places, like to the civilian use or for military uses and things like that.

Q Did it deal with economic matters, mostly?

A Yes, only in material things.

Q Did it have control over the supplies that were required by the military?

A It is a place which determines how much to allocate to the military and how much to civilians.

Q In other words, if the military needed supplies to carry on a particular campaign in a war, they would have to be awarded the supplies by the Planning Board. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Was the military represented directly on the Planning Board?

A Yes, the Army and the Navy were represented there.

- Q How large a Board is the Planning Board, approximately? Is it large in number or is it a small group?
- A It is quite large.
- Q By that you mean as many as one hundred?
- A There are about four or five bureaus in that Board so I do not know how many persons there are.
- Q Well, it is really a board in the Cabinet, is it not? Doesn't it fit into the Cabinet part of your governmental structure?
- A It is attached to the Cabinet and not a part of the Cabinet. Because SUZUKI was a Minister of State, he would be a part of the Cabinet but the organ itself, the Cabinet Planning Board, is not a part of the Cabinet.
- Q To whom is the President of the Planning Board responsible, the Cabinet, or the Military, or the Emperor?
- A It is responsible to the Cabinet.
- Q It makes reports to the Cabinet, does it?
- A Yes.
- Q Is its personnel appointed by the Premier or some Cabinet member, or is the Board appointed by the Emperor himself?
- A Under sponsorship of the Prime Minister, he is appointed by the Emperor.
- Q That is the President of the Planning Board?
- A Yes.
- Q The lesser personnel of the Planning Board is appointed by whom?
- A The lesser board members are appointed by the Prime Minister.
- Q In order to appoint one President of the Planning Board, is it necessary first to obtain the consent of the War Minister and the Navy Minister?

- A Because the relationship is very deep and close, both parties' agreement is required but it is not necessary under law.
- Q As a practical matter, because of the dissension it might cause in the Government, even so much as to cause the fall of the Cabinet, it is practically required to get the consent of these two ministers?
- A Yes, in order to avoid friction.
- Q So, General SUZUKI met with the approval of the War and Navy Minister in order to be appointed head of the Planning Board?
- A Yes.
- Q Why was it Chief of Staff FUSHIMI tendered his resignation about that time.
- A Prince FUSHIMI resigned because of a poor heart.
- Q And he was succeeded by Admiral NAGANO?
- A Yes.
- Q Was Admiral NAGANO a member of the Rightist group?
- A No, he is not a Rightist.
- Q What were his views with reference to the China situation and the southern problem?
- A Admiral NAGANO held the same opinion generally held by the Navy in that he desired to conclude the China incident as quickly as possible.
- Q Was he interested in taking whatever steps were necessary to obtain oil and other supplies in the South Pacific?
- A Yes, as a member of the Navy, he was very eager to obtain oil.
- Q Did he advocate the use of force to obtain it, if necessary?
- A No, there wasn't any such feeling at this time.
- Q When did that feeling first evidence itself in the Navy? At least when was it with reference to the time America placed the embargo on exports to Japan, that you first sensed an attitude on the part of the Navy to move into the southern Pacific to get oil? In relation to that date, when was it?

- A Yes, it was interested in obtaining oil very eagerly upon the embargo of oil by America and at this time, the Japanese-American conference or negotiations were not conducted, so at this time the Navy was interested in solving that matter by negotiating with America. The Navy favored the settlement of the China incident and after that they wanted to settle the oil problem with America.
- Q My question was when was it the Navy first started advocating getting oil in the South Pacific by force of arms, if necessary.
- A I believe it was after the Japanese-American negotiations became graver and graver.
- Q In other words, in the early part of 1941, the Navy desired oil in the South Pacific but it didn't advocate the use of military force to get it. But after the United States placed an embargo upon its oil to Japan and its negotiations by way of settlement did not prove satisfactory to them, the Navy came forth with the plan to take oil by military force. Is that right?
- A But even in October, when the KONOYE Cabinet fell and the Japanese-American negotiations became very difficult, the Navy still was advocating that negotiations be carried on and something definite be done and then it started saying it would be bad to negotiate for about two or three months and then go to war.
- Q By October 1941, even though the Navy still might have wanted to negotiate the matter, it already had definite plans of going into the South Pacific by force of arms if negotiations didn't prove successful, didn't it?
- A But the younger Navy officers; that is, the core of the Navy was leaning toward war and the directing body of the Navy was not able to quell that feeling to keep it in check. So, it took on the attitude later on, to refer all the matters in the hands of the Government.
- Q The true situation is that Japan was fighting a war in China and needed oil in order to continue fighting and when the United States placed its embargo, the Navy adopted the program of trying to get oil by negotiation but made plans to get it by force if negotiations failed. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q Who was Mr. KOREMATSU?

