

"VENPET" - Salvage

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S T A T E M E N T  
- of -  
MASTER of "BOLTENIOR"

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MIDDLETON POTTS & CO.,  
DAUNTSEY HOUSE,  
FREDERICKS PLACE,  
OLD JEWRY,  
LONDON, EC2R 8DB.

JOERG DIETRICH STRAEUSSLER

STATES:

I am and have since the 27th November 1977 been the Master of the Motor Supply Vessel "BOLTENTOR" of the Port of Hamburg and I have commanded various other Supply Vessels also owned by V.T.G. of Bremen since 1975.

I hold a German "AG" Foreign Going Master's Certificate which was granted to me on the 12th July 1972 and altogether I have been going to sea since 1963. Prior to being employed on Supply Vessels I served as a Chief Officer on Freighters of up to 15,000 tons.

The "BOLTENTOR" is a twin screw motor vessel of 1,121 tons gross, 485 tons net register, 61.95 metres in length, 13.33 metres in beam, fitted with 2 engines each of 4,175 I.H.P. or 3,000 B.H.P. with variable pitch propellers and Kort nozzles and she has a bollard pull of 98.5 tons.

The "BOLTENTOR" is also fitted with a Bow Thrust Propeller driven by an independent diesel engine of 610 B.H.P. giving a maximum thrust of 16,000 lbs. and the draughts of the "BOLTENTOR" at the time of the services hereinafter mentioned were 4.80 metres forward and 5 metres aft. The "BOLTENTOR" was manned by a Crew of 12 hands including myself.

The "BOLTENTOR" is fitted with an enclosed Wheelhouse with open bridge wings and the Wheelhouse has 7 large windows looking out forward, 2 windows on each side plus one window in each Wheelhouse door and she also has one window looking aft from the forepart of the Wheelhouse. The Wheelhouse also has an after section which overlooks the Cargo Deck aft and this has 3 windows looking aft and 2 windows on each

The vessel is fitted with twin rudders and hydraulic/electric steering gear which can be operated either automatically or manually. On the Control Panel located in the forward part of the Wheelhouse, from which position we normally navigate the vessel, we have two rudder controls which each consist of a small lever which only requires to be moved very slightly to port or to starboard from its upright position in order to operate the rudders from amidships to hard-a-port or to hard-a-starboard and such a movement of the rudders only requires 7.5 seconds to complete and from hard-a-port to hard-a-starboard only takes 15 seconds. We also have a similar rudder control on the Control Panel located in the after section of the Wheelhouse which we at times use when manoeuvring the vessel astern.

The "BOLTENTOR" is fitted with one set of direct engine controls for each engine in both the forward and after sections of the Wheelhouse and in addition we have a push button type of engine telegraph in the Control Panel in the forward section of the Wheelhouse. In normal circumstances, however, we use the direct engine controls.

We have a Bow Thrust Control in both Control Panels in both the forward and after sections of the Wheelhouse and in both the forward and after Panels we also have the control for the forward anchor windlass. In the Control Panel in the after part of the Wheelhouse we have the controls for the towing winch and anchor winches of the vessel.

The "BOLTENTOR's" two bow anchors each weigh 2,976 lbs. and each is fitted with 328 fathoms of cable and the anchor windlass is capable of retrieving both anchors simultaneously from 135 fathoms of water. In addition to her bow anchors

winch which are able to store 1,200 metres of anchor wire each. One of these storage winches works directly with a 1,350 Kg anchor in use and the other winch is used to store the spare wire. This deep sea anchor is lowered over an hydraulic gantry winch, which when in use is swung out forward to enable the anchor to fall free from the vessel's bow and when such anchor is not in use the gantry is swung inboard over the forecastle deck. This deep sea anchor system is likewise controlled from both the Control Panels in the forward and after sections of the Wheelhouse.

The vessel is fitted with a Gyro Compass and a Magnetic Standard Compass. We also have a Decca Navigator.

The "BOLTENTOR" is equipped with a Decca Radar having ranges of 0.25 to 48 miles; Direction Finder; Echo Sounder; Radio Telephone; 2 V.H.F. Transmitters and Receivers; Single Side Band Transmitter; Emergency Medium Wave Transmitter and an All Wave Receiver. We also carry portable Walkie Talkie sets and the ship is fitted with two powerful searchlights.

The "BOLTENTOR" is fitted with a heavy duty anchor and towing winch which is fitted in a fully enclosed compartment and this winch can either be controlled from an enclosed winch control room located in such space or from the Control Panel located in the after section of the Wheelhouse. This winch, which has a static load of 660,000 lbs., incorporates a powered friction drum for our towing wire, which is carried on two towing wire storage winches having an automatic spooling device and these storage winches each carry 2,000 feet of 2½" diameter wire, one length of which is in use as our towing wire and the other length is

360 feet in length and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches in diameter. We also have 2 wire pennants each 110 metres in length and 56 mm. in diameter and we carry an ample supply of heaving lines, mooring lines, shackles and all the other various items of gear for a vessel of our class and usage.

The "BOLTENTOR" is fitted with a heavy duty towing bollard having a safe working load of 200 tons and towing line guide in the centre of the Cargo Deck which is raised to an upright position hydraulically when required otherwise it is stowed below the Cargo Deck level.

In addition to her heavy duty anchor/towing winch the "BOLTENTOR" is fitted with two 8 ton Tugger winches; two Capstans aft each having a pull of 10 tons and a holding power of 130 tons; one Cargo Derrick with a SWL of 2,100 lbs.; two Shaft Generators driven by the Main Engines each producing 350 K.W. 380/220 Volts AC 50 cycles; one Auxiliary Generator producing 350 K.W. 380/220 Volts AC 50 cycles and one Emergency Generator producing 128 K.W. 380/220 Volts AC 50 cycles.

We also carry 2 Portable Diesel Salvage Pumps having a capacity of 60 tons per hour and a Fire Fighting Monitor located on a platform on top of the Wheelhouse having a capacity of 130 tons per hour at 400 feet.

In addition to the vessel's lifeboats we also carry a 6 man Zodiac Inflatable Rubber Dinghy fitted with a 20 H.P. outboard motor.

At the stern the ship is fitted with a Stern Roller 13 feet in length and 6.50 feet in diameter and a solid stern gate is fitted across the otherwise open stern when we are not engaged in anchor lifting or laying operations and

designed and fitted out for servicing Oil Drilling Rigs in all parts of the World and in this regard she can carry Cargo on deck and also below deck including liquids, refrigerated stores and she has 4 large anchor chain lockers and a supply of certain types of chain.

In December 1977 the "BOLTENTOR" was on Charter to Soekor of Johannesburg to service the Rig "SEDCO K", which was then employed in drilling operations in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 42'03.33'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 49'56.66'E$ . The Supply Vessel "SMIT LLOYD 109" was also on Charter to the same parties for the purposes of servicing the same Rig, which in normal circumstances was provided with the assistance of both the "BOLTENTOR" and "SMIT LLOYD 109" whenever it was necessary to shift the Rig from one location to another. When the Rig was on location, however, one Supply Vessel was employed to stand by the Rig whilst the other transported stores and equipment from the Charterers' Base at Mossel Bay and the "BOLTENTOR" shared these two types of duty with the "SMIT LLOYD 109" on more or less a weekly basis so far as was practicable.

At 1015 hours local time (G.M.T. plus 2 hours) on the 16th December 1977 the "BOLTENTOR" arrived in Mossel Bay from the Rig with Cargo which we had collected from the Rig for discharge at Mossel Bay and had there not been a collision between the Tankers "VENPET" and "VENOIL" the "BOLTENTOR" would have remained in Mossel Bay until we were ordered back to the Rig. The "SMIT LLOYD 109" was then standing by the Rig with some Cement on board for use on the Rig when required.

Shortly after the "BOLTENTOR" arrived in Mossel Bay and at about 1030 hours I was advised by Mr. Ken Martin, the

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location of the "SEDCO K". Mr. Martin also told me that a Helicopter had arrived at the position of the casualty in order to rescue the Crews of the two vessels, which had been abandoned because both had caught fire, and that he understood that those picked up would be transferred to either passing ships or to the Rig.

We commenced to discharge our Cargo at about 1030 hours and this operation then continued until about 1250 hours on the 16th.

Following our arrival in Mossel Bay we were boarded by Mr. Dick Walker, the Project Manager for Soekor, and a Mr. Field and Mr. Raeborn of the Sedco Organisation, the Owners of the Rig, for the purposes of discussing an anticipated movement of the Rig from its present location into Mossel Bay where it was to undergo one of its periodical examinations before actually being moved to a new location. In the above respect I would state that I had not towed the Rig into Mossel Bay on any previous occasion.

At this meeting we discussed the question of the procedure to be adopted when the Rig was towed into Mossel Bay and it was suggested to me that the flotilla should maintain a course along the curve of the 20 metre sounding line. It was also decided that the Rig should finally be anchored in a position 1 mile due East of the Jetty at Mossel Bay. Our discussion continued until about 1130 hours when Mr. Walker was recalled to his Office and our discussion was, in fact, never resumed because of Mr. Walker's subsequent involvement in the salvage of the "VENOIL". Up to the abandonment of our meeting no specific date had been nominated for the proposed shift of the Rig.

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the Charter covering the employment of the "BOLTENTOR" and noted that it provided that we could only undertake salvage of property with the consent of the Charterers.

At about the same time as Mr. Walker was recalled to his Office I was again contacted by Mr. Ken Martin who informed me that he understood that the "SMIT LLOYD 109" was now either on her way to the scene of the collision or that she would shortly be leaving the Rig for the area concerned.

We continued to discharge our Cargo up to 1230 hours when I received orders from Mr. Ken Martin to proceed to the Rig in order to undertake stand by duties at the Rig whilst the "SMIT LLOYD 109" was absent and was standing by to render such assistance as might be required of her by either of the two Tankers.

