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THESIS

POLAND: RENITENCY AND INTEREST BEHIND THE FOG

by

Scott W. Salyers

June 1986

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POLAND: RENITENCY AND INTEREST BEHIND THE FOG

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work is to discuss the post-World War II and present situation in Poland as a background for establishing the phenomenon of renitency and stalemate existing in Poland today. Polish political culture is then used as a model for explaining the continued opposition of the Poles to Soviet rule and their resistance to socialist transformation on the Soviet model. The discussion of Polish political culture and the identity of its essential Westernness then serves as a start point for studying U. S. national interest with regard to Poland. The theory of national interest is first reviewed in the American context; a comparison of Soviet and U. S. interest in Poland then follows, using the Muechterlein and Teti models of the national interest. The work concludes with recommendations for U.S. policy toward Poland based on Polish political culture and U. S. national interest as set forth in this work.

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I. INTRODUCTION

During the summer of 1980, events in Poland captured the imagination and attention of the West as well as a large part of the world. A vast assemblage of workers, united in a movement known as Solidarity, seemingly strove to cast off the invisible but real chains of Soviet bondage in their homeland and challenged the right of the existing government in the purported "People's Republic" of Poland to exercise the functions of government for the Polish people. In a sense "captured" would be better stated as "recaptured" for it was not the first time that similar events in that country had captured the attention of the West.

In 1410, in the forests and fields around Grunwald, the people of Poland had shocked the West by defeating the great lords of Malbork, the seemingly invincible Teutonic Knights, who had sought to place all of the eastern Baltic lands within the long reach and efficient rule of their order. The Golden Age of Poland in the sixteenth century produced one Nicolaus Copernicus, who again captured the attention of the learned West with his theory of a heliocentric universe. Later, in quick succession, the West stared east in 1772, 1793, and 1795 as three partitions of Poland finally erased an independent and long-present Poland from the map of Europe.

Poland gained a reputation as a country that refused to die, however, and it appeared again on Europe's map as the Duchy of Warsaw under Napoleon, and then as Congress Poland, under Russian rule, after his defeat. True to its tradition, Poland recaptured Western attention in 1830 and in 1863 with gallant, though abortive uprisings that stirred democratic souls, but unleashed the fist of the Russian master in reimposing subjugation. Passionate voices of support for Poland were raised even in the new Western land of America where Polish patriots had unforgettably aided the cause of American independence a half-century earlier. But in the end, Poland seemed to slip back into forgotten obscurity as the West looked to other more "pressing" events.

Following World War I, a reconstituted Poland emerged in Europe and immediately was challenged by the forces of Bolshevism from the East. Western eyes gazed in fascination and then admiration as the beleaguered Poles fashioned a miraculous victory from the shadows of certain defeat outside the very gates of Warsaw itself. Those same eyes then turned away and forgot about Poland until a new and monstrous shadow rose up in Germany to threaten the whole of Europe. For a little over a month in the late summer of 1939, all of Europe watched in an almost embarrassed fascination as Poland alone rose to challenge Hitler's war machine, before which all others had cowered in submission or disarray. In the Jewish ghetto of 1943 and in the betrayed uprising in Warsaw in August 1944, the Poles revalidated human dignity and gave new meaning to courage, even in the face of cynical betrayal and savage brutality. The West watched, but then repayed the Poles with acquiescence to a Yalta Agreement that spoke of a free and independent Poland but finally only led to the West hiding its eyes from the post-war Soviet actions that would make a mockery of such words. All the West had done was to give the Poles opportunity to again confront oppression.

The Poles were consistent: 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980--each gave rise to events that would for a time recapture Western attention and imagination. But the West was consistent too as it had watched, and then turned away. Each crisis has followed the long example of Polish history, flashing like lightning across a summer sky. The stark realities of the moment and the rumblings of unrest that followed were revealed for all to see, and then forgotten as Poland again slipped back into the gray fog that had been given the name of "Eastern Europe" after World War II.

The tendency to consign Poland to that fog is made stranger still when one realizes that Poland lies in the geographic center of Europe, not on its eastern fringe. On Warsaw's Parade Square, beneath the Stalinist Palace of Culture, stands an ordinary signpost that gives the distance to other European capitals: Berlin--513 km, Brussels--1122 km, London--1444 km, Moscow--1122 km. The Poles realize they are as close to Brussels as to Moscow and have long claimed to be a Western nation. The Russians have long known this as well; perhaps their realization of this fact explains the vigor of Soviet actions to deceive the West and to redefine geography. But for the

West, Poland seems to lead a Brigadoon existence of brief appearance and then recession into the mists of the East. Perhaps the rumblings that follow each Polish "appearance" are actually the sounds of a troubled Western conscience.¹

In the belief that the West has too long and too often avoided the subject of Poland, with this paper I have sought to shed some light on the ever-present "Polish Question" that has been a recurring theme in European history, especially in the last two hundred years. In this era of superpowers the Polish Question is just as important, for in many ways it provides the same sort of touchstone and linchpin as it did previously, but on a grander scale. Failure to address the problem circumspectly--or worse, at all--will not cause its resolution, at least in our lifetime; Polish history makes that abundantly clear.

As others have written at length about the peculiarly Soviet aspects of the problem, I have chosen to focus instead on what I see as the heart of the problem, the Poles themselves. Despite Soviet efforts to reshape Poland into a fraternal socialist country after the Soviet mold following World War II, the Poles have evidenced a renitency seemingly unexpected by their Soviet masters. Such Soviet experience in Poland, and to varying degrees in the rest of Eastern Europe, has caused many political scientists to turn anew to the idea of political culture as an explanation of why the indigenous cultures are successfully (or unsuccessfully) resisting Soviet domination. A significant portion of this work will thus be devoted to a discussion of Polish political culture, and to the history and experiences that laid its foundations. In so doing, I hope to induce the reader to a

¹While the romantic tones that I have used to introduce Poland may seem overblown to the sedate scholar, I would venture to assert that such an image is more in agreement with the Polish "self-image" than the desiccated descriptions of Poland presented by many Western scholars today; Chopin is, after all, still a Polish national hero today. For a much more eloquent statement of "Polish-ness" I would recommend James A Michener's Poland (New York: Random House, 1963). At the risk of censure for my temerity in citing a novel, I would maintain that Michener does the best job of expressing the spirit that animates the vast sweep of history and life that is Poland.

A good complement to Michener's historical novel approach is Stewart Steven's The Poles (New York: MacMillan, 1962). Steven emphasizes current Polish politics and everyday life (while not forgetting historical roots) by addressing separate chapters to the Party, bureaucrats, the Church, Solidarity, the intellectuals, the countryside, women, the black market, etc. It too provides captivating reading.

better understanding of the spirit of the problem that, in the final analysis, actually underlies and animates any discussion of the superpower aspects, whether acknowledged or not. Specifically, it is my firm belief that through a review of post-World War II Polish history and a general consideration of Polish political culture, the current situation in Poland becomes more understandable, especially in its characteristics of renitency and stalemate; Soviet interest is briefly presented so that one does not perchance forget the geopolitical realities of Poland to which the Poles themselves often refer. The second part of this paper poses the question of U. S. national interest in Poland, attempts to explain and categorize that interest, and then concludes with general recommendations for U. S. policy toward Poland. Above all, it is my hope that this paper will stir the reader's imagination and thoughts concerning Poland and will serve to pull back, at least temporarily, the fog that too often shrouds the people of Poland living in this Brigadoon.

II. POLAND: POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORY

A. 1945-1970

Any attempt to understand specific events in Poland today must ground itself first in the history of Poland, for there tradition combines with reality in the shaping of present events. As one Polish historian wrote,

Poland has been troubled by a history in which myth is as potent a brew to the Polish imagination as fact. There is not an event in our current travails that cannot find some echo in our history. But because that history is constantly distorted by the authorities, it is also distorted in a completely different way by the public. Because the Party is so terrified by the past, ordinary people cling to it with a passion that is terrifying. We have become a people who can live only in the imagination of what we believe to be the glorious past.¹

Thus the events in Poland in 1980, while continuing in a long tradition of resistance to foreign oppression, found their specific context in the Sovietization of Poland following World War II.

The Soviets claimed Poland by right of possession after the Soviet defeat of Nazi German in battle, and by virtue of the Yalta Agreement, which the Soviets viewed as a fruit of victory and as a license for hegemony over what has come to be known as Eastern Europe.² They immediately embarked on a policy of Sovietization in their new lands as a means of ensuring that hegemony; Poland was no exception. The central feature of this policy and process of Sovietization was the imposition of a Stalinist-style Communism on Poland, a monistic Communism that mandated the removal of all roots of pluralism from Polish society. This liquidation of "class enemies" involved the extirpation of popular political parties; the isolation and eventual elimination of representatives of the previously-recognized Polish government-in-exile that had spent the war

¹Steven, The Poles, p. 265.

²Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", Current History, November 1982, p. 372.

years in London; the compulsory incorporation of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) into the Communist-originated Polish Workers' Party (PPR) to form the Polish United Workers' Party (PZRP); and the organization of any remaining political "parties" into a PZRP-dominated United Front. Fraudulent elections were used to ratify these new arrangements. The Communists also declared ideological war on liberal and religious values while pursuing policies of nationalization and collectivization in the economic realm that served to emphasize the dependence of the individual on the government.³

Through Soviet dictate, Poland's boundaries moved west to the old Curzon Line in the East (yielding ancient Polish territories to the Soviet Republics Ukraine and Byelorussia) and to the Oder-Neisse Line in the West (incorporating the old German lands of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia into the new Poland). Poland thus acquired over 100,000 square kilometers, including important industrial and maritime areas, from Germany as compensation for the 180,000 square kilometers, including Vilnius and Lvov, that were surrendered to the Soviet Union. These territorial adjustments were accompanied by a massive forced migration of populations in which some three million Poles were removed from farms in the eastern territories and resettled into the newly-acquired western territories. The 2.5 million indigenous Germans of those western lands were forcibly expelled to provide room for the new settlers. As a result of these migrations and the Nazi extermination efforts against Poland's sizeable pre-war Jewish minority, Poland also achieved a new ethnic purity. Whereas in 1939 about 30 percent of Poland's population had been comprised of ethnic minorities, by 1950 the country was 96 percent ethnic Polish, of whom more than 90 percent were Roman Catholic.⁴

The Poland that emerged then after World War II was largely a product of Soviet thinking. The system established in Poland under Soviet tutelage was not as visibly repressive as the system in

³Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 371.

⁴Harold D. Nelson, ed., Poland, A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Press, 1983), p. 72.

the USSR under Stalin--even at the height of Stalinism in Poland there were no "show trials" and executions of purged Communist leaders like those in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the country's political and economic systems, geographic configuration, and ethnic composition were all shaped by a Soviet Union that was traditionally hostile to Poland's view of itself as a pro-Western, Catholic, and democratic state. The Sovietization of Poland was, in effect, an attempt to de-Europeanize/de-Westernize Polish political culture.⁵

The forced introduction of the Soviet model into Poland soon resulted in a sharp political cleavage between the Polish nation and its government. Poles rightfully viewed the government, i.e., the Party-government-security apparatus, as foreign and subservient at least in large part to un-Polish (or worse, pro-Soviet) interests. The Soviet model imposed on a war-devastated Poland a rigid, centrally-planned economy favoring Soviet needs. The initial Polish six-year plan (covering the years 1950-1955) envisioned the pursuit of rapid industrialization in a Poland that had been largely agricultural prior to World War II. The rigorous execution of such a plan in itself would have caused tremendous strain, dislocation, and inefficiency through blatant disregard of comparative economic advantage in favor of ideological principle. But as recent scholars have suggested, Stalin increased the burden by forcing Poland to further violate its national economic interests by forcing it to organize a large military-industrial complex to Soviet specifications on top of the fact of industrialization. Poland was ordered to revise its six-year plan to accomplish a militarization of the economic and social life of the country in a three-year period. The result was the victimization of civilian-oriented investment as the military aspects of the plan simply took over a large portion of existing and much-needed civilian factories and reallocated resources and production factors sorely needed in the nonmilitary sectors.⁶

⁵A. Ross Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", Rand Note, N-1891-AF, July 1962.

⁶For a detailed discussion of the reasons, supporting statistics, and effects of this imposition see Michael Checinski, "Poland's Military Burden", Problems of Communism, May-June 1983.

The separation of the government from the people, and the inefficiency and distortion of Polish economic life, are an enduring legacy of the post-war Sovietization program in Poland and are at the heart of the last forty years of Polish history.⁷ This legacy has generated a cyclical pattern of revolt that has been punctuated by the events of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980. The course of the cycle is that of revolt, followed by government promises to correct past mistakes, brief lip-service to reform, and finally, an inevitable return to centralized, autocratic, bureaucratic practices that once again generate unrest, resistance, and revolt.

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization drive culminated in his February 1956 address to the Twentieth Party Congress of the KPCC. This process, combined with the sudden death of PZPR first secretary Boleslaw Bierut in March 1956, set the political stage for the 1956 crisis in Poland.⁸ For the Poles Stalinism and Sovietization were one in the same; talk of de-Stalinization aroused expectations of de-Sovietization as well. Bierut's death accentuated a deep split in the PZRP between strict adherents to the Moscow line and those who favored a more Polish identity. This political turmoil was complicated by a downward economic trend, especially in the area of consumer goods and services, a result of the Soviet-imposed shift from a pre-war agricultural economy to a post-war industrial one.

Rising food prices and work quotas eventually sparked a workers' strike in Poznan on 28 June 1956. Within minutes the clamoring for bread assumed traits of a political revolt as Polish flags were unfurled and anti-Soviet slogans were combined with attacks on the local PZRP headquarters

⁷Jadwiga Staniszkis, "Economic Cycles and Politics in Poland", Osteuropa, (Aachen, West Germany), No. 3, 1982, p. 85 [cited in Chęcinski, "Poland's Military Burden"]. Dr. Staniszkis argues that most of Poland's post-war economic difficulties and cyclical crises were a direct result of the phases of modernization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

⁸Adam Ulam goes so far as to suggest that Bierut died of a heart attack from hearing Khrushchev's speech; Expansion and Co-existence (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1974), p. 578. Erwin Weit, Gomulka's personal interpreter, said later that Bierut actually committed suicide as he could not force himself to obey Khrushchev's instructions to return to Poland and dismantle the now discredited cult of personality which he (Bierut) had so faithfully served; Ostblock Intern, (Hamburg: 1970), p. 37 as cited in Dallace L. Meehan, Poland: National Autonomy or Soviet Invasion? Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 1978, p. 19.

building. Khrushchev himself recognized and later mentioned the anti-Soviet overtones of the riots in his memoirs.⁹ Polish army infantry and tank forces were ordered into action and they suppressed the riots that same afternoon and evening. Warsaw Radio reported some 48 persons killed and another 424 wounded, but Western sources in Poznan during the riots (an international trade fair was in progress at the time) estimated the dead at 200-300.¹⁰ The riots represented a terrible challenge to the Polish regime and underscored the need for a new leader who could restore unity to the party while gaining some measure of popular support for government policies.

The choice, advanced by the PZRP and later ratified after initial and vociferous protest by Khrushchev, fell on Wladislaw Gomulka. Gomulka was a relatively popular leader of the "national" wing of the PZRP (he had been in the Communist element of the Polish underground during World War II while Bierut had been in Moscow; Gomulka had been purged in 1948 for "nationalism"). He proceeded to appease the Poles by announcing a "Polish road to Socialism". Gomulka's plan involved the establishment of workers' councils, the reprivatization of most of the 10,600 collective farms, the removal of Marshal Rokossovsky¹¹ and other Soviet-appointed officers in the Polish high military command, relaxation of censorship, and expansion of civil rights to pacify members of the intelligentsia and the Catholic Church.

Within six months Gomulka began a roll back policy. The workers' councils served as Communist mobilization forums, censorship was revived, and civil rights were reduced. Against the advice of his economists, who argued that economic decentralization was a necessity and that

⁹Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 198-200.

¹⁰Facts on File, No. 818, June 27 - July 3, 1956, p. 217.

¹¹Marshal Rokossovsky, although ethnically Polish, was a Soviet citizen and officer who was the Polish minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces at this time. Marshal Rokossovsky, thirty other Soviet generals, and hundreds of other Soviet officers had been placed directly into the Polish military command structure following the Soviet occupation of Poland in the closing months of World War II. These Soviet appointees were to ensure the obedience of the Polish military to Soviet directives, and were to supervise the restructuring and reorganization of the Polish armed forces along Soviet lines.

Poland needed a more balanced economy, Gomulka rejected reforms that would have liberalized the Polish economic system. Fearing that decentralization of the economy would weaken the leading role of the PZRP in Poland, Gomulka returned to strict centralized planning, pursued rapid industrial growth, and emphasized the production of capital goods. The cycle was running true to form--after brief liberalization, Gomulka increasingly tightened political controls and preoccupied himself and his government with the defense of Communist rule. For fourteen years he managed to maintain control, appeasing nationalism and forging domestic consensus by skillful manipulation of the issue of Poland's border with Germany, and maintaining good standing with Moscow through loyal support. Thus Gomulka became one of the leading advocates for socialist fraternal intervention to repress the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968; such a move to combat the Czechoslovakian disease helped, of course, to maintain domestic "tranquility" in Poland as well.

It is important to note, however, that while Gomulka demonstrated loyal support to Moscow in his policies, Poland continued to deviate from Soviet preference in certain matters. Specifically, agriculture retained its private character and the Roman Catholic Church maintained a uniquely strong national, as well as religious, role. Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, primate of Poland, had been released from prison during the 1956 liberalization period (he had been arrested in September 1953 after confronting the Bierut regime on the issue of proposed government control of Church appointments). Having successfully led the Polish church during the most difficult times of the Sovietization period against attempts by the government to destroy the Church as an independent institution, Cardinal Wyszyński directed his efforts in the Gomulka era to resisting government efforts to circumscribe religious and Church-sponsored educational activities.¹²

The Gomulka regime tried to weaken Church influence through increased Marxist indoctrination in schools, atheistic propaganda campaigns, the introduction of social legislation

¹²See Jan Nowak, "The Church in Poland", Problems of Communism, January-February 1982, p. 1.

opposed by the Church (e.g., abortion), prohibitions on the construction of new churches to serve the needs of a population moving into urban centers as a result of industrialization, special taxes for clergy, and even personal attacks on Cardinal Wyszyński. Each of these thrusts was blunted through Cardinal Wyszyński's strong leadership, clerical solidarity, selective civil disobedience, non-compliance with government regulation, and popular mobilization of Church members in maintaining Church prerogatives and in meeting Church needs. The Catholic clergy advocated a people's Catholicism based on the premise that ordinary people were more reliable supporters of the Church than were Catholic intellectuals; this permitted the Polish people, through traditional Church celebrations, to manifest support for their Church and opposition to official state doctrine. This curious blend of Church and nationalism enjoyed particular opportunity for expression in the millennial celebration of Christianity in Poland in 1966. Rival state celebrations could not capture the imagination of the people like those of the Church. Although the Church celebrations focused on religious themes, they could not help but be a statement of Polish national identity and a reminder of the role of the Church in the foundation of both the Polish state and nation (in contrast to the foreign-derived Gomułka regime).

The disillusionment with Gomułka continued to deepen in the 1960s as he moved further from the liberalization that had marked his coming to power in 1956. Division within the PZRP resulted in sniping at Gomułka from the technocrats (led by Edward Gierek) who pressured for reform, especially economic reform. Attacks were also mounted by the Partisans, led by the minister of internal affairs, Mieczysław Moczar, who advocated even tighter central control over the Party apparatus. In February and March of 1968, thousands of Warsaw students took to the streets to participate in sit-in strikes and demonstrations in protest over cultural censorship. The Prague Spring heightened tensions as Gomułka used the situation to draw closer to Moscow for support since his legitimacy at home was failing. Moczar used the student disturbances to weaken further Gomułka's Party control through discovery of a "Zionist plot" that "incriminated" some of Gomułka's closest associates and forced their removal from office. Poland under Gomułka slid into

a general atmosphere of intellectual repression, economic sluggishness, and general despair and depression.¹³

B. 1970-1980

The dissatisfaction with Gomulka reached critical mass in 1970. The autocratic and rigid party control of the economy left the regime incapable of effectively managing the economic crisis that it spawned in December of that year. Two consecutive bad years of poor crops (made worse by a shortage of fertilizer), combined with a long-standing neglect of and under-investment in agriculture, had resulted in a decline in farm production and the necessity to import millions of tons of grain from abroad. (Poland was historically known as one of the breadbasket areas of Europe.) Whereas agriculture exports had previously been used to finance modernization and investment in industry, such exports now had to be cut. The Gomulka government decided to increase domestic food prices to slow domestic demand; the increase (up to 33 percent on meat, 25 percent on dairy products) took effect just before the festive Christmas season. A new, reduced wage scale was also introduced.

The result was strikes and riots of industrial workers in the Baltic cities of Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Sopot. Party buildings were torched and strikers in Szczecin even took over the city government. Polish regular army units were called in. When the strikers refused to disperse, the troops attacked, killing 45 and injuring 1200 (according to official publications). Reportedly suffering from a nervous breakdown, Gomulka resigned as first secretary;¹⁴ leadership passed to Edward Gierek.

¹³Johnathon Randal, "Power Struggle Persists Among Polish Communists", New York Times, 31 October 1968.

¹⁴Security troops moved into isolate Gomulka in his villa three days before his resignation. There is little doubt that he was forced from office by the Gierek/Moczar factions who had challenged him earlier. See Meehan, Poland: National Autonomy or Soviet Invasion?, p. 48.

Gierek was known as a technician, a long-time member of the party hierarchy, who had served as Party secretary at Katowice, Silesia. Upon assuming control, he blamed everything on Gomulka and calmed the nation by rescinding the price increases, boosting minimum pay rates, and promising "socialist democracy" and "socialist welfare" (consumerism). Helped initially by emergency Soviet credits and support, Gierek embarked on an ambitious strategy of simultaneously forcing the pace of industrialization and satisfying consumer demands.¹⁵

Gierek's "new development strategy" was keyed to large-scale import of capital and technology from the West. Such investment would be used to restructure and modernize the economy while stimulating an increase in consumption that was necessary to create incentives, without which it would be difficult to achieve higher labor productivity. Western machines and equipment would be used in new or newly-modernized plants to provide high-quality manufactured goods in accordance with Western specifications for export to the West; licensing from, or even occasionally, cooperation with Western firms would be acceptable. The goal was to achieve quickly an excess of exports over imports. Exports to fellow members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)¹⁶ and to less-developed countries, as well as to the West, were expected to increase the scale of production. When combined with modernized capital stock and increased labor productivity, this program was expected to ensure an intensive pattern of development.¹⁷

The implementation of the "new development strategy" produced a rapid increase of Poland's ties with the West, ties encouraged and made more acceptable in a period of budding East-West

¹⁵Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", p.2.

¹⁶CMEA, also known as Comecon, was founded in 1949. Initially structured to link the economies of the East European countries into a Soviet-controlled socialist, economic bloc, membership in CMEA today is the basis for inclusion in the Socialist Commonwealth of Nations. Members today are Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

¹⁷For a more detailed analysis of Gierek's economic program see Zbigniew M. Fallenburg, "The Polish Economy in the 1970s" in U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, East European Economics Post-Helsinki, a compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 816-864.

detente. Indeed, one of Gornulka's final acts in 1970 had been to sign a treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany that recognized the Oder-Niesse line as Poland's western frontier.¹⁸ The Polish standard of living shot up also, but everything was riding artificially on a flood of Western credits; by 1975 Poland's hard-currency debt was racing toward \$20 billion. Emphasis on industry had discriminated once again against agriculture, a relatively more efficient and more productive earner of hard-currency through export. Declining agricultural production necessitated food imports, further deepening the balance-of-payment difficulties. Profitable exports to non-socialist countries also proved difficult to expand, particularly in the circumstances of a world economic slowdown occasioned by Middle Eastern oil price increases. Such increases also prompted the Soviet Union to reduce its supply of cheap oil to Poland as the Soviet Union sought to cash in on rising oil prices for its own hard-currency needs. Perhaps most important, Gierek's programs did nothing to eliminate the bureaucratic inefficiencies and economic rigidity of the Communist command economic system. Production bottlenecks remained while wages increased, demand exceeded supply on the consumerism side of the strategy, and domestic inflationary pressures added to the generally deteriorating economic situation.¹⁹

By 1976 the situation had become so bad that Gierek's government announced pending foodstuff price increases (nearly 70 percent for meat, 40 percent for grain); the intent again was to curtail consumption while stimulating production. Predictably, strikes and riots ensued in Plock, Radom, and the Baltic ports. According to official Polish government sources, at least 75 policemen were injured and two demonstrators were killed. Remembering the 1970 crisis,

¹⁸The signing of the treaty and the settlement of the frontier issue incidentally called into question the fundamental premise of official Polish post-war security policy, i.e., the argument that Poland needed alliance with the Soviet Union in order to secure protection from "German revanchism". Poland's alignment with the Soviet Union thus became more clearly a case of Soviet interest than Polish, although the German threat provides material for government propaganda to this day, and at times clouds Polish relations even with the Democratic Republic of Germany, especially on the public level.

¹⁹For further analysis of Gierek's policy and its reasons for failure see Zbigniew M. Fallenbuchl, "Poland's Economic Crisis", Problems of Communism, March-April 1982; see also Nelson, Poland, A Country Study, pp. 84-7.

Gierek rescinded the proposed price increases and again secured Soviet loans to bandage the economy. Undoubtedly, Gierek's on-going domestic ideological offensive (especially since 1974) that emphasized Polish-Soviet political solidarity and continued fraternal relations with the Soviets was of assistance in securing such aid. Gierek had convinced Moscow in early 1976 that he was firmly in control, despite clashes with Cardinal Wyszynski on the subject of nationalism and divisions within the Party on the issue of proposed constitutional changes that would have strengthened Soviet-Polish fraternal ties.

The significance of the 1976 disturbances, though, is that in the aftermath of the riots, several leading intellectuals, already agitated by the ideological offensive and encouraged by the 1975 Helsinki Agreement, established the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow or KOR). The purpose of KOR was to investigate independently charges of police brutality during the strikes and to provide legal aid for arrested workers as well as assistance for their families.²⁰ For the first time in post-war history, Polish intellectuals and workers were uniting in mutual support. The intellectuals had been alone in 1968, the workers in 1970. KOR provided a link between the two and an organizational framework for developing the political awareness and organization of the Polish workers.²¹

In the post-1976 period the Church too became more assertive. Cardinal Wyszynski had long walked the tightrope between compromise and resistance, never allowing the Church to become identified with a particular social or economic system, and always directing criticisms at human rights abuses but not at Communism *per se* or at a specific leader. In the late 1970s, the intellectuals began to appreciate more fully the success of the Church in resisting the government while preserving the Polish national identity and staunchly defending human rights. This new

²⁰Nelson, Poland, A Country Study, p. 88.

²¹KOR organized and sponsored a "flying university", so named for the way it continually traveled all over Poland, that challenged the Party's control of education and contributed to the circulation of clandestine publications that challenged the Party's monopoly of information.

acceptance of the Church by the intellectuals helped lay the groundwork for the close cooperation of the Church, intellectuals, and workers that would uniquely characterize the 1980 crisis.²²

The Helsinki Agreement had affirmed the position of the Church in its defense of human rights. The election of the Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope in October 1978, awakened new self-esteem in the Polish people. The visit of Pope John Paul II to his native Poland in June 1979 illustrated the unifying link and crystallizing factor of the Church in Polish society; it also served as a dress rehearsal for the future. The Pope's visit left the Polish people with a marked sense of their own strength and their rulers' weakness. It also heightened the contrast between the Church and the Party, the two mass institutions seeking to represent and mold public opinion. The Church was increasingly seen in the role of defending the rights of the people at large while promoting justice, truth, and honest work. The Party, on the other hand, seemed concerned only with the welfare of its own narrow constituency.²³

The Party was not oblivious to KDR or these events. The security police actively engaged in confiscating publications, harassing and monitoring individuals, and breaking up meetings. However, Gierk did not seem overly concerned. Moreover, he had a particular interest in developing good relationships in the West with such leaders as West German Chancellor Schmidt and French President Giscard d'Estaing. Gierk, of course, wanted Western credits and resources to supply his economy. He also served Soviet interests in promoting such contacts with the West and thus served as intermediary for Breshnev's meeting with Giscard in May 1980 in Warsaw. Such a role naturally gave Gierk prestige and a certain amount of apparent independence as well. Too repressive a policy at home toward the Church or KDR could jeopardize his position and those relationships.²⁴ Gierk believed that he was basically secure with the Soviet leaders; his policy

²²J. Nowak, "The Church in Poland", p. 12.

²³Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81 (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), p. 70.

²⁴Andrews, Poland 1980-81, p.21.

thus became one of defense of position and avoidance of anything that would rock the boat too greatly. -

C. THE 1980-81 CRISIS

As the decade of the seventies closed in Poland, the thunderclouds were gathering once more. It was no secret that the economy was failing, despite Party propaganda claims of success. The standard of living, which had stagnated in 1977 and 1978, began to decline in 1979. Food lines grew longer while workers worked more weekends and longer hours. The Party's banner of honesty, fairness, and morality was heavily soiled as people observed elitism, corruption, and arrogance toward the masses. Gierek seemed not to tolerate any criticism of ineffective policies, although by 1979 even Party members were urging economic reform. Instead, Gierek addressed the VIII Congress of the PZRP in February 1980 and called for more sacrifices--reduction in unnecessary investments, cutback on lesser-priority imports to correct the balance-of-trade, and an increase of productivity. No mention was made of improvement in the average worker's living or working conditions.

Gierek did replace Prime Minister Jaroszewicz with a long-time associate, Edward Babiuch and set him to work on an economic "reform" program. By April 1980, Babiuch concluded that some reform of food prices (that had been basically stabilized since 1970 at the cost of huge subsidies) was necessary. It was decided, however, not to make public announcements of the increases to avoid drawing attention to them (although some meat prices were to increase 90-100 percent). On 1 July, the meat price increase quietly went into effect. The increase was noticed; by mid-July strikes were breaking out.²⁵

²⁵In the seemingly endless saga of meat prices (a situation that goes on today) it is refreshing and enlightening to hear what Poles think about it. Humor is a good conveyor of such thoughts. Quip heard recently in Poland: "Before the war, you'd see a sign on a shop-front and it would say 'Butcher'. And you went in and you found meat. Today the same shop has a sign which says 'Meat'. And you go in and you find a butcher." Reported in Steven, The Poles, p. 47.

The story of the strikes of 1980 and the rise and fall of Solidarity is a fascinating one and worthy of separate study in itself.²⁶ What was particularly noteworthy about the 1980 strikes, and in large part responsible for their initial triumph, was the disciplined behavior of the strikers. Violence was avoided to deprive the government authorities of any pretext for action. Additionally, KOR served as a clearinghouse for information about strikes and negotiations, provided advice to the strike committees, and maintained liaison between the many committees and their leaders. The Church also lent support by organizing a support system for the strikers' families, and by speaking out at the parish level in early support of the strikers. The strikers themselves were not limited to manual workers, but included engineers, middle-level employees, and even members of management; the university students and other intellectuals also supported the strikers. In September, this unity was expressed in the formation of a decentralized independent trade union known as "Solidarnosc" or Solidarity. It took as its symbols the Polish flag, the cross, and the banner "Workers of All Enterprises Unite".

Faced with a spreading strikes across Poland, Gierek tried first in July-August to negotiate settlements with workers striking at individual plants. Gierek desperately wanted to persevere in raising prices to establish the precedent. By early August, though, the negotiated wage increases that had been granted to the workers at the different striking plants had hit \$1.1 billion with no end yet in sight. While Gierek was in the Soviet Union in August, apparently seeking Soviet economic assistance and explaining how he was dealing with the situation, the prestigious Gdansk shipyards struck and the whole situation became critical. The strike triggered even more large

²⁶One of the most readable and thorough accounts of the strikes and subsequent events through martial law is Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81. Andrews is a senior Foreign Service Officer who was stationed in Poland and witnessed the events that led to martial law and the banning of Solidarity.

An excellent source book on the events is William F. Robinson, ed., The Strikes in Poland, (Munich: Radio Free Europe Research, 1980). Robinson has collected documents and reports, observations and broadcasts that he has placed chronologically from 16 July-22 September 1980. The sense of immediacy conveyed by the broadcasts is fascinating, while the collection of documents and analysis of Soviet and East European media coverage in the appendices is unusual and enlightening.

scale strikes along the Baltic ports and in major industrial centers. Drawing up a list of 21 demands, the strikers held firm. On 31 August 1980, Gierek capitulated and, in a ceremony broadcast later that evening by Radio Warsaw, signed the Gdansk Agreement.²⁷ Perhaps most important among the demands, the government acknowledged the right of the workers to strike and to form independent labor unions, and guaranteed their independence. Having signed the agreement, Gierek reportedly collapsed mentally and physically. He was replaced on 6 September by Stanislaw Kania, a PZRP politburo member previously in charge of internal security and Party-Church relations.

Arthur R. Rachwald has noted that the 1980-81 Polish crisis can, as in classical drama, be divided into three acts. The first act is "A Search for Partnership", Act Two is "Polarization", and Act Three is "Knockout--The Lesser Evil".²⁸ During the first stage of the crisis, beginning with the Gdansk Agreement, the search for a *modus vivendi* seemed to characterize the actions of Solidarity and the Party. Both sides recognized the corruption of the Gierek era and sought to avoid head-on collision while attempting to assess the situation and consolidate power. The Gdansk Agreement endorsed the principle of one-party rule as Solidarity pledged to concern itself only with "bread-and-butter" issues and not to transform itself into a political party. Socialism in Poland, collective ownership of the means of production, the leading role of the Party (Communist/PZRP), and the existing system of alliances, were also guaranteed. The political essence of the agreement was an attempt to restrict the "monistic nature of Communism by introducing elements of limited government."²⁹

As J. B. de Weydenthal pointed out in a September 1980 analysis of Gierek's fall, "The most important failure of Gierek's leadership, a failure that precipitated its final undoing, was its

²⁷See Appendix A for text of agreement.

