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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**

## INTERROGATION OF

OKA, Takazumi

Date and Time: 10 April 1946, 0940-1145 hours  
Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan  
Present : OKA, Takazumi  
Lt. Col. Donald T. Winder, Interrogator  
Mr. Hiroshi MATSUDA, Interpreter  
Lillian Anderson, Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Lt. Col. Donald T. Winder:

Lt. Col. Winder: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,  
that you will truly and accurately inter-  
pret and translate from English into  
Japanese and from Japanese into English  
as may be required of you in this pro-  
ceeding?

Mr. MATSUDA : I do.

Questions by : Lt. Col. Winder

Q. State your name, and your duty from 1933 on, please.

A. My name is OKA, Takazumi. In 1933 I was at Geneva attached to the Japanese delegation, and returned to Japan in the spring of 1934. I was head of the Navy Statistical Bureau after returning from Geneva, being promoted to captain on my return upon assuming new duties. Served as head of the statistical section until 1936. In 1936, assigned as captain of the submarine tender JINGE. In the fall of 1937, became the head of the Naval General Affairs Bureau, First Section of the Naval Ministry. Served in this capacity for two full years, then became the head of the Third Section of the Naval General Staff and promoted to Rear Admiral. In the fall of 1940, became the head of the Naval General Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry. Served in this capacity up to the beginning of the war in 1941.

Q. What was your rank on September 2, 1945?

A. Vice Admiral.

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

- Q. What was the function of the First Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry?
- A. The duties of the First Section are administration and preparation of armament, and paper work to see if it could be done or not.
- Q. Does this correspond to the Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Docks, Ordnance, or what? It must correspond to something. Administration and preparation mean absolutely nothing.
- A. It is preparation of armaments. It was the review of technical plans for construction of ships, armament, ordnance, yards, and docks.
- Q. How about communications?
- A. Everything.
- Q. Everything of a technical nature within the Navy?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the function of the Third Section of the Naval General Staff?
- A. The function of the Third Section is intelligence.
- Q. Admiral, from the fall of 1937 through 1939 when you were with the First Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry, what plans were approved for Navy construction in the South Sea Islands?
- A. During those two years, we did not do any expansion in the South Seas.
- Q. What plans were made for the South Sea Islands from the fall of 1940 until the outbreak of war when you were chief of the First Section of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry?
- A. As head of the General Naval Affairs Bureau?
- Q. What is the function of the Third Section of the Naval General Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry?
- A. We were right the first time, he was head of the whole thing.
- Q. The First Section of the General Affairs Bureau from the fall of 1940 until the outbreak of war?
- A. I served as head of the Naval General Affairs Bureau, which included sections one, two, and three.

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

Q. Wait a minute. Are you saying now that you were head of the General Affairs Bureau from the fall of 1940 until the outbreak of war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Admiral NAKAMURA only reports you chief of the First Section of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry up until October 9, 1939. We are changing it then from the fall of 1940 to the outbreak of war--he was chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry, is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. All right. My question is what preparations and construction for naval purposes took place in the South Sea Islands from the fall of 1940 until the outbreak of war, that is Pearl Harbor, while you were chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry?

A. No preparations for fortifications or expansion in the South Seas were made until November of 1941. If I remember right, about a month before Pearl Harbor, various plans for fortification of the southern areas were submitted for approval. It was concerned with shipment of armaments, including large guns, and various materials for fortification purposes.

Q. I presume, Admiral, that you are referring to the order of November 5, 1941, signed by Admiral SHIMADA as Naval Minister upon the verbal direction of Admiral NAGANO who was chief of the Naval General Staff at that time to fortify the islands, to transfer jurisdiction from the Nanyo Cho to the Navy, and order #1 signed by Admiral YAMAMOTO in regard to supplies for the South Sea Islands. As a matter of fact, I have a list as long as your arm of construction work, including the preparation of underground oil tanks, gun emplacements, and the mounting of large caliber guns long prior to the date of that order, and what I would like to have from you is what, of your own knowledge, was done in the way of fortifications in the South Sea Islands prior to the order of November 5, 1941, under the continuing plan for defense of the South Sea Islands?