- A He was my private secretary at one time.
- Q And what did he report with reference to conditions in French Indo-China?
- A I haven't much recollection there because KOREMATSU was not only one time in Thailand. He talked to me about the situation there and he didn't give me anything concrete.
- Q What did he have to say about the newly acquired bases Japan had in French Indo-China?
- A I have no accurate recollection.
- Q On April 13, what was it that took place with reference to granting absolute authority to MATSUOKA in his dealings with Russia?
- A Because MATSUOKA said that on his return from Germany, he stopped by Moscow and obtained a non-aggression pact with Russia and he requested the status of an Ambassador plenipotentiary in that matter.
- Q And what was it the policy of the Government that MATSUOKA should accomplish in Russia?
- A It had the policy of letting MATSUOKA conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia.
- Q Were the military people in favor of negotiating such a pact at that time?
- A Yes.
- Q Was the Government in accord with that without dissent of any consequence?
- A No, there was no dissenting opinion.
- Q The truth of the matter is, is it not, the military desired a neutrality pact with Russia in order that they might have a freer hand in the South to get these supplies for fighting in China? Is that right?
- A No, at that time, the military was not desiring to attack Russia.

- Q Well, since there was a plan, at least on the part of MATSUOKA and TOJO, and maybe some others, to expand in the South Pacific, the neutrality of Russia was necessary in order for Japan to so move, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't that the real reason for wanting Russia to be neutral at that particular time so Japan would have a free hand to move into the South Pacific?
- A Even at the time that the pact with Germany and Italy had been made, feeling was strong. Japan thought that Russia should be included in that pact, too, and when the military alliance was made, this matter was dealt upon with Germany.
- Q What was the German attitude with reference to bringing Russia into the pact?
- A Germany was agreeable to that but the German Foreign Minister said that it should be made into a separate pact and not be included in the Tripartite Pact. It seems for that reason, Germany invited Molotov over and negotiated with him in Berlin but finally there were no agreement of views and it did not materialize.
- Q Well, in the spring of 1941, the Japanese Government had information that Germany would likely attack Russia in the near future. Isn't that right?
- A Yes, fear arose in Japan that after the collapse of the German-Russian negotiations, there would be an attack upon Russia.
- Q And it was at that time that Japan sought and did enter into a neutrality pact with Russia?
- A Yes, Japan would not be able to make close contact with Germany unless she first obtained friendly relations with Soviet Russia.
- Q Why wouldn't she be able to do so?
- A Because of communication matters and things like that.
- Q Well, Japan was very much interested in those days of keeping out of war with Russia, was she not?

- A Yes, Japan was trying its utmost to avoid war with Russia.
- Q Why did she want to keep out of war with Russia at that particular time, having in mind there were many elements in Japan that wanted to attack Russia and when Germany attacked Russia, it might be a logical time for Japan to attack Russia?
- A Because war with Russia would need to be raised on a long front along the Manchurian-Soviet border and Japan was totally unprepared for that sort of a campaign. After the Manchurian incident, Japan was more concerned about Russia attacking Japan than Japan attacking Russia; therefore, the Army was greatly agreeable to a conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Russia.
- Q The difficulty that had arisen between Germany and Russia in the spring and summer of 1941 made it all the more important that Japan acquire resources in the South Pacific, did it not?
- A Upon the start of the German-Russian war, one section advocated immediate attack of Russia but that was not able to be carried out because Japan was totally unprepared for it.
- Q And what did the other faction of the Army advocate as to Japan's military policy; those that were opposed to attacking Russia simultaneously with Russia? What did they consider the best policy for Japan to follow?
- A Because Russia was being attacked by Germany, some sections of the military was of the opinion that Russia would collapse early and because the threat from the North was completely dissipated, opinion became strong for a move toward the South.
- Q In other words, the attack of Germany on Russia and the negotiation of the neutrality pact with Russia eliminated any threat of Russian activities in the Far East, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And that gave the expansionist group in the Army an opportunity to put over its program of moving to the South. Is that correct?
- A Yes, one section had that sort of belief.