²⁸Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis", in Current History, November 1982, pp. 373-391. His description of each act is presented in the following paragraphs.

²⁹Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 373.

inability to integrate the workers into the system of rule. Indeed, one could assert that the relations between the leadership and the workers were the key factor in Polish politics throughout Gierek's rule.³⁰ The Gdansk Agreement was an attempt to redress this failure. Through contractual guarantees of the rights to organize, to bargain, to strike, to access the mass media while enjoying freedom of the press, opinion and publication, and to practice the freedom of religion, the workers sought more active participation in the People's Republic. Perhaps most telling, the agreement contained a general clause that authorized Solidarity to "pass public judgment on key decisions determining the standard of living of the population." For a few months optimism in attaining the *modus vivendi* reigned in Poland. Whereas the previous competitive coexistence of the Church and Party in Poland had found common ground only in the sentiment of patriotism, the advent of Solidarity seemed to offer a bridge, an expansion to a more stable triad of Party, Church, and Solidarity, since Solidarity was both socialist and patriotic.

Such optimism, however, overlooked inescapable and foreboding realities. By recognizing worker demands, the Gdansk Agreement became an attempt to reconcile two conflicting models of politics: "democracy", in which power flows from the bottom up, and Communist autocracy, in which the prevailing flow is from the top downward. Despite Solidarity pledges to the contrary, what had occurred was a *de facto* destruction of the Party's monopoly of the economy, information, and ideology. The Party now confronted an organized, legal opposition representing the workers, who had, in fact, gained a veto over many aspects of Polish politics. With Solidarity membership growing toward its eventual height of ten million members, nearly 70 percent of the labor force (as compared to three million Party members, one-third of whom also belonged to Solidarity!), the entire ideological foundation of the Party's existence was challenged. As such recognition dawned, the Party's humiliation and determination to erase this frightening precedent increased.

³⁰J. B. de Weydenthal, "The End of the Gierek Era" in Robinson, The Strikes in Poland, p. 191.

When Solidarity began to implement the provisions of the Gdansk Agreement into daily life, the dichotomies became visible. As Solidarity and the Party struggled over control of the radio, television, press, police, education, and economic organizations, distrust mounted and Party resistance stiffened. It became increasingly apparent that Solidarity viewed the Gdansk Agreement as the first step in the renewal of the Polish nation; the Party had thought the agreement was to end the process.

Using the weapons of strike and demonstration, Solidarity sought to advance its cause. The ability of the Solidarity leadership to negotiate compromises became increasingly strained, however, as the weeks passed. The reluctance of the Party to grant "further concessions" has already been noted. In the Solidarity camp internal control of increasingly eager and militant factions became more difficult as Solidarity became the proverbial bandwagon for every sort of opposition to the Communist system, to include advocates of the violent overthrow of the state. The prospect of general strikes and the threat of chaos provided grounds for the government to draw a line of no retreat and even to grab for some lost legitimacy as the holder of the instruments of power and hence, stability through force. Government pronouncements indicated that the Party was not about to relinquish its responsibilities (and privileges) for Poland's ultimate destiny, and it was not slow to remind the Poles of their geographical situation and what that could mean if things got out of hand.

Act Two, "Polarization", began in July 1981 in Warsaw with the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PZRP. The rank and file of the Party itself had begun to exhibit reformist tendencies in early 1981. The demands of these reformists for greater liberalization and democratization of the Party pressured the leadership to agree finally to the Extraordinary Congress in July. The reformists hoped to renew the Party from within--to attack corruption and economic mismanagement, and to refurbish the Party image. Aware of the power and source of strength of Solidarity in its ability to represent popular demands, many of the Party delegates

similarly spoke of populism, democracy, and the accountability of Party officials to their constituencies; little was said about Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism.³¹

Such reformists were not widely successful. Although a certain amount of democratization took place within the Party itself--e.g., free discussion, secret balloting, and a decrease of Party professionals elected to the Central Committee--the same democratization was definitely not extended to the government at large.³² Furthermore, the new Central Committee members, though highly-motivated and well-intentioned, proved no match for the surviving veterans. Instead, much of the congress was spent in settling old scores and in attempting to apportion blame for the crisis. No program for solving the crisis was established. The red tape of the system remained and the party bureaucracy retained intact most of its personnel and prerogatives. The changes were cosmetic and real power remained in the hands of a few, who were determined to hold on at all costs.

In a move to broaden its power base in the face of such attacks, the professional cadres of the Party formed an alliance with the internal security forces and the top echelon of the army. The Polish Army had retained its popularity with the Polish people³³ and the Party sought to co-opt that popularity for itself. General Wojciech Jaruzelski had already been invited to become Prime Minister in February. For the army and security forces it was a question of duty and of assisting

³¹Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 375.

³²In comparing the Central Committees elected by the Eighth (1979) and Ninth Party Congresses, the proportion of party professionals fell 50 percent to 8.5 percent, while the combined representation of workers, foremen, farmers and intellectuals rose from 30 percent to over 60 percent (31.3 percent workers and foremen, 13 percent intellectuals, 18.5 percent farmers). Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report, no. 221, 3 August 1981, p. 5 as cited in Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 375.

³³A poll taken in 1980 by sociologists from the Polish Academy of Sciences showed that the institutions enjoying the greatest confidence were: the Catholic Church (94 percent), Solidarity (90 percent), the army (89 percent), the Sejm or parliament (81 percent), and the Council of State (73 percent). Only 32 percent of the respondents declared confidence in the party. Anna Jasinska and Ryszarda Siemienska, "The Socialist Personality: A Case Study of Poland," International Journal of Sociology, no. 1, (London, 1983), p. 64, cited in Jerzy Milewski, Krzysztof Pomian, and Jan Zielonka, "Poland: Four Years After" in Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/85, p. 342.

the government to maintain control of a tense situation. For the Party, it allowed the professional cadres to retain control as factional struggles and forces within the Party surfaced. The apparatus of coercion thus became the Party's principle source of power, negating the idea of seeking a broader base of power in any process of democratization.

Following the Party Congress, Party dogma was re-emphasized. The Party rejected as unrealistic proposals to restructure Poland's political front system to give more voice to Solidarity; instead, it increasingly portrayed Solidarity as a counter-revolutionary organization. Socialist pluralism was rejected on the basis of the impossibility of reconciling two parallel authorities. Party demands on Solidarity replaced the former willingness to negotiate, and battle lines were formed.

Against this background, the National Congress of Solidarity met in September-October 1981.³⁴ Attendance included members of the Rural Solidarity, recognized by the government in May. The Solidarity Congress seemed to confirm government charges that the labor union had become a political party. Ideological rifts surfaced within Solidarity as "pragmatists" battled "fundamentalists" in debating the future direction of Solidarity and its relationship to the state. The fundamentalists (desiring fundamental reform) wanted to replace the monopoly of the Party in all social, economic, and cultural affairs, and to establish pluralism in politics. They also wanted to separate political authority from economic power, and to remove the Party's presence from factory-level committees. The pragmatists regarded the union as a social, not a political movement. They accepted the realities of the political situation, but wanted to defend what had already been won. They thus called upon the government to renounce the use of force against society, and to recognize the new pluralistic social and cultural outlook in public life. In return, the pragmatists pledged that the union was not to be linked to any political party.

³⁴J. B. de Weydenthal provides an analysis of the Congress in "Solidarity's First National Congress: Stage One", Radio Free Europe Research, 21 September 1981.

The congress finally adopted a program that addressed economic, social, cultural, and political issues; it also reflected a "fundamentalist" tilt. The heart of the program was a section called "The Self-Governing Republic". It argued for a transformation of the state through the introduction of principles of self-government, democracy, and pluralism in order to both overcome the economic crisis, and to meet the aspirations of the Polish people.³⁵ It demanded free elections to the people's councils as a basis for territorial self-government in the state, equality before the law, an independent judiciary, social control of investigative authorities, freedom of one's convictions, and the permission to set up union-controlled and operated radio and TV stations.

Given its size, inexperience, and the conflicts of interest within the membership, the Solidarity Congress represented something of a triumph for democratic procedure; it also revealed major weaknesses in Solidarity. There was a reluctance of the regions represented at the congress to entrust too much authority to the Solidarity National Commission; instead, they preferred to trust themselves rather than the leadership they elected. The result was a weak national commission and a consequent diversion of resources to regional issues. At the same time, many delegates assumed an attitude that could be described as overconfident or even arrogant: they interpreted the government's seeming reluctance to act as a sign of weakness and disarray, and indicative of the lack of any will to act. This sentiment, in turn, promoted militancy within the congress.³⁶ Finally, while still maintaining the official desire to negotiate with the Party, the Solidarity Congress did call for workers in other Warsaw Pact countries to establish independent, self-governing unions similar to Solidarity. The Soviet news agency TASS was quick to label such a call as provocative and imprudent.³⁷

³⁵Andrews, Poland 1980-81, p. 210.

³⁶Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland" in Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Communism in Eastern Europe, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 59.

³⁷Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 390.

In the face of such a challenge, the Party hardened further. The troubled economy had been further weakened by the many strikes and social chaos during the previous fifteen months. After the Solidarity Congress the economy continued to deteriorate,³⁸ the political situation too appeared to be getting out of hand. Within the Party, hardliners reasserted themselves and gradually silenced the reformers, who were disillusioned at the failure of the Ninth Congress to effect real change. Criticism of Kania himself by Party members increased, as did Soviet criticism of the seemingly paralyzed PZRP leadership, although the Soviets made no explicit demands for Kania's replacement. Kania's resignation in October 1981 was a consequence of the Party in-fighting and an indicator of the paralysis and disintegration of the Party; the center no longer controlled the local Party organizations.³⁹

Unable to agree on a successor for Kania from their own ranks, the Party turned to Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski was seen as uncompromised by factional struggle, tough-minded, and of course, he personified the prestige of the army while being able to command its employment. Aware of the Soviet sword of Damocles that hung over Poland, Jaruzelski moved quickly to exercise his authority, enhancing the military presence and role of the military in the government through appointment of officers to key posts. Already the Defense Minister and Prime Minister, Jaruzelski concentrated unprecedented power for a military leader in a Communist country into his hands.

By late 1981, the possibility of Soviet intervention seemed very real in light of the Solidarity Congress' demands and government inaction. The prospect of free elections was not likely to be acceptable to the Soviets, let alone to the PZRP and its control of Poland. If the experience of 1945-7 meant anything, truly free elections were simply not permissible in Poland. Even if Poland managed free elections, Solidarity did not have the ideological unity or political expertise to

³⁸Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", p. 25.

³⁹Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", pp. 39-40.

run the country, especially in the face of Soviet opposition. The prospects for instability, if not chaos, appeared ominous.

For Poland, the prospect of Soviet invasion carried the possibility of reduction to Soviet "republic" or "provincial" status. Additionally, the East Germans might be called upon to administer "temporarily" the Oder-Neisse territories. Since such a Soviet invasion would, of necessity, be massive, probably bloody, certainly expensive, and would undoubtedly discredit the Soviet Union in world opinion as had happened in the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets might just decide to attempt to settle the Polish problem permanently. Since the Poles seemed determined to resist more forcefully than did the Czechs, the severity that such a settlement would entail could constitute a real threat to Poland's national independence and even national identity.⁴⁰

Jaruzelski met in November with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and the new Church primate, Cardinal Glemp (Cardinal Wyszynski had passed away), to discuss differences. No agreement was reached as Jaruzelski found Solidarity's demands for partnership in a new national economic council unacceptable. A radical Solidarity faction's call for the formation of workers' guards, a strike at the Interior Ministry's fire fighters academy, and the increasing threat of food riots due to shortages in early December, seems to have settled the issue in respect to timing. Contingency planning for martial law probably had been initiated shortly after the birth of Solidarity and concrete preparations were certainly completed by November 1981.⁴¹ Despite official Soviet silence, Warsaw Pact Commander-in-chief Kulikov spent the last half of November in Warsaw and probably advised and assisted Jaruzelski during that time.

Given such a situation, it is understandable that Jaruzelski declared martial law (actually a state of war since no provision for martial law existed in the Polish constitution) on 13 December 1981, just prior to the two-month deadline for free elections issued by the Solidarity Congress in

⁴⁰Rachwald, "Poland: Quo Vadis?", p. 391. So the argument often ran in Poland itself. For the Soviet view see the section of this paper on Soviet interests.

⁴¹Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", pp. 30-1.

October. In Jaruzelski's estimation, he had only the armed forces and the security apparatus to depend upon. By his measure, he had tried every other avenue of negotiation and had exhibited great patience and moderation. He found himself continually pushed back with increasingly little room for political maneuver. "He was a general in the role of a politician with no political options left."⁴² Thus, to save himself and the Communist system in Poland, he had little choice but to use the forces of coercion to restore order. Jaruzelski publicly explained martial law in terms of national security, political stability, and as the lesser of two evils--the other, of course, being a Soviet solution by direct intervention. Polish martial law at least preserved a system administered by the Poles themselves.⁴³

In retrospect, it appears that Solidarity's major weakness in the 1980-81 crisis was its own lack of definite and consensual goals and objectives. While such were present at the time of the Gdansk Agreement, the very success of these efforts promoted a situation that led to a case of "too much, too fast" as far as the Party authorities were concerned. The bandwagon effect, while registering the dissatisfaction of the nation for its government, also diluted the focus of the original Solidarity organization and purpose. Rising aspirations among so many generated calls for many different objectives, both in scope and in depth. In a day and age where politics and economics walk hand-in-hand, the attempt of a trade union, a politico-economic organization, to favor the economic to the exclusion of the political, is virtually impossible. Under the pressure of initial success and multi-goaled mass support, the slide into political emphasis is extremely difficult to stem or even manage; this is particularly true in a country and for a people like that of Poland, which had been so long denied a voice in its own political affairs. When this increased emphasis on political affairs asserted itself, Solidarity found itself without a clear-cut plan for managing the inevitable change in emphasis, and without a coherent, articulated program to direct

⁴²Andrews, Poland 1980-81, p. 266.

⁴³The underground press would later print Jaruzelski's decree alongside a similar decree of martial law issued by the Russian governor of Poland in the ruthless suppression of the Revolution of 1863.

and control the force of its popular support in the achievement of limited gains at a slower rate. While it is arguable that such control, combined with a moderate rate of advance, may have yielded a more defensible position for Solidarity, and may have enabled Solidarity to retain some gains under conditions of a government counter-offensive, it is also true that the very nature of the economic demands in Communist Poland made eventual political confrontation unavoidable.

To be sure, it was not all Solidarity's fault that things finally got out of hand. Solidarity originally took the position that it should limit itself to monitoring government programs and activities, and to providing advice and criticism as necessary. That it eventually altered that view is in part the responsibility of the government itself. Solidarity became convinced that the government was incapable of straightening out the economy, and concluded that only the union itself, with its considerable prestige, could undertake such an effort. Unfortunately for Solidarity, there was no consensus on exactly how to reform the system, or on how to change economic policy. The only consensus was that the Communist system had not worked and therefore, had to be substantially altered.

Impetus for Solidarity's distrust of the government stemmed directly from the union's experience in attempting to implement the provisions of the Gdansk Agreement. As the authorities reneged on their responsibilities under the agreement once they realized the import of its provisions, Solidarity began to seek additional institutional guarantees for what had been granted in the Gdansk Agreement. This search eventually took the form of demands for the formation of workers' councils, for a social council to participate in devising policy for the national economy, and finally, for new general elections. In the argument of Nicholas Andrews, the entire Solidarity program that was adopted at the Solidarity Congress, and the union's subsequent demands, reflected this search for institutional guarantees in the face of government failure to fulfill its previously-accepted responsibilities.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Andrews, Poland 1980-81, p. 268.

For Jaruzelski, the pace and direction of events in the Autumn of 1981 simply became too much. With the whole regime trembling under Solidarity's assault, and with the Soviets looking anxiously over his shoulder, Jaruzelski did what he thought necessary and took the only course of action remaining to him. Using the recently-strengthened ZOMO⁴⁵ as the spearhead in order to spare the army's prestige and to avoid possible situations where Polish regular forces might prove unreliable in suppressing their countrymen, Jaruzelski declared martial law. In the dark hours of a Sunday evening the security forces fanned out to arrest Solidarity leaders. Over 7000 activists were interned, personal freedoms were curtailed, and Jaruzelski assumed virtual dictatorial powers at the head of a military junta. Act Three of the drama had been performed.

⁴⁵The ZOMO (Zmotywowane Oddziały Milicji Obywatelskiej) is the Motorized Units of the Citizens' Militia. Although ZOMO was established in 1956 after the Poznan riots pointed out Poland's need for troops specially trained in riot control, few Poles were aware of its existence until 1981. Operating under the authority of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, ZOMO quickly established itself as the Jaruzelski regime's most active and least popular enforcer of the martial law regulations. In carrying out their duties, these police units established a reputation for cruelty and aggressiveness that led to widespread resentment; it is popularly believed that ZOMO is manned, in part, by criminals. ZOMO was unsuccessfully deployed in the 1970 riots, and was afterward completely reorganized, retrained, and purged of several thousand members considered unfit for service. After 1980, ZOMO underwent a major expansion and by 1982, had between 25,000 and 30,000 personnel nationwide. They are equipped with tear gas, water cannon, and other riot control gear as well as light armored vehicles. In addition to riot control, ZOMO units have also been used to control crowds at public events, such as soccer games, and to provide support in case of natural disasters. For further information see Nelson, Poland: A Country Study, pp. 331-2.

III. POLISH POLITICAL CULTURE

Poles! If you cannot prevent your neighbors from devouring your nation,
make it impossible for them to digest it.

--Jean-Jacques Rousseau

A. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE

The purpose of recounting the post-World War II history of Poland from a Polish perspective is to impress upon the reader a sense of the unflagging determination and tough-minded perseverance that would ultimately lead ten million Poles to join Solidarity in 1980-81. The Poles, alone of all the Warsaw Pact peoples, managed to force a change of government not once, but three times (1956, 1970, 1980), largely through popular resistance. Despite Soviet efforts to remake Polish society on a Soviet-Socialist model, the Poles have persisted in popular opposition to Soviet desires, and have resisted Sovietization, collectivization, economic exploitation and mismanagement, and attacks on their identity and Church. While "geographic realities" and Communist policies have not been without effect in the 40 years since the imposition of Communist rule in Poland, the state of present reality in Poland is certainly not what the Soviets or their Polish Communist comrades had hoped for, or imagined would be the case, after four decades of "Socialist Progress". In the Polish experience, while all roads may lead to (or at least through) Moscow, the Soviets had been forced to recognize the existence of not one, but multiple roads, some of which have a distinctly Polish design and scenery. While there are certainly several explanations and reasons for the shape of reality in Poland today, anyone who knows a little of Polish history cannot help but be drawn to explanations that include a discussion of Polish political culture as a large contributing factor in explaining the virulence and continued-nature of Polish resistance to Soviet models and policies to be found in post-war Poland--up to, and including, the present situation. Simply stated, such resistance seems to be a Polish tradition, and

should be expected in the conflict between the norms and ideas of Polish political culture and those inherent to the Soviet model of Communism.

The concept of political culture is certainly not new as a tool in the examination of nations, although the term itself does not appear to have been used until the late eighteenth century.¹ Montesquieu, in his *De l'Esprit des Loix*, considered it appropriate to include a discussion of the "general spirit" or "morals and customs of a nation" when analyzing a country; similarly, de Tocqueville, in his *Democracy in America*, included many accounts of the habits, manners, and opinions which he found to animate the Americans he encountered in his travels through America in 1831, and to which he believed American democratic institutions might largely be attributed. Of course, the idea of civic values and the question of citizenship training is to be found as early as the writings of Plato, while Aristotle initially dealt with the relationship of political culture to social stratification and political structure; Plutarch, Machiavelli, and Rousseau also spoke variously of political culture concepts and influences.

Political culture as employed by modern political scientists, however, is a product of the last thirty years. Due to rapid de-colonialization around the world and the emergence of many newly independent states, political scientists of the post-World War II era were faced with studying both a larger and culturally much more heterogeneous range of political systems than had been the case before the war. Traditional methods of classification and categorization proved unwieldy or unable to account for all the varieties and nuances that were to be encountered in the study of these nations, despite similarities or seeming traditionality of formal institutions. Additionally, there was concern that political science should make a practical contribution in determining the prospects for "democratic modernization" among the newly independent nations, and in preserving them from Soviet and Communist influence. Furthermore, as political scientists observed events in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, those who were growing increasingly dissatisfied with the

¹F. M. Barnard, "Culture and Political Development: Herder's Suggestive Insights", American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, 1969, p. 392.

totalitarian model of Communist rule looked for a model to explain the diversity and emerging and varying resistance to Soviet rule which they perceived in the societies and nations of the Soviet European empire. The growing emphasis on comparative analysis of Communist politics virtually demanded a consideration of political culture as an explanation of emerging reality. Thus the political scientists drew on other disciplines, particularly sociology and anthropology, in a cross-fertilization of political science and in the development of political culture theory.²

As one might expect in dealing with such an intangible concept, while the existence of something known as political culture is generally acknowledged to exist, there is much discussion as to its particulars and its operationalization; that there appear to be as many definitions as there are theorists is thus not surprising. Gabriel Almond says that "when we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. . . . It is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."³ Sidney Verba defines political culture as the "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective orientation to politics." For Verba, political culture refers to "the system of beliefs about patterns of political interaction and political institutions." As such it does not refer to the formal or informal structures of political interaction, to governments, political parties, pressure groups, or cliques; rather, the emphasis is on beliefs--empirical about what the actual state of political life is; normative as to the goals

²For a short history of the development of the concept of political culture see Stephen White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's press, 1980), pp. 1-21. Those readers desiring a more detailed history of political culture theory should see Gabriel Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1980); this work is particularly good concerning ancient treatments of the subject. For other seminal works on political culture see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965); and Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Journal of Politics, Vol. 18, 1956, pp. 391-409.

³Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 14-15.

or values that ought to be pursued in political life; and beliefs possessing an important expressive or emotional dimension.⁴

Providing the definition of political culture in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Lucian Pye wrote,

Political culture is the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system. It encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics.⁵

For Lucian Pye political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the individuals who currently make up the system; it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences. Political culture theory constitutes an attempt to integrate psychology and sociology in order to be able to "apply to dynamic political analysis both the revolutionary findings of modern depth psychology and recent advances in the sociological techniques for measuring attitudes in mass societies;" it signals an effort to apply an essentially behavioral form of analysis to the study of such classic concepts as "political ideology," "legitimacy," "sovereignty," "nationhood," and the "rule of law," and seeks to make more explicit and systematic much of the understanding associated with such concepts as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology, and the fundamental values of a people.⁶ Pye further observes that much of the writing on political culture seems to revolve around four general themes: trust versus suspicion, hierarchy versus equality, liberty versus coercion, and the subject or object of loyalty and commitment (i.e., particularism in identification to the family or parochial groups, or a more generalizable identification such as with the nation as a whole).

⁴Pye and Yerba, Political Culture and Political Development, p. 513-516.

⁵David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 12, (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), p. 218.

⁶Pye and Yerba, Political Culture and Political Development, p. 8.

The way in which different societies have developed to combine and vary these themes provides much of the distinctive character of each country.⁷

Whereas many of the earlier political culture theorists stressed beliefs and attitudes at the exclusion of behavior, Stephen White, in the late 1970s, concluded that behavior must also be considered. Noting that Yerba had allowed a close circular relationship between beliefs and the operation of structure, and that Pye had included "operational norms of a polity" in his definition of political culture, White found that other writers seemed less concerned to draw a distinction.⁸ White also argued that the inclusion of behaviour is supported in sociological and anthropological literature from which political science had originally drawn. Methodologically, two advantages were incurred from subsuming a behavioural as well as an attitudinal dimension within the definition of political culture. As White explains,

In the first place, it avoids the problem of circularity which arises when political beliefs are inferred from political behaviour and then used in turn to explain that behaviour (or *vice versa*); and it avoids the related and thorny problem of attempting to assess the extent to which political beliefs may actually be said to have influenced behaviour--beliefs may be internally contradictory, some may be more 'actionable' than others, and so forth.⁹

Finally, White rightfully cautions those who look to political culture for explanations that it is too much to say that a country's political culture provides a necessary and sufficient explanation

⁷Pye and Yerba, Political Culture and Political Development, pp. 22-23.

⁸For example Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, 1974, p. 1173: political culture is "a set of informal, adoptive postures--behavioural and attitudinal--that emerge in response to and interact with the set of formal definitions--ideological, policy, and institutional--that characterize a given level of society"; and David Paul, "Political Culture and the Socialist Purpose" in Jane Shapiro and Peter Potchnyj, eds, Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 4: Political culture is an "observable configuration of values, symbols, orientations and behavior patterns related to the politics of a given society."

⁹White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 17.

of the manner in which its political system operates; to do so would leave one unable to explain rapid changes in political systems that would exceed any conceivable speed of change in a political culture. Similarly, to argue the reverse, that the political culture is wholly a result of the manner in which the political system operates, is also unacceptable since one would then be unable to explain the marked difference in the manner in which Communist political systems have tended to operate, despite the frequent similarity among them in terms of formal structure. Hence,

Political Culture, in fact, must be regarded as both 'causing' and 'caused': as a variable which mediates between the political system and its environment, providing a framework within which patterns of political belief and behaviour, historically considered, can be located, and as a factor which will influence and constrain--though not determine--future patterns of development in a political system.¹⁰

Almond agreed with White when he in turn observed that political culture is not a unidirectional cause of political structure and behavior. Rather,

the relation between political structure and culture is interactive...one cannot explain cultural propensities without reference to historical experience and contemporary structural constraints and opportunities, and...in turn, a prior set of attitudinal patterns will tend to persist in some form and degree for a significant period of time, despite efforts to transform it."¹¹

Having been duly admonished and cautioned about assigning to political culture a too pre-eminent and primary status in the study of any society, one cannot, however, deny its considerable and significant role. While it may often seem subjective, and although its definition is often the subject of heated scholarly debate, that it does exist seems patently obvious, such that even materialistic Marxist-Leninist theorists grant it recognition (renamed, of course, as an

¹⁰White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics, p. 20.

¹¹Gabriel A. Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory" in Comparative Politics, January 1983, p. 127.

"objective" force in society). Indeed, the Communists have first-hand experience of its strength, let alone its objective existence, in their attempts to build Soviet-modelled socialism in the Soviet East European empire. As Almond has observed, the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe provide "natural experiments" in attitudinal change and can serve as a test case for political culture theory. He concludes that despite specific Communist attention to the attempt to shape political culture to conform to a Soviet Socialist model, indigenous cultures, while affected, have resisted change more than the Communists had expected.¹²

It is precisely this phenomenon of persistence in the face of determined assault that has prompted the following discussion of Polish political culture. The Polish case, in particular, is marked not only by persistent oppositional values and attitudes, but by derivative oppositional behavior as well; it is precisely behavior that seems to distinguish Polish political culture at certain times. Consequently, Pye's concept of political culture as a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments, plus White's inclusion of behavior, (in short, a more traditional view of political culture from a sociological or anthropological perspective) is the sense in which political culture is used in this work. Although such a broad definition of political culture does tend to expand the concept beyond the limits of precise operationalization, it is, nevertheless, in accordance with the purpose of this particular work. The objective of the following discussion is not to engage in argument about the identification of Polish political culture as an independent or dependent variable in a scientific analysis of Polish society (others are certainly better equipped and disposed to do so, as so much of the current Political Science literature on the subject demonstrates¹³); rather, it is hoped that the reader will gain from this discussion a historical appreciation of the nation of Poland and a sense of the historical continuity and consciousness so vital to Poles, but so easily lost in analysis limited to current events only. Indeed, in this regard

¹²Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", pp. 136-7.

¹³See, for example, Lowell Dittmer, "Comparative Communist Political Culture", Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. 26, nos. 1&2, Spring/Summer 1983, pp. 9-24.

Poland becomes a prime example tending to confirm the validity of political culture as an area of promising study and as an explanation of how and why the Poles were moved to action most recently, but certainly not finally, in 1980-81.

B. HISTORICAL ROOTS

William Woods, commenting on events in contemporary Poland, once remarked that whenever a Pole wants to explain some aspect of his work, or of the present situation, he starts, as a rule, by talking about Polish history.¹⁴ More than most nations, Poland seems to provide a *sine qua non* example of the role that historical consciousness may play in formulating and shaping the beliefs and attitudes, and hence the political culture, of a modern people. Stewart Steven observed that the Poles are animated by a history in which myth is as potent a brew to the Polish imagination as fact, such that there is not an event on the contemporary scene that does not find some echo in Polish history.¹⁵ Furthermore, this brew is often bathed in the light of glorification, particularly in times of current travail, resulting in the inculcation and nourishment of a tradition of resistance to any foreign presence that is so remarkable to most observers of Poland. History, in effect, becomes a weapon for the Poles, a weapon of defense and self-preservation. As Jan Gross writes,

In the last two hundred years, every time Polish society coalesced and organized itself sufficiently to try to shake off the stranglehold of an unwanted state organization, it found it as necessary to conquer the past as to overcome contemporary institutions. In a series of almost instinctive efforts at self-preservation, Polish society has repeatedly resisted foreign-imposed masters not only by struggling against them but also by trying to come to grips with its own past, to understand its own

¹⁴William Woods, Poland: Eagle in the East (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), p. 219.

¹⁵Stewart Steven, The Poles (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 265.

courses of conduct, and to perpetuate its most important national traditions.¹⁶

The reason for the Poles to do this is historical in itself, as well as being a function of the culture that emerged from Poland's "glorious" history. M. K. Dziewanowski has observed that,

Every nation is, consciously or unconsciously, inspired by an idea that is central to its mentality, an idea that is a guiding principle of its history. Both geographically and culturally Poland cannot be understood except as a transition area between the Western Atlantic world and the Eurasian continental mass forming the heartland of the USSR.¹⁷

While the observer of Polish civilization will find both Eastern and Western elements, the Poles themselves seem to have chosen to emphasize the Western elements, and have for centuries identified themselves much more with the West than with the East. This unmistakable Western orientation stems from the creation of the Polish state itself when King Mieszko I, in marrying a Czech princess, accepted Roman Christianity in A. D. 966 as a strategem to counter the missionary (as well as colonizing) zeal of the neighboring Teutons.

The end of the first Christian millenium was a time of growing division for Europe. To the west of Poland the struggle between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire was heating up. In order to resist Teutonic pressure, Poland drew closer to the Papacy. To Poland's east, the neighboring Slavs of Kievan Russian also accepted Christianity in A. D. 989, but from Byzantium. The pressure of Orthodox Christianity from the east also served to strengthen Poland's identification with the West, and particularly its sense of Roman Christianity as the gap of antagonism between the Latin and Greek churches widened. For Poland, statehood and Catholicism became one in the same, while the growing anomolous position and identification of Poland in Central Europe increased Poland's self-conscious uniqueness.

¹⁶Jan Tomasz Gross, "In Search of History" in Abraham Brumberg, ed., Poland, Genesis of a Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), p. 3.

¹⁷M. K. Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 253.

The eleventh and twelfth centuries thus witnessed the founding of Poland's national identity as well as the emergence of a new social structure. From its pagan period, Poland inherited a strong clan system with a tendency toward equality among its members similar, in some ways, to the Scottish clans. This clannish tradition prevented the early formation of the feudal structure common to most European societies.¹⁸ One of the manifestations of the emphasis on equality was the tendency toward unanimity of decisions in those decisions of great importance to the general community. From this practice can be traced the establishment of the later *liberum veto* that would give every member of the community the right to freely proclaim dissent to majority decisions and the right to invoke the rule of unanimity.

Despite a tradition of equality, class differentiation based on clan heads and their families did develop. The consolidation of clans and the general martial atmosphere of the time and area promoted the emergence of a group of soldiers and advisors to the major chieftains who came to form the nucleus of the *szlachta* or noble knighthood of Poland. The mass of Poles were free men, small independent farmers, while a class of slaves was formed from prisoners of war and debtors. As in Hungary, the principle of primogeniture never took root and hence, every descendent of a nobleman was also considered an equal nobleman. By the sixteenth century this noble gentry, or primary land-owning class, formed a relatively large ten percent of the population. The gentry enjoyed full political rights and identified itself as "the nation", although the mass of free peasants shared in the national identity through religion and through participation in the decisive battles to come.

The *Polish Chronicle* of the twelfth century, written by a foreigner referred to as Gallus Anonymous, noted that Poland, "though it is surrounded and combated by so many peoples Christian and pagan. . . never was entirely subjected by any one." The chronicle also glorified the figures of

¹⁸Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century, p. 4.

victorious, just and protective rulers, the bravery of knights and their fidelity to a ruler.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the strong religious identification of the nation never allowed the development of a cult of the holy ruler in Poland, but rather evolved a cult around the martyred bishop St. Stanislaus, who had opposed the secular authorities.

The identity of the emerging nation of Poland was fired with a particularly glorious sheen when the Polish *szlachts* and peasantry, despite terrific devastation, successfully challenged and slowed the Tatar invasion from the east in the Battle of Legnica in Silesia in 1241. Although Henry the Pious at the head of the Polish forces, as well as a large portion of the nobility, was killed in the battle, the Tatars soon withdrew and Poland escaped the Mongol yoke that had fallen on Kievan Russia. From this stand developed the first identification of Poland as the *antemurale christianitatis*, the shield and bulwark of Christian Europe against the infidel of the East. This image was reinforced by Poland's resistance of the successors to the Tatars, the Ottoman Turks, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries, perhaps most dramatically displayed in Jan Sobieski's rescue of the city of Vienna from Turkish seige in 1683. Similarly, the Polish-Hungarian union in 1440 under Ladislaw III was created to drive the Turks out of Europe, to liberate besieged Constantinople, and to promote the consolidation of the merger of the Greek and Latin Churches agreed to at the Council of Florence in 1439. The defeat of the union forces and the death of Ladislaw III in the Battle of Yarna (1444) on the Black Sea ended these ambitions, but one can not help but wonder at how the course of history may have been altered had the crusade succeeded.²⁰ The growth of Polish agriculture during these same centuries resulted in Poland also becoming thought of as the granary of Europe. For the Poles, this identification as protector knight and provider of bread constituted the basis of self-esteem within the Polish gentry and gave

¹⁹Aleksandra Jasinka-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case" in International Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, no. 1, 1982, p. 101.

