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A history of Rome fo

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A
HISTORY OF ROME

FOR MIDDLE AND UPPER FORMS OF SCHOOLS

BY

J. L. MYRES, M. A.

STUDENT AND TUTOR OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD

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P R E F A C E

THIS book has been designed primarily for use in the Middle and Upper Forms in Schools ; but I have some hope that it may be found useful also for Preliminary and Pass Examinations at the Universities. With this object I have tried throughout to keep close to the original authorities, wherever that has been possible ; and, where conjecture is inevitable, to summarise the best modern criticism. There is therefore probably nothing original in the book ; and it only claims to lay down some outlines which shall not mislead, if the reader pursues the subject afterwards.

So far as the limits of such a text-book permitted, I have condensed the purely political narrative, and given rather ampler space than usual to three classes of commentary. Firstly, as the opening chapters will show, I have tried to suggest the enquiry, how far the main features of the geography and ethnology of the Mediterranean assisted, or hindered, the spread of Roman domination. Secondly, I have lost no opportunity of indicating the social and economic forces which underlie, and so largely determine, the surface-currents of political life. Thirdly, and as a corrective to the foregoing, I have allowed my history to diverge freely into biography, whenever a personality appeared on the scene which could claim to be regarded as a real factor in events. In the last category, naturally, I include the great generals—Roman and other—as well as the statesmen ; and I hope that by elaborating

REC. C. 1003/1111/1

the military biographies, and the military history in general, I may have made the book more serviceable to some who will make warfare their profession.

The final chapter on 'Literature' was added at the suggestion of others, and very much against my own inclination. The subject is in fact too large, and too minutely taught in schools already, to be worth cursory treatment of this kind; and I can only hope that I may have succeeded, in some measure, in sketching out some of the results, on Roman literature, both of the peculiarities of Roman political life, and of the clash of Italian, Hellenistic, and Oriental civilisation. There should, of course, have been a corresponding essay on Roman Art, and on Roman Social Life; but these necessarily depend so largely upon copious illustration that they were out of the question here.

I should like to add a word as to the Maps. They are confessedly an experiment, and, in some cases, I fear they may have aimed too high; but it seemed worth while to see whether, even in a text-book, modern terrain-drawing and modern processes of engraving could not be persuaded to reproduce something of the actual appearance of the localities. If anybody prefers the 'caterpillars' of his childhood, he can very easily make them for himself. My most hearty thanks are due to Messrs. Darbishire and Howarth, of Oxford—and especially to Mr. B. V. Darbishire—for their constant co-operation in compiling the information, and for the actual rendering of the maps. It will be noticed that the pairs of maps, on pp. 4, 21; pp. 80, 111; and pp. 311, 509, 563, are intended to be used together, and are placed on opposite pages in the proper relative positions. The 'Latium' on p. 80, and the 'Campania' on p. 111, overlap on their inner edges to the extent of about three-quarters of an inch.

My best thanks are due to the many friends who have given me help and advice in details; more especially to the President of Trinity College, Oxford, Professor Pelham, who has seen almost every page in proof, and marked a number of passages for revision; to my colleague, Mr. F. Haverfield, Student and Tutor of Christ Church, who has read the constitutional passages, and most of the early chapters; and to Rev. C. M. Blagden, Senior Censor of Christ Church, who has most kindly revised the whole of the proof-sheets, and taken infinite pains in verifying points of detail. I should add a particular expression of gratitude to those of my own pupils who have allowed me, from time to time, to confront them with my draft of the more difficult parts; and can assure them that whatever they did not find to be clear has been re-written till they saw what it meant.

The Index, which I owe to Miss A. M. Clay, of Lady Margaret Hall, does not profess to be complete; but will, I think, be sufficiently copious for the purposes of the book.

JOHN L. MYRES.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD, 1902.

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INTRODUCTION

THE history of Rome is the history of the rise of a single city-state by the Tiber, first to political predominance among its neighbours ; then to supremacy in Latium and predominance in Central Italy ; and then, by the conquest of the Etruscans northwards, and of the Samnites southwards, to supremacy in Italy south of the Apennines.

Roman
History :
(a) External.

Next, the war with Pyrrhus established the claim of Rome to be respected as a civilised power in the barbarian west, and brought her into close relations with the Greek settlements of the south. Then great wars, waged with the united resources of Italy, against Carthage, secured the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain ; and supremacy, naval and commercial, in the western Mediterranean : and meanwhile the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul extended Roman dominion northward to the foot of the Alps. The successive overthrow of Macedon, of Syria, and of Pontus left the mistress of the west, and the champion of Greek liberty and culture, predominant also in the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, Caesar's conquest of Gaul added North-western Europe, from the Atlantic to the Rhine ; while, under Augustus, the Imperial frontiers were advanced to the Danube, the Euphrates, and the Sahara ; and thus at last the whole range of Mediterranean civilisation was included within the limits of a single State.

In this career of conquest and empire, each step resulted inevitably from the contact with fresh neighbours and rivals, into which Rome was drawn by each successive advance ; and the description of Rome's field of action must include at least an outline of the physical geography of Italy, if not of the Mediterranean at large.

In the same way, an explanation of the very peculiar development of the Roman Constitution must show its relationship, in origin at least, with those other forms of city-state with which Rome had to deal. For, side by side with the first growth of her external dependencies, her constitution itself began at first to expand by successive extensions of political privilege, either as a remedy for oppression, or in reward for public services. Through the stress and

(b) Internal.

distraction, however, of a century of wars, it became rigid and ceased to grow. Then, through the rise of the new problems involved in the government of an empire, and the outbreak of new political and economic grievances at home, the Republican constitution fell into disorder ; and, in the end, became practically adapted to a military despotism : the City and the citizens became entirely divorced from one another, and Rome became merely an administrative capital like that of a modern State.

CHAPTER I

THE LAND OF ITALY

Italy—The Alpine barrier—The passes—The Apennine ridge—The Adriatic trough—Peninsular Italy—The Central Highlands—The Southern Highlands—The promontory of Bruttium—Sicily—The coastlands—The valley of the Po—The Adriatic slope—Apulia—Bruttium—Italy looks west—Etruria—Latium—The Liris valley—Campania—Maritime character of Italy—Resources—Agriculture—Vine and olive—Pastures—Forests—Malaria and its effects—The name 'Italy'—Greek usage—Roman usage.

ITALY is the central of three southern peninsulas which project from the mainland of Europe into the Mediterranean Sea. But the Iberian Peninsula of Spain is washed by the Mediterranean on one side only, and presents its longer sea coast to the Atlantic; and Greece, face to face with Asia Minor, projects but little into the main trough of the Midland Sea; whereas Italy, both by its geological structure and by its geographical position, forms, together with Sicily and Carthaginian Africa, a great land-barrier which divides that sea into an eastern and a western basin. This land-barrier was formerly continuous, but has been long since breached by the sea in two places: the passage between Africa and Sicily being now something less than ninety miles wide, while that between Sicily and Italy has never been more than a mere natural canal.

Both basins of the Mediterranean are bounded on their northern or European margin by a mighty fold of the earth's crust, represented, in succession, by the straight chain of the Pyrenees, the vast curve of the Alpine system from the Riviera to Dalmatia, the confused highlands of the Balkan peninsula, and the plateau of Asia Minor. Only twice in its course is this barrier broken: once, where the Gulf of Lyons receives, by the Rhone, the whole drainage of the north-western face of the Alps, and lays open to the Mediterranean the mainland of Western Europe; and again, further east, where the river-like Hellespont and Bosphorus give access to the Black Sea, and draw

ITALY. Physical.



off, through that inland basin, the waters which the Danube has collected from the long northern and north-eastern face of the Alps and the Balkans. It is only a fraction, therefore, even of the northern drainage of this mountain barrier that is conveyed into the Atlantic by the Garonne or by the Rhine. (See map, p. 310.)

But the mountain barrier, though physically continuous, has never been impenetrable. The Rhine, the Rhone and its tributaries the Isère and the Durance, have cut back beyond the highest point of the Western Alps to meet the heads of the valleys of Lombardy, and carved those groups of passes which have made Turin and

Milan, in every age, important centres of communication with the north. Similarly, the Drave and the Save, which fall into the middle course of the Danube, rise within fifty miles of the coast of the Adriatic, and, by a similar group of passes, have laid the foundations of the prosperity of Aquileia, Venice, and Trieste. And further east the complicated structure of the Balkan highlands allows the Morava, a southern tributary of the Danube, to meet, at their source, the rivers of Macedon and Thrace. Through all these lines of weakness in the Alpine barrier, the rough peoples of the bleak, inhospitable north have been wont to force their way, whenever the men of the sunny and fertile south have become too weak, or too divided, to hold their own against them.

The ridge, which separates the two basins of the Mediterranean, we shall know as the Apennine Ridge, though the name is strictly applicable only to its most northern section. Its structure is similar, though on a smaller scale, to that of the Alpine barrier, from which it parts at the point where the western or Maritime Alps spring from the sea; the low pass (only 1300 feet) above Savona, on the Gulf of Genoa, being usually taken as the point of division between them. At first the Apennine ridge runs nearly due east in a single chain of hills, which is washed on the south by the water of the Mediterranean, and encloses on the north the long, deep trough of Lombardy, the ancient Cisalpine Gaul. But as the Eastern Alps turn southward and eastward to join the Balkan system, so the Apennine ridge turns south-eastwards too, and runs diagonally from coast to coast across the actual peninsula of Italy; the prolongation of the trough, between the Apennines and the Dalmatian Alps, forming the long gulf of the Adriatic Sea.

The upper part of this trough, once submerged like the rest, has long been covered with accumulated silt borne down by glacier and mountain torrent from the convergent faces of the Apennines and the Alps: bare hilly masses of gravels and sands at the foot of the mountains on either side; a vast sedimentary plain of the softest and most fertile soil in the centre, watered, and often flooded, by the converging tributaries of the Po. Seawards, by the constant deposition of the same rich river-mud, the coast has been advancing steadily eastwards, even since classical times. The Roman port of Ravenna is now six miles inland; the earlier Etruscan harbours of Hatria and Spina are further still from the sea; and mediæval Venice only averted a similar fate by constant attention to the streams which feed her lagoons.

Beyond the point where it begins to turn south-eastward, the Apennine ridge forms the backbone of a long, boot-shaped peninsula, which runs obliquely from 45° to 38° of north latitude, and from 9° nearly **Peninsular** to 19° of longitude east from Greenwich; while the island **Italy.**

of Sicily prolongs it southwards and westwards beyond 37° N., and nearly to 12° E. Here solid land ends, but a submarine barrier, whose extent is indicated by the Aegatian and Maltese Islands, and by the islet of Cossyra, unites western Sicily with the east-and-west ridges of the Atlas range, in Carthaginian Africa.

At the point where it becomes peninsular, the character of the Apennine changes. Hitherto it has consisted of a single, narrow, and almost continuous chain, mainly composed of clayey and marly rocks, with passes of 2500 and 3000 feet, and a few peaks rising to 7000. Its steeper face has been towards the south, while long spurs spread from **The Central** it northwards between the tributary valleys of the Po. **Highlands.** After touching the Adriatic coast, however, this single chain is succeeded by a series of parallel ridges, lying in oblique order, one behind another, in a roughly south-easterly direction. This determines the course of the principal river valleys, which drain the intervening plains, and break out here and there through the ridges by narrow gorges seawards. Masses of limestone also make their appearance now, and give a more rugged aspect and greater average elevation to these central highlands of the peninsula (modern *Abruzzi*), the enclosed plains of which lie from 2000 to 2500 feet above the sea, while the ridges rise to 6000 and 7000 feet, and a few peaks of the Gran Sasso d'Italia and the Majella, to the north-eastward, reach 8000 and 9000, and retain their covering of snow throughout the year. As they extend southwards, the central highlands approach the western coast, and reach it in the Volscian hills between Latium and Campania; but as they recede **Southern** from the Adriatic their average elevation becomes less, with **Highlands.** passes of little more than 2000 feet; while their structure is disguised by the presence of cross ridges and by the excavation of river gorges between the inland plains. On both slopes the highlands become appreciably more accessible from the coast plains; but gorges like those of Caudium and Callicula still enable a determined enemy to resist a much larger force of invaders. In these southern highlands the general course of the chain becomes more southerly, and its width decreases again—leaving, on the west, the broad Campanian coast-plain, with its groups of volcanoes, extinct and active, about the Bay of Naples—and, on the east, wide tracts of elevated moorland (the 'spur' and 'heel' of Italy), which are separated from the Apennine chain by an ancient

north-and-south depression running from Teanum in North Apulia to Metapontum on the Tarentine Gulf. This broad Apulian lowland is occupied by wide, rolling moors, and is intersected by considerable streams; the Aufidus draining eastward into the Adriatic; the Bradanus and the Casuentus, on the south-western margin of the Apulian plateau, into the Tarentine Gulf.

Then, south of Paestum, and of a line drawn through the deep valleys of the Silarus and the Aufidus, the whole character of the mountains changes. The marls and limestones disappear; Mount Vultur, which overlooks the Aufidus and the Apulian lowland, is an extinct volcanic peak more than 4000 feet high; and the wild forest-clad promontory of Lucania and Bruttium is built of ancient granites and schists, like those of Corsica and Sardinia; severed into detached masses by the deep upper valley of the Crathis, and by the broad gap between Scylacium and Temesa; but continued, with only a momentary break at the strait of Messina, in the rugged Neptunian mountains of north-eastern Sicily. Promontory
of
Bruttium.

In the remainder of northern Sicily, the characteristic structure and scenery of the Apennines are repeated once more. A bold mountain chain with peaks of some 6000 feet runs from east to south-west through the island; its steeper slope still facing abruptly on the Tyrrhenian Sea, while long spurs and river valleys spread south-east and south-west towards the outer shores. The limited and rugged coastland, which projects to the north-west, lies apart from the rest of Sicily, as the home of the barbarian Elymi, and the sphere of influence of Phoenicians from North Africa. The symmetry of the south-eastern corner, between Syracuse and Gela, is disturbed by confused volcanic beds; while Ætna, whose snow-clad cone towers nearly 11,000 feet above the sea, marks, like Vultur, Lipari, and the Campanian and Etruscan craters, yet other points of weakness in the earth's crust, which result from the Apennine upheaval. Sicily.

The shape and structure of Italy, as we have seen, are determined by those of its mountains; but its character and history, like those of any other country, depend rather upon its river valleys and on its coasts and lowlands. The coast-
lands.

The great lowland plain of the Po valley, which fills the head of the Adriatic trough, does not belong to peninsular Italy at all, and was not regarded as Italian by any ancient writer until the time of the Empire. Physically, it is divided from Italy proper by the Apennine chain; culturally, its history was distinct, until the The Valley
of the Po.

Romans imposed their own civilisation upon it by conquest ; politically, it has always been known by the names of successive non-Italian invaders from beyond the Alps ; in antiquity as the land of the Gauls 'this side the Alps' (*Gallia Cisalpina*) ; in the Middle Ages, as the land of the Teutonic Lombards. The main stream of the Po, though copious, is nowhere too rapid to be easily bridged, or even forded, and has never proved a serious barrier or line of defence, while its broad channel has always served as a main artery of communication from east to west. Of its tributaries, those which flow from the Alps—the two Durias, Ticinus, Lambrus, Addua, Allius, and Mincius, rise in deep glacier gorges far back among the mountains, and furnish the greater part of the whole supply of water ; and all except the two Durias are sustained, as if by reservoirs, by deep lakes, formed behind glacial gravel-banks which choke the valley-mouths, where they issue into the plain from the foot-hills of the Alps. Eastward of the Mincius, the Athesis and a number of minor streams discharge directly into the sea, though the mouth of the Athesis is yearly more and more enclosed by the advancing delta of the Po. Of the southern tributaries, the Tanarus and its dependent streams have carved passes in the western Apennines, which carry Roman roads and modern railways to the Gulf of Genoa, and enclose, between themselves and the upper course of the Po, a detached group of hills, which were the fastness of the Ligurian Taurini. The Trebia, the Tarus, and the Secia, and a number of smaller streams, make neither passes in the Apennines, nor effective barriers in the lowland ; but the Renus, which, like the Athesis, forms a common delta with the Po, though it does not join its stream, has cut a group of valleys back nearly through the Apennines, by which as many passes communicate with the valley of the Arno. The smaller streams south-east of the Renus discharge directly into the Adriatic, and are of no historical importance.

Finally, the short course of the Rubicon marks the limit of the open coast plain of Cisalpine Gaul and the beginning of the Adriatic coast of the central highland district. From this point to the root of the promontory of Garganus (the 'spur' of the 'boot') the mountains press closely upon the shore ; the rivers are insignificant, with the exception of the Metaurus, whose head waters almost meet those of the Clanis, an eastward tributary of the upper Tiber, and permit the passage, through the main Apennine ridge, of Rome's 'great north road,' the *Via Flaminia*. The Aternus, similarly, drains the upland valley of Corfinium, and receives the *Via Claudia* from the Veline tributary of the Nar ; and the Sagrus, Tifernus, and Frento have formed deep inland valleys round Bovianum, in the heart

of Samnium. South of Teanum, the Apulian depression begins to separate the highlands from the sea, and from the detached tableland of Mount Garganus, which rises on all sides sharply to an average height of 3000 feet. The lowland of Teanum and Arpi, whose rich cornland sustained so long the army of Hannibal, extends coastwise as far south as the Aufidus ; but is abruptly bounded, immediately beyond that river, by the Apulian and Calabrian plateau, a repetition of Mount Garganus on a larger scale, with wide, rolling moors of soft limestone, which extend as far as Tarentum and Brundisium, but are of little value except as pasture. The Iapygian promontory ends in another small patch of the same high moorland ; but the greater part of it, like the lowlands of Apulia and Lucania, round the head of the Tarentine Bay, is of a later, softer, and more fertile formation, which, so far as the waters of the southern rivers would suffice, became a rich corn-growing country in the hands of the early Greek settlers. The inhospitable promontory of Bruttium, on the other hand, lies high, and falls sharply into the sea, and affords neither harbours nor cultivable coastland, save only where Sybaris (and then Thurii) in the valley of the Crathis, Croton, below the Lacinian headland, and a few other settlements of Greeks, found a precarious foothold between the sea and the Sila Silva, and took advantage of the passes, and of little anchorages on the Tyrrhenian seaboard, to establish portage-roads, and cut short the voyage to Etruria and the north-west.

The Adriatic coast of Italy looks across only at the rugged hills and barbarous peoples of Illyria and Dalmatia, barely a hundred miles away ; it is accessible, by land, only from the north, from the non-Italian plain of the Po ; it faces the continental drought and cold of the winds from north and east ; it is devoid of natural harbours between Brundisium, Ancona, and the mouth of the Po ; and its soil is infertile almost from end to end : for the Apulian corn-land belongs rather to the inland and the south.

The west coast, on the contrary, is much more diversified in physical character, and of far greater importance in the history of Italy. It looks down southwards, over a sea enclosed (but not isolated) by Corsica and Sardinia, upon the Greek settlements in Bruttium and Sicily ; on the Punic Panormus, Lilybaeum, and Carthage ; and on the two sea routes to the civilised shores of the east. It faces the sun's heat, and the warm, moist winds of the south-west ; its rainfall is therefore more copious, and its rivers larger and of more constant flow ; and its soil is both naturally richer, and better seconded by the genial climate. Its structure is far more complex, and its coastline is conse-

quently diversified with bays, promontories, and islands. It is well supplied, therefore, with safe harbours, and sites for fortresses and cities.

Though, moreover, the west coast looks away from Greece—so that Italy seems, as has been said, to lie ‘back to back’ with her eastern neighbour—the defect was largely compensated by the foundation of the Greek colonial states in Sicily and in Campania; and still more, probably, by those earlier settlements round the great south-eastern bay, from Tarentum to Sybaris and Croton, which won for that coast, before the opening of Roman history, and onwards, the name of *Magna Graecia*; which first brought the native tribes of Italy into communication with Aegean civilisation; and which remained, until Rome was ready for it, the constant exponents of the civilisation of Greece.

From the point where the Apennines leave the western coast at Luna, to that where they begin to rejoin it south of the Tiber, the steep western face of the chain encloses a nearly semicircular area, the home of the

Etruria. Etruscans, which is sharply marked off from the mountain barrier by the marginal river valleys of the Arno and the Tiber, and as sharply distinguished from it by its physical structure. It consists partly of ancient granites and schists, fragments, like Calabria and the adjacent islands, Ilva, Corsica, and Sardinia, of an older land, shattered and submerged long before the Italy of the Apennines was formed; partly of recent limestones and marls, like those of Apulia and Sicily; partly, again, of the craters, lava-streams, and ash-beds of a period of volcanic activity more recent still. The surface features of Etruria, as may be well imagined, are most irregular; some of the drainage flows outwards into the Arno or the Tiber; some converges into the basin of the Umbro, or makes its way direct to the sea; but much is caught in inland basins, where it makes broad marshy sheets of water like Lakes Trasimenus and Sabatinus, or collects, as at Volsinii, in the deep volcanic craters. It is a land united by the common character of disorderliness, and by its aloofness from the rest of Italy, yet irretrievably disconnected within itself; a fit home for the one thoroughly non-Italian people of Italy, and for the one organised confederacy of civilised cities which Rome ever had to face there; a confederacy, however, which she was enabled to face with success, because she never had to meet the whole of its forces at the same time.

Beyond the Tiber, as the rugged limestone ridges of the central highlands return to the sea, they enclose a roughly triangular strip of coast-land, which, in a sense, is a prolongation of Etruria; but it **Latium.** [Map p. 80.] contains no old rocks, and its structure is simple and regular. Out of a comparatively level stretch of recent limestones

(*travertine: lapis Tiburtinus*) and stratified volcanic ash-beds (*tufa: lapis Albanus*) rises a single group of volcanic hills, enclosing two crater-lakes like those of Etruria. The low ground north-west of these hills all drains into the Tiber; their south slope, mainly towards the marshy tract behind the promontory of Circeii; their eastern slope, away through a trough between the Aequian and the Volscian mountain-ridges to join the head waters of the Tolerus, a western tributary of the Liris, further south. This compact and uniform plain is Latium,—the ‘broad-land,’ *par excellence* (cf. *latus*, and Gk. *πλατύς*); the central mass of hills is the Alban Mount, its natural fortress and the common sanctuary of the Latini, and its abrupt outwork to the eastward is Mount Algidus; the towns of the Latin League lie perched upon its slopes and outliers, and upon the spurs of the highland barrier which bounds the plain landwards; and there, a little apart from the rest, where the Anio has just joined the Tiber, and the broken edges of the plain command the lowest crossing-place into Etruria, stands the site of Rome.

For a little distance south of the Latin plain, the Volscian hills press hard upon the coast, at Tarracina and beyond. Then, at Minturnae, comes out the important stream of the Liris, which drains a considerable inland plain of some fertility behind the Volscian hills; and provides, through its tributary the Tolerus, a back door, as it were, out of Latium to the south-east—the line of the *Via Latina*; with a strong military position by the river ford at Fregellae. All this basin of the Liris, though geographically distinct from the ‘broad-land’ of Latium, came early to be regarded as Latin territory in the larger political sense.

The Liris Valley.

Beyond the lower Liris lies Campania, a larger and more varied Latium, but with its volcanic features far more pronounced, and the volcanic activity, in the case of the Phlegraean Fields and of Vesuvius, dormant rather than extinct. The Campanian lowland is separated from the Liris valley northwards by the low, fertile, volcanic ridge of the Mons Massicus, which reaches the sea. Next southward comes beneath it the sunny Falernian country, its only rival among the vineyards of Italy. Inland, the buttresses of the highland of Samnium rise abruptly some twenty miles from the sea; their long wall broken only by the gorge of the Volturnus, whose swift stream discharges the whole drainage of central Samnium between Mounts Callicula and Tifata, and, passing its last bridge between Casilinum and Capua, separates North from South Campania, as the Tiber divides Latium from South Etruria. Further to the south-east, above Nola, the barrier inland becomes less abrupt, but southward, between Nuceria and Salernum, a strong cross-ridge cuts short the plain, and runs out boldly to Surrentum

Campania. [Map p. III.]

and the island of Capreae. The volcanic areas of Campania lie along the shore; Vesuvius, within the coastline, silent and vine-clad till the reign of Titus (79 A.D.), but, unlike the Mount of Alba, never more than a bandit's refuge, in the history of Rome; the Phlegraean fields, half immersed in the sea, weird and restless, a sepulchre of living giants,—so the Greek settlers said, who founded Cumae, Dicaearchia, and Neapolis, in the bays to north and south. Other volcanic peaks, Prochyta, Aenaria, Pandataria, and the Pontian islets, trail far away to sea in a long reef to the north-westward.

Beyond Surrentum and Salernum the wide lower valley of the Silarus repeats, in a measure, the features of the Liris basin; and counted, later, as a southern appendage of Campania. Its only important town is Paestum, the Greek *Posidonia*, on the southern margin of its wide bay; the largest and most northerly of the string of similar towns—Velia, Pyxus, and the like—which cling round the rock-bound western coast of Lucania and Bruttium.

From this brief description of its physical features, the character of the Italian peninsula may be inferred in a few lines. Though so large a part of its area is mountainous, it is to its long sea-coast, almost wholly, that it owes its prosperity and its importance in the Mediterranean, and in history. Thanks to the small width of peninsular Italy, and the small depth of the continental area of Lombardy, there are few parts even of the latter which lie more than seventy miles from the sea. The longitudinal trend of the river valleys makes intercourse easy between the coast and the hills; and the summer heat and drought, which sent, and still sends, a large part of the peasantry from lowland to upland, and back, according to the season, has always prevented any marked breach of political continuity between the plains and the highlands. The wealth of harbours on the west coast, and in the southern gulf, has done much to compensate for the almost total absence of considerable rivers—the Tiber is the only one, besides the Po, that is navigable above its mouth—by attracting the enterprise of foreign traders, and providing an outlet for the produce of the country. Thanks, further, to these same harbours, and to its central position, Italy has only to be administered by a stable and energetic government, to command the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean.

Italy has no great mineral resources. Marble was quarried, and iron, copper, and silver were smelted, in antiquity, in North Etruria and in Ilva, and iron and silver also in Sardinia; but elsewhere there were no valuable minerals, for the boundless sulphur beds of Sicily were of

Maritime
character
of Italy.

small account until the invention of gunpowder. But it is not upon mineral wealth that the prosperity of Italy depends. The genial climate, warmed by the sun and the sea, and protected from the cold by the double barrier of Alps and Apennines, together with the great fertility of its alluvial soils, make it above all an agricultural country. Great stretches of ploughland, even in the upland valleys, permit the cultivation of every kind of grain, and of heavy crops of beans and other leguminous plants; and in the warm and well-watered plains of Campania, systematic irrigation makes it possible to gather three, five, or even more harvests in a year. Sicily, in particular, continued to supply the needs of Rome with corn, long after war and mismanagement, together with foreign competition and the rapid growth of the population, had exhausted the resources of Italy.

The vine, which was cultivated in Italy from the earliest times, flourishes everywhere; and the volcanic soils of North Campania yielded those rich Falernian and Massic wines which ranked with the best Greek vintages. But the most characteristic product of Italian agriculture is the olive, which was introduced from the East by the Greek colonists, and established itself wherever sufficient moisture could be found or procured; spreading northwards round the Ligurian gulf, far away into the valley of the Rhone; and only restricted in Cisalpine Gaul by the comparatively continental winter. Unlike the corn, the oil and the wine were steadily protected by the Romans against the effects of foreign competition, and remained, throughout their administration, the principal resources of Italian agriculture.

Even on the poorer lands, and especially in the dry, thin-soiled moors and uplands of the south-east, there was still abundant grazing ground for herds and flocks, which wandered, as they wander still, with their masters, from late to early pastures, according to the season. A great traffic in hides and wool was among the sources of wealth of the old Greek towns of Magna Graecia, and remained, in the south, in Samnium, and in Etruria, the last resource of the farmers when corn crops ceased to pay.

Finally, above and beyond the pastures, stood the forests; oak, beech, and chestnut; with the Mediterranean pine, and the southern evergreens, ilex, laurel, and cypress, to endure the summer drought; rising on the mountain sides to a height of 5000 and 6000 feet, and providing an inexhaustible supply of timber for Greek and Roman shipping, and no little bosage for the swineherds of Cisalpine Gaul.

One natural drawback, however, prevailed in many parts of Italy, and materially affected the habits and mode of life of its inhabitants. All the low-lying parts, and many of the sodden basins of the interior, are Malaria and infested by malaria. Systematic drainage, indeed, and its effects. assiduous cultivation can do much, as the Romans themselves found, to limit its ravages; but where it was once admitted by neglect, half measures or occasional tillage only provoked fresh outbreaks of the disease, and encouraged the idea that land, once deserted, was for ever past cultivation. The only safeguards, as all Italian communities discovered, are to live above the level of the morning and evening mists, to keep close at night within walled towns, to wear warm woollen clothing in all weathers, and to maintain a bright fire, day and night, in the living-room. Hence, in all probability, the situation of so many Latin and Etruscan towns on almost inaccessible cliffs and spurs of the hills; the often needless strength of their early fortifications; the characteristic Italian dress, of which the heavy Roman toga is only the most notable example; and part, at least, of the superstitious veneration which attached to the sacred fire as the symbol of domestic and of national life.

A word should perhaps be added as to the stages by which Italy became known to the ancient nations of the Mediterranean world; partly because this indicates the sources of much of its 'Italy.' higher civilisation; but partly also because only so can we explain the gradual extension and perversion of meaning of the names by which the peninsula became known.

The first Greek explorers seem to have known the peninsula by the name of *Oenotria*—perhaps the 'vine-clad' country—and Sicily under that of *Trinacria*.¹ But the name of *Italia*,² like that of *Sicilia*, derived from the predominant peoples in either country, soon came into common use, and was extended, as the coasts were further explored, to include the whole of the 'toe' south of Metapontum and Paestum; the inhabitants of the 'heel' being known as *Iapyges* and *Messapii*, and those of Campania as *Opici* (= Lat. *Osci*). The names *Ausones* and *Ausonia*, which poetical usage extended later

¹ The form *Θρινακλιη*, 'trident-land,' occurs in the *Odyssey*: Pindar, Thucydides, and later writers use *Τρινακπλα*, 'three-cape land'; and afterwards the two were confused.

² Varro and other Roman antiquaries connected *Italia* with *ιταλός*, *vitulus*; and interpreted it as 'calf-land,' in allusion to the grazing-grounds of the south-east. But this view is not probable.

to all Italy, properly belong only to the Aurunci of the lower Liris valley.

It was not till the Romans felt the need of a common term for their conquests in the peninsula that the name *Italia*, which Greek usage had made familiar, became applied vaguely to the whole peninsula south of the Apennines; and it was only in ^{Roman usage.} the Social War of 90-89 that its inhabitants recognised *Italici* as their common name. Sulla, in 83, gave to 'Italy' the definite political frontier of the rivers Macra and Rubicon; and finally, in 43, Cisalpine Gaul, which had hitherto been jealously excluded, was recognised for the first time as an administrative district of Italy, so that the frontier ran, as now, along the foot of the Alpine range.

CHAPTER II

THE PEOPLES OF ITALY

- (1) Pre-Italic Peoples : Ligurians, Iapygians—(2) Italic Peoples : (a) The Latins and other kindred tribes—(b) The Sabellians—Migrations of Samnites, etc.—Sabini, Aequi, Volsci—Lucani and Bruttii—Contrast between Sabellians and Latins—(3) The Etruscans : their Origin, their Character, their Conquests—(4.) The Gauls : Effects of the Gallic Migration—(5) The Greek Colonies : Achæan, Chalcidian, Dorian ; Tarentum, Massilia, Velia : their Influence.

THE peoples of Italy are found to be distributed, as is natural, closely in accordance with the physical divisions of the country. Like the **1. Pre-Italic Peoples.** neighbouring peninsulæ of Greece and Spain, Italy exhibits traces of an original Mediterranean stock, of moderate stature, shapely figure, and brunette complexion, which, however much its material and intellectual culture may have been transformed by successive immigrations from elsewhere, still determines, even at the present day, the appearance and the temperament of the vast majority of the population south of the Apennines. To this stock are to be referred the vague traditional allusions to various prehistoric peoples, whose character and fortunes it was already impossible to trace clearly, even in classical times. Thus the Roman historians told of the *Aborigines*, of whom nothing was known, save that no man was there before them, or adopted the Greek idea of a prehistoric race of *Pelasgians*, whose existence in Italy, as on the shores of the *Ægean*, was assumed mainly in order to explain the numerous traces of rude forts and settlements whose history was forgotten, and to account for the similarities of tradition, or of religious observance, which were found to exist between separate localities in Italy itself, or between Italy and Greece as a whole. In the same way the *Siculi* were said to have founded the first settlement at Rome, and also Antemnae and Tibur, and then to have been driven south by the arrival of genuine 'Italian' peoples, till at last they found safety in Sicily, and gave to it their name ; an obvious attempt to explain why the actual population of Sicily was so closely allied to that of southern Italy, and

how it had come to preserve certain ruder customs and traditions than were found to survive on the mainland.

It was, however, only in the extreme north-west and the extreme south-east of Italy that any considerable remnants survived of pre-Italic or non-Italic peoples.

The Ligurians of the Northern Apennines and of the Maritime Alps, whom Greek explorers knew as the Ligyes, were a sturdy race of brave and obstinately independent highlanders, of a totally different build and temperament from that of the natives of Peninsular Italy. They had probably once extended much more widely than in classical times, and had been restricted to the safe refuge of their mountain valleys by the expansion of the Etruscans from the south, and of the Gauls on either side of the Alps. Thus they remained aloof from Italian history until Rome was compelled to fight her way, glen by glen, through their country, to her Spanish and Transalpine provinces. Once conquered, they provided the Romans with brave and active auxiliaries, expert in mountain warfare, and their descendants may still be recognised throughout the Riviera and Savoy. Ligurians.

The Iapyges, Messapii, Peucetii, and other kindred tribes of the 'heel' and the Apulian plateau are also definitely of non-Italian race. Their language, of which few specimens are preserved, is written in a barbaric Greek character, but is neither Italic nor Greek, Iapygians. though it has clearly a distant relationship with both. As late as 350, the primitive institutions and backward civilisation of these tribes remained almost unaffected, in spite of their close neighbourhood and frequent contact with Tarentum and other Greek settlements on the coast; but before the end of the second Punic War they had become almost entirely Hellenized. They have been regarded by some writers as the remains of an early wave of Aryan-speaking invaders from the north; but considering the close proximity of the 'heel' of Italy to the opposite coast of the Adriatic, it is more probable that, like the Istri and Veneti, who spread round the head of the Adriatic within the borders of Cisalpine Gaul, they are Illyrian immigrants. The Greek legend of the Illyrian origin of Daunus, Iapyx, and Peucetius shows that this belief was current in antiquity; and it is confirmed by the occurrence of the tribal name of the Chaones on both sides of the strait, and by the fact that an exactly similar immigration, in the Middle Ages, introduced into Calabria a large Albanian-speaking population, whose language and creed are hardly extinct there yet.

In strong contrast with these fragmentary and marginal tribes stands the Italic stock, to which belong all the dominant peoples of Central Italy,

including the Romans themselves. They entered the peninsula from the north, like the Gauls and the Lombards after them, as a superior race

2. **Italic Peoples.** with a strongly marked personality and clear ideals of life and conduct; their languages belong to the Aryan group, and are related both to Greek, and, somewhat more closely, to Celtic speech; and their religion, institutions, and mode of life confirm the impression derived from their language. All the peoples of this Italic stock, which has set its mark for ever upon the history of Italy, are nearly akin to each other; their languages are strongly marked dialects, rather than different tongues; and their temperament, their religious ideas, and their social institutions are in essentials almost identical. But they may be divided, partly by differences of original character, and still more by the effects of their respective fortunes after they entered Italy, into two main groups of tribes—the Latin and the Sabellian.

The peoples of the Latin group appear to have been the earlier to establish themselves in the peninsula, and to have been already partly

(a) **Latins.** overflooded by later comers, before the time when Roman history begins. And since, in all ages, the entrance into Italy from the north has been by the Adriatic flank of the Apennines, into the headwaters of the Arno and the Tiber, we find these 'Latin' folk driven down toward the west coast, so as to be an essentially lowland people which only survives pure and unmixed in the coast-plain of Latium. North of the Tiber they were wholly conquered and enslaved by the Etruscans; south of it, as we shall see, Sabellian highlanders hemmed them in, from the upper valley of the Anio to the promontory of Circeii.

It is probable, though not certain, that tribes akin to the Latini once extended southwards into Campania, if not beyond. The Volsci themselves absorbed a considerable lowland element, the Aurunci and **Otherkindred tribes.** Sidicini are neither Volscian, nor Samnite, nor Campanian; and in Campania itself, which in its physical features so closely resembles Latium, a lowland Italic people certainly existed before the Etruscan and Samnite invasions, and has left behind it many of its place-names, and no small tincture of its blood. It is possible that these ancient lowlanders may be the 'Opici' or 'Osci' of the Greek geographers, just as their 'Ausones' are the Aurunci; but the name 'Oscan' has unfortunately been appropriated, latterly, to denote the dialects of the Sabellian intruders. So too, finally, those other 'Opici' and 'Itali' of Magna Graecia may perhaps represent the last southward traces of the same lowland stock, before the coming of the Lucanian highlanders. Be this as it may, it is clear (1) that from

Latium southwards to Magna Graecia the lowland peoples with whom the Greeks had to deal were recognised by them as possessing some community of civilisation with themselves, and as capable, in large measure, of adopting Hellenic culture; and (2) that in the fifth century B.C. all this was changed with the appearance of the rude and intractable highlanders of Lucania and Samnium.

^ The Sabellians and Umbrians, who form the other group of Italic-speaking tribes present strong points of analogy with the 'Dorian' immigrants in early Greece, and appear to have spread through the peninsula later than the Latin peoples, and to have kept for the most part among the mountains; partly, perhaps, in the first instance, because they found the plains already occupied by a superior civilisation; but partly also from a natural preference for the wilder life of the highlands. The northern section of this group included the Umbrians, who occupied, at one time, the whole width of Italy from the coast of Etruria to the Adriatic. But in historic times they had been wholly expelled from the Adriatic seaboard by the more recent irruption of the Gaulish Senones, and from the eastern side of the Apennines by the Etruscans; though there remained a few Umbrian cantons in the upper valley of the Tiber. Southward they were bounded by their kinsmen the Sabellians.

The latter seem at one time to have occupied a limited area eastward of the Latins, within the basins of the Nar and the Anio; but to have been pressed southward at the beginning of the historic period by their Umbrian neighbours, and to have consecrated, year after year, a part of their natural increase to go forth to find a new home. One swarm of these immigrants, who took the ox of their god Mars as their badge and omen, struck southwards into the glens round Bovianum, the 'Ox-town,' where they became known later as the Samnites;¹ a second, devoted to the wolf (*hirpus* in their dialect) pushed further in the same direction, and appear as the Hirpini; a third, led by the woodpecker (*picus*), pressed north-eastwards towards that part of the Adriatic coast, south of Umbria, which became known after them as Picenum; while a fourth, dedicated more expressly to their own god Mars, formed the warlike tribe of the Marsi, near the Fucine Lake, in the centre of the Sabellian highlands. The less important tribes of the Marrucini, Paeligni, Vestini, and Frentani, which occupy the rest of the central highlands between Picenum and Samnium, seem to be of similar origin.

Migrations
of Samnites,
etc.

¹ *Sabelli*, *Sabini*, *Samnites*, and the Greek *Σαβῆραι* (for *Σαβῖραι*) are all local varieties of the same widespread name: *ab Sabinis orti Samnites*, as Varro says.

South-westward, the migrations of Sabellian peoples were not limited to the hill-country. The Sabini descended into Latium as far as the junction of the Tiber and the Anio, and at one time even held an advanced post on the Quirinal Hill of Rome. The Aequi, further south-east, harassed the inland cities of the Latin League with constant Sabini, Aequi, raids, and attempted again and again to fortify themselves Volsci.

on the Mons Algidus (p. 84). The Volsci followed a coast-range southward till they reached the sea at Tarracina; occupied the Pomptine marshes which terminate the Latin plain; and thence, with their associates the Rutuli, raided the level country to the foot of the Alban Mount. Further south again, the Samnites in their turn made frequent raids upon the rich and populous cities of Campania, where some of them established themselves permanently between 440 and 420; while another body of them swarmed down, a generation later, upon the prosperous Opican districts, round the colonies of Magna Graecia, Lucani and almost wholly overwhelmed them. Finally, through Bruttii. Lucania, about a century later again, broke forth the brigand herdsmen of Bruttium, who continued to desolate the wild region of the Sila Silva, until Rome conquered and enslaved them all.

All these highland branches of the Italian stock agree in their contrast with the Latins and their lowland kinsmen. Whereas in Latium, and to some extent in old Campania, we find regularly constituted city-states, grouped moreover in organised leagues with a common

**Contrast
between
Sabellians
and Latins.**

federal government, the Sabines, Samnites, and other tribes of the Apennine highlands display a much lower and more primitive type of political structure. Here, just as in the Greek highlands of Arcadia or Aetolia, each valley as a rule remained separate from its neighbours in interests and in administration; uniting, perhaps, under the pressure of a common danger from without, in loose military confederacies; but falling asunder again, as soon as the immediate need was over, or local jealousies were aroused. Their frequent raids upon the lowland expressed no consistent policy like that which directed the campaigns of the Latin League or of Rome; the whole Sabellian area included no town worthy to be compared with the cities of Latium or Campania; and all that is known, of their social and economic life, shows them as unreceptive and unprogressive, as Latium and the other coast districts were the reverse. Consequently, in her wars with the Sabines, the Volscians, and the Samnites, the cause of Rome was the cause of order, organisation, and enlightenment, against the representatives of primitive anarchy, isolation, and barbarism.

But the foes of the Latins were not only of their own kindred. The whole of the confused country which lies between the northern

ITALY. Populations.



Apennines, the Tiber valley, and the Tyrrhenian Sea was occupied by a mysterious people, known to themselves as the ³. Etruscans. *Rasenna*, to Greek explorers as *Tyrrheni*, or *Tyrseni*, and in the Latin tongue as *Tusci* or *Etrusci*. On every side they were regarded as alien to the Italian peoples; but as their language became extinct after the Roman conquest of their country, and as their numerous inscriptions, though written in an alphabet borrowed from the Greeks, are now wholly unintelligible, it is impossible to be certain of their real origin. Outside Etruria proper, their remains are found all over the southern half of the Po valley, where

a league of twelve towns, like that of Etruria itself, was overwhelmed by the invasion of the Gauls; and also in Campania, where another league of twelve towns was crushed about 420 by the Samnite invasion.

Whatever their origin, it is generally admitted that the Etruscans were in no sense an Italian people; and two views have been put forward as to how they came to live in Etruria. The Greeks, who described them earliest, believed that they were an Asiatic people, akin to the Lydians, and that they arrived in Italy by sea. Their origin. They pointed to resemblances between the civilisation of the two peoples, which they thought could not be accidental; to traces of 'Tyrrhenian' and 'Torrhaebian' folk, which still remained scattered up and down in the Aegean; and to the peculiar chronology of Etruria, which began its reckoning from an era contemporary with that period of anarchy and migration in the Aegean, which followed the fall of Troy and the collapse of the empire of Agamemnon. Herodotus describes in detail how after many wanderings they 'came to the Umbrians' (Bk. i. ch. 94), and so found their way to the places where they dwelt in his time; and, as we shall see (p. 28), the Romans, too, assumed a similar migration from Phrygia to Latium, to account for the origin of Rome.

The other view, which was first put forward by the later Roman antiquaries, argued, from the traces of former Etruscan settlements in the Po valley, that, like the other dominant races of Italy, the Etruscans entered Etruria by land, and from the north. But this would be equally the case, if the story of Herodotus be accepted, that they landed on the coast of the 'Umbrians,' that is, on the Adriatic shore, and struck thence up-country across the Apennines and so into Etruria.

Meanwhile it is now becoming clear, first, that the northern settlements of the Etruscans are not so extensive or so primitive as those which lie south of the Apennines; and, secondly, that the actual evidence of very early settlements of Aegean adventurers in the west is very much stronger than the Greek historians themselves had any reason to suspect.

But, whatever their origin, neither in Etruria itself, nor in their other settlements, do the Rasenna seem to have formed any large proportion of the population. They are represented rather as a Their character. dominant aristocracy—priests, princes, and landowners in one—strongly marked off by limits of caste, if not of race, from their serfs and dependants, the natives of the land. Their physical frame, if we

may trust either their own portraiture or Roman caricatures, was broad, large-limbed, and thick-set; their disposition stern, gloomy, and superstitious; their civilisation, which borrowed much from that of the Greek settlements in Campania, and more perhaps by direct intercourse with the ports of the Aegean and the Levant, became materially elaborate and luxurious; their alphabet was borrowed from the Chalcidian traders; and their sculpture and painting were clumsily copied from masterpieces of Athenian art, which they hoarded for their splendid funerals. But the gross self-indulgence and cruel sensuality of this race of gorgeous and strenuous tyrants were incompatible with real appreciation of the intellectual side of Greek culture. Etruria produced no living art, and, so far as we know, no literature of its own.

At the time of their greatest expansion, which may be dated from 800 to 500 B.C., the Etruscans were conterminous on the east with the Illyrian Veneti at the head of the Adriatic, and on the west with the Ligurians of the maritime Apennines; while on the south they dominated Latium, and thus maintained communication through a hostile country with their southern conquests round the bay of Naples.

The whole distribution of the peoples of Italy, which has been described, was rudely disturbed at the beginning of the eighth century B.C. by a series of invasions of Celtic or Gallic peoples from beyond the Alps. Of the causes, and of the details of these invasions, we can learn but little as yet, but of their importance to Italy we can judge by the results. The Insubres poured through the passes of the Pennine Alps, settled throughout the whole plain north of the river Po; thrust back the Ligurian Taurini to the hilly country about its headwaters, and the Veneti behind the Athesis and the Euganean hills; and established their headquarters at Mediolanum. The Boii and Lingones occupied the whole of the country between the main stream of the Po and the Apennines, pressing back the Etruscans and Ligurians behind the shelter of the hills. Further east still came the tribe of the Senones, driven by the pressure of those behind, right across the valley into the coast-land of the Umbrians on the Adriatic shore. And still fresh hordes continued to cross the Alps, and the first comers multiplied in the broad fertile plain, until it seemed inevitable that the Gaulish flood should overflow through the passes of the Apennines into Etruria and the valley of the Tiber.

This irruption of the Gauls transmitted a succession of shocks from tribe to tribe throughout Italy. On the eastern coast and in the central highlands the Umbrians pressed upon the Sabellians, and the Sabellians

in their turn sent forth southwards those bands of Samnite adventurers, whose distribution over Lower Italy has already been described. South of the Apennines, the Etruscans, though protected for the moment against further incursions by their mountain frontier and by the impassable swamps of the Arno, recouped themselves for the loss of their northern cities by systematic raids on the originally Latin area south of the Ciminian Forest ; until, with the exception of Falerii and one or two smaller towns which seem always to have been regarded as Latin, the whole country down to the banks of the Tiber became subject to Etruscan overlords, and the Etruscan house of the Tarquinii became the royal family of Rome.

It only remains to account for the Greek settlements on the southern shores. Many vague traces remain of prehistoric communication between the Ægean and the west, which perhaps are partly accountable for the stories of Pelasgian settlements, and of colonies founded by adventurers in their return from the Trojan War.

The Achæans and Locrians of the Corinthian Gulf planted a line of cities round the great southern bay—Metapontum, Sybaris, Croton, Scylacium, Caulonia, and Locri-in-the-West—which attained to great size and prosperity in the seventh and sixth centuries, and earned for that shore the name of Greater Greece (*Magna Græcia*).

Other adventurers from Chalcis in Eubœa, had carried exploration further west. These founded first Naxos in 734, then Catana and Leontini, also in north-eastern Sicily, and Zancle (or Messina) and Rhegium to command the strait ; and then, pushing further afield, built Himera on the north shore of Sicily, and Cumæ and its daughter towns on the coast of Campania. Cumæ, indeed, boasted itself the oldest colony in the west ; and it was perhaps in Campania that settlers from Graia, a small district near Chalcis, gave occasion to the name *Graici* or *Graeci*, which became the common term for all Hellenic folk, in the languages of Italy.

Corinth, too, had run a neck-and-neck race with Chalcis for the occupation of Sicily, and founded Syracuse (in the same year as Naxos) and other towns later in the south-east corner. Other Dorian states—Rhodes, Cnidus, and the Cretan towns—occupied Gela and Agrigentum, next in order ; and the Megarian colony of Selinus carried the sphere of Greek influence within range of the Phœnician stations in the western end of the island.

Of these latter, the most noteworthy were Motye and Lilybæum, over against Carthage ; and Panormus and Soloeis, which look out northwards

into the Sea of the Tyrrhenians, and are bounded in their turn by the Chalcidian Himera.

Meanwhile, in the year 708, low-caste exiles from Sparta landed on the unfriendly coast of Iapygia, and occupied the magnificent natural harbour of Tarentum : where, by their enlightened commercial policy, they drew into their own hands a large part of the westward trade, both by sea and by the land routes into the interior of the peninsula ; pasturing meanwhile vast flocks of sheep on the Apulian downs, and exploiting the purple fisheries along the coast to dye their famous woollens. Tarentum.

A century later, in 600, traders from Ionic Phocæa on the Lydian coast, bolder than all other Greeks, pressed far beyond the Sicilian strait and the Tyrrhenian pirates, and founded Massilia by the mouth of the Rhone. Thence many daughter cities—Nicaea, Antipolis, and Monoecus—spread eastward along the Ligurian coast ; others, like Emporiae, westward as far as the mouth of the Ebro ; and Phocæan explorers visited the half-fabulous mine-land of Tartessus in Southern Spain. Massilia.

Finally, in 545, when their home in Asia was threatened by the Persians, a second swarm of Phocæans made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to establish themselves at Alalia in Corsica, face to face with their Tyrrhenian enemies ; and the beaten remnant found refuge at last on the Lucanian coast at Velia. Velia.

Thus, all South Italy, and Campania in particular, was already in continuous contact with the highest contemporary civilisation, before the foundation of Rome. Oenotrians, Campanians, and Etruscans alike had imported much, and absorbed more, of the elements of industry and art, and had early learned the use of alphabetic writing. Their influence. South Italy, besides, was to produce, within a century of the fall of the Roman monarchy, two independent systems of philosophy—the Pythagorean, in the Achaean towns, and the Eleatic, in Velia ; and the first written codes of public law were those of Zaleucus in Locri (662), and of Charondas in Catana (650-600). Thus, in spite of its westward geographical aspect, Italy was brought early and effectually into contact with the main stream of Mediterranean civilisation ; while at the same time its best native peoples lay far enough, and long enough, beyond the range of the political ideals and struggles of the city states of Greece, to work out an order of society and government, which was, and remained, genuinely Italian.

CHAPTER III.

THE CHRONICLES OF THE KINGS OF ROME

The Autobiography of a People—Its merits and defects—Its value as history—Aeneas of Troy—Romulus and Remus—The seven Kings of Rome—The Expulsion of the Kings—Porsena—Lake Regillus—Origin, Character, and Interpretation of the Legends.

THERE are two ways of studying the growth of a people. We may either take the ancient Romans at their own estimate, and accept as the groundwork of our belief about them the story which they told about themselves; or we may start with their monuments and their art, their observances and ceremonies, and the framework of their society and state, and build up from these an impersonal account of their culture, their constitution, and their relations with their neighbours; and then, with these conclusions as our standard, we may decide what fragments of their own traditions are sufficiently true or accurate to be admitted into a scientific history.

Each of these methods of study, ancient and modern, literary and scientific, possesses obvious advantages which are peculiar to itself; but each of them likewise is subject to defects which only the other can supply. A nation's own story about itself will have all the merits, and also all the faults, of any other autobiography. It will reveal to us the conception which a great people has formed of its own mission in the world, and of the guidance, human and superhuman, by which it believes that it was brought up to fulfil it.

It is proverbial, on the other hand, that 'bystanders see most of the game.' Valuable as it may be as a version of the facts as they appeared to the actors on the stage, and as a justification of their own line of action, a nation's autobiography will not necessarily give us an accurate knowledge of what it was that happened: and the accurate statement of what happened is the primary task of all true historians. It is not the inspired leaders of men, or the strong political partisans, or the heroic rank and file of a great army, who are

qualified best to judge fairly, or even to record truly, the events of which they are themselves so great a part. History composed at such close quarters as these cannot but be partial and short-sighted history, and inevitably needs revision in the colder light of after time and scientific analysis. And when the great deeds of old, told even in the first instance by deeply interested eye-witnesses, are re-told through generations as examples or warnings for the future, still less can we hope, then, to unravel truth from allegory, historical facts from the moral or political interpretation of them. It is not from legends of heroic duels, for example, that we shall recover the policy or the strategy of the early wars of Rome.

Yet the greater the people, and the nobler the part which it has played in history, the more valuable becomes its own account of itself, as a revelation of the ideals and examples which inspired the statecraft of its rulers, and the heroism of its citizens. The Chronicles of the Jewish Kings, with their award of praise or blame, according as a monarch 'did good—or evil—in the sight of the Lord,' record historical events from a moral, not from a historical standpoint; but, for this very reason, the light which they throw upon the scanty record of the same events in the contemporary annals of Assyria and Egypt is of the first importance to the secular historian also. If the Trojan War ever be proved to be a historical event, it will not be from the statements of the *Iliad*, yet the epic 'Bible of the Greeks' not only had the profoundest influence over Greek ideals of life and conduct far on into the historic age, but is a document of the highest value for the history of Aegean civilisation.

Its value as history.

So too with Rome. Never was there a nation whose beliefs about its own origin were so strongly coloured by the ideals which dominated its career; nor, either, whose early career, at all events, was so profoundly influenced by its beliefs about its origin and destiny. Now the 'Bible' of the Romans, so to speak, like that of the Jews themselves, was the whole volume of traditions and memorials of the kings and 'judges,' the prophets and warriors, the heroic men and women of every rank, who spent themselves to keep Rome one and make Rome great; to realise an ideal of loyal citizenship at home, and of an imperial state abroad, which should conquer the world and rule it well—

The Romans' own story about their origin.

'Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
Parcere subiectis, et debellare superbos.'

It is necessary, therefore, at the outset to inquire what kind of stories

the Romans themselves learned and believed about their own State and its origin ; to postpone for the moment the question whether or no these stories are in reality true ; and to present them in some such old-time shape as may help us to realise how a Roman viewed them.

When Troy was taken by the Achaeans, Aeneas, the son of Anchises and the Goddess Venus, took his aged father, and his infant son **Aeneas of Troy.** Ascanius, and his household gods, and sailed away to seek a city to dwell in. After many wanderings he reached the coast of Latium ; and King Latinus received him kindly, and gave him his daughter Lavinia in marriage. Then Turnus, the chief of the Rutulians, who was betrothed to Lavinia, made war upon the Trojans, and was killed in battle by Aeneas ; and afterwards King Latinus died, and Aeneas founded a new city on the Latin coast, and called its name Lavinium. But Ascanius his son, whom the Romans called Iulus, built a new city on the Holy Mount, and called it Alba Longa, and this was the chief of the cities of the Latin League. And twelve kings of the line of Aeneas reigned after Ascanius in Alba.

King Procas of Alba had two sons, Numitor and Amulius ; and on his death Amulius, who was the younger, seized the kingdom, murdered **Romulus and Remus.** the son of Numitor, and consecrated his daughter Rhea Silvia to the Goddess Vesta, to live a virgin all her days. But the God Mars made her the mother of twin sons. Then Amulius put her too to death, because she had broken her vow, and ordered the children to be drowned in the Tiber. But the river overflowed its banks, and washed them up under the fig-tree which grew by the Palatine Hill ; and there a she-wolf took them, and suckled them in her den ; and the woodpecker of their father Mars brought food to them. Then Faustulus, the shepherd of Amulius, found them, and his wife Larentia brought them up with her own children, and called them Romulus and Remus. But the herdsmen of Numitor on the Aventine Hill had a quarrel with Faustulus, and carried off Remus, and brought him before Numitor. And Numitor, when he had heard the story of the boys, and seen Romulus also, knew that they were his grandsons, and that they would avenge him upon Amulius for all the wrongs he had done him. Then the young men went and killed Amulius, and Numitor reigned in his stead.

Yet Romulus and Remus would not stay in Alba Longa, but went to found a city in their own home by the Tiber. And there was a dispute between them ; for Romulus wished to build upon the Palatine Hill, but Remus on the Aventine. So they agreed that the gods should choose between them ; and each stood all night upon the hill he

had chosen, to wait for a sign. And Remus first, at dawn, saw six vultures flying, and sent word to Romulus; but when the sun rose, Romulus saw twelve vultures together; and his was the greater sign. Then Romulus took a bullock and a heifer, and yoked them to a plough, and made the sacred furrow round about the Palatine, which is called the *Pomoerium*; and within the furrow he began to build the wall. But Remus thought scorn of the building of Romulus, and leaped over the wall; and Romulus was wroth, and slew him, and said, 'So perish all who shall leap over my wall.' Wherefore men entered Rome only by the appointed ways, all the days of the city.

The building of Rome, April 21, 753 B.C.

Yet the people of the city were but few. So Romulus made on the Capitoline Hill, hard by, a city of refuge whither men might flee when they had shed blood, or fled from their oppressors. And it was called by the Greek name ἄσυλον, that is, *Asylum*, because it was a place of refuge.

The Asylum.

Now there were not women enough in Rome for the men, and the neighbours would not give their daughters in marriage to the Romans. So Romulus proclaimed a feast and games in honour of the god Consus, and many Latins and Sabines came with their wives and daughters; and the young Romans fell upon them and carried off all that were maidens, and took them to wife.

The Rape of the Sabines.

So there was war to recover the women, and the Romans defeated the men of Antemnae, Caenina, and Crustumerium, and Romulus killed Acron, the king of Antemnae, in battle with his own hand, and dedicated his spoils in the temple of *Jupiter Fereetrius*; for so the custom was, when one leader killed the other in battle; and only two Romans after Romulus did this thing, and offered *spolia opima* to Jupiter (p. 86, 173).

Spolia opima.

Then Titus Tatius, the king of Cures, led his Sabines against the Romans; and the Romans were shut up on the Palatine and the Capitoline within their walls. But the daughter of Tarpeius, the governor of the Capitoline, promised to betray the hill if the Sabines would give her 'what they wore on their left arms'; for she coveted their golden bracelets. But when she opened the gate and claimed what they had promised, they overwhelmed her with their shields as a reward for her treachery; for these too they wore on their left arms. And ever after that, when there was treachery in Rome, the Romans hurled down the traitors from the steep face of the Capitol towards the river, which is called the Rock of Tarpeia.

Tarpeia.

On the morrow the Romans tried to recover the Capitoline Hill, and a

great battle was fought in the valley between it and the Palatine. But when the Romans were almost driven to flee, Romulus and Sabines. vowed to build a temple to Jupiter Stator if he would stay their flight, and the Romans took heart, and the battle was renewed. Then the Sabine women, over whom the war had arisen, ran in between the two armies, and prayed their fathers to forgive their husbands, and be friends. And from that day the Romans and the Sabines became one nation ; Romulus ruled the Romans on the Palatine, and Titus Tatius the Sabines, who were also called *Quirites*, on the Capitoline ; and the two kings, and their elders, and the whole people, met to take counsel in the Place of Meeting, the *Comitium*, in the valley where they had fought ; and so the elders and the people of Rome were called *Senatus Populusque Romanus Quiritium* unto this day. But not long after, Titus Tatius was killed at Lavinium, because he would not make restoration to the Latins for a wrong which his kinsmen had done. So Romulus ruled alone in Rome, and reigned thirty-six years.

But on a day when he marshalled the people in the Field of Mars, by the Goat's Pool, the sun was darkened, and a great storm fell upon them all ; and when the daylight came again, Romulus was not ; for Mars his father took him up into heaven. Yet afterwards he appeared to one Proculus Sabinus, and bade him tell the Romans to worship him by the name of Quirinus, and 'that Rome should rule the world.'

The end of
Romulus,
753-716.

Then the Romans chose to be their king one Numa Pompilius, a Sabine, who had married the daughter of Titus Tatius. And Numa was a man of peace, and reigned in peace forty-three years. He took counsel with the Lady Egeria to set in order the service of the gods, and appointed the *Flamen Dialis* for the worship of Jupiter, and two other *Flamines* for Mars and Quirinus ; also he chose four Vestal virgins, to tend the sacred fire which came from Alba, and was the life of Rome ; and he ordained twelve *Salii* to dance before Mars, and to guard the sacred shields. For a divine shield fell down from heaven, and Numa made eleven other shields exactly after the pattern of it, that none might recognise it and take it away ; and he called the shields *Ancilia*. Also he ordained times and seasons, and set out the boundaries of the fields ; and built the temple of two-faced Janus, of which the gates are shut in time of peace ; and they were shut all the days of Numa.

Then Tullus Hostilius, a Latin, was chosen to be king, and his reign was full of wars. For the Romans fought with the men of Alba Longa ; and, when the armies came face to face, three twin brothers of the house of the

Horatii were chosen to go out before the Roman army, and to fight for their city with the three Curiatii, who were born, like themselves, at a single birth. When two of the Horatii had been slain, the third had recourse to subtlety; for he was still unhurt, but the three Curiatii were all wounded. So he fled before them; and as he ran, the Curiatii followed, each as he could. Then Horatius turned and slew the foremost, and then the second when he came near, and after him the third; and so the men of Alba submitted to the Romans. But as Horatius went into the city, his sister met him, and seeing the spoils upon his shoulder, she cried out for grief, for she was betrothed to one of the Curiatii, and had made for him his cloak. Horatius was wroth, and slew her, and said, 'So perish every Roman woman who weeps for an enemy.' And the two judges of bloodshed¹ took Horatius and would have hanged him on the Sister's Tree;² but he cried for his life to the people, and the people heard his plea, and forgave him, and let him go.

Tullus
Hostilius,
673-642.

Horatii and
Curiatii.

After this the Romans made war against Fidenae and Veii, cities of the Etruscans, and the men of Alba went with them. But Mettius Fuffetius, the Dictator of Alba, would not fight against the Etruscans, and withdrew his men out of the battle; yet when the Romans had won the battle by themselves, he came down again from the hills to wish them well. But Tullus Hostilius knew his treachery, and called both the armies together on the morrow, to receive the reward of victory. And when the Albans came peaceably without their arms, the Romans encompassed them, and Tullus gave sentence that Mettius should be torn in pieces between horses, and that Alba Longa should be laid level with the ground. So the men of Alba were brought to Rome with their wives and children, and Tullus gave to them the Caelian Hill to inhabit; and they dwelt thus in the city, but they were not numbered among the citizens of it (see p. 57).

The destruction
of Alba.

Then King Tullus fell sick, and prayed to the gods; but Jupiter was angry, and smote him and his house with fire. And Tullus reigned thirty-one years, and Ancus Martius reigned in his stead.

King Ancus was a Sabine, the son of the daughter of Numa. He restored the rites and ceremonies which Numa had ordained, and appointed the *Fetiales* to demand justice from the other cities (see p. 123), and to declare war, when that was the will of the gods. He made war against the Latins and subdued certain of their cities, and gave the Aventine Hill to the captives to dwell in. He built a prison house, and a port at Ostia, at the mouth of the river,

Ancus
Martius,
642-617.

¹ *Quaestitores homicidii.*

² *Sororium tigillum.*

and a fort on the Janiculan Hill beyond the Tiber, and over the river he threw the Bridge of Piles.¹ And he reigned twenty-five years, and left Lucius Tarquinius to be the guardian of his young children.

Lucius Tarquinius Priscus was not by birth a Roman. His father Demaratus was a rich man of Corinth; his mother was an Etruscan woman of Tarquinii; his wife was Tanaquil, a noble lady of Tarquinii; and he himself was a *Lucumo*, for so they called the chief men of the Etruscans. But Tarquinius desired to be a king, and Tanaquil his wife was urgent with him to go to Rome. And as they went, an eagle by the Janiculan Hill took the cap from his head, and raised it on high, and set it back again in its place; and by this Tanaquil knew—for she had skill in augury—that he should indeed be king. So Tarquinius came to Rome, and found favour with King Ancus; and when King Ancus died, the Romans chose him to be king in his stead.

Tarquinius reigned thirty-seven years, and made war with the Sabines, and took Collatia, and gave it to his nephew Egerius: also he became the ruler of all the Latins, and took their cities. And in Rome, because the valley wherein the Forum lay was marshy, he built a great drain, called the *Cloaca Maxima*, from the Forum to the Tiber; and it is there unto this day. He made also the Great Circus, and established the Roman Games. To the Senate he added one hundred *patres* of the tribe of the *Luceres*, so that there were three hundred elders in all; but men called the new elders *patres minorum gentium*, because their families were of less account. He made also two new Vestal Virgins, over and above the four. But when he would have done yet more than this, one Attus Naevius forbade him; to whom the king said, jesting, 'Canst thou do what is in my thoughts?' And he said, 'I can.' Then the king said, 'I was thinking that thou shouldst cut this whetstone with this knife.' And Attus took the stone and the knife, and cut the stone in twain; wherefore King Tarquin believed that Attus was indeed a seer, and observed his words.

Now Tarquin had a slave called Servius Tullius, the son of a Latin woman whom he had taken captive at Corniculum. And when a flame of fire played about his head as he slept, and did him no harm, Tanaquil took him, and brought him up as the king's son; and he took the king's daughter in marriage, and served Tarquin faithfully. Yet others say that he was an Etruscan by birth, and by

¹ *Pons Sublicius*: it is believed to have stood close below the steep river-face of the Aventine Hill (see p. 44).

name Mastarna. And the sons of Ancus feared Servius, lest Tarquin should make him king in his room : and they suborned men, who came before the king, as men who would have justice from the king in a quarrel ; but while the king gave ear, one smote him with an axe, and he died. Yet did not the sons of Ancus succeed him. For Tanaquil, when she saw what was done, proclaimed that the king was not yet dead, and that he had appointed Servius to be governor until his wound should heal. So Servius ruled in Rome, and found favour with the people ; and afterward, when they saw that Tarquin was dead indeed, they chose Servius to be their king.

King Servius had peace all his days, and governed the Romans with justice and wisdom ; and he made a league between Rome and all the cities of the Latins, so that they lived at peace with one another.

And because the city of Romulus was too little for the people, he enlarged its borders so that the Seven Hills of Rome lay all within it ; and round the city he built a wall of stone ; and where there was no steep place below the wall, from the Hill Gate¹ eastward to the Esquiline Gate, he made the great mound, which is called the Mound of Servius, with a moat a hundred feet in breadth, and this was the wall of Rome until the days of Augustus ; and the mound and the moat of it are there unto this day. And he divided the city into four 'regions,' and the country into 'tribes' ; and every man was known by his tribe and by his dwelling-place.

And because it is expedient, both that the rich should provide for the defence of the city, whether they be citizens or strangers in the land—because by its safety they get their wealth—and also that those who fight for their country should share in the government of it, King Servius ordered that every man should give an account of all his goods ; and according to each man's wealth, he put them in 'classes' and 'centuries,' from the richest to the poorest, and ordained how they should fight and how they should vote. And this Ordinance of King Servius was long observed by the Romans ; for by it the rich had the greater power, and the proud nobles could no longer oppress the poor ; and as any man became rich, so he had power in the State, though he were lowly born.²

King Servius reigned forty-three years ; and he died by the hand of his own son-in-law. For he had given his two daughters in marriage

¹ *Porta Collina* : on the Quirinal Hill, north-west of the city, at the highest point of the wall.

² For the details of the 'Constitution of Servius,' see Chapter v.

to the two sons of Tarquin—Lucius and Aruns. Now Aruns was a peaceful man, and so also was the wife of Lucius; but Lucius, and Tullia, the wife of Aruns, were of a proud and restless temper, and they conspired together against the king; and Lucius slew his wife, and Tullia her husband Aruns; and so Lucius and Tullia became man and wife together. After that, Lucius conspired with the nobles, who hated the Ordinance of Servius, and put on the robes of a king, and sat on the throne in the Senate-house among the elders. Then Servius arose, and stood at the door of the Senate-house, and bade Lucius Tarquinius come down from his seat; but Lucius seized the king and threw him down the stone steps which were before the house, and sent his servants to follow him; who overtook him and slew him. Then Tullia came in her chariot, and said, 'Hail, King Lucius'; but he bade her go home again; and as she went, the dead body of her father lay in the way. But when the driver of the chariot would have drawn aside, she bade him drive on, so that the blood of her father was sprinkled on the chariot and on her garments; wherefore that street is called *Vicus Sceleratus*, the 'Wicked Street.' Yet would not Tarquinius allow the body to be buried, 'for even Romulus,' said he, 'was not buried'; and for his pride and the hardness of his heart men called him *Tarquinius Superbus*, 'Tarquin the Proud.'

So Tarquin usurped the kingdom of Rome, and set aside the Ordinance of Servius, and oppressed the poor, and forced them to work upon his great buildings, so that many of them made away with themselves in their misery. He oppressed also the rich and the noble, killing them or driving them away, and taking their goods at his will. And when he saw that the people hated him, he surrounded himself with armed men, and ruled the people by force.

He oppressed also the cities of Latium and slew Turnus Herdonius, who withstood him; also he prevailed to offer sacrifice on the Alban Mount, in the name of all the people of the League; and his daughter he gave to Octavius Mamilius of Tusculum, who had great power among the Latins; and the Latins fought for him against his enemies.

He made war also against the Volscians, and took Suessa Pometia, and with the spoils of it he began to build the triple temple on the Capitoline Hill, which his father, Tarquin the Elder, had vowed, to Jupiter, to Juno, and to Minerva. But while the workmen were laying the foundations, they found a man's head in the earth, fresh and bleeding; and Tarquin knew that Rome should be the head of

Tarquinius Superbus, 535-510.

His wars.

The Capitol-ine Temple.

the world, and he called the temple and the hill *Capitolium*, because the head was found there.

And there came an old prophetess, called the Sibyl of Cumae, and would sell to the king nine books ; and when he would not buy them, she went and burned three, and offered the six for the same price The Books of the Sibyl. as the nine. Then the king laughed ; but she went away again and burned three more, and offered the three that remained for the same price as at first. Then the king wondered, and bought the books, which were full of all the things which should happen hereafter. And he put them in the hand of two of the nobles, and ever after that, when Rome was in danger, they read in those books what the will of Heaven might be.

Then Tarquinius fought against Gabii, which would have no part in the Latin League, and took it by subtlety. For he sent Sextus his son, covered with blood and stripes, to take refuge in Gabii ; and Sextus at Gabii. the men of Gabii had compassion on him and made him their leader. Then Sextus sent a messenger to his father, to ask what he should do. But when the messenger came, the king walked in his garden, and did nothing else, but struck off the tallest of the poppies with his sceptre. And the messenger told Sextus, and Sextus cut off the chief men of Gabii on false accusations, killing them and driving them away. And so came Gabii also into the power of King Tarquin.

Then a sign from the gods troubled the king ; for a serpent came out of the altar, and ate of the sacrifice. So the king sent Titus and Aruns his sons to inquire of the oracle in Delphi, and Lucius Junius How Brutus kissed his Mother. Brutus went with them. Now this Brutus was the son of Tarquin's sister, the wife of Marcus Brutus, who was dead ; and Tarquin coveted his estate, and killed the elder son ; but he let Lucius Brutus live, because he feigned to be of weak mind. So when they came to Delphi, Brutus made the priestess a present of a staff ; and there was much gold hidden in the staff. And before they returned the sons of Tarquin asked of the oracle which of them should reign after their father ; and the priestess said, ' Whichever of them should first kiss his mother.' So Titus and Aruns drew lots, and waited. But when Brutus heard it, he knew that the earth is the mother of us all ; and as he went out of the temple, he slipped and fell upon the ground, and so 'kissed his mother.'

Afterwards Tarquin fought with the Rutulians, and besieged Ardea. And in the camp a dispute arose between the king's sons, and Lucius Tarquinius Collatinus their cousin, which of them had the Lucretia. best wife. So they rode together, to take the women by surprise. The wives of the sons of Tarquin they found feasting magnificently in Rome ; but Lucretia the wife of Collatinus they found in her

home at Collatia spinning among her maidens far into the night. But Sextus lusted after Lucretia, and returned again to Collatia, and Lucretia received him well, because he was her husband's kinsman. But Sextus came at night with a drawn sword into her chamber, and said that he would kill her, and kill a slave and lay his body by her, and spread an evil report, if she would not give herself up to him. So for shame Lucretia consented. But when Sextus was gone she sent for her father and her husband; and Lucretius brought with him Publius Valerius, and Lucius Brutus came with Collatinus. Then Lucretia told them how Sextus had dishonoured her, and made them swear to avenge her, and put a dagger to her own heart, and died.

Then Brutus laid aside the madness he had feigned, and became their leader. And they took the body of Lucretia into the market-place, and told the people all that had happened; and the people of Collatia rebelled against the house of Tarquin. After that, they took the body to Rome; and when they heard the words of Brutus the people rose up and made a decree that Tarquin should be king no longer, and that all his house should be driven out of Rome. Then Brutus returned to the camp at Ardea, and the gates of Rome were shut, and the army turned against the king, and Tarquin with his two sons Titus and Aruns fled to Caere; and Sextus fled to Gabii, and was slain there for the wrongs he had done before to the men of Gabii. Then the Romans made a great feast, and called it the Feast of Flight, or the Feast of the Expulsion of the Kings,¹ and it is held on the 24th day of February every year.

Now, after the Expulsion of the King, the Senate and the People went on still as before; only, lest ever again one man should work his will on Rome, they chose two men in the Assembly of the Centuries, which good King Servius had ordained, and gave to them both the emblems of a king, and equal power for one year, to govern, and do justice, and make laws, and each to prevent the other from doing evil. And these were called *Praetores* or leaders; but afterwards *Consules*, because they acted jointly. And they gave to each six men, called *lictors*, to do their bidding and to bear before them rods to chastise, and an axe to slay, in token of their authority. And Brutus and Collatinus were made the first Consuls. But Collatinus was of the hated name of the Tarquins, and so he too must needs leave Rome; and Publius Valerius was elected consul in his stead.

Then messengers came from Tarquin asking that his own possessions might be given up to him. And the Senate and the people agreed;

¹ *Fugalia: Regifugium.*

but before the goods were given up, a slave came and told Brutus that certain of the nobles were conspiring to bring back the house of Tarquin : and the two sons of Brutus were among them. But Brutus would not spare even his own children, but delivered them over to his *lictors* that they might die with the rest. The conspiracy of the sons of Brutus. And the Romans, when they saw the treachery of Tarquin, would not any more give up his goods, but gave them to the people to enjoy.

After that, the men of Tarquinius and Veii took up the cause of Tarquin, and the Romans went out to meet them. And before the battle, Aruns saw Brutus with the Roman cavalry, and rode hard at him, and Brutus rode to meet him, and each slew the other. Brutus dies in battle. Then the Romans and the Etruscans fought, and both claimed the victory : but in the night a voice was heard that the Etruscans had lost more men by one than the Romans ; so they fled, and Valerius took up the body of Brutus and returned to Rome. And for a whole year the Roman women mourned for Brutus, because he had avenged Lucretia.

So Valerius ruled alone in Rome. But when he built a great house on the Velia, which overlooks the Forum, the people feared lest he should make himself king ; so Valerius pulled down the house to the ground, and called the people together, and bade his Valerius Publicola. *lictors* do obeisance to the people, in token that their power was greater than his. And he made a law that when any Roman was condemned to death by the magistrate, he should appeal to the people, as Horatius had done, and then the people should judge. So men called Valerius *Publicola*, because he was the ' People's Friend.' Then the people chose Spurius Lucretius consul in the room of Brutus ; and when he died, they chose Marcus Horatius, who finished the Capitoline temple which Tarquin had begun.

In the next year Lars Porsena, the king of Clusium in Etruria, took up the cause of Tarquin, and summoned all the Etruscans to the war ; and he took the Janiculan Hill, which is beyond the Tiber, and would have crossed the bridge. But Horatius Cocles kept the Lars Porsena. narrow way, and with him Titus Herminius and Spurius Lartius, till the people should have hewn down the bridge ; and the Etruscans pressed hard upon them. Then, when the bridge was well-nigh cut through, Horatius sent back his two companions ; and, when it had fallen, he prayed to Father Tiber, and flung himself into Horatius Cocles. the stream ; and Father Tiber bore him safe to the shore. So Rome was saved, and the people gave to Horatius as much land as he could plough round in one day, and set up his statue.

But the Etruscans still laid siege to the city. And Gaius Mucius went into the camp of Porsena, and killed his scribe, thinking him to be the king ; and when Porsena seized him and would have tortured him, he thrust his right hand into the fire, for a sign that he heeded not pain. And the king wondered, and let him go free ; and Mucius warned him to depart from Rome, for that he himself was but the first of three hundred noble youths, who had bound themselves under an oath to kill the king. So Porsena made peace with Rome, and took ten youths and ten maidens for sureties ; and the Romans restored to the men of Veii the land which they had taken from them before, and swore that they would use iron weapons of war no more. And Mucius and all his house were called *Scaevola*, the 'left-handed,' because he had burnt off his right hand. Then Cloelia, one of the hostages, escaped and swam back across the Tiber ; but the Romans sent her back again to Porsena ; and Porsena wondered, and let her go free, and with her any of the hostages whom she should choose.

Then Tarquin went to Tusculum, to Octavius Mamilius his son-in-law ; and the thirty cities of the Latins made war for him against Rome. And the Romans made Aulus Postumius their *Dictator*, to have the sole command, instead of the two consuls, because the danger was great ; and they gave him twelve lictors, who bore their axes even within the city, because from the word of the Dictator there is no appeal. And Postumius named Titus Aebutius as his *Magister Equitum*, to have command over the cavalry. So they fought a great battle at the Lake Regillus ; and Titus, the son of Tarquin, was slain, and Tarquin himself fled away wounded. Then, when the battle was at its height, Aulus the Dictator vowed a temple to the Twin Brethren, Castor and Pollux, if they would give him the victory. And behold, two shining youths appeared, riding on white horses, and turned back the Latins, and pursued them. Also to the old men who remained behind in Rome there appeared two youths, on white horses likewise, and washed their horses in the pool which is in the Forum by the Temple of Vesta, and said that the victory was with Rome. Then the Romans knew that the Twin Brethren had helped them indeed, and built to them there a temple, as Aulus the Dictator had vowed ; and made a festival for them every year. Then the Latins made peace with Rome ; and Tarquin the Proud was left alone, friendless, and childless, and old ; and he went away to Cumae, and died there. And Rome had rest from her Kings.

In these Chronicles of the Kings, it is easy to see that we have to do,

not with authentic history, but with a highly composite story built up of legends, myths, and guesses, which are of various origin, and very slight direct historical value. In fact, it is not until after the sack of Rome by the Gauls in 390, that we can hope to find anything of the nature of historical records preserved; and it is only from the war with Pyrrhus, 280, that we can speak of a 'history of Rome' in the ordinary sense of the word. It is probable, moreover, that it was even later still, about the time of the Second Punic War, 220-200, that the story of the beginning of Rome assumed the form in which it came down to Livy and Dionysius. The method on which it has been compiled is the method in vogue among the later Greek historians of the third century; and the moral, which the history is planned to enforce, reflects the thoughts of Roman statesmen and thinkers, in an age when Rome was already mistress of Italy, and intent upon the conquest of the Mediterranean world.

Hence, in the first place, the confident belief in a special Divine Providence, watching over the fortunes of the City; the frequent exaggeration of Rome's first attempts to assert herself among her neighbours; and the suppression of disasters like those which seem to have befallen her at the coming of the Etruscan kings, and after the fall of the kingdom: for it is probable that the reforms of Tarquinius and Servius stand, partly at least, for a reversal of the relations between native and alien elements in the population. Even the legend, in fact, admits that Porsena took hostages, and annexed much that was previously Roman territory.

Next, it is clear that whatever native traditions there may have been, they have been handled over and over again in the spirit of Greek mythological interpretation, and by men who were already familiar with the history and traditions of Greece. The story of Aeneas, for instance, is only one of a whole cycle of tales of adventure and migration, which were already current when the Greeks first visited Italy. Latinus, Turnus (i.e. 'Tyrrhenus'), Romulus, and Titus Tatius are *eponymi* or titular heroes, like the 'Hellen,' 'Doros,' and 'Ion' of the Greeks, or the 'Brut' and 'King Lud' of our own chroniclers. Latin tradition had perhaps fixed the date of the foundation of Rome in 753 by counting back seven generations of kings from the first year for which the consuls were known; but Greek tradition placed the Fall of Troy in 1183 and so a gap appeared between Aeneas and Romulus, which was filled by the long line of the kings of Alba Longa.

The Greeks too were always quick to note resemblances between the native gods of other peoples and their own Olympian deities; and the

Italian conceptions of Mars and Venus, of Ceres and Liber, of Hercules and the Twin Brethren, were easily identified with those of their own **Syncretism.** Ares and Aphrodite, Demeter and Dionysus, Heracles, Castor, and Polydeuces. A similar instinct prevailed in dealing with merely human history. To make Greek and Roman history run on parallel lines, the miraculous nurture of Romulus and Remus was compared with that of Œdipus, and of Cyrus the Persian. Numa the lawgiver takes counsel with Egeria, as Lycurgus of Sparta does with the Pythia, and as Minos does with Zeus. The story of the Tarquins was remodelled on those of the tyrant princes of Greece; the anecdote of the poppy-heads comes straight from the story of Periander of Corinth; that of the Sibylline books, from the private collection of oracles made by the Peisistratidæ of Athens; and the excuse for their expulsion, and the characters of Brutus and Valerius, from the story of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; while, finally, to complete the parallel, the expulsion of the kings from Rome was placed in the same year, 509 B.C., as the expulsion of the tyrants from Athens.

Again, only a little before the time when Greek literature became known to the Romans, the Greek historian Euhemerus had put forward the view that the tales which men told of the gods were really pieces of **Euhemerism.** long-forgotten history; that the Zeus of Mount Ida had been a real king of Crete, and Hephaestus the inventor of the forge. The Roman tales, therefore, of Saturnus and Quirinus—the powers who watched over the sower and the spearman—were interpreted in accordance with this ‘last new theory,’ as traces of prehistoric kings of Rome, and their holy places were shown as the site of vanished palaces. Faunus, the god of pastures, became Faustulus, the chief shepherd of Numitor; and Romulus and Numa, the patrons of the Roman city and of Roman religion, were taken to have been the real men who built the prehistoric walls on the Palatine, and ordained the Flamens and the Vestal Virgins.

Finally, a large part of Roman traditional history arose from the desire to find an intelligible explanation for ceremonies and observances of the **Explanatory Folklore.** kind we call ‘folklore,’ which meant nothing now, but could only have been preserved so carefully, because once upon a time they had meant a great deal. If the hair of a Roman bride was parted with a spear point, or a mimic struggle took place when she was led to her new home, it was probably because in ancient times the men of many peoples habitually stole their wives from other tribes; just as among ourselves the bridegroom still brings the ‘best man’ of his acquaintance to help him when he comes to claim his bride, and is pelted by her kinsmen

as he carries her away. Of such survivals of 'marriage by capture' the ancient Romans found an easy explanation in the story of the 'Rape of the Sabines' (p. 29); and in the same way they explained the sacredness of the city wall in the legend of the Death of Remus, or the right '*provocare ad populum*,' the monuments of the *pila Horatia* and the *sororium tigillum*, and the worship of *Juno sororia*, by the anecdote of the Horatii and Curiatii. So too the name of the Capitoline Hill suggested the story of the 'Bleeding Head,' and that of the Tarpeian Rock the legend of Tarpeia; though *Capitol*, like *Cynos-cephalae*, or *Spion Kop*, or *Worm's Head*, is a fairly obvious name for a prominent hill; while the Tarpeian Rock was as convenient a place of execution as the 'Barathron' ravine at Athens. And naturally, in proportion as each name or site or monument seemed difficult to explain, so its institution was thrust back further into the long dim period before the Roman Republic had begun to be; when Heavenly Twins and Sibyls walked upon the earth, and Numa could take counsel with the nymph Egeria, and wolves and woodpeckers fed divine-born babes, and Romulus the king and the god Quirinus were one.

When all is said, however, by way of caution against too literal acceptance of the legendary history, the traditional account of the origin of Rome still remains for us, what it was for the Romans—a picture, idealised, it is true, by patriotic sentiment, and blurred here and there by later antiquarian fancies, but in its main outlines clear and credible,—of the mongrel origin, and the early struggle for existence, of a city and a people with a great future before them. Modern research has uncovered their walls, their temples, and their tombs; modern scholarship has pieced together in outline their constitution, their society, and their religion; but, for the temper, the virtues, and the ideals, which made the Romans what they were, the historian still goes back to Servius and Brutus; to Mucius and Horatius; to Tanaquil, to Cloelia, and to Lucretia.

CHIEF DATES.

Foundation of Rome	April 21. 753
Expulsion of the Kings	February 24. 509
Lex Valeria de provocatione	509
Invasion of Porsena	508
Battle of Lake Regillus	496

CHIEF PERSONS.

The seven kings—Titus Tatius—Tarpela—Egeria—Horatii and Curiatii—Tanaquil—Tullia—Sextus Tarquinius—Lucretia—Tarquinius Collatinus—L. Brutus—P. Valerius Publicola—Porsena—Horatius Cocles—Mucius Scaevola—Cloelia—Octavius Mamilius—A. Postumius.

CHIEF PLACES.

Alba Longa—Antemnae—Cures—Fidenae—Veii—Ostia—Tusculum—Suessa Pometia—Cumaë—Gabiî—Ardea—Collatia—Clusium—Lake Regillus.

SUBJECTS.

The complex origins and the single aim of the Roman State.

The character of the Legendary History, its causes, and its interpretation.

CHAPTER IV


THE CITY AND PEOPLE OF ROME

The Seven Hills by the Tiber—Natural advantages—First settlements—Early monuments—Rome a Latin city—The Primitive Constitution—not peculiar to Rome.

ON the left or eastern bank of the Tiber, about fifteen miles from its mouth, the margin of the Latin plain breaks up into a cluster of low flat-topped hills, mainly composed of harder and softer beds of volcanic ashes (map, p. 44). Between these hills, swampy hollows run out into the main valley of the river, which at this part of its course makes a double curve like the letter S. Just below the middle point of the S there is an island in the stream; and below the island a place where the river can be crossed easily. The back of the S, on the western bank, is overhung by the long narrow ridge of the *Janiculan* hill, which commands the approach to the island, and ends northwards in the separate rise of the *Vatican*. On the eastern side, the upper loop is occupied by the *Campus Martius*, a low stretch of flats, liable, like all the Tiber valley, to sudden and violent floods.

The rest of the 'Seven Hills' of Rome lie round the outside of the lower loop of the river, and the valleys between them radiate from a point a little below the island. The central feature of the site is the four-sided *Palatine* hill, which lies detached from the plateau exactly east of the loop, with its four corners pointing nearly north, south, east, and west. A lower spur called the *Germalus* runs out from it to the north-west, and north-eastward a longer one, the *Velia*. Behind its south-eastern face, on the side remote from the river, rises the *Caelian* hill, a long spur which joins the Latin plain. To the south, the Caelian and the Palatine are divided by a narrow valley from the *Aventine*, which, though more irregular in shape than the Palatine, is, like it, detached from the plateau, and closely overhangs the river bed. By the valley just mentioned issued, later, the Latin and the Appian

Way: the Way down stream to Ostia passed over the landward slope of the Aventine; and the Circus Maximus, the racecourse of old Rome, occupied the long narrow trough between that hill and the Palatine.



Northwards, a similar valley—in which the Flavian Emperors afterwards built the Colosseum—divides the Caelian from the Esquiline or 'suburban' hill,¹ an irregular extension of the plateau, with a rather steep end, known as *Carinae*, or 'the ridges.'

Between the *Oppian* and *Cispian* spurs of the Esquiline a side valley carried a landward track which diverged, on the higher ground, to Viminal. Labicum, Praeneste, and Tibur. Northwards again two

other spurs of the plateau, the *Viminal*, or 'osier hill,' and the *Quirinal*, with the Quirinal valley and the road to Nomentum between them, converge upon the hollow which lies before the north-eastern face of the Palatine. The *Quirinal*, or *Colline* hill—the hill of

¹ Compare *Esquilinus* (from *ex-colere*) with *inquilinus*, a lodger (from *incola*, one who lives inside).

Rome, *par excellence*, and the highest part of the whole site—looks down on its outer northern side on the Campus Martius, and is followed northwards by the *Pincian* hill, or Hill of Gardens, which continues the plateau-margin up the Tiber valley, but was never reckoned among the Seven Hills. Lastly, between the end of the Quirinal and the Tiber island, rises the two-headed *Capitoline*, separate and abrupt. Its easier ascent, the *Clivus Capitolinus* between the two summits *Arx* and *Capitolium*, leads up from the central hollow. Southward, its 'Tarpeian' cliff (p. 29) overhangs the low ground on the side of the Palatine and the river; and its steep north-western face descends upon the Campus Martius. Through the dip between the Capitoline and the Quirinal ran later the Flaminian Way up the main valley to the north.

Of the central hollow, where the valleys join from between the outer hills, the upper part, below the Esquiline and the Viminal, was known as the *Subura*; the swampy bottom of the hollow, as the *Forum Romanum*. North-east of the Palatine this hollow drained into the Tiber by the low-lying *Velabrum*, down which ran the road to Etruria, the *Vicus Tuscus*. Here too the *Cloaca Maxima* was tunnelled 'in the days of King Tarquin' for the better drainage of the Forum; but the memory of its former state was preserved in the *Lacus Curtius*.

Thanks to this drainage, and other works, the present appearance of the surface does scanty justice to the natural advantages of the site. In the many centuries through which Rome has been a city, the level of the hollows has been steadily raised by vast accumulations of soil and rubbish, until the modern streets run some thirty or forty feet above the original surface of the valleys; and the necessities of wheeled traffic, and the foundations of the vast imperial palaces, have done much to reduce the height of some of the hills, and particularly of the Palatine and the Capitol. But enough remains (and more thorough excavation is yearly revealing more) to give a very fair idea of the primeval aspect of the place.

Taking this into consideration, the Seven Hills were clearly marked out by nature for the site of a great city. The Tiber is the one river of Central Italy which is navigable for any distance above its estuary; its valley gives easy access on the one side to the interior of Etruria, on the other to the Sabellian highlands; and the salt from the lagoons along the coast gave rise to a lively trade with the inland peoples, which has perhaps left its name to the *Via Salaria* from Rome to Reate and beyond.

Quirinal or Colline.

Capitoline.

Subura, Forum, and Velabrum.

The site, then and now.

Natural advantages.

(1) The valley route.

At the same time the site of Rome lay far enough from the sea to be safe from the pirates who made the Tyrrhenian Sea a by-word ; just as it lay far enough from the mountains to have timely notice of the approach of brigands.

The low hills, intersected though they are with marshy tracts, are of sufficient elevation to afford some refuge from the malaria which infests the valley and the coast. But they are anything but mountains, being, in fact, mere fragments of the fringe of the Latin plain ; and their distinctness from the Apennine highlands, and even from the Alban Mount, gave Rome for ever the character of a lowland city, and enabled her armies to move on the inner, shorter, and easier lines, against every combination of her highland foes.

Meanwhile, the existence of a crossing-place in the river, by the Tiber island, gave to the site of Rome another claim to greatness, the command of the only road which joined Etruria and Latium. Its marginal position, also on the boundary between two leagues of states, of different races, and hostile traditions, made it a desirable possession or ally to both sets of neighbours, and at the same time enabled its inhabitants to create for themselves a position more or less independent of either. The story of the 'Asylum' of Romulus may not be literal history ; but an outland site of this kind offered obvious advantages to any who failed to live at peace with their own townsmen. We know too that many of Rome's noblest families traced back their origin to Latin, Sabine, and Etruscan townships ; and Rome is not the only state which has emerged from just such a 'cave of Adullam.'

The original population of Rome has very much the character which might be expected from the peculiarities of the site. The group of hills was sufficiently large and diversified to harbour several communities, each with its citadel or camp of refuge on the higher ground, and its own sanctuaries and place of public meeting. And as Rome stands not only on the very bank of the river which divided Latium from Etruria, but also close below its junction with the Anio, which bounded the country of the Sabines, it is not surprising to find traces of settlements of all three peoples, lying close to each other, and to the important crossing over the Tiber.

First, on the square-topped Palatine, surrounded by a massive fortress wall, and the consecrated ring of the *Pomoerium*, lay the purely Latin settlement, to which the name *Roma* originally belonged. To this *Roma quadrata*, the rude walls of which may still be traced, minor settlements were early annexed, on the spur called *Germalus* towards

the Tiber, on the *Velia* landwards, and on the three spurs of the *Esquilina*, or 'outer quarters' beyond, where traces remain of a settlement and burial-places going back to the eighth century B.C. This first union of seven villages round the Palatine fort was commemorated by the festival of the *Septimontium*, the 'seven hills' of which were quite different from those which were included later within the 'mound of King Servius,' and its bounds were beaten annually by the riotous procession of the Luperi. To this also belong the sacred spots of the cave of Faunus, and the *Ficus Ruminalis*, on the river side of the Palatine (p. 28), and perhaps also the 'cottage of Romulus,' and the old palace of the *Regia*, the worship of Vesta, and the votive temple of Jupiter Stator (p. 30), all on its sheltered north-eastern side, in the heart of the group of suburban villages, and close to the ascent to the principal gate of the Palatine fort.

Latins in
Roma
quadrata.

Next, on the Quirinal Hill, beyond the low ground northwards, lie the remains of an independent settlement, which Roman tradition assigned to a colony of Sabines from beyond the Anio; and these Sabines were said to have occupied also the Capitoline, or, at least, its northern peak; though the Capitoline is also connected in legend with the *Asylum* of Romulus. Their tribal name, *Quirites*, was said to mean 'spear-men,' though it is perhaps connected with the place-name Cures; and their patron deity was the warlike Quirinus, apparently a form of Mars. The tradition relates how these Sabine *Quirites*, under their king Titus Tatius, agreed with the Latin *Romani* of Romulus from *Roma quadrata*, to join forces and form a single state. And, in fact, traces of a double origin remained in the twofold cult of Mars, in the twin colleges of *Salii* and *Luperi*, and in the sacred guild of the *Titii*. The twofold name *populus Romanus Quiritium* was borne by the whole people; the first four kings, it is said, were alternately Latin and Sabine; and it is possible that the names *Ramnes* and *Tities*, given to two of the three *tribus* or 'thirds,' under which the Roman clans were arranged, may have represented originally the 'men of Romulus' and the 'men of Titus Tatius.' Each year, moreover, an early quarrel of some kind was commemorated by a ceremonial struggle with a horse's head for the prize, which took place between the *montani*—the inhabitants of the Quirinal or Colline quarter—and the *pagani* of the parts round the Palatine. Other Sabine families also seem to have been incorporated gradually: the great house of the *Claudii*, for example, is said to have migrated in a body to Rome in 504, and its chief Attus Clausus to have become the first Appius Claudius. But while we may well admit both a Sabine invasion of territory which was originally Latin, and the absorp-

Sabines on
the Colline.

tion of the invaders into a Latin state, it is difficult to point to any distinctive feature of the Roman state, or society, or language, as being of indisputably Sabine origin.

On the Caelian hill there was another early settlement, which is said to have been incorporated in Rome in the days of Tullus Hostilius.

Perhaps also Etruscans. But its importance is small, and its nationality uncertain.

According to one account, it consisted of Etruscan immigrants under one Caeles Vibenna. We have seen already that Rome necessarily lay exposed to such intruders from beyond the river, and there can be little doubt that many Etruscan adventurers and traders found their way thither. These have perhaps left their name in the *Vicus Tuscus*, which ran from the Forum towards the river; and it is possible that the third 'tribe,' the *Luceres*, consisted mainly of Etruscan families. More important is the story that, after four kings had reigned, alternately a Latin and a Sabine, Rome fell under the dominion of the Etruscan house of the Tarquini, and of their dependant, Servius Tullius, for three generations in succession; that the Etruscan dynasty oppressed the native population, while they used Rome to gain the mastery over the Latin League; and that at last the kingdom itself came to an end in a revolt of the Latins and Sabines against their tyrant masters. A very similar period of Etruscan domination can be traced far further southwards in Campania; and within much the same limits of time.

To these Etruscan kings the Romans believed that they owed much of the outward semblance of civilisation—the emblems of royal power, and

Early monuments. the forms of augury and religious ritual. To them also they attributed the first great buildings of Rome: the

oldest temple on the Capitoline, which was designed in Etruscan fashion, with triple nave, and a low, six-columned portico in front; the *Cloaca maxima*, a vaulted sewer of massive stone blocks, which made the centre of the town dry enough to be habitable; and the *Tullianum*, a rock-hewn chamber on the Capitoline slope, which may have been originally a well-house, but was used in historic times as a state-prison. Above all, they ascribed to the good king Servius Tullius the great ring wall which included for the first time in a single fortified city all the scattered settlements which we have already noticed, and with them

The Agger Servii. yet another community of low-caste conquered Latins, which King Ancus is said to have founded upon the Aventine.

Of the Servian wall, and of the great earthwork and moat with which it was strengthened eastward on the defenceless edge of the plateau, large portions may still be seen in Rome—the best of them is close to the modern railway station—and though, to judge from their masonry

alone, they may not be earlier than the fourth century B.C., there is a strong probability that the *Agger* at least is of earlier date, and that the later masonry was added after the burning of Rome by the Gauls.

Summing up what we have ascertained as to the first inhabitants of Rome, we find, *first*, two main groups of *pagi* or villages, the one Latin, round the old camp-of-refuge on the Palatine, the other, probably Sabine, on the Quirinal; a nondescript 'Asylum' on the Capitoline; and traces of smaller settlements, Etruscan perhaps, on the Caelian, and lowland Latin on the Aventine; *second*, traces of an early union between Latins and Sabines, of the type which the Greeks termed *συννοικισμός*; *third*, definite indications of a conquest of the whole group of settlements by Etruscan invaders from beyond the Tiber, who fortified the whole site, and used it as a *tête de pont* for the subjugation of Latium and Campania; and, in due course, welded Latin, Sabine, and outlaw-folk alike into one people, by the strong motive of a common hate.

In spite of these complex origins, however, the city of Rome grew up essentially a Latin state. The presiding deities were Latin—Saturnus and Janus, Jupiter and Juno, Diana, Hercules, and Mars.

Its constitution was of Latin type, with its *curiae*, *senatus*, and *comitia*, its *rex*, *dictator*, and *praetores*. Its language, in spite of some words borrowed impartially from Greek, Etruscan, and the Sabellian dialects, was a Latin tongue; and both its traditions of its own origin, and its first historical allies, unite the city closely with the ancient Latin League (pp. 28, 31, 74).

Rome
essentially
a Latin city,

At the same time, Rome was never merely an ordinary member of the League, like Praeneste or Tusculum. It was by the secession of Romulus and Remus from Alba Longa that the city by the Tiber began, and in all their earlier history we find the Romans treating, on equal terms, with the rest of the Latin towns conjointly.

but not a
mere mem-
ber of the
League.

In war the Latins fight under their own dictator, side by side with the Romans under their king; and, under the Etruscan dynasty, the king of Rome himself offers the common sacrifice of the League upon the Latin Mount. How far the earliest Roman territory extended, beyond the Servian wall, we can only conjecture: but it is possible that the *fossa Cluilia* southward and the rites of the Arval Brothers at Festi eastward commemorated an ancient frontier less than five miles away. All further territory in this direction at all events must have been acquired later on, and at the expense of one or other of the nearer towns of the Latins.

The city thus formed of diverse elements developed a constitution

which in the first instance did not differ essentially from those of its Latin neighbours, and had even many points of resemblance to those of the early City-States of Greece.

Political rights were strictly limited to members of a small number of *gentes* or clans, each itself consisting of a number of *familiae* or households, whose members all bore the same clan-name or *nomen*, and were believed to be of common descent on the father's side. In each household the father of the family had absolute power over wife and children, as well as over dependants and slaves ; and instances are recorded in which a *pater familias* actually exercised

The Gens. his right to sell his son into slavery, or even, after consultation with the nearest blood-relatives, to punish a criminal son with death. This *patria potestas* was lifelong : even full-grown sons could only be released from it by the express act of the father, and, while held under it, could only hold property subject to his approval.

But it was limited strictly to private affairs : a father was not allowed to obstruct a son in the discharge of a public magistracy, and might even be called upon to obey him in that capacity ; for in the eye of Rome all full citizens were on an absolute equality of public privilege. On the death of the father, the sons in turn became masters of their own households and descendants ; and thus a single-household multiplied into a *familia* or group of households demonstrably related to one another.

The position of the women was one of dignity and influence within the household. On more than one occasion the Roman matrons were

Position of women. able to exert effective political pressure upon their menfolk ; and certain rites and ceremonies, such as those of the *Bona Dea*, were administered only by the women. But in the eye of the law women had no personal existence : even by marriage, while renouncing their original clan and all participation in its affairs, they only passed from the *potestas* of their father to that of their husband ; and on the death of either father or husband they were legally still *in manu* of the nearest male kinsman of the deceased.

Some of these *gentes*, which claimed to be original members of the State, and in some cases to be of divine origin (like the *διογενείς*

Patricians and Plebeians. *βασιλῆες* of Homeric Greece, and some of the *εἰπαριδίαι* of Athens), were called *patriciae gentes*, and their members—the *ingenui* or *cives optimo iure*—had originally a monopoly of all political privileges, and of such social privileges as the right to hold land. Other clans, not in the strictest sense *gentes* at all, were held to be of base or even alien origin, and stood in the relation of de-

pendants or *clientes* either to some patrician *gens*, whose head was then their *patronus* or civil representative; or, (in the case of refugees and the transplanted inhabitants of conquered towns) to the State itself, in which case their *patronus* would be the king. These less privileged clans were called *plebeia genera*, and their members collectively the *Plebs*, a word like the Greek *πλήθος*, meaning 'multitude.' They had, to begin with, no political rights at all, nor the power to acquire them by any means, nor even the privilege of intermarriage with members of patrician *gentes*, so as to secure those rights for their children; and though by custom they might hold a plot of garden-ground sufficient for their needs, they were legally debarred from all share in the public distributions of conquered territory. On the other hand, they were not bound to render personal military service, nor to pay the *tributum* or war-tax. They were merely allowed to reside in Rome, like the *μέτοικοι* in a Greek state, and to carry on a business under the protection of their *patronus*; and their political disabilities interfered little with their opportunities of acquiring the wealth which the natural advantages of the site, and the growing influence of the city, combined to secure to every inhabitant of Rome. But with wealth came influence, and social intercourse with the members of patrician clans; and from these in turn, and from the practical inconveniences of the system of *clientela*, came the demand for admission within the closed circle; so that the first stage of Roman constitutional development after the expulsion of the kings consists of the struggle of the plebeians for equality of political privileges with the patricians. (Ch. VI.)

The *gentes* of Rome, like the *γένη* of Athens and other Greek States, were grouped together for political purposes in *curiae* or wards. These associations were based partly, as some of their names show, on local neighbourhood, but mainly, as in the case of the Attic *φρατρίαι*, on a belief in a common ancestry, which was commemorated in each *curia* by common *sacra*, or religious observances, participation in which was a test of citizenship. These were administered by a common priest, the *curio* or *flamen curialis*, in the club-house of the ward, which was also called a *curia*, and included the common chapel, hearth, and meeting-hall of the members.

The *curiae* in turn were grouped in three *tribus*, or 'thirds,' named *Ramnes*, *Tities*, and *Luceres*. The origin and significance of these divisions is obscure, but it is safe to regard them as evidence of the composite origin of the Roman people, which has been already described. Politically the three hereditary tribes are of no importance; but it is worth noting that the same three-

fold arrangement occurs again in the three thousand soldiers of the original legion, in the six Vestal virgins, and the six augurs; in the twelve Salii, Luperci, and Fratres Arvales; and in the eighteen *centuriae equitum*.

From time to time a general meeting of all men of full age who were members of the *curiae* was summoned for the announcement and decision of matters of general interest. It came together in *Comitia*. the *Comitium*, in the level ground between the *Palatine*, the *Capitoline*, and the *Quirinal*, to hear announcements of public acts or events, to witness religious ceremonies, and such private legal acts as affected the constitution or the property of a *gens*, and to give its consent to the adoption of aliens into the community, or to the transfer of a citizen from one family to another by adoption, in default of a natural heir. It accepted or rejected, without power of debate or amendment, the appointment of a king, and any change which might be proposed in a law or a treaty; such ordinances being held to be of the nature of a contract or *lex* into which the citizens must enter of their own free will. The assembly of freemen might also be consulted by the king, at his discretion, as to the remission of the death penalty, in cases where a criminal like Horatius admitted the offence, but urged extenuating circumstances. The *Comitia Curiata*, as it was called, expressed its decisions by group-voting. The members of each *curia*, separately, recorded their votes in order, and the vote of the majority of its members determined the group-vote of the *curia*.

Certain leading members of Patrician *gentes* formed a *Senatus* or council of elders, the number of whom was limited, in historic Rome, to three hundred. According to the tradition, the original *Senatus*. Senate of Roma Quadrata had consisted of one hundred members; another hundred had been added to represent the Sabine followers of Titus Tatius; and the remainder by Tarquinius Priscus, either from his Etruscan followers or from the chief clans of conquered Latin states. Some later writers regarded each hundred as representing ten subdivisions or *decuriae* of the ten *curiae* which made up each of the three *tribus*, but there is no good reason for so precise a statement. There was no provision for the maintenance of the exact number of households and clans; and the frequent occurrence of similar round numbers in our accounts of other ancient states, such as Athens, is partially due to a desire for symmetry on the part of antiquarian historians. It is probable enough, however, that originally some proportion was observed between the number of *Senatores* and that of the clans of which the state was composed. The *Senatores*, once appointed, held

office for life ; and vacancies were filled by the king, who was empowered to add to the list (*conscribere*) the names of men of mature age and experience. As, however, these were not always heads of clans (though this was perhaps originally the rule), the Senate came to have the double title *Patres [et] Conscripti*, and a double position, as a meeting of clan-chiefs and as the privy council of the king.

The Senate, however, was not originally an administrative body, any more than the *Comitia Curiata*. Its functions were purely deliberative. All executive power was delegated, both in regal and in republican times, to individual magistrates, and the Senate, Its powers. like the *Comitia*, could only meet at the summons of such a magistrate, to express opinions, and give advice on subjects proposed by him ; nor might any Senator speak except when invited, in order of seniority, to do so. The magistrate was not legally bound to accept the opinion of the Senate ; and the Senate had no means by which to compel him to abide by it. As the meeting of the representatives of the clans, however, it was regarded as the repository of ancestral tradition and custom. It conferred upon the king, and later upon the consuls, the authority to perform the *auspicia*, the ceremonial acts by which the will of Heaven was made known ; and its sanction, the *patrum auctoritas*, was required for all changes in the law or custom of the constitution. In the administration of justice, and of the army, indeed, the king seems to have had absolute powers, though it was customary for him to choose his assessors from the ranks of the Senate. But in questions of peace and war, and of the admission of aliens to citizenship, the members of the *gentes* were not held to be bound by any arrangement to which the Senate had not given its authority.

For administrative purposes, supreme power was placed by the *patres* in the hands of a single magistrate, who was called *Rex* or King. Unlike the 'divine-born kings' of early Greece, the *Rex* of Rome Rex. never succeeded by right of birth, but always on the nomination of the king his predecessor, or of a duly appointed *Inter-rex*. The person so nominated must then be accepted by the *patres*, and confirmed by the assent and homage of the whole assembly of freemen convened for that purpose. Once appointed, the *Rex* held office for life, and by virtue of the supreme *imperium* conferred upon him had supreme authority over all the resources of the state. He was commander-in-chief of the army, and conducted the whole external policy of the city. Over all the citizens he had the power of life and death, which was symbolised by the *fasces*, a bundle of rods for beating, with an axe (*securis*) bound up with them, to represent the power to kill. He was

also supreme judge in all disputes between citizens, and summoned all public meetings and presided over them. He was responsible for the performance of religious rites, the ascertainment of the will of the gods by *auspicia*, the regulation and announcement of festivals, the maintenance of public buildings and other property of the State, and the imposition and collection of the necessary taxes. Any of these functions he could, and did, transmit to subordinate magistrates of his own creation, such as the *praefectus urbi*, the *magister equitum*, the *tribuni militum*, and the *quaesitores parricidii*. His official residence, the *Regia*, adjoined the Temple of Vesta in the Forum, where the eternal fire was maintained, which was the symbol of the life of Rome. But though his *imperium* was in theory unlimited, and though his conduct was regulated by no code of written laws, he was expected to conform to the immemorial custom of the city, and in all important or doubtful questions to summon and consult the *patres*. The limits of his authority were thus moral rather than legal: his will to act was free and unfettered; but he was responsible for observing the right limits in every exercise of it.

On the death of a *Rex*, the supreme *imperium*, and the *auspicia*, reverted to the body of *patres*. If the king had not nominated a successor—
 as he was privileged, if not bound, to do—they at once appointed one of themselves as an *inter-rex*, who after five days' consideration nominated a second, who might either nominate a *Rex* or shelve the responsibility by nominating a third, and so on. An *inter-rex* might not nominate himself, but otherwise his choice appears to have been unrestricted. When at last a suitable candidate had been found, he was presented first to the *patres*, and then to the *Comitia Curiata*. If the *curiae* accepted him, they forthwith conferred upon him the *imperium*; and finally, the *patres*, by a distinct act, entrusted him with the *sacra* of the State. Afterwards, in the case of a consul, the *patres* were bound, by the *Lex Publilia* in 332, to do this beforehand, that the choice of the *curiae* might have immediate effect.

This simple constitution was not peculiar to Rome; there is every reason to believe that it corresponds closely with the primitive constitution of the other towns in Latium; and its essential elements are repeated in that of the early Roman colonies, where the hundred councillors, or *centumviri*, corresponded with the *patres*, and the *imperium* of the executive magistrates (usually two in number, called *duoviri* or *praetores*) was conferred by the *auctoritas* of the *centumviri*, and by a *plebiscitum* of the mass-

Mode of
 appointment.

The constitution not
 peculiar to
 Rome,

meeting of the freemen of the colony. Some outward forms indeed, such as the purple robe and ivory sceptre of the Roman kings, and their escort of twelve *lictors* (pp. 36, 38), may have been introduced from abroad; but the principles on which the constitution of Rome was based, the forms themselves of the government, and even the names by which they were known, are essentially native to Latium.

It need hardly be added that, in the period of which we have been speaking, the Roman constitution was still unwritten, and depended for its preservation on the memory and good sense of those who had to administer it. Nowhere in the traditional unwritten history do we find any reference to written laws of any kind, and there is every reason to believe that it was not until the publication of the Twelve Tables (p. 73-4) that any part of the law or custom of the state was committed formally to writing. Even in the Greek cities, which practised alphabetical writing very much earlier than the remoter states of Italy, written codes of law do not appear till the latter part of the seventh century, when Rome, according to tradition, was already under the domination of the Tarquins.

It is important also to notice that the constitution of Rome, like that of Sparta and of our own country, belonged to no single one of the types of constitution which were recognised by ancient political philosophy. The supreme power of the king was ^{and of} 'mixed type.' of the nature of monarchy; the control of the executive by a council of experienced elders drawn from the noblest families savoured of oligarchy; and the final adoption or repudiation of all really important measures by the whole body of the citizens contained at least the germs of a democracy. In a 'mixed constitution' of the kind which has been described, the interest which attaches to its history centres round the question, which of the three contrasted principles of government is eventually to prevail. It may expand, as the sense of individual responsibility widens, into a democracy; it may be welded by the stress of outward circumstances into a real aristocracy, or stiffen through class-hatred into an oligarchy; or it may drift, in indifference or despair, into the hands of a single able and determined member; and in that case it depends mainly on the character of the monarch, whether it shall not end in a tyranny.

SUBJECTS.

The topography of Rome—advantages of the site—a mixed population, but a single State—the 'city-state' type of constitution—Rome and the Latin League.

CHAPTER V

THE SERVIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE FALL OF THE KINGDOM

Growth of wealth and of an unprivileged class — Different effects in Greece and in Rome — The 'Servian Constitution' — The Regifugium — Regal Survivals — *Imperium* divided — Consequent predominance of the Senate — Plebeian distress after the Regifugium.

THE constitution of a State can only maintain itself unchanged when the balance of power remains constant between the various orders within it; and any event which affects the numbers, or wealth, or activity of any one of these, tends to be reflected in political history, and to leave its mark upon the fabric of the constitution. And we shall see that important changes of this kind had already taken place in the structure of the city-state of Rome, which was described in the previous chapter, even before the expulsion of the kings.

The origin of the ancient distinction between 'patrician' and 'plebeian' clans is never clearly stated in Roman historical writers. There are two ways, however, in which such grades of privilege are found to arise in similar societies elsewhere. Though among all tribal peoples the rights of all full members are equal in theory, it is almost inevitable that, through superior ability or good fortune, some of the tribesmen should be better able than others to avail themselves of them in practice. To take a common instance, all the members may have an equal right to graze a certain number of cattle on the common pastures of the tribe; but, clearly, if a man loses or forfeits his cattle, he cannot use his privilege of grazing. It may, however, be worth while for another tribesman, whose herd is growing, and who is in danger of having more cattle than he is allowed to send out to graze, to lend some of his own cattle to the man who has few or none, on such terms of rent or service as will keep the poor man alive, though they leave him no longer 'his own master,' but dependent for his living on the goodwill of his richer neighbour. In all such cases the dependent or 'client' has *sunk* to his present status from a former position of equality.

On the other hand, the legend of the 'Asylum' of Romulus illustrates well the very common custom of admitting to the protection of a powerful tribe or family the ruined or persecuted members of neighbouring tribes. Such immigrant 'foreigners' are **Outlanders**, tolerated so long as they earn their keep, and usually pay some form of tribute in return for the protection which they enjoy. The same applies, when trade comes into being between tribe and tribe, to the pedlars and travelling craftsmen who are tempted by the prospects of business to take up their abode with another tribe, and are allowed to remain there, because, though aliens, they are useful. Similarly, again, liberated slaves and their descendants, though personally free, have, of course no standing as citizens in their own right, and remain 'clients' of their former master. And, finally, it seems to have been customary, as in the case of Alba Longa and other Latin towns, to force a large part of the conquered population to migrate to Rome and live under the eye, as well as under the protection, of the conqueror; residents, but not citizens, in his city. Unlike the impoverished tribesmen of the former class, all these classes of 'outlanders' have *risen*, not sunk, to the state of *clientela* which they enjoy; and it is with these energetic adventurers, in the majority of cases, and not with ruined and dependent tribesmen, that the demand arises later on for further concessions of privilege.

Situated in so advantageous a position, on the water-way of the Tiber, and at the crossing-place between Latium and Etruria, Rome could hardly escape a gradual and peaceful invasion of adventurers, merchants, and artisans from elsewhere. These resident foreigners, like the *μέτοικοι* of commercial states in Greece, were, of course, excluded from the charmed circle of hereditary citizens, and were incapable of holding office of any kind; but they were permitted, each under the protection of his *patronus*,¹ to enjoy the fruits of their traffic or industry, and even to hold landed estate; and with their growing material wealth and personal influence, their wider experience of the world, and their business connections in the neighbouring towns, they soon came to represent a very important interest in the community. Besides, under the Etruscan kings, Rome was brought into closer connection with her more civilised neighbours beyond the Tiber; and through them, and also perhaps independently, into commercial relations with the Greek settlements on the coast further south; and the number and prosperity of the foreign residents increased in proportion. There is reason, also, for believing that the Etruscan

Growth of
wealth and
of an
unprivileged
class.

¹ Or independently in cases where their own state had *ius commercii*, the right of intercourse' with Rome.

kings were throughout distrusted by their Latin and Sabine subjects, and found it advisable to create a political following of their own by posing as the protectors of this unprivileged class.

In the Greek States the growth of commercial and industrial interests, during the same centuries, led to the appearance of those champions of material interests and wider political views, whom we know as the Tyrants, and to a series of constitutional struggles which generally ended in the replacement of that ancient order of things in which political privilege was held solely as a birthright, by a more liberal system, in which the acquisition of wealth was regarded as a guarantee of personal ability, and the possession of a material 'stake in the country' as conferring the right to a voice in determining the policy by which this wealth should be defended. In a Greek State a revolution of this kind usually swept away wholly the former system of hereditary privilege, and created a new constitution, consistent with itself, and unfettered by survivals of the past. But in Rome the peculiar inborn reluctance of the Romans ever to abolish anything which could possibly be made harmless otherwise, and perhaps also the actual strength of the patrician clans, prevented the destruction of the hereditary regime, and permitted new sets of constitutional forms to come into existence side by side with the old ; leaving it to the future to decide whether the old or the new should determine the practical working of the whole.

But the new constitution in Rome was no mere compromise between conflicting interests. It bears all the marks which distinguish the creations of a single far-sighted legislator. It is assigned by tradition to the sixth king, Servius Tullius, and corresponds both in its general terms and in its traditional date—578-535—with the nearly contemporary work of Solon and other lawgivers in Greece. It is based on the necessities of national defence. The resident aliens had hitherto been prohibited from serving in the army, though probably they were already a majority of the population, and were enabled by their wealth to arm themselves more perfectly than many of the poorer patricians. Consequently, while the latter bore the whole burden and loss of every campaign, the plebeians profited by the security and prosperity of a state to which they had contributed nothing, except apparently some almost inappreciable poll-tax. Meanwhile the rising city was fast outgrowing the resources of the patrician houses and their clients, who were its hereditary defenders. Some change seems to have been contemplated by Tarquinius Priscus, who is said to have proposed to create a second series of *curiae* and *gentes*.

Different effects in Greece and in Rome.

The Servian Constitution.

side by side with the old ; but in the face of opposition, all that he could do was to double the patrician levies under the old system ; and this, of course, only increased the difficulty.

King Servius Tullius, however—if the Servian Constitution be really his work—classified the whole population, patrician and plebeian alike, according to a thorough *census* or estimate of their wealth, in ‘levies’ or *classes*.¹ Each *classis* was subdivided into a number of *centuriae*, of which each could put into the field a company of a hundred soldiers. But as the numbers and wealth of the *classes* necessarily differed widely, the number of centuries in each class was made to vary in proportion, from eighty in the wealthiest, to one in the poorest class ; the latter was, however, in practice exempted from the service altogether. A limited number of very rich plebeians stood outside the regular classes, and formed twelve centuries of *equites*, which served as a cavalry force, together with six older centuries of patrician horsemen (*celerēs*) making eighteen *centuriae* of cavalry in all. These *equites equo publico* were provided with horses and fodder from the proceeds (*aes equestre, hordearium*) of a tax on the estates of widows and orphans, who were incapable of service in person.

Next below the *equites* in wealth came the first *classis*, containing eighty centuries, and including all whose property was valued at more than 100,000 *asses* or Roman pounds of bronze currency. This limit looks extraordinarily high for so early a period, and probably represents a revised scale of later date ; the original estimate was probably made in terms of a man’s landed estate or of the farm produce therefrom, as in the assessment of Solon at Athens, and represented the value of a well-tilled farm of something above the average size. The members of this first ‘class’ were expected to appear fully armed, after the new Greek fashion, in helmet, breastplate, greaves, and round shield (*clipeus*), together with a sword and a long spear (*hasta*) ; and they formed the first four ranks of the infantry phalanx. As these heavy-armed men were the only *classis* or state levy in the strict sense, the other five classes were sometimes described collectively as *infra classem*.

The *second* class included those who held at least three-quarters of the property of the first class, or 75,000 *asses*. They wore no breastplate,

¹ *Classis* properly means a ‘call to arms’ (cf. *ἐκκλησία* in Greek), and so a ‘levy.’ ‘*Classes clipeatas antiqui dixerunt, quos nunc exercitus vocamus*,’ says Festus (Cf. Virg. *Æn.* vii. 716). The bugler, who called the warriors out, is *classicus*. The use of *classis* for a fleet, or army-at-sea, is later : on the Columna Rostrata (p. 158) the phrase is still *CLASSESQVE NAVALES*.

and carried the *scutum*—a large oblong shield of ox-hide—instead of the *clipeus*; and they formed only twenty centuries.

The *third* class held at least half a full-sized estate, or 50,000 *asses*. They wore the *scutum*, but no greaves; and they likewise formed twenty centuries.

The *fourth* class held only a quarter of an estate, or 25,000 *asses*. They carried the *verutum*, a ruder native spear, instead of the regulation *hasta*, and formed twenty centuries, which either stood in rear of the phalanx, as supports, or acted independently as skirmishers.

The *fifth* class included those whose property reached 11,000 *asses*, or about an eighth of that of the first class. They formed thirty centuries, and wore no armour, but went into battle in their cloaks—*velati, velites*—and did what they could with slings and stones.

The *sixth* class contained the numerous remainder whose property fell below the limits even of the fifth class. Being simply 'reckoned by heads,' *capite censi*, they formed only one century, and were not required to go into the field at all.

Two other centuries, or pairs of centuries, whose position among the *classes* is uncertain, contained the non-effective grades of armourers **Super-** (*fabri*) and trumpeters (*cornicines*); and Livy mentions numeraries. a 'supplementary' century of *accensi*, whose purpose is unknown, and whose very existence has been disputed.

The army, thus levied, was armed and organised in the Greek fashion, then newly introduced into Italy. A *legio* or state levy of three **The new** thousand men formed a phalanx, six deep, with a front of 500 army. files; the first four ranks, recruited from the first class, were fully armed; the fifth and sixth, only partly armed, came from the second and third classes; and to each *legio* were attached 1200 light armed auxiliaries. The army in the field consisted of two such *legiones*, while two more, formed from the *seniores*, the older men who had already passed their prime, were held in reserve, and garrisoned the city. The eighteen *centuriae equitum* supplied a cavalry force of 1800 men. Thus the full fighting force of Rome at this period may be estimated at some 18,600 men, rather more, already, than that which Athens could raise a century later for the Peloponnesian War.

The political effects of the constitution of Servius could not but be of the first importance. The control of foreign policy, in every state, must **Political** rest in the long run with those who form the fighting force; results. for it is useless for any magistrate or council to threaten to declare war unless the army is willing to fight; and an army only fights well under a leader in whom it has confidence. Consequently, from the

time of Servius onwards, we find questions of peace and war subject to the approval of a new Assembly-by-centuries, in which group-votes were taken, century by century, as they were in the older Assembly-by-curiae; and consequently also it became customary to submit to this same assembly the names of those who were to be nominated to military commands, and even to give a choice of candidates. Further, just as all dispositions of property which were made in time of peace required the sanction of the *curiae*, so a soldier's last wishes expressed before going into battle were attested and maintained by the *centuriae*, which thus gained a right to express opinions on certain matters of purely civil importance. The period at which the *Comitia Centuriata* began to acquire real political power is quite uncertain; but from the story of the *Regifugium* (p. 36) it is clear that it had then already become fully recognised as the principal political assembly of Rome. But as if to mark its originally military character, the *Comitia Centuriata* long continued to meet round its standards, in the drill-ground or *Campus Martius* outside the city; to be summoned by the sound of the war-horn; and to adjourn at once on the signal of an enemy's approach (p. 468).

Assembly-by-centuries.

Its powers.

Preponderance of the rich.

Whatever the extent and the date of the first purely political activity of this new assembly may have been, the general effect of the Servian Constitution was, certainly, to give to wealth the decisive voice in every question which was discussed. In the old *Comitia Curiata*, each of the divisions had had an equal voting power. But in the *Comitia Centuriata* not only was membership restricted to owners of freehold land—with the possible exception of the one century of *capite censi*—but the group-votes of the centuries were so distributed among the six classes, that the 'first class,' with its ninety-eight centuries,¹ could, if it pleased, carry any question in face of the ninety-three centuries of all the other classes put together. Further, as the centuries voted in the order of precedence, beginning with those of the *equites* and of the first class, the wealthiest secured the first or 'pre-rogative' vote (*sors praerogativa*), which in this, as in the other assemblies, was customarily regarded as an omen of the result, and frequently determined the votes of the centuries which followed it to the poll.

But the reforms which were ascribed to Servius did not stop here. The same classification of the people according to their wealth was employed besides in assigning the *tributum*, or war-tax, which was levied, to meet special emergencies, on all *assidui* or landed proprietors. The numerous plebeians who had

Tributum.

¹ Reckoning, with its own eighty, the eighteen *centuriae equitum*.

no landed property were probably excluded from the centuries, and so from the army, and continued, as *aerarii*, to pay the alien-tax as before.

The *tributum* was so called because it was collected in local districts known as *tribus*, and the establishment of these also is attributed to Servius Tullius. The territory of Roma Quadrata had originally been divided into three local 'thirds' or districts.¹ But at the amalgamation

with the community on the Quirinal, a fourth, the Colline, was added, which ranked after the other three. These four *tribus urbanae* were included within the Servian fortifications, and were divided into *vici* or groups of streets; and apparently the first conquests of the Romans outside the walls were reckoned to one or other of the original four. But afterwards, from time to time, other *tribus rusticae* were added (as one piece of territory, or local group of clans, after another, came under the power of Rome) and these were subdivided not into *vici*, but into *pagi* or villages. One legend gives as many as thirty local tribes in the time of Servius; but after the Expulsion of the Kings and the disastrous wars which followed, we find only twenty-one, and it was by very slow degrees and gradual conquest that the number finally rose (in 241) to thirty-five. To ensure that all landed property contributed its fair share of the *tributum*, some sort of register or *census* was drawn up within each tribe, and revised every fourth

year;² for the same reason every change of ownership had to be formally registered before witnesses; and for the same reason again all the inhabitants of the tribal districts, *aerarii* as well as *assidui*, were probably accustomed from the first to meet together for assessment and similar business. Here, too, as in the case of the Assembly-by-centuries, the custom gradually grew of discussing other matters than those which were strictly relevant; and in the early days of the Republic the Assembly-by-tribes assumed a large and important

Assembly-by-tribes.

¹ *Tribus* means originally simply a 'third.' Cf. *τριτῆς* in Attica, and the Æolic form *τριπῆς*: and the 'Ridings' or 'thirdings' of Yorkshire. In later times the other three 'city-tribes,' besides the Quirinal, were those of the Palatine, Esquiline, and Subura; but it is probable that originally, before the Quirinal settlement was annexed, they corresponded with the older division (of the population, not of the area), into *Ramnes*, *Tities*, and *Luceres*.

² One result of this was that with the multiplication of *tribus rusticae* the four original *tribus urbanae* came to represent less and less of the landed wealth of Rome; and meanwhile, as the urban industrial and mainly landless population grew, the numbers enrolled in the 'urban tribes' grew out of all proportion to those of the rustic tribes. But the political effects of this gradual change belong to a much later period (Ch. x.).

political rôle. But of these regular *Comitia Tributa* we hear nothing at all until after the Expulsion of the Kings.

It is with the Constitution of Servius, as with the massive walls and buildings which legend ascribed to him also, that the mists, which shroud the early history of Rome, first draw aside. And they reveal to us at the outset not the results of the slow growth of ages, but the original creation of a single master mind. Servius, in fact, stands out as the first historical personage in Rome, a statesman who could grasp the economic and social forces which underlay the political stress of his time, and who, with clear and fearless forethought, devised a remedy for it.

Servius a historical personage.

We have seen already that the last three kings of Rome represent an Etruscan dynasty, and probably an Etruscan conquest; and, in the case both of the elder Tarquin and of Servius, that they had attempted to secure their power by admitting to some degree of citizenship the wealthier aliens in the city, so as to break the monopoly of privilege enjoyed by the patrician *gentes*; while they exacted of these plebeians themselves both tribute and military service.

The Regifugium: its causes.

But a reaction was inevitable. Under the Constitution of Servius the resources at the disposal of the king were vastly increased, as the conquests and great buildings of the period attest; but at the same time a far larger and more independent body of citizens was interested in the proper disposal of them. Consequently, as in the states of early Greece, the need was felt of some constitutional check upon the irresponsible executive authority of the monarch. But whereas, in Athens, for example, the change from a life-monarchy to an annual magistracy was gradual, in Rome it appears to have been hastened by some personal cause; and the legend of the Tarquins relates how it was the misconduct of Sextus Tarquinius which provoked an outburst of public feeling against the arbitrary rule of his family, and gave leaders to the popular party from the ancient patrician houses of the Junii and the Valerii. There are traces of a similar revolution in some of the other towns of Latium, which Roman tradition provides with kings, whereas in historic times they are found to have a council of elders, and pairs of magistrates, like the Senate and Consuls of Rome. But it is very likely that both here and in Rome the process of despoiling the *Rex* of his former privileges was a gradual one; and that the sudden and tragic deposition of Tarquin the Proud owes much to patriotic imagination.

Not in Rome alone.

The Romans sometimes claimed that they had utterly expelled the name and the idea of kingship; but great constitutional forms are not

so easily annihilated ; and republican Rome continued to use not merely the functions and the powers of the old kings, but for ceremonial purposes even the very name. A *Rex sacrorum* continued to hold office for life, and, like the Athenian βασιλεύς, to perform those indispensable

Regal religious acts in which continuity was essential; to live in the old palace, the *Regia* ; and to take precedence of all other priestly officers. And at the appointment of a Dictator, and even of consuls, if in an emergency no consul was available, the magistrate who presided was still called *Inter-rex*, as at the appointment of a king.

Still less was the *Imperium* itself abolished, though this was the essential feature of the kingship ; for to have done that would have been to render all administration impossible. It was taken away, certainly, from the ceremonial *Rex*, who, as at Athens, was now prohibited from

performing any but purely religious functions, and from holding any civil office ; but it was conferred upon two *Praetores* or 'leaders,' who came to be called *Consules*, because they acted together.¹ Each of these had the

imperium in full, and independent of the other ; but each had consequently absolute power to forbid any act of the other, of which he disapproved. The consuls, however, only had this veto when they were 'at home' (*domi*) in Rome ; in war (*militiae*) each took command of a separate *legio* or levy of troops ; and his *imperium* was unrestricted, like that of the king, so long as he remained beyond the city walls. The consuls were expected to resign their office after one year, and to nominate their successors as the kings had done. Their nomination had to be confirmed by the whole body of citizens, in the *Comitia Centuriata*, which could choose between rival candidates ; but in accordance with ancient custom the *imperium* was still legally conferred by the *Comitia Curiata*, and the *auspicia* or right, as head of the State, to ascertain the will of Heaven, by the *Patres*. Thus there was no direct diminution of *imperium* ; but the dangers of monarchy were evaded by trusting the two holders of *imperium* to control each other. This principle of *intercessio* or mutual control within a single official board or *collegium*, is a peculiarly Roman institution, and lies at the bottom of all the subsequent developments of the Roman magistracy.

It was not long, however, before the difficulties of a twin-chieftaincy of this kind became apparent. As early as the Latin war of 501 (p. 38) the Romans found it necessary to revert to monarchy, even if only for a time. But rather than revive the hated name of *Rex*, they called their new

¹ Probably from *con-salio*, 'to keep step' ; cf. *praesul* and *exul*. Compare also *consulo* and *consilium*.

chief *magister populi* or *dictator*, both ancient Latin names (p. 31), and limited his term of office to six months only. The Dictator was nominated by one of the consuls whom he was to supersede; his *imperium* was absolute even within the city, as the axes in his *fascēs* showed; and from his sentence there was no appeal. As his second in command, he himself nominated a *magister equitum*, whose primary duty was obviously to command the cavalry. From this time onwards we often hear of the appointment of a Dictator, whenever either invasions from without, or the strife of parties within the State, seemed likely to overtax the ordinary constitution.

Dictators.

Indirectly, meanwhile, the members of the privileged clans secured the desired control over the executive magistrates; for it became customary for the consuls to summon the Senate regularly, and obtain the sanction of the *patres* to every administrative act. To consult the Senate thus never became the legal duty of the consuls, but the authority and experience of the Senate was such that no magistrate is known to have dispensed with it. The result was that, in time, the Senate, which was originally a purely consultative body, acquired an effective general control over the whole administration. Further, although all important business had to be submitted to the *Comitia Centuriata*, the arrangement of the voting gave, as we have seen, a standing majority to the great landowners, of whom a large proportion were still patricians; and so the Senate acquired a practical mastery over the whole machinery of legislation as well. No amendment, or further business, could be introduced, except by permission of the presiding magistrate; and no magistrate ventured to submit any question to the *Comitia* without the sanction of the Senate.

Consequent
predomi-
nance of the
Senate

Thus, though the Expulsion of the King was regarded as the unanimous act of all sections of the people, one of its principal results was that the political power of the old patrician families, which had been damaged by the upstart Tarquins, was very markedly increased and consolidated. It was perhaps inevitable, in a small and rapidly-growing state, that the responsibilities and privileges of government should be concentrated in a limited number of families; especially as those families were the natural representatives and guardians of the strong Roman principles of civic life and conduct, and as they still possessed a large proportion of the lands of Rome, and enjoyed the wealth and influence which such possession confers. But pride in purity of descent and ancestral tradition easily degenerates into a rigid exclusiveness, and an unmerited

and of the
patrician
gentes.

contempt of worthy and long-established neighbours, whose only fault is that their remote ancestors were not among the original inhabitants of the Asylum or the Palatine villages. And if, as was the case in Rome until the right of intermarriage was conceded, the standard of an aristocracy is not kept up by the inclusion of distinguished members of the unprivileged order, it is certain sooner or later to degenerate, and to forfeit the respect which is due to its high traditions. Wealth, in the same way, and especially wealth in land, offers strong temptations to extortion and misuse for personal ends; while unless it is employed with constant regard to the responsibilities which it entails, and to the interest of the whole State, it is sure to breed discontent: for the poor are inevitably made to feel that they have somehow been deprived of their share in the necessaries of civilised existence.

Under the kings, plebeians, in their disputes with patricians, had been sure of justice, if not more than justice, in the royal court. By the *Regifugium*, on the other hand, they were deprived, in many cases of their *patronus*, and, in all, of their natural protector against oppres-

Plebeian
distress
after the
Regifugium.

sion by the nobles; while they were prohibited from redressing their own wrongs by the fact that they had no part in the republican administration. Plebeian landholders had indeed votes in the *Comitia Centuriata*, but

they could choose, for the consulship, only among patrician candidates, and vote only on questions proposed by patrician magistrates, with the sanction of a patrician Senate. Individual plebeians who were wronged by a patrician had to bring their case before a patrician court; while a defaulting plebeian was liable by the traditional law of debt to lose his freedom and become the bond slave of a patrician creditor, and might be put to death on the mere order of a patrician magistrate. Consequently, from the moment of the Expulsion of the

Consequent
struggle of
the Orders.

King a new internal struggle began in Rome between the patrician and the plebeian order, which lasted for nearly two hundred years, and was only terminated by the con-

cession to the plebs of complete legal and political equality with the patricians, and of real safeguards against the abuse of the power of the magistrates.

SUBJECTS

Birthright, wealth, and residence, as qualifications for citizenship—Aristocracy, timocracy, and democracy—Servius, Lycurgus, Solon, and Cleisthenes—the Roman conception of *imperium*. The constitutional conservatism of the Romans.

CHAPTER VI

THE STRUGGLE OF THE ORDERS

The demands of the Plebeians—*Lex Valeria de Provocatione*—The Law of Debt—First Secession—*Tribuni Plebis*—The Public Lands—The demand for a Code of Law—*Decemviri*—The Twelve Tables—Second Secession—*Leges Valeriae Horatiae*.

In the struggle between the patricians and plebeians, which opens with the first year of the Republic, the principal grievances of the plebeians were as follows. Though under the Servian Constitution they already possessed the *ius suffragii*, or right to vote at the election of magistrates, they had not the *ius honorum*, or right to be elected to office themselves. Though they held the *ius commercii*, enabling them to live and do business in Rome, they were unable to acquire landed property, and were at the mercy of patrician creditors and accusers in Roman courts of law. They had no *ius connubii* with the patrician families; all marriages between plebeians and patricians being ignored by the latter, and the children of such unions being counted as plebeians. Plebeians were excluded also from the many religious ceremonies which form so important a part of every public act in an ancient state. They claimed therefore :—

- (1) *The right to full equality of citizenship with the patricians*; a demand first formulated in 509, but only fully conceded by the Licinian Laws of 367.
- (2) *The right to be secured against personal enslavement for debt*; first claimed in 495, and finally conceded in 367.
- (3) *The right to manage their own affairs, and to appoint independent officers of their own*; first claimed in 493, and conceded as early as 471.
- (4) *The right to a fair share of conquered territory*; repeatedly contested from 493 onwards. The importance of this claim in early times has probably been greatly exaggerated by later writers, in order to provide historical precedents for the agrarian legislation of the Gracchi (Ch. xxvii.). But there can

little doubt that the question of the mode of distribution arose from the first moment when there was conquered territory to divide ; for the plebeians fought in Rome's battles, and might justly claim to share the fruits of her victories.

- (5) *The right to know the laws and rules of court*; first claimed in 462, and conceded in principle in 450, but not finally assured till 304.

It will be seen from the dates that the agitations for all the points of the plebeian programme went on for a considerable period side by side ; but it will be convenient to take the principal reforms under each head together, more or less in the order in which the several points of principle were of predominant importance.

One direct legal check was placed very early upon the power of the consuls. The kings had been at liberty at their own discretion to consult the *Comitia* as to the remission of the penalty of death. But on the proposal of L. Valerius Publicola, one of the first consuls of the Republic, this privilege—*provocare ad populum*—was converted into a right. Henceforward no consul might put a Roman citizen to death without allowing him to plead his case before the *Comitia Centuriata*. No penalty, however, was imposed for neglect of this privilege, and it must have been more than once in danger afterwards, for we find it repeatedly re-enacted ; but the *Lex Valeria de Provocatione* was throughout regarded as the corner-stone of civic liberty in Rome.

In the early stages of all societies, where both wealth itself and the openings for the employment of it are rare, the law of debtor and creditor is found to be very severe. Loans are made for short limited periods only ; and the commonest form of security is, that the debtor undertakes, if he is not able to repay at the time appointed, to surrender himself personally to his creditor, and work off the obligation as his bond-slave. But when a man has once surrendered his personal freedom to dispose of his own labour, it is practically impossible for him ever to set himself free ; while if the amount of the original debt is more than a man's whole life work will repay, there is always the danger that the labour and personal freedom of his heirs may be pledged in continuation of the payment. Now this was the form of obligation which was customary in early Rome ; the contract involving a pledge of personal service was called *nexum*, and the debtors surrendered under it *addicti* or *nexi*. It seems first to have become oppressive when the Servian reforms exacted compulsory service from the plebeian occupiers of the smaller farms. These men cultivated their fields with their own hands ;

and so were obliged, if war broke out, to borrow from richer neighbours either the means to pay hired labourers in their own absence, or seed-corn and food for themselves if they left their farms untilled during the campaign. And besides, they ran the risk of finding their homes and savings plundered and burnt on their return if the enemy had succeeded in penetrating into Roman territory.

In the years of political and economic distress which followed the Expulsion of the King, the cruelty of the patrician creditors became so intolerable, that in 494 the plebeians with one accord refused to fight against the Volsci until the consul Servilius had released the imprisoned debtors. **The First Secession 494 B.C.** But after the war, the severity of the other consul, Appius Claudius, caused a second mutiny. The patricians declared the State in danger, and M. Valerius was made Dictator. Valerius succeeded in raising an army, and defeated the Volscians; but his proposals of reform were rejected by the Senate. Whereupon the plebeian soldiers, instead of entering Rome with the rest of the army, withdrew by themselves to a hill called the Sacred Mount, lying in the fork between the Tiber and the Anio, and about three miles from Rome. Here they threatened to found a new city of their own, and to leave the patricians and their retainers to themselves. The patricians in Rome sent Valerius, with Menenius Agrippa and other leaders of their order, to persuade them to return. **Agrippa's Parable.** Agrippa is said to have convinced them, by the parable of the 'Belly and the Limbs,' how helpless either patrician or plebeian would be without the support of the other; and to have persuaded them to listen to terms, which were solemnly confirmed by a *Lex Sacrata* or sworn compact between the orders. Existing debts are said **The Lex Sacrata.** to have been cancelled, and provision made for the settlement of poor citizens on public lands. But the all-important concession was that henceforth the plebeians were to elect annually two of their own order as recognised champions of their rights against the arbitrary power of the magistrates.

These representatives of the plebs were called *Tribuni Plebis*, from which we may perhaps conclude that they were in some way chosen by the local 'tribes.'¹ At first they were two in number, like the consuls; then in the year 471 they were increased to four;² and by the time of the Decemvirate in 449 there were already ten of them. The powers of

¹ The Greek writers translated *Tribuni* by *δημαρχοι*, a name which exactly describes their functions, and was perhaps borrowed from that of certain magistrates of Neapolis.

² Livy (ii. 33) says *five*: and assigns the rise to *ten* to 457.

the Tribunes were of a peculiar kind. Being plebeians, they were not regarded as magistrates of the State, and were incapable of holding *imperium*; but by the *lex sacrata* their persons were declared sacred—*sacro sancti*—during their year of office, so that to touch them, or hinder them in any way, was the gravest religious offence; ‘*transgressor dis inferis deditus*,’ as Livy says. Thus they were enabled literally *intercedere*, to ‘step in between’ a debtor and his creditor, and by the word *intercedo* to forbid arrest for debt, or any public act, whether of magistrate, comitia, or senate, which affected the personal freedom of a citizen. This *ius auxilii* or ‘right of help,’ however, they could only exercise in person; but their doors stood open day and night, that the oppressed might find refuge at any time; and they were obliged to remain in Rome during their year of office. This was partly to secure their presence when required, but partly also to preserve unimpaired the consular *imperium militiae*, and the discipline of the army in the field. Against the order of a Dictator, however, their ‘*veto*’ was ineffectual even within the city. They were further permitted to summon and preside over a *concilium* or mass meeting of the plebeians, and to ascertain their wishes by passing resolutions or *plebiscita*. And it is probable that they were also allowed to punish members of the plebs who did things contrary to the interests of the order.

At the same time, the plebeians were allowed to appoint from their own order two *aediles*, who had charge of public buildings (*aedes*), the roads, of the markets, weights, measures, and of the city watchmen. The plebs thus obtained some control over the administration of public works, in which the greater part of the labour was supplied by plebeians; and over the facilities for trade, in which also plebeians bore the larger share.

The creation of tribunes and aediles was an inestimable gain to the plebeians, for now they were formally recognised as a distinct corporation competent to have officials elected by and from themselves; neither could they now be prevented by force from giving formal expression to their wishes; though it was not until 471 that this permission grew into a positive right. But the law of debt remained unaltered; the patricians continued to monopolise all newly-conquered territory; and the new plebeian officials were expressly precluded from holding any of the regular magistracies at all.

Another flagrant abuse related to the mismanagement of the public lands. In Rome, as in the states of Homeric Greece, a goodly estate

was set apart for the king, to provide for his necessities, and to leave him free to give his whole attention to the business of the city. And, after a successful war, the lion's share of the conquered territory was assigned to the king likewise; for was he not the bravest and most skilled in warfare? Other conquered lands also were held by the king in trust for the citizens in general. The cultivated portions of this *ager publicus* were divided into lots and distributed to private citizens. Much of the rest remained unenclosed as common pasture, on which every citizen was entitled to graze his cattle, paying for each a small registration-tax—*scriptura*. Other uncultivated parts private citizens were allowed to occupy—*occupare* or *possidere*—and to cultivate as they pleased; the land itself remaining public property, and the *possessores* being supposed to pay rent for their use of it. But at the Expulsion of the King, the patricians seem to have seized upon his domain, and on such *ager publicus* as existed already; and thenceforth continued to divide among themselves alone all the territory conquered since the *Regifugium*, 'occupying' it at only a nominal rent, excluding all cattle but their own from the common pastures, and themselves omitting to pay the grazing-tax. Thus the plebeians were deprived of all profit from the lands which they had helped to win; and though the land question did not become acute till a later period in the struggle between the orders, a striking story was told of an early attempt to remedy the evil.

Soon after the First Secession to the Sacred Mount, Spurius Cassius, who was now for the third time consul, is said to have proposed a law affirming for the plebeians the right to occupy public lands—*ius agri possidendi*. Part of each newly conquered territory was to be assigned as before to all who were able to rent it; but part was to be distributed *viritim*, and in freehold, to those who were not. The story goes on that this first *Lex Agraria* was duly carried, in spite of the opposition of the patricians. But in the following year they had their revenge. Cassius was accused of attempting to make himself king. His plebeian friends became suspicious, and held aloof, and he was condemned and put to death according to ancient custom; his house was levelled with the ground, and the provisions of his agrarian law remained a dead letter. Of all this story, the last point only is certain, and perhaps the whole episode may be a late invention. There can be no doubt, however, that the land grievance was felt already, and that efforts were made from time to time to force the government to remedy it. A colony, for example, was founded on public land at Antium in 467, and in 456 all the public lands on the Aventine Hill were distributed by a *Lex Icilia* to provide dwellings

Spurius
Cassius,
486 B.C.

for the poorer plebeians, who were in danger of being crowded out of the city altogether. But it is not till very much later (p. 105) that we can trace any definite legislation as to the disposal of the 'public land.'

Hitherto there had been no form of assembly in which the plebeians were not liable to be outvoted by the patricians; and the earliest

Improved
position
of the
Tribunes.

tribunes seem to have been appointed by a sort of Assembly-by-curiae, to which only the plebeian members of the *curiae* were summoned. The matter demanded a settlement, however, and after Cn. Genucius, one of the

tribunes of 472, had been murdered in a fruitless agitation, Publius Volero, a tribune of the following year, secured that henceforward

Lex
Publilia,
471 B.C.

the tribunes and aediles should be appointed in a purely plebeian assembly, voting according to the local 'tribes'; and it is possible that this, or at least the principle which

it implied, may account for the name *Tribuni* which is given to these representatives of the plebeians. This *Concilium Plebis Tributum* was summoned and conducted by the tribunes; and a *Lex Icilia*, passed either now or earlier,¹ made it a capital offence to interrupt a tribune's speaking.

At first it seems to have been used for little else but these elections, but eventually it took a most important place beside the regular *Comitia*; for the *Lex Publilia* conceded to the tribunes the right, which they had already assumed by custom, to conduct discussions—*cum plebe agere*—in this assembly, and to put resolutions to the vote; and these *plebiscita* were regarded henceforth as legally binding on every plebeian.

Lex Icilia,
456 B.C.

Another *Lex Icilia* in 456 authorised the consuls to bring each *plebiscitum* before the Senate, and (under the usual

provision that the consent of the Senate should be obtained) before the *Comitia Centuriata* also. If it were then accepted by the whole people voting in their centuries, what was formerly a mere expression of the desires of the plebeians became a formal *Lex*, and binding upon every citizen. There was, however, as yet no sort of guarantee either that the consul would exercise his authority to bring a *plebiscitum* before the Senate; still less that, even if he did, the Senate would allow it to be laid before the *Comitia*; and it was only by very slow degrees that the wish of the plebs came to be regarded as equivalent to the will of the Roman people.

All this time patrician magistrates continued to abuse their power of pronouncing, like the 'divine-born' kings of Greece, on points of legal and judicial usage. Like all early law, the law of Rome consisted

¹ The traditional date 492 seems too early.

of a great mass of customs, forms, and ceremonies, all of great antiquity, many already of half-forgotten significance, and many also involving religious rites, into which only the members of a patrician clan could be initiated. Thus patricians were in any case at a great advantage against plebeians, who could not follow their procedure or verify their interpretation of the law. And so partial and inconsistent were their rulings, that the cry arose vehemently for plain, permanently published laws, which any citizen might read and understand, and which the magistrates might be compelled to observe.

The demand for a Code of Law.

Exactly the same grievance had been felt in many Greek cities at a corresponding stage of their development, and had there been met by the publication of legal codes, like those of Charondas and Zaleucus, or of stated penalties like those prescribed in Athens by Draco, or in Crete by the laws of Gortyna.

The fame of the Greek Codes.

Some of these codes had frequently been borrowed by one Greek town from another, while the fame of them soon spread beyond the limits of the Greek-speaking world. And so, in the year 462, a tribune, C. Terentilius Arsa, proposed that a commission of five plebeians should be appointed to define the powers of the magistrates, and to publish the 'Quiritary Law.' For years the patricians resisted the proposal, and tried by various minor concessions to pacify popular feeling. The Aventine lands were distributed in 456, and limits were set to the fines which a consul might impose. But year after year the plebs appointed the same body of tribunes, pledged to this one reform; and in 454 three Commissioners were appointed and sent abroad to study the codes which were in use. A striking tradition asserts that they travelled even as far as Athens, which was then under the administration of Pericles.

Commissioners sent to Greece, 454 B.C.

The Commissioners returned after two years' absence, and on their recommendation a new Commission of Ten—*Decemviri*—was appointed at the beginning of 451 to draw up a code of Roman Law.

Though plebeians might equally have been members of this board of conciliation, the ten who were actually elected were all patricians, and included the two consuls for the year—Appius Claudius and T. Genucius. To leave the field clear, the regular constitution was suspended, and even the tribunes were compelled to resign. The *Decemviri* were intrusted with the supreme *imperium*, unfettered even by the right of appeal; and held office each for one day in turn, attended like a consul by twelve lictors. The government of the *Decemviri* was able and impartial, and in the course of the year they drew up a legal code, which was duly sanctioned by

Decemviri Legibus Scribendis, 451 B.C.

the *Comitia Centuriata*, and written out on the bronze tablets, which were hung up publicly in the Forum.

Such was the general satisfaction with the government of the Ten, that when they reported, at the end of their year of office, that their work was not yet quite finished, the people determined to appoint a similar commission for the succeeding year. But of the **Reappointed 450 B.C.** old *Decemviri* only Appius Claudius was re-elected. Appius had distinguished himself during the former year by his independent and efficient government, and was already dangerously popular with the plebeians. The patricians were therefore particularly anxious to prevent his reappointment; and in order to prohibit his candidature, he was called upon to preside as returning-officer at the election; for in this capacity he was expected to disallow votes given for himself. Appius, however, with the disregard for precedent which was characteristic of his family, ignored the established custom, and declared himself elected; and, moreover, all his new colleagues were found to be men devoted to his service, and five of them actually plebeians.

Appius appears to have had the distinct idea of permanently replacing the old constitution, with its privileges and safeguards, by an irresponsible tyranny of the Greek type, based upon personal influence and the support of the populace. He now felt himself strong enough to defy all constitutional forms. **Tyranny of Appius Claudius.** Instead of a single set of twelve lictors, each *Decemvir* enrolled twelve lictors of his own, who together formed a substantial bodyguard, and carried axes in their fasces even within the city. The Ten omitted to consult the Senate, or to hold *Comitia*, and added, on their own authority, two new tablets to the published code, which was henceforth known as the *Leges Duodecim Tabularum*, or Laws of the Twelve Tables—‘the fountainhead,’ as Livy says, ‘of all law, public and private,’ in Rome. The two new tables contained, however, a confirmation of the most oppressive claims of the patricians, whom Appius seems to have attempted thus to reconcile to his tyranny. At the end of the year the Ten refused either to resign or to hold *Comitia* for a new election. Still, no one **Unrest in Rome,** ventured to resist, though the conduct of the Ten became more and more outrageous, and it became clear that under this new tyranny no man’s life or property was secure. In fact, many distinguished citizens are said to have left Rome altogether.