- Q War Minister TOJO was one who favored the expansion toward the South rather than involvement with Russia, didn't he?
- A Even TOJO believed that any war with Russia would <sup>not</sup> be a quick one and would drag on into the winter months, so he had his eyes toward the South.
- Q Was there any effort, to your knowledge, in those days, on the part of Germany, through its Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, to induce Japan to attack Russia?
- A Germany even went to the extent that she thought that she would be able to defeat Russia within two or three months and she gave the impression that Japan's participation was not desired.
- Q Did Germany through Ribbentrop or any other of its officials try in those days to induce Japan to attack Great Britain in the Far East, such as Hongkong and Singapore?
- A I never heard any such stories directly.
- Q MATSUOKA was one that favored the attack of the British in Hongkong and Singapore, was he not?
- A That isn't clear to me.
- Q On April 15, you mention having a talk with the Aide-de-Camp concerning Chungking. Do you remember what that conversation was about?
- A I just heard the information that the military and all sorts of persons were negotiating or trying to negotiate with/Chungking Government.  
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- Q What was the gist of the telegram received from Ambassador NOMURA who was in Washington at that time about which you write in your diary on April 18?
- A Ambassador NOMURA requested a proposal by the Japanese Government which would take on the over-all problem of the Pacific and which would settle the problems there and he tried to obtain agreement which would solve the over-all problem of the Pacific.
- Q What sort of instructions was he seeking from Tokyo?
- A With his proposal, he thought that the Conference at Washington would be progressed.



- Q Was he seeking authority to agree to holding a conference to negotiate the Far Eastern question?
- A He thought to go right on with the negotiation, not openly but in secret.
- Q These were negotiations with reference to China and the situation in China.
- A Yes, and also the Pacific problems.
- Q On April 19, you mention Ambassador KURUSU. Was he an ambassador to the United States in those days?
- A No, he just returned from Germany.
- Q Had he been Ambassador to Germany at that time?
- A He was Ambassador to Germany but he was replaced by Ambassador OSHIMA on his return.
- Q What report did he make to the Emperor on his return from Germany?
- A His news did not go beyond that of a normal German relationship.
- Q Did he have anything of significance to report as to what was going on in Germany or what Germany desired of Japan?
- A I don't believe there was such concrete matters at that time. This report was very formal and because I did not make any notations, I do not believe there was anything of significance.
- Q What type of instructions did Admiral NOMURA desire when he sent this cable to Tokyo? What was he seeking to obtain by way of instructions?
- A Because the American side had made proposals and has made a concrete plan, NOMURA wanted the Japanese Government to make the same proposals. Also, he wanted to know if he could go on with the conference on the American proposals.

- Q What sort of a reply was sent to NOMURA by Japan in answer to his request for instructions?
- A At this time, M ATSUOKA was absent. It was decided that the liaison conference be opened upon MATSUOKA's return and at that time, the instruction be given.
- Q MATSUOKA returned the latter part of April, April 22, to be exact. Was such a liaison conference held upon his return?
- A Immediately that night upon MATSUOKA'S return, the liaison conference was held but MATSUOKA was very unfavorable toward the negotiations and so it didn't gain any results. The Prime Minister, the War Minister and everybody was highly willing to go on with the negotiation even though it was late in the night but MATSUOKA was very unfavorable toward it and he left early.
- Q MATSUOKA, in those days, was personally very much opposed to any negotiation with the United States. Is that correct?
- A He is not entirely opposed to any negotiation with America but he just disliked this story. That is something that I cannot understand about MATSUOKA.
- Q Was he so powerful that he was able to dominate the situation even though the War Minister and other prominent ministers favored the negotiation?
- A It was because he was the Foreign Minister.
- Q Didn't the War Minister have a good deal to say about what the foreign policy of Japan was in those days?
- A MATSUOKA was very powerful in that respect. Even in the negotiations with Chungking, he thought he would take care of that matter himself, so he was very powerful in diplomatic matters. I believe he had the intention of taking diplomatic powers away from the Army.
- Q On April 19, when you were discussing these negotiations with the United States concerning the China situation with Prince KONOYE, you made this statement in effect: "We must bend every effort to keep our faith with the Axis powers, and at the same time, we must realize the establishment of a new order of the Asiatic co-prosperity sphere, which is our fixed national policy." What did you mean by that?

