

Tojo, 2 Other Accused Voted For Aggression

By IAN MUTSU
United Press Staff Correspondent

Shigenori Togo, Japan's wartime foreign minister, directly named Hideki Tojo and two of his co-defendants on trial before the Allied Tribunal today as those who voted for war at the crucial November 1, 1941 Liaison Conference preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.

Togo's statement came a short while before former Premier Tojo was expected to take the witness stand on Christmas Eve, six years after Pearl Harbor and become the first dictator in history to tell the world in his own words his version of Japan's aggression.

In addition to Tojo, his former Foreign Affairs Chief named former Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada and Teichi Suzuki, former president of the Cabinet Planning Board, as the two Japanese leaders who, from the beginning, were allegedly in favor of war against the Allies.

The statement was made when Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan dramatically pointed toward the

prisoners' dock—while Tojo sat in the middle stonefaced—and demanded:

"Then who in that dock took the position of war?"

Tojo, under cross-examination, admitted that he, himself, and another co-defendant among the 25, Finance Minister Okinori Kaya, finally "found no alternative but to agree" with the war faction "within 24 hours."

Tojo admitted that by continuing to dissent together with Kaya the two cabinet ministers could have definitely postponed any war decision.

STARS & STRIPES

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Togo Names Tojo, Shimada, Suzuki As Voting For War At Conference Preceding Attack On Pearl Harbor

'Had No Alternative But To Agree With Group Within 24 Hrs.'

By Eimei Kato, Staff Writer

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo, Dec. 24.—Shigenori Togo, Japan's wartime Foreign Minister, directly named Hideki Tojo and two of his co-defendants on trial before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as those who voted for war at the crucial November 1, 1941, Liaison Conference preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.

In addition to Tojo, the former Foreign Minister named former Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada and Teichi Suzuki, former president of the Cabinet Planning Board, as two Japanese leaders who, from the beginning, were allegedly in favor of war against the Allies.

The statement was made when Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan dramatically pointed to the prisoners' dock—and while Tojo sat in the center stonefaced—and demanded: "Then who in that dock took the position of war?"

Tojo, under cross-examination, admitted that he himself and another co-defendant Finance Minister Okinori Kaya finally "found no alternative but to agree" with the war faction within 24 hours.

Tojo admitted also that by continuing to dissent with Kaya, the two Cabinet Ministers could have indefinitely postponed any war decision.

With Hideki Tojo himself scheduled to take the stand after Togo, the courtroom was packed with reporters and spectators.

Today's session was adjourned at noon due to the Christmas holidays, but the court will reconvene on December 26 at 9.30 a.m.

Will Charge Allies Provoked Japan To Begin Conflict

By IAN MUTSU
United Press Correspondent

Hideki Tojo, the only Axis dictator to stand trial, "will never evade his political and administrative responsibility for actions he performed," his defense council pleaded before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East today.

Outlining Tojo's defense program before presenting the war leader's personal affidavit, Tojo's Japanese defense council, Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, told the court he proposed to prove "that Japan neither planned nor prepared beforehand for war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands."

"The defense will show," he said, "that the exercise of the right of self-defense was regrettable but was an unavoidable course of action which the then leaders of Japan were forced to take."

Regarding the allegation that Japanese affairs, internal and foreign policies were dominated and directed by "a criminal militaristic clique," the Tojo defense calls the charges "a fallacy of the highest degree, one having no basis in fact or foundation whatever."

There was, according to Tojo, "no militaristic clique in fact or imagination outside the officially constituted state organization," the attorney said. He said that throughout Tojo's testimony it cannot be admitted for a moment that any such imaginary power ever was a motivating force behind Japanese policies.

"Tojo never gave orders for, tolerated nor connived at any inhuman acts," the attorney said, "but on the contrary was known for stern discipline."

Regarding charges in connection with the beheading of American fliers, he said, "he never at any time gave orders for or countenanced the commission of an inhuman act . . . since he has always been obedient to the desires of the Emperor."

He said it will also be proved that Tojo laid before the throne the matter of obtaining imperial sanction for commutation of the death sentences imposed on the enemy fliers who raided Tokyo.

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**War Suspects Getting Fair Trial
At Tribunal, Says Indian Lawyer**

By L. R. MIGLANI

The major war crimes suspects seem to have reposed confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and they are facing their trial in a sincere spirit, Dr. Justice Radhabinod Pal, the Tribunal's member from India, told the Indian people recently.

His observation is contained in an interview published in the influential Calcutta daily, the Amrit Bazar Patrika. Justice Pal recently returned to Tokyo from India where he visited his sick wife and is back on the bench now.

Paying tribute to the sagacious and sympathetic policy of General MacArthur, Justice Pal told the Patrika's correspondent that the Japanese people, far from being resentful of an alien occupation, are cooperating to a maximum with SCAP and his policies.

On his arrival here to join the Tribunal in May, 1946, he said, he found the Japanese people accepted their defeat in a very placid, rational and realistic spirit, and this forced him to revise his earlier thinking that they would be sullen and smarting under a feeling of national humiliation.

The Indian lawyer pointed out to his countrymen that the Japanese people's spirit of discipline holds out a beacon light and that struggling under a painful impact of food shortage plus a grave economic plight, the Japanese are undergoing a self-imposed austerity ungrudgingly and cheerfully.

"In this respect," Justice Pal continued, "I must say that General MacArthur has done a lot to help Japan's food position. His policy of importing food from America for the entire American army has prevented the already grave food situation in Japan from deteriorating.

"The American army does not live off the land and is prohibited to purchase indigenous food products which are left to the Japanese themselves to feed on."

Pointed out by the Patrika's correspondent that India gets only a trickle of the day-to-day Tribunal proceedings, Justice Pal expressed surprise but observed that in Japan the trial has aroused a very keen interest—particularly among the Japanese intelligentsia.

He said the courtroom's large galleries are always full and the seats are booked several days in advance. It is here he said that the accused are taking the trial in a truly sportsman-like spirit and that they seem to have reposed confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the Tribunal. "In fact Tojo is found regularly taking down notes during the proceedings of the Tribunal," he said.

Justice Pal emphasized it might be of great interest to India for her nation-building programs to learn what the trial will disclose as to how Japan developed her various industries within an incredibly short time.

He also pointed out: (1) General MacArthur and his Headquarters are giving the Japanese all help and cooperation to enable the nation to tide over the crisis and live a peaceful and free nation; (2) SCAP maintains a policy of non-interference with the day-to-day civil administration of Japan; and (3) the General himself is extremely genial and a likeable person. He does not care for ceremony and conventions. Unlike many administrative heads of other countries, he works very hard to make the occupation task smooth and efficient.

Togo, Tojo Discuss Reply

In cautious answers that often exasperated Prosecutor Keenan, Togo conceded that he had not read to Tojo all of Roosevelt's telegram when the two discussed the Emperor's reply. On that occasion, Togo said, Tojo had expressed the opinion that in the light of the message, "nothing could be done to save the situation."

To insistent questioning by Keenan, Togo stated that he omitted to give Tojo certain passages in the Roosevelt message relating to historical background, explanation of Roosevelt's own feeling, and phrases concerning relations between the two countries despite the fact that "it was a very important message between the two most important figures in the world at that time."

To Make 'Proper Judgment'

Togo told Keenan that Tojo did not need those passages to make a "proper judgment."

Before the audience with the Emperor, Togo continued, Kido expressed the opinion in a five-minute conversation that he agreed with Tojo that the "message was not worth while" and that the contents of the message alone could not save the situation.

During the cross-examination, Keenan charged Togo with using "weasel" words in giving evasive replies.

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NIPPON TIMES

**Cross-Examination On
Re 'Emperor's Reply'**

**Keenan Charges Togo
With Evading Questions**

By Eimei Katō, Staff Writer
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo,
Dec. 22.—Shigenori Togo, Japan's Foreign Minister at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, today revealed to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East that he and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo drafted the proposed Emperor's reply to President Roosevelt's last-minute personal message on December 7, 1941.

Togo admitted that they did not consult Marquis Koichi Kido, who was Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and now a co-defendant, although it was Kido's duty "to advise the Throne on political matters concerning the Emperor."

Did Not Inform Kido

Togo said that even after his audience with the Emperor at 8 a.m., December 8, he did not seek Kido to inform him of the Emperor's agreement on the proposed reply.

In a tremulous voice, Togo denied that he regarded the Emperor as "only a figurehead or a rubber stamp to be put on by you," as charged by Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan.

Togo claimed that Kido should have been waiting for him in the chamberlain's room after the audience.

Keenan charged that Togo "slipped away from the palace" after the audience without attempting to see Kido, but Togo with a sarcastic laugh declared "it was utterly impossible to slip away from the Palace."

**Tribunal Packed
For Tojo Phase**

By the United Press

More than 500 Japanese began lining up at the gates of the War Ministry building at 6 a.m. yesterday to witness Premier Hideki Tojo take the witness stand before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

The balcony of the big war crimes tribunal courtroom holds a capacity of 192 allocated to Japanese spectators.

The court opened its session at 9:30 a.m.

Allied spectators arriving later filled their section with the greatest number since the opening of the trial.

The press section was also filled for the first time in a long time with correspondents, photographers and news reel camera ready for the "star performer" of an otherwise dull trial.

DEC 27 1947

NIPPON TIMES

Hideki Tojo Takes Witness Stand, Admits Responsibility For Defeat

But Claims 'War Of Self-Defense' Waged; Alleges 'International Law Not Violated'; Reading Of 50,000-Word Affidavit Begins

By Eimei Kato And R. Y. Koitabashi, Staff Writers

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo, Dec. 26.—Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Japan when the Japanese forces struck at Pearl Harbor without warning in 1941, today at 3.15 p.m. mounted the witness stand to "tell the whole story" to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

In a 50,000-word affidavit read by George F. Blewett, Tojo's American counsel, the Japanese leader who led his country into defeat in war outlined a long, involved history of events leading up to the Pacific War which, he contended, was "a war of self-defense and in no manner a violation of International Law."

Kiyose Claims 'No Attempt At World Domination'

"Never at any moment," he said, "did I ever conceive that waging this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime or that regularly constituted officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals of any recognized International Law."

Tojo continued: "As to the responsibility for defeat, I feel that it devolves upon myself as Prime Ministry. The responsibility in that sense I am not only willing, but sincerely desire to accept fully."

The reading of Tojo's 250-page affidavit was expected to continue through Monday's session of the court.

(Ed. Note:—The English Mainichi will carry the gist of Hideki Tojo's affidavit in instalments beginning tomorrow).

As the wartime Prime Minister

today took the witness stand to testify personally before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the courtroom was packed, including over 500 Japanese who began lining up at the gates of the War Ministry Building at 6 a.m.

In an opening statement preceding Tojo's own testimony, Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, the former war leader's Japanese defense counsel, told the Tribunal that Tojo "will never evade his political and administrative responsibility for actions he performed."

Up to July, 1940, declared Dr. Kiyose, Tojo served as an Army officer, serving faithfully under established military authority, and "he was not responsible during those years for the formation or decisions of Japanese national policies."

Outlining Tojo's defense program before presenting the ex-Premier's personal affidavit, Counsel Kiyose outlined the following seven points which he claimed would be proved:

(1) That Japan had neither planned nor prepared for the war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands;

(2) That hostilities against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were provoked by the Allied nations, and "the attacked were unavoidably instituted by Japan in self-defense and for self-existence;"

(3) That the Japanese Government had scrupulously prepared to deliver the lawful notification of war to the United States prior to the commencement of hostilities;

(4) The true purport and signi-

(Continued on Page 2)

Tojo Takes Stand

(Continued From Page 1)

ficance of the Greater East Asia Policy;

(5) The non-existence of the so-called "Militaristic Culture";

(6) The independence of the Supreme Command and the functions of the Liaison and the Imperial Conferences;

(7) That the dominant characteristics of the Military Administration exercised by Tojo consisted in a just control and discipline of the military system, and he gave neither orders for, tolerated, nor connived at any inhuman acts.

No Plan To Dominate World

Dr. Kiyose asserted that "There was no plan to dominate the world or any part thereof in conspiracy with Germany and Italy."

In regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the opening statement asserted that both the Japanese Government and the military had set their hopes on their success, expecting to bring them to "a rich fruition."


The defense counsel revealed that Tojo will produce in evidence a letter addressed by Prime Minister Konoé to Marshal Petain of France in July, 1941, showing that the dispatch of Japanese forces to French Indo-China in 1940 and 1941 was aimed principally at the settlement of the China Affair.

Tojo "will tell," said Dr. Kiyose, how the information obtained as to the attitude of the U.S. and Britain made war unavoidable.

Re Delivery Of Final Note

Concerning the delivery of the final note to the United States at the outbreak of the war, Dr. Kiyose said that the procedure of the delivery was left entirely to Shigenori Togo, then Foreign Minister and now a co-defendant.

In conclusion, Dr. Kiyose disclosed that Tojo would call no witnesses to testify other than himself.



Wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo takes the stand.

MAINICHI

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String Around Tojo's Finger Reminder to Control Temper

By the United Press

Ex-Premier Hideki Tojo, taking the witness stand before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Friday, wore a piece of string tied around the middle finger of his right hand. Asked what he was trying to remember, Japan's leading war-crimes suspect told the United Press through a court interpreter: "I'm inclined to lose my temper. When I feel my anger rising, I look at the string and remember to keep calm."

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NIPPON TIMES

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**How Japanese Newspapers
Played Up Tojo Affidavit**

**His Acceptance of Responsibility for Defeat and
Exhonoriation of Emperor Emphasized**

Japanese newspapers yesterday devoted almost the whole of their front page to the Tojo story.

The six major dailies published in Tokyo reproduced large portions of the affidavit verbatim. The remainder of the statement will be published in instalments in subsequent issues.

Four to five-column headlines unanimously played up Tojo's assertions to assume war guilt and exhonorating the Emperor from responsibility. Some of the headlines quoted Tojo's defense for the "war of self-defense" but scrupulously parenthesized the phrase with quotation marks.

Headlines for the Tojo story included:

Asahi: **EMPEROR NOT RESPONSIBLE**
Insist on "War For Self-Defense"
Mainichi: **ADMITS RESPON-**

**SIBILITY FOR DEFEAT:
STRESSES "EMPEROR FOR
PEACE"**

Tries to Justify "War For Self-Defense"

Yomiuri: **EMPEROR NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WAR
OPENING**

I TAKE BLAME FOR DEFEAT
Asserts Criminal Military Clique Non-Existent

Jiji: **WAR FOR SELF-DEFENSE FORCED ON US**

No Conspiracy For Aggression: I Am Responsible For Defeat

Tokyo: **TOJO EXPLAINS "JAPAN'S POSITION"**

EMPEROR NOT RESPONSIBLE

Acted For National Self-Defense
Nihon Keizai: **RECOUNTS JAPAN'S TRAGEDY**

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**How Japanese Press
Played Up Affidavit**

(Continued from Page 1)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFEAT RESTS WITH ME

Emperor Not To Blame.

None of the papers mentioned one significant point which the foreign news agencies stressed, namely that Tojo's affidavit was reminiscent of pre-war Japanese military propaganda.

The only paper to editorialize on the Tojo trial was the Mainichi. In an editorial entitled "We Apologize to the World," the influential daily roundly disapproved Tojo's assertions and declared, "Unless we continue to repent and reflect upon our misdeeds of the past, we shall never become a respectable member of the community of peace-loving and cultural nations."

No matter how vigorously Tojo may insist that Japan resorted to hostilities in self-defense, the series of wars Japan waged cannot be described as wars for self-defense, the Mainichi said, adding that none of the three recent wars Japan launched was not a war of aggression.

The paper bemoaned the fact that few of the many Japanese who were opposed to the war dared to protest positively against the government's war policy. Deploring the lack of scientific attitude among the Japanese people including Tojo and other defendants at the Tokyo trial, the Mainichi asserted that full scientific knowledge of the war potential of Japan herself and the adversaries would have prevented the occurrence of the Pacific War.

Referring to Tojo's remark, "The responsibility (for defeat) I am not only willing, but sincerely desire, to accept fully," the journal declared, "If only from humanitarian point of view, the Japanese people's verdict on him must necessarily be cold and stern."

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NIPPON TIMES

EDITORIAL

Seeking Forgiveness 575-1

During the two years and a half since the surrender, the Japanese people have lived a life of repentance and introspection relative to the cause and results of the reckless Pacific War.

But the evil effects of the unscientific and dictatorial government of Japan during centuries past have not yet been completely eliminated from the minds of the people. Unless every citizen continues to give serious consideration to the errors of the past and seeks a higher life through repentance, he will never become an upright member of the peaceful and cultured nation now under formation.

In this sense, the affidavit of Hideki Tojo read at the International Military Tribunal courtroom, Tokyo, offers to us another opportunity for introspection as the year 1947 draws to a close.

As it is clarified in the Tojo affidavit, Japan was in a very difficult economic situation immediately previous to the beginning of the Pacific War. As the result of the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese conflict since 1931, the material resources needed to support militaristic Japan had reached the bottom of the barrel. The population problem added to the difficulties.

But the contention that "to endure meant the death of Japan" will hold water only on the premise that militaristic Japan had to be strengthened.

However persistently Tojo may emphasize the "war of self-defense," it is clear that the Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War cannot be lightly dismissed as self-defensive wars.

The Japanese people were troubled by the series of "aggressive wars" since the Manchurian Incident, but they were spiritually paralyzed by the powerful suppression of opinion and the protraction of the armed conflict.

This lack of spiritual independence on the part of the Japanese people becomes more and more clear as we are given opportunities to introspect into our shortcomings.

We must seek the forgiveness of the peoples of the world for the fact that those who persistently and actively opposed the war were so few in Japan. The Manchurian Incident, the Sino-Japanese War, and the Pacific War—can anyone of these be truthfully called a "self-defensive" war?

The Tojo affidavit reveals that very little scientific study was made into the fighting potentialities of the Allied Powers or the warring strength of Japan herself. It is difficult to discover any scientific attitude on the part of the Japanese authorities relative to the war in the Tojo affidavit or in the other statements made before the Tribunal.

