

For TFL, Wilhelm Vol. 5

By: slf Date: 4/18/2001

SECURITY INFORMATION

CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP AUSTRIA (US)

P APO 541 U.S. ARMY Salzburg STATION

Document 14 April 53

Number 3/P/29184

To: TILLY, Mr. Hans Luisenstr.123 Bonn, Germany			
To: l/o sender posted in Salzburg			
Communication date 13 Apr 53 German	DISPOSITION Passed (P) P	STATION ALLOCATION CIC	CCG ALLOCATION CIB
Language German	Condemned (C)		
Examiner	Held (H)		
Reviewer	Excised (E)		
Previous Comments	Returned (RET)		

LETTER REFERRING TO SPY CASE HOETTEL

" Dear Hans,

Many thanks for your letter dated 7 and 8 April to which I am replying immediately, seeing that you are a bit worried.

As far as Dr.H. is concerned, I don't think that his personal attitude has been correctly represented. H.'s sympathy is certainly with the West, but the American agents who as investigators had contacted him already in Nuremberg, questioned him on several of his connections without his knowing that these agents had become or maybe even had been then in contact with the East.

I believe that he has slid into an awkward situation rather innocently, but according to what I know about him he will manage to extricate himself. H. seems to me to dabble too much in intrigues of all sorts without any clear concept for the future. Of course, if the Americans want to stage a show trial on him, then I am sorry for him, for those democrats are quite capable of doing such a thing even at the risk of ruining or exposing their own friends or other absolutely pro-western elements.

I am quite certain that this will not entail any trouble whatever for you, apart from the fact that the thing will certainly be staged in Washington with VERBER, PONGER. Incidentally H. will certainly be a very important witness in this trial. There is no doubt that the affair will be given considerable prominence.

Personally you need not be worried, you have nothing to do with it, and the mere fact of chancing to know him does not involve you in the least.

I suppose this will do for the time being. Should I hear anything of interest, I shall of course inform you.

pl. to USA 12-52 7357

NWC-001725

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

As far as the meeting in August is concerned, I am increasingly in favor of deferring it to next year. Our comrades are mostly lacking the necessary traveling money, perhaps even interest. ...

Grashei is certainly still in office and, as far as I know, in connection with the infantry training.

I cannot recall any man of the name of Spinka, but I will inquire. ...

Your comrade

Signed: HERBERT."

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

MICROFILMED  
AUG 8 1968  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Austria  
P/34011  
15 April 1953

*P*

Subject: Reflections after Dr. Wilhelm HÖTTL's Arrest

Date of Information: 30 March through 14 April 1953

Date Received: 3 through 15 April 1953

- a. Method of obtaining: Para 1 was received from PP-5 through PP-1;  
para 2 from Dr. Emil van TONGEL, who is now a chief propagandist with the Upper Austrian Union of Independents (VdU), in a private conversation with HH-1;  
para 3 from HH-1;  
para 4 from editorial members of the monthly "Das Signal" supervised by HH-1;  
para 5 from HH-1;  
para 6 is a Socialist Party information received by HH-1;  
para 7 from VÖEST sales manager Dr. Rudolf LUEESCH through HH-1;  
para 8 from Dr. Gustav GLATZER in a letter to HH-1, dated 11 April 1953, (Graz).

b. Source: See under para a.

c. Evaluation of

- (1) content): In general probably true
- (2) sources: Fairly trustworthy and better

d. No restrictions for distribution of report

e. Reference is made to hand-written report dated 8 April 1953.

f. Remarks: References to the list covering a part of HÖTTL's address register enclosed hereto.

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

*SAC - CIA - 100-1*


CS COPY

*P/34011 Box 15*

*End*

ABSTRACTED INDEXED

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List of Names covering a Part of HÖTTL's  
Address Register

<sup>H</sup>  
Franz ALLIGER was a former SD officer who in January 1949 emigrated from Hamburg to Argentina.

Dr. Günther ALTENBURG was the former German minister to Greece.

Athenaeum Verlag is located in Bad Godesberg; the same applies to

Deutscher Buchvertrieb Schmidt & Comp.

Kurt AUNER (not AUNIL) is probably living at Winkelstrasse 5 in Munich 25.

Prince Paul AVALOFF (AVALOV), Salzburg, Glockengasse 10, is the 1884-born Russian general living according to our register at Sebelsbergerstrasse 36.

Theodor ALBERT's postbox 52 at Freilassing 2 should be of some interest.

Dr. Wilhelm BEISSNER was formerly a member of ROSENBERG's staff with the Aussenpolitische Amt in Berlin, then became a branch chief with SD Amt VI, and later was one of the liaison staff members with the former Grandmufti of Jerusalem Hajji Amin El Husseini; fled a U.S. internment camp (Italy) for Austria where he worked for FIS, then with the Tolstoy group. BEISSNER is believed to live in Cairo and is suspected of being in close contact with the former Grandmufti.

Count Walter BERCHEM (not BERCHERN) is the old Vienna Abwehr officer who worked for [ ] Tolstoy and VdU-KRAUS.

[ ]

Capitaine Maurice BLONDEL was on particularly friendly terms with Mrs. Werner GÖTTSCHE. He was suspected of having liberated SS Obersturmbannführer Werner GÖTTSCHE from Dachau war crimes prison. GÖTTSCHE later on worked for [ ] BLONDEL was also in contact with Kurt AUNER.

Prof. Dr. Taras BORODAJKEWYCZ (not BORODAJKEWYA) was sponsored by Soviet Prof. STERN after the war and was in contact with both HÖTTL and Dr. Anton BÖHM.

Dr. Rudolf DIELS is believed to be the original chief of Gestapo

Edwin Erich DWINGER was a famous author during nazi time.

Louis (Lois, Ludwig) EDER is the well-known Linz intelligence multiplicator, former nazi, former VdU leader, former Nationale Liga leader.

Kurt FECHNER dob 4 June 1896, is the former Abwehr colonel living in Innsbruck.

August FINKE a former Oberregierungsrat and SS Obersturmbannführer, was a branch chief with SD Amt VI.

Dr. Karl (Karl Heinz) v. FORNER was once arrested by the Russians when he probably worked for a American-sponsored German intelligence. It is believed that FORNER was a former SS and probably SD or Abwehr member.

Elisabeth FRANKE Munich 5, Rumfordstrasse, was SD secretary to SS Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm WANECK and after the war was reported to be a collecting point for former SD members and the SS-General-STEINER group.

Kurt GEISSLER was probably the former Kriminalrat with Gestapo Headquarters and police attache in Bucharest, who fell out of favor, was in a concentration camp, but in the final stage of the war became reactivated.

Werner GÖTTSC and his wife Charlotte were already described under para BLONDEL.

Christl GRIESSER is a secretary of State Secretary GRAF, Ministry for Interior, Vienna.

Otto GRIESSER is probably Christl GRIESSER's brother, a former SD officer.

<sup>ER</sup>  
Edith GURNIK is Rupert MANDL's former SD secretary and now his associate both in private life and in intelligence. Edith GURNIK is known to act as a cover address for MANDL. She is now also operating a ladies wear in Salzburg.

Princess Stefanie HOHENLOHE is believed to be identical with the Princess HOHENLOHE described in HÖTTL's book "Die Geheime Front".

Dr. Felicitas HORACEK (or HORATSCHKEK) is believed to be close relative of former Lt. Col. HORACEK with Abwehr Vienna.

Franz Robert INGRIM is the well-known former Austrian writer Robert KLEIN, later an American, who lives in Switzerland.

Dr. Ludwig JEDLICKA is the ill-reputed intelligence operator in contact with the Soviets, Dr. OFFCZAREK, HÖTTL, EDER, and KOWARIK.

Dipl. Ing. Peter KAMSARAKAN (KAMSARAKHAN) was HÖTTL's pet horse in Armenian intelligence during the war and his liaison to the following

General KANAYAN of Beirut, was chief of an Armenian group working for German intelligence of dubious value against Russia.

Dr. Robert KATSCHINKA of Attnang-Puchheim, was a former German Foreign Office and SD employee, now with an oil exploiting company.

[ ]

Ruth KNOCHEN

is probably the widow of former Gestapo chief Dr. KNOCHEN in Paris.

Prof. Kurt KNOLL

is a close collaborator of OFFCZAREK and a friend of HÖTTL's, who had once been arrested by the Soviets.

Friedrich KONRATH

. Polizeioberkommissaer of Bundespolizeidirektion Linz, is greatly interested in intelligence.

26  
Ing. Karl KOWARIK

is a former Hitler Youth leader and Kreisleiter and belonged to HÖTTL's intelligence staff.

Adalbert KUNDEL

was a former SD officer in Agram, who was briefly connected with the German-operated intelligence group in Austria.

Alfred NAUJOCKS

was an SD Sturmbannführer and originally in charge of the technical branch of SD Amt VI. He is believed to be in contact with [ ]

201-



P/34011

CREDIT SAUER ... TEL. NR. 3732  
OBERBANK LINZ 7.1721  
SPARRHASSE - BAD AUSSEE

AGOSTINI A.

ALBERT THEODOR  
SALZBURG-PAARSCH  
NEUFFANGASSE 36/POSCH  
TEL. 60-9-44

ALFRED KRANZ  
ALLEGGER  
BUENOS AIRES - FELGRAND  
14 DE JULIO 1947

ALTENBURG JOS. A. D., DR. GÜNTHER  
BONN/RHEIN MARKT 26/32  
DEUTSCHER IND. U.  
HANDELSTAG

ASPUCK, WILHELM  
SALZBURG, ANGERASSE 1 TEL. 2179

ATHENÄUM-VERLAG  
GODESBERG  
BAD FRIEDENBERG, BUCHELSTR 53/22C

DEUTSCHER BUCHVERTRIEB  
SCHMIDT U. COMP  
BAD FRIEDENBERG  
VERBERG, PRINZ DR ALDIS  
TRIBÜNEL

Abg - 2 14/23  
[ ]

Encl

AWALOFF PAUL, FÜRST  
SALZBURG, FLOCKENGASSE 10

<sup>ER</sup>  
AUNIS KURT, BEI ANLER X AUNER  
MÜNCHEN 25, WIKELSTRASSE 5

ALBERT THEODOR  
FREILASSING 2  
POSTSCHLIESSFACH 56

RODE, J. HANS B  
BEI N.W.D.R. HANNOVER/20  
RUDOLF U. BEMINGSTRASSE

BANCA ROSINI DI RESI  
MILANO, PIAZZA MERCANTI 5

BARTHELMES HELMUTH  
BEI DAUMER  
MÜNCHEN 19/136  
HILDESTRASSE 144

BARTSCH J.  
SALZBURG  
SIBELBERGERSTR. 23

BAUER, HANS / APA /  
ROMA VIA DELLA MERCEDE  
S. STAMPA ASTERA  
VIA MARRAS 14/17

BETZ, FERD. / HILDEGARD /  
WEIMAR, BELVEDERE ALLEE 46

BERARI, MARCO  
BUENOS AIRES, CERVESEAS  
VARELA 26

BERCHEM<sup>?</sup> GRAF WALTER BERCHEM  
WIESENTHED<sup>?</sup> BEI WITZINGER  
13 a / UNT. FRANKEN<sup>?</sup>

BERGER, ERICH  
DRAMATURG  
HOHENSCHÄPFLAN<sup>?</sup> BEI MÜNCHEN  
088

BLÖMKE<sup>?</sup>, EVOR VON  
WILSSAS<sup>EE</sup> BEI TEGERNSEE (136)  
PENSION EDELWEISS

083

BLONDEL, MAURICE  
BREMEN, REICHSSTRASSE 131  
VILLA MANTHE<sup>?</sup> TEL 2472

BUS. U. INDUSTRIEN, RÖMERSTRASSE 33  
TEL. 3162

BLUM RUDOLF,  
HAMBURG, ADOLFPLATZ 4

BÖCKER DR. ANTON  
BRUCK A. D. INN  
FRAZERSTRASSE 9

BÖHM, DR. ANTON BÖHM  
ALTMÜNSTER NACHDEMSEE 9  
TEL. I. D. GESCHÄFT  
GMUNDEN 9106 (91106)

SALZBURG, NEUTORGLASSE 19a  
TEL. 26-5-34

BÖHME DR. HERBERT  
FLUTER-BLÄTTER  
LOCHHAM BEI MÜNCHEN

BOBET DR. JOSEF  
GRAZ, BUCHVOGELGASSE 10

BORODAKIEWY<sup>74</sup>, UNIV. PROF.  
DR. TORAS VON.  
WIEN I, JAKOBERGASSE 4

BOSCH, VAN DER  
MÜNCHEN 8  
MÜHLBAUERSTR. 2

BREHM, BRUND, DR.  
BRUNDSEE, BRÄUHD

BREITENBACH, DR. EDGAR  
MÜNCHEN, ARCLISSTR.  
COLLECTING POINT

BRENCH, IRENE  
MANHEIM /17a/  
ECKENHEIMERLANDSTRASSE 7

BODEN  
BRASS, ALBERT  
PILSNER

BRUCHNER ?  
WIEN III ORSAYG. 8/I

(3)

BRÜHL'SCHER VERLAG  
GIESSEN, KANZLERBERG 9  
POSTSCHLIESSFACH 273

BUTSCHKE, DR. FRITZ  
LINZ, KOLLEGIUMGASSE 5  
TEL. 215-62

BUCHER, HEINI  
WIEN 14 RICH. WAGNERPLATZ 15/19

BEISSNER, DR. WILH.  
CEITE  
MIA LUK

MARIA ...

BRANCIK GERHARD  
GRAZ, HANS LOCHSGASSE 10

CREDIT BANK VEREIN  
FILIALE SALZBURG  
KAINRATHSTR. 2 TEL. 3732

DEUTSCHE SOLOATENPOST MÜNCHEN  
15 MAININGERSTR. 29

DEVORETSKY, ELFRIEDE  
WIEN XIV, KNEPTELGASSE 29/4

DEVORETSKY, SEPP  
WIEN 5, HANSLAGASSE 13/13

ELLS, DR. RUDOLF  
H. ADD. GRAF FABER CASTELL  
MÜNSTERM. DORRENHANDBACH  
... EISENSTE...

REDMANN, TOMI  
ETTLINGER (17a)  
SCHLOSSGARTEN STR. 6, BADEN

DIETRICH GUSTI,  
WIEN III, KOEHLGASSE 30

DRAGON, FRED.  
19, CHIMANISTR. 26

MEYHAUPT, <sup>Grete</sup>BIETE  
LINZ, ROSEGGER STR. 21  
TEL. 259864  
STUTTGART N  
ED. PFEIFFER STR. 35  
POSTFACH 1150

<sup>W</sup>DRINGER, EDWIN, ERICH BRINGER  
STEEG/ALLGÄU  
HEORIBS HOF/DEUTSCHLAND

DVORAK, PETER  
TRAUNKIRCHEN 39

DURFELD BARON JOSEF  
TEL 1010 BEI ARMER  
BACHMAYER SALZBURG

MEYHAUPT, <sup>Grete</sup>BIETE  
BOBLINGER / WING  
WALDBURGER STR. 17

EONER, GAB:Z  
POSTKARTE 21

FEIGGRUBER, ADOLF  
TRAUN BEI LINZ  
ST. DIONISENBASSE 88

EITLER, DR. ERICH  
OBERTAL 37 POSTSCHLECHMINZ

EMBAKE HEROLD  
MA VIA APPIA NUOVA

ENDRICH DR. WALTER  
KIRCHDORF URČUN  
NEUPERNSTERN TEL. 4

EDER LOIS  
LINZ, LOPENSTERNSTR. 41  
LINZ/D.

FISCHNER, KURT  
INNSBRUCK, PRADLERSTR. 61

FELLNER, DR. ANTON  
ALTMÜNSTER 106, O.O.  
LINZ, BÜRGERSTR. 51

FICKERS, HOFRAT DR.  
LINZ ROSEGGERSTR 21

FINDENIEG, V. KART DPL. 7195?  
WIRTSCHAFTSPR. KARL UBIC  
SCHNEIZSTR 4

FINKE AUGUST FINKE  
KERL BEI OLDENBURG  
ELISABETHSTR. 3

X 2100A-22  
SMIL 155  
88 325A-12

FISCHER HANS BEYSCHULER  
LEOBEN, HANGASSE 21

FLACKE, KARL HEINZ  
FRANKFURT A/MAIN  
GABELSBERGER STR. 12/1

FÖRNER, DR. KARL VON  
3 LANDSTR. H. 7

FRANKE ELISABETH  
MÜNCHEN 5  
RUMPERDSTR. 69/1  
TEL. 22-2-37

FRANKENBERG RICHARD VON  
STUTTGART 5  
ZELLANSTR. 83 TEL. 76-729

FRITZ, DR. MAX  
3, LANDSTR. H. 76/6

GÄHERMANN MERIA  
ST. MARTIN GASTHAUS  
WEHRER MUHLWERTEL

GARGANTI, ALDO  
EDITORE MILANO  
VIA DELLA SPIGAL 30



GEISSLER KURT  
DÜSSELDORF, BAUERSTR. 20

GERLICH, ERICH ERICH  
POST LOIBIEHL BEI MONDSEE

GERALD HANS  
VI. 1/56  
MOLLARDGASSE 2/15

<sup>?</sup>GIMBEIN, THEODOR DR. V  
SALZBURG FABERSTR. 11

GÖTTSCHE CHARLOTTE UND WERNER  
KIEL, ALTE LÜBERNER  
SEE

GRIESSER, CARISTL  
I., HERRENGASSE 7  
AMT D. STATTSKTR.

GRIESSER, OTTO  
BOLZANO CASELLA POSTALE 21

GRUNAUER GRYAR  
FLACHAU 127 SALZBURG

<sup>?</sup>GO. HEINZ  
DIETMANSZCK (13.5.)  
DBB

GRNIK EUTH  
SALZBURG POSTAMT MELZARTL.  
GLASERND

HENGELHAUPT, DR. ERICH, MARY  
BERN, EFFINGERSTR. 103

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HENK MARIANNE,  
KÖLN - RHEIN  
STEINERGASSE 1a 1. ETAGE  
BEI NELTE

---

FAMILIE ADOLF HENK  
REST. SELPERHOF IM GELPTAL  
WUPPERTAL - HAHNERBERG  
RHEINLAND

---

HÖFER DR. ING. HEINZ  
MINKSTATT AM SEE  
KÄRNTEN

---

HÖTL ~~~~~ MARIA  
5 MARGARETHENSTR. 144  
B 22 125 B

---

HÖTL HOFRAT KARL  
5 GIESSEN<sup>?</sup>GASSE 10

---

HOFER PETER  
WALZBURG, DREIFALTIGKEITSSTR. 9  
T. 68292

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HOHENLOHE-WALDENBURG -  
SCHILLINGFÜRST PRINZESSIN  
STEPANIC  
PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.  
CLAY, RITTENHOUSE SQUARE

HOHENÖCKER, DIPL. ~~KONSTANZ~~ KONSTANZ  
LINZ KLEINMÜNCHEN  
VOGELFÄNGERWEG 33

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HOHENSTEIN  
BÜCKLESTR. 1 / ? /  
KONSTANZ TEL. 1042  
HAYDENSTR. 15 (PRIOST)

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HOLECHA, AUGUST  
LINZ, HOFNERSTR. 14

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HOLLAS, HELMUTH  
XVII, ANASTASINSGRÜNG. 38

---

HORATSCHER, DR. FELIZITAS  
LINZ, LUSTENAU 978

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HORN PROF. DR. WALTER  
BERKLEY  
DEPT. OF ART  
U. DIV. OF CALIF.

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HOTEL HABSBURG  
MÜNCHEN 13 SCHWARZING  
A IN MILLERSTR. 11 TEL. 32989

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HUEGEL DR ALANS.  
TUTTGART - FELLBACH  
ROBERT KOCHSTR. 13

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HUF, VERA  
ILZBURG - LEHEN  
OSWERKG. 13  
TEL. 5137

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HOFBAUER, KURT  
SALZBURG PRIV. MANDLGASSE 9  
BAYERHAMMERSTR. 39  
FIRMA TRANSKOMMERZ

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HEINRICHSBAUER, A.  
(16) FRANKFURT A/MAIN  
AN DER HAUPTWACHE 7-8, II  
TEL. 9-23-34  
ODER

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KÖLN A/RHEIN  
KAISER WILHELM RING 2-4  
TEL 70421

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HECHSTETER, DR.  
BAD AUSSEE, COLLOF 31

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HILLGRUBER, ANDREAS  
CANOTT. PAUL.  
GÖTTINGEN (20-6)  
STEGERMÜHLER WEG 8

---

HEINRICHSBAUER, A.  
BONN, WELKESTR. 20  
TEL 4672

---

INGRICH, FRANZ ROBERT  
ST. NIKOLAUSEN KT. LIZERN

---

JAHN, DR. HERBERT  
1, WAPPLINGERSTR. 24-26

---

EDLICKA, DR. LUDWIG  
TEL. MANDLGASSE 35

---

JOHANNSEN, DR. GUDAS  
MARKT GRAFING bei MÜNCHEN  
GRANDINERSTR. 21, TEL. 411

---

JAGY, ING. FRANZ  
MÜNCHEN TEL. 30-6-48  
(MELDET SICH DEHN ODER ADLER)

---

KARR, DR. KARL  
GRAZ, ZAHNSTR. 14

---

KAISER, FRANZ  
TIEBERBRUNN 4, TIROL

---

KAJUM, SHAN.  
SACHRING, OBIB  
CHIEMGAU (136) KAISERBLICK

---

KAMMERHOFER, CONSTANTIN  
HANNOVER - RICKE / 20/  
GÖTTINGEN CHANSEE 7A

---

KAMSA RAKAN, DIPL. ING.  
KITE BÜHEL, KANALSTR. 41  
Wd. IV, Wd. HAUPTSTR. 36

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KARAYAN, DR. SORENCE.  
BEXER DATED, LIBAN.  
B.P. 1422

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KATSCHINKA, DR. ROBERT  
ATTNANG - PUCHHEIM  
JAHNSTR. 7 TEL. 46

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KÄUFMANN, GÜNTHER  
SCHRIFFTLEITER  
HAPFERAN bei FÜSSEN 82  
ALLIÄV

KAPPLER, H.  
CARRERE MILITARE  
GASTA, ITALIEN

(8)

KERNMAYR, ERICH  
GMUNDEN, VILLA WENSE, D.O.

