

Logg / Section - KAWABE ^{Shogo}
(1776) (Masakazu)

⑥

(11)

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W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 996, 16 July 1943 (See AR 380-5).

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT RECEIPT

16-36304-1

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
~~UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC~~
FAR EAST COMMAND
CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.:

Subject: KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu), Internee in Sugamo Prison

Note
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section

Date: 27 MAY 1947

(Attn: Lt Col R. E. Rudisill GB/CIS/OD:TPD/FAF/mk
Investigation Division)

Info Copy To:

IPS

(Attn: Mr. E. P. Monaghan
Investigation Division)

1

1. Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu) (TAB A) shows that he is a career Army officer whose quarter-of-a-century experience in the Army lead to his command of the North and Central China Forces, The Manchurian Army, the Burma Army, and the Central Japan Forces; culminating in his command of the Army Air Forces at the close of hostilities. KAWABE served as Commander of the 1st Army Demobilization Area in the fall of 1945.

2. Evaluation of KAWABE at the time of his arrest in December 1945 reads as per TAB B.

3. Direct and implied accusations against KAWABE in this document (TAB B) are:

a. "KAWABE was detachment commander in North China at the outbreak of the China Incident (Peking)."

b. "In 1939 he became Assistant Inspector of Military Education, after which he was Chief of General Staff of Japanese Army in China."

c. "He was Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army in 1943-1944, in which capacity he issued the declaration of Burmese independence."

d. "When relieved he became Commander-in-Chief of the Central Army Command (Japan), attached to GHQ and eventually CG of the First Reservists Command."

e. "KAWABE should be apprehended for his part in Japanese aggression in China and Burma as well as his activity in Japanese military training and education."

4. The facts that KAWABE was (1) Commander in North China at the outbreak of the China Incident, (2) Assistant Inspector of Military Education in 1939, (3) Chief of General Staff of the Japanese Task Force in China in 1942, (4) Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Theatre Army in 1943-44, and (5) Commander-in-Chief of the Central Japan Army are confirmed by TAB A (Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo) but these facts do not ipso facto constitute basis for war crimes charges. Ipso facto they are merely details in a long series of appointments.

5. It is the belief of G-2 that accusation of responsibility for war crimes should arise from the crime rather than from arrest made on the premise

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GB/CIS/OD: TPD/FAF/mk

1
contd

that some guilt exists and can be established.

6. Unless the IMTFE prosecution has uncovered evidence sufficient for charges of aggressive military action against KAWABE and/or unless there exists evidence of KAWABE's guilt of war atrocities, G-2 recommends that KAWABE be released from internment without preference of charges.

TAB A - Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)

TAB B - Evaluation of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)

Lt. General at the time of arrest

for R.S.B.
C.A.W.

SECRET

KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu), Internee in Sugamo Prison

G-2

Legal Section

27 MAY 1947

(Attn: Lt Col R. E. Rudisill
Investigation Division)

GB/CIS/OD:TPD/FAF/mk

Info Copy To:

IPS

(Attn: Mr. M. P. Monaghan
Investigation Division)

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KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu), Internee in Sugamo Prison

G02

Info Copy To: Legal Section
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27 MAY 1947
GB/CIS/OD: TPD/FAF/mk

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contd

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TAB B - Evaluation of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)
Lt. General at the time of arrest

----- C.A.W. -----

Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)

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Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)

- 1886 Dec - Born, Toyama Prefecture
- 1905 - Graduated from Prefectural Takaoka Middle School
Toyama Prefecture
- 1905 July - Appointed Officer Candidate; attached to Supplementary
Battalion of 35th Infantry Regiment
- 1905 Dec - Entered Military Academy, Tokyo, 19th Class (Infantry)
- 1907 May - Graduated from Military Academy; rejoined 35th Infantry
Regiment
- 1907 June - Appointed probational officer
- 1907 Dec - Commissioned Sub-Lieutenant
- 1908 Mar - Raised to Senior 8th Court Rank
- 1910 Nov - Promoted to Lieutenant
- 1911 Feb - Raised to Junior 7th Court Rank
- 1912 Dec - Entered Military Staff College, Tokyo
- 1915 - Graduated from Military Staff College, Tokyo; reassigned
to 35th Infantry Regiment
- 1916 - Raised to Senior 7th Court Rank
- 1917 Aug - Assigned to Inspectorate General of Military Education;
promoted to Captain (Infantry)
- 1917 Dec - Company Commander of 35th Infantry Regiment
- 1918 Apr - In Switzerland for military studies
- 1919 - In Germany for military studies
- 1920 Nov - Decorated, 5th Class Order of Sacred Treasure, and
granted monies in recognition of service in World War I
- 1921 - Returned to Japan
- 1921 June - Raised to Junior 6th Court Rank
- 1921 July - Assigned to staff of Inspectorate General of Military
Education
- 1923 Aug - Promoted to Major (Infantry)
- 1924 Feb - Sent to Europe and the United States for military studies.
Returned in September 1924
- 1925 June - Assigned to General Staff
- 1925 Aug - Concurrently Aide-de-Camp to Field Marshal, General
KAWAMURA Kageaki
- 1926 Mar - Relieved from concurrent office
- 1926 Aug - Raised to Senior 6th Court Rank
- 1927 July - Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel (Infantry)
- 1927 Nov - Concurrently appointed Instructor for Strategy;
Military Staff College
- 1927 Nov - Decorated, 4th Class Order of Sacred Treasure
- 1929 Aug - Relieved from principal and concurrent office
- 1929 Aug - Appointed Military Attache, Imperial Japanese
Embassy in Germany
- 1930 June - Concurrently appointed Military Officer, Technical
Headquarters of War Ministry and Air Force Headquarters,
in Germany