If the Japanese Army and Navy authorities had conducted precise scientific surveys on the relative fighting power of the nations, it would have been found that Japan had no reserve strength to start the Pacific War.

In retrospection, we keenly feel the utter necessity of perfecting a democratic government in Japan. If real democracy takes firm root in Japan, the people will never again be confronted with a tyrannical government.

Tojo, in his affidavit says: "As to the responsibility for defeat, I feel that it devolves upon myself as Prime Minister. The responsibility in that sense I am not only willing but sincerely desire to accept fully."

The judgment of the Japanese people must be heartlessly rigorous, even from the humanitarian standpoint alone.

MAINICHI DEC 28 1947

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Tojo Maintains Losing War Was Only Crime

Arrogant Defendant Claims Japan Forced Into Conflict

By RUSSELL BRINES
Chief of Tokyo AP Bureau

Bald, lynx-eyed Hideki Tojo—product of a tradition—set the tone today for Japan's recollection of the Pacific War.

His only crime was losing, he said in a defense affidavit before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. For that he apologized to his emperor. But the war into which he led Japan was in "self

defense" and prompted by "aggression" of the western powers.

Too many Japanese still believe that version of the bitter Pacific War. It parallels the last thing their Emperor told them about it during his surrender broadcast of August 15, 1945—a document that gave more attention to "righteous" causes of war than reasons for capitulation.

After 19 months in the courtroom, Tojo does not resemble the "crown prince of defeat" he once was. Instead, in the manner and tone of his affidavit he has reassumed an earlier role—the tough, arrogant prime minister whose iron hand pushed Japan to her greatest moment of power.

Two years ago Tojo grunted, "Let me die" as he lay groaning in his own blood at his Tokyo home. When occupation officers came to arrest him Tojo tried and failed to kill himself with a bullet from a .32 caliber revolver which had been taken from a captured American flier.

"It is not right," he muttered, "for the former head of a state to face trial. . . ."

Inability to die properly was accounted by the Japanese then as the crowning failure of the little man who had been their war dictator. They ridiculed him as a "coward" and said he had "betrayed" them. Now Tojo—one of the healthiest men in the courtroom—has begun to speak to international judges, through his affidavit, in almost the same defiant lecturing tones he once used to whip his people into line.

A basic thread throughout Tojo's narrative is his "concern" for the Emperor.

It was to serve him and save the homeland that Japan conquered and exploited most of Asia "in self defense." It was to advance the country's welfare that Japan joined the tripartite pact, not in any friendship for the Axis powers.

Finally, the Pacific War was started because Japan "was threatened" by United States and Britain who, Tojo implies, wanted to conquer a country so poor it now costs them millions of dollars a year to keep afloat.

During his days of power, Tojo was exalted as the perfect example of what a Japanese Army officer should be. He employs many of those characteristics again in what may be his last speech to the Japanese people—Emperor devotion, opportunism, inflexibility, complete absence of conscience.

This is in a country where devotion to the Emperor has been used repeatedly as a defense for murder. It is a country where even now dramas exalting power and the use of every guile to obtain it are returning to unprecedented popularity.

Tojo in his defense contends there never has been a militaristic clique in Japan and no continuing plans for conquest. In saying so, he had used the same slogans and arguments he himself employed as Japan's most powerful commoner five years ago—and the same outline of an economic federation of Asia, under Japan, which the sword-wearing Samurai used to proclaim 60 years ago.

DEC 30 1947

STARS & STRIPES

Tojo Says Japan Gessed Badly On Russia, Germany

By FRANK WHITE

Associated Press Correspondent

Japan guessed wrong on the tense relations between Germany and Russia and was caught completely off balance when those two nations went to war, Former Premier Hideki Tojo declared today in his defense affidavit read to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Tojo declared that "wishful thinking got the upper hand in our appraisal" . . . of the German-Russian situation. Even after two direct warnings by military attaches in Germany, Japanese leaders concluded "Germany's open grudge against Russia was nothing but a feint" to screen landings operations against Britain," he said.

The ex-war minister said Japanese-Russian relations were proceeding smoothly, adding "true, a softened attitude observed in Moscow authorities did cast upon our minds a slight suspicion."

He declared that Japan's attempt to draw Russia into the tripartite pact failed in April, 1941, when Matsuoka made a trip to Germany and found Hitler's relations with the Soviets strained and war likely in the future.

Tojo said Japan, always was conscious of Soviet forces in the north, readily agreed to a neutrality pact with Russia even if the Germans were not willing to accept Russia in the alliance.

He said that at the time Russia's attitude softened, Japanese leaders were engrossed in negotiations with the United States, which also opened in April, 1941. Tojo told the Tribunal he believed the United States stiffened its attitude toward Japan in June on the basis of advance knowledge that Russia was going to enter the war against the Nazis.

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TOJO TAKES WAR RESPONSIBILITY STICKS TO PRE-WAR PROPAGANDA IN 250-PAGE DEFENSE AFFIDAVIT

Events From July 1, 1940 Until Outbreak Of Conflict Told

BARES 'BLUFF' BY MATSUOKA

Konoye Cabinet Wrecked by His Refusal to Agree to Change in Policy

The following extracts are taken from the text of Hideki Tojo's 250-page affidavit which was introduced into the International Military Tribunal for the Far East yesterday.

On the 17th of July (1940) I received orders from the War Minister to report to Tokyo and accordingly left from the Mukden Air Field arriving at Tachikawa Air Field Tokyo at 9:40 P.M. on the 18th, after making one stop-over at Heijo en route. I immediately visited the official residence of the Minister of War and received reports concerning the circumstances relative to the fall of the previous Cabinet, and was informed also that the Emperor had ordered Prince KONOYE to form the succeeding Cabinet and that I was recommended as the candidate for War Minister.

That evening, I received a summons from Premier-designate KONOYE, and on the following day (19 July) at 3 p.m. I called on him at his private residence at Ogikubo, Suginami Ward, Tokyo. There were present at this meeting Prince KONOYE, Navy Minister Zenge Yoshida, Foreign Minister candidate Yosuke MATSUOKA and myself.

Improvement of Japanese-American Relations

All the members were deeply concerned with what effect the joining of hands with Germany and Italy would have on Japanese-American relations. Premier KONOYE, being fully conscious of the firm wishes of the Emperor that Japan should always be on the most friendly terms with America and Britain, was most prudent on this point, believing that friendly relations with these two countries was extremely essential to the ultimate solution of the China Incident. However, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA insisted that in view of the markedly unfriendly attitude evidenced by America and Britain since the Washington Conference that there was only one policy left for Japan to follow and that was to take a firm attitude towards both. Mr. MATSUOKA held the

responsibility for the decision of 1 December 1941 for war is that of the Cabinet Ministers and members of the High Command, and absolutely not the responsibility of the Emperor.

The Decision on the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War And Its Promulgation

Japan promulgated the Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war on December 8, 1941, on the first day of war. This Imperial Rescript has been introduced as Exhibit No. 1240. As is clearly indicated in the first paragraph of that document, this Rescript was solely addressed to the people of Japan, and it does not fall into the category of a communication of commencement of hostilities, as contemplated under international law.

The final draft of the Imperial Rescript was decided upon at the Cabinet Council on 5 December and at the Liaison Conference on 6 December, and submitted to the Throne on 7 December 1941. However, in view of the gravity of the subject, I made two or three interim reports to the Throne prior to its final form. On these occasions we amended the following two points in the Imperial Rescript in obedience to His Majesty's wishes, on the responsibility of the Cabinet:

The first is, a line of the 3rd paragraph of the Rescript, reading, "It has been truly unavoidable and far from our wishes that our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain" which was amended and added in accordance with His Majesty's wishes. The second, is an amendment to the concluding part of the Rescript, which was transmitted through the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, KIDO, to Cabinet Secretary Inada. The original wording of the concluding paragraph of the draft read, "raising and enhancing thereby the glory of the 'Imperial Way' within and without our homeland," which was thence, according to the Imperial wish, amended to read "preserving thereby the glory of our Empire." His Majesty's true intent and purpose can be easily understood from the foregoing two amendments.

The President's Message to the Emperor

About 1 a.m. on 8 December 1941 (I do not recall the exact hour) Foreign Minister TOGO suddenly called on me at the

Prime Minister's residence, and told me that Ambassador Grew visited him and after informing him that the President of the United States had sent a personal message to the Emperor handed him a copy of this document.

That was the first time I knew of the President's message. It is absolutely untrue, therefore, as alleged by the Prosecution, that I had previous knowledge that the President's message would be forthcoming from America; much less is it true that the Army or the Government contrived to delay the delivery of such message.

In concluding my evidence at this and perhaps the only time permitted to me under the rules of this Court, may I reiterate that the policy of Japan; and certainly the choice of her duly constituted officials of state, involved neither aggression nor exploitation. Step by step, through numerous legally selected Cabinets, and without a variance in regularly constituted governmental procedure, our country finally was brought face to face with stark reality, and to us who at that period were weighted with the duty of deciding the fate of our nation, a war of self-existence was our only alternative. We staked the fate of our country on that decision and lost, bringing about the present plight as we see it before our eyes.

The query as to whether or not the war was a just one considered from the viewpoint of international law and the responsibility for defeat are two different matters clearly distinguishable. The former is a problem between foreign countries and a legal one, but I believe firmly and will contend to the last that it was a war of self-defense and in no manner a violation of presently acknowledged international law. Never at any time did I ever conceive that the waging of this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime or that regularly constituted public officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals under any recognized international law or under alleged violations of treaties between nations.

As to the other question, the responsibility for defeat, I feel that it devolves upon myself as Premier. The responsibility in that sense I am not only willing but sincerely desire to accept fully.

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**INSIBILITY;
PROPAGANDA
AFFIDAVIT**

Tojo's Affidavit 575-1

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vent our entry on the side of Germany and Italy. In case a treaty is signed, and our attitude is clarified, will that not result in an intensification of American pressure against Japan, and result in obstructing the solution of the China Incident?" Foreign Minister Matsuoka's reply to this question was, "American sentiment today against Japan is extremely bad and this condition cannot be remedied by a mere policy of appeasement. Under the present circumstances a firm stand on our part is the only way war can be prevented." Mr. Matsuoka proceeded to confer with Herr Stahmer, and drafted the Tripartite Pact, which in turn was submitted to the Cabinet and subsequently to the Privy Council.

The treaty was signed on the 27th, after confirmation by the Privy Council, and the accompanying Imperial Rescript was issued on the same day.

The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact and Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip to Europe

I shall next testify regarding the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, and my participation in it as War Minister.

When Mr. Matsuoka arrived in Europe the situation was very different from what Japan believed it to be at that time. The relations between Germany and the Soviets were strained to a point where the possibility of the Soviets acting in concert with the three party nations was incomprehensible. Moreover, Germany was in a position where she could not welcome the conclusion of a neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union, so hence, there was no extension of her good offices to that end in prospect. On this point Japan's intention and that of Germany were at variance. Eventually on 13 April 1941, on his way home, Mr. Matsuoka signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union but aside from this no material advantages diplomatically were derived from his trip whatsoever.

The Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact was concluded under those circumstances and did not have much effect on our subsequent national policy.

There was some doubt as to whether the Germans should be advised of the Japan-American negotiations and, if so, to what extent should they be so advised. It was decided to leave that matter to the discretion of the Foreign Minister. It was planned to advise Ambassador Nomura immediately by telegram to the effect that on general principles there was no objection to proceeding with negotiations as suggested. The Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his agreement with the decision of the Conference but proposed that the dispatch of instructions be postponed until the following day in view of the fact that the Foreign Minister was expected at that time. The Conference accepted his proposition and adjourned.

Matsuoka Returns From Europe

However, upon the return of Foreign Minister Matsuoka on the following day (22nd April, 1941) progress on the decision was delayed. It was planned to hold a Liaison Conference on the afternoon of the 22nd and enter into deliberation on this problem, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka limited himself to a report on his European trip and proposed that he be given about two weeks time to ponder over the Proposal. That was the first cause of the slow development in the matter. Then the Foreign Minister revealed the contents of the Proposal prematurely to the German Ambassador, and that was the second cause of the delay. Moreover, the Foreign Minister insisted upon (a) issuing a statement on the European War prior to the instructions to the Japanese Ambassador, as well as (b) proposing a Neutrality Treaty between Japan and America, and these factors further complicated the issues of the negotiations on the proposed understanding.

There are various reasons why the Foreign Minister took this attitude. In the first place, the Foreign Minister was originally of the belief that the Proposal was the outcome of preliminary negotiations carried out by himself, but later he learned that the Proposal did not emanate from his own plan but that it had developed from sources outside the regular diplomatic channels. Consequently he adopted a cool attitude towards the Proposal itself. Additionally, since his visit to Germany and Italy, and after conferences with the leaders of those countries, he became convinced that the obligations of the Tripartite Alliance should be fulfilled and these were revealed in his pronouncements. Finally, his firm belief that only a resolute stand on our part could ward off the dangers of open conflict was reinforced by the attitude shown subsequently by America. These were my personal observations on this point.

Negotiations Between the United States and Japan Under the Third Konohe Cabinet (Part I, Negotiations Prior to September 6th, 1941)

Under the Second KONOHE Cabinet the negotiations between

view that war between Japan and America would result in the destruction of the world, and hence every effort should be made to prevent this occurrence, and for that reason it was essential to improve the relations between the two countries, which in turn could be accomplished only by Japan taking a resolute position. The members decided to entrust the Foreign Minister with the responsibility of drawing up a practical plan of action.

TRIPARTITE PACT

I shall next proceed to testify on the events leading up to the signing of the Tripartite Pact, as I understood them. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was in complete charge of all negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty, and my participation was merely in my capacity as War Minister.

On September 4 a four Minister Conference was held at the official residence of the Prime Minister with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Vice-Minister of Navy, acting for the Navy Minister, and myself attending. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA submitted for discussion, without previous notice, the subject of strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy axis, and proposed that the three powers should cooperate mutually towards the objective of establishing a new order in Europe and Asia, and that they should confer with each other as soon as possible as to the best method of accomplishing this end and make it known to the public at large.

Imperial Conference Held

Following this, the Imperial Conference was held at about 3 p.m. of the same day, and approval was given to the decisions of the Liaison Conference. During the proceedings President Hara of the Privy Council proposed a question to the following effect, "America is withholding her pressure against Japan appreciably in order to pre-

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us and the United States came to a standstill, and the ultimate downfall of that Cabinet resulted. The overthrow of the Government, however, was in fact caused by the necessity of removing Foreign Minister MATSUOKA with a view to a prompt, conclusive and satisfactory settlement of the American-Japanese negotiations.

To have demanded his resignation would certainly have implied political discord so the Government to avert such a situation resigned en masse.

The Imperial Conference Held on September 5th, 1941

Japan was confronted with a grave situation fatally involving her system of national defense on 26 July, 1941 when her assets in America, Great Britain and the Netherlands were frozen. We were forced by this crucial happening to adopt immediately some expedient measures for our future security and continuance as a nation. Thereupon, an Imperial Conference convened on 6 September, 1941 at which a general plan was agreed upon designated as the "Execution of the Empire's Policy."

In substance the "Execution of the Empire's Policy" consisted of proceeding along the following broad bases of action on previously determined measures applicable to the south in view of the constrained circumstances:

(1) Determined efforts should be made to reach a final compromise regarding the American-Japanese negotiations not later than the first decade of October.

(2) Meanwhile we should complete preparations to ensure our self-defense and our self-preservation with such high resolve as not to evade fighting with America and Great Britain not later than the third decade of October.

(4) Other measures than these should be prosecuted according to the previous decisions.

The American-Japanese negotiations had reached a virtual deadlock. The Third KONOYE Cabinet, which was formed after the Government, in order to combat the gloomy situation, had displaced Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, struggled assiduously but in vain trying to solve the knotty problem.

As for the outlook in case war should break out with America and Great Britain it was apparent that we could not be too hopeful of winning against the two greatest powers in the world. Japan had no alternative but to advance to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, holding important strategic points, occupying regions for military resources and repulsing enemy attacks to the best of our ability and spirit to the last ditch.

The American-Japanese Negotiations Under the Third Konoye Cabinet

(Part II, After the Imperial Conference on 6 Sept. 1941)

After the decision reached in the Imperial Conference on 6 September, American-Japanese negotiations were conducted solely through Foreign Minister Toyoda, so I shall refer but briefly to it here from my own understanding.

The Washington Government insisted upon a clear-cut expression of the Japanese Government's intentions in regard to the interpretation placed upon the Tripartite Alliance, the stationing of our troops (in China and elsewhere) and non-discrimination in international commerce.

Thus the American-Japanese negotiations met with another tremendous obstacle. The third KONOYE Cabinet, vainly exhausting its efforts in these prolonged negotiations, collapsed in the middle of October.

At two o'clock, P.M. on 12 October 1941 the meeting of the Five Ministers of State was held at Tekigaiso (Prince KONOYE's residence at Ogikubo) in response to an invitation from the Premier.

The Contention of Premier KONOYE and Foreign Minister Toyoda was that if Japan holds fast to the policies held until today there cannot be any hope to conclude the parley with results. Meanwhile as the crux of the difficulty lies in the question of evacuating our troops from China a specific concession on our part on that point may be accompanied by some hope of success. To the Empire of Japan there is left some room about this problem of the evacuation question in which we may retain what is substantial to us and concede the nominal. That is to say, we may agree at first to withdraw our troops wholesale in conformity with the American requests, and, subsequently, we may yet retain our forces in China under an agreement made with China on an entirely new basis. Practically, this was tantamount to a revision of the decision reached on September 6th. However, the two Ministers did not mention that it was a revision of that decision.