KESSELRING, ALBERT FELDMARSCHALL  
WERL i/W. (21 6)  
LANGENWESTENWEG 46  
MIL. STRAFANSTALT KREISSOEST

KESSELRING ?  
WIESSEE a./TEGERNSEE  
HANS SCHAUINSLAND (13-6)

KHÜEN GRAF DR. KARL  
COSTELLO GANDEGG, POST  
ST. MICHELE D. ADRIANO  
PRESSO BOLZANO, ITALIEN

KIRCHER DR. RUDOLF  
REDAKTION "STANDPUNKT"  
MERAN KATHERINENSTR. 20

KISZLING FERN. MAJ. a D  
HOFRAT RUDOLF  
5, WEHARGASSE 27/12

FLEVENSTUBER, ARNO  
BAD GODESBERG, DÜRENSTR. 4

LIMBURG HEINZ ULRICH  
FREIHERR VON  
AMBURG 36, COLONNADGASSE 9

BOURG, ING HERBERT  
... CHEMIE A.G.

KNOCHEN, RUTH ..  
HÄHNENKLEE / BOCHWIESE  
OBERHARZ, HANS EBERLING  
PROV. HANNOVER

KNOLL, UNIV. PROF. a.D. KUNST  
ORT bei MONDSEE  
POST UNTERACH a. ATTERSEE

KUNDSSEN, THORWALD  
HOLTE HJDEVEL 14  
DÄNEMARK

KOLH ING. FRITJOF  
SALZBURG, REGENSBURGERSTR. 10

KO CZIAN, RUDOLF  
ERNEST THUNSTR. 11  
11, TEL 69057

KONRATH, FRIEDRICH  
POL. OBERKOMMISSAR  
LINZ a/D  
BUNDESPOLIZEI DIR.

KORDT GESANDTER DR.  
THEODOR U. DR. FRIEDRICH  
MÜNCHEN WALTER FLEXSTR. 10

KARTSCHAK, DIPL. SC. POL., MAX  
GRAF MERANGASSE 39

KOWALIK ING. KARL  
LINZ, SCHÖRITZERSTR. 24  
HINTERHAUS TEL. 24-4-67

KRAUS G. KARL  
MÜNCHEN 2/13 6)  
WUNTERS... / 610-?  
... SA MAN

KÜSTER, OTTO, RECHTSANWALT  
STUTTGART, BOPSEWALD STR. 20

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KÜNGEL, ADOLBERT  
bei KATHE NÜSCH  
GRAZ - EGGENBERG  
BAYERNSHOFWEG 8

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KOBER, L. CARL  
DAYTON 3, OHIO, U.S.A.  
1934 SPEICE AVE.

---

WEINBURG, HANS ULRICH,  
FREIHERR  
SCHLOSS THUNFELD  
DEUTSCH POSTSTRITZ / STEIRMARKT

---

KLIMBURG, DR. HEINZ  
ESTANCIA "DON ROBERTO"  
LAVAISSE F.C.N.G.S.M.  
PROVINCIA SAN LUIS

---

ALFRED NANNJOKS  
i. FA. CARL GRUNING  
HAMBURG 22 PRIV. HAMBURG 13  
VOGTEI WEG 15 JAHNSALLEE  
TEL. 223688 TEL. 445831

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FRANZ RÖTHEN  
BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR VERTRIEBENE  
FRANZKARLSTR. 27  
LAFÜRBIENSTR. 33 (PRIVAT)



T. SASHA THRU IVAN

FRANKENSTEIN - HÖTTL - ... ON 5 APR 53

ANG. had a conversation w/ PP 3 on 31 March during which he alleged that PP 3 was in contact w/ Dr. Anton BÖHM. ANG claimed to have been informed by Dr. HUSP, chief state police Salzburg, that a number of ANG's reports - according to an information from PAMMER, Vienna - had appeared in Vienna, Munich and Bonn. From a source that ANG did not disclose he further claimed knowledge that intelligence had arrived with the "HINZE (OR HEINZ) GROUP" bearing the source description of "Ministerium" b) "CSSI - Salzburg" c) "TONI - SALZBURG". He further claimed that BÖHM was collaborating w/ Dr. HÖTTL's (Celt Ansee) group to which also Louis EDER, MAST and BOHLSCHWING belonged. BÖHM also worked for CIC Gmunden, GEHLEN and for Bonn, and was affiliated w/ Dr. LACKNER (Salz. Police). BOHLSCHWING worked directly for OSS and the state secretariat at Washington. HÖTTL was presently under arrest by CIC for his relations with PAMMER.

- 2) FEICHT. had conversations w/ PP 3 informing him on his last meet w/ Frankenstein (cover name - identity still unknown)

[ ]

NWC-001721

2

Frankenstein had asked him to get copies of reports submitted by Theodor ALBERT to ANG. He would pay ANG through FEICH, \$500 monthly. These ANG reports were received by Dr. PÖHM. ALBERT worked for the HANSE or HEINZ group which was headed in Munich by Colonel SCHACK. Other members in Austria were Louis EDER of Linz and Dr. HÖTTL. Frankenstein alleged that PAMMER had recently refused acceptance of ANG's reports because he received the same in greater detail from EDER, possibly through his state police).

3) ANG informed FEICH on 30 March that he had been visited by ALBERT, "who now paid again". HÖTTL had been arrested by CIC. BILCHWING headed a CIC group in Gmunden, which HÖTTL had not known. HÖTTL had been in contact w/ BOLSCH, to whom he had submitted reports from PÖNGER. When PÖNGER was arrested letters from HÖTTL were found.

4) Frankenstein who declared that he worked in GENÈVE, the coming man in Geneva IS, tried to impress FEI. by giving him a letter signed by ALBERT and addressed to HELMER (asking for help to obtain

(16 mail)

(3)

Mayer of Regensburg) This letter should be sent to HELMER through Dr. HOSP. Frankenstein declared "You see how GEHL. has penetrated all, even HÖGNER does what he wants".

- 5) During a meet Frank. FEICH. on 30 March Frank declared: German postwar IS started between SCHJERIN and BIS, later BLANK and GEHL. competed, G now absorbs BLANCK.

Frank had already on a previous meet mentioned BOLSCH, he was carried out "B is sick, he will soon disappear".

Frank wanted connection with Austr. border personnel, but first a name list which FEICH. will ask from HOSP.

- 6) I ordered PP.3 to follow FEICH's meets w/ Frank. closely and have Frank shadowed and possibly identified by a trustworthy man from police.

[ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Encl. 8

VOB-873

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Chief [ ] , Salzburg  
Attn: Chief of Operations  
Chief [ ] , Vienna

21 April 1953

Report on Wilhelm HOETTL's Reaction to  
Solitary Confinement

REFERENCE: [ ]

1. Forwarded herewith are three copies of a report on the reinterrogation of Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL which occurred on 4 April 1953. These copies are for passage to [ ]
2. You have already received copies of this report for your own files under ( )

[ ]

Att: Interrogation Report  
(in triplicate)

Distr:

- 2 - Sals (w/3 Atts)
- 1 - EE ✓
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - [ ]
- 1 - Carding
- 1 - WTL

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

Encl 8  
FAVA 2627

[ ]

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. [ ]

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~MICROFILMED~~ 23 April 1953

TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief [ ] Attn: [ ] Vienna [ ]

SUBJECT: GENERAL [ ]

SPECIFIC— Reinterrogation of Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL

REFERENCE: [ ]

Info: Fran  
Salz  
Pull

DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

JAN 19 1982

File	Checked
Hq Section For	
Hq Comments Recd.	by cable
See para	by pouch
For info and	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Forwarded herewith are copies of the report of reinterrogation of Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL on 4 April 1953. The remaining reports on the confinement and interrogation of HOETTL are being processed and will be forwarded as they are finished.

Attach: As described above  
(In triplicate)

20 April 1953

Distr:

- 3 - EE (w/3 att.)
- 1 - Fran (w/1 att)
- 2 - Salz (w/2 att)
- 2 - Pull (w/2 att)
- 1 - [ ] pwer (w/att)
- 1 - [ ] atlas (w/att)
- 1 - Carding (w/att)
- 1 - CE/630 (w/att)
- 1 - WTL (w/att)

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~ INFORMATION

20 April 1953

INTERROGATION OF DR. WILHELM HOETTL: Reaction to Solitary Confinement

1. Circumstances. A second interrogation of Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL was conducted on 3 April 1953 in the cell where he was confined near Salzburg. From approximately 0600 hours on 28 March 1953 until sometime the 30th of March 1953, HOETTL was held in solitary confinement in an uncomfortable cell adapted from a garage. On 30 March 1953, he was moved to another solitary cell adapted from a wine cellar under a villa near Salzburg. This cell contained no windows and was generally chilly and uncomfortable, though by no means unbearably so. During the period of confinement HOETTL had been permitted to have a typewriter and paper in his cell and had been encouraged to write down any information which, as he was told, might be helpful to himself or to his interrogators.

2. HOETTL's Complaints. HOETTL complained to the interrogator that the cell in which he had been confined was uninhabitable and that he had in effect been submitted to torture. He stated that on the previous night he had had a heart attack and that he had been afraid that he would die and that his attempts to get assistance by beating on the door had brought no response from his jailers. The interrogator stated that as a matter of fact HOETTL was probably in more healthy circumstances than he would be if he were out exercising on the streets. Although the room was somewhat cooler than those in which he would normally live, he was still able to rest as much as he wished and this rest could hardly be said to injure his heart. The interrogator added that if HOETTL should die suddenly during the night while in confinement it would present no particular problem since disposal of a cold body is not much more difficult than disposal of a warm one. The interrogator added that he had no particular wish that HOETTL should die.

3. Response to Questions

a) HOETTL maintained under questioning that he had nothing to add concerning his relations with Kurt PONGER or with any other of the personalities mentioned during previous interrogations. The interrogator covered a certain amount of old ground in attempting to develop a new line of questioning concerning the PONGER case but learned nothing new from HOETTL about his activity in this case.

b) Grandener Freund S. On being quizzed again concerning the identity or identities of the mysterious Grandener Freund S who had been mentioned in the letter from Harry HAST (see previous reports), HOETTL continued to maintain that he did not know to whom HAST referred. After much pressure on this point, HOETTL finally said that the only S he could think of would be Dr. Anton BOHM.

c) Relations with US Agencies. The interrogator queried HOETTL at some length on his understanding of the present organization of the United States intelligence. It was clear from HOETTL's answers that HOETTL believes that the situation prevailing in 1947-48 continues in American intelligence: rivalry and intrigue between TIC and TAC, rivalry and intrigue between CIC and G-2 in Austria (evidently HOETTL had learned something of local rivalries as they existed in 1947 and 1948 particularly in respect to CIC Linz), rivalry and intrigue between United States Army and the Department of State.

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SECRET INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

-2-

rivalry and intrigue among all other US intelligence agencies. It is unclear to the interrogator just how HOETTL mapped out this pattern of intrigue in his own mind but evidently he hoped to be able eventually to solve all his own problems by applying directly to Mr. Allan Welch Dulles. The interrogator is inclined to take 5-to-1 odds that this curious group of opinions, combined with HOETTL's natural inclination towards intrigue and his general cast of mind, which suggests the early stages of schizophrenia, motivates him to withhold information which in his mind would cause one American agency to be hostile to him because of his activities on behalf of another American agency. There is also some indication that he had attempted to penetrate or at least to gather information on intelligence offices which he took to be American-controlled and which he assumed to have something to do with Mr. Dulles; he would naturally be most reticent about this activity because it could be interpreted by Mr. Dulles, whom he believes to take a direct personal interest in local operations, as hostile.

#### 4. HOETTL's Proposals

a) Johann SANITZER. Always the operator, HOETTL took occasion during this interrogation to propose that he be employed by United States Intelligence by establishing contact with Johann SANITZER, a former double agent operator of the German intelligence service who is now thought to be active on behalf of the Soviets. HOETTL proposed to reestablish contact with SANITZER's wife, or to attempt to make a connection with SANITZER through Dr. Othmar TRENNER, Dr. Karl HENNER, or Inga Karl KOWARIK. The interrogator permitted HOETTL to expatiate at sufficient length to determine that HOETTL does not in fact know very much about SANITZER, either in the present or in the past. It is noteworthy that in a written memorandum which HOETTL had prepared on his typewriter before the interrogation containing the same proposal, he was unable to spell SANITZER's name correctly. (He spelled it SARNITZER). The interrogator then told HOETTL that he obviously did not know very much about the case and would not be qualified to operate in such a capacity, even if we were to change our entire orientation and decide that he could be trusted with such an assignment.

b) Double Agent Proposal. HOETTL then suggested that he might be employed to establish contact with the Soviet intelligence office which had operated VERBER and PONGER. When the interrogator asked whether HOETTL really believed that after having been arrested and interrogated by the Americans he would be accepted by Soviet intelligence in Vienna as a reliable person, HOETTL explained that he did not intend himself to travel to Vienna or to establish direct contact but that he thought perhaps by mail to PONGER's wife he might establish an interest in Soviet minds which would cause them to send somebody to contact him. All readers of this report will doubtless be overwhelmed by relief to be told that the interrogator did not accept HOETTL's offer.

#### 5. Future Plans

a) After this re-interrogation of HOETTL it was decided that a press release would be prepared implicating HOETTL in the VERBER-PONGER case and that this press release would be made public if concurrence was received from the Department of Justice in Washington.

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

6) Release. It was decided that HOETTL would be released from confinement two days after the press release had been given out. The two-day lapse would ensure that our version of the story would appear first in the newspapers so that no reporter would be able to check with HOETTL before printing his story.

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~



EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
 (2)(A) Privacy  
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources  
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

1A: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. ( )

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

23 Apr. 1953

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : Chief ( ) Pullach

Info: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ( ) ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— [ ] Connection (Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL - Curt L. PONGER

1. Herewith primarily for the record a photocopy of the report (and rough translation thereof) prepared for ZIPPER by Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, entitled "My Acquaintance with Curt PONGER". HOETTL wrote this shortly after he heard of the arrest of PONGER and VERBER, and after he briefly discussed the case with V-14400 (U/M), his contact to ZIPPER. The report was actually written on the advice of U/M. From HOETTL's correspondence, we know that he regarded this method of putting himself on record to be very clever, as he stipulated that the report was to be used internally only (meaning German staff), but he could (and did, during interrogation) claim he had reported to the U.S. organization with which he was in contact. HOETTL thereby established his "Rueckendeckung", but had no intention of volunteering his knowledge of the case, which certainly could have been helpful; rather, as he stated in letters to his closest associate, Baron Harry MAST, he fully intended to say nothing unless the Americans knew he was involved in the case, and then only when they approached him.

2. It will be noted, as pointed out in other reports, that this report is very similar to the one prepared by HOETTL for CIC Agent Rolf RINGER, with the exception that HOETTL indulges rather freely in oblique attacks on other ZIPPERites in his report to ZIPPER, to deflect attention from himself.

3. A carbon copy of this report was found among the papers confiscated on HOETTL's arrest, so SALZBURG/VIENNA are already provided with copies of this document; this base also made the information in the report available to Liggett for interrogation of HOETTL.

Approved by: [ ]

Date Originated: 15 April 53

DIST:

3-EE (w/1 copy of encl)  
3-COM " " " " "

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28 A  
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [ ]	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT 24 Apr 53	ANALYST
SUBJECT [ ]	Report		DATE

PERTINENT INFORMATION

[ ] an article from the 7 April  
1953 Salzburger Nachrichten [ ]

The article was a report of the arrest of HOTIL in connection with the Kurt POMMER case.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTAINING TO SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
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2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	<del>SECRET</del>	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	[ ] NS
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FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(35)

HWB-00172

~~SECRET~~ INFORMATION

24 APR 1953

Chief ( ) Pullach  
Chief ( ) Frankfurt  
( )  
Dr. Hoettl (Wilhelm)

MICROFILMED  
JAN 19 1962  
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

Forwarded herewith is an English translation of a report received by case officer [ ] from [ ] a severed [ ] agent. The report was received on 13 April 1953, and is being passed to you as unevaluated intelligence for your information and retention.

[ ]

APPROVED: [ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Distribution:  
2-Pullach with 1 attachment as above  
3-EE with 1 attachment as above

RI COPY

21 April 1953

~~SECRET~~ INFORMATION

( )  
41

Extract from a Report of 8. 4. 53.

Subject: Dr. Hoettl

I was surprised to note that Dr. Hoettl was arrested by the Salzburg CIC a fortnight ago and has been in American custody ever since. He had the closest connections to the Russian agent <sup>KJST</sup> Ponger, who was a Captain of the CIC sometime ago. During searches of Dr. Hoettl's premises, more than a hundred letters by Ponger were found.

I was told in Linz that the Americans are eagerly looking for Dr. Schott and Gerhard Schacht, who - as is known - are at the time in Ulm with the Society for a New State Politics. <sup>U.L.P. - Schott</sup> Whether the two are to be arrested or whether they will just be asked to testify, I am unable to say.

Unfortunately, the names of Felix Steiner and Dr. Roeder were repeatedly mentioned in this connection. It seems that Hoettl has tried to make connections for this Ponger through these two men in West Germany. Allegedly Hoettl was again in Ulm shortly before his arrest.

All Austrian papers have already reported Hoettl's arrest. There is also comment that Hoettl has ~~be~~ referred to an excellent connection with the Blank agency and with the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. All in all, the affair is very distressing.

( )

41

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO.          

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 24 April 1953

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Attn:       
Chief      Salzburg

SUBJECT: GENERAL—          

SPECIFIC—           Report on Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL's Arrest

Ref—          

1. Attached hereto is a           report covering various reactions and opinions following the arrest of Subject.

2. Note that the cover sheet (P/34011) describes the sources of the various sections of the report.

Attachment: P/34011, 15 April 1953

Distribution:

- 3 - EE (w/1 att.)
- 3 - Vien (w/1 att.)
- 2 - Fran (w/1 att.)
- 1 - Bonn (w/1 att.)
- 1 - POB (w/1 att.)
- 1 - Salz chrono
- 1 - Salz subj #200
- 1 - Salz #159
- 1 - RCM notebook

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

           
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**NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000**

VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA TOUCH)

PATCH NO. ( )

~~SECRET~~  
**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief ( ) , Vienna  
SUBJECT: GENERAL—  
SPECIFIC— Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL and the Niebelungen Verlag

DATE: 28. April 1953

Deadline	
Hq Action	
See para ..... by touch	
Hq Comments Rec. by cable	
See para ..... by touch	
For info and file	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

1. Following is the translation of a report dated 24 February 1953 received from [ ]

"According to a confidential report the Niebelungen Verlag in Linz, in which the well-known former SS leader Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL has on occasion invested large sums of money, is now in financial difficulties and is alleged to be on the verge of bankruptcy. At the present time, the press is under the leadership of the well-known intelligence fabricator Heinrich (Harry) MAST, who is himself not responsible for the unfavorable commercial situation of the press. The present difficulties are said to be the result of the activities of the previous directors of the press, among them a certain (Dr.) SCHOTT, who is allegedly at the present time in Ulm."

2. This information is well known in intelligence circles in Austria, and is confirmed by HOETTL's statements during his interrogation in Salzburg. (See [ ] It is to be hoped that HOETTL's recent confinement will have the affect of persuading him to put more honest effort into the management of his press and into his own creative writing. We fear however that HOETTL will shortly resume his previous mode of living.

*WTC / R*  
[ ]

24 April 1953  
Distr:  
3 - EE  
1 - [ ]  
1 - [ ]  
1 - Carding  
1 - CE (598)

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2000**

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 151-28A  
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

FORM NO. 35-85  
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 MAY 53

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
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MICROFILMED  
JAN 19 1962  
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA  
FROM: SR REP SALZBURG  
ACTION: ( )  
INFORMATION: ( )

PRIORITY

1715Z 5 MAY 53

SALZ ( )

TO: (PRIORITY) DIR INFO: SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

RE: DIR ( )

( )

( )

) SUGGEST INTERROGATING ON BOEHM WHOSE NAME  
APPEARED VERBER'S COPY HOETTL NOTEBOOK AND WHO KNOWN HAVE HAD  
CLOSE CONTACT HOETTL EDITING DIE GEHEIME FRONT AND FURNISHING  
POLITICAL REPORTS PASSED ON TO AMT BANK.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

\* (OUT 58519)

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
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2000

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ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE 11 JUN 1953

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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(44)

FORM NO. 35-82  
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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7 MAY 1953

TO: [ ]  
FROM: SEE REP AUSTRIA (VIEN, SALZ)  
DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

2695

MICROFILMED  
7 MAY 53 JAN 19 1962  
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

CONF: ( )  
INFORMATION: ( )

240Z

DIR ( )  
TO: SSALZ

INFO: SVIEN

CITE: DIR

IMMEDIATE ACTION

CAN HOETTEL BE RECONTACTED FOR QUESTIONING ON FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. FOREIGN STATES NEGOTIATED WITH HOETTEL ON LATTER'S SECOND BOOK AS WELL AS ON GERMANY FRONT. WHAT IS SUBJECT OF SECOND BOOK? WHAT TRANSACTIONS WERE PLANNED WITH FOREIGN?
2. DID ANYONE INTERVIEW HOETTEL ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS? FOR WHAT PURPOSE? TO HOETTEL'S KNOWLEDGE WERE SUCH INTERVIEWS EVER PUBLISHED? WHERE?