The news, however, of the internal troubles of Rome soon spread **and wars abroad.** abroad, and the Sabini and Aequi took advantage of this opportunity for a raid. The rest of the *Decemviri* took the field with two consular levies, leaving Appius Claudius in sole charge

of the city. But the campaign went ill, and the popular discontent with the Ten was brought to a head by two shameful acts of tyranny, of which the legend may be briefly told, as follows :—

‘ In the army which went against the Sabines there was a brave centurion whose name was L. Sicinius Dentatus. In more than a hundred battles he had been wounded forty-five times, and had killed eight of the enemy hand to hand. Nine times he had returned in triumph with his leader, and had received many crowns and rewards from the people. But when he was chosen Tribune of the people (in 452), he had withstood the nobles ; and he knew what was in the heart of the Ten. So they sent him out with a company of their men to see the camp of the enemy, and these men, when they were alone, fell upon him to kill him. Yet he, ere he fell, slew many of them ; and the rest came and told how that they had fallen into an ambush ; and the Ten made great mourning for Dentatus, and buried him, that the matter might not be known. But his friends saw that it was the work of the Ten, and would have avenged him. Dentatus.

‘ In the other army, also, there was a centurion, Verginius by name ; and his daughter Verginia was exceeding fair, and she was betrothed to Icilius, a leader among the plebeians. But Appius lusted after her, and spoke softly to Verginius, and offered money. But he would not give her to him, and went out with the army against the Aequi. Then Appius set Marcus Claudius, one of his men, to wait for Verginia as she came with her nurse to school. And he laid hold of her, and cried out that she was the daughter of his slave, and that the wife of Verginius had taken her because she had no children ; and he brought her before Appius to have judgment. Then Appius, fearing the people, put off the matter because her father was away ; “ yet to-morrow,” said he, “ I will give judgment, whether her father be come or no.” But to the camp he sent word that they should not let him come. Then one ran to the camp and told Verginius ; and he, when they had given him leave—for the messenger of Appius was not yet come—returned from the camp, and came with his daughter into the Forum with his clothes rent, and a great company weeping with him. But Appius gave judgment that Verginia was his man’s slave, and bade the guards drive back the people from the judgment-seat. Then Verginius, because he saw that there was no remedy, prayed but to speak a word with the nurse apart, to know if Verginia were indeed his daughter ; and Appius gave him leave. And Verginius, when he had drawn them aside into a stall, seized a butcher’s knife that lay there, and stabbed his daughter to the heart, saying, “ There is no way but this.” Then Verginius lifted up the bloody knife, and ran through the city to Verginia.

‘ the army ; and Icilius and Numitorius ran to the other army, and told ‘ what was done to Verginia ; and the soldiers drove out the Ten from ‘ the two camps, and came together to the Holy Mount.’

Such is the famous legend of the fall of the *Decemviri*. On the news of this Second Secession to the Mons Sacer, the patricians forced Appius and the Ten to resign, and sent L. Valerius Potitus and M. Horatius Barbatus to propose a compromise, offering a general amnesty, and to restore the right of appeal, and the right of the plebs to appoint tribunes. On these terms the plebeians returned to Rome, and held a *concilium*, in which, perhaps for the first time,¹ they elected the full number of ten tribunes ; Verginius, Icilius, and Numitorius among them. The *Comitia Centuriata* also reassembled as before ; the resignation of the *Decemviri* was confirmed ; the old constitution was formally re-established ; and Valerius and Horatius were duly elected consuls.

Valerius and Horatius thereupon proposed three measures, which though not regular laws, but rather the terms of an understanding between the two orders, became known as the *Leges Valeriae-Horatae*. These provisions, in which the results of the Second Secession were summed up, and formally confirmed, were as follows :—

**Leges
Valeriae-
Horatae,
449 B.C.**

- (1) *The right of every Roman citizen to appeal to the people against the capital sentence of a magistrate within the city, first conferred by P. Valerius Publicola in the first year of the Republic, was solemnly reaffirmed ; with a further provision forbidding the creation in future of any absolute magistrates such as the Decemviri. Yet the old grievance reappeared even later still, for we find that a third member of the same distinguished gens proposed a third Lex Valeria de provocatione as late as the year 300.*

(1) **Provo-** by P. Valerius Publicola in the first year of the
catio. Republic, was solemnly reaffirmed ; with a further provision forbidding the creation in future of any absolute magistrates such as the *Decemviri*. Yet the old grievance reappeared even later still, for we find that a third member of the same distinguished *gens* proposed a third *Lex Valeria de provocatione* as late as the year 300.
- (2) *The ‘Plebiscita,’ or resolutions of the ‘Concilium Plebis,’ were given the same force as a ‘Lex’ regularly passed in Comitia Centuriata.’ This is the plain statement of Livy,² but, on the one hand, a large part of what was now confirmed had already been granted by the Lex Icilia of 456 (p. 72), and, on the other, almost identical phrases are used to describe the results of the Lex Publilia of 339,³ and even of the Lex Hortensia of 286.⁴ It is possible that the new*

(2) **Plebis-** other, almost identical phrases are used to describe
cita. the results of the *Lex Publilia* of 339,³ and even of the *Lex Hortensia* of 286.⁴ It is possible that the new

¹ But see p. 69 n.

² *Ut, quod tributim plebs iussisset, populum teneret* (Livy, iii. 55).

³ *Ut plebiscita omnes quirites tenerent* (Livy, viii. 12).

⁴ *Ut eo iure, quod plebs statuisset, omnes quirites tenerentur* (Gell., xv. 27).

enactment did little more than *compel* instead of *permit* the consuls to bring a *plebiscitum* before the Senate.¹

- (3) *The sanctity of the persons of tribunes, and other plebeian officials, was reaffirmed as a principle of public law*, whereas hitherto it had been guaranteed only by the religious sanction of the 'ancient oath.'² And by a *plebiscitum* passed immediately afterwards, neglect to provide for the annual appointment of tribunes was punishable with death. The tribunes took advantage of this increased security to attend the debates of the Senate, and to interpose their 'veto' in any department of public business they pleased.

(3) Tribun-
icia
Potestas.

The reformed constitution having been re-established with these new safeguards, and the plebeian organisation being legally sanctioned, Appius Claudius and the other *Decemviri* were formally accused by Verginius. Appius killed himself in prison before the trial took place, and his plebeian friend and colleague Oppius was actually tried, condemned, and put to death; but the remainder, though found guilty, were allowed to go alive into exile. Their property was confiscated to the State.

Death of
Appius
Claudius.

¹ Mommsen's interpretation is different. He holds that the *Lex Valeria* of 449, and the *Lex Publilia* of 339 (p. 107) both refer, not to the *Concilium Plebis* at all, but to the *Comitia Tributa*, the earlier history of which is most obscure, but which after 287 became the chief legislative assembly in Rome. But Livy's words are precise, and it is better to look upon all three laws (449, 339, 286) as marking successive stages in the rise of *Plebiscita* to complete equality with *Leges*.

The difference between the two bodies, which has often been ignored, is most important, and is briefly as follows:—

The *Concilium Plebis* is not *Comitia*, a meeting of the whole Roman people, at all, but a meeting of plebeians only, for the election of Tribunes and Aediles, and for the adoption of resolutions which were binding, in the first instance, only upon plebeians. It could not elect or be summoned by any but plebeian officers. It voted *tributum* merely as a matter of convenience, not as representing all the members of the tribes.

The *Comitia Tributa* consisted of the whole Roman people, patricians and plebeians alike, summoned by a regular magistrate (afterward, and usually, a Praetor), and voting by tribes. Its original function, probably, was simply as a court of appeal against the *Tribuni Plebis*, and perhaps also for the voting of taxation which was assessed, *tributum*, tribe by tribe; but, in 447, the *Quaestores* (p. 101), who had previously been appointed by the Consuls, came to be elected by it, probably because they too were concerned in the collection of revenue; and so also, later, the Curule Aediles (p. 106) and the *Tribuni Militum* (p. 100). Its mode of voting, based upon *local* grouping (like modern Parliamentary divisions), denied both to birth and to wealth the preponderance which the other two forms of *Comitia* admitted; and consequently it came to be regarded as the most impartial means of ascertaining the wishes of the Roman people.

² *Tribunos, religione inviolatos, lege etiam fecerunt* (Livy, iii. 55).

[*The Internal History is resumed in Chapter IX.*]

CHIEF DATES

Lex Valeria de Provocatione	509
First Secession	494
Spurius Cassius	486
Lex Publilia	471
Lex Icilia	456
Decemviri Legibus Scribundis	451
Leges XII Tabularum	450
Second Secession: Leges Valeriae-Horatiae	449

CHIEF PERSONS

P. Valerius Publicola — Menenius Agrippa — Spurius Cassius — Appius Claudius — Sicinius Dentatus — Verginia — L. Valerius Potitus — M. Horatius Barbatus.

SUBJECTS

The Roman Right of Appeal to the People. Enslavement for Debt. The Right to receive Allotments of conquered Land. The Growth of Greek and of Roman Law.

CHAPTER VII

THE EARLY WARS OF ROME

The Wars of the Kings—Wars with the Latins—Latin League of Spurius Cassius—Wars with the Etruscans—Wars with the Volsci—Coriolanus—Wars with the Aequi—Cincinnatus—Siege of Veii—Camillus.

THE traditional history of the wars of the kings may be dismissed in a few lines. From the beginning, Rome is represented as struggling to maintain itself independent of that League of Latin towns which owned the leadership of Alba. On the one occasion when Rome and the Alban League united in a common attack on Etruria, the conduct of the Albans was such that in self-defence King Tullus had to destroy their city (p. 31). And in the reign of King Ancus which followed, many smaller Latin towns were conquered, and their inhabitants transported to Rome.

Of the Etruscan kings, Tarquin the Elder is said to have conquered many Latin towns, and Tarquin the Proud to have concluded a definite treaty between Rome and a Latin confederacy, which had succeeded the League of Alba ; to have celebrated, as its head, the Latin Festival on the Alban Mount ; and to have been provoked to the war with Gabii by the refusal of this town to enter the new league (p. 35). He is also said to have attacked the Rutuli of Ardea, and the Volsci of Suessa Pometia ; and this southward movement is the more credible, since the Etruscan fortress of Signia must have been designed to keep the Volsci in check, and since we know from Greek sources that during his reign a band of Etruscan adventurers even entered and occupied Campania, capturing the Greek colony of Cumae in the year 525 ; its tyrant Aristodemus vainly attempting to play off one set of Etruscans against another by allying himself with Tarquin of Rome.

In foreign, as in domestic affairs, the *Regifugium* left Rome in a desperately feeble state. The exiled Etruscan princes had only to retire beyond the Tiber, to raise the whole force of Veii and Tarquinii, and afterwards the powerful confederacy of the Prince of Clusium, to

LATIUM

avenge their expulsion. In spite of the stories of Horatius, Scaevola, and Cloelia, it is probable that Lars Porsena actually conquered Rome ; and it is certain that Rome lost all her possessions on the further bank of the river. For the next century, therefore, the external history of Rome is one continuous struggle for existence ; first against her Latin neighbours ; then against the three nations which border upon Latium—the Etruscans beyond the Tiber, the Volsci in the south, and the Aequi in the highlands of the interior.

Obviously the first step was to secure the lost leadership of Latium. After the retirement of Porsena, Tarquin is said to have taken refuge at Tusculum, and to have succeeded in rallying thirty Latin towns

about him for a final attack on Rome. The war broke out in the year 501, and the Romans in their alarm resolved for the moment to suspend the very liberties for which they were fighting, and to confer undivided and unrestricted *imperium* upon a *dictator*, T. Lartius, and after him upon A. Postumius. The tale of the miraculous victory of Lake Regillus has been told already (p. 38). Here we are only concerned to note that for the Latins, as for the cause of Tarquin, this half-legendary campaign was decisive. It was only eight years later, according to Livy's account,¹ that Spurius Cassius concluded with them the lasting treaty, which remained engraved upon a bronze pillar, the earliest historical document of Rome. Indeed, the Romans and the other Latins could not remain separated for long. They were of the same race, spoke the same language, and worshipped the same gods; and they were now drawn together more closely than ever by the common danger from the Aequi and Volsci, who were pressing out of their hills into the lowland.

War with
the Latins,
501-495 B.C.

Latin
League of
Spurius
Cassius,
493 B.C.

The League was established on free and equal terms. But it will be seen from the map (p. 80) that whereas to the northward Rome had already lost all her outlying possessions, and lying as she did entrenched behind her river frontier, could choose her own time for attack, and whereas the old power of Etruria was already on the wane (p. 83), the more immediate danger, on the side of the more aggressive highlanders, fell wholly upon the Latins, who lay between the hills and Rome. In the Aequian and Volscian wars, therefore, the Latins suffered all the losses, while Rome took care to secure her full share in the victories. Thus Rome grew steadily and almost unconsciously at the expense of her own kinsfolk and allies.

Its value to
Rome.

Shortly after the establishment of this Latin League, Rome succeeded in attracting the alliance of another group of states also, which was to prove as useful to her in attack as the Latins were in defence.

The highlands of the Aequi and the coast hills of the Volsci are separated by a tract of lower country, which runs out like a wedge from Latium, over into the upper valley of the Tolerus, which runs away south-eastward to join the Liris below Fregellae. The Hernici, who inhabited this strip of country, were connected by race with the highlanders, but had suffered no less than the Latins from their raids, and had formed a defensive league among themselves. In the year 486, and on the proposal of the same Spurius Cassius who had organised the Latin confederacy, they threw in their lot with the Romans,

Alliance
with the
Hernici,
486 B.C.

¹ Livy, ii. 33; Cic. *pro Balbo*, 23.

who were thus enabled to prevent their two principal enemies from joining forces ; while, as the event proved, they secured also, in the Tolerus valley and the *via Latina*, an invaluable entrance into Campania.

The wars of the next generation, from 486 to 446, have only been handed down in outline, in the chronicles of a few distinguished Roman families, which are full of the marvellous adventures and heroic deeds of their chief men. Though Etruria had ceased to be dangerous

with the extinction of the Tarquins, the powerful city of Veii continued to harass the Romans by border raids, and prevented them from recovering their lost territory. Partly to prevent these raids, and partly to escape the consequences of many years of high-handed conduct in Rome, the noble clan of the Fabii undertook, with the consent of the Senate, to punish the men of Veii, and set out in a body ; leaving the city, as was well remembered after-

wards, ' by the right-hand way of the Porta Carmentalis, between the Capitol and the river. In the land of Veii they built a fort by the river Cremera, and from thence they went out and spoiled the men of Veii by the space of one year. But it was the custom of the Fabii once in every year to keep the feast of their fathers on the Quirinal hill in Rome, and they thought not that any would dare to touch them in their pilgrimage. So they went all of them on the way to Rome. But the men of Veii lay in wait for them, and fell upon them by the way, and all the house of the Fabii was destroyed. Yet they had left behind them one little lad in Rome, because he was weak ; and he remained alive ; and from him is the whole house of the Fabii sprung. Then the Romans closed the right-hand way of that gate, because by it the Fabii went forth to their doom.'

The story is of interest because it illustrates the close religious tie which bound a Roman *gens* together, and also the 'truce of God,' which, like the Olympic and Carneian truces in Greece, was usually conceded, even to the bitterest enemies, on the occasion of such a festival. We may note also that a private raid or *coniuratio*, like that of the Fabii, seems to have been quite as regular a proceeding in early Italy, as piracy on the high seas in Homeric Greece.

The massacre of the Fabii is assigned by tradition to the year 477, and is the last important incident on the northern frontier for nearly half a century. The Veientes, it is true, seized the Janiculum hill in a raid three years later, and held it for a while. But the great days of the Etruscans were already over. On land they had held Latium and Campania, and they had dominated the whole Tyrrhenian Sea. But in the

Wars
with the
Etruscans.

The Fabii at
the Cremera,
477 B.C.

very year of the last Veientine raid, the combined navies of the Sicilian Greeks, under Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse, broke up their sea-power in a great naval battle off Cumae, and only twenty years later we hear how a Syracusan fleet attacked their settlements in Corsica, and threatened the shores of Etruria itself. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that within a year of the battle of Cumae, Veii proposed, of its own accord, a truce of forty years with Rome, and abstained from acts of aggression for more than a generation. At the end of that period, Rome was mistress of all Latium, and had fairly beaten the highlanders; while the Etruscans had been the first to feel the double pressure, in Campania of the raiding Samnites, and on her north frontier, of the rising tide of the Gauls. And it was not the only occasion on which a great event in the history of the Greeks was to find its echo among the infant states of Italy.

Decline
of the
Etruscans,
474-434 B.C.

Of the wars with the Volscians little more is known than of the war with Veii; and the only notable legend is that which has made immortal the name of Coriolanus. In the year 488, eleven years

Wars
with the
Volscians.

before the raid of the Fabii, 'there was a man in Rome named C. Marcius, whom the Romans called Coriolanus, because he had done great things when they took Corioli' (493). Yet the people hated him, and would not have him to be consul. So when corn came from Sicily in a time of famine, he would have the Senate bid the people first put away their tribunes, and then they should have bread to eat. Then the people would have torn him in pieces; but the tribunes took him and made him plead his cause before the Assembly of the Plebs. But he hardened his heart, and they drove him out of the city. Then Coriolanus went to Antium, which was the chief town of the Volscians, and said that he would lead them against the Romans; and Tullius, their king, made him leader of all their armies. So Coriolanus fought against Rome, and defeated the Romans, and came near to lay siege to the city. And he laid waste the lands of the plebeians, but those of the patricians he spared; so that the Romans knew not what to do, and sent ten of the chief men in the Senate to entreat him. But he hardened his heart. And they sent again the pontifices, the augurs, and the flamens, with the rest of the priests, and they came in their robes and entreated him; yet he hearkened not. Then at the last the Roman women saved the city. For Valeria, the sister of Publicola, took Volumnia, the mother of Coriolanus, and Virgilia¹ his wife, and his little children, and all the

Coriolanus,
488 B.C.

¹ So Plutarch gives the names, and Shakespeare has copied him. Another account makes Volumnia the wife of Coriolanus, and his mother's name Veturia.

' chief women, and came and besought him with tears that he would not destroy his own city. And when he would have kissed his mother, Volumnia said to him, "Answer me this first. Am I the mother of Caius Marcius, or a prisoner in the hand of the leader of the Volscians? " "If I had not been a mother, my country had still been free." Then Coriolanus was moved, and he turned himself with tears to his mother and said, "Mother, thou hast saved Rome, but thou hast lost thy son." So he went away back with the Volscians; and the Volscians were exceeding wroth, and slew him, because he had repented of his quarrel. Yet some say that he lived on still among the Volscians, and how he said, "Only an old man knows how hard it is to live in a far country."

The story has its value as an illustration not only of the deep-seated feeling of the patrician houses, and the absolute gulf which exile interposed between a man and his city, but also of the high position and reverence accorded to the Roman women; and, incidentally, of the claim of the tribunes to try, and even to exile by a popular vote, any citizen who was regarded as dangerous to the interests of the plebs. That the Volscians made considerable advances into Latium in the years before 450 is very probable. The early Roman colonies at Velitrae and Norba, founded just after the formation of the Latin League, are found later in the hands of the Volscians, who were quite sufficiently civilised to be capable of a systematic occupation of the lowland. And the mention of Rome as mistress of the Latin shore, in a treaty with Carthage, which is assigned to the first year of the Republic, clearly does not suit with a Volscian occupation of the southern half of the plain. The story of Coriolanus, therefore, may very well have arisen as an attempt to explain away Volscian successes, as the work of an exiled Roman.

The wars against the Aequi are bound up with the family history of the Quinctii, as the war against the Volsci with that of the Marci. The Wars with Aequi, though a ruder and less persistent enemy than the the Aequi. Volsci, had occupied the Latin town of Labicum, and endeavoured again and again to establish themselves on the *Mons Algidus*, a northward spur of the Alban hills, from which they could cut off the Romans from their allies the Hernici, ravage the low country, and threaten even the central sanctuary of the Latin League. In the year 463 they joined the Volscians in a raid to the very gates of Rome; and in 458, according to the story, they succeeded in entrapping the consul L. Minucius in a narrow valley below this 'Chilly Hill,' and only five horsemen succeeded in breaking through to Rome with the news.

‘ Then the Senate named L. Quinctius to be Dictator, because he alone
‘ could save them. Now Quinctius was called Cincinnatus, because his
‘ hair was curly ; and he lived beyond the Tiber on a little Cincinnatus,
‘ farm. Two years before, his son, Kaeso Quinctius, who ^{458 B.C.}
‘ was a violent man and hated the plebeians, was accused by one Volscius
‘ the Liar, who said that he had beaten an aged man by night ; and Kaeso
‘ was banished. Afterwards Herdonius the Sabine would have brought
‘ him back, and took the Capitol by surprise ; but Cincinnatus, the father
‘ of Kaeso, was made consul in the room of Valerius, whom the Sabines
‘ had killed ; and he ended the tumult. But when the year was out,
‘ and the nobles would have made him consul a second time, he refused,
‘ and so went back again to his farm. So when the messengers of the
‘ Senate came to Cincinnatus, to make him Dictator, they found him
‘ ploughing on his farm ; and because he had laid aside his toga, they
‘ bade him send for it, and clothe himself ; and when he was clothed,
‘ they gave him the commands of the Senate, and he went with them to
‘ Rome, as he was. Then Cincinnatus chose another poor man, L. Tar-
‘ quitius, who had no horse of his own, to be Master of the Horse, and
‘ ordered the shops to be shut, and all men to come to him at nightfall
‘ into the Campus Martius, each man with twelve stakes, and food for five
‘ days. So they went forth in haste, and came at midnight to the Chilly
‘ Hill. Then Cincinnatus set the Romans round about the enemy, and
‘ made each man dig a trench before him, and set his stakes upon the
‘ mound of his trench, and shout. And the Romans that were enclosed
‘ by the enemy heard it, and rose up, and fell upon the Aequi. And in
‘ the morning, lo, the army of the Aequi was enclosed within the fence of
‘ the Dictator, and the Romans were on either hand. So they took the
‘ Aequi alive, and set up two spears and bound a third across them, and
‘ made them all go out under them, which was called “ going under the
‘ yoke.” And when Cincinnatus came to Rome, he condemned Volscius
‘ the Liar because he had borne false witness against his son, and so
‘ went back home again to his farm.’

We have seen that down to the middle of the fifth century the foreign relations of Rome are only known in outline ; that the record consists simply of the family traditions of a few great clans ; and that the Romans were far from having always the best of it. But from the year 450, when the Decemvirate, the Code of the XII Tables, and the settlement of Valerius and Horatius had freed the Romans from their internal struggles, they rose rapidly by vigorous and united effort to unquestioned supremacy within the natural

Roman suc-
cesses after
450 B.C.

boundaries of Latium ; and the smaller towns of Latium seem to have been satisfied to follow their lead.

The Sabines, as the casual mention of Herdonius in the story of Cincinnatus shows (p. 85), had been a real danger to Rome in the period of the war with the Aequi, but the raid which had threatened Sabines. the Decemvirate in the year 449 is the last appearance of that ancient people within the borders of Latium. This, however, was less the result of the victories of Rome than of the general southward movement of the Sabellian tribes, who were already threatened, like the Etruscans, by the pressure of the Gauls from beyond the Apennines, and who now began to press in their turn upon the Aequi and Volsci, and to find new outlets for their restless energy in Campania and South Italy.

The Aequi were the next to give way. After the raids of the years 449 and 446, they ceased to trouble the neighbourhood of Rome ; in 418 they were finally expelled from their fortress on the Mons Aequi. Algidus, and driven back into their own highlands ; and by the capture of Labicum in the same year, and of Bola in the year 414, the Romans were able to secure their hold over all the inland parts of Latium, and their communications with the faithful Hernici, whose chief town, Ferentinum, was restored to them in 413.

The Volsci were similarly expelled from their advanced posts at Satricum and Velitrae, below the Alban hills. As early as the year 442 the Romans established a new colony at Ardea near the coast ; and by the year 406 they had even taken Tarracina, which lies beyond the Pomptine Marshes, at the point where the Volscian hills run down into the sea.

Meanwhile, at the conclusion of the forty years' peace, or even a few years earlier,¹ the people of Veii began again to contest the advance of Rome beyond the Tiber. They secured the alliance of the Latin town of Fidenae, only six miles up the Tiber from Rome, and there the war was begun by a sudden revolt, and the massacre of all the Roman citizens in the town.

War again with Etruria, 437 B.C. But Rome soon had her revenge. In open battle A. Cornelius Cossus slew Lars Tolumnius, the prince of Veii, with his own hand, and dedicated *spolia opima*, like Romulus (p. 29), to Jupiter Feretrius on the Capitol ; and there the arms still hung, with the name of Cossus upon them, when Augustus restored the temple. Fidenae surrendered and was

¹ Livy's date for the war is 437. The forty years' treaty concluded in 474, expired in 434. Cossus was consul in 428, and Fidenae fell in 426, when Cossus was military tribune ; but some said that he was Master of the Horse when he took his spoils.

destroyed; and Veii was glad to secure another truce of twenty years.

But Veii was too near and too powerful to be allowed to survive longer, and the Romans determined to make an end of the danger from Etruria. No sooner was the truce at an end than they laid siege to Veii, and captured the city after a memorable ten years' siege. With this great struggle Roman tradition connected a military reform of far-reaching importance. The Roman army had hitherto been accustomed only to short summer campaigns: Now, it was compelled by the necessities of the blockade to keep the field all the year round, and the yeomen soldiers were therefore unable to go home to cultivate their farms; and, to compensate them for this, a system of military pay was now first introduced into the army. The new war-fund was raised by a *tributum* or public tax on land, but it bore most oppressively upon the smaller estates, and caused widespread discontent in Rome. Nor was the conduct of the war itself without reproach; though Veii was shut in, the armies of Capena and Falerii, the Etruscan cities which lay nearest, up the valley of the Tiber, attacked the Roman camp in the ninth year of the war, and nearly took it; and, in the tenth, defeated two military tribunes in the field. It happened, however, that these two tribunes, Genucius and Titinius, were plebeians; and the Senate seized the opportunity of their defeat, and of the panic which arose, to suspend the constitution, and appoint, as Dictator, M. Furius Camillus.

Siege of
Veii,
406-396 B.C.

Its effects.

Camillus is henceforward the hero of the war. To him are attributed the institution of pay; the enrolment of *equites equo privato*, volunteer cavalry who provided their own horses;¹ and the reorganisation of the legionary phalanx in a new and more open order.

Camillus.

At the same time, the front ranks at least were armed with a heavy throwing-javelin, the *pilum*, a peculiarly Roman weapon, instead of the long thrusting-spear which belonged to the heavy Greek equipment, and still gave its name to the *hastati*, long after the weapon itself was discarded.

With the advent of Camillus, however, the story of the war with Veii loses its historical colouring, and becomes a series of marvellous portents and stratagems, followed first by unexampled success, and then by the tragic fall of the victor. For 'in the sixth year

The Alban
Tunnel.

'of the siege, the waters of the Alban lake began to rise, so that they flooded the country round about; and the Romans were in fear, and sent to consult the oracle at Delphi. Now an old prophet of Veii had told

¹ In contrast with the *equites equo publico* of the regular *centuriæ equitum* (p. 59).

‘ them that it was written in the sacred books that when the Romans had drained the water of the lake, then they should take Veii; and when the same answer came from the God in Delphi, the Romans believed the saying, and hewed a way for the water through the rock of the mountain, which is there unto this day.¹ Then Camillus took counsel, and thought to take Veii by the same means; and he divided his men into bands, and made them dig day and night beneath the earth, from the camp even into the heart of the city; and when they were come beneath the temple of Juno, which is in the midst of Veii, Camillus took chosen men with him, and lay in wait beneath the temple; and the rest of the army made an assault upon the wall. And as the king of Veii was about to offer sacrifice to Juno, the seer said that whosoever should offer that sacrifice should have the victory. And when the Romans heard it, they broke forth from the ground, and offered the sacrifice, and so took Veii. And the men of Veii who remained from the slaughter were sold into slavery, and the city was left desolate, and all the land of Veii was divided among the plebeians. Then Camillus prayed to Juno that she would show favour to the Romans, and live with them in Rome; and the image of Juno bowed her head, and so they brought her away. But as Camillus prayed in the temple, he stumbled and fell, and he besought the gods to bring the sign to nought. Then he returned to Rome in a chariot drawn by white horses, and with him the image of Juno, and all the spoil of Veii; and he built for her the temple which is upon the Aventine; and of every man’s spoil he returned a tithe to the God in Delphi.

‘ But the heart of Camillus was lifted up, and the people hated him; and the tribunes accused him, saying that he had kept back part of the spoil, even the great gates of bronze. And he, seeing that he would be condemned, withdrew himself to Ardea, and as he went he prayed to the gods that the day might come when the Romans should seek for Camillus and find him not.’

The fall of Veii determined the fate of all Etruria south of the Ciminian Forest. Falerii, it is true, held out for two years longer; but the generous refusal of Camillus to take it by treachery brought about its surrender in 394: and Capena, the other ally of Veii, was soon forced to submit likewise. In the year 391 the Romans successfully repelled an attack from Volsinii, further north, and in the next year occupied Sutrium, on the border of

¹ This great engineering work, certainly not later than the siege of Veii, and perhaps earlier, still exists, and still drains the Alban lake. It is some two thousand yards long, and big enough for a man to work easily within it.

the Ciminian forest. And it was the presence of a Roman embassy as far north as Clusium, in the same year, that drew upon Rome the terrible invasion of the Gauls.

CHIEF DATES.

Invasion of Porsena	505
War with the Latins : Battle of Lake Regillus	496
Latin League of Spurius Cassius	493
War with the Volsci : Coriolanus	488
League with the Hernici	486
War with the Etruscans : Disaster of the Cremera	477
Hiero of Syracuse defeats the Etruscans at Cumae	474
War with the Aequi : Cincinnatus	458
War with the Etruscans again	437
Siege of Veii	406-396
First Payment for Military Service	406

CHIEF PERSONS.

Aulus Postumius—Spurius Cassius—C. Marcius Coriolanus—L. Quinctius Cincinnatus—A. Cornelius Cossus—Lars Volumnus—M. Furius Camillus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Cremera Fl.—Cumae—Corioli—Antium—Mons Algidus—Labicum—Veii—Fidenae—Falerii—Capena—Sutrium.

SUBJECTS.

The relations between Rome and the Latin League.

The decline of the Etruscans, and its causes.

The causes of Roman success against the Aequi and Volsci.

The introduction of payment for military service.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INVASION OF THE GAULS AND THE RECOVERY OF ROME

The Gauls—Roman breach of the Law of Nations—Battle of the Allia—The sack of Rome—Retreat of the Gauls—Torquatus—Corvus—Recovery of the Romans—Rome closes the Latin League—*Civitas sine suffragio* at Caere.

JUST when it seemed that Rome had entered upon an irresistible career of conquest, at the head of her Latin allies, when she had freed Latium to the foot of the hills, and had conquered Etruria as far as the forest, the sudden appearance of a new people on the scene cut off her power at its source, broke up her confederacy, and left her with the work of a century to do over again. True, some of her nearest and most bitter enemies suffered far worse than she did; Etruria, in particular, never fully recovered from the shock; but for the moment all was lost, and some of her bravest leaders seem to have looked elsewhere even for a home.

The Galli, whom the Greeks knew as the Galatae or Keltae, are first known to us as the inhabitants of *Gallia Trans-alpina*, which included all the western parts of Europe between the Alps, the Rhine, the Ocean, and the Pyrenees. They formed a great nation, consisting of many distinct tribes, who, however, were usually found ranged in loose confederacies, owing a general allegiance to some tribe, or tribes, more noble or warlike than the rest. All had at one time got their living from great flocks and herds of cattle, but the majority had found settled abodes, and practised at least the elements of agriculture.

Roman chroniclers have recorded (with what truth in detail we cannot tell), that at the beginning of the seventh century, and in the days of Tarquin the Elder, those tribes in the centre of Gaul who owned allegiance to the Bituriges,¹ found their boundaries too strait for their increasing numbers, and sent out two bodies of emigrants to seek a new

¹ They have left their name at Bourges, in the valley of the Loire. Cenomani, Boii, Lingones, and Senones, too, were still to be found in Transalpine Gaul in Caesar's time, (Ch. XL.); and Boii also in Central Germany, and even in Asiatic Galatia (p. 242).

home, under the leadership of Segovesus and Bellovesus, the nephews of Ambicatus, king of the Bituriges. Segovesus went eastward across the Rhine, and plunged into the Hercynian forest of Central Germany, and of him we hear no more. Bellovesus went southward, and is said to have assisted the first Greek adventurers from Phocæa to found their colony of Massilia.

Galic
migrations
across the
Alps.

This gives us a convenient date-mark, as Massilia is known to have been founded in the year 600. Passing on over the mountain barrier of the Alps, the Bituriges under Bellovesus found themselves in the valley of the Padus, in a country new to them and abundantly fertile.

(1) Insubres.

After a great battle on the Ticinus, they drove out the Etruscan lords who dominated the valley, and founded there a new community with its chief town at *Mediolanum*, the modern Milan (p. 173). These Gauls, who were confined to *Gallia Trans-padana*, between the Alps and the river Padus, the Romans knew as the *Insubres*. Eastward of these, but still north of the river, came a distinct tribe, the *Cenomani*, who pushed down

(2) Ceno-
mani.

stream until they were checked by the Illyrian settlements of the Euganei and Veneti, beyond the river Athesis and round the head of the Adriatic Gulf. Soon after this, two other tribes, the *Boii* and the *Lingones*, sent similar bodies into *Gallia*

(3) Boii.

Cis-padana between the Padus and the Apennines: the Boii occupying the middle valley, over against the Insubres, and the Lingones the lower, between the Boii and the Adriatic. These were the Gauls who pressed most persistently and severely on the states of North Etruria, beyond the bulwark of the Apennines. Finally, a body of

(4) Senones.

Senones, who perhaps crossed the Alps further east, occupied the Adriatic coast, from the borders of the Lingones near Ariminum, to the valley of the Aesis on the frontier of the Sabellian tribes of Picenum. As the last arrivals, the Senones found themselves driven onwards into rougher and less fertile territory, and prepared to cross the Apennines into Central Etruria; where, in the year 391, they attacked the important city of Clusium, which had remained neutral during the final war with Veii, and was now on friendly terms with Rome. The men of Clusium

Senones and
Romans
quarrel at
Clusium.

appealed to Rome for aid, and a deputation of Romans was sent to warn the Gauls not to touch the friends and allies of the city. The Gauls, none the less, made an attack upon Clusium; whereupon the Roman envoys, forgetting that their safe conduct bound them to keep the peace, joined in the fighting, and one of them killed a Gaulish chieftain with his own hands.

The leader of the Gauls (whom Roman chroniclers call Brennus) sent

messengers to Rome to demand the surrender of the man who had thus broken the common law of nations. But the Senate was swayed by an outburst of popular feeling. These rude barbarians, they said, were beyond the pale of civilised life, and must be treated without ceremony. So, instead of being given up, the sacrilegious envoys were elected military tribunes for the ensuing year.

The Romans little knew the proud spirit or the matchless bravery of their new enemy. To avenge the insult, the Gauls at once raised the siege of Clusium, and, neglecting every panic-stricken village in their path, threw all their forces on the road to Rome.

Vengeance of the Gauls.

The Romans raised an army at their leisure, and allowed the invaders to come within eleven miles without a blow. Then a single battle, fought where the little Allia joins the Tiber, and on the eastern bank, decided the fate of the city. At the gigantic forms, the flowing yellow hair, and the pale eyes of the Gauls, the short dark southerners were struck with panic: and before their wild war-cry and furious onset, and the irresistible sweep of their huge iron swords, the frightened Romans broke and fled. The greater number were killed in the pursuit, though a few plunged into the Tiber and escaped towards Veii. The road lay open before the Gauls to Rome; and the fatal 'Day of the Allia' stood in black letters in the calendar of Rome for ever.¹

There was nothing to be done but to prepare for the worst. The sacred relics were buried, and all that Rome most treasured—the Flamen of Quirinus, and the Vestal Virgins bearing the eternal fire—were hurried across the Tiber to the friendly town of Caere; and a great multitude of fugitives went with them.

As the crisis of the story approaches, the chroniclers relapse, as usual, into the heroic and the miraculous. 'The bravest men in Rome, who were still of age to fight, were resolved to defend to the last the Capitol and the temples of the gods; but the old men, who could not fight, and would not fly, came and consecrated themselves to the Gods Below; if haply, by their death, they might save the city. So they sat each on his ivory seat, in his purple-bordered robes, with a sceptre of ivory in his hand, in the entrance of his own home, to wait for the coming of the Gauls. And on the third day the Gauls came to Rome; but for a whole day more they dared not enter in. Then came they into the Forum, and saw the old men sitting like gods on their thrones, without word or sign.

Entry of the Gauls.

¹ a. d. xv. Kal. Sext. A. U. C. cccxiv. = 18 July 390 B. C.

‘ And one of the Gauls drew near and dared to stroke the white beard of M. Papius; and the old man smote him with his staff. Then the Gaul was wroth, and slew him with his sword; and then they slew all of them together. Then the Gauls burned the city and the temples, and went up against the Capitol to take it; but the Romans drove them back again so that they were afraid to go up, but laid siege to the Capitol seven months, and wasted all the land to find themselves provender.

‘ Then those Romans who were at Veii fought with the Etruscans, who came to lay waste the country; and sent to Camillus at Ardea to beseech him to return and deliver his fatherland. And he said that he could not return except the Senate and People of Rome should summon him. But how to bring him word from Rome they knew not, for the Gauls had compassed the city about. Then Pontius Cominius went, and swam across the Tiber, and went up by a steep way into the Capitol, and returned again, and brought word to Camillus that the Senate and People of Rome had chosen him to be Dictator that he might save the city.

The Senate
recalls
Camillus.

‘ But the Gauls had seen the footsteps of Cominius, and came by night and went up by the steep way; and no men heard them, neither did the dogs bark. Yet the geese heard them, which lived about the temple of Juno, and cried aloud after their manner; and M. Manlius arose from sleep, and took his shield, and thrust back the foremost of the Gauls, even as he came to the top of the rock; and he, as he fell, bore down with him the next; and so they all fell back again together, and the Romans came and slew them there. Thus the piety of the Romans was their salvation; for though they were sore pressed with hunger, they forbore to eat of the geese of Juno; and by the geese did Juno save them. And to Manlius they gave the name Capitulinus, and to all his house for ever, because he saved the Capitol from the Gauls.

The Geese
of the
Capitol.

‘ And after that the Romans were in great straits with the siege, and covenanted with the Gauls to give them a thousand pounds of gold by weight, and that they should return again to their own land. But when they weighed the gold in the Forum, Brennus used false weights. And when Q. Sulpicius told him to his face that the weights were false, Brennus threw his great sword into the scales, and said, “Woe to you, conquered! herewith do I weigh out your gold.” But before the weighing was over Camillus came with his men and forbade them to pay aught to the Gauls, except what he should bid them. And he fell upon the

‘ Vae Victis!’
Brennus
and the
Gold.

‘Gauls and drove them out of the city, and defeated them utterly, so that not a man of them escaped.’

The story of the sack of Rome, thus handed down, is in its main outlines certainly true. But the details differ so widely that we may well suspect that the tale of the gold covers a much more ignominious surrender than any chronicler admits. Polybius, who gives the earliest and simplest version, says that the Gauls heard that the Veneti were ravaging their lands beyond the Apennines, and so made terms; Livy alone makes Camillus repudiate the bargain altogether; and both Diodorus and Suetonius say that the gold was certainly paid at the time, though it was recovered eventually.

The Gauls meanwhile had not confined their attention to Rome. We hear of them throughout Latium, and even as far south as Apulia; and the Romans' easy conquest of Etruria, in the years which follow, is best explained if we suppose that the Etruscan towns had suffered no less heavily. Nor did they retire at once to their home beyond the Apennines, though they never again became really dangerous to Rome. Of these later raids we know very little, and even the two campaigns, which are best authenticated, were remembered only for the valiant deeds of a few noble Romans, preserved in the annals of their clans.

In the year 360, for example, the Romans ‘went out against the Gauls, who lay upon the Anio within five miles of Rome. And there came a Gaul, of gigantic stature, with a collar of twisted gold about his neck, and cried to the Romans to choose out a man to fight with him. And young T. Manlius stood forth to fight; and when the Gaul struck at him with his great sword, Manlius ran in beneath his shield and thrust his sword upwards into his body, and killed him. And the collar of twisted gold he put upon his own neck; and men called him *Torquatus*, and his children after him.’

Again, in the year 349, ‘the Romans went out under L. Furius, the son of Camillus the Dictator; and again a great Gaul came forth before the rest, and to M. Valerius was given leave to fight with him. And as they fought, the gods sent a raven, and it lighted upon the helmet of Valerius, and beat with its wings in the eyes of the Gaul, and tore his face with its beak. So Valerius slew the Gaul, and his name was called *Corvus*.’

The Gauls had wrecked Rome; but the Roman people recovered with characteristic rapidity. A proposal to leave Rome desolate, and transfer the city bodily to the deserted site of Veii, though warmly supported

by the tribunes, was rightly resisted by Camillus and the patricians ; and the work of restoration began. But in the confusion of the moment no general plan was laid out for the new town, although Thurii and other Greek towns of South Italy had already supplied, in systematic city-architecture, the model for all time ; and Rome remained, like London after the Fire, a maze of narrow and crooked streets, with irregular houses which often encroached on the older roadway and encumbered the sewers beneath it.

But prompt as was the recovery of Rome, her ancient enemies thought they saw their opportunity. The Etruscans gathered at Fanum Voltumnae, and made a successful attack upon the new Roman post at Sutrium. The Aequi came down as far as Bola, and the Volsci threatened Lanuvium. Even the nearer Latin towns held aloof from Rome ; and others, such as Tibur, and even the loyal Hernici, openly joined in the attack. Single-handed, however, the Romans, led by Camillus, repelled the first assault, and wrestled for the next thirteen years with the widespread disaffection among their allies. Sutrium was re-established in 385, and garrisoned, with Nepete, by a 'Latin colony' (p. 148). Satricum in the Volscian coast-land was colonised in the same year to watch Antium ; and Setia, between the Pomptine Marshes and the Volscian Hills, in 382. In the same year Praeneste, Lanuvium, and the colonies of Circeii and Velitrae revolted openly : Camillus, however, shattered the hopes of the rebels, by repelling a Volscian raid upon Satricum. Tusculum, which had been admitted to the full franchise in 382, was detected in a Volscian intrigue, but saved itself by a timely apology ; and Praeneste, the last to surrender, sustained a decisive defeat in 380. Thenceforward Rome became the aggressor, and devastated the lands of the Volsci year after year. Antium surrendered in 377 ; and another raid upon Satricum, and an ineffectual siege of Tusculum by a force of Volscians and rebel Latins, were summarily and decisively avenged.

But Rome had been brought into severe distress by these continuous disorders, and the comparative peace of the next ten years (377 to 366) is due as much to the internal distractions which issued in the Licinian reforms (Ch. ix.) as to the restoration of Roman supremacy in Latium. Tibur, however, was found even in 360 to have assisted a raiding band of Gauls ; and the Hernici, who had been spared in the earlier revolts, were not completely subdued till 358. Privernum and Velitrae gave trouble again in the same year, and Tibur yet again in 355, while the attention of the Romans was engaged in the war in Etruria (p. 96).

Recovery of
the Romans.

Fresh wars
with the
neighbours,
390-380 B.C.

Recovery of
Roman
supremacy.

The gain from these fruitless and ill-advised revolts was wholly on the side of Rome. In 385, and onwards, she had refused to admit any fresh towns to membership of the Latin League; she had recruited her own strength by enrolling four new 'tribes' north of the Tiber in 387, and two in the Volscian country in 358; and in the latter year she had revised and renewed the covenant of the League itself, on terms distinctly less favourable to her allies. Some time before 348 she had colonised Antium and Tarracina, to guard the coast and watch the Volscian country; and in 354, by way of further precaution, she had concluded an alliance with the Samnite confederacy of the southern highlands.

In Etruria, too, the Romans had experienced a similar success, as soon as the subjection of the Latins left their hands free. In the year 356 the great city of Tarquinii, supported and perhaps instigated by refugees from Caere and Falerii, defeated the Romans in a great battle, and sacrificed over three hundred prisoners to its gods. But Rome soon had her revenge. Tarquinii was taken; three hundred and fifty-eight of its nobles were publicly scourged and beheaded, and the remainder submitted to a truce of forty years. Falerii was forced to accept a 'perpetual alliance' with Rome, which practically destroyed its independence; and Caere, more harshly judged, as it had been more fully trusted before, was deprived of all semblance of autonomy. By a new precedent, of vital importance afterwards, its whole constitution was abolished, and its inhabitants were compelled to take up the private rights and obligations of Roman citizens, *commercium*, *connubium*, *tributum*, and *militia*; though the public privileges of the *ius suffragii* and the *ius honorum* were withheld. These *cives sine suffragio* were governed in their own town by a Roman *praefectus* or superintendent; and the 'Caerite franchise' formed a model upon which, as time went on, many later conquests were prepared, by slow assimilation to the conquerors, for full incorporation in the Roman State. The Etruscan war is also noteworthy as the occasion of the appointment, in 356, of the first plebeian Dictator, C. Marcius Rutilus.

By the year 343, then, Rome found herself once more undisputed mistress of the lowlands, from the boundary of the Ciminian Forest, which was guarded by Caere, Sutrium, and Nepete, to Sora, in the upper valley of the Liris, and Circeii and Tarracina on the frontiers of Campania. She had practised her armies, and restored her prestige, in a series of wars against barbarian Gauls, and against Etruscans and Latins as civilised as her own citizens. She

Rome closes
the Latin
League,
385 B.C.

Successful
wars in
Etruria,
358-351 B.C.

'Civitas sine
suffragio'
at Caere.

First
Plebeian
Dictator.

Complete
recovery of
Rome.

had tightened her grasp on the lowland states, while posing as their champion and protector against the highlanders. And she was developing a system of frontier defence and internal organisation, which was capable of indefinite expansion, at all events within peninsular Italy.

Meanwhile, with one exception, no state or league remained in Italy with the power to dispute the growth of Rome. The cities of North Etruria were disunited, decadent in themselves, and enfeebled already by repeated conflicts, both with the Gauls and with Rome; the aggressive highlanders of the interior had begun their southward drift and had left the middle Apennines, where alone they could directly threaten Latium; and, weakened by these Sabellian raids, the Greek States of the south had barely strength to carry on their own domestic feuds. A Greek fleet from Sicily had, it is true, ravaged the coast of Latium in 349, but the only result had been to provoke a treaty of friendship and alliance between Rome and the Carthaginians, defining their spheres of influence, and conceding valuable commercial privileges to Roman traders.

Only the Sabellian Samnites of the southern highlands remained as a possible rival; and the history of the next fifty years centres round a series of duels between the slow-built, firmly organised city-state of Rome and its lowland satellites, and the temporary loose-knit unions of these half-barbarous highland clans, who were supported in Italy only by those expiring powers in Etruria and Gaul, whose fate was already decided before the new period opens.

[*The Internal History is resumed in Chapter X.*]

CHIEF DATES.

Invasion of the Gauls: Battle of the Allia	18 July 390
Latin League closed	385
War with the Gauls: T. Manlius Torquatus	360
War with the Etruscans	358
First plebeian Dictator	356
Caere receives Civitas sine suffragio	351
War with the Gauls: M. Valerius Corvus	349
Commercial treaty with Carthage	348

CHIEF PERSONS.

Camillus — T. Manlius Torquatus — M. Valerius Corvus — C. Marcus Rutilius.

PLACES.

Mediolanum—Clusium—Allia Fl.—Ardea—Fanum Voltumnae—Sutrium
—Nepete—Tarquinii—Falerii—Caere—Tibur—Praeneste—Tusculum
—Lanuvium — Satricum — Veii — Priverium — Antium — Setia
—Sora.

SUBJECTS.

The ethnology and culture of the Gauls.

The development of the Roman policy of consolidation.

The early relations of Rome with the Carthaginians.

CHAPTER IX

THE CLOSE OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE ORDERS

[*Internal History resumed from Chapter VI.*]

Lex Canuleia—*Tribuni Militares*—*Censores*—Respite in the struggle of the Orders—Political effects of the Gallic Invasion—The Licinian Rogations—Equalisation of the Orders.

By the Valerian and Horatian Laws the plebeians had secured their personal liberties afresh, and had received full recognition of their right to conduct their own affairs, and to appoint representatives of their own. But they could not yet feel that they were members of the State in the same sense as the patricians were. They were still excluded from the regular magistracies, and the customary barrier between patrician and plebeian *gentes* had been recognised legally in the Twelve Tables. The plebeian forms of marriage by *usus*¹ and *coemptio*² were still treated as void by the patricians; and children of such marriages, even where the father was a patrician, were counted as plebeians, in defiance of patriarchal usage. But obviously these were demands which appealed far more to the wealthy and ambitious plebeians than to the great majority, who could not hope to be nominated to the Consulship, or to contract alliances with noble families. Still, all alike found it clearly their interest to support the ambition of their leaders, for it was only through a liberal magistracy that they could hope to secure those social and economic reforms which really appealed to them.

Four years after the Decemvirate, the question of intermarriage between patrician and plebeian came to a definite issue. For the third time the plebs seceded from Rome, but this time only to the Janiculan Hill beyond the Tiber; and a *plebiscitum*, proposed by the tribune C. Canuleius, was accepted, which ordained that all children should be enrolled in the *gens* of their father, whatever the form of marriage might have been. Thus, without violating

*Lex
Canuleia,
445 B.C.*

¹ *Usus* merely certified, after the lapse of one year, that the parties were accustomed to live together as man and wife.

² *Coemptio* was a legal contract, in which the wife passed, as if by sale, from her parent or guardian to the husband.

the patrician monopoly of the religious ceremony of *confarreatio*,¹ it became possible for children of a mixed marriage, and of partly plebeian descent, to share all the privileges of the patricians, and to proceed to the highest offices of state.

Another important point was raised by the Secession of 445, when the same Canuleius proposed that plebeians should be admitted to the Consulship. For a moment, however, the plebs had to be content with a compromise. The Consulship itself was suspended, and the supreme *imperium* was entrusted to six *Tribuni Militares*. Their title properly belonged to an ancient but purely military rank in the Roman army, and, for this, plebeians seem to have been eligible always. The name *Tribunus* here has no connection with the local 'tribes' of the *Comitia Tributa*, but probably refers to the three ancient hereditary tribes; and the office may be compared in its origin and its political developments with that of the *strategi* at Athens. By conferring the powers usually given to the Consuls upon a body of these *Tribuni*, varying, in practice, from two, to six, or even eight, in number, the patricians felt, no doubt, that the claim of the plebeians to hold the *imperium* was practically conceded; while the Consulship itself was 'saved from pollution,' as they said, for the time. Further, a *Tribunus Militaris* was prohibited from celebrating a triumph, and his effigy was not exhibited, like that of a Consul, among the heirlooms of his family; and thus the office was by common consent inferior in prestige. The first Military Tribunes were appointed in the year 444 as a temporary arrangement, and, on a superstitious excuse, were superseded by Consuls before the year was out. But the plebeians, having once secured this essential advantage, did not easily resign it; year after year they renewed their plea for Military Tribunes; and though at first the patricians often succeeded in securing the election of Consuls, it resulted more and more frequently, as time went on, that Military Tribunes were appointed instead. But as the Military Tribunes were elected, like the Consuls, in the *Comitia Centuriata*, the patricians still had everything their own way, in regard to the candidates, for more than forty years. Plebeian nominations, and votes for plebeian candidates, were rejected by presiding officers, and auspices and religious scruples were used to put off the evil day; so that it was not until the year 400 that a plebeian was actually elected to the office.

¹ *Confarreatio* was an elaborate religious ceremony, in the course of which husband and wife testified their union by partaking of the same consecrated loaf (*farreus panis*).

Meanwhile the more far-sighted patricians perceived that nominal political equality was inevitable, and began to prepare for the loss of their monopoly by cutting off from the consulship those functions which it was most important to keep safely in patrician hands. The first step in this direction was taken in the very next year after the first appointment of Military Tribunes.

Patrician counter-moves.

The Consuls had hitherto been responsible for keeping up the *census*, or roll of the citizens, in their proper centuries and tribes, according to their wealth and place of abode, and for revising the list once in five years, when a *lustrum* or solemn rite of purification was performed to make atonement for the sins of the whole people. This task included that of revising the list of the *Comitia Centuriata*; and thus the magistrate to whom it was entrusted could really determine the composition of the governing body of Rome. This grave duty was now transferred from the Consuls to special *Censores*, or 'valuers,' who like the Consuls were to be two in number, and always patricians. They were still to be appointed only once in five years; and in 434, within ten years of the institution of the office, the Dictator Mamerius Æmilius ordained that they should complete their work, and resign their office, at the end of one year and a half, lest, like the Decemviri, they should turn the opportunities of their office to personal ends. For the same reason, if one Censor died in office, the other was bound to resign at once, because functions so wide could not be safely entrusted to any single citizen.

Censores, 445 B.C.

Similarly, in 421, the attempt was made to remove from the Consuls the whole control of the Treasury. Since the beginning of the Republic, two annual *Quaestores* or 'examiners' had been appointed by the Consuls to collect the revenue, keep the accounts, and investigate cases at law. But since the year 447, just before the reforms of Canuleius, the appointment of Quaestors had been transferred from the Consuls to the *Comitia Tributa*, and they had been entrusted with the special supervision of the expenditure of the army. It was now proposed to appoint two new Quaestors for urban purposes, alongside of the old military ones, and to transfer all financial business to the enlarged *collegium*. The plebeians took advantage of the change to press their own claims, and were made eligible not only to the two old Quaestorships, but also to the two new ones, which the patricians had particularly intended to keep in their own hand. In 409, in fact, three out of the four Quaestors were plebeians together. The power to hold this office, as well as to

Quaestores, 447 B.C.

opened to plebeians, 421 B.C.

appoint to it, gave to the plebs a new hold over finance and judicial procedure ; but the peculiar gain was that plebeians were now enabled in the ordinary course to enter the Senate, and in the year 400 a plebeian actually did so enter ; for it became first the custom, and afterwards the rule, to fill its vacancies from the ranks of the ex-Quaestors.

But that these half-hearted concessions and patrician subtleties failed to allay the general discontent, the legend of Spurius Maelius seems designed to show. In the year 440 'there was a sore famine in the land, and one L. Minucius was appointed *praefectus annonae*, to provide bread for the people. Yet their want increased. Then a rich plebeian, named Spurius Maelius, sold all that he had, and bought corn from Etruria, and sold it for little or nothing, that the poor might eat. Now it was known in the city that Maelius longed to be chosen to be Military Tribune ; and the patricians raised the cry that he had done this thing that the people might make him king ; and they created Dictator the same Quintus Cincinnatus who had saved the army of Rome from the Aequi on the Chilly Hill. Then Cincinnatus armed the patricians and posted them by night, and called Maelius before him in the morning to answer for himself ; and when Maelius refused, Servilius Ahala, who was Master of the Horse, fell upon him and slew him in the Forum. But when Ahala was brought to account, he said that he had saved his country from a tyrant ; and they slew him not, but bade him depart out of the city.'

The story of Maelius is full of difficulties. Another account makes the murder more inexcusable, for in this version there is no Dictator ; the constitution is not suspended ; Ahala holds no office, but is simply a hot-blooded young patrician ; and instead, of being exiled, he is freely acquitted. But it is repeatedly quoted, in both versions, by Cicero and other later writers, to show to what lengths a patriot may go in defence of his country. For us the important points are : first, the deep patrician jealousy of rich and ambitious plebeians ; and, second, the new fear lest the growing wealth of individuals should be turned to political uses.

The first *Lex de ambitu*, forbidding 'corrupt practices' at elections, was passed only seven years later.

Another deed of violence, belonging to the same period, is further evidence of the misgovernment of the nobles and the unrest of the lower orders. After the war with the Aequi, in which Labicum and Bola were taken, 418-4 (p. 86) M. Postumius Regillensis refused to divide the spoil among his soldiers, because the tribunes had claimed that the

So a plebeian can enter the Senate.

The story of Spurius Maelius, 440 B.C.

Criticism of the story.

Lex Poetelia de ambitu, 433.

plebeians should be allowed to share in the distribution of the conquered lands. And the soldiers, though they had sworn a solemn oath to serve him, rose up against him, and stoned him, that all might share the guilt of his death. But here too we see the first instance of a practice which became all-important later, and illustrates well the Roman system of collegiate magistracy : for the two tribunes who proposed to divide the land of Bola were vetoed by their own colleagues, and the proposal was dropped.

The land question again.

From the time of the Canuleian Laws, in fact, the movement for equal rights seems for a time to have slackened. This is partly accounted for by the divergence which begins to appear between the aims of the richer and the poorer plebeians ; but is mainly to be attributed to the distractions of the foreign wars, described in Chapter VII., and particularly to the war with Veii ; for in these the energy and ambition of plebeian leaders found free scope and immediate reward. Merit in the field could not be retracted or gainsaid like the achievements of party politics ; and as Rome was, on the whole, markedly successful in her wars during this period, the stress of poverty, and the land-hunger of the lower orders were abated for the moment, and with them one of the chief incentives to reform. On the other hand, the patricians, while conceding part of the substance of the plebeian claims, had retained almost the whole of the outward show, and not a little of what was essential to the maintenance of their privileged position ; and now they were enabled to gain time, and play off their opponents against one another.

Respite in the struggle of the Orders, 445-390 B.C.

The invasion of the Gauls, however, brought everything to the ground. The private property of the citizens of Rome was devastated ; the crushing defeat which her army had suffered had ruined her prestige for the moment ; and the inevitable consequence was a period of extreme depression and distress. The law of debt in particular (which, it will be remembered, had never been reformed) pressed, more hardly than ever since the first year of the Republic, upon all but the richest men ; and most hardly of all on the many who had but little to lose, and had lost it all. The smaller farmers began to borrow, as before, from the larger ; and rapidly fell into practical slavery to them.

Political effects of the Gallic invasion.

The story was current afterwards in Rome, how in this crisis M. Manlius, the defender of the Capitol, came forward as the champion of the poor and the oppressed. Meeting one day in the Forum an old comrade who was being dragged away in chains by one of his creditors, he

paid the man's debt on the spot, and vowed that 'so long as he had anything to spend, he would not suffer any of his fellow-citizens to be treated so.' To this end he sold all that he had, and, having

The end of
M. Manlius,
384 B.C.

thus won the trust of the plebeians, he went on to accuse the patricians of having taken for themselves the gold which had been collected to buy off the Gauls. But Manlius had, it appears, an old quarrel with Camillus, and the patricians seem to have imputed personal motives to him when he took up the cause of the plebeians. They are said to have accused him of following in the steps of Sp. Cassius, and of wishing to make himself king. He was tried by the Comitia Centuriata in the Campus Martius; but when he showed thirty suits of armour which he had stripped from his enemies, and forty public rewards for valour, and laid bare the scars of his countless wounds, and appealed to the gods on the Capitol above him, whose temples he had saved from the Gauls, it was seen that he would not be condemned. So his enemies found a pretext for adjourning the meeting, and continuing the trial in another place, out of sight of the Capitol. There he was condemned, and thrown from the Tarpeian Rock: and his house, which stood on the very hill which he had so bravely defended, was levelled with the ground. This well-known story, like those of Cassius and Maelius, must be received with caution in some of its details; but it is likely enough that the rival of Camillus thought his best chance lay in adopting the cause of the plebeians; and the fact remains unquestioned that the distress was extreme, and revolution therefore imminent.

But though the plebeians did not prevent the death of Manlius, their agitation grew under new leaders of their own. In the very next year

The
'Licinian
Rogations,'
377 B.C.

the Pomptine lands, taken from the Volscians, were distributed at last, and (as had been the case with Veii), among plebeians only. But in the war with Praeneste, 382-379, the distress grew acute again, and at last a general attack was made by all sections of the plebs, rich and poor alike, on all the great abuses together. In the year 376 two tribunes, C. Licinius Stolo, and his kinsman and colleague, L. Sextius Lateranus, brought forward the three celebrated *rogationes*, or 'proposals,' which bear their names:—

- (1) *That henceforward regular Consuls should be appointed instead of Military Tribunes, and that one of the Consuls must be a plebeian.*

This was the only purely political measure among the Rogations, but it struck straight at the root of the worst disability of all.

- (2) *That no citizen should hold more than 500 iugera¹ of public land, nor keep upon public pastures more than 100 large cattle, or 500 sheep, under penalty of a heavy fine; and that all landowners should employ a certain amount of free labour on their estates.—*

The last provision looks like a later invention, as there is no evidence that slave labour was becoming so dangerously common as yet. The other clauses also are almost identical with the proposals made by Tiberius Gracchus in 133 (Chapter XXVII.).

- (3) *That on all debts the interest already paid should be deducted from the original loan, and that three years' grace should be allowed for the repayment of the remainder, if any.*

These far-reaching proposals, which struck at the root of each of the three great grievances, in respect of offices, lands, and debts, were received, as was natural, with the most vehement opposition. Other Ten Years' tribunes were persuaded by the patricians to put their veto **Struggle.**

on the proceedings of Licinius and Sextius; but the latter in turn forbade the holding of *comitia*, and the election of any magistrates for the ensuing year. Consequently no courts were open, and public business was at a standstill; only tribunes and aediles went on as usual, for they were appointed by the *concilium plebis* (p. 72) and not by *comitia* at all. Still the patricians would not yield, but attempted to retaliate by suspending the constitution and nominating Dictators. But year after year, for five years, Licinius and Sextius were re-elected tribunes, and maintained their veto. In the year 371, however, they permitted the election of Military Tribunes to conduct a campaign against the Latins: but the same time, if not earlier, they added a fourth Rogation:—

- (4) *That the Sibylline books, which had hitherto been entrusted to patrician custodians, should now be transferred to a new board, —decemviri sacris faciundis,—of whom five must be plebeians.*

The object of this proposal was to secure that, when the sacred books were consulted in times of public danger, the responses should not be determined solely in the interest of the patricians.

The desperate struggle went on for five years more, but at last the plebeians gained their object. In the year 368 all ten tribunes were found to be unanimous, and in the following year the Licinian Rogations passed into laws, and Sextius himself was elected first plebeian Consul.

But still the patricians refused to acknowledge their defeat. The Consuls, it will be remembered, were elected in the *Comitia Centuriata*

¹ A *iugerum* was about two-thirds of an English acre.

(p. 64), but the *imperium* was conferred on them by the Comitia Curiata. The patricians now used their influence among the *curiae* to reject the *Lex de imperio* in the case of Sextius; and to meet the crisis the aged Camillus was made Dictator for the fifth time. But Camillus had seen that the question was really decided already, and used his authority to bring about a compromise which was accepted by both sides: whereupon he vowed a temple to Concord (*Concordia Ordinum*) to commemorate the conclusion of the long struggle of the two Orders.

The patricians had given way on the direct issue, and the *curiae* conferred the *imperium* on the plebeian Consul; but they had recourse to their old policy of subdividing the Consular duties. The whole of the ordinary judicial business was handed over in 366 to a new, and at first solely patrician,¹ Praetor,² who, though a member of the consular *collegium*, was never called 'Consul' like the other two, but was regarded as a junior member, and was distinguished by his special duties as the *Praetor urbanus*. At the same time two new Aediles were created, to share in the conduct of the markets and festivals. These also, like the Praetor, were to be reckoned 'curule' magistrates, and must be patricians; but the monopoly in their case seems soon to have given place to an alternate arrangement between the two Orders.

With the Licinian Laws the old struggle of the Orders comes to an end; the words 'patrician' and 'plebeian' cease to have more than an antiquarian meaning; and a new line of division begins to be apparent between those who have, and those who have not, had 'curule' offices in their family; with a dangerous tendency to exclude the latter from office. Another symptom, too, of the growing distinction between hereditary citizens and newly enfranchised aliens is the *Lex Manlia* of 357, which imposed a duty of five per cent. (*vicesima manumissionum*) upon the liberation of every slave; a tax directed at the same time against the rich, who alone held slaves in any number, and against the rapid growth of a regular class of freedman-citizens alongside of the old plebeians. But this belongs rather to a later stage in the political history of Rome (p. 117); for the moment at least the parties in the State were united; and two centuries succeed, of almost uninterrupted warfare and expansion abroad.

¹ A plebeian was Praetor, however, as early as 337.

² The original significance of the word *Praetor* (*prae-itor*=leader) is preserved in the Greek translation *σπαρτηγός*, which at first sight seems strangely inappropriate to a judicial officer.

A few points of minor importance remained to be determined, wholly in favour of the plebeians, in the years which followed; but the principle of equal *ius honorum* was already secured, and with a plebeian as Consul, there was little danger that plebeian candidates would be unfairly dealt with at elections. A plebeian Master of the Horse had been appointed by the younger Manlius, who was Dictator in 367; a plebeian Dictator, C. Marcius Rutilus, was created in the year 356; and the same Marcius became plebeian Censor in 351. Both Consuls were still occasionally patrician, perhaps for want of a plebeian candidate, until the year 342, when the tables were turned by re-enacting the Licinian Law, and by a *plebiscitum* which declared that both *might* legally be plebeians; though it was long before this case actually occurred (in 172). At the same time magistrates were forbidden to hold more than one curule office in the same year, or the same office twice within ten years; both limitations telling wholly in favour of the more numerous party. And a mutiny of the legions (p. 112) in the same year, 342, brought about the *Lex militaris* of M. Valerius Corvus, which in the popular interest forbade the degradation of a Military Tribune, or the discharge of a soldier against his will.

In the following generation, however, it was found necessary to re-affirm, yet more strongly, the political independence of the *Concilium Plebis*, and to secure further concessions in favour of the plebeians. In the year 339 another plebeian Dictator, Q. Publilius Philo—who two years afterwards was also the first plebeian Praetor—carried the three Publilian Laws:—

- (1) *That Plebiscita should be binding on all citizens, even without the sanction of the Patres.*—It is not clear how far this enactment went beyond the provisions of the *Lex Valeria Horatia* of 449: and the phrases used by Livy of the two laws are almost identical (p. 77). It has been suggested that what was established now was, that a Consul *must* bring all *Plebiscita* before the *Comitia Centuriata* for confirmation, without seeking first the sanction of the Senate. Even this, however, was very far from securing that the *Comitia Centuriata must* confirm whatever the *Concilium Plebis* might resolve: and it was probably not till the *Lex Hortensia* of 286 that a *Plebiscitum* was given the full force of a *Lex*.
- (2) *That the sanction of the Patres must be given beforehand to all laws proposed by a magistrate in the Comitia Centuriata.*—This, of course, reduced the *patrum auctoritas* to a mere

formality. A *Lex Maenia*, probably about the same time, extended this rule to the elections.

- (3) *That one of the Censors must be a plebeian.*—This broke down the patrician monopoly of a most important office, which had been created, as we have seen, with the very object of evading one result of the admission of plebeians to the Consulship.
- (4) *That all proposals brought before the Comitia Tributa by a Praetor must be put to the vote.*—This ensured that the plebeians should have a decisive and unimpeded voice on every proposed alteration of the legal code. It limited the discretion of the presiding magistrate, and thereby the opportunity for patrician obstruction; and greatly extended the legislative activity of the Comitia Tributa.

Another minor disability was removed in 300 by the *Lex Ogulnia*, which enlarged the *collegia* of Pontifices and Augurs, from four to eight and nine members respectively, and provided that these additional members must be plebeians. The plebs was thus given the upper hand in the very citadel of superstitious obstruction, and only the unimportant offices of the *interrex*, the *rex sacrorum*, and the *flamines*, or chief priests of the principal deities, remained exclusively in the hands of the patrician *gentes*.

Finally, in the year 287, after a fourth and last secession,—this time also only to the Janiculum,—which was provoked by obstruction offered to an agrarian law, a Dictator, Q. Hortensius, carried a *Lex Hortensia*, which gave finally to *plebiscita* the full force of *leges* without further formality of any kind; so that now at last a resolution, passed in a purely plebeian *concilium*, was binding as law upon patrician and plebeian alike (cf. p. 107).

Fourth
Secession.
Lex
Hortensia,
287 B. C.

[*The Internal History is resumed in Chapter XI.*]

CHIEF DATES.

Lex Canuleia	445
Tribuni Militares first appointed	445
Censores first appointed	443
Spurius Maelius assassinated	440
Lex Poetelia de ambitu	433
Quæstorship (and therefore the Senate) opened to Plebeians	421
Manlius Capitolinus executed	384
Leges Liciniae Sextiae proposed, 377 ; carried	367
Praetor Urbanus and Aediles Curules	367
Lex Manlia imposes 'Vicesima Manumissionum'	357
Lex Valeria militaris	342
Leges Publiliae	339
Lex Ogulnia	300
Lex Hortensia	287

CHIEF PERSONS.

Spurius Maelius—Servilius Ahala—M. Manlius Capitolinus—C. Licinius Stolo—L. Sextius Sextinus—M. Valerius Corvus—Q. Publilius Philo.

SUBJECTS.

Equalisation of the Orders.

Subdivision of the magistracy.

Political effects of the distress caused by the Gauls, and of the new distribution of wealth and privilege.

CHAPTER X

THE FIRST SAMNITE WAR, THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LATIN LEAGUE, AND THE CENSORSHIP OF APPIUS CLAUDIUS

[*External History resumed from Chapter VIII.*]

First Samnite War—Mutiny in Campania—Revolt of the Latins—Dissolution of the Latin League—A new populace grows up in Rome—Censorship of Appius Claudius.

THE Samnites were the most warlike of the tribes which had shared in the general southward movement of the Sabellians, who had overrun the lowlands of Southern Italy at the end of the fifth century. One section of them, in the years 424-420, had swarmed down upon the plains round the Bay of Cumae, where they had dispossessed the Etruscan overlords of Capua, and of the ancient Greek settlement at Cumae. But with the soft climate, the fertile soil, and the luxurious civilisation of Campania, they had quickly become unwarlike and enervated, like the Etruscans before them; while frequent intermarriage with the Oscan natives of Campania had further alienated their descendants from their kinsmen in the hills. Finally these lowland Samnites acquired the name of Campani, and identified their interests with those of the native population.

It was not long before the degenerate Campanians began to feel the pressure of raids from their less civilised kinsmen in the interior; and in the year 343 matters came to a crisis. A Samnite raid reached Teanum, a town of the Sidicini, one of the lowland tribes which remained purely Oscan, and lay between the middle course of the Volturnus and the Liris, inland of the Aurunci and the Mons Massicus. The Sidicini had never been members of the league of Campanian cities, but now appealed to them for help. This the Campanians sent, but only with the result of drawing the Samnite attack upon themselves. The highlanders seized a strong position on Mount Tifata, above Capua, and confined the Campanians within their walls. Without foreign aid the position was hopeless, and the Campanians appealed to Rome.

Samnite conquest of Campania, 424 B.C.

Samnite raid upon Teanum, 343 B.C.

The Romans at first professed some disinclination to break with the Samnites, who had themselves contracted a Roman alliance only ten years before (p. 96). But they had lately colonised Sora, on the very border of Samnium itself; the security of Campania

CAMPANIA



was already indispensable to their own; and the Senate probably saw that a quarrel sooner or later was inevitable. When, therefore, the Campanians offered, as the price of assistance, to hand over the city and territory of Teanum to the Romans, the temptation was irresistible, and the excuse seemed adequate. A civil message was sent to the Samnites bidding them to retire from territory which had been surrendered voluntarily to the Roman people. The Samnites abruptly refused, and ordered the invasion to proceed; whereupon the Senate declared war at once, and ordered both Consuls to march into Campania; and M. Valerius Corvus, advancing by the coast road toward Cumæ and Neapolis, followed up a decisive victory at Mount Gaurus by a second blow inland at Suessula. His colleague, A. Cornelius Cossus, struck up the Volturnus, so as to cut off Samnium from Campania, and after considerable difficulties defeated the enemy at Saticula, in the hills behind Mount Tifata.

The new dominion claimed by Rome in Campania was thus promptly and decisively confirmed, and her prestige was widely increased. To protect Campania from attack in future, Roman garrisons were placed in Capua, Suessula, and other towns. The Latins, who had been uneasy again, hastened to prove their loyalty by an independent campaign against the Paeligni, north of Samnium; and Carthage, which had only recently recognised Rome formally as head of Latium, sent congratulations and a golden crown to the new champion of civilisation. Desultory fighting went on for two years more; but while the Samnites were clearly beaten in the plains, the Romans were not yet strong enough to enter Samnium. Moreover, they were beginning to be seriously alarmed by the attitude of their Latin allies; while the Samnites had reason to expect an attack in rear from the great Greek city of Tarentum. So in the year 341 a sudden peace was arranged. The Samnites kept Teanum, over which the quarrel had arisen, and Roman garrisons remained in Capua and Suessula.

But the fertility and luxury of Campania made a striking contrast with the poor and distressful farms of Latium, and brought to an outbreak a strong current of discontent in the army. On reaching camp, as Consul for 342, C. Marcius Rutilus found the legions on the verge of mutiny, and used such severity for the protection of Campanian property and the restoration of discipline, that a revolt actually broke out, and the mutineers, under a retired veteran, T. Quinctius, gathered at Anxur and marched on Rome.

To deal with the crisis, M. Valerius Corvus was made Dictator. He met the men only eight miles out from Rome, and promised at once

**First
Samnite
War,
343-41 B.C.**

**Mutiny in
Campania,
342 B.C.**

that their grievances should be redressed. From the reforms which were enacted we can see that the main points were the irresponsible tyranny of the officers, the block in promotion, and the insufficiency of the pay and share of booty which were assigned to the rank and file. Henceforward no soldier's name, once entered, could be struck off the roll without his consent ; and no one who had once been military tribune could lose his rank and be made to serve again as a centurion. This made it impossible to deprive a soldier, who had risen from the ranks, of his proper share of the booty, by cancelling his previous promotion. It was also proposed, though apparently not enacted, that the rate of pay of the cavalry, which determined their share of the spoil, should be reduced to an equality with that of the legionaries. These timely concessions produced their effect, and secured the loyalty of the lower orders, and even of some of the Latin allies, at a moment when Rome had sudden and urgent need of prompt and whole-hearted service.

Checked by
military
reforms.

The decisive success of the Romans in the Samnite War had, in fact, revived all the jealousy and suspicion of their Latin allies. In the beginning, Rome and the Latins had been leagued together on a free and equal footing. Their contingents to the federal army were in equal numbers ; they had the private rights of citizenship in common throughout the league ; and any Latin resident in Rome was in the position of a *civis sine suffragio*, and perhaps could even vote in the Comitia Tributa. Yet in the early wars the Latins had suffered heavily, while Rome had grown at their expense ; and the revolts of Tibur and Praeneste after the Gallic Raid were an attempt to restore the balance of power. But the Romans had by this time learnt the lesson of empire ; to assimilate the subjects to the masters, by incorporating them, as occasion served, in the governing body of the State. Four new tribes had been formed in 387 from the territory of Veii and other conquered towns beyond the Tiber, and in 358 two more were organised to include the Pomptine Marshes, which had been reconquered in the south from the Volscians. Tusculum, one of the largest of the Latin cities, had been punished for the revolt of 381 by being incorporated wholly as a Roman township, apparently with complete *civitas* ; and Etruscan Caere had been given *civitas sine suffragio* in 351. Finally, in the year 354, Rome had declared the Latin League closed. Thirty ancient towns retained their votes in its government, but some of these were almost extinct ; and seventeen more shared in the Latin Festival, though they had now no vote. But all new

settlements of Latins, and all subsequent conquests made by the armies of the League, were annexed to Rome alone, by a separate treaty in each case; and were forbidden to grant free intercourse to one another. Carthage, meanwhile, had admitted Rome's claim to rule all Latium; and even undertook to assist, by the treaty of 348, in the reduction of rebellious allies.

When, therefore, it became clear to the Latins that in Campania, too, they were to have no share in the conquests they had helped to win, they felt that now or never was the occasion for final and decisive protest. After secret consultation, the chief magistrates of Setia and Circeii, L. Annius and L. Numicius, were sent to Rome, and demanded that all the Latin towns should be incorporated with Rome in one confederate State, and that half of the Senate and one of the Consuls should henceforth be Latins and not Romans. This startling proposal the Senate of course refused, and the Consul T. Manlius Torquatus swore that he would slay the first Latin whom he saw in the Curia, and appealed to Jupiter Capitolinus to witness his vow. Whereupon Annius, in the name of all the Latins, renounced the worship of that 'Roman Jupiter'; but 'while the words were yet in his mouth, Jupiter smote him,' and, as he left the temple, he stumbled and fell senseless upon the steps.

The Latins were joined at once by Volscian malcontents, and by the ungrateful Campanians, who were incensed at what they considered the perfidy of Rome in retaining garrisons in their towns. The rebel army assembled at Capua, intending thence to work northwards into Latium. But the Hernici remained loyal, and the Samnites, who hated the Latins even more than they hated the Romans, readily agreed to a treaty, and allowed the Consuls a free way round through the hills, which enabled them to take the Latin armies in rear, and drive them back seaward and southward.

A single campaign decided the issue, though Latium itself was not wholly subdued for two years more. The decisive engagement was fought at Veseris, between Nola and Mount Vesuvius. The devotion of one Consul, and the brilliant tactics of the other (who armed his supernumeraries, and so was able to keep his veterans in reserve), turned a hard-fought battle at last in favour of the Romans; and though some of the Latin fugitives, rallying northwards in the woods above Teanum, collected fresh levies from Latium and the Volscian country, and threatened the coast road between Sinuessa and Minturnae, Torquatus brought them to an action at Trifanum, near the mouth of the Liris, and had no difficulty in scattering them again.

Latin
Ultimatum
to Rome.

Revolt of
the Latins.

Battles of
Veseris and
Trifanum,
340 B.C.

Two stories were current about the battle of Veseris, which illustrate well those qualities of discipline and self-sacrifice, to which the Romans knew that they owed their right to rule. To prevent irregular contact between the two armies, which in dress and speech were indistinguishable, the Consul Manlius 'forbade acceptance of all challenges to single combat. And when his own son went out, and killed a Latin champion, and brought the spoils with joy, his father said no word of praise, but had him led away and put to death for his disobedience.' Again, 'when the Romans were sore pressed in the battle, the other Consul, P. Decius Mus, dedicated himself to the Gods Below, for a victim in place of the army, and rushed, with his head veiled, into the thickest of the fight, and so won victory by his death.'

Story of
Manlius.

and of
Decius Mus.

The leading states of Latium were deprived at once of a large part of their land, and were reduced thereby to such extremity that in the next year a fresh revolt broke out at Pedum, between Rome and Praeneste. The Consuls for 339 wasted their opportunity and allowed the neighbouring Latins time to concentrate, but in 338¹ two Latin armies were defeated without difficulty; Pedum was stormed, and all the remaining towns conquered and garrisoned in succession. After this, only Privernum ventured, in 329, to break out again, uselessly and alone.

Suppression
of the
Revolt.

It only remained for Rome to secure herself against similar troubles for the future. The Latin League was wholly abolished, though a common sacrifice to Jupiter Latiaris was still offered annually by the Roman Consuls on the Alban Mount. Nearly all the common-land of the League became Roman *ager publicus*, and Roman law and constitutional usages became the regular custom of Latium. Tibur and Praeneste, too strongly placed for Rome to risk unnecessary trouble with them, remained free and independent allies, but lost much of their territory, and bound themselves to follow the lead of Rome in time of war. Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum were placed on the same footing as Tusculum, which was confirmed in its former status as a *municipium*. The other towns of old Latium, together with Latin colonies like Ardea, received the 'franchise of Caere' (p. 96), and remained bound by ties of alliance with Rome; but separately, and no longer as members of a league. Thus no *connubium* was allowed any longer between one Latin town and another; and no *commercium* but

Dissolution
of the Latin
League.

¹ By a striking coincidence, the year also of the battle of Chaeronea, which determined the supremacy, in the Greek world, of the military kingdom of Macedon.

through the intermediation of Rome. A few towns, finally, like Velitrae, which had behaved particularly badly, or which had revolted again, like Privernum, were deprived of their walls; and Velitrae lost also its leading families, which were forbidden to live south of the Tiber.

At the same time the last embers of disloyalty were stamped out among the Volscians. Two new tribes were added to Rome from their territory: Antium was taken, and repeopled by a 'citizen-colony' in 338; and the bronze beaks of its ships of war were set up by the Dictator C. Maenius to decorate the orator's platform in the Forum, which was called from them henceforth the *Rostra*. Nine years later the same fate befell Anxur also, which commanded the coast road into Campania. For the same military reason, further along the coast, Fundi and Formiae received the Caerite franchise; and Cumae and Capua, for the loyalty of their aristocracies in the war; while the frontier of the Liris landwards was secured by the establishment of strong 'Latin colonies' at Cales and Fregellae. In these latter cases, indeed, the Samnites, who had remained true to their agreement with Rome, protested, and with reason. But this Rome could well afford to ignore, for by the year 327 she stood again at last secure, the centre and champion of allies compactly organised and closely dependent. Her Campanian dependencies had proved their loyalty and received their reward; and her frontier was protected by a continuous chain of fortress-colonies, from Sutrium and Nepete on the Etruscan border, to Cales, Fregellae, and Formiae on the south and east.

It was not long, however, before these new relations between Rome and the Latins began to produce an unforeseen effect. Many, if not all,

of the communities of Latin status had been given the *ius* *eculandi*: that is, any of their members who chose to leave their own country and migrate to Rome, could claim by right of residence the *civitas optimi iuris*, including the right to vote and hold office; and a large number of Latins availed themselves of the privilege, and being as a rule landless on their arrival, were customarily enrolled in one or other of the four 'urban tribes' (p. 62).

The same four tribes were already becoming disproportionately increased in numbers from another cause. In all slave-owning societies

it is customary to reward exceptional services or devotion in a slave by the gift of freedom; and wherever, as in Rome, the slaves are for the most part prisoners of war, and of much the same level of civilisation as their masters, such manumission may

General
settlement
of the
lowlands.

The Latin
residents
in Rome.

The
Freedmen.

become very common. The freedman (*libertus*) himself was held to be disqualified for civic rights by the taint of slavery; but the second generation, or *libertini*,¹ were customarily enrolled by the Censors as citizens among the other *clientes* of their former masters, but again by custom only in the four city tribes; most of the *libertini* being industrials, not landowners, and most of them also actually residing in Rome.

Thus while the original plebs had been fighting their way towards political equality with the patricians, and free and equal participation in the government of Rome, the economic and political expansion of the city had given rise almost to another plebeian order, in the persons, firstly, of the resident Latins and the freedmen, the political weight of whose great numbers was discounted by the way in which their votes were confined to four tribes only; and secondly, of the growing number of *cives sine suffragio* and resident strangers who either had not yet qualified for citizenship, or had been obstructed by the exclusive prejudices of a patrician Censor.

A new populace grows up in Rome.

It was to improve the position of these numerous classes of residents, and perhaps also to secure their political support, and to create a new popular party untainted by the inherited rancour of the older plebs, that the Censors of the year 312, Appius Claudius Caecus and C. Plautius, distributed the Latins and freedmen impartially among all the tribes, of which since 315 there had been thirty-one; while apparently also they took a very liberal view of the qualifications of resident aliens for enrolment. Moreover, by a *Lex Ovinia* of uncertain date the Censors were now entrusted instead of the Consuls with the duty of filling vacancies in the Senate; and here, too, the Censors of 312 carried out their revolutionary principles by admitting Latins and even *libertini*. The result of this wholesale enfranchisement, and new distribution in the Comitia Tributa, of persons, almost all of whom lived in Rome, was to give political supremacy to the landless population of the city, and to destroy the influence of the landholders in the 'rustic tribes.' The great conception of a reigning city, such as Rome at last became, was, however, hardly understood as yet, while the practical dangers of such a change in the balance of parties were obvious enough: the new and landless citizens being for the most part resident in Rome, would be always available at short notice for public business, and might easily be used to carry ill-considered measures in the absence of the country landholders, if they had their votes in all, or even in a majority of the tribes.

Censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus, 312 B.C.

¹ The term *libertini* came, however, to be loosely used even for liberated slaves; and probably some of these succeeded, too, in slipping into *civitas*.

Though, therefore, the next Censors, Q. Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius Mus did not venture to disfranchise the new voters, they were constrained to reduce their influence to a minimum, and confined **Subsequent compromise.** all landless citizens and all the poorer freedmen to the four city tribes, to which they customarily belonged. Thus the old citizens recovered the control of twenty-seven country tribes, and so of a large majority in the Comitia Tributa. In the Comitia Centuriata we may fairly suppose that no precautions were needed, as the majority of the new voters would naturally belong to the lower 'classes,' if not even to the *capite censi*. In the Senate, the consuls of 311 found a summary solution of the difficulty by ignoring the nominees of Appius, and reviving the right which in theory they inherited from the kings, of summoning whom they would, as their councillors.

To Fabius and his colleague are attributed also the institution of the censorial review of the *equites*, at which unworthy *equites* could be **Lustratio equitum.** ordered, *vendere equum*, to 'sell their horse,' and publicly dismissed from their *centuria*, a ceremony which did much to define a distinction, which grew to great importance afterwards (p. 351-2), between actual *equites* who could vote in one of the *centuriae equitum*, and a large body of wealthy men of 'equestrian' census, who, for political or personal reasons, were excluded from these groups by the censors.

To the same Censor, Appius Claudius, who was a descendant of Appius the Decemvir, and inherited much of his originality and strength of character—and, no less, those leanings to democratic **'Legis actiones'** absolutism which liken the Claudii in Rome to the **published by Cn. Flavius, 304 B.C.** Alcmaeonidae at Athens—is also due an important legal innovation, which is typical of the new growth of Rome. In the year 304 he procured the election, as curule aedile, of one Cn. Flavius, who was the son of a freedman, a client of his own, and a clerk in one of the public offices. Under the advice of his patron, Flavius published a handbook of the legal phrases and forms of procedure—*legis actiones*—which were in use in the courts, together with a calendar showing the *dies fasti* and *nefasti* on which no courts were held. Henceforward initiated and uninitiated, patrician and plebeian alike, stood on exactly the same footing, not merely in regard to the principles of Roman law, but also to its intricate and scrupulous phraseology, and to the power of the magistrate to adjourn or block the proceedings on technical or superstitious pretexts.

During his great Censorship, Appius showed no less care for the

material well-being of the city populace, than for their political independence. The increased population of Rome was already out-growing the natural resources of the site; and the water-supply in particular was becoming very inadequate. Appius met the difficulty by the construction of a great aqueduct, the *Aqua Claudia*, which carried a pure stream of water from the Sabine hills into the most densely populated quarter of the city.

From the same Appius, finally, is derived the name of the Appian Way, the first of those great military roads with which Rome was wont to secure her hold over her conquests abroad. It leaves the city by the Capuan Gate, and runs south-eastwards, past the Alban Hills and through the Pomptine Marshes, past the market-town of Appii Forum in the conquered Volscian lowland, to Tarracina; thence round the Volscian Hills, across the Liris, and past the Mons Massicus; and thence across the Volturnus to Capua; a distance of one hundred and twenty miles in all. The prolongation of it through the hills of Samnium to Brundisium and Tarentum is, of course, a later addition.

The example of Appius Claudius was frequently imitated in later times. A northward road, for instance, was built as far as Narnia as early as 303; another road in the same year eastwards to Alba Fucens; and another aqueduct, the *Anio Vetus*, in 272. Even at her greatest, Rome never felt again the lack of an abundant water-supply, nor did she ever again allow natural difficulties to prevent the free access of her legions to every part of her dominions. It must be remembered, however, that these great works, though called by the names of individuals, were constructed with public money; they involved the passage of vast sums through the same hands, and demanded for their completion a longer period of office even than the eighteen months usually permitted to a Censor. Appius indeed, with characteristic audacity, retained his Censorship for the full term of five years; but it was already clear that the widening interests of Rome called for some stronger guarantee of continuous and steadfast policy, than an annual magistracy could possibly provide.

**Aqua
Claudia.**

Via Appia.

**The public
works of
Rome.**

CHIEF DATES.

Samnite conquest of Campania	424
First Samnite War : Battle of Mount Gaurus	343
Mutiny at Capua : military reforms	342
Treaty between Rome and Samnium	341
Latin War : Battles of Veseris and Trifanum	340
Leges Publiliae. (Chapter IX.)	339
Dissolution of the Latin League	338
Fall of Privernum, the last rebel town	330
Second Samnite War. (Chapter XI.)	327
Censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus	312
" " Q. Fabius Rullianus	304
Cn. Flavius publishes the Rules of Court	304

CHIEF PERSONS.

C. Marcius Rutilus—M. Valerius Corvus—L. Annius—T. Manlius Torquatus—P. Decius Mus—C. Maenius—Appius Claudius Caecus—Q. Fabius Rullianus—Cn. Flavius.

CHIEF PLACES.

Teanum—Mount Tifata—Capua—Sora—Mount Gaurus—Suessula—Veseris—Trifanum—Pedum—Privernum—Vulturnum, and other Latin towns—Antium—Anxur—Fundi—Formiae—Cales—Fregellae.

SUBJECTS.

Rome recognised as the champion of the civilised states in Italy.
 The new Roman policy of incorporation.
 The new jealousy between old citizens and enfranchised aliens.
 The publication of the principles of Roman law, and the growth of a secular school of lawyers.
 The beginning of the Roman road system, and of Roman aqueducts.

CHAPTER XI

THE SECOND SAMNITE WAR

The Second Samnite War—Palaeopolis—Roman successes—Roman reverses—
The Caudine Forks—The Romans recover—The Samnites at bay—War in
Etruria—Surrender of the Samnites—Third Samnite War—The League of
Gallus Egnatius—More Roman colonies—Trouble with the Gauls.

THROUGHOUT the critical period of the Latin Revolt, the attention of the Samnites had been entirely occupied with a powerful league which had been organised against them in Magna Graecia (p. 112.) But the foundation of a Latin colony at Fregellae (p. 116), which completed the system of Roman frontier defences southward, aroused their suspicions, and was regarded as an infringement of the treaty of 341. Palaeopolis, a colony of Cumae, began to harry the new Roman settlers in north-west Campania, and then refused reparation, and appealed to the Samnites for help; so both Consuls were sent into Campania; Q. Publilius Philo, the reformer of 339, to punish Palaeopolis; L. Cornelius Lentulus, to watch the Samnites. The latter saw their opportunity, threw a force at once from Nola into Palaeopolis, and demanded the surrender of Fregellae. It was an open challenge of the Roman supremacy in central Italy. Latin and Sabellian, highland and lowland, stood face to face. Rome had met at last with a fighting force comparable with her own, and on ground which she had reconnoitred and fortified in advance.

The siege of Palaeopolis lasted on into the winter, and to avoid interruption, the Romans took the new and important step of permitting Publilius, whose Consulship had expired, to retain his command *pro consule* until the war should be ended. All parties saw that the situation was serious, and constitutional forms inevitably gave way to new military necessities. The other Consul was also detained in the field, and appointed a Dictator to hold the elections in Rome.

Early in the following year Palaeopolis surrendered, and was received

by the Romans, together with Neapolis, into free and equal alliance for ever. This moderate treatment of the state which had provoked the war at once brought the other aristocracies of Campania, who were already well disposed, into firm alliance with Rome. Tarentum, which had professed to represent Greek interests in Italy, was both too far off and too weak to interfere; and her attempt to rouse the Lucanians to do so—though it succeeded for the moment—only drove the Apulians, who had long suffered from the Sabellian raiders, into the arms of the Romans. The Samnites therefore found themselves almost isolated at the outset. Lucania was at best half-hearted, and soon held aloof altogether; Apulia provided the Romans with a convenient base and depôt of supply in rear of the enemy; and the northern Sabellians, disunited themselves, jealous perhaps of the Samnite League, and in any case more exposed to the vengeance of the Romans, took up at first a neutral attitude and eventually made treaties of alliance independently. The Vestini, indeed, ventured in 325 to dispute Rome's right of access to Apulia, but they were crushed in a single campaign. And the strength of the new organisation of Latium is shown by the fact that, with the exception of half-hearted revolts at Tusculum, Privernum, and Velitrae in 324, we hear of no disloyalty in that quarter throughout the whole war; and even in these exceptional cases the final reconciliation was complete: L. Fulvius Flaccus, for example, who was the chief magistrate at Tusculum during the revolt, became Consul in Rome in the very next year.

The course of the Second Samnite War, like that of the First, is very obscure in details, through the patriotic, but obvious, exaggeration of the Roman successes. The heroes of the war on the Roman side are L. Papirius Cursor, a strict but able commander, and Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, brilliant and dashing as a leader, but notorious for acute personal quarrels with Papirius. The first five years of the war proved quite indecisive; we hear of a great victory won by Fabius, against the orders of Papirius, and of the refusal, in 322, of a Samnite offer of almost complete surrender; but the fact that the Vestini could rise as they did in 325, that the Roman hold on Apulia was lost for a time in 324, and that the small Latin revolts already mentioned occurred in the same year, make it improbable that the Romans were having everything their own way.

A fresh period opens in 321 with the appearance of a new Samnite general, Gaius or Gavius Pontius, and with the Roman disaster of the Caudine Forks. The Consuls for the year, T. Veturius and Sp. Postumius, were men of no ability or experience; Pontius, as his whole story

Favourable position of Rome.

First stage of the war: Roman successes, 327-321 B.C.

shows, was unrivalled among Italian leaders, in war or in diplomacy. The Romans lay at Calatia, watching the passes into Samnium. Here a false report was sent to them that the Samnites with their whole force had attacked Luceria, the chief town of Apulia. To relieve so important a post, and to reassure Apulia, was all-important. But the only way to arrive in time seemed to be through the heart of Samnium; and, if the news were true, Samnium was undefended; so the Romans set out. Somewhere near Caudium this direct road traversed two *furcae* or gorges, with water-meadows between, and a continuous belt of wooded hills on either side. The Roman army passed the first gorge unopposed, but found the second blocked with tree-trunks and boulders; and before they could retrace their steps, the first gorge also had been blocked behind them, and occupied by a force of Samnites. The Romans were caught in a trap, and after a confused and hopeless struggle the Consuls offered to surrender. Pontius demanded the withdrawal of Rome from her recent conquests and colonies, and the renewal of the alliance with Samnium as a free and independent state. On these terms the lives of the army were spared, but they were stripped, as the custom was, of everything but a single garment apiece, and dismissed with disgrace 'under the yoke'; and the Consuls and all the officers were made to swear that the treaty should be confirmed in Rome. Six hundred *equites*, moreover, were detained as further security for the performance of the pledge.

Second stage: Roman reverses, 321-314 B.C.

The 'Caudine Forks,' 321 B.C.

The beaten army slunk into Rome by night. The Consuls shut themselves up in their houses, and a Dictator was nominated to hold the election of Consuls for the ensuing year. The Senate refused to confirm the Caudine treaty, and adopted the suggestion, made by Postumius himself, that the officers who had sworn to observe it should be sent back in chains to the Samnites. Two tribunes of the people, who protested and interposed their veto, were persuaded to resign their office, and were included in the surrender and sent with the rest to Caudium. There Postumius, so the story goes, solemnly declaring that by the surrender he was now become a Samnite, struck the *fetialis* or sacred herald, who had brought him; to give Rome, as he said, the pretext for renewing the war. But Pontius indignantly refused to accept this evasive surrender of the officers, and claimed, with reason, that if the Romans repudiated the treaty, they must also reject the capitulation on which it was founded, and restore to him their whole army helpless, as it had stood in the Pass of Caudium.

Rome disowns the surrender of Postumius.

The rights of the case have been much discussed. Pontius can hardly have been unaware that no terms of peace arranged by a general were held to be valid until they were confirmed by the state which had sent him out, and that in contenting himself with a mere *sponsio*, and not detaining the whole army prisoners until a *foedus* had been regularly concluded, he was risking the whole fruits of the victory on the chance that the Senate would allow its hand to be forced by the personal promise of the officers. On the other hand, it seems clear that Postumius did not attempt to persuade the Senate to ratify the peace. Every detail of the story of his surrender shows a settled purpose to evade the spirit, while observing the letter of the agreement ; and stands in abrupt contrast with the honourable conduct of Pontius. The latter had obviously a choice of courses open to him. He might have annihilated at one blow the whole fighting force of Rome, and marched upon the defenceless city—and this his aged father is said to have advised at first—or he might have disarmed and detained the army until the city had consented, on some terms or other, to a regular treaty. Or, again, he might have let the army go free—for this was his father's second and humaner view—while he trusted, for an honourable and lasting peace, to the gratitude of those whose lives and honour he had spared. But he adopted a middle course which deprived him at once of the fruits of his victory, without putting either Rome or the army under the obligation of gratitude. He restored the soldiers alive ; but he deprived them, in that very act, of all that made life worth living, and embittered a race-hatred by a needless insult.

But though the Samnites failed to secure the fruits of their signal victory, it is clear that for the next six years they fully held their own.

In Apulia they captured Luceria at once, and occupied it still in 315. On the Liris the fall of Fregellae gave them the entrance to Latium ; and the surrender of Satricum, in Latium itself, threw into their hands the Volscian country and the command of the coast road. We hear, however, of a Roman force watching Caudium in 320, and of a temporary relief of Luceria in the same year. Canusium, Teanum, and some other parts of Apulia submitted to Rome soon after ; Satricum was reconquered in 319 ; the Volscian country was secured anew by the enrolment of two new tribes, Ufentina and Falerina ; and at Antium new officers were constituted, to regulate differences between Roman colonists and the old inhabitants. Rome as usual, was making all secure at home, before advancing to a fresh attack. But Fregellae remained in Samnite hands, and in 315 the Roman colony at Sora was overpowered by the townsmen. Nuceria and

More
Samnite
successes.

Nola went over to the enemy, and at last even Capua threatened to revolt. Q. Fabius, indeed, as Dictator in 315, penetrated into Samnium as far as Saticula; but he was obliged to withdraw from Campania, to assist in the defence of Latium, and on his way home he was caught in the pass of Lautulae, east of Anxur; where, though with great difficulty he extricated the rest of his army, he lost Q. Aulius Ceretanus, his Master of the Horse. The Ausones, moreover, within whose borders the battle took place, revolted at once, and cut Rome off from Campania; while at Capua, which had recently been put under a Roman *praefectus*, the discontent broke into open revolt.

But by this time the Romans had recovered their nerve. Sora, which had been attacked by Fabius in the preceding year, was reconquered in 314; the Ausones were betrayed by their own chiefs, and crushed almost out of existence; at Capua the ring-

Third stage:
the Romans
recover their
lost ground,
314-311 B.C.

leaders were severely punished; Nola was permanently secured by the concession of 'free and equal alliance' like that of Palaeopolis; and a Roman army penetrated into Samnium itself as far as Bovianum. Fregellae, which had been the headquarters of the disaffection in the Liris valley, and had been in the hands of the Samnites for eight years, was retaken in 313; and two hundred of its leading citizens were publicly beheaded in the Forum of Rome, as an example to others. To secure the territory thus reoccupied, new Latin colonies were founded at Interamna in the Liris valley, at Casinum in that of the Volturnus, at Suessa on the Falernian lands of the Aurunci, on the island of Pontia to guard the sea-passage to Campania, and at Saticula on the Samnite border; besides an exceptionally large one of 2500 men at Luceria, which had been retaken finally a year or two earlier. To the same year, 312, belongs also the first appointment of *duoviri navales* to reorganise the fleet captured from Antium in 338, and the construction of the *Via Appia* through the Volscian and Campanian coast-land (p. 119).

From this point, therefore, the character of the war changes. The Samnites are now confined to their own hills, and are enclosed by an ever-narrowing ring of Roman allies and fortress-colonies. But they were now on their own ground; and, for the moment, moreover, the forces of Rome were actively engaged elsewhere.

Fourth stage:
the Samnites
at bay;
the Romans
distracted
to the north,
311-304 B.C.

In 311 the truce of forty years with Etruria came to an end, and a combined attack was made at once by the northern league. The Roman outpost at Sutrium was besieged, and the Consul Aemilius, who came to its aid, was beaten off. Next year, however, Q. Fabius was sent

as Consul into Etruria, and by a vigorous action confined the besiegers to their trenches, though he was not able to raise the siege of the town.

War in Etruria, 311-308 B.C. He thereupon formed and executed the brilliant plan of forcing his way through the rugged Ciminian Forest, which no Roman army had ever so much as entered before, and falling upon the rich cities and fertile lands beyond. His manœuvre was entirely successful, but for some weeks no news of him reached

The march of Fabius. Rome; and meanwhile the other Consul, C. Marcius Rutilus, was defeated and wounded in Samnium. There was consternation in the city; and in the absence of both Consuls, the Senate proposed to make Papirius Dictator once more. But meantime Fabius had reappeared, and the story is told how, on receiving the wishes of the Senate, he generously put aside his long-cherished quarrel with his rival, and named Papirius to be Dictator in due form. Fabius himself remained in his command in Etruria throughout the following year; defeated fresh Etruscan levies in two pitched battles, at Lake Vadimo in 310, and at Perugia in 309; received the surrender of Tarquinii, Arretium, Perugia, and Cortona; and left little to his successor, P. Decius, but the task of concluding a fresh peace of forty years with the Etruscans.

Papirius, meanwhile, had taken over the forces in Campania, and won a great victory over the whole force of the Samnites, whose picked warriors were killed to a man, while their gold and silver shields were carried to Rome, to be the feast-day ornament of the shop-fronts in the Forum. After this, the war went better in the south, and Fabius, who had been elected Consul yet again for the year 308, and was put in command of the other southern army, succeeded in capturing Nuceria, and opened the way southwards into Lucania.

Roman successes in Campania. But no sooner was the forty years' peace with Etruria concluded, than a new danger burst upon Rome from the same quarter; for Etruscan fugitives had stirred up the tribes of Umbria to a combined attack. Decius marched northwards at once; but before he could reach the Umbrian rendezvous at Mevania, Fabius, recalled by the Senate from the south, had outstripped him by forced marches, and scattered the enemy.

War in Umbria, 308 B.C. In the following year 307 Fabius was actively employed again *pro consule* in the south, and gained a victory at Allifae; but on his retirement in 306 the Samnites broke loose again in a final effort, took Calatia and Sora, and massacred the Roman colonists. **Final campaigns in the south.** The Consul, P. Cornelius Arvina, found the enemy strongly posted, and was himself much harassed by their mountain warfare. But

his colleague, C. Marcius, who had been engaged among the Hernici, came to his aid ; and when the Samnites moved to prevent the junction of the two armies, they were taken at a disadvantage and severely defeated. The next year a vigorous attack was made upon Samnium itself. Sora and Arpinum were retaken, and after another hard-fought battle the Samnite capital Bovianum was captured, the Samnite commander taken prisoner, and a peace concluded at last ; under which, however, the Samnites still retained their independence.

Capture of
Bovianum,
305 B.C.
Surrender
of the
Samnites,
304 B.C.

This last outbreak of the Samnites had provoked local revolts among the Hernici and the Aequi. The former were easily subdued in 306 by C. Marcius, and were very leniently treated, in consideration of their ancient loyalty ; the towns which had not joined in the rebellion being allowed to remain *civitates foederatae*, and the remainder merely reduced to 'Caerite franchise.'

Subjection
of the
Hernici,
306 B.C.

The Aequi, who were suspected also of having aided the Samnites, were left unpunished until the war was over, when the two Consuls of 304 offered them the same 'Caerite' status as had been accepted by the Hernici. The Aequi refused what they regarded as the loss of their independence, and were at once attacked and almost annihilated. A 'Latin colony' of 6000 men was placed at Alba Fucens in 303, and two new tribes, Aniensis and Terentina, were enrolled in the same neighbourhood in 299.

Aequi,
303 B.C.

The fall of the Samnites affected also the northern Sabellian clans, though in a less degree. The Vestini had been crushed at the beginning of the war (p. 122); the Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, and Frentani had remained practically neutral, and now received their reward in the recognition of their local independence. But, as *civitates foederatae*, they were reduced to the same isolation as the Latin towns, and they sent a regular levy of men and money to the Roman army.

Marsi, etc.,
304 B.C.

The peace with Samnium lasted only six years. In 298 the Lucanians complained of fresh raids from the hills ; the Samnites, seeing the Romans preoccupied with Etruscan troubles, ignored the summons to retire ; and it became necessary to send an army into Samnium. Desultory fighting went on for three campaigns ; the Samnites no longer sallying out and destroying the Roman colonies, but remaining on the defensive in the mountains. But in 295 a new Samnite leader, Gallus Egnatius, conceived the bold idea of

Third Sam-
nite War,
298-290, B.C.

uniting all those states in Italy, which had grievances against Rome, in one great confederacy, and bringing the proud city to the ground by a simultaneous attack. The Umbrians, the Etruscans, and even the Gauls beyond the Apennines responded to his appeal, and the Samnite army moved northward toward an appointed place of meeting in Umbria. A Roman force was defeated at Camerinum on the Picentine border, and the road to Rome was for the moment open.

But the Romans were fully aware of their danger. Business was suspended, and eight legions were enrolled, including even freedmen who were willing to serve. Fabius and Decius—the same who had scattered the former Umbrian and Etruscan coalition at Mevania (p. 127)—were made Consuls again, and with four legions pressed forward into Umbria, while the rest remained to guard the city, and harry the nearest towns of the enemy. The Etruscans and the Umbrians dispersed at once to defend their own country; but the Samnites and the Gauls, who had united beyond the Apennines, were utterly defeated in a great battle at Sentinum. The Romans, however, suffered severely too, and attributed their success here as at Veseris (p. 114), to the self-sacrifice of the Consul Decius.

The great confederacy melted away as rapidly as it had arisen. The Umbrians made peace at once, for Rome had secured the support of the Picentines in their rear, and had fairly cut them off from Samnium.

The Gauls had suffered terribly at Sentinum, and turned their attention to an easier prey in North Etruria. The Etruscans, harried thus by the Gauls, and disorganised by their internal feuds, bought peace by a large indemnity; though for five years more both Volsinii and Vulci made mischief at intervals. In Samnium itself hill-warfare went on for another four years, and in 294 there was even a pitched battle near Luceria. But in 290 the Consul M^r Curius Dentatus, of whom we shall hear more hereafter, succeeded in bringing the struggle to a close. The Samnites offered peace, and were permitted once more to retain their independence; but Pontius, the hero of the Caudine Forks, was surrendered and put to death. Thus ended the last open war with Samnium; but in the war with Pyrrhus, and later on with Hannibal, the whole hill-country remained a centre of uneasiness and disaffection; nor did the danger cease until Sulla devastated it utterly, more than two centuries later.

Ten years of comparative peace and steady consolidation follow. Already, in 296, fresh colonies had been planted at Sinuessa and Mintur-

nae, to complete the defences of Campania. In 291, Venusia, which commanded the direct route from Campania to Apulia, was secured by an enormous colony of 20,000 men. In the following year the Sabini, the last independent tribe of Sabellian origin in the north, who lay between Rome and the friendly Picentines, were admitted to 'Caerite' status, but were deprived at the same time of so large a part of their land, that Rome, it was said, 'knew not the taste of wealth till then.' Swarms of Roman settlers occupied the confiscated lands, and the country was very rapidly Latinised. To M^r Curius is attributed the draining, into the Nar, of the swamps round the Veline Lake, and the creation, through this new water-channel, of the celebrated Falls of Terni. Finally, in 289, Picenum itself and the Adriatic shore were secured by a Latin colony at Hadria, and colonies of Roman citizens at Castrum Novum and Sena Gallica.

More
Roman
colonies.

This rapid expansion northward of Latin civilisation, and the concurrent decay of Etruria, brought Rome into new and direct conflict with the southern tribes of the Gauls. In 285 a body of the Senones crossed the Apennines and besieged Arretium; but two years later the Consul, L. Cornelius Dolabella, was able to occupy their whole country, and refounded the colony of Roman citizens at Sena, their capital. The Boii, too, entered North Etruria in 284, and were supported by the disaffected party among the Etruscans. But a decisive battle by Lake Vadimo, and another action near Populonia, put an end to this source of disturbance; and a truce was concluded which lasted nearly fifty years. In the west, in fact, the pressure of the Gaulish migrations was relieved, and in this and the next generation it was for Greece and Asia Minor, rather than for Italy, to bear the weight of these restless adventurers. When we next hear of fighting with the Cisalpine Gauls, it is Rome that will be the aggressor, and then her object will be to carry the frontier of Rome and of Italy beyond the Apennines to the greater boundary of the Alps (Ch. xv.).

Trouble
with the
Gauls,
285-4 B.C.

Lake
Vadimo,
284 B.C.

Peace in
the north.

CHIEF DATES.

Siege of Palaeopolis	327
Second Samnite War	327-305
I. Roman successes	327-321
II. Roman reverses : Caudine Forks, 321	321-314
III. The Romans recover their lost ground	314-311
IV. The Samnites at bay : Bovianum taken, 305	311-304
War with Etruscans : a diversion	311-308
War with Hernici, 306 ; Marsi, 304 ; Aequi, 303	306-303
Third Samnite War	298-290
Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls beaten at Sentinum	295
Gallic invasion, 285 : battle of Lake Vadimo	284

CHIEF PERSONS.

Q. Publilius Philo—L. Papirius Cursor—Q. Fabius Rullianus—Sp. Postumius—C. Pontius—P. Decius Mus—Gallus Egnatius—M. Curius Dentatus—P. Cornelius Dolabella.

CHIEF PLACES.

Palaeopolis — Caudium — Luceria — Venusia — Canusium — Saticula — Lautulae—Bovianum—Saltus Ciminius—Perusia — Nuceria — Allifae — Anagnia—Sentinum—Ficenum—Lacus Vadimo.

SUBJECTS.

The prolongation of military commands *pro consule*.
 The morality of the surrender of Postumius.
 The advantage of Rome's inner position with her back to the sea.
 The systematic colonisation of conquered territory.

CHAPTER XII

THE WAR WITH TARENTUM AND PYRRHUS

Tarentum and Rome—Pyrrhus—He arrives in Italy—Heraclea—Ausculum—Pyrrhus in Sicily—Beneventum—Settlement of Southern Italy.

HITHERTO the Romans had been concerned, almost wholly, with states and peoples whose interests were confined to Italy; even the Greek towns of Campania had involved her in no political questions beyond the limits of the peninsula. Now, however, her supremacy over Lucania and Apulia brought her into contact with the cities of Magna Graecia, which by their geographical situation and the whole course of their history had remained in close communication with the rest of the Greek world. Tarentum, in particular, which alone had never succumbed to the Sabellian raids, had used, to the full, both this immunity, and the great natural advantages of her position, to attract to herself a large part of the trade between Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, and had also been careful to cultivate friendly relations with her mother-city Sparta. The great wealth and influence thus acquired enabled her numerous and headstrong democracy to pose as the champion of Greek interests in Italy; and both her long experience of guerilla warfare with her own Messapian neighbours, and her friendship with the military powers of Greece, had served her well, more than once, to repel the Samnites and Lucanians.

In 338, when the Latin War paralysed Rome, and let loose the full force of the Samnites southwards, she had called Archidamus, King of Sparta, to her aid, but before the year was out he was killed in battle with the Lucanians. Archidamus deserves to be remembered as the first Greek who realised the importance of the new power of the Romans, with whom he made a regular military alliance, so as to menace the Samnite position in front and rear at once. In 334, the then King of Epirus, Alexander the Molossian, an uncle of Alexander the Great, responded to a similar invitation, and was in a fair way to organise Greek towns and Lucanian tribes alike into a single

military confederacy, when the suspicions of his Italian allies brought about his assassination in 331.

But it is a bad sign, when a state is forced to rely for its defence upon military adventurers and mercenary armies. The prolonged prosperity and the eastern connections of Tarentum, had undermined the early vigour of her seafaring democracy; luxurious, indolent, and frivolous, they allowed their policy to degenerate into a mild amusement, and their warfare into a game in which they were by choice paymasters and spectators; and between such a



populace, and the yeomen-legionaries of Rome, the issue could not for a moment be in doubt.

Tarentum had already observed with uneasiness the growing power of Rome. It was her interest to keep Rome and Samnium equally matched, and to profit by their rivalry; and with this object she had offered arbitration during the Second Samnite War. The final success of Rome, therefore, had disturbed her calculations in more ways than one. Rome was not only left without a competitor for the dominion of Central Italy, but had become the

champion of the Greek cities of Campania, the ally of the rapacious Lucanians, the mistress of Apulia, and the mother of citizen-colonies, first at Luceria and then at Venusia, which threatened an advance even further southwards as soon as an opportunity should occur; and Cleonymus, another King of Sparta, who had followed the example of Archidamus and brought over a force of adventurers in 302, had even crossed swords with Roman legionaries in a battle with the Lucanians. Worse than all, the rigid Roman policy of isolation-by-alliance was making Rome, inevitably, the headquarters of the commerce of central Italy. She had built a great road as far as Capua, and was extending it to Venusia; she had colonised the Campanian coast and the adjacent islands; she had acquired a fleet, and was learning how to use it. Tarentum became alarmed, and made haste to conclude a treaty, after the campaign of Cleonymus, which stipulated that no Roman ship should pass east of the Lacinian promontory, which forms the western horn of the great bay. The Third Samnite War revived the hopes of Tarentum once more, but at the same time let loose the Lucanians. There was nothing for it but to look again abroad for aid; this time to Syracuse, where the able despot Agathocles had drawn together the Greek States of Sicily into a powerful confederacy. Agathocles, who cared nothing for the woes of Tarentum, used the opportunity to add Bruttium and Magna Graecia to his empire; but all fell to pieces on his death in 289, before he could come into direct collision with Rome.

Such was the situation, when, about the year 283, the Lucanian raids drove a number of the cities of Magna Graecia to implore the aid, no longer of Tarentum, of whom they had long been jealous, but of Rome; offering, like the Campanian aristocracies half a century earlier, to place themselves at the disposal of their liberator. Rome accepted their terms, and sent C. Fabricius to protect them. On the west coast, all the towns except Velia had already succumbed to the raiders; but Rhegium, Locri, Croton, and Thurii, which survived in the south-east, received a Roman garrison. The Tarentines were furious: and though the aristocratic party looked further ahead, and was ready, as in Campania and Etruria, to come to an understanding about a Roman sphere of influence, the democracy began once more to intrigue for allies abroad.

At this moment, ten Roman ships hove in sight of Tarentum. It was a clear breach of the treaty, and their appearance there was never explained; but the conduct of the Tarentines was inexcusable. Without warning they made an unprovoked attack, killed the Roman admiral, sank some of the ships, and drove off the remainder.

The other Greek towns appeal to Rome, 282 B.C.

Outrages at Tarentum.

Rome did not want to quarrel with Tarentum, and sent a deputation to clear up the affair. But the reckless populace refused the envoys a hearing, laughed at their bad Greek, and threw mud upon their white togas: the warning of Postumius, that 'they would wash out the stain in their blood,' passing all unheeded till its fulfilment. About the same time, and probably by a tacit understanding with Tarentum, the democracy of Thurii rose, and ejected the Roman garrison. Locri and Rhegium, however, remained loyal to Rome for the moment. War had already begun, and the Tarentines—though they mustered thirty thousand foot-soldiers and three thousand cavalry, besides numerous Messapians and other native allies—were already having the worst of it at the hands of L. Aemilius, when the aid they had expected arrived.

Pyrrhus, 'the Red King,' son of Aeacides, and nephew of Alexander the Molossian, had established himself in 295 on the throne of his uncle in Epirus. He had seen varied service in the constant wars which followed the death of Alexander the Great and the division of his empire, and had acquired the reputation of a good organiser and an able general. He had shown his ambitious temper by a spirited though fruitless attack upon Lysimachus of Thrace. He had married Lanassa, the daughter of Agathocles of Syracuse, and conceived the splendid scheme of claiming as her inheritance her father's brief dominion over the Greeks of Italy and Sicily; of striking just such a blow for Greece against Carthage, as his cousin Alexander had struck against Persia; and of carving out for himself a Greek empire of the West. The heirs of Alexander, the Greek kings of Macedon, Syria, and Egypt, contributed troops and ne'er-do-weel claimants of their own crowns, glad enough to be rid of him and them on so easy terms; and his total forces are said to have amounted to three hundred and fifty thousand men and twenty thousand cavalry. Pyrrhus had already a general understanding with the democracy of Tarentum, and as soon as he heard of the opportunity which had offered itself, he sent his favourite adviser, the Thessalian Cineas, to arrange the details; and his general, Milo, with three thousand men, to garrison their citadel. He himself arrived soon after, with a picked body of twenty thousand heavy-armed men, five thousand cavalry and light troops, and twenty elephants, which were now seen in Italy for the first time, and acquired from the Roman soldiery the nickname of 'Lucanian oxen.'

His first act was to establish strict military discipline in Tarentum, not a little to the annoyance of that idle and frivolous city. Among the Italian states he found little of the enthusiasm which he had been led to expect, though with Tarentine money he brought together a con-

siderable force of native mercenaries. But he had no reason to believe that the Italian campaign would be a serious affair. His Greek informants had suffered only the reckless raids of Sabellians; He is they had no idea of the Latin temper, or of the resources of undeceived. the Romans. But he was soon undeceived. At the first sight of a Roman camp, with its entrenchments and iron discipline, the surprise of Pyrrhus was unbounded: and Cineas reported later, after his visit to Rome, that 'the Senate was an assembly of many kings.'

Meanwhile the Romans were promptly in the field. Raising the whole force of their allies, and calling even on the landless *proletarii* to serve in the legions, they sent Tib. Coruncanus into Etruria to suppress the sudden revolt of Volsinii and Vulci, and ordered his colleague, P. Valerius Laevinus, to bring Pyrrhus to an engagement before he could raise local revolts, or mobilise his Italian levies. Pyrrhus, after gaining time by a fruitless proposal to arbitrate, took up a position in front of Heraclea, and allowed Laevinus to cross the Siris, and to fight with the river in his rear. The battle was stern and long, and Pyrrhus led his cavalry in person without effect; but against the Macedonian phalanx with its rigid discipline and close hedge of spears, the short swords and open formation of the Romans put them at a disadvantage; and when, at the close of the day, Pyrrhus ordered his elephants to charge, the legions broke and fled, abandoning their camp, and leaving seven thousand men dead with their faces toward the enemy. Rhegium and other Greek towns expelled their Roman garrisons; and at Thurii a Campanian legion, finding itself isolated, renounced its allegiance and held the town against all comers; not without help from the Mamertini, another body of Campanian freebooters, who had been in the service of Agathocles, and since 289 had similarly occupied Messana.

He defeats the Romans at Heraclea, 280 B.C.

But there was no universal rising in support of Pyrrhus, and indeed he had no idea of a general conquest of Italy. The Lucanians and Samnites, with the Bruttians and the Greek towns on the coast, acknowledged his success; but the Latin towns remained loyal, and the fortress of Fregellae, which barred his route, surrendered only to superior force. He advanced, however, unopposed as far as Anagnina, within forty miles of Rome—Laevinus hovering the while about his rear—and The embassy sent Cineas to the city to negotiate. But the eloquence of of Cineas. Appius Claudius, the blind and aged censor of 312, kept the Romans firm; and in the nick of time offers of help by sea, and even an advanced squadron, arrived at Ostia from Carthage, which had good reasons to fear a renewal of the days of Agathocles, and had agreed

with the Romans not to treat with Pyrrhus except on a concerted plan. The lawless Mamertini also, in the south, offered their aid to Rome as the champion of the Italians against a Greek invasion. The Senate refused to treat so long as Pyrrhus remained in Italy; liberated its northern army by a hasty peace with Etruria; and forced him to retire into Campania, where he failed to secure the fortified bases of Capua and Neapolis. He had already wasted more time in Italy than he could spare, for his real heart was set on Sicily and Carthage; so the next year he changed his ground and advanced into Apulia, intending to raise the Samnite country. But the Romans were before

him again, and though they were again defeated in a great battle at Ausculum, which lasted two whole days, the loss on the king's side also was so heavy, that he decided to accept the pressing invitation of the Sicilian Greeks, leaving only such garrisons as he could spare to protect his Italian allies. His son Alexander remained in charge at Locri, and Milo at Tarentum.

In Sicily at first he carried all before him. He evaded the Carthaginian fleet, and drove their army from the siege of Syracuse; captured their fortresses at Panormus and Eryx; and refused their offer to surrender everything but their last stronghold at Lilybaeum. But his Epirote army was by this time sadly thinned; no reinforcements reached him from oversea, and the Greeks of Sicily became weary of his requisitions and the strictness of his discipline; Lilybaeum still held out, and he was no longer strong enough to make, as he had hoped, a last dash at Carthage itself. Two years and four months after his first arrival he returned to Italy, at the urgent request of the Tarentines. His Sicilian conquests vanished in a moment, and his fleet, though it covered his crossing, was annihilated at Messina by the Carthaginians.

In Italy, too, the situation had changed in his absence. The Romans had moved again, slowly but surely, southward; and had recovered Croton and Locri. Pyrrhus, however, recaptured Locri, and then moved, by Tarentum and Apulia, into Samnium. But the country was indifferent, or even hostile. The Romans had learned to face the elephants, and to break the phalanx; and after five long years of continuous fighting, the army of Pyrrhus was no longer what it was. At Beneventum he was met by the Dictator,

M' Curius Dentatus, and totally defeated; and so great were the spoils, that the Dictator was able to build with them a new aqueduct, the *Anio vetus* (p. 119), to supply the increasing needs of Rome. The allies of the king, in Epirus and Macedon, refused him re-

Battle of Ausculum,
281 B.C.

Pyrrhus in Sicily,
278-5 B.C.

Pyrrhus returns to Italy.

Battle of Beneventum,
275 B.C.

inforcements, and there was nothing left but to retire to Tarentum, and thence to his own country. He left his son Helenus, with Milo, to defend Tarentum; but he seems to have recalled them soon after, to reinforce him in a war with Macedon. Death of Pyrrhus, 272 B.C. Three years later, Pyrrhus was killed ingloriously in a street fight in Argos; struck, it was said, by a tile thrown down by a woman from a house-top.

Thus ended Rome's first encounter with a civilised power from oversea. She had met in fair fight a master of the highest warfare of the time. She had learned his tactics and defeated him on his own ground; and so stood revealed, Results of the war. to the eastern, as well as to the western world, a new military and imperial state, mistress of all Italy, and ready to join issue with any power which should dispute her further progress. The Greek king of Egypt, Ptolemy Philadelphus, was the first to salute the rising star, and concluded a treaty of friendship and alliance in the very year after the retreat of Pyrrhus.

The fall of Tarentum was only a matter of time. Whether or no, as the Romans said, the Epirote garrison, or a Carthaginian intrigue, had any share in the surrender, it is certain that the city gave itself up in 272, and was received, with Heraclea, Velia, and other Greek towns, as a free and allied state. Fall of Tarentum, 272 B.C. In the following year Rhegium, which had fallen into the hands of the revolted Campanian legion, was restored, on the same terms, to its former inhabitants; the attention of the Mamertini being distracted by a simultaneous and concerted attack of the Syracusans upon Messana. The Bruttii surrendered half of the Sila Silva, their valuable forest country, and were enrolled as *socii navales* to maintain a Roman fleet; and before 266 the reduction of the Sallentini and Messapii secured to the Romans the important harbour of Brundisium. Settlement of Southern Italy. Meanwhile local disaffection in Samnium was crushed in a single campaign in 269; in 268 the Sabines were promoted to the full franchise; the Picentines in the same year tried to give trouble, but were easily pacified with the loss of Asculum, their principal town; and in 266 a small disturbance was suppressed in Umbria. Colonies were planted southwards, to keep Samnium in order, at Paestum (273), Beneventum (268), and Aesernia (263): northwards, New Roman Colonies. on the Gallic frontier, at Ariminum (268), Firmum (264), and Castrum Novum (264¹), and in Etruria at Cosa (273); while at Volsinii a final

¹ Livy xi. refers the colony at Castrum Novum to 289 (see p. 129). It was perhaps refounded now.

rebellion of the democracy in 265 led to the destruction of the old town, and the establishment of the aristocratic party on a new site nearer the Volsinian lake.

Thus the whole of the peninsula, south of the Aesis and the Arno, formed now for the first time a single political system; and the name *Italia*, by which the Greeks had so long known the southern parts of it, gradually came into use, among the Romans themselves, as a general term for the whole. The first great stage in the history of the city was thus brought to an end; and before passing on to the second, in which, with the resources of united Italy at her command, Rome wrested from Carthage the naval supremacy of the western Mediterranean, it will be well to review in some detail the system of administration which we have seen growing, step by step, as her dominions expanded.

Italy united
for the first
time.

CHIEF DATES.

Foundation of Tarentum	<i>circa</i> 700
Tarentum assisted by Archidamus of Sparta	338
„ „ Alexander the Molossian	334
„ „ Cleonymus of Sparta	302
„ „ Agathocles of Syracuse	299-89
Greek towns appeal to Rome against the Lucanians	282
War with Tarentum: Pyrrhus arrives in Italy	281
Battle of Heraclea	280
„ Ausculum	279
Pyrrhus in Sicily	278-5
Battle of Beneventum	275
Fall of Tarentum: Pyrrhus killed at Argos	272

CHIEF PERSONS.

Pyrrhus — Cineas — Milo — P. Valerius Laevinus — C. Fabricius —
M. Curius Dentatus—Archidamus—Agathocles.

CHIEF PLACES.

Tarentum — Rhegium — Locri — Croton — Thurii — Heraclea — Fregellae —
Ausculum — Beneventum — Brundisium — list of Colonies, p. 137.

SUBJECTS.

The Greek colonies in Italy and their relations with the mother-
country.

The contrast of Greek and Roman warfare.

The results, on Roman policy and trade, of her protectorate of the
Greek towns.

CHAPTER XIII

ROME AND CARTHAGE

Growth of the Roman Constitution—Multiplication of Magistracies—Need of a permanent governing body—The Senate's control of the Magistrates—The popular Assemblies—The Citizen—Municipia—The Allies—The Colonies—Carthage—History—Government merits and defects—Previous relations with Rome.

Growth of the Roman Constitution. DURING the period of the Samnite Wars, and still more as Rome's foreign policy became more involved and her wars were carried on at a greater distance from home, a gradual but vital change came over the working of the constitution, and here and there even affected its forms.

Multiplication of Magistrates. In the first place, as we have seen already, the increase and complexity of public business led to the multiplication of magistracies, and to an increase in the numbers of officials in each grade.

Consuls. The Consuls remained two in number, and retained the nominal sovereignty which had been transferred to them from the King; and they retained the right, which was granted also to the Praetors and the Curule Aediles, to sit upon a *sella curulis*, or royal throne, of Etruscan design. To prevent confusion, each Consul transacted the regular business in turn, month by month; the acting Consul, *penes quem fasces erant*, being attended, during his course, by all twelve *lictiores*. The Consuls summoned and presided over the Senate, and the three forms of Comitia, and could try cases at law whenever they were in Rome. In war they levied the legions, and commanded them with unlimited authority in the field. Later, by the *Lex Villia annalis* of 179, candidates for the consulship were required to be at least forty-three years old, and to have held the office of Praetor.

At the siege of Palaeopolis in 326, the new precedent was established (p. 121) of allowing a successful general to continue his operations *pro consule*, even after his successor had entered office. In such a case he retained his full consular powers as long as he remained in the field, but lost them automatically when he re-entered the city.

Imperium prorogatum pro consule.

To cope with the press of judicial business during the Samnite Wars, when the Consuls were constantly away from Rome, and also, as we have seen (p. 106), to withhold—though in vain—from the plebeians an important part of the consular power, a purely domestic and judicial *Praetor* was added, as *collega minor* with six lictors, to the consular *collegium*. Later, in 246, towards the end of the First Punic War, when Rome's foreign connections and trade were rapidly increasing, a second *Praetor* was created called the *Praetor peregrinus*, to deal with such cases as arose between citizens and foreigners, and consequently could not be decided on the principles of Roman law alone. The original *Praetor* thus became known as the *Praetor urbanus*, because his principal business was with cases arising within the city itself, or between one full citizen and another. He thus became the mouthpiece and formulator of strictly Roman law, and was wont to publish at the beginning of his year of office an *edictum* containing all necessary interpretations of it; for the most part customary, the *edictum perpetuum* or *tralatitium*; but sometimes with additions suggested by his own experience.

*Praetores
Urbanus et
Peregrinus.*

*Growth of
Roman
Law.*

Later, again, in 227, after the conquest of Sicily and Sardinia (p. 165-8), two more *Praetores* were created besides, with the administration of justice in these new dependencies oversea as their special 'department' or *provincia*; and the same precedent was followed again, in 197, after the conquest of the two Spanish 'provinces'; so that in the following century there were six *Praetores* in all. Under the *Lex Villia* the lower limit of age for candidates was forty years; and a *Praetor* must previously have been at least a *Quaestor*.

*Praetor
Siciliae, etc.*

The *Aediles*, plebeian and curule alike, remained responsible for the police of the city, and for the safety of roads and public buildings. They had no *imperium*, and the office was open to all over thirty-seven years of age. The arrangements for public festivals, and especially for the *Ludi Magni*, fell also to their share; and became at the same time an increasing burden on the office, and a new means of attracting public favour to its holders; for by degrees the older and merely athletic competitions came to be supplemented, in 364 by stage plays, in 264 by gladiatorial shows, in 251 by exhibitions of wild beasts, and in 186 by *venationes*, in which rare or valuable animals were hunted and killed in the arena. Moreover, from the time of the First Punic War onwards, the *Aediles* came to be expected to provide these shows largely, or wholly, out of their own pocket.

Aediles.

The *Quaestors* remained purely financial officers, but their number

was increased. Two remained always in special charge of the *aerarium* in Rome. Two more, first appointed in 421, were specially attached to the two Consuls for the service of the war-chest; and four more were added in 267, as the needs of the public service increased. The limit of age was only twenty-eight years, and the only political importance of the office was that it gave the holder, first the privilege, and later the right, to enter the Senate; and that it provided such preliminary training in public business as was expected of candidates for the principal magistracies; the magistrate, to whom each Quaestor was attached, being regarded as his guardian for the time being, and responsible both for his behaviour and for his political education.

The origin and functions of the Censors have already been described (p. 101). In addition, however, to their power to assign to every citizen his proper status in accordance with the Servian constitution, which gave them absolute control over the composition of the various classes of the *Comitia Centuriata*, they had acquired the right, which had been exercised so arbitrarily by Appius Claudius (p. 117), to revise the tribal groups which composed the *Comitia Tributa*, and to accept or reject the claims of Latins and *libertini* to be enrolled; by the terms of the Ovinian Plebiscite passed just before the censorship of Appius Claudius, they had taken over also from the Consuls the duty of filling vacancies in the Senate; and they had been allowed, in course of time, and as the corollary of this, to assume the invidious task of expelling men who had disgraced themselves and might bring disrepute upon their order. They thus came to be regarded as the guardians of public and even of private morality, and frequently placed their black-mark or *nota censoria* against a name, not merely for offences against positive laws, but for any mode of life which they regarded as unpatriotic or un-Roman, such as extravagance or neglect to marry. In virtue also of their control of the assessment of property, they regulated the terms on which the taxes were farmed out to the *publicani* or professional tax-gatherers; administered the vast *ager publicus* which had resulted from the Roman conquests; and were made responsible for planning, executing, and maintaining, with grants of public money, such great engineering works as the roads of Appius Claudius (312), and Flaminius (220); the aqueducts of Claudius (312), and M' Curius (272); and later on (179) the stone bridge of Aemilius over the Tiber.

The Tribunes had lost their proper occupation, from the moment when essential equality was secured between plebeians and patricians.

Yet, with true Roman conservatism, their power of *intercessio*, which permitted them even to arrest and imprison any magistrate but a Dictator, and their right to make laws through the Concilium Plebis, were religiously preserved; and the right, which the Tribunes had already acquired before the Second Punic War, to sit and listen, though not to vote, in the Senate, gave them all the control they needed over the deliberations and the acts of the government. In the meanwhile, moreover, new questions had begun to arise already, such as the registration of Latins and freedmen, and the disposal of the public lands, in which it was of great use to have a recognised champion of the popular claims. The government, too, had found it possible, more than once already, to divide the Tribunician body against itself. A veto is a two-edged weapon in party warfare, and it was but seldom, during the period of the great wars, that the Senate was without some agent of its own among the Tribunes, whose veto was of equal effect with that of any other, against an unruly or anti-senatorial magistrate.

Thus little change took place either in the duties of individual magistrates, or in the relation of the various grades to one another. The silent and gradual revolution, which came about, during the period of the great wars, in the spirit and working of the government, was brought about by the great extension which occurred in the customary powers of the Senate. In theory, only the people could adopt laws so as to make them legally binding; in practice, the *senatus consulta*—mere resolutions of the Senate on matters brought to its notice by the Consuls—were obeyed and enforced as if they had the validity of a statute. In theory, only the magistrates had judicial powers over a Roman citizen, and that, too, subject to the right of *provocatio*; in practice, the custom grew up of appointing, by a *senatus consultum*, which was confirmed as a matter of course by the Comitia, a special *quaestio* or commission, composed of Senators, to inquire into one class of offences after another. The first of these of which we have record was only appointed in 186, and the grave constitutional questions which arose from their abuse belong wholly to the period which followed that of the great wars of conquest (see Chapters xxvi. and xxviii.).

In theory, again, every magistrate was entrusted by the Roman people with the full executive *imperium* within the limits of his *provincia*, and could only be called to account when he laid down his office at the end of his full term. In practice, the multiplication of magistracies, the shortness of the tenure of office, and the overlapping of their various departments, and no less the possibility of a deadlock between the acts of the Comitia and the

Tribuni
Plebis.

The Senate:
growth of
its powers.

The need of
a permanent
governing
body

resolutions of the Concilium Plebis, which were binding, since 287, on all citizens equally, made it essential that all administrative business should pass under the eye of a single managing board with a permanent composition from year to year ; that this board should be equipped with ample official experiences ; and that it should be capable of a consistent policy.

Now the Senate possessed all these qualifications in a peculiar degree. Its members, once appointed, held office for life, unless they were expelled for misconduct by the Censors : as Cineas reported truly, *fully supplied by the Senate.* 'it was an assembly of kings.' They were now chosen almost exclusively from the ranks of those magistrates who had served their term without disgrace ; and these magistrates themselves had been appointed by popular vote from the whole number of full citizens, without distinction of birth or rank ; the Senate might therefore rightly be regarded as, in the best sense, a representative body. It inherited the great traditions both of its older patrician self, and of the long line of statesmen and generals who had made the Roman dominion what it was ; and though this reverence for the *mos maiorum* and for logical consistency of action, made it inclined to safe, rather than to brilliant expedients, while its very numbers set the stamp of mediocrity upon its policy, it must be admitted that, in the century of dire distresses and unparalleled prosperity which was opening, it was well for the Romans that they had so cautious and level-headed a council to manage their affairs ; not the masterful caprice of an Oriental monarchy, nor the clever but irresponsible mass-meeting which brought the empire of Athens to the ground.

It became therefore an invariable custom, though never legally obligatory, for the Consuls to refer all matters of importance to the Senate—*consulere senatum*—and, its opinion once delivered as a *senatus consultum*, to regard themselves as bound to carry it out. *The Senate's control over the magistrates.* Every magistrate, further, was assigned, by the Senate, the limits of his financial expenditure, and was summoned to render his accounts to it at the end of his year of office. The Senate could prolong his command, or supersede him prematurely ; and could mark its opinion of his conduct of a campaign by granting or refusing him a triumph. And if any one made bold to break loose from this control, there was always (as we have seen) a tribune ready to interpose his veto, and bring the unruly official to a standstill.

Every fresh conquest, similarly, was dealt with by the Senate at its discretion. Its constitution was ordained, its governors appointed, and

the terms of their office regulated by the one permanent body in Rome. Finally, every matter of foreign policy, which might lead to a question of peace or war—all embassies from foreign states, and all treaties and alliances—were considered by the Senate, and decided by *senatus consulta*; and Senators alone were entrusted with Roman embassies abroad. Only in case of actual war were the people at large consulted, through the Comitia Centuriata, to make sure, as of old, that the men who would have to do the fighting were of the same mind as the government.

Of all the privileges of sovereignty, therefore, which the citizens enjoyed in theory, they retained in practice only the right to accept or reject such proposals as might be made to them by the senatorial government, on questions of legislation, election of magistrates, and the declaration of war. They were, in fact, far too numerous for the governing body of an imperial city, even if the foreign policy of Rome had been far less complicated than it actually was. And further, whereas in Athens the *Ecclesia* met regularly, frequently, and automatically, and debated public policy with zeal and intelligence, the Comitia, from the time of the Kingdom onwards, had been summoned, even in theory, only to hear announced what their elders and betters had decided to be for the common advantage; and as a general rule had neither the wish nor the experience to dispute their decision.

The old Comitia Curiata never met now except to confirm adoptions and certain kinds of bequests—*testimonia comitiis calatis facta*—and to confer formally, upon a magistrate already nominated by his predecessor, and accepted by the Comitia Centuriata, the *imperium* which made him sovereign for his year. But few cared to attend, and its meetings had shrunk to a formal *quorum* of thirty of the Consul's own retinue.

The Comitia Centuriata remained in use for the election of magistrates, for the trial of cases of treason, and of all other 'capital' charges in which the *caput* or civil existence of a citizen was at stake, and the accused had availed himself of his right *provocare ad populum*; it was used also in some instances for purposes of legislation. Sometime between 292 and 218, and probably about 241,¹ its constitution was altered in detail so as to make the Servian classification, by classes and centuries, fit in with the local division of the citizens into tribes. The centuries thus came to be practically subdivisions of the tribes, and the reform did much to equalise the value of the different group votes,

¹ Some writers, however, assign it to the Censorship of C. Flaminius in 220. The exact method of the change is quite obscure.

and to diminish the predominance of wealth ; and even the *centuriae equitum* seem to have lost their ' prerogative vote.' But in spite of this more modern and democratic method of voting, the centuriate procedure remained so encumbered with ceremonial forms, and so liable to superstitious interruptions, that most of the legislation of the period of the great wars—like the agrarian law of Flaminius (p. 171)—was brought

Tributa. before the Comitia Tributa instead. The latter, in addition, retained some of its original voice in financial matters ; it elected the Quaestors (p. 101), and after 362 a proportion (and eventually the whole), of the *Tribuni Militum* ; and heard appeal cases when the punishment was only a fine.

The Concilium Plebis still went on under the presidency of the **Concilium Plebis.** tribunes ; elected them and the plebeian aediles ; and, though it still consisted only of plebeians, could pass *plebiscita* which were binding on all.

At the census of 265, the total number of citizens was nearly 300,000. Only a small proportion, however, had as yet the *suffragium*, though **The Citizens.** this was rapidly being granted ; and of these again many were scattered over Italy in the citizen-colonies, and only came to Rome at intervals. The number of the territorial ' tribes ' was increased by successive Censors from twenty-one after the Gallic invasion, to the final complement of thirty-five ; four being added north of the Tiber in 389 ; two, probably about Privernum, in 358 ; two, further south, in 332 ; two during the Samnite War, in 318 ; two in the Etruscan crisis of 299 ; and two at the close of the First Punic War in 241. But at this point the number became fixed, and subsequent enfranchisements went simply to swell the numbers of the existing tribes, and deprived them of the local character which they had retained so long. The territory, which they were framed to represent originally, extended over all Latium, Etruria as far north as Veii, a large part of Campania, the lands of the Hernici, Aequi, and Sabini, and the Picentine country on the Adriatic shore.

All the numerous communities, whether within this area or beyond it, which had either the full citizenship or at least the Caerite franchise, **Municipia.** and the right of local self-government, were classed together as *municipia* : their constitutions, as a rule, reproduced the essential features of the old Roman and Latin type ; with two annually elected *praetores* ; auxiliary magistrates (in cases where these were required) ; a *senatus* or town council of *decuriones* or *centumviri* ; and a mass-meeting on the lines of the Roman *Comitia*.

The rest of the Italians, south of the rivers Rubicon and Macra, together with a few old towns in Latium itself like Tibur and Praeneste, whose ancient privileges had been respected after the Latin War, were classed together as the *Socii* or 'allies,' in two grades of privilege. The allies.

The *Nomen Latinum* included all those whose status had been assimilated to that of the few old colonies which had been founded jointly by Rome and the Latins in the days of the Latin League, and of the smaller towns in Latium itself since its dissolution; together with the inhabitants of the numerous 'Latin colonies' of Rome which had been planted later all over Italy. They had *commercium* and *connubium* with Rome, like the members of the towns of the old Latin League, and also, in the first instance, the right, if they chose to exercise it, of *exsilium*; that is, they could become full Roman citizens on the single condition that they left their own country and came to live in Rome. But this latter right was restricted, in or about 268, to those who had already held public office in a Latin township; and Ariminum, which was founded in that year, and all the Latin colonies of later date, enjoyed only this limited access to the full *civitas*. (1) Nomen Latinum.

The rest of the allies, *Civitates liberae et foederatae*, had no direct access to Roman citizenship. They enjoyed local independence under their own form of government, and Roman protection under the terms of the original treaties in each case (*foedus, lex data*). But they were forbidden to enter into foreign relations with any other state than Rome, and were bound, each according to their original agreement, to send auxiliary troops on demand. The Greek cities of the south, and other *socii navales*, sent ships and marines instead of a land-contingent. (2) Socii.

These conquered or surrendered territories were uniformly secured by the establishment of Roman or Latin 'colonies' along the great roads at other important points. The Roman *colonia* differs essentially from all other 'colonies' of the ancient or modern world, save only the Athenian 'cleruchies.' The Phoenician colonies were mere trading factories, like the modern coast-settlements in West Africa; they held little or no territory, and existed solely as places of exchange with the natives. The Greek *ἀποικία*, while it relieved for the moment the natural growth of population in the mother-city, created a new and independent state, bound to its 'mother-city' or *μητρόπολις* only by the natural affection of kinsfolk. The modern colony, though, like the Phoenician, it will be most firmly connected with the mother- The Colonies.

country by the mutual interchange of produce, is always regarded in the first place as an extension of territory ; and though, like the Greek, it relieves over-population at home, and is frequently the result of a secession, it does not as a rule become a separate political whole, and the mother-country continues to be responsible for its administration, and for its defence in time of war. The Roman *colonia*, on the other hand, like the Athenian 'cleruchy,' was established with the primary object of securing the possession of a tract of new territory by planting upon it a permanent Roman garrison ; though it is true here also that the foundation of such a colony might at the same time relieve overcrowding and distress in Rome, and that some colonies did actually contribute much to encourage the growth of Roman trade and industry.

These colonies were of two grades of privilege. The members of a *Colonia Civium Romanorum* retained full Roman citizenship, and continued to exercise their *ius suffragii* whenever they happened

Two classes,
'Roman' and
'Latin.'

to be in Rome. In a *Colonia Latini iuris*, on the other hand, the citizens had only the privileges of the *Nomen Latinum* ; though often they were distressed *cives optimi iuris* who had surrendered the full Roman *civitas* to secure an allotment of land and a fresh start in life. Both kinds of colonies were settled on liberal grants of the newly won public land, on the express condition that they should hold and defend them ; and they were organised for military service and for local taxation in *centuriæ* like those of Rome. They had full local independence, and were governed, like other *municipia*, by two *praetores*, and by *centumviri* who filled the place of a Senate. Like the *Socii*, they had no power to enter into any foreign relations whatever, except with Rome ; while, to secure uniformity of legal procedure, the administration of justice was reserved, at all events in the Latin colonies, to a *praefectus*, who represented the Praetor Urbanus of Rome, and was appointed by him for each colony. Similar judicial *praefecti* were sent to the other *municipia* ; and also, for general purposes of administration, to such parts of the conquered territory as had forfeited, for whatever reason, the privilege of governing themselves.

Such was the State, which, with the surrender of Tarentum and the capture of Brundisium, completed the first unification of Italy. She

General
character
of the
Roman
State.

owed her strength to the devotion and dogged perseverance of her own citizens, and her success to the policy of making the very peoples, whose independence she was forced to curtail, partakers, by gradual incorporation, in her own supremacy. She aspired to be the heart rather than the head of Italy, its leader rather than its mistress ; and her allies were already beginning

to aspire, as a privilege, to the same full citizenship which at first they had regarded as a degradation. Through her position near the coast and on the Tiber waterway, she had always been receptive of the higher culture which the Greeks brought almost to her doors; and as her strength grew, she had become inevitably the champion of order, progress, commerce, and civilisation, against the Samnites and the Gauls; and the representative, in war and in diplomacy, of the interests and the political ideal of Italy. Now, with the completion of her task in the peninsula, she was brought face to face with a new set of problems beyond, and with a new rival oversea; the representative, like herself, of a commercial system and a political creed, but of a trade and an empire which were not European, but Oriental—or, more truly, African—in character.

On the low shore of that bay of the African coast, which looks out towards Sicily between the headlands of Hermes and of Apollo, lies a low ridge of hills, cut off from the mainland by marshy flats and the broad lagoon of Tunis, but offering good anchorage and landing-places at its southern end (map, p. 293). Here, perhaps as early as 825, Phoenician colonists from Tyre founded their 'New City,' *Kirjath-Hadeshath*, which the Greeks called *Carchedon*, and the Romans *Carthago*. Carthage.

Carthage was not the first of the Punic¹ settlements in the West, but the security which her site afforded against the raids of the Numidians,² and her command of the great valley route up the Bagradas river, soon caused her to outrun her older neighbours, such as Utica and Leptis; who, as their Greek rivals in Sicily became more aggressive, were content, one after another, to place themselves under her protectorate. Carthage thus came to be the head of a Punic Empire, which at its widest extent ranged from the Greater Syrtis and the frontiers of the Greek settlements of Cyrene, to the shores of the outer Ocean beyond the Pillars of Hercules; while northwards she held Lilybaeum, Panormus, and Motye, in the west of Sicily, and Tharros in Sardinia; and had joined the Etruscans in 540 in expelling a party of Greek adventurers from Corsica. An attempt made by Dorieus of Sparta, about 515, to colonise the neighbourhood of Earlier history.

¹ The Greeks called the men of Tyre, and their colonists, *Φοίνικες*; the Romans corrupted this to *Poeni*; whence the adjective *Punicus* is formed, in the same way as *punire* from *poena*.

² *Numidae* is the vague Roman name for the native inhabitants of this part of North Africa; it is a corrupt form of the Greek descriptive term *νομάδες*, meaning 'nomad' or 'pastoral' people.

Leptis, was easily repelled; the first Punic treaty with Rome, which guaranteed the security of the shores of Latium, is assigned by Polybius to 509; and while the Greeks of the Aegean were engaged in their life-and-death struggle with Persia, the Carthaginians used their opportunity to overrun Sicily with an army of 60,000 men. But the attempt failed. Gelo of Syracuse inflicted a crushing defeat on them at Himera in 480¹; Hiero I., his successor, shattered the power of their Etruscan partners at Cumae in 474 (p. 83); and it was not till 411 that Carthage ventured again outside her own narrow territories in the west of the island. As the vigour of the Sicilian Greeks declined, however, she renewed her aggressions; and though for a moment, in the years 309 and 307, the tyrant Agathocles of Syracuse united all Sicily against her (p. 133), and even made a raid upon her home-territory in Africa, she had become, by the year 270, the undisputed mistress of some-two-thirds of Sicily; and was supreme at sea in the western Mediterranean.

The government of Carthage was eminently suited to maintain her commercial lead. In theory, and at first perhaps actually, monarchical, it had become, in practice, a close oligarchy in the hands of a few great merchant families. The nominal heads of the state were two *Shophetim*, like the Hebrew 'Judges,' whom Roman writers called *suffetes*, and compared with their own Consuls, or with the twin kings of Sparta. But all real power had passed to a Senate of heads of families elected by the people; and from this in turn, first to a 'finance committee' of thirty (including the two *suffetes*), and later to a 'judicial committee' of one hundred, elective theoretically, but practically hereditary in the great business-houses. There was indeed, as at Rome, a general assembly of the freemen, but it had lost all control over the policy of the state, and only appears in history on the rare occasions when a blunder of the government ended in distress and disaster, or provoked a popular general to appeal to the devotion of the masses.

Carthage had attained her position by strict attention to business; but it is not mere genius for trade and finance, that attracts or holds together an empire. The Phoenicians had none of the gift for conciliating native races, which might have transformed the tribes of the mountains or the desert into loyal and contented subjects; and even their kinsmen in the rest of the Punic towns, and the half-breed Liby-Phoenicians of the coast districts, were oppressed and alienated by pitiless taxation and extortion. Like all Semitic folk, the Carthaginians could fight with fanatical heroism for their lives and their

¹ The battle was said to have been fought on the very same day as that at Salamis.

money, and could defend themselves desperately, like the Jews, behind a stone wall ; but they had no love for military adventure or aggressive warfare, and preferred, except in the last resort, to hire other people to do their fighting for them. Hence every province of their empire was drained of its men for mercenaries, while the remainder of the population was ruthlessly disarmed, and ground down by serf-labour in the mines, and on the vast farms of the capitalists. Hence also, in any crisis which crippled her revenue for a moment, both the conscript army, and the vast slave population round the docks, mutinied for food and arrears of pay. Their service was a hard bargain between hirings and employers, not the free offering of citizens to the welfare of their country ; and the worst foes of Carthage were those of her own household.

To the same narrow penny-wise finance we must attribute further the neglect, into which fell all the machinery of defence, and even the fleet on which her command of the sea, and all her prosperity, depended ; and also the short-sighted policy which starved her ablest generals, so persistently, of supplies and reinforcements in the field. The same love of money for its own sake goes far, also, to explain the personal corruption which infected the whole of the public service, and by no means stopped short even at the governing class ; a vice which, while it embittered the feud between the oligarchy and the few honest men who tried from time to time to reform it, defeated its own ends by making *Punica fides* a byword, wherever Carthaginian traders sold their wares.

To the same miserly temper, finally, must be ascribed the total absence of the higher elegances of life in Carthage. Her workshops had made cheap copies, from time immemorial, of Assyrian, Egyptian, and Greek works of art and utility, and her traders scattered them, at a profit, on the shores of every sea ; but time was money in Carthage, and it was cheaper to hire Greek sculptors and engravers, or to buy Greek art by the piece, than to waste precious business hours in creating an ideal or a style. Her Greek rivals, and even her kinsmen the Jews, found time, without damage to the things of this life, to hand down, to all time, unrivalled masterpieces of literature ; from Carthage, from all the bookshelves of her millionaires, we hear only of a treatise, in twenty-eight volumes, on scientific farming.

Such was the State which was now to do battle with the Romans for the supremacy of the West. So long as Rome was merely the struggling head of a little league of towns in Latium, Carthage had preserved a consistently friendly attitude. When the Romans made good their hold over Campania, she had

Mercenary army.

Corrupt finance.

Lack of real culture.

Previous relations with Rome.

conceded to them access to her own port and to the debatable ground of Sicily, while excluding them from her preserves in Sardinia and Africa ; and when Pyrrhus threatened to repeat on a larger scale the attempt of Agathocles, and to pose as the Alexander of the West, it was her obvious interest to make common cause with them against him. But already, in 272, at the close of the war with Pyrrhus, a Carthaginian attempt to forestall them at Tarentum¹ opened the eyes of the Romans. They found themselves, almost unawares, the natural heirs of the national antipathies and ancient rivalry of the Greeks ; and when Pyrrhus resigned his hopes in Sicily, his parting words opened a new chapter of the history of the world. 'How fair a battlefield,' said he, 'am I leaving to Rome and to Carthage !'

