GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

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31. Post-Japan Peace Planning

(3) Date: Aug. 1951 - Mar. 1952

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
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(5) Item description and comment:

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(7) Film no. Sheet no.

File Under Post-Japan Peace Planning Page

NO.	FROM	DATE	TO	S Y N O P I S
1.	AG	11 Aug 51	See Dist;	Post-Japan Peace Planning
2.	Chairman, Countermeasures Comm.	8 Nov 51	All S/S	Measures for Improving Japanese-American Relations
3.	GS	14 Nov 51	Countermeasure Committee	" " "
4.	GS	10 Nov 51	Psywar Sect.	Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance
5.	PsyWar	29 Nov 51	ACof S G-3 C/S	" " " " "
6.		3 Dec 51		Future Problems in United States Relations With Japan
7.	GS	4 Dec 51	PsyWar	Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance
7A		19 Dec 51		Clemency on War Criminals - Removed Mr. Monagan
8.	Chairman, Countermeas.	24 Dec 51	GS	Improvement of Japanese-American Relations thru Settlement of Claims Arising from UN Operations In Korea
9.	GS	29 Jan 52	G-4 Thru Compt	Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection
10.	GS	2 Feb 52	Countermeasures Comm.	Support of the Japan Olympic Team
11.	GS	27 Feb 52	" "	Legal Status of BSJ
12.	Engr	1 Mar 52	G-4	Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection
12A	GS		Countermeasures	Use of Plaza Grounds by US Forces
13.	GS	11 Mar 52	Comptroller	Administrative Agreement

Subject: Administrative Agreement

Cofs | All Section Chiefs, GHQ, SCAP and FEC | 3 March 52

1

1. The Comptroller, GHQ, FEC and SCAP, is designated as coordinator of actions required in the implementation of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan.

2. It is desired that each addressee review his functions and responsibilities and submit to the Comptroller by 11 March 1952 a brief statement of any problems occasioned by the Administrative Agreement or changes to directives or operations in the Far East Command required in implementation thereof.

- D. O. H. - - - - - - - - -

GS Files

From: Govt Sec | To: Comptroller | Maj. Craig, 26-6962 Date: 11 March 1952

2

1. Since 21 July 1951, GS has performed the function of notifying the Japanese Government of all practice alerts, blackouts, military, air or naval maneuvers, air-ground, air-air, air-sea, military, and naval gunnery or bombing fire practices. Prior to 21 July 1951, this was done by the Civil Affairs teams in the local areas who were informed by the local military commanders and who in turn notified the local Japanese Government authorities. Since July 1951, all information on this subject has been centralized in GS and transmitted to the Japanese Government at the national level so that in all cases the responsibility would be clearly fixed. Immediate determination of the appropriate successor agency of General Headquarters to assume this responsibility is believe necessary.

2. Residual tasks of the former Civil Property Custodian recently merged with Government Section for administration and final phasing out which may still be unfinished at the time of ratification of the Peace Treaty includes return of the reparations plants and fecilities to the Japanese. This requires determination as a matter of urgency of those which are to be used by the garrison forces.

3. In general GS has been concerned with matters pertaining to the relationship of the Allied Forces to the civilian population. It is believed an agency at General Headquarters level should be designated to receive and handle properly such matters in this area as they are brought before it by the Japanese Government for cooperative solution in the mutual interests of the Government and the U.S. Garrison. Examples are:

a. Red Light Districts - Street-walkers.

b. Public display of entertainment of low order patronized by our troops.

13

Maj. Craig
26-6962

Administrative Agreement

Govt Sec Comptroller 11 March 1952

2. (Cont'd)

c. Labor relations of plants and contractors doing business with U.S. forces.

d. Problems of manufacturers and businessmen connected with execution of contracts with the U.S. forces (these are questions of general principles and working relations rather than specific claims).

Therefore, it is believed that a specific agency, such as the proposed Joint Committee, should consider problems in these categories.

-- F. R. ------------------

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Subject: Administrative Agreement

Note No.	From: CofS To: All Section Chiefs, GHQ, SCAP and FEC Date: 3 March 52
1	1. The Comptroller, GHQ, FEC and SCAP, is designated as coordinator of actions required in the implementation of the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan. 2. It is desired that each addressee review his functions and responsibilities and submit to the Comptroller by 11 March 1952 a brief statement of any problems occasioned by the Administrative Agreement or changes to directives or operations in the Far East Command required in implementation thereof. AOH ----------D. O. H.----------

RESTRICTED

Maj. Jay 26-8320

Use of Plaza Grounds by US Forces

Govt Sec — Chairman, Counter-measures Committee — 4 March 52

2 1. Recommend that all parades and drilling, religious ceremonies on the Plaza grounds, as well as all other uses thereof by the Occupation Forces, be discontinued immediately.

F. R.

GS files

RESTRICTED

12A

SECURITY INFORMATION

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060 3/33

COPY COPY

Rst Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

From: G4 To: Engr Date: 14 Feb 52

1 4 Request that an attempt be made to reconcile the divergent view regarding formal agreements as stated in C/N 3. Failing this, request sufficient background information be furnished G4 to establish the basis of a recommendation to the Chief of Staff for resolution of the non-concurrence by Government Section and the Comptroller.

2 Incls
n/c

- -W. A. C.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DO/WLM/VM/vg
Mr. Matthews
26-6495

5 From: Engr To: G-4 Date: 1 MAR 1952

1. No divergent views exist between the Engineer Section and Government Section regarding formal agreements for post treaty provisions for fire protection.

2. The Engineer Section concurs in paragraph 2, C/N 3, in that the local commander should work out a mutually acceptable informal agreement with the municipality concerned in the spirit of cooperation. Such agreement should, however, be reduced to writing so as to be a matter of record and ensure that any successors to the agreeing parties will have a complete understanding of the details and limitations of the agreement. It will also avoid misunderstandings as to the exact manner in which each agency will aid the other during times of emergency and help promote the spirit of cooperation and ensure against misunderstanding.

2 Incls
n/c

WFG

D. C.

Govt Section

DISPATCHED 6 MAR 1952 OHQ-FEC A.G.S.

Action continued line 4999.

Copies furnished:
Govt Sec
Comp

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COPY COPY

C/ N 2 - Engr to G4, Thru: Govt Sec & Compt, 22 Jan 52

From: Govt Sec

To: G-4
Thru: Compt
concur Govt Sec

Mr. Monagan, 26-8806
Date: 29 January 1952

3

1. GS concurs with the Engineer Section that cooperation between the Japanese fire defense organizations and the Armed Forces fire defense organizations is necessary in the post-treaty period; but differs in opinion that a formal agreement should be reached between the installations and the municipalities since the Japanese Government Cabinet Liaison Officer, concurrently Chief of the International Cooperation Bureau, Foreign Office, has requested that all agreements with the Japanese and the Security Forces be made through his Bureau on a national level.

2. It is recommended that the fire provost marshal or staff of the local commanders work out a mutually acceptable informal agreement with the local Japanese fire defense organization in the spirit of cooperation. In this manner such agreements, not being formal, will not come within the purview of the International Cooperation Bureau, but will achieve the purpose desired, although Japanese law requires the mayor or headman to furnish fire protection. An informal agreement for reciprocal services will help promote a spirit of cooperation and insure beneficial results.

2 Incls
n/c

- H. R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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SECURITY INFORMATION

RESTRICTED

Mr. Wheeler 26-7166

Legal Status of BSJ

Chairman, Counter-measures Committee	GS (Attn Maj Jay) Thru: G-2	19 Jan 52

Govt Sec files

1 1. Reference is made to attached correspondence from the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Boy Scouts of Japan and to discussions of this subject in the last meeting of the Countermeasures Committee.

2. Pursuant to the latter reference, this correspondence is forwarded with the suggestion of the Committee that this matter be informally discussed with appropriate Japanese Government officials in order to obtain their views on the possibility of affording some legal protection for this important youth organization.

3. It is requested that the Committee be informed of any action taken on this matter through the GS representative on the Committee.

1 Incl:
1 Ltr a/i

Z.C.F. Maj Jay 26-8320

From: Govt Sec To: Chairman, Counter-measures Committee Date: 27 Feb. 52
Thru: G-2

2 1. The correspondence referred to in Para. 1 above, was informally discussed with an official of the Japanese Government. Information has now been received to the effect that the matter is being circulated through the Japanese Government for recommendations.

2. A copy of the letter sent out by the Vice Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to various governmental agencies, is attached as Incl 2.

3. Govt Sec will transmit further information in connection with this matter when it is received from the Japanese Government.

2 Incls
Added 1 Incl
2. Ltr dtd 22 Feb 52

F. R.

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

National Headquarters
BOY SCOUTS OF JAPAN
42 Nishikubo-Tamee-Cho
Shiba, Minato-ku, Tokyo

To Whom it May Concern:

The Boy Scouts of Japan respectfully submit the following requests:

1. That the name, uniform, badges, and insignia of the Boy Scouts of Japan be fully protected by copyright law.

2. That the Boy Scouts of Japan be granted a charter by the Japanese Government.

It is our belief that the Boy Scouts of Japan should be given legal recognition by the Japanese Government, and that no other organization, commercial enterprise, or individual be allowed to use the name, uniform badges, or insignia of the Boy Scouts of Japan. The Boy Scout program is for the benefit of all of the youth of Japan; therefore, the unique character of Scouting should be recognized by law. (Boy Scout movements in other countries are chartered by, and receive legal protection from, the national governments of those countries.)