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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DATE 19 MAY 1953	

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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FORM NO 35-85  
NOV 731

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
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8 MAY 53

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA  
 FROM: SR REP SALZBURG  
 ACTION: ( )  
 INFORMATION: ( )

ROUTINE

1620Z 8 MAY 53

SALZ ( )

*William Hoettl*

TO: DIR SVIEN CITE: SSALZ

REF DIR ( )

[ - ]

1. DUE TREATMENT AND ADVERSE PUBLICITY ACCORDED HOETTL ARREST IN AUSTRIAN MEDIA PLUS LONG UNFAVORABLE ARTICLE IN GERMAN WEEKLY "DER SPIEGEL" HOETTL NOW BELIEVED UNWILLING TALK A.I.S REPRESENTATIVES. UPON RETURN HOETTL FILES LAST WEEK HE REFUSED TO SEE CIC REPS AND FILES SIGNED FOR BY WIFE. SHORT OF RE-ARREST BELIEVE NO MEANS TO CONTACT AND HE PROBABLY MOST UNCOOPERATIVE.

2. VIEN ACTION: BELIEVE [ ] CAN ANSWER MOST OF QUESTIONS REF.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANTIZED

2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

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<i>rel</i>	
DATE 8 MAY 1953	

COPY NO.

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SALZ-1227<sup>(44)</sup>

FORM NO. 35-85  
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 MAY 53

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP VIENNA

ROUTINE

ACTION: ( )

1217Z 18 MAY 53

INFORMATION: ( )

VIEN ( )

TO: DIR

INFO: SSALZ

CITE: SVIEN

INTEL/ [ ]

RE: DIR ( )

SALZ ( )

1. HOETTL'S NEARLY FINISHED SECOND BOOK CALLED "DIE FUENFTE KOLONNE", CONCERNS CLANDESTINE EXPLOITS OF GIS IN WORLD WAR II. CHAPTERS ON SKORZENY RESCUE OF MUSSOLINI, ON KLATT, ON SANITZER AND [ ] QUERIED HOW CLOSELY ON KLATT AND SANITZER, BELIEVES INFO LIMITED TO RUMOR AND GOSSIP. HOETTL STATED PONGER PROVIDED PHOTOS, SOME RETOUCHE, OF PERSONALITIES SUCH AS CANARIS, HEYDRICH, ETC, AT CURRENT MARKET PRICE FROM HIS COLLECTION.

2. NO INDICATION FROM HOETTL THAT PONGER INTERVIEWED HOETTL FOR PUBLICATION ON POLITICAL OR OTHER SUBJECTS.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE 18 MAY 1953	56

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

~~SECRET~~

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. [ ]	SOURCE SALZ-	DATE OF DOCUMENT 18 April 1953	ANALYST [ ]	
SUBJECT Local Intelligence Net for Skorzeny			DATE 26 May 1953	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
<p>FINKENSTEIN (fmg) plans to contact Dr. Otto BEGUS and <u>Willi HORTTL</u>, known intelligence operatives with possible Soviet I.S. connections. She plans to visit Austria soon to organize a local intelligence net for Otto SKORZENY.</p> <p>THIS IS ALL THE INFO ON SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p> <p>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2000</p> <p>CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE AS SANITIZED 2000</p> <p>EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p>				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
<del>SECRET</del>			[ ]	NS

FORM MC 59-34  
DEC 1952

(35)

100-001722

VIA: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. [ ]

~~SECRET/CONTROL~~  
Security Information  
CLASSIFICATION

To : Chief, WE

Date: 26 May 1953

From : Chief [ ]

*IC*

SUBJECT: GENERAL-  
SPOFFIC- Wilhelm HOSTL @ Walter HAGEN

Date Info: 11 May 1953

Date Recd: 13 May 1953

The attached news article which concerns the activity of Subject, and which was published in the crypt-Communist paper Il Paese (Rome edition) on 9 May 1953 is forwarded for the record. The article is entitled "Life and Exploits of Wilhelm HOSTL the Nazi-Catholic Agent of CIC. It should be noted that the writer, Enzo RAVA, omits any references to HOSTL's possible double game activity in favor of the Russians.

Prepared by [ ]

Enc. 1 (newspaper article)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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Dal giornale "IL PAESE" edizione romana del 9 maggio 1953. n.128

MICROFILMED  
MAY 1963  
J.C. MICRO, BERL

LE SPIE DELL'ANNO SANTO

# Vita e miracoli di Wilhelm Hoett il nazicattolico agente del C.I.C.

I vagoni letto per l'anno santo - Il tesoro delle SS - « Partigiani » antisovietici sulle Alpi - Vendonsi notizie e caffè - La più grande centrale europea di contrabbando

(Dal nostro corrispondente)

BERLINO, maggio. — Due anni fa, nella stazione di Innsbruck, un viaggiatore dava uno schiaffo ad un poliziotto austriaco che rispondeva alla provocazione con un preciso k. o. al mento: il viaggiatore cadeva malamente e decedeva sul colpo. Un amico, che lo accompagnava, ebbe una crisi di nervi a quella scena. Il morto era Fritz Westen, soprannominato « Schwabe e Rothschild », grande azionista di monopoli elettrici italiani, commerciante all'ingrosso di legname in Austria e proprietario del più grosso monopolio di carrozze letto (mille vagoni) per il traffico dell'Anno Santo. Sul suo passaporto, era segnata la nazionalità lussemburghese.

Sulla figura di questo pio schiaffeggiatore di poliziotti, hanno fatto luce indagini espletate nelle ultime settimane a carico dell'amico e socio in affari che l'accompagnava quel giorno ad Innsbruck, Wilhelm Hoett. Costui, un agente del C.I.C. statunitense, è stato tratto in arresto dallo stesso servizio di spionaggio sotto l'accusa di contrabbando e doppio gioco, ma successivamente rilasciato. Si tornò per l'occasione a parlare del defunto Fritz Westen, il monopolista di tante carrozze letto: Westen era un vecchio contrabbandiere croato che durante la guerra, grazie all'appoggio che gli garantì Kaltenbrunner tramite l'allora agente della Gestapo Hoett, rubò a man salva in Jugoslavia oro, valuta, macchine, gioielli e tappeti. Dopo il crollo nazista aveva trovato una vigna nei servizi americani di spionaggio e poco prima dell'inizio dell'Anno Santo, s'era scoperto straordinariamente pio. Quello della stazione di Innsbruck non fu che un infelice incidente che chiuse male una vita ricca di prospettive occidentali e cristiane: la spia e contrabbandiere dell'anno santo aveva presa una sbornia ed aveva commesso certo scellini con il camerata Hoett che avrebbe preso a schiaffo un qualsiasi poliziotto pur troppo, si incontrò con uno dai pugni solidi.

L'inchiesta Hoett ha dall'altra parte portato alla luce tutta una serie di elementi veramente interessanti. Memore della organizzazione giovanile cattolica austriaca « Neuland », Hoett era passato alle SS e

occupò in un primo tempo, a Vienna, di questioni religiose, poi passò nel servizio di spionaggio all'estero, lavorando lungamente anche in Italia. Fu in questi anni — '42-'45 — che divenne amico del capo del servizio nazista di sicurezza Kaltenbrunner e che poté così garantire al suo socio Fritz Westen larghe possibilità di rapina e contrabbando.

Poco prima di essere imprecato a Norimberga, Kaltenbrunner informò la moglie che il fidato Hoett avrebbe provveduto al suo futuro: in mancanza di Hoett il gerarca nazista avrebbe lasciato « il tesoro delle SS », sepolto in una qualche località dell'Austria o dell'Italia settentrionale (« A Donco? », s'è chiesto tempo fa un giornale tedesco). Naturalmente, quando la moglie dell'imprecato si presentò da Hoett a bussare quattrini, il bravo agente nazista fece l'indiano.

Hoett intanto s'era lasciato agganciare dagli americani. Già nel corso del conflitto aveva avuto in Svizzera contatti con la gran spia statunitense Allen Dulles e nel 1945 riceveva così dal C.I.C. l'incarico di riprendere contatti, anche via radio, con ex agenti nazisti a Budapest e Bucarest, per inquadrarli nei servizi di spionaggio americani.

Il suo lavoro ebbe una breve interruzione nel corso dei processi di Norimberga, ad alcuni dei quali Hoett dovette essere presente come teste, e dove ebbe occasione tra l'altro di fornire cifre esatte — « sei milioni » — sugli ebrei massacrati nei campi di concentramento dalla Gestapo.

Nel 1949 il C.I.C. inviava Hoett nella sua patria Austria incaricandolo di costituire una organizzazione a metà di spionaggio ed a metà militare, con ex membri delle SS, delle SD, con ex ufficiali della Wehrmacht e con « Profuhi » dai Paesi Orientali. La organizzazione Hoett doveva fornire notizie di carattere economico e militare, preparare gruppi di « partigiani » antisovietici, nel massiccio alpino, condurre azioni di sabotaggio contro le industrie sovietiche in Austria e stabilire una rete di spie e provocatori nel Partito Comunista Austriaco. Fu il periodo più bello della vita di Hoett:

riceveva dal comando americano di Salisburgo un più che lauto stipendio, e stabiliva contemporaneamente contatti con altri servizi di spionaggio occidentali e con tanti contrabbandieri tipo Westen. Il tanto si dava al giornalismo e diventava il corrispondente da Vienna della nazista « Soldaten Zeitung » di Monaco. Scriveva persino un libro, con lo pseudonimo di Walter Hagen, « Il fronte segreto: organizzazione, figure e azioni del servizio segreto tedesco », libro tradotto con grande successo anche all'estero (tredo anche in Italia) e che Churchill stesso trovò « molto simpatico ». In realtà Hoett aveva incassato i quattrini per quel libro, che aveva fatto scrivere invece ad un amico di quella giovanile organizzazione cattolica « Neuland ». Scopo dell'opera, in ogni caso, era la « stabilizzazione del servizio segreto nazista ».

L'organizzazione Hoett lavorava intanto splendidamente, vendendo informazioni non al

C.I.C. soltanto ma agli inglesi ed ai francesi. Monaco di Baviera divenne presto il centro di collegamento di questa « agenzia di notizie » i cui quadri erano i più esperti spioni del tempo nazista. Hoett aveva conservato inoltre ottime relazioni con spie fasciste in Italia ed in Jugoslavia, e ripresi i contatti le utilizzava proficuamente. Ogni tanto scappava qualche piccolo scandalo, perché l'organizzazione vendeva ad esempio agli inglesi i piani francesi per la Indocina, ma tutto finiva per riassetarsi. Hoett incominciò anzi ad interessarsi di politica e, dato che operava soprattutto in Austria, in particolare nelle organizzazioni cattoliche ed in quelle neonaziste tipo Lega degli Indipendenti.

Ad un certo momento, a fine marzo di quest'anno, arrivò il palatrac: gli americani arrestarono il proprio agente Wilhelm Hoett. Imputazione: contrabbando. Attraverso Salisburgo, profittando della sua rete di agenti, Hoett contrabbandava un po' ovunque e particolare verso la Germania di Bonn ogni ben di dio e soprattutto sigarette e caffè. Venne accusato anche di aver contrabbandato notizie, ma soltanto la prima appariva una imputazione seria.

Hoett, invece, si sbellicò dalle risa. Infatti, dopo sole tre settimane, venne rilasciato con tante scuse e tornò tranquillo alle sue occupazioni diverse. Il fatto è che quando gli investigatori americani interrogarono Hoett sulla sua attività di contrabbando, egli incominciò a parlare, e a dire la verità. E la verità era che la più grande centrale europea di contrabbando, che spediva ovunque merci di ogni tipo con tanto di regolarissimi timbri, era proprio la centrale statunitense di spionaggio, e precisamente il suo quartier generale di Salisburgo. Processare Hoett traducendolo in tribunale voleva dire dovergli sentire pubblicamente elencare tutti i suoi complici, cioè tutti gli alti papaveri dell'esercito statunitense e del C.I.C. D'altra parte Hoett, con la sua rete di agenti nazisti, era troppo utile per la difesa del cristianesimo e dell'occidente, e non valeva davvero la pena toglierlo di circolazione per un poco di caffè.

ENZO KAVA.

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PERTINENT INFORMATION

14. HOETTL, WILHELM /DR./ [ ]  
SUBJECT BECAME ACTIVE IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD IN MARCH 1952 WHEN HE BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH ONE DR. WILHELM HOETTL, THROUGH ONE GEORG UBL, THE SALZBURG REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OLYMPIA MACHINE WORKS. UBL KNEW SUBJECT IN BRATISLAVA. WHEN SUBJECT FIRST MET HOETTL, THE LATTER STATED THAT HE HAD OBTAINED SUBJECT'S NAME FROM UBL AND THAT HE (HOETTL) WAS INTERESTED IN ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE PUBLICATION INTERREPORT OST. DURING THEIR ACQUAINTANCESHIP, HOETTL TOLD SUBJECT HE WAS WORKING FOR A GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ASKED IF SUBJECT WAS WILLING TO WORK FOR THE SAME AGENCY.

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DATE: 11 Juni 1953

TO : Chief, EE  
Attn: [ ]  
FROM : Chief ( [ ] ), Salzburg  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— ( )

SPECIFIC— Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL

Ref- ( )  
*... made in KRECHBAUMS ...*

Attached hereto is a photograph of Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL taken on or about 28 March 1953.

*L.O.M.*  
[ ]

28 May 1953  
Attachment:  
Photograph

- Distribution:
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
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17 November 1953

Jack:

As per our conversation of today, I believe Mr. Dulles might find the article by Wilhelm Hoettl in the attached issue of "Argosy" amusing.

There should also be a fairly voluminous file on "The Mount Case", Hoettl's Balkan network and "last fling" available here someplace as I sent one back from London years ago.

To Mr. [ ]  
from [ ]

] O/DCI  
- ] C/I&R

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17 JUN 55  
**REVEALED: The Top Secrets of World War II!**

# I Was Hitler's

What was the deal Mussolini made with Churchill? What did Tito promise Stalin? Who sabotaged the Long Island saboteurs? What "friend" tipped off the Allied landings? Read this story of history's most amazing double crosses

by **WILHELM HOETTL** as told to **LADISLAS FARAGO**

**I** AM a marked man, hunted and harassed—but I'm not saying this for effect. Whether I like it or not, my life is full of melodrama. Complete strangers finger me on the streets and secret agents trail me all the time. They watch my house, search my files, rifle my mail and photograph my visitors—because for 10 hectic years of my life, I was one of Hitler's master spies.

Those who know the story of my life—the strings I pulled, the men I moved and the events I helped to shape—refuse to believe I am no longer in the espionage racket. A man like him, they say, can never retire! He must be up—or down—to something. So they keep after me and link my name with every spy plot in Europe.

Only a few months ago, when two American spies were caught in Vienna, they picked me up again. They went through my papers and carted me off to jail. I didn't know why. Neither did they. I was promptly released, but just as I was leaving the jail, a headline hit me with my name in it. The article "exposed" me as Europe's most mysterious mystery man, and a millionaire to boot. I was called "the keeper of the fabulous slush fund of Hitler's secret

service that disappeared without a trace"—if it ever existed at all.

In Europe it is enough to mention my name to make certain people scurry for cover. I am "Exhibit A," a kind of museum piece. Because I am Germany's only big-time spy who is still alive.

The strange men who headed German Intelligence during its turbulent decade between 1935 and 1945 are all dead, and only one of them died in bed. Reinhard Heydrich, Hitler's personal spy chief, was the first to go. He was killed by British agents near the Czech town of Lidice. He was followed by his greatest adversary, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, whom the Nazis hanged with piano wire.

Then went Heinrich Himmler,

the Big Boss, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich's successor. Himmler committed suicide and Kaltenbrunner was hanged by the Allies in Nuremberg. Shortly afterward, the Yugoslavs hanged Hermann Behrens, Heydrich's right-hand man.

My last boss was Werner Schellenberg, the genius of the German secret service who masterminded the biggest plots of World War II. He died a few months ago, at the age of 40, under obscure circumstances in exile in Italy.

But I'm still alive, a freak by that very fact alone. But then, I was a freak, anyway, throughout my career in the secret service. If we should meet by chance, I don't think you would recognize me as a spy. I don't look the part, although I don't really know how spies are supposed to look.

I am still a young man today, not quite 40. And I was nothing but a kid, just out of Vienna University as its youngest graduate, when I was sucked into the game. In the University, I was a kind of prodigy because of my somewhat precocious preoccupation with political science. It seems that people who looked for hudding spy masters, the way baseball scouts look for rookies, noticed me as a



# Master Spy



boy who would bear watching.

Then I went down to the Balkans, the hotbed of Europe, to gather material for my doctor's thesis. When it came out in print, I got a call from someone who said he was my friend. "Read your paper," he said. "I think it's darned good. Would you be interested in working for us?"

At first I didn't quite get who "us" were, but my friend quickly enlightened me. It was the German Intelligence Service, he said. At that time, in the middle Thirties, it was just getting back into the business again.

I told the man who recruited me that I was a sort of intellectual who had very little to offer by way of brawn. But he scoffed at me and said, "The spies of today are no muscle men or buccaners. We need people with brains, and you seem to be filling the bill."

The German secret service which I entered was an untidy organization functioning on two levels. Each was more or less independent of the other and even operated at cross purposes. On one level was the actual Intelligence Service called, misleadingly, Auslands-Abwehr or Foreign Defense, to camouflage its real activities. The over-all Intelligence Service

of the armed forces; it was headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, a shortish, graying, soft-speaking dreamer to whom espionage was but a means of anti-Nazi activities.

The Abwehr was organized in three Departments. Department I was Secret Intelligence Service; Department II was Sabotage under another bitter anti-Nazi named Erwin von Lahousen-Vivement; Department III was Counterespionage.

The Abwehr, I found, had instructions to stay away from political intelligence. This job was assigned to Bureau VI of the Nazis' own, HSA, or Foreign Political Intelligence Service. This Bureau VI was organized in nine sections, of which Section D was

spying on the United States. When, in 1914, the Nazis assumed total power in Germany, this dualism was abolished and all Intelligence work was centralized under the HSA.

But when I joined the service, this fateful reorganization was still eight years away. Because of the political nature of the work for which I was slated, I was assigned to Bureau VI of HSA. At that time, in the middle Thirties, it was in personal charge of Reinhard Heydrich, the notorious "Hangman."

To learn my trade I was first ordered to spy on German churches and then was shifted to the Central and Southeastern Europe section where, after several years, I rose to acting head of District VI there. My first job was a shocking one. It turned out to be the plot of the decade, that weird overture to World War II, the Sudeten crisis in Czechoslovakia.

Much has been written about this but the truth has never been told. The truth often isn't pretty; in this case it is ugly. But now the time has come to tell it since it provides a vital footnote and lesson to the history of our time. Here is the true story of the Sudeten crisis. (Continued on page 72)



geant?" Moloney asked. "Couldn't you one slip out the back while I'm watchin' the front?"

"That's a good thought, Moloney," said the sergeant. He called then in a loud voice to the water bailiff. "Here, you! Come and stand guard at the back door, and hurry up or your man will have slipped out the back while you're 'min'. How can I catch poachers when I get no co-operation?" He said this in a loud voice. Sandy came running. "Ye nearly caught him, all right" he said. "But he's holed up proper now."

"Go to the back door," said the sergeant, "and stay there until mornin' if you have to. I'll have to raise a justice of the peace for a search warrant but I'll be back as soon as I can and we'll grab him." It's a good job, he was thinking, that Sandy is as dumb as a bucket of water. "On guard now, min," he said to them, "and don't let him out of your

sight. I'll collect the evidence below at the river, and I'll be back."

He walked away from them to the river bank. He was humming a bit. He was thinking, *Well, ta hell with it, I'm nearly pensioned off, anyhow, as it is.* He picked up the gaff where it had dropped in the struggle. He went to walk off, started and paused. What had Mickey been loo'ing at? Well, it doesn't matter. He walked on. Then he walked back. *I'll just look, anyhow.* He got down on his belly and peeped over the edge. He whistled softly: Great God, he must be up to twenty-five pounds! He was beautiful. It was the moon betrayed him. He was motionless in the clear water. A small head and a round body on him. Beautiful. *That's the way,* said the sergeant. His heart was pounding. He rose to his knees. *I may as well get back.* He used the gaff to get himself to his feet. The gaff. The sergeant looked

at the w... d winking point of it. Terrible things, terrible things, man.

He got back on his belly. He looked once. He struck. Something jolted his arm as if he had hold of an exploding hand grenade. Great God! The eyes were bulging out of his head. His heart was turbulent. Full of triumph, and a great fear that somehow he was going to lose the beautiful creature.

He started to pry him loose from the water.

A soft voice from his right-hand side, asked, and asked.

"What's the country comin' to?" the voice asked. "Corruption in high places. Bloody poachers in the police force. And amateur poachers, at that," went on the voice urgently, as the salmon started to play the sergeant.

"For the love of God help me, Mickey," said the sergeant, "or he'll get away."

## I Was Hitler's Master Spy

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 19

popular memory, the Sudeten German crisis is remembered as a typical spy plot. In reality it was a conspiracy hatched within the British Intelligence Service as far back as 1933 when Adolf Hitler was still more or less an unknown quantity. It was thought up by Sir Gilbert Vansittart who, as the permanent under-secretary of the Foreign Office, was the ex-officio chief of the PID, Britain's own Political Intelligence Division.

Vansittart tried to kill two birds with one stone when he developed the gigantic plot. With the settlement of the Sudeten-German conflict, Vansittart hoped to undermine the Soviet's influence in Europe, while at the same time he expected to take the wind out of Hitler's sails. As long as the Sudetens were an "oppressed minority," Vansittart felt that the Germans had a case against Czechoslovakia. But once they were firmly integrated into the federation of the republic, Hitler could not properly ask for a revision of their status and mingle in the internal affairs of the Czechs.

An obscure member of the British Intelligence Service named Colonel Graham Christie was chosen to develop the plot. And he in turn picked an unknown gymnastics teacher and anti-Nazi, Konrad Henlein, to head this British-inspired and in part British-financed, Sudeten-German movement. Right at the outset, Colonel Christie took Henlein to London and introduced him to men like Vansittart, Harold Nicolson, Alfred Duff Cooper, and even to Winston Churchill and his son-in-law, Duncan Sandys. Henlein soon became a favorite figure in London's diplomatic drawing rooms.