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Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu) (cont'd)

- 1931 Aug - Promoted to Colonel (Infantry)
- 1931 Sept - Raised to Junior 5th Court Rank
- 1932 Feb - Relieved from principal and concurrent office. Assigned to General Staff
- 1932 Apr - Returned to Japan
- 1932 Apr - Commander, 6th Infantry Regiment, Nagoya
- 1933 Aug - Commander, Infantry Corps attached to Infantry School and concurrently appointed instructor; Member, Post Graduate Course
- 1934 Mar - Chief of 1st Section, Inspectorate General of Military Education. Concurrently member, Post Graduate Course, Military Communications School
- 1934 Apr - Member, Deliberation Committee for War Supplies
- 1934 Apr - Decorated, 3rd Class Order of Sacred Treasure in recognition of Service in the Manchurian Incident.
- 1935 Feb - Member, Post Graduate Course, Military Motor-Car School
- 1935 Mar - Member, Staff of First Special Military Inspector
- 1936 Mar - Promoted to Major-General. Assigned to Inspectorate General of Military Education
- 1936 Apr - Commander of North China Garrison Infantry Brigade, Peking Headquarters
- 1936 May - Raised to Senior 5th Court Rank
- 1937 Aug - Vice-Chief of Staff of North China Expeditionary Force, Tientsin
- 1938 Feb - Chief of General Staff of Central China Task Force, Shanghai
- 1938 Sept - Decorated, 2nd Class Order of Sacred Treasure
- 1939 Jan - Returned to Japan. Assistant Inspector General of Military Education, Tokyo
- 1939 Feb - Member, Textbook Investigation Committee
- 1939 Mar - Promoted to Lieutenant-General
- 1939 May - Raised to Junior 4th Court Rank
- 1939 Sept - Acting Inspector-General of Military Education
- 1940 Apr - Decorated, 2nd Class Order of Golden Kite and 1st Class Order of Rising Sun in recognition of service in Sino-Japanese Incident
- 1940 Dec - Relieved from principal and concurrent office and Textbook Investigation Committee
- 1940 Dec - Commander, 12th Division of the Kwantung Army, Manchuria
- 1941 Mar - Commander, 3rd Army in Manchuria; Headquarters at Mitankiang
- 1941 June - Raised to Senior 4th Court Rank
- 1942 Aug - Chief of General Staff of Japanese Task Force in China; Headquarters at Nanking. Succeeded General USHIROKU Jun
- 1943 Mar - Commander-in-Chief, Burma Theatre Army. Succeeded by Lt. General KIMURA Heitaro
- 1944 July - Raised to Junior 3rd Court Rank
- 1944 Aug - Returned to Japan

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Curriculum Vitae of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu) (cont'd)

- 1944 Dec - Commander-in-Chief, Central Army Area, Headquarters at Osaka. Succeeded Lt. General IIDA
- 1945 Feb - Commander-in-Chief, 15th Theatre Army and concurrently Commander-in-Chief, Central Army Area
- 1945 Mar - Promoted to full General
- 1945 Apr - Supreme Commander of the Army Air Force. Served in this capacity until the surrender
- 1945 Oct - Commander-in-Chief of 1st Army Demobilization Area
- 1945 Nov - Retired
- 1945 Dec 12 - Interned in Sugamo Prison as a war crimes suspect

Evaluation of KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu)
Lt. General at the time of Arrest

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Evaluation of KAWABE, Shozo (Masakazu) at time of Internment - Dec 1945.

KAWABE Shozo (Masakazu), Lt. General

"Graduate of Military Academy and Staff College, was commander of Non-Commissioned Officer's Corps at Infantry School, Chief of Section I of Inspectorate General of Military Education, served as military attache to Germany. KAWABE was detachment commander in North China at the outbreak of the China Incident (Peking). In 1939 he became Assistant Inspector of Military Education, after which he was Chief of General Staff of Japanese Army in China. He was Commander in Chief of the Burma Army in 1943 - 1944, in which capacity he issued the declaration of Burmese Independence. When relieved he became Commander in Chief of the Central Army Command (Japan), attached to GHQ and eventually CG of the First Reservists Command.