- A Ever since the 1st KONOYE Cabinet, the Japanese policy was defined as the establishment of the China, Manchuria and Japanese federation co-prosperity sphere and at the same time to maintain faith of the Axis powers and I thought this explanation of KONOYE would be a very good thing to do if it can be done at all.
- Q You say that ever since the 1st KONOYE Cabinet, Japan had adopted as its national policy this Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q What did that involve? What were the purposes of this program - this Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere? What was its program?
- A The three basic principles uttered by Prince KONOYE became a basis of that.
- Q What were they?
- A The three basic principles was (1) friendly relations with neighboring countries; (2) economic cooperation of China, Manchuria and Japan; and (3) the anti-comintern pact.
- Q Didn't this new order of co-prosperity in Greater East Asia involve a more or less Eastern Monroe Doctrine, to the effect that Japan would not tolerate any interference in Eastern Asia affairs by outsiders, such as England and the United States?
- A It did not have any intention of driving away American or British influence from the Far East nor any other countries.
- Q There were many statement made in those days with reference to the so-called East Asia Monroe Doctrine, was there not and that Japan wanted no interference in East Asia from outside powers?
- A There were such argument among certain people but the Government never adopted such a policy.
- Q The national policy that KONOYE advocated involved the domination of East Asia by Japan, did it not?

- A No, KONOYE did not hold such a view.
- Q Who was it in the Japanese Government that wanted any influence on the part of the United States or Great Britain removed from Asia?
- A The Government never took on such a policy. Some sections of the military and the civilians, however, did have such a policy.
- Q Who in the military at this period we are talking about advocated such a policy?
- A I have no accurate recollection as to who had such a policy?
- Q Didn't War Minister TOJO have such a policy?
- A Even TOJO as a member of the Government undoubtedly did not agree to such a policy although there are various manifestations of such a sentiment among certain factions of the Army.
- Q Where were they emphasized and by whom?
- A The names of the persons are not clear to me.
- Q You don't mean to say that War Minister TOJO wasn't opposed to the United States and Britian giving aid to China?
- A He was opposed to aid to China by Britain and America.
- Q What was it that President Roosevelt had said that the Emperor had referred to in your conversation with him on April 21?
- A The report of NOMURA was that the American President was very agreeable and that there is great hope of the matter being properly disposed of.
- Q What did he have to say with reference to the Tripartite Pact on that occasion?
- A Because Japan was leaning toward Germany and at this time, America was trying to pull Japan toward her, the Emperor was of the opinion that any friendship with America should be highly desirable. And the Emperor was not so highly pleased with alliance of Germany and Italy.
- Q What objection did he have to that alliance?