CHIEF DATES.

Carthage founded	about 825
Alliance with the Etruscans	540
First Treaty with Rome	509
First War with the Sicilian Greeks : Gelo	480
Second " " " : Dionysius	410-340
Second Treaty with Rome	348
Third War with the Sicilian Greeks : Agathocles	310 ff.
Third Treaty with Rome	306
Carthage attempts to forestall Rome at Tarentum	272

SUBJECTS.

The growth of the Senate's control, and its causes.

The Roman organisation of Italy.

The rivalry of Greek and Carthaginian in the West.

The contrast between the State, Army, and Empire of the Romans and the Carthaginians.

¹ A Carthaginian fleet, which was to have snatched a surrender from conspirators within, was already in sight, when the Romans took the city from the land side.

CHAPTER XIV

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

The Mamertini—Simultaneous intervention of Rome and Carthage—(1) Roman successes—Hiero takes the Roman side—(2) The Romans secure the command of the sea—Invasion of Africa—(3) The struggle round Lilybaeum—(4) The successes of Hamilcar Barca—(5) The Romans recover the command of the sea—Treaty of Catulus—Roman settlement of Sicily.

It will be remembered that on the death of Agathocles in 289, a body of his Campanian mercenaries had treacherously occupied Messana on their way home, and maintained themselves there as brigands and pirates (p. 135); calling themselves the *Mamertini*, after Mamers the Sabellian war-god. They had already come under the notice of Rome in 270, when they had helped the revolted Campanian legion at Rhegium; and on that occasion Hiero, the general, and afterwards the king, of Syracuse, had earned Rome's gratitude by a vigorous attack upon their base at Messana. Five years later, Hiero resolved to rid himself finally of these dangerous neighbours, and the Mamertini were compelled to look about them for aid from abroad.

The
Mamertini
at Messana.

Two courses were open to the Mamertini, and opinion in Messana was divided. They formed a State in Sicily which, for the first time for centuries, was neither Greek nor Carthaginian in its sympathies, but belonged to one of the old native stocks of the west. As the enemies of the Greeks of Syracuse, they were sure of support from the Carthaginians, to whom the possession of Messana would give the control of the strait and of the north-eastern parts of Sicily. But the Mamertini were Italians by descent and tradition, and some of them held that the Romans, who had now asserted themselves as the champions of all Italian peoples, might not be unwilling to secure a footing also in Sicily, which was so nearly allied to South Italy in population and history. For the moment the latter policy prevailed, and the Mamertini applied to Rome; offering, like the Campanians and the Italian Greeks, to surrender themselves and their city in return for her assistance.

They appeal
to Rome,
264 B.C.

FIRST PUNIC WAR



The Roman Senate was at first inclined to refuse. The Mamertini were notorious malefactors. Hiero, who was now threatening them, had already shown himself the friend of the Romans ; and their rivals the Carthaginians, even if they were asked, and consented, to interfere, were bound by treaty to respect the interests of Rome ; while Rome had every reason for remaining on good terms with the one State which could take her at a disadvantage on the sea. But popular feeling was in favour of a forward policy ; the excitement and the booty of the recent wars had made the people restless and ambitious ; the land-hunger of the populace was still unappeased by

Rome decides to intervene.

the distributions of land in Italy; and the commercial interest demanded unanimously that, at all events, Carthage—though she had equally discountenanced the Mamertini hitherto—must not be permitted to threaten the sea-route to Tarentum, more especially at the expense of a State which was practically Italian. The Senate hesitated, and finally gave way; and the Consul, Appius Claudius, the grandson of the Censor, was ordered to raise 20,000 men and proceed to Messana.

But meanwhile the other party had got the upper hand in Messana; and while Rome was deliberating, Carthage acted promptly on its invitation, and threw a garrison under Hanno into the town. Then, on the arrival of a Roman advanced party under C. Claudius, the Mamertini changed their minds again. Hanno, in spite of his proud boast that 'no Roman should so much as wash his hands in the sea,' not only failed to prevent a landing at Messana, but was compelled to evacuate the city; whereupon his own government promptly put him to death, 'to encourage the others.'

Simultaneous intervention of Carthage.

It was now open war between Rome and Carthage. With 25,000 men, in transports hastily collected from his Greek allies, the Consul crossed the straits without mishap, occupied Messana in force, defeated the Syracusans, and compelled them to raise the siege. The Carthaginians had lost no time in concluding an alliance with Hiero; they reconciled him for the moment with the Mamertini, and sent an army of their own to his aid. But Claudius beat them, too, outside Messana; made himself master of all north-eastern Sicily; and even laid siege to Syracuse. The lateness, however, of the season, the valour of the Syracusans, and the ravages of famine and disease, postponed further successes, though Claudius well deserved the triumph which he celebrated on his return to Rome. In the following year both Consuls, M. Otacilius and M. Valerius Maximus Messala, were sent to Sicily with 30,000 men, and had already beaten the Carthaginians and Syracusans, when there occurred a sudden change in the situation.

First stage of the war.

Roman successes in Sicily, 264-261 B.C.

The first campaign had shown already that the question really in dispute was whether Carthage or Rome should be supreme in Sicily. Now Carthage had been for centuries the hereditary enemy of every Greek in the West. Rome had long played the part of champion of Greek liberties in Italy; she had now crushed the Mamertine pirates and occupied their city; and with this new base of operations she had already expelled the Carthaginians from

Hiero takes the Roman side.

a considerable part of Sicily. With these alternatives before him, it was the plain interest of Hiero to support the cause of the Romans. He accordingly made a treaty with them in 263, by which, for an annual tribute of a hundred talents, he was recognised by them as king of Syracuse and its dependencies; the Romans, however, were to keep Messana, which was the immediate cause of the war. The treaty was to last fifteen years in the first instance: but it was repeatedly renewed, and throughout his long reign Hiero remained loyal to Rome.

Reinforced by this new ally, the Romans at once laid siege to Agrigentum, the headquarters of a strong Carthaginian force under Hannibal, the son of Gisco. Agrigentum had always been a close rival of Syracuse, but had never wholly recovered from its former destruction by the Carthaginians in 405, though since the time of Timoleon (340) it had once more become the second city in the island. The town lies a little distance away from the sea, and the besiegers were thus enabled to repel the attempts of the Carthaginian admiral to relieve the garrison, though they suffered grievously themselves from plague and famine. At last, after seven months' blockade, the Punic garrison cut its way out, and the town itself was taken. By this time, all the inland towns of Sicily had come over to the Roman side, while those on the coast were only deterred by their terror of the Carthaginian fleet; though it was only at Segesta in the far west that the Carthaginians ventured to blockade a Roman post. But by thus evacuating the interior, the Carthaginians had, in fact, strengthened their position; for while they were now unassailable themselves, their command of the sea made Rome's communications with her island conquests most precarious, and Carthaginian squadrons were already extending their raids far up the coast of Italy.

By this time, however, the Romans, like the Carthaginians, seem to have realised the full meaning of the struggle in which they had engaged.

Second stage. It was a struggle 'between whale and elephant.' A sea-power with its arsenal oversea, can only be vanquished on the sea, and by a superior sea-power. But the elephant can learn to swim; and, with characteristic resolution, Rome set to work to create a navy. We need not take too literally the stories which Roman chroniclers loved afterwards to tell: how their only model was a Carthaginian wreck; how in sixty days a forest became a fleet; and how landsmen, perched on scaffolding, were taught to handle the oar. The Romans had had the beginnings of a fleet since the capture of Antium nearly a century before

The Romans secure the command of the sea. 260-253 B. C.

Roman naval preparations.

(p. 116): there had been a regular naval board—*duoviri navales*—since the year 311, and a naval treasury with two *quaestores classici* since 267; and troops had been convoyed by sea safely in the Second Samnite War. Many of the seafaring towns of South Italy, moreover, together with the Bruttian foresters, had been regularly enrolled as *socii navales*, and had rendered effective service already in the present struggle. For all that, the antiquated triremes of the Italians were no match for the gigantic quinquiremes of Carthage; and the traditions of seamanship, and the skill and confidence which come of undisputed supremacy, are not to be acquired in a moment.

Yet, taking everything into consideration, it was a bold and far-sighted policy, and a great feat of industrial and administrative ability, which, in the spring of 260, sent out a fleet of a hundred quin-
 quiremes and twenty triremes, fully equipped for a campaign. Defeat of Scipio.

The first engagement was unlucky, for the Consul, Cn. Cornelius Scipio, was captured with his whole squadron of seventeen ships at Lipara. The remainder of the fleet surprised the Carthaginian admiral a few days later, and defeated him with some loss; but it was clear that, in naval warfare, the Romans were not yet a match for their opponents.

C. Duilius, however, the other Consul, who had attempted, unsuccessfully, to raise the siege of Segesta, discounted the seamanship and strategy of the Carthaginians by a new and ingenious device. He
 provided each ship with a drawbridge thirty-six feet in Invention of the 'corvus.'
 length, and wide enough to admit two armed men abreast. The inner end of this bridge was pivoted round the base of an upright mast in the prow of the ship, so that the bridge could be swung round to either side as occasion required. The outer end was kept drawn up, by tackling, to the mast-head, until an enemy's ship came within range. Then it was released and allowed to fall suddenly upon his deck, gripping it fast by an iron spike which projected from its underside like a crow's beak, and gave the name *corvus* to the whole. The enemy, thus grappled at close quarters, was deprived of the advantage of his superior speed and handiness, while Roman legionaries poured by the bridge on to his deck, and easily overpowered the crew.

Thus armed, Duilius put to sea, and met the Carthaginian fleet off Mylae, a few miles west of Messana. The Punic commander came heedlessly on; but the 'crows' did their work well, and
 fifty of his ships were sunk or captured. Carthage lost, Victory of Duilius at Mylae, 260 B.C.
 for the moment, the command of the Sicilian waters, and Duilius was able to advance along the north coast, land his men at a convenient spot, and relieve Segesta easily. On his return he was

received with unprecedented enthusiasm ; he was granted a triumph for his successful campaign, and escorted at night in the streets with torches and music thenceforward ; while a *Columna Rostrata*, adorned with the bronze rams of the captured ships, was set up for a memorial in the Forum.


For the next two years, the war in Sicily made little progress ; mainly because both sides were busily engaged elsewhere. Carthage had lost everything but Lilybaeum, Panormus, and a few fortresses in the west of the island ; but succeeded in recapturing Eryx, in cutting up a Roman and Siciliot force near Himera, and, in 259, in establishing at Drepanum, the port of Eryx, a naval arsenal which became of the first importance later on.

The Romans, meanwhile, used their newly-won sea-power to the full. L. Scipio attacked and conquered Corsica, and made vigorous but unsuccessful descents upon the Carthaginian posts in Sardinia ; and in 258 C. Sulpicius even made a descent upon the coasts of Africa, which were as defenceless still, as they had been a generation earlier, at the time of the raid of Agathocles. On both sides the conviction gained ground that the crisis of the war was imminent. Rome was making vast preparations for a campaign in Africa : Carthage strained every nerve to create an overpowering fleet and to recover the command at least of the African seas. A drawn sea-battle was fought at Tyndaris, opposite Lipara, in 257.

In the following year the Romans determined to carry the war into Africa. An enormous fleet, of three hundred and thirty ships, carrying the Consuls, L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus, and forty thousand troops, sailed along the south coast of Sicily, and was met off the promontory of Ecnomus by a Carthaginian fleet of three hundred and fifty under Hanno and Hamilcar.

The battle which ensued ranks among the greatest sea-fights in history, for nearly seven hundred vessels were engaged, and more than three hundred thousand men. The Roman fleet went into action in the shape of a wedge, so that each ship was partly protected by the prow of that which followed it ; the ships of the two Consuls formed its apex, and other ships of war, each towing a transport, formed the base of the triangle ; while a separate squadron of warships brought up the rear. The Carthaginians, with their swifter ships ranged in a single line of four squadrons, and their left wing thrown forward between the Romans and the coast, easily outmanœuvred the Romans, and threw their unwieldy formation into disorder ; but when the fleets closed, and the Carthaginians tried to ram, the advantage of the Roman tactics

reappeared: the *corvi* held their ships fast, and the obstinate courage of the Romans prevailed. The Romans lost twenty-four ships only, while they sank twenty of the enemy and captured sixty-four. Carthage possessed no second fleet; and the way lay open to the coast of Africa.



The Romans landed near Clupea, which became their headquarters, and ravaged the open country to within sight of the walls of Carthage. The native tribes rose as one man against their hated oppressors, and received the Romans with open arms. The town of Tunis was taken; eighteen elephants and twenty thousand slaves, together with countless booty, were sent home to Italy; fifteen thousand Carthaginians were killed, and fifty-one thousand taken prisoner. Then, under the stress of warfare abroad and political red-tape at home, the Roman system broke down as it had done before. Vulso was summarily recalled by the Senate to preside over the consular elections, and carried back with him two of the four legions; while Regulus remained in Africa *pro consule* with the other half of the force.

The Carthaginians were already reduced to extremities by famine and by the desertion of their hired troops, and would gladly have accepted any reasonable terms. But Regulus, whose head seems to have been turned by his easy success, insolently rejected their proposals, and demanded a surrender so humiliating that the Carthaginians preferred to resist, if need be, to the bitter end. But, at the critical moment, unexpected aid appeared.

Among the Greek mercenaries of Carthage was a Spartan adventurer named Xanthippus, who had seen service in the East, and had at the same time considerable military ability, and—what at the moment was

more important—the gift to inspire others with his own enthusiasm. He organised a force of 4000 cavalry and 100 fighting elephants; faced the Romans boldly in the open country; and by his modern Greek generalship easily secured a decisive victory. Thirty thousand men were killed in the battle; Regulus himself and five hundred more were made prisoners; and only a miserable remnant, some two thousand strong, straggled back to Clupea, which was relieved and evacuated in the spring, as soon as the season permitted. The retirement from Clupea had been safely covered by a naval victory off the Hermaean promontory, when the greater part of the laden fleet perished in a storm near Camarina, on the south coast of Sicily; and the Romans never attempted again, in this war, to carry out an invasion of Africa.

Xanthippus
expels the
Romans
from Africa.

Sea-fight at
the Hermaean
Cape:
subsequent
shipwreck,
255 B.C.

Carthage, however, was not in a position to follow up her success, since for some time all her energies were needed in Africa to reconquer her revolted subjects. The Romans, therefore, who within a few months had built once more a fleet of 220 vessels, were able to devote the following year to active operations in Sicily, with the object of expelling the Carthaginians entirely from their fortresses in the west of the island. The capture of Panormus in 254 gave them undisputed control of the north coast, and greatly increased the security even of the shores of Italy; and in the following year a Roman squadron harried the African seaboard. But on its homeward voyage, between Sicily and Italy, the fleet was overtaken as before by a storm, and a hundred and fifty ships were wrecked round Cape Palinurus.

Third stage.
The struggle
round
Lilybaeum
and Panormus,
254-248 B.C.

Disaster
off Cape
Palinurus,
253 B.C.

This second disaster, and the continued inactivity of the Carthaginians at sea, seem to have determined the Romans not to rebuild a war fleet, but only to keep some sixty triremes afloat, for coast defence, and to cover their communications with Sicily. In continuation of the same policy, they took Lipara, Himera, and Thermae in 252; but no considerable operations were undertaken, even in Sicily, until 250. In that year, another Carthaginian, of the common name of Hasdrubal, brought over 130 elephants and collected a large force in the west of the island, with the object of recapturing Panormus; but he was decisively defeated, outside the town, by the Consul L. Caecilius Metellus, who secured more than a hundred of the elephants to adorn his triumph.¹

Land
warfare
in Sicily.

Victory of
Metellus
at Panormus,
250 B.C.

¹ These elephants are frequently represented on the coins of the *Gens Metella*.

After this marked success, the Romans laid siege to Lilybaeum, and seemed to have been roused to build ships once more; while the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, except the fortress of Lilybaeum and their new arsenal at Drepanum, and again proposed to the Romans to put an end to the war. To this incident belongs the touching story of the captive Regulus,¹ who was sent to Rome to support the Carthaginian envoys, but instead besought the people to go on with the war, and returned to Carthage to face a horrible death. Rome could only retaliate, if the story be true, by the torture of captive Carthaginians, and by pressing on with vigour the siege of Lilybaeum.

Carthage again sues for peace: story of Regulus.

The Carthaginians, about this time, began to assert themselves again, and frustrated the Roman land-blockade through the free communications which they maintained by sea with their Sicilian ports. Himilco was even able to throw 10,000 fresh troops into Lilybaeum, and, in a bold sortie, to burn the Roman siegeworks. It was at all costs necessary, if the blockade was to be maintained at all, to cut the place off from the sea, and the Consul P. Claudius Pulcher was sent with a large fleet for that purpose.

Blockade of Lilybaeum.

But Claudius had all the violent and headstrong temper of his family. He allowed the Carthaginian admiral to entice him into the harbour of Drepanum, and, in the action which followed, saved only thirty ships out of two hundred and ten. Afterwards it was explained how he had neglected the warnings of the augurs, and thrown his omen-birds into the sea. 'They shall drink,' said he, 'even if they will not eat.' The Senate recalled him at once, and ordered him to name a Dictator; and when Claudius, headstrong to the last, named M. Claudius Glycia, a freedman of his own, they ignored his choice and appointed A. Atilius Calatinus, who had already been twice Consul during the war, and was the first Dictator to hold a command beyond the confines of Italy.

Defeat of P. Claudius at Drepanum, 249 B.C.

To repair the disaster at Drepanum, the other Consul, L. Junius Pullus, was sent to Sicily with a fresh squadron; one hundred and twenty ships of war, and eight hundred transports laden with supplies for the camp round Lilybaeum. But he too, like his colleague, allowed a small Carthaginian squadron to drive him, near Cape Pachynus, too close to a rocky shore; where a sudden autumn storm completely destroyed his fleet, almost at the same point as in 255. After this double disaster, we hear nothing of a Roman fleet for more than five years; and meanwhile, by slow degrees, the Cartha-

Disaster off Cape Pachynus.

¹ Horace, *Odes*, iii. 5.

ginians built up anew the naval supremacy which they had lost, till their ships could ravage the very coast of Latium, and interrupt Roman intercourse with Sicily.

Junius himself escaped from the wreckage of Cape Pachynus, and made his way overland to Lilybaeum. Here he made a fresh diversion by seizing the temple of Venus, which stood on Mount Eryx, and commanded the approaches to Drepanum. But the new post was soon besieged in its turn by the Carthaginians from below. So, year after year, the desperate and indecisive siege went on: the Romans experiencing ever greater difficulty in maintaining upwards of a hundred thousand men in a country which had been desolated by more than ten years of war; Carthage, unhampered in her communications, but slowly breaking down under the double burden of a fleet-in-being and a mercenary army.

The treaty between the Romans and Hiero expired in 248, but it was renewed on the same terms, save that, in future, Syracuse was to pay no tribute. The concession was fully justified by Hiero's services and the distracted state of Sicily, but it was one which, at this lowest moment of their fortunes, the Romans could but ill afford.

In the next year, 247, there appears for the first time a capable general on the Carthaginian side, and the one striking personality of the whole war.

Fourth stage. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca,¹ was appointed to command the Carthaginian forces in Sicily. He was the head of one of the most powerful Carthaginian families, and still in the prime of life; his greater son, Hannibal, having been born in the very year of his appointment to Sicily. Whether on land or sea, the lightning speed and decision of his movements struck terror into the hearts of the Romans, and changed in a moment the whole character of the war. With a fleet of swift privateers he devastated the coasts of Italy, and forced Rome in self-defence to found three new citizen-colonies; Alsium (247), and Fregenae (245), to defend Etruria, and Brundisium (246), to guard the Adriatic shore. In Sicily he paralysed the garrison of Panormus by establishing himself on the impregnable fortress-peak of Ercte, which overhangs the town, and contains within itself both corn-land, abundant water, and a secure harbour for light vessels. From this new base he disconcerted the operations of the enemy by sudden raids in all directions; while the Romans, whose sea-power had vanished as

¹ *Hamilcar* means 'protected by Melcarth'; *Barca*, like the Hebrew *Barak*, means 'lightning.'

suddenly as it had come, could neither retaliate in Sicily, nor protect their own communications. Three years later, Hamilcar abandoned Ercte, but secured another fortress, overlooking Drepanum, by the recapture of the Roman post on Mount Eryx. He was now fast wearying out the enemy's forces in the west. In five years the Romans had lost nearly fifty thousand men, a sixth part of their total strength. The copper *as*, their unit of currency, had been diminished in weight from twelve *unciae*, or 'ounces,' to two. The treasury was empty; the Senate irresolute; and, worst of all, no military genius had appeared to meet the 'Thunderbolt' with his own weapons.

But Eryx proved a far less effective base than Ercte had been. It lay some two miles from the coast, and could not therefore be so easily relieved from the sea; and though Hamilcar was in possession of the town on the hillside, a body of Gallic mercenaries continued to hold for Rome the temple of Venus on the summit, while a Roman force threatened his communications in the low ground. And so for two years more he held his own 'like a royal eagle,' as Polybius says: while the war itself 'dragged on,' in the phrase of the same historian, 'like a boxing-match, in which swift blows are struck and parried, but no plan or policy is intelligible to the bystanders.'

At last, in 242, the Roman Senate resolved to try once more the dangerous experiment of a naval campaign, convinced that by this means only could the war be brought to a close. The state was penniless, but by the liberal contributions of private citizens a fleet of two hundred vessels was built on superior models, with every improvement of equipment and discipline which the experience of failure could suggest. The obvious strategy was to blockade the harbours of Drepanum and Lilybaeum, and prevent the Carthaginians from sending supplies and reinforcements to their general at Eryx; and in this operation the Consul, C. Lutatius Catulus, was entirely successful; so that, unless Carthage could break through the ring once more, the surrender of Hamilcar was only a question of time.

But Carthage also was well-nigh exhausted by more than twenty years of war, and it was not till the spring of the following year that a fleet of transports, deep-laden, unwieldy, and almost unescorted, made its way cautiously across the open sea. Catulus himself was disabled for the moment by a wound received at Drepanum, but the Praetor, P. Valerius Falto, who saw that everything depended on cutting off the convoy, put out to

Eryx.

Hamilcar
at bay.Fifth stage.
The Romans
recover the
command of
the sea,
243-241 B.C.Catulus
blockades
Drepanum.Battle of the
Aegates
Insulae,
241 B.C.

sea, some twenty miles, to the Aegates Insulae, and attacked the enemy as they made their last run home to Drepanum. The laden ships and untrained crews of the Carthaginians were no match this time for the new Roman vessels; fifty were sunk and seventy captured, and the remainder fled away to Hiera, the furthest of the islands.

Carthage had spent all her last resources upon this one convoy, and had neither the strength nor the spirit to continue the struggle. Her Carthage exhausted. African subjects had never been thoroughly pacified since the invasion of Regulus, and threatened to break out into a fresh revolt. Her trade was disorganised, her treasury empty, and her mercenary forces were clamouring for arrears of pay. Moreover, The peace party. there was a strong party at home which, while they drew upon the resources of the State for distant expeditions among the Berber tribes of the south, had never approved of the war in the Mediterranean, and cherished a personal hatred of Hamilcar as the incarnation of the forward policy and of naval adventure. The failure of the last relief force gave this 'stop-the-war' party their chance. They proposed to Hamilcar that he should surrender his troops and fortresses, and make what terms he could with Rome. And though Hamilcar indignantly refused to sacrifice his devoted soldiers to a political necessity, he consented to treat with Catulus for an honourable evacuation of Sicily.

Terms of peace were arranged between the two commanders, and ratified, in a slightly harsher form, by commissioners sent from Rome for the purpose. Carthage was to surrender Sicily, where her hold had never been secure, and had depended upon an undisputed command of the sea-passage; and therewith the adjacent islands, Lipara and the like, whence she had threatened the security of Roman communications and trade. She was to restore all Roman prisoners and deserters, without ransom, and to pay a war indemnity of three thousand two hundred talents within ten years;¹ and she promised, in addition, not to wage war on Hiero or his allies. Rome thus acquired the whole of the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily, and retained also Messina; leaving Hiero independent, with an enlarged dominion, in the south-east of the island.

At so great a distance beyond the sea, the old Roman system of federal alliance was clearly inapplicable, even if the other great cities of Sicily had not all been devastated in the long war, and their former

¹ Catulus had demanded two thousand two hundred talents only, to be paid in twenty years; but one thousand talents more were enacted by the commissioners while the period of payment was halved.

prosperity destroyed. The Carthaginian system of treating dependencies as revenue-producing estates was, therefore, retained with but slight modification. Sicily became a separate department, or *provincia*, of Roman administration, and in 227 an additional Roman settlement of Sicily. Praetor was created to supervise it; tribute was exacted to the amount of a tithe of the produce (*decumae*); and *portoria*, or customs dues, of five per cent. (*vicesima*), were imposed on all exports and imports. But so far as the political relations of the native states went, Rome pursued her traditional policy of isolation-by-treaty. All existing leagues were dissolved; Messana was restored to its old inhabitants, as a state in 'free and equal alliance' with Rome, and a few other towns received similar favourable terms; but the majority, instead of entering into Roman alliance and supplying contingents of troops, like the Italian states, were treated as conquered territory, and either paid *decumae*, or saw their land pass as *ager publicus* to Roman *occupatores*, whose gigantic slave-plantations, and wasteful mode of agriculture, brought economic and social disorder, and ruined the future of the island.

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„ appeal to Rome	264
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CHIEF PERSONS.

C. Claudius—M. Valerius Messala—C. Duilius—L. Manlius Vulso—
M. Atilius Regulus—L. Caecilius Metellus—P. Claudius Pulcher—
L. Junius Pullus—C. Lutatius Catulus—Hanno—Hannibal Gisgo—
Hamilcar Barca—Xanthippus—Hiero.

CHIEF PLACES.

**Messana — Syracuse — Agrigentum — Segesta — Lilybaeum — Mylae —
Tyndaris — Ecnomus — Clupea — Prom. Hermaeum — Prom. Palinuri —
Panormus — Drepanum — Prom. Pachyni — Ercte — Eryx — Aegates
Insulae.**

SUBJECTS.

**The creation, maintenance, and value of sea-power.
The breakdown of the system of annual commands.
The new problem, how to govern dependencies oversea.**

CHAPTER XV

ROME AND CARTHAGE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The 'Truceless War'—Carthage left helpless—Roman wars in Sardinia, Corsica, and Liguria—in the Adriatic—in Cisalpine Gaul—Hamilcar Barca in Spain—Hasdrubal founds 'New Carthage'—Hannibal—Attitude of the home government—Saguntum—The 'Hannibalic War.'

THE troubles of Carthage did not end with the treaty of Catulus. Her surrender had dealt a well-nigh fatal blow to her prestige, and the enormous fine threatened to absorb her whole revenue.

Her mercenary armies had been kept together till the end of the war by the personal character of Hamilcar; but they cared nothing for Carthage, and everything for their pay, which was now far in arrear. The government at home ignored their just claims, and by its mean and tactless behaviour, cringing and bullying by turns, goaded them into revolt. Spendius, the Campanian slave, Matho, the African who had served in Sicily, and Autaritus the Gaul—fit leaders of this motley crowd of adventurers—seized a Carthaginian officer, and summoned all Libya and Liby-Phoenicia to combine with them, and to destroy their hated mistress. Carthage was thus deprived at once of her army and of the sources of her revenue, while tribute and reinforcements poured into the mercenary camp. Utica and Hippo Zarytus were besieged; and Hanno, the head of the peace-party, whose extortions and schemes of conquest in Africa had made him detested in the army, was surprised and defeated in the field.

The Carthaginians, in despair, were forced to apply to Hamilcar, whose strategy in Sicily they had thwarted, and whose veterans were among the leaders of the revolt. Hamilcar, patriotic as ever, consented; and compelled the citizens to enlist, and, with 10,000 men and 170 elephants, slipped past the insurgents, who lay at Utica and Tunis, into the interior; reconciled the Numidian chiefs by his personal influence; cut up the communications of the rebels, and harried the revolted natives.

So many of the mercenaries deserted to him at once, that Spendius and Matho resolved to make peace impossible by a diabolical massacre of all who would hear of a surrender; and Hamilcar was forced to retaliate by similar cruelties. The jealous incompetence of the government, the revolt of Hippo and Utica, and the desperate valour of the mercenaries prolonged this 'Truceless War' for three years; but Hamilcar, given a free hand at last, reduced the insurgents to extremities at Tunis, caught and crucified Spendius before its walls, exterminated the army of Matho, and led the last rebel leader to a death of torture in 238.

Carthage was saved, but only by wholesale massacre of her own tributaries and defenders, and stood exhausted but relentless amid the ruins of her own empire in Africa. And could Rome have foreseen the future, she would have done well to accept the pressing invitation of the mercenaries and rebels of Utica, to rid herself of Carthage once for all. Though she observed the letter of the treaty, however, she did not fail to profit by the distractions of Carthage as soon as an excuse arose.

The mercenary garrison of Sardinia had revolted already, before the treaty of Catulus, as soon as the Carthaginians ceased to send pay and supplies by sea; but the Romans had honourably ignored their offers of surrender. When, however, at the close of the Truceless War, Hamilcar set out with a fleet to recover the island, the temptation to intervene was irresistible. The Senate professed to believe that the expedition was really aimed against Rome, and threatened instant war. The injustice and insolence of this interference were inexcusable; but of Hamilcar the Romans were frankly and heartily afraid, and their behaviour is most leniently explained by their panic fear at the news that he was once more on the water. In their present exhaustion, the Carthaginians had no choice but to apologise. They surrendered to Rome not only Sardinia, but also all their claims in Corsica; and submitted to a further indemnity of 1200 talents. Sardinia was annexed and governed in the same manner as Sicily, and like it was constituted a Praetorian 'province' in the year 227.

The interval of twenty-three years, between the First Punic War and the Second, was employed both by Rome and by Carthage in steady preparation for the struggle which both states knew to be inevitable. Carthage—the mercenary war once over—willingly dispensed with the presence of Hamilcar, who set out at once to create single-handed a new empire in the west. The Romans turned their energies in three principal directions,

Carthage
left
helpless.

The Romans
annex
Sardinia.

Twenty-
three years
of peace and
preparation.

which each resulted in a distinct step in advance ; the operations themselves were in no way remarkable, but they attest a continuous activity and expansion. Only once indeed during the whole interval—in the year 235—was the temple of Janus shut, and Rome not actually at war.

The settlement of the new island-provinces was not effected in a moment. Neither in Sardinia nor in Corsica had the Carthaginians ever really conquered the interior, and the Romans inherited from them the hostility of the highland clans. Carthage moreover was suspected, and not without reason, of encouraging the disturbances ; and in 238 and 236, and again even as late as 225, we find a consular army engaged in the thankless task of pacification. The Ligurian peoples also, round the Gulf of Genua, seemed to have shared the fears of their kinsmen in the islands, and provoked a Roman expedition in the year following the peace with Carthage, and again in 238 and 236. Little, however, is known of Rome's first dealings with a coast which was to become the highway later to her conquests in the west.

More important events led to the assertion of Rome's responsibility for the safe navigation of the Adriatic, and brought her for the first time into direct and friendly relations with the free states of Greece. During the First Punic War, an Illyrian chief, Agron, the son of Pleuratus, had built up a considerable dominion among the wild tribes of the rugged coast north of Epirus. He had been successful in repelling the migratory Gauls from the north, and had made himself useful to the King of Macedon, who was at war with the Greeks, by allowing his Liburnian and Illyrian privateers to harry their commerce and pillage their coasts ; for the Greek states had long allowed their navies to fall into decay, and found themselves at the mercy of the raiders.

But the Illyrians had made little distinction between Greek and Italian traders, and when appeals for help came from the Greeks of Pharos and other settlements up the Adriatic, they found the Romans quite prepared to interfere on their own account. Agron himself had died in 231, but his widow Teuta, and her unscrupulous adviser Demetrius, a Greek of Pharos, disclaimed all responsibility for the ravages of the privateers, and murdered Gaius and Lucius Coruncanus, the Roman envoys, who were sent to her capital at Scodra to protest. To avenge this insolence, both Consuls crossed over into Illyria with two hundred ships—the first Roman force to strike beyond

(1) Wars in Sardinia, Corsica, and Liguria, 238-225 B.C.

(2) Wars in the Adriatic, 230-219 B.C.

Illyrian piracy.

First war with Illyria, 230-228 B.C.

Italy to the eastward—and entered into an alliance with the Greek leagues of Aetolia and Achaea. Macedon, distracted for the moment by internal feuds, was unable to support the Illyrians; and Demetrius, thinking that the game was up, deserted his mistress and betrayed to the Romans the important island city of Corcyra, which the Illyrians had lately conquered. The Parthini and Atintanes of southern Illyria rose against Teuta, and compelled her to retire northward at once to the strong pirates' nest of Rhizon—the modern Cattaro—and in the following year to accept humiliating terms. She undertook not to pass south of Cape Lissus with more than two ships of war at a time, to pay a substantial tribute to the Romans, and to surrender a large part of her southern dependencies, which the Romans handed over to Demetrius as a reward for his treachery, though in nominal ward for the infant stepson of Teuta. The Parthini and Atintanes, and the Greek cities of Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, were received into alliance with Rome, and were placed, as the Campanian towns had been, under the charge of Roman *praefecti* directly responsible to the Consuls.

To remove all misunderstanding as to the objects of Rome, the Consul, L. Postumius, sent envoys to the principal Greek towns, and the result of their explanation was entirely satisfactory. The Greeks were full of gratitude for the suppression of the Illyrian pirates, and overjoyed at the appearance of a military counterpoise to the power of their hereditary enemy in Macedon. Corinth admitted the Romans to the Isthmian Games, and thus recognised them as members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Athens conferred upon them the freedom of the city and initiated them into the Eleusinian Mysteries.

Demetrius of Pharos was not long satisfied with the fruits of his villainy. While the Romans were engaged in the Gallic Wars (p. 173), he took the opportunity of extending his dominion into Illyria; effected an alliance with Antigonus Doseon, who had established himself on the throne of Macedon; and scattered pirate squadrons all over the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, and even far away into the Aegean. But no sooner was the Gallic conquest complete, and a Roman province extended to the head of the Adriatic, than his turn came to settle his account. Demetrius had probably counted on the outbreak of another Punic War: Rome, on the other hand, was determined that, when that war did come, she would at least be secure in rear. A single campaign in 221 (a) in Istria, crushed his allies in Istria, and opened a land-route round the head of the Adriatic to his northern border; and two years later the

Second
Illyrian
War,
221-219 B.C.

full force of Rome was turned upon Illyria. L. Aemilius Paullus took the island of Pharos, and the mainland fortress of Dimale, together with much booty ; for the misuse of which both he and his colleague M. Livius Salinator were afterwards called to account. These conquests were secured for the future by re-establishing in Illyria all the petty chiefs who were hostile to Demetrius and to Macedon, and by the retention, in Roman hands, of Dyrrhachium, Apollonia, and Corcyra. Demetrius himself escaped, and took refuge with Philip V. of Macedon, whom he succeeded in inspiring with a profound dislike of Rome, which became of fatal importance afterwards.

(b) in Illyria.

Demetrius incites Macedon against Rome.

The other great advance during this period was the conquest of the Cisalpine Gauls, whereby the Roman dominions in Italy were extended to the foot of the Alps, and were made, to all appearance, as safe from attack on the north and west, as the Illyrian and Istrian Wars had made them on the side of the Adriatic. Since the extermination of the Senones in 283, the Gauls in Italy had remained inactive, while the more restless tribes from beyond the Alps had drifted eastward into Greece and Asia Minor. But in 238 fresh hordes began to press into the valley of the Po, and threatened a general movement southwards ; and in 236 a mixed force even reached Ariminum. But the Gauls were disunited among themselves ; the Cenomani, in the north-east, had already been enrolled as the allies of Rome ; and there was no common grievance to supply motive power for a serious invasion.

(c) Wars with the Gauls, 238-222 B.C.

Renewed unrest in Cisalpine Gaul.

In 233, however, provocation came, quite unintentionally, from the Roman side. The Punic War had left the lower classes in the city in a state of acute distress ; the peasantry were ruined by the interruption of business and the scarcity of money ; while Rome itself was filled with veteran soldiers left destitute by the peace, and demoralised by years of fighting and adventure. In this crisis, C. Flaminius, an energetic and popular tribune, brought in a bill to relieve the overcrowded city, and to provide means of support for the people, by distributing in allotments the *Ager Gallicus et Picenus*, the confiscated lands of the Senones and their southern neighbours. But the wealthy nobles who had been allowed to become *possessores* of the lands in question, and had introduced slave-cultivation and wholesale pasturage, were in no mood to be evicted. The Senate accordingly refused to sanction the bill. But Flaminius, throwing all consti-

Agrarian agitation in Rome, 233 B.C.

Ager Gallicus.

Proposals of C. Flaminius.

tutional usage to the winds, brought his measure before the *Concilium Plebis* direct, and declared it passed without further ado. The blow to the prestige of the Senate was severe, and later writers regarded Flaminius as the first forerunner of the revolutionists of the age of the Gracchi (Chapter XXVII.).

The immediate effects of the allotment of the *ager Gallicus* were as alarming as they were unexpected. The arrival of the Roman settlers, invitation of which at the most was a measure of frontier defence, was the Gauls.

interpreted by the Gauls as the prelude to further aggression. The Boii, who lay nearest to the *ager Gallicus*, summoned to their aid the neighbouring Lingones, the warlike Insubres from beyond the Po, and a free-company of Transalpine warriors known as the Gaesatae.¹ Such a gathering of the clans had not been known since the year of the Allia, and panic spread through Italy. The Sibylline books declared that Rome 'must twice be held by a foreign enemy'; and the verbal anticipation of the oracle, by burying alive two Gauls and a Greek in the Forum Boarium, did little to allay the terror. A more

practical step was the complete enumeration which was ordered of the military resources of Italy, which showed that, without counting the Bruttii and other 'naval allies,' or the loyal Cenomani and Veneti of the north-east, the city could put into the field 700,000 foot and 70,000 cavalry; truly, as Polybius observes, 'a whole nation in arms,' though Hannibal, ere long, was to invade and well-nigh conquer it with less than 30,000 men.

But for some unknown reason, it was seven years more before the Gauls actually moved; and when, in 225, the dreaded *tumultus* came, the

Romans were not wholly unprepared. One consular army, Gallic 'Tumultus,' it is true, was absent in Sardinia under C. Atilius, and 225 B.C.

had to be recalled; but the other, under L. Aemilius, was thrown forward promptly by the Adriatic route to Ariminum; 55,000 Etruscan and Sabine levies advanced to Faesulae and Arretium to block the roads west of the Apennines; a large body of Umbrians lay ready, in the centre, to make a flank attack to either side; and a reserve corps of 50,000 more was retained for the immediate defence of the city. The Gauls, however, slipped through the hills, between the Etruscan force

and that of the Consul at Ariminum, and pressed on, pursued by them both, as far as Clusium, only three days' march from Rome, whence they turned and defeated the western army at Faesulae before the Consul could join hands with it. On

¹ They probably got their name from *gaesum*, the heavy Gaulish javelin. Cf. Virg. *Æn.* viii. 661.

his approach, however, they drew away toward the Etruscan coast, in the hope to circumvent him again, and so escape northwards with their spoils.

But the army of Atilius had landed from Sardinia at Pisae, and now came southward to meet them; Aemilius pressed upon their rear; and at Telamon, near the sea-coast, they were compelled to Battle of Telamon. barricade their flanks and to fight a double battle. The Gauls fought with desperate valour, but the discipline and superior weapons of the Romans prevailed. Atilius was killed, but the Gallic army was annihilated; forty thousand men were left on the field, ten thousand were captured, and only the cavalry succeeded in breaking away. The trophy of golden torques and other ornaments which adorned the triumph of Aemilius was long remembered in Rome; and no Gaulish army ever again succeeded in passing the Apennines.

'Tumult' like this, however, must not be suffered to occur again. In self-defence, if for no other motive, the Romans were bound to complete the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul. Conquest of Cisalpine Gaul. The Boii and Lingones were easily and completely conquered in a single campaign, and by the end of 224 the Roman frontier lay (1) Boii. along the Po. The Insubres gave more trouble. The first Roman general to cross the Po was the same C. Flaminius whose land-law had provoked the outbreak, and who, as Consul of 224, was still on the worst of terms with the Senate. (2) Insubres. His first inroad was unsuccessful; but a flank attack from the east, through the country, and with the support, of the Cenomani, compelled the Insubres to sue for peace. Letters from the Senate, forbidding him to fight, he discreetly left unread till the decisive battle was over. But the spirit of the Insubres was not broken. In 222 they hired 30,000 more Gaesatae from beyond the Alps, and engaged both consular armies together. But in a desperate encounter at Clastidium on the Po, M. Marcellus takes spolia opima. Claudius Marcellus killed, hand to hand, the Gaulish chieftain Viridomarus, and dedicated *spolia opima* for the third, the last, and perhaps the only really historical time in Roman history. Cn. Cornelius Scipio meanwhile captured their chief towns, Mediolanum and Comum (*Milan and Como*), and received the unconditional surrender of the remainder of Cisalpine Gaul.

The conquered territory was not incorporated in Italy, as the *ager Gallicus* had been, but was treated as a subject province, on the new model supplied by Sardinia and Sicily, though without the formation of a distinct Praetorian *provincia*; tribute and hostages being exacted from the Boii and Insubres, who had been the ringleaders in the *tumultus*,

but the Gallic canton-government being left very much as it was. Two years later, in 220, C. Flaminius, who as Censor had already gratified his popular supporters by building the Circus Flaminius, completed the defence of Italy, and set his mark for ever on the country he had secured, by extending the old north road through the Apennines from Spoletium to Ariminum, and restoring and consolidating the whole into the *Via Flaminia* which bears his name. In the same year a strong citizen-colony was founded at Mutina among the Boii, and Latin colonies, of six thousand settlers each, at Placentia and Cremona, to guard the passage over the Po into the country of the Insubres. The eastern frontier had been secured, from Liburnia to the Alps, by the subjection of Istria, in the war of 119 (p. 170), so that the loyal Cenomani, and non-Gaulish Veneti, were now guaranteed against disturbance. Peace and order once secured, Roman ideas and customs spread rapidly to the foot of the mountains, and though, in the Hannibalic War, which fell upon the country before the pacification was really completed, the Gauls threw off their allegiance for a time, their spirit seems to have been broken almost without exception, and Rome might well regret that she had not followed the earlier, rather than the later precedent of conquest, and incorporated them from the first within the bounds of Italy.

Settlement
of Cisalpine
Gaul,
222 B.C.

Flaminia
Via, 220 B.C.

Rapid
spread of
Roman
culture.

We have already seen how, at the close of the 'Truceless War,' Hamilcar Barca obtained leave from his government to go abroad, and extend Carthaginian influence in Spain. The government was only too glad to get rid for a time of so powerful and dangerous a servant, and in 236 Hamilcar set out, with a picked body of his own troops, and his three young sons. The story is well known how, at the opening of the campaign, he called his first-born Hannibal, who was then nine years old, to the altar, and made him swear by the sacrifice which lay upon it, 'that he would never be friends with the Romans.' For it was to damage Rome, even more than to benefit Carthage, that this Spanish adventure had been conceived.

Hamilcar
Barca in
Spain,
238-229 B.C.

Hannibal's
oath.

The bulk of the Spanish peninsula was still but little known. Carthage, it is true, had traded for long with the south-east coast, and had occupied the mining country round the old Phoenician port of Gades. And in the sixth century, if not earlier, Ionian Greeks from Phocaea had pushed onwards from Massilia at least as far as the Ebro, and had at one time held a monopoly of the trade with the

The Iberian
peninsula.

rich and friendly people of the mysterious 'Tartessus.' But the Phocæan colonies had long since fallen into decay ; while neither Greek nor Phœnician had ever known anything, at first hand, of the interior.

The object of Hamilcar was threefold. Spain was in the first place naturally fertile and exceedingly rich in minerals, while it remained the one section of the Mediterranean shore which was accessible to Carthage, but had not yet been opened up by her traders. Its value to Carthage. Rome had expelled her from her ancient markets in Sicily and Sardinia, and had crippled her sea-going trade with Italy ; but the exploration and conquest of Spain might open to her a (1) Natural wealth. new source of prosperity, with which even Rome could hardly hope to interfere.

Next, the Iberian population of Spain was closely akin to that of Mauretania and Numidia, whence Carthage had hitherto drawn her best mercenary soldiers ; while in the north and (2) Mercen- aries. centre a strong infusion of the blood of Gaulish invaders had produced a mixed Celtiberian race, of peculiarly warlike and adventurous temperament. Here then was a recruiting ground for Carthage, inexhaustible and hitherto untouched ; with the further advantage over Numidia that, in case of another revolt, the sea would lie between the Spanish mercenaries and their employers.

Finally, the acquisition of Spain would give Carthage a new and independent base of operations in Europe itself. The last war had been decided by the failure of Carthage to retain the command of the sea, or to allow full freedom of action to her best (3) Overland route to Rome. generals. In Spain Hamilcar would be independent, alike of sea-power and of the government at home. If the Romans, in fact, should cut him off from Africa, so much the better ; for, in a Carthaginian army, those Senators and citizens who were present were empowered to form a temporary council and assembly, to support and ratify the acts of their commander. He would thus be able to plan and attain, unmolested by the peace party in Carthage, that one end, to which all these Spanish conquests were to be but the means—a war of revenge with Rome.

Thus for nine years he laboured, from his base at Gades, to create, up the valley of the Baetis and far into the Celtiberian plateau, an organised and loyal empire ; making himself respected everywhere by successful warfare, but at the same time beloved by his lenient and considerate treatment of the natives. Then, Hamilcar's work and end. in the year 228, he was killed in battle and his great career was cut short ; his son Hannibal being as yet barely twenty years old.

Hasdrubal succeeds him, 228-221 B.C. Hamilcar's policy was continued without interruption by his devoted friend and son-in-law Hasdrubal, whom the army elected to succeed him. Under his just and conciliatory rule the Spanish dominion extended rapidly; and he was soon able to take the important step of transferring the seat of government from the old, distant, and mainly commercial settlement of Gades, to a 'New Carthage,' which he founded on the Mediterranean coast, in the midst of a rich mining district; and provided with a good harbour and arsenal, to improve and ensure his communications with Africa.

Signs a new treaty with Rome, 228 B.C. By this time the Romans seem to have discovered that something was going on in Spain; but they were preoccupied for the moment by the Gallic War, and readily concluded an agreement with Hasdrubal, whereby the Ebro was to be the boundary between the two spheres of influence. By this means Hasdrubal gained time for consolidation, and secured the title to a far larger share of Spain than he had as yet effectively occupied; while the Romans, who had as yet barely reached the Alps, and seem to have regarded Spain merely as another plum which would presently drop into their mouths, felt that they had more than sufficiently safeguarded their own interests, and those of their Greek friends in Massilia and elsewhere. This agreement, however, does not seem to have been ratified by Carthage, and it did not prevent Rome from accepting, or retaining, alliance with the important town of Saguntum, though it lay far south of the Ebro.

Hannibal succeeds him, 221 B.C. Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221 by a Spanish slave, whose master he had put to death, and the army unanimously elected Hannibal as their general. Hannibal was now in his twenty-sixth year; he had been trained from boyhood under the eye of his father and of Hasdrubal, and had already displayed talent of a very high order for both warfare and diplomacy, and a character which endeared him to all who met him. The opposite party in Carthage foresaw perfectly well what must happen if the young man succeeded to the inheritance and obligations which had been created for him. They dared not annul the choice of the army in Spain; but they prepared to ignore both him and his works as long as they might, and to disavow him in the end, if the collision with Rome should come at a time when they did not want it.

The Second Punic War, which follows, is rightly known in history as the Hannibalic War. It was a struggle provoked, directed, and sustained

by Hannibal and his family almost unaided; Carthage herself had desired to avoid it; except in Spain, she was totally unprepared for it; and, but that Hannibal was for the greater part 'The Hannibalic War.' of it quite out of reach, her government would have brought it, by neglect and mismanagement, to a far earlier and more disastrous ending.

For two years after the death of Hasdrubal, however, Hannibal devoted himself to the completion of his father's work in Spain; and the conquest of the Olcades in 221, and of the Vaccaei and Carpetani in 220, made all secure up to the line of the Ebro. Saguntum.

Only one town remained independent within the treaty limit. Saguntum was an Iberian town, lying about a mile from the sea; the belief that it had been a Greek colony from Zacynthus seems to have arisen from similarity of name; and the tradition that it was peopled from Ardea in Latium is a diplomatic invention to support the claims of Rome. The town had surrendered to Rome about the time of Hasdrubal's treaty, and had hitherto been spared by the Carthaginian commanders; but in 219 Hannibal had completed his preparations. He could not afford to leave in his rear what was practically a Roman fortress, so he picked a quarrel with Saguntum over its dealings with the neighbouring tribes. The Saguntines saw what was coming, and sent to Rome for help.

The Romans had doubtless intended Saguntum to serve as a base for eventual operations in Spain; but at the moment both consular armies were in Illyria (p. 171), and they had no help to send. So they made a merely formal protest to Hannibal, in the hope of gaining time. The Romans
made a protest;
in vain. Hannibal, however, who had meanwhile laid vigorous siege to Saguntum, gained time in his turn by refusing to see the envoys—whose instructions were, in that event, to make their complaint to his government—and himself wrote home to prepare his partisans for the crisis. The Barca family had greatly diminished their influence in Carthage, by transferring their headquarters to Spain; but their wealth, their successes, and the prosperity which these had brought to the lower classes at home, gave them still a numerous following. On the arrival of the Roman envoys, the proposal of Hanno, the spokesman of the opposite party, to surrender Hannibal and make reparation to Rome, was rejected; the blame was laid on the Saguntines, and the Romans were reminded of their treaty obligation not to see beyond the Ebro.

Meantime the siege of Saguntum was pressed with vigour, and though the town defended itself with proverbial Iberian pluck, it was captured

street by street, after only eight months' resistance. The nobles, here, as elsewhere, more closely in sympathy with Rome, are said by Livy to have destroyed themselves beforehand; while in the final assault no quarter was given to any one; as if to ruin utterly the prestige of Rome in Spain.

The news of the surrender of Saguntum took the Romans completely by surprise, and a second mission was sent forthwith to Carthage, to inquire whether the government held itself responsible for what Hannibal had done, and, if so, to make declaration of war. The Carthaginians tried to shelter themselves behind technical informalities of Hasdrubal's treaty, which had nothing to do with the case. But when in their turn they challenged the Romans to declare their policy, Q. Fabius held up two folds of his toga and said: 'Here I carry peace and war; choose ye which ye will.' The Carthaginians in desperation bade him give them which he pleased; and Fabius, letting fall his toga, replied: 'Then I give you war.' Suspense was over. 'We accept your gift,' they cried, 'and we will use it well.'

**Saguntum
is captured
meanwhile.**

**Declaration
of war with
Carthage,
219 B.C.**

CHIEF DATES.

'Truceless War' between Carthage and the Mercenaries	241-238
Sardinia annexed by the Romans: Hamilcar Barca goes to Spain	238
Roman wars in Sardinia, Corsica, and Liguria	238-225
Gallic raids	238-6
Flaminius proposes to divide the Ager Gallicus	233
First Illyrian War	230-228
Gallicus Tumultus: Battle of Telamon	225
Conquest of the Boii, 224: of the Insubres	222
Via Flaminia built to Ariminum	220
Second Illyrian War	221-19
Spain: Hamilcar Barca	238-228
" Hasdrubal	228-221
" Treaty with Rome	228
" Hannibal	221
" Siege of Saguntum	219-18
Rome declares war against Carthage	218

CHIEF PERSONS.

**Ti. Sempronius Gracchus—C. Flaminius—L. Aemilius—C. Atilius—
M. Claudius Marcellus—L. Aemilius Paulus—M. Livius Salinator
—Q. Fabius—Agron—Teuta—Demetrius of Pharos—Hamilcar—Has-
drubal—Hannibal—Hanno.**

CHIEF PLACES.

**Utica — Tunis — Pharos — Rhizon — Scodra — Prom. Lissi — Corcyra—
Faesulae—Telamon — Ariminum — Mediolanum — Nova Carthago —
Saguntum.**

SUBJECTS.

**The fatal weakness of Carthage, the mercenary army.
The frontier defences of Italy.
The relations of the Romans with the states east of the Adriatic.
The introduction of Spain into Mediterranean History.**

CHAPTER XVI

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: (1) TO THE BATTLE OF CANNÆ

The Roman plan of campaign—Hannibal's brilliant strategy—He crosses the Alps—Ticinus—Trebia—Trasimene—Fabius Cunctator—Minucius—Paullus and Varro—Battle of Cannæ—No thought of surrender.

THE Romans had made all their preparations on the assumption that the war which was imminent would be very like the last: that all the Roman plan fighting would be in Africa and in Spain; and that the worst of campaign. that Carthage could attempt would be to reassert herself at sea, and make an attack upon Sicily. The total forces of Rome had been shown at the time of the Gallic War to amount to over seven hundred thousand men; but it was not thought necessary to enrol more than seventy thousand citizens and a corresponding force of allies. The fleet was in good condition after the Illyrian campaign, and two hundred and twenty ships were soon ready for sea. Of the two Consuls of 218, Ti. Sempronius Longus, with two legions, sixteen thousand allies, and one hundred and sixty ships of war, was ordered to proceed to Sicily, to defend the island if necessary, but if possible to effect a landing in Africa, and repeat the successes of Regulus: while P. Cornelius Scipio was sent by sea to Massilia with two more legions, twenty-two thousand allies and two thousand two hundred cavalry, but with only sixty ships; his object being merely to protect Rome's Greek allies on that coast, and to bar the path of Hannibal if he should attempt to invade Italy by land. That this was not improbable was already suspected in Rome, for Q. Fabius and his colleagues had visited the north of Spain on their way home from Carthage, and had found the Celtiberian tribes only too willing to purchase immunity for themselves, by allowing Hannibal a free passage through their country. It was known, moreover, that intrigues were going on between Hannibal and the Cisalpine Gauls, who were still irritated by the allotment of the lands confiscated from them in the recent war, and by the foundation, in this very year, of the large Latin colonies at Placentia and Cremona (p. 174). It was thought necessary, therefore, to retain the

remaining two legions for the defence of North Italy, and to send them into Cisalpine Gaul under the Praetor, L. Manlius.

Hannibal's plan of campaign was a masterpiece of brilliant audacity. Its central idea was to strike swiftly and decisively from Spain into Cisalpine Gaul, to the very gates of Italy, where he was sure of a friendly reception and abundant supplies; and thence to move southwards through Italy, cutting up the Roman communications and detaching the more warlike allies, to a second base in Apulia. Here he would have the mountains and, as he hoped, the rebels, of Samnium between himself and Rome, and would be able both to reopen direct sea-communication with Carthage from one of the Greek ports, and to induce Macedon to co-operate in Illyria and on the Adriatic. But he quite expected that, before that time came, the Italian confederacy, in which, he knew, the real strength of the Romans lay, would have dissolved of its own accord, and that, with Italy against her, Rome would be unable to hold out.

Hannibal's
brilliant
strategy.

What perhaps he failed to realise was, first, that the difficulties of the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Apennines would deprive him of half his forces before he set foot in Italy; next, how completely Central Italy had now become unified and Romanised; and finally, how indomitable was the tenacity of Rome herself, which at the very moment when her fate seemed sealed, not merely maintained a firm front against him in Italy, but steadily refused to recall those other troops which were undermining his own base in Spain.


Its weak
points.

Saguntum fell at the end of 219,¹ and early in the next spring Hannibal crossed the Ebro, with ninety thousand men, twelve thousand cavalry, and twenty-nine elephants. In Spain he left his brother Hasdrubal, with twelve thousand men, two thousand five hundred cavalry, an equal number of elephants, and the whole of his fleet; while twenty thousand more were sent to Africa to protect the coast and the passage thence into Spain. To guard against revolt, the garrison of Africa consisted mainly of Spaniards, and that of Spain mainly of African troops. The early part of the summer was occupied in the conquest of northern Spain, and in the passage of the Pyrenees, which cost him valuable time and the loss of twenty thousand men; besides eleven thousand whom he left behind as a garrison under one Hanno, and ten thousand Spaniards whom, for sundry misconduct, he thought it well to send back to their own country. Then

Hannibal
leaves
Spain,
218 B.C.

¹ Livy (xxi. 15) disputes this date, and suggests the beginning of 218; but the majority of writers agree with Polybius.

with the shrunken, but now thoroughly trustworthy force of fifty thousand men and nine thousand cavalry, he hurried on through southern Gaul, and in face of the open opposition of the Volcae, and the intrigues of



the Greeks of Massilia, succeeded in crossing the Rhone near Roquemaure, in the neighbourhood of Avignon, some four days' journey from the sea.

The news, sent from Massilia, that Hannibal had passed the Pyrenees, reached Scipio before his preparations were completed. He had been delayed in Cisalpine Gaul by a sudden revolt of the Boii early in the season, whereby the new colonists had been expelled from Placentia and Cremona, and the Roman Praetor Manlius shut up in Tannetum. But on hearing the news, he left Manlius to deal with the revolted Gauls, put to sea at once with all the forces he could collect, and reached Massilia without mishap. A cavalry skirmish soon informed him that the enemy had already crossed the Rhone; but before he was ready to leave his base, Hannibal, who had already lost more time than he could spare, had turned inland, and had fully three days' start of him. Scipio saw, in a moment, that he had come too late, and that, being responsible for the defence of the north, it was his duty to return to Italy; but he realised the importance of preventing the despatch of reinforcements from Spain, and most wisely decided to send on thither, under the command of his brother Gnaeus, the army which he had brought with him. He himself returned, almost alone, to Pisae, and crossed into Cisalpine Gaul, to raise fresh levies there, and cooperate with the army of Manlius. He was too weak, with Gaul so uneasy, to garrison, at all, either the passes of the Alps, or the country of the Insubres; and contented himself with refounding Placentia and Cremona, and occupying the line of the Po.

Scipio reaches Massilia too late,

and sends his army to Spain.

Meanwhile, Sempronius, who with the help of the Syracusans had beaten a Carthaginian fleet off the coast of Sicily, and was on the point of setting sail from Lilybaeum into Africa, had been peremptorily recalled, and had done the right thing. He left the Praetor, M. Aemilius, in charge of the island, and brought his army round by way of the Adriatic to Ariminum; annexing the stepping-stones of Malta on the voyage.

Sempronius is recalled from Sicily.

Hannibal, meanwhile, had followed the left bank of the Rhone northward as far as the confluence of the Isara, and had secured the favour of the Allobroges by his settlement of a dispute between rival chiefs. Here he turned eastward, and began the ascent of the Alps. The season was far advanced; the first snow had fallen, and the mountain torrents were swollen with rain. The mountain tribes, also, resented his intrusion, and harassed his march by night and day. In a first encounter he succeeded, by a night

Hannibal crosses the Alps.

march, in surprising their strongholds, though his baggage train suffered heavily before it emerged from the crowded gorge below ; but later on, at the ' White Rock,' his whole column was surrounded ; great boulders were rolled down the sides of the valley, and it was only after a miserable night in the open that he was able to go forward. After nine days' climbing and fighting he reached a small plain on the summit of the pass, and halted for two days, to rest his men and to allow the stragglers to rejoin. But a fall of snow warned him that he had no time to lose ; so, cheering his troops with a glimpse of the plains of Italy far below them, he pressed on again.

But the Italian face of the Alps is far more abrupt and rugged than the other ; and, to a weary and laden army, the descent is in any case more perilous than the upward climb. Added to this, the new snow now lay thick on the surface of the old ; and at one point a landslide or an avalanche had carried away the path, leaving the slope above so steep and slippery as to be quite impassable. There was nothing for it but to halt and encamp. The rocks were heated with fires, and splintered by pouring vinegar upon them while glowing hot ;¹ and after four days' strenuous labour, a new road was built in zigzags down the precipice, strong enough even for the elephants to pass.

At last, after seven days of desperate exertion and fatigue, the starved and ragged army emerged from the mountain pass, and rested below in the luxuriant and sheltered plain. It was barely five months since they had crossed the Ebro, but of that whole army only twenty thousand men, with some six thousand cavalry, had reached the valley of the Po. The news of their arrival spread rapidly throughout Cisalpine Gaul, and all the principal tribes hastened to offer their allegiance.


The exact route followed by Hannibal was already disputed in the time of Livy, and cannot now be determined with certainty, for none of the narratives which we possess describe its features with sufficient accuracy. Livy's graphic story, based on the contemporary account of L. Cincius Alimentus,² takes it for granted

¹ *Ardentiaque saxa infuso aceto putrefaciunt*, Livy, xxi. 37. The phrase is rhetorical, but the sense is clear. The ' vinegar,' which (as in Matt. xxvii. 48) means the sour wine of the soldiers' rations, could not of course eat into the rocks ; but for want of water they may well have thrown on their wine to make the hot rocks splinter. The splintering process itself was quite familiar in ancient engineering ; and its effects may still be seen, for example, in the Roman lead mines at Matlock.

² Praetor in 210, and at one time a prisoner in the camp of Hannibal.

that Hannibal descended among the Ligurian Taurini.¹ In this case he must have left the Isara, and followed the valley of the Druentia, crossing the Cottian section of the Alps into the valley of the Duria Minor (*Dora Riparia*) either by the pass of the *Col de l'Argentière* or by that of *Mont Genève*, the lowest and easiest of the whole range; and with this version the geographer Strabo concurs.

THE ALPS AND NORTH ITALY



But Livy admits that many people followed Caelius Antipater (who used the contemporary account of a Greek named Silenus) in the belief that Hannibal crossed by the *Cremonis iugum*, in the Pennine Alps further north; and Polybius, who examined the passes for himself, and mentions no other version, says that the descent led among the Salassi, who, like the guides, were Gauls. If so, Hannibal must have kept to the valley

¹ In spite of the fact that the Taurini were at war with his friends, the Gallic Insubres.

of the Isara throughout, and crossed by the *Little St. Bernard* (for that of Mont Cenis was not yet in use), descending into the valley of the Duria Major (*Dora Baltea*). But both soldiers and Alpine climbers have doubted the possibility of bringing so large a force over a difficult pass more than seven thousand feet high.

Scipio, meanwhile, on his return from Massilia, had lost no time in reducing the Boii and other insurgents south of the Po; and he was about to advance into the country of the Insubres, and had already crossed the Po, when, in a reconnaissance beyond the Ticinus with his cavalry and light-armed troops only, he came into collision, unexpectedly, with a body of Numidian cavalry. The Romans were outmanœuvred and driven back with some loss; the Consul himself being severely wounded, and only saved by the courage of his young son Publius, the hero of the latter part of the war. Scipio saw at once the danger of his position, and fell back rapidly on Placentia to wait for the coming of Sempronius; breaking the bridges over the Po in the very face of Hannibal's vanguard.

It was important to Hannibal to bring about a decisive action, if he was to retain the allegiance of the Gauls, or make sure of supplies for the winter, which had already set in. He accordingly crossed the Po higher up stream, conciliated the nearest tribes of Gauls, and advanced by the southern bank to within six miles of Placentia. Still Sempronius did not appear; a body of Gauls broke out from Placentia and deserted to the enemy; and Scipio, fearful alike of treachery in the town and of Hannibal in the open, moved his camp again. He now rested upon the last northward spurs of the Apennines, and had the river Trebia between himself and the enemy; who was so close at hand, that the Numidian cavalry plundered the deserted camp almost as soon as the Romans had left it,¹ and cut up their stragglers on the march. A few days later the village of Clastidium, which was left exposed by this manœuvre, was betrayed to Hannibal, with a great quantity of Roman stores, and relieved him of all immediate fear for his supplies.

Meanwhile Sempronius with his army arrived from Ariminum, anxious to cover his disappointment in Sicily by fighting a decisive action before the close of his consulship. Hannibal had long been waiting for his opportunity; and Sempronius was soon provoked by irritating raids, first

¹ Livy, xxii. 47, seems to have thought that Scipio was previously in Placentia itself, but this is inconsistent with what follows. The first Roman camp must have been in the low ground *west* of the Trebia.

to a cavalry action, in which the Romans mistook a small tactical success for a great victory, and then to a general engagement on ground chosen by Hannibal, whose younger brother Mago and a picked body of two thousand were concealed in one of the dry, overgrown 'dongas' which furrow the plain beyond the Trebia. Then, in wind and rain, on a cold, snowy morning, the Numidian cavalry appeared, and by pretended flight tempted the Romans across the swollen stream, till drenched and breakfastless, with a river in their rear, they found themselves confronted on level ground by the Carthaginian line, well fed and oiled, and warmed by great watchfires. The Punic cavalry soon drove the Roman squadrons off the field, and fell upon the flank and rear of the legions. Mago's force sprang forth and completed the confusion, and the Gallic auxiliaries broke and fled. One body of ten thousand Romans cut its way through and escaped to Placentia; the rest, twenty thousand in number, were killed or scattered; and only a few stragglers faced the cold river once more, and regained the camp of Scipio. The violence of the storm, however, checked the Carthaginian pursuit, and permitted Scipio, under cover of the night, to withdraw his own army, with the fugitives and wounded, to Placentia, and thence to Cremona beyond the Po.

Sempronius arrives.

Battle on the Trebia, 217 B.C.

The victory of the Trebia brought all the Cisalpine Gauls to the cause of Hannibal, and relieved him of anxiety in regard to his supplies. Only the colonies of Placentia and Cremona held out behind their walls, and proved once more the supreme importance of such settlements in the Roman military system. Scipio, being still disabled, was left in charge of the fragmentary forces in Cremona, while Sempronius returned to Rome to hold the consular elections, and was very nearly captured by Hannibal's raiders on the way.

Its results.

The surprise and alarm in the city, when the news of the Trebia arrived, increased the tension of a domestic crisis. An attempt had been made by the popular party to preserve the government from the taint of commercial speculation, which we have seen was so virulent at Carthage, by limiting the share which a Senator might have in the shipping business; and the same C. Flaminius, who had incurred the hostility of the Senate in 223, and had taken a prominent part in this agitation, was again a successful candidate for the consulship. He was, as we have seen, a man of energetic and independent character, and a brave soldier of the old Roman type. But like most of his countrymen, he had no genius or patience for scientific

Democratic agitation in Rome.

warfare, and all his experience had been won against the impetuous and undisciplined Gauls, when the right strategy was to bring about a prompt and decisive action. Now, moreover, as before, he roused the deepest resentment in Rome, at least in serious circles, by the deliberate way in which he ignored the traditional ceremonies by which, as he well knew, his enemies in the Senate would gladly have hampered his movements. He left Rome prematurely and secretly, as soon as his 'province'—the command in the north—was assigned to him, and entered office without formality at Ariminum; while his colleague, Cn. Servilius, attended to the ritual which ancient usage and the panic of the moment required.

Meanwhile, in the early part of winter, when Sempronius returned to the front after the elections, there was indecisive fighting round Placentia, until the remains of the army of Trebia could be withdrawn; and Victumulae and other Roman depôts fell one after another into the hands of the enemy. Westwards, too, the Ligurians were harried and subdued by their hereditary enemies the Gauls, and two Roman Quaestors, and other noble Romans with them, were surprised and retained by them as hostages.

The general idea of the Romans, in the campaign of 217, was much the same as it had been in 225 against the Gauls. Far behind the fortresses of Cremona and Placentia, and of Luna, Luca, and Pisa, on the Etruscan shore, lay the two Consuls—Servilius at Ariminum, Flaminius at Arretium, further south, and on the other side of the Apennines. But again, as in 225, the enemy was allowed to slip past the chain of colonies, and through the mountain passes; to draw aside the defenders from their base; and so to destroy them piecemeal.

Hannibal had never intended to use the Cisalpine Gauls as a permanent base. Their enthusiasm began to flag even before the winter ended, and continual minor raids failed to revive it. Treachery was imminent; he himself was forced to use disguises in self-defence; and long before the winter was over, he felt that it was time to move. His first attempt to cross the Apennines was frustrated by the bitter weather; but a second, by a difficult and circuitous route, succeeded; and he descended at last with his whole force, and a large body of Gallic allies, into the valley of the Arno. Here, however, the severe winter had caused an inundation, and for four days the army floundered in rain and sleet through a treacherous and unhealthy morass, till the Gauls in particular

The Roman
defence
of the
Apennines.

Hannibal
crosses the
Apennines


and the
Arno.

could hardly be induced to proceed, and had to be shepherded vigorously by Mago and his cavalry ; while Hannibal himself was taken seriously ill, and lost the sight of an eye from inflammation and exposure.

The exact course of his march is uncertain again ; but it was clearly his object to slip past the left flank of Flaminius at Arretium, and then to provoke him to an engagement on the most unfavourable ground. Accordingly, after a few days' rest and plunder at Faesulæ in the valley of the Arno, he advanced through Etruria towards Cortona and Perugia, devastating all the country within his reach, until in the valley of the Clanis he cut the direct road between Arretium and Rome. Flaminius, in spite of the repeated warnings of his staff, and the obvious danger of treading unwarily upon the heels of such a master of stratagem, left his strongly fortified base at Arretium and followed the enemy southward.

But by this time Hannibal had read the character of his opponent, and prepared for him an appropriate snare. Between Cortona and

BATTLE OF LAKE TRASIMENE



Perusia the road skirts for some distance the northern margin of the *Lacus Trasimenus*, reaching the shore from the north-west by a narrow pass through the hills, and traversing a wide alluvial plain which was formerly part of the lake itself, and is bounded by the hills on the other three sides. Then the hills approach the water's edge again, and the road passes away eastward through more rugged ground. Here Hannibal halted to lie in wait for Flaminius. The main body of his infantry he posted in the narrow eastern exit from the plain, between the hills and the lake ; his light-

armed and auxiliaries he distributed along the slopes which enclose the level ground ; and the cavalry he held in readiness to close the western entrance as soon as the Romans should have entered the trap.

Flaminius, eager only to overtake the enemy—for they were now fairly on the road to Rome—fell headlong into the snare. He had a true Roman disregard for the refinements of scientific scouting ; but the heavy April mist, which hung over the lake and the plain, made his habitual carelessness more inexcusable than ever.

Yet while it effectually concealed the movements of the enemy from the Romans in the low ground, the bank of fog was not deep enough to prevent them transmitting their own signals from hill to hill. As soon as the Roman army had entered the plain, the cavalry descended upon the pass by which they had come, and a general attack was made upon the column of march. The issue could not be in doubt for a moment ; generalship was out of the question, and Flaminius, like the brave soldier that he was, fought in the ranks with the rest ; till his death, at the hands of an Insubrian Gaul, avenged his former conquests. His army was practically annihilated. Many were killed as they stood along the road ; more were driven in confusion into the shallow waters of the lake, where the cavalry rode in after them till they lost their footing ; and fifteen thousand were taken prisoners on the spot.

Disaster of
Trasimene,
217 B.C.

One body of six thousand did indeed cut its way through ; but there was no Placentia at hand, as at the Trebia, and they were overtaken next day by Maharbal and the cavalry, and gave up their arms on his promise to let them go free. Hannibal, however, ignored Maharbal's pledge, and kept them in captivity with the rest ; maintaining thus the distinction which he had always made, since the Trebia, between Roman citizens and their Italian allies. The latter, as before, were sent away unharmed, to spread the report of his clemency. His own loss, of 2500 men, was comparatively slight.

'Punice
fides.'

A few days later, he had the further good fortune to cut off the whole of the cavalry of Servilius, which had been hurriedly sent forward into Umbria under C. Centenius, on the first news of the battle of Trasimene. This loss forced Servilius, who had left Ariminum, to remain on the defensive ; and allowed the enemy to block the Flaminian Road and cut him also off from Rome.

By this time Hannibal must have begun to realise the strength of the ties which bound the Roman confederacy together ; for neither the crushing defeat of the Romans, nor the marked clemency of the invader, drew any response from the Italian allies. Even the Etruscans, who had revolted so often and so recently, scarcely raised a finger in his favour.

Umbria, too, remained quiet; and after an ineffectual attempt to surprise Spoletium, the strongly posted colony which commands the Flaminian Road and lies only sixty miles from Rome, he moved away, still unopposed and unwelcomed, into Picenum, and in ten days reached the Adriatic coast; whence, for the first time since he left Spain, he was in a position to send news home to Carthage.

Hannibal
checked at
Spoletium.

Rumours of Trasimene, closely followed by the arrival of the fugitives and the news of the cavalry action, threw Rome into the greatest concern; and, in the absence of the other Consul, no regular provision existed for meeting the crisis. But the people took the matter into their own hands, and Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed Dictator by the Comitia Centuriata, with M. Minucius Rufus as his Master of the Horse. Fabius was a stern old-fashioned patrician of the highest family, with the strictest conservative views, and the strongest dislike to the intrusion of enthusiastic politicians like Flaminius into responsible military posts. He saw that against a military genius like Hannibal, Rome's only chance was to avoid general actions, and to harass the enemy by continual attacks from the higher ground; depriving him thus at the same time of his sources of maintenance, and of the opportunity for those brilliant engagements which appealed to the imagination of his supporters.

Dictator-
ship of
Q. Fabius.

His first care was to repair the ceremonial shortcomings of Flaminius, and propitiate the higher powers by solemn services and dedications. Having thus restored the confidence of the people, and having put the defences of the city in order, he raised two new legions, and took over, besides, the army of Servilius. The latter had retired on Rome as soon as his rear was set free; and was now sent down to Ostia to reorganise the fleet, and to keep off a Carthaginian squadron which was waiting for Hannibal on the coast of Etruria, and had captured a Roman convoy on its way to the army in Spain. Then, leaving a corps of freedmen and recruits to defend the city, and issuing a general order for the evacuation of the open country and the destruction of all produce and stores, Fabius himself set out in search of Hannibal.

His
preparations.

He found him already in Apulia, whither he had gone in pursuance of his original design, partly in search of forage and fresh horses for his cavalry; partly to make touch again with Carthage by sea, and to concert measures with the King of Macedon; and partly in the hope of raising, against Rome, at least the Sabellian south. But the Samnites showed no sign of disaffection, and in Apulia only Arpi

Hannibal in
Apulia.

opened its gates to him. As before, he must win a victory or starve ; and no sooner did a Roman army appear on the border of Apulia than Fabius he offered battle at once. But Fabius, true to the policy Cunctator.' which won him the name of *Cunctator*, refused, and contented himself with close observation of the enemy from well-chosen positions in the hills, cutting off his forage-parties and stragglers, and confining him to his fortified camps.

Hannibal was soon obliged to change his ground, and laid his plans for an occupation of Campania. He had already communicated with Hannibal the popular party in Capua, which he knew to be dis- moves into affected towards Rome, and he had reason to believe that Campania. this city, which he proposed to make the capital of a Carthaginian Italy, would be betrayed as soon as he appeared in its neighbourhood. He moved accordingly from Apulia into Samnium, ravaging Beneventum and capturing Telesia on the way, in the hope of enticing Fabius into an action.

To cut off the Romans more completely from their southern allies, and to provoke Fabius, if possible, to a battle, he now appears to have given orders for an advance up the Volturnus to Casinum, which commands both the Latin Way from Rome to Capua, and also the direct road into Samnium. But the native guide misheard the order, and brought him down the river to Casilinum, in the immediate neighbourhood of Capua, and the mistake was not discovered till the army was within a few hours of the place. The wary Cunctator, still following every move from a safe distance, on a line between Hannibal and Rome, profited by this respite to take post on the Mons Massicus, which commands both the Appian and the Latin Road.

Once again, however, the political information of Hannibal was at fault. None of the Campanian cities joined him, and after ravaging the whole Fabius weakness in cavalry confined him to the higher ground, bars his retreat, at Callicula. he found himself compelled to withdraw. Fabius now saw his opportunity, and moved inland, followed shortly by his right wing, under Minucius, which had been guarding Tarracina. He succeeded in strengthening the garrison of Casilinum so as to cut off the enemy from Capua and the Ager Campanus, and himself occupied the hills above Cales, so as to block the narrow pass through the ridge of Callicula, by which Hannibal had come. Here a small body of Roman cavalry got out of hand and was destroyed. On the arrival of Minucius, however, both sides of the pass were occupied in force, while a division of four thousand men was posted across the actual road.

But Hannibal was determined to break through, and had recourse to an ingenious stratagem. He bound faggots to the horns of some two thousand captured oxen, lighted them after nightfall, and drove the terrified animals up the mountain side. The Romans in the pass, seeing what they imagined to be the enemy marching by torchlight above and beyond their position, retreated in disorder, only to fall in with Hannibal's light-armed troops, while his main army made its way silently through the deserted pass to Allifae. In the morning, thanks again to the excessive caution of Fabius, the light-armed troops also were withdrawn in good order, and Hannibal retired northwards into the country of the Paeligni; threatening from hence, too, a rapid march on Rome, but eventually retiring into winter quarters at Gereonium, between the pastures and the corn-land, on the extreme northern border of Apulia. But hither, too, he was followed still by his 'footman,' as men called the Cunctator, who fortified a winter camp at Larinum close by.

Hannibal
breaks
through.

'Fabian tactics,' however, though eminently safe, and, so far as they went, successful, were not exciting or interesting to those who took part in them. The army had recovered its confidence, but had barely been allowed to see the enemy except in retreat: and the discontent of the soldiers with their apparent inaction had grown apace. Hannibal himself, too, had contributed to the rising distrust of Fabius, by sparing his estate in the country, while all around it was ravaged; and though Fabius cleared himself on this occasion by selling the farm to ransom Roman prisoners, the accusation was freely made that in some way or other the waiting game was profitable to the Cunctator or his party.

Popular
discontent
with
'Fabian
tactics.'

The agitation was fostered, on personal and political grounds, by the Master of the Horse, Minucius, a man of fiery eloquence and democratic prejudices, but of no military gifts or experience. At the end of the campaign, Fabius returned to Rome for the usual religious rites, and left the army under the charge of Minucius, with repeated warnings against the danger of reckless experiments. But Hannibal soon detected the absence of the Cunctator, and used his opportunity to collect supplies from the surrounding country. Consequently Minucius was able to win a cheap success, which he magnified into a great victory for the benefit of his partisans in Rome.

Insolence of
Minucius.

Thereupon one of the Tribunes, M. Metilius, accused Fabius, openly, of obstructing the course of the war, and playing into the hands of Hannibal. He went on to propose to create Minucius co-Dictator with Fabius, which was not merely a relapse into the hopeless system

of dual command, but a constitutional contradiction in terms, and a fatal blow to the prestige of the Dictatorship. Only once again, in the panic after Cannae, was this great defensive magistracy made to be used to solve a real crisis; after that, it became co-Dictator; merely a temporary expedient to supply the place of the Consuls or the Censors; and after 202 it sank into disuse altogether. Fabius scorned to defend himself, and left Rome in disgust before the measure was introduced. All he could do was to halve the mischief by insisting upon the equal division of forces, instead of allowing to Minucius the alternate command of the whole.

The triumph of Minucius, however, was of short duration. After a few days Hannibal enticed him into a general engagement, in which his whole force would have been annihilated, but for the prompt interference of Fabius. Minucius honourably resigned, and apologised for his presumption, and resumed his subordinate position; and popular opinion, both in the army and in Rome, came round again to the side of the Cunctator.

The year 216 was now nearly over. Fabius seems, before long, to have laid down his office, and the Consuls, Servilius and M. Atilius (the successor of Flaminius), who had been engaged in a fruitless expedition to Africa, returned and carried on the same tactics until they were superseded. But the result of the consular elections showed that the popular war-party was becoming impatient again. One of the new Consuls, indeed, L. Aemilius Paullus, was the same prudent and experienced officer who had cut short the Illyrian War of 219; but he held strongly aristocratic views, and was personally unpopular with the other side; and his colleague, C. Terentius Varro, was a typical representative of the new democrats who had supported Flaminius and Minucius. Varro was of humble origin, and essentially a self-made man: by sheer ability and a fluent tongue he had forced himself forward in domestic politics, and he had taken a conspicuous part in the attack on Fabius. But he had no military experience, and declined to learn, by the fate of Sempronius and Flaminius, the inevitable consequences of divided counsels and amateur generalship.

Under a leader, however, so energetic and popular as Varro, the people put forth their whole energies and raised the unprecedented number of nine legions, each of the increased strength of five thousand men and three hundred cavalry. An equal force of infantry, and double contingents of cavalry were requisitioned from the allies, and so great was

Minucius
made
co-Dictator;

but being
defeated,
resigns and
apologises.

Paulus
and Varro
elected
Consuls,
215 B.C.

the confidence that was inspired, that voluntary offers of help, from the Greeks of Neapolis and Paestum, were courteously refused. A vigorous policy was inaugurated by the despatch of P. Scipio, with thirty ships and eight thousand men, to reinforce his brother in Spain; and by a message to Philip V. of Macedon to demand the surrender of Demetrius of Pharos, who was known to be making mischief in that quarter. L. Postumius Albinus was sent, with a single legion, to watch the Cisalpine Gauls; M. Claudius Marcellus to protect Sicily; and T. Otacilius, with a naval force, to make a fresh descent upon Africa. The two Consuls, with the express consent of the Senate, prepared for a direct, and, as Varro at least believed, an overwhelming attack upon Hannibal's position in Apulia, with eight full legions, forty thousand allies, and six thousand cavalry.

Vigorous
prepara-
tions.

They found him in his old quarters at Gereonium, and for a while seem to have observed some caution, [for his first snare, an apparently deserted camp, failed to tempt them; but Hannibal drew his own conclusions, and waited for his opportunity. At last he took advantage of their very caution, to desert his camp in earnest, and attack and capture the Roman grain-store at Cannae, which commands the plain of Canusium, thus eluding them for the moment, and cutting them off both from their own supplies and from the rich corn-country further south. The enormous Roman army was soon in great straits for provisions, and the Consuls were compelled either to fight or to retire—in either case, over ground chosen by their opponent.


Hannibal
withdraws
to Cannae;

The valley of the Aufidus, in which Cannae lay, is the most considerable on the Apulian side of the Apennines. The river runs north-eastward, and only escapes from the last hills about eight miles from the sea. On the left bank, the high ground ends abruptly, and a level plain continues to the sea; but on the right the descent is more gradual, and a long spur, running nearly half-way to the coast, is cut to a steep face, some sixty feet high, by the river directly beneath it.

The Romans, advancing in pursuit from the north-west, found Hannibal strongly posted at Cannae itself, on the high right bank beyond the stream. The Consuls still continued the antiquated custom of assuming supreme command on alternate days; and the difference of policy between Aemilius and Varro led to a game of cross purposes which is not easy to follow. Varro wanted to fight at once with the whole of his enormous force; Aemilius, more wisely, preferred at least to wait until Hannibal should be forced to move to some more favourable spot, and set about hampering his

and forces
the Romans
to give
battle.

movements and cutting his communications. The Romans formed two camps—the larger on the left bank, the smaller on the right and apparently nearer to the camp of Hannibal, who was thus partly cut off from the cornland which he had come to occupy. To draw the Romans across the river, he ordered a sharp attack on the lesser camp, which his Numidian cavalry pressed home to its very gates. At the same time he transferred his own camp to the left bank, within striking distance of the larger camp of the Romans. Aemilius, who happened to be in command that day, resisted the provocation and remained where he was : Varro, however, drew out the army next morning without consulting his



colleague, crossed the river, and offered battle in advance of the smaller camp. Only ten thousand men were left behind to guard the larger camp, and to threaten that of the enemy as soon as the battle began.

The Roman legions formed the right of the line, with their own cavalry, under Aemilius, on the flank next to the river ; the allies formed the left, and protected the exposed flank with their far larger cavalry, which Varro commanded in person ; the pro-consul Servilius being put in charge of the whole of the infantry.

It was the worst position imaginable : the Romans had their backs to the sea, both camps on their flank, and the river between them and the larger one ; a strong wind from the hills blew the dust in their faces ; and the sun, though as yet on their right flank, would shine straight into their eyes as the June day wore on. By the defective Roman calendar

it was the second day of Sextilis (August), a day henceforward only less black in her annals than that of the battle of the Allia (p. 92).

Hannibal at once recrossed the river and drew up his army in front of his original camp. His formation was skilfully calculated to take advantage of the Romans' impetuosity, and at the same time to deprive them of the advantage of their nearly four-fold numbers. His Africans, whom he had armed in Roman fashion with the spoils of the Trebia and Trasimene, formed a deep compact column on either wing. The centre, composed of the less trustworthy Spaniards and Gauls, was drawn up in a line convex towards the enemy; in a mere screen, in fact, to cover the vacant space between the wings. Hasdrubal, with the heavy Gallic and Spanish cavalry, protected the left wing, facing the Roman right, and lying next to the river; Maharbal, finally, on the free right wing, far outflanked the mounted troops of the Roman allies with his invincible Numidians.

After the usual encounter of light-armed scouts in front, the battle began in earnest. Varro's heavier cavalry resisted, for the moment, the swarms of light Numidian horsemen; and the Roman centre, in columns of maniples, a new and heavier formation than usual, broke easily, as Hannibal intended, the thin screen of Spaniards and Gauls, and drove them back through the space between the wings; losing its own formation, however, as the enemy's centre gave way.

Battle of
Cannae,
2nd August
216 B.C.

On the right a desperate encounter took place between the cavalry of Aemilius and Hasdrubal's heavy division; in the narrow space between the masses of infantry and the steep river bank there was no room but to wrestle hand-to-hand; but at last the Romans gave way and were driven across the river into the plain beyond. Thereupon Hasdrubal, acting on his orders, stopped the pursuit, re-formed his men, and, passing round behind the long line of Roman legions, fell with crushing force upon the rear of Varro. Aemilius, who had been wounded in the cavalry action and was deserted by his men, rode in to join the centre, but too late to save them from the consequences of their impetuous charge. For no sooner had the Roman legions plunged into the pitfall prepared for them, than the flying Gauls and Spaniards rallied before their disordered front; the deep columns of the Africans faced inwards on their flanks; and Hasdrubal, leaving the broken squadrons of Varro to the tender mercies of the Numidians, rallied his own division a second time, and fell full upon their rear.

The Romans
are en-
trapped.

Completely enclosed, and too closely packed even to use their

weapons, seventy thousand Romans and allies were butchered as they stood. Aemilius, Servilius, and Minucius fell among their men, the wounded Consul refusing to survive the blunder which he could not prevent; and with them eighty Senators, besides innumerable Equites, whose golden rings were sent—a bushel full—to Carthage in token of the victory. Varro escaped, when his cavalry was dispersed, and fled some thirty miles inland to Venusia, the nearest Roman colony. The garrison of the larger camp, and the few fugitives who reached it, surrendered; and only a few thousand stragglers found their way by degrees to the neighbouring town of Canusium. Here they were hospitably received, but a rash conspiracy of the younger men to abandon Italy altogether was checked only by the personal influence and energy of young P. Scipio, one of four survivors only among the military tribunes. Varro, meanwhile, 'had not despaired of the Republic'; he re-organised the remnants of his forces, and on hearing of the survival of Scipio and his party, was soon back at Canusium.

Hannibal seemed to have Rome at his feet. He had lost some six thousand men, chiefly the Gauls of the broken centre, but his Africans and the cavalry were practically untouched. Maharbal, the brilliant commander of the latter, begged him to march at once upon the city: 'Within five days,' he said, 'you shall dine with me in the Capitol.' But Hannibal knew better than Maharbal 'how to use his victory.' His losses, though trifling in comparison with those of the Romans, were irreplaceable; Rome was two hundred miles away, beyond the mountains; and a check at this moment, or even a siege of the city—for which, besides, he was totally unprepared—would have annihilated the prestige of his victory.

For now, at last, he seemed to have shaken the confederacy of Rome to its foundation. Herdoneae and Salapia in Apulia, Uzentum in Messapia, all the towns of Bruttium but Petelia and Consentia, the Lucanians, the Hirpini, the settlements of exiled Picentini round Salernum, and all the tribes of Samnium except the Pentri, joined him at once; and Capua, which, after Rome, was the most powerful city in Italy and had always been treated by the Romans with the utmost consideration, fell shortly after into the hands of the anti-Roman democracy, and gave Hannibal at last the base on which he had set his heart. But northern and central Italy moved no more now, than after Trasimene; and even in the south, small towns like Petelia exhibited a desperate confidence in the fortunes of their mistress. The Roman colonies, of course, had everything to lose by surrender; and the Greek

After the battle.

Hannibal refuses to march on Rome.

General revolt in South Italy.

Central Italy remains loyal.

coast towns in Campania and Magna Graecia—including Rhegium, the key to the Sicilian strait—were kept true, partly by the memory of the uniform clemency and Philhellenism of Rome, but partly also by the presence of Roman garrisons in most of them, which might be trusted to sell their own lives dearly.

In Rome itself, one moment of agonised panic was succeeded by stern and silent preparation. In the absence of the surviving Consul, the Senate was convened by the Praetor; scouts were sent out for news along the southern roads, and order was restored in the streets and public places; Q. Fabius, in this hour of disaster, taking informal but undisputed lead. Varro's own despatches soon put men in possession of the facts; public mourning was ordered, but was limited to thirty days; a sacrifice of Gauls and Greeks was offered to appease the angry gods, and a mission was sent to Delphi for consolation and advice.

M. Claudius Marcellus, the victor of Clastidium (p. 173), who was then with the fleet at Ostia, was sent at once to replace Varro at Canusium; and M. Junius Pera was appointed Dictator to raise another army. Of Marcellus' own levies fifteen hundred were left to garrison the city, and a legion of marines from the fleet was pushed forward by the Latin Way to Teanum. The survivors of Cannae were formed into two unpaid 'legions of dishonour,' and boys, debtors, freedmen, and even slaves, bought by the State and manumitted for the purpose, composed four new ones, which were armed with ancient spoils from the temples, in default of modern weapons. The proposal of Hannibal to make terms of peace was rejected without hesitation, and his envoy Carthalo was forbidden to enter the city. His Roman captives were left, unredeemed, on his hands; partly as a matter of principle, but partly no doubt on account of the scarcity of money; for we find a board of *tresviri mensarii* appointed, to take steps to relieve the financial trouble. In the common peril, political feuds were forgotten. The vacant places in the Senate were filled with men of known ability, without distinction of party; a new era was opened by the dedication of a temple to Concord, and the formal thanks of Senate and People were tendered to Varro on his return.

Reception of
the news in
Rome.

Fresh
levies.

No thought
of sur-
render.

CHIEF DATES.

Hannibal leaves Spain	218 Spring
Campaign in Cisalpine Gaul : Ticinus and Trebia	218 Autumn
„ „ Etruria : Trasimene, Spoletium	217 Spring
„ „ Apulia and Campania : Callicula	217 Autumn
„ „ Apulia : Cannae	216 Summer

CHIEF PERSONS.

P. Cornelius Scipio — Tl. Sempronius Longus — C. Flaminius Nepos—
 Cn. Servilius Geminus—Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator—M. Minucius
 Rufus—L. Aemilius Paulus—M. Terentius Varro—M. Junius Pera—
 M. Claudius Marcellus—Hannibal—Hanno—Mago—Maharbal—
 Hasdrubal.

CHIEF PLACES.

Massilia—Tarraco—Pisae—Placentia—Cremona—Ariminum—Ticinus
 Fl.—Trebia Fl.—Faesulae—Arretium—Trasumenus L.—Geronium—
 Arpi—Casinum—Casilinum—Mons Massicus—Callicula—Aufidus
 Fl.—Cannae—Canusium—Venusia—Teanum.

SUBJECTS.

Merits and defects of Hannibal's plan, and of the Roman defence.
 Effects of domestic quarrels on the conduct of the war.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: (2) THE STRUGGLE FOR CAPUA AND TARENTUM, AND THE CONFLICTS IN SICILY AND WITH MACEDON

Revolt of Capua—First Roman success at Nola—Hannibal gains Tarentum—Hannibal marches on Rome—The fall of Capua—Tarentum retaken—Revolt of Etruria and twelve Latin towns—Progress of the war outside Italy—Sardinia—Sicily—Macedon.

THE battle of Cannæ marks the close of the first period of the war. Hannibal had fought his way without a reverse from the Ebro to the Aufidus, and a large part of Italy had come over to his side. It was now his task to consolidate what he had won into a Carthaginian empire; to secure for himself a capital and a port; and to co-operate with his own government, and with the other enemies of Rome abroad, to bring her wholly to the ground. We have therefore next to trace this deep-laid scheme as it unfolded, in Italy first, and afterwards oversea.

The second period of the war.

Marcellus lost no time in crossing into Apulia and bringing back the force at Canusium into Campania, picking up at Teanum his own legion of marines. Capua, as we have seen (p. 198), had revolted at once and massacred its Roman residents; and Hannibal had already visited his would-be capital, and expelled Decius Magius, the only Roman partisan who dared to practise the freedom which had been guaranteed in the agreement. But Marcellus was able to throw a small force into Neapolis, which had already resisted an assault; and was just in time to secure Nola, the central point of southern Campania, though it had been on the verge of revolt. Here, in a sally from headquarters, he gained the first success of the war against Hannibal in person. It was a mere skirmish, but with judicious exaggeration it was enough to break the spell. He failed, however, to save Acerræ, or even Nuceria, the key to Lucania; or to relieve the siege of Casilinum, which defended itself

Revolt of Capua.

First Roman success at Nola.

pluckily all winter, but fell early in the spring of 215. Long before this, however, the four new legions were ready, and the Dictator, Junius Pera, had advanced cautiously to Teanum.

Hannibal spent the winter in Capua, where he could separate the Roman armies in north and south Campania, and collect reinforcements from his new allies in Samnium; while he maintained, from close at hand, the important siege of Casilinum. Roman historians dated, from this sudden introduction of his toil-worn troops into the most luxurious civilisation in Italy, the change in Hannibal's fortunes which actually followed. But we have only to turn to the operations of the next few years, to the continual exposure and constant endurance of his men, and to the precision and swiftness of his march on Rome (p. 205), for a sufficient refutation of the charge. The vices of Capua may well have been notorious; but it is not from Roman sources that we can expect an unbiassed account, either of these, or of the *morale* of a Punic army. It was not Hannibal and his men who had forgotten how to win, but the Romans who had learnt by sad experience to avoid wholesale defeats. Henceforward, in fact, we find them no longer assuming the offensive, or launching huge untrained masses to certain destruction, as at Trasimene or Cannae, but relying on the defensive network of their fortress colonies, and operating rarely but swiftly between the meshes with small mobile columns of veterans: while they used the vital advantage which they had held from the first, on the sea and in Spain, to sap the strength of the enemy at its very sources.

The Consuls for 215 were Q. Fabius Maximus and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus. Marcellus was retained in proconsular command in south Campania; Laevinus was sent with two legions to harry Apulia; Tarentum and Brundisium were garrisoned against invasion from Macedon; and Varro, in Picenum and at Ariminum, reorganised the defences of the Apennines, in case the Gauls should think fit to follow up their success over Albinus (p. 195), who had been cut off, with his whole force, in the *Silva Litana* near Mutina. The Romans had already lost over one hundred and twenty thousand men in the war, but by unparalleled efforts they had even increased the army with which they had begun it. They had now fourteen legions in the field; and without diminishing their garrisons, or drawing upon the forces in Sicily and Spain, they were able to devote sixty thousand men to the blockade of Hannibal in Campania. Fabius posted himself at Cales (see map, p. 111), to command the Latin Way and harry the nearest parts of Samnium; Gracchus, at

Hannibal
winters at
Capua.

Roman
defensive
strategy.

Campaign
of 215 B.C.

Liternum, protected Cumae and the other Greek towns with a division of allies and liberated slaves; and Marcellus lay in his old quarters at Suessula, and held Nola loyal in his rear. The fall of Casilinum at the end of the winter gave Hannibal the passage of the ^{Operations} ^{in Campania.} Voltumnus; but he preferred to maintain himself in the old Samnite fortress of Mount Tifata above Capua, and to keep up his communications with the south-east through Samnium, striking sudden blows meanwhile, this way and that, at the three Roman armies before him. Another attempt to surprise Nola was checked by the vigilance of Marcellus, but Fabius found it wise to move round to Suessula, so as to set him free to operate between Nola and the Samnite passes. Gracchus, meanwhile, surprised and massacred two thousand Campanians on their way to a festival at Hamae, close to Cumae, and repelled an attack on Cumae itself. Hannibal was able, however, after all, to withdraw into Apulia, where Laevinus, from his station at Luceria, had been doing considerable damage; but he thus set Gracchus free to follow him, and to defeat a detached force under Hanno at Grumentum. For this effectual service, the slaves who formed so large a part of the force of Gracchus, were granted freedom and citizenship by the Senate.

Hannibal spent the winter at Arpi, waiting for the King of Macedon, with whom he had concluded an alliance in the course of the summer, and for the reinforcements from Carthage which had been ^{Bomilcar at} ^{Locri.} promised after Cannae. Bomilcar, indeed, who was cruising in Sicilian waters, succeeded in landing a small force of Africans at Locri, which had been captured, together with Croton, in 215. But the stress of circumstances in Spain and Sardinia, to which we shall shortly return (pp. 208, 217), had diverted thither the army which was intended for Italy.

As soon as the season opened, Hannibal returned to his post at Tifata, but not in time to prevent the surrender of Casilinum and the massacre of its garrison by Marcellus; who was now ^{Campaign} ^{of 214 B.C.} Consul, together with Q. Fabius. The Romans had never ceased to put troops into the field since the morrow of Cannae. The army of 214 numbered twenty legions, of which eight were massed in Campania; while the fleet was increased to one hundred and fifty ships, in view of the activity of Carthage in the Sicilian seas. After an ineffectual descent upon Avernus and the coast near Puteoli, Hannibal withdrew early from Campania into Apulia. This sudden change of plan was inspired by the hope that an anti-Roman faction would bring about the surrender of Tarentum. But Tarentum stood firm, the Romans began to close in from Suessula and Casilinum upon the devoted Capua, and Hannibal returned again to his old winter quarters at Arpi.

The following year brought little change in the course of the war in Italy. Gracchus was Consul again, and the Romans recovered Arpi while Hannibal was absent in the south; some of the Bruttian towns, too, began to fall away from the invaders. But the absence of Marcellus, and the pre-occupation of both sides by the war in Sicily (p. 208), sufficiently account for a certain want of enterprise nearer home.

Early in 212, however, Tarentum deserted at last. The Tarentine hostages in Rome had been detected in an attempt to escape, and were put to death. This was unwise, for the Tarentine populace at once declared for Hannibal, who by forced marches reached and occupied the city. But the Romans were there before him. M. Livius, with the little garrison from Metapontum, was just in time to save the citadel, which commanded the entrance to the harbour; and thus deprived the enemy of a large part of his advantage. The effect of the surrender of Tarentum was immediate. Metapontum, Heraclea, and Thurii went over at once, and gave Hannibal, if not the harbour and arsenal which he required, at all events a number of new landing-places for the Macedonians, whenever they should choose to come. Philip's first emissaries, however, had fallen into the hands of the Romans, who, seeing clearly what the danger was, had already taken steps to keep the King of Macedon employed on his own side of the water (p. 212).

For the moment, therefore, the capture of Tarentum only gave Hannibal another base to defend; and as his forces were already insufficient for their work, his hold over Campania began to relax. The Consuls of 212, Appius Claudius Pulcher and Q. Fulvius Flaccus, took advantage of his absence to descend into the plain, and to concentrate at last round Capua in earnest. No regular blockade could be established; but the city was already short of provisions, and a large convoy escorted by Hanno from the south was surprised and captured at Beneventum. But with Magna Graecia assured for the moment, Hannibal was free to recover the lost ground. He entered Campania, by a circuitous route, from the north, and had the good fortune, through a Lucanian traitor, to surprise Sempronius Gracchus, who was guarding the Appian Way, and whose slave-corps broke up at once on the death of their beloved general. Hannibal was thus able to throw a force of cavalry into Capua, and for the moment to raise the blockade; though the Consuls still wisely avoided a decisive action.

The Romans, meanwhile, had suffered two defeats: a large force of

Hannibal
in the south,
213 B.C.

Hannibal
gains
Tarentum
and other
Greek towns,
212 B.C.

The Romans
close round
Capua.

Death of
Sempronius
Gracchus.

cavalry and irregulars under M. Centenius had been cut up in Lucania, and the Praetor Cn. Fulvius had allowed himself to be badly beaten at Herdonea. Hannibal spent the winter in Apulia, and was Other Roman reverses. delayed all the following spring in a fruitless attack upon the citadel of Tarentum, so that when at last he moved into Campania, he found Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, whose command had been prolonged, and the new Praetor, C. Claudius Nero, regularly entrenched Capua besieged. round Capua, and defended, without, by a second line of works. Hannibal made his appearance from the south, captured Calatia, and established himself as before on Mount Tifata. But the Romans never stirred from their entrenchment, and it was clear that, unless he could dislodge them by some new stratagem, Capua must fall.

With his old brilliant audacity he broke up his camp at Tifata, flung a picked force northward by an inland route, and encamped unopposed beyond the Anio within three miles of Rome, ravaging the defenceless villages up to the very walls of the city, and Hannibal suddenly marches on Rome. riding in person up to the Colline Gate. The Romans devoutly ascribed their salvation to the powers of Retreat and Deliverance,¹ but it was in no mere bravado that they sold and bought for its full value the land where Hannibal's army was encamped. There was no real danger. A surprise was out of the question; there were troops enough in the city, and in the garrisons of Etruria, to render a blockade impossible; the only fear was, lest in the moment of panic, on which Hannibal had reckoned, the main army should be recalled from Capua. Whether as a surprise or as a feint, the bold stroke failed; at the most, though even this is disputed, a moderate force under Q. Fulvius was moved up from Casilinum along the Appian Way. Hannibal retired suddenly as he had come, pausing only to defeat the Consul P. Galba, who had imprudently followed him too closely.

But he did not return to Campania, and we hear of him next in the extreme south, assaulting Rhegium in vain. No further attempt was made to raise the siege of Capua, and the city was soon The fall of Capua, 211 B.C. starved into a complete surrender. The surviving leaders, fifty-three in all, were scourged and beheaded publicly in the neighbouring towns for a warning. The whole population was enslaved, and its goods confiscated; and the wide lands became *ager publicus*, and a fruitful source of revenue. The public buildings were appropriated to Roman uses, and the very constitution of the spoiled and treacherous

¹ To *Rediculus Tutanus* an altar was afterwards erected at Hannibal's nearest post, by the second milestone on the Appian Way.

city was abolished for ever. Capua, the 'second city' of Italy, fell, as men said, 'to be its first village'; a lodging for herdsmen and tillers of the land, and nothing more. The revenge of Rome was perhaps inevitable, and ancient warfare knew no half-measures in such a case; but it is the dishonour, rather than the dismantlement, of Capua, which marks the intensity of Roman feeling towards her only real rival in Italy.

The fall of Capua revealed the real weakness of Hannibal's position, and, coupled with the failure of his raid on Rome, produced the worst impression on his allies. Marcellus, who from 215 to 211 had been in command of the operations in Sicily (p. 209), was Consul again in 210, and pressed the war vigorously for a while. Salapia in Apulia revolted to Rome, and cost Hannibal five hundred of his trusty Numidians; but we hear of another defeat of a Fulvius at Herdonea in the same neighbourhood, and in the latter part of the summer little was done. The enormous levies of men, and the consequent desolation of the country districts, had reduced the loyal parts of

**The cam-
paign of
210 B.C.**

Italy, and particularly Etruria, to the verge of famine and revolt; and the new treaty with Egypt, which was made in this year, probably contained some understanding about the supply of corn from abroad. The crushing taxes were collected with ever greater difficulty, and we hear more and more, each year, of voluntary contributions to meet the needs of the war. But the defeat of a Roman fleet, off the beleaguered citadel of Tarentum, showed the danger of premature economy and of the least relaxation of effort.

The small results of the Consulship of Marcellus caused questionings in Rome, and brought Fulvius and the aged Q. Fabius into office again in 209. Marcellus remained *pro consule* in Apulia, but was so mishandled by Hannibal, that he shut himself up in Venusia, and was formally impeached in Rome. Fulvius carried on minor operations in Lucania, and among the Hirpini; and received the submission of these, and many Samnite tribes, on relatively easy terms.

Hannibal, distracted by these losses, and by an attack which was made upon his stronghold in Bruttium by a force from Sicily under Lævinus, failed to prevent the siege of Tarentum by Q. Fabius; the last public service of that able and devoted general.

Tarentum was quickly betrayed by the Bruttians in the garrison; and was punished, as Syracuse had been (p. 210), by a wholesale massacre, by the enslavement of thirty thousand of the survivors, and by a fine of three thousand talents.

**Tarentum
retaken by
Fabius.**

**The cam-
paign of
209 B.C.**

Again, however, as after the fall of Capua, the Romans seemed unable to push their advantage ; and now their meagre resources were crippled by a fresh misfortune. The Etruscans had for some years shown signs of uneasiness. Since the scene of the war had shifted to the south, they had borne a heavy share of the burdens, without the excitement of self-defence, which makes the heaviest sacrifices less intolerable. Lying nearest, as they did, to the city, together with the Latins, they had contributed more than others to its immediate needs, and had been more completely drained of resources and of men. And they were close enough, besides, to see for themselves, what even Hannibal could hardly guess, the real depths of exhaustion and distress into which Rome had fallen. A revolt which broke out in 209 in Etruria itself was easily suppressed, and only became the excuse for further exactions, and for the reinforcement of the Roman posts at Arretium and elsewhere. But the sudden refusal, in the same year, of twelve of the nearest and oldest of the Latin towns, and of a number of the Latin colonies in central Italy, to send their contingents to the army, was the most serious peril which had yet arisen ; for these towns were the very foundation of the hold of Rome upon Italy, and she had not the means to coerce them. But the danger passed away. The nearer Latin colonies, with Fregellae at their head, reaffirmed their devotion and even increased their contributions ; and it is significant that, even in the critical year that followed, we hear no more of this unrest ; while, no sooner was the army of Hasdrubal destroyed (p. 222), than the Romans felt themselves strong enough to exact arrears from the defaulters.

It is now time to return to the morrow of Cannae, and to trace the progress of the war in other fields outside the peninsula of Italy. The operations of Hannibal which culminated in the defeat of Aemilius and Varro were but the prelude to the universal rising which he had planned. He had planted himself securely in the heart of the Roman territory, and the southern half of Italy had at last thrown off the yoke. He had taken the lives of some one hundred and twenty thousand citizens and allies, and had reduced the city to the gravest straits for means to carry on the war. Now he was waiting for his confederates in Spain, in Sicily, and in Macedon. From a mere invasion of Italy, the war was to extend till it included the whole western basin of the Mediterranean, and was only to close with a partition of the Roman dominion, and the establishment of a new balance of power between east and west. In the years, therefore,

Revolt of
Etruria ;

and of
twelve
Latin
towns.

Progress of
the war out-
side Italy.

which immediately followed, the proceedings of Hannibal himself had become less and less important. His two main objects, to protect Capua and his hard-won allies in Italy, and to reopen communications with Africa from Tarentum or some other southern harbour, had first been both attained, and then both lost again; and it became clear that unless either Carthage itself through Sicily, or King Philip of Macedon from the rear, or his own brother Hasdrubal in Spain, could fulfil their part of the scheme, the enormous advantage which had been gained in Italy would be wholly thrown away.

The first movement outside Italy was a general revolt of Sardinia in the very year after Cannae. The island had never been thoroughly conquered; it was infested with Punic agitators; and the discontent was brought to a head by the exactions of the Roman garrison and fleet, which were left for the moment without supplies from Rome. The Praetor Q. Mucius was ill, and the garrison insufficient; but the veteran T. Manlius Torquatus, who had reduced the island as Consul in 231, was sent with reinforcements, and acted with such decision and energy that he not only put down the native rebellion but inflicted a crushing defeat on a Carthaginian expedition under Hasdrubal the Bald, which the avaricious and short-sighted government of Carthage had diverted to the recovery of a revenue province, from its proper aim of bringing reinforcements to Hannibal.

The trouble in Sicily was more serious, and absorbed a large share of the attention of the Romans during the next six years. In the latter part of 216, Hiero, King of Syracuse, died at the age of ninety, after a reign of fifty-four years. He had long foreseen that another war between Rome and Carthage must bring disaster upon Syracuse; but he had never wavered in his loyalty to Rome, and had rendered considerable service in the naval operations of the first year of the war. He was succeeded now by his grandson Hieronymus, a weak tyrannical creature, who seems to have conceived the vain idea of profiting by the disturbance to secure all Sicily for himself. He cancelled the alliance with Rome, and negotiated a treaty with Hannibal, under which his boundaries were to be considerably extended. Hannibal, however, had no sea-power, nor even any land-forces to spare for Sicily; and the behaviour of Hieronymus was such that he was assassinated, in the streets of Leontini, after a reign of little more than a year. Monarchy in Syracuse was abolished in favour of an aristocratic government, which renewed the understanding

Sicily:
death of
Hiero of
Syracuse,
216 B.C.

Hieronimus.

Revolution
in Syracuse,
215 B.C.

with Rome ; but the democratic party, which clung to the idea of a Syracusan empire in Sicily, revolted and seized Leontini, and was joined by the mercenary army which consisted largely of runaway slaves and Roman deserters, who dared not return to their allegiance, and was led by the brothers Hippocrates and Epicydes, Liby-Sicilian half-breeds whom Hannibal's favour had restored from exile.

The Roman Consul of 215, M. Claudius Marcellus, had little difficulty in recapturing Leontini, and determined to make an example by the execution of two thousand deserters. The remainder of the mercenary force had been sent by their government to his assistance ; but on hearing the fate of their comrades, and being joined by the two ringleaders, who had escaped from Leontini, they revolted in their turn, marched back to Syracuse, put down the aristocratic party, and surrendered the city again to the Carthaginians.

Marcellus
retakes
Leontini.

The danger to Rome was obvious. With Sicily in Roman hands, the direct route between Hannibal and his government was closed, and the sea passage rendered extremely precarious ; but Sicily was the bridge between Africa and Italy, and, with Sicily hostile to Rome, the First Punic War would have to be fought over again. Syracuse was the largest and the only independent city in the island, and had the only good harbour on the side towards Magna Graecia ; so that, even if the Romans could maintain themselves in the rest of Sicily, they would, without Syracuse, practically lose the command of the Ionian Sea ; and, in fact, one of the first results of the Syracusan revolution was that Bomilcar, with a Carthaginian squadron, effected a landing at Locri with reinforcements for Hannibal.

Importance
of Sicily to
the Romans.

Marcellus lost no time in assailing Syracuse with all the forces at his command ; but its eighteen miles of magnificently situated walls, the stubborn defence organised by Epicydes, and the novel and ingenious artillery of the great engineer Archimedes, made anything like a siege impossible. The few Roman ships were shattered by rocks hurled from gigantic catapults, and capsized by long arms swung out like cranes over the sea ; and the story is told even of a great mirror which focussed the sun's rays, and set them on fire at a distance. After eight months Marcellus was forced to content himself with an imperfect blockade on land, while Bomilcar's fleet used the great harbour as it pleased. Meanwhile the prospect of the recovery of Sicily had roused even the home government of Carthage. A considerable African force landed at Agrigentum, and moved to the relief of Syracuse, being joined, as it advanced, by Hippocrates, who had made his way out into the open, and by a number of Sicilian towns.

Marcellus
besieges
Syracuse,
214 B.C.

Marcellus, who had been re-elected Consul in 214, was reinforced by the Praetor Appius Claudius, and in the following year by T. Quinctius Crispinus. The two 'legions of Cannae' (p. 199), which had been sent to Sicily to wipe out their disgrace as they might, held their own round the Roman arsenals in the west; but the greater part of Sicily was in open revolt, and the massacre of the citizens of Enna, one of the more important towns of the interior, inspired, among the rest, a desperate fear of Marcellus.


At last, after two years of ineffectual blockade, a weak place in the walls was betrayed to the besiegers. A night attack during the festival of Artemis put the landward plateau of Epipolæ into the hands of Marcellus, and gave him both a far shorter front to besiege, and, at the same time, healthier quarters for his men: and the impregnable fortress Euryelus, at its highest and furthest point, surrendered soon after. The Carthaginian army under Himilco and Hippocrates made vigorous efforts to relieve the city, which was now closely invested landwards; but it was soon cooped up in its turn by Crispinus in the marshes of the Anapus, and lost its two commanders and a large part of its forces by the same deadly malaria which had destroyed so many foes before. The survivors vanished into the interior; and a relief force, sent by sea from Carthage, was dispersed by the Roman fleet before it could land. Epicydes saw that the game was up, and slipped away to the Carthaginians at Agrigentum.

Ortygia too, the old island-quarter of Syracuse, was betrayed before long by an officer of the Spanish mercenaries, and Achradina, thus left unprotected on the side towards the harbour, surrendered at discretion to Marcellus. But the mutinous character of the survivors deprived them, in his eyes, of all claim to consideration. The city was given up to plunder and massacre, in spite of the orders of Marcellus that the lives of the citizens should be spared. Archimedes, in particular, too deeply absorbed in his calculations to answer a question addressed to him, was killed by a hasty soldier who should have taken him alive.

The remains of Hiero's savings were a welcome contribution to the Roman treasury; but an evil example was set, in the transportation of many works of art from the captured city to Rome; a measure which proved as great a shock to old-fashioned opinion in Rome as to the national feeling of the Sicilians, whose resistance was embittered and prolonged by this needless and tasteless spoliation. At the close of the year Marcellus returned to Rome; but, on

the doubtful ground that Sicily was not yet fully pacified, he was not allowed a full triumph and had to content himself with a magnificent *ovatio*.

SYRACUSE



Sicily, in fact, held out for two years more. But Hanno, a fresh Carthaginian commander, allowed himself to be decisively beaten at Himera in 211, and quarrelled with the able Liby-Phoenician Mutines, who had been sent by Hannibal to succeed Hippocrates. Mutines avenged himself by betraying the last

Pacification of Sicily.

stronghold, Agrigentum, to Laevinus, the successor of Marcellus; and the last Carthaginian forces left the island before the end of 210. The task of reorganisation was committed, in the following year, to an able Praetor, the historian L. Cincius Alimentus. Agrigentum was made a Roman colony, and strongly fortified. Syracuse remained a free and allied city, but no longer an independent state; and the whole land of Leontini, where the revolt had broken out, became Roman *ager publicus*.

The danger from Macedon became imminent, like that from Sicily, in the years immediately after Cannae. King Philip V. had succeeded Philip V. of Macedon. to his father's throne in the year 220. At his accession he was only seventeen years of age, and he was too much occupied in securing his own position at home to take any active part in the Illyrian War (p. 170). He soon fell, however, under the influence of Demetrius, the Greek adventurer whom the Romans had expelled from Illyria, and was easily persuaded that he had only to make terms with Hannibal, to rid himself for ever of the intrusions of Rome on his western border. Accordingly, in the year of Trasimene, he patched up his quarrel with the Aetolian Greeks by the peace of Naupactus, and on the news of Cannae sent proposals of alliance to Hannibal in his camp at Tifata. The first mission fell into the hands of the Romans, who thus received timely warning of what was going on; but the second was more fortunate, and before the end of the year the bargain was struck (p. 203).

Philip was first to help Hannibal to conquer Italy, which, with all the spoils, was to fall to Hannibal's share; but Philip was to have Illyria and Corcyra at once for himself, and when the war was over Hannibal, in his turn, was to help Philip to conquer the east. Here the immediate advantage was all on the side of Hannibal; a fact which goes far to explain the negligent and half-hearted way in which Philip performed his part of the contract.

He found, besides, in his first operations in Illyria, that he had entirely miscalculated the weakness of Rome. He had barely captured Oricum, and laid siege to Apollonia, when a Roman fleet arrived, with a single legion under Laevinus, who found no difficulty in relieving the one city and retaking the other; while Philip had to burn his own fleet in order to save it from capture. He succeeded, however, in 213, in conquering Lissus, Dimala, and other towns on the mainland; and the Romans were too much occupied in Sicily and Italy to do more than watch the coast, and

Alliance
with
Hannibal,
215 B. C.

Laevinus
in the
Adriatic,
214 B. C.

maintain a strong force in Apulia. Philip, however, made no attempt to cross over into Italy, though Hannibal's successes in Magna Graecia (p. 214) would have made his landing easy.

At last the fall of Capua in 211 set Rome free to retaliate. Philip had made himself so feared and hated by his behaviour towards his neighbours, that there was no difficulty in forming a strong coalition against him. In Greece, Elis, Sparta, and Athens, and the League of Aetolia, had their own quarrels with him already; and King Attalus of Pergamum contributed a strong force of ships in the Aegean. Philip, on the other hand, was supported against Attalus by King Prusias of Bithynia, and against the Aetolians by the League of Achaea, which feared to be deprived of its possessions in Acarnania. The Romans only bound themselves to send a fleet, which maintained itself for five years on the coasts of Greece and Epirus, and in 208 even effected a junction with that of Attalus. In 207, however, Rome needed all her strength to cope with Hasdrubal's invasion of Italy (p. 220); while a Carthaginian squadron arrived to co-operate with Philip. The Aetolians, therefore, who had suffered severely, made their own peace with Philip in 206, surrendering their own northern dependencies, but forcing him to resign Illyria; and a final Roman expedition to Illyria, in 205, extorted from Philip a promise to respect the possessions of Rome on his side of the Adriatic. The whole war was a succession of wearisome and indecisive skirmishes, but the object of Rome was attained: Philip was prevented from fulfilling his compact with Hannibal. On his own part, moreover, he had needlessly irritated Rome, and alienated most of his natural allies; while the Romans had been able to pose once more, and at very little cost to themselves, as the patrons and protectors of the Greeks.

Graeco-Roman coalition against Macedon.

Philip makes terms, 205 B.C.

CHIEF DATES.

Victory of Marcellus at Nola; Philip of Macedon joins Hannibal	215
Syracuse declares for Carthage	214
Hannibal seizes Tarentum; Marcellus captures Syracuse	212
Hannibal loses Capua; Graeco-Roman league against Philip	211
Sicily pacified	210
Revolts in Etruria and among the Latins	209
End of the Roman operations against Macedon	205

CHIEF PERSONS.

M. Claudius Marcellus—Ti. Sempronius Gracchus—M. Valerius Laevinus
—Q. Fabius Maximus—Q. Fulvius Flaccus—T. Manlius Torquatus
—Hannibal—Bomilcar—Hippocrates—Himilco—Mutines—Philip V.
of Macedon.

CHIEF PLACES.

Teanum—Capua—Nola—Nuceria—Hamae—Locri—Petelia—Tarentum
—Heraclea—Metapontum—Thurii—Syracuse—Leontini—Agri-
gentum—Apollonia.

SUBJECTS.

The change in Roman policy and strategy.

Hannibal's schemes abroad are defeated by the Roman command
of the sea.

The renewed importance of Sicily.

Rome and the States of Greece.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: (3) THE WAR IN SPAIN, THE DEFEAT OF HASDRUBAL, AND THE INVASION OF AFRICA

Hannibal's difficult position—Character, and Spanish policy, of the Scipios—Hasdrubal slips past Scipio—Scipio reconquers Spain—Nero and Livius—Battle of the Metaurus—Exhaustion of the Romans—Scipio lands in Africa—Syphax and Masinissa—Recall of Hannibal—Battle of Zama—Terms of the peace.

By the year 209 Hannibal had already lost nearly all that he had gained by the victory of Cannæ. His allies in South Italy were rapidly deserting him; he had been obliged to relinquish his hold upon Campania, and his hopes of an Italian harbour. Sicily was evacuated by the last Carthaginian forces in 210, and had become both a source of supplies to Rome, and a secure base for an attack on South Italy. Philip had more than enough to do in his own country; and from Carthage Hannibal had long ceased to hope for effective aid. His last hope lay in the chance of reinforcements from Spain: if that failed, nothing that he himself could do could save the situation.

Hannibal's
difficult
position.

He looks for
help from
Spain.

In Spain, Roman prestige had been reduced to its lowest by the fall of Saguntum; but Cn. Scipio, who in 218 had been sent forward from Massilia with his brother's army (p. 183), was able not only to secure a landing beyond the Pyrenees, but to inflict such a defeat at Cissis upon Hanno's army of occupation, as drove him back upon the Ebro, and enabled Scipio to secure and fortify Tarraco, near the mouth of that river, both as his own headquarters, and as a 'New Rome' to rival the 'New Carthage.' Early in 217 he succeeded, with the help of the Massiliotes, in cutting out and annihilating the Carthaginian fleet, which had imprudently entered the Ebro; and he was joined shortly after by his brother Publius, who had recovered of the wound which disabled him at the Ticinus, and brought with him another legion (p. 195). The Senate, greatly to its credit, had wholly endorsed the bold move with which he had begun the

Cn. Scipio
in Spain,
218 B. C.

Joined by
P. Scipio,
217 B. C.

war, and never lost sight either of the initial advantage thus gained, or of the vital importance of preventing any reinforcements, which might accumulate in Spain, from finding their way to Hannibal by the same route. The first supplies, indeed, which had been despatched from Rome to Cn. Scipio were unfortunately captured by a Carthaginian squadron off the Etruscan coast (p. 191) ; but the fleet organised by Servilius after Trasimene beat off the intruders, and kept the sea-route open for the future.

Both the Scipios—*duo fulmina belli*—were good soldiers and able diplomatists, and very soon commanded the respect and allegiance of the Spanish tribes of the north. The Carthaginians were feared and disliked, for they had made it no secret that they regarded Spain merely as a revenue-province, and a recruiting ground for expeditions into Italy ; while the Spaniards, then as ever, only asked to be left to themselves. The Romans therefore were able to pose as their friends and deliverers, and received substantial help on these terms.

The history of the ten years' war which follows is frequently obscure in detail : the conformation of the country, and the complicated feuds of the various tribes, obscured or prevented all comprehensive plan ; the absence of large towns in the interior, and the scattered disposition of the Carthaginian forces, made great sieges or regular battles impracticable ; and the halo which gathered round the exploits of the whole family of the Scipios has reduced to romantic legend much that may originally have been historical fact.

The general outline of the war, however, is clear. The Romans had originally intended to act simply on the defensive, and, at most, to keep Hasdrubal and his reinforcements in check, by holding the line of the Ebro ; but the divided counsels of the Carthaginians—for the Barcine feud repeated itself also in Spain—and the desertions and revolts of the natives, permitted them to take the offensive, and to undermine the Carthaginian dominion in Spain till it became a source of weakness rather than of strength. Then, finally, when Hasdrubal had at last succeeded in eluding their vigilance, and had drained the country of its last regular army, the Romans established themselves rapidly and expelled the remaining Carthaginians altogether.

In the year of Cannae, if not before, the two Scipios inflicted so serious a defeat upon the army collected by Hasdrubal, which was on the point of starting for Italy, that they felt themselves able to cross the Ebro ; where a stroke of luck, and the treachery of a Spanish chief named Abelux, put them in possession of all the Spanish hostages, whom the Carthaginians had placed at Saguntum.

Character and policy of the Scipios.

Difficulties of Spanish warfare.

Roman plan of campaign.

Hasdrubal's first move foiled, 215 B.C.

But though their progress was slow, a serious revolt in the south-west crippled Hasdrubal so severely that another part of the reinforcements from Africa, for which Hannibal was waiting after Cannae, was diverted under his brother Mago to Spain, as part had been diverted already to Sardinia (p. 208) : for the government at home seemed to care nothing about the war in Italy, if a revenue-province was in danger. Worse still, a widespread revolt in Mauretania, led by Syphax, the able king of the Massaesyli, and inspired, and perhaps directed, by Roman citizens, recalled Hasdrubal himself to Africa in 215 ; and in the following year, while Publius Scipio retook and restored Saguntum, Gnaeus, in the interior, seems to have penetrated even into the valley of the Baetis.

Revolts
against
Carthage
in Spain,

and in
Africa.

But the Romans had now to hold and govern the country which they had won. They enrolled in their turn some twenty thousand Spanish troops, and even contributed some of them to the defence of Italy. The natives soon perceived that it was but a change of masters ; and on the return of Hasdrubal, with Mago, Hasdrubal Gisgo, and the Numidian Masinissa, after suppressing the African revolt, the Roman conquest fell to pieces as quickly as it had been won. In 212 the Spanish levies melted suddenly away, leaving the Scipios isolated from one another and at a distance from their base. Publius was killed in battle, and Gnaeus a month later was destroyed with his whole force in his camp. The Romans lost everything beyond the Ebro, and only a few small parties, under brave subalterns like L. Marcus and T. Fonteius, were able to maintain themselves at all. Only the cruelties of Mago and Gisgo, and the negligence of the Carthaginian government, prevented the reaction from being far more complete than it was.

Reaction
against the
Romans.

Both Scipios
destroyed,
212 B.C.

In the meanwhile Capua had fallen, and the Senate, which had never allowed itself to lose sight of the operations in Spain, at once despatched from among the troops thus liberated a legionary force of twelve thousand men, under the Praetor, C. Claudius Nero. Nero seems to have had some successes at first, but his severity offended the Spaniards, and before long he had retired almost to the Pyrenees. It was clear that something further must be done, if Hasdrubal was not to be allowed to break loose ; and the Senate decided to create in Spain a new and independent command.

Fresh
efforts.

In this emergency, a striking and original character appears upon the scene. When all the older soldiers—if we may believe the story—hesitated to volunteer for the command in Spain, young P. Scipio, the

son of the Consul of 218, offered himself as a candidate for the exceptional position. He was only twenty-four, and had held no public office but the civilian post of Aedile ; but he had saved his father's life at the Ticinus ; as Military Tribune he had been the soul of the rally at Canusium ; and there was a certain dramatic fitness in his claim to be allowed to avenge his father and his uncle. His family also was one of the oldest and most influential in Rome ; highly connected, but at the same time popular with the lower classes, and among the foremost to adopt the new Greek culture which was now slowly making way. By Q. Fabius, however, and the other leaders of the older generation, he was suspected and feared for his cool self-confidence, his foreign manners and new-fangled tastes, his brilliant promise and often erratic performance. And it was not without difficulty that the Senate was persuaded to sanction his appointment to a command so unprecedented and so responsible.

But the result more than justified the choice. Supported by his friend C. Laelius, and the pro-Praetor M. Junius Silanus, Scipio landed in Spain with a fresh legion and a number of auxiliary troops, and raised a large native contingent in the north. He crossed the Ebro in the spring of 210 with nearly thirty thousand men, and flung his whole force, by a sudden and well-concealed movement, straight upon New Carthage, which he knew to be insufficiently defended ; for the three Carthaginian armies lay scattered in the south-west, far away from their arsenal and from each other. The town lay, strongly fortified, on a tongue of land which runs out into the harbour, and was defended bravely by its scanty garrison. But the Roman assault on the land-side was only a feint to occupy the attention of the besieged. Scipio had learnt that the side facing the harbour was left exposed at low tide, and with the well-grounded prophecy that 'Neptune himself would find them a way,' he sent a picked force through the shallow water, which scaled the undefended wall, and compelled the surrender of the town on the very first day of the siege. This brilliant achievement put into his hands the principal fortress of the Carthaginians in Spain, with all their fleet and stores, six hundred talents of treasure, and the whole of their Spanish hostages. The latter were at once set free, on promises of allegiance from their several tribes ; the town was restored to its inhabitants, and remained loyal to Rome ; the captured fleet was made ready for sea, and the arsenal was employed to equip the Roman force with the long Spanish type of sword. Then, before Hasdrubal could take advantage of his enemy's really perilous position, Scipio was back again

Young
Publius
Scipio goes
to Spain,
211 B.C.

He captures
New
Carthage,
210 B.C.

at his post on the Ebro, and spent the winter dismantling his own ships and training their crews for more immediate usefulness on land.

In the following year, instead of confining himself to his instructions, he determined to take the offensive on a great scale, advanced into the upper valley of the Baetis, and fought a great battle at Baecula. Hasdrubal's preparations, however, were at last completed, and he thought he saw his opportunity. The force which he had left at Baecula was only a screen to cover the northward movement of his main army, and while Scipio hurried back to guard the eastern passes of the Pyrenees, Hasdrubal made a long detour to the north-west, and slipped past him into Aquitania by way of the Atlantic coast.

Hasdrubal
slips past
Scipio,
209 B.C.

For the moment it seemed as if the whole game were lost. Scipio was content, however, to leave the defence of Italy to the armies at home, and to devote himself, now that his principal adversary had disappeared, to the extinction of Carthaginian authority in Spain. Gisgo retired at once into Lusitania in the west, and Mago to the Balearic Islands, leaving Masinissa and his cavalry to play the part of Mutines (p. 211). Scipio sent Silanus to complete the conquest of Baetica, while he himself remained behind holding an almost regal court at Tarraco, and using his marvellous personal influence and sympathy with the native character to consolidate his conquests and to reconcile the Spaniards, who would gladly have made him their king, to the Roman system of administration.

Scipio
reconquers
Spain,

In the following year new troops, brought from Africa by Hanno, and rejoined by Mago from his islands, were beaten by Silanus, and Hanno himself was taken prisoner; but, once again, in 206, an enormous army, partly African, partly Spanish, reoccupied Baetica, and threatened to break out northward. With a far smaller force, however—composed largely, too, of Spanish levies which he dared not use—Scipio met them once more in the neighbourhood of the same Baecula, and scattered them to the winds. That decided the complete evacuation of Spain, and brought Masinissa over to the Roman side. Mago indeed held out for a while in the ancient port of Gades, in the hope that the Spaniards would rise against their new masters; but an abortive revolt of the Ibergetes in the north, and a mutiny in the Roman army, were soon suppressed, and before the end of 206, he set sail, with all the forces which remained to him, to the Balears, and thence to Liguria, to strike one more blow for his brother in Italy. Gades surrendered as soon as he was gone, and Scipio stood in undisputed possession of Spain, whence he returned soon afterwards

and expels
the Cartha-
ginians,
206 B.C.

to Rome. But the Senate refused him a triumph on the ground of his tender years, forgetful that the same shortcoming should first have disqualified him from gaining his victories.

The centre of interest now shifts back again to Italy. After his successful evasion of Scipio's blockade in Spain, Hasdrubal spent the winter among the Arverni, a powerful people who have left their name in the mountainous district of Auvergne, between the Garonne, the Loire, and the Rhone. The Alps he crossed in the spring of 208, without encountering any of the natural obstacles which beset the autumn march of Hannibal; and descending without opposition into Cisalpine Gaul, found a large native contingent, and a considerable force from Liguria, ready to rally round him. His own army numbered some fifty-six thousand men, with fifteen elephants, and the total forces of the two brothers amounted now to some eighty thousand in all.

The anxiety which his appearance occasioned in Rome is shown by the extraordinary efforts which were made to reorganise the defences of Italy. Preparations were made to enrol, if need be, one hundred and fifty thousand men; and fifteen full legions were put into the field at once. There was more difficulty in finding efficient commanders. The veteran Marcellus had been appointed for the fifth time Consul, and had devoted himself, with his colleague Crispinus, to the same patient preparation as before for a decisive blow. But his long and distinguished career was abruptly closed by his death in a mere skirmish near Venusia. Both Consuls were engaged in a reconnaissance of Hannibal's position, when they were unexpectedly attacked by a superior force of his African cavalry. Crispinus, mortally wounded, escaped, but Marcellus was killed; his body, left in the hands of the enemy, was buried reverently by the express orders of Hannibal. To Marcellus—a true Roman soldier, fearless and not without military ability, but hard and stern even to cruelty in the pursuit of his single object—Rome owed the conquest of the Insubres in 222, and the recovery of Sicily in 212-11; and also, more than to any single man till now, the demonstration that in fair fight Hannibal was not invincible. But his work was over; the strength of Hannibal in Italy was now fairly on the decline; and the final stage of the war called for another and a greater leader.

Marcellus, then, and Crispinus were dead; Q. Fabius was over eighty; P. Scipio was in Spain, and it was through his mistake that Hasdrubal was in Italy at all. The choice fell upon the same C. Claudius Nero,

who had been Praetor in Spain before Scipio's arrival, and upon M. Livius Salinator, who, since his condemnation for misappropriating the Illyrian spoils of 219, had lived in sullen retirement, and was moreover a personal enemy of Claudius. But in face of the common danger a public reconciliation was effected. ^{Preparations of Nero and Livius.}

Claudius, with two legions, and the use of four more, scattered between Tarentum and the Bruttii, kept watch in the south upon Hannibal, who moved restlessly to and fro while he waited for a message from his brother. Livius, with the remainder of the army of Italy, advanced to Ariminum, whither the Praetor, L. Porcius, had already been compelled to retire. Hasdrubal had wasted precious time over a futile siege of Placentia—yet another example of the value of these fortress-colonies—but on learning of the preparations of the Romans, perceived that he must press on. He sent word to Hannibal to meet him in Umbria and make thence a final attack upon Rome itself, and meanwhile threw forward his own force through the Ager Gallicus, pushing Livius aside off the Flaminian Way in the direction of the border of Picenum. But by ill luck Hannibal had changed his quarters, and the messenger of Hasdrubal missed his way and fell into the hands of the Romans. Claudius saw his chance, and, by a bold stroke of genius, used it to the full. Hannibal, he now knew, would not move far, until news came from Hasdrubal; so, leaving the greater part of his army to keep watch upon the enemy in his absence, and sending word of his intentions to Rome, he hastened, with a picked force of seven thousand, to reinforce his colleague in the north.

The Senate could not but sanction the bold manœuvre, and the whole body of reserves was thrown forward, in support, along the Flaminian Way; while Claudius, moving by the shortest route, and by forced marches of some forty miles a day, was welcomed in every town along the road with abundance of supplies, and the prayers and the good wishes of the people. ^{By forced marches Nero joins Livius.} On the evening of the sixth day he reached the camp at Sena, and entered it by night to avoid the notice of the enemy. But when the morning came, the double bugle-call that rang through the camp, and the way-worn look of a part of the Roman forces, told Hasdrubal that the other Consul had arrived; and fearing that only some sudden reverse in the south could have set him thus free, he left his camp under cover of the following night, and retired in the direction of Ariminum. But his Gaulish guides deserted, and in the darkness he missed the ford of the Metaurus, which flows swiftly down between steep banks from the hills of Umbria. His Gauls got out of hand, and he was obliged to halt

his army in disorder ; and so in the morning he found himself overtaken by the two Consuls, and compelled to give battle with the rushing torrent in his rear.

The Gauls, demoralised and drunken, he posted on broken ground on his left ; his Ligurian allies were in the centre ; while his own Spaniards and Africans held the weaker flank on his right. The battle of the Metaurus, 208 B.C. battle was stubbornly contested ; and the victory of the Romans was due, once more, to a brilliant manœuvre of Claudius ; who, finding that the Gauls who faced him, though strongly posted, were incapable of an attack, left, now as before, a skeleton force to contain them, drew the rest of his troops round the rear of the legions of his colleague, and fell upon the flank and rear of Hasdrubal. The Gauls proved useless, as he had foreseen ; the Spaniards and Ligurians fought bravely, but were clearly outnumbered and outmanœuvred ; and Hasdrubal, seeing that all was lost, threw himself, sword in hand, into the thickest of the fight, and died as he had lived, a brave and devoted soldier.

It was the turning-point of the war. The anxiety in Rome gave place to unbounded rejoicing ; the two Consuls were allowed a well-deserved and magnificent triumph ; and from the troops of Hannibal at bay in the south. the northern army thus set free in Italy, large reinforcements were despatched to Scipio in Spain ; which materially hastened the close of the operations there. Hannibal, waiting still in his camp in Apulia, was the last to learn of his brother's fate. The severed head of Hasdrubal, thrown by the command of Claudius over the rampart of the camp, revealed to him at once the fate of his brother, and the inevitable issue of the war in Italy. He had ceased to be able to hold the open country, and evacuated Lucania and Magna Græcia at once ; and it was only through the sudden reaction which came upon the Romans after their victory, that he was able, for four years more, to maintain himself in the mountain forests of Bruttium, with the ragged remnants of his original infantry, and almost no cavalry at all.

But the Romans, too, had suffered severely. They had lost very heavily in the battle of the Metaurus, and rightly felt that their first duty was to relieve the strain upon their allies and on their own treasury, by disbanding every man who was not actually required to keep watch on Hannibal, or to wind up the war in Spain ; while the Italians were only too glad to return to the cultivation of their own farms.

Their thoughts, however, were soon turned in quite another direction. P. Scipio returned from Spain in 206, and announced his intention of

standing for the Consulship, and, if elected, of carrying on the war into Africa. But old Q. Fabius refused to believe that Rome could attack in Africa while Hannibal remained in Italy; the suspicions of the Senate, and even of the Tribunes, were aroused by the aspiring schemes and regal air of Scipio; and it was only by the threat to appeal, like Flaminius, from the government to the people, that he forced his opponents to a compromise. The youth of thirty became Consul before he had been Prætor, and received the command of Sicily, with the permission to cross into Africa if he thought fit. But he was limited to the command of two legions and only thirty ships, and frankly told that he must look for no aid from the treasury.

Scipio elected Consul to go to Africa, 205 B.C.

The people, however, had implicit belief in Scipio's luck, and voluntary offers of service and supplies poured in. From Etruria and Umbria, and still more from Sicily, which had by this time somewhat recovered from its troubles, while it was still garrisoned by the veteran survivors of Cannæ, he collected a force of some thirty-five thousand men. He raised his fleet to forty ships, and the number of his transports to four hundred, and provided himself, too, with a siege train calculated to break down the defences of Carthage itself. To confirm the confidence of the Romans, he provided for the transference to Rome of Cybele, the great Mother of the Gods, from her sanctuary at Pessinus in Phrygia; while to annoy and cripple Hannibal in Bruttium, he sent out from Sicily a sudden raid which captured Locri, his principal remaining seaport.

Preparations in Sicily.

But the excesses committed by the Roman troops at Locri, and the scandalous behaviour of their commander Pleminius, gave Scipio's enemies their chance. They denounced him for laxity of discipline, irregularity of administration, and tyrannical cruelty to the Sicilians; and a commission of inquiry was sent from Rome to Sicily, accompanied by two of the inviolable Tribunes, in case it should be necessary to arrest the popular commander on his own ground. A great expedition, however, cannot be collected, in an exhausted country, without some hardships and some show of severity; and the commission was able to report that nothing was seriously wrong.

Opposition to Scipio.

Before the end of his year of office, Scipio set sail for Africa, and, changing his point of attack almost on the voyage, effected a landing at Utica without opposition. He had long realised that the foundations of the power of Carthage were just as insecure in Africa as in Spain; and he counted on the co-operation of either one party or the other among the native chiefs of Numidia.

Scipio lands in Africa, 204 B.C.

For this purpose, if the story be true, he had himself snatched time already from his organisation of Spain, to pay a secret visit in 206 to the court of Syphax, who had created an important diversion in the Mauretanian revolt of 215 (p. 217). But the diplomacy of Hasdrubal Syphax and Masinissa. Gisco, and the charms of his daughter Sophonisba, prevailed over the intrigues of Scipio; and when Laelius landed in Africa to prepare the way for the army of invasion, he found Syphax already the husband of Sophonisba, and ardently loyal to Carthage. As a natural consequence, Masinissa, his rival in love as in politics, was now the ringleader of disaffection in Africa. On the news of the Roman invasion, Syphax lost no time in expelling Masinissa from his dominions in eastern Numidia, and advanced with his whole force to the assistance of the Carthaginians.

Masinissa fled almost unattended to the Roman camp, and Scipio's schemes fell for the moment to the ground. He had intended to raise Scipio in all Africa from the west eastwards, and to use Syphax difficulties. to distract Masinissa in rear. As it was he found himself outnumbered, and hemmed in between the enormous hordes of Syphax and the army of Hasdrubal Gisco, and threatened in rear by a Carthaginian fleet. He was forced to abandon the siege of Utica, and to retire to a promontory on the coast nearer Carthage, which gained from him the name of the 'Cornelian Camp.' Here then he awaited the result of the mission of Masinissa, who had slipped past the army of Syphax and was raising his own adherents in his rear. To gain time meanwhile, and to occupy the winter, Scipio proposed to negotiate with the Carthaginians, and flattered the vanity of Syphax by inviting his arbitration.

Under cover of these negotiations, his officers explored the enemy's lines, and when the Carthaginians had sufficiently relaxed their precautions, Laelius made a sudden night attack upon the camp of Syphax, fired the thatched *tukuls* of the Numidians, and cut down the enemy as they attempted to escape. Scipio meanwhile fell upon Gisco's men as they hurried up in support, and fired their camp, too, behind them. The enemy was obliged to retire altogether, and the Romans advancing into the Carthaginian territory, won a second victory, on the 'Great Plains,' over a reserve force mainly composed of recruits. Masinissa had by this time succeeded in his mission in the interior, and the victories of the Romans produced their effect. The Numidian tribes threw off their allegiance to Carthage; and the capture of Syphax, who fell, with his whole court, and the natural fortress of Cirta, his capital,

He surprises the Carthaginian camp.

Capture of Syphax.

into the hands of Masinissa, was followed before long by the tragic death of Sophonisba.

The general defection of the Numidians alarmed the government of Carthage. Terms of peace were proposed to Scipio, and were actually sent home by him for the approval of the Senate. Rome was to evacuate Africa; Carthage to recall Hannibal from Italy, to resign Spain altogether, and to pay an indemnity of five thousand talents. But the war party in Carthage got the upper hand again; summoned Hannibal from Bruttium, and Mago from Liguria, to organise a last struggle in Africa; and broke the truce which had been arranged, by an attack upon an outlying force of the Romans.

A truce
made and
broken.

Mago, as we have seen (p. 219), had taken advantage of the dismantlement of Scipio's fleet at Tarraco, to effect a landing in Liguria with a force of fourteen thousand men, the relics of the army of Spain; and had been joined by great numbers of Ligurians and Gauls. But he had not succeeded in penetrating into Italy, and was already threatened by the advance of a Roman force, when the summons came for him to return. He withdrew his men in good order to Genua, and set sail for Africa, but is said to have died on the voyage.

Recall of
Mago from
Liguria.

Hannibal, too, lost no time in returning to Africa. It was evidently useless to protract the struggle in Italy, and he had no longer any reason to do so, if his country needed him at home. Locri he had lost; but he embarked his men without obstacle at Croton, after slaughtering two thousand Italians who refused to follow him, and dedicating, in the temple of Hera Lacinia, the celebrated tablet of bronze engraved with a chronicle of his campaigns.

Recall of
Hannibal.

He landed at Leptis, a little town south of Hadrumetum, effected a junction with the last Carthaginian levies, and met Scipio's army in the interior near Zama, or more probably at the village of Naragara further westward, some five days' journey from Carthage. Hannibal had already done all in his power to bring about a tolerable peace, but a personal interview with Scipio, shortly before the battle, made it clear that the war must be fought to the bitter end. Scipio had lately been reinforced by the whole of Masinissa's cavalry force, and had no mind to throw away his advantage. On the 19th of October in the year 202 the decisive battle was fought, the date being fixed by an eclipse which occurred during the engagement. The Roman legions evaded the charge of the elephants by posting their second line of maniples, not as usual in the intervals of the first, but

Battle of
Zama, 19 Oct.
202 B. C.

directly behind them, so that the infuriated animals dashed harmlessly, through wide lanes in the line, into the open country beyond. Under Hannibal's generalship, the Carthaginian army might still have withstood the Roman attack. But his orders were disregarded; the inveterate feud broke out anew between the veteran army of the son of Barca and the mercenary levies from Carthage; and Masinissa's cavalry turned the confusion into a rout.

Carthage was unable to continue the war, but behind her strong walls her position seemed impregnable, and the Romans remembered Regulus, Carthage and were glad to make peace before worse happened. surrenders. Scipio's command, also, which had been already twice prolonged, was coming to an end, and he did not wish to have laboured for the triumph of a successor. Hannibal, too, after Zama as before, used his whole influence, now that victory was out of the question, to mitigate the terms of capitulation. He had seen, for long, that the Romans had only been waiting for a real military genius; and now Scipio had come; and as it had been impossible, since the defeat of Hasdrubal, to keep Rome any longer on the defensive, he knew that there was nothing left but to surrender.

Peace was concluded early in the following year, but on far harder conditions than those which had been proposed before. Carthage surrendered Spain, and all other dependencies outside her own territory in Africa. She undertook not to wage war outside Africa at all; or even within it, without the consent of Rome. She gave up all her ships but ten triremes, all her elephants and prisoners, together with hostages for her good faith; and she promised to pay an indemnity so enormous—ten thousand talents within fifty years—that it practically made her a tributary state. Numidia, together with a large part of the territory of Syphax further west, became a single state under Masinissa, who had already been made a Roman citizen, and could be trusted, if only in self-defence, to maintain a sharp watch on the proceedings of his neighbours; while, as the 'friend and ally of the Roman people,' he was entitled to provoke the interference of Rome, at the convenience either of his own policy or of hers.

CHIEF DATES.

Cn. Scipio lands in Spain	218
P. Scipio joins him	217
Hasdrubal's first move foiled	215
Spanish revolt ; both Scipios destroyed	212
Young P. Scipio sent to Spain	211
New Carthage captured by the Romans	210
Hasdrubal slips past Scipio	209
Hasdrubal defeated by Livius and Nero at the Metaurus	208
Scipio elected Consul	205
Roman Invasion of Africa	204
Hannibal recalled from Italy	203
Battle of Zama	202

CHIEF PERSONS.

P. and Cn. Cornelius Scipio—P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus—M. Junius Silanus—C. Claudius Nero—M. Livius Salinator—Hannibal—Hasdrubal Barca—Hasdrubal Gisgo—Hanno—Mago—Syphax—Masinissa.

CHIEF PLACES.

Tarraco — Baecula — Nova Carthago — Gades — Baleares Insulae — Grumentum—Metaurus Fl.—Locri—Utica—Cirta—Leptis—Zama.

SUBJECTS.

Roman strategy and policy in Spain.
 Character and political position of Scipio Africanus.
 Full meaning of the surrender of Carthage.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EFFECTS OF THE PUNIC WARS, AND THE RECOVERY OF ROME

Causes of Roman disasters—of Hannibal's successes—Exhaustion of Rome and Italy—Its effects on agriculture and on trade—Capitalism and slave industry—The landless populace and the professional soldiery—Effects upon Roman foreign policy—Punishment of Italian rebels—Expulsions of Latins from Rome—Growth of an official class—Settlement of Cisalpine Gaul—Conquest of Liguria—Sardinia and Corsica—Organisation of Spain.

THE result of the war with Carthage had demonstrated the strength and solidity of the power of Rome, but it had strained her resources to the uttermost, and led her inevitably into modes of thought and policy, from which she never freed herself again.

Strong in their supremacy over an united and contented Italy (which they kept in the main throughout the war), in their network of roads and colonies, and in their command of the sea, the Romans had entered upon the Hannibalic War almost light-heartedly, as the shortest way to make a final end of Carthage; and it was mainly to their own mistakes and defects that they owed the disasters which befel them. They had learnt something of the nature of scientific, that is to say, of Greek warfare in their struggle with Pyrrhus, and in their former encounters with Xanthippus, and the trained hirelings of Carthage; but they were slow to profit by their experience, and their subsequent wars with the brave but undisciplined Gauls and Illyrians had put them on the wrong road again. The mediocrity of their amateur strategists, their system of divided and annual commands, and the close control which the Senate maintained over matters which ought to have been left absolutely to a commander-in-chief, effectually prevented the grand courage and determination of the citizen-army from achieving the success which it deserved; and the accusations of *Punica fides* which they heaped upon Hannibal cover little more than their own ignorance of the most elementary devices of warfare. Their

overwhelming strength in infantry, too, was heavily handicapped by their deficiency in cavalry, and by the defective mobility of all citizen-armies ; and just because their army was their very own, they could not put it into the field in its full strength at all, without leaving the fields of Italy uncultivated, and bringing soldiers and civilians alike to the verge of starvation—a drawback which was serious even in a single campaign, but became intolerable in an invasion which lasted for fourteen years.

Hannibal's marvellous successes, on the other hand, resulted, first and foremost, from his personal military genius, which divined from the outset the right line of attack ; and from the position, independent alike of the government of Carthage and of the command of the sea, which he inherited from his father and his cousin.

Causes of
Hannibal's
successes ;

Like his father also, he had the gift of inspiring, in a miscellaneous force of mercenaries and adventurers, if not loyalty to Carthage, at all events a strong personal devotion to himself. He was strong in his mobility, and in the light mounted troops which are the most valuable arm of an invader ; and he had the enormous advantage that in Italy, at all events, he had no capital or base to defend, but could change his ground as he pleased without anxiety for his rear or his communications.

Yet he failed, utterly, in his attempt to rally round Carthage, or even round himself, the conquered peoples of Italy ; and was so far from raising an Italian army himself, that he hardly even checked the exhaustive conscription of the Romans. He seldom attempted, and never once effected, the reduction of the great fortress-colonies ; he was weakened, rather than strengthened, by his capture of Capua and Tarentum, and even by the adhesion of the southern highlands ; just because they gave him cities and territory to defend, and something stationary for the Romans to attack. His grand scheme of uniting the civilised world to crush out the name of Rome crumbled piecemeal when the Romans used their sea-power and central position to isolate his fellow-conspirators ; and the dogged persistence with which they held on to Spain, when they had almost lost Italy, deprived him at last of the only real base he had, and of the only serious reinforcements which ever attempted to reach him.

and of his
failure.

The victory, nevertheless, left the Romans only less exhausted than their enemy. The number of Roman citizens alone sank from two hundred and seventy thousand in 220, to two hundred and fourteen thousand in 204, and the losses of the allies were at least proportionately great. Whole districts, moreover, had been desolated by the ravages of the combatants, particularly in southern Italy, which seems never to have recovered its early prosperity again.

Exhaustion
of Rome
and Italy.

In Etruria, too, and other parts which were not themselves invaded, the dearth of men and the pitiless requisition of supplies ruined the farmers, and put a large part of the land out of cultivation. Indeed, it was only her freedom at sea that saved Rome from starvation; but the very fact that her people learnt to look for their bread from abroad, encouraged artificially—what, if the population continued to grow as it was growing before the war, was inevitable in any case—the importation of Sicilian and Egyptian corn; and that at prices which made it difficult to make corn-growing pay any longer in Italy. With the best intentions, the government itself increased the evil during the worst years of famine; for in 203 we find the Aediles engaged in importing corn from Spain, and selling it below cost price to the poorer citizens in Rome.

A further result of the artificial impulse thus given to foreign trade was the growth of a mercantile and capitalist party in Rome. That this development had already begun before the war, and that its evil effects were foreseen, is clear from that Claudian Law which was passed, in the year of Trasimene (p. 187), to forbid Senators to hold any interest in a shipping business; but both its result and its intention were rather to separate the mercantile from the governing class, than to put a check on the growth of the former.

Moreover, from the growth of capitalism arose in turn a new class of speculators in Italian land, who bought up, cheap and wholesale, the deserted farms in Sicily, Etruria, and other distressed districts, and either worked them on the grand scale with enormous gangs of slaves, bought likewise cheap, as prisoners of war, during the temporary depression of industry; or, where corn-growing could not, even so, be made to pay, let the land run to waste altogether; stocked it, as pasture, with flocks and herds which needed little tending; and made their profit, while the war lasted, from the enhanced prices of wool and hides.¹ The primary ruin wrought by the war among the yeoman farmers of Italy was thus perpetuated and made irreparable by the use which the one class of men who profited at all were enabled to make of their gains; and that some did profit appreciably is clear from the way in which, even while the treasury was empty, private contributions were forthcoming in abundance, as soon as the chance came of striking a real blow at the rival traders of Carthage.

