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ANCIENT HISTORY.

THE

HISTORY OF GREECE.

FROM

VARIOUS AUTHENTIC SOURCES,

BOTH ANCIENT AND MODERN.

WITH TWO MAPS.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE

PART I.

CIVIL AND MILITARY TRANSACTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

THE EARLIEST INHABITANTS OF GREECE.

THE countries of Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece, are represented in Scripture as peopled at an earlier period than any other portion of the western world. The country of Greece appears in ancient times to have been inhabited by two different races—the Hellenes, who finally possessed themselves of the whole country, and were termed by foreigners Greeks; and the Pelasgians.

According to some Greek writers, the whole of Greece was not occupied, before foreign settlers from Egypt, Phrygia, and Phœnicia, were attracted thither. This, however, is doubtful; for in the Homeric poems no traces of such colonies can be discovered, and it is not till a comparatively late period—a period which followed the rise of historical literature among the Greeks—that they are mentioned, and then it is under such marvellous circumstances, as exceed the bounds of belief. Notwithstanding, it is probable that some Egyptians and Phœnicians, and even Phrygians, may have intermingled with the inhabitants of Greece at an early period, and that their knowledge may have had a beneficial effect upon the manners of the natives; but the account of them is so full of romance, that the truth cannot be ascertained. Hence it is that the stories of the various Egyptian colonies under Danaus, Inachus, Cecrops, Erechthens, and Pelæus—the tale of a Phœnician colony under Cadmus—and the tradition which states that Pelops passed over from Phrygia into Greece with treasures enabling him to found a new dynasty in Argos, which lasted for three generations, are passed over in this history. No profitable account can be given of any races but the Pelasgic and Hellenic; and even concerning these, in the remotest ages, our knowledge is very imperfect. Thus much, how

established—that the various tribes which comprised these races, peopled and cultivated Greece.

THE PELASGIANS.

Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides, speak of the Pelasgians as occupying only some insulated points in Crete and Asia Minor, where, in the Trojan war, they took part with the Trojans against the Greeks. Such may have been the case in the heroic age; but that they were widely diffused in Greece itself in earlier times is a fact firmly established. Strabo says that the Pelasgians were an ancient race, prevailing throughout all Greece, and especially by the side of the *Æolians* in Thessaly. This, however, must be understood with some limitation, for the geographer himself enumerates a long list of other races, which he considers as equally ancient and equally foreign; he must therefore mean, what Thucydides says plainly, that the tribe of the Pelasgians, before the rise of the Hellenes, had spread its name more widely than any other over the country. Ancient tradition confirms this view, for it speaks of them as inhabiting some districts exclusively; as mingled, in some, with a crowd of other tribes; and in others as not to be found.

The chief districts occupied by the Pelasgians, either in whole, or in part, appear to have been the eastern side of Pindus in Thessaly, the northern and southern borders of Thessaly, Epirus, Bœotia, Attica, Argolis, Achaia, and Arcadia. In all these districts, traces of their existence are found in names of cities and plains, as those of Larissa and Argos. Thus the *Iliad* mentions a Pelasgian Argos; and most of the Larissæ founded in ancient times, as that in Argolis, which is held to have been so named after the daughter of Pelasgus, can be clearly traced to the Pelasgians.

Which of these districts the Pelasgians first

occupied, is a matter of doubt. In the *Iliad*, Achilles is represented as invoking Jupiter as the Dodonæan, Pelasgic king, and it was a disputed point among the ancients, whether the Dodona from which the god derived the epithet lay in Thessaly or Epirus. The most common opinion, however, favoured the latter district, and that it was one of their most ancient seats, and that the Thesprotian Dodona belonged to them, is universally admitted. Notwithstanding, the *Iliad* testifies the existence of a Thessalian Dodona; and unless it could be proved, as some ancient writers maintained, that the oracle of Pelasgian Jupiter was transplanted from Thessaly to the Thesprotian Dodona, the question must remain undecided.

Whence the Pelasgians migrated into Greece, cannot be ascertained. The Greeks themselves were ignorant of their origin, and were not even tempted to inquire into the subject. The poetic historians of the early ages deemed it sufficient when they had ascended to the person whom they considered as the common ancestor of a nation, to describe him as the son of a god, or as the natural production of the earth, or uniting both these views, as framed by the divine hand out of some brute matter. Thus Plato observed of Attica, in a funeral oration "The second praise due to our country is, that at the time when the whole earth was sending forth animals of all kinds, wild and tame, this our land proved barren and free from wild beasts, and, excluding all other animals, gave birth to man, the creature which excels the rest in understanding, and alone acknowledges justice and the gods." The genealogical poet Asius of Samos, also, asserting the antiquity of the Arcadians, said of the Arcadian Pelasgus, that "the black earth sent him forth in the shady mountains, that the race of mortals might exist." The reader need not be reminded that these popular notions among the Greeks were fallacious, it is not, however, too much to suppose that they originated from a tradition of the creation of Adam, of whom Scripture says, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul," Gen. i. 7. Deprived of the book of revelation, that bright and morning star to benighted man, they were left to account for the origin of the human race by the taper light of tradition and reason. Hence the only question among the Greeks concerning the tribe of the Pelasgians was, not from what foreign region it came, but from what part of Greece it had issued! Whether from the "dust of Attica," or "the black earth of Arcadia!"

From this it will be perceived, that all attempts to discover the origin of the Pelasgians, or the country whence they came, from Grecian fable, is vain. Thirlwall has strenuously endeavoured to throw light on the subject, but his theories are based upon conjecture. He could discover no certain clue, either in tradition, their language, civilisation, name, national features, manners, or religion: at every turn he is compelled to acknowledge himself baffled in the research. All, therefore, that can be safely asserted is, that they migrated into Greece.

Reason and authority, as he observes, unite to convince us that the Pelasgians were a wandering people before they migrated into Greece, but neither supplies an answer to the varied questions this fact suggests; nor, it may be added, has this answer been found elsewhere.

Compared with these uncertain annals, how glorious does the truth of Scripture appear! Events which transpired ages anterior to any found in the pages of Greek history, are there related with a distinctness truly remarkable. And the great charm of the sacred historical writings is, the stamp of truth discerned in every part. But it could not be otherwise: they were not written and composed by erring man, but by the Spirit of God. "All scripture is given by inspiration of God," 2 Tim. iii. 16.

The condition of the Pelasgians in the earliest ages, is wrapped in the same obscurity as their origin. Some accounts represent them as little better than savages; while others imply that they had, in the very earliest period of their settlement in Greece, attained a high state of civilization. There is an important variation, also, in the history of their progress in civilization. One account states, that it was gradual and native, while another ascribes it to foreign influence. In all this, tradition may be said to be but a blind guide. Thus a legend of Arcadia represents king Pelasgus, the "earth's first-born," as teaching his people to build rude huts, to clothe themselves with skins, such as were worn in some parts of Greece down to the latest times, and to substitute the fruit of the oak for leaves and herbs, on which they had before subsisted. The same legend reports that his son Lycaon founded the first city, Lycosura, and that it was not before the reign of Arca, the fourth from Pelasgus, who gave his name to the country, that the Arcadians discovered the use of bread, and exchanged their bear-skins for woollen garments. All this bears evidence of a sketch of the order in which useful discoveries may be supposed to have succeeded each other in a primitive community, traced by the understanding, and filled up by the imagination.

Other traditions, more worthy of credence, assign tillage and useful arts to the Pelasgians as their proper and original pursuits. The very fact of their having migrated from another country would imply this. If they came to Greece, as it is certain they did, from some part of the earth near to that where mankind first came into being, it is evident they must have had some knowledge of navigation, and the knowledge of agriculture takes the precedence of that of navigation, inasmuch as before man roves abroad he must provide for his subsistence.

Traditions of the above nature state, that the Pelasgians loved to settle on the rich soil of alluvial plains, whence the name and legend of Peneus, who reigned over the Pelasgians in the valley of the Hermus, and who grew wanton from the exuberant fertility of the soil. In the same manner, Pelasgus is represented as hastening to take possession of Thessaly, as soon as the waters were discharged by the earthquake which rent Ossa and Olympus asunder. Then again, it is evident that the powers presiding

over husbandry, the fruits of the earth, and the growth of the flocks and herds, were the oldest Pelasgian deities, which evinces that they possessed a knowledge of agriculture when they migrated into Greece. Hence it is that Thirlwall supposes that the genuine and most ancient form of the national name, which is so difficult to be accounted for, was expressive of this character—*Pelasgoi*, from *argos* and *pelo*, inhabitants or cultivators of the plain and this may explain how the tribe came to be so widely diffused, without superseding those which prevailed elsewhere.

It must not be supposed, however, that the Pelasgians were solely addicted to agricultural pursuits. Even if it were not certain that they originally crossed the sea from the cradle of the human race, Asia, into Greece, it would be more than probable that the tribes seated on the coast very early acquired the art of navigation. In accordance with this view, we find that the islands of the Ægean were peopled by Pelasgians, that the piracies of the Leleges preceded the rise of the first maritime power among the Greeks, and that the Tyresman Pelasgians entered the seas after the fall of Troy.

It seems evident, therefore, that the Pelasgians, on their first appearance in Greece, were not a horde of helpless savages, and that, long before they came into contact with any foreign people there, they tilled the ground, planted the vine, launched their boats, dwelt in walled towns, and honoured the gods with festive rites and songs. The whole tenor of ancient tradition, on which any reliance can be placed, tends to support this view. It is confirmed, also, by the most ancient architectural monuments in Greece and other parts of the world, for those huge structures, called Cyclopean, remains of which are still visible in Epirus, Italy, and the western coast of Asia Minor, and which may perhaps outlast all that have been reared in later ages, might more properly be called Pelasgian than Cyclopean, from the Greek legend of the Cyclopes, that epithet, probably, expressing nothing more than the wonder excited by their appearance. They are calculated to remind the beholder of the tower of Babel, and this may be offered as an additional proof of Asiatic origin, and it may be reasonable to infer from this that the people migrated into Greece either at the time of, or soon after, "the confusion of tongues." It is a well-established fact, indeed, that the different portions of Greece Proper were peopled by the four sons of Javan, the fourth son of Japheth, in accordance with the remarkable prediction of the patriarch Noah—"God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant." Gen. ix. 27.

With this prediction Homer himself seems to have been acquainted, for he has well described the partition of the earth among the families of Noah, in the following geographical allegory, which he puts into the mouth of Neptune, when provoked at Jove's command to desist from assailing the Greeks in the Trojan war—

"What means the haughty sovereignty of the skies?
(The king of ocean thus incensed replies.)
Ruler as he will his portion'd realms on high,
No vassal god, nor of his train am I.

Three brother deities from Saturn came,
And ancient Rhea, earth's immortal dame,
Assign'd by lot our triple rule we know
Infernal Pluto sways the shades below,
O'er the wide clouds, and o'er the starry plain,
Ethereal Jove extends his high domain,
My court beneath the hoary waves I keep,
And hush the roarings of the sacred deep
Olympus and this earth in common lie
What claim has here the tyrant of the sky?
Far in the distant clouds let him control
And awe the younger brothers of the pole,
There to his children his command be given,
The trembling, servile, second race of heaven."

ILIAD

In this passage, heaven, or the northern regions, is assigned to Jupiter, or Japheth, the sea, or middle regions, to Neptune, or Shem; and hell, or the southern, to Pluto, or Ham. Hence Neptune is incensed with Jupiter, or Japheth, for interfering with his province. "God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem," which the poet assigns to Neptune.

It would appear that there were many tribes of Pelasgic origin, who had different names from their progenitors, just as the twelve tribes of Israel from the twelve sons of Jacob. This may be the solution of the difficult problem concerning the various families inhabiting Greece. Hence it is that Thirlwall suggests that the name Pelasgians was a general one, like that of Saxons, Franks, or Alemanni, but that each of the Pelasgian tribes had also one peculiar to itself. These were the Bœotian Hæcetes, the Temmices, Aones, Hyantes, Caucones, Leleges, Taphians, Teleboans, Curetes, Helli or Sellæ, Greci, Chaones, and Thracians, a brief account of whom will now be given.

The Bœotian Hæcetes, Temmices, Aones, and Hyantes. These tribes are mentioned as among the most ancient inhabitants of Greece, but our knowledge of them extends no farther than their names. Tradition, according to Strabo, states that two of them had migrated from Sumum, in Attica, and that a third finally settled in Phocis and Ætolia, but no argument can be adduced tending to show that they were not of Pelasgic origin.

The Caucones. This tribe anciently occupied a great part of the western side of the Peloponnesus. By ancient authors they were said to be a tribe of the Pelasgian race, and there is every reason to believe that their view is correct. Pausanias reckoned Caucon their progenitor, among the sons of Lycaon, and legend connects a person of the same name with the religion of Eleusis, which he is said to have introduced into Messenia during the reign of the first king.

The Leleges. The Leleges are presented to our view under different aspects, but there is evidence of their being, like the Caucones, a tribe of the Pelasgians. Homer represents them, during the Trojan war, as being auxiliaries of the Trojans, and their king Altes as father-in-law of Priam. At that period they inhabited a town called Pedasus, at the foot of Ida; and Strabo relates that they, together with the Carians, with whom they are often confounded, once occupied the whole of Ionia. They also resided in many parts of Caria; and occupied,

conjointly with the Carians, the territory of Miletus and Ephesus, from whence they were driven by a party of Ionians, under Androclus Miletus contained many fortresses and sepulchres of the Leleges, and Strabo says that the Carian town of Pedasa was founded by them. The Leleges, moreover, were the earliest known inhabitants of Samos, and Athenæus relates that they there founded the most ancient temple of Herè, a Pelasgian goddess, which indicates their origin. That they were a Pelasgian race is confirmed by Herodotus, who speaks of such inhabiting the islands of the Ægean before the Ionian migration; and it is a well-established fact that the Leleges and Carians were driven out from thence by the Ionians.

It is probable that this intermixture of the Leleges and Carians gave rise to the Megarian tradition that, in the twelfth generation after Car, Lelex came over from Egypt to Megara, and gave name to the people. The grandson of Lelex, according to Pausanias, led a colony of the Megarian Leleges into Messenia, where they founded Pylus, and whence they were driven out by Neleus, and the Pelasgians from Iolcus. That Messenia was inhabited by the Leleges appears evident from the name of the "vine-cherishing Pedasus," which occurs among the seven towns of Messenia, offered by Agamemnon to Achilles. Laconian traditions, however, speak of a Lelex as the first native of the Lacedæmonian soil, and as giving the name of Lelegia to the land, and Leleges to the inhabitants. The son of this Lelex is said to have been the first king of Messenia.

Thus, on the coast of Asia, in the islands, and in the south of Greece, the Leleges appear to have been almost identified with the Carians; on the contrary, in the north of Greece, they present the aspect of an Hellenic tribe. Aristotle says that their original seat was on the western coast of Acarnania, or in the Leucadian peninsula, where Lelex, the "first child of the soil," reigned over them. By Hesiod they were considered the first men that sprang from the stones with which Deucalion reseeded the earth after the deluge, and the subjects of Loecrus. This theory is adopted by Aristotle, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the latter of whom reckons the Leleges among the forces with which Deucalion expelled the Pelasgians from Thessaly. According to Aristotle, these western Leleges were the same as occupied Megara, and when they drove the Pelasgians from Iolcus, it is said that the Pelasgians found another tribe of them in Pylus, where they took refuge. This would seem to confirm the opinion of Strabo, that they were a wandering and mixed race, both in the north-west of Greece and the Ægean, but yet Hesiod, on whose verses he grounds his conjecture, simply alluded to their high antiquity. The question of their origin, therefore, is too difficult for solution, but it is probable that they were allied, to some extent, either to the Pelasgians or Hellenes, but more probably to the former.

The Taphians. This people were connected with the Leleges of the Ægean, and resembled them in their habits; but this is the extent of our knowledge of them.

The Teleboans. The Teleboans are said to have descended from Lelex, in the Leucadian peninsula. They are celebrated in the *Odyssey* under the name of Taphians; but this appears to have arisen from the circumstance of their being intermingled with that tribe in Acarnania. Teleboans, from whom they descended, is enumerated among the posterity of the Areadian Pelasgus by Apollodorus.

The Cureses. Like the Taphians and Teleboans, this tribe dwelt in Ætolia and Acarnania, in common with the Leleges. All these four tribes were, indeed, intimately connected, either by their birth or fortunes, with each other, though they may have differed in name and in character. Probably they were so many different branches of one family, and their names may have been derived from their different ancestors.

The Helli, or Selli. Homer describes this race as dwelling around the sanctuary of the Thesprotian Dodona, of which temple they were the ministers. They appear to have been a considerable tribe, for they occupied a region named Hellopia, which was evidently called after their own name. Ancient writers identify them with the Pelasgians, which is a proof of their origin.

The Græci. Aristotle places this people with the Helli, in the parts about Dodona and the Achelous. It is from them that the Italian name of the Hellenes has been transmitted through the Roman into the modern European languages. In Epirus the Pelasgians were called Græci.

The Chaones. The Chaones are said to have ruled over all Epirus, before it fell under the dominion of the Molossians. They were distinctly connected with the Pelasgians, and they are described as interpreters of the oracle of Jupiter, like the Selli. Probably they were only a kind of priestly order among the Pelasgians, for Chaonia is called Pelasgia by Strabo.

The Thracians. This people are numbered among the barbarian inhabitants of Bœotia, and they are represented as sharing the country with the Pelasgians. There appears, in truth, to have been a close affinity existing between these two tribes, notwithstanding they were distinguished, by name and character, from the other Pelasgian families. In after ages the name was applied to the inhabitants of Thrace, but whether the Bœotian Thracians were in any degree related to that people cannot be ascertained, as the population of Thrace underwent great changes during the period in which that of Greece was also changing, and even after that of the latter country had been settled. They appear, however, to have been connected with the northern Pierians, and the worship of the muses, and the establishment of Greek oracles, are attributed to them. The Pierian Thracians are, indeed, the tribe which seems to have combined the various elements of the Greek mythology, and to have moulded them nearly into the form in which they are presented in the pages of Homer.

Such are the various aspects of the Pelasgian

race presented to our view, as far as they can be collected with any degree of certainty. They appear originally to have passed over from Asia—whether in a small or large body cannot be stated—and to have spread gradually over a large portion of Greece. Eventually, however, they had neighbours to contend with, who proved too powerful for them. Those neighbours were the Hellenes, or Greeks, by whom they were driven out, or with whom, perhaps, in some instances, they became united, as will be seen in the succeeding section.

THE HELLENES.

The nation of the Hellenes, says Heeren, preserved many traditions respecting their earliest state, representing them to have been nearly on a level with the savage tribes which now wander in the forests of North America. From these traditions it would seem that there was a time when they had no agriculture, but lived on the spontaneous produce of the woods, and when even fire was not appropriated to the service of man till it had been stolen from heaven. Yet, in the mean while, they gradually spread themselves over the country which they afterwards occupied, and all foreign races were either driven from the soil, or mingled with them. Much is told of the emigration of individual tribes from the southern districts to the northern, and from these back again into the southern, but the peculiar habits of nomades, as seen in the nations of central Asia, were as unknown to the Greeks as they were to the Germanic nations. The limited extent and the hilly character of their country, which afforded no pasturage for large flocks, did not admit of that kind of life.

Greek fable relates—and historians generally have adopted the statements as historical facts—that the Hellenes, or Greeks, owed their origin to Hellen, the son of Deucalion, in whose time a great flood happened, and a new race sprang up from the stones which he and his wife, Pyrrha, threw behind them on Mount Parnassus, to replenish the desolated earth. The flood here alluded to, was, doubtless, that which happened in the days of the patriarch Noah, wherein all mankind, save eight souls, perished by reason of their iniquities. Thus far, inasmuch as it tends to confirm the truth of Scripture, this account merits our attention. Beyond this, however, it appears to be but a tissue of romance. Thirlwall has ably shown, indeed, that no such person as Hellen ever existed, and that his immediate progeny are fictitious personages, created by the genius of Hesiod. He suggests, also, that Deucalion is probably a mere symbol of the flood itself. There can be no doubt that the Hellenes knew of the flood which happened in the days of Noah, through tradition, whence it may be more reasonably inferred that Deucalion was another name among them for that patriarch, as is the generally received opinion.

Avoiding the labyrinth into which this fable of the Greeks would lead if it were followed, we pass on to the most probable conjecture of the origin of the Hellenes. And thus appears to be—since their language was different from that of

the Pelasgians, and they must, therefore, be considered as having had a different origin or ancestor—that *they*, also, at some remote period passed over from Asia into Greece. Their very knowledge of the flood would indicate this; for if they had not brought this from Asia, whence could it have been obtained? The whole world, elsewhere, had been destroyed, and the tradition of that event seems to have essentially belonged to them. Upon its results they founded their origin. It is, indeed, a well-established fact, that the different portions of Greece Proper were peopled by the four sons of Javan. Thus Elishah and Dodanim may be recognised in Elis and Dodona, the oldest settlements of Greece. Kittium may be discovered in the Citium of Macedonia and Chittim, or maritime coasts of Greece and Italy, and Tarshish in the Tarsus of Cilicia, and Tartessus of Spain. By the prophet Daniel, Greece itself is called Javan, and the people are denominated Jaones—a name by which the descendants of Javan were distinguished—by Homer.

This view of the inhabitants of Greece in the early periods is borne out by the direct and infallible testimony of Scripture. Speaking of the four sons of Javan—Elishah, Tarshish, Kittim, and Dodanim—the sacred historian says, “By these were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations.” Gen. x. 5.

At what period the migration of these families took place cannot be determined. It must have been after the dispersion, for we read, Gen. xi. 1, that, before that event, “the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.” There is good reason to believe, however, that no long time elapsed after the language of men had been confounded before Greece received the descendants of Javan, for the sacred historian, speaking of the plain of Shinar, in which the tower of Babel was erected, says distinctly, that “from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.” Gen. xi. 9. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that so soon as mankind found themselves confounded, they who understood each other would collect in families, or bodies, and, separating from the mass, depart as Providence might guide to the various parts of the globe. Some would settle on the soil of Asia, while others would trust themselves in their frail barks, and seek lands unknown, where they might gain a subsistence, and establish themselves as nations.

Here it may be proper to notice a remarkable feature in the event of the confusion of tongues. In his judgments God remembered mercy, for it seems clear that distinct families were still united, and the bands of affection preserved by this merciful provision—that each family had a language assigned to them peculiar to themselves. The husband was not cut off from the wife, nor the wife from the husband, neither were they separated from their offspring, by not being able to understand each other. The all-wise and all-gracious God never effects anything after a promiscuous or arbitrary manner. He had ordained that the descendants of Noah should each have their distinct portions of the earth,

and therefore numbers were mercifully united to each other by being able to express their wants, desires, and designs in a known language. And this may suggest the idea that the Pelasgians and Hellenes were two distinct families descended from one common ancestor, but who had this line of demarcation set between them, namely, an unknown tongue. Hence it was, that, though they migrated to the same shores, they lived there as strangers—that they divided the land, “every one after his tongue,” as the sacred historian represents. No other reasonable hypothesis can be adduced concerning the first inhabitants of Greece. Legend may occasionally bear some semblance of truth, but Scripture alone can give us any certain information on such a subject. It is from following the former, and neglecting the latter, that the accounts given by historians generally are as contradictory as they are fallacious.

The position which the Pelasgians held in Greece has been seen in the preceding section. When the Hellenes first migrated from Asia, if Thucydides may be credited, they settled in Thessaly. Tradition would seem to confirm this, for it states that when Deucalion brought his newly created people down from Parnassus, he crossed over from the adjacent regions into Thessaly. Afterwards they appear to have spread themselves about Dodona and the Achelous, where, according to Aristotle, lay the ancient Hellas. “For,” he says, “the Sellians dwelt there, and the people who were then called Græci, but now Hellenes.” The country about Dodona was celebrated by Hesiod, also, for the richness of its pastures, under the name of Hellopia; and the sanctuary of Dodona itself was called Hella. Here, however, they were mixed with the Pelasgians, for they also inhabited these territories, as before related. So also were they mingled with that race in other parts at a very early period. Before, indeed, the name of Hellas had extended beyond the district of Mount Othrys, in the south of Thessaly, their earliest seat, the people appear to have gained a footing in almost every part of the country afterwards so called.

All ancient authors agree in describing the diffusion of the Hellenes, as an event which changed the condition and character of the inhabitants of Greece; they do not, however, relate the nature and progress of the revolution. On this subject Heeren remarks, that the nation of the Pelasgians, who, with the Hellenes, were the first inhabitants of the country, was, perhaps, at an early period the most powerful; but it was constantly reduced to narrower limits, and either emigrated to Italy and other countries; or, where it preserved its residence, as in Arcadia and Attica, was gradually mingled with the Hellenes, whose power, by their skill in warfare, was constantly increasing, until every vestige of the Pelasgic, as a separate race, was entirely lost.

Whilst the Hellenes were thus spreading over Greece, the several tribes of their nation became more and more distinctly marked; and this division was so lasting, and so replete with important consequences, that on it the internal history of the country chiefly turns. The most power-

ful of these tribes were the Æolians, Dorians, Ionians, and Achæans: but there were others of minor importance, as the Bœotians, Locrians, Thessalians, etc., whose histories will be found blended with the narrative, and therefore do not demand a separate notice.

The Æolians.—The Greeks state that Hellen had three sons—Æolus, Dorus, and Xuthus; and that when he died he left his kingdom to Æolus, and sent his other two sons to make conquests in distant lands. This kingdom of Æolus is represented as being bounded by the Asopus and Enipeus, which nearly corresponds with that division of Thessaly known in later times by the name of Phthiotis. There was, also, another part of Thessaly, which was included in the division afterwards called Thessalitis, bearing the name of Æolus, whence it has been supposed, that this territory must likewise have been one of the earliest settlements of the Æolians. This, however, does not appear to be clearly established, for the people which inhabited this district from the remotest known period, is the same which afterwards gave its name to Bœotia, and it is only the name of Æolus that attests the presence of the Æolians in this district. Notwithstanding, it is possible that these Bœotian Æolians were related to those of Phthia, or Phthiotis, as it is certain that the Bœotians, in after ages, spoke the Æolian dialect.

Nothing is recorded, either in legend or history, of the conquests and achievements of Æolus, but his sons and their descendants spread the Æolian and Hellenic name far and wide. By some authors, Æolus is said to have had ten sons, by others seven; but Hesiod names only five—Cretheus, Athamas, Sisypheus, Salmoeneus, and Perieres.

The principal settlements of the descendants of Æolus in Thessaly, lay round the shores of the Pagasæan gulf, and in the fruitful plains near the coast. On this coast Cretheus himself is said to have founded Iolcus, the port from whence the Argonauts steered, and Phææ, adjacent to it, is thought to have been named after his son Phææ. In the same region lay Alus, where the memory of the sufferings of Athamas, whose family are said to have been destroyed by one of the furies commissioned by Juno, was preserved for many generations by peculiar rites. In this region, also, was a tract called the Athamantian plain, and it is remarkable that on this side of Thessaly, towards the north, the plains round lake Bœbe were long inhabited by the Athamaneæ, who, in the lower ages, appear as one of the Epirot tribes.

On the gulf of Pagasæ, the Æolians appear identified with the Minyans, who were a race of great celebrity in the most ancient epic poetry. This may be accounted for by a tradition which describes Minyas, the progenitor of their race, as a descendant of Æolus. Thus Apollonius Rhodius, in his Argonautics, puts these words into the mouth of Jason their leader:—

“A land there is, that lofty hills surround,
Where numerous flocks and fertile plains abound,
Sprung from Iphitus of heavenly fire,
There dwell Prometheus, good Deucalion’s sire.
He first by laws o’er willing subjects reign’d,
And towns for men, and fates for gods ordain’d.”

"It is called *Hæmonia** by the neighbouring race,
There towers Iolcus, my paternal place,
And various other stately cities smile,
Nor e'en by name is known *Æet*'s isle.
From thence, 't is said, the noble Minyas went,
Who drew from *Æolus* his proud descent,
And built *Orchomenus*, a town that stands
In peaceful neighbourhood with Theban bands."

It appears probable, however, that the ancient Minyans were Pelasgians, but that they were overpowered by, and blended with, the *Æolians*. This appears evident, indeed, by the names of the two Orchomenian tribes—the *Eteoclean* and the *Cephusian*. The former of these, called after *Eteocles*, the son of *Andreas*, their first monarch, seems to have comprised the warlike chiefs of a barbarous age; and the latter the industrious people which tilled the plains watered by the *Cephus*—or, in other words, the *Æolians*.

Traces of the *Æolians* are discovered in the south of *Bœotia*, where *Tanagra* is said to have received its name from a daughter of *Æolus*, and *Hyrta*, from a hero of *Minyas* legend. Another of their principal seats was *Ephyra*, which afterwards became more celebrated under the name of *Corinth*. It was here that the "wily *Sisyphus*," son of *Æolus*, is said to have established himself; and *Thirlwall* suggests that his legendary character may be connected with the causes which procured the epithet of "wealthy" for his city before the age of *Homer*. *Ornytion*, the son of *Sisyphus*, was the father of *Phocus*, who gave his name to *Phocis*, which was evidently another *Æolian* settlement. This is intimated by a legend, which describes *Deion*, son of *Æolus*, as reigning there; and, perhaps, by the story of the strife of cunning between *Sisyphus* and the *Phœcian Autolyceus*, which states that *Autolyceus* dwelt on *Parnassus*, and stole the cattle of *Sisyphus*, and changed their marks to deceive their owner.

The descendants of *Æolus* seem to have spread the *Æolian* name over the western side of the *Peloponnesus*. They peopled both *Elis* and *Pylus*, as is evident from many legends. Thus the *Eleans* ascribed the first celebration of games at *Olympia* to *Endymion*, the son of *Æthlius*, by *Calyce*, a daughter of *Æolus*, who, they said, first led a colony of *Æolians* to *Elis*. Other *Æolian* settlements on this side of the *Peloponnesus*, are connected with the name of *Salmones*, who is said to have founded *Salmone* in the territory of *Pisa*. South of *Elis*, another *Æolian* tribe, renowned both in epic song and history, owed its origin to *Tyro*, the daughter of *Salmones*. Her son *Neleus* founded a kingdom in *Pylus*, which was apparently the *Triphylian*, there being three towns of that name on the western side of the *Peloponnesus*, one of which is described by *Homer* as the residence of *Nestor*. Another branch of the same family seems to have preceded the *Nelends* at *Pylus*, in the person of *Amythaon*, son of *Cretheus*, the uncle, and afterwards the husband of *Tyro*; this, however, cannot be clearly ascertained.

Some writers represent that *Messenia* fell under the dominion of *Æolian* princes at this period. The first of these princes, they say, was

Æeretes, whom *Hesiod* numbers among the sons of *Æolus*. It would seem, however, to have been not from the south of *Thessaly*, the seat of the *Æolians*, that *Messenia* received its new inhabitants, who shared it with the *Leleges* and the *Caucones*, but from the north, or the upper part of the valley of the *Peneus*. The towns of *Messenia* and this part of *Thessaly* were called by the same names, which is an evidence of the truth of this supposition. Thus, as there was a *Tricca* in this upper part of the vale of *Peneus*, celebrated for the most ancient temple of *Esculapius*, so there was a *Tricca* in *Messenia*, which contained a temple sacred to the same god. Still the people who migrated from thence may have been descendants of *Æolus*, and the assertion that *Messenia* fell under the *Æolian* princes at this period, would, if this can be imagined, still bear the semblance of history.

The tradition which ascribes the first celebration of games at *Olympia* to *Endymion*, in which his three sons, *Pæon*, *Epeus*, and *Ætolus*, contended for the succession to his throne, states that he decided in favour of *Epeus*, who reigned over *Elis*.* The two brothers are reported to have led colonies to foreign lands. Thus *Pæon* is said to have settled on the banks of the *Axius*, where he was supposed to have become the father of the *Pæonian* nation, while *Ætolus* wandered to the land of the *Curetes*, which was thenceforth named *Ætolia* after him, as its two principal towns or districts were after his two sons, *Calydon* and *Pleuron*. These Hellenic settlements in *Ætolia*, however, seem only to have comprised the maritime part of the country. The interior appears to have been occupied by other tribes till a late period, when they bowed before the influence of their more civilized neighbours. The *Curetes* are supposed to have retreated before *Ætolus* into *Acarmania*, and they are described in the *Iliad* as formidable enemies to the people of *Calydon*. The country round about *Calydon* once bore the name of *Æolis*, but this seems to have been derived from an invasion of the *Bœotian* *Æolians*, for, although the name was obsolete in the time of *Thucydides*, yet *Ephorus* says distinctly that the *Epean* settlers in *Ætolia* were afterwards compelled to receive a colony of *Æolians*, who were driven out of *Thessaly* with the *Bœotians*.

Another portion of Greece in which the *Æolians* appear to have settled was *Locris*. This will be seen in a future account of the *Locrians*; and it need be only remarked here, that a strong predilection for maritime situations is exhibited by the various *Æolian* settlements. *Iolcus*, *Corinth*, *Orchomenus*, and *Phocis* were theirs; and it is, doubtless, from this cause, that *Posidon*, and other deities connected with the sea, so frequently occur in *Æolian* genealogies and legends.

The Dorians. After observing that the *Dorians* and *Ionians* were anciently distinguished from one another, and from the other branches

* An ancient name of *Thessaly*.

* It was in the reign of *Epeus*, that *Peleus* is said have arrived in Greece, and to have wrested the territory of *Pisa* from the *Epeans*.

of the Greek nation, Herodotus observes: "The one was a Pelægian, the other an Hellenic race the one had never changed their place of residence, but the other went through many wanderings. In the reign of Deucalion it inhabited Phthiotis; under Dorus, the son of Hellen, the land called Hestiasotis, at the foot of Ossa and Olympus; when it was forced by the Cadmeans to quit Hestiasotis, it dwelt on Mount Pindus, and was called the Macedonian people. After this it migrated to Dryopis; and finally, from Dryopis it came into Peloponnesus, and was henceforth known by the name of Dorians." It is questioned by Thirlwall, whether this description of Herodotus exhibits the real course of the migrations of the Dorians; and, after much able reasoning on its various points, he concludes that they first entered Thessaly as an independent people from the north, on the same side as the historian represents, namely, Phthiotis; that they spread from thence to Hestiasotis, at the foot of mounts Ossa and Olympus; that they were there called a Macedonian people from their vicinity to Macedonia, instead of being driven into Pindus, which, however, may be but another name for Hestiasotis; that they were afterwards expelled from thence by the aggressions of their northern neighbours, the fiercer hordes of Upper Macedonia, or the hostility of the Lapith lowlanders, when they took up their abode at the opposite extremity of Thessaly, in the land of the Dryopes, which henceforth retained the name of Doris; and that at a later period they issued from thence to effect the conquest of Peloponnesus.

The common genealogy of the race of Hellen represents Dorus as the ancestor of the Dorians, and as the brother of Æolus. That the Dorians and Æolians, however, originally inhabited the same district, or were united by bonds of relationship, is exceedingly improbable. Legend neither mentions such a connexion, nor speaks of any alliance contracted between the mythical descendants of Dorus and Æolus; but, on the contrary, the friends and brothers of the Æolians are represented as the first and bitterest enemies of the Dorians. On this ground Thirlwall supposes that they first issued from the north, either by the defile of Tempe, or across the Cambunian range, or by the pass of Metaxo. All attempts, therefore, to discover their immediate origin would be vain, it must suffice to know that they were of the race of Hellenes.

The above two races are represented as deriving their names from the immediate descendants of Æolus: those of the Ionians and Achæans, which will be next described, are said to have been designated after Ion and Achæus, the sons of Xuthus, the third son of Æolus. It may be remarked, however, that Hellen, Æolus, Dorus, Ion, and Achæus, appear to be fictitious persons, who are representatives of the race which bore their names, rather than real personages.

The Ionians. Uncertain as the early history of the Æolians and Dorians is, that of the Ionians is still more obscure. This is to be regretted, as its relation to the ancient institutions of Attica makes it peculiarly interesting.

The generally received opinion of the Ionians is, that they were an Hellenic tribe, who took forcible possession of Attica and a part of Peloponnesus, and communicated their names to the ancient inhabitants. This name, it is said, they derived from Ion, the son of Xuthus; who, being driven out from the patrimony of Hellen, which he held in common with his brothers, Æolus and Dorus, took shelter first in Attica, where he founded what was called the Tetrapolis; and then, after having wedded Creusa, daughter of Erechtheus, king of Attica, who brought him two sons, Ion and Achæus, he passed over with his children to Peloponnesus, to the region then called Ægialus, or "the coast;" but which afterwards successively received the names of Ionia and Achaia. From this it will be perceived, that it is a question whether the conquerors brought the name of Ionians with them, or only assumed it in their new territories. From legend, the latter supposition seems to be the more correct, for in every part it speaks of Xuthus as the founder of the power of the Ionians; but never of Ion himself as having migrated into Attica from the north. Still it may be supposed that the people afterwards took the name of the son rather than that of Xuthus himself. There seems good reason to believe, however, that the name was connected with the Peloponnesus anterior even to the appearance of the Hellenes in Thessaly; and it is certain that no trace of the Ionian name is to be found in that country; which, if a son of Xuthus had given name to it, would certainly have been the case.

On this subject, Thirlwall, after balancing the accounts of historians and legend, says: "The result of the whole is, that the Peloponnesian Ionians were at least of equal antiquity with those of Attica. And to this conclusion we are led by the legends of the southern Ionia; for here the only king named before the arrival of Ion is a Selinus, who takes his name from one of the rivers of the country, which flowed near Helicæ, the chief town of the Ionians; so called, it was said, from the daughter of Selinus, who became the wife of Ion. But, besides this settlement of the Ionians on the western side of the peninsula, it is clear that they once occupied a great part of the eastern coast. The legends both of Sicyon and Corinth speak of a very ancient connexion between this region and Attica. Marathon, it was said, the son of Epepeus, one of the kings of Corinth, who reigned there before the arrival of the Æolids, or descendants of Æolus, had first fled to the sea-coast of Attica; and afterwards, returning to his paternal dominions, divided his kingdom between his two sons, Sicyon and Corinth; and hence the fall of the Æolian dynasty is said to have been accompanied by the expulsion of the Ionians. Still more distinct traces of an Ionian population appear at Træzen and Epidaurus. The people of Træzen are distinguished, in the historical times, as the kinsmen and friends of the Athenians; and their city was the birth-place of the great Attic hero, Sphærus and Anaphlystus, the sons of Træzen, founded two of the Attic towns; and the strife between Athené and Poseidon for the possession of the land was equally celebrated in the Attic

and the Troezenian legends, and was commemorated on the ancient coins of Troezen by the trident and the head of the goddess. At Epidaurus, the last king before the Dorian conquest was said to be a descendant of Ion; and when driven from his own dominions, he took refuge with his people in Attica. The well-attested antiquity of the Cynurians seems to warrant the assumption, that the name of the Ionians had, in very early times, prevailed still more widely on the eastern side of Peloponnesus; and that it was signified by the ancient epithet of Argos, the Iasian, which appears to have preceded that derived from the Achæans. Their growing power may, perhaps, have confined the Ionians within narrower limits, and have parted states which were once contiguous. The early predominance of the Ionian name in this quarter might then be connected with the fact, that it is used in the books of Moses as a general description of Greece."

This latter inference suggests an idea that the earlier inhabitants, both of Attica and the Peloponnesus, derived their name of Ionians from Javan, the son of Japheth, himself. It is, indeed, a generally received opinion, that Javan was the father of the Javanians, or Jaones, or Ionians of the Greeks, as he was of the Yavanas of the Hindoos. Hence it appears clear, that one branch of his family settled in this part of the territories of Greece, while others settled in Thessaly and elsewhere. This hypothesis is greatly confirmed by that previously considered, namely, that at the dispersion the mass of mankind were divided into families, and distinguished from each other by their languages. And it follows from this, that the Pelasgians, as well as the Hellenes, had their origin in Javan, the son of Japheth, and that they divided the land, "every one after his tongue, after their families." It follows, also, that the early Ionians may have been Pelasgians, and that Attica and the Peloponnesus were among their first settlements. A passage in Herodotus, wherein he contrasts the Dorians, as an Hellenic race, with the Ionians as Pelasgians, confirms this view: so does another passage, wherein he speaks of the Cynurians—a people inhabiting a little tract situate between Argolis and Laconia—as an aboriginal people, and the only remnant of the genuine Ionians existing in his time.

Still, it is certain that some foreign settlers established themselves, and became powerful in Attica, and that these settlers were of the Hellenic race. How, then, it may be asked, did they obtain the name of Ionians? The question is answered by Herodotus, for when he speaks of the Cynurians as the only genuine Ionians, it is evident the great body of the people of Attica had assumed that name. And this appears to have occurred after the union of Xuthus and Creusa, which implies that this settlement exerted considerable influence over the fortunes of Attica—that while the Hellenes assumed the name of the original inhabitants, they brought with them civilisation, and its happy consequences. In truth, the original inhabitants of Attica, the Hellenic strangers, and some bodies of the Peloponnesian Ionians, when driven out by the Dorians, appear to have become finally

blended with each other under the name of Ionians, and to have presented a state of society which would indicate a pure Hellenic descent. This view appears to be borne out by the circumstance that nothing decisive is recorded of an Hellenic conquest, either in Attica or the Peloponnesian Ionia.

Speaking of the Ionians and Dorians, the two most important tribes of Greece, Heeren observes:—"From the earliest times these two races were distinguished from each other by striking characteristics, which were never wholly obliterated by civilisation or intercourse. On the Doric tribe, the character of severity is imprinted, which is observable in the full tone of its dialect, in its songs, its dances, the simplicity of its style of living, and in its political institutions. It was most strongly attached to ancient usage. From this its regulations for private and public life took their origin, which were fixed by the prescriptive rules of its lawgivers. It respected the superiority of family and age. The governments of the Doric cities were originally more or less in the hands of the rich and noble families; and this is one cause of the greater solidity of their political institutions. Good counsel was drawn from the experience of age: wherever an old man appeared, the young arose from their seats. Religion, among the Dorians, was felt to be a matter of importance and necessity. What important transaction did they ever begin without first consulting the oracle? All this is true of the earliest times. When once the reverence for ancient usage was overcome, the Dorians knew no bounds; and Tarentum exceeded all cities in luxury, as Syracuse did in internal dissensions. After this race had once emigrated to the Peloponnesus, not only the greater part of that peninsula, but also of the neighbouring mainland of Greece, was occupied by it.

"The Ionians, on the contrary, were most distinguished for their vivacity and proneness to excitement. Ancient usage restrained them much less than it did the Dorians. They were easily induced to change, if by change pleasure could be gained. They were bent on enjoyment, and seem to have been equally susceptible of the refined gratifications of the mind and of the senses. They lived amidst holidays, and nothing was pleasant to them without song and dance. Their soft dialect brings to mind the languages of the South Sea; but in both cases the remark is found to be true, that a soft language is by no means a proof of deficiency in warlike spirit. In the constitution of their states, hereditary privileges were either rejected at once, or borne with only for a short time. The sovereign power resided in the people; and although it was restrained by many institutions, the people still decided the character of the government. Anything could be expected of these states rather than domestic tranquillity: nothing was so great that they did not believe they could attain it; and for that very reason they were often successful."

As the history of all Greece is inseparably connected with the history of the Doric and Ionic states, the above remarks may enable the reader to understand why they were so frequently at war with each other. This difference of

races produced a deep-rooted hatred between Sparta and Athens, though that hatred may have been fomented by other causes, and have originated, as it certainly did, in the perverseness of human nature.

It may be mentioned, that in the days of their greatest power, most of the Eubæan islands belonged to the Ionians, that many of the small islands of the Archipelago were entirely occupied by them, and that while their colonies in Asia Minor were superior, those on the coasts of Italy and Sicily were but little inferior, to those of other Grecian tribes. At this time, however, all had laid aside the name of Ionians, except their colonies in Asia Minor, and the parent stock was known in Attica by the name of Athenians. From this cause, the extent of this tribe cannot be accurately stated, and, as Heeren observes, no attempt should be made to trace every little Grecian tribe to its origin, and form a tree of descent for them all.

Achæans—Concerning Achæus, said to be the founder of this race, and, like Ion, the son of Xuthus, ancient authors differ widely in their statements. Some relate that he was forced to quit Attica in consequence of accidental bloodshed, and that he led his followers to the eastern side of Peloponnesus, where they mingled with the inhabitants of Argolis and Laconia, or subdued them, whence arose the Peloponnesian Achæans, from whom the Peloponnesus was sometimes called the Achæan Argos, to distinguish it from the Pelasgian Argos of Thessaly. Others, however, relate that Achæus collected a band of adventurers from Ægialus, and from Athens, and, bending his course to Thessaly, recovered the patrimony of which Xuthus had been unjustly deprived by his brothers Æolus and Dorus. Hence it was, they say, that the districts of Phthiotis and the ancient Hellas in Thessaly, were, at a later period, called Achæa. And, indeed, Homer, though he usually terms the Greeks in general Achæans, more particularly thus designates the subjects of the great Achilles, who reigned in Phthiotis.

That there was, therefore, anciently a race of Achæans in Thessaly and on the eastern side of Peloponnesus, is evident. The question is, which race was the most ancient—the northern or the southern Achæans? Opinions are greatly divided on this subject; but the greater weight of evidence is in favour of the priority of the northern, or Thessalian Achæans. If this be granted, however, the question still remains who these Achæans originally were, and whether they were related to the Hellenic race in the nearness which the current genealogy indicates. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says, that Achæus, together with Phthius and Pelasgus, were the sons of Larissa and Poseidon, and that in the sixth generation after the first Pelasgus, they led the Pelasgians from Argos into Thessaly, and taking possession of the country, divided it into three parts, namely, Achæa, Phthiotis, and Pelasgotis. This account, therefore, would lead to the conclusion that the Achæans were a branch of the Pelasgian race, and this appears to be confirmed by another genealogy, which states that Phthius, who was generally considered as belonging to the stock of Pelasgus, was the son of Achæus.

Whether this be correct cannot be stated; but it seems evident that a part of the tribe, at some period or other, migrated from the north to the south, and established themselves in Argolis, where they found a kindred people, among whom they gained admission—more, it is true, by force than good-will, but still without effecting a total revolution. This appears to have taken place before the Æolians had become masters of Phthia, and had begun to be also called Achæans; whence Thirlwall imagines that the Achæans of Argos continued to be Pelasgian long after the Æolians had gained a footing in other parts of Peloponnesus, and he concludes that it must be with reference to the former that Strabo calls the Achæans an Æolian race, and that Euripides, when he speaks of Xuthus as a son of Æolus, describes him as an Achæan.

To these Æolian Achæans belong the Myrmidons, whose memory has been handed down to us through the fame of their leader, Achilles, and whose seat was in Ægina, for although the name may have originated in the island, yet it is certain that an Æolian or Achæan colony from Phthia settled there. It may be about the same time that the Æolian chieftains established themselves in Argolis, and became blended with the Argive Achæans, an event which seems to have contributed to bring the latter nearer in language and religion to those of Thessaly. It is probable, also, that about the same period the Achæan name spread into Laconia, though this cannot certainly be ascertained. All the historian can do, in reference to these early times, is to present the reader with that view of them which appears most probable. The same remark will apply to several succeeding chapters, for it was long before sober history supplied the place of fable.

CHAPTER II

THE HEROIC AGE

B C 1300—1184.

THE history of the heroic age, or, in the language of poetry, the history of "heroes," extends from about the thirteenth to the eleventh century before the Christian era, at which period the Greeks arrived at a far higher degree of civilization than they possessed before.

Our information concerning the Greeks of this period is derived from Homer, on whose merits as a poetical historian, Heeren remarks—"Homer was regarded even by the ancients as of historical authority, and, to a certain point, deserved to be so regarded. Truth was his object in his accounts and descriptions, as far as can be the object of a poet, and even in a greater degree than was necessary, when he distinguishes the earlier and later times or ages. He is the best source of information respecting the heroic age, and while that source is so copious, we need not have recourse to any other authority."

Still, the accounts of the wars, expeditions, and adventures of these heroes are conveyed in the form of legend, and it requires much discrimination to distinguish which of these legends have reference to history, and which have not.

It is clear that some are based only upon romance; we shall therefore only notice those statements that are most worthy of observation, or, in other words, those which appear to throw light on the general character of the period and its historical events.

THE EXPLOITS OF BELLEROPHON AND PERSEUS.

The scene of the adventures of these heroes is laid in the East. Bellerophon, having stained his hands with the blood of a kinsman, fled to Argolis, where he excited the jealousy of Prætus, and was sent by him to Lycia, where Prætus himself had been hospitably entertained in his exile. It was in the adjacent regions of Asia that Bellerophon proved his valour by vanquishing ferocious tribes and terrible monsters, as related in the history of the Assyrians. Perseus, it is said, went over the sea in the same direction by the command of his grandfather Acrisius, where he also performed great achievements. According to fable, he even took a wider range than Bellerophon, for he sailed along the coasts of Syria to Egypt, and to the unknown regions of the south.

As Thirlwall observes, there can be no doubt that these fables owed many of their leading features to Argive colonies, which were planted at a later period in Rhodes, and on the south-west coast of Asia, it is, however, not improbable that the connexion implied by them between Argolis and the nearer parts of Asia, may be well founded.

THE LABOURS OF HERCULES

It would be vain for history to investigate the particulars of the life of this celebrated personage, since his actions have been so disguised with ornament as to bring his existence into question. Yet, besides an abundant concurrence of other testimony, Homer leaves no room to doubt, either that there was such a Grecian prince, or who and what he was. In his pages he is not described as a vagabond savage, whose only covering was a lion's skin, whose only weapon was a club, and whose strength was equal to the discomfiture of hosts, or to the labours of a thousand hands, but as a prince commanding armies which were the instruments of his famous exploits.

The life and adventures of Hercules are briefly these. His reputed father was Amphitryon, the son of Alcæus, who is named first among the children born to Perseus at Mycenæ, and his mother, Alcmena, was the daughter of Electryon, another son of Perseus, who had succeeded to the kingdom. In the reign of Electryon the Taphians, a piratical people, who inhabited the islands called Echinades, near the mouth of the Achelous, landed in Argolis, and carried off the king's herds. While Electryon was preparing to avenge himself by invading their land, Sthenelus, a third son of Perseus, compelled Amphitryon and Alcmena to quit the country; they took refuge in Thebes; whence Hercules, though an Argive by descent, and by his mortal parentage legitimate heir to the throne of Mycenæ, was, as to his birth-place, a Theban, and Bœotia became the scene of his youthful exploits.

Hercules is said to have been bred up among the herdsmen of Cithæron. His first exploit was to deliver Thebæ from the lion which made havoc in its capital. He then freed Thebes from the yoke of its more powerful neighbour Orchomenus. It is said that the king of Orchomenus having been killed by a Theban in the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus, his successor, Erginus, imposed a tribute on Thebes, and sent heralds to exact it. This aroused the choler of Hercules, he slew the heralds, and then, marching against Orchomenus, destroyed Erginus, and forced the Minyans to pay twice the tribute which they had received. This account bears the resemblance of historical tradition; but it is disfigured by a legend which states, that on this occasion Hercules stopped the subterranean outlet of the Cephissus, and thus formed the lake which covered the greater part of the plain of Orchomenus.

While Hercules was thus engaged, Sthenelus had been succeeded by his son Eurystheus, the destined enemy of Hercules and his race, at whose command the hero undertook his labours. These were, to kill the lion of Nemea, to destroy the Lernean hydra, to bring a stag, famous for its celerity, golden horns, and brazen feet, into the presence of Eurystheus, to bring him also a wild boar which ravaged the neighbourhood of Erymanthus, to clean the stables of Augeas, where 3,000 oxen had been confined for many years, to destroy the carnivorous birds which ravaged the country near the lake Stympalis in Arcadia, to bring to Argos a wild bull which had waste the island of Crete, to obtain the horses of Diomedes, which fed upon human flesh, to obtain the girdle of the queen of the Amazons, to kill the monster Geryon, king of Gades, and bring to Argos his numerous flocks, which fed upon human flesh, to obtain apples from the garden of the Hesperides, and to bring the three-headed dog Cerberus from Hades to the earth. All these labours Hercules is represented to have accomplished, and his voluntary subjection to Eurystheus, is said to have been imposed by the Delphic oracle, because the hero had destroyed his wife and children, in a fit of frenzy.

It is remarkable, says Thirlwall, that while the adventures which Hercules undertook at the bidding of his rival are supernatural, he is described as, during the same period, engaged in expeditions in the peninsula, which, if they stood alone, might be taken for traditional facts. In these he appears in the light of an independent prince, and a powerful conqueror. Thus he led an army against Augeas, king of Elis, and, having slain him, bestowed his kingdom on one of his sons who had condemned his father's injustice, he invaded Pylus, to avenge an insult which he had received from Neleus, and put him to death, with all his children except Nestor, who was absent; and he carried his conquering arms into Laconia, where he exterminated the family of king Hippocoon, and placed Tyndareus on the throne. All this, however, is irreconcilable with the traditional statement, that while he was overthrowing hostile dynasties, and giving away kingdoms, he suffered himself to be excluded from his own throne.

All these exploits are recorded as having been

performed in the earlier years of Hercules. After he had effected this—had laid the foundation of a perpetual union between the Dorians and his own descendants, he is represented as a friend and protector of the royal house of *Ætholia*, and as fighting its battles against the Thesprotians of Epirus. This, however, may arise, as Thirlwall supposes, from confounding the Theban Hercules with the Dorian and the Peloponnesian hero. There were, indeed, three heroes of that name, one in Phœnicia, and two in Greece; and the actions of the three, real or supposed, may probably have been ascribed to one, in order to enhance his glory. There is evidence of this, for the Tyrian Hercules is supposed by some to have reference to the story of Samson; and there are many points of resemblance between the Hebrew, the Tyrian, and the Theban hero. Each is represented to have destroyed a lion, and their resemblance appears more striking in the worship of the Grecian hero, which, in after ages, became so prevalent throughout Greece. The sum is this: Hercules appears to have engaged in war among the various tribes of Greece—to what extent cannot be known, and thereby becoming great in the sight of his contemporaries, fictitious adventures were ascribed to him, which were multiplied by their descendants, till he became, in Grecian history, a character which bears upon it the stamp of fable.

THE EXPLOITS OF THESEUS.

The exploits of this hero have given rise to a proverb, "Another Hercules." Theseus was to Attica what the Theban hero was to Greece at large. His legend is interesting, inasmuch as it may be regarded as a partial outline of the early history of Attica. At all events, it may be gathered, that before the reign of Perseus, there were the kings Erechtheus, Cecrops, Pandion, and Ægeus, who was the father of Theseus, although, perhaps, some of these names have a signification to us unknown.

The legend of Theseus describes his adventures as three-fold. 1, his journey from Træzen to Athens, 2, his victory over the Minotaur, and 3, the political revolution which he effected in Attica. Passing over the fabulous details of these adventures, which equal those ascribed to Hercules, it may be remarked that the part which relates to the journey from Træzen, seems to be grounded on the fact, that he wrought some change in the ruling dynasty and institutions of the country on the coasts of the Saronic gulf, which were early occupied by kindred tribes of the Ionian race; that the legend of the Cretan expedition probably refers to a temporary connexion between Crete and Attica; and that the war in which he is said to have repelled the invasion of the Amazons may have some historical foundation, though that foundation cannot be ascertained. Others of his adventures may have reference to history, but there are no certain data that warrant any conclusion on the subject.

THE EXPLOITS OF MINOS.

Who Minos was, has for ages been a question. Homer describes him as the son of Jupiter and the daughter of Phœnix; and he places his reign

in the remotest period of Cretan antiquity, apparently as a native hero, and too ancient to allow his descent to be traced to any other source than that of the gods. Legend, however, speaks of the origin of Minos being Dorian; and there are many points of resemblance in the religious institutions of the Dorians and the Cretans which would seem to establish the fact; unless it be imagined, as some intimate, that the Dorians derived their institutions from the Cretans. One of the Homeric hymns intimates a very early intercourse between Crete and the Delphic oracle, in which the god himself is represented as conducting a band of Cretans, who came from Cnossus, the city of Minos, to Crissa, and to his sanctuary at the foot of Parnassus, where he constituted them his ministers. The subject of this legend, also, seems to be confirmed by the name of Crissa, and by other traditions, which state that the Cretan Chrysothemis, was the first who won the meed of poetry at Delphi, by a hymn in honour of the god, and that his father, Caramnor, had purified Apollo and Artemis by sacrifice, after they had slain the Python.

The general voice of antiquity speaks of Minos as having raised Crete to a higher degree of prosperity and power than it reached at any subsequent period. He appears in the two-fold character of a victorious prince and a wise lawgiver. In his former capacity he is said to have united the various tribes of Crete under his sway, to have raised a great navy, with which he scourged the Ægean, subdued the piratical Carians and Leleges, made himself master of the Cyclades, planted various colonies, undertook a successful expedition against Megara and Attica, and to have carried his arms into Sicily, where he perished, and where his fleet was destroyed. The tradition which relates these adventures of Minos is sanctioned by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristotle, besides other traditions, and there is good reason to believe that they are, in the main, historical facts.

The polity of Crete, established by Minos, rested upon two principles—that all freemen should be equal, and that they should be served by slaves. Hence the lawgiver allowed no private property in land. The soil was cultivated by slaves, on the public account the freemen ate together at public tables, while their families were supplied from the public stock. They might, therefore, be likened to a community of bees, the slaves resembling the working bees, and the freemen the drones living upon the fruits of their labour. The monarch's authority, except in war, was extremely limited—it scarcely exalted him above the level of his subjects. Still there were some features in the government of Crete deserving admiration. Thus morality was enforced by law, superiority was bestowed upon age and merit only, and on the youth were enjoined the strictest modesty and temperance. Their education, which was public, tended to render them warlike, whence it has been remarked, that the Cretan constitution was not that of a civil, but of a military community; not so much of a state as of a camp. It was from this cause that they were enabled to keep their slaves in subjection—to compel them to industry for the support of the community.

THE AMPHICTYONIC CONFEDERACY.

Hitherto the heroes of the age under consideration are represented to the reader as warring single-handed, and as making warlike excursions wherever and whenever they pleased. During the same period a quarrel arose which divided the regal house of Thebes, and led to a series of wars between Thebes and Argos, which terminated in the destruction of Thebes, and the temporary expulsion of its inhabitants, the Cadmeans. In these Theban wars seven chiefs united. This was the Amphictyonic confederacy. The northern districts of Thessaly being peculiarly exposed to invasion, the petty princes of that province were induced to enter into this confederacy for their mutual defence. It is said that it was governed by Amphictyon, a descendant of Deucalion; but Thirlwall justly remarks, that there can be no reasonable doubt of this Amphictyon being a fictitious person, whose name was invented to account for the institution ascribed to him, the author of which, if it was the work of any individual, was probably no better known than the other Amphictyomics. The advantages which the confederates derived from this measure were early perceived by their neighbours, and the central states gradually acceded to their alliance, so that about the middle of the fourteenth century B.C., Acrisius, king of Argos, and the other princes of Peloponnesus, united with them.

After this union, the Amphictyons appear to have confined themselves to the original purpose of their institution—that of defending their territories from the irruptions of barbarian neighbours. It was not to be expected, however, that their restless activity could be always exhausted in defensive warfare. The establishment of the Amphictyons brought together chiefs distinguished by birth and bravery, and, before a century elapsed, stimulated by ambition and revenge, they directed their arms against the barbarians. Their first expedition is known in history under the appellation of the Argonautic.

THE ARGONAUTIC EXPEDITION

Divested of all poetical ornament, the narrative of the Argonautic expedition may be thus described—Jason, a young man of high birth and superior strength, finding himself an object of jealousy at home, was ambitious of conducting a practical expedition to some foreign land. With the assistance of the wealth and power of his uncle, Pelias, who reigned at Iolcus, and of the skill of a Phœnician mechanic, he built a fifty-oared galley, the largest his countrymen had ever launched, and having manned it with a band of heroes, set forward on his adventure. The Argonautics directed their course to Colchis, on the eastern coast of the Euxine sea, a country abounding in gold, silver, and iron mines. They encountered many difficulties, and suffered some loss; but in one great object of their ambition they succeeded. They carried off Medea, the daughter of the Colchian king, Æetes.

Arrian and Strabo relate that it was the prac-

tice of the Colchians to collect gold on Mount Caucasus, by extending fleeces across the beds of the torrents, that, as the waters passed, the metallic particles might be entangled in the wool. It appears to have been from this circumstance, that the adventure of Jason was denominated "the expedition of the golden fleece." Hence it has arisen, in connexion with a variety of other circumstances related in the legend, all having the appearance of fable, that the account of the expedition has been called into question. That it had its foundation in truth, however, cannot be doubted, and Thirlwall suggests that the historical side of the legend exhibits an opening intercourse between the opposite shores of the Ægean—an intercourse begun by the northern Greeks, and early shared by those of Peloponnesus.

THE TROJAN WAR.

It has been seen, page 11, in what manner Eurystheus, the son of Sthenelus, had usurped the inheritance belonging to Hercules, as the representative of Perseus. Sthenelus had reserved Mycenæ and Tiryns for himself, but he had bestowed Midea on Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pelops, a prince of Phrygia, and uncles of Eurystheus. On the death of Hercules, Eurystheus persecuted his children, until they found an asylum in Attica. The king of that country, Theseus, refused to surrender them, and when Eurystheus invaded Attica, his army was routed and he himself slain by Ilylus, son of Hercules, as he was passing through the Isthmus. He was succeeded in his kingdom by his uncle Atreus, whose sceptre descended at his death to his son Agamemnon. About the same time, also, Menelaus, another son of Atreus, having married Helen, daughter of Tyndareus king of Laconia, that monarch resigned his dominions to his son-in-law, and thus the house of Pelops became enriched with the spoils, and possessed of the fruits of the conquests of Hercules; that hero having bestowed Laconia on Tyndareus.

In the meanwhile a flourishing state had arisen on the eastern side of the Hellespont. Its capital was Troy, and Hercules, with the assistance of Telamon, son of Æacus, had captured it, but had restored it to Priam, the son of its conquered king, Laomedon. Priam reigned there in peace and prosperity over a number of little tribes, until his son Paris, attracted, it is said, by the fame of Helen's beauty, came to Laconia, and, abusing the hospitality of Menelaus, carried off his queen to Troy. This aroused the choler of the chiefs of Greece, and they combined their forces, under the command of Agamemnon, to avenge the outrage. They sailed with a large armament to Troy, and after a siege of ten years, took and destroyed the city, B.C. 1184.

By some writers the tradition of the Trojan war has been called into question. This has, doubtless, arisen from the circumstance of its being surrounded with poetic ornament. Setting this aside, however, there appears to be no ground for scepticism, for it was universally received in Greece as a leading event in their early history. Not that it can be supposed that the abduction of Helen was the cause of the Trojan war. It would rather appear that the Argonautic

expedition was the real occasion of the first conflict between the Greeks and Trojans, for it is inconsistent with the piratical habits of the early navigators to suppose that their intercourse was always of a friendly nature. The fact of the city having been taken and sacked by Hercules nearly a century before, proves that it had already provoked or tempted the cupidity of the Greeks, and it may readily be imagined that a revival of its power and opulence would again excite the same feelings. Notwithstanding, Paris may have retaliated upon the Greeks for the previous sack of Troy—may have undertaken a marauding expedition against Laconia, and thereby have called their ancient enmity into action, so as to arm the confederated chiefs against the Trojan power. That there was a mutual and fixed hatred between the two powers is evident from the account of the war. Throughout the whole of the *Iliad*, they are represented as panting for, and as executing, vengeance on each other. Although, therefore, the facts of the war are highly coloured by the genius of the poet, yet that such a war occurred cannot be doubted.

Among the distorted features of the poetic narrative may be mentioned the affirmed result of the war, namely, that the Trojan state was overturned by the confederated Grecian chiefs. Although it appears clear that the expedition accomplished its immediate object, yet it is equally clear that a Trojan state existed after the fall of Troy. Homer himself indirectly confirms this, for he introduces Poseidon predicting that the posterity of Æneas should long continue to reign over the Trojans, after the race of Priam should be extinct. More explicit testimony, however, is discovered, in the pages of Xanthus, the Lydian, who is an historian of great authority, both from his age and country. He relates that the Trojan state was finally destroyed by the invasion of the Phrygians, a Thracian tribe, which crossed over from Europe to Asia after the Trojan war.

To the conquerors, the remote consequences of the war were little less disastrous than its immediate result was to the vanquished. Of five Bœotian commanders only one remained, and the siege had been proportionably fatal to the leaders of other tribes, as well as to their followers. Those, also, who lived to divide the spoils of Troy, were impatient to set sail with their newly acquired treasures, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the skies, and many of them perished by shipwreck, while the rest were long tossed on unknown seas. Even when they landed, and expected to find in their native country the end of their calamities, they were exposed to greater than any which they had yet endured. The thrones of several of the absent chiefs had been usurped by violence and ambition, the lands of various communities had been occupied by the invasion of hostile tribes, and even the least unfortunate of the adventurers found their domains uncultivated, or their territories laid waste—their families torn by discord, or their cities shaken by sedition. The most celebrated combined enterprise of Greece tended to plunge the country into barbarism and misery, as may be learned from the succeeding chapter.

Such is the history of the heroic age, or, as it

may perhaps more properly be termed, the mythical period. More might have been offered to the reader; but, as truth should form the basis of history, only that which bears at least the semblance of truth, culled from the regions of poetry, has been adduced, and even of that it may be said, its veracity cannot be asserted. The Greeks, of later ages, were proverbially mendacious, and, in the heroic age, they appear to have been wholly given to romance. It would seem that they were permitted to work good or evil, as their imaginations or inclinations might lead them. It was, in truth, one of the darkest ages in the annals of the Greeks.

CHAPTER III

RETURN OF THE HERACLEIDS

B C 1184—884.

THE Trojan war, says Heeren, was followed by a stormy period, in consequence of the many disorders prevalent in the ruling families, especially in that of Pelops. But more violent commotions soon arose, from the attempts of the rude tribes of the north, particularly of the Dorians and Ætolians, who, under the guidance of the descendants of Hercules, who had been exiled from Argos, strove to obtain possession of Peloponnesus. These commotions shook Greece during a whole century, and as the seats of most of the Hellenic tribes were then changed, the consequences were lasting and important.

For sixty years after the fall of Troy, history is silent as to any great change in the face of society. About the end of that period, however, a long series of wars, invasions, and migrations commenced, which finally introduced a new order of things, not only in Greece, but in many of the surrounding countries.

This revolution began in Thessaly. The Thessalians, who were probably of Pelasgian origin, crossing over the chain of Pindus from Epius, descended into the rich plains on the banks of the Peneus, and began the conquest of the country. Their success, however, was but slow. For a long time they were ably resisted by the Achæans, Perrhæbians, and Magnesians. Still, by their celebrated skill in horsemanship, an art of war unknown to the Greeks at this period, they finally prevailed.

The tribes which yielded first to these Thessalian invaders were the Bœotians, who inhabited the central territory of Æolis. These generally fled before the invaders, and all who remained became serfs, under the peculiar name of Penests, or "labourers." The Bœotians directed their march towards the country henceforth called Beotia, the subjugation of which they gradually effected. These emigrant Bœotians drove the inhabitants before them, and a great body of the fugitives, joined by bands of adventurers from Peloponnesus, and led by descendants of Agamemnon, embarked for Asia. Many families also sought refuge in Attica and Peloponnesus, and the Pelasgians of Lemnos are likewise said to have migrated, while

their allies, the Thracians, retired westward, and settled in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, where they probably became blended with other tribes, since from that time they do not appear in the page of history B. C. 1124.

Twenty years after this, a more important event took place, in the migration of the Dorians from their seats at the northern foot of Parnassus to Peloponnesus. It is by no means certain what was the cause of their migration, but ancient writers unanimously relate this story concerning it. After the death of Hercules, they say, his children, persecuted by Eurystheus, took refuge in Attica, and there defeated and slew their persecutor. After this, they resumed possession of their birthright in Peloponnesus, but shortly after a pestilence drove them into exile again, and they once more took refuge in Attica. An ambiguous oracle, however, encouraged them to believe, that, after they had reaped their third harvest, they should find a prosperous passage through the Isthmus into the land of their fathers, and at the end of that time they were tempted to return. But their design was defeated. At the entrance of Peloponnesus they were met by the united forces of the Achæans, Ionians, and Arcadians, and, seeing that there was no hope of effecting the passage, Hyllus, the eldest son of Hercules, proposed to decide the quarrel by single combat. This challenge was accepted by the confederates, and Echemus, king of Tegea, was selected by them as their champion. Echemus was successful, he slew Hyllus, and the Heracleids were bound by the terms of the agreement to abandon their enterprise for 100 years. Notwithstanding, Cleodæus, son of Hyllus, and his grandson Aristomachus, renewed the attempt, which was unsuccessful. Aristomachus fell in making it, but after this, the oracle was explained to his sons Aristodemus, Temenus, and Cresphontes. They were assured that the time, the third generation had now come when they should accomplish their return, not over the Isthmus, as they had expected, but across the mouth of the western gulf, where the opposite shores are parted only by a narrow channel. Acting upon this, they sought and gained the aid of the Dorians, Ætolians, and Locrians, and, passing the straits, they vanquished Tisamenus, son of Orestes, and divided the Peloponnesus among them.