²⁰Constantinople, of course, fell to the Turks in 1453 in one of the major watershed of history.

it a feeling of superiority in relation to others, particularly merchants, in the rest of Europe. As J. Tazbir states,

Just as each estate had its own separate duties, so too every nation was occupied with something characteristic: the English were to sail the seas, the Dutch were to be merchants, while the Poles were to be the defenders of other Christian nations, this type of duty being obviously more honourable than the others, thereby strengthening even further their nobility.²¹

If nothing else, such a "superior" view of the world convinced the Poles that foreign models of civilization and government were useless and contrary to the Polish character.

This prideful self-view of the Poles was further enhanced by Poland's achievement of great power status in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The establishment of the Jagiellonian Dynasty in 1386 had joined the Lithuanian and Polish crowns into a great union designed, initially, to stop the advance of the Teutonic Knights from the west. Although the knights of the Teutonic Order constituted the greatest military power of the time, the Polish-Lithuanian forces defeated them at the epic Battle of Grunwald in 1410, causing a profound shift in the power situation in Central and Eastern Europe. By the latter half of the fifteenth century, the Jagiellonian dynasty ruled over not only Poland and Lithuania, but Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia as well, with Prussia and Moldavia as fiefs. Thus most of the territory between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas was under Polish rule. The Golden Age of Casimir IV, the Great (1447-1492), was at hand. Such greatness is remembered by Poles today.

The Golden Age of Casimir IV also gave rise to the expansion of gentry political rights. The Statutes of Nieszawa (1454) obliged the king to make no laws or binding decisions without the consent of the representative of the nobility, and are often referred to as Poland's Magna Carta. The first *Sejm* (diet) of the Polish nation met in 1493 to vote on taxes for the king. Because the

²¹J. Tazbir, Kultura Szlachecka w Polsce [Gentry Culture in Poland] (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1978), p. 79, as quoted in A. Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 102.

Polish nobility comprised so large a proportion of the country's population, Poland could be said to have had at that time the most representative government in Europe in terms of the level of participation in political decisionmaking.²² The privilege of *Meminem captivabimus nisi jure victum* (none may be arrested unless sentenced by a law court), issued as early as 1433, gave the gentry the rights of *Habeus Corpus* that would not appear in England until 1685. The *Liberum Veto* had not yet degenerated into the tool of dissension and manipulation that would infamously characterize it in the eighteenth century, a civic spirit held sway, and foreign observers admired the *monarchis moderata* in Poland. Political tolerance and high cultural development, epitomized by the general European high regard for the University of Cracow, accompanied the political developments. Small wonder that the Poles believed their nation to be the freest and most advanced in the world.

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century served again to emphasize the identity of Poland with Catholicism after some initial Protestant success in the form of Calvinism in the 1540s and 1550s. In any case, such flirtations with the new religion did not extend to the peasantry. If anything, Poland is more notable for the religious toleration it evidenced during these times of European turbulence.²³ This tolerance may be attributable to the depth to which Catholicism was already established, such that it was never seriously threatened by Protestantism. Poland thus avoided the civil wars that plagued other countries.

More threatening, however, was the growing power of Russia to the east, as the Russians, starting under Ivan III in the fifteenth century, threw off the Tatars and expanded the former Duchy of Moscow; Novgorod, an ally of Poland-Lithuania, fell in 1476. But the most

²²Harold D. Nelson, ed. Poland, A Country Study (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Press, 1983), p. 16.

²³Indeed, religious toleration was even extended to some Tatars who, after one conflict, asked to stay and settle in Poland in the vicinity of Vilno in the early fifteenth century. Enjoying freedom of religion, these Tatars served Poland faithfully in peace and war after their settlement. The descendants of these Tatars even fielded a valiant body of volunteer horsemen in the struggle against the Bolsheviks in 1920. See Roman Dyboski, Poland in World Civilization (New York: J. M. Battett Corp., 1950), p. 19, and pp. 45-59.

momentuous events were occurring within Poland itself where the civic and martial virtues that had served Poland so exemplarily before seemed to atrophy in an atmosphere of seeming prosperity and false security. A constitutional crisis gripped the nation as the nobility continued to limit the power of the king. The extinction of the Jagiellonian dynasty in 1572 began a practice of electing kings, often foreign, as a method of balancing competing gentry interests and maintaining gentry control of the state. Changing trade routes and a shifting of trade centers toward the west following the fall of Constantinople caused urban and business centers in Poland to fail while land values rose. The power of the gentry soon introduced measures of serfdom as early as 1520 and a growing bifucation into "lordly" and "plebian" spread through Polish society. By the eighteenth century the concept of a "gentry nation" was introduced, thereby excluding other estates from the unified concept of nation that had previously marked Poland.²⁴

Such internal deterioration could not have occurred at a worse time, since in 1648, when the rest of Europe had exhasuted itself in the religious wars that had culminated in the Thirty Years War, Poland was just beginning its "Deluge" that would last until the end of the century. Expanding Russian power instigated the Ukrainian Cossacks, orthodox brethren of the Russians, to revolt against Polish rule. The Swedes, seeking to control the Baltic trade, invaded Poland in support of its candidate for the elective kingship. The Turks continued their expansion from the south, and the Russians, taking advantage of the Polish-Lithuanian weakness, absorbed the previously Polish lands in the Ukraine. By the time of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Russia and Sweden were the major competitors in the area, and Poland, allied alternately with Russia and Sweden, found that Peter was interested in manipulating Polish affairs as well.

The devastation of Poland was mirrored in the factionalization of the Polish gentry. Extraordinary sensitivity to democracy and to freedom from a powerful monarchy led to a situation bordering on anarchy as members of the gentry sold their votes for the kingship and

²⁴A. Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 103.

their use of *liberum veto* in the Sejm to the highest bidder. This inability to form an effective, united Polish government weighed heavily against Poland's survival in a time of emerging new powers. Further, the troubles in the East were compounded by the re-emergence to the west of the Germans in the form of a rising Prussia under the rule of the ambitious Frederick II (the Great), and in the form of the growing Hapsburg power to the southwest. The wars of Austrian succession in Europe were mirrored by wars of Polish succession in East-Central Europe as Russians, Austrians, and Prussians all vied for further interest in Poland, and found willing allies among the nobility of Poland who were intent in pursuing their own rivalries.

Despite a tardy revival of nationalistic feeling in Poland after Stanislas Poniatowski was placed on the throne by the Russians,²⁵ Poland's fate was sealed; such attempts at reform by the Poles only instigated their neighbors to preemptive action. The First Partition of Poland in 1772 by Austria, Prussia, and Russia cost Poland nearly one-third of its territory, almost one-half of its population, and more than one-half of its resources, while naturally strengthening the partitioning powers (Prussia, for instance, annexed the Polish territory that had separated Brandenburg-Prussia from East Prussia).

The shock of dismemberment galvanized the Poles to attempt a series of progressive reforms that culminated in the May Constitution (1791), which converted Poland into a hereditary monarchy, made cabinet ministers responsible to the Sejm, nullified *liberum veto*, and began the first steps toward abolishing serfdom. The constitution reflected the influence of the Age of Enlightenment that was in full force in Europe, and liberals throughout Europe heralded its provisions. For later generations of Poles the May Constitution came to be regarded as "the Bill of Rights" of the Polish tradition, the embodiment of all that was enlightened and progressive in Poland's past, a monument to the nation's will to live in freedom, a permanent reproach to the

²⁵Stanislas August Poniatowski was a former Polish ambassador in St. Petersburg and a discarded lover of Catherine II. A man of brilliant mind but weak character, he was, as Stanislas II, to be the last king of Poland.

tyranny of the partitioning powers."²⁶ Even the noted English conservative, Edmund Burke, commented that "Humanity must rejoice and glory when it considers the change in Poland."²⁷

The prospect that the new constitution would regenerate Poland, revitalize the divided country, and transform Poland into a modern state caused Catherine II of Russia to take action. Finding support among some of the more conservative magnates in Poland who were angered at the limitations the constitution imposed on their former liberties, and joined too by a Prussia that smelled the promise of spoils, Catherine sent her army into Poland to restore the old constitution. The Poles were defeated, the May Constitution was repealed, and Russia and Prussia proceeded to partition Poland a second time. The irony was that while Poland had been partitioned the first time on the grounds that its anarchy and weakness upset the power relationships in East-Central Europe, it was now despoiled precisely because it had been successfully reforming itself and had thus started to threaten its neighbors.

The Second Partition sparked a popular uprising under the leadership of Tadeusz Kosciuszko.²⁸ Influenced by his experience with the American militia in the American Revolution, and by the success of the citizens' army in France at the time, Kosciuszko appealed to the whole Polish nation to rise in arms against the oppressors. In a throwback to Legnica and Grunwald, the Poles seized the initiative and inflicted several defeats on the Russians. Such

²⁶Norman Davies, God's Playground, A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), Vol. I, p. 535. Davies also notes that Karl Marx later wrote of this constitution that it was "the only work of freedom which Central Europe has ever produced of its own accord. . . The history of the world knows no other example of such generosity by the gentry."

²⁷Quoted in Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century, p. 27.

²⁸Tadeusz Kosciuszko (1746-1817), soldier, statesman, and (to this day) symbol of Romantic military romanticism, led an insurrection in Krakow in March 1794, that soon spread throughout Poland. Though he scored some remarkable victories against both the Russians and the Prussians, the nationwide uprising was finally crushed by superior Russian armies in November of that year. A democrat in the tradition of Jefferson and Lafayette (he had offered his services to the Continental army in 1776 and was eventually appointed by Washington as his adjutant), he was the co-author of a manifesto granting personal freedom to Polish peasants and reducing their dues in the way of serf labor by one-half; in 1817, shortly before his death, he granted full emancipation to his serfs. (Biography taken from Gross, "In Search of History", pp. 298-99)

success induced the Prussians to join the Russians in finally subduing the Poles, and in 1795, Austria, Russia, and Prussia sought to solve the Polish problem permanently by erasing Poland from the map of Europe in the Third Partition. Their efforts to do so would not only prove the resiliency of Polish traditions, but would also permanently mark Polish political culture.

Looking back over the history of Poland prior to the Third Partition, Polish sociologist Jan Szczepanski has observed that many of the essential traits of Polish nationality and culture were formed during this period. These traits include "a cult of individualism, a highly developed feeling of honor and personal dignity, the intransigence of the gentry to subordination, and an inability to organize collectively for any long-term efforts. They also include a deep patriotism, bravery, and national pride."²⁹ The identification of Poland as the "Bulwark of Christendom" and how that identity reinforced these traits has already been noted. Additionally, memories of Polish greatness, at a time when the rest of Europe was living in the shadow of the Middle Ages and was torn by recurrent dynastic and ecclesiastical warfare, would serve to fire the imagination and pride of Poles for generations to come.

In the opinion of Roman Dyboski, equal in importance to Poland's services in the defense of Christian Europe was its achievement of moving the frontier of Europe's Christian civilization eastward by peaceful unions with its neighbors.³⁰ The contrast to the Teutonic Knights' method of the sword in converting pagans was even argued before the Pope at the Council of Constance (1414-1418), with the council opting for the Polish argument. Poles thus point with pride at how Poland was able to fashion a large and great federal state in the debatable borderlands between Central and Eastern Europe entirely by means of peaceful association with neighboring peoples. This "Jagiellonian idea" of Polish policy uniting the middle European nations around Polish

²⁹Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 11.

³⁰Dyboski, Poland in World Civilization, p. 20.

leadership would again be taken up after World War I and would be considered a political possibility by some Polish politicians as late as World War II.³¹

Finally, from the history of pre-partition Poland, there was a national heritage of peasant folk culture reaching back to the first kings, and a tradition of peasant participation in Polish history, from Legnica and Grunwald, to King Stefan Batory (1576-1586), who had organized an infantry of peasants that helped him win decisive victories against the Russians, and Kosciuszko and his peasant forces of 1794. The legal state of Poland may have disappeared in 1795, but the Polish nation was not about to submit.

C. PARTITION POLAND

The destruction of Poland infused the Poles with one moral imperative -- that of regaining Poland's lost independence. Paradoxically, the loss of an independent state promoted the strengthening and broadening of national identification in Polish society. Deprived of political sovereignty for nearly 125 years, until World War I, the Poles missed out on the development of national identity that was being expressed in the creation of new nation-states in Europe. But while the Poles failed to acquire state identity through armed struggle and revolution, national identity was maintained, strengthened, and realized through intellectual and spiritual effort as the Poles sought to transcend the oppressive reality of the nineteenth century.

Without going into a detailed history of this struggle, it should be sufficient to recount some of the more salient points. First, the Poles tried to take advantage of any situation to push for independence. The first major opportunity came with Napoleon's mastery of Europe. Naturally drawn to the ideas of the French Revolution and to the fact that Napoleon was fighting the partitioning powers, Poles fought in Napoleon's forces in Italy, Spain, Egypt, and Haiti; indeed, the Polish national anthem was written by an officer of the Polish Legion in Italy with Napoleon. Thus

³¹ Szczepanski, Polish Society, p. 15.

it was that Polish expatriate forces accompanied Napoleon when he entered Poland in 1806; they were rewarded with the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw by the Treaty of Tilsit. Poland contributed over 100,000 troops to Napoleon's Russian campaign, and Napoleon is said to have impressed by the bravery of the Poles. Unfortunately, because the Poles had looked on Napoleon as a liberator and had pledged him their support, they also shared in his eventual defeat.

The partitioning powers were confirmed in most of their Polish holdings by the decisions of the Congress of Vienna, although some central provinces were organized into Kingdom Poland, normally referred to as Congress Poland, and placed into personal union with the Tsar of Russia. This arrangement lasted until the Polish revolt in 1830, after which Congress Poland was incorporated into the Russian empire. The suppression of the revolt resulted in the Great Emigration when more than 10,000 Poles of the intelligentsia, political and student leaders, and army officers left Poland.³² Despite further uprisings in 1846, 1848, 1863, and 1905, the fact of foreign domination remained. What was indelibly established, though, was a tradition of resistance to foreign oppression.

The struggle for Polish independence was deeply influenced by the Romantic era of European culture. The Polish expatriate community was instrumental in establishing and nurturing the *ideas* of Poland at a time when legal statehood was missing. Europe witnessed a flowering of Polish

³²Nelson, Poland, A Country Study, p. 37.

culture-in-exile, from the music of Chopin to the Romantic poetry of Mickiewicz,³³ Slowacki,³⁴ and Krasinski; and always, the central theme of this cultural expression was the imperative to regain Poland's lost independence, to restore the Poles to their rightful place among the nations of the world, and to pay homage to the idea of Poland. Tsarist police records show that this poetry inspired the thoughts and actions of young Polish patriotic conspirators; indeed, in that Romantic patriots made little distinction between poetry and political writings, in a certain sense literature and politics have remained intertwined in Polish tradition ever since.³⁵

Jan Gross has observed that "to keep alive the idea of Poland as a nation, Poles developed a particular attitude toward their country's history. Instead of viewing it as a series of facts, such as dynastic succession, legislative acts, or some combination of extrinsic events, they proceeded to search for the meaning of that history."³⁶ Such self-examination of its history tended to confirm in Polish minds the belief that Poland was unique. Despite oft-occurring bans on Polish schools and universities, of Polish institutions, and of the Polish language, sometimes even at religious

³³Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855) was Poland's greatest poet, a friend of Puskin, and an ardent revolutionary. Forced to flee Poland after the November 1830 Uprising, he taught Slavic literature at the College de France for four years, and during the 1848 revolutions, organized a Polish Legion in Italy. In 1849 he founded an international journal in Paris called La Tribune des Peuples. He died of cholera in Constantinople where he had gone to organize a Polish army to fight against Russia during the Crimean War. Mickiewicz's most famous works are the narrative poem Pan Tadeusz and the play Dziady [The Forefathers]. (Biography taken from Gross, "In Search of History", p. 298. Unfortunately, space does not permit examples of Mickiewicz's work in this study, but a reading of his poetry is incredibly inspiring, even for non-Poles, and important for a better understanding of partition Poland; the spiritual element of his work is truly powerful. For an outstanding examination of Mickiewicz's life and work and how his efforts helped to shape Polish national consciousness (an examination written by a Pole) see Wacław Lednicki, Life and Culture of Poland as Reflected in Polish Literature (New York: Roy Publishers, 1944), especially pp. 158-211.

³⁴Juliusz Slowacki (1809-1849) is considered by some to be equal if not superior to Mickiewicz in poetic genius. He left Poland in 1831 but kept apart from the rest of the so-called Great Emigration. Zygmunt Krasinski (1812-1859) is considered, with Slowacki and Mickiewicz, to be one of the three greatest Polish romantic poets. He spent most of his life abroad, became a prolific epistolarian, and died in Paris. (Biographies taken from Gross, "In Search of History", p. 298).

³⁵Gross, "In Search of History", p. 5.

³⁶Gross, "In Search of History", p. 4.

services, the Poles held on. The family became the basic national institution and homes became the "fortresses" of the national spirit, where the glorious history of Poland was retold and the cultural heritage was cultivated.

In some ways one could almost describe Polish Romantic patriotism as a religion of freedom. The spiritualization of the Polish struggle, as well as the strong Polish identification with Roman Catholicism, gave rise to imagery of Poland as a *figura* of Christ: Poland, enslaved and innocently suffering, was destined to atone for the sins of other nations and to redeem the world. Poland acquired a messianic mission of introducing the world into an era of liberty and happiness, and Poles continued to fight around the world in struggles for freedom under the watchword of "for your freedom and ours." The current oppression, suffering, and injustice that Poland was experiencing was actually a purification to prepare Poland to carry out its mission.³⁷ A Pole was to be measured by the manner in which he fought for his ideals, not by the outcome of the struggle. The effect of such powerful imagery is still alive in the Polish identity.

Having briefly discussed the Romantic tradition in Poland, one must also recognize the development of the concept of "organic work". Originating in the ordered and rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment, it also contained elements of positivism. The program proposed to overcome Poland's underdevelopment by transforming its social structure and by introducing reforms modelled on more developed countries³⁸ (the nineteenth century was not a century of progress or of modern economic development for Poland due to its subject status). Adherents of this line of thought critically evaluated the former systems of Poland and its ruling gentry class, concluding that in their faults were to be found the sources of the country's demise. The future of Poland thus rested in recognizing realities and in working "within the system" to secure eventual independence. In the meantime, the foundations for a strong Poland capable of independence and able to compete in the modern world had to be laid.

³⁷Clifford Barnett, Poland (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958), p. 408.

³⁸Jazinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 104.

The principles of organic labor first took hold in Austrian-occupied Galicia, where Austrian rule was less repressive and more conducive to cooperation. The brutal suppression of the 1863 insurrection by the Russians, however, caused the concept to spread to other parts of Poland as a backlash to the excesses of Romantic resistance that seemed to lead only to disaster and destruction. Then too, the social and economic changes that accompanied the emancipation of the serfs and then, industrialization in Poland in the latter half of the nineteenth century, led to problems that seemed to demand cooperation in administrative reforms and in the development of new municipal and civic institutions. A new emphasis was placed on economic labor, a field previously disdained in the gentry cultural values. Further, the passage of time and the new host of problems tended to be dealt with differently in the three parts of Poland, such that the older concepts of Polish political unity were strained.³⁹

The years of partition thus created traditions of both intense Romantic resistance and a less assertive kind of positivist adaptation; both existed side-by-side, with one never far from the other, as situations seemed to dictate. In neither tradition, however, was the goal of independence forgotten or forsaken. The cultural heritage of Poland was maintained and, indeed, with the redoubled efforts at Polish education that accompanied the advent of industrialization and the need for an educated populace, new strides were made at strengthening that heritage.

Education had always been the mark of social distinction in Poland and had traditionally been the preserve of the intelligentsia. In the suppression of the nobility that accompanied the partitionings of Poland, the intelligentsia emerged as a critical national elite that could carry on the struggle against foreign oppression. The effect of the Polish intelligentsia living abroad, whose ideas were continually smuggled into Poland, has already been mentioned. As Aleksander Gella observed in his comparative study of the Russian and Polish intelligentsias, the Polish intelligentsia, deprived of its own state and national institutions, needed history (as we have

³⁹Barnett, Poland, pp. 16-18.

seen). "They looked to themselves as the continuation of the best elements of the Polish gentry. They tried to adapt the fundamental democratic ideals from the Gentry Republic to modern times. . . . The Polish intelligentsia actually inherited some elements of the life-style of the gentry."⁴⁰ Thus the old gentry values were passed and broadened as the ranks of the intelligentsia expanded. As Gella observed,

Not only those who were directly involved in social struggle, but all persons who had completed the *gymnazium* (if unpropertied) felt themselves to be members of it [the intelligentsia]. The *gymnazium* inculcated the value system that included commitment to the political struggle for the independent Polish state; the social struggle was a means to their final goal.⁴¹

The effect of the foreign occupation and the maintenance of the idea of a Polish nation outside the concept of the legal state was to have other effects on Polish political culture, effects that bear directly on the situation today. As Aleksandra Jasinska-Kania wrote in her study of Polish national identity,

The partitions brought about a clear demarcation of the notions of nation and state in social consciousness. National identity could not coincide with the identity of the citizens of a state who perceive its authority to be the representation of their interests. Such authority was alien not only because it represented foreign interests but also because it abolished the old order and old laws and replaced them with new ones, often incomprehensible and inconsistent with national traditions and customs. . . . A citizen's inability to view his interests as coinciding with those of the state and to identify himself with the authorities (always described as "they") became permanent components of Polish national consciousness, even after the regaining of independence.⁴²

⁴⁰Aleksander Gella, "The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias: A Sociological Perspective", *Studies in Soviet Thought*, Vol. 19, no. 4, June 1979, pp. 314-15.

⁴¹Gella, "The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias", p. 318.

⁴²Jasinska-Kania, "National Identity and Image of World Society: the Polish Case", p. 104.

In a study of contemporary Poland and the problems of the current regime in establishing its legitimacy in Poland, Paul Lewis also found historical roots in the experience of partition and foreign domination. Lewis lays part of the explanation for the PZRP's inability to legitimize its rule to what many have seen as the general weakness of political authority in Poland. As a consequence of the partitions the Polish nation developed as a stateless entity in which patriotism was equated with resistance to government and state power. Furthermore,

law and legal statement were simply regarded as the command of leadership and no basis for the emergence of any conception of a *Rechtsstaat* existed. There was little scope for public confidence and trust in a legal system to develop and this has been associated with what may be called a schizophrenic attitude to authority: a constant questioning of that of others but an insistence on one's personal position and authority.⁴³

While the experience of partition may underlie the weakness of political authority, the same experience served to strength the position and role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland. The fact that the religions of the two most repressive and culturally repressive partition powers, Prussia and Russia, were Protestantism and Orthodoxy respectively, increased the Polish identification with the Catholic Church. In the absence of a nationally accepted monarch it was the Church primate who acted as head of state and maintained national unity.⁴⁴ Already established in deep traditions from the tenth century, the Catholic Church was a major source of continuity of Polish national tradition and identity, and was a tradition that linked all classes and social strata in all parts of the divided country--a Pole was a Catholic under all partitions.

The experience of partition was thus critical in the development of the modern Polish identity and in many of the elements of Polish political culture. The concept or idea of the Polish nation was strengthened, albeit outside of the legal and usual structure of the state; this would affect

⁴³Paul Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 12, no. 2, April 1982, pp. 129-30.

⁴⁴Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland", p. 130.

general Polish attitudes toward the state in general as the idea of nation became clearly established without the state. The intelligentsia, enlarged through expanding education, assumed a leading role in the spiritual and intellectual struggle of the nation. The Church, already a critical element of the uniqueness of Poland, was confirmed in its role as the keeper of the nation of Poland. Finally, traditions of Romantic resistance and organic work developed and existed in close competition, further complicating (and enriching) Polish political culture. The family continued as a breeding ground of aspiration to traditional Polish values harking back to pre-partition Poland, despite the new pressures of foreign domination, industrialization, and urbanization. Poland continued to exist, and Poles looked forward in fervent anticipation of the return to independence.

D. INDEPENDENT POLAND

World War I brought Poland the opportunity to again take arms in the hope of re-establishing an independent Poland as the upheaval of war engulfed the partition powers. A Polish Legion in the Austrian army under the command of the future Polish leader, Jozef Pilsudski, entered Russian Poland at the commencement of hostilities; Poles also fought with the Western allies in the quest for liberation. On 11 November 1918, Pilsudski, as head of state, proclaimed Poland independent.

The first task of the new state of Poland was to again serve as Europe's bulwark in the East as Poland fought to stave off the attacks of the Russian Bolsheviks. In close and heroic fighting that culminated at the gates of Warsaw itself, Poland "saved Europe from Communism" and then set out to reintegrate itself and to recover from the devastation of war.⁴⁵ The May Constitution of 1791

⁴⁵It is one of the ironies of history that Pilsudski should command the Polish armies and state in this victory. During the reign of Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, a group of young Poles from Vilno were arrested for cooperation with their Russian friends in the preparation of the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Alexander III. Among the Poles in this group, arrested and sentenced to heavy imprisonment or deportation to Siberia were two brothers, Bronislaw and Jozef Pilsudski; among the Russians sentenced to death at the same trial was Alexander Uljanov, the older brother of Lenin. Only 33 years later the younger Pilsudski brother, Jozef, fought and defeated the Red Army sent against Poland by Lenin, the younger Uljanov brother, when both the older brothers, as well as Jozef, had suffered for the same cause earlier. See Gella, "The Russian and Polish Intelligentsias", p. 320.

provided the inspiration for a democratic Poland, but the country faced many real problems. Once independence was achieved, it was found that a broad range of competing political parties sought to represent the equally broad range of Polish political experience both within and without Poland resulting from the years of partition. The nineteenth century training in disobedience and opposition had not prepared Poland for the compromises of parliamentary government and the democracy failed in 1926. It was replaced by a semi-dictatorial government led by Pilsudski and based on army support that, in turn, provided a new target for the opposition parties seeking to restore full parliamentary democracy.⁴⁶

Poland additionally faced the problem of foreign relations with its traditionally hostile neighbors. Although Austria had been removed, the problem of balance between Germany and Russia remained. Faced with the promise of recovered strength by both Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland's best hope seemed to be a new Jagiellonian idea to unite the smaller states of East-Central Europe in opposition to both of the powerful neighbors. Such a plan was not acceptable to the newly independent states of the region, however, and Poland was forced to substitute reliance on the Western democracies and gambling on non-aggression pacts with both its neighbors in an attempt to maintain its independence. The events of 1939 proved the unfortunate inefficacy of such policies.

Still, despite such daunting problems, Poles still have a high regard for their interwar independence. As Kolankiewicz and Taras point out, "Poland rebuilt as an independent state in the aftermath of the First World War occupies a very special place in the national collective memory."⁴⁷ They go on to cite studies by Szacka and Possart that demonstrate the popularity of the time among respondents in contemporary Poland. It is interesting to note that in the opinions of Kolankiewicz and Taras, the Pilsudski dictatorship "did little to undermine the fundamental

⁴⁶Szczepanski, *Polish Society*, p. 21.

⁴⁷George Kolankiewicz and Ray Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?" in Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), p. 103.

democratic ethos in Polish political culture, the best evidence of which was the participation in and the results of the municipal elections of 1938, which signalled the emergence of more cohesive political groupings."⁴⁸ One is left with the idea that, given time, a democratic Poland more in accordance with its traditions would have emerged.

Such speculation, of course, was cut short by World War II and the repeat of partitioning of Poland by the Germans and the Soviets in 1939. The experiences of that war, not unexpectedly, constitute the most potent elements of contemporary Polish historical consciousness. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the "abandonment" by the Western powers, the Katyn Wood massacre by the Soviets, the cruelty of Nazi occupation, the resistance of the Home Army and the nightmare and betrayal of the Warsaw uprising--all are well-known to Poles today. Six million Poles (out of a population of 35 million) are reported to have perished during the war. Poland claims the highest loss rate of all the belligerent nations: 220 out of every 1000 people were killed; 35 percent of the intelligentsia was destroyed.⁴⁹ Finally, despite the sacrifices, Poland found herself at the end of the war materially devastated and again under foreign (Soviet) domination.

Jan Szczepanski credits World War II with effecting a basic change in the social composition of Polish society. According to him, German occupation policies such as expropriation of land and German exploitation of the Polish economy for the German war machine resulted in the virtual disappearance of the Polish landowning class and the shattering of the older private business elites. The heavy population losses of the intelligentsia, combined with the destruction of the land and business elites, deprived Poland of the leadership in national life that was needed for postwar reconstruction. Such leadership would have to come eventually from the peasant and working classes, since they had comparatively suffered the least, retaining their fundamental structure and

⁴⁸Kulankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?", p. 103.

⁴⁹Szczepanski, Polish Society, p. 35. Compare to Yugoslavia, 108 per 1000; USSR, 40; Czechoslovakia and France, 15; United Kingdom, 8; US, 1.4.

composition. However, the development of leaders from these ranks would take time. Szczepanski writes,

It can thus be seen that the war was a great turning point in Poland's social history, disrupting the continuity of the social structure and eliminating the traditional leading social forces, thereby opening the way for radical social change. The social classes that had traditionally supplied the leading elites were unable to reconstitute themselves, and so the new elites had to come from the working class, the peasantry, and the lower ranks of the intelligentsia. It has been sufficiently shown in the history of various nations that it takes at least two or three generations to form a social background such as will give elites the necessary skills in leadership and the art of government and provide them with political insight and foresight.⁵⁰

It was into this opening that the Soviets stepped, introducing their Marxist-Leninist ideology.

⁵⁰Szczepanski, Polish Society, pp. 40-41.

E. THE CLASH

The Communists installed by the Soviets in Poland after World War II were certainly not unaware of the power of political culture, since Marxist-Leninist doctrine recognizes its existence. Stephen White has noted that both Lenin and Breshnev have used the term "political culture" itself.⁵¹ What seems to underlie Soviet thought on the subject, however, is that Marxism is essentially a structural theory, i.e., for Marx, a changed political consciousness, necessary for the new socialist society, is a consequence of underlying structural alteration. Lenin expanded on Marx by postulating a properly indoctrinated Communist party that would lead the rest of the society along the path to Communism by introducing structural changes in the formerly capitalist society. The transformation of political culture was expected to occur in spurts congruent with major structural changes and, while the process may be slow, it was asserted to be certain. Marx would thus have sided with political culture structuralists such as Brian Barry, Carole Esteman, and Ronald Rogowski who hold the priority of structure in the causal interaction with attitude, belief, and feeling. Changes in culture follow inevitably from changes in structure, cultural properties have a consequential relation to structure, and attitudinal variables can explain lead and lag in the process of historical change.⁵²

Lenin's treatment of the subject indicates that while he believed it was certainly possible to properly indoctrinate a revolutionary elite, to shape their political culture so as to prepare them for the task of revolution, the same revolutionary transformation with the masses was expected to be extremely difficult. Lenin expected that the peasantry, while it might be mobilized for land reform under capitalism, would not be interested in all the details of building a socialist society once its primary grievance was satisfied. Similarly, the workers are inclined to "bread and butter" economic issues that do not cover the whole of the socialist agenda. The consequence of such

⁵¹Stephen White, "The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism" in Brown and Gray, Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, p. 58.

⁵²Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", pp. 130-31.

tendencies could thus be the persistence of peasant proprietary attitudes and residual capitalist or pre-revolutionary attitudes that could affect productivity and even limit policy goals under the new Communist regime.⁵³ The task of the Communist elite thus became that of recognizing these challenges and of striving to maintain control while executing structural changes and attempting to "socialize" the masses through propaganda and through emphasis on socialist values in literature and art, the schools, the Communist party and related organizations, and the mass media of communication.

In a very interesting study of political culture in Marxist-Leninist systems, Kenneth Jowitt has explored how such a structural/organizational approach has fared in transforming the target societies. His thesis is that all Marxist-Leninist regimes are oriented to certain core tasks that are crucial in shaping the organizational character of the regime and its relationship to society. In Jowitt's words, these tasks include:

- Transformation--the attempt to alter decisively or destroy values, structures, and behaviors which a revolutionary elite perceives as comprising or contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centers of political power;
- Consolidation--the attempt to create the nucleus of a new political community in a setting that ideally prevents existing social forces from exercising any uncontrolled and undesired influence over the development and definition of the new community; and
- Modernization--the regime's attempt to develop more empirical and less dogmatic definitions of problems and policy, a formal, procedural approach rather than a substantive, arbitrary approach to the solution of problems, and an understanding of the executive function that stresses leadership rather than command competences.⁵⁴

The significance of these tasks is that while the character and methods of the revolutionary elite easily lend themselves to a clear pursuit of the first two tasks, the third task, vitally

⁵³Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", p. 130.

⁵⁴Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, no. 3, September 1974, p. 1174.

necessary for the continued growth of the new society, requires a change of direction. As Jowitt says,

Transformation involves a confrontation between the regime and the "unreconstructed" society. Consolidation yields a structure of domination as the politically defeated but "hostile" society must be prevented from "contaminating" the nuclei of the new socialist society. Modernization, however, requires a rather significant redefinition of the relationship between regime and society from mutual hostility and avoidance to the regime's selective recognition and managed acceptance of society.⁵⁵

The events that transpired in Poland as World War II drew to a close and the Soviets installed their supporters in power seem to follow this pattern. The human losses that Poland sustained under German occupation were added to by Soviet actions in the Katyn Forest, and by Soviet inaction during the Warsaw uprising in 1944, as the Soviets allowed the Germans to crush the Polish Home Army without lifting a finger in support. The traditional leadership of Poland was virtually annihilated, a conclusion to which the 35 percent destruction of the intelligentsia attests. In such a weakened state, Polish society could do little to resist the installation of Soviet-backed Communist rulers. The work of transformation and consolidation began immediately, with Stalinism providing a particularly repressive and bludgeoning model for execution of those tasks.

