

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:


Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Dr. James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, October 19, 1973
7:17 - 7:28 p.m.

PLACE:

The Secretary's Office
Department of State



Secretary Kissinger: Dobrynin called last night with a resolution he wanted to kick around. It included a demand to return to the 1967 lines, and possible negotiations. I said we would call back. This morning we got a message from Brezhnev proposing that the President send me to Moscow.

[To Scowcroft:] Make sure that Jerry Warren gets out that we let the Chinese know about the Kissinger trip before their dinner [the dinner for Secretary Kissinger that evening at the PRCLO at the Mayflower Hotel].

Sending me would delay it a few days, give them a face-saver, and avoid Gromyko coming here with tough instructions. Brent will keep you informed. I will work for a simple ceasefire, with maybe a call for negotiations. The trouble is Israel doesn't want anything, but I may have to include a reference to 242. I may have to go back to our original status quo ante.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY RAC 5/21/06 NLF-MDC-2-16-1, NSC/state guidelines

SECRET/XGDS

BY SO **NLF DATE** 6/12/08

Everyone knows in the Middle East that if they want a peace they have to go through us. Three times they tried through the Soviet Union, and three times they failed.

Please give me your best intelligence estimate.

Keep the aircraft going to Israel so Israel will be grateful and can't say we screwed them in their hour of triumph. Give them the other eight F-4's.


Last Thursday I arranged with the Soviet Union for abstaining from a ceasefire. I then beat Israel into agreeing, but Sadat turned it down. On Monday we offered a ceasefire again with a tie to 242.

We can't humiliate the Soviet Union too much.

The A-4's should go at ten a day; the F-4's at four a day.

I have long postponed this Chinese trip and have to go.

Colby: It's only two weeks. Then put it off again if necessary.



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HK / Schloinger / Colby / Warren / 100.
19 OCT 73

K D called last night w/ a resolution he wanted to talk around. Included w/ channel to 67 times & possible negotiations. Said we would call back. This morning got msg from B - decided not -

** → Make sure that Warren gets out that we let Chinese know about HK trip w/ their desire. Sending me would delay, give them a few more, avoid George's coming w/ tough instructions. Brent will help you inform - I will work for single CF w/ maybe a call for negotiations. Trouble is I don't want anything, but ² may ^{have to} involve upward to 242. I may have to go back to our orig. status quo ante.

Every one knows in MI that if they want a plane they have to go thru us. Three times they tried thru SU, 3 times they failed.

Please give me your best intelligence yet. Keep a/c going to I so I will be justified can't say we screwed them in their hour of triumph.

Can't turn the other 8 F-4's

last Times I ~~offer~~ arranged w/ SU for obtaining from CA. I then went into agreeing but Sabat turned it down. On Monday we offered again w/ the to 242.

→ We can't broadcast SU to ~~us~~ us
A-4's at 10/day. F-4's at 4/day
Have long postwar China trip

Colby Only 2 weeks. Then put off again if necessary

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY Pres LDC 5/24/06 NLF - msc - 2-16-1
BY ll NLF, DATE 6/27/08 msc/stk guidelines