We finally completed the discharge of our Cargo at 1250 hours and because of the urgency of the situation I did not wait to take on additional bunkers and water before sailing for the Rig at such hour.

When we sailed from Mossel Bay the weather was fine and clear and the wind South East force 2, which gradually increased to force 3/4 from the South South East before we reached the Rig at 2005 hours.

Upon our arrival at the position of the "SEDCO K" at 2005 hours I was then instructed to stand by for further orders. At 2010 hours, however, I received orders from Mr. Lambert Foster of Soekor on the Rig to proceed to the casualties in order to relieve the "SMIT LLOYD 109", which was to return to the Rig in order to discharge her Cement Cargo which was then required on the Rig, which was then in the process of closing down operations at such location. I was



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sent back to the casualties in order to relieve the "BOLTENTOR", which would then have to return to the Rig to resume stand by duty.

I refer to my Statement regarding the services rendered to the "VENOIL" for details of the events which took place during the course of our passage from the Rig to the position of the colliding vessels. From that Statement it will be observed that the "BOLTENTOR", in fact, first came up with the "VENOIL" at about 2200 hours on the 16th and after establishing a towing connection the "BOLTENTOR" began to tow the "VENOIL" off the Coast at about 0200 hours on the 17th.

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The "BOLTENTOR" thereafter remained connected to the "VENOIL" until 1315 hours on the 17th when upon the instructions of the Salvage Contractor, Safmarine Ltd., she cast off in order to proceed to the assistance of the "VENPET". The Salvage of the "VENOIL" was then taken over by Contractors' own Tug "S.A. WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE".

The "BOLTENTOR" cast off from the "VENOIL" in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 24'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 17'E$  and then proceeded on a Southerly course in order to come up with the "VENPET" in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 45'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 13'E$ .

The "VENPET" is a vessel of 152,372 tons gross, 130,729 tons net register, 340 metres in length, 53.60 metres in beam and she was in ballast at the material time.

Upon our arrival at the "VENPET" at 1450 hours on the 17th we found that the "SMIT LLOYD 109" was connected to the starboard bow of the ship with a doubled length of pennant wire which in turn was shackled to a length of 225 feet of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inch Rig wire and this was connected to a 30 metre length of 15 inch double nylon stretcher which in turn had

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gear up to the inboard end of her nylon stretcher.

The weather was now cloudy and squally, the wind still being South South East force 7 with a rough sea.

The "VENPET" was heading about South West across both wind and sea and from what we observed as we first approached her starboard side and then closed her bow to take over the towing gear it appeared that the fire had been extinguished and she was not then smoking. The Accommodation and Bridge which were both located aft appeared to be completely burnt out and her starboard side shell plating had been holed over a length of 100 metres or thereabouts from about the forward bulkhead of the aftermost Cargo Side Tank, through certain Fuel Tanks in way of the Engineroom and ending almost at the stern in way of the afterpeak with the Engineroom itself partially open to the sea above the water line. Some of the damaged plating was also protruding outside the normal line of the shell plating.

Upon our arrival the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" contacted me and suggested that we made use of his towing connection to which I agreed whereafter I backed the "BOLTENTOR" stern on to the starboard quarter of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" which was then lying in a position broad off the starboard bow of the "VENPET". Upon closing the starboard quarter of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" we cast her a heaving line secured to our tugger wire messenger whereupon those on the "SMIT LLOYD 109" disconnected their stretcher from their main towing wire and connected our messenger wire to the stretcher which we hove on board the "BOLTENTOR" by means of our Tugger winch and finally shackled the same to our main towing wire on towing winch.

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we carried out the task of switching the Tugs and connecting the remainder of the "SMIT LLOYD 109's" gear to our towing wire. We completed this operation at 1515 hours and from 1520 hours we began to slack away our towing wire up to a total length of 1,000 metres.

At this time there were apparently two men from the "SMIT LLOYD 109" plus three members of the Crew of the "VENPET" on board the ship, which still had a very long rope ladder hanging down her starboard side. The two members of the Crew of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" refused to leave the ship by means of this ladder and they were later taken off by Helicopter. One was landed on the "BOLTENTOR" and the other was landed on the Rig.

The "SMIT LLOYD 109" sailed for the Rig shortly after 1515 hours and at 1550 hours I had a telephone call with Commander Howarth when I reported the situation.

At 1600 hours the position of our flotilla was Lat 34° 41.3'S, Long 24° 16.5'E and at 1630 hours Lat 34° 43.1'S, Long 24° 15.8'E and at this stage the wind was still South East force 6 to 7.

At 1635 hours I received a further telegram from Safmarine Ltd. reading :-

"AS YOU NOW HAVE VENPET IN TOW PLEASE PROCEED DIRECT SOUTH OUT TO SEA AND REMAIN 40 TO 50 NM SOUTH OFF COAST BETWEEN CAPE ST FRANCIS AND CAPE SEAL STOP KINDLY KEEP SA WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE FULLY IN PICTURE REGARDING YOUR MOVEMENTS AND POSITIONS STOP PLEASE LOOK TO OUR CAPTAIN NAGEL OF SA WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE FOR FUTURE INSTRUCTIONS STOP WE ANTICIPATE A DELAY AS SEA WILL BE BUMPY ON SHORE FRONTIER

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CABLE POSITION REPORT INDICATING FUEL ON HAND  
EVERY 12 HOURS TO CABLE ADDRESS SAFTUG  
CAPE TOWN"

At 1700 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 45'S$ ,  
Long  $24^{\circ} 13.5'E$  and having completed paying out our towing  
wire we began to tow the ship head up into the South  
Easterly wind with the intention of holding the "VENPET"  
in a position about 20 miles South of the Latitude of the  
Rig "SEDCO K" and also about 40 miles clear of the Coast  
until we received the promised instructions as to the  
Port to which the "VENPET" was to be towed.

At 1800 hours weather still cloudy with squalls  
and South East wind of force 6/7.

At 1830 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 48.5'S$ ,  
Long  $24^{\circ} 17'E$  and at about this time I received a further  
telegram from Safmarine Ltd. reading :-

"WE BELIEVE RAILWAY TUG F.T. BATES WANTS TO  
TAKE OVER TOW OF VENPET STOP DO NOT HAND  
OVER TOW TO THIS RAILWAY TUG WITHOUT PRIOR  
PERMISSION OF THIS OFFICE OR OF THE MASTER  
OF ZTUG STOP WE HAVE NO CONTRACT OR  
RELATIONSHIP WITH RAILWAY TUG AND SHE WAS  
ORDERED TO ASSIST WHERE NECESSARY BY OWNERS  
REPRESENTATIVE STOP KEEP UP A GOOD WORK"

Subsequent to 1800 hours the wind began backing to  
the North North East and as the "VENPET" was now subject to  
the influence of the Agulhas Current we experienced difficulty  
in holding the vessel up against the wind whilst it was still  
South Easterly. In the circumstances from about 1830 hours  
we proceeded on variable courses in a generally Westerly  
direction with the current being in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 46.5'S$ .

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time we had the "VENPET" in tow we illuminated her with our searchlights.

At about 1900 hours the Tug "F.T. BATES", which is an old Steam Tug owned by the Railway and Harbour Authority at Port Elizabeth, arrived in the area and thereafter followed in the wake of the "VENPET". At 2047 hours, however, I received a V.H.F. message from the Port Captain at Port Elizabeth that I was to hand the "VENPET" over to "F.T. BATES", but I informed him that I had no instructions to hand over the tow and accordingly suggested that he should contact Safmarine Ltd. at Cape Town.

From 2200 hours we proceeded in a general Northerly direction and head up into the wind which was then North North East force 6 and at 2320 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 41.4'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 11.3'E$  and at 2345 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 40'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 11'E$ .

Between 2317/20 hours I spoke to Captain Gigerich of my Owners' Office in Bremen and gave him a situation report.

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At 0040 hours on the 18th our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 39'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 10.6'E$  and I attach a Plot Nod. 2 showing the various positions of our flotilla from 1600 hours on the 17th until 0040 hours on the 18th during which period we towed the "VENPET" a distance of 24 miles.

From 0040 hours we put about under starboard wheel and again began to proceed in a Southerly direction in order to maintain a position well clear of the Coast and at 0300 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 44'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 11.4'E$ .

From 0300 hours we proceeded in a general Westerly direction until 0430 hours when our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 45.7'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 3.5'E$ .

At 0430 hours, however, the "VENPET" suddenly developed a violent and uncontrollable sheer to starboard and

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finally heading 90° to starboard of our initial course and the "BOLTENTOR" was then in a position off the port quarter of the "VENPET" and heading at an angle of about 90° to the centre line of the ship, which, of course, imposed a very considerable strain on the towing gear and also exposed the "BOLTENTOR" to the risk of being girted.

In order to recover a suitable towing position from this situation I was obliged to reduce the speed of the "BOLTENTOR" until the tow line was slack which in turn resulted in the Tug gaining a position close to the stern of the "VENPET" which was, in fact, then overhauling the "BOLTENTOR" because the "VENPET" developed a substantial speed whenever she sheered. Upon gaining sufficient slack in the towing gear I then had to steam the "BOLTENTOR" at full speed up and parallel to the port side of the ship until the Tug had reached a position ahead of the "VENPET's" bow and at this stage I was again obliged to reduce the speed whilst we took up the slack in the towing gear with caution so as not to place it under a strain which could have parted the gear.

The "VENPET" developed several sheers of this nature during the next few days she was under tow and on most occasions the recovery manoeuvre I have described involved us carrying out a complete turn of 360° to starboard before we were able to resume towing the "VENPET" because the "VENPET" would not turn to port and it later transpired that her rudder was, in fact, jammed in the hard-to-starboard position.

