

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 it in 14 parts and imagine that you will receive it tomorrow.  
3 However, I am not sure."

4 Mr. Richardson: And it was that language which in-  
5 formed you that there would be more to follow?

6 Captain Safford: It was that language which informed  
7 me there was more to follow.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, if this message was delivered  
9 and how it was delivered would be the responsibility and  
10 act of someone other than yourself?

11 Captain Safford: That is correct. That message was  
12 translated by the Army and the time of delivery in the  
13 Navy Department all depended upon what time the Army sent  
14 our copies of the translation over to the Navy Department.  
15 That is not a matter of record and we can only guess.

16 Mr. Richardson: Can you tell me how long it was after  
17 your attention was called to the pilot message that any  
18 execute appeared on the long 14-part message to which it  
19 referred?

20 Captain Safford: The long 14-part message actually  
21 was received in the Navy Department and our men on watch  
22 began what we call processing it before I could have seen  
23 the translation of the pilot message.

24 Mr. Richardson: What do you mean by, before your men  
25 were processing it, what do you mean by that, what is

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1 "processing"?

2 Captain Safford: The first five or six parts of the  
3 long 14-part message were received in the Navy Department  
4 I believe about 10 minutes of 12, just before noon. The  
5 officer on watch telephoned over to the War Department and  
6 found out that the War Department Unit was securing it at  
7 1:00 o'clock because they were observing the normal working  
8 hours prescribed by the Civil Service Commission at that  
9 time and therefore he held it and worked on it himself  
10 although it was an Army responsibility under a joint agree-  
11 ment under date of 1941 whereby the Army processed the  
12 messages on the even days of the month and the Navy on the  
13 odd days. Processing means decoding or decrypting where it  
14 had to be done, exclusion of the code where that had to be  
15 done, recovery of the key where that had to be done,  
16 translation and finally smoothing up and typing the smooth  
17 copies for distribution to higher authority.

18 A number of copies were typed; early in the year I  
19 think we were limited to 4; by December 1941 I think there  
20 were 12 or 14 copies prepared, half of which went to the  
21 Navy and half to the Army for distribution.

22 Mr. Richardson: Would they go to anyone else than the  
23 Army and the Navy?

24 Captain Safford: By agreement which was made and  
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1 approved on the 12th of November 1941 the Navy made all  
2 deliveries to the White House via the Naval Aide to the  
3 President, who at that time was Rear Admiral Beardall and  
4 the Army made all deliveries to the Secretary of State.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, would those deliveries be made  
6 out of the number of copies that had been furnished to the  
7 Navy and to the Army?

8 Captain Safford: They were made out of the total number  
9 of copies and their copy was identical with the ones of  
10 the Army and Navy.

11 Mr. Richardson: Would there be new copies or simply  
12 one of the multifold copies that had been delivered to them?

13 Captain Safford: They were one of the multifold  
14 number of copies.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, when that message was  
16 delivered in that way a copy of what was delivered, in the  
17 ordinary course of recording, would appear in the files  
18 of the particular department that got the copy?

19 Captain Safford: There was a file copy kept in the  
20 Navy Department in my section. There was a file copy kept  
21 in the War Department. I think it was originally kept  
22 by the SIS and later taken over by G-2 after there had been  
23 an unfortunate leak and name calling in connection with  
24 it which was followed by a controversy as to who was responsible  
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2 for the leak.

3 Mr. Richardson: And the Navy assumed the responsibility  
4 for sending one of these copies to the White House?

5 Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Richardson: And the Army would have the responsi-  
7 bility of sending a copy to the Secretary of State?

8 Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: And when those copies were delivered  
10 they would become a part of the files of the office or  
11 person to whom they were delivered?

12 Captain Safford: No, sir. They were collected after-  
13 wards. Sometimes they were allowed to keep them 24 hours.  
14 We wanted them back as soon as we could get them. And  
15 they were destroyed. I believe the Army destroyed everything  
16 but the file copy. The Navy kept one file copy and also  
17 another copy so that we would have a loose copy to work  
18 with and not have to remove a copy from the file.

19 Mr. Richardson: Then there would be one copy remaining  
20 in the files of the Navy and one copy remaining in the  
21 files of the Army?

22 Captain Safford: At all times.

23 Mr. Richardson: How many copies would come to rest  
24 and remain in your files?

25 Captain Safford: Always one; generally a second.

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1 Mr. Richardson: How many communications units,  
2 where messages were being intercepted and brought in, were  
3 we maintaining at that time?

4 Captain Safford: Do you mean the intercept stations  
5 where we were intercepting?

6 Mr. Richardson: I want the intercept stations first.

7 Captain Safford: We had major intercept stations  
8 at Winter Harbor, Maine; Sheltenham, Maryland; Bainbridge  
9 Island, Washington; Heeia on the Island of Oahu, and at  
10 Corregidor.

11 We had a small intercept direction-finding station at  
12 Guam, a small one at Imperial Beach, California. We had  
13 a small intercepting direction-finding station at Amagansett,  
14 Long Island; and Jupiter, Florida.

15 In addition a number of direction-finder stations  
16 which did not attempt any intercepting.

17 Mr. Richardson: If anyone made an intercept that would  
18 be transferred by them where?

19 Captain Safford: Normally to their primary control  
20 station or office, or CI unit, as we called it.

21 Occasionally it would come direct to Washington,  
22 depending upon what type of message it was, and what  
23 the instructions were in the case.

24 Mr. Richardson: It is a fact, is it not, Captain, that  
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1 the Washington office had the most experienced personnel  
2 and was the most extensive office of that kind that we  
3 had in the world, was it not?  
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5 Captain Safford: It had a few of the most experienced  
6 personnel, but 90 percent of them had been in service less  
7 than a year. It was a training ground, as well as a working  
8 place.

9 Mr. Richardson: But it was the best we had?

10 Captain Safford: It was the largest we had. I would  
11 say that the best we had, as far as experience and all  
12 around skill was up at Pearl Harbor.

13 Mr. Richardson: Was there any division of activity  
14 assigned to these various stations, for instance, Washington,  
15 Pearl Harbor, and Corregidor, as to what character of  
16 work they should do, or were they all doing the same  
17 thing?

18 Captain Safford: That was highly specialized. The  
19 Navy Department was responsible exclusively for the handling  
20 of anything which originated in the Atlantic Ocean, I mean  
21 from the European Continent. It was responsible for Japanese  
22 diplomatic communications; it was responsible for backing  
23 up our other two stations on their particular problems,  
24 and was responsible for the training of personnel to send  
25 out to the outlying stations, because we did not believe in

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1 sending untrained personnel into the field.

2 Mr. Richardson: Then this 14th part message we are  
3 talking about came into the station here in Washington in  
4 the regular course of the kind of intercepting that that  
5 station was supposed to do?

6 Captain Safford: That is correct.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now, I think you testified that around  
8 12 o'clock the first four or five sections of this 14-part  
9 message came in.

10 Does that mean when they came in in code?

11 Captain Safford: That is when they came in, in code  
12 in teletype from Bainbridge Island, Washington, or other  
13 stations which had intercepted the message.

14 Mr. Richardson: Now, how long did it take before  
15 those various sections of the message that came in were  
16 translated into English?

17 Captain Safford: Bainbridge Island copied a whole  
18 what we call schedule of radio transmissions from Tokyo  
19 to San Francisco. They transcribed all of the Government  
20 messages and ignored the commercial messages. The Govern-  
21 ment messages included in other systems on other points,  
22 and a lot of messages which had no connection with the  
23 14-part. There was no external way to differentiate.  
24 Everything of interest to Washington was punched on a  
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teletype tape and when the tape was completely prepared it was sent into the Navy Department by TWX through the teletype wire exchange by mechanical transmission at a rate of 60 words a minute, and received by the Navy Department.

This high speed transmission cut our tolls to a third, and we got faster service.



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2 Then it was taken by the watch officer and decoded  
3 into the basic form as rapidly as possible. Then we knew  
4 what we had to do with it next. In many cases the Japanese  
5 would use another code underneath this so-called purple  
6 machine. In this case they did not. Therefore we saved  
7 time. Usually these messages came in Japanese and had to  
8 be translated into English. In this case it came in English.

9 Mr. Richardson: Let me be sure that I understand.  
10 This message, 14-part, as I understand it, came in in  
11 ordinary code which, when translated in the ordinary way,  
12 gave you the English translation?

13 Captain Safford: Not translated in the ordinary way.  
14 We were in possession of the Japanese diplomatic cipher  
15 machine known as purple to conceal its real nature. The  
16 Army got that for us. We helped build the machines.

17 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if it is  
18 necessary to go into technicalities. We have gone far  
19 enough in attacking national security without going into  
20 details on this.

21 Mr. Richardson: Since this is the first time anybody  
22 has raised that point I am perfectly willing to stop.

23 Mr. Murphy: It was raised before by me and I want to  
24 again protest the necessity of the Captain revealing the  
25 mechanics and the details of how we broke the code. I do

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not see how it could help national security or help national defense or add anything to the inquiry.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I have no intention of going into it.

Mr. Murphy: I don't mean counsel; I don't mean to criticise counsel.

Mr. Richardson: Captain, don't give us any of the operative details as to just how a code is broken. All I am interested in is that the code came in.

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Mr. Murphy: May I move that the part that the witness already related so far as the mechanics are concerned be stricken from the record?

Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, that is absurd. Why be so secretive about things that every foreign agent in the world knows all about? These matters are well known, well understood, have already been the subject of books and magazine articles, there is no secret about them and there is no use pretending that there is.

Mr. Murphy: I want my position to be clear. I move that the part that is in the record about the mechanics and the construction of the where-with-al be stricken from the record.

The Vice Chairman: Permit the chair to inquire. You are in a position, Captain, to know better than we are what the situation is with respect to this matter.

Captain Safford: Mr. Chairman, I think I can answer the essential part of the questions as regards the time element, which is very important, and not give away anything that is essential to security.

The Vice Chairman: Well, have you said anything so far that would endanger the element of security?

Captain Safford: No, sir, nothing that has not been brought out in the papers.

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2 The Vice Chairman: All right. Does that take care of  
3 the situation?

4 Mr. Murphy: May I ask one question? You say that the  
5 mechanics which you have just outlined have been in the pa-  
6 pers?

7 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: I would like to know which one? Well, I  
9 will go into that later, as to what paper.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right. You understand the coun-  
11 sel's statement?

12 Captain Safford: Yes.

13 The Vice Chairman: And the committee's desire along that  
14 line, Captain, and I feel sure that you are in better position  
15 to help take care of that than even we are.

16 Mr. Richardson: When this message began to come in was  
17 there any attempt made to make any delivery of any portion of  
18 it prior to the reception of the first thirteen parts?

19 Captain Safford: No, sir, not to my knowledge, except  
20 that Commander McCollum, who was the head of the Japanese sec-  
21 tion of Naval Intelligence, knew that the message was in and  
22 coming in and being worked on when it was partially in. I  
23 think he knew that around three or four o'clock in the after-  
24 noon.

25 Mr. Richardson: But there was no delivery outside of

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2 your office of this message so that anyone could read it or  
3 see it or know of it or act on it or deliver it until the  
4 first thirteen parts had come in, was there?

5 Captain Safford: The message was not ready for delivery  
6 until about nine o'clock in the evening. It might have been  
7 ready for delivery a little earlier on a limited scale.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, by "the message" you refer to the  
9 first thirteen parts?

