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22,182

Plans were not known to the Chinese, but some of the facts may have been exposed to them. He believed that the Chinese were always earnestly preparing for war. At the time of the Manchurian incident, they thought if they could take Mukden the crisis would pass.

22,183

When asked the length of time the operational plans provided for occupying all Manchurian railway towns, the witness said that they did not consider occupying the whole of the towns along the railway line. * When asked whether they did not in fact occupy all towns in 48 hours, he stated that the only towns occupied by force were Mukden, Yinkow and Changchun.

When asked whether the fact that they did not expect reinforcements from Tokyo was due to the fact that Tokyo did not want any hostilities, the witness stated that neither Tokyo nor the Kwantung Army wanted a settlement of outstanding questions by a resort to arms. The refusal of the central authorities was not because they thought the Kwantung Army did not need reinforcements.

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At the time that the big guns were installed at Mukden, Japan and China were conducting peaceful negotiations. They tried to keep the installation as secret as possible, but they were not successful in this. He did not know how the Chinese found out, but they did find out somehow because immediately after the two guns were placed the Chinese posted gendarmes right outside this spot.

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He believed that the installation of the guns was reported to Tokyo but had no recollection on the point. If it was reported, the witness was responsible for it. He had no recollection of his reporting it. He could not remember no matter how much he tried. The guns were ordered installed by HISHIKARI, then commander of the Kwantung Army. * The witness talked to all those who had to do with the actual moving of the guns, but he tried to keep the number limited to the minimum. He talked to ITAGAKI about this.

22,186

At that time the diplomatic situation with China was very tense. He could tell that from the papers. He did discuss this tense situation with his fellow officers at mess and on similar occasions. The mounting of the guns was decided in 1929 before ITAGAKI came. * He would say that he discussed

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the tense diplomatic situation with ITAGAKI. He did not discuss it with the consul at Mukden. It was not his duty to contact individuals of the consulate. This was ITAGAKI's. He did not know if ITAGAKI discussed it with the consul.

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When asked why KAWAMOTO was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang Tso-lin by bombing, the witness stated it was because KAWAMOTO was under suspicion of having something to do with the bombing.

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The witness stated he was more or less acquainted with DOHIHARA. The function of the Special Service Organ was the collection of information and liaison with the Chinese Army and government. Its duties were vague and can not be defined clearly. They themselves did not look with great favor on this organ, but since politics in China were conducted mostly by military men, the Chinese desired some means of contact with the Japanese Army other than * ordinary diplomatic channels. For this reason the Special Service Organ came into being as a natural growth of the special circumstances in China. Espionage was not one of the original duties of the Special Service Organ. It was not one of its clearly defined duties.

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When DOHIHARA was chief, his mission was to collect information in as many ways as he could. He did not know definitely what methods were employed, but he believed they conducted activities similar to those of military attaches. The Organ was part of the Kwantung Army and under its control.

22,191

Later the Kwantung Army created another Special Service Department. The duty of this later body was to set up plans by which Japan would guide Manchuria. It was established after Manchukuo was established and its duties were different from the old organ. He stated that DOHIHARA did not report on the anti-Japanese atmosphere in China to him.

By the words, failure of various diplomatic negotiations in his affidavit, he meant the Wanpaoshan incident and the NAKAMURA incident. * The newspapers were always full of reports that diplomatic negotiations had failed and he had likewise heard that from the staff officer in charge of such matters, Captain ARAI. He talked to ITAGAKI about that.

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22,192 However, the Kwantung Army did not take upon itself to decide whether negotiations had failed. He had not asked consular officials whether they had failed. When asked whether any other responsible persons in the Kwantung Army asked, he said he did not remember. At the time there were 300 unsettled incidents * in the consul's office in Mukden. He had not asked the central authorities in Tokyo whether the diplomatic negotiations had failed. * He did believe that when ITAGAKI went to Tokyo on business he did hear from the central authorities about the failure of diplomatic negotiations. He did not remember whether ITAGAKI told him about this. This failure was something that all Japanese knew as a matter of common sense, not only the officers of the Kwantung Army but practically all the Japanese people.

22,195 Asked what he meant by the conciliatory attitude of the Army, the witness stated that he believed that the Foreign Office authorities were trying to make every concession so that the outstanding questions between China and Japan could be settled diplomatically.

22,196 When asked what he meant by the fact that the whole Army entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable, he stated that since the Chinese were taking an increasingly positive attitude, they were afraid that in the end the Chinese would start armed action against them. * When he said that it was inevitable, he did not mean that the Kwantung Army would start an action. They thought that the Chinese would take the action which would force the Japanese to act.

22,197 Since the KAWAMOTO incident, the various commanders of the Kwantung Army took great pains and tried to insure that the Kwantung Army would not start any action. If the Chinese should start some action, they always told the men they were to reply at once. By the whole army he meant the Kwantung Army * and the Kwantung Army believed that an armed conflict was inevitable in face of the fact that the Foreign Office was adopting a conciliatory attitude. Diplomatic negotiations must always be conducted conciliatorily.

It is the duty of military men, however, to see that if the worse comes to worse that they be prepared for any eventuality. They did not believe that an armed conflict

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22,198

was absolutely inevitable. They never gave up hope that a settlement could be found, but they felt that the possibility * of an armed conflict was extremely likely. ITAGAKI did entertain the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable. Asked if DOHIHARA entertained such an idea, he stated at the time of the incident DOHIHARA had been at his post for a very short time. The witness did not believe he was as fully aware of the actual situation as were ITAGAKI and himself. Since DOHIHARA was very fluent in Chinese and considered an expert on China affairs, his role in the Manchurian incident has been overrated by the public at large, * despite the fact that he played a fairly insignificant role. DOHIHARA was not a staff officer, but head of the Special Service Organ.

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The fact that all the Army felt that an armed conflict was inevitable was reported to Tokyo. ITAGAKI and all other officers who went there on business reported it. They made special efforts to report this to War Minister MINAMI. Since he was not in charge, he did not know whether this idea was reported to the consul, but he believed repeated reports were conveyed to them at Mukden, the consul there being HAYASHI.

22,201

He believed that the enlisted men who actually participated in guard duty were keenly aware of the situation. * They were cautioned as to their behavior because of their entertaining such an idea. The entertainment of this idea was the basis of his previous statement that relations were such as to be sitting on top of a volcano.

He did not know whether ITAGAKI discussed this idea with any other officers in the Kwantung Army. Every time he saw the witness he continually told him of his great anxiety and desired that something be done. ITAGAKI could not have had any control over enlisted men outside of his headquarters.

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Asked how he knew that the officers mentioned in his affidavit had no connection with the March incident, the witness said there were rumors at the time that the principal figures in the incident were KOISO, UGAKI, NAGATA, and other officers in the War Ministry. He could tell that none of the

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22,203 officers named in his affidavit were connected with the incident from his own experience living in Manchuria. He did not know whether HASHIMOTO was connected with the incident. He stated there were none in Manchuria who were related to the incident. * He knew these people well and he could say they had no connection with the March incident. None of them were members of the Sakura-kai. Members of the Sakura-kai were such people as HASHIMOTO and CHO. In Manchuria neither the March incident nor the Sakura-kai ever became the topic of conversation.

22,204 The 2nd Battalion of the Independent Garrison attended to its guard duties day and night and their training was conducted in the firm belief that an armed conflict was inevitable.

22,205 General SHIRAKAWA was from the central authorities in Tokyo. When asked whether SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria because the Army entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable, the witness said SHIRAKAWA came after the Manchurian incident because the perpetrators of the October * incident spread a rumor that the Kwantung Army was carrying on very disturbing activities, and he came to appease the Army. He did not come because it had been reported to Tokyo that an armed conflict was inevitable. He came after the incident.

22,206 Asked who were the civilians who held various opinions on the Manchurian problem, he said one of the biggest organizations was called the Manchuria Youth League. OKAWA was not then in Manchuria. * By civilians he meant ordinary civilians. He meant the civilians in the railway and outside the railway. The Manchuria Youth League was composed of employees of the South Manchuria Railway and civilians not connected with the railway. He meant only organizations in Manchuria.

22,207 The 200,000 Japanese residents in Manchuria felt most keenly the inevitability of the armed conflict and were in great excitement about it. The Army was quite cool about the NAKAMURA incident, but the residents at large were different and were in a great state of excitement. Some went to Japan and gave lectures.

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22,208

The chief of the Special Service Organ is under the direct jurisdiction of the commander-in-chief. ITAGAKI was the one among the staff officers in charge of this Organ.

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The second telegram came from the Mukden Special Service Organ. The witness saw the decoded telegram. He had no opportunity to talk to ITAGAKI, then in Mukden, about it. DOHIHARA * is head of the Special Service Organ and was under the direct control of HONJO. He was then away on business in Tokyo. He did not play a very important role. He was in Tokyo when the telegram was sent.