Very truly yours,

(signed)
Naohiko Koyama
Chairman, Board of Directors
Boy Scouts of Japan

Incl. 1

COPY

Translation

22 February 1952

Kyo-San-Go No. 283

To: Vice-Minister, Ministry of Education
Vice-Minister, Ministry of Finance
Director, Patent Agency
Chief Secretariat, Attorney General's Office

From: Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Use of Name of "Boy Scout"

This Ministry has received an inquiry from the Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as to whether (a) the Japanese Government has any intention to protect the name of the Boy Scout, in view of the fact that the name of the Boy Scout has been used on merchandizes and this does not seem desirable from the nature of the organization (for instance, a whisky is being sold under the name of the "Boy Scout Whisky"); (b) if so, what kind of appropriate counter measures be taken, and (c) by what means and by what time these measures be materialized, although it seems quite difficult to control the abuse of the name of the organization under the existing laws and regulations.

It is therefore requested that this ministry be furnished with the most expedient reply from your office.

Incl. 2

SECURITY INFORMATION
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Major Jay 26-8320

Support of the Japan Olympic Team

GS Chairman, Countermeasures Comm. 2 Feb 52

4 1. GS has no objection to presenting any contemplated program to the Japanese Government for its opinion as recommended in paragraph 4, C/M 3.

2. GS will undertake to determine the opinion of the Japanese Government when requested to initiate such action.

1 Incl
n/c

- F. R. -

GS Files

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Mr Wheeler 26-7166

Support of the Japan Olympic Team

Chairman, Countermeasures Committee — SS — Thru: G-2 — 18 Jan 52

1 — 1. Attached is a paper prepared by CIE at the request of the Countermeasures Committee relative to Japanese participation in the 1952 Olympics and possible ways and means by which the US Armed Forces in Japan can be of some assistance in aiding the financing of such participation.

2. The Committee has reached the conclusion that more information is needed prior to making any recommendations to the CofS on the matter. In order to expedite the overall action separate check notes are being sent to SS, G-1 ESS, COMPT and letters to FEAF and NAVFE.

3. The Committee believes that even token US participation in this program should go far toward improving and cementing amicable and harmonious Japanese-American relations. Your comments and recommendations on this proposal are requested.

1 Incl:
a/i

- E.C.E. -

Capt Ford 26-6588

From : SS — Thru: G-1 — To: Chm, Countermeasures Committee — Date: 24 January 1952

2 — 1. Special Services is fully in accord with the principles set forth in the attached proposal of CI&E insofar as the interest of the Japanese people in the Olympics and the desirability of monetary contributions by the US Forces to assist in sending a delegation of athletes to the games are concerned. However, there are certain factors involved which limit the support that can be provided:

a. Military forces are prohibited from sponsoring charitable and welfare fund raising activities, under the provisions of Section II, Bulletin 8, Department of the Army, 28 May 1951, except for the American Red Cross and the three military relief agencies. While this policy is firm in regards to military sponsorship, CINCFE can appoint DAC's to administer and control fund raising campaigns to which the military may contribute, such as the current March of Dimes drive. This, however, is not considered advisable in view of other contingencies stated below.

b. The Chief of Staff has directed that admission charges be made for FEC Army and Air Force tournaments, conducted in connection with the 1952 Olympics, in order to defray expenses incurred in sending five (5) teams to the ZI. It is estimated that this will necessitate raising approximately $20,000.00 which

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Capt Ford
26-6588

Support of the Japan Olympic Team

SS xx Thru: G-1 24 January 1952
To: Chm, Counter-
measures Committee

2 (cont'd) in itself, will throw a heavy financial burden on the occupation forces. In this connection, it appears that the dollar goal to which the CI&E proposal aspires is an amount in excess of $100,000.00. It is believed that any concentrated efforts on the part of the occupation forces to provide a substantial portion of this amount will detract from our own fund raising activities to a critical degree.

c. The Japanese people, through committees or agencies, can sponsor sports events in which occupation personnel could participate. Admissions, however, would have to be in yen since the Japanese are not authorized to acquire MPC. This would require the establishment of arrangements with the Japanese Government to permit conversion of yen to dollars, which might be accomplished by the maintenance of records showing the numberof tickets sold to occupation force personnel and the granting of special authority by the Japanese Government to convert the yen, representing these sales, to dollars.

2. Based upon the foregoing, this section recommends that:

a. Participation by US Forces in the proposed project be restricted to that of providing teams and/or individual contestants. (In this regard certain facilities now under control of the occupation, such as the Nile Kinnick Stadium or Memorial Hall, could be made available).

b. The administration and control of any funds pertaining thereto be handled entirely by the Japanese.

c. Any publicity attached to participation of US Forces clearly indicate the purpose for which the charges are made in order to avoid any misunderstandings or misconceptions.

1 Incl
n/c

R. W. S.

Lt Col Pangburn/bjm
26-8827

Support of the Japan Olympic Team

G-1 | Chairman, Countermeasures Committee | 1 Feb 52
Thru: Government Section

3 1. G-1 concurs in general with SS, C/N 2. Within the authorized limits referred to above and as specifically referred to in para 1a, C/N 2, it is believed that participation of occupation personnel individually or as teams on a token and/or cooperative basis would be beneficial in cementing amicable relationships with the Japanese people.

2. Japanese Government officials are closest to the problem and their decision on the number to be sent will necessarily be based on factors that include other than that of finances. These additional factors should be considered in any plan to expand the Japan Olympic teams by occupation force activities. Some Japanese Government problems in this connection include:

a. The fact that some reparations creditor nations are sending only token teams to Olympics.

b. Other commitments of the Government require careful plans for funding in foreign exchange.

3. Other methods to finance the program might be suggested such as the use of foreign funds which cannot be otherwise liquidated.

4. G-1 recommends, in addition to SS recommendations in C/N 2, that any contemplated program to provide donation of U.S. dollars directly or indirectly to finance the Japanese Olympic team be brought to the attention of the J.C. for their opinion as to its merits and relationship to Japan's international relations.

5. Any plan or program decided on will require immediate implementation if funds are to be made available in time to permit participation by Japanese teams in the 1952 Olympics.

1 Incl
n/c

Gov't Section

- B. L. M. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Mr. V. Matthews
26-6495

Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

Engr
Thru: Government Sec
AAA Compt
To: G-4

(2) Cont'd installations and municipalities a proposed letter to the major commands concerned is inclosed herewith. Approval and dispatch are recommended.

2 Incls:
Added 1 Incl
2. Prpsd ltr to maj sub comds, AG 600.9( )CE, Subj: Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

D. O.

GS Files

From: Govt Sec
To: G-4
Thru: Compt

Mr. Monagan, 26-8806
Date: 29 January 1952

3. 1. GS concurs with the Engineer Section that cooperation between the Japanese fire defense organizations and the Armed Forces fire defense organizations is necessary in the post-treaty period; but differs in opinion that a formal agreement should be reached between the installations and the municipalities since the Japanese Government Cabinet Liaison Officer, concurrently Chief of the International Cooperation Bureau, Foreign Office, has requested that all agreements with the Japanese and the Security Forces be made through his Bureau on a national level.

2. It is recommended that the fire provost marshal or staff of the local commanders work out a mutually acceptable informal agreement with the local Japanese fire defense organization in the spirit of cooperation. In this manner such agreements, not being formal, will not come within the purview of the International Cooperation Bureau, but will achieve the purpose desired, although Japanese law requires the mayor or headman to furnish fire protection. An informal agreement for reciprocal services will help promote a spirit of cooperation and insure beneficial results.

2 Incl
n/c

F. R.

Mr. V. Matthews
26-6495

Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

Thru: Government Sec
Engr XIX Compt
To: G-4

(2) Cont'd

(1) Article 7, Chapter III provides that fire defense of a city or town shall be controlled by the mayor of the city or the head man of a town or village.

(2) Article 21, Chapter IV provides that the mayor of a city and the head man of a town or village may make mutual aid agreements.

3. It appears that SR 420-510-1, Circular 29, GHQ, FEC, and the Japanese law adequately provide for fire protection for U. S. Forces installations and activities following ratification of the treaty and no further action is necessary on the part of GHQ, FEC to assure that no interruption occurs.

4. In reference to the suggested agreement between the U. S. Forces and the Japanese Government (paragraph 3, C/N 1) the following information is considered pertinent.

a. The Japanese "Fire Law", 26 July 1948, abolished the Kansetsu (National Fire Service) and placed the national fire department under municipal control.

b. The national organization in Japan concerned with matters pertaining to fire defense is the National Fire Defense Board. Article 19, Chapter IV, Law of Fire Defense Organization reads as follows:

> "Article 19. There shall exist neither administrative nor operational control by the National Fire Defense Board over the fire department of cities, towns and villages."

5. In view of the above it is recommended that agreements for fire protection between the Japanese and the U. S. Forces be accomplished at installation and municipal level rather than at U. S. Force and Japanese government level.

6. To aid in the implementation of necessary agreements between the

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DO/WLM/VM/tk

Mr. V. Matthews
26-6495

Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

Engr
Thru: Government Sec
Lt Compt
To: G-4

(2) 1. Fire protection furnished by the Japanese municipalities under the provisions of SCAPIN 2014, 2 June 1949 is limited to those installations and activities located within or a part of a municipality. In these instances no interruption should occur following the ratification of the treaty and subsequent abrogation of SCAPIN 2014 Article 6, Chapter III of the Law of Fire Defense Organization, promulgated 23 December 1947 by the Japanese Government reads as follows:

> "Article 6. Cities, towns and villages shall be responsible for providing adequate fire defense within the boundaries of the respective cities, towns and villages."