Such is the account which ancient writers give of the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus and that they were led to that conquest by princes of Achæan blood, the rightful heirs of its ancient kings, was believed by all from the days of Hesiod. And it was received, not only among the Dorians themselves, but among foreign nations, whence it has the appearance of an historical fact. Notwithstanding, its truth has been questioned, and cogent arguments have been adduced on both sides of the question, into which it would be unprofitable to enter.

According to the received accounts, the Heracleids were led into the Peloponnesus by Oxylyus, an Ætolian chief, and their kinsman, who stipulated with them for the kingdom of Elis, to which he alleged a title like that under which his allies claimed the kingdoms of the Pelopids. He was put into possession of this kingdom by the

issue of a combat between one of his Ætolian followers and an Epean chief. Oxylyus used his victory wisely and mildly; he permitted the ancient inhabitants, after resigning a share of their land to his followers, to retain the remainder as independent owners; and it is likewise said that he granted several privileges to Dius, the deposed king, and maintained the honours of Augeus and the other native heroes. This was the only immediate result of the conquest on the north-western side of the Peloponnesus. It may, however, be fairly conjectured, that the new settlement was followed by a migration from this as well as from other parts of the Peloponnesus.

It appears that Oxylyus, fearing the sight of his promised territory, which was very fertile, might tempt the Heracleids to violate their compact with him, led them through Arcadia into the regions which they claimed as their patrimony. They passed through Arcadia without molesting or being molested by the various tribes, and proceeded to the conquest of the country subjected to the house of Atreus. At that time Argolis and Laconia, afterwards called Lacedæmon, were governed by Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who either fell fighting with the invaders, or withdrew from his territories—for accounts vary on this subject—and at the head of some Achæans turned his arms against the Ionians on the coast of the Corinthian gulf, and having driven them out, took possession of this part of the Peloponnesus, which henceforth bore the name of Achæa. After some years, a part of these Achæans, invited by Oxylyus, founded a settlement in Elis. As for the dislodged Ionians, they first sought refuge in Attica among their brethren, but they eventually followed the example of the Ætolians, and, with adventurers of various races, migrated to Asia.

As soon as the Heracleids had gained possession of their paternal inheritance, by the defeat of Tisamenus, they divided the lands. According to the general belief, Aristodemus died before they entered the Peloponnesus, but he left two sons, Procles and Eurysthenes, who succeeded to his claim of an equal share with their uncle, Temenus and Cresphontes. The fertile imagination of the Greeks has surrounded the manner in which this division was made with romance, but it appears that it was settled by lot, and that Cresphontes obtained Messenia, that Temenus had for his share Argolis, and that Procles and Eurysthenes had Lacedæmon between them. Upon the government of these territories they entered through the medium of the Dorians, by whose power they were wholly sustained.

The fate of the Eleans and Achæans has been recorded. At the time of the Dorian invasion, Melanthus, a descendant of the venerated Nestor, governed in Messenia, and the people are said to have been disaffected towards him as a foreigner, and hence to have offered no resistance to the Dorians. In consequence of this, he quitted the country, and retired, with some few followers, to Attica, where, as will be seen, he became the founder of a house, which supplied the Athenian annals with many illustrious names.

According to Ephorus, when Cresphontes took

possession of Messenia, he divided it into five districts, fixing his own residence in the plain of Stenyclera, where he is said to have founded a new capital. It would appear, however, that neither Pylus nor Andania, provinces of Messenia, were yet in his power, and that this measure was only the first step towards the conquest of the entire territory.

From the statements of the same author, it would seem that the subjugation of Lacedæmon was effected as quickly as that of Messenia. He says, that the strength of the Achæans was collected at Amyclæ, and that the city was betrayed, or its inhabitants were induced to capitulate, by the counsels of Philonomus, one of their own countrymen. After this, Eurysthenes and Procles divided the country into six districts, over which they set governors: that of Amyclæ was bestowed on Philonomus, as the reward of his treachery; and they themselves fixed their residence in Sparta. During the reign of Eurysthenes, the vanquished were admitted to an equality of privileges with the Dorians, as citizens; but his successor, Agis, deprived them of these rights, and they became subjects of the Spartans. Ephorus adds, that only the inhabitants of Helos, a town on the coast, attempted to shake off the usurped dominion, and that they lost thereby both their political independence and their personal liberty, giving rise and name to the serfs called in history Helots. There is good reason to believe, however, that the Heracleids became masters of Lacedæmon only gradually, and after a long struggle. There are strong indications, indeed, that Amyclæ and its district formed an independent state for nearly three centuries after the invasion. "In the reign of Telechus,"* says Pausanias, "the Lacedæmonians took possession of Amyclæ, Pharis, and Geronthæ, which before were in the hands of the Achæans. The people of the latter two towns were dismayed at the approach of the Dorians; and capitulated, upon condition of being allowed to withdraw from Peloponnesus. The Amyclæans were ejected, after a long resistance, and many notable deeds; and the Dorians showed the importance they attached to the victory over the Amyclæans by the trophy they erected." The truth of this is confirmed by a tradition of a long-protracted warfare, which occasioned the proverb, "The silence of Amyclæ." It would appear, therefore, that the later Spartans concealed the fact of the long contention of their ancestors with at least this part of Lacedæmon, in order to enhance their warlike renown.

It was not the Dorians alone that took possession of Lacedæmon a Theban clan, who accompanied them, and rendered them important services in its subjugation, and especially in their war with Amyclæ, settled in the country, and became a great tribe, named the Ægeids, from Ægeus, the grandson of Theras, their leader; or, as others say, from an earlier Ægeus. This clan probably consisted of several noble Cadmean families, who had migrated on the approach of the Beotians to Doris, where they were adopted as kinsmen, and whence they followed the fortunes of that

division of the Dorians which settled in Sparta, on account of their connexion with its leader.

At the same time, it is said, a band of Minyan adventurers entered Lacedæmon, and, for some time, these appear to have been intermingled with the Dorians; but they were afterwards driven out, and they took possession of that part of Peloponnesus, or the western coast, known by the name of Triphylia. From thence they expelled its ancient possessors, the Cancones, and other tribes, and founded six towns, which formed as many independent states, under the names of Lepreum, Macistus, Phrixa, Pyrgus, Epium, and Nudium. Thirlwall, however, supposes that these Minyans shared the fortunes, not of the Dorian conquerors, but of the Achæans; that is, they did not enter the country *with* them, but were driven out *by* them, in the same manner as the Achæans. As they are said, also, to have been connected with Theras, the leader of the Ægeids, it may be a question whether they were not a portion of the ancient inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who retired before the long spears of the Dorians.

It has been seen that the portion of Peloponnesus which fell to the share of Temenus was Argolis. How far he subdued this territory cannot be stated. It seems clear, however, that neither Tiryns nor Mycenæ, its ancient capitals, fell into his hands. After some time, the four sons of Temenus conspired against his life, and Crisus, the eldest, succeeded him at Argos. The youngest brother, Agræus, appears to have conquered the adjacent territory of Trœzea, where the Dorians are said to have been admitted without resistance. During the same period, Deiphontes, a Heracleid of another line, who had married Hyrnetho, a daughter of Temenus, drew a part of the Dorians over to his side, and with their aid undertook and effected the conquest of Epidaurus, which thenceforth became a Dorian state. Aristotle says, however, that Ionians from the Attic Tetrapolis accompanied the Dorians in their expedition, and shared the possession of Epidaurus with them. If this be fact, it may have had great influence on the Attic traditions relating to the return of the Heracleids.

About the same period Phalces, another son of Temenus, subjected Sicyon to the Dorian sway. In the next generation the Dorian arms were carried up the valley of the Sicyonian Asopus against Phlius. They were led by Rhegidas, son of Phalces, who appears to have been assisted by forces from Argos. The Dorians invited the Sicyons to receive them as friends, and to make a fair partition of their fruitful territory with the new settlers. The majority of them acceded to this proposition, but Hippasus, who opposed it, with some few followers, joined the Ionian emigrants, who were embarking for Asia. Phlius, therefore, fell into the hands of the Dorians, and Cleonæ seems also to have been occupied by them, as a state independent of Argos.

Another settlement of the Dorians was effected at this period in Corinth. Aletes, son of Hippotes, one of the Dorian chiefs, who had embarked at Naupactus, for the subjugation of Peloponnesus, having grown up to manhood, collected a band of adventurers, all Dorians, and

* About the close of the ninth century B.C.

directed his arms against Corinth. The mode in which he effected his conquest is uncertain, as it is variously related, but it is clear that he overthrew the house of Sisyphus, and that Corinth fell into the hands of the universally victorious Dorians.

The fall of Corinth brought the Dorians, for the first time, into conflict with Attica. At the instigation of Aletes, the conqueror of Corinth, the Dorian states united their forces for its subjugation, and for this purpose they marched an army to Athens, and encamped before its walls. Their object, however, was defeated in the main intent, but the little territory of Megara was separated from Attica, and occupied by a Dorian colony, which continued closely united with Corinth, as its parent city, for a long season.

Such appears to have been the extent of the conquests of the Dorians in the Peloponnesus during the earlier ages. Their love of dominion, however, was not confined within the limits of Peloponnesus. Dorian colonies were established at this period in Ægina, hitherto the seat of an Æolian population, and in Crete. Two principal expeditions are said to have proceeded to Crete, one from Laconia, and the other from Argolis. As, however, these took place about sixty years after the Dorian invasion, it must not be supposed that the emigrants were all Dorians. It would rather seem that they were a mixed body, under the rule of Dorian leaders. Their numbers were not large, but the state in which they found the country seems to have favoured their undertaking, and to have enabled them to gain at the time a firm footing, and then to make steady progress, till the whole island was subjected to the Dorian rule.

Thus the Dorians, under the sway of the Heracleids, established themselves over the whole of Peloponnesus, the mountainous districts of Arcadia and Achaia excepted. Their settlements were various, and, as may be supposed, some rose, in process of time, to a pre-eminence over the rest. Conspicuous among these settlements was Sparta, where Eurysthenes, and Procles fixed their residence, and which soon usurped an authority over the whole country which it ever afterwards preserved, the other towns becoming unfortified, defenceless, and insignificant. In this state it was that the laws of Lycurgus, which have been so much admired by some in all ages, were established.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE RETURN OF THE HERACLEIDS TO THE SIXTH CENTURY B.C.

B. C. 884—668.

THE history of two centuries after the Dorian invasion of Peloponnesus, exhibits little else than the repeated wars of the Spartans with their Argive neighbours. These domestic broils, however, which were occasioned by the unequal division of property, by the feuds, and diminished power of the kings, were the origin of that constitution to which Sparta was principally indebted for her subsequent splendour. At the

end of that time, about 880 B. C., Lycurgus, the uncle and guardian of the minor king Charilaus, framed this constitution, in order to avert the fatal consequences which it was evident to him would otherwise occur. At the same time, Lycurgus did not legislate for peace, as the details of the history, and the section on the Greek governments will show, the constitution which he framed was essentially warlike.

The effects of the warlike institutions of Lycurgus were soon displayed in Sparta. Its youth, having been trained for war, were ready, and perhaps impatient, for new enterprises. Hence they early engaged in contests on the side of Arcadia and Argos. These, however, were not attended with any important results, the Argives and Tegeans successfully withstood their assaults for a long series of years.

At length, a more inviting conquest offered itself to the Spartans on another side. This was Messenia, which, as before recorded, had fallen to the share of Cresphontes, when the Peloponnesus was divided among the Heracleids.

Since that division, Messenia had greatly flourished. Under the mild and equitable rule of Cresphontes, and his son Epytus, with their successors, the arts of peace were encouraged, and the whole country prospered. This appears to have excited the jealousy of the Spartans, and the Messenians not being famous for their skill in arms, the country offered them an easy conquest, and they only waited for a pretext of invasion.

The assigned causes of the fatal quarrel are worthy notice, inasmuch as they tend to mark the manners of the age, and to show that, however the Greeks were politically divided, they always maintained a community in the concerns of religion, at least in many respects. At a place called Limna, or "the pools," on the western skirts of Taygetus, there was a temple of Artemis Limnatis. It stood on the confines of Laconia and Messenia, and was a common sanctuary for both. In the reign of the Spartan king Teleclus, the seventh from Agis, the Spartans sent a company of virgins to celebrate a festival at this temple, and Teleclus went with them. Some Messenians offered violence to this company, and the king was slain.

Such was the tale of the Spartans. The Messenians, however, say that Teleclus had laid a stratagem for capturing some of their citizens at this festival, and that these Spartan virgins were youths in disguise, having daggers hid under their dress. Discovering this, they add, the Spartans fell by the hands of their intended victims, and their countrymen, conscious of their injustice, made no demand of reparation.

In this, therefore, it is doubtful who were the aggressors, the Messenians or Spartans. Before this breach was healed, however, a fresh one was made, in which the Spartans were palpably in error, and which would tend to show the truth of the Messenian accusation, that the Spartans quarrelled with them from motives of ambition.

A Messenian, named Polychares, a man of great note among his countrymen, who had gained the prize at the Olympic games, having cattle for which he had no pasture, contracted

with a Spartan, or more properly, a Laconian, named Euphnius, to feed them on his pastures in Laconia. Euphnius proved unworthy of his trust. He sold both the cattle and the herdsmen to some traders who had touched at one of the Laconian ports, and went to Polycharès with the tale that they had been carried away by pirates. While yet the lie was in his mouth, one of the herdsmen who had escaped, came to his master and related the truth. Euphnius, seeing his crime was discovered, deprecated the resentment of Polycharès, by the most humiliating confession of his guilt, and he intreated him to be satisfied with the price of the oxen, and to send his son along with him to receive it. Polycharès consented, and the youth went with Euphnius, but when they were on Laconian ground, the treacherous Spartan took away the life of his companion Polycharès, as was natural, sought redress at Sparta, but when the kings and ephors refused to listen to him, he took his revenge into his own hands; he waylaid passengers on the borders of Laconia, and slew every Laconian that fell into his power.

At this time, Alcámenes and Theopompus reigned in Sparta, and Androcles and Antiochus sat on the throne of Messenia. The two former, in their turn, sent to demand that Polycharès should be given up to them. The kings of Messenia held an assembly to deliberate on their answer, and they took opposite sides of the question. Androcles sought to deliver up Polycharès to justice, but Antiochus opposed it on the ground that the aggressor, Euphnius, would remain at large, while the innocent would suffer. This division of sentiment gave rise to a conflict, in which Androcles, and some of the chief men on his side, lost their lives, and his children fled to Sparta.

By the issue of this conflict, Antiochus became sole king of Messenia, and he sent proposals to Sparta for settling the dispute by the decision of some impartial tribunal, as the Argive Amphictyony, or the Athenian Areopagus. To this the Spartan kings made no reply, and in the course of a few months Antiochus died, and he was succeeded by his son Euphnius. This was the signal for war. In the beginning of his reign, about B. C. 743, the Spartans bound themselves, by oath, never to cease from war with the Messenians till they had made the land their own by right of conquest.

Having come to this resolution, the Spartans, dispensing with the established usage of sending a herald before them to declare war, suddenly crossed the border, under the command of Alcámenes, in the dead of the night, and marched against Amphea, one of the towns on the frontiers of Messenia. The gates of Amphea were open, as in time of peace, and the invaders massacred the inhabitants without mercy, and took possession of the town.

As soon as Euphnius heard of the surprise of Amphea, he prepared to resist the enemy. He summoned a general assembly of his countrymen to the plain of Stenyclarus, when it was resolved that the Messenians should abandon the open country, and settle in such of their towns as were best fortified by art and nature, and there exercise themselves in arms, in order to acquire

that vigour and discipline requisite to oppose their Spartan invaders.

While they were thus occupied, the Spartans made inroads from Amphea into the heart of the country, and began already to look upon Messenia as their own. Hence they spared the farm-houses, and the vines, and olive trees, and only carried away the fruit, corn, cattle, and slaves. On the other hand, the Messenians made frequent incursions into Laconia, and infested its sea-coasts, carrying away every thing on which they could lay their hands.

At length, in the fourth year of the war, about B. C. 740, the Messenians ventured to take the field. They did not, however, put everything to the hazard of a battle, but entrenched themselves in a strong position, where they could not be attacked without great risk. This campaign, therefore, closed after a few skirmishes, the results of which were dishonourable to the Spartans.

During the next year it is said that a great battle was fought, in which the Spartans were assisted by Cretan archers, and by the Dryopes, whom the Argives had expelled from Asinè. The two armies engaged with a fury of which modern times, being without equal incentives, can furnish no example. They were alike animated with a love of glory and a desire of vengeance—passions which they carried to such a pitch, that no one deigned to ask quarter, or attempted to soothe, by the promise of ransom, the unrelenting cruelty of the victors. The issue of the battle was, however, doubtful; neither side raised a trophy, and they buried their dead by mutual consent.

But, although the effects of this battle were equally destructive to both parties, its remote consequences were ruinous to the Messenians. Every year they suffered more and more from the presence of the enemy. The open country had been so long the spoil of the Spartans, that their means of support began to fail, their slaves also deserted, and disease, the natural concomitant of war and scarcity, made havoc among them. Thus situated, the Messenians adopted new measures: they took refuge among the almost inaccessible mountains of Ithome, on the western side of the vale of Pamisus—a place which, though situated near the frontiers of Laconia, afforded them a secure retreat, being strongly fortified by nature, and surrounded by a wall which had been built in early times, probably by the Æolian settlers from the north of Thessaly.

Still the Messenians were exposed to the danger of perishing by famine; and, in their extremity, they sent to consult the oracle at Delphi. The pythonesse declared that a virgin of the blood of Æpytus, selected by lot, must be offered up as a victim to the gods, and that should the lot fall wrong, one willingly offered must suffer instead. The lot fell on the daughter of Lyciscus, but the father opposed the sacrifice, and privately carried her away, and fled to Sparta. Discovering this, one Aristodemus, an Æpytid also, freely offered his own daughter; and when this was opposed by her sutor, the unnatural father slew her with his own hands. The priests now demanded another victim: but the Messenian

king, supported by the Ægyptidan families, who were numerous and powerful, persuaded the people that the command of the oracle was fully obeyed, and that no more blood was required by the gods.

The aid which superstition brought was effectual in putting a stop to the war for five years. The Spartans, hearing of this sacrifice, were fearful of coming to an engagement. At the end of that time, however, Theopompus ventured to lead an army against Ithome. The Messenians accepted the challenge for battle, but, as before, though it continued till night-fall, no victory was gained on either side. It was chiefly distinguished by contests between the chiefs; and this led to important consequences. Euphaes himself attacked Theopompus, and died of the wounds he had received in the contest. He left no heir, and Aristodemus was called to the throne by the unanimous voice of the people, in opposition to that of the priests, and in preference to all others of the Ægyptidan race.

The bravery and activity of Aristodemus were such, that he baffled the hopes of the Spartans for five years. He defeated them in several desultory rencounters, and in the fifth year is said to have overcome them in a great battle, at the foot of Ithome. The spirits of the Spartans began to sink, and they now, likewise, called in the aid of superstition. In their distress they had recourse to the same oracle which had relieved the affliction of the Messenians, and the destruction of Ithome was announced, with prophetic obscurity. Aristodemus, also, was warned by the god to beware of Spartan cunning, and that prodigies should mark the approaching fall of Ithome. The Spartan perseverance prevailed over the endurance of the Messenians, and Ithome was taken B.C. 723. Aristodemus having previously put an end to his life at the tomb of his daughter, whom he had slain through the detates of the oracle.

It is not clear whether the Messenians escaped from Ithome by force, by capitulation, or by sufferance. Some, it would appear, withdrew into foreign lands, many of higher rank took refuge in Sicyon, Argos, and other Arcadian towns, the priestly families retired to Eleusis, while the main body settled in those parts of Messenia from which they had been collected in Ithome.

As soon as they gained possession of Ithome, the Spartans rased it to the ground. They also made themselves masters of the other Messenian towns, except Mithone and Pylus, and disposed of the country at pleasure. Thus they gave a portion of the coast, near the western cape of the Messenian gulf, to the Dryopes, and a district called Hyamia was bestowed upon the descendants of Androcles. The treatment of the rest of the nation may be gathered from the verse of Tyrtæus, who, in the third generation of the conquest, roused the pride of the Spartans by reminding them of what their ancestors had done to the Messenians. they had made them stoop, he said, like asses, to their burdens, and to pay their masters a moiety of the fruits of the land, they were, therefore, reduced to the condition of Laconian helots. Thus ended the first Messenian war.

At the close of this war Greece appears to have been in tranquillity for several years. Peace promoted population, and the inhabitants of Peloponnesus continued to diffuse colonies over the islands of Sicily and Coreyra, and the southern division of Italy, known in after ages by the name of Magna Græcia. In this latter country two considerable establishments were formed about the same time, at Rhegium and at Tarentum. The former early acquired the ascendancy over the neighbouring cities, and the latter became the most powerful community on the eastern coast, and gave name to the spacious bay which penetrates so deeply into Italy as almost to unite the Tuscan and Ionian seas.

Concerning most of these colonies no particulars are handed down to us in history, and that of Tarentum is connected with circumstances over which it is better to draw a veil. It will be sufficient to say, that it was composed of a race called Partheniæ, the illicit offspring of Spartan women, and who were born while the Spartans were performing the conditions of their oath not to lay down their arms until they had subdued the Messenians. On the return of the Spartan warriors, these Partheniæ joined with the Helots to sacrifice them, and the conspiracy being discovered, they were dismissed, under a leader named Phalantus, to the delightful recesses of the Tarentine gulf.

Thus about forty years passed away, and a new generation sprung up in Messenia, which, while they groaned under a degrading yoke, had the heroic deeds of their fathers engraven in their memories. And even the Messenians, who had been exempted, by the policy or generosity of Sparta, from the servile condition to which the bulk of their countrymen were reduced, felt the exception humiliating to their character. The exiles, also, were eager to recover their patrimony: the universal wish was for that independence which the other Greek states possessed, and they only waited for a leader able and willing to cope with their oppressors.

That leader was found in Aristomenes, a youth descended from the ancient line of Messenian kings, and whose high natural spirit was elevated still more by the opinion of his descent from Hercules. In strength and courage he equalled Aristodemus, and no fearful remembrance of guilt pressed upon his conscience. From his birth-place, Andania, he cheered the hopes of the exiles, excited still more the indignation of the oppressed Messenians, and obtained promises of aid from Argos, Arcadia, and Elis. After these preparations, the second Messenian war commenced, B.C. 685.

The first engagement was fought at Deræ, a village of Messenia. At this time no succours had arrived from abroad, but the Messenians struggled so desperately that the victory was doubtful. The valour of Aristomenes, indeed, struck fear into his enemies, and inspired his countrymen with confidence. They would have raised him to the throne, but he refused the proffered honour, and contented himself with the appellation of general, which, in that age, implied a superiority in martial exercises, in the knowledge of war, and in the experience of command.

The first adventure of Aristomenes, after his elevation, appears romantic but the situation of the Messenians required something extraordinary which should act upon the superstitious feelings of the Spartans, and cause a diminution of their courage. Knowing this, Aristomenes crossed the mountains, came down at night on the plain of Sparta, and fixed a shield he had taken in battle against the temple of Athens, surnamed Chalciæus, or, "the brazen house," on which was inscribed, that Aristomenes had dedicated it from Spartan spoils. This event caused the Spartans much alarm. They saw that they had no common enemy to contend with, and they sought aid of the Delphic oracle. The Pytho-ness bade them seek for an Athenian counsellor, and they accordingly sent an embassy to Athens for that purpose. The Athenians were by no means desirous of the finest province of the Peloponnesus being irrecoverably annexed to the dominion of Sparta, and yet superstition forbade disobedience to the oracle. In this dilemma, therefore, they sent to Sparta Tyrtaeus, a man who, in common with every Athenian citizen, had borne arms, but who was chiefly known as a poet.

The Spartans received Tyrtaeus as the sacred messenger of the divinity, and his verses were supposed to be instructions and sentiments inspired by the god. Notwithstanding, the valour of Aristomenes long continued to prevail against the force of the oracle, and the enemies of Messenia. He thrice defeated the Spartans in the plain of Stenyclarus, and the most remarkable of these battles was fought at a place called the Boar's Monument, from a tradition that Hercules had anciently sacrificed a boar on that spot.

In these engagements, the Messenians were reinforced by the assistance of their allies of Elis, Sicyon, Argos, and Arcadia. The Spartans were aided by the Corinthians, and the citizens of Leprea, who chose to seek the protection of Sparta, rather than own the government of Elis. The combined army of the Spartans was commanded by Anaxander, the Spartan king, and was influenced by the authority of Hecateus, the diviner, and Tyrtaeus, the poet. On the part of the Messenians, there was no poet to inflame the passions, but it is said that the predictions of their diviner, Theoclus, had great influence on the valorous Aristomenes, to whom the success of those engagements was chiefly owing. In the battle of the Boar's Monument, at the head of a little band of Messenian youths, he successively broke each division of the Spartan forces, till all were put to flight, and many slaughtered.

The issue of this battle rescued Messenia from Spartan domination for three years; and Aristomenes, in the mean time, overran the hostile territory, to destroy the defenceless villages, and to carry the inhabitants into servitude. The towns of Pharus, Caryse, and Eglia, successively experienced the effect of his ravages. He even meditated an attack on Sparta itself, but he was induced to forego his design.

The success of the Messenians so completely prostrated the courage of the Spartans, that both the kings, senate, and assembly meditated negotiations of peace. The poet Tyrtaeus, however,

opposed this measure, with the influence of his verse, and the Spartans, inspired thereby, again entered Messenia with an army as numerous and powerful as on former occasions.

It may seem incredible that poetry should have such influence, it is, however, well known, that even in these days, a popular song sometimes produces considerable consequences, and the verse of Tyrtaeus was of that soul-stirring nature which well accorded with the warlike spirit of the Spartans. The following is a specimen:—

"Rouse, rouse, my youths! the chain of torpor break!
Spurn idle rest, and couch the glittering lance!
What! does not shame with blushes stain your cheek,
Quick mantling, as ye catch the warrior's glance!"

"Ignoble youths! say, when shall valour's flame
Burn in each breast? here, here, while hosts invade,
And war's wild clangors all your courage claim,
Ye sit as if still peace embower'd the shade."

"But sure, fair honour crowns the auspicious deed
When patriot love impels us to the field,
When to defend a trembling wife we bleed,
And when our shelter'd offspring bless the shield."

"What time the Fates ordain, pale death appears
Then, with firm step and sword high drawn, depart,
And, marching through the first thick shower of spears,
Beneath thy buckler guard the intrepid heart."

"Each mortal, though he boast celestial sires,
Slave to the sovereign destiny of death,
Or mid the avenger of the plain expires,
Or yields, unwept at home, his coward breath."

"Yet sympathy attends the brave man's bier,
Beats on each wound the balmy grief bestow'd,
And, as in death the universal tear,
Through life inspires the homage of a god."

"For like a turret his proud glories rise,
And stand, above the rival's reach, alone,
While militious hail, with fond adoring eyes,
The deeds of many a hero met in one."

Such strains as these would naturally excite the warlike temperament of the Spartans. The influence of poetry, indeed, may be said to have been a fearful stimulant to war in all ages. Homer is known to have been the constant companion of both Alexander and Napoleon. His strains have for many years excited the spirit of ambition and the love of war.

Aroused by the verse of Tyrtaeus, the Spartans longed to meet their foes once more. One consideration only, suggested by their superstition, damped their ardour. They foresaw that an engagement would be attended with indiscriminate slaughter, whence they feared that they should not obtain the sacred rites of funeral. This melancholy thought chilled the boldest heart with superstitious horror, and might have formed an obstacle to success, had not their terrors been removed by Tyrtaeus. By his advice, each soldier tied a token, inscribed with his name, round his right arm, by means of which his body, however disfigured by wounds, might be recognised by his friends and kindred. Thus fortified, they marched forward to meet their dreaded, and hitherto victorious foes.

In order to ensure the victory, the Spartans had recourse to unworthy arts. Although possessed of little private wealth, they had a considerable public treasure, and with this they seduced Aristocrates, son of Hicatas, who commanded the Arcadian allies of the Messenians, to draw off his men in the heat of the battle.

This threw the Messenian ranks into disorder, and left them exposed on all sides to superior numbers. It was in vain that Aristomenes sought to withstand his enemies. After a great slaughter, in which Androcles, Plintias, and Phanas were slain, who, next to Aristomenes, formed the principal ornament and defence of their declining country, the Messenians were completely overthrown.

After this defeat, Aristomenes, and a feeble and disheartened remnant, collected in Andania. Aristomenes felt himself unable to keep the field, and therefore he resolved to take up his position in the mountain fortress of Eira, at the foot of which the Neda separates Messenia from Triphylia. Here they took up their position, while the Spartans made themselves masters of the country, Pylos and Methone, and the adjacent coast, excepted. Having effected this, they encamped at the foot of mount Eira, hoping to reduce it either by force or famine.

But the enterprising spirit of Aristomenes was not to be broken by misfortune. In this situation he resisted the efforts of the Spartans for eleven years, during which time he made various successful sallies. Nor was this all. With a chosen band of three hundred men, he, at different times, overran the Spartan territories, and plundered such cities as were either weakly garrisoned or negligently defended. He swept the vales of Messenia and Laconia, and returned laden with spoil to Eira.

Thus baffled, and forced to feed the enemy which they sought to starve, the Spartans resolved to turn Messenia and the borders of Laconia into a desert. They forbade their citizens to till the land in this region until the war should be ended. But this was a measure which struck at the root of their own interests. As these lands were the most fertile in the provinces, and the crops in other parts had failed through the inclemency of the season, they were themselves threatened by famine, and the proprietors of the wasted grounds, deprived of their harvests, were ready to add to its horrors by sedition. Civil broils would inevitably have ensued, had not Tyrtæus touched a different chord, and allayed their passions by celebrating the blessings of concord and obedience to the state. He taught the Spartans patiently to bear the loss of fortune, as well as of life, in the service of their country, by these verses —

"If fighting for his dear paternal soil
The soldier in the front of battle fall,
'Tis not in fickle fortune to despoil
His store of fame—that aimes, the charge of all

"But if, oppress'd by penury, he rove
Far from his native town and fertile plain,
And lead the sharer of his fondest love
In youth too tender with her infant train,

"And if his aged mother, his shrunk sire,
Join the sad group, see many a bitter ill
Against the houseless family conspire,
And all the measure of the wretched fill.

"Pale shivering want companion of his way,
He meets the lustre of no pitying eye,
To hunger and dire infamy a prey—
Dark hatred scowls, and scorn quick passes by

"Alas! no traits of beauty or of birth—
No blush now lingers in his sunken face!
Dies every feeling, as he roams o'er earth,
Of shame transmitted to a wandering race

"But be it ours to guard this hallow'd spot,
To shield the tender offspring and the wife,
Here steadily await our destined lot,
And for their sakes, resign the gift of life."

Emboldened by his success, and while the enemy were disturbed by these commotions, Aristomenes undertook a bolder exploit than hitherto. He set out late in the evening with his favourite band from Eira, and marching all night arrived by day-break at Amyclæ, situate on the banks of the Lurotas, at the distance of a few miles from Sparta. He entered the place, carried off a considerable booty, and returned to his mountain, before the Spartans could arrive to the assistance of the Amyclæans. His bold daring, however, carried him beyond the bounds of prudence. In a second incursion, he met with half of the Spartan forces, with both their kings at their head, and himself and band were made prisoners. They were all condemned to be thrown down a high rock into a pit called the Cadeas.* His companions were dashed to pieces by the fall, but Aristomenes was preserved by an accident, and finally escaped to Eira.

This escape of Aristomenes has been surrounded by fable, but in itself it was perfectly natural. The Spartans, who admired valour, even in an enemy, permitted him, it appears, to retain his shield, which was held in high veneration by the Grecian soldiers. As he descended, this shield struck against the sides of the pit, and thereby broke his fall, and preserved his life. He continued two days in this situation, waiting the approach of death. On the third day he heard a noise, and looking towards the spot whence it proceeded, he perceived a fox, or jackall, devouring the mangled remains of his companions. He allowed the animal to approach him, and then caught hold of its tail, determined to follow wherever it should lead. It conducted him towards a chink in the rock through which it had entered, and Aristomenes followed with much difficulty, and the next day he reached Eira.

The news of the escape of Aristomenes was carried to the Spartans by a Messenian, but he was not believed. In a few days, however, they received full demonstration that he was yet alive. At this time preparations were being made for pushing the siege of Eira with vigour, and a body of Corinthian auxiliaries were marching to assist in its capture. Aristomenes received intelligence of this, and issuing with a chosen body from Eira, attacked them by night, routed them with great slaughter, and plundered their camp.

Other adventures are related of Aristomenes which bear the mark of fiction. At length, in the eleventh year after he had taken up his position in Eira, the fate of Messenia was decided. As usual, the oracle takes a leading part in the victory, but the facts appear to be these: in foul weather, it was usual for the Messenian sentinels to leave their stations, and seek shelter from the fury of the elements. This was discovered to the Spartans, and accordingly, in a tempestuous night, they scaled the walls of the citadel, and before the alarm was given, they were already within. At this time, Aristomenes

* This cavern was commonly employed as a grave for the most atrocious criminals.

was suffering from a wound, but in spite of this, and though he had lost all hope, he urged his companions to the combat. For three days and nights they maintained the struggle, the very women fighting with them. But their valour was of no avail. Their little band was constantly diminished, while the Spartans were as constantly relieved by fresh troops. Seeing their desperate situation, the diviner Theocles at length decided the issue of the battle. After exhorting Aristomenes to abandon the strife with destiny, and to save the last hopes of Messenia, and after warning the Spartans that their triumphs would not be perpetual, he rushed into the thickest of the fight, and perished. On seeing this, Aristomenes checked the ardour of his warriors, and bidding them form into a hollow square, inclosing their wives and children, advanced towards the enemy, and the Spartans, fearing the rage of their despair, opened a road through their ranks for the fugitives, and they took shelter in Arcadia.

The Messenians were hospitably received by their faithful allies the Arcadians, and thus encouraged, Aristomenes meditated an exploit, the boldness of which little corresponded with his fallen fortune. With five hundred of his own soldiers, and three hundred Arcadians, he determined to make his way in the face of his enemies to Sparta. It was hoped by him, that, as the main body of the Spartans were at Era, his little force might make a deep impression on that unwall'd city, while its defenders were absent. The arrangements for this purpose were made with the Arcadian king, Aristocrates, but he again betrayed the cause of his allies. Having retarded the execution of the project, on pretence that the appearance of the entrails of the sacrifice was unfavourable, he sent a confidential slave to Sparta, with a letter, warning the Spartan king, Anaxander, of his danger. This slave was intercepted on his return with a letter from that prince, acknowledging the services of Aristocrates. This was the signal for his doom. The enraged Arcadians stoned him to death, and raised a monument, whereon were inscribed his crime and punishment.

Thus baffled in the only design by which they could hope to avenge the wrongs of their country, fifty of the exiles, with an Ægyptid leader, secretly crossed the border and fell upon the Spartans at Era, sword in hand, and perished. This act closed the second Messenian war, B. C. 668.

The conquered Messenians experienced various fortunes. Those who remained in Messenia became helots, but it is probable that few free men submitted to slavery. The citizens of Pylus and Methone, seeing no hope of retaining their independence, after the fall of Era, fled by ship to Cyllene, the Elean port. Arrived there, they sent to Aristomenes, desiring him to lead them to a new country. Aristomenes, however, could not abandon the task he had imposed upon himself, namely, to wage ceaseless war with Sparta; but he appointed his two sons, Gorgus and Manticlus, to be the founders of the new colony. These differed in opinion as to whether they should bend their steps. Gorgus proposed to take possession of the island Zacynthus, which, from its situation in the Ionian sea, lay conveniently for

harassing the maritime coasts of Laconia, while Manticlus advised that they should sail to the great island of Sardinia, where, forgetting their revenge, they might live in comfort. Neither advice prevailed, but one band under Gorgus and Manticlus sought the city of Rhegium, on the straits that separate Italy from Sicily, where they found some of their kinsmen, who had settled there at the end of the former war. About forty years after, one of their countrymen, named Anaxilans, raised himself to the supreme authority of Rhegium, and, with his aid, they made themselves masters of Zancle, on the opposite side of the straits, which they named Messene, and which is still called Messina.

But while these Messenians were seeking a subsistence, there were others under Aristomenes seeking an opportunity of revenge, and who therefore remained in Greece. While thus waiting, however, Aristomenes died a natural death at Rhodes, and the Spartan yoke appeared, by his death, to be fitted on the neck of Messenia for ever. Henceforward, Sparta continued to rise towards undisputed pre-eminence not only in Peloponnesus, but in all Greece.

CHAPTER V.

THE HISTORY OF ATHENS TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PISISTRATIDS.

ABOUT B. C. 1300—505.

DERIVE the period coeval with and anterior to the Messenian wars, the history of Athens is rendered important, rather by domestic revolutions than by conquest. The situation and peculiarities of Attica, while it rendered it less exposed to the attacks of wandering hordes, favoured the gradual growth of national prosperity. This is incontestable, but it would be difficult to point out the course of its progress with perspicuity.

In the earliest ages, Athens was a kingly government. As such its history begins properly with Theseus, who succeeded his father Ægeus, about B. C. 1300. Certain institutions, however, as that of the *areopagus*, and the division of the people into nobles, husbandmen, and mechanics, may be ascribed to the colony of Cecrops. Still Theseus was, properly speaking, the founder of the state, since, instead of four districts, hitherto independent of one another, he constituted the city of Athens as the only seat of government. Conspicuous among his successors are Menestheus, who fell before Troy, and the last king Codrus, who, by voluntary sacrifice of his life, rescued Attica from the inroads of the Dorians. He, it is said, finding that the Delphic oracle had assured Aletes, the Dorian leader, that he would be successful, provided he spared the life of the Athenian king, went out at the gate, disguised in a woodman's garb, and provoked a Dorian to slay him.

The death of Codrus occurred about B. C. 1068, when the Athenians, charmed with his self-devotion, resolved to abolish monarchy, since they could find no one worthy to occupy his throne. Having taken this resolution, they es-

tablished archons for life, taken from the family of Codrus. Thirteen of these appear to have ruled, succeeding, like the kings, by inheritance, but being accountable for their administration. The first of these was Medon, and the last Alcmaeon, at whose death, about B. C. 752, the form of government was again altered. There were still archons taken from the family of Codrus, but their period of office was ten years. Seven of these ruled, reaching down to B. C. 682, when another change took place. Instead of one ruler, nine archons were yearly chosen, but so arranged that the prerogatives of the former kings, and the archons who succeeded them, were divided among the first three of the nine. All these were chosen from noble families alone, as were the members of the areopagus, and this gave rise to an oppressive aristocracy, like that of the patricians of Rome immediately after the expulsion of the Roman kings. The political factions of the Pedæi, Demiæ, and Parhali, produced anarchy at Athens, during which the neighbouring Megarians took possession of the island of Salamis, and the insurrection of Cylon, and the deaths it caused, were long used as a pretext for commotion.

While thus rent in pieces, an attempt had been made at legislation, B. C. 622, by Draco. His legislation, however, was imperfect; his laws were rendered useless by their severity. They were written not with ink, but blood, since death or banishment were his ordinary penalties, alike for the most trivial offences and the most dangerous crimes. They, therefore, tended only to increase the evils they were designed to remedy. Whence Athens presented one continued scene of confusion and misery down to the year B. C. 594, when it was rescued from anarchy by Solon.

At this period the people of Athens in general felt the need of a leader, and would even have preferred the despotic rule of one man to the tyranny of their nine archons. Hence they sought for one who could remedy the disorders of the state without giving offence to the nobles or commonalty. Such a man was found in Solon. Belonging himself to the nobles, he was nevertheless beloved by all for his prudence, activity, justice, and humanity. Under these circumstances, therefore, he was chosen, by unanimous consent, to the office of archon, and invested with full power to frame a new constitution and a new code of laws.*

According to Plutarch, after Solon had completed his work of legislation, he found himself exposed to such incessant vexations from the questions of the curious, and the cavils of the discontented, that he left Athens for ten years, during which time he visited Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Egypt, where he both collected and diffused knowledge. This account, however, does not appear to be satisfactory, inasmuch as it supposes him to have there found Cæresus reigning in Lydia, who did not commence his reign till twenty or thirty years after. It is more probable, therefore, that Solon remained in Athens for several years, in order to observe the practical effects of his institutions, and to second their

* An account of this new constitution and new code of laws, devised by Solon, will be found in a succeeding chapter.

operations by his personal influence. At the same time it appears certain that he eventually withdrew from Athens to avoid factions, and that he visited the countries named and the court of Cæresus, by whom he was at first received with much deference, as related by Herodotus. See the history of the Lydians, in Ancient History, chap. iv.

On the return of Solon to Athens, he found that party spirit, which is the activity of many for the gain of a few, had been actively labouring to prevent his institutions. Three parties, termed the Plain, the Coast, and the Highlands, had revived their ancient feuds under different leaders. The Plain was headed by Lycurgus, the Coast by Megacles, a descendant of Alcmaeon, and the Highlands by Pisistratus, a kinsman of Solon, and the friend of his youth.

Before he withdrew from Athens, Solon had detected the secret designs of Pisistratus, and he is said to have observed of him that nothing but his ambition prevented him from displaying the highest qualities of a good citizen. Accordingly, when, on his return, he discovered that he was engaged in a struggle for supremacy, he remonstrated with him, and with the other chiefs, on the danger in which their strifes placed the commonwealth. Self-interest, however, was more dear to them than the interest of the community; and, though Pisistratus listened respectfully to Solon, yet he only waited for an opportunity of executing his project.

The contention of the three chiefs, therefore, continued. But it was in vain for Lycurgus and Megacles to contend with Pisistratus. His illustrious birth—for he claimed descent from Codrus—eminent abilities, winning manners, and the popularity he had acquired by his munificence toward the poor, gave him an immeasurably greater chance of success. Pisistratus knew this; and accordingly, when his schemes were ripe for action, he wounded himself and mules, and then dove his chariot violently into the public place, where he informed the multitude that on going into the country he had been assailed by assassins, because he was their declared friend. On hearing this, one general feeling of indignation prevailed among the crowd, and at this critical juncture, an assembly was called by his partisans, in which Aristo proposed that a guard of fifty citizens, armed with clubs, should be decreed to protect the person of Pisistratus. It was in vain that Solon lifted his voice against this proposition, the body-guard was decreed, and, with their aid, Pisistratus seized the citadel, upon which Megacles and the Alcmaeonids left the city, and Lycurgus and his party relinquished further opposition. From that time Pisistratus is termed, by historians, Tyrant of Athens.

Pisistratus appears to have been satisfied with the substance of power, and to have acted with great moderation in his government. He made no visible changes in the constitution, affected the demeanour of a private citizen, and owned himself amenable to the established laws. He also continued to show honour to Solon, and to advise with him in the administration of the commonwealth.

From the circumstance that Solon did not withhold his friendship and advice from Pisistratus,

some have supposed that he was a party to the usurpation. There is nothing in the records of history to warrant such a conclusion. He still seems to have been the unblemished patriot, and only to have acquiesced in a change which he had neither the influence nor authority to prevent. It is probable, also, as Thirlwall suggests, that Solon looked upon the government of Pisistratus, though at variance with the principles of his constitution, as a less evil than would have ensued from the success of either Megacles or Lycurgus, and even as good, so far as it prevented them from acquiring a similar preponderance.

It is not certain how long Pisistratus enjoyed the benefits of the counsels of the sage Solon. One account, that of Phanas of Lesbos, which is apparently the most authentic, places the death of this great man in the year following that in which the revolution took place, or B.C. 559. The leisure of his retirement seems to have been devoted to the muses, and Plato asserts, that at the time of his death he was engaged in the composition of a poem, in which he had designed to describe the flourishing state of Attica before the Ogygian flood, and to celebrate the wars, which it waged with the inhabitants of the vast island which afterwards sank in the Atlantic Ocean.

Soon after the death of Solon, Pisistratus fell from his high situation. The party of Lycurgus combined with the exiled Alcmeonids, and compelled him to leave Athens. They soon had occasion, however, to perceive that he was formidable in defeat; for when his property was exposed for sale, Callias alone, an ancestor of the celebrated Alcibiades, was found bold enough to bid for it. From this circumstance, combined with a quarrel between the confederated rivals, Megacles made overtures of reconciliation to Pisistratus, offering to bestow on him the hand of his daughter Ceryra, and to assist him in recovering his lost honours. Pisistratus accepted this proposal, and as it was necessary that a majority in the assembly should be procured to favour their views, it was obtained through the medium of superstition, of the aid of which the ambitious have availed themselves in all ages.

Herodotus thus relates the circumstance — "The Greeks, from the remotest ages, were distinguished from the barbarians by their acuteness, and the Athenians were, of all the Greeks, the most renowned for sagacity. In one of the Attic villages they found a woman, by name Phya, of unusually high stature and comely features. Having arrayed her in a complete suit of armour, she was placed in a chariot and conducted towards the city, being preceded by heralds, who proclaimed that Minerva herself was bringing back Pisistratus to her own citadel, and exhorted the Athenians to receive the favourite of the goddess. Pisistratus rode by her side, and when they reached the city, the Athenians, believing that they saw the goddess in person, adored her, and welcomed Pisistratus."

There is an air of romance about this story, but it does not exceed the bounds of belief. The ancients believed that the gods were made in the likeness of men, and being enveloped in the darkness of superstition, were hence ever ready to do homage to any extraordinary personage. A remarkable instance of this is recorded, Acts

xiv, where it is stated, that Paul having healed a cripple at Lystra, the citizens were disposed to worship him as Mercurius, and Barnabas as Jupiter. It was a popular belief, also, among the Greeks, that the gods did sometimes visit the abodes of men in mortal shape; and it can be no wonder, therefore, that the Athenians were thus imposed upon. Even in late ages, a nation wise in its own conceit exhibited a similar farce to wondering Europe. In the festival of the goddess of liberty, Robespierre and his atrocious gang decked out a beautiful courtesan to represent the goddess, and conducted her in a triumphal car, with ceremonies similar to those described above, to the church of Notre Dame! Strange as the stories of the ancients are, there is, therefore, nothing in this but what may be believed.

Notwithstanding, it may not be expedient to consider the story in the light of a stratagem on which the confederates entirely relied for overcoming the resistance they might otherwise have expected from their adversaries. The pageant might only have been designed to add solemnity to the entrance of Pisistratus, and to suggest the reflection that it was by the special favour of Heaven he had been restored. This was, doubtless, the general feeling as Phya passed through the streets of Athens, but if the cheat had been detected, the result might have been directly the opposite to awe and wonder. Artifice, seen through, begets implacable revenge in the minds of the superstitious against those who practise upon their credulity, and hence it may be supposed, that it was not till after Pisistratus was firmly re-established that the secret was made known, and then only to a few, the multitude may have been left under the impression that they had in reality seen their tutelary goddess.

Being restored to power, Pisistratus nominally performed his part of the compact by marrying the daughter of Megacles. It was soon discovered, however, that, thinking the multitude held her family under a perpetual curse, he treated his young wife as one only in name. This led to a new revolution. Indignant at the affront, the Alcmeonids again made common cause with Lycurgus, and Pisistratus was compelled to retire to Eretria in Eubœa.

Pisistratus appears to have been inclined to end his days in exile, but Hippias, his eldest son, prevailed on him again to make head against his enemies. Accordingly, having great interest in several Greek cities, he exerted it to the utmost to gather contributions toward his projected enterprise. He was thus employed ten years, about the end of which time, having made his preparations, he set sail from Eretria, and landed on the plain of Marathon.

At this time the two adverse parties were firmly united, but their government was not popular, and Pisistratus had still many friends in Athens and the surrounding country, who flocked to his standard. This aroused his rivals, hitherto supine, to action. They marched to meet him, but their army was ill-disciplined and ill-commanded, so that they were quickly routed, and Pisistratus became undisputed master of Athens.

In the moment of victory Pisistratus behaved

with unwonted humanity for the age in which he lived. He stopped the slaughter, and proclaimed a general amnesty, on condition of their dispersing quietly to their homes. No sooner, however, had he regained his lost power, than he commenced an iron rule. He took a body of foreign mercenaries into constant pay, and sent the children of some of the principal citizens, whom he suspected of being ill disposed toward him, to Naxos, which he had reduced under the power of his friend Lygdamis, to be there kept as hostages.

After this, Pisistratus revived the claim of the Athenians to the town of Sigeum, on the Hellespont, which he took from the Mityleneans, of Lesbos. As the ruler of Athens, the chief city of the Ionian name, he also undertook the purification of Delos, which was enjoined by an oracle, and was effected by the removal of the bones of those buried within sight of the temple of Apollo. In Athens he still preserved the forms of Solon's institutions, and he courted popularity by largesses, and by throwing his gardens open to the poorer citizens. Still, he held the reins of government with a tenacious hand. He made use of the areopagus to maintain a vigorous police, and he enforced that law of Solon which required every citizen to give an account of his means of gaining a subsistence, and punished idleness. All those who had no regular employment he removed from the city, and compelled them to engage themselves in rural occupations.

It was probably the same policy which prompted Pisistratus to engage in many useful and magnificent works, whereby Athens was greatly adorned. Among these were a temple of Apollo, a temple of Olympian Jove, of which he only lived to complete the under buildings, the Lyceum, a garden at a short distance from Athens, sacred to the Lycian Apollo, where stately buildings, destined for the exercise of the Athenian youth, rose amidst shady groves, and the fountain of Callirhoe, which, from the new channels in which Pisistratus distributed its waters, was afterwards called the Fountain of the Nine Springs. To defray the expenses of his varied undertakings, Pisistratus laid a tithe on the produce of the land, which excited great discontent in the minds of the class affected by it, and which was, in effect, a tax on the rich for the employment of the poor.

Historians generally record that Pisistratus was the author of a beneficent law which provided for the support of the citizens disabled in war, but he appears only to have carried out the intention of Solon in this respect. It is more certain that he was a patron of literature. Tradition states that the world is indebted to his love of letters for the collection of the Homeric poems, which, till his age, had been scattered in unconnected rhapsodies; and there can be no doubt that he made a collection of the poet's works superior in extent and accuracy to any which had yet been effected. He is said, also, to have been the first person in Greece who collected a library, and he earned still higher praise by imparting the contents of that library to the public. Notwithstanding his ambition, therefore, Pisistratus seems in reality to have been a benefactor of

Athens, though under his rule it never has attained the greatness and glory of the sight of mankind. His sovereignty to the end of his life, B. C. 527, at an advanced age, thirty, after his first usurpation.

At the death of Pisistratus, his three sons, Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus, succeeded him in his government. Although the characters of these three brothers are described as being very different, they appear to have lived together in great harmony, and to have co-operated, with little outward distinction, in the administration of the state.

For some years the successors of Pisistratus trod in his steps and prosecuted his plans. All their attention was directed to the promotion of the internal prosperity of the country, and to the cultivation of letters and arts. Thus a number of Hermæ, or stone busts of Mercury, were erected by them along the sides of the roads leading from the capital, inscribed on one side with an account of the distance which it marked, and on the other with a moral sentence in verse. This appears to have been suggested by Hipparchus, who probably wrote the verses, and to him, also, is ascribed the establishment of the order in which the Homeric poems were, in after ages, recited at the Panathenæan festival.

Although Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus, imitated the policy of their father in dropping a show of power, as far as consistent with its maintenance, they appear to have been implacable toward those who had incurred their resentment or aroused their jealousy. Cimon, whom Pisistratus had recalled from exile, was murdered by assassins hired by them. Still, they made no change in the laws or the forms of the constitution, and were otherwise lenient. They even reduced the tax imposed by Pisistratus to a twentieth, and their government is spoken of as having recalled the happiness of the Golden Age. This was doubtless hyperbolic, but Thucydides testified that they diligently cultivated virtue and wisdom, and sought the happiness and prosperity of their subjects. Under their rule the country certainly flourished, and the generally pacific aspect which prevailed among the people seemed to indicate that their rule would be enduring. But it was not so. While they were dreaming of peace, an event occurred which suddenly overthrew the government—an event which testifies to the transitory nature of the affairs of mankind.

This sudden revolution had its origin in an outrage which Harmodius, a youth distinguished by the comeliness of his person, had received from Hipparchus. The resentment of Harmodius wounded the pride of Hipparchus, and, out of revenge, he offered an insult to the honour of his family. By his orders, the sister of Harmodius was invited to take part in a procession, as bearer of one of the sacred vessels, and when she appeared in her festal dress, she was rejected as unworthy of the honour. This kindled the indignation of Harmodius, who, together with a friend named Aristogiton, resolved to destroy Hipparchus and overthrow the dynasty of Pisistratus.

The season fixed for effecting their purpose

some have supposed the great Panathenæa, which usurpation. The march a procession, in which the history to war'd armed with spears and shields, seems to be was the only occasion on which, in only to have, they were allowed to carry arms, neither were but few engaged in the plot, and it is measures appear to have been ill concerted. Solon's first attempt was intended against Hippias, while he was directing the ceremony in the Cereiacus, a place in the suburbs, but as they approached him, they saw one of the conspirators familiarly conversing with him, which caused them to believe they were betrayed. Acting upon this feeling, they suddenly resolved to seek Hipparchus within the city, and to destroy him at all hazards. In this they succeeded, Harmodius, however, was immediately killed by his guards, and though Aristogeiton escaped for the moment, he was afterwards taken, and put to death with extreme torture.

It was at this period that tyranny commenced in reality at Athens. Rendered suspicious by this event, Hippias was led immediately to acts of great severity. All his subjects were regarded as secret enemies, and instead of endeavouring to conciliate them, he aimed only at ruling them by rigour. Frequent executions, extraordinary imposts, and artifices by which he filled his treasury at the expense of all classes of the people, were the leading features of his future sway. He also entered into an alliance with foreign powers, in order to strengthen his cause, and perhaps to provide a place of retreat for himself and family should any reverse occur. He gave his daughter Archelice in marriage to the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus, who stood high in favour with Darius, king of Persia, and was therefore able to afford him assistance should it be wanted.

Hippias soon wanted assistance, but his downfall was so sudden that he had no opportunity of obtaining it from such a distance. The banished Alcmeonids were still numerous and wealthy, and still desirous of regaining their position in Athens. Accordingly, on the death of Hipparchus, the growing unpopularity of Hippias encouraged them to renew their attempts at a revolution. At first they failed. Having taken possession of a stronghold on the frontier of Attica, they were repulsed by Hippias with great loss. But although they were thus defeated, they were not destroyed. They sought foreign aid, and the influence they had acquired over the Delphic oracle was favourable to their views. This temple had been destroyed some years before by fire, and the Alcmeonids, who had contracted with the Amphictyons to rebuild it on certain terms, substituted Parian marble in the front of the temple for a less costly stone. This munificence gained them favour throughout Greece, and especially secured the gratitude of the Delphians. Hence Cleisthenes, now the head of the Alcmeonid house, found means of making the Pythian priestess the instrument of his designs. As often as any Spartans came to consult the oracle, whether on public or private affairs, they received this reply, "Restore Athens to freedom." As might be expected, and as was certainly foreseen, these repeated exhortations had the desired effect on the Spartans. They revered the

oracle and loved war, and although they were connected with the family of Pisistratus by ties of hospitality, which among the ancients were held sacred, they determined to overthrow the dynasty. A force under the command of Archimolus, a man of high reputation, was accordingly sent by sea. This expedition, however, proved abortive. The Athenian government, having received timely information of their danger, sent to Thebes for assistance, and, by the aid thence afforded them, the Spartans were routed and driven to their ships. The Spartans now sent a more efficient force by land, under Cleomenes, their king, and the Thessalians were in their turn defeated, and, though their loss was trifling, they abandoned Hippias and returned home. Hippias was unable to meet the forces of Cleomenes in the field, or to defend the city, and therefore he shut himself up in the citadel. He might have retained his position here until the Spartans had departed, as they were not prepared for a siege, but by an excess of precaution he afforded them a speedy triumph. He directed his children to be conveyed out of the country, and they falling into the hands of the Spartans, he could only redeem them by consenting to quit Attica in five days. Accordingly, he set sail for Asia, where he fixed his residence in his hereditary principality of Sigeum, B. C. 510.

After the departure of Hippias many severe measures were taken against his adherents, some were punished by death, and others by the loss of their political privileges, or by exile. The family of Pisistratus was condemned to perpetual banishment; and so deeply rooted was the hatred which the Athenians bore to them, that they were excepted from the most comprehensive decrees of amnesty published in later ages. As for the tyrannicides, by whom the revolution was brought about, they received almost heroic honours. Statues were erected to them as the reward of virtue, the convivial songs of Athens assigned them a place in the islands of the blessed, by the side of Achilles and Tydides, and orators, in their harangues on behalf of liberty, never failed to remind their audience of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

Faction once again became rife at Athens. As head of the Alcmeonids, Cleisthenes was naturally the first person of the commonwealth. But Cleisthenes did not possess sufficient ability for maintaining sway in a turbulent democracy. A party was formed against him under Isagoras, with whom the principal citizens combined, and Cleisthenes found himself unable to cope with it. Under these circumstances he attached himself to the popular cause, which Pisistratus had done before, determined at least to gain advantage over his rivals, though he should himself reap no benefit therefrom. Having gained the confidence of the commonalty, who were all-powerful in the general assembly, and having also obtained the sanction of the Delphic oracle, which was necessary for the success of his measures, he made some important alterations in the constitution of Solon. Thus he abolished the four ancient tribes, and made a fresh geographical division of Attica into ten new tribes, each of which was dignified with the name of some defunct Attic hero. This struck at the root of party spirit, and

the blow was seconded by another measure creating new citizens, which greatly increased the strength of the commonalty. Cleisthenes is said to have enfranchised, also, both aliens and slaves, a step to which he could only have been urged by the exigencies of his position; and which, combined with his other measures, had the effect of transforming the commonalty into a new body, and of throwing the nobility farther into the shade.

The new division of the country necessarily involved the re-organization of the whole frame of the state. Thus the senate of the four hundred was increased to five hundred, that fifty might be drawn from each tribe, and the rotation of the presidency was adapted to this change, the fifty counsellors of each tribe filling that office for thirty-five or thirty-six days in succession, and nine counsellors being elected from the other nine tribes to preside in the council and in the assembly of the people. A similar change took place in the *Helma*, which was distributed into ten courts, and the same division henceforth prevailed in most of the other public offices. Cleisthenes, moreover, is said to have established the formal institution of the *ostracism*, which was a summary process, enabling the people to rid themselves of any citizen who had made himself formidable, without any proof of guilt, and even if his influence was the fruit of superior merit. Solon had enacted that no law relating to citizens should be passed by less than a majority of six thousand voices, but this was so far altered, as that not merely an absolute but a relative majority of the same number, and that by secret votes, might send an obnoxious citizen into exile for any period not exceeding ten years.

Thus effectually shorn of power, Isagoras and his party had recourse to Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who espoused his cause. He sent a herald to Athens, by whom he demanded the banishment of Cleisthenes and the Alcmaeonids, on the old pretence that they were an accursed race. Cleisthenes wisely withdrew from the gathering storm, but Cleomenes, encouraged rather than appeased by his departure, brought a force to Athens to reduce it to the dominion of Isagoras. At first, the Athenians suffered him to act as their absolute master. He banished seven hundred families pointed out by Isagoras, and proceeded to suppress the council of the five hundred, and to lodge the government in the hands of three hundred of the partisans of Isagoras. Athens, however, was not so far prepared for subjection. The council resisted this innovation, and excited the people to opposition. Cleomenes and Isagoras took refuge in the citadel, but, as they were not prepared to sustain a siege, they capitulated on the third day, upon condition that the Lacedaemonians might depart in safety. Isagoras went with them, but his Athenian adherents were executed. After this, Cleisthenes and the seven hundred banished families returned to Athens.

On his return to Sparta, Cleomenes made preparations to avenge his humiliating defeat and to restore Isagoras. In their first alarm the Athenians sent envoys to Sardis, to conclude an alliance with, or rather to seek the protection of, Persia. In the mean time, Cleomenes and his colleague

Demaratus, with Corinthian aid— on the side of Eleusis, while the towns of Cnoss and Hysiae, colonies, and frontier, and the Chalcidians ravaged the coast. Thus threatened, the Athenians Cyfome, with all their forces against the Sparta, being the most formidable. Before battle joined, however, there was a general defection of the Peloponnesian allies, and Demaratus refused his concurrence with his colleague, upon which Cleomenes was compelled to abandon his enterprise.

Thus freed from their most formidable foe, the Athenians determined to punish the aggression of their northern neighbours. For this purpose they marched toward the Euripus to attack Chalcis. While marching through Boeotia they were met by the Thebans, whom they defeated with great slaughter, and on the same day they crossed the straits, and won a victory over the Chalcidians. They reduced this latter people so far, as to be enabled to parcel out the estates of the great Chalcidian landowners among four thousand Attic colonists. This was a valuable addition of territory to them, inasmuch as it provided so many families with a maintenance, and afforded them the means of raising a body of cavalry, in which force they were deficient.

The prisoners which the Athenians captured in these two battles, were treated with great severity. They bound them in fetters, and kept them in close confinement, till they were ransomed at two minae* a man, which was a large sum, the Greeks being then not very rich. These fetters were afterwards hung upon the walls of a temple in the citadel, as a monument of Athenian valour, and a brazen chariot was dedicated to Athens as a tenth of the ransom, with an inscription commemorating this first achievement of the emancipated commonwealth.

Disheartened by their late defeat, and yet burning to avenge their disgrace, the Thebans resorted to the Delphic oracle for advice. An ambiguous reply of the Pythoress bade them seek aid from *Ægina*, which at this time had attained a high pitch of prosperity, and was crowded with an industrious population. The *Æginetans* bore a mortal grudge against the Athenians, and they readily promised their aid to the Thebans, who, thus encouraged, renewed their hostilities on the northern frontier. At the same time, the *Æginetans* crossed over with a squadron, and landing on the coasts of Attica, plundered many towns.

The Athenians were preparing to retaliate upon *Ægina*, when their attention was directed to danger in another quarter. By this time the Spartans had detected the fraud practised on them by the Delphic oracle, and they regretted that they had been induced to overthrow the dynasty of the Pisistratids. This regret was embittered by the discovery of some predictions which Cleomenes professed to have found in the citadel of Athens, when abandoned by the Pisistratids, and which threatened Sparta with manifold injuries from the Athenians. Acting upon these feelings, therefore, they sent to Hippas, at Sigeum, to invite him to Sparta. Hippas eagerly embraced this invitation, and when he arrived at Sparta, a

* About 26 10s of our money.

some have supposed, the Peloponnesian usurpation. The attempt, in which it was proposed to unite their forces in an expedition only to have peace, in order to restore him to his lost throne, all seemed to acquiesce in the project, till the Corinthian deputy, Sosicles, resolute in vehement language against the establishment of a form of government at Athens contrary to the spirit of their institutions. His arguments were so cogent, that the other deputies were convinced of the injustice of the proposition, and they refused to combine their forces for such a purpose. Accordingly, the Spartans were compelled to abandon the design, and Hippas returned to Sigeum, and thence proceeded to the court of Darius, where he remained for several years, cherishing the hope that he should one day be restored to the government of Athens. But his hopes were fallacious. The cause of the Pisistratids was lost, as will be fully developed in the progress of the history. Their sun of prosperity was gone down to rise again no more.

CHAPTER VI.

HISTORY OF THE GRECIAN COLONIES

B. C. 1124—504.

HEEREN has observed, that no nation of antiquity ever founded so many colonies as the Greeks. These colonies became so important in various respects, that an acquaintance with them is requisite to a knowledge of the early history of the world. Not only is the history of the civilization of the mother country and of early trade connected with these settlements, but some of them grew to such power as to have great influence on political events.

The colonies of most importance are those founded by the Hellenes, in the time which elapsed between the Dorian migration and the period of Macedonian history. It appears certain that before that period some Pelasgian, and perhaps some Hellenic settlers, passed over into Italy, to the coasts of Asia, the Euxine, and Thrace, but the history of these is not only involved in the obscurity of legend, but they ceased after a time to be essentially Greek. The later settlements of the Macedonians were also essentially different from those of the Hellenes.

The Hellenic race spread to the east and west of Greece, but their settlements were confined to the shores of the Mediterranean and Black Sea. The countries in which their principal colonies were established, were Asia Minor and Thrace in the east, and the coasts of lower Italy and Sicily in the west. The most ancient, and in many respects the most important, were those along the western coast of Asia Minor, extending from the Hellespont to the boundary of Cilicia. In these parts, since the Trojan war, which first made these countries generally known, Hellenes of three great families, Æolians, Ionians, and Dorians, planted settlements. Besides all these, however, particular Hellenic settlements were to be found scattered here and there on the shores of various other countries.

Concerning their origin, Heeren observes, that it arose either in political motives or in commercial speculations. The former seems to have been the case generally with the settlements made by the mother country; the latter, with those which branched out of such colonies as had exalted themselves by commerce.

The connexion between the colonies and their parent cities was generally determined by the causes that led to their foundation. Thus, where a city had been founded by malcontent or banished emigrants, all dependence on the mother country ceased, but where colonies were established for the purposes of trade, a connexion with the mother country was still preserved, though frequently it became very slender, and sometimes wholly ceased. The very nature of their government tended to produce this effect; for these settlements, more than a hundred in number, were each governed by their own laws, differing essentially from the laws of their parent cities. Sometimes, indeed, these cities had neither the will nor the power to enforce obedience. Hence it arose, that in the lapse of time these colonies generally became independent.

Having made this preface to the history of the colonies, we proceed to notice them more particularly according to their antiquity or importance.

THE ÆOLIAN COLONIES.

The Æolian migration was the natural and immediate consequence of the conquest of Peloponnesus by the Heracleids. Driven from their homes, some Achæans sought new seats in the east. As they passed through Bœotia to their place of embarkation, they were joined by a part both of the ancient inhabitants of Bœotia, and other Æolian conquerors, the latter of whom are supposed to have predominated both in numbers and influence, whence the migration is called Æolian.

These emigrants were headed by chiefs who claimed descent from Agamemnon, and the main body embarked at the port of Aulis, whence that chief had led the Greek armament against Troy. These settled on the isle of Lesbos, where they founded six cities, at the head of which was Mitylene, while other detachments occupied the coast of Asia, from the foot of Ida to the mouth of the Hermus. They were followed, during the next century, by other adventurers, who were either driven from home or attracted by the country, so that eventually eleven cities were occupied by them on the main-land, which were called Æolian, and about thirty others were founded in the territory of Priam, which the Lesbians claimed as legitimate heirs to the conquests of Agamemnon.

All these Æolian towns appear to have been independent of one another, and to have possessed forms of government of their own. Nothing, however, is known respecting their governments, except that they were subject to disorders, which rulers, under the title of *Æsymneta*, were elected and endowed with unlimited power for the purpose of quelling. These *Æsymneta* were sometimes elected for a stipulated period, and at other times for life. The most celebrated among

them was Pittacus of Mitylene, who flourished in the time of Sappho and Alcæus, about *n. c.* 600.

The Æolians maintained their independence till the time of Cyrus, except Smyrna, which was captured and destroyed about the time of Pittacus, by the Lydians, and not rebuilt till four hundred years afterwards, when it was restored by Antigonus. The Persian conqueror compelled the cities of the main-land to acknowledge his supremacy, the islands, however, remained independent.

The Æolian cities were not leagued together by any permanent bond, though in particular cases they debated in common. Mitylene was regarded by all of them as their capital. It was the only city that became rich by trade and formidable by its naval power. Notwithstanding, it became tributary to Athens about *n. c.* 470, and having revolted in the time of the Peloponnesian war, it was recaptured and levelled to the ground by the Athenians.

THE IONIAN COLONIES.

Like the Æolian colonies, those of the Ionians were a consequence of the Dorian migration. Driven out of Peloponnesus by the Achæans, the Ionians had withdrawn to Athens, whence, soon after the Dorian invasion, in which Codrus devoted himself for his country, they proceeded to Asia by sea, under the command of Neleus and others of the sons of the devoted monarch. In their progress through Greece, they were joined by some Thebans, Phocians, Eubœans, Abantes, and various other Greeks.

In their passage across the Ægean, these Ionian emigrants formed many settlements in the Cyclades and other islands, and in the lapse of time Delos became a common sanctuary for the Ionian race. At the time of their arrival on the Asiatic coast, henceforth called Ionia, and the neighbouring islands of Chios and Samos, these parts were inhabited by tribes of various origin. The new invaders appear to have readily coalesced with all of them except the Carians and Leleges, who were either expelled or exterminated.

