


GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents



(1) Box no. 3301

(2) Folder title/number: (20)
Safeguarding Military Information

(3) Date: Jan. 1952, Feb. 1952

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
020	e

(5) Item description and comment:

(6) Reproduction: Yes No

(7) Film no. _____ Sheet no. _____

LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 380.01SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1	CHS	7 Jan 52	Asst C/S	Military Security.
2	CHS	7 Jan 52	President, GHQ DDB	Designation of Officer Responsible for Regrading of Documents.
3	G-3-0	8 Jan 52	Hq & Sv Comd	Defense Against Airborne Operations.
4	CHS	16 Jan 52	Govt. Sec.	Far Eastern Commission Documents.
5	STAFCOM	1 Jan 52	CHS	Security Information.
6	G-2	25 Jan 52	Chfs of Staff	Transmission Security Violation.
7	CHS	12 Feb 52	G-2	Security Officer.

Maj. Beard 26-7136

Security Officer

GHS

G-2
Attn: Chief, Security Division

12 Feb 1952

In compliance with paragraph 3, G-2 checknote, "Security Inspections," the following officer is designated as Security Officer for the Civil Historical Section:

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u>	
	<u>OFFICE</u>	<u>RESIDENCE</u>
J B BEARD, Major	26-7136	06-3837

-----N. C. C.-----



(7)

CHS - GHQ - SGP

ROUTING SLIP

Date JAN 28 1952

M/C Log No. 11

To	Initial	For
Chief	2 ✓	Action
Special Assistant		Comment/Concur
Exec. Off.	1 X	Note-Return
Admin.	3 #2	Dispatch
Personnel		Info
Library Div.		File
Spec. Proj. Br.		Initials
Pol-Soc. Aff. Div.		Signature
Economic Div.		Suspense Slip

Remarks:

Save

(Adm. #2 - Revised 22 May 50)

*Restricted
Security Information*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Maj T. M. Sherman Jr
Tel: 81-5486

File No: _____ Subject: Transmission Security Violation

Note From: G2 To: Chiefs of Staff Sections Date: 25 January 1952
No. SCAP, FEC, and UNC

1. On 3 January 1952 monitoring operations were begun on the telephone trunk circuits between Japan and Korea. As of 17 January 1952, forty three (43) hours of conversation had been recorded. Analysis of the transcribed conversations reveals that a substantial amount of classified information can be derived from the transmissions as a whole, although serious security breaches are comparatively rare.
2. Chatter, or unofficial conversation is the most frequent violation of transmission security. To date twenty three (23) percent of all transmissions have fallen into this category.
3. Other malpractices noted include:
 - a. Use of profanity.
 - b. Identification of individuals, units and unit locations.
 - c. Linkage of code names with their meanings.
 - d. Discussion of critical supply shortages and supply movements.
 - e. Transmission of information on flight schedules, destinations, and passengers; battle casualties; weather; radio frequencies, and tactical operations.
4. None of the telephone trunk circuits between Japan and Korea is approved for the transmission of classified information in the clear. All conversations transmitted over them are vulnerable to interception. Approximately ten (10) percent of the circuits employ radio links.
5. None of the classified information found in the conversation monitored to date has been of such a nature as to require transmission

*Restricted
Security Information*

Restricted Security Information
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Maj T.M. Shorman Jr
Tel: 81-5486

File No: Subject: Transmission Security Violation

Note From: C2 To: Chiefs of Staff Sections, 25 Jan 52
No. SCAP, FEC, and UNC

1 in the clear under the provisions of paragraph 41c(3)(b) of AR 380-5.
(Cont'd) (CG can authorize due to operational necessity).

6. The above analysis is furnished for your information with a view toward improving transmission security. Request that all users of the trunk circuit between Japan and Korea be cautioned against making these violations.

W.F.E.

-----R. F. E.-----

Restricted
- 2 -
Security Information

*Restricted
Security Information*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets) Maj T. M. Sherman Jr
Tel: 81-5486

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*Restricted
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Restricted Security Information
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FAR EAST COMMAND

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W.F.E.

-----R. F. E.-----

CHS - GHQ - SCAP

ROUTING SLIP

FEB 4 1952

Date _____
M/C Log No. 36

To	Initial	For	
Chief	2		Action
Special Assistant			Comment/Concur
Exec. Off.	1		Note-Return
Admin.	3		Dispatch
Personnel			Info
Library Div.			File
Spec. Proj. Br.			Initials
Pol-Soc. Aff. Div.			Signature
Economic Div.			Suspense Slip

Remarks:
*Jack - Where did we get
 this & why? Don't have
 b/c, unless in Lib.*

RESTRICTED
Security Information

Dir History

STAFCOM (Summary of Effective Changes, 1 Jan 52) 1 Jan 51

All holders are requested to verify that the following effective changes are posted.

[Signature]
FWM

- Page I - Original, 1 Jan 51, no change.
- (Added) Page II - Original, 1 Jan 51
European NATO Commands Subordinate to SHAPE - - - - - 21
- Page III - Original, 1 Jan 51, no change.
- (Changed) Page IV - Original, 1 Jan 51
Provisions of the Paragraph entitled "Regrading" suspended until further notice.
- Page V - Original, 1 Jan 51, no change.
- (Changed) Page VI - Original, 1 Jan 51
Army Attaches.- Concurrence of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Intelligence, GSUSA, is required on all messages addressed to Army attaches for action.
- (Changed) Page 1 - Change 6, 21 May 51
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (+6) 4SACEUR PARIS FRANCE
- (Changed) United States Liaison Officer (+6) 4USLO SHAPE PARIS FRANCE
- (Deleted) Page 1a - Change 6, 21 May 51
United States Air Force (+5) USAFDEL FOUR POWER AIR
Delegation Four Power Air CONFERENCE PARIS FRANCE
Conference
- (Added) Page 2 - Change 6, 21 May 51
Seventh Air Division (+5) 4CGAIRDIVSEVEN RUISLIP ENGLAND
- (Added footnote) 4. Subordinate to Strategic Air Command. Add CGSAC and CINCUSAFE as info addressees.
- Page 3 - Change 8, 20 October 51, no change.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

STAFCOM (Summary of Effective Changes, 1 Jan 52) 1 Jan 51

(Added) Page 4 - Change 5, 1 May 51
Commander Iceland Defense Forces (+4) COMICEDEFOR ICELAND

Page 5 - Change 5, 1 May 51, no change.

Page 6 - Change 8, 20 October 51, no change.

(Changed) Page 7 - Change 8, 20 October 51
Air Pictorial Service (0) CGAPS PHILADELPHIA PA

Page 8 - Change 8, 20 October 51, no change.

Page 9 - Change 2, 1 March 51, no change.