My position was as follows. Judging from the course that the negotiations have taken hitherto, especially from the American reply dated October 2nd, which was made to our proposal founded upon the discussion in the Imperial Conference on September 6th, as well as the American virtual refusal to a personal meeting of the responsible chiefs of the two countries, could anyone

entertain the slightest hope that the parley would ever successfully be concluded? To continue the conversations longer will surely result in our being imposed upon by America's dilatory policy. In case we are forced to make war with the United States, we may be placed in a precarious position and suffer considerable restriction in the conduct of such a war by allowing ourselves to drift along with that procrastination. Now is the time, therefore, to make a decision anticipated in the resolution of September 6th.

At 10 o'clock in the morning (Oct. 14) the Cabinet council was opened whereupon Foreign Minister Toyoda expressed an opinion similar to that which he had disclosed during the talk at "Tekigaiso." I also made an explanation which was the same in purport as I had done at that meeting. In this council neither Premier KONOYE nor Minister of the Navy OIKAWA, nor other colleagues, except the Foreign Minister, made any remarks at all. Thus a collision ensued between the Foreign Minister and myself, and all was over.

Formation of the Tojo Cabinet

With regard to the formation of a new ministry, I found it pretty hard to make up my mind. Considering that there would be no way left for me but to seek the Divine Will to guide me, I hastened to pay homage to the Meiji Shrine, and, secondly, I went to bow before the TOGO Shrine, and, later proceeded to the Yasukuni Shrine. While so engaged, an idea for the formation of the ministry occurred to my mind of its own accord, namely, (1) to complete the formation of a cabinet I must go to the last extremity, once the Imperial order to proceed was given to me, (2) no delay in constructing a Cabinet is permissible, (3) as to the selection of personnel, excepting the candidate for Navy Minister, which was to be left with the Navy, I determined that it should be made solely on the merits of each man's personal timber.

The Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941

Upon the occasion of my receiving the Imperial Mandate to form a Cabinet, His Majesty, from His deep wishes for peace, commanded me, as previously asserted, to return to a policy of a clean slate. Accordingly, after the formation of the Cabinet, the Government, with the cooperation of the Supreme Command, immediately went into deliberations of high state policy on the basis of that injunction. From 23 October to 2 November Liaison Conferences were held frequently.

Deliberations were held on the manner of guiding the subsequent state policy of Japan in accordance with the outline for negotiations with America, and the following three plans were finally drawn up.

The first plan was to continue Japan-America negotiations on the basis of the outline newly adopted for negotiations with America. Furthermore, even in case the negotiations ended in a rupture the Government was to continue its policy of patience and caution.

The second plan called for the termination of negotiations at that stage and immediately decide on war.

The third plan was to continue negotiations with America based upon the outline as constituted but that a determination to go to war should be made in the event of the failure of these negotiations, and operational preparations should be commenced accordingly. A solution through diplomatic means was to be sought by the early part of December. In case the negotiations succeeded, all operational preparations were to be immediately recinded. In case the negotiations ended in failure, a decision to go to war was to be made forthwith. This decision on war was to be taken up at that time as an independent issue.

The Liaison Conference in the final analysis adopted the third plan.

The above decision of a very serious nature was submitted to the Throne informally by me and by the Chiefs of the General Staff of both the Army and the Navy at about five o'clock in the afternoon on November 2nd, 1941. While presenting the submission I could see from the expression of His Majesty that he was suffering from a painful sense of distress arising from his peace loving

faith. When His Majesty had listened to what we had to submit he was grave and thoughtful for a time and then with a serious air of concern deplored, "Is there no way left but to determine, against our wishes, to wage war against America and Britain in case our effort in America-Japan talks should fail to break the deadlock." Then he continued, "If the state of affairs is just as you have stated now there will be no alternative but to proceed in the preparations for operations, but I still do hope that you will further adopt every possible means to tide over the difficulties in the America-Japan negotiations."

In view of the grave concern of His Majesty, I deliberated upon the subject, and with a view to leaving no stone unturned in the study of the question and by so doing to act in accordance with the anxiety of His Majesty, I de-

better act in accordance with the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on 5 November. But the final decision was to be made not at the Liaison Conference but at the Imperial Conference, and the next Imperial Conference was scheduled to be held on 1 December to which all members of the Cabinet were to be present representing the Government.

Suddenly, a little past 3 p.m. on 30 November, I was summoned by the Emperor. I immediately proceeded to the Palace and was granted an audience accordingly. What the Emperor was pleased to say to me was that Prince TAKAMATSU, the Imperial brother, told him that as our Navy's hands are full it desires to avoid war. And the Emperor asked for my comment on this point, whereupon I answered as follows: "It is the common desire of your Government and the High Command to avoid this war. Now that the Liaison Conference, after prudent and scrupulous deliberation, has arrived at a decision, as has already informally been reported to the Throne, there is no remaining alternative but to resort to a war of self-defense. The High Command is fully convinced of victory. If, however, Your Majesty should entertain any shade of doubt on this point you had better summon the Chief of the Navy General Staff and the Navy Minister, and let them explain to your heart's content."

After 7 o'clock that evening, Marquis KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, notified me by telephone that the Emperor allowed the Imperial Conference to be held on 1 December as slated.

The Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941

I was permitted by His Majesty to preside over the proceedings, which was the usual procedure. That day's agenda was, "Whereas the negotiations with the U.S.A. based on the outline of Japan's national policy, decided on 5 November, having ended in failure, Japan opens war against the U.S.A. Britain and the Netherlands."

Mr. Hara, the President of the Privy Council, made queries on the prospect of a naval victory in the face of a progressive increase and reinforcement in U.S. armament. To this question the Chief

of the Naval General Staff answered. It was true that the U.S. was pursuing a big armament plan. But 40% of its Naval strength lay in the Atlantic, which could not speedily be transferred to Pacific waters. An increase in the British fleet in the Far East was to be expected to a certain extent and it was already actually taking place. But judging from the European war situation it was apparent that they could not move any major portion of it to the Far East. The power of the U.S. and Britain had the defect of being an Allied and a combined force. So if they challenged us in a combat we were ready to meet them with a hopeful prospect of success. The important question was, how would we manage if the war became protracted. The answer was in effect that it was quite impossible to make any positive calculation on the outcome of the war if protracted, as much depends on varied factors, both actual and implied, the total potentials of the belligerents, and, above all, on the fluctuating world situations of the future. (Even then he did not betray a word on the operational plan including an attack on Hawaii.)

I answered that the Government and the High Command are proceeding with their war plans. In the case of a prolonged warfare we would be very careful to guard the people against restlessness and maintain law and order internally by preventing disquieting influences to arise from within, and disturbing artifices to be injected from without.

Therefore the proposal was adopted. His Majesty, the Emperor, uttered not a single word during this Conference.

All the Cabinet Ministers attended this Imperial Conference, and we regarded the decision of the Conference to be taken as the decision of the Cabinet. On the part of the High Command, it also took the necessary course of action under its respective competence and responsibility.

As to affairs of state consummated through the above described procedure, the entire responsibility rests, in effect, upon the responsible persons in the Cabinet and in the Supreme Command, and not with the Emperor.

The Emperor had no free choice from the governmental structure setting up the Cabinet and the Supreme Command. He was not in a position to reject the recommendations and advice of the Cabinet and High Command. His wishes or hopes were necessarily assisted by the Lord Keeper, and even these hopes when expressed finally were to be scrutinized by the Cabinet or the Supreme Command. Recommendations and suggestions after this careful examination had to be approved by the Emperor and never to be rejected. That, then, was the position of the Emperor before and during the most perplexing period in the history of the Japanese Empire.

These facts being what they are, it was solely upon the Cabinet and the Supreme Command that the responsibility lay for the political, diplomatic and military affairs of the nation. Accordingly, the full

terminated to hold a joint conference of the Army and Navy Councillors prior to the Imperial Conference of November 5th so that further deliberations on the problem might be made.

Supreme War Council

On 4 November 1941, one day before the Imperial Conference, this meeting was held.

Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral NAGANO, first of all explained the position concerning Naval operations, the gist of which is as follows:

If matters continue as at present it is plain that the resiliency of our national strength will be lost, and we will be placed in the worst possible situation. . . . The High Command desires to make proper operational plans to meet such a contingency judging that in doing so it will contribute at the same time to expedite diplomatic negotiations. In case, however, the Japan-America negotiations fortunately succeed, the operational preparations will be countermanded at once. On this point agreement with the Government is already reached.

At the end of the Conference a report was unanimously adopted to the effect that the Supreme War Council deem it proper and just that the Army and Navy High Command take measures in their respective jurisdictions to expedite operational preparations to meet the worst possible contingencies.

His Majesty the Emperor, was pleased to listen to the proceedings, although uttering not a single word from the beginning to the end.

Negotiations With the United States Under the Tojo Cabinet

In the TOJO Cabinet, the Foreign Ministry took charge of the negotiations with the United States, so my personal knowledge is confined to the general outlines.

As the Government foresaw increasing difficulties and as the situation required a prompt solution, it was decided to send Ambassador Kurusu to assist Ambassador Nomura in the negotiations, which had, since August, been the wishes of Mr. Nomura. Kurusu left Tokyo on the 5th of November and arrived at Washington on the 15th of the same month. In this procedure there was no design whatsoever to camouflage Japan's intention, if any, to start war. It came purely from the wish to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion, as was testified to by the witness Yamamoto.

The Foreign Minister advised Ambassador Nomura that the situation required a rapid solution of the questions involved, and the Japanese wish to that same effect was fully conveyed to the American Government.

It may be said that the representations of both parties had become clear by that time, after six months of negotiations, and that the sole remaining question was whether or not any effort should be made to maintain peace in the Pacific by means of reciprocal concessions by both parties. For this purpose, Japan realized, on her part, the necessity of explaining to the world the limit of the terms that could be borne by her at that time. For the purposes of safeguarding her independence and sovereignty, the Japanese Government expected:

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(1) That third powers would not disturb Japan in her disposition of the China Incident;

(2) The elimination of military and economic interference with Japan by foreign powers, and the return to customary foreign relations;

(3) The prevention of the European War spreading to East Asia.

Under such tense circumstances, on November 26th, 1941, the U.S. Government, to both Ambassadors Nomura and Kuruu, made a reply to the effect that it, after carefully studying and consulting with the states concerned with Japan's proposal of November 20th, dissented from the proposal, and submitted a note as a basis for further negotiations. This was what has been termed the "Hull Note" of 26 November. Its contents were as set forth in Exhibit 1245-I. The said "Note" contained not only further adherence to the former assertions on the part of America, but also the following unreasonable demands, which proved to be absolutely unacceptable to Japan at that time, namely:

a. The unconditional withdrawal of the Japanese Army and Navy, including Police force, from French Indo-China as well as from all parts of China (including Manchuria).

b. Denial of the Manchoukou Government.

c. Denial of the Nationalist Government at Nanking.

d. Making the Tri-Partite Alliance a dead letter.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of 27 November, a Liaison Conference was held where we carefully discussed the items in the information so received. We were all dumbfounded at the severity of the U.S. proposition. The main points of the conclusion reached after our deliberations were, as I recall, the following:

(1) The U.S. memorandum of 26 November amounts to an ultimatum against Japan.

(2) Japan cannot accept this memorandum.

It was decided at this Liaison Conference that since there was no hope, further, in the American-Japanese negotiations, we had

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TOJO STAND UPHELD BY DEFENSE COUNSEL

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He Will Not Evade Political
Responsibility, Kiyose
Tells Tribunal

By FRANK WHITE
Associated Press Staff
Correspondent

The defense described former General Hideki Tojo as a stern disciplinarian "strictly obedient to the desires of the Emperor," who as Premier led Japan in a war of "self-defense and self-existence" which was "provoked by the Allied Nations" in the opening address to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East yesterday.

"Tojo will never evade his political and administrative responsibilities for actions he performed and events which took place within the scope of his authority since assuming the War Minister post in July 1940 and later that of Prime Minister in October 1941," said Defense Attorney Iichiro Kiyose.

In his own version of events leading to and occurring during the Pacific War until Tojo was deposed July 22, 1944 when the Allied powers were closing in on Japan for final victory, Tojo will make the following points and explanations, Mr. Kiyose said:

First—"that Japan had neither planned nor prepared beforehand for war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands."

Second—"that hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands were provoked by the Allied nations and the attacks were unavoidable instituted by Japan in self-defense and self-existence."

Third—"that the Japanese Government had scrupulously prepared to deliver the lawful notification of war to the United States of America prior to commencement of the hostilities."

Fourth—explain the "true purport and significance of the Greater East Asia policy" which aimed at "securing political freedom for all the peoples of Greater East Asia" and their "mutual cooperation" in the establishment of a co-prosperity sphere.

Fifth—deny the existence of a

(Continued on Page 3)

Tojo Stand Upheld By Defense Counsel

(Continued from Page 1)

"criminal militaristic clique," show that "political parties became alienated from the people owing to international unrest and internal discontent" and contend "military organs had come to be entrusted with greater power as a result of the system of selecting Army and Navy Ministers from the active list as well as from the absolute independence of the high command from the civil administration."

Sixth—explain the "independence of the Supreme Command and functions of the Liaison and Imperial conferences" in the Japanese Government organization.

Seventh—offer proof "that the dominant characteristic of the military administration exercised by Tojo consisted in a just control and discipline of the military system and he gave neither the orders for, tolerated, nor connived at any inhuman acts."

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**War Was Not A Violation
Of International Law,
He Contends**

BLAMES U.S. AND BRITAIN

**Cabinet, Supreme Command,
Not Emperor, Responsible,
He Declares**

By IAN MUTSU
United Press Staff Correspondent

In a 60,000-word affidavit reminiscent of pre-war Japanese military propaganda, Hideki Tojo, who master-minded Japan's war cabinet and led her military autocracy to defeat, yesterday accepted responsibility for the war, but stoutly denied the criminality with which he is charged before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Tojo's 250-page defense comprised a long, involved history of events leading up to the Pacific War which, he said, was "I believe firmly and will contend to the last, was a war of self-defense and in no manner a violation of international law."

Tojo's entire defense was summed up in the final paragraphs. "Never at any time," he said, "did I ever conceive that waging this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime or that regularly constituted officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals of any recognized international law."

"As to the responsibility for defeat," Tojo said, "I feel that it devolves upon myself as Premier. The responsibility in that sense I am not only willing, but sincerely desire, to accept fully."

Throughout the document Tojo strained to exonerate Emperor Hirohito from responsibility for war, saying: "With regard to the true position of the Emperor there should be no possibility of misconception. The entire responsibility rests, in effect, upon the responsible persons in the Cabinet and in the Supreme Command."

Instructed By Emperor

With regard to the failure of Japan to warn the United States before the Pearl Harbor attack, the affidavit said that the Emperor "frequently instructed both myself and the two chiefs of the general staffs that a warning must precede the attack and the Emperor's wishes in this connection were conveyed to all members of the liaison conference and they were fully aware of them."

"I conscientiously believed at the time that delivery was made (of notification of war) rigorously in confirmation with the foreign minister's instructions," Tojo said. "It was but natural for us to place full faith in our diplomatic official in executing a function of such vital importance."

Regarding the execution of American and Allied fliers, Tojo assumed the responsibility for the laws affecting war prisoners but argued that Japan never ratified the Geneva protocol and that "the Japanese conception regarding prisoners of war differs from that of Europeans and Americans."

Tojo denied flatly that he delayed President Franklin D. Roosevelt's last message to Emperor Hirohito, asserting that the first time he heard of the message, Japanese claims had already taken off from their carriers as a task
(Continued on Page 3)

**War Responsibility
Is Taken by Tojo**

(Continued from Page 1)

force in their mission against Pearl Harbor.

"No subject", he said, "would even think of committing such an outrageous act of lese majeste as to willfully delay a message from the head of the nation addressed to the Emperor."

Blames Matsuoka

After relating his surprise and hesitation over accepting the premiership, Tojo launched into his defense of Japan's position in which he said he found it impossible to bring the "China Incident" to a conclusion because of the "encirclement" of Japan by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

Tojo attempted to place the entire blame for a tripartite pact on the late foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, afterwards insisting that the pact had little effect on subsequent national policy, particularly since Japan had been fooled by the appearance of Russo-German harmony at the time the Alliance was negotiated. Eventually, however, Matsuoka signed the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, but derived no material advantages thereby. Later, Russia pledged itself to enter the war against Japan at the promise of territorial gains even while neutral under the treaty, which was still valid, and actually attacked Japan while the agreement was in force.

Dealing with the events immediately leading up to the war Tojo said:

"A speedy solution of the China Incident required severing the partnership in the South between Chungking and America, Britain and the Netherlands. The expansion of the three powers military preparations in the southern area formed an Allied encirclement around Japan. Provocative statements and actions directed by high American officials on many occasions against Japan plus the increase of economic pressure, construction to our obtaining supplies essential to self existence, the American-British manuevres to alienate French Indo-China and Thailand gave the appearance of hostile activities. The rupture of commercial negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies contributed in the formation of the encirclement."

The freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, the Netherlands and Britain simultaneously was cited as "a combination of the closest nature among the governments" which brought Japanese commercial activities to the point of annihilation.

The affidavit went on to say:

"It was apparent that we could not be too hopeful of winning against the two greatest powers in the world. However, Japan had no alternative but to advance to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, holding important strategical points, occupying those regions for military purposes and repulsing enemy attacks to the best of our ability and spirit to the last ditch.

"But neither the government nor the High Command maintained any war plan against any particular government. We aimed at the prevention, not preparation, for war."

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Tojo Affidavit Bares Path Which Led Japan Into War

Highlights of Tojo's affidavit up to the time of Japan's declaration of war, follow:

The Konoye Cabinet was formed on July 21, 1940. Konoye was fully conscious of the firm wishes of the Emperor that Japan should always be on the most friendly relations with America and Britain but foreign policy was left entirely in the hands of Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka who, while holding that war between Japan and the United States "would result in the destruction of the world," and admitting that "it was essential to improve relations between the two countries," held that the only way this could be done was by Japan adopting a strong stand against the United States, such as by entering into an alliance with Germany and Italy.

(Note: This was probably the most colossal diplomatic bluff that anyone has ever attempted to pull

(Apparently the Emperor did not trouble to summon the Chief of the Naval General Staff whose view, as expressed the following day was that "it was quite impossible to make any positive calculation on the outcome of the war if it were protracted.)