Thus constituted, twelve independent states were gradually formed, which, notwithstanding the widely different elements of which they were composed, were all designated by the Ionian name, and were regarded as parts of one nation. These twelve states were Samos, Chios, Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Erythræ, Clazomenæ, and Phocæa. These all possessed, in common, one sanctuary, that of the temple of Neptune, built on the headland of Mycale. Here they celebrated their festivals, and assembled to deliberate upon matters affecting the general interests, although each town was in itself independent, as has been stated above.

The accounts of the foundation of these colonies which have reached our age are scanty and imperfect. So far as can be gathered with any degree of certainty, they appear to have been founded as follows. Miletus was the seat chosen by Neleus himself. His followers, who were of the purest Ionian race, massacred all the males in the island; and Neleus fixed on a site nearer

to the sea than the old town of Miletus, as a city. This site commanded four harbours, and of which was capable of containing 20,000 men. Myus was wrested from the Carians by Cyozone, an illegitimate son of Codrus. Priene was occupied by Ægyptus, son of Neleus, whose followers were partly Ionians and partly Thebans. Ephesus was wrested from the Leleges and Lydians by Androclus, son of Codrus, but the temple of the goddess, in whom the Greeks recognised their Artemis, afforded an asylum to a considerable number of refugees. Colophon was occupied by Ionians, under Damasichthon and Prometheus, sons of Codrus, in common with its possessors, the Cretans, who had taken the place of the earlier Carian population. Another son of Codrus, named Andromon, or Andropompus, drove the Carians out, and took possession of Lebedus. Teos had been previously occupied by Myrians from Orchomenus, intermingled with Carians, and the Ionians, on their arrival, were admitted to a share in the colony. They were afterwards joined by fresh bands of adventurers from Attica, commanded by chiefs of the line of Codrus, and also by another from Bœotia. Erythræ appears to have become a member of the Ionian body at a later date; for Cleopus, son of Codrus, is said to have settled there with a band of followers collected from the former Ionian cities.

The whole of the above towns were in existence before the Ionian migration, but Clazomenæ and Phocæa owed their origin to that event. Clazomenæ was founded by Ionian wanderers, mingled with a body of adventurers from Cleonæ and Phlius, and Phocæa was built on ground obtained by contract from the Cumeans, by a colony of Phocians. It is not clear what share the Ionians had in the population of Chios, but it seems most probable that the island received colonists from Erythræ, which lay on the opposite coast. The same uncertainty is connected with the people of Samos, but they appear to have been a mixture of Ionians, from Epidaurus and Ephesus, the number of the former predominating, inasmuch as they were governed by the descendants of the old Epidaurian kings.

To these twelve Ionian cities, another, that of Smyrna, originally an Æolian colony, was subsequently added. This appears to have been first founded by Ionians, from Ephesus, where, according to Strabo, a part of the ancient town once bore the name of Smyrna. It was afterwards wrested from these settlers by the Æolians and refugees from the Ionian town of Colophon, the latter of whom ruled therein.

The political constitution of these towns seems to have been, in the earliest ages, republican, but they were frequently oppressed by factions, and sometimes by tyrants. They maintained their independence until the time of the Lydian dynasty of the Mermnads, and that of Cyrus, under whose reign they were subdued to the yoke of Persia. They embraced, however, every opportunity of delivering themselves from this thralldom, whence their history, in the succeeding period, is interwoven with that of Greece.

The most important Ionian towns on the continent were those of Miletus, Ephesus, and

some have supposed, c. 2000, to be the principal seat of trade, history to which it flourishes during its existence seems to be between B.C. 700 and B.C. 500. In the only year it was implicated in the insurrection of Aristagoras against the Persians, which led to its destruction, B.C. 496, from which time it never recovered its splendour. In the days of its prosperity, Miletus was the first emporium of the world after Carthage and Tyre. By sea, its trade was chiefly carried on in the Euxine and the Palus Mæotis, on whose shores its inhabitants established more than one hundred colonies, by means of which they monopolized all the northern trade in pulse, dry fish, furs, and slaves. By land, the trade of Miletus was carried on by the great military road which led far into the interior of Asia, and which was constructed by the Persians. The vessels of Miletus were admitted by four harbours, and these were so numerous, that from eighty to a hundred sail were more than once fitted out for the purpose of war. The flourishing period of Phocæa was contemporary with that of Miletus, but it ceased at the rise of the Persian dominion, B.C. 540, when the inhabitants migrated to Corsica. This city had the most extensive trade by sea of all the Grecian cities. This trade lay westward, as far as Gades; and they established colonies in Italy, Gaul, and Corsica. Ephesus was not so important, in a commercial point of view, as Miletus and Phocæa, but it was much celebrated for its temple of Diana, upon which it depended for its wealth. Hence it was that the clamour of the people arose against the apostle Paul, at the instigation of Demetrius, who made "silver shrines for Diana," as recorded Acts xix. The flourishing period of Ephesus appears to have commenced about B.C. 355, long after that of Miletus and Phocæa had terminated. In the Macedonian and Roman ages it was regarded as the first city of Asia Minor, but the plough has long since passed over its site.

Of the cities in the islands, Samos and Chios seem to have been the most important. The splendour of Samos was greatest during the reign of the tyrant Polycrates, about B.C. 540, whose sway extended over the sea and islets of the neighbourhood. Soon after his reign the island was almost depopulated by the Persians, and about B.C. 440, it was dependent on the Athenians, who made it the rendezvous for their troops and fleets, during their war with Sparta. Chios was little inferior to Samos, either in power or wealth. Like the other Ionian colonies, it submitted to the Persian yoke, but it still continued powerful, and, after the death of Xerxes, it entered into the Athenian league, from which it endeavoured to secede in the war of the Peloponnesus, B.C. 412. The naval power of the Chians, however, continued formidable for some time afterwards.

THE DORIAN COLONIES.

The Dorian colonies were situated in Asia Minor, upon the southern coast of Caria, and in the islands of Cos and Rhodes. The emigrants who founded these colonies were partly Dorians and partly Achæans. The most celebrated ex-

pedition was led by the Argive Althæmenes, who, leaving one division of his followers in Crete, proceeded with the rest to Rhodes, where, according to a legend, the Heraclid Tlepolemus had founded the cities of Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus, before the Trojan war. It is probable, however, that the legend arose out of this colony, and that the cities were founded by these Dorian and Achæan emigrants. About the same period, another band of Dorians, from Trœzen, founded Halicarnassus, a second band, from Laconia, founded Cnidus, and a third band, from Epidaurus, took possession of the island of Cos, which rivalled its parent in the worship of Esculapius. These six colonies formed an association called the Dorian *Hezapolis*, but which, when Halicarnassus had been compelled to withdraw from it, was distinguished by the name of the Dorian *Pentapolis*. Like the Ionians, they had one common sanctuary, the temple of Apollo Triopius, where they held their assemblies, and celebrated their festivals. They remained independent until the Persian supremacy. Each of the cities, however, was occasionally the scene of violent revolutions. At Cnidus the oligarchy was converted into a democracy, and Halicarnassus became subject to the Carian sovereigns.

The three cities in Rhodes do not appear to have attained any great importance, for the city of Rhodes, which was not built till after the irruption of Xerxes into Greece, B.C. 480, soon eclipsed them. Its flourishing period commenced after the death of Alexander.

It is probable that Rhodes was the parent of most of the Greek colonies on the south coast of Asia Minor, several of which were ascribed to Argos. Rhodes may, also, have contributed to form the Greek population of Lycia, a race renowned for valour, and for their wise political institutions. The origin of the Lycians, however, was purely Cretan, as appears both by the Homeric story of Bellerophon, and by the legend that the country owed its name to Lycus, son of Pandion, an Attic king.

COLONIES IN CYPRUS.

According to poetical tradition, which is adopted by the most judicious Greek writers, shortly after the Trojan war, Teucer, son of Telamon and brother of Ajax, led a colony from the island of Salamis, and founded the city of Salamis, in Cyprus. From the same source we also gather, that Paphos was founded by the Arcadian, Agapenor, Amathus by the followers of Agamemnon, and Soli by the sons of Theseus, at the same early period. About the century after the Dorian conquest, other emigrants followed in the steps of these early adventurers, both from Laconia, Argos, and Athens. In time, therefore, Cyprus became a Grecian island, and, from being important for nothing but ship timber and its copper mines, was made a rich and populous country, producing corn, wine, and oils in abundance. It was however, divided into too many little states for any one among them to become considerable; and these were under that rule which the Greeks denominated tyranny.

COLONIES IN SICILY.

Great, widely spread, and important, as many of the Asiatic colonies were, yet they were exceeded in historical importance by those which were planted at a later date on the coast of Sicily, and over the southern part of Italy. These acquired for Sicily the name of Great, or the Greater, Greece.

In the days of Homer, Sicily and Italy were scarcely known, but by name. The former was the region of savages and imaginary monsters—of “unblessed Cyclopians.” The poet thus describes its inhabitants, and the features of Sicily—

“The land of Cyclops first, a savage kind,
Nor tamed by manners, nor by laws confined
I taught to plant, to turn the glebe, and sow,
They all their products to free nature owe
The soil untill'd a ready harvest yields,
With wheat and barley sate the golden fields,
Spontaneous wines from weighty clusters pour,
And Jove descends in each prolific shower
By these no statutes and no rights are known,
No council held, no monarch tills the throne,
But high on hills or airy cliffs they dwell,
Or deep in caves, whose entrance leads to hell
Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
Headless of others, to his own severe.”

ODYSSEY

Time disabused the Grecian mind of this ancient prejudice concerning the Sicilians, and the country finally became a desirable spot whereon to plant colonies.

A long interval elapsed after the Æolian, Ionian, and Dorian migrations, before the state of Greece gave occasion to send out new colonies. In the seventh century B. C. however, they established themselves on the coast of Sicily, and over a portion of the south of Italy. These colonies were of various origin—some Æolian, some Dorian, and some Ionian.

The circumstance, according to Strabo, which led to the planting of these settlements, is briefly this. Theocles, an Athenian, being driven upon the coast of Sicily, had an opportunity of observing the riches of the country, and the weakness of its inhabitants, accordingly, when he returned to Greece, he first endeavoured to induce his fellow citizens to send out a colony to Sicily, and when they refused, through the old prejudice, he addressed himself to the Chalcidians, with whom he was more successful. The Chalcidians, with some others from the island of Naxos, sailed under the command of Theocles, and founded a town on the eastern coast of Sicily, to which they gave the name of Naxos, B. C. 735.

At this period Sicily was inhabited by four races, by Sicanians, who were probably a tribe of Iberians, from Africa, by Sicels, an Italian people, by Phœnician settlers, and by Elymians, who were probably composed of different tribes, varying in their degrees of affinity to the Greeks. These tribes gradually retreated before the Greeks, who having once gained a footing in the country, sent out colony after colony, so that in the course of a century they covered the eastern and southern sides of the island. They founded Naxos, Leontium, and Catania, and they likewise wrested from the Sicels the town of Zancle, which

an advantageous harbour.

date, under the immediate direction of a colony, and the oracle, a band of Chalcidians, with whom were Messenians, founded Rhegium. The most important Greek cities in Sicily, however, were of Dorian origin. Among these was Syracuse, founded the year after Naxos, by Corinthians, under a leader named Archias, a Heraclid, who was compelled to quit his country through misconduct. At the same time another Heraclid, from Corinth, named Chersicrates, took possession of the island of Corcyra, then inhabited by Laburnians and Eretrians, who were expelled by the Corinthians. Soon after this, Megara, which had not long become independent of Corinth, followed in this field of enterprise. Megarian emigrants established themselves on the coasts of the Propontis and the Bosphorus. Here, about a century after the foundation of Rome, they founded the future rival of the “eternal city,” Byzantium. They established themselves, also, at Hybla, which was betrayed to them by a Sicel chief, and which was henceforth called the Hyblean Megara. During the same period, Gela was founded by a band collected from Crete and Rhodes, and about B. C. 582, Gela sent forth settlers to the banks of the Acragas, where they built Agrigentum. About the same time Himera, which continued for a long period the only Greek city on the north side of Sicily, was peopled by Chalcidians from Zancle, and by Dorian exiles from Syracuse.

The most remarkable of these towns were Syracuse and Agrigentum.

The history of Syracuse comprised four periods. From B. C. 734 to 484 it was a republic, but does not appear to have risen to any great power. From that period it was successively governed by Gelon, Hiero, and Thrasybulus, three brothers, under whose rule it became powerful. On the death of Thrasybulus, B. C. 466, Syracuse became a democratic state, in which all its republican forms of government were re-established, and which it maintained till B. C. 405. From that time till Roman occupation, Syracuse was governed by several kings, but the restless Hannibal having entangled it in a war with Rome, after a long siege, celebrated for the inventions which Archimedes made for its defence, it was brought to ruin, B. C. 212.

The first constitution of Agrigentum was that of its mother city, Gela—Dorian, or aristocratic. Soon after its foundation, however, it fell under the dominion of tyrants, who maintained their power till B. C. 470, when, by the aid of Syracuse, the Agrigentines established a democracy. From that time till B. C. 405, Agrigentum attained the highest degree of public prosperity. It was taken and destroyed in the Carthaginian invasion, from which blow it recovered but slowly, and never effectually, for it fell under the dominion of the Romans, B. C. 262.

The other cities of Sicily were more or less dependent on those of Agrigentum and Syracuse. They had all originally republican forms of government, but they were afterwards oppressed by tyrants, either from among their own citizens or by those of Syracuse. All of them grievously suffered, likewise, in the wars between Syracuse and Carthage.

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COLONIES IN LOWER ITALY.

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In these colonies, to which allusion is made in the preceding article, were founded within half a century after the Greeks first set foot in Sicily. They are variously traced to the Dorian, Achæan, and Ionian families. Of Dorian origin were Tarentum and its colonies, Heraclea, and Brundisium. Of Achæan origin were Sybaris, Croton, Laus, Metapontum, and Posidonia, which last founded, at a later date, Terina, Caulonia, and Pandosia. Of Ionian origin were Thurii, Rhegium, Elea, Cumæ, and its branch settlement of Neapolis. Locri Epizephyrii, a colony of the Locri Ozolæ, is considered as an Æolian city.

The most remarkable of these towns were Tarentum, Croton, Sybaris, Thurii, Locris, Epizephyrii, Rhegium, and Cumæ.

Tarentum was founded by the Partheni from Sparta, about B. C. 707, and it quickly became one of the richest and most powerful of the maritime towns. Its most brilliant period was between the fourth and fifth centuries B. C., but excess of wealth introduced luxury, which extinguished the national spirit, so that it gradually decayed, till it finally fell under the Roman dominion, B. C. 273. Originally the constitution of Tarentum was a moderate aristocracy, but after the Persian war it became a democracy. At that time it was governed by a senate, without whose consent no war could be undertaken, and the members of which were elected, half by lot, and half by majority of votes given in the assemblies of the commons. This constitution appears to have preserved its form until the period of the Roman dominion, although towards this date it was much corrupted.

Croton was founded by the Achæans, B. C. 710, and during the first century it attained to very great power. About B. C. 600 an army of 120,000 Crotoniates joined in the battle of Sagra against the Locrians. The original constitution appears to have been a moderate democracy, but nothing is known concerning its organization. About B. C. 540 Pythagoras arrived at Croton, and there laid the foundation of a league named after him. The object of this league was not to change the form of government in the Italian cities, but to create men capable of managing public affairs of state. It lasted about thirty years, when it appears to have been broken asunder by a democratic faction under one Cylon, the consequence of which was universal anarchy, not only in Croton, where Clinias usurped supreme power, about B. C. 494, but likewise in the other cities. This anarchy was, however, quelled by the intervention of the Achæans, when these colonies adopted the laws of their mother cities, and soon after signed a league of confederacy in the temple of Jupiter Honorius. Affairs remained in this posture till about B. C. 400. Afterwards Croton was repeatedly captured by the kings of Syracuse, and finally, subsequent to the war with Pyrrhus, became dependent on Rome, B. C. 277.

Sybaris was founded by Achæans, mingled with Trœsmians, about B. C. 720. Shortly after its foundation it became one of the most extensive, populous, and luxurious, of the colonies in Italy. The height of its prosperity ranged from

B. C. 600 to B. C. 550. At that time it possessed a large territory, comprising four of the neighbouring tribes and twenty-five towns. The extraordinary fertility of the soil engendered vast wealth, which was increased by the great trade in oil and wine which it carried on with Africa and Gaul. Like that of Croton, the constitution of Sybaris was originally a moderate democracy; but about the year B. C. 510 this was subverted by one Telys, who obtained the supreme power, and expelled five hundred of its leading citizens. The exiles were received at Croton, which kindled a war between the two cities, which ended in the defeat of the Sybarites and the destruction of their city, B. C. 510.

The town of Thurii was founded ostensibly by Athens, B. C. 446. The inhabitants, however, were of mixed origin, which gave rise to disputes as to who was the real founder. The broil was settled by the Delphian oracle, which declared the city to be a colony of Apollo. The constitution of Thurii was a moderate democracy, but the Sybarites, who had joined the settlement, having taken possession of the best lands, it was converted into an oligarchy. These Sybarites were, however, expelled, and Thurii, being joined by several new colonies from Greece, grew into importance under a constitution meliorated by the adoption of the laws of Charondas of Catania. About B. C. 390 the Thurians were attacked by the Lucanians, and they sought the assistance of Rome, which afforded the Tarentines an excuse for attacking them also, and which finally led to their amalgamation with the Roman empire, B. C. 190.

The city of the Locri Epizephyrii appears to have been peopled, at various periods, by bands of Greek emigrants. The chief colony was sent out by the Locri Ozolæ, B. C. 683. About twenty years after it was founded Zaleucus gave it laws, by which it was governed for more than two centuries. The constitution was aristocratical. Its senate consisted of a thousand members, probably elected from the commons. The principal legislative power seems to have rested in this body, but there was a supreme magistrate called *cosmopolis*. The maintenance of the laws was committed to a body called *nomophylacs*. Locri continued to flourish till B. C. 358, when Dionysius II, of Syracuse, having taken refuge there, brought it to the verge of ruin by his insolence and licentiousness. After his departure, however, the Locrians recovered their independence, until the time of Pyrrhus, when they placed themselves under the protection of the Romans to escape his yoke, B. C. 275.

Rhegium was founded by a colony from Chalcis, in Eubœa, B. C. 668. The government of Rhegium was aristocratic, the supreme power being placed in the hands of a council consisting of one thousand members. Out of this government arose an oligarchy, which was succeeded by a monarchy, B. C. 494, which lasted during thirty years, after which Rhegium was governed by the laws of Charondas, of Catania, like Thurii. The city enjoyed a period of prosperity till B. C. 392, when it was destroyed by the Syracusans, under Dionysius I. It was partially restored by his successor, Dionysius II, but it was subdued to the power of Rome B. C. 271.

Cumæ owed its origin to the same people as Rhegium, who founded it as early as B. C. 1030. It early attained to a high degree of power and prosperity, its territory being extensive, its navy considerable, and Neapolis and Zancle being among its colonies. Originally the government of Cumæ was a moderate aristocracy, which was subverted by the tyrant Aristodemus, B. C. 544, and restored after his assassination. Having sustained many conflicts with the petty Italian states, and the Etruscans and Daunians, Cumæ was eventually incorporated with the Roman empire, B. C. 345.

COLONIES IN SARDINIA.

Two colonies were founded by the Greeks in Sardinia—those of Garalis and Olbia, but the date of their foundation and the circumstances connected with it are unknown.

COLONIES IN CORSICA

In Corsica a body of emigrants founded Alaria, or Alaha, about B. C. 561. Twenty years later, the inhabitants of the mother city, Phocæa, themselves resorted thither, but after the naval engagement with the Etruscans and Carthaginians they withdrew to Rhegium and Massilia, B. C. 536.

COLONY IN GAUL

The colony of Massilia, in Gaul, was founded by the Phocæans, B. C. 536, when they were driven out of Corsica, or, in other words, they established themselves in an old settlement of that name. After this Massilia grew rapidly in wealth and power. Her territory on the main land was rich in wine and oil, but limited in extent. Notwithstanding, Massilia established several colonies along the shores of Spain and Gaul, as Antipolis, Nicea, Olbia, etc. The Massilian constitution was a moderate aristocracy. The governing body was a senate, consisting of six hundred persons called *Timuchi*, who governed for life. At the head of this council were fifteen presidents, three of whom were chief magistrates. The *Timuchi* were chosen from among those who had children, and in whose families the right of citizenship had been possessed for three generations. As early as B. C. 218 the Massilians cultivated an alliance with the Romans, under whose care they attained a high degree of prosperity. Their freedom was preserved till the war between Pompey and Cæsar, when, having taken part with Pompey, they were subdued by Cæsar. Notwithstanding, they soon retrieved their affairs, and, under the reign of Augustus, they were celebrated for their cultivation of literature and philosophy. Massilia became, indeed, to the west of Europe what Athens was to the east. Thither the most illustrious of the Roman youths resorted to pursue their studies. Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus, have all recorded the high praises of the Massilians for their love and patronage of literature.

COLONY IN SPAIN

The date of the foundation of Saguntum, a colony which the Greeks founded in Spain, is

undetermined. It was an important colony, and became opulent by its commerce, but it was destroyed by Hannibal for its alliance with Rome, B. C. 219.

COLONY IN AFRICA

In the earliest ages Theras led a colony, chiefly of the Minyan race, from Laconia to an island then called Calliste, and one of the Cyclades. About B. C. 630, this little island, also, sent out its colony to Africa, which founded Cyrene. The causes which led to this expedition are involved in legend, and hence obscurity. One account states that Battus, its leader, undertook it as the result of civil discord, while Herodotus states that it was undertaken by the command of the oracle, with which they would not comply till after a seven years' dearth. The former account is the more probable, for the latter supposes that Libya was an unknown country, which is not true. As early as the days of Homer, a rumour of its fertility had reached Greece, as appears from the fable of the lotus-eaters, and from the manner in which he speaks of it in connexion with the wanderings of Ulysses.

"Nine days our fleet the uncertain tempest bore
Far in wide ocean, and from sight of shore
The tenth, we touch'd, by various cross'd,
The land of Lotus and the flowery coast
We clumb'd the beach, and springs of water found,
Then spread our hasty banquet on the ground
Three men were sent deputed from the crew,
An herald one, the dubious coast to view,
And learn what habitants possess'd the place.
They went, and found a hospitable race,
Not prone to ill, nor strange to foreign guest
They eat, they drink, and nature gives the feast,
The trees around them, all their fruits produce,
Lotus, the name, divine, nectarous juice
(Hence call'd Lotophagæ) which whose tastes,
Insatiate riots in the sweet repasts,
Nor other home, nor other care intends,
But quits his house, his country, and his friends
The three we sent, from off the anch'ring ground
We dragg'd reluctant, and by force we bound
The rest in haste forsook the pleasing shore,
Or, the charm tast'd, had return'd no more."

ODYSSEY

It is evident, therefore, that Libya was known to the Greeks in the remotest ages, whence, as population increased, they naturally looked to that quarter of the globe as a desirable spot whereon to plant colonies. The part of Africa where the Theraans finally settled was the singular table-land which rises on the eastern border of the greater Syrtis. Enclosed between the sea and the desert, and blessed with inexhaustible stores of wealth, and with a pure and temperate air, it seemed, beyond every other shore of the Mediterranean, to invite the enterprise of the Greeks. Here, therefore, they founded Cyrene, and they soon converted the adjacent land into a luxurious garden, while they extracted from its rocky basis the materials of imperishable monuments. Cyrene, also, became "the root of other cities," four of which—its port Apollonia, Barca, Tauchira, and Hesperides—composed, with the capital, the Cyrenaic Pentapolis.

The government of Cyrene was at first monarchical. It was ruled by monarchs, indeed, down to the date B. C. 450, when it received a republican constitution, with the details of which

we are unacquainted. It does not appear, though they had for their legislator Democles of Arcadia, that it was established upon sound principles, for accounts of domestic troubles and tyrants make up the sum of the history of Cyrene while thus governed. Subsequently to Alexander, B. C. 331, Cyrene became a part of the Egyptian kingdom, and it continued to receive various rulers from the family of the Ptolemies, until the reign of Ptolemy Physcon, when it became a separate state by being transferred to the Romans, B. C. 97. Under the Romans Cyrene appears to have declined, as the maritime towns of the Pentapolis rose into importance. It afterwards suffered greatly, and was ruined in a great measure during the insurrections of the Jews, under Hadrian and Trajan. At the present time it is in ruins, and its former splendour and importance are abundantly testified by its noble remains.

COLONIES ON THE PROPONTIS.

The most important Greek colonies on the Propontis were Cyzicus, Lampsaacus, Perinthus, subsequently called Heraclea, and, at the mouth of the Thracian Bosphorus, Byzantium, over against which was Chalcedon. Nearly all these colonies were planted by the city of Miletus alone, between the eighth and sixth centuries before the Christian era. Cyzicus, however, the most important of them, is referred to an earlier origin. Eusebius gives two dates, B. C. 756 and B. C. 675, and it has been supposed that the former belongs to a Milesian, and the second to a Megarian colony. The planting of other Milesian colonies, however, in the same neighbourhood at the latter date, as Abydos, Priapus, and Proconnessus, seems to render it probable that Miletus had at least a share in the second settlement of Cyzicus. The latter town stood on an island connected with the continent by means of bridges, and, at the time of the Romans, it was one of the most beautiful and flourishing cities of Asia. The prosperity of all the most important towns, indeed, affords sufficient proof of the skill with which sites were chosen for the establishment of colonies on the Propontis.

COLONIES ON THE BLACK SEA.

The Greek colonies on the Black Sea were Bithynia, Heraclea, Sinope, Amisus, Phasis, Dioscurias, Phanagoria, Panticapeum, Tanais, Olbia, and the minor colonies of Apollonia, Tomi, and Salmidessus. Sinope was a Milesian settlement; and, though its history is involved in the greatest obscurity, it appears to have been the most ancient and the most powerful of the Grecian colonies on the Black Sea, of which it long held the sovereignty. Its freedom and independence lasted to about B. C. 100, when it fell under the dominion of the kings of Pontus, and afterwards under that of the Romans. Its principal source of wealth was derived from the shoals of migratory fish, which, issuing from the Palus Mæotis, spread along the shore of the Black Sea down to the Thracian Bosphorus. Heraclea, which was the most western of the Greek colonies on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea, appears to have been established by the Me-

garians. It was situated in the territory of the Maryandini. Originally it was governed by a republican constitution, but frequent broils and revolutions led to a tyranny in the person of Clearchus, B. C. 370, who abrogated the senate, and whose family continued for a long time in possession of power. Amisus is said by Strabo to have been peopled by Milesian emigrants. It stood in the Pontus, and was the mother city of Trapezus. Like Sinope, which was also in Pontus, it fell under the dominion of the Romans. Phasis, Dioscurias, and Phanagoria, were on the eastern coast of the Black Sea. Concerning their origin, little is known. The last-mentioned town was the principal mart of the slave trade, and for Indian commodities imported across the Oxus and the Caspian Sea. Panticapeum was in the Chersonesus Taurica, and it was the capital of the little Grecian kingdom of Bosphorus, whose kings remained in alliance with Athens till Mithridates the Great laid there the foundation of his dominion. Tanais stood on the mouth of a river of the same name at the bottom of the Palus Mæotis, and Olbia was situated at the mouth of the Borysthenes. Both these towns were of the highest importance for the inland trade which, issuing from thence in a northern and eastern direction, extended to the centre of Asia. Apollonia, Tomi, and Salmidessus, were on the western coast of the Black Sea, but they never attained to any degree of importance.

COLONIES ON THE ADRIATIC, ETC.

The glory of opening new tracks of commerce in the Adriatic Sea, or Gulf of Venice, is ascribed to the Phocæans. The date of their first adventure cannot be precisely fixed, but it was probably about the same time, the seventh century B. C., as that when they began their voyages to the western coasts of Italy, where they gained access to Etruria, and where they were soon followed by the Corinthians. Herodotus, also, ascribes the more important discovery of Iberia and Tartessus to the Phocæans, and it is certain that, in the days of the Tartessian king, Arganthonius, they were to be found in great numbers there. That king invited the whole people to leave Ionia, and settle in his dominions. At an earlier date, however, a band of Samian emigrants resorted to Tartessus, and established themselves there as merchants. More recently, the Rhodians followed in the same direction, and founded Parthenope, afterwards named Neapolis, from a new colony of Chalcidians and Athenians. The Rhodians also established themselves at Rhode, or Rhodos, in Catalonia, and it is supposed that the Rhone (Rhodanus) was named after them. The Milesians established themselves as merchants in the west, and became closely connected with the Sybarites; whence, on the fall of Sybaris, they displayed their grief by a public mourning.

COLONIES ON THE ÆGEAN.

The coast of Thrace and Macedonia, washed by the Ægean Sea, was covered with Grecian colonies from various cities, and especially from

Corinth and Athens. On the Thracian coast of the Chersonesus, and ranging along the Hellespont, were the towns of Sestos, Cardia, and Ægospotamos; and, farther to the west, stood Maronea and Abdera. The towns on the Macedonian coast, however, were of far greater importance than those in Thrace. These were Amphipolia, Chalca, Olynthus, and Potidæa. Amphipolis was a colony from Athens, and it was founded about B. C. 464. Chalca was a colony from a city of the same name in Eubœa. Olynthus derived its name from the founder, who was one of the sons of Hercules. This city ranked, in the course of time, among the most powerful cities of Thrace, although it was tributary to the Athenians. It took a part in the wars between Sparta and Athens, and it flourished till B. C. 348, when it was taken by Philip, king of Macedonia, by whom it was destroyed. Potidæa was a colony of Corinth, from which it received annual magistrates. It became tributary to the Athenians after the Persian war, and having revolted B. C. 431, its inhabitants were expelled, and their place supplied by an Athenian colony. After this it remained in possession of Athens, till it was taken by Philip in the same year as Olynthus.

COLONY IN EGYPT.

About the same time that the Phœcians were making their first excursions on the west of the Mediterranean, a band of Ionians and Carians chanced, in the course of a piratical expedition, to land on the coast of Egypt, and were induced to enter into the service of Psammiticus, who was then struggling for the crown. By their aid he obtained the prize, and he rewarded them with a grant of lands on the Nile, and gave all their countrymen free access to his dominions. To promote their commerce with his subjects, he consigned a number of Egyptian youths to their care, to be instructed in the Greek language, whereby they might form a permanent class of interpreters. The successors of Psammiticus adhered to the same line of policy, so that Greeks of various classes were drawn to Egypt, which greatly swelled the number of the original settlers in that country. According to Eusebius, a band of Milesians resorted thither, and founded Naucratis, which story is confirmed by Athenæus. The effect of this intercourse was twofold. It not only promoted traffic, but Greek literature was indebted to it for one of the most important conditions of its development—a cheap and commodious material for writing—the Egyptian papyrus.

Thus widely did the Greeks spread themselves. Their system of colonization, however, was not the result of preconceived plans. Few of their colonies were founded with any view to extend the dominion of their mother country. The leaders were frequently no more than pirates; and when a state, by a public act, sent out a colony, the purpose was generally no more than to deliver itself from numbers too great for its territory, or from factious men whose power was not equal to their ambition. The city of Corinth, however, and, in later ages, Athens, had sometimes more enlarged views,

and founded colonies for their own aggrandisement. But these were exceptions to the general rule. For the most part, in the colonies, as in Greece itself, every considerable town claimed to be an independent state, and, unless oppressed by a powerful neighbour, maintained itself by its own strength and alliances. The colonists carried the tone of the mother country with them, and that tone was freedom.

Mitford notices one remarkable feature presented in the history of the Greek colonists; namely, that they never coveted inland territories. They invariably chose maritime situations, and if driven from these, they sought others of the same kind in remoter regions. Their motives for thus appear to have been, that they might not be excluded from the sea, and the means which it afforded for communication, not only with Greece, but the world. Hence the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, and the African colonies, maintained constant intercourse with the land of their fathers. So, also, did the Asiatic colonies, to which cause, as will hereafter be unfolded, Grecian art and Grecian philosophy owed their celebrity; for it is a well established fact that the colonies, in general, advanced nearly equally in art, science, and cultivation, and sometimes outstripped the mother country. A generous rivalry seems to have existed between Greece and her colonies in this respect, and this emulation tended to material improvement. In the third century after their establishment in the east, and above seven hundred years before the Christian era, the Greeks of Asia far surpassed their European ancestors in splendour and prosperity. And the reason of this is evident. While ancient Greece was torn by factions and harassed by barbarians, the eastern colonies enjoyed profound peace, which is the best promoter of improvements in science and literature. What the poet has said of liberty may be said of peace, that it

“gives the flower
Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume.”

Under its benign influence, the Asiatic Greeks became renowned for the useful and elegant arts. They found these among the Phrygians and Lydians, but in their hands they became ennobled. Music, poetry, painting, sculpture, all received improvement under their fostering care, and philosophy owed its origin to the Ionian colonists. They appear, also, to have been the first people who made statues of brass; and the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture perpetuate, in their very names, the honour of their inventors.

“First, undorn'd
And nobly plain, the manly Doric rose
The Ionic, then, with decent matron grace
Her early pillar heaved luxuriant last,
The rich Corinthian spread her wanton wreath
The whole so measured, true, so less'n'd off
By fine proportion, that the marble pile,
Form'd to repel the still or stormy waite
Of rolling ages, light as fabrics look'd
That from the magic wand aerial rose.”

If such, therefore, are the effects of peace, how ought it to be cultivated by mankind! Above all, it should be nursed by them, because it is most favourable to their spiritual interests.

When the heart rages with strife, there can be no sober reflection, and no due preparation for eternity. For it can only be when we are at peace with God and man, through the blood of the atonement, that the influence of the religion of Jesus can be savingly felt in the soul. Oh, how many have gone down to their graves without thinking of this great truth! Indulging in wrath and bitterness, they have made shipwreck of their faith. To all who read these pages, therefore, we would say, in the language of the apostle Paul, "Let all bitterness, and wrath, and anger, and clamour, and evil speaking, be put away from you, with all malice; and be ye kind one to another, tender-hearted, forgiving one another, even as God for Christ's sake hath forgiven you," Eph iv. 31, 32.

CHAPTER VII

THE AFFAIRS OF THE ASIATIC GREEKS TO THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPES TO THE THRONE OF PERSIA

B. C. 700—521.

It has been seen that the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia flourished, from their earliest settlement there, in freedom, commerce, wealth, and the arts of life. While thus prosperous, a power was growing up by their side which gradually encroached on their territory, and finally crushed their independence. That power was Lydia.

For a long period the Lydians were disturbed by the irruption of Thracian and other barbarous hordes, the fiercest of whom were the Treres and Cimmerians. Some of these established themselves in the inland regions of Asia, and even in Sardis, the Lydian capital, while others passed like a tempest over the land. At length, however, in the reign of Alyattes, the fourth king in the dynasty of the Mermnadæ, these barbarian hordes were finally and for ever expelled, which left the Lydians free to pursue other conquests. In the reign of Gyges, the first king of this dynasty, an attempt was made to dispossess the Asiatic Greeks of several of their cities. The gold of Lydia enabled him to hire mercenaries, and Miletus, Smyrna, and Colophon, were successively attacked by him, and Colophon appears to have submitted to his arms. His successor, Ardyes, prosecuted the war, and made himself master of Priene. He also attacked Miletus, but he seems to have been prevented from taking it by the incursions of the Cimmerians, who, in his reign, captured Sardis, except the citadel. His son, Sadyattes, however, renewed the attempt upon Miletus, and he dying before the conquest was completed, his successor, Alyattes, continued these hostilities.

During the first five years of his reign, Alyattes regularly marched his army into the Milesian territory. This army, however, does not appear to have been very effective. It marched to the sound of festive music, as if for the purpose of revelry, and it wasted the fruits of the husbandman's labour; but beyond this, except when the Milesians ventured to meet the enemy

in the field, they suffered no harm. Their town was secure from attack, and the sea supplied them with an abundance of provisions.

Sull the deprivation of the produce of their gardens and vineyards might eventually have led the Milesians to submit to their more powerful neighbour. The Lydian king seems to have expected this result, but in the sixth year of his reign an accident happened which relieved the city, for a time, from Lydian aggression. In that campaign, the Lydians having set fire to a field of ripe corn near the temple of Athene, the flames spread till they caught and consumed the sacred building. The circumstance does not appear to have caused any compunction at the moment; but, at the end of the campaign, Alyattes fell sick, and, ascribing his illness to the sacrilege committed by his troops, he listened to the admonition of the Delphic oracle, which commanded him to repair the insult offered to the sanctuary.

At this time Miletus was governed by Thrasylbulus, who, informed of the oracle that Alyattes had received, made preparations to play upon the ambassador whom he expected from the Lydian king to ask a truce for the purpose of rebuilding the temple. He ordered all the corn and other provisions, collected by him and his subjects for their support, to be brought into the public markets, and commanded the citizens, at the sight of a certain signal, to enjoy a general feast, and to exhibit convivial mirth. The stratagem succeeded. The ambassador of Alyattes reported what he had seen, and when the king heard the report, he not only built two new temples in the place of the one destroyed, but concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with Miletus.

After this, Alyattes, according to Herodotus, reduced Smyrna, which was the sole extent of the advantages he gained over the Asiatic Greeks. His successor, Cræsus, however, adopted the same line of policy which the whole of the dynasty of the Mermnadæ had pursued towards them. He commenced by laying siege to Ephesus, which was ruled by the tyrant Pindarus, whose mother was a daughter of Alyattes. This city was reduced; and he attacked, with like success, one after another, all the Greek cities on the continent that retained their independence.

Having become master of the whole western coast, Cræsus made preparations for the subjugation of the western islands. From this design he was diverted by the advice of a wise Greek,* who pointed out the dangers to which he would expose the Lydians on an element to which they were strangers. He therefore turned his views in a different direction, and enlarged his dominions on the main land, till they included all the nations westward of the river Hæly, the Lycians and Cilicians excepted.

The Lydian empire was now the greatest and most flourishing hitherto known to the Greeks, except by the voice of rumour. The fame of Cræsus resounded through all their states; and, encouraged by his liberality and hospitality, many of their sages repaired to his court. His

* Some attribute this advice to Bias of Priene, and others to Pittacus of Mitylene, in the isle of Lesbos.

prosperity, however, was soon disturbed by domestic calamities, and a humbling reverse, which reads an important lesson to mankind on the uncertain nature of all terrestrial affairs. Urged by ambition, and alarmed at the growing greatness of the Persian empire under the rule of Cyrus, he prepared to lead his forces into Cappadocia, in full expectation of becoming master of Persia. He was deceived. Cyrus met him at Pteria in Cappadocia, and, after sustaining a sanguinary conflict, he was compelled to retreat. Still he was not disheartened. He gathered around him a great army from Asia Minor, Ionia, Thrace, and Egypt, which assembled on the river Pactolus, from whence he intended, on being joined by some Spartan forces, again to march into the Persian dominions. Cyrus heard of this intended second invasion, and, with his usual promptness, he forestalled the Lydian king's intentions. He marched into his territories, and the two armies meeting on the plains of Thymbra, near Sardis, the Lydians were overthrown, and the power of Croesus was no more. His treasures and his kingdom fell into the hands of the conqueror,* B. C. 548.

The conquest of Lydia established the Persian monarchy on a firm foundation, and led to the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks. This latter step appeared to be necessary, for, instigated by the Ionians, the vanquished Lydians at this time were making a feeble attempt to free themselves from the Persian yoke. Accordingly, Cyrus, being called away to the east by vast designs which he had against Babylon, and by the invasion of his territories on the north-eastern frontier by the fierce barbarians who ranged over the plains that stretched from the skirts of the Indian Caucasus to the Caspian, left some forces under Mazares to punish the revolt of the Lydians, and to take possession of the Asiatic Greek cities.

Before Cyrus quitted Sardis he received envoys from the Æolian and Ionian cities, who offered submission to him on the same terms as had been granted them by Croesus. Previous to his triumph over the Lydian monarch, Cyrus had invited them to submit to his rule, and, according to Herodotus, he now replied to them in the following oriental apologue — "A fisherman stood upon the sea-shore, and played upon his flute in order to allure the fish to land, but the fish would not listen, and kept still in the water. Seeing this, he took his net and drew them out on the shore, and they quivered and leaped. He observed their motions, and interpreting them as indicating their wish for liberty, he exclaimed, 'It is unnecessary now to dance, since I have ceased to play.'"

As soon as the Asiatic Greeks discovered that they had no choice but between war and slavery, they began to prepare for resistance. The inhabitants of Ionia assembled in the Panionian grove, which was their ordinary rendezvous, in general and important deliberations. This place, which, together with the adjoining promontory of Mycale, was solemnly consecrated to Neptune, formed the centre of the Ionian coast, and thi-

their representatives appeared from Myus and Priene, on the south coast, from Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Claromena, Erythræ, Phocæa, and Smyrna, which formed the maritime part of Lydia, and from the isles of Chios and Samos. These, with Miletus, completed the whole number of the Ionic settlements, but no representative appeared from thence. The Milesians, being the most powerful in the Ionian confederacy, had, in truth, been exempted from the stern demand of Cyrus; and they were, therefore, severed from the cause of their brethren.

In the mean time, the Æolians, alarmed by the same danger, met together in their ancient capital of Cyme. Here deputies from their inferior towns assembled, and resolved on war. These towns were Larissa, Neontichus, Tenus, Cylla, Notium, Ægiroessa, Pitane, Ægæa, Myrina, and Smyrna. Their territory was more extensive and more fertile than that of their Ionian rivals, but their harbours were less commodious, and their cities inferior in fame and power.

Of the six Doric republics that annually assembled at Triopium, to celebrate the festival of Apollo, four only resolved to oppose the power of Cyrus. These were Cos, Lindus, Iulisus, and Camirus. The other two, Cnidus and Halicarnassus, from circumstances which it is impossible to explain, determined to stand aloof in the approaching conflict.

The struggle was one in which fearful odds were conspicuous. The Asiatic Greeks saw this, and hence they resolved to send an embassy into Greece to seek assistance. It might have been expected that Attica, the native country of the Ionians, would have received the first visit of their ambassadors, but Athens was then governed by the tyrant Pisistratus, and they were directed to pass on to Sparta. Having no claim upon the Spartans, the proposals of the Asiatic ambassadors were coolly received by the senate, and they declined sending any forces into Asia to resist the arms of Cyrus. Though their generosity furnished no public assistance, caution led them to send several citizens to observe the operations of the war, who paved the way for the future war between Greece and Persia.

When these citizens arrived in Ionia, they exceeded the bounds of their commission. Imagining that their name would carry weight with Cyrus, they appointed Læcines to repair to his court, to desire, in the name of Sparta, that he would refrain from doing harm to any Grecian city. Cyrus had never heard of this miniature state, and, supposing that it was like the Ionian towns, a mart of busy traffic, he bade the messenger return, and tell his countrymen that Cyrus despised the threats of men who had a public place in their city set apart for the purpose of false swearing and mutual deceit, and that he hoped, on some future day, to afford them stronger reasons of complaint than his operations against the Asiatic Greeks.

Meanwhile Mazares, the general of Cyrus, had quelled the insurrection of the Lydians, and he now proceeded to subdue the Ionians. He only lived, however, to take Priene and Magnesia, and to ravage the vale of the Mæander. He was

* See Ancient History, Lydians, chap IV

succeeded in command by Harpagus, who vigorously pressed the Ionian cities. His method of besieging appears to have been new to the Ionians, though it is the same which had been long used in the civilized states of Asia, as may be gathered from Scripture.* According to Herodotus, it consisted in casting up mounds against the walls, by which the assailants were enabled to clear the streets by showers of missiles, or to effect an entrance by filling up the intervening space.

The first city which Harpagus thus attacked was Phocæa. The works were rapidly advancing, and the Phocæans began to despair, when Harpagus sent a taunting message to the besieged, stating that he would be content if they would but throw down a single battlement, and convert one dwelling into holy ground. The Phocæans asked for one day to deliberate, and desired Harpagus to withdraw his troops for that period. Foreseeing their design, Harpagus complied with their request, and, during the armistice, they freighted their ships with their most sacred and precious treasures, embarked with their wives and children, and set sail for Chios. When the Persians returned to take possession of the town, the whole community was floating on the waves, and they found the city desolate.

Having arrived at Chios, the Phocæans endeavoured to purchase of the inhabitants the small Cnossian islands, but they, jealous of their commerce, and knowing the active and enterprising spirit of the fugitives, refused their consent. Thus rejected by men of their own race and language, the Phocæans determined to sail for Corsica, where, about twenty years before, they had formed a minor establishment. Before they abandoned their country, however, they once more sailed home, and surprised and slew the Persian garrison. They then dropped a ball of iron into the sea, and, by mutual oaths, bound themselves never to return into Phocæa till it should rise up to the surface yet, such is the powerful attachment which men possess to their ancient habitations, that before they had left the Ægean, half of them, in utter disregard to their oath, returned to the desolated city. Meanwhile the rest bent their course to Corsica, where they settled among their kinsmen. They were soon, however, engaged in a war with the Carthaginians and the Tyrrhenians of Agylla, in which they lost the greatest part of their fleet, after which they sailed for Rhegium. While they rested there they heard of a site on the coast, of which Sybaris was mistress, and under her protection they took possession of it, and there founded Elea, which long preserved the independence its founders had bought so dearly.

The citizens of Teos followed the example of the Phocæans. As soon as the mound of the Persians had risen to the top of their walls, they fled to their ships, and sailed to the coast of Thrace, where a band of Ionian adventurers had previously founded a town, from which they had been expelled by the Thracians. The Teians *now took possession of the vacant site, and the new city of Abdera long flourished like Elea.*

The rest of the Ionian cities were not capable of the heroism of Phocæa and Teos. All fell successively under the attacks of Harpagus; and even the islanders disarmed his hostility by voluntary submission. They were compelled to submit to the Persian yoke, which they discovered to be far more grievous than the Lydian. The most bitter portion of their lot was, that they were compelled to carry arms in the service of a foreign master, alike against barbarians and Greeks.

Having subdued Æolis and Ionia, the Persian general pushed his conquests against the Dorian states on the southern coast. The Carians submitted without a struggle, and their example was followed by all around, except the inhabitants of Cnidus and Pedasa, who made a show of resistance, but who were finally compelled to submit to the Persian yoke.

The spirit of freedom was more determined in Lycia. The citizens of Xanthus manfully struggled against the Persian host, and when overpowered by numbers, they retired into the city, and, collecting their treasures, with their wives and children, in the citadel, they set it on fire, and perished. Only a few families, then absent from the city, whither they afterwards returned, remained to perpetuate the race of the ancient Xanthians. The inhabitants of Caunus made a similar display of courage, but to no purpose. Those who did not submit to the conqueror were destroyed, and, after a few struggles, the whole of Lower Asia acknowledged the sovereignty of Persia.

In the meantime Cyrus was enlarging and strengthening his power in the East. The proud city of Babylon fell under his dominion, by which event he was rendered sole master of the valuable countries around the Tigris and the Euphrates. But he was soon compelled to submit to a power universal and irresistible—that of death. His line of policy, however, was adopted by his immediate successors. Was he ambitious? So were they. His son Cambyses received the submission of Tyre and Cyprus, and effected the conquest of Egypt, in which the Greek colonies in that country and on the adjoining coast were involved. They also submitted to the yoke of Persia. Even the Greek inhabitants of Cyrenaica, who had braved the united power of Egypt and Libya, awed by his merciless behaviour to the Egyptians, readily offered submission and tribute, and those of Barce followed the example.

During the rule of Cambyses, the Greek cities of Asia Minor remained quietly under the sway of their Persian governors, who were so many tyrants. The adjacent islands, though they had made professions of obedience, were more independent, because the Persian satraps on the coast had no naval power at their command to enable them utterly to subdue them.

Among these islands none had risen to a higher pitch of prosperity than that of Samos. A long series of changes had taken place in the political constitution of this state; and at this period it was governed by a small number of wealthy land-owners, who had rendered themselves odious to the people at large. Under this rule they sent a fleet to the aid of their colony,

* See 2 Sam xx. 15, 2 Kings xix. Jerem vi. 6, Hab. i. 10

Peinthus, which was threatened by the Megarians. The Samians gained the victory, and sailed back with 600 prisoners, but before they entered the harbour they resolved to set their captives at liberty, and subvert their present form of government. This was effected. The rulers were surprised in the council chamber and slain, and a democratical constitution was established.

But this constitution did not long exist in Samos. Towards the end of the reign of Cyrus, a man named Polycrates, supported by a few followers, made himself master of the city. At first he shared his power with two brothers, but he afterwards slew one, and banished the other, that he might rule alone. He did so, with much vigour. He took a thousand bowmen into his pay as his life-guards, and raised a fleet of six hundred galleys, with which he protected the Samian commerce, enriched himself by piratical excursions, subdued many of the islands, and took several towns on the coast. He even made war on Miletus, and defeated a Lesbian armament sent to its relief.

These expeditions involved Polycrates in hostilities with Persia, though each was secure from the other's power. By land the Persians could defy Polycrates, and on his own element Polycrates could defy the Persians. Thus his power became established, and he lived in state and luxury. At the same time he extended his protection to the arts, for which Samos had long been renowned. He adorned his island with magnificent and useful works, and he drew the most celebrated artists from Greece by munificent rewards. The poets, also, especially those whose strains were devoted to love and wine, were welcome guests at his table. Around his board sat Ibycus and Anacreon, the bard of Teos, and many of the lascivious strains which are handed down to our age as the productions of the latter, may be attributed to the patronage of Polycrates. They were composed to administer to his pleasures, and they remain at once a monument of genius and impure passions.

But Polycrates did not become so immersed in pleasure as to forget the extension of his power. He meditated uniting all the Ionian cities under his dominion. His authority at home, however, did not rest on a basis whereon he could depend. There was a party in Samos which desired his overthrow, and only waited for a favourable opportunity to revolt. Polycrates knew this, and, in order to get rid of them, when Cambyses made his preparations for the invasion of Egypt, he offered to assist him with a squadron of ships. This offer was accepted, and Polycrates equipped forty galleys, in which he embarked all those whom he suspected, and at the same time sent a private message to the Persian king to request him not to allow them to return to Samos.

This would have appeared to have been a judicious measure, but it was one by which Polycrates himself incurred much danger. The Samian malcontents resolved to turn the force which had been placed in their hands against the tyrant himself. Their attempt was defeated, and they sought and obtained aid from Sparta and Corinth in order to enable them to renew it. Thus reinforced, the Samian malcontents sailed again to Samos; but, after a sharp conflict, and

sustaining a siege for forty days, they abandoned the undertaking in despair. Their allies returned home; and, after ranging some time as pirates over the Ægean, they took possession of Cydonia in Crete, where they flourished till they were conquered and enslaved by the Ægæans.

The power of Polycrates now seemed to have taken deep root, like the wide-spreading oak of the forest, and he again turned his views to the enlargement of his dominions. But as the lightning sometimes in a moment blasts the glory of the oak, so was Polycrates suddenly cut down in the midst of his prosperity. He fell as suddenly as he had risen, and by a fate as ignominious as his fortune hitherto had been exalted. With the consent of the Persian monarch, Oroetes, the satrap of Sardis, by a refined stratagem, enticed him to Magnesia on the Mæander, where he was arrested and crucified, *n. c. 523*.

Soon after this event, Cambyses died, and Smerdis Magus usurped the throne of Persia. But this usurper was hurled from his giddy height in a few months, and Darius Hystaspes assumed the reins of government. It was under Darius that the Persian empire became consolidated. The dominions of his predecessors were but a mass of countries united by subjection to the will of a common ruler, which expressed itself by arbitrary and irregular exactions. Darius organised these countries into an empire where every member had its due place assigned. He divided his vast realms, which stretched from the Ægean to the Indus, and from the steppes of Scythia to the cataracts of the Nile, into twenty satrapies, or provinces, and appointed the tribute which each was to pay, and the proportion in which they were to supply provisions for the army and for the king's household. In this manner we find that the Ionians and Magnesians of Asia, the Æolians, Carians, Lycians, Melyeans, and Pamphylians, were formed into the first satrapy, as described by Herodotus, and were compelled to pay annually four hundred talents, that is, about 77,500*l.*, into the king's treasury.

Such was the result of the struggle of the Asiatic Greeks against Cyrus and his successors. Their subjection was the result of the ambition of one man—Crocus. Had he been content with dominion west of the Halys, Cyrus had probably never crossed that river for the purpose of conquest. In this, therefore, may be seen what evils follow in the train of ambition. But the evils did not stop at this point. In the reign of Darius Hystaspes, a fierce war arose between Greece and Persia, which ceased not till the Persian empire was overthrown. This war will form a conspicuous feature in the details of the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER VIII.

HISTORY OF GREECE, FROM THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPES TO THE BATTLE OF MARATHON

B. c. 521—490

DURING the reign of the Median king Cyaxares I., or Kai Kobad, a Scythian horde, dwelling

between the Danube and the Don, had broken into the civilized regions of Asia, and were not expelled till they had ranged over them as masters for twenty-eight years. This appears never to have been forgotten or forgiven by his successors. They resolved, one day, to take revenge upon them for the bold act. But neither Astyages nor Cyaxares II, who sat upon the throne of Media after that date—and neither Cyrus nor Cambyses, who inherited their dominions as kings of Persia, had found leisure for such a distant conquest. The subjugation of the East demanded their utmost attention and their utmost stretch of power, and the Scythians, therefore, still remained unscathed.

Darius Hystaspes, however, ascended the throne under different circumstances to those of his predecessors. The East acknowledged his supremacy, and he turned his attention chiefly toward the western side of his dominions. He resolved to visit the aggressions of the ancient Scythians upon the heads of their now remote descendants. Accordingly, with an army, it is said, of 700,000 men, he traversed Asia Minor, crossed the Thracian Bosphorus, ravaged Thrace, and arrived on the banks of the Danube.

Accidental causes arising out of this movement brought this regal adventurer—for such an expedition may be properly termed an adventure—into collision with the Greeks, a collision which laid the foundation of the future splendour of Greece.

Darius passed over the Danube by a bridge of boats, and when his troops were safely landed on the left bank he ordered the Greeks to break it up, and to follow him into Scythia. Coes, a Lesbian, who commanded the contingent sent by Mitylene, perceived the danger which might arise from such a measure, and he advised the king to leave it in the care of the Greeks. Darius saw the wisdom of this suggestion and adopted it, but, as he was not certain he should return by the same route, he fixed a term of sixty days for his absence, after which the Greeks who guarded the bridge were to quit their post and return home.*

Having given these directions, Darius moved forward in search of the Scythians. He expected to find them waiting his approach in battle array. But he was mistaken. The Scythians retreated before him, and he and his army were in danger of perishing in the desert, hence the pursuit, in which the Persians had wasted their strength, was changed into a disastrous retreat.

In the meanwhile the sixtieth day had passed, and the Scythians had sent tidings to the Greeks who were guarding the bridge of the situation of Darius, and exhorted them to break it down, and leave the Persians to their fate. It seemed a favourable opportunity of effecting their liberty, and they were urged by Miltades, prince of the Chersonesus, to embrace it. Hystæus, however, prince, or tyrant of Miletus, represented to the Ionian chiefs that their power was linked to that of Darius, since it was under his protection that

each of them was lord in his own city; and that the cities of Ionia would not fail to depose them, and recover their liberty, should the Persian empire be overthrown. The advice of Hystæus prevailed, and Darius, appearing shortly afterwards, was enabled to re-pass the Danube with the fragments of his army.

The army Darius brought back with him was still large enough to enable him to leave 80,000 men in Europe, under the command of Megabyzus, to complete the conquest of Thrace and the Greek cities on the Hellespont, which would convey the impression that he had not suffered so much as Herodotus represents. With the rest of his troops, Darius passed the Bosphorus, and took up his quarters at Sardis, where he spent the winter and the greatest part of the year following, in attempting to retrieve his losses. B. C. 513.

One of the first cares of Darius on his return to Asia, was to reward the services of Coes and Hystæus. The former was made tyrant of Mitylene, and the latter was rewarded with Myrcinas of Edonia, a territory upon the river Strymon in Thrace, with the liberty of building a city there. It does not appear that any immediate measures were taken to punish the treason of Miltades, for he remained long unmolested in his Chersonesian government, and was driven from it by an irroad of the Scythians themselves three years before he was finally compelled to abandon it to the Persians. The Scythians meditated an invasion of Persia, whence the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, having harassed the Persian army in their retreat, were ordered by Darius to be burned, lest they should join the Scythian hordes in their contemplated measure. It was, perhaps, from this precautionary, but severe act, that the Persian empire was preserved from the expected attack.

Megabyzus proved to be an able and active officer. He quickly subdued all the Thracian tribes which had not yet submitted to his master, and, after effecting this, he demanded earth and water, the usual tokens of submission, from the hands of Amyntas, king of Macedonia. Alarmed at the consequences of a refusal, Amyntas consented to become the vassal of Darius, and Macedonia, which at this period did not extend far to the east of the Axius, and did not include the upper part of the course of that river, was annexed to the Persian empire.

Before Darius returned to Susa, he appointed his half-brother Artaphernes, satrap of the Asiatic coast of the Ægean, and of the southern provinces of the kingdom of Cressus. He also left Otanes in the room of Megabyzus, to reduce the maritime cities which still held out against his power, on the coasts to the north of the Ægean. Otanes was as successful as his predecessor. Byzantium, Chalcædon, and the other towns on that coast, were reduced by him; and, with the aid of a squadron furnished by the Lesbians, he subdued the islands of Imbros and Lemnos, which were still occupied by a Pelasgian population.

The success of these campaigns richly compensated for the check Darius had received in his Scythian expedition. The Persian empire had now attained the summit of its greatness.

* The method which Darius adopted to assist the Greeks in keeping an account of time, was one of great rudeness. He caused sixty knots to be tied in a leathern thong, and bade them unfasten one every day till the prescribed interval had expired.

It stood pre-empt above all other powers. Awe'd by that power, the world, for a time, rested from war, and the nations from the banks of the Indus to the borders of Thessaly rested under its shade.

But, as in nature intervals of profound calm often precede the gathering of a storm, so it was with these nations. The repose in which the world had been hushed from B. C. 505 to B. C. 501 was disturbed by a contest between two factions in the little island of Naxos, which finally brought the armies of Greece and Persia into the field of battle.

At this time the democratic party in Naxos had gained the ascendancy, and the most opulent citizens were forced to quit the country. These citizens were united by political ties to Hystæus, who was now a prisoner in the splendid palace of Susa, whither he had been allured, lest his growing greatness should lead him to disturb the Persian government. On repairing thither at the Persian monarch's invitation, Hystæus left his kinsman Aristagoras to rule at Miletus, and the Naxian exiles applied to him for succour. Aristagoras was willing to restore them, but he wanted the power, for Naxos maintained a considerable navy, and could bring eight thousand men into the field. Under these circumstances, he repaired to Artaphernes, at Sardis, and represented to him the ease with which he might annex not only Naxos, but all the Cyclades to the Persian empire. Then, stretching his views, he laid before Artaphernes a more tempting conquest, that of the large and wealthy island of Eubœa.

Artaphernes was led to favour the views of Aristagoras, and he promised to place two hundred ships and a Persian force at his disposal if he could gain the consent of Darius. This was no difficult matter. Widely spread as his empire was, a few small islands were still coveted, and the measure gained the monarch's warmest approbation.

Reader, behold in this event the boundless grasp of the human mind! Could it have been satisfied with worldly possessions, then surely Darius had been a happy man. Nothing mortal, however, can satisfy an immortal principle. Wealth, honour, and dominion, are not sufficient to render it happy. It may become satiated with them, but never satisfied. What avails, then, the mighty struggle that prevails in the world for such possessions? They are baits which allure men from that fountain where alone true bliss is to be found—the love of God. Hence arises the affectionate exhortation of the apostle John—"Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him," 1 John ii. 15. Let love to God, then, be esteemed our duty and our happiness. His favour during life, in the hour of death, in the day of judgment, and through eternity, will prove a source of never-failing pleasure. It was this that made our first parents happy in paradise, and this alone can render their descendants happy, for the immortal mind was formed for delighting in its Creator, whose name and whose nature is love. Nothing below the skies can satisfy a creature of immortality. It is our interest, then, to seek the par-

don of our sins through the atoning sacrifice of Christ, for this alone will give us a title to heaven. In vain should we seek it by our own merits, or by our own works; none but Christ can save us from condemnation, and that he is willing to save us is one of the great truths of the gospel. "This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners," 1 Tim. i. 15.

As soon as Artaphernes received a favourable answer from Susa, he equipped the promised armament, which he intrusted to the command of Megabates, a Persian of high quality. This armament first sailed to Miletus, in order to take on board the Ionian force which Aristagoras had raised. Megabates, wishing to lull the enemy into security, made toward the Hellespont, but he brought the fleet to anchor off the coast of Chios.

A circumstance occurred while the ships lay at anchor which led to the preservation of Naxos. Megabates, one day, going round to inspect the discipline maintained by the inferior officers, found a Myndian ship without either watch or commander. He immediately sent for the latter, and directed that he should be fastened to the side of the galley, with his head through one of the holes which were opened in the ancient vessels for oars. This Myndian officer was a friend of Aristagoras, and when the latter heard of his ignominy he applied for his release, and this being refused, he boldly set him at liberty. Megabates was indignant at this act of defiance to his authority, and Aristagoras, to wound him still more, disclaimed all obedience to him, and asserted his own right to the command. Thus defied, Megabates resolved to defeat the designs of the expedition. He sent a message to warn the Naxians of their danger, and the result was, they made such a vigorous resistance when attacked by the armament, that Aristagoras, after besieging them four months, was compelled to return to Miletus.

Aristagoras had relied on the reduction of Naxos as a means of fulfilling the promises made to Artaphernes. This was now out of his power, for all his treasures were exhausted in the war, and he was, moreover, a debtor to the Persian government for large sums supplied in order to enable him to carry on operations. His situation was desperate, and he resolved upon a desperate measure to retrieve his fallen fortunes—that of exciting his countrymen to insurrection. He was confirmed in this undertaking by a message received from Hystæus, who believed that a general commotion in Ionia might render his presence necessary, and afford him a chance of escaping from captivity.

At this time there were many in all the Ionian cities who were discontented with the form of government imposed upon them by the Persians, and ready at any time to shake off the yoke. Aristagoras, doubtless, knew this, and therefore he assembled some of the leading men to deliberate on the plan of action. He proposed, as a lure, the restoration of republican government, and offered himself to resign the tyranny. This met the views of all present, except Hecateus, the historian, who, though he loved liberty, thought that the colossal power of Persia was irresistible. His advice, however, was rejected,

and he then urged the necessity of making themselves masters of the sea, and pointed out a resource of which they might avail themselves for this purpose—namely, the treasures that had been accumulated in the temple at Branchidæ by the piety of successive generations and the liberality of Cræsus. These he exhorted them to seize, lest they should fall into the hands of Darius, and with them to raise a navy to withstand the Persian power. But this advice was rejected also, and the assembly resolved on war without any well-concerted plan of operations.

One measure, however, was deeply laid by this assembly, inasmuch as it drew the whole of the Ionian cities into the revolt. The Grecian forces which had returned from Naxos were still encamped at Myus, and it was resolved to arrest several leaders, tyrants of their respective states, and send them each to their own city. This was effected, and it was the signal of a general insurrection liberty was everywhere re-established in the revolted cities.

Having thus successfully kindled the torch of liberty, Aristagoras sailed to Greece to persuade some of the leading states to espouse his cause. He first resorted to Sparta, where Cleomenes was now king in the line of Eurysthenes, and Demaratus in the line of Procles. Aristagoras addressed himself to Cleomenes, as being more inclined to enterprise than his colleague. Drawing forth a brass plate containing a map of the world, according to the notions of the Ionian sages, he pointed out the situation of the provinces of the Persian empire that lay between the Ægean and Susa, extolled their wealth and fertility, and expatiated on the immense treasures collected in the capital. After this he drew a picture of the hard struggles Sparta had often endured with Messenia, Arcadia, and Argos, for a strip of barren land like Cydnria, and he compared these conquests with the regions of Asia, which a slight effort would be sufficient to subdue. Cleomenes took three days for consideration, and at the end of that time he asked how many days' journey lay between the sea and the palace of Susa. Aristagoras replied, a three months' march, and Cleomenes, astonished and alarmed, bade the stranger instantly quit Sparta.

Aristagoras, however, was not so easily repulsed, and he had, moreover, one engine of persuasion still in his power. Accordingly he repaired again to the house of Cleomenes in the character of a suppliant, and to offer him a high price for his assistance. As Cleomenes remained unmoved his offers gradually rose, until they had reached fifty talents. This was a tempting bait, and perhaps Cleomenes exhibited signs of yielding; but he was fortified against the temptation by the exhortation of his daughter Gorgo, a child eight or nine years old, who was then in the room. Perceiving that her father was tempted to something which he thought to be wrong, at this point she exclaimed "Go away, father, the stranger will do you harm." Cleomenes took the hint, and retired, and Aristagoras quitted Sparta.

The lesson which Gorgo taught her father might prove useful to mankind in all generations, and the circumstance may be offered as a commentary on the words of the apostle address-

ed to the youthful Timothy. "They that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the love of money is the root of all evil which while some coveted after, they have erred from the faith, and pierced themselves through with many sorrows," 1 Tim. vi. 9, 10. When, therefore, allured by the world, its riches, honours, and pleasures, the Christian would do well to retire from them lest they do him harm. And the reason he has for acting thus is much more cogent than that by which Cleomenes was actuated. His motive for retiring at his child's suggestion, was, lest he should be tempted to depart from Spartan simplicity of manners. The Christian should retire from temptation, lest he should be seduced to abjure his faith in Christ, by which alone he can hope to obtain an entrance into heaven.

Disappointed in his views at Sparta, Aristagoras directed his steps to Athens. At Athens he had better hopes of success, for the Athenians had already had some transactions with Artaphernes, which excited in their breasts a hostile feeling towards the Persian government. When threatened with invasion by Cleomenes, as before recorded, they had sent envoys to Sardis to propose an alliance with Persia, and to solicit his aid. Artaphernes was not adverse to their request, but he required, as a preliminary step, the usual tokens of submission, earth and water. The envoys unwarrantably complied with his demands, and when they returned they were censured, and the act repudiated. Artaphernes heard of this, and Hippias, who was now at Sigeum or Sardis, seeking his assistance to restore him to his rule at Athens, Artaphernes felt disposed to afford his aid. When, indeed, the Athenians sent to deprecate his interference, the satrap answered in terms of rebuke they should be safe if they would recall their tyrant. But this was a proposition to which they could not listen, and therefore the Athenians prepared to withstand the enmity and power of Persia.

This was a favourable state of affairs for the views of Aristagoras. When he arrived at Athens he found willing hearers in the assembly of the people, as he unfolded the prospects he had set before Cleomenes, and when he added to this a motive of piety, that of the religious obligation of protecting a distressed colony of Athens, it was decreed that a squadron of twenty ships should be sent to the assistance of the Ionians, under the command of the experienced Melanthus, B. c. 500.

Thus successful, Aristagoras hastened to Asia, and before the squadron had arrived he had taken a decisive step for provoking Darius. In his conquest of Thrace, the Persian monarch had transplanted the Pæonians into Asia; and to these Aristagoras now sent a message, offering to furnish them with the means of returning to their native land. The thought of home was a charm to the Pæonians too strong to be resisted, and they forthwith set out in a body with all their households, and having reached the sea-side, they found Ionian vessels which transported them to Thrace.

In the mean while the Athenian squadron, ac-

compared by five vessels from Eretria, arrived at Miletus. Having united their forces, they proceeded to Ephesus under the command of two Milesians. They landed at Coressus, in the Ephesian territory, and, being reinforced by a strong body of Ionians, they proceeded up the vale of the Cayster, and crossing over Mount Tmolus, rushed impetuously upon Sardis.

Artaphernes, being unprepared to meet the storm which had so suddenly burst upon him, threw himself into the citadel, which was capable of sustaining a long siege. The invaders, therefore, proceeded to pillage the town, and, in doing so, a soldier set fire to a house, the flames of which soon spread through the town*. This excited the rage of the inhabitants. They rushed in a body to the market-place on the Pactolus, and resolved with all the courage of despair to combat their invaders. The Athenians were alarmed at the appearance of their hostility, and conceiving that they might be attacked in the rear by an army sent to the relief of Artaphernes before they had overcome their difficulties, they resolved to retreat. As they retreated, they were overtaken by a force levied in the provinces on the news of the invasion, and a battle ensued in which they were defeated. Those who escaped fled the Ionians to their cities, the Athenians and Eretrians to Greece, B. C. 499.

As might be expected, when Darius heard of the destruction of Sardis, he was greatly enraged he resolved to punish first the Ionians, and then those obscure strangers who had dared to defy his power and aid his rebellious subjects. For this purpose, though he seems at the moment to have suspected the fidelity of Hystæus, he intrusted an army to his command, to suppress the Ionian revolt.

In the mean while, though abandoned by their allies, the Ionian fleet continued their hostility. It sailed to the north, and its presence induced Byzantium, and the other cities of the coasts between the Ægean and the Euxine, to rise against the Persians, and enabled them to assert their independence. At the same time Caria and Cyprus, seeing the determined spirit of the Ionians, shook off the Persian yoke.