2. In instances where an installation or activity is contiguous to a municipality it is desirable that arrangements be made with nearby Japanese fire departments for assistance to the installation fire departments. Authority to make such arrangements, together with the Japanese Laws, governing these agreements appear below:

a. Paragraph 3e, Circular 29, GHQ, FEC, 20 July 1951, reads in part as follows:

> "- - - - Arrangements may be made with municipal fire departments to assist the installation fire department and for response by such fire department installation to areas outside the military reservation at the discretion of the commander concerned."

b. Change 2, Paragraph 19 a, SR 420-510-1, which authorizes contracts for outside aid for military installations reads in part as follows:

> "19 Outside aid - a. Arrangements may be made with nearby fire departments to assist the installation fire department. Contracts may be made to provide such additional protection for a reasonable consideration when the installation is not located within the municipal limits. - - - "

c. Japanese Government Law of Fire Defense Organization includes the following provisions:

Government Sec

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COPY

CHECK SHEET

Col Conway 26-6042

Subject: Post-Treaty Provision of Fire Protection

From: G4 To: Engr Date: 8 Nov 1951

1 1. At a briefing attended by the CofS on 5 Oct 51 Gen Weible discussed certain post-treaty problems facing JLC, and on 6 Oct he forwarded to the CofS the JLC staff-prepared papers which he used for background information for the discussion. The inclosure hereto, withdrawn from JLC letter, is the JLC staff discussion of a problem of concern to the Engineer.

2. On 2 Nov 51 G4 submitted a brief discussion of these items to CofS and recommended that the problems be studied by interested staff sections and appropriate action taken where necessary.

3. Since SCAPIN 2014, covering provision of fire protection for occupation force facilities within or part of a municipality, will become void on the coming into effect of the treaty it will be necessary to consider action to insure that there is no hiatus period during which these facilities will be without fire protection, and to provide that agreement exists between the US forces and the Japanese Government on this matter. In the event the Administrative Agreement does not specifically resolve this problem it will probably be necessary for the bilateral committee, which will come into effect on the conclusion of the treaty, to consider it.

4. Request you study this problem and, in coordination with Government Section and Comptroller, develop a solution to this matter.

1 Incl
Fire Protection

- -G. L. E.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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DO/WLM/VM/tk

AG 600.9 ( )CE

SUBJECT: Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

TO: Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, APO 343
Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command,
General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East Navy No. 1165

1. References:

a. Special Regulations 420-510-1, Change 2, 21 February 1950.

b. Circular 29, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 20 July 1951.

c. SCAPIN 2014, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 8 June 1949.

2. The post treaty period will bring about a changed situation in mutual fire defense arrangements between the Japanese municipalities and the Security Force installations concerned. It is the responsibility of the installation commander to determine the effects of these changes and to take measures to provide an effective fire protection program.

3. Fire protection for Security Force installations and activities, located both in and out of the corporate limits of municipalities, can best be achieved after a complete understanding of the regulations and laws that govern the implementation of this protection.

4. Fire protection for Security Force installations and activities that involve the Japanese can be divided into three classes as follows:

a. Protection now furnished by Japanese municipalities under the provisions of SCAPIN 2014, 8 June 1949, to occupation installations and activities located within the corporate limits of municipalities.

b. Mutual aid defense.

c. Outside aid.

5. With the ratification of the peace treaty SCAPIN 2014 will be void. However, installations and activities located within the corporate limits are still entitled to fire protection from the

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Incl 2

Govt Sec

AG 600.9 ( )CE
SUBJECT: Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

municipalities under the terms of Article 6, Chapter III, Law of Fire Defense Organization, promulgated by the Japanese Government 23 December 1947 which reads as follows:

a. "Article 6: Cities, towns and villages shall be responsible for providing adequate fire defense within the boundaries of the respective cities, towns and villages."

6. Full compliance on the part of the Japanese with the provisions of the Law of Fire Defense Organization will insure continuing fire protection for installations located within the corporate limits of municipalities.

7. Security Force installations and activities located adjacent to municipalities should coordinate the fire defense potential of both departments to insure that full advantage is taken of the protection each can afford the other. This must be done in the spirit of full partnership with the Japanese. The Japanese fire service on the whole is experienced and capable. Chiefs are appointed after many years experience and are qualified to conduct operations at the scene of the fire. Full advantage should be taken of this experience. The best method to provide mutual fire protection is by a mutual aid agreement. Regulations and Laws authorizing these agreements are listed as follows:

a. Paragraph 3e, Circular 29, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 20 July 1951, authorizes the installation commander to arrange for municipal fire departments to assist the installation fire department, and also authorizes the response of the installation fire department to areas outside the military reservation.

b. Article 21, Chapter IV, Japanese Government Law of Fire Defense Organization is the authority for the mayors of a city or the head man of a town or village to enter into mutual aid agreements.

8. There are a few installations in Japan where mutual aid is not desirable and outside aid is required. Change 2, paragraph 19a, Special Regulations 420-510-1 authorizes the installation commander to:

a. Arrange with municipal fire departments to assist the installation fire departments.

b. Arrange for a contract to provide such additional protection for a reasonable consideration when the installation is not located within the municipal limits.

AG 600.9( )GE
SUBJECT: Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

10. Arrangements with municipalities covering mutual aid and/or outside aid will be in writing and will be approved by the commanding officer, as provided in Changes 2, paragraph 19a, Special Regulations 420-510-1.

11. It is desired that installations located adjacent to municipalities give full consideration to the protection that may be provided by the Japanese fire departments and when desirable, arrangements be made to utilize this protection. Mutual aid and outside aid arrangements should be limited however to municipalities where the greatest distance between a municipality fire station and the installation headquarters does not exceed ten (10) miles. It is further desired that mutual aid rather than outside aid form the basis for the arrangements, wherever possible. In exceptional cases where mutual aid is not practicable agreements should make provision to pay for the dispatch of a predetermined number of fire pumpers from nearby municipalities; this number should not exceed limitations imposed by the amount of water available at the installation at the basic rate of 500 gpm per pumper. Equipment to be used in mutual aid or outside aid agreements should be subject to mutual inspection. A cancellation clause should be included in each agreement to be effective if terms of the agreement are not fulfilled.

12. Current Procurement Regulations, General Headquarters, Far East Command, apply to fire protection contracts.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

Copies furnished:
CinC
C/S
G-4
Govt Sec
Compt

SECRET

PERTAINS TO: Ltr, maj sub comds, AG 600.9 ( )CE, subj: Post Treaty Provisions of Fire Protection

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. At a briefing attended by the C/S Gen Weible discussed post-treaty problems facing JLC including the problem of fire protections.

2. It appears that the chief concern centered on the fact that SCAPIN 2014 which provides that fire protection be furnished occupation facilities located within the corporate limits of municipalities will be void with the ratification of the peace treaty.

3. It is believed that this concern is unfounded in that the Japanese enacted a law approximately 18 months prior to publication of SCAPIN 2014 which placed the same responsibility on the Japanese municipality. As this law was being implemented at the time SCAPIN 2014 was published and has continued in force since that time there is no reason to believe fire protection will not be provided to installations and activities within corporate boundaries following the peace treaty.

4. The real problem appears to arise from the mutual aid agreements now in effect between municipalities and installations. In some instances there have been an agreement between the local fire chief and the installation fire chief. In others it has been a demand that the local fire department respond to installation fires without regard for municipal protection. The fault most urgently in need of correction is the assumption by some Americans, that by virtue of being such, they are inherently experts in the field of fire protection. There have been instances where Japanese chiefs, with a life time of fire fighting experience, have been under the operational control of Americans without any fire fighting experience. Unless the Japanese are treated as equal partners in mutual fire defense operations it is believed this type of protection will fail.

5. The instant letter directs that installation commander make a study of the fire defense problem as it exists at their installations and take measures to insure that adequate fire protection is provided following the peace treaty.

6. Action initiated and completed line 7480.

V.M.

Concurrences:
Govt Sec _____
Compt _____
G-4 _____

SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Wheeler
26-7166

Improvement of Japanese-American Relations thru Settlement of Claims Arising from UN Operations in Korea

Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures	GS Mr. Monogan	24 Dec 51

1 1. In its 29th meeting on 20 December 1951, the Countermeasures Committee discussed the harm to good Japanese-American relations and the resulting propaganda material being made available to the Communists arising through our inability to compensate Japanese nationals who suffer damages resulting from activities of the Occupation. The Committee is well aware that US Federal Law prohibits the paying of claims of this type to enemy nationals, i.e., Japanese. The Committee understands that provisions of the Peace Treaty provide for settlement of such claims and that the provisions of the Security Pact provide for claims arising after the Occupation as a result of actions of the Security Forces.

2. One very important field not covered by the above, however, is that of claims arising as a result of damages inflicted in pursuit of activities on behalf of the United Nations, particularly in the interim period before the Treaty comes into effect. In this connection, the recent plane accident at Yokota AFB, as a result of which Japanese homes were destroyed, was cited as an example of damage done, not as a result of any Occupation act, but purely as a result of using Japan as a base for the United Nations operations in Korea. This Yokota incident and similar ones are furnishing valuable material for Communist exploitation. Incl 1 is a translation of a recent Communist propaganda leaflet on this incident. One factor brought out in the Committee discussion of this subject was the fact that Koreans who suffer damages as a result of UN activities are compensated on the spot and it is assumed that the same applies to nationals of other nations not enemies of the United States.

3. From the foregoing, it appears that a very good opportunity to further amicable Japanese-American relations is not only being overlooked but the Communists are thereby being provided an effective propaganda weapon simply because just and equitable action in the settlement of claims is not being taken.