When the war came to an end, the distress was increased still more.

¹ The consumption of leather, when an army lived *sub pellibus*, and wore *loricae* and *scuta*, was something incredible.

After years of almost constant soldiering, the yeomen themselves were but ill-disposed to settle down to their former uneventful mode of living. In a death-struggle, and in a citizen-army, discipline easily gives way to expediency, and in ancient warfare the soldier was expected to make his living from the plunder. The results had already been seen in the spoliation of Syracuse, and in the disorders, which even Scipio was not wholly able to prevent, during his preparations for the campaign in Africa (p. 223).

Scipio and the government did what they could to mend the situation, by the free assignment of allotments, to all veterans who chose to claim them, on the vast lands confiscated from the southern rebels, and by the foundation of a number of citizen-colonies; some to secure yet further the Apennine border; some, like Puteoli, Salernum, and Liternum in Campania, Buxentum in Lucania, Tempa and Croton in Bruttium, and Sipontum in Apulia, to punish and terrorise the more disloyal parts of the south.

But the demoralisation wrought by the war was too deep-seated to be cured by expedients like these, and found expression in two new ways, both fatally important. On the one hand, we find the forced levies on the verge of mutiny, as in Spain, for example, in 206. Here were men who had been away from their homes and even from Italy for years, thoroughly weary of the war, but already incapacitated, as the event proved, for a life of peaceful industry; they had forgotten how to dig; to beg they were not ashamed. These drifted to Rome and increased, what had already become a source of anxiety, the landless and thriftless populace of the city. The *Lex Sempronia*, passed in 193, *de pecunia credita*, is ample commentary on their fate.

Many, on the other hand, had found the soldier's life to their liking, and literally found their 'occupation gone' when the peace was signed. These veterans too were incapable of returning to the life of a farmer; their home was in their legion, and all they asked was, not to be turned adrift while they were still in their prime. From these there grew up a class of professional warriors, who were certain sooner or later to supplant the yeoman-soldier as the backbone of the army; whose ideal Rome was a militant and conquering state; and whose political sympathies were mainly with their old comrades in the city populace.

The results of this double pressure from the veterans were only too obvious in the history of the next two generations. Hitherto the wars of Rome had been wars of necessity. The Romans were a growing and a dominant people, and they were surrounded in Italy by people of

Demoralisation of the citizen-army.

Temporary remedies.

The landless populace,

and the professional soldiery.

kindred civilisation, and for the most part of equal and often greater simplicity of life. There was little to be gained by fighting but hard

Effects on Roman foreign policy. knocks and the honest respect of their enemies; and they fought because they must, for room to grow, and for an ideal of civic freedom. But the plunder of Capua, of Tarentum, and of Syracuse, and still more the discovery that, with the

fall of Carthage, they had half the Mediterranean at their feet, put a new complexion on warfare and conquest, and taught them to fight for the pleasures and the profits of mastery. True, Rome, as we shall see, could not possibly have halted where she stood in 204; the enmity of Macedon alone was sufficient pledge of that. But from this point, nevertheless, a new conception took form, both of the prerogatives of the conquering state, and of a distinction to be maintained between the citizens and the subjects of Rome.

This distinction between citizens and subject-peoples was wholly alien to Roman policy in the period of the conquest of Italy. Down to the

Tendency to restrict the franchise. war with Pyrrhus the Romans had tended rather to force Roman rights upon their enemies, than to build up any barrier against them; and the whole system of graduated

promotion, through Latin franchise and municipal organisation, to full citizenship and communion in the government of Rome, rested upon this idea at bottom. But the consequent overgrowth of the City State, which inspired first the experiments of the Censor Appius, and then the limitations imposed (p. 147), upon the Latin *ius exulandi*, only became a more pressing problem as time went on and the consolidation of Italy proceeded. And so, when not only the rest of Italy, but also Sicily beyond the strait, and Cisalpine Gaul beyond the Apennines, had fallen into the hands of Rome, we find the process of assimilation suddenly cut short, and the new dependencies organised as separate 'provinces' outside the pale of 'Italy,' and left without any mode of access even to the lesser rights of citizenship.

In Italy itself, too, the Hannibalic War brought about the same change of attitude, more markedly, because nearer home. The south Italian

Punishment of Italian rebels. peoples had indeed behaved ungratefully. The Samnites, for example, had been allowed, after their defeat, to retain their whole country except such land as was absolutely

needed for the foundation of Roman colonies; Tarentum, for all her insolence, had been received into free and equal alliance. But in the second conquest of the south all this was changed. The Bruttii, who were regarded as incorrigibly barbarous, were reduced to absolute serfdom, while the best of their land went to the Latin colony of Vibo

Valentia in 192; and the fate of the Picentini in southern Campania was almost as bad. Samnium, Lucania, and Apulia, and a large part of Campania, were saddled with numerous colonies (p. 231) and wide allotments to veterans; the Greek towns were either converted into colonies like Croton and Thurii, or reduced to mere *praefecturae* like Capua; and Etruria too was punished for the revolt of 209 by wholesale confiscations, and the worse depredations of the capitalists. Nowhere were even Latin rights distributed now, as they had been, broadcast, after the war with Samnium.

Worse still, the futile Latin revolt of 209 brought about a lasting estrangement between the Romans and their ancient allies and colonies. For the moment, in the stress of the campaign with Hasdrubal, the Senate could do nothing; but in 204 double contingents were demanded from each of the rebellious towns, with every mark of Rome's severe displeasure. And whereas the years immediately after the war saw an important group of citizen-colonies established, only four more Latin colonies were founded at all, and Aquileia, the last of them, no later than 181.

Estrangement
between
citizens and
Latins.

More than this, in 187, the Senate ordered the expulsion from Rome of some twelve thousand Latins, who had taken up their abode in the city; and on the occasion of a similar expulsion, ten years later, a *Lex Claudia* set new limits again on their ancient right of migration, which were strictly enforced by the Censors of 174 and 169. It was becoming evident that the full citizens of Rome, who crowded more and more into the streets of the capital, were beginning to grudge a share in their privileges, even to those to whom the half had already been granted. Nor is the reason far to seek. The booty of the eastern wars after 200, the wealth which flowed in from every corner of the Mediterranean upon the imperial city, the recurring spectacle of triumphal processions and lavish games, and the largess which was scattered (in spite of reiterated laws *de ambitu*)¹ by candidates for popular favour, were perquisites of sovereignty too precious to be distributed lightly; and the fewer there were to receive them, the more there would be for each. In the same year, 177, in fact, the author of the *Lex Claudia*, on his return from a campaign in the north, gave the customary presents to the allies on a markedly lower scale than to the citizens.

Expulsion of
Latins from
Rome.

Within the charmed circle of citizenship itself, also, the first signs began to appear of a new cleavage, no longer between plebeian and

¹ *Ambitus* (from *ambire*, 'to go about among' the electors) properly includes all forms of personal canvassing; but practically the laws *de ambitu* are directed against demonstrable bribery.

patrician, but between official and non-official families. Even during the Punic Wars, the number of new *gentes* whose members attained to the consulship begins to decrease, and men who have distinguished themselves in the field failed unaccountably to reach curule office. At the same time, we have had a case already, in the second Illyrian war, of the impeachment of two Consuls for misappropriation of the spoil (p. 171). The two things went together. The days of a Cincinnatus or a Fabricius belonged already to a former age. Office had come to mean wealth and influence, and for the wealthy and influential the rewards of office were reserved.

The effect of this new development upon the position of the Senate was obvious. The Senate, under the Republic, had always been an official body, and the representative of official traditions. It now became the champion of an official class, the *Senatorialis Ordo* of the next age of Rome, and used its enormous political influence to safeguard and extend the privileges of that order. In 194, for example, reserved places were set apart in the theatre for men of the Senatorial rank; and the *Lex Villia* of 180, which fixed by law the accustomed succession of office, had obviously the effect both of securing to each member of the order his regular place in the succession, and of preventing the intrusion of a popular favourite of the moment, like Flaminius or Scipio. Thus, as influence was still the key to official nomination to office, and under the Claudian Law of 218 official influence and commercial wealth became increasingly opposed, the struggle between the *nobiles*, who belonged to 'recognised' families, and the *novi homines* who did not, became steadily more acute; with the further effect, moreover, of drawing the official families even more closely together than ever, by the bond of a common enmity.

These are some of the new features in Roman political life which begin to be apparent during and after the Hannibalic War, and can be traced more or less directly to its effects. But the change was very gradual, and was obscured still more, first, by the stress of the deadly peril of the war itself, which drew all classes and grades into line against the national enemy; and, then, from the moment of deliverance onwards, by the uninterrupted succession of great wars of conquest abroad. It was only when the tide of victory ceased to flow for a moment, and the stream of wealth and prosperity was checked, that the results came fully into view, and it could be seen how far the Roman State and its citizens had diverged from their original path.

Internal changes obscured by the period of conquest.

The peace with Carthage left the Romans free to repair their shattered

fortunes, and to provide, so far as possible, against another assault meanwhile. The first and most pressing duty was to restore the defences of Italy on the north, the weakness of which had been the opportunity, in turn, of Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago. The latter, indeed, on his recall to Africa in 204, had left a capable officer behind him, with orders to keep the spirit of revolt alive among the Ligurians and Gauls; and in 200, or a little later, a general attack was made by all the Gauls together on the Roman fortress-colonies, in which Placentia fell, and Cremona was closely besieged. But as soon as the war with Carthage was over, the Romans set themselves with vigour to recover the lost ground. The colony of Placentia was restored at once, and war was declared against both the Boii and the Insubres, who, as usual, had headed the movement. The Insubres were defeated on the river Mincius in 197; the Cenomani, who had wavered for the moment, returned forthwith to their allegiance; and in the following year M. Claudius Marcellus, the son of the Consul of 223, captured Comum, and pacified all the country between the Po and the Alps. But no further annexation took place. The Gauls were left in possession of their lands, and in enjoyment of their own tribal institutions. They were not permitted to take up Roman citizenship, but were left as a first line of defence between Italy and the barbarians of the north. The rebellious Boii, indeed, though they were thus left completely isolated, were not completely subdued until 191, when the Consul, P. Scipio Nasica, could boast that, after a merciless campaign in their country, he had left there 'only the old men and the boys.' After that, the Cisalpine Boii disappear. Half of their territory was confiscated at once, and the remainder soon occupied by Roman and Italian settlers.

All this Cisalpine country, from the Apennines to the Alps, instead of being incorporated in Italy, was formed in the same year, 191, into a separate district; but, unlike Sicily and Spain, it paid no tribute; it retained, almost unimpaired, its native tribal organisation; and it had no provincial Praetor of its own, but remained under the general supervision of the Consuls. Its loyalty was secured by the foundation of Latin colonies at Bononia in 189, and at Pisaurum and Potentia on the Adriatic shore in 184; and of citizen-colonies at Parma and Mutina in 183. The Flaminian Way was extended from Ariminum to Bononia by the younger C. Flaminius in 187; an important branch road from Ariminum to Placentia was built by his colleague, M.

Settle-
ment of
Cisalpine
Gaul.

Fresh
revolt,
200 B.C.

Insubres,
197 B.C.

Boii,
191 B.C.

Provincia
Cisalpinga,
191 B.C.

Colonies
and roads.

Aemilius Lepidus¹; and a third road, the Via Cassia, was completed about this time from Rome to Arretium, and prolonged thence, through the Apennines to Bononia, in 171.

Under these effective precautions, Roman civilisation and settlers spread very rapidly up to the foot of the Alps, and also among the half Gaulish, half Illyrian tribes at the head of the Adriatic, where Aquileia, the last Latin colony, was established in 181. A fresh horde of migratory Gauls, directed, perhaps, by Macedonian intrigues, but professedly in search of a peaceful settlement in Italy, who attempted soon after to enter from the north-east, were compelled to return home. The Istrians, however, seem to have felt themselves threatened by the precautions of the Romans, and by the new post at Aquileia; and required two punitive expeditions in 178 and 177; and it was not till 155, in fact, that the piratical tribes of Dalmatia were finally reduced to submission, and the way thrown fully open for what proved to be the very rapid extension of Italian commerce in the direction of the middle Danube. Even as late as 157 the Adriatic defences of Italy demanded the foundation of a new citizen colony at Auximum in Picenum, the last citizen colony in Italy, as Aquileia in 181 had been the last Latin colony.

The conquest of Liguria, which proceeded side by side with that of Cisalpine Gaul, was a more difficult and tedious affair. The country is difficult of access, for north of Etruria the Apennines descend directly into the sea. The Ligurian tribes were independent and warlike, and maintained themselves, after each defeat, in the hill-forts in which the country abounds. But the control of the country was essential to Rome, not only for the sake of the farming communities of North Etruria, but also because, so long as the Romans were in possession of Spain, it was necessary to command the land route thither.

The almost annual expeditions into Liguria afford no striking incidents, and only deserve mention as a source of that experience of mountain warfare which the Romans began to display in their Macedonian wars. But the outline of the conquest is clear. First, the country was pacified to the nominal frontier of 'Italy' along the Macra. Next, the piratical Ingauni and their neighbours on the

¹ Distinguish carefully this road of M. Aemilius *Lepidus* from the *Via Aemilia*, commonly so called, which runs along the Ligurian coast, and was only built in 109 by M. Aemilius *Scavrus*.

Riviera were attacked by L. Aemilius Paullus, the future conqueror of Macedon, who had already shown his ability as Praetor in further Spain, and was Consul in 182; and his conquest was completed in the following year. Then, in 180, forty thousand of the Apuani were transported in a body, by M. Baebius Tamphilus, from their homes between Luna and Genua, to the desolate hills of Samnium, and settled down peaceably in their new surroundings. Citizen-colonies, meanwhile, were founded at Pisae in 180, and at Luna in 177. The latter marks the close of the period of colonial and agrarian expansion in this direction; and also soon came into notice as the centre of a prosperous and increasing trade by sea with Transalpine Gaul and Spain. Finally, in 173-72, M. Popilius Laenas reduced the Statiellates on the northern slope of the mountains towards the Po, and extended the organisation of the Cisalpine province to its natural boundary westward. But though the passage of Roman troops and supplies along the coast road to Spain continued to provoke constant raids from the inhabitants of the Maritime Alps, and though a Roman force under Opimius was employed in the defence of Massilia from the Ligurian Oxybii in 154, no further annexation of territory took place in this quarter until the year 123 (pp. 343-4).

Sardinia and Corsica had been recovered without difficulty after the revolts during the Hannibalic War (p. 208), but the Roman occupation had never been effective in the interior. Sardinia, however, was at last more thoroughly pacified in 177-75 by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, a kinsman of its first conqueror; and the number of his captives was so great that the cry '*Sardi venales*' became proverbial for a 'drug in the market.' In 173 Corsica suffered a similar fate, and we hear no more of trouble with the natives in this quarter. The Balearic Islands, in spite of the shelter they had more than once given to Mago, were, of course, powerless in themselves, so long as Rome had command of the sea; and it is not till the neglect of this department of administration had permitted the rise of universal piracy, that a Metellus could earn a cheap triumph and the title *Balearicus* by their formal annexation as late as 123.

It only remains to account for the Roman settlement in Spain. The country had been occupied originally as a merely defensive measure, to cut off the reinforcements of Hannibal; and though, in 205, the Romans found themselves in nominal possession of all except the north and

west, whither even Hamilcar and Hannibal had never penetrated, their effective occupation was confined to the area of the older Greek and Punic settlements, on the east and south coasts, and in the valley of the Baetis. In these districts, however, and particularly round the harbours and garrison towns of Tarraco, Saguntum, Gades, and New Carthage, civilisation spread with great rapidity. In the west, too, the same process of assimilation between the conquerors and the conquered, which had long been in progress in Italy, and was beginning in Cisalpine Gaul, was started by the settlement of a body of Scipio's veterans, who had married Spanish wives, in a new settlement at Italica beyond the Baetis. Roman conservatism and want of originality, however, prevented the completion of this scheme, and postponed the creation of any regular *municipium* beyond the limits of Italy, until the foundation of Carteia, thirty-five years later, in 171.

For nine years, after the departure of Scipio, the country remained under a provisional military administration, borrowed from that of the Carthaginians; but in 197 Spain was divided into two regular provinces, 'Hither' and 'Further,' corresponding essentially with the basins of the Ebro and the Baetis, though the 'Hither' province was extended southward so as to include New Carthage, and to range with 'Further' Spain along the hill-country of Castulo. These two provinces, as we have already seen (p. 141), were governed by two new Praetors. But owing to the distance from Rome, they seem to have held office customarily for two years in succession; while to meet the continual revolts they were furnished with the powers of a Consul, and supported by a standing garrison of four legions in all. For from the moment that the natives perceived that the Romans had come to stay, the history of the Spanish provinces is that of one long insurrection, ineffectually suppressed, and continually breaking out afresh, which lasts right through the period of the great wars of conquest with which Rome now found herself confronted in the East (see Chap. xxv.)

Organisation of Spain.

Romanisation by settlements of veterans.

Hispania Citerior et Ulterior, 197 B.C.

CHIEF DATES.

Italica : first Roman settlement of any kind outside Italy	205
Spain reorganised : Provincia Citerior et Ulterior	197
Gallic Revolt	197
Provincia Cisalpina constituted	191
Via Flaminia extended	187
Expulsion of Latins	187
Colonies (Latin) : Bononia, 189 ; Potentia Pisaurum, 184 ; Aquileia	181
Lex Villia Annalis,	180
Expulsion of Latins : Lex Claudia	177
Colonies (Roman) : Parma and Mutina, 183 ; Pisa, 180 ; Luna	177
Ligurian War	182-172
Gallic raid from the north-east, towards Aquileia	179
Istrian War	178-177
Sardinia pacified, 177 ; Corsica	175
Carteia : first Latin Colony outside Italy	171

CHIEF PERSONS.

M. Claudius Marcellus—P. Scipio Nasica—L. Aemilius Paulus—
M. Baebius Tamphilus—M. Popilius Laenas—Q. Opimius—Ti. Sempronius Gracchus—L. Metellus Balearicus.


CHIEF PLACES.

Placentia—Cremona—Bononia—Pisaurum—Potentia—Parma—Mutina—
Aquileia—Pisa—Luna—Italica—Carteia—Castulo.

SUBJECTS.

The frontier troubles and defences of Italy.
Cessation of Roman colonisation.
The spread of the provincial system.

THE EAST in 200 B.C.



Engl. Atlas C 200

CHAPTER XX

THE WAR WITH PHILIP OF MACEDON

The successors of Alexander—Egypt—Syria—Macedon—The Leagues of Aetolia and Achaea—Macedon and Syria combine to plunder Egypt—Reluctance of Rome to begin a new war—Combined attack on Macedon—Flamininus—Cynos Cephalae—Flamininus declares the Greek States free.

ALEXANDER the Great ascended the throne of Macedon in 336 B.C. His father, Philip, had just emerged victorious from a struggle with Athens and other city-states, which left Macedon as absolute in the Greek world, as Rome was in Central Italy after the Latin War of the same year 338. In a series of matchless campaigns Alexander shattered the tottering empire of Persia, and extended his dominions from the Danube to the Indus, from the Caucasus and the Caspian to the Sudan. On his early death in 322—the Caudine disaster was in 321—his generals scrambled for his conquests; and the three who survived, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, found themselves masters respectively of three kingdoms, which took their names from Syria, Egypt, and Macedon itself. To Syria went the whole of the old Persian empire in Asia, except Judaea, Phoenicia, and parts of the shores of Asia Minor. Egypt became a Mediterranean sea-power, which held the coast-lands (just named) of Syria and Asia Minor; the Greek settlements round Cyrene; the rich island of Cyprus; Samos, Ephesus, and Thasos, in the Aegean, and a number of other towns among the islands, and on the coast of Thrace. Macedon retained its old European dependencies, and the precarious mastery of the city-states of Greece.

The balance of power thus created was, however, disturbed in several ways during the century which followed. Egypt, though rich, and still of some strength at sea, was governed by the house of Ptolemy weakly and extravagantly, and lost all her Syrian provinces to the descendants of Seleucus; but in art, in learning, and in commerce, her new capital, Alexandria, attained the highest place in the whole Hellenistic world.

The latter, however, in their turn lost a large part of their possessions, east of the Euphrates, to the new Parthian kingdom of Arsaces in 250, and removed their capital from Seleucia on the Euphrates to Antioch on the Orontes ; which was named

Syria. after Antiochus the son of Seleucus, and became the most splendid of the innumerable Greek foundations with which both Alexander and his successors consolidated and Hellenised their conquests. North of Mount Taurus, the kingdom of Syria lost most of its original possessions.

Galatia. Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia threw off all but a nominal allegiance. An invasion of Gaulish tribes—Tolistoboi, Trocmi, and Tectosages—burst through Thrace and Phrygia about 280, and established Celtic states in Galatia in the heart of the peninsula.

The north-western districts, Mysia and Hellespontine Phrygia, cut off by the Gauls from the rest of the Syrian kingdom, were rescued from ruin by an able merchant-prince named **Pergamum.** Attalus, and formed into a new kingdom, which had its capital at Pergamum, in the valley of the Caicus, and pursued an enlightened policy of naval and commercial enterprise, and patronage of Greek literature and art. Syria indeed had attempted in vain, between 234 and 228, to recover her former dependencies and nip the kingdom of Pergamum in the bud ; but had soon learned to let Attalus alone and look elsewhere for compensation.

The free Greek state of Rhodes, meanwhile, had profited by the balance of power, to develop a prosperous trade by sea, and to enrich itself, at the expense both of Syria and Egypt, by the annexation of Caria, Lycia, and many of the adjacent islands, till it became the Venice, as it were, of the Graeco-Roman world. In the same way, too, a few other Greek cities, like Byzantium, Cyzicus, and Abydus, had retained their independence and much of their prosperity ; though none of them had risen to at all the same importance as Rhodes.

Macedon. Macedon, too, had suffered severely from the invasions of the Gauls, and from the raids of the mountain tribes of Thrace. But its warlike population, and the superb military organisation which it inherited from Philip and Alexander, enabled the successors of Lysimachus to retain their hold on Thessaly, and to garrison three great fortresses (Map, p. 409), Demetrius on the Gulf of Pagasae, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth at the gateway of Peloponnese, which were justly called the 'Fetters of Greece.' Macedon, however, had no trade and no sea-power, and this gave to the free Greeks a countervailing advantage against its invincible phalanx.

Among the States of Greece, Athens and Sparta retained nominal independence. Athens, though still a great seat of learning and culture, had little real power, and was rapidly being transformed into a mere university town. Sparta had made one brave bid for reform under Agis IV. (244-241), and for freedom under Cleomenes III. (226-221); but the battle of Sellasia in 221 put her at the mercy of Macedon, and the death of her enlightened king plunged her again into anarchy, till, in 207, she fell wholly into the hands of a brigand and pirate named Nabis. Corinth and Chalcis, favoured above the rest of the ancient trading-cities by their geographical position, continued to enjoy a measure of commercial prosperity, and Delos was beginning to come to the front again. Of the other States, not one kept more than a shadow of its ancient self; and Crete and the smaller islands were nests of piracy and slave-stealing.

The Greek States.

The smaller States of western Greece, which had never fully developed a city-state form of government, adapted themselves more readily to the new state of things. In Aetolia and in Achaea they formed two large and well-organised leagues, each with a single president or commander-in-chief, a strong central executive, a federal council of representatives, and a mass meeting of the citizens of all the confederate towns, which the Aetolians held at Thermum, and the Achaeans at Aegium on the Gulf of Corinth. But the Aetolian League had been forced to make terms with Macedon in 217, and had betaken itself to such raiding and piracy along its seaboard as to attract the displeasure of Rome. The Achaeans, involved, by their ambition to be supreme in Peloponnese, in a quarrel with Sparta, had been persuaded by their great leader Aratus to follow the lead of Macedon and to surrender the fortress of Corinth; but they retained far more of the old Greek ideas of conduct and government than the Aetolians, and their present chief, Philopoemen, had been deeply impressed with the services which Rome had rendered to their cause in the Illyrian wars.

The Leagues of Aetolia and Achaea.

Such was the state of the eastern Mediterranean when the Romans first became involved in its affairs. The attempts of Greek adventurers like Alexander the Molossian, Archidamus of Sparta, and Pyrrhus to rescue the Greek towns of South Italy had warned them what they must expect as soon as they should reach the Ionian Sea. An embassy from Egypt in 273 had revealed the weakest of the three eastern kingdoms looking out already for a new military and naval ally; and to this Rome responded deliberately, on her own account in 238, after the First Punic War, and again in 210. Her protectorate of the Greek States in Italy, and the expansion of her

First contact of Rome with the Greek world.

own trade, soon brought her into collision with the Illyrians and spread the fame of the new pacific sea-power as far as Athens, Rhodes, and Pergamum; while it sent the arch-plotter Demetrius to poison the ears of the young king of Macedon (p. 171).

On Philip's ill-will to Rome were based the subtle calculations of Hannibal, which forced her in self-defence to ally herself yet more closely against despotism with the pacific, commercial, and freedom-loving States of the Aegean; and finally, in 202, a corps of some four thousand Macedonian adventurers had been caught fighting at Zama on the Carthaginian side. But the quarrel with Philip could wait. Rome had no wish to entangle herself in another war, or in the politics of the eastern Mediterranean. It was from Egypt, her ally, and not from Macedon, that the irresistible temptation came.

At the very moment when Philip was making his peace with the Aetolians and Rome, a sudden crisis arose between the three eastern kingdoms. In 205, Ptolemy IV. (Philopator) of Egypt died, leaving a son, Ptolemy Epiphanes, only five years old. The opportunity was too good to be lost, and the kings of Macedon and Syria concluded an unholy alliance for the spoliation of Egypt. Antiochus III. of Syria, who had called himself 'the Great' for some early wars with the Parthians, was to have Cyprus, Coele-Syria, and Palestine; with Egypt itself, if he could get it. Philip claimed, as his share, Cyrene, and the numerous possessions of Egypt on the shores and among the islands of the Aegean. The Egyptian court discovered the danger, and profited by its long-standing friendship with Rome to implore assistance. The Romans claimed afterwards that they had even been offered a protectorate over Egypt itself, and that they had appointed M. Aemilius Lepidus to be the guardian of the infant king.

The two kings lost no time in putting their scheme into execution. In the years 201-198 Antiochus gradually occupied Coele-Syria, while Egypt looked helplessly on, and no help came from Rome. Philip's enterprise was less easy. He had an understanding already with his son-in-law, King Prusias of Bithynia, and succeeded between 203 and 201 in making himself master of Thasos and most of the Egyptian towns on the Thracian coast, and in setting his foot firmly in the parts round the Hellespont. Lysimachia, the key of the Thracian Chersonese; Perinthus the dependency, and Chalcedon the Asiatic rival, of Byzantium; and Cius, at the gates of Bithynia, fell one after another into his hands; but the brutal enslavement of the Thasians and Cians roused

**Hostility of
Macedon.**

**Macedon
and Syria
combine to
plunder
Egypt,
205 B.C.**

**Antiochus
annexes
Coele-Syria.**

**Philip
conquers
Thrace and
invades
Asia Minor.**

universal indignation, and warned the Greek cities of the fate which threatened them. Pergamum and Rhodes, their hereditary protectors in Asia Minor, lost no time in declaring war, and were joined by Byzantium, which owed its very existence to its command of the Hellespont, and was moreover under old obligations to Rhodes. But Philip pressed on into Asia, captured Lampsacus, and ravaged the territory of Pergamum, while he attempted to besiege the city: sending on his fleet, meanwhile, and capturing the important town of Samos. The combined fleets of Pergamum and Rhodes defeated him between Chios and the mainland; but the fleet of Attalus retired in confusion, and the Rhodians were overtaken and beaten at Lade, and so lost Miletus and a considerable part of their possessions on the Carian mainland. Philip meanwhile returned to complete the conquest of the Thracian coast, and to repeat his former atrocities in the obstinate siege of Abydus, the capture of which was to secure his communications with Asia. But here he was confronted with M. Aemilius Lepidus, who commanded him to restore to Egypt her ancient possessions in the Aegean; to abstain from war with the Greek states; and to refer to arbitration his disputes with King Attalus and with the Rhodians. Philip returned a contemptuous answer, but was soon made aware of the presence, in the Aegean, of a Roman squadron of thirty-eight ships under Laevinus.

The
Romans
protest,
200 B.C.

The Romans had the strongest wish to avoid an eastern war; but they had been deeply wounded by the intrigues of Philip with Hannibal—futile as these had been—and they saw very well that so turbulent and unscrupulous a neighbour could not but disturb the balance of power, which they had striven to confirm in the Aegean. They had received urgent appeals for help from Attalus, from Rhodes, and from Athens, which had its private quarrel with Philip; and their previous relations with Athens (p. 170), as well as with Egypt, afforded them a clear pretext for interference. But when the Consul for 200, P. Sulpicius Galba, proposed to the Comitia that war should be declared with Philip, not one of the centuries was found to have voted in his favour. The Tribunes openly attacked both the Senate and the official circles at large, for their selfish and ruinous war-policy; and it was only through the rumour that Philip was in a position to throw his army into Italy, and after very substantial and ill-omened concessions to popular feeling, that the government was allowed to have its way. All the full citizens then on service were allowed to return to their homes, and only volunteers, of whom many were restless veterans of the late war, were enrolled for

Reluctance
of Rome to
begin a
new war.

the campaign against Philip. The allies, however, were retained with the standards and assigned to the garrisons of Italy and the western provinces of Sicily, Sardinia, and Cisalpine Gaul; and thus, at the very outset of Rome's career of conquest, a fatal step was taken to divorce the voting-force from the fighting-force of the State; to replace the old levies of yeomen by bodies of professional adventurers; and to establish new and invidious distinctions between the citizens and the Italian allies.

Of the new volunteer legions six were raised in all; but two were required for garrison duty round Rome, and two for Etruria, and only two of them actually crossed the water. A considerable fleet was sent in advance to Apollonia; and from this point a squadron was hurried round to the coast of Attica, where Philip's troops were ravaging the country with their accustomed barbarity, and wrecking all the historic tombs and other monuments within their reach. Philip was compelled to withdraw, and his strong fortress of Chalcis fell into the hands of the Romans and their allies.

The Romans cross the Adriatic, 200 B.C.

Late in the autumn Sulpicius crossed to Illyria, and attempted the invasion of Macedon by way of the valley of the Apsus; his right flank being protected by the friendly attitude of Epirus. But he had with him only two legions; the Aetolians held aloof, and he soon found himself in a position of extreme difficulty, and was obliged to retire to his base.

Sulpicius on the Apsus river.

It was still the policy of Rome, as in the former war, simply to organise in Greece a coalition strong enough to keep Philip in check; to weaken Macedon without destroying it; and if possible to avoid bringing upon themselves the hostility of King Antiochus. The last point was easily arranged. Antiochus had no love for Philip, and was still busily occupied in dismembering the eastern dependencies of Egypt; so that Lepidus was able to postpone anxiety in that quarter till a more convenient season, by the simple expedient of ignoring the clamours of Egypt.

Antiochus neutralised.

In the course of the winter, the Aetolians lost their hesitation; and on finding their contingents expelled from the garrisons of Cius and Lysimachia, they definitely joined the Romans. Sulpicius had made overtures also to the barbarian Dardani, in the upper valley of the Axius, and could count on help from Orestis, the westernmost district of Macedon itself. In the following spring a combined attack was made by Sulpicius on the west, by the Aetolians and Athamanians further south, and by the Dardanians on the north; while the fleet, in concert with that of Attalus, captured

Combined attack on Macedon, 199 B.C.

the depôt of Oreus in north Euboea, and threatened a diversion in rear. But the combination failed ; and the Achaean League which, with Sparta and Boeotia, had hitherto remained neutral, proposed openly, through its leader Philopoemen, to mediate between Philip and the Aetolians, in the hope of removing the excuse for Roman interference altogether. Philip had only twenty thousand men and two thousand cavalry, and the sparse population of Macedon had been sadly thinned by continuous wars abroad, and by the Gaulish invasion half a century before. Yet, isolated as he was through his own misdoings, and assailed on every side, he not only held his own, but advanced in the following winter, 199-198, to a strong position in the valley of the Aous, by which the Romans were now attempting to advance; and P. Villius, the Consul of 199, effected nothing at all. But with the arrival of his successor in 198 the whole situation changed.

T. Quinctius Flaminius was only thirty years of age, when a strong and influential party in Rome secured his election as Consul. He was an able general and a clear-headed statesman ; but his peculiar talent lay in his unrivalled knowledge of the Greek character, and his sympathy with its peculiar modes of thought. He soon made friends with the Epirotes, and, on the failure of his frontal attack upon Philip's position on the Aous, was put in possession of a circuitous path which completely commanded it ; and thus forced the king to throw open the road to Thessaly. Here Flaminius employed himself in harrying Philip's allies and blockading his fortresses, till the winter drove him into camp on the borders of Phocis and Locris. The fleet, which had captured Eretria and Carystus, was sent on to Cenchreae on the Isthmus to threaten the approaches to Peloponnese.

Arrival of
Flaminius,
198 B.C.

In the winter, Flaminius held a congress at Sicyon. The Achaean League was persuaded to join the Romans, and its fleet assisted in the blockade of Corinth ; which they were to have as their reward, if they could take it. Some States, however, and particularly Argos, dissented from the policy of the League ; and the operations at Corinth failed to prevent Philocles, Philip's general in Euboea, from effecting the relief of the fortress.

Congress of
the Greeks
at Sicyon.

By this time Philip was anxious to make peace. He had been forced to retire as far as Tempe ; all his allies in Greece were hostile or indifferent, and there was no sign of help from Antiochus. At a conference at Nicaea, near Thermopylae, he obtained from Flaminius a truce of two months, and the leave to send a deputation to Rome. But the Senate demanded nothing less than

Philip's
terms are
refused.



the evacuation of all Greece, and the surrender beforehand of its three fortress 'Fetters,' Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias. Philip preferred to continue the struggle, and by the gift of Argos tried to bribe Nabis, the tyrannical ruler of Sparta, to distract the attention of the Achaeans. Nabis took the bribe, but joined Flamininus, who was also supported now by the Boeotians.

His command in Greece had been prolonged *pro consule*—though only through the exertions of his friends and the vigorous support of the Tribunes—and he proposed to end the war by a decisive campaign in Thessaly. Leaving his allies to mask the fortress of Corinth in his rear, and escorted on the east coast by his fleet, he occupied Thebes at the end of the winter, and in south Thessaly met the army of Philip which had advanced to defend Demetrias. For some days the two armies moved westward on parallel lines through the hilly country between Pherae and Scotussa, but an affair of outposts in hazy weather, across the ridge of Cynoscephalae, gradually involved the main body on either side. Philip's

Decisive
battle of
Cynos
cephalae,
197 B.C.

army consisted of a phalanx of sixteen thousand Macedonians, with some ten thousand auxiliaries. The latter were severely handled, early in the action, by the cavalry of the Aetolians; and though the right wing of the phalanx was successful at first, the left became disordered by its downward charge over the uneven ground. The battle was decided by a manœuvre, like that of Nero at the Metaurus, which demonstrated the superior flexibility of the Roman legionary formation: twenty maniples were detached from the pursuit of Philip's beaten left, and flung round upon the rear of the unbroken right. Philip left on the field eight thousand Macedonians killed, and three thousand captured; while the Roman loss was only seven hundred men. He was forced by his defeat to evacuate Thessaly; and when the news came, in quick succession, of the capture of Corinth, of defeats in Acarnania, and of the failure of his forces in Caria to maintain themselves against the Rhodians, he lost no time in making peace with the Romans.

He surrendered all his conquests in Greece, Illyria, Thrace, and Asia Minor, gave up his fleet, reduced his army to five thousand men, and promised an indemnity of one thousand talents, half at once and half spread in instalments over the next ten years. On these severe terms he was admitted a 'friend and ally' of the Roman People, promising, like Carthage, to declare no war without their consent, and to conclude no alliance without their knowledge. A commission of ten Senators was sent, early in 196, to arrange the details with Flaminius.

It was not the object of Rome to annihilate Macedon, which, once rendered powerless against the Adriatic and Italy, would prove a valuable barrier against Gallic and Thracian invasions, and a necessary counterpoise to the leagues of the Greek States. In the same way, the Romans had no intention of enlarging their territory at the expense of the Greeks. They had promised repeatedly to respect their independence; they more than half believed what they had heard, of their former genius for self-government; and Flaminius at least was determined to give them every opportunity of justifying their reputation. A free, strong, and friendly confederacy of Greek States would be the surest guarantee against the ambition of Macedon or the greed of Syria, and would offer the most favourable prospect, eastward, for the peaceful expansion of Roman commerce.

Freedom and independence therefore were proclaimed, at the Isthmian Games of 196, to all Greeks who had been subject to Macedon. But so incredible did the magnanimity of Rome appear, that the assembled multitude could not believe their ears, and Flaminius, it is said, had to order the herald to recite the procla-

Terms of
peace.

Roman
policy in the
East.

Flaminius
declares the
Greek states
free, 196 B.C.

mation again before they could be convinced. They had so long been the sport of one despot after another, that the best they had looked for was the usual change of masters. They threw themselves with one accord upon the neck of Flaminius, and nearly smothered their deliverer in their joy.

It was only when the Roman commissioners proceeded to distribute the liberated districts among existing political organisations, that the difficulties of the scheme became apparent. The only power which could be disregarded safely was Egypt, which had given no help, and received no compensation beyond the nominal restoration of its possessions in Thrace and Asia Minor. The Achaean League received Heraea and Triphylia, in southern Elis; but was exhorted to live at peace for the future with Messenia and Sparta! Athens, already the object of Rome's especial consideration, was duly compensated for its losses at the outbreak of the war by the restoration of Paros, Scyros, and Imbros; so Boeotia sulked. The Aetolians recovered Phocis and Locris, and most of their former dependencies in the west; but Thessaly was made a separate group of four independent districts; and Philip's conquests in Illyria were reserved to King Pleuratus of Scodra. Rome, for her part, still delayed to surrender the 'Fetters of Greece,' or to admit that it was the Aetolian contingent which had really won the battle of Cynos Cephalaë! She expected her 'friends and allies' in Greece to refrain, like Philip, from harrying one another without her leave; and the complaint was already heard among the Greeks that it was only a change of masters after all.

Nabis of Sparta detained the Romans in Greece for another two years. He did not see why he should lose his piratical livelihood, or surrender Argos to the Achaeans after evading his compact with Philip. But in 195-4 he was attacked by the Romans, the Achaeans, and King Attalus at the same moment; and surrendered after a brave resistance. He lost Argos, Messenia, and his pirate strongholds in Crete; and the client-towns on the coast of Laconia were made free and independent. But he was too useful as a check upon the Achaean League to be suppressed altogether, as he deserved.

At last the work of Flaminius was accomplished. At a farewell congress at Corinth, in 194, he exhorted the Greeks—how vainly, it took but a very few years to show—to 'use their freedom wisely'; withdrew his garrisons from the 'Fetters of Greece'; and returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph, only less brilliant than that of Scipio; in which the gratitude of his Greek friends was attested by a procession of twelve hundred Roman

Roman
garrisons
withdraw
from Greece,
194 B.C.

prisoners freely ransomed by them at his request. Rome had gained nothing by the war but the honourable prestige of the championship of Greek independence. It remained for the Greeks themselves, corrupt, degenerate, and impracticable as they had shown themselves to be, to work out their own salvation under the new *régime*.

CHIEF DATES.

Death of Alexander the Great	322
Gaulish invasion: Attalus founds the kingdom of Pergamum	about 280
Syria loses its Eastern Provinces: capital moved to Antioch	about 250
Macedon and Syria combine to plunder Egypt	205
Rome declares war on Macedon	200
Battle of Cynos Cephalae	197
Flamininus declares the Greek states free	196
Roman garrisons withdrawn from the 'Fetters of Greece'	194

CHIEF PERSONS.

M. Aemilius Lepidus—P. Sulpicius Galba—T. Quinctius Flamininus—Philip V. of Macedon—Antiochus III. of Syria—Ptolemy V. of Egypt—Attalus of Pergamum—Prusias of Bithynia—Aratus—Philopoemen—Nabis.

CHIEF PLACES.

Antioch—Pergamum—Rhodes—Byzantium—Abydus—Athens—Sparta—Thermon—Aegium—Apollonia—Apsus Fl.—Aous Fl.—Axius Fl.—Oreus—Demetrias—Chalcis—Corinth—Cenchreae—Sicyon—Cynos Cephalae.

SUBJECTS.

The state of the Eastern Mediterranean from Alexander to Philip V.
 The spread of Hellenism and the decay of political life in old Greece.
 Roman policy in the East, particularly towards the Greeks.
 The military organisation of Macedon; the meeting of *phalanx* and *legion*.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF SYRIA

Antiochus—Invasion of Europe—Hannibal at the Court of Antiochus—Antiochus crosses to Greece—Battle of Thermopylae—L. Scipio sent to invade Asia—Battles of Myonesus and Magnesia—Roman settlement of the Aegean—Galatian War—Settlement of Greece—Results of Roman intervention.

THE only person left out of the reckoning, in the Roman settlement of Greece, was Antiochus the Great, of Syria, who had taken advantage of **Aggressions of Antiochus.** Philip's preoccupation with the Romans to carry out, on his own account, that spoliation of Egypt, which he had arranged in concert with Macedon. In 198 he had won a victory at Mount Panium, in North Palestine, over the army of Egypt, which had secured to him the possession of Coele-Syria; but, seeing how things were going in the Aegean, he had nominally restored these conquests as the dowry of his daughter Cleopatra, whom he betrothed to the young king of Egypt. Rome had, therefore, no occasion now to pose as the champion of the oppressed in that quarter, and Antiochus was free to turn his attention northwards. In deference, however, to the protest of the Romans, with whom he did not want to pick another quarrel, he desisted for the moment from an attack on Pergamum, which he had planned in 198.

Philip had been forced, as we have seen, to withdraw from the Egyptian dependencies in the Aegean; and in the winter of 197-6 **He invades Europe.** Antiochus was able to advance unopposed to the Hellespont, and to rebuild the fortress of Lysimachia, on the European side, which had been destroyed after the retreat of Philip. But meanwhile Rome had proclaimed 'free and independent' all Greeks who had been subject to Macedon. Smyrna, Troas, and Lampsacus made a vigorous resistance to Antiochus, and on his arrival in Europe he was met by a message from Flaminius summoning him not only to recognise the freedom of the Greek States, which Rome had proclaimed, but also to retire from the districts which had formerly belonged to Philip, the 'friend and ally' of the Roman People. It will be observed that there was still no mention of the claims of Egypt; Antiochus was represented as the despoiler, not

of Ptolemy, but of Philip ; so as to secure at least the neutrality of the latter, if a war with Syria should prove to be unavoidable. Antiochus retorted with some dignity that he was, but reuniting the heritage of Alexander the Great, and recommended the Romans to mind their own business.

The Romans were as anxious as ever to avoid a conflict with what they had been taught to regard as the greatest kingdom of the East, and the successor of the empire of the Persians. They were still engaged, as we have seen, not only in Greece, but in Cisalpine Gaul and in Spain (pp. 235-7), and they were glad enough to believe the assurances of Antiochus that he was but reconquering what was his own.

Reluctance
of the
Romans to
interfere.

But two events occurred, which they could not safely overlook. The first, an expedition sent in 195 to Cyprus, which was still a dependency of Egypt, and valuable for its wealth of minerals and ship-timber, made it clear that Antiochus did not intend to confine himself to the mainland ; and provoked urgent representations to Rome from Eumenes of Pergamum, who had succeeded his father Attalus in 197 ; as well as from Rhodes, and all the smaller States of the Aegean, who were exposed to the like aggression. The other event was the arrival of Hannibal at the court of Antiochus.

Protests of
the Aegean
States.

Hannibal had not been able to remain long in Carthage. He had attempted to reform and widen the narrow oligarchic government, but the ingratitude and treacherous hatred of his countrymen had already driven him into exile. Faithful, therefore, to the oath of his boyhood, ' never to be the friend of Rome,' he betook himself to the court of Syria, the last great power that was left, which could be made the centre of a world-wide coalition. His advice to Antiochus was, briefly, to secure Philip and, if possible, Eumenes also, as his ally ; to detach the Greek States, by any means, from their new alliance with Rome ; and to direct conjointly all the forces of the East upon Italy ; believing that, in that case, even Carthage might be roused to renew the struggle ; and that he himself could raise again the Spaniards and Gauls in the west, as soon as the attention of Rome was sufficiently occupied elsewhere.

Hannibal at
the court of
Antiochus.

But Antiochus was too little of a statesman or a general, to carry through, or even to comprehend, so vast a design. With oriental slackness and irresolution, he threw away his opportunity, and gave Rome ample time to wind up her settlement of Greece, and to plant the numerous maritime colonies of 194 to defend the southern shores of Italy. The Romans would still gladly have

Antiochus
misses his
opportunity.

given him a free hand in Asia, if he would have undertaken to retire from Thrace; and demonstrated their peaceful intentions by withdrawing their own troops from the fortresses of Greece. Antiochus meanwhile began to prepare his ground by such concessions to the Asiatic cities, as he hoped would secure him a loyal base in the Aegean; and lent a favourable ear to the invitations of discontented Greeks on the European side.

The Aetolians had by this time persuaded themselves that in the late war they had been hoodwinked and ill-treated by the Romans. Macedon

The Aetolians invite Antiochus to Greece, 193 B.C.

continued to exist, and the 'victors of Cynos Cephalae' were debarred, by their treaty with Rome, from completing its destruction. They therefore took upon themselves, in 193-2, to invite all the available despots—Antiochus, Philip, and

Nabis—to stand up for the rights of free Greece. But Philip, who knew more about Antiochus, and feared him a good deal more than he did the Aetolians, remained loyal to Rome; and received in return a substantial remission of his tribute, the surrender of his hostages, and some extension of his territory. Nabis attempted to recover the Laconian seaboard; but the Achaean league, under Philopoemen, was upon him in a moment; a Roman squadron appeared at Gythium; and Nabis was murdered by his Aetolian friends, who coveted his country for themselves. Antiochus alone, flattered by the protestations of the Aetolians, and wholly against the advice of Hannibal, who knew well what Greek enthusiasms

His arrival and reception.

were worth, accepted their invitation, crossed over into Greece with a small force in 192, and occupied Demetrias and Chalcis. But he misjudged the sentiment of the greater

part of Greece. Elis and Messenia alone declared in his favour; Epirus and Boeotia held themselves aloof; and Philopoemen, who had forced Sparta after all to join the Achaeans, declared war upon Antiochus as soon as he landed.

Rome was now bound to interfere. Macedon was directly threatened by the invasion of Thessaly. Bithynia and Byzantium, Pergamum,

The Romans collect an army in Greece.

Rhodes, and Egypt were all on her side. The majority of the Greek States were thoroughly afraid of Antiochus, and the ridiculously small force—only ten thousand men and five hundred cavalry—with which he made his appearance,

and the futility of his operations in Thessaly, produced a sudden reaction, even among his friends. A small Roman force, under Appius Claudius, was landed at Apollonia in the autumn of 192, and the king retired for the winter to Chalcis.

He had utterly thrown away his opportunity. By the following spring

the Romans were in superior force in Greece, and the main army of Antiochus had not yet arrived. They had doubled their fleet at once ; and soon concentrated at Larissa an army of ^{Battle at Thermopylae,} forty thousand men under M' Acilius Glabrio, including a ^{191 B.C.} large body of African cavalry, and even a corps of elephants. In face of this force Antiochus evacuated Thessaly, and prepared, in the pass of Thermopylae, to defend his hold on Central Greece until his main body should arrive. Here he would have had little difficulty in repelling a mere frontal attack ; but his Aetolian allies, posted on Mount Callidromus to guard the same flanking path which had been the ruin of Leonidas in 480, were scattered by a small force under M. Porcius Cato, who, though of consular rank, was serving under Glabrio as a mere military tribune. Attacked in front and in flank together, the whole force of Antiochus was cut to pieces ; the fleet cut off his communications with Chalcis and with Asia ; and the king himself barely escaped to Ephesus with an escort of some five hundred men.

Philip meanwhile had recovered Demetrias, and had invaded the territory of the Aetolians ; and though the latter, with the Athamanians, still held out in strong positions at Heraclea and Naupactus, the rest of the Greek allies of Antiochus submitted at once. ^{War between Philip and the Aetolians.} Heraclea soon fell, and the Aetolians proposed to discuss the situation ; but Glabrio did not understand these Greek ways, and refused to listen to them. On the mediation of Flamininus, however, a truce was concluded, and negotiations were begun.

The Consuls for the following year were C. Laelius and L. Cornelius Scipio, the brother of Africanus. Through the influence of his family, rather than through any merit of his own, the latter secured the command in the east, but only on the understanding ^{L. Scipio sent to invade Asia.} that Africanus should accompany him and really direct the operations. Once more it was clear that an offensive strategy would soonest end the war. Besides, in Asia Antiochus was on his own ground, and the only chance of saving Pergamum and Rhodes was an immediate invasion in force ; and, for this, three thousand veterans volunteered to serve with their old commander. A six months' truce was concluded with the Aetolians ; and though the direct sea-route was not yet fully open, the long land-journey through Macedon and Thrace was accomplished without mishap, through the loyal support of Philip, and of Prusias of Bithynia.

The Roman fleet, however, had not been idle. Acting in concert with the squadrons of Pergamum and Rhodes, its commander, C. Livius, had already met the navy of Antiochus in 191, and after defeating it

at sea at Cape Corycus, had shut up its admiral, Polyxenidas, in the harbour of Ephesus; and then, in the following spring, had succeeded, after a severe struggle, in taking Sestos in the Hellespont.

Successes of the Roman fleet in the Aegean.

But in the winter Hannibal had created a new fleet in Syria; and meantime, while L. Aemilius Regillus, the successor of Livius, was decoyed away for a moment to Teos, Polyxenidas broke through the blockade of Ephesus. But Hannibal's squadron

Battle of Myonnesus, 190 B.C.

was delayed and defeated at the Eurymedon—almost on the site of Cimon's victory in 466; and at Myonnesus, between Teos and its own base at Ephesus, the fleet of Polyxenidas was shattered, with the loss of forty-two ships; both victories being mainly due to the seamanship of the Rhodian squadron and the skill of its admiral Eudemus.

On Antiochus the effect of these naval defeats was immediate. Even before the Roman army appeared he withdrew from Lysimachia, gave up the defence of the Hellespont, and concentrated his enormous forces in Lydia. At the same time he offered

Antiochus retires from the Hellespont.

voluntarily to resign his claims in Europe, and the Greek towns which were the excuse for the war; attempting, meanwhile, to bribe Africanus. Even in Asia, meanwhile, his position was not undisputed. Prusias and Eumenes were active on the side of the Romans; his flank was threatened by the fleet of the Rhodians; and his rear by their energetic action in their mainland territories.

In reply to his proposals, the Romans demanded the complete evacuation of Asia Minor, and the recognition of the Taurus Range as his northern frontier; and the king chose to continue the

Roman invasion of Asia.

struggle, rather than submit to these humiliating conditions. But instead of retreating into the interior, and tempting the Roman army to follow him into the mountain-passes of Phrygia, he resolved to confront them with his whole force where he was. Summoning contingents from Galatia, Paphlagonia, and Lycaonia, and from King Ariarathes of Cappadocia, he advanced into the valley of the Hermus, and occupied a strong position near Magnesia, on the slopes of Mount Sipylus. The winter was approaching, and the Romans were anxious to fight before the weather compelled them to withdraw; moreover, they had never met an enemy whom they held in such utter contempt as the Syrians. L. Scipio was ill, but Cn. Domitius took command of the force, which numbered some thirty thousand men, of whom five thousand were Achaeans and Pergamenes, and two thousand Macedonians and Thracians.

Antiochus, instead of allowing the Romans to attack him on Mount

Sipylus, threw away all the advantage of the ground he had selected, and drew out his huge force across the river. It was a gigantic array. In the centre was a phalanx of sixteen thousand men, divided into deep columns by fighting elephants in pairs; on the flanks were a mixed multitude of chariots and camel-corps, with archers, and other light troops—sixty thousand men in all, besides twelve thousand cavalry. The Romans, who could scarcely even see the whole extent of the vast line opposed to them, rested their left on a tributary stream of the Hermus, and stationed Eumenes with the whole of the cavalry to cover their right. When the battle began, Eumenes had little difficulty in driving in the left wing of the enemy upon the centre, so that the phalanx fell into disorder before it came into action at all. The right wing of Antiochus had some success to begin with, but was soon hurriedly recalled; only to find the vast mass of horses, camels, elephants, and scythed chariots already in hopeless disorder, and too closely packed even to take refuge in flight. The legions had hardly needed to strike a blow, yet more than fifty thousand of the enemy were left on the field; while the total Roman loss was less than four hundred men, of whom the greater part belonged to the division commanded by Eumenes.

Antiochus submitted at once to the terms of the Romans, which, though considerably harsher than before, still showed no sign of a policy of annexation, and were simply intended to re-establish the balance of power, and to keep Syria at arm's-length from the Aegean. Antiochus surrendered all his possessions west of the Taurus and the river Halys, and undertook not to send ships of war beyond Cape Sarpedon on the coast of Cilicia. Even east of the Halys, the kingdoms of Cappadocia and Armenia were to remain practically free, and were launched henceforward on an independent career of their own. The king gave up all his elephants, and all ships of war except ten; and paid the enormous indemnity of fifteen thousand talents. Further, he undertook to surrender all the enemies of Rome who had taken refuge at his court: for, with Hannibal at large, Rome might still feel herself insecure. For the moment, however, Hannibal made his escape.

Antiochus had been defeated; but the more difficult business remained of distributing the fruits of the victory among the dependants and allies of the Romans. Galatia, Paphlagonia, and Bithynia (where Prusias was retained as king) formed a chain of weak buffer-states between the Halys frontier and an enlarged kingdom of Pergamum. Eumenes received the Thracian Chersonese and all Mysia, Phrygia, Lycaonia, and Pamphylia, together

Battle of
Magnesia,
190 B.C.

Antiochus
submits.

Roman
settlement
of the
Aegean.
(Map, p. 261.)

with Lydia, and all Caria north of the Maeander. He became the 'friend and ally' of Rome, and was required to protect the coasts of the Aegean from Thracian and Galatian marauders; and we find him, shortly afterwards, in definite alliance with Ariarathes of Cappadocia. The Rhodians gained Caria south of the Maeander, and all Lycia, and were bound by a similar understanding to keep Syria within its treaty limits. Finally, all the Greek states, which had not been tributary to Eumenes before, were declared free and independent; thus carrying out, as far as possible, the policy already inaugurated in Greece. The Scipios then returned with their enormous booty to Rome, leaving part of the army under the new Consul, Cn. Manlius Vulso, to supervise the execution of the treaty.

The Galatian Celts had lost a considerable part of their territory to Eumenes. But they had been among the most valiant of the allies of Antiochus, and were still the terror of their neighbours.

Vulso makes war on the Galatians, 189 B.C.

Vulso wanted an occupation for his men—perhaps also a triumph for himself; so against the advice of the peace commissioners, without consulting the Senate, and apparently wholly unprovoked, he marched first through Cibyratis and Pamphylia, and then into Galatia, defeating the Gauls in a great battle near Mount Olympus in Phrygia, desolating their country, and recovering vast quantities of spoil which had accumulated from their innumerable raids. It was the first time that a proconsul had so flagrantly exceeded his instructions from home, and the first time also that a Roman army had undertaken an expedition in the search for plunder mainly; and well would it have been for Rome if it had been the last. The Senate, however, does not seem to have interfered, and Vulso received a triumph; though he was nearly cut off by the Thracians on his way back to Italy.

Meanwhile, the truce which had been concluded in Greece (p. 255) seems to have bound no one but the Romans. Philip went on with the war against the Aetolians and Athamanians on his own account, and

Subjection of the Aetolians, 189 B.C.

Rome still refused to hear of anything but an unconditional surrender of the malcontents. But in 189 the Aetolians, deceived by false news of the doings of Antiochus, broke the truce with Rome, and drew upon themselves the combined forces of Rome, Macedon, and the loyal Greek states, under the command of the colleague of Vulso, M. Fulvius Nobilior. Further resistance was hopeless, and their appeals for peace were supported by Athens and Rhodes, who did not wish to see either Macedon, or Rome, left without a sufficient counterpoise. At last Fulvius consented to negotiate, and the Senate

ratified the severe terms which he proposed. The Aetolians surrendered their last fortress, Ambracia; gave up their claim to the territory already captured by Philip and the Achaeans; paid an indemnity of five hundred talents; acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome; and promised to furnish her with troops. They continued, however, to hold a large part of central and western Greece.

This peace set Rome free to complete the settlement of the peninsula. Philip was confirmed in possession of his recent conquests; but the Thracian Chersonese had been already given to Eumenes by the treaty, and the Greek towns of Thrace remained free, as before. The Achaean League was allowed to incorporate Elis, Messenia, Laconia, and all the remaining states of the Peloponnese, which thus came for the first time under a single political organisation; but when they clamoured for the possession of Zacynthus, they were met with the reminder that 'the tortoise is safest within its shell.' Zacynthus, with Cephallenia (which was expressly excluded from the treaty), remained in the hands of the Romans, and completed the line of their naval stations in the Adriatic. The settlement of Greece was now outwardly complete, and Fulvius returned to Rome; taking with him, however, many fine works of art from Ambracia, the ancient capital of Pyrrhus; and sowing, thereby, new seeds of doubt as to the disinterestedness of Roman policy. The last check on the fanatical patriots and calculating politicians of Achaea was, moreover, removed shortly after by the death of the far-sighted and high-principled Philopoemen, who at the age of seventy was captured in a border quarrel with the Messenians, and poisoned by them in prison in 183.

The last hope, too, of a wide coalition against Rome, died the same year, with Hannibal. After the treaty with Antiochus (p. 257), which was intended to secure his surrender, he took refuge for a while among the pirate cities of Crete; but reappeared again some years later at the court of Bithynia. Here, for a time, he seemed to be secure; for Prusias had a standing quarrel with Eumenes of Pergamum, who, in turn, was the protégé of Rome. But it was not long before the faithless Prusias saw his chance of rendering an invaluable service to the conquering power; and Hannibal only escaped surrender by suicide.

Thus, in eleven years, Rome had broken up the kingdoms of the Diadochi, the 'successors' of Alexander, and had completely altered the balance of power in the East. Macedon had been driven out of Greece, and Syria out of Asia Minor, while Egypt had lost all her foreign possessions except Cyprus and Cyrene. All the smaller states, on the other hand, had been sustained

Settlement of Greece.

Death of Hannibal.

Results of Roman intervention in the East.

and augmented under the protectorate of Rome; and this protectorate it was her constant policy henceforward to maintain, with the isolation of its individual members, as in Italy, as its corollary. In this task she was materially aided by the jealousies which existed between the smaller states, and the internal weakness of such larger aggregates as the kingdom of Pergamum. But it was not long before the inherent difficulties of such a policy made themselves felt; and the question became pressing in the East, just as in Sicily and in Africa, whether annexation was not inevitable after all. The forces of the greater East, too, were only repelled for a time; and the struggle which opened for Rome on the Hellespont was to be closed more than a century later on the Euphrates.

CHIEF DATES.

Antiochus defeats the Egyptians in Palestine	198
„ invades Thrace	195
„ crosses by sea into Greece	192
Battle of Thermopylae: Antiochus retires to Asia	191
Naval War in the Aegean: Battle of Corycus, 191; of Myonnesus	190
Roman invasion of Asia: Battle of Magnesia	190
Galatian raid of Vulso: Submission of the Aetolians	189
Death of Hannibal and Philopoemen	183

CHIEF PERSONS.


M' Acilius Glabrio—M. Porcius Cato—L. Aemilius Regillus—C. Livius—
L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus—C. Laelius—Antiochus III. of Syria—
Hannibal—Polyxenidas—Eudemus—Eumenes of Pergamum.

CHIEF PLACES.

Mount Panium—Lysimachia—Chalcis—Apollonia—Thermopylae—
Heraclea—Naupactus—Cape Corycus—Ephesus—Teos—Myonnesus—
Hermus Fl.—Magnesia—Taurus Mons—Halys Fl.—Zacynthus—
Cephalenia—Ambracia.

SUBJECTS.

The ingratitude of the Greek states.
The growth of Roman sea-power.
The new balance of power in Asia Minor.



CHAPTER XXII

THE WAR WITH PERSEUS OF MACEDON

The grievances of Philip of Macedon—The schemes of Perseus—The successes of Eumenes—The Third Macedonian War—Its results in Rome—and in the East.

Of all the allies of Rome, in the war with Antiochus, none had been so scantily rewarded as Philip of Macedon. His services in facilitating the Roman advance into Asia, and in distracting the attention of the disaffected Aetolians, had been invaluable. Yet he had been excluded from Thessaly and from the Thracian coast, and was left exposed to the intrigues and annoyances of his Greek neighbours. Even the Magnesian country, with the fortress of Demetrias, and the Greek towns of Aenus and Maroneia in Thrace, which were all that he had been allowed to annex, were taken from him again in 185-4, in consequence of complaints and accusations made by the Greeks to Rome. Philip knew, however, that open protest would do him more harm than good, and devoted himself to steady and patient reorganisation of his kingdom; improving the social condition and the material prosperity of his people, developing his revenue, strengthening his frontiers, and creating friendly relations with his immediate neighbours.

The Romans watched his proceedings with alarm, and took advantage of the mission of his son Demetrius, who had been educated in Italy as a hostage, and now was sent back to Rome with explanations, to sow dissensions in Macedon itself, and create a Roman party there. But Perseus, the half-brother of Demetrius, whose title to the throne, though inferior, had already been recognised by the Romans, regarded him as a dangerous rival, and made the conduct of Demetrius appear so questionable, that Philip had him put to death on his return. Then, too late, the old king discovered the deception, and died broken-hearted in 179; leaving Perseus to succeed him, unpunished and undisputed.

The
grievances
of Philip of
Macedon.

Perseus
plots to
succeed him,
179 B.C.

Perseus was careful to renew the Roman alliance at once, while he completed the preparations which his father had begun. He was a cool-headed, business-like and unscrupulous man, economical even to avarice, and cautious to the verge of timidity ; and having none of his father's passionate enthusiasm, enterprise, and resolution, he failed signally, when the decisive moment came, to make use of the really formidable forces which he had collected. He was already related, by the marriage of his sister, to King Prusias of Bithynia, and himself took to wife the daughter of Seleucus IV., who had succeeded Antiochus in Syria in 187. He had cultivated the friendship of the Rhodians, of the chiefs of Thrace and Illyria, and even of the Bastarnæ, beyond the Danube : the latter he hoped to use as a counterpoise to the Dardani on his own north frontier, who had been of great service to the Romans in the former war (p. 246), and had a standing agreement with them. In the several states of Greece he sedulously cultivated the friendship, while he flattered the ambition, of anti-Roman patriots and democratic factions ; visiting Delphi and other important centres in state, and posing successfully as a second Alexander, who should lead Macedon once more to the conquest of the world, at the head of a triumphant and expansive Greece.

Thus the whole of the peninsula gradually drew apart into a Roman and a Macedonian party, both vigorously active in grouping old feuds in new and disastrous combinations, and undermining, alike, the old spirit of independence, and the new protectorate of Rome. The young Antiochus Epiphanes, also, who had succeeded Seleucus in Syria in 175, encouraged the intrigues of his brother-in-law, and began to play upon the vanity of the Greeks by the erection of public buildings and costly dedications, in Rhodes, in Athens, and in the more susceptible towns of the Achaean League.

The crisis was precipitated by the jealousy of the King of Pergamum. Eumenes had been engaged, since the Roman settlement of Asia in 189, in enlarging his borders at the expense, first, of Bithynia, the last unavailing refuge of Hannibal (p. 259) ; and then of Pontus, Armenia, and the Greek states in the Euxine. His victims were encouraged and supported by the King of Syria ; while Eumenes, on his part, was backed vigorously by Ariarathes of Cappadocia, and at first, though always ineffectively, by Rome. A decisive victory, however, which he won in 179, caused the Romans to view his unexpected successes with mixed feelings, and marks the turning-point in their relations with Pergamum.

The schemes
of Perseus.

Old feuds
and new
parties in
Greece.

The successes
of Eumenes
of Pergamum,
189-179 B.C.

A Thracian raid upon Macedon in 172 led to the customary appeal to Rome, and Eumenes took the opportunity to appear in Rome in person, and to ingratiate himself with the Senate by revealing all that he knew about the intrigues of Perseus. On his way home, he was set upon and nearly murdered at Delphi ; and the Romans, rightly or wrongly, regarded Perseus as responsible. Perseus thereupon denounced the treaty with Rome, and the Senate was not sorry for the excuse to rearrange the affairs of Macedon. Perseus had, it is true, no fortresses, and phalanx-fighting had been shown by the former war to be out of date ; but Macedon was prosperous and contented, and devoted to himself and his family ; and he had friends enough in Greece and elsewhere, who were only waiting for the first victory to declare themselves openly on his side. Macedon, therefore, was by this time well prepared for war, and should have struck hard and at once ; for the Romans had allowed everything to go to pieces since the settlement of 189, and now were obliged to gain time by a pretence of negotiation.

Perseus, however, threw away his opportunity, and allowed the Romans time, first to assure themselves that the Aetolians and Achaeans were for the most part loyal, and to commit to the latter the charge of the fortress of Chalcis ; then to dissolve the Boeotian League, which was the centre of Macedonian feeling, and to secure the support of most of its members separately ; and further, to send representations to the courts of Bithynia, Pergamum, Syria, and Egypt, and to the free states of Byzantium and Rhodes, which succeeded in dissolving the very coalition on which Perseus had counted, before a single blow had been delivered.

In the spring of 171, P. Licinius Crassus crossed into Epirus with thirty thousand men, and was joined by some twenty thousand more from the loyal states in Greece ; while a fleet under C. Lucretius sailed round into the Aegean and ravaged the coast of Boeotia. Crassus made his way unopposed into Thessaly, and occupied Larissa, whence he had intended to join hands with the fleet. But Perseus, who was strongly posted at Tempe, interposed, and inflicted on him a considerable cavalry defeat at Sycurium, in the low ground below Mount Ossa, which drove the Romans back north of the Peneus. An indecisive battle at Phalanna put Perseus in turn in fear for his communications, so he withdrew from Thessaly and remained on the defensive on his southern frontier. Reassured in front, however, he renewed his understanding with Cotys, King of Thrace, and developed his preparations in the north ; while he began to intrigue

The third
Macedonian
War,
172-168 B.C.

Roman
counter-
moves.

Campaign
of Crassus
in Thessaly,
171 B.C.

with Epirus, and with a worthless Illyrian, Genthius, who had succeeded King Pleuratus at Scodra.

The Romans, finding Macedon harder to conquer than they had imagined, occupied the winter in pillaging their Greek allies. Chalcis in particular suffered very severely, and was so stripped of its works of art by the incapable Lucretius, that the Senate was obliged to interfere and to cancel his command. The Consul of 170, A. Hostilius Mancinus, failed equally either to enter Macedon or to restore the discipline of his army. He was expelled from Epirus, which now definitely joined Perseus, and found himself cut off from his base; while a force under Appius Claudius was defeated more than once in the attempt to keep touch with the sea through Illyria. Perseus, on his part, continued inaccessible, still plotting and preparing among the mountains.

Roman
mismanage-
ment,
170 B.C.

In the next year, 169, Q. Marcius Philippus succeeded Hostilius, and fared somewhat better. He attempted a combined attack by land and sea; masked and outflanked the Macedonian defence of Tempe; and then, by a hazardous movement over the slopes of Mount Olympus, rejoined his fleet on the narrow coast plain south of Diium. For the moment Perseus had the Romans in a trap, but again he missed his chance: the fortresses of Tempe surrendered, and he retired from his strong post at Diium to the line of the river Elpius; cutting off the supplies of the Roman army, however, and reducing it to great straits. Meanwhile, with characteristic parsimony, he refused to subsidise twenty thousand of the Bastarnae, who offered to come to his aid; and cut off his subsidies to Genthius, just when the latter had committed himself irrevocably by the capture of a Roman envoy.

Philippus
penetrates
into Mace-
don, 169 B.C.

These ill-timed economies, however, were counterbalanced at the moment by the general disposition in his favour. The demoralisation of the Romans could be concealed no longer; Perseus himself had never intended to push his quarrel to extremities; and there appeared to be some prospect of a peace. Eumenes, indeed, was irreconcilable, for he had been fishing with success in troubled waters, and had already captured more than he could hope to retain when once Rome had her hands free; but both Antiochus and Ptolemy were disposed to mediate; and the Rhodians, whose commerce was being ruined by the war, threw aside for the moment their customary cautious diplomacy, and declared that they would make war forthwith upon whichever side refused to submit to arbitration.

Prospects
of peace.

The silly threat of the Rhodians could be safely ignored; but the

Senate was now fully alive to the scandals which the war had provoked, and L. Aemilius Paullus, a son of the commander at Cannae, was elected L. Aemilius Paullus Consul for 168, to bring the affair to an end. He was a poor man, and already sixty years of age, but was of noble family and unblemished character; and had already shown considerable military ability in the wars in Spain and Liguria. Moreover, he was one of the most cultured and open-minded of the friends of the Scipios; and one of his sons, the future conqueror of Carthage, had been adopted by the childless Africanus as his heir.

He brought with him large reinforcements, and at once put a stop to the pillage and disorder which had disgraced the army in Thessaly.

Battle of Pydna, 168 B. C. The Greeks saw what was coming, and tried to mediate. But it was too late. Within fifteen days of his arrival at the front, he outflanked the Macedonian position by way of the pass of Pythium, over the west shoulder of Olympus, forced Perseus to retreat upon Pydna, and brought him there to a decisive action. The date is fixed, by an eclipse of the moon the night before, to June 22 by astronomical reckoning, or September 4 of the defective Roman calendar. The issue proved once more the superiority of the Roman mode of fighting: the Macedonian phalanx, indeed, crashed irresistibly through the Roman line, and extinguished the detachment immediately in its front; but its close order was disturbed by the shock of the encounter and the unevenness of the ground, and its flanks were exposed by the dispersal of the cavalry; and then, on the command of Aemilius, the Roman maniples forced their way into the gaps, and with their short handy swords made havoc among its defenceless spearmen. Twenty thousand Macedonians fell, and with them the last remnant of the old power of Macedon. Perseus fled, early in the engagement, to Pella; and thence, by way of Amphipolis, to the sanctuary of Samothrace, where he eventually surrendered with his two sons, Philip and Alexander, and the whole of his hoarded treasures. Macedon submitted at once; and, in a campaign of only thirty days, the Praetor L. Anicius put down the resistance of Genthius, and made a final end of the pirate kingdom of Illyria.

The war had been undertaken from the first with the definite object of destroying the kingdom of Macedon: but the Romans still hesitated to carry out its annexation. The kingship indeed was abolished, and Perseus and many of the officials of the old régime were banished to Italy. The country itself was disarmed, and divided into four 'free and independent' states, each governed by a council of the local nobility; and between these separate communities,

Provisional settlement of Macedon.

just as between the conquered peoples of Italy, intercourse and intermarriage were forbidden. Trade was discouraged by frontier restrictions, and the valuable mines of gold and silver were closed. Of the land-tax formerly paid to the King of Macedon, half was remitted, and the remainder, to the amount of a hundred talents, was transferred to the Roman treasury. But though Rome thus assumed the direct sovereignty, and appropriated a large share of the revenue of the country, no Praetor was appointed as had been the case in Sicily and Spain, nor was any provision made for the defence or general administration of the country. The examples of Vulso (p. 258), of C. Lucretius (p. 265), and the like, had caused an exaggerated distrust of distant and practically irresponsible commands; all questions, therefore, which were of more than local importance, and all cases of appeal, were referred directly to the Senate, at whatever cost of efficiency and punctuality.

Illyria was divided similarly into three independent states, liable to tribute, and directly administered, by the Consuls, in connection with the new province of Cisalpine Gaul; and in this naturally isolated Illyria and Epirus. and disunited country, the system seems to have worked

better than in Macedon; at all events, no regular province was constituted there until a much later period. Epirus had offended past forgiveness by enabling Perseus to cut off the Roman army from its ports on the Adriatic; so, by a simultaneous movement of all the garrisons together, seventy of its towns were wiped out for ever, together with the whole people of the Molossians, while one hundred and fifty thousand of the population were sold into slavery. The country never recovered from the disaster, and the scarcity which beset Caesar in the campaign of Pharsalus was largely due to the desolation which befell it now.

It only remained to dispose of the Macedonian factions in the Greek states. The majority of the adherents of Perseus had fallen away from his cause at once, but their continued presence in Greece was intolerable. From the position of impartial arbiter Faction fights in the Greek states. between the local parties Rome had fallen—though with the best intentions all the time—to be merely the all-powerful patron of the oligarchic and anti-Macedonian section; and ambitious busybodies like Callicrates, in the Achaean League, had come to depend for their influence upon their success in bringing cases of 'treason' to the notice of the Senate, which naturally found it impossible to distinguish personal and local feuds from violations of the Roman settlement. In Aetolia five hundred 'friends of Perseus' were simply massacred by the partisans of Rome; and in the Achaean towns a similar outrage was only prevented by the summary removal of more

than a thousand suspected persons to political exile in Etruria and other parts of Italy. Among the latter were the historian Polybius and his father, who owed the exceptional permission to reside in Rome to the personal protection of Aemilius and the Scipionic circle. The leading patriots were thus at the same time saved, as exiles, from extinction at the hands of the philo-Roman faction, and reduced to impotence, as hostages for those of their party who were permitted to remain behind ; while without them the Achaean League became weak and subservient enough to suit the new state of things. In reward for its servility, it was allowed shortly afterwards to annex Heraclea at the foot of Mount Oeta, and Pleuron in Acarnania. The Aetolians, meanwhile, lost Amphipolis, Acarnania, and Leucas. The Rhodians, in spite of their conspicuous services, and of Cato's able defence of their conduct, were punished for their untimely interference (p. 265) by the loss of their possessions on the mainland, which were declared free and independent ; and by the revision of their alliance with Rome on very much stricter terms. Their trade, too, was seriously damaged by the growth of piracy in Crete, which the Roman naval squadron proved utterly unable to repress ; and by the establishment of Delos as a free port in the hands of the Athenians, whose loyalty was further rewarded by the possession, once more, of Samos.

Even Eumenes, hitherto the spoiled favourite of the Romans, fell under their suspicion, now that he had served his purpose. In vain he came again to Rome to defend himself ; he was refused an audience, and requested to go away. His brother Attalus, meanwhile, was encouraged to intrigue against him ; and in the long wars with Bithynia, Galatia, and Pamphylia, in which he was shortly involved, the favour of Rome was clearly shown on the other side ; in particular to Prusias, who had already displayed his character in his betrayal of his guest-friend Hannibal (p. 259), and continued to distinguish himself by his abject flattery of the Senate, and to receive encouragement, in return, in his aggressions against his hereditary enemy. It was only by a like show of humility and flattery that the successors of Eumenes, Attalus II. and III., succeeded in maintaining themselves, at all, as a first-class power in Asia Minor ; and the loss of freedom of action, and consequently of prestige, which thus befell both Pergamum and Rhodes, led, in spite of the nominal Roman protectorate, to the revival of all the disorder and insecurity, which these commercial and maritime states had striven hitherto to repress.

Aemilius returned to Rome, and celebrated a splendid triumph of three days' duration. He resigned his command as poor as when he

received it, saddened in the moment of his triumph by the death of his two remaining sons, and hated by the soldiers whom he had balked of what they had come to consider their right of pillage. The booty which he poured into the treasury was in fact so great, that *tributum*—the old direct war-tax on the property of the citizens (p. 87)—was never levied afterwards. From that moment onward, as Polybius perceived, the empire of the Romans was at last full-grown and self-supporting; but in that very maturity there were already the seeds of decay.

Results of
the war
on Rome,

The effects of the battle of Pydna were felt far beyond the actual scene of war. The ancient quarrel between Syria and Egypt, over the possession of Coele-Syria, had broken out again in 173; and two years later, Antiochus Epiphanes had beaten Ptolemy Philometor at Pelusium, invaded Egypt, and taken Ptolemy himself prisoner. His brother, however, Ptolemy Euergetes II.—more popularly known as Ptolemy Physcon—held out at Alexandria until Rome had her hands free. After the fall of Macedon in 168 C. Popillius Laenas was sent to order Antiochus to evacuate Egypt. The king hesitated, but Popillius, with admirable firmness, drew a circle round him with his staff where he stood on the sand, and demanded a reply before he stepped out from it. Antiochus decided to retire, and the Romans assumed the protectorate over Egypt *de iure*, which they had long enjoyed *de facto*; while the brothers Philometor and Physcon were permitted to reign there conjointly. At the same time, however, Egypt was weakened by the cession of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia to Antiochus; and still more, five years later, by the dissensions which arose at home between the joint kings. In 163 Philometor was expelled by his brother; and Rome took the opportunity of his restoration to propose, and partly carry out, a partition of the dominions of Egypt, in which Physcon received Cyrene, and would have had Cyprus also but for the vigorous opposition of Philometor. On the death of the latter, however, in 146, Physcon reunited the whole, and it was only on his death in 116 that Cyrene became separated finally.

and in the
East.

Egypt.

Syria.

In Syria, too, Rome had shown herself able, if not even willing, to interfere. Antiochus Epiphanes died in 163, and a Roman guardian, Cn. Octavius, was assigned to his infant son, Antiochus Eupator. But in the following year Demetrius, the son of Seleucus IV., who had been one of the Syrian hostages in Rome, but had made his escape, expelled his cousin, murdered Octavius, and set himself to recover for Syria some of its former importance in Asia; effecting even,

in 157, a change of dynasty in Cappadocia. For the moment the Romans could do nothing but foment, with promises and treaties, the fanatical revolts of the Jews against their Syrian overlords; but in 150 a local coalition, inspired by Rome, and headed by Ptolemy Philometor, succeeded in expelling Demetrius, and in plunging Syria into a period of disputed successions and internal weakness of which the result was the disruption of its western parts into a number of petty principdoms, and in the absorption of the remainder by the growing power of Parthia.

CHIEF DATES.

Death of Philip V. and accession of Perseus	179
War between Syria and Egypt	173
Third Macedonian War : Campaign in Thessaly	171
Decisive battle of Pydna : Deposition of Perseus	168
Popillius compels Antiochus IV. to evacuate Egypt	168
Roman Protectorate over Syria, and partition of Egypt	163

CHIEF PERSONS.

P. Licinius Crassus—C. Lucretius—Q. Marcius Philippus—L. Aemilius Paullus—C. Popillius Laenas—Cn. Octavius—Philip V.—Demetrius—Perseus—Cotys—Genthius—Prusias—Eumenes—Antiochus IV. Epiphanes—Ptolemy Physcon—Ptolemy Philometor—Demetrius of Syria.

CHIEF PLACES.

Tempe—Sycurium—Phalanna—Dium—Pydna—Samothrace—Heraclea—Pleuron—Delos—Alexandria—Cyrene.

SUBJECTS.

The gradual change of Roman policy and administration.
 The growth of Pergamum and the decline of Egypt and Syria.
 The balance of parties in the Greek leagues.

CHAPTER XXIII

SCIPIO AND CATO : ROMAN SOCIETY AND GREEK CULTURE DURING THE GREAT WARS

Political changes in Rome—Decay of the Comitia—Omnipotence of the Senate—Consolidation of a Senatorial Order—Rival ideals and personalities—P. Scipio Africanus—M. Porcius Cato—Hellenism in Roman Literature—in Art—in Society—in Religion—in Political Life.

THE period of the great wars, in the external history of Rome, coincides with one of internal change in the political and social order, which passed almost unnoticed by the majority of the men of the time, and is only described obscurely and indirectly in our authorities. But it is none the less of vital importance, if we are to understand the century of revolution and disorder which follows ; and the momentary pause in Rome's career of conquest, which follows the fall of Perseus, is perhaps the most suitable place to review its leading features.

The political situation in Rome at the close of the Hannibalic War has been already described in Chapter XIX., and there is little to add in regard to the generation which followed. The democratic movement represented by Flaminius, Minucius, and Varro, had spent itself, wholly, before the crisis of the Hannibalic War was over ; and the few legislative acts of the period which follows are almost wholly of social, not of political, import. All the principal questions which arose, in fact, belonged to that department of foreign politics in which the authority of the Senate had always, and rightly, been allowed to predominate ; and the continuous need for real military ability, and trained political experience, gave to the Senatorial order an opportunity, such as no other governing body in the world has ever had, of extending and confirming its position. In theory, the Roman State was still a democracy of landed proprietors, with an annual magistracy and a yeoman army. But it was not by a mass-meeting of country farmers, or even of veteran soldiers, that the balance of power in the Mediterranean could be adjusted or maintained ; and even had the attempt been

made, the new difficulties which beset the working of the Comitia would, by themselves, have rendered it impossible. The great extension of the franchise after the Hannibalic War, the foundation of so many citizen-colonies in the years which followed the restoration of order in Italy, and the demands of successive and long-continued wars, had brought it about that a large majority of the citizens, being never in Rome, could never exercise their right-of-vote, and rapidly fell out of touch with the political life of the city. In the army, too, this loss of political feeling was intensified by the disappearance of the old bond between the privilege of a vote and the obligation of military service: the Italians, who had no vote, were encouraged to serve in the legions, and detained long years at the front; while the city populace, which had one, was permitted, more and more openly, to shirk conscription.

The Senate, on the other hand, remained a small, compact, intelligent, and expert body. It was practically resident in Rome, easily summoned,

and in touch with every department of administration.

Supreme
control of
the Senate.

Its rules of debate were peculiarly elastic; it had acquired, by custom, a position of positive control even over the magistrates who convened it (p. 144); and its *senatus consulta* provided a prompt and efficient substitute for the machinery of the Comitia, for the despatch of all ordinary business. Thus the Senate continued to control all alliances and treaties with foreign states, all annexation and administration of successive conquests, all prolongation of commands to meet the necessities of distant warfare, all levies of men, and appropriations of the 'sinews of war.' The Comitia, did indeed, still formally sanction the declaration of war, and the final terms of peace, and could give expression, as in 199, to the strong reluctance of the people to enter on a military career; but in 167, it was *novo maloque exemplo* that the Praetor, M. Juventius Thalna, ventured to consult the Comitia as to the desirability of war with Rhodes; and it was not till the Senate's prestige had been undermined by the attacks of a new democratic party, and by its own shameful mismanagement, that the popular assembly ventured to take the control of military or foreign affairs into its own hands again. This practical omnipotence of the Senate was, however, the natural outcome of the needs of Roman policy, not of any revolution in the laws or constitution of the State; and so long as it was essential to the stability and advancement of Rome, there was nothing in it which a democratic agitator could attack as a curtailment of popular liberties. It was the customary usage, not the statute law, of the city, which made the government of the Senate possible.

But this informal character of the Senate's rule was its weakness as well as its strength ; for should it ever be discovered that the Senate was using its vast influence to further the interests of an order or a clique, there would be no legal charter to which the governing corporation could point, to justify its action on constitutional grounds. It was only to be expected, therefore, that, when the interests at stake were so enormous, and even the legitimate opportunities of gaining wealth and distinction were on so gigantic a scale, a governing body, whose tenure was at bottom so precarious, should take steps before long not merely to fortify its own position, but also to prevent the intrusion of what it inevitably came to regard as unqualified persons. Access to the Senate and to high office came insensibly, as we have seen (p. 234), to be limited in practice to members of those families, whether originally patrician or plebeian, whose members had already held curule office, and so won the *ius imaginum* for their descendants. By a provision made in 194 the members of the Senatorial Order were permitted to wear a distinctive dress, with a broad purple border—*latus clavus*—on their *tunica*, and a gold ring on their hand, and to claim a reserved seat at the theatre in the front rows of the stalls. Thus outwardly distinguished as an official order, these privileged families, though, in many cases, plebeian in origin, began, as Livy says of them even in the crisis of the Hannibalic War, *contemnere plebem, ex quo contemni a patribus desierunt* ; and to use their united influence, at election time, to prevent the intrusion of *novi homines* into the charmed circle of *nobilitas*.

Consolidation of a Senatorial Order.

The Senate had started on its career strong in the monopoly of all the good blood, and approved ability, which Rome had produced hitherto, and in the prestige which resulted from its deliverance of the city from the danger which threatened from Carthage. But no such body can remain at its best for long unless it is either constantly recruited by fresh blood from outside, or kept up to the mark by effective criticism, and by the fear of losing the rewards, if it should neglect the duties, of empire. But the former safeguard, as we have just seen, the Senate had cut off for itself : as to the latter, the Romans never attempted to develop a party-system, or to introduce into politics the principle of patriotic competition ; and so, by insensible degrees, and in presence of unexampled temptation, the new 'official order' degenerated, unchecked, into the arrogant, corrupt, oppressive, and inefficient oligarchy of the period of the Republic's fall. Public attention, however, was distracted, throughout the period of the change, by ever new prospects of wealth and adventure abroad : and

Effects of Senatorial exclusiveness.

little heed was paid to the gradual changes which were undermining the stability of the government at home.

So gradual, indeed, was its decline, and so feeble and half-hearted the isolated attempts of the few who perceived it, to avert it, that the interest of the internal history of Rome, during the period of the great wars is more personal and social than political. It is the history of a struggle between rival cultures and rival ideals of life; between the old, native, simple, inartistic, and illiterate civilisation of Italy, and the mature art and literature, and the refined and complex modes of thought, feeling, and behaviour, which poured in from Greece and beyond, as Rome became the centre of the Mediterranean world. Typical of these rival cultures were the two leading men in Rome, P. Scipio Africanus and M. Porcius Cato.

Scipio is the most conspicuous figure in a family group, every member of which contributed markedly, both in this and in the next generation, to educate Rome in the highest civilisation of the known world. He himself had never been quite as other men were. As a youth of seventeen, he had saved his father's life at the Ticinus; at nineteen, he had been the soul of the rally at Canusium; at twenty-four he had claimed, and been awarded, as the avenger of his father and his uncle, a vast and exceptional command in Spain; at thirty he was Consul, and entrusted with the war in Africa; and before he was thirty-three Carthage lay at his feet; in 199 he had been proclaimed *Princeps Senatus* over the heads of all his elders; and Rome, like Spain before (p. 219), seemed only to be waiting for him to proclaim himself absolute. But his indifference to military or political distinction, if not also his own real patriotism, kept him loyal to the city throughout. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he had interests and attractions, of a higher order, in the new Greek culture and thought, which peace with Carthage gave him the time to enjoy; and it was only when the ambition of his brother Lucius, and the wise precaution of the Senate, gave him opportunity of seeing something, at first hand, of the Hellenic East, that he consented to emerge from his retirement (p. 255) and to act as chief of the staff in the last campaign against Antiochus.

Yet Scipio was by no means free from the defects of his great qualities. He was proud, exclusive, and affected in demeanour; and his brother Lucius, whom, though utterly lacking in the genius and strength of his own character, he allowed to be closely associated with himself, was openly accused of sustaining his magni-

Rival ideals
and person-
alities.

P. Scipio
Africanus,
235-183 B.C.
His char-
acter,

his enemies,

ficent luxury at other people's expense. At the conclusion of the war with Antiochus, both brothers, on relapsing into private life, became the objects of a popular attack, both on their conduct of the war and on their personal honesty. Lucius was accused by two Tribunes, the Petillii, of taking bribes from Antiochus, and of appropriating part of the indemnity. He was summoned to produce his accounts, and would have done so, but Africanus intervened in open court and tore up the books, exclaiming that when a man had paid millions into the treasury it was a mean thing to be critical of the details. The attack, however, was renewed, and Lucius was condemned; whereupon his brother rescued him from imprisonment by force. The Tribunes then turned upon Africanus, who disdained to say a word in his own defence, or on any subject but his own services to the State; and then, on the second day of the trial, called the assembled people to witness that this was the anniversary of Zama, and bade them follow him to the Capitol to renew their thanksgiving for his victory. The fickle people responded at once to his appeal, and his accuser, M. Naevius, was left upon the Rostra without an audience.

But Scipio saw that his day of supremacy was over. Not only the common people, but also the Senate and the nobles, were jealous of his exceptional position, and of his assumption of almost royal ^{his fall,} majesty. So, rather than risk a real defeat, he retired from ^{187 B.C.} Rome altogether, and died some four years afterwards at his country place at Liternum; the same year, it seems, as his great opponent Hannibal. His brother meanwhile was accused again, and again was saved only by the interposition of the Tribune Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (a son of the Consul of 215), who married Cornelia, the daughter of Africanus, and whose just and firm rule afterwards pacified Spain and Sardinia (pp. 237, 300).

The attack upon the Scipionic clique had been mainly directed by M. Porcius Cato, the last and most famous representative of the old Roman asceticism. Born in 234 at Tusculum, of poor and humble parents, he had been encouraged and advanced by his patron, L. Valerius Flaccus, who had property in the neighbourhood. He had fought at Trasimene, and had served with distinction at Tarentum under old Q. Fabius Maximus. As Quaestor of Scipio Africanus, in 205, he had displayed at the same time marked financial ability, and a strong disinclination to favour the new-fangled ideas and mystical caprices of his chief; while he came to be regarded as the representative of the old-fashioned party in Rome which inherited

M. Porcius
Cato,
234-149 B.C.

the traditions of the Cunctator. As Praetor in Sardinia in 198 he had conciliated the provincial population by his simplicity and rigid economy, and by his impartial suppression of usury; and his *Lex Porcia* of 197 extended the ancient right of *provocatio* to all forms of corporal punishment; and especially to chastisement in the army.

In 195 he was elected Consul, through the influence, and as the colleague, of his friend and patron, Valerius. His Consulship was marked by a vigorous but liberal pacification of the Spanish provinces (p. 300); and also by an absurd incident in Rome, which is typical of the principles and character of Cato, and, at the same time, of the rapid changes which were affecting the social life of Rome. In the stress of the year after Cannae there had been passed a *Lex Oppia* which limited the wearing of jewellery by Roman women to one half-ounce of gold for each, and had prohibited expensive dresses, and unnecessary use of carriages and horses. By the irony of chance, or by a gleam of humour which is rare in Roman politics, the agitation for the repeal of this law—which, indeed, was wholly out of date since the conquest of Carthage and Macedon—came to a head in the Consulship of Cato and his patron, who both treated the matter seriously as a symptom of the depravity of the age, and procured a Tribune to put his veto on the bill. Whereupon the women took the matter into their own hands, and raised such a turmoil of feminine distress and importunity, that even Cato was compelled to give way.

Ten years later, however, he had his revenge. In 187, as we have seen, he had broken the power of the Scipios; and in 184 he became Censor, again as the colleague of Flaccus. This responsible office gave full play both to his great financial ability and to his stern sense of public duty and morality; and his rigid observance of the ancient forms of virtue, tempered as it was by real and keen common sense, spread consternation among the advanced thinkers, and loose livers, of the upper classes. Taxes were imposed upon articles of luxury, public contracts were revised, and fraudulent or extortionate *publicani* mercilessly exposed. L. Scipio was deprived of his horse and status as an *Eques*, and L. Flaminius, the brother of the conqueror of Greece, was degraded for an official murder of a Gaulish refugee. Drains, waterworks, and a new court of justice, the *Basilica Porcia*, were built and maintained, and provision was made to relieve distress and overcrowding, by the citizen-colonies (p. 235) which were founded in the following year.

Nor did his activity cease with his retirement from office: we may trace to his influence the *Lex Orchia* of 181, which limited the

number of guests at dinners ; the *Lex Fannia* of 161, which limited their cost ; the expulsion from the city in 173 of two Epicurean philosophers, Diogenes and Critolaus ; and the prohibition, in the same year as the *Lex Fannia*, of the teaching of grammar and philosophy in Rome at all. In foreign policy, too, he was active and of weight. He was the leader of the party in Rome—composed, though it mainly was, of his old victims, the merchants—which advocated the complete extinction of Carthage ; and it was the report of his Commission in 157 (p. 291) that determined the change of Roman policy in Africa. In 151 he joined, as we shall see, even with the phil-Hellene Scipios, in advocating the return of the Achaean exiles—though, only, perhaps, as the most practicable way of removing them from Italy ; and his last public appearance, in 149, which actually hastened his death, was to put in operation the new Calpurnian Law *de pecuniis repetundis* (p. 319), and to avenge his old friends, the provincials of Spain, by the prosecution of the infamous Galba (p. 304).

Even Cato, however, though he was regarded by his contemporaries as a model of austerity and morality, must be judged by the standard of his age and surroundings. He performed notable services to Roman administration and finance ; but he was the persistent advocate of that system of wholesale, pitiless slave-farming, which all the while was extinguishing the peasantry, and ruining the productiveness of Italy : his own slaves he worked till they dropped, or sold them when they became useless, as he had sold his old war-horse in Spain. Though, moreover, as a Senator, he was prohibited from trading in his own name, he was hand-and-glove with the men who were building up the slave- and money-traffic which were the curse of Roman enterprise abroad ; who wanted to hit Carthage when she was down, because the trade of the world would not yet flow all to Ostia ; and who formed the backbone of the new party of mere wealth, which was slowly taking shape in opposition to the aristocracy-of-office.

Even in matters of pure culture Cato did not remain wholly true to his ideal. Though Naevius, Pacuvius, and Plautus were developing the Latin language and a Roman literature, on mainly Italian lines, in face of the new craze for Greek, and though he himself had set a model of Latin prose style in his historical treatise on the *Origines* of Rome, Cato modelled his diction increasingly upon that of Thucydides and Demosthenes, and in his old age even condescended to learn to write and to speak in Greek.

The latter step was perhaps inevitable, even for Cato. The Romans

had never had a real literature of their own. Rude ballads, indeed, they had had, and outpourings of rustic wit, in the indiscriminate and abusive *Saturae*, and in the half-dramatic *Fabulae*, introduced from Atella in Campania; but of epic, lyric, or dramatic poetry, in the Greek sense, there was none; the nearest approach to tragedy was in those magical pageants, of Etruscan origin, which were performed in a crisis to avert the wrath of the gods; and the only prose literature was the brief official minutes of public business, and the private chronicles of a few noble families.

But, ever since the capture, at Tarentum in 272, of a Greek playwright, Andronicus (who took the name of his captor, and patron, Livius), the invasion of Greek literary forms, and even of Greek phrases and of the Greek language itself, had been persistent and increasing. Livius Andronicus himself translated the *Odyssey* into Latin Saturnian verses; and was exhibiting Latin versions of Greek plays in Rome as early as 240. His immediate successors, though they bear Latin names, hail also from the south, and belong to the same literary school. A Campanian, C. Naevius, whose first play, adapted, like those of Livius, from the Greek, was produced in 235, retained, and strove to develop, the native Saturnian metre; but his models, and mode of treatment, were those of the Attic comedies of Cratinus and Aristophanes, and it was only at the end of his life, when his personal attacks on the Metelli had driven him into exile, that he turned to history, and began to chronicle the events of the First Punic War. About the time of the death of Naevius, in 204, his successor, Q. Ennius, who was born at Rudiae in Calabria in 239, was brought to Rome under the patronage of Cato; but he was soon attracted into the more cultured and enlightened circle of the Scipios, and continued to produce copiously till his death in 169, when he was buried in the family tomb of his patrons. Ennius was the first of the new school to take in hand a comprehensive epic account of the Romans themselves; but he advanced still further in the way of Hellenistic innovation, by composing his history, not in the old Saturnians, which were based, like our own popular poetry, mainly upon the spoken accent of the words,¹ but in Greek hexameters, based

¹ Compare a line of Naevius with one of our own nursery rhymes—

Dabunt' malum' Metelli Nae'vio' poe'tae.

The Queen' was in' the par'lour, Eat'ing bread' and ho'ney.

And contrast the discrepancies between metre and accent in the following:—

Μῆνιν ἀειδε, θεὰ, Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλλῆος,
 οὐλομένην, ἣ μυρ' Ἀχαιοῖς ἄλγε' ἔθηκεν.—*Iliad*, i. 1-2.

upon metrical quantity ; which superseded the old native rhythm almost wholly from his time onwards. His *Saturae*, too, or 'miscellaneous pieces,'¹ are the prototype of the true 'Satires,' first fully represented by the crudely-phrased but vigorous and popular attacks thrown off by C. Lucilius against the follies and vices of society. Lucilius, however, though born in 180 (at Suessa Aurunca), belongs rather to the age of the Gracchi and of his own friend Scipio Aemilianus ; for he continued active until his death at Naples as late as 103. In the same way, too, even the Umbrian dramatist, T. Maccius Plautus—(born at Sarsina before 250 ; died in Rome 184)—who is in many respects the most thoroughly Roman of all these early writers, makes frequent use, in his comedies, both of Greek modes of expression, and of the iambic and other metres of the Greeks.

Worse still for the prospects of Roman literature, the first prose histories of Rome, written during, or just after, the Hannibalic War by Q. Fabius Pictor and L. Cincius Alimentus, the reorganiser of Sicily (p. 212), were actually composed, not in Latin at all, but in Greek ; and it was, in fact, to remedy this crying defect that Cato, who had long been preaching that Roman children ought to learn good Latin from their parents, before they were taught bad Greek by unprincipled or atheistical slaves, set about his great work, the *Origines*, which carried the history of Rome in vigorous and stately Latin from the first days of the kingdom down to the close of his own lifetime ; while in his treatise *de Re Rustica* he inaugurated a class of sound scientific manuals, which were much more in keeping, than either epic or tragedy, with the practical bent of the Roman character.

With the next generation, however, the natural reaction set in. The period of mere imitation was over ; and Roman poets and dramatists began to stand upon their own merits, and to work out a genuinely Latin style. M. Pacuvius, for example, the son of a sister of Ennius, who was born about 220 and died at an advanced age in 110, is commended by later critics for his vigorous Latin and high-toned thought, as well as for his wide culture and learning. Many of his tragedies were modelled still upon Greek examples ; but others, such as the *Paullus*, were based on episodes of recent or contemporary history, like the conquest of Macedon ; and were known as *Fabulae Praetextatae*, because the actors appeared, not in Greek attire, but in full Roman dress. L. Accius, too, who was born in 140, and lived to converse with Cicero, handled

¹ The word originally means a mixed dish of all kinds of fruit or vegetables.

native and historical subjects in his plays as well as legendary and foreign ones.

In comedy the movement was in the same direction. Statius Caecilius, a Gaulish slave from Mediolanum, who died in 168, and P. Terentius Caecilius. Afer—a Carthaginian slave educated and freed by his master

P. Terentius, and admitted on the publication of his *Andria* in 166 to the friendship of the younger Scipio—both followed, it is true, the prevailing custom of adapting *Fabulae Palliatae* from the Terentius. Greek, in which Greek names and manners, and the characteristic Greek dress, the *pallium*, were retained on the

Roman stage. But Terence, in particular, under the criticism and often with the help of his patrons, Laelius and Scipio Aemilianus, completely transformed the style and diction of comedy by his mastery of pure and eloquent Latin; and made way, on his early death at the age of

Afranius. thirty-six, for a new school of *Comediae Togatae*, which took their subjects, as well as their costume, from the everyday life of Rome; and were best represented by the plays of L. Afranius, the contemporary of Lucilius and of Marius.

In art and architecture, too, the same Hellenising process went on. The old rude Latin style of building, and the Tuscan style—itsself but Hellenism barbarised Greek—which had been introduced from South in art, Etruria—had given way rapidly before the introduction of Greek methods and models. The plunder of Tarentum in 272, of Panormus in 254, and still more the wholesale robbery of statues and pictures from Syracuse in 212, and of Corinth in 146, had filled both Rome itself, and the private houses of noble Roman connoisseurs, with the masterpieces of Hellenic art; and the eastern wars flooded Italy with captive Greek artists and artificers. But, in art, the Romans were less capable even than they were in literature, either of adapting the foreign style, or of developing a native school; and it was only in the more homely and mechanical art of reproducing, on funeral urns (*busta*) and in waxwork masks, the features of deceased individuals, that Roman sculpture ever attained to the first rank at all. Here, however, it may truly claim to be original; for it gave to the world that practical, if most inartistic, abbreviation of a portrait, the funereal *bust*.

But the effects of the contact with Hellenism were not confined to literature and art: they penetrated the whole life and thought of the upper classes of society. It was inevitable, perhaps, that the in society, conquerors of Carthage, of Macedon, and of Syria should allow the vast wealth which lay at their feet to corrupt their simple tastes, and inflame—though without satisfying—their new love of show

and luxury ; but the temptation was infinitely stronger when wealth came disguised as the minister of a higher civilisation and a more elegant mode of life. The Romans had conquered the luxurious Etruscans, and stripped the barbaric Gauls of their gold, without harm to their society or their morals ; but the subtle intellect and the depraved ingenuity of the Greeks, who had made pleasure a fine art, if not the very end of life, captured and enslaved the coarse if simple-minded legionary, and his unrefined though quite well-meaning leaders. Private luxury grew by leaps and bounds. We have already seen (p. 276) how the Oppian Law was repealed, within eight years of the battle of Zama ; and how dinner-parties had to be limited, in size in 181, and in quality in 161 ; while in 154 it needed all the influence of Scipio Nasica and the party of old Roman orthodoxy to counteract the new demand for dramatic display, and make the people pull down the permanent theatre which the Censor, C. Cassius, had begun to build after the Greek model. It was noted already as a sign of the times, as early as 219, when a Greek doctor began to practise and teach in Rome ; two Epicurean philosophers had already been expelled in 173, and professors of rhetoric and philosophy were forbidden to live within the city in 161 ; yet the influx of Greek adventurers and of hostages and deputations from Greek cities, went on apace ; in 159 Crates the grammarian set up a regular school, and in 155 we find Carneades and his companions Diogenes and Critolaus preaching openly that might is right, and that the struggle for existence can know no law but the survival of the cleverest.

And the mischief did not stop here. Foreign philosophy, however logical and rationalistic, was but the counterpart of foreign superstitions, which began to take hold upon the minds of the masses, just in proportion as their belief in the gods of their country was undermined by foreign scepticism.

The old Roman religion had been a simple, practical creed, which corresponded closely with the needs of the national character. A few great gods, Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Venus, and Mars, the counterparts of the high Olympian powers of early Greece, shared the veneration of the Italian peoples with a multitude of other Powers, which have been described, not without reason, as abstractions, but were originally regarded rather as the authors and maintainers of the common facts of nature, and of the daily acts of life. *Saturnus* presided over the sowing, *Ceres* over the reaping, *Liber* over the outpouring of the grape juice, *Vertumnus* over the shifting of the winds. *Janus* looked inwards and outwards through every door, and in his own

month of January both closed the old year, and opened the new; *Terminus* held fast the boundaries of the fields; *Vesta* kept alive the sacred fire; *Consus* inspired good counsel in the elders; *Fides* and *Pudicitia* maintained honour in men and modesty in women. Just so, again, when the long struggle of Patrician and Plebeian came at last to an end (p. 106), the national thanksgiving, and the firm confidence of the leaders, found alike their fullest expression, when *Concordia Ordinum* could look down, from her new temple-dwelling, over the Comitium and the Forum; and in 211 it was *Rediculus Tutanus* who 'turned back' Hannibal, and 'kept safe' the city.

But with the coming of the Greeks, all this was changed, though the early stages of the process are not easy to discern. Even before the fall of the kingdom we hear of Sibylline books, and of a solemn visit to the Oracle of Delphi; and the latter was consulted again at the time of the Decemvirate and at the siege of Veii. But it was not till the beginning of the Hannibalic War that a Greek cult was formally instituted in Rome; Delphi, consulted again on the news of Hannibal's arrival, prescribed the institution of a solemn festival to Apollo; and the *Ludi Apollinares*, which were celebrated first in the year 212, were made a permanent institution in 208. Scipio Africanus, as we have seen, revived the public confidence, before his African campaign, by the installation of Cybele, the Mother of all the Gods, in 205; and completed and dedicated her great temple in 191. Here, indeed, was involved a political motive also: just as Juno of Veii had set her seal upon the Roman conquest of her city by accepting the invitation of Camillus, so, with the great Lady of Asia, the Mother of all the Gods, dwelling visibly in Rome, the ultimate victory of the Romans over all the world who worshipped her would seem to be fore-ordained. A less harmless cult was that of the Greek Bacchus, with its fanatical orgies, which had been introduced about the same time: for in 186 unspeakable suspicions spread abroad in Rome; the Senate became alarmed, and appointed a special commission, under a decree which remains our greatest monument of early official Latin;¹ and so widely and deeply had the dangerous contagion spread, that before the close of its inquiries more than seven thousand men, in all ranks of society, had been found guilty of conduct unworthy of a Roman citizen.

The conquest of Syria and the kingdoms of Asia Minor introduced another taint besides. In 139 it was found necessary to expel summarily the Chaldaean soothsayers and magicians, who were unsettling men's minds and conduct. These, too, however, like the devotees of the Greek cults, had come to stay in Rome; henceforward

**Oriental
cults also.**

¹ See Wordsworth's *Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin*.

almost every Roman commander—Marius, Sulla, Pompeius, even Caesar himself—fortified his strategy, even if he was not sometimes advised in it, with the prophecies of a wise woman, or the tricks of a common conjuror.

Even in political life, the Greek spirit, which, as old Cato said, 'questioned everything, and settled nothing,' began to disturb men's confidence in the established order which had served them so well hitherto. Was the Senate indeed the heaven-sent guardian and champion of the Roman Empire? Or was this aristocracy also only an oligarchy after all, and only to be hated and suspected the more because the luck had been on its side so long? Was it under a Senate that Sparta had repelled the Persians? that Athens had ruled the waves in the Aegean? that Macedon had conquered the Great East as far as India? What was the meaning of that old ideal of Pericles; 'government by the people, in theory, but in act the dominion of one first man'? It was Scipio, the choice of the people, after all, who had made Hannibal retire from Italy; it was the people's choice, again, before long (p. 294), which was to set another Scipio free to vanquish Carthage utterly, and wipe out again at Numantia the disgrace of the Senate's misrule; and it was Scipio's own daughter Cornelia, born, bred, and married within that Greek-reading, almost Greek-thinking circle, who was training now, on Greek principles of education, and with Greek tutors to help her, the little sons of that same Sempronius Gracchus, who had almost made Spain Roman, simply by letting men see that a governor could govern for the governed.

Hellenism
in political
life.

CHIEF DATES.

First Play of Livius Andronicus 240; of Naevius	235
First Greek Physician in Rome	219
Ludi Apollinares instituted, 212; made annual	208
Cato brings Ennius to Rome	204
Consulship of M. Porcius Cato: Repeal of Lex Oppia	195
Senatorial Order acquires distinct social privileges	194
Temple of Cybele dedicated	191
Fall and withdrawal from Rome of P. Scipio Africanus	187
Senatus Consultum de Bacanalibus	186
Censorship of Cato	184
Death of Africanus	183
Lex Orchia limits the number of guests at dinners	181
Epicurean Philosophers expelled from Rome	173
Lex Fannia limits cost of dinners: Rhetoricians expelled from Rome	161
Chaldaean astrologers expelled from Rome	139

CHIEF PERSONS.

**P. Scipio Africanus—M. Porcius Cato—Livius Andronicus—C. Naevius—
Q. Ennius—C. Lucilius—T. Maccius Plautus—M. Pacuvius—L. Accius—
Stattus Caecilius—M. Terentius Afer—L. Afranius—P. Scipio Nasica—
Crates—Carneades.**

SUBJECTS.

**The consolidation of the Senatorial Order, and its effects.
The influence of Greek ideals of culture on Roman civilisation.
Greek and Roman religious ideas.
The growth of a Roman school of Poetry and Drama.**

CHAPTER XXIV

THE END OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE

The change in Roman provincial policy—Macedon becomes a Roman province—Degeneracy of the Greeks—Roman intervention—Dissolution of the Achaean League—Recovery of Carthage—Mission of Cato—*Delenda est Carthago*—Scipio Aemilianus—Province of Africa.

THE difficulties and dangers of the Roman policy of protectorates in the East had long been apparent, and in the war with Perseus of Macedon the policy itself might seem to have fairly broken down.

Yet still the Romans hesitated to extend over the older and higher civilisations which had come under their sway, that system of direct provincial administration which had seemed obvious, and proved effective, in the chaotic and barbarous West. About the middle of the century of conquest, however, a sudden change took place in their policy towards their dependencies. The evils of toleration and abstention seemed, at last, to be clearly greater than the advantages; and within three years, 149-6, we find regular Roman provinces established in Macedon and in Africa, and in spirit, though not formally, in Greece; while in 133 the allied kingdom of Pergamum was voluntarily surrendered by Attalus III., and was formed into a province of Asia.

In Macedon the change was provoked by the continual disputes between the four *regiones* which had been established after the war with Perseus; and by the appearance of a pretender to the old Macedonian kingship. The latter, Andriscus, who was actually the son of a fuller at Adramyttium, gave himself out to be Philip, a son of Perseus, who was, however, known to have died in exile in Italy. His first appearance was in Syria, where he was arrested by King Demetrius and sent in chains to Rome. He made his escape, however, from Italy, and with the support of King Teres of Thrace, and of the people of Byzantium, made himself master of all

The change
in Roman
provincial
policy.

Revolt of a
pseudo-
Philip in
Macedon,
149-8 B.C.

Macedon, annihilated a Roman legion under P. Juventius, the Praetor of 149, and even occupied a part of Thessaly. But the Praetor of 148, Q. Caecilius Metellus, who was aided by the fleet of Pergamum, put down the revolt without difficulty, and Andriscus was surrendered from his last refuge in Thrace.

The revolt of Andriscus, futile as it had proved, showed the real danger that existed, and determined the Senate to make a new settlement on purely Roman lines. Macedon was constituted a regular province on the model of Sicily and Spain; including also Illyria south of the Drilon, and the whole of Epirus, together with the Ionian islands, the western Greek ports of Apollonia and Epidamnus (or Dyrrhachium), and the Aegean harbour of Thessalonica. The tribute, local institutions, and internal administration remained much as they had been left by Aemilius Paullus; but the Romans made themselves wholly responsible for the defence of the frontier, and improved their communications from sea to sea by the construction of a military road—the *Via Egnatia*—from Dyrrhachium to Thessalonica; while they were enabled, at the same time, to establish a closer watch upon the restless confederacies in Greece. The spirit of the Macedonian people seems, by this time, to have been broken utterly. A pretender to the name of Alexander (a brother of Philip who had settled in Italy, and was also by this time dead), appeared indeed in 142; but he was suppressed at once by the Quaestor, L. Tremellius; and with the exception of this, and of occasional revelations of mismanagement on the frontiers northward and eastward, Macedon appears no more in the history of the Roman Empire.

In Greece, in spite of the deportation of the Achaean patriots, things went, meanwhile, from bad to worse. Politically, socially, and economically, the country was ruined, and the Peloponnese, in particular, had become a happy hunting-ground of mercenaries and brigands. The population was diminishing, business was at a standstill, and public life had degenerated into a succession of socialistic experiments at the expense of every one who had anything to lose; while the continual appeals to the distant and indifferent Senate extinguished all sense of responsibility, national or individual. Such independence as was retained by bodies like the Achaean League, they owed—and knew that they owed wholly—to the contemptuous toleration of the Romans, and to the calculating subservience of men of the type of Callicrates.

Typical, at the same time of the disorders in Greece, and of the

Macedon becomes a Roman province.

Degeneracy of the Greeks.

degeneracy of political principle, is the shameless appropriation of the border-town of Oropus by the Athenians in 156. For when the Senate imposed a heavy fine on the aggressors, and the Athenians petitioned for its remission, their philosopher-spokesman Carneades preached, in the Senate, and elsewhere in Rome, such downright opportunism and such doctrines of political expediency (p. 281), that on the motion of M. Cato, he was requested to remove himself from the city.

The teaching of Carneades.

The continual interference of the Senate had the inevitable result of increasing the numbers of the disaffected party; and the return, in 151, of some three hundred survivors of the exiled patriots, which had long been recommended by Polybius, and was secured at last through the influence of Scipio Aemilianus and the scornful indifference of Cato, only added a new factor to the confusion. Some of the wiser of them, and among these Polybius himself, had taken to heart the parting advice of Cato, 'not to go back into the Cyclops' cave to fetch their things,' and resigned themselves as well as they could to their altered circumstances. But others could see nothing in their release but a fresh opportunity for intrigue against Rome; and one of them, Diaeus, took advantage of a dispute which occurred during the revolt of Andriscus, between Sparta and the rest of the League, to force on a rupture with Rome.

Return of the Achæan patriots.

The Spartans had been incorporated in the League against their will; but had always been permitted an exceptional degree of freedom within it. A quarrel had arisen in 149 between them and their neighbours of Megalopolis over some land on the frontier, with the usual result of an appeal to Rome. Diaeus, who was Strategus, or President of the League, contended that the appeal should have been heard by the League itself in the first instance; and the Achæans under his successor Damocritus attacked and defeated the Spartans, without waiting for the final award of the Senate; and against an express warning sent to them from Macedon by the Praetor Metellus.

Quarrel between the Achæans and Sparta, 149 B.C.

The Senate could not overlook this breach of the peace, and resolved to deprive the Achæans of their recent acquisitions of territory, including Sparta, Corinth, and Argos, and thus to create conflicting interests in Peloponnese itself. The decision was announced at a meeting of the League at Corinth by the Senatorial Commissioner, L. Aurelius Orestes; whereupon the Achæans gave way to an outburst of fury, and imprisoned all the Spartans who were to be found in the city.

Roman intervention.

The Senate still wished to leave the way open for an apology, and sent Sex. Julius Caesar to meet a fresh Achaean gathering at Aegium, the federal capital. But Diaeus and Critolaus, who took the forbearance of Rome as a sign of preoccupation, if not of weakness, frustrated the intended conference. Fresh riots broke out at Corinth; the Roman envoy was insulted; and a second warning from Metellus, who had disposed, by now, of the revolt of Andriscus, fell on deaf ears. Raising men and funds by the most violent and improvident expedients, Diaeus and Critolaus declared war upon Sparta in the winter of 147-6, and dared the Romans to interfere. They were joined by the discontented states of Euboea, Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris; and while Diaeus carried on the operations against Sparta, Critolaus, who was Strategus for 146, threw a large force northwards to besiege Heraclea, which had refused to participate in the revolt.

But on the advance of Metellus from Macedon, Critolaus, who was as cowardly as he was violent and incapable, retreated in such haste

Suppression of the revolt, 147-6 B.C. towards the isthmus, that he omitted to block or to hold even the pass of Thermopylae; so he was overtaken and routed by Metellus at Scarpheia in Locris, and disappeared himself in the confusion. The other Achaean contingents in Central Greece were easily suppressed in detail, and Metellus was already master of Boeotia, Megara, and the approaches to the isthmus, when he was superseded by the arrival of L. Mummius, the blunt, boorish, good-natured Consul of 146. The defence of the isthmus was conducted

Capture of Corinth, 146 B.C. with desperate ferocity by Diaeus; but the mob of Corinth, reinforced by liberated slaves, and fed only by the supplies forcibly collected from the Peloponnese, could not be expected to hold out for long. Diaeus killed himself when he saw that his cause was hopeless, and Corinth surrendered after a few days' siege.

The settlement decreed by the Senate shows how completely the Greeks had forfeited the confidence of Rome. The usual commission of ten Senators was appointed, under general instructions from Rome; with Polybius, the adviser and friend of the Scipios, as their confidential agent. Greece still remained nominally free, but was put under the direct control of the Roman governor of Macedon; and some of the northern states were even incorporated in that province. The Achaean League was dissolved; all combinations of the kind were forbidden for the future; and even *commercium* and *connubium* were forbidden between the several towns. Their turbulent and wayward democracies were replaced by aristocratic

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governments, which represented the party of order and stability, and gave some guarantee for the payment of the tribute which was imposed. The territory of the most disaffected communities was confiscated to the Roman people, and the landed property of the others was strictly limited and defined.

Athens and Sparta, in consideration of their former fame and their actual services to Rome, became *civitates foederatae et immunes*, self-governed, and exempt from tribute; Argos, another friendly town, succeeded Corinth as the headquarters of Roman commerce in Greece; while Thebes and Chalcis, which had joined the Achaean rising voluntarily, were deprived of their constitutions, and degraded, like Capua, to the rank of villages. Corinth, which had long been a serious rival to Roman commercial speculation, while the spiteful violence of its mob had been the immediate provocation of the war, was stripped of its pictures and statues to adorn the triumph of Mummius, and was then burned to the ground, while its whole population was sold into slavery; and the story was told, by the few who knew their value, how the careless soldiers mishandled the masterpieces of Greek art, and how, in the contract for their conveyance to Rome, the inappreciative Consul inserted the usual clause that 'they were to be replaced, in case of damage, by others of equal worth.'

In Africa, meanwhile, the course of events had effected the same complete change in the attitude of the Romans, as occurred in Macedon and in Greece. The treaty of 201 had been intended at the same time to tie the hands of the Carthaginians, and to establish such a balance of power between them and the Numidians, as would relieve Rome from the necessity of further interference. But the amazing rapidity with which the Carthaginians recovered their trade and prosperity, in the years which followed the war, completely upset their calculations. Hannibal, through the generosity of Scipio, had been allowed to remain at the head of affairs in Carthage, and to devote his matchless energy and ability to the task of reorganisation. To break the oligarchic clique which was responsible for the mismanagement and disasters of the past, he revived the ancient powers of the *Suffetes*; he reformed the administration of the city, and restored her financial credit. But his enemies at Carthage and at Rome knew well that he had not forgotten the vow of his childhood; he was accused of peculation at home, and of intrigue with Rome's enemies abroad; and before the outbreak of the

war with Antiochus in 196 the Senate thought it necessary to demand his surrender ; Scipio alone protesting against the mischievous proposal. To spare his country further harm, Hannibal retired of his own accord, and opened, as we have seen, at the court of Antiochus, a new stage of his lifelong struggle with Rome. At Carthage, his house was pulled down, his goods were confiscated, and the Roman party came into power ; but his work remained. Carthage was already in a fair way to recover commercial supremacy in the west ; and this, for her, was the

Revival of
Roman
jealousy.

one thing needful. The natural resources of the very considerable territory which was left to her by the treaty, and likewise her immense invested capital, rapidly became productive again, and as early as 187 the government was able to offer to pay off at once the remaining instalments of the indemnity. But the offer was refused. The object of Roman policy was to keep Carthage still in the position of a tributary ; and with this unmistakable proof of revived prosperity, Roman jealousy and suspicion awoke once more.

With her Numidian neighbour, too, there was no security of peace for Carthage. Masinissa had more than fulfilled his part of providing

Masinissa
develops
Numidia.

a counterpoise to her in Africa. By judicious and enlightened government he had transformed the Numidians from a nomad to an agricultural people, with fixed abodes, a wealthy and imposing capital on the fortress rock of Cirta, and a number of growing centres of industry and commerce. At Hippo, and elsewhere along the coast, he had revolutionised the old Punic civilisation of Numidia by encouraging the immigration of Greek and Italian settlers. He had earned the confidence of the commercial interest in Rome, and he could count on the support of a strong party in Carthage itself, in the design which he cherished of acquiring that city as the capital of a Numidian Empire.

The treaty of 201 contained a contradiction in terms ; and was perhaps intended to do so. Carthage, it said, was to retain undiminished

Quarrel
between
Numidia
and
Carthage.

such territory as she was then allowed to hold ; but Masinissa was guaranteed in possession of all that he or his ancestors had ever possessed. Now a large part of this territory of Carthage had been acquired from time to time at the expense of kings of Numidia ; and so was included under both designations. Masinissa claimed, in particular, the strip of fertile coastland between the Greater and the Lesser Syrtis, which derives both its older name *Emporiae*, and its modern name *Tripoli*, from the 'three ports,' Leptis, Oea, and Sabrata, which gave access thence, by old-established caravan-routes, to the far interior of Africa. The possession

of Emporiae and the intervening country would enable the King of Numidia to outflank Carthage along the whole length of her landward frontier, and to cut her off entirely from the trade with the *hinterland*, the only source of all her old prosperity of which she still retained a monopoly. The dispute about Emporiae was referred by both sides to Rome, and after long negotiations an award was made in favour of Masinissa.

It was not long before repeated troubles in Spain distracted the Romans, and gave him another opportunity of aggression; and in 157 a Senatorial Commission, with M. Cato at its head, was sent to make inquiries on the spot. This incident proved the turning-point in the policy of Rome in Africa. The commissioners were startled by the evidence of prosperity and enterprise which confronted them in Carthage. They could not but see, in her revived commercial activity, a standing menace to the growing trade of Rome; and Cato, in particular, came home convinced, and insistent, in season and out of season, that 'Carthage must be destroyed.' Yet a strong party in Rome, led by P. Scipio Nasica, still declined to interfere; partly from the same reasons of practical policy which had delayed annexation in the East, partly from the well-grounded fear that, with the removal of the last real enemy in the Mediterranean, the Roman State would turn upon itself, and fall to pieces through internal quarrels.

Mission of
Cato to
Carthage,
157 B.C.

'Delenda est
Carthago.'

On the matter immediately in dispute, the Senate proposed to arbitrate as before. Masinissa agreed, but Carthage not unnaturally refused, and the dispute dragged on for another two years, aggravated in the meanwhile by the expulsion of the friends of Masinissa from Carthage; and by the growth there, as in Greece, of a democratic faction of irreconcilable patriots, who actually took up arms to meet a fresh incursion, and were severely defeated in battle by Masinissa in 150. War in Africa, however, even in self-defence, was a clear breach of the treaty of 201, and though the aristocratic party, which came into power on the failure and disgrace of the democrats, sent abject apologies to Rome, the party of Cato had at last what they desired, a legal pretext for interference.

Carthage
makes war
on
Masinissa,
151 B.C.

The envoys of Carthage found war-preparations already going on, and the Consuls of 149, M. Manilius and L. Marcius Censorinus, under orders to lead an expedition into Africa. In vain they offered to surrender everything outside the walls of their city: they were ordered to find three hundred noble hostages at once, and for the rest to await the decision of the Consuls, who

Carthage
submits
too late.

were already at Lilybaeum. The Consuls delayed their reply until they had landed in Africa. There, from their camp at Utica, the old rival of Carthage, with the Carthaginian hostages in their hands, they demanded the surrender of all weapons and warlike stores; and two hundred thousand sets of weapons, with two thousand catapults from the walls were surrendered without a murmur. Then, and only then, when the city lay disarmed and at their mercy, the Consuls delivered their final orders. The lives, the liberties, and the possessions of the inhabitants would be protected, and they were free to build a new town anywhere they pleased in Africa; only, it must not be less than ten miles from the sea. Carthage itself, the fortress and the port, was to be destroyed utterly.


The Romans were probably right in believing that for them there could be no lasting peace while Carthage was allowed to exist. Even while she stood disarmed, her magnificent natural position and her commercial genius and prestige made her peaceful rivalry intolerable; and the armaments which were actually surrendered spoke only too clearly of the vast resources and the revived prosperity of the city; of the distrust and disaffection with which she had regarded the Roman protectorate; and of the intentions of the present government. There was, too, always the danger of a sudden coalition between a restored Carthage and the reformed Numidia of Masinissa, which had been allowed to grow far stronger than had been originally intended: and, in fact, one of Masinissa's sons was actually fighting now on the Carthaginian side. But the treachery of the Roman procedure is inexcusable; each successive surrender was extorted by a fresh insistence on the sufficiency of Roman protection to preserve the liberties of Carthage, till the moment came when the Romans believed that they themselves could safely destroy the one liberty on which the existence of Carthage depended,—that of access, through her own natural emporium, to her native element, the sea.

The Roman ultimatum was received at Carthage with a storm of desperate patriotism. Those leaders who had favoured the earlier surrenders were massacred on the spot, together with all the Italians to be found in the town. The exiled leaders of the war-party were recalled, and frantic efforts were made to extemporise a defence of the city. Iron and lead, for weapons and missiles, were torn from the clamps of the public buildings, and the women offered their long hair for the strings of the new catapults. Behind its enormous walls, forty-five feet high and thirty-three feet thick, the city might well hold out for a while against a siege; and it was garrisoned by half a million desperate Semites who had everything

Reasons for
the fears of
Rome.

Desperate
resistance
of Carthage.

to lose by surrender. Hasdrubal, the Numidian, a half-breed kinsman of Masinissa, directed the operations in the city; another Hasdrubal, a Carthaginian, nicknamed the Fat, set out to raise an army in the open country and the neighbouring towns, which, with the one exception of Utica, remained on the side of their former mistress; and a third leader,



Himilco Phameas, took advantage of the local quarrels which honey-combed the kingdom of Masinissa, to raise a very serviceable force of Numidian cavalry.

The Romans, with inconceivable negligence, allowed a month to pass before taking any steps to enforce their ultimatum, and when at last they set about the siege—Manilius advancing by the broad eastward isthmus,

Marcus by way of the *Taenia*, the narrow sand-bar which separates the southern lagoon from the sea—their forces suffered severely from the unhealthy neighbourhood of the marshes; and an expedition against the field force of Hasdrubal failed wholly of its object. Neither Consul showed the smallest military ability, and the only officer who distinguished himself at all was P. Scipio Aemilianus,—the son of Aemilius Paullus, and the adopted heir of Africanus,—who was serving as a military tribune, and had already, on one occasion, saved the whole force from disaster. Scipio persuaded Himilco Phameas to come over to the Roman side, and rendered a still more important service soon after; for the war had hardly begun when Masinissa died, at the advanced age of ninety, and at his express desire Scipio undertook,—and, what is more, carried out successfully,—the partition of Numidia between his three sons, Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal; raising, too, at the same time, a considerable Numidian force, to cover the Roman siege works.

Roman
negligence
and
mismanage-
ment.

Death of
Masinissa,
149 B.C.

But still Carthage held out. The Consul of 148, L. Calpurnius Piso, had no success either in the siege itself, or in his attacks upon the other Punic towns. The Carthaginians were intriguing with the 'pseudo-Philip' in Macedon (p. 285), and with the native chiefs in Africa; and a body of eight hundred Numidians, with their commander Bithyas, actually deserted to the side of the besieged. Both Senate and people were disconcerted by the length of the war; the army was demoralised by incapable leadership; complications were imminent in Achaea, and had actually arisen in Macedon. The only able man was young P. Scipio, and the cry went up that the African war should be put into his hands.

Scipio
Aemilianus
made
Consul,
147 B.C.

Scipio had come home for the elections, and was a candidate, in the usual course, for the aedileship. But though only thirty-seven years old he was unanimously elected to the consulship for 147, and specially appointed to the command against Carthage. His first task was to restore the discipline of the army in Africa, and to train his subordinates—one of whom, Mancinus, endangered the whole force by an ill-managed flank attack along the shore of the southern lagoon. It was only with an efficient army that so difficult a siege could be carried through.

Restoration
of discipline.

The Carthaginians had already found themselves unequal to the defence of the long lines across the isthmus, and were compelled to evacuate them; and with them went the whole northern suburb of *Magalia*, or Megara, which gave Scipio, at the same time, a higher and healthier camp, a fresh means of access to the sea, and a

Occupation
of Megara.

smaller front of fortification to attack. He was soon able to complete the investment of the city by land, and to establish a blockade on the port.

But the deserter Bithyas continued, from time to time, to throw supplies into the starving city by sea, and the advancing season made it increasingly difficult to maintain an effective blockade. Scipio's Mole. Scipio was compelled therefore to undertake the enormous task of enclosing the whole mouth of the Merchants' Harbour by a mole, ninety-six feet broad, running out from the base of the Taenia towards the town. With infinite trouble the mole was completed; but the Carthaginians had cut, meanwhile, a new outlet from their War Harbour to a point on the shore beyond the mole, and the Romans were astonished to see a fresh fleet of fifty ships sail out through what they had believed to be solid land and dangerous breakers. But their surprise was soon over. The Carthaginians failed to attack the dismantled ships of Scipio, and after three days' ineffectual manœuvring they were confronted with the Roman blockading-squadron near the new channel, and were destroyed as they crowded into it.

Henceforward the city was completely enclosed, and the distress within became intolerable. Hasdrubal, who had lost any claims to generalship which he may have had, was in supreme command, and made repeated but ineffectual attempts to come to terms; but differences broke out between the rival factions, and ended in a massacre of the moderate party and of the Roman prisoners. Distress and disunion in Carthage.

The end came early in the following year: Laelius had already defeated the field-army near Nopheris, on the other side of the lagoon, and had captured Nopheris itself, and all the other towns which still held out. Scipio himself led an assault upon the shattered walls round the Merchants' Harbour, while Laelius, with a separate force, surprised the *Cothon* or War Harbour beyond it; and the quarter round the market-place fell into their hands without a struggle. Capture of the Harbour Town.

Nothing remained but the *Byrsa*, or Citadel, itself, and the crowded quarters through which the three main streets led up to it. But here, for six days and nights, a desperate struggle went on. House after house was defended with obstinate heroism against the advance of the enemy. House after house, therefore, the Romans were compelled to break through the party-walls and fight their way from room to room, to avoid the hail of missiles from the roofs, which overwhelmed them if they used the narrow streets. But, on the seventh day, Street fighting.

the citadel quarter was reached, and to clear the way for a final assault Scipio ordered the whole of the conquered buildings to be burned and levelled with the ground.

Fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the Byrsa, who surrendered to Scipio as suppliants, were allowed to go out with their lives, but nine hundred deserters from the Romans shut themselves up in the Temple of Eshmun¹ on the summit, and prepared to set it on fire. Hasdrubal disgraced himself by a cowardly escape at the last moment, but his heroic wife gathered the remnants of the defence together, killed her two sons upon the roof, and flung herself and them into the flames, with curses on her husband and congratulations to the Roman commander; who burst into tears as he watched the work of destruction, and was heard to repeat to himself the ominous words:

ἔσσειται ἡμῶν ὅταν ποτ' ὀλωλῆ Ἴλιος ἱρή.
'The day shall be, when holy Troy shall fall.'

All that remained of the town was given over to plunder; but the gold and silver which were found, and the ornaments of the temples, were reserved for Scipio's triumph; and such works of art as had formerly been captured from Greek towns in Sicily were returned, by his express command, to their proper owners—a small and tardy recompense for the spoliation of Syracuse by Marcellus. Those quarters of the town, which had not been destroyed in the assault, Scipio was anxious to spare; but the Senatorial commission, which came out to regulate the conquest, ordered the effacement of every trace of the hated city. All buildings, except the temples, were levelled with the ground; the whole site was obliterated with the plough and dedicated to the Powers of the Under-world; and the other towns which had supported Carthage were destroyed in like manner and their territory leased as *ager publicus*.

Of the territory of Carthage, part was divided between Utica and the few other towns which had given assistance to Rome. The remainder was constituted a Roman province under the name of Africa, with the 'free city' of Utica as its capital; and was made liable to a fixed *stipendium* (p. 317) as tribute. Numidia remained, under the terms of Scipio's partition, a group of allied states under the three sons of Masinissa. But, like Pergamum and Rhodes, it had outlived its usefulness; and though it continued responsible for frontier defence against the ruder tribes to the westward, it received no share of the plunder.

¹ The Greek and Roman writers identified this deity with their own Asklepios or Aesculapius.

The whole of the old dominions of Carthage had now been brought under the direct control of Rome, which thus became undisputed mistress of the whole of the western Mediterranean. 'All men, took it for granted,' says Polybius, 'that nothing remained but to obey the commands of the Romans.' But in the destruction of Carthage, as in the contemporary annexation of Macedon and the suppression of the Greek Leagues, Rome could not plead, as heretofore, the necessities of the defence of Italy. In both these cases, it is true, the system of protectorates had broken down. But in both cases, also, one dominant motive was the growing thirst of both Senate and people for the wealth and power which would come from direct ownership of the rich estates of the conquered. The second Macedonian War had freed Rome for ever, as we have seen, from the burden of taxation for her own defence in war-time. The Revolt of Achaea, and the third Punic War, had rid her of her two chief commercial rivals, Corinth and Carthage, and bade fair even to relieve her citizens of the obligation of self-support in time of peace.

Effects of
the fall of
Carthage.

CHIEF DATES.

Expulsion of Hannibal from Carthage	196
Death of Hannibal, in Bithynia (Ch. xxii.)	183
Mission of Cato to Carthage	157
Mission of Carneades to Rome	155
Carthage makes war on Masinissa	151
Roman ultimatum to Carthage	149
Macedon becomes a Province	148
Scipio Aemilianus Consul in Africa: Achaean Revolt	147
Destruction of Carthage and of Corinth	146

CHIEF PERSONS.

L. Caecilius Metellus—M. Porcius Cato—L. Aurelius Orestes—L. Mummius—M. Manilius—L. Marcus Censorinus—P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus—C. Laelius—Andriscus—Callicrates—Carneades—Diaeus—Critolaus—Polybius—Hannibal—Masinissa—Hasdrubal Numida—Hasdrubal the Fat—Himilco Phameas—Bithyas—Micipsa—Gulussa—Mastanabal.

CHIEF PLACES.

Apollonia — Dyrrhachium — Thessalonica — Via Egnatia — Oropus —
Aegium — Corinth — Cirta — Emporiae — Utica — Nepheris — Carthage
(Megara — Taenia — Cothon — Byrsa).

SUBJECTS.

The causes of the change in Roman provincial policy.
The decay of Greek political ideas.
The causes of Cato's jealousy and hatred of Carthage.

CHAPTER XXV

THE ROMANS IN SPAIN DURING THE PERIOD OF CONQUEST

Separateness of the history of Spain—Continuous revolts—Cato—Sempronius Gracchus—Defects of the Roman administration—The Lusitanian War—Viriathus—The Celtiberian War—Numantia—Evil effects of the Spanish wars on the Romans—The new Spanish nation.

WE have now to turn to the history of Roman administration in Spain, which, during the period of the wars of conquest in the East, pursued a continuous but independent course of its own ; putting one point after another of the Roman provincial and military system to the test, and eliciting unsuspected deficiencies and unpremeditated expedients in both ; but performing for Rome the double service of training for them at the moment a succession of experienced commanders—among them Scipio Africanus, Cato, Paullus, Mummius, and Scipio Aemilianus—and of working out for all time the methods by which Roman civilisation was brought to bear on one people of Western Europe after another, till the Roman language and culture, and Roman institutions and legal ideas became dominant from the Atlantic to the Danube.

The Romans, as we have seen (p. 216), arrived at first in Spain as the deliverers of the Iberian peoples from the hated yoke of Carthage ; and for a while the wise rule of the Scipios disguised from the majority—what a few saw from the first—that the Roman conquest only meant a change of masters. From the moment, however, that the Celtiberians and other warlike peoples of the interior realised that the Romans had really come to stay, they raised an almost continuous series of revolts, which led the Romans on, like the English in India, till, almost unawares, and simply with the object of securing what they had already won, they found themselves in possession of the whole peninsula. But though the greater part of the country had been fought over and pacified, once already, before the close of the Hannibalic War, the peculiar physical character of the interior and the obstinate

independence of its inhabitants, no less than the incompetence and treachery of many of the Roman commanders, delayed the final settlement for more than seventy years ; while the Cantabrian hill-men of the Atlantic seaboard were not really subjugated at all until the time of Augustus.

The provincial organisation of Hither and Further Spain, under two Roman Praetors, armed with consular powers and a garrison of four legions, was fully established, as we have seen already (p. 238), in the year 197. But a determined revolt broke out at once ; and when M. Porcius Cato arrived as Consul of 195 he found the Roman garrisons confined to the harbour-town of Emporiae, at the foot of the Pyrenees, and to one or two other fortresses along the coast. By vigorous military operations, and by turning to his own advantage the inveterate feuds among the Celtiberian tribes, he soon made himself master of the open country, and then issued separate orders to each native town, to pull down its walls by a certain day. The majority thought themselves isolated, and obeyed at once, and Cato had no difficulty in forcing the remainder to do the same. Having thus reduced both provinces to order, he reopened the silver mines of New Carthage, which had been closed since the expulsion of the Carthaginians, and greatly relieved the grievances relating to administration and revenue. The latter, it should be noted, though at first collected in Spain, as in Sicily, by *decumae*, or tithes upon produce, which involved fresh reassessment upon each annual crop, and was collected for the government by *publicani* or middlemen, who made their own profit in the process, was commuted before long to the far less vexatious form of *stipendium* ; each community being assessed, once for all, at a fixed lump sum, which it raised from among its own members in whatever way it found least burdensome, and without any outside interference at all.

For the next fifteen years, the settlement of Cato gave tolerable satisfaction, and we hear only of expeditions successfully led into Lusitania, in the intractable west, by L. Aemilius Paullus as Praetor in 191-89, and by L. Calpurnius Piso in 185. But in 181 a serious rising of the Celtiberians round Compelea, in Hither Spain, only partially repressed by the Praetor, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, led to the memorable administration of Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, a member of the Scipionic circle, and the father of the celebrated reformers. After suppressing the revolt itself, in concert with the other Praetor, Albinus, he removed its more obvious causes by his reform of the provincial administration, and by his sympathetic handling

Settlement
of Cato,
195 B.C.

Adminis-
tration of
Sempronius
Gracchus,
179 B.C.

of the natives. He revised the treaties thoroughly on more liberal terms, and regulated more equitably the tenure of landed property. He founded towns, to encourage a more settled mode of life in the interior; and he opened an honourable career to the ambitious chieftains, and the more restless among their followers, by encouraging them to enlist, as irregular troops, in the Roman army. Above all, he set an example of a firm, just, and clean-handed government, which was never forgotten by the Spaniards, and kept them loyal for nearly a generation, under the blunders and extortions of his successors.

The same liberal policy was continued in 171, in the foundation, at Carteia close to Gibraltar, of the first Latin colony outside Italy; and by the favourable consideration which the Senate gave, in the same year, to a petition from the native communities against the reappearance of official extortion.

Foundation
of Carteia,
171 B. C.

But the possession and administration, and above all the defence, of a dependency so large, so restless, and so far from home, could not be without its effect upon the Roman political and military system. The creation of prolonged, and necessarily uncontrolled, commands over large standing armies, and great resources and revenues, led inevitably to increased independence of Senatorial control—as in the case of Scipio himself, at the very beginning of Roman Spain—and weakened the sense of responsibility for honest and upright government. The tenure of office, even doubled in length, as it had been in Spain almost from the first, was still too short for a governor to study the peculiarities of his province, or to identify himself with its interests. Meanwhile, each successive Prætor had a fresh pocket to fill, and a fresh reputation to make, by cheap and short-lived successes on the frontier, and too often also by recourse to foul play, if the expedition or the revolt threatened to outlast his term of office. The constant wars, it is true, made the Spanish provinces a school of generals who frequently made their mark elsewhere. But it is in Spain, too, where there was always a determined and really warlike enemy, that we find the most flagrant cases of incapacity, cowardice, and treachery. And the frequent necessity for summary punishments, and still more the terrible moral strain of guerilla warfare, repressed, with very rare exceptions, all show of consideration on the part of the Roman generals for the sensitive feelings and prejudices of the Celtiberian temperament; and too often even for the treaty rights of the native communities.

Defects of the
Roman ad-
ministration.
(1) Misgovernment.

The experience, also, of the maintenance of a great army on a war footing had already led, even before the end of the Hannibalic War, to the financial

principle that military operations must pay their own way. The burden, therefore, of the tribute to Rome—which in itself was not grievous, and, in Spain, was levied, as we have seen, with the least possible interference with the self-government of the natives—was appreciably increased by requisitions, regular and irregular, for the support of the enormous garrison which the disturbed state of the province demanded.

The maintenance, moreover, of so large a force, at such a distance from home, and, even after the Ligurian land-route was secured, still practically over-sea, led, of itself, to a gradual but vital change in the character of the Roman army. Ordinary leave of absence was of course out of the question; and the traditional system of annual service, which had broken down in any case in the stress of the Hannibalic War, was quite unequal to the supply of the necessary reliefs, when four whole legions were quartered permanently five hundred miles or more from Italy. Service in Spain, besides, was particularly unpopular, for there was both more fighting than anywhere else—and of a peculiarly wearing and wasteful kind—and at the same time far less glory and booty. The result was an increased reliance, even for the annual reliefs, on veterans who had made the army a regular profession, on volunteers who intended from the first to do the same, and on Spanish conscripts and mercenaries. At last a regular system of long-service enlistment was introduced. The soldiers remained with the standards, for ten years in the cavalry (which was now almost wholly composed of Italians, with auxiliary corps of lightly-armed Numidian and Aetolian scouts), and in the legions for sixteen; and the way thus lay open not only for the growth of a purely professional army, but also for that conservatism, in organisation and tactics, which is inevitable wherever the veteran element prevails; and which, in the prolonged absence of a really formidable enemy, may be carried so far as to be positively dangerous.

The population of free citizens, too, was steadily falling out of proportion to the demand for men. The reduction of the property qualification, before the time when Polybius wrote, from eleven thousand to four thousand *asses* for the legions, and even lower for the fleet, only thrust into the service a worse class of recruits than ever. The regulation, made as early as 180, that candidates for public office must produce certificates of at least ten years' service, attracted but few who would not have done their duty in any case. The city populace, even when it could be got to enlist at all, was worthless and insubordinate, and the introduction of conscription-

(2) Oppressive taxation.

(3) Long-service system in the army.

(4) Citizens shirk military service.

by-ballot only roused a fresh form of dislike and reluctance. Worst of all, a cheap popularity was to be won in Rome, by releasing Roman citizens from the obligation of military service, and by recruiting the provincial army from the Italian allies, who had no votes in the Comitia ; a practice which steadily drained Italy of her best and most loyal blood, and aroused deep-seated discontent in the very heart of the Empire.

The settlement of Gracchus secured peace in Spain for nearly twenty-five years ; but about the year 154, the mismanagement and extortion of his successors provoked a two-fold rebellion, which continued almost without intermission, in the Further Province for twenty years, and in Hither Spain for twenty-five.

Second
period of
Spanish
revolts.

In Further Spain, the ringleaders were the Lusitani, a powerful and restless group of tribes who lay north-west of the valley of the Baetis, in the lower valleys of the Anas and Tagus. They had been partially subdued by Paullus in 191, but had quickly recovered their strength, and were all the more troublesome because they had taken to the sea, and could harry the coasts of the province, and even the nearer parts of Africa.

(1) The
Lusitanian
War,
154-136 B.C.

The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the town of Segeda to pull down its walls, which it had rebuilt in defiance of the settlement of Cato ; whereupon the Lusitanians took up the quarrel as their own. Under their chief, Punicus—the name itself is suggestive—and with the help of the Vettones from their north-east frontier, they won two battles in 154, but were checked for the moment by the Praetor, L. Mummius, the future conqueror of Corinth. But the revolt went on, until a lull in the struggle in Hither Spain, to which we shall return presently, allowed the Romans to unite against them the forces of both provinces together. In this concerted attack L. Licinius Lucullus, the Consul of 151, advanced with the Hither army from the east, while the Praetor, Servius Sulpicius Galba, attacked them from the south. Galba, at first, was utterly defeated ; but in the next campaign he fought his way into Lusitania, forced the tribes to come to terms, and offered to settle them, elsewhere, on better lands than their own. The Lusitanians trusted his word, and began to assemble for the move. But Galba's term of office was nearly at an end, and he wanted a striking success before he returned to Rome. So in utter defiance of his promise, he took a mean advantage of their confidence, to massacre and enslave seven thousand of their warriors. For this atrocity, indeed, he was put

Its causes.

Treachery
of Galba,
150 B.C.

on his trial on his return to Rome, and the prosecution was undertaken by M. Cato, who was now in his eighty-fifth year, and who died very shortly after this last effort to serve his old provincials. But Galba was eloquent and wealthy, and when he produced his weeping family to work upon the feelings of the court, he was acquitted.

But there was one among those who escaped from Galba's massacre, who was fully able to avenge it. Viriathus, a young Lusitanian chief—
Viriathus. brave, popular, and eloquent, a born leader, and of true Spanish chivalry—found little difficulty in firing his outraged countrymen with his own high courage. From a shepherd, as it was said, he became a hunter in the woods; from a hunter, a robber chief; from a robber chief, the leader of a regular army. Vetilius, the successor of Galba, was defeated, captured, and killed in 148; and for eight full years Viriathus maintained a desperate guerilla warfare.

In 145, however, when the African and Achaean Wars were over, both Consuls were sent into Spain; C. Laelius to repress a revolt of the Celtiberians, and Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the
More Roman mismanagement. brother of Scipio Aemilianus,¹ to undertake the command against Viriathus. Fabius found the army utterly demoralised by bad leadership and repeated disasters, but by enforcing strict discipline he succeeded, in the following year, in inflicting a defeat upon the Lusitanians. Yet in 143 we find the Praetor Quinctius shut up by the enemy in Corduba, on the Baetis; and in 141, Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, an adopted brother of the other Fabius, and Consul of the year, who had been sent with fresh forces to Further Spain, was caught almost at the outset in a defile near Erisane, and had to buy his release by a humiliating treaty. The Lusitanians were recognised as 'friends and allies' of Rome, and secured in possession of their own territory under the chieftaincy of Viriathus.

These terms were duly ratified by the Senate, though sorely against its will. Yet in the very next year, another Consul, Q. Servilius Caepio,
Treachery of Caepio, 140 B.C. the own brother of Fabius Servilianus, repudiated the treaty altogether, and invaded Lusitania from the side of Further Spain; while M. Popillius Laenas co-operated with reinforcements from the other province. Viriathus, as before, was prepared to submit, but the demand for the absolute disarmament of his people
Murder of Viriathus. caused a protracted negotiation. Caepio, however, who, like Galba before him, wanted to secure a triumph before the end of his year, treacherously cut the matter short by offering

¹ They were both, it will be remembered, sons of L. Aemilius Paullus, and had been adopted into the respective families whose names they bore now.

bribes—which he hypocritically repudiated afterwards—to some of the Lusitanian leaders ; and Viriathus was murdered in his sleep.

This shameless treachery, coupled with the loss of their only leader, broke the spirit of his followers. Teutamus, his successor, was captured in a raid into the province ; and in the years 138-6 the Consul, D. Junius Brutus, an able and honourable man, organised a fleet on the Atlantic coast, and with this new weapon completed, in fair fight, the conquest of Lusitania. Then, to secure the country, he transported a large number of the inhabitants from their hills to the low ground ; fortified Osilipo, on the site of Lisbon, at the mouth of the Tagus, to defend the coast ; and settled at Valentia, on the Hither coast, a little south of Saguntum, a regular Latin colony of the captured followers of Viriathus. Junius was the first Roman commander, also, to penetrate into the wild north-west corner of the peninsula. He crossed the river Minius, and received the submission of the Gallaeci, and for himself the well-earned title of Gallaecus.

Pacification
of Further
Spain,
136 B.C.

The other series of revolts, in the Hither Province, originated among the Celtiberian tribes of the high ground, between the Ebro valley, on the one hand, and the headwaters of the Anas, the Tagus, and Durus, on the other. Though it produced no striking figure like that of Viriathus, it lasted longer than that in Further Spain, and inflicted greater damage on the military reputation of the Romans.

(2) The
Celtiberian
War,
153-133 B.C.

Like the trouble in Lusitania, it broke out in or about the year 153 ; and, like it also, was aggravated by the blunders and cruelty of the Roman commanders, until it caused such a drain on the resources of Italy, as made it appear formidable even in Rome. The first troubles appeared among the Belli, the Titthi, and the Arevaci, and arose from questions of interpretation of the settlement of Gracchus. That settlement, however, the Senate refused to regard as final ; and the situation became so grave that in order to arrive in time for a full summer campaign, the Consuls of 153, Q. Fulvius Nobilior and T. Annius Luscus, entered office on the first of January instead of in March : a custom which maintained itself thenceforward, and has been perpetuated in the midwinter 'New Year's Day' of the modern European calendar.

Its causes.

The prompt arrival of Fulvius in Spain was quickly succeeded by his surprise and defeat among the hills ; his depôt at Ocilis was forced to surrender, and he was himself defeated again before Numantia, a natural fortress of the Arevaci. His successor, M. Claudius Marcellus,

succeeded by humaner methods in pacifying the Celtiberians, and concluded a treaty at Numantia on very reasonable terms. Yet, in order to secure a success and some plunder for himself, L. Licinius Lucullus, the Consul for 151, and the confederate of the infamous Galba, ignored or repudiated the treaty; and spread the area of the disturbance still further by attacking the Vaccaei, who had hitherto remained loyal, and the remote Cantabri, who had taken no part in the quarrel. He too, like Galba, would have been entirely cut off on one occasion, but for pledges honourably given and redeemed by young Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving with him as a military tribune.

After this incident the war seems to have flagged for nearly ten years, probably because the attention of Roman commanders was so fully occupied with the war with Viriathus. In 143 an alliance was formed between the Vaccaei and the Arevaci, but both were beaten by Q. Metellus Macedonicus, and only the fortresses of Numantia and Termes remained in arms.

But on the question of disarmament the native leaders were firm; and though Termes was taken by Q. Pompeius in 141, Numantia, a magnificent natural stronghold, precipitous on three sides, and lying in the fork of two of the upper tributaries of the Durius, held out for nearly eight years more, and has deservedly given its name to the whole war in Hither Spain. Pompeius attempted to make peace, but his terms were not ratified by the Senate, and were repudiated by his successor, M. Popillius Laenas. Yet he too failed in two campaigns to take Numantia, though his forces far outnumbered the defenders; and in 137 the Consul, C. Hostilius Mancinus, was sent with orders to bring the war to a close.

Mancinus, however, allowed himself to be completely cut off by the enemy; his men behaved with disgraceful insubordination; and to save the lives of twenty thousand Roman citizens, he submitted to an abject surrender. Even these dishonourable terms were only conceded on the intercession of his Quaestor, Tiberius Gracchus, who was welcomed by the Celtiberians as the son of their former benefactor; and were guaranteed by the pledged word of all the officers in the force. But, just as at Caudium, the Senate repudiated the shameful bargain, and satisfied its own conscience, again, by surrendering the person of Mancinus, who lay naked and bound beneath the walls of Numantia until it was clear that the enemy did not mean to take him in. Two years more of blundering followed. In 136 the colleague of Junius Brutus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, stirred up the Vaccaei again, and was

**Roman
mismanage-
ment.**

**Ten years'
interval.**

**The war of
Numantia,
141-133 B.C.**

**Surrender of
Mancinus,
137 B.C.**

severely defeated in the course of a retreat from Pallantia ; and his successor, Q. Calpurnius Piso, found his hands so fully occupied with this new enemy, that he paid little attention to the siege of Numantia.

Then, at last, the Senate became alive to the scandal and waste of this miserable war—*bellum triste et contumeliosum*—which popular imagination was seriously comparing with the struggle with Carthage ; and decided to send out its ‘only general,’ P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the hero of the Third Punic War, in spite of the fact that, under the *Lex Villia* (p. 141), he was not yet legally eligible for another consulship. He was, however, so ill supported by the treasury in his preparations that he was forced, like Africanus in 205, to rely upon his personal influence, and the contributions of his friends, to complete his equipment ; while, to introduce a healthier tone into the degraded and dissolute army, if not even to secure his personal safety in camp, he set a new and momentous precedent by surrounding himself with a *praetoria cohors*, or general’s escort, composed of his personal friends and clients—the prototype of those Praetorian Guards who play so important a part in the later history of the Empire. Thus supported, he set himself to reorganise the ruined army which he found in Spain ; expelled the civilians and camp-followers who infested its quarters ; and by rigorous discipline, constant marches, and the exhausting labour of intrenchment, reduced his men to a certain appearance of smartness. His next step was to practise and season his force by systematic operations against the rebellious tribes, whereby he gradually stamped out the revolt in the open country.