But these fair prospects were soon overclouded. The generals who had driven the Ionians to their cities, and the Athenians to their ships, proceeded to reduce the maritime cities to obedience. Several towns on the Hellespont and Propontis submitted at the first assault, and Daurises, the Persian general who reduced these, having heard of the rebellion of Caria, marched thither to suppress it. A battle ensued, in which the Carians lost the day and ten thousand men, and, succours arriving from Miletus, they ventured upon another battle, in which they were defeated with yet greater slaughter. Still they maintained the unequal conflict, and even drew Daurises into an ambush, in which he was slain, but this only preserved them for a time, for they were subdued by his successors. The same fate awaited Cyprus. A Persian general crossed from Cilicia to that island in a Phœnician fleet,

and the Cyprians, betrayed by one of their native princes, were defeated.

At this point, Artaphernes and Otanes commenced the reduction of the cities of Ionia and Æolis. Those of Clazomenæ and Cuma soon fell under their power; and Aristagoras, alarmed at these disasters, began to think of fleeing. He assembled his friends, and proposed, that if the Persian arms should force them to abandon Miletus, they should take possession of Myrcinus. His views were adopted by the majority, and he then left Miletus in the hands of a citizen, and sailed to the banks of the Strymon, where he was soon after cut off with his army, as he lay before a Thracian city, by a sally of the besieged.

At length Hystæus arrived with his army and his commission to punish the Ionians for their revolt. But such was not his intention. This was soon perceived by Artaphernes; and he one day observed to him, that Aristagoras had drawn the sandal on, but that it was of his stitching. This observation drove him prematurely into the measure he had long contemplated. He secretly fled to Chios, where he persuaded the Chians that Darius designed transplanting the Ionians to Phœnicia, and bestowing their lands on the Phœnicians. He forged this story in order to gain their confidence, and having done this he persuaded them to assist him in recovering Miletus. The attempt was made under cover of the night, but he was repulsed and wounded, when he was again compelled, by the Chians, to take refuge in flight. He fled to Lesbos, whence, having collected a squadron of eight triremes, he sailed to Byzantium, where he seized the merchant vessels of all the Ionian cities which would not acknowledge his authority.

While Hystæus remained at Byzantium, the Persian generals resolved to capture Miletus, the fall of which would crush the hopes and insure the destruction of the other Ionian cities. It was determined by them to besiege Miletus by sea and land, and the scattered divisions of the army were therefore collected, and a large fleet equipped in the harbours of Phœnicia, Egypt, Cilicia, and Cyprus, to blockade it from the sea. This led to a great naval engagement. In a congress at the Panionium it was agreed that the whole strength of the Ionian confederacy should be exerted to drive the enemy from the Ægean, and the fleet was appointed to assemble at Ladé, which was then a small island, but which, by the deposits of the Mæander, has now become part of the plain which separates Miletus from the sea. Here, accordingly, the naval force of the confederates, which amounted to 353 triremes, met, and they were encountered by the hostile fleet, which numbered 600 triremes. But, notwithstanding the inferiority of their numbers, they might have been successful, had not treachery been rife among them. In the beginning of the action most of the Samians quitted their post, and their example was followed by the Lesbians, and, as the alarm spread, by the greater part of the fleet. The Chians alone, with a few other ships, remained firm amid the general consternation, but their skill and valour availed little, they were overpowered

* The houses of Sardis were chiefly of wicker-work, and those which were built of bricks were thatched with reeds.

by numbers, and finally compelled to take refuge in flight.

The defeat of Ladé was followed by the reduction of Miletus. It was stormed by the Persians, and those of the citizens who escaped the sword were carried into captivity with their families. They were transplanted to the head of the Persian gulf, and settled in a town called Ampe, in the marshes near the mouth of the Tigris. The city became a Persian colony, and a part of its territory was annexed to that of Pedasa. This occurred B. C. 494, and the next year the other cities on the coast of Ionia experienced a similar fate. The islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, also, were swept of their inhabitants, and the subjugation of Ionia was thereby rendered complete. As for Hytastus, he retired to Lesbos, but he was soon after taken by the Persians in Asia Minor, whither he had gone on a marauding excursion, and carried to Sardis, where, by the order of Artaphernes, he was crucified.

After the reduction of the islands, the Persian fleet continued its victorious career towards the Hellespont. The cities north of the Ægean were successively overpowered and reduced to ashes. The Byzantians and Chalcidians did not wait for the attack of the enemy, but left their towns to found a new one called Messembria, on the western coast of the Euxine. Even Miltiades, who had long governed in the Chersonesus, did not consider himself any longer safe. Conceiving that the part he had taken in the Scythian expedition would now be visited upon him, while the Persian fleet was lying off Tenedos, he filled five galleys with treasures, and set sail for Athens. He narrowly escaped the enemy, with four of his ships, and the fifth, in which his eldest son commanded, was taken, and sent as a welcome prize to Darius, by whom he was generously treated. Instead of a prison or death, the son of the treacherous Miltiades received a fair estate and a Persian wife, which proves that Darius was no merciless tyrant. Miltiades himself escaped to Athens, where he became a citizen, as he was before he was sent by Pisistratus to take possession of his uncle's inheritance in the Chersonesus.

As soon as the revolt was quelled, Artaphernes set about the regulation of the subdued country. In the true Roman sense of the word, he reduced it to the form of a province. Every spark of independence was extinguished. He forbade the people any longer to decide their quarrels by the sword, and compelled their deputies, whom he had summoned to Sardis, to bind themselves by treaties to submit all their differences to arbitration. After this, he caused a survey to be taken of their territories, and apportioned the tribute according to the extent of the districts, the whole amount of which, however, was not larger than that levied before the revolt.

Meanwhile, Darius was not unmindful of the part which Greece had taken. As soon as he discovered that the success of his arms was certain in quelling the insurrection, he sent a mighty army under Mardonius to wreak his vengeance upon Athens and Eretria, and, at the same time, to spread the terror of his name in

Europe. Mardonius was appointed to this command B. C. 494, and in the next year he set out on his expedition. Pursuant to orders, Mardonius marched through Thrace into Macedonia, ordering his fleet to reduce Thasus, and then to coast along the shore, that they might act in concert. The Thasians yielded to the Persians without a struggle, but the fleet was soon after checked in its progress by a violent storm, which overtook it off mount Athos, and which is said to have destroyed 300 vessels and 20,000 men. Mardonius himself was not much more successful. The Macedonians submitted; but, encamping in a place not sufficiently secure, the Bryges, probably an independent tribe of Thracian blood, attacked him under cover of the night, slew many of his troops, and wounded him. He punished this aggression, but his forces were so weakened by these disasters that he deemed it prudent to return to Asia.

Darius does not appear to have been satisfied with the rigorous line of policy which Artaphernes was pursuing toward the Greek cities, for, the year after the close of the war, Mardonius, who had not fallen into disgrace by his misfortunes, was sent to replace him in the government. Mardonius adopted an expedient better fitted to allay the discontents of the Ionians and to keep them in subjection. One of his first proceedings after his arrival at Sardis was to depose the tyrants placed there by his predecessor, and to set up a democratical constitution, which was in strict accordance with the popular feeling. This conduct indicates more knowledge of mankind than had ever been exhibited before by any Persian ruler. The Persian government, in truth, sought to profit by the lesson taught by the revolt.

While these events were transpiring in the Asiatic Greek cities, commotions prevailed in Greece itself. Darius had not been disheartened by the disasters that had befallen Mardonius in his campaign, and during the next year he renewed his preparations for the invasion of Greece. As a preliminary step, he sent heralds to the Greek cities, and, among the rest, to those which had incurred his anger, to demand earth and water. Many cities on the continent complied with this demand, and it was rejected by none of the islands. Those, however, who were sent to Athens and Sparta were put to death with cruel mockery. Nor did the enmity which these states bore the Persians stop here. Concerning that the Æginetans had complied with the demand of Darius from the malice they bore against Athens, the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta, and accused Ægina of having betrayed the cause of Greece. Without waiting for a formal commission, Cleomenes immediately prepared to proceed to Ægina, to arrest some of the principal citizens, and he would have carried this into effect, had not Demaratus, his colleague, secretly encouraged the Æginetans to resist the measure, as one not sanctioned by any legitimate authority. They did resist, and Cleomenes was compelled to retire from Ægina disgraced.

It has been stated, in a previous chapter, that Demaratus had thwarted the designs of Cleomenes against Athens. This offence had never been

forgotten, and being thus aggravated, Cleomenes turned his thoughts upon revenge. The step he took to effect this was, to raise a dispute concerning the title of Demaratus. His mother, by a contract permitted by the Spartan law of marriage, had been transferred, by her first husband, to Ariston, his father. The birth of Demaratus was premature, and Ariston himself had expressed disbelief of his legitimacy. This, however, he afterwards suppressed, and Demaratus was permitted to rule. But the doubt Ariston had expressed was never wholly effaced from the minds of the Spartans, and Cleomenes now instigated Leotychides, the next in succession of the same house, to avail himself of these grounds, and urge his claim to the throne accordingly the cause was tried, and the words of Ariston were insisted on as an evidence of the illegitimacy of Demaratus. The matter was gravely discussed in the assembly, and they came to the conclusion that they could not decide so grave a question on such evidence. At the same time, they referred it, on the suggestion of Cleomenes, to the Delphic oracle, which led, as he expected, to the overthrow of Demaratus. The priestess was gained over to his cause, and she declared, in her answer, that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston. Accordingly Leotychides triumphed, and Demaratus retired to Asia, where he was welcomed, and presented with lands and revenues of cities by Darius.

Having thus rid himself of his rival, Cleomenes, accompanied by Leotychides, passed over to Ægina, to obtain satisfaction for the affront he had there received. Alarmed at the consequences of refusal, the Æginetans surrendered ten of their principal citizens into their hands, and they deposited these hostages with the Athenians. But the wise were soon after taken in their own craftiness the sacrilegious fraud was detected, the priestess lost her office, and Cleomenes was compelled to seek refuge in flight. He fled to Thessaly, but, in a short time, he returned to Peloponnesus, and took up his residence in Arcadia, where he began to draw the Arcadians into a confederacy against his country. This measure led to his restoration. Alarmed at it, the Spartans invited him back, with promises of impunity, but he had not been long reinstated before his violent humour broke out into madness, and he died miserably by his own hand. Nor did Leotychides carry with him his ill-gotten dignity to the grave. Some years after, as will be seen, he was convicted of taking bribes from the enemy in an expedition which he made into Thessaly. His house was razed to the ground, and he was exiled to Tegea, where he died—a striking comment upon the words of Solomon, "The house of the wicked shall be overthrown," Prov. xiv. 11.

On the death of Cleomenes, the Æginetans sent to demand the restoration of their citizens. Convinced of the injustice of their retention, the Spartans were willing to comply with this demand; but the Athenians, still actuated by implacable hatred to them, refused to restore the deposit. Thus galled to action, the Æginetans retaliated by the capture of the Athenian sacred vessel, in which several men, of the first rank,

were embarked to attend the festival of Apollo at Delos.

At this time Ægina, like all other Grecian states, had its factions. The government was an oligarchy, and Nicodromus, who had formed a plan for its overthrow, conceived that this was a favourable opportunity to put it in execution, he therefore connected his interest with Athens, and succours were promised him by that state, to further his enterprise. Accordingly, on an appointed day, Nicodromus rose, and seized the citadel, but the Athenian succours did not arrive in time, and he, with 700 of his adherents, fell into the hands of his adversaries, by whom they were put to death. In a few days, the Athenians, who had been prevented from fulfilling their engagements by the want of a fleet able to cope with that of Ægina, and had therefore been compelled to send to Corinth to borrow ships—appeared off the coast. They came too late, but they defeated the Æginetans in a sea-fight, and were still carrying on the war, with varying fortune, while the second Persian armament was advancing towards Greece, B. C. 490.

This new force was collected in Cilicia, and placed under the command of Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, son of the satrap of Lydia. They sailed from the Cilician coast in 600 triremes, and came first to Samos, whence they crossed directly to the Cyclades. Naxos was the principal object of their attack, and that city was soon taken. Alarmed at the appearance of the large armament, the inhabitants abandoned their walls, and took refuge in the mountains. Those, however, who had not time to escape fell into the hands of the Persians, and their city and their temples were committed to the flames. From Naxos the Persians proceeded to the neighbouring islands, all of which submitted, and resigned the children of their principal families as hostages. The island of Delos alone escaped, and that was screened by the fame of its sanctuary. The Delians, whose whole lives were spent in a round of sacrifices, fled to Tenos, and left their rich temple, with its treasures, to the protection of its tutelary gods. Now, the Persian generals had heard that Delos was the *birth-place* of two deities, who corresponded to the sun and moon, which held the foremost rank in their own religious system. The comparison was probably suggested to them by some Greek, who wished to save the temple, and it had that effect. When the Persian general, Datis, heard that the inhabitants had fled, he sent a herald to the fugitives, to remonstrate with them on their groundless alarm, and to assure them that he held their persons no less sacred than their temple. He would not even suffer his ships to touch the sacred shore, but kept them at the island of Rhenea, while he passed onward to Delos, and burned a pile of incense on their altar. So powerful were the effects which superstitious association had upon the minds of this heathen.

From the Cyclades the Persian fleet held on its course to Eubœa, to accomplish one of the two great objects of the expedition. The first town before which it appeared was Carystus, which made an unavailing resistance. The waste of their lands, and siege laid to their towns, soon compelled the inhabitants to comply with the

Persian general's demands. Earth and water were presented to the lord of Asia.

While the Persian fleet was before Carystus, the Eretrians, whose punishment was decreed by Darius, sent to Athens for succour. The Athenians so far complied with their request, as to direct that the four thousand colonists lately sent from Athens into Eubœa should assist in their defence. This aid might have been important, had the Eretrians been firm in council and prepared for a siege. But such was not the case. One party, honest, but yet timid, proposed to retire to the mountains, and another to purchase the favour of the Persians by submission. The Athenian colonists, on their arrival, discovered this state of affairs; and, seeing that there was danger of being deserted or sacrificed by their allies, they left them to their fate, and crossed over to Attica. The event proved the prudence of their retreat. Upon the fall of Carystus, the Persians laid siege to Eretria, and, after an almost continual engagement of six days, their strength and numbers, combined with treachery, prevailed. On the seventh day, the gates were treacherously thrown open, and Eretria was taken. That its fate might strike terror into the minds of the Athenians, the city, with its temples, was plundered, burned, and levelled with the ground.

Hitherto, every thing had been prosperous. The delightful islands of the Cyclades, and Carystus and Eretria, were compelled to own the Persian sway. But a more difficult task remained to be accomplished. In a few days the Persian generals spread their proud sails, and steered to the coast of Attica. Guided by Hippas, the expelled tyrant of Athens, the fleet came to anchor in the Bay of Marathon, where it was sheltered from the northern gales by a promontory shooting out from the foot of Mount Parnes. The army landed in the plain, where a level tract, five miles in length and two in breadth, afforded a favourable situation for the movements of cavalry. In this position the Persian generals encamped, hoping that an opportunity might offer itself of fighting a decisive battle on that spot.

The hope of the Persian generals was well founded, but the issue of the battle which ensued was contrary to their expectations. As soon as the Athenians discovered the fate of Eretria, measures were concerted for the general security. They armed not only all their citizens who could render any service, but such of their slaves as were willing to earn the price of their liberty by the risk of their lives. At the same time, they despatched a messenger named Phidippides, who was noted for the extraordinary speed with which he could perform long journeys, to request instant succour from Sparta. Phidippides reached Sparta the day after he had left Athens*. As soon as he arrived, he related the fall of Eretria, and the danger of Athens. The danger was common, and therefore the Spartans did not refuse their assistance; but superstition prevented them from supplying instant aid. The moon wanted five days of the full, and

their laws and their religion, they said, forbade them to march before that period, at least in the month then passing, which was probably that of the great Carnean festival. Accordingly, the messenger was dismissed with promises of distant succour. But, as superstition had prevented him from obtaining aid, so Phidippides resolved to use it as an instrument to encourage the Athenians. He told them, that as he was crossing the top of the mountains that separate Argolis from Arcadia, the god Pan called him by name, and bade him cheer the Athenians with a gracious reproach for having neglected the deity who had befriended them in days gone by, and would aid them yet again! This appears greatly to have encouraged the Athenians, for afterward they repaid the woodland god, by dedicating to him a natural grotto in the Cecropian rock, and by honouring him with a yearly sacrifice and a torch race. But the sylvan god was not deemed a sufficient protector by the Athenians on this occasion. The promise of his aid was grateful and pleasing, but they likewise invoked the protection of Artemis against the arrows of the barbarians, and that by an extraordinary vow. They promised the fancied invisible, that for every slain enemy a she-goat should be led in solemn procession every year to her altar, at Agræ, on the banks of the Ilissus.

Thus strengthened by superstition, the Athenian army crossed the ridge which divides the plain of Marathon from the midland of Attica, and posted itself on the eastern skirts of the hills at the head of the valley. The army was commanded, according to the constitution of Cleisthenes, by ten generals. At the head of these generals was the polemarch, or chief governor, Callimachus, whose authority and influence could alone secure unanimity among them. This is discovered in the account of their deliberations before the battle. Opinions were equally divided between them, as to whether they should give battle to the Persians, or vigorously prepare for a siege. Those who were adverse to a conflict urged, that it was at least prudent to wait for the Spartan reinforcement—to accustom the troops to the sight of an enemy so much dreaded—and that a thousand fortunate accidents might occur in a short period to rid them of this formidable host. Miltiades, however—the late ruler of the Chersonesus, who had raised himself to the office of general in Athens, despite much opposition—strongly opposed these views. Addressing the polemarch, who had the casting vote, he observed,—"It depends upon you either to reduce Athens to slavery, or establish her freedom, and leave an eternal memory of yourself among men, more glorious than even Harmodius and Aristogiton. For never before were the Athenians in such danger, and if, yielding to the Persians, they are delivered into the power of Hippas, what will their sufferings be? But if they conquer, Athens will become the first city in Greece. Besides, should they, by your decision, be debarred from engaging the enemy, faction will divide the citizens, and some will sell the rest to the Persians, whereas, if we engage before any corrupt disposition prevails, the gods only dispensing their favours, we shall conquer." Callimachus acknowledged the force of these argu-

* The distance between Athens and Sparta was 1,140 stadia, which, allowing eight to a mile, would be about 143 miles.

ments, and gave his decision in favour of battle.

The ten generals of the Athenian army took the command successively, each for a day. Those whose views coincided with the advice of Miltiades, were willing to resign their turns to him; but he waited till his own turn came, that he might assume the command in his own right. On that day, he drew up his little army in order of battle.

The forces of the Persians stretched across the broadest part of the plain of Marathon. The two nations on which the generals placed most reliance, were the Persians themselves and the warlike Sacians. These, therefore, were placed in the centre, and here their chief strength lay. This was unfavourable to the attack of Miltiades, for, as his army was small, he was compelled to weaken his centre, that he might so strengthen his wings as to make a simultaneous attack upon the whole front of the Persian army. Still, nothing daunted, they pressed onward over the intervening space between the armies, which was about a mile, with steady resolution. As they approached, the enemy eyed them with wonder and scorn, deeming them men devoted to destruction, and before they thought themselves of using their missiles with effect, they found themselves engaged in close combat with their sturdy opponents. It is, perhaps, to this circumstance that the event of the battle may be attributed, for Grecian weapons and armour gave the soldier a decided advantage in close combat. Notwithstanding, the Persians and Sacians sustained the shock, and repulsed and pursued the centre of the Athenian forces to the hills. In each wing, however, the impetuous onset of the Athenians overpowered those of the Persian contingents, and drove them toward the shore and the adjoining morasses, and Miltiades, drawing them off from the pursuit, and closing them, led them to meet the Persians and Sacians as they returned from the pursuit of the Athenian centre. The defeat of this body followed, and the only effort of the Persian army now was to reach their ships. Some succeeded in this, but many perished in the marshes, and many others on the shore, as they were thronging to get on board. The victors even took seven ships, and Cynægirus, a brother of the poet Æschylus, obtained great honour by clinging to one till his hand was cut off with a hatchet. Callimachus, and Stasilaus, also, were left dead on the field.

At length the Persian fleet steered from the harbour of Marathon. But the invaders left the shores of Greece reluctantly, and exhibited a desire to recover their lost honours. Instead of shaping their course eastward, they steered towards Sunium, with the apparent intention of proceeding to the southern coast of Attica. Their designs, however, were foiled by the promptness of the victorious army, which, suspecting their purpose, marched to Athens, and arrived there before the Persians appeared off the coast. Perceiving, therefore, that their movement had failed of its object, the Persians shortly after spread their sails for Asia, and thus ended their invasion.

It is no wonder that such a victory should have

supplied a theme for many tuneful and eloquent lips, and that it should have given rise to many marvellous stories, which have usually been received as history. The Persian forces, at the lowest computation, could not have amounted to less than 120,000 men, while the Athenians did not reckon more than the twelfth part of that number. Besides, the very sight of the Median garb, according to Aristagoras, and as their previous history shows, was yet terrible to the European Greeks. It required, therefore, no common courage to meet such foes; and hence, when they had conquered them, supernatural events were recorded as occurring, both during and after the battle. These legends are here passed over, out it may be mentioned, that the block of marble which Datis brought for a trophy, was wrought into a statue of Nemesis, the goddess of vengeance. It is possible, also, looking at the greatness of the victory, and the consequent excess of joy it would occasion, that a soldier who was despatched from the army to convey the welcome tidings to the capital, fell down dead, as these words passed from his lips (*Chairete, chavomni*—"Rejoice, we rejoice," i. e. "Rejoice with the victors.") It seems certain, moreover, that the field of Marathon was made holy ground. While the slain Persians were committed to obscure graves, the bones of the Athenians who had fallen in defence of their country were gathered together under a stately sepulchre adorned with ten pillars, on which their names were inscribed according to their tribes. The Plateans and the slaves were buried under another barrow there, and when Miltiades died, his deserts were acknowledged by a separate tomb on the same ground.

It is related that a body of two thousand Spartans arrived at Athens the day after the battle. They had marched with the speed of men who wished to repair a delay which could not be justified, but they came only to congratulate the victors. They desired to see the field and the renowned barbarians, who, for the first time, had been vanquished in Greece. Accordingly they resorted to Marathon, reviewed the carnage, extolled the Athenians for their bravery, and then returned to Sparta.

The effect which the victory had upon the Athenians, will be seen in their future history. By it they were taught to know their own strength, and their character was fixed by the consciousness it awakened. And its importance was not suffered to pass by as a dream. It lived in the monuments, trophies, votive offerings, pictures, sculptures, songs, and panegyric harangues, that celebrated the victory. All these were a constant incitement to action and enterprise, by reminding them of Marathon! They were thus reminded of great men who had lived among them, and they were ever seeking to emulate their deeds. But the evil was, that the Athenians were oftentimes led by a sense of their superiority to deeds of valour at the expense of justice. The sword of right was exchanged for the sword of might, so fond is man, in all ages and nations, of displaying power over his fellow man.*

* The details of these events will be found more fully narrated in the history of the Persians.

CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THAT
OF SALAMIS

B. C. 490—480

THE very first act of the state of Athens, after the battle of Marathon, proves the truth of the closing remarks of the preceding chapter, for it was one of conquest.

It has been seen that the islands of the Ægean readily submitted, from fear, to give Darius earth and water. Some, under the same feeling as Paros, had even sided his views by sending triremes with the armament under Datis. Allowances might have been made for this, since acts committed under compulsion should not be construed into offences. But this was not taken into account by the Athenians. At the suggestion of Miltiades, they raised a fleet of seventy ships, in order to punish them for their supposed delinquencies.

This fleet was placed under the command of Miltiades, and he was directed to reduce these islands to obedience, or, at least, to bring them under the influence of the Athenian government. Most of them appear to have submitted, for he ravaged their fields without opposition. At length he passed on to Paros, to which city he regularly laid siege. At this time Paros was one of the most flourishing of the Cyclades, which induced Miltiades to demand a heavy penalty. This was refused, and the Parians kept strengthening their walls, and baffled all his attacks, till, despairing of success, and having received a warning as he attempted to penetrate into a sacred inclosure, he was compelled to return to Athens.

The return of Miltiades to Athens without having accomplished his commission, proved the cause of his overthrow. Before the battle of Marathon he had many enemies, and his success on that eventful day seems rather to have increased than diminished their enmity. Envy was joined to malice, and the conqueror of Marathon fell before their united power. No sooner had he returned to Athens, than his foes joined in a cabal against him. Taking advantage of the irritation produced in the public mind by the failure of the enterprise, Xanthippus, son of Ariphron, chief of the rival house of the Alcmeonids, brought a capital charge against him for having betrayed the Athenian interest. On the day that he was to appear to answer this charge, a gangrene had begun in his injured limb, and he was brought into the court on a couch. He was not able to plead his own cause, but neither the sight of his sufferings, nor the eloquent appeal of his brother Tisagoras, had any effect upon the people. They condemned him to die; but, on the ground of his services at Marathon and Lemnos, the capital penalty was commuted for a fine of fifty talents. But this was little more lenient, for as he was unable to raise this sum immediately, he was cast into prison, where he died. The fine was exacted from his family, and it was paid by his son Cimon.

The ingratitude of the Athenians towards Miltiades forms a prominent feature in their poli-

tical character, and exhibits likewise their moral degradation. That system of religion which they professed must, indeed, have been gross and grovelling not to have lifted the moral standard of their dealings towards such a patriot as Miltiades higher than this. For to persecute our benefactor is a crime at which the heart almost naturally revolts. The savage of the wilds of Africa would shudder to commit such a deed. He, dwelling in the night of ignorance as he does, nevertheless partakes somewhat of that feeling which the poet Milton thus aptly expresses —

“A grateful mind,
By owing, owes not, but still pays,
At once indebted and discharged.”

Thus, by the law of nature, even men are taught the principles of gratitude, and that to be ungrateful is almost to become a monster. But it becomes us, as professed Christians, not to measure this conduct of the Athenians by the practice of barbarians, and by the laws of nature, but by the practice of those, who not only are taught the duties of Christianity, but who carry them out in their lives and conduct. They not only love those who love them, and who are their benefactors, but even their enemies and persecutors such being the sublime morality which the gospel teaches, and such the example which our Lord and Saviour exhibited on the cross when giving up his life for his enemies, and praying for his murderers.

The Persian armament had now arrived in Asia. Its generals carried with them the captive Eretrians, and the tidings of defeat at Marathon. Darius was merciful to the Eretrians, for he planted them in a part of his own domain, the Cissian village of Ardericca, but his wrath knew no bounds against the Athenians, and he resolved fully to exert his power for their destruction. Accordingly, every nation that owned his sway was called on to contribute to the new armament—to send the flower of its warriors, and an extraordinary supply of ships, horses, provisions, and stores. During three years all Asia was alive in preparing for the work of vengeance, in the fourth Darius was diverted from it by a quarrel in his own family, and by an insurrection in Egypt, and in the fifth he died, B. C. 485.

Darius left his throne to Xerxes, and with it this twofold work of vengeance—to punish Egypt and Greece. The former object was accomplished in the second year of his reign; the latter was for some time postponed. As ambition was not naturally prominent in the character of Xerxes, it seems probable that this expedition might have been foregone, had not the Pisistratids used their art to inflame that evil passion, in the hope that they might, by his means, recover their lost power in Athens. These had long been exiles in Asia; and in their train was a man named Onomacritus, who was one of the first among the Greeks to practise the art of forging prophecies and oracles. While the Pisistratids ruled in Athens he had been detected in fabricating verses, which he had interpolated in a work ascribed to Mæseus, a poet said to have lived many generations anterior to the Homeric age; for which cause he was banished by his

previous patron, Hipparchus. The exiles, however, conceived that they might make use of his talents, and therefore had taken him into their service. To this end they recommended him to Xerxes as a man possessed of prophetic knowledge, and the young king listened with such eagerness to the predictions of Onomacritus, that he was at length inflamed with a desire of rivalling his predecessors, and of extending his dominions to the ends of the earth.

Contrary to the advice of the sage Artabanus, his uncle, Xerxes gave commands that the vast preparations already made should be continued with redoubled activity—that an armament should be raised worthy the presence of a king. For four years longer all Asia was kept in restless turmoil. Such a period was not required for raising the army, but for providing for its sustenance. Lest it should perish, it was necessary that magazines should be formed along the whole line of march, as far as the confines of Greece. Two great works were also begun, in order to exhibit to the world the power and majesty of Xerxes. He might easily have transported his troops over the Hellespont in ships, but it was deemed better suited to his dignity, that he, who was about to unite both continents under his dominion, should join them by a bridge laid across the channel, the erection of which was entrusted to the skill of Phœnicians and Egyptians. The other work alluded to was, cutting a canal behind Mount Athos, the coast of which had become terrible to the Persians from the destruction of the fleet of Mardonius at that place. The simplest mode of avoiding this cape would have been to draw their ships over the narrow, low neck, connecting the mountain with the main land, but Xerxes preferred leaving a monument of his greatness and enterprise, by causing the canal to be cut through the isthmus, which was a distance of about a mile and a half. When these preparations were drawing to a close, Xerxes set out for Sardis, where he intended to winter, and to receive the reinforcements ordered to repair thither, B.C. 481.

While Xerxes was sojourning at Sardis the bridge was completed, though it was soon after broke to pieces by a violent storm. It is said that the monarch was so enraged at this accident that he caused the architects to be put to death, but perhaps this story may have been an addition to the extravagant fables that gained credit among the Greeks on the subject of his bridging the "sacred Hellespont." Be this as it may, it seems certain that the construction of two new bridges was committed to other engineers—the one for the army, and the other for the beasts of burden and the baggage. These were made to stretch from the neighbourhood of Abydos to a projecting point in the opposite shore of the Chersonesus, resting each on a row of ships, which were stayed against the strong current that rushed against them from the north by anchors, and by cables fastened to both sides of the channel. These being completed, early in the spring the armament was set in motion, B.C. 480.

The whole length of these bridges was not far short of a mile, and seven days and nights were occupied, unremittingly, in passing them. The

march was then continued through the Chersonesus, to the great plain of Doriscus, near the mouth of the Hebrus, where the land and sea forces met, and where the monarch reviewed his forces. Drawn up according to their natural divisions, Xerxes rode in his chariot along the ranks, while the royal scribes recorded the names, and probably the equipments, of the different races.

Heeren conjectures that this document was the original source from which Herodotus drew his description of the dress and weapons of the different nations. According to this description, all the nations between the Tigris and the Indus were equipped, with few variations, after the manner of their old masters, the Medes. The bow was the principal weapon, but to it was commonly added a spear and a short sword, and the warlike Sœcians used the hatchet. Their defensive armour was more diversified. Most of them were without shields, and the tunic, scaly breast-plate, and loose trowsers of the Persians, formed a striking contrast to the cotton vest of the Indians, the shaggy skins worn by some mountain hordes, the Arabian plaid, and the bright dyes of the Sarangan garb. A cap or turban, in general, supplied the place of the helmet to all these nations. The Assyrians, or Chaldeans, were conspicuous for their brass helmets, linen corslets, wooden clubs, tipped with steel, and the shield, spear, and dagger. To these, with the exception of the club, for which the bow was substituted, the weapons of the barbarians of western Asia were very similar. But among the most prominent figures in the motley host were the negroes of Nubia. These exhibited bodies painted half white and half vermilion, and partly covered with skins of lions or leopards, while they held in their hands, as instruments of death, bows four cubits long, small arrows, in which a sharp stone supplied the place of steel, spears pointed with the horn of the antelope, and knotty clubs. Some eastern Ethiopians, a dark, but straight-haired people, resembled their Nubian neighbours in their armour, except that for a helmet they wore the skin of a horse's head, with the ears erect, and the mane flowing down their backs.

According to Herodotus, all these nations were able to furnish cavalry, but only a part of them were required thus to aid Xerxes. Among these was a nomade people, of the Persian race, the Sagartians, who were expert in the use of the instrument now known under the name of the lasso. The mass of the cavalry was swelled by the dromedaries of the Arabians, and by chariots from the interior of Africa and the borders of India, in which the Indians yoked both horses and wild asses. All these divisions, both of horse and foot, were commanded by Persian officers.

Having reviewed his land forces, Xerxes proceeded to inspect his fleet, which consisted of one thousand two hundred and seven ships of war, and each of which, besides the native crews, was manned with thirty marines, Persians, Medes, or Sœcians. The total number of the armed part of the multitude that followed Xerxes over the Hellespont, according to the result of his inspection, as registered by his

scribes, was one million seven hundred thousand foot, and eighty thousand horse. As they proceeded southward, however, both the army and the fleet received an addition from the inland tribes, from the sea-ports of Thrace, from Macedonia, and from the neighbouring islands. These Herodotus computes at three hundred thousand infantry, and one hundred and twenty triremes, and although there does not seem sufficient ground for supposing that the estimates are greatly exaggerated, yet, when their accompaniments are taken into account—women, eunuchs, cattle, and dogs—belief may well be staggered, since it seems impossible that provisions could be collected wherewith to feed so large a multitude. Even Herodotus himself, after making an attempt at calculating what would be required for each day's consumption, gave it up as a problem too difficult for solution. That any man in his senses could hope to conquer with such an unwieldy host seems incredible, for its real strength was lost among the undisciplined herds which accompanied it. These could only impede its movements, and consume its stores. But this does not appear to have been reflected upon by Xerxes, or even to have been suggested to him by any of his followers.

The army of Xerxes pursued its march from Doriscus, along the coast, accompanied by the fleet, through a region already subdued in the expeditions of Megabazus and Mardonius. As it advanced, it still swelled its numbers by taking reinforcements from the Thracian hordes. And it seems to have experienced no scarcity of provisions. The country, the fleet, and the magazines formed in the towns on the coast, together, furnished abundant supplies. Xerxes, moreover, had given orders that the principal cities in the line of march should prepare for his reception, and each celebrated his arrival with a banquet. A single meal, it is said, cost the Thasians four hundred talents, and a citizen of Abdera advised his townsmen to offer thanksgiving to the gods, that Xerxes was used to make only one meal in the day. The principal inconvenience that the armament felt, seems to have arisen from scarcity of water. Herodotus mentions several rivers which did not yield sufficient supply, and when it is recollected that many of the rivers of Greece are mere mountain rivulets, his assertion does not exceed the bounds of belief.

The army and fleet of Xerxes proceeded in concert as far as Acanthus. At this place he stopped to view the canal by which the fleet was saved from the danger of doubling Mount Athos. After this, the army left the coast to strike across the Chalcidian peninsula to Thermæ. Here, after the fleet had coasted the intervening bays, and strengthened itself with ships from the Chalcidian ports, the two forces again met, and staid some time.

Although Greece could not be perfectly tranquil while these mighty preparations were being made for its invasion, yet the confidence produced by the triumph at Marathon, the uncertainty of the enemy's invasion, and the revolt of Egypt, retarded the counsels of the different states, and prevented them from making active preparations for defence. At length, however,

as the storm approached nearer, and they saw that it would certainly burst over their heads, the leading states felt the necessity of making preparations for their defence from its fury. But the strength of Greece lay in the union of her sons, and this union was wanting. The views of the different states varied in respect to the threatened invasion, as will be seen in the progress of the history, almost as much as their natural situations. An ardent love of freedom, and a fixed aversion to foreign dominion, were the characteristics of the great body of the people, but passion, interest, and political relations, prevented unanimity of sentiment as to the best means of repelling the assailant.

When the Thessalian house of the Aleuads urged Xerxes to undertake the expedition, they had led him to believe that they expressed the wishes of the whole people of Thessaly. This proved to be false, for, as Xerxes was about to cross into Europe, they sent to the congress of the Greek states assembled at the isthmus, to seek assistance in defending their passes against invasion. While they were yet uncertain whether they should receive this aid, Xerxes sent from Sardis to demand of all Greece earth and water, except Athens and Sparta. In this dilemma, the Thessalians acceded to his demands, and their example was followed by all the tribes seated between them and the chain of Cæta. The Locrians, who afterwards retracted, the Phocians, from their hatred of the Thessalians, who had previously invaded them, the mountaineers of Ionia, from their conviction of weakness, and the Thebans, from their hatred of Athens, submitted to Xerxes. On the other hand, the Thebians and Platæans were united with Attica, from their hatred of Thebes. Thus, in the states north of the isthmus, selfish views and angry passions, in most instances, overcame all concern for the cause of liberty.

Similar causes prevented the peninsula, also, from exerting its whole strength on this momentous occasion. Most of the Peloponnesian states were, indeed, either allies of Sparta or subject to her influence, but there were two which kept aloof from the struggle, from a feeling of hatred to her power, those two were Argos and Achæa. The Argives were only just beginning to recover from a blow with which Sparta had almost crushed them some years before, in the reign of Cleomenes; and the hitherto noble Achæans had not yet forgotten or forgiven the invasion by which they had been expelled from their original seats, now occupied by the Spartans. Hence it was, that they earnestly desired the overthrow of Sparta, and submitted to the Persian monarch. The Argives offered to forego their hatred, if Sparta would acknowledge the pre-eminent dignity of Argos, give them an equal share in the command, and conclude a truce with them for thirty years; but this could not be, in the whole, conceded; and though the Spartans would have granted a truce, and offered to give the Argive king an equal voice with each of their own, the proposal was rejected, negotiation was broken off, and Argos remained a passive spectator of the struggle.

Such a state of affairs must have been disheartening to those who were yet willing to

stake everything for the cause of liberty. Notwithstanding, the two principal states, Athens and Sparta, prepared for the last extremity, calmly availed themselves of all the means at their command to repel their formidable foe.

At this time, these states numbered many eminent citizens. At Sparta, the wild Cleomenes had been succeeded by his brother Leonidas, in himself a host. At Athens, the great Themistocles had risen up in the place of Miltiades. Formerly, he had for a rival Aristides, "who knew no cause but that of justice, and the common weal, no party, but its friends." Aristides, however, was removed from Athens, from sheer hatred of his virtues. This conduct being a silent reproof to his fellow citizens at large, without having incurred accusation or reproach, and without being suspected of ambitious designs, he was sent by the ostracism into banishment. He was exiled because he had earned for himself the honourable title of "Aristides the Just"—because, like Hermodotus, of Ephesus, he had no equal in the highest virtue, B. C. 483.

And thus it ever is in communities, Christian or Pagan. The man conspicuous for virtue or holiness is exposed to the scorn and hatred of the profane. Nor can it be otherwise. The natural enmity of fallen man to every thing that is good and holy is deeply seated in the heart, and according to a man's heart, so are his thoughts, words, and actions.

In the matter of Aristides, however, there was another evil spring of human action at work to uproot his credit with the people. This was that most contemptible of all human passions, envy. At the time Themistocles was beginning to rise into credit with the people, Aristides possessed the respect and confidence of the majority of his fellow citizens, and as this was a barrier to his complete promotion to public favour, he resolved that it should be removed. For this purpose Themistocles formed a union with men pledged to mutual protection and assistance, for whom, and with whom, he was guilty of many corrupt practices, which he well knew would bring him into collision with his rival. Aristides, as he foresaw, opposed them, and from that hour his ruin was certain.

The fall of Aristides was the rise of Themistocles: he thereby became possessed of popular favour. Nor did he now make an undue use of his power. Foreseeing that Athens must either cease to exist as an independent state, or rise to a new rank in Greece, early in the interval between the first and second Persian invasion, he prevailed upon the people to give up the profits which they personally enjoyed from the silver mines of Laurion, during one year, and to apply them to the enlargement of their navy. It was not, however, by holding out the danger of a new Persian invasion that he gained their consent. Although this was his chief motive, he sought the ends he proposed by appealing to their hatred and jealousy of Ægina, which was still at war with them, and was mistress of the sea. This was sufficient. In order to reduce this formidable rival they increased their naval force to two hundred ships, and decreed that twenty triremes should be built every year.

It has been stated, that while Xerxes was win-

tering at Sardis, envoys from the Greek states which still adhered to the cause of liberty, held a congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, to deliberate about the common interest. Their first measure was to mediate between Athens and Ægina, and to induce them to bury, or at least suspend, their old enmity. After this they sent envoys to Argos and Crete, but without success. The reason why Argos refrained from the struggle has been stated: the Cretans referred to the legend of the disastrous expedition of Minos to Sicily, and called in the aid of the oracle, which forbade their taking part in the matter, and so they refused. Thus disappointed, these envoys passed on to Coreyra. The Coreyreans received them with assurances of good will, and promised their aid; but although they raised sixty ships ostensibly for that purpose, it afterwards appeared that they had no other end in view than that of taking part with the successful party, whether Persians or Grecians.

The congress sent other envoys to Syracuse to solicit aid of Gelon, then tyrant there, and who possessed the means of raising a greater force than any Grecian state. On a former occasion, Gelon had made proposals for an alliance with the Greeks, and had sought their assistance against the Carthaginians, the Tuscan pirates, and the Egestæans, but in vain. It might have been expected, therefore, that the Greek ambassadors would now have met with a fixed refusal. But it was not so. Gelon reproached them for the treatment he had experienced from them, yet expressed his readiness to succour them with an armament of two hundred triremes, twenty thousand heavy armed foot, two thousand heavy, and the same number of light horse, as many bowmen, and as many slingers, and to furnish provisions throughout the war for the whole Grecian army. This was a princely offer, but it had one condition annexed to it, which rendered it abortive. Gelon demanded that he should be allowed the command of the allied forces, and the Spartan, Syagrus, indignantly refused to transfer that honour to a Sicilian Greek, which belonged exclusively to Sparta. "The shade of Agamemnon," he observed, "would groan at such disgrace," to which Gelon calmly replied, "that they had lost the spring out of the year," and they returned to the isthmus.

Meanwhile Themistocles, with Cheilos of Tegea, was employed in allaying animosity and strife among the Grecian cities, and in using every expedient for cherishing the ardour, and bracing the vigour of his fellow citizens. During this period he procured a decree condemning Arthmius, of Zela, and all his posterity, to outlawry, for having scattered Persian gold and promises in Peloponnesus. He also caused an interpreter who accompanied the Persian envoys to be put to death, for having uttered the commands of Xerxes in the Greek tongue, and it was probably at his suggestion that the assembled deputies bound themselves by an oath to consecrate to the Delphian god, a tenth of the substance of every Greek city which submitted to the Persians without compulsion.

Having made all the preparations that could be made for the defence of their country, the next point for the consideration of the congress

was, at what spot it should be defended. They first resolved to take possession of the pass of Tempe in Thessaly, which they did with a body of 10,000 men, while Xerxes was preparing for his passage at Abydos; but, warned by Alexander, now king of Macedonia, they retired from thence; and it was next resolved to defend the pass of Thermopylæ. At the same time a naval force, consisting of 271 triremes, set sail to guard the northern entrance of Eubœa, and these took up their position in a long beach called Artemisium. The army commissioned to defend the pass, as will be seen, was commanded by Leonidas, and the navy by the Spartan admiral Eurybiades.

When the Persian army was waiting in Pieræ, while a passage was being made through the thick forests of Cambunia, a squadron of ten ships was detached from the fleet of Thermæ, to watch the movements of the Greeks. At the same time the Greeks sent three vessels, one an Athenian, and the others of Trœzen and Ægina, to watch the movements of the Persians. These met off the island of Sciathus, the vessels of Trœzen and Ægina were taken, and the Athenians ran their vessel aground in the mouth of the Peneus, and marched home through Thessaly.

This first victory of the Persians was marked with an action which forcibly shows the debasing and cruel nature of pagan superstition. The victors selected the comeliest man among their Trœzeman prisoners, and sacrificed him at the prow of their vessel as an omen of victory. Well has it been said by the psalmist, that "the dark places of the earth are full of the habitations of cruelty." *Psa lxxiv 20*

This first appearance of the enemy was speedily announced by fire signals from the heights of Sciathus to the Greeks at Artemisium. The alarm which it excited was so great that the Spartan admiral resolved on quitting his station, and retiring to Chalcis, in order to defend the narrow pass of the Euripus. Before he set sail, however, he set watches on the heights of Eubœa, to secure the earliest notice of the movements of the Persian armament.

It was not long before that armament appeared. The Persian squadron returned with a report that the coast was clear, and Xerxes gave direction to sail onward, and the same evening they came to anchor on the southern coast of Magnesia. The spot on which they cast anchor was a beach under the brow of Pelion, stretching from the town of Canasthina to the cape of Sepias. This beach, however, was not sufficiently ample to receive all their ships, and the majority rode at anchor, line within line, with their sterns toward the sea. The night was calm and beautiful; but when the morning dawn appeared, a ripple and a swell of the sea gave notice of a tempest. It came on furiously from the north-east, and it was in vain that the Magians repeated their incantations, and offered sacrifices to the wind and to Thetis and the Nereids, to whose powers those coasts were said to be sacred—at spent its fury upon them, and when it subsided, the shores were strewn with the wrecks of four hundred ships of war and the dead bodies of those who manned them.

It would be impossible to describe the joy

which the Greeks experienced on observing the rising and the raging of the tempest. They believed that their gods fought for them, and the Delphians sacrificed to the wind, the Athenians to Boreas, and all to Poseidon, in grateful acknowledgment of their supposed favours. They saw not His hand in the event, at whose command alone the stormy wind ariseth, and the storm becomes a calm. Christians, however, should learn from the readiness with which these heathens acknowledged the hand of their supposed deities, to see the hand of the Lord in the events which take place on earth.

So encouraged were the Greeks by this event, that the fleet returned to its former station at Artemisium, and it arrived in time to capture fifteen Persian ships, which had been detained at Sepias after the departure of the main armament. As they followed in search of it, they mistook the Greeks of Artemisium for their friends, and did not discover their error before it was too late.

But the loss of the Persians, though great, was scarcely felt in their vast armament. Accordingly, when from their station at Aphetæ, they beheld the slender force of their adversary, they detached a squadron of two hundred sail, northward, with orders that when they had got out to sea beyond Sciathus they should bear away to the south, round the southern extremity of Eubœa, sail up the channel, and cut off their retreat. On the other hand, the Greeks, who had been led to suppose that the whole armada had been almost swept away, were thrown into consternation at finding it still so formidable. Still, by the exertions of Themistocles, they were led to wait the combat, and when they found that the enemy did not move from his station at Aphetæ, they at length resolved to venture out to sea to try their strength. Astonished at their boldness, the Persians hastened to meet and inclose them. They formed a circle round them, but the Greeks, drawing their line into a smaller circle, with their prows facing the enemy, darted forward to break the wall of ships that encompassed them, and the Persians were thus thrown into disorder, and lost thirty of their ships. From that moment the Greeks ceased to fear the enemy, and the Persians began to fear the Greeks. The one perceived that though their foes were numerically strong, yet they were pusillanimous, and the other that though their antagonists were few in number, yet, fighting for liberty, they were not to be despised.

During the following night, another violent summer storm arose, which was accompanied with torrents of rain, thunder, and lightning. This more terrified the Persians at Aphetæ than hurt them, but it overtook the squadron sailing round Eubœa, and driving it on a part of the coast known in ancient times as an object of dread under the name Coela—"The Hollows," and which probably lay on the eastern side of the island, it perished. The news of this reached the Greeks, at Artemisium, just as they received a reinforcement of fifty-three ships from Athens, and, thus strengthened and cheered, they again sailed out for combat. The terror which the Persians experienced from the tempest of the preceding night was not yet abated, and they de-

clined the conflict; but a squadron of Cilicians, having left the main body for some purpose unknown, was destroyed.

Thus braved and shamed, the Persian generals resolved, on the day following, to attack the Greeks in the harbour of Artemisium. As they approached, they bent their line into a crescent, but the Greeks assailed, pierced, and broke it, and the armament was again thrown into confusion. Still, an obstinate conflict ensued, and though the Greeks at the close of the day were victors, they had suffered so much that it was deemed necessary to retreat. They were confirmed in this resolution the next day by the tidings brought them, that Leonidas, the Spartan monarch, had fallen at the pass of Thermopylae.

When the congress at the isthmus resolved to defend this pass, the Olympic and the Carnean Apollo festivals were at hand. The danger did not appear so imminent as to require that these games should be suspended, and it was therefore deemed sufficient that a small force should be sent thither to oppose the progress of the enemy. Accordingly, a force of about five thousand, three hundred of whom were Spartans, were stationed there under the command of Leonidas, with the express understanding that the whole of the Peloponnesian army would follow as soon as the festivals were concluded.

In the mean time, the Persian host arrived. It covered the whole of the Trachinian plains, and it is said to have struck some of the followers of Leonidas with that instinctive dread which their brethren at Artemisium felt at the first approach of the Persian armament. The Peloponnesians would have retreated, and have reserved their strength for the defence of their own isthmus, but this was opposed by the Phocians and Locrians, whose interests were at stake, and Leonidas, in order to soothe them, despatched messengers to the confederate cities, demanding instant aid.

On his road to Thermopylae, Xerxes had heard that a few men, under the command of a Spartan king, were stationed at this part of the road to dispute his progress. He imagined, however, that the pressure of his army would scare them away, and the intelligence caused him no disquietude. As he was approaching the pass, he despatched a horseman forward to observe their motions, and he returned with the intelligence, that some were at exercise, and others sitting quietly combing their flowing hair. On appealing to Demaratus for an explanation of this conduct, he was assured that the Spartans, at least, had come to dispute the pass with him, for that it was their wont to trim their hair on the eve of a combat. Still, four days escaped before Xerxes could be convinced of their hardihood, and when, at length, he saw that they were nothing daunted by the presence of his host, he sent a body of Median and Cissian troops to take them alive and bring them into his presence. In order to encourage them, he seated himself on a lofty throne, from whence he could view this first essay of his arms on land. It proved abortive. The Medians and Cissians fought on ground where their numbers were of no avail. Their ranks were broken and thinned, till at

length, spent with their efforts, they were recalled from the contest. They were succeeded by the band of the Ten Thousand Immortals, who were led up as to certain victory. But these also were defeated. The Greeks stood their ground as before, and at the close of the day heaps of barbarians lay dead upon the field, while but few Spartans only are recorded to have been lost.

During the progress of these futile assaults, Xerxes is said to have twice started up from his throne in a transport of rage. This had not subsided on the following morning, for he then gave directions that the attack should be renewed. It was so, but with the like ill success. The different bands of the Grecian army relieved each other at the post of honour, and slew a great number of the enemies. Xerxes was astounded; his confidence was shaken, and he came down from his throne in a mare of perplexity.

What force could not effect treachery accomplished. Over the mountains was a secret path, named Anopia, and the knowledge of this was revealed by two Greeks, a Carystian, and Corydallus, of Anteyra, or, as some accounts say, Epialtes, a Melian. A band of Phocians had been posted to defend this path, on the brow of Callidromus, but the Immortals, whose ranks had been filled up, coming upon them under cover of the night, they were compelled to retire, and the Persians descended towards Alpenus.

It was daybreak before the Greeks discovered the motions of the enemy, and by that time they were passing the ridge. There was but a short period left for deliberation, and it was promptly determined that all should retire except the Spartans, Thebans, and Thebans, who were resolved, under Leonidas, to defend the pass to the last extremity. The rest of the allies, therefore, retired, and, not long after, the Ten Thousand poured down from the mountains to charge the enemy. At this time Leonidas was more desirous of making havoc among the barbarians, than of husbanding the lives of his men, whence, leaving a guard at the wall, he sallied forth, and charged the advancing foe in front. The breaches which he made in their ranks with his little band were deep and fearful. Driven on to the conflict by the lash of their commanders, they fell in heaps by the swords of the Greeks, while many perished in the sea, and many more were trampled under foot by the throng that pressed on from behind. Yet were the ranks of the Spartans thinned, and Leonidas himself fell early in the conflict. Still the remnant fought desperately, and it was not till most of their spears were broken, their swords blunted with slaughter, and word was brought them that the Persian army was about to enter the pass from behind, that they thought of retreat. Then, with the exception of the Thebans, who threw down their arms and begged for quarter, they retired to the wall, and passed on to a knoll on the other side, where they took up their last stand. But it was now in vain the Persians rushed forward, broke down the wall, and surrounded the hillock where they stood—they fell there beneath the arrows, javelins, and stones of the enemy, and where they fell there were they

buried. Their tomb was held in great veneration.

According to Herodotus, the Persian monarch lost on this day above 20,000 men, which is probably an exaggeration. His loss, however, was evidently great, for Xerxes, dismayed by it, asked Demaratus if the Greeks had yet many such soldiers, and he was told that they numbered about 8,000 equal in valour to those who had fallen. Herodotus also relates that Xerxes caused great numbers to be buried secretly, lest the rest should be appalled—a deed which is perfectly natural, and but slightly differing from both ancient and modern usage.

The spirit by which the Spartans were actuated may be traced in a story inseparably blended with the recollection of this memorable day. When the band of Leonidas was nearly inclosed, two Spartans, Eurytus and Aristodemus, who had been forced to quit their post from a disorder which affected their sight, were staying at Alpeni. When they heard the tidings, Eurytus called for his arms, and made his Helot guide him to the place of battle, where he was left, and where he died. But the conduct of Aristodemus was far different: he shrank from the danger, and returned home, where he was shunned like a pestilence. No man would take a seat at his hearth, or speak to him, and he was universally branded with the name of "the recreant Aristodemus."

Xerxes was now in possession of the key of Northern Greece, which left him free to march whither he pleased. Influenced by the Thessalian nobles in his camp, he proceeded to cross that part of the Citeran chain which separates the vale of the Sperchius from the little vale of Doris. They were led thus to counsel Xerxes from their hatred of the Phocians, and therefore, sparing the Dorians as friends, the great king directed the utter destruction of Phocis. Those of the Phocians who had the means of escaping took refuge on the heights of Parnassus, but on all that remained in their homes, and in the fields, cities, and temples of the devoted state, undistinguished ruin was poured. The whole vale of the Cephissus, down to the borders of Bœotia, was wasted by fire and sword.

While at Panopeus, Xerxes, who had heard of the immense treasures heaped up in the temple of Delphi, sent a detachment thither, with orders to bring them, and lay them at his feet. At the same time the main army turned off toward the lower vale of the Cephissus, to pursue its march through Bœotia to Athens.

The people of Delphi had heard of their danger, and had retreated before it. They shipped their families across the sea to Achæa, while they themselves retired to the summits of Parnassus. Previous to their departure, however, they had consulted the oracle about securing the sacred treasures, and requested to know whether they should bury or remove them. According to Herodotus, the god acted like a god: he told them not to touch his treasures, for that he was able to guard his own! Impressed with this belief, *sixty Delphians remained in the sacred inclosure, with the prophet, to await the invaders, who, after burning and wasting all they found on their way along the sacred road, at length*

approached the temple. It remained now for the god to perform his promise, and what arts were used to save his credit history cannot distinctly unfold. It can only be stated, that as the barbarians reached a temple of Athene, in the vestibule a noise, as of thunder, was heard, and lights, as of lightning, were seen; while fragments of rocks poured down upon them from above, and a war-cry was heard from within the temple. This was doubtless produced by the art of man, but it was equally as effective as though produced by the god, for the barbarians, struck with terror, retired, and the temple and its treasures were saved. The Delphians, perceiving their terror, rushed down upon them from the heights whither they had retreated, and pursued them with great slaughter. They halted not till they had passed the borders of Bœotia, where they joined the main army.

When the Grecian fleet quitted its station at Artemisium, the Athenians conceived that, on reaching the Euripus, they should hear of a Peloponnesian army encamped in Bœotia for the protection of Attica, but finding that no force had arrived to guard their frontier, and that the Peloponnesians were determined to reserve all their efforts for the defence of the peninsula, they begged their allies to sail with them to Salamis, that they might provide for the safety of their families, and decide on the course to be pursued with reference to the approaching invasion. In the mean time, Athens herself had become anxious to take some decisive measure for averting the storm. In their distress, they sent to Delphi for advice, but their messengers heard only ruin denounced from the lips of the Pythoness. Athens, and all therein, were to perish by the fire and sword of the barbarians. The messengers were overwhelmed with grief and dismay at this prediction, but, while they were revolving it in their minds, they were cheered by Timon, who, doubtless instructed by Themistocles, encouraged them to approach the god again with the ensigns of suppliants, if haply they might obtain a more favourable decree. Accordingly they returned, and spreading the olive-branches before the shrine, declared that they would not quit the sanctuary till the god was moved to compassion for their city. A more favourable reply was given, but it was shrouded in ambiguity. "Pallas," the Pythoness reported, "had pleaded in vain with her sire to spare the city and the lands, but Jove had granted to her prayers, that when all beside was lost, a wooden wall should shelter her citizens." She added of the citizens "Let them not wait to be trampled down by the horsehoofs of the invader, but turn their backs, since they might again look him in the face." Then apostrophizing Salamis, she observed "In seed-time and harvest, thou, divine Salamis, shalt make women childless."

When this ambiguous answer was reported to the Athenians, opinions were divided as to the signification of the "wooden walls." Some, and especially the young men, who had begun to look to the sea as their proper field of action, conceived that reference was made to the fleet. On the contrary, the elder citizens could not believe that Pallas would abandon her ancient citadel, and resign her charge to that deity with whom

she had anciently contended for the possession of Attica. They, therefore, concluded that the oracle alluded to the hedge of thorns, which once fenced in the rock of Pallas, and they asserted that this, if repaired and strengthened by the same materials, would prove an impregnable barrier against all assaults. Themistocles, however, who all along had been in the secret, and had, in fact, in conjunction with Timon, committed a fraud upon the multitude, settled the matter in dispute. On appealing to him, he broadly asserted that the god meant, that they should retire to their ships, and when doubts were expressed as to the use which was to be made of the wooden wall—whether they were to emigrate or sustain a conflict—Themistocles, who burned to meet his foe on the mighty waters, reminded his hearers that a Grecian oracle would not have called the island “divine,” if it was not to be the scene of the destruction of the barbarians. His opinions were adopted, and the Athenians went on board the fleet, to wait the coming struggle, except a few who remained in the citadel, while their families and property were transported, some to Salamis, some to Ægina, and some to Trœzen.

During these grave debates, in which the deep art and sagacity of Themistocles were conspicuous, the Persian army was in full march for Athens. After desolating Phœcia, it had passed peaceably through Bœotia, all the cities—except Thebes and Plataea, which were reduced to ashes—having submitted, and received Macedonian garrisons. It then passed into Attica, which, like the vale of the Cephissus, was desolated. At length Xerxes approached Athens, and ere long, the flames rising from the rock published far and wide that the oracle was fulfilled—that every inch of Attic ground was in the power of the barbarians. Yet Athens was not taken without a struggle. The few citizens who remained in the citadel bravely defended it, and Xerxes and his host were at first baffled and perplexed by their energies, but some Persian mountaineers having scaled the northern rocks, while the Athenians were busied in repelling the attacks of the enemy at the western wall, they entered the citadel, and opened the gates that the army might enter. Seeing this, some of the garrison threw themselves over the precipice, while others took refuge in the sanctuary of Minerva, where they perished in the midst of the flames that consumed the city.

With the destruction of the city of Athens, the success of Xerxes ended. By this time the fleet of Salamis had been reinforced by a squadron, composed partly of additional ships furnished by the same states which had contributed their succours at Artemisium, and partly by ships supplied from other quarters, as Naxos, Leucas, Ambracia, and Croton. The whole armament, thus strengthened, amounted to 380 ships, and it was still commanded by the Spartan Eurybiades.

On taking up their position at Salamis, a council of war was held to deliberate on the spot in which it would be most advisable to wait the enemy's approach. The majority conceived that they ought to leave Salamis, and take up a station nearer the isthmus. This, however, was opposed by the Athenians, and the matter was

still undecided, when the smoke of their city was first seen to rise up toward heaven. This was an additional reason, with the majority, why they should retreat, and it was resolved in council that they should repair to the shore of the isthmus and there give battle. Themistocles strenuously opposed this measure, but his voice was disregarded. Still he would not give up the point. After a long consultation with Mnesiphilus, an Athenian statesman of the old school, and of vigorous practical understanding, he was convinced that when the Peloponnesians had reached their own shores it would be impossible to keep them together, and that the cause of liberty would be thereby sacrificed to the timidity of several states. Impressed with this conviction, Themistocles repaired again to Eurybiades, to explain to him the real ground for apprehension, and to beseech him to summon another council. Eurybiades complied with his request, and Themistocles strove to show, by all the force of argument he could adduce, the imprudence of retiring from Salamis. All his arguments, however, were met with ridicule and contempt, when, irritated by the proceedings, he turned to Eurybiades, and declared that if they persisted in their design, the Athenians would take their families on board, and sail to the rich land of Siris, in the south of Italy, where a colony of Ionians had already founded a flourishing city. This threat was more effective than argument. By it Eurybiades was induced to await the issue of a battle in the bay of Salamis.

After the Greeks had left Artemisium the Persian fleet remained stationary for three days, to refresh their crews in three days more it arrived in the Attic bay of Phalerum. On its arrival, Xerxes went on board one of the ships with Mardonius, and summoned the chief commanders into his presence to deliberate on the expediency of seeking an immediate engagement. All gave their voices for it except Artemisia, queen of Caria, and she represented the rashness of hastening a contest, by which every thing might be lost, and nothing gained. At the same time, she stated that a victory might be gained without a contest, if time were allowed for the disunion and dispersion of the Greeks, which would inevitably take place, when the want of provisions should have driven them from Salamis to the isthmus. Thus advice, however, was only looked upon as the fruit of womanish fears, and Xerxes resolved to attack the enemy without delay. The morrow, therefore, was fixed for the conflict, and Xerxes, imagining that the checks his fleet had met with at Artemisium were owing to his absence, resolved to cheer his hosts in the struggle by his presence.

On the same day on which this deliberation took place, Xerxes ordered the fleet to sail up toward Salamis, and to form in line of battle, but the hour was so late, that there was only time to perform the evolution without advancing into the straits. This had an unfavourable effect upon the minds of the Peloponnesians. They conceived that it was madness in Eurybiades to remain in a position where, if they were defeated, there could be no hope of escape. Their murmurs grew louder and louder every moment,

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and at length a council was held, in which the voices of the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were drowned by those of their allies. Thus, in danger of being thwarted in his designs, Themistocles had recourse to artifice to bring about an action. In the heat of debate he withdrew, and sent a slave named Sicinnus—who had the charge of his children, and who had been brought from the east, and spoke the Persian language—with this message to the Persian admiral: "Themistocles, general of the Athenians, wishes well to Xerxes, and desires to see his cause prosper. Hence, he has sent to say that they are alarmed, and bent on flight. If you prevent their escape, you will ensure an easy victory. Already divided among themselves, they will no sooner see that they are inclosed by your ships, than they will turn their arms against each other." Having despatched this messenger, Themistocles returned, and used all his arts to prolong the discussion, that the Persians might have time to advance.

While yet the commanders were bandying passionate words, Themistocles was called out of the room to speak to a stranger. It was the much-injured Aristides. Like a true patriot, as he was, he had left his place of exile, Ægina, and had come to offer his services to his countrymen in the approaching conflict. He had passed, under cover of the night, to the Persian fleet, and when Themistocles appeared, he exclaimed, "Themistocles, let us still be rivals, but let our strife be, which can best serve our country. I am come to tell you that you are wasting words in debating whether you sail away from Salamis. We are encircled by the Persian fleet, and can only escape by cutting a passage through." Themistocles related his artifice, and begged Aristides to go into the council room to report its success. He did so, and while the assembly was engaged in a fresh dispute on this intelligence, which many of them refused to believe, it was confirmed by a Trojan ship which came over from the enemy. Then, and not till then, all resolved to conquer or perish!

It appears that the information sent by Themistocles was greedily received by the Persian commanders. As soon as they received it, about midnight, they moved from Phalerum to block up the entrance of each of the narrow channels by which Salamis is separated eastward from Attica, and westward from Megara. One line of ships stretched from Cynosura to the Attic part of Munychium, and another from Ceos—which is probably the western cape of Salamis—round the mouth of the other strait. At the same time, a body of Persians was posted in an island named Psytaleia, situate between Cynosura and Attica, to protect those of their own fleet who might suffer in the battle, and to slay all the Greeks who might fall in their way.

It was in this position that the Greeks beheld the Persian fleet when the morning appeared, while their army lined the shores of the Gulf of Eleusis, and Xerxes was sitting on a throne raised on the heights of Mount Ægaleos, from which he could view the fight, encourage the host by his presence, and dispense punishments or rewards, as justice might demand. Scribes were seated by his side, to register the names of

those who might signalize themselves in the conflict.

On their parts, when the Greeks had come to the resolution of making a firm stand, they were no less active in preparing for the struggle. They took their stations in such order, that the Persians appear to have been surprised at the arrangement. Before they embarked, Themistocles addressed them, in a speech in which he set before them all that was good and evil in the condition of man, according to pagan views, and exhorted them to choose and hold fast that which was good, and which, according to him, was their independence. And, indeed, it may fairly be presumed that Themistocles was correct, for virtue, honour, prosperity, and happiness, could not long survive the fall of liberty.

The speech of Themistocles had a due effect upon the minds of the Greeks, but they appear to have been still more cheered by the aids of superstition. When the resolution of defending Salamis was adopted on the day before, a vessel was sent to Ægina to implore the assistance of Æacus and his line, who were the tutelary heroes of Ægina. They were solemnly evoked from their sanctuary to come and take part in the battle, and it was looked upon as an auspicious event, that this vessel returned just as the combat was about to commence. If tradition speaks truth, it brought these heroes with it, for it asserts that they were seen during the day in the form of armed warriors, lifting up their hands to shield the Grecian allies!

Thus encouraged, and with their valour fired by martial music, the Greeks awaited the advance of the Persians in the straits. As they approached, the Greeks backed their galleys, in order to let as many crowd into the straits as they pleased to bring, that so they might easily be contounded. At length, when about treble their own numbers had appeared, an Athenian vessel, commanded by Arminas, darted forward and struck one of the Persians. This was the signal for a general conflict. It raged with vigour on both sides, but, aided by the action of a strong breeze which regularly blew up the channel at a certain time of the day, and which, while it affected the large vessels of the Persians, left those of the Greeks unharmed, Greek valour at length prevailed. The unwieldy armament was thrown into a confusion from which it could not recover, and, though it continued to struggle for some time, and though the Carian heroine, Artemisia, strove to restore or arrest the defeat, the Persians were overcome and put to flight. The remnant took refuge in Phalerum.

At the time of this battle Aristides was on the shore, anxiously watching the course of events, and for an opportunity of ministering to that victory from which his rival alone was to reap glory and power. Accordingly, when the tide of battle had begun to turn, he embarked a body of heavy-armed Athenians, with some archers and slingers, in light craft, and landed them on the island of Psytaleia. When landed, he drove the Persians into one corner of the island, and there destroyed the whole, under the very eye of Xerxes.

Herodotus does not state the loss of either the

victors or the vanquished. Ctesias says that the Persians lost five hundred ships, but it is probable that Diodorus, who states two hundred for the Persians, and forty for the Greeks, is more correct. As for the number of men, it is impossible to state how many were sacrificed on that eventful day. On the part of the Persians the loss must have been proportionably greater than on that of the Greeks, for few of the mariners from the inland regions of Asia could save themselves from death by swimming, whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the sea from childhood, when in the sea were almost in their own element.

But, notwithstanding his severe loss, Xerxes still had the elements of power in his hands, and he exhibited signs of again wielding it for the destruction of Greece. He made preparations for throwing a bridge, or causeway, over the narrowest part of the strait, thereby threatening to bring his whole force to bear upon them on land. But this was only a feint. He had at length learned, what he might have learned before, that

"Power usurp'd
Is weakness when opposed."

and that hence his situation was one of no small danger. Xerxes, disheartened, resolved to return into Asia. On the night after the battle of Salamis, the fleet received orders to sail with all speed to the Hellespont, and to guard the bridges till the king's arrival.

Still, the conquest of Greece was not abandoned. Mardonius, the main author of the expedition, hoping yet to achieve a conquest which would re-establish him in the royal favour, bade the king not to let his spirits be depressed by the loss of a few ships, nor because the Greeks had shown themselves more skilful on the sea than the Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, since the Persian arms were still irresistible by land. He then offered to undertake the reduction of Greece, if he were permitted to select 300,000 troops from the army, and Xerxes, yet willing to subjugate the hated nation, and caring little what became of his slaves so that he himself was safe, returned to Asia.

