

D. D. 1500-D-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
15 March 1940.

Confidential

15 March 1940.

Dear J. O.: I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in the Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the (he) okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery

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firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAs on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it - but I am prepared to do what you want.

Every good wish as always and best of luck.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.

P.S.--Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASHVILLE 15 April, arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24

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April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you
can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take
up the details on his arrival in the West, etc. and you will
be acquainted with them later.

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「エイチ・アール・スティーブ」提督ヨリ「ジェー・オー・リチャードソン」

提督ニ宛テタル一九四〇年三月十五日書翰

一九四〇年三月十五日

親愛ナル「ジェー・オー」君

嚴秘

小生ハ三月八日附貴翰中ニテル(a)(b)及(c)ノ質問ニ對シテ如
何返答シラモ、カト聊カ途方ニ暮レテナルトコロデアル

「ブロンチ」君ガ彼ト小生トノ間ニ往復シテ彼ノ私信綴ラ貴君ガ通
讀スル様ニト残シテ行ツテモ「テアルカ」トモ彼ガ貴君ト話シ合フ
ヲモ「テアルカ」小生ハ知ラ「テアル」布哇派遣隊(艦隊)裏面ハ其ノ大
部分ガ此ノ私信中ニ合メテ「テアル」

小生ガ本職ヲ擔任シテ後小生ニ課セラレテ最初ノ問題「ハバ」
ト提督ノ要求ニテ爾亞細亞艦隊ノ可及的増強「テアル」ハバト
要求ニヨルト此ノ増強ハ重巡洋艦一分隊ヲ要望シテナルモノ
デアツテ、彼ノ第二ノ撰擇ハ分隊ノ輕巡洋艦デアツテ、上海租界
取締ニ関シテノ同地域ノ情勢ハ緊張シテナク、天津ノ情勢モ特
ニ英日關係ニ付テ危機一發ト云フ所デアツテ、歐洲テハ戰端ガ開
始サレテナク、我々「ハバ」ト爲メ出来得ル限リ「コト」ヲ爲シ國務
省ノ力ヲ強化シ同時ニ我々ノ地位ヲ弱化セシメザルコトヲ放シテ「テ
アル」

小生ハ我ガ戰術計畫問題特司令長官ノ「オ」ニテ戰ニ對スル
作戰計畫ニ付テ研究シテ、コレハ「ハバ」トハ海軍ノ展開ヨリ支持
サレ然モ司令長官ハ猶艦隊ノ全單位ヲ密接ニ統御スルト云
フ様ノ塩梅ニ太平洋上ノ戰略的態勢ト一致スルヤウニ思ハレタ、其ノ
結果九月八日小生ハ「ブロンチ」ニ書面ヲ書キ布哇ニ分遣隊ヲ派

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追スル提議ヲシテ、但シ之ハ小生が大統領ト其ノ事ヲ相談シ大統領ガ全面的ニ承諾シテ後デアツク、尚國務省ハ提案通りニシテ

數通、通牒 (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1235, CINCUS 0023-1253) 全