4. The Committee has been informed that while the Japanese Government has machinery to handle such claims and to make compensation, the compensation being made by that agency is a token one only. When a Japanese villager loses his house, its furnishings, and perhaps members of his family, and his only compensation is a few thousand inflated yen, there is little wonder that he has a receptive mind for anything that promises to better his lot, Communist or otherwise. It does seem that in comparison to the untold millions that the US is pouring into Asia to "win friends and influence people", the amounts involved in claims of this nature would be indeed small, not to mention the far reaching effect that magnanimity on the part of the US would have.

GS FILES

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Mr Wheeler
26-7166

Improvement of Japanese-American Relations thru Settlement of Claims Arising from UN Operations in Korea

Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures — GS — 24 Dec 51

1 (Cont'd) 5. This problem, in the eyes of the Committee, merits careful consideration. If the settlement of such claims is prohibited under existing rules and regulations, then it would appear that a proposal for the means with which to accomplish this action would be in order. Your comments and recommendations are, therefore, requested with the ultimate view of making appropriate recommendations to the CinC.

1 Incl:
Transl a/i

- E. C. E. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

From: Govt Sec — To: Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures — Mr. Monagan, 26-8806 — Date: 3 January 1952

2 GS believes that Japanese nationals who suffer injury or property damage as a result of UN action as distinguished from Occupation actions are equitably entitled to compensation and that means should be found to accomplish such payments. GS leaves discussion of the technical aspects of the problem to the appropriate staff sections within whose responsibility the establishment of a legal method of payment and a source of funds belongs.

1 Incl
w/d

- F.R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE YOKOTA INCIDENT

Newspapers of the 19th reported an incident in which a burning American plane crashed into Japanese homes near YOKOTA, an U.S. Army air base, killing and wounding many Japanese and destroying homes.

With regard to this incident, the people living near the Yokota Air Base gave the following account, revealing their hatred and anger:

American planes, loaded heavily with bombs, take off from Yokota to KOREA particularly every day to kill the Korean people. On this particular day, also, many planes took off from the base to kill people.

One of the planes developed engine trouble shortly after the take-off and returned to the base. However, if the crippled plane had attempted to land loaded with the bombs, it would have been blown to pieces, to say nothing of the airfield. The Americans, therefore, dropped the bombs on the absolutely innocent Japanese people, killing and wounding many of them and destroying their homes.

It is said that despite the fact that the Americans killed many Japanese by dropping bombs on them, they made a safe landing with only slight damages to their plane. The whole crew is said to be well and sound, except for a few scratches.

Moreover, according to the story of a person living over two and a half miles away from this stricken area, the explosions of the bomb sounded as though atomic bombs were dropped.

The newspapers did not reveal the truth to the Japanese people, instead they reported that the damages were caused because the plane crashed in flames. They have thus reduced themselves to the position of slaves of the Americans and have revealed that they are traitors. The truth, however, cannot be suppressed by any authority. The fact that the Americans on that plane saved their own lives at the cost of many Japanese lives is being told from one person to another, and the people are looking upon the Americans with hatred and indignation.

Moreover, a certain person made the following remark: "The Americans have killed a great number of Koreans, but not satisfied with this, they have even killed the Japanese. They are not human beings. They save their own lives by killing innocent Japanese. We are not slaves."

"YOSHIDA has approved such incidents for his own gains. And, despite the fact that the livelihood of the people is in a hopeless state just because of the Americans, he has concluded an enslaving treaty with the Americans, a treaty which begs the Americans to permanently use all of Japan.

"Unless the Americans and YOSHIDA and his cohorts are driven out of JAPAN, not only will such incidents continue to occur, but we will be dragged into war. Let us drive them out of JAPAN."

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Maj. Monagan
26-8806

Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

Govt Sec PayWar 4 December 1951

2. 1. In response to the request of your Section the reasons for Government Section's non-concurrence in the proposal and recommendations contained in paragraphs 6 and 9 of PayWar Check Note No. 1 above are listed below:

a. The return of the property in question to the city of Kyoto is not believed to be an appropriate occasion for American-Japanese commemorative public celebration and ceremony.

(1) In the estimate of Kyotoans such properties as the Daiken Building, Miyako Hotel, Kyoto Hotel and the area near the Heian Shrine are more important both intrinsically and sentimentally than the Nishi Kyogoku Stadium.

(2) Return of the stadium does not initiate a wholesale return of properties to the Japanese.

(3) A ceremony that would attract widespread attention to the return of the stadium would invite an avalanche of requests and raise the existing pressure for the return of other properties, many of which the U.S. Forces plan to retain. This would create disappointment and distrust.

b. To commit the SCAP to a somewhat empty gesture would dilute his prestige among discriminating Japanese.

c. It is believed that the Prime Minister would not voluntarily participate in the proposed ceremony although he might be induced to attend if he were given to understand that the SCAP expected him to do so. This would be an undesirable form of pressure on a personage whose handling calls for the greatest degree of care.

d. It is believed that the proposed ceremony would create just the sort of over-emphasis which would boomerang to the detriment of U.S.-Japanese relations.

2. In view of the foregoing, Government Section recommends that the property be returned without fanfare, routinely and quietly, letting the action speak for itself.

2 Incls
n/c

- F.R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Returned 1 Dec 51 Maj Deering/jf 26-6914 now C/W w. thru w/up

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: PWS 602.5 Subject: Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

Note No.	From: PsyWar	Thru: ACofS G-3 To : CofS	Date: 29 November 1951

1

1. Reference Paragraph 3a(7) of the attached staff study by the Committee on Countermeasures which was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, on 6 November for further exploration by appropriate staff agencies. (Tab A)

2. Authoritative reports indicate increasing evidence of a growing anti-U.S. reaction, unquestionably stimulated by the Communists. Hence the need for recognizing sensitive areas susceptible to irritation by the communists, and for taking countermeasures designed to produce the desired impact on the public consciousness. Japanese properties of wide sentimental significance, now being used by the Occupation, comprise just such an area.

3. If an event of logical newsmaking propensity is staged, the return of these properties to the Japanese will offer opportunities for legitimate propaganda exploitation to form public opinion favorable to U. S. policy.

4. The Municipal Nishi Kyogoku Stadium at Kyoto is scheduled by the Japan Logistical Command for early return to the city of Kyoto, an action qualifying under the preceding paragraph. As the first large public property to be returned by the Occupation it heralds the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan, and properly sets the stage for a demonstration of solidarity between the U. S. and Japan, Security Pact partners of the future.

5. Moreover, Kyoto itself is of wide sentimental significance to all Japanese, a fact which probably has not escaped the communists. On two recent occasions there, small student communist groups demonstrated against the Occupation and against the Emperor, actions which have aroused popular sentiment against the communists by the majority of Kyoto's populace, intensely loyal to the status quo.

6. It is proposed that the Municipality of Kyoto hold a civic celebration on December 15 to signalize the return of this property. December 15 has been selected because later dates conflict with Christmas, or go into competition with similar but more news-worthy events of New Years. The celebration would be high-lighted by a football game in Municipal Nishi Kyogoku Stadium between all-star teams selected from U. S. Occupation schools and Japanese schools--typifying the new, postwar generation, the citizens of tomorrow--symbolic of the Japanese-American amity of the future. The Commander-in-Chief and Japan's Prime Minister could appear for a brief ceremonial in which the CinC would acknowledge that the use of these and

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

CHECK SHEET

Major Dearing/jf
26-6914

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: PWS 602.5 Subject: Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

Note No.	From: PsyWar	Thru: ACofS G-3 To: CofS	Date: 29 November 1951

1 (cont'd) other facilities has not been without some sacrifice on the part of the Japanese, call attention to the good sportsmanship and fine competitive spirit of the day's game, "bringing together the youth of Japan and America as, indeed, together they are prepared to face the future", etc.

7. Both the football game and ceremony will be of logical news interest for extensive coverage by radio, newsreels, wire services and newspapers, throughout Japan and overseas, and as such should serve admirably to implement U. S. policy.

8. This celebration if given full encouragement and support by GHQ should go far to (a) strengthen U. S.-Japan relations throughout Japan, (b) deal the communists a decisive blow in a community of national influence, and (c) register abroad the fact of U. S.-Japanese solidarity.

9. It is recommended (1) that PsyWar, in coordination with CG, Southwest Command, be authorized to work actively with the Kyoto city officials to develop the celebration, and (2) that the CinC's schedule be arranged to permit him to accept the Kyoto invitation.

2 Incls
1. Tab A-Staff Study on J-A relations
2. Tab B-Concurrences

JWG

Concurrences:
ACofS G-1 ( )
ACofS G-2 ( )
ACofS G-4 ( )
CIE ( )
DS ( )
GS ( )
PIO ( )
TIE ( )

From: Govt Sec To: Psywar Maj. Monagan, 26-8806 Date: 30 Nov 1951

2. Nonconcur in suggestion as inappropriate.

1 Incl
= 1. w/d

F.R.

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MEMORANDUM

December 3, 1951

SUBJECT: FUTURE PROBLEMS IN UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

With the re-establishment of Japan's international position as a sovereign state, the United States appears destined to face a number of serious problems in its future relations with Japan and the Japanese people. Some of these problems are the direct outcome of defeat in the Pacific War and the consequent reduction of Japan from a once ambitious, powerful and comparatively wealthy empire to a small, congested nation compelled for want of sufficient natural resources to live on a marginal if not austere economy. Other problems have grown out of the results of six years of a predominantly American occupation with its efforts to overhaul and remodel a proud and tradition-conscious people's political, economic and social concepts. Still other problems will arise from the new and unusual relationship which has developed between the United States and Japan as a result of the cold war between the Soviet bloc and the democratic nations wherein Japan, through no choice of her own, has acquired a new political and strategic significance. Each problem discussed below cannot be considered as a self-contained entity lending itself to any single, specific solution. These various political, economic, cultural and social problems interplay on each other thereby defying any piece-meal remedies. From the standpoint of the United States, however, it may be said that the numerous facets shape up into one principal issue, namely, the fact that the United States has acquired a basic interest in Japan's future security.