The above manoeuvres were highly dangerous so far as the "BOLTENTOR" was concerned because she is not a Harbour Tug and the height of her towing bollard and towing line guide

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circumstances.

I was also obliged to allow the very long towing line to hang down at its original length to avoid the risk of it being overrun by the "VENPET" and this involved us in the risk of the wire snagging on the bottom which could in turn have pulled the "BOLTENTOR" on to her side.

We were, in fact, occupied until about 0550 hours in regaining a suitable position for towing the "VENPET" and by that time our position was Lat 34° 44.2'S, Long 24° 05.2'E.

From 0550 hours we again began to proceed in a general Southerly direction and with difficulty towed the sheering "VENPET" head up into the wind which was then East South East force 6 to 7.

As stated above it was at about this stage that it came to my knowledge that the rudder of the "VENPET" was jammed in almost its hard-a-starboard position and when we later provided food to the "VENPET" I instructed the Chief Officer of the "BOLTENTOR" who boarded the "VENPET" on that occasion to ascertain what, if anything, could be done to shift the rudder to an amidship position.

In response to the request for food from the Chief Officer of the "VENPET" shortly before 0700 hours, at which time the wind was Southerly force 6 with a moderate swell, I turned the tow to starboard to make a lee for our rubber dinghy to proceed to the "VENPET" with food and certain items of clothing.

Our rubber dinghy which is a craft of 3 metres x 1.50 metres fitted with a 20 H.P. Johnson Outboard motor was manned by the Chief Officer Spalek, Chief Engineer Schmidt and Rosun Ludwig and I instructed the Chief Officer to

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of her being able to provide power for her anchor windlasses and (c) finally what gas oil she had on board which could be made available to us as bunkers.

The dinghy left the "BOLTENTOR" at about 0700 hours and arrived alongside the port side of the "VENPET" at about 0730 hours, at which time there was a sea of 4 to 6 metres running alongside the ship which was at this stage lying across the wind and sea and she was rolling up to at least 10°.

The dinghy thereafter made its way round the stern of the "VENPET" then up her starboard side where she had a rope ladder hanging down over her starboard side and leading up to her main deck approximately 70 feet above the water line and at times the bottom of this ladder was in the water and at other times well out of the water due to the rolling of the "VENPET". The ladder was also swinging out from or against the ship's side depending upon whether the ship was rolling to starboard or to port.

By this time the "BOLTENTOR" was in a position off the starboard bow of the "VENPET" and I watched the dinghy make its way to the position of the ladder, but unfortunately the motor of the dinghy failed just as the Chief Officer was about to jump and catch the rope ladder. Because of the failure of the engine and consequent drifting of the dinghy the Chief Officer missed the ladder and he was thrown into the sea and was twice carried under before he succeeded in grabbing a rope which was hanging from the bottom of the ladder whereafter with very considerable difficulty he then finally succeeded in climbing a few metres up the ladder clear of the sea.



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difficulty in retaining his hold on the ladder.

In the meantime the dinghy had drifted down the starboard side of the "VENPET" and very close to the overhanging damaged plating which might well have ripped the hull of the boat exposing the remaining members of its Crew to the risk of being cast into the sea. Fortunately, however, the Crew, with the use of the boat's small paddles, were able to steer her clear of the damaged plating.

Because of his unfortunate experience the Chief Officer was very exhausted and he had to make his way up the swinging rope ladder in easy stages and he did not, in fact, reach the deck until 0845 hours having been on the swinging ladder for almost an hour. As a result of being cast into the sea the Chief Officer lost his Omega Chronograph Watch and the portable Walkie Talkie which he had slung round his neck was ruined. The Chief Officer also suffered injury in the way of various abrasions and bruises.

M/S  
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In the meantime the Chief Engineer and Bosun had succeeded in restarting the engine of the dinghy and they stood by after passing up on a line cast down from the ship the food and drink which we had prepared for those aboard her. At the request of the Chief Officer the dinghy then returned to the "BOLTENTOR" for some dry clothing for him and this was then transported to the "VENPET" and put aboard by line like the food.

The Chief Officer later reported that it was not possible to shift the rudder because all of the power cables leading from the Engineroom which passed through to the burnt out Accommodation had also been burned. The Chief Officer further reported that the Accommodation could not be entered

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vessel could not be operated that it was not possible to obtain any power for the anchor windlasses.

Between 0730 hours and 0915 hours whilst our dinghy was in water our flotilla had drifted from position Lat  $34^{\circ} 50.5'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 07.5'E$  to Lat  $34^{\circ} 49.6'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 05.5'E$ .

At 0930 hours I sent the boat back to take off the Chief Officer, but he declined to leave the "VENPET" by means of the rope ladder and he accordingly remained on board.

At 1000 hours the Supply Vessel "AGULHAS" owned by Land & Marine Salvage Co. arrived on the scene with a supply of bunkers for "BOLTENTOR" and at 1003 hours I received instructions from Commander Howarth to take 48 tons of gas oil from "AGULHAS" that day and a further 160 tons on the following day.

At 1045 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 49'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 06.1'E$  and from that time we proceeded in a Southerly direction against the wind.

Following the receipt of the above instructions the "AGULHAS" manoeuvred alongside the port side of the "BOLTENTOR" and with a loose connection consisting of one spring and the vessels being protected from causing damage to each other by the use of Yokohama fenders provided by the "AGULHAS" we took on board 45 tons of gas oil between 1220 and 1325 hours. At the time this operation took place there was, in fact, a moderate to heavy swell running.

At noon the wind was West South West force 4.

Whilst taking bunkers and upon the completion of that operation we continued to proceed on various courses towards the Southward in order to maintain a position well clear of the ice and at 1430 hours our position was

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From about 1530 hours we started to encounter Westerly winds and from that time we towed head up into such wind.

During the afternoon of this day I had a conversation with the Master of the "S.A. WOLRAAD WOLTEMADE" who suggested that we should so far as possible maintain a Westerly course as it then appeared, that we might be ordered to go to False Bay.

Shortly before 1613 hours a Helicopter landed on the "VENPET" with a Surveyor and two Divers and this Helicopter brought the Chief Officer of the "BOLTENTOR" back to our ship landing him on our deck with her rescue sling.

At 1648 hours I received a telegram from Safmarine Ltd. reading :-

"PLEASE ADVISE BY CABLE TO SAFTUG FULL DETAILS  
OF EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO VENPET STOP  
ALSO ADVISE WHETHER YOU REQUIRE FURTHER SALVAGE  
GEAR TO ASSIST YOUR WORK STOP URGENTLY ADVISE  
NAMES ALL PERSONNEL ON BOARD TANKER STOP  
MAINTAIN CASUALTY AS PREVIOUSLY INSTRUCTED  
STOP"

to which I replied as follows :-

"DAMAGES ON VENPET AS FOLLOWS :  
THE ANCHOR OF VENOIL STRUCK INTO NO 5 STARBOARD  
WING TANK ABOUT 37 FEET ABOVE WATERLINE.  
STARBOARD SIDE OF HULL FROM FOREPART OF NO 5  
WING TANK TO STARBOARD FRESH WATER TANK  
COMPLETELY DAMAGED STOP DECK PLATE FROM NO 5  
STARBOARD CENTRE TANK TO AFT PART SLOP TANK  
DEFORMED STOP ACCOMMODATION ABC DECK  
COMPLETELY BURNED OUT ALSO STARBOARD LIFEBOAT,

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ALL BURNED THROUGH STOP ENGINE CONTROL ROOM,  
 BOTH BOILERS, MAIN TURBINE AND GEAR BOX  
 SEEM TO BE OK STOP RUDDER OF VENPET LIES  
 HARD STARBOARD THEREFORE VENPET IS UTMOST  
 DIFFICULT TO MANOEUVRE BUT AT THIS STAGE NO  
 NEED FOR STERN TUG STOP RECEIVED 45 TONS  
 OF GAS OIL BY AGULHAS TODAY STOP IF TOW KEEPS  
 GOING ON AN ADDITIONAL 120 TONS OF GAS OIL  
 WILL BE FINE TOMORROW STOP BUNKERS ON BOARD  
 TODAY 1800 50 CUBIC METRES HEAVY FUEL, 70  
 CUBIC METRES GAS OIL STOP SALVAGE EQUIPMENT  
 IS SUFFICIENT AT THE MOMENT STOP FURTHER  
 REQUIREMENTS 2 WALKY TALKIES AND 6  
 FOTOFILMS 36 MMM BY NEXT CHANCE STOP NAMES  
 OF CREW MEMBERS AT VENPET CHIEF ENGINEER  
 WONG CHING YOH, CHIEF OFFICER HSIEH CHIAN  
 YUAN, BOSUN LEUNG CHE KIM, CHIEF OFFICER  
 SPALEK OF BOLTENTOR IS BACK AGAIN ON  
 BOLTENTOR ON BOARD VENPET MOMENTLY 1 SURVEYOR  
 AND 2 DIVERS"

Between 1700 hours and 2335 hours on the 18th whilst  
 we were still awaiting instructions as to the destination of  
 the "VENPET" we continued to proceed in a Westerly direction  
 in a position well to the Southward of the Rig and we obtained  
 the following fixes :-

1700 hours	Lat	34° 52.3'S,	Long	24° 05'E
1750 "	"	34° 52.1'S,	"	24° 03'E
2000 "	"	34° 53.2'S,	"	23° 56.8'E
2045 "	"	34° 51.5'S,	"	23° 53.1'E
2100 "	"	34° 51.3'S,	"	23° 52.5'E

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As will be observed from Plot No. 3 attached to this Statement covering the navigation of our flotilla on the 18th from 2000 hours we were set substantially to the Northward of my intended course line by the current and wind.