10 Captain Safford: I mean the first thirteen parts.

11 Mr. Richardson: Did you consider the first thirteen  
12 parts as a complete message for the purpose of delivery?

13 Captain Safford: I never saw the first thirteen parts  
14 until Monday morning.

15 Mr. Richardson: When did you last see or hear anything  
16 of this message of Saturday, December 6th?

17 Captain Safford: I left the office at the close of work-  
18 ing hours, at 4:30 P.M. on Saturday, December 6th. It was  
19 the first time in two weeks that I had observed normal work-  
20 ing hours.

21 At that time Commander Linn had come on and was re-working  
22 the message. There had been a mistake in the key which was  
23 set up on the machine which decoded the message and the whole  
24 entire part we had in there was badly garbled and because of  
25 its importance Linn thought it was better to check the key

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first and find out the mistake and produce perfect copy rather than to clear the garble by guess and maybe make mistakes at critical points in the message. This would take quite a little bit of time and we simply had to throw away all the work that had been done before.

Linn was my best man on the watch side. Normally I do not expect watches from a man in charge of a section. He was taking the place of a man whom we had let go on Christmas eve and we were hoping that we would be able to get somebody else to take his place.

Kramer was standing by to deliver the message. As soon as it was completed McCollum knew about it.

Mr. Richardson: Were you there?

Captain Safford: I was there until 4:30. I checked it and said, "There is nothing I can do but get in your way and make you nervous. I am going home."

Mr. Richardson: Then after 4:30 you knew nothing of your own knowledge as to what happened to the thirteen part message?

Captain Safford: Until Monday morning, when I got the reports from Linn and Kramer on it.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now, did you on Monday morning get reports from them with reference to the thirteen parts?

Captain Safford: I did immediately and about anything

1 Witness Safford

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2 else that happened over the week end.

3 Senator Lucas: May I ask a question at this point,  
4 counsel?

5 Captain, did you know that these thirteen parts were com-  
6 ing?

7 Captain Safford: We could read enough to --

8 Senator Lucas: No, I am talking about you, not "we".  
9 Did you yourself personally know that these thirteen parts  
10 were coming in?

11 Captain Safford: We knew -- I knew at 4:30 from what we  
12 had that it was the first part of the long message. In fact,  
13 the rest of it was coming in, began coming in I think around  
14 3:30 and it took about an hour for the whole message to come  
15 in and other messages mixed up with it.

16 Mr. Richardson: Did you see the thirteen parts before  
17 you left at 4:30 that afternoon?

18 Captain Safford: No. I saw all thirteen parts in their  
19 original code form but you could not identify them until they  
20 had been decoded.

21 Senator Lucas: That is what I say. You could not  
22 identify them.

23 Captain Safford: They had probably twenty or twenty-five  
24 messages on hand, thirteen of which were the various parts  
25 of this and the rest were other messages. They could not be

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2 identified until they had all been decoded.

3 Mr. Richardson: Then you left your office at 4:30?

4 Captain Safford: That is correct.

5 Mr. Richardson: And you did not again see any part of  
6 this message until Monday?

7 Captain Safford: Until Monday.

8 Mr. Richardson: And all of the transactions that oc-  
9 curred after 4:30 on Saturday, - on Saturday evening and Sun-  
10 day morning came after you left?

11 Captain Safford: That is correct.

12 Mr. Richardson: And you had no independent knowledge of  
13 this?

14 Captain Safford: That is correct.

15 Mr. Richardson: Might I ask of the committee --

16 Senator Ferguson: Did he work Sunday?

17 Mr. Richardson: Might I ask the committee whether the  
18 committee desires me to interrogate Captain Safford as to  
19 the hearsay report which he got with reference to this message  
20 on Monday? Because it is apparent from his testimony that  
21 his own personal knowledge ceased at 4:30 on Saturday after-  
22 noon.

23 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I think we should have  
24 that because that was an official report.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, permit the chair to inquire at



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2 this point. Is counsel prepared to present other witnesses  
3 who can give definite testimony and not hearsay on these  
4 points?

5 Mr. Richardson: Yes, that is right.

6 Senator Lucas: May I ask counsel if there is any con-  
7 flict in the report that was made to the Captain and what  
8 the witnesses will testify to when they come to the stand?

9 Mr. Richardson: I do not know what the Captain's tes-  
10 timony will be. I am entirely willing to elicit that if the  
11 committee wants it, in view of the fact that it came to him  
12 on Monday.

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13 Mr. Murphy: May I as one member of the committee say  
14 that I would like to hear what he heard on Monday? I am  
15 very much interested in that.

16 Senator Ferguson: I move, Mr. Chairman, that we take  
17 that because it was an official report.

18 The Vice Chairman: Well, I had rather assumed that the  
19 committee would prefer to have the best evidence.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, you will have it anyway.

21 The Vice Chairman: And that is the reason I was in-  
22 quiring of counsel, if he expects to get the best evidence,  
23 which is not hearsay. Does counsel state that he expects to  
24 present that?

25 Mr. Richardson: Yes, we expect to have Lieutenant Kramer,

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2 who is the man who handled it, who was there and knows more  
3 about it than anyone else and I just want to exhaust the point  
4 with Captain Safford and to do it I would have to ask him now  
5 to relate to you what he learned on Monday when he returned to  
6 his office.

7 The Vice Chairman: It will be, of course, hearsay evi-  
8 dence.

9 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the  
11 events that occurred between Saturday and Monday would be hear-  
12 say but what he heard on Monday is direct evidence and in view  
13 of him being here and covering the general picture, what he  
14 heard on Monday and, therefore, as it impressed him, I think  
15 the whole situation would be direct evidence.

16 Mr. Richardson: Let us be realistic. What the Captain  
17 heard on Monday would be a fact, of course, but it would be a  
18 fact that would ordinarily be best testified to by the people  
19 who created the acts which he heard.

20 The Chairman: Permit me to inquire of counsel. Are  
21 the people who reported to Captain Safford on Monday and gave  
22 him this hearsay information that is now being discussed the  
23 witnesses that counsel expects to present here?

24 Mr. Richardson: Well, until I hear the Captain's state-  
25 ment I would not be able to say that I have the witnesses that

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2 he contacted, that all of the witnesses that he contacted on  
3 Monday will be here.

4 The Vice Chairman: All right.

5 Mr. Richardson: I propose, in view of the interest of  
6 so many members, to go right on and inquire.

7 The Vice Chairman: Well, without objection then you may  
8 proceed.

9 Mr. Richardson: All right.

10 The Vice Chairman: That takes care of your motion,  
11 doesn't it, Senator?

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Mr. Richardson: At what time did you return to your of-  
14 fice on Monday?

15 Captain Safford: At the beginning of working hours,  
16 which I believe was eight A.M. at that time.

17 Mr. Richardson: And was your attention then called to  
18 anything relating to this fourteen part message?

19 Captain Safford: I immediately called all of my heads  
20 of subsections under me into conference.

21 Senator Lucas: Who was it that you called?

22 Mr. Richardson: Whom did you call into conference?

23 Captain Safford: Commander Kramer, Commander Linn, par-  
24 ticularly, and Commander Parke. I believe they were all  
25 Lieutenants at the time. I called them in to find out what

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2 had gone wrong and how the people had been surprised the way  
3 they had; first, to see if our section had been to blame in  
4 any other way and the second, to immediately start writing  
5 out a full report of the circumstances, as required by Navy  
6 regulations, I believe, and certainly by Navy custom.

7 Now, I have been in other accidents and collisions, and  
8 so forth, and that was always done. In view of so many peo-  
9 ple being involved it seemed better to prepare such a state-  
10 ment or report of those in my section and let those who were  
11 in agreement with that report sign with me and those who held  
12 counter-views submit their own views.

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13 Sometime within the week following Pearl Harbor I and  
14 the other officers were called into conference in the office  
15 of the Director of Naval Communications; I am not certain  
16 whether Admiral Noyes presided and he was called away sud-  
17 denly and Captain Redmond, the Assistant Director of Naval  
18 Communications, presided.

19 Mr. Richardson: When was this?

20 Captain Safford: This was in the week following the at-  
21 tack on Pearl Harbor; some time prior to the 15th I remember,  
22 probably Thursday or Friday.

23 Mr. Richardson: And where did it take place?

24 Captain Safford: In the office of the Director of Naval  
25 Communications.

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Mr. Richardson: The meeting was called for what purpose?

Captain Safford: The meeting was called of all of the section heads to discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor and the whispering campaign against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch which was then getting into full swing.

Mr. Richardson: Now, we are concentrating here at this moment on the fourteenpart message.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir. May I finish my statement?

Mr. Richardson: Will you bring your testimony to that point?

Captain Safford: The discussion in that meeting was that all section heads were asked to tell all the people not to talk, there was too much loose talk going around, that there would undoubtedly be an investigation later and that anybody who had anything to say would be called before that investigation and permitted to say all they had to say, if they had anything to say, and if we had written out anything to destroy it immediately. I considered it a perfectly logical order from my superior.

Mr. Richardson: Who gave you the order that you were to destroy anything, name these people?

Captain Safford: It was either Admiral Noyes or Captain Redmond, the Director or Assistant Director, on the instructions of Admiral Stark.

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Mr. Richardson: Was it in writing?

Captain Safford: It was not in writing.

Mr. Richardson: Who told it to you?

Captain Safford: Whichever officer presided at this conference and I cannot remember which one they sent.

Mr. Richardson: It was an oral direction?

Captain Safford: It was an oral direction.

Mr. Richardson: Given to you by either Noyes or Redmond?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: What did they say?

Captain Safford: I have said it once before.

Mr. Richardson: Say it again.

Captain Safford: We had standing orders not to talk, not to spread the gossip against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, to keep anything we had to ourselves until we were called to a witness stand to testify officially and if we had anything in writing to destroy it immediately and pass that word on to our subordinates, and I carried out that order.

Mr. Richardson: What was meant by "anything in writing"? What did you understand it to mean?

Captain Safford: I presumed it to mean notes or any other kind of records which we had in writing.

Mr. Richardson: About what?

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2 Captain Safford: About the circumstances leading up  
3 to the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

4 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, you understood that it be-  
5 came your duty to go to your office, accumulate all of the  
6 files of your office that had to do with the events leading  
7 up to Pearl Harbor, and destroy them?

8 Captain Safford: No, sir, only notes which we had made  
9 ourselves.

10 Mr. Richardson: Oh. Was there any reason given why  
11 those should be destroyed?

12 Captain Safford: Yes, that this was an emergency situ-  
13 ation, we had just suffered a terrible defeat, the morale was  
14 low, that all kinds of rumors were going out from the Navy  
15 Department and we had to put a stop to this whispering cam-  
16 paign. It seemed perfectly logical at the time.

17 Mr. Richardson: Well, how would you stop the whisper-  
18 ing campaign by destroying the notes you made as to the facts?

19 Captain Safford: At that time I did not question my  
20 orders any more than Admiral Wilkinson questioned his verbal  
21 orders. We carried them out.

22 Mr. Richardson: What did you destroy yourself?

23 Captain Safford: I destroyed considerable notes concern-  
24 ing statements given to me by Lieutenant Linn and Lieutenant  
25 Commander Kramer and other people who were intimately asso-

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ciated with them.