(Added) Page 10 - Change 8, 20 October 51
Air Attache USAIRA BRUSSELS BELGIUM

Page 11 - Original, 1 Jan 51, no change..

(Changed) Page 12 - Original, 1 Jan 51
France (+6)

(Deleted) Army Attache USAIRMA TEGUCIGALPA HONDURAS

(Deleted) Page 13 - Original, 1 Jan 51
Asterisk following Israel.

(Added) Page 14 - Original, 1 Jan 51
Air Attache USAIRA MANILA PI

(Deleted) Air Attache USAIRA BUCHAREST RUMANIA

(Added) Page 15 - Original, 1 Jan 51
Air Attache USAIRA BANGKOK THAILAND

(Deleted) Page 16 - Original, 1 Jan 51
Asterisks following Vietnam and Yugoslavia.

(Added) Page 17 - Change 4, 3 April 51
Military Assistant Advisory (+14) ¹CHIEF MAAG (FORMOSA) TAIPEI
Group Formosa FORMOSA

(Changed) Joint American Military Advisory (+5) DIR JAMAG LONDON ENGLAND
Group Europe

(Changed) Military Assistant Advisory (+6) ¹CHIEF MAAG (FRANCE) PARIS
Group France FRANCE

SECURITY INFORMATION

-2-

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Security Information

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Security Information

SECURITY INFORMATION

STAFCOM (Summary of Effective Changes, 1 Jan 52) 1 Jan 51

Page 18 - Change 4, 3 April 51, no change.

(Added) Page 19 - Change 7, 20 August 51
 U.S. Deputy Representative, Standing (0) ²US DEPREP STDG GP NATO
 Group NATO, Washington, D.C. WASHDC

(Added footnote) 2. To be used for NOFORN and other messages for the U.S. Element,
 Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(Changed) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (+6) ¹COMDT NADEFCOL PARIS FRANCE
 Defense College, Ecole Militaire
 7 Place Joffre, Paris VII, France

(Changed) Page 20 - Change 7, 20 August 51
 Financial and Economic Board (+6) ¹SECY FEB PARIS FRANCE
 Annexe Ventadour, 2 Rue Marmollier
 Paris II, France

(Changed) Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (+6) ^{1, 2}SACEUR PARIS FRANCE
 in Europe (SHAPE), Marly-le-Roi,
 France
 (APO 55, c/o Postmaster
 New York, New York)

(Changed) Page 21 - Change 7, 20 August 51
 Commander-in-Chief Allied Land (+6) ¹CINCLANDCENT FONTAINEBLEAU
 Forces Central Europe FRANCE
 Fontainebleau, France

(Changed) Flag Officer Central Europe (+6) ¹FLAGCENT FONTAINEBLEAU
 Fontainebleau, France FRANCE

(Changed) Commander-in-Chief Allied Air (+6) ¹CINCAIRCENT FONTAINEBLEAU
 Forces Central Europe, FRANCE
 Fontainebleau, France

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STAFCOM

(Change 6, 21 May 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>ALASKA.</u>		
Commander-in-Chief, Alaska	(-5)	CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB AL
United States Army, Alaska	(-5)	¹ CGUSARAL ELMENDORF AFB AL
Alaskan Air Command	(-5)	¹ CGALAIRCOM ELMENDORF AFB AL
<u>ASIA.</u>		
(See "Army, Navy and Air Force Attaches and Liaison Officers", page 10)		
<u>CARIBBEAN.</u>		
Commander-in-Chief, Caribbean	(0)	CINCARIB QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ
United States Army, Caribbean	(0)	¹ CGUSARCARIB FT AMADOR CZ
United States Army Forces Antilles	(+1)	² CGUSARFANT SAN JUAN PR
Caribbean Air Command	(0)	¹ CGCAIRC ALBROOK AFB CZ
Bermuda Base Command, Atlantic Division, Military Air Transport Service	(0)	³ COBERMUDA BASECOM KINDLEY AFB BERMUDA
<u>EUROPE.</u>		
Supreme Allied Commander Europe	(+5)	⁴ SACEUR PARIS FRANCE
United States Liaison Officer Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	(+5)	⁴ USLO SHAPE PARIS FRANCE

1. Direct communications is authorized only for messages concerning normal administration and supply.
2. Direct communication is authorized only for messages concerning GCM cases, casualty reports, AGRS and National Guard matters.
3. Add COMMATS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD as an info addressee.
4. Address NOFORN messages to USLO SHAPE, not to SACEUR either directly or indirectly by means of "PASS TO" or "FOR". "ADVISE GEN EISENHOWER", "NOTIFY US ELEMENT SHAPE", and other similar internal instructions followed by titles or names of US personnel may be included in NOFORN messages.

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STAFCOM

(Change 6, 21 May 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>EUROPE (contd).</u>		
United States Forces in Austria	(+6)	CGUSFA SALZBURG AUSTRIA
Joint American Military Advisory Group Europe	(+5)	DIR JAMAG LONDON ENGLAND
Commander-in-Chief European Command, Europe	(+6)	¹ CINCEUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY
United States Army, Europe	(+6)	¹ CGUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY
Seventh Army	(+6)	² CGARMYSEVEN VAIHINGEN GERMANY
Frankfurt Military Post	(+6)	³ CGFMP FRANKFURT GERMANY
United States Berlin Command	(+6)	CGUSCOB BERLIN GERMANY
United States Air Force Delegation Four Power Air Conference	(+5)	USAFDEL FOUR POWER AIR CONFERENCE PARIS FRANCE

1. Address messages concerning only U.S. Army troops, command policy, administration or operations to CGUSAREUR. Address messages concerning Allied policy or strategy, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, HICOG relations and intercommand activities to CINCEUR.
2. Direct Communication is not authorized. Address messages to CGUSAREUR with the internal instruction "PASS TO CGARMYSEVEN".
3. Technical messages for Allied Contact Branch and ASA will be addressed TO: CGFMP, and INFO: CGUSAREUR, with appropriate internal instructions "FOR ALLIED CONTACT BR" or "FOR ASA."

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STAFCOM

(Change 6, 21 May 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>EUROPE (contd).</u>		
Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe	(+6)	CINCUSAFE WIESBADEN GERMANY
Third Air Force	(+5)	¹ CGAFTHREE RUISLIP ENGLAND
59th Air Depot Wing	(+5)	² CG 59TH AIR DEPOT WING BURTONWOOD ENGLAND
Twelfth Air Force	(+6)	CGAFTWELVE WIESBADEN GERMANY
Seventh Air Division	(+5)	⁴ CGAIRDIVSEVEN RUISLIP ENGLAND
<u>FAR EAST.</u>		
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command	(+14)	CINCUNC TOKYO JAPAN
Supreme Commander Allied Powers	(+14)	SCAP TOKYO JAPAN
Commander-in-Chief, Far East	(+14)	CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN or ³ CINCFE (COMMAND) TOKYO JAPAN

1. Direct communication is authorized only on specific subjects for which authority has been granted by CINCUSAFE; add CINCUSAFE as an info addressee. Address other messages to CINCUSAFE and add CGAFTHREE as an info addressee.
2. Add CGAFTHREE as an info addressee.
3. CINCFE (COMMAND) is authorized only for messages of the greatest urgency concerning command decisions, operational planning, JCS and high level Army directives, and messages which require the personal attention of the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.
4. Subordinate to Strategic Air Command. Add CGSAC and CINCUSAFE as info addressees.