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The witness did not personally make any investigation as to the extent of the damage to the railway, and he did not believe that ITAGAKI had any time to make the investigation. ITAGAKI had no power to issue orders. He was, however, unable to leave his office because he was in a most convenient position to contact headquarters of the Army and maintain contact with it. ITAGAKI is a man of very moderate temperament.

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Asked whether he was prepared to deny that ITAGAKI did in fact issue orders to HIRATA, the witness said that

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ITAGAKI had no authority to issue orders. He had said that HIRATA would have made up his mind to attack on his own. * He did not say that ITAGAKI gave instructions. He said ITAGAKI had authority to give guidance in accordance with the intention of HONJO, that HIRATA would have carried out the attack without the guidance from ITAGAKI. This is the impression he gained from ITAGAKI's report on the afternoon of September 19, 1931. His report was that in accordance with the intentions of HONJO he had intended to tell the two commanders to attack. Before that, the commanders came to him saying that they had decided to attack. * HONJO was greatly pleased with this report.

22,213

He is not prepared to say that ITAGAKI in fact did not issue instructions to HIRATA. He did this because he heard ITAGAKI report that although he had the authority to give guidance it was not necessary to do so. ITAGAKI may think he gave guidance, but the situation was a very good one in which it was not necessary to do that. He can say that ITAGAKI did not in fact issue orders because he did not issue orders.

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- 22215 The witness stated that on the night of September 18, 1931, he was in Port Artuhr with HONJO and MIYAKE, and ITAGAKI was in Mukden; HONJO and the witness having left him on the afternoon of September 18. He next saw ITAGAKI on the evening of the 19th, and was not in communication with him during the interim. He did not actually see * what ITAGAKI did in the period, but he was with HONJO when ITAGAKI reported on the evening of the 19th and learned of what had transpired during the period. ITAGAKI had gone to Mukden to meet General TATEKAWA. He did not know the details of the message that TATEKAWA had.
- 22216
- 22217 * When ITAGAKI reported to HONJO, he stated that TATEKAWA asked him whether the younger officers were not excited over the NAKAMURA Incident, and ITAGAKI replied that they were not. Then ITAGAKI asked the General the purpose for which he had come to Mukden, and TATEKAWA said, "On hearing what you have to say about the NAKAMURA case, I am relieved. Let us meet and talk about the situation tomorrow". ITAGAKI, who had intended having a drinking party with TATEKAWA that night, left. They were unable to get TATEKAWA's specific purpose in coming to Manchuria. He heard this when ITAGAKI reported to HONJO. * This is the only reference that ITAGAKI made.
- 22218
- 22219 The witness did not know anything about the so-called message, and he received no reports concerning TATEKAWA's purpose. He did not ask ITAGAKI to send TATEKAWA to Mukden, and he had not learned from HONJO anything about it. It was impossible that KOISO should have sent TATEKAWA to Mukden, because at the time * TATEKAWA was a section chief in the general staff.
- 22220 In the second report received from Mukden, it stated that Japanese forces were being attacked by five or six hundred of the enemy. He did not personally investigate after arrival at Mukden the truth of this statement. * Reports reached from the front line must be accepted as of the greatest accuracy. When a war is actually in progress, one cannot investigate further than the actual reports received from the front line.

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22221 The witness did not personally investigate railway damage, and he did not know whether ITAGAKI did. * HONJO did not personally investigate the damage. Pei-tayin was the North Barracks. Yingkon is half-way between Mukden and Dairen, and is 200 kilometers from Mukden on the railway.

22222 *The conference to make a decision was held at Port Arthur. With respect to a decision being made, the word decision is a very difficult word. Staff officers cannot make a decision by themselves. A conclusion was reached. One of the conclusions was mobilization of the whole Kwantung Army.

22223 * The conclusion reached was that they must resolutely mobilize the whole strength of the military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time. * When asked what was meant by mobil-

22225 izing the whole strength of Japan's military might, he said that it meant that, acting in accord with previous operational plans, to concentrate the utmost strength in fighting in and around Mukden, to correct his statement it meant to concentrate and participate in the attack. He meant the entire strength of the Kwantung Army. All units were ordered to concentrate and did concentrate. This conclusion was made before he and HONJO got to Mukden. * They left Port Arthur after arriving at this conclusion. This conclusion was reached when they had information that only five or six hundred were attacking, and he had not verified whether they were.

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By the term to seal the fate of the enemy in the shortest possible time, he meant to deal a great blow to the enemy in the vicinity of Mukden to capture the fortress which was the headquarters and nerve center of the Mukden regime. The capture of Yingkon was a small auxiliary measure.

22227 When asked what he meant "Should get rid of the enemy in Yingkon", he stated that the enemy at Yingkon * was in the best position to threaten railway communications between Port Arthur and Mukden, and was a part of the Mukden forces. The force at Yinkon had not attacked the Japanese, and no other Chinese army other than the five or six hundred had at any time attacked the Japanese.

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22228 While the blow delivered might not have been a fatal blow, it was a semi-fatal one. The Japanese were the iron, but the hammer was small. * By the blow that was dealt, the encirclement of Japanese forces was broken. * The power of the Chinese Army to encircle was broken, although the encirclement itself was not broken because the distance was to grow. The Chinese Army in the vicinity of Mukden was defeated, as were the Chinese forces at Fenhuang and Antung. * This was accomplished with the ill-equipped Japanese Army with not even half of the ten thousand Japanese participating in the actual fighting in Mukden.

22229 In the course of the battles, none of the Chinese planes went into action. They were all captured on the ground.

22230 These actions were all in self-defense. Attack is a method of self-defense; besides, the Japanese were attacked first. * The taking of the air strip was in self-defense. If fighting should break out at one point, one cannot defend himself by simply fighting at that point. One must take all measures against any possible attack from any other part.

22231 The air strip was taken on the afternoon of September 19. The order for it was not issued on September 10. KAWAKAMI was commander of the Garrison at Fuhsien. He did not believe that KAWAKAMI had issued an order on the 10th to take the air strip on the night of the 18th. * He had explained that information before. Toward the end of August HONJO ordered the company at Fuhsien which had the main duty of guarding Fuhsien to occupy the airfield in the event of an incident, and these instructions were conveyed to KAWAKAMI privately. KAWAKAMI felt anxious about the situation, since by attacking the airfield * Fuhsien would be defenseless.

22232 To maintain an adequate defense, he decided to ask for cooperation of police and ex-servicemen. He drew up a plan for maneuvers, on which he and his entire company were to leave for Mukden, and continued his research on this hypothesis. After a conference with the police and ex-servicemen he sent them a notice saying he would not actually leave for Mukden on the 18th.

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By coincidence, the Incident actually broke out in Mukden on the 18th. On hearing of the actual outbreak, KAWAKAMI was caught by surprise and his company did not carry out its new duty to attack the airfield and he brought his whole company in an extremely ill-equipped state to Mukden, and received a scolding.

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* KAWAKAMI based his order of the 10th on what he had been thinking of up to that time. His main concern was how Fuhsien could be defended after his company had left, and he held the maneuvers so the police and ex-servicemen would be able to maintain defense. The orders were given to conduct such maneuvers on the 18th, but he did not know whether they were given on the 10th. KAWAKAMI apologized to the witness after the Incident, saying that because of these maneuvers planned by chance for the 18th, he had caused great embarrassment to the army as a whole.

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* KAWAKAMI was not under the witness' direct control, but so far as operations were concerned the witness could contact directly, since he was an independent garrison commander. The witness stated that there were many people who greeted them at the stations on these trips. They were not only the intelligentsia, but all the Japanese residents of a particular Japanese area who crowded the station to greet them. They subsequently carried out punitive measures against the Chinese. They regarded these measures as self-defense.

22237

It was necessary to have an Imperial sanction to move an army across the border. The original operation plan did not include the transfer of the Korean Army into Manchuria, because they had no authority to make such a plan. * When it was pointed out that he had mentioned a pre-arranged plan in his affidavit, the witness stated that in the case of operational plans drawn up by the Central authorities, they are given separately to the Commanders in Manchuria and Korea in so far as the plans related to them. In these plans, in case fighting broke out in Manchuria, it was arranged that the Manchurian Commander was to ask for one mixed brigade from Korea as quickly as possible. Every year detailed agreements between the two armies were made in connection with the transportation of the mixed brigade.

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22238

He did not remember whether HONJO communicated with Tokyo when he asked for Korean reinforcements. * The witness was not in charge of sending such reports. The plans which the witness drew up went only as far as the seizure of the Mukden fortress, and there would not be enough time for reinforcements from Korea, and his plan did not contemplate any such reinforcements.

