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HIRATA

證明書

近衛文麿年記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜萃と題せる
別添文書は昭和二十一年四月一日日本電報通信社より発行せる近衛文麿
年記「平和への努力」と題する書籍の壹枚頁よりの正確なる抜萃たる事
を證明す

昭和二十二年一月廿一日

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日本電報



近衛文磨午記「平和への努力」第百四頁及第百五頁より抜萃

支那事変に就て

一、内閣組織前より駐日支那大使と屢々會合し、日支國交調整に奔走。且政府に斡旋す。即ち日支永久の友たうざるべからず。我も蔣介石の支那統一を支援せざるべからずとの確信を有せり。

二、故に組閣後向もなく日支武力衝突起りたることは最予の意に及ぶ所なり。百方局地解決不擴大方針を以て事態を收拾せんとかめたり。

この場合記憶すべき事実は

- 1. 日本内閣としては対支戦争を決意する所が、極力之を回避せんとす。
- 2. 軍自身も在留邦人の生命財産保護を名目に出兵を提案する所あり。若し不擴大局地解決方式を堅持せる旨を確言す。
- 3. 軍自体の対支方針を明確にせしめんと努力したるも、少なからず陸海軍部

間の意嚮は内閣と根本的に違及せるものと覺えず、結局内閣の
軍を抑ふる力足らざりしといふよりは——而も憲法上の建前よりいへ
ば、内閣と統帥とは全然相互に独立なり——軍首脳部に軍
統帥の力なかりしと断ずる方至當なり。

三、故に不擴大方針漸次敗るゝに及んで、殊に上掲に戦局及ぶに至つては、
内閣としては總辭職し以てそれが白うの意に及することを表明し、且その
責を負ふことも考へられ、事實上兵剣にこの問題を検討せり、然れども、總辭
職したる結果如何、軍を事實上動かせる令子——それが青年將校であれ、
現地軍であれ——加之によつて及有し、事態を收拾する方向に行動せし
たうと考へ得らるゝや、却て傀儡政村を立て、事態を日本として誤りた
る方向に益々導く可能性なかりしや、余は飽く迄軍を激成することを懸け
たから、極力他の凡ゆる手段により之を制御することを以て余の使命なり

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と感して、その努力をなせり、皇道派を復活せしめんと極力努力したるも
この目的の爲なり、この努力は軍の首脳部及一部密中勢力によらば阻れた
り。故に余の力足らざりて遂に軍を揮ふこと能はざりし事實に對して
は衷心より之を遺憾とし、且その責任を痛感す。然れども如何なる意
味に於ても支那武力侵略を承認、乃至支持せりとの輿論に對しては
絶対に之を甘受する能はず。前者の理由によつて戦争犯罪に向はる
るならんば致方なきも、後者の故を以てならんば余は自己の潔白を確信す。

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(Translation)

Extracts from the memorandum, "EFFORTS FOR PEACE",
by AYAMARO KONOYE, pp. 104-105.

On the China Incident

1. Prior to my organizing the Cabinet, I had repeated conferences with the Chinese Ambassador accredited to Japan and had exerted myself for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and offered my good offices to the Government, being convinced that Japan and China must be eternal friends and that Japan must help Chiang Kai-shek in his work of unifying China.

2. That a clash should occur between Japan and China soon after my forming a Cabinet, therefore, was farthest from my true wishes. Accordingly, I left no stone unturned in order to save the situation based upon the principle of local settlement and of preventing the spreading of the trouble.

Concerning this situation, three facts must be remembered.

(1) The Japanese Government, far from taking a resolution to start warfare against China, did its utmost to prevent it.

(2) The military itself, although it proposed the sending of troops to China for the protection of the life and property of Japanese residents, always assured that it firmly held to the principle of non-aggrandizement and local settlement.

(3) The results of my efforts to ascertain the policy of the military toward China revealed that at least as far as its leaders were concerned, their policy was not fundamentally different from that of the Government. Consequently, I came to the conclusion not that the Government lacked the power to check the military -- under the Constitution, the Government and the military command are mutually independent -- but rather that the military leaders themselves were unable to command the whole military.

3. As the non-aggrandizement policy thus grew gradually untenable and especially when the war spread to Shanghai, I came to think of a resignation of the entire Cabinet to answer for its responsibility, as well as to show that it was contrary to its will. Actually, we gave the matter of resignation serious consideration. However, what would have been the results of the resignation? Is it conceivable that the elements that really led the military, be they the junior officers or the troops on the spot, should have been moved to reflect and to come to act toward the settlement of the disturbed situation? Would there not have been a possibility that they would have set up a puppet government and have led Japan further in a wrong direction?

I felt it my mission, avoiding at all costs further to infuriate the military, to try all available means to check them, and did my utmost accordingly.

It was also to this end that I exerted my utmost to aid the come-back of the KODO (Loyalist) faction. This effort of mine was checked by the military leaders and by certain factions in the Imperial Court.

This being the case, I sincerely regret that I failed to check the military due to my lack of ability, and at the same time I feel a keen sense of responsibility. But I cannot submit myself to an accusation that I, in any sense, approved or supported armed invasion of China.

If I am charged with war crime for the former reason, I have nothing to say; but I am firmly convinced of my innocence if for the latter reason.

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