It was about the middle of the following day that the Greeks discovered the departure of the Persian fleet. They pursued it as far as Andros, where they stopped the chase, and held a council of war, to deliberate on the plan of future operations. Themistocles proposed, and his proposition was seconded by the Athenians, that the Hellespontine bridges should be broken down, and the rout of Xerxes thereby intercepted. This measure, however, was rather dictated by vengeance than by wisdom, for great danger might have arisen from driving a powerful enemy to despair. Eurybiades saw this, and he gave it as his opinion that it would be madness to throw an impediment in his way, and with him all the admirals concided, and Xerxes therefore pursued his course unmolested. Themistocles himself seems to have been convinced of the soundness of the argument, for he not only laboured to soothe the disappointment of his countrymen, who wished to separate themselves from their allies and block up the Persians in Europe, but he sent a messenger to Xerxes,

informing him that he might return to Asia without molestation. He was accompanied as far as Thessaly by Mardonius, who there selected the flower of the whole army, including the Ten Thousand, for the purpose of subjugating Greece, with whom he took up his winter quarters in that territory. A body of 60,000 of the troops he selected, however, pursued their course to the Hellespont, with Xerxes, under the command of Artabazus, in order to guard him on his route. Those who accompanied Xerxes presented a far different aspect on their return to that which they presented on their advance. Instead of splendour, pomp, luxury, and waste, there were disorder, distress, want, and disease, in every part of the ranks. Ordinary food was nowhere to be found, and the army was compelled to feed upon the herbage of the plains, and the bark and leaves of the trees. So reduced were numbers by famine and disease, that Xerxes was compelled to consign them to the care of the cities which he had impoverished by his wanton luxury on his approach. The passage of the Strymon will remind the reader of the passage of the Berezina, on Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow. It had been frozen in the night, and as the Persians passed over it, the ice suddenly gave way, and thousands perished. Still Xerxes pressed onward, and in forty-five days after he had left Mardonius in Thessaly, he reached the Hellespont. When he arrived, he discovered that storms had effected that which the Athenians, burning with vengeance, had wished to perform. The bridge had been broken up by them, but the fleet was there ready to carry the miserable remnant over to Abydos, and there Xerxes again found rest, in which he endeavoured to bury the remembrance of his disgrace. The luxuries his army enjoyed there were almost as fatal as the sword and the famine with which it had been wasted on the shores of Greece, and when Xerxes arrived at Sardis, it was dwindled away to the mere shadow of what it once had been.

In seeking the destruction of others, Xerxes had brought down ruin upon his own head. The great Disposer of human events sent him home confounded and ashamed. It is true we do not read of His holy name in the pages of ancient historians. Storms, the sword of the Greeks, famine, and a variety of causes, are there described as contributing to that consummation, but His hand is nevertheless discernible throughout the whole course of his history. Even Themistocles, in allaying the angry feelings of the Athenians when thwarted in their wish to break down the Hellespontine bridges, was led to observe, that what had been done was not their own deed, but the work of the gods and heroes, whom Xerxes had provoked by his pride and sacrilegious violence. He saw that there was some secret power at work, but, lost in the thick darkness of paganism, he could not discover whose power it was that worked out their deliverance. And this was the general feeling of the Greek nation, as may be traced in the sacrifices offered to the different gods at the conclusion of each successive victory. Apollo, Neptune, Bacchus, and a long line of fabled divinities, each came in for their share of honours in

humbling the invader. And this may be adduced as a peculiar feature in the character of the Greeks. There was no boasting in their own arms or in their own swords, as having thereby achieved the victory. All acknowledged that they owed their deliverance to the gods, and hence they bowed down humbly at their shrines. The sum of the matter, therefore, is this,—that whether nations be Christian or pagan, all events concerning them are disposed and brought to pass by Him whose name is Jehovah, and who ruleth in the armies of heaven and on earth according to his Divine will. Let all the inhabitants of the earth then acknowledge, "The Lord, he is the God, The Lord, he is the God!"

CHAPTER X.

FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO THE FINAL EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS FROM GREECE

B. C. 480—477.

THE news of the victory of Salamis seems to have changed the disposition of various Greek cities. Awed by the formidable appearance of the invader, and from unworthy motives, as before recorded, they had bowed their necks to the Persian yoke. When, however, Xerxes turned his back upon Greece, many on the coast of the Chalcidian peninsula repudiated their allegiance to him. The first to act thus was Potidaea, on the isthmus of Pallene, and Olynthus followed the example. But they did not go unpunished. As soon as Artabazus had executed his commission, and conceiving he should be able to crush this rebellion before his presence would be needed in Thessaly, he laid siege to Olynthus. That hapless city fell, and the whole population was massacred in cold blood, after which it was re-peopled with colonists of the Chalcidian race. Artabazus then laid siege to Potidaea, but here his triumph ended. Determined to resist to the last, the garrison of that city kept him at bay during three months. At the end of that time, an event occurred which seemed to presage their ruin, but which resulted in the destruction of the barbarians. An extraordinary ebb of the sea left the shore of the isthmus bare under the walls, and Artabazus, taking advantage of it, sent a division of his army round the town, but as they were marching, the waters returned, and they were drowned, or cut to pieces by the garrison. Artabazus was, therefore, compelled to raise the siege, and return to Thessaly, where he rejoined Mardonius.

The Greek fleet remained among the Cyclades after the pursuit of the Persian armada, to punish the islanders for assisting Xerxes. Their mode of punishment was by contribution. This was first demanded of Andros; and when the inhabitants refused, Themistocles informed them that they had on board two gods, who would compel them to accede to the demand—*Persuasion* and *Force*. To this threat the Andrians replied, that there were two gods on the island, and would not suffer them to comply—*Poverty*

and *Inability*. These were certainly not to be overcome, yet the Greeks laid siege to the island in the hope of accomplishing this feat. But they were defeated. The Andrians made so vigorous a defence, that they were compelled to resort to the other islands, where they were more successful, after which the fleet returned to Salamis.

On his return to Salamis, Themistocles met with the reward of his exertions. All Greece resounded with his praises, and, next to the favour of the gods, the deliverance effected was ascribed to his foresight and vigour. Accordingly, when the choicest of the spoil having been sent to the different oracles as thank-offerings, and the rest having been divided among the allies, the commanders met in the temple of Poseidon to award the palm of individual merit, the first was given, at the suggestion of the Delphic oracle, to Ægina, for the active part that state had taken in the battle, and the second was unanimously awarded, by the competitors themselves, to Themistocles. He received still higher honours at Sparta. That state, always a severe judge of Athenian merit, invited him thither, and bestowed on him the same reward as they did on their own admiral, Eurybiades—a chaplet of olive leaves. They bestowed on him, also, their best chariot, and when he returned, they sent three hundred knights to escort him to the borders of Tegea, thereby honouring him above all other foreigners that had ever visited Sparta.

Within a few days after the departure of Xerxes, the Athenians returned to Attica to cultivate their fields, and repair their dwellings. The necessity of such a step was one of the main arguments which Themistocles used in order to prevent their further pursuit of the Persian fleet, and they applied themselves to the work with great alacrity. They did so under the hope, that though the enemy was still formidable by land, yet, after the lessons that had been taught him, he would not again invade them, or that, if he did, the allies would not, as heretofore, look on at a distance while the barbarians overran their territory, since they had done and suffered so much for the common cause of liberty.

The Athenians found themselves, in the end, deceived. During the winter, the Greeks remained peaceably at home, but in the spring, they awoke as from a slumber, and recollected that Mardonius was in Thessaly, and a Persian fleet still riding upon the seas.

The fleet of the Persians, having transported the army across the Hellespont, had wintered partly at Cuma and partly at Samos, and when the spring arrived, the whole assembled at Samos, under the command of three new admirals. It consisted of 300 ships, and opposed to it was a Grecian fleet, consisting of 120 triremes, under the command of the Spartan king, Leotychides, and Xanthippus, the Athenian accuser of Miltiades, and which was stationed at Ægina. The intention of the Persian admirals was to remain on the defensive, and they appear to have been led to this by the expected defection of their *Ionian allies*. At this time, some Ionian refugees, who had failed in an attempt against Stratias, the tyrant of Chios, went to Ægina to solicit the aid of Leotychides and Xanthippus for the

purpose of restoring Ionia to independence, and had they obtained it, a revolt in Ionia would have given the Persian admirals full employment. The only point, however, which they could carry, was to prevail on the Grecian fleet to advance eastward as far as Delos, and here it remained for fear of the Persians, while the Persian fleet remained at Samos for fear of the Greeks. The places between the two islands, therefore, remained in peace, through mutual fear.

More active operations were carried on by land. During the winter, Mardonius had been preparing for his campaign, and no measures were neglected which might promote his views. Justly dreading the Athenians, he made an attempt, while in winter quarters, to detach Athens from the cause of Greece, and to gain her as an ally for Persia. With this view, he sent Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was intimately connected with Persia by the marriage of his sister Gygæa to a Persian of high rank, and with the Athenian commonwealth by ties of friendship and hospitality. Upon his arrival at Athens, Alexander was well received, and he delivered this message to the Athenians in the name of Mardonius, as the lieutenant of Xerxes—"The king," he said, "was ready to forgive past offences, to secure the Athenians in the possession of their territories, to add to them any other they might covet, and to rebuild all the temples he had burned in their city, if they would be his allies as a free and independent state." Alexander then delivered a personal exhortation from Mardonius, exciting them to embrace the king's offer, and not to keep up a ruinous struggle, against a power before which, sooner or later, they must inevitably fall. Having thus delivered his message, Alexander proceeded to give them his advice—"As for me," he observed, "I would not have been the bearer of such a message, if I had seen any prospect of your being able to prolong a contest with Xerxes. But his power is more than mortal, and his arm of power stretched beyond the reach of man. If, therefore, you do not wish your land to be a perpetual theatre of war, or to be deprived of it from time to time by invasion, I would advise you to accept the offer of the great king—an offer vouchsafed to you alone."

The Spartans had heard of the embassy of Alexander, and, alarmed by it, had sent their ambassadors to strengthen the constancy of the Athenians. When, therefore, Alexander had concluded, the chief of these ambassadors rose, and spoke to this effect—"The Spartans have sent to request, Athenians, that you will admit nothing to the prejudice of Greece, nor receive any proposal from the barbarians. Such a proceeding would be unjust, and unbecoming to any Grecian people, and especially to you. To Athens we owe this war which ravages all Greece. Besides, that the Athenians, who from of old have more than all mankind asserted the general cause of liberty, should become the authors of slavery to Greece, would be most heinous. The Spartans, moreover, grieve for the distress which you have suffered in the late invasion, and for the sacrifices you may still have to make, and will do all in their power to

mitigate them. They offer, indeed, to maintain your families as long as the war shall last, at their own expense; and are desirous, with the other confederates, of making you reparation. Let not, therefore, the Athenians prefer the hollow promises of barbarians, to those of their natural and faithful allies."

The Persian commander had no reason to hope that the Athenians would listen to his tempting offers, nor the Spartans that their fidelity would be shaken, as appears from their imperative reply—"Tell Mardonius, that so long as the sun holds on its course, we will never come to terms with Xerxes. Great as his power is, relying on the gods and heroes, whose temples and images he has burned and defaced, we will defy it to the death. For yourself, Alexander, we warn you to come no more to the Athenians with such proposals, but we shall always be desirous of showing you that friendship and respect to which you are entitled according to the rites of ancient hospitality." Then, turning to the Spartan ambassadors, the Athenians replied, "That you should have been anxious about the conduct of the Athenians was natural, according

to the dictates of human nature, but, at the same time, their character ought to have protected them from the suspicion that they could be tempted to betray Greece, for all the gold contained in the bowels of the earth, or the richest land under the sun. Before acting thus, we must forget the injuries we have suffered, and the ties of blood, language, manners, and religion, which unite us to Greece. As for your offers, we thank you, but we desire not to be a burden to your state. This is not the kind of assistance we desire from our allies, but we would wish you to put your forces in motion without delay, to meet Mardonius in Bœotia, as, on receiving the answer we have just given Alexander, he will most likely set out on his march to Attica."

What the Athenians expected of the Persian general came to pass, but what they desired of the Spartans was not done, and their land was again ravaged. As soon as Mardonius received the message, aided by his Thessalian friends, with Thorax of Larissa at their head, and by the Thebans, through whose territories he passed, he advanced to Attica unopposed. On his approach, when they saw that they had no protection to expect from the Peloponnesus, the Athenians retired again to Salamis, and ten months after its capture by Xerxes, their city was in the hands of the fiery Mardonius.

Still Mardonius seems to have had an instinctive dread of the opposition of the Athenians, whence, seeing them deserted by their allies, he renewed the proposals by a Greek envoy, named Murychides, which he had before made through Alexander. The message was received in council, and one man, named Lycidas, ventured to recommend compliance. He was probably bribed to this by Persian gold, and if so, he met with the due reward of his treachery. He was heard with indignation by his colleagues, and the report of his counsel having spread among the multitude that surrounded the doors of the council chamber, he was by them stoned to death. The punishment of his dereliction was unhappily

extended to innocent objects. Caught with the same spirit of fury, the Athenian women destroyed both his wife and children.

It appears that the Spartans, instead of complying with the request of the Athenians, were employed, under the direction of Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas—who exercised the kingly functions during the minority of that heroic monarch's son, Pleistarchus—in fortifying the isthmus. It appears, also, that the Ephori designed, when that work was completed, and the peninsula should thus have been secured from all fear of a sudden attack, to send the Spartan forces, under Cleombrotus, against the Persians. The work was drawing to a conclusion when Mardonius took possession of Athens, and Cleombrotus was preparing for his expedition; but an eclipse of the sun, which happened while he was consulting the victims on its issue, so terrified him, that he returned home with his army, where he soon after died, leaving a son named Pausanias as guardian of the youthful Pleistarchus.

Meanwhile, ambassadors were sent by the Athenians, Plataeans, and Megarians, to remonstrate with Sparta on the indifference and neglect with which their constancy had been requited, and to demand instant aid. When they arrived, they found the Spartans celebrating the great Amyclæan festival of the Hyacinthia. They immediately laid their complaints before the Ephori, and reminded them of the offers which the Athenians had received from the Persians, and which were not yet refused, and of the promises of succour which Sparta had given, while yet, their wall being unfinished, they trembled for the fate of the Peloponnesus. They added, that though the Athenians were justly indignant at their desertion of the cause of liberty, the Spartans might yet repair their fault by hastening to the Thracian plain, where the army was encamped.

The Ephori, who, it may be mentioned, had now usurped a power in civil concerns superior to that of the kings of Sparta, deferred their answer till the morrow, and the sacred festival afforded them a pretext for protracting the delay ten days longer. At the end of that time, convinced by the arguments of the Arcadian Chelus, then at Sparta, of the imprudence of sporting with the feelings of so valuable an ally, they ordered Pausanias to put himself at the head of the army, which they meant to send into the field. This army consisted of 5,000 Spartans, each of whom was attended by seven helots, thereby making a total of 40,000 men. Concerning the departure of these, the Athenian envoys were kept in the dark, whence, on the morrow, when they renewed their complaints, the Ephori replied, that they were ready to swear their army was already on the march, and they believed that it had then reached Attica. The envoys could scarcely believe what they heard, and when they were convinced, they set out in pursuit of Pausanias.

That the grave Ephori of Sparta should condescend to act thus out of mere wantonness, as Herodotus intimates, appears incredible, whence the historian is compelled to seek a cause for their conduct. This may be found in the fact that

the Argives were so deeply in the Persian interest, that they had undertaken to intercept any Spartan troops which should attempt to quit Laconia. It might, therefore, be necessary for Pausanias to set out on his march suddenly and secretly, lest his army should be wasted by a struggle before he reached Attica. His march was so rapid, that the Argives had no opportunity of carrying their intentions into effect, but when he had reached Arcadia, they sent information thereof to Mardonius.

As long as Mardonius had any hopes of bringing the Athenians over to the cause of Persia, he had spared their city, but when he discovered that the Spartans were marching against him, he destroyed all that was left therein, and retreated into Bœotia, where he encamped on the banks of the Asopus, or on the plain between Erythræ and that river. At this place he expected that the enemy, entering Bœotia by the passes of Cithæron, would overtake and give him battle, and, as he was anxious for an early opportunity of fighting, he prepared for the event. He enclosed a space of upwards of a mile square with a rampart surmounted by a palisade, and flanked with wooden towers, to guard his treasures and afford a refuge in time of danger. It was while this work was proceeding that the banquet took place, in which the Persian revealed the general sense of danger prevailing in the camp, as recorded in the History of the Persians.

In the mean time, the Spartan army, on its arrival at the isthmus, was joined by the forces of all the Peloponnesian allies. At this spot, according to the usage of the Greeks, the entrails were examined by the soothsayer, Tisamenus, an Elean, who declared that they were favourable to the expedition. Thus cheered, the allies passed on to Eleusis, where they were met by an Athenian reinforcement, under the command of Aristides. The army then took the road across Cithæron, and coming down upon Erythræ, discovered the Persians in the situation described.

Pausanias halted near Erythræ, and formed his line on the uneven ground at the foot of the mountain. Being here joined by the Thespians, his whole force amounted to about 110,000 men, while that of the Persians was nearly triple that number, it being by this time swelled by about 50,000 Macedonian and Greek auxiliaries from the north of the isthmus.

It was the wish of Mardonius to draw Pausanias into the campaign country, where, through his cavalry, which was the principal reliance of Asiatic armies, he conceived he might obtain an easy victory. Pausanias, however, would not relinquish his advantageous ground, and his position was so strong, that Mardonius despaired of assaulting him with success. At length, despairing of enticing the Greeks down from their heights, Mardonius ordered Masistus, general of the cavalry, to advance with the horse, and assail them with their missiles. The camp of the Megarians was, in that part, most accessible to cavalry; and these were attacked by troop after troop in such rapid succession, that their ranks were thinned by the missiles, and their strength and spirits began to fail. In this extremity, they sent to Pausanias for relief, and a battalion of

three hundred men, with a body of archers, were sent to cover the Megarians. On their arrival, they received the charge of the enemy with a well-directed shower of arrows. Foremost in the Persian ranks was the Persian general himself; and his horse, being wounded in the side, reared and threw its rider. Attentive only to their evolutions, the Persian cavalry wheeled and retreated with full speed, and the Athenians rushed forward to secure the prize. As Masistius was cased in armour from head to foot, for some time he defied their weapons, but at length he was pierced with a javelin through the visor of his helmet. By this time the Persians had discovered their loss, and they rushed forward to remove the body of the slain chief. A fierce struggle ensued, and the little band of Athenians were compelled to resign it; but the Greeks, coming up at that moment to their assistance, renewed the struggle, and again wrested it from the Persians. They were repulsed with some slaughter, and compelled to return with the mournful tidings to the camp.

The loss which the Persians sustained in the fall of Masistius is testified by the extreme grief they exhibited on its discovery. According to Herodotus, they not only shaved their own heads but their horses and beasts of burden, and their wailings resounded throughout Bœotia. These were funeral honours paid only to the illustrious dead among the Persians.

On the part of the Greeks, the death of Masistius was a matter of rejoicing. They placed his gigantic body, for he was a man of great stature, in a cart, which was drawn along the lines, that it might become an animating spectacle to the soldiers. The issue of this assault of the Persian cavalry was greatly encouraging to the Greeks, for by it they discovered that the cavalry of the East was not irresistible. Under this impression, as the present position on the heights of Cithæron was inconvenient, from scarcity of water, Pausanias resolved to abandon it and descend into the territory of Plateæa.

The town of Plateæa, which was still in ruins, lay about two miles off to the west, near the foot of Cithæron. The plain before it is watered by a number of small streams issuing from the side of the mountain, some of which feed the Asopus, which, after it has collected these and other tributaries, takes an easterly direction toward the Eubæan channel. Other streams from this mountain go to form the Eræo, which, rising in the same plain, flows through a glen at the western foot of Cithæron, into the gulf of Creusis, now Livadostro. Herodotus says that Pausanias posted himself on the bank of a stream which he calls the Asopus, but which can only be considered as one of its tributaries. The right wing of the army, occupied by the Spartans as being the post of honour, was stationed near the spring of Gargaphia. The whole encampment consisted of gentle eminences, such as would give infantry advantage over cavalry.

Previous to taking up their final position, the Spartans were called upon to decide a dispute which arose between the Tegeans and Athenians, each of whom claimed to occupy the left wing as the second place of honour. Both these states founded their claims upon their mythical glories.

The Tegeans grounded their pretensions on the exploit of Echemus, who, they asserted, had been rewarded by the Peloponnesians for his victory over Hyllus, by the privilege granted for ever to his people of occupying one wing in all expeditions of the states of the peninsula, while the Athenians urged their defence of the Heracleids against Eurysthenes, the aid they had successfully afforded to the Argives against the Cadmeans, and their victory over the Amazons. In order to turn the balance in their favour, to these claims they added one which appealed to every heart, their victory on the field of Marathon. They prevailed the Spartan army exclaimed, as one man, that the Athenians were the most worthy, and, as both had declared that they would abide by their decision, they accordingly occupied this post of honour.

As soon as Mardonius was apprised of the movement of the Greeks, he advanced with all his forces, which he drew up on the opposite bank of the Asopus. The Persians, being the best troops, were stationed on the left wing to face the Spartans, while the Greek auxiliaries were opposed to the Athenians. The day was too far advanced when the movements were completed, to begin the struggle, and the next day both armies sought to discover the will of the gods from the appearance of the entrails of slain victims. On both sides, the soothsayers read similar answers in the sacrifices. Tisamenus declared that the Greeks would conquer if they remained on the defensive, but if they crossed the river they would be defeated. Hegistratus also, an Elean soothsayer in the pay of the Persians, whose hatred impelled him to exert all his arts against the Spartans, for injuries received at their hands, assured Mardonius that the entrails forbade him to commence the attack. This experiment was repeated day after day with the same result, and hence the two armies were rendered inactive, except that the Persian cavalry harassed the Greeks, and confined them to their encampment.

During eight days the Greeks were well supplied with provisions, brought them from Peloponnesus over Cithæron, and they daily received fresh reinforcements. On the contrary, Mardonius, having taken no precautions to insure supplies, became daily more straitened in his means of subsistence. On that day, however, Timagenidas, a Theban, suggested to Mardonius the idea of watching the passes, and of intercepting the supplies brought into the Greek camp. This was acted upon. Some cavalry were sent to guard the outlet of the defile, under cover of the night, and these surprised and captured a convoy of provisions, with five hundred beasts of burden. Still, the impatience of Mardonius was not soothed; and, perceiving that the enemy was yet gathering strength, on the tenth day he resolved to be no longer governed by the appearance of the entrails. It is probable that hitherto he had only respect to them on account of the fears they wrought in his Greek auxiliaries, for it seems remarkable that a Persian general should be kept motionless by Greek soothsayers, the nature of whose pretensions he could scarcely have understood. Notwithstanding, there was nothing in the difference between the religions of

Greece and Persia to prevent his admittance of their prophetic art; and he exhibited a great proneness to adopt Greek superstitions, when, on a former occasion, he sent a mission to the Boeotian oracles. Still, he was not so enthralled by superstition as were the Greeks, and it can form no matter of wonder, especially if his fiery temperament is taken into the account, that he resolved to break through its rules. As for Pausanias, there can be no doubt that he would have been prevented by the report of Tisamenus, had it had been continued for as many years as days; for, setting aside the power which superstition had over the minds of the Greeks at large, that soothsayer, sprung from a branch of the Jamids of Elis, was the most celebrated diviner in all Greece.

Mardonius communicated his intentions secretly to Artabazus, who used all his efforts to dissuade him from his purpose, and advised him, as the Thebans had done before, to avoid a battle, and to fall back upon Thebes, where magazines had been formed for his army, and whence he could find means of corrupting some of the Grecian allies by means of Persian gold. The counsel of Artabazus, however, was rejected, and Mardonius adhered to his purpose. Yet, that it might not appear to his Greek allies that he despised the prognostics, he summoned a council of the principal officers of both nations, and endeavoured to convince them by an ancient oracle that fate was on his side. This oracle—which Herodotus believed, in his simplicity, had reference to the irruption of an Illyrian horde, who, in early times, had carried their irruptions as far as Delphi—stated, that a foreign army should invade Greece, and plunder Delphi, and Mardonius argued that it applied to the Persians, and that they would be invincible as long as they refrained from spoiling the sanctuary. The application was by no means logical, but Mardonius overcame all scruples, and it was resolved that the battle should take place on the ensuing morning.

The attack was to be made by surprise, but, in the dead of the night, Alexander of Macedonia presented himself at the out-posts, and desired to speak with the Greek generals. He was brought before them, and after giving them timely information of the intention of Mardonius, and asking their goodwill if the cause of Greece triumphed, he returned to the Persian camp.

On the departure of Alexander, a change was proposed by Pausanias in the order of the troops. As the Athenians were more familiar with the Persian mode of fighting than the Spartans, he requested the Athenian commanders to exchange positions, and this meeting with approval, the movement was performed before daylight. Apprised of this, Mardonius altered his own disposition to meet it, and transferred the Persians to his right wing, where they again faced the Spartans, but Pausanias brought the Spartans back to the right, and the Athenians again faced the Persians. This was at length interpreted by Mardonius as emanating from fear on the part of the Spartans, and he ordered his cavalry to charge them, which they did with so much vigour, that the Gargaphian spring fell into the hands of the Persians.

The loss of this spring was irreparable, for, as

they were prevented from fetching water from the Asopus, they depended on it for their whole supply. At the same time, the pass of Cithæron was so narrowly watched by the Persian cavalry that the Greeks were in danger of suffering from famine. Under these circumstances, it was resolved, that if battle should not be joined in the course of the day, the army should retire to a part of the plain nearer Plataea, which, being almost surrounded by two branches of the Eræus, was known by the name of the Island. Mardonius did not follow up the desultory warfare of his cavalry, and therefore, when night arrived, the greater part of the allied generals moved off, but instead of taking up the position agreed on, they posted themselves near a temple of Juno, which was close to the town.

Meanwhile, Pausanias was detained by an unexpected impediment. One of his officers, named Amompharetus, conceiving that the movement was a flight by which the honour of Sparta was sullied, and recollecting that the laws of his country forbade him to fly from an enemy, refused to set his division in motion. The force he had under him seems to have been too considerable to allow Pausanias to leave it exposed to the Persian host, and he remained to argue him out of his obstinacy. Day began to dawn, and still Amompharetus would not yield, Pausanias, therefore, thinking his obstinacy would give way if he saw himself deserted, now moved forward, with the rest of his forces and the Tegeans, along the skirts of Cithæron. Loth to leave him to destruction, however, Pausanias halted when he had marched about a mile, hoping that he would yet be induced to follow. The firmness of Amompharetus did at last give way, and he reluctantly led his forces, at a slow pace, after the main body. They overtook them, and soon after the Persian cavalry came up, and began to infest them as on the day before. This led to a general battle, and to victory on the part of the Greeks. Conceiving that they fled before him, Mardonius crossed the Asopus, in order to overtake them. The Spartans and the Athenians were still within his reach, and having despatched the Greek auxiliaries against the Athenians, he advanced, with the bravest of the Persian troops, against the Spartans. Pausanias perceived his danger, and prepared to meet it with Spartan fortitude. The soothsayer was ordered to examine the victims, and while this was performing, the Spartan general ordered his men to seat themselves on the ground, and to hold their long shields before them to defend them from the missiles of the enemy, till the gods should vouchsafe to give the signal for battle. It was long delayed, and, in the mean time, many Spartans were wounded by the arrows of the enemy, but at length Tisamenus announced that the last sacrifice showed favourable tokens, and then the whole army sprang upon their feet, and advanced upon the Persians. They sustained the shock with great bravery, but their short spears and daggers were ill fitted to make an impression on the Spartan panoply, as their light corslets were to repel the Spartan lance. Yet they struggled fiercely, and rushed forward singly or in irregular troops, with intent to seize and break the enemy's lances. But it was to no purpose; and

Mardonius, who, mounted on a white charger, led on the thousand horse which he had selected from the royal guards, being slain by a Spartan named *Æmnestus*, his fall decided the fate of the day. The Persians immediately fled, and their example was followed by the rest of the barbarians, and the rout became general. The fugitives made for the camp as their nearest and best refuge, but *Artabazus*, who had lingered behind with his division of 40,000 men, finding that all was lost, took the road to *Phocis*, with the design of making his way to the *Hellespont*. As for the Greek auxiliaries, they, finding the Persians overcome, dispersed without striking a blow, with the exception of the *Bœotians*, who, instigated by the *Theban* traitors, maintained a sharp conduct with the Athenians. These were, however, put to flight after losing three hundred men, and they sought shelter behind the walls of *Thebes*. B C 479

Intelligence of the battle was soon received by the Greeks under the walls of *Platœa*, and they hastened to repair their misconduct. Before they arrived, the victory was gained, and the *Megarians* and *Phliasians*, advancing by the way of the plain, met with a body of *Theban* horse, who attacked them, and, after having slain six hundred, drove the rest to the mountains.

It now only remained for the Greeks to complete the victory by storming the Persian camp, whither the fugitives had retreated. The Spartans, who had followed close upon their heels, had attempted this, but, being unaccustomed to sieges, they were repulsed. After the *Thebans* had been defeated, however, they were joined by the Athenians, who mounted the walls, and forcing away the wooden defences, opened a breach by which their allies entered. A fearful scene of carnage ensued, for out of the whole multitude, who submitted without a struggle, only three thousand were spared. Rage and a sense of their wrongs suffered no dictates of mercy to be heard among the Greeks.

At length, when their enemies were destroyed, the rich plunder of the camp arrested the attention of the conquerors. This was immense, for the furniture of their tents glittered with gold and silver, and vessels of the same metal were scattered about for ordinary use and piled up in wagons. The tent of *Mardonius*, which had been that of *Xerxes*, fell into the hands of the *Tegeans*, who were the first to enter through the breach, and were therefore permitted to carry away this prize to adorn their temple of *Athene Alea*.

The rest of the spoil, according to the direction of *Pausanias*, was collected by the helots, that gods and men might receive their due. Much, however, was embezzled by the helots, and the great wealth of several families in *Ægina* was commonly attributed to the gains they had made in purchasing these from men ignorant of their value, or wishing to rid themselves of their plunder for fear of detection.

The spoils being collected, a tenth was set apart, according to the usage of the Greeks, for an offering to the gods. The sanctuaries of *Delphi*, *Olympia*, and *Poseidon* on the isthmus, were all enriched by them, and a sum of eighty ta-

lents, or about 20,000 pounds, was awarded to the *Platœans*, to enable them to build a temple in honour of *Athene*. After paying this debt of gratitude, they rewarded those states and individuals that had struggled for the cause of liberty. The highest honour was by general consent awarded to the Spartans, and their leader, *Pausanias*, was presented with ten samples of every thing most valuable in the mass of plunder. One man, however, was left unrewarded and unhonoured, although his dauntless and reckless bravery was conspicuous in the field of battle. This was the "recreant *Aristodemus*," who sought to wipe out his former disgrace, and to regain the good-will of his countrymen. But his efforts were unavailing. *Aristodemus* fell on the field of *Platœa*, but no honours were paid to his memory, and his body was excluded from the barrows in which the rest of the slain were buried. So difficult is it to re-establish ourselves in the good-will of those whose favour has been lost by misconduct.

Before the army left the field of victory, incidents occurred which illustrate some of the manners and customs of the Greeks. Having gained the sanction of the *Delphic* oracle, they erected an altar to the father of the gods, under the title of the *Deliverer*. Before they offered the first sacrifice on it, they were directed to extinguish all the fires in the country, and to light them anew from the hearth at *Delphi*. This was effected, and an assembly was afterwards held, in which, on the motion of *Aristides*, it was decreed that deputies should be sent from all the states of Greece to *Platœa* yearly, for the purpose of political consultations, and to celebrate the anniversary of the battle with sacred rites. It was farther decreed, that every fifth year a festival, called the *Feast of Liberty*, should be solemnised at *Platœa*, that the *Platœans* should be held sacred and inviolable so long as they offered these new sacrifices, and that the allies should keep an army and a fleet, to prosecute the war against the barbarians.

On their part, the *Platœans* undertook to honour the defenders of Greece who were buried in their land with yearly ceremonies, concerning which *Plutarch* has left a minute description. He says, that on these occasions a procession marched at dawn of day to the sound of the trumpet, through the city, followed by wagons loaded with myrtle boughs and chaplets, by the victim, which was a black bull, and by free youths, bearing the vessels which contained libations for the deceased heroes. Behind these was the archon, who, contrary to the general rules of his office, held a sword in his hand, was dressed in a purple tunic, and bore an urn kept in the public archives for this solemnity. On reaching the burial ground, the archon washed and anointed the tombstones, sacrificed the victim, poured out the libations, prayed to the gods of the lower world, and then solemnly invited the sleeping dust of those who had fallen in defence of their country to accept the banquet provided for them by her gratitude. This is one of the many instances which abound in Grecian history, showing how deeply the Greeks descended into the depths of superstition, and with what facility that superstition led them to combine

insignificance with greatness. It could hardly have been supposed that the victors of Plataea, the champions of Grecian liberty, could have acted thus foolishly, but the truth is, while their arm of flesh was strong, their minds were darkened and rendered vain by their idolatry.

The battle of Plataea was fought on the third or fourth day of the month Bœdromion, corresponding to the 29th or 29th of August. Accordingly, the season was not too far advanced for taking vengeance on those Greeks who had joined the Persians, and when the above rites and sacrifices had been performed, a council was held, in which it was agreed to march against Thebes. On the eleventh day after the battle of Plataea, the confederates entered the Theban lands, and demanded that Timagenidas and Attagninus, the ringleaders, should be given up to them to be slain. This was refused, and the allies ravaged their territory, and made incursions to their very walls. Their ravages continued during twenty days, but at the end of that time Timagenidas offered to become a victim in order to save the city. The Theban assembly accepted his offer, and he was given up, with the rest of his abettors, except Attagninus, who made his escape, and they were executed at Corinth. At the same time the children of Attagninus were delivered into the hands of Panamus, by whom they were humbly spared, because, as he justly observed, "they were not guilty of Medism" that is, they had not taken part in the Persian invasion.

On the same day that the victory was won at Plataea, the Persians suffered the first signal blow that the Greeks struck at their power in Asia. While the Grecian fleet was stationed at Delos, three envoys arrived to lay before Leotychides the wishes of a strong party in Samos, who were desirous of shaking off the yoke of Persia, and with it that of their tyrant, Theomester, who had been rewarded with the supreme power by Xerxes for zeal and courage displayed in the battle of Salamis. Leotychides was assured that he had only to show himself on the coast of Ionia to excite the Ionians to a general insurrection, and, although he had refused a similar proposal from Chios, he was inclined to favour the suit of the Ionians, and the sacrifices being propitious, he set sail for Samos.

On the approach of Leotychides, the Persian admirals sent away the Phœnician squadron, and sailed, with the remainder of the fleet, across to the main land, to seek protection of the land force, which was stationed, under the command of Tigranes, at the foot of the mountains that end in the promontory of Mycale. At first the Greeks were confounded by their retreat, and debated whether they should not return to the Hellespont; but, at length, they resolved to cross over to Mycale and offer battle. As soon as they arrived within hearing of the Persian troops, Leotychides addressed a proclamation to the Ionians, in which he exhorted them to remember the liberty of their country in the approaching battle. On hearing this, the Persians believed that a plan of desertion had been formed among the Ionians, and that this proclamation was the signal for revolt. Under this impression, they disarmed the Samians, and removed

the Milesians from the camp, under the pretext of posting them at the top of Mycale to guard the passes. This was agreeable to the wishes of Leotychides, and he no longer hesitated to land his forces, to attack the Persians who were drawn up at the foot of the mountain.

It is recorded that, in order to animate his troops, Leotychides caused a report to be spread, which stated that their countrymen had gained a victory over Mardonius in Bœotia. It was impossible for him to have heard of this victory, whence the account may be looked upon as one of those marvellous stories with which Grecian history is marred, unless it can be supposed that Leotychides simply referred to the skirmish in which Masistius was slain, and which he magnified into an important battle for the purpose of invigorating his followers. Be this as it may, the Greeks marched onward to the battle, apparently in full confidence of victory. Nor were they deceived. The Athenians, who, with the troops of Corinth, Sicyon, and Troezen, occupied one wing, soon forced the slight barrier of the breastwork which the Persians had formed with their serried shields, and the Spartans and the rest of the forces, who had been parted by the bed of a torrent and a spur of the mountain, coming up at the moment, the whole army was put to a general rout. They betook themselves to the passes of the mountains, guarded by the Milesians, whither they were pursued by the Greeks, and the Ionians followed their example and fell upon the Persians. Even the Milesians sought their destruction. Instead of guiding them to the summit, they led them into tracks which brought them upon the enemy, and where they joined in their extermination. Tigranes their general, was slain, and but a few escaped to relate the tidings at Sardis.

Having collected the booty and burned the ships, the Greeks returned to Samos, where a council was held to devise a plan for the protection of the Ionians, should they be induced to engage in a general revolt. The Peloponnesian commanders proposed that those who prized independence above every other good should quit their country, and that those who still took part with Xerxes should be compelled to resign their maritime regions, but this was opposed by the Athenians, and it was finally resolved that the continental Ionians should be left to make the best terms they could with the Persians, and that Chios, Lesbos, Samos, and other Ægean islands, should be admitted into the Greek confederacy, by solemn oath.

As soon as this question was settled, the Grecian fleet steered its course to the Hellespont, in order to destroy the bridges which, it was supposed, were still standing. They were found in ruins, and Leotychides and the Peloponnesians, conceiving that every object of their expedition had been attained, proposed to sail home. Xanthippus and the Athenians, however, wished to make an attempt to recover the ancient dominions of Miltiades in the Chersonesus, and they separated from the allies for that purpose, and immediately laid siege to Sestos, which was the strongest place in the whole peninsula.

At this time, the Chersonesus was governed by a Persian named Artayctes, who had abused his

power by acts of tyranny. One act especially provoked the indignation of the Greeks. The town of Elmsu, which was situated on the south-east coast, possessed a rich temple consecrated to the hero Protesilaus, who had fallen by the hand of Hector, as he leaped, the first of all the Greeks, on the Trojan shore. As Xerxes passed through Sestus, on his way to Greece, Artayctes requested that he would grant him the house of a Greek who had invaded his dominions, and who, having been slain, was buried in the neighbourhood. Without suspecting the real tenor of the suit, Xerxes granted it, and Artayctes spoiled the temple of its treasures, and even ploughed and sowed the sacred enclosure. This was an act of sacrilege, which could neither be forgiven nor forgotten by the Athenians, and it was made the chief motive for their attempt to conquer the Chersonesus.

The siege of Sestus was so unexpected, that Artayctes had made no preparations for resistance. Yet an obstinate defence was made during the winter, and it was only through famine that it was reduced. It was in the spring of b c 478 that this famine began to make ravages among the besieged, and they were driven to such extremities, that they were compelled to boil and eat the leathern staves of their bedding. Thus reduced, Artayctes, and another Persian of high rank, named Cebazus, with many of their countrymen, attempted to make their escape, and they passed through the Athenian lines by night, upon which the Greek inhabitants of the town opened their gates to the besiegers. The fugitives were closely pursued, and Artayctes and his son were overtaken and put to death—the father by crucifixion, the son by stoning. Cebazus found his way out of the Chersonesus, but he fell into the hands of the Absinthians, who sacrificed him to one of their gods. This conquest effected, the Athenian fleet sailed home, carrying with it rich treasures, and the remains of the cables that had been employed in the bridges, to be dedicated in the numerous temples of the gods of the Athenians.

Xerxes remained in Sardis to receive the pitiful relics of his forces which had escaped from Platæa and Mycale. Shortly after this, he removed to Susa. Before his departure, he ordered all the Grecian temples within reach of his power to be burned, an act which was probably dictated by the prejudices of the Magian religion, combined with the spirit of malignant revenge for his disastrous defeat, which it may be supposed he attributed to the power of the multiplied gods of Greece. There can be no doubt that, in common with the Greeks, he believed that the destruction of his vast hosts was the work of some unseen power.

Such was the conclusion of the Persian war. The two campaigns of that war redounded to the honour of Greece, and tended to establish its liberty, and are among the most remarkable in the annals of mankind. Their consequences, however, did not end here. Had Xerxes been the conqueror, Europe might, to this day, like Persia, have been groaning under the bonds of physical and mental slavery. But God, in his wisdom, ordained that, by means of this inflexible band of patriots, liberty should be established on

her shores, and the law of freedom be handed down to succeeding generations, even to our own times. Nor must we forget that a state of freedom is most favourable to the diffusion of that gospel which proclaims spiritual liberty to the slaves of sin and Satan. Had the Persians succeeded, the Magian religion would most likely have been, as the Mohammedan religion which succeeded it is, an insuperable barrier to the adoption of the Christian religion. By it the heart would have been fortified against its reception, and the sword of its advocates, as it was in the latter days of the Persian empire, would have been drawn for the extermination of those who sought its extension. By the limitation of the Persian empire, the influence of the Magian religion was limited. It is true that Xerxes is not represented as desiring to establish the Magian religion beyond the confines of Asia, but there can be no doubt, that had he enslaved Greece, the religion of the Persians would have become that of the Greeks.

Hence it becomes mankind not to look upon the history of this period as a mere record of passing events, but as teeming with important consequences to succeeding generations, even to the end of time.—consequences under the control of an all-wise and gracious God.

CHAPTER XI

FROM THE FINAL EXPULSION OF THE PERSIANS FROM GREECE TO THE THIRTY YEARS TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA

B c 477—445

THE expulsion of the Persians from Greece wrought an entire change on its internal and external relations. From being invaded, the Greeks became the invaders, in order to free their Asiatic countrymen from the yoke of Persia. Before this took place, however, many important events occurred in Greece itself which demand prior notice.

On the return of the Athenians to Attica, they found a wasted land and a city in ruins. The public coffers were drained by the war, and, though the spoils may have enriched individuals, still the state remained almost unbenefted by them, for that part which fell to its share was mostly consecrated to the gods. Athens, therefore, seemed to be in the last stage of poverty and weakness. But it was not so. In reality, her strength had never before been so great, and time only was wanting for the city to rise again, clothed in beauty and splendour.

It would appear that the restoration of the private dwellings was left to their owners, and that they were rebuilt, like Rome after its destruction, merely for the convenience of the citizens in their present condition. The rebuilding of the ruined temples was reserved for another date, Themistocles and Aristides being engaged in providing for the present security and future strength of the city by surrounding it with new and enlarged fortifications.

The erection of these fortifications had well

nigh become the subject of war between the Athenians and some of the Grecian states, especially Sparta. Conceiving that they had a right to take the lead in all the common concerns of the nation, the Spartans sent an envoy with a message to Athens, which sounded like the language of friendship, but which was, in truth, the language of jealous dictation. "The Athenians would do better," they observed, "to throw down all the walls north of the Isthmus, rather than erect new walls, as Thebes had already done, which might hereafter serve to shelter the barbarians in a fresh invasion. The Peloponnesus would always be a refuge and a place of arms where the united forces of the Greeks might assemble." This was a tacit proposition that Lacedæmon should be considered the fortress of Greece, and that, therefore, Sparta should maintain the supremacy. But this was foreign to the views of Themistocles, and, it may be believed, of the Athenians generally. They had not resisted the barbarian host, with a view of becoming dependent upon a neighbour state, but of establishing their independence. As yet, however, they could not brave the storm they saw hovering over their heads, and, therefore, they resolved to elude it by art. The envoys of Sparta were dismissed with a promise that an embassy should be immediately sent thither to treat on their proposal.

Among these envoys was Themistocles, who advised, that while he proceeded to Sparta, his colleagues should delay their departure till the wall had been raised to such a height as would sustain an attack, and that for this purpose every Athenian capable of labour should assist in the work, and that every building, public or private, sacred or profane, should supply materials. This was agreed to, and Themistocles departed to Sparta, where he contrived to amuse the Spartans amid much distrust, till at length he was joined by Aristides and another envoy, who announced that the walls were high enough to sustain a siege. Themistocles then dropped the mask. At his next audience with the Ephori, he informed them that the fortification of Athens was advanced too far to be stopped, and admonished them, that when they and their allies sent ambassadors again to Athens, they should deal with the Athenians as with reasonable men - men who could discern what belonged to their own safety, and what to the interests of Greece. Dissembling their vexation, the Spartans expressed their regret that what had been meant as a friendly suggestion should have been considered as a design of encroaching on Athenian liberty, and so the matter ended. The walls were raised, and they were composed of materials from houses, temples, and even the monuments of the dead, held sacred by the Athenians as emblems of the clashing interests and jarring passions of the Greeks.

The next plan which Themistocles adopted to secure the glory of Athens, was far more conducive to that end than the erection of its fortifications. From the earliest ages it had been the policy of the Athenian government to discourage maritime commerce, and a disposition to naval affairs. Themistocles saw that this was an error, and that, on the contrary, an efficient

navy would be the means of raising Athens to the highest pitch of prosperity, he aimed, therefore, at rendering her (as England is at the present day) "mistress of the sea."

The invasion of the Persians had led the Athenians to enlarge their navy, and they must have been convinced, from the result of this measure, that their wisdom was to maintain it thus enlarged. Hence Themistocles found no difficulty in carrying out his favourite policy. His first care was to provide a port for the enlarged navy. In ancient times Athens was content with Phalerum, the most easterly and smallest of the three harbours which lay nearest to the city. That of Piræus, which was the largest basin, and contained three distinct ports, capable of being closed by separate bars, all opening into the sea by a narrow outlet, had been neglected by the state. To this Themistocles turned his attention. His plan was to fortify the three ports - Phalerum, Munychia, and Piræus, by a double range of walls, one on the land side enclosing space for a city, the other following the windings of the shore between the mouth of Phalerum and that of Piræus, so as to include the peninsula of Munychia. When threatened by the Persian invasion, Themistocles had persuaded the Athenians to commence this work, and the wall was carried to half its intended height. It was now resumed, and completed under the superintendance of Hippodamus, a Milesian architect, who is also said to have designed some new streets in the city, but the historian probably means the new quarter of the city, the architecture of which far surpassed that of the upper town. It was finally adorned with temples, a theatre, a market-place, and with every building required by Grecian life for use or pleasure, and it attracted thither merchants of different nations from many countries. The Piræus was the completest arsenal that the world had ever yet seen. It was the Athenian stronghold, and their future natural refuge in times of danger.

Athens was now prepared to dispute the supremacy with Sparta, and an event occurred which tended to exalt her above that state. During the next year after the fall of Sestos, B.C. 477, the allied fleet put out to sea, under the command of the regent of Sparta, Pausanias. This fleet first sailed to Cyprus, the greater part of which island was wrested from the Persians. After this, it steered for the north of the Ægean, and laid siege to and captured Byzantium. But here the success of the allies ended, through the strange conduct of their leader—conduct which has never yet been fully explained, though it appears clear that the secret spring was ambition.

Before the fall of Cyprus and Byzantium, the regent had caused the tripod dedicated to Apollo, from the spoil taken at Platæa, to be inscribed with a couple of verses, in which his name alone was mentioned as having obtained the victory. This had been removed by the Spartans, and Pausanias might have taken the hint that they would not suffer his ambition to soar beyond due bounds. This, however, was lost upon him; for after Byzantium was taken, and while the allies remained in this station, he laid aside the manners of his country for those of the Persians,

and he carried himself towards his allies, among whom were Aristides and Cimon, son of Miltiades, as though they were his subjects. Such conduct in a Spartan naturally engendered suspicions as to his fidelity, and the reasonableness of these suspicions was soon made manifest. Having captured some Persians of high rank at Byzantium, Pausanias secretly released them, and then sent a messenger to Xerxes to claim the merit of this service, and to offer that if Xerxes would give him his daughter in marriage he would lay the whole of Greece at his feet.

To have made such a proposition as this, Pausanias must have joined with his ambition no small share of vanity, and even ignorance of the popular feeling. He might conceive that, having prostrated the power of Persia, he should be able to restore it if Xerxes fell in with his views. But he was egregiously mistaken. Xerxes caught at the new hope set before him with eagerness, and sent Artabazus to take the government of that satrapy which included the provinces of the north-west coast of Asia, and was called the Dascylian, that he might keep up an active correspondence with Pausanias, and supply him with money and every other aid suited to the great occasion. Thus encouraged, Pausanias acted as though he was already a vassal of the king of Persia. He not only assumed the state of a Persian satrap, but he treated those under his command with harshness and arrogance, after the manner of the barbarians. This provoked the Ionians, who had just escaped from the yoke of Persia, and, contrasting the deportment of the Athenian generals with that of the Spartan command, they, with the rest of the confederates, except the Peloponnesian states and Ægina, called upon the Athenians to supersede the Spartans in the supremacy of command in the affairs of the alliance. Through the rash ambition of Pausanias, therefore, Athens was henceforth the first state of Greece as regarded naval affairs.

Aristides was the first Athenian commander of the allied forces. To him the confederates entrusted the task of regulating the laws of the union, and of its subordination to Athens—a task which he accomplished with that high moral rectitude which long before had procured for him the title of “the just.” He fixed the assessments of the numerous members of the confederacy to the satisfaction of all, and without incurring the suspicion of having acted in any one instance to his own advantage. A pleasing instance of self-denial, and one that may be proposed as an example for all those connected with public affairs throughout all ages. By it he has earned for himself a character which redounds more to his honour than that of Pausanias would have done, even had he gained the summit of his wishes. To moral turpitude, shame and disgrace are ever annexed, while posterity looks with favour upon the records of a man whose one desire is to act uprightly. Hence arises the well-known and generally approved adage, “Honesty is the best policy.”

Meanwhile, tidings of the dereliction of Pausanias had reached Sparta, and the Ephori had recalled him, and sent out Dorcis, with a small force, to supersede him in the command. This step, how-

ever, was taken too late. The islanders and the Asiatic Greeks were irrevocably lost to Sparta, and when Dorcis arrived, he found that if he remained he must be content with a subordinate rank. This was repugnant to Spartan feelings; and, accordingly, the Spartans, with the Peloponnesian allies, retired from the field, and left the rest of the confederates to work out the object of the expedition, namely, to protect the Greeks in the islands and the coast of the Ægean from the aggressions of the Persians, and to humble their power. Henceforth, therefore, two separate associations divided between them the whole strength of the nation—Athens and the Ionian confederacy, Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies.

At this point in Grecian history, the course of events must be anticipated by a record of the end of three great actors in the Persian wars—Pausanias, Themistocles and Aristides.

On his recall to Sparta, Pausanias was subjected to a severe inquiry, and to various charges for injuries inflicted on individuals under his command. On some of these he was convicted, and condemned to slight penalties, while on others he was acquitted. Pausanias was also tried for corresponding with Xerxes, but, as no direct evidence could be obtained, the charge was withdrawn. After this, it would have been his wisdom to have returned quiet, but, being reduced to an obscure and narrow sphere, and fettered by many restraints, he cast aside the authority of the Ephori, and retired without their leave to Byzantium, where his creature Gongylus, an Ægina, whom he had employed in his negotiation with Xerxes, still ruled.

On his arrival he renewed his treasonable practices, which being discovered by the Athenians, they compelled him to quit the city. He retired from thence to Colone, in Troas, where he continued his criminal intrigues with such audacity, that the Ephori having heard of it, he was directed to return to Sparta under pain of being proclaimed a public enemy. As his plan was not yet perfected, and as he could not hope to carry it on in the condition of an outlaw, Pausanias obeyed the command, and, on his arrival at Sparta, he was thrown into prison for having gone abroad without leave. Soon after, however, he obtained his release, and demanded a trial. The Ephori would have complied with his demand, but as they had not sufficient evidence of his treason, so as to warrant them in proceeding to the last extremity against a man of his rank, the affair was again dropped. But still the infatuation of Pausanias continued. Having proceeded thus far into the maze of guilt, he seems to have had no thought of receding, but rushed madly on to destruction. He conceived the design of exciting an insurrection among the helots, and of placing himself, by their aid, combined with that of Persia, at the head of Sparta. Had this been carried into effect, it is probable he would have established a tyranny more odious than the government which would have been overthrown, and more dangerous to the liberties of Greece. It is even possible that he would have plunged the emancipated slaves into aggravated wretchedness. Some of the helots seem

to have anticipated this, for they betrayed the scheme to the Ephori. Still the Ephori, exercising their usual caution in requiring unquestionable proofs before they proceeded to extremities with a Spartan, refused to act. But his guilt was soon unfolded. It had been his cruel custom, in corresponding with Persia, to request the Persian ambassador to put the bearers of his letters to death. At length, he selected a Spartan, named Argilias, to execute one of these fatal commissions; and the suspicions of this man being awakened, he opened the letter; and, fired with indignation at the indifference with which he proposed to sacrifice his life, he revealed the secret to the Ephori. Being now convinced of his guilt, the Ephori resolved to bring him to condigna punishment; and, to this end, they devised a plan of obtaining a confession of his treason from his own lips. There was a celebrated temple of Poseidon, on the peninsula of Tanarus, at the southern verge of Laconia. In this temple Argilias took refuge, in the expectation that Pausanias would come to inquire into the motive of his conduct, while some of the Ephori concealed themselves in a position where they could overhear their conversation. The device succeeded: Pausanias came, as was expected, and Argilias having reproached him with ingratitude, he acknowledged the justice of his complaints; and endeavoured to soothe his anger, by assuring him that he should be in no danger if he now discharged his commission. Having thus heard the confession of his guilt from his own lips, the Ephori took measures for arresting him on his return to Sparta; but, seeing them advance in a body, Pausanias took the alarm, and fled to the sanctuary of Athene Chalcioecus, where he took shelter, in one of the detached buildings inclosed within the hallowed precincts. As religion forbade to force him thence, the building was unroofed, while the entrance was blocked up, and its approaches carefully guarded. It is said that his mother was among the first to lay a stone at the doorway for the purpose of immuring her son! He was thus starved to death; but, in order to obviate profanation, when it was known that he was on the point of expiring, he was taken out of the sanctuary, and he breathed his last as soon as he had crossed the threshold. Superstition, however, was even then alarmed; and perhaps the recollection of his services rendered his fate a subject not only of compassion and regret, but of religious compunction. The Delphic oracle was consulted; and, by its direction, the bones of Pausanias were buried on the spot where he expired; and as two persons were to be surrendered to the goddess in the room of the suppliant she had lost, two brazen statues of the deceased were dedicated in her sanctuary.

With the fate of Pausanias, that of Themistocles was involved. While yet the terror of the Persian invasion was fresh in the minds of the Athenians, the influence of this great man was predominant at Athens. Like Pausanias, however, he sunk beneath the weight of his own glory. Prosperity blinded but spoiled him. Fed up with a sense of his own merit, he was ever reminding his countrymen of the debt of gratitude they owed him. Thus, according to

Plutarch, he asked them on one occasion where they would have been without him; and on another, he compared himself to a wide-spreading plane tree, under which they had taken shelter in the storm, but which they began to lop and rend when the bright blue sky again appeared. All this might have been passed over as little tricks of vanity; but, unhappily, his sense of merit led him into acts of criminality. He made no scruple to convert his popularity into a source of petty profit: after the retreat of Xerxes, he exacted contributions from those islanders who had sided with the barbarians, as the price of immunity from the resentment of the Greeks. He also found another source of profit in the factions by which many of the maritime states were divided. On every hand there were persons who needed the aid of his influence, and were willing to purchase his mediation. This he appears to have extended without any regard to the merits of the case, or to the sacred ties of friendship. Timocreon of Ialysus, a Rhodian poet, who had been his intimate friend, accuses Themistocles of retaining him in exile, contrary to his promise, for the price of three talents given him by his adversaries. This selfishness procured him enemies; while, on the other hand, he provoked others by his enlightened patriotism. His success, indeed, in protecting the interests of Athens against the encroachments of Sparta, contributed more to his downfall than any of his delinquencies. The Spartans never forgave him for thwarting her insidious attempt to suppress the independence of her rival in the matter of the walls of Athens; and soon after he inflamed their resentment, by opposing another measure, which they proposed in order to retain their supremacy. This was to punish the states which had aided the barbarians, or had abandoned the cause of Greece, by depriving them of their right of sending deputies to the Amphictyonic congress. As this measure would have excluded Argos, Thebes, and the northern states, the effect would have been, that Spartan influence would have preponderated in that assembly, and therefore Themistocles frustrated the attempt by throwing the weight of Athens into the opposite scale, and by pointing out the danger of reducing the council to an instrument in the hands of two or three powerful members. The effect of all this was, that Themistocles created enemies on every hand; and at length, from a conviction that he had arisen too high above the common level to remain a harmless citizen in a free state, he was condemned to temporary exile, by that species of ostracism which he had before directed against Aristides. Themistocles retired to Argos, where he was welcomed, if not as the saviour of Greece, yet as the enemy of Sparta. Here he resided at the time of the death of Pausanias; and in searching for further traces of the treason of the fallen regent, the Ephori found some parts of a correspondence between him and Themistocles, which they construed into a sufficient ground for charging the latter with the same crime. Acting upon this, and actuated by a spirit of revenge, the Ephori sent envoys to Athens to accuse him, and to insist that he likewise should be punished. It would not appear that any documents on which the charge was founded, or

any evidence of the fact beyond the charge of the Ephori, was transmitted to Athens; yet such was the state of the public feeling towards him, that officers were sent with the Spartans, to arrest him and bring him to Athens for trial. Feeling that in the prevailing disposition of the Athenians, inevitable death awaited him, Themistocles retired before the storm. He first sought refuge in Corcyra; but the Corcyrans, though willing, were not able to shield him from the united power of Athens and Sparta, and thence he crossed over to the opposite coast of Epirus. At this time, *n. c.* 467, the Molossians, the most powerful people of Epirus, were ruled by a king, named Admetus, who claimed Achilles as his ancestor and the founder of his dynasty. In the days of his prosperity, Themistocles had thwarted this prince in a suit which he had occasion to make to the Athenians; and it might, therefore, have seemed madness in him to have sought protection at his court. The result proved otherwise. Admetus was from home when Themistocles arrived at his gate, and his queen Phthia, acting with that compassion which is so lovely in the female character, received him with kindness, and instructed him how to appease her husband's resentment, and secure protection. She directed him to sit on the hearth, and to hold the young prince in his hands, which among the Molossians was a more powerful form of supplication, than the olive branch among the Greeks. It was thus that Admetus found his fallen enemy on his return; and, being informed of the danger that threatened the life of the suppliant, forgetting past wrongs, he raised him from his hearth, and gave him an assurance of protection. This promise he fulfilled, for when the Athenian and Spartan commissioners resorted thither in search of him, he refused to deliver up his guest. Themistocles, however, does not seem to have intended to make a permanent abode with the Molossian monarch, and perhaps he conceived he had not sufficient power to protect him from his enemies. It would rather appear that he had an early design of seeking his fortune at the court of Persia, and it is said that the oracle of Dodona directed his course thither. He was aided in his flight by his host. Admetus supplied him with the means of crossing over to the coast of the *Ægean*, whence he sailed in a merchant ship bound for Ionia, and after having narrowly escaped discovery by the Athenians at Naxos, whither the vessel was driven by a storm, he arrived safely at Ephesus. While in this city, Themistocles received that portion of his property which his friends were able to collect at Athens, and that which he had left at Argos. It is probable that it was here, also, that he was joined by his family, for he appears to have lived in seclusion and unknown for some time. This was his wisdom; for when Themistocles arrived in Asia, the inveterate foe of Greece, Xerxes, was still alive. Some months after, however, he was assassinated by Artabanus and the eunuch Spamtres, when Artaxerxes, his younger son, ascended the throne. To this young prince, Themistocles made himself known by letter, wherein he acknowledged the evils he had inflicted on the royal house in defence of his country, but claimed the merit of having sent timely warning,

by which Xerxes was enabled to effect his retreat from Salamis in safety. He added, that his persecution and exile were owing to his zeal for the king of Persia, and that he had the power, if a year's leisure was allowed him, of proving his attachment by still greater services. This letter of Themistocles had the desired effect. He received a favourable answer, and, after having studied the Persian language and Persian manners, he went to Susa. His reception at that court was highly flattering, and such as no Greek had ever before experienced. At length, however, he was sent down to the maritime provinces, probably to wait for an opportunity of striking the blow by which he was to raise the power of Persia upon the ruins of Greece. In the mean time, a pension was bestowed upon him, in the usual style of oriental magnificence. Three Grecian cities, yet under the power of Persia, were assigned for his maintenance. Magnesia was to provide him with bread, Myus with viands, and Lampascus with the produce of the vineyard. He fixed his residence at Magnesia, where he lived as a prince, till he was overtaken by death. What time this happened is uncertain; but it would not appear that he enjoyed the Persian monarch's favours for any extended period. It is supposed that his consciousness of being unable to perform the promises he had made to the king hastened his end. This seems probable, for it can easily be imagined that the man who envied the trophies of Miltiades, felt a bitter pang at hearing of the rising glories of Cimon his son. That he felt no satisfaction in the prospect of ruining his country, or in the high honours heaped upon him by Artaxerxes, is evident from the tenor of his last wish—that his ashes should be carried to Attica. There, within the port of Piræus, it is supposed they were buried. A splendid monument was raised to him in the public place at Magnesia.

Such was the end of two great actors in the history of Greece at this period. Raised to the highest pinnacle of earthly fame by their skill and prowess, they grew dizzy by their exaltation, and the natural consequence was, they marred their fair fame by strange and unjustifiable actions. It is hard, indeed, so to manage prosperity as to preserve a humble and an upright mind. Such characters are rare in the pages of history, but we turn to one bright example—that of Aristides.

On the fall of Themistocles, this great man naturally became the first in the state. Although his fortune was below mediocrity, yet was he made archon, in which capacity he wrought many changes for the benefit of the state. His greatest work was the regulation of the Ionian confederacy, before noticed; and as it was that which displayed the noble features of his character in the clearest light, so it is the last recorded in the page of his history. It seems probable, however, that it may have preceded, and have had some share in producing, a change in the Athenian constitution of which he was the prime mover. This was the demolition of the barriers of privileges which separated the higher classes from the lower, by opening the archonship, and the council of the Areopagus, to the wise among the poorer citizens. The reasons which induced

him to make this innovation appear to have been threefold:—1. That every Athenian citizen was entitled, by his birth, to every office in the state, save those which concerned the custody or expenditure of public money, 2 That they had won a title to it by their heroic exertions in the Persian wars; and 3 That it was necessary, now that the Athenian people had assumed the rank of chief of the Ionian confederacy, for that all shades of dignity were lost in the new lustre bestowed on the Athenian name. It was thus that Aristides laboured for the welfare of his country. He had the mortification, however, to see the order he had established in the confederacy, for the benefit both of the members and their head, broken in a material point, which he vainly endeavoured to prevent. Soon after this he died, but the close of his life is so obscure, that nothing is definitely known concerning it, save that he died poor, and that he preserved, to the last, the respect of his countrymen. This was exhibited in the erection of a monument at the public charge, and in the fact that his posterity was punished by the state for several generations. It is a great honour for a man to have his name handed down to after ages as an upright man and a benefactor to his country, like Aristides. It is a still more glorious privilege to have our names registered in the "book of life," where they will stand to all eternity.

It has been seen that the object of the Ionian confederacy was chiefly to humble the Persian power. Most of the states comprising that confederacy would have been contented to have acted on the defensive. But this did not suit the general temper of the Athenians. They saw, in the east, a vast field open to their ambition, and, as the situation of the Asiatic Greeks favoured a continuance of hostilities, the leading statesmen of Athens encouraged the restless spirit of their countrymen.

Conspicuous among these statesmen, was Cimon, son of Miltiades. In his youth, Cimon gave little promise of ability or integrity. His whole pursuit was pleasure, which he so greedily devoured, that he drew on him the satire of the comic poets. So strong were the prejudices of the Athenians against him, that when he first appeared in public life, he was so disheartened that he resolved to lay aside all thoughts of concerning himself with public business. At length, however, he attracted notice, and gained reputation, by the spirit which he displayed on the occasion of leaving the city to the Persians, when he hung up a bridle in the Acropolis, as a sign that he placed all his hopes in the fleet, and by the valour with which he fought at Salamis. These events drew around him many friends, and especially Aristides, who encouraged him to tread in his father's footsteps, and gave him wholesome advice as to his future conduct, to which he listened, and by which he profited.

During the decline of Themistocles' popularity, Cimon was rapidly rising in public favour and esteem, by a series of successful enterprises. Thus, in the third year after the battle of Platæa, B.C. 476, he achieved the conquest of Eion on the Strymon, which was held by a Persian garrison. In the course of the same year,

also, he destroyed the inhabitants of the isle of Scyros, who were a mixed race of Pelasgians and Dolopians, and who had incurred the ban of the Amphictyons for their propensity to piracy, and especially for a breach of hospitality in plundering some Thessalian merchants. Cimon embraced this specious pretext for destroying this people, and he divided their land among Attic colonists. After this, he proceeded to enterprises which were important as the first steps towards the establishment of a new system in the relation between Athens and her allies. The inhabitants of Carystus, in Eubœa, from some unknown cause, had provoked the hostility of the Athenians; and, after a long resistance, they were reduced to terms of submission. This effected, Cimon next proceeded to lay siege to the rich and powerful island of Naxos, which had refused compliance with the requisitions of the leading state. Naxos was conquered, and, from an ally, became subject to Athens. The same fate awaited the other islands, which, unwarned by the example of Naxos, offered the Athenians the same provocation. One after another refused compliance, and one after another was punished with the loss of its independence.

Many, however, offered to commute their personal services in the expeditions to which they were summoned for stated payments of money, which were readily accepted, and which finally led to the same consummation. Being exempted from the necessity of keeping up a naval force, they were ever after exposed to the demands of Athenian rapacity, and, having no means of defence, they found themselves involved in that servitude from which they sought immunity by their gold.

All this tended to exalt the character of Cimon in the sight of the Athenians, and in the year of the conquest of Naxos B.C. 466, he gained a great victory over the Persians, which for ever established his reputation. At the mouth of the Lurymedon, in Pamphylia, a great sea and land force had been collected. Having enlarged his fleet by successive reinforcements, Cimon sailed thither, and provoked the enemy to an engagement, and, having defeated the fleet, he sailed up the river to their camp, which met with the same fate. Flushed with the victory by sea, his men completely routed the Persian army, and carried away the rich treasures found in their tents. It is said that he also defeated a Phœnician squadron which was then sailing to join their Persian allies.

The next enterprise of Cimon was one in which he had an hereditary interest. At this time the Persians held the Thracian Chersonesus, where his ancestors had ruled, and he sailed thither, and chased them not only from the territory of the republic, but from his own domains.

In the year B.C. 465, the Athenians were engaged in another contest with one of their allies. Their cupidity having led them to seek their continental gold mines from the Thasians, as a conquest won by the Persians, the demand was resisted, and Cimon was directed to subjugate them to the power of Athens. Accordingly, he sailed thither, and having defeated them by sea, he laid close siege to the island.

During the progress of this siege, the Athenians suffered a defeat in one of their principal possessions. They sent a body of ten thousand men, partly citizens and partly allies, to establish themselves in a site on the Strymon, called the Nine Ways, which was occupied by the Edonian Thracians. At first they were successful. They dislodged the inhabitants on the coast, but, undertaking an expedition against the Edonian town of Drabescus, which was situated in the interior, they were met by the united forces of the Thracians, and utterly destroyed.

While Cimon was besieging Thasos, the inhabitants, having a knowledge of the jealousy existing between Sparta and Athens, sent an embassy to engage the Spartans to make a diversion in their favour by invading Attica. The Thasian envoys were well received, and the Spartans were about to comply with their request, when a calamity overtook them which prevented a present display of hostility. Laconia was desolated by an earthquake. Great chasms were opened in the ground, and huge masses toppled down from the lofty heights of Taygetus. Sparta itself became a heap of ruins, only five houses being left unharmed. The loss of life was fearful, more than twenty thousand persons perished. Another terrible disaster threatened to follow in its train. Taking advantage of the consternation of the citizens, the oppressed helots assembled and hastened to the city, in the hopes of surprising and destroying their masters. But this was prevented by the presence of mind displayed by king Archilamus. As soon as the first consternation had subsided, he ordered an alarm to be sounded, as of the approach of an enemy, and the Spartans gathered round him in arms, upon which the helots relinquished their intention.

Still the safety of Sparta was not yet secured. Many of the slaves who groaned under their bondage were descendants of the Messenians, men of the same blood with themselves—Greeks and Dorians. These seized the opportunity of rising against their hated lords, and of fortifying themselves in the ancient stronghold of their liberty, Ithome. They were joined by many helots of other races, and even by the free inhabitants of some of the Laconian towns, so that they far outnumbered their masters. Notwithstanding, the Spartans were still masters of the open country, and they ventured to lay siege to Ithome.

In the mean time, the Thasians were compelled to surrender to the power of Cimon. They did so under very humiliating circumstances. Their fortifications were dismantled, and they surrendered their ships, ceded their continental territory and mines, and not only paid a certain sum at the moment, but stipulated to pay future tribute.

The Spartans early discovered that they were too weak to reduce Ithome, and they called on their allies for aid. As they had not openly avowed their hostility to Athens, they did not scruple to implore assistance from thence. At this time there was a strong party in Athens, who were swayed by Ephialtes and Pericles, (whose character will shortly be considered,) decidedly opposed to the Spartans, and they laboured to prevent acquiescence in the request.

Cimon, however, who, with the aristocratical party, considered Sparta as the natural ally of Athens, and who did not wish to see the latter without a rival in Greece, urged the Athenians not to permit Greece to be lamed and their city to lose its yoke-fellow; and his advice prevailed. He was sent with a large force to assist the Spartans at the siege of Ithome, an unfortunate event, since it ended in a rupture between these two leading states.