A. Yes, after the acquisition of the Mandated Islands, the Navy was very much interested in expanding to the south. It was a fact. However, because of the various disarmament conferences and treaties, the Navy could not expand in their own way and they had to conform to the treaties, but preparations for

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

various defenses were contemplated by the Nanyo Cho so that they could be converted into real fortifications in case of emergency. The Navy, of course, was very much in favor of this plan and therefore did all it could do to help the cause. During my years as head of the various sections and head of the Naval General Affairs Bureau personally I was very cautious and carried on my duties in accordance with the treaties. I was never in the South Seas and I don't know where any preparations or fortifications were made in the Mandated Islands. I fulfilled my duties in accordance with and as prescribed by various treaties.

- Q. Admiral, I have the facts. I have a report in writing dated the fourth of March of this year where the Japanese government, the Second Demobilization Ministry, admits that large guns up as high as 12.7 CM were mounted in the South Sea Islands. I have definite proof that starting in 1934 you started building farms down there that could be and were later converted into airfields. In 1937 you started constructing facilities for storing oil for naval purposes. In 1940 you intensified and actually constructed fortifications in the South Sea Islands and in August of 1941 you started mounting guns in concrete gun emplacements of the new type, replacing the older guns that had been mounted there at an earlier date. I have talked with a large number of naval officers, enlisted men, civilian engineers, koin of the Naval Construction Bureau and representatives of commercial firms who operated in the South Sea Islands and I believe that I have the correct picture of what the Japanese government did down there, so you don't have to hold back anything from me because somebody else has already admitted what was done down there. Do you admit that fortifications were constructed in the South Sea Islands prior to the order of November 5, 1941 we have already mentioned?
- A. Of course, the Navy was very much interested in fortifying the South Sea Islands, but all of the fortifications were carried out by the Nanyo Cho and with the intention of having them turned over to the Navy for final fortification in case of emergency. However, as far as I know, the Navy had never sent any guns or implements of fortification except those that were sent for fleet maneuvers from time to time. I am sure that the Navy had never openly sent any armament or material for fortification. Also on maneuvers, I do not know how the affairs were actually carried out or what equipment was shipped to these various areas. As I have never been to the South Seas, nor taken part in any of these maneuvers, I do not know how or where this equipment was used. I am sure that those who were connected with the maneuvers or disposal of various equipment know what was actually being carried out in the South Seas.

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

- Q. Admiral, under the Japanese system, who would be responsible for the building of facilities for naval use in the South Sea Islands contrary to the provisions of the treaty and the mounting of guns and the ordering of troops to the South Sea Islands, the Naval Minister, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, or just who would be responsible?
- A. Anything pertaining to fortification or sending of troops to strengthen certain areas is directly the responsibility of the Navy Minister. On maneuvers the Naval General Staff is responsible. However, if anything contrary to treaties are carried out, it has to be an order from the Navy Minister.
- Q. Was Prince FUSHINOMIYA active as Chief of the Naval General Staff during the period that you were Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry until he retired about April of 1941?
- A. Prince FUSHINOMIYA was chief of the General Naval Staff only during the early part of my term as chief of the Naval General Affairs Bureau.
- Q. Who was vice chief of staff of the Naval General Staff during this period?
- A. Vice Admiral KONDO, Nobutake. Before Vice Admiral KONDO, I think it was Admiral SHIMADA. I was wrong--there was a Vice Admiral KOGA between Admiral SHIMADA and Vice Admiral KONDO.
- Q. Admiral, I am going to ask the interpreter to translate paragraph B of the Admiral NAKAMURA report, and I ask you whether Admiral NAGANO as chief of the Naval General Staff or Admiral OIKAWA as Naval Minister would be held responsible for ordering such maneuvers under the Japanese system of responsibility?
- A. All responsibilities and orders concerning the maneuvers comes under the Naval Chief of Staff. However, if any part of the maneuvers are not in conformity with treaties and still carried out, the responsibility is that of the Navy Minister.
- Q. This part of the report admits that there were large caliber guns mounted there which would be directly contrary to the treaty provisions, so I ask you to answer my question. Maneuvers on the scale as shown in that report, would they be the responsibility of the Naval Minister or the Chief of the Naval General Staff?
- A. All plans for maneuvers are worked out by the Naval General Staff, but before it is carried out, it has to be approved by the Navy Minister. Therefore, I don't know who would be

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

responsible in this case, but as the Navy Minister has the final say on the matter, I think that the responsibility would be on the Navy Minister.