- A The Emperor was greatly worried about Japan's alliance with Germany and Italy would lead to war with America and Britain, and about that great concern he inquired of Prime Minister KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied that the alliance with the Axis power was entered into in order to prevent American participation in the war and gavethat sort of an excuse.
- Q Participation in what war?
- A Participation in a world war or Pacific war. The negotiations conducted between Germany and Italy in those matters as well as the negotiations with America are all given very clearly in the newspapers so that I desire you refer all those matters to those articles.
- Q What did the Aide-de-Camp have to say on that date (April 21) with reference to the Army's attitude toward NOMURA's plan of negotiating with America?
- A I have no accurate recollection of that.
- Q What did Foreign Minister MATSUOKA report to the Emperor when he returned on the 22nd? You make a note of that in your diary. What did he have to say about the affairs in Europe?
- A Upon returning to Japan, M ATSUOKA reported to the Emperor this talk about the neutrality pact entered into with Russia and he didn't say anything about the Axis relationship whatsoever and for that reason I thought it was very insufficient.
- Q Didn't the Emperor ask him any questions about the German relationship?
- A He may have asked but I do not know - but MATSUOKA immediately went home after making his report.
- Q You discussed the matter at some length then with the Emperor on the 23rd? What was your conversation with the Emperor on that occassion?
- A It was on this day that I heard from the Emperor that MATSUOKA only reported about having a pact drawn up with Stalin and about not saying anything about German relations, and I thought it was very odd.

- Q What significance did you attach to the fact that he did not say anything about Germany? What did that indicate to you and the Emperor?
- A So the Emperor thought there wasn't hardly any significant talks done with Germany and he felt that undoubtedly MATSUOKA just went out there for a courtesy visit.
- Q What did MATSUOKA actually accomplish on his trip to Europe other than just negotiating this neutrality pact with Russia?
- A I believe there wasn't anything done other than the conclusion of the neutrality pact with Russia and we thought this was true because it was reported that Germany was greatly disappointed because MATSUOKA did not have any concrete plan with them.
- Q What was Germany expecting so as to cause Germany to be disappointed?
- A The Germans expected MATSUOKA to bring along a more concrete plan of Japan but because Japan did not have such a plan, they were disappointed.
- Q You think that Germany was expecting a more definite plan on the part of Japan as to what it was going to do in the Far East with reference to the South Pacific and China, etc.
- A I believe so. But the Japanese Army and Navy did not have any such plan and they were not yet in the stage where they would draw up any such plan.
- Q When did the plans of the Army and Navy start to take form if they weren't in existence in April and May of 1941?
- A They were highly hopeful of the Japanese-American negotiation and they did not have any plan for battle in the South.
- Q What month did you say that those plans for activities in the South took form?
- A Right after words came that the Japanese-American negotiations wasn't going along smoothly and simply that the younger officers in the Staff Headquarters began to take on the matter of plans toward the southern regions.
- Q What month would you say that was in in 1941?
- A I believe it was probably around July.

- Q On May 1 you mentioned that a liaison conference was called for the following Saturday. Do you know what the purpose of that liaison conference was?
- A I believe that liaison conference determined the instruction to NOMURA.
- Q Is that the case when due to the efforts of MATSUOKA, Japan refused to authorize negotiations by NOMURA?
- A As a result of this conference, it was decided that the negotiation would be continued. Ever since MATSUOKA returned from Europe, he postponed the reply for about two weeks. This fact obstructed the settlement of the problems greatly.
- Q What reply finally was sent to NOMURA?
- A I believe that the basis of negotiation had been determined there. The details are not known to me.
- Q Was it concluded at this liaison conference that negotiations would go forward?
- A Yes.
- Q Where are these liaison conferences held - at Imperial Headquarters?
- A Yes.
- Q Is that within the Palace grounds? Where are they held physically - the place?
- A The liaison conferences are usually held in the official residence of the Prime Minister.
- Q Where were the Imperial General Headquarters located here in Tokyo? What building?
- A It is located between the Diet and the Palace.
- Q There is a separate building for Imperial General Headquarters.
- A It is the same building with the Imperial General Headquarters Army section and the Navy Staff headquarters.
- Q Are all located in one building?

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- A The Navy and Army are separated. The military section of the Imperial General Headquarters and Staff Headquarters are in the same building. Then, the Navy General Staff and the Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters are in another building.
- Q So there was no one central building in which General Headquarters met regularly? Is that right?
- A Yes
- Q They met separately and came together for liaison conferences? Is that right?
- A And finally gathered in a room within the Palace occasionally.
- Q In the summer of 1941, did Imperial General Headquarters meet in the Palace Grounds?
- A Yes, it was established in the Palace, too but the two separate sections of the Army and Navy existed long before.
- Q They had their own separate sections and came together on occasions but by the summer of 1941 they set up the Imperial General Headquarters in an office in the Palace grounds?
- A Yes.
- Q And were liaison conferences held there quite often or were they normally held in the Palace residence?
- A It was frequently held in the Palace. In the latter part, it was more frequently held in the Palace.
- Q Would they be in the presence of the Emperor, necessarily?
- A No, the Emperor never came out.
- Q Where would the records of these liaison conferences be kept? The matters, orders or decisions?
- A I believe it is kept by the Imperial General Headquarters and the Cabinet.
- Q And would they be on file in this particular building in the Palace grounds with the Imperial General Headquarters office?