As the Athenians were skilful in the art of besieging towns, the Spartans had hoped that they would have speedily reduced Ithome. In this they were disappointed. That stronghold long resisted their united power, and threatened to baffle it altogether. This led the Spartans to conceive that it was rather from unwillingness than inability that their auxiliaries did not succeed, and they conceived apprehensions that the Athenians might be induced to betray their cause. There were no grounds upon which they could warrantably come to such a conclusion but their own bad faith, and yet, while they retained all the other allies, they dismissed the Athenians, with an intimation that they had no further need of their services. This so exasperated that state, that it was resolved to break off all connexion with Sparta, and to make the rupture more conspicuous, it was further resolved to enter into an alliance with Argos, that ancient rival of Sparta.

The Argives had been induced, by their jealousy of the Spartans, to stand aloof in the Persian war, and had probably been offended at seeing their dependant, Mycenæ, take an active part in that struggle. After the success of the Greeks, Mycenæ, grown bold by the event and encouraged by Sparta, asserted the right to the presidency of the Nemean games, which had long been enjoyed by Argos, and to the superintendance of a temple of Hera, which was common to both cities. This increased the hatred of Argos towards Mycenæ, and an opportunity was looked for when revenge might be securely taken. Accordingly, when the earthquake and the Messian insurrection had disabled Sparta from assisting others, or even defending herself, the Argives, assisted by Tegea and Cleonæ, made war on Mycenæ, and, after a furious resistance, took it and razed it to the ground, adding its territories to their own. It was soon after this conquest that they received proposals of alliance from Athens, which they gladly embraced, and the Thessalians were, from some cause unrecorded, included in the treaty.

This turn of events was very agreeable to the democratical party at Athens, as it justified their recent opposition to the aid afforded Sparta, and as it afforded them an advantage in their conflict with their adversaries, and especially with Cimon, whose downfall was eagerly sought by them.

The ostensible head of this party was Ephialtes, but Pericles, son of Xanthippus, the conqueror of Mycæ, had recently been gaining a superiority in the public estimation, and was gradually winning his way to the summit of popular favour.

Pericles gave early indications of a mind formed for great things, and a will to execute them. In his youth he was not satisfied with the ordinary

Greek education, but had applied himself to intellectual pursuits, then new at Athens, and confined to a narrow circle of inquisitive spirits. His birth and fortune favoured these pursuits, and he numbered among his instructors Pythocles and Damon, who taught him music, and Zeno and Anaxagoras, who instructed him in the arid subtleties of the Platonic school. To the latter especially, who was denominated "the philosopher of mind," on account of his solicitude to confirm the most important and pleasing of all doctrines, that a benevolent Intelligence presides over the operations of nature, and the affairs of human life, Pericles seems to have been peculiarly indebted. From him, it is said, he early learned to control the temper of youthful passions, which so frequently blight the prospects of manhood, to preserve an unshaken constancy in the vicissitudes of fortune, and to trample upon the grovelling superstition of the vulgar. The doctrine of an ordering Intelligence, distinct from the material universe, and ruling it with absolute sway, seems to have had the greatest effect upon the character of Pericles. This was striking from its novelty, and he appears to have adopted it as the medium for gaining an ascendancy over the multitudes at Athens. All his acquirements were considered by him as instruments to that end, and especially oratory. There are no specimens of his oratorical powers handed down to our age, and therefore it can only be estimated by the effect it produced. This was so powerful that it suggested a motive for alarm. The Athenians were led to suspect, from the bold and vivid images in which he is said to have indulged, that he entertained views adverse to freedom. And these fears were heightened by circumstances, nugatory in themselves, but well calculated to heighten the impression. The aged fancied that they saw in his person, manners, and voice, a resemblance of Pisistratus, their former tyrant, and this circumstance being communicated among a superstitious people, in order to escape the disgrace of the ostracism, he long shunned the dangerous admiration of the assembly. He devoted himself to war, in which he is said to have been brave and skilful, until after the ostracism of Themistocles and the death of Aristides. After those events, while Cimon was engaged in perpetual expeditions, Pericles began to present himself more and more to the eye of the public, and he soon became the chief of a party that sought the curtailment of Cimon's influence, and the establishment of measures foreign to his views. In fact it was a democratical party opposed to an aristocracy, and much bitterness of heart prevailed on both sides. Each, under the pretence of seeking the good of their country, sought the downfall of their opponents. Their patriotism degenerated into personal persecution.

This feeling was long displayed by Cimon and Pericles in private life, although in disguise. To gain the good-will of the Athenians, after his conquests, Cimon undertook several great works for the security and adornment of the city. He built the southern wall of the citadel, and, carrying out the intention of Themistocles, he laid the foundation of a wall for joining the city to its harbours, which was to be carried

down on the one side to Phalerum, and on the other to Piræus. Cimon also adorned the public places of the city with trees; and, by introducing a supply of water, converted the Academy, a spot about two miles north of the city, from an arid waste into a grove containing lawns for pleasure, and bowers for study. All this would have been praiseworthy if the motives had been pure. But that they were not—that they were undertaken with a view of soaring above the head of Pericles, is proved by other displays, degrading both to the benefactor and the benefited. His orchards and his fields were thrown open to the public; he kept a table constantly open to the rich; and he employed agents to go out into the streets, for the purpose of exchanging clothes with the poorer citizens, and to supply them with money. All this munificence was manifestly the work, not of a benevolent mind, but of an artful politician. By it Cimon sought popularity, if not for himself, at least for his order and his party. It was, in truth, one of those mean shifts to which partisans resort, in all ages, in order to gain popular favour.

Pericles, on his part, was equally active in ingratiating himself with the Athenians. He foresaw the probable effects of Cimon's munificence, and he sought to counteract them, not by opposing private liberality to liberality, for of that his fortune would not admit, but by public measures. He threw the munificence of Cimon into the shade, by proposing a similar application of the public revenue. Through his means a series of measures, as will be hereafter seen, were passed for the subsistence and gratification of the poor at the public expense.

While Pericles was thus courting the favour of the multitude, he was no less solicitous to command its respect. He lived in almost utter seclusion, attending only to public business, and admitting into his society only a select circle of intimate friends. Much care was taken by him in the preparation of his speeches, and the impression they produced was heightened by the dignity of his carriage, and by the composure he maintained under provocations. But even in this he avoided familiarity with the people. It was only on great occasions that he appeared in the public assembly. Ordinary measures were carried through the agency of his friends and partisans, as Ephialtes, son of Sophonides.

Such were the leading features of the two great parties now in the political field at Athens. That they should come into contact, and one finally fall before the other, was inevitable. Hence we find that on several occasions these parties were opposed against each other. The first great occasion appears to have been immediately after the conquest of Thasos. After that event, Cimon had received instructions to attempt some further conquest on the main-land, between the newly conquered district and Macedonia, before he returned to Greece. These instructions were neglected, and his adversaries ascribed his conduct to the influence of Macedonian gold, and so inflamed the popular mind that he was brought to trial for delinquency. On this occasion, however, Cimon triumphed, for whether Pericles found that the charge could not be substantiated, or that the question

was not of sufficient moment to warrant him in displaying the thunders of his eloquence against his adversary, cannot be ascertained, but it is certain that he only rose once, for form's sake, to second the accusation, and so the matter dropped.

But this event may be considered as only a prelude to a storm thickly gathering in the horizon of the political course of Cimon. The next struggle involved the principles of the parties, and excited stronger feelings of mutual animosity. It has been recorded, that by an innovation introduced by Aristides, the poorest citizen, if a man of talent, *might* gain admission into the Areopagus. The emphasis is here laid on the preterite *might*, because the change hitherto had been scarcely perceptible, and it was attended with no effect in the maxims and proceedings of that ancient court. Pericles observed this, and he resolved to attack the aristocracy in that stronghold. He did not, indeed, attempt to abolish the institution, for such would have doubtless brought ruin on his own head, but he aimed at limiting its functions, so as to leave it little more than a name.

This contest had commenced before Cimon went to the aid of Sparta against Ithome, and when he returned with the lustre of his fame diminished by the rupture between Athens and Sparta, the natural result of his failure, it was renewed with greater vigour. In reality, Cimon had little influence to exert in its behalf, but what he had he used. He called in the powerful aid of the poet Æschylus, who was attached to the Areopagus by his character and early associations. That poet, who was himself a Eupatrid, and perhaps connected with the priestly families of Eleusis, reached down his harp, to oppose what he considered a sacrilegious encroachment on a venerable and time-hallowed institution. In a tragedy entitled "The Euménides," which was acted before the public, he exhibited the mythical origin of the court and council of the Areopagus, tracing it to the cause first pleaded there between the Argive matricide, Orestes, who pledged his country to an eternal alliance with Athens, and the dread goddesses who sought vengeance for his crime. These goddesses were brought upon the stage, and Athene herself, the tutelary goddess of the city, who had instituted the tribunal to last throughout all ages, was afterwards represented as exhorting her people to preserve it as the glory and safeguard of their city. But the charms of poetry, the reverence for the mythical and religious traditions of Greek antiquity, and even respect for the tutelary goddess, were lost in the tumult of passions which ruled in the breasts of the Athenians. A decree was passed by which the Areopagus was shorn of its authority, and was only allowed to retain a few branches of its jurisdiction.

It is difficult to determine the precise nature of this innovation, whether it affected the power of the tribunal which took cognizance of murder, or that of the council which claimed superintendence over the education and conduct of the citizens, and the decision of causes pertaining to religion, morals, and the right of interfering with the decrees of the people, when it seemed to be required for the public welfare. From the open-

ing of the drama of Æschylus, which turns on the foundation of the court, it would appear that the law took cases of murder out of the jurisdiction of the court of the Areopagus; but his after praises of the tutelary goddess of the city apply rather to the council. Hence opinions are divided on this subject, but the strongest arguments are on the side of those who consider that it was the council, with its incidental jurisdiction, rather than the tribunal for the prosecution of murder, which felt this blow of the democratical party. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive what object Pericles could have had in touching that part of criminal jurisdiction which was not only the most venerable, but the least liable to abuse. Had party spirit become so furious as to resort to assassination, such might have been the case, but it does not appear as yet to have become so mad, though a future page will reveal such deeds; and therefore the criminal jurisdiction may have been adjusted with a view to that foul consummation. And yet the common feelings of humanity seem to forbid the thought assassination is a dark spot in the human character, when committed in the tumult of passion, it is rendered still darker by premeditation, and he must have been a monster who could venture to legislate for such a purpose.

At length Pericles triumphed over Cimon immediately after the reduction of the power of the Areopagus, and about two years after the return of the Athenians from Ithome, like Themistocles and Aristides before him, he suffered banishment by the ostracism. This appears to have been then deemed necessary by the moderate of both parties, in order that public tranquillity, which had been so long disturbed by strife, might be restored. This is a notable proof of the truth of the remark of an eloquent writer, that party spirit, by encouraging pride and many evil passions, frequently excites to malice and bitter persecutions.

At the period of the rupture between Athens and Sparta, the two states, Corinth and Megara, had been for some time at war.

On this occasion, the party in power at Megara renounced their alliance with Sparta, and admitted an Athenian garrison into the city and into the port of Pegæ, on the Corinthian gulf. In order to secure the communication between Megara and the sea, and its dependence on Athens, the Athenians connected the city with its harbour at Næsea, by a similar work to that between Athens and Piræus, and they themselves garrisoned the walls. This was a great immediate advantage to Athens, but it was more than counterbalanced by the loss of one of her most faithful allies—Corinth.

At the time a part of the Athenian force was thus employed, another part was engaged in assisting Inarus, king of some of the Libyan tribes, on the western border of Egypt, against the Persians under Achæmenes. The Persians were defeated, and Achæmenes slain, and the Athenians then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where a body of Persians, with some Egyptians, were still in possession of that quarter of the city called the White Castle. To this they laid siege, and were thus engaged while their countrymen were employed in transactions now to be recorded, *a. c.* 457.

The occupation of Megara by the Athenian forces aroused the utmost resentment of Corinth; and it was followed by a war, in which the Corinthians were joined by Ægina, and the maritime towns of Argolis. The Athenians saw the storm lowering in the distance, and sought to counteract its fury. They landed a body of troops near Halie, in the Argolic Act^u, in the hope of crushing their enemies before they had collected their full strength. Here, however, they were defeated by the united forces of the Corinthians and Epidaurians. But this check was, in some measure, compensated for by a victory which they gained over the Peloponnesian fleet, off the island of Ceryphalea, in the Saronic gulf. And this was but a prelude to a more decisive victory. The Æginetans having joined their fleet with that of Corinth and the other Peloponnesian allies, the Athenians collected the naval force of their confederacy to meet them. They joined issue near Ægina, and the Athenians, under Leocrates, were victorious. They took seventy galleys from the Corinthians and their allies, and, on their landing, laid siege to Ægina. In order to make a diversion, the Corinthians invaded the Megarian territory, conceiving, that while so large a force was employed in Egypt, either Megara must be exposed, or the siege of Ægina raised. But the activity of the Athenians surmounted their difficulties. Aroused by Myronides, who was second only to Cimon or Miltiades, the aged and the young, who had been left at home for the defence of their city, marched out, under his command, to meet the Corinthians. A battle ensued, and though Myronides could not lay claim to a decisive victory, yet he remained master of the field, while he erected a trophy, while the Corinthians returned home. They reached their city, but being there reproached for yielding to an inferior force, they returned, and met with a decisive defeat, which so weakened Corinth, that she was incapacitated, for some time, from making any strenuous exertions against her opponents.

Previous to the attempt made by the Corinthians to relieve Ægina, Artaxerxes, fearing the loss of Egypt, sought, by a similar diversion, to draw away the Athenians from Memphis. Anticipating that gold might be found more potent than arms, Artaxerxes sent a Persian to Sparta with a sum of money, to bribe the principal Spartans to use their influence in engaging their countrymen in an expedition against Attica. Spartan integrity so far yielded to hostile feelings, as to wish to take the proffered rewards, but Ithome still held out, and the Spartans had not yet the means of undertaking the proposed invasion.

A rumour of this negotiation seems to have reached Athens, and to have quickened the energy with which Pericles urged the completion of the walls, for which preparations had before been made by Cimon, and which were to unite the city with its ports. These walls were conducted to Phalerum, the distance of about four miles, and to Piræus about five miles, with towers at proper intervals, and thus Athens and Piræus came to be after distinguished by the names of the upper and lower town, as two parts of the same city.

There was a party in Athens who saw, in this

great work, not the means of securing the independence of the city, but a bulwark of the hated commonalty, and hence they longed to see its progress obstructed. During its erection, events occurred which threatened to fulfil their hopes. In the same year that Myronides had triumphed over the Corinthians, the Phocians had invaded Doris, and had captured one of its minor towns. Aroused by this act, the Spartans collected an army of ten thousand allied troops, and a small body of their own, and marched into Doris, where they compelled the Phocians to restore their conquest. An obstacle, however, was placed in the way of their return. They had been allowed to traverse the isthmus without opposition, but the passes were now guarded by the enemy. Under these circumstances, Nicomedes, who headed the Spartans, turned aside on his march to Boeotia, and encamped at Tanagra, near the borders of Attica. Thus, at least, was his ostensible motive for taking such a step, but he had received secret advice from the oligarchical faction at Athens, which led him to hope for their co-operation in aiming a blow at the power of that state. In this he was deceived, the intrigue became known, and the Athenians, mustering their whole strength, which, with some Argives and other allied troops, chiefly from Ionia, amounted to fourteen thousand infantry, and a body of cavalry from Thessaly, marched out to seek the enemy at Tanagra.

While the two armies were facing each other, in daily expectation of a contest, Cimon, who was in the neighbourhood, came to the camp, and requested leave to take his post among his friends and partizans, who amounted to about one hundred men. The generals referred this request to the council of Five Hundred, who rejected it, and Cimon, thus repulsed, left his armour with his friends, exhorting them to retort the calumnies of those who charged him and them with preferring Sparta to their country, by deeds of valour. They did so, for, in a battle which ensued, they all perished, while fighting round his paucity, and this disaster, combined with the treachery of the Thessalians, who went over to the enemy in the midst of the action, contributed to decide the victory in favour of the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies. By this victory, after ravaging the Megarian territory, they were enabled to return home over the isthmus.

Neither the power nor the spirit of Athens was broken by the defeat at Tanagra. In about three months afterwards, and early in the year B.C. 456, the Athenians were again in the field to retrieve their lost honours. Under the command of Myronides they marched into Boeotia, and meeting the Bœotians, in a tract called, from its vineyards, Cœnophyta, they gained a victory, which gave them undisputed possession of that country and Phocis. According to Diodorus, Myronides made himself master of all the Bœotian towns, except Thebes, and, to secure his advantages, he razed the walls of Tanagra, and compelled the Locrians of Opus to place a hundred citizens in his hands as hostages.

During the same year, Leocrates returned victorious over Ægina. Deprived of all relief, the Æginetans capitulated, upon similar terms to

those granted to the Phasians—the demolition of their walls, the surrender of their ships, and the payment of an annual tribute.

In the following year, B.C. 455, the Athenians resolved to prosecute offensive operations against the Spartans and their allies. An Athenian squadron, under the command of Tolmides, sailed round Peloponnesus, burned the Spartan arsenal at Gythium, took the town of Chalcis, belonging to the Corinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to oppose the landing of their troops. A more important advantage gained in this expedition was the capture of Naupactus, belonging to the Ozolian Locrians. This capture was made at a seasonable juncture for the defenders of Ithome. At this time they had obtained honourable terms of the Spartans, and they were permitted to quit Peloponnesus with their families, on condition that slavery should again be their portion if they returned. Tolmides settled these homeless wanderers in Naupactus, and there, with the revised name of the Messenians, they became once more numbered among the Grecian people under the sheltering wing of Athens.

While success thus generally attended the Athenian arms within the limits of Greece, they suffered reverses in Egypt. After the defeat of Achamenes and after being disappointed in his hopes of assistance from Sparta, ARTAXERXES resolved on sending an overwhelming force to recover Egypt. It was placed under the command of an able general, Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus. By him the insurgents and their allies were defeated, and the Greeks were forced to evacuate Memphis, and to take refuge in a town called Byblus, in an island of the Nile, named Protopitis, where they were besieged for eighteen months. At the end of that time, Megabyzus turned the streams which separated the island from his own side of the river into new channels, by which means the Greek galleys were all left aground, and were burned by the Athenians lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy. After this the Persians marched into the island over the bed of the river, and the Athenians, overpowered by numbers, were almost all destroyed, a few only reached the opposite bank, and escaped to Cyrene. About the same time, a squadron of fifty galleys sent to the relief of the Athenians, sailed up the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and being surprised by a combined attack of the Persian land force, and the Phœnician fleet, a remnant only escaped to Athens.

In the mean time, the tocsin of war was rung in another part of Greece, and the Athenians, whose spirit still seemed invincible, answered to the dread summons. War had, indeed, to them become their natural element, and it was only while engaged in it that they seemed to breathe freely. Orestes, son of Echeeratides, king, or perhaps more properly *tytus*, of Thessaly, being compelled to flee from his country, implored assistance from Athens. The Athenians had neither forgotten nor forgiven the Thessalians for deserting their cause in the battle of Tanagra, and hence succours were granted to him. An army composed of the newly-acquired auxiliary force of Beotia and Phocis, with a body of Athenian troops, entered Thessaly under the command of

Myronides, and penetrated as far as Pharsalus. The superiority of the Thessalians, however, checked all his operations in the field, and after having failed in an attempt upon Pharsalus, he was compelled to return, foiled, to Athens.

It was, perhaps, to allay public dissatisfaction arising from the failure of this enterprise, that Pericles, soon after the return of Myronides, embarked with a thousand men at Pegæ, and coasting the south side of the Corinthian gulf, made a descent on the territory of Sicyon. The Sicyonians quitted their walls to protect their fields, and they were defeated. Pericles then took on board some Achaean troops, and sailed over to the coast of Acarnania, when he laid siege to the town of Cænada, which had incurred the enmity of Athens, or rather excited their cupidity, because it was situated in a tract of rich land, formed by the deposits of the Achelous. But in this attempt Pericles failed, and he returned to Athens without having enhanced her reputation for deeds of arms.

By these events the Athenians appear to have lost their overweening confidence in their leaders, and the friends of Cimon considered it a favourable opportunity of awakening regret in the minds of the people concerning his banishment. Hence, not long after, that great man was recalled from his exile, and Pericles so far bowed to the feelings of the populace, as to move for such a decree himself. It must be considered, however, that he only made a virtue of necessity in acting thus, and that he sought to condone his rival, by complying with public feelings, rather than to redress the wrongs he had inflicted on Cimon. It is difficult for the human mind to shake off the feelings of enmity, and it is still more difficult to submit to the humiliating feeling of offering redress to those we have injured. Hence it arises that the enmity men contract in early life, is frequently perpetuated to the day of death. No conviction of the innocence of those with whom they are offended, is able to alter their line of conduct towards them. Policy alone, as in the case of Pericles, can smooth down their anger while they remain in a state of nature; grace alone can effect a real change in man's heart.

The restoration of Cimon to a leading situation in the commonwealth of Athens, was followed by a cessation of hostilities in Greece. This appears to have been proposed by Cimon, and Pericles, having recently lost his coadjutor Ephialtes, who had been assassinated in the dead of the night, seconded his views. But, though desired by the two leading men of the Athenian state, it was difficult to reconcile interests where so many were concerned, and three years elapsed before any truce with the Peloponnesian confederacy could be brought to a conclusion. At the end of that time, B.C. 450, a treaty of peace was concluded, but it was only to the effect that the sword should rest in its scabbard for five years.

During that short pause of war, Cimon embarked in his last expedition. He was appointed to the command of a fleet of two hundred galleys, with which he sailed to Cyprus. Having arrived there, he sent sixty of his ships to the assistance of Amyrtæus, in Egypt, while he himself laid siege, with the rest, to Citium. At that

place he was carried off by illness, or a wound, and the armament was compelled to raise the siege for lack of provisions. Soon after, the Athenians fell in with a great fleet of Phœnician and Cilician galleys, near the Cyprian Salamis, which they defeated; and then landing, gained another victory over the troops which had left the enemy's ships, or over a land force by which they were supported. Being joined immediately after these events by the squadron which had been sent to Egypt, and which had not achieved any material object, the Greek armament sailed to Athens. They brought with them the remains of Cimon, which were buried at Athens, and a magnificent monument was erected to his memory, under the name of Cimoneia, *b.c.* 449, which was to be seen in the days of Plutarch.

The loss which Athens sustained in the death of Cimon was great. So also was that of Greece at large, for no one was left able or willing to divert the military spirit of her sons from civil war. But a short time elapsed before his pacific labours were defeated; and though even he might not have been able to control the causes whence this sprung, he might have greatly softened the asperity of the contending parties by his wisdom, moderation, and conciliating disposition.

After the recall of Cimon, it would appear that Pericles was contented to be the second person in the commonwealth, but when he was removed, a variety of circumstances combined to make him the first. The aristocratical party opposed Thucydides, brother-in-law of Cimon, to him, but Thucydides, though a man of great abilities, and renowned for his military talents, statesman-like conduct, and oratory, was nevertheless unable to cope with his more skilful antagonist. A war of oratory ensued, of which little is known, save that Pericles acquired the superiority, which was, for the time at least, decisive.

The superiority of Pericles was by no means conducive to peace. Although well aware that Sparta was jealous of the prosperity of Athens, and still ambitious of supremacy, instead of conciliating those feelings, he inflamed them by one of his first measures. According to Plutarch, he carried a decree through the assembly, by virtue of which envoys were sent to various parts of Greece, and even the islands and Asiatic colonies, to invite every Greek state to send deputies to a general congress to be held at Athens. The ostensible objects of this assembly were partly religious and partly political. Thus they were to take measures with respect to the temples which had been burned in the Persian war, and the vows made on that occasion, which were still unperformed; and they were to provide for the security of commerce, and to remove all obstacles which obstructed the free passage of the Greek vessels. Had these been the only motives of Pericles for procuring this decree, he would have stood clear of blame, but it carried upon the face of it a design to have Athens acknowledged as mistress and sovereign of all the Grecian states. In such a light it was viewed by Sparta; and through her counter-machinations, it fell to the ground. The different states refused to send their deputies.

By this movement the breach between Athens

and Sparta was widened; and during the year after the death of Cimon a new occasion of indirect hostility occurred. The people of Delphi, though they were commonly considered as a branch of the Phœcian nation, and were nominally subject to the Amphictyonic council, had, from the earliest ages, been in the exclusive possession of the temple of Delphi, and had exercised the superintendence of the oracle, and the guardianship of the sacred treasures, by ministers of their choice. Relying on the protection of Athens, the Phœcians wrested this charge from the Delphians; and the Spartans replaced them in possession of their ancient privilege, which induced them to renounce their union with the Phœcian league, and to declare themselves an independent state. To require these benefits, the Delphians passed a decree which gave to Sparta the right of precedence in consulting the oracle; an honour which the Spartans caused to be engraved on the bronze image of a wolf consecrated in the temple. The Athenians looked upon this interference with one of their allies as insulting and derogatory to their honour and interests; and, therefore, as soon as the Spartan army was withdrawn from Phœcia, Pericles appeared at Delphi with an Athenian force, and reinstated the Phœcians in the custody of the temple. The honour of precedence in consulting the oracle was now transferred to Athens, and it was commemorated on the side of the bronze wolf, whose front bore the decree of the Delphians in favour of Sparta. There can be no doubt that these events inflamed the animosity existing between Athens and Sparta, but still they forbore coming into direct collision. The flame of war between them, however, was only stifled, that it might burst forth at a future date with increased fury.

In the mean time, events occurred which greatly weakened the power of the Athenians. After the battle of *Æuophyta*, the Athenians having gained the ascendancy in the *Bœotian* cities, as before recorded, bands of exiles from those cities found means of making themselves masters of *Orchomenus*, *Chæronea*, and other minor towns of *Bœotia*. This event threatened the interests of Athens throughout the north of Greece, and, contrary to the advice of Pericles, an expedition, under the command of *Toimides*, was sent to dislodge them. *Toimides* first attacked *Chæronea*, and reduced it; but, as he was retiring thence, he was surprised by the appearance of a hostile army, composed of the *Bœotian* exiles assembled in *Orchomenus*, of *Locrians*, and of exiles from various parts, by whom the Athenians were defeated and he himself slain. The consequence of this victory was the loss of Athenian influence throughout *Bœotia*. In order to recover the prisoners taken in this battle, who were probably young men of good families, the Athenians stipulated to withdraw all their troops from *Bœotia*; and their departure was followed by the return of the exiles, and the predominance of the party hostile to the Athenian state, *b.c.* 447.

The success of the *Bœotians* encouraged the revolt of the *Eubœans*. This was alarming to the Athenian state, and Pericles crossed over to reduce them to subjection. No sooner, however,

had he debarked, than he received intelligence of a revolution at Megara, where the adverse party, supported by auxiliaries from Corinth, Theyon, and Epidaurus, had put the greater part of the Athenian garrison to the sword, and compelled the remainder to take refuge in Nisæa.

It is probable that this would not have been sufficient to have diverted Pericles from the conquest of Eubœa, but the tidings were coupled with others still more alarming. The five years' truce had now, B.C. 445, expired, and there was no disposition to extend it. A Peloponnesian army was on its march towards Attica, and, being informed of this, Pericles transported his forces back from Eubœa for the defence of Athens.

Soon after the return of Pericles, the Peloponnesians entered the country, and ravaged the fertile plains on the western frontier. The army was commanded by the young Spartan king, Pleistoanax, son of Pausanias, who was seconded by a counsellor of maturer age, named Cleandridas. Fearing the result of a battle, Pericles, while he was encamped opposite the enemy at Eleusa, had recourse to policy, and it was generally supposed that he succeeded in bribing Cleandridas to withdraw the invading army. Whether such was actually the case cannot be ascertained; but it is certain that when, on their return to Sparta, he and the young king were charged with having sold the interests of their country, Cleandridas shrunk from the accusation by a voluntary exile, and was condemned to death in his absence. According to Plutarch, Pleistoanax was sentenced to so heavy a fine, that he, being unable to pay it, was obliged to abscond also; but the records of Thucydides would convey the idea, that he fled to avoid death, since he chose the sanctuary of Jupiter, on mount Lycæum in Arcadia, not only for a temporary retreat, but as a final abode.

Athens being relieved from this imminent danger, Pericles returned to the conquest of Eubœa, which he speedily accomplished. The people of Histiaea were expelled from their native country, in order to make room for an Attic colony, and as a punishment for the inhumanity with which they had immolated the crew of an Athenian galley captured during the war. The rest of the Eubœans were admitted to a capitulation, by which they retained their estates and the municipal administration of their cities.

At length the Athenians saw that there was danger in the struggle for supremacy; and, lest ruin should ensue, they began to sigh for peace. The Spartans, also, having lost the most favourable opportunity of humbling their rivals, were no less inclined to sheath their swords, at least for a period. Hence, when Callias and Chares, as the envoys of Athens, proposed a truce, they were listened to with complaisance. Notwithstanding, the Spartans took advantage of the public feeling at Athens to exact conditions, which in the days of uninterrupted Athenian prosperity would have been rejected with scorn. They demanded the restitution, or evacuation of Troezen, Achaia, Pegæ, and Nisæa; and this demand being conceded, a truce was concluded between Sparta and Athens, and the confederacies over which they presided, for thirty years.

By this treaty, therefore, the Peloponnesus was

completely delivered from Athenian influence. It seems probable, also, that the Phocians seceded from their alliance with Athens at this time, for when they are next mentioned they are numbered among the allies of Sparta. At the same time it would appear, moreover, that the temple of Delphi was restored to the custody of the Delphians, for, although the fact is not recorded, it is evident that a few years after it was in their possession, since, before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the oracle zealously espoused the cause of Sparta.

Such was the conclusion of the first great struggle between Athens and Sparta for supremacy. It was the first-fruit of the Persian war. Raised thereby to a high pitch of military glory, Athens lusted for dominion, and it commenced a struggle for that dominion at home. Hence she was opposed by Sparta, which had hitherto enjoyed supremacy over the Grecian states, and was, therefore, jealous of her prerogative. The flames of war spread as time rolled on, till almost the whole of Greece was involved in the dire conflagration, and they then died away. But the ashes were still left on the hearths of the different states, and their future development in still fiercer flames will form the subject of future pages. In after ages they consumed the already scorched bonds of brotherhood, with the flower of the whole nation. History scarcely unfolds such another picture of the desolating effects of civil war, of which past events were but the prelude. The boasted philosophy of Greece could not rescue her sons from the fearful calamity the corruption of the human heart showed itself triumphant over the wisdom of the human mind; which, being also depraved, extended and perpetuated the evil, until Greece was on the brink of ruin. Religion, moreover, if Grecian superstition could be termed religion, did her part in the dreadful work.

CHAPTER XII

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND CORINTH

B.C. 445—435.

THE history of Athens, during the interval of peace, may be comprised in a general survey of the administration of Pericles; which, combined with other causes, raised her to a high pitch of prosperity and refinement.

It has been stated, that, after the death of Cimon, his party found a new leader in Thucydides. It appears that Thucydides had made up by his devotion to political business what he lacked in ability; for, about the period of the truce between Athens and Sparta, he had organised a more regular opposition than had hitherto been formed against the administration of Pericles. His activity, however, only served to hasten his own downfall, and to consummate the triumph of his adversary. He was far surpassed by Pericles in eloquence and address, which he himself acknowledged to the Spartan king Archidamus. Being asked by that monarch

which of them was the better wrestler, he replied, "When I trip up Pericles, he never fails to persuade the people that he has not been down." The eloquence of Pericles, therefore, gave him a great advantage over his opponent; and when, at length, the contest was brought to an issue—when it became necessary that one or the other should be deemed the victor, Pericles triumphed. Thucydides was sent into temporary exile by the ostracism, B.C. 444.

Being now without any formidable opponent, Pericles was enabled to carry out his views, which were popular, with all the means the state could furnish. His policy seems to have had a twofold purpose; to extend and strengthen the Athenian power, and to raise the confidence and self-esteem of the Athenians to a level with the position they had attained.

In the time of Aristides, a proposal had been made by the Samians, to transfer the treasury of the Athenian confederacy from Delos to Athens. This change was opposed by Aristides, he probably conceiving that the proposal was only made by a section of the Samian community, but it was not long deferred. Cimon had stripped the weaker states, one after another, of their defence, and when the power of Pericles became dominant, he took the few remaining steps to convert the confederacy into one state, over which Athens had hitherto ruled only as a tyrant.

The first measures of Pericles to this end were to raise the annual contributions of the allies from 460 to 600 talents, and to cause the Athenians to exercise authority over the states deprived of their independence, and to interfere with their internal administration. In almost every instance, the effect of this authority was the establishment of a democratical constitution, answering to that of the ruling state, and where an aristocratical party was permitted to prevail, there heavier burdens appear to have been imposed. This was a great grievance, but it was slight, compared with the regulations imposed on the subject states with reference to the dispensation of justice. All trials of capital offences, and all cases involving property beyond a small amount, were transferred from the local courts to the tribunals of Athens. In reality, therefore, these states became as so many provinces of the Athenian democracy.

The authority which Athens assumed over her allies appears to have been submitted to without opposition; but her interference with their judicial proceedings involved so much loss to the different states, and entailed so much inconvenience upon them by the expenses and delays of justice, that it proved the occasion of a war. A quarrel arose between Samos and Miletus, about the town of Anaxa, on the mainland, opposite Samos; and a war ensued, in which the Milesians were worsted. The vanquished sought protection from Athens; and their application was seconded by a party in Samos itself, which sought to overthrow the oligarchical government that had been permitted to rule the island. The Milesians found a ready hearing; and the Samians were ordered to desist from hostilities, and to submit the dispute to an Athenian tribunal. To this the Samians showed an unwillingness to

consent; and Pericles was sent with a squadron to enforce obedience, and to regulate the state of Samos as the interests of Athens might appear to require. Arriving in Samos, Pericles established a democratical constitution; and, to secure it against the party favourable to oligarchy, took a hundred hostages, and sent them to Lemnos. Diodorus says, that he also exacted a contribution of eighty talents; after which, leaving a garrison in Samos, he returned to Athens.

Samos, however, was not yet secured. On the approach of the Athenians, a body of Samians had quitted the island, and had opened a correspondence with Pisisthnes, a satrap of Sardis; and, by the time the Athenian squadron possessed of their country. They exerted great energy and skill in carrying this plan into execution. Having raised a band of seven hundred mercenaries, and given notice to their party in Samos, they landed by night, overpowered the Athenian garrison and their political adversaries, and abolished the democratical form of government. After this they sailed to Lemnos, and made themselves masters of the hostages retained there, and, this accomplished, they publicly renounced their alliance with Athens. In order to ensure success, they placed the Athenian prisoners in the hands of Pisisthnes, on condition that they should be supported by a Phœnician fleet, and they engaged Byzantium to join in the revolt. Still these aids were not sufficient to inspire a reasonable hope that they should escape the vengeance of Athens, so long as she was able to direct her undivided strength against them. Foreseeing this, the Samians sought to stir up her enemies in Greece; and the allies of Sparta held a congress, in which the question of interfering in this matter was vehemently debated. Many of these allies were for aiding the Samians, but Corinth voted against them; and the confederates finally determined to leave them exposed to the vengeance of Athens.

While this subject was under consideration in the Spartan congress, Pericles, accompanied by nine colleagues, crossed the sea with a fleet of sixty sail, to suppress the revolt. He gained a victory over a Samian fleet of seventy ships and twenty transports, and having received reinforcements from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, he landed a body of troops sufficient to drive the enemy into the town, and to invest it with a triple line of intrenchments. His force being thus divided, the Samians ventured to meet him again on the sea, and were this time victorious. The advantage, however, seems to have been but small, for Pericles soon after sailed along the coast of Caria, hoping to meet with the Phœnician fleet, then sailing to the aid of the Samians. During his absence, the besieged drew out their remaining galleys, and surprised and defeated the naval encampment of the Athenians, a victory which made them masters of the sea, and enabled them to introduce supplies into Samos. But their triumph was of short duration. On hearing of this reverse, Pericles returned, and the town was again closely besieged. He was enabled to do this more effectually than before, for the Athenians, hearing of the stubborn resistance of the Samians, sent a greater force.

Still the besieged defied their power for nine months, and had not famine come to the aid of the Athenians, they would not even then have been victorious. Thus subdued, the Samians capitulated; and the terms which they obtained may be considered mild, especially if what Plutarch relates is correct, that the parties had been so exasperated against each other, as mutually to brand their prisoners. The Athenians branding theirs with the figure of a merchant-ship, used at Samos, and called a Samarna, and the Samians theirs with the figure of an owl. The terms were, that the Samians should dismantle their fortifications, deliver up their ships, and pay the cost of the siege by instalments. The submission of Byzantium seems to have followed close upon the reduction of Samos, after which Pericles returned to Athens, where he was greeted with extraordinary honours. No distinction was made, because the victory obtained was over a Greek city, and not over the barbarians these were alike matters of rejoicing at Athens.

The event of the Samian war, says Thirlwall, gave the sanction of success to the claim which Athens advanced of absolute authority over her allies. It established the fact, that the name "alliance," so far as it signified a relation of equality, or any degree of subordination short of entire subjection to the will of the ruling state, was a mockery. The question of right, indeed, could not be so determined. But the aid which Chios and Lesbos had lent toward the suppression of the Samian revolt, and still more the acquiescence of Sparta and her allies, interpreted by the language in which a part of them expressly recognised the title of Athens to the sovereignty which she claimed, seemed to attest the justice of her cause.

Having thus exalted the Athenian power, Pericles proceeded to effect the second object of his policy, namely, to elevate the Athenians to a full consciousness of their lofty station, as members of the sovereign state, as citizens of Athens. This could not have been very difficult, for the condition of an Athenian citizen acquired a new dignity and value, when he was considered as one of the people which ruled a great state with absolute sway. Impressed with this conviction, there can be but little doubt that the general feeling among the Athenians was, that they were like so many kings. In this line of policy, therefore, Pericles was aided by the working of proud human nature, which is ever prone to a love of dominion.

There was, however, a class of individuals in Athens who could hardly have worked themselves into the belief that they were lords in Greece. These were the indigent, of whom there appear to have been many. But Pericles took an effectual step to raise these in their own estimation. He sent them out as colonists into different parts, where they might best guard and promote the interests of Athens, as true citizens. The north of Eubœa, Naxos, Andros, the Thracian Chersonesus, the territory of the Bœotian Thracians, which lay to the south of the Strymon, Sinope, Sybaris, Amisus, and Neapolis, successively received such colonists from Athens, who were thereby at once provided for, and raised to the dignity of Athenian citizens. The

houses and the property of those who were expelled by the Athenian arms to make room for them became theirs, and, being thus rendered wealthy, they soon became impressed with the feelings of self-importance, pride being a general attendant upon riches.

The circumstances connected with the establishment of the Athenian colony at Sybaris, are interesting from the celebrated names connected with it, and from the ambitious hopes which it suggested. After the fall of Sybaris, as related in a previous page, the Sybarites who survived the destruction of their city took refuge in their colony of Laos and in Scidrus. They might have remained there in quiet, but the love of their fatherland was implanted in the breasts of their descendants, and at the period now under consideration, having engaged a body of adventurers from Thesaly, they effected a settlement on the vacant site of their ancient city. But this new colony soon roused the jealousy of their old enemies the Crotoniates, and at the end of about six years they were forced to resign their position. Under these circumstances they sent envoys to Sparta and Athens, to solicit aid for the renewal of their attempt. Sparta declined interference, but at Athens the envoys were received with favour, and her commissioners were sent out to their aid. Among these commissioners was a celebrated diviner, named Lampon, who procured an oracle, suited to the purpose of the leaders of the expedition. A new town was built under their guidance, at a short distance from the site of the old city, which was named Thurii, from a fountain which rose in its vicinity. Among the new settlers, were Herodotus the historian, and Lysias the orator, who, like many others sent thither by Athens, were foreigners, or, in other words, adventurers from various parts of Greece, and especially from Peloponnesus. This mixed population gave rise to violent quarrels, which shook for a while the peace of the colony. The Sybarites put forward pretensions to superiority over them, claiming the exclusive enjoyment of the most important offices in the state, the best of the territory, and the precedence in public sacrifices. These pretensions ill accorded with the feelings of the new settlers, particularly the Athenians, and their resentment at length broke out into a furious attack, by which the whole of this last remnant of the Sybarites were exterminated. The remaining Thurians, after this, recruited their forces by fresh hands of adventurers from Greece, whom they invited to join them upon terms of civil and political equality. These combined, formed themselves into tribes after the manner of the Athenian institutions, and those who took their names from Athens, Ionia, Eubœa, and the islands, may be considered as the guardians of the interests of the Athenian state in that quarter. Three of the other tribes represented the north of Greece, and three the Peloponnesus; but they all seem to have lived in harmony, both among themselves and with the Crotoniates. The equal division of territory which was made at the outset, and, above all, the institutions of Charondas, by which they agreed to be governed, seem to have conduced to this desirable end.

One leading measure adopted by Pericles to exalt the Athenians in their own estimation was, to raise the value of the Athenian franchise. In early life he had procured a decree which confined the rights of citizenship to persons whose parents were pure Athenians. This law, however, was not called into operation till about the same time with the foundation of Thurii. In that year, Psammiticus, who had become master of a great part of Lower Egypt, sent a present of corn to be distributed among the Athenian people; and Pericles seems to have considered this a favourable opportunity of distinguishing between those who were Athenians and those who were not. A rigid scrutiny was instituted, to try the titles of those who claimed a share of the largess; and the result was, that nearly five thousand persons were declared aliens, and suffered the penalty appointed by a rigorous law, for those who usurped the privileges of citizenship—they were sold as slaves.

The number of the citizens who passed through this ordeal amounted to about fourteen thousand; but after this reduction, and while the colonies were absorbing the surplus portion of the population, Pericles found it necessary to provide for the subsistence of the unsuccessful claimants. This he did by maintaining a squadron of sixty galleys, which were kept out at sea eight months during the year, and by employing a large portion in works designed for the defence and the embellishment of the city. So vigorously did Pericles carry on these works, and at such an enormous expenditure, that they have rendered his accession to power an epoch as important in the history of the arts as in that of Athens.

Under the administration of Pericles, some of the greatest sculptors and architects Greece ever produced found ample scope for the exercise of their talents. Phidias, Alcamenes, Agoracritus, Ictinus, Callicrates, Mnesicles, Callimachus, Corobus, Metagenes, and others, executed many useful works. Thus the great plan of Themistocles, which Cimon had prosecuted, namely, the erection of the long walls, was completed by the construction of a third wall within the two first built, and running parallel and near to that which joined the city to Piræus. The ravages of the Persians, also, and the gratitude felt towards the gods, having imposed a religious obligation of replacing the demolished temples at Athens, Eleusis, and in other parts of Attica, new ones were erected, on a scale of magnificence which corresponded to the exalted position of the state. The summit of the rock on which Athens stood was literally covered with sacred buildings and monuments; among which the Parthenon, planned and executed by the five first-mentioned artists, was pre-eminent. At the same time, edifices for theatrical and musical entertainments were erected; as the Odeum, which had a pointed roof, in imitation of the tent of Xerxes, and was constructed out of the masts of Persian ships. These works, while they gave scope for talent in sculpture and architecture, afforded also employment to the skill and ingenuity of a multitude of inferior workmen, so that it would not be too much to suppose that Athens was, at this date, a vast workshop. Carpenters, masons, smiths, turners, dyers, carvers, and gilders, were

in active operation; while a great number of trades were in constant exercise, to procure the materials both from the neighbourhood of Athens and from foreign lands. By this means, therefore, not a hand which required employment needed to be left idle in Athens; and hence history records that there was, at this period, general prosperity. Fed by the bounty of the state, over which Pericles was sole ruler, all flourished.

While the art of sculpture was brought to perfection by the genius of Phidias, the sister art of painting could not be despised; hence we find that Panæus, brother of this great man, and Zeuxes and Parrhasius, his contemporaries, were amongst the most celebrated of the Grecian school. During the same period, also, Greek poetry was enriched with a new composition—the drama, which united the leading features of every species before cultivated, and exhibited the grace and vigour of the Greek imagination, aided by the compass and refinement of the language peculiar to Attica. Phrynichus appears to have been the first great dramatist of Athens; but he was succeeded in the popular favour by a greater master of the lyre, Æschylus, who, by a variety of new inventions, so far succeeded as to be considered the father of Attic tragedy. Æschylus, however, in his turn, gave way to a rival in the person of Sophocles, who, from his superior taste, and knowledge of the force and beauties of the Greek language, became the favourite poet of the age of Pericles. With their names that of Euripides is also united. There were others who excelled in comedy. This species of composition, however, was not, in the same sense as tragedy, an Attic invention. The application of it seems to have been first made at Megara, and to have been thence imported into Attica by its author, Susarion, where it appears to have been neglected or despised for nearly a century, at the end of which time it became popular.

Both tragedy and comedy were made subservient to political purposes, although, as regards the former, its scenes were generally laid in the heroic age, and its action confined to the circle traced by the epic poets. An example of departure from this rule has been given in a previous page, where Æschylus is described as composing a tragedy at the instance of Cimon, in order to save the reputation of the Amphictyonic council. Another instance may be given, in a play by the same author, which celebrated the battle of Salamis, in which the poet connected his theme with the earliest struggles between Europe and Asia, and with the recent victory gained by the Sicilian Greeks over the Carthaginians at Himera; both which events he represented as a fulfilment of ancient prophecies, and as pledges of a final triumph of Greece over the barbarians.

Comedy was the more powerful weapon in the hands of political parties, inasmuch as its very essence was personal ridicule, which had the effect of bringing public characters into contempt. It was hence, perhaps, that while the power of Pericles was at its height, about *b.c.* 440, a law was passed to restrain its exhibition. This law, notwithstanding, was only in force for two or three years, at the end of which time it was

repealed, and not renewed in Athens as long as that state preserved its political independence. How effectual it was for good and evil may be seen in events which were brought about by its means at this period. Epoulus, Cratunus, Plato, and Telechides, had long played their dramatic engines against Pericles in harmless satire, while Hermippus assailed him with confirmed malignity, both in and out of the theatre. While they attacked his person, however, he was proof against their united assaults, for he was too dignified and elevated to be rendered ludicrous. I appears, also, that he was invulnerable on the side of public confidence, for although he was frequently styled by them "the father of the gods, whose sovereignty he represented by his absolute sway over the Athenian state," and "the eldest born of fame and faction," by way of ridicule, he enjoyed the public confidence. Thus failing to injure his reputation, the adversaries of Pericles assailed his private character. And here they found points that were vulnerable, and, though their blows did not permanently injure his reputation, they at least disturbed his domestic happiness.

The choice of the artists employed in the great works now being carried on at Athens was, in a great measure, entrusted to the judgment of Pericles, and the large sums expended in their erection passed through his hands. This gave occasion to suspicion and calumny, and, at length, his enemies ventured to call his integrity into question. The first blow aimed at him was through the side of a friend. As Phidias still was pre-eminent, he had been brought into intimate relation with Pericles, and to ruin the one by convicting him of fraud, was effectually to shake the credit of the other. Accordingly, Meno, who had been employed in some of the details of the statue of Minerva placed in the Parthenon, was induced to accuse Phidias of embezzling a part of the gold which he had received from the treasury for the fabrication of the golden ornaments of the goddess. But this charge fell to the ground. The ornaments had been fixed on the image in such a manner that they could be taken off, and Pericles challenged the accusers of Phidias to use this opportunity of proving their charge, which they declined.

When malice, however, is once conceived, it ever seeks to bring forth mischief. An accusation was therefore devised against him, founded on one of his works—the shield of the goddess Minerva. In the battle between Theseus and the Amazons thereon depicted, Phidias had introduced himself as a bald old man, and Pericles as a comely personage. This was sufficient to condemn him in the sight of a superstitious people. The introduction of their portraits with an object of public worship appeared to them as a violation of the sanctity of the place, and perhaps offensive to the majesty of the commonwealth. Phidias, therefore, was committed to prison, where he died.

Having thus obliquely wounded Pericles, his adversaries attacked him openly in the same vulnerable point—his private life. He had formed a gay connexion with Aspasia, a native of Miletus, who had long attracted much public attention. Aspasia acquired an ascen-

dancy over him which soon became notorious, and thus furnished the comic poets with a fund of ridicule, which was followed by serious charges. She was called, on the public stage, by names derived from depraved females of the heathen mythology. She was also charged with being the origin of the Samian war in favour of her birth-place, and with encouraging Pericles in the most licentious conduct. There does not appear to have been any ground for these accusations, and the first was passed over; but the second, supported by a third comedy written for the purpose, was made the subject of a criminal prosecution against her.

As may be gathered from previous pages, Athens, at this period, became a place of resort for learned and ingenious men of all pursuits. Philosophers especially were welcomed at the table of Pericles, and particularly if they professed new speculative tenets. As such, Anaxagoras, Zeno, Protagoras, and other celebrated men, resorted to the house of Pericles, where such subjects were long and eloquently discussed, Aspasia taking her part in the discussions. To liberal minds this could have been no offence, but these philosophers held doctrines remote from the conceptions of the vulgar, and the house of Pericles was held up as a school of impiety. Out of these materials the comic poet, Hermippus, framed a two-fold criminal prosecution against Aspasia. He charged her before the public with having offended against religion, and with corrupting the Athenian women.

While this cause was pending, one Diopithes procured a decree, by which persons who denied the existence of the Athenian gods, or taught doctrines concerning the heavenly bodies contrary to the established forms of religion, were made liable to a criminal process. This was aimed directly at Anaxagoras, whose various speculations had become famous, and were certainly wild and extravagant, although they could not tend, as his accusers supposed, to rob the greatest of the gods of their honour. Indirectly, however, the stroke was aimed at Pericles, for when the discussion of this decree, and the prosecution of Aspasia, had disposed the people to listen to other less probable charges, the old accusation of fraud was renewed, and a decree was passed directing Pericles to give in his accounts to the Prytanes, to be submitted to examination. Yet all these machinations failed of reaching their main object. Through the eloquence and tears of Pericles, the danger which threatened Aspasia was averted, and this success seems to have induced his adversaries to drop the proceedings instituted against himself, or at all events to postpone them to a more favourable season. As for the issue of the trial of Anaxagoras, a cloud of uncertainty hangs over it. According to some authors, he was condemned either to a fine and banishment or to death, while others state that he was defended by Pericles and acquitted.

Such were the leading events which took place at Athens during this interval of peace. To Pericles they bring, generally, much honour, showing him at once to have been a wise and enlightened statesman. But his wisdom could not save him from guilt. His connexion with

Aspasia is a foul blot upon his character; and how much he suffered by it may be seen in the tears he shed in her defence, and the persecutions to which he thereby subjected himself. It was the vulnerable point of his private character, which gave his enemies an advantage over him; and had not their asperities been softened down, it seems probable that it would have led to his ruin. Misery is connected with guilt; it is the wisdom of man, therefore, to flee from sin as from a serpent.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND CORINTH, WITH OTHER EVENTS LEADING TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

n c 435—431.

PEACE had not existed in Greece more than two years, when her sons were again engaged in war. By some authors, both ancient and modern, Pericles stands charged with enkindling this war, in order to divert the prosecution which hung over him, from a consciousness that his expenditure of the public money would not bear a public scrutiny. Thucydides, however, the great contemporary historian, acquits him of this charge, and declares that his integrity was unassailed. In truth, there is no other ground for it than the assertions of the enemies of Pericles, which they could never establish. The abrupt conclusion of the Thirty Years' Truce, therefore, must be ascribed to that love of war, which was deeply implanted in the Grecian breast in the earliest ages, and which was called into more lively action by the Persian invasion. Unhappily, although Greece was divided into so many parts, yet such was their connexion, that war in any one always endangered the peace of the whole. This will be exemplified in the following pages. From a spark excited in a remote corner, a general conflagration arose throughout Greece, which is distinguished in history as the Peloponnesian war.

The city of Epidamnus had been founded on the eastern side of the Adriatic, on the site of the modern Durazzo, by colonists from Corcyra, who had taken a Corinthian named Phalax, a Heraclid, for their leader, and had admitted some Corinthians and other Dorians to share in the settlement. This colony became flourishing and populous; but with its growth domestic factions were unfolded, which brought it to the verge of ruin. Being planted in the territory of the Taulantians, an Illyrian tribe, the colony was looked upon by them with a jealous eye, and when internal dissensions appeared, they availed themselves of the opportunity of attacking it in order to its destruction. The democratical party of Epidamnus expelled the oligarchs, and the exiles leagued themselves with the Taulantians, to infest the city by sea and by land. In this extremity, the party that remained masters of the city applied to the parent state, Corcyra, itself ruled by a democratical government, for succour. To this application the Corcyreans turned a deaf ear, and the suppliants proceeded to consult the Delphic oracle, whether

they should not transfer the colonial allegiance to Corinth, and implore her aid. The oracle advised them to do this, and the Epidamnians, therefore, surrendered the colony to the Corinthians, and claimed their protection. The Corinthians, being at enmity with the Corcyreans for withholding the usual tokens of filial respect from Corinth, which was their mother city, were well pleased to strengthen themselves at their expense, and they accepted the offer, and forthwith sent a mixed force of their own citizens, with Ambracians, to garrison Epidamnus; at the same time inviting all who might be willing to go and settle there.

It would have appeared from their withholding the required aid, that the Corcyreans set no value upon this faction-torn colony. But it was not so. In the meanwhile the exiled Epidamnians had been pleading their cause at Corcyra, and when the proceedings of their adversaries and the Corinthians became known, they excited the utmost indignation, and the Corcyreans despatched a squadron thither, with orders for those remaining in possession of the city to receive the exiles back again, and to send away the Corinthian garrison with the new settlers. This was refused, and the squadron then laid siege to the place, in which they were assisted by the exiles and Taulantians.

The government of Corinth expected such measures would be taken, and as soon as they received intelligence of them, they raised troops and money, by offering the freedom of Epidamnus to all who would share the expedition in person, or would advance a small sum on this security. At the same time they procured the loan of money and ships from some of their allies, and from others both ships and men, while they themselves equipped thirty galleys, and three thousand heavy-armed troops. In the whole, they were enabled to send out an armament of seventy-five sail, which, directing its course towards Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulph, near the friendly harbour of Actum. In the meanwhile the Corcyreans manned all their galleys, amounting to eighty sail, and put out to meet the enemy. A battle ensued, in which the Corinthians were totally defeated, with the loss of fifteen ships, and the rest returned home, leaving the Corcyreans masters of the sea. On the same day, also, Epidamnus surrendered to the besiegers, on condition that the settlers should be sold as slaves, and the Corinthians imprisoned during the pleasure of the conquerors.

Emboldened by their success, after erecting a conspicuous trophy of victory over the promontory of Leucimne, whose distant ridges overlooked the scene of action, the Corcyrean fleet sailed, first to the Corinthian colony, Leucas, where the troops ravaged the land, and then to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans, which was burned, in revenge for the aid that people had furnished the Corinthians. The allies of Corinth on the western coast were so infested by the Corcyreans, that the Corinthians were obliged to send out a fleet for their protection; but no offer of battle was made on either side, and on the return of winter both fleets returned home. n. c. 435.

It had been the maxim of the Coreyreans to enter into no alliances with other states; and especially to keep aloof from the two great confederacies over which Sparta and Athens presided. What were their motives for acting thus it would be difficult to say, but the time at length arrived when they considered it advisable to alter their line of policy. The Corinthians were burning to revenge their defeat; and, during two years, were making formidable preparations to that end. Thus menaced, the Coreyreans came to the resolution of resorting to Athens for assistance. Their envoys met those of Corinth at Athens, and each party endeavoured to gain the Athenians over to their side—the one by entering into an alliance with them, and the other by inducing them not to violate the spirit of their treaty with Corinth. Two assemblies were held on the question, and the point at issue was highly critical for Athens. At length, however, the Athenians perceived war to be inevitable, and, as they were equally unwilling to abandon the Coreyrean navy to the Corinthians, and to see the two states which, next to their own, possessed the greatest maritime power wasting their strength in a struggle from which they themselves stood aloof, they entered into a treaty of defensive alliance with Coreyra, by which each state was bound to assist the other in case any attack should be made on its territories. In pursuance of this policy soon after, ten ships were sent, under the command of Lacedæmonius, son of Cimon, to the assistance of the Coreyreans, with orders not to act against the Corinthians, unless they should attack Coreyra.

Inducted by this determination of Athens, the Corinthians, at length, in c. 432, with the aid of their allies, Elis, Megara, Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium, sent out a fleet of 150 galleys, which proceeded to the Thesprotian port, Chimerium, where they encamped, and where they were joined by a great number of the Epirots. About the same time the Coreyreans, whose force amounted to 110 galleys, took their station with the ten from Athens, at the little island of Sybota, or "the swine pastures," while their troops, with 1000 auxiliaries from Zacynthus, encamped on their own coast, at Leucimne. A few days after this the Corinthians quitted the port of Chimerium, with the view of bringing the Coreyrean fleet to action. They were not disappointed they soon met in order of battle, and after an engagement, which Thucydides says was the greatest which had taken place between Greeks to that day, the Coreyrean fleet was overpowered, except twenty of their ships, in the left of their line, which put to flight and pursued the Megarians and Ambraciots.

At the commencement of this battle, the Athenian commander, fearful of overstepping his instructions, abstained from mingling in the fight, and contented himself with threatening the enemy by his presence, at the points where the Coreyreans were in the greatest danger. As it continued, however, and the danger of the Coreyreans grew more imminent, the Athenians were drawn into the combat, and they took an active part against the Corinthians. It was probably by their exertions that the Coreyrean

fleet was saved from utter destruction, and it is certain that when, late in the evening, twenty other Athenian ships appeared in the distance to their aid, the Corinthians, imagining a greater armament might be behind, suddenly retreated to the port of Sybota. They were more confirmed in this step, from the circumstance that the Coreyreans, being rejoined by the victorious part of their fleet, and encouraged by Lacedæmonius, notwithstanding their severe loss, had already sung the psalm for a renewal of the conflict, whence they augured a severe contest.

The next day, the Coreyreans, with the thirty Attic ships, sailed towards the port where the Corinthians lay, to offer battle. The Corinthians drew up their fleet, as though they would accept the offer, but, though greatly superior in numbers, they had no wish to risk an engagement on a desert coast, where they had no means of repairing their vessels, and found it difficult to guard their prisoners. Under these circumstances their wish was to return home, and they only feared that the Athenians would obstruct their passage. To discover their intentions, therefore, they sent them a message, the bearers of which came alongside one of the Athenian vessels, without the herald's staff, which was necessary to protect them from declared enemies. These complained of the aggressions which the Athenians had committed in taking part with the Coreyreans, and offered themselves as the first victims of undisguised hostility, if it was their design still further to violate the faith of treaties, by impeding the passage of the Corinthians towards Coreyra, or any other quarter. The Coreyreans sought the destruction of these messengers; but the Athenians protected them, and replied that they had not been guilty of violating any treaty, since they came out to protect their allies, the Coreyreans. At the same time, they informed them that they would not offer any impediment to the Corinthians, if they wished to sail in any other direction, but that they would endeavour to prevent their landing in Coreyra. This was sufficient. On receiving this security, the Corinthians erected a trophy, and returned to Corinth. The Coreyreans followed their example—they also erected a trophy, on the pretext that the Corinthians had retreated before them on the evening of the battle, and that they had recovered their wrecks and the slain, which had been drifted to their station, without asking leave of their enemies.

In this battle the Corinthians had taken upwards of 1000 prisoners. Of these 800 were slaves, who were sold. The rest, being freemen, were carefully guarded, and well treated, in the hope that when they should be restored to their country, they would form a party in favour of Corinth among their countrymen—a hope which was realised.

This breach of existing treaties, as it was considered by the Corinthians, was followed by more decisive proceedings. The colony of Potidæa, on the isthmus of Pallene, was planted by Corinth, but had become subject and tributary to Athens, while, at the same time, it was governed by Corinthian magistrates. The Athenians apprehended that the Corinthians would

use the influence they possessed in that quarter to injure their interests; and they were the more afraid of this, because Perdicas, king of Macedonia, whom they had provoked by entering into an alliance with his brother Philip and a chief named Derdas, who were leagued against him, had sent envoys to Peloponnesus to instigate Sparta to war, and to concert measures with Corinth for a revolt at Potidæa. Such a revolt would have endangered all that part of the empire of Athens which lay between Thrace and Macedonia, and therefore the Athenians took measures to prevent such a catastrophe. Shortly after the return of their fleet from Corcyra, they ordered the Potidæans to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and to receive no more, to throw down the walls of their town on the side of the peninsula of Pallene, and to give hostages to ensure their allegiance. The execution of these orders was committed to the officers of an expedition which the Athenians were fitting out for the invasion of Macedonia; and the complete prostration of Potidæa seemed inevitable. Under these circumstances, while the Potidæans sent envoys to Athens to obtain a revocation of the decree, they sent others to obtain assistance from Sparta if their suit should be denied. Being seconded by the Corinthians, they obtained an assurance from the Spartan Ephori, that if the Athenians attacked Potidæa, a Peloponnesian army should march into Attica.

This inspired them with hope, and when they found that their suit was rejected at Athens, they asserted their independence, in which act they were followed by many of the Chalcidian and Bottæan towns. By the advice of Pericles, the Chalcidians on the coast abandoned and demolished their towns, and concentrated their strength at Olynthus, while their families retired to lands assigned them by the Macedonian monarch about the lake Bolbe in Mygdonia till the storm of war should pass over.

On the arrival of the Athenian commanders, Archestratus and ten colleagues, the revolt was already completed; and, judging their force was too small to attempt the reduction of the insurgents, they proceeded to the coast of Macedonia, to carry on the war against Perdicas, in conjunction with Philip, which was the primary intent of the expedition.

In order to ensure the success of the Potidæan revolt, the Corinthians raised a force of two thousand men, whom they sent to their aid, under the command of Aristæus. On discovering this, the Athenians sent an army of equal force, under Callias and four colleagues, to recover and punish the revolted cities. They met with Archestratus on the coast of Macedonia, engaged in the siege of Pydna. Him they assisted for a while; but, finding that the siege would take much time, they concluded a treaty with Perdicas, and proceeded to prosecute the main object of their expedition.

On quitting Macedonia, the Athenian commanders made an attempt on Beroea, which failed. Callias then sent the fleet forward, and marched, with the heavy-armed Athenians and the troops, furnished by the allies of the republic, and about six hundred Macedonian horse, under Philip and Pansauas, over land to Po-

tidæa. Aristæus, who had been appointed by the Potidæans and their Peloponnesian allies to the supreme command of the infantry, resolved to wait for the Athenians in the isthmus near Potidæa, with the bulk of his forces. At the same time he ordered some Chalcidian troops, with some Macedonian cavalry supplied by Perdicas, who had already forgotten his treaty, to remain at Olynthus, about eight miles from Potidæa, and on a signal being given, to hasten to the field and fall upon the rear of the Athenians. By this means he hoped to defeat the enemy; but, though the Athenians came as he expected, his hopes proved delusive. The wing of the army over which he presided routed and pursued the division opposed to it, but the rest of his forces were driven into Potidæa, and no aid appeared from Olynthus. Aristæus himself, on his return from the pursuit, was obliged to seek refuge in the town, which he obtained with difficulty and some loss.

The success of the Athenians enabled them to commence the circumvallation of Potidæa, by carrying a wall across the isthmus on the side of Olynthus. It is probable that they would not have been able to have completed this, for Callias, their general, had been slain in the battle, but not long after a fresh reinforcement arrived from Athens, under the command of Phormio, by whose active exertions the town was soon blockaded by sea and land. Seeing no hope of deliverance or success, Aristæus advised that all but five hundred of the garrison should make their escape by sea as soon as the first propitious wind should arise. This advice was rejected, and he contrived to elude the Athenian guard ships with the Corinthian forces, and passed over to Chalcidice, where he carried on a successful war against the allies of Athens, and whence he sent to Peloponnesus to obtain further aid. Discovering this, Phormio, after having invested Potidæa, made an inroad into Chalcidice with the forces he had brought from Athens, where he ravaged the territory of the insurgents, and captured some of the minor towns.

By this second breach of the treaty between Athens and Corinth a general war became inevitable. The Corinthians invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there to charge the Athenians with breaking the treaty, and trampling on the rights of the Peloponnesians.

On the arrival of these deputies, the Spartans held an assembly to receive their complaints, and to discuss the question of peace or war. At the period of their arrival there happened to be some envoys from Athens in Sparta, who had been sent on other business, and these were allowed to attend the audience with the deputies of the confederacy. All being met, proclamation was made according to Greek custom, declaring permission for those to speak who had any complaints to make. Many stood forward; but the complaints made were of little importance or dubiously founded, except those of the envoys of Ægina, Megara, and Corinth. The Ægnetans represented that the subjection to which their island was reduced was inconsistent with the terms of the treaty existing between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy;

and the Megarians, among other minor grievances, alleged the injustice of the hostility by which, in contravention of the treaty, they were excluded from commerce with Attica, and the various ports subject to the dominion of Athens. These complaints made a deep impression on the assembly, and the Corinthian deputy at length stood forward to deepen that impression.

According to Thucydides, the Corinthian envoy thus addressed the Spartan assembly:—"That strict faith which characterises your public and private conduct makes you unwilling to listen to unjust accusations, and hence you have obtained the praise of moderation and equity. But you remain ignorant of the transactions of foreign states. We have often forewarned you of the wrongs Athens was preparing for us, but you would not summon this assembly till we had already suffered and hostilities were commenced. Of all other states Corinth has most cause to complain of injuries inflicted by Athens, and of the neglect of Sparta. And yet the subject of her complaint does not affect her alone. All Greece is concerned, for many states are reduced to subjection, and the bonds of slavery await others of our allies. Corcyra, whose fleet is superior to that of any republic of our confederacy, is ravished from us, and Potidæa, our most important post for holding dominion, or carrying on commerce with Thrace, is besieged.

"These injuries, Spartans, may be, in a great measure, laid to your account. After the Persian war, you permitted the Athenians to fortify their city, and to erect long walls, and although you claim the title of 'vindicators of the freedom of Greece,' you have looked calmly on while they have deprived not only their own but our confederates of freedom. Even now, it was with difficulty that the convention of this assembly was obtained, and even now we do not apparently meet for the purpose which ought to be the subject of our consideration. Is this a time to inquire whether we have been injured? No! It should rather be, how we should repel injury. Spartans, you have the reputation of being provident and circumspect, but such honour is not borne out by facts. The Persians came from the furthestmost parts of the earth into our territories before you made any adequate preparations to withstand them, and now you are equally remiss against the neighbouring state of Athens. As the barbarian failed in part through his own misconduct, so the errors of the Athenians, and not your support, have enabled us hitherto to withstand their power. Do not imagine, however, that this expostulation is prompted by resentment. We expostulate with those who err unconsciously; we criminate those by whom we are wilfully injured.

"It appears, Spartans, that you have never reflected on the wide difference existing between your character and that of the Athenians. They are fruitful in invention, and quick in executing their projects. You are content with what you have, averse from seeking more, and can scarcely be brought to act by the spur of necessity. They are daring beyond their strength, adventurous beyond their judgment, sanguine in the midst of dangers. Your undertakings fall short of your

power, and you distrust the soundest dictates of your own judgment, and think yourselves never free from danger. They are as prompt as you are dilatory; as fond of roaming as you are of home. When they gain a victory, they push forward as far as they can; when they are defeated, they fall back no farther than they are driven. The disappointment of any proposed acquisition is considered as a loss of something that belonged to them; and whatever they may gain they account but little, in comparison with what remains to be won. The disappointment of obtaining any one object is succeeded by some new hope to supply its place. Through their activity to acquire, they enjoy nothing which they possess. Their pastime is that of business, and they prefer laborious occupation to repose.

"And yet, Spartans, when such an adverse commonwealth is opposed to you, you slumber, considering those only as your enemies who avow hostility. You think to preserve peace through antiquated maxims of policy and equity, no longer fit for the new era which has dawned upon Greece. By other maxims, by new arts, and by refined policy, Athens has risen to a greatness which threatens us all. Let this, then, be the term of your supineness. Give, at length, that assistance to your allies which is owing to them, and relieve the distressed Potidæans. This can only be done by an immediate invasion of Attica. Unless you do this, you will leave a friendly and kindred people a prey to your enemies, and compel us, through despair, to seek some new alliance. Consult, therefore, your own interests, and do not diminish that command in Peloponnesus transmitted to you by your forefathers."

The Athenian envoys who were present, deeming it inconsistent with the interests of Athens to be silent, asked and obtained leave of the Spartan ephori to address the assembly on the momentous question before them. It is said that they did not do this with a view of defending their city from the charges brought against it, but to caution the Spartans against rashly engaging in an uncalled-for war, and to remind them of the power of Athens, and of the steps by which she had risen to that power. The speaker, notwithstanding, not only expatiated on the glorious origin of the Athenians, but vindicated the conduct of the Athenians toward their allies. He contended that the course they had pursued was prescribed more by necessity than by ambition, and that that necessity arose in part out of Spartan jealousy and estrangement. No other people, he observed, placed in the same position, would have shown greater moderation, or have governed more mildly, and least of all the Spartans, whose supremacy was always rendered intolerable. In conclusion, he bade them reflect on the uncertainty of war, and proposed that their differences should be settled by arbitration.