3 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, let us get this straight.  
4 Before you left on Saturday at 4:30 the first part of the  
5 fourteen part message was coming in, was it not?

6 Captain Safford: That is correct.

7 Mr. Richardson: And you did not have any notes with you  
8 about anything informative with reference to the parts of  
9 that message that had come in, did you?

10 Captain Safford: The fourteen part message is only one  
11 small part of the whole affair.

12 Mr. Richardson: That may be and you may be very anxious  
13 to get on to the other points, but what I am driving at now  
14 is to give the committee all of the facts we can find out  
15 about the fourteen part message.

16 Now, you say that when you came back on Monday you got  
17 a report with reference to the fourteen part message?

18 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: What was that report? Give us the de-  
20 tails of it.

21 Captain Safford: Well, I --

22 Mr. Keefe: May we find out whether that report was in  
23 writing, Mr. Chairman? I understood the Captain to say that  
24 he destroyed -- ~~that~~ he instructed his heads, - that as a  
25 result of calling his heads in he instructed them to make



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 sure that they make out a report in writing and sign it.

3 Captain Safford: No, sir. Those were verbal reports to  
4 me. I was going to make up a consolidated report which  
5 everybody would sign when we had all of the facts straightened  
6 out.

7 Mr. Keefe: And those that were in opposition to that,  
8 that were dissatisfied with that report?

9 Captain Safford: They could make out their own report if  
10 they thought that we were incorrect as to the facts.

11 Mr. Keefe: May I ask counsel, was such a report as that  
12 actually made up in writing and signed by him and the other  
13 persons involved?

14 Mr. Richardson: Let us get first things first.

15 When you went back on Monday to your office and met with  
16 your associates and subordinates was there any discussion  
17 there before any report was made up? Was there any discus-  
18 sion there as to what had happened with respect to the four-  
19 teen part message?

20 Captain Safford: There were many discussions.

21 Mr. Richardson: Now, tell us what that discussion was,  
22 what was it about, if anything?

23 Captain Safford: Linn told me that the fourteenth part  
24 did not come in before midnight. He had waited up beyond  
25 midnight and it had not come in until the next morning. We

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 found out from the records of the people on watch that it had  
3 come in around five A.M. on Sunday morning and had been sent  
4 over to the Army for translation and there was a little doubt  
5 as to just what time the Army had sent the translation back.

6 Commander Kramer --

7 Mr. Richardson: Was there anything said about what had  
8 been done with the thirteen parts?

9 Captain Safford: Lieutenant Linn said that his work on  
10 the thirteen parts had been completed about seven P.M. and  
11 after that it was Kramer's responsibility to straighten the  
12 message out and get it typed.

13 Kramer told me that he left the Navy Department about  
14 nine P.M.; that he first telephoned to Admiral Stark at his  
15 residence in the Observatory Circle and found that he was  
16 not at home. Then he telephoned to Admiral Wilkinson, the  
17 Director of Naval Intelligence, and requested instructions.

18 Admiral Wilkinson ordered him to leave a copy at the  
19 White House with the President, explaining its urgency and  
20 then to come out to Admiral Wilkinson's residence and report  
21 to him with the other copies.

22 Kramer carried those orders out. Kramer told me he did  
23 not see the President because the President was having a  
24 dinner party and entertaining some high ranking British  
25 official, who I think has turned out to be Vice Admiral

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 French.

3 Kramer left the copy of that with the President's aide,  
4 out in the coffee room, and told him to get word to the Presi-  
5 dent that this was very urgent and he was to interrupt his  
6 dinner party and let him see it as soon as possible.

7 Senator Lucas: What night was this, now?

8 Captain Safford: This is the night of Saturday, December  
9 the 6th, 1941.

10 I believe that Kramer -- Kramer told me a lot of things  
11 at that time which are rather dim in my memory having lost  
12 the notes. I believe that on the way to Admiral Wilkinson's  
13 residence he stopped at the Warman Park and gave a copy to  
14 Secretary Hull and discussed the matter at length with the  
15 Secretary. I know that he saw the Secretary that night and  
16 then took the copy to Admiral Wilkinson's residence. Secre-  
17 tary Hull called up several people --

18 Mr. Keefe: You don't mean Secretary Hull?

19 Captain Safford: Secretary Knox.

20 Mr. Murphy: He said "Hull" twice.

21 Mr. Richardson: Let us get this straight. Was this  
22 delivered at the Warman Park or to Secretary Knox?

23 Captain Safford: It was Secretary Knox, and Secretary  
24 Knox called up Secretary Hull and other people and discussed  
25 the message with him. In the meantime Secretary Hull had

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 received his copy, --

3 Mr. Richardson: Go on.

4 Captain Safford: (Continuing) -- from the Army, and an  
5 appointment was made the next morning for Secretary Knox, Sec-  
6 retary Hull, Secretary Stimson to meet in Secretary Hull's  
7 office at ten o'clock and Kramer and Colonel Bratton were re-  
8 quested to be there also.

9 Then Kramer went to Admiral Wilkinson's house, gave him  
10 the messages; he had given him the substance of the message  
11 over the telephone.

12 Mr. Keefe: May I interrupt you a moment? What you are  
13 telling now is what you claim Kramer told you on Monday?

14 Captain Safford: Kramer told me on Monday the best I  
15 can remember it.

16 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead, Captain.

17 Captain Safford: So they got it and I specifically asked  
18 him, I asked him about Admiral Stark and he said Admiral  
19 Stark did not receive it but that he was told about it  
20 Saturday night and gave orders which he received through Ad-  
21 miral Wilkinson, - I think he was a Captain at that particu-  
22 lar time, - to deliver the written message to Admiral Stark's  
23 office the following morning, Sunday, at nine A.M., which he  
24 did.

25 Mr. Richardson: Anything said about General Marshall?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Captain Safford: I asked him about the Army and the only thing he said that he knew about the Army was that they had been given their copies at nine P.M. and that Colonel Bratton had gotten a copy to Secretary Hull. He knew nothing about the rest of the Army delivery.

Mr. Richardson: All right. Go right ahead and give us all that you can recall, Captain.

Captain Safford: He had made personal delivery to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, who was Rear Admiral Ingersoll. He had also given a copy to the Director of War Plans, who was Rear Admiral Turner.

Kramer remained at Admiral Wilkinson's until about midnight and then when he went home he stopped by the Navy Department to see if the fourteenth part had come in there, to find out if it had been and he told the man on watch to give him a call if anything happened and that he would be down the next morning early because he had to make this nine o'clock appointment at Admiral Stark's office with the thirteen parts of the message.

I believe that some time during the evening that Kramer had phoned Captain McCollum, but Captain McCollum lived way out in Virginia and did not see the message until the next morning when he came into his own office.

Mr. Richardson: Now, do you recall any other facts which

1 Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Richardson  
 2 were reported to you when you got back to your office on Mon-  
 3 day? I am only asking you to tell us what you can remember.

4 Captain Safford: Yes.

5 Mr. Richardson: I am not blaming you for not remembering,  
 6 but is that all you can remember?

7 Captain Safford: That is in regard to the fourteen part  
 8 message.

9 Mr. Richardson: Now, Mr. Chairman --

10 Mr. Murphy: May I interrupt, counsel? He said that af-  
 11 ter he was told to destroy the papers that he went and gave  
 12 orders to those under him. I would like to know who he gave  
 13 orders to to destroy papers, the names.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, that is later in the week.

15 Mr. Richardson: Let me ask the chairman this: This is  
 16 the testimony by this witness with reference to the fourteen  
 17 part message. Is it the desire of the committee to interro-  
 18 gate now individually on that examination of the witness as  
 19 to the fourteen part message, or is it the desire of the  
 20 committee to have me now turn from the fourteen part message  
 21 to the question of the win's message?

22 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make. Here  
 23 is a witness who has told us that he went out and carried out  
 24 orders to destroy papers and that he ordered those under his  
 25 jurisdiction to destroy them and I think that is one of the most

1 Witness Safford Questions by: Mr. Richardson  
2 important things before us and I suggest that we proceed to  
3 it immediately.

4 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I move that the counsel  
5 proceed with the whole examination of this witness on every  
6 point that there is and then when the committee gets to ex-  
7 amining him it will be an over-all coverage, just like we  
8 have done with every other witness.

9 The Vice Chairman: I am really inclined to think that  
10 would be the better course. In other words, counsel, you  
11 conduct the examination of this witness as you have on the  
12 others.

13 Mr. Richardson: Until I am through.

14 The Vice Chairman: Until you get through and then the  
15 committee will inquire.

16 Mr. Richardson: Now, go right ahead, Captain, if you  
17 think of anything that you have overlooked.

18 Captain Safford: I asked him if he was certain that the--

19 Mr. Richardson: You asked who?

20 Captain Safford: Kramer if he thought that the President  
21 had seen it that night and he said he thought he did; that --

22 The Vice Chairman: Repeat that, Captain. I am sorry, I  
23 did not hear it.

24 Captain Safford: Kramer said he thought that the Presi-  
25 dent had seen it that night; that the naval aide to the Presi-

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ent, Admiral Bearall, was a dinner guest at Admiral Wilkin-  
3 son's and that he had phoned in at the White House and that the  
4 aide had informed him that the President had seen those  
5 thirteen parts and the President then had expressed the de-  
6 sire to do everything possible to get the fourteenth part to  
7 him as soon as it came in.

8 Mr. Richardson: Can you think of anything else now?

9 Captain Safford: Not on the fourteen parts.

10 Mr. Richardson: All right. Now, Captain, a few moments  
11 ago you referred to a meeting later in the week at which some  
12 instructions were given with respect to a whispering campaign  
13 and about destruction of notes. When did that take place?

14 Captain Safford: It was probably a Thursday or Friday fol-  
15 lowing the 7th of December.

16 Mr. Richardson: And in whose office?

17 Captain Safford: It was in the office of the Director  
18 of Naval Communications.

19 Mr. Richardson: That would be Wilkinson?

20 Captain Safford: That would be Admiral Noyes' office.

21 Mr. Richardson: And who were present?

22 Captain Safford: All the section heads who were on duty  
23 at that time and who were present in the building that day.

24 Mr. Richardson: And as far as you can remember then give  
25 me the names. Who presided?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Captain Safford: Admiral Noyes presided at the meeting.

3 Then he was called away --

4 Mr. Richardson: Who was Admiral Noyes?

5 Captain Safford: He was the Director of Naval Communi-  
6 cations.

7 Mr. Richardson: All right. Go ahead, now.

8 Captain Safford: He was called away some time before the  
9 conference broke up and Captain Reimond, the Assistant Direc-  
10 tor of Naval Communications, took on in his place.

11 This word was given us, came down in the name of the  
12 Chief of Naval Operations. It seemed a perfectly logical  
13 and reasonable order. We were in an emergency situation and  
14 there was panic running through the Navy Department at that  
15 particular time and there were desperate measures used, it  
16 seemed, to get the situation in hand.

17 Mr. Murphy: I suggest to counsel, he says it came down  
18 in the name of the Chief of Naval Operations. Was it writ-  
19 ten?

20 Mr. Richardson: How did it come down, orally or in writ-  
21 ing?

22 Captain Safford: It came down orally. I presumed there  
23 had been an earlier conference in Admiral Stark's office.

24 Mr. Richardson: And who purported to convey the infor-  
25 mation in the first instance, what person?

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Captain Safford: The Director of Naval Communications.