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STAFCOM

(Change 8, 20 October 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Eighth Army	(+14)	¹ CGARMYEIGHT KOREA
Japan Logistical Command	(+14)	¹ CGJAPLOGCOM YOKOHAMA JAPAN
Far East Air Forces	(+14)	¹ CGFEAF TOKYO JAPAN
Far East Air Materiel Command	(+14)	² CGFEAMCOM HONSHU JAPAN
Fifth Air Force	(+14)	² CGAFFIVE KOREA
Thirteenth Air Force	(+13)	² CGAFTHIRTEEN CLARK AFB PI
Twentieth Air Force	(+14)	² CGAFTWENTY KADENA AFB OKINAWA RI
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines	(+13)	³ CHIEF JUSMAGPHILIPPINES MANILA PI
Marianas-Bonins Command	(+15)	⁴ CGMARBO GUAM MI
Philippine Command (AF)	(+13)	⁴ CGPHILCOM (AF) CLARK AFB PI
Ryukyus Command	(+14)	⁴ CGRYCOM OKINAWA RI
U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea	(+14)	⁵ CHIEF KMAG KOREA

1. Direct communication is authorized only on specific subjects for which authority has been granted by CINCFE. Messages concerning routine personnel matters may be addressed to the commander concerned with INFO: CINCFE. Address other messages to CINCFE with the internal instruction "PASS TO ____".
2. Direct communication is authorized for messages concerning emergency returns, court-martial matters and monthly assignments. Address other messages to CGFEAF with the internal instruction "PASS TO ____".
3. Direct communication is authorized only for messages concerning technical, administrative and training matters. Add CINCFE as an info addressee.
4. Direct communication is authorized only on specific subjects for which authority has been granted by CINCFE. Messages concerning routine personnel matters may be addressed to the commander concerned with info CINCFE. Address other messages to CINCFE with the internal instruction "PASS TO ____".
5. Direct Communication is authorized. Add CINCFE as an info addressee on Department of the Army messages concerning military matters.

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STAFCOM

(Change 5, 1 May 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>MEDITERRANEAN.</u>		
Army Graves Registration Service Mediterranean	(+6)	COAGRSMZ ROME ITALY
Joint U.S. Military Aid Group in Greece	(+7)	¹ CHIEF JUSMAG (GREECE) ATHENS GREECE
Trieste United States Troops	(+6)	CGTRUST TRIESTE
<u>NEAR EAST.</u>		
U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie	(+8:30)	CHIEF GENMISH TEHERAN IRAN
U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army	(+8:30)	CHIEF ARMISH TEHERAN IRAN
Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey	(+7)	CHIEF JAMMAT ANKARA TURKEY
U.S. Army Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey	(+7)	CHIEF TUSAG ANKARA TURKEY
U.S. Air Force Group, American Mission for Aid to Turkey	(+7)	CHIEF TUSAFG ANKARA TURKEY
United States Engineer Group, Ankara Turkey	(+7)	CHIEF TUSENGR ANKARA TURKEY
U.S. Army Radio Station, Asmara	(+8)	COUSARRS ASMARA ERITREA
<u>NORTH ATLANTIC.</u>		
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Northeast Command	(+1:30)	CINCNE PEPPERELL AFB NFLD
Northeast Air Command	(+1:30)	CGNEACOM PEPPERELL AFB NFLD

1. Messages for service stations (Army-Navy-Air) will be addressed as above with internal instructions "FOR ARMY (Navy or Air as may be appropriate)".

RESTRICTED

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STAFCOM

(Change 5, 1 May 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Air Force and Joint Commands Overseas

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>PACIFIC.</u>		
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific	(-5)	CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR TH
United States Army, Pacific	(-5)	¹ CGUSARPAC FT SHAFTER TH
Pacific Division, Military Air Transport Service	(-5)	² COMPACIFIC DIV MATS HICKAM AFB TH
<u>SOUTH AMERICA.</u>		
United States Army Delegation, Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission	(+2)	CHIEF USARMDEL JBUSMC RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
United States Air Force Delegation, Joint Brazil- United States Military Commission	(+2)	CHIEF USAFDEL JBUSMC RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL

-
1. Direct communication is authorized only for messages concerning normal administration and supply.
 2. Add COMMATS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD as an info addressee.

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STAFCOM

(Change 8, 20, October 51)

1 Jan 51

Army Commands in the United States

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Army Antiaircraft Command	(-2)	CGARAACOM ENT AFB CCLO
Eastern Army Antiaircraft Command	(0)	CGEASTARAACOM MIDDELTOWN NY
Western Army Antiaircraft Command	(-3)	CGWESTARAACOM HAMILTON AFB SAN RAFAEL CALIF
Army Field Forces	(0)	CHIEF AFF FT MONROE VA
First Army	(0)	CGARMYONE NY NY
Second Army	(0)	CGARMYTWO FT MEADE MD
Third Army	(0)	CGARMYTHREE FT MCPHERSON GA
Fourth Army	(-1)	CGARMYFOUR FT SAM HOUSTON TEX
Fifth Army	(-1)	CGARMYFIVE CHGO ILL
Sixth Army	(-3)	CGARMYSIX SFRAN CALIF
Military District of Washington	(0)	¹ CGMDW WASHDC
Army War College Carlisle Pennsylvania	(0)	COMDT ARWC CARLISLE PA
New Orleans Port of Embarkation	(-1)	CONOPE NRLNS LA
New York Port of Embarkation	(0)	CGNYPE BKLYN NY
San Francisco Port of Embarkation	(-3)	CGSFPE FT MASON CALIF
Seattle Port of Embarkation	(-3)	CGSEPE SEATTLE WASH
Overseas Supply Division New Orleans Port Of Embarkation	(-1)	CHIEF OSD NOPE NRLNS LA
Overseas Supply Division New York Port of Embarkation	(0)	CHIEF OSD NYPE BKLYN NY
Overseas Supply Division San Francisco Port of Embarkation	(-3)	CHIEF OSD SFPE FT MASON CALIF
Overseas Supply Division Seattle Port of Embarkation	(-3)	CHIEF OSD SEPE SEATTLE WASH

1. Indicate "MDW" under distribution unless it is desired to show "CGMDW" as an addressee.

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STAFCOM

(Change 8, 20 October 51)