I don't know whether the British ever realized how delicate and dangerous their game really was. By the time I got into it, they had already lost all control over the conspiracy of their own

making. At that time Neville Chamberlain had replaced Stanley Baldwin at 10 Downing Street and appeasement of Hitler became the official policy of Whitehall. Sir Gilbert Vansittart was removed from political intelligence and men like Graham Christie were quarantined. The bewildered Henlein was left to shift for himself. Inflamed with the dream of a German federal state within Czechoslovakia, and deserted by the British, he decided to risk a deal with Hitler.

We in Section E had our own agents within the Henlein movement and learned immediately of this major change in Henlein's plans and fortunes. We lost no time in bringing Hitler and Henlein together, and from then on the conspiracy which the British Intelligence Service had launched became our own undisputed plot. I became one of the behind-the-scenes managers of the Sudeten crisis that was soon rocking the entire world.

### We Set the Pace

From then on we called the tunes and the British danced. Men like William Strang, brilliant chief of the British Foreign Office's Eastern-European division, Lord Rothermere of the *Daily Mail*, and even Lord Halifax, did, unbeknown to themselves, exactly what we wanted them to do. It was in a sense, on our initiative that Lord Runciman was sent to Prague "to settle the crisis." Throughout his mission, Runciman was our unwitting tool. We listened to his phone conversations, read his mail, overheard his conversations through concealed microphones, decoded his cables, planted advisers on him, and in fact, arranged his weekends in the homes of nobility sympathetic to our cause.

It seemed to me that the British were

so hell-bent on appeasement that they actually wanted us to lead them around by their noses. The only man wise to our game was Jan Masaryk, son of the founder of Czechoslovakia, then serving as his country's ambassador in London. He chanced to meet Konrad Henlein during his periodic visits to England and didn't seem to bear a grudge. On the whole, he watched the unfolding events with melancholy resignation and said so to Henlein.

"You, sir," said Masaryk, "may tell them as much as you please. It's quite immaterial what you desire or what I want. Whether or not we'll slide into a war one of these days, you and I have no control. The decisions are made elsewhere."

During the height of the Sudeten crisis, when he was on his way to 10 Downing Street, Masaryk was accosted by reporters. He told them: "Gentlemen, I am merely the envoy of Czechoslovakia. Who cares?"

In the chaos that followed, the British suddenly realized that their plot had backfired. In a last-minute effort to regain control over it, they took Christie off the shelf, dusted him off and sent him to Czechoslovakia to re-establish contact with Henlein. But by then, in the summer of 1938, it was too late. "I'm sorry, Colonel Christie," Henlein told him. "I followed your advice for building a German state and then tied myself to Herr Hitler body and soul. There is nothing more you or I can do. Czechoslovakia is doomed!"

Chamberlain made a last desperate effort to stop the march of events by going to Godesberg and then to Munich in September, 1938, but we in German Intelligence had nothing but pity for his naive endeavor. For the first time in history, the young German Intelligence Service had beaten its great opponent,

ARGOSY

the British Intelligence Service, at its own game.

This was my baptism of fire. It was a fascinating spectacle to watch, if only because everything was done with the cold precision of a surgeon operating on a cancerous body. Far from the conventional cloak-and-dagger stuff of the spy yarns, this was a brainy operation, a real battle of wits.

Try to visualize yourself in my place. I was a mere kid, an apprentice spy, but I was permitted to assist on a work of art the way one of Collini's pupils was allowed to help with a precious piece of metalwork. The men with whom I worked belong to the most obscure pages of history. Their names are forgotten. Most of them are dead. But then, during those perilous days, they dominated the scene. They were the unseen masters of Europe. And I was one of them.

Probably because I am the last surviving spy-master of Germany, my name is now used as a synonym for all the intrigue that legend pegged onto Hitler's spy system. The chances are, though, that you have never even heard my name. But I'm sure you have seen some of the things I did, because they made the front pages of the newspapers throughout the world.

Do you recall Stalin's bloody purge of 1937 when he killed Marshal Tukachevsky and destroyed the commanders of his own Red Army? Or the last day of Benito Mussolini and the famous picture that showed him hanging upside down with the limp body of his mistress at his side?

I was there in the background of both dramas. I watched them from the wings and helped move those marionettes.

During the war itself, while you were impressed with the struggle of Mikhailovich and Tito, I used to buy from their trainloads of military supplies which your High Command had smuggled into Yugoslavia. Men under me forged the English pound notes with which a strange spy we called Cicero was paid for his betrayal of the Allies' most closely guarded secrets. You have probably seen this quaint adventure in the motion picture "Five Fingers."

It was a monumental case of espionage which still makes British diplomats and counterspies blush. The personal valet of the British Ambassador to Turkey, with unexplained access to the diplomatic strength in His Excellency's bedroom, was an ordinary spy working regularly for us. He was a shiftless Albanian who knew no loyalties and owed allegiance to no one. When he discovered with what ease he could gain possession of the most secret documents of the Allies which his boss used to keep in his private safe, he set himself up in business. He stole those documents, photographed them and sold them to us for \$250,000 in cash, the highest price we ever paid to a common garden-variety spy.

But it was worth it, because through this tricky Albanian we obtained copies of the protocols of the Tehran and Cairo

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conferences and a draft Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Europe scheduled for June 1944. It was especially worth it if we consider that we paid him every penny of his price—in money we ourselves had forged just for such an eventuality.

Whatever I did, I was merely doing a job. I was one of the directors of HSA, the Haupt Sicherheits Amt, whose Section VI was Germany's super-secret espionage service. I was assigned to the Balkans and Italy, traditionally the most fertile fields of intrigue. I was working on the home grounds of history's most intrepid and ruthless spies.

Even when Germany was on the brink of defeat, I was still fighting on the secret front. Ask your own spymaster, Allen W. Dulles, about me. He knows me because he dealt with me when the German secret service emerged as Hitler's most dangerous enemy. What cruel irony of fate! The fantastic secret force which Hitler himself created, the powerful system of espionage, not only speeded his downfall but made his victory impossible from the very beginning.

Today it is a matter of historical record that instead of aiding Hitler in his war, his own secret service aided the Allies. From the first day of the war, treason was rampant within the German Intelligence Service. Its supreme chief, a peculiar old admiral named Wilhelm Canaris, betrayed Hitler at every step by faking information to mislead him or by withholding from him decisive bits of intelligence.

Hitler's personal orders, to kill and sabotage, were themselves sabotaged. Very often the German Intelligence Service worked directly for the Allies. For instance, it warned the Dutch that their country would be invaded. It also leaked information to the Russians about Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Allies could invade North Africa, Sicily, Italy and France with relative impunity, despite the fact that we knew well in advance the exact dates and spots of the landings. The information about the landings in North Africa came to us from two specific sources. One was a highly placed Hungarian, stationed in Stockholm, who fooled the Allies by working for us. But more important was an unexpected source in London which had knowledge of these impending landings because of his own direct interest in them. He was the Spanish Ambassador, the allegedly pro-British Duke of Alba, who was frequently an important source of information for us. Even during the blitz when our communications intelligence people proved incapable of breaking the rapidly changing British codes, we learned the success of our operations from the reports which the Duke was sending to the Foreign Ministry in Madrid. We actually read his reports, as if they had been prepared for us, on many an important development in the Allied world.

Because of the arrangements the Allies had to make for their operations in the

immediate vicinity of Spanish possessions, the Duke of Alba had learned more about them than proved healthy for the Anglo-American armada. This information was passed on by the Duke to his people in Madrid and from there it came into our possession.

This was, too, how we came into possession of information about D-Day in Normandy, although it was but one of several of our reliable sources. We had our agents planted inside the French and Dutch undergrounds and learned from their instructions virtually every detail of the Normandy landings. A final clue came from Cicero, the Albanian valet of the British Ambassador in Ankara, who supplied the date and the place of the impending landing from the inexhaustible safe of his employer, although we could never figure out why such information had ever been forwarded to a diplomatic officer in faraway Ankara.

### Confusing Intelligence

But whatever information the Abwehr managed to collect about the intentions of the Allies, it was either kept from Hitler or supplied with confusing contradictory intelligence, leaving it to the Fuehrer's intuition to make the choice. In the case of the North African landings in November, 1942, Admiral Canaris accepted the misleading information put out by London as fact and served it up to Hitler. According to that, the Allies were planning to invade Norway. When this balloon was punctured, Canaris set up an elaborate intelligence conference in Pau in Southern France at which Allied intentions were examined from all angles. While he had definite information on file that the landings would be staged off Casablanca and Oran, he persuaded the Wehrmacht that they would be at Dakar and Bengazi, many hundreds of miles from the spots where the Allies actually came off their boats.

As a result, the major German air force was shifted from the Western Mediterranean and Southern France to Italy and Libya and the bulk of the U-boats concentrated off Dakar. All that was left to them was to listen in on their radios to the Allied communiqués which described the landings. In Normandy, German Intelligence sold Hitler on the idea that it was but a feint and that the real landings would come off somewhere else. Thereby German Intelligence became instrumental in holding back the main German defensive forces in the Atlantic Wall until it became too late to throw their weight against the Allied tide.

German Intelligence was among the best in the world. Throughout the war, we read every word in the cables which the American Legation in Berne, Switzerland, was sending to Washington, and every bit of Tito's coded communications. In November, 1939, we smashed Britain's most important spy nest in Europe. For almost four years we ac-

tidally managed a whole British spy network from the Netherlands by operating 18 secret "underground" radio transmitters. This story has just been told in the new book by H. J. Giske, "London Calling Northpole," which has rocked Britain.

We maintained brilliant spies in Britain whose identities are still unknown to MI-5, the British counter-intelligence service which is supposed to know everything. And there are a few secrets which we managed to keep even from the FBI.

We read the protocols of the Tehran and Cairo conferences virtually the day after they were signed and knew in advance every move the Allies were planning to make. We knew them all—but Hitler didn't know them. Information that could have helped him win the war was not allowed to reach him. He was left groping in the dark, blinded by his own intelligence service.

I entered this house divided against itself on the ground floor. At that time Hitler was playing his game pretty close to his chest, so there wasn't a need yet for a big espionage organization. But the world was full of stories about the omnipresent German spies. I myself heard a British politician say that in Britain alone we had more than 70,000 spies.

I looked around in our office and laughed. At that time, in 1938, we had about 50 full-time operatives. Even at the peak of our work, during the war itself, the permanent staff of our political intelligence service had only 200 members.

This doesn't mean that we didn't have informers at large in the world: V-men for *Vertrauensmann*, or confidential informers, as we used to call them. We had people everywhere who sympathized with Hitler and supplied information to us. They often even volunteered it against their own governments and armies. If you could read the roster of our V-men you would be surprised by some of the big names on our list.

But the agency that co-ordinated and directed them, which evaluated and disseminated their reports, wasn't big at all. The victories we scored were not due to any lavish expenditures or to the efficiency of a super-organization. As a matter of fact, we had to operate on a shoestring. Whenever we had to pay out big sums for the real stuff, we had to get the money ourselves by counterfeiting it.

And insofar as the organization was concerned, the much vaunted German efficiency was nowhere evident in our secret service. The whole network was split by hickerings, duplications, inter-departmental jealousies. There was indecision at the top. Orders were given only to be countermanded. Operations were planned and abandoned almost in the same breath.

Once during the war, for reasons known only to him, Hitler decided to liquidate the venerable French General Maxim Weygand. He ordered Section II of the Abwehr to assassinate Weygand.

He took this plot extremely seriously and assigned Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel to supervise its execution. But General Lahousen, in charge of Section II, decided to defy Hitler and sabotage Weygand's assassination. In this daring insubordination, Lahousen was aided by Canaris himself.

Hitler was growing impatient and kept inquiring about Gisella, the cover name by which the plot was known. And Keitel dutifully called Canaris from time to time, asking, "What about this Gisella? How long do we have to wait?"

"For heaven's sake, Keitel, be patient, my man!" Canaris answered. "These things are not as simple as you think there at the headquarters of the Fuehrer."

Finally the pressure became so great that something had to be done. Canaris decided to go to Paris to settle Gisella once and for all. He was accompanied by Admiral Leopold Buerkner, his second in command, and General Lahousen, the unhappy chief of the sabotage section of the Abwehr. By the time they reached Paris, they had their counterplot all ready; they planned to tip off Weygand and actually organize his escape from their own assassins.

But just then Weygand managed to escape on his own, leaving Canaris in a pickle. And, as usual, Keitel was on the phone the moment Weygand's escape became known at the Fuehrer's headquarters.

"Hitler is very angry," he said rather ominously. "How could you botch up Gisella so badly?"

At that moment Lahousen handed Canaris a slip of paper on which a few words were hastily scribbled: "Heydrich has just been killed in Czechoslovakia. This is definite."


Canaris read the paper and a broad smile came upon his face. "This is one case for which you won't be able to blame us, Keitel," he said. "This whole Gisella business was taken away from us; we were overruled as usual by Heydrich. He actually forbade me to handle the case. If you want to, you may ask him personally about it."

#### Ready for Sabotage

At another time, orders came direct from Hitler's headquarters to sabotage the planes of Pan-American Airways plying between New York and Lisbon, Portugal. When Admiral Canaris learned about the plot, it was advanced to the point where a time bomb had already been placed in one of the planes. The admiral rushed to Lisbon and supervised in person the removal of the bomb, only afterward thinking up an excuse to Hitler.

The famous mission of the saboteurs who went to the United States in submarines was deliberately bungled in Berlin even before they left. Orders to kill Churchill and Roosevelt were dismissed with scorn the moment they were received.

Part of this was undoubtedly due to



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
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the disorder that was rampant in the organization. But part of it was due to a deliberate, organized effort to sabotage Hitler's plots. It wasn't as easy as it sounds to do this—and probably it would have been altogether impossible had not the British succeeded with a decisive plot of their own. With that one single blow to our solar plexus, the British destroyed the effectiveness of our organization, although I doubt if they planned it that way or if they are aware even today of the fantastic consequences of their operation.

This plot involved the liquidation of Reinhard Heydrich at the very height of his enormous powers. He was ambushed and killed on his way to the Reich just when he was about to take over direction of the whole spy system.

Heydrich is the most misunderstood and underrated figure in the espionage history of World War II. Due to the inevitable legend which springs up in the wake of every war, it is not Heydrich but Admiral Wilhelm Canaris whose picture is etched on the imagination of the world as Germany's master spy.

Despite his top position in the service, Admiral Canaris was merely a minor character. Called to head military espionage on the eve of his retirement, never trusted by Hitler, and himself torn between his loyalty to the Fuehrer and what he regarded as his duties to humanity, Canaris proved a dismal failure—no matter how glorious this failure now may appear from the viewpoint of the Allies.

Aside from an insatiable curiosity, his love of travel and an uncanny knowledge of the world, there was nothing in Canaris that qualified him for his job. He was a hopelessly bad organizer and a mystic who wrapped himself up in esoteric thoughts which had little relation to reality.

### The Spy Master

The man who was the real spy master of Germany was Reinhard Heydrich, known in the west as "the Hangman." He, too, was a former Naval officer, but he was Canaris' junior by more than 30 years. A fanatical Nazi despite his partly Jewish origin, and a born practitioner of intrigue, this young man attracted Hitler's attention even before his seizure of power.

With nothing but determination and zeal to offer at first, Heydrich inched his way into Hitler's admiration and confidence. He was about to arrive on top, to replace Canaris, when he was killed. He died at the end of his titanic fight against Canaris—a plot by itself within the greater plot.

When I joined the German secret service, his struggle against the admiral was just beginning. Even so, it was a breathtaking experience to watch their fight. It started in the winter of 1937 with a plot that led to the bloody purge of that year and paid enormous dividends years later when Hitler decided to crush Russia.

During those winter days in 1937, we observed that Heydrich had a particularly mysterious air about him. He had just hit on an idea that was so fantastic that it staggered even Hitler's imagination. It was to become the spy plot of the century.

Heydrich suggested that "evidence" be produced for Stalin himself that the top-ranking generals of his Red Army were plotting the overthrow of the Communist regime. There were some rumors abroad that some of the Red generals did, in fact, think along those lines. It is entirely possible, too, that some of them had actual contacts with their German opposite numbers.

But Marshal M. N. Tukachevsky, the best brain in the Red Army General Staff, had nothing to do with this groping design. He was loyal to Stalin and a bitter enemy of Germany. This made him a marked man in Heydrich's eyes, who aimed his plot against him. Heydrich told Hitler: "I have an idea the success of which would certainly end with Tukachevsky's liquidation. It would start a purge in the Red Army that would not only destroy the morale of the Russian officers' corps but a great number of the officers themselves."

Hitler was fascinated and told Heydrich to go ahead. I was never to see secrecy in any secret service even approaching the one in which Heydrich shrouded this plot. He isolated part of the dreaded cellars in Gestapo headquarters in Berlin's Prinz Albrecht Strasse and established an office there whose sole function was the preparation of the conspiracy.

There were only six men who knew about these preparations. They were Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich himself, and three aides. One of them was Hermann Behrens, Heydrich's personal aide, who directed the technical apparatus. Another was a controversial Russian named Nikolai Skoblin, a former Czarist general living in Paris. He acted as a kind of technical adviser. The third was another Russian who deserted to us from the Soviet secret service. He prepared the necessary texts and forged the documents Heydrich needed.

By the strange whim of history, none of these men is alive today. Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich are dead. So is Behrens, Skoblin and the other Russian disappeared without a trace in the wake of the plot. I suspect that Heydrich had them killed to wipe out the only outside witnesses to his scheme. Even on the Russian side, nobody actively involved in the plot is alive today. There is no eyewitness anywhere in the world. But the documents survived. I probably was one of the few men alive who had a chance to see them before they were finally destroyed.

Heydrich set out at once to produce his "evidence": letters which Tukachevsky was alleged to have sent to his German "friends." It wasn't particularly difficult to forge these papers. There was plenty of bona fide correspondence between the Russian and German generals on file.

Some of them were lifted from the archives of the German War Ministry, and their stationery, rubber stamps and signatures duplicated. Heydrich even managed to procure a typewriter that resembled the one on which Tukachevsky's letters were written.

### Dossier Goes to Hitler

By April 1937, the documents were ready. They were bound in a red leather dossier and submitted to Hitler. All that remained to be done was to smuggle the dossier into Stalin's hands.

At first Heydrich planned to let it fall into the hands of the Czechoslovak General Staff because he was certain that they would forward it promptly to Moscow. But on second thought, when Behrens was already in Prague with the dossier, he canceled the plan. He felt sure that such a find would gain for the Czechs Stalin's eternal gratitude. And he wasn't particularly anxious to deepen the bonds of Russo-Czech friendship.

Heydrich decided to make a direct deal with the Russians. He instructed Behrens to contact an attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin and to play the dossier into his hands. A secret meeting was arranged and the attaché was acquainted with the existence of the documents. The attaché then rushed to Moscow with the news and returned to Berlin with General Lev Mekhlis, chief of the Communist Party's military administration.

Mekhlis was empowered by Stalin himself to acquire the dossier by all means, but when he asked the middleman how much he wanted for the papers, he found that the agent was not ready to discuss a price. Heydrich never expected to get money for his dossier, so he failed to give instructions to his agent that would have covered just such an eventuality.

But he wasn't long in making up his price. It was 6,000,000 rubles in cash. The horse-trading began. After a few days of hard bargaining, Mekhlis paid 3,000,000 rubles and left Berlin with the dossier in the diplomatic pouch.

The consequences of the plot soon became evident to the whole world. At dawn on June 5, 1937, Heydrich was called by the Foreign Office and told that Marshal Tukachevsky had been arrested the night before. Then events followed with machine-gun rapidity. The great Red military purge was on.

At 10 a.m. on June 11, Tukachevsky's trial began. At 9 p.m. of the same day he and seven other generals were sentenced to death by a special military tribunal. It was not yet midnight when the flash came that all of them had been executed by firing squads.

During those exciting days Heydrich set up his own monitoring service in his office and listened to Moscow Radio. He remained at the set to the bitter end—to Tukachevsky's bitter end, that is.

The backbone of the Red Army was broken, its leading generals liquidated, its officers' corps decimated—without go-



ing to war or sending even a single operative to Moscow.

Canaris was not in on the plot and, in fact, elaborate measures were undertaken to keep it from him. But somehow the admiral found out about it and recognized that a formidable opponent appeared on the scene in the person of young Heydrich. He turned his own spy organization to the task of collecting information about Heydrich. In the established tradition of the Continental intelligence services, Canaris believed that the rattling of a few skeletons in Heydrich's private closets would keep his adversary quiet. And he proved right. His agents succeeded in discovering evidence that Heydrich, the fanatical Nazi, was partly of Jewish origin—a crime far worse than murder in Hitler's eyes.

Then, spying on Canaris just as Canaris was spying on him, Heydrich got word of the admiral's discovery. Realizing that the great secret of his life was out, he decided to conclude a tenuous alliance with Canaris, although his first impulse was to destroy him.

Yet Heydrich continued to outsmart Canaris. While the admiral was busy with relatively minor assignments, surveying Czechoslovakia and Poland in preparation for the *Blitzkrieg*, Heydrich moved about boldly where the admiral feared to tread.

### British Secret Service

He decided to challenge the arch-enemy, the British secret service itself.

We were on the very eve of the second World War and large-scale preparations were made to gear our work to new tasks. Just then we discovered that the British had beaten us to the punch. They had an intricate spy net all ready for the war, established in The Hague, the Netherlands, with tentacles reaching deep into the Reich. This net was supposed to conduct espionage and sabotage during the war, so it became imperative for us to destroy it before it could become dangerous.

British spy headquarters in The Hague were in charge of two rather timid-looking men, but we knew that they were ace operatives of the British Intelligence Service—in fact, members of Britain's professional intelligence officers' corps. One was a "civilian" or political agent named Payne S. Best. The other was an old-timer in military intelligence, Captain Stevens. Heydrich decided to strike at them and to destroy their whole network by removing its double head.