- Q. Admiral, what was Admiral SHIMADA's attitude towards preparing for war against the United States and Britain and other western powers?
- A. The Japanese Navy at all times was never interested in war. They have always opposed various measures that were being taken by the Japanese government that led to war as the three-power pact, fortification of the southern areas, etc. Admiral SHIMADA as I know him was personally against war with the United States, Great Britain, and allied countries. So was his predecessor, OIKAWA.
- Q. How about YOSHIDA and YONAI who were ahead of OIKAWA as Naval Ministers?
- A. Admiral YONAI and Admiral YOSHIDA also were opposed to Japan going to war. I would like to further add that Admiral SHIMADA became Naval Minister during TOJO's cabinet and, therefore, as a government of Japan under TOJO was all prepared for war. Admiral SHIMADA although personally opposed, had to fulfill his post and go through with the war.
- Q. What was the attitude of Admiral NAGANO who preceded YONAI as Naval Minister?
- A. Admiral NAGANO was of the same opinion, and I know him quite well as I have been with him at Geneva. He is a very refined person and very conservative.
- Q. What was your own attitude Admiral OKA?
- A. I was very much opposed to Japan entering the war and during the third cabinet of KONOYE I worked hard to see if war could be avoided. I worked with TERAZAKI, chief of the Bureau of American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and was very much interested in Admiral NOMURA's success in negotiating peace terms.
- Q. Admiral, in what capacity did you attend the liaison conferences?
- A. I was a secretary of the liaison conference.
- Q. As secretary did you have a vote or voice in the matters brought before these conferences?
- A. I could voice my opinions, but I had no vote.



INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

- Q. Admiral, you and all of these other ranking naval officers were very much opposed to war with the United States and England as you have testified. Did any of them protest or threaten to resign from office because of the acts that were proposed such as, specifically, did Admiral OIKAWA threaten to resign as Naval Minister because he was asked to approve the plan for the maneuvers in the South Seas in the spring and autumn of 1941 that was reported by Admiral NOKUMURA?
- A. I have not heard about OIKAWA's attitude under certain conditions, but as Navy men we are not permitted to resign and furthermore, even if anybody tried, it would not be approved and he had to carry on in his capacity whether he liked it or not. In the history of Japan we do not have any resignations except one instance when the head of the First Section of the Naval Staff resigned because of results of the London Conference. During this case, what actually happened was the Navy Minister replaced him simultaneously. The only person that could hand in a resignation is the Navy Minister if he wanted to.
- Q. What was the name of the Chief of the First Section of the General Affairs Bureau that did resign at the time of the London Conference?
- A. He was Admiral KATO.
- Q. Is he still alive?
- A. Yes, he is still alive.
- Q. Did he resign as Chief of the First Section because Japan withdrew from the London Naval Conference between January and March of 1936?
- A. The reason of his resignation was because the outcome of the London Conference brought about disagreement between the Navy Minister and the Naval General Staff.
- Q. Was this a protest resignation because of the way things were going within the Navy?
- A. Yes, the trouble arose from the way matters were carried out by the Japanese government rather than the outcome of the parley.
- Q. Was Admiral KATO disciplined in any way because he resigned his position, such as being court-martialed, reduced in rank, or reprimanded?