1 Jan 51

Air Force Commands in the United States

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Air Defense Command	(-2)	CGAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
Central Air Defense Force	(-1)	¹ CGCENTAIRDEFOR KANSAS CITY MO
Eastern Air Defense Force	(0)	¹ CGEASTAIRDEFOR STEWART AFB NY
Western Air Defense Force	(-3)	¹ CGWESTAIRDEFOR HAMILTON AFB CALIF
Air Force Finance Division	(-2)	COAFFINDIV DENVER COLO
Air Materiel Command	(0)	CGAMC WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB DAYTON OHIO
Middletown Air Materiel Area	(0)	² CGMAMA OLMSTEAD AFB MIDDLETOWN PA
Mobile Air Materiel Area	(-1)	² CGMOAMA BROOKLEY AFB ALA
Ogden Air Materiel Area	(-2)	² CGOAMA HILL AFB OGDEN UTAH
Oklahoma City Air Materiel Area	(-1)	² CGOCAMA TINKER AFB OKLAHOMA CITY OKLA
Sacramento Air Materiel Area	(-3)	² CGSAMA MCCLELLAN AFB SACRAMENTO CALIF
San Antonio Air Materiel Area	(-1)	² CGSAAMA KELLY AFB TEX
San Bernardino Air Materiel Area	(-3)	² CGSBAMA SAN BERNARDINO CALIF
Warner-Robins Air Materiel Area	(0)	² CGWRAMA ROBINS AFB GA
Air Pictorial Service	(0)	CGAPS WASHDC
Air Proving Ground	(0)	CGAPG EGLIN AFB FLA
Air Research and Development Command	(0)	CGARDC BALTIMORE MD
Long Range Proving Ground Division	(0)	CGLRPGDIV COCOA FLA
Arnold Engineering Development Center	(-1)	CGAEDC TULLAHOA TENN
Air Training Command	(-1)	CGATRC SCOTT AFB ILL

1. Add CGAIRDEFCOM as an info addressee.
2. Add CGAMC as an info addressee.

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STAFCOM

(Change 8, 20 October 1951)

1 Jan 51

Air Force Commands in the United States

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Air University	(-1)	CGAIRU MAXWELL AFB ALA
Civil Air Patrol	(0)	CGCAP BOLLING AFB WASHDC
Continental Air Command	(0)	CGCONAC MITCHEL AFB NY
First Air Force	(0)	¹ CGAFONE MITCHEL AFB NY
Fourth Air Force	(-3)	¹ CGAFFOUR HAMILTON AFB CALIF
Tenth Air Force	(-1)	¹ CGAFTEN SELFRIDGE AFB MICH
Fourteenth Air Force	(0)	¹ CGAFFOURTEEN ROBINS AFB GA
Headquarters Command United States Air Force	(0)	CGHQCOMUSAF BOLLING AFB WASHDC
Special Weapons Command	(-2)	CGSWC KIRTLAND AFB ALBUQUERQUE N MEX
Strategic Air Command	(-1)	CGSAC OFFUTT AFB OMAHA NEBR
Seventh Air Division	(+5)	³ CGAIRDIVSEVEN RUISLIP ENGLAND
Second Air Force	(-1)	CGAFTWO BARKSDALE AFB LA
Eighth Air Force	(-1)	CGAFEIGHT CARSWELL AFB FT WORTH TEX
Fifteenth Air Force	(-3)	CGAFFIFTEEN MARCH AFB CALIF
Tactical Air Command	(0)	CGTAC LANGLEY AFB VA
Ninth Air Force (Tactical)	(0)	² CGAFNINE POPE AFB NC
Eighteenth Air Force (Troop Carrier)	(0)	² CGAFEIGHTEEN DONALDSON AFB SC
United States Air Force Security Service	(-1)	CGUSAFSECSVC BROOKS AFB TEX

-
1. Add CGCONAC as an info addressee.
 2. Add CGTAC as an info addressee.
 3. Add CGSAC and CINCUSAFE as info addressees.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

STAFCOM

(Change 2, 1 March 51)

1 Jan 51

Military Air Transport Service

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Military Air Transport Service	(0)	COMMATS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD
Air Rescue Service	(0)	CO ARS WASH DC
Air Weather Service	(0)	CHIEF AWS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD
Airways & Air Communications Service	(0)	CGAACS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD
Atlantic Division	(0)	¹ COMATLANTIC DIV MATS WESTOVER AFB MASS
Bermuda Base Command	(0)	¹ COBERMUDA BASECOM KINDLEY AFB BERMUDA
Continental Division	(-1)	¹ COMCONTINENTAL DIV MATS KELLY AFB TEX
Pacific Division	(-5)	¹ COMPACIFIC DIV MATS HICKAM AFB TH
Brookley Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-1)	¹ COPAE BROOKLEY AFB ALA
Great Falls Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-2)	¹ COPAE GREAT FALLS MONT
Hamilton Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-3)	¹ COPAE HAMILTON AFB CALIF
Kelly Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-1)	¹ COPAE KELLY AFB TEX
McChord Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-3)	¹ COPAE MCCHORD AFB WASH
Moffett Naval Air Station Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-3)	¹ COM MOFFETT NAS CALIF
Travis Port of Aerial Embarkation	(-3)	¹ COPAE TRAVIS AFB CALIF
Washington National Airport Port of Aerial Embarkation	(0)	¹ COPAE WASH NATL AIRPORT WASHDC
Westover Port of Aerial Embarkation	(0)	¹ COPAE WESTOVER AFB MASS

1. Add COMMATS ANDREWS AFB CAMP SPRINGS MD as an info addressee.

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(Change 8, 20 October 51)

1 Jan 51

Army, Navy and Air Force Attaches and Liaison Officers

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>Afghanistan.</u> *	(+9)	
Army Attache		USARMA KABUL AFGHANISTAN
Air Attache		USAIRA KABUL AFGHANISTAN
<u>Argentina.</u> *	(+1)	
Army Attache		USARMA BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
Naval Attache		ALUSNA BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
Air Attache		USAIRA BUENOS AIRES ARGENTINA
<u>Australia.</u>	(+15)	
Army Attache		USARMA MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA
Naval Attache		ALUSNA MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA
Air Attache		USAIRA MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA
<u>Belgium.</u>	(+5)	
Army Attache		USARMA BRUSSELS BELGIUM
<u>Bolivia.</u> *	(+1)	
Air Attache		USAIRA LAPAZ BOLIVIA
<u>Brazil.</u>	(+2)	
Army Attache		USARMA RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
Naval Attache		ALUSNA RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
Air Attache		USAIRA RIO DE JANEIRO BRAZIL
<u>Burma.</u> *	(+11:30)	
Army Attache		USARMAT RANGOON BURMA
Air Attache		USAIRAT RANGOON BURMA
<u>Canada.</u>	(0)	
Army Attache		USARMA OTTAWA CANADA
Naval Attache		ALUSNA OTTAWA CANADA
Air Attache		USAIRA OTTAWA CANADA
<u>Ceylon.</u> *	(+10:30)	
Naval Attache		ALUSNA COLOMBO CEYLON
<u>Chile.</u> *	(+1)	
Army Attache		USARMA SANTIAGO CHILE
Naval Attache		ALUSNA SANTIAGO CHILE
Air Attache		USAIRA SANTIAGO CHILE

