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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3370

15 April 1948

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: "Report from Field Marshall Count Terauchi, Supreme Commander Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions, Concerning 'Ration and Medical Supplies in POW Camps'"

Date: 2 April 1946 Original () Copy (x) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL: Official Records Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Official Records Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service

PERSONS IMPLICATED: POW Camp Senior Officers and Supply Officers

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: POW Treatment

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

A. Policy of Japanese Forces, especially of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces Southern Regions regarding treatment of Prisoners of War.

B. Conditions of Japanese Army Supply lines.

C. Responsibility for POW Rationing Appendix: ~~A. Re: food rations~~

- a. Re: Food rations
 - I. Singapore Area
 - II. Siam Area
 - III. Sumatra Area
 - IV. Java Area
 - V. Malucia Islands
 - VI. Celebes Area

Analyst: ~~b. Names of officers concerned with POW Depots and Hospitals~~
J HOYT

c. Food rations of Japanese depot troops

d. Report on medical supplies

Analyst: J HOYT

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IPS Doc # 3370

C E R T I F I C A T E

The undersigned CHARLES JONGENEEL, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., head of the War Crimes Section of NETHERLANDS FORCES INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed report is a full, true, complete and accurate copy of the original document, entitled

"Report from Field Marshall Count TERAUCHI, Supreme Commander Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions, d.d. Johore Bahru, April 2nd, 1946 JEFIS no. 11, concerning 'Ration and Medical Supplies in POW Camps' " - 3810/R,

which document is a part of the official records of the NEFIS.

SIGNATURE:

BATAVIA, June 7th 1946.



Subscribed and sworn to before me, K.A.de WEERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A., Higher official attached to the office of the Attorney - General N.E.I.

K. A. de Weerd.

C O P Y

voor Tokio.

3810/R.

JEF SR. NO.11.

Johore Bahru, 2nd April 1946.

To: 15 War Crimes Investigations Team,
SACSEA Inter Service Mission to French Indo China,
SAIGON, F.I.C.

From: Field Marshall Count Terauchi,
Supreme Commander,
Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions.

Subject: Rations and Medical Supplies in POW Camps.

Refer : WCIT/FIC/7, dated 29th January 1946.

Copy to: HQ. SACSEA.
HQ. ALFSEA (War Crimes Legal Section)
HQ. ALFSEA (GSI Liaison)

1. Owing to disruption of signal communication and the burning of all important documents on or about 15th August 1945 by all Japanese forces under orders from General Headquarters, Tokyo, I regret to say that investigation into your requirements has proven very difficult. Especially with regard to those records covering the period between 1942-1945, I made every endeavour for over a month to secure the same, but because of the constant interchange and shifting of personnel in charge of the work and the detention of some of them by the Allied Forces after the Cessation of hostilities, records have proved to be unavailable for this period. I regret very much that for above reasons I am unable to submit an entirely satisfactory reply to your order.

2. In accordance with your message I despatched orders to all my forces, and now beg to submit herewith a report containing the data. However, the figures etc. appearing in the report are, for the most part, based purely upon the imperfect memory of those who were in charge, and, I would ask that the same be considered accordingly. Owing to the dislocation of our signal channels, I would also request that further particulars desired be obtained through the Allied Units on the spot.

With regard to this investigation, I wish to mention the actual conditions prevailing in the Japanese Forces during the time of war, in order that those in charge of the War Crimes Investigations will properly grasp the real situation. The following three features should be called to attention.

A. Policy of Japanese Forces, especially of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Regions (hereafter referred to as JEF SR), regarding treatment of Prisoners of War (hereafter abbreviated as POW).

The JEF SR, basing its policy upon the regulations concerning treatment of POW's as drawn up by the Japanese Government, set up rules governing rationing to POW's in hands of JEF SR. All forces coming under JEF SR were ordered to abide by the regulations adopted and to mete out rationing fairly and as amply as circumstances permitted. Every Japanese force and POW camp, on the basis of the JEF SR rules, drew up its own detailed regulations to meet the local conditions.

It goes without saying that the basis policy was to observe and respect the

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international conventions to the fullest extent. There was not the slightest thought of intentionally lowering the scale of rations and medical supplies issued to the POW's to the detriment of their health. However, as trend of war gradually turned against the Japanese Forces, they found themselves frequently cut off from supplies. Consequently, in certain areas, the lowering of the scale of supplies not only to the POW camps but also to the Japanese forces themselves became wholly unavoidable. I would ask that the above be considered as a cardinal point in the circumstances. It behoves me to state that all through this war this question was constantly on my mind and was a source of my greatest worry and anxiety. However, in areas such as Saigon etc., where conditions were more favourable, every effort was made to maintain a satisfactory standard of treatment for the POW's.