At 2325 hours I received a further telegram from Safmarine reading :-

"KINDLY PROCEED EASTWARDS WITH YOUR TOW STOP REMAINING AT LEAST 40 MILES OFF COAST AT ALL TIMES STOP TAKE UP STATION TO SOUTH OF RIY BANK IN POSITION  $34^{\circ} 40'S 25^{\circ} 52'E$  STOP WE HOPE TO HAVE DECISION REGARDING DELIVERY VENPET ROMORROW STOP UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM US MAINTAIN THIS NEW POSITION STOP THANKS YOUR COOPERATION STOP KINDLY CONFIRM RECEIPT THIS CABLE STOP"

to which I replied as follows :-

"RECEIVED YOUR CABLE REGARDING TAKING UP POSITION SOUTH OF RIY BANK AWAIT YOUR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS"

and at 2335 hours when in the position set out above I started to turn the "VENPET" being in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 55.1'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 44.4'E$  at 0050 hours on the 19th.

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I attach a further Plot No. 3 indicating the various positions of the flotilla between 0040 hours, on the 18th and 0050 hours on the 19th and during that period we had towed the "VENPET" a distance of 48 miles.

At 0100 hours the wind was West South West force 4/5 and at 0200 hours we were still in process of turning the "VENPET" on to a suitable heading for proceeding to the Eastward in order to gain our new holding position. At

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Long  $23^{\circ} 47.1'E$  I resumed towing the "VENPET" with the intention of making our new holding position. At about this time, however, the wind started to freshen from the Westward and because the "VENPET" then had the wind on her starboard beam with her rudder still jammed hard-a-starboard she continually sheered off to starboard to such an extent that the "BOLTENTOR" and "VENPET" were on occasions sailing parallel and almost abeam of each other with the "BOLTENTOR" on the port side of the ship. This situation imposed very considerable strain on the gear and the "BOLTENTOR" was more or less permanently listed to starboard. Although I was able, with difficulty, to manoeuvre the "BOLTENTOR" into a position ahead of the "VENPET" again from time to time we were not able to make any effective progress up to the Eastward.

The weather continued to deteriorate and by 0700 hours the wind was Westerly force 6/7 increasing to force 7/8 by 0800 hours with a very rough sea.

Because of these adverse wind and sea conditions the "VENPET" continued to sheer to starboard and once again we found ourselves either abeam of the "VENPET" or lying at an angle of about  $90^{\circ}$  to her from time to time, which necessitated my taking the type of action I have previously described with all its consequential risks in order to regain a position ahead of the "VENPET".

Our position at 0800 hours was Lat  $34^{\circ} 04.4'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 49.6'E$  and shortly thereafter the "VENPET" again developed a very sudden and also violent sheer to starboard. On this occasion before we could bring her under our control again she had herself made a complete turn of  $360^{\circ}$  and by the

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Upon bringing the "VENPET" under control we resumed towing her in a North Easterly direction and by 1000 hours had reached position Lat  $34^{\circ} 59.6'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 44.5'E$ .

At 1000 hours the wind was West by South force 7/8.

Our flotilla was still being followed by the Tug "F.T. BATES" and at 1100 hours when we were in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 59.1'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 46.6'E$  the "F.T. BATES" steamed in very close under the bow of the "VENPET" and it appeared to me that she had, in fact, made contact with the towing wire. I at once contacted the Tug by V.H.F. on Channel 16 and protested in the strongest terms at her action, which could have had very grave consequences. I warned her Master not to approach either the "VENPET" or the gear so close again and he replied to the effect that he had been ordered by his Owners to inspect the towing gear.

At 1130 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 52.8'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 50.6'E$ , which indicated that we had been set by the strong South West wind and also current about 7 miles to the Northward. Although our flotilla was definitely set to the Northward by the strong current experienced from 1100 to 1130 hours I think it is possible that the 1100 hour position is not a reliable one.

From 1130 hours we were able to tow the "VENPET" on a substantially Easterly course and the position of our flotilla at 1150 hours was Lat  $34^{\circ} 52.9'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 52.2'E$ ; at 1220 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 52.6'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 54'E$  and at 1320 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 51'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 59.9'E$ .

At 1300 hours the wind was South West by West force 7 and at 1340 hours we ceased towing to examine the towing gear and recover some of the damaged rubber wire protectors which had worked their way outwards along the line. Subject to

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When we ceased towing for this purpose the "VENPET" again sheered heavily to starboard and, in fact, I thereafter found that as soon as we were obliged for any reason to reduce the rate of towage the "VENPET" always tended to sheer.

At 1400 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 51.8'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 02.2'E$  and having completed our inspection of the towing gear and the recovering of the wire protectors by 1420 hours we started to slack away the gear again until 1440 hours when we resumed towing on the same length of gear.

At 1445 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 53.2'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 04.2'E$  and from this position we again made good a general Easterly course.

At 1610 hours I sent Safmarine Ltd. the following message :-

"NOON POSITION  $35^{\circ} 00'S$   $23^{\circ} 46'E$  ETA HOLDING  
POSITION TOMORROW 0900 STOP HAVE RECEIVED  
45 TONS GAS OIL OF AGULHAS RECEIVED ALSO  
MESSAGE FROM AIRCRAFT STOP STOCK ON BOARD  
HEAVY FUEL  $47.5 m^3$  GAS OIL  $69.5 m^3$ "

At 1600 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 53.4'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 11'E$ ; at 1620 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 53.3'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 12.2'E$  and at 1620 hours I gave the Shipowners' Representative on board the "VENOIL" at his request our E.T.A. at position Lat  $34^{\circ} 50'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 11'E$  as 0900 hours on the 20th.

At 1710 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 53.8'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 15.4'E$  and at 1810 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 53.7'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 21.7'E$  and the wind at 1800 hours was South West force 7.

At 1848 hours I had a call from Commander Howarth who reported that he understood that the "BOLTEMENTOR" would now be released from her normal Charter duties with Soekor for



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"BOLTENTOR" to the Rig.

At 1900 hours the "AGULHAS" again appeared on the scene with a further supply of 100 tons of gas oil, but I advised her Master that it was not possible to carry out the transfer at such time because we were running on heavy fuel and could not, therefore, decrease speed and I also advised him that I thought it preferable to await more favourable weather conditions and daylight. At that time the wind was still South West force 7 and the "BOLTENTOR" was rolling up to 15° at times in the Westerly sea and Southerly swell and we were also taking water on deck.

At 1910 hours our position was Lat 34° 53.6'S, Long 24° 27'E and at 2000 hours Lat 34° 53.8'S, Long 24° 30.6'E.

The wind was still South West force 7 at 2000 hours and at 2050 hours I received another telegram from Safmarine Ltd. reading :-

"REFERENCE LAST CABLE INDICATING 1600 19.12.  
POSITION STOP MAINTAIN AGREED POSITION OFF  
COAST UNTIL APPROVAL FROM GOVERNMENT OBTAINED  
TO ALGOA BAY STOP THIS APPROVAL HAS NOT YET  
BEEN GIVEN STOP REGARDING AGULHAS ASSISTING  
WITH TOW PLEASE YOU DECIDE ALLOWING FOR WEATHER  
AND YOUR GOOD PROGRESS IF AGULHAS IS REQUIRED  
TO MAKE TOWAGE CONNECTION TO VENPET"

Because the strong South Westerly wind and Westerly sea and Southerly swell still prevailed the "BOLTENTOR" was at times now listing up to 20° to starboard which resulted in the port propeller coming out of the water and the racing of that engine, but because of the tendency of the "VENPET" to sheer violently whenever we reduced speed we maintained full way to avoid the tow sheering. On several occasions

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was placed upon the towing gear and, in fact, the Tug vibrated heavily when the gear came under such stress.

From about 2100 hours the wind began to abate to force 5 from the South West, but the rough sea and swell still prevailed for the remainder of that day.

Both the "VENPET" and "BOLTENTOR" continued to roll heavily throughout the remainder of this day and during the night of the 19th/20th.

At 2110 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 52.2'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 34.4'E$ ; at 2200 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 51.1'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 37.5'E$ ; at 2300 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 49.5'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 41.1'E$  and at 2400 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 48'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 45'E$ .

I attach Plots Nos. 4 and 5 showing the position of our flotilla between 0050 hours on the 19th until 2400 hours that day and during that period we towed the ship a further 82 miles.

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At 0100 hours on the 20th the wind was West South West force 5 with a high sea and swell and our position at 0110 hours was Lat  $34^{\circ} 46.6'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 49.6'E$ .

At 0300 hours the wind was South West force 5 with a slightly reduced sea and our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 44.2'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 57.5'E$  and we were generally making good a course of  $65^{\circ}$ .

At 0500 the flotilla's position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 41.7'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 07.2'E$  and the wind South West force 4 with a sea of force 3.

At 0600 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 40.8'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 11.5'E$  and the towage continued without incident until 0830 hours when we were obliged to shut down the port engine because of the heavy loss of lubricating oil in way of the packing of the main driving shaft which had been brought

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the "VENPET" was sheering violently out to starboard which caused the port propeller to come out of the water and permit the engine to race.

Whilst the Crew set about the task of repairing the port engine we continued to proceed with only the starboard engine in use and at 0855 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 38'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 25'E$ .

At 0900 hours the wind had backed to the Eastward of force 2 with a like sea and at 1000 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 36.6'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 19.8'E$ .

At 1015 hours a Salvage Association Surveyor, Mr. Walker, boarded the "VENPET" by Helicopter and at his request at 1030 hours we agreed to permit the "AGULHAS", which was still standing by to supply us with further bunkers, to go alongside the starboard side of the "VENPET" in order to wash out with her hose lines the damaged fuel oil tank, which it was thought still contained some oil which it was considered necessary to remove before the vessel would be granted permission to anchor off Port Elizabeth. The "AGULHAS" accordingly took up a position alongside the damaged tank and with her hoses started to flush out the tank.