Scipio
Aemilianus
sent to
Spain,
136 B.C.

Praetoria
cohors.

Military
reforms.

Siege and
fall of
Numantia,
133 B.C.

At last it became possible to attempt a regular siege of Numantia. Scipio surrounded the fortress with a double line of works five miles in length, blocked the approach by the river Durius, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Yet for fifteen months the desperate siege dragged on, until the defenders were reduced to such extremity of hunger that they ate the dead bodies of their fallen comrades. At last Numantia fell. Its walls were razed to the ground, and all the inhabitants were sold as slaves, except only fifty, who were reserved to crown the triumph of Scipio. Under Scipio’s direction, the usual Senatorial Commission restored a certain measure of contentment to the exhausted province ; and now all the tribes of the peninsula, except the Astures and Cantabri of the far north-west, acknowledged the supremacy of Rome.

The history of the Spanish provinces during this distressful period shows more clearly than anything else the disastrous change which came

over the stern and simple character of the Romans after they had been forced, almost in spite of themselves, into the position of the 'dominant state' in the Mediterranean. The unprincipled vacillation between conventionality and opportunism which characterises the government of the Senate; the steady decline in ability and morality among its leaders; the limitation of choice within the governing circle which is shown in the close family relationship of so many commanders in Spain; the mercenary indolence and political degeneracy of the mass of the people, all stand out first and clearest in the Spanish wars, which thus occupy a peculiar middle position between the Rise and the Fall of the Republic.

Yet behind the misgovernment of Rome, and the turbulent and futile opposition of the more backward among the native tribes, it is already possible to trace, in Spain, first the growth of a new Latin nation, which unites with the chivalrous bravery and the high standard of honour of the old Iberian and Celtic inhabitants, that solid Italian taste for agriculture and industry which make of Spain the most uniformly prosperous of all the Roman provinces; and afterwards that familiar acquaintance with the Latin language, and the facility and elegance in the use of it, which produced later such ornaments of Latin literature as Lucan, Seneca, Quintilian, and Martial; and that genuinely Roman gift for orderly self-government, which, early appreciated and utilised by liberal administrators like Cato and Gracchus, produced almost 'another Italy' under the leadership of Sertorius (p. 437); and gave back to Rome, in Trajan, her first provincial Emperor.

CHIEF DATES.

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Administration of Tl. Gracchus	179
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Brutus Gallaecus conquers the Gallaeci: Osilipo founded	136
Scipio Aemilianus captures Numantia	133

CHIEF PERSONS.

**M. Porcius Cato — Ti. Sempronius Gracchus — Q. Fulvius Nobilior —
L. Mummius — L. Licinius Lucullus — Ser. Sulpicius Galba — Q. Fabius
Maximus Aemilianus — Q. Servilius Caepio — Q. Pompeius — D. Junius
Brutus Gallaeus — C. Hostilius Mancinus — P. Cornelius Scipio
Aemilianus — Punicus — Viriathus.**

CHIEF PLACES.


**Emporiae — Carteia — Segeda — Corduba — Erisane — Osilipo — Valentia —
Ocilis — Termes — Numantia.**

SUBJECTS.

The causes of the discontent in Spain.

**The effects of the Spanish wars on Roman character and administra-
tion, civil and military.**

The growth of the new Spanish Nation.



CHAPTER XXVI

ROME AND THE EMPIRE DURING THE GREAT WARS

Retrospect of Roman Conquest—Consequences for Rome—Restrictions of Privilege—*Nobilitas*—Senatorial government—Degeneracy of the *Nobiles*—Decay of public spirit—Economic ruin of Italy—Roman commerce abroad—Rise of a wealthy non-official class—The Roman Provincial system—Taxation—Proconsular government—Merits and defects—Roman Finance—Wastefulness of the system—The work of Rome in the West—and in the East.

THE destruction of Carthage, and the dissolution of the Greek Leagues in the same year, mark the close of a great period in the history of Rome, and a turning-point in the fortunes of the city. From the morrow of the Expulsion of the Kings to the momentary disaster of the Gallic raid, and from the Gallic raid to the fall of Tarentum in 272, the Romans had risen, almost without a check, to be masters of all Italy, and had gone far towards a new ideal of constitutional development, in which a whole country like Italy should become one free republic, and should be governed through its First City by a real aristocracy of its citizens; for, steadily gathering round the old Patricians and Plebeians of the city of Rome, there was all that was most capable and most loyal to the Roman ideal, not merely among the kindred Latins, but among all those other states in Italy to whom the grant of the *ius Latii* and of municipal institutions was to be but the probationary step towards full incorporation later on.

Two generations of struggle with Carthage, from 264 to 202, left this Roman Italy the mistress of the sea from Gades to Dyrrhachium, and of great transmarine territories in Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain; and confronted her with the new and harder problem, how to weld peoples so different as the civilised Greeks of Sicily, the rude highlanders of Sardinia, and the turbulent but by no means barbarous Celtiberians, into one coherent empire; and we have seen already (in Chapter XIX.) what changes resulted from that struggle in the economic and social condition of Italy, and in the relations between the citizens and the subject populations.

Retrospect.

Rome and Italy.

Rome and the western Mediterranean.

Since then, once more, nearly sixty years of almost continuous expansion had raised the Romans to the position of the greatest single state of Rome and the East. the known world, with an empire which, though not so vast in land area as that of Alexander, yet embraced nearly two-thirds of the whole coast-line of the Mediterranean Sea; and it was clearly a question rather of the time and the opportunity than of the power to incorporate the remainder. Egypt, Rhodes, and Pergamum lay in fact already under an informal protectorate, and the rapid dissolution of Syria made danger on that side inconceivable.

Success and prestige so unbounded could not but have far-reaching effects upon the character and institutions of the Romans themselves, which reacted in turn upon their treatment of the countries Rome. Consequences for Rome. which had come under their sway. The social and economic changes which we saw already in progress even at the conclusion of the war with Hannibal (Ch. XIX.), had gone on with ever-increasing rapidity through the whole period of foreign conquest; but the attention of Roman thinkers and administrators was directed during these years to very different problems; and the new tendencies were allowed to go on growing unchecked, and undirected, until in the period which follows they broke out into violent and protracted revolution.

Wealth and the opportunities for amassing it continued to accumulate far more quickly than its creators could find wholesome use for it; but at the same time the holders of great wealth became fewer and fewer in number, and the cleavage, consequently, more and more pronounced between those who had riches and those who had not; while the few who had wealth, strong in their assured monopoly, turned an ever duller ear Restrictions of privilege. to the warning murmurs of the majority. Privilege, too, whether of office or of citizenship, became more and more closely restricted to those who possessed it already: extensions of franchise, and even of Latin rights, became rarer and rarer as time went on; colonies ceased to be founded altogether; and the new provincials were left without legal redress against official tyranny or the oppression of Nobilitas. citizen adventurers. Within the closed circle of citizenship, meanwhile, the distinction between office-holding *nobiles* and the common run of citizens became more and more pronounced, and the career of the public service became almost unattainable to any who were not born in a 'noble' family. The bad old days of patrician exclusiveness seemed to have returned again, only with the additional grievance that *nobilitas* had no immemorial antiquity behind it, but had itself resulted from an abuse of that liberty and equality, for which the old plebeians had striven.

From the moment when the Senate ceased to be a merely advisory body, and began to impose its wishes upon the magistrates of the people's choice, its supremacy as the one governing body of Rome was assured ; provided only that no one was bold enough to question the ground of its authority, or strong enough to act in defiance of it. These possibilities, however, were precluded by the circumstances of the Carthaginian wars, when it was the firm and persistent devotion of the Senate to a high and patriotic ideal which, more than anything else, had saved Rome itself from defeat. In the eastern wars which followed, likewise, it was all-important to hold fast to a continuous policy, and to take a broad and reasoned view of international questions. In face of Oriental life-monarchy, the annual change of consuls and provincial governors would have been as fatal to the state, as the daily change of generals had been to the troops of Minucius and Varro. The Senate, on the other hand, outlasted Hannibal and Philip, and could wait for an Antiochus or a Perseus to take its enemy at a disadvantage.

And, for a while, the Senate justified its supremacy. Mismanagement indeed there was, in detail, when war after war seemed to be so nearly final, that at the close of each the military system was allowed to fall into neglect ; while from sheer weariness of conquest and annexation the government chose the easy rather than the thorough way of dealing with the questions of policy which arose. But so long as there were real differences of opinion within the Senate itself as to the course that should be pursued, and so long as men of the capacity of Cato and Scipio Africanus took active part in its debates and in the execution of its decisions, the damage from these fits of slothfulness could not be serious. It was only when a new generation grew up which had never seen a life-and-death struggle between great nations, and had lost the instinctive Italian *virtus* without acquiring the 'right reason' of the Greeks, along with their manners and luxuries, that the Senate began to lose sight of the duties of empire, and to grasp immoderately at the perquisites.

Inevitably, too, the really high level of ability which had carried the government of the Senate through earlier times of peril, sank to mediocrity, and worse, when the door was closed by the nobles themselves to reinforcements of merit from outside. It was the *carrière ouverte aux talents* which had made it that 'assembly of kings' which aroused the amazement of Cineas ; it was a selfish conspiracy to confine the spoils of the world in the pockets of a hereditary clique, that led to the barbarities and failures of the later wars in Spain.

How, then, during the generation which followed, did this degenerate Senate contrive to evade disaster? Abroad, mainly because after the conquest of Macedon in 168 there remained no power, in the Mediterranean world, which had the resources or the leader to take advantage of the situation. In the West, indeed, we have seen already, in the cases of Viriathus and Numantia, what a single outlaw chief or a single upland fortress could do; but in the East, not even this seemed possible. The Greek world, in fact, was both too rotten and too prosperous to risk another struggle with its conquerors; and as the Romans had not yet laid hand on Asia Minor, the time was not yet come for the highland princes of Pontus or Armenia to take alarm at their expansion.

At home, the *nobiles* themselves had secured that the 'sovereign people' should have little chance of turning against its governors. Repeated laws *de ambitu*, and the introduction at last even of secret voting (p. 315 n.), show only too clearly how the wealth and influence of the official families had been brought to bear upon the corrupt and poverty-stricken voters in the Comitia. By wholesale bribery and costly entertainments the city populace was easily kept in good humour: the country voters had better things to do than to leave their farms—which barely repaid them, even so, for their labour—to join in the farce of a Comitial election; and, besides, the drain of the great wars had told more heavily upon the country population, in proportion as their services were more valuable, at the front, than those of a town-bred levy. The same drain of men, also, probably accounts for the absence even of any mouthpiece of the better sort of citizens; and with the *cursus honorum* closed to the vast majority, the only road to distinction of any kind was either in business or in the army, and, in either case, outside Italy.

The condition of Italy itself, meanwhile, went steadily from bad to worse. The yeoman-farmers gave place everywhere, except in the central highlands, to the slave-gangs and *latifundia* of the great landowners. In face of the competition of cheap corn from abroad, farming in the strict sense simply ceased to pay; and whole tracts of country went out of cultivation altogether, or became mere moorland pasture for gigantic herds of slave-watched cattle. Rome and large parts of Italy became dependent on the provinces for the very necessaries of life; yet exported little in return, and became a yearly heavier burden on the natural resources of the Mediterranean.

Disguised by
absence of
opposition:

(a) abroad;

(b) at home.

Decay of
public spirit
among the
citizens.

Economic
ruin of
Italy.

It was only by the organisation of vast commercial and financial enterprises abroad that the inhabitants of the home-territory repaid their debt to the provinces at all. Not only Roman citizens, but Italians also, with Latin rights, or with none, spread in great numbers all over the Empire, and beyond; rivalling the Greek in their genius for trade and speculation, and surpassing the Phoenician in their oppression of the unfortunate native. The introduction on a great scale of method and system into the commerce of the Mediterranean was no doubt a contribution of the first order to the general prosperity of the world; but the transfer of the centre of credit and enterprise from the older centres of trade to Rome and Ostia could not be effected without grave economic disturbances; and much of the distress and unrest of the Greek towns in the period of the Mithradatic wars has its root far away back in the displacements which were inevitable after the ruin of Carthage and Corinth, the only states of the middle Mediterranean which had competed successfully thitherto. Even great mercantile states like Rhodes and Pergamum began to lose their initiative in the generation which immediately follows; and only Alexandria and Antioch in the far East were sufficiently remote from the new rival to remain unaffected for a while.

Roman
commerce
and finance
abroad.

The political effects of this new tide of prosperity, upon Rome and Italy, were barely perceptible for the moment: but in the history of the period which follows, it is all-important to remember that alongside the spoils of war and provincial government there was another great and growing source of wealth and influence; and that the men who wielded it were the very men to whom the official class were strenuously holding shut the door to a political career; and with whom the provincial governors came most sharply and frequently into collision in the race to plunder the natives. This, in fact, is the other side to those laws *de ambitu* which come so oddly from the corrupt Senatorial government.¹ Two golden showers, not one, descended upon the Comitia at election time; and it was only by the most stringent precautions that the *nobiles* could prevent the gold of the *nouveaux riches* from producing the same effects as their own. A struggle was not far off—and in fact had already begun—between hereditary rank and individual ability, as the qualification for a political career, which recalls, on the surface, the old struggle of Patrician and

Rise of a
wealthy
non-official
class.

¹ See p. 314. In the same direction are the Ballot Laws—*Leges Tabellariae* (*Lex Gabinia*, 139; *Cassia*, 137; *Papiria*, 131); which attempted to secure secrecy of individual votes, in elections, judicial proceedings, and legislation respectively.

Plebeian ; but which led, as we shall see, not to a *concordia ordinum*, but to revolution and the Civil Wars.

In one department of political growth, and in one only, is the period of the great wars memorable ; for it was during these years, in the stress of frontier quarrels and wholesale annexation of widely different nationalities, that there was forged, in gradual outline, the greatest engine of imperial administration that the world had hitherto seen—the Roman Provincial System.

The Romans had shown already in the conquest of Italy a new and remarkable power of assimilating to themselves the peoples whom they conquered, and of welding them into a compact and uniformly organised state. But as their dominions extended oversea to Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain ; and landwards into Gaul beyond the Apennines ; and still more when they were forced to assume direct control of Macedon, Greece, and Carthaginian Africa, they found themselves confronted with a new set of problems ; and these too they met with a new solution which, in the middle course which it preserved between tributary enslavement on the one hand, and unmanageable expansion of the State of Rome on the other, was far in advance of anything yet seen.

This provincial system, like our own system of Colonial government, grew up gradually and almost unconsciously ; and it was applied and extended reluctantly or involuntarily, and without any fixed or far-sighted plan. The Romans, in fact, were hurried into their wars of conquest eastward before they had had time to set their affairs in order even in Italy ; before the war with Philip, and again before that with Antiochus, the strongest repugnance was expressed against entering into any kind of fresh complications abroad ; and though for a few years in the middle of the century we may see traces of a ‘forward policy’ in the annexation of Macedon, Achæa, and Africa, this was only a passing phase. Even in 142, when the imperial destiny of Rome must already have been seen to be inevitable, we find the younger Scipio laying down his censorship with a modification of the customary formula, and praying, not for the ‘expansion,’ but for the ‘preservation,’ of the Roman Empire. Yet Scipio himself had but recently returned from a general tour of inspection in the East, and though he was wholly alive to the need of a respite for the assimilation of the new culture of Hellenism, and for the organisation of the vast new territories, yet he, of all men living, had the best reason to know how much still remained to be done.

Yet Roman provincial organisation, however experimental at first,

rapidly hardened into a regular system. The constitution of each new province was fixed at its conquest by the *lex provinciae*, a special ordinance which defined the status, privileges, and obligations of each community within it, and the mode of government, of taxation, and of judicial administration which the successive Roman governors were to be bound to observe. The *lex provinciae*, once published, was only rarely altered, and its provisions consequently varied in the case of each province, according to the circumstances of the annexation. The characteristic Roman principle prevailed throughout of minimum interference with any arrangements which were found already in force and intelligible to the natives, and in most cases it worked fairly well. Each separate community within the province was allowed to retain its own constitution and usages, so far as they were not inconsistent with the *pax Romana*. All federations of towns, however, were either wholly dissolved or made purely ceremonial in character; and predominance was given everywhere to the party which had the largest material interests, as a guarantee for the prosperity and stability of the whole. Some few towns, whose earlier services or peculiar importance deserved it, remained *extra provinciam*, practically independent of the province in which they lay; and regulated their intercourse with it by a separate treaty with Rome. But these *civitates foederatae*¹ were the exception. In the large majority of cases, Roman control extended at least to the administration of justice and of finance: and everywhere, of course, completely extinguished the right of the various communities to conduct warfare or any kind of foreign affairs of their own, or to make any agreements with their neighbours except through Roman intermediation; though in the later provinces *commercium* and *connubium* were usually permitted between them. These *civitates foederatae*, and a few states which were *liberae sine foedere*, reserved entire their right to govern themselves without Roman intervention, and while they could be called upon to furnish men, ships, or supplies to the Roman forces, were exempt from the obligation to entertain any part of the Roman garrison of the province. The remainder, *civitates stipendiariae* or *decumanae*, paid regular tribute; and the Roman governor could examine their accounts, and overrule their constitutions at his discretion.

The system of taxation usually conformed to whatever had been in vogue before the occupation: *decumae*, or tithes of the yearly produce, for example, in Sicily; *stipendia*, or lump sums fixed by the *lex*

¹ Also called *civitates immunes*, because they were exempt from the ordinary obligations (*munera*) of provincials as to tribute and service.

provinciae, in Spain and Macedon. But in all cases the amount of the former taxes was appreciably reduced, and, in theory at all events, only enough was levied to pay the expenses of government. The

Taxation.

vast wealth of the eastern provinces, however, allowed the Romans, even so, to collect a considerable surplus. In Macedon, for example, the old land-tax was halved; but the balance, after paying for the administration of the province, more than sufficed to relieve Rome henceforward of all war-tax whatever: and when the kingdom of Pergamum became the 'province of Asia' in 133, an enormous sum found its way annually into the Roman treasury. There were also *portoria*, or harbour dues on exports and imports; and in most provinces large tracts of public lands—either the private estates of the conquered kings, or, as in Italy, the result of confiscation from disaffected cities or tribes—were administered and farmed as *praedia populi Romani*.

But there was no central supervision of provincial finances, and no security but the honour of individual governors that the money which

Absence of central supervision.

was raised was applied to the purposes for which it was intended. Under a bad governor, therefore, roads, harbours, and frontier defences were allowed to fall into decay; frontier wars were provoked, as used to happen in Spain and in Macedon, to secure for the governor a triumphal return into Rome; public servants were underpaid and allowed to make good the deficiency by blackmail and extortion; tax-gatherers (*publicani*) were allowed to get out of hand, and to levy double or treble what would satisfy their contract with the Senate; and the governor himself might return to Rome with ancient debts repaid, and a substantial fortune remaining, to buy off awkward questions, and maintain him in luxury for the future.

The first provinces, as we have seen (pp. 141, 238), were governed by additional praetors either appointed annually for the purpose, or, as in the case of Spain, customarily reappointed for a second

Proconsular government. year, to avoid waste of time in going to and fro. But in Spain, and elsewhere also, local disturbances or frontier wars frequently made it necessary for the Senate to assign the government of a province either to one of the consuls of the year, or to prolong the command of one or both of the consuls of the year before, and send them abroad *pro consule*, so as to leave the actual consuls free for their proper business. The increase of legal business in Rome meanwhile made it more and more difficult to spare even the additional praetors: the new standing commission *de pecuniis repetundis* (p. 319), occupied one praetor wholly from its establishment in 149; and after 146 no praetor was sent abroad during his year of office at all. All therefore looked now forward,

whether consuls or praetors, to a provincial command, *pro consule* or *pro praetore*, to follow as a matter of course; and meanwhile the appointment to these great governorships, though theoretically still made by the Comitia, was practically, like so much else, in the hands of the Senate, and a matter of rotation among the *nobiles*.

The growth of these new provincial commands inevitably brought about a complete change in the character of the Roman magistracy. A proconsul or proprætor, once established in his province, had no colleague to control his actions. He was beyond its abuses. the reach of instructions from the Senate for long periods of time together. He was unfettered by the right of *provocatio*, for he was dealing with provincials who had not the citizenship; and beyond the walls of Rome there was no tribune to interpose his veto on an illegal act. The only financial officer in the province was the Quaestor, a young and inexperienced lad, who was technically the ward of the governor, and came and went with his chief. There was no public prosecutor, and the only remedy in the hands of the provincials was either to appeal to the Senate, hundreds of miles oversea; or to threaten proceedings after the governor had returned to Rome; by which time he, for his part, had so laid out his plunder as to secure an easy acquittal. In practice, it is true, many communities made use of the old Roman custom of *clientela* and put themselves under the protection of some noble and influential family in Rome: the Marcelli, for example, were *patroni* of the people of Syracuse from the first, and the Fabii, later on (p. 470), of the Allobroges in Transalpine Gaul. But this was a mere private arrangement, and it was not till the establishment, by the Lex Calpurnia of 149, of a standing commission of inquiry, the *quaestio perpetua de pecuniis repetundis*—with a legal definition of the offence, a prescribed punishment, and a final sentence without appeal—that any legal remedy was available at all. Even so, it often seemed more tolerable to submit to the common fate of provincials than to throw good money after bad by incurring the expense of getting up a case and transporting witnesses and pleaders to Rome, with the practical certainty, after all, that, as in the first important case that was tried—that of Galba in Spain (p. 304)—the judges, who were themselves exclusively senators, would take the same view of the matter as the accused.

Even with an honest governor the provincial system gave no guarantee of even-handed or efficient management. A proconsul or proprætor need not have had any training in the administration or handling of native races; no experience of the working of any constitution but that of Rome, or of any office unqualified by the restraint and the support

of a colleague ; no aptitude for the little frontier wars which constantly occurred. There was no fixed salary attached to the office of governor ;

no permanent civil service in the province ; no constitution or legal code except the original *lex provinciae* and such parts of the *edictum* of his predecessors as a governor chose to incorporate in his own. The Senate fixed, at its pleasure, the amount of his *ornatio*, or allowance for equipment ; and, appointed him such deputy-governors (*legati*) and military escort (*cohors*) as it thought fit : the provincials received him with presentations and subscriptions, ¹ and offered the customary *vectigal praetorium* as blackmail against the billeting of his troops ; the tax-gatherers waited on him to learn the price of the year's impunity for their proceedings ; the aediles in Rome pestered him to send them strange beasts for their shows in Rome, or corn for distribution to the poor, or demanded the *vectigal aedilicium*, which seems to have become a regular substitute ; while, if a triumph was in prospect, the victorious general was expected to hand over a liberal share of the gifts of fortune to the sovereign people who had sent him out to receive them. Even an honest and able man, unless he was a very Cato, had probably spent more than he could afford in his own

aedileship, or in the customary canvassing which went on for the higher offices ; and every one understood in Rome that those who ministered to the provinces were expected to live on the provincials. In Spain, indeed, an urgent petition from the natives had secured in 171 a *senatus consultum* fixing the amount of supplies which might be demanded, and the prices which were to be paid for them ; but it was not till the consulship of Julius Caesar in 59 that any general regulation was laid down ; or that a provincial governor was bound, as a matter of course, to render his accounts to the Senate.

Moreover, in a single year, or so much of it as the great distances permitted, it was impossible to become sufficiently acquainted even with the current business of a great province ; much less to carry out the thorough reforms for which ample opportunity was left by the antiquated *lex provinciae* ; or to build up a continuous frontier policy, when the object of each successive governor seemed to be rather to provoke a border-war than to conciliate the confidence of the tribesmen.

The system, therefore, which had begun by offering such appearance of financial relief, and security from disturbance, to the troubled remnants of the empires of Carthage and of Alexander, proved, after all, to be little

¹ C. Calpurnius Piso collected in Spain in 184 eighty-three golden crowns and 12,000 pounds-weight of silver presents.—Livy, xxxiv. 4.

better in practice than an organised scheme of mismanagement and extortion. As a later writer expressed it, Roman government came 'as a wolf, not as a shepherd': frontier defence was neglected, and intrigue beyond the border went on unchecked; piracy flourished in every sea; commerce and industry languished; and the wretched provincials sank into hopeless arrears of tribute, and accumulated debts to Roman bankers which they could never hope to repay.

Consequent
distress
throughout
the empire.

But it was not only provincial finance that was in disorder; the affairs of the central treasury were equally devoid of system, and open to manifold abuse. Rome had emerged from the Hannibalic War almost bankrupt; and had been forced upon her career of conquest before she had had time or spirit to set her affairs in order. Then, from utter poverty, the Carthaginian indemnity and the plunder of the wars with Macedon and Syria raised her to an unimaginable wealth, and postponed again, though from quite opposite reasons, the necessary revision of her finance.

Roman
finance.

Thenceforward the principal sources from which the Roman treasury was replenished were as follows:—Italy as a whole paid no direct taxes, after the final remission of the war-tax in 167; but a considerable revenue was supposed to come from the leases of *ager publicus* contracted by the Censors, from the customs at Ostia and other ports, and from the *vicesima manumissionum* which continued to be levied on the liberation of a slave. In the provinces, as we have seen, the domains of the former rulers became the estate of the Roman people, as for instance, in the kingdom of Macedon, in the home territory of Carthage, in the case of Syracuse after the abolition of the kingship, and, above all, in the case of Pergamene Asia. The huge war indemnities also came straight to the treasury; but the vast booty of the campaigns of conquest became the perquisite of the general and the army, in spite of Cato's vigorous remonstrance *de praeda militibus divisa*; and, as we have seen, it was originally intended that the annual revenue of the provinces should not be spent on anything except their own internal administration. Much, moreover, of the vast provincial surplus, which arose eventually through miscalculation or extortion, was sent to Rome in kind, especially from the corn-growing provinces, Sicily and Africa; and as this was for the most part given away, or sold at a loss, as it arrived, it can hardly be counted as a regular source of income.

Revenue.

Against these heads of revenue we have to set down, as expenditure, first the repayment of the forced loans of the Hannibalic War; next, the

maintenance of roads, buildings, and other public works, and the expenses of the standing garrisons ; next, the variable *ornationes* of provincial governors and their civil and military staff ; and **Expenditure.** in addition to these the constant drain of the frontier wars, great or small, which the province which they were fought to defend was not always prosperous enough to defray from its own revenue. Finally, the burden of the corn supply, unsystematic though it was as yet, became yearly heavier, as the earning power of the city populace diminished, and the number of idle mouths increased. The public service, however, was still practically unpaid ; justice, in particular, cost little or nothing ; nothing was spent on education, and little on police or local government as we know it. The fleet, as we shall see, when once the navies of Antiochus had been extinguished, was allowed to fall utterly into disorder even as a police-force, to the encouragement of piracy and the grave detriment of sea-borne trade ; and the army, too, was encouraged more and more to believe that warfare must be made to pay for itself ; which meant reckless aggression in the east, where there was booty to be won ; and scandalous neglect even of frontier defence in the north and west, where there was not.

Yet small as these outgoings appear, the treasury never seemed to overflow. The system of collection by *publicani* was wasteful and oppressive ; the gold and silver mines of Macedon, for **Wasteful-** example, were actually closed in 167, because at that distance **ness of the** from home the Roman government had no choice but to **system.** work them by contract, and contract-working, as Roman *publicani* understood it, would have led at once to intolerable scandal ; the ground-rents of speculative millionaires in Italy tended not to be enforced at all ; the tithes on poor provincials abroad, to be paid three or four times over. No comprehensive *census* was ever made of the resources of any single province, except perhaps of Spain, under Cato and Gracchus ; still less was there any attempt to represent the finance of the empire in a single balance-sheet. The Censors, who ought to have done it, were wont to resign office after eighteen months out of a term of five years ; and the Quaestors, as we have seen, were merely financial secretaries to the great spending magistracies. The result was that though the provincials seemed always to be paying, the State was seldom receiving, and was never in a position to return them the value of their money. Private fortunes were amassed by publicans and proconsuls, but the navy, the army, and the civil service, such as it was, fell into disrepair, and the provinces became an additional burden instead of a relief to the empire.

Yet, in the western Mediterranean, at all events, the Roman system was an immeasurable advance upon any form of administration which had been known there before. The old Greek colonists had never cast aside the limitations of the City State, and had confined themselves to coast settlements which maintained with the natives merely such friendly relations as permitted of intercourse and trade. The Carthaginians had looked for little from their dependencies but tribute or mercenaries, and had given nothing of their own in return. The Romans, on the other hand, were the first to feel or to formulate the responsibilities of the conqueror for the welfare and advancement of the conquered; they displayed all the Greek genius for commerce, and felt more than the Carthaginian need of an army and a revenue, yet they insisted first and foremost on the maintenance of that *pax Romana* which made peace, and not war, the normal relation between state and state; with the result that to quarrel with one's neighbour was to quarrel with the whole might of Rome. This in itself was a new and inestimable boon; but Roman administration brought more than this. In all but the poorest and most turbulent districts, it greatly diminished the burden of direct taxation; and it imposed—in theory at all events—as a first charge on the revenue, the maintenance of a regular system of government, of defensive army, and of roads, bridges, and harbours to improve internal communication. Above all, it introduced a system of law and judicature, founded on the wide experience of foreign codes and customary law, which had been accumulated by the Praetor Peregrinus; elaborated by great Roman lawyers into a sort of international code of universal application; and provided with a single court of appeal in the Roman Senate, with its special and perpetual *Quaestiones*. Thus the Romans were laying in the West, in Cisalpine Gaul, in Spain, and in Africa, the foundations of a new Roman type of civilisation, and, as the event proved, of new Roman and Latin-speaking nations, such as the peoples of Italy itself were already coming to be.

But whereas in the West, where the provincials had less to offer, and the Romans had more to give, the administration remained comparatively strong and clean-handed throughout, it was in the East that the provincial system led to the most serious abuses. The distances were greater, and the sea-transit longer and more frequently imperilled by rival navies or by pirates. The previous organisation of the conquered countries was more advanced, more complicated, and more akin to despotism, and their wealth, their standard of comfort, and their aesthetic and intellectual culture were superior to those of their

The work
of Rome
in the
West,

and in the
East.

conquerors. Eastward, moreover, the Romans had advanced, not as the pioneers of order and discipline, but as the liberators of the Greeks; whom they regarded, with a persistence which becomes almost pathetic, as the models of rational self-government. Hence provincial organisation was introduced in the eastern Mediterranean slowly and reluctantly, and only, as it were, as a last resource, when Greek autonomy had failed; and it remained throughout hampered and complicated by the attempt to preserve as far as possible the very constitutions which it superseded.

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SUBJECTS.

- Effects of empire on the Romans themselves.
- The Roman Provincial System, its merits and defects.
- The different effects of Roman rule in the East and the West.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE LAND QUESTION AND THE LEGISLATION OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS

History of the Land Question—*Possessio* and *divisio*—Ruin of Italian agriculture—Tiberius Gracchus—His *Lex Agraria*—Veto and deposition of Octavius—Murder of Tiberius—The work of the Land Commission—Scipio Aemilianus—Fulvius Flaccus and the enfranchisement of the Italians.

POLITICAL abuses, so long as they are merely political, seldom produce that wide and deep-seated feeling in the great mass of people which alone makes possible a general uprising against an established form of government. The popular reaction against the régime of the Senate and the Nobles only became effective when the latter used their political position to protect from economic reform the capitalists and great landowners with whom they were so intimately associated. The first shock to the constitution of the Republic, in fact, resulted directly from a thoroughly disinterested attempt to improve the condition of Italian agriculture.

Political and economic grievances.

Until the conquest of Italy was completed, the Romans had systematically provided for the abnormal growth of their own population by the distribution, in freehold allotments, of a large part of the territory which they confiscated from their conquered enemies. In the majority of cases the division took place at the moment of conquest, in equal shares to all those who applied. But such land as was rough and unfit for allotments, or was found to remain over and above this first distribution, was offered, for temporary 'occupation' (p. 71), to all citizens who had capital or enterprise enough to develop its resources. In these cases, the State exacted 'Possessio', a nominal rent from the 'occupiers,' and guaranteed them and 'divisio,' against disturbance by private individuals; while it reserved its own right to eject them, if the land should be required at any time for any other purpose.

Of these two methods, the former, *divisio viritim*, gave equal oppor-

tunities to all ; the latter obviously favoured those who had capital or labour at their disposal : but as, until the period of the Punic Wars, there was always more than enough land for the needs of the moment, the difference between the two methods of distribution had never become a grievance, and so it had never been decided which was best. At the close of the First Punic War the newly-won lands in Sicily and Sardinia were all leased for 'occupation,' because they were over-sea and out of reach ; but it was probably to rectify the dissatisfaction thus caused, as well as to provide for the great increase of population, that the democratic measure of C. Flaminius in 233 (p. 171) ordained that the new *Ager Gallicus* should be divided wholly into small allotments. After the Second Punic War, the lands of revolted Sabellian tribes, and again in 173 the territories of the conquered Gauls and Ligurians, were divided similarly : but these went only a short way to supply the demand for land which arose after the pacification of Italy. Yet, with these exceptions,¹ no further allotments were possible. In Italy, Rome had bound herself by treaty to respect the territory of her allies, and the idea had not yet dawned that it was possible to found a settlement of citizens in the vast new provinces beyond the water.

This dearth of assignable land was bad enough in itself ; but it was also notorious that many of the 'occupiers' had quietly extended their boundaries, and 'occupied' land which either should have been, or actually had been, 'divided' in the first instance. Similar accusations were brought against the great syndicates of *pecuarii* who pastured huge flocks, tended by armed and mounted slaves, on the *saltus publici*, the wide public grazing-grounds of Apulia and Samnium. But against these and similar encroachments there was no security but a barren clause in the Praetor's edict ; and since the *Lex Claudia* excluded Senators from trade, and made landed property the only legal investment for their money, many of the governing class were themselves among the worst offenders, and therefore the last people to put the law in motion against the others.

But the scarcity of cultivable land was not the worst evil. Italian agriculture itself was now in a fair way to be ruined, and that, as we have seen already (pp. 230, 314), from a variety of causes. The Hannibalic War had caused the complete devastation of many parts of the country, and sadly thinned and demoralised the agricultural population. And before the land and the people had time to recover, the drain of able-bodied men began again, for the conquest of Macedon and Syria, and for the continual replenishment of

¹ Compare also the rearrangement of the *Ager Campanus* in 172 (p. 328).

Dearth of land, and growth of abuses.

Ruin of Italian agriculture.

the provincial garrisons. Between 196 and 169 it is calculated that one hundred and fifty thousand men were sent to Spain alone; and in the succeeding period, 154-134, we hear of a further loss of one hundred and forty-six thousand citizens, to whom at least an equal number must be added, to represent the contingents of the Italian allies. The reduction of the minimum qualification for military service (p. 302), from eleven thousand to four thousand *asses*, is a further indication of the disappearance of yeoman-farmers, from whom the legions had been mainly recruited hitherto.

Further, the vast foreign conquests of Rome disturbed the whole economic condition of Italian farming. Sicily had paid a large part of its tithes in corn from the time of its annexation after the **Foreign** First Punic War; in the Hannibalic War it had con- **competition.** tributed much to relieve the scarcity in Rome, and the supply did not cease when peace was restored. This alone would have been bad enough, for Sicily is far more fertile of corn than Italy; but the enormous supplies which were poured into the Italian markets, partly from the conquests of the next half-century, partly, in the ordinary course of trade, from Africa and from Egypt, reduced the price of corn to a point which threw half the arable land in Italy out of cultivation.

Meanwhile the same causes which led to the ruin of the smaller farms, favoured the growth of a large class of capitalists and speculators, who had amassed great fortunes abroad. These men bought land **Capitalism** cheap and worked it hard, to the utter exhaustion of the soil; and slave- **labour.** they replaced, moreover, the free proprietors by great gangs of slaves, which had become cheaper and cheaper—for, during the years of conquest, the supply had far exceeded the demand—and which had no legal remedy against ill-treatment or over-work, and were not liable to interruption by the duty of military service. Vineyards, olive-groves, and pastures were soon found to be more economical and productive than corn-fields, especially when cultivated on this gigantic scale. Thus Italian farming changed its character almost entirely, and Rome became completely dependent upon foreign supplies of corn. In time, too, even the wine and oil suffered, like the corn, from foreign competition; though in these cases vigorous protective measures were taken. But the capital which had ruined the small farms was now largely withdrawn in its turn for more profitable investment abroad, and the more enter- **Pastores.** . . . prising of the commercial classes followed in its wake; so that large tracts of Italy, more especially in Etruria and in the south, were reduced to desolate and savage wastes, peopled only by vast flocks of sheep, and by gangs of brutalised and ill-regulated slaves, herded together in their

great barracks or *ergastula*. In other parts, such as the valleys of Samnium, and the plains of Campania and Cisalpine Gaul, where the farmers only produced enough for their own use, things were not quite so bad ; but taking one district with another, the general state of Italy was one which rightly aroused the anxiety of the few political thinkers of Rome.

And the danger was not merely economic. The drain of men for military service had at last become apparent in the difficulty which was experienced in obtaining recruits in Italy. In vain the minimum qualification was lowered : it only brought inferior recruits. In vain, between the Hannibalic War and the battle of Pydna, some twenty colonies were founded from the city population and the veterans. Veterans and townsmen made but poor farmers ; they soon wearied of the monotony of country life, sold their allotments for what they would fetch, and drifted back to the wars or to Rome. Sipontum and Buxentum, for example, had to be completely re-peopled, in 185, within eight years of their foundation. In vain, too, the government ordered the translation into Latin of Mago's treatise on Agriculture, or Cato spent his leisure in the composition of a Farmer's Manual ; it was not by technical education that the vanished yeomanry could be restored to the villages. The real danger was, in fact, that in a crisis Rome would find herself absolutely short of soldiers. The city mob was as incapable of discipline, as it was unwilling to be drilled ; and though there was precedent, in the stress of the years after Cannae, for the enrolment of freedmen and slaves, it would be an evil moment for the State when it should be compelled to rely upon these.

Meanwhile, the continued growth of population, and particularly of the landless class in the lower quarters of Rome, made the question a pressing one, whether the State ought not to make an effort to deal with the matter on a great scale ; whether, in fact, it ought not to resume some part of the land hitherto held in 'occupation' by lease-holders—which it had a perfect right to do—and divide it in allotments among the surplus population of the city. In 172 the Ager Campanus, confiscated in 211 from Capua and other revolted towns, and at first divided into leaseholds, was rescued from the *possessores* who had crept into occupation, and re-divided into allotments ; the evicted *possessores* being compensated, in 164, for improvements made while the land was in their 'occupation. But the influence of Cato and other agricultural enthusiasts was more than matched by that of the capitalists and slave-owners, and the experiment was not repeated. Attempts, however, were made in other

Vain attempts to deal with the Land Question, 164-157 B.C.

directions to provide land for allotments, by draining the Pomptine marshes in 160, and by the establishment in 157 of a last citizen-colony at Auximum in Picenum.

After the fall of Carthage, and the disbandment of the African army, the problem of the landless populace became more acute than ever, and C. Laelius, the intimate friend of Scipio Aemilianus, prepared a bill, when Consul in 145, which proposed to revive and enforce the terms of the Licinian Law (p. 105) and to deal with the whole land-question in a comprehensive way. But the *nobiles* could only see in the measure an attack upon their own privileges and interests; and Scipio himself,—who, though too liberal for the majority of his order, had little political courage, and a deep-seated contempt of the indolent and undisciplined populace,—put strong pressure upon his friend to withdraw the proposal. The bill was dropped, and Laelius acquired from his contemporaries the title of *Sapiens*, or ‘The Wise.’

C. Laelius
'Sapiens,'
145 B.C.

So matters stood, when in 133 a new and independent reformer appeared on the scene. Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was the son of the reorganiser of Spain, who had twice been Consul, and, as Censor in 169, had re-enforced the restriction of the freed-men to the four City Tribes. The father, though his career had been long and distinguished, had died early; the son, with his younger brother Gaius, and a sister, Sempronia, was brought up by his mother Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Africanus, and one of the most talented and cultivated women of her day; and the sister became the wife of Scipio Aemilianus. The young Tiberius was therefore closely united to the most liberal and cultivated circle in Rome, and had been educated by Blossius of Cumae and Diophanes of Mytilene, in accordance with the best Greek thought of the time. At an early age, his marked ability and eloquence, and his distinguished bravery in the final assault on Carthage, secured his nomination to a vacancy in the College of Augurs, and his betrothal to the daughter of Appius Claudius; who, though a political opponent of the Scipios, inherited the liberal views of his family, and was glad to secure to himself a supporter so promising and so popular. Tiberius began his official career as the Quaestor of Mancinus in Spain, where he fully justified the reputation which he inherited from his father, and took an honourable and independent part in the capitulation of his chief (p. 306).

On his return from Spain to Italy, he was deeply impressed, it is said, by the painful contrast between the prosperity of the western provinces

and the desolation of Etruria; and when he offered himself as a candidate for the Tribunate of 133, it was with a deep and silent determination to do what in him lay for the regeneration of Italy. He was encouraged in his enthusiasm by the *Princeps Senatus*, his father-in-law Appius Claudius; by the distinguished lawyer, P. Mucius Scaevola, one of the Consuls for the year; by another great lawyer and orator, P. Licinius Crassus; and by the liberal thinkers and statesmen of his own circle; though their leader, Scipio Aemilianus, was still engaged at the moment in the siege of Numantia.

The *Lex Agraria* which he introduced dealt only with such *ager publicus* as was held in 'occupation.' It simply revived, with amendments, the dead letter of the Licinian Law of 367, and provided permanent machinery to carry out its provisions:—

1. The old limitation of 'occupations' to five hundred *iugera* was to be re-enacted, but with an additional allowance of two hundred and fifty *iugera* apiece for each of two full-grown sons working on the farm; and with a renewed assurance against eviction in the future.

2. All public land illegally 'occupied' above these limits was to be resumed by the State, for 'division' into small allotments (possibly of thirty *iugera*), which were to be held on inalienable lease at a nominal rent to the Treasury.

3. Compensation was to be allowed for tenants' improvements effected by the 'occupiers' during their occupancy.

4. A Commission of Three—*tresviri agris iudicandis adsignandis*—was to be elected,—

- (a) To decide what land—whether original *ager publicus* or later encroachments—was illegally held, and ought to be resumed.
- (b) To arbitrate on disputed ownerships and compensation.
- (c) To divide the new allotments, and assign them to their tenants.

The measure met with but qualified support, and much opposition; though it was not a party question, but a straight and thorough attempt to deal with a flagrant abuse which was admitted by everybody but the offenders. The only fault that could be found was with the means by which the change was to be effected.¹ The question of compensation was particularly difficult to handle, for many of the lands in question had been in 'occupation' for generations, and had been repeatedly bought and sold as if they had been private property; no register of landed property existed, and all lands, whether originally

¹ As Appian says, it was νόμος ἄριστος καὶ ὠφελιμώτατος, εἰ εἰδύνατο πραχθῆναι. *Bell. Civ.*, i. 27.

'public' or not, to which the title was now uncertain, seemed in danger of being brought within the scope of the bill. The wide and vague powers also, which were to be conferred upon the Commissioners, seemed liable to very serious abuse; especially when it became known that the Commission was to be made almost a family affair, and that Tiberius himself, his brother Gaius, and his father-in-law Appius Claudius, were to be proposed as its first members. The whole measure therefore was vigorously opposed by the capitalists and great landowners, and it was evidently useless to apply for the sanction of the Senate. But Tiberius, young and impetuous, was not to be baulked by official red-tape. Following the ill-omened precedent set by C. Flaminius (p. 172), he laid his bill, unsanctioned by the Senate, before the *Concilium Plebis* direct.

In omitting thus to consult the Senate beforehand, Tiberius was no doubt acting strictly within the letter of the law; for the *Lex Hortensia* of 287 had definitely freed the *Concilium* from the last constitutional check upon its legislative freedom. But in practice the previous reference of legislative proposals to the Senate had rarely been omitted; and the neglect of it by C. Flaminius had been widely disapproved at the time. Even in 233 it was no longer possible to regard the *Concilium* as representing the 'sovereign people' of Rome: in 133 it was absurd to pretend that the city rabble, prejudiced and inexperienced as it was, had any claim to pose as the *populus Romanus Quiritium*. The spirit of the constitution, moreover, though admittedly not the letter, clearly required that the real governing body should have reasonable notice of any change which the popular favourite of the moment might wish to persuade the nominal legislature to pass. The Senate, in fact, though it had long lost its veto, was entitled to 'notice of motion'; and it was this which reformers like Flaminius and Gracchus withheld. It was his opponents' conviction, therefore, whether justified or not, that Tiberius intended nothing less than to revive the long dormant powers of the People, at the expense of the Senate's authority, which made his procedure far more revolutionary in fact than its author at all intended.

The Senate, however, had laid its own plans. One of the colleagues of Tiberius, the Tribune Cn. Octavius Caecina (who was himself a landed proprietor of some influence), interposed his veto, and for the moment Tiberius could only reply by laying his own veto on all public business, and by fruitless appeals to the Senate to intervene. The bill was proposed again, this time without the compensation clause, which had provoked the most damaging criticism, and would certainly have greatly complicated the task of the Commission.

Revolutionary procedure of Tiberius.

Veto and deposition of Octavius.

But the concession was made in vain ; Octavius renewed his veto ; and this time Tiberius lost patience, and committed the fatal mistake of inviting the *Concilium* to depose his obstructive colleague on the spot. Of the thirty-five tribes, seventeen had already voted unanimously against Octavius, when Tiberius stopped the voting, and made a final appeal to his colleague to withdraw his veto before it was too late. But Octavius remained obstinate, and the vote of the eighteenth tribe gave a clear majority against him. His inviolability stood cancelled, and ? Gracchus dragged him from the platform with his own hands.

Now, it lay at the foundation of the Roman constitution, that an officer, once appointed, was irremovable until the expiration of his term ; he might resign of his own accord, or he might be prosecuted afterwards, and all his acts might be vetoed at the time by a superior or a colleague ; but he might not be deposed, even by the very body which had appointed him ; otherwise all honest and independent administration would clearly become impossible. The rash act of Tiberius struck not only at the inviolability of the Tribunes, the keystone of his own constitutional position, but dealt a fatal and irremediable blow to the prestige of every magistracy in Rome ; and that too at a time when the régime of the Senate was already on its trial, and a strong and undisputed executive was the crying need of the situation.

For the moment, however, the Agrarian Law was carried, with Tiberius, Gaius, and Appius Claudius as the first Commissioners, and the *Lex Agraria* 'Treasures of Attalus,' which were arriving then from Pergamum (p. 341), as a fund with which to furnish the new farms. The Senate and the *nobiles* protested vainly against this fresh invasion of their monopoly of financial and foreign affairs, but saved their strength till the Tribunate of Tiberius should be over ; for it was no secret that he would be impeached for his acts by Q. Pompeius on the very day of his resignation.

One false step leads to another. Tiberius had attempted, in an annual office, to carry out a work which demanded, for a lengthened period, the very sanctity of magistracy, which he had himself done most to destroy. His only chance either of prosecuting his schemes of reform, or of evading punishment for his revolutionary acts, lay in securing his own re-election to the Tribunate for the ensuing year. But this also was against the spirit and probably at that time even against the law of the constitution ; annual change of officers was the natural complement of annual inviolability while in office, and, in fact, the only safeguard against its abuse ;

Roman
view of
magisterial
privilege.

Lex Agraria
carried.

Tiberius
wishes to be
re-elected
Tribune.

and though the prohibitions known to us¹ deal only with *magistratus*, there is no reason to doubt that they were applicable also to Tribunes; though the case of Licinius (p. 105) seems closely analogous to this one.

Gracchus, moreover, had organised no party, and the election took place in July, when the country voters, who had crowded into Rome before, in support of the Agrarian Law, were busy, on their land, over the harvest. Many of the voters, too, being members of the ancient cities of Latium, had been alienated by this arbitrary re-distribution of lands which had been originally acquired at their expense; while some of them had themselves slipped back as 'occupiers' into the territory which had been confiscated from their ancestors. The Senate and the *nobiles*, meanwhile, spread persistent rumours of the aims and motives of Tiberius—who had still four months of his first year of office before him—which unsettled the more cautious minds even of his own friends and supporters.

On the day of election, however, the first votes were all for Tiberius; so his opponents used their veto, and succeeded in breaking up the assembly. At an adjourned meeting on the following day the votes and the veto fell as before, and the riotous behaviour of the partisans of Tiberius dispersed the assembly again. The Senate met in the Temple of Fides, close to the Capitoline Temple and the place of election; and vehement attacks were made upon Tiberius by his opponents. He was openly accused of aiming at the crown, and the Consul Scaevola was urged to have him put to death. Scaevola indignantly refused; but a body of the younger and more headstrong Senators, led by the violent and intolerant P. Scipio Nasica, rushed forth, armed with the benches and stools of the meeting, and attempted to expel the adherents of Tiberius from the Capitol. In the struggle which followed, Tiberius himself was killed, while he attempted to escape; some three hundred of his followers were beaten to death; and their bodies were thrown, with his, into the Tiber.

It was the first time that blood had been shed in civil strife in Rome; and it was the party of the Senate which, under whatever provocation, had shed it. Yet the only concern of the government appeared to be how to justify the murder. A special court of inquiry, under P. Popilius Laenas, the Consul of the following year, condemned a number of the surviving adherents of Tiberius on a charge of treason; C. Laelius taking part in the prosecution, and Scaevola himself, in the Senate, publicly approving the very act which he had refused to commit at the time. Scipio Nasica, how-

¹ A *senatus consultum* of 460 and a *plebiscitum* of 342.

ever, was sent on a mission to Asia, and practically into exile; and died some years afterwards at Pergamum.

Tiberius was dead, but his Agrarian Law remained in force. His place on the Land Commission was filled by the eminent jurist P. Licinius Crassus; and on the death of Crassus, in 130, by C. Papirius Carbo, at this time the leader of an extreme democratic section; while Appius Claudius was replaced by M. Fulvius Flaccus, another enthusiastic and very advanced reformer. A considerable quantity of public land seems to have been resumed and assigned, and the number of land-owning citizens on the census-roll rose rapidly in the next ten years.¹ But great indignation was caused in the country districts by the disturbance of Latin and Italian 'occupiers,' who, not being Roman citizens, had no adequate means of appeal against the awards of the Commission, but whose claims to ownership were in many cases founded on the terms of the original treaty with Rome, and who found a powerful champion in Scipio Aemilianus, whom they had persuaded by strong personal appeals to become their legal *patronus*.

Scipio had not returned from Numantia at the time of the death of Tiberius. But on hearing the news he had expressed his feelings in the Homeric phrase, *ὡς ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι*,² and when asked for his opinion of his kinsman's conduct, had replied cautiously that, if Tiberius had aimed at the crown, he certainly deserved to be killed. It was through his influence, too, in 131, that the bill of the Tribune Carbo was thrown out, by which it was proposed to make Tribunes legally eligible for re-election; though in some form or other this change seems to have been made soon after. He soon showed his sympathy with the grievances of the allies by his prosecution of Aurelius Cotta for misgovernment; and in 129 secured the transference of all the judicial powers of the Land Commission to the Consuls of the year, who could be better trusted to take an impartial view of the claims of Latins and Italians, than the representatives of the extreme popular party in Rome. Another effect of the same measure was promptly shown; for one of the Consuls, M. Perperna, was in Asia nearly all the year (p. 340); and the other, C. Sempronius Tuditanus, joined a punitive force in Illyria as soon as the bill became law, and so paralysed the machinery of the Commission altogether.

Scipio probably saw already that the only way to maintain Senatorial

¹ From 319,000 in 131, to 395,000 in 125.

² *Od.* i. 47.

government, in face of democratic reformers like Tiberius, was to prepare the Latins, and all the Italian allies, for admission to full Roman citizenship, and so to swamp the degenerate and clamorous populace of the city with a new and self-respecting sort of voter ; who would, moreover, be too fully occupied on ordinary occasions with his own affairs, to obstruct or disturb the customary administration of the Senate.

But the popular leaders, also, were fully alive to the grievances of the allies, and to the widespread demand for wholesale extension of the franchise ; and for the next forty years after the first introduction of the question by Scipio, the enfranchisement of the Italians held a prominent place in the programme of the party of reform. Their jealousy of Scipio, therefore, was loudly and openly expressed ; and on the very morning of the day on which he was to have expounded his policy with regard to the allies, he was found dead in his bed under circumstances which seemed to suggest foul play. Rumour pointed to Fulvius, to C. Gracchus, and even to Cornelia ; but the Senate, too, had never trusted Scipio, and permitted no inquiry into the cause of his death.

The great majority of the governing class, in fact, objected quite as vehemently as the city populace to any further extension of the franchise in Italy, and, finding themselves for once in agreement with their customary opponents, lost no time in giving effect to their feelings. One of the Tribunes of 126, M. Junius Pennus, proposed, and enforced, the complete expulsion of Italian residents from Rome, not excepting even leading men whose presence in the capital could ill be spared.

But the government having thus committed itself, the way of the reformers was clear. Ignoring for the moment the prejudices of his supporters in the city, Fulvius, who was Consul for 125, drafted a bill to permit individual Italians to petition the People of Rome for the full citizenship, and to take a vote of the Comitia. He probably hoped to allay the dissatisfaction aroused by his land policy, because a large number of Italians would thus be entitled to share in the allotments of public land. This proposal brought the question of the enfranchisement of the Italians within the range of practical politics, and roused the liveliest expectations throughout Italy. But the bill was not passed, and the whole subject appears to have been definitely shelved. Fulvius made a sudden exit from Rome, to lead an expedition into Liguria (p. 343); and C. Gracchus, who had meanwhile been elected Quaestor, was kept

His Italian policy.

His mysterious death, 129 B.C.

Expulsion of Italians from Rome, 126 B.C.

Fulvius Flaccus and the enfranchisement of the Italians, 125 B.C.

on duty for two whole years in Sardinia by his pro-Consul L. Aurelius Orestes.

One Latin town, however, had risked its all on the success of the measure of Flaccus. Fregellae, in the Hannibalic War the most conspicuously loyal of all the old Latin towns (p. 207), broke into open and desperate revolt; at the direct instigation, so some said, of the democratic leaders in Rome. The outbreak was of course suppressed at once, though not without treachery, by the Praetor, L. Opimius; and both the town and its inhabitants were utterly destroyed. Its lands were divided among its loyal neighbours, and among the members of a new citizen-colony, which was founded, in 124, at Fabrateria in the same neighbourhood.

Revolt of
Fregellae,
125 B.C.

CHIEF DATES.

Ager Campanus redistributed	172
Last citizen-colony at Auximum	157
Lex Agraria of Laelius: not passed	145
Tribunate of Tiberius Gracchus: Lex Sempronia Agraria	133
Murder of Tiberius: First civil bloodshed in Rome	132
Death of Scipio Aemilianus	129
Expulsion of Italians from Rome	126
Franchise bill of Fulvius Flaccus: Revolt of Fregellae	125

CHIEF PERSONS.

C. Laelius 'Sapiens'—Ti. Sempronius Gracchus—G. Gracchus—Cornelia—
Appius Claudius—L. Licinius Crassus—Q. Mucius Scaevola—P. Scipio
Nasica—P. Scipio Aemilianus—C. Papirius Carbo—M. Fulvius Flaccus—
L. Opimius.

SUBJECTS.

The successive stages of the land question.

The Roman view of the inviolability of the magistrate, and of Senatorial prerogative.

Roman and Italian claims to land and citizenship.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF THE PERIOD OF THE GRACCHI

Character of the period—Growth of Roman slavery—The First Slave War—The client kingdom of Pergamum and the new province of Asia—Frontier wars in Macedon and elsewhere—Province of Gallia Transalpina.

THE external history of Rome during the period of the Gracchan reforms presents, at first sight, little that deserves remark. The main outlines of Roman frontier policy, which had been laid down during the period of the great wars, remained unaltered, and so long as no new power appeared above the Roman horizon, there was little for provincial governors to do, except to fill in the details of the scheme. Three incidents, however, deserve more especial notice, two of which allusion has already been made; while all will have to be borne in mind later on, if we are to perceive the full significance of the revolution proposed by Gaius Gracchus in 123. The revolt of the slaves in Sicily marks the first open protest against the silent change, which the century of wars had wrought, in the economic and social state of the oldest Roman province. The conversion of the kingdom of Pergamum into the Roman province of Asia is at the same time the opening of a new period in the Oriental policy of the Romans, and the occasion for the first serious attack upon the Senate's administration of their dominions abroad. And the formation of a Roman province in Transalpine Gaul, and of a great citizen-colony outside the limits of Italy, lays the foundation, in Western Europe, for a new fabric of empire.

Character
of the
period.

The most disastrous result of the great wars, and, at the same time, of the growth of individual wealth, was the enormous increase of the slave population. Ancient warfare knew no other fate for captured enemies than slavery; and it was by an act of grace, or of policy, on the part of the victors, that the survivors of a surrender retained any political rights or personal freedom

The growth
of Roman
slavery.

at all. As soon, therefore, as the Romans began to conduct more than mere frontier operations, or to meet with enemies whom they could not transform at once into subjects or allies, they became, inevitably, slaveholders and slave-dealers on a gigantic scale. Even in the First Punic War, the capture of Agrigentum put as many as twenty-five thousand slaves into their power, and, in 177, as we have seen (p. 237) the conquest of Sardinia, with eighty thousand captives, made *Sardi venales* a byword.

Worse still, with these brief exceptions, the demand exceeded the legitimate supply. A Roman provincial commander could be sure of an eager market for captives from a border war; piracy and kidnaping were winked at, if not encouraged, throughout the eastern Mediterranean; and the *publicani* and the Roman money-lenders could add the threat of enslavement to their other weapons of extortion. Delos was the centre of this shameful and degrading traffic, and at one time its market is said to have delivered ten thousand slaves a day. The extension, moreover, of the Roman slave-trade into the East, and its alliance with systematic kidnaping in time of peace, meant that a considerable proportion of the new slaves had been bred up in refinement and luxury, and were often actually more cultured and enlightened than their masters; and the introduction, by their means, of Greek and Oriental ideas of life and conduct into the very lowest stratum of Roman society could not but lead to the most important and disastrous consequences.

Some of these slaves passed into household or industrial service in the towns, accumulated private savings, and in course of time either bought their freedom, or earned it by exceptional fidelity; but the majority were drafted on to the huge slave-farms in the country, where the work was crushing, the supervision brutal and inefficient, and the prospect of liberty remote. The standard of industry was degraded; and the economic state of agricultural Italy went from bad to worse. A large proportion of these country slaves were barbarians, accustomed to lawless freedom and tumultuous warfare, while not a few had been chiefs and leaders before their capture; and the danger became imminent that at any time, when the forces of the Romans were employed elsewhere, a wholesale rising, planned by men of ability, and carried through by a desperate and revengeful population, might break out in the very heart of the empire. As early as 196, for example, we find Roman troops employed to put down slave riots in Etruria; similar disturbances on a small scale were frequent in Apulia and other parts of South Italy; and one is recorded also from the slave-worked silver-mines of Attica.

A much more serious rising occurred at the very opening of the period with which we have now to deal, though fortunately at a moment when the government had its hands free. The seat of the First Slave War was in Sicily, where the abuse was of longer standing, and the conditions were more unfavourable to reform, than in any other part of the empire. The original organisation of the province had long ago become antiquated; almost the whole of the open country had been confiscated after the revolt of 215-12, and this, with the distance from Rome and the survival of Greek and Carthaginian methods of slave-farming, had made Sicilian agriculture a monopoly of the great capitalists, who lived far away in Rome and left everything to their agents; and these were often only slaves themselves. The great moorland pastures and the mountainous character of other parts of the island favoured the escape of runaways and the growth of brigandage; and the waste thus caused was only repaired by systematic slave-raiding and kidnapping, through pirates, and even through Roman privateers. Thus a large number of the Sicilian slaves were Greeks and Orientals; and many of them not prisoners of war but well-born victims of foul play.

Under these distressful circumstances, trouble was inevitable. A momentary outbreak, which occurred in 139, was put down without trouble; but, in 134, four hundred slaves revolted in a body at Enna, under a Syrian named Eunus, and in a moment all Sicily was in anarchy. Enna was captured, the slave-drivers and the free proprietors were massacred, and Eunus, whose pretensions to magic powers gave him the confidence of the rest, proclaimed himself king under the name of Antiochus, and with the assistance of an able Greek slave, Achaeus, organised a regular army and a civil administration. At the same time a separate band, under one Cleon, who had been a Cilician brigand, took Agrigentum, and joined forces with the rebels of Enna. In a few months two hundred thousand slaves had revolted all over the island; Messana fell into their hands, and the Praetor, M. Hypsaeus, with a hasty levy of militia, was beaten in the field. In 134 and 133 the Consuls, C. Fulvius Flaccus, and L. Calpurnius Piso, were sent to Sicily in succession with a regular army, but failed to make head against the revolt. The Romans kept, however, the command of the sea-coast, and of most of the towns; the able Consul of 132, P. Rupilius, stormed the slave fastnesses of Tauromenium and Enna; Eunus was captured, and died in prison at Morgantia; and by the end of 131 the revolt was at an end. Rupilius then took in hand a complete reorganisation of the province, and seems to have effected a

The First
Slave War,
134-131 B.C.

real improvement in its condition ; but he alienated the slave-owners by his wholesale execution of the more dangerous classes of slaves ; and nothing was done to check the real sources of the trouble, the irresponsible management of the slave-farms, or the ravages of the slave-dealers of the Aegean.

When the Roman protectorate over the European Greeks was exchanged in 146 for direct provincial rule the kingdom of Pergamum and the republic of Rhodes, which had remained loyal to Rome, were still left free and independent. But the practical inconvenience of the arrangement soon became obvious ; the comparative prosperity of the Asiatic side of the Aegean roused the jealousy and cupidity of the Senatorial government ; and shortly after the settlement of 146, Scipio Aemilianus was sent out, on a roving commission, to report upon the condition of the eastern half of the empire. Scipio, however, saw more clearly than some of his contemporaries the degeneracy into which the Roman military system, as well as Roman foreign policy, had fallen ; and no action was taken as long as he remained in Rome.

But a change was clearly inevitable ; and when, in the year 133, King Attalus III. of Pergamum died, he left, by his will, the Greek cities in his dominions free, and the rest of his kingdom to the People of Rome. Scipio was absent at Numantia, and the Senate accepted the bequest and sent a commission of Senators to organise a new Asiatic province. But the task proved more difficult than they had expected. An illegitimate half-brother of Attalus, named Aristonicus, disputed the will, and claimed the throne of Pergamum ; and though he was easily defeated at sea, he was acknowledged by a number of the inland districts, and organised an army of mercenaries and freed slaves, with the help of an influential society of political visionaries, the Heliopolitae. The Romans were supported in their claim by all the neighbouring kingdoms, which had ancient quarrels with Pergamum ; but the Consul of 131, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, though a distinguished lawyer, proved a poor general, and was killed in the following year at the siege of Leucæ. His successor, however, the able Italian, M. Perperna, who was Consul of 129, defeated and captured Aristonicus at Stratonicæ, and sent the vast treasures of Attalus to Rome ; and the Consul M' Aquillius was sent in the following year to draw up a permanent settlement. The object of the Senate was to secure as much of the profits, and as few of the responsibilities of direct administration, as possible ; the neigh-

The client kingdom of Pergamum.

The new Province of Asia, 133 B.C.

bouring kings had little difficulty in bribing Aquillius to part with large portions of the remoter dependencies of Pergamum; and though Aquillius was detected, he easily secured an acquittal on his return to Rome. In this way Mithradates V. of Pontus secured Phrygia; and Lycaonia went to Ariarathes VI. of Cappadocia, whose father had been killed on the Roman side in the war. The Pergamene system of *stipendia* was retained, and the revenue continued to be collected, for the present, by the provincials themselves. How the 'Treasures of Attalus' were dealt with, after their arrival in Rome, we have already seen in connection with the Land-Law of Gracchus (p. 332).

The Romans were now in direct occupation of both shores of the Aegean, and the pressure of Roman government and, still more, of Roman commercial and financial competition, was felt severely by the Greek communities on the coast and on the trade-routes into the interior; and in the struggle for concessions and mercantile privileges which ensued, the Roman capitalists made common cause with the Roman provincial administration to exploit this new field for extortion. The suppression, also, of the fleet, which the kings of Pergamum had been careful to maintain, to protect their kingdom's trade, removed one of the few remaining checks on the growth of piracy; and left the coasts of Asia Minor so defenceless that, scarcely a generation later, Nicomedes II. of Bithynia could excuse his failure to send a contingent of troops, on the ground that his able-bodied men had all been stolen as slaves.

Under these circumstances, Roman prestige in Asia continued steadily to decline; and, while the attention of the Senate was distracted by revolutionary movements at home, and by the consequences of similar mismanagement and incapacity in the west, new powers were allowed to grow up unheeded and unchecked on the eastern frontier. Pontus and Cappadocia, in particular, extended and consolidated their dominions in the north and interior of Asia Minor, and were only prevented from combining against the Romans by their inveterate feud with each other; and the military dynasty of the Maccabees built up a strong highland principality in Judaea, which held apart, for the moment, the decaying kingdoms of Egypt and Syria, and, so far, played the game of the Romans. But meanwhile, behind the nearer states, two wholly Oriental kingdoms were beginning to eat their way westwards into the rotten empire of the Seleucidae, and were bound to come sooner or later into collision with the lords of the Mediterranean. Armenia, beyond the upper Euphrates, was slowly emerging from its impregnable mountain fortress,

Results of
the change.

Decline of
Roman
prestige in
the East.

and threatening the rear alike of Cappadocia and of Syria : and Parthia, under the Scythian dynasty of the Arsacidae, had at last absorbed the derelict state of Bactria, the last isolated survivor of the eastern conquests of Alexander ; and was now steadily absorbing province after province which lay between the Euphrates and the Syrian capital at Antioch. For the moment, however, the conversion of the client-state of Pergamum into the province of Asia did not seriously affect the balance of power ; and even the financial and administrative changes introduced ten years later by Gaius Gracchus (p. 351) sowed but the seeds of a deep-rooted discontent, for the reaping of Mithradates and Sulla.

Elsewhere on the eastern borders of the empire there are only minor operations to record, which illustrate rather the absence of any comprehensive scheme of frontier defence, and the general decline of the efficiency of the provincial machinery, than any new departure, either of principle or of practice. In Eastern Europe the boundaries of the province of Macedon had never yet been defined ; partly, indeed, because in those intricate highlands no natural line exists on which either a political or a military frontier could be based ; partly because persistent raids of Gauls and Thracians, Maedi and Scordisci, more than absorbed the whole fighting forces of the province in the task of strict self-defence ; but partly, also, because no comprehensive view was ever taken of the situation, either by the Senate, or by the successive governors of Macedon.

In Illyria, the suppression of the pirates of Delminium in 155 had brought a new district under the direct control of the Consuls, but no regular province had yet been formed on the east side of the Adriatic, and in 129 we find military operations in progress under the Consul, C. Sempronius Tuditanus. In 119, again, both Consuls, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Caecilius Metellus, were engaged with the Iapydes and Dalmatians, reinforced from inland by the Scordisci of Sciscia ; in 117 Metellus gained the surname *Dalmaticus* by his suppression of Adriatic piracy, and by the occupation of Salonae, which henceforward became the headquarters of the Romans ; and in 115 M. Aemilius Scaurus defeated the Carni further north, and pressed right through the mountains into Noricum.

Further north again, on the Alpine frontier of Cisalpine Gaul, similar little wars with the Salassi (143), Stoeni (118), Rhaeti and other Alpine peoples, alternated with longer periods of peace and commercial intercourse. The Ligurian tribes had almost wholly ceased to cause trouble ;

but their kinsmen in Sardinia provoked in 126-3 the expedition of L. Aurelius Orestes, in which G. Gracchus took part; and another revolt, in 115, demanded the presence of a Consul, and lasted into a third season. The annexation of the Balearic Islands, whose piratical inhabitants had long been a cause of annoyance, was secured in 123 by the foundation of the Roman colonies of Palma and Pollentia; and gave Q. Caecilius Metellus the title *Balearicus* (p. 237).

in Liguria
and else-
where.

More important than these scattered operations were the steps by which Rome obtained a footing in Gaul-beyond-the-Alps. The Greek colony of Massilia had long been a faithful ally of the Romans, and had rendered substantial service in the Hannibalic War. The whole of the coast, from Genua to the Rhone, had been regarded by the Romans as the sphere of influence of Massilia, and its troops had fought side by side with the Romans in a punitive expedition against the Ligurians when they had attacked Antipolis and Nicaea in 154. But the prosperity of Massilia, and of its Gaulish dependencies, provoked the jealousy of Roman politicians. To protect Italian agriculture, restrictions were placed upon the cultivation of the vine and the olive beyond the Alps; and to obtain for Roman enterprise a share in that fertile area, a policy of expansion was presently inaugurated by M. Fulvius Flaccus, the political confederate of the Gracchi. In his Consulship in 125, and again in the following year, he beat the Salluvii and Vocontii in pitched battles, near Aix and Vaucluse, and annexed part of their territory, giving over the remainder to Massilia. His successor, C. Sextius Calvinus, continued his work, and founded in the territory of the Salluvii the important *castellum* of Aquae Sextiae (Aix).

Transalpine
Gaul.

Rome and
Massilia.

War with
Salluvii.

The chief of the Salluvii, however, took refuge with the influential tribe of the Allobroges, who lay further inland, between the Rhone and the Alps. These people were at that time members of a powerful Gaulish confederacy, which is said to have extended from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and was led by the Arverni, who still inhabited that mountainous inland district beyond the Rhone (see map, p. 486), where Hasdrubal had wintered in 209-8. The Allobroges marched to avenge their guest, but they too were defeated by Sextius near Aix; and their country was successfully invaded by his successor, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who then pushed on beyond the Rhone, and attacked and conquered the Volcae round Tolosa. Meanwhile the

Allobroges
and Arverni.

new Consul, Q. Fabius Maximus, gained the title of *Allobrogicus* in August 121 by a decisive victory over the whole force of the Arvernian confederacy, whose king Betuitus was taken.

In these operations, the Romans had been greatly assisted by an alliance which they formed with the Aedui, the leaders of a rival confederacy in the valley of the Arar, further north, who were induced to avenge their own quarrel with the Arverni and their following, by a simultaneous attack in rear ; and this friendship with the Aedui remained a fixed point in Roman frontier policy until the final annexation of Gaul. (p. 484 ff.).

The territory conquered by Fabius and Domitius, which included the whole land of the Allobroges and an indefinite strip, along the coast, from the Rhone to the Pyrenees, was formed into the new province of Gallia Transalpina. ¹ *vince* of *Gallia Braccata*, called also *Narbonensis* from the old Gaulish town of Narbo, which became the Roman seat of government, and in 118 received a large citizen-colony—the first to be founded over-sea except the ill-fated Junonia (p. 356). Narbo was intended, by the Gracchan economists who founded it, to supersede Massilia as the port of Gaul ; but it served also to secure the land-passage from Italy to Spain, and this was further assured by the construction of the *Via Domitia* from the Rhone to the Pyrenees, on land voluntarily surrendered by the conquered Arverni. In the same year, 118, Domitius returned in triumph, leaving the new province populous already with Roman settlers and merchants ; and Roman civilisation securely planted in the coast-districts, and even for some distance into the interior.

¹ Hence the later name *Provence*. The name *Braccata* alludes to the continued prevalence of native costume beyond the Alps, in contrast with the Roman dress, which had been adopted commonly in Gallia *Togata* = Cisalpine Gaul.

CHIEF DATES.

Slave revolt in Sicily	139
First Slave War in Sicily under Eunos and Achaeus	134
Attalus III. of Pergamum leaves his kingdom to the Romans	133
P. Rupilius pacifies and reorganises Sicily	131
M'. Aquillius organises the Province of Asia	129
Revolt in Sardinia	126-3
Transalpine Gaul: War with the Salassi	125
Balearic War: Colonies of Palma and Pollentia	123
Aquæ Sextiæ founded	122
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Province of Gallia Narbonensis formed	121
Wars in Dalmatia and the Eastern Alps	119
Narbo founded: a transmarine Citizen-colony	118
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CHIEF PERSONS.

M. Hypsaëus—C. Fulvius Flaccus—L. Calpurnius Piso—P. Rupilius—
P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus—M. Perperna—M'. Aquillius—L.
Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus—Q. Caecilius Metellus Balearicus
—L. Aurelius Orestes—M. Fulvius Flaccus—C. Sextius Calvinus—Cn.
Domitius Ahenobarbus—Q. Fabius Maximus—Attalus III.—Aristo-
nicus—Mithradates V.—Ariarathes VI.—Eunos—Achaëus—Cleon
—Betuitus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Enna — Tauromenium — Morgantia — Stratonicea — Sciscia — Salonæ —
Massilia — Aquæ Sextiæ — Tolosa — Narbo.

SUBJECTS.

The economic and social effects of Roman slavery: contrast with Greek
slavery.

The Roman province of Asia and the balance of power in the East.

The perilous insecurity of the North Frontier.

The extension of Roman influence beyond the Alpine barrier.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE TRIBUNATE OF GAIUS GRACCHUS

Gaius Gracchus—The need of a thorough reform—The schemes of Gracchus—His mixed motives and ideals—Reaction against Gracchus—‘Concord restored’—The work of the Gracchi.

GAIUS GRACCHUS returned from Sardinia to Rome in 124. He was nine years younger than his brother, and had already shown promise of the same rare talent and independence of character. He resembled Tiberius in his liberal and classical education, his wide sympathies, and his strong political convictions; but while he fell short of the single-minded and enthusiastic devotion of his brother, he far surpassed him in his knowledge of men and things, in his extraordinary energy and ability in administration, and in the passionate fire of his unrivalled eloquence. He had taken an active share in the proceedings of the Land Commission, and was known to be in sympathy with the party of reform; but he had allowed Flaccus and Carbo to assume the credit, or the discredit, of leadership, in the years which immediately followed his brother's murder.

The Senate, however, had marked him as a dangerous man, and his Quaestorship in Sardinia was prolonged for a year beyond the usual time. He would indeed have been detained longer, but that in 124 he suddenly reappeared in Rome, without leave of absence; vindicated himself before the Censors against the accusations which were intended to disqualify him for office, and to implicate him in the revolt of Fregellae; and was a successful candidate for the Tribune of 123, just ten years after that of his brother.

Tiberius had seen only one side of the many problems of his age, and had confined himself to proposing a practical solution of that. He had treated a symptom, without attempting to combat the disease; and his revolutionary procedure had been the outcome of youthful impatience and inexperience, not of a premeditated attack upon the system of government in general. Gaius, on the other

Tribunus
Plebis,
123 B.C.

The need of
a thorough
reform.

hand, with deeper and clearer insight, perceived that the disorders of Roman administration and of Italian society proceeded, mainly and directly, from the social and political monopoly of the *nobiles*, and of the Senate which had become their tool; that the system of government had been allowed by a narrow conservatism to become inadequate and out of date; that the growth of the body politic had been checked and stunted by the establishment of rigid barriers of class and privilege, which were foreign to the spirit of the best age of Roman advancement; and that nothing but a general revolution in the relations between the Senate and the magistracy, and between the people of Rome and the inhabitants of Italy, would permanently remedy abuses which every one felt to be intolerable.

But he saw, also, that such a revolution could only be effected by a strong and closely organised political party, based upon an alliance between all the various classes which had grievances against the government and its supporters; between those who desired to return to the land, and those who only clamoured for cheap living in Rome; between subject Italians who coveted full and equal citizenship, and the city populace which resented the least extension of its own monopoly of perquisites; between clear-headed thinkers who deplored the misgovernment of the provinces, or the restriction of public office to a hereditary clique, and the capitalists and speculators who only resented the irresponsible dominion of the *nobiles*, because they were excluded from it themselves.

Out of these incongruous elements, Gracchus proposed to create a strong constitutional opposition; keeping always in view, however, two distinct and quite incompatible ideals, of administering the Roman Empire as Pericles had governed Athens and the Athenian League,¹ and of avenging on the *nobiles* the murder of his brother Tiberius. It is this confusion of motives and interests, which explains the extraordinary diversity of the legislation of Gaius Gracchus, and makes it convenient to consider his measures not in order of time, but in the order of the results which they were intended to bring about.

To punish the murderers of Tiberius, and to secure himself, if possible, against a similar fate, he re-enacted the old Valerian and Porcian Laws²

¹ λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή.—Thuc. ii. 65.

² For the *Lex Valeria*, see pp. 68, 76. The *Lex Porcia* of 197, as Livy says (x. 9), *sola pro tergo civium lata videtur*; it imposed a heavy penalty for striking or killing a Roman citizen; and was probably intended originally to check abuses of military discipline.

(509 : 197) *ne de capite civium Romanorum iniussu populi iudicaretur* ; his object being to render illegal the special power conferred by the

Senate upon the Consuls in times of disturbance to arrest
(x) *Lex Semproniana* and punish persons who were suspected of sedition.¹ Under *provocatio*. this law, the Consul Popilius, who had presided over the inquisition against the adherents of Tiberius, was driven into exile, and all such special inquiries were forbidden for the future. A further proposal, aimed at Octavius, to disqualify for further office those whom the people had once deposed, was wisely withdrawn, on the intercession of Cornelia, as being at the same time too personal and too double-edged a measure.

To relieve the prevailing distress, the *Lex agraria* of Tiberius was re-enacted ; but the greater part of the land legally available had been

(2) *Lex Agraria*. distributed already, and little remained to be done in this direction. But to provide immediate employment, and better communications in the country districts, a number of roads were
(3) *Repair of Public Roads*. built and repaired ; and to these great public works Gaius himself devoted the same close and frequent attention which marked every department of his administration.

Citizen-colonies also were to be founded, at Tarentum under the title of Neptunia ; at Scylacium, in Bruttium, under that of Minerva ; at

(4) *Citizen-colonies*. Puteoli, where the colony of 194 had fallen to pieces, and at Capua ; and also, by a new and brilliant conception of the use of such settlements, over-sea at Junonia, on the desolate site of Carthage ; and also at Corinth, where, as in Africa, much confiscated land was still available for distribution. It will be seen that these new foundations were not designed, like the older colonies, merely as military posts. They were intended in the first place to afford economic relief, and also to provide indirect means of access to the franchise, for Italians were expressly permitted to join them, and received the full citizenship if they did so.

The *Lex frumentaria*, which provided a supply of cheap corn for the relief of the poorer classes in Rome, was intended to consolidate and
(5) *Lex frumentaria*. organise the city populace, as a political weapon, in the hands of a popular leader such as had frequently dominated the more democratic of the states of old Greece, and it marks an entirely

¹ This *ultimum senatus consultum*, as it was called, was drawn in the vaguest terms, *uti viderent consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet* : and it was a standing controversy whether or not it suspended the ancient right of *provocatio*, and justified the consuls in causing the death of a citizen without trial. The senate's party contended that it did ; that of the democrats, that it could not.

new departure in public policy, most far-reaching and disastrous in its consequences. The idea of state-control of the prices of necessaries was not in itself a new one. The aediles had always had a general control over the price, as well as the quality, of goods exposed in the market.¹ Salt had long been a government monopoly; and, more than once, occasional distributions of corn, either free or at a low rate, had been made, both by the State in times of scarcity (pp. 230, 322), and by individual magistrates to gain popularity with the mob. But the proposal of Gracchus went far beyond these precedents, and seems almost to have been modelled—like the political system of demagoguery which it was designed to make possible in Rome—on the wholesale distributions, and on the direct and indirect payments for public services and for amusements, which had been in vogue in Athens and some other Greek democracies. Henceforward, every citizen was entitled to apply for a sufficient allowance of corn—five *modii* a month—at $6\frac{1}{3}$ *asses* a *modius*, or only half the current market price.

For the moment, Gracchus secured by this law the allegiance of a horde of impoverished farmers and freedmen, as well as of the normal population of artisans and small traders who had been attracted by the rapid growth of the Imperial City, but ^{Its effects.} who were thus set free for ever from the necessity of regular work, and from dependence upon the liberality of noble patrons. The freedmen and *bonâ-fide* residents did not so much matter, for their votes affected only the four 'urban' tribes, but the multitudes who now began to flock even more than ever into the town retained their old registration, and soon began, on all ordinary occasions, to outnumber the country voters in the 'rustic' tribes as well. But, whatever further effects Gracchus himself may have expected from the measure, the inevitable result of it was that the city populace only became more numerous, more indolent and corrupt, more discontented, unruly, and irresponsible than ever; while a growing burden was laid upon the treasury, which it was impossible ever to shake off; though it soon became almost intolerable, even to the mistress of the world.

A *Lex militaris* secured a number of minor reforms in the conditions of service in the army. For the first time the State undertook to clothe and equip the soldier without deduction from his pay; the ^{(6) *Lex militaris*.} term of service was further regulated, and perhaps also shortened; and strict limits were set to the officers' powers of punishment, which were a standing grievance everywhere, and especially among the Italians who had no right of appeal.

¹ Hence Greek writers on Roman antiquities regularly translated *aedilis* by *ἀγορανόμος*. For the history and duties of the office see pp. 70, 141.

Meanwhile, the severity and uncertainty of the criminal courts was mitigated, in the case of citizens, by the reassertion already mentioned of the law of appeal; by the reference of crimes of violence to a new *Quaestio perpetua*; and by the practice which had grown up and was now, for the first time, legalised, that any one who was accused on a capital charge might, if he pleased, evade the sentence by going into voluntary exile before the trial was over; in which case he was allowed to retain all property of which he stood in unencumbered possession.

To increase the efficiency of the *Comitia Centuriata* a formal change was made in the order in which the votes were given. In the last rearrangement of the centuries (p. 145) the *centuria prerogativa* had still been chosen by lot from those of the first class only, which set to the credit of the wealthy the superstitious weight which the first vote carried. Gracchus in some way equalised the votes completely, though the details of the change are not clear. His object was to restore the *Comitia* in practice to its theoretical place as the sovereign assembly of Rome, and to conduct the government, not as in recent years by decrees of the Senate, but by the direct decrees of the people, which should be executed through popularly elected magistrates, as in a Greek democracy.

His remaining measures, therefore, were directed at the same time to diminish the extent of the authority of the Senate in actual administration, and to set up a counterpoise to the 'aristocracy of office' in the shape of an unofficial 'aristocracy of wealth,' consisting of the great capitalists, merchants, and speculators, who were now practically excluded from office by the *nobiles*, though they still found it their interest to afford a general support to the Senatorial administration.

By the *Lex Sempronia de provinciis consularibus*, the Senate was compelled to assign any province which one or other of the Consuls was needed to administer, before, instead of after, the date of their election. This was a direct interference with the Senate's long-established claim to award these commands according to the results of the election, often without regard to the needs of the provinces, or the abilities of the individual Consuls. And in view of Senatorial obstruction, it was further provided that the veto of a tribune should be of no effect to delay this piece of business. The new arrangement, however, does not seem to have revived the popular sense of responsibility for the election of honest or able men to the Consulship, or to have effected any practical improvement in provincial government; while it was still more impossible than ever to provide

(7) *Lus exilii.*

(8) Reform of the mode of voting in the *Comitia*.

(9) *Lex de provinciis consularibus.*

for emergencies, when appointments had to be made so long in advance.

The financial control of the Senate was invaded in the same way by a measure which regulated on a new basis the taxation of the province of Asia. Since its annexation in 133 the tribute seems to have been raised for the most part by variable *vectigalia*, levied on all cultivated land as *decumae*, or tithe, and on pastures by a registration-tax or *scriptura*. Such *vectigalia* yielded considerably greater profits than the fixed *stipendia* (p. 300), which were the rule in the western provinces; and they were assessed and collected, like *portoria* or customs, by *publicani*—contractors who paid a fixed sum to the treasury and made what profit they could in the process of collection. In Sicily, Sardinia, and elsewhere the contracts were sold by auction in the province itself, and so fell often into the hands of provincial *publicani*; but in the case of Asia, Gracchus ordained that the auction should take place in Rome, and thus practically handed over the whole of this valuable source of profit to the Roman capitalists, who at so great a distance from the province were easily able to outbid or outmanœuvre the small provincial syndicates. Senatorial interference was excluded, for the future, by fixing once for all the terms of the contracts, and even the mode of sale.

(10) The taxation of Asia.

This reorganisation of the Asiatic revenues was not merely a blow to the financial prerogative of the Senate; it was also the most important of a series of measures by which the great merchants and bankers of Rome were organised, under the name of the *Ordo equester*, into a social and political rival to the senatorial *Nobiles*. Here, as elsewhere, the legislation of Gracchus gave formal expression to the results of a long process of development.

(11) Consolidation of the Ordo Equester.

The *Equites*, or members of the first eighteen *centuriae*, had originally constituted the actual cavalry force of the Republic, and were provided with horses at the public expense (*equo publico*). They included, of course, all citizens, whether Senators or not, who possessed the necessary *census*, and they were subject¹ to periodical inspection by the Censors, who could expel an unworthy *equus* from the corps, by condemning him *vendere equum*; filling his place at their discretion from among the citizens of the requisite wealth (*census equestris*). But, as time went on, the significance of the name *equites* had been widened in two very different directions.

History of the Equites: (a) actual cavalry.

On the one hand, the eighteen *centuriae equitum* ceased to be

¹ At least from the year 304 onwards; see p. 118.

effective cavalry, and became a merely honorary corps through which youthful *nobiles* had to pass before entering on a public career. The process of decay was gradual. Firstly, in an age of almost constant wars, it was practically impossible for the same man to do his duty in the cavalry and also to attend the deliberations of the Senate. Consequently the custom grew, on the one hand that a man who was enrolled by the censors in an equestrian *centuria* could not also be a member of the Senate; on the other, that after a reasonable term of cavalry service (fixed later at ten years), an *equus* could claim his discharge, and was then eligible to a seat in the Senate, or to any office, like the Quaestorship, which qualified for this.

Consequent separation between senate and centuriae equitum.

Next, during the siege of Veii (p. 87) a body of volunteer cavalry, the *equites equo privato*, was organised from among the richer citizens, who provided their own horses, and were not included in the *centuriae equitum*; so that from thence onwards, and still more, later, when the expense and burden of cavalry-service was almost wholly transferred to the allies, the *equites equo publico* rapidly lost their military significance; till, if they served 'in camp or province' (as the saying was) at all, it was only as the honorary escort of a general.

(b) Non-effective cavalry.

On the other hand, as the wealth of Rome increased, and particularly during the period of the foreign wars, an immense increase took place in the number of rich merchants and financiers who were excluded, as far as possible, by the official prejudices of the *nobiles*, both from the eighteen *centuriae equitum* and from the curule magistracies which qualified for a seat in the Senate, and were only *equites*, at all, in the sense that they were of full equestrian *census*—equivalent probably, by this time, to four hundred thousand sesterces.¹

(c) Census equester.

Thus, by slow degrees the term *Equites* came to be applied to two quite distinct bodies of men. It might mean a member of an equestrian *centuria*, and in that case merely meant a young *nobilis* who had not yet finished his military education; or it might mean a man of wealth and influence whose birth in an 'ignoble' family alone precluded him from an official career and senatorial rank; and in practice it was only in the latter and, strictly speaking, inaccurate sense that the term 'Equestrian Order' was used at all in the period now under review.

It was not long, as we have seen already, before the new 'aristocracy of wealth' and the noble 'aristocracy of office' became not merely

¹ To put the matter in a nut-shell, they were *equites a non equitando*.

distinct, but active rivals of each other. First the *Lex Claudia* of 218 (p. 187), had forbidden members of the Senate to engage in commercial speculations, and had made the career of commerce just as distinct from the career of office, as the career of cavalry service had been in the olden time. Next, when the foreign conquests began, it was the men of equestrian *census*—the Equestrian Order in the widest sense—who had naturally become the pioneers of trade abroad, and the chief investors in the revenue contracts for one province after another, and who both by their commercial enterprise and by their frequent sharp practices had had the most frequent collisions with provincial governors of Senatorial rank and upbringing; more particularly as the latter, by the very circumstances of the case, had little or no experience of the commercial or financial point of view, a strong hereditary contempt for men who made their wealth by such means, and no little jealousy of the prosperity and influence which they had acquired.

(d) Senate and Equites as rivals.

Here then, and here alone, as it seemed to Gaius Gracchus, was an instrument ready to his hand to break down the Senatorial monopoly of administration, and to establish a counterpoise for the future. All that was required was to give life and cohesion to the 'aristocracy of wealth'; and to transform the Equestrian Order from a mere social and economic division into a new and closely organised political party. The corner-stone, as we have seen, of the reform of Asiatic taxation was the transference of the *locatio*, at which the revenue contracts were assigned, from the province itself to Rome; which practically excluded provincial *publicani* from the competition. It only needed the further restriction imposed now by Gracchus, that every *publicanus* must possess at least the *census equestris* of 400,000 sesterces, to make the tax-farming of the richest province of the empire the monopoly of the Equestrian Order.

(e) Gracchan organisation.

Equestrian control of Asiatic taxation.

One of the chief causes of friction, moreover, between the Senate and the Equestrian Order had been the relations which existed in all the provinces alike between Roman officials on the one hand, and Roman merchants and bankers on the other; and hitherto, the latter had had no sure means of redress against the former; for the Senate was certain to shelter a Senatorial governor against complaints from the side of the capitalists. Gracchus exactly reversed the situation, for he enacted that henceforth all the *quaestiones perpetuae*, or standing courts of inquiry for cases of official misconduct, should be composed exclusively of men of Equestrian

Equestrian control of the Jury-Courts.

census, while men of Senatorial rank were excluded altogether. Henceforward, therefore, it was for the 'aristocracy of wealth,' not for that of office, to determine whether complaints from provincials or traders were justified or no.

With the control of the taxes of Asia, and of the courts of inquiry in its hand, the Equestrian Order gained at once a quite new significance in the working of the Republic, as a compact political party with definite functions, wide and valuable privileges, strong common interests to defend, a common object of attack in the degenerate government of the *nobiles*, great personal influence and business capacity, and vast material wealth with which to carry out their desires. Even the right, which equestrian *census* had long brought to its owners, of wearing a golden ring, and of a reserved seat in the theatre immediately behind the seats of the Senate, gained now a new significance as the outward symbols of Equestrian rank; and may even have been confirmed by Gracchus as a right, where before they had been conceded by courtesy, outside the *centuriae equitum*.¹

This *Lex iudiciaria* of Gracchus, which completed the installation of the Equestrian Order, and curtailed still further the authority of the Senate in a peculiarly important department, needs some-
 (12) *Lex* what fuller explanation; for, like so much else of the
Iudiciaria. Gracchan reforms, it brings to a focus, and formulates in legislation, the results of a long process of development which had gone on almost unawares during the period of the great wars.

In the theory of the Roman Constitution, the supreme jurisdiction over criminal offences lay with the whole people assembled in the *Comitia Centuriata*; but it had long been customary (p. 143) to refer difficult or unusual cases, involving careful examination of points of law or evidence, to special investigators (*quaesitores*) or commissions of inquiry (*quaestiones*), which acted in the name of the people, and from whose decision consequently there was no appeal. A recent instance of such a *quaestio* was the court appointed ten years before to try the followers of Tiberius Gracchus (p. 333).

But as certain well-defined classes of offences became more common, the inconvenience of appointing a fresh commission each time led to the institution of *quaestiones perpetuae*, which, like the special *quaestiones* which they replaced, were each appointed in the first instance by either

¹ Livy even says that Gracchus proposed to swamp the votes of existing Senators, who were about three hundred in number, by the admission to the Senate of six hundred Equites; but there is no trace that any such measure was passed at this time.

a law or a *plebiscitum*. A standing list of duly qualified judges was prepared, called the *album iudicum*, and from this a variable number of *iudices* were empanelled, like a modern jury, to hear each case as it occurred. The first and most important of these ^{Quaestiones Perpetuae,} standing commissions was the *quaestio perpetua de pecuniis repetundis*, established, by the *Lex Calpurnia* of 149, to hear accusations of extortion against provincial governors. As long as the administration of the Senate remained unchallenged, it had become the custom that none but Senators should serve on this or any other commission. It may well be imagined, therefore, that, as the probity of the Senate declined, Senatorial offenders found an indulgent verdict from men who had either been already acquitted themselves, or were looking forward to offend and be pardoned in their turn. The recent acquittal of Aquillius, the organiser of the province of Asia (p. 341), had been a peculiarly scandalous example of this grave abuse, and it was urgently necessary that the whole system should be either purified or altered.

The law of Gracchus, as we have seen, dealt very summarily with the whole question. No Senators—and in the *quaestio de repetundis* even no sons of Senators—were allowed to be enrolled as *iudices* at all, and their place was to be taken by members of the ^{transferred from Senate to Equites.} Equestrian Order exclusively. Senatorial governors were thus to be brought to trial not before accomplices or amateurs, but before a class of men who were intimately acquainted with provincial finance and foreign methods of corruption, and who had been loudest hitherto in their criticism of the Senatorial conduct of the *quaestiones*.

Yet it must have been foreseen that, while the new *iudices* had the strongest political and personal motives for dealing severely with extortion in high places, they were not likely to spare the few ^{Evil effects.} really honest and energetic governors, who were after all the only security the provincials possessed against the exactions of Equestrian *publicani*. And as the law of Gracchus contained no effective provision for the punishment of judicial bribery, it was not long before the new *iudices*, like the old, discovered the market price of an acquittal, and shamelessly exacted it.

The execution of this long programme of reforms naturally occupied time; but Gracchus, more fortunate than his brother, seems to have had no difficulty in securing re-election to the tribunate of ^{Gracchus re-elected Tribune, 122 B.C.} 122. Among his colleagues was M. Fulvius Flaccus, the revolutionary Consul of 125; and one of the Consuls, C. Fannius, was also practically his nominee: a strange reversal of the

parts, and prophetic of much that was to come; since, merely as tribune, Gracchus was not, strictly speaking, a Roman magistrate at all.

The influence of Flaccus was soon apparent in a fresh proposal to extend the franchise: all those, apparently, who now held the *ius Latii* were to have the full citizenship, and all the rest of Italy the old Latin rights. It was also clear that the projected colonies in Africa and Achæa were intended to prepare even the provinces for closer union with Rome, and to break down the hard-and-fast line between Italy and the foreign dependencies.

Flaccus
and the
franchise.

But these colonies had still to be founded, and the practical difficulties were already seen to be formidable. 'Neptunia,' at Tarentum, was actually established, but it was regarded with jealousy by the Roman colonists and merchants of Brundisium; the restoration of Capua threatened to disturb the recent settlement of the Ager Campanus (p. 328); and new settlements at Corinth and Carthage could not fail to injure the Roman vested interests which had sprung up since 146, and centred in Argos and Utica. Moreover, at Carthage (which, under the name of 'Junonia,' it fell to Gracchus to go out and organise in person) the curse of Scipio still rested on the site, and ill-omened signs cast a shadow over the enterprise.

So wholly, also, did the power of Gracchus rest upon the magic of his personal influence, that an absence of only seventy days sufficed to break the spell. The proposal, moreover, of splendid schemes of reform was a game at which two could play. One of his own colleagues in the Tribunate, M. Livius Drusus, was put up by the Senatorial party to beat him on his own ground, in his absence, with a still longer series of promises which could be made all the more fascinating, since this time at least there was no intention of fulfilling them. No less than twelve citizen-colonies were to be founded in Italy, with allotments rent-free and alienable at will; the rent was to be remitted on allotments made under the law of Gracchus, and the corporal punishment of Italians by Roman officers was to be abolished altogether in the army. Moreover, unlike Gracchus the busy-body, the modest Drusus would content himself with the introduction of the reforms, and resign the execution of them into abler hands than his own.

This simple bait was taken greedily by the fickle populace, and when Gracchus returned to Rome he found his supremacy already a thing of the past. His own colleagues obstructed him. His franchise bill was vetoed by Livius Drusus; and even his creature C. Fannius was heard to declare that the Forum was full enough of citizens as it was. At the tribunician elections for

Senatorial
counter-
move in his
absence.

Reaction
against
Gracchus.

121 neither he nor Flaccus was re-elected; while the new Consuls were Q. Fabius, of the strictest sect of the *nobiles*, and L. Opimius, the ruthless destroyer of Fregellæ.

A general attack ensued on the whole legislation of Gracchus, and the *Lex Rubria*, which had authorised the colony of Junonia, was the first to come up for repeal. Gracchus and his friends went with an armed escort in self-defence; and at the meeting for the repeal of the *Lex Rubria*, the insolence of Antullius, an attendant of Opimius, provoked a sudden blow from one of the bystanders. Antullius fell dead, and the assembly dispersed at once. The Senate met, and declared the popular leaders enemies of the State; and, as if in defiance of the new law of Gracchus (p. 348), conferred the old absolute powers upon the Consuls. Opimius summoned the supporters of the Senate, with two armed slaves apiece, to meet him, in the morning, in the Forum at the temple of Castor and Pollux; while Flaccus seized the temple of Diana on the Aventine—the sanctuary of the old plebeian reformers—and armed his followers with the spoils of his campaigns in Gaul. After a fruitless parley, the rebel stronghold was stormed and occupied without resistance. Flaccus was killed as he fled. Gracchus and a single slave were found, both dead, in the Grove of the Furies beyond the river; his head was cut off and brought to Opimius, who rewarded the bearer with its weight in gold.

Violent end
of Gracchus,
121 B.C.

Of the followers of Gracchus, three thousand were tried and condemned to death, by a special commission under Opimius. The bodies of the slain were thrown into the Tiber, their property 'Concord' and houses confiscated and destroyed, and their widows restored. forbidden to wear mourning for them; and the Senate commemorated the massacre by a new temple to Concord. But beneath the dedication of Opimius, 'THE TEMPLE OF CONCORD,' a nameless hand added by night the words, 'THE WORK OF DISCORD.'

Thus, in two bloody struggles, the family of the Gracchi was well-nigh extinguished. The son of Gaius died soon after his father, and only Cornelia remained for many years, in retirement at Misenum, to repeat to a new generation of reformers the tragic story of her sons. Part of their work fell with them; but part also, for good or evil, survived. The Gracchan vindication of the right of public trial remained, as we have seen already, a dead letter from the first, against the *ultimum senatus consultum*. Popilius was recalled, and, with Opimius, was acquitted, on public grounds, of the charge of the murder of citizens. Carbo, who had shown the zeal of a recent

Close of the
Gracchan
struggle.

convert on the side of the Senate, but, as a renegade, was a convenient scapegoat, killed himself rather than face an Equestrian jury. The measures of Drusus, of course, were dropped at once; and the Gracchan colonies were abandoned, except one or two, which were already too far advanced. But the citizen-colony of Narbo, founded in the new province of Transalpine Gaul (p. 344) in 118, though still a military outpost of the old type, preserves distinct traces of the Gracchan spirit, both in its establishment beyond the limits of Italy, and in the full franchise offered to Italian members of it.

The Agrarian Laws, too, had already practically fulfilled their purpose. An amendment which made the allotments alienable, in 121, allowed the town-bred farmers to drift again back to Rome. Another Settlement of the land question. in 118 prohibited further allotment altogether; and a third law in 111 closed the whole question by declaring all allotments, and all *ager publicus* which was still held in 'occupation,' whether by citizens, or Latins, or allies, to be henceforward indisputably private property; only the *ager Campanus* and the public pastures still remaining as before on lease from the treasury. All subsequent agrarian legislation, therefore, for distributions to veterans or others, was hampered by the financial question, how to purchase such land as was required; and consequently stands on quite a different footing from that of the Gracchi.

The democratic party was shattered by the loss of its leaders, but the Senate dared not discontinue the dole of corn, and the city populace still grew more degenerate and more formidable. The doles, indeed, were even extended in 119, in spite of the opposition of a rustic tribune, C. Marius, who made himself still more obnoxious by narrowing the voting lobbies of the Comitia in order to prevent intimidation; and the demoralisation of the Comitia is further shown by the fresh restriction of the freedmen to the four city tribes effected in 115 by the Censor, M. Scaurus. Political situation after the death of Gracchus.

The *Equites* also were too powerful, and too closely organised by Gaius Gracchus, to be dispossessed of their privileges in Asia or in the courts; but they abused their wide opportunities of reforming administration through the *iudicia*; and they remained still practically excluded from the Consulship and other principal magistracies. The *Nobiles* only rallied more closely, in defence of their threatened privileges and their aristocratic vices; they had closed their ears to the unmistakable warning which they had received, and refused to share their power, either with the rich, of whom they were afraid, or with the poor, whom they despised. Truly, as Varro says of him, Gracchus had

'made the State two-headed'—*bicipitem civitatem fecit* ; but two heads are not always better than one.

The hopelessness of the solution proposed by Gaius Gracchus was manifest from the first. The limited tenure of the Tribune and its essentially defensive and negative character ; the certainty of disunion within so large a *collegium* as that of the ten Tribunes ; the political incapacity and uncertain temper of the popular assembly ; and the irreconcilable divergence of the various interests which opposed the compact Senatorial party, combined to demonstrate that it was not in this direction that a strong, honest, and efficient form of government could be expected. The importance, in fact, of the Gracchi, in the history of Rome, is rather this—that they were the first to bring to light and demonstrate those hidden forces which were undermining the traditional order of things, and to formulate the whole series of problems of which the solution was only to be found in the Principate established by Augustus.

The work
of the
Gracchi.

CHIEF DATES.

Equites equo privato instituted	<i>circa</i> 304
Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis	147
Formation of the province of Asia	133-1
Tribunate of G. Gracchus	123-2
Death of G. Gracchus	121
Further allotment of land prohibited	118
Lex Thoria : all allotments and 'possessions' made freehold	111

CHIEF PERSONS.

G. Sempronius Gracchus — Cornelia — M. Fulvius Flaccus — M. Livius Drusus — C. Fannius — C. Papirius Carbo — L. Opimius.

CHIEF PLACES.

Tarentum (Neptunia) — Carthage (Junonia) — Capua — Narbo.

SUBJECTS.

- The growth of the Ordo Equester, of the exclusive City Populace, and of the system of Jury Courts.
- The influence of Greek political ideals on the Gracchi.
- The settlement of the Agrarian question.

CHAPTER XXX

THE WAR WITH JUGURTHA AND WITH THE CIMBRI

The restored rule of the Senate—The war with Jugurtha—Capture of Cirta—Scandalous conduct of Bestia and Scaurus—Jugurtha in Rome—Surrender of A. Albinus—C. Marius—*Cupido cum Mario eundi*—Jugurtha betrayed—Political effects of the war—The Cimbri—Roman disasters—Marius in Gaul—Battles of Aquae Sextiae and the Raudine Plain—The political position of Marius.

THE Tribune of G. Gracchus gave to the authority of the Senate and the customary order of the Roman Constitution a shock from which they never recovered. But it was nearly a generation before the effects became obvious. For the moment, indeed, the Senate seemed to have reasserted itself as the guardian of public order, and the saviour of the State from revolution : and although, as we have seen, it was some years before the land question was entirely settled, and though the colonial policy of Gracchus is reflected in 118 in the constitution of the colony of Narbo, the history of Rome for the next twenty years is mainly concerned, as before, with external, not with domestic matters. Even in these, however, the same question was really at issue, whether the Senatorial Order was any longer worthy to be entrusted with the management and defence of the empire ; and in regard both to disorder within, and to attack from without, the answer was unmistakable,—that it was not.

The annexation of Transalpine Gaul was hardly completed, when a trouble broke out in the African protectorate, which, though in itself of small importance, has passed, in the graphic version of Sallust, into Roman literature ; and which serves, too, to exhibit in the darkest colours the corruption and incapacity of the governing class in Rome, and the ease with which the rule of the Senate might be paralysed and defied, either by a single petty chieftain of ability and determination, or by a popular champion of the malcontent factions in Rome.

The War
with
Jugurtha.

The kingdom of Numidia had been created for Masinissa out of the African dependencies of Carthage, and included, with one exception, the whole coast of North Africa from the borders of Cyrene to the independent kingdom of Mauretania beyond the river Muluca. The exception was the Roman province of Africa, which, however, comprised only the neighbourhood of Carthage, Utica, and Hippo, and the regions immediately southward as far as the lesser Syrtis and the Tritonian lakes, and covered much the same area as the modern Tunis.

During the long reign of Masinissa, Numidia had remained a single state, and though on his death (p. 294) the kingdom was divided among his three sons, it was not long before the premature death of Mastanabal and Gulussa permitted Micipsa to reunite the whole, and carry on for thirty years more the enlightened policy of Masinissa. Micipsa had two sons of his own, Adherbal and Hiempsal; but he had also adopted, as their co-heir, a natural son of his brother Mastanabal, by name Jugurtha; and on his deathbed in 118 he had bequeathed his kingdom to the three conjointly, and commended the two boys to the care of their older cousin.

Jugurtha was an ideal leader for a people of Berber race. Handsome, charming, and athletic, he combined reckless personal bravery and universal good-fellowship with a high degree of military and political ability. He had led a corps of Numidian auxiliaries at the siege of Numantia (p. 307), and had rapidly won the confidence and the goodwill of Scipio, while he had ample opportunities of measuring himself against the fashionable young Romans on the staff. His ambition, however, was aroused by what he saw; and with it appeared the faults of an undisciplined and unscrupulous temperament. No deception was too subtle, no treachery too base, no cruelty too barbarous to serve the ends he had in view. At home he could count on his personal popularity, and the restless and adventurous spirit of the Numidians. In Rome, he had learnt that 'everything had its price.'

On his return from Spain, he had soon made himself indispensable to the aged Micipsa, while he organised a powerful faction of his own; and thus, when the inevitable quarrel broke out with his cousins, he found no difficulty in procuring the murder of the impetuous Hiempsal, or in compelling the mean-spirited Adherbal to take refuge in the African province, whence he carried his complaints to Rome. The Senate had no desire to interfere; yet murder and expulsion of client kings could hardly be overlooked. But Jugurtha, too, had friends in Rome, and paid them well. By the

Numidia.

Death of
Micipsa,
118 B.C.

Jugurtha.

Quarrel with
Adherbal,
116 B.C.

influence of M. Aemilius Scaurus a compromise was arranged, and a commission, headed by the same L. Opimius who had suppressed the Gracchan riot, was sent to carry it out. Adherbal was restored and put in possession of Cirta, and of the part of Numidia nearest to the Roman province, but Jugurtha was left in possession of the more fertile and more warlike west, which was also the more remote from Roman observation. The division was not in itself unreasonable, but rumours went about, and Opimius was condemned presently for bribery. In Africa there was peace for nearly four years, broken only by futile complaints from Adherbal, to which the Senate had neither the wish nor the energy to attend.

At last Jugurtha was ready. In 112 he invaded Adherbal's country, beat him in battle north of Cirta, and shut him up in his capital. Cirta forms an almost impregnable fortress, surrounded on three sides by a precipitous ravine, and Adherbal might well hope to hold out till the Romans could come to his aid. In response to his appeal, a deputation of young nobles came to see what was to be done; Jugurtha received them courteously, and sent them back with many excuses, and nothing arranged. The siege had already lasted five months, when a second mission arrived, headed this time by M. Aemilius Scaurus, the ablest, most influential, and most characteristic figure of the governing class. He had done good service as Consul on the Adriatic frontier (p. 342), and was now *Princeps Senatus*. But Scaurus was poor, and Jugurtha had much gold. After a reasonable interval the Roman envoys were courteously bowed out again; and when Cirta fell soon afterwards, Jugurtha killed and tortured not only Adherbal himself, but also his supporters, and among them, most unwisely, a number of Italian merchants.

The Senate was still in no mood to interfere; but the massacre of Cirta had roused the business men, and Jugurtha's open defiance had touched the common people in a tender point. The suspicion that they were being betrayed was confirmed by the obvious reluctance of the government. C. Memmius, a popular leader, and a tribune-elect, opened a violent political campaign. The Senate was frightened for the moment into an attitude of resolution, declared war on Jugurtha, and ordered the Consul, L. Calpurnius Bestia, to invade Numidia. Bestia had the reputation of being a good officer, but he was notoriously corrupt, and he took Scaurus as his *legatus*, and a staff composed of nobles who could be trusted to co-operate. A timely alliance offered by the king of Mauretania was declined, some warlike operations were performed, and

Capture of
Cirta,
112 B.C.

Scandalous
conduct of
Bestia and
Scaurus.

then, to the surprise of every one who was not in the secret, Jugurtha surrendered unconditionally, and was graciously reinstated by Bestia in the full extent of his dominion, paying a small indemnity and surrendering some horses and elephants, which he was allowed to buy back again at once. There was something, it is true, to be said at this moment for a policy of conciliation in Africa, since a dangerous time was coming both in Macedon and in Gaul; but the populace was disappointed of the booty and the beast-shows which it had expected, and, in the scandalous bargain of Bestia, even the Senate had not been consulted.

The whole proceeding was grossly irregular and flagrantly corrupt, and Memmius pressed his advantage, to discredit the government and cancel the treaty. Jugurtha was summoned to Rome to explain his conduct; and to Rome Jugurtha came, in the dress of a suppliant and under a promise of safe conduct.

Jugurtha
in Rome,
111 B.C.

But when Memmius adjured him to save himself by a full confession of the Senate's share in the plot, another tribune rose—the tool of the conspirators—and forbade him to reply. Even now Jugurtha might have gained his object, but for another needless act of treacherous cruelty. There was living, in Rome, another of his cousins, Massiva, son of Gulussa, whom he regarded as a possible claimant to the Numidian kingdom. At the instigation of Jugurtha, who was himself under a safe-conduct, Massiva was assassinated, and the murderer, Bomilcar, was permitted to make his escape. At this new outrage, popular indignation could be restrained no longer. Even the Senate had to break off the negotiations, and ordered Jugurtha to leave Italy. And we may well imagine him, as in Sallust's picture, looking back upon Rome, as he withdrew, with the words: 'A city for sale, and soon to perish, if it can but find some one to buy it.'¹

The new war was entrusted to one of the Consuls of 110, Sp. Postumius Albinus; but tribunician obstruction delayed his election, and it was late in the season when he set foot in Africa. He found Bestia's army utterly demoralised, and he had hardly reduced it to order when he was obliged to return again to Rome, to hold the elections for 109. He left the army in charge of his brother Aulus, who was serving as his *legatus*; a foolish and inexperienced person, who took advantage of the Consul's absence to make a raid, at midwinter, on a distant fort named Suthul, and easily allowed Jugurtha to draw him out into the desert with his whole force. He soon lost his way; his camp was surprised; and he was compelled to surrender

Surrender
of Aulus
Albinus,
110 B.C.

¹ *Urbem venalem et mature perituram, si emptorem invenerit.*—Sallust, *Jug.* 35.

absolutely, passing his army under the yoke, and promising to evacuate Numidia within ten days.

The Romans were filled with a fury of indignation when the shameful news arrived, and the Tribune C. Mamilius Limetanus demanded a special commission, to inquire into the whole Numidian scandal from the beginning. The nobles protested, but Mamilius had the support of the Equites; the commission was formed, and Opimius, Bestia, and Sp. Albinus, with many others, were found guilty of corruption, and sent into exile. Scaurus alone, of all who had been concerned, succeeded, with his usual subtlety, not merely in evading conviction, but in securing a seat on the commission itself. The Senate, in the meanwhile, repudiated the disgraceful treaty, and went through the usual farce of surrendering the person of its author; and the further conduct of the war was given to one of the strictest and most distinguished of the nobles, Q. Caecilius Metellus, an honest, vigorous, and by no means incapable officer, the nephew of Macedonicus, and one of the Consuls for 109; and it was noted that he selected his staff, not as was usual from the young men of fashion in Rome, but from the most experienced officers of the army, such as P. Rutilius Rufus, who had lately published a new book on drill, and C. Marius, originally a private soldier from Arpinum, who had risen from the ranks, and held a frontier command *pro praetore*; and who, like Rutilius, and Jugurtha himself, had seen real war under Scipio before Numantia.

Metellus set to work at once and in earnest. He brought with him large reinforcements from Italy, and reduced to a semblance of order the dissolute and demoralised remnants of the army of Albinus, while he cautiously prepared the way for an advance into Numidia. Jugurtha, seeing the turn things had taken, offered what seems to have been a genuine surrender. But Metellus replied by playing the king's own game. He bribed the messengers to bring Jugurtha alive or dead into the Roman camp, and meanwhile advanced under cover of the negotiations to Vaga, an important business centre and military post, not far from the frontier of the province.

At last Jugurtha saw that the negotiations were merely a blind, and that Metellus was on the march to Cirta. So he prepared a trap for him on the route, at a point where the Roman army left the shelter of the hills, and had still some way to go over open country to their camping ground by the river Muthul, the nearest running water. By the greater mobility of his own men, he cut them off from the river, from their own advanced guard, and from their line of retreat; and then flung a sudden attack upon their right flank. But

Metellus
goes to
Africa,
109 B.C.

Battle on
the Muthul.

by a hasty change of formation Metellus defeated the manœuvre. The Numidian infantry failed to break the legions ; and, through swarms of cavalry and light-armed foot, the Roman centre fought its way, in dust and drought, to the support of its advanced party and their unfinished entrenchments. After this one indecisive battle, both sides divided their forces and adopted the guerilla tactics which suit so well the natural features of Algeria, and give so decided an advantage to the defensive side. At the close of the year, Metellus is found again within the province, engaged in a fruitless siege of Zama Regia, and in equally vain attempts to delude Jugurtha into a surrender of his person.

The command of Metellus was prolonged over the following year 107, but small progress was made with the war. A momentary revolt at Vaga in the winter of 108 was suppressed without difficulty, but a perilous expedition to the southern oasis of Thala, in the hope of surprising Jugurtha, arrived too late to secure him. Expedition
to Thala,
108 B.C. Meanwhile the Gaetulians of the interior and the Mauretanians in the west rallied round the Numidian standard, and Jugurtha pressed forward again with a large force into the neighbourhood of the fortress of Cirta.

The Consular elections for 107 were approaching, and with them a new spirit passed over the war. C. Marius has already been mentioned as a promising officer on the staff of Metellus. He was born of poor parents near Arpinum in 155, and began life as a farm-labourer. But he soon found his vocation in the army, where he rose from the ranks to be military tribune under Scipio before Numantia. As tribune of the people in 119, he had carried a substantial reform in the methods of popular voting, and had not hesitated to imprison a Consul—another Metellus—for illegal obstruction of his bill. His marriage with the sister of C. Julius Caesar had secured to him the countenance of one of the noblest families in Rome ; but he had missed the Aedileship, and was barely elected Praetor in 115. As Proprætor he had distinguished himself in Further Spain, and had learned to handle legionaries in guerilla warfare. But he was without experience or tact in political matters, and had hesitated, hitherto, to incur the hostility of the nobles by coming forward for the Consulship. Two years' experience of the African War, however, convinced him that his chance had come, and he asked leave of absence from Metellus to conduct his candidature. Metellus, himself too a man of plain words, replied that it would be time enough for Marius to compete when his son (who was not actually Consul till 80) should be old enough to be his colleague. This superfluous insult rankled in the spirit of Marius. He persisted

in his criticisms of the strategy of Metellus, and in the charge that his chief was purposely prolonging the war ; till the popular demand for a new general was brought at last to a head, and Metellus was forced Consul for 107 B.C. to allow him to return. Only twelve days remained for canvassing after his arrival ; but with the combined support of the merchants and the democratic opposition, he was elected Consul by a large majority, and entrusted with the command in Africa by a special decree of the people. This last act was a fresh breach of the Senate's monopoly of foreign policy, but it was one which the commission of Mamilius had shown to be richly deserved.

Marius used the favourable moment to the full. His personal popularity with the army called out many veterans to swell his levy, and he set an all-important precedent by drawing most of his recruits, not, as heretofore, by ballot even from the lower regular classes of the *census*, but as volunteers from the *capite censi*, who fell below even the lowest grade of four thousand *asses*, and who had hitherto only been called upon to serve in the gravest emergencies. To such men, however, the call to arms promised not only regular work and an honourable career, but a life of adventure under a popular leader of their own stamp, and a substantial share in the spoils of victory. It was soon seen that the *cupido cum Mario eundi* more than compensated for his relaxation of the unpopular rules of the conscription.

When Marius landed in Africa, he found that Metellus had remained utterly inactive since the result of the elections was known, but, fortunately, that the enemy, too, had failed to profit either by the delay or by his half-hearted negotiations. But no sooner was the army remodelled, and sufficiently trained to its work, than Marius took the offensive with vigour. He captured the oasis and fortress of Capsa in the far south of the province after a longer and more difficult desert march even than that of Metellus to Thala. He reduced the Gaetulians, and pacified eastern Numidia ; and then, in the hope of bringing Jugurtha at last to a decisive action, he undertook a land march through the whole length of his country to the river Mulucca on the Mauretanian border, and succeeded on the way in surprising one of his treasure-cities. But the lavish promises of Jugurtha, coupled with the nearer approach of the Romans, and the prospect of cutting off their retreat, tempted Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, who had remained neutral hitherto, to throw in his lot with the Numidians ; and Marius found himself compelled to retire. He had now been joined, however, by his Quaestor, L. Cornelius Sulla, who had been left behind at first

to bring up reinforcements of cavalry. Sulla had seen no service before, but he soon revealed an unusual degree of ability as a commander of cavalry; and the safe retreat of the whole force must be ascribed as much to his energy and cool-headedness, in a desperate rearguard action, as to the obstinate bravery and unshaken discipline of the new legionaries of Marius.

It was clear by this time to Marius, as it had been to Metellus before him, that he could only end the struggle by the capture of Jugurtha himself; and he opened negotiations with Bocchus for the surrender of his son-in-law and ally. But Marius was no diplomatist, and he had already offended Bocchus unnecessarily by his march to the Mulucca. Sulla, on the other hand, had the reputation of a gentleman and a man of the world, and on the express invitation of Bocchus he was entrusted with the dangerous mission of visiting the wily Moor, and holding him to his treacherous promise. Bocchus, in fact, is said to have doubted long, whether he should surrender Jugurtha to Sulla, or Sulla to Jugurtha; but in the end Sulla prevailed. Jugurtha was invited to a friendly conference early in 105. His escort was cut down by the attendants of Bocchus, and he himself found trapped, at last, with the treachery which he had so often practised on others. He was carried by Marius to Rome, where, after adorning the triumphal procession of the conqueror, he was cast into the loathsome dungeon of the Capitoline prison, and there perished miserably.

The African War was at an end. The Gaetulians, to avoid further trouble, were received into free alliance with Rome, and the southern frontier of the province was advanced to the edge of the desert. Bocchus was rewarded with the whole of western Numidia, and the remainder, to save the cost and risk of direct occupation, was handed over to Gauda, another grandson of Masinissa. Metellus was consoled for his disappointment with the empty title of *Numidicus*; and Marius, who had been re-elected Consul in his absence, and had remained in Africa to carry out the settlement, triumphed with great splendour in January 104; while Sulla, who had contributed more directly than any one to the actual result, contented himself with quietly assuming, on a new signet-ring, the credit for the capture of Jugurtha, and waited for a more convenient season to prosecute his new rivalry with the popular hero of the moment.

The war with Jugurtha, insignificant as it was in itself, and protracted mainly by the shortcomings of the victors, marks the beginning of a new period in the political history of Rome. The administration of the Senate, though rudely shaken at home by the popular agitation of the

Jugurtha
betrayed,
105 B.C.

Settlement
of Africa.

Gracchi, had yet remained unquestioned in its conduct of affairs abroad. But now the populace had felt its power in this department also. It had found a leader in its own ranks, whose military genius had stood the rough test of actual warfare. In the face of Senatorial opposition, it had given him the Consulship two years in succession. It had assigned to him in advance the province which it desired him to undertake, and it had provided him with a devoted army of professional soldiers of fortune, who looked to him and not to the Senate for their maintenance during the war, and for a career in time of peace hereafter. The master of the legions stood already contrasted and confronted with the established government of the State, and it was only a matter of time, when they should come into collision.

In all the wars on their northern frontier hitherto, the Romans had been concerned mainly with the tribes of the great Gaulish stock : Allobroges, Volcae, and Arverni in the Rhone valley and the new Transalpine province ; Taurisci, Carni, and kindred tribes to the north-east. They were now to be confronted with a fresh race of barbarians, who were pressing westward and southward from beyond the Danube and the Rhine upon the rear of the Gauls themselves, and found little difficulty in forcing a passage through them ; for the Gauls had long been weakened by the encroachments of the Romans, and were rapidly losing their hardihood under the spell of the softer civilisation of Italy.

The first wave of this new tide of invaders the Romans knew as the Cimbri. We hear of them vaguely threatening, first the Gallic Boii of Bohemia and Bavaria ; then the Scordisci of northern Illyria ; then the Taurisci of Noricum. The Taurisci were already allies of the Roman people, and the Consul of 113, Cn. Papirius Carbo, the brother of the Gracchan turncoat, was sent by way of Illyria to defend them. Carbo advanced as far as Noreia, where Roman speculators had large interests at stake in the mines of gold and iron ; and received an apology from the Cimbri. But when he attempted to entrap them treacherously, he was defeated and repulsed with loss, which would apparently have been even greater than it was, but for a violent storm which ended the action.

After this we hear no more, for the present, of the Cimbri in Noricum ; but two years later we find them crossing the Rhine, at the invitation of the Sequani, and harrying the tribes which had entered into alliance with Rome beyond the borders of the new province : and in this they were joined by the Helvetian

Political effects of the war.

The northern frontier.

They cross the Rhine, 111 B.C.

Tigurini, by the Gallic Ambrones, and by the Tougeni, whose origin is doubtful, but whom some writers have identified with those Teutones, who became so important later on.

The Cimbric invaders had a definite object in view. Their own country had ceased to be able to support them, and all they asked was land on which to settle peaceably, or at least the permission to earn a living with their swords. But strange tales had begun to come south about the Cimbri: of the covered waggons in which whole families lived and travelled together; of the copper helmets, the coats of mail, and the huge iron swords of their warriors; of the fair-haired, light-eyed giants, chained girdle to girdle as they fought, in impenetrable phalanx; and of the women, braver and more desperate even than the men. The short, dark, sedentary southerners were terrified at the approach of this nation on the march; and the Senate refused the request.

The Senate forbids them to move southwards.

The Consul of 109, D. Junius Silanus, went out to meet them beyond the frontier of the province; but his army was destroyed, and, had the Cimbri known how to use their victory, the road lay clear into Italy. But for some reason the danger drifted away westward, and in 107 the colleague of Marius, L. Cassius Longinus, was hastily summoned to the upper valley of the Garonne to repel a movement of the Tigurini and Tougeni. In a single battle near Agen, Cassius and his *legatus* L. Piso were killed, M. Scaurus was taken prisoner, and the whole army was surrendered to the enemy. C. Popilius, the officer who signed the capitulation, was subsequently convicted on a charge of treason; but the Senatorial government cannot be acquitted of gross miscalculation and wholly inadequate preparations.

Roman disasters, 109-7 B.C.

Such a defeat could not but shake the loyalty of the Gauls within the province. The rich and venerable city of Tolosa revolted at once, and the Consul of 106, Q. Servilius Caepio, did little else but retake it by surprise, and strip it of its accumulated treasures. It was a blunder, in any case, to despoil a national sanctuary, when the provincials were already so uneasy, and the prestige of the government was so low. But the subsequent conduct of the Consul made it a crime. On the way to Massilia, the magnificent booty, to the amount of one hundred and fifty thousand talents, was allowed to fall into the hands of robbers, whom many believed to be the agents of Caepio himself; and the 'gold of Tolosa' passed into a proverb for ill-gotten gain.

Aurum Tolosanum, 106 B.C.

Caepio's command, however, was prolonged in 105, and his successor

as Consul, Cn. Mallius Maximus, was sent with reinforcements; for Marius, the only real general of the time, was still engaged in the settlement of Africa. The Cimbri, under their leader Boiorix, had by this time concentrated their forces for a regular invasion of the province, and the Roman commanders collected their forces at Arausio. But their counsels were divided. Caepio wanted to remain on the defensive, and to hold the line of the Rhone, while Mallius preferred a bolder course; and a preliminary engagement on the further bank, which ended badly for the Romans, and cut off a detachment under M. Scaurus, only increased the quarrel; for Mallius grew more eager than ever to attack, and Caepio more determined to risk nothing. Mallius, however, persisted, and Caepio at length reluctantly consented to follow him across the Rhone, and give battle with the river in his rear. The result was disastrous and decisive. The whole force, numbering more than sixty thousand men, was routed and destroyed, and only ten survivors made good their escape. The Cimbri gave themselves up to a passion of exultation, insulted the dead, hanged the prisoners, and wantonly destroyed the rich spoil which they had taken.

The panic in Italy was unexampled. The Cimbri had by this time annihilated five Roman armies, and so great was the difficulty in raising fresh troops, that all the customary exemptions were cancelled, and universal conscription was enforced. By an express vote of the Comitia, Caepio was deprived of his proconsular command forthwith; by a subsequent enactment he was expelled from the Senate; and in the following year, when the first terror had subsided, both he and Mallius were tried, condemned, and banished by a special commission.

The only hope of salvation seemed to lie in the popular hero Marius. Before he could return from Africa he found himself re-elected to the Consulship for 104, and on the first day of the new year he celebrated his triumph over Jugurtha, and devoted himself at once to raise an army to meet the Cimbri. But again the barbarians missed their chance, and by purposeless raids among the Arverni, and even beyond the Pyrenees, gave Rome a breathing-space of nearly two years. At the end of that time Marius was ready. Twice in succession he had been re-elected Consul, not without Senatorial opposition; and, in spite of the long delay, there was no decline in his popularity and influence. He had fixed his headquarters in the neighbourhood of Arles, and accustomed his men by constant training, and a new system of tactics, to meet the wild rush of

**Battle of
Arausio,
105 B.C.**

**Punish-
ment of
Caepio.**

**Marius in
Gaul,
104-102 B.C.**

the barbarians. To relieve the traffic at the mouth of the Rhone he had dug a sea-canal, the *fossa Mariana*; he had created a fleet, so as to provision his forces by the short and safe route over-sea; and he had slowly recovered and consolidated both the Gaulish province and its outlying dependencies, which had borne the whole brunt of the invasion hitherto.

At last the Cimbri reappeared. They had been expelled from Spain by the Celtiberian natives, and had drifted northwards again through Western Gaul. Repulsed here, too, by the Belgae, Cimbri and they had left one of their clans, the Aduatuci, stationary in Teutones. charge of their spoils, and had divided their forces for a twofold descent upon Italy. The Cimbri and the Tigurini moved back by the way they had come, along the north face of the Alps, and emerged by Tridentum and the passes of the Tyrol, where the colleague of Marius, C. Lutatius Catulus, was to hold the line of the Athesis; while the Teutones and Ambrones made a direct attack through the Transalpine province by the coast road of the Riviera, which led them past the position of Marius.

Marius allowed them to cross the Rhone unopposed. He maintained himself in his camp against a three days' assault; and then watched, with satisfaction, the long line of the invaders filing past his outposts for six days more, on the road to Italy, shouting sarcastic offers, as they went, to take the last messages of his soldiers to their wives and friends in Rome. Marius now followed cautiously in the track of the enemy, and two days later found his opportunity near Aquae Sextiae. One force, of three thousand men, he sent to work its way round to the vanguard of the unsuspecting Teutones, who were suffering severely from the heat. The remainder he kept to hang closely on their rear; and so, when he was ready to make a general attack, he held the enemy caught as in a vice. The victory of Marius was complete; and it was regarded as an omen for the future, that as he watched the solemn burning of the enemy's spoils, on the site which is still shown at Aix, the double message was announced to him, that the Cimbri had forced their way into Italy, and that he himself was now for the fifth time Consul.

Battle of
Aquae
Sextiae,
102 B.C.

There was, indeed, no time to lose. While Marius had been occupied with the Teutones, the Cimbri had entered Italy without opposition; and Catulus, without striking a blow, had retired from his position on the Athesis, leaving Transpadane Gaul at their mercy. Once again, had the enemy known it, the road to Rome lay open; but they feared the passage of the Padus, and preferred to move westward searching for the Teutones, and enjoying the rich country around

Catulus and
the Cimbri.

them. Marius grasped the situation in a moment; sent his army in advance to reinforce his colleague; and himself paid a hurried visit to Rome, to enter formally on the Consulship, and to bring up his reserves. Refusing the triumph offered him for the victory of Aquae Sextiae, he was soon on his way back to join Catulus, whose command had been extended *pro consule*, and who was still watching the Cimbri from a safe distance behind the Padus.

Marius crossed the river at once, with fifty thousand men in all, and promptly accepted the formal challenge which Boiorix, after the northern custom, had offered him; naming, for the place, the Raudine Plain, near Vercellae, about half-way between Milan and Turin, and, for the day, the thirtieth of Sextilis (July). The armies met on the appointed day: the great phalanx of the Cimbri, with a solid front of more than three miles in length; the Romans in their usual triple line of companies, with the spiritless legions of Catulus in the centre, and the veterans of Marius somewhat in advance on either flank. The fierce rush of the barbarians well-nigh broke the unstable centre, but Marius raised the spirits of his Italian levies by the promise of Roman citizenship to all who should survive; and their iron discipline carried all before it. The barbarians, exhausted by the summer heat, by the sun which shone in their faces, and by the suffocating dust of their crowded advance, soon broke and fled to their laager, where the women fell upon the fugitives with any weapon they could find; and killed themselves too, finally, rather than survive as slaves. Only the Tigurini, or some of them, seem to have made their escape, and appear again, a generation later, as a canton of the Helvetii beyond the Alps.

CHIEF DATES.

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CHIEF PERSONS.

Micipsa — Hiempsal — Adherbal — Jugurtha — Bocchus—L. Opimius—
M. Aemilius Scaurus—L. Calpurnius Bestia—C. Memmius—
C. Mamilius Limetanus—Q. Caecilius Metellus—C. Marius—L. Cor-
nellius Sulla—L. Cassius Longinus—C. Servilius Caepio—Gn. Mallius
Maximus—Q. Lutatius Catulus—Boiorix.

CHIEF PLACES.

Cirta — Muthul Fl. — Thala — Vaga — Noreia — Tolosa — Arausio --
Aqua Sextiae—Athesis Fl.—Vercellae.

SUBJECTS.

Urbs venalis, et mature peritura, si emptorem invenerit.

Cupido cum Mario eundi.

The new questions of frontier defence raised by the annexation of
a province beyond the Alps.

The Cimbric migration : Gaul and Teuton in Central Europe.

CHAPTER XXXI

MARIUS, SATURNINUS, AND DRUSUS

Party feeling in Rome—Marius joins the popular party—Saturninus and Glaucia—Anarchy in Rome—The military reforms of Marius—The State, the Army, and the General—Slave War in Sicily—Foreign affairs—New grouping of parties in Rome—Jealousy of the allies—The Equestrian Courts—The proposals of the younger Drusus—Opposition of the nobles—Murder of Drusus.

To estimate the position in which Marius found himself in Rome, it is necessary to look back for a moment over the domestic history of the preceding years. Ever since the fall of G. Gracchus, the party of the people, and the party of wealth also, had been without a leader. The government of the Senatorial Order had been going from bad to worse; and the incapacity which provoked the invasion of the Cimbri had been, like the Numidian scandal, only a more flagrant example of what went on in Rome every day. But now, at last, the people had found one of themselves who, by common honesty and mere attention to business, had first set things straight in Africa, and then saved Italy from the worst danger that had arisen since the days of Hannibal. The chance seemed at last to have come for a thorough reform of the home administration also; for the prestige of the *Nobiles* had been shattered by the wars abroad, and the Mamilian Commission of 109 had deprived them of many of their ablest men, and had revealed a degree of depravity in official circles, which encouraged the democratic party to take further measures. Caepio, the robber of Tolosa, was a particular object of attack, for, besides his defeat at Arausio (p. 370) he had proposed in his Consulship to restore the *iudicia* from the Equites to the Senate. The summary curtailment, therefore, of his *imperium* after his disaster, though apparently not an illegal act, was a fresh interference with Senatorial prerogative; and the *Lex Cassia* of 104, which forbade any man to re-enter the Senate if he had once been deprived of *imperium*, was another step in the same direction.

The *Lex Appuleia perduellionis* also, under which Caepio was eventu-

ally tried—though not till ten years after his misconduct in Gaul—had created a new and vague political offence,¹ as a weapon of attack against leaders of the official party; and in 106 the *Lex Coelia* had introduced ballot-voting in trials under the new statute, as a precaution against corruption on the part of the accused and their party. It was a part of the same democratic campaign when the *Lex Domitia* of 104 transferred the elections of Augurs and Pontifices from the sacred *collegia* themselves to the *Comitia*; for this, at the same time, threw open a highly prized distinction to popular competition, and deprived the official clique of the monopoly of the power to obstruct legislation by announcing that the omens were unfavourable. In this connection, also, it is to be noted that a scandal which was discovered among the Vestal Virgins during the Cimbric War, was investigated not by the Pontifex Maximus, who was the proper religious officer, but by the Praetor Urbanus in a purely secular court.

Fresh attacks on the government of the Senate.

Such was the troubled state of Rome when Marius returned from the war; and further mischief was in the air.

Conspicuous among the democratic leaders were C. Servilius Glaucia and L. Appuleius Saturninus. The former, as Tribune in 106, had opposed the reactionary proposal of Caepio, and had risen into notice since then by his witty but vulgar eloquence, and by the turmoil which ensued when Metellus Numidicus, as Censor of 102, attempted to expel him from the Senate. Saturninus, a clever ne'er-do-weel, who had reformed, and turned politician, to avenge a quarrel with Scaurus, had marked his Tribunate in 103 by securing the fourth re-election of Marius, and by the *Lex Appuleia* which has been mentioned already. He, too, had been degraded by Metellus, but he had avenged himself and Glaucia by a riotous attack upon the Censor's house, and had further alarmed the nobles by his disclosures of bribery in connection with the intrigues of King Mithradates of Pontus (p. 404). At the moment of the return of Marius, Glaucia was a candidate for the Praetorship of the following year, and Saturninus for a second Tribunate.

Saturninus and Glaucia.

The position of Marius was peculiar and unprecedented. He was saluted on his return to Rome as the 'Saviour of Rome' and as a 'Second Romulus'; and celebrated, conjointly with Catulus, a magnificent triumph for his double victory. He had demonstrated to the uttermost the incapacity and corruption of the rule of the Senate; but hitherto, though repeatedly Consul, he had spent practically

The position of Marius.

¹ *Qui perduellionis reus est, hostili animo adversus rem publicam animatus est.*—Ulpian *Dig.*, 48, 4, 11.

all his time with the army, and away from Rome. He had adopted no programme of administrative reform; and he had no claim to consideration in politics except as the creator of the 'new-model army' which had beaten Jugurtha and the Cimbri, and as the master of many veterans whom he had promised to pension with allotments of land. On the very day of his triumph, he had exhibited his own utter inexperience of all but military matters, and, at the same time, all unconsciously, the impossible position in which he found himself in politics, by entering the Senate, to conduct civil business, without first putting off his war cloak. It was a breach of all rules of tradition and political propriety, and awakened at once the hatred and suspicion of the *nobiles*: the rude camp-manners of the *novus homo*, and his tactless disregard of forms, rapidly effaced the prestige of his military services; and the inherited statecraft and accomplished manners of his colleague Catulus were there, at every turn, to mark the contrast, and to point an obvious moral.

But Marius seems to have had no idea of using his position, either to enforce reform, or to establish a military despotism. He disbanded his

He joins the popular party.

army at once; and if, like Scipio Africanus, he had retired into private life as soon as his year was over, the political situation in Rome would hardly have felt his absence. But he clung with a pathetic vanity to a witch's prophecy that he should be 'seven times Consul'; and, finding out at last how deeply he had offended Catulus and the party of the *nobiles*, he had no choice but to commit himself to the popular side. The elections were conducted in a riotous fashion. Marius was re-elected to a sixth Consulship, defeating his old rival Metellus, and securing a harmless colleague in L. Valerius Flaccus; and Glaucia was duly elected Praetor; but it was only through the murder of Nonius, one of the successful candidates, on the evening after the election, that Saturninus secured a place among the Tribunes.

It was clear, by this time, to everybody, that Marius was incapable of creating a policy, or of leading a political party, and that the conqueror of the Cimbri had become a mere tool in the hands of his democratic and reckless associates. Saturninus and Glaucia

Proposals of Saturninus and Glaucia.

lost no time in promulgating a long list of revolutionary proposals. An agrarian law distributed among the Roman populace all the lands, in Cisalpine Gaul, which had been reconquered from the Cimbri; regardless of the fact that in many cases the rightful owners were still alive, and were only waiting to be reinstated. A corn law reduced still further the low price fixed by G. Gracchus for the public doles. Citizen-colonies were to be founded over-sea, in Sicily, in Achaea, and in Macedon, to accommodate the veterans of Marius; Italians, as at

Narbo, were to be allowed to participate in them, and so to gain a new mode of access to Roman citizenship; and Marius,—who had already promised the franchise to the Italian contingents on the field of Vercellæ, and defended himself afterwards with the characteristic saying that ‘in the clash of arms he could not hear the voice of the laws,’—was to have a special share in the administration of these new colonies. Finally, the fatal prophecy which still rang in his ears was to be fulfilled by the grant of a continuous Consulship: the counterpart, on new and more perilous ground, of the continuous Tribunes of the Gracchi.

This extensive programme of legislation was carried through in a riotous assembly, and without the sanction of the Senate. A clause was even added that, within five days of the passing of the laws, every Senator should swear to observe them, under penalty of a fine of twenty talents; and the weakness and degeneracy of the Senate may best be judged from the fact that, out of the whole number of its members, only Metellus Numidicus, the stern old rival of Marius, dared to refuse compliance, and to retire for a time from the city. At this point, however, even Marius himself began to feel that he had let things go too far; for he, too, hesitated when it came to the point, and only took the oath, at last, ‘in so far as it was legally binding.’

The next step was if possible to secure the re-election of Saturninus and Glaucia, the former as Tribune again, the latter, quite irregularly, as Consul; for he was still Praetor when the election was held. The Senatorial candidate for the Consulship was the distinguished orator, M. Antonius, who was regarded as certain of election. The other place lay between Glaucia and C. Memmius, the same who had so fearlessly opposed the government in the Numidian scandal (p. 362), a man of ability, eloquence, and approved moderation. But Glaucia had never been a scrupulous person, and Memmius was murdered openly on the morning of the election.

The democratic leaders had already sufficiently alienated by their recklessness and intolerance all but the worst and most violent of their following; and the murder of Memmius completed the ruin of their cause. The capitalists, and all respectable people, rallied at once to the Senate’s side. The nobles armed their clients and domestic slaves; even old Scæurus, and the venerable Scaevola, the counsellor of the Gracchi, appearing at their post among the rest. Saturninus and Glaucia replied by seizing the Capitol; threw open the prison doors; and promised freedom to the slaves. Marius, meanwhile, confronted at last with a real political crisis, was

Intolerance
of the
democrats.

Anarchy in
Rome.

Murder of
Saturninus
and Glaucia.

a ludicrous picture of helplessness and indecision ; and after unavailing efforts to bring about a compromise, summoned the Senate, as Consul, and begged to be saved from his friends. The Senate, thoroughly frightened, and only anxious to put the responsibility somewhere, gave him the same absolute discretion as Opimius had received in 121 ; and he found himself forced to take up arms against his former supporters. Fighting began in the streets ; but though the friends of the agitators were the more desperate and aggressive, the weight of numbers was for once on the side of the Senate, and Saturninus and Glaucia were driven to take refuge in the Capitol, where the water-supply was cut off, and they surrendered—but to the Consul, not to the Senate. Marius did his best to save their lives ; but while the Senate was debating over their fate, a mob led by young nobles broke through the roof of the Curia Hostilia, where the prisoners were confined, and pelted them to death. For the murder of Saturninus (a Tribune, and inviolable), a slave named Scaeva was given freedom and even citizenship ; yet Marius seemed powerless to interfere.

He had had a chance, such as few men ever had in Rome, to hold the balance between the contending factions, and restore the government and the constitution to working order ; yet, in the course of little more than a year he had thrown the chance away. By his tactless vanity and sheer political incompetence, he had brought the State to the verge of revolution, and broken up the very party to which he owed his rise. Now, his influence was gone, with the people, no less than with the Senate, and he gladly availed himself of the excuse of a vow that he must fulfil, to make a journey in the East—half pilgrimage to the shrine of the Great Mother in Phrygia, half reconnaissance of the new power which was being created by Mithradates of Pontus, at whose court, too, many survivors of the popular party were already taking refuge. There was nothing else, in fact, that he could do. By the time of his return to Rome, the victor of Vercellae found himself a mere private citizen, forgotten by the populace, and ignored by the government, with a temper soured by his misfortunes, and the prophecy of a seventh Consulship still far from its fulfilment.

It is a relief to return from the political failure of Marius, to estimate the permanent results of his reform of the Roman army. The old citizen-armies of Rome had been admirably suited to contend with the militia levies of other Italian towns ; and by superior bravery and diligent training had made good their superiority from the first. In the wars with Pyrrhus, with Carthage, and with the Greek generals of the East,

moreover, the Romans had successively adopted improvements in equipment, in drill, and in the general art of war, which had kept the legions abreast of the highest civilised warfare of the Mediterranean.

But the growth of the dominions of Rome had brought her now into contact with peoples who had developed, independently, a system of warfare which demanded a quite different response ; and the very fact that the wars themselves took place over-sea, and were likely to extend, as in the case of Numidia, over many years in succession, demanded a thorough reform in the methods of recruiting and in the conditions of military service.

New conditions of military service.

The reforms attributed to Marius probably include some which had come into force already before his time, some which originated with his contemporary and comrade P. Rutilius Rufus, and some also which followed later, as the result of his changes of principle. Conscription from among the farmers and artisans, who could ill afford to leave their daily business, was practically superseded by voluntary enrolment among the city mob of destitute and unemployed, many of whom were only too glad to embrace so interesting and profitable a career. The army thus became wholly democratic in feeling, while the upper and middle classes had few representatives in it, except among the officers, or in the general's bodyguard. Soldiering thus became a regular profession, and warfare a fine art, which it needed a lifetime to master. Discipline became more rigorous, in proportion to the attractiveness of the service ; promotion was given for military proficiency, no longer for political or social reasons ; greater attention was paid to the kit and the material comfort of the rank and file ; the old distinctions of equipment between *hastati* and *triarii* were abolished ; the *pilum* and short sword were introduced throughout, and a higher standard of proficiency was set, in the new system of swordsmanship and physical drill which Rutilius had borrowed from the training-schools of the gladiators.

The military reforms of Marius.

The legion itself was reorganised by the abolition of the old tribal ensigns and the introduction of the single standard of an eagle ; its establishment was fixed at six thousand, and it was subdivided, as the allied contingents had always been, into battalions or *cohortes* of six hundred men ; each strong enough, that is, to act on occasion as a separate tactical unit, but themselves subdivided again into six *centuriae*—each under its own *centurio*, or company-officer—which filled the place of the old *manipuli* in the triple line of battle.

Legio, cohorts, and centuria.

The cohorts of each legion were numbered in order of precedence, and promotion from the ranks was given freely, up to the grade of senior

centurion of the first cohort (*centurio primi pili*). The military tribunes, still elected by popular vote in the Comitia, were gradually reduced to the position of commanders of cohorts merely, and were superseded, in the command of the legion as a whole, by a *legatus* of senatorial rank, who was appointed by the commander-in-chief from among members of his own staff, and was directly responsible to him.

At the same time the *equites*, the old yeomanry-cavalry, were finally abolished, so that all the mounted troops were henceforth furnished by the allies: they were arranged according to nationality in *alae*, and their organisation was kept quite apart from that of the legions. The legionary *velites*, too, were replaced by auxiliary *cohortes* of light-armed men, raised similarly from the allies; and the *cohors praetoria*, which had served since the time of Scipio Aemilianus (p. 307) as the personal escort of the general, was reorganised on a more serviceable model.

The repeated Consulships of Marius himself had been an emphatic protest against the antiquated system of annual commands, which had only survived till now because the Senate had so long maintained its claim—and so long, also, even its power—to exercise effective control over the whole conduct of a war.

Henceforward the armies of Rome took the oath of allegiance, not for a single campaign, but for the whole war for which they were levied; and they took it not to the State, which they were raised to serve, but to the commander with whom they enlisted. To him, therefore, they looked, and not to the Senate, for instructions in the field, for redress of all grievances, and for the eventual rewards of loyal service. The *imperium*, that grand and fundamental conception of Roman magistracy, tended to be regarded, more and more, merely as the right to levy troops and overawe resistance; while the elaborate balance of conflicting jurisdictions (p. 64) became unworkable and out of date, when a single Consul or Proconsul at the head of a professional army could bid defiance alike to his colleagues, to the Senate, and to the Comitia.

There was need enough, meanwhile, of a strong hand somewhere in the State, to deal with the many pressing questions of social and economic order. During the Cimbric War the old slave-trouble broke out again. In Attica the slaves in the silver mines of Laurium struck work for better treatment; and in South Italy a Roman *eques*, named T. Vettius, raised a revolt at Thurii, which called for the intervention of a Praetor. In Sicily, as a generation earlier, the rising

New Problems.

was more formidable. At the first signs of trouble the Praetor of 104, P. Licinius Nerva, had obtained the authority of the Senate to liberate all who could show that they had been wrongfully enslaved ; and eight hundred such were set free on the first examination. But the slave-owners became alarmed and put pressure on the government at home. The liberations were suspended ; and the slaves in desperation broke out into organised revolt. A rising in the west of the island was betrayed and crushed without difficulty, but round Enna and the lake of Palica some twenty thousand slaves rose together, proclaimed one Salvius as king, under the Syrian title of Tryphon, established their headquarters at Triocala, routed the Roman Praetor, and attacked Morgantia. Here, however, the domestic slaves remained loyal, and refused the freedom which their masters offered them. Simultaneously, an able Cilician brigand and astrologer, named Athenio, headed an outbreak in the west, and sent in his allegiance to Tryphon. For the moment the Romans had neither the will nor the power to interfere, and, as before in 133, found themselves confined to the walled towns ; but in the following year 103, after the first Cimbric terror was past, L. Licinius Lucullus was sent with a small force, and defeated a body of forty thousand slaves at Scirthaea. But not until both he and his successor, C. Servilius (who did nothing at all), had been condemned for speculation and mismanagement, did the colleague of Marius, M' Aquillius, succeed in defeating Athenio ; who had succeeded Tryphon on his death in 102, and now had Messana at his mercy. Aquillius killed the rebel commander with his own hand, and carried off the other ringleaders to Rome, where they killed each other rather than stoop to fight with beasts before their conquerors. Two more years of desultory fighting stamped out the revolt, and, though the abominable system remained unaltered, Sicily slowly began to recover some of its former prosperity.

In other matters also, both within and without the frontiers of the empire, there was urgent need of a settled policy. The Senate, indeed, made use of the momentary respite, which followed the fall of Saturninus, to set in order some of the new questions which had arisen during the Cimbric War. The slave revolt in Sicily came to an end in 98 ; a new rising of the Celtiberian tribes of Spain, which had broken out during the Slave War, was checked, in the year following the pacification of Sicily, by T. Didius, with whom young Q. Sertorius, of whom we shall hear more hereafter (Ch. XXXVI.), had his first glimpse of Spanish warfare. The Spanish disturbance, however, went on at intervals for five years more, and was not completely

Second
Slave War
in Sicily,
104-100 B.C.

Foreign
affairs,
99-92 B.C.

subdued until 93, when L. Licinius Crassus triumphed both over the Celtiberians and over the Lusitani of the Atlantic sea-board. Cyrene, meanwhile, which had been separated from Egypt in 116 (p. 269), was bequeathed to Rome on the death of Ptolemy Apion in 96. No permanent government, however, was established for the present; the district itself and the native tribes were annexed, until 75, to the province of Africa, while the Greek towns were left as free and independent allies. On the Macedonian frontier, the raids of the Thracians were stopped for a while, and the restless Maedi and Dardani were subdued in 97. In Asia the province of Cilicia, first formed by M. Antonius after the Pirate War of 103 (p. 452), was slowly reduced to order, and was extended so far inland beyond Mount Taurus that L. Sulla, who held it *pro praetore* in 92, could find himself in conflict, in Cappadocia, with the King of Pontus (p. 405).

In Rome, meanwhile, the revolutionary acts of Saturninus and Glaucia had brought about a new grouping of political parties. The wealthy representatives of material interests had been irrevocably estranged from the reckless and violent *populares*, and in the momentary struggle which had ensued they had thrown in their lot with the Senate. Of all the programme of Saturninus nothing had been realised but a single colony, at Eporedia in Liguria; while the democratic party had earned once more a reputation for lawless and unscrupulous violence. The Senate, too, was not in the mood to spare the survivors, or to permit further progress on those lines. The popular cause was, in fact, reduced to such straits, that when Titius, one of the colleagues of Saturninus in the Tribunate of 99, tried to revive the agrarian part of his legislation, a formal religious scruple was sufficient to block the proposal. The *Lex Appuleia* of Saturninus himself (pp. 374-5) soon became, in the hands of the other side, a convenient weapon for the overthrow of his followers; and in 94, C. Norbanus, the accuser of Caepio, who was tried under this very law on the charge of 'subverting the Republic,' was only acquitted on the eloquent plea of Antonius, that there had been victims enough already.

The *Lex Caecilia Didia* also, which was proposed by the Consuls of 98, put a new check upon hasty legislation and upon the perversion of political issues by tempting promises, by forbidding the democratic practice of 'tacking together,' in the same bill, independent measures intended to attract different classes of voters. The same law further increased the difficulty of securing a snap-vote in a moment of popular enthusiasm, by insisting on a minimum

**New group-
ing of
parties
in Rome,
99-94 B.C.**

**Lex Caecilia
Didia,
98 B.C.**

interval of fifteen days (*trinundinum*) between the formal proposal of a bill, and the voting.

The false hopes which had been raised among the Italians by the thoughtless promise of Marius at Verceellæ, and by the provisions of the colonial scheme of Saturninus, had inevitably led to dis- Jealousy of the allies. appointment and unrest among the allies, and to increased jealousy and vigilance on the part of the city populace and the nobles. It came to be suspected, moreover, that many of the Italians had anticipated the march of events, and were in illegal enjoyment of the rights of citizens. The Consuls of 95, L. Licinius Crassus and Q. Mucius Scaevola, both of them strong and not illiberal men, and both leading authorities on points of constitutional usage, felt it their duty to propose a measure to correct the abuse. By this *Lex Licinia Mucia* Lex Licinia Mucia, 95 B.C. *de civibus regundis* inquisition was made into the status of every professed citizen of Rome, and those who could not produce the necessary proof were deprived, and expelled from the city ; while severe penalties were imposed on similar offences in future. The abuse proved to be even more prevalent than had been suspected ; while the measure itself was of the most exclusive and reactionary character, and quite opposed to all the earlier traditions of Roman policy in regard to the allies. It closed the only way of escape from the long-standing grievance which the depraved exclusiveness of the Romans had allowed, and set a great gulf between the Romans themselves and a class of men who had adopted their civilisation, and fought Indignation of the Italians. their battles, for well-nigh two hundred years. The indignation throughout Italy was intense ; and all the Italian communities, except those of Etruria and Umbria, banded themselves together in a secret league to make good their claim by any means in their power, so soon as a favourable opportunity should befall.