He picked one of his deputies, a young intellectual named Werner Schellenberg, to prepare the ground. Schellenberg went to The Hague and established contact with Best and Stevens as a representative of a disgruntled anti-Nazi underground within the German Army. The two Englishmen swallowed the bait and went out of their way to collaborate with Schellenberg.

Soon we were operating inside the British spy network. One of our master spies was a trusted agent of its two

chiefs. Then suddenly Heydrich decided to go after the whole organization.

Late in the afternoon of November 8, 1939, Heydrich called us into his private office and I heard him instruct Schellenberg to bring in Best and Stevens alive. A plan was worked out. The two British agents would be lured to a rendezvous at Venlo, the Dutch town on the German border, then kidnaped and taken across the frontier. "I am sick and tired of this cat-and-mouse game," Heydrich said. "I'll feel much better when I have Best and Stevens locked up in the Reich instead of pulling their legs long-distance."

With confidence in Schellenberg's honorable intentions, Payne Best and Captain Stevens showed up in Venlo as agreed. The moment their car reached the rendezvous, agents of Heydrich, dressed in the uniforms of Dutch frontier guards, rushed at them and dragged them into Germany. Like the famous Cicero case, the Venlo incident remains a soft spot with the British Intelligence Service and I am reluctant to open up old wounds. Yet the fact remains that we again triumphed where others failed, this time against our most formidable opponent.

Soon afterward we were to add insult to injury with still another plot that remains in the annals of espionage second only to the action against the Red Army General Staff. Holland was the scene of this plot as well, and the British Intelligence Service was again its victim.

This particular operation went under the code name *Englandspiel* or England Game. It began in September 1940 and lasted until April 1944. During that period the German secret service actually dominated the major British espionage activities in Western Europe. We directed British spies as will. We ordered supplies from Britain, called for agents and information, as if we were operating within the offices of Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co.—the phony firm which served as the cover for this branch of Britain's wartime secret service.

A few figures might indicate the magnitude of this operation and especially its success. While it lasted, we called for 190 parachute drops and received 95 of them. We obtained from our British "friends" 570 containers and 150 parcels with more than 7,000 pounds of explosives, 3,000 Sten guns, 300 Bren guns, 2,000 hand grenades, 75 radio transmitters, over half a million bullets, 5,000 revolvers, bicycles, raincoats, rubber boots, uniform pieces—everything we needed ourselves to equip our own secret agents.

We also called for and received samples of a weapon which the British guarded as the apple of their eyes: a special spy gun that could be fired without making a sound. Our British contacts were most reluctant to let us have this gun, but we coaxed them long enough and finally received six of them, an unexpected gift.

We also asked for money and got 500,000 Dutch guilders, in addition to

lots of other currencies. The operation that yielded such enormous results was based on a monumental ruse. In September, 1940, we succeeded in penetrating an important branch of the Dutch underground, taking it under our wing and operating it as if nothing had happened. We masqueraded as British spies and Dutch patriots, and while we had to supply at least some information to our enemies, we received far more in return.

### Foreign Agents Fall

During the climactic days of this operation, we had 18 radio transmitters in contact with headquarters in London and operated 14 landing grounds. More than 50 British and Dutch agents fell into our hands. Some decided to co-operate with us, but others defied us and preferred the gallows to treason.

In the end, three such young patriots forced us to abandon this espionage bonanza just when we needed it most—on the eve of the invasion of Europe. They escaped from us and returned to England with word about the *Englandspiel*. After three years and seven months our great secret was out. We decided to call it a day. But somehow we couldn't suppress the urge to send a last parting message to Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co.

"We are aware of the fact," the message read, "that you are doing business in Holland without our help. Having been, as we were, your sole representatives for a considerable period of time, we regard your conduct as rather unfair. Yet this will not prevent us, should you ever decide to pay us a visit on a far greater scale, from receiving you with the hospitality which we showed your agents."

This last message was dated April 1, 1944. After that the 18 fake transmitters went off the air and never opened up again.

By then, Heydrich, too, was buried and forgotten. But in his place appeared a still greater genius, although he lacked Heydrich's bitter determination and ruthless zeal. He was Werner Schellenberg, the man who lured the British agents to their doom and who, in effect, controlled the *Englandspiel*.

At the head of the German secret service, Werner Schellenberg knew that he was representing a lost cause. His activities were devoted to an effort to bring the war to an earlier end. In the end, he was a failure. Although he was only 33 years old when Germany surrendered unconditionally, Schellenberg was an aged and broken man, with no will to live.

It was under Schellenberg's direction and guidance that I moved up in the hierarchy until I became commander in chief of that sector of the secret front that include the Balkans and Italy. The enemies against whom I had to fight were the guerrillas of Yugoslavia, the conspirators of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and the growing anti-Fascist forces of Italy.

I never worked in enemy territory. As

a matter of fact, I never operated directly against either Britain or America. Few of us did. My job was to keep the tottering Axis coalition together and hold Germany's disgruntled allies in line.

It proved a super-human job and it failed in the end, but only under the hammer blows of the military defeat. Even so, for two long years I was the virtual ruler of half of Europe—the part of Europe which proved traditionally the most difficult to rule.

When I reached the Balkans as chief of Germany's secret service, I found an incredible mess in every country there. Conspiracies, intrigues and revolutionary moves were brewing everywhere. Large-scale civil war was raging in Yugoslavia. To make things worse, I found that our own ally Italy, was secretly collaborating with Tito.

In Bulgaria, the pro-German king was in danger, and no matter how I tried, I couldn't save his life. In Rumania, young King Michael was moving to head a palace conspiracy against us. In Hungary, the gaga old regent, Admiral Nicholas Horthy, plotted jovially and leisurely with a group of loud-mouthed but weak-kneed patriots, among whom a beautiful actress, Katalin Karady, appeared to be the only one with a really stout heart.

I didn't know what to do first. Then I made a hasty estimate of the situation and decided to take on what appeared to be the most dangerous foe: the Croat peasant Josip Broz, already calling himself Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It seems that the western world is still puzzled by Tito's gyrations and takes his defection from Moscow with at least a grain of salt. My own personal experience with Tito would indicate that at least some caution is advisable in dealing with this shrewd Balkan politician who was made by the fortunes of war.

Tito, I found, has three outstanding points of strength. One is his absolute faith in himself. The other is his savage determination, learned in Communist terror schools, to press home his own aims by all means, fair or foul. And the third is that he has no qualms about shuffling his alliances and making deals with anyone who at a given moment might serve his purpose.

Tito had no secrets from me because I had my agents firmly entrenched in his headquarters and read every scrap of communication that entered or left his radio shack. I studied his coded messages to (1) the Western Allies, (2) to Moscow, and (3) to Mussolini's High Command.

I was certain that sooner or later he would show up in my camp as well, offering to do business with Hitler. I hid my time, but I didn't have to wait too long.

I was most annoyed by the way the Italians were playing ball with Tito. It was the summer of 1942. Our own forces were getting set for a large-scale operation against the Partisans, and the plans called for an Italian army under General Mario Roatta to cover our southern front. But when zero hour came, General Ro-

atta was the little man who wasn't there. Without notifying us at all, he moved out of the territory allocated to his forces and allowed Tito to occupy the vacuum. With this sudden move, the German occupation collapsed even before it could be really started.

There was little I could do about it, not even when my agents reported to me that General Roatta was buying arms wholesale from Tito's men. But then something happened that brought me directly into the picture. Listening to Tito's secret radio, we overheard a fascinating conversation between Moscow and the marshal in the mountains.

First I heard Moscow telling Tito that the Western Allies were planning to invade the soft underbelly of Europe, to strike at the Germans by way of Yugoslavia. "What do you think of this, Walter?" Stalin asked Tito, using the name by which he was known in the Komintern. "And what are you planning to do?"

Tito answered promptly and indignantly. "I will resist them with everything I have and throw them back into the sea."

Stalin seemed to like Tito's truculence because he spurred him on. Just as this conversation progressed between Stalin and Tito, an envoy of the Partisans arrived at my headquarters in Zagreb. He said his name was Doctor Petrovic. He came to negotiate the exchange of some prisoners. He bore credentials signed by Tito himself and we had no reason to doubt, indeed, that he was Tito's personal envoy.

In the midst of these negotiations, this Dr. Petrovic suddenly confided to us that he was neither a doctor nor was his name Petrovic. In fact, he said, he was Lyubo Velebit, a general of the Partisans, and Tito's adviser on foreign affairs.

Velebit came to us to propose a truce. I refused to believe my own ears, but Velebit went even further. He told us about the Allied plan to land in Yugoslavia, and then, in the name of Tito, he invited us to form an alliance with Tito to repel this invasion from the west.

Even we, hard-boiled agents of the German secret service, were flabbergasted at such brazen opportunism. Tito volunteered through his envoy to place at our disposal the supplies his Allies were sending in and to collaborate with us in the field.

#### Hitler Reacts

The matter was of such importance that we had to submit it to Hitler himself. But Hitler recoiled. "What?" he shouted. "Make an alliance with bandits and rebels? Never! I won't negotiate with bandits! I'll shoot them!"

At about the same time, we made an important catch in Hungary. We captured a Partisan courier on his way to Tito from Moscow. We found on him a crucial document, a letter from Stalin to Tito. In it Stalin formally endorsed Tito's plan to join the Germans and to

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fight against the Allies should Britain and the United States try to land in the Balkans. This at a time when the Communists throughout the world were clamoring for a second front!

This episode of the war is not included in Tito's official biography, but there are enough eye-witnesses still alive today to bear me out. At any rate, it provided us with a different picture of Marshal Tito than the world presently was holding.

From then on we dealt with him only clandestinely, as we were forbidden by Hitler to negotiate with him directly. He sold us immense quantities of his supplies. But he had an insatiable appetite. He refused payment in marks or lire, the currencies over which we had control. His agents demanded payment in American dollars or English pounds, and some of it had to be paid to an account in a Swiss bank.

With Hitler's orders to shoot rather than negotiate, my work as an operational secret service chief was concluded in Yugoslavia. Just in time, at that, because I had to turn my undivided attention to a tragic-comic plot in Hungary.

The leader of Hungary, doughty old Admiral Horthy, was discovered to be dealing with Tito and planning to desert the German cause. It was a rash and pathetic course. At dawn on October 16, 1944, old Horthy was taken in protective custody by the notorious Colonel Otto Skorzeny, about whom you will hear more later. He was carted off to Germany, and the floodgates of terror were opened up with his departure. The Hungarian Nazis who took his place in Budapest proved worthy pupils of their German masters and, if possible, they even outdid them in barbaric cruelty. They murdered thousands of innocent people during the closing days of the war and joined with the Nazis in destroying their homeland in futile resistance to the rapidly advancing Russians.

Disgusted by the consequences of an action I tried hard to prevent, I decided to seek direct contact with the Allies in the West. I refused to become a party to the vandal methods of warfare which a maddened Hitler was introducing during the waning hours of his power.

The man I sought out for contact was a prominent New York attorney by the name of Allan W. Dulles. He was established in a patrician house in Berne's Herrengasse, as an alleged member of

the American Legation staff. But I saw that he was in fact my American opposite number, chief of the Eastern European outpost of the Office of Strategic Services.

As a matter of fact, I knew quite a lot about Mr. Dulles. His ideas about the war were all known to me in detail, not because I read his thoughts, but because I had been reading his cables. I am sure Mr. Dulles will be surprised to learn that it wasn't the vaunted German secret service but merely the signal corps of the Hungarian Army which broke his code. But this enabled us to learn a lot about him and to size him up.

Reading those cables, we were annoyed by the vicious tone of the messages sent by the American Minister, Leland Harrison. Aside from their evident malice, they also showed that Mr. Harrison wasn't too well informed about us. On the other hand, Allan Dulles showed a remarkable knowledge of things and a prophetic foresight concerning the Russians. No wonder! He was fed accurate information by a conspiratorial group in the offices of Admiral Canaris.

It was Dulles' new mousetrap that I was soon beating my path, armed with certain information that proved of inestimable value to the Allies. It was information about the Redoubt, the mythical mountain stronghold which Hitler was allegedly preparing for his last-ditch stand in the Alps.

But before I could wind up my career as a secret agent, I had a last mission to perform. It was a tragic mission, at that. It was probably the very last intrigue of the second World War, but it was intrigue on a monumental scale. It was the murder of Benito Mussolini, the pathetic Duce of Italy.

By then it was April 1945. The war had but a few weeks to go and Mussolini, who made all the miscalculations and mistakes a man in his position could make, was sitting on the floor between two stools. He knew that the Germans in Italy were negotiating with the Allies and were about to surrender unconditionally. He also knew that powerful forces within Germany decided to abandon him to his fate. In his despair, he turned to Winston Churchill with a plea for help.

The details of Mussolini's negotiations with Churchill are obscure, but now documents are produced to show that

Prime Minister promised definite help to the frantic Duce. The idea was for Mussolini to escape to Switzerland and there to place himself at the disposal of British Intelligence.

Into these negotiations burst an unexpected time bomb in the decision of certain die-hard, fanatic Italian Fascists to get rid of the Duce on the very eve of his escape. The man who was to supervise the liquidation was Mussolini's own former Minister of the Interior, a ruthless adventurer named Guido Buffarini-Guidi.


His plan was designed to remove the Duce without soiling his Buffarini's hands with his blood. He approached the panicky Duce with offers of help in his escape, and volunteered to obtain for him the necessary papers and to arrange for transportation.

Grasping at every straw, Mussolini accepted the offer and arranged with Buffarini the route of his escape. All was set. Mussolini, carrying his crated state papers and a substantial treasure with him, was scheduled to leave Italy in the direction of Lonza on April 26. He would make the crossing into Switzerland on April 27. From there, he would contact his new friends, the British in Cairo. Everything seemed in perfect order.

As soon as he made the arrangement with Mussolini, Buffarini rushed to the German secret service with the other end of his plot. It was my misfortune to receive the Buffarini plan in all its hideous detail during a meeting at German police headquarters in Meran. Buffarini asked us to supply the necessary papers to Mussolini and make his flight possible. But at the same time we were supposed to tip off the anti-Fascist Partisans and lead them to Mussolini's trail.

In a discussion that was remarkable only for its sound and fury, I refused to be a party to such dastardly a scheme. But we counted without Buffarini. He was determined to see his scheme succeed. When we kicked him out, he went directly to a prearranged meeting with a mysterious Colonel Valerio of the Italian Partisans. He was in reality Walter Audisio, one of the triggermen of the Communist underground. It was to this Audisio that Buffarini carried his lethal plan. From then on everything progressed according to schedule.

Benito Mussolini, traveling with his mistress Clara Petacci, left his hideout in Como as planned on April 26. Near



WALTER AUDISIO  
ARGOSY Magazine

Nesso, at the exact spot where he was supposed to cross into the safety of Switzerland, his convoy was ambushed by an execution squad of the Partisans led by Colonel Valerio. But a few miles from safety, Mussolini lost his life. While Communist Partisans took credit for killing the Duce, the irony of it is that it actually was his own Fascists who led him to slaughter.

### Slaughter Continues

His end came on April 29—yet still there seemed to be no end to the killing of World War II. Germany's southern front was wiped out. The western Allies stood on the Elbe and in the heart of Czechoslovakia. In Berlin, the Russians were fighting in the streets and Hitler was preparing his suicide in the besieged Reichschancellery. Yet the Allies were still worried that a diehard army of Nazi soldiers might entrench itself in the Alps and continue to fight in their impregnable fortress for years.

By then I was in close and daily contact with Allan Dulles in Berne. Not only did I supply him with information about events in Italy and Southeastern Europe, but also served as his intermediary with the men who were slated to prepare this Redoubt for Germany's last stand.

What was the truth about this allegedly impregnable fortress where Hitler planned to delay his total defeat?

In November, 1944, the Gauleiter of Tyrol, a Nazi named Franz Hofer, sent a memorandum to Hitler with the recommendation that a fortress be built in the Austrian Alps. He also outlined the possibilities of its prolonged defense. The plan was seconded by another Austrian Gauleiter, Friedrich Rainer. While nobody in the Wehrmacht seemed to take it seriously, the German secret service recognized in it an opportunity to mislead the Allies. Phony blueprints were drawn up and intelligence was leaked to the Americans, who seemed to be most prepared to believe such a romantic military plot.

Some of the blueprints themselves were smuggled into Allied hands with the help of double agents. It soon became known in Germany that the Allies were inclined to take the hoax rather seriously. Sporadic items in the Allied press indicated genuine apprehension. Spies reported serious concern at General Eisenhower's headquarters and also in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

Hitler at first ridiculed Hofer's fantastic plan, but when he was told that the Allies were frightened by it, he thought the idea might not be so bad after all. He ordered Hofer to develop the southern positions of the planned Redoubt as quickly as possible. A team of SS geologists was sent into the region and pupils of the SS Mountain School were alerted to begin large-scale blastings in the Alpine rocks.

But the grand design of the Redoubt never passed beyond this stage. Even so, every move connected with it was leaked

to the Allies—the arrival of the geologists, the special exercises of the SS Mountain School, the moves of the Schoerner Army that was slated to garrison it. They all added up to feverish preparations where in reality nothing existed.

It was at this point that I could report to Mr. Dulles the true state of affairs in the Alps. Even during my first encounter with him, I discovered that he was most interested in intelligence about the Redoubt. A plan was worked out to gain as much genuine information as possible and then to win over to our side those who were slated to command Hitler's desperate last stand.

An operation plan was evolved and I got busy with its execution. My task was facilitated by the fact that the Redoubt's prospective commanders were, like myself, all Austrians, themselves anxious to save at least Austria from the inescapable collapse of the Third Reich.

Very soon I was able to assure Mr. Dulles that, first, the planned Redoubt was still in the stage of preliminary planning, that construction did not progress beyond some blastings; and, second, that all the men slated to command the troops in the Alps had expressed their willingness to co-operate with the Allies in frustrating Hitler's last grand design.


My report to Dulles brought forth genuine sighs of relief. Mr. Dulles stated quite frankly that my report to him, and the assurances I was authorized to supply, removed the last road block from the victorious path of the Allies.

When Germany's defeated leaders set their signatures under the instruments of total capitulation, my work as Hitler's master spy came to an end. I thought that the past would recede from me rapidly and that I could return to "normal life," to begin my studies where I interrupted them 10 years before.

A few months ago, however, this weird past returned to me abruptly for a fleeting moment. It came in the form of a strange and embarrassing discovery, reminding me of the manner in which Heydrich used to do business. The most secret of his operations, about which we used to speak only in hushed tones, was suddenly exposed by the chance discovery of a couple of Austrian fishermen. The secrets of our "Operation Bernhard" were out. The last mysterious plot of World War II had lost its mystery.

Two fishermen on the Austrian lake called Traunsee came upon big green and red patches on the surface of the lake that at first seemed to them a strange variety of water lilies. On closer examination they found that in reality they were pieces of paper, floating by the thousands on the surface of the lake. They picked up an armful of them and returned to their village with their find. You may imagine the surprise of the quiet village folk when the pieces of paper turned out to be—English pound notes.

I am able to clear up the mystery of their discovery and explain the sudden appearance of millions of English



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pounds in an Austrian lake. It was money printed by the German Secret Service on Heydrich's orders and dumped into the sea when the end of the war found us with caches of it still on our hands.

Early in our game, and contrary to widespread belief, the German secret service was woefully short of ready cash. What we needed were dollars and pounds, the international currency of the espionage business. But neither the Ministry of Finance nor the Reichsbank had adequate supplies to pay for our quaint operations.

Already, in 1939, in the wake of his discovery of the counterfeit rubles, Heydrich hit upon the idea of printing the money we so urgently needed. At first, the technical difficulties proved almost insurmountable. No matter how hard they tried, they couldn't duplicate the intricate paper design the British used in printing their five-pound notes. Nevertheless, the technical branch of the secret service finally succeeded in producing counterfeit pounds which were so good that most of the banks of the world accepted them.

But it was not until 1943 that the secret service could begin the dissemination of these counterfeit pounds in greater quantities. We had to devise fantastic methods to bring this money into circulation. A special branch was set up within the secret service which was devoted exclusively to the distribution of the counterfeit notes.

A network of special agents was established in Italy. They sold the pound notes to Italians for genuine lire and then used the lire to buy genuine pounds on Switzerland's black market. The losses we suffered in these transactions were enormous. But what did it matter as long as we were printing our own pounds?

Soon another method was found to get rid of the millions of pounds on hand. It became known that the Partisans of Yugoslavia were only too glad to sell some of the supplies they received from the Allies—provided they were paid in pounds or dollars. This led to the development of the most fantastic business

in the history of warfare. The German secret service appeared on the scene as the buyer of automatic weapons which Tito received from the Allies. Soon the business was flourishing to the point where whole trainloads of Allied supplies came into our hands. They were paid for with forged English pound notes. Our buyers traveled freely in the regions controlled by the Partisans even while our troops had a hard time fighting against them.

The counterfeiting of dollar notes succeeded only toward the end of the war, but even then the notes proved to be so primitive that our agents refused to peddle them. Only shortly before the surrender did the German Secret Service succeed in improving the quality of these forgeries, but there was no time left to bring them into circulation.

The British understandably took a very serious view of this operation. They discovered the existence of these counterfeit notes when an airman of the Royal Air Force was caught at an airport in the act of smuggling French currency into Britain. He had all kinds of money on him, including British pound notes. And on closer scrutiny, more than 70 per cent of them proved counterfeit.

The airman confessed that he received them as part of his winnings in a Belgian gambling casino. This discovery alerted the Bank of England and Scotland Yard. More and more forged pound notes were discovered and, in the words of one of Britain's outstanding spy experts, "the notes were such perfect forgeries that any British bank would have accepted them as genuine without the slightest hesitation."

A special forgery squad was formed by Scotland Yard under the famous Inspector Jack Smith, one of Britain's legendary spy catchers. Squads of Scotland Yard men were sent out into the world to track down every single note. Chief Inspector Rudkin was sent to South America. Inspector Smith went to France, Belgium and Italy. Inspector Minter moved straight into the lion's den, into Germany itself.