* Commercial Facilities (see page III)
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STAFCOM

(Change 4, 3 April 51)

1 Jan 51

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>JOINT AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP.</u>		
Joint American Military Advisory Group Europe	(+5)	DIR JAMAG LONDON ENGLAND
<u>JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP.</u>		
Joint U.S. Military Aid Group in Greece	(+7)	¹ CHIEF JUSMAG (GREECE) ATHENS GREECE
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of the Philippines	(+13)	² CHIEF JUSMAGPHILIPPINES MANILA PI
<u>MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS.</u>		
Military Assistance Advisory Group Belgium and Luxembourg	(+5)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (BELLUX) BRUSSELS BELGIUM
Military Assistance Advisory Group Denmark	(+6)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (DENMARK) COPENHAGEN DENMARK
Military Assistance Advisory Group Formosa	(+14)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (FORMOSA) TAIPEI FORMOSA
Military Assistance Advisory Group France	(+5)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (FRANCE) PARIS FRANCE
Military Assistance Advisory Group Indochina	(+12)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (INDOCHINA) SAIGON VIETNAM
Military Assistance Advisory Group Indonesia	(+12:30)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (INDONESIA) DJAKARTA INDONESIA
Military Assistance Advisory Group Iran	(+8:30)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (IRAN) TEHERAN IRAN
Military Assistance Advisory Group Italy	(+6)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (ITALY) ROME ITALY
Military Assistance Advisory Group Netherlands	(+5)	CHIEF MAAG (NETHERLANDS) THE HAGUE NETHERLANDS

1. Messages for service sections (Army-Navy-Air) within each group will be addressed as above with internal instructions "FOR ARMY (Navy or Air as may be appropriate)".
2. Direct communication is authorized only for messages concerning technical, administrative and training matters. Add CINCFE as an info addressee.

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(Change 4, 3 April 51)

1 Jan 51

Mutual Defense Assistance Program

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
<u>MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (contd).</u>		
Military Assistance Advisory Group Norway	(+6)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (NORWAY) OSLO NORWAY
Military Assistance Advisory Group Portugal	(+5)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (PORTUGAL) LISBON PORTUGAL
Military Assistance Advisory Group Thailand	(+12)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (THAILAND) BANGKOK THAILAND
Military Assistance Advisory Group United Kingdom	(+5)	¹ CHIEF MAAG (UK) LONDON ENGLAND

1. Messages for service sections (Army-Navy-Air) within each group will be addressed as above with internal instructions "FOR ARMY (Navy or Air as may be appropriate)".

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(Change 7, 20 August 51)

1 Jan 51

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
North Atlantic Council 13 Belgrave Square London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECY NAC LONDON ENGLAND
North Atlantic Council Deputies 13 Belgrave Square London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECY NACDEP LONDON ENGLAND
North Atlantic Military Committee Room 2D-858, The Pentagon Washington 25, D.C.	(0)	¹ SECY NAMILCOM WASHDC
Standing Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Room 2D-858, The Pentagon Washington 25, D.C.	(0)	¹ SECY STDG GP NATO WASH DC
London Branch, Standing Group Secretariat, NATO 15 Belgrave Square London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECLONSTAN LONDON ENGLAND
Military Standardization Agency of the Standing Group, NATO 34 - 36 Chesham Place London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECMILSTAN LONDON ENGLAND
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense College, Ecole Militaire 7 Place Joffre, Paris VII, France	(+5)	¹ COMDT NADEFCOL PARIS FRANCE
Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group Room 5D-175, The Pentagon Washington 25, D.C.	(0)	¹ SECY CUSRPG WASHDC
North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group 4803 Main Navy Bldg Washington 25, D.C.	(0)	¹ SECY NAORPG WASHDC

1. International Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should not be confused with the United States Representative thereto.

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(Change 7, 20 August 51)

1 Jan 51

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Western European Regional Planning Group, 34 Chesham Street London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECY WERFG LONDON ENGLAND
Defense Production Board 22 Belgrave Square London SW1, England	(+5)	¹ SECY DPB LONDON ENGLAND
Financial and Economic Board Annexe Ventadour, 2 Rue Marmollier Paris II, France	(+5)	¹ SECY FEB PARIS FRANCE
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), Marly-le-Roi, France (APO 55, c/o Postmaster New York, New York)	(+5)	^{1,2} SACEUR PARIS FRANCE

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1. International Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should not be confused with the United States Representative thereto.
 2. Messages for the U.S. Element of SHAPE should be addressed to USLO SHAPE PARIS FRANCE.

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(Change 7, 20 August 51)

1 Jan 51

European NATO Commands Subordinate to SHAPE

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces Central Europe Fontainebleau, France	(+5)	¹ CINCLANDCENT FONTAINEBLEAU FRANCE
Flag Officer Central Europe Fontainebleau, France	(+5)	¹ FLAGCENT FONTAINEBLEAU FRANCE
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Fontainebleau, France	(+5)	¹ CINCAIRCENT FONTAINEBLEAU FRANCE
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway	(+6)	¹ CINCNORTH OSLO NORWAY
Commander Allied Land Forces Norway, Oslo, Norway	(+6)	¹ COMLANDNORWAY OSLO NORWAY
Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark	(+6)	¹ COMLANDDENMARK COPENHAGEN DENMARK
Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway	(+6)	¹ COMNAVNORTH OSLO NORWAY
Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe, Oslo, Norway	(+6)	¹ COMAIRNORTH OSLO NORWAY
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy	(+6)	¹ CINCSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe, Verona, Italy	(+6)	¹ COMLANDSOUTH VERONA ITALY
Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy	(+6)	¹ COMNAVSOUTH NAPLES ITALY
Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy	(+6)	¹ COMAIRSOUTH NAPLES ITALY

1. International Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should not be confused with the United States Representative thereto.

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Maj. Curtis
26-6962

Far Eastern Commission Documents

Govt Sec

CHS

14 January 1952

1.

1. Listed below are the names of persons from CHS authorized to withdraw and/or examine Far Eastern Commission Documents on file in Government Section Library.

2. Request Government Section be notified by indorsement hereon of any additions or deletions to this list, giving name, signature, and highest classification authorized for each person.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
Weins, M. E., Miss	Top Secret
Zink, Jane E.	Top Secret

----- F.R. -----

From: CHS

To: Govt. Sec.