"KAWABE should be apprehended for his part in Japanese aggression in China and Burma as well as for his activity in Japanese military training and education.

"He qualifies under Paragraph 7-a. of Joint Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 Nov., 1945."

Arrested 12 December 1945 - Sugamo Prison.

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Kawabe, Shōzō (1776)

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NAME: KAWABE, Shore.

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

Commander of a detachment during the China Incident. Assistant Inspector of Military Education in 1939, after which he became Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Army in China; Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army in 1943 and part of 1944. He later became Commander-in-Chief of the Central Army. At one time he served as Military Attache to Germany.

REMARKS:

As Commander of a detachment during the period surrounding the China Incident, SUBJECT played a prominent part in Japanese aggression. As Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army in 1943 he issued a declaration of Burmese Independence. Most of the information available concerning SUBJECT has to do with his military career rather than political. No recommendations regarding the final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIS/G-2, FEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class B war criminal suspect and tried as such.

SECRET

NAME

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B

KAWABE, Shozo

Present status

Sugamo Prison

Positions & organizations

(see original list)

Remarks

commanded detachment during "China incident".
Chief of gen. Staff of Jap army in China.
Comdr. in chief of Burma Army in 1943-44

Rec.

F.P.S. References to record:

7506 - 701

7512 - 702

EX-2479A
P. 182

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (translation)

Being duly sworn on oath in accordance with the procedure of my country, I, Masakazu Kawabe, hereby depose and say:

I was born on December 5 in the 19th Year of Meiji at Nōka Higashi-Noziri-mura Higashi-Tochinami-gun Toyama prefecture, which is my permanent address, and I live at 2874 Koganei Koganei-machi Kitatama-gun Tokyo.

My career runs as follows:

1907	graduated from the Military Academy
1915	graduated from the Military Staff College
1936	major-general
1936	commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in North China
September 1937	vice-chief of the staff of the North China Area Army
February 1938	chief of the staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces

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January	1939	chief of the Department of the Inspector-General of Military Education
March	1940	commander of the 12th Division
March	1941	commander of the 3rd Army
August	1942	chief of the staff of China Expeditionary Forces
March	1943	commander of the Burma Area Army
December	1944	commander of the Central Army
March	1945	general
April	1945	commander of Whole Air Force

I. I served as chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, from February to December, 1938, and later as general chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, from August, 1942, to summer, 1943.

II. General HATA was appointed commander-in-chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General Iwane MATSUI. His duties, however, essentially differed from that of his predecessor, Commander-in-Chief MATSUI. His was a very negative one, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order with the strength of about six divisions in the triangular zone connecting Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. Therefore he did not take over the duties any report concerning military operations from the ex-Commander-in-Chief MATSUI.

III. In spite of negative restriction of his duties to the maintenance of peace and order, he carried out the Hsueh campaign for the following reason. About the beginning of April, 1938, the North China Expeditionary Forces reached Tsinan while the Central China Expeditionary Force reached the Hwai River. The 10th Division, however, suffered a considerable loss at the battle of Tai erh wang, east of Hsueh, and the 5th Division also was unsuccessful in attacks, thus the North China Expeditionary Forces had difficulties for further advance. It was, therefore, found necessary for the two expeditionary forces to expel to the west the enemy forces and secure their contact. The Imperial Headquarters issued an order to carry out such operation. Under these circumstances the Hata Forces began movement on about May 10 and opened an attack against the enemy forces at Tai erh wang, east of Hsueh, with the strength of about three divisions, while the North China Expeditionary Force attacked them with about four divisions, with the result that the enemy forces were driven away on about May 20 and the battle at Hsueh came to an end.

IV. At last stage of the battle at, Hsueh namely, about the middle of May, the Imperial Headquarters issued an informal order that we should carry out Hankow operations with the Central China Expeditionary Forces as the main strength. We were then

to continue Hsueh operations on the one hand and prepare ourselves for Hankow operations on the other. This compulsory operation orders threw us into no small panic. In the middle of June, we received ^{from} the Imperial Headquarters a formal order to effect Hankow operations.

At the beginning of July we had necessary reinforcements for Hankow operations on orders from the Imperial Headquarters and re-organized the entire forces for the operations. The troops reinforced to us the 2nd Army Under Prince Higashikuni and the troops under Lieutenant-General OKAMURA. Wuchang and Hankow campaign was scheduled for early autumn.