B. Conditions of Japanese Army supply lines.

Actual conditions at the time, particularly in the areas referred to in your message, are in general as follows: -

1.) Singapore Area

In the early period, following the occupation of this area, prevailing conditions were not pressing. Consequently, every effort was made to distribute food and medical supplies in conformity with the regulations. A quantity of food supplies seized in this area, not meeting the usual Japanese dietary habit, was for the most part given over to POW camps.

Later, however, with the trend of war gradually going against the Japanese forces, the Allied threat to our supply routes into Singapore from Siam, French Indo China, and Java, both by Land and Sea, became increasingly serious and movement of supplies became most difficult. As a result, the Japanese forces, having charge of the Military Administration and assuming the responsibility of feeding the 800,000 civilians of Singapore, found themselves in a situation, with reserve stocks of supplies running short.

Moreover, in order to cope with the situation arising from a probable isolation of Singapore, it was deemed absolutely necessary to prepare a strong defense to last one year. To this end, the accumulation of food and medical supplies became of paramount importance to our forces. In order to execute this plan, it became necessary to limit all supply of food to the minimum. As a further step, it was decided that the 7th Area Army Headquarters and all units under its command would endeavour to augment the shortage by a program of self-sustenance and for this purpose, all Japanese units, regardless of their character, put forth their efforts in farming. Consideration was given to dietary habits of the POW's and milk supplies etc., which in the Japanese Army was confined only to hospital patients, was although in a small quantity, distributed to the POW's.

2)

Siam Area.

The general food situation in this area was good. However, the POW's were used in the construction of the Siam-Burma railway which required the building of POW camps in out-of-way places, where lack of lines of communication resulted in short supplies and local production was unfavourable. The rationing of

food to Japanese troops in such areas could not and did not exceed that given to the POW's. Furthermore, transportation of supplies by sea to the Burma area became increasingly difficult from the beginning of 1943. In order to alleviate this situation, work had to be speeded up to complete the railroad and also to improve and maintain the lines. Poor ration scale had to be endured by all under such circumstances. The ration scale at Linthin Camp, Siam, as shown in Appendix A of your message, represented at that time the highest level for the Japanese POW Camps. It will no doubt be readily seen that the inmates of Linthin Camp were receiving a daily scale of rations exceeding 1,680 calories now being generally allowed to the Japanese surrendered forces by the Allied forces.

3) Malucca Islands Area.

Since 1943 the transportation of supplies to this area became most difficult owing to Allied attacks on your shipping, which frustrated all attempts to attain our objectives. Practically all large vessels were sunk before reaching the islands. This brought about a most acute food shortage. The Japanese units, as much as the POW camps, were obliged to subsist on inadequate rations, which was indeed most regrettable.

C. Responsibility for POW Rationing.

In view of the general food supply situations as outlined above, any shortage of rations was more a result of circumstances beyond human control, and it would be unfair and unjust to place the responsibility on a few officers who happened to be in charge of the camps at the time as implied in your order, unless there was wilful intention or gross negligence on their part.

With reference to your order to conduct a thorough investigation into the then existing conditions in various areas with the view of determining those responsible therefore, it will readily be seen that such an investigation is beset with greatest difficulties because of the lack of sufficient information or reports the frequent changes of units in charge, and the complex nature of the problems involved, I would ask, therefore, that the names listed in Appendix 'B' be regarded, on reflection, as "persons concerned" rather than "persons responsible".

In light of all the explanations offered above, I trust that due consideration will be given to all the circumstances and difficulties inherent in the prosecution of war, particularly the local conditions and obstacles in the way of transportation of supplies. This consideration will, I feel, certainly inevitably lead to just and reasonable dealing with those persons concerned with the POW camps, whose conduct was, at times, the unfortunate result of the force of circumstances.

(Signed)

Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff,
for Field Marshall Count Terauchi
(Signed)
Supreme Commander,
Lieutenant General,
Japanese Expeditionary Forces,
Southern Regions.

APPENDIX.

A.

Item (a) of your investigation re: food rations.

I. Singapore Area (refer your WCIT FIG 7 Appendix A - 1, 5, 8, 11, 14, 16, 24

Period	Class	Rations							
		Rice	Meat	Vegetable	Edible	Sugar	Salt	Speces	Tea
Feb. 1942- June 1943	General	21.4	3.6	10.7	0.03pt.	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
	Laborer	28.5	5.3	17.9	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
July 1943	General	17.8	3.6	10.7	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
-Jan. 1945	Laborer	25.0	5.3	17.9	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
Feb. 1945	Gen. & Lab.	14.3	1.8	7.2	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
Mar. 1945	General	10.7	1.8	7.2	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
-Aug. 1945	Laborer	14.3	1.8	7.2	0.03 "	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3

- Notes: 1- In the absence of exact data, this table has been made wholly from memory etc. but, in our judgment, there is very little discrepancy.
- 2- Ration referred to is for one man per day. Unit: oz.