- A As far as the Palace is concerned, they just let us use the room and no documents are allowed to be kept there, so they are taken along.
- Q Where would they be taken to?
- A I believe that the Imperial General Headquarters military section and the Navy sections or the Cabinet has it.
- Q Were those buildings destroyed? At least, those Imperial General Headquarters of the Army and Navy were.
- A Later on, the Imperial General Headquarters moved to another place called Ushigome and that place was not burned.
- Q You think the records should be there if they haven't been moved?
- A I do not know.
- Q Where would the cabinet records of these liaison conferences be kept in the Diet building?
- A I believe it is kept in the document section of the Cabinet.
- Q In the Diet Building?
- A No.
- Q What building is the document section of the Cabinet located?
- A I do not know where it is kept. Maybe, the Chief Secretary knows it.
- Q Did any of the Ministers in the Cabinet have offices in the Diet building or were they located in other buildings?
- A No officials are in the Diet Building.
- Q I notice between May 3 and May 8 you have several entries in your diary concerning conferences with Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and the Emperor with reference to instructing NOMURA. What did the Emperor tell MATSUOKA with reference to the answer to be given to NOMURA?
- Q A I do not know accurately what was said but I believe that the Emperor said to do the utmost so that NOMURA would be able to continue negotiations with America.

- Q Was MATSUOKA actively opposing the continuation of these negotiations?
- A Actually or on the surface, MATSUOKA did not oppose the carrying on of negotiations.
- Q I thought you said earlier today that MATSUOKA was not sympathetic with trying to negotiate the differences between Japan and the United States; that he even left one of the liaison conferences early because he was not interested in trying to work out some of the instructions?
- A During those two weeks which he postponed it, the Army and the Navy went up to him and beseeched him and as a result his feeling changed.
- Q In other words, at the outset, when this note was received from NOMURA, MATSUOKA didn't want to have anything to do with negotiations in the United States but he was finally prevailed upon to give NOMURA authority. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q You say that the Army and the Navy talked him into changing his mind?
- A I heard that the Bureau of Military Affairs in the Army prevailed upon him vigorously and in America, Colonel IWAKARO, the Military Attache was very active for the negotiation.
- Q In other words, it is your opinion that in these days, the Japanese Government and also the Army and Navy honestly desired to avoid war with the United States. What they were most concerned with was to retain what had been accomplished in China and wanted to settle the China incident without withdrawing troops from China, if they could accomplish that without interference on the United States. They didn't want to have any trouble with the United States?
- A Yes.
- Q Can we say fairly that although the military had a plan or program to expand in Manchuria and to establish influence in China, it didn't have any over-all plan to attack the United States in those days. It merely wanted no interference from the United States in its operations on the continent. Is that a fair statement?

A Yes, generally so.

Q The war between Japan and the United States, in your opinion, came about through a clash of the foreign policy between Japan and the United States with reference to China?

A Yes.

Q In the last of your diary, on May 9, you refer to a talk with War Minister TOJO, at which time he furnished you information regarding the United States and Germany. What did he have to say on that occasion?

A I believe that the report from the Military Attache was heard and especially Colonel IWANURO's report.

Q What did he have to say? What did he have to say about the United States and Germany when TOJO talked to you on that occasion?

A Colonel IWANURO's report as Military Attache in Germany was that he was highly in favor of negotiation and that the report from the Military Attache in Germany was that Germany is about to use strong pressure upon Russia.

Q On May 10, you refer to negotiations between MATSUOKA and the German Ambassador OTTO. What did these negotiations involve and what were MATSUOKA and OTTO trying to negotiate?