Hankow fell on October 26 and on November 3 Commander-in-Chief Hata made formal entry into the city. At that time people in Hankow remained very calm, order was maintained, the buildings were in good order, and it was difficult to believe that battle was fought in the city recently.

When Wuchang and Hankow fell, we met with resistance of the enemies until we reached a spot two or three 'ri' outside the city, but after that little resistance was made and it was almost a bloodless occupation; therefore the soldiers remained composed and showed no excitement.

Commander-in-Chief HATA not only issued strict orders to each unit under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline, but to prevent disorder in the city after

the occupation, he gave each unit as instructions of the chief of the staff, detailed regulations accompanying the orders. Those instructions indicated the directions the Army and Navy or individual unit of the Army should take, and fixed the areas of occupation by the Army and Navy. We also made a definite agreement with the Navy regarding the use of the buildings in the city, and selected the best soldiers out of each unit to enter the city; that is, we transferred the units engaged in the battle to the rear and sent into the city the very best portion of the 13th Division which was not only full trained and educated but was mild and obedient. As we gave such strict orders and instructions and took every precaution with minute care, we believe there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow, such as massacre, violence, plunder and etc. Nor did we receive any report or even hear of them. I read in the papers that someone testified to the massacre in Hankow, and I am astounded at such ^{an} inconceivable testimony.

The Army and Navy air forces engaged in Hankow campaign had their bases in Nanking and Kiukiang respectively and were under entirely different command. However, part of the air forces had been transferred to the attack of Canton, and the strength was considerably decreased so that long-distance bombing was not carried out.

V. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do

with the Canton operations, and we resented at the transfer of part of the air forces.

VI. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Changkufeng Incident either. The occurrence of the Changkufeng Incident made it impossible for us to get the air forces which the Japanese Army in Manchuria had promised to give us. As the Central China Expeditionary Forces were in the midst of the Hankow operations at that time, we felt bitter about it.

VII. The Authority of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was restricted to negative duties relating to the maintenance of peace and order. He had not sufficient strength under him and he had to receive orders from the Imperial Headquarters and get reinforcements upon their instruction in order to make any military movements. He had no authority to act independently.

Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces were restricted to the duties of the strategic operations and military administration, and offensive operations were beyond his authority. His was the authority over the defense of the occupied territories and administration was in the hands of the ambassador after his appointment.

VIII. Since the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs hitherto handled by the Commander-in-Chief

were transferred to it, but till the set-up of the Board was completed, special service organizations handled them in reality in every place upon request of the Chinese authorities.

IX. As regards to the Chinese prisoners of war, we made it a rule to deliver them to the Central Government of China as there existed no treaty concerning them. Persons responsible for them were the Commanders-in-Chief (i.e. the Commanders-in-Chief of each army under General (HATA), and they acted upon permission of the War Ministry.

X. The Communist Army in China endeavoured to win the people, In the villages under its control all the people offered resistance to the Japanese Army. No sooner had the Japanese Army entered the villages than the communist went underground and they doubled our trouble, because we could not distinguish underground soldiers from the villagers. In those areas we could not but fight the people in general.

XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. Secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was supplied by the War Ministry and we had no other fund. Therefore, it is clear that the Commande in-Chief had nothing to do with the opium question, but I am not quite certain how far the special service bureau or the special service organizations know about it.

XII. The court-martial of the air force officers who attacked Tokyo in April 1942 was held upon orders of the War Ministry and everything was carried out strictly in accordance with orders.

XIII. The headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was in Shanghai at first since General HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief but later it moved to Nanking. Then in March 1941 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expedition Forces in succession to General NISEIO, and the headquarters was in Nanking at that time. Therefore, General HATA stayed at first in Shanghai while he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces (1938) and at the time of Wuchang-Hankow campaign he issued orders of dispatch of troops at the headquarters in Nanking. He left there on August 25 and moved the headquarters to Kiuking where he stayed until October 30. On November 3 he entered Hankow and stayed there until the middle of the same month. After holding a requiem service for the war-dead, he returned directly to Nanking.

XIV. The duty of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was not a positive one. His was the negative duty of maintaining peace and order in the occupied areas, therefore he laid special stress on the maintenance of military discipline. Soon after his arrival in Shanghai he held the conference of Division Commanders when I remember vividly that he gave whole-hearted instructions concerning the

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maintenance of military discipline. General HATA was not involved in any irksome as he was not engaged in any outstanding operations.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

At Sugamo Prison

6 December, 1946.

I, Tomoharu Kokubu, hereby certify that the affiant was sworn to and affixed his signature to the above statement in my presence. (He did not, however, affix his seal as he was not in possession of it)

/S/ Tomoharu Kokubu (seal)

At Sugamo Prison

6 December, 1946

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to state the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

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EX - 2479

On this 27th day of February 19

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

I, KAWABE, Shōzō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IKEDA, Sumihisa (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