3 Mr. Richardson: Who was that?

4 Captain Safford: Rear Admiral Noyes.

5 Mr. Richardson: Just what did he say as near as you can  
6 recall it? How did he phrase what he had to tell you? Give  
7 me your best recollection, that is all I want, Captain.

8 Captain Safford: He started off that there were alto-  
9 gether too many rumors running around the Navy Department and  
10 people running to the newspapers telling them, they were get-  
11 ting in the newspapers and on the radio, they were saying all  
12 manner of things against Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch  
13 which were not true, that we had to put a stop to that, that  
14 we would have to stop these rumors ourselves, if we knew  
15 anything let it lie with us, pass that word to our subordi-  
16 nates; we have got to stop this thing and not originate any  
17 rumors ourselves or any suspicion or anything.

18 He said if anybody wanted to talk they would be given  
19 all the opportunity to talk that they wanted because there  
20 would be an official investigation held and we could appear  
21 on the witness stand under oath and be responsible for what  
22 we said.

23 He said, "Furthermore, if you have got any notes or any-  
24 thing in writing, destroy them because somebody might see  
25 them and start something which you don't intend."

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 It seemed a perfectly logical and fair order at the time.

3 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, you had present, according to  
4 the record, yourself and Admiral Noyes and Captain Reimond.  
5 Can you think of anyone else who was there?

6 Captain Safford: I am not certain what ranks they hold  
7 now. They were all Captains at the time.

8 Captain Patterson I believe was there; Captain F. O.  
9 Willenbacher. I could probably get a list of the other sec-  
10 tion heads on duty at the time. I cannot remember them all  
11 from memory.

12 Mr. Murphy: Will you give us your present recollection?

13 The Vice Chairman: Give us your present recollection of  
14 all who were present. Give them slowly and if there is any  
15 doubt about the spelling of the name give the spelling of the  
16 name to the reporter.

17 Senator Lucas: And also what department they were the  
18 head of.

19 Mr. Murphy: If you know.

20 Senator Lucas: If you know.

21 Mr. Murphy: We have already, I think, the names of  
22 Noyes, Reimond, Patterson, Willenbacher and yourself.

23 Captain Safford: I could not give any more names at the  
24 present time without a chance to refresh my memory, without  
25 guessing. I did not expect to make this statement, I did

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 not expect this matter to come up at all. I am totally un-  
3 prepared to answer that question any further.

4 Mr. Richardson: Were you given any direction to destroy  
5 any files or official records?

6 Captain Safford: We were not given any instructions to  
7 destroy files or any official records.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, did you destroy any notes as a re-  
9 sult of that direction?

10 Captain Safford: I destroyed all the notes I had pre-  
11 pared.

12 Mr. Richardson: Did you destroy any note that had re-  
13 ference to the fourteen part message?

14 Captain Safford: Only such notes as I had made concern-  
15 ing the time of delivery, yes, I did.

16 Mr. Richardson: And those were the notes you had made  
17 when Kramer reported to you?

18 Captain Safford: When Kramer reported to me.

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, we have spoken of the fourteenth  
20 part message. There was a part of that message that con-  
21 tained the equivalent of one o'clock P.M. Was that a part of  
22 the fourteenth part?

23 Captain Safford: No, that was a separate message, Number  
24 907.

25 Mr. Richardson: Did it come in in the same sort of a code

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

that the other message did?

Captain Safford: It came in the same sort of a code exactly except that it was in Japanese and had to be translated.

Mr. Murphy: May I inquire, counsel? Will you have him give the names of the people that he gave orders to to destroy it? I think that is important.

Mr. Richardson: Did you give any specific orders yourself, based upon what Admiral Noyes said, to any other persons with reference to the destruction of any of their notes?

Captain Safford: I passed these orders down to my immediate subordinates whom I can name.

Mr. Murphy: Can or cannot?

Captain Safford: I can.

Mr. Murphy: Will you name them, please, the ones that you gave orders to to destroy notes?

Captain Safford: Captain G. W. Welker, OP 20-GX. That was his official designation. Captain L. W. Parke, OP 20-GY. Captain A. D. Kramer, OP 20-GZ. These were the people it directly applied to.

Mr. Murphy: How about Linn?

Captain Safford: I probably also told Linn the same thing, although Linn came under Parke and we would have depended upon Parke to do it.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Murphy: How about Brotherhood?

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Captain Safford: Brotherhood was only one of the watch officers who came in there under Linn. I did not give it to the watch officers individually, with the possible exception of Linn, who was the senior watch officer.

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Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to object but it seems to me that there is quite a radical departure from the usual practice of the committee. I thought it was understood that counsel was to examine the witness and when he is through each individual member of the committee would have a right to go into any matter that he wanted to. I do not want to interrupt the witness or the counsel during his examination.

Mr. Richardson: I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I rather welcome Mr. Murphy's suggestions. I have no objection.

The Chairman: Well, the chair will say that the point made by Congressman Keefe is well taken, although the members have since the beginning of the hearing violated it by interjecting questions during the interrogation of counsel and other members of the committee, but the chair thinks it ought to be observed. If the witness makes a statement that any member of the committee does not understand or gives some name that is indistinct the member has a right, of course, to clarify that, but the chair thinks that counsel and mem-

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 bers of the committee when they are interrogating a witness  
3 should be permitted to do so without interruption.

4 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, you stated that the so-  
5 called one o'clock section of the message came in in a sep-  
6 arate message in Japanese.

7 Captain Safford: In Japanese.

8 Mr. Richardson: That was different from the way the  
9 first fourteen parts came in?

10 Captain Safford: Yes, because they were in English.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, do you know, or was it reported to  
12 you how long after the fourteenth part came in that the one  
13 o'clock message came in?

14 Captain Safford: The two parts came in about half an  
15 hour or an hour apart, maybe closer.

16 Mr. Richardson: Well, then, what was your information  
17 that you got on Monday as to when the one o'clock message  
18 came in and was ready for delivery on Sunday?

19 Captain Safford: It was ready for delivery some time  
20 Sunday morning.

21 Mr. Richardson: You cannot be more definite than that?

22 Captain Safford: I cannot be more definite from my  
23 memory.

24 Mr. Richardson: Now, is it your distinct recollection,  
25 Captain, that Lieutenant Kramer told you that this thirteen

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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part message, the arrival of the thirteen part message had been telephoned to Admiral Stark on Saturday night?

Captain Safford: That was his report to me, - it is my recollection that it was his report to me at the time. I asked him about that particularly because everybody else in authority had received a written copy in person and Admiral Stark had not and I particularly asked him about that, "Did Admiral Stark get it?" And he said, "Yes." He assured me that Admiral Stark knew about that message.

Mr. Richardson: Do you know whether any part of the thirteen part message as such had been sent to Hawaii? I am speaking of the thirteen parts now.

Captain Safford: I know that none of that was ever sent to Hawaii. I did not know that Monday morning, I will add.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: From your experience in that office, did you regard the 13-part section of the whole message as important?

Captain Safford: I regarded the first 13 parts just as important as the 14th part.

Mr. Richardson: Was there anything about the first 13 parts that was unusual?

Captain Safford: The Japanese, for the first time in the whole series of negotiations, became very abusive in their language in an official note to be presented to the United States Government.

Mr. Richardson: And what conclusion did you draw or would you draw, in view of your experience, with those messages, from the tone of those first 13 parts?

Captain Safford: That they were breaking off diplomatic relations with the presentation of that note, and this was particularly in view of the instructions which they had given in the pilot message about its presentation and holding its presentation until they were told to do it.

Mr. Murphy: What was that last?

Captain Safford: Holding the presentation until they were told to present it.

Mr. Richardson: That made you intensely interested, did it not, in the 14th part that was coming?

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Safford

Question by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Then will you explain to me why it was that you made no inquiry about the 14th part of the message until you got to your office on Monday? Why did not you call up Sunday morning the first thing and find out about the 14th part? Have you any explanation for that?

Captain Safford: I have an explanation that is perfectly logical in my own mind.

Mr. Richardson: Give it to me.

Captain Safford: I stayed out late Saturday night. I was eating breakfast in my pajamas and bathrobe when I received a telephone call from the watch officer that the Japanese had attacked Hawaii. I realized there had been a slip and a bad slip high up in the Navy Department.

Senator Lucas: What was that last?

Captain Safford: That there was a slip in the Navy Department, high up. I told the watch officer I would be on call, I would not leave my house, but if my presence was needed in the Navy Department I would go down, but I would not go down unless called for.

Mr. Richardson: Did you make any reference at all to the 14th part of the message?

Captain Safford: I did not make any reference to the 14th part to him that I can recall.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: Before you left at 4:30, Captain, did you read and understand the character of the parts of the 14-part message that had come in up to the time you left?

Captain Safford: Enough to realize that it was the 14th part of it that they were talking about.

Mr. Richardson: Did you read it far enough to conclude that there was anything unusual about it?

Captain Safford: To conclude that it was particularly hot, and it was probably the last message we would ever receive from the Japanese.

Mr. Richardson: Would you say you read enough of it to arouse your curiosity as to what the rest of it would be?

Captain Safford: Not curiosity. It gave me a sample of what the rest of it would be.

Mr. Richardson: At any rate, whatever you knew about it, when you left your office at 4:30 you did not thereafter make any inquiry with reference to it until you came to your office on Monday?

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Mr. Richardson: Your office was then on a 24-hour basis?

Captain Safford: My office was on a 24-hour basis since the first of February, 1941.

Mr. Richardson: Then there were in your office persons to whom you could have telephoned on Sunday morning and gotten

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 the particulars of whatever had happened to the 14th part  
2 message?

3 Captain Safford: That is correct.

4 Mr. Richardson: Did you receive any telephone from  
5 anybody until you got the telephone about the attack?

6 Captain Safford: Not that I can definitely recall. I  
7 usually got three or four telephone calls at night and one  
8 more or less telephone call made no impression on me whatsoever.  
9 I imagine I was called and told what they had delivered and  
10 I promptly forgot about it. I cannot say I recall receiving  
11 any calls until I received the call that the attack was on.

12 Mr. Richardson: You are quite sure that there was  
13 no telephone to you that had any reference specifically to  
14 this so-called 14th part message?

15 Captain Safford: I can recall nothing about the 14th  
16 part specifically.

17 Mr. Richardson: Was there anything said about the 14-part  
18 message in this conference that you had later in the week  
19 that you testified to?

20 Captain Safford: There was no mention of the 14-part  
21 message whatsoever.

22 Mr. Richardson: Did you talk to anybody else about  
23 the 14-part message after you talked with Kramer on Monday  
24 when you got back and got his report?  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Captain Safford: I asked Kramer if a warning message had been sent out and he said he thought of course it had been, but that would be for his superior officers and he did not know.

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Mr. Richardson: How far did you live from your office?

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Captain Safford: About two miles.

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Mr. Richardson: Have you anything further, Captain, that you would like to tell the committee with reference to the 14-part message, or the 14th part, or the 1:00 o'clock end of it, or the pilot message? Is there anything further you would like to tell the committee?