While Tojo accepts full responsibility for Japan's defeat, he places responsibility for the decision to wage war jointly upon his cabinet and the High Command but not on the Emperor who "had no free choice from the governmental structure setting up the Cabinet and the Supreme Command."

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Did Not Notify Britain

Attempting to explain why Japan did not deliver the war notification to Great Britain and the Netherlands, Togo said he believed the United States would notify its ally, Britain, which had pledged simultaneous entry into the war with the United States.

When the ex-Foreign Minister pointed out that Britain did not accept his suggestion that it participate in the negotiations, Keenan countered, "Are you suggesting criminal conduct on the part of Great Britain in forfeiting the right to take part in the talks?"

On Keenan's suggestion that Japan was employing "Hitlerian tactics," Togo, laughing ironically, replied, "At that time I thought not once of Hitler."

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off. When it was called, Japan did not have the cards. So Konoye ditched Matsuoka and apparently sought to mend the fences. But the damage had been done. At this point Konoye and his new foreign minister, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda demanded that if "Japan holds fast to the policies held until today there cannot be any hope to conclude the (American) parley." Tojo, however, opposed any change and demanded that the previous decision to go to war in the event the negotiations proved fruitless be adhered to. Konoye and Toyoda refused to go that far and this resulted in a collision which caused the collapse of the Konoye Cabinet.)

Tojo was commanded to form a cabinet. He was determined on war but out of consideration for the Emperor's desire for peace, agreed to continue negotiations (Continued on Page 3)

Able To Prevent War Legally, Admits Togo

Claims Resignation Would Not Have Preserved Peace

By R. Y. Koitabashi
Staff Writer

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo, Dec. 26.—Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet, admitted to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, that "legally" he was able to prevent war but declared he could not have altered the war decision by resigning.

Cross-examined by Chief of Counsel Joseph B. Keenan, Togo told the court that as early as late October or early November, 1941, he could do nothing to save the situation by resigning.

Answering questions put by Chief Prosecutor Keenan, Togo said that since an unanimous Cabinet decision was required he could have prevented a decision to be reached by having cast a dissenting vote.

Acquiesced in 'Self-Defense'

He explained that he had no alternative but to acquiesce in the interests of "self-defense" since acceptance of the Hull Note of Nov. 26, 1941 would have reduced Japan to a third-rate power. Japanese was forced to choose between "war or suicide," he said.

"Legally speaking," Togo added, "I would have been able to prevent war, but in the light of the situation, I can clarify that I cannot conceive that I could have prevented war merely by my resignation."

Togo denied any relation between Japan's decision and the departure of the Japanese fleet for Pearl Harbor.

He revealed that he instructed Ambassador Nomura to secure an agreement with the United States and other powers by November 25—coincidentally one day before the sailing of the Pearl Harbor attack fleet—explaining that at least five days would be required to secure a joint signature of not only the United States but also Great Britain, the Netherlands and China.

DECISIONS ON WAR LEADERS EXPECTED MAY NEXT YEAR

Lengthy Trial Reaching Climax As Tojo Gives Testimony

By JOHN RICH

International News Service
Decisions in the trial of Hideki Tojo and other wartime Japanese leaders are not expected before early May.

As the lengthy trial reached a climax Friday with the testimony of Tojo a tribunal member told International News Service he expected the case to go to the judges the first of March with decisions being handed down a couple of months later.

Now more than a year and a half old the trial overshadows its Nuremberg sister both in wordage and length of time. More than seven million words have been read into the court record and the transcript is more than 36,000 pages long.

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NIPPON TIMES

Affidavit Bares Path Leading Japan to War

(Continued from Page 1)

with the United States. No progress was made in the talks. He puts the entire blame for this upon the United States and Britain.

Tojo brushed aside efforts on the part of the Emperor and some of the leading statesmen to solve the differences without having recourse to war.

His Cabinet considered the U.S. memorandum of 26 November, 1941, to be an ultimatum and decided on waging war.


The Emperor made one final effort on November 30 to dissuade Tojo who sarcastically answered: "The High Command is fully convinced of victory. If, however, Your Majesty should entertain any shade of doubt on this point you had better summon the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Navy Minister, and let them explain to your heart's content."

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Tojo Accepts War Blame




(Signal Corps Photo) Smiling as his affidavit is read to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, ex-Premier Hideki Tojo admits his responsibility for the war but steadfastly denies he should be subjected to criminal charges for what he did in an official capacity.

575-1
Tojo Admits Plunging Japan Into War, Denies He Plotted

Confesses Guilt In Trial, Death Sentence Of Doolittle Raiders

575-1
Study Of Hideki Tojo As He Takes Stand



From left to right, Tojo is sworn in by the Marshal of the Court and then sits impassively as his Defense Counsel begins his opening statement. Tojo listens as it is read to the Tribunal, telling of his association with Japan's alleged

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By IAN MUTSU

United Press Staff Correspondent

Hideki Tojo Friday admitted full responsibility for the Pacific War and Japan's defeat but told the world that he had committed no crimes.

The unrepentant Tojo, wearing a khaki Japanese army uniform, took the witness stand at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East to tell his story and to be the only witness for his defense.

He denied that he had plotted against the Allied nations.

He assumed responsibility for plunging Japan into the war, but insisted that it was a defensive war.

He took the blame for the trial and death sentences of the Doolittle fliers, but said the American airmen violated international law when they bombed Tokyo.

He challenged the right of the 11-nation Allied Tribunal to sit in judgment upon him.

He vigorously defended the Emperor.

Tojo Admits

(Continued from Page 1)

who will be 64 on December 30 replied with a firm "So-desu" ("That is right.")

It was noticed that Tojo had a string tied around the middle finger of his right hand, but none knew what he was trying to remember.

Tojo's entire defense was summed up in the final paragraphs. "Never at any time," he said, "did I ever conceive that waging this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime or that regularly constituted officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals of any recognized international law."

The affidavit went on to accuse the American fliers of international law violations. Attempting to justify the passage in 1943 of the Japanese prisoners of war punishment bill, Tojo asserted, "when on the 18th of April, 1942, the Doolittle fliers invaded the Tokyo area, atrocities were committed by these fliers in violation of international law and regulations."

"It is unnecessary to recall that these same atrocities, instigated against a civilian population, constituted war crimes according to established international law."

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STARS & STRIPES

The courtroom was packed to capacity as the baldheaded, bespectled former premier of Japan's Pearl Harbor cabinet began unfolding his story as the only Axis dictator to go on trial.

Tojo smiled broadly the minute Dr. Ichiro Kiyose, his Japanese lawyer, finished reading the opening defense summation.

Tojo vigorously blew his nose. Then, with the courtroom flooded in blinding arc lights and newsreel cameras grinding, he walked the 20 paces to the witness stand accompanied by an MP.

On the stand, Tojo removed his black spectacles while he was being sworn in. He sat down and affixed the Japanese characters of his name affirming that the affidavit was his, also affixing his fingerprints.


To the question as to his name and the authenticity of the document, the bald former warlord

Continued On Page 4

(Signal Corps Photo) Far East, ex-Premier subjected to criminal

Japan plotted

Tojo As He Takes Stand In War Crimes Defense



his Defense Counsel begins his opening statement. In the fourth photograph, the war-time premier identifies his 250-page affidavit. At right, he association with Japan's alleged aggression against the U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands.

STARS & STRIPES

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Togo Files Answer, Defends Hirohito

By FRANK WHITE
Associated Press Correspondent

Hirohito was not in "full dress uniform" but merely in his "full uniform" as Fleet Admiral at 3 A.M. December 8, 1941 (Tokyo time) —20 minutes before Japanese naval planes made the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor—President Roosevelt's personal plea for peace was received and rejected, ex-Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo explained yesterday afternoon to the International Military Tribunal.

"Would there be any significance to the fact that the Emperor received you in the uniform of a Japanese Navy officer at or about the time the Japanese Navy was attacking Pearl Harbor?" asked Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan.

"I do not think there is any special significance at all," replied Togo.

In his direct testimony, Togo had not mentioned the garb of the Emperor. However Kennan during the cross-examination had produced a Foreign Office document dug up by Allied investigators which described the scene, when Togo delivered Roosevelt message to the Emperor. Togo at first said did not know who wrote the document, but after prodding by Keenan finally told the Tribunal it was "authentic."

One statement in the document read the "Emperor appeared in full naval uniform" when Togo reported the message to which Togo has admitted that he and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo had already drafted a rejection before showing the missive to Hirohito.

In his later explanation, Togo said the Emperor "usually received him in uniform of either the Japanese Army or Navy, but said he could recall "one or two instances" when the Emperor wore civilian garb on state occasion.

STARS & STRIPES DEC 23 1947

Togo Cross-Examined By Keenan At Trials

Asked To Interpret Threat Made By Shimada

By Eimei Kato, Staff Writer

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo, Dec. 23.—Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan today charged Shigenori Togo, former Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet, with trying to give the impression that he was "merely a simple, benighted, uniformed diplomat walking into extreme danger without any warning."

Togo, who is on the witness stand before the International Military Tribunal, insisted to repeated questioning that the strict secrecy of the progress of the Japanese-American negotiations in the autumn of 1941 prevented anyone not directly concerned to learn details.

Keenan, asked Togo: "So as the late Will Rogers expressed it, all you knew was what you read in the newspapers?"

Information From Newspapers

Togo replied: "Well, I don't know what Will Rogers said, but my sole sources of information were the newspapers and what I heard from journalists and friends in the Foreign Office."

Togo admitted that Tojo violated secrecy regulations when he indicated the direction of the negotiations at the time he asked Togo to become Foreign Minister in his Cabinet.

Keenan then inquired why Togo felt it necessary to insist to Tojo that the Japanese-American negotiations be carried through in case he accepted the Foreign Minister portfolio.

Togo answered that he had heard the stern stand taken by Tojo as War Minister caused the collapse of the third Konoe Cabinet which preceded the Tojo Cabinet in 1941.

Opposed To Pact

Togo revealed that he was opposed to the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy when he joined the Tojo Cabinet, but that the continuity of diplomatic affairs made it impossible to change the national policy.

Concerning his testimony earlier that a co-defendant, former Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada, had threatened him in Sugamo prison, Togo said it was difficult to interpret the meaning of the threat, opining that Shimada did not mean "bodily harm."

MAINICHI DEC 24 1947

TOJO'S TESTIMONY TO BE READ FRIDAY

Togo Says Tojo, Shimada and Suzuki Approved War Decision

By IAN MUTSU
United Press Staff Correspondent

Shigenori Togo, Japan's wartime foreign minister, directly named Hideki Tojo and two of his co-defendants on trial before the Allied Tribunal today as those who voted for war at the crucial November 1, 1941 Liaison Conference preceding the Pearl Harbor attack.

In addition to Tojo, his former Foreign Affairs Chief named former Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada and Teiichi Suzuki, former president of the Cabinet Planning Board, as the two Japanese leaders who, from the beginning, were allegedly in favor of war against the Allies.

Togo, under cross-examination, admitted that he, himself, and another co-defendant among the 25, Finance Minister Okinori Kaya, finally "found no alternative but to agree" with the war faction "within 24 hours."

Togo admitted that by continuing to dissent together with Kaya the two cabinet ministers could have definitely postponed any war decision.

The Foreign Minister emphasized that the Cabinet decision was not sufficient to commit the nation to war and that the Japanese constitution required "further steps" by the Imperial conference.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East adjourned at noon until 9:30 a.m. December 26. Advertently or inadvertently, by doing so it granted Tojo a pre-Christmas reprieve from appearing on the stand to give his long-awaited testimony.

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Tojo Affidavit Condensation

The following is a condensation of the affidavit of Hideki Tojo, wartime Prime Minister, which he submitted to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on December 26, read by George F. Blewett, his American counsel:

Part I

I was born in Tokyo in 1884.

I had no participation in politics whatsoever until July, 1940, when, upon formation of the Second Konoe Cabinet, on July 22, 1940, I was appointed Minister of War.

On October 18, 1941, I received the Imperial Mandate to form a Cabinet and accepted, as any loyal subject would have done, holding at the outset the portfolio of Prime Minister, War Minister, and Home Minister concurrently. (I was promoted to the rank of full General as of that date).

Subsequently I held the portfolios of Foreign Minister, Minister of Education, Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Minister for Munitions.

In February, 1944, I was appointed Chief of the Army General Staff.

With the resignation en bloc of my Cabinet on July 22, 1944, I was relieved of all public offices and placed on the reserve list.

I wish to emphasize at this point that whenever I employ the terms, "of responsibility," or "when I was in a position of responsibility," in the subsequent paragraphs, and in my interrogations, I mean that those events or actions referred to fell within my administrative jurisdiction, and, consequently, I was in the position of being answerable for them politically, but at no time do these terms when used by me admit of any legal or criminal responsibility.

In 1937 an active anti-Japanese movement was sweeping over all China. The Kwantung Army, which shouldered the burden of defending Manchoukuo against Soviet invasion, could not stand idly by and permit such an unstable state of affairs to ensue at its rear, and it, therefore, desired to ameliorate this abnormal and unstable situation.

Our paramount hope was for a final, peaceful settlement with China. Mere appeasement, it was felt, would only aggravate the Chinese, and this view of the Kwantung Army was communicated in my name according to the ordinary official procedure.

2nd Konoe Cabinet

On July 17, 1940, I received orders from the War Minister to report to Tokyo. I was informed that the Emperor had ordered Prince Konoe to form the succeeding Cabinet and that I was recommended as the candidate for War Minister.

On July 19, at 3 p.m., I called on Prince Konoe at his private residence at Ogikubo, Suginami ward, Tokyo.

There were present at this meeting Prince Konoe, Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida, Foreign Minister candidate Yosuke Matsuoka and myself. This is the meeting which later was referred to popularly as the "Ogikubo conference."

The Premier-designate proposed that there should be a closer harmony between the Army and the Navy. No conditional reservations were made by the Army or the Navy in joining the Cabinet, although I did express my personal wish that the solution of the China Incident be accelerated and that plans for national defense be perfected.

As War Minister, I considered three principles for my future course of action:

- (1) To exert unstinted effort toward the solution of the China Incident,
- (2) To establish rigorous control over the internal discipline of the Army, and,
- (3) To work for closer coordination between the Supreme Command and the Government, and between the Army and the Navy.

It is necessary at this point to touch upon the prevailing aspects of domestic and foreign affairs.

There was imminent danger of the European war spreading to East Asia, and it was vital, therefore, that Japan take some active measures to prepare for that contingency. The economic strangulation of Japan by America and

To summarize, at the time the decision on the above "Gist" was made, there was no thought whatsoever of war against America and Britain, but it was feared that regardless of Japan's wishes on this point hostile action by force of arms by America and Britain was a possibility.

Tripartite Pact

Foreign Minister Matsuoka was in complete charge of all negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty, and my participation was merely in my capacity as War Minister. Discussions concerning this move began to assume tangible form with the arrival of Herr Heinrich Stahmer.

At the Privy Council meeting on September 26, 1940, I, as War Minister, made the explanatory remarks that in the event of a war between Japan and America the Army would divert a part of its strength. This remark was made in response to a question based upon the premise of the "worse possible contingency."

It had no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether or not any decision had been made on the part of the Government as to war with America. The treaty was signed on the 27th, after confirmation by the Privy Council, and the accompanying Imperial Rescript was issued on the same day.

It is my sincere belief that the purpose of the treaty was to improve the international position of Japan and thereby operate as a factor in the solution of the China Incident, as well as in preventing the spread of the European War to East Asia.

Stationing Troops In North French Indo-China

The southern policy was the resulting effect of the continuous economic strangulation of Japan by America and Britain. There were two aspects to this southern policy. One was to sever the coalition between America and Britain with Chungking, as a means of solving the China Incident, and the other was the establishment of economic self-sufficiency for Japan.

I shall testify now relative to the request made to the French Indo-China authorities for a grant of facilities in connection with the dispatch of a small Japanese force to north French Indo-China.

The dispatch of Japanese troops to north French Indo-China in the latter part of September, 1940, was prompted by a desire to speedily solve the China Incident and from beginning to end it was our consistent policy to accomplish that wish peacefully.

Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty

It is to be noted that this Treaty did not contain the usual conventional clauses found in most international treaties drawn up at the close of the war, such as the annexation of territory and war indemnity.

Japan undertook to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity



(Top): With earphones clamped firmly on his head, Hideki Tojo listens while his counsel George F. Blewett read his 250-page affidavit.

(Bottom): Tojo's defense counsels George F. Blewett, on the left, and Ichiro Kiyose.

Britain was increasing in severity with each passing day.

The "Gist of Main Points in Regard to Dealing with the Situation to Meet the Changes in the World Conditions" was approved by the Liaison Conference on July 27, 1940.

All the members were deeply concerned with what effect the joining of hands with Germany and Italy would have on Japanese-American relations. Mr. Matsuoka held the view that war between Japan and America would result in the destruction of the world.

The strengthening of national defense against the Soviet Union, and the establishment of a self-sufficient nation were two absolutely essential problems facing Japan at that time.

The obstacles blocking the accomplishment of these crucial objectives were (1) the China Incident and (2) pressure from America and Britain.

of China and pledged itself to surrender those rights to extra-territoriality possessed heretofore and to return its settlements. This promise was carried out step by step by the spring of 1943.

Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact

The central objective of the negotiations with the Soviet Union was to obtain harmonious relations between that country and the Axis powers, thereby maintaining the existing peaceful relationship and enhancing the international position of Japan.

It was contemplated that by so doing the dual objectives could be obtained (1) improving the relations with America and (2) Soviet assistance to Chiang Kai-shek could be curtailed, thereby expediting the settlement of the China Incident.

Eventually on April 13, 1941, on his way home from Europe, Mr. Matsuoka signed a Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union but aside from this no material advantages diplomatically were derived from this trip whatsoever.

Mr. Matsuoka's trip to Europe in the spring of 1941 consisted merely of courtesy calls to Germany and Italy, and no political benefits were derived from these visits.

The Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact did not have much effect on our subsequent national policy. There is no connection whatever between it and the Japanese policy towards the South Seas.

The strength of the defensive force in the north against the Soviets was not reduced because of the pact.

Japan conscientiously and strictly lived up to this Neutrality Pact from beginning to end. It is a fact that the Soviets, on their part, had actually pledged themselves to enter the war against Japan on the promise of territorial gains even while the treaty was still valid, and that nation actually attacked Japan while that Neutrality Agreement was still in force.

Negotiations Between Japan And America

The negotiations between Japan and America under the Second Konoe Cabinet developed into an impasse. The resignation en bloc of the Cabinet resulted from the attitude of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

Stationing Of Troops In S. French Indo-China

Referring to the existence of American and British alienation maneuvers in French Indo-China and Thailand, and the unfriendly tendencies in these countries toward Japan, we received repeated intelligence reports that since 1940 important persons in French Indo-China and Thailand were in close liaison with British authorities in Singapore.

The Prosecution infers that by stationing troops in southern French Indo-China, Japan intended to establish bases for an aggressive attack on America and Britain, but that is an erroneous impression.

Stand In Relation Toward War Between Germany, Soviet Union

It was on June 22, 1941, that the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union actually came to the knowledge of the Japanese Government.

The probability of America's entry into the European war was considerably heightened by the actions of that country, which amounted practically to war, and by the opening of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Tojo Affidavit Condensation

(Continued From Page 1)

Liaison Conference, which was convoked on August 4, 1941, but it was impossible to accept the President's proposition requesting the withdrawal of Japanese troops from FIC unless the cause necessitating those measures were removed or, again, some alleviation of the situation there was really in sight.

To Premier Konoe there was but one course remaining which might in our estimation tide over this dangerous situation. That was a personal meeting between the heads of the two countries where in all frankness opinions could be exchanged on broad lines seeking to restore between the two countries amicable and cooperative relations.

The Washington Government had no objection to the suggestion in principle, but expressed its reluctance to comply with our request unless an agreement was first reached covering all the essential matters. Hence, the hoped of interview was fraught with difficulties at the outset, and seemed doomed to failure.

Imperial Conference On Sept. 6, 1941

The "execution of the Empire's Policy," adopted at the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, consisted of proceeding along the following broad bases of action on previously determined measures applicable to the south in view of the constrained circumstances:

1. Determined efforts should be made to reach a final compromise regarding the American-Japanese negotiations not later than the first decade of October.
2. Meanwhile we should complete preparations to ensure our self-defense.
3. To make up our mind to go to war with America, Britain and the Netherlands if our demands were not to be satisfied diplomatically within the time designated.
4. Other Measures.

It was well known by us, of course, that since May of 1940 the main force of the American Navy with its strength greatly augmented, especially its air arm, had been advanced to Hawaiian waters, and retained there. Thus the relations

Negotiations Under 3rd Konoe Cabinet

(Part I, Negotiations prior to September 6, 1941):

Under the Second Konoe Cabinet the negotiations between us and the United States came to a standstill, and ultimate downfall of the Cabinet resulted.

The Washington officials misunderstood our dispatch of troops to the southern part of French Indo-China and regarded it as the first step in an alleged southern expansion policy directed against America, Britain, and the Dutch East Indies.

Washington intimated a desire to end the negotiations under the plan that it was unable to find a basis on which peace in the Pacific was to be maintained, and went so far as to freeze our assets in the United States. President Roosevelt's proposition demanded that we give up our contemplated dispatch of troops to French Indo-China, or if the dispatch was already under way to withdraw them immediately.

We made a counter proposal following the deliberations in the

(Continued on Page 2)

between Japan and America were consequently put to a severe strain.

In August 1941 it was announced by President Quezon that 30,000 of the United States organized reserves were to be called into service under the command of the Far Eastern Army under General Douglas MacArthur.

From all sources of information it was clearly discernible that the United States was exerting itself feverishly in military expansion.

Furthermore, the American-Japanese negotiations had reached a virtual deadlock. After reflection upon these unsavoury results we determined that in order to accomplish our objectives a different basis of negotiations had to be contrived from a new angle entirely.

Since the possibility of a rupture existed at all times the Imperial High Command was in duty bound to make some preparations to meet the contingency. These consisted of a mobilization of manpower, requisition of shipping, refitting of vessels, insuring maritime transportation, and other similar steps of extensive application.

The High Command requested one month's time at the least, after the national decision to engage in war was reached before hostilities were commenced.

Operational Plan For Possible War

We were quite unable to have a provided plan of war even if such a plan of war was actually essential. There were no preparations for war therefore since we were not equipped with a plan of war, still less, any permanent plan for war in anticipation of a conflict or conflicts in the Pacific was not even dreamed of. It was correct, however, that we were attempting to consolidate our military preparations.

Japan's preparations for possible hostilities against America and Britain were made as emergency measures. But wholesale war preparations aimed against America and Britain may be said to have been non-existent so far as the Japanese Army was concerned.

Negotiations Under 3rd Konoe Cabinet

(Part II, after the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941):

Japan sought to solve vital problems which involved her very existence nationally, whereas the United States stubbornly adhered to the theoretical principles enunciated at the initial stage of the negotiations. Thus the American-Japanese negotiations met with another tremendous obstacle.

The third Konoe Cabinet, vainly exhausting its efforts in these prolonged negotiations, collapsed in the middle of October.

**Downfall Of
3rd Kono Cabinet**

The Empire's decision was reached that war against Britain, America and the Netherlands should not be determined until all hope was lost regarding our requests, which should be met by the first decade in October.

As late as the last part of September the conversations were still in a state of deadlock. Thereupon, the High Commands of both the Army and the Navy in the Liaison Conference of September 25 went so far as to present the Government with a demand calling for a prediction of the success or failure of the pending negotiations, and also to decide the issue of peace versus war not later than October 15, 1941.

The attitude as well as views held by the Army General Staff about that time were roughly as follows:

(1) No hope was to be entertained about the American-Japanese negotiations in view of the attitude of the Washington Government.

(2) The Army General Staff disagreed with our unconditional recognition of the four cardinal principles enunciated by America.

(3) It had no mind to revise the decisions reached in the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941.

My position was as follows:

Judging from the course that the negotiations have taken hitherto, especially from the American reply dated October 2, which was made to our proposal founded upon the discussion in the Imperial Conference on September 6, as well as the American virtual refusal to a personal meeting of the responsible chiefs of the two countries, could anyone entertain the slightest hope that the parley would ever successfully be conclude?

To continue the conversations longer will surely result in our being imposed upon by America's dilatory policy.

Now is the time, therefore, to make a decision anticipated in the resolution of September 6.

If we swallow the American demands, totally giving up the stationing of our troops in China, and withdraw them wholesale, what then will

ensue after that? Not only would Japan bring to naught those sacrifices and those efforts paid for in the course of the China Incident of more than four years standing, but also the Chinese contempt for Japan will ever expand if we retire from China unconditionally because of U.S. duress.

Briefly, the causes I entertained for the resignation of the Cabinet en bloc were these:

(1) Measures had not preceded as yet to a point in the American-Japanese negotiations to enable us to ascertain whether or not there was a hope of settling the matters diplomatically.

(2) Determination of the Navy to go to war was uncertain.

(To Be Continued)

MAINICHI DEC 28 1947

Part II
is on 5 page

Tojo Affidavit Condensat

mainichi Dec 30 '47

This is the last of three parts of a condensation of wartime Prime Minister Tojo's affidavit which is now being read to the International Military Tribunal East in Tokyo:

Part III

**Carrying Out
Pearl Harbor Attack**

Japan on December 1, 1941, for the first time made preparations for opening hostilities. The attack was opened at dawn of December 8 (Japanese time).

As Minister of War, I had been notified of its general outline through the Chief of the Army General Staff but no Cabinet colleague, other than myself, was acquainted with the operation.

I was not without anxiety that the plan of attack might collapse by being forestalled by an enemy attack.

It was at 4.30 a.m. of December 8, 1941, that I received news from the Navy of the successful attack on Pearl Harbor.

At 7.30 a.m. on the same day the Cabinet was called into extraordinary session, and on that occasion the complete plans of military operations were explained for the first time by the Army and Navy Ministers.

As borne out by the evidence, since the United States had full knowledge of our attack prior to its actual launching, and had completed the necessary measures to cope with the situation, such an act as to delay the delivery of the note on our part would not have had any particular effect.

**President's Message
To Emperor**

About 1 a.m. on December 8, 1941 (I do not recall the exact hour). Foreign Minister Togo suddenly called on me and told me that Ambassador Grew visited him and after informing him that the President of the United States had sent a personal message to the Emperor, handed him a copy of this document.

I asked the Minister if the message contained any concessions from the positions hitherto taken by the United States and got the reply that there were none.

I told him that although I had no objection to his reporting the matter to the Emperor, I was afraid that by this time the planes of our task force would be beginning to take off from the carriers.

That was the first time I knew of the President's message.

It is absolutely untrue that I had previous knowledge that the President's message would be forthcoming from America; much less is it true that the Army or the Govern-

ment contrived to delay the delivery of such message.

**Responsibility For
Control, Supervision
Of Administrative Business**

In the military organization of Japan, the responsibility for controlling and directing subordinates is divided into two categories, according to the nature of the matter concerned:

(1) The first category covers matters which arise within the chain of command of the Supreme Command. The final responsibility involved in these matters rests with the Chief of the General Staff.

(2) The second category involves matters which occur within the jurisdictional authority of the Minister of War.

For example, the treatment of prisoners of war after internment at detention camps, established by the Minister of War, or the treatment of civilian internees interned in the war zones.

With respect to the second category I assume administrative responsibility as Minister of War for the period from the beginning of the Pacific War up to July 22, 1944.

Regarding the affairs in the first category, I take administrative responsibility incumbent on the Supreme Command as the Chief of the General Staff from February, 1944, to July, 1944.

Should there be any questions concerning foreign affairs such as protests from enemy countries, or through the International Red Cross, during the period of September 1 to September 17, 1942, I also take administrative responsibilities as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Should there be any incidents

involving the treatment of civilian internees in Japan Proper during the period from December 8, 1941, to February 17, 1942, I also assumed responsibility as Minister of Home Affairs.

Further, as Prime Minister and concurrently as War Minister, I am politically responsible for matters relating to the promulgation of the POW Punishment Law.

As to the Geneva Protocol, it was not ratified by Japan. As a matter of fact, the Japanese conception regarding prisoners of war differs from that of Europeans and Americans.

Furthermore, differences in everyday living conditions, as well as customs and manners between Japanese and other nationals, together with the enormous number of prisoners covering such a vast area and embracing many different races, plus the acute shortage of various materials and supplies, made it impossible for this country to apply the Geneva Protocol verbatim.

The statement that the Japanese conception regarding POW's differs from that of Europeans and Americans means that from ancient times the Japanese have deemed it most degrading to be taken prisoner.

**Military Regulations For
Punishment Of Enemy Fliers**

As regards the punishment of the fliers who raided the Japanese homeland on April 18, 1942, a trial was held pursuant to the aforesaid court-martial law at a court established in Shanghai, and all eight prisoners were sentenced to death.

Being fully aware of His Majesty's gracious concern on such matters, I, as the War Minister, after an informal report to the Throne, took measures to have the death penalty of five of the prisoners commuted.

**Construction Of
Thailand-Burma Railway**

The object sought in plans for the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was to expedite supplies to the Japanese forces in Burma.

With respect to labor in connection with the work on the railway, I agreed to the employment of prisoners of war. Many Japanese soldiers employed there side by side with the POW's were treated equally with men of other and stronger nationalities.

Condensation

tion of wartime Prime Minister Hideki
International Military Tribunal for the Far

Greater East Asia Policy Maintained By Japan

The ultimate object of the policy was, simply, to establish the stability of the Far East. The key point was the establishment of a Greater East Asia. Never could we imagine that
(Continued on Page 2)

Tojo Affidavit Condensation

(Continued From Page 1)

such a policy should be construed as the planning of conquest, the domination of the world, or of aggression.

It is clear from the foregoing statements that we, in our diplomatic relations with Manchoukuo, in the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty, in the announcement of the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration, in reaching a solution of the China Incident, and in the settlement of amicable relations with French Indo-China and Thailand, have bent our achievement of the above goal by means of peaceful means.

As one of the external measures the new China policy was formulated on December 21, 1941, in line with the principle of the Greater East Asia Policy. The execution of this line of policies was completed on October 30, 1943:

(1) The Sino-Japanese agreement stipulating redemption of every concession in Chinese territory and abolition of extra-territoriality, which we had held as our special interest in China, was concluded on January 9, 1943, and became effective as of the same date.

(2) On February 8, 1943, Japan transferred the right to control enemy property we held in China to the Nanking Government.

(3) Japan and China concluded the Sino-Japanese Alliance.

(4) The above-mentioned alliance was newly concluded on equal terms.

Responding to the long-cherished and most ardent wish of the people of Burma, Japan recognized the independence of Burma as a nation on August 1, 1943.

On October 14, 1943, Japan recognized the independence of the Philippines and the enactment of its constitution in accordance with the aspirations of all its people.

As to the true relations between Japan and Thailand, far in advance of the outbreak of the Pacific War, peaceful negotiations were in progress under the principles of the Greater East Asia Policy.

Consequently, (1) on June 12, 1940, the Japan-Thailand friendship treaty was concluded and (2) on May 9, 1941, a protocol of guarantee and political understanding was signed between Japan and Thailand. Furthermore, after the outbreak of the Pacific war:

(1) On December 21, 1941, the two nations signed the treaty of alliance, furthering the cause of the establishment of a new order in East Asia, respecting each other's independence and sovereignty, and promising mutual political and military assistance.

(2) By concluding the Japan-Thailand cultural agreement on October 28, 1942, we promised to strengthen the spiritual ties of the two nations.

(3) In August, 1943, we concluded the treaty which provided that Japan should return to Thailand the four Malayan provinces of Perulis, Kedah, Kerantan and Trengganu out of the former Siamese territory in Malay and the two Shan provinces of Kentung and Monpang then under occupation by Japanese troops.

With respect to the Netherlands Indies, local conditions did not warrant immediate independence.

It is true that the decision of the Imperial Conference of May 31, 1943, appears presumptively to incorporate the territory of the Dutch East Indies under Japanese jurisdiction.

As to the status of that area, the Japanese Government at the time, including myself, desired to realize its independence as promptly as possible.

Army And Politics

It is charged in the Indictment that the internal and foreign policies of Japan were dominated and directed by a "criminal militaristic clique."

In this country, however, apart from the distant past, there has never existed a so-called "militaristic clique," much less a "criminal militaristic clique," during the period covered by the indictment.

It is undoubtedly a fact that the military influence appeared within the political orbit to replace the political parties, but this was not by any means a re-emergence of the old military clique.

It was in character and in historical emergence entirely at variance with Nazism and Fascism, which were organized on a different concept absolutely, both philosophically and politically.

Involvement of the military in politics was due principally to the following political factors:

(1) Impoverishment in the life of the Japanese people.

(2) The gradual transformation of every national activity into the shape of a general mobilization system.

(3) In connection with these factors, the independence of the Supreme Command.

Particularly, since the institution of the Imperial Headquarters in November, 1937, the military authorities gained great power in politics. This tendency was a logical outcome of the concentration of full national strength aimed at the victory we hoped to attain as the object, since its inception, of the Pacific War.

There was no criminal element and I cannot, as one who knows the facts, agree to the assertion that a criminal military clique dominated the politics of Japan.

My Policy To Maintain Military Discipline

As the deplorable incidents of May 15, 1932, and February 26, 1936, suggested a tendency for military officers to interfere in politics and to foster factional relationships, the Army authorities were forced to handle these cases sternly.

War Minister Terauchi took decisive measures to maintain military morale, prohibiting strictly any kind of participation by military men in politics.

I also supported this policy rigidly. Above all, since my assumption of the Premiership, I prevented severely any confusion of affairs between the War Ministry and the Cabinet.

It was true that the political organization of Japan was in a state of general mobilization or of total war standing during my tenure of office as War Minister and as Prime Minister, but there was never at any time political control or domination by a military clique.

Japan never intended to invade the USSR.

The nature of the operation plan of the Japanese Army towards the USSR was essentially defensive.

It was not Japan that broke the Neutrality Treaty and committed aggression in August, 1945, when its terms were still valid.

Japan also had held deep concern in the fact that the influence of the Third International began to pervade through East Asia.

Conclusion

I have portrayed the reasons and the causes leading up to the Pacific War, which was an unavoidable war of self-defense insofar as my country was concerned. There is no doubt in my mind that our decision to make war was made only as a last resort, and by reason of urgent necessity.

May I reiterate that the policy of Japan, and certainly the choice of her duly constituted officials of state, involved neither aggression nor exploitation.

Step by step, through numerous legally selected Cabinets, and without a variance in regularly constituted governmental procedure, our country finally was brought face to face with stark reality, and to us who at that period were weighted with the duty of deciding the fate of our nation, a war of self-existence was our only alternative.

We staked the fate of our country on that decision and lost, bringing about the present plight as we see it before our eyes.

I believe firmly and will contend to the last that it was a war of self-defense and in no manner a violation of presently acknowledged International Law.

Never at any time did I ever conceive that the waging of this war would or could be challenged by the victors as an international crime or that regularly constituted public officials of the vanquished nation would be charged individually as criminals under any recognized international law or under alleged violations of treaties between nations.

The responsibility for defeat, I feel that it devolves upon myself as Premier. The responsibility in that sense I am not only willing but sincerely desire to accept fully.

THE END

MAINICHI DEC 30 1947

Tojo Affidavit Condensation

This is the second of three parts of a condensation of wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo's affidavit presented to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East:

Part II

Formation Of Tojo Cabinet

It was some time past 4 p.m. on October 17, 1941, as I remember, when I reached the Palace, and I was at once given audience by His Majesty who gave me the Imperial Mandate to form the Cabinet.

I held the opinion that no one other than Prince Higashikuni could control the situation with success following the resignation of the Konoe Cabinet.