To the questions asked by Messrs. MIYATA and Blakeney, Defense Counsel, at Tokyo, on November 2 in the 21st year of Showa (1946), I, KAWABE, Shōzō, replied as follows:

- Q. Tell us about the term of your service at Peking as Commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in China.
- A. From April, 1936 (Showa 11) until August, 1937 (Showa 12).
- Q. Tell us about the strength of the army which you, as Brigade Commander, commanded at the time, and how you stationed the troops.
- A. I had two infantry regiments, the strength being about 5,000. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment of Infantry was at Peking. One battalion each was posted at Peking, Fengtai and Tienchin, and one company was sent to Tungchow. The headquarters of the 2nd Regiment of Infantry was posted at Tienchin, where two battalions were also stationed. One battalion was posted at Shanhaikwan and along the railway east of Tienchin. The headquarters of the Brigade was at Peking.
- Q. Where was the headquarters of the Army? And in what manner were the technical corps posted?
- A. The headquarters of the Army was at Tienchin, and cavalry, artillery, engineer and tank corps were also posted there.
- Q. Were there other military organs at Peking?
- A. A Special Service Agency, military attaches to the Embassy and a KEMPEITAI unit were at Peking, and these three were all independent organs.
- Q. Give an outline of the disposition of the Chinese Army at the time of the Lukuochiao Incident.
- A. In North China, the 29th Army under the command of Sung Cheh-
was stationed in the area, including Tienchin, Peking, Paoting and Kalgan. The headquarters of the Army was at Peking, and one division each was stationed near Peking, Tienchin, Kalgan and Paoting.
- In the neighborhood of Lukuochiao, about a battalion was stationed at Nanyuen, Peiyuan, Papaoshan and Hwapingchen. It seemed that at Lungwangmiao was posted a part of the battalion.
- Q. Were the Japanese and Chinese armies on good terms before the outbreak of the Incident?
- A. The relations between the both armies were very friendly until the fall of 1936 (Showa 11). Both armies often inspected each other's maneuvers and feats of arms so the friendly relations between both armies were promoted remarkably. But on Sept. 18, 1936 (Showa 11), a skirmish was begun between Japanese and Chinese units when they were marching near Fengtai and passed each other. It was peacefully settled by the efforts of the staff members of both armies. As the resu

part of the Chinese troops stationed at Fengtai were moved elsewhere. This seemed to have left an unpleasant impression on the part of the Chinese Army. And after the Hsian Incident, which took place in December in the same year, the sentiment of the Chinese in the vicinity of Peking generally became unfavorable toward Japan, and the communists' secret maneuvers became more active. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the Chinese troops were affected by the communist movement. Although in the Chinese higher circles there was still seen a strong trend toward the harmonious collaboration of Japan and China; among the lower circles of the army it was observed there was an anti-Japanese sentiment which was very keen.

- Q. How were the relations between you and Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang} and other Chinese staff members?
- A. I was not especially intimate with Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang}, except on the occasions of formal exchange of courtesies. But I was very intimate with Chang Tsu-chun, the Division Commander. We often exchanged frank opinions about the friendly relations of the two nations. Our opinions were similar on some points.
- Q. What sort of instructions were given to you by the authorities as to the attitude of the Japanese garrison forces toward China? And tell us how you instructed your men in line with the instructions from the authorities.
- A. It was the fundamental policy of the Army to keep contact with the Chinese Army like a friendly army and bring about better relations between both armies. As a brigade commander, I always kept this in mind and led my men to be on good terms with the Chinese Army. When I went to the General Staff to pay a visit of courtesy after I was appointed Brigade Commander, Major General ISHIHARA, Kanji, who was then Chief of Military Operations, told me privately, clearly showing the intention of the Central Authorities, "The Central Authorities have no intention of fighting a war with China. You will please keep this in mind in line of duty."
- Q. What were the duties of the Stationary Force in China?
- A. The protection of the official institutions and the Japanese nationals in North China as well as the defense of railway, traffic and communications.
- Q. Tell us about the plans for military operations of the Japanese garrison forces against China.
- A. I never received any instructions for military operations against China.
- Q. Please explain about the program of the garrisoning.
- A. In accordance with the duty, that is, the order to defend railway, traffic, communication and to protect Japanese diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents, the Brigade, in peace time, scattered its forces along the railway, Peking and Tientsin and the thus stationed forces took charge of the garrisoning of their respective stations.
- Q. Please explain about the garrison near Peking.