Remarks: With reference to the reason for the foregoing decrease in rations and the countermeasures taken by the 7th Area Army, up to June 1943, based on the regulations governing POW rations in the JEFSSR, a minimum of 21.4 oz. (labourers 28.5 oz) or more of polished rice was supplied as above-mentioned: but, with the disruption of sea and land communications and shortage of transportation owing to the military position, food supplies became steadily scarce from July 1943. At that time all rations for the Japanese forces, including attached civilians (Gunzoku), were cut short (see Item C of this appendix) and it was unavoidable that rations for POW's were also reduced. Subsequently, as the war progressed transportation facilities became shorter still, until in 1945 all communications were practically at a standstill.

Imports from rice-growing areas especially became more and more difficult so that it was necessary to make further reductions of the scale of rations in February 1945.

In order to counteract above conditions and to supplement rice rations, the 7th Area Army approved of the plan to supply substitute staple food in place of polished rice up to 25 ozs. for the POW's from local supplies but, in spite of all efforts, the result were not satisfactory.

Regarding vegetables, approval and encouragement was given to increase supplies by local farming by the POW's themselves in order to augment the fixed quantities. Every effort was made to prevent a decline in physical strength of the POW's.

Moreover, from April 1945, for POW's engaged in heavy labour 100 grams of or 250 grams of tapioca were additionally supplied, and further small amounts of coffee, sugar, milk jam, oatmeal etc. were also given.

With reference to the remarks attached to No. 14 River Valley Camp, Singapore, that there were no eating utensils, your consideration of the following is requested. It is believed that the shortage of eating utensils occurred when about 700 survivors of a sinking in the Malacca Sea when they were being transferred to Pagan Baroe POW Camp (Sumatra), were placed in the River Valley Camp. In view of the fact that immediate preparations were rushed to obtain dishes,

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Knives and forks, spoons etc., there was some delay during which time the shortage is believed to have arisen.

II Siam Area (refer WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A 3,4,7,10,19,25,26,27,28,29,31,32,34).

The 18th Area Army has been making every effort to carry out investigations but, owing to the following reasons, full data and actual figures of POW rations could not be obtained to date:-

- a- all the POW camp staff personnel are being detained by the British forces in Siam.
- b- the POW camps were under the command of O.C., Field Railway Corps, JEFPSR or the Inspector General, 2nd Railway Corps. As various relating documents were destroyed or lost, the names of those in actual charge are unknown.

It is certain, however, that in view of the actual labour carried on by the POWs, full consideration was taken to ensure that the scale of rations stipulated by the general POW ration regulations of JEFPSR was maintained and, on two occasions, applications to increase the scale to the level of the Japanese troops were made to and readily accepted by the Japanese Garrison in Siam at that time (the present 18th Area Army). Special mention must be made of the fact that between March and September of 1943 the 2nd Inspector General Railway Corps transported 10,000 head of cattle, almost all of which was consumed by POW camps. At that time, the supply of fresh meat to the POWs far exceeded that of the Japanese personnel.

The Japanese railway units, for the most part, depended upon the POWs for labour and the decrease of labour power on part of the POWs was of utmost concern to the prevailing rations. Lack of fresh vegetables and difficulties in receiving supplies troubled them most and plans for planting vegetable gardens in order to obtain self-sufficiency were drawn up, with all units putting forth every effort.

III. Sumatra Area. (refer WCIT FIC 7 appendix A.13,15,17,33)

- a- No.17 Pakan Baroe POW camp.

Your date of May 1944 is that of the period immediately following transfer of the POWs from Java and the scale of rations used was that for POWs camps in Malaya. The following is the actual records:

Ration	Polished Rice	Meat or Fish	Fresh Vegetable	Sugar	Table Salt	Cooking Oil	Tea	Spices
Designated Supply	500	50	300	20	20	25	3	20
Actual Supply	500	Meat 40 Salt 50	150	20	20	25	3	20

Remarks: Ration in this table for one man per day.

Unit: Gramme.