I felt this all the more strongly especially as I have been the one to advocate the resignation of the Third Konoe Cabinet.

In order to change the September 6 decision, the difficulties would be increased if I assumed the premiership or remained as War Minister after the downfall of the Konoe Cabinet.

These were also the thoughts of the military circles at that time.

Therefore, if it had not been for the "clean slate" message from the Emperor, I might indeed have declined to accept the Imperial Mandate to form the new Cabinet.

Before And After Imperial Conference Of November 5, 1941

After the formation of the Cabinet, the Government, with the cooperation of the Supreme Command, immediately went into deliberations of high state policy on the basis of the "clean slate" injunction.

As the result of these consultations, and taking into consideration the American demands of October 2, 1941, a proposal outline on the negotiations with America was decided upon.

Deliberations were held on the manner of guiding the subsequent state policy of Japan in accordance with the outline for negotiations with America, and the following three plans were finally drawn up:

The first plan was to continue Japan-American negotiations on the basis of the outline newly adopted for negotiations with America. Furthermore, even in case the negotiations ended in a rupture, the Government was to continue its policy of patience and caution.

The second plan called for the termination of negotiations at that stage and immediately decide on war.

The third plan was to continue negotiations with America based upon the outline as constituted but that a determination to go to war should be made in the event of the failure of these negotiations, and operational preparations should be commenced accordingly. A solution through diplomatic means was to be sought by the early part of December.

In case the negotiations succeeded, all operational preparations were to be immediately rescinded.

In case the negotiations ended in failure, a decision to go to war was to be made forthwith. This decision was to be taken up at that time as an independent issue.

With regard to the first plan, it is understandable that it was impossible to accept in toto the American proposal of October 2.

The second plan was reasoned upon the basis that it was obviously impossible to accept the American proposal of October 2.

The Liaison Conference in the final analysis adopted the third plan. It was decided at 2 a.m. on November 2 that we should adopt the third plan, but, of those members present, Foreign Minister Togo and Finance Minister Kaya reserved their approval of the third plan until the next morning, when they communicated their consent.

The plan was decided upon at the Imperial Conference held on November 5, 1941. The gist of it is as follows:

(1) Our Empire with determination to resort to arms against the United States and Great Britain if need be will proceed to negotiate diplomatically with the United States along the lines given in the accompanying gist of plans A and B, but meanwhile will instruct our military to begin operational preparations with the date of using

force as the beginning of December, in case the negotiations fail.

(2) Our Empire will try to strengthen her cooperation with Germany and Italy, and, immediately before using force, will establish close military relations with Thailand.

(3) In case the negotiations with the United States should succeed by the beginning of December, operational preparations will be revoked.

"Plan A" was the final conciliatory plan, based upon the Japanese proposal of September 25, and seasoned with the American desires as much as possible.

"Plan B" was the one whereby, in case Plan A should fail, Japan should revert to the stand that she had taken before advancing into South French Indo-China,

whereupon America would revoke the freezing orders and agree to Japan's acquisition of the necessities most urgent and essential for her livelihood.

The above decision was submitted to the Throne informally by me and by the Chiefs of the General Staff of both the Army and the Navy at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon on November 2, 1941.

While presenting the submission, I could see from the expression of His Majesty that he was suffering from a painful sense of distress arising from his peace-loving faith.

When His Majesty had listened to what we had to submit, he was grave and thoughtful for a time and then with a serious air of concern deplored, "Is there no way left but to determine, against our wishes, to wage war against America and Britain in case our effort in America-Japan talks should fail to break the deadlock?"

Then he continued, "If the state of affairs is just as you have stated now, there will be no alternative but to proceed in the preparations for operations, but I still do hope that you will further adopt every possible means to tide over the difficulties in the America-Japan negotiations."

In accordance with the anxiety of His Majesty, I determined to hold a joint conference of the Army and Navy Councillors. The conference of the Military Councillors was held on November 4, 1941, for the first time since the establishment of the Military Councillor system in 1903.

Supreme War Council

The conference was held before the Imperial presence. Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano, first of all explained the position concerning naval operations, the gist of which is as follows:

We concur with the Administration in bending all our efforts to tide over this crisis by means of diplomacy.

Meanwhile, however, as for us, we must take into our consideration that we might be placed in a position where we would have no alternative but to decide on the commencement of hostilities in case the above measures end fruitlessly.

There is a good chance for us in the initial operation and in the first meeting if the commencement of war be in early December, on the basis of respective actual fighting strength in the Pacific.

Next General Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General Staff, expounded on matters relating to the Army Command, the gist of which was as follows:

Armaments in the southern regions are going to be strengthened day by day. Army forces there have been increased from three to eight times over the number prior to the opening of the war in Europe, aggregating more than 200,000 men and 600 planes.

In case of war between Japan and America and Britain, reinforcements will be dispatched to the zone of battle by the allies from India, Australia, and New Zealand, at a strength estimated at 800,000 men and 600 planes.

As to the time of opening hostilities, no delay can be permitted considering the rapid increase of the military strength of America and Britain. The date desired was early December.

At the end of the conference, a report was unanimously adopted to the effect that the Supreme War Council deems it proper and just that the Army and Navy High Command take measures in their respective jurisdictions to expedite operational preparations to meet the worst possible contingencies.

Imperial Conference, November 5, 1941

At the November 5 Imperial Conference the aforesaid program was taken up for discussion. The object of holding Imperial Conferences of this kind was to ensure coordination

(Continued on Page 2)

Tojo Affidavit Condensation

(Continued From Page 1)

between the Government and the High Command.

I assumed the duty of presiding at the meeting, and undertook to explain the circumstances which necessitated the convening of that Conference.

In short, the third plan formulated at the previous Liaison Conference was adopted and approved.

The pressure of the Allied Powers economically and militarily against Japan became more and more flagrant as time went on. It was under such circumstances as these that the Liaison Conference in the latter part of October, and the Imperial Conference of November 5 were constrained to make the decisions referred to heretofore.

The Supreme Army Command appointed General Terauchi on November 6 to the post of Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, and decided the organization in the southern area.

On the same day it also issued orders to prepare for the attack on the key points in the same area, and on the 15th of the same month, it decided on the general strategic outline against the United States and Great Britain. Of course, it was only a preparatory action based on an assumption.

Negotiations With U.S. Under Tojo Cabinet

As soon as the Tojo Cabinet was formed, the Government, with the concurrence of the Supreme Command, informed Ambassador Nomura, through its Foreign Minister on October 21 of its intention to continue negotiations on the condition that the negotiations should be started afresh.

It was decided to send Ambassador Kurusu to assist Ambassador Nomura in the negotiations, which had, since August, been the wishes of Mr. Nomura.

In this procedure there was no design whatsoever to camouflage Japan's intention, if any, to start war.

On November 26, 1941, the U.S. Government, to both Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, made a reply to the effect that it, after carefully studying and consulting with the states concerned with Japan's proposal of November 20, dissented from the proposal, and submitted a note as a basis for further negotiations. This was what has been termed the "Hull Note."

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, November 27, a Liaison Conference was held where we carefully discussed the items in the information so received. We were all dumbfounded at the severity of the U.S. proposition. The main points to the conclusion reached after our deliberations were, as I recall, the following:

- (1) The U.S. memorandum of November 26 amounts to an ultimatum against Japan.
- (2) Japan cannot accept this memorandum. The United States seems to have proposed these conditions knowing full well that they were unacceptable to Japan.
- (3) The United States seemed to have already decided upon war against Japan. Putting it bluntly, Japan must be attacked by the United States at any moment, and she should guard fully against it.

Following are some facts coming to my knowledge after the war's termination, which I did not know at the time:

(a) That the American authorities had succeeded in deciphering our secret code and knew our decision before it had been presented to them.

(b) That the U.S. State Department had knowledge that Japan's proposition of November 20, 1941 would be the final one from Japan to the U.S.

(c) That prior to Hull's note of November 26, the United States had formulated the draft of a Modus Vivendi based on President Roosevelt's idea, which still left room for negotiations and on the basis of which the United States had intended to carry out her diplomacy toward Japan; that the draft was intended to gain time for the U.S. Navy's replenishments of armaments; that even this temporary agreement was abandoned owing to the strong opposition of the British and Chungking Governments, and consequently the note was adopted, and, finally, that the United States was aware that this note would never be accepted by Japan.

(d) That the U.S. Government also knew that Japan was regarding Hull's note of November 26 as an ultimatum.

(e) That by the end of November, 1941, the United States, together with Great Britain, had decided to enter war with Japan.

Senior Statesmen's Meeting

On November 29, 1941, two days

before the Imperial Conference, the Government invited the Senior Statesmen to convene at the Imperial Palace. I explained the reasons why we were placed in a position where resort to arms against the United States and Great Britain could not be avoided.

After the above meeting adjourned, a Liaison Conference was held in the Palace, where the subject for discussion to be held on December 1 ("opening of hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands") was taken up and adopted.

Suddenly, a little past 3 p.m. on November 30, I was summoned by the Emperor.

What the Emperor was pleased to say to me was that Prince Takamatsu, the Imperial brother, told him that as our Navy's hands are full, it desires to avoid war.

I answered as follows: "It is the common desire of your Government and the High Command to avoid this war, but there is no remaining alternative but to resort to a war of self-defense."

Imperial Conference Of Dec. 1, 1941

The agenda for the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941, was, "Whereas the negotiations with the USA based on the outline of Japan's national policy, decided on November 5, having ended in failure, Japan opens war against the USA, Britain, and the Netherlands."

Finally, Hara, the President of the Privy Council, summarized his opinion as follows:

(1) The attitude of the United States was unbearably hard on Japan. It would be futile to try further means. War, consequently, would be unavoidable.

(2) There was no doubt about our initial success.

I outlined the points as follows:

We would try our best to bring the war to the earliest possible conclusion.

The Government and the High Command are proceeding with their war plans under a mutual understanding that even after our decision to fight, we will relinquish our war plans at any time provided the United States accedes to our representations before the blow is struck, and grant us an opportunity to find a solution to a peaceful settlement.

Therefore the proposal was adopted.

It was solely upon the Cabinet and the Supreme Command that the responsibility lay for the political, diplomatic, and military affairs of the nation.

Accordingly, the full responsibility for the decision of December 1, 1941, for war is that of the Cabinet Ministers and members of the High Command, and absolutely not the responsibility of the Emperor.

From Imperial Conf. To Outbreak Of War

Since the decision to commence hostilities was reached in the Imperial Conference of December 1, 1941, up to the actual outbreak of war, two items of importance were studied:

(1) Preparations for carrying out the commencement of hostilities, and

(2) Execution of State affairs connected with these preparations.

Concerning the decision on the note to be handed to the United States and the time of its delivery, the Foreign Ministry was responsible for all the diplomatic steps concerning this notification.

On December 7, the following day, the Japanese Government gave instructions by wire to Ambassador Nomura to hand the note in person to the United States at 1 p.m. sharp, Washington time, on December 7.

I conscientiously believed at that time that the delivery was made rigorously in conformance with the Foreign Minister's instructions.

As the attack on Pearl Harbor at the outset of hostilities was solely in charge of the Navy Division of the Imperial General Headquarters, I had no connection with it whatsoever.

The transaction of the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war was submitted to the Privy Councillors for discussion. I remember it was past 11 a.m. on December 8, 1941, that the above Rescript was announced by the Cabinet, after deliberations in the Privy Council, and the Imperial sanction

obtained.

My statements before the Privy Council were recorded not through stenographic methods but were only summarized by the secretary. Hence they do not correctly convey what I actually said on that occasion. What I actually said was as follows:

"The decision to go to war against the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands was made on December 1. After that date preparations for the commencement of hostilities were foremost in our efforts. However, even in the course of these preparations, we continued to hope for some possibility, however faint, of arriving at a diplomatic settlement through reconsideration of the matters on the part of the United States.

If this hope materialized, we contemplated the suspension of all military operations.

(To Be Continued)

5-75-7

Russia Was Alloted India And Iran

World Division Plans Revealed In Tojo Trial

575-1

By PETER KALISCHER
United Press Staff Correspondent

Hideki Tojo, yesterday submitted as evidence of Japan's peaceful desires a plan drawn up nine months before Pearl Harbor to divide the world into four blocs, giving India and Iran to Russia and leaving Japan in control of Greater East Asia.

The plan was formulated at the Japanese Liaison Conference

of February 3, 1941, when Tojo was War Minister in the Konoye Cabinet. It was put in the record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East during the second day of Tojo's personal appearance on the witness stand during which Defense Attorney George Blewett of Philadelphia, continued to read Tojo's 245 page affidavit to the court.

The Liaison Conference Plan further advocated:

1. A "no separate peace treaty" with Germany and Italy should Japan become involved in the European War.
2. To get Russia to cooperate with Japan, Germany and Italy to overthrow England.
3. To have Germany arm Japan "to the best of her ability" while Japan gave Germany raw materials and food.
4. To have the Soviet Union sell North Sakhalien to Japan and failing that, to guarantee the sale to Japan of 1,500,000 tons of oil in five years after transferring oil drilling rights in that area to Japan.

DEC 3 0 1947
STARS & STRIPES

Tojo Takes Stand While Wife Sobs

By RUSSELL BRINES
Chief Of Tokyo AP Bureau

Mrs. Hideki Tojo, onetime social queen of Japan, saw her husband on the witness stand for the first time yesterday and broke into nervous sobs.

Tojo's hard eyes picked her out from the crowd of Japanese spectators in the balcony of the International courtroom as he entered

with two American military police for the afternoon session. He glanced at his wife impassively for a moment, then turned toward the witness stand.

Mrs. Tojo, dressed in a black silk ceremonial kimono, sat in the second row of the Japanese spectators gallery. Throughout the session, she kept her face partially covered with an handkerchief and left before the end of the court session, attempting to avoid the curious stares of her neighbors.

During the onetime dictator's moment of power, Mrs. Tojo became Japan's leading lady. It was whispered she was running her hard-faced husband and that she had persuaded him to reorganize women's patriotic societies so that she could become their head. One opposition Japanese general was quoted as saying "when hen grows it will be the end of Japan," in reference to the reported increasing authority of the premier's wife.

Mrs. Tojo was in the house just before her husband attempted suicide, few days after the Occupation began. She fled when American authorities came to arrest the onetime general. She appeared later with her children at the family home in Kyushu.

At one time it was reported that Tojo had ordered his family to stay away from the courtroom while the trial is in progress. It was evident yesterday, however, that he expected them. For he looked toward the gallery as soon as he entered the courtroom.

The Japanese gallery as usual was crowded mostly with men. Spectators had trudged through the chill of the gloomy afternoon—speckled with the start of a snowstorm—to hear their onetime leader defend Japanese imperialism.

DEC 3 1 1947

STARS & STRIPES

Calls Questions 'Stupid' 'Inconceivable'

Tojo Barks Defiance In Cross-Examination

Hideki Tojo Wednesday arrogantly admitted that he personally smashed the peace efforts of the third Konoye Cabinet in the autumn of 1941 when, as War Minister, he differed with Navy Minister Koshiro Oikawa, who insisted on more extensive Japanese-American negotiations.

By FRANK WHITE
Associated Press Correspondent

The rasping, domineering voice of Hideki Tojo, who was Japan's wartime dictator and premier with the rank of full general, came to life in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East today as he barked out such replies as "stupid" and "inconceivable" in reply to questions by attorneys for some of his 24 fellow defendants.

City attorney for former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Marquis Koichi Kido, chose to cross-examine Tojo—a maneuver which placed Kido in the position of contending that Tojo's testimony was injurious to Kido but which allowed Logan more freedom in propounding questions.

Recalling instructions given by Emperor Hirohito when Tojo was made premier October 18, 1941, Logan asked Tojo: "Did you interpret the Emperor's words to mean that the navy should blind-

ly follow the army or that the army should blindly follow the navy?"

"As a matter of common sense, I never thought such a thing," replied Tojo, gesticulating wildly and leaning forward, gazing intently through horn-rimmed glasses.

"It's inconceivable that the Emperor should think of such a thing," Tojo continued.

Kido has testified that the Emperor ordered Tojo to "cooperate" with the navy and that at the same time the Emperor called in the navy chief and ordered the navy to cooperate with the army. This was at a time when the navy reportedly was opposed to going to war with the United States, while Tojo, as War Minister, had just overthrown the third cabinet of Prince Fumimaro Konoye by insisting that the cabinet carry out the imperial conference decision of September 6, 1941, that final plans for opening the hostilities be completed by mid-October.

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STARS & STRIPES

1-565

575-1

Cross-Examination Of Tojo May Last 2 Weeks At Least

To Cover 13-Yr. Period
From Manchuria Incident
Through World War II

By R. Y. Koitabashi, Staff Writer

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL COURTROOM, Tokyo.
Dec. 30.—Former Premier Hideki
Tojo on his 63rd birthday today—
the third day of his testimony from
the witness stand—faced prospects
of the most eventful day of his life,
the start of an extensive, vigorous
cross-examination by American Pro-
secutor John W. Fihelly and at-
torneys of other defendants.

This morning, George F. Blewett,
his counsel, laboriously continued
reading Tojo's 50,000-word affidavit.

Only Living Dictator

Meanwhile, the only living Axis
dictator to stand trial with the death
of Hitler and Mussolini sat in the
witness box, flanked by two MPs.
Persistently wearing his khaki army
uniform, stripped of insignia and
decorations, he wandered his be-
spectacled eyes from the spectators'
section to the judges' bench, to the
ceiling and other parts of the court-
room.

With the completion of the read-
ing of the lengthy affidavit into the
court records expected this after-
noon, William Logan, defense
counsel for former Lord Keeper of
the Privy Seal Marquis Koichi Kido,
and possibly other defense counsels,
is expected to cross-examine Tojo
before the prosecution gets at him.