By virtue of its leading role in Japan's defeat, the administration of the Occupation, and the bringing about of the peace settlement, the United States has come to face both explicit and implicit responsibilities for Japan's future. These responsibilities are twofold. On the one hand, there are responsibilities to the other democratic nations of the world, and on the other hand, there are responsibilities to the new Japanese democratic nation and its people. The United States has in effect become Japan's sponsor, a difficult role which may at times conflict with United States policies and obligations toward other countries, especially in Asia, with the domestic and international interests of the United States, and also with the ambitions and aspirations of the Japanese themselves.

I. Political Problems

1. Japan's Security. The United States has acquired a vital interest in Japan's future security, and in order to achieve this objective has concluded a Security Treaty with Japan.

The conclusion of the Security Treaty, however, has been opposed by an indeterminate but nevertheless considerable segment of Japanese opinion.

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This opposition represents primarily the Socialist Party (and other left-wing parties including the Communist), certain groups among organized labor, student elements, a large part of the intelligentsia, and certain ultra-rightists. Opposition to the Security Treaty is based on two general considerations. There is a widespread belief that a security arrangement with the United States (or with any one country) is neither necessary nor desirable. It is unnecessary because Japan is supposedly not menaced and can derive adequate security by neutrality and reliance upon the United Nations. It is undesirable because alignment with the United States makes Japan choose sides in the cold war thereby alienating Japan from normal relations with Communist Asia and exposing Japan to attack in the event of an East-West conflict. The Security Treaty is also undesirable to many of its critics because it will necessitate rearmament which is not only too costly for Japan's present economy, but, it is charged, will in turn revive and strengthen militarism and other right-wing tendencies. On the other hand, there are many Japanese who are not opposed to the Security Treaty in principle but fear that its implementation through the Administrative Agreement will compel Japan to assume heavy financial burdens as well as onerous if not humiliating obligations, such as providing what appear to the Japanese as extravagant living facilities and extraterritorial privileges and immunities for the United States garrison forces.

Japanese opposition to the Security Treaty cannot be regarded as a temporary phenomenon which will disappear after the immediate issues involved in concluding the Administrative Agreement are negotiated. The mere presence in a sovereign Japan of large numbers of security force personnel and their dependents will keep the issue alive. This unique post-peace treaty military position of the United States in Japan might well involve numerous jurisdictional problems, incidents, resentments, and a wide range of cultural and social adjustments which will present continuing issues not only for commanding officers of the units concerned but for the future American Embassy which will most likely become the focal point for all Japanese grievances and criticism. Moreover, it is to be expected that opposition elements in Japanese politics will utilize as fully as possible the emotional aspects of Japanese resentment and opposition to the security force and its related issues.

2. Japan's Rearmament. Closely related to opposition to the Security Treaty is the critical Japanese attitude toward suggestions for Japan's rearmament. Rearmament is and will continue to be opposed by many Japanese not only because of the financial burdens involved but also because of what are believed to be its undesirable consequences in strengthening militaristic and rightist tendencies. Since the United States will, in all probability, encourage Japan's rearmament and be directly associated with the rebuilding of Japanese ground, sea and air forces, the United States will be in turn directly identified with a highly controversial domestic political issue.

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3. Polarization of Japanese Politics. For the foreseeable future it appears that Japanese politics is destined to become even more polarized, with a strong conservative party having many rightist aspects confronting a left wing under Communist or ultra-radical Socialist leadership bridged by a weak and indecisive political center. Japan will thus remain in all probability under extreme conservative leadership. This conservative leadership will, moreover, foster and encourage various conservative trends in Japanese life, many of which will endeavor to revive pre-war institutions and concepts. As the controlling force and center of real power in Japanese politics, it will accordingly be necessary for the United States to recognize and work through this conservative leadership in implementing its future policies in Japan. There will therefore be a strong tendency for the United States to be identified with Japanese conservatism in a manner which will inject the United States into controversial domestic political issues, especially those arising from the increasing tension between the conservative and leftist forces. The polarization of Japanese politics combined with the present conservative trend in Japan and United States efforts to establish a practical means of providing for Japan's security have gone far to alienate from the United States the Japanese liberals and intelligentsia who in many ways may be regarded as the most democratic elements in the country. The United States is thus finding itself in the difficult position of undermining its own previous efforts to make Japan a democratic country.

4. Occupation Reforms. Conservative Japanese leadership is already giving a strong indication of a desire to modify or eliminate many of the Occupation reforms. This effort may very likely be accelerated after Japan recovers sovereignty and will confront the United States with a number of difficult problems. To acquiesce completely in any Japanese effort to abolish or modify drastically Occupation-inspired reforms would have serious repercussions not only in the United States and such countries as the Philippines and Australia, but also in Japan, tending to turn further the liberal elements against the United States. On the other hand, to resist this conservative effort to modify or abolish reforms would be interpreted by many Japanese as an unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, an argument which might even find support from such countries as India.

5. Japanese Relations with China. For the foreseeable future it would appear undesirable for the United States to permit Japan to open normal political and economic relations with Communist China. The enforcement of such a restraint on a sovereign Japan may prove exceedingly difficult and require measures on the part of the United States which will be strongly resented by a great many Japanese. At present there is considerable pressure against the Japanese Government to consider re-establishing relations with continental China regardless of the political or ideological problems involved. This pressure is generated not only by the Japanese Communists and other left-wing elements, but by influential business groups and many intellectuals.

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The supposed advantages of trade are the principal reasons behind this pressure, but there are also non-Communist political arguments to the general effect that Japan cannot for its own future security and well-being remain indefinitely insulated from such an important country which is almost a next-door neighbor.

6. The Reliability of the United States as an Ally. In the post-treaty period the United States will continually have to face suspicion on the part of many Japanese that the United States is unreliable as an ally. One argument used against the Security Treaty as well as against any too close alignment with the United States as opposed to the Communist bloc is the contention that Japan cannot rely upon the United States to provide for its defense and security. Even among many Japanese who are not necessarily inclined to question the reliability and good faith of the United States in general, there is an underlying fear that in any global conflict the United States would pursue a Europe-first policy as a consequence of which it would be necessary to abandon temporarily Japan even if this were to involve Japan's invasion by Soviet or Chinese Communist forces. While many Japanese may recognize the necessity of such a decision in [illegible] a global war, the prospect of Soviet or Chinese Communist occupation [illegible] concern and makes many Japanese wonder if there is really sufficient advantage to Japan in a security alignment with the United States.

II. Economic Problems

1. The Overall Problem of Japan's Existence. Because of the responsibilities assumed by virtue of its paramount role in the Occupation, the United States has had a direct interest in solving the basic problems of Japan's existence. Although direct United States aid has ceased, problems associated with Japan's efforts to be economically self-sufficient will doubtless persist, and as Japan's ally it is difficult to see how the United States can remain indifferent to them. For their own part, the Japanese will naturally keep looking to the United States for the answers, and for aid if necessary. In a sense the United States will be virtually open to a form of international blackmail on this issue, for unless Japan's basic problems of existence are met to some reasonable extent, the United States must face the consequence of diminishing enthusiasm and support for the alliance with the United States and concurrent efforts to associate with Communist Asia.

2. Problems of Japanese Trade. In order to solve Japan's problems of existence without resorting to charitable hand-outs, it will be necessary for the United States to encourage and assist Japan in finding expanded sources of foreign trade. This will in turn involve the twofold problem of reconciling the expansion of Japanese trade with American domestic interests and the conflicting interests of other countries, especially those areas where there will revive or develop opposition to Japanese imports or to Japanese participation in economic development.

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3. Japan's Role in War Production. Japan's industrial capacity has an important role to play in the economic defense program of the United States. There is already manifested in Japan, however, considerable opposition to the suggestion that Japan's industry help to meet the defense requirements of the free world. This opposition, so far largely of leftist origin, pictures Japan as becoming an under-paid sub-contractor for the United States defense effort and raises the bogey of higher living costs and lowered living standards in consequence of such alleged economic exploitation.

4. Post-Treaty Economic Controls. By virtue of Japan's ability to participate in the defense program of the United States, there arises the problem of the need for an extension of war-economy types of controls in Japan. It would be impossible to mesh the economic capacities of the two countries for a major defense effort without some form of control or regulation. Yet the degree to which war-economy controls or regulations appear to be adopted at the insistence of the United States will pose a serious problem having far-reaching domestic political implications in Japan and affecting Japanese enthusiasms for and support of the United States-Japan partnership.

5. Reparations. In its efforts to eliminate or restrict reparations claims against Japan, the United States has already incurred some misgiving and distrust on the part of the Philippines and Indonesia. At the same time, United States efforts to work out a feasible solution of this problem in the Peace Treaty have raised considerable concern among the Japanese. The reparations issue will undoubtedly remain a sore point after the Peace Treaty comes into force and greater Japanese opposition to reparations payments can be anticipated.

III. Cultural and Social Problems

The future close relationship between the United States and Japan as a result of the Security Treaty will raise a number of important cultural and social problems any one of which by itself may seem inconsequential buy which in the aggregate could have almost adverse effect on relations between the two countries.