When the envoys had all been heard, they were desired to depart, that the assembly might deliberate. But the minds of the majority were already made up, and the only question that remained to be settled was, whether war should be commenced immediately, or whether it should be delayed for a brief period. Of this latter

number was the elder king, Archidamus, who recommended that time should be taken, in order to acquaint themselves fully with the resources of Athens, to make alliances, even with barbarians, if necessary, and to make preparations by raising fleets and armies. Such counsels, however, were too sober to suit the temper of the assembly; and when Sthenelaidas, the presiding ephor, after a brief harangue, in which he expressed the prevailing sentiments, put the question to the vote, the Spartans decided upon war— instant and inveterate war. Of this the deputies were informed, and, at the same time, they were told that a general congress of the confederacy would be shortly summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that, if decided on, war might be decreed by universal consent.

Before the meeting of this general congress took place, the Corinthians were actively employed in soliciting the votes of the several states in favour of the measure they desired. The Spartans, also, with a view probably of biasing the public mind, sent to consult the Delphic oracle as to the propriety of war. The answer was favourable for that alternative. The oracle was made to declare, that if the Spartans carried on the war with vigour they should conquer; and that the god himself, whether invoked or not, would be their defence!

At length the congress met to decide the question. As before, the Corinthian deputies spoke last, and, as before, they were the most strenuous advocates of the measure. For the satisfaction of those who felt either scrupulous about the justice of the war, or doubtful as to its issue, they urged the sanction of the oracle, and they endeavoured to work upon the fears of those states, which, lying remote from the sea, dreaded the cost of a war from which they had nothing to fear or gain, by pointing out the connexion of their interests with those of the maritime states, and the common danger which threatened all from the ambition of Athens. They also animated the timid, by showing that the power of the enemy, formidable as it might appear, rested on a foundation which might easily be overthrown, if the confederacy would put forth its whole strength. This might be done, they said, by raising such a navy as would crush that of Athens, by exciting its foreign subjects to revolt, and by occupying a permanent post in its territory. But, setting all this aside, they added, if there was more to be feared and sacrificed, and less grounds for confidence, all ought to be risked, rather than suffer an Ionian city to swallow up the liberties of the rest, and establish itself tyrant of Greece. The Corinthians prevailed; the congress decided upon war, and resolved to make immediate preparations for carrying that decision into effect.

Nearly a year elapsed before the congress was able to bring an army into the field. and, in the mean time, embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, in order to amuse the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and to multiply pretexts for war. Thus, one embassy called upon them in the name of the gods to banish all who remained of the blood-stained race of the Alcmeonids, which aimed at

Pericles, who was connected with them by the mother's side. A second required the Athenians to desist from the siege of Potidæa, to restore Ægina to independence, and to repeal the decree against Megara. And a third, still bolder, demanded that Athens should restore the Greeks to independence; or, in plainer terms, relinquish her rule over the other Grecian states, and descend to a station which would place her at the mercy of Sparta. To the first of these demands the Athenians retorted, by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution by which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tanarus, by dragging some Helots hence who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. Finally, the Athenians held an assembly for the purpose of giving a decisive answer to the demands of Sparta.

In this assembly, some of the speakers were for granting the concessions of Sparta, especially with reference to Megara. But not so was Pericles. On this occasion he uttered that fatal speech which determined the war of Peloponnesus, and which reads thus — "Athenians, I have often declared that we must not obey the unjust commands of the Peloponnesians. Convinced as I am of the dangerous vicissitudes of war and fortune, and that human hopes, designs, and pursuits are all fallacious, I am still of that mind. And, in the present crisis, necessity and glory should fix us in this resolution. The decree against Megara is not the cause of that hostile jealousy which has long secretly envied our greatness, and which now openly conspires our destruction. Besides, that decree, of which some men have spoken lightly, involves the honour of our councils and the stability of our dominion, and, by repealing it, we shall embolden our enemies, who, notwithstanding our firmness in the first instance, have yet successively risen higher in their demands—demands which merit to be answered, not by embassies, but by arms

"The resources and actual strength of the republic afford us the most flattering prospect of success. Attica is impregably fortified by land, and her shores are defended by three hundred gallees. A body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, can immediately take the field, together with two thousand archers, and thirteen thousand pikemen, and that without diminishing our foreign garrisons or the sixteen thousand men who defend the walls and fortresses in Attica. The wealthy sea-ports of Thrace and Macedonia—the colonies of Ionia, Æolia, and Doria—in a word, the entire coast of the Asiatic peninsula, acknowledge, by annual contributions, the sovereignty of your navy, whose strength is increased by the ships of Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, while the smaller islands furnish us with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thousand tributary republics; and, notwithstanding the expenses incurred by the siege of Potidæa, and the works carried forward on every hand, she possesses six thousand talents in the treasury.

"The situation of our enemies is the reverse of this. Rage may rouse them to a transient and desultory assault, but, destitute of resources, and divided in interests, they are incapable of steady persevering exertion. They may enter

Attica with sixty thousand men, and if our un-reasonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle, but unless our imprudence assists and enables them, they cannot prosecute war successfully. Men of Athens, I dread the power of the enemy less than your own ungovernable spirit! Instead of being seduced from your security, by a vain desire to defend, against superior numbers, your plantations and villas in the open country, you ought to destroy those possessions with your own hands. To you, who receive the conveniences of life from so many foreign dependencies, the devastation of Attica is of small moment. But how can your enemies repair, or survive, the devastation of the Peloponnesus? How can they prevent or remedy this calamity, while the squadrons of Athens command the seas? If these considerations be allowed their full weight—if reason, and not passion, conducts the war, it seems scarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Let us answer the Spartan envoys with moderation, let us send them home with this message—that Athens will repeal the prohibition against Megara, as soon as Sparta shall abolish that law which excludes foreigners from intercourse with her citizens, that the Athenians are ready to restore their subjects to independence, if Sparta will grant such to her allies, to whom she now prescribes the form of their political constitutions, that they are still willing to refer their differences to an impartial tribunal, and that, while they will not begin the war, they will hold themselves in readiness to repel any attack.”

At the conclusion of this speech, the hum of applause was heard in the assembly, and the envoys were sent home with the reply dictated by Pericles. War, therefore, was determined upon on both sides, but each forbore to enter the field, till an event which occurred the next spring, *sc.* 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, beckoned them thither, to act the tragical scenes about to be related.

Although situated in the heart of Bœotia, in the midst of numerous and warlike enemies, the Plataeans, who had shared the toils and triumphs of the Persian war, still preserved an unshaken fidelity to Athens. This was particularly displeasing to the Thebans, and, being invited by a Plataean named Naucleides, and others of the same party, they resolved, while war was in abeyance between the two leading states, to attempt its subjugation. Accordingly, a body of three hundred men, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs, repaired thither under cover of the night, and one of the gates being thrown open by the faction within, they advanced, without interruption, into the marketplace. Their Plataean friends wished to lead them to the house of their adversaries, to glut their hatred by a massacre, but the Thebans, fearing to provoke resistance by acts of violence, issued a proclamation, inviting all who were willing that Plataea should become, as in days of yore, a member of the Bœotian body, to join their cause.

At first, the Plataeans, conceiving that the force by which their city was surprised might be too strong to be overcome, entered into a parley with the Thebans; but, in the course of their conference, they discovered their real strength,

and they resolved, while yet the darkness might favour them, to leave nothing untried for their deliverance. As they could not assemble in the streets without suspicion, they opened passages through the walls of their houses; and, having barricaded the streets with wagons, ploughs, and other instruments of husbandry, a little before day-break they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice repulsed the assailants; but, as they still returned to the charge, and were aided by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the tops of the houses on them, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight, leaving about one hundred slain in the streets. A few of those who fled escaped, by one of the gates in a lonely quarter, which they broke open with an axe, but the main body entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates for those of the town, where they surrendered at discretion.

It had been concerted at Thebes that a large force should be sent to the assistance of the band which had entered Plataea. This force set out in the night, but although the distance between the two cities was not more than nine miles, the river of Asopius had been so swollen by the rain, which had fallen in torrents during the strife, that their progress was retarded. They were still on their way, when they heard of the failure of the enterprise, and, conceiving that many of their countrymen might have been taken prisoners, they resolved to seize as many of the Plataeans as they could find without the walls, and retain them as hostages. As many of their fellow citizens were living out of the town in the security of peace, and there was much valuable property in the country, the Plataeans were alarmed at this measure, and they sent a herald to the Theban army to complain of their attack, and to threaten that if any further aggressions should be offered, the prisoners should be put to death. Upon this the Thebans retired; and, yet burning with rage, after they had transported all their moveable property out of the country into the town, the Plataeans put all the prisoners to death, not excepting Eurymachus, who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes.

During the time in which the Plataeans were parleying with the Thebans, they had sent a messenger to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had arrested all the Bœotians in Attica by way of retaliation. A second messenger brought the news of the victory, and they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. But it was too late, they were already slain, and the Athenians, foreseeing that Plataea would stand in need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed all those from the city who were unfit for service in a siege.

The quarrel now could only be decided by arms. The Athenians considered the attack on Plataea as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for hostilities, while the Peloponnesian confederates assembled for the invasion of Attica, under the Spartan king, Archidamus. A more formidable army had never yet issued from the peninsula, and all were impatient to move

onward except their leader. As they were encamped in the isthmus, he, conceiving that the resolution of the Athenians might be shaken by the prospect of the evils of war which stared them in the face, sent Melesippus to sound their disposition. But the die was cast. Pericles had obtained a decree, to the effect that no embassy should be received from the Spartans while they should be under arms, and Melesippus was informed that if his government wished to treat with Athens it must first recall its forces. At the same time he was ordered to quit Attica, and persons were appointed to conduct him to the frontier. As he passed the boundaries of Attica, he exclaimed, "This day will prove the beginning of great evils in Greece."

It needed no prophetic vision to foretel such a result. Simple reflection on the nature of the two powers now coming into contact, and on the great resources of both, would have suggested such a declaration. Within the isthmus, the allies of Sparta included all the states of Peloponnesus, except Achæa and Argos, the latter of which was bound to neutrality by an unexpired truce; and, beyond the isthmus, she was supported by Megara and Thebes, which ensured the assistance of the rest of the Bœotian cities, except Plataea and Oropus. On her side, also, were the Locrians of Opus, the Dorians of the mother country, and the Phocians. Many powerful cities in Italy and Sicily, moreover, won by the title she assumed, that of the champion of liberty, against the Athenian tyranny and ambition, promised their aid. These, in truth, engaged to furnish her with money and ships, which, it was calculated, would amount to five hundred, and would be sufficient to cope with the navy of Athens. As for the extent of the Athenian dominion, it cannot be so easily defined; but, allowing the assertion of Pericles, which was borrowed from the comic poet, Aristophanes, that it comprehended "a thousand cities," to be the language of exaggeration, his speech, as before recorded, may convey a just idea of Athenian power. Sparta solicited assistance from the Persian monarch, Artaxerxes, and from Perdicas, king of Macedonia, both the natural enemies of Athens, while Athens, also, condescended to crave the aid of barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalees, the warlike chief of the Odrisians, who formed the most powerful tribe in Upper Thrace. Their mutual animosities had risen, by degrees, to such a pitch, that each strained every nerve to ensure the other's destruction. So true it is that—

"In every heart
Are sown the sparks that kindle fiery war,
Occasion needs but fan them, and they blaze."

COWPER

When the invasion of Attica became no longer a matter of doubt, Pericles urged the Athenians to transport their families and their moveable property out of the reach of their enemy, and, as long as the war should last, to look upon the capital as their home. This was a painful sacrifice; for many had been born, and had passed all their lives, in the country. They were attached to it, also, not merely by domestic but by religious associations; for though the incorporation of the

Attic townships had long ago extinguished their independence, it had not interrupted their religious traditions or disturbed their local worship. Still, there was no alternative. The proposition of Pericles was reluctantly adopted; and while the flocks and cattle were sent to Eubœa and other adjacent islands, all beside, that was portable, was carried into Athens, whither they themselves and their families repaired with heavy hearts, as if going into exile. So great was the influx, that many, when they arrived in the city, found themselves homeless as well as homeless. Some took refuge in the temples, which were usually open, others occupied the towers of the walls, others raised temporary hovels in any vacant space they could find, and even resorted, for this purpose, to a place under the wall of the citadel, called the Pelasgicon, on the tenants of which a curse had been pronounced, and which an oracle had declared had better remain untrudged. This measure of necessity was considered as a foretaste of the evils of war, but it did not damp the general ardour. The youth of Athens, especially, burned with impatience to meet the enemy, and they were encouraged by numberless oracles and predictions, put into circulation for the occasion. In these every one found something that accorded with the tone of his feelings, and they were led to expect a successful issue, or, at all events, to determine to oppose the invaders to the utmost. Such was the state of public feeling in Athens, when, after the return of Melesippus, Archidamus broke up his camp in the isthmus, and set forward on his march to desolate Attica, to commence that series of events known in the pages of history under the general denomination of THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, which continued its ravages in Greece during the space of twenty-seven years.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM SPARTA, IN THE SEVENTH YEAR.

B. C. 431—425.

WHEN Archidamus broke up his camp on the isthmus, instead of marching into the heart of Attica, or advancing along the sea-coast into the plain of Eleusis, he turned aside to the north, and, crossing the Megarian territory, laid siege to the little town of Cœnoe, which had been fortified and garrisoned to secure one of the passes of Cithæron, between Attica and Bœotia. As neither the Spartans nor the Peloponnesians in general were skilful in sieges, this gave the Athenians an opportunity of placing all their moveable property in safety. This provoked the impatience of the army of Archidamus, and, at length, he was compelled to abandon his attempt upon Cœnoe; and, marching southward, he entered the Thriassian plain, or the district of Eleusis.

At the time he entered this district the corn was just ripe, and he advanced slowly, in order to leave the deeper traces of the ravages which the Athenians might expect from the continuance of war. In the neighbourhood of Eleusis he encountered and defeated a body of Athenian cavalry, after which he proceeded across the ridge of the Corydallus to Acharnæ, which was about seven or eight miles north of Athens, where he encamped, and where he made a long and destructive stay. Archidamus was induced to act thus from the hope that the Athenians, seeing ruin hang over Acharnæ, the most populous and wealthy of the Attic townships, would be provoked to meet him in the field, that so, perhaps, he might finish the war at a blow. But in this he was mistaken. There was a general disposition in Athens to march out and defend Acharnæ, and the Acharnians, whose numbers entitled them to be heard in the city, were urgent that such a step should be taken, but, restrained by Pericles, who disregarded the clamours raised against him, the taunts of the comic poets, and the prophecies circulated to second the wishes of the multitude, the Athenians still remained passive spectators of the desolation of their country. Still, though determined not to risk an engagement with the confederates, he employed the Athenian and Thessalian cavalry to intercept their convoys, and to harass, surprise, and cut off their advanced parties. On one occasion, these were repulsed by the Bœotian cavalry and a body of infantry, which gave the Peloponnesians a pretext for a trophy. But this was the sole extent of the Spartan feat of arms during this campaign. Perplexed by the cautious policy of Pericles, and finding his provisions were nearly spent, Archidamus broke up his camp, and, marching on to Oropus, returned home through Bœotia, and dismissed his allies.

Archidamus had not yet quitted the shores of Attica, before an Athenian fleet of a hundred galleys set sail to retaliate upon Peloponnesus. This fleet was joined by fifty Coreyean ships, and by others from Naupactus. Thus combined, they ravaged the coast of the Argolic Acte and the Laconian territory. After this, they made an attempt to take the town of Methone, but it was defeated by the activity and courage of Brasidas, who became one of the most conspicuous persons in this period of Greek history. On the coast of Elis, whither the Athenians next proceeded, they were more successful. They ravaged the country for two days, and captured the town of Pheia. Hearing, however, that the Eleans were approaching with their whole force, they re-embarked, and pursued their course northward, where they reduced the Acarnanian towns of Solium and Astacus, and effected the conquest of the island of Cephalenia, which was now added to the Athenian alliance. These were the last fruits of this expedition.

While this great fleet was at sea, a squadron of thirty ships made a series of descents on the Locrian coast, to take vengeance for the evils the Locrians had inflicted on the coast of Eubœa. About the same time, the Athenians, consulting both policy and revenge, expelled the whole free population of Ægina, and settled a colony in that island. The greater part of the outcasts found a

home in Laconia, where the government assigned them the town and territory of Thyrea, which the Spartans had wrested from Argos, for their habitation.

Athenian revenge was not yet satisfied. Towards the beginning of autumn, Pericles led the whole force of Athens to ravage the hostile territory of Megara. While the invading army was carrying on the work of devastation, it was joined by the troops returning from the expedition round Peloponnesus. Combined, they were more in number than the Athenians had ever before brought into the field at one time; but, though thus formidable, they only exerted their strength in devastating the land, and when this was effected, the invaders returned home.

Shortly after the return of this expedition, regulations were made for the defence of the coast of Attica and the frontier; and a decree was passed, to set apart a thousand talents from the sum then in the treasury, and to reserve a hundred of the best galleys in the navy every year, for the purpose of the defence of the city, should it ever be attacked by a naval armament, and on no other occasion or pretext whatsoever. This decree was guarded by the punishment of death to any one who should propose to divert this fund and these vessels to any other purpose, as well as to the magistrate who should put such a proposition to the vote.

Ancient usage demanded that funeral honours should be paid to those who had fallen in defence of their country, and, as soon as military operations were suspended, these rites were performed. The bodies of the slain having been burned, according to custom, their bones were arranged under an ample awning, where they were to remain three days, and where they received the separate tributes of domestic affection. At the end of that time the bones were placed in ten coffins of cypress wood, each raised on a cart—one for each tribe—and an eleventh cart bore an empty bier, with a pall, in honour of those whose bodies had not been recovered. Procession was then made to the public sepulchre in the Ceramicus, the fairest suburb of the city, where, since the Persian war, all those slain in battle had been interred, except the heroes of Marathon. The procession was attended by a long train of citizens and strangers, among the foremost of whom were the relatives of the deceased, who took the chief part in the funeral wailings.

While yet the bones were on the margin of the tomb, some person of eminence was, by custom, appointed by the people to utter the funeral oration. This task fell to the lot of Pericles, who embraced the opportunity of animating the courage and the hopes of his countrymen, and, indirectly, of vindicating the policy of his own administration, in an harangue which, for its sublimity, has been the admiration of succeeding ages. Passing over the mythical successes of Attica, the usual topic of rhetoricians, he dwelt long and eloquently upon what Athens then was, and upon the steps by which she had arrived at her present greatness. The institutions, the manners, and the national character of the Athenians, were pointed out by Pericles as the true foundation of her power, and these he exhorted

them to preserve, regardless of the sacrifices their preservation might demand.

Such a disposition pervaded the breasts of the Athenians, when, early the following summer, B. C. 430, Archidamus again entered Attica, with as formidable an army as that of the last campaign. Again he ravaged the land, destroying not only the hopes of the harvest, but the fruit trees, which were the pride of the Attic soil and the growth of many years. He advanced, by the way of the plain, on the west and north side of the city, he next proceeded along the maritime region, south of Athens, as far as the mining district of Laurium, and he finally crossed over to the eastern coast, and continued his ravages as far as the plain of Marathon. Archidamus remained in Attica forty days, and it is probable he would have passed over the small portion of territory yet untouched, had not an enemy appeared, whose ravages were still more horrible than those of war, and whose power defied the sword and the shield. A pestilential disease, hitherto unknown to the Greeks, and which was supposed to have risen in Nubia, and from thence to have been propagated, through Egypt and Western Asia, to the Aegean, made its appearance, first in Piræus, and afterwards spread through Athens and Attica, destroying its thousands.

The character of this contagion is minutely described by Thucydides. It first showed itself, he says, in the head, after which it proceeded to the lower extremities of the body. The pain and inflammation of the head, redness of the eyes, foulness of breath, and blood-like tinge of the tongue and throat, were followed, as it descended to the chest, by sneezing and hoarseness, and then by a short cough. It was marked in the region of the heart by distressing qualms, discharges of bile, and convulsive hiccups. As it sank lower, it disordered the intestines, and where it did not prove fatal, it frequently took such a hold of the extremities as to deprive the sufferer of the use of them. Others, also, lost their sight from the first attack, and many who recovered lost their memory and their reason. One distinguishing feature of the contagion was the burning heat which accompanied it, the unquenchable thirst, and the continual restlessness, which banished sleep from the eyes of the sufferer. No remedy was known for it; and the patient, on its first symptoms, was hopeless of relief, and hence careless about the means of counteracting the evil. It preyed equally upon the robust and the infirm, and when it proved fatal, it was generally on the seventh or the ninth day after it had seized its victim.

One circumstance appeared to alleviate this dreadful calamity, namely, that those who recovered from the pestilence were never again infected. By this the Athenians seemed warranted against that utter extinction which the effects of the disorder had appeared to threaten at the commencement. Yet was the mortality fearful, and the misery was enhanced tenfold by the crowded state of the city, and the want of sewers, which was a convenience unknown in Grecian towns. The streets, the public places, and the very sanctuaries, were strewn with corpses, and few found a friendly hand to burn them.

So loathsome were they, that neither dogs nor carrion birds would touch them; and it is recorded as remarkable, that not one of the latter was seen in the city so long as the pestilence continued. The very government stood aghast at the calamity, and did nothing for its palliation. This gave occasion to acts of violence on the part of the relatives, who had not the means of paying their departed friends the last offices of their religion. They would frequently take possession of the funeral piles raised for others, and a stranger's corpse would sometimes be thrown upon a pile already burning. But the sight of living sufferers was still more dreadful. Goaded by inward fever and quenchless thirst, they might be seen rushing naked out of their houses, in search of water, that they might plunge themselves into it, and find relief from their torments. The wells, the cisterns, in every quarter of the city, and even the sacred fountains, were continually surrounded by a crowd of miserable creatures, struggling or dying.

When the plague had reached its height, then the effects of the Grecian religion were seen. And very dreadful were they. There was no humiliation displayed among its votaries, no deprecating the wrath of their gods. They were considered powerless to save, and all religious ceremonies were neglected. The one great cry prevalent throughout Athens was, "Let us enjoy ourselves, let us drown thought in pleasure to-day, for to-morrow we die." This feeling seems principally to have been induced from the fact that the virtuous and the wicked perished alike. Hence succeeded an inordinate, and before unknown, licentiousness of manners. Laws, human and divine, were set at defiance, and thus Athens exhibited at once whatever is most afflicting in wretchedness, and most abominable in vice; uniting to the rage of disease the destructive fury of unbridled passions.

This event, therefore, shows in lively colours the inefficiency of the pagan system of religion to restrain mankind from evil. Not that such moral consequences of the plague belong exclusively to pagan Athens. In countries nominally Christian, similar consequences have been witnessed. Athens, however, had been celebrated for its devotion to the gods, and prided itself on that devotion. Her numerous and gorgeous temples indicated what was deemed the "piety" of her sons. Whence, then, did it arise, that in the time of affliction they so universally cast the fear of their deities behind their backs? Because their religion had no influence upon the heart. It was a religion of speculation, and only affected the intellect from whence it emanated. And thus was seen in the inhumanity of the Athenians toward the plague-stricken, in as legible lines as in their unseemly profligacy. Their engrossing selfishness forbade them generally to administer relief or comfort to those unhappy beings, and they were left to suffer and die unheeded. The few persons who ventured their lives to attend upon their sick friends are mentioned by Thucydides as persons of extraordinary generosity, and as having thus acted from a sense of honour, not a sense of duty. Affection seemed swallowed up in the general profligacy, and hence Athens must have presented a picture, at this period, more frightful

than we can conceive. It appears as if the Great Ruler of the universe had sent this plague, to exhibit to the world how inefficacious the religion of Greece was to ensure right moral conduct among its devotees. Influenced by true religion in times of calamity, individuals and nations have bowed down in humble supplication before the throne of the Majesty on high to seek his mercy. What a contrast this to the conduct of the Athenians towards their gods on this trying occasion! They were no sooner afflicted, than they became infidels. And the contrast is equally striking in the deeds of charity which have distinguished Christian communities, when thus smitten by the rod of the Almighty. The kindness and care of the early Christians in similar calamities have been well defined as "bright spots in the history of religion and humanity." Then, with unwearied patience, the living put their lives into their hands, and waited upon the dying and the dead, seeking to modify their pains while yet they had breath, and paying them due rites as soon as it had departed. A religion of human fabrication is powerless to help man in the time of trouble, while the religion of the Bible teaches him the source of aid and deliverance

"O Book! infinite sweetness! let my heart
Suck every letter, and a honey rain,
Precious for any grief in any part
To clear the breast, to mollify all pain"

HABERT

In the midst of this calamity at Athens war was not forgotten. Those in health thirsted for revenge upon the Peloponnesians. Their numbers being thinned, however, Pericles found it less difficult to maintain the cautious policy of the last year. Still, he found it necessary to soothe the public mind by an expedition against Peloponnesus, which he commanded in person. While the enemy was still ravaging Attica, he set sail with a fleet of 150 galleys, and 300 horse embarked in transports, now for the first time formed out of old ships, to Epidaurus, where he wasted the greater part of its territory. This effected, he then slowly coasted the Act, and ravaged the fields of Træzen, Halie, and Hermione. He next crossed over to the coast of Laconia, and stormed the town of Præsie, and spoiled its territory. At this point, however, he was stopped by the pestilence, which raged in the fleet as in the city and he returned soon after Archidamus had quitted Attica.

But, notwithstanding this untoward circumstance, as soon as Pericles returned, two of his colleagues, Agnon and Cleopompus, were ordered to sail with this fleet to Potidea, in the hope of terminating the expensive and tedious resistance of that city. These, combined with the forces of Phormio, who had already left Chalcedice, prosecuted the siege with great vigour. But it was to no purpose. Their attacks were repulsed, and the disease which they had brought from home in the fleet spread over the camp, and they were obliged to return home. They left the same force which they had found there to blockade the town; but it was now enfeebled by the plague they had transported thither.

These accumulated evils at length irritated the minds of the Athenians beyond sufferance. The popular resentment raged furiously against Pe-

ricles, and, despite his opinion, an embassy was sent to Sparta with proposals of peace. But peace was not for Athens. Their proposals were rejected, as the fruits of weakness and fear, which increased the general irritation against Pericles. Yet such were the effects of his eloquence, that he still maintained his supremacy among them. As general of the commonwealth, he had a right to summon the assembly whenever he thought proper, and, in an eloquent harangue, he rescued himself from the fury of the multitude. Having mounted the speaker's rostrum, he said, "Your anger, Athenians, excites no surprise, because it was expected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the wretched. Yet, as you mistake both the cause and measure of your calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often unfolded. It is just that you who have protected and saved, should govern Greece, it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, your honour and your safety depend. The sovereignty of Greece cannot be taken up with indifference like an empty pageant of grandeur, or be laid down without danger. That dominion which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit to the contumely of your allies, and the animosity of your enemies. The hardships to which you are exposed from war I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture. Yet, great and unexpected as our misfortunes are, they are still accidental and transitory, while the advantages of the war will be permanent, and its glory immortal. The greatness of our empire extends beyond the territories of our distant allies. Of the two elements designed for the use of mankind, the sea and the land, we absolutely command the one. In this none dare dispute our dominion. Let this elevate your hopes, and then personal afflictions will be drowned in the tide of public prosperity. Bear the strokes of Providence with resignation, and you will surely repel the assaults of our enemies. It is the hereditary distinction of Athens never to yield to adversity. In the midst of danger and wars, we have augmented the power and extended the fame of a city unrivalled in wealth and splendour, and governed by laws and institutions worthy of its magnificence and renown. If Athens must perish— as what human grandeur is not subject to decay?—let her not fall through her own cowardice, for that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and destroy that edifice at once which it has been the work of ages to rear. When the walls and harbours of Athens are no more—when the terror of her fleets shall have ceased, and her external magnificence crumbled to dust—her glory shall remain. This is the prize which I have exhorted, and still exhort you to defend, regardless of the clamours of sloth, the suspicions of cowardice, and the persecutions of envy."

For the moment the Athenians were convinced by this speech, and Pericles escaped the threatened danger. There were, however, some in Athens who still sought his overthrow, and, through their means, probably at the expiration

of his office as general, he was brought to trial, and fined,* on charges connected with that office. But he yet triumphed over his enemies; for when the popular discontent had subsided and reason resumed its sway, Pericles recovered his habitual ascendancy. He was restored to office, or, in other words, elected among the generals for the ensuing year.

During the following winter the garrison of Potidæa, subdued by famine, which was so extreme as to compel them to eat human flesh, proposed to capitulate to the Athenian commanders. The besiegers themselves were suffering, and they had still more to apprehend from the rigour of the climate, whence, further influenced, perhaps, by their ignorance of the real state of the besieged, the generals granted them very favourable terms. The garrison and all the inhabitants were allowed to leave the city, and proceed to what quarter they wished, with a fixed sum of money for the journey, and a change of apparel for the women. On their return, the generals were reprimanded for their leniency; and a colony of Athenians, amounting to one thousand, were sent to occupy the lands and houses of the wanderers.

As soon as the spring of B. C. 429 arrived, a Peloponnesian army again assembled at the isthmus, under the command of Archidamus. Fearing the effects of the pestilence, however, which still raged in Attica, Archidamus marched into the territory of Platæa, where he encamped, and prepared to lay it waste. Before he had committed any acts of hostility, the Platæans sent envoys to him to deprecate hostilities, urging the ancient merit of their commonwealth in the Persian wars, and the privileges solemnly granted to it, when, in the battle in their territory Pausanias sacrificed to Jupiter, the deliverer, in the agora, or open place of meeting, in their city. Archidamus replied by offering them neutrality. The envoys returned with this answer and, after laying it before the people, came back, instructed to reply, that it was impossible for them to accede to the proposal of Archidamus without the consent of the Athenians, who had their wives and their children in their hands, for they should have reason to fear either the resentment of their allies, or the treachery of the Thebans, who, under the cover of neutrality, might again surprise them. To obviate this latter objection, Archidamus offered to take their city, houses, and lands, into his keeping, and, if they would withdraw elsewhere during the war, to restore them again when peace was re-established. But the Platæans could not accept this without renouncing the friendship of the Athenians; and, therefore, when their envoys returned with this proposal, they requested an armistice, that they might lay it before the Athenians, promising to accept it if they could obtain their consent. Archidamus granted this request, but an answer from Athens cut short the negotiation. The Platæans were called upon by the Athenians to keep their faith with their ally, and to depend upon Athenian protection,

and they resolved, whatever might befall them, to adhere to the fortune of Athens.

On receiving a declaration to this effect, and after having called the gods and heroes of the land to witness that he had not invaded it without just cause, but after the Platæans had first abandoned their ancient confederates, Archidamus bent all his thoughts on the object of his expedition. After ravaging the country, he invested the city with a palisade to prevent egress, the forest of Cithæron furnishing him with materials. Then, in imitation of the Persians, he attempted to raise a mound to a level with the walls. This mound was piled up with earth and rubbish, wood and stones, and was guarded on either side by a strong lattice work of forest timber, also from Cithæron. Seventy days were employed in this work, but as the mound rose, the besieged devised expedients for averting the danger. They first surmounted the opposite part of their wall with a superstructure of brick, secured in a frame of timber, and shielded from fiery missiles by raw hides and skins, which protected both the workmen and their work. After this, finding the mound rise as high as the walls, they issued out by night, and scooped out and carried away large quantities of the earth from the lower part of the mound. But this was discovered by the Peloponnesians, and they repaired the breach with layers of stiff clay, pressed closely down on wattles of reed. This required more labour to remove, and the besieged next undermined the mound, and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still the garrison feared that the enemy would finally prevail, and they built a second wall, in the shape of a half-moon, behind the raised part of the old wall, behind which they might retreat and assail the enemy. This drove the besiegers to their last resources. Battering engines were employed, and, when the spirit and ingenuity of the besieged had baffled these assaults, Archidamus caused the hollow between the mound and the wall, and all the space which he could reach on the other side, to be filled up with fagots steeped in pitch and sulphur, which were set on fire. The conflagration, which Thucydides compares to a burning forest, penetrated to a great distance within the city, and, had it been seconded by a favourable wind, on which the besiegers rested their hopes, the city would probably have been destroyed. No breeze, however, sprung up, and the flames died away, whence Archidamus, thwarted and disheartened, converted the siege into a blockade. To the palisade already surrounding the town, a contravallation was added, with a double ditch—one without, and the other within. These works were completed at the autumnal equinox, and a sufficient body of troops, half of which were Boeotians, being appointed to guard them, the rest returned to Peloponnesus.

During this year the Spartans engaged in another expedition, in order to shut out the Athenians from the western seas, by crushing their allies on that side of Greece. They were called upon to this conquest by the Ambracians, who, having in vain attempted the reduction of Argos during the preceding year, concerted a new expedition against the heart of Acarnania. As the

* The exact amount of this fine is not known. Some authors say it was fifteen talents, while others say it was fifty, and one account states eighty, but probably even the lowest statement is an exaggeration.

Acarnanians, from their power and position, were among the most important of the Athenian allies, and as the Ambracians held out the hope that the subjugation of Acarnania would be followed by that of Cephallenia and Zacynthus, and perhaps of Naupactus, which would render the western seas almost inaccessible to the Athenian arms, Sparta readily responded to the call. So, also, did Corinth, the parent of the Ambracian colony; she warmly entered into the views of the Ambracians, and promised active assistance.

The plan of this campaign was, that a Peloponnesian fleet should sail to Leucas; and, in conjunction with the squadrons of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, should then proceed against the maritime towns of Acarnania. Before this fleet, which was to sail from Corinth, was yet in readiness, the Spartans despatched their admiral Cnemus, with one thousand men at arms, in a few galleys, to Leucas. When Cnemus arrived there, he found the squadrons of the northern allies assembled, and he forthwith put himself at their head for the invasion of Acarnania. Besides the Greek troops, many barbarians were drawn thither, in the hope of booty, as the Chaonians, Theoprotians, Moossians, Atintanians, Paravans, and Orestians, which were tribes of Epirus, and of the central islands. With this mixed force, Cnemus marched against Stratus, the principal city of Acarnania.

In the course of the preceding winter, the Athenians had been led from the danger to which their allies in this quarter were exposed by the Ambracians, to send Phormio with a squadron of twenty galleys to Naupactus, where he was to guard the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, and to prevent the passage of vessels from all hostile ports, whether Corinthian or otherwise. When they perceived themselves threatened by sea and land, the Acarnanians sent to beg succours from Phormio, but, as the fleet from Corinth was expected, he could not leave his station, and Stratus was left to its own means of defence. And these, in the end, proved sufficient. The invaders advanced in three divisions—the Chaonians and the other barbarians in the centre, the Leucadians and Anactorians on the right, and the Ambracian and Peloponnesian troops, with Cnemus, on the left. Eager for their plunder, the barbarians pushed forward with blind impetuosity, and commenced the assault before the Greeks had reached the city. This led to their overthrow, and the defeat of the invaders. The Stratians, discovering their disorder as they approached, laid an ambush for them near the walls, and, sallying forth to meet them, attacked them in front, while their troops in the ambuscade rose upon them in the rear. A dreadful slaughter ensued; and though Cnemus, on his approach, caused the Stratians to retreat, yet he deemed it expedient to retire from Acarnania, and after burying the dead and disbanding his army, he returned to Peloponnesus.

During these events, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed out of the Corinthian gulf. It consisted of forty-seven galleys; and, as it was nearing the Acarnanian coast, over against Patra, it was attacked by Phormio, who, aided by a wind which commonly blew out of the gulf at sunrise,

and which drove the windward ships against those in the centre, thereby causing confusion and dismay—sunk many galleys, took twelve others, and dispersed the rest. On his return from the pursuit, Phormio carried his prizes into the harbour of Molycrium; and, after raising a trophy on the headland of Rhium, and dedicating one of the captured vessels to Poseidon, he returned to Naupactus.

The few ships which escaped in this battle proceeded to the Elean arsenal of Cyllene. As the Spartans conceived that it was owing to the incapacity of the admiral that they had been defeated, they sent thither three of their citizens—Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to act as his counsellors or colleagues. On their arrival, exertions were made to refit the ships engaged in the last action, and to procure reinforcements from the allies. Aware of this, Phormio sent to request additional force from Athens without delay, but this was delayed till Phormio had again contended with and defeated the Peloponnesian fleet, although it consisted of seventy-seven galleys. After this discomfiture, the Peloponnesian commanders stole away in the night, and, with the exception of the Leucadian contingent, made for Corinth.

Soon after the departure of the Peloponnesians, Phormio was joined by the squadron he had solicited at Athens, and, thus reinforced, he sailed to Acarnania, in order to establish the Athenian interest on a surer foundation in Stratus and some other towns, where there was a party disaffected toward it. Some obnoxious individuals were sent into exile, and Coronta was obliged to receive one of its banished citizens, who was a partisan of Athens. Having effected his purpose, Phormio returned to Naupactus, where he spent the winter, and, when the spring arrived, he carried his prisoners and his prizes to Athens. The freemen among these prisoners were shortly after exchanged for as many Athenians, prisoners with the Peloponnesians.

While the Peloponnesian fleet remained yet assembled on the Corinthian coast, a plan was suggested by the Megarians for striking a deadly blow at Athens, by surprising Piræus, which, being deemed secure from danger as long as the Athenians were masters at sea, was left unguarded. A select body of seamen were to take each his oar, seat-cover, and thong, which were necessary implements for the rowers of ancient galleys, and to cross the isthmus to Megara, where, in the port of Nisæa, they would find forty galleys, which they were to man, and pass over with to Piræus. These men reached Nisæa in the night, and put to sea, as was proposed; but, instead of proceeding to Piræus, the commanders, as if they were alarmed at the greatness of the enterprise, sailed to Salamis. At that place they made themselves masters of three ships, which were stationed at the fort of Budorum to blockade the port of Megara. Thus successful, they attacked the fort, and ranged over the island in search of plunder. But this tended to defeat the object of their enterprise. While they were thus employed, fire signals conveyed the intelligence to Athens, and the whole city was put in motion to repel the invaders. While

a part kept guard in Piræus, the rest sailed to Salamis; and the invaders retired before them, and made their way to Corinth. This alarm became a wholesome warning to the Athenians, henceforth the Piræus was secured by chains at the mouths of the harbours, and other suitable precautions were employed.

With these events the offensive operations of the Peloponnesians ceased for this year. As for the Athenians, they had engaged in none, except an expedition against the towns of Chalcidice and Bottiæa. This expedition was first directed against the Bottusan town Spartolus, and was defeated by the united forces of that city and Olynthus. In a battle fought near Spartolus the Athenians were put to the rout, and driven into Potidea, leaving all their generals, and about four hundred men, dead on the field. But this check was probably the occasion of more important movements, which took place in the autumn, in the same quarter.

The powerful sovereign of Thrace, Sitalces, had, by his treaty of alliance with Athens, as recorded in a former page, engaged to compel its revolted dependencies in Chalcidice to return to their obedience. This had been hitherto delayed, but he now came in person, at the head of a numerous host, to redeem his pledge. But this was not the only work he had to perform. Soon after he had contracted an alliance with Athens, Sitalces was induced, by large promises made by Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, to reconcile him with the Athenians. These promises had never been performed, and Sitalces resolved to punish Perdiccas for his faithlessness. This was the first object of his expedition, and, in effecting it, he met with little resistance. He carried with him Amyntas, the brother of Perdiccas, whom he intended to place on the throne of Macedonia, and he directed his march into the province which had been their father's appanage. In this province several of the towns opened their gates to the invader, and others, as Eridomene and Europus, were besieged. The former of these cities was taken, but the latter made so vigorous a defence, that Sitalces raised the siege, and proceeded through Lower Macedonia toward Chalcidice. As he passed on, his host ravaged the country without opposition. Before them the land was as a garden, behind them as a desolate waste.

Although Perdiccas had made peace with Athens, yet he had secretly sent aid to their enemies in the invasion of Acarnania, whence, before Sitalces set out on his expedition, the Athenians sent ambassadors to urge him to perform his promise with reference to Chalcidice without delay. At the same time, they promised that, on his arrival in Chalcidice, he should find an Athenian armament ready to co-operate with him both by sea and land. On arriving there, however, Sitalces found not the armament which was to have supported him, but envoys, with presents and excuses to cover the real motive of this breach of promise, namely, that as he had so long delayed, the Athenians did not expect that he would keep his word. Had Sitalces not been eager for the work of destruction, this might have turned him aside, but, steady to his purpose, he wasted the terri-

tory of the Chalcidians and Bottians for eight days with a part of his army, while the rest were collecting spoil in Macedonia. At the end of that time, the season becoming boisterous, and his provisions beginning to fail, he resolved on a retreat. Before he did so, Perdiccas gained over Seuthes, the king's favourite nephew, by promising him the hand of his sister Stratonicæ, with a large portion, and the last fruit of this formidable expedition, therefore, was the marriage of an Odrysian prince and a Macedonian princess.

Such were the leading events of this third year of the Peloponnesian war. There was yet one event, which, though it happens to all mankind alike, proved more important in its consequences than all the feats of arms accomplished both to Athens and to Greece at large. Pericles had lost his two sons Xanthippus and Paralus, with his sister and many valued friends, by the plague, and at length he fell a victim to its ravages himself. He seems to have died with philosophical composure, for when the women who attended him hung a charm round his neck, he showed it, in a playful mood, to a friend, as a sign to what a pass his disorder had brought him, when he could submit to such trifling. When, also, his friends, as they gathered round his bed, recalled to remembrance the military exploits he had performed, and enumerated the trophies he had raised, he calmly reminded them that other generals had done us much, adding an assertion which is scarcely borne out by his history—that he never caused an Athenian to put on mourning, which he looked upon as his highest praise. And so, in truth, it would have been, if his words had been correct, but if he had involved the country in the war yet untermi-nated, as ancient historians seem to intimate, then he deceived himself, and he died with a lie in his right hand. Parents were yet steeped in sorrow for their children, and children for their parents, from one end of Greece to the other, while the land itself was arrayed in mourning. Truly there are no errors so hard to be discovered as our own. Sin hardens the conscience, and even induces mankind to believe that they are righteous in the sight of God and man.

God, however, who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, can never be deceived. By Him all human actions are weighed in the balances, and a woe is denounced upon all those who are found wanting in righteousness. And in such a state all mankind stand in his sight. How then can they be justified? By faith in Christ, the atoning Saviour. Sinners, being clothed in that garment of righteousness wrought out for them by the Son of God, find a sure refuge from impending wrath.

On the death of his two sons, who were pure Athenians, Pericles, seeing his name and race threatened with extinction, which was a thought of intolerable bitterness to a Greek, petitioned the people to bestow the privileges of an Athenian citizen upon the son of Aspasia, from which he had hitherto been excluded by the law which Pericles himself had proposed. According to Plutarch, he wished to repeal this law; but this was unnecessary, for the people willingly legiti-

mated his natural son, permitting him to be enrolled in his father's family, and to take his father's name. But neither this new-made Pericles, nor any citizen of Athens, was able to take the place which by the death of this great man had become vacant. The fragments of his power were snatched up by unworthy hands, and Athens gradually sunk from her lofty position into the deepest disgrace.

The winter passed away in peace, as before, but Attica was no sooner again enriched with the fruits of the earth, than a Peloponnesian army, under the command of Archidamus, again laid it waste. The Athenian cavalry, however, was employed in desultory attacks, which prevented his light troops from spreading over the country, and infesting the immediate neighbourhood of the city, so that the desolations were not so extensive as heretofore. Harassed by them, indeed, the Peloponnesians, having consumed their stores, and those which they could collect in Attica, returned home, and were disbanded.

In the mean time new troubles were preparing for Athens. Among its most valuable and powerful dependencies was the island of Lesbos, which was divided between six republics, each claiming a separate and equal independence. Among the most powerful of these republics were Mitylene and Methymna; and, in truth, the names of the others are scarcely known, and, therefore, they could not have been of great importance. The inhabitants of Lesbos were of Æolian extraction, and hence disposed to the Spartan alliance, but more especially to the Boeotian, rather than to the Athenians, to which the course of events and the naval superiority of Athens had led them. This was particularly the feeling at Mitylene; and before the war had broken out, the Mityleneans had only been prevented from casting off the Athenian yoke by the reluctance which the Spartans had shown to break the Thirty Years' Truce. But the motives which led to the design still continued, and the altered state of affairs having now opened a fair prospect of success, the Mityleneans prepared for revolt.

The causes which conspired to render the Mityleneans eager for a revolution were manifold. But the leading cause was, that in Mitylene the aristocratical party was powerful, and an aristocratical party, if not oppressed, must always have been insecure where Athenian influence prevailed. Hence they had perpetual reason to dread that their too powerful ally might one day encourage their subjects to revolt. But this motive was only sectional, pervading the ruling caste alone: there was another, which was, doubtless, more generally felt, as interesting to Mitylenean patriotism. The time had been when Mitylene carried on successful war with Athens, and had exercised a supremacy over the other towns of the island, like that of Athens over her confederacy. This could never be forgotten by a people who, like the other Greeks, thirsted for glory. And these recollections of their city's ancient greatness, became more bitter as Athens increased in power, and threatened to swallow up all remains of their independence. Hence it was that they resolved, on the first opportunity, to throw off her yoke for ever. In the mean time preparations were going forward for the enterprise. Ships were built, for-

tifications were gradually enlarged and strengthened; and in the spring of this year, B.C. 428, these works being far advanced, agents were sent into the Euxine to bring a supply of corn and a body of light troops, that they might be enabled to carry their intended measure into effect. At the same time, also, the population of Mitylene was receiving continual additions from the smaller towns subject to her influence, these being impelled thither by persuasion or force. Still much remained to be done before matters were ripe for hostility; and when the Lesbian contingents were called for this spring, Mitylene sent ten galleys to Athens.

But the Athenians were not left in ignorance of the proceedings at Mitylene. Among her neighbours that republic had rivals and enemies, of which Methymna, the second city in the island, and Tenedos, a neighbouring island, stood forth as the most conspicuous. These saw through the motives of the preparations Mitylene was making, and, dreading her success, sent information thereof to Athens. Their report was confirmed by the testimony of some of her own citizens in the Athenian interest. These joined in attesting the meditated rebellion, but the Athenians, afflicted by war and pestilence, were slow to believe, and, instead of sending an armament, they only sent envoys, to require the Mityleneans to desist from measures which gave alarm to Methymna, and umbrage to Athens. But this requisition was disregarded, and the envoys returned with the intelligence that the same line of conduct was still pursued at Mitylene.

On receiving this report, a fleet, which was then ready to set sail to the Peloponnesus, under the command of Cleippides, was directed to change its course and proceed to Mitylene. It was recollected at Athens, that a festival of Apollo was at hand, which was usually celebrated at some distance from the city by the whole population. Cleippides was ordered to embrace this opportunity of surprising them in the performance of this ceremony. This design, however, was rendered abortive by the activity of a Mitylenean merchant, who, passing from Athens to Eubra, preceded southward to Geræstus, and reached Mitylene before the Athenian armament arrived to take the city. His advice not only prevented the Mityleneans from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear in such a state of defence as induced Cleippides to listen to their request for an armistice, for the purpose of sending an embassy to Athens to remove the suspicions raised against them.

This transaction, however, was only a contrivance on the part of the Mityleneans to gain time. At the same time that their envoys set sail for Athens, they secretly despatched others to Sparta, requesting to be admitted into the Peloponnesian confederacy, that they might thereby be entitled to the protection of that powerful league. These ambassadors were favourably heard in a convention of the Peloponnesian representatives; and they received assurance of immediate and effectual assistance by a fresh invasion of Attica, which it was hoped would divert the Athenians from their attempt upon Mitylene.

As soon as this resolution was taken, the contingents, which had been recently disbanded, were

directed again to meet at the isthmus. The Spartans arrived there first; and they immediately began to make preparations for transporting a fleet across the isthmus into the Saronic gulf. But their allies were not so ardent at this time in the cause. They had spoiled the Attic harvest, and were now so busied with their own, that they reluctantly obeyed the summons to a fresh expedition.

While the Spartans were in this dilemma, Athens showed herself still powerful. Although the Mitylenean envoy had represented that state as in the last stage of weakness, from war and the plague, they saw her sending out her sons on every hand to combat with her foes. A squadron of thirty galleys was sent under Asopius, a son of Phormio, to ravage the maritime districts of Laconia, and then to proceed to Acarnania; while another, of a hundred galleys, manned partly with her own citizens, and partly with aliens, coasted the isthmus, and then proceeded to make descents on various parts of the Peloponnesian coast. This induced the Spartans to return home, and the Athenians, having accomplished the purpose of their expedition, followed their example.

Notwithstanding, the design of preventing the immediate pressure of the siege of Mitylene was in part accomplished. The Athenian force in that quarter was so little equal to its object, that the Mityleneans made an expedition against Methymna, hoping that, with the aid of a party among the citizens friendly to their cause, they should be able to take that city. This enterprise failed; and after marching in succession to Antusa, Pyrrha, and Ereusus, where they strengthened the fortifications, and secured the ascendancy of their partizans, they returned to Mitylene. These occurrences induced the Athenians to send in the autumn a body of a thousand heavy armed infantry, under Pachus, who, on his arrival, carried a wall across the land-side of the city, and built forts in some of the strongest positions, so that Mitylene was blockaded both by sea and land before the season of winter was over.

The expedition under Asopius, before mentioned, completed its designs upon Laconia, after which he sent back the greater part of his fleet, and pursued his voyage to the west. He made an unsuccessful attempt upon Œniade, and then pushed forward into the interior of the Leucadian territory, where he fell, with a part of his force, in battle.

It seems almost incredible that Athens should have been able, after, and even in the midst of, so much suffering, to make such extraordinary exertions against her varied and implacable foes. But this had been at the expense of her treasures, of which Pericles had boasted before the war commenced. These treasures, which had been the sinews of the war, were now exhausted. It became a question, therefore, how the siege of Mitylene was to be carried on. Without money they could neither equip fleets nor pay their soldiers, and the only expedient was to impose an extraordinary property-tax to meet the present exigencies. This produced two hundred talents; and with this sum a squadron was sent out, under the command of Lysicles and four colleagues, to levy contributions from friends and foes: an expedition in which he was unsuccessful; for, in

passing down the valley of the Mæander he was overpowered and slain, with a great part of his troops, by a body of Carians and Samians, who dwelt in Ane.

While Athens was thus contending with her foes, her faithful allies, the Plataeans, seem to have been forgotten. They had now been closely blockaded for nearly two years, and famine, with all its horrors, began to appear in the streets. The hope of relief was gone; to hold out longer became impossible; and no mercy was expected from the besiegers. In this situation of affairs, Themætus, a soothsayer, and Eupomidas, one of their generals, conceived the project of escaping across the enemy's lines. When it was first proposed, this plan was unanimously adopted; but as the time for its execution approached, half of the garrison shrank from the danger, and, finally, only about two hundred adhered to their resolution. These, led by the contrivers of the enterprise, taking advantage of a dark and stormy night, directed their march to the middle of the interval between two towers of the battlement raised by the enemy around the walls of Plataea. It was known that in such nights the sentinels took shelter in the towers, and left the intervening battlements unguarded; and it was on this practice that the success of the adventure chiefly depended. Having passed the ditch unperceived, ladders were placed, and twelve men, armed with short swords, and led by Ammeas, son of Corœbus, proceeded to secure the two nearest towers. Behind these came another party, armed with short spears; and many were already mounted, when the fall of a tile, broken off from a battlement by one of the Plataeans as he laid hold of it, alarmed the sentinels, and brought the whole force of the besiegers to the walls. Confusion, increased by the din of the storm, followed, but, after much danger, the adventurers made their way through their foes, and escaped to Athens, having lost only one man, who was taken prisoner.

When the Spartans were compelled to abandon the idea of invading Attica a second time during the summer of this year, they resolved to send succours to Mitylene, and directed their allies to equip a fleet of forty galleys, which their admiral Alcidas was to conduct thither in the course of the next summer, a.c. 427. This was made known to the Mityleneans early in the year by a Spartan named Sælethus, who contrived to make his way into the city through the Athenian lines by ascending the course of a torrent. The summer came, and, with it, brought the promised aid Alcidas was sent, with his fleet, to Mitylene, and an army, under Cleomenes, proceeded to invade Attica. Cleomenes was successful. He committed ravages scarcely less destructive than those of the second invasion, and then returned home. But the issue of the expedition under Alcidas was different. Instead of pushing vigorously forward to the main end of his commission, he lost time on the coast of Peloponnesus; and when he reached the Cyclades, he heard that Mitylene had fallen into the hands of the Athenians. The populace, becoming clamorous for bread, had declared that unless the wealthy citizens would open their granaries, and distribute their hidden stores among the fam-

ished people, they would make their own terms with the Athenians. This alarmed the ruling body; and, dreading a capitulation from which they would be excluded, they agreed to surrender the city, and to cast themselves on the mercy of the Athenians. Upon these terms the gates were opened, and Paches permitted them to send an embassy to Athens, engaging that until the pleasure of the Athenians was known, he would not deprive any Mitylenean either of life or liberty. Notwithstanding, under the pretext of respecting their persons, the principal leaders of the revolt were removed to safe custody in Tenedos, till the return of the envoys.

On discovering this state of affairs, Alcidas bent his course southward. He carried with him a number of prisoners, chiefly Ionians, who, not expecting to see a Peloponnesian fleet in their waters, had taken the enemy for Athenians, and had thus fallen into their hands. When he touched at Myonnesus, near Teos, Alcidas considered himself bound to adhere to the cruel policy which Sparta had adopted. Although he had been lately assured that these unhappy men were, at heart, his friends, he ordered most of them to be put to death, the remainder, through the remonstrance of some Samians from Anax, who met him at Ephesus, were liberated.

While the Peloponnesian fleet had lain among the Cyclades, it had been seen by the two Athenian state galleys, the Salaminia, and the Parnas, which hastened with the information to Paches. The danger seemed great to the Athenians, whence Paches, who had already reduced Antissa, deferred the subjugation of Lesbos, and set out in pursuit of Alcidas. He chased him as far as Patmos; but there, finding that the enemy was too far ahead to be overtaken, he returned to his work at Lesbos.

Before Paches reached Lesbos, an opportunity was offered him to do service to his country, but in doing which he marred his otherwise fair character with a blot of eternal infamy. Colophon, once famous for the wealth of its citizens, being torn by contending factions about three years before this date, one party, obtaining assistance from Itamenes, a Persian officer, suborned to the satrap of Sardis, expelled their opponents. The fugitives possessed themselves of Notium, the sea-port of Colophon, and became there a separate commonwealth. But faction soon became rife even among this body, and it arose to such a pitch that one party applied to the satrap himself, Pisuthnes, for assistance. This was afforded them, and their opponents were, in consequence, expelled from Notium. But, at the same time, the victorious party were compelled to submit to the government of their enemies at Colophon, who had pre-occupied the favour of the satrap. At this juncture, Paches came, with his fleet, into the neighbourhood of Notium, and the new fugitives claimed his protection, and that of the Athenian commonwealth, to which they asserted they had been faithful. Paches listened to their request, and, landing his forces, desired a conference with Hippias, the commander of the Arcadian forces. Trusting in a safe conduct, Hippias went to his camp, but he was immediately arrested, and, after Paches had entered Notium, and destroyed the

Arcadian and Persian troops, he ordered the unfortunate general, contrary to his solemn pledge, to be cruelly executed. The Colophians of the adverse party were then put into the possession of Notium, and soon after they were strengthened by a body of Colophian refugees, whom the Athenians collected from their various places of exile.

On the return of Paches to Mitylene, one of his measures was as little consistent with his plighted faith as his treatment of Hippias. Having consummated his conquest of the island, all the Mityleneans who had been active in the revolt, together with those who had been lodged in Tenedos, and the Spartan Salathus, were sent to Athens. This measure seems to have been hastened, that he might be enabled to send the greater part of his forces home. He remained with the rest to administer the affairs of the island.

On the arrival of these prisoners at Athens, the assembly met to determine upon their fate. Eager for revenge, the Spartan Salathus was ordered to immolate execution, but the fate of the Mityleneans became the subject of a lengthened discussion. It would probably have been rigorous, if it had been determined only by circumstances, seeing that the utmost resentment prevailed at Athens against them for revolting at a time when her treasury was exhausted, and she was enfeebled by her domestic calamity, and she was waged against her by the Peloponnesian confederacy, but the assembly was wayed by a man who, since the death of Pericles, had been gradually rising to power, and who acquired celebrity as an Athenian sycophant and demagogue, whence a severe doom awaited them. That man was Cleon, son of Cleonetas.

Cleon, who was a tanner by trade, entered early upon a political career, finding it more lucrative, as well as more dazzling, than his occupation. He possessed but slender abilities, and his knowledge of public affairs was extremely circumscribed. Still he could talk, and the multitude listened to him. But it was perhaps to the contrast which his language and manner exhibited to the ancient style of oratory, that he owed his pre-eminence. While that was calm, grave, earnest, and majestic, and varied with but little action, his oratory was impetuous and coarse, set off with a stentorian voice, and with vehement gesticulations. Throwing open or casting aside his upper garment, Cleon would clap his thigh and rush from one side of the speaker's stand to the other, which at once amused and caught the favour of the multitude. By this means, Cleon endeavoured to make up for his deficiency of knowledge and intellect. Added to this, he claimed the reputation of being a plain straightforward man, who always kept the good of the people in view, and endeavoured to take the shortest course to that consummation. By this means, he gained credit for honest patriotism, while he watched every turn of the popular inclination, that he might anticipate or outstrip that inclination.

In the language of Hermippus, the comic poet, Cleon had been like a horse-fly, or other biting and importunate insect, in his attacks upon

Pericles. His person and his administration were equally the objects of his calumnious invectives. Thus, at the time of the first Peloponnesian invasion, he loudly seconded the popular clamour which called on Pericles to meet the enemy in the field. But the line of policy adopted by Cleon, which chiefly bears on the subject of the punishment of the Mityleneans, was, that he ever treated the allies of the commonwealth with despotical harshness—as subjects who had no right to interfere with the will of the sovereign state, or to murmur at her exactions. Hence it was not difficult to foresee what course he would pursue in the case of Mitylene. Knowing that the public mind was disposed to rigour, and feeling that it was a fair opportunity of increasing his popularity, and satisfying his sordid cupidity, he inflamed the popular humour, and succeeded in carrying a decree, that not only the prisoners sent by Paches to Athens, but all the adult citizens of Mitylene, should perish, and the women and children be enslaved.

The command for this wholesale massacre was despatched to Mitylene the same day; but on the next, when the passions which had been heated by the debate were cooled, many who had voted with the majority recoiled at the thought of such severity, and wished that they could recall the sentence. The Mitylenean envoys and their Athenian friends took advantage of this altered state of public feeling, and induced the presiding magistrates to call another assembly, and put the question to the vote. The ferocious Cleon again came forward to advocate the measure, and it may be supposed that his oratory was more vehement than on the preceding day, since his popularity was now somewhat at stake. He endeavoured, indeed, to shame the people out of their humanity, and to show that a democratical government, which is liable to such sudden changes of mood, was unfit to rule over other states. But his arguments and boisterous oratory were at this time alike vain. The cause of the Mityleneans was pleaded by Diiodotus, who had opposed the decree in the previous assembly, and who, being now seconded by the better feelings of the assembly, prevailed. The decree was repealed, and a galley was despatched with orders for Paches not to put the decree into execution. Although the other galley had started twenty-four hours sooner, yet that which bore the errand of mercy, being rowed by men who were nerved to action by promises of reward, arrived just as the fatal order was put into the hands of Paches another hour, and the streets of Mitylene would have flowed with blood. Yet were the prisoners at Athens, more than one thousand in number, all sacrificed to the vengeance of the people, as Cleon had proposed, without even the form of a trial. Mitylene, also, was deprived of all remains of independence: her walls were razed, her navy was seized, and she was no longer allowed to retain even the rank of a tributary state. The whole island, moreover, except the territory of Methymna, was parcelled out into three thousand shares, the title of which was consecrated to the gods, and the rest allotted to Attic colonists; to whom the Lesbians, who were allowed to till the ground, were to pay a fixed rent.

From these transactions it will be seen that the

public temper of Athens was fickle—that it was rather swayed by the passions of orators than by sober reason. This is also observable in the fate of Paches, who returned about this period to Athens, and who expected to reap honours and rewards for his distinguished services. But in this he was disappointed. His services were forgotten, and he was brought to trial on some charge, the particulars of which are not recorded, and, either having been convicted, or perceiving that conviction was inevitable, he stabbed himself in the presence of his judges. His own hand committed the retributive act for having so treacherously cut off Hippasus. But this by no means extenuates the ingratitude of the Athenian people, for that they were ungrateful to Paches is proved by the fact, that his name in later times was frequently joined with the names of Miltiades, Themistocles, and Aristides, by orators who declaimed against Athenian envy and ingratitude. His fate was determined by the virulence with which he was assailed by the orators who spoke on the occasion of his trial; these, as in the assembly which met to decide on the fate of the Mityleneans, worked upon the multitude for evil.

The heart of the humane reader must sicken as he passes from the record of one tragedy to another. Yet those which have been recorded may prepare his mind for that which follows in the course of history, although it is more fearful in its nature. He may have concluded that no action was too bloody for the Greeks to commit, proud as they were of their civilization. War had so deadened the feelings of humanity in the Grecian breast, that they breathed extermination each one against his fellow. No ties of kindred were taken into the account, or, if they were, they appear only to have administered to mutual animosity.

The garrison of Platrea was by this time reduced to the last stage of weakness. The Spartans might, indeed, have taken the city by assault before, but they had a motive for wishing to bring the siege to a different termination. They looked forward to a peace, which they might have to conclude upon the usual terms of a mutual restitution of conquests made in the war, and in this case, if Platrea fell by storm, they would be compelled to restore it to Athens. On the contrary, if Platrea capitulated, they might allege that it was no conquest, and treat the garrison as they pleased. With this view, they protracted the blockade, until at length they discovered that the garrison was unable to defend their walls, and then, in the spirit of this refined policy, they sent a herald to propose that they should surrender to the Spartans, on condition that Spartan judges should decide upon their fate; which terms were accepted.

In a few days, commissioners arrived from Sparta, to hold the promised trial. But this proved a mere mockery. Instead of the usual forms of accusation and defence, the prisoners found themselves called upon to answer this single question: "Whether, in the existing war, they had rendered any service to Sparta and her allies?" Alarmed at such an interrogative, which they could not answer satisfactorily, the Platreaans requested that they might plead for themselves without restriction. This request was granted, and their defence

was conducted by Astymachus and Laco, the latter of whom was connected by ties of hospitality with Sparta.

The line of argument which the Platæan orators adopted was convincing and pathetic to the last degree. They pointed out the absurdity of sending commissioners to inquire whether the garrison of a besieged town were friends to the besiegers—they appealed to their services and sufferings in the Persian war, when they alone among the Bœotians remained constant to the cause of Greece—they pleaded an important obligation which they had more recently conferred on Sparta, whom they had succoured with a third part of their force, when her existence was threatened by the Messenians, after the earthquake—they urged that their alliance with Athens had been formed by the advice and approbation of the Spartans themselves, and that justice and honour forbade them to renounce a connexion which they had sought as a favour, and from which they had derived great advantages—they maintained that they had not broken the last peace, but had been treacherously surprised by the Thebans, contrary to the faith of treaties—and they concluded by showing, that if their former merits were not sufficient to outweigh past offences, they were, at least, entitled to the Greek usage of war, which forbade proceeding to the last extremity with an enemy who had voluntarily surrendered himself, and that, as they had proved the patience with which they had endured the torments of hunger, they preferred perishing to falling into the hands of the Thebans, they had a right to demand that they should not be placed in a worse condition by their own act; but that, if they were to gain nothing by their capitulation, they should be restored to the state in which they were when they made that capitulation.

Unhappily, the Platæans had nothing to rely upon but the mercy and honour of the Spartans, principles which were unknown in their public transactions. Yet they appear to have been so much affected by the appeal of the Platæan orators, that the Thebans, distrusting their firmness, judged it necessary to reply. These orators treated the question as one existing between the Platæans and themselves—attributed the conduct of their ancestors in the Persian war to the compulsion of a small dominant faction—pleaded the services which the Thebans had rendered to the Spartans—depreciated the patriotic deeds of the Platæans as the result of their attachment to Athens, whom they had assisted in all her undertakings against the liberties of Greece—defended the attempt which they had made upon Platæa, on the ground that they had been invited by a number of its most influential citizens—and charged the Platæans with a breach of faith in the execution of their Theban prisoners, whose blood cried as loudly for vengeance as they did for mercy. The Thebans prevailed. Considering that Thebes was their most useful and powerful ally, the Spartans set aside all humanity and justice, and proposed the original question to each separately; and when the ceremony was finished, by his answer in the negative, or by his silence, he was consigned to the executioner. In this way, two hundred Platæans perished, and twenty-five

Athenians shared their fate. As for the women, they were all made slaves; while the town and its territory were ceded to the Thebans.

At first, the Thebans permitted the town of Platæa to be occupied by a body of exiles from Megara, and the Platæans belonging to the Theban party; but in the course of a year they razed it to the ground, leaving only the temples standing. With the materials of the demolished buildings, however, they erected an edifice two hundred feet square, with an upper story, the whole of which was divided into apartments for the reception of those pilgrims who might come to the celebration of the feast of Liberty, which was established after the overthrow of Mardonius, as related on a former page. The Thebans, also, built a new temple, which they dedicated to Heræ, the goddess to whom Pausanias was supposed to have been indebted for his victory on that occasion. So fell Platæa, in the ninety-third year after it had entered into an alliance with Athens, not even the decree which rendered it sacred and inviolable, so long as the Platæans offered the sacrifices above mentioned, could save it from destruction. Ruthless fury, engendered by continual wars, swayed the Spartan breast and Theban policy. Rendered cruel and remorseless thereby, nothing but the destruction of the citizens and their city could satisfy either Sparta or Thebes.

The Peloponnesian fleet, with which Alcidas escaped from Ionia, after being dispersed by a storm off Crete, re-assembled in the port of Cyllene, where it was reinforced by a squadron of thirteen galleys from Leucas and Ambracia, under Brasidas, and whence it was sent on an expedition in another part of the theatre of war—a part in which scenes still more fearful than those recorded were acted. Every step which the Greeks now took was marked by bloodshed and desolation. The thirst which they exhibited for slaughter was fearful, every drop of blood that was shed seemed only to increase their desire for more. Like the horse-leech of the East, whose insatiable thirst for blood is proverbial, each cried "Give, give." So little does civilization, without higher principles, restrain man from evil.

It has been seen that on a former occasion the Corinthians had taken some Coreyean prisoners, whom they treated with indulgence, in the hope of gaining them over to their interest. These prisoners were afterwards sent back to Corycra, nominally ransomed for eight hundred talents, on security given by some Corinthians themselves, but, in reality, that they should restore the Corinthian ascendancy in the island. As most of these men belonged to that class for which a revolution would open a path to power, they readily engaged in this matter, and at length succeeded in forming a party strong enough to procure a decree in an assembly, which was attended by envoys from Athens and Corinth, which revived the ancient system of neutrality between the belligerents. Corycra was not to take part with Athens, her ally, nor to be unfriendly to the Peloponnesians.

Having thus successfully taken this stride to power, the restored party soon attempted to take another. At this time the democratical section of Corycra was headed by one Pithias, whom they arraigned, in the hope of causing his downfall,

on a charge of making the state subservient to Athens. Pithias, however, was acquitted, and he retaliated upon five of the wealthiest among his adversaries, whose private property was contiguous to some public domains, by convicting them of having cut stakes on ground sacred to Zeus and the hero Alcinous. These delinquents were legally fined a stater, (about one guinea,) for every stake; and it would appear that they had cut so many, that the whole penalty which they had incurred was of ruinous amount. Under these circumstances, they besought the people to allow them to pay it by instalments, but Pithias, who was a member of the council, prevented them from being thus indulged. At the same time, he prepared to use the advantage which his station afforded him for obtaining a reversal of the decree of neutrality. This aroused his enemies to fatal action. Collecting a band of conspirators, they suddenly rushed into the council-chamber, and despatched not only Pithias, but about sixty other members of the council. Those who escaped took refuge on board the galley which had brought the Athenian envoys, and accompanied them to Athens.

This was the first scene in the act performed at Coreyra. The conspirators, having become masters of the assembly by their treachery, carried a motion for closing their ports against all but single vessels belonging to either belligerent power. They also sent envoys to Athens to justify their proceedings, and to induce the refugees there to remain tranquil. But this could never have been expected by them, or, if it was, they were disappointed. On the arrival of the envoys, they, and all their countrymen who had yielded to their threats or persuasions, were arrested by the Athenians, and sent in custody to Argina.