The prosecution's cross-examina-
tion will last "at least a couple of
weeks," Mr. Fihelly told the Mai-
nichi. The lengthy cross-examina-

(Continued on Page 2)

575-1

War Trials

(Continued From Page 1)

tion is attributed to the fact that
chronologically it will take the entire
period covering the indictment,
from the Manchurian Incident,
through the China Incident, and
through the World War up to 1944,
a period of 12 to 13 years. Having
been in charge of military admin-
istration he has admitted responsi-
bility concerning treatment of
prisoners of war, he said.

51 Interrogations At Prison

"No defendant has a broader field
of responsibility than Tojo," said
Prosecutor Fihelly, whose 51 inter-
rogations of Tojo at Sugamo Prison
during the period from December,
1945 to December, 1946, have been
introduced into evidence against
him.

Mr. Fihelly, here on leave of
absence from his duties as First
Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, returned to Tokyo
on November 25 for the cross-ex-
amination of Tojo.

MANICHI

DEC 31 1947

575-1

TEN JAPANESE PLEAD NOT GUILTY TO WAR CRIMES CHARGES

Ten Japanese war crimes suspects pleaded not guilty yesterday before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama, to charges that they mistreated and brutally beat Allied prisoners of war.

The accused, arraigned together on numerous counts alleged to have occurred between June, 1942, and January, 1945, at the Cabanatuan POW Camp, Luzon, P. I., are: Hitoshi Okamoto, former 1st lieutenant in the Japanese army; Sotojiro Tamura, ex-warrant officer; Hatsuo Muta, ex-corporal; Shishitaro Yoshinago, ex-private; Rai O Ran, civilian; Tateso Yamasaki, 1st Lieutenant; Noboru Nagai, Sgt. Major; Kasuo Kanugasa, civilian; No Ei Chin, civilian; and Ei Hatsu Rin, civilian.

Leonard Estrin, 110 Isabella Ave., Newark, N. J., and Murray Sprung, 225 West 86th St., New York, N. Y., are prosecuting the case for SCAP's Legal Section.

Names and addresses of victims named in the specifications are as follows:

Pvt. Donald Russel (deceased), 3033 Ruby Ave., Kansas City, Kansas; S/Sgt. James C. Kent, Henderson, Tenn.; Cpl. L. Burt, Columbia, Miss.; Sgt. Brooks L. Tanner, 4620 Oakridge St., Houston, Tex.; Cpl. Arthur S. Roberts, Manor, Tex.; Sgt. Tensell E. Bruce, Lynnville, Ky.; Sgt. Felix J. McCool, 129 Carr Dr., Glendale, Calif.; Cpl. Faustino Olguin, Albuquerque, N. Mex.; Capt. J. Franklin Batcheler, Sheridan, Ark.; Lt. William E. Holton, Hayfield, Minn.; Lt. G. R. Pfaff, Tyler Ave., St. Louis, Mo.; Capt. Leslie B. Gilbert, New Albin, Ia.; S/Sgt. Harry J. Pacer, 18 Krakow St., Buffalo, N. Y.; Pvt. Barney Ozella, 221 N. Main St., Creve Coeur, Ill.; Capt. Raymond H. Knapp, 259 Genesee Rd., San Antonio, Tex.; Lt. Jens Jensen, Jr., 331 College Ave., Westerleigh, Staten Isl., N. Y.; Lt. William Gentry, Harrodsburg, Ky.; Maj. Lloyd E. Mills, 701 Euclid, Lawton, Okla.; S/Sgt. James Albert Campbell, 2005 Lafayette St., Butte, Mont.; Norman Tant, Carrollton, Ga.; Whitney A. Langlois, Mullins, S.C.; Pfc. Brownell H. Cole, Lisbon, N. D.; Cpl. Edward D. Wyatt, Hazen, Ark.; Earl Phillips, Tarpon, Va.; John B. Trujillo, Wiley, Colo.; Andrew D. Carson, Los Angeles, Calif.; Pvt. Winfield J. Thompson, Browns Valley, Minn.; Cpl. Amuel P. Paskey, 1004 Maple St., Danville, Ill.; Pvt. J. B. Slaughterback, Ramona, Okla.; Pvt. P. P. Smith (deceased), Randlett, Okla.; S/Sgt. Frank J. Destefan, 218 Morrison St., Du Bois, Pa.; Capt. Arthur W. Wermuth, Traverse City, Mich.; Pvt. William K. Smith, Jr., Red Bay, Ala.; S/Sgt. Wilson Harmon Snow, Houston, Tex.; and Pvt. Gustave Nichols, 128 Kentucky St., Petaluma, Calif.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 3 1947

SIX JAPANESE SENTENCED FOR MISTREATING ALLIED POW'S

Convicted on charges involving the mistreatment of Allied prisoners of war, six Japanese war criminals were sentenced to terms totalling twelve and one-half years imprisonment at hard labor by an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama today.

The verdicts were: Ko Osaka, former Japanese army lieutenant, and camp commander at the POW Camp No. 8, Motoyama, Honshu, Japan, where the atrocities took place, two years; Nobori Kodama, civilian guard, 30 months; Tetsuya Murakami, ex-sergeant, 18 months; Bunki Nishimura, civilian guard, two years; Hirozo Goto, civilian guard, 30 months, and Motoru Okamoto, civilian guard, two years.

Prosecutors for SCAP's Legal Section were Gray Anderson, 310 Stuart Dr., Galax, Va., and C. R. Liggit, 1202 Genoa St., Coral Gables, Fla. Counsel for the defense was Seymore M. Alpert, 500 East Main St., Meriden, Conn.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 3 1947

575-1
EIGHT JAPANESE WAR CRIMES SUSPECTS PLEAD NOT GUILTY TO CHARGES
OF BEATING AND MISTREATING CHINESE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Eight Japanese war crimes suspects, arraigned together in the first war crimes trial in Japan involving Chinese victims exclusively, pleaded not guilty this morning before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama, to charges that they mistreated and beat Chinese military and civilian personnel.

The accused, all civilian employees at the Chusan Chinese Prisoners of War Camp at Hanaoka, Akita Prefecture, Japan, where the atrocities are alleged to have taken place between August, 1944 and October, 1945, are Masao Shimizu, Kingoro Fukuda,

575-1
Masatoshi Kono, Chitoku Ise, Saburo Shibata, Eishi Motoi, Taichero Miura and Kenzo Goto.

The POW Camp, which contained both military prisoners and civilian internees, was operated by the Japanese police, rather than the Japanese Army. It is alleged that seven Chinese died at this camp because of mistreatment received from the defendants.

Clark S. Gregory, 625 East Alisal St., Salinas, Calif., and Paul F. Faison, formerly of Raleigh, N. C., will prosecute the case for SCAP's Legal Section.

Names and addresses of victims listed in the specifications are as follows:

Gun Chun, Honan Province, China; Shun Jin-tin, Shang Tung Province, China; Cho Do-lin, Honan Province, China; Yi Sou-shin, Hopei Province, China; Wang Yin-loo (deceased), Hopei Province, China; Shiu Shang Chang (deceased), Sin-loh, Hupei Province, China; Ying Duk Tien (deceased), Sin-loh, Hupei Province, China; Ting Chun Chung (deceased), Nan-yang, Hunan Province, China; Tin Bun Wong (deceased), Nan-yang, Hunan Province, China; Fa Gue Cho (deceased), Hsiu-chang, Hunan Province, China; Ton Tau Shiea (deceased) Hsiu-chang, Hunan Province, China; Sun So Liau, Da-ming, Hupei Province, China; Zai Yee Lieu, Hsia-tsin, Shantung Province, China; Do Li Yan, Hsia-tsin, Shantung Province, China; and Tan Lu Lieu, Ning-chien, Hupei Province, China.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 1 1947

575-1
SENTENCE OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINAL REDUCED 15 YEARS

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, YOKOHAMA--A 15 year reduction of a 25 year imprisonment sentence, in addition to a 14 month period of previous confinement prior to trial, has been granted by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, Acting Eighth Army Commander, the reviewing authority, to Kiyoshi Obayashi, a Japanese convicted of war crimes on June 25, 1947.

Obayashi was found guilty on all specifications and the charge.

The defense based their recommendation for clemency upon the prosecution's lack of evidence as to the severity of the beatings, which appeared more as common assault cases from the affidavits which were read in court.

Only eight people from an approximate total of 650 prisoners of the Hiroshima Branch No. 1 POW Camp, Zentsuji, Shikoku Island, were mentioned in the affidavits as having been mistreated in any way by Obayashi, who was a civilian employed by the Japanese army.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 19 1947

575-1

46 JAPANESE PLEAD NOT GUILTY BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSION

575-1
The 46 Japanese who allegedly figured in the beheading of two American Navy airmen and the bayoneting of a third victim, pleaded not guilty this morning before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

The accused, arraigned together in the biggest mass trial by an American military court in the Far East, are all former Japanese navy personnel and are charged with events which occurred on the Island of Ishigakajima, near Okinawa, about April 15, 1945, when they captured three American airmen who parachuted from their falling plane.

It is alleged that two of the victims were decapitated, one of them by Otohiko Inoue, former Japanese navy captain who was commander of the small navy garrison at the island.

The victims, whose bodies were buried in the execution pit, were later disinterred, cremated and the ashes tossed into the ocean, the specifications state.

The victims were Lt. Vernon L. Tebo, 1512 East Gonzales St., Pensacola, Fla.; AO 1/c Robert Tuggle, Jr., Box 175, Brownwood, Texas; and Radioman Warren H. Lloyd, 68-11 Burns St., Forest Hills, L. I., N. Y.

Prosecutors in the case for SCAP's Legal Section are Lt. Comdr. Emory C. Smith, 1105 Mulberry St., Denton, Texas; E. Walter Guthrie, Los Angeles, Calif.; and Joseph Walton, Hobbs, New Mex.

Counsel for the defense is headed by Joseph G. Wiman, 250 West 75th St., New York City.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 3 1947

-0-

90 JAPANESE ON TRIAL AT YOKOHAMA FOR ALLEGED WAR CRIMES

575-1
Ninety Japanese war crimes suspects are presently appearing before Eight Army military commissions in 11 separate trials in Yokohama, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief of SCAP's Legal Section, reported today.

This is the largest number of suspected war criminals to be involved in trials in Yokohama at one time.

More than half of the defendants are involved in the mass trial of 46 former Japanese navy-men who are charged with the murder of three American navy airmen from the aircraft carrier "Makassar Strait" on April 15, 1945. The victims were Lt. Vernon L. Tebo, USNR, Pensacola, Fla.; AO 1/c Robert Tuggle Jr.; Brownwood, Texas, Radioman, and Warren H. Lyod, Forest Hills, L. I., N. Y. Two, it is alleged, were decapitated and the third bayoneted.

Also on trial are eight Japanese accused of atrocities committed at the Chusan Chinese POW Camp, Hanaoka, Akita, Japan, where more than 400 internees died while at the camp.

Three of the current trials are concerned with atrocities committed in the Philippine Islands at camps where the survivors of the Bataan Death March were interred along with other captured American and Filipino prisoners.

Iku Takasaki and Kazua Maeda, former camp commanders of the infamous Davao Penal Colony, are facing charges for the campaign of starvation, mistreatment and death endured by the prisoners. Also on trial for crimes committed at Cabanatuan Camp, Luzon are ten defendants. The key defendant is Hitoshi Okamoto.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 4 1947

-0-

SENTENCE OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINAL SUSPENDED BY REVIEWING AUTHORITY

575-1
 HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, YOKOHAMA-- The first of many recommendations for suspension of sentences involving Japanese war criminals tried in Yokohama was accepted yesterday in the case of Masao Uwarori, former lieutenant and commander of Tokyo 3-D POW Camp, by Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, Acting Eighth Army Commander, the reviewing authority. The letter announcing the finding read, "the sentence is approved, but the execution thereof is suspended."

Uwarori was convicted April 28, 1947, following a plea of guilty to war crimes charges, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for three years.

Uwarori was convicted of failing to discharge his duties as commander of the camp by ordering, compelling or permitting Allied prisoners to perform work and services connected with the operations of the war; mistreating prisoners; permitting members of his command and persons under his control to commit atrocities and failing and neglecting to provide adequate food, quarters, heat and safe working conditions.

The tribunal trying Uwarori, in recommending the suspension, pointed out that he was camp commander of three camps simultaneously and therefore could not be responsible for the actions of his subordinates at the camps when he was not able to be present; that he made special efforts to obtain medicines, additional food and recreational facilities for the prisoners,

575-1
 that he never permitted sick prisoners to work; and that his actions in behalf of the prisoners brought about charges from his superiors to the Kempeitai that he was "disloyal to Japan."

His sentence was recommended suspended by Ira Kaye, 24 Warren St., Sumter, S. C., chief defense counsel for the trial.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 6 1947

JAPANESE ACCUSED OF PERFORMING MEDICAL EXPERIMENTS ON ALLIED PRISONERS FOUND "MENTALLY COMPETENT" BY MILITARY COMMISSION

575-1
 HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, YOKOHAMA--An Eighth Army Military Commission yesterday expressed an opinion that Hisakishi Tokuda, formerly commander of the Shinagawa Prisoner of War Hospital, Tokyo, and currently a war crimes suspect, "is and always has been, since the start of this trial (Sept. 9) mentally competent" and ordered the trial's continuance.

575-1
 The reconvening of the trial yesterday followed a lengthy recess, during which the accused was examined by leading Japanese and American psychiatrists in Japan. He is accused of having performed medical experiments on Allied POWs while they were interned at the Shinagawa Hospital.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 9 1947

756-1

JAPANESE ACCUSED OF WAR CRIMES PLEADS NOT GUILTY

575-1
575.1
Hiroshi Ushioda pleaded not guilty today, before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama, to charges that he mistreated and beat Allied Prisoners of War.

575.1
The accused, a former medical sergeant in the Japanese army, faced one of his alleged victims, Wing Commander Leonard J. Birchall of St. Catherine's, Ontario, Canada, who arrived here recently from Canada, especially to testify against Ushioda.

Charges and specifications signed by Alva C. Carpenter, Chief of SCAP's Legal Section, are concerned with crimes committed at both the Sendai POW Camp, Ohasi, Honshu, and the Tokyo Area POW Camp Number 2 in Yokohama, where Ushioda served.

It is alleged in one of the four specifications under which Ushioda is charged, that he stood ten unidentified American and Allied POWs at attention, and beat them with his fists. Other specifications charge Ushioda with compelling sick and wounded prisoners to do arduous work for which they were physically unfit.

Wing Commander Birchall became a prisoner when his plane was shot down on a patrol flight in April, 1942. He was interned at the Yokohama camp.

Capt. Lee F. Hunter of Freeport, Maine, will prosecute Ushioda, and Murray E. Gottesman, 251 Montgomery St., Brooklyn, N. Y., will be defense counsel.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 15 1947

JAPANESE ACCUSED OF WAR CRIMES PLEAD NOT GUILTY

575.1
Six suspected Japanese war criminals pleaded not guilty today before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama, to charges that they buried alive and killed 2d Lt. Leland P. Fishback, Route 1, Thorntown, Indiana.

Five of the accused, it is alleged, struck the American airman with swords and bayonets and smothered him with dirt near Tokyo, Japan, March 10, 1945, after Lieutenant Fishback's B-29 crashed near Tokyo. He was captured by the Japanese police and turned over to military authorities.

Key defendant in the case is Kimiya Ichinoe, former lieutenant colonel, who is charged with permitting his subordinates to brutally kill the American airman, who had suffered severe injuries in the plane crash.

Other defendants are ex-Lt. Sadamu Motokawa, ex-warrant officer Kenichi Yanagizawa, and ex-master sergeants Masao Kuwabara, Goro Yamanaka and Soichiro Matsumoto.

Ex-Lt. Rokuro Sonobe, a medical officer, is a seventh defendant in the case. He is not implicated in the killing, but is charged with failing to provide proper medical attention for Lt. Fishback.

Robert B. Neptune, 2095 Johnstone Ave., Bartlesville, Okla., and Harold L. Shellenberger, 5001 Marlborough Dr., San Diego, Calif., are prosecuting the case for SCAP's Legal Section.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC DEC 22 1947

JAPANESE WAR CRIMINAL SENTENCED TO 25 YEARS AT HARD LABOR

1-575-1
575-1
Iku Takasaki, former lieutenant colonel and one time commander of the Davao Penal Colony, POW Camp Mindanao, and Cabanatuan Camps, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, was sentenced today to 25 years imprisonment at hard labor by an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

He was convicted of permitting the unlawful killing of Lt. Robert Huffcutt, 99 Gallatin Ave., Buffalo, N. Y., who was shot about Aug. 11, 1944, by Takasaki's subordinates. Takasaki was found guilty on numerous counts involving atrocities on American prisoners of war, including Capt. Arthur Werruth (later Major), the "one man Army" of Bataan.

The court also found Takasaki guilty of numerous specifications of failing to properly discharge his duties as camp commander, and with permitting American internees to work under dangerous and unhealthy conditions. The prosecution proved implicity in the death of Maj. Charles F. Harrison, Leesburg, Va., who although critically ill, was confined to a guardhouse without proper medical care.

Nathan A. Cobb of Mound, Minn., prosecuted the case for SCAP's Legal Section. Defense attorney was Sol E. Brinsfield of 210 East Le Bron St., Montgomery, Ala.

Victims listed in the charges and specifications were: Maj. Charles F. Harrison (deceased), Leesburg, Va.; Capt. Richard R. Connary, 937 Garfield Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah; Capt. Arthur Werruth, Traverse City, Mich.; Pvt. Simon D. Vilar, Manila, P. I.; Maj. Raymond H. Knapp, 259 Genesee Rd., San Antonio, Texas; Lt. Robert Huffcutt (deceased), 99 Gallatin Ave., Buffalo, N. Y.; Lt. William Gentry, Harrodsburg, Ky.; Lt. Lars C. Jensen (deceased), 720 38th Ave., Minneapolis, Minn.; Chaplain John J. McDonnell, 1017 Dahill Rd., Brooklyn, N. Y.; Maj. Loyd Ed. Mills, 701 Euclid Ave., Lawton, Okla.; T/Sgt. James A. Campbell, 2005 Lafayette St., Butte, Mont.; Capt. Ted Parker, 505 W. Slate St., Albuquerque, N. Mex.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 15 1947

JAPANESE WAR CRIMINAL SENTENCED TO SEVEN YEARS AT HARD LABOR

1-575-1
575-1
Convicted of committing war atrocities and of permitting his subordinates to beat and mistreat Allied Prisoners of War, Hisao Mori was sentenced yesterday to seven years imprisonment at hard labor by an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

Mori, an ex-lieutenant in the Japanese Army, was camp commander in the Tsumori Prisoner of War Camp, Osaka Area, Honshu, Japan, where he inflicted cruel tortures on POWs and forced sick prisoners to do arduous tasks for which they were physically unqualified.