The Korean commander sent troops without obtaining Imperial Sanction, on request being made by HONJO on the train between Port Arthur and Mukden. There was no Imperial Sanction.

222 39

* He did not recall where DOIHARA was at the time of the Tientsin Incident. DOIHARA was entrusted with liaison work between the Kwantung and Tientsin armies for a long time, but he did not know whether DOIHARA had that duty at the time of the Incident. He was Chief of the Special Service Department.

22240

The primary purpose of a reconnaissance plane is reconnaissance, and such planes do not usually carry bombs. * When asked how therefore he could call the dropping of bombs while on reconnaissance self-defense, the witness stated that he participated in the flight and remembered its details. According to reports received, enemy troops from within the Great Wall were concentrated in Chinchou and it seemed they were about to advance on Mukden. They they decided that reconnaissance flights * must be carried out, planning to use only two 88-type planes. They had just recently come and their pilots were not well trained. They also had reports of a considerable number of anti-aircraft guns at Chinchou, and it was decided to alter the original plan and to send 11 planes. These planes left with the permission of HONJO to bomb the headquarters and barracks of the enemy if the enemy should fire at them.

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The planes had to fly low because they could not see at 1500 meters, * and they were fired on from the Chinese barracks. The planes which were fired on and those which followed them dropped their bombs. It may be the usual process for a reconnaissance plane when fired on to turn around and fly back. In cases where the object of reconnaissance is not obtained, it cannot be helped.

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The planes were not loaded down with bombs, although some bombs were taken. There were only five or six in each plane. The bombing was not the object.

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* He had no exact knowledge on the point when the Japanese army completed occupation of Manchuria, but he believed it was around 1933, after he had left the Kwantung Army. Manchuria was not completely occupied in 1931. It was not completely occupied by the Japanese Army, and the new Manchukuo Government was set up in March, 1932.

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When asked what he meant by the word "politics" when he stated the army was not much concerned in politics and economy of the new state, he stated politics means politics. * It was used in the ordinary sense of the word. It did not include industrial exploitation.

22247

The Self Government Guidance Board was for local self-government and was headed by a Manchurian named Yu Chung-han. This included politics, which was one of the points earnestly stressed by Yu. This Board was under the control of the Kwantung Army. It would naturally get in touch with the Kwantung Army on questions concerning peace and order, but it was army policy * not to interfere with its functions and not to interfere with the Board as much as possible. Japanese were members of the Board, but he did not believe they were in the great majority. According to his recollection, half of the members were Manchurians, but this was outside his own field of work.

22248

When asked if KASAGI stated there were 120 members on the Board this would be a fair statement, he said he did not know. When asked how the Board came to be organized so quickly, he stated that Fengtien Province has an old culture and many * inhabitants who lived there before the influx of Chinese after the Russo-Japanese war and after the establishment of peace and order. They were dissatisfied with the Chiang family dictatorship, and a certain clique were in existence, Yu being one of the leaders. In a short time the movement gathered great strength in various areas.

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It is not true that the Board was under the control of the Kwantung Army and everything it did had to be sanctioned and approved by the army. KASAGI, for instance, did not agree with the ideas of the Kwantung Army staff officers and was not on good terms with them. This was because the Guiding Board very often tried to take over the functions of the local Chinese officials and the Kwantung Army had had connections with these officials, and the Board frequently clashed with the Kwantung Army.

22249 * ITAGAKI had hardly any connection with the Self-Government Guidance Board. On several occasions ITAGAKI had told of his dissatisfaction at the attempt of the Self-Government Guiding Board to interfere with the functions of Tsang Shih-yi. * He did not believe that ITAGAKI was political advisor to the Board. He was not connected with Yu.

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When asked whether he knew a Mr. Norton, who interviewed him on April 25, 1946, the witness stated he met several people connected with the court and newspapermen, and he could not remember foreign names. He did not recall being questioned about the Board and ITAGAKI.

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When asked whether he gave the following statements * that he had heard that the Self-Government Guidance Board, which was organized in September or October, 1931, under the leadership of NAKANO and KASAGI, and that NAKANO was dead and that KASAGI was in Japan, and that he also knew Yu, and that he had said that the Board came under the command of the Kwantung Army and that anything it did had to be sanctioned by the army, and that ITAGAKI, its political adviser, would be able to give a complete report, * and that ITAGAKI was not connected with Yu until after the Incident because Yu did not take control of the Board until after the Incident, and that he had stated that this organization had been planned and studied by NAKANO and KASAGI sometime previous to the Incident, and they organized various organizations made up mostly of Japanese as early as 1928, which were after the Manchurian Incident amalgamated to form the Self Government Guidance Board, the witness stated that he did remember the conversation.

22252

ISHIHARA

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

25 April 1947

MEMO TO: Mr. D. N. Sutton
FROM: Lt. Kurt Steiner

Your attention is invited to the following documents:

1. IPS Document 2403, an affidavit by IMURA, Jo (or Minoru). This document was not introduced in evidence. IMURA is a defense witness assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
2. IPS Document 2421, an affidavit of KOMAI, Tokuzo, regarding control of Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army. This document has not been used in evidence. KOMAI is a defense witness assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
3. IPS Document 2546, an affidavit of ISIHARA, Kanji. This document has not been used in evidence. ISIHARA is a witness for the defense assigned to Mr. Dunnigan.
4. IPS Document 2626, containing among other items a report from General TADA, Shun (or Hayao), regarding the reorganization of the Manchurian Army. This file contains also documents implicating General NISHIO, Toshizo. This document has not been used in evidence. Both TADA and NISHIO are defense witnesses assigned to Mr. Lopez.

I suggest consideration of the first named three affidavits for use in cross examination, and further analysis and research into IPS Document 2626 for use in cross examination or rebuttal.

KURT STEINER
1st Lt., Inf.

cc: Mr. Dunnigan
Mr. Lopez
Mr. Wagner

DATE 2 April, 1947

Kwanji

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Ichihara, Kwanji

ITEM

Partially
Completed

Fully
Completed

- | | | |
|---|-------|----------|
| 1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 3. Examination of case file, if any. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses. | _____ | <u>X</u> |
| 9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you. | _____ | _____ |

Lester C. Durigan
LB

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dunigan and Mr. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Lopez
SUBJECT : Defense Document No. 886 - Deposition of
ISHIHARA, Kanji

1. Attached hereto is copy of IPS Document 2546
which you might have some use of in analyzing Defense Docu-
ment 886.

Pedro Lopez
Associate Prosecutor

Attachment.
As described.

Put this off to one side

C O P Y

Doc. No. 2546

Title: Affidavit of General ISHIHARA, Kanji

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHERS

AFFIDAVIT RE: ARAKI, Sadao and Others

I, Lieutenant General ISHIHARA, Kanji, born in Meiji 22/1889/, will make the following statement.

I served as an operations staff officer of the Kwantung Army from 1928 to 1932 (Showa 3 to Showa 7) and was attached to the General Staff Headquarters from 1932 to 1933 (Showa 7 to Showa 8). I held the post of Section Chief in the General Staff Headquarters from 1935 to 1937 (Showa 10 to Showa 12) and after March, 1937, I served as Chief of the First Section in the General Staff Headquarters. Moreover, I served as Vice-Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from October, 1937, to December, 1938.

I hereby confirm that I have come to know the following facts during these periods which was in connection to my aforementioned duties.

The major duties of the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters were in the formulation of operation plans against the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which were then seen as being prospective enemy countries.

The plans of operations against U.S.S.R. in Showa 3 /1928/, Showa 4 /1929/ and Showa 5 /1930/ were of the same substance. I made these plans at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff and later received the approval of the Chief of General Staff. The main objective of the plan of operations for these years (namely: 1928 - 1930) was to occupy Harbin and Tsalai and thus to use these points as the bases for war against the U.S.S.R. This plan was not changed until 1931 -- when all of Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese troops as the result of the Mukden Incident.

The plan of operations against Russia in Showa 11 /1936/ was made by the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters. This plan has been scheduled to transfer almost the whole of the Japanese troops, namely 20 - 30 divisions, to Manchuria in the event war broke out between Russia and Japan. Troop transport was scheduled by ships to Fusan and Dairen, and then to the point of arrival by railways. All troops arriving were to be concentrated in the Harbin area, and thereafter the Kwantung Army Headquarters were to station them at the necessary points. Only after the military strength in Manchuria became sufficient would the attack begin;

Doc. No. 2546

the plan being to occupy the Soviet Far Eastern occupied territory. In order to assure the success of the operations as scheduled by the plan of Showa 11 /1936/, various measures have been adopted in Manchuria in areas destined for major operations.