But the sudden understanding between the Senate and the Equites, which had resulted from the violence of Saturninus, fell to pieces as suddenly as it had grown. The Equestrian *iudicia* had The Equestrian Courts. always lain under the suspicion both of subservience to the tax-farmers, speculators, and great merchants, and of forcing provincial governors to turn a blind eye upon the oppressions of Roman capitalists ; and already, before the Cimbric invasion, this ancient grievance had been revived. The proposal of Caepio, in 106, to restore the courts to the Senate, had been defeated by the opposition of Glaucia ; but, since the year of revolution, two flagrant cases in succession had recalled attention to the scandal. In 98 a notoriously corrupt and inefficient governor,

M' Aquillius, who was known to have been hand-in-glove with the capitalists, was acquitted through the influence of wealthy friends and the specious pleading of Antonius ; while P. Rutilius Rufus, the Stoic and military reformer (who, in the same year, had been Scaevola's *legatus* in Asia, and had effectually protected the provincials from the *publicani*), was accused and condemned, five years after the event, on the frivolous charge of obstructing public servants in the performance of their duty : the baselessness of the prosecution being shown when Rutilius sought and found a safe place of exile in the very province which he was accused of having despoiled.

In the following year, 92, a determined attack was made on the whole Equestrian system. It was defended by the shallow and unprincipled Agitation for reform. Consul-designate, Q. Marcius Philippus, and by a son of the same Caepio who had been one of its strongest opponents and most notorious victims. The agitation, it is said, was instigated in the first instance by M. Scaurus, who had himself been lately accused before an Equestrian Court ; but it was supported by the full force of the more honest members both of the Senatorial and of the popular party ; and it was led by a new and unique figure in Roman politics.

Marcus Livius Drusus was the son of that Drusus who, in the interest of the Senate, had outbidden Gaius Gracchus ; and he had recently been elected Tribune for the year 91. He was a man of good family, rich, able, and popular ; but his political ideals were so far in advance of his age, that the accounts of him which have come down to us are sadly vague and confused. He seems to have cherished the impracticable hope of conciliating all parties, and of paving the way for a complete reform of the constitution, by an interchange of far-reaching concessions on the very points which each side held it essential to maintain.

The Senate he proposed to strengthen and widen by doubling its numbers, and including in it the pick of the Equestrian Order. To this His schemes of reform. representative and, as he fondly hoped, impartial body, he proposed to restore the control of the *iudicia*, together with a new court *de ambitu*, which was to reform the corruption which prevailed among the electors. The popular party, which still clung to the ideals of the Gracchi, was to be appeased by fresh doles of corn, new assignments of land, and the foundation of more colonies—this time, however, not over-sea, but in Italy and Sicily. Finally, the fatal barrier interposed by the *Lex Licinia Mucia* between Romans and Italians was to be removed, and the full citizenship thrown open to all the Italian allies. The scheme might appear to combine the restoration of Senatorial

control on a sound popular basis, with the best points in the democratic programme; and leading nobles like Scaurus and Antonius, rising enthusiasts like P. Sulpicius Rufus, and even Crassus and Scaevola, the very authors of the Alien Law of 95, were quoted in support of it.

In spite of the violent opposition of the Consul Philippus, supported by the majority of the Senate and even by some of the Tribunes, the proposals of Drusus were carried in the Comitia; but by a curious infringement of the *Lex Caecilia Didia*, the vote was taken *per saturam* on all the clauses together, and Philippus took **Opposition of the nobles.** advantage of the informality to declare it null and void. Party feeling ran high. Philippus, when the Senate hesitated to support him, threatened ominously that 'if so, he would have to look out for other advisers.' Crassus, who had made a vehement and telling speech on the other side, died suddenly, like Scipio Aemilianus, in the middle of the crisis; and Drusus, though as Tribune he might claim to be inviolable, remembered the fate of the Gracchi, and thought it prudent to raise an armed escort.

Meantime the Italians, who had crowded into Rome to claim their new rights, began to give voice to their disappointment, and to alarm the city populace by their violent demeanour. Philippus and Caepio **Disorder in Rome.** were hustled in the street. A rumour spread—all the more dangerous because, as we have seen, it was so nearly true—that the Italians had formed a general confederacy to win the citizenship by force; that Drusus was implicated in the plot, and was in frequent correspondence with its leaders; and that he had barely succeeded in turning them from their design of murdering the Consul at the Latin Festival, and marching in force upon Rome. The bare prospect of having to share their monopoly of State-fed idleness with men who could work and fight, roused the worst passions of the city mob; the capitalists resented the proposal to restore the courts to the Senate; and the Senate only cared to keep the capitalists outside the charmed circle of nobility.

Drusus found, in fact, that he had irritated all parties, and conciliated none; and he was openly assailed, in the Senate, as a traitor to his country. As a precaution against accidents, and to allow time for **Murder of Drusus.** public feeling to calm down, he secluded himself for a while in his house among his own supporters. But one evening, as he dismissed his visitors in the doorway, an unseen hand struck him; and with the words 'Will the State ever find another citizen like me?' he fell mortally wounded, and expired within a few hours. A leather-cutter's knife was found in the wound, but the assassin was never arrested.

With his death, the cause both of the allies and of judicial reform became desperate; for the mob, the capitalists, and the exclusive oligarchs were united, for once, in a common policy of revenge.

The nobles
take their
revenge.

A special commission was established, on the proposal of one of the colleagues of Drusus, a man of Spanish origin named Q. Varius, to try, on the vague and dangerous charge of *maiestas*,¹ all who were believed to have favoured the claims of the Italians. His law, indeed, was not carried without opposition, but in the panic of the moment the reactionary coalition prevailed. Many of the more liberal Senators were exiled; others, like Antonius and Pompeius Strabo, found means to clear themselves of the charge; and here old M. Scaurus makes his last appearance in public life, with the famous utterance: 'Varius the Spaniard accuses of treason Scaurus, the leader of the Senate. Scaurus denies the charge. Romans, which will you believe?' The case collapsed, and the wary schemer escaped once more, typical of the best, if not also of the worst, of his order; while Varius fell himself, not long after, under the very charge which he had framed.

CHIEF DATES.

Slave revolt at Thurii	104
Slave Revolt in Sicily	102
Saturninus and Glaucia: Marius Consul VI.	100
End of Slave Revolt in Sicily	99
Lex Caecilia Didia: Prosecution of M' Aquillius	98
Celtiberian revolt	97
Cyrene bequeathed to Rome	96
Lex Licinia Mucia: Expulsion of Italians	95
Condemnation of P. Rutilius Rufus	92
Cilicia annexed, to repress piracy	92
Legislation of M. Livius Drusus	91

CHIEF PERSONS.

C. Marius—C. Servilius Glaucia—L. Appuleius Saturninus—L. Valerius Flaccus—Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus—C. Memmius—T. Vettius—P. Licinius Nerva—L. Licinius Lucullus—M'. Aquillius—T. Didius—P. Licinius Crassus—M. Antonius—L. Sulla—C. Norbanus—Q. Mucius Scaevola—P. Rutilius Rufus—Q. Marcus Philippus—M. Livius Drusus—M. Aemilius Scaurus—Q. Varius—Tryphon—Athenio—Ptolemy Apion.

¹ *Maiestatem minuere est, de dignitate, aut amplitudine, aut potestate populi, aut eorum, quibus populus potestatem dedit, aliquid derogare.*—Cicero, *Inv.*, ii. 17.

CHIEF PLACES.

Thurii — Enna — Lacus Palicanus — Tricala — Morgantia — Scirthaea —
Cyrene — Cilicia — Eporedia.

SUBJECTS.

The new democratic programme: extension of the franchise, and reform
of the jury courts.

The reform of the Roman army.

The unrest among the Italian allies.

The significance of *Perduellio* and *Maiestas*.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN ALLIES

Rome and Italy—The demand for full *Civitas*—The Italian League—*Bellum Sociale*—Roman concessions—End of the struggle—Persons and parties in Rome—Marius and Sulla—The revolution of Sulpicius—Sulla occupies Rome—The rule of the sword.

THE failure of the attempt of Drusus to reform the position of the Italians left Rome face to face with the gravest crisis in the whole of her internal history. The city had risen to be mistress of Italy and of the Mediterranean mainly because her citizens had been accustomed not merely *debellare superbos* but *parcere subiectis*; transforming each successive conquest, in Latium, in Etruria, or in Samnium, into a fresh reserve of brave soldiers and loyal adherents, who looked to Rome not as a tyrant or an oppressor, but as their natural leader, and as the champion of the liberties of Italy. Now, however, the Romans suddenly found themselves confronted with an injured and indignant Italy, and with a summary demand for the abolition of that distinction between Roman and Italian which had remained practically unchallenged throughout the whole course of their history. And yet, hitherto, there is no change of the constitution, no enactment or decree, to which we can point as the cause of this utter revolution of feeling. The situation of which the Italians complained had arisen, like so much else in the history of Rome, only by imperceptible degrees; and it is only by tracing the abuse from its beginnings that we can see how it had come to be intolerable now.

In the earlier days of the Republic, the ideal of the allies had been to preserve, as far as possible, the state of civic independence to which they had been accustomed before. Incorporation in the Roman State had rather been forced upon them, as a measure of political necessity, than sought by them as a privilege in itself. But the liberal concessions of the 'minor right' to trade with

The original status of the allies.

Rome, to hold landed property in Roman territory, and to intermarry with Roman citizens, gradually broke down this exclusive feeling. An equal share of military service in the legions, coupled as it was with freedom from direct taxation, encouraged the growth of a sentiment of common patriotism and common interest; and Roman citizenship became recognised as the crowning prize of a graduated scale of political privilege, in which every step was the recognition of honourable service rendered to the mistress of Italy.

Many of the allies, too, profited even more than the Romans themselves from the firm administration, watchful policy, and growing prestige of the period of conquest which followed. They were nearer, ^{their former} both in position and in culture, to the commercial centres of ^{loyalty.}

the Hellenic East, and were enabled to pursue, from a position of greater influence and security, the profitable intercourse with the other states of the Mediterranean which had long been the ground of their prosperity. Even as early as the Second Punic War, nothing had so deranged the calculations of Hannibal as the fact that, even in the direct stress of the invasion, the Italian communities had, almost without exception, persisted in regarding Rome as their champion, not as their tyrant. And in the wars with the slaves, with Jugurtha, and later with Mithradates, it is Italians, even more than Romans, who are found settled broadcast over the coasts of the Mediterranean, and whose lives and interests are at stake whenever the prestige of Rome is brought low.

But during the period of the great wars, and of the undisputed rule of the Senate, a gradual change had passed over the relations between the city and its allies. Their *ius commercii* with Rome had its counterpart in the prohibition to communicate directly with one another, which, however necessary at first to check conspiracy and revolt, had greatly retarded the movement towards Italian unity, and had put Roman officers and merchants in the profitable but invidious position of middlemen between their neighbours and political dependants. The heavy burden of military service over-sea was allowed, as we have seen already (p. 233, 303), to fall with undue severity on the allies. They found themselves called upon to contribute far more than their due proportion of the total levy, and their contingents were consigned to the inglorious and oppressive tasks of keeping order among the restless tribesmen of Spain and on the remoter frontiers elsewhere; while the Romans reserved to themselves the more lucrative campaigns in the East. They were defrauded of their share of the booty no less than of the excitement and the glory; and since the higher military offices could only be filled by full Roman citizens, no distinction

Gradual
change
in their
position.

or merit availed to promote an Italian soldier beyond the command of his own contingent.

More serious was the inability of the allies to restrain, by constitutional means, the insolence and extortion of Roman officials, or the growing oppression of the government. In their local affairs the allies were nominally independent, but here even the Senate claimed an indefinite right to interfere on the ground of public interest. The *Senatus Consultum de Bacanalibus*, for example (p. 282), was administered with inquisitorial severity throughout the whole length of Italy. Individually, too, though they frequently put themselves under the *clientela* or *hospitium* of great families in Rome, they had no legal right of appeal against personal ill-treatment. A soldier in the ranks, a countryman in the fields, or even a local magistrate could be insulted, beaten, or put to death by a Roman of position, without right of inquiry or redress; and a fragment of an oration of Gaius Gracchus describes, in vehement terms, how the chief magistrate of Teanum was publicly scourged on complaint of the wife of a Consul that the men's public bath, which she had requisitioned for her private use, was not promptly surrendered and cleaned; and how a travelling Senator had a townsman of Lavinium beaten to death on the spot for a harmless wayside jest.

Meanwhile, the growth of prosperity among the Italian merchants led naturally to the demand for a career in which accumulated wealth could be exchanged for influence or distinction; and the contrast became yearly more marked between the pauper citizens in the Roman Comitia, and the well-to-do aliens who had settled in numbers in the city, and were now a main source of its material prosperity. But the same contrast only served to confirm the Roman populace in its selfish jealousy and suspicion; and the Senate, too, became less liberal, as time went on, both in the grant of the full *civitas* to individuals, and in the foundation of citizen-colonies.

The question of the enfranchisement of the Italians had first been brought into practical politics by the Gracchi, as the counterpart of their agrarian reform: for while Roman citizens were to be settled upon Italian land, Italian landowners were to be permitted to qualify for Roman citizenship. Their object, however, was twofold: not merely to reform an admitted grievance, but to create a political counterpoise to the proletariat; and this party motive, while it roused fiercer hostility among their political opponents, embittered the enthusiasm of the reformers themselves, divided their party, and led to retaliation on both sides. Thus the proposals of Fulvius Flaccus in 126 (p. 335)

The growing
tyranny of
the Romans.

The demand
for the full
'civitas.'

Successive
failures.

had been provoked by the expulsion clauses of the *Lex Junia* of 125 ; just as the larger schemes of Saturninus in 100 provoked, in 95, the *Lex Licinia Mucia*. Thus, again, while the specious promises of the elder Drusus had served their purpose in the overthrow of Gaius Gracchus, the sincere efforts of the younger had been an excuse for his assassination. Every party in Rome, in fact, had played with the question in turn to gain its own ends, and the patience of the Italians was exhausted. The Varian Commission and the persecution of the more liberal-minded Romans even within the Senate itself, brought things to a crisis, and confronted the city with the only occasion in which she found herself at war with her own best soldiers, and with the only crisis in Roman history in which a deliberate change of policy was forced upon her by pressure from outside.

The first outbreak occurred, early in 91, at Asculum in Picenum, where the unpopular Praetor, C. Servilius Caepio, the opponent of Drusus, was murdered, together with his *legatus* and the Roman residents. The Picentines revolted at once, together with their southern neighbours, the Paeligni and Marsi, the bravest and most thoroughly Latinised of the highland clans of the centre ; and the Samnites and Lucanians of the south, among whom Oscan dialects and customs still prevailed, followed suit immediately, and almost without exception.

The first demand was simply for full and equal citizenship for all Italians ; but, when this was refused, an independent federal state was proclaimed, with two Consuls and ten Praetors, annually elected like those of Rome ; a Senate of five hundred members, and a general assembly meeting at Corfinium among the Paeligni ; which became the seat of government under the high-sounding name of *Italia*. Federal coins were struck, with emblems of the eight federated clans, and inscriptions in Latin or in Oscan ; and every device was employed to make the repudiation of Roman sovereignty explicit, insolent, and complete.

But in all this ambitious attempt to create a united Italy, with Rome left out, there is little trace of real political genius. Not a step was taken to supersede the Senate and Comitia of this overgrown City State by institutions really appropriate to the extent and the circumstances of the peninsula. No trace can be found of any government by representation, like that of the Achaean League, or even of any surrender of the independence of each little highland community, beyond what was demanded by the military needs of the moment. There were, in fact, two inconsistent aims in the counsels of the Italians.

The proposal
of Drusus.

Open
revolts,
91-88 B.C.

The Italian
League.

Its inherent
weakness.

The majority only claimed their fair share in the benefits of the existing empire of Rome, with Rome as their partner still, if that might be; or, in the last resort, without her. But, among the Samnites and Lucanians, the old race-hatred seems once more to have mastered everything else. At all costs, down with Rome and the 'Latin yoke,' and let the future take care of itself!

On the Roman side, the Senate seems to have been taken utterly by surprise; but it quickly recognised how serious the crisis was, and made praiseworthy efforts to scrape together a defence. The situation, though desperate, was not by any means hopeless. The Latins remembered the fate of Fregellæ (p. 336), and showed no sign of revolt. In Etruria and Umbria there was no free population left, and the slaves had nothing to gain by a change of masters; and Cisalpine Gaul was at the same time too distant to make practical use of citizenship; too thoroughly Romanised to side with the Italians; and, like Etruria, too wholly dominated by the capitalists to give rise to anxiety. Most important of all, the Latin colonies, which lay scattered throughout the revolted territory, remained loyal, one and all; and, though closely besieged, rendered inestimable service, once more, in dividing the attention of the rebels, and masking a large part of their forces.

On land, therefore, the resources of Rome and of the Italians would seem to have been equally matched. In discipline and generalship the Italians showed themselves a match for the Romans throughout, and in the first campaign had a decided advantage over them. But the Romans had the more central position, and the enormous advantage of the command of the sea. They need have no anxiety for their food supply, or for an attack in rear; and, in time, they could recall their provincial garrisons, and draw upon the warlike populations of Numidia, of Spain, and of Gaul.

The first year of the struggle was indecisive in its issue. In the north, the Marsian, Q. Pompeidius Silo, fully occupied the attention of the Consul P. Rutilius Lupus and his legates, conspicuous among whom were old C. Marius, Cn. Pompeius Strabo, and M. Perperna. In the south, the Samnite, C. Papius Mutilus, blockaded the fortress-colony of Aesernia, and barred the road into Apulia against the other Consul, L. Julius Caesar, with whom were Crassus, Catulus, Didius, and Sulla. Julius was defeated and driven back as far as Teanum, and Aesernia fell. Whereupon Mutilus, whose whole force was thus set free for attack, took Nola, shut up a Roman force in Acerræ, and overran the greater part of Campania, on which the southern army had mainly depended for its supplies.

Resources and preparations of the Romans.

Campaign of 490 B.C. in Samnium.

Meanwhile, Rutilius and the northern army had fared even worse. In Picenum, Strabo had ill-luck at starting, but was able at last to shut up the rebels in Asculum. Pinna, among the Vestini, and other loyal towns, were compelled to surrender; and the main army In the north. not only failed to relieve the besieged colony of Alba Fucentia, but was defeated in June in a pitched battle on the Tolenus river, in which Rutilius and Perperna were slain. By their death Marius rose to the chief command, and with the help of Sulla, who had been detached from the other army to his support, succeeded in outmanœuvring and defeating the Marsian contingent. But with this one success he appears to have been content, and for the remainder of the season remained entrenched and stationary. It may well have been that increasing personal infirmities made him averse from further exertion; but the complete defeat of a detached column under Q. Caepio, which followed close upon the victory of Marius, showed how precarious his situation really was; and perhaps, also, he was unwilling to proceed to extremes against a cause, which at Vercellae he had made his own.

The ill-success of the northern army provoked wide unrest in Etruria and Umbria, which boded ill for the next year's operations; and besides, the Roman treasury was exhausted, and Mithradates, King of Pontus, was known to be watching his opportunity to expel the Romans from Asia. It was high time for the Romans Roman concessions.
90-89 B.C. to reconsider their position, and the winter afforded an opportunity for timely concessions. A *Lex Julia*, proposed by the outgoing Consul of 90, granted full *civitas* to the Latins, and to all other allies who had remained loyal; and early in 89 the Tribunes M. Plautius Silvanus and C. Papirius Carbo carried a more comprehensive law, under which any member of an allied community, residing anywhere in Italy south of the Po, was permitted to register as a citizen by appearing before the Praetor within the next sixty days. A *Lex Calpurnia* conceded the point raised formerly by Marius, by authorising any Roman magistrate to confer *civitas* on the field of battle upon deserving Italian soldiers; and the *Lex Pompeia* of Cn. Strabo, the new Consul, conferred Latin rights upon the remainder of Cisalpine Gaul between the Po and the Alps. Even in this extremity, however, these measures of reasonable reform did not pass unchallenged; but the Tribune Plautius revived the Varian Commission *de maiestate*, and broke down the opposition of the reactionaries.

These wholesale concessions split the camp of the Italians, for they guaranteed, to the majority of them, everything for which they were fighting. The threatened rising in Etruria came to nothing; and a force

of fifteen thousand Marsi, who had started to support it, found themselves cut off; and were scattered by Pompeius Strabo. The Consul pressed on with the northern army into Picenum, defeated the rebel leader Judacilius with great slaughter, and took the stronghold of Asculum; whereupon all the northern tribes except the Marsi gave up the struggle, and surrendered Corfinium.

Meanwhile the other Consul, L. Porcius Cato, who had taken over the forces of Marius, fell early in the year, by the Fucine Lake, in battle with the Marsi; and left his legate Sulla practically in supreme command in the south. Sulla soon recovered Campania as far as Nola, and harried the Hirpini; then, turning northwards, he defeated and killed the Samnite leader Mutilus, and captured his base at Bovianum; while his lieutenants secured his rear by raids in Lower Samnium and Apulia. By the end of the campaign, only Nola, and parts of Lucania and Samnium continued to hold out; and Sulla, saluted deservedly as *Imperator* by his troops, was elected to the Consulship of 88.

But in the winter the rebels had time to recuperate. They refounded a capital in the conquered colony of Aesernia, raised fifty thousand fresh troops in Lucania and Bruttium, and entered into an understanding with Mithradates, who promised them aid so soon as he should have expelled the Romans from Asia; a promise which, as we shall see (p. 406), he was already in a fair way to keep. But the campaign of 88 made further resistance hopeless. In the north, Pompeius was continued in command as Proconsul, and thoroughly conquered the Marsi. Silo, the last surviving general of the Italians, recovered Bovianum for the moment, but was defeated and killed in Samnium. Apulia was overrun by Sulla's lieutenants, Cosconius and Metellus Pius, and Sulla himself proceeded vigorously with the siege of the Samnite garrison of Nola. In Lucania—where Gabinius was defeated by the rebel Lamponius—and in the Samnite hills, a guerilla war went on for five years more.

For the rest of Italy the great struggle was over. In fair and equal fight the Romans had proved themselves once more masters of the Italians; but, on the point of principle, they had been obliged to surrender everything which they had refused before. Italy had ceased to be a federation of subject states under the leadership of Rome. Henceforth the Republic of Rome was Italy, with its seat of government among the Seven Hills on the Tiber. The cities of the Italians had ceased to be more than Roman *municipia*, uniformly organised on the old Latin model; but Rome, apart from the Senate and

the Comitia, was little more, henceforward, than the chief *municipium* of Italy.

So sudden and so complete a change, however, could not but lead to fresh difficulties on every hand. The simultaneous admission to full citizenship of many thousands of persons, who lived for the most part at a distance from the seat of government, and were mainly or wholly absorbed in their own concerns, raised a new crop of political and constitutional questions, for which no provision had as yet been made. It was useless to expect the Italian *municipales* to spend their time in Rome and devote themselves to the government of the empire; yet the nobles and the city populace had, now, less claim than ever to be regarded as representing the Roman People. The Equites were reinforced strongly, and on their best side, by the more wealthy and intelligent Italians, who could at a pinch afford the journey to Rome; and accordingly the party of material interests grew rapidly in political importance. But the mutual contempt and suspicion between the *urbani* and the *rustici* remained unassuaged. The political weight of the new voters was restricted arbitrarily, at least at first, by confining them to eight tribes only, and making them vote last of all—even after the liberated slaves. The irregularity of their attendance kept them out of touch with the working of party organisations, and permitted the old purely Roman feuds to go on just as before; and ere long the country voters ceased to be of any account in the Comitia, and took little or no part in the struggles which brought Republican government to an end. Even now, moreover, the franchise was not universally bestowed, even in Italy. Neapolis, Heraclea, and a few other Greek towns still preferred free and independent alliance to absorption in the Roman State. Numerous *dediticii*—captured and surrendered rebels—were kept without any legal status at all, as if for the use of any future agitator. Many of the inhabitants of Cispadane Gaul had omitted to take up their citizenship under the *Lex Julia*. Transpadane Gaul, which in parts was not yet fully Romanised, had been admitted only to the Latin right. And Sicily, which had taken no part in the revolt, received in consequence no share in the privileges which were conceded to the rebel Italians.

The social and economic condition of Rome was pitiful in the extreme. Immense destruction of property had taken place all over Italy. The treasury had been drained to the utmost by the war. The currency had been neglected and debased to a disgraceful and dangerous extent; and the failure of the revenues from

Fresh
political
problems.

Disastrous
effects of
the war.

Asia, which had been aggravated by the panic inspired by the operations of Mithradates, had produced a grave financial crisis. The Praetor Urbanus of 89, A. Sempronius Asellio, thought fit to apply a heroic remedy. He revived the ancient laws prohibiting or restricting the payment of interest on loans; and the debtors presumed on his folly to claim extravagant compensation for interest already paid. The creditors, small and great, were furious; Asellio was openly murdered as he sacrificed in the Forum, and no steps were taken to investigate or punish the deed.

Material distress, however, could have been relieved by time and the revival of material prosperity. What was irremediable, among the consequences of the Social War, was the waste of men and the degradation of public morality. Three hundred thousand of the flower of the population had exterminated one another in two desperate campaigns; while Rome, to fill the legions, had enfranchised freedmen, and even slaves, wholesale. As so often happens in a civil war, military discipline had been relaxed irrevocably; when the marines, for example, mutinied and killed their admiral, Sulla merely bade them justify their act in the next fighting. Worst of all, perhaps, the stress of the campaigns had brought to the front a new generation of competent military leaders of every shade of political opinions, each with his following of lawless and ambitious veterans; and among the Italians, too, thousands of disbanded rebels were unable in the prevailing distress to return to peaceful occupations, and only asked to be allowed to prove their loyalty, and at the same time earn their living, in the ranks of their late enemies.

Conspicuous among all the new figures, who emerged from the Social War was L. Cornelius Sulla, the Consul of 88, and the real hero of the struggle. He had first made his mark, it will be remembered, both as a dashing cavalry officer, and as an able diplomatist, in the war with Jugurtha. He had handled the turbulent province of Cilicia with firmness and tact in 92 (p. 405), and had been the first Roman general to penetrate even temporarily into the interior of Asia Minor. Now he had eclipsed the fame of Marius—who, after his one barren victory, in the first year of the war, had retired to sulk over his own political perversity—by saving the State in a crisis far more desperate than that of the Cimbric invasion. By his prompt and effectual suppression of the revolt in the south, he had established his reputation as the first general of his time. Finally—and this is the point where the appearance of Sulla worked the profoundest change in the political situation—he had provided the Senatorial party, for the first time since the great wars, with a really able leader within the strictest sect of the oligarchy.

Lucius
Cornelius
Sulla.

the struggle. He had first made his mark, it will be remembered, both as a dashing cavalry officer, and as an able diplomatist, in the war with Jugurtha. He had handled the

And there was sore need, at this moment, of a strong hand in Rome ; for the necessary work of completing the pacification of Italy was already in danger of being postponed, on the one hand to the clamours of the discontented factions in the city, on the other to the urgent question, which of the new generals should be entrusted with the lucrative task of expelling the armies of Mithradates from the Roman provinces of Asia ? In Rome, the friends of those who had suffered under the Varian Commission were agitating already for an amnesty. Debtors and capitalists alike were struggling for relief from the financial crisis and from the chaos created by Asellio. The agitation about the *iudicia* had broken out again during the war, and had resulted in the enactment of a *Lex Plautia*,—proposed by the Tribune of 89, and carried by the combined votes of all the enemies of the Equites,—by which the courts, or at all events the Varian *quaestio de maiestate*, were transferred to a new body of *iudices*, popularly elected, fifteen from each tribe. And at the same time, the friends of the Italians were scheming to remove the antiquated restrictions which had been imposed upon their use of the franchise. The democratic party, too, had found once more a real leader in P. Sulpicius Rufus, one of the Tribunes of 88 ; a young man of marked talent and wide popularity, who had been a close friend of Drusus, and was already regarded, after Antonius, as the most accomplished orator of the time.

Persons and parties in Rome.

The question of the command in Asia soon resolved itself into the ancient rivalry between Marius and Sulla. On the first symptom of trouble with Mithradates, the Senate had designated Asia as a consular province for the following year, and, of the two Consuls, Sulla was obviously the man. Marius, however, could not forget the prophecy of a seventh Consulship. Ever since his failure to secure re-election, as the patron of Saturninus and Glaucia, he had been preparing himself to emerge once more as the 'only general' of the State in some new public danger. For this, after his former failure, he had withdrawn on a prolonged visit to the eastern provinces, to study the military situation created by the rise of Pontus. For this he had taken the field, even against his own political associates, in the Italian War. For this, when it was clear that Rome was not outmatched, he had hesitated and withdrawn, lest he should estrange the Italian veterans. Now he emerged, once more, from his retirement at Misenum, and was to be seen, to the amusement of his enemies, devoting himself to athletic training in the Campus Martius. Once more, too, as before, he made no secret of his own political incompetence, and entrusted himself and his cause to Sulpicius Rufus and the demo-

The rivalry of Marius and Sulla.

cratic party, who welcomed the old soldier as a counterpoise to the genius of Sulla. Moreover, if report said truly, Marius had paid, or promised to pay, the debts of Sulpicius; and there were those who felt that the spoils of a Mithradatic War would be more equally distributed by a Marius than by a Sulla.

The first step of the democratic leaders was to secure a working majority in the Comitia; the next to transfer the Asiatic command from Sulla to Marius. The first would be best accomplished by distributing the Italian voters among all the thirty-five tribes. In return for this boon, if not out of devotion for their former champion, the Italians could be trusted to vote for Marius; and with the allies, the populace, and the Equites (who had their own reasons for hating Sulla), united all at once on the same side, the issue should not be in doubt. To these manœuvres the Consuls replied by declaring a *iustitium* or bank holiday, so that public business was at a standstill, and Sulpicius could not summon the Comitia; but Sulpicius armed his followers, and expelled the Consuls from Rome. Q. Pompeius, the son of the Consul, who had married Sulla's daughter, was killed in the disorder, and Sulla himself only escaped by taking refuge in the house of Marius, and cancelling the *iustitium*. The proposals of Sulpicius and Marius were then formally carried—though under circumstances of extreme violence—and two other measures with them; the one recalling the victims of the Varian Commission, the other degrading from his order every Senator whose debts were found to exceed two thousand *denarii*. But the coalition itself was on the point of breaking up. The populace resented the redistribution of votes; the Equites were offended by the amnesty; and the provision with regard to the Senate was soon found to be cutting both ways. It was not the reactionaries only, whose expenses exceeded their incomes.

Sulla, meanwhile, had measured the situation, and retired at once to his army, which was still besieging Nola. He explained to his devoted soldiers, that, in the strife of factions in the city, their chances of the spoils of Asia were at stake; then raised the siege of Nola, and marched straight upon Rome with a force of six legions. Two military tribunes sent by Marius to take over Sulla's army were seized and stoned, and though many of the officers deserted, rather than take arms against the city, the rank and file remained loyal to their general, and Marius found his own system turned against himself. Meanwhile the other Consul, whose son had been among the victims of the recent riot, had declared for Sulla, and brought his own army from the north, to join him not far from Rome. Aristocrat though he was, Sulla

The revolution of Sulpicius.

Sulla's reply.

was not the man to let antiquated scruples stand in the way of business. He marched without hesitation straight into the undefended city, and crossed the sacred *pomoerium*, which no armed Roman had ever profaned before. The Praetors forbade his entry, and Sulla enters Rome. Marius offered freedom to the slaves; but Sulla's six legions easily repressed the street fighting, which was all the resistance that the unsuspecting democrats could offer. Marius himself and his son, with Sulpicius and ten other ringleaders, were proclaimed outlaws and public enemies. Sulpicius was caught and killed, and his head was fixed in mockery upon the very *rostra* which he had so often adorned in life. Marius and his son escaped, and, after hairbreadth adventures, took refuge in the province of Africa.

The laws of Sulpicius were formally cancelled, at the sword's point, in the Comitia Centuriata, and a temporary constitution was installed, which revealed, already in some measure, the views which Sulla held on the leading problems of the time. The old restriction of the Italian votes was restored; the Servian order of voting, with its systematic preferment of wealth before numbers, was reintroduced in the Comitia; and the previous approval of the Senate was strictly required. The powers of the Tribunes were closely restricted; three hundred new members were added to the Senate; and colonies were announced to relieve the distress, and to provide for the maintenance of disbanded veterans.

In Rome there was no further disturbance. Sulla and his legions, with Asia in prospect, had no need of plunder, and the strongest reasons for moderation, in this new order of things. Yet might had triumphed over right in Rome. Rioting there had been, and bloodshed in the Forum, before now; but never, before Sulla, had Roman legions been turned against the city, nor had a Consul exercised *imperium militare* within the *pomoerium*. Henceforward the sword was to decide the government of Rome; the only question would be, who was the real lord of the legions, or of most of them?

Sulla's measures might have been more thoroughgoing still, but that his troops were clamouring to be on their way to Asia, and he dared not detain them longer. Sending on the bulk of his forces to Capua, he remained himself in Rome until the end of the year, in the hope of securing the appointment, for 87, of Consuls who could be trusted to maintain his cause in his absence. In this, however, he failed. One of the new Consuls, indeed, was an honest but narrow-minded aristocrat, Cn. Octavius; but the other was L. Cornelius Cinna, a coarse, violent, and untrustworthy agitator, far more dangerous, in his

Sulla enters Rome.

His provisional settlement.

The rule of the sword.

Sulla leaves Italy.

way, even than Sulpicius had been. The northern army, meanwhile, revolted and killed its general, who had been Sulla's colleague and ally. But Sulla could delay no longer. Ignoring the mutiny in the north, and the usurpation of its leader, Q. Pompeius Strabo, and merely exacting from the new Consuls a public oath that they would not disturb his constitution, he set off to join his army; and leaving his legate Appius Claudius to conduct the siege of Nola, and Metellus Pius, with proconsular powers, to keep Samnium in check till his return, he set sail at last for the East.

[The internal history is continued in Chapter XXXIV.]

CHIEF DATES.

Lex Junia	126
Lex Licinia Mucia	95
Leges Liviae passed and repealed : murder of Drusus	91
Revolt at Asculum : establishment of 'Italice' at Corfinium	91
Bellum Sociale	90-88
Lex Julia (in the winter)	90-89
Lex Plantia-Papiria : Lex Calpurnia : Lex Pompeia	89
Leges Sulpiciae : Sulla's army occupies Rome	88

CHIEF PERSONS.

C. Servilius Caepio—P. Rutilius Lupus—Q. Servilius Caepio—C. Marius—
M. Perperna—Q. Pompeius Rufus—L. Julius Caesar—L. Cornelius
Sulla—L. Porcius Cato—C. Plantius Silvanus—C. Papirius Carbo—
Cn. Pompeius Strabo—P. Sulpicius Rufus—A. Sempronius Asellio—
C. Judacilius—Q. Pompeadius Silo—C. Papius Mutilus—C. Lamponius.

CHIEF PLACES.

Asculum—Pinna—Corfinium—Alba Fucens—Tolenus Fl.—Aesernia—
Teanum—Nola.

SUBJECTS.

The relations between Rome and the Italian allies.
The effects of the enfranchisement of Italy.
The new conflict between the city and the legions.

CHAPTER XXXIII


SULLA'S CAMPAIGNS IN ASIA

The kingdom of Pontus—The Cappadocian question—The Bithynian question—Mithradates declares war—Massacre of Romans—Invasion of Europe—Sulla in Greece—Battles of Chaeronea and Orchomenus—Reaction against Mithradates—Flaccus and Fimbria—End of the war—Sulla's settlement of Asia.

THE formation of the province of Asia from the dominions of the king of Pergamum, in 133, introduced direct Roman government into the mainland of Asia Minor; but the full importance of this change of policy was not realised by any one at the time. Roman policy in Asia Minor. The other states of the peninsula, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and the two kingdoms of Cappadocia, remained free and independent allies of Rome, and were allowed to neutralise and weaken one another by constant feuds, with which the Roman government was unable and unwilling to interfere. The result of this policy of indifference and neglect inevitably was that, when once a really able ruler appeared in one of the native states, he found nothing to prevent him from building up, unobserved, a powerful and aggressive kingdom, and coming forward as the champion of the conquered and divided East against the oppressive tyranny of Rome.

At the time of the formation of the Asiatic province, the kingdom of Northern Cappadocia, which acquired the name of Pontus from its long sea frontier on the Euxine, was the weakest and the remotest The kingdom of Pontus. of the client states of Asia Minor. Originally an obscure province of the empire of Persia, it was already practically independent in the time of Alexander the Great, and in the next generation became a separate kingdom. The reigning house traced its descent from the Persian royal family of the Achaemenidae, and could claim to represent the highest traditions of Oriental monarchy. In the period of Rome's eastern wars, its able ruler Pharnaces fought repeatedly with Eumenes of Pergamum, and secured also a strong footing on the Pontic coast by the capture of the old Greek seaport of Sinope. His son Mithradates, the fifth of that name, who succeeded him in 156, completed the conquest

WAR WITH MITHRIDATES



British Isles

of the Pontic coast, and captured Amastris, westward beyond the Halys ; while he won the title Euergetes by his services to Rome in the Third Punic War and during the revolt of Aristonicus in 132. He was further rewarded, when the province of Asia was reduced to order by Aquillius, by the grant of a large part of Phrygia. Ten years later Mithradates died, or was assassinated, leaving two young sons under the guardianship of their mother Laodice ; and the Senate took the opportunity to cancel the Phrygian concession, on the ground of corrupt dealing between the late king and Aquillius. But in 114 one of the boys came of age, got rid of his mother and brother, and ascended the throne of Pontus, with the title of Mithradates VI., and the surname Eupator.

Mithradates was one of those exceptional and commanding personalities whose character and fortunes are enveloped, even in their lifetime, by a halo of mystery and fable. Most of what we hear of him—**Mithradates** as of his western counterpart Jugurtha—comes from the side **VI. of Pontus.** of his enemies ; but his enemies were the first to admit that this was no common man. His personal beauty, his unrivalled strength, his endurance and skill in warfare and the chase, his untiring energy, his apparently boundless command of the twenty-five languages of his motley empire, were the common talk of Asia. The last, if not the noblest, of the Achaemenid kings, he commanded the enthusiastic loyalty of every Asiatic who resented the recent inroads of western culture, enterprise, and government ; brought up in the best Greek models, at Sinope, and himself fully in touch with the Greek ideals of taste and sentiment, he aspired to double the part of Darius with that of Alexander, to infuse the Greek spirit into an Oriental empire, and to lead Greek and Oriental together to the conquest of the rude and dangerous West.

At the moment of his accession, the Romans were in the crisis of their struggle with Jugurtha, and for twenty years more they were sufficiently occupied, nearer home, with this and subsequent difficulties, to leave Mithradates a clear field for his preparations. His **His policy and** first step was to use his position as patron of the Greek **preparations** coast towns of Pontus, to pose as the protector of their kinsfolk in the Cimmerian Chersonese (the *Crimea*), and along the northern shore of the Euxine, against Scythian raids from the interior ; with the result that in a few years he had organised them, under his own suzerainty, in a compact and civilised kingdom, with its capital at Panticapæum on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and its dependencies extending along the Scythian coast as far as the mouth of the Danube. The acquisition of this Kingdom of Bosphorus assured to him the control of the important Scythian corn-supply ; while further conquests on land in western Armenia, and Colchis, and treaties

with the wild Scythian tribes in the north, with the Bastarnæ of the lower Danube, and with the Thracians of the Balkan highlands, made in the Pontus, him in a new and true sense 'King of the Pontus,' with the supreme control of the Euxine Sea and the vast resources of its hinterland. Most important of all, he had now the men, the timber, and the open water, with which to create an irresistible war-fleet; for the first time in history, the Dardanelles were to be forced from the side of the Black Sea, and the king of a highland state in Asia Minor was to use this great arsenal to contest the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean.

On his landward frontier, his first care was to unite to his own dominions the southern kingdom of Cappadocia; and the reigning king, Ariarathes VI., in Asia Minor, was murdered by a Pontic agent named Gordius in 112. In Galatia similar intrigues brought a large part of the country under his control; and when the ruling house of Paphlagonia became extinct in 102, Mithradates stepped in also here, in spite of the protests of Nicomedes of Bithynia. Hitherto Rome had remained indifferent; but two years later the assassination of Ariarathes VII. of Cappadocia, by the same murderer, Gordius, provoked that mission of Marius, of which mention has already been made (p. 378). Mithradates was not yet ready for open defiance. He disowned his agents, apologised for the irregularities which had occurred, and assured the Senate of his devotion to Rome.

Meanwhile he secured his eastward frontier, and won a powerful ally in his operations in Cappadocia, by the friendship of Tigranes, the new king of Armenia. In the distribution of the Persian Empire in Armenia, among the successors of Alexander the Great, Armenia had fallen, with the rest of the Euphrates basin, to the Seleucidae; but after the defeat of Antiochus at Magnesia, in 189, it had made itself independent, and maintained itself, as best it might, against the growing power of the Parthians, who rapidly overran the whole of Media and Mesopotamia, and occupied the southern districts of Armenia itself. Tigranes came to the throne in 95; received in marriage Cleopatra, the daughter of Mithradates; and profited by the Tartar raids which befell the Parthians, to recover the territories which they had seized, and to conquer from them a large part of the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. Mithradates annexed to himself the western or Lesser Armenia, on his own side of the Euphrates, and left Tigranes a free hand to find compensation at the expense of Parthia and Syria.

Hardly had Marius left the court of Mithradates when Ariarathes VIII., the last king of that ill-fated house, was openly expelled from Cappadocia. The Senate protested again, and installed a new dynasty in the person of Ariobarzanes. But in the next or the following year, Tigranes, with a

large force of Armenians, Parthians, and Iberians from the Caucasus, suddenly invaded Cappadocia, deposed the new king, and installed a near kinsman of Mithradates in his place. This time, however, the aggression was not all on one side. Sulla, who happened to be *pro praetore* in Cilicia in the year 92, raised a small force on his own responsibility, forced his way into Cappadocia at once, expelled the Armenians and the intriguer Gordius, and replaced Ariobarzanes on the throne. Mithradates had at this moment one hundred thousand men at his command, but his time was not yet ; and, as before, he apologised and withheld his hand. Sulla pressed his advantage, pursued Tigranes and his allies as far as the Euphrates, and placed himself, at a historic interview on the bank of that river, in the seat of honour between Ariobarzanes and the representative of Parthia. It was the first direct intercourse which Rome had held either with Parthia or with Armenia, and marks the beginning of a new period in the frontier policy of the Empire.

The
Cappadocian
question,
93 B.C.

Prompt
action of
Sulla,
92 B.C.

But the vigorous action of Sulla ceased with his return home ; and the Italian War, which broke out in 91, absorbed the whole energy of the Romans. Nicomedes, their loyal though incapable ally, died about the same time, and Mithradates felt that, at last, the long-expected moment had come. In the following year he invaded Bithynia and replaced the rightful king, Nicomedes III., by a dependant of his own ; while Tigranes expelled Ariobarzanes once more from Cappadocia. But harassed as they were by the revolt in Italy, the Romans could not afford to overlook the destruction of the buffer states which they had hitherto maintained between their province and the power of Pontus ; and M' Aquillius, the son of the Proconsul of 129, was sent to take charge of Bithynia and to restore Nicomedes ; while L. Cassius, the Proconsular governor of Asia, was charged to effect the re-establishment of Ariobarzanes. Again, for the moment, Mithradates withdrew and apologised, and the two princes were restored ; but the folly and greed of the two Proconsuls made the long-deferred struggle inevitable, at the very moment when Rome was least able to face it. For Aquillius, with incredible folly, and entirely without authority from Rome, stirred up Nicomedes to a counter-invasion of Pontus. Mithradates protested, but received an evasive answer, and learned meanwhile that Aquillius had dismissed his envoys and broken off negotiations altogether.

The
Bithynian
question,
91 B.C.

M' Aquillius.

Then the storm broke. With a force of two hundred and fifty thousand men, and forty thousand cavalry, Mithradates threw himself upon the whole

line of the Roman province at once, while a fleet of four hundred ships, manned from the Pontus, from Crete, from Egypt, and from Syria, burst into the Aegean and joined hands with the pirate squadrons of the Levant. His rear was protected by his allies in Armenia and Parthia ; and he had treaties with the pirate states of Cilicia, with the Thracian brigands on the Macedonian frontier, and with the revolted Italians. Crowds of adventurers and deserters rallied to his side, from Scythia, from the Greek cities of the coast, from Numidia, from Samnium, from Rome itself ; and his generals, Archelaus and Neoptolemus, were trained in the best school of Greek scientific warfare. Nicomedes was decisively beaten in Bithynia, at the river Amnium, and fled first to Pergamum, and then to Rome. Aquilius took refuge in Mytilene, but was surrendered to the king, and put to death with insult and torture. Cassius, who had advanced with a raw provincial levy into Phrygia, and Oppius, who attempted a flank movement from the Pamphylian province, were swept away like chaff. Oppius was captured at Laodicea, in Phrygia ; Cassius found a precarious refuge in Rhodes, the only state in the Aegean which dared to remain loyal to the power which had used her so ill ; the few Roman ships in the Levant were surprised, and surrendered at once ; and the Pontic and pirate fleets held undisputed command of the sea.

In Asia every district and state, except the mountain parts of Paphlagonia and Lycia, received Mithradates with open arms. The hateful oppression of the Roman provincial system, with its corrupt tax-gatherers, dishonest traders, and parade of western order and rigour, had fallen, it seemed, like a house of cards, before the Saviour of the East ; and the Greek cities in particular, both in Asia and in European Greece, hastened to lay themselves at the feet of their benefactor. Mithradates, who had established his winter quarters at Pergamum, played the part of deliverer to perfection : remitted taxes wholesale ; scattered the spoils of the Romans with a lavish hand ; and won all hearts by his clemency towards the few Asiatics who had hesitated to renounce their allegiance to Rome.

Then one inhuman and unnecessary act spoiled all. To gratify his Asiatic allies, or to complete the extermination of western intruders in Asia, Mithradates ordered a simultaneous and universal massacre of all Romans and Italians in the province. The decree was issued from Ephesus in the winter of 88-87 ; and it was obeyed to the letter. The number of the victims is variously given from eighty thousand to a hundred and fifty thousand, and testifies to the bitterness of the hatred which the Roman administration had inspired. But this

colossal blunder was the one thing wanting to unite all classes in Rome in a common cry for vengeance, and to alienate the rebel Italians for ever. Mithradates proved no better able than any other Oriental despot to keep a level head in the moment of his success, or to rise superior to his good fortune ; and it was only a matter of time before the forces of the West should be brought to bear upon him too.

But for the moment his plans went forward without a hitch. Archelaus and the fleet crossed the Aegean, captured and massacred the Roman merchants of Delos, and restored the island to its old masters **Invasion of Europe.** Rome by declaring at once for Mithradates, and offering their city and harbour as his base of operations in Europe. All European Greece, except the island of Euboea, followed suit. The Roman legate of Achaëa, Bruttius Sura, barely succeeded in holding the fortresses of Chalcis and Demetrias, and, after a three days' battle at Thespiæ, fell back northward on his superior officer, C. Sentius Saturninus, the Propraetor of Macedon. But this province since its formation had always been less than self-supporting ; and the troubles in Italy still prevented the despatch of reinforcements. Ariarathes, the son of Mithradates, had no difficulty in organising an overwhelming force of Thracians, seizing the seaports of Abdera and Philippi, and advancing by land to join hands with Archelaus ; while a raid of Gauls poured simultaneously into Macedon and Thessaly, plundering and cutting communications as far south as Delphi. Archelaus placed Athens in the hands of the philosopher-tyrant Aristion ; and prepared to meet the army which Rome was by this time ready to throw across the Adriatic.

The quarrel over the assignment of the command in the Mithradatic War, and the revolutionary measures by which Sulla secured it for himself, have been described already (pp. 397-9). Massing all **Sulla in Greece.** his available force at Brundisium in the early spring of 87, he crossed, unopposed, into Epirus. He brought with him only five legions, and an empty treasury ; he had no fleet ; and he knew—so far was he from expecting reinforcements of any kind from Italy—that his enemies would lose no time in sending one of his rivals to arrest and supersede him. He saw that Athens and the army of Archelaus were the key to the Pontic position in Europe ; so, leaving Sentius to make what stand he could in the north, he pressed rapidly into Boeotia, collecting on his way such Aetolian and Thessalian contingents as he could raise. In this he succeeded, for rumours of the excesses of the Pontic army, and of the growing cruelties of Mithradates, had shaken the fickle enthusiasm of the European Greeks, and the majority of them returned to their allegiance

as soon as Sulla appeared. Archelaus advanced to meet him in Boeotia, but was defeated and forced back on Athens.


Sulla followed close behind, and tried to take the city by storm ; but the attempt failed, and he found himself obliged to devote the autumn **Capture of Athens.** and winter to a systematic siege, protecting his own rear by fortified posts at Eleusis and Megara, and sending his legates, Hortensius into Thessaly, and Munatius to Chalcis, to reorganise the devastated province, and raise Greek troops from the northern states. At last, on March 1, 86, Athens was taken by storm. Aristion, who was in command, was captured and killed ; and the town and the acropolis were given over to plunder. Piraeus fell soon after ; and leaving a small force to blockade Archelaus, who clung desperately to the fortified hill of Munychia within its limits, Sulla hurried northwards to meet the land army of Mithradates, one hundred thousand strong, which had by this time captured Amphipolis, traversed Macedon and Thessaly, and passed the barrier of Thermopylae almost unopposed.

There was, indeed, no time to lose. Chalcis had fallen at once ; and Archelaus, who had slipped out meanwhile from Munychia, had joined **Battle of Chaeronea.** the northern army, and maintained, with his fleet, the full command of the sea, and free communication with his Asiatic base. Sulla's prompt and brilliant strategy retrieved what looked like a lost game. He despatched his quaestor, L. Lucullus, to Rhodes and Egypt, to scrape together a fleet, and take that of Archelaus in flank. He recalled Hortensius from Thessaly, and Munatius from lower Boeotia, and forcibly borrowed the treasures of the temple at Delphi. Then, concentrating every man of his force on the Phocian border, he waited for the advancing host to come within his reach. The decisive battle was fought on the historic site of Chaeronea, and ended in the utter defeat of Archelaus. The Pontic army was too big for its work ; it fell into confusion at once, and had no time to recover. Sulla's skilful leading cut it off from its line of retreat, and out of a total number of a hundred and ten thousand, barely ten thousand made their escape to Chalcis. Sulla, to whose little army prestige was everything, published his own loss at no more than fifteen men !

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the general of the Marian party, L. Valerius Flaccus, had got together an army to follow after Sulla. He **Arrival of Flaccus.** landed in Illyria soon after the battle of Chaeronea, and advanced with two legions into Thessaly. Sulla moved northwards to meet him, but was recalled by the sudden arrival of another Pontic army of eighty thousand men under the leadership of Dorylaus, which had landed in Euboea from Asia, and put itself under the orders of Archelaus.

Sulla met the enemy at Orchomenus, not far from Chaeronea, and fought a desperate battle. The cavalry of Archelaus, indeed, broke the Roman line, and for a moment the issue was in doubt; **Battle of** but Sulla leapt from his horse and dashed into the **Orchomenus**. thickest of the fighting, bidding his wavering veterans go home and say they had left their leader at Orchomenus. The soldiers rallied at the word; the enemy fell, as before, into confusion, and the victory of the Romans was decisive. Mithradates had lost his hold upon European Greece as suddenly as he had gained it, and Archelaus, though he still refused to withdraw, thought it well to open negotiations at once with Sulla. Indeed, his means of retreat were already insecure, for though Pontic ships had ranged as far west as Zacynthus, the small Roman

SULLA IN BOEOTIA. - Orchomenus & Chaeronea.



squadron, which Lucullus had raised in the Levant, had been able to relieve Rhodes, and, with small successes at Cnidus, Colophon, and Chios, was already working northwards in the direction of the Hellespont.

In Asia itself, too, the cruel and overbearing temper of Mithradates had brought about already a strong revulsion of feeling. His massacre of the local chiefs had provoked a revolt in Galatia, and his inhuman behaviour to the defenceless Chians alienated the other Greek towns. Already, before the news of Chaeronea arrived, Ephesus and other important cities had shown signs of discontent, and now returned one by one to their allegiance to Rome ; provoking the king to even greater excesses and to reckless political measures—abolition of debt, liberation of slaves, and wholesale redistribution of private property in land.

**Reaction
against
Mithradates
in Asia.**

Sulla spent the winter of 86-5 in Thessaly, reorganising the province of Macedon, and negotiating with Archelaus. After the Marian massacres at home (p. 416) he was naturally anxious to return to Italy at the earliest possible moment, and contented himself with demanding the restoration of the state of things which had existed before the war. But he was roused, by the news of the proceedings of Flaccus, to move slowly by land towards the Hellespont, lest after all his Marian competitor should snatch the fruit of his victories.

**Sulla and
Flaccus.**

At the first contact with the army of Sulla, Flaccus had lost the whole of his advanced guard by desertion ; but while Sulla was drawn southward by the arrival of the army of Dorylaeus, he had taken the opportunity to move northward into Macedon and Thrace, to seize the Bosphorus, and to occupy Byzantium and Chalcedon. But he had lost all semblance of control over his mutinous and rapacious army, which was only kept together by the influence of one of its officers, C. Flavius Fimbria, an ill-regulated but able and eloquent demagogue. At Byzantium Flaccus quarrelled with Fimbria, and degraded him ; but the men mutinied, and Flaccus had to fly to Nicomedia, where he was overtaken and killed. Fimbria, who seems to have been no mean general, assumed the command, beat the Pontic troops at Miletopolis, and compelled Mithradates to evacuate Pergamum, which he had made his capital, and to take refuge in Mytilene. Here, indeed, for the moment he was at the mercy of Sulla's fleet ; but Lucullus preferred to spite Fimbria by observing Sulla's truce with the king, and passed on rapidly, securing the Hellespont for his own chief and cutting off the retreat of his rival. Fimbria took his revenge by cruel ravages at Ilium and other Hellespontine towns which had put

**Fimbria
in Asia
Minor.**

themselves under Sulla's protection ; and moved about aimlessly in Mysia.

Sulla, meanwhile, had defeated the Illyrians and Celts who disputed his march ; had punished severely the wild Thracian tribes who harried the borders of Macedon ; and had joined Lucullus in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont. Mithradates knew well that Sulla was an outlaw from Rome, and, as a last resource, offered him his help against his enemies in Rome, while by perverse jealousy he drove his own general Archelaus to take refuge with the enemy ; but Sulla adhered to his original demand, and on his threat of an invasion of Asia, the king thought it well to submit. He had already withdrawn his European garrisons, and surrendered the fleet of Archelaus as security for the observation of the truce ; he now promised to hand over eighty ships of war to transport Sulla's army back to Italy ; to surrender the province of Asia, and the whole of his conquests in the war, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Cappadocia ; and to pay an indemnity of two thousand talents : and with these very moderate terms Sulla expressed himself satisfied, promising on his part to spare the Asiatic towns which had joined Mithradates. At a personal interview at Dardanus in the Troad, the treaty of peace was confirmed ; End of the Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes were restored to their kingdoms under an escort of Roman troops, and Sulla was left free to settle his account with Fimbria, who lay with his rabble army in the neighbourhood of Thyatira. Fimbria tried to assassinate Sulla, but in vain ; then, finding that his men were going over in crowds to his rival, he retired to Pergamum and killed himself there.

Sulla spent the winter in Asia, quartering his troops upon the states which had offended most, and doing what time allowed, to restore order, and to deal out rough justice on the agents of Mithradates throughout the province. He had refrained from visiting the massacres upon their real instigator, but he exacted mercilessly the five years' arrears of taxation from the revolted province, and imposed fines, in addition, to a total amount of twenty thousand talents. For the better collection of these vast sums, he divided the province into forty-four districts, assessed the amount payable by each, and fixed dates for the payment of successive instalments. The assessment of Sulla and the reckoning of time which he established, remained permanent elements in the Roman organisation of Asia ; but it is from this moment that we must trace the financial ruin of the whole province. To make up their enormous arrears, and to pay at the appointed times, the cities plunged deeper and deeper into debt to Roman and native moneylenders ;

Sulla
reaches the
Hellespont.

war.

Sulla's
settlement
of Asia.

till, only fourteen years later, the total debt of Asia was estimated at a hundred and twenty thousand talents, or six times the original indemnity. European Greece also had suffered severely in the war. Attica had been devastated during the siege of Athens, and Sulla had helped himself freely to the temple treasures of Delphi, Epidaurus, and Olympia.

Nor does Sulla appear to have attempted to reorganise the territory, which he had recovered, on stable or defensible lines. He re-established

the border kingdoms which had been the cause of all its merely provisional character. He rewarded Rhodes, it is true, for its

loyalty by a larger measure of freedom, and a considerable grant of territory among the islands and on the Carian mainland ; and he made Chios, Ephesus, Laodicea, and other cities free and independent allies ; but he left all the rest of the province exposed to the same misgovernment and extortion as before ; and did nothing to provide for frontier defence or for the security of the coasts against the pirates. In Europe, Macedon was reorganised on the same lines as before, and Athens, the ringleader of the revolt in Greece, was allowed once more to plead a glorious past, in excuse for base ingratitude in the present, and received back the ruins of the port of Delos. But Thrace and Crete were left, unconquered nests of robbers and pirates, on either flank of the province of Macedon ; and, above all, Pontus and Mithradates remained, discredited, indeed, abroad, for the moment, but unbroken at home, and waiting merely for a convenient season to renew their struggle for supremacy in Asia.

Thus, in the year 84, Sulla returned to Greece with his whole army, leaving L. Licinius Murena in Asia with the remains of the two Fimbrian legions, which he dared not take back to Italy, and addressing to the Senate a report of his proceedings, and a warning message for itself. Then he spent one more winter in the Macedonian province, and set sail for Dyrrhachium in the early spring of 83.

[The history of Roman Asia is resumed in Chapter XXXVII.]

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Sulla, as pro-Prætor in Cilicia, interferes in Cappadocia	92
Mithradates deposes the kings of Cappadocia and Bithynia	91
M' Aquillius restores them	90
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CHIEF PERSONS.

L. Cornelius Sulla—M'. Aquillius—L. Cassius—C. Sentius Saturninus—
 L. Lucullus—L. Valerius Flaccus—C. Fimbria—L. Licinius Murena—
 Mithradates VI.—Tigranes—Nicomedes III.—Ariarathes VI., VII.,
 VIII.—Ariobarzanes—Gordius—Archelaus—Aristion—Dorylaus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Pergamum — Mytilene — Ephesus — Rhodes — Athens — Piræus —
 Eleusis — Megara — Chalcis — Chaeronea — Orchomenus — Byzantium
 — Nicomedia — Ilium — Thyatira.

SUBJECTS.

The rise of the kingdom of Pontus.
 The unpopularity of Roman administration in the Greek world.
 The collapse of Roman sea-power.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE MARIAN ANARCHY AND THE RETURN OF SULLA

[*Internal history continued from Chapter XXXII.*]

Democratic Reaction in Rome—'Bellum Octavianum'—The Marian Massacre—Two years of Anarchy—Sulla lands in Italy—Defeats Norbanus and Scipio and enters Rome—Campaign against Carbo—Siege of Praeneste—Battle of the Colline Gate—Pompeius in Sicily and Africa—Sulla Dictator—The Proscriptions.

No sooner was Sulla's back turned, in 87, than the inevitable reaction set in. The Consul Cinna, who owed his election to the support of the Marian and democratic factions, threw off at once the allegiance he had sworn to the constitution established by Sulla, revived the revolutionary proposals of Sulpicius, and summoned the Italian voters to Rome to carry them through. His principal supporters were Cn. Papirius Carbo, a clever but low-minded and unscrupulous politician, and Q. Sertorius, the one man of honesty and statesmanship on that side, but ill-suited on that very ground to co-operate with any of the existing factions, and unable in consequence to make his influence felt as he deserved. The action of Cinna, and the influx of Italians, naturally provoked disorder; but the constitutional party, and the other Consul, Cn. Octavius, put themselves once more voluntarily and irrevocably in the wrong, by meeting force with force. Cinna and his partisans were violently expelled from the city, and the democratic Consul was deposed from his office and proclaimed a public enemy. Fighting took place again in the Forum, and Octavius went on to perpetrate, on this excuse, a systematic massacre of the Italian voters, and of the remains of the democratic party. In this *Bellum Octavianum* more than ten thousand citizens are said to have been slain in Rome; the Italians were hopelessly alienated again; and, worst of all, the Senatorial party had thrown away of their own accord that observance of constitutional usage, which would have been the strongest

weapon of their side, and had shown themselves no more competent than their opponents to govern the citizens of Rome.

Cinna took refuge with the garrison of Capua, and set himself to raise a large force from the nearer Italian towns, which had suffered the most severely from the Octavian massacre. The fatal policy of his opponents enabled him to pose as the champion of consular privileges, of democratic reform, and of Italian citizenship : but few of his supporters were without further aims of their own. The rebel Samnites and Lucanians, who in their own highlands had never been disarmed, rallied with enthusiasm round an outlaw Consul ; the younger Marius reappeared as the representative of his father's grievances ; and the old man himself, who had left his hiding-place in Africa on the first sign of trouble, effected a landing, on his own account, at Telamon in Etruria, and was already marching southwards with a thousand Numidian cavalry, releasing the slaves from the *ergastula*, and daily reinforced by multitudes of his own veterans, and by the brigands of the coast road and the northern Apennines. Sertorius indeed protested against confusing the political issue with the personal cause of Marius, but Cinna insisted ; and perhaps had really no alternative. Marius was recognised, and allowed to raise a fleet, and to cut off the corn-supply of Rome by blockading the Tiber : he took and devastated Ostia, and occupied the Janiculum. At the same time Cinna himself accepted from the Samnite rebels insulting terms of alliance, which had already been rejected by the Senate ; and with his rear thus secured, and reinforcements rallying in the highlands, advanced towards the city from the south.

The Senate, meanwhile, had lost control of the only considerable force on which it could have depended. Q. Pompeius Rufus, the colleague of Sulla, who had retired from the Sulpician riots to his own army in Picenum, had been murdered by his soldiers, and his place was taken, unchallenged, by Cn. Pompeius Strabo, who was suspected of having instigated the mutiny, and of playing now simply for his own hand. Strabo was summoned to Rome by the Senate, and came at leisure, letting Ariminum fall into the enemy's hands behind him, and opening negotiations with Marius. Q. Metellus Pius, on the other hand, who had been left by Sulla to watch the Samnites, and was also recalled by the Senate, threw himself promptly between Cinna and the city. But this very step removed the last check upon the south, which had thrown in its lot with Cinna unanimously ; for the Senate's hurried concession of full citizenship to the *dediticii* influenced only the communities in the north and centre, which were disposed to be loyal from the first.

Reprisals of
Cinna and
Marius.

Rome
defenceless.

Rome was by this time practically in a state of siege. Strabo, though he arrived at last, did nothing, and soon died of the pestilence which broke out; and Metellus, thwarted at every turn by the scruples or the obstinacy of Octavius, withdrew at last to Africa, and left the Senate no choice but to surrender. Cornelius Merula, the harmless and useless priest, who had been thrust into Cinna's place, resigned his office, recognised the outlaw as Consul, and conceded the return of Marius. Cinna, on his part, demanded the abolition of the reforms of Sulla, but promised that there should be no bloodshed. Marius sat by in ominous silence while the terms were arranged; but no sooner was the surrender complete, and the city and the Senate in his power, than, in spite of the promises of Cinna, he let loose his own army of ruffians, and slaked his long thirst for revenge in five whole days of indiscriminate slaughter. No rank or distinction, among those who had ever crossed his path, protected them from his ruthless fury. Octavius was cut down in his consular robes, and on his curule chair; M. Antonius, P. Crassus, L. and C. Caesar, and others of the more conspicuous victims, were mutilated even after death, and their heads were affixed to the *rostra*, like that of Sulpicius before. Catulus, whose only offence was his share in the victory of Vercellae, and Merula, the instrument of the recent surrender, were graciously allowed, in virtue of their sacred offices, to put an end to themselves. Sulla's property was confiscated, and his house destroyed; and his wife and children barely escaped with their lives.

It was the end of the official year, but no consular elections were held. Marius nominated himself for the 'seventh time Consul,' with Cinna as his colleague. But he barely lived to fulfil the prophecy which had cursed his career. Worn out with a hard-spent life, with the wild excitement of his revenge, and with the unrestrained debauchery into which he flung himself in Rome, he fell into a fever, and died on the thirteenth day of his Consulship, and in the seventy-fourth year of his age; still dreaming, in his delirium, that he had gone to Asia after all, and was meeting his rival Sulla on the battlefield.

The death of Marius, however, did not affect the general situation. A weak partisan of Cinna, M. Valerius Flaccus, was made Consul in his place, with orders to put together an army, overtake and depose Sulla, and carry on the war with Mithradates; while Cinna and Sertorius attempted to restore order in Rome. The latter ended the massacres by putting to death some four thousand of the worst ruffians of Marius. The former maintained himself as master of

Marius
Consul VII.,
86 B. C.

Cinna in
Rome.

Rome for nearly three years, holding no elections, but nominating himself and his associates to office. Sulla's settlement was abolished, and his person outlawed. The debtors were relieved of three-quarters of their obligations, the slaves who had been liberated in the struggle were confirmed in their citizenship, and the Italian voters were distributed finally among all the thirty-five tribes by the Censors of 86, one of whom was the same Philippus who had annulled the laws of Drusus only six years before. The Samnites gave no trouble, for they were reserving their strength against the return of Sulla. Metellus, the only surviving general on the Senate's side, was expelled from Africa, and took refuge for a while in Liguria; the rest of the survivors of that party had fled to the camp of Sulla; and the western provinces without exception submitted with indifference to a change of masters in Rome, which for them had little practical significance.

But the very success of the democratic party revealed at once its inability to replace the government which it had destroyed. Cinna and his associates held Rome unopposed for more than two years. Two years of anarchy. But they formed no government; they created no constitution; they neglected even to organise a regular army and fleet, or a scheme of defence for the inevitable struggle with Sulla. Even of the army of Flaccus, part had deserted at once on arrival in Epirus, and the remainder, after killing its commander, drifted away into Asia Minor in a gigantic band of brigands (p. 410).

At last, early in 84, came news of Sulla. In a despatch addressed to the Senate, he announced his victories over Mithradates, and his intention to return home, as soon as the settlement of Asia was complete, to establish a constitutional government. News of Sulla. The Senate, though composed by this time almost entirely of partisans of Cinna, tried to open negotiations. Against the wishes of both leaders, it proposed a useless armistice, and offered Sulla himself a safe-conduct to Rome. Cinna and Carbo, however, as Consuls for 85, had already begun to make feverish preparations to meet him, and declared themselves re-elected for the following year. Sulla replied that he could provide his own escort, and that it was rather for him to guarantee the safety of the Senate.

Cinna, rash as ever, wanted to cross over into Illyria and meet Sulla before he could effect a landing in Italy; but after one detachment had already started, a mutiny broke out in the main camp at Ancona, and Cinna was killed; whereupon Carbo prevented the election of a *suffectus*, and governed alone for the remainder of the year, raising enormous levies for the defence of Italy, but

Death of
Cinna,
84 B.C.

incurring more and more damaging attacks from the moderate party and the few who remained to sympathise with Sulla. Carbo had on his side the greater part of the Italian communities, in particular the Samnites and other highlanders of the south, who had good reason to remember Sulla's conduct of the Social War; and the unwilling support of a large number of wealthy speculators and men of business, who had profited vastly by the forced sales of confiscated property, who mistrusted Sulla's intentions with regard to the princes of Asia, and who preferred any form of settled government to the uncertainties of another revolution. But he was not strong enough to maintain his irregular position in Rome, and formal elections were held at the end of 84; with the result that L. Cornelius Scipio and C. Junius Norbanus were appointed Consuls, and that Q. Sertorius was among the Praetors, while Carbo himself was assigned a proconsular command in Cisalpine Gaul.

Sulla landed at Brundisium, early in 83, with five veteran legions and a considerable force of auxiliaries, escorted by a fleet of sixteen hundred ships. His treasury was replenished not only with the spoils of the war in the east, but even with the savings of his veterans, so closely had they identified their fortunes with his. He was accompanied by many nobles and other refugees from the Marian massacre, and was soon joined by Metellus from Liguria, by M. Crassus from Spain, and by others of his party who had found shelter elsewhere in the west; most important of all, by Strabo's son, Cn. Pompeius, who had retired, on his father's death, into Picenum, and now, at the early age of twenty-three, had raised three volunteer legions from his father's veterans and his own clients, and was able to detain three of Carbo's lieutenants in Picenum.

Sulla advanced slowly from his base at Brundisium, and encountered no serious opposition until he reached Campania. He pacified the Italians by binding himself and his troops by an oath to observe the political rights they had acquired under the settlement of 88; by forming separate treaties in the ancient fashion with each community as he reached it; and by rigorously suppressing disorder in the south. Samnium alone remained irreconcilable, but it made no active resistance, and could safely be left to be dealt with later on.

His opponents were far superior to him in numbers, but the majority of their two hundred thousand men were irregulars and ill-disciplined; their counsels were divided, and they had no leader of military ability. Their largest army was with Carbo at Ariminum; the Consul Norbanus, and young Marius, had advanced with a smaller force into Campania; and Scipio, with another, was posted

defeats
Norbanus
and Scipio.

nearer Rome, in support. The first collision occurred at Mount Tifata, where Norbanus vainly contested Sulla's entry into the plain, and was defeated and shut up in Capua; while Sulla pressed on to meet Scipio, whom he encountered at Teanum. Scipio tried to negotiate, against the urgent advice of Sertorius; but his soldiers took advantage of Sulla's amnesty, to desert wholesale, and he was compelled to surrender. Sertorius, however, had kept a small force together and attacked the town of Suessa, which had taken Sulla's side; and Sulla took advantage of what he claimed to be a breach of faith, to repudiate his own convention with Scipio, to dismiss the Consul and his officers unharmed, and to press on again in the direction of Rome. As Carbo said of him, Sulla was 'a lion and a fox in one,' and the fox was the more dangerous of the two. But the strength of Carbo's party in and near the city, and the severity of the season, caused him to retire into Campania for the winter. He had conquered half Italy almost without striking a blow, and the omens, too, seemed to point against his enemies: in particular, the fire which, on July 6, 83, had consumed the ancient temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, and in it the Sibylline Books and the archives of state, was seen to mark the close of the old order of things, and the anger of the gods against the party of Carbo.

Early in the following year Sulla advanced again into Latium, and was confronted by young C. Marius, who had been irregularly nominated Consul, together with Carbo, and had begun his work by outlawing all the partisans of Sulla who still remained in Rome. Marius was soon defeated at Sacriportus, near Signia, and barely made his escape to the natural fortress of Praeneste. He was, however, able to add one more cruelty to those which stain his name, by ordering the Praetor, L. Brutus Damasippus, before evacuating Rome, to entrap and murder the last surviving representatives of the Senatorial party, including P. Antistius, L. Domitius, and the learned and venerable Pontifex Maximus, Q. Scaevola. Sulla now entered Rome without opposition, but lost no time in premature reprisals, and was soon on his way northwards; leaving his *legatus*, Q. Lucretius Ofella, to maintain the blockade of Praeneste.

Sulla enters
Rome,
82 B.C.

Carbo, meanwhile, had rallied the last of the veterans of Marius, and had raised fresh troops from Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul. As before, he held a strong position on the Adriatic coast, with Cisalpine Gaul in his rear, and his advanced posts in Picenum and Umbria. Hitherto he had been held in check by the vigorous efforts of Pompeius, Metellus, and M. Crassus; but the arrival of Norbanus, who had escaped from Capua to take over

Campaign
against
Carbo in the
north.

Cisalpine Gaul, set him free to extend his operations, and the advance of Sulla provoked him to move southwards into Etruria. Sulla's fleet, however, had the command of the Adriatic, and Metellus succeeded in effecting a landing at Ariminum, and in entrenching himself at Faventia, on the line of communication between Carbo and Norbanus. Pompeius and Crassus, meanwhile, followed Carbo's movements in Umbria, and kept him out of touch with the Samnites, who were by this time on the war-path again; and Sulla himself was advancing on the direct line northwards from Rome. Carbo was thus caught on three sides at once, and prevented, at the same time, from rejoining Norbanus and his base. He decided therefore to press on, checked Sulla for the moment at Clusium, and threw forward a force under C. Carrinas to raise the siege of Praeneste. But Pompeius was too quick for him, and caught Carrinas near Spoletium; and a second attempt under Q. Marcius fared no better. Meanwhile Norbanus, who had been decisively beaten by Metellus, threw up the game and took refuge in Rhodes, where he saved himself from Sulla by suicide. The north was thus wholly lost to Carbo, and the failure of a third attempt, under Damasippus, to relieve Praeneste convinced him that the game was over. He fled to Africa, and such of his men as had not by this time deserted, struggled through, with Carrinas, to join Damasippus and Marius.

But by this time the whole force of the Samnites and Lucanians, under Pontius Telesinus and Lamponius, were also on the march towards Praeneste, and were joined by the remainder of Norbanus' former army from Capua; and Sulla, leaving a small detachment in Etruria, drew his main body southward again, and rejoined Ofella in good time. Metellus and Pompeius also were on their way, and the democratic cause seemed hopeless unless Praeneste could be relieved before their arrival.

The enemy risked all on a single desperate move. Like Hannibal at the siege of Capua, Pontius and Damasippus conceived the idea of distracting Sulla by a sudden dash on Rome. Moving with their whole force down the Latin Way, they found the city wholly unprepared, and pitched their camp outside the Colline Gate, in readiness for a general assault on the morrow. The Samnites' hour of vengeance seemed to have come, and Pontius openly threatened to raze the city to the ground. But Sulla had divined their intention, and seeing at once how desperate the situation was, threw forward the whole of his cavalry, and followed by forced marches with every man he could collect. It was already midday when he arrived, and he was entreated to give his men rest until the morrow; but after

The Samnites strike at Rome.

a short interval for food—too short to permit of any kind of strategy—he hurled his worn-out legions, just as they stood, upon the enemy.

It was late in the short winter afternoon when the battle began, and it lasted far on into the night. Crassus, on the right wing, defeated the enemy's left, and pursued them as far as Antemnae; but Sulla's veterans, who were confronted by their old enemies the Samnites, were thrust back upon the very walls of Rome, and Sulla himself was in imminent danger of his life. At last, long after nightfall, he received the news of the comparative success of Crassus, and finding, in the early morning, that the Samnites were already in retreat, he used his advantage to the full and fell upon them again. A large detachment of the enemy deserted in the middle of the action, and completed the rout. Pontius was killed, and his head was sent, in token, to the garrison of Praeneste. His army, and almost his entire nation, were annihilated; for prisoners and deserters alike were slaughtered to the number of eight thousand men. The massacre was deliberate, and Sulla admitted that it was so, in a phrase which was typical of the man. He had convened the Senate outside the *pomoerium*, in the temple of Bellona, and the shrieks of his victims as they were butchered in the Campus Martius were plainly to be heard. But when his audience started with horror, he coolly bade them never mind the noise: 'he was only punishing a few criminals.'

Battle
of the
Colline Gate,
November 1,
82 B.C.

The victory at the Colline Gate decided the fate of Praeneste. Marius killed himself; the garrison was massacred; and the fortress itself was razed to the ground. Other strong posts at Norba, Neapolis, and Aesernia fell in quick succession before the lieutenants of Sulla; and though Nola held out until 80, and Volaterrae even until 79, all the rest of Italy was easily and quickly pacified. Sardinia had been already secured in 82 by Philippus, who had changed sides once more on Sulla's return, and had been sent where he could do no harm; Gaul surrendered without hesitation; and Sertorius, who had taken refuge in Spain, was harmless, and also out of reach.

Fall of
Praeneste.

In Sicily, indeed, Carbo and M. Perperna began to raise another army; but Pompeius was sent with six legions and a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships, and had no difficulty in mastering the island; Carbo, who had fled once more, being captured at Cossyra, off the coast of Africa, brought back to Lilybaeum, and executed at the command of Pompeius. Finally, the Numidian king, Hiabas, had sheltered Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus; but Pompeius crossed promptly over into Africa, defeated Domitius, captured Hiabas, and enthroned, in his place, his exiled rival Hiempsal II.

Pompeius
in Sicily
and Africa.

Having thus broken down all resistance in Sicily and Africa within forty days, Pompeius returned to Rome and demanded a triumph. He had held no public office, and was of only equestrian rank ; but his personal popularity and the clamours of his men forced Sulla not only to grant this irregular distinction, but to salute the young man with the coveted title of *Magnus*.

Sulla himself had triumphed but a few days before—on the 24th of January, 81—and had erected an equestrian statue of himself before the Rostra. In his closing speech he had assumed the well-merited title of *Felix*, which in its Greek form, Ἐπαφρόδιτος, bound up his fortunes even more intimately with the fate of Rome. Already, however, the situation which he had created in fact was recognised in law ; for before the end of 82, on the death of both Consuls, an interrex, L. Valerius Flaccus, had nominated him Dictator, the first for more than a century. He was to hold the office, not as of old for six months only, but until he should himself think fit to resign it ; and, his authority thus recognised, he lost no time in setting about the work of restoration. But as if to mark his position as exceptional, Consuls were elected as usual for 81 ; and in 80 Sulla himself was both Consul and Dictator at the same time.

The first thing to be done was to complete the annihilation of the rebel and democratic factions. A schedule or *proscriptio* was published, containing the names of dangerous or suspected persons. A reward of two talents was offered, in each case, for their death or betrayal, and to give them shelter was made a capital offence. Their descendants for two generations were declared incapable of holding public offices, while their goods were confiscated, and either sold by auction at nominal prices—for who would bid against the favourites or agents of Sulla ?—or bestowed by the Dictator himself upon his supporters. As time went on, moreover, supplementary ‘proscriptions’ were announced, till the total number of the proscribed was not far short of five thousand ; of whom more than half—two thousand six hundred in all—were of equestrian *census*, and ninety were even members of the Senate. It was an open secret, however, that many names had found their way into the lists to gratify the greed or private feuds of powerful partisans of the Dictator ; and that some had actually been inserted, after murder or confiscation had already taken place.

These proscriptions were Sulla’s reply to the Marian massacres ; and were designed and executed with the cold-blooded, systematic thoroughness, which marks every stage of his career. But they were a wholly new departure in Roman political life. They set the grave prece-

dent of healing the disorders of the State by amputation, not by treatment; and the bitterness of party strife was increased henceforward by a new motive of terror; even when, as in Caesar's case, it was both the policy and the personal instinct of the victor to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.

On the rebel Samnites and Etruscans, also, the hand of Sulla fell with relentless weight. All those nations of Italy which had shown themselves irreconcilable to Rome were stamped out finally, and their lands were for the most part laid waste <sup>Reorganisa-
tion of Italy.</sup> for ever. Towns, such as the Gracchan colony of Capua, which had made themselves conspicuous on the rebel side, were deprived, at the same time, of the higher rights of citizenship; while loyal communities like Brundisium received full recognition of their services to the cause of Rome. To complete the Romanisation of Italy, to repair the double depopulation caused by the social and the civil war, and at the same time to make provision for the twenty-three legions of veterans, the Dictator resumed, on a larger scale, the policy which he had initiated in 88, by the foundation of numerous colonies, such as Faesulae and Arretium, on the lands of the rebels and the proscribed, and by imposing settlements of loyal soldiers, which were practically garrisons, upon disaffected communities like Praeneste and Pompeii. At the same time, he granted the franchise with a free hand to veterans, and other adherents, of Gaulish or Spanish origin, and set free, to the number of ten thousand, the slaves of the proscribed: and these new-made citizens, who assumed the clan name of the Cornelii, in recognition of their liberator, provided him also with a strong and organised body of pocket-voters in the Comitia, whose whole interests were bound up with the political order which he proposed to establish.

Sulla had now retrieved the position of Rome in the East, put down disorder in Italy, and laid, as he believed, the foundations of a political party strong enough and solid enough to carry on the <sup>Sulla's
policy.</sup> government. It only remained to give harmony and consistency to the constitution, after more than forty years of fruitless and demoralising reforms. The terms of his Dictatorship not only confirmed all unconstitutional or violent acts which he had done or permitted in the past, but authorised him also to regulate all public and private matters, and to delegate authority at his discretion; and legalised beforehand any measures he might enact for the better ordering of the State. But he preferred to regard his unique and sovereign position as a temporary expedient only, and to proceed for the future on strictly constitutional lines; and all the *Leges Corneliae* were passed openly and regularly in the Comitia Centuriata.

CHIEF DATES.

Sulla leaves Italy : 'Bellum Octavianum'	87
Marius Consul VII. : Marian massacre	86
Sulla lands in Italy	83
Battle of Sacriportus : Siege of Praeneste : Sulla in Umbria (summer)	82
Battle of the Colline Gate (Nov. 11) : Pompeius in Sicily (winter) .	82
Sulla Dictator (Dec. 82) : Proscriptions : 'Leges Corneliae' . . .	81

CHIEF PERSONS.

L. Cornelius Cinna—Cn. Papirius Carbo—Q. Sertorius—C. Octavius—
 C. Marius—Q. Pompeius Strabo—Q. Metellus Pius—L. Cornelius
 Merula—M. Valerius Flaccus—L. Cornelius Scipio—C. Junius Nor-
 banus—M. Licinius Crassus—Cn. Pompeius Magnus—L. Brutus Damas-
 ippus—C. Carrinas—Q. Lucretius Ofella—Q. Marcius Philippus—
 Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus—Pontius Telesinus—M. Lamponius—
 Hiarbas.

CHIEF PLACES.

Capua — Telamon — Ostia — Ariminum — Ancona — Brundisium —
 Mount Tifata—Nola—Teanum—Suessa—Sacriportus—Praeneste—
 Faventia—Clusium—Spoletium—Cossyra—Rhodes.

SUBJECTS.

The causes of the breakdown of the democratic party.
 The strategy of Sulla.
 The settlement of the Sabellian Question.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA

Democracy and Anarchy—Sulla's Constitution—The Senate—Its control of Legislation and Judicature—The Magistrates—The Comitia—The Tribunes—Criticism of Sulla's Constitution—Permanence of his Judicial Reforms—Resignation, death, and character of Sulla.

THE anarchy which had resulted from the revolutionary proceedings of Sulpicius, Cinna, and Carbo had been the inevitable outcome of that movement of revolt which had been initiated by the Gracchi against the government of the Senate and the Nobles. Throughout that long period of agitation, which extended over nearly fifty years, the fundamental questions at issue had been throughout the same. By what right did the Senate claim to dominate every department of Roman administration? What constitutional barrier separated the official order from the rest of the citizens of Rome, and gave it the monopoly of the rewards of empire? To these questions, as we have seen, the answer of the defenders of privilege and oligarchy had only been, and could only be, that the system which was assailed had grown up automatically and almost unquestioned in the stress of Rome's greatest need; that it was under this very system that Rome had won the empire which she held; and that if new dangers and temptations had given rise to new disorders in the State, it was for those, who experienced or foresaw them, either to stand loyally by the government and the system which had served them so well till now, or else to propound a constitution which would work, to take its place. Now, with the best intentions in the world, the democratic reformers had done neither the one nor the other. They had hampered and dislocated the Senatorial machine; they had spread disorder in Rome, disloyalty in the army, and discontent in Italy; and they had had treasonous correspondence even with open enemies of the empire. Yet neither the personal monarchy of Gaius Gracchus, nor the camp-rule of Marius; neither the Utopian philosophy of Drusus, nor the club-law of Saturninus and Cinna had led to

any result but more acute disorder, with the conviction, on the part even of the more thoughtful members of the Senatorial party, that it was not in the direction of democracy of that kind that the salvation of the State would be found.

Thus, on the return of Sulla, the way was clear, for the moment, for an attempt in the opposite direction. The fundamental weakness of the Senate's position had always been this, that there was nothing in the letter of the constitution, to which either the Senate or the official order could point to justify their actions or their claims; they could plead expediency, and 'reasons of State'; but if expediency were disputed, and 'reasons of State' given on the opposite side, they had no justification left. But what if the citizens of Rome should bind themselves under a new constitution, based indeed upon the old, but expressly affirming the very rights and privileges which had been disputed before? The Senate and the nobles would then have a legal as well as a historical claim to be regarded as the rightful government; the democratic opposition would be disarmed at the same time of its most effective weapon; and the traditional system would have a fair field before it once more: and its supporters, at least, believed that this was all that was required, to bring the State safe out of the present troubles.

This, in fact, was the task which Sulla set himself to perform; and he was ideally the man to undertake it. A thorough Roman, and a proud and exclusive aristocrat, he had no sympathy with the aspirations of the democratic reformers, or with the dreams of the students of Greek political theories; himself the conqueror of the Samnites, and of the generals of Mithradates, he had nothing to fear from the remains of the Marian faction, or from the critics of Senatorial inactivity; a man of deeds, not of words, he had already shown, before his departure for Asia, how lightly he esteemed the windbag politics of the Comitia and the Tribunate. Master of Italy and Rome *de facto*, he was now *de iure* Dictator without limit of time, and with the express commission to create in Rome a constitution that would work.

The keystone of his reconstruction was the Senate, which he replenished, and permanently doubled in number, by the admission of three hundred new members of equestrian rank; partly young and wealthy members of families already Senatorial; partly Sullan officers who had enriched themselves during the proscriptions, and could be trusted to support their chief socially as well as politically. The new members were chosen, nominally at least, by popular election in the Comitia; and thus the new Senate

(1) The Senate: restored and reformed.

was given a fresh claim to the allegiance of the citizens, as at least in some sense a representative body. To maintain this character, so far as possible, for the future, provision was made that henceforward all Quaestors, whose number was now increased to twenty annually, should be admitted to the Senate without further qualification: and as the Quaestors were elected openly in the Comitia, this change amounted to the recognition of popular election as the avenue to a seat in the Senate.

In other ways, too, the position of the Senate was strengthened and extended. The provision for life-membership, for example, was made retrospective, in order to recall the abler victims of the equestrian jury courts; though Rutilius, and some others of the more distinguished of them, are said to have declined to avail themselves of the concession. And at the same time the sacred colleges of Pontifices, Augurs, and the like, which had formerly (p. 375) been important instruments of Senatorial control, were both increased in numbers, and restored to the privilege of co-optation, which they had lost in 104 by the democratic *Lex Domitia*.

The automatic replenishment of the Senate from among the Quaestors had the further advantage that it rendered superfluous the invidious task of the Censors, who had notoriously given a corrupt preference, in recent years, to candidates who were rich enough to influence their choice. And since, at the same time, permanence and continuity were secured, within the Senate, by making membership of it tenable for life, the censorial *nota* for disgraceful conduct ceased to have political effect; and, though it appears again later on, carried henceforward only a social stigma. Consequently we hear little more, after Sulla's time, of these formerly influential magistrates; their financial duties had never provoked political controversies; and their control of the conscription had been wholly replaced, by this time, by the Marian system of voluntary enlistment under individual commanders.

The Censorship falls into disuse.

To the Senate, thus strengthened, enlarged, and protected against disturbance, was restored the complete control of administration and policy; and this not, as heretofore, as a vague customary privilege, but as a formal rule of the constitution. To the Senate all magistrates were made responsible for their actions, and to the Senate was restored the right to assign magisterial provinces, to give or withhold *imperium militare*, and to confer or refuse *prorogatio* beyond the original term of one year. To the Senate, moreover, was restored the primitive monopoly of initiative in legislation, and also the control of the *iudicia*. The latter were greatly extended by the establishment of new *quaestiones*—one *de vi*

Senatorial control of legislation and judicature.

against seditious riot, another *de sicariis et veneficiis* against murder, another *de iniuriis* against perjury and the forgery of documents or coinage; and also by wider and clearer definition of the scope of the existing *quaestiones*, and especially of those which had been instituted formerly *de ambitu* and *de maiestate*.

While the influence of the Senate was thus markedly increased, that of the administrative offices was proportionately weakened. A complete and

(2) The Magistrates: separation of 'imperium domi' and 'militiae.' formal separation was effected now for the first time between urban and domestic officers, on the one hand, and those whose functions were essentially provincial or military. An old rule was revived which forbade Consuls and Praetors to absent themselves from Rome during their year of office.

Henceforward, therefore, a Consul or a Praetor enjoyed during his year of office in Rome only the *imperium domi*, and looked forward to the year of provincial command, which followed as a matter of course, for the enjoyment of *imperium militiae* and the opportunity of distinguishing himself on the frontiers. At the same time provision was made, by increasing the number of the Praetors from six to eight, both for the service of the increased number of *quaestiones perpetuae*, and for an annual succession of ex-magistrates, sufficient, with the two Consuls, to fill ten provincial commands.

To complete this number of provincial commands, and at the same time to make it unnecessary for the Consuls to keep a standing army for

Cisalpine Gaul made a province. the defence of Italy at all, Cisalpine Gaul (which, though never included in Italy, had hitherto remained under the

direct control of the Consuls) was raised to the rank of a 'province,' lying between Italy the home-territory of Rome, and the northern frontier of the empire. Thus, as it were, a new *pomoerium* was drawn round Rome, along a frontier marked by the streams of the Macra and the Rubicon; and attempts, such as that of Carbo, to use the resources of Cisalpine Gaul, to terrorise Italy and the capital, were rendered illegal for the future.

In the same way, those evasions of the regular sequence of magistracies, and those abuses of re-elections to the Consulship which had enabled

Lex Annalis. men like Marius and Cinna to install themselves permanently at the head of affairs, were forbidden by a revised *Lex Annalis*, one provision of which confirmed the *Lex Villia* of 179 (p. 141) and legalised the customary sequence of Quaestor, Praetor, and Consul, with a statutory interval of two years between each post; while another revived an older enactment, dating from 342 (p. 107), which forbade any magistrate to hold the same office twice within ten years. The new law

was interpreted strictly ; for Q. Lucretius Ofella, who had distinguished himself at the siege of Praeneste, was actually put to death, by the Dictator's orders, for presuming to offer himself, out of his proper turn, as a candidate for the Consulship of 81. It should be noted that by the terms of the revived law, the Aedileship, which had become a purely plutocratic office, and which Sulla himself had never held, lost finally whatever political importance it had ever possessed, and became little more than an elegant introduction to popular favour, for those who were rich enough to hold it. The Censorship, as we have already seen, was deprived of the few powers which it had retained hitherto, and remained practically impotent throughout the Sullan régime.

Something was done, also, to regulate the tenure and the competence of the provincial governors. They were strictly forbidden—except by the express leave of the Senate—to declare or wage war beyond the frontiers of their provinces, to leave their province at all during their year of office, or to remain in it more than thirty days after the arrival of their successor ; the rule of annual succession to provincial governorships was more strictly framed, and the Senate was invested with the sole right to give or withhold *prorogatio* in exceptional cases. At the same time, a careful and thorough revision of the terms of the *quaestio de pecuniis repetundis* was calculated to increase the security of the provincials against the extortions of provincial magistrates.

The powers of the people too were curtailed, and with even less ceremony than those of the magistrates. The Comitia surrendered to the Senate, as we have seen, all that initiative in legislation which had been assumed by successive reformers, and likewise the right to control the nominations to the sacred colleges ; and only received, in return, the right to replenish the Senate indirectly through the avenue of the Quaestorship. The Concilium Plebis, in particular, which had been the stronghold of the democracy and the Tribunate, had in fact long ago served its purpose in promoting the complete enfranchisement of the Plebs, and now only differed from the Comitia Centuriata in the mode of its assemblages, and in its neglect of considerations of wealth or status in its reckoning of the votes. Sulla seems to have done something accordingly to diminish the chaos of public assemblies by rehabilitating the Comitia Centuriata as the recognised assembly of the people ; though clearly, in a constitution such as his, the part which even this was allowed to play was merely that of registering, formally, the enactments of the Senate, and confirming the nomination of its candidates for the magistracies.

Regulation
of provincial
commands.

(3) The
Comitia
deprived
of their
democratic
character.

The democratic party, moreover, had been decimated by massacre, proscription, and disfranchisement, and was perhaps even outnumbered by the influx of Italian voters into the capital; and the city mob was left to starve as it pleased, by the suspension of the Gracchan corn-doles, and encouraged to betake itself to honest ways of living, by the foundation of numerous colonies in Italy, and by the distribution of confiscated lands.

Above all, the authority of the *Tribuni plebis*, the most potent check upon Senatorial administration under the old constitution, but of recent

years the slave, as we have seen, of every political party in turn, was muzzled and made practically harmless by withdrawing altogether the power of legislation from the Tribunes and the Concilium Plebis; by transferring the last

remains of their old judicial competence to the new Senatorial *quaestiones*; by limiting their right of veto to single acts of individual magistrates, and imposing heavy penalties for its abuse; and by a narrow restriction even of their right to summon and address a *contio* or public meeting at all. Finally, it was ruled that any one who had once held the Tribunate was disqualified permanently for any curule office whatsoever; and thus all men of ability or ambition were warned off from entering on a career which led nowhere. In practice, these radical changes meant far less than would appear at first sight, for the period of great Tribunes was in fact already over. The office had fallen to be a mere pawn in a new political game, and though many of the positive restrictions imposed by Sulla were soon withdrawn, we hear no more of Tribunes like the Gracchi or Drusus, with a programme or a policy of their own; and it was without opposition that the *tribunicia potestas* was absorbed, at last, as merely one element in the all-embracing authority of Augustus.

This careful and systematic constitution, however, with all its precautions against popular or progressive attack, scarcely survived its

author. Sulla had made the fatal mistake of revising the forms, while neglecting the spirit of the Republic. He had treated the symptoms, but he had failed to remove either the disease or its cause; and by his thoroughly partisan treatment of political problems, he had set a number of precedents which could be turned to equal account by his opponents. Worst of all, he had replaced

an authority, which had rested on venerable tradition and immemorial custom, by one which was formulated in a modern code, and established by a legislative act; and it was obvious that what a law could create, another law was competent to annul.

His reform of the Senate had removed all restrictions, ancient or

(4) The Tribunes rendered harmless.

Criticism of Sulla's constitution.

(1) Its artificiality.

recent, upon the misuse of absolute power by the nobility—the censorship, the tribunician veto, the equestrian courts. He had admitted wealthy Equites to the Senate, and recognised popular election as a test of fitness for admission; but he had done nothing to make it really representative of that new Republic of Italy which had come into being after the Social War; and he had failed to bring home to its members anything more than a merely collective responsibility. Individual influence might be, and often was, very strong in the Senate, but no mechanism existed by which the blame of an ill-advised *senatus consultum* might be brought home to its real proposer. The Senatorial Courts showed themselves, from the first, more rather than less corrupt than the Equestrian had been; and deprived both Senate and magistrates of the most potent incentive to honest government.

(2) Absence of safeguards.

Nor were there wanting the elements of a formidable opposition, with serious social and economic grievances against the Sullan régime. The Equites who, in spite of the fearful losses which they had suffered in the massacres and proscriptions, recovered from the distress of the Civil War more rapidly than any other class, awaited only an opportunity and a leader, to recover, if not their political, at least their social distinction, and to balance their account with the nobles. In the same way, though Sulla accepted as irrevocable the incorporation of the Italians in the electorate, he did nothing to secure that their citizenship should have any particular value either to themselves or to Rome, and the conception of anything like modern representative government remained beyond the horizon of practical politics. The colonies of veterans were for the most part a failure, and even a fresh cause of disturbance; for the veterans made but poor farmers, and frequently ignored the prohibition to sell their allotments. Much of the land, moreover, was confiscated property, which, whether it remained with the *Sullani*, or accumulated, afresh, in the hands of equestrian speculators and slave-owners, provoked innumerable quarrels with the survivors and heirs of the proscribed. Large tracts, too, were never assigned at all, and became the haunts of dangerous bands of brigands, the inevitable product of so long a period of depression and intermittent warfare; and the excesses of the *pastores*, the half-wild shepherds of Apulia, began to recall, once more, the worst outbreaks of the Sicilian slaves.

(3) Social and economic defects.

The attempt, moreover, to base a stable order of things on wholesale emancipations and on the votes of *Cornelii* and *Sullani*, rested, like so much else of Sulla's work, on a precedent of the Sullan which it was only too easy for slave-owners, or other generals, to follow. The cessation of the corn-doles, it is true, did something, for

(4) Instability of the Sullan party.

the moment, to reduce the numbers of the unemployable in Rome, but it was obvious that without the creation of an alternative career for the city populace, the evil was only driven below the surface, and that no permanent reform had been effected in the composition or the temper of the popular assemblies.

Nor, even on the administrative side, did Sulla really solve the questions which underlay the disorders of his time. The separation, which he effected, of military from urban commands had obvious practical advantages; but the anomaly remained, that the urban magistrates of the city of Rome, brought up as they had been in the complicated system of veto and countercheck which made up the Roman Constitution, were still permitted, as of right, to proceed not merely to absolute civil jurisdiction over great provinces abroad, but even to wide military authority remote from any effective check upon incapacity or oppression; and were liable to be called in question, if at all, only before judges who were chosen, as of old, from among their own order, and whose own hopes, or recollections, were of identical misgovernment in their turn.

The broad question, in fact, which had been really at issue ever since the Social War, was how to separate, not urban from provincial, or civil from military, but imperial from municipal government. Yet Sulla does not seem to have taken any thought either for the creation of a central military authority, capable of controlling, or of holding responsible, the Proconsuls and Proprætors who held the full *imperium*, and commanded the armies of the Republic; or for the organisation, either in Rome or among the Italian communities, of an honest and businesslike form of local government, in which to discover and to train men of sufficient administrative talent to bear the responsibility of the great commands abroad. On the contrary, the separation, on Sullan lines, of the government of Italy from the government of the provinces, and the prohibition of the maintenance of an armed force within the line of the Rubicon, left Rome, as the sequel proved, simply unarmed, and at the mercy of any great Proconsul who, like Sulla himself, might choose to turn a victorious army, and the resources of his own province, against the City and the Senate, whose servant he nominally was.

The only permanent contribution, in fact, which Sulla made to the fabric of the Roman Constitution, was his reorganisation of the criminal courts. It was not long, indeed, as we shall see, before the Senatorial monopoly of them was broken down; but the system itself remained, almost in the form in which Sulla left it, and superseded, rapidly and

(5) Inadequacy of the reforms.

(6) No provision for an imperial government.

finally, the cumbrous and uncertain procedure of a direct appeal to the Comitia. Henceforward, in criminal as in civil causes, the case came in the first instance before the Praetor ; but whereas in civil cases he referred the matter, if at all, to a single *iudex*, criminal cases were assigned to the standing commission appointed under a *Lex Cornelia*, or other statute, to try that kind of offence—to a permanent court, that is, with a regular and appropriate procedure, and usually a Praetor as president. In this way two important results were attained. The Special Commissions, which had worked so much mischief in the recent revolutions, were avoided altogether ; and at the same time the death penalty, which only the Comitia could legally inflict, and which is most liable to lead to retaliations in the very cases in which it is most effective, passed wholly out of use, and was superseded by banishment or fine.

Permanence
of Sulla's
judicial
reforms.

After thus reconstructing the mechanism of the Republic, Sulla's next care was, to see if it would work. Without resigning his Dictatorship, in case anything should go wrong, he allowed himself to be elected Consul for 80, with his trusted legate, Metellus Pius, as his colleague, and went through the whole annual cycle of his duties, with but few and unimportant appeals to the powers which he held in reserve. Apparently he was satisfied with the result ; for, after handing over the Consulship to successors duly elected, he summoned the Comitia early in the following year, and, amid universal surprise, laid down his office. Then, after inquiring, in vain, whether any one had aught for which to call him to account, he walked away unattended to his house, a private citizen like the rest. His enemies, we learn, had called his rule a 'kingdom,' and indeed he had shown the Roman people, after more than four hundred years, what a virtual king could do. But 'king in Rome' this Roman noble did not choose to be.

Sulla
resigns his
Dictator-
ship, 79 B.C.

He retired unmolested to his country house at Puteoli, and amused himself for the remainder of his life with literature and the arts among his family and friends, transgressing indeed one of his own enactments by the gorgeous funeral which he ordained for his devoted wife Metella, but abstaining from all share of political life outside the local government of Puteoli. In 78 he died in his bed, worn out, some said, either by pursuit of pleasure, or by a noisome disease ; or, as the less malicious version has it, cut off in a fit of passion with an obstinate local dignitary who had ventured to overrule the man who had conquered and remodelled Rome.

His death,
78 B.C.

His body was brought to the city, escorted by his friends and his veterans. It was an impressive sight, as the stately convoy moved through village and township, to see his former soldiers rally from their farms along the road, and fall in instinctively in their old ranks behind their adored commander. In the city, too, the signs of respectful mourning were universal ; and the preparations were complete for a solemn and magnificent burning. The Consul Lepidus, indeed, must needs attempt, at this untimely moment, to turn the dead man's orders against himself, and forbid the lavish display of pomp and splendour ; but public feeling was all but unanimous, and the unusual and impressive ritual was concluded without serious interruption.

For this was a man, as all Rome knew, whose like they would not see again. He had spent his youth, as noble Romans did, in undisguised and strenuous enjoyment of all that Roman society had to give, and his keen delight in worldly pleasures remained insatiate to the end. But in Africa, in Samnium, and in Asia, he had done what no one among his contemporaries appeared to have the power to do : he had simply put his pleasures on one side, and shown himself in a second sense *επαφρόδιτος* ; the most brilliant, as he was admittedly the most lucky, general of his time. Casual in tactics, and reckless often in his strategy, he seldom lost an engagement, and never a campaign. Forced, meanwhile, by his enemies, if not by such friends as he allowed himself, into political life, he had shown himself a subtle diplomatist and an able administrator, a statesman as cool and clear-headed at the moment as he was short-sighted and indifferent to the future which did not concern himself ; contemptuous of human life and of all that most men seem to value, yet capable of strong family affection, and the idol of a devoted army ; by nature and education conservative to the verge of antiquarianism, but unrivalled in the weird art of making dead bones live, just so long as his own hand touched them ; the founder of the system which separated civic from provincial administration and made possible the organisation of the Empire ; but, above all, the great practical lawyer who gave Rome what even Crassus and Scaevola had failed to give her—a comprehensive criminal code.

CHIEF DATES.

Leges Corneliae	82
Sulla resigns the Dictatorship	79
Death of Sulla	78

SUBJECTS.

The change in the character of Senatorial rule.

The instability of the constitution of Sulla.

The growth of the Roman system of criminal law.

The growing distinction between imperial and municipal government.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE DECAY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA

The Revolt of Lepidus—Sertorius—Cn. Pompeius—Democratic movement in Rome—Recovery of the Equites—M. Licinius Crassus—The revolt of Spartacus—The new moderate party—The Consulship of Pompeius and Crassus.

THE history of the next ten years is that of the rapid dissolution of the new Senatorial Oligarchy which Sulla had installed with so much care and bloodshed. And the attack did not come from one quarter only. The remains of the Marian party had been stamped out in Sicily and in Africa by Pompeius, but in Italy there were many left who had escaped the proscriptions, and were only waiting for an occasion to take their revenge ; while the ablest of all the Marians, Q. Sertorius, maintained himself in arms in Spain, and defied the government of Rome, for more than six years after Sulla's death.

In Rome, the very funeral of the Dictator had been disturbed by the Consul, M. Aemilius Lepidus, a weak, fanatical person, who tried to repeal the laws relating to the Tribunate, the corn-doles, and the property of the proscribed. For the moment his colleague, the rigid optimate Q. Lutatius Catulus, succeeded in keeping him in order ; but before the end of the year a riot of dispossessed Italians broke out at Faesulae in Etruria, and Lepidus, who had gone out with Catulus as if to suppress it, raised a force of malcontents on his own account beyond the Cisalpine border, and marched upon Rome, with a revolutionary programme and the demand for a second Consulship. But the wild attempt failed. The better part of the populace, and the anti-Sullan factions in Rome held off ; his accomplice, M. Brutus, was shut up in Mutina by Pompeius ; and Lepidus himself was met by the forces of Catulus at the Mulvian Bridge over the Tiber, and utterly defeated. Lepidus took refuge in Sardinia, and died there in the following year ; and the Praetor, M. Perperna, who was in the secret, collected the remnants of his army and fled to Sertorius in Spain.

Sertorius had been the first to see that the Marian cause was hopelessly discredited in Italy, and that the only chance of success was to occupy a distant province, take the natives into his confidence, educate a new Roman people by liberal and clean-handed government, and then force similar reforms on the rest of the empire and on the city. He was himself peculiarly fitted for so bold and enlightened an adventure. He had a genius for efficient administration, and a peculiar gift of impressing his wishes and his principles upon his followers. His Spaniards, indeed, believed him to be inspired, and held the tame fawn, which went with him, to be his familiar spirit. After a first attempt in Africa, he chose Spain as the place of his experiment; beat easily the small Roman forces which opposed him, and was in full possession of both the Spanish provinces before the death of Sulla. He soon adapted the existing form of government to his purpose, filling the chief posts with Roman exiles of his own party, and conceding a large measure of self-government to the Spanish communities; while, to prepare them for full enfranchisement, he introduced Roman methods of education everywhere, and established a regular college at Osca for the sons of the native chiefs, whom he held as hostages for the loyalty of their respective families.

Sertorius
in Spain.

In the year 79 the Senate sent Q. Metellus Pius, who had been Consul in 80, and was the ablest of the older lieutenants of Sulla, to crush the insurrection of Sertorius. But he made little progress against the guerilla tactics of the Spaniards, and it was not long, as we have seen, before Perperna arrived, on the Marian side, with the remains of the army of Lepidus. The war went on, year after year, and the drain of men from Italy grew intolerable. Yet the Senate seemed incapable of taking more vigorous action.

Metellus
fails to
crush him.

In Rome, meanwhile, another thorn appeared in the side of the Sullan government. Cn. Pompeius, who as a mere boy had raised three legions for Sulla, and had been employed by him to crush out the Marian movement in Sicily and in Africa, had caused even the Dictator some trouble on his return, and had extorted from him the surname *Magnus* and a triumph; though he was only twenty-five years old, and had held as yet no curule office at all. He had used his influence again to secure the election of Lepidus, to embarrass the Sullan government; but had taken no part in the foolish proceedings of his nominee, and had demonstrated his loyalty anew by suppressing the partisans of anarchy in Cisalpine Gaul.

Pompeius,
'Magnus.'

Pompeius was, first and foremost, a soldier of rare ability, popular with his men, and devoted to their well-being. But he was no states-

man ; he had no political tact or knowledge of men, and no real grasp of the problems which confronted the city at home. His real merits, too, were heavily discounted by a strong vein of personal vanity, which led him, again and again, to throw away his chances for a moment of worship or flattery. He had joined Sulla for the prospect of service on a winning side, and with a real master of war ; but he had no love for a Senate which neither made great wars nor went out of its way to keep a rising general before the public eye. After the suppression of Lepidus he had refused to disband his levies, and he was so obviously bidding for the command in Spain, that the Senate began to have its own suspicions of his meaning.

But the ill success of Metellus, the criticisms which this aroused, and the absence of any other possible commander, gave Pompeius his opportunity ; and the Senate, by a distinct breach of Sulla's ordinance, and sorely against its own will, gave him a command against Sertorius *pro consule*—and as the wits said, *pro consulibus*—though even yet he had held no regular office. Pompeius raised a force of forty thousand men, and marched to Spain overland, forcing his way, with some difficulty, and by a new route, over the Cottian Alps. Metellus had been roused by the advent of an independent commander, and before the arrival of Pompeius, in 76, had defeated Hirtuleius, an able lieutenant of Sertorius, at Italica in the south, and gained fresh hold on a large part of the peninsula.

At first, the advent of Pompeius served only to draw together the leaders of the other side. Perperna, who had hitherto been acting independently, put himself at the disposal of Sertorius, and though Pompeius took Valentia on the east coast, Sertorius recovered Lauro not fifty miles away ; and in the campaign of 75 Pompeius was twice saved from disaster only by the approach of his rival Metellus. After this there was no more open fighting. Metellus was fully occupied in the south and the interior, while Pompeius kept close watch on the movements of Sertorius in the Hither Province. Pompeius received large reinforcements in 74 ; but after the outbreak of a fresh war with Mithradates (p. 448) he could look for little further help from Rome ; and the native mode of warfare was wholly favourable to the defence. Sertorius, besides, was in secret alliance with the pirates of the Mediterranean, and with Mithradates ; and the last named sent him forty ships and three thousand talents of money, and accepted his offer of Roman officers to remodel his Asiatic army.

At last, what numbers and strategy could not effect was secured by the treachery of Perperna. He had always been jealous of the abler

and more popular Sertorius, and had only been driven by stress of circumstances to admit his leadership at all. In the year 72 he began to hamper his movements, and encouraged a conspiracy among his Marian officers. The plot was discovered and severely punished; but at a banquet at headquarters, shortly afterwards, Sertorius was assassinated, and forty thousand of his native followers, who had bound themselves, after the custom of their country, to live and die with their chief, are said to have followed him beyond the grave.

Death of
Sertorius,
71 B.C.

With the death of its leader the rebellion fell to pieces immediately. Perperna was defeated and captured by Pompeius, and tried to buy his life by the surrender of the private papers of Sertorius. But Pompeius refused to see him, burned the papers unread, and put the traitor to death without further ado. Some few towns in the Ebro valley, like Calagurris, held out till the end of the year, but the rest of Spain was easily pacified. Sertorius, in fact, had done his real work already. He had permanently Romanised the Celtiberian people; he had defied for nearly eight years the Sullan government, and two of the best generals of Rome; and he had shown the world how completely the control of the distant provinces had passed from the hands of the Senate to any commander who could keep a subject nation loyal to himself and his ideas. But he was too far away and too completely isolated, like the Carthaginians in Spain before, to be able to upset the rule of the restored Senate, or to lay his hand upon the city or the rest of the empire; and he was too true to his own Roman principles, to become an efficient instrument in the hands of his confederate Mithradates, or to surrender one foot of Roman territory to an acknowledged enemy of Rome.

Suppression
of the revolt.

The war in Spain was over none too soon; for in Italy the mismanagement of the restored Senate had gone from bad to worse, and the Sullan constitution was steadily falling into pieces. The remains of the democratic party had begun to reassert themselves as soon as it was safe after the rash attempt of Lepidus, and demanded the restoration of the ancient privileges of the Tribunes as the mouthpiece of popular grievances, and as a constitutional check upon the Senate and its nominees in office. In 76, indeed, a first proposal, made by Cn. Sicinius, failed; but the liberal Consul of 75, C. Aurelius Cotta, though he had been an active lieutenant of Sulla, succeeded in cancelling the provision by which the Tribunate disqualified for other offices, and perhaps restored also the right

Democratic
movement
in Rome.

of intercession. In 76 young C. Caesar thought it safe to accuse a Sullan favourite, Cn. Dolabella, of extortion, and won his case, though Hortensius conducted the defence. And in 73 the *Lex Terentia Cassia*, proposed by the Consuls, M. Terentius Varro and C. Cassius Varus, re-established in some degree the doles of corn which Sulla had suspended altogether.

The Senatorial misgovernment of the provinces, too, provoked renewed hostility on the part of the merchants and capitalists. The old Equestrian Order had been decimated and ruined by the proscriptions ; but the numerous wealthy Italians with whom Sulla had recruited its ranks were not long in identifying themselves with the demand for more liberal and efficient administration ; and the revived trade with the east, under Sulla's treaty with Mithradates, only intensified the evils of irresponsible oligarchy abroad. The leader of this fresh party of material interests was M. Licinius Crassus, the ablest banker and financier of Rome : a man of Senatorial family, but by habit and disposition entirely divorced from his order ; a fair soldier, as we shall see ; a weighty but unimpassioned orator ; above all, a man of money and influence, cool, calculating, and unscrupulous, who had made his fortune by judicious buying during the period of proscription, and who held at his mercy half of the oligarchs themselves ; as one after another outran his means in the growing competition for office, and borrowed heavily from the great banker. His only drawbacks, in fact, were his want of openness and straightforwardness, his lack of statesmanlike ideas, and the vanity which led him, like Pompeius, though with far less reason, to aspire to a military reputation.

The chance for Crassus came through an outbreak in Italy itself, for which he and his friends were in the long run mainly responsible. The state of the country districts of Italy was worse than ever, and it only needed a spark to produce a conflagration. The Roman passion, too, for human combats in the public shows, which had long been indulged by victorious generals and candidates for public office, had produced another source of dangerous unrest in the gladiatorial schools, in which prisoners of war, condemned criminals, and ruined adventurers were trained for their brutal profession. In the year 73 the inmates of one of these schools at Capua broke loose, at the instigation of Spartacus, a captured brigand from Thrace, and of two Gaulish prisoners, Crixus and Oenomaus. The escaped gladiators made their headquarters in the vine-clad crater of Vesuvius, whence they dominated all Campania, and summoned to arms those savage herds-

Rapid
recovery of
the Equites.

M. Licinius
Crassus.

The
Revolt of
Spartacus,
73-1 B.C.

men and runaway slaves of Southern Italy, whom the ravages of the campaigns in 90, 89, and 83, of Sulla's desolation of Samnium, and of the renewed drain on the free population for the wars with Sertorius and Mithradates, had left to be almost the only living souls in the country districts of the south. For other reasons also, the Gladiatorial War was a far more serious affair than the Slave Wars formerly in Sicily (pp. 339, 381). It took place on the mainland, and no natural barrier lay between the rebels and the city; and, besides, under Sulla's ordinance, no Roman troops were stationed any longer in Italy. Pompeius and Metellus were far away in Spain; L. Lucullus was in Asia Minor, and his brother Marcus on the Macedonian frontier; and C. Cotta died in the course of this very year.

By the end of 73, Spartacus had collected a regular army of seventy thousand men, had twice scattered the raw Roman levies who opposed him, and had beaten the Praetor, P. Varinius, who tried to bar his way into Lucania. In the next year both Consuls took the field against the gladiators: and though L. Gellius succeeded in defeating Crixus near Mount Garganus in Apulia, both he and his colleague Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, together with reinforcements from Cisalpine Gaul, were defeated in Picenum by Spartacus, whose forces were swollen to more than a hundred thousand, and who threatened at one time to march on the city itself. His own design was simply to fight his way northwards out of Italy, and home to his native hills; but his motley force refused to submit to his discipline, and succumbed to the temptation to plunder the country round; before the end of the campaign the Romans had summoned the garrisons of Cisalpine Gaul, and had made their dispositions to bar his escape; and he retired again to Thurii and the hills of Lucania and Bruttium.

In the next year, 71, his case was already desperate. Crassus was now Praetor, and devoted both his wealth and influence, and his great powers of organisation, to the suppression of the movement. He decimated the remains of the consular levies for their cowardice in the previous year, raised six fresh legions on his own account, and, having somewhat restored the tone of the army, moved southward, with eight legions in all, to enclose the rebels in Bruttium. Spartacus tried to persuade the pirates to convey his forces over to Sicily; and, when this failed, made a desperate dash through the entrenched lines of Crassus, and broke loose into Apulia. But his forces were divided against themselves. The Celts and Germans among them went adrift from the rest, and were soon entrapped and massacred by Crassus; and when Spartacus himself gained a momentary

Successes
of the
Gladiators.

Crassus
puts down
the revolt,
71 B.C.

success, his men ruined all by insisting on a regular battle. Spartacus was killed, and his army scattered to the winds. Six thousand, who were taken prisoners, were crucified as a warning between Capua and Rome, along the Appian Way ; and five thousand more, who had made a last dash northwards, were intercepted by the army of Pompeius, who arrived at this moment overland from Spain, and took to himself a full share of the credit for the successful termination of the war:— ‘Crassus cut down the enemy,’ he said ; ‘but I have pulled them up by the roots.’

The war with Spartacus, even more than that with Sertorius, had demonstrated the incapacity of the Senate, under the Sullan constitution, either to preserve public order, or even to provide for the safety of life and property ; and all the malcontent factions united in a common agitation for reform. Even before the war in 73, C. Licinius Macer, with the support of the leaders of the democratic party, had renewed the agitation for the revival of the powers of the Tribunate, and the moment now seemed opportune for a final effort. For Pompeius still bore a deep grudge against the nobles, who envied his successes and were shocked at his neglect of the official routine ; and he was quite prepared to pose as the champion of reform, if the reformers in their turn would secure him the Consulship, and the foreign command which would yield him fresh triumphs later on. Also he wanted power, to provide lands for his veteran soldiers, and it was only with the help of the popular party that he could hope to carry a land-law.

The capitalists, too, had suffered severely under Lucullus’ impartial administration of Asia, to which we must return later ; in Italy, they had seen their slaves run wild, and their estates devastated through the Senate’s negligence ; and Crassus, though an old rival of Pompeius, was not unwilling to co-operate with him and with the democrats to impose a tribunicial check upon the mismanagement of the Senate, if at the same time something could be done for the Equites in the way of reform of the *iudicia*.

And there were other parties, besides, whose help was not difficult to secure. The country towns, which had suffered heavily in the war ; the freedmen, who felt the weight of their votes the more dis- counted, the faster their numbers increased ; the children of the proscribed, who still hoped against hope to recover the estates which Sullan favourites and equestrian speculators had annexed,—all alike were prepared to support a movement to upset the Sullan constitution.

Renewed agitation in Rome :
(1) Democrats.

(2) Pompeius.

(3) Equites.

(4) Other malcontents.

There was also a large, and yearly more influential group of moderate politicians, whose objects lay between those of the party of wealth on the one hand, and those of the democratic party on the other; all that they demanded being a really efficient government, and a real aristocracy of talent, if that might be, irrespective of rank, or wealth, or influence. Their spokesman was M. Tullius Cicero (p. 460), who had had his first taste of official life as Quaestor in Sicily in 75; and they were quite ready to support a coalition government and a democratic programme, as the most likely way to effect a substantial reform.

A new moderate party.

All that was wanted was the means to coerce the Senate, and this was supplied—in defiance of Sulla's provision to the contrary—by the armies of Pompeius and Crassus, which the necessities of the late revolt had admitted within the frontiers of Italy. The two commanders lay outside the walls of Rome, and announced their intention of standing for the Consulship of 70. Neither was qualified for election: Crassus had only been created Praetor in 71; and Pompeius, as we have seen, had held no regular office at all. But Metellus, the only strong man on the Senate's side, had been persuaded to disband his army as soon as he arrived from Spain; and the Senate dared not oppose their election. Pompeius was allowed to celebrate a triumph over Sertorius and the gladiators, on the last day of 71; while Crassus, who had held no proconsular *imperium*, had to be satisfied with a mere *ovatio*. But both retained their own legions under arms outside the gates, in case they should have use for them during their year of office.

Consulship of Pompeius and Crassus, 70 B.C.

Under these circumstances, little resistance was offered to the reforms which the Consuls proposed. The Tribune was fully confirmed once more in its power of veto, and its initiative in legislation. The Censorship was re-established, and no less than seventy-four Senators were marked off the list for gross misconduct. And on the proposal of L. Cotta, the brother of the reformer of 75, the monopoly of the *iudicia* was withdrawn from the Senate, and *iudices* were ordered to be chosen—one-third from the Senate, one-third from the Equestrian Order, and one-third from the *Tribuni Aerarii*, whose exact status is not clear, but who seem to represent the next grade of wealth and social standing below the *Equites*, and the political views of the new moderate party of Cicero and his associates.

Their reforms.

The last-named reform was indeed rendered inevitable by a scandalous case of misgovernment, which Cicero himself had been mainly concerned to expose. C. Verres, who had been sent to Sicily *pro praetore* in 73,

returned to Rome laden with all imaginable spoil, and pursued by the universal hatred of the unfortunate provincials. He had saved himself once already, in 77, by turning evidence against his patron Dolabella (p. 440), and though he was threatened with a prosecution *de repetundis* in the ordinary course, he had taken the usual precautions to secure favourable *iudices*, and made no doubt of securing an acquittal. Cicero, however, who knew Sicily himself (p. 461), and had still many friends in the island, took up the case, and by judicious management and eloquent pleading created so bad an impression against both the accused and the senatorial court, that Verres threw up his case and went into voluntary exile. Cicero's reputation was made; and the Senate dared not oppose the Aurelian Law, which was already under discussion, for fear of worse disclosures.

Of all the provisions of the Sullan constitution, therefore, there remained in force only the forms of the criminal code and of legal procedure; and of all his settlement of Italian society, only the heartburnings and personal injuries which resulted from the proscriptions. The Tribune had regained its use as an instrument of reform, and as a tool in the hand of the Senate or of any other political faction; the Equites had reasserted their control of provincial administration and finance; the ten thousand Corneli had gone over to their fellows in the city populace; and doles and shows and political excitements had begun again to accumulate, among the latter, the materials for a popular and irresponsible outbreak, in the cause of any adventurer who could get the favour of the mob for a moment.

Pompeius, of course, was given the satisfaction which he required for his veterans; but neither Crassus nor the Senate wished to see him launched upon another career of victory. In the war which was going on in Asia Minor, the luck was, as yet, all on the side of the Senate's general, Lucullus; and elsewhere, for the moment, there was peace. Moreover, the Equites, having got what they wanted by the new compromise in regard to the *iudicia*, began to look with suspicion upon the further movements of the democrats and of their military champion; and Pompeius was not long in displaying the same kind of tactless inaptitude for political matters, which, with Marius, had been the beginning of the end. With the democrats themselves, too, he had no close tie; he had already fulfilled his part of the bargain, and had enjoyed his triumph and his Consulate. It was conveyed to him, therefore, at the end of the year, that there was no provincial command available, and Crassus managed to persuade him to dismiss his veterans to their farms. On laying down office, therefore, Pompeius found himself,

The case of
C. Verres.

Dissolution
of the Sullan
régime.

Break-up of
the coalition.

once more, merely an ordinary citizen without political following, and was forced to retire for the moment into private life.

[The internal history is resumed in Chapter XXXVIII., see also p. 453.]

CHIEF DATES.

Revolt of Sertorius in Spain	80
Death of Sulla : Revolt of Lepidus	78
Pompeius sent to Spain	77
First Lex Aurelia reopens curule offices to Tribunes	75
Revolt of Spartacus	73-1
Lex Terentia Cassia resumes corn-doles	73
Murder of Sertorius, and end of the Spanish Revolt	72
Crassus crushes the revolt of Spartacus	71
Consulship of Pompeius and Crassus	70
Second Lex Aurelia reforms the Judicia	70

CHIEF PERSONS.

M. Aemilius Lepidus—M. Junius Brutus—M. Perperna—Q. Sertorius—
 Q. Metellus Pius—Cn. Pompeius Magnus—L. Hirtuleius—Cn. Sicinius—
 C. Aurelius Cotta—C. Julius Caesar—Cn. Cornelius Dolabella—
 M. Licinius Crassus—P. Varinius—L. Gellius—Cn. Cornelius Lentulus
 —M. Tullius Cicero—C. Verres—M. Aurelius Cotta—Spartacus—Crixus
 —Oenomaus—Mithradates.

CHIEF PLACES.

Faesulæ—Mutina—Pons Mulvius—Osca—Italica—Valentia—Lauro—
 Calagurris—Capua—Mons Vesuvius—Mons Garganus.

SUBJECTS.

- The reappearance of a Democratic Party in Rome.
- The aims and methods of Sertorius.
- The revival of the Equestrian Order.
- The new Moderate Party.
- The characters of Pompeius and Crassus.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE EASTERN CONQUESTS OF LUCULLUS AND POMPEIUS

[*The history of Roman Asia, continued from Chapter XXXIV.*]

The Second War with Mithradates—His schemes—The Third War with Mithradates—Reforms of Lucullus in Asia—War with Tigranes of Armenia—Difficulties of Lucullus—The Pirates—*Lex Gabinia*—Pompeius clears the Mediterranean of pirates—*Lex Manilia*—Pompeius in Asia Minor—Death of Mithradates—Settlement of the East.

It was not long before the need of a single strong hand was demonstrated afresh in the east. Sulla, as we have seen, had been forced to content himself with a provisional arrangement with Mithradates, and had probably intended to return to the matter, as soon as his position should be secure in Rome; and he had left in Asia L. Licinius Murena with a force of two legions, to keep watch over the movements of the king of Pontus. Mithradates, after the failure of his great scheme of conquest, seems really to have desired an interval to recover his strength; but Murena wanted a triumph, and the deserter Archelaus urged him to take advantage of the prostration of his former master. Under the pretext, therefore, that Mithradates had not yet wholly evacuated Cappadocia, and that he was gathering a fresh army, Murena advanced beyond the provincial frontier in 83, crossed the Halys, and entered Pontus itself. Mithradates was indeed arming, but it was against trouble in Colchis and the kingdom of the Bosporus, not for war with Rome. The proceedings of Murena took him quite unawares, and he professed himself wholly willing to conform to the terms of Sulla's treaty. But Sulla and the Senate were preoccupied, and he could get no confirmation of the terms from Rome. Murena remained aggressive, and Mithradates had no choice but to defend himself. In concert with his son-in-law, Tigranes of Armenia, who was rapidly extending his kingdom into Syria and Asia Minor, he poured all his forces into Cappadocia in 82, and beat Murena in a pitched battle on the Halys. But

by this time Sulla had had time to look round him, and sent summary orders to Murena to stop the war and come home. Murena, who had really done good work in the east by his suppression of piracy, and by the annexation of the troublesome district of Cibyra in the south-west, was allowed the triumph he coveted. Mytilene, which had been so foolish as to declare for Pontus, was punished after a siege, in which young C. Caesar (p. 463) won his first military distinction. Mithradates evacuated Cappadocia, and there was peace for nearly six years.

While Sulla lived, however, there remained the fear that he might come back to Asia to avenge the massacre of 88, and complete the reorganisation he had begun; and Mithradates devoted himself to the reform of his army on modern Roman lines, and ^{Schemes of} Mithradates. to the cultivation of friendship with Sertorius, who lent him officers and instructors from Spain; with the Marian exiles at his own court and elsewhere; with the mountain tribes of Thrace, who guarded the only land-access from the west to Asia Minor; and with the pirates, who swarmed in every corner of the Mediterranean. On the Roman side, the Sullan Senate did little or nothing in reply. P. Servilius in 78 had some success against the pirate states of Cilicia, and there was war on the Thracian frontier of Macedon in 77 and 73; but when Egypt was bequeathed to Rome (like Pergamum before in 133), on the death of its king Alexander in 81, no steps were taken to secure or to organise so valuable a dependency. The pirates barred only too completely all access to it from Italy.

At last Mithradates was ready. In Pontus alone, besides his forces north of the Euxine, he had one hundred and twenty thousand men, sixteen thousand cavalry, and a corps of a hundred scythed chariots; he had a superior fleet of his own, with a safe base and refuge behind the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, and, thanks to the pirates, the right-of-way over the whole of the Mediterranean. His ally Tigranes had conquered Syria and overrun Cappadocia, and with his captives had founded a new capital, Tigranocerta, to overlook the plains of the Euphrates; and Sertorius was still occupying the whole attention of Pompeius and Metellus, when the pretext for intervention came. In the winter of 75-74, Nicomedes III. of Bithynia died, and bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman People. The Senate declared it a province at once, and sent both Consuls to Asia to superintend the settlement.

Roman
annexation
of Bithynia,
74 B.C.

The annexation of Bithynia utterly upset the balance of power in Asia. It gave the Romans the command of the Bosphorus and the right-of-way into the Euxine, and opened to them the highway of the Sangarius valley,

and the front door of Phrygia and Galatia. Mithradates, therefore, struck back hard, and promptly set up a pretender and invaded Bithynia in force. Heraclea opened its harbour to his fleet, which destroyed a Roman squadron at Calchedon, and pressed on into the Aegean unopposed. But on land the Romans were ready for him. Their main army indeed, which was in Bithynia under M. Aurelius Cotta, was unable to stop his advance, and was badly beaten at Calchedon; Lampsacus fell; and Mithradates established a regular blockade of Cyzicus. But in Galatia, Deiotarus and other Gaulish chiefs held fast to the Romans, and covered the movements of the other Consul, L. Licinius Lucullus. Lucullus was a commander of real ability and some degree of training, and of his five legions four were veterans, and two of these were the remains of the army of Fimbria. Cilicia, Isauria, and Pisidia declared for the king and the pirates; but he was able first to reinforce the loyal party in Cappadocia, and to menace Pontus from the south; and then to move cautiously northwards behind the Galatian screen, and hang on the flank and rear of the Pontic army, cutting off its supplies and its communication by land with its base. The winter storms, meanwhile, deprived Mithradates of the advantage of his command of the sea; his army began to melt away; and Lucullus lay between his camp and his kingdom. He was compelled therefore to raise the siege of Cyzicus early in 73, and to retreat westwards to his port at Lampsacus; losing heavily, in rearguard actions, at the crossing of the Granicus and Aesepus, and barely effecting his embarkation in face of the advance guard of Lucullus. An attempt to re-land at Heraclea failed, and the king found himself confined once more to his own frontiers. Moreover, his fleet had been badly defeated at Lemnos and Troas, and had been beaten back from the Aegean; and Lucullus, thus freed from anxiety for his communications with Europe, lost no time in reducing Nicomedia, the capital of Bithynia, and in advancing into Pontus itself.

In the coast districts he met with little opposition. Sinope, Amisus, and Themiscyra were besieged, and Mithradates retired into the mountains of the interior. But though the winter had already come on, Lucullus continued to press his advantage. Leaving Murena to finish the siege of Amisus, which soon fell into his hands, he advanced into the valley of the Lycus, and early in 72 had the good luck, near Cabira, to throw the new forces of Mithradates into a panic which scattered them to the winds. The king himself barely escaped with his life, over the hills to Comana; his camp and treasures were taken by the Romans; his more distant

Third War
with Mithra-
dates,
74-65 B.C.

Lucullus
invades
Pontus,
73-72 B.C.

reinforcements failed to make their appearance, and he found himself compelled to take refuge as a suppliant at the court of the king of Armenia ; who long refused even to see him, so as to avoid a quarrel with Rome.

Lucullus thus gained time to complete the conquest of Pontus and the 'Lesser Armenia' west of the Euphrates. The Greek towns on the coast, though aided by the pirates of the Euxine, fell one after another into the hands of Cotta and Triarius, his energetic *legati*. Amisus, the first to surrender, was restored to freedom ; and Lucullus, whose command had been repeatedly prolonged, returned to the province of Asia to relieve the many grievances which had resulted from the hasty settlement of Sulla. He had gained an honourable reputation already by his just and liberal administration of the province as Quaestor in 80, and now he was in a position to continue the reforms which he had then begun. Asia was still groaning under the enormous indemnity imposed by Sulla ; it had been ruined by the former invasion of Mithradates, and by the unchecked extortions of publicans and usurers ever since ; and the distress which prevailed can best be pictured from the remedies which Lucullus had to apply. He cut down the rate of interest altogether to 12 per cent., and forbade the recovery of arrears, or the addition of these to the amount on which interest was reckoned ; the burden on landed estates was reduced to one-quarter of the annual produce, and the *publicani* were confined strictly to the limits of their original contracts. But Lucullus was himself a man of enormous wealth, luxurious habits, and a decided taste for works of Greek art ; and the very publicans and usurers, whom he attempted to restrain, had little difficulty in spreading the report that he too was not above suspicion in his dealings with the provincials. The unrest and unhappiness of Asia were not yet allayed by his real reforms, and the government at home was put on its guard against so active and energetic a Proconsul.

Meanwhile a new complication had arisen on the frontier. Lucullus had sent his own brother-in-law, Appius Claudius, to Tigranes, who was now at Antioch, to demand the surrender of Mithradates ; and what the pitiful spectacle of his father-in-law had not availed to procure, was provoked by the insolence of the Roman envoy. Tigranes, who had hesitated long, suddenly decided to throw in his lot with Mithradates, called out the whole of his vast Oriental army, and disdainingly the cautions and the experience of his guest, declared war on Rome, and advanced into Cappadocia. Lucullus had no orders from Rome to make war with Armenia ; but the refusal

Reforms of
Lucullus in
Asia.

War with
Tigranes
of Armenia,
70 B.C.

of the demands of Claudius, and the unprovoked aggression of Tigranes, were an ample excuse. With two legions, which were all that he could spare, and a small force of Thracian and Galatian cavalry—about ten thousand men in all—he struck boldly forward into Melitene in 69, hoping to meet the king before he could complete his preparations. Tigranes, confident in his enormous numbers, sent forward orders ‘to take Lucullus alive.’ The little Roman force seemed to him, indeed, ‘too small for an army, though too large for an embassy’; but a pitched battle, fought before Mithradates could join him, cost him one hundred thousand men, and convinced him of the wisdom of his ally’s advice. Lucullus meanwhile, who had crossed the Euphrates, laid siege to Tigranocerta; beat the relief force raised by Tigranes; captured and destroyed the city; and received the submission of all the southern conquests of Armenia. The Parthians, grateful for the destruction of their ancient enemy, accepted the Euphrates, readily, as the boundary between their empire and that of Rome.

Lucullus wintered in Cappadocia, and set out again early in 68 to complete the conquest of Armenia. He met and defeated the two kings near Artaxata, the old capital, in the centre of the Armenian highlands; and conciliated the natives by liberal treatment, and the strict discipline in which he held his men. But Artaxata itself held out, and the increasing cold and the growing discontent of the army made it necessary for him to move southwards into Mesopotamia. He had, besides, as it seems, the great idea of striking a blow at the power of Parthia also, and of reuniting under Rome the conquests of Alexander the Great. The latter part of the winter he spent in the siege of Nisibis, east of Tigranocerta; but though Phraates, king of Parthia, was already prepared to make terms, the renewed activity of the Armenians, and a mutiny in his own camp, brought all his schemes to the ground. The veteran remnant of Fimbria’s army had now seen thirteen years’ continuous service in Asia; they were disgusted with the strict discipline imposed by Lucullus, and with the unprofitable warfare of the Armenian hills; and their grievances were fomented by a young democratic agitator, P. Clodius, of whom we shall hear more later on.

Meanwhile the aspect of the war itself changed also. A detachment of Roman troops under C. Fannius was cut off and shut up near Tigranocerta, on the line of retreat from Nisibis. In Asia, the *legatus*, M. Fabius, had made himself unpopular; and, worst of all, Mithradates had given Lucullus the slip and reappeared in Pontus, and, after spending the winter at Comana, had shut up Fabius and the Roman garrison at Cabira. Then in the spring of

Roman reverses in Asia Minor.

67 another legate of Lucullus, C. Triarius, had been forced by the behaviour of his men to give battle at a disadvantage, and had lost his camp, with seven thousand men and a great number of officers, at Zela. The provincial governor of Bithynia, M. Acilius Glabrio, was unable or unwilling to interfere, and Q. Marcius refused to spare help from Cilicia for the needs of the interior.

Lucullus was soon on his way back from Mesopotamia; and relieved the threatened legates; while Mithradates withdrew into Lesser Armenia to wait for Tigranes. But by this time the news of the mutiny at Nisibis and of the reverses in Asia Minor had given to the enemies of Lucullus in Rome the opportunity they required. They represented his ill-success as the result of excessive greed, which had launched him on a fool's errand in Parthia, while preventing his men from reaping the fruits of their trouble. The Senate had never sanctioned the war with Armenia; and now that the luck had turned, the government turned upon its general, commanded the discharge of the Fimbrian veterans, and ordered Glabrio, the new Proconsul of Bithynia, to supersede Lucullus. To make matters worse, the Senatorial Commission, which had been appointed to organise the new province of Pontus, arrived on the scene of their labours about the same time, to find everything in confusion, and Mithradates himself on the frontier. Glabrio, meanwhile, though he duly published his intention of taking over the armies of Lucullus, remained within his own province of Bithynia; and before the end of the year Mithradates was re-established in his old kingdom.

Lucullus is superseded, 67 B.C.

While Lucullus had been conquering Asia as far as the Tigris, the state of the Mediterranean coasts had gone from bad to worse. The pirates, on whom Mithradates had relied to harass the Roman communications with Asia, had more than fulfilled their part of the bargain, and had put even Rome itself to severe inconvenience. Piracy in the Mediterranean had been a profitable occupation for the outlaws of every state since history began. The strong sea-power of Athens in the fifth century had indeed held the evil in check for a time; but the rivalries of the Greek states in the fourth century, and of Egypt, Syria, and Macedon in the third, had given them almost a free hand; and the Roman conquest of the Aegean had even made matters worse. For, while it destroyed or thwarted the sea-power of Pergamum and Rhodes, the Senate wholly neglected to provide even an adequate police-force in the Aegean, and allowed what had been hitherto merely the last refuge of desperate adventurers, to become an

The Pirates.

organised profession, and almost a sea-power in itself, with impregnable headquarters on the rugged coast of Cilicia, and in Crete, and a systematic policy of plunder and slave-trade from end to end of the Mediterranean. As the Romans remained, at least in name, the champions of order and commerce—however they might have treated their responsibilities—the pirates found their natural ally and patron in Mithradates; who was thus enabled, as we have seen, to maintain communications with Sertorius in Spain, and to destroy the commerce and ruin the dependencies of Rome.

As early as 103 the Romans had been compelled to take vigorous action against the pirates in self-defence, and M. Antonius had been sent, with a proconsular command, to annex and occupy Cilicia.

Roman
annexation
of Cilicia,
103-78 B.C.

But the Cilician province languished, and though Sulla in 92 had been able to use it as the base of his first campaign against Mithradates (p. 405) it soon became again a headquarters of piracy. In the very year of Sulla's death, the Senate was forced to send an able officer, Cn. Servilius, with special instructions to restore order on that coast; and his annexation of Isauria westward did something to diminish the evil for the moment. But on the outbreak of war with Pontus in 74, Pisidia, Isauria, and Cilicia declared for Mithradates at once, and the pirates in Crete and elsewhere redoubled their activity.

The strength of the pirate system lay in its single organisation; the weakness of Roman coast-defence, in the fact that each province was M. Antonius, kept isolated, of set purpose, from the rest; and the jealousy 74 B.C. and neglect of the provincial governors completed the chaos which resulted from the total neglect of the fleet. When the war broke out with Mithradates, however, an attempt was made at last to remedy this vital defect. M. Antonius, the Praetor of 75, the son of the conqueror of Cilicia, and the father of the Triumvir (p. 530), was given a special and unlimited command, *imperium infinitum aequum*, which enabled him to go anywhere, and make what use he pleased of the resources of each province, without let or hindrance on the part of the regular governor. But the experiment failed utterly. Antonius used his 'unlimited' powers for unlimited plunder of the provinces, and earned the derisive surname *Creticus* from his ignoble death in Crete in 71.

After this fiasco, the pirates grew more audacious than ever. They raided the coast of Latium, carried off two Roman Praetors on the Q. Metellus, Appian Way, and burned the corn-ships at Ostia, so that 68 B.C. the city was brought almost to a state of famine. In 68, while Lucullus was in Armenia, Q. Metellus succeeded in entering and

partly annexing Crete ; but the pirate squadrons had other ports at their command, and the distress in Rome became acute.

It was obvious that the only remedy was to entrust the whole naval resources of Rome to a single able man, and leave him unfettered by restrictions of time and place until the seas were cleared ; *Lex Gabinia*, a revolutionary proposal indeed, but clearly the only ^{67 B.C.} alternative to the customary method which had made all the trouble. Early in 67 one of the Tribunes, A. Gabinus, a mere instrument of the anti-Senatorial factions, proposed a measure that the People—no longer the Senate—should nominate one man of consular rank to supreme and sole command against the pirates for a period of three years, giving to him, as to Antonius, *imperium infinitum aequum* on all seas, and for fifty miles inland ; with fifteen *legati* of praetorian rank, two hundred ships, all the troops and supplies he might need, and a war fund of two thousand talents ; while all governors and client-states were to be ordered to assist him to the utmost of their power. The measure of Gabinus was supported vigorously both by the city populace, which was starving, by the Equites, whose business was at a stand-still, and even by a few young aristocrats like L. Quinctius and C. Caesar, who, though of the noblest families and bred up in the government circle, saw very clearly that the republican system was fast breaking down. It was opposed by the leaders of the constitutional party, Q. Lutatius Catulus and Q. Hortensius, who pointed out the danger of a command so vast and so prolonged, and by the whole of the Senate, with the single exception of young C. Caesar. Another Tribune, L. Trebellius, was procured to interpose his veto ; but Gabinus threatened to treat him as Gracchus had treated Octavius, and Trebellius gave way.

Gabinus had mentioned no names in his bill, but there was only one man in Rome to whom its provisions could be applied. After some disturbance the bill was passed, and Pompeius, the conqueror of Sertorius and Spartacus, and the rehabilitator of the power of the Tribunes, was appointed to the new post unanimously. The price of provisions began to fall at once, and it was not long before the general confidence was more than justified. Sending out small squadrons, under his *legati*, to divide the forces of the pirates, Pompeius started with his main fleet from the coasts of Spain, and within forty days had driven the last pirate east of Lilybaeum and Messana. He then returned to Italy, to report the western basin clear ; rejoined his ships at Brundisium ; and in forty-nine days more had swept the eastern seas likewise, and driven in the pirates to their last refuge in Cilicia. A single battle off Coracesium annihilated their fleet,

Pompeius
clears the
Mediterranean
of pirates.

and left twenty thousand prisoners in the hands of Pompeius. Yet the pirates were, indeed, more sinned against than sinning; and Pompeius rightly set himself to provide the survivors, first of all, with an honest means of living. All along the Cilician coast, as at Soli or Pompeiopolis, and also at Dyme in Achaëa, and elsewhere, he founded towns with his captives, and encouraged peaceful commerce and agriculture; and so far as we can judge, his clemency was justified by the result. Only in Crete had he the smallest trouble; and there not from the pirates, but from Q. Metellus, whose former instructions had never been cancelled, and who contested the right of Pompeius to demand his co-operation. Metellus, however, was practically powerless, and was consoled for his disappointment by the empty title of *Creticus*.

It was during this Pirate War that the Senate ordered the supersession of Lucullus; and the successes of Pompeius, no less than the inaction of *Lex Manilia*, Glabrio and Marcius Rex, made it inevitable that the 66 B.C. popular party should urge the appointment of their victorious favourite to the command in Asia also. M. Manilius, one of the Tribunes of 66, followed the example of Gabinius, and proposed that in addition to his present command, which still had two years to run, Pompeius should be entrusted with the province of Bithynia, and a general commission to settle the eastern question. The Senate had no reply that could be made, and a brilliant speech by M. Cicero, the hero of the Verres case, secured the adoption of the measure.

Pompeius had waited in Cilicia, and so was able to begin operations at once. To secure his own rear, he maintained his victorious fleet on a war footing, and no fresh outbreak of piracy occurred during the whole of his absence inland. To allay the suspicions which Lucullus had aroused in the East, and to secure a new ally in rear of the enemy, he concluded a treaty with the Parthians, and engaged them to support the pretensions of the son of Tigranes to the throne of Armenia. Thus assured that Tigranes would find occupation enough at home, he crossed the Taurus, raised a land army of fifty thousand men, making short work of Glabrio and Marcius Rex; and, after a stormy interview with Lucullus at Damala in Galatia, took over his army and cancelled his acts of administration.

Mithradates had already been established in Pontus for more than a year, and had harried Bithynia and Galatia during the summer of 66, but on hearing of the arrival of Pompeius, he offered terms of peace. These, however, were rejected at once, and Mithradates began to draw away towards the Armenian border. He still had some thirty

Pompeius
in Asia
Minor.

thousand men, and a proportionate force of cavalry; but Pompeius harassed his movements, and at last cut off his retreat, by night, in a pass in Lesser Armenia, where the city of Nicopolis stood afterwards. Mithradates himself escaped to the fortress of Sinoria, and tried to rally the survivors; but Tigranes refused to admit him, and he was forced to retire from Asia altogether and to fight his way round by Colchis and the Caucasus to his Bosporean kingdom. Here he killed his son and viceroy Machares, and established himself for a last stand against the Romans, whose fleet had already entered and dominated the Euxine.

Battle of
Nicopolis,
66 B.C.

For the moment, however, Pompeius let him alone, and turned upon Tigranes, whose son joined the Romans at once. The crisis came soon, near Artaxata; the army of Tigranes deserted him, and he surrendered as a suppliant to the invader. Pompeius received him kindly, and re-instated him in Armenia proper, demanding only an indemnity of six thousand talents and the resignation of his claim to style himself the 'king of kings.' The younger Tigranes received the southern districts of Sophene and Gordyene, round Tigranocerta, as an independent kingdom, but showed such signs of restlessness that Pompeius was obliged to keep him personally under close control. The rest of the conquests of Tigranes—Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Cappadocia—were directly annexed to Rome; but the latter was restored, as a client kingdom, to its loyal prince Ariobarzanes.

Conquest of
Armenia.

Armenia being thus pacified, Pompeius left the work of reorganisation for the moment, and went northwards in pursuit of Mithradates. But the enormous difficulties of the mountainous country, the hostility of the Iberian and Albanian tribes, and the approach of winter, caused him to stop short at the Caucasus; and having exacted pledges of loyalty from all the states south of that natural barrier, he returned into winter quarters at Amisus, and completed the organisation of Pontus and Bithynia as Roman provinces.

Pompeius in
Colchis,

But no sooner was the weather open, than he was on the move again. Syria and the southern districts taken from Armenia remained to be settled. A Seleucid pretender had appeared under the name of Antiochus Asiaticus, and the Parthians were quarrelling with the king of Armenia. There was, however, no real opposition. The Parthians accepted the arbitration of Pompeius; Syria was declared a Roman province, and its dependent states became client kingdoms, like Cappadocia; and Pompeius spent the winter of 64-3 at Antioch.

in Syria,

The settlement of South Palestine was more difficult. This district had long been a bone of contention between Syria and Egypt, and the

Jews of the highland districts had been encouraged formerly by the Romans in their attempts to found an independent state, under the able priestly family of the Maccabees. But a feud had broken out in Judaea. Between the two sons of Alexander Jannæus, the last great prince of this line. Hyrcanus was supported by the sect of the Pharisees, who held that the mission of the Jews was to retain their ancient creed undefiled, and to abstain from secular politics; by the Nabataean kingdom of Aretas in north-western Arabia; and by the growing Idumæan power of Antipater, the father of Herod the Great, which lay between Judaea and the Nabataeans. Aristobulus, on the other hand, represented the liberal, Hellenising party of the Sadducees, with their dream of a great temporal kingdom like that of Solomon. Gabinius, who had been sent on into Syria by Pompeius two years before, had recognised Aristobulus provisionally; but the party of Hyrcanus saw in the protectorate of Rome their only prospect of security for peace and toleration, and now came forward to Damascus with offers of surrender. The arrival of the Romans, meanwhile, had proved the deathblow to the dreams of the Sadducees; Aristobulus revolted, and held out at Jerusalem against a three months' siege. But Pompeius, though with Roman thoroughness he insisted on verifying in person the mystery of the 'Holy of Holies,' had no wish to embitter a fanatical people by rigorous treatment. He demanded an indemnity, which the temple-treasures could well afford; he confined the Jewish State to its own proper limits; and he installed Hyrcanus and the Pharisees, as a guarantee against expansion in future. The kingdom of Antipater was considerably extended, and Pompeius was already on the borders of Aretas, when he was recalled by fresh trouble in Judaea; but this was soon suppressed, and Aristobulus was sent to Rome to be out of the way. All was now quiet in the south, and Pompeius was credited with a desire to penetrate through Arabia to the southern ocean, as he had already touched the shores of the Atlantic and the Caspian, when the news reached him, at Jericho, that Mithradates was dead.

For two years, now, the old man had strained the resources of the kingdom of Bosphorus, to create a new army for a last struggle with Rome.

Asia was lost, but he is said to have designed to follow the example of Hannibal, and fling himself on Italy from the north, by way of the Danube and the Tyrol. He organised a fleet, and raised some thirty-six thousand men; but the Greek towns on the coast were deterred by his cruelties, and by the presence of a Roman squadron in the Euxine. An illness delayed his preparations, and his son Pharnaces, whom he had already detected

**Death of
Mithradates,**
63 B.C.

plotting once before, proclaimed himself king at Panticapæum, and was accepted by the army. The old king saw that the game was up, and resolved to put an end to his own life; and when poisons failed, by reason of the antidotes he was wont to use, he found his death at the hand of a Gaulish mercenary. Pharnaces surrendered, and sent his father's body to Pompeius, who ordered it to be buried honourably at Sinope, while he confirmed the usurper in possession.

With the death of Mithradates the danger in the East was over. Pompeius had already reached the limits of effective Roman occupation, and events in Italy called for his presence there. He lost no time in completing his settlement of Asia, and preparing for his return to Rome. The old system of protectorates was almost wholly given up. Beyond the Roman frontier, which now ran from the Euxine to the Euphrates and the Arabian desert, Armenia became a client kingdom, and was confined to its own mountains; while Parthia was bound by a definite alliance, and debarred by the states of Gordyene and Sophene from access to the upper Euphrates. Within the frontier, the only native states remaining were the Judæa of Hyrcanus, the Cappadocia of Ariobarzanes, the enlarged Galatia of the trusty Deiotarus, and a few minor principalities like Commagene on the Euphrates border. All else was organised on the regular provincial model. Cilicia was extended, by the inclusion of Isauria and Pamphylia; and Crete became a new province by itself.

As in the case of the pirates, a new impetus was given to commerce and industry, and a new security for the spread of order and civilisation, by the grant of freedom to the greater Greek centres, like Antioch, Seleucia, and Mytilene, and by the foundation of nearly forty new cities on the Greek model; some, like Zela, Cabira, and Nicopolis, as monuments of the great events of the war; others, like Cyzicus, Sinope, and Amisus, on sites already famous in the world's trade. Many of these new centres of Hellenism bore the name of their founder; but the policy was not his alone. Lucullus had already done much, and had left much planned but uncompleted; and the encouragement of the spread of Greek city-life was but the outcome, under new conditions, of the old Roman patronage of Hellenism, and the counterpart, in the East, of the policy of colonisation which had been pursued in Italy and Gaul.

Settlement
of the East.

Foundation
of new Greek
cities.

CHIEF DATES.

Pirate war in Cilicia	103
Murena attacks Mithradates	83
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Death of Mithradates	63

CHIEF PERSONS.

L. Licinius Murena—L. Licinius Lucullus—M. Aurelius Cotta—C. Triarius—
 P. Clodius—M. Acilius Glabrio—Q. Marcius Rex—Cn. Pompeius
 Magnus—A. Gabinus—M. Manilius—M. Antonius (2)—P. Servilius
 Isauricus—Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus—Mithradates—Machares—
 Pharnaces—Ariobarzanès—Hyrcanus—Aristobulus—Antipater—
 Tigranes—Deiotarus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Mytilene—Lampsacus—Cyzicus—Chalcedon—Heraclea—Sinope—
 Amisus—Cabira—Comana—Tigranocerta—Nisibis—Artaxata—Zela—
 Pompeiopolis (Soli)—Nicopolis—Antioch—Jerusalem—Panti-
 capaeum.

SUBJECTS.

The causes of the growth of piracy.

Imperium infinitum aequum: the Senate's loss of control over foreign
 policy.

The policy of Rome in regard to the Jews.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

CAESAR, CICERO, AND CATILINE

[*Internal History continued from Chapter XXXVI.*]

The political situation in Rome—The Senatorial Party—The Equites—M. Tullius Cicero—The popular party—C. Julius Caesar—Elements of anarchy—L. Sergius Catilina—Consulship of Cicero—Conspiracy of Catiline—Execution of the conspirators—Legality of Cicero's action.