Captain Safford: In checking up on the message afterwards we discovered that Tokyo filed the first 13 parts as separate messages a few minutes apart over a span of about three or four hours, apparently, to finish encoding it. Then they delayed about 12 hours before they filed the 14th part. We received the messages, or the parts of it in approximately the same order and the same span of time in which filed. Our people had thought for a long time that they had missed the 14th part, or for some reason we failed to intercept it, and they put in some very worried hours, the men who watched it, and they were very relieved themselves when the 14th part came in and they knew their job was done.

Mr. Richardson: How long was it from the time that

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1  
2 they reported to you that the first part came in until the  
3 14th part showed up?

4 Captain Safford: It was roughly 12 hours.

(5) 5 Mr. Richardson: Now was there anyone else at this  
6 meeting later in the week, when there was this admonition  
7 from Admiral Noyes, was there anyone else there from your  
8 immediate section but you?

9 Captain Safford: I was the only one from my immediate  
10 section.

11 Mr. Richardson: What time of day was that meeting?

12 Captain Safford: In the morning, I would say around  
13 10:00 o'clock, 10:00 or 10:30.

14 Mr. Richardson: How long did it last?

15 Captain Safford: About 15 minutes.

16 Mr. Richardson: When you left it did you go right  
17 back to your section?

18 Captain Safford: I went right back to my section,  
19 called my section heads in and passed the news to them.

20 Mr. Richardson: Orally?

21 Captain Safford: Orally; nothing in writing.

22 Mr. Richardson: And told them just what Noyes told you?

23 Captain Safford: Just what I had been told, and if  
24 they had any notes about the thing, to get rid of them.  
25 There was nothing said about destruction of official papers.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1  
2 Mr. Richardson: Can you tell us a little more in detail  
3 as to what you said? Is your recollection keen enough to  
4 tell us just what you said to your men?

5 Captain Safford: As well as I could I passed on to  
6 them the exact words that had been given to me.

7 Mr. Richardson: Was there any discussion of that?

8 Captain Safford: There was no discussion. It seemed  
9 the correct thing to do under the circumstances.

10 Mr. Richardson: You had no idea, did you, Captain,  
11 that you were being asked to do anything that was improper  
12 or surreptitious?

13 Captain Safford: Absolutely not, or I would not have  
14 done it.

15 Mr. Richardson: You have no sense of embarrassment  
16 or shame for transmitting the report to your division heads?

17 Captain Safford: None at all.

18 Mr. Richardson: Now when this message would come in,  
19 as you testified it did, would it be taken by one man or  
20 would several people cooperate in receiving it?

21 Captain Safford: I did not quite understand the question.

22 Mr. Richardson: You had how many watch officers on  
23 duty?

24 Captain Safford: We had two men on watch, an officer  
25 and Chief Petty Officer on a particular system. We had



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 four of each on the watch list, and each one stood 8 hours  
2 on and 16 off.

3 Mr. Richardson: Would such a message, when it came  
4 in, be handled by one man or more than one man?

5 Captain Safford: By two men together.

6 Mr. Richardson: It would take two men to handle this  
7 14-part message as it came in?

8 Captain Safford: The 14-part message, in order to save  
9 time we called the Army in and they ran off part of it on  
10 their machine in the Munitions Building, and part of it  
11 was run on our machine in the Navy Building.

12 Mr. Richardson: How long after the pilot message came  
13 in did you ask the Army for help?

14 Captain Safford: We did not ask the Army for help  
15 until about 3:00 p.m. when the rest of the 14-part message  
16 came in and decided with what we had it was more than we  
17 could handle.

18 Mr. Richardson: Then you wanted help?

19 Captain Safford: Then we wanted help.

20 Mr. Richardson: And you called on the Army?

21 Captain Safford: We called on the Army.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now who called on the Army? Did you?

23 Captain Safford: Commander Kramer called the Army  
24 and got in touch with some officer over there and he called  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

(6)

1 some of his people.

2 Mr. Richardson: Would they come to your office?

3 Captain Safford: They worked in their own office on  
4 their own machine.

5 Mr. Richardson: And then when all the work was done  
6 it was brought together as a complete job?

7 Captain Safford: It was brought together as a complete  
8 job.

9 Mr. Richardson: What did you mean by your reference  
10 a few moments ago of having it translated by the Army?

11 Captain Safford: That was the 1:00 p.m. message. It  
12 is in Japanese and we did not have a Japanese-speaking  
13 officer on watch, so we had to send it over to the Army  
14 where they arranged for that Sunday, they would handle any  
15 transmission, because Kramer had all these appointments  
16 with Admiral Stark and with Secretary Knox.

17 Mr. Richardson: Do you speak Japanese?

18 Captain Safford: No, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: Kramer does, does he not?

20 Captain Safford: Kramer does.

21 Mr. Richardson: Have you anything further now that  
22 you would like to tell us that has any reference to the  
23 14-part message, or any part of it?

24 Captain Safford: I would like to say this, that calling  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 extra men in the Navy would not have speeded up any work  
2 because we only had one machine and could only run one  
3 thing at a time. We had to call the Army people, to use  
4 their machine over in their own office.

5 Furthermore, the 6th was supposed to be the Army's  
6 day of responsibility, and the only reason we were handling  
7 this message was because we were standing a 24-hour watch,  
8 week-ends and everything else, and that is the reason for  
9 breaking the normal day's duty that was carried on up until  
10 this time. I think they went on a 24-hour basis at 6:00  
11 p.m. on Saturday 6 December 1941.

12 Mr. Richardson: How long have you known Commander  
13 Kramer?

14 Captain Safford: He had served under me two years, I  
15 believe.

16 Mr. Richardson: I now want to ask you some questions,  
17 Captain, about what is known as the winds code.

18 How many times, in how many different investigations  
19 of this Pearl Harbor matter, have you testified?

20 Captain Safford: I have testified four times.

21 Mr. Richardson: In which hearings?

22 Captain Safford: I testified before Admiral Hart,  
23 before the Navy Court of Inquiry, before the Army Board of  
24 Investigation, before Admiral Hewitt, but I was not permitted  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 to testify before the Roberts Commission.

2  
3 Mr. Richardson: And in each of those examinations you  
4 testified in considerable detail to the various particulars  
5 in connection with what we call the winds code and winds  
6 code execute?

7 Captain Safford: That is correct.

8 Mr. Richardson: And when you were called, you knew you  
9 were going to be a witness here, you prepared a written  
10 statement as indicating what you wished to present to the  
11 committee on the winds code?

12 Captain Safford: That is correct.

13 Mr. Richardson: And would you like to read that in  
14 presentation to the committee at this time?

15 Captain Safford: I would.

16 Mr. Richardson: With the committee's permission I  
17 would ask him to read it.

18 The Chairman: Without objection, it will be read.

19 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, in order to save time,  
20 I believe every member of the committee has read the state-  
21 ment, and I was just wondering whether or not counsel could  
22 proceed to examine him on it and let the statement go in the  
23 record at this time?

24 I do not care to read it again. I would rather have  
25 counsel get through with his examination.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Keefe: I would like to hear the witness read  
2 this statement.

3 The Chairman: All right. Proceed to read it.

4 Mr. Keefe: I have read it carefully, but I would  
5 like to have him read it.

6 The Chairman: Go ahead and read it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

9 Mr. Gearhart : Mr. Chairman, I forgot to bring my  
10 copy over. Is there an extra copy?

11 Senator Lucas: I would like to have a copy too,  
12 as long as he is going to read it.

13 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, before the starting of the  
14 reading of this statement, I would like to say I think  
15 Captain Safford has put parts in this statement that reveal  
16 certain mechanics which should not be revealed. I think  
17 the Captain knows where they are. However, the statement  
18 has been given out so the press and everybody else has  
19 it. I will call attention to that when you come to it.

20 Mr. Keefe: Everything is revealed in the letters of  
21 Dewey and Marshall.

22 The Chairman: We will not go into the Dewey and  
23 Marshall letters. Everything that has been produced before  
24 this committee has been produced without any deletion or  
25

Witness Safford

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1 any exceptions to it, and we will make no exception in  
2 this case. You will read toe entire statement.

3 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, as one member of the com-  
4 mittee when we come to that part, I would just like to  
5 enter my protest.

6 The Chairman: All right. It will be entered. Enter  
7 it now.

8 Mr. Murphy: I do not want to single it out now,  
9 but I have it marked.

10 The Chairman: Will you go ahead, Captain?

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir. The statement regarding  
12 the winds message will start with --

13 PREVIEW

14 There was a Winds Message. It meant War -- and we  
15 knew it meant War. By the best estimate that can be made  
16 from my recollection and the circumstantial evidence now  
17 available, the "Winds Message" was part of a Japanese  
18 Overseas "New" Broadcast from Station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980  
19 kilocycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich Civil Time on  
20 Thursday, December 4, 1941. This time corresponded to 10:30  
21 p. m. Tokyo time and 8:30 a. m. Washington time, December  
22 4, 1941. The broadcast was probably in Japanese Morse code,  
23 and was originally written in the Kata-Kana form of written,  
24 plain-language Japanese. It was intercepted by the U. S.  
25

Witness Safford

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1 Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham,  
2 Maryland, which serves the Navy Department. It was re-  
3 corded on a special typewriter, developed by the Navy,  
4 which types the Roman-letter equivalents of the Japanese  
5 characters.

6 Mr. Murphy: That is the part I do not think should be  
7 in this statement, Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman: We will note your objection to the  
9 reading of that at this point.

10 Mr. Murphy: I just want to say I do not think the  
11 witness should go into the mechanics of how this thing was  
12 done.

13 The Chairman: What is the will of the committee about  
14 it?

15 Mr. Murphy: All the papers have been given copies.  
16 I just call attention to that fact, that it is improper  
17 to do it.

18 The Chairman: Go ahead and read it. If the Chair  
19 is going to pass on it, he will hold that it will all  
20 be read without deletion.

21 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman?

22 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

23 Mr. Keefe: May I interrupt at this time to ask the  
24 Captain who is an officer in the United States Navy, and  
25

Witness Safford

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1 Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham,  
2 Maryland, which serves the Navy Department. It was re-  
3 corded on a special typewriter, developed by the Navy,  
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5 characters.

6 Mr. Murphy: That is the part I do not think should be  
7 in this statement, Mr. Chairman.

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9 reading of that at this point.

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11 witness should go into the mechanics of how this thing was  
12 done.

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14 it?

15 Mr. Murphy: All the papers have been given copies.  
16 I just call attention to that fact, that it is improper  
17 to do it.

18 The Chairman: Go ahead and read it. If the Chair  
19 is going to pass on it, he will hold that it will all  
20 be read without deletion.

21 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman?

22 The Chairman: Mr. Keefe.

23 Mr. Keefe: May I interrupt at this time to ask the  
24 Captain who is an officer in the United States Navy, and  
25



Witness Safford

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1 who has carefully prepared this statement who knows the  
2 limitations that have been placed upon him in statements  
3 heretofore made by the committee, whether or not there is  
4 anything in this statement that, in his judgment as an  
5 expert in this field, reveals anything that would be of  
6 value today to any potential or real enemy of the United  
7 States?

8 Captain Safford: No, sir. I have gone over this  
9 whole statement with the legal representative of the Direc-  
10 tor of Naval Communications.