In spite of efforts made by all units of the army, there was some shortage in fresh vegetables: the main reasons for it being (1) time was so short after the transfer to this camp, (2) the lack of supplies on the spot, (3) and the difficulties in transportation. Efforts were made to make up the shortage by local farming. Drinking water was scarce as the lay offland did not offer sufficient sources of water supply. Local

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inhabitants used water from rivers or rain-water and the Japanese Army made use of the same. Although later on the water reservoirs and filtration equipment were strengthened, there was very little improvement and both the Japanese Army as well as the POWs suffered to the end on account of lack of water.

b- No. 33 Palembang POW Camp.

Basic rations for POWs at Palembang POW Camp is as follows:-

Time	Item	Rice & cereals	Meat & Fish	Fresh Vegetable	Sugar	Cooking Oil	Table Salt	Tea or Coffee	Spices
26 Feb. 1945 and after.		500 (200)	50	400	20	35	15	5	5
27 Feb. 1945 and after.		400 (250)	50	400	15	30	15	3	5
25 May. 1945 and after.		300	50	200	10	30	20	5	5
After cessation of hostilities.		700	180	690	20	35	15	5	5

Remarks: 1.- Figures in brackets indicate extra rationing to heavy labourers.

2.- Besides the items shown in the above table, after the cessation of hostilities, 45 grammes of one of the following was given: butter, cheese, milk, biscuits, and jam with some tobacco. Unit: Gramme.

Further explanations regarding the scale of rations are as follows:-

- (1)- From 27th May 1945 until the end of the war, the principle food (rice) per man averaged 300 grammes: the particulars of distribution are as below:-
- | | |
|--------------|-------------|
| heavy labour | 400 grammes |
| light labour | 250 " |
- (2)- In addition to the items in the table, products of local farming in the Camp zone were all given to the POWs as extra rations.
- (3)- Reasons which necessitated the drastic cut in the principle food since May 1945 are given in detail as below:-

As Palembang area employed many native labourers for work on local defence projects and in the vast oil-fields there, the demand for rice was great, but unfortunately, food resources in the area were not only poor but insufficient, resulting in a constant shortage of rice. The stock of rice in the Japanese Army Supply Depot of the Area showed a sharp decrease at the end of April 1945, so that there remained barely sufficient stock to maintain the Japanese Army in the area for one month. On the other hand, from the supply point of view, it was the off season for rice crops in southern part of Sumatra and furthermore, considering the shortage of transportation and labour, the results of the last crop were not encouraging. Owing to the blockade at sea by the Allied forces, it became increasingly difficult to import rice from outside the islands. On top of this the 7th Area Army ordered stocks of rice to be sent from this area to Malay. In view of the critical military si-

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tuation, it was of paramount importance to economize on food in order to prepare for future operations. With regard to the Japanese Army, in spite of the increased labour caused by work for strengthening the defences, the ration of the principle food was reduced in April to 600 grammes daily, with the actual amount supplied avering not over 480 grammes. In May instructions came from the headquarters of POW camps, Malay, fixing the principal food of the POWs to a daily ration of 300 grammes, which meant a reduction of rations for the POWs in this area. These measures were taken in dire necessity in order to complete all preparations for urgent military operations and to surmount the acute food situation.

Regarding the Following POW camps:-

No.13 Zlengoer POW Camp, Sumatra

No.15 POW Camp Penang, Sumatra.

nothing was available to us about them and investigations are now being made.

IV. Java Area. (refer WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A 9)

Soerabaja Jaarmarkt POW Camp, Soerabaja HBS (former high school)

Fixed Food Rations (May-September 1942) for POW Camp.

Class	Rations	Polished Rice.	Meat	Vegetables	Sugar	Table Salt	Tea	Spices	Cooking Oil	Remarks
General Labourer		550	45	300	20	20	3	some	some	one man
		750	60	500	20	20	3	some	some	one man

Notes: Actual volume of food supplied is thought to be the same as the above.

Unit.: gramme.

Malucca Islands. (refer /WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A 9,20,21,22)

a- No.9 Ambon Group Haroekoe Island POW Camp (May-September 1942)

At present being investigated.

b- No.20 Ambon Island, Liang POW Camp (May-1943--? 1944)

Rations were here the same as the foregoing Soerabaja POW Camp but, owing to difficulties in sea transportation, the volume gradually decreased by necessity. Among other things, the volume of meat and vegetables supplied differed in accordance with the following conditions.

With regard to vegetables, shortage occurred in the civil administration area of the island which was under the Navy and the amount supplied by the Naval Supply Depot reached only one half of the fixed amount. To overcome the shortage, purchases were made from the natives in the district, and thus supplies were barely brought up near to the required volume.

Meat was practically unobtainable on the island and conditions for supply of meat were such that once a week one or two head of cattle or sheep were brought over by small sail-boats from points several tens of miles away.