Many railways, barracks and warehouses were constructed and the methods of communications were strengthened. Fortification constructions were carried out on points along the northern frontier; namely, in the various areas of Heiho, Suifenho and Tunkning. Numerous airfields were built, but among them the major ones being Mutanchiang, Chiamusi, Harbin, Suihua, etc. Thus, after being occupied by Japan, Manchuria gradually changed into a base for war against Russia.

The plan of operations in 1937 was unchanged to that of the above-mentioned plan of 1936.

In the plan of operations against Russia in 1938, the KWANTUNG Army planned to amass its forces in the first stages of the war along the Suifenho-Tunkning line and in Kulin on the opposite bank of the Iman River, leaving a part of the troops to remain at Hailar and Heiho and await the arrival of the main Japanese forces. When the main force arrive from the homeland, it was scheduled to have a military strength of 12 - 13 divisions in Suifenho area and two or three divisions in the Khailar-Heiho area.

All the troops amassed were to be used for the occupation of Soviet Primorye, excepting those few garrisons in Heiho and Khailar. It was planned to advance operations along the both shores of Hsingkaihu Lake and, after defeating the Russian frontier troops, to besiege and occupy Vladivostok. Similar to the plan of 1937, plans were made to attack Vladivostok and Kharbarovsk in the first phase of the war, and then to annihilate Russian troops in these areas together with the occupation of these cities.

What I have said, as aforementioned, regarding the plan of operations, is none other than an outline of the operations that was planned. Since the situation could not be perceived clearly until the outbreak of war, it seems that only an outline of the plan of operations was made.

The plan of operations of the Army was connected to the Navy's operations through the cooperation of the General Staff Headquarters and the Naval General Staff. The major duties of the Navy were the transportation of the Army and the blockade of Vladivostok.

The plan of operations was submitted for Imperial sanction annually. Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff Headquarters, reported the plan to the Emperor.

Signed and sealed by

ISHIHARA, Kanji

Prisoner

ISHIHARA
Isihara

INTERROGATION OF: YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi
PLACE : Room 371, War Ministry Building
INTERROGATOR : Mr. D. N. Sutton
DATE : 25 March 1947

Q Did you stop in Manchuria on your way from Geneva in the fall of 1931; and if so, approximately what time?

A As I have told you already I left Paris perhaps on the 27 of December '31, and therefore when I entered into Manchukuo it was already in '32. And I arrived here in Tokyo on the 14 of January. The date when I met General Honjo at Mukden was a date between the 5 and the 10 -- I have forgotten the exact date, but between the 5 and the 10.

Q Will you please give the purport of your conference with General Honjo on that occasion?

A Well, I don't remember the details of the talk I had with General Honjo, but the General explained the events which occurred since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and the future program about the organization of the Manchoukuo--the State of Manchukuo. He was thinking of bringing Mr. Henry Pu-Yi to make him the -- to bring him to the throne of the Manchoukuo. I confess that I don't remember the details which General Honjo explained to me. I don't think that interview which I had with the general was a so important one. General Honjo was under me when I was the Japanese Minister in Peking. He was Military Attache to the Legation in Peking, so I knew him very well, and it is quite natural that he came to the station to meet me at Mukden when I arrived there on my way home from France. And perhaps I was invited to a dinner that evening. After that dinner the interview took place. I am unable now to recall the details of the talk which I had with him, but the general was speaking what he told me was explanation of the campaign which he made since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and his future plan of forming an empire in Manchuria.

Q Was General Honjo sponsoring or guiding the movement for the organization of an independent government in Manchoukuo?

A Oh, yes. He being the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army-- the top man, you see--is responsible for every military campaign and so on. He was assisted by General ITAGAKI-- ITAGAKI was still at that time a colonel--and General ISHIHARA, who

was still a lieutenant colonel at that time. ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were the real spirit of the Kwantung Army, and the program, as I understood, was formed by these two men. I was told so.

Q By whom?

A Oh, everybody whom I met since my arrival in Manchoukuo. The information which I obtained while in Paris was rather scanty, but when I marched toward the East my information had been increased. According to those informations ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, lieutenant colonel at that time. Later he became a general -- These two men -- but of course General Honjo, being the top man, took every responsibility.

Q Did you understand from General Honjo that he together with ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were attempting to organize an independent government in Manchuria, or was the independent movement entirely spontaneous and without any direction on the part of the Kwantung Army?

A Now, you see, owing to the lapse of fifteen years since that time I can not recall it in a detailed manner what General Honjo told me, but as I understood, there was a movement for the independence in Manchuria by the populace. At the same time General Honjo and his members of the staff, on which ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA were most prominent -- On their part they had a program of their own, of course.

Q A program of their own for what purpose or to what end?

A Well, independence of Manchuria, and to make Mr. Henry Pu-Yi as Chief Executive, and so on.

Q That was the program of the leaders--of General Honjo, ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, as leaders of the Kwantung Army?

A And on other part the leaders in Manchuria themselves had the same idea. I was told so. It was at the end of February, I believe-- if I remember correctly--that I had asked for a visit of Lt. Col. ISHIHARA at my office, by which I mean the Foreign Office. I asked ISHIHARA to postpone the independence of Manchuria as long as possible because I was afraid of the intervention by other powers if the Kwantung Army hurries up to the formation of the new empire. To my request ISHIHARA told me it was impossible because everything was already prepared in Manchuria.

What was in February 1931?

Did you ever talk with ITAGAKI around that time with regard to the independence movement -- I mean, either when you were

(YOSHIZAWA, Kenkichi)

in Manchuria or in Tokyo?

A Yes, I met him in Korea. I came back from France by way of Siberia, Manchuria, and Korea, and I went to Shimonoseki and took the train there. I made a stay of one day in Seoul when ITAGAKI was returning to Mukden from Japan by an airplane, and he met me at the Chosen Hotel.

Q When was that?

A About the 10 of January. I can not say the exact date.

Q Did he discuss with you --

A Not "discussed", I asked him. I wanted every possible information about the Manchurian so-called Incident, and what the Kwantung Army was thinking of, so I wished to have talks with leading officers, military officers--especially people like ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA--and I had taken a chance of seeing ITAGAKI during my short stay in Seoul. Although I can not recall the details of what ITAGAKI talked to me at that interview I am sure he explained the same thing as what General Honjo told me in Mukden.

Q Was ITAGAKI at that time planning to bring Henry Pu-Yi in as the ruler of the State which they anticipated setting up in Manchuria?

A He may have mentioned or may not have mentioned. I don't recall it exactly.

Q Was ITAGAKI working at that time to set up an independent state in Manchuria?

A I think so.

Q That was your impression?

A Yes. Although I can not tell you that ITAGAKI told me to that effect. As I have told you, there were two sides of this story: the one is a movement of the populace, the other the plan made by the Kwantung Army. They both went parallel to each other.

Did you know that the government in Tokyo had notified the Kwantung Army not to participate actively in the independence movement?

Tokyo government? -- Well, by -- I can not say the Tokyo government as a whole had any intention of that sort. But I if being the Foreign Office man made every possible effort to hurry up the independence. On one of the occasions,

yes, there were two occasions, in the latter half of January-- in the latter half of January, Yes--I received a statement setting forth several items. That statement came from the War Office, and I forgot now the other items, but the only item which I still keep in my memory is the independence of Manchoukuo. I went to the home residence of the Minister of War --

Q Who was he then?

A ARAKI. And I had a conference at which General ARAKI and Vice Minister and the Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs --

Q Who was the Vice Minister?

A Let me see -- He used to be the Chief of General Staff -- General -- Let me see.

Q KOISO?

A No, KOISO was at that time still Director of the Military Affairs.

Q General MASAKI?

A No, MASAKI was Vice Chief of the General Staff. I became Foreign Minister January 14, 1932. In the beginning of my assumption of office as Foreign Minister, KOISO was not Vice Minister, but a month later he was made the Vice Minister of War.

Q Was MUTO at this conference you were talking about?

A Yes. I may have been wrong to have said, if I have said so. In any case Vice Minister and the Director of Military Affairs and Vice Chief of General Staff--that is to say, General Masaki--and some others were present at the conference. The conference was to consider the statement made by the War Office which was shown me, and I made that visit to attend that meeting. At that meeting I agreed to every other item, but I opposed to the independence of Manchoukuo, and this disagreement lasted about -- but I did not agree to the last. But I was obliged to recognize the development of the situation. The developments came one after another without recommendation of the Foreign Office in Manchuria.

The leaders of the Kwantung Army were the compelling force in the organization of the separate state and recognition of the separate State of Manchoukuo ?

A Separate State of Manchoukuo, yes.

Q I will appreciate it if you will read this statement which KATAKURA, Tadashi, or rather, the testimony which KATAKURA, Tadashi, gave on yesterday relative to the interview which you had with General Honjo at Mukden, and state whether or not this is correct, and if not, in what particulars it is in error.