At 1100 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 35.8'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 24.3'E$  and at noon Lat  $34^{\circ} 35.5'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 28'E$ . At noon the wind was East force 3, but from then onwards it started to veer to the South West, being South West force 3 at 1300 hours with a high swell which, in fact, always developed whenever the wind was Westerly or South Westerly.

At 1240 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 34.9'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 27.6'E$ .

At 1315 hours the "VENPET" again suddenly developed a violent sheer to starboard and because we only had one

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about  $90^{\circ}$  to starboard of our original course line with the "BOLTENTOR" ending up in a position off the port quarter of the ship.

Both ships were also rolling heavily at such time, but by following the same procedure as that adopted on earlier occasions when we found ourselves in a similar situation I ultimately succeeded in gaining a position ahead of the "VENPET". We thereafter resumed our Easterly course reaching position Lat  $34^{\circ} 34.8'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 33'E$  by 1500 hours.

At 1500 hours the wind was South West 3 and remained of that force until 2000 hours.

We were able to maintain our course without further incident until 1545 hours when the "VENPET" once more sheered off to starboard, but again with difficulty because of the loss of the use of one engine I was ultimately able to bring the "VENPET" back under my control and proceed in an Easterly direction.

At 1700 hours the Engineers reported that they had completed the repair of the port engine, which was again brought into use.

At 1705 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 35'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 42.5'E$  and in anticipation of my receiving instructions to proceed towards Port Elizabeth I altered course up to the Northward at about that time. In fact, at 1730 hours I received instructions from Safmarine Ltd. to proceed to a position 20 miles off Cape Recife, but no closer pending further instructions.

At 1930 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 29'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 42'E$  and at 2010 hours Lat  $34^{\circ} 22'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 42'E$ .

As we were now in an area where we might encounter

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"SECURITY, SECURITY, SECURITY, SECURITY,  
SECURITY, SECURITY  
ALL SHIPS, ALL SHIPS, ALL SHIPS.  
THIS IS TUG BOLTENTOR WITH TANKER VENPET  
IN TOW POSITION AT 1900 HOURS 34° 28'S  
25° 42'E COURSE TRUE NORTH SPEED 3.5 KNOTS  
LENGTH OF TOW 1500 METRES. THE TOWED TANKER  
IS UNLIT, PLEASE KEEP A GOOD LOOKOUT AND  
A WIDE BERTH BOLTENTOR OUT"

This warning was picked up by Port Elizabeth Radio which repeated it at regular intervals. I also repeated the signal several times during the night of the 20th/21st and especially whenever we saw the lights of another ship. In addition we still kept the "VENPET" illuminated during the hours of darkness with our searchlights.

After reaching our 2010 hour position I turned the "VENPET" on to a Southerly course to ensure we kept well clear of the land at night and at 2400 hours our position was Lat 34° 25.4'S, Long 25° 41.3'E with the wind South West force 4.

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At 0200 hours the wind was South West force 4 and the like weather prevailed at 0400 hours.

From about 0200 hours we began to shorten up the towing gear to about 500 metres in anticipation of our receiving instructions to proceed to Algoa Bay, but because of the volume of other traffic then being encountered in the position in which we were then holding the "VENPET" I decided to tow the casualty further to the Southward. The navigational warnings to which I have earlier referred were again also frequently repeated by both the "BOLTENTOR" and

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At 0600 hours the wind was South West force 4 to 5, but by 0800 hours it was Westerly force 6/7 with a substantial deterioration in the state of the sea, which was now force 6.

Our position at 0800 hours was Lat  $34^{\circ} 36.1'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 42'E$  and this was confirmed by the "AGULHAS", which also is fitted with a Decca Navigator.

Because of the deterioration in the weather I again slacked away our towing gear to a total length of 1,000 metres and endeavoured to hold the "VENPET" up into the wind, our position at 0900 hours being Lat  $34^{\circ} 40'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 39'E$ .

In order to pay out more of our towing wire I was required to reduce the speed of the "BOLTENTOR" and whenever I did so the "VENPET" at once tended to sheer off to starboard. In the circumstances I was obliged to cease slacking the gear and increase the speed of the "BOLTENTOR" until the sheer had been checked whereafter I would again reduce speed and resume slacking away further wire. Because I was required to repeat this process on several occasions before we had out 1,000 metres of gear this operation which would normally only take about 20 minutes, in fact, lasted for about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours on this occasion.

In the ever deteriorating sea and swell conditions the "VENPET" again started to roll very heavily and the "BOLTENTOR" herself was also subject to much movement in the adverse sea conditions. On several occasions the "BOLTENTOR" and "VENPET" again rolled in opposite directions or in other words away from each other and the gear, which was already under great strain, was once more subject to even greater stress.

At this stage of the events I enquired who was on board in addition to those already known to me and I was told

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out certain work which would enable the "VENPET" to regain some power.

Our flotilla was also now being accompanied by the Oil Pollution vessel "KUSWAG NO. 1" and during the heavy rolling of the "VENPET" she reported that some oil was still being washed out of the damaged fuel tanks of the "VENPET".

By various manoeuvres of the type previously described I succeeded in gaining a position ahead of the "VENPET" when she again sheered and then endeavoured to hold her head up into the wind, which again proved very difficult because of the ever increasing adverse sea and swell conditions. The swell was very long and also very high reaching 20 metres at times from the South West.

At 1110 hours I received instructions from Safmarine Ltd. to allow the "AGULHAS" to connect to the "VENPET" in order to assist us to hold her up into the wind and at the same time either to prevent or reduce the rolling of the "VENPET". In the latter respect there was a danger that during the time she was rolling the "VENPET" could have shipped water into her engine space through the very large and open collision wound and apart from causing damage to her engines and other machinery such water might in turn have also affected her stability. Furthermore the more water the vessel shipped into her Engine room the deeper her stern would sink into the water thereby bringing the bottom of the collision wound nearer the level of the seas which in turn would increase the risk of additional water entering such space and also causing additional damage to equipment at higher levels in the Engine room.

At about the time I received these instructions we were, in fact, experiencing much difficulty in holding the

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reduction in the speed became effective, however, the "VENPET" again started to sheer off to starboard and also resumed rolling.

Having advised the Master of the "AGULHAS" of my conversation with Safmarine Ltd. she then closed the stern of the "VENPET" and from that time until about 1130 hours she made several unsuccessful attempts to cast a heaving line up to the stern of the "VENPET" and at about 1130 hours she, in fact, abandoned her attempt to establish a connection.

By this time the wind was West South West force 7 with a 20 metre swell also running from the same direction and despite the fact that the "BOLTENTOR" was still subject to much rolling and vibration I continued to work the engine at maximum power in order to eliminate so far as possible further sheering by the "VENPET". At this period the "BOLTENTOR" was at times listing up to 30° to starboard with the tow out on the starboard quarter of the Tug and this again brought the port propeller out of the water which allowed the engine to race and increase further the general vibration of the ship working in the adverse conditions. The "BOLTENTOR" was then also taking water up to about the middle of the Cargo Deck.

The conditions, in fact, became so dangerous for all of us working on the "BOLTENTOR" and more especially for those compelled to go out on deck that I gave instructions for the issue of all lifevests which were, in fact, worn by anyone who went out on deck at any time so long as the adverse weather lasted.

At 1300 hours on this day I received the following telegram from Safmarine Ltd. :-

"SOEKOR REGRETABLY REMAINS FRUSTRATING



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CONTRACT UNDER LLOYDS OPEN FORM WITH  
SAFMARINE IS UNCHANGED STOP YOU WILL REMAIN  
CONNECTED VENPET UNTIL RELEASED BY  
SAFMARINE STOP THE LAWYERS CAN SORT OUT  
THE COSTS AFTER THE JOB COMPLETED SEAMANLIKE  
KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK"

and at the same hour we also received a weather forecast from Port Elizabeth Radio for the period 1100 G.M.T. to 2200 G.M.T. for the Cape Agulhas to East London area of Westerly to South Westerly winds of 15-25 knots and later between 10-15 knots with partly cloudy sky and good visibility.

At 1300 hours the wind was still West South West force 7 with the same adverse sea and swell conditions and these conditions still prevailed up to 1600 hours.

At 1630 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 50'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 23'E$  and in that position the Supply Vessel "AGULHAS" received instructions to proceed to the Rig "SEDCO K" in order to carry out stand by duties. The "AGULHAS" accordingly left the position of the "VENPET" and took no further part in the salvage of that vessel so far as I am aware.

At 1645 hours the "VENPET" again took a heavy sheer out to starboard which once more necessitated my carrying out the manoeuvres I have previously described in order to regain a suitable position for resuming the towage of the ship.


From shortly after 1645 hours I was obliged to proceed with the engines working at their maximum power to hold the "VENPET" up against the South Westerly wind and high swell, but from such time we also experienced a very strong South Westerly current which together with the use of the

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At 1807 hours I received the following telegram from my Owners :-

"IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT BOLTECTOR KEEPS TOW CONNECTION TO VENPET UNTIL SAFELY ANCHORED OR MOORED IN PORT ELIZABETH PLEASE ADVISE WHICH OTHER TUGS ARE TOWING"

From 1900 hours the wind abated to force 4 from the South West, but the high swell still prevailed. At 1945 hours the stern gate of the "BOLTECTOR", which is secured by bolts, was struck by a heavy downward thrust movement of the towing wire which caused the door to buckle in way of the middle and this in turn caused the door to swing open at one end. In order to enable the Crew to secure the stern door by spot welding the same into position I was required to shorten the towing gear until the same led from our towing bollard in the centre of the Cargo Deck straight up to the bow of the "VENPET" as indicated in the following sketch :-



and this necessitated the stern of the "BOLTECTOR" being brought very close to the very large bulbous bow of the "VENPET" and an inevitable risk of the ships colliding.