1. United States Cultural Activity in Japan. The United States presumably intends to embark upon a very vigorous and positive cultural exchange and informational program in Japan after the Peace Treaty comes into force. In most respects such activity will have a desirable if not necessary part in building mutual goodwill. Moreover, it will be in part through such activity that it will be possible to mitigate some of the other political and economic problems the United States must face in its future relationship with Japan. Nevertheless, there exists the danger of over-shooting the mark in cultural exchange and informational activities.

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It will be most necessary for the United States to avoid charges of "cultural imperialism" and "cultural penetration". Skill will be required not to antagonize Japanese cultural sensitivities by what may appear to be efforts to "Americanize" the Japanese. While cultural and informational activities can help solve other problems, it is also necessary to recognize that the solution or partial solution of these other problems will have in turn a direct bearing on how successful cultural and informational work can be.

2. Social Adjustments. As a result of the Security Treaty a fairly large American population will be living for some years to come in Japan. The large American population under the Occupation has presented various problems of social adjustment which have only been given really serious consideration in the past year. This problem will, however, be greatly intensified when this large American population finds itself living in an independent, sovereign nation.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Major Dearing/jf
26-6914

SUBJECT: Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

File No. PWS 602.5

From: PayWar Thru: ACofS G-3 Date: 29 November 1951
To : CofS

1. 1. Reference Paragraph 3a(7) of the attached staff study by the Committee on Countermeasures which was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, on 6 November for further exploration by appropriate staff agencies. (Tab A)

2. Authoritative reports indicate increasing evidence of a growing anti-U.S. reaction, unquestionably stimulated by the Communists. Hence the need for recognizing sensitive areas susceptible to irritation by the communists, and for taking countermeasures designed to produce the desired impact on the public consciousness. Japanese properties of wide sentimental significance, now being used by the Occupation, comprise just such an area.

3. If an event of logical newsmaking propensity is staged, the return of these properties to the Japanese will offer opportunities for legitimate propaganda exploitation to form public opinion favorable to U.S. policy.

4. The Municipal Nishi Kyogoku Stadium at Kyoto is scheduled by the Japan Logistical Command for early return to the city of Kyoto, an action qualifying under the preceding paragraph. As the first large public property to be returned by the Occupation it heralds the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan, and properly sets the stage for a demonstration of solidarity between the U.S. and Japan, Security Pact partners of the future.

5. Moreover, Kyoto itself is of wide sentimental significance to all Japanese , a fact which probably has not escaped the communists. On two recent occasions there, small student communist groups demonstrated against the Occupation and against the Emperor, actions which have aroused popular sentiment against the communists by the majority of Kyoto's populace, intensely loyal to the status quo.

6. It is proposed that the Municipality of Kyoto hold a civic celebration on December 15 to signalize the return of this property. December 15 has been selected because later dates conflict with Christmas, or go into competition with similar but more news-worthy events of New Years. The celebration would be high-lighted by a football game in Municipal Nishi Kyogoku Stadium between all-star teams selected from U.S. Occupation schools and Japanese schools--typifying the new, postwar generation, the citizens of tomorrow--symbolic of the Japanese-American amity of the future. The Commander-in-Chief and Japan's Prime Minister could appear for a brief ceremonial in which the CinC would acknowledge that the use of these and

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SECRET 5

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Major Dearing/jf
26-6914

SUBJECT: Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

From: PsyWar | Thru: ACofS G-3 | Date: 29 November 1951
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9. It is recommended (1) that PsyWar, in coordination with CG, Southwest Command, be authorized to work actively with the Kyoto City officials to develop the celebration, and (2) that the CinC's schedule be arranged to permit him to accept the Kyoto invitation.

2 Incls
1. Tab A-Staff Study on J-A relations
2. Tab B-Concurrences

------------------------- J W G ----------

Concurrences:
ACofS G-1 ( )
ACofS G-2 ( )
ACofS G-4 ( )
CIE ( )
DS ( )
GS ( )
PIO ( )
TIE ( )

From: Govt Sec | To: Psywar | Maj. Monagan, 26-8806
Date: 30 Nov 1951

2. Nonconcur in suggestion as inappropriate.

1 Incl
= 1. w/d ------------------- F.R. -----------

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

Secret Security Information

SUBJECT: EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR IMPROVING JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING TRANSITION OF SOVEREIGNTY FROM OCCUPATION TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

1. PROBLEM.

a. To eliminate potential reaction among elements of the Japanese population during the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.

b. To exploit legitimate public relations opportunities for insuring lasting goodwill among the Japanese while phasing out the Occupation.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. The realization of democratic institutions in Japan, has perforce, alienated two potent segments of the population, groups represented by Japan's influential military and industrial leaders, which conceivably could develop into a strong reactionary force, detrimental both to Japanese democratic institutions and to future U.S. - Japan relations.

b. During the past year, virulent nationalism has erupted throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Asia, creating unrest and engendering a dangerous anti-American sentiment.

c. In some incidences these nationalist movements are known to have been Moscow inspired and directed.

d. Occupation policies in Japan, which were necessary immediately after World War II, reviewed in the light of these trends would determine whether their continuance appropriately serves future plans for Japan, plans which were not envisaged when all the Allied Powers drafted such policies.

e. Where it is reasonably certain that specific Occupation policies will be invalidated by the Japanese government soon after its sovereignty is restored, the Occupation would be well advised to invalidate them itself, both to gain goodwill and to attenuate forces of reaction before they may become crystalized.

f. Public sentiment is volatile. It will adopt its own course when no hand guides it. In the absence of a comprehensive, coordinated plan to safeguard the goodwill of the Japanese, communist and nationalist extremes, together or separately, abetted by external pressures from the North and West

into a strong reactionary force, detrimental both to Japan's democratic institutions and to future U.S. - Japan relations.

b. During the past year, virulent nationalism has erupted throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Asia, creating unrest and engendering a dangerous anti-American sentiment.

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d. Occupation policies in Japan, which were necessary immediately after World War II, reviewed in the light of these trends would determine whether their continuance appropriately serves future plans for Japan, plans which were not envisaged when all the Allied Powers drafted such policies.

e. Where it is reasonably certain that specific Occupation policies will be invalidated by the Japanese government soon after its sovereignty is restored, the Occupation would be well advised to invalidate them itself, both to gain goodwill and to attenuate forces of reaction before they may become crystalized.

f. Public sentiment is volatile. It will adopt its own course when no hand guides it. In the absence of a comprehensive, coordinated plan to safeguard the goodwill of the Japanese, communist and nationalist extremes, together or separately, abetted by external pressures from the North and West (pressures which are certain to be intensified after the Occupation) can make extremely difficult the post occupation roles of both the State Department and Security Pact Armed Forces agencies.

g. Between now and the end of the Occupation, the United States has an unusual opportunity to create favorable impressions of enduring value, an opportunity which it will have but once.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Restrictive Measures to be Further Reviewed. To bring about the democratic evolution of Japan, a wedge was driven into the population structure isolating industrial and military groups. By following depurging processes from the bottom up, the leaders, the real centers of greatest influence remain alienated and incipiently reactionary. Yet their influence grows as the Occupation declines.

(1) Industrialists. No less needed by Japan to breast the economic storms of its post-occupation period are competent business and industrial leaders. The purpose in purging those, as in the case of the

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militerists was to destroy the industrial capacity to wage an imperialistic war. Now that this has been accomplished there remains little to be gained by disfranchising this group, while rancor, bitterness and reaction can be the result, and Japan's economic well being is penalized. "Trust busting", an extremely difficult legal and moral process even in an enlightened democracy, can become almost fictional in an ancient community where business ties are family ties, and family ties can be rigged thru "adoptions" to suit any convenience. To now depurge all Japanese industrialists, who are neither guilty of crimes or suspected of subversion, does not condone collusion, combinations in restraint of trade, or unbridled acts incompatible with fair trade laws and ethical practice, and here again reaction may be halted before it gains momentum.

(2) War Criminals. War criminals now serving prison terms, who were not convicted of brutalities or other violations of the Geneva Conventions, for all the reasons heretofore established might profitably be considered for amnesty. A petition for their release is now being prepared for circulation among all the lawyers of Japan. It will doubtless gather thousands of signatures, and some foreign support. After the Occupation ends can the Yoshida government withstand this kind of pressure? It may be better that an Occupation initiated amnesty be granted.

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(6) Relations With Individual Japanese.

(a) The CinC's statement of 28 October that U.S. occupying forces now consider themselves guests of the Japanese might go progressively further and require that an amount of objectivity inspire our efforts to improve relations with the Japanese. This, in short, would mean permitting Japanese nationals to be guests of the U.S. forces wherever other nationals are permitted as guests, including military messes. If, from a practical standpoint, this imposes a burden on messing facilities,

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the privileges may be limited to officers messes while ascertaining the problems involved.

(b) Despite directives issued by GHQ there still remain a number of obnoxious signs and other injunctions discriminating against Japanese nationals. If not already accomplished, the inclusion of these directives in the Inspector General's check notes would soon result in remedial action.

(7) Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance. Within the requirements of the Korean War, and those of the military establishment in Japan is the use of certain national shrines and athletic areas which are of considerable sentimental significance to the Japanese people. When other such facilities may be substituted for these, the Occupation might well deprive itself of their use with considerable benefit in goodwill. In Tokyo, for example, these include the Meiji Stadium, National Youth Center and Swimming Pool, and Memorial Hall. It would seem desirable to signalize the return of these to the Japanese with appropriate ceremonies or athletic events of joint U.S. - Japanese participation.