A I am unable to recollect the talk I had with Honjo at that time as KATAKURA has explained yesterday. I have not such memory as KATAKURA. As I have said, Honjo explained what transpired since the beginning of the Manchurian Incident and his intention was to remove the capital of Manchoukuo from Mukden to Chanchung, which was later known as Sinking--the new capital. As soon as Manchoukuo was established the capital was intended to be removed from Mukden to Chanchung.

Q And Chanchung was later called?

A Sinking. Chinese character "sin" means "new"; "king" means "capital."

Q I see, new capital.

A According to this explanation the Manchurian Incident occurred as a result of a movement for reforming Japanese fishing and farming abilities. I can not recollect that sort of thing. You see, after my return to Tokyo I saw General ARAKI and other military leaders on the occasions of Cabinet meetings and other occasions, and the most important meeting I had with General ARAKI was the one which I have mentioned, which I have told you already, about the Manchoukuo--the establishment of the Manchoukuo. Nevertheless, the Manchoukuo as an independent state made appearance on March 1 in that year. And Mr. Henry Pu-Yi was made Chief Executive. -- "The price of cotton had gone up" -- I can not recall that HONJO said that sort of thing.

Q Do you remember whether KATAKURA was present when you were talking with HONJO?

A I have forgot. I don't remember.

You don't remember?

No.

Do you know him personally?

Yes. I met him in Manchuria, you see, several years later the Manchurian Incident occurred. I made a visit to Manchuria

in 1934--5. On that occasion my visit to Manchuria, he was the Chief of the 4th Section of the Kwantung Army stationed in Mukden, the most important post he had at that time as Chief of the Economic Section. I thought that it was our first contact when I saw him on that occasion. I don't remember that he was himself present on the occasion of the interview I had with General HONJO. I knew HONJO very well because he was the Military Attache to the Legation when I was the Minister in Peking.

Q When was that approximately?

A I held that post for more than six years. I was in Peking as Japanese Minister for more than six years -- I mean, I am the record-holder.

Q What years, what period was that?

A It was -- You see, I must calculate in your calendar --

Q What year in Showa?

A Until the fourth year of Showa. I left Peking for good in August the Fourth Year of Showa.

Q You were in Peking then from about 1924 to 1929?

A Something like that. There were three consecutive Military Attaches, and General HONJO was the middle one.

Q Some of the leaders of Manchuria understanding the desires of the Kwantung Army started the so-called independence movement, and the leaders engaged in the activities-- Is that correct?

A Engaged in activity of hurrying up the independence.

Q There were two camps of the movement, one on the part of the populace, and one on the side of the military, each working with the other?

A Yes.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (translation)

Deponent : ISHIHARA Kanji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was in charge of operations as a staff-officer of the Kwantung Army from March, 1929 to August, 1932, and concerned with the Manchurian Incident which was touched off by the Mukden Incident in September, 1931. So I shall state hereby on the actions of the Kwantung Army at that time, laying stress on its military movements, as they relate to the Manchurian Incident.

(1) On the general situation with special reference to the military position of Japan before the Manchurian Incident.

At the time when Japan obtained the right to station her troops in Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese forces in four north-eastern provinces were so meager that Japan could manage to defend the far-stretching South Manchuria Railway and also to protect her residents with the small force allowed by the treaty. But after the collapse of Ching Dynasty, it happened that ^{Chan Tsuo-lin} grew powerful and started to have an ambitious eye to things within the Great Walls, gradually increasing his forces. His policy in Manchuria was influenced by the campaign for recovery of lost national rights then prevailing all over China and tended to aim at driving out the Russo-Japanese influences from Manchuria. So the movement of his forces became a considerable factor in considering Manchurian affairs.

After Chang Tsuo-lin was killed by bombs, his successor, Chang Hsui-liang declared his allegiance to the Kuomintang. So, the Kuomintang influence

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made a steady inroad on the north-eastern area, instigating and organizing anti-Japanese campaigns, until it affected the North-eastern Army, the importance of which could no longer be disregarded.

Chang Hsui-liang was appointed Vice-commander of the Kuomintang Army upon his declaration of allegiance to the Nanking government. He attempted to re-organize his forces, and to reinforce their armaments in both quantity and quality namely, maintenance of a standing strength amounting to 226,000, enlargement of the munitions factory in Mukden, equipping his forces with tanks, airplanes and other modern arms, and strengthening of training systems etc. They were superior in numbers and equipment to our forces in Manchuria at that time, and were in high spirits with elated anti-Japanese sentiments. Their disposition was re-arranged into an encircling position so that they besiege those areas occupied by our army along the South Manchuria Railway. In the face of such a challenging attitude, the Kwantung Army scattered in an extensive area was placed in a dangerous position from a military point of view. Organized actions against or in contempt of Japan were committed under the leadership of the North-Eastern Army authorities while our railway-guards were on duty or in training. In the face of various kinds of successive interruptions and accidents, and the distress and misery, from which the Japanese residents ^{our} suffered, ^{Kwa-} tung Army was driven to the extreme limit of indignation.

In order to cope with the threatening situation produced by the change of military conditions in general in the north-eastern China, the Kwantung Army in the field made a proposal to increase the numbers and re-arrange its forces to the central military authorities. However, it was not accepted. So the Japanese forces remaining in its peace-time disposition, had

to be exposed to the superior Chinese forces burning with anti-Japanese sentiments: on the other hand, no effective diplomatic steps ^{were} taken except the lip service to alleviate the situation. The relation between the two forces was on the verge of explosion as if sitting on top of a volcano.

(2) On the outline of operational preparations by the Kwantung Army at the time of the Incident.

Besides its usual duty of guarding the South Manchuria Railway and also of defending the Kwantung Province, the Kwantung Army was in charge of

covering the concentration of our main forces in Manchuria, in the possible event of hostilities between Soviet Russia and Japan, which might be touched ^{of} by the Soviet encroachment on the Manchurian territory. Necessary preparations were always made for such ^{a duty in view, which, of course, were of} a defensive nature as to expect to give a blow at the advancing enemy in the northern part of South Manchuria in case the enemy should attack the south after occupying the northern areas. So the Chinese army was not our original objective of operational preparations. But, as previously stated, the north-eastern situation was steadily growing worse and finally it came to be feared that the Chinese army burning with anti-Japanese sentiments might clash with our forces. So, according to the orders and instructions received from the central headquarters of supreme command preparations for the worst had been made for the preceding several years in order to execute the duty even by force. Our ill-equipped forces of about 10,000 remained at that time in their usual disposition, dispersed along about 1,000 K.m. of the South Manchuria Railway line south of Changchun, encircled by the Chinese forces of 200,000. strength. There were thousands or tens of thousand of Chinese forces stationed in Mukden. Changchun, Chuangte and Fenghwang-cheng, and the commander's notice was posted in every barrack of the Wang I-che's Brigade announcing his firm resolution against Japan to stir up hostile feelings. Under such circumstances the Kwantung Army established an operational plan to settle whatever incident might happen, in the shortest possible time and finished all the preparations regarding education, training, transportation etc. Our tactics were to forestall the enemy, concentrating all our strength to Mukden to deal a fatal blow to the military centre of Mukden and the pick of the North-eastern Army if our main forces should be

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obliged to take actions in the conflict between Japan and China regardless of the place of the conflict.

It required a scrupulous planning and preparation, a strong unity and careful training of troops to discharge this difficult duty with so small a force available. So, every unit was required to maintain strict discipline and strong unity and to conduct education and training to the point and adaptable to actual fightings.

When Commander HONJO replaced General HESHIKARI in August, 1931, he understood the gravity of the situation in view of the Captain NAKAMURA's Case, Wan-pao, etc. affairs and other conflicts in connection with the great duty. So he issued an order to the effect that his forces should abstain from rashness and impatience on the one hand, and on the other hand should take a positive and resolute action in discharging their duties, especially in the case of a small unit once a clash with the enemy actually occurs should not allow the enemy to aggrandize the incident by despising us. In his first inspection tour following his arrival at his post the command simultaneously undertook an unexpected inspection with especial reference to the operational preparations of every unit. As the Kwantung Army was inferior in point of numbers and equipment, and was so situated as to expect no re-inforcement from the central military authorities, it tried to increase its fighting strength by making the most of operational materials available in Manchuria. For example, two heavy-guns were mounted on the 2nd Battalion's Barrack of the Mukden Independent Garrison, several armored cars were attached to a part of infantry forces, and explosive provisions and other wall-attack materials were prepared. It is true that it endeavored to make up the shortage of the fighting strength, but it was

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not in a position to carry out extensive operations for a long time. As to the transportation of the forces, we had the confidence in our ability to start it about an hour after the alarm was received, but, I regret to say that it took in actuality about four hours at the very moment of the incident. In view of the superiority of the enemy in its armaments, especially in mortar, tank or airplane, our forces devoted themselves to the training in our favorite light or wall-attack, with such intensity as to develop a fighting spirit strong enough to meet the opposing forces however great the odds might be.