Minter discovered the German counterfeiting plant in Block 19 in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Millions in foreign currency were printed there by slave labor. Most of the men who worked in the plant were expert engravers and printers. They were taken from the various camps to this plant.

Everybody concerned with Operation Bernhard regarded this as a top secret and nobody liked to discuss it. The British were the most reluctant to talk about it because currency in excess of £50,000,000 was found and more than £100,000,000 was believed to be in circulation. When Inspector Minter raided Block 19 in Sachsenhausen, he found millions of pounds still stored there. He also discovered millions of rupees printed specially for a conspiracy in India which, however, never came off.

The Germans involved in the plot kept their mouths shut because they feared reprisals for something of which international law takes an extremely serious view. Were it not for that one airman and those two Austrian fishermen on the Traunsee, the whole plot might have remained the war's only undisturbed secret. But their strange catch created a greater stir than if they had caught the Loch Ness Monster in Traunsee.

With the belated discovery of the counterfeit notes, the secret war book of the German espionage service saw its last chapter written. As I look back on my part in it, I feel a certain pride in our achievements, just as a British or an American who served on the secret front must be proud of what he did.

My pride is enhanced by the fact that in the crucial days of the war's climax, I found my way to the Allies, contributing a modest share to the termination of the holocaust before the atomic bomb could make its cataclysmic appearance on the European battlefield.

In making the balance sheet of this strange enterprise, I find a lot on both sides of the ledger. If in the end we in the German Secret Service failed, it was only because we never wanted to succeed.

## How to Use Your Head

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 53

either neck mount or shoulder mount. The safe way is to cut the hide off behind the withers, shoulders and brisket, then you won't run short.

Skinning is simple. Make a single cut up the top of the neck to a point between the ears, then branch off in a "Y" cut to the base of each antler. A small-blade pocket knife, *very sharp*, is very good. Peel back the hide until the base of the ears shows, then slice these off close to the skull, leaving the entire ear in the skin to be reversed later. Continue skinning until the antler butts are reached, then pry the skin out from under the antler burrs with a screwdriver. The skin clings tightly here so your knife isn't of much help. When the eyes

are reached, place your finger in the eye socket, lift the skin away from the skull and *carefully* separate it from the head. You must be careful not to cut the eyelids in any way. Now, with great care, skin out the tear duct in the front corner of each eye. There is no hair here to cover a slip of the blade, so be cautious.

When you reach the back of the mouth, insert your finger under the lips and slice off all the lip flesh close to the jawbone, leaving all the flesh attached. (You'll remove this later). Likewise, cut the nose cartilage close to the skull, leaving all flesh and cartilage attached to the head skin. This frees the scalp from the head.

Lay aside the skin and detach the skull piece, with the antlers. For this use an old handsaw or hacksaw and make the cut just above the eyes so that the high point of the skull will stay with the antlers. Saw straight across so that you'll wind up with a more-or-less triangular piece of skull with the antlers. Shake out the brain pan, remove the flesh and sprinkle the skull with table salt.

Now attack the scalp, first by reversing the ears. Do this by freeing the cartilage from the skin on the back side of the ear. It's a slow process so you'll have to use knife, fingers and screwdriver as you need them in order to break the cartilage loose right out to the tips

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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SECURITY INFORMATION  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
Attention: [ ]  
FROM : Chief ( ) Vienna

DATE: 29 Sep 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL ( )  
SPECIFIC ( ) Reports on Alois Eder and Willi Hoettl Associates.

1. ( ) has passed a group of 15 reports on individuals who are associated with one exception with either Alois Eder or Willi Hoettl. Included are separate reports on Vera OBERNDORFER, Dr. Edgar CRAUGOTT, Dr. Otto SCHOTT, Erich KERNMAYR, Alois EDER, August RECHSBERGER, Dr. Willibald JEDLITSCHKA, Werner LEHMAN, Edith BERNDT, Johann OBERMULLER, Wilhelm SCHEE, Emil HELM, Heinrich MAST, Dr. Emil von TONGEL, and Stefan SCHUCHERMAYR. Mentioned inter alia in the reports are: Waldemar KERN, Josef SCHEERER, Johann SPECK, Dr. Herbert KRAUS, Viktor BAND, Lixl RINNER, Karl KOWARIK, Anton FELLNER, Alfred PONZ, Josef GODA, Frederick PLACER, Ferdinand DURCANSKY, Franz PESENDORFER, Fritjob RIEDL, Johann GOSTENSCHNIK, Gunther KAUFMANN, Hans RETHENEERG, Otto GRIESMAIER, Anton NICALDONI, Engineer Josef HEGER, Lothar GREIL, Karl KAGERER, Rudolph LEHNER, and Franz STEFFEL.

2. Because of the volume of the reports they are being forwarded raw. The following are general VOB comments concerning the reports:

a. While VOB has some traces on the more prominent of the people reported on ( ), it is believed that CIC has ample traces.

b. Generally speaking, despite the intelligence activity of such people as Eder, Kernmayr, and Hoettl, they are not of immediate operational interest to the Austrian Mission, and we cannot attempt to do more than keep an eye on the major machinations and realignments involved.

c. The largest portion of these reports consists of biographic data taken from official records. The data concerning past intelligence activity is probably correct since the police keep careful tabs on this genre in Austria. The statements re present affiliations may well also be reliable since they appear to stem from a person close to the group if not in it. (

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d. If the previous patterns of constant realignment common to similar groups applies to the Eder net, it would seem likely that the affiliations shown will be of a temporary rather than a permanent nature.

e. Hoettl and Kernmayr while listed as members of the Eder group are undoubtedly so in the sense that they trade information with Eder rather than being paid for services rendered. (

) relations between Kernmayr and Eder are strained as the result of the "Der Spiegel" article referred to several times in the reports.

3. The following VOB traces were found on the individuals reported on or mentioned in the [ ] reports:

a. VON USLAR, fnu: The following card trace on one (Major fnu Von Uslar may concern the subject: Uslar, Major or Hauptmann, member of the Abwehr, commanded a group of North Africans on several missions of reconnaissance and sabotage in Tunisia in 1943; he was in Tunis, Italy and Vienna in 1943 and in Klagenfurt in 1944. (

b. KERNMAYR, Erich: The subject is a notorious intelligence figure and political dabbler in Austria. Recent reports on him are included in (

c. KONARIK, Karl, Ing.: The subject has been a minor intelligence figure in Austria for several years; he was at one time closely connected with Kernmayr. (

d. KRAUS, Herbert: The subject is a leader in the right wing VdU. During the war he was active in intelligence. (

e. NEY, Karl: The subject is identical with Karolej NEY alias Carl KIRCHBERGER. The following background is supplied in ( ) Ney (born 9 November 1906 in Hungary) during the war was associated with both Willi Hoettl and Otto Skorzeny. After the war he worked for a while with CIC on Hungarian targets. In 1949, using the name of Carl Kirchberger he went to Italy and made contact with the Italian IS. He founded, with the aid of Hartmann LAUTERBACHER (a HJ leader), an organization called the Bolshevik International Organization. It is believed that the subject engaged in intelligence activity in order to finance his political machinations. (

~~SECRET~~  
OPERATION

f. MASCHER, Josef (Sepp): The subject is a notorious fabricator (formerly connected with Sigfried PETER and Adolf URBAN) who was picked up by the Soviets in 1951. (

g. MAST, Baron Harry: The subject is a well-known intelligence figure in Austria who has in the past been associated with Zipper. CIC ( ) and Willi Hoettl. (

h. LAUTERBACHER, fnu: The subject is possibly identical with Hartmann Lauterbacher, the former Hitler Youth leader who with Karoley Ney founded the International Bolshevik Organization in Italy. Hartmann Lauterbacher is mentioned (

i. FONZ, Alfred: An Alfred Fonz is listed on a card reference as being born in Ischl on 17 June 1914 and having fought with the Russians against the Germans. (

j. RIEDL, Fritjof: The subject is a well known Austrian intelligence figure who was formerly closely associated with CIC. (

k. SLAVIK, Adolf: The subject is the leader of the Soviet sponsored "National Liga" and a former SS officer. (

l. SCHOTT, Dr. Otto: The subject is mentioned frequently in VOB traces as the head of the Willi Hoettl sponsored Nibelungen Verlag. ( ) he is now in Germany with a publishing firm, but his standing was injured by the "Der Spiegel" article. (



m. TONGEL, Emil Von: The subject is probably identical with the fnu Tongel who is described in ( ) as a resident of Alt Aussee and a former partner in the Nibelungen Verlag. ( ) Von Tongel as the chief propagandist of the VdU in Upper Austria.

n. TRAUGOTT, (Dr.) Edgar: The subject is the associate editor of the Oberoesterreichische Nachrichten. A CIC trace (AUS US Zone 1153, Ref 9303, dated 14 March 1951) lists him as sponsor of the Europaeische Aktion. He allegedly attempted to recruit one fnu Slavik into this organization. P/O1971 dated 31 September 1951 reports him as the founder of a neutralism movement and as having had connections with (Dr.) Gustav CANAVAL. He is also mentioned as a contact of Otto Schott ( )

o. FELLNER, Anton: Fellner is believed identical with the subject ( )

p. EDER, Alois: Eder is ( ) in Austria ( )

q. HOETTL, Willi: The subject is a notorious intelligence figure in Austria who was recently reported on in connection with the ( )

r. GOSTENSCHNIK, Johann: ( ) report on Richard KAUER, lists one Hans Gostenschnik (born 7 February 1909) in Graz, address: Gabelbergstrasse 35, Salzburg) as a former member of Ast 3, Belgrade, and presently a businessman in Salzburg.

s. GAISWINKLER, Albrecht: ( ) Hoettl, who stated that Ponger was particularly interested in Gaiswinkler.

t. HEGER, (Ing.) Josef: One Josef Heger, possibly identical with the subject, is described as a CIC subsource and a former Nationalrat for the VdU. He was approached by one Hermann JACKL (a registered CIC source) and offered a job working for the RIS. Heger reported the offer to another CIC source. ( ) lists Heger as the founder of a group called the National Demokratischer Verband. Collaborators were stated to be, inter alia, Erich Kernmayr and Adolf Slavik. It was Nazi in membership and reportedly sponsored by the Soviets.

u. NICALADONE, Anton: The subject may be identical with or related to one Herbert Nicaladone, SS Untersturmfuehrer and staff member of the

Kommandeur fuer Spezial Abwehr (a Skorzeny unit) in Vienna, whose inter-rogation was reported on (

v. SCHEE, Wilhelm: ( ) the subject as an ex-employee of the Nibelungen Verlag and states that there may be an intelligence connection between him and Hoettl.

w. SCHEERER, Josef: One Josef (Sepp) Scheerer is mentioned in (

x. KRAMMER, Karl: Subject is described ( ) as the SPOe Land Secretary in Upper Austria and controller of SPOe intelligence for that area.

y. GREIL, Lothar: The subject is described ( ) as the junior assistant and private secretary to Eric Kernmayr.

z. SCHACHERMAYR, Stefan: Schachermayr is described ( ) as one of the leaders of the group that split off from the Kernmayr circle to adhere to Adolf Slavik. Previously he had been a close adherent of Kernmayr.

aa. FESENDORFER, Franz: Subject is described ( ) as being in close contact with Erich Kernmayr concerning a new "Austrian middle party."

bb. SCHWARZKOPF, Georg: Subject was formerly closely connected with CIC Salzburg. (

cc. REIMANN, (Dr.) Viktor: For references on the subject (

Attachment: 15 raw reports

17 September 1953

Distribution:

3 - EE (w/att)  
1 - [ ]  
1 - [ ]  
1 - [ ]  
1 - Carding

~~SECRET~~ MICROFILMED  
SECURITY INFORMATION  
JAN 19 1962  
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

EE

3 December 1953

Chief ( ), Vienna  
Attention: [ ]  
Chief ( ), Salzburg [ ]

( )  
Hermann Broch de Rothermann

Ref: ( )

*Winkel*

1. Attached as per reference is the copy of the contract between subjects which de Rothermann claims was broken by Hoettl after Hoettl's detention by U.S. forces. Other correspondence between de Rothermann and Hoettl is also attached.

2. This material was furnished by [ ] of POB. [ ]

[ ] [ ]

Enclosure  
4 photocopies of letters

Distribution  
4-Via w/3cc encls  
1-de Rothermann 200  
1-chron  
1-SAH

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

~~SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

[ ] [ ]

CONFIDENTIAL

6030 ✓  
INTELLIGENCE  
FORT HOLABIRD

15203  
15 January 1954

CARD 36018  
ROEDER, Dr. Rolf  
Possible Intelligence Operative

L/29892 RDM/bg

F8085815

On 26 November 1953, the following information was obtained from Informant (6030) who in turn received it from a Sub-source of unknown reliability:

Dr. Rolf ROEDER, press chief of the firm Kathreiner, Munich, Germany, still maintains contact with Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl. Although ROEDER's permanent residence is listed as Munich, Germany, he practically lives in Cologne, Germany, where he is frequently visited by Hoettl. ROEDER is reportedly the official head of the recently established Office for Combating Coffee Smuggling (Büro zur Bekämpfung des Kaffeeschmuggels), which allegedly is some sort of a private investigative agency in Western Germany.

Source: (B-3)

Sub-source: (P-3)

Agent's Notes: Hoettl is a well-known intelligence operative.

DECLASSIFIED  
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
PL 105-246

By:            Date:           

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

Page 1 of 1 page

Copy 2 of 6 copies

ROCCO D. MELO, 430th CIC Det.,  
Region "B"

*Rocco Melo*

CONFIDENTIAL

\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COPY OF AN INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT FILED AT CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, FT. HOLABIRD, MD. \*\*\*\*\*

1	14
2	5
3	6
SERIAL DOC. NO. 4251445	
DOSSIER NO.	


NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
 (2)(A) Privacy  
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources  
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANTIZED  
2000

VIA: Air  
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. ( )



4 Feb 54

Date: 4 FEB 1954

To : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief ( ) Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL- ( )  
SPECIFIC- Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL

1. For the record, we forward photo-copies of correspondence found during search of Subject's house on the occasion of his arrest in March 1953. The correspondence provides at once a picture of the mechanics involved in [ ] terminating Subject in October 1952, and at the same time show Subject in his character of "Kleiner Inrigant".

2. Letters enclosed are:

- ✓ a. Notification dated 3 October 1952 to Subject ( ) of his termination.
- ✓ b. Letter dated 30 October 1952 from Subject to Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ, protesting.
- ✓ c. Letter from Subject to Theodor [ ] dated 25 November 1952, complaining that he had received no satisfaction from HEINZ.
- ✓ d. Letter, dated 19 December, from Graf KIELMANSEGG, answering for [ ]
- ✓ e. Letter by Subject, dated 22 January 1953, to Graf KIELMANSEGG.
- ✓ f. Curt note from Graf KIELMANSEGG, dated 2 March 1953, indicating someone would come to talk matters over with Subject.
- g. Also included is a letter Baron Harry MAST ("GRAF BOBBY") wrote to Theodor [ ] on 22 February 1953. MAST was Subject's chief assistant, both in representing the HOETTL interests in the Nibelungenverlag, and in gathering together reports from varied sources which HOETTL then subjected to his "high level" touch, and sent on to MUNICH.

Dist:

2 - EE (DIRECT), w/1 cy atts.


3 - COM, w/1 cy atts.

1 - BONN

2 - Files

2 February 1954

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1949



RI COPY

16-5043-1 GPO

~~SECRET~~

3. ZIPPER secured copies of Subject's letters to HEINZ and BLANK through the fact that the person Subject chose to take the letters to Germany for mailing was a ZIPPERite. As we recall, this person was either V-11728, or V-11672, the former being a close friend and former classmate of Subject (that was a grand class at the University of VIENNA!) and ( ) ZIPPER later obtained copies of the answers from HOETTL himself. ZIPPER showed [ ] and [ ] Subject's letters, after considerable comment to the effect that this was an internal German affair, but never did show us the letters sent HOETTL in reply. All in all, this is not a terribly vital collection of letters, but probably has some historical interest to addressees. We will send the microfilm along soon.

COM: Would you give or lend enclosures to BONN? Our photo facilities aren't up to mass printing of microfilm.

[ ]

Approved by:

[ ]

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para .....	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para .....	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Info and files		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [REDACTED]	SOURCE ( )	DATE OF DOCUMENT 15 Feb 1954	ANALYST ( )
SUBJECT [Jan 1954] Progress Report 1-31			DATE

PERTINENT INFORMATION

[REDACTED] claims that he was not affiliated with any of the Aussenstellen of the SD in the Vienna area, nor did he admit recognizing the names of Otto Begus and Willie HOETL, two former members of the Vienna Aussenstelle.

THIS IS ALL THE INFO PERTINENT TO SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CROSS REFERENCE FORM	FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] NS

FORM NO. 59-34  
DEC 1952

(35)

DISPA CH NO. ( )

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

11 MAR 1954

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : Chief ( ) Pullach

Info: COM

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ( ) ZIPPER

SPECIFIC— Dr. Willi HOETTL - Correspondence Files

1. Herewith four rolls of microfilm of Willi HOETTL's personal files, which were seized on the occasion of his arrest on 25 March 1953.

2. Most of these files were examined by [ ] and [ ] during the two weeks Willi HOETTL was held, and appropriate exploitation made at the time. Our examination of these files since then has filled in our picture, to some extent, of HOETTL's association with ZIPPERite V-11728, who would appear to act pretty much as HOETTL's agent for business and personal affairs in Germany. We have pointed out the disadvantage to ZIPPER of having so close a connection to the eternal Willi, but, naturally, without avail.

[ ]

Approved by:

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

[ ]

DIST:

3-EE w/att.  
3-COM w/o att.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

10 March 1954

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

[ ]



NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

REPROFILMED  
JAN 19 1962

DOCUMENT

24 MAR. 1954

SECRET SERVICE

VIA: Air  
(Specify air or sea pouch)

Dispatch No. ( )

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

Deadline: (Check one)

Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info and files		

To : Chief, EE  
From : Chief ( ), Pullach  
SUBJECT: GENERAL- ( )  
SPECIFIC- Willi HOETTL

Date

1. The following information was buried under some old snow in our files over the winter, and is dated about September 1953, but we pass it on for what it is worth. Sometime late last summer or early last fall, HOETTL was approached by the Yugoslav IS, with the proposal that he commence operations on their behalf. The proposal was a bit vague, but seemed to involve activity in TRIESTE under Vatican cover. HOETTL immediately turned to his old friend, U/M, and proposed that the Yugoslav pitch be accepted, but that he (HOETTL) have ZIPPER backing in so doing (HOETTL is well versed in the principle of Rueckversicherung). HOETTL's proposal was immediately refused by ZIPPER.

2. U/M states he has been able to confirm that HOETTL actually was the object of a Yugoslav approach (it had occurred to U/M that this might be a maneuver by Willi to achieve his major objective - being hired by ZIPPER). One of the Yugoslav contacts to HOETTL appears to have been (Mrs.) von KREMPLER, wife of the former SS General Karl von KREMPLER. Mrs von KREMPLER resides in the British Zone, and U/M implied that she was an established Yugoslav agent. The whole conversation was rather en passant, but recalled to me that U/M had queried me earlier about Karl von KREMPLER, who resides in Bahnhofstrasse, SALZBURG. A check of G-2 USFA at that time turned up nothing of interest, but U/M quite obviously has some idea that von KREMPLER is associated with the Yugoslavs. U/M of course knows him from Yugoslavia, and indicated some slight apprehension about von KREMPLER's possible activities in SALZBURG.

3. Insofar as we know, HOETTL has not accepted the Yugoslav bid.

4. For EE and SALZ: Would you please provide current traces on Karl von KREMPLER. He was last known to us as representative of the firm "MONTAN" (ALPINE-MONTAN?) in SALZBURG.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2000

Approved by:

Dist: 3 - EE (DIRECT)  
3 - COM 2 - VIEN (DIRECT)  
2 - SALZ "

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR 1949

3 March 1954

~~CLASSIFICATION~~

RE COPY

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

16-53043-1 GPO

VIA: Air  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. ( )

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE  
FROM : Chief ( ), Pullach  
SUBJECT: GENERAL— ( )  
SPECIFIC— ( )

DATE: 16 APR. 1954

Subject of above reference has recently come to our attention through V-14 400. He is a contact of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl who "can help HOETTL in his future dealings with the Bonn government."

Approved by:

[ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

Dist:  
3 - EE (DIRECT)  
3 - COM

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

13 April 1954

Deadline:		Check one
No Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para .....	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para .....	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info and files		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

RI COPY

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

Air

~~SECRET~~

16 APR 1954

Chief, EE

Chief ( ), Pullach

( )

( )

Subject of reference is a contact of Dr. Wilhelm HUSTIL. HUSTIL recommended him to V-14,400 as a recruiter and spotter because of his active role in the Armenian emigre circles.

Approved by:

[ ]

*Orig to Reg. via EE/A*

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

Dist:

3 - EE (DIRECT)  
3 - COM

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

13 April 1954

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Deadline:	Check one
Hq Action Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para ..... by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req. by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para ..... by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info and files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

COPY

SECRET

22 April 1954

Chief ( ) Germany  
Attn: [ ]  
Chief ( ) Salzburg  
( )

Kasscheck Reply - Karl von KREMPLE

RE: ( ) 24 March 1955

1. SOB files revealed no traces on Subject.
2. The last trace in the G-2 files on Karl von KREMPLE lists him as being discharged to the Austrian police at Linz per A & D List (sic) of 21 July 1947, page 10. He was a Waffen SS Standarten Fuehrer.

[ ]

15 April 1954

- 2 - POS
- 3 - Fran
- 2 - EL
- 3 - Vian
- 1 - File 1
- 1 - Gurove

*cc with memo for Hoettl*  
261

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

*orig to R1 thru EG/a*

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

[ ]  
[ ]

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Touch)

DISPATCH NO.       