INTERROGATION OF OKA, Takazumi - cont'd

- A. No, as I have stated previously, the matter was taken up by higher authorities and he was transferred to another post.
- Q. In view of that precedent, did it ever occur to you that inasmuch as you were personally opposed to war, that you might resign as Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry when Japan actively planned and prepared for war in 1940 and 1941?
- A. Yes, I have tried in my career to resign, but it wasn't accepted. When OIKAWA was replaced by SHIMADA, I handed in my resignation but it wasn't accepted.
- Q. How long after the outbreak of war did you remain as head of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry, Admiral OKA?
- A. I served in that capacity up until June 1944.
- Q. As Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry, were you aware that the Germans ordered submarine commanders to destroy all crews of ships that had been torpedoed?
- A. No, I did not know any such order was in existence.
- Q. Admiral, do you know of the order that went out to the Japanese submarine commanders to destroy or kill the members of crews of ships that Japanese submarines had sunk?
- A. No, I did not know of any such orders, and I do not believe that there was such an order.
- Q. What was the name of the officer of the Naval General Staff in 1943 who was in charge of the operation of Japanese submarines?
- A. I do not remember who was in charge of submarine operations, but the First Section of the General Naval Staff is responsible for all operations.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Hiroshi MATSUDA, \_\_\_\_\_,  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 8 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Hiroshi Matsuda

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of April, 1946.

Donald T. Winder Lt Col  
(Name and Rank)

Duty Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Lillian Anderson, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lillian Anderson

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Donald T. Winder, Lt. Col., USMC

and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on the 10 day of April, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) OKA, Takazumi and according to Hiroshi MATSUDA, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.


Tokyo, Japan  
Place

Donald T. Winder

12 April 1946  
Date

Certificate of Interrogator

I, A. A. Muzzey, hereby certify that on the 1 day of April 1946, personally appeared before me Takazumi OKA and according to Lt. John Curtis and Dave HOSHIMIYA, T/4, Interpreters, gave the foregoing answers in an interrogation conducted by me, which answers I wrote down in long hand, and are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

A. A. Muzzey  


Tokyo, Japan

1 April 1946

IPS Doc No 4194

INTERROGATION OF

Oka, Takazumi

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Oka, Takazumi, Vice Admiral  
Muzzey, A. A. Interrogator  
Gardner, Johnny B. Interpreter

MOSHIMITA, Dava, S/Lt, Interpreter  
Frost, W. B.

Date of transcription: 1 April 1946

In your solemn oath, by Almighty God,  
that 1 April 1946 and accurately interpret  
and translate from English into Japanese  
and from Japanese into English, as may be  
required of you, in this proceeding.

I do.

I do.

INTERROGATED BY: A. A. Muzzey

File No. \_\_\_\_\_37

INTERROGATION OF

OKA, Takazumi

Date and Time: 1 April 1946, 0930-1530 hours

Place : Room 730, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan

Present : OKA, Takazumi, Vice Admiral  
Muzzey, A. A. Interrogator  
Curtis, John, 2d Lt., Interpreter,  
0934860  
HOSHIMIYA, Dave, T/4 - 39935310, Interpreter  
Prout, Wm. C.

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Mr. Muzzey:

Mr. Muzzey : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,  
that you will truly and accurately inter-  
pret and translate from English into Japanese  
and from Japanese into English, as may be  
required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Curtis : I do.

Sgt. HOSHIMIYA: I do.

Questions by : Mr. Muzzey

A summary of the questions and answers given in an interrogation of OKA, Takazumi on above date is as follows:

The above named subject was interrogated on the above date without a stenographer with reference to information concerning him which is contained in cross-reference files. The information contained in the cross-reference files and Admiral OKA's comments with reference to this information are set forth hereinbelow.

File No. 20, Serial 73.

During the course of the interrogation of General Hideki TOJO by Mr. John W. Fihelly, on February 19, 1946, TOJO stated that at the final Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference of December 1 or 2, 1941, the great question was the question of war or peace and in connection with this question the problem of treaty obligations was also considered. TOJO further stated that he expressed his views in favor of attacking the United States and Great Britain and that everyone present at this Liaison Conference, including Takazumi OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Navy agreed in favor of attacking the United States and Great Britain (p. 4).