Maj. Beard 26-7136
16 January 1952

2.

Request the names of persons listed in above checknote be deleted.

----- N. C. C. -----

CHS - GHQ - SCAP

ROUTING SLIP

JAN 9 1952

Date _____
MIC Log No. 14

To	Initial	For	Action
Chief	2		Comment/Concur
Special Assistant			Note-Return
Exec. Off.	1		Dispatch
Admin.	3		Info
Personnel			File
Library Div.			Initials
Spec. Proj. Br.			Signature
Pol-Soc. Aff. Div.			Suspense Slip
Economic Div.			

Remarks:

(Adm. #2 - Revised 22 May 50)

*Restricted*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500*CVV
HIST*

AG 381 (8 Jan 52)GC-0

8 January 1952

SUBJECT: Defense Against Airborne Operations

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 301
 Commanding General, XVI Corps, APO 14
 Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, APO 343
 Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, APO 331
 Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, General
 Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500

The growing air and airborne potential of the enemy against this command should develop increased concern on the part of all commanders. It is desired that distribution be made in your command and all commanders and staff officers become familiar with attached extracts from Department of the Army pamphlet No. 20-232, "Historical Study, Airborne Operations (a German appraisal)."

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

1 Incl

John P. Maher
 JOHN P. MAHER
 Colonel, AGC
 appraiser of Airborne Operations Acting Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"D"

"X"

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is covered. This is extremely difficult, especially at night, and usually considerable time passes before some degree of clarity is possible. Therein lies the defender's greatest weakness. However, it is never advisable to delay countermeasures until this clarity has been obtained. In most cases, the situation will remain obscure until the counterattack is launched. It is all the more important, therefore, that reporting should not be neglected during the fighting; this is a matter of training and indoctrination.

e. It is a unique characteristic of airborne operations that the moments of greatest weakness of the attacker and of the defender occur simultaneously. The issue is therefore decided by three factors: who has the better nerves; who takes the initiative first; and who acts with greater determination. In this connection, the attacker always has the advantage of being free to choose the time and place of attack, and he therefore knows in advance when the moment of weakness will occur, whereas the defender must wait to find out where and when the attack will take place.

f. The attacker will always endeavor to aggravate the defender's disadvantages by deception and try to force him to split up his countermeasures. The most popular method of deception is the dropping of dummies with parachutes. In such cases an immediate attack rapidly determines whether it is a genuine landing operation or a diversion. Radio interception will also prove to be helpful at an early stage, for troops just landed must make prompt use of radio communications to establish contact with each other and with their superior commands at the jump-off base. Radio, however, cannot be used in diversionary actions. Even if dummies were equipped with radio sets functioning automatically or by remote control--which should not be an insoluble technical problem--alert and competent radio interception personnel would not be deceived for long. During the invasion in 1944, it was the signal intelligence service which was able, with comparative rapidity, to give the high command an accurate picture of the enemy's tactical grouping during the air landings. The attacker will naturally endeavor to eliminate any targets such as radar equipment and long-distance radio stations by air attacks prior to the air landings. On the other hand, such attacks can also be an advance warning for the defender.

3. Theoretically, the defender's best method of defense against air landings is the employment of air forces to attack the enemy while he is still approaching and to annihilate him or force him to turn back. In 1944-45 during the Western campaign, it was a foregone conclusion that victories were out of the question in view of the hopeless inferiority of the Luftwaffe. To repeat, mastery of the air by the attacking air force will always be the prerequisite for successful airborne operations. The attacker endeavors, by means of bombing attacks, to destroy the defender's air forces on the ground and to protect the approach flight with superior numbers of escort fighters. If the attacker is unable to accomplish this, he will of necessity abandon the idea of an airborne operation altogether. Only in exceptional cases and under particularly favorable conditions will it be possible for the defender to launch an air attack against approaching air formations with any chance of success.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

EXTRACTS FROM A GERMAN APPRAISAL
OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

* * * * *

1. The great latitude which the airborne attacker enjoys in selecting his target makes it extremely difficult for the defender to take passive defense measures against airborne operations. It is quite impossible to set up anti-air-landing obstacles throughout the country. While there is a limited use of such measures where the fronts are inactive for a long period of time no more can be done than to determine what might constitute particularly desirable targets for an airborne attack and in what specific areas air landings directed against these targets might be undertaken by the enemy. In mobile warfare the only passive measures to be applied are preparation for an all-around defense carried out by all troops, staffs, supply services, etc., behind the lines.

2. a. The prerequisite for a successful defense against enemy airborne operations is the early recognition of preparations for such operations. Frequently the signs of imminent air landings may be recognized from agents' reports and radio interception. The Germans themselves had no doubt that the invasion from the West would involve airborne operations on a large scale. On the other hand, it will nearly always remain uncertain up to the last moment, where and when these operations may take place. Changes in the overall picture obtained through radio interception may appear to give advance warning of an attack. If such changes occur frequently without an actual operation taking place, the alertness of the defender becomes blunted.

b. The first positive reports are obtained through radar detection of the approach flight. In one case in Normandy it was possible, on the basis of radar, to infer as early as two hours before the jump that an airborne formation was approaching, and to alert the German forces in time.

c. A well-organized observation service based on the co-operation of all units and agencies, even in the rear areas, should provide assurance that the point where enemy forces are actually landing is quickly determined. All observation, however, is useless unless the reports are rapidly transmitted to the superior agencies and to units immediately concerned. Experience has proved that telephone communications are unreliable for this purpose since they are frequently disrupted by enemy action, such as preparatory bombing attacks. The transmittal of prepared messages by radio and appropriate warning broadcasts which all agencies and troops are able to receive has proved effective.

d. As soon as the air landings are an established fact, the next step is to determine where they are concentrated, which of the attacks are being made for the purpose of diversion and deception, and how wide an area

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4. a. A report made in June 1944 by Army Group B on the battle of Normandy includes the following statement: "The designation of areas to be taken under fire by all weapons while opposing the landing of airborne troops has proved satisfactory. (Fire by 20-mm. guns directed at enemy landing forces proved to be particularly effective.)" Countermeasures taken by the attacker include landings at night or during poor visibility. In this connection, the same report says, "Rainy weather and low clouds are favorable for airborne operations, because planes are able to dive and land without being hit by flak."