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION

APR 29 1954

TO Chief ( ) n, Frankfurt  
ATTN: Chief ( ) Pullach   
FROM Chief, EE

SUBJECT { GENERAL ( )  
          SPECIFIC WILLI HOETTL

INFO: VIEN  
      SALZ

REF: ( )

Headquarters files reflect no current information of  
General Karl von KREMPER or wife.

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

Distribution:  
3 - Pullach (DIRECT)  
2 - Frankfurt  
1 - Vienna  
1 - Salzburg  
1 - EE  
2 - EE/FIG/Z

EK: bw  
22 April 1954

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

(Relaying office)  
EE

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)  
EE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CLASSIFICATION


201-9060  
FORM NO. 51-29  
JUN 1949

- (A) Privacy
- (B) Methods/Sources
- (C) Foreign Relations

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2000

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000



TO : Chief, EE

FROM : Chief ( ) Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL— ( )

SPECIFIC— Information on Otto JOHN Case

DATE: 10. Sep. 1954

INFO: COM  
Vienna  
POB

1. Transmitted herewith in German original is [ ] dated 10 August 1954, which contains information on the alleged connections between Dr. JOHN and one Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, born 19 March 1915 in Vienna. According to the report HOETTL lived in Alt-Ausee, Austria, and uses the cover name Walter HAGEN. HAGEN was allegedly a CIC agent from 1945 until 1949, and during the war a member of the SS and SD.

2. ( ) admitted that the source of this material is Karl KUEHN, who is reported on in ( ) stated that despite the fact that KUBARK is not interested in KUEHN, felt that we should have this information. From what we know here of KUEHN's past connections we feel that the reliability of the attached information is poor.

*Heinz*  
*This copy applied the first of the attached info to the file. Can't be used B-2.*

3. The following persons are mentioned in the report as having direct or indirect connection with HOETTL:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| a. Dr. Rudolf ROESSLER                   | k. Capt. Maurice BLONDELL, Bregenz [ ]      |
| b. Dr. Xaver SCHNIEPER                   | l. Baron (fnu) BERCHEM, Paris               |
| c. Fritz WESTEN                          | m. (fnu) GAMOTTA                            |
| d. Dr. Anton BOEHM, Salzburg - <i>no</i> | n. Albrecht GALSINKLER -                    |
| e. Otto von BOLSCHWING                   | o. Alois RENNERT, Aussee                    |
| f. Univ-Prof. Taras BORODAJKIEWITSCH     | p. Alois EDER                               |
| g. Baron Harry MAST                      | q. Dr. (fnu) SLAVIK (of the Nationale Liga) |
| i. Edith BERNDT, Linz                    | r. Carlheinz Von FORMER                     |
| j. Dr. (fnu) SCHOTT, Ulm                 | s. (fnu) BOGDAN-CONSTANTINESCU              |

Attachment  
As Indicated

3 September 1954

- Distribution
- 3 - EE w/latt DIRECT
  - 3 - COM w/l att
  - 2 - Vien w/l att THRU: COM
  - 1 - POB w/l att (DIRECT)
  - 2 - MOB w/l att

KPT  
MICROFILMED  
JUL 11 1954  
DOC. MICRO. SER.

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1949

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DATE : 16 DEC 54

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH

CLASS : ( )

INFO : ( )

*see page 2 - 3*

PULL ( )

1509Z 16 DEC 54

ROUTINE  
PRECEDENCE

TO: (PRIORITY) SMUNI

INFO: DIR, SFRAN

CITE: SPULL

( )

FROM: MUMI ( )

1. NO POS KNOWLEDGE RECENT ACTIVITIES (DR) GEORG MERGL.  
 AGE 45. DESCRIPTION NOT AVAILABLE.

2. MERGL'S SUPERIOR IS KURT MÜNER, 179 C MAKE (5 FEET 10 INCHES),  
 BLUE EYES, MUSCULAR BUILD, FAIR COMPLEXION, BLOND, AGE 40.

3. NO TRACES MANIFEST NAMES WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION  
 PSCHIKRIL. ON 25 MAR 53 [ ] LETTER TO (DR) WILHELM WETTL  
 FROM RODERICH PSCHIKRIL, ANZENGRUBERSTR 16, STUTTGART, INDICATED  
 PSCHIKRIL HAD STAYED IN MUNICH WHERE MET (FNU) <sup>Wend</sup> KAI, WHO ATTEMPTING  
 BLACKMAIL HIM.

4. ADVISE IF ZIPPER CHECK DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2000

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE Copy No.

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b):
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO. [ ]	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT 13 February 1955	ANALYST
SUBJECT Alois EDER Alois EDER, RIS Agent			DATE 16 FEB 1955
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
<p>...Willi HOETTL visited EDER in Linz, apparently in November 1954. During this meeting, HOETTL allegedly informed EDER that he is active again in the intelligence field and allegedly asked EDER if he, EDER, could arrange for him a direct contact with the Soviets. EDER allegedly replied that he has a Soviet contact which was arranged for him by a Linz contact, and that he would inquire into the possibility of arranging such a contact for HOETTL."</p>			
<p><b>NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT</b> 2000</p> <p><b>CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS</b> <b>RELEASE AS SANITIZED</b> 2000</p>			
<p>EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)</p> <p>(2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>(2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/></p>			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. [ ]



VIA: COURIER

DISPATCH J.

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

NOV  
28 MAY 56  
23 SEP 1955

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : Chief, Pullach

INFO: COS

SUBJECT: GENERAL - /ZIPPER

SPECIFIC - Frans Josef Ritter von Hentschel von GILGENHEIM

REF : *Handwritten notes: ... 10 ... 16 ...*

1. According to ZIPPER who was queried on Subject, von GILGENHEIM is a former lieutenant colonel residing at Munich 19, Laspadiusstr. 12/II. According to a 1952 report he is the second chairman of the "Gesellschaft fuer Politik". In a December 1953 report Subject sent out invitations for a meeting of the "Tafelrunde" on 7 December 1953 at which (Dr) Hjalmar SCHMIDT would speak. Finally in a ZIPPER report of May 1954, Subject is reported active for the firm RAYTROPA which has offices in Rome, Cairo, Munich, Paris and Dusseldorf. RAYTROPA is in contact with the firm WITTE & Co., Munich 13, Turkenstr. which is engaged in wholesale exports to the south. Subject is believed to have functioned as a courier between Rome, Paris and Munich for the firm SOLLER & BECKER, transport agents, Munich, Schwanthalerstr. 10a. Subject is a personal friend of Hermann SCHLEIER (born 2 April 1910 and residing Kricheldorf a.d. Kraas, Austria) who pretends to be a lawyer but really is not.

2. ZIPPER states that Subject is not and never has been in contact with them and they have no information of a connection by Subject with STEINER, KREUSMAYR, or FREYBORN. ZIPPER has no further information on Hermann WITTLER or the above named firms.

3. The above information is from ZIPPER Headquarters' files in response to a routine IOB name trace. IOB received no response to the question put to ZIPPER with this trace request that Subject might possibly be using ZIPPER as cover for activities on behalf of Wilhelm ROETTL in view of the fact that KREUSMAYR and FREYBORN are old contacts of ROETTL. Actually ZIPPER's name trace section is in no position to answer such a question, but this makes interesting speculation. IOB does not intend to pursue the matter further unless Headquarters indicates otherwise. Any further information on Subject's activities would, of course, be welcomed here. Please note the corrected spelling of Subject's surname with an "H" instead of "R".

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

Approved by:

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Distribution:  
3 - EE (DIRECT)  
3 - COS

22 September 1955

FORM NO. 51-28A  
MAR. 1953

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

~~SECRET~~  
(WHEN FILLED IN)

D 75

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET / 0121 25084 0121

INSTRUCTIONS: Use officer designations in the "TO" column. Number each comment to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Draw a line across the sheet under each comment. Each officer should date and initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record sheet should NOT be removed from the attached RECORD document.

FROM: RI/AIN

DOCUMENT NUMBER [ ]

DOCUMENT DATE: 30 Jan 1957

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED	
1. EE/REG 2000 K			18 FEB 1957	ES
2. [ ]				
3. EE/A-H 9/17/				JW
4. [ ]				
5. NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2000				
6. [ ]				
7. CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS				
8. RELEASE AS SANITIZED 2000				
9. EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)				
10. (2)(A) Privacy <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods/Sources <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations <input type="checkbox"/>				
11. [ ]				
12. [ ]				
13. [ ]				
14. RI/RI				

COMMENTS: NOTE: If a copy or attachments are removed from the attached document, note the location of the copy and/or attachment hereon. If this RECORD COPY is to be retained in the files at the Desk, call the Central File Section for permanent loan.

1cc w/att - chms  
please include in  
journals  
CALL RESEARCH ARCHIVES, EXT. 2471  
FOR ATTACHMENTS. CIA RECORDS  
CENTER JOB NO. 59-154  
4/9

**BULKY**

stored in brown box in aisle 3 by air conditioner

FILE TITLE: Hoettl, Wilhelm (SR)  
pv

FILE NUMBER

ENCLOSURE: [ ]  
DATE PROCESSED: 14 FEB 1957  
ASSTRACT:   
INDEX:

~~SECRET~~

VIA AIR  
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. [ ]

~~SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE 30 January 1957

FROM : [ ]

INFO: COS [ ]

SUBJECT { GENERAL - [ ]  
SPECIFIC - Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL, Born 19 March 1915, Vienna, Austria

1. Transmitted herewith for incorporation in Subject's 201 File are documents from [ ] and [ ] files. There is no indication that copies of these documents, listed below, were ever forwarded to Washington:

- ( [ ] ), 18 November 1953
- [ ] Report, 29 April 52
- [ ] Report, undated
- [ ] , 17 Sept 53
- Der Spiegel Article, 22 Apr 53
- [ ] 31 March 53 w/att.
- [ ] , 18 March 53
- [ ] 16 May 52 w/att.
- Letter to Ottmar KATZ, [ ]
- [ ] Linz, 3 April 1952
- [ ] 7 April 52
- [ ] 1 April 52
- [ ] 1 April 52
- [ ] 9 March 52
- [ ] 3 June 51
- [ ] 13 June 51
- [ ] 6 June 51
- [ ] , 23 May 51
- Extract from ( )
- CIC Reports ( ) , 29 Feb 52; ( ) , 27 March 52;
- ( ) , 15 May 53;
- 25 May 53; 28 Jan 54

- Att. to ( ) , 1 Feb 53
- Draft Press Release, 3 April 53
- Photostat of Reisepass
- Photostat "Komplex Dr. Willi HOETTL"
- ( ) 9 April 53
- Informal Memo from POB, 24 Mar 1953
- ( ) , 22 Dec 52
- ( ) , 11 Dec 52
- ( ) , 29 Apr 52
- ( ) , 4 April 52
- ( ) , 18 Mar 52
- ( ) , 7 March 52
- ( ) , 23 July 51
- ( ) , 12 July 51
- ( ) , 18 June 51
- ( ) , 12 June 51
- ( ) , 23 May 51
- ( ) , 16 May 51

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[ ] 4  
Page 2 of 2

2. For the record, the following documents on this case, which have been destroyed by [ ] are available to Washington:

[ ]

( )  
[ ]

Distribution:

- 3 - EE, w/atts. as noted above
- 2 - COS [ ] w/o atts.
- 2 - [ ]

drp

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[ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
(2)(A) Privacy   
(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

DECLASSIFIED  
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure  
PL105-246

By: *[Signature]* Date: *[Date]*

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*[Handwritten: Second Review CTR]*

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Summary of Information (AR 381-131) DATE: 21 June 1960

PREPARING OFFICE: CENTRAL RECORDS FACILITY, USAINTC, Ft Holabird, Baltimore 19, Maryland

SUBJECT: HOETTL, Willy  
AKA: HOETTL, Willi  
o Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl  
  
*X9 02 1453*

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE . . . . . A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES: 1
USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . B	PROBABLY TRUE . . . . . 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE . . . . . C	POSSIBLY TRUE . . . . . 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE . . . . . D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE . . . . . 4
UNRELIABLE . . . . . E	IMPROBABLE . . . . . 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN . . . . . F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(S) A check of the files of CRFUSAINTC Supplemental Topical Section revealed the following references to a Dr Wilhelm Hoettl and a Wilhelm Hoettl, who may or may not be SUBJECT of your request:

a. Case Report, 66th CIC Detachment, file number D284948, subject, Intelligence Apparatus of Blank Office, dated 29 May 1952, stated substantially that Dr Wilhelm Hoettl, an Austrian national, was reported to be one of the chief agents of the Blank Office Intelligence Apparatus and was alleged to have excellent intelligence connections in Hungary and Romania. Hoettl developed a press clipping service which was devoted to gathering items from Balkan and Soviet satellite newspapers and other publications which Hoettl believed to contain considerable hidden intelligence information. Hoettl published a book prior to 1952 which dealt with German intelligence during the Hitler regime, using the alias of Walter Hagen. (unevaluated)

b. Agent Report, 430th CIC Detachment, file number L/26533, subject, West German Intelligence Operatives Active in Austria, dated 16 July 1952, listed one Wilhelm Hoettl, who was alleged to be working for the West German Intelligence Agency Blank. It was rumored that Hoettl maintained contact with the Russians. (C-6)

c. Agent Report, 430th CIC Detachment, file number L/28385, subject, Institut fuer Gegenwartsforschung, dated 15 May 1953, stated substantially that Dr Wilhelm Hoettl had intelligence liaison with Alis Eder, an independent writer and alleged intelligence agent. Eder allegedly posted a letter on 1 April 1953 to Dr Gerhard Lerner, a Vienna newspaper man, in which Eder stated that Hoettl had been arrested by the Americans. The letter requested Lerner to ascertain how closely Hoettl had been associated with Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber who had recently been arrested for furnishing intelligence information to the Soviets. Eder reportedly feared the letter had been intercepted by the Soviets. Eder reportedly suspected that Hoettl may have compromised some of his (Eder's) sources to the Soviets. (F-6)

d. Agent Report, 430th CIC Detachment, file number L/29633, subject, Alleged "Left-Wing" Intelligence Organization Lands Upper Lands Upper Austria and Styria Districts Gmunden and Liezen, dated 19 November 1953, listed one Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl of the German Intelligence Service as reportedly being under very close surveillance by KZ Verband operatives. (The KZ Verband is the Austrian branch of the International Federation of Resistance Fighters, a Communist front) KZ Verband operatives believed Hoettl was working for British Intelligence. Hoettl allegedly received 18,000 shillings from the British for intelligence work. (C-6)

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IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED**

THIS REPORT CONTAINS "RAW" INFORMATION WHICH HAS NOT RECEIVED DEPARTMENTAL OR MAJOR COMMAND EVALUATION.

THE PROVISIONS OF PAR 5 & 7, AR 381-131

DISTRIBUTION - CRF dossier

"Only information derived from Army sources is included in the above summary." (Par 490 (2) SR 381-131 (1))

DA FORM 568 (Formerly DA AGO)

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 568, 1 JUN 47, WHICH IS OBSOLETE  
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GPO 818504

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
TO INFO	Chief COS/		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM	Chief, EE		DATE 27 JUL 1960
SUBJECT	WALLI HOSTIL Arrest	<u>KUMARK ONLY</u>	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED	See paragraph 2 below.		MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/>
REFERENCE(S)			NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
			INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

1. The attached paragraph from a report of a conversation between the [ ] Reports Officer and [ ] officer, is thoroughly inexplicable to us here. We were not aware of HOSTIL's arrest, nor of a FECHNER who was involved. The tidbit about [ ] implication is fascinating but equally confusing. Since [ ] may have been "fishing" and since he is not our [ ] for [ ], it does not seem advisable to query [ ] through this channel. To place a query with the proper people would blow the case up out of all proportion to its significance.

2. Therefore, we suggest that [ ] tell us what they know about the HOSTIL arrest and advise [ ] and Headquarters. If [ ], without recourse to [ ] knows the full details we need query no more. On the other hand, out of curiosity, if nothing else, [ ] and [ ] may wish to get together as to how to uncover the details.

[ ]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

22 July 1960

Attachment: As Stated

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- 1 - EI [ ] chrono

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2000

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 (2)(A) Privacy   
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources   
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

[ ]  
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ATTACHMENT TO

27 JUL 1960

EXTRACT FROM CONTACT REPORT OF MEETING 27 MAY 1960

BETWEEN: [ ] and [ ] Reports Officer

"4. Arrest of Willy HOETTL and FECHNER in Lins: In a follow-up to what he had told [ ] earlier about the arrest in Lins of Willy HOETTL and Fechner, [ ] said that they had both been held for a day or so and that the case had still not been fully clarified, at least as far as [ ] knew. The examination had shown that FECHNER was passing HOETTL intelligence on Yugoslavia and Albania which he had received from one ROSSMANNITH. (Comment: To the best of [ ]'s recollection, is in the [ ] and is involved with the [ ] asked [ ] if they knew why FECHNER should be passing such intelligence to HOETTL and whether HOETTL was representing someone else. [ ] said [ ] had no idea, but speculated that FECHNER might have been making use of HOETTL's area knowledge of southeastern Europe in the evaluation of intelligence. [ ] agreed that this sounded reasonable, since HOETTL does know the Balkan area very well."

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000-

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)  
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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

SECRET

<b>DISPATCH</b>		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.
TO	C/RES; COS	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM	Chief	DATE
SUBJECT	Willi HOETTL Arrest	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
ACTION REQUIRED	Please bring [ ] Station up to date on this matter.	MARKED FOR INDEXING
		<del>NO INDEXING REQUIRED</del> 961
		INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)  
[ ] 27 July 1960

1. We have read reference with interest and request that [ ] forward to us a copy of any earlier [ ] comments on the alleged arrest of Willi HOETTL and Kurt FECHNER in Liss. To date we have not had an opportunity to make inquiries since the officers concerned are out of town on vacation. As you know, we are in close contact with both of the men concerned and up until 1 August neither of them had even mentioned the name of Willi HOETTL. First reaction to the story described in reference is that it is fantastic.

2. However, we are prepared to investigate it further but would prefer to have the full story from the beginning from [ ]

EXEMPTIONS Section 3 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 (2)(A) Privacy  2000  
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources   
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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 1 - [ ]  
 1 - COS, [ ]  
 1 - Reg  
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21 MAR 61

MAGYAR NEMZET, No. 44, February 21, 1961.

Feb. 21, 1961.

Dr. Höttl, an Accomplice of Eichmann's in Committing Criminal Acts in Hungary, is "Hiding" in Austria

Eichmann's testimony will cause much worry not only to the Nazis who are in the limelight, but also to those who cautiously stay in the background; though take an active part in the tangling up of the torn network of the fascist plot. The importance of the Eichmann trial is not negligible from the point of view that it may direct the world's attention on the Nazis in hiding and their relations with various government organs.

In Hungary the Hungarian references of the Eichmann case are being collected and worked up. The bloody events had many participants who succeeded in getting away with impunity and today too they play an active part in the public life of West Germany, Austria and other Western countries.

One of the most sinister figures active here in Hungary was Dr. Georg Wilhelm Höttl, Sturmbannführer. He did not have to pay for his criminal deeds. His activity in Hungary was mentioned at the Nuremberg Trial, as he took an active part in the preparations for Hungary's occupation by the Nazis and cooperated with Eichmann in the deportation of Hungarian Jews. He was one of the main supporters of Szálasi, as he was dissatisfied with the "cautious conduct" of the Horthy set.

Eichmann, Novak, Höttl and many other Nazi leaders who committed excesses in Hungary were of Austrian origin. We do not want to deduct any conclusions from this fact, still it belongs to the general picture. While Dr. Höttl was described by Winckelmann as excessively ferocious in his dealings in Hungary, this did not prevent him from building up relations with Allen Dulles, the American espionage boss, then staying in Switzerland. This shows not only Höttl's foresight, but also A. Dulles's flexibility.

The Budapest Municipal Court issued a warrant against Höttl and the Hungarian authorities made steps in Austria to have him extradited. These have so far remained unsuccessful, although the extradition request contains his whereabouts: Altaussee-Pusen 38, Austria.

The judicial organs under the leadership of the Austrian social democrats seem to be rather difficult in these matters. Though, this is not so in all cases. For instance, Novak was caught in 24 hours after the warrant issued against him by the West-German authorities. Is it possible that West-German is better understood in Austria than our language? Of course, their clumsiness may have other reasons as well.

We do not believe it is in Austria's interest that this impression should spread in the world's public opinion.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

( Short summary )

2000

GIA-SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

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2000

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

[ ]  
3 March 1961

Wilhelm Hoettl

EXTRADITION DEMAND: According to independent "Die Presse" and other papers of Feb. 22, Hungary officially requested the extradition of former SS major Wilhelm Hoettl as a war criminal. Hoettl is now living in Bad Aussee as administrative director of a private high school, the papers report. "Die Presse" says that Hoettl is charged by Hungary with the mass arrest of Hungarian resistance fighters in 1944, but adds that no proof has yet been submitted. The paper also discloses that Hoettl published several books on the Nazi era after the war under the pseudonym of Walter Hagen. — Communist "Volksstimme" of Feb. 22 complains about the promotion of a Vienna police official who allegedly was a Gestapo member and convicted as a war criminal in France after the war.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

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[ ]

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2000

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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2000

FROM FBIS  
DAILY REPORT  
MIDDLE EAST  
AFRICA  
WEST EUROPE  
15 MAY 1961

A U S T R I A

15 May 1961

AUSTRIAN NAZI LINKED TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE

Review of Austrian Press and Radio for 13-15 May--A

(Editorial Report) The Vienna press gives prominent coverage to the arrest of an Austrian whose name was mentioned at the Eichmann trial in connection with the assassination of Jews in Vilna. The man, Franz Murer, from Gaishorn in Upper Styria, was reportedly arrested 12 May and imprisoned in Graz.