11 Mr. Keefe: And it has his approval?

12 Captain Safford: His qualified approval.

13 Mr. Keefe: I mean as to the question raised by  
14 Congressman Murphy.

15 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

16 The Chairman: Go ahead and read it.

17 Captain Safford: And it has been given thorough weight  
18 by me.

19 The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded to the Navy  
20 Department by TWX (teletypewriter exchange) from the tele-  
21 type-transmitter in the "Intercept" receiving room at  
22 Cheltenham to "WA91", the page-printer located beside the  
23 GY Watch Officer's desk, in the Navy Department Communication  
24 Intelligence Unit under my command. I saw the Winds Message  
25

Witness Safford

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1 typed in page form on yellow tletype paper, with the trans-  
2 lation written below. I immediately forwarded this message to  
3 my Commanding Officer (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, USN),  
4 thus fully discharging my responsibility in the matter.

5 PREPARATIONS FOR INTERCEPTION

6 There are various sources of the so-called "Winds  
7 Code," two of which have already been introduced as evi-  
8 dence: Tokyo Circular 2353 on page 154 of Exhibit No. 1  
9 and Tokyo Circular 2354 on page 155 of Exhibit No. 1. The  
10 most important source was Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet  
11 secret dispatch 281430 of November 28, 1941, addressed  
12 for information to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet  
13 and Commandant 14th Naval District -- thus letting them  
14 in on the secret. I had taken no action personally on the  
15 first tip-off (Tokyo Circular 2354), because I was still  
16 awaiting the instructions of higher authority. CINCAF  
17 281430 together with Tokyo Circular 2353 and other collateral  
18 intercept information apparently made an impression upon  
19 the Director of Naval Intelligence, for he immediately  
20 sent word to me, through the Director of Naval Communica-  
21 tions, that he wished the Communication Intelligence  
22 Organization to make every attempt to intercept any message  
23 sent in accordance with the Winds Codes. It was a request  
24 from Admiral Wilkinson and an order from Admiral Noyes.  
25

Witness safford

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1 I hastened to comply, with the secondary motive that it  
2 would be a feather in our cap if the Navy got it and our  
3 sister service didn't.

4 Just about the time I received Admiral Wilkinson's  
5 request, I was shown Tokyo to Washington Serial 843,  
6 dated November 27, 1941, prescribing a "schedule of (Tokyo News)  
7 Broadcasts," which gave me something tangible to work with  
8 as well as giving added meaning to the Winds Code. The  
9 "November 29 deadline" indicated that the Winds Code might  
10 be used to notify overseas officials as to things which  
11 would "automatically begin to happen." Tokyo Circulars  
12 2353 and 2354 blueprinted what this action would be. Tokyo  
13 Serial 843 implied that such notification would be made.  
14 After a conference with my subordinates, I drafted a summary  
15 of Tokyo Serial 843 (or had Kramer do it for me) , had it  
16 coded in the COPEK system, and released it myself at 6 p.m.  
17 (Washington time) on November 28, 1941. This secret message  
18 was transmitted "Priority" to the Commandants of the 14th  
19 and 16th Naval Districts for action, and to the Commander-  
20 in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet for information,  
21 and may be identified as OPNAV 282301. This took care of  
22 our overseas Communication Intelligence Units; they now had  
23 all the available technical information on the subject.  
24 I know that they monitored the Tokyo Voice Broadcasts; I  
25

Witness Safford

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1 also know that Corregidor monitored the Tokyo Morse  
2 Broadcasts; in fact, Corregidor and Heeia went beyond their  
3 instructions and guarded the Tokyo Broadcasts 24 hours a  
4 day. Captain Rochefort and Commander Lietwiler can verify  
5 this.

6 I discussed the situation with Commander Welker, in  
7 charge of the intercept and direction-finder stations, and  
8 with Chief Radioman Lewis, his technical assistant. Our  
9 prospects for interception looked somewhat dubious. We  
10 were not encouraged when a day or two later Washington and  
11 Rio objected to the new frequency assignments and Rome  
12 complained about the poor quality of the Tokyo Voice Broad-  
13 casts.

14 I would like to digress long enough to invite the atten-  
15 tion of the committee to the fact that OPNAV 282301 is not  
16 included in the "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches" (Exhibit No.37),  
17 and that Tokyo Serial 843 (JD-1 #6899: SIS #25446) is not  
18 included in the "Intercepted Japanese Diplomatic Messages"  
19 (Exhibit No. 1). Three other relevant intercepts not appear-  
20 ing in Exhibit No. 1 are also of interest at this point, namely:  
21 Washington to Tokyo Serial 1197 of November 27, 1941 (JD-1  
22 #6908: SIS #25476), Rio to Tokyo Serial 482 of November  
23 30, 1941 (JD-1 #6982: SIS 25571), Rome to Tokyo Serial  
24 768 of November 29, 1941 (JD-1 #6981: SIS #25604).

25 These 5 documents should be introduced as evidence for the  
purposes of record.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Safford

1  
2 Welker, Lewis and I agreed that 5160 kilocycles would  
3 probably come in nicely at Manila and at Pearl Harbor.  
4 Station JHL was of too low power to reach the greater  
5 distances to the continental United States. 9430 kilocycles  
6 appeared a bit high for a night frequency in winter, as  
7 far as the West Coast was concerned. There did not seem  
8 to be a remote possibility of the 11980 kilocycles and  
9 12265 kilocycles being heard by any station in the Pacific  
10 Ocean or along either shore at the time of day scheduled.

11 Nevertheless, we decided to have Bainbridge Island  
12 monitor the Tokyo Morse Code Broadcasts on the chance  
13 that the times given in Tokyo Serial 843 might not be given  
14 in Tokyo time or the schedules could be heard because of  
15 freak conditions.

16 We did not order Bainbridge Island to monitor the  
17 Tokyo Voice Broadcasts because its two sound recorders were  
18 guarding the two ends of the Tokyo-San Francisco radio  
19 telephone circuit. Our estimates for Bainbridge Island  
20 were closely realized: Excellent receivability at the  
21 wrong time of day and almost a complete "black-out" of  
22 reception on the higher frequencies during the period  
23 scheduled for the winds message broadcast.

24 We agreed that the best chance of intercepting the  
25 listed schedules (other than those on 5160 kilocycles) was

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

1 on the East Coast of the United States. During the winter  
2 months the East Coast had good reception of Tokyo during  
3 the few hours included in the schedules. Our best bet was  
4 Cheltenham, which had been guarding the MAM (Tokyo) Broad-  
5 casts to Japanese merchant vessels, so we had up-to-the-  
6 minute data on the receivability of Tokyo.  
7

8 According to my memory we decided to play safe and  
9 have all East Coast intercept stations monitor the Tokyo  
10 broadcasts. We agreed it would be impossible to hear  
11 voice broadcasts from Tokyo on the East Coast and therefore  
12 did not attempt it. We did not order Guam or Imperial  
13 Beach (California) to monitor any of the Tokyo broadcast  
14 schedules.

15 Commander Welker or I sent TWX messages directing the  
16 intercept stations at Bainbridge Island (Washington) and  
17 at Cheltenham (Maryland) to monitor the schedules given  
18 in Tokyo Serial 843 as first priority and to forward all  
19 plain-language Japanese intercepts on these schedules to  
20 the Navy Department by teletype. We may have sent these  
21 instructions to other stations also. We did not want  
22 English or coded messages -- only written Japanese. We  
23 gave the same instructions to both stations, and sent them  
24 out immediately after releasing the previously mentioned  
25 OPNAV 282301.

## Witness Safford

1  
2 I have confirmation of the above orders plus knowledge  
3 of existing receiving conditions in the monthly reports  
4 from Cheltenham, Winter Harbor, and Bainbridge Island,  
5 extracts from which are quoted below:

## 6 Station "M" (Cheltenham) - Operations - November 1941

7 Receiving conditions throughout the month were  
8 very good on all frequencies. Atmospheric disturbances  
9 have been at a minimum. Orders received from OP-20-GX  
10 at 2315 (GCT) November 28, via teletype to give  
11 highest priority to various broadcasts at designated  
12 Japanese broadcast stations. These schedules were  
13 covered and found to be press broadcasts sent in  
14 both Kana and English. Log sheets were forwarded to  
15 OP-20-GX daily with regular traffic files.

## 16 Station "M" (Cheltenham) - Operations - December 1941

17 Receiving conditions during the month were fair  
18 to good on all frequencies. At 2300, 7 December 1941,  
19 telephone orders received from OP-20-GX to drop the  
20 Tokyo JJC/MAM schedules and assignments; continued  
21 watch for Orange activity.

## 22 Station "W" (Winter Harbor) - Operations - December 1941

23 Receiving conditions in general. Daily attempts  
24 were made to intercept Tokyo and Osaka channels employed  
25 to Europe, but only on a few occasions was any intercept

Witness Safford

1 possible.

2 Station "S" (Bainbridge Island) - Operations - November 1941

3 During the month of November a sharp increase has  
4 been noticed in the amount of message traffic sent  
5 on the Kana General Information Broadcasts. Where  
6 before we seldom averaged more than one or two such  
7 messages monthly, it is now not unusual for two or  
8 three such messages to appear daily. These messages  
9 are sent in both number code and Kana.

10  
11 On 28 November, a directive was received by TWX  
12 from Op-20-GX which called for coverage of the following  
13 stations at times specified, with priority transmission  
14 of intercepted material by TWX. Times listed were  
15 given as PST. Because the use of PST time designation  
16 is unusual, we asked for a verification, but were told  
17 that time zone was uncertain and verification was not  
18 possible.

19 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if the  
20 witness would tell us as he goes along what those symbols  
21 mean.

22 Captain Safford: Yes. TWX was the teletype exchange.  
23 You call the switchboard. They plug you in and charge you  
24 by the minute.

25 PST is Pacific Standard Time. And GCT, Greenwich Civil



Witness Safford

Time.

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<u>PST</u>	<u>GCT</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>
0100	(0900)	JVJ	12275
0130	(0930)	JUO	9430
0200	(1000)	JVJ	12275
0300	(1100)	JHL	5160
0400	(1200)	JHL	5160
0500	(1300)	JHL	5160
0530	(1330)	JHP	11980

Since the time zone indicated was not certain we were faced with the possibility that the time could be either GCT, PST, zone - 9, or even a combination of these. As soon as the directive was received we started copying all broadcasts of this same type which were readable at "S". We found that in some cases other stations were tied in with the stations listed in the original directive, and that although we could not copy the station listed we could copy the cornetted channel carrying the same broadcast.

The stations and times that we can copy are listed below. Time used is GCT.

<u>GCT</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>CORNETTED WITH</u>
0000	JVJ	12275	JUP
0030	JUD	15880	JVJ/JAU2
0100	JUD	15880	JVJ

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## Witness Safford

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<u>GCT</u>	<u>STATION</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>CORRELATED WITH</u>
0130	JVJ	12275	
0200	JVJ	12275	
0230	JVJ	12275	JUP/JUD
0300	JVJ	12275	JUD
0330	JVJ	12275	JUD
0400	JVJ	12275	
0430	JVJ	12275	
0500	JVJ	12275	JUD
1300	JHL	5160	
2200	JVJ	12275	
2300	JVJ	12275	
2330	JVJ	12275	

The important thing is that with the exception of the 1300 schedule from station JHL on 5160 kilocycles there was a complete "black-out" for 16 or 18 hours where no broadcasts from Tokyo could be heard and the schedules on which we expected the winds message came in the middle of this long period of "black-out".