Because of these conditions, in order to replenish protein vitamins,

"tanpei" and yeast made from soy-beans were given. To overcome the lack of local meat, endeavours were made to obtain same from Java, but with sea

transportation practically cut off, it became impossible to obtain fresh supplies of frozen and salted meat. Here again, local farming was planned and about 500 fields were tilled and planted, with special efforts made to grow tapioca and greens.

c- No. 21 Ambon Town Camp, Maluccas (August 7-15, 1944)

The scale of rations was the same as that at Soerabaja, Java, but owing to the stopping of sea traffic, steady decrease of rations was inevitable. Reason for the especially bad food during this period of nine days are as follows:-

During this period the POW of this camp were waiting reshipment to Java. On or about 9th August there was a heavy air raid, as the result of which all natives engaged in bringing in food supplies practically entirely scattered. It became impossible to buy and obtain supplies on the local market and, accordingly, the POW camp staff went to Liang, about 40 kilometers distance, where they managed to obtain tapioca, greens, etc. and thus feed the POW.

VI Celebes Area (refer WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A 23)

-No. 23 Moena Island POW Camp (October 1944-July 1945)

The scale of rations was the same as that of the Ambon Town Camp in most respects. Actual food supplies and conditions are as follows:-

When leaving Amboina in October 1944, two months supply of principal food and condiments for about 450 persons were handed out. Moena Island was reached on 14th October and thereafter the intended one month food supply for 100 persons) boarded a steam and sail driven vessel to return to Java: as they had gone for about three kilometers from the island, an attack was received from three P 38's, resulting in the sinking of the ship with all the food. The POWs were once again brought back to the island. Subsequently, replenishment of food was obstructed and stopped by air bombings, and there was nothing else to do but to cut the rations (rice about 300 grammes mixed with corn). Sufficient supplies could not be obtained locally, and little could be anticipated from local farming as the soil was extremely poor. In the end fruits (bananas mostly) were eaten to supplement the lack of vegetables.

B. Item (b) of your investigation re: names of officers concerned with POW camps and hospitals mentioned in W.C.I.T./FIC/7 appendix A.

NO.	POW Camps or Hospitals	Senior Officers responsible for administration.	Officers responsible for supply of rations
1.	Roberts Hospital Singapore. Chngi POW Camp)) Lt. Genl Shimpei FUKUEI)	Pay-Maj. Tetsuji TOSHI
2.	Nakon Nyok Camp, Siam	Col. Hikoshige SUGASAWA	Camp Commandant Capt. Takejiro NOGUCHI

(continued).

NO.	POW Camps or Hospitals.	Senior Officers responsible for administration.	Officers responsible for supply of rations
3.	Chunkai POW Camp, Siam.	Maj.Gen.Makoto SASSA Col.Shizuo NAKAMURA	
4.	Kanburi Base Hospital	Maj.Gen. Makoto SASSA	
5.	Farrar Park Camp, Singapore.	Lt.Gen.Shimpei FUKUEI	Pay-Maj. Tetsuji TOSHI
6.	Shamshuipo, near Hong Kong.	Under investigation by the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China.	
7.	Kinsaiyok Main POW Camp.	Maj.Gen.Makoto SASSA Col.Shinzuo NAKAMURA	
8.	Tangjoeng Pagar Camp, Singapore.	Maj.Gen.Masatoshi SAITO Capt.Tsuneo FUKUDA	Pay Lt.Coll.Seiji NAKANO.
9.	Haroekoe Island, Ambon Group Jaarmarkt Camp,...Shool Sourabaya.)) Under Investigation.))	
10.	Fouchau Bridge Camp, Thailand.	Maj.Gen.Makoto SASSA Col.Shizuo NAKAMURA	
11.	Changi POW Camp Singapore Maj. Gen.Tsunemichi ARIMURALT	Maj. Gen. Masatoshi SAITO. Capt.Zenpei TAKAHASHI Gen.Shimpei FUKUEI	Pay-Maj.Tetsuji TOSHI Pay-Majo Choji TANAKA. Pay-LtCol. NAKANO Seiji
12.	Hong+Kong POW Camp.	Under investigation by the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China.	
13.	Zlengoer POW Camp, Sumatra.	Under Investigation	
14.	River Valley Camp, Singapore	Maj. Gen.Masatoshi SAITO	Pay-Maj.Choji TANAKA
15.	POW Camp Penang, Sumatra.	Under Investigation.	
16.	Farrar Park Camp, Singapore.	Lt. Gen.Shimpei FUKUEI	Pay-Maj.Tetsuji TOSHI.
17.	POW Camp Pakan Baroe, Sumatra. U	Under Investigation.	
18.	POW Camp Klian Kali Thailand	Col. Shizo NAKAMURA	
19.	Kinsaiyok No. 1 Jungle Camp. Thailand.	Maj. Gen.Makoto SASSA Col. Shizuo NAKAMURA	
20.	Liang Camp, Ambon Isle, Moluccas.	Maj. Misuo ANAMI. Maj.Gen.Masatoshi SAITO.	
21.	Ambon Town Camp, Moluccas.	Maj. Misuo ANAMI Col.Masaji NAKADA	
22.	Weijama Camp, Moluccas.	Under Investigation.	