部九月中、モノ往復及二回、電話招出トガ行ハレテ、ブロウナハ

「ブロウナ」ガ指揮スルコトヲ推薦シ、又布哇ニ替航艇ヲ派遣スル

ト云フ小生、最初、提案ガ支持サレルコトヲモ推薦シテ、小生ハ

兩推薦ニ賛同シテ、ブロウナ、ブロウナニ提督ハ亞細亞艦隊更ニ巡

洋艦ヲ巡遊^{スルコトハ反對サレタ}カシカシテ、我々ハ一隻、附屬船哨戒機一中

隊及ビ六隻、新造替航艇トテ亞細亞艦隊補強ヲ行ハシメ

ル、布哇ハ増強分遣隊ハ司令長官「オリニテ」作戰計畫ト一致

スルコトデアル。

布哇分遣隊ガ出發スル時期トソツク時ニ「作戰演習ヲ容易クシ

ムル目的」ト云フ理由ヲ示ス新聞發表、案ガ立テラレテ、大統領

ハ最後ニ「新聞ニシテ知ラシテハナラヌ」ト謂ヒ渡シテ、ブロウナ

分遣隊ガ布哇ニ到着セルヤ否ヤ交替問題ガ生シテ、ブロウナニ教

通信、往復、後、我々奮然難局ニ當リ、此問題ハ「この連続番

號 0008 或ハ一九四〇年一月四日」ニ関シ、我々ノ命令ヲ發送シテ、ブロウナ

云フ迄モナク、母國港ト從屬者輸送、問題ハ其、最後の決定

到着スルニハ大キナ項目デアツクデアル。

抑々布哇分遣隊ニ関スル小生ノ考ハ「この派遣隊、指揮官ハ止

規、發砲演習計畫ヲ實施シ且ソ訓練、為メ中部太平洋

域ニアル各島々、領土ヲ視察シ、此、領土ニ通曉シ、戰時ニ際シ

ハ其ヲ使用スルコトガ或ハ出来ルカモ知レナイ、否ヤ分出來ルアラウ

ト云フデアツク。

No. 2

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No. 3

現下ノ世界情勢デハ哇ニ分遣隊ヲ派遣スル決定ハ正シト小
 生未ダ考^海同地ニ同分遣隊ヲ居ルトガドレケノ影響ヲオレニザ^{外交}
 政策ニ及ホスベキカハ誰モ測^難國務省ハ現在編成ヲ強ク支持シ之ヲ有利
 ナリト考テアル彼等ハ總ベテ討議新聞発表等関シ参割習意ヲ表シ
 テ居ル以上以テ貴官ノ内項ト内項ヲ或ル程度を査シラト思^{余ハ海軍}
 中將ガ布哇分遣隊ヲ指揮ベキモト感^ザラル得^{ナイ}彼ハ大方戦^争計畫ニ
 規定サレテ上記艦隊ヲ指揮スルコト管理ハ困難テアルカモ知^ス然^レ戦^争
 際ハ層困難ニテ^ルコト故^ニ困難ヲ除去スベキ手段ガ講^ハラ^ル
 テ^{アル}

貴官ノ内^閣ニ^テハ大統領ガ其ノ任期満了前ニ太平洋沿岸ニ行^ク
 否ハ^可論小生ハ知^ラナイガ行^クコト云^フ可能性ガ有^ルナルト考^ヘル
 事實昨年十月彼ハ行^クコト欲^シタガ行^ケテカワチ^テアル^事時^ハ彼
 ハ桑港^人々^ハ彼^ハ後日行^クコトヲウニ^シヨウト告^ゲテ^{アル}小生ノ推測^ハ
 ハ世界情勢ガ彼^ノ華盛頓ヲ離^ルコトヲ許^スナ^ラバ^冬ニ^テル^前ニ
 何時カ釣^行ヲ希望^シテ以^テ恐^ラフハ彼ガ辱^ムロ^ニテ^キト^スアラ^スカ
 行^クコト希望^シテ持^ツテ彼^ハ西海岸ニ行^ク事^ト思^フ

巡洋艦艦隊獲^艦又ハ之^ト同等ノモノガ西^方ニ^テラウ大統領ハ^必ズ
 誰^カヲ隨^行サセ度^イカラウカラ彼ガマスカル^ルサ^レ運^河地^帯ニ
 行^ク時^ハ不自由^ハナ^カツ^テガ隨^行員^ハ之^ヲ最^少限^度ニ^テ詰^ル
 メ^テテ^アツ^テ

「オーガスタ」號ノ交代ニ関^シテハ余ハ貴官ノ公文書翰ヲ受^領
 致^スル目下^ニテ^ララ^ル角^度ヲ^テ慎重ニ研究中^ニテ大^体ニ於^テ兩
 目的ニ満足^シ解決^シ見^出ス^コトヲ希望^スル。

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No. 4

大西洋一等巡洋艦一戦隊ヲ留置フ決定ハ大統領ト相当計
議後ナサレテモ、テアル中ニ戦隊ヲ持ツコトヲ希望スル者モ、
自分ハ現在、通、二等巡洋艦ニ戦隊ニ依ツテ補ハレテ居ル一
隊ヲ充テアルト主張シ、カリブ海ニ巡洋艦ニ隻ト北大西洋
海岸ニ隻一般的要素ガアルカラ、我々ハコレ以下テハ、マ
ケイ、少クとも、今ノ間ハ我々ハコレニ等巡洋艦一戦隊ヲ留
置カネバ、ナラズ、

二等巡洋艦艦隊旗艦ニ就イテ、小生ノ書翰ニ對スル御回答ヲ得ハ
幸テアル、小生トシテハ、賛同致シ兼、ネル、テアルカ、然シ御希望ニ應スルコト
ナル。

敬具

署名 / ベッテイ

カリホルニア州 サンペドロ

米國軍艦、ペンシルバニア 號

米國艦隊司令長官

米國海軍大將、シチオー、リヤードソン

追伸

エダソン氏ハ三月二十六日華盛頓發四月一日艦隊着四月十五日「ナツ」
ビルニテ布哇發四月二十日宋港着四月二十四日頃、サンデーゴ視察、
四月二十八日頃華盛頓ニ歸ル予定。

貴官が彼ニ、旅行中ニ海軍ヲ熟知セシメラレシコトヲ切望ス、
テ、
西部等へ彼が到着スルヤ詳細ヲ相談、答、尚後ニ之ヲ貴官ニ通
知、答。