(3) On the relation between the operational preparations of the Kwantung Army and the outsiders.

At the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the Commander of the Kwantung Army was Lieutenant-general IONJO, Shigeru, who, as previously stated, succeeded General HISHIKARI in August, 1931. The chief of staff was Major-general MIYAKE, Koji, the senior staff-officer was Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, who succeeded Colonel KAWAMOTO after the latter was obliged to be transferred following the death of Chang Tsuo-lin by bombing; the operational staff-officer was myself. There were also some other staff officers of the ranks of major or captains.

The chief of the Mukden Special Service Organ was Colonel DOIHARA, Kenji, who succeeded Major-general SUZUKI, Yoshimichi in August, 1931, and the military adviser of Chang Hsui-liang was Lieutenant-colonel SHIBAYAMA, Kenshiro. There were also some other military instructors engaged by the North-eastern Army. The Commander of the 2nd Division was Lieutenant-general TAMON, Jiro, and the commander of the Independent Garrison was Lieutenant-general MORI, Ren. None of these officers had

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any connection with the so-called "March Incident", nor were they the members of the SAKURA (Cherry) Association. I had no opportunity to have intimate talks with Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro or Doctor OKAWA, Shumei before the Manchurian Incident. As, sharp criticisms were made in Japan concerning the actions of the Kwantung Army, especially after the death of Chang Tsuo-iin, the leaders of the Kwantung Army, including the former commanders, General HISHIKARI and General HATA (Eishiro), gave the forces a strict warning against rash actions. Colonel ITAGAKI, in particular as the senior staff-officer, had a Perfect-Control over the headquarters' staff officers, so he was confident that no one would dare to attempt an irregular conduct. But, in view of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in China, especially of her troops' hostile feelings and insubordinate movements, and also in the face of the failure of various diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China inspite of our conciliatory attitude the whole army, including its commander, staff officers, force-commanders, officers and men entertained the idea that an armed conflict was inevitable. So the Kwantung Army continued to study, in such great earnest, its peculiar operational preparations for the worst, as well as the measures to be taken in order to maintain peace and order, that there was no staff-officer in the headquarters at Fort Arthur who was absent on private business, even on Sundays. All the units did their best day and night in training and execution of their guard duties.

When the so-called "October Incident" took place after the Manchurian Incident, it was suspected in Tokyo that the Kwantung Army might declare independence and that troubles might be caused in concert with the Kwantung Army. Telegrams in violent tones were received, and General SHIRAKAWA came to Manchuria to appease the Army. But the forces in the field which

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were quietly striving to do their duties could not help sneering at the confusion in the central authorities. It is true that there were some civilians in the South Manchurian Railway and other circles, who had various opinions on the Manchurian Problems but no member of the Kwang Army including myself had ever conspired with them to cause the incident.

(4) On the Out-break of the "Sept. 18th Incident" and the resolution and measures taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

On September 13, 1931 General HONJO ended his occasional inspection in connection with his first round of inspection at Liaoyang and was delivering an address to the 2nd Division, when there came a telegram addressed to Commander HONJO from the chief of staff, MIYAKE at Port Arthur, requesting him to ask the Staff-officer ITAGAKI or ISHIHARA (I) to stay in Mukden, as Major-general TATEKAWA was to arrive there from Tokyo. Then Commander HONJO ordered ITAGAKI to go to Mukden, and returned to Port Arthur that night, accompanied by the other members of the staff including myself. ^{At} that very mid-night, I was called up by Staff-officer NAKANO, who requested me to go at once to the official residence of the chief of staff. I hurried up to the place, not far from the headquarters, where I found all the members of the staff, including Lieutenant colonel T. KESHITA, in Japanese clothes, called together by Staff-officer Captain K. TAKURA. Then I was shown the first military top secret telegram stating that the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison at Mukden was moving to the field upon receiving a report that after 10.00 p.m. Sept. 18 the outrageous Chinese troops destroyed the S.M.R. Railway at a point on the west side of Fei-tayin in Mukden, and attacked our guards with a resultant clash.

Then chief of staff, MIYAKE, called up the Commander at his official residence, asking him to come to the headquarters, where we ourselves went to work out remedial measures. At about 0:28 a.m., we received the second telegram from the Mukden Special Service Organ, stating that the enemy in Fei-tayin with three or four company strength exploded the S.M.R. Railway that our Hushint^a Company was fighting with some 5 or 6 hundred enemies after 11 p.m.; that a portion of Fei-tayin was occupied by us; that the enemy was increasing machine and infantry-guns; that the company was in great difficulty and disadvantage, and that Lieutenant NODA was seriously wounded. Then appeared the Commander of the Army, after a careful study the whole staff arrived at the following conclusion:

"The expected worst has unfortunately come owing to outrageous acts on the part of China; the limit of patience is reached. There is no knowing how the situation may aggravate even during this night unless we take a resolute measure to chastise the enemy. There is no time to lose. We must resolutely mobilize the the whole strength of our military might to seal the fate of the enemy within the shortest possible time."

When I expressed my opinion as the operational officer to General HONJO to that effect, he meditated a few minutes with his eyes closed, and then, judging from the general situation, he made a final decision, saying resolutely, "Yes, let it be done on my own responsibility." We were all silent with deep emotion, and felt a great responsibility in the face of such a solemn, weighty resolution. Moreover, in spite of our usual operational plans, Commander HONJO ordered our forces not to concentrate in Mukden but to remain in Chang-chun in preparation against the enemies from Kuan-chengtzu and Nanling, or from Kirin. In view of the war situation in the

neighbourhood of Mukden, he adopted the course of gradually increasing our strength in order to make an attack instead of concentrating the main forces in Mukden. According to this decision and the general principle concerning the disposition of our units as indicated by the Commander, the usual operational plans were altered, and the orders were issued by telephone between 1:30 and 2:30 a.m. on September 19, to the following effect: the Commander of the Second Division in Liacyang should make an attack upon Mukden and its neighbourhood; the commander of the Independent Garrison in Kungchuling should concentrate its 1st and 5th battalions near Mukden; the commander of the 3rd battalion of the Independent Garrison in Tashichiao should get rid of the enemy in Yinkon; the commander of the 4th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Lienshankwan should sweep the enemies in Fonhuangcheng and Antung; the commander of the 6th battalion of the Independent Garrison in Anshan should go to Mukden with two companies and await orders from the commander of the 2nd Division; the commander of the 3rd infantry brigade in Changchun should guard Changchun with the 4th infantry and the 2nd cavalry regiments. In addition to the above the 30th infantry regiment and the heavy-gun battalion in port Arthur were ordered to move.

Commander-in-Chief HONJO, accompanied by the greater part of his staff officers including myself, left Port Arthur for Mukden shortly after 3 a.m. on the 19th, leaving MIYAKE, Chief of the Staff, one staff-officer, and the chiefs of each department temporarily in Port Arthur. On his way, he listened to the cries of officials and people on the railway-line demanding a punitive measure against the Chinese troops, and received reports on the changes of situation of battle. Upon his arrival at Mukden Station about noon

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on the 19th, he set up the commanding station immediately at the railway station for this occasion. In the meanwhile he sent reports to the central military authorities, and requested the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean Army to send reinforcements (one mixed brigade) in accordance with the Pre-arranged plan of operations. Also he requested a part of the 2nd overseas Fleet to be ordered out to Yingkon.

Previously on September 18, General HONJO had learned at Lioyang that General TATEKAWA was coming for intercommunication by way of Mukden, and dispatched Colonel ITAGAKI to Mukden in the same afternoon, after the conclusion of inspection, in order to come in touch with him and also contact the Mukden Military Special Service Organ and the Consulate-General concerning the N.K.MURA case. Colonel ITAGAKI saw Major-general TAKEKAWA who arrived late at night on the same day, but left him without obtaining the details of the message under agreement that they were to meet again the next day. As the incident took place at that very mid-night, he gave certain directions as occasion required, concerning the war situation in Mukden. As the senior staff-officer, Colonel ITAGAKI was well acquainted with Commander HONJO's intentions, and it was all the more true at that time, because the inspection of operational preparations just before the Incident disclosed Commander HONJO's idea rather clearly to him. So, every step he took in coping with the incident was in conformity with the Commander's intention, and as such was approved by the Commander as having contributed to the execution of the operation at about 6 p.m. on September 19, we received a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff to the following effect:

"(1) I believe that the decision and steps taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army since the night of September 18 were quite opportune,

enhancing the prestige of the Japanese Army.