In Jowitt's definition, Stalinism was a system-building approach that has left a legacy with which the Polish leadership continues to struggle to this day. This approach contains three basic components, the first of which is the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The dictatorship of the proletariat defines the relationship between the ruling elite and the rest of the society. It mandates policies that focus on the separation of the regime elite from the rest of the society and, in effect, encourages a sense of opposition between both sides. Widespread coercion and violence are justified and used by the regime as instruments of persuasion. Finally, the Party tries to

⁵⁵Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", p. 1174.

assume complete control and direct responsibility for the direction and pace of social development and concentrates all decision-making powers into its hands. "What is involved here is the denial of any integrity to the public realm as distinct from the official realm."⁵⁶

The second component of the model is the rapid, forced development of the society and the sustained mobilization of its resources. This is done through a command-structured economy and society. Such command is not always perfect, however, and non-priority areas tend to be controlled, at best, as attention is focused on priority areas; transformation is consequently much slower or even nonexistent in such "omitted" areas.⁵⁷ The third component is a leadership with what Jowitt terms as "production mentalities." The regime's emphasis is on achieving political, economic, and social breakthroughs on the premise that in so doing, "the cultural domain can be effectively circumscribed, transformed, and the few 'remnants' of bourgeois origin gradually 'mopped up'."⁵⁸

The weakened state of Poland and the presence of overwhelming Soviet power initially allowed the use of this model for transformation and consolidation to be implemented by the new regime. However, the very success and virulence of the new regime in pursuing its task caused it to disregard the warnings of Lenin about the possible renitency of the workers and the peasants. Attempts to collectivize agriculture, decrees that raised food prices and work quotas, and attacks on the Polish Church brought the regime into direct opposition from the peasants and workers who became mobilized against the regime and the Stalinist model; the bloody riots of 1956 and the reinstatement of Gomulka in a desperate attempt to defuse the situation was the result. Gomulka found that the tasks of transformation and consolidation, let alone modernization, had not been

⁵⁶Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", p. 1175.

⁵⁷See Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 48 for more discussion of this "commanding heights" type organization and its consequences.

⁵⁸Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems", pp. 1175-1176. Jowitt terms this a kind of "island-hopping" strategy.

accomplished. He also found that as Poland developed economically and socially under the goal of socialist progress, the rigid conception of the Party's leading role and of the unitary nature of leadership made those Party cadres, including himself, whose political identities had been formed during the Stalinist period, fearful that the growing need for technicians and specialists would necessitate a shift to expanded leadership and decision-making; this, of course, was seen as threatening to dilute the Party's (and individual) power, place, and control. Gierek, rising to power on the wave of such expanded membership, staked all on the "island-hopping" strategy that gambled on the transformation of society in the wake of spectacular economic breakthroughs. When his economic policies fell apart in the second half of the seventies, he was left bankrupt and with a Poland that was increasingly confirmed and proficient through experience in resistance to the regime. Gierek's successors have been forced to readdress the problems of transformation and consolidation, while the problem of modernization, as Jowitt defines it, remains seemingly insurmountable for the foreseeable future; rather, the current regime seems intent on the task of maintaining itself, fearing the loss of control for the Party, control with which modernization is perceived to be synonymous.

Thus, neither Gomulka nor any of his successors has been able to adequately accomplish the tasks of transformation, consolidation, and modernization in Poland. This is not to say that some success has not been achieved; indeed, socialism has entered into the political culture of Poland due largely to the experiential daily interaction between the regime's Communist-derived structure and Polish society itself--political culture theorists are correct in noting the change-producing power of structure and day-to-day contact and experience within the culture. What has surprised the Soviets and their closest allies in Poland, however, is the stubborn opposition and resiliency that "traditional" Polish political culture has manifested. Furthermore, the very attempts of the regime at system-building have often unintentionally reinforced that resistance (as in 1956). The result has thus not been the easy victory of Soviet-modelled socialism, but the emergence of a Polish socialism that retains elements of traditional Polish political culture that not only oppose

Soviet values, but challenge the Soviet desire of a pliant and supportive Poland as well. As Arthur Rachwald has observed,

Socialism in Poland is a unique, self-generated system whose content and destination are predominantly Polish; only its overall contours resemble the Soviet mold. Socialism in Poland is a function of the Soviet form of authority combined with Polish tradition and values.⁵⁹

In a report summarizing the results of sociological surveys among Polish students in 1958, 1961, and 1978, Stefan Nowak notes that in response to the question, "Would you like the world to move toward some form of socialism?", 21 percent of the students in 1978 answered "definitely yes" (1958: 24 percent), while 45 percent answered "rather yes" (1958: 44 percent), with only 9 percent as "rather" or "definitely no" (11 percent, 1958).⁶⁰ Poles seem to have strongly embraced the propagation of egalitarian ideology of the socialist regime, and also generally applaud the lessening of social stratification in socialist Poland. The idea of ongoing economic and social progress is also appealing, and Poles do generally feel that their social status is higher than that of their fathers at the same age.⁶¹ Furthermore, Solomon Rawin has asserted that there exists an affinity between the ideology of the intelligentsia and the Socialist system in Poland, whereby those elitist tendencies that do remain present "a ready-made pattern for legitimization of status of the new managerial elite that emerges from Socialist industrialism."⁶²

However, in response to the question, "Do you consider yourself to be a Marxist?", only 18 percent of the students in 1978 said "definitely" or "rather yes" (13 percent, 1958), while 46

⁵⁹Arthur R. Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", Current History, November 1984, p. 357.

⁶⁰Stefan Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", Scientific American, Vol. 245, no. 1, July 1981, p. 51.

⁶¹S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 49.

⁶²Solomon John Rawin, "The Polish Intelligentsia and the Socialist Order: Elements of Ideological Compatibility", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 83, no. 3, September 1968, pp. 376-77.

percent said "rather or "definitely no" (66 percent in 1958).⁶³ Socialism's problem in Poland seems not to be socialism *per se*, but rather socialism as practiced by Soviet-oriented authorities, who can not apparently live up to their own ideology and promises.⁶⁴ Socialism in Poland did not originate with the Soviets, but out of the socialist tradition of nineteenth century Europe. The Polish Socialist Party played a significant role in the shaping of independent Poland after 1918, and one of its early leaders was even Jozef Pilsudski. The socialism of the Soviet-backed Communists, however was different. As Jowitt observed, the founding of post-World War II socialist Poland was rooted in the Stalinist model such that the regime today still identifies with its origins when challenged by other elements of Polish society, thus making modernization so difficult. Indeed, Polish popular opinion holds that Communism is the main roadblock to real socialism in Poland.⁶⁵

This Polish socialism in opposition to Stalinist socialism was a major theme of the 1956 unrest. Stefan Nowak's maintains that surveys conducted during the first years of Gomulka's regime indicate that

people stressed that they were in favor of "the Polish road to socialism." This meant democratizing the political system, removing the most drastic limitations on citizens' rights and the major sources of their fear, promoting freedom of speech and expression, increasing the influence of people on the government and, after the Yugoslavian model, encouraging the participation of workers' councils in the management of factories. The "Polish road to socialism" was also suffused with the patriotic feelings people attach to a nation as distinguished from state.⁶⁶

⁶³S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 51. Respondents indicating "no opinion" were 17 percent, 1958; 35 percent, 1978.

⁶⁴Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 357.

⁶⁵Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 357.

⁶⁶S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 49.

What is particularly interesting about Nowak's recent surveys, however, is that he has found that the opinions of the Polish people in 1978 have changed very insignificantly from 1958. Despite an intervening 20 years of Communist rule, the Poles maintain their Polishness in their political culture. The trauma of World War II and the imposition of the new regime introduced new values, but Polishness has reasserted itself, thus underscoring the conflicts in Poland today between the people and the regime. Nowak says,

In general one can say that the value system we found in the late 1950's had formed in the interaction of values propagated by the new system and values that persisted somewhere deep in the people's minds. The synthesis began to exert pressure on the course of events on the national level in about 1956.⁶⁷

Thus is it arguable that the egalitarian sentiment found in Polish society today is a reflection of the older gentry concern for equality that eventually gave rise to the extremes of *liberum veto*. Similarly, the satisfaction with decreased social stratification today may be, in part, a reaction to the excessive social stratification that the late gentry period and the turn toward serfdom had introduced, as opposed to the less pronounced cleavages of the earlier Polish nation. Furthermore, Nowak was struck by the general uniformity of opinion and values among Poles, finding little evidence of a "generation gap" and only weak correlation between values and the demographic characteristics of the respondent (distinction by education provided the most visible exception to this generalization). "It is possible, in sum, to speak about a system of values in Poland rather than about systems."⁶⁸

An interesting variation on the issue of attitudes and beliefs among the Poles is presented in a study by Janina Frentzel-Zagorska. Building on Stefan Nowak's surveys, Zagorska looked for any changes in responses that might have surfaced during the Solidarity experience. Respondents in 1983, seemingly incited by the Solidarity hope, indicated only nine percent "definitely yes" and

⁶⁷S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 50.

⁶⁸S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 47.

34 percent "rather yes" in answer to the question "Would you like the world to move toward some form of Socialism?"--a drop of 23 percentage points in the overall affirmative category since 1978, before the Solidarity crisis (66 to 43 percent; negative responses rose from 10 percent to 36 percent). Similarly, the number of respondents considering themselves to be a Marxist went from 19 percent "yes" in 1978 (3 percent "definitely yes", 16 percent "rather yes") to only 7 percent "yes" in 1983 (2 percent "definitely", 5 percent "rather yes"); the "no" respondents to the same question rose from 48 percent in 1978 (24 percent "rather no" and 24 percent "definitely no") to 66 percent in 1983 (20 percent "rather no" and 46 percent "definitely no").⁶⁹

Zagorska's interpretation is that the Poles hold "latent" or "recessive" beliefs and values that come out of latency with great strength as soon as some possibility of free expression is restored. The reason these were not accurately detected before was that questions about basic values were not asked previously during the post-war upheavals.⁷⁰ As expressed during the Solidarity experience, the socio-political system approved and desired by Polish society may be characterized as an essentially democratic one--with strong control of government by citizens, civil rights, with freedom of speech as the first priority, based on social equality or equal chances for all citizens. Solidarity's great strength and appeal was its demand for truth, authenticity, and human dignity and as such should be regarded as "the spontaneous organisation of the emerging civil society against the distrusted elite which was treated as illegitimate."⁷¹

Zagorska maintains that the Poles adapted to their situation under an illegitimate regime, but that it was "adaptation through opposition to the system." Involuntarily forced to be involved in a system they in truth reject, Poles have maintained themselves in a psychological opposition to the

⁶⁹Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, "The Dominant Political Culture in Poland", Politics, Vol. 20, no. 1, May 1985, pp. 96-97.

⁷⁰Polish nationalist apologists, of course, argued that such beliefs and values existed, based on the experience of Polish history, even if they were not "scientifically measured".

⁷¹Frentzel-Zagorska, "The Dominant Political Culture in Poland", pp. 88-89, 91.

regime that permits day-to-day living, with many basic values in recession, but which also "stores up powder" for those occasions when basic values can be expressed. As we have seen, the Poles have considerable experience at living and "opposing" in this manner, and, if post-war Soviet experience with Poland, and particularly with Solidarity, is any guide, it is arguable that the opposition factor may becoming stronger as the "powder" for increasingly powerful explosions is stored.

The realization of the existence and persistence of such Polish values does much to help explain events in Poland today. Further, it is apparent that even many of the members of the Party and regime in Poland, (we are, of course, describing a spectrum here ranging from non-Party members in government to a fanatical few who identify much more with the Soviets than with the Poles) realize through experience, and probably through their own Polish identity, that these Polish values must be recognized and often accomodated. Such a "Polandization" of Communism is most evident in the continual expression of even liberal thoughts within the Party, especially during the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress in July 1981; the continued maintenance of a sizesable private sector of the economy, particularly in agriculture; and in the government's grudging accomodation with the Church. Similarly, while the declaration of martial law certainly arrested increasingly divisive trends between Polish society and government, it also shielded Poland from a possible bloody conquest and second attempt at Sovietization; the evolving Polish model of a socialist state was thus preserved. Furthermore, there were no doubts but that the imposition of martial law was designed only to restore order and a return to a *status quo ante bellum* -- not to return to a purer form of Soviet Communism. The Soviet acceptance of this solution may also reflect their growing awareness of the virulence of Polish values and traditions, and the difficulty (a difficulty to which Russian experience with Poland attests) in imposing total Soviet orthodoxy on Poland. Such acceptance also evidences a *de facto* recognition of a unique Poland, often independent from and not fully adaptable to the Soviet model.

F. CULTURAL CONTINUITY

What then are those values and attitudes, those traditions and views that continue to be found in Polish political culture, and which make Poland so intractable to its Party elite and the Soviet overseers? In his introduction to a chapter on Polish values and attitudes, Clifford Barnett identifies many of the themes that seem to explain the essential "Polishness" of the Poles. He writes,

Poland is a Western nation. The creation of the Polish state and its adoption of Christianity were simultaneous and the Poles have viewed themselves for centuries as an outpost of the Latin Christian world. The significant attitudes and forms of behavior of the Polish people revolve around the value placed on individual dignity, initiative, originality, and self-expression. The uniqueness of the Polish people in part lies in the intensity with which they hold these and other values of the Catholic West. In terms of Poland's present alignment with the Soviet Union, it is significant that Poles always have identified Russia, tsarist or Soviet, as an alien culture hallowing conformity and the submersion of the individual in the state.⁷²

Here then one sees evidence of the themes we have traced throughout Polish history.

Korbonski identifies the "traditional" Polish values as:

- the basic distrust and disobedience of political or government authority;
- emphasis on egalitarian values and equality;
- fervent, if not rampant nationalism; and
- attachment to certain traditional institutions and social arrangements such as the Church.⁷³

The evidence and origins of such values has been demonstrated earlier, but let us expand and then summarize on these themes and values from the present Polish perspective.

⁷²Barnett, Poland, p. 396.

⁷³Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland", Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Communism in Eastern Europe (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 63.

A "tradition of resistance" is often used to characterize Polish actions in history and to explain the spirit of opposition among Poles today. As early as the sixteenth century the French political theorist Jean Bodin observed that the Poles belonged to "those nations whose attachment to freedom and unrestrained abhorrence of servility and slavery were especially strong."⁷⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski noted in the forward to a work by Jan Nowak, "the roots of Solidarity spring from the unity of the Polish people forged during the uprising [in Poland during World War II] and from a history of struggle and resistance to foreign oppression."⁷⁵ A spirit of resistance is, of course, part of the national identity as the eastern outpost, the *antemurale christianitatis*, of the West against the infidels--Tatars, Turks, or Russians--of the East, as well as the defender of Roman Catholicism against Islam, Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, or the secular power of the Holy Roman Empire.⁷⁶

The experience of partition and the development of the Romantic tradition breathed fire into the tradition of Polish resistance that burns to this day. Every schoolchild in Poland learns about the importance of the country's Romantic authors. Not only literature textbooks, but also history books--which everybody must read and study--eulogize the struggles for liberation. The Kosciuszko insurrection and the 1830 and 1863 uprisings are key subjects in all curricula.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the rich tradition and history of struggle has even provided proven tactics for adoption by modern Poles. The "flying universities" employed by Solidarity and KOR in the current crisis, for example, were first developed in resistance to Russian rule between 1890 and 1914.

⁷⁴Cited in Anna M. Cienciala, "Resistance: A Polish Tradition", a book review in Problems of Communism, September-October, 1982, p. 78.

⁷⁵Jan Nowak, Courier From Moscow (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1982), p. 14.

⁷⁶Kolankiewicz and Taras note that a film version of the Battle of Grunwald has been showing *somewhere* in Poland almost continuously since its release in the mid-sixties; "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?", p. 125.

⁷⁷Gross, "In Search of History", p. 6.

The resistance of World War II, both to initial invasion and to occupation, is, of course, a subject of even more recent memory. One can imagine the stories told by grandfathers and even fathers to Polish children about events in the war. The organization of effective underground resistance, even in the face of vaunted Nazi police methods, undoubtedly has provided guidance for the establishment and preservation of an active underground in Poland today. Finally, the post-war experience of the Poles in 1956, 1970, and 1980 has been that resistance can still be expected to achieve some results.⁷⁸

It is a historical fact that many of the most momentuous events in the most recent half of Poland's thousand-year history have directly involved the Russians, usually in the form of bloody confrontation with Russian imperialism. That as strong, deep-held sentiment of anti-Russianism, born of bitter experience, is to be found in Poland today should, therefore, not be surprising--nor should it be overlooked. Tsarist Russia never inspired the Poles to anything except resistance. The Poles see Russia as a culturally and economically backward civilization, as an alien culture that has no part in the heritage of the West, and one that is thus antithetical to Poland. Neither of the two other occupiers of partition Poland--Austria or Prussia--followed policies as brutal or

⁷⁸One of the greatest statements of this tradition of resistance must be Poland's national anthem. As indicated earlier, it originated in Dobrowski's Polish Legion fighting under Napoleon in Italy. Despite Soviet attempts to supplant it with "The International", which is played on official occasions, Poles much prefer their own anthem:

"Poland is not Yet Lost"

While we live she is existing,
Poland is not fallen;
We will win with swords resisting,
What the foe has stolen.

Poland! shall the foe enslave thee,
Sadly and forever;
And we hesitate to save thee?
Never, Poland, Never!

We'll cross where Warta's surging
Gloomily its waters,
With each blade from sheath emerging
Poland's foes to slaughter!

(Chorus)
March, March, Dabrowski,
From Italy's Plain;
Our Brethren shall meet us
In Poland again!

Hence unto the field of glory,
Where the life blood's streaming;
Where with talons red and gory,
Poland's eagle's screaming.

as fiercely designed to deprive Poles not only of political, but also of cultural and even linguistic identity, as those adopted by the Russians. Similarly, Poles well remember how the Soviets quickly and fiercely sought to deprive Poland of its newly-acquired independence after World War I, with the Poles only "miraculously" stopping them at the very gates of Warsaw itself. Soviet ruthlessness was again experienced in the 1939 occupation and in the Katyn forest.⁷⁹ As Jan Gross observes,

Official historiography, which emphasizes the ostensible congruence of interests and historical alliance of Polish patriots and Russian Communists (who fought against tsarist absolutism), is not terribly persuasive. The profound anti-Russian animus was passed from one generation of Poles to another, if only because it is easier to see a continuous line of conflict where two nations are pitched against each other than to absorb the rather subtle and meretricious idea that, at a certain point in history, class alliance superseded a conflict of nation-states. By far the great majority of Poles simply do not believe that Russian imperialism miraculously evolved after the October Revolution into something qualitatively different--i.e., "Communist internationalism." For many Poles, their recent family history contains some striking evidence to justify their suspicions.⁸⁰

Poles are aware too of the lower standards of living in Russia compared to Poland or the West; the Poles have no doubt as to which way they would like to move. It is known that Polish goods that

⁷⁹George Kennan records that "the Soviet police authorities proceeded to deport from the Soviet-occupied portion of Poland to the interior regions of Russia and Siberia, under conditions of extreme brutality and cruelty, people in the number of several hundred thousand--probably over one million. These people were, in the overwhelming majority of cases, guilty of no specific offenses whatsoever against the Soviet occupational authorities. . . . So appalling were the circumstances of their deportation and their subsequent treatment in the Soviet Union that a large portion of them, as much as 50 percent it is sometimes claimed, have never been heard from since. In addition to this, the Soviet authorities had taken into detention nearly 200,000 members of the Polish armed forces--men whose sole offense consisted, so far as one can see, in the effort to defend their country when it was attacked in 1939. And of these, nearly ten thousand officers--many of them reserve officers, doctors, lawyers, the cream in some measure of the Polish intelligentsia--had been individually executed in the Katyn forest, in the spring of 1940, by Soviet police detachments detailed for this purpose." George F. Kennan, Memoirs (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), pp. 209-10.

⁸⁰Gross, "In Search of History", p. 6

could be sold in the West for higher prices and hard-currency are often sold instead to the Soviet Union. Similarly, poor quality Soviet-made goods are imported to Poland at higher prices than would be necessary if purchased elsewhere. Poles thus see themselves as attached to a fundamentally Third World economic country that, unfortunately, has a dominating military power and geopolitical location *vis-à-vis* Poland.

It is not difficult to see how such a history and how such experiences would imbue Poles with a fervent nationalism. The contributions to such nationalism by Poland's earlier great power status and by Polish cultural superiority in comparison with its neighbors while living in a semi-isolated position from its brothers in Western cultural heritage also help to explain such fervor. Stefan Nowak's survey of 1978 shows that in response to the question, "Do you believe one should risk one's life in the defense of country?", 82 percent of the respondents said yes. This out-ranked family (73 percent), human dignity (46 percent), friends (42 percent), truth (26 percent), religion (22 percent), and "a social idea" (14 percent); only "human life" (89 percent) ranked-higher.⁸¹

Patriotism is an ideal shared by all Poles, including those abroad. The assistance sent to Poland today by Polish emigrees, particularly those in the United States, follows in a tradition established under the nineteenth century partitioning; Paderewski's efforts at persuading Woodrow Wilson to call for Polish independence are an example. As Clifford Barnett says,

All Poles are expected to be patriots. Oppression during the nineteenth century created a proud intelligentsia tradition of heroic self-sacrifice in the name of national ideals, a tradition that has since then been absorbed by all classes of society. It glorifies courageous behavior, bravado, and fearless persistence in the face of all attacks and the refusal to admit "moral" defeat.⁸²

⁸¹S. Nowak, "Values and Attitudes of the Polish People", p. 53.

⁸²Barnett, Poland, p. 410.

Despite such patriotism that can draw Poles together in support of the nation, it must also be remembered that Poles evidence a strong individualism that has often made such common recognition of a threat extremely difficult. Jan Szczepanski writes,

The traditional Polish personality ideal was derived from the culture of the nobility and was composed of such traits as readiness for the defense of the Catholic faith, readiness for the defense of the fatherland, a highly developed sense of personal dignity and honor, a full-blown individualism, and imposing mien, chivalry, intellectual brilliance, and dash. This personality ideal developed by the nobility was in some degree assimilated by the peasants, whose sense of attachment and fidelity to the religious faith, to their fathers' heritage, and to old customs proved to be a vital factor in maintaining the national existence in the nineteenth century.⁸³

Poles feel that discipline is to be found in the individual, rather than enforced by society's institutions. The ideal person is independent, strong, and self-reliant. The idea that each person is unique and that he should be allowed freedom for self-expression is supported by the Catholic religious concept of the sacredness of the individual and the responsibility of each person before God for his actions and beliefs. Hence personal dignity and difference is a fundamental basis for a Pole's behavior as a member of society and the nation.⁸⁴ Such emphasis on individuality is not for material gain, but as a means of protecting identity. Honor, therefore, becomes of great importance.

On a national scale, such individualism is reflected in the basic distrust of political or government authority, although Kolankiewicz and Taras conclude from more recent surveys that disobedience to government authority has lessened.⁸⁵ This does not seem to mean that the current regime is becoming more popular, but rather that an expanded governmental role in a modern society is increasingly realized as necessary and consequently, one must work with it while

⁸³Szczepanski, Polish Society, p. 167.

⁸⁴Barnett, Poland, p. 396.

⁸⁵Kolankiewicz and Taras, "Poland: Socialism for Everyman?", pp. 108-9.

simultaneously jealously guarding one's freedoms. Similarly, there is much desire for equality of opportunity and emphasis on egalitarian values as a way of ensuring the recognition of the individual. Thus Poles may accept socialist egalitarianism while rejecting the hierarchical authority of the Party. It is not surprising, therefore, that the old challenge of the Polish nobles to their kings, *nic o nas bez nas* (nothing about us without us) appeared as a slogan in the Solidarity movement in 1980-81.

Poles also place a high value on freedom of speech, Kolankiewicz and Taras finding that it ranked directly after equality of opportunity and reasonable living standards in recent research. Freedom to speak one's mind, to express one's opinion, is a means of reinforcing individual identity. The right to criticize government decisions or officials (in a country where *liberum veto* once held sway and where kings were elected) is basic to Poles, although it can easily clash with "democratic centralism".

The sister of equality is fairness, as it postulates equal treatment of individuals. Such concern for fairness was evidenced in the Solidarity call for an independent judiciary during the 1981 Solidarity Congress. The judiciary had seemingly become nothing but an institution of the Party, charged with protecting the interests and privileges of the Party hierarchy at the expense of non-Party individuals.

As one can see, such Polish attitudes, traditions, and values are often contradictory to the ideology and purposes of the Communist party. Although the Poles might be expected to distrust any government authority, Communist or not, the fact that all realize that the current Party and its regime is a Russian derivative only adds fuel to the fire. Such a realization serves as a prod to Polish nationalism and thus makes even "Polish" communism more palatable than any Soviet version. The revolt of 1956 against Sovietization, and the initial popularity of Gomulka is explained by this opinion. Again, during the 1980 crisis and after the fall of Gierek, a popular saying in Poland was "Better Kania than Yanya"--Yanya being a diminutive of the Russian name Ivan. Thus the PZRP is often seen as a Trojan horse for Soviet plans of hegemony in Poland.

As the foregoing demonstrates, and as Paul Lewis indicated in his study of obstacles to regime legitimacy in Poland, the PZRP does not have any basis for public support; there is not even a Communist tradition during the interwar years on which to build, the Bolshevik invasion of 1920 having dashed any allure of the new variant of socialism from the East. To make matters worse, as the years led to the 1980 crisis, Poles became increasingly aware that corruption pervaded the Party elite and that state funds were swelling private purses as the economy plunged into chaos and personal incomes were cut back; the regime's "propaganda of success" only served to irritate Poles further and heighten their distrust of the Party. Gierek's attempt at new economic methods was not a reform, but was based solely on the principles of Party authority and its control of the socio-economic system; its failure only discredited the Party further and emphasized in the minds of many Poles, to include some Party members (especially on the local level), the desperate need for reform and renewal. The regime was seen as being fundamentally unfair, corrupt, alien, and narrow. As one writer stated in *KOR* journal in 1976, "The events of 1976 showed that Gierek's technocratism was worth as much as the patriotism of Gomulka. . . that, in short, the leaders of the PZRP have only one authentic ideology: power. The years 1971-6 have further brought a return to the conceptions of the Stalinist period."⁸⁶

Although left here until the last, perhaps the most critical, and certainly the most continuous element in Polish political culture has been the Roman Catholic Church. The preceding paragraphs have amply demonstrated how the Church and Poland are wrapped up as one in the Polish identity, the Church providing the necessary ingredient for uniqueness that first served to set Poland apart from its neighbors. Since then it has been a constant and unduring thread through over a thousand years of Polish life and has become not only the guardian of the spiritual values of the nation, but also the repository of the Polish identity, preserving it through partition, war, and occupation.

⁸⁶A. Macierewicz, "Walka o prawa obywatelskie", *Głos* (Paris: Kultura, 1980), p. 131, as cited in Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland", p. 139.

The Church became a surrogate for the Polish state during the period of partitions; when thousands of Poles were exiled to Siberia, clergymen were among the number, and the Church shared in the suffering of the people. Back in Poland the Church continued to function, though, nurturing the traditional, peasant patriotism of the ordinary people. Similarly in World War II, the Church and the clergy widely participated in the resistance movement, suffering torture, imprisonment, and execution.

From World War II, and until the formation of Solidarity, the Church was the only organized force in Poland that cut across all social groups and confronted the government when the latter opposed the civil rights of individuals. A bipolar relationship evolved between the Party and the Church. The Church was aware of its uniqueness such that it repeatedly, but carefully, confronted the regime. The strikes of 1980 and the emergence of Solidarity as a legal third force transformed the role of the Church from major adversary of the regime to a much-needed mediator between the regime and Solidarity.⁸⁷

Initially the new role caused misunderstanding. Many Solidarity members became irritated that the Church did not quickly side with Solidarity against the government. Although the Church eventually did strongly support individual rights through Solidarity, the Church remained a strong force for patient effort and negotiation to avoid violent confrontation. With such a policy the Church undoubtedly helped extend Solidarity's success, while maintaining its own ability to continue to function as an independent institution when martial law came. Without arguing the question as to whether or not the Poles are strongly religious, it is enough to observe that the Church enjoys immense popularity today because it has played, and continues to play, a spiritual and religious role, while also functioning as the bastion of independence from Communist control.

⁸⁷Jan Nowak, "The Church in Poland", Problems of Communism, January-February 1982, p. 14.

G. SUMMARY

This study of Polish political culture has demonstrated the uniqueness and resiliency of Polish traditions, attitudes, and behaviors over many centuries of history and under a variety of circumstances. The attempt of the present regime, under Soviet mandate, to transform the traditional culture of Poland into that of Soviet socialism has failed, and all indications are that it will continue to do so. The structural approach of Marxism-Leninism has modified some elements of Polish culture, but has simultaneously strengthened some through congruence (not necessarily in a manner helpful to the regime), and incited others to intensified resistance and opposition. The Soviet argument of a new ideology under the banner of socialist internationalism has foundered on a long history of Polish experience with Russia, while the Poles in response have generated a true representative organization, Solidarity, that has severely challenged the Soviet-backed regime's ability to control Poland as a part of the Soviet empire. Strengthened too by great experience in renitency, to include continued existence of the nation even when deprived of statehood, the Poles have proven a much more difficult nut to crack than the Soviets had imagined. What has emerged is a Polish socialism that is often in opposition to the arrogance of the Soviet masters.

The Communists have introduced new political and economic institutions, as well as a new organization of state administration and a new legal system. They have tried to revolutionize the representative national culture, to direct literary and artistic creativity in such a way as to replace traditional Polish culture with socialist culture. But the regime elite has found that the strength of Polish traditional culture has not only challenged its efforts at transformation and consolidation, but has demanded modernization along Polish lines, further threatening the elite that had not even figured out how to conduct modernization under its own control that would protect its privileged interests.

The Church in Poland and a national consciousness and interest of a people in its unique history have guarded the traditional values of Polish political culture; historical experience taught them how to do so. In hundreds of little ways, in patterns of interaction and relation, in informal groups

and social circles, in family life and local communities as well, the stability of Polish culture continues.⁸⁸ The peasant stratum also absorbed many of the values, traditions and behaviors of the nobility, due to aspiration and emulation as well as convention, and has proven to be a powerful social force in preserving them. Reinforced by the Church and its own conservatism, the peasants have even managed to maintain their private ownership of land under a regime supposedly dedicated to the principle of collectivization.

In commenting on the factors of continuity in Polish society, Jan Szczepanski has this to say:

Maintained in the system of education, in socialization, in families, schools, organizations, and so on, some national cultural values--such as, in Poland, individualism, sense of honor, pride in national military glory, a cult of national heroes, and patriotism in the sense of dedication to national interest--comprise a significant factor of continuity. Thus, the self-image of the Polish society remains almost the same as it was in interwar society. This self-image is sustained, in part, by the mass publication of Polish nineteenth-century literature and by the fact that the great masters of Polish literature in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries present in their works the very essence of Polish patriotism and national pride. . . . Each new generation of young boys and girls reads the novels of Henryk Sienkiewicz, which re-create the wars with the Cossaks and Tatars, the Swedish invasion, and the war with the Turks in the seventeenth century. These are written in a style similar to that of the Alexander Dumas novels, but they are laden with patriotic content and present a fascinating picture of past military glory. It was in the spirit of this tradition that hundreds of thousands of young Poles volunteered in the last war to join the underground armies within the country or to go a long and hazardous way abroad to join Polish armed forces fighting in foreign lands.⁸⁹

⁸⁸An indication of the extent of that stability is provided by the fact that some proverbs in Polish thought that are used to characterize Poles emerged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and are still in use today.

⁸⁹Szczepanski, Polish Society, pp. 199-200.

Thus one cannot understand the situation in Poland today, nor the prospects for the future, without consideration of Polish political culture. Although one could certainly argue about the relative degree of influence of any one particular trait, value, or tradition, one must nonetheless conclude that the sum of that culture, and its demonstrated resiliency, will compel the Poles to continue to resist the imposition of an essentially alien political system in their land. The best hope for some form of political stability, over the long run, is a more distinctly Polish regime. Whether or not the Soviets will agree to allow this to occur remains to be seen.

IV. SOVIET INTEREST IN POLAND

Having raised the issue of Soviet interest in Polish events, it is instructive at this point to depart temporarily from the Polish-centered perspective and to review briefly Soviet interest in Poland, as well as the Soviet calculations that preceded the imposition of martial law in Poland. Geography and history have established a Polish-Russian relationship as a geopolitical reality. As the review of Polish history has shown, the Soviet Union/Russia has played a crucial role in Polish national life since the seventeenth century; Poland has reciprocally weighed heavily in Soviet history. The Russian playwright Chekov observed that the past "weighs upon a Russian mind like a thousand-ton rock." If Chekov is right, then the Soviet view of its historical relationship with Poland is likely to be helpful in understanding the Soviet interest in Poland and will provide a good place to begin a review of that interest.

The sixteenth century is notable in Russian history for the defeat of the Tatars and the rapid expansion of Muscovy under Ivan IV and his son Feodor (1533-1598). Such Russian expansion soon collided in the West with Poland, which was in its Golden Age at the time. Poland, in union with Lithuania, had extended its boundaries east and south to include modern Byelorussia and much of the Ukraine, including Kiev. In the clash of nations that followed, Russia was plunged into its Time of Troubles (1598-1613), during which Polish armies under Sigismund II occupied Moscow and placed the pretender Dmitri on the Russian throne.

The establishment of the Russian Romanov dynasty in 1613 reversed the Polish tide, but the struggle between Poland and Russia has continued to this day. Russia absorbed eastern areas of Poland in the latter half of the seventeenth century as Russia, Sweden, and Poland vied for supremacy in the lands between the Baltic and the Black Seas. After Peter the Great knocked Sweden out of the struggle in 1721, Poland and Russia faced each other directly. As described earlier, Russia, in league with the empires of Prussia and the Hapsburgs, progressively annexed Poland off the map in the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795). Polish troops fought for

Napoleon in his invasion and burning of Moscow in 1812 (Napoleon considered the Polish troops "the most loyal and aggressive"). The Congress of Vienna left Poland under Russian rule, where it continued until World War I.