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No.	POW Camps or Hospitals	Senior officers responsible for administration.	Officers responsible for supply of rations.
23.	Moena, South Celebes	Capt. Shukei SHIOZAWA	Capt. Shukéi SHIOZAWA
24.	Keppel Harbour, Singapore.	Maj. Gen. Masatoshi SAITO Capt. Tsuneo FUKUDA	Pay+ Lt. Col. Seiji NAKANO.
25.	No. 4 Camp, Thailand	Majoor Gen. Makoto SASSA	
26.	Kinsaiyok POW Camp Jungle Camp 1, 2, 3. Thailand.	Col. Shizuo NAKAMURA	
27.	Tonchan POW Camp, Thailand	Maj. Gen. Makoto SASSA Col. Shizuo NAKAMURA	
28.	Barn Luang Camp, Thailand.	Maj. Gen. Makoto SASSA	
29.	Tarkélin Camp, Thailand.	Maj. Gen. Makoto SASSA	
30.	Shamshuipo Camp, Argylly St. Camp, Hong-Kong.	Under investigation by the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China.	
31.	Linthin Camp, Thailand.	Col. Hikoshige SUGASAWA	
32.	POW Camp, Ontlé, Thailand.	Col. Shizuo NAKAMURA Col. Hikoshige SUGASAWA	
33.	A, B, C, and Sungei Ron Camps Palembang, Sumatra.	Under investigation.	
34.	Kanyu No. 2 POW Camp, Siam.	Col. Shizuo NAKAMURA	

C. Item (c) of your investigation re: Food rations of Japanese depot troops.

I. Singapore Area.

Period	Ration	Polished Rice	Meat	Vegetables	Cooking Oil	Sugar	Salt	Spices	Tea.
Feb. 1942 to June 1943		28.5	7.4	21.4	0.03pt	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
July 1943 to Jan. 1945		25.0	6.4	24.5	0.03pt	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
Febr. 1945		21.4	6.4	24.5	0.3pt	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3
March 1945 to Aug. 1945		17.8	6.4	24.5	0.3pt	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3

Notes: In absence of exact data, this table has been made from memory.
This table shows ration per man per day.

Unit: Oz.

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With the progress of war, the obstruction and destruction of both sea and land supply routes increased, the shortage of transportation facilities became more acute, and it became increasingly difficult to supply the demands for food. Thus, in July 1943 all food rations were shortened and further drastic reductions were necessary from 1945 in view of the fact that nearly all transportation routes had become to a standstill. Since the latter half of 1944, the shortage of meat and vegetables in Singapore Area became critical and it became necessary to substitute dried salted fish for meat to one half of the fixed ration, while supplies of vegetables were cut down to one third.

II. Siam Area.

Although efforts were made to maintain the scale of rations as fixed at that time, the actual rations received by the Japanese depot troops varied to local food supply conditions. Troops in various districts at various times failed to receive full scale of rations. This was most apparent with regard to meat and vegetables.

As for the rations of Japanese depot troops stationed along the Thailand-Burma railway, it is believed that they were no better than that of the POW Camps in the same districts.

III. Sumatra Area.

1. The fixed scale and actual rationing of food of the Japanese depot troops in the Sumatra Area about May 1944 is, in general, as follows:-

Descr.	Item	Polished Rice.	Starch	Meat & Fish	Fresh Vegetables	Sugar	Salt	Cooking Oil	Tea	Spices
Ration Scale		700	-	180	690	30	10	30	3	3
Actual Ration		500	100	100	300	20	10	10	3	3

Unit: Grammes.

2. Actual rationing of food for Japanese troops in Palembang about June 1945 is as below:-

Descr.	Item	Polished Rice.	Sweet Potatoe	Fish & Meat.	Fresh Vegetable	Sugar	Salt	Cooking Oil	Tea	Spices
Actual Ration		450	100	50	400	16	12	10	5	3

Unit: grammes.

IV. Java Area.

The fixed scale of food rations to the Japanese depot troops in Sourabaya area is as below. The figures for rations actually supplied are not available; however, they are supposed to have been close to the fixed scale.