The press reports that the news of Murer's arrest caused several hundred inhabitants of Gaishorn to stage a demonstration. This action is condemned by the Socialist ARBEITER-ZEITUNG, which contrasts the sympathy shown for a man who is suspected of the murder of some 80,000 Jews with the wartime efforts of the populations of Holland, Denmark, and Norway to save Jews from deportation. According to the press, the Gaishorn demonstrators acted under the erroneous assumption that Murer had been abducted by Israeli intelligence agents.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG runs the first installment of a special report on the case of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, a former high-ranking official in the "SS-Reichssicherheitshauptamt" who testified about Eichmann at the Nuremberg trial and now lives in Altaussee, Styria, as the principal of a private high school. Describing Hoettl as "a world champion in surviving" the collapse of the Nazi regime which he had supported, the socialist paper says it helped a lot that he established contact with an Austrian resistance group and the Central Intelligence Agency shortly before the end of the war. The paper claims that Hoettl later worked for the Americans as an informer and "had considerable dollar earnings." The paper finds it indicative that one of Eichmann's two sons, Horst Eichmann, is said to have called on Hoettl a few months ago to raise funds for his father's defense.

The people's party NEUE TAGESZEITUNG UND DAS KLEINE VOLKSBLATT report a planned amendment of the Italian citizenship law that would enable the Italian authorities to deport undesirable members of the South Tyrolean minority "under threadbare pretexts." TAGESZEITUNG reports that the amendment provides for a repeal of the renaturalization of those South Tyroleans who opted for Germany in 1939 but returned to South Tyrol after the war. If such a person commits "actions incompatible with the duties of loyalty to the Italian republic and its institutions, his Italian citizenship can be annulled by a decree of the Italian president upon suggestion of the minister of the interior, the planned amendment reportedly states.

NWC-001754

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		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE		
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION	
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

#### PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.  
 HOETTL, WILHELM /DR/ [ ]  
 SEX M DOB 19 MAR 15 [ ]  
 AUSTRIA, ALTAUSSEE [ ]  
 CIT ? [ ]  
 OCC ? [ ]  
 TARGET OF [ ] FOR-  
 MER COLLEAGUE IN AUSTRIAN STATE SECURITY [ ]  
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 OR RUSSIAN.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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NWC-001758

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		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION			
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PERTINENT INFORMATION			
14.			

HOETTL, WILHELM /DR./  
 SEX M DOB 19 MAR 15  
 AUSTRIA, VIENNA  
 CIT ?  
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E E }  
 20 MAY 63  
 PI

PAFR - 1516572

GERMAN LANGUAGE RAW REPORT ATTACHED  
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 2000

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NWC(17-00) = 001754

15 NOV 63

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# DISPATCH

TO: Chief of Station, [ ]

FROM: Chief, EE

SUBJECT: Suspected RIS Network in the Linz Area

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/ Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT 2000

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

See Paragraph 1

- A. [ ] 4 October 1963
- B. [ ] 8 November 1963
- C. [ ] 15 November 1963

1. Pursuant to your follow-up of the 513th's initial disclosures concerning what it believes to be an RIS network operating in and/or through the Linz area, we shall welcome early receipt of a copy of the report Lt. Col. TIPA promised to furnish COS per reference B. As you will appreciate, we share your interest in obtaining sufficient details concerning the network, its known and suspected members and the efforts to date mounted against it by whatever Austrian security elements are involved to permit a professional assessment as to just what--if anything--it is that the Austrians really have here. From the admittedly skeletal information on the network provided to date, it sounded like something out of the immediate postwar era. Indeed, if the network actually does exist and is being run by the RIS as an authentic intelligence mechanism, it probably grew out of the known intensive efforts to build such mechanisms the Soviets undertook during the occupation of Austria. One can safely assume the Soviets have not dropped agents recruited during those years whom it still finds of any use. We shall solicit more detailed comments from the competent Headquarters elements after the 513th's detailed reporting has been received here.

2. The question of RIS "old timer" agents brings to mind the name of the redoubtable Willi HOETTL, long active in Linz and Salzburg and equally long suspected of being an RIS agent. [ ] has confirmed that HOETTL was in fact a Soviet agent of long standing; presumably he is still active. HOETTL turned out to be identical with the Soviet agent whom [ ] knew only as

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*See next page*

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 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act  
 PL 100-240

CONTINUATION OF  
DESPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DESPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

"CHEKA," describing him as the highest-paid RIB agent he knew of ( ) vis-a-vis "CHEKIN" was limited to making the arrangements for meetings in Vienna between him and his case officer). We plan to tackle the voluminous files available here on NCATTIL in an effort to provide you a useful summary of KUBARK's knowledge about him.

3. We trust an equity for KUBARK in this connection will eventually be found as the result of the 513th's further revelations of its knowledge about the alleged network in LAM. For future reference, we should like to draw your attention to the fact that the Headquarters traces you have received in Reference C reflect close to three weeks' work on the part of one of the Branch's experienced IAs. This is not intended as an indirect complaint. We do and unquestionably should accept the tracing requirements levied on us by the Station as entirely our proper function. Nonetheless, a simple truth is that our manpower is not unlimited, and extensive tracing performed within the [ ] context can only be carried out to some extent at the cost of timeliness in our tracing of other names of direct, unilateral interest to the Station.

[ ]

*see next  
page*

# DISPATCH

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## PROCESSING ACTION

TO	Chief, EE	XX	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO	Chief, SR; COS, [ ]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	[ ]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	[ ]		MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action required: As indicated.

Reference: [ ] 6 Dec. 63, paragraph 2 (6. . . . .)

PRIORITY

As Headquarters can well imagine, we were intrigued to read in reference the statement that [ ] has confirmed that Subject was in fact a Soviet agent of long standing. The nature of the statement is in stark stark contrast to the fact that this was news to us

[ ]

Distribution:

2-EE ✓  
2-[ ]  
2-SR

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	[ ]-5929	7 January 1964
	CLASSIFICATION	MCS FILE NUMBER
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

24 ~~SECRET~~

ROUTING			
1	G	4	CC
2	VH-G	5	CC
3	SH	6	CC

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : [ ] [ ]

ACTION: [ ] [ ]

INFO [ ] [ ]

*Handwritten notes:*  
WAB CM  
1 CC  
m-000

~~SECRET~~ 161552Z

DIR INFO [ ] [ ]

CITE [ ] [ ]

16 JAN 64 11 99951

REF DIR [ ] [ ]

ALIAS NAKOSCHIRI OR SANITZER ALIAS MUELLERS

1. [ ] ALIAS NAKOSCHIRI OR WAHLBACH. WAHLBACH.

2. HOETTL LIVING ALT AUSSEE, STYRIA. IN REPLY [ ] QUERY

SUMMER 63 LOCAL SCHOOL PRINCIPAL STATED HOETTL STILL ACTIVE AS DIRECTOR PRIVATE BOYS SCHOOL. DURING FALL 63 HOETTL APPEARED AUSTRIAN TV IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL AUSTRIAN SEARCH FOR NAZI DOCUMENTS OR TREASURES ALLEGEDLY SUNK IN TOPLITZ LAKE.

CONFIRMS SANITZER DIED VIENNA HOSPITAL 57.

WILL OBTAIN COPIES OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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WIENER KURIER  
17 FEB. 64

LOKALES

## Mit 15 Mill. S in Konkurs Privatschule geschlossen

Bad Aussee (Eigenbericht). Mit fast 15 Millionen Schilling ist kürzlich der Besitzer der Privatschule von Bad Aussee, der ehemalige SS-Sturmbannführer und Geheimagent Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, in Konkurs gegangen. Dr. Höttl hatte jahrelang vergeblich versucht, das Öffentlichkeitsrecht für seine Schule und damit auch staatliche Subventionen zu erreichen.

Der in der letzten Zeit immer stärker werdende Schülermangel, nur 132 Gymnasiasten und 28 Handelsschüler waren eingeschrieben, hat den Schulleiter nun endgültig ruiniert: Die Gebäude seiner Schule besitzen nämlich eine tatsächliche Aufnahmekapazität für etwas mehr als 400 Schüler. In den letzten Jahren konnte den Schülern zwar alles für die Reifeprüfung nötige Wissen vermittelt werden, die Matura selbst aber mußten sie an anderen Schulen unter Aufsicht anderer Professoren ablegen.

Mit Neubauten unter Aufwand großer finanzieller Mittel versuchte Dr. Höttl vor allem im letzten Jahr, die Erlangung des Öffentlichkeitsrechtes durchzudrücken. Es gelang ihm nicht und - zurück blieben 15 Millionen Schilling Schulden. Die Schulanlagen selbst wurden auf acht-einhalb Millionen Schilling geschätzt. Dr. Höttls Gläubiger haben das Nachsehen.

Die Marktgemeinde Bad Aussee hat nun, um die derzeit die Anstalt besuchenden Schüler nicht zu schädigen, die vorübergehende Übernahme der Schule verfügt. Das Land Oberösterreich wird zumindest bis Schluß monatlich eine Subvention von 40.000 Schilling beisteuern. Der Lehrkörper der Schule soll beibehalten werden.

Noch fraglich ist, ob die Anstalt im Herbst wieder ihre Pforten öffnen wird. Dies hängt einzig und allein vom Entscheid der Landesregierung und des Unterrichtsministeriums ab. Wenn diese Be-

hörden der Schule das Öffentlichkeitsrecht verleihen, soll sie unter der Patronanz der Marktgemeinde weitergeführt werden.

Ex-Schulbesitzer Dr. Höttl dürfte jedoch trotz des Verlustes seiner Anstalt kein armer Mann werden. Die Tantiemen für seine Kriegsbücher, unter ihnen auch jenes über das „Unternehmen Bernhard“ - die Versenkung der gefälschten NS-Pfundnoten im Toplitzsee -, werden ihn auf jeden Fall für die nächste Zeit „über Wasser“ halten. Dr. Höttl will, so hört man, in der nächsten Zeit noch weitere Bücher schreiben und auch als Berater für Spionage- und Kriegsfilm tätig sein.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL  
2000

1000-00141

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	PROCESSING ACTION
TO Chief, EE			<input type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED <input type="checkbox"/> ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> MICROFILM
INFO Chief SR: [ ]			
FROM Chief [ ]			
SUBJECT ① Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl			
ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES			
Action Required: See Paragraph 2			
<p>1. For whatever interest it be to Headquarters, we are forwarding herewith an article on Subject which appeared in the <u>Kurier</u> on 17 February 1964 about the bankruptcy of Subject's private school in Bad Aussee. The article is submitted because of the interest expressed in a Headquarters dispatch [ ] (6 December 1963) in reactivating some interest in Subject because of ( ) (identification of him as the person whom ( ) had described as "the highest paid Soviet agent he knew of".</p> <p>2. In view of Headquarters expressed interest in Subject and in view of the distinct possibility of using [ ] to collect information on Subject, we would appreciate being advised as to the extent of Headquarters interest in Subject and whether, based on ( ) and ( ) information, Headquarters wants us to undertake any investigative action. Please reply Info: [ ]</p>			
Attachment Newspaper Clipping, herewith		[ ] <b>CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS</b> <b>RELEASE AS SANITIZED</b> 2000	
Distribution: 2-EE w/1 cy att 2-SR w/1 cy att 2- [ ] w/1 cy att		EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b) <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(A) Privacy <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (2)(B) Methods Sources <input type="checkbox"/> (2)(G) Foreign Relations	
( ) If Hoettl has ever been a highly paid Soviet agent, then he managed to defraud the RIS along with his other employers. I would advise strongly against wasting our time on Hoettl who could not be cornered or controlled under more favorable circumstances than prevail today. Any investigation of Hoettl will be inconclusive and unproductive.			
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [ ]	DATE 28 February 1964
		CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	HQS FILE NUMBER Unknown [ ]

**DISPATCH**

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSING ACTION

TO Chief of Station, [ ]	X	MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO [ ]		NO INDEXING REQUIRED ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief, EE		
SUBJECT Dr. Wilhelm HOETTL		MICROFILM

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE  
2000

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

As suggested

REFERENCE: [ ] 28 February 1964

1. We subscribe wholeheartedly to ACOS comments in the reference. After mentioning Willi HOETTL in [ ] 6 December 1963, we reviewed the file material on HOETTL, and traced him in RI. The files extend into four volumes, plus several pounds of integrated CIC reporting. RI returned the trace request with 85 pages of card references. Analysis here would clearly be a job of weeks. Like ACOS, we doubt that the results could be used productively against HOETTL. It makes much better sense to continue to work on persons and situations susceptible to KUBARK manipulation and exploitation. Willi HOETTL probably is not. And if he were, we doubt that the results would be worth the effort.

2. Of whatever interest it may be, we forward herewith the text of the fleeting [ ] reference to HOETTL during [ ] interrogation by [ ] [ ] was interested in Dr. Siegfried ZIEGLER, [ ] Identity. The [ ] contain no earlier information on HOETTL, despite the comment at the bottom of page 7 about mention of HOETTL the previous day.

3. Now we shall enter the HOETTL file once more, perhaps this time permanently.

Attachments;

- A. Interrogation Text HERewith
- B. Identity Sheet UNDER SEPARATE COVER

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Distribution:

- 3 - COS. [ ] W/Att A H/W, Att B USC
- 1 - [ ] W/O Att A, W/Att B USC

2000

Group 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification.

- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
  - (2)(B) Methods/Sources
  - (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER [ ] GS CC	DATE 18 MAR 1964
	CLASSIFICATION <del>SECRET</del>	10 March 1964
		MOS FILE NUMBER [ ]

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OS Distribution: ✓ x p RIDA/EA 201 [ ]	OFFICE EE [ ] [ ] [ ]	4411
	COORDINATING	

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- 1 - [ ] W/O Att A, W/Att B USC

*See Previous Page*

Group 1

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HEREWITH ATTACHMENT TO

[ ] could  
be far

A Yes. They consider that many of them are being used by intelligence.

F Sort of a basis to work from?

A Like philatelists.

M Yes, that's a typical circle of people.

F So really Esperanto is one of the targets or main basis of -

A Oh, not main basis. They usually are interested and it was many years.

F Now this fellow has another significant point in his life. He is, I should say, strongly connected with one of the parties in our country, with the SPD, with the Social Party of Germany. And he's sort of a go-between of our organization and the Social Democratic Party of Western Germany.

Unfortunately I have no picture of him here but it shouldn't mean very much to you.

A For me enough his background.

F It's a very sad face. Sad face with a small mustache.

A For me it's important background, not face.

F Yes, for you much more important is the background and -

A Yes, all these things which you tell but I want to read them.

F He was very active in the Balkans during the war and he had during the war and later on, and there is no doubt, contact to WAGNER-DEBIUS who I mentioned yesterday. And to HOETTL whom you recollected yesterday and, if I am right, your idea is that HOETTL was connected with the K in

[ ] - 10/10  
10/10/10

agent under the name of CZECH or CHESH.

A CZECH or maybe his cryptonym HAGER or maybe even somebody else.

I mean it means that circle. When he have been in Czechoslovakia,  
HOETTL, during the war ?

F HOETTL ? Yes. Sometimes.

A It could give them maybe grounds to call him CZECH.

F HOETTL, as far as I know has not been stationed mainly in Czechoslovakia,  
but in Austria. Austria was his base.

A I mean Austria-Hungary. He, it seems to be, old person.

F Yes. Now -

M You gave information on CZECH very early I remember, didn't you ? Only  
you said -

A I don't recall now whether I told before or not. Could.

M It must have been to you a well-known cryptonym.

A Oh yes, I knew that there was a CZECH but I am not sure that his name is  
HOETTL. You see there was a group of agents.

M Well it was only a calculation more or less that HOETTL and CZECH are  
identical.

A Might be very close, but of course I am not sure 100%.

F Did somebody ever give you a picture of HOETTL and his -

A I read his file at that time.

[ ] cont'd  
18 Jan 63

F You read the file already. Yes.

M Did you come over his book?

A No.

M Or did you hear about him in connection with the EICHMANN trial in Jerusalem?

A No, I don't think so.

F Well, this fellow we are talking about and his name is ZIEGLER,

Dr. ZIEGLER. And one of his cover names is Dr. KOENIG, like king.

He was in the older times himself a case officer and he had some sources in East Berlin. It was a couple.

A Before the war?

F No, no, after. It was in the years of 1951-52. And this couple lived in East Berlin and in West Berlin. They were engaged, not yet married. And they got arrested under very suspicious circumstances. We never found out really why.

R Lr '55-56?

F Yes.

A That's interesting.

F These sources were radio operators. So maybe you can have heard of this fellow under entirely different points of view: being a source of positive intelligence in the political field. You remember he has very strong



~~SECRET~~

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT

TO: [ ]

IDENTITY SHEET

IDENTITY - A [ ]', now under [ ] There is  
no additional information currently available at Headquarters  
on his possible connection with HONNITL.

~~SECRET~~

( )

Volksstimme, Vienna (CP newspaper) 28 March 1964

# SS-Höttl gerichtlich angezeigt

Wien, 27. März

Wie wir erfahren, wurde gegen den ehemaligen SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, der in Ungarn wegen Kriegsverbrechen gesucht wird, eine Anzeige wegen fahrlässiger Krifa erstattet. Höttl hatte in Bad Aussee als Hauptbesitzer einer „Maturamühle“ und mehrerer anderer Schulen eine Schuldenlast von rund 15 Millionen aufgeschuldet. Überall, von wo man Geld bekommen konnte, machte er Schulden wie ein SS-Stabsoffizier. Bei der Zentralsparkasse sind es 6,7 Millionen, bei der lokalen Bank machen die Schulden ebenfalls eine erkleckliche Summe aus. Doch auch kleinere Leute -- etwa der Filialleiter einer Lebensmittelfirma -- jammern nun um ihr Geld.

## Die Ausseer Maturamühle

Höttl hatte im Laufe der Jahre drei Schulgebäude gebaut, fünf Internate eingerichtet und umfangreiche Grundstücke gepachtet, vorwiegend mit fremdem Geld. Eine Zeit lang ging alles gut. Höttls Maturaschule florierte, da sie den Ruf genoss, daß dort Schüler maturieren konnten, die in jeder anderen Anstalt wegen Faulheit oder Dummheit durchgefallen. Dann wurde die Sache augenscheinlich doch zu plump. Es gab Anzeigen wegen Maturaschwindels, die Öffentlichkeit wurde auf Höttls Vergangenheit aufmerksam -- er war führender Funktionär im berühmtesten Reichssicherheitshauptamt gewesen --, und

die Behörden mußten einschreiten. Da Höttl aber politisch noch immer ein heißes Eisen ist und noch immer mehr weiß, als manchem geachteten Funktionär zuträglich ist, zog man ihn nicht in Untersuchung wegen Verdachts von Kriegsverbrechen, sondern entzog nur seiner Schule die Maturaberechtigung.

## Der Krach

Das genügte allerdings, um die finanziellen Konstruktionen zum Einsturz zu bringen. Die Zahl der Schüler und damit auch das Schulgeld und die Einkünfte aus den Internaten nahmen ab, die Studenten nahmen weiter zu. Denn noch immer war der Kredit Höttls nicht erschüttert. Jedermann in Aussee wußte zwar, daß Höttls Geschäfte schlecht gingen, aber jedermann war überzeugt, daß Höttls Zahlungsunfähigkeit nur ein Schwindel wäre. Dem Mann, der wußte, wo der „Schatz im Toplitzsee“ lag, und der dabei war, als in den letzten Kriegstagen Goldbarren und Kisten voll Schmuck und Münzen im Ausseerland vergraben wurden -- diesem Mann glaubte man, gefahrlos Geld borgen zu können.

Doch Höttl enttäuschte seine Gläubiger. Anfang dieses Jahres mußte die „Privatmittelschule Bad Aussee Ges. m. b. H.“, deren Hauptgesellschafter er ist, den Ausgleich anmelden. Mindestens zwei Jahre lang hatte sie sich nur mehr mit Schulden über Wasser gehalten. Die Gläubiger, die auf Höttls Privatvermögen bauten, übersahen aller-

dings, daß sie ihr Geld einer Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung borgten, für die Höttl eben nur beschränkt haftet. Falls also Höttl noch irgendwo Geld versteckt oder an seine Frau überschrieben hat, fällt es ihm nicht ein, damit herauszurücken. Das Gericht wird nun allerdings zu überprüfen haben, ob die Schulden, die er in den letzten Jahren auf sein schon verschuldetes und schlecht gehendes Unternehmen machte, nicht schon fahrlässig waren.

## Zwei Meineidsanzeigen

Politisch wird Höttl aber noch immer als „heilige Kuh“ behandelt. Das Auslieferungsbegehren der Ungarn wurde mit der Begründung abgelehnt, daß Höttl als Österreicher nur hier wegen Kriegsverbrechen angeklagt werden könne, und die österreichischen Behörden ließen ihn ungeschoren. Auch ein von der „Volksstimme“ veröffentlichter Beweis dafür, daß Höttl bei der Ausrottung der Wiener Juden seine Hand im Spiel gehabt hatte, wurde von der Staatsanwaltschaft nicht beachtet. Ebenso erging es einem weiteren Beweis dafür, daß er an der „Kristallnacht“ beteiligt war.

Höttl hat sowohl bei seiner Einvernahme im Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozeß als auch bei seiner in Jerusalem verlesenen Zeugenaussage im Eichmann-Prozeß -- Höttl selbst wagte sich ja nicht nach Israel -- unter Eid in Abrede gestellt, daß er je etwas mit dem Referat Eichmann oder mit Judenmorden zu tun hatte. Deshalb wurden nun gegen ihn zwei Meineidsanzeigen erstattet. Diese Anzeigen wanderten den vorgeschriebenen Instanzenweg: Von Aussee nach Leoben, von Leoben nach Graz, von Graz ans Justizministerium und von dort in den Papierkorb. An Höttl, der erst für die Nazispionage und nach dem Krieg für die amerikanische CIA und die westdeutsche Organisation Gehlen arbeitete, an Höttl, der sicherlich noch immer viel auspacken könnte, was vielen sehr peinlich wäre -- an Höttl traut man sich politisch noch immer nicht heran.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
2000

NWC-001761