Independent Poland was the first target of the new Soviet state as the Russian Civil War drew to a close. What the Soviet Union failed to do in the Russo-Polish War in 1920, namely to return Poland to Soviet rule, it accomplished briefly in 1939, and finally in the post-war partition of Europe.¹ Despite the unrest in Poland under Soviet rule as already noted, the Soviets are historically convinced of their right of ownership of Poland, and sometimes refer to it as "the Vistula provinces" in private conversations.² At most Poland is thought of as some autonomous entity under Russian supervision. Moscow's traditional fear of the threat that a strong and independent Poland would pose to Russian empire seems to be at the root of such a view.³

If traditional fear and historic experience are one explanation of Soviet interest in Poland, another is the country's strategic-geographical importance. Poland lies athwart the traditional invasion route to Russia and, in an area of few natural impediments to attack, is often thought of as the gateway to Russia. The three hundred miles of Baltic coast now controlled by Poland as the result of post-World War II boundary settlements also means that Poland has a special strategic significance in Soviet war plans. In the event of war with NATO, Poland provides the springboard for, and Polish military forces are expected to participate in, a westward thrust along the Baltic coast to occupy Denmark and thus gain control of the entrance to the Baltic Sea. Poland also plays a crucial role in Soviet air defense, as it guards a large portion of the approaches to the Soviet Union--an importance not to be underestimated in the age of cruise missiles, theater nuclear

¹For a good grasp of the history of this continuing struggle see Arthur E. Adams, Ian M. Matley, and William O. McCagg, An Atlas of Russian and East European History, (New York: Praeger, 1967).

²Dimitri K. Simes, "Clash Over Poland", Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, p. 55.

³It is interesting to note that Marx and Engels endorsed the Polish struggle for independence (Grunwald, op. cit. p.78ff) while most nineteenth century Russian liberals, including Pushkin, fully supported Russian suppression of Polish uprisings.

weapons, and continued developments in anti-missile defense.⁴ Additionally, Poland's armed forces, the largest in the area, are an important part of the Warsaw Pact's so-called 'Northern Tier' (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic), the most important and sensitive part of the Soviet East European empire.

Another strategic consideration is Poland's geographic position between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. Critical Soviet lines of communication to the GDR run through Poland such that the "Polish corridor" is indispensable to the logistical support of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. A destabilized or unreliable Poland would increase the risk that NATO forces would cut off and isolate the nineteen elite Soviet divisions in the GDR in time of war. One solution to that risk would be the withdrawal of the divisions from the GDR. The implications of such a move, the ideological cost, and the impact of such a withdrawal on FRG-GDR and general Soviet-NATO relations--to include the heightened possibility of German reunification and all that it would entail--is certainly frightening to the Soviets. The prospect of Poland's 350,000 man military, the third largest in Europe, being directly on the Soviet border and not under Soviet control, must alone cause the security-conscious Soviets to shudder violently.

The Soviet Union also has a considerable ideological-political interest in Poland. The PZRP is, of course, a progeny of Soviet Communism. It is an article of faith and a principle of policy that socialism will succeed in Poland. However, the Soviets are acutely aware that Poland is not the model of stability and friendship that Bulgaria is, or the showplace that the GDR is. As has been shown, Moscow's approach to the Warsaw regime since 1956 has "often appeared aimed as much at containing Polish heresies within manageable limits as at imposing the prescribed orthodoxy. The difficulties of dealing with Warsaw have been further complicated by the remarkable ineptness of

⁴Andrzej Korboński, "Soviet Policy Toward Poland" in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, ed., Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1984.), p. 61.

Polish Communist leaders, whose repeated and dismal failure to generate popular support for the regime has necessitated periodic propping up by the Kremlin."⁵

The Soviets also view Poland as a conduit for alien (and generally unwanted) influences. Poland is in many ways a quintessential Western country, as evidenced in its political culture. This cultural orientation and Poland's Roman Catholicism serve to intensify the antipathy which Russians historically harbor toward the Poles. Traditional Russian xenophobia is heightened by the secret inferiority which Russians feel toward the Poles, an inferiority that is well-concealed behind, and may be part of the cause of, the disdain outwardly exhibited by the Russians toward the Poles. This "inferiority" is brought home to the modern Soviet citizen in economic comparisons. Whereas Warsaw has been called the Paris of the East, the same can not be said of Moscow.

Economically, the Soviet Union has interests in Poland as well. The Soviets have supplied billions of rubles in economic aid and loan rescheduling, and have sustained losses to the Soviet economy, to support the struggling Polish economy. Among the CMEA countries, Poland is the fourth-largest Soviet trading partner, with a 1984 foreign trade turnover of 11,366 billion rubles.⁶ Although Poland is less of an economic asset to Moscow than is the GDR or Czechoslovakia, it is a source of coal, ship production, and some specialized industrial equipment. More importantly, Poland's opening to the West in the 1970s has made it an indirect source of Western technology otherwise unavailable to the USSR.

Finally, in the Soviet Union's estimation, Poland shares in common with Eastern Europe a whole set of simultaneous functions. Vernon Aspaturian describes those functions as being,

- a defense glacis;
- a springboard for possible expansion westward;
- an ideological legitimization of her universal pretensions;

⁵Korbonski, "Soviet Policy Toward Poland", p. 63.

⁶V. Klochek in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, no. 12, Mar 1985, pp. 20-21 as reported in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol 1, 1985. This represents 15.6 percent of the Soviet Union's trade with CMEA countries.

- a laboratory for the application of the Soviet model of development;
- a reservoir of human, natural, and economic resources to be exploited for Soviet recovery;
- a collection of diplomatic pawns and surrogates to be used in international politics;
- a source of psychological and even quantitative comfort in international organizations and conferences, where the Soviet Union might otherwise be isolated and alone.⁷

Thus Poland figures importantly in Soviet interests. With a population of 36 million, Poland is the fifth largest nation in Europe (excluding the Soviet Union). Its GNP of \$111 billion (1981) is as large as that of India with a population of over 650 million. As Andrzej Korbonski writes,

By virtue of its physical characteristics--area, population, resource base, and geographical location--Poland has since 1945 been the most important member of the bloc next to the Soviet Union itself. Whether measured by its military or its economic strength, it is the largest contributor among the East European countries both to the WTO and, at least until recently, to CMEA. For these reasons alone, Poland has long been perceived as the geopolitical linchpin of Moscow's hegemonic system in Eastern Europe and, contrarily, as a potential catalyst of change in the region. Any shift in Soviet policy toward its largest ally could be expected to have a powerful, even domino effect on the rest of the area. The most recent crisis, culminating in the imposition of martial law in December 1981, underscores once again Poland's vital importance to the Soviet Union.⁸

Moscow's view of Poland as the linchpin to the Soviet East European empire served to heighten Soviet fears about a possible spillover of unrest from the Polish crisis into other East European countries, and about the long-term effect the Polish developments could have on the rest of the empire, to include various Soviet republics. The economic difficulties existing in Poland are not limited to Poland, but can be found elsewhere in the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the alienation between the Communist regime and the population, the seemingly intractable problem of legitimacy and stability, is also repeated in other Eastern European countries. Lithuania, of

⁷Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective", p. 16.

⁸Korbonski, "Soviet Policy Toward Poland", p. 61.

course, has long historic ties to Poland (Jagiellonian dynastic Union, 1386-1572), and sided with Poland in the 1831 and 1863 insurrections. The Polish minority in Lithuania still comprises 7.3 percent of Lithuania's population (1979).⁹ Poland and the briefly-independent Ukraine fought as allies against the Bolsheviks following World War I, and many Poles still live in the Ukraine as the result of centuries of fluctuating borders. Poles can also be found today in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, as well as in Byelorussia and, to a small extent, in Estonia and Latvia.

Y. Stanley Yardys, a specialist in Baltic studies, asserts that the events in Poland in 1980 did reverberate through the Baltic regions, and that those reverberations can be documented. He found strong evidence too of concern among Baltic Communist leaders regarding possible spillover effects.¹⁰ The leaders of Czechoslovakia and the GDR also repeatedly criticized developments in Poland, in part, to forestall a potential spillover of labor unrest into their countries. There is evidence too of Ukrainian labor unrest sparked by the Polish events. Thus, Soviet concerns about the impact of Poland on its empire are real.¹¹

Despite such fears and such major interest (or perhaps, due to them), the Kremlin had little doubt but that a Soviet invasion of Poland would have been costly. Poland's armed forces are certainly the largest, and are generally regarded as the most professional, most competent, and best-equipped in Eastern Europe (with the possible exception of the GDR). Moreover, for all the reasons of political culture, and because the Polish military is responsive to Polish, not Soviet Party leadership, the Soviets could not count on using the Polish military to assist in subduing Poland during the last crisis. Even in 1956, when the Soviet-appointed Marshal Rokossovsky and

⁹USSR Central Statistical Administration, The USSR National Economy, 1922-1982 (Moscow, 1982), p. 36.

¹⁰Y. Stanley Yardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic" Problems of Communism, July-August 1983. Yardys presents a detailed study of the impact of the Polish events on each of the three Baltic republics.

¹¹See Jan B. de Weydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, The Polish Drama: 1980-1982 (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), pp. 145-167. The authors provide a country-by-country survey of the repercussions of the Polish crisis throughout all the countries of the Soviet East European empire.

his generals were commanding the Polish army, many military units switched to Gornulka during the crisis. Khrushchev later was reported to have said that "As we began to calculate which Polish regiments we could count on, the situation began to look somewhat bleak."¹² Indeed, the Soviets had to give great credibility to the proposition that the Poles would fight the invading Soviet forces.

In Czechoslovakia the Soviets had used a half million men against no resistance; Poland would have required many more--perhaps 750,000. Such an operation would have been different from Afghanistan as well, and could be expected to severely strain the Soviet military reserves. Casualties would have been heavy. If such fighting continued for weeks or months, the contingency planning with respect to NATO would be in a shambles. With troops already in Afghanistan, the Soviets faced the thought of suspending operations there, or of weakening their position on the Sino-Soviet border.

The Soviets used Warsaw Pact allied troops in Czechoslovakia and would have desired to do so again with Poland, if only for the manpower, let alone the ideological justification such a concerted action would have produced. However, serious difficulties and questions were associated with such a proposal. With memories of 1968 in their minds, the Czechs may not have proved useful; the Hungarians were reluctant in 1968, sending only a token force then. They too had a 1956 to recall as well. The Romanians could not be expected to participate, and the Bulgarians were precluded from playing a role by geography. Only the East Germans were really available, and although they were probably reliable, the psychological impact of German troops invading Poland would probably have stiffened Polish resistance.¹³

¹²Alex Alexiev, A. Ross Johnson, S. Enders Wimbush, "If the Soviets Invade Poland", Rand Report, No. P-6569 (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., 1980), p. 2.

¹³Johnson and Wimbush, "If the Soviets Invade Poland", pp. 5-6.

The political repercussions of invasion would have been great also. Other East European countries might have been sparked to revolt. Yugoslavia and many Communist parties around the world would conceivably have tilted to the West. The one million Poles living in the Soviet Union and in the Baltic republics would have required close monitoring. Finally, the Soviets must have anticipated that the West would retaliate economically, thus further straining the imperial economies in a time of need. The pipeline deal with the West would probably have been cancelled, and the Soviet position in any number of international forums would have been discredited, particularly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in Madrid. In short, invasion would have severely strained, if not completely ruptured, East-West detente. As had happened in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, direct intervention would have alienated France and West Germany, and restored unity to the Western alliance. Zbigniew Brzezinski later wrote that a Soviet intervention would have

produce[d] a rupture in the political detente in Europe, disrupt[ed] East-West economic cooperation, generate[d] increased NATO budgets, produce[d] severe strains between West European Communist parties and the Soviet Union, further alienate[d] the Non-Aligned Movement from the Soviet Union, possibly precipitate[d] turmoil elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, and probably [would have led] to overt American-Chinese military cooperation.¹⁴

While an invasion would have been costly, it is probable that the Soviets would have eventually succeeded. Martial law, however, provided an option for avoiding invasion. As noted before, the Soviets have tolerated developments in Poland that were not tolerated elsewhere in the

¹⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 465. Brzezinski also claims that the United States received assurances from the German ambassador that West Germany would adopt economic sanctions in the event of a Soviet move, and even prevailed upon Indira Gandhi to register India's concern. Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO was prepared for a worldwide boycott on Soviet shipment of goods. Cited in "Exploiting 'Fault Lines' in the Soviet Empire: An Overview", a paper prepared for the European-American Institute Workshop on "Fault Lines in the Soviet Empire: Implications for Western Security", Ditchley Park, England, 18-20 May 1984, p. 16.

empire. The goal of the Kremlin in Poland, after all, was control--i.e., the issue of whether or not the Polish Communist leadership remained in control of events. It was reasonable to believe that the Polish military and security forces could impose control under martial law--an option preferable in the long run. If it had not worked and Party control was seriously threatened, the Soviets would have invaded. As Edmund Burke once wrote, "most political decisions are a choice between the disagreeable and the intolerable." The Soviets know well the truth of that statement with regard to Poland.

V. POLAND TODAY

A. MARTIAL LAW

General Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law did provide the Soviets with a disagreeable option to the virtually intolerable prospect of invasion. The speed and efficiency with which the Sunday surprise operation was executed also favorably answered the critical question of whether or not it would reestablish the control of the Party regime. Solidarity was not organized to resist and, like most Western observers, was surprised by the move. The tolerance and inaction of the regime throughout the crisis, its seeming disarray and repeated retreats in the face of Solidarity's advance, and the widespread belief that the Polish army would not fire on Polish citizens¹ led most of the opposition to doubt that the regime was capable of effective internal repression without help from Soviet troops. At the same time, there was widespread intellectual optimism that Soviet invasion could somehow be avoided. As one intellectual said, "The Soviets' analytic ability must not be underestimated. They know Poland well." What such calculations ignored, however, was the possibility that Jaruzelski and the military high command would act in the army's name, but would use newly-strengthened internal security forces (especially ZOMO), supported by elite military units and backed up by regular forces, to conduct a crackdown.²

The East European governments quickly voiced their approval of Jaruzelski's action, with the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria issuing the loudest support. Romania was less vocal, but approving; Hungary was somewhat ambiguous. As a matter of interest, Yugoslavia expressed shock and disapproval of the act.

¹Jaruzelski himself had promised in 1976 that "Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers" and had lent support to that statement during the 1980-81 crisis as he continually called for a peaceful solution.

²Johnson, "Poland in Crisis", p. 37.

The support of the East European governments is probably best explained by their fear that the infection of Solidarity would spread beyond Poland's borders. As fellow members of CMEA, each also hoped that the crackdown would turn Poland's economy around. Czechoslovakia and the East Germans in particular had been complaining that the unrest in Poland was depriving their economies of scheduled shipments of raw materials, and was causing a drop in their exports to Poland.

The East European governments began to change their tune, however, as some of the impacts of the declaration of martial law began to make themselves felt. David Buchan, in an article for the The Washington Quarterly in the Spring of 1982, perceptively outlined some of the serious effects that Poland's martial law was beginning to exert on Eastern Europe.³ According to Buchan, the situation in Poland had already:

- Heightened East-West tension--such a development meant trouble for all the Eastern European countries since each had gained some political freedom of maneuver during times of reduced East-West tensions. This was particularly true for Hungary, with its growing economic ties to the West, and for Romania, with its relatively independent foreign policy.
- Weakened Moscow's relations with the Western Eurocommunists--the Italians, Greeks (KKE-Interior), Spanish, Belgians, and British had severely criticized Moscow for allowing such a repressive action. In the case of Italy, relations were nearly severed as the Italians denounced not only Moscow's role in the affair, but also attacked the Soviet model that had produced the crisis. Pravda counterattacked with language reminiscent of the denunciations of Tito and Mao. Only the neo-Stalinist French Communist party was equivocal, saying that they did not want to do anything to make matters in Poland worse.
- Raised the specter of Bonapartism in that the army had displaced, even if only temporarily, the Communist Party in Poland. That such a turn of events could occur flew directly in the face of the Communist dogma that the Party controls the gun.
- Highlighted weaknesses common to all the CMEA countries, i.e., the crisis had called attention to the corruption, incompetence, poor productivity, overcentralism, and lack of incentives that plagued all the CMEA countries.

³David Buchan, "Eastern Europe: Only the Beginning", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1982, pp. 137-141.

- Aroused fresh doubts in the West about the wisdom of lending to the East, and about the ability of the Soviet Union, with increasing problems of its own, to act as Eastern Europe's underwriter. The size of the growing Eastern debt (\$55 billion to the West) and Moscow's unwillingness or inability to bail out Poland (reportedly 4 million rubles were eventually released to Poland) caused Western governments and banks to look more closely at CMEA economies. What they saw was not encouraging. Any relaxation of such scrutiny could not be expected until improvements occurred in Poland.

Meanwhile in Poland, the very fact that the crackdown succeeded quickly and completely meant that Jaruzelski had to face the question of the future sooner than he may have anticipated. It was one thing to identify, roundup, and intern Solidarity leaders and activists, close down presses, and break up any spontaneous strikes and demonstrations of workers or miners--these had the flavor of military operations. It was another to address the problems that had beset Poland for so long and that had proved intractable to the civilian regime.

Jaruzelski announced his task to be that of "normalization", with a promise of a continuation of the process of "renewal" begun in 1981 within the PZRP. Polish society, of course, had never been "normalized" to the extent that other East European societies had. Furthermore, it was doubtful that Jaruzelski had in mind the "normalization" that followed in the wake of the disturbances in Hungary of 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968; such a formula would have destroyed the principle goal of martial law, namely stability. What Jaruzelski probably had in mind was the continuation of stability with enough popular support (or even apathy) to allow the economy to revive. The sooner such a turnaround could be achieved, the sooner the army could be pulled out of the "bad guy" position that was quickly eroding its public image and prestige.

Hoping to rechannel and control the participatory spirit spawned by Solidarity, Jaruzelski began a program of dissolving old institutions and replacing them with new, party-controlled ones; he also weakened the laws that had appeared in the aftermath of the Gdansk Agreement. In July 1982, the regime-sponsored Patriotic Committee for National Rebirth (PRON) was formed to act as a coalition of all social forces. Additionally, new organizations for artists, writers,

journalists, and students were established.⁴ As might have been expected, the new organizations attracted little public support, most being unable to match the earlier membership levels of their predecessors. PRON itself was widely criticized for not reflecting public needs. Solidarity also sponsored a boycott of all "official" organizations.

By the Autumn of 1982, Jaruzelski felt confident that enough stability existed to move against Solidarity. In October 1982, Solidarity was formally outlawed, and was replaced with a law establishing new unions. These unions were described in the law as being independent, self-governing, and possessing the right to strike. There were, however, heavier restrictions. The new unions were permitted to exist only at the factory level, not at the regional or national level like Solidarity had been. They were organized by branch of industry, not by region as with Solidarity, and there was a restriction of only one organization per factory. Subsequent legislation in July 1985 strengthened the unions by giving them responsibility for all employees at a factory, not just members of the union, and by extending their responsibilities into the area of social welfare. The unions took over many of the functions of local self-management councils, areas to which many Solidarity members had gravitated as a way to continue unofficial operations, following the banning of Solidarity.

In November 1982, Lech Walesa was released, and in July 1983, martial law was lifted. Many of the restrictions of martial law, however, were transferred into the civil code and remained in effect. Government proclamations in July 1983 and July 1984 released most internees and granted amnesty to most Solidarity members in arrest or hiding. Still, while popular defiance and open opposition were reduced, the regime was not able to achieve popular support, nor was it able to mobilize the population toward economic and political goals.

⁴David S. Mason, "Stalemate and Apathy in Poland" in Current History, November 1985, p. 378.

B. THE UNDERGROUND

Underground activity remains widespread in Poland today. Although Jaruzelski has often seemed to use the carrot in dealing with dissent, he has also used the stick on numerous occasions. Organizations are penetrated and demonstrations are broken up; arrests, trials, and imprisonments continue. Walesa, a popular figure whose reputation was enhanced by the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize, is closely watched, occasionally harassed, and recently was tried (and acquitted) for anti-government statements. An active underground press of over two thousand periodicals continues to function, and many articles appear regularly in the West as well. The Polish underground recently added video recordings to its means of fighting censorship. There are reportedly more than 70,000 owners of video recorders in Poland today,⁵ many of which are clubs that show Western films officially unavailable in Poland. Many parishes are also investing in video equipment and organizing film showings.

Independent cultural life is also flourishing. In addition to the many periodicals, books, photograph albums and sound cassettes are also widespread. An "alternative society" has grown up, offering independent cabarets, theaters, and art exhibitions. The underground also organizes independent educational activities ranging from the awarding of grants to academics to arranging lectures and study courses.⁶ Interestingly, this underground mass media, while providing an important source of information to the Poles, has also forced the competing official media to be more open and to address some controversial issues. Despite censorship, Poland has the liveliest press in the Soviet bloc.⁷

⁵Teresa Hanicka, Polish Situation Report no. 8, Radio Free Europe Research, 21 May 1985, item #6. This report describes efforts being made to copy and distribute videocassettes in Poland by NOWa, the oldest of Poland's current underground publishing houses.

For a detailed and thorough examination of the underground press from 1980 to 1983, see also Anna Sabbatt-Swidlicka, "Poland's Underground Press", Radio Free Europe Research.

⁶Hanicka, Polish Situation Report no. 8, p. 1.

⁷Mason, "Stalemate and Apathy in Poland", p. 390.

Solidarity too carries on an unofficial existence. Members have continued to focus on carving out relatively independent fields of activity, particularly through the self-management councils. Approximately one-fifth of the work force continues to pay monthly dues to underground Solidarity structures.

Despite Solidarity opposition, the official unions today have about five million members, one-third of whom are former Solidarity members. Most workers, though, have adopted a kind of "wait and see" attitude to determine if the new unions really mean anything. The government claims that the unions recently negotiated a reduced price hike on food, but most workers seem to doubt the unions' role in this.

C. THE PARTY

The mobilization of the Polish population is a task that both the government and the underground find difficult today. Much of society seems to be keeping to itself. In the October 1983 elections to the Sejm (the Polish Parliament), both sides claimed victory. The government claimed victory in that all of its candidates were elected to seats by a large voter turnout that allegedly proved the public supports "stabilization, peace and socialist development" (naturally, there were no opposition candidates). Jaruzelski then used the opportunity to give up the post of Prime Minister to his First Deputy Prime Minister, Zbigniew Messner. Jaruzelski then assumed the role of head-of-state as Chairman of the Council of State. Solidarity had called for a boycott of the election, and claimed victory based on the large number of voters who did *not* cast a vote : 21 percent (or 5.5 million people) according to official figures, 34 per cent by Solidarity calculations. Such results are without precedence in the electoral history of People's Poland.⁸ The PZRP is experiencing severe membership problems, registering a drop in membership from a

⁸J. B. Weydenthal, "Eastern Europe in 1985 - Poland", Radio Free Europe Research Background Report, no. 150, 27 Dec 1975. In the 1980 Sejm elections the participation rate was 98.8 percent.

peak of 3.1 million in 1980 to a rebuilt level today (1985) of an estimated 2.1 million, or 12 percent of the adult working population. Of this membership only 39.4 percent were workers; a mere 12.6 percent of Poland's industrial working class and only 3.7 percent of its farmers are party members. Limited support is also evident among the young where only 11 percent of the PZRP is under the age of thirty, the smallest proportion in the party's history.⁹

The basic problem for the Party seems to be a continuing lack of direction. The Party continues to talk of the need for discipline and political purity, but offers nothing new to mobilize the population. At a pre-Party Congress conference in November 1985 that was convened to work on a Party Program for party activity to the year 2000, Jaruzelski proclaimed that the Party was following the road toward socialist renewal, and that normalization was progressing. While not offering specific solutions, he affirmed the Party's exclusive right to set the direction of Poland's evolution. Although he spoke of technological breakthroughs and changes based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of social conditions, he made no mention of the issue of public autonomy or independence from governmental control. As such, his views were traditional and reflected none of the Gdansk Agreement reforms that had so mobilized the population six years earlier. It seems that the Party is unwilling to compromise or to resurrect the ideas of democratization or greater self-determination; at the same time, it is not exactly certain on how to overcome the stagnation and inefficiency in the system.¹⁰

It is not that the regime is unaware of the arguments of the opposition. Indeed, the regime is proving very adept at weaving threads of opposition thought into its own propaganda as it seeks to persuade people to accept the existing state of affairs, to give up resistance, and to allow themselves to be harnessed to the task of salvaging the economy. By manipulating national symbols, and by exploiting the popular interest in national history, the regime attempts to

⁹Janus Bugajski, "The Party in Crisis", Radio Free Europe, p. 207.

¹⁰J. B. de Weydenthal, "The Polish Party: In Search of a Program", Radio Free Europe Background Report no. 138, 2 December 1985.

convince the population of the legitimacy of Communist rule. It attempts to persuade the people that the interests of the Party-controlled regime are identical with national interests--interests that are largely determined by Poland's geopolitical situation (i.e., the Soviet Union). Further, the Soviet Union liberated Poland in World War II, and since Poland has been liberated, it must therefore be free. True, the economy may be shabby, but it is not as bad as Czechoslovakia or Romania. Remember Kadar? Just help the Party to Jaruzelski-ize Poland and all will be well. What Poland needs is peace, order, stability, hard work, and trust in the state. Working together under the local autonomy that the Soviets grant to Poland as a benefit of undivided Party rule will allow Poland to reach the light at the end of the tunnel.¹¹

A more cynical view of regime efforts to discredit the opposition was published by the Solidarity underground in Krakow in early 1983. A meeting of senior Party members and military commanders took place in Warsaw in November 1982; those present proceeded to confidentially discuss the situation in Poland. The underground obtained a report of their assessment and published it in the underground press. The assessment discussed methods to be used to compromise Lech Walesa and to win popular-Catholic personalities to PRON. It was decided to allow a certain degree of criticism in order to create an impression of growing tolerance and normalization in public life. It also related how Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu had promised Jaruzelski that he would use the lease of the American bases in Greece to bargain new credits for Poland from the United States. If the report is true, it also reveals the poor condition of the Polish economy and its continued decline, in contradiction of official pronouncements of progress.¹²

¹¹For a fascinating description of regime propaganda techniques and goals see Casmir Garnysz, "Polish Stalemate", Problems of Communism, May-June 1984, pp. 51-59. The examples presented above are from this article.

¹²"A Confidential Assessment of the Situation", Survey, Vol. 26, Summer 1983, pp. 108-110.

D. THE ECONOMY

Most observers agree that any solution to the continuing Polish crisis will need to begin in the economy. Solidarity did not cause the crisis, nor did the strikes or the labor unrest; these were only symptoms. Rather, the strikes and the establishment of free labor unions grew out of a rapidly accelerating economic crisis with which the government and Party leaders were unable to cope. The real causes of the economic crisis lie in the system itself, a Soviet-type economic system transplanted to Poland after World War II.¹³

The characteristics of that system have been alluded to above and include:

- High concentration in a command economy. Command economies are touted on their ability to enforce a high degree of mobilization of resources, to ensure full utilization of these resources, and to direct the allocation of resources to the fulfillment of selective targets. Command economies cannot, however, ensure efficiency, and become increasingly difficult to manage, because of their sheer complexity, as economies become more technical and more sophisticated.
- A strong element of autarkism, the establishment of a self-sufficient and independent national economy. The emphasis was on the expansion of industry, particularly heavy industry, in an attempt to attain industrial self-sufficiency. But the raw materials must come from somewhere and Poland, like most countries, does not have all the raw materials a modern industrial nation needs. Furthermore, such a industry-heavy development strategy in Poland played down agriculture, consumer goods, and socioeconomic infrastructure. Finally, these new industries, by their nature, were generally capital-, energy-, and material intensive and required heavy imports; the threat of a balance-of-payments problem was inherent from the beginning.
- A reorientation of Poland's foreign economic relations toward the Soviet Union first and CMEA second. The requirement for Poland to construct a large military-industrial sector after World War II was mentioned earlier. Poland was also forced to withdraw from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and was told to reject the Marshall Plan aid. Traditional trade links to the West, especially with Germany, France, and Britain, were redirected to serve the Soviet economy after the war.

¹³2. M. Fallenbuchl, "Poland's Economic Crisis", Problems of Communism, March-April 1982, p. 3. The characteristics of that system as discussed here are from that article.

As the summary of Poland's post-World War II history indicates, the recurring economic crises have been repeatedly answered by "reforms". Such "reforms" actually are little more than a tinkering with the economy in which the ends remain the same, the characteristics remain intact, some means are modified, and workers are urged to work harder. Even Gierek's initially-successful economic policies in the early 1970s were not really reforms of Gomulka's policies, but rather the quintessential example of a command economy seeking rapid expansion in a policy of import-led growth on a sea of foreign credit.

The Hungarian model is often cited as a pattern for Poland to adopt in order to alleviate the economic crisis. Indeed, the Jaruzelski government initiated reforms in 1982 that allegedly were to restructure the Polish economy along the lines of the Hungarian model, to decentralize some decision making, and to introduce a rational pricing structure. It soon became evident, however, that plans were easier to make than to fulfill. By the end of 1983, the government had launched a media campaign against small-scale enterprises and against the very market elements that the 1982 "reforms" had introduced. Although billing its actions as a struggle against "speculation" and unlawful "enrichment", the government attacked private enterprise by tightening tax and administrative regulations that constrained private investment. Hence the economy remains stagnated as "reforms" languish in a land where the government attitude toward market elements has grown increasingly hostile, while the private sector has experienced mounting distrust of the government and general pessimism.¹⁴

J. F. Brown and A. Ross Johnson examined the applicability of the Hungarian model to Poland in a 1984 Rand study. They concluded that the extent of Poland's crisis and the international economic circumstances of the 1980s are much less favorable than the situation Hungary faced when it introduced significant reform in the 1960s. Additionally they found three serious political-social problems to true reform in Poland.

¹⁴Rachwald, "Poland's Socialism", p. 359. See also Milewski et al., "Poland: Four Years After", p. 344.

First, there is considerable, entrenched opposition inside the present regime to any expansion of its ranks to bring into the decision-making apparatus the specialists, who are needed to redirect the economy, and the workers' representatives, who are needed to mobilize the work force. Such expansion would necessarily diminish the breadth of authority of current decision-makers.

Secondly, there are serious doubts in Moscow, where Soviet leaders are sometimes split over Hungary; even when they may like parts of the Hungarian model, they are quick to point out that Poland is not Hungary (two Hungarys may be too much).

Finally, there is a strong disinclination on the part of Polish society to make the necessary initial sacrifices that reform would entail. Any cure for the illness is apt to be painful in terms of unemployment, transfers of workers, higher prices, lowering of living standards, etc. The Poles have demonstrated their reaction to such proposals before. Moreover, for any such measures to take effect and to be accepted, society, particularly the workers, must have political trust in the government--in Poland there is practically none (hence the huge propaganda war between the underground and the government). The alternative vehicle for introducing economic reform and overcoming the unwelcome austerity is national defeat such as Hungary experienced in the wake of the 1956 revolution. The Poles, of course, are not about to allow that to happen, so the reforms die, the Hungarian model is not applied to Poland, and the economy remains stagnated.¹⁵

Poland's \$27 billion hard-currency debt to the West (1985; also 4.8 billion rubles to CMEA countries) complicates Poland's situation but, like other East European countries, it is attempting to deal with this problem by reducing imports to a minimum and by mounting export drives to hard-currency markets. Thus 1984 was a record coal exporting year and there is evidence that Poland is using arms exports as a way of tackling the debt.¹⁶ In general, though, the consumer pays for such policies, encountering more shortages, longer lines, and experiencing a further

¹⁵J. F. Brown and A. Ross Johnson, "Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe", Rand Report, R-3189-AF, (Santa Monica: Rand Corp, 1984), pp. 7-11.

¹⁶Randall J. Stewart, "Warsaw Pact Arms Production and Exports", an unpublished paper prepared for a graduate seminar, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1986).

depression of the standard of living. Thus inflation in Poland for 1985 exceeded 14 percent, while the cost of living has increased 357 percent from 1980 to 1984. Some relief was forthcoming, however, when the United States lifted most of its sanctions after the 1984 amnesty. Additionally, in July 1985, Poland's seventeen Western creditor nations agreed to reschedule Poland's debt payment.

The future is rather bleak, however. The Polish Academy of Sciences studied the economic trends in Poland and issued a report in 1985. Its officially endorsed "Committee 2000 Report" predicts within a few years,

ecological deterioration, further pauperization of the populace, disintegration of transport, a dangerous decline in the motivation of workers, and other dramatic developments. . . .The long limitation of investments may have in the near future social and ecological consequences on an unimaginable scale.¹⁷

In a report prepared for a NATO conference of economic ministers in 1980, Peter Broderon expressed concern not only about the hard-currency debt, but also about an expected stagnation of manpower resources in Poland by the late 1980s as a shrinking population of working-age citizens will have to provide for a growing number of pensioners as a result of post-war demographic trends. The Polish government will seek Western credits for investment projects focusing on energy development (nuclear, brown coal, Vistula water projects) to offset the decreasing energy supplies provided by the Soviet Union. The demand for and consumption of consumer goods will also increase. Any real improvement in living standards will depend on agriculture, but improvements in agriculture will require a restructuring of retail prices. Broderon was optimistic about long-range prospects for production and living standards due to

¹⁷Liberation (Paris), 24 May 1985, as cited in Milewski et al, "Poland: Four Years After", p. 345.

the great potential and under-utilized resources of the country. He was pessimistic, however, about the short-term possibilities to exploit this potential for growth, due largely to the debt.¹⁸

Despite the economic crisis, it seems the government leaders are more concerned about maintaining their privileged control than with taking the risks necessary to overcome the economic morass into which the country has sunk. Masters of the instruments of force, they seem willing to continue to muddle through as long as things stay quiet. It is not that they like the economic situation, but it appears again to be the choice of lesser evils, since the option of power-sharing is seen as a zero sum game in which no losses are tolerated. Such a policy seems short-sighted to most Westerners, but the Polish regime also seems to have more patience (and *de facto* staying power) than do most Westerners.¹⁹

An example of this elevation of political considerations above economic ones is the situation surrounding the Church's efforts to gain official approval for the establishment of an independent foundation to acquire and distribute funds to modernize and aid Polish private farmers. The Church project was proposed in September 1982 by Cardinal Glemp. It envisioned a foundation that would be independent of the authorities and that would act, within the framework of existing law, as a clearinghouse for transactions involving Western donors and groups of private Polish farmers. Western donors would supply funds that the foundation would use to purchase Western farm equipment. The farmers would then buy the equipment from the foundation in Polish *zloty* (currency). These proceeds would then be spent by the foundation on projects for the general modernization and improvement of agriculture. Such a program is necessary, says the Church, because government policies habitually overlook the private farmer in the allocation of state resources. As of 1985 the Church had reportedly secured pledges exceeding \$28 million, but has

¹⁸Peter Broderson, "Prospects for the Polish Economy in the 1980s", Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Prospects for the 1980s, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980).