At my instructions, or at least with my concurrence, Commander Welker consulted with his opposite number in the War Department, Captain Schukraft, and ascertained that the Army was monitoring for the winds message at San Francisco, and possibly elsewhere, but was not monitoring

Witness Safford

1 for the winds message anywhere on the East Coast of the  
2 United States. I do not know what sort of instructions  
3 the Army gave its intercept stations. I do not know why  
4 the Army failed to monitor for the winds message on the  
5 East Coast of the United States; Colonel Sadtler or  
6 Colonel Schukraft may remember.

7 I believe that the above-mentioned conference was  
8 held before we issued instructions to our own intercept  
9 stations.

10 The F.C.C. was requested by the War Department to  
11 monitor for the winds message on the Tokyo voice broadcasts  
12 and was given the code words of Tokyo Circular 2353 but  
13 without their meaning. The F.C.C. was not furnished the  
14 Tokyo broadcast schedules nor any mention of the fact that  
15 the winds message could come by Morse code.

16 The F. C.C. was requested to monitor the winds message  
17 at its monitor station at Portland, Oregon, and also at one  
18 of its monitoring stations on the East Coast of the United  
19 States. The latter request was not complied with because  
20 the F.C.C. doubted if voice broadcasts from Tokyo could be  
21 heard on the East Coast of the United States. The F.C.C.  
22 monitor station at Honolulu also monitored for the winds  
23 message, at the request of the local military authorities.

24 The F.C.C. monitor station at Portland, Oregon, could  
25

Witness Safford

1 not possibly have intercepted the same winds message that  
2 Cheltenham did because Cheltenham was monitoring for  
3 Morse code, exclusively, and the F.C.C. station at Portland  
4 was monitoring for voice, exclusively.  
5

6 In addition to the stations previously named, the  
7 winds message was monitored for at the following localities,  
8 to my personal knowledge:

9	Heeia, T.H.	(U.S. Navy)	Voice only
10	Corregidor, P.I.	(U.S. Navy)	Voice and Morse
11	Singapore	(British Intelligence)	-?-
12	Australia	(Australian Intelligence)	-?-
13	Java	(NEI Intelligence)	-?-

14 Intercept stations in Canada, England, and China  
15 probably watched for it too. And, of course, the Japanese  
16 diplomatic and consular stations listened for the winds  
17 message themselves on their own receiving sets.

18 On December 1, 1941, I was shown the translation of  
19 Tokyo Circular 2444 (Exhibit No. 1, page 209), advising  
20 that London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila had been  
21 ordered to destroy their code machines, and instructing  
22 Washington to retain its machine regardless of other  
23 instructions.

24 The significance of the winds message now became very  
25 clear to me and I began to take the matter most seriously.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

## Witness Safford

1 So did Colonel Sadtler, over in the War Department. The  
2 only means by which Tokyo could announce its decisions of  
3 peace or war to its overseas diplomatic representatives  
4 who had destroyed their regular codes was by means of the  
5 emergency winds code. This applied to London and the Far  
6 East but not to Washington. Higher authority in the War  
7 and Navy Departments likewise took a greatly increased  
8 interest in the winds message, and began heckling me as to  
9 the possibility of having missed it. I instituted a daily  
10 check of the incoming teletype messages to see that our  
11 intercept stations were doing as much as could be expected  
12 of them.

13  
14 One evening, about December 1, 1941, I drove out to  
15 Station "M" at Cheltenham, Maryland, and remained until  
16 about midnight. The primary purpose of my visit was to  
17 inspect the new landline telegraph for direction-finder  
18 control which had been completed at Cheltenham and the  
19 Navy Department, which was scheduled to be placed in service  
20 on December 1, 1941, but which had been delayed by in-  
21 stallation difficulties at some of the outlying stations.  
22 I made a personal check of the winds message watch and,  
23 as I recall, found that Chief Radioman Wigle was monitoring  
24 the Tokyo News Broadcasts 24 hours a day and had assigned  
25 qualified Kana operators to this duty. I have further

Witness Safford

1 documentary proof that Cheltenham was monitoring the  
2 Tokyo broadcasts in the fact that between 1200 and 1500  
3 GCT, on December 6, 1941, Cheltenham intercepted and  
4 forwarded to the Navy Department Tokyo Serials 902-2  
5 and 904, plus two other messages. This is entered in the  
6 GY log for December 6, 1941: Items Nos. 6609, 6610, 6618,  
7 and 6619. These messages were transmitted by Station JAH  
8 (Tokyo) to San Francisco on 7630 kilocycles. The Tokyo-  
9 San Francisco circuit was not a regular Cheltenham assign-  
10 ment.

11 I may summarize the preparations for interception by  
12 stating that the United States Navy listened for the winds  
13 message at Cheltenham, Maryland, and did everything that  
14 it possibly could to intercept it elsewhere, and that the  
15 other services did all that they considered reasonable.

16 INTERCEPTION

17 There is no basis for assuming that the winds message  
18 had to be sent on a voice broadcast. In 1941, the  
19 Japanese Government was sending out "General Information  
20 Broadcasts" as well as "Domei News" to its diplomatic and  
21 consular officials in foreign lands. This was partly to  
22 give speedier service, partly to permit use of the  
23 Japanese Morse Code and the Kata-Kana form of written  
24 Japanese, and partly to be independent of foreign communication  
25

Witness Safford

1 systems in emergency.

2 Each office had its own Japanese radio operator and  
3 its own short-wave receiving set. We knew it. The United  
4 States Government was doing the same thing itself, with  
5 a Navy radio operator serving at each post. The German  
6 Government was doing likewise but was a bit ahead of us,  
7 with machine reception. We used to "sample" these broad-  
8 casts periodically until the F.C.C.'s Foreign Broadcast  
9 Intelligence Service came into existence and relieved  
10 the U. S. Navy of this duty. I wish to reiterate that  
11 neither Japan, the United States, nor Germany was dependent  
12 on voice broadcasts for direct communication from the seat  
13 of government to overseas officials.

14 The radio schedules listed in Tokyo Serial 843 were  
15 in Morse (i.e., dot-and-dash) code exclusively; either  
16 Japanese Morse, International Morse, or both. We expected  
17 that the winds message would be sent in Morse Code -- and  
18 it was. If the winds message had been sent on a voice  
19 broadcast the U.S. Navy would have missed it, unless it  
20 came on a schedule receivable at Pearl Harbor or Corregidor.

21 The original documents giving details of the inter-  
22 ception of the winds message are not available. Therefore  
23 it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circum-  
24 stantial evidence and by process of elimination. Collateral  
25

Witness Safford

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3 its own short-wave receiving set. We knew it. The United  
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19 broadcast the U.S. Navy would have missed it, unless it  
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22 ception of the winds message are not available. Therefore  
23 it is necessary to reconstruct the situation from circum-  
24 stantial evidence and by process of elimination. Collateral  
25



## Witness Safford

1 information has been plotted or recorded on a single sheet,  
2 a reduced size photograph of which is appended. This  
3 graph tells the story better than words and shows just  
4 what actually happened. It should convince the most  
5 skeptical.

6 As I have previously testified, the frequency, distances,  
7 and time of day were such that the winds message could be  
8 heard on the East Coasts of the United States and Canada,  
9 while it was a physical impossibility for it to be heard  
10 (except under freak conditions) on the West Coast of the  
11 United States and Canada, Pearl Harbor, Manila, Java, and  
12 Singapore. Everything checks perfectly; there is no  
13 element of doubt as to conditions of radio wave propagation.

14 The winds message could be heard also in the North  
15 Atlantic Ocean, British Isles, and Western Europe, but it  
16 could not be heard in Burma, Australia, or in Rio de  
17 Janerio. It was sent on the so-called "European Schedule"  
18 of Tokyo's big foreign broadcasting station "J-A-P" and  
19 was intended for London. We knew that the Japanese Am-  
20 bassador in London had destroyed his secret codes three  
21 days previously; this was the only way that Tokyo could  
22 get news to him secretly. Reception or non-reception at  
23 other points was irrelevant. Tokyo knew full well, before  
24 the winds message was sent, that it probably would not be  
25

Witness Safford

1 received in Washington or in Rio. That was immaterial --  
2 the winds message was intended for London.

3 In the next sentence I would like to make a change.  
4 I would like to change the word "my" to "our", so that  
5 the sentence would read:

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follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Safford

1 Our ability to intercept it was due  
2 partly to good luck, partly to our foresight, and partly  
3 to the high quality of the Navy operators and receiving  
4 apparatus at Cheltenham.

5 The Winds Message broadcast was forwarded by teletype  
6 (TWX) from Cheltenham to the Navy Department (Op-20-GY)  
7 shortly before 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 1941. Kramer dis-  
8 tinctly recalls that the Winds Message was shown to him by  
9 the GY Watch Officer after 8:30 a.m. on that date. It was  
10 my recollection, as stated in previous testimony, that I  
11 had first seen the Winds Message a little after eight a. m.  
12 on December 4, 1941. The Winds Message broadcast was about  
13 200 words long, with the code words prescribed in Tokyo  
14 Circular 2353 appearing in the middle of the message,  
15 whereas we had expected to find the code words of Tokyo  
16 Circular 2354 in a Morse broadcast. All three "code words"  
17 were used, but the expression meaning "North Wind Cloudy"  
18 was in the negative form.

19 When I first saw the Winds Message, it had already been  
20 translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of  
21 the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communication  
22 Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code  
23 phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below  
24 the printed message was written in pencil or colored  
25

Witness Safford

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1 crayon in Kramer's handwriting, the following free trans-  
2 lations:

3 "War with England (including NEI, etc.)

4 War with the U. S.

5 Peace with Russia."

6 I am not sure of the order; but it was the same as in  
7 the broadcast and I think England appeared first. I think  
8 Kramer used "U.S." rather than "United States." It is  
9 possible that the words "No war", instead of "Peace," were  
10 used to describe Japan's intentions with regards to Russia.

11 "This is it!" said Kramer as he handed me the Winds  
12 Message. This was the broadcast we had strained every nerve  
13 to intercept. This was the feather in our cap. This was  
14 the tip-off which would prevent the U. S. Pacific Fleet  
15 being surprised at Pearl Harbor the way the Russians had  
16 been surprised at Port Arthur. This was what the Navy  
17 Communication Intelligence had been preparing for since  
18 its establishment in 1924 -- War with Japan!

19 DISTRIBUTION

20 I immediately sent the original of the Winds Message  
21 up to the Director of Naval Communications (Rear Admiral  
22 Noyes) by one of the officers serving under me and told him  
23 to deliver this paper to Admiral Noyes in person, to track  
24 him down and not take "no" for an answer, and if he could  
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Witness Safford

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

not find him in a reasonable time to let me know. I did not explain the nature or significance of the Winds Message to this officer. In a few minutes I received a report to the effect that the message had been delivered.

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or seven copies for the Army were sent over to the War Department as rapidly as possible: here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure. I have no reason for believing that the Army failed to make a prompt distribution of its translations of the Winds Message.

I am thoroughly satisfied in my own mind that Admiral Noyes telephoned to everyone on his list without delay: I cannot bring myself to imagine otherwise. There is some question as to whether the Admiral was understood, but this only shows the unreliability of telephone messages. Any

Witness Safford

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misunderstanding of what Admiral Noyes said was of negligible effect because written translations of the Winds Message were distributed within 2 or 3 hours of his telephone calls. In fact it was not until 1944 that any suggestion or criticism was offered that any official on the "Magic" distribution list - Navy, Army, State Department, or White House - had not been notified that the Winds Message had been received or that the Winds Message had been translated in any terms other than War and Peace.