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Where practical, it would be appropriate, at a given signal, to lower the American flag over certain official installations and to raise Japanese colors. This could be done throughout Japan at the same hour, so that the sentimental significance of the demonstration would be nationwide, in as many prefectures and communities as there are American installations. Appropriate also, and useful for oversees consumption, would be demonstrations of US Naval strength in these waters, as well as a moderate show of U.S. air power. These arms will symbolize the power the United States intends to keep for Japan's protection-emphasis on their strength can be beneficial in reassuring the Japanese as well as registering appropriate

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SECRET

Relinquishing Certain Japanese Properties of Sentimental Significance

CS FILES

Maj. Monagan, 26-8806

From: Govt Sec To: Psywar Section Date: 10 November 1951

2. In accordance with [illegible], Government Section concurs in policy of returning to Japanese control facilities not needed by the occupation. The determination as to whether the Meiji Stadium is such a facility is left to the appropriate staff section.

1 Incl n/e

F.R.

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SECRET

Major Monagan 26-8806

Measures for Improving Japanese-American Relations

GS | Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures | 14 November 1951

1. The following comments pertain to those subjects in the memorandum attached to checknote 1 which relate to Government Section's sphere of responsibility:

a. Paragraph 3a (1). Based upon the recommendation of Government Section, a depurge program was approved in April 1951, announced early in May and subsequently carried out. As a result of this program, out of 193,602 persons who were subject to purge restrictions on 3 May 1951, 175,825, or fully 90.6%, have been released from purge designation. This program has been carried out without any change in either the governing Far Eastern Commission Directives (FEC 014/10 and FEC 017/20) or SCAP Memorandum (SCAPIN 550 of 4 Jan 46). It was achieved by permitting the Japanese to modify their implementing ordinances and thereafter to screen all purgees in accord with certain minimum standards worked out with the advice of GS. To insure a further review to any remaining purgees whose designation might be considered unjust, an appeal procedure will be established to receive and pass on appeals from individuals who feel that they have meritorious cases. This is as far as any relaxation could possibly go without openly and flagrantly defying the controlling Far Eastern Commission Directive which will be binding on the Supreme Commander until the end of the Occupation.

b. Paragraph 3a (4) and (5). GS for sometime has been coordinating with ESS/PI on these matters. The limiting factor is SCAPIN 338, which is based on specific provisions of JCS 1380/15. It is understood that ESS is preparing an appropriate recommendation to be cleared with Washington.

2. Throughout paragraph 2 of the memorandum appears to run a premise that policies pursued by the Occupation were such as to alienate important Japanese opinion and that, therefore, now that the Occupation is about to end, the Headquarters should repudiate those policies in order to create favorable Japanese opinion. GS believes that this approach is fundamentally wrong and that the correct approach is that those policies which were restrictive or corrective in nature have served their purpose, (i.e. the Japanese have learned their lesson) and that if relaxation has been encouraged during the last two years it is because the Japanese have become trustworthy - not because the United States has turned its back on the policies which our forces came to Japan to enforce. Specifically, GS questions the validity of the premise which seems to underlie the memorandum and of certain statements explicitly made therein. GS does not believe that "The realization of democratic institutions in Japan has perforce alienated" any segments of the Japanese population that are worthy

GS Files

Major Monagan 26-8806

Measures for Improving Japanese-American Relations

GS — Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures — 14 November 1951

2 (Cont'd) of consideration. The military and industrial leaders specifically mentioned in paragraph 2a are, in the opinion of GS, not anti-American even though many of them were subjected to the restrictions of the Purge and other SCAP directives during the Occupation. In the experience of this Section, only a few individuals have developed a hostile attitude. The majority of them accepted the restrictions to which they were subjected as being necessary and proper.

1 Incl
n/c

- F. R. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

C O P Y

Colonel Ewert 26-6358

File No:

Measures for Improving Japanese-American Relations

1 From: Chairman, Committee on Countermeasures To: All Staff Sections GHQ, FEC & SCAP Date: 8 November 51 CI Div/ECE/me

1. The Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, on 6 November approved the recommendation of the Committee on Countermeasures that the attached report on suggestions for improving Japanese-American relations during the transition period from now until the effective date of the Peace Treaty be circulated to staff sections for comment on the desirability and feasibility of taking action on those portions of the report coming within the sphere of the staff section's appropriate responsibilities as well as for the securing of any additional suggestions which the Chief of Staff Section may desire to bring to the attention of the Committee.

2. Since the next meeting of the Committee is scheduled for 0930 Thursday 15 November, it would be appreciated if these comments could be received by the Chairman, Room 503, NYK Building (Civil Intelligence Division/G-2), before that time.

1 Incl:
Report

- E. C. E. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECURITY INFORMATION

C O P Y

SECRET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

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9/16

Colonel Ewert 26-6358

CHECK SHEET

File No:

Subject: Measures for Improving Japanese-American Relations

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9 NOV 1951
GHQ FEC
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SECURITY INFORMATION

Secret 2

Secret Security Information

SUBJECT: EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR IMPROVING JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING TRANSITION OF SOVEREIGNTY FROM OCCUPATION TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

1. PROBLEM.

a. To eliminate potential reaction among elements of the Japanese population during the restoration of Japanese sovereignty.

b. To exploit legitimate public relations opportunities for insuring lasting goodwill among the Japanese while phasing out the Occupation.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. The realization of democratic institutions in Japan, has perforce alienated two potent segments of the population, groups represented by Japan's influential military and industrial leaders, which conceivably could develop into a strong reactionary force, detrimental both to Japanese democratic institutions and to future U.S. - Japan relations.

b. During the past year, virulent nationalism has erupted throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Southern Asia, creating unrest and engendering a dangerous anti-American sentiment.

c. In some incidences these nationalist movements are known to have been Moscow inspired and directed.

d. Occupation policies in Japan, which were necessary immediately after World War II, reviewed in the light of these trends would determine whether their continuance appropriately serves future plans for Japan, plans which were not envisaged when all the Allied Powers drafted such policies.

e. Where it is reasonably certain that specific Occupation policies will be invalidated by the Japanese government soon after its sovereignty is restored, the Occupation would be well advised to invalidate them itself, both to gain goodwill and to attenuate forces of reaction before they may become crystalized.

f. Public sentiment is volatile. It will adopt its own course when no hand guides it. In the absence of a comprehensive, coordinated plan to safeguard the goodwill of the Japanese [illegible] nationalist extremes

into a strong reactionary force, detrimental both to Japanese democratic institutions and to future U.S. - Japan relations.

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f. Public sentiment is volatile. It will adopt its own course when no hand guides it. In the absence of a comprehensive, coordinated plan to safeguard the goodwill of the Japanese, communist and nationalist extremes, together or separately, abetted by external pressures from the North and West (pressures which are certain to be intensified after the Occupation) can make extremely difficult the post occupation roles of both the State Department and Security Pact Armed Forces agencies.

g. Between now and the end of the Occupation, the United States has an unusual opportunity to create favorable impressions of enduring value, an opportunity which it will have but once.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. Restrictive Measures to be Further Reviewed. To bring about the democratic evolution of Japan, a wedge was driven into the population structure isolating industrial and military groups. By following depurging processes from the bottom up, the leaders, the real centers of greatest influence remain alienated and incipiently reactionary. Yet their influence grows as the Occupation declines.

(1) Industrialists. No less needed by Japan to breast the economic storms of its post-occupation period are competent business and industrial leaders. The purpose in purging those, as in the case of the

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militarists was to destroy the industrial capacity to wage an imperialistic war. Now that this has been accomplished there remains little to be gained by disfranchising this group, while rancor, bitterness and reaction can be the result, and Japan's economic well being is penalized. "Trust busting", an extremely difficult legal and moral process even in an enlightened democracy, can become almost fictional in an ancient community where business ties are family ties, and family ties can be rigged thru "adoptions to suit any convenience. To now depurge all Japanese industrialists, who are neither guilty of crimes or suspected of subversion, does not condone collusion, combinations in restraint of trade, or unbridled acts incompatible with fair trade laws and ethical practice, and here again reaction may be halted before it gains momentum.

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128/5

Ltr, Hq & Svc Comd, GHQ, FEC, HC 388 (GD), subj: Post-Japan Peace Planning, undated

AG 388, GC-P 1st Ind

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 11 August 1951

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500

1. The attached "GHQ, FEC and Hq & Svc Comd, GHQ FEC Troop Basis for Post-Treaty Planning" with explanatory notes and inclosures thereto, will be used as a guide for planning for the move of this Headquarters to Camp Drake. A detailed table of distribution for General Headquarters, Far East Command will be forwarded at the earliest practicable date.

2. Construction and rehabilitation will be of such type and extent as to provide for economical maintenance life of ten years, using standards and criteria established by Circular 30, General Headquarters, Far East Command, 8 June 1949, with such modifications as may be required to accommodate a headquarters of the nature of General Headquarters, Far East Command.

3. Such additional detailed information as may be required will be determined through coordination with appropriate General or Special Staff Sections of this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

K B Bush

K. B. BUSH,
Major General, USA,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl
Troop Basis w/2 Incls

Copy furnished:
CG, JLCOM, APO 343

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HEADQUARTERS
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

HC 388 (GD)

SUBJECT: Post-Japan Peace Planning

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, APO 500

1. Reference is made to letter GHQ FEC, file AG 388 (4 Jun 51)GD, subject: Post-Japan Peace Planning, dated 4 Jun 51. Referenced letter indicates that General Headquarters and the Headquarters and Service Command will move to Camp Drake after the termination of the occupation of Japan, and after the cessation of the Korean hostilities.