¹⁹For a more optimistic view of the possibilities of evolutionary change even within socialist regimes see Stanislaw Gebethner, "Political and Institutional Changes in the Management of the Socialist Economy: The Polish Case" in Morris Bornstein, Zvi Gitelman, and William Zimmerman, East-West Relations and the Future of Eastern Europe, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981).

still not been able to obtain a government go-ahead (Lech Walesa pledged his Nobel Peace Prize award to the proposed foundation).

The government's coolness to such a project is understandable when one realizes that the existence of the large number of private farmers (80 percent of Polish agriculture is in private hands) has long embarrassed the regime, and that the Church too is a long-time embarrassment and protagonist of the government. However, the investment is needed if the government is to achieve other economic growth goals; it will help keep meat on the table at no additional cost. The government is also aware that the private farmers are the most efficient and productive element of the economy (even if that does contradict Communist ideology). The fear is that the foundation would operate without the clear and direct supervision of the authorities. Indeed, the government has long been tacitly opposed to any form of Western aid to the economy unless that aid can be directly controlled by the government itself. It thus came as somewhat of a surprise when the government announced in September 1985 that it was studying proposals advanced by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers' Fund (RF-RBF) for creating an agricultural foundation. RF-RBF officials said it would be separate from the Church's foundation, although they expressed a willingness to coordinate activities with the Church. The Polish government has reportedly responded by proposing that the foundation be placed under its control; negotiations continue with RF-RBF. It certainly appears that the negotiations are a maneuver to diminish the significance of the Church's initiative, while maneuvering for political advantage by pursuing the form but not the substance of the foundation idea.²⁰

²⁰For additional information see J. B. de Weydenthal, "The Politics of International Farm Aid to Poland", Radio Free Europe Background Report, no. 113, 1 October 1985.

E. THE CHURCH

The Church itself continues to enjoy a massive following and great prestige among the population. A Solidarity poll conducted in May 1984 showed that while the "underground opposition" was rated favorable by 54.6 percent of the respondents, the Church scored an impressive 74.5 percent (the PZPR was near the bottom).²¹ With the banning of Solidarity, the Church has resumed its role as the single legal alternative to the Party. The close association established between workers and parish priests continues, while the Church hierarchy generally favors a policy of "organic work", a concept born in Polish nineteenth century history in which citizens reject overt opposition to the rulers and work for the good of the nation, not of the occupier or, as they consider it, the puppet regime installed by the occupier.²²

Cardinal Glemp has drawn underground criticism as he has maintained a generally conciliatory policy toward the government and is learning how to fill Cardinal Wyszynski's shoes. In this he seems to have the support of the Pope, whose visit in 1983 again demonstrated the popularity and support of the Church. A kind of turning point occurred in 1984, however, when a government attempt to remove crucifixes from a regional school sparked largely successful youth demonstrations and Church resistance. A more critical juncture occurred when the Church became decidedly more oppositional in the wake of the October 1984 murder by the security police of Father Popieluszko, a very popular and outspoken Solidarity supporter. Popieluszko became a national martyr, 250,000 mourners attended his funeral (over which Cardinal Glemp officiated), and opposition mounted against the regime. In an unusual state trial lasting from December 1984 to February 1985, four security officers were tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to terms ranging from 14-25 years; the trial was closely followed by the Polish media. Relations between the Church and the government have remained sour ever since as occasional arrests of activist

²¹Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Poland, 23 January 1985,

²²Brown and Johnson, "Challenges to Soviet Control in Eastern Europe", p. 8.

priests, charges of Church conspiracy with the outlawed Solidarity, and press attacks on Cardinal Glemp and even on Pope John Paul II continue.

F. SUMMARY

The internal Polish situation remains one of stalemate in an atmosphere of repression, pessimism, and dismal economic prospects. The locked nature of the stalemate is evidenced by (1) the Party's stubborn persistence in maintaining its position and privilege, and (2) Solidarity's refusal to die.

Developments since the imposition of martial law in December 1981 indicated that Jaruzelski's government has ignored all domestic opportunities to work out a compromise between the designs of the Communist rulers of Poland and the aspirations of the Polish people. The incorporation of most of the regulations of martial law into the "normal" Polish legal system has allowed the regime to pursue its policy of attempting to eradicate Solidarity, despite the official end of martial law in the Summer of 1983. Economically, Jaruzelski's regime has emasculated any attempt at reform that would threaten or constrain the role of the Party in directing the economy--despite the evidence of Polish economic history and the voices of economists that argue of the bankruptcy of the current system and of the need for genuine change. In Jaruzelski's eyes, and in the eyes of hard-line Communist leaders, however, economic restructuring is indivisible from political issues; "reform" thus becomes little more than tinkering with the economy, since any changes in the economy pose a direct linkage to the institutional and personal power bases of the Communist leaders. Hence the general observation that since the imposition of martial law, the regime's actions and policies have been subservient to the supreme goal of maintaining, and even strengthening, the power of the Communist Party apparatus after its years of decline.

This single-mindedness of the Jaruzelski regime has been frustrated by the viability and vitality of Solidarity and the opposition underground. The richness of the developing underground culture is amazing. In itself an anomaly among Communist regimes, it joins the unique institution

of the Church in Poland and the uncharacteristically large private agricultural sector to represent a continuing challenge to Party goals of domination. The tradition of resistance to foreign oppressors, and especially to Russians (and their supporters in the Polish government), appears to be very real in Poland today.

VI. U. S. NATIONAL INTEREST IN POLAND

A. NATIONAL INTEREST THEORY

Having now looked at Poland from the Polish and Soviet points of view, and having briefly described the U.S. response to the 1980-81 crisis, what indeed is the U. S. interest in Poland in the mid-1980s? Essentially, we are seeking to discuss American policy toward Poland and to do that, few would dispute that American policy should rationally be founded on the American national interest in Poland; thus the original question of what is the American national interest in Poland. But while the question seems simple and logical, it is also true that the answer tends toward significant complexity, if not obfuscation. The difficulty turns on the issue of what is the definition of national interest, a question that appears to have as many answers or proposals as commentators. A review of the concept of national interest, and specifically American national interest, is thus in order in the hope that this will assist the reader in understanding the difficulty in stating the American national interest in regard to Poland, as well as why the subject of national interest is debated so hotly at times.

In the phrase "American (or U.S.) national interest", the word "national" in itself implies a legitimacy of the interest with the nation of America. If America is, as it proclaims itself to be, a nation of, by and for the people, if it is indeed a representative and responsive government of the American people, then the American national interest should represent to a significant measure, at least, the interest of the American nation at large. Legitimacy in this regard usually emerges from the political culture of a country, and thus will necessitate reflection on American political culture. "Interest" implies some type of need, remembering that it is the unfulfilled need that motivates to action; in this case, it is action as policy. Needs can be thought of as a function of where a country is, pictured in a Maslovian hierarchy.

To speak of a nation as we are doing automatically catapults us beyond strictly physical formulations, such as "state" might imply, and into the realm of ideology, values, goals, and national identity. The material world is not the sum of existence, and thus any conceptualization of something like a nation must attempt to deal with immaterial, as well as material realities; the history and experience of the Polish nation is an obvious case in point. Of course, since we are also talking about this national interest in an actual physical world, any concept of national interest must also address the issue of problematic correspondence; our concept of national interest will be useless unless it is capable of addressing actual world problems. For Americans this is, perhaps, particularly true, since we seem to be a nation given to action, impatience, and immediate problem resolution, rather than philosophy and patient reflection. As doers, though, we recognize that the world is characterized by changing conditions; hence our often *ad hoc* solutions to problems. Consequently, national interest must account for these changing conditions; the definition must change when the problem changes, while still maintaining a fix on some guiding star (in itself, we are told by astronomers today, ever-moving as well). Perhaps one should try then to conceptualize national interest as a process, rather than as simply a fixed point.

Having thoroughly roiled the waters of definition, let me point out the obvious by restating that this is *American* national interest about which we are thinking. The significance of this is that America is a tremendously diverse polity deriving from a plethora of varying, and often conflicting, philosophical and social roots. Having stated that the national interest must contain the elements of legitimacy and national needs, that it must reflect the nation's goals, ideologies, values and identity, and that it must still be capable of solving real world problems, one is tempted to simply throw up one's hands in despair and regret that the question was ever posed.

Indeed, that has been the reaction of most of those thinkers who have sought to define the American national interest in recent years. That no universally acknowledged definitive statement of the national interest has yet been published is, no doubt, partially a result of the complexity, (some would say impossibility), of the task. Another explanation might be that we simply have

not yet thought about it long enough. The issue of national interest in American foreign policy has only risen to its present heights as a result of the rise to globalism of American foreign policy in World War II and its aftermath.¹

As Richard Reeves observed, "national interest" is a phrase heard often in Washington, D. C., but rarely, if ever, heard outside Washington, New York, and Cambridge. In an interview with former-President Richard Nixon, Reeves asked Nixon how many people actually control American foreign policy. Nixon's response was only about two or three thousand. Reeves went on to conclude that the reason for the limited usage of the phrase "national interest" is a result of the small number of persons directly involved in formulating foreign policy, and the fact that America has not had need of a foreign policy until the twentieth century. Reeves called these policy formulators the "national interest" elite--the elite which believes that it is its duty to define the national interest in regard to foreign policy. It is essentially a self-selected elite made possible because the United States once did not need a foreign policy, and when it did need one, the information needed to formulate policy was remote and inaccessible to the general public. Since Americans live and govern themselves on the basis of their own life experiences, the foreign policy elite came to be made up of Americans who studied, spoke, sold, bought, or went to anything or to anywhere foreign. These ventures set them apart from the usual American experience and hence, the nation. They cared about foreign policy, so they made foreign policy.²

While this may be a plausible explanation, it does little more than describe a state affairs and does not come to grips with the larger issue. National interest must be more than the interests of a single group, if it will claim to be national. Thus some writers have sought to find a national basis in studies of America, Americans, and how the American nation evolved and perceives itself today. This approach emphasizes the element of values, goals, and national identity.

¹Stephen E. Ambrose sets the beginning of the rise in 1938 and describes this rise in his book *The Rise to Globalism*, (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).

²Richard Reeves, *American Journey*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

Ralph Henry Gabriel is considered to have written one of the most definitive works of this line of study. His major work, The Course of American Democratic Thought, is a study of the social beliefs that emerged among Americans to serve as guides for action, as standards by which to judge the quality of social life, and as goals to inspire humane living. It is an intellectual history of America that seeks to support the thesis that Americans have a unique political culture that has produced a "democratic faith" founded on a fundamental and absolute moral law. According to Gabriel, the primary doctrine of the American "democratic faith" is that beneath society's customs and institutions, there exists a law not made by men that includes the natural rights of men and the moral laws of God. Three beliefs then follow from this "democratic faith": (1) faith in constitutionalism and a government of laws, not men; (2) belief in the free and responsible individual; and (3) the belief that America, being unique in the world, has a destiny in the world as the bastion of democracy. It is upon this faith and these beliefs, then, that the nation can build its national interest and hence, find a basis for its foreign policy.³

Some authors have attempted to pursue a study of the American Identity by using the myths that Americans seem to share. James O. Robertson did just that in American Myth, American Reality. Robertson saw myths as being used to maintain common ideals, common images, and common behaviors while providing a means to reconcile our ideals and reality. Such myths, being rooted in reality and ideals, serve to overcome the plurality of Americans and to unite the diverse elements of the American polity into a shared American identity.⁴ A similar study of symbols and reality was done with regard to America's frontier experience by Henry Smith. Smith was particularly concerned with demonstrating the impact of the American West on the consciousness of Americans and in shaping the uniqueness that distinguishes Americans.⁵ Both writers agree

³Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Democratic Thought, (1956).

⁴James Oliver Robertson, American Myth, American Reality, (New York: Hill and Wang Co., 1980).

⁵Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land, (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

with Gabriel as to the uniqueness of Americans, and as to the special destiny that Americans feel they have in the world. In the nineteenth century this self-conscious awareness of "specialness" was expressed in the concept of "Manifest Destiny". Today it takes the form of an increasingly world-wide concern for human rights and the spread of democracy to all men. As Richard Reeves put it, Americans believe that the moral problems of the world have not been solved, can be solved, and that the last best hope for solving them is America.⁶

If one accepts the proposition that a certain American identity can be established to exist, and that this identity can be described and understood, then one should be able to use it as a guide for developing policy in the interest of that "American-ness". A school of writers has taken this tack and have developed the concept of the public interest. As William J. Meyer contends, a concept of the public interest is necessary if one desires to understand the behavior of men organized in a state. For Meyer, the public interest means the indirect consequences of social transactions seen as the affairs of the people of a state. Specifically, the public interest is the goals and strategies society may articulate and pursue for the purpose of regulating and controlling the common condition. With the public interest (or public good) defined, Meyer proceeds to develop a concept of pragmatism as a tool capable of dealing with pluralistic truth in testing, through experience, the body of general beliefs in a society. Those beliefs that prove workable and satisfactory to the public at large form the body of the public interest. Of course, as experiences and the range of situations change, so too will the set of beliefs and the public interest.⁷ Thus Meyer, while recognizing the concept of a public interest arising out of an "American" set of beliefs derived from the American identity, also maintains that situations play a role in determining which beliefs rise to the top in the public interest.

It is in this concept of pragmatism that Americans really began to demonstrate a sophisticated uniqueness in the world. Whereas the settlers of America came basically out of European

⁶Reeves, American Journey, p. 275.

⁷William J. Meyer, Public Good and Political Authority, New York: Kennikat Press, 1975).

traditions of thought that viewed the world as dichotomous between idealism and materialism (or realism), the American experience was that this traditional dichotomy did not seem applicable in the new "promised land". The settlers who were carving out a nation from the wilderness, and even those who lived in the growing cities of the New World, were very much aware of the vicissitudes and challenges of a real, material world that they encountered every day, a world arguably more "real" to them than that experienced by their more "civilized" cousins back in Europe. At the same time, despite the concrete, ever-present reality of this raw new world, Americans repeatedly and forcefully experienced the power of ideas in motivating, even driving, men and women to accomplish tasks and to achieve goals that seemed beyond rational, "realistic" expectation or possibility. It was from this necessity of combining idealism and realism that the first American philosophy of pragmatism emerged. Morton White, in his monumental work on American philosophy, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism,⁸ describes this rejection of European forms and the development of a uniquely American philosophy at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. It is upon this foundation that Meyer would eventually develop his theory of the public interest. White's work, combined with Meyer's, can also be seen in the work of Frank Teti.

By now, the difficulty in framing the public interest should be apparent. Some writers emphasize the American identity itself and develop an essentially static definition of the public interest. Others attempt to point out the pluralism that exists even within the "American" identity, and thus will tend towards a more dynamic, changing public interest. The whole role of the situation is at times disregarded in favor of a public interest that transcends all temporal events; in the estimation of others, actual situations play a dominant role in defining the public interest. Many writers do not even begin with American identity, but factor it in only later,

⁸Morton Gabriel White, Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1947).

emphasizing instead the role of ideals that transcend nationality, or laws that derive from a source above man.

Glendon Schubert's appraisal of the subject identifies three such basic theories--rationalist, idealist, and realist--in framing the public interest, none of which are directly concerned with the American identity. Rationalist theory postulates self-evident truths which man then translates into policy through the use of his reason and intellect; the public interest will be best served by those policies that best utilize the self-evident norms. Idealist theory postulates a higher law that policy makers seek to uncover, a law that is above the question of public interest; the quest for the ideal in itself takes care of the public interest. Realist theory tends to be more situational-oriented, recognizes an ongoing conflict of goals in society, and identifies the role of public officials as being one of mediation, thus serving the public interest.⁹

Whatever method is used, this review of the literature should serve to highlight some of the varied ways of discussing and identifying American interest. At some point all reviews must end, and the writer must state his own views and get on with the work at hand. It is my fervent hope that this review, while understandably, perhaps, frustrating to the reader in that no definite, coherent framework for discussing American interest has emerged, was nonetheless not too confusing in its separate parts and thoughts. Such, unfortunately, is the state of affairs in the field.

Before going further, though, I should clear up a couple of points. I have used the terms "public interest" and "national interest" seemingly interchangeably and I trust the reader has not become side-tracked on this issue. In the early post-WWII years as Americans for the first time were forced to deal extensively and systematically with the concept of American interests, it was general practice to specify public interest as a domestic concept, and national interest as a concept used in foreign policy. In recent years, however, this distinction has been relaxed. If we assume

⁹Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

that public interest (whatever it is) is at the center of a modern, democratic society, then the policies that flow from that society, both domestically and abroad, must somehow address the concept of interest. This is especially true if one believes, as I do, that the public interest, though always dynamic and changing, arises out of the interaction of the many pluralistic elements of American society; this "public interest" then seeks both expression and affirmation through the institutions of American democratic government, to include finding an inevitable niche in foreign policy as well, the domain of the "national interest". Such a process means that both are but different sides of the same coin, especially if one postulates the unity of the people and their government.¹⁰ Hence the following discussion will speak of "national interest", while recognizing and accepting the existence of a domestic tie and input.

With this theoretical background in mind, then, how have political scientists defined national interest? Writing shortly after World War II, Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the seminal political scientists of our time, defined national interest strictly in terms of a quest for power. He wrote:

The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. . . . We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power. . . . Intellectually, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. . . . He thinks in terms of interest defined as power.¹¹

While Morgenthau certainly brought new structure and systematic thought to the field of political science with his theory of power, his *tour de force* is, nonetheless, a single-factor analysis. It ends up with power having meaning only in relationship to other states, and thus, when national interest is defined solely as the maximization of power, the national interest

¹⁰Abraham Lincoln's formulation of American government as being of, by, and for the people would seem to make this unity indisputable. Any arguments about "reality" versus "idealism" can be bridged by the American philosophy of pragmatism such that the two must be connected, although the tie may seem strained at times.

¹¹Hans L. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th edition, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), p. 5.

becomes recognizable only in relationship to other states and has no clear domestic content. Further, how does one define the national interest of a state that is not in competition in a given situation?

Paul Seabury has this to note about national interest:

The idea of national interests may refer to some *ideal* set of purposes which a nation *should* . . . seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations. Wanting a better word, we might call this a *normative*, civic concept of national interest. . . . A second meaning of equal importance might be call *descriptive*. In this sense the national interest may be regarded as those purposes which the nation, through its leadership, appears to pursue persistently through time. When we speak of the national interest in this descriptive sense, we move out of the metaphysical into the realms of facts. . . . Disagreement about policy and action may arise even among men who are essentially in agreement about the general aims of their country in the world. But policy disagreements are usually due to differences among policy-makers about conceptions both of what the United States is and what its role in world politics, even its mission, should be.¹²

This definition is really nothing more than a description; it does not address the essence of national interest. The writer is unable to find a box that perfectly contains the concept of the national interest and thus falls back on description. Unfortunately, many political scientists take the approach of K. J. Holsti:

Even though there may be some immutable national interests such as self-preservation, to which everyone will agree, no one can claim with certainty that any other specific goal or set of goals is in the national interest. Therefore we will avoid the term and substitute the concept of *objective*.¹³

¹²Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States of America, (New York: Random House, 1963), p.86.

¹³K. J. Holsti, International Politics, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 124.

Unable to define *the* national interest, it is swept under the rug and the writer reverts to an essentially descriptive method. Perhaps the key to the difficulty is the conception of the national interest as *the* national interest, as if it were static and single, all-embracing and immutable. Perhaps John Stoessinger comes closer when he writes,

We see therefore that it is misleading to define the national interest in terms of any one concept. In fact, our definition of foreign policy as the formulation of the national interest is purely formal. . . . The formula of the national interest is ambiguous and frequently not at all helpful when applied to a concrete situation.¹⁴

It thus becomes clear that the question, how it is asked, and the type of answer expected, can greatly aid or hinder our understanding. Rather than seeking to "define" the national interest, a better approach may be to start with a conceptual model of what it is.

For a working model of the national interest I am partial to Frank Teti's model as it enables an easy grasp of a complex topic. This model identifies a historical-cultural context that interacts with a situational context to produce a hierarchy of perceived and/or real needs that becomes known as the national interest. The critical component of this model, though, is the flowing together and interaction of the historical-cultural context with the situational context in a process of compromise and consensus--the heart of the Madisonian model of government that is, in turn, the basis of American government.¹⁵ The challenge to American government in particular, and to the American people in general, is to make maximum use of the process of compromise and consensus. Elements of the highly pluralistic historical-cultural context must be drawn into the compromise and consensus process or they will attempt to subvert the model, and hence the public/national interest, by directly establishing their own agendas in the hierarchy of needs. Similarly, government, under the pressure of responding to real, fast-moving and changing

¹⁴John G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations*, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 30.

¹⁵See Appendix B for a graphical representation of this model; I think it will make it much clearer than can words alone.

situations, will be tempted to act without first ensuring the foundation that derives from the compromise and consensus process; government will be tempted to deal directly with the problem in the name of expediency and efficiency, using its own hierarchy of needs, to the possible detriment of the public/national interest.

The beauty of the Teti model is that it addresses both the source of American uniqueness, and the reality of current situations. The plurality of American society, its energy, drive, resourcefulness, and fecundity in generating new ideas and approaches has long been a great source of strength for this country; it could, of course, also be a source of weakness if all players do not regularly take part in the interaction of the compromise and consensus process. The Teti model also shows the dynamic quality of the national interest. To speak of *the* national interest is to miss its essence--the constant, dynamic interplay of ideals and reality, of "who we are" with "where and when we are" in the world. American national interest is a product that requires constant monitoring of the formulation process, not exclusive attention on the end-product.

What the Teti model does not do is to study the hierarchy of perceived and/or actual needs in a systematic fashion. This becomes particularly important as one begins to think about policy formulation based on the needs expressed as national interest. For this task Donald Nuechterlein has provided a framework for categorization and study.¹⁶ Although the model does not have the precision of a mathematical formula, it does allow a focused, albeit subjective, analysis of American interest on different questions, both absolutely and relative to other affected nations. We will look more closely at the Nuechterlein model in the next section.

¹⁶Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978).

B. AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. INTEREST IN POLAND

The previous sections of this paper have examined the Situational Context of the Teti national interest model with respect to Poland. Although some discussion of the American Historical-Cultural Context has also occurred in the preceding section, a more comprehensive articulation is necessary before we proceed further with the Teti and Nuechterlein models.

The wide pluralism in the American Historical-Cultural Context, the result of immigrants from all over the world, and of the broad political and social freedoms of the land, is one of the most striking and fascinating aspects of America. Henry James observed that the American character is filled with contradiction and paradox and once said, "It's a complex fate, being an American." Thus it is perhaps not surprising that when America developed its own distinctive philosophy, it was the pragmatism of Henry James. As mentioned earlier, this pragmatism perceived a pluralistic universe where men can discover partial and limited truths--truths that work for them--but where no one can gain an absolute grip on ultimate truth.

However, despite this diversity, there also seem to be generally-held principles and ideas with which Americans tend to identify themselves. While Americans live by experiment, they also demonstrate a yen for broad generalities, concepts that are all-encompassing and tend toward the universal. This may be traceable to the nurturing of America on the theology of Calvin--elaborate, abstract and systematic as it is. This Calvinist theology also imparted a concept of salvation to the American mind that grew to become an almost messianic view of America and its place in the world.

The American's propensity to ideology has surfaced repeatedly in American history--Johnathon Edward's theology of Providence, the Webster-Calhoun views of slavery, Woodrow Wilson's vision of a new world order, and even John Foster Dulles' call to a virtual holy war against atheistic communism. Americans cite with relish the foundation of their society as being embodied in great ideological documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and even the Gettysburg Address. And yet, how many Americans are really familiar with the

specific principles that are contained in these cornerstones? How many Americans can, or even try, to articulate the meaning of freedom, democracy, and liberty? Actually, the fact that they are not elaborately articulated in today's America is not unusual for America. Tocqueville observed in the 1830s that the ideas of the Americans "are all either extremely minute and clear or extremely general and vague." He went on to observe that the ideas that were clear dealt with matters of fact and practice; those that were unclear were those of theory and ideology. He wrote, "In no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the United States." Tocqueville also observed, however, the fervent (to him almost nauseating) belief in the righteousness and uniqueness of America. President Reagan captured that ongoing belief when he said, "I have always believed that this annointed land was set apart in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent here between the oceans to be found by people from every corner of the earth who had a special love of faith and freedom."¹⁷

It is important to remember that even if most Americans cannot deliver an impromptu dissertation on the principles of freedom, there *is* an American idealism to which Americans generally subscribe, and most Americans fervently believe in that idealism. It is a belief in Freedom, both economic and personal, equality, the right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, the individual dignity of a man and the worth of the individual. Thomas Jefferson said in his first inaugural address, "Equal and exact justice to all men. . . .Freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of person under protection of *habeus corpus*, and trial by juries impartially selected--these principles form the bright constellation which has gone before us."

William Tyler Page (1868-1942) said it this way in "The American's Creed":

I believe in the United States of America as a government of the people, by the people, for the people; whose just powers are derived from the consent of the governed; a democracy in a republic; a sovereign nation of many sovereign states; a perfect

¹⁷Quoted in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character" in Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983, p. 5.

union, one and inseparable; established upon those principles of freedom, equality, justice and humanity for which American patriots sacrificed their lives and fortunes. I therefore believe it is my duty to my country to love it, to support its constitution, to obey its laws, to respect its flag and to defend it against all enemies.¹⁸

American idealism as expressed in these beliefs, together with a companion belief in progress and optimism, (stemming, no doubt, from the "knowledge" that we are specially favored by God), lay the cornerstones of American political culture. These threads run throughout our history, and over the decades they have drawn in and woven into the fabric of American society the many diverse strains of the seemingly pluralistic historical-cultural context. We are Americans because we share these beliefs within our own historical-cultural context.

Given the strength and broad dissemination of these beliefs in American society, it is not surprising that they would find their way into the concept of the national interest. In Christianity, Faith is strengthened and nourished as it finds affirmation in action. Similarly, the secular beliefs of the American historical-cultural context naturally seek affirmation in the formulation of national interest and in the execution of resultant policy. This has led to many a clash between idealism and realism, between the standard-bearers of the historical-cultural context and the proponents of the situational context, as they come together in the compromise and consensus process of America. The zigs and zags of American foreign policy generally reflect the temporary victory of one or the other.

Certainly the star of the national interest model is the American compromise and consensus process. At the heart of this process is the Madisonian form of government, as set forth in the Federalist Papers. The Madisonian model recognizes, and even encourages, the competition of varied self-interest within the bound of law so that all may become players, and so that all can be

¹⁸Written by William Tyler Page, Clerk of United States House of Representatives, 1917; accepted by that House on behalf of the American People, April 3 1918. Printed in U. S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, A Welcome to U. S. A. Citizenship, p. 2, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

accommodated (and eventually co-opted into larger consensus groups) through the power of compromise and majority rule. While the achievement of perfect mix within this dynamic process is virtually impossible, the process and model do succeed in regulating the swings back and forth such that the extremes are usually avoided, and a revolution around a moderate middle is maintained in the long-run. Thus it is in the interest of all players to ensure the widest possible participation both to promote one's own cause and to moderate the causes of others.

It is precisely this clash and mix of the historical-cultural and the situational contexts that we must now address in studying American interest in Poland. Again, having covered the situational context earlier, what is it about the Polish situation, if anything, that revealed the historical-cultural elements of American national interest?

Richard Reeves observed in his journey through America that it is in vogue today to seem cynical or nonchalant about American ideals, particularly among the young, who are searching for "sophistication". Nonetheless, he found that in moments when the veneer was stripped away, the belief in the ideals remained. Interestingly, it sometimes takes a foreigner to spark us into an appreciation of what we have and into a realization of what we believe. Such was the case with the Polish Crisis.

Timothy Ash called Solidarity the "most infectiously hopeful movement in the history of contemporary Europe," and saw its long-term legacy as one of hope.¹⁹ Solidarity struck a resonant chord in the American imagination as Americans watched the Poles fighting with extraordinary courage, dignity and self-restraint for values Americans recognized as their own-- individual freedom, democratic government, the rule of law, free speech--values which powerfully reminded Americans of Poland's Western heritage. Interest was born in the perception of this common bond. Young people in the West who had doubted the primacy of those values in the modern world were suddenly seeing Solidarity banners on shipyard cranes that proclaimed, "Man

¹⁹Timothy G. Ash, "Under Western Eyes: Poland, 1980-1982", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1984, p. 131.

is born and lives free." As only a sick man knows the full value of health, so it took an unfree people to remind many Americans of the real value of freedom. Finally, the popular image of the valiant Poles struggling against the forces of "the evil empire", established a Polish-American bond that was soon translated into an ideological interest within the national interest. With the historical-cultural context now established in interaction with the situational context, it is time to apply the Nuechterlein model.

Nuechterlein identifies four different types of basic national interests:

- Defense interests--the protection of the nation-state and its population against the threat of physical violence directed from another state;
- Economic interests--the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being;
- World Order Interests--the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state and its citizens can feel secure beyond their borders;
- Ideological Interests--the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.

Nuechterlein then provides a framework for expressing the different degrees of intensity of each of these interests:

- Survival Issues--when the very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy as a result of overt attack or threat by ultimatum;
- Vital Issues--When serious harm will very likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional forces, are employed;
- Major Issues--When a state's political, economic, and ideological well-being may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment, requiring corrective action;
- Peripheral Issues--When a state's well-being is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when private citizens and companies might be in danger.

Before assembling these into the Nuechterlein matrix, let us look at the U. S. position on each interest with respect to the Polish situation.

It is obvious to anyone who can find Poland on a map that there is probably a difference in the U.S. and Soviet interests in Poland. Geographically, Poland, the "gateway to Russia", is of a much more immediate concern to the Soviet Union than to the U.S. As the discussion of Soviet interests in Poland earlier in this paper showed,²⁰ the Soviets have a long and very important relationship with Poland that has established the current nature and degree of Soviet interest in Poland. Poland is also critical to the Soviet position in East Europe in general, and to the Soviet control of the German Democratic Republic in particular. The dilemma of the Polish state has always been the question of how to proceed along essentially Western lines of thought, development, and action when one is constantly aware of the overpowering presence of the great Russian bear next door.

Hence, the ultimate fate of Poland lies somewhere between absorption into the Soviet Union and full alignment with the West. Since neither of these extremes in itself will probably be reached, both being absolute and opposed by historic countervailing tendencies, the important issue then is not destination so much as direction along the range. Since World War II in particular, the Soviet Union has sought to weave a net of integration around Poland, and to bring Poland ever closer under Soviet control. If we speculate on the import of this encouragement toward integration with the Soviet Union, we soon realize that this direction of Poland's movement is of abiding interest to the U.S. The more certain and secure that Soviet control of Poland is, the more that Poland becomes a Soviet bridge (of outward-moving influence) to the West. By assuring achievement, on a more or less permanent basis, of their objectives in Poland, the Soviets would have a secure route to Western Europe. Hence the potential military and political threat increases in the area the U.S. regards as holding paramount security interest.

The long-range possibilities for Western Europe under this degree of Soviet pressure break down into two distinct areas--fragmentation and consolidation, both equally dangerous to the Western camp. Fragmentation of Western unity in the face of the Soviet Union would make each

²⁰See the section in this work entitled "Soviet Interest in Poland", pp. 80-88.

separate nation more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure supported by a secure forward military position in the center of Europe. While the word "domination" may not precisely describe either the Soviet objective or this outcome, it is still apparent that Soviet influence in the West would be stronger, and that such an outcome could only be realized at the expense of Western autonomy and institutions. The consolidation of the West, with the United States surely involved, could reverse the present multipolar trends in the world and lead ultimately to the bipolarity seen as unstable by many because it provides the framework for the "zero sum" outcome in which one side or the other must lose all.²¹

While the prospect of Poland's move toward the Soviets certainly is an undesirable outcome, the contrary trend, that toward the inclusion of a truly autonomous Polish state into the Western community, becomes the most desirable outcome for the U.S. The advantages for the West in this instance are in part the reciprocals of the disadvantages of the former. Poland would become a bridge from the West to the Soviet Union, opening it to Western pressures and traditions that it has resisted in the past. Nor should it be overlooked that such an outcome would alter the entire Soviet presence in Europe, while strengthening the West by making available to it the considerable energies and resources of the Polish nation. Again, while such an outcome may be seen as unrealistic in today's light, the outcome as defined remains valid as providing a desirable direction for change.

What then of Nuechterlein's basic interests? American *defense interests* in Poland can only be seen as very small for the present and foreseeable future; using Nuechterlein's labels, it would be classified as *peripheral*. While future events could certainly raise that degree of interest, the present situation does not warrant a higher interest.

²¹Daniel M. Duffield, Jr, United States Security Interest in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, National Security Affairs Monograph 77-6, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1977), pp. 47-8.