- . Fengtai, Peking and Tungchow constituted three stations respectively as one unit near Peking, which were put under my command as the Peking garrison district. In Fengtai the commander of the battalion, in Peking the commander of the infantry regiment, and in Tungchow the commander of the company, were ordered to discharge their duties as the commanders of stationary forces.
- Q. Explain about the preparation for the operations against China which the Japanese garrison forces in China made.
- A. We did not think of fighting with China, so we made no preparation for operations against China. Our forces were the so-called garrison forces; therefore, in organization we had no moving activity and in munitions we had no stock for operations except those which were continually supplied.
- Q. Was the Brigade charged with duty regarding secret information and the investigation of topography necessary for the army?
- A. We were not charged with any such duty.
- Q. Were you given directions regarding where to place the emphasis in the education and training of the Japanese garrison forces in China?
- A. We were given directions about education, but it meant the training which aimed at complete preparation and equipment of the forces and was not aimed at the Chinese army. This was applicable similarly in the case of the forces in Japan. We had no idea of fighting with the Chinese army, so we did not think of aiming at it.
- Q. Explain about the disposition and the maneuvering areas of the Japanese Army near Fengtai.
- A. One battalion under the command of Major ICHIMI was stationed in the Japanese barracks at Fengtai with some infantry guns attached to it. To the north of the barracks there stretched a narrow parade ground, but near Fengtai there were many farms and no maneuvering areas. About three kilometres west of Fengtai, there was the ballast-collecting place of the railway which was not a farm but was a plain well-adapted for maneuvering. After negotiations with China, Japan was granted temporary use of this plain, with Mt. Ichimonji as its center and we were to use it as a maneuvering area. In that district ballast was collected for the Peiping-Mukden Railway.
- Q. Where was the maneuvering area of the forces in Peking?
- A. Though there was a narrow common parade ground for the units of each nation to the east of Kuominkong within the walls of Peking, the Japanese units in Peking used to utilize the exercise grounds surrounding the units of the Tungchow garrison as their area for field exercises.
- Q. Were they at liberty to use the maneuvering area?
- A. Yes, they were at liberty to use it. Hitherto, in case of carrying out maneuvers, the Japanese units had done it by their own choice without the necessity of informing the Chinese authorities of it. However, at the beginning of June, there was a friendly desire from the Chinese, saying,

"As a night maneuver is apt to excite the public, you will kindly inform us of it in advance, by which, we would like to announce it to the public previously so as to prevent any excitement". Understanding this, the Army made it a rule to make an announcement in each case through a military intelligence bureau.

Q. About the time when the incident broke out, did they carry out exercises every night?

A. Yes. Almost every night after the end of June they practised exercises. The units practised furious exercises as it was just before the inspection of the second term.

Q. Were you in Peking on 7 July, the very day of the incident?

A. I was not there. In order to attend to the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment which took place, at that time, at the maneuvering area at Nantassu, south of Shanhaikwan, I left Peking on 6 June.

Q. Who was the garrison commander while you were absent?

A. The commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUDAGUCHI, acted for me.

Q. Were all the units in Peking at their permanent stations?

A. Leaving one company in the city, all the Peking infantry regiments were in Tungchow for the purpose of maneuvering. Therefore, only with one company within the walls of Peiping and a battalion at Fengtai, we had had little strength.

Q. How were you informed of the situation about the outbreak of the incident when you were traveling?

A. Throughout the night of 7 July, there was the inspection of exercises. About 3:00 A.M., on 8 July, on the scene of the maneuvers, a slip of paper with something written down as a telephonic report to me from the commander of the Peking Regiment was brought to me from the signal corps. The paper read, "While a company was practising exercises at the maneuvering area of Lukouchiao, we were fired upon by a Chinese unit and one of our soldiers is missing. The Ichiki battalion has been shifted to the guarding formation and is now searching for the missing soldier." I did not reply to it. When morning came, I made contact with the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and determined to return to Peking. As an airplane was fortunately provided by the Army, I left Shanhaikwan at about noon, and after changing to a train at Tientsin and arriving at Fengtai, at about 3:00 P.M., I immediately hurried to Lukouchiao.

Q. Did you visit the Army Headquarters when you passed Tientsin?

A. The train schedule did not permit me to go, but I established contact by telephone at the station to the Chief of Staff, Hashimoto. The Chief of Staff said, "The policy of the Army is to achieve a solution on the spot. You will watch the situation as it is at present." By this I was informed of the Army's policy of localizing the affair.

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- Q. Did you suspend the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment at Nantassu?
- A. I had ordered the regimental commander to continue the inspection.
- Q. Was the regimental commander there when you reached Lukouchi?
- A. Yes. He was there, and reported the situation in general to me as follows:

"After eleven o'clock last night, I received the following report from the battalion commander, ICHIKI, 'A company carrying out exercises was fired upon by a Chinese unit, and as a soldier is missing, a search is now being made for him. The battalion is now concentrating at Mt. Ichimoji in preparation for any emergency.' Then, I, the regimental commander, ordered the battalion by telephone as follows: 'You will await further orders as you are now. It is expected that the investigation parties will be despatched from both Japanese and Chinese sides to the spot to investigate the situation on the spot.'"