b. It is undoubtedly advisable to inflict the highest possible losses on airborne troops while they are still in the air and while they are landing. To this end, it is necessary for all weapons within whose range an enemy plane is landing to take such a plane under fire. At Arnhem the British troops that landed in the vicinity of the Deelen airfield suffered heavy losses inflicted by German anti-aircraft fire. By the same token, however, it is true that anti-aircraft fire alone cannot succeed in preventing an air landing, since enemy troops descending by parachute cannot be held off or turned back by overwhelming fire, as might be the case during ground combat. They have to come down, whether they want to or not, and some of them will always succeed in reaching the ground in good fighting condition. It would be a mistake to say on that account that anti-aircraft defense fire offers no chance of success. On the contrary, it is the very moment of landing which holds out the greatest promise of success for anti-aircraft defense, for the enemy troops which are landing are without cover; they are defenseless to a certain degree and likely to suffer very heavy casualties. At this juncture, it is impossible for the attacker to protect the troops from the air or by long-range artillery fire. Only gliders can use their arms against the firing defenders, and then only if they happen to be landing at the appropriate diving angle. The losses suffered by airborne troops while jumping and landing will greatly impair their combat efficiency and power of resistance. This will facilitate the task of subsequently annihilating them, and thus frustrate the landing attempt. For instance, the German invasion of Crete illustrates that it is possible to inflict serious casualties by anti-aircraft fire. The same example, however, also demonstrates that the employment of anti-aircraft fire alone is not sufficient to effectively resist an invasion. It can be achieved only through attack. If the defenders of Crete had not contented themselves with using anti-aircraft fire alone but had immediately attacked the troops which had landed, the entire invasion would have failed at the outset.

5. a. Experience gained during their own air landings caused the Germans to regard attack as the only effective means of combating airborne operations. Their fight against Allied airborne operations demonstrated the wisdom of this rule. The Germans failed to crush the Allied invasion, not because this principle proved erroneous, but because the necessary forces were either lacking or could not be brought up quickly enough or because German counterattacks were not conducted properly. In many instances, however, these attacks did impede the progress of Allied airborne operations; at Arnhem they brought Allied operations to a complete standstill.

b. The most vulnerable period of any air landing is the interval between the jump and the assembling of the forces into organized units under a unified command. In order to exploit this weakness, German field service


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regulations stipulated that any unit within range of enemy troops which had landed from the air should immediately attack since every moment's delay meant an improvement in the situation for the enemy. This method proved to be fundamentally sound. It led to success whenever the enemy landed in small scattered groups or whenever the landing was effected in the midst or in the immediate vicinity of German reserves ready for action. But these tactics are not successful if the defending forces available for immediate action are too weak to defeat enemy troops vastly superior in number, or if the defenders are too far from the point of landing to be able to exploit the enemy's initial period of weakness. Then there is no longer any purpose in dissipating the defending forces in small isolated attacks or in doggedly fighting the enemy. It now becomes necessary to launch a systematic counterattack.

c. Speed in carrying out a counterattack against enemy airborne troops is essential, because it is certain that the enemy's fighting strength will be increased continuously by means of additional reinforcements brought in by air. In general, only motorized reserves are successful in arriving in time. If the enemy's air force succeeds, as it did in Normandy, in delaying the arrival of the reserves, the chances for success dwindle. The elements which are nearest the enemy have the task of defending important terrain features against air-landed troops, maintaining contact with them, and determining the enemy situation through reconnaissance until all necessary arrangements for the counterattack have been made. The counterattack should be conducted under unified command and as far as possible, launched as a converging attack from several sides and supported by the greatest possible number of heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks; it is directed against an enemy who is well prepared and whose weakness lies merely in that he may be troubled by lack of ammunition and in that his heavy weapons, in general, are inferior in number since he has not established contact with those elements of the invading force which are advancing on land. To prevent the enemy from establishing contact is therefore highly important. If this fails, the defender's chances for success are considerably less. There were no cases during World War II in which the Germans succeeded in annihilating airborne enemy troops after they had established contact with their forces on the ground.

d. The greatest stumbling block encountered by the Germans in combating Allied airborne operations in the West was the superiority of the Allied air force. German failure to eliminate this air force, or even to clear the skies temporarily, led to the most serious delays in bringing up reserves. The general scarcity of mobile reserves, combined with the fact that they were tied down elsewhere by order of the German High Command, led to the result that in Normandy counterattacks were made too feebly, too late or not at all. The success of the German counterattacks at Arnhem was due to the energetic action and unified command of the Army Group B; the fortunate coincidence that two SS panzer divisions were in the immediate vicinity; the weather, which prevented Allied air intervention; and the resistance offered by the German troops at Nijmegen which prevented the prompt establishment of contact between Allied ground troops and airborne elements.

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*Restricted*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 381 (8 Jan 52)GC-0

8 January 1952

SUBJECT: Defense Against Airborne Operations

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 301
 Commanding General, XVI Corps, APO 14
 Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, APO 343
 Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, APO 331
 Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, General
 Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

John P. Maher

JOHN P. MAHER

1 Incl

Copies of extracts from a German
 appraisal of Airborne Operations Acting Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

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EXTRACTS FROM A GERMAN APPRAISAL
OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

* * * * *

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is covered. This is extremely difficult, especially at night, and usually considerable time passes before some degree of clarity is possible. Therein lies the defender's greatest weakness. However, it is never advisable to delay countermeasures until this clarity has been obtained. In most cases, the situation will remain obscure until the counterattack is launched. It is all the more important, therefore, that reporting should not be neglected during the fighting; this is a matter of training and indoctrination.

e. It is a unique characteristic of airborne operations that the moments of greatest weakness of the attacker and of the defender occur simultaneously. The issue is therefore decided by three factors: who has the better nerves; who takes the initiative first; and who acts with greater determination. In this connection, the attacker always has the advantage of being free to choose the time and place of attack, and he therefore knows in advance when the moment of weakness will occur, whereas the defender must wait to find out where and when the attack will take place.

f. The attacker will always endeavor to aggravate the defender's disadvantages by deception and try to force him to split up his countermeasures. The most popular method of deception is the dropping of dummies with parachutes. In such cases an immediate attack rapidly determines whether it is a genuine landing operation or a diversion. Radio interception will also prove to be helpful at an early stage, for troops just landed must make prompt use of radio communications to establish contact with each other and with their superior commands at the jump-off base. Radio, however, cannot be used in diversionary actions. Even if dummies were equipped with radio sets functioning automatically or by remote control--which should not be an insoluble technical problem--alert and competent radio interception personnel would not be deceived for long. During the invasion in 1944, it was the signal intelligence service which was able, with comparative rapidity, to give the high command an accurate picture of the enemy's tactical grouping during the air landings. The attacker will naturally endeavor to eliminate any targets such as radar equipment and long-distance radio stations by air attacks prior to the air landings. On the other hand, such attacks can also be an advance warning for the defender.