Economic Interest. While U.S. trade with Poland rose sharply in the 1970s, such trade has never been of great importance to the U.S. Even Poland's large Western debt is primarily owed to Western European lenders, not the United States (about ten percent of the hard-currency debt is owed to U.S. banks). Poland is at best only a secondary market and supplier for the United States. U.S. exports to Poland in 1981, before the imposition of sanctions, was valued at approximately \$70.3 million; imports from Poland amounted to \$31.6 million.²² The relative size of the Polish and American economies in comparison to each other means that America is certainly more important to Poland than Poland is to America, such that the U. S. economic interest in Poland is "major" (as compared to vital), at best, and more likely, for the United States, *peripheral*.

In the consideration of *World Order Interests*, Poland holds a higher degree of importance for the United States. Poland is, of course, a part of the Soviet East European empire and thus falls into U.S. interests with regard to Eastern Europe as a whole as well. The very first comprehensive statement on American policy toward that region, NSC 58 (a then secret document signed by President Truman in 1949), states that "Our ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in Eastern Europe of non-totalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community."²³ The American conception of Eastern Europe that was to emerge after the Yalta Agreement did not in any way envision the kind of Soviet hegemony that one finds today. As discussed above, Soviet presence in Eastern Europe is a major U.S. concern with regard to American interests in Europe, our foremost zone of security interest in today's world (due to that presence). Poland, as a major linchpin of that Soviet presence, is thus of great American interest. However, it is also clear from past U.S. actions and policy with regard to Eastern Europe that the interests are not yet such that the United States is ready to commit

²²Based on information from Poland, Central Statistical Office, Consize Statistical Yearbook of Poland, 1982, (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 195, 197-98; a 1981 exchange rate of 35 *zloty* to US\$1 was used. (By the end of 1982 that exchange rate was up to 86 *zloty* to US\$1.)

²³T.H. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis, eds., "NSC 58: United States Policy toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe (September 14, 1949)", Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 211-23.

military forces to change the world order there. While the U. S. is so committed to preserving the Western order in Europe, the extension of that order to the East through military action is not contemplated at this time. It is for similar reasons that the U. S. did not send military support to Hungary in 1956 or to Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nuechterlein proposes that vital interests may be defended by the use of conventional forces; hence, I would classify the U.S. world order interest in Poland as *major*.

Finally, we come to the consideration of American *Ideological Interest* in Poland. As discussed earlier, the events in Poland captured American interest as Americans perceived the Poles to be struggling for many of the same ideals held dear by Americans. Perhaps this identification with the Poles and their struggle has something to do with the "frontier" experience of both cultures, the Poles having inhabited the West's eastern frontier against the barbarians of the East, the Americans, in effect, constituting the West's western frontier against the same. Certainly the extremities of experience and the challenge to life that the Poles experienced in defending their frontier and which the Americans experienced in settling the North American frontier were similar, and thus could have forged the common reverence for freedom and the philosophy of individualism.

Poland also cannot help but stir America's ideological identity that sees the Soviet Union as the embodiment of evil and the antithesis of all that is good and just by American standards. Such castigations are often bemoaned in this country by those of Reeves' "national interest elite", for such "irritable patriotism" (Tocqueville's characterization of the American penchant for self-righteousness in 1831) can, in the heat of passion, apply tremendous pressure for aggressive action. This leads to those situations in the Teti model in which the Historical-Cultural Context will seek to circumvent the Compromise and Consensus Process that seems suddenly too slow and staid to satisfy inflamed passion; if the Compromise and Consensus Process is bypassed, however, and inflamed passion is allowed to directly establish elements of the Hierarchy of Perceived and/or Actual Needs, the national interest will not be best served.

Be that as it may, the intensity of the American ideological interest nonetheless stems, in part, from the need of the American belief system to express itself and to affirm itself in the world arena. Samuel Huntington has stated that, "For most Americans, foreign policy goals should reflect not only the security interests of the nation and the economic interests of key groups within the nation but also the political values and principles that define American identity."²⁴ The 1975 Helsinki Human Rights provisions have thus received American support for just that reason; Americans feel better about themselves when they publicly proclaim their beliefs and see them affirmed in the world at large. The challenge of rational government thus becomes how to accommodate this in a manner to capitalize on its strength, without falling victim to its excesses. As James Schlesinger once explained to the Europeans,

The United States is largely a romantic country. It has encountered little opposition and does not think in terms of moves and countermoves in a never-ending game. It sees no reason that it can't accomplish its presumably formidable objectives. Its history is marked by a belief in Manifest Destiny--abetted by a Puritan past in which the American nation was foreordained to be a Beacon into the World. In order, therefore, to understand American policy, one should not simply go through a careful calculation of the national interest. However important such a calculation may be to officials of the Department of State, it would squire little visceral support among the American people. . . . [American policy finds its strength when] the American public believes that *it is right*.²⁵

While Nuechterlein normally reserves vital interests for those interests to be supported by conventional forces, his case studies do indicate that ideological interests may assume a vital degree of intensity while not necessarily resulting in a willingness to commit troops. Hence, due

²⁴Samuel P Huntington, "American Ideals versus American Institutions", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 97, no. 1, Spring 1982.

²⁵James R. Schlesinger, "An American Perspective" in Robert E. Hunter, ed., NATO: The Next Generation, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 43, 45. Italics are those of Schlesinger.

to the intensity of American attitude in reference to the Soviet Union and East Europe in general, and toward Poland in particular, and due also to the need of the American identity and belief system for public proclamation and affirmation of its tenets for its own health, I think the American ideological interest in Poland should be classified as *vital*.

A similar categorization of Soviet interest in Poland using the Nuechterlein model is useful here. As discussed earlier, the Soviet interest in Poland is much older and more intense than that of the United States, due, in large part, to geographical realities. Russian experience with Poland has historically proven the critical impact Poland has on the existence of the Russian state; even today, the Soviets would be extremely concerned about any threatened establishment of an independent, hostile Poland on its borders. It is thus not imperceivable to classify Soviet *Defense* interest in Poland as being of *survival* intensity. In a related fashion, since Poland is the linchpin to the Soviet Union's East European empire, as well as being a member of the Socialist Commonwealth of nations and thus a "beneficiary" of the Breshnev Doctrine's promise of "fraternal assistance", Soviet *World Order* interest, shaped as it is to a large degree on the foundation of that East European empire, should be classified as at least *vital* in regard to Poland specifically.

Many Sovietologists argue that the ideological component of the Soviet Communist Party is the justification for its continued existence; the destruction or the debasement of that legitimizing ideological function and basis would result in a major upheaval in Soviet government. One of the fundamental tenets of that ideology is the irreversibility of the tide of history that has swept nations such as Russia and Poland towards a higher social level of "socialist" organization superior to capitalism. The Communist Party is solely charged with guiding these "advanced" nations along the road of socialist development to ever-purer forms of socialism and, ultimately, communism. The rejection of these ideological tenets would necessarily destroy the Party's legitimization for rule. Solidarity, being ultimately a creation and expression of the Polish nation and not the PZRP, with its inference of rejection of PZRP monopoly rule, was just the sort of development that passes

an extreme survival challenge to Party rule and existence. Of course, as the events of 1980-81 showed, the disintegration of Party control in Poland threatened to spill over into neighboring socialist countries and into Soviet republics, a threat that Communist leaders in those areas took very seriously, and for good reason, as we have seen. Thus the *Ideological* interest of the Soviet Union is also of *survival* intensity.

Finally, economically, the Soviet Union has invested considerable funds in the form of subsidies and loans into the troubled Polish economy. It has also structured Poland's economy into a major supporting role for the Soviet economy as evidenced by Soviet actions in the post-war years. Again, however, the relative size of the Polish and Soviet economies means that the Soviet Union is more important to Poland than is Poland to the Soviet Union in economic terms. Hence, Soviet economic interest in Poland could be classified as major at least.

The Nuechterlein matrix allows us to place these classifications into an easily comprehensible presentation and comparison of the interests. The resulting Nuechterlein matrix for comparison of Soviet and U. S. interest on the issue of Poland would be constructed as follows:

Issue: Poland				
<i>Basic interest at stake</i>	<i>Intensity of interest</i>			
	<u>Survival</u>	<u>Vital</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Peripheral</u>
Defense of homeland	USSR			US
Economic well-being			+ USSR	US
Favorable world order		+ USSR	+ US	
Ideological	USSR	US		

As this matrix shows, the interests of the Soviet Union are clearly more intense than those of the United States on the issue of Poland. Nuechterlein's model does not place a priority on any particular category of interest, but rather seeks to encourage the inclusion of all in the balanced

evaluation of the overall national interest and in the consequent formulation of policy. Thus, while the U. S. ideological interest in Poland may be vital, the absolute level of American interest in the other categories, and the relative comparison of all categories of interest to the Soviet Union, must not be disregarded. Ideology, long cast as the equal opposite of realism in a dichotomous view of American interest and policy, is thus placed in a different perspective by the Nuechterlein model, helping to form a more complete view of the national interest. Such a view sets limits on the messianic passions of American policy, while continuing to recognize the inescapable role of ideological interest in any discussion of the American national interest.

For the policy-maker, this comparison of interest, while basic in establishing a basis for policy, must soon raise the question of capability as well. A quick consultation of the geography of Europe reveals that the Soviet Union is in a position to more easily pursue any of its interests than can the United States. The challenge for policy-makers is thus to recognize the entire spectrum of national interest, the process as well as the multiple categories, to the exclusion of none, and then to build policy that reflects that interest both in absolute terms, and in terms of relative comparison to other powers. The subject of policy will thus constitute our next area of discussion.

C. THE U. S. RESPONSE TO THE 1980-81 CRISIS

With a concept of the general theory of national interest and a specific analysis and classification of U. S. interest with regard to Poland now in mind, let us next turn briefly to the actual course of events during the 1980-81 crisis to see if and how U. S. policies toward Poland were formulated and executed in consonance with our findings and comments on the national interest.

The creation of Solidarity in the summer of 1980 attracted a certain amount of attention from the Carter administration. President Carter had made human rights a centerpiece of his foreign policy, and as recently as 7 August 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie had addressed the United Steel Workers of America in Los Angeles saying, "Human freedom is America's vision. First is the freedom of nations, second, the political freedom of people within nations; third, freedom from poverty and human misery. A narrower approach, an approach which ignores the hopes and needs of people within nations, cannot succeed." The difficulty of such a view, particularly as the imminent Polish crisis would show, was demonstrated when he added, "When peaceful change is frustrated, violent and radical change can explode in a storm that damages America's interests and creates opportunities for our adversaries."

After the Gdansk Agreement of 31 August 1980, the Carter administration faced a difficult dilemma: should it encourage the forces of Solidarity, knowing full well the interests of the Soviet Union in Poland and the possible chance of a repeat of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968; or should it seek stability in the area and in East-West relations, and try to limit this appeal for freedom? Was it really possible to promote peaceful change in Eastern Europe? If so, how? What would Carter pay for human rights, and how would he do it?

It appears that the Carter administration opted for caution (some would say excessive caution) as the first priority in developing a response to the Polish situation. The initial policies of the Carter administration were thus designed to preclude direct American involvement in the

developing crisis. The economic nature of the Solidarity movement and the reality of Poland's \$20 billion debt to the West made economic actions the first instruments of policy for the administration. After the Gdansk Agreement the U. S. administration had an opportunity to formulate policy that would have made the extension of further U. S. credits to the Polish government conditional upon its good faith in honoring the concessions wrested from it by Solidarity. Such a policy would have supported the Polish workers in a legal manner consistent with President Carter's human rights policy and the provisions of the Helsinki Accords; it also could not have been construed as intervention in the internal affairs of another nation, another principle of the Helsinki Accords. Rather, such a policy would have been good business, since the Polish government had already demonstrated its mismanagement of the Polish economy and needed the support of the workers if economic improvements and the repayment of the debt were to be forthcoming. Such a policy would also have been in consonance with the U. S. vital ideological interest, as well as its peripheral economic interest.

Unfortunately, the Carter Administration rejected this lever and instead chose to make unconditional grants that neither helped the Solidarity cause, nor advanced the principle of human rights. The policies did not even have the appearance of understanding the differences between the Polish government and people, nor did they evidence an understanding of the situation as it was developing. Furthermore, the policies recognized no varying intensity of interest and thus failed to capitalize on, or draw strength from an accurate awareness of American interest.

In an effort allegedly designed to ease the economic situation and hence the crisis atmosphere, President Carter approved a Commodity Credit Corporation extension of \$670 million in credit guarantees to the Polish government. President Carter intended this to be a sign of solidarity between the American and Polish peoples. As he explained to the Polish National Alliance in Chicago on 20 September, he made the approval because Poland needed food, and the credits would provide four million tons of American grain and other farm products to Poland. Such a policy demonstrates a failure to understand the ongoing conflict in agriculture in Poland between the state

and the private farmers. Thus, unfortunately, private farmers in Poland never were able to use the grains because the Polish government made them available primarily to the collective and state farms, not to the private farmers. One result of such a policy was not the feeding of the Polish people, but rather a sharp reduction of the swine herd in the private sector and the disappearance of meat from the market.²⁶

Although American workers seemed to understand and identify with the cause of the Solidarity workers, Secretary of State Muskie warned AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland on 3 September against plans to provide material assistance to Solidarity, despite an appeal from Walesa for help from abroad. Additionally, Muskie informed Soviet Ambassador to the U. S. Dobrynin that the U. S. government had no intention of becoming involved in the Polish situation.

Soviet saber-rattling in the autumn of 1980 was also given perhaps too much credence by the Carter Administration, another indication of extreme caution or a lack of perceptive analysis of the situation. While it was correct to recognize the Soviet Union's vital defense interest in Poland, more attention should have been paid to how difficult and how costly an invasion of Poland would be to the Soviets. Secretary Muskie warned in an interview in October that "the Polish government, the Polish workers, and the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to Russian reactions to how they finally achieve and resolve the issue which is before them. . . . I think the Polish people ought not to be insensitive to pressures from outside, not only from the Soviet Union but from other countries in the Eastern bloc."²⁷ It is arguable that the Polish workers and people were very much aware, as they have always been, of Soviet pressures, and had chosen to confront them. U. S. pronouncements such as this only served to assist Soviet pressure on Poland to resolve the issue.

²⁶Richard T. Davies, "The United States and Poland, 1980-82", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1982, p. 147.

²⁷Davies, "The United States and Poland", p. 146.

When the Soviets deployed forces along Poland's borders in December 1980, President Carter did warn that, although the United States had no desire to exploit the crisis, an invasion of Poland would have most negative consequences for U. S.-Soviet relations. At the time, the Poles, the government and the nation, seemed to find this policy relevant and effective, for it was in their interest to forestall a Soviet invasion. That this warning was only designed to limit U. S. involvement with the Soviets and was not designed to protect human rights or the Solidarity movement was demonstrated in other pronouncements. Although, in light of previous Administration actions, it was reasonable to assume that actions taken in response to Polish developments would be economically-related, Secretary Muskie seemed to blunt even this instrument in an interview in December after the NATO ministerial meeting. When asked if NATO would react if the Polish Communist authorities took repressive action against Solidarity, he indicated that NATO sanctions would presumably not be invoked, since the NATO powers held to the policy of nonintervention in what happened between the Polish people and their government.

Although there was talk in Washington during the autumn of 1980 about proposing a "mini-Marshall aid plan" to Poland that would supposedly strengthen the credibility of liberalizing developments in that country, nothing came of it. This may well have been due to the change of administrations that was to occur in January. How much of the general administration response was due to election year politics, either in approving credits or in avoiding an explosive issue, remains open to question.

January 1981 ushered in a change of administrations, but Polish affairs were not subsequently accredited major importance during the first five months of the Reagan administration as the President was concerned primarily with initiating his own domestic programs. Talk of any new Marshall plan ceased and events in Poland drifted toward the fog. It was 26 March before the White House issued a statement setting forth the new administration's view of relations with Poland. The occasion for the announcement was the upcoming visit of Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Jagielski to Washington to seek credits. The statement said,

We would like to make clear to all concerned our view that any external intervention in Poland, or any measures aimed at suppressing the Polish people, would necessarily cause deep concern to all those interested in the peaceful development of Poland and could have a grave effect on the whole course of East-West relations. At the same time, we would emphasize our continuing readiness to assist Poland in its present economic and financial troubles, for as long as the Polish people and authorities continue to seek, through a peaceful process of negotiation, the resolution of their current problems.²⁸

Following Jagielski's visit the U. S. government authorized the sale of \$71 million worth of surplus dairy products to Poland. The Poles were allowed to pay in *zloty*, but there were no conditions attached to the deal. Similarly, in July, the Reagan administration agreed to provide \$55 million in credits for the purchase of poultry feedgrains. This time the administration requested that the Polish government agree to make some of these credits available to the private farmers. When the Polish government refused to do so, the administration allowed the deal to go through anyway.

The Reagan administration joined fourteen other Western creditors of Poland in April in agreeing to reschedule some of Poland's debt for 1981. The amount due to the U. S. was approximately \$400 million; again, no conditions were made to the Polish government. Nonetheless, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleberger stated, "In taking these steps we have emphasized to the Polish authorities that we expect the Polish government and people to make meaningful efforts to reinvigorate the Polish economy and to restore Poland's creditworthiness."

While the Reagan administration did not seem to differentiate between the Polish government and the people, it also weakened its case by seeming to ignore the Soviet ability to influence the Polish government as well. Bowing in large part to domestic pressure, President Reagan, on 24

²⁸Davies, "The United States and Poland" p. 147.

April, lifted the embargo on grain sales to the Soviet Union that had been imposed by the Carter administration after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to White House sources, this move was made to recognize the Soviet Union's conclusion of the large and extended spring military maneuvers on Poland's borders (*Soyuz-81*) without having invaded Poland.²⁹ The lifting of the embargo was apparently made against the advice of Secretary of State Haig and contained no conditions with regard to Poland. By adopting a "business as usual" approach to the Soviets the administration, whether it realized it or not, was telling the Soviets that profits from grain sales were more important to the U. S. than a settlement of the Polish crisis that would recognize and preserve the rights gained by Solidarity in the Gdansk Agreement.

Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law on 13 December provoked a sharp, immediate, and emotional reaction from the President, but by then the best opportunities had passed. While it is one thing to seek to encourage a government to live up to agreements it has already made, it is quite another to attempt to force a regime to reverse such an obvious and momentuous move as imposing martial law. Even if the Polish government were not under Soviet pressure, it would suffer extreme embarrassment if it were to allow the United States to control what certainly appeared to be now a strictly internal matter. Furthermore, the unconditional support of the Polish government by the United States throughout the crisis seemed to make American denunciations of martial law more meaningless. Jaruzelski certainly played on previous U. S. actions when he rationalized his move not only on the grounds of Polish national security, but also with the argument that martial law was necessary to restore order, and to obtain a period of time, free of strikes, in which he could reenergize the economy and begin paying off the debt to the West.

Having denounced the declaration of martial law, U. S. faced the problem of deciding an appropriate response. The administration's first move was to turn to its NATO allies in an attempt to fashion a coordinated policy with regard to Poland. The U. S. first called for sanctions against

²⁹Davies, "The United States and Poland", p.148.

both Poland and the Soviet Union, but despite the arguable rightness of this call, the administration's previous actions in regard to the Soviet Union, and the fact that the Soviet Union did not openly take part in the imposition of martial law, served to discredit calls for action against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the NATO countries could not agree either on a joint policy, or even on a joint rhetoric, concerning the violation of human rights in Poland, as the Polish situation revealed American-European division in policy. The United States had drawn away from detente in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, a withdrawal with which the Reagan administration seemed to agree and which it continued. The Europeans, though, had not given up on detente and actually seemed more concerned with maintaining relaxed relations with the East as U. S.-Soviet relations deteriorated. The issue of Poland brought that difference in perspective into open view. The continuance of detente became the primary goal of the Europeans, who refused to take any action that could jeopardize their openings to the East. As a member of NATO's military committee had said a year earlier in discussions about Poland, "NATO is a defensive alliance which does not include Poland."

The Reagan administration decided on economic sanctions against Poland, challenging Jaruzelski to liberalize if he wanted the U. S. to lift the sanctions; no specific definition of liberalization was given, nor were any positive incentives provided. The sanctions assumed the appearance of punishment only, and Jaruzelski determined to persevere. These sanctions also drew heated criticism from some Europeans on the grounds that they further heightened East-West tensions. The sanctions were, nonetheless, initially popular with Solidarity activists, who feared that further unconditional Western credits to the Jaruzelski regime would only assist the regime in motivating its supporters, rather than in providing help to Polish citizens.

By late 1983, however, Jaruzelski had not significantly changed his ways and was still actively engaged in his program of "normalization". In December, Lech Walesa himself asked for relaxation of the sanctions. What had happened?

First, the Jaruzelski regime did indeed use the sanctions to rally its supporters. The sanctions also became an excuse for the continued mismanagement of the economy and the lack of will to execute genuine economic reform in Poland. By pointing to the U. S. as the "bad guy", Jaruzelski sought to shift the blame for the continued misery of the Polish people and to enhance his own regime's legitimacy by default. The denunciation of the American sanctions thus became a key theme of the government propaganda in Poland.

Second, the imposition of sanctions also denied political maneuver room to Walesa and Solidarity. The big bolt of ammunition had been spent and, unfortunately, it was not tied to either positive incentives to entice the Jaruzelski regime, nor were the conditions of the sanctions precise enough to pry the Jaruzelski regime into action. The Administration pronouncement was that "if the Polish government introduces meaningful liberalizing measures, we will take equally significant and concrete actions of our own."³⁰

Third, the Europeans failed to take an active part in finding a solution to the crisis. Although some did eventually endorse the U. S. sanctions, the U. S. actions were essentially viewed as unilateral and inconsistent, especially when the U. S. approved new grain sales to the Soviet Union, while trying to block the European gas pipeline deal with the Soviets. While many Europeans did speak out against human rights violations in Poland, European credits continued to flow to the Polish government. Such aid was "justified" on the grounds that it would help pacify the Jaruzelski regime.

As we have already seen, Jaruzelski continued on his course in accordance with his own agenda. By the summer of 1983, he had regained sufficient control to release some internees and lift martial law, a move which he then used to show the West of his liberalization; the same argument of liberalization was repeated in 1984 when most of the remaining internees were released. The 1984 move was soon followed by the lifting of U. S. sanctions on Poland, but it should be clear that

³⁰Quoted in Current Policy, no. 621, 11 October 1984, (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs).

these sanctions did not drive Jaruzelski to "liberalize". That the West is once again trying to forget what happened in Poland is evidenced by the agreement of the Western creditor nations in July 1985 to again reschedule Poland's debt; again, no conditions concerning human rights or the now-banned Solidarity were made.

D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The foregoing discussion seems to indicate that U. S. policy with regard to Poland during the 1980-81 crisis did not accurately reflect a careful analysis of U. S. interest in the situation, nor recognize some of the basic realities of the events in Poland. Certainly the press of current events at the time, U. S. domestic concerns, and uncertainties about Soviet, as well as Solidarity, directions and actions gave U. S. policy makers large challenges, while also making hindsight from today's perspective more clear and more knowledgeable. Be that as it may, policy must still be formulated and executed. If nothing else, this study of Poland should cause one to expect more unrest in the future. It is appropriate and wise, therefore, to present proposals and arguments now, in the belief that preparation now will aid action in the future. In no case must the situation in Poland be allowed to simply disappear once again into the fog of obscurity without provision being made for its eventual reappearance. The following proposals are thus advanced in the hope of stimulating thought, discussion, and hopefully, preparedness for the next time.

Given the relative power of the Soviet Union *v/s* - *s* - *v/s* the United States in Eastern Europe in general and, for our purposes, Poland in particular, it may be well to recall Raymond Aron's definition of the "supreme alternative" in strategy as deciding whether "to win or not to lose."³¹ Recalling the discussion earlier about the direction of Polish movement, either toward the East or toward the West, the West cannot allow the Soviet Union to go unchallenged in its efforts to absorb Poland. Indeed, given the repeated pattern of Western neglect of East Europe in general, the West is

³¹ Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations, (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 30.

fortunate that the Poles are themselves so Western-oriented to begin with; this has made the Soviet task much more difficult while buying time for the West. Still, the magnitude of Soviet military power makes the formulation of Western policy extremely difficult as well.

In designing its policy toward Poland, the United States must therefore consider long-term plans for providing vision, direction, and guiding principles; short-term plans for dealing with emergencies; and the general situation in Poland and Eastern Europe both as separate from, and as an integral part of the greater whole of Europe. The policies that the United States develops then, must seek to slow the movement toward integration that the Soviet Union is encouraging, and must also provide for encouragement of Polish Westward movement. Thus policy will optimally seek compatibility--those measures that will serve both long-term and short-term goals. This qualification is certainly not always possible, in which cases a choice between conflicting measures will have to be made; it is understandable that the urgency and importance of the short-term goal will govern in most cases. This only increases, however, the importance of well-articulated long-term goals that will put emergency measures in the proper context and provide the guiding light for again resuming a long-term direction after the crisis has passed.

U. S. policy must also accept the quality of indirectness for now. Not only does the lower relative intensity of American interest not warrant a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union under current conditions, the United States also has at its disposal no direct means to degrade Soviet power in Eastern Europe or to convince the Soviet Union to change its policy of integration toward Poland short of violent confrontation. For now, our national capabilities and the will to use them do not support violent confrontation. Similarly, the U. S. must be circumspect in avoiding policies that present ultimatums to the Soviets, or that cast the situation into the context of an obvious "zero sum" game.

Such indirectness should not be written off as synonymous with "ineffective." As Evan Luard observed, the rules of diplomatic intercourse have changed over the last forty years such that governments around the world recognize the issue of human rights on the international political

agenda. To completely deny the efficacy of human rights discussion is to reject all cases where international pressure or concern on the issue has led to improvements in the human rights policies of particular states. While certainly not unqualified successes, the Soviet Union's Jewish emigration policy, the practices of Brazil and even Argentina, and the recent events in the Philippines, South Africa, and in Haiti, to name a few, seem to indicate at least a limited response to international concern for human rights. While such governments would be unwilling to admit a modification of policy as a result of human rights discussion and concern, such discussion does bring offending governments to the realization that there may be some external costs to their policies; additionally, it is at least arguable that the foreign offices in such governments, usually most aware of foreign criticisms, may become an influence within the government machine for a reform of policy. Also, human rights campaigners in such countries may be given new hope and encouragement, maintaining and encouraging them in their efforts to secure reforms. Finally, the establishment in the international realm of new norms of behavior to be expected from civilized governments can not be regarded as without benefit or effect.³²

These considerations lead the U. S. to the proposition of supporting those factors in Poland itself that encourage the natural resistance of the Poles to the Soviets. Poland's basic Westernness should be encouraged, especially in contrast to the Easternness of the Soviet Union. The earlier discussions of Polish political culture and its many shared ideals with Americans should make this task somewhat easier, while capitalizing on the strongest of U. S. interests in Poland for the mobilization of domestic support of U. S. policy. The United States thus can find it profitable to encourage both Moscow and Warsaw to move toward reconciliation with the Polish people. To the extent that contradictions within Poland are resolved in favor of the Polish people the "true" legitimacy of the Warsaw government is strengthened in place of the artificiality conferred by Soviet support, and Polish uniqueness with additional distance from Moscow is achieved.

³²Evan Luard, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy", International Affairs, Vol. 56, no. 4, Autumn 1980, p. 588.

One cannot avoid the charge that it is easier to describe such policies than to enunciate them. However, much of the difficulty revolves around a lack of understanding of the Polish situation, a problem which I hope this paper has somewhat alleviated. It is this problem of imprecise assessment that I feel resulted in the ineffective policies of the U. S. response to the 1980-81 crisis. Little distinction seemed to be made between the Polish government and the Polish people; little recognition of the glaring contradictions between the Polish people and government surfaced in U. S. policies. Instead, credit and money was provided without qualification; when martial law was declared, economic sanctions were imposed as punishment, not as instruments of constructive policy. Indeed, by the time martial law was declared, the best opportunities for effective action had passed. While the sanctions certainly had the effect of expressing American opposition to events in Poland, the need for such a forum was only necessary because previous oportities had been overlooked. American policy could be accused of being only an attempt at crisis management, an attempt severely hampered by a lack of control or even influence due to long neglect. The need for and lack of long-term vision and policies was evident.

What policies should we then have? In a move to address the most intense American interest in Poland and in Eastern Europe, American policy should begin by recognizing and openly stating that there is nothing God-given about Soviet hegemony of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the West has the right to challenge that hegemony, and will do so as situations permit. Neither the Yalta agreements nor any other international law precludes the U. S. from sympathizing with, and declaring public support for the aspirations of the Polish people for human dignity, freedom, and a voice in their own affairs. While it is true that the U. S. should not encourage violent action, since this will only generate violent Soviet backlash and repression while demonstrating again the inability of the United States to provide material assistance as in Hungary in 1956, it is certainly permissable for the U. S. to encourage that such aspirations be resolved through peaceful means. The United States should not allow Moscow to assume that the U. S. considers the Soviet sphere of influence to be sacrosanct, especially when the Soviets do not hesitate to aid America's foes in the

western hemisphere. The United States should apply the Soviet trick of at least being on the side of change in the "march of history." Such a declaration is needed for American self-esteem and self-image as well. The Helsinki Accords provide a further forum for such declarations. The Poles know that the Helsinki Accords cannot liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviets. The accords do, however, create the diplomatic means to assist efforts to make the system more humane and less repressive while reinforcing those shared Polish and American ideals. As President Reagan has demonstrated, detente in the form of Soviet appeasement is not the only alternative to cold war.

What about economic policies? The peripheral U.S. national economic interest in Poland means that the United States is not constrained by trade to any particular course of action. The United States should realize from its experience in the Polish crisis, though, that sanctions will influence behavior only on issues of less than vital interest to the country on which they are imposed. Sanctions designed to influence a regime are most effective when implicit rather than explicit, positive rather than negative. Further, U.S. economic leverage in Poland is, frankly, rather limited. Finally, even punitive sanctions, though they may feel good as signals of displeasure, send effective messages only when they involve a credible threat of escalation to a level sufficient to stop the offender.³³ There was no credible threat of escalation in the Polish case.

Still, economic instruments can play a role in policy if used wisely. It is arguable, and the distinction is important, I think, that while East-West trade has not forced the Soviets to liberalize, it has had some interesting results in Eastern Europe. It is not that economic pressure has been proven useful in directly influencing the behavior of the Warsaw Pact; indeed, it would seem that with the major exception of technology transfer, trade has relieved Poland of certain problems, only to be confront it with by many more. Indeed, trade seems to have introduced more contradictions into Poland that can ferment for further resistance to Soviet integration. Poland

³³Dimitri K. Simes, "Clash Over Poland", Foreign Policy, Spring 1982, p. 63.

needed Western capital to modernize, and consumer goods to keep its people productive. It ended up with a massive debt and an unhappy population. Western imports have pointed out more clearly the deficiencies of the Polish command economy system, whetted consumer appetites, increased the need for reform, and entangled the whole of Eastern Europe in heavy debts. Exposure to international trade makes inefficiency more expensive, so market incentives and rational prices become even more urgent.

The overall objective of our economic relations with Poland, and those of the West in general, should not be volume for its own sake, or even balance between imports and exports. What matters is how trade can have an impact on certain aspects of the Polish economy and on social contradictions. Thus, our objective should be to exert influence toward the rationalization of the Polish economy and its integration in the Western economic system. The objective is long-term and the means of achieving it evolutionary. Without going into a detailed examination of the Polish economy, a few observations will suffice.

Rationalization does not mean that Poland will no longer be socialist. Rather, the aim would be to encourage the forces pressing for decentralization of economic decision-making and greater reliance on market factors, both domestic and external. The power of those forces was demonstrated in the demands of the Solidarity movement. Economic assistance aimed at modernization would encourage such trends. The support of the Catholic Church's agricultural foundation would be an excellent way of encouraging these trends.³⁴ Joint venture arrangements such as projects to develop Polish coal or water for energy production could be pursued on a basis that provides ties on the managerial and sales levels rather than simply providing equipment or capital. A long-term goal could be to eventually establish the convertibility of the *zloty*.³⁵ The next few years seem to indicate a developing situation in which the Eastern European countries will remain politically dependent on the Soviet Union, but could become economically more

³⁴See the section on the Church in Poland today, this paper, for details.

³⁵Duffield, United States Security Interests in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, p. 51.

dependent on the West. This provides opportunity for Western integration versus Soviet and opportunities for U. S. policy, especially if one is willing to accept a policy of "not losing" for now.

Much has been said about tying credits to qualifications or conditions. It is critical that any conditions be specific and provide incentive, not punishment or unreasonable ultimatums. Since the establishment of conditions by the U. S. could appear highly political and thus likely to be rejected, an indirect approach could be found that would be based on a growing role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Such institutions would be able to make demands which would be unacceptable from Western banks or government.³⁶ For instance, they can demand not only different prices, but different methods for setting prices; they can ask for new administrative structures to favor exports, or new incentives for the more efficient use of materials. Demands such as these are generally incompatible with centralized planning and protection from world markets and could thus force cracks in the system. The interrelatedness of economics and politics can thus be used also to pry concessions aimed at greater productivity. Thus trade union pluralism at least at the local level could be sought, as well as the full and genuine observance of equal rights in economic activity for all ownership sectors: private, municipal, cooperative and state. Furthermore, such economic inroads should require removal of secrecy and censorship from economic matters (excluding military) so that some independent monitoring of the new policies will be possible.

The objective of recognizing and cultivating Poland's Western-ness is easily addressed through increased cultural ties and are probably the most obvious policy means. However, because they are also the most difficult to assess in terms of effectiveness, "rationalists" tend to discount their use. We must not forget that education, information, science and culture are part of the battleground today as well. The United States should make clear to the Polish nation through every possible device our great respect for its historic tradition and our conviction that its rightful

³⁶See Richard Davy, "Eastern Europe: New Policies for Old", The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1984, p. 40.

destiny is as a member of the Western community. U. S. policy should focus on the intelligentsia and the students, while giving recognition to labor leaders who seek moderate change like Leon Walesa. By emphasizing programs such as exchanges of scholars specializing in medicine, agriculture, and education the U. S. can pursue cultural reinforcement while also providing humanitarian aid. A broadened cultural exchange in information, e.g., books and films, can attack the Party's monopoly of information while appealing to a demonstrated thirst for uncensored knowledge among the Polish people. In this regard too, the United States should increase investment in radio broadcasting to Poland in the Polish language. Above all, the effectiveness of the program should not be measured in terms of numerical balance of exchange. If U. S. policy is to affect the drift of Poland toward the Soviet Union, then our policy would be served if all the "exchange" flowed from the U. S. to Poland. If the balance seems to favor the Poles at times, then it is also true that America can always learn something about this too-oft neglected land, while Polish exposure in America will cater to that fundamental fact of American policy that Americans must believe in what they are doing.