A I have no accurate recollection. Because of the military alliance, I believe he went out there to make contact.

Q What did he want to contact OTTO about with reference to Germany?

A I believe MATSUOKA talked on the matter because of Japan's relation in regard to the military alliance.

Q On May 11, do you recall what Mr. KOBAYASHI had to say about Dutch Indo-China?

A He was my friend and he farmed in the Celebes Islands and he informed me of the situation there in the Netherlands Indies.

Q What did he have to say about it?

A I heard him say that the relationship between the Japanese nationals in the Dutch East Indies and the people there had become very acute and grave and that the Japanese nationals there wanted the Government to do something about it and to ease the situation.

- Q What was the dispute between the Japanese nationals and the local people? What was their difficulty about? What were they having trouble about?
- A It was due to the circumstances and the situation prevalent at that time in which anti-Japanese sentiment was manifested and made Japanese living there rather difficult and unbearable.
- Q Isn't it true that the Japanese Army expansionist group desired to stir up difficulty in Dutch Indo-China in order that the military might have an excuse to move in and take possession and control?
- A I didn't hear of such things at this time.
- Q You don't think the military or the Army were trying to create incidents in order to have an excuse to move in like you said took place in Manchuria in those days?
- A I do not believe that was contemplated because there was no troops stationed there as in the case of Manchuria and China and in order to carry on such a thing out, it requires agreement and the use of the Navy.
- Q What, as of the first of June 1941, was the status of the negotiations between Japan and the United States according to your recollection? What was the issue between them? How far apart were they and what did Japan insist upon and what did the United States insist upon, according to your recollection as of June 1941. I just use that as an arbitrary date.
- A At this time, there were numerous transfer of materials and negotiations and replies and things like that. There were negotiations being conducted back and forth.
- Q What was the issue and what was Japan insisting upon and what was the stand of the United States at that time?
- A I believe there were problems of withdrawal of Japanese troops from China or about the rights in the southern regions and the scope of the problems; that is, whether to include the entire Pacific area or just a section of that area.
- Q Japan insisted upon keeping her troops in China in order to save face? That was her position was it not?

- A But Japan was agreeable to withdrawing her troops gradually.
- Q Did she so advise the United States in these negotiations that she would withdraw her troops gradually?
- A I believe such advice and information had been given to the United States. The details of that is given in the memoirs written by Prince KONOYE.
- Q Yes, I have read that. What was MATSUOKA'S attitude with reference to the withdrawal of troops from China?
- A MATSUOKA did not oppose it as long as Japan did not lose face.
- Q Was it possible to withdraw troops from China and not lose face?
- A If Japan was able on its own initiative to withdraw troops from China, through agreement with China, she considered that the best way.
- Q She didn't want to have to withdraw troops under pressure from outside influence. Is that the feeling she had? She wanted to do it voluntarily and not because the United States or Britain wanted her to do so?
- A Japan thought it would be best that America act as a mediator and would make it appear that Japan on its own initiative would withdraw its troops.
- Q And that is what she was seeking in her negotiations with America?
- A Yes
- Q On June 3, you refer to the calling of the liaison conference to discuss the Southern Penetration Policy. By that time, had it become a national policy of the Japanese Government that Japan should move into the Southern Pacific?
- A I believe that it was a story relative to the fact that an agreement had been reached with Thailand and French Indo-China and it does not involve any forceful incursion into the Southern region?
- Q You don't think there was any liaison conference held on that occasion or on or about that time when the Government discussed taking active measures to move into the South Pacific?