With reference to the above information OKA admitted that he was present at the final Liaison Conference preceding the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941. He stated that he was present in the capacity as one of the three secretaries to this Liaison Conference. He, however, denied that he took any active part in the discussion of the problem of treaty obligation and the question of war or peace with the United States and Great Britain. He further stated that his views concerning the question of attacking the United States were not solicited and that his only function at this Conference was that of a secretary. He further stated that at this Conference TOJO did express approval of attacking the United States.

File No. 59, Serial 52.

In a translation of Document No. 59-16, obtained from the Tokyo residence of the late Prince KONOYE, it is stated by Prince KONOYE that on October 11, 1941 OKA informed Prince KONOYE that with the exception of the Naval General Staff, the brains of the Navy did not

it was decided to open war between Japan and the United States with the proviso that if there was a favorable turn in negotiations the attack was to be called off (p. 2). TOJO further stated that the issuance of operation orders was a function of the Naval Chief of Staff in reply to a question as to who issued and how soon after the Conference the order to attack Pearl Harbor was issued. TOJO further stated that he is not positive that minutes were taken of the proceedings at the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941; that it was not customary to keep records of the Imperial Conferences; that if a record was kept the secretaries might take notes because they had the responsibility of putting in motion a great deal of administrative detail on the basis of policy decisions at the Conferences (p. 3).

With reference to the above information, OKA admitted that he was present at the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941 in the capacity of a secretary. He denied that any notes were taken by him at this conference.

File No. 1, Serial 38.

In the signed statement of TOJO dated February 28, 1946, TOJO stated that OKA was present at a number of Liaison Conferences between October 23, 1941 and December 8, 1941 (p. 1), and that the big question at these conferences was the settlement of the differences with the United States.

With reference to the above information OKA admitted that he attended a number of Liaison Conference between October 23, 1941 and December 8, 1941 and agreed that the big question at these conferences was the settlement of the differences between the United States. He again reiterated, however, that he did not participate in the discussions and attended only as a secretary.

File 88, Serial 17.

During the course of the interrogation of Vice Admiral Shigeru FUKUDOME, Chief, 1st Section (War Plans and Operations) Naval General Staff in 1941, by Lt. Joe B. Alexander on December 14, 1945, FUKUDOME stated that OKA, Chief of Bureau of Naval Affairs and a Secretary to the Liaison Conferences might know of the plans regarding the procedure for notification to the United States prior to the attack upon Pearl Harbor (p. 10) and that with reference to any discussion or conference as to when the notification was to be given the United States he suggested that: (1) Admiral Nagano, Chief of the Naval General Staff, (2) the Minister of the Navy, and (3) Vice Admiral OKA, be interrogated.



Admiral ITO, Vice Chief. He advised that it was his duty to present these plans to the Minister of the Navy and that he was generally familiar with these plans. He admitted that he knew that the plans called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and further admitted that he first heard of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor on or about November 20, 1941. He denied that he as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, ever discussed these plans with Admiral NAGANO or Admiral ITO or the Minister of the Navy.

File No. 5, Serial 6.

During the course of the interrogation of Marquis KIDO by Messrs. Fihelly, Higgins, Sackett at home on December 21, 1945, KIDO stated that OKA was present at the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941 at which conference it was decided to continue negotiations with the United States and if Japan did not succeed in settling the negotiations by about October 10th, a decision would be made as to starting war with the United States (p. 6).

KIDO further stated that the young officers of the Army and Navy were responsible for the preparations for war with the United States while negotiations with the United States were being carried on and that ISHIKAWA and OKA were the leaders of the young officers in the Navy (p. 8).

With reference to the above information OKA denied that he was associated with any officers in the Army and Navy who were responsible for war with the United States and that he was opposed to waging war on the United States but that he was not in a position to express his views. He stated that although he saw or heard about the operational plan to attack Pearl Harbor, he in his position, could not express any official information and in this connection he stated that in his opinion, the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was a dangerous undertaking which would jeopardize the position of the Navy.

File 20, Serial 49.