3. Theoretically, the defender's best method of defense against air landings is the employment of air forces to attack the enemy while he is still approaching and to annihilate him or force him to turn back. In 1944-45 during the Western campaign, it was a foregone conclusion that victories were out of the question in view of the hopeless inferiority of the Luftwaffe. To repeat, mastery of the air by the attacking air force will always be the prerequisite for successful airborne operations. The attacker endeavors, by means of bombing attacks, to destroy the defender's air forces on the ground and to protect the approach flight with superior numbers of escort fighters. If the attacker is unable to accomplish this, he will of necessity abandon the idea of an airborne operation altogether. Only in exceptional cases and under particularly favorable conditions will it be possible for the defender to launch an air attack against approaching air formations with any chance of success.

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4. a. A report made in June 1944 by Army Group B on the battle of Normandy includes the following statement: "The designation of areas to be taken under fire by all weapons while opposing the landing of airborne troops has proved satisfactory. (Fire by 20-mm. guns directed at enemy landing forces proved to be particularly effective.)" Countermeasures taken by the attacker include landings at night or during poor visibility. In this connection, the same report says, "Rainy weather and low clouds are favorable for airborne operations, because planes are able to dive and land without being hit by flak."

b. It is undoubtedly advisable to inflict the highest possible losses on airborne troops while they are still in the air and while they are landing. To this end, it is necessary for all weapons within whose range an enemy plane is landing to take such a plane under fire. At Arnhem the British troops that landed in the vicinity of the Deelen airfield suffered heavy losses inflicted by German antiaircraft fire. By the same token, however, it is true that antiaircraft fire alone cannot succeed in preventing an air landing, since enemy troops descending by parachute cannot be held off or turned back by overwhelming fire, as might be the case during ground combat. They have to come down, whether they want to or not, and some of them will always succeed in reaching the ground in good fighting condition. It would be a mistake to say on that account that antiaircraft defense fire offers no chance of success. On the contrary, it is the very moment of landing which holds out the greatest promise of success for antiaircraft defense, for the enemy troops which are landing are without cover; they are defenseless to a certain degree and likely to suffer very heavy casualties. At this juncture, it is impossible for the attacker to protect the troops from the air or by long-range artillery fire. Only gliders can use their arms against the firing defenders, and then only if they happen to be landing at the appropriate diving angle. The losses suffered by airborne troops while jumping and landing will greatly impair their combat efficiency and power of resistance. This will facilitate the task of subsequently annihilating them, and thus frustrate the landing attempt. For instance, the German invasion of Crete illustrates that it is possible to inflict serious casualties by antiaircraft fire. The same example, however, also demonstrates that the employment of antiaircraft fire alone is not sufficient to effectively resist an invasion. It can be achieved only through attack. If the defenders of Crete had not contented themselves with using antiaircraft fire alone but had immediately attacked the troops which had landed, the entire invasion would have failed at the outset.

5. a. Experiences gained during their own air landings caused the Germans to regard attack as the only effective means of combating airborne operations. Their fight against Allied airborne operations demonstrated the wisdom of this rule. The Germans failed to crush the Allied invasion, not because this principle proved erroneous, but because the necessary forces were either lacking or could not be brought up quickly enough or because German counterattacks were not conducted properly. In many instances, however, these attacks did impede the progress of Allied airborne operations; at Arnhem they brought Allied operations to a complete standstill.

b. The most vulnerable period of any air landing is the interval between the jump and the assembling of the forces into organized units under a unified command. In order to exploit this weakness, German field service

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regulations stipulated that any unit within range of enemy troops which had landed from the air should immediately attack since every moment's delay meant an improvement in the situation for the enemy. This method proved to be fundamentally sound. It led to success whenever the enemy landed in small scattered groups or whenever the landing was effected in the midst or in the immediate vicinity of German reserves ready for action. But these tactics are not successful if the defending forces available for immediate action are too weak to defeat enemy troops vastly superior in number, or if the defenders are too far from the point of landing to be able to exploit the enemy's initial period of weakness. Then there is no longer any purpose in dissipating the defending forces in small isolated attacks or in doggedly fighting the enemy. It now becomes necessary to launch a systematic counterattack.

c. Speed in carrying out a counterattack against enemy airborne troops is essential, because it is certain that the enemy's fighting strength will be increased continuously by means of additional reinforcements brought in by air. In general, only motorized reserves are successful in arriving in time. If the enemy's air force succeeds, as it did in Normandy, in delaying the arrival of the reserves, the chances for success dwindle. The elements which are nearest the enemy have the task of defending important terrain features against air-landed troops, maintaining contact with them, and determining the enemy situation through reconnaissance until all necessary arrangements for the counterattack have been made. The counterattack should be conducted under unified command and as far as possible, launched as a converging attack from several sides and supported by the greatest possible number of heavy weapons, artillery, and tanks; it is directed against an enemy who is well prepared and whose weakness lies merely in that he may be troubled by lack of ammunition and in that his heavy weapons, in general, are inferior in number since he has not established contact with those elements of the invading force which are advancing on land. To prevent the enemy from establishing contact is therefore highly important. If this fails, the defender's chances for success are considerably less. There were no cases during World War II in which the Germans succeeded in annihilating airborne enemy troops after they had established contact with their forces on the ground.

d. The greatest stumbling block encountered by the Germans in combating Allied airborne operations in the West was the superiority of the Allied air force. German failure to eliminate this air force, or even to clear the skies temporarily, led to the most serious delays in bringing up reserves. The general scarcity of mobile reserves, combined with the fact that they were tied down elsewhere by order of the German High Command, led to the result that in Normandy counterattacks were made too feebly, too late or not at all. The success of the German counterattacks at Arnhem was due to the energetic action and unified command of the Army Group B; the fortunate coincidence that two SS panzer divisions were in the immediate vicinity; the weather, which prevented Allied air intervention; and the resistance offered by the German troops at Nijmegen which prevented the prompt establishment of contact between Allied ground troops and airborne elements.

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Maj. Beard 26-7136

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Asst Chief of Staff
G-2

7 January 1952

Forwarded herewith is copy of certificate in compliance with par. 9, SCAP and FEC Staff Memo No. 29, subject: "Military Security," dated 26 July 1951.

1 Incl
- As-identified above

-----N. C. C.-----

(1)

Major Beard 26-7136

Designation of Officer Responsible for
Regrading of Documents

CHS

President, GHQ
Document Downgrading Board
Rm. 253, Dai Ichi Bldg.

7 January 1952

1. In compliance with par. 10, Staff Memorandum No. 2, "Review and Regrading of Documents," the following named officer is designated as officer responsible for downgrading of documents in the Civil Historical Section:

BEARD, J. B., Major, 26-7136

----- N. C. C. -----



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Historical Section
APO 500

7 January 1952

CERTIFICATE

I certify that all personnel assigned to this section who are allowed access to material or information classified CONFIDENTIAL or higher have been granted appropriate clearance under the provisions of SR-380-160-1 as implemented by the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.

Norman C. Caim

NORMAN C. CAIM
Colonel, Infantry
Chief of Section