Polished Rice	700 grammes.	Cooking Oil	9 grammes.
Fresh Meat	180 "	Miso(bean paste)	75 "

(Continued)

Fresh Vegetables	690 grammes.	Shoyu(Japanese Sauce)	0.06 grammes.
Sugar	20 "	Tea	3 "
Salt	5 "		

V. Malucca Island and Moena Island, Celebes.

The fixed scale of rations to the Japanese depot troops in the Maluccas was in general similar to that of the Sumatra area. However, as explained before on account of the complete disruption of sea communications, it was extremely difficult to obtain any outside supplies whatsoever. As a result, since spring of 1944, there were no other means but to rely upon local production in each district, which, inevitably, resulted in the lowering of the scale of rations to far below that of the Sumatra Area. The actual situation, it is believed, was that the barest minimum requirements were supplied to the troops at that time. Although full details are not available at the moment on account of the dislocation of our signal communication facilities, it is further believed that the local Japanese Army ration scale, which was cut and insufficient owing to the lack of supply routes, was not above that of the POWs in the same district.

D. Report on Medical Supplies.

I. Singapore Area. (refer to/WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A Items 5,8,11,16,24.)

- a). The scale of medical supplies for POWs is, in general, based upon the table of standard medical supplies to Japanese military personnel. There is no special scale or standard fixed only for POWs.
- b). It is to be regretted that it is impossible to report on the comparison between medical supplies actually provided and what the scale called for owing to the reason that all records referring to the actual quantities supplied to each supply depot and POW Camp were burned and destroyed at the end of war.
- c). Supplies of the following medicines were extremely difficult to renew:-
 - Malaria medicine (except quinine)
 - Vita-camphor injections
 - Novacaine injections
 - Cocaine antiseptics
 - Vitamin medicine.

The reason for difficulties in renewing supplies were the slowing down of home production, critical shortage of shipping, and deficiency of local production despite all efforts towards self-maintenance.

II. Siam Area.

1. General Matters (refer to/WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A Items 2,3,7,18,26,27, 32,34.)
 - a.) Medical supplies to POWs were distributed on the same basis and scale provided for the Japanese troops as in Singapore.
 - b.) The actual supply of medicine was undertaken by the Supply

(continued)

- b.) Depot of the 39th Army (later the 18th Area Army) according to orders issued by the 2nd Railway Inspector-General which changed later to Field Railway Commander, JEFSSR. From May 1945 orders were from the POW Camp Commander.
- c.) All POW camps in Siam listed in appendix A, with the exception of Nakhon Nyok Camp, were under the command of the 2nd Railway Inspector-General's Headquarters until March 1944. From then until April 1945 they were under command of the Railway Headquarters and since then the 39th Army, which was later the 18th Area Army. It may be added that the 2nd Railway Inspector General Corps (later Field Railway Headquarters of JEFSSR) was an independent unit, with its own supply and medical or sanitary services, organized as a regular army corps.

2.

Explanation of conditions of receiving medical supplies by each POW camp.

- a.) Conditions of receiving medical supplies, March to August 1945.
The stock of medical supplies at the Supply Depot was only 2,700 to 3,000 cases, of which those of utmost importance and necessity were very few. Furthermore, in anticipation of an Allied attack carried out by air-borne troops against the Japanese forces in Siam, some time during August 1945, it was necessary, from a strategical point of view, to collect and concentrate some 2,000 cases of important and necessary medical supplies.
- b.) It was almost impossible to receive new supplies from Saigon or Singapore, as both land and sea routes of communications were blocked by Allied attacks. Moreover, local manufacture of necessary medical supplies had started too late to be of any help, and this fact, combined with uncooperative attitude of the local population, made it almost impossible for the renewal of supplies to the Supply Depot.
On the other hand, on the Burma front the Japanese forces were forced to retreat after suffering defeat in the hands of the Allied Forces. Furthermore, as the rainy season had begun, the disorganized Japanese Burma Area Army faced a crisis from the medical and sanitary point of view. The most important duty at that time was to order back into Siamese territory the 4 or 5 army corps that need reorganizing and to care and treat the patients who were sent to the rear. For these reasons other Japanese troops were forced again to reduce their medical supplies.
- c.) By July 1945, transport communication lines between Siam and Burma had almost been completely severed, owing to the rainy seasons and Allied air attacks. As a result, medical supplies sent from Saigon and Singapore after much trouble and destined for Burma, accumulated in and around Bangkok, and this became a part of the supplies held in Siam. Plans had been made to gradually send off these supplies to their destinations when hostilities ceased.