A final area to address in prescribing U. S. policy is that of integration of policy with our European allies. That contingency plans for future crises in Poland and Eastern Europe should be worked on continuously should be obvious. It is also critical that the United States remember the relative value of its Polish policy to its Western Alliance policy when confrontations with our allies do occur. In this regard the U. S. decision to go ahead and declare sanctions on Poland after the declaration of martial law without raising its disagreement with the NATO allies to an alliance-splitting level does deserve commendation. I think, though, that there is much that the Europeans themselves are better suited to doing than is the United States. The general pull of European unity is something that Americans do not understand. We tend to concentrate on the divisions that mark European history rather than the European concept of its own European-ness. The division of Europe into East and West is a moral and spiritual wound for Europeans that has not healed. While Americans may not be able to understand this, they would find greater unity with the Western

allies if they would accept it and tie themselves (on the basis of U.S. interests) to this emotional cause of Europeans. In so doing the United States would find a goal worthy of its own idealism and one capable of galvanizing a shared sense of historic purpose with the Europeans.

The Soviet Union is, of course, a major obstacle to this goal. It is vital to the understanding of the problem, though, to realize that European restoration cannot be accomplished as an American victory over the Soviet Union; nor can it be pursued as such if the United States wants the help of the Western allies in pursuing U.S. goals in Europe. The Soviet Union will certainly not yield voluntarily and thus the pursuit of the freedom of Eastern Europe will require the joint strength of the Western alliance. Historical stealth will serve the United States better than violent confrontation.

In this regard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, discussing the "future of Yalta", envisioned a common strategy combining five broad political, economic and military dimensions.³⁷ Briefly, he proposed the following.

First, on the symbolic plane, it would be appropriate for the heads of the democratic West as a whole to clarify jointly, through a solemn declaration, the West's attitude toward the historic legacy of Yalta. In publicly repudiating that bequest--the partition of Europe--the West should underline its commitment to a restored Europe, free of extra-European control. It should stress the existence of a genuine political identity, the heir of European civilization, and affirm the right of every European nation to choose its sociopolitical system in keeping with its own history and tradition. It should explicitly reject and condemn Moscow's imposition on so many Europeans of a system that is culturally and politically so alien to them. The declaration should also pledge that the establishment of a more authentic Europe would not entail the extension of the American sphere of influence to the borders of the Soviet Union.

³⁷See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Future of Yalta", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1984/5.

Second, the West should simultaneously reconfirm its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act confirming the durability of existing frontiers in central and eastern Europe; this is essential to reassuring the East Europeans. The context of the Helsinki Accords should be explained as a healing of the East-West rift offering the European people the opportunity to participate fully in wider all-European cooperation, not the dismantling of any existing state. Thus the division of Germany would not need to be undone through formal reunification, but could be recast in a less threatening loose confederation of the existing states.

Third, Western Europe should strive to create the maximum number of opportunities for East European participation in various all-European bodies.

•Fourth, Europe should intensify its aid to those East European who are struggling actively for the political emancipation of Eastern Europe. West European should take the responsibility of undertaking to provide the support for activities that America has generously, for Europe's sake as well as its own, sustained for more than three decades. A continuation of the division of labor in which the United States is seen alone in support dissent and "subversion" while the Europeans engage exclusively in official courtship, is self-defeating.

•Finally, as the above would indicate, the time has come for a more fundamental rethinking of the relationship between Western security and political change in Europe as a whole. America is needed in Europe to deter the Soviets from committing both military aggression and political intimidation. The European role in that deterrence must be increased, however, since the American presence there tends to reduce the incentive for European unification while simultaneously increasing the incentive for the Soviets to stay entrenched in central and eastern Europe.

Thus, in the final analysis, only Europeans can restore Europe; it cannot be done for them by others. The time has come for Americans to realize that the emergence of a more vital Europe would be a positive outcome, for ultimately a pluralistic world is in America's true interest of world order. Our examination of U. S. interest in Poland leads inescapably to the conclusion that the United States has maximalist objectives as a product of its own historical-cultural context, but has only minimal tools for pursuing those goals in Poland due to the real constraints of the present situational context. Additional strength and tools are available in coordination with our allies. The policies outlined above should promote the protection and implementation of the real American interests in Poland, while recognizing the constraints within which we operate.

VII. CONCLUSION

As this study has shown, the Poland that lies behind the fog of Western popular inattention and Warsaw/Moscow camouflage efforts is a Poland deeply troubled and restless. Polish nationality is yearning for free expression a state, institutions, and an administration of its own origins and making. Instead, Poles see themselves as, in effect, occupied by a foreign oppressor, and ruled by a regime and institutions essentially foreign to their culture. What is so noteworthy about this situation is the virulent renitency and resiliency the Poles have demonstrated in continuing to resist this oppression, despite over forty years of Soviet efforts to counteract such attitudes and behavior. Indeed, if anything, the 1980-81 crisis and the emergence of Solidarity may be interpreted as indicating that this renitency is even increasing.

A primary, though certainly not exclusive or singular explanation for this continued resistance is Polish political culture. The case of Poland has thus become an oft studied and frequently cited example of the efficacy of political culture theory.¹ Poland is a Western nation historically, culturally, and ideologically, and long established in an identity of defender of the West against the infidels, heretics, and barbarians of the East--labels that have been applied to the Russians in the past and, more guardedly, to the Soviets today. It rejected Asia, Byzantium, and Moscow early in its history and has resisted efforts to redirect this orientation to this day. If allowed to develop "naturally," Poland could be expected to develop into a Western socialist democracy of central Europe, rather than being assigned a role in Soviet Eastern Europe as it is today.

Poland is a country built around a strong sense of nationhood that has historically proven its ability to maintain itself, and even flourish, without the logical expression of a state. The

¹See Dziewanowski, Poland in the Twentieth Century, pp. 251-253 for an interesting comparison of Poland to Ireland and to Spain.

Romantic traditions of the struggle for survival that were born in the partition experience find eager ears in Poland even today. The Polish experience and faith is that such renitency will eventually lead to liberation and the establishment of state and nation as one on Polish terms. Post-war boundary redefinitions, population migrations, and life under oppression itself have molded the Poles into a homogeneous people exhibiting a marked uniformity of beliefs and values, a uniformity borne out by modern research. Using the Church as a type of surrogate state, and spurred by its long tradition of resistance, the Poles seem prepared for the long battle that they know they must wage, but which they also expect to win.

This does not mean that all is rosy or victorious for the Poles; on the contrary, defeats are generally the rule against the power of the regime. The beliefs, values, and actions described above and expressed so vividly during the 1980-81 crisis are necessarily often forced into latency, as they were following the imposition of martial law. While underground activists continue the struggle directly, many Poles practice opposition through adaptation, waiting for the next revival. But it can be argued that stalemate is a victory of sorts, for it strikes directly at the Soviet-desired transformation of Poland into a loyal proponent of the Kremlin.

Thus there exists in Poland today a tripartite division of the population into supporters of Solidarity, adherents of the Party regime, and a large middle group that seems to prefer to "wait and see" after the not-so-distant events of 1980-81, or to turn away from social and political activism altogether for the time being. The economy has shown minimal improvement, despite the stability imposed by martial law. In fact, national income has not yet recovered to the 1978 levels and in some areas (e.g., livestock), production is less than it was in the 1960s. Despite the fact that Jaruzelski claims to have achieved a degree of stability and "normalization" since 1981, his regime has not been able to achieve the legitimacy needed to mobilize the work force in attacking the economic situation. Consequently, hopes to gain a modicum of legitimacy through economic growth and gradual improvement in the standard of living have foundered in a catch-22 type situation. Political democratization and the inclusion of more of Poland's emerging technical

and specialist groups into the political decision-making process in the manner of the Gdansk Agreement would help to mobilize the needed support; it would also contradict the ideology of the Communist regime and destroy its reason for existence. Moreover, such a threat would run the risk of generating a Soviet backlash.

Despite its recognized and considerable military might, the Soviets face a dilemma in Poland. The Poles have proven more resistant to Sovietization than any other East European country, challenging the structuralist transformation tenets of Marxist-Leninist ideology. While such continual resistance has caused ideological embarrassment for the Soviets and the threat of spillover to neighboring peoples, both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself, the Soviets have grudgingly allowed the situation to continue for significant geographical and political reasons. Poland is a critical member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in geographical, military, and strategic terms. To force Poland into line would be extremely costly in military, economic, and political terms. Although direct intervention is an option that the Soviets always keep open (they periodically remind the Poles that they do so), they have always made a search for other options before playing their hand. The result of this is that the Soviet Union has allowed Poland to get away with more questionable things for a longer time than any other country in its European empire. The professional, nationalistic, and significant Polish army that Moscow tried to clone in the 1950s, and then allowed to develop with more freedom in the 1960s and 1970s, eventually saved the day in the 1980-81 crisis, but the motivations of the army were arguably not to help the Soviet Union, but to protect Poland. Furthermore, the loyalty of the Polish army to Soviet directives except in the case of direct NATO attack is increasingly suspect.² While the importance of Poland to the Soviet Union and the intensity of Soviet interest in Poland mean that the bottom line of Polish alliance to the Soviet Union cannot be transgressed as long as the Soviets have the

²See Karen A. Pritchard, The Reliability of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: Can the Soviet Union Depend on its Northern Tier Allies?, (Masters Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1985).

power to enforce it, the vigor of that alliance is often taxed. Certainly the Soviets have first-hand knowledge of Scylla and Charybdis with respect to Poland.

U. S. policy-makers face a similarly Herculean task in developing policy that is in accordance with U. S. national interest. The first problem is that of determining just what is the U. S. interest in Poland. The Teti model of the national interest reveals that the national interest is more a process than a single interest; indeed, a survey of the literature on the national interest soon leads one to conclude that attempts to ask what is *the* national interest are doomed to failure. The Teti model demonstrates how national interest grows out of America's historical-cultural context; its confluence with the situational context in the compromise and consensus process is what produces the hierarchy of perceived and/or actual needs that is the basis of national interest.

By applying the Nuechterlein model of national interest classification, one is able to construct a matrix to compare Soviet and American national interest in Poland. Such a comparison quickly reveals the deeper intensity of Soviet interest in Poland. Nonetheless, the United States has an intense ideological interest in Poland, both from the standpoint of American idealism and value affirmation, and from the obvious role that Poland, as the linchpin of the Soviet East European empire, plays in American world order interests. Aware of the dominating geographical and military position of the Soviet Union *vis-à-vis* Poland, the task remains for American policy makers to formulate circumspect policies that strengthen the qualities of Polish political culture and Western-ness that in themselves naturally resist Soviet attempts to integrate Poland more closely, while avoiding direct confrontation with the Soviet Union itself. Such policies are possible, but require a detailed understanding of the situation in Poland, the assistance of U. S. allies, and a great deal of patience.

Above all, it is vital for the United States in this fifth decade since the division of Europe and the rise of the superpowers, to carefully analyze its interests and options not only with regard to Poland, but in regard to Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Europe as a whole, and the Soviet Union as the leading military power on the Eurasian landmass. The United States must give careful

consideration to what it desires in its relationship with Europe, and should prod the Europeans to take an increasingly active role in their own development and extension. That the map of Europe will someday change, even if not in the near future, must be postulated, and the processes of that change, already in progress, must be sought and identified today. The international realm is not static, but dynamic, and the United States must be a part of that dynamism. As peoples around the world seek the inalienable rights of human dignity and freedom, Americans must not shirk their leadership role in this process. This means that a situation like Poland cannot be allowed to drift into the fog of inattention. Long-term policies that preserve and reinforce American ideals while providing long-range vision are crucial to this process. Short-term policies, developed from a thorough understanding of the situation, must be vigorously executed, even when indirect, to protect and advance U. S. interest abroad. Such policies obviously require extensive study and derivative preparedness for success. Finally, the pursuit of these policies will seemingly necessitate a modern reevaluation of U. S. relations with its allies and a reexamination of U. S. interest in Europe in general.

The significance of the 1980-81 crisis is this: Forty years after the establishment of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe the imposed political systems are widely regarded as artificial and illegitimate. Solidarity became the first mass movement to strive for the peaceful transformation of the Communist system, while accepting a leading role for the Communist Party and alliance with the Soviet Union. Furthermore it was a movement of primarily industrial workers, the "righteous" proletariat in Marxist ideology, that spearheaded the drive in a People's Republic. The arrest of that movement by martial law seemed to emphasize the bankruptcy of Communist attempts to overcome that illegitimacy and artificiality. As Jan de Weydenthal has observed,

The ultimate message of Gdansk was that embers are smoldering beneath the socialist regimes of the East. Regardless of how successful the Soviet Union and the Polish regime are in bringing

about a measure of normalization in Poland, those embers are certain to flare up again somewhere in Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union can no longer control the burning, its domination of the region will end. That time is probably decades away. . . . History argues, however, that the life span of every empire is limited. A century from now historians may well look back on the signing of the Gdansk Agreement in August 1980 as the beginning of the inevitable end.³

Thus it is time for the West to undertake more steadfast observation of these events in Poland, to rip away the fog that conceals the reality, and to call the present order in Poland and Eastern Europe by the name that it is--Soviet empire, not brotherhood. Furthermore, the Polish crisis dramatically challenges the widespread assumption that Communist regimes in Eastern Europe will gradually (or even inevitably) liberalize peaceably if given the right opportunity to do so; the total incompatibility of democracy and communism, of plurality and democratic centralism makes this so, as Solidarity found out. The short-term U.S. interest thus becomes that of blocking Polish eastward drift--in effect, a policy of "not losing". The long-term policy is that of freeing Poland and East Europe from the Soviet grip without generating violent confrontation with the Soviets. The challenges and implications of these policies are indeed as exciting as they are difficult.

³de Weydenthal, The Polish Drama: 1980-1982, p. 163.

APPENDIX A

THE GDANSK AGREEMENT¹ August 31, 1980

This protocol was signed on behalf of the strikers by Lech Wałęsa (President of the MKS), Andrzej Kolodziej and Bogdan Lis (vice-presidents), Mr. and Mrs. L. Bądkowski, W. Gruszeński, A. Gwiszda, S. Izdebski, J. Kmiecik, Z. Kobylinski, H. Krzywonos, S. Lewandowski, A. Pienłowska, Z. Przybylski, J. Sikorski, L. Sbiexzek, T. Stanny, A. Walentynowicz, and F. Wisniewski.

It was signed for the government commission by: Chairman Mieczysław-Jagielski (vice-prime minister.); M. Zielinski, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the PZRF; T. Fiszbach, president of the Party Committee of Gdansk Voivod and the mayor of Gdansk, J. Kolodziejski.

The governmental commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee (MKS), after studying the twenty-one demands of the workers of the coast who are on strike, have reached the following conclusion:

On Point No. 1, which reads:

"To accept trade unions as free and independent of the party, as laid down in Convention No. 87 of the ILO and ratified by Poland, which refers to the matter of trade unions rights," the following decision has been reached:

1. The activity of the trade union of People's Poland has not lived up to the hopes and aspirations of the workers. We thus consider that it will be beneficial to create new union organizations, which will run themselves, and which will be authentic expressions of the working class. Workers will continue to have the right to join the old trade unions, and we are looking at the possibility of the two union structures cooperating.

2. The MKS declares that it will respect the principles laid down in the Polish Constitution while creating the new independent and self-governing unions. These new unions are intended to defend the social and material interests of the workers, and not to play the role of a political party. They will be established on the basis of the socialization of the means of production and of the socialist system that exists in Poland today. They will recognize the leading role of the PZRF in the state, and will not oppose the existing system of international alliances. Their aim is to ensure for the workers the necessary means for the determination, expression, and defense of their interests. The governmental commission will guarantee full respect for the dependence and self-governing character of the new unions in their organizational structures and their functioning at all levels. The government will ensure that the new unions have every possibility of carrying out their function of defending the interests of the workers and of seeking the satisfaction of their material, social and cultural needs. Equally it will guarantee that the new unions are not the objects of any discrimination.

¹Taken from Abraham Brumberg, Poland, pp. 285-295.

3. The creation and the functioning of free and self-governing trade unions is in line with Convention 87 of the ILO relating to trade unions rights and Convention 98, relating to the rights of free association and collective negotiation, both of which conventions have been ratified by Poland. The coming into being of more than one trade union organization requires changes in the law. The government, therefore, will make the necessary legal changes as regards trade unions, workers' councils, and the labor code.

4. The strike committees must be able to turn themselves into institutions representing the workers at the level of the enterprise, whether in the fashion of workers' councils or as preparatory committees of the new trade unions. As a preparatory committee, the MKS is free to adopt the form of a trade union, or of an association of the coastal region. The preparatory committees will remain in existence until the new trade unions are able to organize proper elections to leading bodies. The government undertakes to create the conditions necessary for the recognition of unions outside of the existing Central Council of Trade Unions.

5. The new trade unions should be able to participate in decisions affecting the conditions of the workers in such matters as the division of the national assets between consumption and accumulation, the division of the social consumption fund (health, education, culture), the wages policy, in particular with regard to an automatic increase of wages in line with inflation, the economic plan, the direction of investment, and prices policy. The government undertakes to ensure the conditions necessary for the carrying out of these functions.

6. The enterprise committee will set up a research center whose aim will be to engage in an objective analysis of the situation of the workers and employees, and will attempt to determine the correct ways in which their interests can be represented. This center will also provide the information and expertise necessary for dealing with such questions as the prices index and wages index and the forms of compensation required to deal with price rises. The new unions should have their own publications.

7. The government will enforce respect for Article 1 of the trade union law of 1949, which guarantees the workers the right to freely come together to form trade unions. The new trade union will not join the Central Council of Trade Unions (CRZZ). It is agreed that the new trade union law will respect these principles. The participation of members of the MKS and of the preparatory committees for the new trade unions in the elaboration of the new legislation is also guaranteed.

On Point No. 2, which reads:

To guarantee the right to strike, and the security of strikers and those who help them," it has been agreed that:

The right to strike will be guaranteed by the new trade union law. The law will have to define the circumstances in which strikes can be called and organized, the ways in which conflicts can be resolved, and the penalties for infringements of the law. Articles 52, 64, and 65 of the labor code (which outlaw strikes) will cease to have effect from now until the new law comes into practice. The government undertakes to protect the personal security of strikers and those who have helped them and to ensure against any deterioration in their conditions of work.

With regard to Point No. 3, which reads:

"To respect freedom of expression and publication, as upheld by the Constitution of People's Poland, and to take no measures against

independent publications, as well as to grant access to the mass media to representatives of all religions," it has been added that:

1. The government will bring before the Sejm (Parliament) within three months a proposal for a law on control of the press, of publications, and of other public manifestations, which will be based on the following principles: censorship must protect the interests of the state. This means the protection of state secrets and of economic secrets in the sense that these will be defined in the new legislation, the protection of state interests and its international interests, the protection of religious convictions, as well as the right of nonbelievers, as well as the suppression of publications which offend against morality.

The proposals will include the right to make a complaint against the press control and similar institutions to a higher administrative tribunal. This law will be incorporated in an amendment to the administrative code.

2. The access to the mass media by religious organizations in the course of their religious activities will be worked out through an agreement between the state institutions and the religious associations on matters of content and of organization. The government will ensure the transmission by radio of the Sunday mass through a specific agreement with the Church hierarchy.

3. The radio and television as well as the press and publishing houses must offer expression to different points of view. They must be under the control of society.

4. The press, as well as citizens and their organizations, must have access to public documents, and above all to administrative instructions and socioeconomic plans, in the form in which they are published by the government and by the administrative bodies that draw them up. Exceptions to the principle of open administration will be legally defined in agreement with Point No. 3, par. 1.

With regard to Point No. 4, which reads:

"To reestablish the rights of people who were dismissed after the strikes in 1970 and 1976 and of students who have been excluded from institutions of higher education because of their opinions, (b.) to free all political prisoners, including Edmund Zdrozinski, Jan Kozlowski and Marek Kozlowski; (c.) to cease repression against people for their opinions," it has been agreed:

(a) to immediately investigate the reasons given for the sackings after the strikes of 1970 and 1976. In every case where injustice is revealed, the person involved must be reinstated, taking into account any new qualifications that person may have acquired. The same principle will be applied in the case of students.

(b) the cases of persons mentioned under point (b) should be put to the Ministry of Justice, which within two weeks will study their dossiers; in cases where those mentioned are already imprisoned, they must be released pending this investigation, and until a new decision on their case is reached,

(c) to launch an immediate investigation into the reasons for, the arrests of those mentioned (the three named individuals).

(d) to institute full liberty of expression in public and professional life.

On Point No. 5, which reads:

"To inform the public about the creation of the MKS and its demands, through the mass media," it has been decided that:

This demand shall be met through the publication in all national mass media of the full text of this agreement.

On Point No. 6, which reads:

"To implement the measures necessary for resolving the crisis, starting with the publication of all the relevant information on the socioeconomic situation, and to allow all groups to participate in a discussions on a program of economic reforms," the following has been agreed:

We consider it essential to speed up the preparation of an economic reform. The authorities will work out and publish the basic principles of such a reform in the next few months. It is necessary to allow for wider participation in a public discussion of the reform. In particular the trade unions must take part in the working out of laws relating to the enterprises and to workers' self-management. The economic reform must be based on the strengthening, autonomous operation, and participation of the workers' councils in management. Specific regulations will be drawn up in order to guarantee that the trade unions will be able to carry out their functions as set out in Point No. 1 of this agreement.

Only a society that has a firm grasp of reality can take the initiative in reforming the economy. The Government will significantly increase the areas of socioeconomic information to which society, the trade unions, and other social and economic organizations have access.

The MKS also suggests, in order that a proper perspective be provided for the development of the family agricultural units, which are the basis of Polish agriculture, that the individual and collective sectors of agriculture should have equal access to the means of production, including the land itself, and that the conditions should be created for the recreation of self-governing cooperatives.

On Point No. 7, which reads:

"To pay all the workers who have taken part in the strike for the period of the strike as if they were on paid holiday throughout this period, with payment to be made from the funds of the CRZZ," the following decision has been reached:

Workers and employers participating in the strike will receive, on their return to work, 40 percent of their wages. The rest, which will add up to a full 100 percent of the nominal basic wage, will be calculated as would holiday pay, on the basis of an eight-hour working day. The MKS calls on workers who are members to work toward the increase of output, to improve the use of materials and energy, and to show greater work discipline, when the strike is over, and to do this in cooperation with the management of the factories and enterprises.

On Point No. 8, which reads,

"To increase the minimum wage for every worker by 2,000 zlotys a month to compensate for the increase in prices," the following has been decided:

These wage increases will be introduced gradually, and will apply to all types of workers and employees and in particular to those who receive the lowest wages. The increases will be worked out through agreements in individual factories and branches. The implementation of the increases will take into account the specific character of particular professions and sectors. The intention

will be to increase wages through revising the wage scale or through increasing other elements of the wage.

White-collar workers in the enterprises will receive salary increases on an individual basis. These increases will be put into effect between now and the end of September 1980, on the basis of the agreement reached in each branch.

After reviewing the situation in all the branches, the government will present, by October 31, 1980, in agreement with the trade unions, a program of pay increases to come into effect from January 1, 1981, for those who get the least at the moment, paying particular attention to large families.

On Point No. 9, which reads:

"To guarantee the sliding scale," the following decision has been reached:

It is necessary to slow down the rate of inflation through stricter control over both the public and private sectors, and in particular through the suppression of hidden price increases.

Following from a government decision, investigation will be carried out into the cost of living. These studies will be carried out both by the trade unions and by scientific institutions. By the end of 1980, the government will set out the principles of a system of compensation for inflation, and these principles will be open to discussion by the public. When they have been accepted, they will come into effect. It will be necessary to deal with the question of the social minimum in elaborating these principles.

On Point No. 10, which reads:

"To ensure the supply of products on the internal market, and to export only the surplus,"

and Point No. 11, which reads:

"to suppress commercial prices and the use of foreign currency in sales on the internal market,"

and Point No. 12, which reads:

"to introduce ration cards for meat and meat-based products, until the market situation can be brought under controls," the following agreement has been reached:

The supply of meat will be improved between now and December 31, 1980, through an increase in the profitability of agricultural production and the limitation of the export of meat to what is absolutely indispensable, as well as through the import of extra meat supplies. At the same time, during this period a program for the improvement of the meat supply will be drawn up, which will take into account the possibility of the introduction of a rationing system through the issue of cards.

Products that are scarce on the national market for current consumption will not be sold in the PEWEX shops; and between now and the end of the year, the population will be informed of all decisions that are taken concerning the problems of supply.

The MKS has called for the abolition of the special shops and the leveling out of the price of meat and related products.

On Point No. 13, which reads:

"To introduce the principle of cadre selection on the basis of qualifications, not on the basis of membership of the party, and to abolish the privileges of the police (MO) and the security services (SB), and of

the party apparatus, through the abolition of special sources of supply, through the equalization of family allowances, etc." **We have reached the following agreement:**

The demand for cadres to be selected on the basis of qualifications and ability has been accepted. Cadres can be members of the PZRP, of the SD [the Democratic Party, which draws its membership from small private enterprises][], of the ZSL [the Peasant Party--these three parties make up the National Front], or of no party. A program for the equalization of the family allowance of all the professional groups will be presented by the government before December 31, 1980. The governmental commission states that only employees' restaurants and canteens, such as those in other work establishments and offices, are operated.

On Point No. 14, which reads:

"To allow workers to retire at fifty years for women and fifty-five for men, or after thirty years of work for women, and thirty-five for men, regardless of age," **it has been agreed that:**

The governmental commission declares pensions will be increased each year, taking into account the real economic possibilities and the rise in the lowest wages. Between now and December 1, 1981, the government will work out and present a program on these questions. The government will work out plans for the increase of old age and other pensions up to the social minimum as established through studies carried out by scientific institutions; these will be presented to the public and submitted to the control of the trade unions.

The MKS stresses the great urgency of these matters and will continue to raise the demands for the increase of old age and other pensions, taking into account the increase of the cost of living.

On Point No. 15, which reads:

"To increase the old-style pensions to the level paid under the new system," **it has been agreed:**

The governmental commission states that the lowest pensions will be increased every year as a function of rises in the lowest prices. The government will present a program to this effect between now and December 1, 1981. The government will draft proposals for a rise in the lowest pensions to the level of the social minimum as defined in studies made by scientific institutes. These proposals will be presented to the public and subject to control by the unions.

On Point No. 16, which reads:

"To improve working conditions and the health services so as to ensure better medical protection for the workers," **it has been agreed that:**

It is necessary to increase immediately the resources put into the sphere of the health services, to improve medical supplies through the import of basic materials where these are lacking, to increase the salaries of all health workers, and with the utmost urgency on the part of the government and the ministries, to prepare programs for improving the health of the population. Other measures to be taken in this area are put forward in the addendum below.

Addendum to Point No. 16:

1. To introduce a "Charter of Rights for Health Services Employees."
2. To guarantee supplies for sale of an adequate amount of protective cotton clothing.
3. To reimburse health service workers for the purchase of work clothes from the material expenditure fund.

4. To provide a guaranteed wage fund that would make possible rewarding all those who have performed outstanding work in accordance with the theoretically existing possibilities.
5. To set up funds for additional payments upon the completion of twenty-five and thirty years of work.
6. To establish additional payment for work under difficult or harmful working conditions, and to introduce additional pay for shift work by nonmedical employees.
7. To restore additional payment to those attending patients with infectious diseases or to those handling contagious biological material and to increase pay for nurses on night duty.
8. To recognize spinal diseases as occupational for dentists.
9. To allocate good-quality fuel to hospitals and nurseries.
10. To recognize additional payment for years of service to nurses without secondary school diplomas, to bring them up to the earnings level of graduate nurses.
11. To introduce a seven-hour workday for all skilled workers.
12. To introduce free Saturdays without the requirement of making up the time otherwise.
13. To pay a 100 percent increase in wages for Sunday and holiday duties.
14. To make medicine available free of charge to health service workers.
15. To make it possible to make a partial refund of housing loans from the social fund.
16. To increase the allocated apartment space for health service workers.
17. To make it easier for nurses living alone to be allotted apartments.
18. To change the award fund into a thirteenth monthly salary.
19. To give a six-week vacation to health service workers after twenty years of service and to make it possible for them to receive an annual paid vacation for health reasons, as is enjoyed by teachers.
20. To give people working for their M.D.'s four-week vacations and those working for specialized degrees two-week vacations.
21. To guarantee a doctor the right to a day off after night duty.
22. To give workers in nurseries and kindergartens a five-hour schedule, as well as free board.
23. To introduce allocation of cars for basic health service workers and a mileage limit or a lump sum refund for business travel.
24. Nurses with higher education should be recognized and paid the same as other workers with a higher education.
25. To create specially trained repair groups in the ZOZs (factory health centers) to protect health service buildings from further deterioration.
26. To increase the per-capita standard allowance for medicines for hospital patients from 1,138 zlotys to 2,700 zlotys, since the latter is the actual cost of treatment, and to increase the nutrition allowance as well.
27. To set up a system of food vouchers for the bedridden.
28. To double the number of ambulances--this being a real need today.
29. To take steps to guarantee purity of air, soil, and water, especially coastal seawater.
30. To provide citizens with health centers, drugstores, and nurseries, along with new housing developments.

On Point No. 17, which reads:

"To ensure sufficient places in day nurseries and playschools for the children of all working women," it has been agreed that:

The government commission is fully in agreement with this demand. The provincial authorities will present proposals on this question before November 30, 1980.

On Point No. 18, which reads:

"To increase the length of maternity leave to three years to allow a mother to bring up her child," it has been decided that:

Before December 31, 1980, an analysis of the possibilities open to the national economy will be made in consultation with the trade unions, on the basis of which an increase in the monthly allowance for women who are on unpaid maternity leave will be worked out.

The MKS asks that this analysis should include an allowance that will provide 100 percent of pay for the first year after birth, and 50 percent for the second year, with a fixed minimum of 2,000 zlotys a month. This goal should be gradually reached from the first half of 1981 onward.

On Point No. 19, which reads:

"To reduce the waiting period for the allocation of housing," the following agreement has been reached:

The district authorities will present a program of measures for improving the housing situation and for reducing the waiting list for access to housing accommodations, before December 31, 1980. These proposals will be put forward for a wide-ranging discussion in the district, and competent organizations, such as the Polish Town Planners' Association, the Central Association of Technicians, etc., will be consulted. The proposals should refer both to ways of using the present building enterprises and prefabricated housing factories, and to a thoroughgoing development of the industry's productive base. Similar action will be taken throughout the country.

On Point No. 20, which reads:

"To increase the traveling allowance from 40 to 100 zlotys, and to introduce a cost of living bonus," it has been agreed that:

An agreement will be reached on the question of raising the travelling allowance and compensation, to take effect from January 1, 1981. The proposals for this to be ready by October 31, 1980.

On Point No. 21, which reads:

"To make Saturday a holiday in factories where there is continuing production, where there is a four-shift system. Saturday work must be compensated for by a commensurate increase in the number of holidays, or through the establishment of another free day in the week," it has been agreed that:

The principle that Saturday should be a free day should be put into effect, or another method of providing free time should be devised. This should be worked out by December 31, 1980. The measures should include the increase in the number of free Saturdays from the start of 1981. Other possibilities relating to this point are mentioned in the addendum, or appear in the submissions of the MKS.

Addendum to Point No. 21:

1. Change the Council of Ministers' decree concerning the method of calculating vacation pay as well as sickness benefits for those working under the four-shift system. At present, an average of thirty days is used (while they work twenty-two days in a month). This method of calculation decreases the average day's wages during short sick leaves and lowers the vacation equivalent.

2. We demand regularization, by one legal act (a Council of Ministers' decree), of the principles governing calculation of earnings for periods of absence from work in individual cases. The obscurity of the rules at the moment is used against workers.
3. The lack of Saturdays off for workers on the four-shift system should be compensated for by additional days off. The number of days granted in the four-shift system is higher than anywhere else, but they serve as additional periods of rest after exhausting work, not as real days off. The administration's argument that such compensation should be granted only after the number of working hours in both systems have been made the same does not seem justified.
4. We demand all Saturdays off every month, as in the case in other socialist countries.
5. We demand removal of Article 147 from the Labor Code, which permits extending time to nine hours a day in a week preceding additional days off, as well as Article 148. At the moment, we have one of the longest working weeks in Europe.
6. Upgrade the importance of agreements concerning remuneration by introducing appropriate changes in the Labor Code. These should specify that changes in both individual salary grading or in other components of pay, and also a change in method of payment (from daily wage to piecework) require notification by the employer. One should also introduce the principle that the system under which individuals are classified for purposes of setting piecework rates be made to cover basically all types of work performed by the worker. It is also necessary to systematize the ways in which young workers are made use of, in keeping with their qualifications, so that the above settlement does not become an additional obstacle to their professional advancement.
7. Employees working night shift should be granted up to a 50 percent supplement if under the daily wage system and 30 percent more real pay if under the piecework system.

After reaching the above agreement, it has also been decided that:

The government undertakes:

to ensure personal security and to allow both those who have taken part in the strike and those who have supported it to return to their previous work under the previous conditions;


to take up at the ministerial level the specific demands raised by the workers of all enterprises represented in the MKS;

to publish immediately the complete text of this agreement in the press, the radio, the television, and in the national mass media;

The strike committee undertakes to propose the ending of the strike at 5:00 P.M. on August 31, 1980.

APPENDIX B

THE TETI MODEL OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST ¹



¹ Developed from an unpublished paper by Frank M. Teti, The National Interest, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

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