"By the mediation of the Military Intelligence Bureau, it was decided to make a common investigation by sending committees from both Japanese and Chinese sides. Then, with a regimental officer, Lt. Colonel MORITA as the chairman, the committee was despatched to the spot. The Chinese chairman was the chief of the Yuanpin-hsien."

"About 2:00 A.M. there was a report from the battalion commander that our units had been fired upon by Chinese armed forces at the Yuanpin-hsien castle. Furthermore, after 4:00 A.M., there was another report that we had again been fired upon by the Chinese. I, the regimental commander, gave the following order, 'It is an insult against the Japanese that the Chinese had fired upon us again, despite the fact that, as it had begun to get light, the Japanese could be easily identified. If you should be fired upon again in the future, your battalion will be free to fight back.' However, it was about 5:00 A.M. when the party of the investigation committee arrived at the spot by automobile and when chairman MORITA was inspecting the spot, the ICHIKI battalion launched an attack, was deployed and was just about to advance. Thereupon, the Lt. Colonel rebuked the battalion commander for the battalion's unlawfulness. When the battalion commander replied that he had just received an order from the regimental commander that the battalion was free to accept the challenge, there was another volley from the Chinese. So Lt. Colonel MORITA told the Chinese committee, 'The unlawful firing of the Chinese units is as you are now actually witnessing. I cannot disregard a battalion commander's determination to accept the challenge. And the Lt. Colonel agreed to the battalion commander's determination. Then after 5:00 A.M. the battalion attacked the Chinese at Lungwangmiao."

- Q. Then what did you, the brigade commander, do upon receipt of that report?
- A. I gave the following order to the units, "Watch the Chinese under present situation. Do nothing rash." At the same

time, I ordered that the casualties be taken care of.

Q. There is talk that the encounter between the Japanese and the Chinese units at Lukouchiao started from an intrigue by a third party. What do you think about this?

A. I cannot say distinctly about that, but after the outbreak of the incident on 7 July, while the Japanese and the Chinese were facing each other, there frequently was unlawful firing every night. Every time such unlawful firing took place, we investigated the situation, but there was no sign that either the Japanese or the Chinese unit had opened fire. It almost seemed that a third party which did not belong to the Japanese unit nor to the Chinese were firing from the intermediate area between the Japanese and the Chinese which were facing each other. And we could assume that it was an intrigue by someone.

Q. After 7 July, both units were facing each other, while negotiations were in progress between the Japanese and Chinese. Did any untoward incident break out during that time?

A. There were successive outbreaks of untoward incidents, such as the unlawful firing at Mt. Ichimoji on 21 July (company commander wounded), the Langfang incident on 25 July, the Kannanmen incident on 26 July, etc. The anti-Japanese sentiment of the lower class Chinese officers and other ranks was most intense.

Def. Doc. 970

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT; KAWABE, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on
attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure
followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

(紙数7枚)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC 昭三ニ五二一

答申者

河邊 正三
KAWABE, MASAKAZU (SHOZO)

一、會見者ハ昭和十六年十一月七日及昭和二十年九月二日
ノ日ニハ如何モ職務カニ當テハリ居リシヤ。

(答)

昭和十六、一七、七、 第三軍司令官

(任地、滿洲國牡丹江市)

日ニ〇、九、二、 航空總軍司令官

(東京)

二、會見者ノ氏名。

河邊 正三
KAWABE, MASAKAZU

三、會見者ガ本名ノ外使用セシ氏名及有名モ氏名ヲ記入セシ。

(答) 無シ但シ名 (SHOZO) シヨウゾウト讀マルルコトナシ。

四、生年ノ月日

明治十九年十二月五日

(1886 AD)

五、本籍地 (出生地)

富山縣東砺波郡東野尻村苗加三ニ一番地

六、身長

六四 インチ

七、体重

一二二 ポンド

八、傷痕、目印、不具、有無。

(答) 近眼鏡使用、外特別ノコトナシ

九、現住地

東京都豊島区巢鴨拘置所

一〇、住居地

東京都北多摩郡小金井町小金井二八七四番地

一一、身分証明ノ様式ト番號

(答) ナシ

一二、會見者ヲ捕ハレシトキノ例、其理由、犯罪ノ有無。

(答) 該當事項ナシ

一三、會見者ノ現在マデノ最高階級

陸軍大將

一四、會見者ノ掌務ノ年代記録、會見者ガ昭和六年

一月一日ヨリ現在マデノ職務ヲ記入セヨ、

前記々入ノトキ政府カ軍閥ノ役目、夫レヲ記入ノトキハ

會見者ノ地位ヲ忘レズニ記入セヨ。

(答)