By such circumstances, there was an ample stock of medical supplies on hand in this area a-t the end of the war.

d). Supply and distribution of Medical Supplies in the Japanese Army for the period of March to August 1945.

During the above-mentioned period, all medical supplies with the exception of Medical salt were short, and even for demands from the Japanese Army only 3/4 or 3/5 of the required amount was supplied (with some Items even less).

e). Supply and distribution of Medical-Supplies to POW Camps.

Owing to shortage of medical supplies as explained above, the supplies to POW Camps were reduced to 3/4 or 3/5 of the required and fixed quantity as in the case of the Japanese forces then, which was extremely regrettable.

3. Nakon Nyok.

a). Hospital facilities of the Nakon Nyok POW-Camp were under the control of the POW Camp commander: medical treatment was given to the POWs in an infirmary much like that attached to any Japanese unit. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Patients requiring long treatment or complicated cases were accommodated in the Nakon Nyok POW Hospital (temporary building with maximum capacity of 10,000 patients. Several thousands were always being accommodated), while those requiring immediate treatment and emergency cases were taken into by the Nakon Nyok Field Hospital.

b). Although there were many new malaria patients among the Japanese troops stationed at Nakon Nyok, there were comparatively few new cases in the POW camps.

c). In Siam it was quite difficult to acquire buildings, and the construction of this hospital during the worst period of Allied air raids must be regarded as a manifestation of the Red Cross Spirit, which was ~~xxx~~ most appreciated by the POWs in the camps.

4. Other POW Camps (refer to WCIT/FIC/ 7 appendix A Items 3,7,18,26,27,32,34).

With regard to full details of shortage of medical supplies and the names of the persons in charge of the POW camps as below:-

Chunkai	Tonchan
Kinsaiyok	Antei
Klian Kali	Kanyu

Kinsaiyok Nos.1,2 and 3 Hospitals

reports from the Commanding officers of the Field Railway Corps JEFBR, have still yet to come in. Further orders to expedite the reports have been issued and they will be submitted to yours soon as they arrive.

III. Sourabaya Area (refer to WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A Item 9)

Jaarmarkt Camp.

It is to be regretted that the officer in charge of medical supplies at the above camp, Surgeon Capt. Kuranosuke SHIMADA, is at Moena Island (South-east part of the Celebes) and, as it is at present impossible to get in contact with him, reports for medical supplies are unavailable.

IV. Malucca Islands. (refer to WCIT/FIC/7 Appendix A Items 8 & 23)

Harokoe Island, Ambon Group, POW Camp

Under Investigation.

(continued)

V. Moena POW Camp, South Celebes.

a. During the one month after landing on Moena Island on October 1944, it was possible to obtain medical supplies. However, after 8th November of the same year as the result of repeated sinkings of Japanese sailing motor vessels and successive cases of machine-gunning and bombing, it became most difficult to secure the lines of supply as explained above.

b. With regard to the question that no supplies of medicine from the Red Cross Society were received by the POWs, this has been taken up with the 2nd Army, with no reply from it up to now. A report will be submitted as soon as the information is received.

As report have been receives, kindly add the following to:-

Sheet 8. "D. Report on Medical Supplies.

I. Singapore Area-(refer to WCIT/FIC/7 appendix A Items 5,8,11,16,24)"

Conditions in POW Camps.

a). Farrar Park Camp.

The supplies of medical stores to the POWs were divided into Whites and Indians. All supplies were distributed from Changi by the POWs in charge to each POW camp for detailed distribution. Full and detailed particulars of conditions at Farrar Camp are lacking, but it is believed that it is more than unlikely that the said camp was the only one suffering from shortage of medica supplies.

b). Tangjoeng Pagar Camp.

Distribution of medical supplies was as same at the above camp, with full details of actual amount distributed lacking also. Simple facilities providing for emergency treatments, were established at the camp: however all serious cases or patients requiring hospital treatment were sent to Changi, where all such patients from all POW camps in this district were concentrated as by general policy.

c). Changi POW Camp.

As to your statement that throughout the whole period there were numerous cases of malnutrition and beri-beri, details are unavailable at present as the Camp Commander is being detained by you and no relative papers can be found. It can not be believed that such cases were numerous throughout the whole period as, in event that such a tendency of cases arose, the responsible persons in charge of the camp would positively have contacted the Area Army, which would have tried their best to supply the necessary medicines.

d). Keppel Harbour POW Camp.

Although positive information is unavailable owing to the absence of those in charge at that time, it is believed that there is nothing to substantiate the charges that medical treatments were deliberately withheld from the POWs and that supplies from the Red Cross were hidden away.