(2) In view of the attitude on the part of China since the outbreak of the Incident, the cabinet has decided that it should deal with the affairs without going too far beyond necessity. The actions of the forces in the field shall conform to this principle.

(3) On the relation between the measures to be adopted by the central authorities according to the principle of non-aggrandizement and the military movement of the Kwantung Army.

The Japanese government decided upon the principle of non-aggrandizement on September 19, immediately after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, and at about 6 p.m. on the same day, a telegram addressed to the Commander of the Army was received from the Minister of War, on the heels of the one already mentioned from the Chief of the General Staff, saying that, as regards the conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces, the Cabinet had decided upon the principle of making every effort to prevent the aggrandizement of the incident, though it is of the opinion that as it had been caused by the destruction of the S.M.R. Railway by the Chinese, the Chinese were to be blamed, and accordingly, it requested us to act upon this principle in the future. The Kwantung Army understood thoroughly the intention and policy of the government and also of the central military authorities e.i. the policy of non-aggrandizement through the abovementioned telegrams from the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. But the objective actuality of an armed clash in the field was contradictory to the policy of non-aggrandizement in the result and severe reprimandings were very often received from the central authorities. It is, firstly, because the central authorities failed to understand the

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real situation in the field. Of course we, the Kwantung Army, strove to act in conformity with the central policy, but it was absolutely necessary to forestall the Chinese by showing activity, and dealing with them immediately, as we were inferior in numbers and scattered all over South Manchuria. However, the central authorities failed to understand this psychology of the forces in the field and the movements of the Chinese, and intended to treat the matter with a optimistic observation or consideration of a purely diplomatic convenience. Secondly, it is because the Nanking Government with whom our central authorities entered into negotiation had no control over the North-eastern Army, and failed to live up to its promise. Even Chang Hsui-liang could not control the confused movements of his regional forces. The negotiations at Tokyo, Nanking and Peiping failed to be in time, so that there was no other way left than that of settling the situation regionally in the field.

Toward the end of September, the Kwantung Army concentrated its forces along the S.M.R. Railway to watch the situation. The enemies in Chinchou and Lungkian were showing signs of counter-attacks accumulating a superior strength. When the Nonkian-chao Bridge was destroyed toward the end of October in 1931, we negotiated with the Executive Council of the Chinese Eastern Railway through our consul-general in Harbin, and also with Ma Chanshan through our consul in Chinchihærh, and, with their understanding, began the repair of the damaged bridge, when the Chinese army stationed there started firing unreasonably at our repair unit. Our covering force was thus obliged to return the fire, and was placed in a difficult position. Ma Chanshan failed to make a concession inspite of sequence of negotiations, until our central authorities, recognizing the situation, took actions to

meet the Ma Chanshan Forces.

While the Kwantung Army was obliged to send its main forces to Chichi-haerh, leaving only 2 companies in Mukden, the Chinese concentrated a great force in Chinchou. The anti-Japanese propaganda from China Proper was constantly made and thus the advance of this reinforced enemy forces was a great menace to the South Manchurian Area as well as an irritant to the nerves of the Kwantung Army. Then we came to entertain an opinion that we must sweep out the source of disturbance in Chinchou. In the second Tientsin Incident toward the end of November, our Tientsin Army requested the help of the Kwangtung Army but, in view of the basic policy not to stimulate the Soviet Union after the collapse of Ma Chanshan's main forces, we were ready to send forces to Chinchou by any means, even though we might be obliged to call back forces from the North. However, the attempt was checked by the central supreme command. It seemed that, through the medium of the Chinese diplomatic authorities, a proposal was made to our diplomatic circles, to establish a neutral area in the neighbourhood of Chinchou. But the Chinese attitude was such that if we withdrew our forces, China would immediately withdraw this proposal too. At any rate, it was necessary for our small force situated in an extremely disadvantageous position from a military standpoint, to take the initiative in increasing the war-like intention of the enemy at the start.

General HCNJC, Commander of the Kwantung Army, though a man of mild character, used to take a wide view of things to listen to the positive opinions of junior staff-officers, to take the whole responsibility, for his duties abroad, and to issue orders or point out the general principles. It is true that the Kwantung Army often did not hesitate to make positive

suggestions to the central authorities and sometimes had heated arguments with them, but I affirm that it has never acted against an Imperial order or instruction so long as the supreme command was involved.

The actions, if any, taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army without asking instructions from the central authorities, were only the following two :

The one was the movement of the main forces of the Kwantung Army at the sudden outbreak of the Mukden Incident. But, in view of the prevailing military situation, it can be learned that General HONJO exercised his authority according to Article 3 of the regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and his usual operational preparations in peace time.

The other was the bombing of Chinchou on October 8. The fact was that six of scout-airplanes of 88-type and five seized FOTEKI's (T.N. phonetic) were flying to reconnoitre the conditions of the North-eastern Army in Chinchou area, when they were fired at, and in self-defence, dropped 75 bombs on the Communications University (Military Government Office), barracks of the 28th Division and Chang Tsuc-hsiang's private residence and so on. These bombs were in the size of 7 c.m. mountain-gun balls, and were dropped by hands having no perfect dropping-apparatus so they might have gone wild. Compared with the bombing of London by the German air forces in the former European War, or the bombing of the Japanese towns by the American B-29s, etc. in the present war, or the destruction of the cities of HIROSHIMA or NAGASAKI by the Atomic Bombs, I am sure that the damage caused by our bombing was almost insignificant

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in all other matters the Kwantung Army went through thorough exchange of views with the central authorities, and never started its operations without receiving the latter's instructions. As to the operations in the North Manchuria, the general relations with the Soviet Union were taken into consideration, and our forces were subjected to restriction in their movements, inspite of the operational disadvantage and inconvenience, lest the Soviet Union should suspect aggressive intention on our part or her rights and interests in North Manchuria should be violated.

(4) "On the settlement of the Manchurian Problem and the military point of view". The true situation then existing between Japan and China can be characterized as the conflict of opposing demands, the recovery of national prestige from the Chinese side and the preservation of the rights and interests from the Japanese side. It seemed exceedingly difficult to settle the issue unless one party make a concession or a compromise be reached between the two parties, consequently we could hardly expect to maintain our rights and interests merely through diplomatic negotiations. In order to enable our people to engage in peaceful economic activities in Manchuria, there seemed to be no other way of solution than to give up all our special rights and interests, political, economic and military unless China agreed to compromise. However, judging from the then Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA's statement made in the Diet in October, 1931, or Prime Minister WAKATSUKI's made in a provincial meeting in April, our government could not carry out such a drastic policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia, nor did the public opinion permit such a course. As a matter of fact, should the Japanese forces have been entirely withdrawn from Manchuria, not only our rights and interests would have been

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lost imperilling even the lives of our residents but also the Soviet Union which was recovering her influence in the Far East, as was seen in the then "Russo-Chinese dispute," would have encroached upon Manchuria. Then, in view of the traditional policy of the Soviet Unions, Manchuria would have become a basis of Communistic propaganda, and the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria would have been impossible, imperilling not only our national defence but jeopardizing China's national defence. It was quite clear judging from the conditions after the Sino-Japanese War and the causes of the Russo-Japanese War. The reason why Britain and U.S. supported us in our war with Russia was to check the Russian encroachment upon the Far East. Though the Kwantung Army was not concerned in making demand or comment on our diplomatic policy, it was seriously concerned with the establishment of peace and the defence of Manchuria in order to save the situation caused by the collapse of the North-eastern Army after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. In the face of such a new situation, the Kwantung Army and its commander could not but consider the advisability of establishing a defensive disposition against the Soviet Union from a military standpoint.

Of course it meant only the establishment of our defensive position toward Russia and it was not our intention to attack the Soviet Union with Manchuria as its basis of operations. In other words, we tried to make the most of this favorable disposition, from a strategic point of view, in perfect concert with China to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding south, and to give a silent assistance to our delegate in negotiation. The founding of Manchukuo was brought about as a result of the new political revolution in the North-eastern China, following the collapse

of the North-eastern military clique, quite apart from the said military view-point. It was anything but the means or object of our military movements though our military action may have given an opportunity for it. It is a pity that Manchuria was separated from China as a means of settling the Incident, but we thought that we must understand the tendencies, activities, and co-operations of the various races in Manchuria before we could cut the root of disturbances over many years in order to establish equilibrium in the East. That is to say, we should seek the co-prosperity of the races through their cooperation, which, from a military point of view, would terminate war, and consequently achieve Sino-Japanese co-operation. So the Kwantung Army was devoted to the speedy establishment of peace and order, from this military point of view, expecting the situation to be improved by officials and people themselves of the region and did not enforce military administration in the occupied areas.