- Q When was it that the Japanese troops were first landed into French Indo-China?
- A I have no recollection as to what date.
- Q Wasn't it about this time or a little later in 1941 that the troops were landed?
- A I believe it was a little later than that.
- Q What were the circumstances that caused Japan to land these troops in French Indo-China? Why was that found necessary to send a large body of troops into French Indo-China?
- A I believe that it was to attack China from the South.
- Q And did Japan have any treaty arrangements with French Indo-China authorizing her to land troops there?
- A Japan landed troops there after a peaceful negotiation and agreement.
- Q And was that agreement entered into between Japan and the Vichy Government?
- A We may have had an agreement on the part of the Vichy Government but actually it was through direct negotiation with the Government of French Indo-China.
- Q On what theory was it agreed that Japan should be able to land troops in French Indo-China. Was that agreed upon by French Indo-China in order that Japan might attack China from the South?
- A I don't believe that it was for such a conclusive reason but it is not clear to me.
- Q Why do you think that French Indo-China was willing to have Japan land troops on her soil?
- A I believe they had no other alternative.
- Q By that, do you mean French Indo-China?
- A Yes.

- Q In other words, great pressure was put on French Indo-China to force them to sign this treaty also? Tell me what you know about how this treaty was negotiated, how it came about and how the pressure was put on.
- A I do not know anything about how this negotiation was done but the Foreign Minister probably knows everything about it.
- Q Certainly, the French Indo-China people were not interested in inviting Japan to come in and occupy their country, were they? Do you have any knowledge or information that they were?
- A I never heard anything about the situation then. I do remember, however, that the matter progressed very smoothly without any hitch.
- Q How many troops were landed in French Indo-China? Do you have any idea? Few or many?
- A I have no recollection as to what size force was landed there.
- Q It was a sizeable force, was it not?
- A I believe it was just about one division.
- Q On June 16, you refer to a visit from Dr. HIROSE with reference to the population problem. What was that problem at that particular time and what did you discuss?
- A HIROSE is a medical doctor and he is highly interested in population problems and from him I heard academic view-points on this population problem.
- Q What was the population problem confronting Japan in those days?
- A He said that because Japan is deeply involved in war, that there is danger that her population would be decreasing constantly and he said that the population would have to be increased on and on.
- Q On that same date, you mention a conference between the Aide-de-Camp and yourself with reference to the pending occupation of French Indo-China. Do you recall what was discussed between you and he concerning the occupation of French Indo-China?

- A There were stories about the proposal for occupation but that the Foreign Minister opposed it and I think that there is a report concerning that.
- Q Your entry on June 17 was with reference to your report to the Emperor on the proposal of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. Why did he oppose the occupation of French Indo-China? What did he have to say on that subject?
- A Because in agreement previously reached by French Indo-China, no mention was made whatsoever of the stationing of troops and he opposed it on the ground that it would gain distrust and loss of confidence.
- Q You mean by that, that Japan was planning to move troops into French Indo-China without agreement on the part of French Indo-China?
- A Yes, Japan was going to use some means of sending troops there and without having any such agreements would cause distrust, so the Foreign Minister opposed it.
- Q In other words, it was the plan of the Government that Japan should land troops in French Indo-China whether they had any agreement with that country or not and that plan, MATSUOKA opposed. He favored negotiating the right to land troops rather than just landing them by force. Is that right?
- A Consequently, on the 18th day, the Foreign Minister dispatched an order for direct negotiation with the Vichy Government.
- Q Who was it in the Japanese Government that was advocating the landing of troops without agreement on the part of French Indo-China by force of arms?
- A The Army.
- Q And who, in the Army, was outstanding in advocating such forceable entry into French Indo-China territory?
- A Those persons connected with the operation in the General Staff Headquarters.
- Q Was War Minister TOJO in favor of such an operation?
- A I believe that TOJO had approved it in having it passed through the liaison conference.



Q In other words, the military people, including the Chiefs of Staff, the War Minister and people in that category, were in favor, in effect, of invading French Indo-China without any consent on the part of that country and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was opposed to that, and in order to justify the landing of troops sought to negotiate through Germany with Vichy France.

A Yes.

Q And it was through that means with Germany, the conquerer of France, Japan obtained consent on the part of French Indo-China to land troops?

A Yes.

Q And because of the condition in France at that time, I take it you feel that a great deal of pressure was brought to obtain consent to land these troops that more or less would not have been granted?

A Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa , 2nd Lt. 02030605  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 58 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. PW 5*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar , hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*S M Betar*

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) Henry R. Sackett , \_\_\_\_\_,  
~~xxx~~ \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on the 25th day of February , 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.  
Place

25 February 1946.  
Date