昭和六、一、一日 (職務) 獨逸國在勤大使館附 陸軍中佐

(昭和四年復) 武官 (ハルリン)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

- 昭和六、八月 陸軍大佐ニ任ズ
日 九月 滿洲事変起ル
日 七、四月 (帰國ノ上)
日 八、八月 歩兵第六聯隊長 (名古屋)
日 八、八月 陸軍歩兵学校教導隊長 (千葉市)
日 九、三月 教育總監部第一課長 (東京)
日 一一、三月 陸軍少将ニ任ジ教育總監部附上士
日 四月 北支那駐屯歩兵旅團長 (北京)
(日 一三、七月 右職務ニテ日支事変生起ニ會ス)
日 九月 北支那方面軍參謀副長 (天津及北京)
日 一三、二月 中支那派遣軍參謀長 (上海及南京)
日 一四、一月 教育總監部本部長 (東京)
日 一五、三月 陸軍中將ニ任ズ
日 一五、三月 第十二師團長 (滿洲團東部團境 東寧縣)
日 一六、三月 第三軍司令官 (滿洲團牡丹江市)
(日 一七、八月 大東亞戦争起ル)
日 一七、八月 支那派遣軍總參謀長 (南京)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

昭和十八、三月
ビルマ方面軍司令官(ラングーン)

日 一九、九月
参謀本部附 (東京)

日 一、三月
中部軍司令官 (大阪)

日 二〇、三月
陸軍大将ニ任ズ

日 四月
航空總軍司令官 (東京)

日 八月
終戦と同時に航空本部長ヲ兼ス

終戦後復員ノ業務ニ従フ

日 一〇月
第一復員監(東京)ヲ兼務ス

日 一一、三〇日
待命トシ

日 一一、一二日
巣鴨拘置所ニ收容セラル

一五、會見者カ聖蹟會ノ公會、地方會、東京支部會
及大日本政治會ノ會員及組織者ナリト記入セリ。
其他各団体支部、組合及特別ノ事務ノ編
輯ヲセリトヲ記入セリ。

(参)該當事項ナリ

一六、党、組合、協會、兄弟之會、會、學會、協會
ノ學會、政治ノ學會、軍ノ學會、愛國ノ學會、
博士ノ學會、教員ノ學會、名譽ノ學會、運動
ノ學會等ノ會員ナリシカヲ記入セリ。何事モ前

記ノ下カ秘密トモ記入セヨ。

(答) 偕行社 (陸軍将校) 社員 (任官時ヨリ) 終戦マデ

。帝國在郷軍人会 (在郷陸海軍之人) 理事

(昭和十四、二月ヨリ同十五、三月マデ)

。同右中文聯合分會長

(昭和十七、九月ヨリ同十八、三月マデ)

。星光社 (同郷陸軍将校) 社員

(任官時ヨリ終戦マデ)

。赤十字社社員

(昭和三年以來)

。皇軍會 (戦争哲理研究) 理事

団体

(昭和十四年夏頃ヨリ昭和十八年夏頃マデ)

一七、有見者ノ家族中前記ノ所及之ニ関連セシ職務ニ
當ルヲ又其地位及直接権利者又ハ間接権利者
カ居タカ。居タカハ氏名、現任所、続柄、勤務先
名及役柄ヲ記入セヨ。

(答) 該當者ナシ

一八、會費ノ外寄附(金銭・土地)ヲ自發的ニカ又ハ
内寄ニ各關係組合ニ渡シカテ記入セヨ。其他國
民カウカ上長カテ自發的又ハ強制的ニ寄附セシヤ。

(答)該當事項ナシ

一九、會見者ハ前記關係組合ヲ階級・位・勲章・
賞状又ハ名譽ヲ与ヘシメテアリヤ。若シテハ名譽
ヲ与ヘシメ理由、年月日ヲ評記セヨ。

(答)該當事項ナシ

二〇、會見者ガB.C.P.ノ答ヲ例外トシテ會見者カ此
和六、一、一、ヲ軍關係・教育・治安・公安・刑
事會ニ關係セテアリヤ。

前記ノ年月日關係會ノ名又關係中ノ最高階級夫
レヲ又テ年月日。

(答)該當事項ナシ

二一、昭和六、一、一、ヲ會見者ガ編輯(題名・編輯
者名)・演説(聽衆人員)・關係會ヲ題名
シテ演説及編輯セシムル其會名ヲ記入セヨ。
若シ演説及編輯ヲセヌ場合ハ其通り記入セヨ。

(答)該當事項ナシ

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

二、會見者のEノ答ヲ例外トシテ昭和六、七、八、九
リ職務トシテ夫レが日本國内又ハ國外ニテ國統管
理者及支配人、組合名、役目、年月日ヲ記入セヨ。
(答) 該當事項ナシ

(以上)