2. The first step of this plan has been accomplished. It required among other things the determination from an overall strength figure of the potential of Camp Drake for housing the administrative activities and troop functions of the two headquarters. It has been determined that Camp Drake can accommodate General Headquarters and the Headquarters and Service Command for all functions except dependent housing, providing some additional accessory buildings can be provided. However, the condition of the buildings at Camp Drake dictates that considerable expensive alterations and rehabilitation must be made.

3. The buildings at Camp Drake are of Japanese-type construction, the camp having been built by the Japanese Army about eighteen years ago. Deterioration of the wooden structures has progressed normally until now there is not a building which can be moved into without rehabilitation. The upper stories of most of the barracks are in such a poor structural condition that normal billeting for barracks purposes is considered dangerous. Double-deck bunking, if it becomes necessary, is impossible. It is considered dangerous to install on even the first floors, the static loads imposed by the weight of modern office equipment. Signal equipment with its high unit load will impose an additional hazard to these old buildings. The fact that these buildings are in use and have been used by the 1st Cavalry Division for five years is appreciated. However, for the purposes of billeting and housing the General Headquarters of the U.S. Army garrison in Japan, these buildings are decidedly sub-standard. A considerable time will be required for the rehabilitation of these buildings.

4. Properly directed planning by this headquarters can go no further until a determination is made of the strength, composition, and

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BASIC: Ltr fr Hq HSCOMD, file HC 388 (GD), subj: Post-Japan Peace Planning, dtd

organization of the future General Headquarters and the future Headquarters and Service Command. This determination is necessary in order to arrive at the required square footage of office space; that required for troop housing; the square footage necessary for BOQ-type billets for Department of the Army civilians; as well as the determination of the number and type of accessory buildings.

5. It is requested that this headquarters be furnished with tables of distribution and/or organization which will apply to the General Headquarters and the Headquarters and Service Command after the move to Camp Drake. Further, that this command be supplied with an estimate of the office space to be allocated to the General and Special Staff Sections of General Headquarters at Camp Drake. In addition, it is felt that a statement of policy should be made as to the type of construction and the extent of rehabilitation desired at Camp Drake.

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Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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GHQ FEC and Hq & Svc Comd, GHQ FEC

Troop Basis for Post-Treaty Planning

Unit	T/O&E or T/D	O	FMO	WO	EM	WAC	AGG	Location*
GHQ,FEC (Note 1)	80-8100	688	65	35	344	354	1486	Incl 1
CAS Annex (Note 2)		269		8	405		682	Note 2
Hq, Hq & Svc Comd	80-8232	193	12	24	1143	130	1502	
Honor Guard Co	80-8233	9			256		265	
293d Army Band	20-107			2	56		58	
473d MI Interp Tm	30-600	1			3		4	
TIS	80-8238	73			212		285	Incl 2
441st CIC Det	30-500	127		90	273		490	Incl 2
319th MI Co	30-600	(Included in 441st CIC figures)						Incl 2
FEC Ln Gp	80-8240	66		1	79		146	Incl 2
500th APU	12-605	3			42		45	
96th MRU	12-318T	3		3	36		42	
96th MRU (Augmentation)	80-8236	1			113		114	
FEC Print & Pub Plant	80-8234	13		2	108		123	Kawasaki
720th MP Bn (-2 Cos)	19-55	22		1	609		632	Incl 2
23d MP CID	19-500	4		14	27		45	Incl 2
Tokyo Finance Office	80-8237	3		1	28		32	
AFRS	80-8003	3			18	2	23	
AFRS	80-8004	1			12		13	Sendai

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Unit	T/O&E or T/D	O	FMO	WO	EM	WAC	AGG	Location
AFRS	80-8005	1			12		13	Sapporo
AFRS	80-8006	1			12		13	Osaka
AFRS	80-8007	1			12		13	Kokura
AFRS	80-8008	1			10		11	Hachinohe
71st Sig Svc Bn	11-500	72			728		800	Incl 3
71st Sig Svc Bn (Aug)	80-8235	15			235		250	
Hq & Hq Co, 64th Engr Base Topo Bn	5-186	10		2	91		103	
34th Engr Base Photo Co	5-189	2		6	195		203	
95th Engr Base Repro Co	5-347	4		3	145		152	
71st Engr Svy Ln Det	5-500	5		1	24		30	
72d Engr Svy Ln Det	5-500	5		1	9		15	
AGRS	80-8204	34		2	339		375	Kokura
Total Hq & Svc Comd		673	12	153	4827	132	5797	
Total GHQ (-CASA) and Hq and SVc Comd		1361	77	188	5171	486	7283	
Total GHQ and Hq & Svc Comd		1630	77	196	5576	486	7965	
Total GHQ and Hq & Svc Comd at Camp Drake		1071	77	99	3809	486	5542	

* Units will be located at Camp Drake unless otherwise indicated.

Note 1. a. The "Utilization of Manpower" study prepared by each office or staff section of GHQ, FEC in May 1951 was used as the basis for reductions in personnel who are performing purely SCAP type duties or are currently required solely as a result of the Korean operation.

b. Residual activities of the Korean operation are almost impossible to project; however, it has been assumed that many will continue for years. Appropriate estimated requirements have been included.

c. Inasmuch as assumptions of SCAP type duties by the State Dept will require a transition period of unknown duration, personnel spaces have been included for a section to advise CINCFE of civil affairs and for liaison with Japanese Govt.

Note 2. a. Camp McKnight: 84 off, 59 EM.

b. Camp Norima: 12 off, 17 EM (will require billet and messing at Camp Drake).

c. Rmdr throughout Japan.

Note 3. See Incl 2 to Troop Basis for details as to units or elements thereof not located at Camp Drake.

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PROJECTED PERSONNEL STRENGTH, GHQ FEC, POST TRE
Plus Units and Elements Attached for Logistic
(Basis: G-1 GHQ "Utilization of Manpower" Study,

		OFFICERS			DEPARTMENT OFFICERS			ENLISTED	
		M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F
A.	Projected T/D 80-8100(incl CASA)	957	55	1012	43	10	53	749	354
	(Projected T/D 80-8100,less CASA)	(688)	(55)	(743)	(35)	(10)	(45)	(344)	(354)
B.	Units and Elements that will be located at other than Camp Drake:								
	1. ** CASA			269			8		
	2. COM AUdit Teams			7			3		
	3. Okinawa Engr District			50					
C.	Units and Elements attached for logistic support:								
	1. ASA			78			5		
	2. CIA, FBIS, ARC, etc.			-			-		
D.	Projected Strength, Tokyo Area	709	55	764	37	10	47	605	354

Notes: 1. A-B + C = D
* 47.7% Male DAC = Average for FY 51
** Includes CASA request for increase in pers str

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OJECTED PERSONNEL STRENGTH, GHQ FEC, POST TREATY PERIOD
lus Units and Elements Attached for Logistic Support
s: G-1 GHQ "Utilization of Manpower" Study, May 1951)

	OFFICERS			ARRANT OFFICERS			ENLISTED			TOTAL MILITARY			DAC			JN
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	
	957	55	1012	43	10	53	749	354	1103	1749	419	2168			2048	1271
	(688)	(55)	(743)	(35)	(10)	(45)	(344)	(354)	(698)	(1067)	(419)	(1486)			(1994)	(360)
:																
			269			8			405			682			54	911
			7			3			22			32			50	26
			50						75			125			775	-
			78			5			358			441			4	214
			-			-			-			-			140	10
	709	55	764	37	10	47	605	354	959	1351	419	1770	*(627)	(686)	1313	558

for FY 51
r increase in pers str

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INCLOSURE 1

Incl 2 to GHQ, FEC and

Hq & Svc Comd Troop Basis

Units or elements of units not located at Camp Drake

Unit	O	WO	EM	AGG	Location
GHQ:	57	3	97	157	
(OKED)	(50)		(75)	(125)	Okinawa
(COM Audit Tms)	(7)	(3)	(22)	(32)	Japan
CAS (Annex)	257	8	388	653	Note 2
TIS (ADVATIS)	19		74	93	Korea
*441st CIC Det and 319th MI Co	101	74	224	399	
	(8)	(3)	(12)	(23)	Kokura
*Breakdown of personnel according to geographical location includes both units	(4)	(3)	(9)	(16)	Fukuoka
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Beppu
	(3)	(2)	(8)	(13)	Kumamoto
	(4)	(2)	(10)	(16)	Sasebo
	(10)	(5)	(19)	(34)	Kobe
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Kure-Hiro
	(3)	(3)	(8)	(14)	Kyoto
	(3)	(3)	(8)	(14)	Osaka
	(2)	(0)	(1)	(3)	Maizuru
	(2)	(3)	(6)	(11)	Gifu
	(2)	(3)	(6)	(11)	Nagoya
	(13)	(9)	(17)	(39)	Sendai
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	Tachikawa
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Niigata
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Hachinohe
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Yamagata
	(3)	(3)	(8)	(14)	McGill
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Iwahana
	(3)	(3)	(9)	(15)	Yokohama
	(14)	(8)	(32)	(54)	Sapporo
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	Wakkanai
	(2)	(0)	(1)	(3)	Nemuro
	(1)	(1)	(1)	(3)	Abashiri
	(4)	(3)	(13)	(20)	Muroran
FEC Ln Gp	51	1	62	114	
	(36)		(58)	(94)	Korea
	(15)	(1)	(4)	(20)	Sapporo
FEC Print & Pub Plant	13	2	108	123	Kawasaki