POMPEIUS left Rome to suppress the Pirates in the summer of 67, and he did not return from the settlement of the East until the beginning of 61. It was his unique and overwhelming position, however, which determined the course of events in Rome during his absence. Everybody knew that, when he returned, he would be in a position to impose, like Sulla, whatever solution he pleased upon the difficulties which beset the Republic; but nobody knew what that solution would be, and few could guess that he really had no solution to propose. Consequently every political faction devoted itself, during his absence, to strengthen its own position, and to put itself in the good graces of the great man on his return.

It was the Senate, with characteristic indifference, which troubled itself least about the matter. The mismanagement of the last ten years, and the blow to its prestige which had been inflicted by the recent reforms (p. 443), left it incapable of organising effective opposition to any demands which Pompeius might make on his return; and its hereditary exclusiveness went far to prevent it from fortifying itself with allies from outside. Its leaders, Catulus and Hortensius, Metellus Creticus and Lucullus, had one and all been embittered by the inconsiderate habit of Pompeius, of bringing other people's work to a successful conclusion; and it had been discredited further by the useless opposition which it had offered to the proposals of Gabinius and Manilius. It had no positive policy or programme of its own, and it was further weakened by the usual division into an irreconcilable and a more enlightened faction; and the former was

strengthened for the moment by the appearance of a young and vigorous champion, M. Porcius Cato, the most honest, the most exclusive, the most tactless, and the most obstinate man in Rome.

The Equites, as we have seen already, had recovered very rapidly from their losses in the Sullan troubles. The Aurelian Law had given them a measure of control over the provincial governors; the successes of their own leader, Crassus, in the war with Spartacus, had guaranteed life and property against disturbance from below; the suppression of piracy, and the restoration of order in Asia had reopened to them the principal sources of their prosperity; and the *Lex Roscia* of 67 had restored even the outward social distinctions confirmed to them by C. Gracchus (p. 354), and cancelled in the time of Sulla. But their chief representative, Crassus, the millionaire banker, had never forgiven Pompeius for his untimely return from Spain, which had deprived him of half the glory of the suppression of Spartacus, and he saw clearly that, much as financiers and merchants might profit by the regulation of the East, it was Pompeius in whose hand the prestige and the military force would lie, against which mere wealth could do but little in a struggle for supremacy in Rome.

The Equestrian Order, moreover, no longer consisted only of the capitalists and great merchants of Rome. The enfranchisement of Italy had added to its ranks a very large number of substantial citizens from the country towns, whose interests were quite detached from the old party feuds, and lay wholly in the direction of even-handed and efficient government. This wing of the Equites, therefore, came rapidly and closely into contact with the more liberal and independent members of the Senate's party, from whom they differed only, if at all, on the question of the admission of *novi homines* within the official circle.

Typical of the new Italian Equites was the rising lawyer and orator, Marcus Tullius Cicero. Born in 106 at Arpinum, the home of Marius, in a family which, though of some repute locally, had never mixed in the political life of Rome, he had served with credit in the Social War, and had evaded the perils of the Marian anarchy by devoting himself, in retirement, to the study of rhetoric and law. Before the death of Sulla, however, he had come prominently into notice, at the age of only twenty-five, by accepting the defence of a victim of the worst phase of the proscriptions, Sextus Roscius of Ameria. The father of Sextus had been murdered by private enemies with the connivance of a hanger-on of Sulla; his name had been included subsequently in the fatal list; and now it was proposed to fix

Marcus
Tullius
Cicero.

the guilt of his murder upon his son. Cicero's unforeseen acceptance, and skilful conduct, of this difficult case secured the acquittal of his client, and the exposure of the conspiracy, without incurring the resentment of Sulla ; but the young man's health broke down, and he lived abroad for a while in the rhetoric-schools of Greece and Asia Minor, to prepare himself for his chosen career. On his return to Rome, and to legal practice, some two years later, he rose rapidly, first to rivalry with the foremost pleaders of the day, Q. Hortensius and C. Cotta, and soon to undisputed pre-eminence ; and thus found himself, though a *municipalis* and a *novus homo*, in a position of sufficient influence to solicit political office. In 75 he held the office of Quaestor in Western Sicily, and formed connections there, which proved invaluable to him later on : for in 70, when he had already been elected Aedile, he came once more into prominence by undertaking, at the request of his Sicilian friends, the prosecution of the infamous C. Verres, who had been three years Proprætor of Eastern Sicily, and had devastated the province in a manner which was shocking even in that age. Every obstacle, however, was put in the way of an honest trial. Hortensius, who was Consul-elect, claimed the right to conduct the case instead of Cicero, and technical delays made it almost impossible to get the evidence together in time ; but Cicero's energy and good sense prevailed, no less than the admitted strength of his case. Verres retired into exile before the trial was over, and the impression, which Cicero had produced, that the Senatorial Courts would stick at nothing to defend corruption in high places, contributed largely to the adoption of the Aurelian Law in the same year.

Cicero had now reached a point at which he was bound to take a side in politics, and it was as the champion of the *municipales* of Italy, and of the party of efficiency and reform, that he entered upon this field. He had, in his favour, a His policy. persuasive style, a magnificent command of the Latin language, and a fund of humour and common sense which he knew well how to turn to account on the platform. His studies in Roman law and constitutional history gave him a high and wide conception of political life, and of the better qualities of the Roman character and system ; and his instincts were strongly in the direction of a liberal and judicious conservatism. He believed that it was not impossible to organise the public opinion of Italy as a real force in the politics of Rome, to overcome the exclusiveness of the Senatorial party, to break down the insincerity of political life, and to reform the degenerate luxury of the capital, through the native worth, the straightforward dealings, and the simpler Italian manners of the country towns ;

and to build up, on the foundation of this *consensus Italiae*, a real *concordia ordinum*, against which should avail neither the money-bags of Crassus nor the triumphant armies of Pompeius. But his scholarly speculations, his personal disinterestedness, and his inveterate vanity, blinded him to the practical impossibility of extorting these mutual concessions and realising this ideal Republic; and his want of the political courage to choose a consistent line, and of sustained determination to adhere to it, were liable to leave him helpless, at a crisis, in the hands of men with far meaner ends, and baser ways of attaining them.

Already, in 67, Cicero had defended the attempt of the Tribune, C. Cornelius, to set limits to the abuse of Senatorial and magisterial privileges, and as Praetor in 66 he had warmly recommended the Manilian Law. Pompeius, for him, was the only man with the gifts, and at the same time the independence and the loyalty, to restore order in the East without turning his success to the account of one party or another. To Pompeius, accordingly, he gave his unqualified support, and it was partly, at least, to his unstinted eulogy that the appointment of Pompeius was due. But as time went on, and the political situation darkened, it became less clear what the absolute master of Asia was likely to think of that system of give-and-take, which was Cicero's idea of republican government. To save the republic from Mithradates, or from anarchy, was one thing; to sit day after day in the Senate, bargaining, for the maintenance and the welfare of a republican empire, with men like Catulus and Metellus Creticus, was quite another. Cicero might well have his doubts whether his former advocacy of Pompeius had been the right line to take, after all.

There were others, too, to whom the successes of Pompeius presented themselves in an uncomfortable light. The democratic party, like that of the Equites, had begun to feel a new sense of freedom since the Consulship of Pompeius and Crassus. But again, like the Equites, they were hampered by a diversity of interests, and by the absence, for the moment, of a programme and an undisputed leader. The restoration of the Tribunate had done much to give them the political recognition which they required, and the disappearance of the pirates from the corn-routes had relieved the very real hunger of the city mob; but they had other objects in view, towards which little progress had been made. The enfranchisement of Italy could not be regarded as complete, while the Po formed an artificial barrier, between citizen and subject, down the middle of Cisalpine Gaul; the memory of the proscriptions would never be effaced while the children of the proscribed were excluded from their inheritances and debarred from public

office ; the land question and the debt question were arising again in dangerous imminence, as Sulla's veterans and more prodigal associates began to tire of country life and to drift back once more to the capital. To deal a blow at Senatorial prerogative, and to relieve the urgent distress in Rome, the popular party had heartily supported the proposal of Gabinius ; and the Manilian Law, too, had come partly as the natural sequel, partly as another blow at the Senate's general, Lucullus, and partly also as a bid for the support of the only general who had a grievance against the government. But the parallel between the position of Pompeius and that of Sulla was obvious to every one, and here too the question arose : What view would he take, when he returned, of the aspirations of the democratic party ?

That party, moreover, had found a man once more, among their own ranks, who promised to be a political leader of the highest order. Gaius Julius Caesar was by birth a member of one of the noblest Gaius Julius Caesar. clans in Rome, but of one which had never shared the exclusive views of the majority of the Roman nobility. One of his family (p. 393), as Consul of 90, had been the first to propose a conciliatory step in the crisis of the Social War ; his aunt, Julia, was the wife of Marius, and he himself, just before Sulla's return, had married the daughter of Cinna. Sulla had ordered him to put away his bride, and, when he refused, had ordered his death ; but the influence of his family and the intercession of the Vestals procured his escape, and provoked the prophetic warning of the Dictator, that 'in that young man lies many a Marius.' To avoid worse, Caesar left Rome for a while, and took service in Asia under M. Minucius Therimus, gaining valuable experience of the art of war, and winning at the siege of Mytilene a 'civic crown' for the rescue of a fellow soldier. After Sulla's death he ventured back to Rome, and showed himself at once on the popular side by a vigorous prosecution of Cn. Dolabella for misgovernment in Macedonia. Dolabella indeed was acquitted, but Caesar had felt his own powers of speech, and retired to Rhodes to perfect them under the distinguished rhetorician Apollonius. It was during this period that he was captured at sea by pirates, and that, on the morrow of his ransom, he pursued and overtook his captors, and fulfilled his jesting promise to crucify them all. On the outbreak of the war with Mithradates in 74, he had lent a hand to organise a first defence of the province ; but he held no regular office in Asia, and was back in Rome, and appointed military tribune, before the end of the year. Here by his charm of manner, and profuse liberality, he became the centre of a new group of rising democratic politicians, and roused general curiosity and wide popular sympathy and

enthusiasm by reviving in a striking speech the memory of Marius, and carrying his likeness among the family portraits, at the funeral of Julia and of his own wife Cornelia. In the same year, 63, he held the office of Quæstor in Further Spain, and made his first acquaintance with the half-conquered peoples of the west.

As befitted a rising member of the popular party, Caesar was active in support of the Gabinian Law, and in opposition to the misgovernment of the Senate; but no sooner was Pompeius away than he set about a comprehensive scheme to create a democratic counterpoise. In the year 65, when he held the office of Curule Aedile, he astonished Rome by the magnificence of his games and shows, and did practical work by a much-needed restoration of the Appian Way, while he manifested his political principles by replacing, by night, the trophies and statues of Marius, which Sulla had removed from the Capitol, and maintaining them there to the delight of the survivors of that party, and in face of the protests of Catulus. He also raised the question, which was daily growing in urgency, of an amnesty to the 'children of the proscribed.'

Caesar appeared; moreover, now, for the first time, in open alliance with Crassus, who was one of the Censors of 65, and had proposed, firstly, to enfranchise the Transpadane Gauls, and secondly to reckon Egypt among the regular provinces, and to send Caesar thither to set matters in order. The question of Egypt was of long standing already, and was destined to give more trouble still, before it was finally settled. The last free king, Ptolemy Alexander II., had died in 81, and had left his dominions to the Roman people by will (p. 447). The bequest was ignored by Sulla and the Senate, and contested in Egypt by a low-bred kinsman, Ptolemy the Piper—*Auletes*—who seized Alexandria and established himself on the throne. The meaning of the proposal of Crassus clearly was to establish Caesar in control of the main corn supply of Rome, and at the same time in a rich, populous, and eminently defensible position on the flank of Pompeius, where he could train an army and accumulate resources in the interest of the democrats and Equites. All these schemes, however, came to nothing through the opposition of the other Censor, Catulus, and before long both resigned together without completing even their regular duties.

Like the party of material interests, however, and as so often before, the democratic party had a left as well as a right wing. While Caesar was drawing upon the resources of Crassus to lay the foundation of a democratic monarchy not unlike that of C. Gracchus, and of a military force to counterbalance that of Pompeius, other

factions were working silently but persistently beneath his feet, with the object, in the first place, of overthrowing all that remained of the Sullan order of things, and restoring the irresponsible anarchy of Marius and Cinna. And their motives are easy to divine. Nothing had been done by the restored oligarchy to remedy the desperate distress which followed both the Social and the Civil War, or to heal the feuds which were the legacy of the proscriptions. Nor had the redistribution of private wealth, which resulted from that time of violence, led to the creation of any new group of material interests, such as the *Sullani* and *Cornelii* had been intended by their author to be. The veterans soon sold or wasted their farms, and looked about in vain for more congenial employment. The favourites and conspirators who had profited by the confiscations ran quickly through their ill-gotten spoils, and began to wonder how soon there could be another proscription. The growing extravagance of the age brought more and more young nobles annually to the verge of bankruptcy, and aggravated the evil practices of Equestrian money-lenders. The slaves and shepherd-bandits had been rendered expectant and uneasy by the half-success of Spartacus, and by the absence in the East of so many of the fighting men of Italy; and the utter incompetence of the central government, and the patent inadequacy of the precautions against organised violence, both in Rome and in the country districts, made a sudden concerted outbreak seem perhaps even more easy than was actually the case.

The centre and ringleader of these desperate and abandoned factions was L. Sergius Catilina. This man was a member of an old Roman family which had fallen on evil days, and he himself had gone further (it seems) even than most of his associates into the disreputable depths of fast Roman society. His enormous physical strength made him the admiration alike of the veterans, the cut-throats, and the dissolute young men about town; and his real talents and a certain charm of manner made him pass, with many, for an abler man than he was. But his utter unscrupulousness, his recklessness of his own and other people's property, and a strange want of mental balance, which drove him ever to take the means for the end, made it inconceivable that he should become the leader of a serious political party. In the days of the proscriptions he had been an ardent agent of Sulla, and had sacrificed his own brother-in-law, Q. Caecilius, to the needs of the moment. He had murdered his wife, and then his son, to be free to marry Aurelia Orestilla, a woman, by all accounts, not unlike himself; and though he had retained his seat in the Senate, and had risen in 68 to be Praetor, and then pro-Praetor in Africa, he

Lucius
Sergius
Catilina.

had never succeeded in identifying himself with any political party ; but sank steadily from oligarchy to democracy, and from democracy, as he understood it, to anarchy, for the satisfaction of his private needs.

Early in 65 Catiline had attempted to become a candidate for the consulship ; but he was on his trial, at the time, for extortion in Africa,

The plot of 65 B.C. and the presiding officer refused to accept his name. The elections were conducted with scandalous bribery, and the

successful candidates, P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, a nephew of the Dictator, were promptly unseated in favour of their competitors, L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus. What followed is obscure. Catiline, who meanwhile had been acquitted, by an arrangement with his accuser P. Clodius, seems to have formed a plot with Autronius and others, to murder the Consuls on the New Year's Day, and to reinstate those whom they had displaced. Rumour whispered further, that Crassus was to be proclaimed Dictator, with Caesar as his *Magister Equitum*. Nothing happened, however : some said because Catiline gave the signal too soon, others because Crassus changed his mind. But, in truth, it is most unlikely that either Crassus or Caesar had anything to do with so wild a scheme. They may well have done their best—perhaps, as the event proved, even too much—to secure the election of democratic candidates like Paetus and Sulla ; but it was everything, with both the capitalists and the more far-sighted democrats, to keep the popular confidence and maintain a constitutional government, at least until they had something solid to put in its place. It may, nevertheless, very well have been by the influence of his patron Crassus, that young Cn. Piso, who seems to have been an associate of Catiline, was sent about this time on a special mission to Spain, where memories of Pompeius were still strong, and where the death of Piso, shortly afterwards, was ascribed in some quarters to Pompeian partisans.

As the consular elections of 64 drew near, Catiline renewed his candidature ; and again rumours were afloat that he had the support of

Crassus and of Caesar, and that he intended to signalise his consulship by drastic changes in the State. The Senate, at all events, became thoroughly alarmed, and, having no strong candidate of its own, was reduced to the necessity

of supporting the candidature of M. Cicero, who under ordinary circumstances would have been bitterly opposed as a mere *peregrinus* or 'outsider.' With this unexpected support, and the solid vote of the Italian countrymen, Cicero came out easily at the top of the poll ; his colleague was C. Antonius Hybrida, a needy and unstable person, who was suspected of having an understanding with the conspirators ; while

Cicero
elected
Consul for
63 B.C.

Catiline came third by a few votes. To secure his shifty colleague, Cicero at once announced his intention not to apply for a provincial command; and the promise of the rich province of Macedon seems to have been sufficient to keep Antonius loyal to the government. For the moment, therefore, the situation was saved, and the advanced party of the democrats had received a serious rebuff. Pompeius was known to have shattered Armenia and Pontus, and to be engaged already on the settlement of Syria; and nothing had been effected by way of creating a counterpoise. There was no time to be lost, and the democratic leaders set to work in earnest.

Hardly had Cicero entered on his office, when a Tribune of the Plebs, P. Servilius Rullus, announced an agrarian law, the ostensible object of which was to relieve distress, and provide anew for veteran soldiers by the distribution of public lands. But, as there remained no land unassigned in Italy, it was proposed to utilise the proceeds of the recent Asiatic conquests to buy land at a fair price, and in particular to eject with compensation the tenants of that *Ager Campanus* (p. 328) which had become Roman property by the capture of Capua in 208, and had since then been let out by the Censors in tenancies which were practically permanent. To effect these purchases and compensations, a board of ten persons was to be nominated, after personal candidature in Rome. They were to hold the full *imperium* for five years, and to be entrusted with the whole of the resources of the State, and the whole of the booty and territory acquired by conquest since Sulla's departure for the East in 88. It was indeed, as Cicero said, a proposal to crown ten kings in Rome; and as Pompeius was practically excluded by the provisions of the bill,—for he could not be expected to come back to Rome to stand,—it was clear that its object was to put the heads of the rival factions in a position to oppose him with effect, when his work in the East was finished. Cicero saw clearly what the issue was, and believing Pompeius to be loyal at heart to the republican constitution, set himself vigorously to oppose the bill. He attained his object, and the bill was withdrawn; but he had now shown himself unmistakably on the side of the existing régime, and, though he still commanded the support of the moderate sections of the Senate and the Equites, his popularity with the crowd began to wane.

Another move on the side of the democratic party soon compelled him to appear once more as the champion of the senatorial point of view. A Tribune, T. Labienus, an open confederate of Caesar, brought up for trial an old man, named C. Rabirius, on the ground that, more than thirty-five years before, he had been the

Agrarian
Law of
Rullus.

Trial of
Rabirius.

murderer of Saturninus. Caesar and his uncle got themselves appointed *duumviri perduellionis*, and condemned Rabirius, who appealed in his turn to the Comitia. The question at issue was the old principle that no Roman citizen might be put to death except by the sentence of his peers—a principle which had been infringed by the government in the cases of the two Gracchi, and on more than one occasion since. Caesar took up the matter with apparent energy; not so much from any desire to avenge Saturninus, as to reassert a democratic principle in place of the *concordia ordinum* which Cicero had brought about. Cicero felt himself bound once more to oppose the democratic party; he could not prevent the trial of Rabirius, but he took up his cause, and defended him with energy. The matter, however, had apparently gone far enough. The Praetor, Q. Metellus Celer, summarily dissolved the Comitia by the antiquated device of pulling down the flag on the Janiculum—which signified an Etruscan invasion!—and as Caesar had now forced Cicero into a false position, and so got what he wanted, the trial was never resumed.

An accidental circumstance showed, more clearly still, which way things were going. The Pontifex Maximus, Q. Metellus Pius, died.

Caesar
elected
Pontifex
Maximus.

The office was of no political importance, but was still highly esteemed as a position of dignity and social influence; and as soon as the vacancy occurred, the democrats seized the opportunity to capture the post. The same T. Labienus, who had been Caesar's tool in the case of Rabirius, proposed to re-enact the Lex Domitia of 104, which Sulla had cancelled, and to throw open this and similar offices to popular election. Cicero did not feel it worth while to contest the point; and under the new rule Caesar was elected almost unanimously, in the face of competitors of distinction and seniority, such as Catulus and Servilius Isauricus.

Meanwhile, the consular elections came round, and Catiline was a candidate again. Hitherto he had posed, outwardly at least, as an advanced member of the democratic party; but now, with his repeated failures, his debts, and his desperate associates pressing hard upon him, he devoted himself with frantic energy to organise a gigantic conspiracy from all the many quarters where discontent could not afford to wait. But he had no genius to control the forces which it was only too easy for him to raise; the conspiracy became an open secret, and Cicero was well informed by his spies of all that went on. On October 20 he accused Catiline in the Senate of plotting against the Republic, and announced openly on the following day that, in a week's time, a Sullan centurion named C. Manlius was

pledged to take up arms at Faesulae; that peasantry, slaves, and ruined veterans would flock to his standard and advance on Rome; that Catiline and his friends were to burn Rome, massacre the Consuls, and proclaim *novae tabulae*¹ and a new proscription of all honest men. The Senate postponed the consular elections until the 28th, and charged the Consuls with the customary formula, *uti viderent ne quid res publica detrimenti caperet*: the same vague phrase, the same *senatus consultum ultimum*, which had preceded, and in the Senate's view authorised, the massacre of G. Gracchus and his adherents.

At Faesulae the revolt broke out as Cicero had said, but in Rome Catiline made no sign. Cicero held the elections with a breastplate under his robes; and two trustworthy men, D. Junius Silanus and C. Licinius Murena, were elected as the Consuls of 62. Catiline, defeated again, was driven to desperation. Cicero had defeated him at every point, and clearly was only waiting for the conspirators to do something rash, to shatter the whole of their scheme. On the evening of November 6 a meeting was held at the house of M. Porcius Laeca, at which two of the conspirators bound themselves to murder Cicero on the following day; but on reaching his house they found it closed and guarded. Cicero had had news of them again, and in a meeting of the Senate the same day let loose his indignation against Catiline, who had the effrontery to attend, and sat alone, shunned and avoided by the rest. *Quousque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?* he began, and unfolded all he knew about the plot. Catiline attempted to reply, but he was howled down by the Senators, and rushed forth with curses on the Consul and the Republic. The same night he was on the road to Faesulae, wearing the emblems of a Consul, but already proclaimed by the Senate a 'public enemy.' To watch his movements, and also to remove a dangerous colleague from Rome, Antonius was sent forward with all the forces that could be raised; while Cicero remained in the city to deal with the rest of the conspirators and to defend the Consul-designate, Murena, against an untimely charge of corruption.

Catiline had entrusted his cause to C. Cornelius Cethegus, a desperado like himself, and to P. Cornelius Lentulus, who had been Consul in 71, but had been expelled from the Senate, and had only now re-entered it as one of the Praetors of the year. They were to have everything ready for a *coup d'état* on December 17; but, in their eagerness to make all secure, they delivered themselves utterly into Cicero's hand. Certain

Cicero
unmasks
Catiline.

Arrest of
Lentulus
and
Cethegus.

¹ 'Making a clean slate,' that is, by wiping out all existing debts.

envoys from the Allobroges of Transalpine Gaul had reached Rome on business connected with their tribe, and Lentulus and Cethegus took upon themselves to invite them to join the rebellion. The Allobroges conferred with their *patronus*, Q. Fabius Sanga, and he in turn with Cicero, who took full advantage of his opportunity. The Gauls were instructed to secure written instructions under the sign and seal of the principal conspirators, and left Rome on the night of December 2, accompanied by one Volturcius, who bore despatches for Catiline. On the Mulvian Bridge, barely two miles from Rome, they were entrapped and arrested by Cicero's men, and conveyed back to the city. Cicero summoned the Senate at once; sent for Lentulus and Cethegus, and three other ringleaders, and confronted them with their own seals, still unbroken, on the documents. Volturcius, too, was produced, and told the whole story, under promise of a free pardon. There was nothing left but to admit their guilt, and the conspirators were entrusted for safe keeping to Crassus, Caesar, and the other democratic leaders, who could least afford to let them escape now. Then, in an open meeting on the same day, the Consul announced the discovery of the plot.

Two days later, on December 5, the Senate was summoned again, to determine the fate of the conspirators. Cicero might indeed have dealt with them at his own discretion, under the terms of the *senatus consultum ultimum* which he had already secured; but he preferred—and probably rightly—to fortify himself with the express opinion of the Senate. On the question being put, the Consul-elect Silanus moved that they be put to death; and every Senator in turn assented, until it came, among the Praetors-elect, to Caesar, who moved as an amendment that they should suffer perpetual confinement in Italian country towns. The eloquence of his appeal to expediency shook the resolution of Silanus and others who had already voted, and Cicero found it necessary to intervene in the debate; but the situation was saved by M. Cato, who argued vigorously for the death penalty, and eventually carried the day. The prisoners were sent for, one by one, to the *Tullianum* below the Capitol, and strangled there; and Cicero announced their end to the expectant crowd in the Forum, in the single word—*Vixerunt*.

It only remains to account for the proceedings of Catiline. At Faesulæ he found Manlius ready with some ten thousand men, veterans, peasants, shepherds, brigands, and slaves. But they were undisciplined and badly armed; C. Antonius was hurrying up the road from Rome, and by Cicero's order, the Praetor, Metellus Celer, had closed the roads into Cisalpine Gaul. Catiline's forces began

to melt away, and it was not long before he found himself obliged to give battle near Pistoria. Antonius contrived to fall ill, but his army, under M. Petreius, had little difficulty in surrounding and cutting down the insurgents. The game was up; and Catiline, reckless now of his own life, as he had been, throughout his career, of the life of others, threw all his enormous strength into the thickest of the fight, and died the death of a soldier.

The legality of the execution of his accomplices has been hotly disputed. Those who uphold the contention of the Roman democratic party, that the right *provocare ad populum* admits of no exception, and that the *senatus consultum ultimum* could confer no power of life and death upon a magistrate, have regarded it, in modern as in ancient times, as a 'brutal judicial murder.' But in Rome, as elsewhere, *salus populi suprema lex*. Roman law always admitted the possibility that a citizen might by his own act, as well as by decree of his fellows, constitute himself a 'public enemy,' and forfeit every vestige of civic right; and this it can hardly be denied that the accomplices of Catiline had done. They had plotted to destroy the Roman constitution, to burn the city, to assassinate the consul, to massacre the citizens wholesale, to call in to their aid their hereditary enemies the Gauls; and if this was not to incur the fate of 'public enemies,' it is difficult to see how enmity to the State can be a crime at all.

There remains the question whether Cicero should have acted on his own responsibility, or consulted the Senate first, as he actually did. He would probably have been within his right in acting alone, and a bolder and stronger man would probably have done so; nor did his own course save him from the vengeance which afterwards befell. But for Cicero to consult the Senate was inevitable on another ground also. He had taken office as the Senate's candidate, as the representative of strict constitutional government, and as the opponent of personal violations of the customary order, like those proposed by the democrats; he had chosen, too, the difficult task of bringing all possible parties into line against the common enemies of society; and it was everything to him to secure for his act the consent, if not the co-operation, of the representatives of those parties in the Senate.

The controversy broke out at once. Cato and Catulus, on the one side, applauded Cicero as the Saviour of the State; he was saluted as *Pater Patriae*, and escorted home with torchlight and jubilation; and his name rang throughout Italy as the Italian who had rescued Rome. But on the other hand he had alienated for ever the confidence of his old democratic supporters; he

Legality of
Cicero's
action.

His motives.

Agitation
against
Cicero.

had passed over, finally, into the ranks of the Senate and the opponents of radical change; and he had forfeited any claims he may have had to the goodwill of Pompeius, by saving the State when the latter was just on his way to save it himself; for, had Cicero failed or fallen, nothing but the army of Pompeius could have saved Rome from Catiline, just as only Sulla could save Rome from Cinna and Carbo. And the disappointment of Pompeius made itself felt without delay: in fact, it was his advanced guard, Metellus Nepos, who, arriving barely in time to be elected Tribune for 62, made it the first business of his office to veto Cicero's outgoing oration at the New Year, and hardly permitted him even to affirm—what was the simple truth—that it was he who had 'saved the State.'

CHIEF DATES.

Pompeius leaves Rome for the East	67
Lex Roscia restores Equestrian privileges	67
Censorship of Crassus and Catulus	65
Consulship of Cicero: Conspiracy of Catiline	63

CHIEF PERSONS.

Gn. Pompeius Magnus—Q. Lutatius Catulus—Q. Hortensius—M. Porcius Cato—M. Licinius Crassus—M. Tullius Cicero—C. Julius Caesar—L. Sergius Catilina—P. Servilius Rullus—T. Labienus—C. Antonius Hybrida—C. Rabirius—C. Manlius—D. Junius Silanus—C. Cornelius Cethegus—P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura—Q. Fabius Sanga—Q. Metellus Celer—Q. Metellus Nepos.

SUBJECTS.

- The new municipal or Italian party.
- The *Concordia Ordinum* of Cicero.
- The leaders and aims of the new democratic party.
- The legality of the Catilinarian executions.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE RETURN OF POMPEIUS AND THE CONSULSHIP OF CAESAR

Pompeius arrives—He disbands his army—Senatorial obstruction—Affair of the *Bona Dea*—Caesar returns from Spain and forms a coalition with Pompeius and Crassus—His Consulship—*Leges Juliae*—His Gallic command—Banishment and recall of Cicero.

POMPEIUS landed in Italy late in the year 62. He had given no sign of what he meant to do on his arrival, and even the affront which his agent Metellus Nepos had put upon Cicero could hardly be construed into a declaration of policy. Pompeius
Metellus, however, had gone on to propose that Pompeius should be given the consulship of 61 and also a special mandate to deal with the survivors of the party of Catiline; and had secured for this scheme the active support of Caesar. But the suspicions of the Senate were aroused, and at the instance of M. Cato the proposal was rejected. Whereupon Metellus, whose tribunate had been suspended by the Senate for his violent behaviour, retired from Rome and took refuge in the camp of Pompeius; and Caesar, too, felt that he had gone too far, and shut himself up in his house for the remainder of his praetorship. At the end of the year he contented himself with throwing down a bone of contention between the Senate and Pompeius, in a proposal to transfer from Catulus to the latter the restoration of the Capitoline temple (p. 419); and started at once to his provincial command in Further Spain; which he had secured, through the influence of Crassus, as the last chance of paying off his enormous debts.

On arriving in Italy, Pompeius, to the surprise of all parties, disbanded his army at once, and threw himself on the good feeling of the Senate, both for the recompense of his veterans and for the ratification of his settlement of the East. In the last days of September he celebrated the most splendid triumph that Rome had ever seen, and handed over to the treasury the enormous sum of twenty thousand talents. It was the turning-point in his career. From Sulla's

death, till his dismissal of his army, he had been the central figure in Roman politics ; the only general of the Republic ; the sole guarantee for the maintenance of order at home and for efficient government abroad. Now he had voluntarily thrown away the chance, which everybody assumed that he would use, of establishing a permanent government, whether on the lines of the republican constitution, or on whatever new plan his unrivalled experience might suggest. But it was the fatal defect in the character of Pompeius, that he was without a trace of political originality or creative genius. He could remodel the East, almost without effort, from Byzantium to Jerusalem, in a provincial system which was permanent and effective ; but he would not, or could not, either guide, or reform, or abolish the republican government, any more than he would take up a place of dignity and independence within it. His highest ambition was to play the part of armed guardian of free institutions : they must be unable to go on without him ; but, with him, they must go on of themselves.

It was not long before the Senate awoke from its first surprise to the discovery that Pompeius was, after all, only a private citizen, with political **Senatorial** needs of his own which he did not know how to satisfy ; **obstruction.** and it became the sport of his old enemies and rivals, to postpone the satisfaction of them indefinitely. One indeed of the Consuls of 61, L. Afranius, was his nominee, but the other was Q. Metellus Celer, who when Praetor in 63 had been one of the principal supporters of Cicero. Catulus, the leader of the Senate, was still sore about the Capitoline temple ; and Cato, on the strictest grounds of justice, was prepared to go point by point into every detail of the settlement of Asia, and of the proposed reward of the veterans. For the moment the Senate seemed really to hold the key of the situation. Cicero, since his consulship, had come over wholly to its side ; Caesar was away, Pompeius was powerless, and Crassus was only anxious to annoy Pompeius, and keep the government in good humour for purposes of his own.

The democratic party, however, had begun a fresh attack already upon this ascendancy of the Senate, which its leaders regarded with very **natural alarm.** A land law was proposed, which revived **The affair of the Bona Dea.** the provisions of the law of Rullus ; and though this was withdrawn in face of the opposition of the government, it was apparently necessary to make some concessions. Cato produced his own revision of the corn law, and Metellus Nepos was allowed to carry the abolition of harbour-dues throughout Italy. An accident, however, led to fresh feeling, and to a virtual defeat of the government. One of the

youngest and most lively of the democratic leaders, P. Clodius Pulcher, the same who had sowed sedition in the army of Lucullus in Armenia (p. 450), was accused of penetrating in disguise into the house of Caesar when Praetor, while the rites of the *Bona Dea* were being celebrated, to which none but women were admitted. There were also rumours of an intrigue between Clodius and Caesar's wife. The Senate, as the guardian of public morality, seized eagerly on this opportunity of discrediting two leading democrats at once, and put Clodius on his trial for impiety. But they overdid their case. The jury was notoriously packed, the evidence was contradictory, equestrian gold was freely used on the other side, and Clodius was acquitted on a doubtful *alibi*. The late Praetor, however, thought it necessary, as a further precaution, to divorce Pompeia; 'Caesar's wife,' he said, 'must be above suspicion.'

It was not long before the *concordia ordinum*, so carefully built up by Cicero, began to crumble to pieces of its own accord. The first shock came from Crassus and the capitalists. The Roman financiers had formed exaggerated estimates of the prosperity which would result from the restoration of order in the East, and had contracted for the taxes of Asia at a far higher rate than could possibly repay them for their trouble. They applied, therefore, to the Senate for a revision of the contract on easier terms. Obviously, however, the financial miscalculations of the Equites were no concern of the government, and though Cicero argued strongly in favour of this concession to his old allies, the Consul, Metellus Celer, with the ardent support of the upright Cato, persuaded the Senate to refuse. The Equestrian bankers were furious with the Senate for this sudden fit of virtue, and also with the arrangements of Pompeius, which they had misunderstood to begin with. Cato, meanwhile, for his part, thought the moment opportune for the revision of an ill-drafted statute of G. Gracchus, which had been held to give exemption to the Equites from prosecutions for bribery; and for certain changes in the arrangements for the corn supply, which would diminish the profits of the merchants.

Such was the state of deadlock in Rome, when Caesar returned from his Spanish province. He had earned the reputation of an even-handed and liberal administrator; he had enlarged and reorganised the province; and he had contrived both to conciliate the provincials, and to satisfy the traders and the money-lenders. Yet at the same time he had cleared off debts of his own to the amount of more than a million of our money, and was consequently now no longer under obligations either to Crassus or to his other creditors. Most important of all, he had learned, in a short but decisive campaign

Break-up of
Cicero's
coalition.

Caesar
returns
from Spain,
60 B.C.

against the wild tribes round Brigantium, that he possessed the genius of a military commander, and the peculiar gift of managing a barbarous people; his soldiers had hailed him as *imperator*, and the Senate had decreed a public thanksgiving in his honour. He returned to Rome, therefore, more than ever convinced of his ability to create for himself a position like that of Pompeius, if only he could secure a field of action worthy of his new-found talents.

His first step was to announce himself as a candidate for the consulship of 59. But he wanted also a triumph for his Spanish successes. This, however, he could not have, if he once set foot inside the *pomoerium*; for that would cancel his *imperium* automatically (pp. 64, 399). So he asked the Senate's leave to conduct his candidature without entering the city. It seemed a small concession, but Cato was shocked at the proposed breach of etiquette; and the Senate, nothing loth, refused the dispensation. Caesar, therefore, had to choose between the smaller and the greater gain: he resigned his triumph, and entered Rome forthwith.

His next proceeding was to form, out of all the parties that had grievances against the Senate, a single coalition under his own direct control.

To Pompeius, he proposed to secure the ratification of his acts in Asia and the rewards which he had promised to his men; and offered him in marriage his clever and charming daughter. To Crassus and the Equites he promised the revision of the Asiatic contracts. Cicero also was invited to join the coalition, and for a moment was greatly tempted to do so. His eloquence would have been invaluable on the side of Caesar, and still more his connection with the steady and well-to-do people of the country towns. But he did not see his way to desert the Senate, and still trusted fondly to his dream of a *consensus* of law-abiding republicans; he was afraid, too,—and not without reason,—of Caesar's open disregard of ancient law and custom, and not a little jealous of the ascendancy which Caesar had acquired over his own idol, Pompeius. Cicero, therefore, was left out in the cold, and was soon made to feel the consequences of his devotion to these dreams of liberty. Caesar, meanwhile, succeeded in the difficult task of reconciling Pompeius and Crassus, and so completed the close but quite informal partnership which has passed into history as the 'First Triumvirate.'

In due course Caesar was elected Consul, and all that the Senate could do, to hamper his proceedings, was to provide him with a colleague, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, as obstinate and short-sighted as could be found even in the ranks of the reactionaries. Caesar's first act was to

Coalition
with
Pompeius
and Crassus.

fulfil his compact with Pompeius by proposing an agrarian law, and, as he had no wish to quarrel unnecessarily with the Senate, the bill was introduced there in the usual way, and criticism was invited freely. Yet the Senate could see in this attitude nothing but a chance for fresh obstruction; and as Caesar had other things to do than to join in this game, he transferred his bill at once to the Comitia. Here, too, the Senate put the usual obstructions in force. Bibulus came down with two Tribunes into the Forum, and vetoed the proceedings. But he had mistaken the situation. Caesar quietly removed the Tribunes, and Bibulus, out of the way, and went on with the business. The civil veto having failed of its effect, Bibulus' last resource was the religious bar. He shut himself up in his house, and announced that he should 'see lightning' or other evil omen, whenever Caesar summoned the Comitia; but the sham 'lightnings' of Bibulus harmed nobody, and legislation went on apace under a clear sky. The persistence of Caesar, however, in face of the strictly constitutional opposition of the Tribunes and of his colleague, produced an unfavourable impression among many who would otherwise have gone far with him; and Cato, and even Cicero, were heard to complain that this had made an end of republican freedom altogether. Moreover, it was open now to the enemies of Caesar to annul his acts, whenever opportunity occurred, on the ground that they had never been legally enacted.

Besides the law which provided land for the veterans of Pompeius, another land law was passed for the benefit of the poorer citizens of the capital. Twenty commissioners were appointed, and *Leges Juliae* twenty thousand settlers in all were planted out on the *Ager Campanus* and elsewhere; the loss of revenue from the *Ager Campanus*, and the purchase-money of the new allotments, being made good from the tribute of the new revenue-provinces in the East. The settlement of Pompeius was formally ratified at last; and the pledge given to Crassus was fulfilled by the reduction of the contract for the Asiatic taxes by one-third. It was a scandalous piece of jobbery; but it secured the Equestrian vote, and broke up finally the short-lived *concordia* of Cicero.

Something was done, meanwhile, to promote more efficient administration. The Senate was compelled to publish an account of its proceedings — *acta* — for the general information. A *Lex Julia de repetundis* re-enacted the earlier regulations, but with stricter definitions and heavier penalties, such as fourfold restitution, expulsion from the Senate, and even exile. Another law corrected an abuse of long standing, by restricting the right of provincial governors to

Caesar's
Consulship,
59 B.C.

requisition supplies for their journeys. There are signs, too, that an old democratic measure—the enfranchisement of Transpadane Gaul—was contemplated again during the consulship of Caesar, though nothing was actually done, except to found a Latin colony at Novum Comum.

Caesar had now to provide for the realisation of his great ideal—a prolonged provincial command, with the opportunity of military operations

on a great scale, and at the same time the freedom to keep an eye on the progress of events in Rome. The Senate, which quite foresaw Caesar's consulship, and how he intended to use it, had assigned beforehand to the outgoing Consuls the most trivial *provinciae* that could be found, and to Caesar himself nothing but the care of the woods and forests of Italy! One of Caesar's creatures, therefore, the Tribune P. Vatinius, followed the precedent set in the case of Pompeius, and proposed to the people that Caesar should be appointed for five years to the command of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum—to the whole northern frontier, that is, of the Italian peninsula. He was to have ten *legati* of praetorian rank, and leave to raise a force of three legions. Cato protested—and with reason—that to give Cisalpine Gaul to Caesar was to install him in 'the citadel of Italy'; in the summer he could be training his army and winning territory and glory beyond the Alps; in the winter he would be within striking distance of the capital, in case anything should occur to his disadvantage. The Senate saw, however, by this time, that resistance was useless, and even made a virtue of necessity by adding Transalpine Gaul, with one additional legion, to the command. In doing this, it was probably hoping that the troubles, which were known to be brewing in that quarter, might prove too much even for the genius of Caesar: for it must be remembered that, except for a single frontier expedition in Further Spain, Caesar had as yet held no office which involved the management of an army.

Caesar's Gallic command.

It now only remained to make everything safe in Rome, before Caesar set out for his new command. The Senate, it was clear, was harmless so long as it was without a leader; and Pompeius, its natural champion, was held fast for the moment on Caesar's side. Only Cato and Cicero remained capable of mischief, and it was to reduce them to impotence, that Caesar turned his attention now. For the real excellences of Cicero he had always had a genuine regard, and had displayed more than once the most marked desire for his support. But if that was not to be secured, it was essential to the maintenance of Caesar's arrangements that Cicero should not remain in Rome. To remove him, therefore, with the least possible affront to his feelings,

The position of Cicero.

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Caesar offered him a high position on his own provincial staff; and it would have been well for Cicero if he could have brought himself to accept the post. But he could not. His innate respect for the constitution had been shocked by Caesar's disregard of forms and usage, and he seems still to have cherished hopes of bringing Pompeius back into the right path; so Caesar's flattering offers failed to tempt him. It remained, therefore, to see if chastisement would bring him to a better mind.

Now, there was one man in Rome, of whom Cicero stood in deadly fear. P. Clodius Pulcher was a descendant of the ancient house of the Claudii, and inherited much of their brilliant and wayward ability. He had first come into notice as the instigator of the mutiny in Armenia which led to the recall of Lucullus; and after an adventurous career in the East, made himself notorious in Rome as the noisiest and most dissolute of the younger nobles. He made his mark in the courts as the accuser in the charge which foiled Catiline's candidature in 65, and increased his evil reputation in 62 by his reputed intrigue with Caesar's wife and by his profanation of the mysteries of the Bona Dea (p. 475). It was on this occasion that he first fell foul of Cicero, whose evidence went far to upset his plea of *alibi*, and who attacked him again, in unmeasured language, after his corrupt acquittal. Clodius swore to be avenged; attached himself as a free-lance to Caesar's coalition; and begged to be allowed to renounce his patrician ancestry, and, by adoption into a plebeian clan, to make himself eligible for the Tribunate. So long as Cicero left the way open for a reconciliation, Caesar—before whom, as Pontifex Maximus, the adoption must take place—refused to let Clodius loose; but as soon as it became clear that Cicero had made up his mind, the ceremony took place, with Pompeius himself as officiating augur. It was close to the end of Caesar's consulship, and Clodius was elected forthwith Tribune for 58.

Publius
Clodius
Pulcher.

He lost no time in bringing forward a bill to punish with outlawry all those 'by whose act any Roman citizen had lost his life untried.' The bill was evidently aimed at Cicero, as the author of the executions of December 63; but for the moment Cicero would not believe that the Three, or at any rate Pompeius, would suffer the 'Father of his Country' to be treated so. He was soon undeceived, however. His attempts to rouse popular feeling in his support were rudely checked by the new Consuls, A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso, who were both nominees of the Three; and early in April he found it safest to leave Rome, travelling slowly and reluctantly to Brundisium,

Banishment
of Cicero.

and thence through Macedon to Thessalonica. No sooner was he gone than Clodius procured against him a formal sentence of banishment, pulled down his house in Rome, plundered his country villas, and proclaimed as a public enemy any one who should propose his recall.

Cato was more easily dealt with. In Caesar's consulship the difficult Egyptian question (p. 464) had come to the front again. Ptolemy Auletes had been expelled from Alexandria by the fickle and excitable populace, and appealed to Rome for restitution. It was late in the year, and there was no time to go into the rights of the question ; but something had to be done, and it seemed to the Three the simplest way out of the difficulty, to accept the bribe of nine thousand talents offered by Auletes, and recognise his right to the throne. But another question remained. The island of Cyprus, which had been bequeathed to Rome, together with Egypt, by the late king's will, had never been formally transferred ; and its nominal king, the high priest of the temple of Paphos, had omitted even to send a bribe. It was easily discovered that the royal treasures of Cyprus were so rich that no one less upright than Cato could be entrusted with the settlement of the island ; and Cato, tempted on his tenderest side, fell open-eyed into the trap and accepted the commission. It proved a task as simple as it was undignified. The unfortunate king committed suicide on Cato's arrival, and Cyprus was annexed, without opposition, to the neighbouring province of Cilicia. But, for the moment, the object of Caesar was secured, and Cato did not reappear in Rome until the year 57.

At the conclusion of his consulship, Caesar had hesitated for a while to leave the capital ; but when all seemed to be going on as he desired, and urgent news from Transalpine Gaul warned him that his presence was demanded elsewhere, he departed hurriedly for his northern command ; leaving Crassus and Pompeius to carry on the government of the Three as best they could, and Clodius to keep an eye on either or both of them in case of need.

Clodius was more than equal to the occasion. With his own chief away beyond the Rubicon, the leaders of the Senatorial party safe in Cyprus and Thessalonica, and the old feud breaking out afresh between Crassus and Pompeius, he had practically a free field for a democratic programme of his own. So long as he confined himself to domestic matters—such as the abolition of the *obnuntiatio* or religious veto, which had been the last weapon of Bibulus, the curtailment of the powers of the Censors, or the legalisation of secret societies (*collegia sodalicia*) in Rome, which could be used to rig an election, or compel the passage of a bill, Pompeius, at all events, had

Removal
of Cato.

Caesar
leaves
Rome.

Clodius
defies
Pompeius.

no reason to interfere. But when he turned to foreign politics, and assigned Cilicia and Syria to his confederates Piso and Gabinius; still more, when he permitted the escape of young Tigranes, whom Pompeius had detained as a hostage for the loyalty of the Armenians, the 'great man' was compelled to intervene. Clodius replied with insults and abuse, and threats of personal violence, which kept Pompeius indoors for the remainder of that Tribunate; and it became clear that, useful as Clodius had been in procuring the banishment of Cicero, Cicero might be still more useful as a check upon the proceedings of Clodius.

Early in the following year, therefore, proposals were made for his recall. Both Consuls—P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, a friend and partisan of Caesar, and the same Q. Metellus Nepos who had been the agent of Pompeius in 62—professed them-
Recall of Cicero.
 selves willing to accept a bill to that effect; but the veto of two of the new Tribunes, and the organised violence of the *operæ* or 'gangs' which the legislation of Clodius had revived, made progress impossible for the moment. At last, force was met by force. Another Tribune, T. Annius Milo (of whom we shall hear more hereafter), raised similar *operæ* of his own in the interest of the other side, and caused such annoyance to Clodius, who was at the moment a candidate for the aedileship, that after some eight months of anarchy the proposal of Lentulus was permitted to go through. Cicero had been waiting long at Dyrrhachium for the news of his recall, and returned to Rome at once, full of expressions of gratitude to Pompeius, and of veiled bitterness against the conduct of Caesar, whose hand he was hardly wrong in recognising behind the pranks of Clodius.

For the moment it seemed as if Cicero had learned his lesson. He proposed a solemn thanksgiving in honour of Caesar's victories in Gaul, and supported a proposal which had been made already, on
His behaviour.
 the occasion of a severe famine in Rome, to entrust Pompeius with a special commission for five years to organise the corn supply. But he could not bring himself even now to work heart and soul for the Three. His own proposal with regard to the *cura annonæ* (as it was called) gave Pompeius only the ordinary powers of a Proconsul, not the *maius imperium*¹ and the command of legions, which had been originally suggested; and in his defence of P. Sestius, one of the Tribunes of 57 who had effected his recall, on a charge of riotous conduct, he made a vehement attack upon Caesar's agent Vatinius, and even gave notice that at an early date, May 15, 56, he would propose a motion in the

¹ This *imperium infinitum maius* went one step even beyond the *imperium infinitum æquum* conferred by the *Lex Gabinia* (p. 453).

Senate to reconsider Caesar's settlement of the *Ager Campanus*. He evidently thought that the coalition of the Three was breaking up, and that the time had come for a more independent policy.

Other events, too, pointed in the same direction. Pompeius, who had left Rome, at the end of 57, to make a short tour of inspection in Sicily, and had done something to alleviate the scarcity of corn, found himself, on his return, so jealously regarded by the Senate, so coolly received by Cicero, and so violently assailed by Clodius, who had defeated Vatinius in the election to the aedileship, that he began to think seriously of demanding a real commission in the East, where renewed disturbances in Alexandria afforded sufficient excuse for interference, and where, at all events, he would know who his friends and enemies were. But on this point he came into direct collision with Crassus, who also wanted a military commission, and was encouraged by Clodius to hope for the Egyptian command; and a Sibylline oracle was found which forbade the use of an army, and confirmed the Senate's reluctance to reopen that question at all.

Caesar, meanwhile, as we shall see, had found that the conquest of Gaul was a larger business than could be completed in a five years' command, or with the forces which were as yet at his disposal. To him, therefore, it was everything to secure the renewal of the Triumviral coalition, even at the risk of creating counterpoises elsewhere to his own army; and, above all, to prevent the resumption of activity by the republican party. When, therefore, his personal enemy, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, threatened to cancel his command, and Cicero gave notice of his intentions with regard to the *Ager Campanus*, Caesar delayed no longer. He invited Crassus to confer with him at Ravenna; and having thus given Pompeius the impression that he was being left out in the cold for his sympathy with republican methods, persuaded him too to come to Luca, on the other border of the Cisalpine province, and discuss the whole situation.

Conference
of Luca,
56 B.C.

[The internal history is resumed in Chapter XLI.]

CHIEF DATES.

Return of Pompeius	62
Affair of the Bona Dea : Caesar in Spain	61
Consulship of Caesar	59
Tribunate of Clodius : Banishment of Cicero	58
Recall of Cicero : Cura Annonae given to Pompeius	57
Conference of Luca	56

CHIEF PERSONS.

Pompeius — Caesar — Crassus — Cicero — Cato — P. Clodius Pulcher — M. Calpurnius Bibulus — P. Vatinius — P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther — Q. Metellus Nepos — T. Annius Milo.

CHIEF PLACES.

Brigantium — Cyprus — Thessalonica — Dyrrhachium — Ravenna — Luca.

SUBJECTS.

The character of Pompeius.
 The nature and aims of the coalition of Caesar, Pompeius, and Crassus.
 The administrative reforms of Caesar.
 The changed position of the Tribunate.

CHAPTER XL

CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

The Transalpine frontier—Ariovistus—The Helvetii—Battle of Bibracte—Caesar expels Ariovistus, 58 B.C.—Campaigns against the Belgæ and Nervii, 57 B.C.—Veneti and Aquitani, 56 B.C.—Usipetes and Tencteri, 55 B.C.—Caesar crosses the Rhine, 55 B.C.—First and second expeditions to Britain, 55 B.C.—Uneasiness in Gaul—Revolt of Ambiorix, 54-3 B.C.—Revolt of Vercingetorix, 53-2 B.C.—Settlement of Gaul.

No sooner were Cato and Cicero safely removed from Rome, than Caesar set off to the north to join his legions in Gaul. He had already tarried almost too long; events which he had long foreseen had come suddenly to a crisis, and the Transalpine province was threatened by a double invasion.

Since the first constitution of Gallia Narbonensis in 121, little had been done either to extend its borders, or even to secure them: not even the invasion of the Cimbri had awakened the degenerate government to deal with this all-important frontier. The Transalpine Frontier. Roman Provincia, therefore, still remained nominally bounded by the course of the Rhone from Genæva (*Geneva*) to its junction with the Arar (*Saone*)—including thus the powerful but friendly tribe of the Allobroges—and by the steep eastward escarpment of the Cevennes. Westward, its limits were defined by no natural barrier, but ran vaguely, a little beyond Tolosa (*Toulouse*), along the borders of the Aquitani, and across the head-waters of the Garumna (*Garonne*). On the east, too, the hill-men of the Graian and Cottian Alps had never been really subdued, so that, though the passes of the Alps were largely used for commercial traffic, official communications between Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul were still chiefly maintained either by sea, or along the coast road through Liguria.

Beyond the frontier, the great confederacy of which the Aedui were the leaders had remained loyal to the Romans from the first. But as time went on, its influence waned rapidly, while the German invasion. Romans did nothing on their part to maintain its prestige, and by Caesar's time it was in serious danger of being crushed altogether

between the leagues of its powerful neighbours, the Arverni and the Sequani. The latter, moreover, lying as they did between the Aedui and the Rhine, had not scrupled to prosecute this hereditary feud by calling in those natural enemies of their race, the Germans from beyond the river, who for many years past had been threatening to overflow out of their boundless forests into the more open and fertile lands of Western Europe; while one great tribe, the Teutones, had even followed the fortunes of the Cimbri (p. 371).

In particular, about twenty years before Caesar's consulship, they had secured the aid of a great chief of the Suebi, Ariovistus, promising him land and plunder for his men as the price of his services. Thus encouraged, Ariovistus harried and defeated the Aedui, and took from them hostages and tribute; while the Senate, intent upon domestic quarrels, had ignored the appeals of its allies, and in Caesar's consulship had even granted to Ariovistus the title of *rex et amicus populi Romani*; which he, at all events, regarded as a formal recognition of his conquests in Gaul.

The other danger came, not directly from the Rhine, but by way of the upper Rhone. The open trough of lowland Switzerland which lies between the Alps and the Jura was inhabited by the Celtic Helvetii, but it had long been exposed, like the rest of eastern Gaul, to German raids from beyond the Rhine, and its own population, besides, was rapidly outgrowing the narrow limits of the country.

In the year 59, these Helvetii determined to burn their towns and to migrate in a body to a new home in Gaul. From their rendezvous at Geneva, two roads led down the valley of the Rhone. That on the left or southern bank was easy in itself, but led through that corner of the Roman province which was held by the Allobroges; the other, on the right bank, led through the narrow and difficult gorge—the *Pas de l'Écluse*—by which the Rhone cuts its way through the end of the Jura range. Early in 58, therefore, the Helvetii asked Caesar's leave to use the easier road and traverse the Roman province.

Caesar had only one legion in Transalpine Gaul; but he gained a little time by negotiation, and meanwhile broke down the bridge over the Rhone at Geneva, and fortified the fords down stream. Then sending to the Helvetii a curt refusal, and leaving his lieutenant Labienus to guard the frontier, he hurried back to Italy, and, by forced marches through the Graian Alps, brought up three legions from Aquileia on the Illyrian border, and two of recruits raised in Cisalpine Gaul.

On his return he found that, through the favour of Dumnorix, the leader of the anti-Roman party among the Aedui, the Helvetii had obtained leave from the Sequani to use the Pas de l'Écluse, and were already on the point of crossing the Arar into the territory of the Aedui. But he was just in time to cut up one of their four tribes, the Tigurini,¹ who formed their rearguard.

GAUL.



Then throwing his own troops over after them by a bridge, he forced the main body to turn northward up the stream, and followed closely after it. But the difficulty of obtaining provisions, and his distrust of the Gallic allies, who furnished the greater part of his cavalry, compelled

¹ By some accounts these Tigurini represented a surviving remnant of the Cimbri (p. 372).

him to turn aside westwards into one of the side valleys of the Liger (*Loire*) and halt at Bibracte (*Mont Beauvray*, close to *Autun*), the chief town of the Aedui; whereupon the Helvetii faced about, and fell upon him with their whole force.

Caesar, however, had chosen his ground well, and broke the enemy's charge; but when the legions pressed forward in their turn, the Helvetian rearguard came up and attacked them in flank and from behind; whereupon Caesar made the third line of maniples face about and form a new front to receive them. After a desperate struggle, which lasted far into the night, the discipline and tenacity of the Romans prevailed; the enemy's laager was stormed, and their whole army destroyed or put to flight. The survivors surrendered, and were sent back at once to their own country, with orders to hold it, for Rome, against their common enemy the Germans.

The victory of Bibracte produced the profoundest impression among the Gauls. In every tribe the Roman faction took the upper hand, and a general council was summoned, which invited Caesar to expel also Ariovistus and his Germans, who had made themselves intolerable even to their allies the Sequani. Caesar was not unwilling to accept the commission, and requested Ariovistus to refrain from attacking or oppressing the allies of Rome, to restore the hostages which he had taken from the Aedui, and to bring no more Germans across the Rhine. Ariovistus replied that it was Caesar, not he, who was the intruder, and that the Roman Senate had already acknowledged his claims; whereupon Caesar, finding negotiations useless, and learning that the Germans were advancing down the valley of the Dubis (*Doubs*), threw forward every man he could raise, and by forced marches reached and occupied Vesontio—now the great French fortress of *Besançon*, and at that time the capital of the Sequani—which gave him abundant supplies for his army, and a very strong position in face of the gap between the Jura and the Vosges. Quelling, here, a momentary panic, which the native description of the Germans inspired among his city-bred staff, and even among the rank and file of his army, he pushed on again through the gap into the valley of the Rhine, and accepted the invitation of Ariovistus to a personal interview; but fearing treachery, and finding that the Germans were attempting to cut off his line of retreat, he brought them with some difficulty to give battle. In this decisive action Caesar himself, on the right, was successful from the first; the left was reinforced at the critical moment through the promptness of P. Crassus, the younger son of the millionaire, who was in command of the cavalry, and after a hard-fought struggle the

Battle of
Bibracte,
58 B.C.

Caesar
is invited
to expel
Ariovistus.

Germans were defeated and fled in headlong disorder towards the Rhine, and the greater part of them were destroyed in the pursuit by the Roman cavalry. Ariovistus himself escaped in a boat with a few followers, but his power was broken ; the Suebi, who were on their way to reinforce him, were attacked and scattered by their own neighbours the Ubii ; and Caesar was able to proclaim the Rhine, once for all, as the boundary which no German might transgress.

In a single season he had shattered the Helvetii, and expelled Ariovistus from Gaul ; and the Gauls themselves had recognised him as their effectual champion. But Caesar perceived already that these successes were only the prelude to a complete conquest of Gaul ; so leaving Labienus and his army in winter quarters among the Sequani—who most deserved to suffer, and were the most likely to give trouble in his absence—he set out at once for the Cisalpine province, to hasten on the civil business of his command ; to raise fresh legions for the next campaign ; and, above all, to keep a watchful eye upon affairs in Rome.

Before the winter was over, however, Labienus reported that the great confederacy of the Belgic Gauls, which extended from the Sequana (*Seine*) to the lower Rhine, was prepared to resist any further advance. Caesar acted promptly and swiftly as usual, and taking advantage of the inveterate quarrels among the Gauls themselves, advanced to Durocortorum (*Rheims*) and accepted the surrender of the Remi, before the Belgae were ready to move. He thus reached and crossed the Axona (*Aisne*) without opposition, but on the further bank found his path barred by the full force of the enemy, some three hundred thousand men. To attack, even with eight legions, would have been too great a risk ; so he fortified a strong position in the fork of two streams, and remained on the defensive, until the natural impatience of the Belgae, the failure of their supplies, and a concerted attack of his Aeduan allies upon the Bellovaci, broke up their league, and gave Labienus a chance to scatter them utterly ; and the Suessiones (about *Soissons*), the Bellovaci (about *Beauvais*), and the Ambiani (about *Amiens*) were disarmed in turn, and compelled to give hostages.

The Nervii, however, and other clans further north still held out stubbornly, and succeeded in surprising Caesar's whole army as it was preparing its camp among the woods and thick-set hedges of the valley of the Sabis (*Sambre*). A desperate battle ensued, which was only retrieved by the personal bravery of Caesar himself, who seized a legionary's shield and fought in the ranks among

Results
of the
campaign
of 58 B. C.

Campaign
against the
Belgae,
57 B. C.

his men. The Nervii resisted to the last, and their fighting force was almost annihilated; and their allies the Aduatuci, who withstood a siege of their capital, and professed a treacherous surrender, were sold utterly into slavery as a warning to the rest. For these striking successes the Senate, on the proposal of Cicero, decreed a public thanksgiving of fifteen days—an honour greater than had ever been paid before to any Roman general.¹

Young Crassus, meanwhile, had made a reconnaissance with one legion in the direction of Brittany, and had received the submission of the west; and in preparation for another campaign the winter quarters of the whole army were established among the Andes and Turones (*Anjou* and *Touraine*) in the basin of the lower Loire.

One small expedition belonging to this winter deserves to be mentioned, as illustrating the difficulties of intercourse across the mountain barrier of the Alps. Servius Sulpicius Galba was commissioned to force a passage, and maintain a military road, by the upper valley of the Rhone and over the Great St. Bernard; and he advanced through the country of the Nantuates as far as Octodurus (*Martigny*) at the entrance to the valley of Chamounix. Here, however, he was so fiercely attacked by the Veragri and the Seduni (about *Sion*) that he was compelled to retreat; and we hear of no further attempt to use this far shorter road to the northern territories.

As Caesar had expected, the Veneti (round *Vannes*) and the other tribes in the Armorican promontory soon began to give signs of uneasiness, and seized two of his officers who were sent to collect supplies for the army. This outrage demanded prompt and exemplary punishment, and Caesar made instant preparations to avenge it. Sending Labienus eastward to hold down the Treveri (about *Trèves* on the Moselle), Q. Titurius Sabinus northward to distract the attention of the Curiosolites and Lexovii (*Corseult* and *Lisieux*), and P. Crassus southward into Aquitania, he ordered D. Junius Brutus to build a fleet at the mouth of the Loire, manned it with crews collected from Narbo and Massilia, and after arranging with Pompeius and Crassus for the future prolongation of his command (p. 497), set off, himself, to join Brutus and conduct the punitive expedition into Armorica.

The Veneti, who held the command of the sea with their stout oaken sailing-ships, and carried on an extensive trade with Britain, defended themselves vigorously among the creeks and islands of their intricate and

¹ Pompeius, for the defeat of Mithradates, had been decreed ten days.

dangerous coast ; but the fleet of Brutus soon learned their tactics, and paralysed their manœuvres by a device for cutting loose their rigging. Their fleet was destroyed ; their towns, one after another, were besieged and taken ; their chiefs were executed, and their whole population sold into slavery. Sabinus, meanwhile, had defeated the Venelli, and their allies the Aulerci and Eburovices (*Evreux*) ; and Crassus, after preliminary difficulties, had been wholly successful in the south, and had annexed the greater part of the country from the Garonne to the Pyrenees. Finally, Caesar himself found time, after the close of the Armorican War, to make a short raid among the Morini and Menapii of the coast of Normandy, and distributed his men for the winter among the tribes of the north and west.

The campaign of 56 had completed the subjection of the Gauls. But two dangers still threatened the stability of Caesar's conquests. The one came, once more, from the side of the Rhine. Two German tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, which had been driven from their own homes by the Suebi, the powerful nation of Ariovistus, had crossed the lower Rhine into the country of the Menapii. The news of their coming spread far and wide, and produced the worst impression among the half-conquered Gauls. Caesar's prestige, and the principle of the Rhine barrier, were at stake, and he decided to nip the movement in the bud. Advancing by the valley of the Mosa (*Meuse*) and sweeping aside their attempts to gain time by negotiation, he took advantage of what he regarded as a treacherous attack upon his cavalry, to detain the chiefs who came to apologise, and having thus deprived the Germans of their leaders, he fell upon their camp, and massacred men, women, and children alike to the number of four hundred and thirty thousand persons. To demonstrate his power still further to the tribes beyond the Rhine, he built, in ten days, a bridge of piles across the river, and crossed into the territory of the Ubii (by *Bonn* and *Cologne*) with whom the Suebi were at war. The Suebi withdrew at once into the forests of Central Germany ; and, after ravaging the neighbouring land of their allies the Sugambri, Caesar returned to Gaul, only eighteen days after his first crossing, and broke the bridge behind him.

The treatment of the Usipetes and the Tencteri is the one blot on Caesar's military career. Perhaps the massacre was unavoidable ; but Cato, for one, thought Caesar guilty of deliberate treachery, and, impracticable as ever, proposed in ancient fashion to hand him over bound to the Germans ; and it is to the impression which

Conquest of
Armorica
and
Aquitania.

Campaigns
of 55 B.C.

Usipetes and
Tencteri.

Caesar
crosses the
Rhine.

Treachery
or policy?

this severity produced in Rome, that we must ascribe the terror which was inspired among his opponents by the very thought of Caesar's return to Italy.

The other danger was on the side of Britain, the inhabitants of which were of kindred race with those of Belgic Gaul, and were in constant communication with them. Britain, consequently, had come to be regarded as a place of refuge for opponents of the Roman conquest, and the centre of plots for its subversion. To explore, therefore, and intimidate this dangerous island, Caesar collected eighty ships near Boulogne, and crossed the channel, with two legions, quite at the end of the season. Coasting beyond the line of chalk cliffs, he effected a landing on a low-lying shore ;¹ the inhabitants, who had crowded to defend the beach, scattering as soon as his men reached land, and sending offers of submission. But a storm disabled many of his ships, and a second squadron, which should have followed with the cavalry, was compelled to return to port ; whereupon the natives, gaining confidence, began to harass his camp. The season, too, was by this time far advanced, and Caesar was soon obliged to return to Gaul, which he did without further accident.

First
expedition
to Britain,
55 B.C.

Throughout the winter, however, he employed his men in preparations for a much larger invasion. Flat-bottomed boats were built, so as to take the shallow water, and a force of five legions was collected at Portus Itius (probably *Wissant*, near Boulogne), while Labienus, with the remainder and a large force of cavalry, was left in charge on the mainland. Caesar landed, unopposed, at the same point as before, marched some twelve miles into the interior, and captured a wooden fort held by the natives. But meanwhile a storm destroyed a large number of his ships, and he was forced to return to draw up the remainder on shore, and surround them with a fortified camp ; sending word at the same time back to Labienus, to build him another fleet in Gaul. He was now free to advance again into the interior ; but after one severe engagement, the native commander-in-chief (whom Caesar calls *Cassivelaunus*) avoided pitched battles, and only harassed his march with sudden chariot charges from among the woods. Caesar pressed on, however, and crossed the Thames by a deep ford (probably near Kingston), in spite of the entanglements laid down by the enemy. He also took from *Cassivelaunus* a fortified town—which some hold to have been *St. Albans*—and forced him to give hostages, to submit to

Second
expedition
to Britain,
54 B.C.

¹ Authorities are divided as to whether this landing was at Romney, to the south of the South Foreland, or at Deal, to the north of it. Caesar only says that he drifted past the cliffs with the tidal current.

tribute, and to respect the independence of the Trinobantes (in Essex), whose chief, Mandubracius, had taken refuge with Caesar while he was still in Gaul. But, as Cicero observed at the time, there was no glory or booty to be gained by a prolonged occupation of Britain; and having demonstrated his ability to enter the island when he pleased, Caesar was well content to withdraw his army before the equinoctial storms (September 21, 54).

On his return to Gaul, he found many fresh signs of uneasiness. His conquest had been of the nature of a surprise, due mainly to his extraordinary rapidity of movement; and the Gauls had now had time to realise how small his forces were. The necessity of contributing to the maintenance of the legions had provoked profound discontent locally, and a bad harvest compelled him now to scatter his forces even more widely than usual. Moreover, he had been obliged to kill the Aeduan chief Dumnorix for attempted desertion on the eve of the invasion of Britain, and he had reason to suspect that a general conspiracy was on foot among the Gallic nobility. He fixed his own headquarters at Samarobriva among the Ambiani (*Amiens*), and three other legions were within a few days' march: Labienus, as before, was left among the Treveri; Q. Cicero, the brother of the orator, was among the Nervii; and Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta held a legion of recruits and five cohorts of veterans at Aduatuca.

Caesar had held a farewell council of the chiefs at Samarobriva, and was already on his way to Italy, when the news arrived that the Eburones, between the Meuse and the Rhine, had risen under their chiefs Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, and had besieged Aduatuca; that Sabinus had been persuaded, against the better judgment of Cotta, to leave his entrenchments, and accept a safe-conduct from the Gauls to the camp of Labienus; that the whole force had been treacherously surrounded and cut to pieces on the way; and that the rebels had been joined by the Nervii, and were now closely besieging Cicero. The latter, with difficulty, succeeded in sending news of his peril to headquarters, and Caesar, hastily calling in the forces which lay nearest, hurried, with only two legions, to the rescue. Cicero, unlike Sabinus, held out with energy within his works, and was at length encouraged by a cipher-message from his chief, whose approach distracted the attention of the besiegers, and whose well-feigned caution drew them into a decisive action, and relieved the plucky little garrison. But nothing more could be done, in the depth of winter, except to raise two legions more in Cisalpine Gaul, and to borrow yet another from

Revolt of
Ambiorix,
54-3 B.C.

Sabinus
and Cotta.

Q. Cicero.

Pompeius, in view of further trouble. And before the spring opened, the Treveri under Indutiomarus, who was the ringleader of the whole movement, attacked the force under Labienus, and called in the Germans from beyond the Rhine. But Indutiomarus **Labienus.** fell early in the revolt; Labienus feigned retreat, and surprised the army of the Treveri before the Germans arrived; and Caesar, who had put down smaller risings among the Menapii, the Senones (*Sens*), and the Carnutes (*Chartres*), and had shown greater severity than usual in the execution of the chief conspirator Acco, made a second reconnaissance across the Rhine, which soon brought the Germans to their senses. Finally, the Eburones were punished mercilessly for their treacherous behaviour; and though Ambiorix made good his escape in the recesses of the Arduenna Silva (*Ardennes*), all was now quiet once more, and Caesar was able for the moment to attend to the many questions which awaited him in Cisalpine Gaul and Italy.

The revolt of Ambiorix had shown how easy it really was to surprise and cut off the Roman army of occupation, and the news of the murder of Clodius (in January 52), whom many people believed to be Caesar's agent in Rome, seemed to the imaginative Gauls to confirm what they had heard of the jealousy with which the government regarded Caesar's successes. A fresh and widespread revolt was already in contemplation, and broke out among the Carnutes soon after midwinter. This time the Gauls found in their own ranks a real leader of men—a young Arvernian named Vercingetorix, who persuaded the tribes of the central highlands, and of all the west, to combine to throw off the Roman dominion. His proposal was to seize the opportunity of Caesar's absence in Italy to cut him off from his legions, and destroy the latter in detail. Vercingetorix organised the outbreak in the centre, held down the loyal Aedui, and massacred all the Roman settlers and traders at Genabum (*Orleans*) on the Loire, while his friend Lucterius raised a force in the south, and even threatened to invade the old Transalpine province.

Once more, however, Caesar's lightning rapidity broke up their plan of campaign. He hurried back across the Alps, raised a small force in the valley of the Rhone, and cut his way through the winter snows of the Cevennes; and having planted thus a Roman post between Lucterius and Vercingetorix, and drawn the latter southwards to defend his own people, returned as quickly as he had come, and reached his own nearest legions in the land of the Lingones (about *Langres*), ordering the rest at the same time to meet him at Agedincum in the country of the Senones (*Sens*).

Revolt of
Vercingeto-
rix,
53-2 B.C.

Caesar
crosses the
Cevennes.

Vercingetorix, meanwhile, had moved north again, and was besieging Gorgobina; and Caesar, though the weather was still against him, advanced to its relief; took and burnt Genabum, the scene of the late massacre; and then struck southwards by Noviodunum (*Neuvy*) to Avaricum, the capital of the Bituriges (*Bourges*). Vercingetorix now persuaded the Gauls to execute his settled policy of starving the Romans out, by burning the towns and devastating the country. But he could not persuade them to destroy Avaricum, which Caesar, after suffering extreme hardships, succeeded in taking by storm.

Caesar's next object was to reach and punish the Arverni. To hold the Senones and Carnutes in check, he sent Labienus back northwards with four legions, and himself pressed on, up the river Elaver (*Allier*), till he reached the great natural fortress of Gergovia, which Vercingetorix had occupied in force. An attempt to storm it by a front attack almost succeeded, but the Gauls rallied in time, and Caesar thought it more prudent to raise the siege and retire by the way he had come.

The immediate results of this check, and of the intrigues of the disaffected party, were a number of local risings among the Belgae, and a total revolt of the Aedui, who had been distracted by false rumours and internal feuds since the death of their loyal chief Divitiacus, and who held in their hands all Caesar's Gallic hostages.

Labienus, too, had effected little, and, after advancing as far as Lutetia Parisiorum (*Paris*), had been compelled, like his chief, to fight his way back to Agedincum. Vercingetorix, meanwhile, was confirmed as commander-in-chief at a great council held at Bibracte, and set about to cut off Caesar and his army from the province. In this he was so nearly successful that Caesar, who had hitherto trusted for his cavalry almost wholly to his Gallic allies, was compelled to have recourse to a desperate remedy, and borrowed a mixed body of cavalry and infantry from the Germans beyond the Rhine.

Suddenly a complete change came over the fortunes of the rebels. A single battle, in which Caesar's Germans routed the cavalry of the Gauls, threw open the road to the province, and forced Vercingetorix to retire to the strong hill-town of Alesia (*Alise Sainte Reine*). He still had a force of eighty thousand men with him, including a large cavalry contingent; yet Caesar's army—all trained engineers—though barely equal in number to the force within, not merely succeeded in enclosing the whole hill with formidable siege works, but also in keeping at bay, by an outer line of trenches, a relieving force of some two hundred and fifty thousand men, which gathered from the rest of Gaul. Then

two hard-fought battles concluded the struggle: one decided by Caesar in person, the other by the energy of Labienus and the well-planned co-operation of the German cavalry. Vercingetorix saw that his cause was hopeless, and threw himself on Caesar's mercy, if only thereby he might save his own people. But mercy, Caesar had none; his greatest enemy, once safely in his hands, was reserved to adorn his triumph, and to die like Jugurtha at its close.

A few tribes, like the Bellovaci, held out obstinately for another campaign, and the remains of the Arvernian rebels stood one siege more at Uxellodunum in the south. But the Gauls soon saw that they had found their master, and the last year of Caesar's command was free to be devoted to the great work of organisation.

There was indeed more than enough to be done in the time. Old enemies remained to be conciliated by grants of citizenship, and enlistment of the more restless spirits in the legions, and especially in the cavalry; old feuds to be healed by a judicious system of local government; tribute to be imposed, and the beneficent civilisation of the Mediterranean to be spread over a new world between the Rhine and the Atlantic; and, though, throughout the generation of civil war which followed, the Gauls, almost alone, remained loyal to the new master and to his heirs, it was not in Caesar's time that the real fruits of his great achievement were matured.

Even for him, however, the ten years' struggle in Gaul was not without its value. He had had a free field and a brave enemy, whereon to practise his unrivalled military genius; he had created, what immediately he needed most, a trained and independent army wholly loyal to his own cause; and he had found, in the new world which he had discovered beyond the Alps, a new and higher point of view, from which he could look down upon the petty politics of Rome, and realise his own power to replace them by an effective government.

CHIEF DATES.

Campaigns against Helvetii (Bibracte) and Ariovistus	58
„ „ Belgae, Nervii, Aduatuci	57
„ „ Veneti: Crassus in Aquitania: Galba in the Alps	56
„ „ Usipetes and Tencteri: First invasion of Britain	55
Second invasion of Britain: Death of Dumnorix	54
Revolt of Ambiorix (Sabinus and Cotta; Q. Cicero)	54-3
„ „ Vercingetorix (Avaricum, Gergovia, Alesia)	53-2
„ „ Bellovaci (Uxellodunum)	51
Settlement of Gaul	50

CHIEF PERSONS.

Caesar—T. Labienus—P. Crassus—Q. Titurius Sabinus—D. Junius Brutus
 —Servius Sulpicius Galba—L. Aurunculeius Cotta—Q. Tullius
 Cicero—Ariovistus—Dumnorix—Divitiacus—Cassivelaunus—Mandu-
 bracius—Ambiorix—Catuvolcus—Indutiomarus—Acco—Vercinge-
 torix—Lucterius.

CHIEF PLACES (besides the rivers, mountains, and tribes of Gaul).

Narbo—Tolosa—Genava—Arar Fl.—Bibracte—Vesontio—Durocortorum
 —Sabis Fl.—Aduatuca—Octodurus—Portus Itius—Samarobriva—
 Genabum—Cevenna Mons—Agedincum—Gorgobina—Noviodunum—
 Avaricum—Gergovia—Lutetia—Alesia—Uxellodunum.

SUBJECTS.

The civilisation and social order of the Gauls (cf. Chap. VIII.)

The significance of the Rhine frontier.

The causes of the Gallic revolts.

The results, for Caesar, of the ten years in Gaul

CHAPTER XLI

THE QUARREL BETWEEN CAESAR AND THE SENATE

[*Internal history continued from Chapter XXXIX.*]

Caesar's position in 56 B.C.—Conference of Luca—Consulship of Pompeius and Crassus, 55 B.C.—Crassus in Syria—Anarchy in Rome—Murder of Clodius—Pompeius sole Consul—Caesar's position and plans—Negotiations for his return—Caesar crosses the Rubicon—His clemency—Pompeius retires to Epirus.

WE must now return to the internal condition of Rome in the spring of the year 56. Caesar's original command had yet two years to run, but, as we have seen, he had still before him the maritime campaign against the Veneti, and was far from the end even of the first conquest of Gaul. He knew also that the friction which always existed between Crassus and Pompeius was threatening once more to make the coalition unworkable; that the new vista of conquest which he had opened up beyond the Alps had aroused the anxiety of the one, the cupidity of the other, and the profound jealousy of both; and that both Cicero and Cato, with their respective followers, were only waiting for the coalition to show signs of real dissolution, to bring the whole structure to ruin on the ground of the technical illegalities of 59, on which it was based. It was to Caesar's interest, therefore, to gain time for himself by any means, even at the risk of arming afresh those confederates, whom by this time he must have seen to be his ultimate rivals; and it was for this reason that he summoned first Crassus, and then Pompeius also, to meet him on the southern borders of his province, and to revise the terms of their compact.

The conference of Luca was attended also by several of the more prominent members of the Senate, and some two hundred of the rank and file, for there was nothing to be gained by concealing the real strength of the coalition. The conference itself was short, and its result decisive. Caesar was to have his Gallic command renewed for five years more, from 1st March 54 to 1st

Caesar's position in 56 B.C.

Conference of Luca.

March 49, with an increased force of ten legions, and a grant-in-aid from the treasury ; and he was to have the consulship again in 48. To carry out this arrangement, Pompeius and Crassus were to be the Consuls of 55, and were thereafter to hold provincial commands like that of Caesar, both for five years and on similar terms—Pompeius over all Spain, and Crassus in Syria ; and Cicero was to be taught once more that the only result of his opposition had been to draw closer the alliance which he had sought to destroy, while he was made once more its tool. He was told that he would have to withdraw his motion about the Ager Campanus, to support the proposal to confer these new commands, and to do any other dirty work which the Three might choose to set him.

It was not so easy, however, to carry out these arrangements. A Tribunician veto postponed the consular elections beyond the beginning of 55 ; when they were held, in great disorder, under the presidency of an *interrex*. Cato had by this time returned from Cyprus, and both he and Domitius, who had counted on the consulship of 55, offered the most strenuous opposition to the election of Crassus and Pompeius. The latter, however, summoned his veterans to the poll, and carried the matter by force ; while Cato, who had been wounded in the disturbance, was defeated by Vatinius for the praetorship. The provincial commands were conferred forthwith. Pompeius and Crassus themselves proposed the prorogation of that of Caesar, and a Tribune, named C. Trebonius, the creation of the new offices in Spain and Syria. Cicero fulfilled his new rôle in a magnificent speech *de Provinciis Consularibus*, and retired, sick with chagrin, into literary retirement ; whence he was recalled, however, now and again, at the bidding of Pompeius, to defend such men as Vatinius and Gabinius, when they were made the scapegoats of the Three. The remainder of the year 55 passed without further disturbance. Crassus carried a law *de sodaliciis* to paralyse the riotous fraternities which Clodius had resuscitated ; and Pompeius, another which raised the property qualification required of *iudices*, as a check on the influence of the *municipales* and the middle class. Pompeius also gained a momentary popularity by the completion of his great theatre in the Campus Martius—the first in Rome to be built of stone—which was inaugurated with magnificent games and shows. Before the end of the year, however, Crassus had left Rome, and was already on his way to his command in Syria.

The question with which he had to deal was one which had long been inevitable. Between the client state of Armenia and the growing power of the Parthians in Mesopotamia there was no natural barrier, and

Pompeius, who had enlarged Armenia at the expense of the Parthians, had erected no political or military frontier, and had refused the Parthian proposal to recognise the Euphrates as the boundary of the Roman province of Syria. It was not long, therefore, before the Parthians invaded Armenia; but internal discord, and the vigorous measures of Gabinius as governor of Syria, kept their aggressions within bounds, until Gabinius was diverted, probably by the orders of his chief, to interfere in the affairs of Egypt. Recalled hence by the Senate to answer for this breach of discipline, Gabinius left to Crassus a *casus belli*, and the elements at least of an efficient army; and Crassus lost no time in taking the offensive.

Crassus had learnt the elements of warfare under Sulla, and was inspired, by his jealousy of the reputation of Pompeius and Caesar, to a great dream of conquest which should eclipse the achievements of Alexander, and open to Roman enterprise the resources of the splendid East. But he was now more than sixty years old; he had seen no service since the revolt of Spartacus (p. 441); and his ignorance of military management was only equalled by his incapacity for taking advice. His first campaign in 54 was without incident or result, except that it roused the Parthians, and gave them ample time for preparation; and in the winter season he allowed his army to harry his province, and plunder such sanctuaries as that of Jerusalem. Early in 53 he crossed the Euphrates with a force of seven legions and an absurdly inadequate escort of cavalry; he alienated the Armenians, by refusing their offer to co-operate on his left; and gave up his one great advantage, the command of the river route, by his foolhardy plan of leading an infantry army straight across the Mesopotamian desert.

The result may be imagined. His Arab guides deserted, and informed the enemy. The Parthians had sent all their infantry northwards into Armenia, and operated against Crassus with archers and cavalry only, against whose mobility and long-range shooting the legions were helplessly outmatched. Crassus himself made matters worse by ordering his men to concentrate, so that every arrow told, and by allowing P. Crassus, his able and impetuous son, who had seen good service with Caesar, to take his Gallic cavalry too far. Publius was cut off, with six thousand of his men, and killed himself rather than surrender; and the main army began a painful retreat to Carrhae (Haran), intending to strike northwards towards Sinnaca and the Armenian hills. But the Parthian commander invited Crassus to an interview, and Crassus was weak enough to consent. A scuffle occurred; Crassus

Crassus in Syria, 54-3 B.C.

Disaster of Carrhae.

was killed, and his head was sent as a trophy to the Parthian king, who, 'to satisfy its thirst,' it is said, had molten gold poured into its mouth.

The army of Crassus, meanwhile, was surrounded and totally destroyed. It was the greatest defeat that a Roman force had suffered since Cannae. Twenty thousand men perished, ten thousand were taken prisoners, and the eagles of the legions became the trophies of the enemy. Only the Quaestor, C. Cassius, whose wise advice had been neglected by Crassus, cut his way out, with a small party, to Antioch, and though at one time closely besieged there, held the province of Syria against the attacks of the Parthians. Even when Cassius was superseded in 51 by Caesar's old enemy, the incapable Bibulus, the Parthians seemed unable to follow up their victory; and Pacorus, their brilliant general, preferred, as before, to recognise the Euphrates as his frontier, and to turn his army against his father, King Orodes.

The death of Crassus completely upset the balance of power in the empire. As long as he lived, it was impossible for a rupture to take place in the coalition without two of the Three being ranged against the other one: henceforward, any difference between Caesar and Pompeius must inevitably become a duel for supremacy, on nearly equal terms. Moreover, while Crassus lived, and the Triumvirate held together, there was clearly no hope of successful opposition on the side of the Senate; but with Caesar and Pompeius as rivals, it was only too likely that the latter would be tempted to strengthen his position by posing once more as the champion of a free Republic. And of both these developments there were signs already visible in Rome.

Effects of
the death of
Crassus.

Unlike Crassus, Pompeius had been in no hurry to take up his provincial command. He raised legions, indeed, and sent them to Spain under his *legati* L. Afranius and M. Petreius; but he himself, with part of his army, remained in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, as though the Republic could not stand without such a guarantee for good order. His foresight was justified, for anarchy broke out again at once; but his inveterate indecision, and his respect for the worn-out forms of the State, prevented him from attempting the very task which he had imposed upon himself. The consular elections for 53 were postponed, again and again, for the period of a whole year, and the *operae* of Clodius and Milo made life in the city a burden. Gabinius, who had accepted a bribe of ten thousand talents to restore Auletes in Egypt, was brought to account on his return, and was defended by Cicero; but, in spite of the eloquence of Cicero and the influence of Pompeius himself, he was sent into

Anarchy
in Rome,
54-2 B.C.

exile before the end of 55. Cato, who had been defeated by Vatinius in 55, was elected at last to the praetorship for 54; and Domitius, another ringleader of the aristocratic party, to the consulship for the same year.

Between Pompeius and Caesar, too, the bonds were already beginning to loosen. The death of Julia in 54, while she was still in the prime of life, removed one who by her charm and tact had been of the greatest service in smoothing the relations between her father and her husband; and the continual reports, which came, of Caesar's great conquests beyond the Alps, touched Pompeius in his tenderest point of all, for they revealed Caesar as his rival in a field which till now had been exclusively his own, and his fame, hitherto unrivalled, began to pale before the achievements of a new military genius. He began, therefore, once more to look round for consolation in Rome, and to cultivate friendly relations with the better men among the Senatorial party.

The consular elections for 52 brought matters to a crisis. Milo was a candidate for the consulship, and Clodius for the praetorship; and the proceedings of both were such that the elections were postponed till January. Then, as ill-luck would have it, the two bullies met by chance near Bovillae, on the Appian Way, and Clodius was killed. His body was brought to Rome, and popular feeling was excited to such an extent that a funeral pyre was extemporised for it in the Forum; and in the riots which ensued, the Senate House and some other neighbouring buildings were burned to the ground. The populace clamoured that Pompeius should be proclaimed Dictator; and the Senate commissioned him to raise levies at his discretion and to restore order; confessing thus both its own utter impotence, and its adoption of Pompeius as its chief.

On the proposal, therefore, of Cato and Bibulus, Pompeius was elected 'sole Consul,' and having thus for the moment got what he wanted, he set about the restoration of order with some vigour. By a law *de vi* he constituted a new *quaestio*, to punish the authors of the recent disturbances, which condemned adherents not only of Clodius but of Pompeius himself, such as T. Munatius Plancus and Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, and even the notorious Milo. The last named was to have been defended by Cicero, but at the critical moment the orator's nerve failed him. He broke down in his speech, and Milo went into exile.¹

¹ The extant speech *pro Milone* is Cicero's version of what he would have said if he had dared. Milo, on receipt of a copy of it, is said to have remarked that he was glad that it had not been delivered: 'otherwise he would not have known the taste of these mullets at Marseilles.'

Quiet thus restored, other reforms followed. A *Lex Pompeia de ambitu* increased still further the penalties of bribery, as a check upon His legislation. the corrupt practices of the clubs ; it limited also the duration of the speeches of counsel, and the publication of pamphlets like the *pro Milone*. It also prohibited the practice of summoning powerful personages as *advocati* to bear testimony to character (*laudationes*) in criminal trials. Another law *de iure magistratuum* reaffirmed the indispensability of [personal candidature, and introduced a new and important reform by enacting that henceforward Consuls and Praetors should proceed to their provincial commands, not, as hitherto, immediately after their turn of office in Rome, but after an interval of five years. This would obviously do something to prevent extortion by bankrupt officials, and provided an interval during which a bad magistrate might be brought to account, before being allowed to hold the more irresponsible office.

But it was obvious, from the first, that the measure was intended also as a blow at the position of Caesar ; and it is round this point that the interest of the situation begins rapidly to concentrate. By Caesar's position and plans. the *Lex Licinia Pompeia* of 55 (pp. 497-8) Caesar was to hold his renewed command in Gaul until March 1, 49, the New Year's Day of the provincial calendar. It had also been arranged at Luca that he should hold the consulship of 48. Now Caesar knew that, so soon as he should vacate his command, he would be impeached by Cato or some other of his opponents, and so be prevented, like Catiline, from competing at the consular elections of July 49 ; he would also probably be condemned, and there his career would close. It was all-important to him, therefore, to retain the command of his legions until he could become Consul. This, however, he might reasonably hope to do ; for the Senate's custom was to appoint the outgoing Consuls only to commands which would be actually vacant when their year in Rome expired ; consequently Caesar could only be superseded by a Consul or Praetor of 49, and these would not be in a position to leave Rome until the end of that year. Until the end of 49, therefore, Caesar was safe ; and if he could only get leave to stand for the consulship of 48 without presenting himself in Rome, his tenure of the *imperium* would be continuous, and his position secure. He had therefore moved the Tribunes of 52 to secure him leave to compete in absence, and this leave had already been granted.

But the law *de iure magistratuum* changed the whole situation. Its clause insisting on personal candidature was, it is true, eventually made subject to an exception on Caesar's case ; but the provision for a five

years' interval between home and provincial command carried with it an instruction to the Senate to provide for the needs of the *next* five years—which must elapse before the magistrates of 52 were qualified to go abroad—from among those *consulares* who, for any reason, had not yet held a provincial command at all. Cicero, for example, was sent to Cilicia for 51; and Bibulus, as we have seen already (p. 500), to Syria. This enabled the Senate to fill up the command in Gaul at the moment when it fell legally vacant—that is, on March 1, 49—and this would leave Caesar defenceless during the critical interval between March and the consular elections in July.

Counter-
moves of
the Senate,

Pompeius himself, too, was now drifting rapidly into the arms of the Senate. He had already married Cornelia, the daughter of Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, and in August took Metellus himself as his colleague for the remainder of the year. He also committed an open breach of his own laws by appearing as an *advocatus*, and by permitting the Senate to decree a renewal of his proconsular command for the five years following his present consulship: *suarum legum auctor idem ac subversor*.¹

and of
Pompeius.

In the following year the opposition to Caesar became more marked, and more definitely republican in character. The Consuls, M. Claudius Marcellus and Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, were both of them the Senate's men, and the former took upon himself to offer an open insult to Caesar, by causing a magistrate of Novum Comum, Caesar's Transpadane colony, to be scourged as though he were a mere provincial. He also proposed in the autumn (Sept. 29) that as the war in Transalpine Gaul was now over, by the defeat of Vercingetorix (p. 495), Caesar should be recalled, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus sent to take over the command. Here, however, Pompeius felt himself bound to intervene, and had the question postponed until March of the following year. The question of personal candidature, also, was raised yet once more, and Pompeius, though he had already promised exemption to Caesar, would go no further than to observe that 'the Senate must be obeyed.'

Events of
51 B.C.

With the elections for 50, the situation improved a little. The new Consuls were C. Claudius Marcellus, a cousin of the outgoing Consul, and L. Aemilius Paullus, whom Caesar had no difficulty in securing by a bribe. More important to his cause was the election, as Tribune, of C. Scribonius Curio. Curio was one of the cleverest and most extravagant of the younger members of the nobility,² and had entered political life on the aristocratic

Tribunate
of Curio,
50 B.C.

¹ Tacitus, *Ann.*, 3, 28.

² *Homo ingeniosissime nequam*.—Velleius, 2, 48.

side. But Caesar bought him in, as Marius had bought Sulpicius (p. 398), by the payment of his debts to the amount of £500,000, and Curio became one of the ablest and most trusted members of his staff, and eventually contributed more than any one else to secure at least a measure of justice to Caesar's side.¹ Much, too, had been done, broadcast, by Balbus, Caesar's confidential agent in Rome, to inspire the ruined and restless young men about town with expectations of better things when Caesar should return, and to overcome the panic which the notion of his relentless treatment of the German trespassers (p. 491) had inspired, even in serious persons like Cicero.

But the anxiety of the Senate only increased as time went on. An attempt was made, early in the year, to weaken the army of Caesar by **Caesar loses two legions.** demanding, both of him and of Pompeius, one legion for the purposes of a war with Parthia. Now, in the stress of the Gallic revolt of 53 (p. 492), Caesar had borrowed one legion from Pompeius, and this Pompeius proposed now to regard as his contribution, thus reducing Caesar's army by two legions, and his own by none. Moreover, these two legions, the surrender of which Caesar did not feel it politic to refuse, were as a matter of fact not sent to the East at all, but remained in camp in Italy, and were practically added to the army of Pompeius.

Various suggestions were also made to meet the difficulties raised by Caesar's return. It was even proposed that Caesar should lay down his command definitely on March 1, 49, without waiting for the arrival of a successor, on pain of being declared a public enemy; and Cato announced openly his intention of prosecuting him, thereupon, for the illegalities of his former consulship. Here Curio, posing still as an independent Republican, interposed his veto, and proposed on the other hand that, if anything, Caesar and Pompeius should resign their commands together; but, though this was actually carried in the Senate, Pompeius refused to accept it, and the suggestion was dropped. Pompeius himself, meanwhile, seems to have proposed, as a compromise, that Caesar should hold his command until November 13, 49, and should

Negotiations for his return. then come to Rome and stand for the consulship of 48; but even this left an interval of six weeks, during which Caesar would be *privatus*, and exposed to violence or impeachment. Later in the year, Caesar himself, still anxious, if possible, to effect what he wanted without illegal action, offered to surrender Transalpine Gaul altogether, provided only that he might retain either Cisalpine Gaul or Illyricum, with one legion, until after the consular election. To this the Senate's only reply was to appeal to Pompeius to

¹ *Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*—Lucan, *Phars.*, iv. 819.

exercise the power which he already held, to call out the levies of Italy ; and Curio, seeing how things were going, left Rome as soon as his year of office expired, and betook himself to Caesar's winter-quarters at Ravenna.

Finally, on the first day of 49, Curio reappeared in Rome, with a further letter from Caesar. The new Consuls, L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius Marcellus, the brother of the Consul of 51, both violent partisans of the Senate, proposed to ignore it ; but two of the new Tribunes, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus, insisted, and gained their point. The letter was found to contain a fresh proposal for simultaneous disarmament on both sides ; which was rejected by the Senate at once. Thereupon Metellus Scipio, the father-in-law of Pompeius, moved that Caesar be ordered to disband his army at once, or be declared a public enemy. Antonius and Cassius interposed their veto, but the proposal of Scipio was declared carried ; the Consuls were armed with the *senatus consultum ultimum* ; and the two Tribunes, as if in fear of their lives, took refuge at once with Caesar. They had gained, however, an all-important point for his cause, for they had provoked the Senate into a grave breach of the constitution, in ignoring their veto ; so that now Caesar could represent himself as the champion of Republican liberties against the domination of a clique of nobles.

Flight of Antonius and Cassius, Jan. 7, 49 B.C.

Caesar received the news at Ravenna. He had with him only one legion, the thirteenth ; but his policy, no less than his instinct, demanded instant action. He sent word at once to his Transalpine legions to concentrate and move southward with all speed ; convinced himself, in a stirring meeting, of the loyalty of the little force he had ; crossed the Rubicon at once, and pushed on in the direction of Ariminum. The story was common afterwards how he pondered long before committing himself irrevocably to such an enterprise ; and his sudden and decisive cry, *jacta alea esto*, has passed into a Roman proverb.

Caesar crosses the Rubicon, Jan. 49 B.C.

Even now, however, he made one last effort to avoid the inevitable, by promising to surrender everything, if Pompeius would consent to disband the Italian levies and withdraw to his command in Spain ; but the Senate's reply was to make Pompeius commander-in-chief, with full powers over the men and money of the Republic. Pompeius had no difficulty in raising a vast crowd of recruits, and, with time and capable officers, he might have succeeded in creating an army. But his old veterans, by this time, were dead or past work ; his own army was over-sea in Spain ; and the only trained legions in Italy were the two which he had recalled from Caesar less than a year before.

Pompeius evacuates Rome.

He saw at once that, at so short an interval, Rome was indefensible ; and gave orders to evacuate the City, and concentrate every available man at Luceria in Apulia. Only Domitius was allowed with a small force to reconnoitre northwards and eastwards, and rally, if time allowed, the old retainers of Pompeius in Picenum.

But even this stroke failed. With inconceivable swiftness—for it was still midwinter—Caesar pressed on beyond Ariminum, which fell at once, and swept down both sides of the Apennines ; himself on **Capture of Corfinium.** Ancona, Curio on Iguvium and the *Via Flaminia*, and Antonius on Arretium and the *Via Cassia*. A single engagement at Auximum cost Pompeius the command of Picenum ; by the 14th of February Caesar had shut up Domitius with the whole of the seasoned troops in Corfinium, and by the 20th Corfinium had fallen ; for the orders of Domitius had been precise—to avoid an action and retire to Luceria—and Pompeius was not going to throw good legions after a bad commander.

The fall of Corfinium gave Caesar just the chance he wanted, to dispel the evil rumours which hung about his name. Even men like **Caesar's clemency.** M. Cicero, who knew him well, had been led to believe that his return would mean a renewal of the Marian massacres, if not of the invasions of the Cimbri and the Gauls. So, to the surprise and relief of all Italy, he dismissed his prisoners unharmed ; and most of them repaid him by enlisting immediately on his side, to the number of three whole legions. Two of his own legions, the eighth and the twelfth, had by this time arrived from the north ; and with these ample forces he had no difficulty in making his way to Rome.

Such had been the panic which his first advance had inspired, that the Senate had not even waited to carry with it the treasury in its flight.

Surrender of Rome. One Tribune indeed remained behind, to veto, with unconscious irony, and without avail, his use of the 'sacred reserve' which was maintained from of old to meet invasion from the north ; but no other resistance was offered, and men of all classes and all degrees of wealth and influence flocked to his side, both before and after his arrival.

Pompeius, meanwhile, cut off for ever from his Spanish army, and paralysed by the ruinous folly of Domitius, had nothing left but to fall back from Italy upon the East, where he well might hope that the fame of his generalship would have survived. In this he was successful ; for he had his Italian forces well in hand by this time, and the whole Roman fleet was behind him at Brundisium. Yet, even so, Caesar was upon him before he

Pompeius retires to Epirus, March 17, 49 B.C.

could complete the evacuation of Italy, and laid vigorous siege to his rear-guard. The town of Brundisium was strongly fortified, however, and the shipping in the harbour bore an active part in the defence; so, by March 17, Pompeius had made good his escape, and Caesar, who had as yet no ships, was on his way back to Rome to reorganise the conquests of his ten weeks' war.

CHIEF DATES.

Conference of Luca	56
Second consulship of Pompeius and Crassus	55
Death of Julia	54
Disaster of Carrhae : Death of Crassus	53
Anarchy in Rome : Revolt of Vercingetorix in Gaul	52
Tribunate of Curio	50
Caesar crosses the Rubicon (January)	49
captures Corfinium (February) and enters Rome	49
Pompeius evacuates Italy (March)	49

CHIEF PERSONS.

Caesar—Pompeius—Crassus—Julia—Cicero—Cato—Gabinus—Vatinius—Clodius—Milo—P. Licinius Crassus—C. Cassius Longinus—Orodes Pacorus—L. Afranius—M. Petreius—L. Domitius Ahenobarbus—T. Munatius Plancus—Ser. Sulpicius Rufus—Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio—Cornelia—C. (2) and M. Claudius Marcellus—L. Aemilius Paullus—C. Scribonius Curio—L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus—M. Antonius—Q. Cassius Longinus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Theatrum Pompeii (in Rome)—Luca—Bovillae—Massilia—Carrhae—Ravenna—Ariminum—Ancona—Iguvium—Arretium—Auximum—Corfinium—Brundisium.

SUBJECTS.

- The break-up of the coalition between Caesar, Pompeius, and Crassus.
- The relations between Rome and Parthia.
- The character and career of Crassus.
- The dispute between Caesar and the Senate.
- The failure of Pompeius to hold Italy.

CHAPTER XLII

THE FIRST CIVIL WAR AND THE RULE OF CAESAR

Caesar's settlement of Italy—Caesar in Spain—Pompeius in the East—Caesar crosses into Epirus—Battle of Pharsalus—Murder of Pompeius—Caesar in Egypt, Pontus, Italy, and Africa—Battle of Thapsus—Death of Cato—Reforms in Rome—The Julian Calendar—Revolt in Spain—Battle of Munda—The rule of Caesar—The title *Imperator*—Remedial measures—Municipal institutions—Provincial government—Republican discontent—Murder of Caesar.

THE evacuation of Italy by Pompeius, however necessary as a military measure, was a fatal mistake politically ; for it not only surrendered to Caesar the command of the capital and the treasury, but it enabled him to pose as the protector of the City, and to divide the forces of his opponents in Spain and in the East. The extravagant threats, moreover, of the extreme aristocrats, of the things they would do if they ever came back, more than outweighed those rumours about Caesar's cruelties, which his actual clemency had already done so much to dispel.

Caesar had now three urgent tasks before him : to secure his position in Italy, to defeat the Spanish army before it could leave the West, and to crush Pompeius himself before he could muster his levies in the East. The first was made easy by his own policy of moderation. There were no massacres, no proscriptions, no *novae tabulae*, much to the disappointment of the bankrupts and anarchists who had joined him. Interest already paid, however, might be deducted from the principal, and, by a provision new to Roman law, a debtor might save his personal freedom by a *cessio bonorum*—that is, by surrendering his estates at their estimated value before the outbreak of the war. Non-combatants were respected, and prisoners of war released ; and when Labienus, alone among his officers, deserted to the side of the Senate, his baggage was sent after him, to show that Caesar bore no malice.

The most pressing need was to establish a provisional government,

and to secure the corn supply ; for the Senate held the fleet and the command of the sea, and openly threatened to starve Caesar into surrender. M. Lepidus was made *praefectus urbi*, and M. Sardinia and Sicily. Antonius was charged with the defence of Italy. Q. Valerius, meanwhile, secured Sardinia without difficulty, and Curio the corn province of Sicily. But on passing over rashly into Africa, Curio was defeated and killed by the united forces of the Proconsul, P. Atius Varus, and of King Juba of Numidia—the latter a personal enemy of Caesar.

The fact that Africa was in the hands of the enemy made it more urgent than ever to deal with the army of Spain, and for this Caesar set out at once (about the end of April), sending word to his Spain. legate, C. Fabius, to meet him on the Pyrenean border with the six legions which had been left in the north. At Massilia he found his old enemy, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, but he had no time to waste upon him ; so leaving C. Trebonius to besiege the town by land, and D. Brutus with a few ships to blockade the harbour, he pressed on, himself, with a small cavalry escort, and on June 23 came up with his legions, which had already reached the Pyrenees. A campaign of forty days ended in the complete surrender of the Spanish army. Arriving too late to hold the mountain frontier, Afranius and Petreius fell back upon the line of the Ebro. Caesar, however, came up with them at Ilerda, some twenty miles to the north, and though greatly impeded by the floods of the river Sicoris, and at one time cut off from his supplies, succeeded first in crossing the stream in coracles, such as he had seen in use in the north, and then in outflanking the enemy's position, and outmarching them in their retreat to the Ebro. On August 2 the whole force surrendered ; whereupon M. Terentius Varro, who held the Further Province, was immediately deserted by his men, and gave himself up at Corduba. Caesar, as before, dismissed the whole force unharmed, and escorted them himself to the frontier of Italy ; receiving on his journey the surrender of Massilia, and the news that by a special law he had been created Dictator to hold the consular elections.

Returning at once to Rome he nominated himself as Consul for 48, with P. Servilius Vatia, the son of Isauricus, as his colleague ; dealt Reforms in Rome. summarily again with the financial distress ; redressed a long-standing grievance by the restoration of the *liberi proscriptorum* and the victims of the recent anarchy ; and consummated the enfranchisement of Italy by extending the full citizenship to Transpadane Gaul.

As he had himself foretold, Caesar had defeated in Spain 'an army without a leader.' He had now to meet equally 'a leader without an army.' Pompeius had, however, in fact, collected a vast Pompeius in though miscellaneous force, and had already repelled an attempt of P. Dolabella to effect a landing in Illyria. He occupied, besides, a strong and defensible position. The East was his entirely; the fleet, under M. Bibulus, kept close watch on the Adriatic coast of Italy; Africa remained a standing danger on Caesar's southern flank; and to recover Italy, as Sulla had done, seemed only a matter of time. By the beginning of the year 48 his forces in Macedonia and Epirus amounted to nine legions, and some seven thousand cavalry; while Caesar in South Italy had only seven legions, and a very much smaller mounted force.

But here again, as before, Caesar upset all the enemy's calculations by leaving Brundisium on January 4 with as many men as he could crowd into his ships, and by landing them next day on the opposite coast. Bibulus was caught napping, but he roused himself in time to capture part of the transports on the return journey, and to fulfil his threat of killing all his prisoners.

Caesar
crosses into
Epirus,
Jan. 48 B.C.

Caesar was thus left isolated in the enemy's country with barely five thousand men, and no immediate prospect of reinforcements. He moved rapidly northwards, however; captured Oricum and Apollonia, and had already succeeded in blockading the land side of the enemy's arsenal at Dyrrhachium, when Pompeius appeared from Macedon, and took up a position a few miles down the coast at Petra, whence he could communicate with Dyrrhachium by sea (see map, p. 512).

Caesar thereupon conceived the audacious plan of blockading Pompeius with a far inferior force, and ran a line of siege-works southwards from his camp to enclose him. But though Antonius succeeded, in March, in landing further up the coast at Lissus, and brought the rest of the army to reinforce him, it was easy for Pompeius to prolong his counter-works in proportion, and eventually to slip out through the gap which remained, and inflict a severe defeat on Caesar's army. The latter, however, had gained his immediate object; he had dislodged Pompeius from Dyrrhachium, and had no difficulty in drawing him out of touch with his fleet, by turning to face Metellus Nepos, who was bringing up reinforcements from Asia. Pompeius followed him into Thessaly, and took up a strong position between Larisa and Pharsalus. But the difficulties which Pompeius had already experienced with the hot-headed and inexperienced aristocrats, who formed his staff and hampered his strategy, came now to a head, and compelled him to move out and give battle.

Siege of
Dyrrha-
chium.

The battle of Pharsalus which ensued, and decided the fate of the Roman world, was fought on August 9 of the defective Republican calendar, or June 6 of our own. Pompeius had with him already some forty-seven thousand men, and seven thousand cavalry, gathered from Thrace, Galatia, and Numidia; and large reinforcements were still expected from Asia. Caesar, on the other hand, had only twenty-two thousand foot, and barely a

Battle of
Pharsalus,
June 6,
48 B.C.

DYRRHACHIUM



thousand mounted men. The tactics of Pompeius were to hold Caesar in front with his infantry, while he used his great superiority in cavalry to envelop his right and rear. Foreseeing this, Caesar posted his trusted tenth legion at the point of danger, under his own immediate orders,

and in front of it a force of cavalry and light infantry mixed—a fashion which he had learnt from the Gauls. Cn. Domitius Calvinus, a repented aristocrat, commanded in the centre, and M. Antonius on the other wing. All fell out as he had foreseen. The flank attack of the cavalry failed to break his composite line, and his legionaries, charging in their turn, and using their *pila*, by his orders, not as missiles but as pikes, created such a panic as involved the enemy's centre, and scattered the whole force to the winds. Fifteen thousand men, among whom was



L. Domitius, were left dead on the field; the camp was taken, and the survivors surrendered in a body. Caesar still pursued a policy of conciliation. Some few Senators who had shown themselves irreconcilable were executed, but the rank and file were pardoned and set free, provided only that those who were Roman citizens did not return to Italy. A few of the leaders escaped, first to Corcyra and thence to Africa, to organise resistance anew; but many honest Republicans, like M. Brutus and C. Cassius, preferred to surrender, and were invited, if not compelled, to accept responsible posts on Caesar's side.

Pompeius had fled from the field before the fighting was over, and hurried by way of Tempe and Lesbos—where his wife joined him—to Cyprus, and thence to Egypt; hoping to find shelter and assistance from the young king Ptolemy Dionysius, who had succeeded Auletes in 51, and who, with the assistance of his advisers Pothinus and Achilles, had expelled Cleopatra, his sister and coheirress, into Syria. On learning of the arrival of Pompeius, the same unscrupulous ministers persuaded the young king to go down to the beach at Pelusium to meet him, and Achilles, pretending that the water was too shallow for the ship, brought him to land in a small boat, almost unescorted. But as he rose in the boat to step ashore, a former centurion of his own, Septimuleius, stabbed him from behind; Achilles fell upon him also, and Pompeius died without a struggle. The treacherous Egyptians cut off his head within sight of his family and of the king; and his body was left on the shore, to be hurriedly buried at last by his devoted freedman Philippus. His wife and attendants, who had remained in the ship, took refuge in Cyprus.

Caesar, too, had hurried to Egypt with an escort of less than a legion, in the hope of bringing Pompeius, if possible, to a conference. But he arrived too late; the severed head of his rival was all that remained to meet him; and there was nothing to be done but to seize and execute the murderers.

It was the greatest blow that had befallen the cause of Caesar. Pompeius was only fifty-eight years old. Until the death of Julia, only six years before, he had been on terms of personal friendship with Caesar, and it was rather through the design of others, than of either of the chief actors, that their aims had drifted so widely apart as they did. Even now, while Pompeius lived, the chance had remained of restoring the indirect personal control by which Caesar had maintained himself hitherto. Now, however, it was no longer the cause of Pompeius—a jealous colleague, or at worst, a personal rival—which Caesar had to face, but the cause merely and only of the Senate and of the bad old order of things; a cause, however, which was still that of the legitimate government of Rome. Pompeius, too, in his earlier career, had done real and permanent service for Rome, which Caesar had been the first to acknowledge and to reward as it deserved. He was the greatest soldier, and the most gifted administrator of great provincial matters, that the Republic had known till now. It was in fact only in the personal politics of Rome, in the perception of the drift of events, in the art of creating a party, of making friends and conciliating opponents, that he had been found wanting; and for this his real blunt honesty was almost as

much responsible as his invincible shyness, or his admitted vanity. He was the last upright and moral citizen, the last loyal servant of the Republic, who had also the genius to conquer and administer an Empire ; and, with his death, Rome and the world had to choose between a Caesar, on the one hand, and a Cato, a Bibulus or a Domitius on the other.

On the news of the battle of Pharsalus, Caesar was created Dictator again in his absence, and also Consul for five years. He was given, in addition, the powers of a Tribune for life, and the right to nominate to all magistracies except the plebeian offices, to allot the praetorian provinces, and to declare peace or war. But he did not yet return to Rome. Nominating M. Antonius once more to defend Italy as his *Magister Equitum*, he spent nine months in Egypt, which remain unaccounted for in his career. Perhaps, like Alexander and Napoleon, he saw in Egypt one key to the dominion of the East, and lingered to read its riddle; perhaps he needed time to study the tremendous problem of reconstruction; perhaps it was merely Cleopatra's charms that held him. At all events he stayed : first, restoring Cleopatra to share her brother's kingdom ; then, opposed by the guardians of the latter, and besieged in the Pharos by the mad mob of Alexandria ; then, reinforced from Syria, and intent for three months on the exploration of the Upper Nile, and the reorganisation of the country under Cleopatra and a younger brother. The result determined, once for all, the place which Egypt was to hold under the Empire. The country was not left independent, for its army was dissolved, and a Roman garrison of two legions was installed ; but neither was it made a regular province ; and in Caesar's lifetime it was administered, personally, by a freedman of his own.

In June 47, however, Caesar emerged once more, on the news of a grave revolt in Pontus, where Pharnaces, the treacherous son of the great Mithradates (p. 456), had defeated Domitius Calvinus, and threatened to carry with him the native chieftains of Galatia. Caesar, with all his old rapidity of movement, put Syria in charge of Sextus Caesar, a dependant of his own, held a congress of native chiefs at Tarsus, and then, in a five days' campaign, won a decisive victory on August 2 at Zela, and announced it in Rome by the immortal message *Veni, vidi, vici*. Pharnaces was deposed, Lower Armenia was transferred from Deiotarus of Galatia to Ariobarzanes III. of Cappadocia, and the general settlement of Asia was revised on liberal and conciliatory lines.

Now at last Caesar was free to return to Italy, where matters had gone steadily from bad to worse. The Republican admiral, M. Octavius, had continued to harry the Adriatic, until a fleet raised by

Vatinius expelled him. Gabinius had attempted to pacify Dalmatia, and had been badly beaten by the natives. In Africa the remains of the Senatorial party had organised a new army, with the support of Juba and the Numidians; Spain was in open revolt against the extortionate government of Caesar's *legatus*, C. Cassius Longinus; and in Italy itself, though an anarchical movement (led by M. Caelius Rufus, one of the Praetors of 48, and supported by the veteran agitator Milo) had come to nothing, on the death of both the ringleaders, yet a more recent cry for *novae tabulae* raised by P. Dolabella, another Caesarian spendthrift, had led to disturbances in Rome, which Antonius, himself a pattern of disorderliness, had hardly been able to suppress. Besides all this, for the first nine months of 47 no regular magistrates had been appointed by the Dictator at all, and in August a dangerous mutiny had broken out among the troops stationed in Campania.

Caesar reached Italy in September, and very soon restored order and peace; resuming the Dictatorship, and appointing Consuls and other magistrates for the remainder of the year. Dolabella was pardoned; the Campanian mutineers were brought to their senses by Caesar's single word *Quirites!*—denoting them, for the moment, not as his soldiers, but as mere civilians—the severe economic distress was relieved by the reduction of all debts by one-quarter; and two new Praetors were created to deal with the mass of legal business which had resulted from the confusion. The Senate was given at the same time a new and almost representative character, by raising its numbers from six hundred to nine hundred, and by enrolling in it not merely centurions and low-born partisans of the Dictator, but even Gaulish and Spanish provincials, who, as the saying went, did not even know the way to the Senate-house.

It was high time, however, to deal with the Republicans in Africa, and before the end of the year Caesar was on the move again. But a storm scattered his fleet, and he was left for a while on the African coast at Ruspina, with barely half a legion, and a mere handful of cavalry, in face of the whole army of the Republicans, and Juba's swarms of horsemen. After three months' waiting and manœuvring, however, he felt himself strong enough, on April 6, to give battle at Thapsus to a Republican force of no less than fourteen legions, and gained a decisive victory. His own loss was not more than fifty men; while, in spite of strict orders to the contrary, some fifty thousand of the enemy were cut down in the fury of the pursuit. King Juba and M. Petreius escaped, only to kill each other. The former had offended Caesar past forgiveness; and the latter

Disorder in the West.
 Caesar restores order in Italy, Sept. 47 B.C.
 Campaign in Africa.
 Battle of Thapsus, April 6, 46 B.C.

was the same who had been released on parole in Spain. His colleague Afranius, too, was murdered shortly afterwards; Metellus Scipio committed suicide; and Cato, who took refuge at Utica, rightly judging that the cause of the Senate was lost, and further resistance useless, faced the same end with stoic resignation—the last, the most honest, and the most impracticable of the champions of Republican freedom. Labienus and Sextus Pompeius, meanwhile, made their escape, and joined Cn. Pompeius to foment the disorders in Spain. The settlement of Africa, which followed, abolished for a while the troublesome kingdom of Numidia; its eastern tribes being incorporated in the Roman province, and the western added to the client state of Mauretania.

Caesar lost no time in returning to Rome, to celebrate at last a gorgeous fourfold triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Numidia; suppressing, with characteristic moderation, all mention either of Pompeius or of Cato. The servility of the Senate, and of his own followers on the other hand, was more marked than ever. He was voted a public thanksgiving of forty days, and created Dictator for ten years, and *Praefectus Morum* for three; his statue was set up with those of the Seven Kings on the Capitol, and he was saluted with the title *Divus*, as if he were indeed something more than human.

He had now a few months' time to proceed with his work in Italy. The admission of a popular element into the jury courts under the Aurelian law (p. 443), had long since served its purpose, and had led in its turn to abuses which the law of Pompeius (p. 498) had not wholly removed. Caesar closed the question by selecting the *iudices* in equal proportions from the Senate and the Equites only. The *collegia*, which had been the engine of anarchy in the hands of Clodius, were either abolished altogether, or, as in the case of the Jewish *synagogues*,¹ were carefully registered and restricted. The demands of the veterans, and the needs of Italian agriculture, were met by the judicious distribution of allotments; not however wholesale, but here and there a few, so that the new settlers might have every encouragement to accustom themselves to their new life. The most crying abuses of the provincial system were removed, at the same time, by strictly limiting the tenure of Propraetors to one year, and that of Proconsuls to two. A new place of business, the *Forum Julium*, was laid out in Rome to relieve the congestion of the old Forum; and the new era in the life of Rome was marked by the dedication of a temple to *Venus Genetrix*.

The most memorable, however, of all the reforms of this year was

¹ *Συναγωγή* is, in this sense, the exact equivalent of *collegium*.

that of the Roman calendar. The old Roman year had consisted of lunar months of approximately equal length, forming a year of only 355 days, and the difference between this and the solar year of 365½ days was made up from time to time by intercalating a whole month at the discretion of the Pontifex Maximus. Between carelessness and political intrigue, however, this cumbrous system had gone so far wrong that, as we have seen (p. 512), the battle of Pharsalus, fought actually on June 6, was assigned by the calendar to August 9. To remedy this discrepancy, Caesar called in the distinguished astronomer Sosigenes of Alexandria, and promulgated, in his capacity of Pontifex Maximus, that 'Julian Calendar' which survived in England till 1752, and is still in use in Eastern Europe.¹ To correct the current error, the year 46 was reckoned to consist of 445 days; and the new civil year 45 was inaugurated, like the official year (p. 305) on January 1; whereby December,—hitherto, as its name implies, the *tenth* month,—became, as now, the *twelfth*. For the future, some of the months were increased in length, to make up a year of 365 days; and the annual error of one-quarter of a day was compensated by the intercalation every fourth year of one whole day, at the end of February, the *twelfth* month of the old Roman calendar.

Before the end of the year, meanwhile, Caesar had left Rome in charge of a board of *praefecti*, and was in the field once more, on his 'hardest campaign of all,' as he said, against the rebels and Republicans in Spain; taking with him, at the age of seventeen years, his favourite nephew C. Octavius, of whom we hear now for the first time. After the battle of Thapsus, as we have seen (p. 517), Sextus Pompeius, Labienus, and many other fugitives, betook themselves to Cn. Pompeius, who had taken advantage of his father's ancient popularity, and the cruelties of Caesar's *legatus*, to raise an insurrection there. It was a winter campaign of no little difficulty, but, in the end, of short duration; for Caesar fought his way as far as Corduba in only twenty-seven days. The decisive battle was fought at Munda on March 17, 45, and was won, like so many others, by the personal exertions of Caesar. Labienus was killed in the fight, Cn. Pompeius shortly after; and a very large number of the rebels, refusing to surrender, were cut down as they stood. The province was pacified and regulated on equitable terms; but

Revolt in Spain.
Battle of Munda, March 17, 45 B.C.

¹ Our present Gregorian calendar was instituted by Pope Gregory XIII. (1582), and differs only by omitting the bissextile thrice in 400 years (*e.g.* in A.D. 1700, 1800, 1900), to compensate for a slight margin of error which remains in the Julian reckoning.

this time Caesar's patience was exhausted, and on his return to Rome in September he celebrated a regular triumph over a Roman enemy.

Caesar was now indisputably supreme over the whole Roman world, and unprecedented and dangerous honours were pressed upon him by the Senate and by his own supporters. He was created ^{Caesar at} Dictator for life, and Consul for ten years, with power to ^{last supreme.} nominate to all magistracies, plebeian as well as curule, and to make peace or war; with the supreme command of the armies of the State. He received the titles of *Pater Patriae* and *Imperator*, with the privilege of wearing always the embroidered robe, the sceptre, and the golden laurel wreath of a *triumphator*. His person was declared sacrosanct; the Senate took an oath to protect his life; and he was offered a bodyguard of Senators and Equites. His portrait appeared on the coinage; his statue had been already set up on the Capitol with those of the Seven Kings; the month *Quinctilis*, in which his birthday fell, was renamed after him 'the month of Julius' (*July*); and he was accorded once more the title and worship of a divinity, with M. Antonius as his *flamen* or priest. Now at least, if not long before, it was evident that the Republic of Rome had passed away: whatever outward forms might still be observed, by the favour of the single ruler, and whatever name that single ruler might choose, the Empire of Rome was now, for good or evil, a Monarchy.

Of all the titles and honours which had been showered upon Caesar, two alone represented adequately either what he had done, or what he still proposed to do. The office of Dictator, revived as it had been in Sulla's case after the lapse of more than a ^{The titles and rule of Caesar.} century—from 202 to 83—and offered in vain to Pompeius as the remedy for the anarchy of 52, marked, in Caesar's case also, the definite suspension of the Republican constitution, and the absolute discretion entrusted to him, both to restore order, and to ^{Dictatorship.} establish some form of permanent government. But, by its history and very nature, a Dictatorship was provisional only. Sulla, who had used it as such, to reconstitute the government of the Senate, had stained it at the same time, indelibly, with memories of massacre and proscription; and the very name of the office, and still more the anomaly of a lifelong Dictatorship, such as was conferred on Caesar in the moment of enthusiasm in 45, roused all the deepest feelings and all the worst suspicions of the many who were still at heart Republican.

But it was not on the Dictatorship that Caesar relied, to found the new monarchy which he designed. Differing, in this, most markedly from his great heir and successor Augustus, he had practised, from

his first appearance in public life, an utter disregard of the formalities and conventions of Republican government and had acted throughout with an absolute self-reliance, and an indifference both to the problem of Empire. colleagues and to opponents, which went far in men's minds to justify the view, which has been widely held, that he intended from the first to set up an absolute monarchy. But whether this were so or no, his long experience, in Gaul, of administration on a great scale must have convinced him, in any case, that if the Roman Empire was to be held together at all, it must be by a single strong man at the centre, and, in the various departments and provinces, by deputies who should be responsible directly and solely to him. It was also clear to everybody that as it was the sword that had won the empire, and the sword that had threatened to divide and destroy it, so it was the sword alone which could guard and maintain it: in other words, that the power of the monarch must rest in the last resort upon his absolute command of the legions.

Now there was one title only, which was capable of expressing both the position which Caesar actually held, and that which he designed to perpetuate in Rome. The word *Imperator*, in its origin, 'Imperator,' signified merely 'one who held *imperium*,' that absolute power, conferred by the whole people, through which the kings of old had ruled, and which afterwards had been conferred, for the term of their office, upon the annual magistrates. It had, however, acquired a secondary meaning, when it became customary, after a victorious campaign, for the soldiers to salute their general formally as *Imperator*—'one worthy to hold the *imperium*.' The Gabinian and the Manilian laws (66-65) had enlarged the conception of *imperium* further, by creating in the case of Pompeius a proconsular *imperium*, which, being *aequum* and *infinitem*, could be exercised equally within all the special *provinciae* of the ordinary proconsuls and propraetors; and the original proposal for the *cura annonae* in 57 (p. 481) had contemplated an *imperium* not merely *aequum* but *maius* in regard to all other magistrates. Moreover, every magistrate who held the *imperium* was empowered at his discretion to exercise it for local or particular purposes through *legati* or *praefecti* of his own choosing, who were responsible directly to himself; and in the great provincial commands this had become the regular system.

Now in all these senses the word *Imperator* exactly expressed Caesar's mode of operation. As Proconsul in Gaul, and as Consul in 48, 46, and 45, and now as perpetual Consul for ten years, he held, by decree of the people, the supreme *imperium* in the strict constitutional sense.

His conquests in Gaul, and his decisive victories in the Civil War, had proclaimed him *Imperator* in the second sense, as no Roman general had ever been before. The breakdown of the Republican government, and the extinction of all its official representatives, had left his own *imperium* absolute; and the decrees which had been passed after Pharsalus and after Munda had transferred to him the sole authority to confer *imperium* on others for the future. It was probably, therefore, as supreme holder of the *imperium*, that Caesar justified his position of monarch in Rome; it is in this sense that Greek political writers, quick as ever to represent the essence of Roman titles, even at the expense of the form, uniformly translate the word *Imperator* by *αὐτοκράτωρ*—‘empire,’ by ‘autocracy’; and it is in this sense, too, that the biographer Suetonius begins, with the life of Caesar, his ‘Lives of the Roman Emperors.’

Caesar's
use of the
Imperium.

His scheme of personal rule is well shown in his dealings with the Republican magistracies. Both in Gaul as Proconsul, and ever since his return to Italy, it had been his habit to entrust all really important duties, such as the government of the capital, the defence of Italy, or the administration of provinces or districts like Spain or Egypt, not to independent magistrates, but to *legati* or *praefecti* from among his own staff-officers; and it has been seen, already, how indifferent he was to the existence, or non-existence, of the regular magistrates. In 47, for example, he had omitted to nominate them at all; and now, when he had time for such things, he nominated not merely for the current year, but for one or more years in advance; raising the number of Praetors to fourteen and of Quaestors to forty, to meet the press of business; while by appointing a *consul suffectus*¹ for a few hours only, at the end of 45, and by conferring the powers of a Praetor upon a man who was already Tribune, he seemed to show that these were now merely complimentary titles.

His
treatment of
Republican
Magistracy,

In his dealings with the Senate, Caesar followed the same policy as with the magistracies: treating it simply in its original capacity as a council of advice; filling it with his own supporters, of every class; consulting it or not, as he pleased; and using its name and that of its leaders, as if its consent were merely a matter of form. All real deliberation, meanwhile, was confined to a few personal friends and confidential agents; and it was only in those matters which concerned it as the town-council of Rome that the Senate retained even a shadow of its former authority.

of the
Senate,

¹ When a magistrate died during his year of office, the ‘substitute’ who was appointed to finish his task was said to be *suffectus*.

The Comitia, having lost all claim, since the enfranchisement of Italy in 89, to represent anything but the populace of the capital, were of the People allowed, in the same way, only the formal privilege of of Rome. sanctioning the election of such candidates as came forward with a *commendatio* from Caesar. More than this, the city populace itself was deprived of much of its power for harm, and confronted with new ways of earning an honest living. The political clubs were broken up, and the corn doles were restricted to some hundred and fifty thousand of the deserving poor, and supplemented by lavish shows and largesses from the Dictator's privy purse. Great public works, such as the *Forum Julium*, the *Septa Julia* in the Campus Martius, the draining of the Fucine Lake and the Pomptine Marshes, a great scheme (never realised) for diverting the course of the Tiber, and a new road through the Apennines, were devised to provide employment for those who would work, and to develop the resources of the back-country. For those who were willing to emigrate, new colonies, oversea and in Transalpine Gaul, afforded the opportunity to make a new start in life ; and for those who remained, the reimposition of harbour-dues (*portoria*) gave the needful protection to Italian industries against the produce of the provinces, which had suffered less in the war. To mitigate the brigandage on the great pastures, it was made compulsory that at least one-third of the *pastores* should be free men ; and a series of enactments, some of which have been noticed already, were directed to mitigate the pressure of debt and financial distress. Hoarding of money, for example, which had become dangerously common during the long years of anarchy, was forbidden, in 49, above the limit of fifteen thousand *denarii*. A new gold coinage was introduced ; and in 47 capitalists were compelled to invest half of any money they had to lend, in the purchase of Italian land. Luxury was repressed, and marriage and home-life encouraged, by strict sumptuary laws ; and by permitting the *cessio bonorum* (p. 509), which gave general satisfaction, the foundations were laid for a real law of bankruptcy.

By depriving the Senate, the people, and the magistrates of Rome of their accidental and grievously misused control over the rest of the empire, Caesar had reduced them to be little more than the governing body of the capital town of the empire ; and had laid open the way for a new system of government for Italy and the provinces. In both, the same principle was applied. Municipal institutions, such as had worked so well, under the Republic, in the colonies and country towns of Italy, were extended wherever the city-state system either had broken down, or had not yet

Remedial
measures
in Italy.

Municipal
institutions
in Italy
and the
Provinces.

sprung up out of the older tribal societies. New citizen-colonies were founded in Transalpine Gaul; Narbo was refounded, and the status of a citizen-colony was conferred even upon the native community of Gades in Further Spain. Colonies were established also at Corinth (under the name of *Laus Julii*), and at Carthage, in the hope of reviving at length the commercial prosperity of Greece and Africa. Latin rights and municipal organisation were extended over all Sicily and parts of Gallia Narbonensis; and citizenship was conferred with a free hand upon individuals of all nationalities who seemed worthy to exercise its privileges. It was a systematic return to the old Roman system of gradual incorporation, which had fallen into disuse during the great wars; and it laid down, once for all, the lines on which Roman citizenship was in time extended universally.

While local patriotism and loyalty to the empire were thus fostered side by side, the worst abuses of government were modified by restricting the duration of provincial commands and the opportunities of the magistrates for misgovernment. The wasteful and oppressive system of tithes was abolished, and the perquisites of Roman officials were strictly defined. The governors were to be regarded simply as Caesar's agents, and were charged chiefly with the maintenance of order, the prevention of extortion by the merchants and money-lenders, and the settlement of disputes between the self-governing communities; with whose internal affairs they had nothing to do.¹

Whatever Caesar's own intentions may have been, however, no one in Rome could mistake the direction in which events were moving. In fact, if not in name, there was a king in Rome, and the hateful word *rex* came to men's lips in more quarters than one. A Sibylline oracle declared that the Parthians could only be conquered by a 'Roman King,' and it may well be imagined that in dealing with eastern potentates it would be an advantage to Caesar to have the use of so definite and intelligible a title. Some of Caesar's own supporters, too, foresaw offices and titles for themselves, if their chief became king and organised a royal court; and in the mad merriment of the Lupercalia, in February, 44, M. Antonius attempted publicly to put a crown on Caesar's head. But public disapproval expressed itself promptly and loudly, and Caesar put the crown aside.

It was now clear that, whether as *Rex* or as *Imperator*, Caesar was in no

¹ *E.g.* somewhat later, the riotous behaviour of the Jews in Corinth was 'nothing to do with' the Proconsul of Achaëa (οὐδὲν τούτων τῷ Γαλλίῳ ἐμέλειν. —Acts xviii. 17).

mind either to abdicate, as Sulla had done, or to pose, like Pompeius, as the champion of a free Republic. His introduction of personal rule into every department of administration, and his contempt for both of venerable forms, and, still more, of the surviving representatives of the old order, roused a few genuine Republicans to form a definite plot to get rid of him. The ringleaders were C. Cassius, formerly the Quaestor of Crassus (p. 500), and later the commander of the Pompeian fleet, a gloomy, ill-conditioned man, who had been pardoned by Caesar after Pharsalus, and was governor-designate of Syria, but felt himself slighted in the allotment of the praetorships of 44; M. Brutus, a philosopher and student, who read into Caesar's acts the motives of the tyrants of early Greece, as the popular histories presented them, and was easily persuaded, by anonymous allusions to his heroic namesake (p. 36), to play 'Aristogeiton' to the 'Harmodius' of Cassius; D. Brutus and C. Trebonius, Caesarian officers who were disappointed of the plunder they had expected from the Civil War; P. Servilius Casca, one of the Tribunes, and L. Tillius Cimber, the governor-designate of Bithynia, friends and officials of the Dictator with private grudges of their own; and some sixty other Republicans and Senators were in the secret.

The day fixed for the deed was the Ides of March, when Caesar was to resign his consulship in the Senate, before starting for a new Parthian campaign. Though warned beforehand of his danger, Caesar refused to protect himself with a guard, and, regarding alike the portents which were announced, his actual ill-health, and the entreaties of his wife Calpurnia,

**Murder of
Caesar,
March 15,
44 B.C.**

allowed himself to be escorted to the Curia by D. Brutus, and was received by the Senate in due form. Tillius Cimber pressed upon him a petition for his brother's recall from banishment, and the conspirators crowded round as if to support his plea. Then Caesar rose to free himself; the signal was given; Casca from behind struck the first blow, and the rest fell on together. Caesar defended himself for a while with his *stilus*; but when he saw Brutus, who owed him everything, among them, he covered his face with his *toga*, and fell, pierced with three-and-twenty wounds, at the feet of the statue of Pompeius, which he had himself restored to its pedestal.

So died Gaius Julius Caesar, 'the greatest Roman of them all.' By sheer force of genius, and ability to execute single-handed the great designs he had conceived, he rose, with the open support of his only possible rivals, to the highest posts which the Republic had to give him. Still using those very rivals to maintain a balance of power in Italy, he created in his ten years in Gaul the one weapon which he lacked—an army; and laid, as if by the way, the foundations of the

**Estimate of
his work.**

civilisation of France, and of the frontier which held back the Germans from Gaul for four centuries longer. Then, when his time was come, he swept away Pompeius and his army in two campaigns ; and extinguished Republican government, without severity, and in Italy almost without bloodshed. His enemies he forgave ; his political opponents he hardly needed even to ignore. In less than five years, of which only some fifteen months were spent in Rome, he replaced the rule of anarchy and incompetence, by a strong central government based upon the old Roman *imperium*, and by a system of local and provincial administration, which endured until the Roman Empire fell. He had an unrivalled gift of inspiring the most unpromising agents—Crassus, Cicero, and Clodius, Antonius, Curio, and Dolabella—to do his work, and to do it in his own way ; the champion of the democratic party in Rome, he did more than any Roman to make the Roman People powerless to ruin the Empire ; while he fought, against the government of the Republic, as the defender of the rights of the Tribunate ; and against the Asiatics of Pompeius, as the champion of Italy and Europe. And his genius was not confined to political life. He was a scholar, and a lawyer, and an economist, and a student as well as a patron of art and science. Cicero judged him an orator of the first rank ; and his *Commentaries* (p. 581) remain to us as the ideal of a military history, and a pure and graceful example of the Latin language. A king among men he was, indeed, though he was never king of Rome ; adored like a god, by the multitudes who benefited by his rule, and murdered by the few who would not understand either his real greatness or his goodness towards themselves.

CHIEF DATES.

Campaign in Spain : Surrender at Herda, August 2	49
Caesar lands in Epirus, January 4 : Battle of Pharsalus, June 6	48
Campaigns in Egypt and Asia Minor : Battle of Zela, August 2	47
Campaign in Africa : Battle of Thapsus, April 6	46
Campaign in Spain : Battle of Munda, March 1	45
Murder of Caesar, March 15	44

CHIEF PLACES.

Herda — Massilia — Oricum — Apollonia — Dyrrhachium — Lissus —
Pharsalus — Pelusium — Pharos — Zela — Ruspina — Thapsus — Utica —
Corduba — Munda — Gades.

CHIEF PERSONS.

Caesar—Pompeius—Cato—Curio—Antonius—M. Lepidus—C. Trebonius
 D. Brutus—L. Afranius—M. Petreius—M. Terentius Varro—M.
 Bibulus—Q. Metellus Scipio—L. Domitius Ahenobarbus—L.
 Domitius Calvinus—M. Octavius—A. Gabinius—P. Vatinius—C.
 Cassius Longinus—M. Caelius Rufus—Cn. Cornelius Dolabella—Cn. and
 Sex. Pompeius—P. Servilius Casca—L. Tillius Cimber—Calpurnia—
 Juba—Ptolemy Dionysius—Cleopatra—Pothinus—Achilles—
 Pharnaces.

SUBJECTS.

The strength and weakness of the parties of Caesar and Pompeius.

Practical and ideal Republicanism : Cato and Brutus.

The monarchical government of Caesar.

The separation between imperial and local government.

CHAPTER XLIII

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR

Antonius and the 'Acts of Caesar'—Arrival of Octavianus—*Bellum Mutinense*—*Tres viri reipublicae constituendae*—Proscriptions—Brutus and Cassius in the East—Battle of Philippi—Partition of the Empire—Treaties of Brundisium, Misenum, and Tarentum—End of Sex. Pompeius and Lepidus—Cleopatra's evil influence—The Senate declares war on Egypt—Battle of Actium—Suicide of Antonius and of Cleopatra.

As soon as the deed was accomplished, the murderers of Caesar issued from the Senate House, and proclaimed the 'downfall of the tyranny.' They expected no doubt to be received as the saviours of the Republic; but the people of Rome, though they did not love Caesar, respected his work, and had profited by the restoration of order; while they mistrusted the motives and the ability of these new Republicans, and foresaw, from the crime, only a renewal of disorder. The murderers, alarmed at their cold reception, retired hurriedly to the Capitol, and were there joined by Cicero, who, though he had not been privy to the plot, approved the deed, and regretted only that the 'heir to the kingdom'—meaning M. Antonius—had not been put to death together with the 'king.'

Proceedings
of the
murderers,

The 'heir,' meanwhile, when his first terror was over, emerged from a place of safety and made the most of his time. By Caesar's nomination he was Consul for the remainder of the year, and as a personal friend and confidential agent he secured from Calpurnia the dead man's papers, and also the treasures which he had collected in view of the Parthian War. Ignoring the claims of P. Dolabella, who should have been his colleague, and making sure of M. Lepidus, the *Magister Equitum*, by the promise that he should be *Pontifex Maximus* in Caesar's place, he secured the control of the only armed forces which lay in the neighbourhood of Rome; and the same evening Lepidus occupied the city. Antonius had probably no means of knowing how weak the conspirators really were; and he threw away much of the advantage which he had, by convening the Senate on the second day

following (the 17th), and there proposing a compromise. Caesar's acts, down to the day of his death, were to be maintained ; his will was to be executed, and his funeral celebrated, in due form ; but his murderers were to retain their offices, and were not to be punished in any way. This contradiction-in-terms was accepted for the moment ; the conspirators emerged from the Capitol, and Brutus and Cassius took supper, respectively, with Lepidus and Antonius.

Antonius thereupon published Caesar's will, in which he made his favourite great-nephew, C. Octavius, his personal heir ; left legacies, among others, to many of his murderers ; bestowed his magnificent gardens, beyond the Tiber, on the People of Rome ; and distributed a largess of thirty sesterces—nearly £3—to every Roman citizen. A wave of profound indignation passed over Rome ; and when at the public funeral, which took place two days later, Antonius turned all his passionate eloquence to the same end, so violent a riot occurred, that the murderers fled from Rome ; while a harmless poet named Cinna was murdered by the crowd, in mistake for the conspirator of that name.

Antonius was thus left master of the city. He demanded from the Senate a bodyguard, proposed the utter abolition of the Dictatorship, and set himself, on the pretext of carrying out the 'acts of Caesar,' to strengthen his own position in every possible way : re-assigning, in particular, the provinces to which Caesar had designated the ringleaders in the plot, and transferring Syria from Cassius to his would-be colleague Dolabella, Macedonia from M. Brutus to his own brother Gaius, and Cisalpine Gaul from D. Brutus to himself. Dolabella set out at once ; and as Lepidus meanwhile had withdrawn from Rome to take over his own provinces of Narbonese Gaul and Hither Spain, there was no one left in the city to dispute the proceedings of Antonius, who forthwith alienated the support of every one by squandering the treasures of Caesar, and giving the most arbitrary interpretation to his 'acts.'

It was not long, however, before a new and unlooked-for figure appeared on the scene. The legal heir of Caesar, C. Octavius, had been sent on to Epirus, to take part in some cavalry manœuvres before the Parthian War. On the news of the murder his soldiers frankly offered to follow him to Rome to avenge his uncle ; but Octavius refused their aid, and sailed almost alone to Brundisium, where he received news of the will. Adopting at once the name of C. Julius Caesar Octavianus, he hurried on to Naples and thence to Rome, where he arrived late in April, and formally accepted his dangerous inheritance.

**Publication
of Caesar's
Will.**

**Antonius
and the
'Acts of
Caesar.'**

**Arrival of
Octavianus.**

He was only eighteen years old, and had held as yet no public office at all ; but he had seen service with his uncle, and exhibited, from the first, that marked discretion and self-control, in pursuance of his single purpose, which characterised him throughout his long career. While professing the completest accord with Antonius, he made it known from the first that he intended to discharge in full the bequests mentioned in the will ; and when Antonius refused to hand over to him the treasures of Caesar—which indeed were by this time well-nigh spent—he paid out the legacies and the largess from his own purse ; selling his own estates, as well as those of Caesar, and borrowing largely from his friends, in order to do so.

Antonius did all he could to prevent him ; but the young man had the full support of the Senate, and much encouragement from Cicero, who had come actively to the front since the murder, and on September 2 began a series of vehement ‘Philippics’ against Antonius. To the first attack Antonius replied with equal warmth ; but before the second, which was never spoken, was published, he had left Rome, and was on his way to Cisalpine Gaul, to dispossess D. Brutus and get together an army. Cassius and M. Brutus, meanwhile, had left Italy in September, and Octavianus (who, ever since his arrival, had been collecting Caesar’s legionaries quietly, and had been fortunate also in securing the allegiance of two legions which Antonius had recalled from Epirus) was thus able to pose with effect as the champion of the Senate and of Italy against attack, whether from the north or from the east. Cicero and the revived Senate were delighted. They thought they could do what they pleased with the young man, and throw him aside when he had served their purpose.¹ So they regulated his position by sanctioning his levies and granting him the powers of a Proprætor.

Before the end of the year, Antonius had occupied Cisalpine Gaul and shut up D. Brutus in Mutina. He was thereupon declared by the Senate to be a public enemy, and A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa, who were Caesar’s nominees to the consulship of 43, were ordered to go out to depose him. Hirtius accordingly started at once to relieve Mutina, and was accompanied by Octavianus ; while Pansa remained in Rome to raise more troops. On April 15, the latter, coming north with these, was attacked by Antonius at Forum Gallorum, near Bononia, and mortally wounded ; but, on the arrival of Hirtius, Antonius retired to his camp before Mutina ; and here he was defeated, shortly after, with such loss, that he raised the siege and retreated into the province of Lepidus. Hirtius, however, was killed in

Cicero tries to make use of him.

Bellum Mutinense, April 43 B.C.

¹ ‘*Laudandum adolescentem, ornandum, tollendum.*’—Cic. *ad Fam.*, xi. 20.

the battle, and Pansa died of his wound a few days later; so that Octavianus was left in sole command of the consular forces.

The Senate now thought that the time was come to dispense with his services, and Cicero moved that the demand which the young man made for the consulship should be refused, and that the army of the north should be entrusted to D. Brutus. It was a sad miscalculation. The 'boy'—he was now only twenty—appeared in the Campus forthwith with eight loyal legions, and on August 2 was elected Consul, with his cousin Q. Pedius as his colleague. The Senate had committed itself already by the grant of a *maius imperium* to Brutus and Cassius; but Pedius declared them outlawed, and cancelled the proclamation against Antonius. It had been the Senate's design also to support D. Brutus; so Octavianus set out forthwith, and went northward 'to meet Antonius'; and it was only too clear what the nature of the meeting would be.

Antonius, meanwhile, had been well received by Lepidus in Gallia Narbonensis, and had also secured the support of T. Munatius Plancus, who commanded in Northern Gaul, and of C. Asinius Pollio in Further Spain. He was now crossing the Alps with seventeen legions—the united forces of the west—and between these, and the army of Octavianus, the fate of D. Brutus could not long be in doubt. His men began to desert, and after divers wanderings he was caught and killed at Aquileia, on his way round the Adriatic to join the army of his namesake.

There was now no force west of the Adriatic—save only a small squadron, off Sicily, under the pirate Sextus Pompeius—which could be ranged on the side of the Senate; and it only remained to be seen what course the avengers of Caesar would pursue. To Lepidus, apparently, was due the immediate reconciliation which followed between Octavianus and Antonius. With all their enormous forces—forty-three legions now—the three commanders met at Bononia, and on an island in the river Renus a conference was held, at which the fate of Rome, and of their enemies, was sealed. In the first place they demanded from the Senate and People a joint commission for five years, as *tres viri reipublicae constituendae*, to reconstitute the State. In the second place, Lepidus was confirmed in command of Spain and Narbonese Gaul; Antonius took Belgic Gaul, in addition to the Cisalpine province which he had reoccupied already; and Octavianus received Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa. Thirdly, till the murderers were punished, Lepidus was to remain in charge of Italy and be Consul for 42, while Antonius and Octavianus were to fight Brutus

Octavianus becomes Consul.

Antonius and Lepidus enter Cisalpine Gaul.

Tres viri reipublicae constituendae.

and Cassius, and reconquer the east. Fourthly, money was to be acquired for the war, and the task of Lepidus to be made easy, by removing, for ever, the heads of the Senatorial party, and all personal enemies of the Three whose fortunes were worth the murder.

It was a cold-blooded and inexcusable revival of the worst cruelties of Sulla, but this time at the expense of Sulla's own party, and without the provocation which Sulla had suffered; and it was planned and carried out with the clearest foresight of the issue, and the most heartless balancing of life against life. Antonius must needs be avenged on Cicero for the Philippics, and for his loyalty to the tradition of freedom; so Octavianus, who may well have desired to save him, must needs exchange his life for that of L. Caesar, the kinsman of Antonius and himself; Lepidus, likewise, gave up his own brother Paullus; and so the list grew, till it included, in all, some three hundred Senators, and two thousand men of Equestrian rank.

The demands of the Three, with a first proscription list of seventeen names, were sent forward forthwith to Q. Pedius, the Consul. On November 27 the Triumvirate was duly voted, on the proposal of one of the Tribunes; and the Triumvirs, with all their forces, moved rapidly down to Rome. Resistance was impossible; but the public agitation was such that Pedius died of his exertions the night before their arrival. The lists of victims were published only gradually, and thus the reign of terror was prolonged, for no one could feel himself secure; and the brutality and rapacity of the legions—whom all men saw to be the only real power left—added to the horror of the massacre. The Three, for their part, pointed the moral by laying publicly, amid such scenes as these, the foundation-stone of a new temple, the *Aedes Divi Julii*, on the spot where Caesar's body had been burned. It was to be twelve years more, however, before Octavianus should dedicate it; and then he would be at peace, and alone.

The name of Cicero was in the first list of the proscribed. During the rule of Caesar he had lived in retirement, devoting himself to literature and philosophy, and emerging only rarely to plead for mercy for old associates. But from the moment of the murder he had come forward fearlessly and eloquently—striving, once more in vain, to unite all honest men in defence of a free Republic. He had hoped to use Octavianus, but it had been the 'boy' who had used him; he had withstood Antonius when he was at the height of his power, and had torn his reputation to ribbons, and neither from Antonius nor from his wife, the widow of Clodius, could he hope for mercy, now that the

Proscription.

Proceedings
of the
'Three'
in Rome.

The end of
Cicero.

cause of freedom was lost. The news reached him at Tusculum, and he fled in safety to Astura by the sea. But money had been forgotten ; and his brother Quintus, who returned to Rome to get it, was caught there and killed, together with his son. The orator took ship meanwhile, and coasted down to Formiæ, where he landed and waited at his villa. But the pursuit had already begun, and his slaves were hurrying him again towards the beach, when the agents of Antonius overtook them ; and Cicero, bidding his servants leave him and save themselves, suffered with fortitude the fate which he knew to be inevitable. His head and hands were carried to Rome and hung upon the Rostra ; and Fulvia took foul revenge upon the tongue that had scourged her husbands.

Cicero's work, however, was over. His true place was in a free state, where men still ruled by reason and persuasion ; not in an age of civil war, and of the choice between anarchy and tyranny. Vain, **Estimate of his career.** unpractical, irresolute as he had been at times, he had yet saved Rome once from Catiline, and had done, after the death of Caesar, what no other Republican had dared to do—remained at the post of danger at the head of the legitimate government, and striven *contra arma verbis*, as he said, to unmask the schemes of Antonius, and secure Caesar's heir on the side of a restored Republic. Of him truly it may be said that 'nothing in his life became him like the leaving of it.'

Others of the proscribed, more prompt or more cowardly than Cicero, took refuge in Sicily with Sextus Pompeius, to whom the Senate, on the death of Caesar, had assigned the command of the fleet, and **Sextus Pompeius.** who was thus in a position to threaten the food supply of the capital. To meet the danger from this quarter, Octavianus moved southward at once, and though his inferior fleet was beaten in the Strait of Messina, and he was unable to effect a landing in Sicily, he succeeded for the moment in confining Pompeius to the island, and protecting the coasts of the peninsula. The main object of the Triumvirs, however, was to break up the forces which were being collected by Brutus and Cassius, and to recover the eastern half of the Empire. To this end Lepidus was left to take charge of the defence of Italy, and Pollio to satisfy the demands of the veterans, while Antonius and Octavianus prepared to cross into Macedonia, to fight once more the battle between East and West, which had been decided once already at Pharsalus.

Brutus and Cassius had made good their escape in the previous year to their respective provincial commands, and had strained every nerve to bring together an overwhelming army. Brutus, in Macedonia, had captured L. Antonius, and had rallied to the Republican standard the Roman students in Athens, and the survivors of the army of Pompeius.

Cassius, meanwhile, had besieged Dolabella at Laodicea, and forced him to suicide; and had bought the support of the Parthians by the surrender of the province of Syria. Before long, Brutus joined his confederate in Asia, and a motley Republican army began slowly to concentrate at Sardis. But its leaders wasted precious time, while they plundered the towns of Lycia and Rhodes; and the avengers of Caesar were already in Greece before his murderers had crossed into Europe. To keep in touch with their fleet, and with the piratical operations of Pompeius, the Republican land forces followed the coast road of Thrace, and came in touch with the enemy at Philippi. Brutus, who lay opposite to Octavianus, occupied a strong position between the road and the sea, while Cassius faced Antonius, beyond the road, about a mile further inland.

Brutus and Cassius in the East.

It was late in the season, and the Republicans had everything to gain by holding their ground. Their own fleet was expected, and would enable them to outflank their opponents seaward; and the Triumvirs were far from their base, and very short of supplies. But the troops were restless, and insisted on forcing a battle. Octavianus, who was ill, and at no time a great soldier, was badly beaten by Brutus, and narrowly escaped capture in his own camp; but the success of Antonius on the other wing relieved the situation. Cassius, who mistook for a flank attack of Antonius the cavalry which Brutus detached to his assistance, killed himself in desperation; and Brutus, after holding his ground for twenty days longer, and reducing the Triumviral army to the utmost straits for food, weakly gave battle again, and so was totally defeated; whereupon he too put an end to his own life, with his friend and tutor Strato. Of his followers, some, like Valerius Messala and the poet Horatius, surrendered to the Triumvirs; others took refuge with Pompeius; and others, under Q. Cornificius, prolonged for a few months a hopeless resistance in Africa: while the fleet, under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, remained for a while in the Aegean, and degenerated into a dangerous gang of pirates.

Battle of Philippi, 42 B.C.

The Republican cause was dead, and under leaders so divided and so incompetent it deserved to die. The Triumvirs were left supreme in the Roman world; and the partition, which they designed, of the monarchy which Julius had left them, revealed from the first what the end must inevitably be. Antonius, the best soldier, and to all appearance the most active man of the Three, claimed the reorganisation of the East, and the conduct of that war with Parthia which Julius had had in his mind; and remained in the east, with six legions, to carry it out. He retained, however, in the west, the command

Partition of the Empire.

of Transalpine Gaul and Africa. Octavianus received the command of Spain and Numidia, and the thankless task of satisfying the demands of the veterans and crushing Sextus Pompeius. Lepidus, who had already outlived his usefulness, was thought sufficiently rewarded with the government of Italy—in which Cisalpine Gaul was now definitely and finally included—and the promise of Africa presently, if he could satisfy his colleagues that he was not playing a double game with Pompeius.