During the time the Crew were engaged in carrying

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which constituted a serious risk to those working at the stern and if ever the wire had parted at such time there would have been a grave risk of the Crew suffering injury.

The work of securing the damaged gate into position occupied my Crew until 2130 hours and about that same time I was advised by Mr. Bruce Ridell of Land & Marine Salvage Co. on board the "VENPET" that they had succeeded in putting the rudder of the "VENPET" amidships.

At this time our position was Lat  $35^{\circ} 10'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 19'E$  and after slacking away the towing gear again to 1,000 metres I gradually turned the "VENPET" on to a heading of  $30^{\circ}$  and we then steamed towards the Coast because owing to the disturbed atmospheric conditions then existing we were unable to obtain either a reliable Decca or Direction Finder fix.

At 2200 hours the wind was Westerly force 4 with a moderate sea and swell and because the rudder of the "VENPET" was now secured amidships we were able to maintain our course of  $30^{\circ}$  without any difficulty during the remainder of that day and also during the night of the 21st/22nd.

The position of our flotilla from 0000 hours until 2130 hours on the 21st is shown on Plot No. 6 and the position of the vessels up to 1815 hours on the 22nd is also shown on the same Plot. The total milage covered by this Plot is 183 miles.

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At 0100 hours and 0300 hours on the 22nd the wind was West South West force 4 and the like conditions prevailed at 0400 hours.

At 0150 hours on the 23rd I sent the following message to Safmarine Ltd. :-

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After I had sent this message I left the Bridge for a short rest and the Chief Officer was in charge.

At 0430 hours the Chief Officer fixed our position by observations as being Lat  $34^{\circ} 49'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 34'E$  and at 0600 hours by Radar bearings of Cape Recife and Cape St. Francis to be Lat  $34^{\circ} 39.1'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 38.2'E$ .

I returned to the Bridge shortly before 0600 hours and at 0600 hours the Oil Pollution vessel "KUSWAG NO. 1" reported that the "VENPET" was not now losing any oil.

The Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" made contact with me at 0630 hours to report that he had been instructed to return to the "VENPET" in order to assist us in towing that vessel to its ultimate destination and in answer to his enquiry I gave her Master our approximate position at that time. I also promised him an exact position in due course because I wanted time to personally check the position of our flotilla in preference to giving the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" one based upon the earlier positions obtained by the Chief Officer.

The West South West wind of force 4 prevailed up to 0800 hours when it was South West force  $3/4$ .

At 0800 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 30.5'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 42'E$  and I gave that position to the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" by V.H.F. at that time.

At 0900 hours I was obliged to reduce the speed of the "BOLTENTOR" because of the further loss of lubricating oil in the port engine through the packing, which it is thought was brought about by the continuous listing of the Tug to starboard owing to strain on the gear during this period of towage of the "VENPET", which was then occupying a position off the

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wind setting on to her port quarter and I was obliged to increase our speed in order to bring her under control again despite the continuing loss of oil pressure in the port engine, which may have sustained damage in consequence.

As a result of reducing speed and the action taken to recover a suitable position for towing the "VENPET" following her sheer to port our flotilla was set to the Southward of our 0800 hour position and at 0930 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 32.1'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 43.1'E$ .

At 0930 hours the "SMIT LLOYD 109" arrived at our position and her Master again stated that he had been instructed to make fast to the "VENPET", but because I had not requested the assistance of another vessel and had not been advised by Safmarine Ltd. that the "SMIT LLOYD 109" had been authorised to assist in any way I informed the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" that I could not allow him to make fast until I had contacted the parties concerned.

At 1010 hours I succeeded in making contact with Commander Howarth and having advised him of the position and of the request of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" he promised to enquire into the situation. As a result of the foregoing at 1015 hours Commander Howarth authorised me on behalf of Safmarine Ltd. to permit the "SMIT LLOYD 109" to make fast.

Having advised the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" of my instructions I started to gradually reduce speed in order to eliminate the risk of the "VENPET" sheering as she had done on almost every other occasion I had reduced speed and at 1030 hours I began to shorten up our gear.

At 1035 hours Captain Zandee of Safmarine Ltd. contacted me and confirmed that it was necessary for the

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excess of that which could be provided by the "BOLTENTOR" alone.

At 1050 hours our towing wire whilst being hove inboard jumped out of the friction sheave and we were obliged to cease the operation until we had corrected the position of the wire. At about the time of this incident a Helicopter which was in the area picked up two members of the Crew of both the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and "BOLTENTOR" and put them on board the "VENPET" to establish the towage connection of the "SMIT LLOYD 109". Bosun Ludwig and Able Seaman Stiller constituted the party from the "BOLTENTOR" and they left the "BOLTENTOR" at 1050 hours.

Whilst we were working on the wire of the "BOLTENTOR" the "SMIT LLOYD 109" had closed the port bow of the "VENPET" and she was then made fast with similar gear consisting of a doubled section of wire plus another wire connected to a nylon stretcher which in turn was connected to her main towing line on her towing winch.

We cleared our towing wire at 1120 hours and at 1125 hours the "SMIT LLOYD 109" reported that her towing gear was all secured. After both the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and I had slacked our gear out to a total length of about 1,000 metres we resumed towing the "VENPET" in a general Easterly direction at 1150 hours from position Lat  $34^{\circ} 32'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 52'E$ . Our position at noon was Lat  $34^{\circ} 29.1'S$ , Long  $24^{\circ} 55'E$ .

When the "SMIT LLOYD 109" joined in the towage her Master agreed that I should act as the Towage Master and I gave all instructions as to the courses to be steered until the service was completed. I was also in communication with Safmarine Ltd. for the purposes of seeking or receiving their

22nd  
Dec.

When the "SMIT LLOYD 109" joined in the operation the "BOLTENTOR" generally maintained a position ahead of or fine on the starboard bow of the "VENPET" whereas the "SMIT LLOYD 109" was always in a position on the port bow of the "VENPET" which was consequently always in a position off the starboard quarter of that Tug.

At 1300 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 29.5'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 01.2'E$  and the wind was South West 4 with a sea of force 3.

At 1310 hours I received instructions from Safmarine Ltd. that we were to complete the salvage of the "VENPET" despite the ultimatum of Soekor referred to in the telegram which had been sent to me at 1300 hours on the 21st.

At 1400 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 28.2'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 08.2'E$  and the weather at 1500 hours was South West wind force 4 with a force 3 sea. At 1600 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 25.1'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 25'E$  and by 1700 hours we had reached position Lat  $34^{\circ} 23'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 32'E$ .

At 1700 hours, however, the weather again began to deteriorate, the wind increasing to force 5 from the West South West, and I then estimated that we would arrive at our final holding position to the Southward of Cape Recife at 1830 hours.

At 1725 hours I contacted Captain Gulbard of Safmarine Ltd. to advise him of the position and to ascertain the present situation regarding our proceeding into Algoa Bay and I was then informed that permission had not yet been obtained for the "VENPET" to enter and anchor in Algoa Bay. In the circumstances we were required to hold the vessel off Cape Recife pending further developments.

22nd Dec. Plot No. 7.

Just after we arrived at the holding position, however, our Bosun on the "VENPET" reported that two strands of the nylon stretcher had parted and suggested that this section of our gear should be replaced before we attempted to tow the vessel into Algoa Bay. I advised the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" of the position and arranged with him that he would continue to tow the "VENPET" ahead in order to avoid the risk of her falling athwart the wind and sea and also rolling whilst I shortened up my towing line and replaced the stretcher whilst the flotilla was also still underway.

I thereafter began to shorten up our tow line and to take the stretcher aboard the "BOLTENTOR" to replace it with one of our own stretchers, but when I endeavoured to carry out that task by holding the "BOLTENTOR" stern on to the bow of the "VENPET" I found that the "BOLTENTOR" could not, in fact, maintain such position and swung off by the head to starboard until she lay athwart the course line or heading of the "VENPET". As the "BOLTENTOR" obviously could not remain in that position I allowed the "BOLTENTOR" to fall off further to starboard until she was heading towards the stern of the "VENPET" in a position very close off to the starboard bow of the ship and then with the Bow Thruster in use I also maintained sufficient speed astern to keep up with the tow as indicated by attached sketch :-





22nd  
Dec.

The above operation was carried out when the wind was West South West 5/6 with a 15 to 20 foot swell and apart from the risks which the Crew ran in working on the stern of the "BOLTENTOR" in such conditions the "BOLTENTOR" was also again exposed to the danger of colliding with the large bulbous bow of the "VENPET".

We completed the operation of replacing the stretcher by 2100 hours at which time our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 25.1'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 52'E$  and thereafter the "BOLTENTOR" regained her original towing position abeam of the "SMIT LLOYD 109".

At 2100 hours I was advised by those aboard the "VENPET" that they had now succeeded in bringing the Emergency Diesel Generator and also one of the vessel's Ballast Pumps into use and from that time the "VENPET" was able to exhibit the appropriate navigation lights.

At 2128 hours I was called by Commander Howarth who then advised me that he now understood that there was a possibility of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and "BOLTENTOR" being replaced on the 23rd by the Tug "LLOYDSMAN" which Safmarine Ltd. had now chartered. At 2149 hours I called my Owners and advised them of the situation generally.

At 2205 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 28'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 54.5'E$  and at 2212 hours I was advised by Captain Culbard of Safmarine Ltd. that there was now no objection to our approaching the Coast closer than 20 miles. Captain Culbard also informed me, however, that the Tug "LLOYDSMAN" would not, in fact, be replacing either the "BOLTENTOR" or "SMIT LLOYD 109".