During the course of the interrogation of TOJO by Mr. Fihelly on February 8, 1946, TOJO stated he believed that OKA attended the Imperial Conference on December 1 or 2, 1941, and that OKA attended in the capacity of a secretary and that at the Imperial Conference

want a Japanese-American War but since the Navy themselves cannot say "they can't do it" in view of their approval of the decision of the Imperial Headquarters, the Navy Minister will propose to leave it in the hands of the Prime Minister (p. 2).

With reference to the above information, OKA denies that he ever had any conversation with the late Prince KONOYE regarding war with the United States and he stated that Prince KONOYE was incorrect in making the above statement in his memoirs. He believes, although he does not definitely remember, that he may have made such statement to his secretary, who in turn, may have informed Prince KONOYE.

File No. 123, Serial 6.

During the course of the interrogation of TAKATA, Toshitone, Real Admiral, Naval Affairs Bureau, on December 4, 1945 by Capt. Robinson, U.S.M.R., which interrogation is contained in the Report of Major L. H. Barnard, dated December 17, 1945, TAKATA stated he served under OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau. TAKATA stated that the Naval Affairs Bureau was the center of naval administration and the brains of the Navy. He further stated, however, that during the war the Navy General Staff became more powerful than the Naval Affairs Bureau (pp. 2 & 3).

He stated he heard from OKA in early December 1941, that the attack on Pearl Harbor was to be preceded by a Declaration of War. (p. 6)

With reference to the above information, OKA denied that he, as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, and the Bureau itself, had any influence in deciding whether war would be waged against the United States and Great Britain. He stated that all decisions concerning policies of the Navy were made by the Minister of the Navy and the Naval General Staff. He further stated that several days prior to the receipt of the Hull note, Ambassador NOMURA sent a telegram to TOJO advising that he NOMURA, thought that negotiations could no longer be continued and thereby implying that war with the United States was inevitable. About the middle of November 1941, he stated that the Navy started to make preparations for war against the United States in the event war should come but, that the Navy hoped that war did not come. He further stated that he had no connection whatsoever with the preparation of the Navy War Plans and that these plans were prepared by the GUNREIBU, which is the Navy General Staff, headed by Admiral NAGANO, Chief, and

With reference to the above information, OKA stated that he did not attend the Liaison Conference at which the question of procedure <sup>for</sup> giving notification to the United States was discussed.

File No. 1, Serial 42.

During the course of the interrogation of TOGO by Mr. R. L. Morgan on March 11, 1946, TOGO, in response to a request for the names of the individuals present at the Liaison Conference who could be considered responsible for the contents of the final notification to the United States stated that OKA was one of the members present who decided what the note should contain when drafted by the Foreign Office (p. 1). TOGO also stated that OKA, as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau and one of the Secretaries of the Liaison Conferences was in frequent contact with the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the note (p. 4).

With reference to the above information, OKA admitted that he was present at the Liaison Conferences at which the contents of the notification to the United States were discussed. He stated that he did not remember whether he participated in these discussions and whether he expressed any opinions concerning the contents of the note. He further admitted that he knew generally what the contents of the notification were to be but denied that he had any voice whatsoever in the drafting of notification. He stated that this function was performed by the Foreign Office. He further stated that he did not know whether the notification was to be intended as a declaration of war or a severance of diplomatic relations. He further stated that he asked some one, whose name he cannot recall, and was informed that it was intended to be a declaration of war.

ATIS Press Translations. (575-599)

No. 592.

In Prince KONOYE's Memoirs, published in the December 30, 1945 issue of the Asahi Shimbun, KONOYE stated that at a cabinet meeting on October 14, 1941, the Chief Secretary asked Admiral OKA about the Army's wishes and OKA replied "The Navy cannot officially say that it does not want war. At best the Navy can merely state that the matter should be left to the Premier".

With reference to the above information, OKA denied that he made the above statement, however, he stated that he believed that the statement expressed the views of the Navy.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, John Curtis, Lt., ASN 0934860, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 6 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

John A. Curtis

I, Dave HOSHIMIYA, T/4, ASN 39935310, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 6 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dave Hoshimiya

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1 day of April 1946.

A. A. Munggay  
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer  
International Prosecution Section  
GHQ, SCAP