My final verification of the fact that the Winds Message translation was typed and distributed lies in the fact that about December 15, 1941, I saw a copy of it in the special folder of messages which were being assembled for Admiral Noyes to present to the Roberts Commission. I checked these over with Kramer for completeness as well as for the elimination of irrelevant material. Kramer told me in 1944 that he had shown Assistant Secretary Forrestal a special set of Pre-Pearl Harbor messages about December 10, 1941, when Secretary Knox was making his personal investigation at Pearl Harbor, and that he discussed those messages with Mr. Forrestal for about two hours. This set of messages was apparently the basis and possibly the identical file that was given Admiral Noyes and shown to the Roberts Commission via Admiral Wilkinson. This was the last time I

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Safford

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1 saw the Winds message. I believe that the translation  
2 of the Winds Message was given the JD-1 Serial number of  
3 7001, because this number is missing and unaccounted for,  
4 and comes within the range of messages translated on  
5 December 3 and 4, 1941.

6 The distribution of the Winds Message was the responsi-  
7 bility of Naval Intelligence and not Naval Communications.  
8 I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the  
9 original message to Admiral Noyes and after checking  
10 Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented  
11 in a logical and understandable order.

12 ACTION TAKEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE WINDS MESSAGE.

13 About an hour after I had send the original Winds  
14 Message up to Admiral Noyes, I received a call from him on  
15 the inter-phone to the effect that we ought to tell Guam to  
16 burn their excess codes and ciphers. I replied that I was  
17 in full agreement but there were other odds and ends to  
18 be taken care of, and that I would have some messages ready  
19 for his approval by noon.

20 As a direct result of the Winds Message and other con-  
21 temporaneous information from intercepted Japanese messages,  
22 I prepared the following secret message:

23 OPNAV 041754 (Priority) - Not yet introduced as evidence.

24 OPNAV 042000 (Priority) - Not yet introduced as evidence.

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## Witness Safford

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OPNAV 042017 (Deferred) - Page 44 of Exhibit No. 37.

OPNAV 042018 (Deferred - Not yet introduced as evidence.

OPNAV 042019 (Deferred) - Not yet introduced as evidence.

I took four of these messages up to Admiral Noyes' office, cleared them through the Assistant Director of Naval Communications (Captain Joseph R. Redman) and made an appointment to see the Admiral with his secretary, as per office instruction. I was called to his office shortly before 3:00 p.m.

OPNAV 041754 was a correction to a previous Priority message, and was sent in response to a Priority service message requesting verification of the last four groups of OPNAV 040343 (page 43 of Exhibit No. 37). I released this message myself during the noon hour to save time.

OPNAV Priority 042000 for action of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16, COM 14, Guam and Samoa, made a "new Intelligence" cipher effective immediately and directed the immediate destruction of the old cipher by Guam and Samoa. This message was released by Admiral Noyes himself, and is the most important of the five which were sent on this occasion because the precedence did give some idea of urgency.

OPNAV Deferred 042017, for action of Guam and for information of CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 14 and COM 16 was sent in the new cipher made effective by OPNAV 042000. It



Witness Safford

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1 directed Guam to destroy excess cryptographic aids and  
2 other secret matter. This message was rewritten by Admiral  
3 Noyes and was released by Admiral Ingersoll. My original  
4 wording was much stronger than the message actually sent,  
5 because I had directed the destruction of everything except  
6 the system in which sent and the current edition of the  
7 Direction Finder Code. However, I was not trying to use  
8 this message as the vehicle for a war warning as I had the  
9 day before in OPNAV 031855 (page 41, Exhibit No. 37). I  
10 was just trying to insure that Grum "stripped ship"  
11 before a Japanese Commando-raid from Saipan, 100 miles  
12 away, captured a complete allowance of codes and ciphers,  
13 a matter for which I was officially responsible. Admiral  
14 Noyes made no mention of a war warning when he directed me  
15 to prepare this message and I feel sure he did not have any  
16 such warning in mind when he toned down my original draft.  
17 This message had to be sent "for Information" to CINCPAC,  
18 and others, as notification that Guam's allowance of codes  
19 and ciphers was being reduced, and as a reminder to Guam  
20 to notify the addressees what systems would be available  
21 for its future communications. This message was sent  
22 DEFERRED to insure that OPNAV 042000 would arrive well in  
23 advance and thus avoid confusion and unnecessary messages  
24 at this critical time.  
25

Witness Safford

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1 OPNAV 042018 and OPNAV 042019 are not important except  
2 that they help establish the date the Winds Message was  
3 intercepted and the time and date that the unsent warning  
4 message, prepared by Commander McCollum, was seen by me.  
5

6 EVALUATION OF THE WINDS MESSAGE

7 Evaluation of the Winds Message was not based on JD-1  
8 #6850 and #6875 alone. CINCAF 281430 gave much stronger  
9 translations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354, which dis-  
10 pelled any doubt as to whether or not WAR was meant by  
11 the literal translation:

12 "Japan - (blank) relations are in danger."

13 This message contained official British translation  
14 furnished by Singapore, from which I quote:

15 "NISHI NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI  
16 OR INVASION OF MALAY AND N.E.I."

17 That means war, no matter how worded. No one disputed  
18 this British translation in November-December, 1941: in  
19 fact our own translation was considered consistent with it.

20 Two confirmations of the British translation came  
21 from the official Netherlands East Indies Government trans-  
22 lations of Tokyo Circulars 2353 and 2354. Colonel Thorpe,  
23 the Senior Army Intelligence Officer in Java, sent an  
24 official message via the Navy addressed to General Miles,  
25 the Chief of Army Intelligence in Washington, which is a

Witness Safford

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1 matter of record in previous Pearl Harbor investigations.  
 2 This message may be identified as Alusna Batavia 031030  
 3 dated December 3, 1941. I quoted from this message:

4 "FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT:

5 JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION  
 6 IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END.

7 EAST WIND RAIN UNITED STATES:

8 NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA;

9 WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND

10 MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES."

11 Copies of this message were circulated in the Navy  
 12 Department, and the Chief of Naval Operations was indicated  
 13 as receiving a copy.

14 Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representa-  
 15 tive in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941  
 16 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time)  
 17 sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from  
 18 which I quote:

19 "WHEN CRISIS LEADING TO WORST ARISES FOLLOWING WILL BE

20 BROADCAST AT END WEATHER REPORTS:

21 ONE EAST WIND RAIN WAR WITH UNITED STATES,

22 TWO NORTH WIND CLOUDY WAR WITH RUSSIA,

23 THREE WEST WIND CLEAR WAR WITH BRITAIN INCLUDING

24 ATTACK ON THAILAND OR MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES.  
 25 - - - - -

Witness Safford

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1           WHEN THREAT OF CRISIS EXISTS FOLLOWING WILL BE USED FIVE  
2           TIMES IN TEXTS OF GENERAL REPORTS AND RADIO BROADCASTS:  
3           ONE HIGASHI EAST AMERICA,  
4           TWO KITA NORTH RUSSIA,  
5           THREE NISHI WEST BRITAIN WITH ADVANCE INTO THAILAND  
6           AND ATTACK ON MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES.

7           This message was received in the State Department at  
8           9:19 a. m. on December 4, 1941 (Washington time). Copies  
9           were forwarded to the War and Navy Departments by the  
10          State Department liaison Officer, Mr. Orme Wilson. They  
11          were given a wide circulation in the Navy Department.

12          My own evaluation of the foregoing, on December 4, 1941,  
13          was about as follows:

14          (A) The Basic Japanese War Plan was divided into 3  
15          categories or provided for 3 contingencies, any or all of  
16          which might be followed, namely:

17                 (1) War with the United States  
18                 (2) War with Russia  
19                 (3) War with England including the invasion of  
20          Thailand and the capture of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies.

21          (B) The Winds Message gave us the answer in all  
22          3 cases:

23                 Affirmative for the 1st and 3rd categories, and  
24          Negative for the 2nd.  
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Witness Safford

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1 (C) The Winds Message was probably a "Signal of  
2 Execute" of some sort.

3 The "Signal of Execute" theory received strong con-  
4 firmation from a secret message received from the Philip-  
5 pines in the early afternoon of December 4, 1941. This  
6 message informed us that the Japanese Navy had introduced  
7 a new cipher system for its so-called "Operations Code"  
8 at 0600 GCT that date. This time was 7-1/2 hours before  
9 the Winds Message was broadcast. I might add that there  
10 was only one J-A-P European broadcast per day, so the  
11 times coincided as closely as possible. I would like to  
12 add also that my subordinates on Corregidor spotted and  
13 reported this change only nine hours after it was made.  
14 The message may be identified as Commandant 16th Naval Dis-  
15 trict Priority 041502 dated December 4, 1941, and was  
16 addressed to Naval Operations and the Commandant 14th Naval  
17 District but not to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific  
18 Fleet. So far as I know, this message has not been introduced  
19 as evidence before any previous investigation of the Pearl  
20 Harbor disaster. In fact, this is the first time it has  
21 ever been mentioned except to Admiral Hart. The unusual hour  
22 and unusual date at which the Japanese Navy changed its  
23 "Operations Code," combined with the Winds Message and  
24 other collateral information available in the Navy Department,  
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Witness Safford

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made this message highly significant as the probable "Signal of Execute" to the Japanese Navy. Up till now the Winds Message has had to bear a double burden in my testimony.

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Witness Safford

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2 As I have previously testified, we expected that if  
3 the Japanese did suddenly attack the United States this  
4 attack would come on a week-end or national holiday. In  
5 fact, a warning message to this effect had been sent out  
6 in April, 1941 (page 1 of Exhibit No. 37). The War Depart-  
7 ment over-emphasized the imminence of war as forecast by  
8 the "November 29, deadline" and predicted that the Japanese  
9 would strike during the week-end of November 29-30, 1941.

10 The Navy Department estimated the situation more  
11 accurately - the Japanese armada which had been concentrating  
12 for the southern invasion was too far from any conceivable  
13 objective to give serious consideration to this date. Also  
14 the covering Naval forces were not yet deployed and other  
15 signs indicated that the U. S. Army estimate was a bit  
16 premature.

17 The next week-end, December 6-7, 1941, was just the  
18 reverse. The winds message and the change of the Naval  
19 Operations Code came in the middle of the week; 2 days to  
20 Saturday and 3 days to Sunday. It was unthinkable that  
21 the Japanese would surrender their hopes of surprise by  
22 delaying until the week-end of December 13-14, 1941. This  
23 was not crystal gazing or "intuition" -- it was just the  
24 plain, common sense acceptance of a self-evident proposi-  
25 tion. Colonel Sadtler saw it, and so did Captain Joseph

Witness Safford

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R. Redman, U.S.N. -- according to Colonel Sadtler's testimony in 1944, before the Army Board of Investigation.

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941.

In the next sentence I would like to change the words "Pearl Harbor" to "England and the United States", so that the sentence reads:

The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

The Chairman: It is now a quarter after four, and we will recess until 10:00 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 10:00 o'clock a.m., Saturday, February 2, 1946.)

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.