At 2230 hours under my direction we commenced to turn to port in order to proceed to the Northward and towards

22nd Dec. was satisfied that the "VENPET" had not caused any pollution during the afternoon and evening of this day.

At 2400 hours our position was Lat  $34^{\circ} 27'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 54'E$  and the wind at that time was West North West force 7 with a 20/25 foot swell, which prevailed up to about 0400 hours on the 23rd.

23rd Dec. Our positions from 0100 to 0500 hours were as follows :-

0100 hours	Lat $34^{\circ} 21.7'S$ , Long $25^{\circ} 50.5'E$
0200 "	" $34^{\circ} 19.4'S$ , " $25^{\circ} 49'E$
0300 "	" $34^{\circ} 15.2'S$ , " $25^{\circ} 49.1'E$
0400 "	" $34^{\circ} 10'S$ , " $25^{\circ} 48.2'E$
0500 "	" $34^{\circ} 07.2'S$ , " $25^{\circ} 47.8'E$

At about 0400 hours we endeavoured to turn the "VENPET" to starboard, but during such manoeuvre we were carried in a position astern of the ship and we abandoned such manoeuvre until the "BOLTENTOR" had recovered her position ahead of the "VENPET".

By 0500 hours, however, the wind was West South West of force 7 and in order to prevent the "VENPET" from rolling the course was altered to port in order to bring the "VENPET" head into the wind and up to 0700 hours we proceeded on a course of  $205^{\circ}$  reaching position Lat  $34^{\circ} 08'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 45.6'E$  by 0700 hours.

By this time the "BOLTENTOR" was running short of gas oil which we should use when manoeuvring or proceeding at reduced speeds and having discussed the position with the Master of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" it was agreed that she would supply us with some from her stock. In the foregoing respect it was further agreed that we should adopt the high line

23rd  
Dec.

system which apparently differed from that on the "BOLTENTOR".

Upon the necessary transfer being agreed upon we closed the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and by means of a heaving line we first passed over to her the special connector she required together with 6 lengths of 60 m. 4" flexible hose made up in one length by 4" Wecco couplings which we had also secured in loop fashion to a length of 10 cm. diameter Polypropylene mooring line to avoid direct strain on the flexible hose when it was in use.

This work was carried out in a South Westerly wind of force 7 with a rough sea and swell and both the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and "BOLTENTOR" had to be handled with much care whilst working in close proximity of each other to avoid the risk of collision.

During the time we were employed in rigging the hose between the vessels I received instructions from Captain Culbard of Safmarine Ltd. to proceed towards the Coast to enable a Government Surveyor to inspect the "VENPET", but then Captain Gillespie, also of Safmarine Ltd., instructed us to remain in our present position until the Inspector of the Department of Transport had boarded.

Our position at 0900 hours was Lat  $34^{\circ} 10'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 45'E$ , but as we still had the hose slung between the two Tugs we could not carry out any turning manoeuvre at that stage, we continued to maintain our Southerly course and held the ship's head up to the wind.

At 0900 hours the wind was South South West force 7.

At 0945 hours the "SMIT LLOYD 109" started to pump over the gas oil, but due to the adverse sea conditions and the consequent movement of both vessels one of the couplings

23rd  
Dec. over to heavy fuel oil and to steam on full power in order to conserve our remaining stock of gas oil amounting to only 32 cm.

After recovering our hose and other gear at 1010 hours we began to alter course to port being in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 13.4'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 44.8'E$  at 1030 hours.

At 1200 hours my two Crew were brought back from the "VENPET" by Helicopter and at 1315 hours we started to alter course to the Northward with a view to holding our position, but at 1438 hours I was advised by Captain Gillespie that we were to meet the Pilot, Dock Master and Harbour Tugs at 0600 hours local time at position Lat  $34^{\circ}S$ , Long  $26^{\circ}E$  and then to take the "VENPET" to an anchorage at position Lat  $33^{\circ} 55'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 48'E$  in Algoa Bay.

Following the receipt of these instructions and at 1530 hours from position Lat  $34^{\circ} 14.1'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 51'E$  we altered course to the Westward and we maintained this course until 1800 hours.

Throughout the afternoon of this day the wind was South South East or South East force 5 except for one period of force 4.

At 1800 hours we altered course to the Southward for 1 hour and then altered course to the Eastward, being in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 22'S$ , Long  $25^{\circ} 02.4'E$  at 2200 hours and in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 23.5'S$ , Long  $26^{\circ} 11.5'E$  at 2400 hours.

The positions of our flotilla from 1815 hours on the 22nd until 2400 hours on the 23rd are shown on Plot No. 8 and the distance towed was a further 72 miles.

During the afternoon of this day I spoke with both Commander Howarth and also my Owners advising them of the

23rd  
Dec.

At 2400 hours we started to turn the "VENPET" under starboard wheel on to the Northerly heading through South, being in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 25'S$ , Long  $26^{\circ} 08.5'E$  at 0100

24th  
Dec.

hours on the 24th, at which time the wind was South South East force 5. By 0200 hours we were proceeding on a Northerly course towards the assigned meeting place, our position at 0200 hours being Lat  $34^{\circ} 20'S$ , Long  $26^{\circ} 04'E$ .

At 0300 hours the wind was South East force 4 and from 0415 hours we began shortening the towing gear to about 350 metres in unison with the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and we had both achieved such a length by 0500 hours when our flotilla was in position Lat  $34^{\circ} 5'S$ , Long  $26^{\circ} 04.5'E$ .

At 0500 hours the weather conditions were the same and at 0605 hours we had reached position Lat  $34^{\circ} 01.7'S$ , Long  $26^{\circ} 05.2'E$  and we finally arrived at the agreed meeting place at 0635 hours. There were no Harbour Tugs in sight upon our arrival, but a Pilot and a Captain were put on board the "VENPET" by Helicopter.

The positions of our flotilla from 2100 hours on the 23rd until 0635 hours on the 24th are shown on Plot No. 9 and the distance steamed from 2400 hours on the 23rd until 0635 hours was 62 miles.

Our flotilla thereafter proceeded towards the proposed anchorage position for the "VENPET" and at 0700 hours Cape Recipe was bearing  $256^{\circ}$  distant 16.5 N.M. At 0705 hours Captain Gillespie confirmed the anchorage position.

At 0700 hours the wind was North Easterly force 4 to 5. At 0715 hours Port Elizabeth Radio broadcast a weather forecast to the effect that Easterly winds of force 6/7 were imminent and the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and also the Pilot

24th  
Dec.

the vessel would have to remain outside until the conditions improved unless she was quickly brought to the proposed anchorage.

At 0720 hours I advised Commander Howarth of the situation and under the general directions of the Pilot on the "VENPET" who maintained contact with me by V.H.F. I thereafter controlled the navigation of our flotilla towards the anchorage position which we finally reached at 0915 hours, by which time the wind was, in fact, Easterly force 6 and showing signs of increasing. I attach a Plot of our navigation up to the anchorage position from 0635 hours.

At 0920 hours two Harbour Tugs made fast to the stern of the "VENPET" bow on to the stern of the ship and a third Tug stood by, but by 0935 hours one of these Tugs had parted her line and she did not make fast again.

Upon my orders at 0945 hours both the "SMIT LLOYD 109" and the "BOLTENTOR" ceased towing ahead and thereafter both Tugs turned about on the port and starboard bows of the "VENPET" until they were heading towards the stern of the ship in order to check the remaining forward way of the "VENPET", which was, in fact, finally brought to a stop at 1000 hours.

The party on board the "VENPET" were working on the provision of power to the anchor windlasses of the ship up to the time of our arrival in Algoa Bay and they were able to release the port anchor at 1015 hours with 8 shackles of cable which was found to be holding at 1020 hours and by 1040 hours she was safely at anchor in a position with Port Elizabeth Breakwater bearing 240<sup>0</sup> and distant 7.5 miles. The anchor windlasses were not, however, fully operational until later that day.

24th Dec. At 1100 hours I received a telegram from Safmarine Ltd.  
reading :-

"WELCOME TO ALGOA BAY WITH VENPET STOP GOOD  
WORK STOP REMAIN WITH VENPET AND TOW UNTIL  
RELEASED BY SAFMARINE BY CABLEGRAM ONLY STOP  
BUNKERS ARE AVAILABLE IN PORT ELIZABETH WHEN  
REQUIRED STOP YOU REMAIN UNDER OUR CONTRACT  
UNTIL RELEASED STOP"

At 1130 hours we let go our starboard anchor with  
8 shackles of cable with our towing gear still made fast  
to the "VENPET" on a scope of 400 metres. The "SMIT LLOYD 109"  
also anchored with her gear still fast to the ship.

The strong Easterly wind prevailed throughout the  
night of the 24th/25th.

25th Dec. We remained at anchor and connected to the "VENPET"  
throughout the 25th and also during the night of the 25th and  
26th. During the 25th the wind was East South East or Easterly  
force 4 to 5.

26th Dec. At 0215 hours on the 26th I received a telegram from  
Safmarine Ltd. reading :-

"LLOYDS OPEN FORM ON VENPET WILL BE TERMINATED  
AT 06.00 LOCAL TIME TODAY DECEMBER 26TH 1977  
STOP AT THAT TIME YOU ARE RELEASED BY SAFMARINE  
FROM YOUR CONTRACT TO US STP MANY THANKS YOUR  
COOPERATION AND GOOD WORK"

At 0600 hours we were still awaiting advice from the  
"VENPET" that she had power on her windlasses and could release  
our towing gear and as I was not in possession of any  
Delivery Certificate by 0815 hours I went ashore by Helicopter  
to discuss the situation with various interested parties

26th Dec. at 1240 hours and at 1253 hours we sailed into Port Elizabeth where we arrived at 1355 hours to bunker. We completed bunkering at 1730 hours and departed for the Rig "SEDCO K" at 1745 hours on the 26th.