Prosecuting the case for SCAP's Legal Section was Jesse Deitch, 167 Greenridge Ave., White Plains, N. Y. Counsel for the defense was Eli A. Glasser, 58 Bicknell St., Dorchester, Mass.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 16 1947

1-575-1

TODAY MARKS SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS IN YOKOHAMA

5751
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, YOKOHAMA---Today marks the second anniversary of the war crimes trials that are currently being held in Yokohama.

Since the opening session Dec. 18, 1945, 427 Japanese have faced Eighth Army military commissions on war crimes charges. Of that number, 33 have been sentenced to death, 26 to life, 19 acquitted, and 350 have received term of years imprisonment. To date, 196 cases have been completed.

Of the first six trials held, three accused received the death sentence for atrocities they committed, while two others were sentenced to life imprisonment.

First of the trials to be held involved Tatsuo Tsuchiya, also known as "Little Glass Eye," a civilian guard from the Matsushima Prisoner of War Camp, Matsushima, Honshu. "Little Glass Eye" is now serving a life sentence in Sugamo Prison, home for Japanese war criminals.

5751
During 1946, an average of three courts were in continuous session. In the past year, the average was raised to eight when additional personnel became available for the courts. A total of 175 American and Allied officers, including Dutch, British, Canadian, New Zealand, Australian, and Chinese have served as commission members. Forty-five "FACs" and EM are presently engaged as interpreters.

A majority of the cases involve ten or less accused, with one to four defendants the average number of accused per case. The average elapsed time per accused during the trials has been from six to eight days.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC
-0-

DEC 18 1947

TWO JAPANESE ACCUSED OF WAR CRIMES PLEAD NOT GUILTY

5751
Charged with denying available medicines to critically ill Allied prisoners of war and with committing atrocities which contributed to the deaths of numerous POWs, former 2d lieutenant Toshio Toda, and Chomatsu Takura, former corporal, pleaded not guilty yesterday before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

Toda, it is alleged, was responsible for deplorable living conditions at the Nagoya area Camp Number 10, Toyama, Honshu, which resulted in widespread sickness. He is also charged with forcing prisoners to work in military target areas.

Victims listed in the specifications are: Harold Elmer Clough, 1472 Union St., San Diego, Calif.; William A. Cronin, (deceased) 14 Alejandro St., Caridad, Cavite, P.I.; Pvt. Wayne Allen Smith, Route 2, Box 178, Fort Collins, Colo.; J. H. Andrews, (deceased), Shepperton, 2 Station Approach, England; Alfred Keeler, (deceased), London, England; Radjab Shafi, (deceased), Allahabad c/o P.O. Bombay; Walter Charles Davis, (deceased), 62 Church St., West Tamworth N.S.W. Australia; and John Boyd, Bayview Terrace, Clayfield, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.

Abram M. Jones, 186 Warrington Drive, Rochester, N.Y., and Murray Gray, 1579 East 2d St., Brooklyn, N.Y., are prosecuting the case for SCAP's Legal Section.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 23 1947

5751

FIVE JAPANESE PLEAD NOT GUILTY TO WAR CRIMES CHARGES

575-1
575-1 For alleged atrocities, believed to be the first committed against Americans in the Far East after Pearl Harbor, five suspected Japanese war criminals pleaded not guilty to this morning before an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

The accused are charged with crimes alleged to have taken place aboard a Japanese transport which was taking prisoners from Wake Island to Shanghai shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack.

Among the prisoners captured six years ago today at Wake Island was Medal of Honor winner, Col. James Pevereaux, USMC, who with 1,500 other Marine Corps and Navy men, were herded aboard the former Japanese liner Nitta Maru.

Four of the accused, Tamotsu Takezoe, former chief petty officer; Yasuo Kohara, former chief petty officer; Tokuichi Takamura, former 3d class petty officer; and Asaichi Yoshimura, former 3d class petty officer; are accused of killing four of five Americans by decapitation aboard the transport.

The fifth defendant, Usaji Hida, a former senior petty officer, is charged with contributing to the death of one of the victims by ordering his subordinates to bayonet an American sailor.

Names and addresses of victims listed in the specifications are M/Sgt. Earl Raymond Hannum, USMC, (deceased), address unknown; T/Sgt. Vincent William Bailey, USMC; (deceased), address unknown; S2/c Theodor D. Franklin, USN, (deceased) 21092 Locust St. Hayward, Calif.; S2/c Roy J. Gonzales, USN (deceased), 2137 Julian St., San Diego, Calif.; and S1/c John W. Lambert, USN (deceased) 141 W. Doxey St., Ogden, Utah.

575-1
575-1 Prosecuting the case for SCAP's Legal Section are Raymond G. Sweeney, 95 So. Washington St., Binghamton, N. Y., and Leroy W. C. Mather, 4632 49th St. N. W., Washington, D. C.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 23 1947

-0-

575-1

FOUR JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS SENTENCED 575-1

575-1
Four Japanese war criminals were given sentences today totalling 31 years confinement at hard labor by an Eighth Army Military Commission in Yokohama.

The longest sentence, 14 years, was given Yoshitaro Matsumoto, formerly a civilian guard at the Taisho Camp, Osaka area, who beat, abused and cruelly punished Australian Prisoners

575-1
of War. Matsumoto forced prisoners to kneel with sticks behind their knees for long periods of time.

Former 1st lieutenant in the Japanese army, Toshitaro Habe was sentenced to eight years confinement at hard labor for failing to provide POWs with food and for allowing his subordinates to beat the prisoners at the Tanagawa, Tsumori, Tokuroshi, Yokkaichi, Sakurajima, and Taisho camps, which he commanded in the Osaka area.

Ex-superior private Yoichiro Terashita received a six and one-half year sentence for beating POWs, and ex-corporal Tadao Tenabe, medical orderly, was sentenced to two and one-half years on similar charges.

American advisory counsel for the defense was Michael A. Braun, 1550 Townsend Ave., Bronx, N. Y., and F. Kirk Maddrix, 614 Ellsworth Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland.

Andrew A. Adinolfi, 3015 Roberts Ave., Bronx, N. Y., and John P. Laughna, 9303 East Jefferson Ave., Detroit, Michigan, prosecuted the case for SCAP's Legal Section.

PRESS RELEASE - AFPAC

DEC 29 1947

575-1

ITEM 2 Tojo's First Appearance in the Witness Stand - Mainichi - 31 Dec 47.
Translator: S. Ono. (RL)

5751
Summary:

TOJO made his initial appearance on the witness stand on 30 Dec, which, as a coincidence, was his 63rd birthday.

Defense Attorney BLEWETT questioned TOJO about the date when the War Ministry and Military General Staff conferred on the execution of the American fliers who bombed TOKYO in April, 1942.

At first, the answering voice of the defendant was weak and vague, but as he continued to talk it became clear and loud, reminiscent of his days of power. To questions on the execution date of the American fliers, he replied in a clear military tone, "Although I have no exact recollection, I believe it was shortly after the bombardment." TOJO's testimony was as follows:

Attorney: Did any member of the General Staff insist on the execution of the fliers without legal procedure?

TOJO: No, there was absolutely nothing of the kind.

Attorney: Have you ever asked SUGIYAMA, chief of the General Staff, if he had informed the Emperor about the execution?

TOJO: No; moreover, this is not true. I first heard of this allegation at this tribunal in connection with the affidavit of KIDO, one of my co-defendants. When I personally asked HASUNUMA, former chief aide-de-camp to the Emperor, he flatly denied the fact that SUGIYAMA saw the Emperor about the matter. To obtain his answer, I later sent KIYOSE, my defense council, to question him. KIYOSE received the same answer.

Defense Attorney Questions TOJO

Defense Attorney HOWARD, in charge of defendant KIMURA, questioned TOJO as follows:

Attorney: Did KIMURA show interest in political and diplomatic issues?

TOJO: What do you mean by "show interest"?

Attorney: Did he take part in the decision of these issues?

TOJO: No, not once.

Attorney: How did he assist you as the vice war minister?

POLITICAL SERIES: 2179 (Continued)

ITEM 2 (Continued)

TOJO: You had better ask KIMURA himself about this.

Chief Judge: Very well put.

TOJO: He faithfully assisted me as my subordinate.

Here, TOJO eloquently explained KIMURA's competent handling of the Munition Administration Headquarters, adding that he was fully qualified to the post of the vice ministership. He explained that the responsibility of deciding the execution of prisoners of war was on the War Minister's shoulders.

In reply to questioning by Defense Counsels MUNEMIYA and FUJI, regarding the task of managers in the Liaison Conference and the Imperial Conference, TOJO testified that the managers were only in charge of arranging business affairs.

Attorney FUJI: Then, they were not responsible participants in these conferences?

TOJO: Naturally not.

Attorney FUJI: Do you remember if HOSHINO, whose defense counsel I am, ever declared that he was against the army's withdrawal from CHINA, and advocated a tough policy against AMERICA?

TOJO: No, I have not. I can testify to the contrary. In the first place, towards the end of October, 1941, when the first and the second drafts regarding Japanese diplomacy toward AMERICA were adopted, he called on me. Overjoyed, he told me that these drafts would increase the possibilities of a peaceful conclusion of negotiation with AMERICA.

Later, about the end of November of the same year, when information was reported that AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN and CHINA were holding a secret meeting in WASHINGTON, he told me that as the meeting was undoubtedly related to the proposal by JAPAN, the meeting might lead to harmonious negotiations. HOSHINO's true view is revealed in these statements. However, all leaders at that time actually held the same view.

KIDO's Defense Counsel Questions TOJO

KIDO's Defense Counsel, LOGAN, then questioned TOJO.

Counsel LOGAN: In your affidavit, you state that when the TOJO cabinet was formed, the Emperor issued an order, directing that the army and navy co-operate with each other. Did this order mean that both the navy and army should blindly agree to what the other party asked?

TOJO: That is nonsensical. The Emperor would never have thought of such a silly thing.

Counsel LOGAN: Then, did it mean, as OIKAWA interpreted, that both parties should co-operate so that Japanese-American negotiations should be concluded successfully?

TOJO: What the Emperor ordered me to do was actually this: I order you to form a new cabinet. You shall observe the regulations in the Constitution. The situation is very critical. Both the navy and army must closely co-operate. I will send the same order to the Navy Minister. OIKAWA quoted from another order sent by the Emperor, whose contents are not known to me. As he spoke under oath, I believe his statement is true.

Counsel LOGAN: What about OIKAWA's interpretation?

TOJO: I know well that the Emperor dearly loved peace. My interpretation is right.

Counsel LOGAN: After your appointment to premiership, did you tell Colonel AKAMATSU, your secretary, that you were no longer a mere TOJO?

TOJO: I do not remember the words. Maybe I did say so because I was full of excitement at that time.

Counsel LOGAN: Did you try to select someone as navy minister who would obediently follow orders of the army?

POLITICAL SERIES: 2179 (Continued)ITEM 2 (Continued)

TOJO: This is the silliest question I have ever heard.

The exactness of TOJO's memory was shown when he corrected defendant KIDO's affidavit, stating that the Imperial Conference on 29 November, lasted for one hour. According to TOJO, the conference continued for more than an hour.

Replying to questioning about the responsibility of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal as adviser to the Emperor, TOJO stated, "According to Article 11 of the old Constitution, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has no power to interfere with the supreme Command's authority. Therefore, he gave no advice to the Emperor regarding military affairs."

Counsel LOGAN: Did the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal have authority to interfere with the cabinet's decision, or of those who were in charge of helping the Supreme Command of the Emperor?

TOJO: The Cabinet's decision was made at the responsibility of the cabinet members and that of the supreme command, at the responsibility of those who were in charge of assisting the Supreme Command of the Emperor. No outside person, including the Lord Keeper, was allowed to interfere.

Relating to questions asked by HARA, Chief of the Imperial Privy Council, at the Imperial Conference on 6 September 41, TOJO replied, "As is stated in my affidavit, the gist of HARA's question was: 'Is the conference's objective regarding the Japanese Government's future policy to prepare for war or to continue peace negotiations with AMERICA?' Navy Minister, representing my cabinet, answered that its objective was continuing peace negotiations with AMERICA."

Counsel LOGAN then asked, "Before the war actually started, did you ask KIDO about his views regarding the approaching war?"

Prosecution Attorney KEENAN raised an objection to this question, but LOGAN continued his questioning.

LOGAN: Did you meet KIDO to hear his views about the above question?

TOJO: You said, "Before 8 December 41." How far does this "before" extend back?

The session of the tribunal was adjourned at 1600 hours until 2 January 48.

ITEM 1 Public Criticisms on Various Issues - Magazine: Jinmin Hyoron
(Monthly) - Dec 47. Translator: C. Ida. (RL)

Summary:

I. The War No One Started

575-1
The Tokyo Tribunal has entered the individual phase, and to our great surprise, all the defendants insist that they were pacifists, never militarists. It was contrary to our expectation that the defendants would apologize to the Allied Powers and to all mankind for their crime.

For instance, Ex-Army Minister ARAKI, before whom liberals trembled at the time of his appointment, asserted that he had been an advocate of peace. Defendant KAYA also declared that he had exerted his utmost efforts to preserve peace. Ex-Premier HIRANUMA, who had endeavored to maintain the purity of JAPAN's fascism, was, according to one witness, such an enthusiastic pacifist that he had advocated that JAPAN fight with GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES in order to maintain peace.

Listening to their affidavits, one can easily be driven to the false conclusion that the Allied Forces had erred greatly in incarcerating pacifists instead of war criminals. However, if these defendants had really devoted themselves to preventing war, who then is responsible for plunging JAPAN into war?

These defendants further denied any responsibility on the part of their ruler for the war. In this respect they made it clear that as far as sentiment toward their respective rulers was concerned, some differences existed. All of them emphasized that the Emperor keenly desired peace, which was their final act of loyalty to their ruler who had guaranteed them a life of fame for many years.

II. The Constitution; It Is Not a Scrap of Paper

The Japanese people are so ignorant of the new Constitution that many of them will be surprised to hear that Article 25 provides that all people shall have the right to maintain a minimum standard of wholesome and cultured living. The people, however, should not be blamed for their ignorance, for little effort is made to make this the Constitution of the people.

Of course the Constitution's provisions are propagandized in some ways, but efforts to infuse them into our daily life have not been made by the ruling class. Struggles of the working class people towards this end are, in fact even, being obstructed. Although the Constitution is saturated with a democratic spirit, some people think that the Constitution is nothing but a scrap of paper.

A merchant in OSAKA who thought the Constitution must not be so misconstrued, filed a suit against the KATAYAMA cabinet for conducting an administration which functioned contrary to the Constitution. The merchant's suit charged that even the minimum standard of living guaranteed by the Constitution was not being maintained by the cabinet.

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From a legal point of view; there seems little possibility of the merchant winning his lawsuit; his success politically is even more unlikely. However, to ridicule his action as being fantastic and senseless is wrong, for there is almost no provision which the cabinet is not violating.

Filing a suit, however, will not bring about the realization of the constitutional provisions, and the Constitution itself will remain a scrap of paper until all people, like the OSAMA merchant, become aware of this fact and establish a vigorous democratic national front.

III. Get Rid of the Theory of Second Best

(Reprinted from a round-table discussion held by the YOMIURI Press on 14 Oct 47.)

YOSHIDA (affiliated with NCIO): It would be better if the KATAYAMA cabinet resigned and let the Liberal Party take over the leadership. Then it would become clear how harmful the Liberal Party is to the people.

Labor Minister YONEKUBO: In that event, a conservative cabinet will remain in power from six to ten months at the least. Imagine what hardships you and the working class would undergo during that period.

YOSHIDA: The present Socialist-led coalition cabinet is following the Democratic Party's policies and cannot be called a cabinet for the working class.

YONEKUBO: Under the present circumstances, I sincerely believe the present Cabinet is of some benefit to the workers.

YOSHIDA: I think its policy of maintaining the basic 1,800 yen level, which has driven workers into despair, will be detrimental to JAPAN's future.

(The following is the summary of an address by a labor leader at a general labor union meeting.)

What is a compromise? It means an armistice in the struggle. If the Social Democratic Party is sympathetic toward labor, we demand that the party fight to the last in behalf of the workers. If the Social Democratic Party compromises only after fighting for preservation of its ideals, we will back the party. However, how can we give our whole-hearted support to its primarily conciliatory policies?

It is often said that compromises are imperative in order to maintain a cabinet. Has the present cabinet ever fought for the benefit of the working class to such a point as to endanger its existence? We desire that the Socialist Party adhere as closely as possible to its own policies.

If it is determined to do so, the cabinet will never fall and other parties will reach a compromise with the cabinet. Even if the cabinet should fall, we workers would rally together to the support of the Socialist Party in order to make the party strong enough to form an all-Socialist cabinet. I fear that the Socialists only lack the courage to accomplish such a step.

It is difficult to decide which is the correct attitude toward the KATAYAMA, that of YONEKUBO and YOSHIDA and that of labor leaders. We can only say that we must be aware of the danger of indulging ourselves in the idea of "second best." The way to our defeat and the present crisis was paved by the advocates of this theory. Has the time not arrived when we must be emancipated from the idea of "second best?"

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Sadao Araki, twice/Minister of Japan, on 10 September was first of 25 major war criminal suspects to testify on stand in own behalf as International Military Tribunal began individual defense phase following completion of general phase same date. 11 SEP 1947