The task assigned to Octavianus was one of no mean difficulty. Italy was disturbed and distressed by two years of anarchy and suspense; even the food-supply was uncertain, so long as Pompeius was at large; and the legions clamoured for dismissal, for largess, and for allotments. But in Italy neither money nor lands were to be found without harsh measures; and Octavianus was forced to choose the lesser evil, and incur the dislike of the civil population by ejecting farmers from their holdings, to create the allotments which he had not the money to buy. The partisans of Antonius, moreover, headed by his brother Lucius and his shifty colleague Plancus, the Consuls of 41, took advantage of these difficulties to pose as the champions of the oppressed; and a rising which broke out in the summer, while Octavianus was in the south of Italy, was joined, if not instigated, by Fulvia and by both Consuls. The rebels even entered Rome and expelled Lepidus; but the prompt action of M. Vipsanius Agrippa, the boy-friend and devoted lieutenant of Octavianus, drove them back into the Etruscan city of Perusia, where they surrendered, after a close siege, early in the following year. Perusia, with its principal inhabitants, was destroyed. Fulvia and Plancus took refuge with Antonius in Greece; the other ringleaders fled to Sextus Pompeius; and public feeling came round strongly to the side of Octavianus, as the best guarantee, after all, for peace and good order in Italy.

Antonius, meanwhile, had wilfully thrown away every advantage which he had secured by the division of the Empire. After parting with Octavianus, he made a riotous and extravagant progress through the cities of Asia Minor, completing the ruin which Brutus and Cassius had begun by their extortions, and appearing publicly at Ephesus in the character of the god Dionysus. Arriving at last at Tarsus, he summoned a congress of the client princes of the East, to account for the support they had given to the Republican cause, and to provide fresh levies for the war with Parthia.

To Tarsus, among the rest, came Queen Cleopatra of Egypt. Antonius had already met her once as a girl, when he served under Gabinus in

55 ; and her arrival now, in the fulness of her matchless beauty, was the turning-point in his career. In a ship with sails of purple and oars of silver, she advanced up the Cydnus river, with music and incense, an Aphrodite from the East to match this **Cleopatra.** Roman Dionysus ; and from that hour Antonius was her slave. He dismissed the congress of Tarsus, and followed in her train to Alexandria, and lay there, sunk in love and luxury, nearly two years. The Empire of the East and the Parthian War might take care of themselves.

The news of the proceedings of Fulvia, however, and of the growing influence of Octavianus, roused him at length to return to Greece, where the arrival of his wife and brother apprised him of the fate of Perusia. Making terms for the moment, through **Quarrel with Octavianus.** Pollio, with the pirate Domitius, who held the Ionian Sea, and intriguing, as was believed in Italy, with Sextus Pompeius also, he pressed on rapidly to Italy, to find the gates of Brundisium closed against him by order of Octavianus. He promptly laid siege to the town, and for the moment a rupture seemed inevitable.

But opportunely Fulvia died ; Pompeius gave no sign ; a Parthian war broke out in earnest in Syria ; and the legionaries on both sides were weary of killing one another. A new partition was arranged at Brundisium, on the same general lines as before, **Treaty of Brundisium, 40 B.C.** though it marked, more distinctly, the division between east and west, and the rivalry between the leaders. Antonius still retained the whole of the east, and the command against the Parthians ; Octavianus secured the whole of the west, including Transalpine Gaul, and was guaranteed a free hand against Sextus Pompeius. The consulship was to be held alternately by the friends of either, and Antonius was to receive in marriage the sister of Octavianus. The name of Lepidus, indeed, still appeared in the agreement, and he was confirmed in the command of Africa ; but he had ceased to be of serious account from the moment when the control of Italy was assumed by Octavianus.

The marriage of Antonius and Octavia was celebrated with great pomp in Rome, and proved effectual for a while in keeping the former out of Cleopatra's reach ; but he was still suspicious of Octavianus, who had lately dropped his own personal names, and called himself simply *Imperator Caesar*. He began therefore once more to intrigue with Sextus Pompeius, whose **Intrigues with Sextus Pompeius.** pretensions were totally ignored in the Treaty of Brundisium, and who avenged himself now by occupying Sardinia and Corsica. **Treaty of Misenum, 39 B.C.** Rome was thus brought once more to the verge of famine ; and it became necessary even for Octavianus to conciliate this pirate

chief until a better moment should come for his extinction. A conference was therefore held, in 39, at Misenum, and Sextus Pompeius received a proconsular command, for five years, over Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica and Achæa, with an amnesty for his friends, and the promise of the consulship of 32 and the restoration of a part of his father's estate; undertaking, for his own part, to relieve the present necessity, by supplying corn to the capital.

The story is told how, during the meeting which took place on board the ship of Pompeius, his treacherous freedman Menodorus came to him and asked if he should cut the ship adrift, and 'make him master of the Roman world'; and how Pompeius, with that mixture of policy, generosity, and weakness which belongs to his character, replied—'No; you should have done it first and asked me afterwards.'

With Pompeius thus planted formally as a thorn in the side of Caesar, Antonius felt free to move back again into Greece, and took Octavia with him. The Parthian War, which had threatened so long, had broken out at last, while Antonius was absent in Italy; but this time the aggression had not been on the side of the Romans. Amid the divisions and distractions of the civil wars the Roman dominion of the East had been practically lost. Brutus and Cassius had even bought the assistance of Orodes, by the surrender of Syria, and a force of Parthian cavalry had fought on their side at Philippi. The arrival of Antonius in the east, after Philippi, had prevented Orodes for the moment from entering upon his new possession; but the news of his doings with Cleopatra, and the arrival of a son of Labienus, as a fugitive at the Parthian court, brought him at once the occasion, and a capable commander. No sooner did Antonius withdraw towards Italy in 40, than the whole force of the Parthians was flung upon the Roman frontier. Syria was overrun from Palestine to the Taurus, and even of the towns, only Tyre held out; while Labienus penetrated through Cilicia into Asia, drove Plancus, who was governor, to take refuge among the islands, and assumed the title *Parthicus* for his victories over his own countrymen. But he had based his calculations on the support of Pompeius and his pirates, and on the outbreak of civil war at Brundisium; and the vigorous action of P. Ventidius Bassus, whom Antonius had left in Syria, shattered his conquest almost before it was made.

The career of this Bassus illustrates well the change which had come over the Roman State. In boyhood he had been captured and enslaved at **P. Ventidius Bassus.** Asculum in the Social War, and had followed as a prisoner in the triumph of Pompeius Strabo. After that, he had earned his freedom, and risen to wealth as a dealer in mules. In this

capacity Julius had employed him in the Gallic wars, and had rewarded his ability with a Tribune and a Praetorship. On the death of the Dictator he had been outlawed with Antonius, but had held the consulship of 43, and then the command of Gallia Narbonensis. Left behind now in Syria, he succeeded, in 39, in cutting off Labienus in Cilicia; captured him and put him to death; and expelled the Parthian Pacorus from Syria. In the following year he repelled a fresh attempt at invasion, and fought a battle at Gindarus, on the anniversary of Carrhae, in which Pacorus fell and the Parthian army was routed. But by this time Antonius had returned, and relieved him of his command. Active operations ceased forthwith, but Bassus enjoyed a well-merited triumph in the very streets where he had walked a prisoner and a slave.

Defeats the Parthians.

Caesar meanwhile found time at last, after the Treaty of Misenum, to attend to the organisation of his new Gallic provinces. Agrippa, too, was sent first to complete the conquest of Aquitania, and afterwards to secure the Rhine frontier by settling a body of the Ubii on the left bank round Cologne.¹ Caesar was soon recalled, however, by the behaviour of Sextus Pompeius. Antonius had refused to give up Achaea in accordance with the Treaty of Misenum, and Caesar himself had not scrupled to accept the treacherous offer of Menodorus to surrender Sardinia and Corsica. Consequently the pirates were let loose again, and war was inevitable. The struggle turned ultimately on the possession of Sicily, which Pompeius had held continuously since 44; but it was first necessary to secure the command of the Tyrrhenian Sea. The first campaign ended badly for Caesar: two squadrons were destroyed at Cumae and Scyllaeum, and a storm, which followed, proved, disastrously, how ill his crews were trained. Agrippa therefore was summoned from the north and given the consulship for 37, with orders to create a seaworthy fleet. To this end vast preparations went on for two whole years: twenty thousand slaves were enrolled and trained at the arsenal of Baiae, and a landlocked practice-water, the *Portus Julius*, was created by connecting the inland lakes, Avernus and Lucrinus, by an artificial channel, with the sea.

Caesar and Agrippa in Gaul.

War with Sextus Pompeius.

Before a blow could be struck, however, Antonius interfered once more. In the summer of 37 he suddenly appeared at Tarentum with three hundred ships, as if to take part in the war; and to ascertain his motives,

¹ The *Colonia Agrippina*, however, which was formed in 51 A.D. in this *Oppidum Ubiorum*, and gives its name to Cologne, gets its title not from Agrippa but from his granddaughter Agrippina, the wife of the Emperor Claudius.

and secure an agreement, the trusted adviser of Caesar, C. Cilnius Maecenas, made a hurried 'journey to Brundisium,' which has been immortalised by his companion Horatius. After some negotiation, a meeting was arranged between Caesar and Antonius in the neighbourhood of Tarentum; the Triumvirate was renewed for five years more—this time without legislative sanction; Sextus Pompeius was deprived of his promised consulship, and in exchange for a force of two legions for the Parthian War, Antonius left behind him one hundred of his ships under the command of Statilius Taurus. It was the last friendly meeting between the rivals, and Antonius seems to have seen that it must be so; for on his departure from Tarentum he was careful to leave Octavia behind, and sent on word to Cleopatra to meet him at his camp in Syria.

The way was now clear for the extinction of Sextus Pompeius, and in July of 36 three separate fleets set out simultaneously for Sicily—Caesar himself and Agrippa from Portus Julius, Statilius from Tarentum, and Lepidus from his own province of Africa. But again a sudden storm came on; the combination failed, and Caesar lost a large part of his fleet off Cape Palinurus. A second attempt to land an army at Tauromenium fared better; but Caesar himself, with the covering fleet of Statilius, withdrew, and the land force had to cut its way overland to join Agrippa, who was watching the north coast of the island. Agrippa, for his part, succeeded in beating the fleet of Pompeius at Mylae, and then again, on September 3, at Naulochus, between Mylae and Cape Pelorus; and as Lepidus had already landed at Lilybaeum and occupied the west of the island, Pompeius threw up the game, and with seventeen ships that remained fled, unpursued, to Lesbos. Hence, in the following year, he made a reckless raid upon the province of Asia, but, failing, was captured as he fled to Armenia, and was put to death at Miletus by order of Antonius. By persistent encouragement of all that was worst and weakest on the Republican side, he had wrecked a chance, which at one time was no small one, of recovering a position worthy of the name he bore; and the son of the man, who had swept the Mediterranean of pirates, sank to be himself the ringleader of a pirate anarchy.

No sooner, however, was Pompeius expelled from Sicily than a quarrel broke out between Caesar and Lepidus, who had fought his way through to Messina with an army of twenty-two legions, and claimed the island as his prize, together with an equal share in the Triumvirate. But it was too late. His army deserted rapidly, and he was soon glad to throw himself on the mercy of Caesar. His life, indeed,

Treaty of
Tarentum,
37 B.C.

Sicilian War,
36 B.C.

End of Sex.
Pompeius.

Extinction
of Lepidus.

was spared, but he was stripped of his provinces and commands, and was kept in honourable captivity at Circeii; retaining, nevertheless, the dignity of Pontifex Maximus until his death in 12.

The disappearance of Pompeius and Lepidus left Caesar undisputed master of the west; a single campaign of Statilius added to his dominions the province of Africa also; and in the same year 36 he received, like his uncle, the grant of the *Tribunicia Potestas* for life. But as yet he showed no signs of aiming at absolute mastery, or of interfering with the nominal government of the Senate and Consuls. His enormous army—forty-five legions in all—threatened indeed, more than once, to become unmanageable. Caesar foresaw the danger which would come if the army once realised its power, and lost no opportunity of reducing it gradually by the settlement of veterans in Italy and Southern Gaul, while he kept the remainder fully employed in the difficult and long-projected task of advancing the northern frontier to the line of the Danube, and rendering this river as definite a boundary of the Empire, as Julius had made the Rhine. In 35 Caesar himself led a campaign against the Iapydes and the Pannoni of the valley of the Savus (*Save*); and in the following year his second self, Agrippa, conquered the Dalmatians, and Valerius Messala the Salassi of the western Alps. In Italy, too, brigandage was repressed with a strong hand; and, in Rome, Maecenas, who, though not even a Senator, acted as *praefectus urbi* during the frequent absences of Caesar, introduced for the first time a regular force of police; while Agrippa, who was Aedile in 33, remodelled the whole water-supply of the capital, and restored many public buildings which had suffered in the civil wars. Besides these loyal helpers, too, Caesar had found, at last, in his third wife, Livia Drusilla, a consort worthy of himself, whose commanding personality counted for much throughout the rest of his career.

Antoni^{us}, meanwhile, had returned to Cleopatra and the Parthian War. Vast preparations were made for a decisive campaign in 36, and an army of eighteen legions was gathered together in Syria; but Antoni^{us} was not ready to start till too late in the season, and then, instead of marching into Parthia, he engaged himself in a quarrel between the Armenians and the Medes, and laid fruitless siege to the fortress of Gazaca. Here his siege-train was intercepted and destroyed by the Parthians, and he was compelled to retreat, with great losses and privations, into the shelter of the Armenian mountains, whence he returned in hot haste to the company of Cleopatra. His military reputation was gone; but the Parthians did

Caesar's
rule in the
west.

Agrippa.

Maecenas.

Livia.

Failure of
Antoni^{us}
in Parthia.

not follow up their success, for Orodes had been killed by an usurper, Phraates, and the country was distracted again by domestic feuds. Antonius spent the year 34 in fresh preparations in Syria, but no advance took place; and a sudden raid which he made, in 33, upon the allied state of Armenia effected nothing but the treacherous capture of the king, Artavasdes, while it implanted among the Armenians a deep hatred and suspicion of the Romans, which was to bear bitter fruit later on. More disastrous, for the moment, was the ill-earned triumph which Antonius celebrated in Alexandria; for it alienated the goodwill even of those Romans who had been loyal to him hitherto, and caused very grave scandal in Italy and the West.

It was, indeed, becoming clear to all that Antonius was being brought to cut himself adrift from Rome, and to found an eastern kingdom, with Cleopatra for its queen. To her he gave first part and then the whole of Phoenicia, Coele-Syria, and Cilicia, together with Cyprus, Palestine, and Arabia; he openly acknowledged the children she bore him, and gave them the title of kings, while he needlessly insulted Caesar by proclaiming her elder son Caesarion as the true heir of Julius, and setting him on the throne of Syria. For himself, he adopted wholly the dress and bearing of an eastern king, and was worshipped in Egypt as Osiris, with Cleopatra as Isis by his side.

A breach between Caesar and Antonius was now inevitable; but it was the folly of Antonius that made it at the same time a rupture between the Empires of Rome and Alexandria. Late in 32 Caesar brought matters to a head, by publishing the will of Antonius, which had fallen into his hands; whereat the Senate declared war upon Egypt, and deposed Antonius from his eastern command, which would have expired in any case at the end of the year. Antonius, who had moved already into Greece, replied in unmistakable terms by divorcing Octavia, and hurrying forward every man he could raise to the frontier of Epirus. In Rome opinion was divided. Both Consuls declared for Antonius, and fled to his court in Greece; but Caesar was invested, unopposed, with the consulship of 31, and was joined by Plancus and other Roman officers from the opposite camp. At the moment Antonius had the stronger position by far. He had sixteen legions mobilised in Greece and Epirus, a fleet of eight hundred ships in the mouth of the Adriatic, and all the treasures of Egypt at his command. Caesar, on the other hand, had his army scattered and engaged along the new northern frontier; his fleet consisted mainly of the slight though rapid vessels of the Liburnian coast,


Cleopatra's
evil
influence.

The Senate
declares war
against
Egypt.

which were no match for the castled galleys of Antonius ; and he had, as usual, the greatest difficulty in meeting even the current expenses of his government.

Once more, however, Antonius threw away his chance. When he should clearly have taken the offensive and invaded Italy, he spent the whole winter in Greece with Cleopatra, withdrawing his fleet from Corcyra, and allowing Agrippa to take post in defence of the crossing to Brundisium. Caesar used this respite to collect his own legions, and, leaving Maecenas as before in charge of Italy, crossed into Epirus and entrenched himself on the promontory, where Nicopolis afterwards stood, on the north side of

Battle of Actium, Sept. 2, 31 B.C.



the entrance to the Gulf of Ambracia. The whole army of Antonius lay on the promontory of Actium opposite, and his fleet and that of Cleopatra in the bay within the strait ; it was an easy task, therefore, for Agrippa to bar the exit, and hold Antonius prisoner. But it was not so easy to bring him to an action. The generals of Antonius wanted to imitate the

strategy of Pompeius at Dyrrhachium, to draw Caesar's army away from its entrenched position, and to decide the war on land ; but, for the sake of Cleopatra, it was decided first to break out with the fleet, and as many land-troops as that could carry, and convoy her and Antonius himself to Egypt. Agrippa, therefore, had at last the occasion he desired. On September 2 the eastern armada came out into the open, and a freshening breeze soon threw the laden galleys into disorder, and put them at the mercy of the light and active Liburnians. **Flight of Cleopatra.** The same accidental circumstance favoured the design of Cleopatra's squadron, which lay to in the rear, to slip away unharmed, and the order was given to set all sail and make use of the breeze while it lasted. But at the sight of his mistress deserting him, as he thought, before the action was decided, Antonius too fled after her ; and the confusion of the rest, the approach of evening, and the fireballs which were flung from the ships of Caesar, converted a drawn battle into a total rout. The land army, too, cut off from its supplies, and deserted by its chief, surrendered in a body, only a few days later. Agrippa was sent back to Italy, with a part of his force, to support Maecenas ; and Caesar, advancing as far as Samos, spent the winter in re-organising on liberal terms the provinces which Antonius had plundered, and in gaining the confidence of the client princes of Asia ; whom it seemed politic to confirm on the thrones which their late patron had bestowed on them. Even in Parthia he recognised the usurper Phraates till a more convenient season, though he maintained his rival Tiridates in Syria by way of precaution.

These necessary measures, and a sudden mutiny in the army, which recalled him for a while to Brundisium, and put him in the greatest straits for money, occupied most of the following year ; and it was not till late in the autumn that he was ready to advance into Egypt. Both Antonius and Cleopatra had written to him already to offer terms ; but to Antonius, who challenged him to single combat for the mastery of the world, Caesar returned no answer ; to Cleopatra he promised safety, if only she would surrender her lover. The queen, in reply, devoted herself to the defence of Egypt, and to gigantic schemes of conquest eastward, if the west should prove to be lost. But on the arrival of Caesar from Syria, Pelusium surrendered without a blow ; Cornelius Gallus attached the Delta from the west, with a force of Antonine deserters, and joined him before Alexandria ; and the Egyptian fleet, and all the cavalry of Antonius, passed over to the invaders at the first encounter. Antonius took refuge in Alexandria, where Cleopatra had already shut herself up

and in Egypt.

Suicide of Antonius

in the mausoleum of her family ; and believing too hastily her message that she was dead, stabbed himself rather than survive her ; yet lingered long enough to join her and die in her arms.

Alexandria surrendered, and Cleopatra, arrested by the officers of Caesar, staked all that was left on a personal interview with her captor. But where Julius and Antonius had fallen, the colder ^{and of} temper of Octavianus prevailed, and he would promise her Cleopatra. nothing but that she need fear no violence. Learning, however, at last that a day was fixed for her removal to Rome, and scorning to grace the triumph of a man she could not conquer, she procured an asp, it is said, to be brought in a basket of figs ; and died, with her two handmaidens, a queen in her own country still. As a queen, too, she was buried, by Caesar's order, in the royal tomb of the Ptolemies, and by her side Antonius, as if to mark his fall ; while her children, by the irony of fate, were entrusted to Octavia, and by her brought up in Rome. The kingdom of Egypt was abolished ; but the country was ^{Annexation} too rich and too dangerous to be made into an ordinary of Egypt. province. The precedent set by Julius was followed, of government by a *praefectus* of Caesar ; and the wholesome rule was maintained, that no one of the rank of a Senator was permitted to come within its borders.

The conquest of Egypt enabled Caesar, at last, to pay his debts and recompense his army. But there was still much to be done for the settlement of the East, and he spent yet another winter in Samos ; handing over to Maecenas the suppression of a ^{Caesar} futile revolt in Italy, which was excited by a son of returns to Rome. Lepidus. On January 11, in 29, the Temple of Janus was closed, for a sign that the world was at peace ; and at last, late in the summer, he was free to return to Rome, and to celebrate, on August 13-15, a threefold triumph over Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Egypt. With the cold impartiality which marked his whole career, he set himself at once to remedy the worst disorders which resulted from the civil war. Of the fifty legions which composed his own army and that of Antonius, a full half were disbanded as rapidly as possible ; and three hundred thousand men were settled, friends and enemies alike, on lands bought at fair prices with the treasure collected in Egypt. Ample largess, too, was distributed to the populace and the remaining legions ; a general amnesty was proclaimed, and arrears of taxation were cancelled everywhere. The first step was already won in the restoration of public confidence ; and when Caesar returned to Rome the rate of interest fell from twelve to four per cent.

CHIEF DATES.

Murder of Julius Caesar, March 15	44
Bellum Mutinense (April) : Triumvirate : Proscriptions	43
Battle of Philippi : Death of Brutus and Cassius	42
Antonius and Cleopatra : War of Perugia	41
Treaty of Brundisium : Parthian invasion	40
Treaty of Misenum	39
Sicilian War against Sextus Pompeius	38-6
Treaty of Tarentum	37
Battle of Naulochus : End of Sex. Pompeius : Extinction of Lepidus	36
Declaration of war against Egypt	32
Battle of Actium, September 2	31
End of Antonius and Cleopatra : Annexation of Egypt	30
Temple of Janus closed, Jan. 11 : Triumph of Caesar, Aug. 13-15	29

CHIEF PERSONS.

Antonius — Lepidus — Cicero—M. Brutus — Cassius — D. Brutus—
 C. Octavius (= Octavianus, 44 B.C. = Imperator Caesar, 40 B.C.)—
 P. Cornelius Dolabella—A. Hirtius—C. Vibius Pansa—Q. Pedius—
 T. Munatius Plancus—C. Asinius Pollio—Sex. Pompeius—M. Valerius
 Messala — Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus — L. Antonius — Fulvia —
 Cleopatra—Octavia—P. Ventidius Bassus—Q. Labienus Parthicus—
 Orodes—Pacorus—Phraates—M. Vipsanius Agrippa—Statilius Taurus
 —C. Cilnius Maecenas—Livia—Artavasdes—C. Cornelius Gallus.

CHIEF PLACES.

Mutina — Bononia — Aquileia — Tusculum — Formiæ — Sardis — Philippi —
 Perugia — Tarsus — Brundisium — Misenum — Gindarus — Cumæ —
 Scyllæum — Baiæ — Portus Julius — Tarentum — C. Palinurus—
 Tauromenium — Mylæ — Naulochus — Lesbos — Gazaca — Corcyra —
 Actium — Samos — Pelusium — Alexandria.

SUBJECTS.

The aims and motives of the murderers of Caesar and of the Republican party.
 The characters of Antonius and Octavianus.
 The significance of the repeated rivalry of east and west.
 The growing power of the legions.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE PRINCIPATE OF AUGUSTUS

The position of Caesar—He receives legal powers and the title *Augustus*—*Proconsulare Imperium*—*Tribunicia Potestas*—Relations between *Princeps* and *Senatus*—Settlement of the East—Provincial System—Financial and military reforms—Reforms in Italy and Rome—The Republican Constitution under the Principate—*Ordo Senatorius*—*Ordo Equester*—Social and Religious Reforms—Worship of 'Rome and Augustus'—The Northern Frontier—The Succession to the Principate.

THE battle of Actium made Caesar indisputably supreme over all the Roman world. But he had risen by the might of the sword, and had no legal authority but that which he derived from the original establishment of the *tres viri reipublicae constituendae* in 43—and even this had technically lapsed in 33, and had never been renewed—and from the consulships which he had held in 33, and continuously since the outbreak of war in 31. He himself, indeed, seems to have based his claim to rule on the universal acquiescence in an accomplished fact: *per consensum universorum potitus rerum omnium*. Like Sulla, therefore, and like his uncle Julius, Caesar was free to rebuild the State as he pleased; but unlike them he represented neither the Republican Senate, nor that democracy which had clamoured by turns for monarchy or anarchy.

If the new master represented anything, it was the plain business-like Italian of the country towns, to whom he belonged by descent,¹ and whose confidence he had already won by his cautious policy, his unbroken self-control, his persistent loyalty to his chosen friends and counsellors, his simple living and strict economy, public and private, and his instinctive aversion to all things foreign to Roman character and discipline. Now what Italy and the Roman world demanded was a law-abiding, practical, and permanent administration of some kind, and if any man living seemed capable of creating that, it was Caesar.

It was no surprise, therefore, that one of his first acts, in 28 B.C., was

¹ His own grandfather had been a plain citizen of Velitrae in Latium.

to associate with himself his friend Agrippa in the consulship, to hold with him the first regular *census* since the year 70,¹ and to restore the

Census, and
Lectio
Senatus,
28 B.C.

Senate, which was still the outward symbol of Roman Republican government, 'to its ancient form and magnificence.' The provincials and freedmen, with whom it had been flooded by Julius, were expelled; its numbers were

reduced once more to the Sullan total of six hundred; and by strict revision and careful selection it was made once more fairly representative of the best blood of Rome and of Italy, with Caesar himself as *Princeps senatus* at the head of the roll of its members. A solemn purification of the whole people in the Campus Martius gave formal expression also to the general feeling that a new leaf was turned in the history of Rome, and that the dark days of anarchy and civil strife were over. More striking still, in his sixth consulship of 28 he publicly revoked all the illegal acts of the Triumvirate, and announced his intention of resigning, at the end of the current year, all his irregular powers.²

But it was one thing merely to resign illegal powers, or to 'transfer the State out of his own power to the free disposal of the Senate and People of Rome';³ it was quite another, *republicam restituere*, as

Caesar receives legal
powers

Caesar could justly boast afterwards that he did. Every one knew by now that what Rome and the Empire needed

was to be ruled and upheld by a single strong man; the only problem was, how the one strong man could be invested with a legal title to do so. The result was a compromise, characteristic of its author, in which everything essential was secured with the least possible disturbance of the outward forms which many still prized so highly. Caesar surrendered all his irregular commands; but the Senate responded, three days later, by conferring on him the consulship; with *proconsulare imperium* for a period of ten years; the sole right to command and levy troops, to conclude treaties, and to make peace or war; and the definite

and the title
Augustus,
27 B.C.

command of all those provinces where any armed force was needed or any foreign power was to be met. At the same time the new title *Augustus* was conferred upon him, to signify that 'in dignity though not in legal power' he surpassed all other

¹ There had been Censors, it is true, till 55, and Julius had revised the Senate-roll in 46; but since the deadlock of 65 (p. 464), there had been no revision of the roll of citizens.

² '*Sexto consulatu, quae triumviratu iusserat, abolevit.*'—Tacitus, *Ann.*, 3, 28.

³ *Rempubicam ex mea potestate in senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli.*

citizens ;¹ and this, together with the popular epithet *Princeps* (which, in a genuinely Republican sense, had been used by Cicero both of Pompeius and of Julius), describes perhaps most fitly the new and peculiar position in which Caesar stood to the 'restored Republic' and the citizens whom he had 'saved.'² For now, as he said of himself, he 'held no office contrary to the custom of his forefathers'; on the contrary, he was in the truest sense the 'champion of the liberty of the Roman People.'

The *Principatus*, thus inaugurated, was further developed some five years later. On his return to Rome in 23 (June 27), Augustus resigned the consulship, which he had held with a colleague from year to year, and thereby gave up his *maius imperium* over other magistrates, and his right to act within the walls of Rome. The Senate, however, forthwith conferred upon him in return the full *Imperium Proconsulare* for five years,³ with *maius imperium* in regard to every provincial magistrate. To amend his position in Rome, which still remained unregulated, a variety of proposals were made. The dictatorship, and a special *cura legum et morum*, he declined ; but he accepted an innovation which made his proconsular *imperium* equal with that of the Consuls, and consequently valid within the city ; and at the same time the right to convene the Senate, to issue edicts of his own, and to nominate to public offices. Later, in 20, on the occasion of a severe famine, with food-riots in Rome, he accepted a special *Cura Annonae*, like that of Pompeius (p. 481), in lieu of the Dictatorship which the Senate pressed upon him once more ; in 12, when the death of Lepidus made a vacancy at last, he allowed himself to be made *Pontifex Maximus* by popular election, and thus gained legal control of the Roman state religion ; for special occasions, in 5 B.C. and 3 B.C., he held the consulship in the ordinary course ; and he held a *census* in 8 B.C. and 14 A.D. ; but otherwise his proconsular position remained practically unaltered.

Final form of the Principate, June 27, 23 B.C.

(a) Proconsulare Imperium.

For the general control, however, of the domestic affairs of the city, he relied mainly upon the *Tribunicia Potestas*, which had been conferred upon him first in 36, but was now

(b) Tribunicia Potestas.

¹ *Post id tempus praestiti omnibus dignitate, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam qui fuerunt mihi quoque in magistratu collegae.*

² The Greek equivalents supply an instructive commentary, as usual : *Σεβαστὸς* (for *Augustus*) means 'reverend' ; *ἡγέμων* (for *Princeps*) is simply a 'leader.' The quotations are from Augustus' own great record of his life and work, of which a copy has been preserved in the famous 'Monument of Ancyra' in Galatia.

³ This *imperium proconsulare* was again formally renewed for fifteen years in 18 B.C. ; and for ten in 3 B.C. and in 8 A.D.

solemnly confirmed, and renewed thenceforward annually to mark the years of his Principate. This 'power to act as a tribune' designated him, in fact, more clearly than any other title, as the champion of civic freedom; while at the same time it defined his relations with the Senate, for it gave him the right to stop its proceedings at will, or to 'intercede' on behalf of offenders who came up before it for trial: 'whatever,' moreover, 'the Senate desired should be administered by his means, he carried out through the tribunician power which he held.'

Even with these amendments, however, the Principate remained a personal and temporary expedient, and, as such, perhaps, was accepted by many loyal Republicans who would have resisted a dictatorship or a kingdom. Legally, in fact, the Principate came to an end, not only at the death of Augustus, but at all subsequent vacancies; and the question returned, as at first, '*in Senatus Populique Romani arbitrium*,' whether there should ever be another *Princeps* at all. Practically, however, on each successive vacancy the need for a *Princeps* was more generally admitted even than at the first, and circumstances usually pointed sufficiently clearly to the man on whom the customary titles should be conferred, even if they had not been partly conferred already on some colleague of the late emperor.¹ When they were conferred, however, it was always by a definite *lex de imperio* which enumerated them in detail; and the years of each successive *Princeps* continued to be reckoned by the annual renewals of the *Tribunicia Potestas*.²

The peculiar advantage of this arrangement was that whereas, to all appearance, Consuls and Senate and Comitia and all the apparatus of Republican government continued to exist, there was always one 'First Citizen' in reserve, who not merely undertook, as his personal responsibility, just those departments of administration—finance, the army, and the frontier provinces—the neglect of which had brought the Republic to ruin, but who united in his own person all the different authorities which had been so carefully separated and subdivided under the old system. He could, moreover, use either his *maius imperium*, or his tribunician veto, to settle any emergency; and, if these too should fail, he was, after all, sole master of the army, and lord of some three-fourths of the provincial Empire. It

¹ *E.g.* at the death of Augustus, Tiberius had already held *Proconsulare Imperium* for one year, and *Tribunicia Potestas* for nineteen.

² The full title of Augustus, at the close of his Principate, ran, therefore, thus:—*Imperator Caesar, Divi filius, Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Consul XIII., Imperator XX., Tribunicia Potestate XXXVII., Pater Patriae.*

was inevitable, too, that powers so wide, and backed in case of need by forces so invincible, should make themselves felt in every department of administration, and should be called in frequently when any difficulty arose. Not merely were the corn supply, the public roads, and numerous minor departments transferred bodily from the Republic to the *Princeps*; the Senate and the Consuls soon learned to look to him for guidance in the settlement of ordinary matters. Caesar's provincial system, Caesar's financial arrangements and legal decisions, were freely borrowed and adapted by the Republican magistrates; and it was not long before men trained in Caesar's service, and backed by Caesar's *commendatio*, began to take a prominent part in the Republican government itself.

Augustus had now to expound and justify in practice the system which he had devised; and the long course of his Principate gave him an opportunity, which had been denied to Julius, of showing in his own person how he intended it to work. The first ten years of his administration (27-17 B.C.) were mainly spent in organising the provincial system throughout the Empire, in restoring Roman prestige on the Syrian frontier, and in laying the foundations of a new social order in Italy. Twenty-five years more (17 B.C.-9 A.D.) were devoted to the elaboration of a great design for a scientific frontier on the north, and to the education meanwhile of one destined successor after another; while the last six years of his old age (9-14 A.D.), after the sudden loss of his northern conquests and the death of his favourite grandsons, were devoted to the confirmation of the old Rhine barrier of Julius, and the thankless task of moulding to his own policy his adopted heir, Tiberius.

When the civil wars were ended by the victory of Augustus, two main lines of foreign policy seemed almost equally possible. On the one hand, it had been shown by Julius Caesar in Transalpine Gaul what a single Proconsul of genius could do, within a single section of the borderland; and there seems to have been some expectation that the Empire, once freed from internal convulsions, and united under a strong military government, would extend itself without check over the remainder of the habitable world; so that men began to talk freely of conquests in Britain, in Arabia, and in India and beyond. On the other hand, it was widely felt that the fortune of the Roman People must not be tempted further; that this Mediterranean empire, which already stretched so far into the surrounding mainland, would not bear the addition of more remote dependencies; and that the true policy of the new monarch was to consolidate the

The reign of Augustus.

Foreign policy of the Empire.

existing provinces into a self-sufficient whole, fenced off from the outer barbarians, and proof against the attacks, which, with so remote and extended a frontier, were assumed to be inevitable.

Between these alternatives, the choice of Augustus was influenced mainly by considerations of internal policy. Though his **Difficulties of Augustus.** supremacy was unquestioned for the moment, he knew that it was founded on force; and that it would lie in the power of an ambitious general, who could attach to himself an army on a distant frontier, to turn upon the central government as Julius had done. It was necessary, therefore, to set the frontier at least so far back from Italy as to secure the home territory and the capital from all risk of a surprise. But on the other hand, a remoter frontier meant an augmented army; not only to protect the borders, but to garrison the more recently civilised provinces within it; a very necessary precaution, as was soon to be proved by the local outbreaks which followed almost every re-adjustment of the outer defences of the Empire. Imperial administration, too, proved a very costly machine; and while it was necessary to the domestic policy of Augustus to multiply posts of honourable service, to satisfy the aspirations and traditions of the nobility, he is constantly seen to be restraining the natural desire to complete the symmetry of his dominions, in order to economise both men and money for the defence of what he held already.

The provinces originally assigned to Augustus in 27 B.C. were Hither Spain; the whole of Gaul, and Syria, together with the new dependency **Reforms in** of Egypt. His first task was to continue, in 27-6 B.C., the **Gaul** reorganisation of Gaul, which he had begun in 39-8 B.C., compiling a statistical survey (*census*) of its resources, and founding thereon a more equable system of taxation. In the same year, 27 B.C., his *legatus*, M. Valerius Messala, won a triumph for successes in Aquitania, which completed the subjugation of the south-west; while a troublesome series of little wars among the Salassi ended in the foundation of the colony of Augusta Praetoria (*Aosta*) in 25 B.C., and in the final pacification of the short route to northern Gaul through the Graian Alps.

From Gaul, Augustus went on, in 26 B.C., to Spain, and conducted a campaign against the wild Astures and Cantabri of the north-west. An **and Spain.** illness, in 25 B.C., forced him to leave this work in other hands, but in spite of repeated revolts the new province of Lusitania was pacified and organised before 20 B.C.; while new colonies of veterans were founded elsewhere in the peninsula; Caesar-Augusta (*Saragossa*) in 27 B.C., and at Augusta Emerita (*Merida*) in 25 B.C.

The Empire of Augustus, thus completed and consolidated to the Atlantic in the west, presents three great land frontiers, south, east, and north; each of which offers problems of defence peculiar to itself. The problems of the eastern frontier were the legacy of the mismanagement of the last fifty years. Pompeius had made the fatal mistake of irritating, without disabling, the rising militant power of the Parthians; instead of taking the line of the Syrian desert and the middle Euphrates as the basis of a scientific frontier, he had accepted the allegiance of the king of Emesa beyond it; and his interference with the throne of Armenia involved endless intrigues between the protégés of Rome and of Parthia. Crassus had made matters worse, not only by exasperating the Orientals, but by leaving a standing *casus belli*, in the captured eagles. Julius Caesar had threatened, but was murdered before he could strike; the proceedings of Brutus and Labienus had exhibited Roman disunion on its most shameful side; and Antonius, after one disastrous retreat, had dropped the whole problem, and left it for his rival to solve. But for nearly ten years domestic reforms and distractions in the north and west detained Augustus elsewhere, and lost him an unique opportunity; for the battle of Actium had almost coincided with a change of dynasty in Parthia.

Rome had no direct quarrel with Parthia: it was mainly in Armenia, where there was no great natural barrier, that the two great states made indirect collision, as the backers of rival interests locally. But, for Rome, Armenia was the keystone of the structure of client states and recent provinces which Pompeius had erected in Asia Minor. It was in Asia Minor, therefore, that Augustus must needs begin, if the foundations of the new frontier were to be secure.

The death in 25 B.C. of King Amyntas of Galatia, who had been installed by Antonius in 37 B.C. and confirmed by Caesar after Actium, gave the opportunity for a new settlement in Asia. Two new provinces, Galatia and Pamphylia, were established in 25 B.C., and Cilicia also came under the direct control of Augustus about the same time. Cappadocia, under King Archelaus, was enlarged so as to include Lesser Armenia and part of Cilicia, and extended west of the Euphrates from the frontiers of Pontus to the sea opposite Cyprus; Commagene, under King Antiochus, filled the angle between Cappadocia and the province of Syria; and Pontus, under King Polemo, was rewarded a little later (14 B.C.) by the addition of the kingdom of the Bosporus. The Pompeian system of client states was thus remodelled and retained, but only as a provisional arrangement until one kingdom after another became ripe for incorporation in

The eastern frontier.

Settlement of the East.

Asia Minor.

the regular provincial system. Cappadocia, for example, was annexed on the death of Archelaus in 17 A.D.; Pontus, under Nero, in 62 A.D.; and Commagene in the reign of Vespasian.

The next care was to restore prestige and security eastward, for the failure of Antonius in 36 B.C. had revived the old fear of a Parthian invasion. In 23 B.C. Agrippa was given a general command over Syria and the eastern frontiers, which he held with some intermission for nearly ten years (23-13 B.C.). In 21 B.C. Augustus himself, who had already received in Rome a friendly mission from the king of Parthia, crossed over into Asia and spent two winters in Samos; and in 20 B.C. Phraates voluntarily restored the Roman standards which had been taken at Carrhae, and came to an understanding to respect the frontier of the Euphrates and the Desert.

Further north, as we have seen, there was no such natural barrier. In Armenia itself, which stood as a 'buffer state' towards Parthia beyond the line of the Euphrates, the Roman party was re-established first by Tiberius, who made Tigranes II. king in 20 B.C.; and again, after the death of Tigranes, by the mission of C. Caesar in 1 B.C.; but native feuds and Parthian intrigues still made this fickle people a source of constant anxiety.

In the old client-state of Judaea, which lay safe behind the desert frontier, and barred the way from the great provincial command of Syria to the emperor's private dominion of Egypt, a strong and politic prince, of Idumaeen origin, Herodes, 'Herod the Great,' had risen, first, under Julius Caesar, to be Roman *procurator*; and under the Triumvirate, in 40 B.C., to be king. He took the wrong side at Actium, it is true; but his real value, and his personal friendship with M. Agrippa, and with Augustus himself, secured his pardon; and he held a wide and prosperous dominion until his death in 4 B.C. His kingdom was then divided among his sons, Antipas, Archelaus, and Philip; but Archelaus was deposed in 6 A.D., and his 'tetrarchy,' Judaea, was placed under a Roman *procurator*. Between 37 and 41 A.D. the whole kingdom was reunited again under Herod Agrippa, a grandson of Herod the Great; but on his death in 44 A.D. it was finally incorporated, under a *procurator*, in the Roman province of Syria.

In Egypt and North Africa there was still much more to be done. Egypt itself, the private possession of Augustus, was peaceful; but an ill-advised raid into Arabia, led by the *praefectus*, Aelius Gallus, in 24-3 B.C., came to a disastrous end; in 22 B.C., however, an Ethiopian invasion from the Upper Nile was successfully met by C. Petronius. In 25 B.C. Numidia was exchanged with King

Juba II. for Mauretania, and incorporated finally in the Roman province of Africa, where a campaign against the desert tribes in 19 B.C. earned for C. Cornelius Balbus the first and only triumph which a provincial celebrated in Rome. It remained necessary, however, in spite of the protection afforded by the great desert tracts beyond the Atlas frontier, to maintain a garrison of one legion in this province, the only one not under the control of Augustus in which an armed force was permitted at all; and even here it was in charge, not of the Proconsul of Africa, but of a special *legatus* of Caesar.

While the eastern and southern frontiers¹ were thus confirmed against invasion, the reform of the provincial organisation had gone on everywhere without a check or a mistake. The failure of the Roman Republic to administer an Empire had resulted mainly from the Senate's inability to maintain effective control over the provincial governors. The system of proconsular *imperia* had kept each separate province isolated from its neighbours, hampering trade, and putting military or financial co-operation out of the question. The assignment to Augustus, on the other hand, of all the more important provinces and all the unsolved problems of frontier organisation, made it possible for the first time to co-ordinate and centralise the provincial governments, and to entrust them not to irresponsible and independent magistrates, but to deputies selected for their ability and honesty, responsible directly to one and the same chief, and removable by him at his discretion. The larger 'imperial' provinces were ruled by *legati pro praetore*; the smaller, like Rhaetia (15 B.C.), Noricum (15 B.C.), or Judaea (6 A.D.), by *procuratores* or 'stewards,' like the bailiffs of a private landowner; and some other dependencies, such as Egypt, by *praefecti*; all alike appointed by Augustus, and responsible solely to him. To concentrate responsibility still more, and extend uniformity of method, neighbouring provinces were sometimes grouped together temporarily in a single command, like that held by Agrippa in the East, or that of Gallia Comata when its three subdivisions, Aquitania, Lugdunensis, and Belgica, were established in 17 B.C. Extortion and oppression were checked by forbidding arbitrary requisitions; by making the regular allowances (*salaria*) large enough to live upon with dignity; by prolonging the term of office, and by letting one appointment lead to another, in a regular career of active service. Above all, the control of finance was transferred, in all 'imperial' provinces, from the governor's

¹ The treatment of the northern frontier belongs, as we have seen, to the second period of the principate of Augustus, and is described on p. 562.

quaestor to a new service of financial *procuratores*, responsible independently to Augustus. The jurisdiction of the governors, too, was limited by the increasing numbers of full Roman citizens in the provinces, and by the right, which every distressed provincial had, to 'appeal unto Caesar' against the decisions of his subordinate officers—*provocare ad Caesarem*, in fact, just as a Roman citizen had had the right *provocare ad populum*. Finally, their power to raise revolts or to betray their trust was reduced to a minimum by the separation of civil (and military administration; for a Proconsul either had no soldiers in his province at all, or, as in Africa, was without control over the *legatus* who commanded the garrison; while it became a treasonable act either to levy or to use an army at all *iniussu principis*).

In the provinces which were left under the control of the Senate, the Republican system of proconsular commands was retained; but its worst **Senatorial** abuses were abolished with the transference of the legions to **provinces.** the control of the *Princeps*, and the administration of a large part of the provincial revenue by his *procuratores*. As a guarantee for honesty and independent means, the wise provision was retained which required an interval of five years between civic office and provincial command (p. 502); and the privilege, which the *Princeps* jealously maintained, of 'recommending' (pp. 522, 549) a certain proportion of the candidates for all the lower offices,¹ did much to leaven the Republican service with a new element of strength and experience. Moreover, the *maius imperium* which the *Princeps* enjoyed, and his visits to the more important commands, made it possible *provocare ad Caesarem*, even in a Senatorial province; while both his formal edicts, and the administrative practice of the provinces which he ruled, were widely observed and imitated by Senatorial governors, as time made their wisdom clear.

Under these new conditions the prosperity of the Empire increased with extraordinary rapidity, and was fostered carefully by a new and **Financial** systematic regulation of the revenue. One of the first **reforms.** measures ordered by Augustus was the compilation of a statistical account of the whole Empire, on the lines of that which he had himself carried out in Gaul in 27 B.C. 'There went out a decree from Caesar Augustus that all the world should be enrolled';² and on the basis of this survey—which took many years to complete—the whole of the taxes were remodelled, and an annual statement made of revenue and expenditure. The old wasteful system of tithes in kind was abolished, wherever that was possible, and was replaced by simple

¹ And, in Nero's reign, even for the Consulship.

² St. Luke ii. 1 (Revised Version).

land and property taxes paid in money. To these were added, in 6 A.D., a legacy-duty of five per cent. and a tax of one per cent. on all sales in open market—*centesima rerum venalium*—which fell on all alike, and were appropriated to the maintenance of the army.¹ By these and other indirect taxes the inhabitants of Rome and Italy, and the many Roman citizens abroad who did not pay the provincial taxes, contributed their share to the revenue.

The expenditure of the Empire was reformed on a twofold plan, to correspond with its twofold administration by the Senate and the *Princeps*. All the ordinary revenues from the Senatorial provinces continued to be paid into the Republican *Aerarium*, and remained at the disposal of the Senate; but the revenues of Caesar's provinces, and the income from forests, mines, and other forms of state-land, went to the *Fiscus*, or privy purse, of the *Princeps*. The double arrangement worked well; but it had one important result which probably was not foreseen. The government of the Senate, in spite of all reform, remained far more expensive even than Caesar had anticipated; the *Aerarium*, with its less efficient management, was repeatedly obliged to ask for help from the *Fiscus*; and the *Princeps* was obliged to take over one expensive department after another—such as the corn supply in 22 B.C., and the public roads in 20 B.C.—which the Senate was unable to carry on.

The military system of the Republic had fallen into the same chaos as its finance; and in the main from the same cause, the utter want of system and central control. Every commander had raised an army of his own, which took the *sacramentum* to him personally—not to the State—and looked to him for successes and booty now, and for maintenance in idleness afterwards. Since the abolition of *tributum*, too, there had been no separate war-tax; and soldiers and commanders alike had made warfare pay for itself. The result had been, as we have seen, that the career of the soldier had become irrevocably separated from that of the citizen; the Republic had lost all control over the policy and the ambitions of its generals; and the master of the legions had become the master of Rome. More than this, the legions themselves had already learned their power. If they could make a man master of Rome, they could also unmake him, and set another in his place; the worst embarrassments of Caesar himself had been incurred to satisfy the repeated demands of his enormous army; and the wholesale desertion of

¹ Equivalent to one per cent. The tax on the sale of slaves was double: *quingagesima mancipiorum venalium*.

the forces of Antonius had shown how fatally easy it had become, to fight on the winning side.

Augustus could not hope to cure this evil, but he did all that could be done to minimise the risk. By securing, from the first, the sole right to use an armed force, he concentrated the professional loyalty of all the legions to himself. All the soldiers were now to be the soldiers of Caesar, not of this or that provincial commander; they took the oath of allegiance to Caesar alone, and they were employed about Caesar's business, and at Caesar's orders only. Even the grant of a triumph soon ceased to be given outside the family of Caesar, all other commanders being regarded strictly as Caesar's *legati*, and he as their commander-in-chief.¹ By fixing the duration of service at sixteen years in the ranks, and four *sub vexillis* in the reserve; by greatly improving the pay, the maintenance, and the prospects of discharge; and by strictly excluding all but Roman citizens from the legions, he made the army a respectable profession, and attracted the best class of voluntary recruits. By making each legion a permanent school of soldiering, under its own *legatus* of Senatorial rank, by a clearer distinction of status between the rank and file and the officers,² and by making promotion among the latter depend mainly on merit and efficiency, he introduced a spirit of discipline and *esprit de corps* which was wholly

absent from the hasty levies of the Civil War. At the same time, the use of auxiliary corps recruited from the more warlike of the conquered races was largely developed and systematised; local modes of equipment and fighting were encouraged and preserved, so that each tribe and nation could feel that its own *cohors* or *ala* was fighting for its own country as well as for Rome; and full citizenship was conferred upon veterans, at their discharge. By limiting the number of the legions, moreover, and by stationing them only at the points of danger on the frontiers,³ the expense and the danger of maintaining so large a standing army was greatly reduced; and by establishing, in 6 A.D., a separate *aerarium militare*, fed by the legacy duty and the *centesima rerum venalium*, it became possible, for the moment at least, to make both ends meet, without either

¹ The last triumph of a *legatus* was that of Balbus in 19 B.C.: when Agrippa annexed the Cimmerian Bosphorus to Pontus, in 14 B.C. (p. 551), he received *triumphalia insignia*, but was allowed no formal ceremony.

² The appointment of the *tribuni militares* by popular election ceased, and all offices alike held their commission from Caesar.

³ Three in Spain, twelve on the northern frontier, two in Dalmatia, four in Syria, four in Egypt and Africa. The numbers given are those for 23 A.D.; the first for which we have evidence.

oppression of the frontier provinces, or disturbance of the finance of the Empire.

After the settlement of the East in 22-19 B.C., Augustus spent two years in Rome, with the object of restoring to Italy and to the capital some measure of the order and prosperity which he had **Reforms** inaugurated abroad. But there was no repetition of the **in Italy.** levelling process which had been begun by Julius. Italy remained distinct in status and government from the other parts of the Empire ; and it was exempt from direct taxation, though no longer from indirect duties such as *portoria* (p. 522) and the *centesima* (p. 555). Freedmen and foreigners were only admitted rarely, and for exceptional reasons, to full Roman citizenship ; but liberal grants of the *ius Latii* were made in the provinces. Free municipal institutions were extended to the foot of the Alps, and Istria was detached from Illyricum and treated as part of Italy. Twenty-eight new colonies were founded in the peninsula, with Pola and Concordia on the Istrian border ; and a number besides in the provinces, as at Carthage, Syracuse, Patrae, and Philippi. Italy was divided, for the first time, into eleven administrative districts ; brigandage and piracy were put down, slave-gangs supervised, roads built and restored, marsh-lands reclaimed, and the foundations laid for the great revival of prosperity which took place under the successors of Augustus.

In Rome, too, much was done to beautify the city, and to foster feelings of self-respect in its mongrel and pampered population. The *Septa Julia* and other unfinished works of the Dictator were **Buildings** completed, a great temple was dedicated to Apollo on the **in Rome.** Palatine as a thanksgiving for Actium, and a temple to Mars Ultor, in the new *Forum Augusti*, in memory of Philippi. Libraries were founded by Asinius Pollio on the Palatine, and by Augustus himself in the *Porticus Octaviae*, which he built in memory of his sister ; and the theatre raised in memory of Marcellus, the baths or *Thermae* built by Agrippa, and the restoration of more than eighty temples ruined or neglected in the civil wars, fully justified the boast of Augustus, that 'he had found Rome of brick, and left it of marble.'

To protect these great works from damage, and to repress the constant disorder and insecurity of the streets, the city was placed at last under an administration and a police of its own. A *praefectus urbi*, **Praefectus** whose office went back to the days of the kings and had **urbi.** been revived again by Julius, was appointed, temporarily at first, in the frequent absences of Augustus, but under later *Principes* continuously ;

and a military force of fourteen *cohortes urbanae* was placed at his disposal, in seven permanent barracks in different parts of the city.

Vigiles.

Besides these, a separate corps of *vigiles* was organised to deal with the frequent and disastrous fires ; at first (22 B.C.) under the superintendence of the Aediles, but afterwards (6 A.D.) under a separate *praefectus vigilum*.

To encourage municipal feeling and give a new interest to the better classes of the population, the city was divided into fourteen *regiones*, and these again into *vici* or wards, with their own *magistri vicorum* and vestry-constitution ; new chapels of the *Lares publici* and of the cult of Augustus were committed to their care, and though the old rowdy *collegia* were dissolved finally, the formation of orderly and duly registered societies was encouraged. The freedmen, too, who both in Rome and elsewhere were excluded from a municipal career, were allowed, in compensation, to form guilds of their own named after Augustus himself, and to manage the affairs of their own order through committees of *seviri Augustales*.

Government of the city.

But while everything was done to provide local and municipal interests for the 'sovereign people,' their share in the government of the Empire was inevitably reduced to a minimum. The Comitia, indeed, still met to elect magistrates, and occasionally to pass laws ; and it was even found necessary to legislate once more *de ambitu*, and to take measures—as, for instance, in 21 B.C.

The Republican Constitution under the Principate.

—to prevent rioting at election time ; but the *Princeps*, besides directly nominating some of the magistrates, followed the example of Julius Comitia. in furnishing certain candidates for election with a *commendatio*, which could not well be ignored ; the Comitial elections became more and more a mere matter of form, and it was not long before the right to elect at all was transferred from the Comitia to the Senate.

The magistrates, too, though their numbers and functions remained nominally what they were before, retained but little, under these circumstances, even of the power that had been left them in the **Magistrates.**

anarchy of the civil wars. Even if they did not owe their election to Caesar's favour, it was to him that they had to look for support against opposition, while his *maius imperium* enabled him to overrule their acts and judicial decisions as he pleased. Moreover, we have seen already (p. 555) that the comparative poverty and wastefulness of Republican administration led to the transference of all really important departments to his side of the public service.

Even the Senate, while it retained and even increased the outward

show of dignity which it had won in its best days, rapidly lost the character of an independent body, and became little more than the mouthpiece of a certain class of official opinion. It had attained its former supremacy, as we have seen, through the necessity of finding some single and permanent body to adjust and co-ordinate a crowd of independent magistrates. Now, every function of government was vested for life in a single hand, and it was left with no duty to fulfil but its original task of giving advice when asked. By a substantial reduction of its numbers to begin with; by wholesale revisions of it, in 8 B.C. and 14 A.D.; by insisting on a high property qualification for the Quaestorship, which still gave admission to it; by refusing 'recommendations' to candidates who were not already of Senatorial rank; by freely granting to men of his own choosing the *latus clavus*, which was the outward symbol of that rank; and by restoring the privilege of trying and passing sentence on its own members, Augustus had little difficulty in supplanting the remnants of the old official nobility by a new Senatorial Order of wealth and ability. Yet it often served the purpose of Augustus to secure the appearance of Republican sanction by issuing decrees as *Senatus consulta*, rather than as *edicta Principis*; and as the members of the Senatorial Order enjoyed a monopoly of the old curule offices, and of the administrative experience afforded by those provinces which still remained under the control of the Senate, its advice was frequently asked and tendered on such matters of State as it was competent to discuss; and still more on questions of social and moral order, in which regard must be had, in any case, to the educated opinion of the ruling race.

Meanwhile, alongside of the Senatorial Order, which thus provided the aristocracy of the capital with a scheme of public duties and prospects of its own, Augustus was careful to supply the middle classes of Rome and Italy, whom he rightly regarded as the most loyal supporters of the Principate, with a separate career of offices, and a social status only less dignified than that of the Senate itself. To this end he reorganised on its original basis the old Equestrian Order, limiting it to some five thousand *Equites equo publico* admitted by himself, under strict qualifications of descent and *census*, and subjected, like the Senate, to stringent revision from time to time. And while the *Princeps* himself was enrolled as *Princeps Senatus* at the head of the Senatorial Order, his personal heirs were created *principes iuventutis* at the head of the Equestrian, which received once more the control of the jury courts, and was provided with a distinguished and varied career in the personal service of the *Princeps*; for not only all the large staff of

civil *procuratores* and *praefecti*, who governed his provinces and administered great public departments like the revenue, the corn supply, or the coast defence of Italy, but also most of the higher officers of the army, and even some of the *legati Caesaris* (though the chief of the latter were always of Senatorial rank), were chosen from the Equestrian Order; while it not infrequently happened that distinguished Equites were ennobled by the grant of the '*latus clavus*,' which qualified them for the Senatorial career.

Even the lower orders were not forgotten. They too were bound by ties of interest and loyalty to the *Princeps*, whom, as the representative of Tribunician power, they were taught to regard as their patron and *libertatis vindex*. No sooner did Augustus take over the corn supply, in 22 B.C., than the corn doles were increased again to two hundred thousand a month; ample food, largess, and shows kept the people alive, contented, and amused; they too had the elements of a career in the new municipal offices of the city and the urban guilds; and they were taught, by the strict exclusion of freedmen and foreigners from the outward privileges of citizenship, by the insistence of Augustus on the public wearing of the *toga*, and by the widespread adoption of the worship of the City of Rome, to regard themselves as in some sense members of a responsible and dignified body.

The peculiar genius of Augustus for bringing order out of disorder, and likewise the thoroughly Roman bent of his character, are nowhere more clearly seen than in his attempt to reform the corruption into which Roman social life and Roman religion had fallen, and the dangers which consequently threatened the purity, and even the continued existence, of the Roman race itself. At the first moment after he had made the Syrian frontier secure against the Parthians, he returned to Italy and promulgated a long series of *Leges Juliae*, intended to curb the prevalent luxury and looseness of living, and restore something of the old Roman severity of life and morals. In particular, a return to the old manner of family life, which had been fatally undermined by the growth of luxury, and by the insecurity of the civil wars, was encouraged by severe punishments on adultery, by disabilities put upon the unmarried, and by privileges and remissions offered to fathers of three or more children; and the consular *Lex Papia Poppaea* of 9 A.D. went further still in the same direction. But the evil had gone too far to be remedied by mere legislation; and it was observed with amusement that the *Lex Papia Poppaea* itself was proposed by Consuls who were both unmarried men.

More important, by far, were the changes which were introduced into

the State religion. The foreign cults which had sprung up everywhere in Rome during the decline of the Republic were rigidly suppressed, and every effort was made, by the restoration of ancient shrines, the foundation of new and splendid temples, and the example of poets like Virgil, Horace, and Ovid, to recall popular belief, or at least popular observance, to the old gods of Rome. But alongside of this there grew up, at first insensibly, and then by politic encouragement, a new worship of the government of Rome itself, and of the earthly providence which had thus brought order out of universal chaos. The example had been set already, when Julius allowed himself to be saluted as *Divus*, and worshipped in his lifetime like a king of Egypt or Syria. True, Augustus sternly discouraged any proposal of divine honours to himself, though at one time the temptation must have been strong to be even, on this ground, with Antonius and Cleopatra—the Osiris and Isis of Egypt; but he completed the temple to *Divus Julius*, which the Triumvirs began (p. 531), and permitted his name to be associated, in the provinces at all events, with the temples and altars which sprang up everywhere to the name of the City of Rome. The cult of *Roma*, in fact, was to him a powerful engine of policy, for it accustomed the provincials, however far away, to associate the protection and well-being, which resulted from Roman domination, with an outward and visible sign of the Roman Empire; and this outward symbol, in its turn, with a power beyond their reach, which rewarded the good citizen, and punished treachery and wrong-doing. In every province, ultimately, the altar and cult of 'Rome and Augustus' were entrusted to the provincial council, which was at the same time the mouthpiece of public opinion, and an effective means of implanting a sense of loyalty and public spirit in the chief men of the subject peoples; and the office of *flamen Augusti* rapidly rose to be a post of high distinction, and the reward of conspicuous services to the State. Even in Italy and in Rome, something of the same incarnation of Empire was permitted and encouraged; for the freedmen's guilds of *Augustales* (p. 558) performed the same function among the lower orders as the priesthoods of Rome and Augustus in the provinces; and the *genius Augusti* was given a place by the side of the *Lares publici* in the ward-chapels of Rome. It was a significant feature, indeed, of the trend of popular belief, when the Power that maintained and ruled the world was best conceived as incarnate in the person of the *Pater Patriae*, the Saviour of his Country: a title which the Senate conferred upon Augustus formally in 2 B.C.

The two years thus spent in social and religious reform in Italy were

closed by the celebration, with unprecedented magnificence, of a great national festival—the *Ludi Saeculares*—designed, as the *Ludi Saeculares*, 17 B.C. *Carmen Saeculare* of Horace (which was composed for the occasion) shows, to set a seal upon the reformation effected by the *Leges Juliae*, and to open a new era of prosperity and peace.

Augustus was now free to devote himself to the arduous task, which he had long projected and even already begun, of creating a defensible frontier in the north,

The problems involved were of the most intricate kind, but they may be grouped in three geographical divisions. Firstly, immediately northwards from Italy, effective Roman occupation had long ago come to an abrupt stop at the foot of the Alps; and even Julius had failed (p. 489) to secure a right-of-way over the Great St. Bernard into the upper valley of the Rhone. Here, therefore, it was essential, first, to conquer the whole length and depth of the Alpine range; and then to create a chain of frontier provinces between Cisalpine Gaul and the next practicable frontier, the upper course of the Danube.

Secondly, southward and eastward of the Alps, the vague provisional frontiers of Dalmatia, Illyria, and Macedon were severely harried by powerful confederacies of active tribes in Pannonia and Dacia, corresponding with the valleys of the Save and Drave, and with the rough country of the southern Carpathians. Here, also, as in the Alps, the true frontier lay far beyond the mountainous region of the Balkan highland, and coincided with the course of the middle and lower Danube, from the neighbourhood of Vienna to the Black Sea.


Thirdly, north and west of the Alps, the conquest of Belgic Gaul had thrown forward the Roman frontier till it ran, nearly north and south, along the Rhine. But this made a re-entrant angle with the Alpine frontier of Cisalpine Gaul, and enclosed, at the angle itself, a dangerously weak spot, between the headwaters of the Rhine and the Danube, where there was no natural frontier at all, and where, in fact, the pressure had been applied in 58 B.C., when the Helvetii were forced into Gaul. The Rhine frontier, moreover, which Julius had proclaimed to be the boundary between Gauls within, and Germans outside the Empire, had proved in practice to be neither the real division between the two races, nor a satisfactory frontier from a military point of view. On the Rhine, therefore, the problem was, first, to find a better river-frontier somewhere out beyond the Lower Rhine, and then to extend this new line south-east-

The northern frontier, 16 B.C.-9 A.D.

(a) Alps.

(b) Danube.

(c) Rhine.



ward, in front of the Helvetian gap, till it met the good frontier of the Danube, where it flows between the Alps and the Carpathians. These, then, were the problems, and these the solutions which Augustus seems to have proposed. We have now to see how far his ideal was realised.

The Cisalpine frontier gave very little trouble. As early as 25 B.C. A. Terentius Varro had conquered and annihilated the Ligurian Salassi, and had founded the strong colony of Augusta Praetoria (*Aosta*) to guard the passes of the Graian Alps. A single campaign in 16-15 B.C., in which Tiberius advanced eastward from southern Gaul, and his brother Drusus westward by the passes of the Tyrol, sufficed to reduce to subjection the whole northern face of the range; the Rhaeti, Vindelici, and Norici gave no further trouble, and two new provinces, Rhaetia and Noricum, were added at once to those under the control of Augustus. One season more opened the Alpine passes, and though scattered fighting went on, in parts, as late as 6 B.C., the supremacy of Rome was never seriously called in question along the whole length of the mountain chain. The Danube frontier was won, from the neighbourhood of Vienna westward.

The next task was to complete the conquest of the south-east. Augustus himself had already conquered part of the valley of the Save in 35-4 B.C., and in 29 B.C. a new province was formed by Moesia and Pannonia. M. Crassus, a former lieutenant of Antonius (who was Consul with Caesar in 30 B.C., and triumphed in 27 B.C. over the Getae and Bastarnae), which extended, under the name of Moesia, from Thrace and Macedonia to the Danube, and from the mouth of that river to its junction with the Save. A revolt which broke out among the Pannoni in 14-13 B.C. was promptly crushed by Agrippa, who was recalled for this work from Asia; and after his death in 12 B.C., Tiberius, who succeeded him, fought his way to the Danube, and in three years organised a large part of the basins of the Save and the Drave, in the new province of Pannonia. The Danube frontier was thus realised along its whole extent, from its source near Lake Constance to its mouth on the Black Sea.

Transalpine Gaul had fallen, in the Triumviral division of the Empire, to the share of Antonius (p. 530); but the campaign of Philippi and the Parthian War prevented him even from visiting it; and the Gaul and the Rhine. treaty of Brundisium transferred it in 40 B.C. to Cæsar, who inspected the Rhine frontier with Agrippa in 38, and settled the loyal Ubii on the Roman side of the river. Subsequent disturbances recalled Agrippa to the north in 20 B.C., but it was not till later that serious trouble arose. In 16 B.C., however, a powerful confederacy,

headed by the Sugambri, and provoked by a punitive expedition under M. Lollius, broke through into Gaul in force, and severely defeated Lollius; and Augustus and Tiberius left Rome hurriedly, in the same year, to take command of the forces in Gaul. The successes of Tiberius on the Upper Rhine and the north face of the Alps, have been described already; and the Sugambri, thus threatened on their southern flank, retired for the moment. Augustus reorganised the defences of the Rhine on a new basis, and in 13 B.C., when the operations in Noricum were over, put Drusus in command of the whole frontier force from the sea to the sources of the river.

The next five years a series of brilliant campaigns led Drusus far beyond the Lower Rhine, shattered the power of the Sugambri, and conquered the whole district between the Rhine and the Lower Elbe. **Germany.** In 9 B.C. a fall from his horse cut short his distinguished career; but Tiberius took up his work, and in the next year reached the Elbe again. Ten years of consolidation followed, in which every preparation was made for the permanent incorporation of this vast new district in the Empire; and on the return of Tiberius, who had been in retirement at Rhodes from 6 B.C. to 4 A.D., a fresh expedition on the Elbe seemed to have made all finally secure.

It only remained now to join the frontier of the Elbe with that of the Danube by a concerted attack upon the strong confederacy of the Marcomanni; which alone held out, under a Suevian chief named Maroboduus, in the forests and mountains of Bavaria and Bohemia. C. Sentiens was to attack from the north with the army of the Rhine, while Tiberius himself collected a large force on the other flank in Pannonia. But at the critical moment a desperate revolt broke out over all Pannonia and Dalmatia; the gravest danger, as was believed in Rome, since the Second Punic War. Peace had to be made at once with Maroboduus, and for three years more it was a struggle of life and death for Tiberius and the Pannonian garrisons. **Revolt in Pannonia, 6 A.D.** In 9 A.D. the danger on this side was over; but a revolt in **'Clades Variana,' 9 A.D.** Germany, and the mismanagement of P. Quintilius Varus, led to the annihilation of Varus himself and a force of three whole legions, in the Teutoburgian forest, by the national hero Arminius.

This second disaster seems to have convinced Augustus, whose strength and spirits were already giving way, that the task he had undertaken was beyond the power even of the Roman Empire. A single **The Rhine frontier.** expedition into Germany in 11 A.D., though led by Tiberius, and Germanicus, the able son of Drusus, served only to show how slight the hold of Roman civilisation had been; and from that moment a

complete return was made to the old Rhine frontier of Julius, and to a conservative and defensive policy like that which had been adopted already against the Parthians. The defence of the Empire, on this side, was united henceforward with the general administration of the three Gallic provinces; Germanicus was left with an army of eight legions to dominate the frontier districts along the river; and the last commands of Augustus to his heir and successor were, not to attempt to hold more than had been already won.

It was a disastrous end to an enterprise which had promised to rival the work of Julius himself. The frontier of the Elbe would have formed with that of the Danube a continuous, clear, and slightly convex line from sea to sea, and would have given to Rome the vast recruiting ground of which the army stood so sorely in need. The Rhine frontier of Gaul, on the other hand, lay nearly two hundred miles in rear of that of Noricum and Pannonia; it formed with it, as of old, a re-entrant angle, which greatly favoured an invader; and it was separated from it by the strong and aggressive confederacy of Maroboduus. It was inevitable, therefore, that sooner or later this vital weakness in the frontier should be detected, and whenever that should occur, the armies of the Rhine and of the Danube would be powerless to co-operate, or to reinforce each other.

The Principate, as we have seen, was in no sense a hereditary office. Its powers were conferred, in theory, by the free choice of the Senate and People of Rome; and, practically, on the man who, at the death of the *Principes*, proved to be most closely associated with him in the work of administration, and in the affections of the populace or the legions. The question, therefore, was always present, whom Augustus would permit to acquire the dignity and influence which should designate his successor; and, as years went by, it became clear that Augustus, too, had given constant and careful attention to this all-important question, and that the failure of one hope after another was throwing a deepening shadow over his later years. It was natural that he should wish to find some one among his own kindred, who could be trained to carry on his work. He had been three times married: first to Clodia, the daughter of Antonius, whom he divorced in 41 B.C.; and next to Scribonia, a relative of Sextus Pompeius, whom he married in 39 B.C. and divorced in the following year; of this brief marriage, however, there was one daughter, Julia. Thirdly, in 38 B.C., he took Livia Drusilla from her husband, Tib. Claudius Nero, and made her his wife; and her strong and determined character probably accounts for much in the ultimate

settlement of the question. Livia had already one son, Tiberius Claudius Nero, by her first marriage ; and bore another, Nero Claudius Drusus, shortly after ; but to Augustus she bore no children. Soon after the establishment of the Principate, therefore, Augustus adopted young M. Claudius Marcellus, the son of his sister Octavia **Marcellus.** by her first marriage with C. Marcellus, the Consul of 50 B.C. ; and in 25 B.C. Marcellus was married to Julia ; but two years afterwards he died, full of promise of ability, at the early age of nineteen. Augustus next gave Julia, in 21 B.C., to his devoted minister Agrippa, **Agrippa.** and in 18 B.C. made him his colleague in the *imperium* and the *tribunicia potestas*. Agrippa, however, died in 12 B.C., and Livia now at last succeeded in persuading Augustus to adopt her first-born Tiberius, who divorced the daughter of Agrippa and married Julia in the following year, and was associated in the *tribunicia potestas* in 6 B.C. But by this time the young sons of Agrippa and Julia, **C. and L.** C. and L. Caesar, who had been adopted by Augustus in **Caesar.** 17 B.C., were of an age to enter on public life. Tiberius found himself unacceptable, and retired into private life at Rhodes ; and Augustus soon after adopted his two grandsons, and advanced them to high public office. But in 2 A.D. L. Caesar died suddenly at Massilia, and Gaius two years later, on a mission to Armenia ; and a younger brother, Agrippa Postumus, who was adopted in 4 A.D., proved so ungovernable that he was banished, in 7 A.D., to the island of Planasia. Julia meanwhile had scandalised Rome by her unseemly conduct, and had been banished likewise, to Pandateria, in 2 B.C. All hope from the family of Agrippa being now lost, and Drusus too having died in 9 B.C., Augustus was compelled to fall back upon Tiberius, for whom he clearly had little **Tiberius.** affection, but whom he had reinstated in the *tribunicia potestas* on the death of C. Caesar ; in 11 A.D. he made him colleague in the *imperium* throughout the provinces, though not in Italy ; and in 13 A.D. he commissioned him to conduct a *census* of the whole Empire. On the death of Augustus, therefore, which occurred in the following year, Tiberius was left as his personal heir, and was at once entrusted by the Senate and People with the *tribunicia potestas* and all the other powers by which Augustus himself had ruled.

CHIEF DATES.

Temple of Janus closed, Jan. 11 ; Triumph of Caesar, Aug. 13-15	29 B.C.
Caesar revises the Senate, and resigns illegal powers	28
Principate established ; title 'Augustus' conferred	27
Settlement of Gaul and Spain : Cantabrian War	27-25
Settlement of Asia Minor : Provinces of Galatia and Pamphylia	25
Principate revised : death of Marcellus	23
Euphrates frontier settled : standards restored by Parthia	21-20
Agrippa associated in Principate, 18 : Ludi Saeculares	17
Alpine frontier : Provinces of Rhaetia and Noricum	16
Danube frontier established, 14-12 : Province of Pannonia	10
Rhine frontier, 12-9 : Tiberius advances to the Elbe	8
Death of Agrippa, 12 ; of L. Caesar, 2 B.C. ; of C. Caesar	1 A.D.
Aerarium militare established	6
Rhine frontier : defeat of Varus in Germany	9
Tiberius associated in Imperium and Tribunicia Potestas	11
Death of Augustus : accession of Tiberius	14

CHIEF PERSONS.

Augustus—M. Vipsanius Agrippa—C. Cilnius Maecenas—M. Valerius Messala—Aelius Gallus—C. Petronius—C. Cornelius Balbus—A. Terentius Varro—M. Lollius—C. Sentius—P. Quintilius Varus—Livia—Tiberius Claudius Nero—Nero Claudius Drusus—M. Claudius Marcellus—Julia—C. Caesar—L. Caesar—Agrippa Postumus—Phraates—Tigranes—Archelaus—Polemo—Herodes—Maroboduus—Arminius.

CHIEF PLACES.

Augusta Emerita—Caesar Augusta—Augusta Praetoria—Syracuse—Patrae—Philippi—Savus Fl.—Albis Fl.—Saltus Teutoburgensis—Nola.

SUBJECTS.

The character of the Principate, and its relations with the Republican Constitution.

The provincial government of the *Prinoeps* and the Senate.

The problem of the northern frontier.

The worship paid to the *Prinoeps*.

CHAPTER XLV

LITERATURE AND THOUGHT FROM THE GRACCHI TO AUGUSTUS

Republicanism, Hellenism, and Imperialism, as principles of Society and Culture—Roman Oratory alone remains Republican—Influence of Greek Rhetoric—The Gracchi—Antonius and Crassus—Hortensius—Cicero—Subsequent Decline of Oratory—Other Prose Literature—Rhetoric and Grammar—Varro—Roman Law—History—Sallust—Caesar—Nepos—Cicero's Letters—Philosophy in Rome—Cicero's Philosophic Terminology—Roman Poetry of the Republic—Alexandrianism—Lucretius—Catullus—The Augustan Age—The Circle of Maecenas—Virgil and Horace—Livy, the Imperial historian—Non-political elegiac verse—Tibullus—Propertius—Ovid—Conclusion.

THE political history of Rome, as we have traced it in the preceding chapters, falls apart into three main phases, dominated each by a distinct principle of conduct. Until the conquest of Italy became **Republican-**inevitable, Roman ideals and policy were those of a City **ism.**

State of the ancient type; never indeed quite a normal one, and tempted increasingly to a more spacious view of political life; but dominated at heart by the stern code of *Republicanism*, which subordinated the individual wholly to the State, while the welfare of the State was all in all.

In the second phase, from their first contact with the Greeks of Campania and Magna Graecia to their final triumph over Mithradates, the Romans found themselves both the pupils intellectually, **Hellenism.** and the champions politically, of the Greek way of looking at life. *Hellenism* indeed had begun, like Roman Republicanism, within the bounds of a City-State régime; but by the time when the Romans first felt its force, Alexander had burst those bonds for ever; and Zeno and Epicurus were formulating new rules of life, in which the State fell into the background, and the Individual stood immediately face to face with the world. Old gods, old institutions, and old traditional beliefs of right and wrong had been submitted, in the light of pure reason, to a new and searching scrutiny; and, in the vast majority of cases, they had failed to stand the test.

The problems which resulted from the collapse of the City-State régime, and the rapid unification of the Mediterranean world, under the supremacy of Rome in politics, and of Hellenism in matters of culture, found in due course a solution. Foreshadowed dimly long before, in the *πρώτου ἀνδρός ἀρχή* of Pericles, and the Philosopher-kingship of Plato's dream, and realised for a moment in the person of Alexander, *Imperialism* had become the only answer left to the questionings of the Gracchan age. Rome had never been a true democracy, and the *Imperialism*. Great Wars had cost her the one chance she had of ever becoming one: either, therefore, the senatorial oligarchy, with all its imperfections, must be tolerated till it broke down of itself, which it was certain to do; or it must be replaced, at whatever cost, by a monarchy of some kind. It might be frankly confessed, like the Dictatorships of Sulla and Julius Caesar; or veiled, like the Tribunate of C. Gracchus, the *imperium infinitum* and the 'sole consulship' of Pompeius, and the 'Principate' of Augustus, under the semblance of a compromise with the Republic; but in either case the principle was the same—the unquestioned rule of one supreme man.

Considered as rules of life, these three contrasted principles worked out as follows:—*Republicanism* bade men live for the State; *Hellenism*, in the cosmopolitan maturity in which alone the Romans **The results in society.** knew it, bade them live for themselves, and realise individual perfection, at whatever cost to the society into which they were born; *Imperialism*, emerging from the chaos of conflict between old and new, bade them resign themselves to a power not themselves which made for peace and order, and to live as under the eye of a master.

The stages of literary culture which resulted from the successive predominance of these three principles of society, were not of course divided **and in culture.** from each other by hard and fast lines; but shaded off into each other, and overlapped, as circumstances allowed. Yet nowhere are the three phases so distinct, or so clearly contrasted, as in the stress and clash of the Republican decline.

We have seen already, in Chapter XXIII. how the strenuous infancy of Republican Rome, and its remote situation on the very margin of the Hellenic world, had left little room in men's lives for literature or art; and how the national character had been moulded to action rather than **Native instinct and foreign influences.** to thought; to a hard grasp of facts, rather than to grace of style. Poetry, in fact, had been at all times poorly esteemed in Rome, just because it seemed unpractical: oratory and history, on the other hand, took a high place, in proportion as their uses were seen and appreciated. We have seen, too, how the

spirit of Hellenism had worked in every department of social life, and how even its outward forms had supplanted, in Roman literature, the rude metres and styles of early Italy. And this process, once begun, went on inevitably to the end; for indeed there was nothing native which could resist it. Roman literature as a whole continued to draw its inspiration, its models, and its phrases from Greek sources; and ceased, with one exception, to pretend to independence of its own.

One department there was, however, in which the spirit of Republicanism kept the language and literature of Rome on true and living lines to the end. It is of the essence of a free State that the citizen sways his fellows, not by compulsion, nor by independent effort of his own, but by convincing them, in fair and full debate, of the reasonableness of his proposals. Consequently in all the great free States of antiquity, and none the less in those of the modern world, we mark the growth of great schools of public oratory. And this was pre-eminently so in Rome. The Italians, ancient and modern alike, have a strong natural gift of eloquence, and keen appreciation of its use; throughout the long domination of the 'assembly of kings,' Roman policy had been shaped under the fearless criticism of debate among equals; and the masters of statecraft had, one and all, been masters of oratory also. Throughout the period of Republican freedom, likewise, it had been the cardinal privilege of every Roman citizen, in every crisis of public life, *provocare ad populum*, and in full session of his peers to plead his cause in person. Oratory therefore in Rome was not only a powerful engine of administration, but the supreme weapon of self-defence: a man who could not speak for himself, could not hope to be followed in public, or respected in private life. It was consequently in oratory, and in the great rhetorical prose-style which resulted, that Roman literature most nearly approached originality: while it was in the more private and personal arts of amatory and epigrammatic poetry, that it surrendered most utterly to Hellenism.

Roman
Oratory
alone
remains
Republican.

Even in oratory, however, it is largely to the spread of Greek ideas of composition, and especially to the Greek custom of writing out great speeches for publication afterwards, that we owe the scanty remnants we possess. Isolated fragments, indeed, of more ancient oratory survived—single speeches, for example, of Appius Claudius Caecus and the Cunctator;—and Ennius had sung the praise of M. Cornelius Cethegus *suaviloquenti ore* during the Hannibalic War: but it was not till the time of Cato that the custom of publication set in. Of the broken periods and rugged phrases of the stern old Censor some hundred

Early
efforts.

and fifty examples were preserved to the time of Cicero, when opinions differed widely as to their merit. For us the value of what we know of them lies in the glimpse they give of the methods of senatorial debate in the period of the Senate's ascendancy, and of that *gravitas* which distinguishes Roman oratory throughout from the more popular rhetoric of the Greeks. Cato's opponent, too, the cruel and unscrupulous Galba (p. 304), was notorious for the vehemence and pathos of his speeches; but he gave little attention, it seems, to their literary form, and only a few were written out for preservation.

It was only by slow degrees that Greek methods of speaking made their way. In 161, indeed, teachers of rhetoric were summarily expelled from Rome, and similar suspicions curtailed the Greek rhetoric. embassy of 155. But the troubled period which opens with the Gracchan reforms gave new scope both to political and to forensic oratory: hardly a year passed without either a violent public controversy or a criminal trial of universal interest and importance; and meanwhile the systematic study of scientific rhetoric, which the City-States of Greece and Asia Minor, and particularly the Republic of Rhodes, had long ago reduced to a fine art, began to give form and style to the utterances of Roman orators. Both the manly good sense of Scipio Aemilianus and the *mitis sapientia Laeli* were expressed already in terms which showed careful study of Greek models; within the same generation Diophanes of Mytilene was the tutor of the Gracchi; and in the next, the Rhodian experts, Apollonius and Molo, held regular classes in Rome, which were attended respectively by the youthful Caesar and Cicero.

The Gracchi themselves were prominent examples of the new method. In their great natural abilities, their young enthusiasm for a noble and The persecuted cause, their thorough discipline in Hellenism, Gracchi. and the free and flowing style which they practised, both the brothers were at one; but while Tiberius, the blameless idealist—*homo sanctissimus, vita innocentissimus*—spoke *vi temperata*, simply and unaffectedly, Gaius, the ardent self-reliant statesman, pledged to vengeance as well as to reform, carried away both his audience and himself by the exuberant wealth of his diction, the vehemence of his invective, and the unexampled fervour of his utterance and gesture; *impetu tumultuator*.¹

The generation which follows shows at the same time the results of

¹ Fragments of his speeches remain, and wholly confirm the opinion of Cicero, that to stimulate natural gift, as well as to train it, there was nothing to compare with them.

the Gracchan Hellenism, and a certain reaction from its excesses. The tribune C. Memmius, the opponent of Jugurtha, was remembered for a vigorous natural freedom of address ; Marius for his bluff camp-wit, and studied contempt for foreign affectations ; Scaurus, as an incarnation of true Roman *gravitas*, ' offering advice, rather than seeking to persuade ' ; Rutilius Rufus, the honest, unimaginative Stoic, for his convincing arrangement of evidence ; and Catulus for his pure and lucid composition. But the leading figures of the period are the **Antonius and Crassus.** brilliant handsome pleader, M. Antonius, and the learned and majestic L. Licinius Crassus. Both shone most in the law-courts, though Crassus distinguished himself also in debate ; both owed much—and this is especially true of Crassus—to the systematic arrangement, minute preparation of detail, and studied reliance on the external aids of intonation, pose, and gesture which were the principal discoveries of Greek rhetoric ; but both were careful to conceal their indebtedness to foreign models ; and both marked a great advance on genuinely Roman lines. Antonius, however, with the greater natural gift, was better able to dispense with the laborious learning which Crassus had made his own ; and, considered simply as a master of style, may well have deserved the slight preference which Cicero accords to his performances.

Each of this great pair of pleaders left a disciple and imitator behind him. Crassus, by his tragic dignity of style, gave weight and form to the fiery originality of P. Sulpicius Rufus, the spokesman of **Rufus and Marius in 88 ;** but the headstrong enthusiasm of the pupil **Cotta.** left him careless of the fine scholarship, and deficient in the learning, of the master. The successor of Antonius was C. Aurelius Cotta, who had begun his career under the auspices of Rutilius Rufus, and had been exiled for his Italian sympathies in 91 ; but his milder temperament, weaker health, and more pliant and persuasive style permitted him to survive the proscriptions, and to rise to the consulship in 75 ; only to be eclipsed, still in his prime, by the greater and very similar genius of Q. Hortensius, whom the early extinction of Sulpicius had left as his principal rival.

Hortensius alone, of the great orators of Rome, took little part in the political life of the time. Though a constant partisan of the Senate, he confined himself to forensic speaking, and defended the **Hortensius.** corrupt or incapable men of his own party in the courts, during the Sullan respite. Cicero's success against him in the case of C. Verres (70) was the prelude to ten years of constant rivalry ; and his eventual adherence to the party of the Senate, to the total retirement of Hortensius from politics. He continued, however, to practise in the

courts, amassed a huge fortune, and became notorious for his versatile and ingenious luxury. His oratory was characteristic of the man : great personal charm was enhanced by elaborate gesture and careful pose, which actors like Roscius would sit and study as he spoke ; and his luxurious temperament, as well as his marvellous memory, and the opportunities of a purely forensic career, tempted him to load his speeches with florid ' Asiatic ' phrases, which would have choked the fire and forcefulness of a political speaker. His orations, consequently, were better to hear than to read ; he himself was often too prudent or too lazy to write them out ; and Cicero, though far from insensible to his real talents, notes nevertheless that they sometimes suffered from want of care and preparation.

The culmination, and the close, of the great period of Roman oratory came with the career of Cicero. Old enough to have fought in the Social

War, to have conversed with the poet Accius (p. 279), and to have been the pupil of Q. Scaevola (p. 577), and yet young enough to have made his *début* by defending the victims of the proscriptions, he had employed the Marian anarchy, and the Sullan respite, to improve his health by travel, and to perfect his natural gifts by close study of rhetoric and philosophy in Athens and in Rhodes. Returning to Rome in 77, he soon made his mark in forensic oratory by his courageous and spirited prosecution of C. Verres, and in the political world by his eloquent support of the Gabinian and Manilian Laws. From the moment of his consulship, however, the odium of the Catilinarian executions, the personal animosity of Clodius, and his own misjudgment of the situation, reduced him to insignificance in politics ; and his banishment in 58, no less than his tenure of the Cilician province in 52, interrupted not only his practice in the courts, but also his private studies ; which, however, he never wholly intermitted. In the crisis of 49 he had joined Pompeius ; and Caesar, though he pardoned him, had little use for him in public life, and left him free for philosophic and literary work of the most varied and fruitful kind. It was only on the death of Caesar, in fact, that he ventured again into the open, and revealed, by his brilliant ' Philippics ' against Antonius, what years of culture, zeal for his party, and strong personal indignation could inspire.

Many-sided as he was, Cicero was first and foremost an orator, who subordinated every other activity to a high ideal of what a perfect orator should be. Of his speeches some fifty-nine are preserved, from youthful experiments like those *pro Quintio* (81) and *pro Roscio Amerino* (80), to that *pro Milone* (written in 52, but never delivered), and the *Philippicae* of 44 and 43 ; and from the sophistical

ingenuities of that *pro Cluentio* (66), to the pathos of those *post Reditum* and *pro Domo sua* (57), and the sterling indignation and white-hot invective of the speeches against Verres (70) and Catiline (63). It is, however, in his defensive pleadings that his peculiar talents are most fully displayed; for while his invective is often forced and hollow, his sympathy with the oppressed or fallen is genuine above suspicion, while in panegyric, which admits of a livelier personal touch, a more genial humour, and more varied and picturesque adornment, he stands wholly in a class by himself; and his portraits, whether of friend or enemy, have never been excelled. In narrative, his buoyant imagination often tempts him to exaggerate, and the very exuberance of his vocabulary and his enthusiasm, to overload his theme with the conceits and embroidery of his 'Asiatic' training, which left nothing to the imagination of his hearers, and little room—for a southern audience at least—to criticise the weak points of his argument.

To compare his forensic oratory with a modern standard, however, would be to ignore an essential difference between an ancient and a modern public trial; namely, that whereas a modern court aims at the discovery of objective truths, an ancient trial, Forensic. whether in Athens or in Rome, was always primarily of the nature of a *provocatio ad populum*, an appeal from law to equity. Countervailing pleas, such as the past good service to the State, the personal character, or the private circumstances of the accused, and also of the accuser, were held to be relevant topics for the pleader; the judges came prepared to be influenced by them, and the speakers, to strain every nerve, even when the legal point was clear, to meet, by similar arts, the tactics of their opponents. As Antonius used to say, his first business was to make the judges pleased with themselves, and then to make them pleased with him; this done, the rest was easy.

Compared, on the other hand, with the eloquence of great statesmen-orators like Demosthenes, there is still something lacking in the political oratory of Cicero, which cannot wholly be ascribed to Deliberative. differences of personal character. Though he can simulate enthusiasm or indignation, and pile up plausible arguments in graceful and orderly speech, he seldom invents, and frequently is not at pains even to go beyond the commonplace. In deliberative eloquence he has neither the depth of learning, nor the weight of character, nor the brilliance of originality which mark the great popular or Parliamentary orators; and the same applies, to some extent, even to his chosen field of judicial practice; for his law, and even his politics, like his philosophy and his literary studies, are soon seen to be subservient to the same

central aim—to make a great speech. Throughout, in fact, able and honest as he was, Cicero allowed his inveterate vanity to mistake the means for the end. And his end he attained: the ‘Philippics’ were delivered; but it was Cicero, not Antonius, who succumbed to them.

Cicero had outlived his age, and he had no successor. ‘*Latrant homines, non loquuntur,*’ he had written, in his later years, of the *clamatores, non oratores*, who were growing up. Pompeius had been never so unhappy as when he had to open his mouth; and, moreover, he seldom had anything to say. Caesar’s eloquence, too, like his writings, was the eloquence of a despatch or a word-of-command—concise, imperative, unanswerable. Antonius, indeed, had the warm natural temperament, the ready wit, and the copious flow of words of his earlier namesake; but—in spite of Shakespeare—it was with legions, not speeches, that he made his bid for Caesar’s heritage. Brutus and Licinius Calvus affected a purity and simplicity which were ‘Attic,’ but also dull; their only chance, perhaps, in face of Cicero, of creating a style of their own; but here the list closes. Later on, indeed, Valerius Messala and Asinius Pollio had learning, scholarship, and a sense of style; but the changed conditions of the Augustan Age, by removing the perils, and calming the passions of the dead Republic, had extinguished the soul of Roman oratory even in the courts; and left the dry dust of rhetoric and ‘Latin prose.’ Where there was nothing left worth winning, enthusiasm had no more meaning; with the cold stern *Princeps* as the ultimate arbiter, appeals to sentiment were thrown away. *Deflendus Cicero est, Latiaeque silentia linguae.*

Very closely connected with the study of oratory are the studies of grammar and rhetoric, on the one hand, and of law, history, and political philosophy, on the other; and in Rome, at all events, even remote studies, such as logic, and mental and moral philosophy, were pursued by Cicero and his contemporaries with a very keen eye to their usefulness in deliberative or forensic speech, proficiency in which was the goal of a liberal education.

The earlier orators relied on their native wits, and personal experience, in planning out their speeches; and the later passed their training time in the Greek schools of rhetoric abroad; but meanwhile the copious Greek literature of the subject was not long in finding its way to Rome. The Greek treatises, however, which dealt mainly with externals, seemed to the practical and serious-minded Romans empty and indefinite; and in 93 one Plotius Gallus drafted a

new handbook of rhetoric, in Latin, which adapted Greek theory to the conditions of Roman practice, and dealt more fully with the due arrangement of evidence and arguments. Other text-books followed, and one of them, which is preserved—the treatise dedicated *ad Herennium*, and attributed to Q. Cornificius, the Caesarian *legatus* of Syria in 45—throws much valuable light both upon literary and rhetorical theory, and upon Roman educational methods.

But it is again to Cicero that we turn for the mature expression of Roman rhetorical theory. The fragment *de Inventione* indeed is both early work and inadequate; but the three books *de Oratore* (written in 55) are a careful and judicious analysis of the principles of oratory, set in dialogue form in the mouths of Crassus and Antonius (p. 573). The *Brutus*, which followed it, is a critical summary of the progress of the art, and of the contributions of its successive exponents; the *Orator* sketches a perfect master of speech, as Cicero conceived him; the *Topica* are discussions of the logic and rhetoric of argument; and the essay *de Optimo Genere Oratorum*, intended as a preface to a translation of the masterpieces of Demosthenes and Aeschines, illustrates well the often-quoted contrast between the ‘Attic’ and the ‘Asiatic’ style, from the point of view of a master of the latter. All these technical treatises of Cicero are inimitable examples of the Latin of literary discourse, and an invaluable contribution to the history of one of the few genuine arts of Rome.

It is to the orator’s need for clear, effective, and accurate speech, also, that the Roman science of Grammar owes its first encouragement. True, the Greeks had gone far in the direction of etymology, and in definition of terms; and something had been done in Athens, and still more in Alexandria, to formulate the principles of syntax. But it was reserved for the Romans, with their genius for accurate observation of things practical, and for the co-ordination of cases under general laws, to give precision and theoretical value to the rules of correct speaking which students of oratory required: a Latin Thucydides, with his bold breaches of sequence, and acrobatic contortions of phrase, would have found few readers among this logical and systematic people.

The Romans had also the immense advantage, which the Greeks had never enjoyed, that they had been compelled, in the period of the Great Wars, to master another language than their own; and by good fortune the language which they had thus to master, for practical ends, was at the same time similar enough in its general structure to challenge constant comparisons with Latin; different enough

in its feeling and literary style to merit careful scientific study; and grand and beautiful enough to challenge wonder and imitation.

The rapid changes, too, which befell the Latin language itself through its daily contact, first with other Italian dialects, and then with the speech of the Hellenistic East, provoked close examination of the older Roman literature, and comparison of it with the idiom of the day.¹ Lucilius, for example, devoted more than one of his *Saturæ* to matters of grammar and scholarship; Ennius and Naevius were hardly dead before commentaries began to appear on their poems and plays; L. Aelius Stilo (144-70), a friend of Metellus Numidicus, and the first regular grammarian of Latin, spent much labour on the language and interpretation of Plautus; and Aurelius Opilius, under the patronage of Rutilius Rufus, kept a regular school of language-study, no later than 92.

All these phases of literary research found their full fruit in Varro, to whom Stilo dedicated his grammar. M. Terentius Varro, of Reate,² was born in 116, and died at the great age of eighty-eight.

Though a close friend of Cicero, and a staunch Pompeian, he was spared by Caesar—who himself was no mean scholar, and composed a Latin grammar of his own—and commissioned to organise a great library in Rome. This task, after a narrow escape from the Triumviral proscription, he resumed under the favour of Augustus, and continued till his death. His great work *de Lingua Latina*, of which six books (out of twenty-five) are preserved, illustrates well both the strength and the weakness of Roman linguistic science. It embraces a vast store of early Latin words and phrases, and much antiquarian learning of every kind, and its systematic part remained the corner-stone of the study of language until the discovery of Sanskrit in the eighteenth century; but its etymologies are childish, and valuable only for the boundless learning which they betray.

Varro's researches were not by any means confined to philology: but of the four hundred and ninety books ascribed to him the majority are not preserved, and many of his collections perished when Antonius ransacked his library during the proscriptions. But with the exception of the *Saturæ Menippeæ* and the great treatises on *Antiquitates*, the loss is probably not serious; for science, except in its obviously practical applications, seemed to a Roman useless, and disturbing to current

¹ The only Hellenic parallel is the close study of the *Homeric* dialect, which occupied so many of the grammarians of Alexandria.

² To distinguish him from the contemporary Narbonese poet, P. Terentius Varro *Atacinus*.

beliefs. Even physics, however, might lead to improvements in engineering; and natural history to more profitable agriculture and stock breeding; and the last years of Varro's long life were devoted, by command of Augustus, to the compilation of the treatise *de Re Rustica*, which alone survives from this side of his labours.

In the humaner sciences of Law and History, on the other hand, the practical application was more obvious, and here, as in Oratory, the Romans worked out something of a style of their own. The great forensic speakers, as we have seen, were permitted, by the Roman Law, low standard of veracity which prevailed, to treat research into matters of fact as a secondary consideration, and to devote their whole talents and energies to plausible recommendation of the opinions they had undertaken to maintain. But for this very reason there grew up meanwhile a separate class of advisory lawyers—*iuris periti* or *iuris consulti*—whose researches into precedents, and comment upon current practice, led gradually to the formulation of that code of Roman Law which was one of Rome's greatest gifts to the world. Conspicuous among these *iuris consulti* were P. Mucius Scaevola (Cos. 133), and his son Q. Scaevola (Cos. 95). The former, as *Pontifex Maximus*, published a collection of *Annales Pontificum*, and also a volume of *Responsa*, laying down the outlines of the Sacred Law, which played so great a part in the political life of Rome. The latter, who was also *Pontifex Maximus*, applied his wide Greek learning, and his study of the Stoic principles of justice, to the task of reducing to intelligible system the whole range of Civil Law. Even the brilliant Antonius used constantly to seek his aid on doubtful points; and by his statesmanlike judgment, and unblemished personal character, he exercised a profound influence upon Cicero, and the more thoughtful pleaders and politicians of that generation. Among later jurists, the ill-fated Sulpicius Rufus is quoted as having shown great legal promise, and the learned C. Trebatius, the friend and contemporary of Cicero, survived the Civil Wars, and wrote, like the Mucii, both *de Iure Civili* and *de Religione*; but the period of Republican decline favoured neither regular practice nor protracted research, and even Cicero found little time, and perhaps had not the inclination, to take up the study seriously. Valuable, moreover, as the works of these founders of Jurisprudence are, they possessed as little literary value as the scientific treatises of Varro; and it was not long before they were absorbed and lost in the more comprehensive law-books of the Empire.

The study of History, meanwhile, with its opportunities for stately

description, its affinity with political life, and its practical applications, had a natural attraction for the literary genius of the Romans. But

History. the prejudices of the Civil Wars, and still more the supersession of earlier treatises by the popular and comprehensive work of Livy (p. 599), have caused the destruction of almost every example of this kind of writing. Moreover—not to mention Polybius, the Achaean friend of the Scipios, Diodorus the Sicilian, a contemporary of Caesar and Cicero, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the Augustan Age, who wrote in Rome, and about Roman history, in their native language—many of the historical works, even of genuine Romans, were composed not in Latin but in Greek. Lucullus, for example, wrote a Greek history of the Social War, and Cicero a Greek memoir of his own consulship.

The Latin histories, on the other hand, which are known to us, fall under two main heads: general histories of the period of remote antiquity, and biographies or short personal memoirs of recent events. The former need not detain us long, for all have perished; though Livy quotes and compares their statements frequently. Three writers of the Scipionic circle, C. Fannius Strabo the son-in-law of Laelius, P. Sempronius Asellio, and L. Caelius Antipater, wrote Latin histories of the Great Wars, in which they had themselves served with distinction: the last-named is quoted with approval by Livy as an authority for the war with Hannibal; and both his work and that of Fannius were abridged to handbook form by M. Brutus, probably 'for use in schools.' Three other writers of Sullan date, C. Licinius Macer (the father of the poet Licinius Calvus), Q. Claudius Quadrigarius, and Q. Valerius Antias, rewrote the history of the earlier periods also: Claudius and Valerius, however, with gross patriotic exaggerations which drew down the sharp criticism of Livy. It is noteworthy that all these works belong to the earlier period of Hellenism, when Attic rather than Asiatic models were in vogue; and also that they arose in the first periods of the Republican decline. They were designed, it would seem, like the histories of Thucydides and of Polybius, which they copied, to serve as a retrospect of a great period of expansion and conquest, which was felt already to be nearing its close; and their appearance especially within the Scipionic circle is a symptom, like the prayer of Scipio himself (p. 316), of the feeling in the more thoughtful minds, that the world was passing over into a new and very different era. Of their literary qualities it is of course impossible to speak, in the absence of the original text.

The memoirs of more recent events are characteristic of the period of

civil wars, when the disturbed state of Italy imperilled the leisure which a work of larger scope would have required ; when the Republicanism, which made the State first and all-in-all, was at its last ebb ; and when more depended upon setting the exploits of individuals in a favourable light. Thus, first, the exploits of Marius were described by L. Plotius ; and then L. Cornelius Sisenna recounted the Social and Civil Wars from the point of view of Sulla, and was praised by Cicero for his graceful style. (c) Memoirs.

Of such memoirs, which were numerous, the only examples which have survived are those of C. Sallustius Crispus on the 'War with Jugurtha,' and the 'Conspiracy of Catiline.' Born at Amiternum in 86, expelled from the Senate in 50 for gross misconduct, and notorious both for his personal luxury, for his stately palace and park beyond the Quirinal Hill, and for his oppression of the African province in 46, their author was a friend and adherent of Caesar, whose policy, and that of his relative Marius, the memoirs are partly designed to recommend. Sallust. The narrative style is usually terse and vigorous, with obvious traces of close study of Thucydides ; less rhythmical than that of Cicero, and closer probably to that of the older annalists. The frequent inquiries, however, into causes and motives, the bold character sketches, and the dramatic imagination of the speeches, with which the crises of the story are adorned—though occasionally rhetorical and digressive—put the work of Sallust on a wholly different level from his predecessors. A more ambitious 'History of his own Times' has come down to us only in fragments.

Some of these historical memoirs were autobiographical, and the work of leading personages in the events which they describe. Q. Catulus, for example, wrote the history of the Cimbric War in a pure and simple style, which Cicero compares with that of Xenophon ; Sulla amused his last years with an account of his conquests and reforms ; and Julius Caesar projected, and partly carried out, a series of official 'Commentaries' on his campaigns. Caesar. The *Commentaria de Bello Gallico*, which are all that he found leisure to execute, remain the model, for all time, of purely military narrative, and a striking example of the clear, graceful, and expressive Latin of the highest circles in Rome. The skilful arrangement of the subject-matter, the studied moderation of phrase, and the detachment from personal or political considerations, which are conspicuous on every page, served, of course, also an important diplomatic purpose, in creating an impression of invincible decision and rapidity of action, and of thoughtfulness for the welfare of his own men, and in refuting the rumours of savagery which his enemies spread

about his name (pp. 504-6); and reveal the author as a master of subtle rhetoric, as well as a great descriptive artist. Even the Gallic 'Commentaries,' however, were not finished by Caesar himself; but he had trained his own officers in the same clear and graphic style. The last book *de Bello Gallico*, and the account of the campaign of Alexandria, appear to be the work of A. Hirtius; and the commentaries on the wars in Africa and Spain are ascribed respectively to C. Oppius and L. Cornelius Balbus—the latter an able, if somewhat warm-blooded Spaniard, who became Caesar's confidential agent, and survived to be his literary executor.

Of the biographical works of Cornelius Nepos, a native of Verona, of whom Cicero and his own neighbour Catullus write in terms of admiration, and who lived on until B.C. 24, only two lives—of **Cornelius Nepos.** M. Cato, and of his own patron, Atticus—are preserved in full; and a detailed life of Cicero is known to have been lost. The series, which has survived, of brief *Vitae Excellentium Imperatorum*, though certainly from his pen, seem to be either preliminary drafts of more elaborate 'Lives,' or popular abridgements of them; and hardly bear out the opinions expressed by his contemporaries. As a historian, in fact, Nepos is careless and untrustworthy; but he shows considerable insight into character; and illustrates, by his maturer style and greater delicacy of treatment, the changes which were passing over the language in the interval between Caesar and Livy.

Not strictly speaking 'history,' but invaluable materials for the historian, are the numerous private letters of Cicero. The longest series of those which have been preserved—selected and edited, **Cicero's 'Letters.'** apparently, by Cicero's favourite secretary, Tiro—was written by Cicero himself to his friend and confidential adviser T. Pomponius Atticus, the patron of Cornelius Nepos; others are addressed to members of his own family—to his wife Terentia, or to his brother Q. Cicero, when absent in Gaul under Caesar; others again to men of note in the political world—to Caesar himself, to Pompeius, and to M. Brutus; or to personal friends like M. Caelius Rufus. And fortunately there are included with this latter series *ad Familiares*, a large number of letters in reply, which greatly extend the interest and value of the collection. All alike were written, as their contents show, on the spur of the moment and with the utmost unreserve, and were intended only for the private eye of the recipient. But for this very reason they reveal, as nothing else could, the varying moods, the intimate habits, the personal likes and dislikes, and the innermost character and feelings of some of the most distinguished men in Rome. And they illustrate, in a

remarkable way, the vigour and the grace of the written idiom, and almost of the spoken language, of the higher circles of Roman society ; its unrivalled lucidity and precision, and its half-humorous affectation of Greek.

In Philosophy the Romans made little progress. As long as they could, they closed their doors to its Greek exponents, partly because these 'questioned everything' and disturbed men's faith in their **Philosophy** ancestral creed ; partly because, while itself without **in Rome,** practical value, philosophy set up for attainment another object in life, which threatened serious rivalry with the political career of the Republic. But repeated expulsion of 'philosophers,' in 162, in 155, and even in 92, failed utterly to check the stream. Greek views of the structure of the world, of the nature of society, and of the duty of man, became fashionable rapidly ; and, just as had been feared, a fatal separation took place between the forms and the spirit of religious and social life. The ritual of auspices and sacrifices, and the old Republican forms, went on more rigidly than ever ; but the gods and the State were deposed from the hearts of the citizens ; and men began to look about painfully, as in Greece before, for some rational theory of life.

But the Roman had no conception of the Greek search after truth for its own sake. All that he asked, now that the old gods and customs were passing from him, was a practical rule of life, **rhetorical,** and a reasoned estimate of the value of things in this world ; **not scientific.** and this he required, quite as much for an instrument of conviction for others, as for a stand-by in his own dark hours. Hence a fatal association of Roman philosophy not with science, as among the Greeks, but with the political and rhetorical studies, in whose company, in fact, it had arrived. Now the pre-Socratic physicists offered little that was human or practical, even had their views been still in fashion ; the moral questionings of Socrates, and the mystical imaginations of Plato 'settled nothing' that the Roman could follow or apprehend ; and the works of Aristotle seem to have been unknown in Italy till Sulla transferred to Rome, among the booty of the Mithradatic War, the library of Apellicon of Teos ; though afterwards Cicero studied and summarised, and even translated parts of them ; while he popularised, in like manner, in his treatise *de Legibus*, the substance of the 'Laws' of Plato.

It was consequently among the later schools of thought that the Romans had to choose ; and at this point came the parting of the ways. The noble poetry of Lucretius will show (p. 589) in what **Epicurean.** form the doctrines of Epicurus filtered through Roman minds ; how the lords of the known world—as they rapidly became—

were bidden to enjoy that world to the full, and to satisfy their sense of order, and find guidance for their rule, in the contemplation of the works of Nature. But the frank rejection of the popular Olympian deities, which on one side was the strength of the Epicurean system, shocked minds less sophisticated than those of third-century Greece; and that easy and widespread misconception of its morality, by which 'pleasures,' not 'happiness,' were made the end of life, was as repulsive to the instincts, as it was inconsistent with the experience, of the austere and self-disciplined Roman. Hardly one of the great figures of the period of Republican decline embraced Epicurean views; and of those who did so, the majority, either for pleasure or for contemplation, avoided the strenuous and ill-considered turmoil of the public life of the day. For the rest—the common herd, the 'hogs of Epicurus' sty'—used his system merely as a fresh pretext for the licentiousness which was only too easy without it.

The alternative was the philosophy of the Porch. Stoicism was quite as subversive as its rival of the traditional subordination of the individual to the State; and its insistence on the vanity of this world's aims deterred men of character and talent from the corrupt public life of the time, and impoverished the Republic at a crisis when only such men could have saved it. But it retained and allegorised the popular mythology; its doctrine that goodness is its own reward suited well the austere and self-reliant character of a ruling race; and its neglect of the changing chances of outward prosperity fitted equally well the rapid shifting of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and the no less incalculable ebb-and-flow of party politics in Rome. It needed, however, a sharper trial of virtue even than the Civil Wars, to bring out the full grandeur of Stoicism; and its ultimate domination over Roman thought was reserved for the period of the Empire.

To the period of transition, consequently, belongs the third school of thought, which comes out so markedly in Cicero. It was based upon the thorough scepticism of the New Academy, and largely moulded by the liberal Stoicism of the Peripatetic morality; but is best described as *Eclectic*, for it scorned consistency in matters so high and ambiguous, and picked out single doctrines here and there from all systems alike, in accordance with their practical usefulness. All the great problems had been worn threadbare, in Cicero's time, by reiterated controversy, and are left by him in a haze of contrasted probabilities, and inconclusive dialogue; and this wholly Roman indifference to absolute truth in such matters extends even into his moral and political theories.

Cicero's philosophical essays, however, were meant far less to satisfy questionings of his own than to popularise the broad lines of Greek thought among his countrymen, to make the conclusions of philosophy harmonise to some degree with common sense, and to coin—if only for rhetorical purposes—a terminology and a diction, in which Greek commonplaces could be brought home to a Latin audience in the assembly or the courts. And this indeed is his greatest gift to the world: the complete and purely Latin vocabulary, in which not only Roman lawyers and moralists of Imperial times, but Christian thinkers like Augustine, and through their means the philosophic schools of the modern world, have thought, and read, and written, was created for them by Cicero almost single-handed, and tempered by him to a nicety of discrimination which only its Greek prototype surpasses.

**Cicero's
gift to the
world.**

It is in oratory alone, as we have seen, that Roman literature can fairly claim to be original; and it is to the rhetorical bent of the language that the Latin prose-style of the Republic owes its characteristic excellences. When we turn, however, from prose to poetry, the exotic character of the latter strikes us at once; and also—in contrast with the continuous development of the prose-style—the ephemeral vogue of each successive phase of imitation. Many Roman poets might claim, and rightly, to have been the first to introduce this or that mode of verse-making to their Italian public; but it was rarely that more than one excelled in the same style, or handed on a tradition to a successor, and not one of them succeeded in founding a school. So dependent indeed was Roman poetry upon foreign—that is to say, Hellenic—inspiration at every stage, that it is necessary, in order to explain its successive phenomena, to recapitulate briefly the sequence of events in the literary world of the Greeks.

**Roman
Poetry is
Hellenistic
throughout.**

We have already had occasion to note the far-reaching effects which resulted from the contact of Rome with the city-states, first of Magna Graecia, and then of Greece itself, and particularly with Athens, during the Punic and Macedonian Wars; and how, after a period of almost religious imitation, the genius of the native language began to reassert itself, exercised and developed by the ordeal through which it had passed, in the works of Naevius, Lucilius, and Plautus. With the growth of intercourse with Hellenistic Asia, and with the age of the Scipios and the Gracchi, a new period opens, marked by the predominance, no longer of Athens, but of Pergamum and Rhodes, as the fountain-heads of inspiration; and the prose-style of Rome, like her architecture and much of her sculpture, remains

**Athens,
Pergamum,
and Rhodes.**

saturated with these 'Asiatic' influences to the end. But already, even before the Civil Wars began, and still more after the wreck of Asia in the Mithradatic troubles, and of Athens, after long tolerance, by Sulla, a third and more turbid stream of, as it were, 'African' Hellenism began to flow Rome-wards from the Nile.

In Egypt alone did the circumstances of the country, and the ever-present contact with a monarchic and immemorial civilisation, inspire the successors of Alexandria with the policy of making their new capital the focus not merely of administration and industry, but of science and literature as well: and Alexandria sprang rapidly into an unique position in the Mediterranean world, as a centre of learning and research. For this, the splendid library became almost a first charge upon the revenues of the country; for this, manuscripts were begged, borrowed, and stolen, and the records of ancient Egypt and the Jewish scriptures were translated or summarised in Greek by royal commissioners; for this, Aristarchus and his colleagues revised the text of Homer and the great Greek classics, and Euclides, Archimedes, and Eratosthenes laid the foundations of mathematics and natural science; for this, in a word, the court became a university, and the university a royal court. The result was a Hellenism which, in transcending the limits of the city-state, had likewise burst the bonds of Attic classicism—the first rift within the lute we may detect already in Euripides—which, while it lost for ever the perfect form and lucidity of European Hellenism, gained almost as much in width and depth and flexibility; became cosmopolitan instead of parochial; and, while it held at bay the dark superstitions and the obscure magic of its foster-land, spread a more genial and liberal *humanitas* over the West; clothed it in forms less inimitable, and therefore easier to practise and acquire; and thus met Rome half-way in her programme of an united Mediterranean.

But while in thought and culture the influence of Alexandria was mainly for good, in literature the overwhelming mass of material which accumulated in the great library, the inevitable predominance of critical over constructive genius among the professors, and the hot-house artificiality of the corrupt Ptolemaic court, combined to crush freedom and originality of thought out of existence, and to set up a false standard of scholarship which has profoundly hampered the subsequent development of style. Prettiness and conformity to pattern extinguished beauty and truthfulness to nature; and the desire for variety of attainment put good work in any single study at a discount.

The influence of Alexandria was potent and widespread in the Hellenic

The
Hellenism
of
Alexandria.

Its
defects.

East : both Pergamum and Rhodes had already felt its force before the Roman conquest came; and Rome, as we have seen, succeeded, in spite of all the troubles which beset her eastward march, in engaging the goodwill of the Ptolemaic monarchy, and maintaining copious and fruitful intercourse with Egypt. But Athens, Rhodes, and Pergamum lay nearer, and presented, besides, a purer type of Hellenism, and it was not until the wreck of these that Alexandria secured the **Range of its influence on Rome.** predominance which it exercised in the age of Cicero and Catullus. In style, this new period is marked by a new wave of ornate, formal, and exacting scholarship; in matter, by the cruder forms of luxury and splendour which belong to the Great East, and to Africa; and in form, by the apparition of the three literary types which Alexandria had made peculiarly its own—the didactic, the erotic, and the epigrammatic poem.

In the period of the Great Wars, the mingled oligarchic and democratic elements in the government of Rome had permitted respectively of schools of epic and of drama: the exploits of the great families furnishing the theme for the one, and popular heroes, or the **Absence of epic and drama.** familiar episodes of life, the leading characters of the other. But neither the epic of oligarchy, nor the drama—tragic or comic—of popular government, could flourish, either in a monarchy of the Ptolemaic type, or in a chaos of individualism like the period of Republican decline. Alexandrian epic either degenerated, together with the drama, into pedantic declamation, or broke up into bucolic and didactic verse: in Rome both epic and tragedy vanished before the greater drama of the Republic's Fall; while comedy fell apart between Satire and the Mime. The drama, moreover, in the form in which the Romans knew it, had lost already the close bonds with religion on the one hand, and with current political life on the other, which alone can give it either dignity or practical value. It had already become secularised and degenerate in tone, and had come to rely more upon gorgeous pageantry, sensational plots, and broad topical allusions, than upon grace of style or nobility of sentiment. And, in the end, it is an amphitheatre, not as in Greece, a theatre, which dominates the ruins of so many Roman towns.

Legitimate drama indeed was still performed, and Cicero, his brother Quintus, and even Caesar are known to have written tragedies; but these were rather exercises in high-flown style, like their **The Roman stage.** Alexandrian models, than composed with a view to performance; and both Aesopus, the freedman tragedian (122-54), and the native Latin comedian, Roscius (120-61), confined themselves, like some modern actors, to splendid revivals of plays which were already classical;

and relied for their success on tricks of voice and gesture which they could copy from Hortensius, and discuss on even terms with Cicero himself. Whether on the stage or in the library, in fact, drama had become little more than an understudy of practical rhetoric.

The Mime, meanwhile—which had begun as a comic interlude between the acts of a serious play, and was the only form of dramatic entertainment which was ever really popular in Rome—was simply

Mimes. drama with the poetry left out; a variety show of buffoonery and caricature, in which one 'star' actor bore the brunt of the piece, and not infrequently was author and manager as well. The players appeared without masks; gesture, dance, and song were liberally interspersed; and women were allowed to perform: and the result, among a degenerate, and at their best a plain-spoken people, may be better imagined than described

Yet this was not always so. Two at least among the writers of Mimes took their vocation seriously, and seem to have done something to raise

Laberius and Syrus. its tone, at all events to the level of contemporary satire. D. Laberius, a man of equestrian rank, wrote Mimes, without acting in them, from the time of Sulla to that of Caesar (106-43). The latter patronised his entertainments, but punished him for an unguarded allusion by forcing him at the age of sixty to appear on the stage himself; a degradation which the old man felt keenly,¹ and avenged upon Caesar during the performance²: though it put an end, it seems, to his literary career. His rival, to whom Caesar awarded the prize on this occasion, was an enfranchised slave from Antioch, Publius Syrus, whose Mimes, though for the most part improvised, were full of ingenious humour, and gave many terse proverbs to the language.

But indeed the populace of Rome cared little for poets or artists of any kind. It liked corn-doles, gladiators, and elephants or giraffes from oversea, with a triumph, a revolution, or a fit of anarchy and massacre, to vary the programme now and then. The rich and influential, meanwhile, who might have been the patrons and protectors of literary genius, preferred in troublous and uncertain seasons to lay out their money in ways which promised a prompter and more secure return. Lucullus had his dinner-table; Hortensius his fishponds and aviaries; Pompeius seems really to

Barrenness of the Age of Revolution.

¹ *Equus Romanus lare degressus meo
Domum revertar mimus. Nimirum hoc die
Uno plus vixi, mihi quam vivendum fuit.*
² *Necesse est multos timeat, quem multi timent. . . .
Porro, Quirites, libertatem perdimus.*

have had no aesthetic side at all ; and Caesar, till his final success, had first his early debts, and then his army, his tribunes, and the rest of his bankrupt following, as a first charge upon his income. Fertile therefore as the period of revolution was in great works of oratory, and in the advancement of history and the sciences, it was, in the main, most unfavourable to the rise of any school of poetry.

Only two poets, in fact, emerged from this transition period, and found the means, the leisure, or the protection, which made literature possible at all. Both, however, stand in the front rank of Roman literature, and both, though in very different ways, are thoroughly characteristic of their generation.

T. Lucretius Carus was born of an ancient Roman family in 95 ; lived apart from political life under the patronage of C. Memmius Gemellus—a son-in-law of Sulla, and an active and unscrupulous senatorial—and put an end to his own life in 52. He was **Lucretius.** deeply versed both in the physical science of early Greece, and in the philosophical system of Epicurus (p. 583), and his great poem *de Rerum Natura* was a sincere attempt to popularise the stern agnostic creed which alone had brought comfort to himself. Half the evils in the world, he saw, resulted from men's ignorance of its laws, and neglect of the fatal bond of cause and effect. Back to Nature, then, in whom we live and move and have our being ; and to the study of Nature's Laws, to which the terror of man-made gods, or ambition of worldly fame, or the futile study of phrases instead of things, have blinded men's eyes. It was in a nobler cause that Empedocles faced death on Etna, or Anaxagoras was expelled from superstitious Athens ; for **His** it was on their great discoveries—of the reasonableness of **philosophy.** Nature, and the harmonious interaction of its ultimate parts—that Democritus could base the first atomic theory, and therewith the conviction that all is peace with those who walk according to Nature, and so fulfil the law of their being ; while it was on the fabric reared by Democritus, that Epicurus at last—*Graiae gentis decus*—set the ethical corollary, that happiness and goodness come from right enjoyment and unstinted use of what this world has to give ; that the many warring gods of current fancy are creatures, not creators, of the world ; that the popular religion results from men's fears of what they do not understand, but that perfect knowledge must end in perfect harmony with the universe, as well as perfect happiness in the soul.

These high, if crudely stated, themes Lucretius expounds in stately epic verse ; harking back for his models, and even for his phrases, to the founders of Roman literature, Ennius and Pacuvius, and for his treat-

ment, to the didactic poetry of earlier Greece; but holding altogether aloof (just as Varro was doing in prose) from the contemporary worship of Alexandrian prettinesses; ingenious in his translation of difficult scientific problems into this unfamiliar setting; vividly felicitous in the graphic narrative passages with which he illustrates his theories or their practical consequences; majestic and impressive in his denunciations of human error, in his praises of his masters in philosophy, and in his great reverential hymns to the name of Venus, whom he figures as the source of all life and as the guiding genius of Rome.

Yet practical as was his theme, and lofty as is his treatment of it, Lucretius was little appreciated in Rome. Cicero mentions his book, but passes it by with a phrase—*multis ingenii luminibus, multae tamen artis*—; Horace, among all the Latin poets whom he cites, gives him never a word; and it was reserved for Virgil, more learned, more philosophic, and more sensible of natural beauty than the rest, to borrow copiously from his cadences and his diction, and to commend and admire—what frankly he could not imitate—his fearless insight and his ardent zeal for truth.¹

Very different in temper and performance, but closely contemporary in time, is C. Valerius Catullus. The son of a personal friend of Caesar, and born near Verona in Transpadane Gaul in 87, Catullus came early to Rome, and attached himself to the same Memmius who was the patron of Lucretius. After dissipating a considerable fortune, he accompanied his patron to a propraetorship in Bithynia, but soon returned, and passed the rest of his brief gay life in Rome, and in his country seats at Tibur and Sirmio: dying, in 54, at the early age of thirty-three. His political views may be gauged by his high esteem for Cicero—*disertissime Romuli nepotum!*—and by his abusive dislike of Caesar; but he took no part in public life. Of his poems one hundred and sixteen remain. The majority are brief lyric studies composed in Greek metres, and saturated with Greek feeling; amatory, epigrammatic, and satirical by turns. Many of the finest were inspired by a hopeless passion for one whom he calls Lesbia, who is thought to have been a notorious sister of Clodius; while the lines on his home-coming to Sirmio give a glimpse of genuine enjoyment of country life, and the two elegies on the death of his brother betray unaffected sorrow and strong personal regard. Others, like the wild dithyrambic *Attis*, the

¹ *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum
Subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari.*—Virg. *G.* ii. 490-2.

learned *Coma Berenices*, and the courtly *Nuptiæ Pelei et Thetidos* are longer and more ambitious imitations of the Alexandrian Callimachus : but all have a peculiar grace of style, a charming frankness of sentiment, and independent vigour of thought.

With the re-establishment of order after the battle of Actium begins the Augustan Age of Roman literature, and in particular the brief culmination of Roman achievement in poetry. True, nearly every member of its first rank of writers had begun to write, if not to come before the public, before the political crisis was over ; but, as we have seen already, the keynote of the new period was Imperialistic : to forget the past, to accept the present, and to find an earthly providence and an object of grateful loyalty in the man who had proved himself the master.¹ It is not surprising therefore that the men of the Augustan Age succeeded or failed in literature, as in the political world, in proportion as they welcomed the new régime, and preached the new standard of right living, which alone could ensure its stability.² The single exception is Ovid ; but his is rather a revolt against an established order by one who had been brought up within it, than a refusal to accept a new situation, such as had put an end to Cicero, and probably underlay the contempt in which Anser, Bavius, Maevius, and other irreconcilables were held by the circle of Maecenas. Oratory, indeed, had died when free debate was stifled by the Triumviral legions ;³ the study of the law became a mere learned profession when Augustus required a licence from *iuris consulti* ; and history was, for a while at least, too dangerous, because too plain-spoken, and too provocative of inquiry in the reader—*nec scire fas est omnia*. Science, as we saw in Varro's case, had never made its peace with literary style ; and only poetry, which, under the Republic, had languished in privacy, found a new scope, now that the only patron who was left had time, and even need, for the celebration of himself and his Empire. Hence, therefore, arose a new bond of union between litera-

¹ *Nanque erit ille mihi semper deus*.—Virg. *Eclogues*, i. 7. The old gods were dead ; the universal impulse was to render unto Caesar the things which were Caesar's ; and for the moment 'Caesar' seemed all in all.

² *Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt!*—Hor. *Odes*, iii. 24, 35. The frequent insistence upon the old virtues of the Republic, at first sight inconsistent, amounts in truth to this : that the Empire, like the Republic, insisted first and foremost on the submission of the individual to the common-weal. Similarly, the return to Attic models in literature is the search for a form of Hellenism which should not be also individualist.

³ *Quum divus Augustus, sicut cetera, eloquentiam pacaverat*.—Tacitus, *Dialogus*.

ture and public life—almost between literature and the public service—which was quite unprecedented since the age of the Scipios, and strengthened and popularised both Poetry and the Principate alike. Literature, in fact, left the service of party and entered the service of Augustus: by ceasing to be political, it had freedom to be patriotic, and gained the strength to be Imperial.

Another general character of the Augustan Age is the provincial, or at least non-urban, origin of its distinguished writers. The prolonged disturbances in Italy had not merely decimated the Roman aristocracy, and dispersed the city populace, but had caused the exodus of many industrious Italians into the nearer provinces, leading to a rapid and uniform Romanisation of these parts of the Empire, which had indeed begun long before, but was greatly furthered by the enfranchisement of Transpadane Gaul in 49, by the far-sighted organisation of the Transalpine conquests, and by the comparative isolation of Spain. Italy itself, however, never wholly recovered from the stress, and except Horace and Propertius—the former, moreover, *libertino patre natus*—produced no great writer of its own, till it received, long afterwards, a new non-Italian strain of inhabitants. In Rome, too, only Tibullus and Ovid claimed even equestrian rank; but the one, by his complete abstinence from public life, falls out of comparison with the rest; the other by his retirement from it, and his intentionally non-Augustan attitude belongs, as we have seen, almost to post-Augustan literature. The example of Catullus, meanwhile, had shown what a reserve of genius lay latent in Cisalpine Gaul; and Varius and Bibaculus, as well as Virgil and Livy, traced their origin beyond the Apennines, to Padua, Mantua, and Cremona. Further afield again, P. Varro Atacinus from Narbonese Gaul, and Annaeus Seneca and Lucan from Corduba in Spain, are the first-fruits of a wider sowing, in which the provinces were to repay in some measure the debt of culture which they owed to Rome. These provincial writers, in fact, naturally looked to Rome as the fountain-head of their own civilisation, just as the older writers of Rome had looked to Greece; and in this way, also, Augustan literature acquired a national and patriotic tone which is absent from the literature of the Republic.

Between Rome and Hellenism, moreover, an important change had been wrought by the outcome of the last civil war. The alliance of Antonius and Cleopatra¹ had opened the eyes of the world to the perils of Alexandrian culture: Hellenism itself seemed in danger of submergence in the grosser flood of Oriental pomp which

(c) New models.

¹ *Quidlibet impotens sperare, fortunaque dulci ebria.*—Hor. *Odes*, i. 37.

converged from Egypt, from Antioch, and from the new empire of Parthia: thoughtful men began to hark back to purer and older sources of Hellenic inspiration; and meanwhile both the revival of Athens as an university town—which was already beginning in Cicero's time, and is conspicuous in the year of Philippi (p. 532)—and the encouragement given by both Caesar and Augustus to the formation of great public libraries in Rome itself, made the masterpieces of older Greece more easily accessible in the West than they had ever been before. The result was a new fashion of literary imitation—since original, at any price, the Roman writers would not be—so that where Lucretius and Cicero had followed Aratus, and Catullus had copied Callimachus, Virgil went back to Homer and Hesiod, Horace to the lyric schools of early Lesbos and Ionia, Varius and Ovid (in his *Medea*) to the Attic tragedians of the fifth century, and Messala to the orators of the fourth. The new models, moreover, were more difficult to imitate, in proportion as they were higher in themselves: poetry ceased to be the recreation of an idle hour, and became a serious and laborious profession; and originality meant, in part at least, the discovery, by research among the treasures of the past, of a single new manner of style, and the lifelong study, by a specialist, of its possibilities in Latin speech.¹ The result was a revival not merely of purer forms of style, but of nobler flights of thought, than the West had seen hitherto; the best minds of Greece could work now at first-hand upon the best minds of a new and unspoiled Rome; and with new motives, new brains, and new models, a great national style became possible at last.²

Augustus himself had little skill or facility in writing: he had been but a youth when he was called to his great heritage, and his weak health had left him little strength beyond what his gigantic task demanded. But he was peculiarly fortunate in his personal friends; and while Vipsanius Agrippa stood ever at his right hand in matters of provincial administration, the judicious and courtly **Maccenas** was entrusted with the management of Rome and Italy, and with the delicate task of conciliating the best of the rising generation to the new order of things. It was at his suggestion, too, that Augustus ignored the rare explosions of Republican regret, and allowed, throughout

¹ *Mediocribus esse poetis*

Non homines, non di, non concessere columnae.—Horace, *A. P.*, 373-4.

² Again, the exceptions are instructive. Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid, more deeply sunk in Alexandrian artificialities, are at the same time less typical and less influential.

his rule, the fullest liberty of utterance to the literary men ; and it was probably not by chance that the worst excesses of Ovid were postponed until Maecenas was dead. Luxurious, unambitious, and personally indolent though he was, his great wealth, his liberal use of it, and his wide literary sympathies made his palace on the Esquiline the centre of a large circle of friends and clients, all men of talent and facility of style, on whom he could count to requite his favour and assistance by cordially recommending the policy of his chief.

Other distinguished men took up the same friendly view of literature. C. Asinius Pollio, a supporter first of Julius Caesar, and then of the Triumvirate, who had withdrawn from politics in 39, survived in constant literary activity till B.C. 4. His own speeches and tragedies, as well as his history of the Civil War, have perished ; but his name is memorable for his kindly patronage of Virgil and Horace,¹ for the severe standard of scholarship which enabled him to criticise the Latinity of Cicero and Livy, and for the enlightened liberality which created the first public library in Rome.

In the same way, M. Valerius Messala Corvinus,—who as a student in Athens had joined Cassius in 44, but went over first to Antonius, and then to his rival, as the trend of events grew clearer,—retired in 27, like Pollio, after a distinguished career, and devoted his ample fortune, and nearly thirty years of leisure, to historical, literary, and grammatical studies ; appearing, however, still occasionally in the courts, and adding example to precept by his translation of the speeches of Hyperides ; but perhaps best remembered as the personal friend of Tibullus, and the early patron of Ovid.

It was, however, mainly in the circle of Maecenas that the Augustan literature took shape. Intermediate between old and new, in thought and diction, stands its earliest member, L. Varius Rufus, a Cisalpine poet, who had already made his reputation, when Horace was writing his earlier 'Satires,' by an epic poem, *de Morte Caesaris*.² All that we know of this work shows us a phase of art intermediate between Lucretius and Virgil ; and the same is the case with his later *Panegyric* of Augustus. The rapid rise of Virgil to popularity eclipsed his fame, and turned him from epic to tragedy ; and his lost *Thyestes* seems, in spite of rhetorical leanings, to have done something to recall Roman literary taste to the study of the great Attic dramatists. His chief claim to remembrance, however, is that, as the confidant of Maecenas, he was the means of introducing both Virgil and Horace to his notice ;

¹ See *Eclogues*, iii. iv. viii., and *Odes*, ii. 1.

² *Forte epos acer, ut nemo, Varius scribit.*—Hor. *Sat.* i. 10, 51.

and that, as literary executor of Virgil, he saved from destruction the unfinished 'Æneid,' and recorded many details of the life of its author.

The talent of Maecenas and of his master for turning to account the materials which came under their hand is well illustrated by the career of Virgil, in many ways the most characteristic, and certainly the most permanently influential of the Augustan poets. P. Virgilius Maro was born in 70, near Mantua, and consequently only received Roman citizenship by the Caesar's enfranchisement of the Transpadanes of 49. His health was always weak, and confirmed his natural inclination to studious retirement, while his youthful introduction to the doctrines of Epicurus almost determined him to desert literature for philosophy. In the Triumviral appropriations of land, which followed the campaign of Philippi, his Mantuan estate was taken from him, and he was forced to take refuge with his old friend and tutor, Siro; but his early experiments in pastoral and Catullian verse had attracted the attention of Pollio, who had been *legatus* in Cisalpine Gaul in 43; and with his help, and that of Maecenas and Cornelius Gallus, he was reinstated in his farm. He accompanied Maecenas, however, on his 'journey to Brundisium' in 37, and spent much of his later life in the neighbourhood of Naples. In 20 he followed Augustus on his Asiatic journey, to revise the local colour of his 'Æneid'; but, falling ill, he returned, only to die at Brundisium in the following year, at the early age of fifty-one. His tomb was long shown between Naples and Puteoli.

The sequence of his works is instructive. In the *Catalepta*, a few short juvenile poems, there is already marked ease of diction, versatility in imitation, especially of his compatriot Catullus, and some power of playful parody. In the *Eclogues*, published in 37, in the midst of the Triumviral crisis, we have the same natural flow of graceful, strongly Hellenistic versification, this time in the manner of Theocritus, and skilful adaptation of Alexandrian models to Italian topics, and the same unspoiled delight in Cisalpine country life; but also a greater depth of feeling, which begins to recall Lucretius, and already, in the poem on the Consulship of Pollio (in 40), the courtly and again mainly Alexandrian eulogy, and the mystical, almost Hebraic forecasts of a peaceful Golden Age in the near future, which so puzzled mediæval Christianity, and made of Virgil the great Pagan Prophet.

Maecenas was not slow to turn gifts like these to account. The urgent need in Italy, after two generations of turmoil, was to create a

healthy public estimation of country life; and though the poet complains of the *haud mollia iussa* of his patron, the battle of Actium had hardly been fought when the *Georgics* were ready for publication. Their practical themes—the raising of crops, of vines and olives, and of herds, and the management of bees—caught Roman public taste at once: the praise of country life was congenial to the poet's temper, and the exposition of technical details gave full scope to his wide antiquarian learning and to his even maturer and more flexible diction. The didactic poetry of Alexandria supplied copious models,¹ the works of Hesiod a purer stream of early Greek inspiration, and the poem of Lucretius, little known indeed except to Virgil, had *gravitas* and also Latinity enough, to correct his inclination to Hellenise outright.

The 'Georgics' became widely popular at once, and Augustus, in his turn, commissioned a yet loftier enterprise; nothing less than to justify Roman domination over the world, and the Julian Principate in Rome, as the fulfilment of a Divine command, and almost of a natural law. Virgil, like Varius, appears to have attempted a historical poem before the publication of the *Eclogues*, but had given it up in despair.² He now returned to the task, and the result was the epic *Æneid*, which traces the fortunes of Æneas and of his son Iulus, the mythical ancestor of the Julii, from the sack of Troy to the successful occupation of Latium. Here too the model is primarily Alexandrine—the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius—with its copious learning, its composite plot, and its failure to give life and personality to its character: but here too, as in the *Georgics*, the poet returns again and again to purer and earlier sources of inspiration; to the *Odyssey* for Æneas' wanderings in the first six books, and to the *Iliad* for the scenes of combat, and for the funeral games of Anchises.

The *Æneid*, however, as we have it, is incomplete. Broken lines, imperfect versification, roughness of phrase, and inconsistencies of matter are frequent: the last book ends abruptly with the death of Turnus, and the final settlement of Latium is not reached at all: and the great Carthaginian episode of Book iv., which is the mythical prelude to the Punic Wars, is left so wholly without sequel, as to raise the question whether the poet did not indeed intend, as has been said, 'a poetical counterpart to Livy.' Virgil himself, indeed, shy and diffident as ever,

¹ His personal friend and neighbour, moreover, Æmilius Macer of Verona (who died about B.C. 16) was engaged about this time on a zoological poem, imitated from the *Theriaca* of Nicander.

² *Cum canerem reges et proelia.*—*Eclogues*, vi. 3.

ordered the *Æneid* to be destroyed, when he found that he could not finish it: and its preservation is due to his executors, Varius and Plotius Tucca. Long expected, and highly appreciated by the friends who watched it in the making,¹ it became, like the *Georgics*, a classic at once, and a school-book before the death of Augustus.

The career of Horace, in its broad outlines, is the counterpart of that of Virgil. Born at Venusia, *libertino patre*, in 65, Q. Horatius Flaccus was put to school early in Rome, and read Greek and also early Latin poets under a retired soldier named Orbilius, whose rough-and-ready discipline has passed into a byword. At eighteen he went on to Athens, where he studied Epicurean and Academic philosophy, met Messala and the young son of Cicero, and volunteered, in 43, for service under M. Brutus (p. 533). At Philippi he served as Military Tribune, and ran away among the rest, *relicta non bene parmula*, to find himself penniless in Rome, his father's estate having disappeared in the troubles. He secured, however, a clerkship in the treasury, and wrote occasional verses, which barely kept him alive; till his friendship with Varius and Virgil led to his introduction to Maecenas in 38, who took him, as a personal friend already, to Brundisium in the following year. Later on he became known to Agrippa and Pollio, and eventually to Augustus; but it was long before his Republican feelings would allow him to profit by their patronage. Maecenas, indeed, had hesitated long before offering him his friendship; when Augustus offered him the post of private secretary, he refused it abruptly; and it was not till after the final settlement of 28 that he could bring himself to write eulogy of the Principate. The rest of his life was passed in Rome, at a small cottage at Tibur, and on a farm in the Sabine country which Maecenas gave to him in 32. He died within a month of his patron, in B.C. 8.

His literary development, too, recalls that of Virgil, in the gradual adaptation of his talent to imperial ends. In the years of his poverty, *ieiunis dentibus acer*, he had made his mark by *Saturae* or topical verses somewhat in the manner of Lucilius (p. 279); plain-spoken, witty, and critical, and—in spite of Philippi—not wholly reconciled to the new régime. This style of composition, fluent, rather formless, as it was, he resumed from time to time in later years also.² The *Epistolae*, of which a first collection appeared in 21, and a

¹ E.g. Propertius writes (2. 34. 66.) in the year 26: *Cedite Romani scriptores, cedite Graii: Nescio quid maius nascitur Iliade.*

² *Nisi quod pede certo
Differt sermoni, sermo merus.—Sat. i. 4.*

second, at the suggestion of Augustus, in 10, are little more than metrical conversations (*sermones*) like the *Saturæ* themselves. But the worldly wisdom is mellowed by wider experience; the crude Epicureanism is gone; the diction, though far less colloquial, is still quite uncontaminated by the rhetoric which was so rapidly invading both poetry and prose; and the versification is smoother and more melodious than of old. The *Ars Poetica* in particular, which belongs to the later series of 'Epistles,' amplifies the literary criticisms which appear in some of the Satires into just such a review of earlier Latin poetry as Cicero's *Brutus* gives of the history of Latin prose: but the critical ear of Horace leads him to protest strongly against the growing antiquarianism which preferred the rude and pompous jargon of the earlier Latinists, like Naevius and Lucilius, to the polished and reformed Alexandrianism of the Augustan Age: even Calvus and Catullus are mentioned rarely and slightly, and Lucretius, in spite of his Epicurean theme, not at all; and the repeated jests at Ennius contain at least an implied reflection on the archaisms of Maecenas and Virgil. In vain, however; it was Virgil, not Horace, who set the fashion to the generation which followed.

Horace himself meanwhile is quite frank in his admission that the Satires and Epistles are not really poetry. Even before his introduction at court, however, he had made experiments—of Odes. which the *Epodæ* survive—in the adaptation of Greek lyric metres to Roman occasional poetry; and had displayed an early gift, not only for neatness of phrase and vigour in personal attack, but also for courtly exhortation, and high patriotic eloquence. The political settlement of 25, which established a Principate without disestablishing the Senate, seems to have reconciled him to the new order of things, while the downfall of Antonius and the prompt pacification of the frontiers impressed his imagination: and in the years which followed he set himself not merely to perfect and expand his treatment of Greek metres, in complimentary verses to his friends and patrons, but to celebrate, like his close friend Virgil, that Golden Age, which seemed to be returning, in semi-public Odes, addressed more or less directly to the Princes. Brilliant, however, and versatile as Horace was, his genius inclined rather to short topical poems which had their momentary use and then fell on one side—the longest even of the Epodes contains barely one hundred lines; and it was not till 24 or 23 that he ventured to republish collectively three 'Books' of such *Carmina*, which, while they show some faint traces of intentional arrangement in their present order, were certainly composed for the most part—like the published letters of Cicero—without any such object in view. Even the *Carmen Saeculare*, which

was written at the invitation of Augustus for performance at the Festival of the year 17, is no longer than the longest of the earlier *Carmina*. But a fourth Book of Odes published (again at the suggestion of Augustus) in 14 exhibits more formal and elaborate composition, and a more definite plan, in which the separate poems, if read consecutively, support and reinforce one another.

As Virgil's purer taste had led him back beyond the Alexandrine epic and didactic to the fountain-head of Homer and Hesiod, so Horace also claims as his distinctive merit that he introduced and popularised the style of the early lyric masterpieces, and particularly the metres and the manner of Archilochus, Alcaeus, and Sappho.¹ The boast is not wholly true. Catullus, and his minor contemporaries had written already 'alcaics' and 'sapphics' in Latin; just as they had practised already that 'elegiac' metre which Horace never attempted. What Horace did, on the other hand, was to select, combine,² and transfigure into conformity with the spoken language of Rome, a wide range of metres and styles which his predecessors, while they practised them with facility, had mainly failed to naturalise. So far as really Roman lyric was possible, Horace created it; but the labour involved was too great,³ and the delicacy of touch too rare,⁴ for the seed thus sown to grow: the rhetoric and the conscious artificiality of the elegiac couplet outlasted the concealed intensity of Horatian lyric; and the Odes, alone of Roman poetry, have never found an imitator.

To the same far-sighted policy as inspired the *Aeneid* and the later Odes, we owe, in prose, a great imperial history. T. Livius Patavinus was born in Caesar's consulship in Cisalpine Gaul; but moved early to Rome, and spent most of his long life there, dying, however, at his birthplace (Padua) in A.D. 17. His natural bent was in the direction of oratory; but for success in this he was born too late, and it was through the fortunate accident that both Messala and Pollio were too deeply committed in the last Civil War to be encouraged to write history on a great scale, that the choice of Augustus fell upon the

¹ *Parios ego primus iambos*
Ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus
Archilochi.—Hor. *Ep.* i. 19, 23-5.

² *Apis Matinae*
More moloque
Grata carpentis thyma per laborem
Plurimum.—Hor. *Odes*, 4. 2. 27.

³ *Operosa parvus carmina fingo.*—Hor. *Odes*, 4. 2. 31.

⁴ *Horatii curiosa felicitas.*—Petr. 118. 5.

young pleader, with the commission to create an official History of Rome. Begun not later than 25, drawn up on the model of the ancient *Annales*, and following, almost without exception, the chronological sequence of events, it is designed, first and foremost, to present the resistless march of Roman conquest, from the Foundation of the City to the defeat of Varus and the death of Drusus in A.D. 9, which set limits to the frontier-schemes of Augustus. Of the total number of its one hundred and forty-two books, only thirty-five are preserved.¹ The language throughout is simple and clear, though the critical Pollio detected *Patavinitas* here and there. The style, too, is finished and dignified, graphic in description of great scenes and in portraiture of character, and animated with a wealth of imaginative colour and patriotic feeling which established the work at once as the authoritative version of Roman History.

From the scientific point of view the work of Livy is, of course, anything but final. He quotes and compares his numerous predecessors with industry and good taste, rejecting obvious exaggerations, and selecting in each instance what appeared the more reasonable version; but his verdict on the trustworthiness of each author varies from page to page; and he seems to have refrained, as of set purpose, from independent inquiry outside the books before him. Inscriptions and contemporary documents—even such as confronted him daily in the Forum—are simply ignored; and the great works of Cato and Varro do not seem to have come under his eye. His knowledge of law and public business, and still more of military and geographical matters, is sadly defective; and in political life he seems to have confounded the stern persistent plebeians of the days of the 'Struggle of the Orders' with the later *faex Romuli*, the worthless city-populace of his own early years. Of the more recent political history, however, he was thought to have written with insight and impartiality; so much so that Augustus is said to have called him, in jest, a 'Pompeian.' It is, however, as a patriotic monument, and an unsurpassed rhetorical panegyric that his work is to be judged; for the dissection of myth and legend, and for the demonstration of cause and effect, the world had to wait for a Niebuhr and a Mommsen; but as a picture of the lifetime of a great people, and of the triumph of labour and faith in an age-long cause, the history of Livy has never been surpassed.

Side by side with the culmination of epic and didactic poetry in the hands of Virgil, and of a Roman lyric in those of Horace, elegiac verse,

¹ Namely i.-x. with the Prologue (down to the Conquest of Samnium in 241), and xxi.-xlv. (the Hannibalic War, and the Eastern Wars down to 167).

inherited, like the rest, as we have seen, from Alexandria, was undergoing similar but more far-reaching changes. First used in Rome, as in early Greece, for brief epigrams and inscriptions, and long applied, as in Alexandria, only to brief and highly artificial compositions, the elegiac couplet was taken over by Catullus and his contemporaries, almost unaltered; the sense still running on from couplet to couplet, as it does from stanza to stanza in Horatian lyric. The peculiarly Roman modification begins with the custom, introduced apparently by Tibullus, of treating each couplet separately, and advancing the thought by short and separate stages: and culminates in the subtle artificiality of Ovid, each of whose couplets, while it carries forward the sense of a long declamation or narrative, is an epigram complete in itself. Less popular, and less capable of vigour and sustained elegance, elegiac verse seems never to have been enlisted fully in the imperial service; and its predominance in the latter part of the Augustan Age foreshadows the breach between literature and the Principate which comes in the next generation.

The life-history of the three chief elegiac poets will illustrate this characteristic of their style. Albius Tibullus was born about the same time as Horace, and died in the same year as Virgil. Though of equestrian status, he had lost most of his wealth in the proscriptions, and owed much to the friendship of Messala, with whom he visited Aquitania in 31, and started for the East in 30; though he fell ill at Corcyra, and was forced to return to Rome. Of the poems which are attributed to him—though not all are his for certain—the majority are love-poems of moderate length, and of a gentle sweetness and melancholy,¹ which raises them out of all comparison with their Alexandrian prototypes. Others are idyllic sketches of country life, which reveal no less the affectionate and open nature of the poet, and his remoteness from the public life of his time. For alone of the Augustan poets neither Tibullus Augustus nor Maecenas had any work to do.

Comparable in many ways with Tibullus, but of greater vigour and learning, and of less choice and chastened taste, is Sextus Aurelius Propertius. Born in Umbria a little before 50, he began to write verses young; but lost his estate in the confiscations of 41, and attached himself to Maecenas, who tried, but in vain, to rouse him to imperial themes. His verses, like those of Tibullus, are addressed to a half-imaginary mistress; they have fire and passion enough at times, but it is cramped by his close adherence to the affectations of Calli-

¹ *Neu miserabiles decantes elegos*, says Horace (*Od.* 1. 33. 8).

machus,¹ and overloaded with a pedantic display of erudition which explains his exaggerated admiration of Virgil's *Æneid* (p. 597 n^o). In his treatment of the couplet he follows and outruns Tibullus, but he betrays already that instinct for imitation, and even for frank plagiarism of contemporary lines, which becomes so marked in Ovid, and leads in the next generation to a regular school of merely imitative writing.

Latest of all the Augustan poets, and marking already the transition to post-Augustan literature, comes P. Ovidius Naso. Born, like Tibullus, of an equestrian family, at Sulmo, as late as 43, he alone of the Augustan writers escaped the stress of the last Civil War, and grew up wholly under the Principate. A distinguished 'equestrian career' lay ready to his hand, but after brief experiences of the bar, of rhetoric, and of travel, and a few years' tenure of minor offices in Rome, he withdrew from public life, and gave himself up to verse and dissipation. His first pieces, the *Amores*, published in 13, were conceived in the style of Tibullus—whose patron, Messala, gave him the benefit of his criticism—but were executed with a brilliance of finish, and an undisguised levity of tone which gained immediate popularity. The *Heroides*, which followed, make a new departure in literature, frankly modernising the love-tales of Greek legend, with a strange mixture of rhetoric and romance, with even less reserve than in the *Amores*, and with no pretence at all either of reverence or morality. Then, emboldened by this second success and by the death of Maecenas in B.C. 8, he threw all caution to the winds, and compiled a handbook of dissipation, the *Ars Amatoria* of B.C. 3, which threatened to undo all the laborious results of the social reforms of the Principate; and the breakdown of Augustus' own daughter Julia was but a flagrant instance of what was going on every day. Still no punishment befell; the poet took warning and turned to tragedy; and the lost *Medea* was in antiquity the most famous of his works. He made also, after the death of Messala, a bid for imperial favour by a metrical version of the Roman calendar, the learned and elegant *Fasti*; and by the eulogy of Julius Caesar which concludes the *Metamorphoses*. But there was no sincerity in the change; he himself laughs at the idea of his conversion to serious poetry, and the rest of the *Metamorphoses* retold, like the *Heroides*, the intrigues of gods and heroes, with all the wealth of imagination and learned splendour of ornament which his maturer genius could supply. But the patience of Augustus was exhausted. Suddenly, in 7 A.D., when the *Metamorphoses* were just published, and the *Fasti* barely half done, the poet was ordered to leave Rome and take up his abode at Tomi, a half-frozen, half-barbarous town

¹ It was his pride, as he says, *Italia per Graios orgia ferre choros* (3. 1. 4.).

near the mouth of the Danube. There was no trial, no defence, and even no definite charge; for the *Ars Amatoria*, though it richly deserved such punishment, had been published unproved nearly ten years before. Ovid himself hints at a more personal offence; and it is probable that the misconduct of the younger Julia (p. 567) was in some way laid at his door. To such a poet the sentence meant intellectual death. The *Fasti* remained a fragment; and the *Tristia*, the *Epistolæ*, and the rest of the products of his exile, while they retain the technical finish, have lost the force and brilliance of his earlier work. Flattery and piteous entreaty for ten long years fell on deaf ears in Rome: Tiberius was no more inclined than Augustus to reprove so hardened an offender; and in 17 A.D. Ovid died at Tomi.

His career and fate mark well the changes which were coming over Roman literature. Long years of study and a genius for adaptation had produced at least a style which could hold its own with those of Alexandria; could handle like them the old themes of mythology and social life on new and quite modern lines; and could bid defiance alike to popular taste and to imperial favour. The learned reverence of Virgil, and the subtle allusiveness of Propertius, gave place to the frank familiarity of Ovid; whose gods, like those of Euripides, are made in the likeness of men and are presented no longer as incarnations of the great powers of the world, but as masterpieces of fortunate depravity. Mythology, in fact, had no sooner ceased to veil the working of nature, than it became a storehouse of licentious extravagances; imitation had ceased to be the compliment paid to the genius of a friend, and was becoming the tasteless freak of a versified rhetoric¹; originality had degenerated into mere inventiveness; and poetry, divorced from the service of religion, of country, and of honourable emotion, had fallen to be the mouthpiece of fashionable and deliberate vice.

The novelties, and unfortunately also the excesses, of the great Augustan poets found numerous imitators. Sabinus wrote answering letters in reply to the *Heroides*; Rabirius—*magni oris*—an epic on Caesar's Alexandrian War, which caught the favour of his contemporaries, and was compared by them with the *Æneid*; Macer popularised in epic form the rest of the Trojan Cycle outside the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; Gratius wrote didactic *Cynegetica* in close imitation of the *Georgics*; and M. Manilius, with a peculiarly obscure and uncouth style, and very imperfect knowledge of the subject, produced a long metrical treatise on Astronomy; which points onwards,

¹ *O imitatores! servum pecus! ut mihi saepe*

Bilem, saepe iocum, vestri movere tumultus.—Hor. *Ep.* i. 19. 19-20.

in its remote unpractical theme, and its inclination to Stoic rather than to Epicurean views, to the succeeding age, when patriotism, which the liberal patronage of Augustus had stimulated to new and wholesome enthusiasm, passed easily first into abject flattery, and then into belated and fruitless opposition to the soulless pedantry of Tiberius ; when even literary distinction was beginning to be an object of suspicion ; and when resignation instead of citizenship was the cardinal human virtue.

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