27th Dec. We arrived back at the location of the "SEDCO K" at 0200 hours on the 27th at which time the "SMIT LLOYD 109" was employed in lifting some of the Rig's anchors. We remained on stand by until 0510 hours when we started to load Barytes (mud) from the Rig in order to lighten the same and this operation continued until 1000 hours.

28th Dec. At 1110 hours we cast off from the Rig and from 1200 hours we were also employed in recovering some of the Rig's anchors until about 0100 hours on the 28th.

30th Dec. At 0200 hours on the 28th with the "SMIT LLOYD 109" also assisting we towed the "SEDCO K" towards Mossel Bay and at 1652 hours on the 29th we began dropping her anchors Nos. 6 and 7 at Mossel Bay with the last anchor being set at 2105 hours that day. The "BOLTENTOR" was tied up at the Rig at 2205 hours and was not released until 0220 hours on the 30th and we finally berthed alongside the Quay in Mossel Bay Harbour at 0325 hours on the 30th.

3rd Jan. We remained in Mossel Bay until 1230 hours on the 3rd January and started to lift the Rig's anchors at 1945 hours

4th Jan. the same day and at 0245 hours on the 4th the "SMIT LLOYD 109" alone started to tow the Rig out of the Bay and the "BOLTENTOR" did not connect until 0820 hours on the 4th January. Our

5th Jan. flotilla reached the Rig's new location on the 5th January at 2040 hours. The new location, which was Lat  $34^{\circ} 49.2'S$ , Long  $23^{\circ} 46.1'E$ , was only a very short distance from the previous location.



the 27th December when she arrived back at the Rig. During the aforesaid period the "BOLTENTOR" towed the "VENPET" for 6 days 19 hours calculated from 1515 hours on the 17th until the "VENPET" anchored at 1015 hours on the 24th and we towed her a total of 533 miles.

The "SMIT LLOYD 109" assisted in the towage from 1125 hours on the 22nd until 1015 hours on the 24th, i.e. for 1 day 22 hours 50 minutes.

Although the "VENPET" was in tow of the "SMIT LLOYD 109" when we relieved her of such vessel at 1515 hours on the 17th upon the instructions of the Contractors, Safmarine Ltd., the "VENPET" remained totally disabled from the point of view of motive power and steerage facilities throughout the period of the "BOLTENTOR's" towage service which lasted for 6 days 19 hours.

The rudder of the "VENPET" was also jammed hard over to starboard from the time we started the tow at 1515 hours on the 17th until 2130 hours on the 21st and this caused the "VENPET" to frequently develop sudden and also very serious sheers to starboard which on many occasions exposed the "BOLTENTOR" to the risk of being girted. This sheering of the "VENPET" also placed the towing gear under severe strain and stresses especially when the two vessels also rolled in opposite directions. Furthermore on the occasions when the towing gear became slack because of the sheering of the "VENPET" and the resulting change in the position of the "BOLTENTOR" in relation to the "VENPET" the gear was then exposed to the risk of snagging on the bottom.

Had the towing gear ever parted on any occasion during the course of our towage service considerable difficulty

unsuccessful attempts of the Supply Vessel "AGULHAS" to establish a towage connection at the stern of the "VENPET" which had a very substantial freeboard.

Our flotilla was frequently subject to the influence of the current and if the towing gear had parted when such a situation prevailed and especially when the Agulhas current was setting to the Westward the "VENPET" could have been carried down on to the Rig before she could again be taken in tow. Equally if the "VENPET" had been set inshore by the adverse wind and current when adrift, she could not have anchored because neither of her windlasses were operational until a few hours before we delivered her off Port Elizabeth on the 24th.

We experienced adverse wind, sea and swell conditions on almost every day we had the "VENPET" in tow and I was obliged on many occasions to alter course in an endeavour to hold the vessel head up to the wind whilst holding her off the Coast pending the receipt of instructions to deliver the vessel. I was also required to take action to avoid exposing the serious collision wound on the starboard quarter of the ship to the seas and swell to eliminate as far as possible the flooding of the engine space through the open shell plating.

In addition to our towage services we were also required to illuminate the blacked out "VENPET" during the hours of darkness and we also issued Navigation Warnings.

The rendering of these services resulted in the port engine of the "BOLTENTOR" suffering the loss of lubricating oil on two occasions which necessitated the engine being stopped whilst repairs were carried out to check such loss.

Crew and I were all exposed to the risk of being injured especially when working out on deck for the purposes of handling, inspecting or changing the towage gear and when repairing the damaged stern gate. In the above respect I would also refer to the fact that I deemed it necessary to give orders to issue lifevests and to insist upon these being worn by those working out on deck during adverse weather.

The Chief Officer who boarded the "VENPET" from our rubber dinghy and those who manned such boat were obviously exposed to unusual risks.

Finally I would again refer to the fact that I was at all times in charge of the operation which led to the successful delivery of the "VENPET" at Port Elizabeth.

.....  
JOERG DIETRICH STRAEUSSLER

MOSSEL BAY



9th/10th January, 1978.

17.12.1977

00	Pos.	34° 41,3' S	24° 46,5' E
30	"	34° 42,1' S	24° 45,8' E
00	"	34° 45,5' S	24° 43,5' E
30	"	34° 46,5' S	24° 47' E
00	"	34° 46,5' S	24° 40,1' E
30	"	34° 44,4' S	24° 41,3' E
45	"	34° 40,5' S	24° 41,0' E

18.12.1977

40 Pos. 34° 39,0' S 24° 40,6' E





distance: 24 nm

Beijing Sunset 17./18. Dec. 1977



02.50	34° 56,4'	23' 44,4" E
03.00	34° 58,3'	44,5'
03.40	34° 59,4'	46,0'
03.20	34° 59,7'	47,0'
03.35	35° 01,6'	48,4'
03.00	35° 04,4'	48,6'
04.20	35° 04,3'	23' 46,3" E
05.00	34° 59,6'	44,5'
06.00	34° 59,1'	44,6'
06.30	34° 58,8'	50,6'
06.50	34° 52,9'	52,2'
07.20	34° 52,0'	58,0'
07.20	34° 54,0'	59,9'
08.00	34° 51,6'	24' 02,2" E
08.45	34° 53,2'	08,2'
09.00	34° 53,4'	14,0'
09.20	34° 53,3'	12,2'
09.40	34° 53,8'	15,9'
10.40	34° 53,7' S	24' 24,9" E
10.40	34° 53,6'	27,0'
20.00	34° 53,8'	30,6'
21.40	34° 53,2'	34,4'
22.00	34° 54,4'	37,5'
23.00	34° 48,5'	44,4'
24.00	34° 48,0' S	24' 45,6" E

see page 5



Survey report 19. October 1977

17.10	34° 53,8' S	24° 45,4' E
18.10	53,7'	27,7'
19.10	53,6'	27,6'
20.10	53,8'	30,6'
21.10	52,2'	34,4'
22.10	54,4'	37,5'
23.10	49,5'	40,4'
24.10	34° 48,0' S	24° 45,2' E



17.10



18.10



19.10



20.10



21.10



22.10



23.10




24.10



distance: 27 mm

Bezugswinkel 13. Dezember 1977 (Zürich)




Wageningen 20.12.77



0430	34° 49' S	24° 34' E
0500	34° 39' S	24° 36' E
0560	34° 29' S	24° 42' E
0630	34° 21' S	24° 49' E
0700	34° 14' S	24° 55' E
0730	34° 05' S	25° 02' E
0800	34° 00' S	25° 09' E
0830	34° 00' S	25° 16' E
0900	34° 00' S	25° 23' E
0945	34° 20' S	25° 37' E

Cave in distance




Distance 183 mm

Bearing changed 21/22 Dec 1972

0430	34° 25' S	25°
0500	34° 31' S	25°
0530	34° 40' S	25°
0600	34° 50' S	25°
0630	34° 50' S	25°
0700	35° 00' S	24°
0730	35° 00' S	24°



26° - 9-

23.12

7.00	34° 21,0' S	25° 55,2' E
8.00	34° 22,0' S	26° 02,4' E
9.00	34° 22,1' S	26° 08,7' E
10.00	34° 23,0' S	26° 14,5' E

24.12


1.00	34° 25',5'	26° 05,5' E
2.00	34° 20',5'	26° 04',5' E
5.00	34° 05',5'	26° 04,5' E
16.05	34° 01,7' S	26° 05,7' E

Bergung Venpel 23.12./24.12.97

distance 62 nm

23.12.74

20



13° 55'  
34° 13' S  
26° 06' E

nach Norden ab  
Fahrt voran  
Schleppboot aufbauen

2815  
271  
370 14  
581  
251

0215  
258  
319  
577  
360  
2713

0420  
727  
12.5

24 22 S	21 00	06 05	06 35	07 00	07 30	07 55
25 50	34° 21.8' S	315	314	294	770	777
	25° 56.2 E	370	215	322	333	325
		235	222	616	607	602
		360	262	360	360	15.6
		275 70.3	262 12.5	256	247	
22.00	23.00	34° 01.5 S			15.8	273 07.5
34° 22' S	34° 22' S	26° 04.7 E				318
26° 02.4 E	26° 07.4 E					577
		05.00				360
21.00	03.00	34° 05.4	05 40	07 15	735	237 15.4
34° 23.5	34° 14'	26° 04.5	C.H.	324	788	311 05.5
26° 11.5	26° 02'		276° 21 SW	273	360	284
			34° 03.2	360	604	595
				253 15.8 km	48	260
					220	
					288	