The army was not concerned much in the politics and economy of the new state. But, we were confident that, in order to exterminate disturbances through racial unity in Manchuria and to realize co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and China, Japan herself should set an example, by abandoning her claims to the rights and interests and contributing to the stabilization of Manchuria in a new moral basis. With this confidence we instructed officers and men to watch over their own conducts with great self-restraint.

As the new state was successfully founded, there appeared afterward some people, military and civilian, who claimed for themselves the credit of its foundation, saying that they planned it themselves on with the Kwantung Army, etc. But the foundation of Manchukuo was nothing more than

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a historical product of Manchuria, and I believe that the idea of racial cooperation will live for ever.

On this 16 day of January, 1947.

at Yamagata Prefecture

DEPONENT ISHIURA, Kenji (seal)

I, YAMADA Hanzo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

at the same place

Witness: (signed) YAMADA Hanzo (seal)

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Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ISHIHARA Kanji (seal)

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Translation Certificate

I, SASAGAWA Tomoji, of the Defence, hereby certify
that the attached translation of Affidavit of Ishiwara, Kaikji
is, to the best of my knowleg^e and belief, a correct translation
and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

T. Sasagawa

Tokyo, Japan

Date 6/3/47.

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1. Summary of Interrogations of ISHIHARA, Kanji, and MAYAZAKI, Masayoshi
2. Statement of East Asia League furnished by ISHIHARA when interrogated on 3 May 1946.
3. Statement furnished by ISHIHARA on Japanese-Manchuqooan Financial and Economic Investigation Society when interrogated on 3 May 1946.
4. Excerpts from statement of KANEI, Ken-Ichiro.
5. Report on Cherry Blossom Society.
6. Excerpts from Record.
7. Curriculum Vitae.
8. Statement furnished by UEDA, Shunkichi, re Japan-Manchurian Finance and Economic Research Institute.

Feb
1939

9. See Yashuzawa file. *repeated*
unless -> justify the independence
of Manchuria as long as possible
unless replied *impossible*
as everything was already fixed
in Manchuria

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: 229

Subject: ISHIHARA, Kanji

Note
No.

From: G. C. Hardin

To: Executive Committee

Date: 1 April 1946

The file shows no interrogation of the subject. The last reference in the file is dated March 13, 1946 by Col. Goulsby. At that time the subject was a patient at the Teishin Hospital and it was suggested that he be interrogated as soon as he was released from the hospital but no interrogation is found in the file.

The subject is sometimes referred to, it appears, as ~~ISHIHARA~~ ^{ISHIAARA} but it seems that he is one and the same person as ISHIHARA.

He was born January 17, 1889, graduated from the Military Academy in 1909, and later, the General Staff College. He was commissioned as a sub-lieutenant in 1909, a first lieutenant in 1913, a captain in 1917, served continuously in the army, was made a major in 1924 while on duty in Germany, later, an instructor at the General Staff College, was made a lieutenant-colonel in 1928, was on the staff of the Kwantung Army - 1928 to 1932, a full colonel in 1932 and at that time, was advisor to the army delegation at the League of Nations. He was assigned to General Staff Headquarters in 1935, was on the Naval General Staff, was adjutant of the Kwantung Army in 1937 and made major general the same year and was director of the first section of the General Staff Corps. He commanded the Sixteenth Division of the Kwantung Army from 1939 to 1942. He was Head of the Far Eastern League and then joined the Japanese East Asia Federation. He was generally credited as one of the young colonels who instigated the annexation of Manchuria and it is said that he had great influence in the Japanese program of aggression.

There is significantly in the file a postal card directed to General MacArthur dated October 8, 1945 signed "Voice of the People" written in Japanese strongly urging that General Kanji ISHIHARA be prosecuted as a war criminal.

The records show that he was with the Kwantung Army in 1937 when they moved into Shanghai. It was in several provinces until 1939 when it moved back into Japan and in November 1941, it moved from Japan into the Philippines. It took part in the Bataan Campaign

Subject: Kanji ISHIHARA (Cont'd)

from February to April of 1942, remained in Luzon until 1944, moved to Leyte and there, it seems, in December, 1944, it was rendered ineffective. Another significant connection, is his connection with the Cherry Blossom Society. He is referred to as one of the most clever pamphleteers in the Army.

While the investigation is quite incomplete, it seems reasonably clear from the subject's history and connections that a case could be made against him. His activities in China and the provinces, and at Bataan, his connections with these organizations, particularly the Cherry Blossom Society, all suggest that this subject ought not be overlooked. It is regretted that the investigation has not been completed and suggested that he be included tentatively, nevertheless, for indictment.

G. C. HARDIN

229

ISHIHARA, Kanji

G. C. Hardin

Executive Committee

1 April 1946

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G. C. HARDIN

Capt. Robinson

Mr. Harbin

Ishihara file

You probably have this paper - please return this copy when finished with it

25 March, 1946

I have more data

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HEAD OF THE INVESTIGATION SECTION.

On Ishihara if you want it. R

The following items, obtained from a personal friend who is a Japanese subject, and who is indirectly responsible for some of the information in our files, are set forth for information:

I. UNO, Yōraburō - Daishin In Hanji, who was judge of some high court, is alleged to have in his possession a pile of documents, reaching from floor to ceiling, regarding the SAKURA KAI investigation and the SHIM PEI TAI Incident. It is possible that he might be of value as a witness.

II. ISHIWARA Kanji is thought to have been behind the Manchurian Incident and the "2-26 Incident," his motive being to promote a managed economy in Manchuria. He and TOJO allegedly cooperated and later quarreled. It is possible that he would be of value as an informant or witness, particularly against Tojo.

III. The Imperial Order (CHOKURUI?) as a result of which it became necessary for the War Minister and Navy Minister to be a General and Admiral on the active list, is alleged to have been forced through sometime between March 1936 and February 1937 by one TSUGITA Daisaburo, Chief of the Legislation Bureau of the cabinet. It is further alleged that Tsugita boasted to friends that he was responsible for this matter.

Shortly following this in February of 1937, General UGAKI, who was a well known liberal and who favored retrenchment in army matters was unable to form a cabinet because the army refused to nominate a war minister therefor. It is believed by the writer that this step represented the ground work on which much of the army's assumption of power was based.

YALE MAXON
Commander, U.S.N.R.
Translators Pool.

The Case of Lt Gen ISHIWARA
Project of
Insent

Ishihara

Objection is raised concerning the discussion about Mr. ~~Ryukanji~~ ISHIWARA RA by Mr. Tatsuo IWABUCHI. In Mr. I's discussion, there are suppressions

There are ^{duties} liabilities which he himself published proclaimed gave out concerning his part in the ~~MANN~~ ^{an} anglo-american Incident of 1931.

Mr. Iwabuchi's discussion of the part played by Mr. Ishihara in the ^{Nov} ~~Feb~~ 26, 1936 Incident, ~~Mr. Ishihara's beach property~~ ^{at the Imp Hotel} ~~was~~ ^{was} at the Imp Hotel ~~was~~ ^{was} the

evening of 2-26. ^{points out that Mr. Ishihara met} ~~at the~~ ^{Isobe?} and Muranaka at the Imp Hotel ^{on} the night of 2-26. ^{or} Examine also his friends: ASAHARA Kensaburo, KITA

NISHIDA Chikara; HASHIMOTO Kingo-vo, TANAKA ^{he was} ~~they were~~ ^{was} a man who ^{was} ~~was~~ confined

to their houses along with Mr. Hashimoto in the October 1931 Incident and committed

suicide in the 2-26 Incident. ~~KITA, NISHIDA, MITA~~ ^{DA} ~~MITA~~ (?) W. regard to the

point that KITA, NISHIDA, and MITA ~~ITA~~ (?) bore the blame while ISHIWARA

石原中將の場合
石原中將は、二月十六日、日清戦争の戦功をたたえ、勲一等旭日大勲章を授けられた。...

夢中から無我夢中で
夢中から無我夢中で、夜中ついに新劇で殺害された。...

夢中から無我夢中で (続)
夢中から無我夢中で、夜中ついに新劇で殺害された。...

文化座談会
文化座談会、三月二十一日、午後七時、東京市立第一高等学校講堂で開催された。...

文化座談会 (続)
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文化座談会 (続)
文化座談会、三月二十一日、午後七時、東京市立第一高等学校講堂で開催された。...

600号オウシ
文具各種卸小賣
小松商店
東京市立第一高等学校講堂

文化座談会 (続)
文化座談会、三月二十一日、午後七時、東京市立第一高等学校講堂で開催された。...

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進駐軍要員緊急募集
アメリカンクラブ
小石川勤勇

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現像部募集

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東京印刷製紙統制組合

大映東京撮影所人事課
現像部募集
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