In the meanwhile, the conspirators and their party, being encouraged by the arrival of a Corinthian galley, fell sword in hand, upon the commonalty. At first they put them to the rout, but in the following night these took possession of the citadel and the other eminences in the city, with one of the harbours called the Hyllæic. The other party held the principal port and the agora adjoining it, in which most of them lived. During the next day each party was employed in procuring reinforcements. The commonalty obtained the assistance of the slaves by the promise of freedom, and their opponents brought over eight hundred Epirot auxiliaries from the continent. And now the struggle began, in which the commonalty prevailed. The oligarchs, being overpowered, were driven to the necessity of setting fire to the houses in the agora, to prevent their utter destruction, and the shades of night closed over this conflagration. During the night the Corinthian galley departed, and most of the foreign auxiliaries, who saw the cause of their friends declining, made their escape.

Soon after this struggle commenced, the commonalty had sent intelligence of it to Naupactus, where Nicostratus, son of Ditrephes, commanded the Athenian squadron. On the day after they had gained the ascendancy, Nicostratus arrived with twelve galleys and five hundred Messenians. His presence restored peace. He concluded a solemn agreement between the parties, by which ten of the principal authors of the

late convulsion were to be brought to trial, and an alliance offensive and defensive was contracted with Athens. The humane Nicostratus provided that the ten who were to be brought to trial should escape; and thus a sedition, begun with the most outrageous violence, ended in a manner hitherto unrecorded in the Grecian annals—*without further bloodshed*. This is a bright spot in the history of this sanguinary period, and the circumstance redounds to the honour of Nicostratus.

The solemn agreement which Nicostratus had laboured to procure between these factions did not establish peace. When the peacemaker prepared to depart, the leaders requested him to leave five of his galleys with them and to take five away, which they would man instead. To this he consented, and they then signified their intention of putting their enemies on board. Unhappily, a suspicion arose among these, that they were to be sent to Athens, and they took refuge in the temple of Castor and Pollux, or the Twins. It was in vain that Nicostratus endeavoured to allay their fears; they refused to quit the sanctuary. This mistrust was interpreted by the democratical party as a proof of some treacherous design; and they, arming themselves, broke into their houses to search for arms, and, but for the intervention of Nicostratus, would have slain all who fell in their way. Upon this, those who had hitherto remained quiet betook themselves, as suppliants, to the sanctuary of Juno, and the popular leaders were so alarmed at their numbers, that they induced them to consent to be carried over to the little island of Ptychia, where they were to be supplied with provisions from Coreyra. Thus mutual jealousy prevented the harmony which Nicostratus had endeavoured to obtain.

While the minds of the parties were in this state of suspense, the Peloponnesian fleet, under Alcidas and Brasidas, arrived in the channel. Consternation now spread through the town. The triumphant party scarcely knew which most to dread—the Peloponnesian armament, or their own fellow citizens. Still, urged by Nicostratus they manned sixty of their galleys, and sent them out with the Athenian force to combat the enemy. But there was little union among them. Two of their galleys joined the Peloponnesian fleet, while in others the crews fought with one another. Seeing this disorder, Alcidas divided his force, and with twenty galleys attacked the Coreyreans, while with the rest he encountered the Athenian squadron. Against the former he was successful, taking thirteen galleys; but the latter, by superior tactics, withstood his attacks, and he retired to Sybota.

Alarmed lest the enemy should make use of his victory to attack the city, or to deliver the prisoners at Ptychia, the Coreyreans removed them back to the temple of Here, and prepared for defence. Had the counsel of Brasidas been followed, Alcidas would have thus acted; but after disembarking his troops at the headland of Leucumna, and ravaging the country, he sailed away to his station. At nightfall he received intelligence, conveyed by fire-signals, from Leuca, of the approach of an Athenian armament; and, pushing by the shore under cover of the night,

he reached the Leucadian isthmus, and had his ships hauled over to the other side, whence he sailed home.

The approach of the Athenians, and the departure of the Peloponnesians, were followed by one of the most horrid massacres recorded in the pages of profane history. The vindictive passions which prudence had hitherto restrained broke out in the breasts of the democratical party with unbridled fury. The Messenians, hitherto encamped without, were admitted within the walls, and the fleet, which had been again collected to repel the expected attack of Alcidas, was directed to pass round into the Hyllæic harbour. When they arrived there, all the partisans of the oligarchy who had helped to man them were thrown overboard, and, in the same instant, massacre commenced in the city. The suppliants in the temple of Heræ remained protected by that superstitious dread, which generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evils from the vengeance of the gods. Fifty of them, however, were enticed away by the promise of a legal trial, and were all summarily condemned and executed. The rest, informed of their fate, yielding to despair, destroyed themselves on holy ground, some even by hanging themselves on the boughs of the sacred trees. This was only the signal for a more general slaughter. For seven days, the democratical party hunted down their opponents as beasts of the forest. In the sanctuary of Bæchus, where some had taken refuge, the suppliants were walled in, and died of hunger, while, from other sanctuaries, some were dragged out and put to death. Nor was difference of opinion the only criterion of offence. Private revenge and avarice had their victims. Debts were cancelled by the murder of creditors, and even near relatives fell by each other's hands. So complete was the work of destruction, that when Eurymedon, the Athenian admiral—who, to his shame, had calmly looked on—sailed away, hatred and revenge were compelled to rest for lack of victims. A remnant, however, of the vanquished party still survived. This remnant, amounting to about five hundred, escaped to the opposite coast, where, having seized some forts, they kept possession of the continental territory of the state, and, by continual excursions, harassed their adversaries, till, in the end, as will be hereafter recorded, they also were destroyed.

Such were the tragical scenes acted during this fifth year of the Peloponnesian war. Winter put a stop to them, by compelling all the belligerents to sheathe their swords. But desolation still continued at Athens. The plague had abated for a twelvemonth, but during this season it broke out with fresh malignity. This second attack lasted during a year, and, according to Thucydides, it carried away 5,700 of its soldier citizens, besides a great number of the mixed population. This winter was also distinguished by earthquakes, which shook Athens, Eubœa, and Bœotia, but more especially Orchomenus. Could the Greeks have traced the hand of Providence in these events, they would have discovered that God was wroth with them for their evil doings, and that he designed to teach them this lesson.—

"That, where all deserves
And stand exposed by common peccancy,
To what no few had felt, there should be peace,
And brethren in calamity should love"

OWPEN

The void which the plague had made in Athens was filled up in the course of nature, but it was attended with one pernicious consequence which continued to be felt for ages. It produced a relaxation of the laws which prescribed the conditions of the Athenian franchise, by which means many gained admission to its privileges by fraud. Still, these surreptitious citizens do not appear to have produced further discord at present than that which had already been rife in the city, and which had, at all times, ended in a wordy war, or personal persecution. It is remarkable, that neither Athens nor Sparta was subject to the evils which their struggle had occasioned in Corcyra—those of civil war. These were reserved for them till after ages, and, in the mean time, they continued to struggle with each other. It was, perhaps, this mutual animosity that preserved their internal tranquillity.

Athens and Sparta again prepared for war in the spring of the 426. The troops of Sparta were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus, under Ages, the son of Archdamus, who had now passed off the stage of life, for a proposed invasion of Attica, when repeated earthquakes checked the design, and the troops were dismissed. These convulsions, which were thought to signify that the gods forbade the progress of this expedition, extended to some distance under the bed of the Ægean, and produced partial inundations, such as those in ancient times, which are recorded in the mythical traditions of Attica and Bœotia. Yet the Spartans were not entirely inactive during this summer. At the request of the Malians of Trachis, who were harassed by the mountaineers of Cita, they sent a body of colonists, and founded a new city near the ancient Trachis, which they named Heraclea. Later in the season, Sparta was induced to make an effort to counteract the movements of the Athenians in the west.

While yet the terrors of the earthquakes were rife in the Grecian coast, Athens had fitted out two fleets—one destined to act, under Nicias, against the island of Melos, which refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Athens, or to cast off its alliance to Sparta, and the other, under Demosthenes and Procles, was sent round Peloponnesus, to work mischief where it could. Nicias ravaged the island of Melos, but he was not able to reduce the town, and the tedious business of a siege was postponed for another enterprise, which had been concerted before the fleet left Attica, namely, the devastation of the fertile plain of Tanagra, which Nicias, being joined by the whole force of Athens, under Hipponicus and Eurymedon, effected. In revenge for the waste which Attica had suffered, the plain was rendered like a wilderness. After this, Hipponicus and Eurymedon marched back to Athens, and Nicias, having ravaged the coast of Lœcis, returned home likewise.

In the meanwhile Demosthenes and Procles proceeded round Peloponnesus on their work of

destruction. Being joined by fifteen Corcyrean ships, and by troops from Zacynthus and Cephalonia, they sailed to attack Leucas, where their operations were supported by the Acarnanians, who hoped to crush the Leucadians. Demosthenes and Procles ravaged the territories of Leucadia, but the citizens kept within their walls, the Athenian commanders, therefore, accepted an invitation from the Messenians of Naupactus to undertake an expedition to Ætolia. Before they set out, the Corcyrean galleys returned home, so that when they sailed round to Eneon, a town of the Ozolian Locris on the Crisean gulf, the point from which they intended to begin their march, they had only the Messenian, Zacynthian, and Cephalonian auxiliaries, with three hundred Athenians, at command. With these, acting upon the advice of the Messenians, after destroying some minor villages, Demosthenes and Procles moved onward to Ægium, a village town, situate about ten miles from the coast, and among the mountains. This was captured, but the Ætolians, who had received early intelligence of the expedition, were already on their march with the whole force of the country, which was augmented by the Opionian tribes of Eta, the Bomienses, and the Callienses, whose seats approached the Malian gulf. These came upon the invaders at Ægium, and, descending from the mountains above, charged upon them with such irresistible force, that they were utterly overthrown. A great number of the allies were slain, with 120 Athenians, and Procles their general. The rest effected their escape to Eneon, from whence they sailed to Naupactus, and shortly after, with the exception of Demosthenes, to Athens. Demosthenes remained at Naupactus, from a dread of the Athenian people, who ever held want of success as a crime that should be punished.

It was at this time that the Spartans again appeared in the field. Desiring to revenge themselves on the Messenians of Naupactus, who had brought the invader into their country, the Ætolians sent three ambassadors to Corinth and Sparta to solicit assistance, and a Peloponnesian army, under the Spartan Eurylochus, marched to Delphi. At this place Eurylochus was joined by five hundred heavy armed men from the newly founded Heraclæa, and by the forces of the Ozolian Locris, who were induced thus to act from fear that, as his march lay through their territories, they should be exposed to the first attack. Some few Locrian towns, however, refused to renounce their alliance with Athens, and when Eurylochus set out on his march, these were, in consequence, reduced. No obstacle now stood in his way, and the Spartan commander reached the territory of Naupactus, which, in concert with the Ætolian army, he ravaged. Eurylochus made himself master of an unfortified suburb, and the town itself was in great danger, as the population was unequal to its defence, but the Peloponnesians, instead of besieging it, turned aside to take the town of Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, which had become subject to Athens. This saved Naupactus. On receiving intelligence of the invasion, Demosthenes had gone into Acarnania, for the purpose of persuading the Acarnanians to lay aside their resent-

ment, and to send a thousand troops with him to the relief of Naupactus. It was a difficult task, but at length Demosthenes prevailed, and the reinforcement was introduced into the town by sea. When Eurylochus heard of this, deeming a siege hopeless, he dismissed the Ætolian forces, and cantoned his own in the adjacent part of Ætolia. He did this, that he might be in readiness to support a fresh expedition which the Ambracians meditated against the Amphilocheian Argos, and Acarnania.

Winter had already arrived, when the Ambracians and Eurylochus invaded Amphilocheia, and took up their position at a place called Olipu, which in ancient times had belonged to the Acarnanians, and had been fortified by them as the seat of their national court of justice. They had not been long in this position before an allied army of Athenians, Messenians, Acarnanians, and Amphilocheians, under the command of Demosthenes, marched against them. The two armies remained in the presence of each other five days, parted by a ravine, but on the sixth they engaged in battle, the issue of which was, that Eurylochus was slain and his forces defeated. Menedæus, on whom the command of the Peloponnesians devolved, found himself reduced to the alternative of sustaining a blockade both by land and sea, or of attempting a retreat before the victorious army. He chose the latter, and having buried his slain, which the usages of war permitted him, and gained the consent of Demosthenes and his colleagues, he returned towards Peloponnesus. Notwithstanding, the Acarnanians pursued the retreating forces in their march, and slew about two hundred Ambracians; the rest made their escape into the territory of the Agræans, where they were hospitably received by the Agræan king, Salyntius.

At the time of this conflict the whole force of the Ambracians was on its march towards Olipu. They encamped for the night on a hill which lay in the road named Idome, occupying one of its two summits. In this position, they were encountered by Demosthenes, and the greater part of them were slain on the spot, and of those who escaped this slaughter most were destroyed in their retreat through this mountainous region. A small number only made their way to Ambracia.

After these victories, which completely humbled the Ambracians and satiated the revenge of the Acarnanians, the victors returned to Argos, where they divided the spoils. A third of these was assigned to Athens, and three hundred panoplies were reserved for Demosthenes, who, no longer fearing the displeasure of the people, carried them home, and dedicated them in the Athenian temples. On the departure of their allies, the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians granted an unmolested retreat to the Ambracians and Peloponnesians, who had withdrawn from Agræa to Enæade, and concluded a treaty of peace with the former for one hundred years, on terms of mutual defence. By this treaty, the Amphilocheians recovered the hostages and places which had been wrested from them by the Ambracians. So depopulated was this colony by the war, that the Corinthians sent a garrison of three hundred men, in order to protect them till, in

the course of nature, the population should be augmented.

With these transactions the sixth year of this fell war terminated. The seventh, *b.c.* 425, opened with brighter prospects for Athens. The plague, which had so long scourged its citizens, had disappeared, and, in gratitude for their relief, the Athenians, in the course of the preceding winter, purified the island of Delos, the seat of that god, who, it was believed, both sent and swept away such diseases. All the dead who had been interred in the island were removed therefrom; and it was decreed that it should never be again profaned by the death or the birth of a human being. The sick and those who bare children were to be removed in tune to the adjacent islet of Rhenea. At the same time, different ceremonies were instituted for the purpose of propitiating the favour of the god. Thus an ancient festival, described in the pages of Homer, as celebrated by the "long-robed Ionians," to delight the eye and ear of the god by trials of strength, dancing, and music, was revived and made quinquennial, and to these games that of the horse-race was added. So vulgar was the Greek notion of deity, that they measured the senses of their gods by their own! What wonder is it, therefore, that such deeds of darkness were committed during this stormy period, if the wrath of their gods, enkindled by their evil doings, could be appeased by dancing, show, and music?

Having thus displayed their gratitude, the Athenians earnestly and vigorously prepared for the renewal of the long-continued strife. And as if their enemies at home were not sufficient to employ their returning vigour, they addressed themselves to a distant and wider field of action—the conquest of Sicily. While the Peloponnesian army, under the Spartan king Agas, again invaded Attica, and committed its usual ravages, Sophocles and Eurymedon set sail with forty galleys to the aid of the Leontines, with the ostensible motive of delivering them from the Syracusan armament by which that Athenian colony was threatened, but in reality to obtain acquisitions in that rich island, and to reduce the whole under the subjection of Athens.

While yet the Athenians were suffering from the united effects of pestilence and war, in *b.c.* 427, the Leontines had sought relief from Athens, and twenty galleys, under Laches, were sent to them, partly for that purpose, and partly with the view of exploring the state of Sicily, and of ascertaining what encouragement it held out to their schemes of conquest. This squadron sailed to Rhegium, where a party held rule who were favourable to Athens. As a city of Chalcidian origin, Rhegium was naturally attached to Athens, and this attachment was strengthened by its proximity to Locris, which was in part a Spartan colony, and was an ally of the Peloponnesian confederacy. At this place, therefore, Laches took his station, and waited for opportunities of action. His first measure was directed against the *Æolian* islands; but he failed in his main object, the reduction of Lipara. His presence, however, had the effect of animating the Sicilian allies of Athens to more vigorous efforts, and for a time relieved Leontium by drawing off the Syracusan squadron by which it was blockaded.

During the next summer, Laches gained a more important advantage by capturing the fort of Myla, in the territory of Messana, as well as the capital of Messana, bearing the same name, which surrendered on his first approach. Laches was equally successful in a descent which he soon after made on the coast of Locris, where he defeated an adverse force, and made himself master of a fort on the river Halex. Laches, however, failed in an expedition which he led in the following winter against the Sicel town Inessa, where he was defeated, with considerable loss, by the Sicels and Syracusans; and though this check was soon after in some degree compensated by another successful descent on the Locrian territory, yet the main end of the war seemed as distant as on his first arrival. The Leontines were still pressed both by land and sea, and they therefore sent again to Athens soliciting more effectual succour. This was granted, while Pythodorus was sent with a few ships to supersede Laches, preparations were made for despatching an armament to Sicily, under Eurymedon and Sophocles.

On his return from an expedition which he had made against Himera and the *Æolian* isles, Laches found his successor at Rhegium. But Pythodorus was not more successful than the general he had superseded. He was not only defeated in an expedition which he had made against the Locrians soon after his arrival, but in the spring of *b.c.* 425, the united forces of the Syracusans and Locrians took possession of Messana, while the latter invaded the territory of Rhegium with their whole force. They were incited to this by a body of Rhegian exiles, who hoped, through their medium, to be restored to their country.

Such was the state of affairs in Sicily, when Sophocles and Eurymedon, accompanied by Demosthenes, who had obtained leave to embark with them in a private capacity, set sail in order to effect its conquest. The generals were directed to touch at Corcyra, where the friends of Athens were again threatened by the refugees, who had taken up their position, and were waiting for the arrival of a promised Peloponnesian armament. Demosthenes had obtained leave to use the services of the fleet, as occasion might offer, on the coast of Peloponnesus, and when it had reached the coast of Messenia, he announced a design of occupying that point called by the Spartans *Corryphasium*, and which stands at the northern entrance of the bay now known under the name of Navarino. Demosthenes conceived the project of fortifying this point, and of entrusting it to a garrison from Naupactus, which his personal influence could command, but Sophocles and Eurymedon, who had received intelligence that a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty galleys was already arrived at Corcyra, would not enter into his views. Stress of weather, however, forced them soon after to put into this harbour, and they were detained there so long, that Demosthenes was gratified by seeing the headland fortified as he proposed. A rude wall was built, and, after it was completed, the weather being fair, Eurymedon and Sophocles prosecuted their voyage, leaving five galleys with Demosthenes to guard the fortress.

When the intelligence of this transaction arrived at Sparta, the people were celebrating one of those festivals which occupied so much of the attention of the Greeks. At Sparta, however, it rather excited ridicule than alarm; for, confident in the superiority of their land force, they could not believe that the Athenians could become formidable by land in Peloponnesus, and a fort so soon raised they conceived might be as soon destroyed. Agis, however, who was then invading Attica, was of a different opinion. He was induced thereby immediately to withdraw his army from Attica, where he had only been fifty days, and to march against Coryphasium, in order to dislodge the Athenians.

As soon as Agis had returned from Attica, orders were sent to the Peloponnesian allies to bring up their contingents without delay, and the fleet was recalled from Corcyra. Demosthenes saw the gathering storm, and he despatched two of his galleys to Zacynthus, where Eurymedon and Sophocles were lying, to inform them of his danger. In the meantime, he was hard pressed by the Peloponnesians both by sea and land. Dividing his little force, however, Demosthenes defended his position with great bravery. It was on the side of the sea that he expected the most formidable assault, and therefore, while he distributed his main force round the walls on the land side, he himself came down to the water's edge, with sixty heavy-armed and a few bow men, there to defend the fort. The attack began on all sides at once, but, as Demosthenes foresaw, the main effort was directed against the quarter where he was stationed. The nature of the shore would only permit a few ships to approach at a time, but as the fleet consisted of forty-three, they continually relieved each other, so that the Athenians were pressed during the whole day by an uninterrupted series of assaults. Demosthenes himself fell covered with wounds, but the conflict was unintermitted till nightfall, and was renewed the next day, at the close of which the assailants were obliged to confess themselves baffled. On the third day they resolved to change their plan of attack, and they sent some ships to Asine, to fetch timber for constructing engines, with which they proposed to make an attempt on the fort from the side of the harbour where the landing was easier, though the wall was stronger. But, in the meantime, the Athenian fleet, which was augmented to the number of fifty by a reinforcement of four from Chios and eleven from Naupaetus, appeared to the rescue. The harbour and the adjacent island of Sphacteria being in possession of the Peloponnesians, they sailed away to moor for the night at the little island of Proté, but the next day they returned, and, entering the harbour, took five galleys, shattered others, and put the rest to flight. The dread of a loss, however, which would leave their comrades in Sphacteria defenceless, roused the Spartans to desperate exertions. They pushed into the sea to regain their empty vessels, and succeeded in rescuing all but the five first taken, with which the Athenians at length sailed away, determined to keep strict watch over the island, to prevent those shut up there from making their escape.

When intelligence of the situation of these

men, amounting to 420 in number, reached Sparta, it caused a consternation which can only be understood by supposing that life had become precious through the desolations of war. The ephori sought means for their deliverance; but, as the Athenians were masters by sea, one way only was left—that of negotiation. Accordingly the Spartans sought a truce of the Athenian generals, in order to enable them to send an embassy to Athens. This was granted in the true spirit of victors. The Spartans were to deliver up their whole navy at Coryphasium, and the Athenians were to keep up the blockade of the island, only allowing certain rations of bread, meat, and wine, to be sent in daily to the besieged, under their immediate inspection, until the return of the envoys. Hostilities, also, were to cease on both sides till the result of the embassy should be known, otherwise the truce was to be considered at an end.

Under these circumstances, envoys were conducted from proud Sparta to prouder Athens. The proposition of the Spartan envoys resolved itself into this one point—the recovery of the men in Sphacteria, as the price of peace and alliance between Athens and Sparta. But there was no peace yet for the sons of Greece. The Athenians were as much intoxicated with their unexpected success as the Spartans were cast down by this sudden reverse. They looked, also, upon the men in the island as already their own, and, consequently, that they might always command peace, so that they were induced to exact concessions, which rendered this application for a cessation of strife abortive. It is probable, however, that the Athenians might have been more moderate in their demands, had not their counsels still been swayed by that arch-demagogue, Cleon. By his boisterous oratory, he prevailed on the Athenian assembly to return this answer to the Spartans—that the men in the island should surrender themselves, with their arms, and be conveyed to Athens, to be restored only to their country, after the Spartans should have reinstated the Athenians in the possession of all those places which had been ceded as the price of the thirty years' truce, and that when these preliminaries had been executed, a treaty of peace should be concluded for any term of years, as might be agreeable to both states. To such conditions as these the Spartan envoys could not listen for a moment, and they requested that commissioners might be appointed to treat with them privately. This proposal was construed, by Cleon, into a proof of double-dealing, for which the veil of secrecy was sought, and, as such, he procured its rejection by the people. So the Spartan envoys returned home unsatisfied, and the war still continued.

On the return of the envoys, the Spartans demanded the restoration of their ships, according to the truce. This the Athenians refused, alleging that the truce had been infringed by some acts of hostility, which appears to have been unfounded. Both parties, therefore, renewed hostilities with redoubled activity and bitterness. The Athenians directed their attention particularly to the guard of Sphacteria, while the Peloponnesians made repeated attacks on the fort.

chiefly with the hope of finding some opportunity of delivering their besieged friends.

It was hoped by the Athenians, that they should be able to reduce the Spartans in Sphacteria by famine. But this was warded off by the activity of the Spartan government. Large rewards were offered to all persons who carried in provisions, and the helots were excited by the promise of freedom. By these means, many were induced to *sift* to Sphacteria in small vessels during the darkness of the night, while others, expert in diving, swam under water across the port, rising only occasionally for air, and dragging after them bags filled with a nutritive mixture of bruised seed and honey. Two or three months thus passed away, and, at length, the Athenians themselves began to suffer those wants through which they had hoped to reduce the Spartans. The headland of Coryphasium contained only one spring of water, whence many of the troops were forced to drink the brackish water obtained by digging into the beach. At the same time, their provisions grew scarce, and the barrenness of the neighbouring coast afforded no supply.

When the report of this state of affairs reached Athens, it created a mingled feeling of impatience and alarm. The assembly was thrown into commotion by it, and Demosthenes, and even Cleon, were, in their turns, assailed by the orators. It was feared by the assembly, that the prey, after all, might slip through their fingers, for if winter should find the parties in the same position, it would be next to impossible to victual the fort or sustain the blockade of the island, and hence the besieged would escape. Looking at circumstances in this light, many regretted that they had been induced to reject the offers of Sparta. The growing discontent of the people was chiefly pointed against Cleon, and he appears to have deemed himself in no little danger, for he used all the force of his deep cunning to sustain his reputation. Putting on a bold countenance, he flatly denied the truth of the accounts brought from the scene of action. This challenged the officers who had brought the report stood forth, and demanded that if they were thought unworthy of belief, proper persons might be sent to ascertain the truth.

This brought Cleon into a still greater dilemma. The assembly assented to this request, and named Cleon himself as one of the commissioners. The artful demagogue was thus caught in his own trap, and he endeavoured to make his escape. The commission was embarrassing to the utmost degree, for he saw that he should not be able to lie without detection, or to report truly without convicting himself of calumny. Accordingly, he shifted his ground. "It were idle waste of time," he observed, "to send commissioners to inquire, they should rather send generals to execute." At the same time, he advised the assembly, if they were satisfied as to the truth of the reports brought to them, at once to send some man of spirit, who would compel the Spartans to surrender. He added, that if their generals had been men, they would not have so long delayed an easy conquest; and that if he had been in office, it would have been done.

The more Cleon used his cunning on this oc-

casion, the more he involved himself in perplexity. The taunt contained in the latter clause of his reply was aimed at Nicias, who was one of the generals of the year, and whom he hated as a rival in popular favour. Hence the friends of Nicias murmured, in a strain of irony, that if Cleon thought the conquest so easy he should be allowed to try. Nicias caught at this sneer, and gravely proposed that such should be decreed. It was so; and, although Cleon endeavoured to avert the undertaking by declaring that he did not wish to usurp the functions of Nicias, he found himself compelled to submit to the humour of the people. He did this, at length, with a good grace. Advancing to the middle of the assembly, he declared that he was not afraid of the Spartans, and that he would bring them prisoners to Athens in twenty days, or die in the attempt. This heroic boast excited universal laughter in the assembly, and there were those among it who considered that of two things to be desired one must necessarily arise out of this expedition—either the Spartans would be captured, or Athens would rid herself of an arch-demagogue.

It was the capture of the Spartans that followed this measure, but the event may be attributed more to an accident than to the courage of Cleon. The island of Sphacteria was uninhabited, and thickly covered with wood, which, while it concealed the number of the Spartans there besieged, enabled them to watch all the movements of the enemy, and to profit by his mistakes, while it screened them from his attacks. This was the chief cause of the cautious movements of Demosthenes, for he remembered his disasters in the woods of *Atolia*. But this obstacle was, at length, cleared away. A party of Athenians, having landed on a corner of the island to take their meal, lighted a fire, which happened to catch the adjoining wood, and the flames, fanned by the wind, left the island almost bare. The real number of the Spartans, hitherto unknown, now became visible, and a fair opportunity was offered of engaging them to advantage. Demosthenes was preparing to do this, when Cleon arrived with his body of targeters and four hundred bowmen—the only force he required in his boast to effect this conquest—and they proceeded, in concert, to the enterprise. A herald was first sent to the camp, to propose that the besieged should surrender themselves and their arms, on condition of being detained in mild custody till a general peace was concluded, and, this being rejected, a severe contest ensued, the result of which was that nearly three hundred prisoners were taken captive, the rest perished in the struggle. Within "twenty days" Cleon returned, with his prisoners, to Athens, and the Athenian commanders, leaving a garrison in Coryphasium, sailed away for *Coreyra* and *Sicily*.

The effect of this conquest was to raise the spirit of the Athenians, to deject the Spartans, and to astonish all Greece. It was a circumstance hitherto unknown in the Greek annals, that a body of Spartans, with arms in their hands and food in store, should surrender themselves to an enemy. Hence, it was doubted whether the prisoners were of the same race as those who had

fallen; and one was insultingly interrogated at Athens to this effect. But the truth is, Spartan courage was vain against the arrows of the enemy, by which it would seem that their subjugation was chiefly accomplished. They reached them in the distance, piercing through their armour, while their short swords were grasped uselessly in their hands. Those who died, died not in close combat, in which the Spartans excelled, but as the dart or the arrow happened to speed; and the remnant, seeing their fate inevitable, and yielding to fear, surrendered. Still, it must be confessed that a change had come over the Spartans, for their ancestors, cherishing the spirit of fatalism, so universally inculcated by their poets and orators, would have chosen death rather than life at the expense of Spartan honour.

It was, doubtless, from observing this manifest change in the conduct of the Spartans, and perhaps interpreting it as a general feeling, that the Athenians resolved to take the utmost advantage of the capture they had made, and the footing they had gained at Coryphasium. It was decreed in the assembly, that the prisoners should be chained till the two states should come to some terms of accommodation, and that if the Peloponnesians should again invade their territory, they should be destroyed. The Athenians also garrisoned Coryphasium, from which the Peloponnesians had withdrawn their army, with a body of Messenians, who embraced every opportunity of annoying their hereditary foes. These measures alarmed the Spartans, and they again sounded the dispositions of the Athenians toward peace, but the demands of the enemy rose so high, and their arrogance, inflamed by the harangues of Cleon, now the popular favourite, was so galling, that all endeavours for peace proved fruitless. Negotiation was again dropped, and the sword furnished again for the slaughter. Stained as it had hitherto been with each other's blood, it was decreed, by mutual consent, that the stain should yet become deeper, that it should utterly consume the fairest flowers of Greece. It was drawn in passion, and, although seven years had passed away, passion kept it still unheated, so that Greece became one vast charnel-house.

CHAPTER XV.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, FROM THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM SPARTA IN THE SEVENTH YEAR, TO HIS CONSUMMATION, IN THE TENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

B. C. 425—421.

On discovering that Spartan pride would not consent to yield to their haughty demands, the Athenians resumed offensive operations. Their first measure was to take revenge on the Corinthians, who had not only instigated the war, but had been, at all times, the most zealous actors in it. For this purpose, a fleet of eighty galleys, with two thousand heavy-armed Athenians, and horse transports, with two hundred cavalry, together with auxiliaries from Miletus,

Andros, and Carystus, was sent, under the command of Nicias and two colleagues, to invade the territory of Corinth, and also the eastern side of Peloponnesus. Nicias, having put out from Piræus in the night, arrived off the Peloponnesian coast by the dawn of day, and he landed his troops on an open beach, about seven miles south of Corinth.

While this armament was preparing, the Corinthians had received intelligence thereof from some Argive friends, and they had made preparations to meet the threatened attack, without knowing the precise point to which it would be directed. It happened that they had taken up their position not more than two or three miles from the spot where Nicias landed, and being apprized by fire signals of the enemy's presence, the Corinthian generals, Battus and Lycophron, leaving one-half of their troops at Cenchreæ, for the protection of the northern boundary, proceeded with the other to the shore, where they discovered that Nicias had just effected his landing. An obstinate action ensued, in which, after several vicissitudes, the Athenians were victorious, chiefly, it appears, through the means of their cavalry, of which the Corinthians had none. But, though one of the Corinthian generals, Lycophron, was slain, together with about two hundred men, the army retreated in good order, and took up a position on the higher ground, not far from the shore. The advantage which the Athenians gained was but small. They stripped their slain foes, and erected a trophy, but the forces of Cenchreæ and the citizens of Corinth arriving at the scene of action, they re-embarked, leaving two of their own ships, whom their comrades could not find, in the power of the enemy.

The effect of this circumstance marks both the character of Nicias, and the manners of the age. Among the Greeks the possession of the slain was the test of victory or defeat, and the party which was forced to solicit leave of the enemy to bury its dead was held to acknowledge itself defeated. As Greek opinion demanded that the slain should be buried, Nicias, apprehensive of the popular ill-will, sent a herald on shore to recover the two corpses, and thus, according to Grecian maxims, surrendered at once the honour of his trophy and all claim to victory.

It had been supposed, by the Corinthian generals, that Nicias would have directed his force against Crommyon, whence it was that they had left half of their forces for the protection of the northern border. There appears to have been good ground for such a supposition, for it was to this quarter that Nicias now shaped his course. He landed near that town, and plundered the territory; after which he proceeded to the coast of Epidaurus. In this quarter, he carried a wall across the isthmus which connected the rocky peninsula with the mainland, and behind it erected a fort, where he left a garrison, for the purpose of making inroads into the territories of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halus, and thus accomplished, he returned to Athens.

In the mean time, Eurymedon and Sophocles played the last act in the tragedy of the sedition at Corcyra. According to their instructions, as

before recorded, they touched at Corcyra, in their way from Coryphasium to Sicily, and, with the Corcyreans of the city, stormed the fort of Mount Istome, held by the aristocratical faction. The Athenians made themselves masters of the stronghold, but its defenders took refuge in a higher part of the mountain. Their situation was, however, hopeless, and they were compelled to surrender themselves to the Athenians. On surrendering, no conditions were made on behalf of their auxiliaries, but their own doom was to be fixed by the Athenian people, and they were to be kept in the little island of Ptychia, as on parole, until they should be sent to Athens for trial. An attempt to escape was to be considered as an infraction of this agreement, and this gave the leaders of the opposite party, who feared that an Athenian tribunal might disappoint their thirst for vengeance, an opportunity of ensuring their destruction. By their emissaries, they induced these unhappy men to believe that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them up to their enemies, and they made an attempt to escape, in which their adversaries took care they should not succeed. The fugitives were arrested, and the whole body were abandoned to their opponents, who proceeded at once to glut their revenge. Humanity would prevent the pen from recording the scene that followed, but history demands that it should stand in its pages. The victims were lodged in a spacious building, and then led out in bands of twenty, chained together, between two rows of armed men, who, as they passed, aimed their blows with deadly effect, each at the object of his personal hatred, while behind them came other men of blood, who, with scourges, urged the faltering steps of those who shrank from their visible fate. Three bands were thus despatched before their surviving friends learned their fate, and perceived their own danger. In their despair they called aloud upon the Athenians to put them to death, and declared that they would neither go out, nor suffer their adversaries to enter. Although they were unarmed, their ruthless enemies dared not force the doors, and they mounted on the roof, and made an opening, through which they attacked them with their arrows. Many of the prisoners hastened to baffle the malice of their murderers by destroying themselves, which they did, some by the weapons discharged at them, others by strangling themselves with the cordage of their couches, or strips of their own garments, and thus all perished. When they had all fallen, their corpses were piled in carts, and carried out of the city, where they were disposed of without any of those funeral ceremonies which were deemed of sacred importance among the Greeks, as tending to the repose of the soul.

This cruel transaction shows the evils attendant upon political excitement. And, indeed, the Peloponnesian war itself conveys the same lesson, for it was not merely a struggle between nations, but likewise against forms of government—aristocratical Sparta arrayed against democratical Athens; and their mutual bitterness of party spirit produced widely-spread destruction. Influenced by party spirit, every Greek grasped his weapon, and rushed to battle. Their land mourned because of the violence which it created,

from the Ægean to the Ionian seas, and its very isles took up its tale of mourning. If mankind, therefore, would wish to avoid these evils, let them avoid that which gave them birth—party spirit. It is a disposition which envenoms and contracts the heart, separates families, and divides society. Differences of opinion must inevitably arise from the fallen nature of man, but then mankind may "agree to differ"—may look upon and regard one another as brethren.

The fearful scene exhibited at Corcyra closed the transactions of this year. During the winter, the Athenians exerted themselves to obtain an alliance with the Persians. They had the prospect of accomplishing this, but the death of Artaxerxes crushed those hopes, and they were left to their previous resources.

The next year, B. C. 424, Athens enjoyed rest. The Peloponnesians, awed by the threat of the Athenians to retaliate upon the prisoners of Sphacteria, refrained from committing their annual ravages. But this only increased the rage of the Athenians for war, and stimulated them to the prosecution of the last campaign. When Xerxes invaded Greece, he was advised by Demaratus to send a squadron and take possession of Cythera, and from thence to carry the war at once into the heart of Laconia. This now became the policy of Athens. Nicias was sent, with an armament of sixty galleys, to wrest the island of Cythera from the dominion of Sparta. This was effected. The garrison, which Sparta, aware of the importance of the island, constantly kept there, with all its inhabitants, were quickly compelled to surrender, without any condition but that their lives should be spared.

The alarm which this event caused in Sparta was great, and the measures taken in consequence mark the lack of ability which now prevailed in the Spartan government. It was the opinion of Lycurgus, that a moving force was more effectual for the protection of a country than strong fortifications, whence he forbade the erection of any in Sparta. Expecting that descents would now be made on their coasts, the Spartans departed from this maxim, and divided their strength in forts and strong posts in every part of their territories. The result of this proved the sagacity of Lycurgus. The Athenians, having stationed a garrison in Cythera, proceeded thither, landed without any risk, and wasted the land, during seven days, at pleasure. One body only ventured to arrest their progress, but they were soon defeated, and an Ionian trophy, a thing unknown before since the establishment of the Dorians in the country, was erected in Laconia.

(On the return of Nicias to Athens, he ravaged the district of the Laconian Epidaurus. After this, he proceeded along the coast to Thyrea, where the outcast Æginetans had been planted by the Spartans after their expulsion from their island. At the time of his approach, the new colonists had begun to fortify a lower town by the water-side, suited to their maritime pursuits, but seeing their danger, they retired into Thyrea, which stood on an eminence about a mile from the sea. But it was in vain that they sought refuge there. the town was taken by

storm and committed to the flames; while the inhabitants, with a Spartan officer, named Tantalus, who commanded in the town, were taken prisoners, and carried to Athens. The ill-fated Æginetans were put to death. They fell victims to the hatred which had been inflamed by their ancient prosperity, and which their recent disasters could not appease. Tantalus was consigned to the same custody with his countrymen from Sphacteria; while some suspected Cythereans, whom Nicias had deemed it unsafe to leave at Cythera, were transported to various islands.

While the Athenians were thus successful in Greece, the war in Sicily was brought to a close unexpectedly. During the preceding summer, when Eurymedon and Sophocles were detained at Coryphæum, it had been carried on with varied success, in which neither party gained any permanent advantage. After their arrival, also, the war seems to have been still less marked by important events, but the presence of the Athenian armament awakened a jealousy in the Sicilian Greeks, which led to a general peace between them and the Syracusans. The terms on which peace was concluded were, that all parties were to retain their possessions, with the exception that Syracuse was to cede Morgantina to the Camarinaeans for a stipulated sum. When this was concluded, the allies of the Athenians announced this to the Athenian generals, and informed them that the benefit of it, as regarded the cessation of hostilities, would be extended to them, and Eurymedon and Sophocles, not knowing how to act in this dilemma, were obliged to return home without having effected the primary intention of their expedition—the conquest of Sicily. Well-timed jealousy of their ulterior designs baffled Athenian ambition.

That the Sicilian Greeks were correct in their conjectures, and wise in promoting peace, was proved on the return of Eurymedon and Sophocles to Athens. They were received there with as much indignation as if they had involved the state in some disaster, or had betrayed its most valuable possessions. Blighted ambition charged them with accepting bribes as the price of abandoning the conquest of Sicily; and while Eurymedon was fined, Sophocles and Pythodorus were banished, as enemies of the state.

The success of the Athenians had, by this time, reduced Sparta to a state of despondency not justified by her real distress and danger. In the midst of this, however, a ray of hope appeared, and it continued to brighten till all their gloom was chased away. The revolted towns of Chalcedice were alarmed when they saw Athens prevailing, and her rival almost under her feet, for they expected that they should be the next objects of her vengeance. Their neighbours, also, who had not yet cast off her yoke, feared that it would now become more galling; and Perducas, though still nominally in alliance with Athens, was agitated by similar apprehensions. Under these circumstances, all agreed to send to Sparta for some Peloponnesian troops, to be maintained at the cost of the allies, in order to attack the Athenian possessions in the neighbourhood of Macedonia and Thrace. This proposal was wel-

comed at Sparta for two reasons. First, because it would be the means of drawing off the enemy from Laconia; and secondly, because it would enable her to employ a part of her helot population, of which she stood in fear, in foreign service. Accordingly, she now gave full arms to seven hundred helots, and placed them under the command of Brasidas, who added as many troops as he could engage, by pay and by the attraction of his name, from all parts of Peloponnesus.

Brasidas was employed in collecting this army, when an opportunity presented itself to him of checking the progress of the Athenian arms in another quarter. Megara, from its contiguity to Athens, suffered from her success more than any other territory of Greece. Twice in every year it was ravaged by the Attic forces. Yet the government of Megara, like that of Athens, was democratical; and it might have been supposed from this that her territories would have been respected. But it was not so. Athens still oppressed Megara, and the distress which followed emboldened the friends of aristocracy yet remaining in the city, to urge that a composition should take place in order to prevent the utter destruction of the state, with some exiles whom the prevailing faction had banished from the capital, and who had possessed themselves of the town and port of Pægae. These sentiments were becoming popular, when the leaders of the democratical party, apprehensive that loss of power, and perhaps exile, would accrue to themselves, resolved to avert such an event at any cost. They negotiated secretly with Demosthenes and Hippocrates, now generals at Athens, and concerted a plan for betraying the city to the Athenians.

As the first step towards this treacherous act, it was agreed that Demosthenes and Hippocrates should be put in possession of the long walls which ran down to Nisæa, and which would prevent the Peloponnesian garrison stationed at Nisæa for the protection of Megara from interfering. For this purpose, the two generals sailed to Minoa under cover of the night, and having left their ships there, crossed over to the mainland. The long walls and Nisæa were captured, with the Spartan garrison, but Megara itself was saved, just as the conspirators and the Athenian generals were on the point of accomplishing their design. One of the associates of the conspirators having betrayed the secret to the opposite party, that one of the gates which opened into the space between the city and Nisæa was to be thrown open to admit the Athenians, they counteracted this measure by their exertions and threats; and thus Demosthenes and Hippocrates were left outside the city.

This was the opportunity which offered itself to Brasidas of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Informed of the dangerous position in which Megara stood, he resolved to hasten to its relief. For this purpose, beside his own levies, he obtained troops from Corinth, Sicyon, and Phlius; and he sent into Bœotia for succours, which were directed to meet him at the Megarian village of Tripodiscus. On his march he was informed that Nisæa was taken; upon which, leaving his army at Tripodiscus, he has-

tened in the night, with 300 picked men, to the gates of Megara. Arriving there, he desired to be admitted into the city, that he might defend it from the Athenians; but both factions within agreed in refusing his request the one, because it feared he would recall their exiled enemies; the other, because, knowing the feelings of its adversaries, it dreaded a struggle which might expose the city without defence to the Athenians. But Brasidas was not to be deterred from his purpose. Being joined at daybreak by the Boeotian reinforcement he had desired, he commenced offensive operations against the Athenians. By the aid of the Boeotian cavalry, he dispersed the enemy's light troops which were scattered over the plain, and drew up his men in order of battle, hoping that the Athenian generals would be tempted to engage with him. Demosthenes and Hippocrates, however, shrank from risking a battle against superior numbers, and contented themselves with drawing up their troops in front of the long wall. But this tended equally to their defeat. Within the walls of Megara the inaction of the Athenians was construed into a confession of weakness, whence their friends were seized with consternation, and suffered the adverse party to open the gates to Brasidas, and to confer with him on the means of securing the Spartan interest in Megara. Seeing this, the Athenian generals left a garrison at Nisaea and withdrew to Athens, and Brasidas soon after returned to Corinth.

The events which followed in Megara resembled those which transpired in the sedition of Coreyra. Those of the democratical party who had been most forward in the Athenian interest, avoided the consequences of the return of the opposite faction to power by a voluntary exile. On the other hand, those who had been more moderate in their attachment to Athens ventured on a conference with the aristocratical leaders, in which it was agreed that the exiles in Pigea should be restored, if they would bind themselves by solemn oaths to the observance of a general amnesty. They were restored upon these terms, but these oligarchs had no sooner assumed the reins of government, than they disarmed the commonalty, under the pretext of a review, and, having selected one hundred of their principal adversaries, compelled the commonalty itself to condemn these, its own adherents, to death. After this revolution, the oligarchy, which Thucydides represents as being extremely narrow, subsisted at Megara for a longer period than such governments were commonly able to stand in Greece.

Soon after Brasidas had thus delivered Megara from Athenian domination, he set out with his seven hundred helots and about one thousand mercenaries on his expedition to Macedonia. He was joined at Melitea by some Thessalians, who, notwithstanding the Thessalian government was allied to Athens, were friends to the cause of the Chalcidians and Perdiccas. Through their interest and directions he was enabled to cross the central plains of Thessaly without interruption, and, passing over the mountain region of Peræbia, he came to Daum, the first Macedonian town on the frontier.

Perdiccas proposed directing the first operations of the combined army against his own

enemy, Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians. Having arrived at the borders of Lyncestia, this barbarian monarch offered to submit the differences between Perdiccas and himself to Brasidas, and engaged to abide by the award, however unfavourable to his interests. This was foreign to the wishes of Perdiccas, and he, therefore, assumed the tone rather of a master than an ally. He had not brought Brasidas, he said, to be an arbitrator, but to fight his battles, and it was for this he maintained the half of his troops. He added, that it would be a breach of faith if, while Brasidas received his wages, he should enter into a negotiation with an enemy. Brasidas, however, feeling that he had not come to make enemies, but to win friends for Sparta, declared that he would not employ his valour against those who implored his justice, and he had an interview with Arrhibæus, who prevailed on him to withdraw his forces from Lyncestia. This produced a breach between Brasidas and Perdiccas, and the latter vented his displeasure by reducing the amount of the pay which he furnished from one half to a third, and this was rather extorted from his fears than bestowed by his munificence.

This thwarted in his designs against Lyncestia, Perdiccas returned home, and Brasidas hastened to join the Chalcidians. The first efforts of their combined forces were directed upon Acanthus, an Aælian colony, near the isthmus of Mount Athos. Like the rest of the Greek cities, Acanthus was divided between two factions, but their party spirit does not seem to have attained the usual rancour. The oligarchical party, which was in the minority, had invited Brasidas, and they warmly contended for opening the gates to his army. In this matter they were opposed by the democratical faction, who feared that, if they should connect themselves with Sparta, they might lose their political constitution, and remain subjects as heretofore, though to a different power. Brasidas, however, obtained leave to enter the city alone, and to plead his own cause in the popular assembly, and he did this with such effect, with such a show of moderation and justice, that, when the votes were taken, the majority were for the admission of the Peloponnesian troops into the city. Soon after, the neighbouring town of Stagirus followed the example of Acanthus, and thus the whole of the Chalcidian towns seceded from the cause of Athens. But the chief motive which induced Acanthus and Stagirus to revolt was, not so much their wish to rid themselves of the yoke of Athens, as to save their vintage from the ravages which Brasidas threatened to effect, if they refused to listen to his offers of alliance with Sparta. Thus cajoled and threatened, both were lost to Athens.

Meanwhile the advantages recently gained by Athens became more apparent. The partisans of democracy in every state, and more especially the democratical exiles, eagerly watched for an opportunity of profiting by this turn of affairs in Greece. In this state of public feeling, a plan was concerted for a revolution in Bœotia. A Theban exile, named Ptoæodorus, was at the head of this design, some banished Orchomenians were among the most zealous in it; and a party in Phocis was ready to join them on the first

favourable occasion. The Orchomenians undertook to engage mercenary troops in Peloponnesus among the friends of democracy; and while these were collecting, Pissodorus communicated with Demosthenes and Hippocrates, between whom a project was formed for betraying Siphæ, a port on the Corinthian gulf, and Chæroneæ, on the borders of Phocis, into their hands. On their part, the Athenians undertook to seize and fortify the sanctuary of Apollo, called Delium, on the coast opposite Eubœa, and about five miles from Tanagra. These movements were to take place on the same day, in order that the attention of the country might be distracted, and its force divided. If they were successful, it was expected that, even if the oligarchical governments throughout Bœotia were not immediately overthrown, yet, these posts being securely occupied, they might afford so many rallying-places for the disaffected, from whence incessant inroads might be made into the heart of the land, the issue of which would be, the establishment of democracy in that territory.

The plan being concerted for this revolt, Demosthenes was sent to Naupactus, that he might collect a body of troops from Acarnania and the other western allies, and at the appointed time might sail up the Corinthian gulf to Siphæ, while Hippocrates marched from Athens into Bœotia. On the arrival of Demosthenes in Acarnania, he found Cœniadæ already reduced by that province to Athenian alliance. Being joined by those allies, in the interval preceding his expedition to Bœotia, he marched against Salyntius, king of the Agræans, whom he reduced to subjection. After this he returned to Naupactus, to prepare for the expedition against Bœotia.

It was in the autumn that Demosthenes set sail for Siphæ with his Athenian and Acarnanian forces, with other auxiliaries from the western provinces. As he passed along, he was sanguine of success, but when he approached Siphæ, he found the plan completely disconcerted. It had been discovered the place was strongly garrisoned, and the whole force of Bœotia was there to oppose his progress, whence he was compelled to return to Naupactus. It appeared, afterwards, that the design on Siphæ had not only been discovered, but that, through some mistake of the day, Hippocrates had not made his intended diversion on the side of Delium. This part of the plot, however, does not seem to have been unfolded, for no sooner had Demosthenes returned from his expedition, than Hippocrates, with the whole serviceable population of Athens, both citizens and aliens, residents and sojourners, came to Delium, and, meeting with no opposition, fortified that consecrated ground. In three days, the fortifications were nearly completed, and the troops were then ordered to return to Athens. The light infantry made straight for Attica; but the heavy-armed halted about a mile from Delium, to wait for the general, who stayed behind to give final directions to the garrison, and for the completion of the works.

While the Athenians were thus engaged at Delium, intelligence thereof had spread through Bœotia, and an army assembled at Tanagra, under the eleven Bœotarchs, or governors. The district of Tanagra belonged to Oropus, and was,

therefore, considered Attic ground. For this reason, most of the Bœotarchs present were adverse to engaging with the enemy. Pagondas, however, one of the two Theban Bœotarchs, and supreme in command, was eager to give battle; and he harangued the divisions of the troops separately, in order to rouse their patriotism, pride, and resentment. Pagondas was successful, inspired by his harangue, the army was as eager for battle as himself; and he led them at full speed towards the enemy.

Hippocrates was still at Delium when he received the first intelligence of the approach of the Bœotians, and he hastened thither to make preparations for battle. His lines were scarcely formed before the Bœotians appeared on the top of the ridge before them. At this point they halted, but after Pagondas had again addressed them with a few animating words, they raised the pæan, and descended to meet the foe. A contest ensued, in which victory was some time doubtful, but at length the Bœotians prevailed. The Athenian army was completely dispersed—some of the fugitives taking the direction of Delium, and others making for Oropus and Parnæ. A body of Locrian cavalry, which appeared on the field of battle as the rout began, aided the Bœotians in the slaughter of the flying enemy. If the shades of night had not sheltered them, few would have been left. As it was, nearly a thousand heavy-armed Athenians fell, with a much greater number of light-armed and irregulars. Hippocrates, the general, was also slain. When pursuit had been pushed as far as circumstances would admit, Pagondas raised his trophy and collected the spoil, after which he marched to Tanagra, with the intention of recovering Delium, which was still in the hands of the Athenian garrison.

Before Pagondas retired to Tanagra, he left a guard on the field of battle, in the hope of extorting a high price for the usual permission to bury the slain. For this purpose a herald was sent to the Athenians the next day, who complained that they had violated the common law of the Greeks, by which it was established, that in any invasion of each other's territories, no temple should be profaned—that they had polluted the holy water within Apollo's precincts by drawing it for common uses—and in the name of Apollo and his partners in the consecrated ground, he bade the Athenians withdraw from it, before they asked for anything which it was in the power of the Bœotians to deny them. In return to this remonstrance of the Bœotian herald, the Athenians sent a herald to the Bœotian camp, who represented that the Athenians had not profaned, nor would intentionally profane, the temple—that by the common law of the Greeks the possession of temples always passed with territory—that the Bœotians themselves, when they had acquired their lands by conquest, had taken possession of the temples likewise—that, if they had disturbed the sacred fountain, it was from necessity, and they trusted that the god would overlook the transgression, since it was not done willfully—that the refusal of the Bœotians to restore the slain was an impiety without excuse—and that the Athenians considered Delium as theirs by conquest, and would not evacuate it; but they,

nevertheless, demanded that their dead should be restored, according to the laws and usages of the Greeks from time immemorial. The Boeotians seem to have felt the imputation of impiety and contravention of this most sacred law, as laid down by their progenitors, for they endeavoured to obviate it by evasion. "If the Athenians," they replied, "were in Boeotia, they must quit it before any indulgence could be expected from them; but if, as they pretended, they were on their own ground, the Boeotians had nothing to do with matters pertaining to a foreign soil." With this reply, negotiation ended, and Pagondas immediately prepared to besetge Delium.

In order to ensure success, Pagondas sent for dartsmen and slingers from the Malian gulf. He also received a reinforcement of 2,000 Corinthians, together with the Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa and some Megarian troops. Yet so deficient were the Greeks, even at this period, in the art of attacking fortifications, that they made many fruitless attempts upon the rude defences of Delium, and at length owed their success to a new engine, with which they kindled so fierce a flame against that side of the wall which had been constructed chiefly of timber, that its defenders could no longer protect the temple. As they retired from the walls the enemy entered, and captured two hundred prisoners, but the greater part of those who escaped the sword took refuge in some ships then in the harbour, in which they fled to Attica. This took place seventeen days after the battle, during which time the Athenian dead lay unburied. After the capture of Delium, however, another herald came from Athens to solicit the remains of the slain, and, the revenge of the Boeotians being now satisfied, they were no longer withheld. It is probable, also, that the fear of their gods, which was a marked feature in Grecian superstition, may have operated powerfully upon the minds of the Boeotians, so as to induce them at length to accede to the request of the Athenians.

There was yet another chapter in this disastrous campaign in Boeotia. When Demosthenes was repulsed from Siphae, he crossed over to the coast of Sicyon, and proceeded to land his troops. But in this he was defeated. The divisions first landed were attacked by a superior Sicyonian force and driven to their ships, with some loss both of lives and prisoners. Demosthenes was, in truth, obliged to ask his slain from the enemy, and with these he sailed away, instead of the plunder he desired.

These reverses, important in themselves, were still more so from their effects. At this time, many of the distant subjects of Athens were only restrained from revolt by their fears, and were, therefore, anxiously watching the progress of her arms. All her reputation, also, was needed to counterbalance the efforts of Brasidas, who was now, notwithstanding the approach of winter, meditating a blow more injurious to Athens than any which she had suffered during the war. Thus was the subjection of Amphipolis.

Amphipolis was the most important place held by the Athenians in Thrace. Not only was it in itself, on account of its wealth and magnificence, one of their most valuable possessions, but it was still more important on account of its

position, which commanded the only passage by which an enemy from the south could reach the Thracian coast—a coast which, with its subject towns and gold mines, was one of the chief sources of the Athenian revenues.

Fearing that Brasidas might attempt this conquest, an Athenian general, named Eucles, had been already sent to ensure the fidelity of Amphipolis by his presence, and the historian Thucydides was associated with him in command, with an especial view to the protection of the towns north of the Strymon. Thucydides was stationed at Thasos, about half-a-day's sail from the mouth of the Strymon, when Brasidas moved, with a body of auxiliaries in addition to his own force, from the Chalcidian town of Arna, to surprise Amphipolis. In the course of the night he arrived at the little town of Argilus, where the people, always disaffected to Athens, were prepared to receive him. This was an important step towards the success of his enterprise, for had the Argilians resisted him, the enemy would have discovered his design. As it was, he passed on, conducted by his Argilian friends, to the bridge which crossed the Strymon, near Amphipolis. A small guard defended this bridge, but it was soon overpowered, and Brasidas immediately occupied the open ground which lay between the city and the river. There was a party within the city favourable to the cause of Brasidas, whence Eucles saw that he was threatened from within and without. It is believed that Brasidas might have taken the city at once, if he had not suffered his troops to be detained by the pillage of the suburb, a measure which gave the alarmed inhabitants time for reflection, and Eucles to send for the aid of Thucydides. That the gates were not opened, convinced Brasidas that his partizans were not so numerous in Amphipolis as he had been led to expect; and, fearing the arrival of Thucydides might defeat his enterprise, he at length proceeded to vigorous measures. A herald was sent to demand the surrender of the city, upon terms which relieved all classes of the citizens from their worst fears, and, as the prospect of relief was very uncertain, Amphipolis was delivered into the hands of Brasidas. The terms upon which Amphipolis surrendered were, that all Athenians, or those who wished, might quit the town, with all their moveable property, within five days, and that the rest should remain in the enjoyment both of their estates and of their civil and political rights.

Having secured Amphipolis, Brasidas proceeded to take measures for possessing himself of Eion, distant about three miles, and for excluding the Athenian fleet from the river. Late in the evening, however, Thucydides arrived from Thasos, and entered the harbour with his squadron. Eion was thus saved from the power of Sparta, but it was beyond the power of Thucydides to recover Amphipolis.

The successes of Brasidas in Thrace, and especially the loss of Amphipolis, irritated the public mind of Athens to an intense degree. Hitherto, these remote dependencies had been deemed secure under the guard of the Athenian navy, but now they were laid open to the superior land forces of the Peloponnesians, which, if unopposed by the Thessalians, might be poured in upon

them at pleasure. Looking thus at their misfortunes, the Athenians vented their rage against Thucydides. His unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years in exile, and he was only restored to Athens in the season of her deepest humiliation, which occurred, as will be seen, at the termination of that period. One statement attributes his banishment to the calumnies of Cleon; and that he should direct the public indignation at such a time against Thucydides is in perfect accordance with the character of that rude demagogue. The historian himself, however, is silent on this subject. Indeed, he neither mentions the charge brought against him, nor his accusers; but only says that he spent so many years in exile, and that it was to the liberty which he acquired by his exclusion from public duties that he owed the opportunities of collecting, from the best sources, the materials of his history, and of obtaining access to persons and places which could not have been visited in this stormy period by any Athenian, unless a fugitive.

By the acquisition of Amphipolis, a wide field was opened to Brasidas for conquest and negotiation. Nor did he neglect the opportunity. Although in want of additional troops, and denied more by the Spartan government, in which several leading persons were jealous of his honours, he proceeded, with the aid of Perdicas, who now again came, in a friendly manner, to the camp, to reduce some towns in the neighbourhood of Amphipolis. Myrcinus was taken from the Edonian Thracians, and soon after, the Greek towns of Galepus and Cleone submitted to his arms. Thus successful, Brasidas next marched against the semi-barbarous tribes inhabiting several towns in the peninsula of Athos. Most of these towns submitted to him, but one, named Dium, and the Greek town of Sane, defied his utmost efforts. In revenge for their opposition, Brasidas ravaged the fields belonging to these towns, and, while thus occupied, he was invited by a small party at Torone, on the coast of the peninsula west of Athos, to come and take possession of that town. Torone was occupied by an Athenian garrison, but it proved unequal to the defence of the town. Through the able conduct of Brasidas, and the bold adventures of seven men who were introduced in the night by the party disposed to revolt, Torone was taken. The Athenian garrison made their way, with the loss of a few lives, to the fort of Lecythus, which stood on a point of land connected with the town by a narrow isthmus; and here they were joined by those Toronians who were still attached to the cause of Athens. Brasidas summoned this fort to surrender, offering permission for the Athenians to depart, with their property, and inviting the citizens to return to their habitations. This offer was rejected; but the Athenians demanded a day's truce for burying their dead. Brasidas granted two days, and he made use of the opportunity for assembling the Toronians, in order to gain them over to his interest. The demoralised Toronians, however, remained true to the Athenians; and it was not till machines were prepared, and a strong force assembled, that their firmness gave way. Even then the

city was taken in the midst of a panic caused by an accident, and all who could not escape on board the Athenian galleys perished by the sword. The fortress was razed to the ground, with the exception of a temple of Athene, and that was saved because the conqueror fancied that he owed his success to the goddess worshipped there.

By this time, the spring of B. C. 423, the haughtiness of Athens was completely subdued. Alarmed by the conquests of Brasidas, she, in her turn, longed for a cessation of arms, and a truce was concluded between the belligerent powers for one year. Yet was this truce proposed by the Spartans themselves. Considering the recovery of their citizens as the most valuable fruit they could reap from the victories of Brasidas, and that the loss of them could never be compensated by the most brilliant success of his arms, they conceived that this was a most favourable opportunity of obtaining them, and of opening negotiations for a lasting peace. The Athenians readily entered into their views, and a truce was concluded upon these terms—that the Athenians should be allowed the free use of the Delphic temple and oracle, from which both they and their allies had been excluded during the war, that the money which had been embezzled from the sacred coffers during that period by the Peloponnesians, who conceived that they had a right to use it to defray their expenses, should be restored, and that each party should retain what it possessed, the Peloponnesians, however, ceding the legitimate sovereignty of the sea to Athens. On the side of the Peloponnesians, the articles were ratified by envoys from Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, who engaged to use their interest for persuading the other allies to accede to the truce. The main end of the truce was to give opportunity for negotiating a permanent peace, and negotiations were therefore immediately commenced.

But, while a general disposition was displayed between the belligerent powers for the cessation of war, events occurred in Thrice which not only set it aside, but added new fuel to its flames. Only a day or two after the truce had been concluded, Scione, in the peninsula of Pallene, renounced the alliance of Athens, and invited Brasidas into her walls. Having taken possession of this town, he soon after transported a large force across the gulf, in the hope of making himself master of Mende and Potidea before succours could arrive from Athens, where he knew that the revolt of the towns in Pallene would excite the utmost indignation. His operations, however, were interrupted by the arrival of a galley, with a Spartan and Athenian commissioner on board, who came to give notice of the truce. And now the difficulty arose which prolonged the war. By one article, as before seen, all parties were to retain their then actual possessions; but it appeared that Scione had revolted after the truce was concluded. It suited the views of Brasidas, notwithstanding, to assign an earlier date to the revolution of Scione; and he resolved to retain it for his government. This excited the fiercest resentment at Athens, and Cleon instigated the people to send an expedition against the city

Envoys came from Sparta to remonstrate, but the Athenians were too angry to listen to them, and it was decreed that Scione should be taken, and every man therein destroyed.

Meanwhile, the Mendæans revolted; and Brasidas conceived himself justified in receiving its inhabitants as allies, partly on the ground that they offered themselves freely, and partly because if he was accused of infringing the truce, he had a similar charge to bring against the Athenians. This aroused the Athenians to still more furious action. They prepared for the reduction of both Scione and Mendæ, and Brasidas, in the expectation of such an event, removed the families and effects of the citizens of both towns to Olynthus, sending, at the same time, five hundred of his own infantry, and three hundred Chæliadina targeteers, under the command of Polydamidas, for their protection.

Before the Athenians arrived, Perdicas persuaded Brasidas once more to join his forces to a Macedonian army, which was about to invade Lyncestis. The expedition proved, in the end, unsuccessful. Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestians, was defeated in a battle, with great loss, but the mountainous region afforded a refuge to the remnant of his army, and, being joined by some Illyrian auxiliaries, who came for the ostensible purpose of assisting Perdicas, the invaders were compelled to retreat before them. But this was not the only issue of this invasion. The Peloponnesians, being in the rear of the Macedonians, overtook a part of the baggage which had been left behind by the fugitives, and, conceiving that they had been unnecessarily hasty in their flight, they at once gratified their resentment and love of plunder by slaughtering the oxen which drew the carts, and by appropriating everything of value to their own use. This hostile proceeding determined Perdicas again to seek reconciliation with Athens, and to break with the Peloponnesians.

On his return to Thrace, Brasidas had reason to regret his expedition to Lyncestis. Mendæ was already taken by an Athenian army, under Nicias and Nicostratus, and Scione was besieged. It was while this siege was in progress that Perdicas carried his intentions to effect. He concluded a negotiation with Nicias and his colleague, and, in proof of his sincerity, he induced his Thessalian friends to stop the progress of a reinforcement under Ischagoras, which was on its march from Peloponnesus to join Brasidas. Notwithstanding, Ischagoras himself, with his two colleagues, and several other Spartans, who were sent to take the command in the revolted towns, were allowed to proceed. On their arrival, Brasidas entrusted the government of Amphipolis to Clearchidas, and that of Torone to Pastelidas. It is remarked by Thucydides, that all the officers sent were young men, and that to appoint persons of their age to such stations was a breach of Spartan usage. Probably the ephori perceived that the service was one which required the energy of the prime of life, rather than the calculating prudence of a more advanced age; or the elder Spartans may have looked on the contest in this remote quarter as one of doubtful issue, and therefore may have been reluctant to

fill such stations. If such were their thoughts, events would seem to have justified them. During the winter Brasidas made an attempt by night on Potidæa, but he was baffled by the vigilance of the Athenians. Indeed, Athens bid fair to regain the ascendancy in this quarter, for Nicias and Nicostratus succeeded in completely investing Scione; after which, leaving a sufficient garrison in the camp, they led their armament home, there to winter.

Still, amidst all this show of hostility, the truce nominally existed; and negotiations were continued even after it had expired—which was in the spring B. C. 422—for six months. But there was one man in each state hostile to peace, and their measures thwarted its conclusion, these were Brasidas and Cleon.

The ruling motive of Brasidas in endeavouring to prolong the war was, that his victorious career might not be interrupted, while Cleon wished its prolongation, that opportunities might be still afforded him of exciting the passions of the multitude, calumniating his enemies, and enriching himself by unfair means. Cleon was now, indeed, in the height of his popularity, for, although the comic poet, Aristophanes, had bare his character and artifices in one of his dramatic satires, which told upon the multitude, soon after his return from Coryphasium, and although he had since been compelled, by a legal prosecution, to disgorge the sum of five talents, which he had extorted from some of the insular subjects of Athens, yet, such were the effects of his effrontery and boisterous oratory, that he still stood firm in the public favour. In reality, he swayed the counsels of the state, and, through his exertions, war was prolonged by the general consent of the state at Athens.

In procuring this unhappy consummation, Cleon displayed another feature in his character—a feature which led to his destruction. By this time he was so intoxicated with success, that he began to conceive a high opinion of his own talents. He fancied that he was the only man capable of arresting the progress of Brasidas, and of recovering the lost towns; and hence he persuaded the people to entrust him with the sole command of the squadron which they had determined to arm for that expedition. So the demagogue Cleon was placed at the head of the warriors of Athens.

The grand design of Cleon was to retake Amphipolis, but on his way he touched at Scione; and, having taken on board a part of the besieging force, he crossed over to a port near Torone. On his arrival in this port, he discovered that Brasidas was not in that town, and that the garrison was inadequate to its defence, whence he resolved to recapture it. In this he was successful, favoured by the weakness of the enemy, part of his forces scaled an unguarded wall, while another part entered the harbour. Torone fell into his hands, with all its inhabitants; the women and children among whom were sold as slaves; and the men, amounting in all to no more than seven hundred, sent as prisoners to Athens.

Although there had been few difficulties to overcome in the capture of Torone, the affair seems to have heightened Cleon's esteem for his

them at pleasure. Looking thus at their misfortunes, the Athenians vented their rage against Thucydides. His unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years in exile, and he was only restored to Athens in the season of her deepest humiliation, which occurred, as will be seen, at the termination of that period. One statement attributes his banishment to the calumnies of Cleon; and that he should direct the public indignation at such a time against Thucydides is in perfect accordance with the character of that rude demagogue. The historian himself, however, is silent on this subject. Indeed, he neither mentions the charge brought against him, nor his accusers, but only says that he spent so many years in exile, and that it was to the liberty which he acquired by his exclusion from public duties that he owed the opportunities of collecting, from the best sources, the materials of his history, and of obtaining access to persons and places which could not have been visited in this stormy period by any Athenian, unless a fugitive.

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Although, there had been few difficulties to overcome in the capture of Torone, the affair seems to have heightened Cleon's esteem for his

own military capacity; and he proceeded boldly to the mouth of the Strymon, and took up his head-quarters at Eion. From this place he made a fruitless attempt upon Stagirus, but he succeeded against Galepsus. In the meantime, he applied to Perdicas for auxiliaries, and sent to Polles, king of the Odontian Thracians, for as many mercenaries as he could raise among his subjects.

At this time Brasidas was at Amphipolis. The force under him, though about equal to that under Cleon, was very inferior, both in the quality and the equipment of the men, the greater part being barbarians. Although Cleon was aware of his advantage in this respect, and still entertained a high sense of his superiority, he still wished to receive the reinforcements he had sent for, before he attacked the town. His troops, however, who were by no means elated at having such a general at their head, soon began to vent their impatience and contempt at his inaction, and he was induced thereby to try to divert them by a march toward Amphipolis. Brasidas expected that such a movement would take place, and he had, in consequence, posted himself with a division of his forces, on an eminence called Cerdylum, which was separated by the Strymon from that on which Amphipolis stood, and commanded a view of the whole country to the sea-coast. From this position he watched Cleon as he advanced, until he halted on the high ground above Amphipolis, and then went forward to survey the lake formed by the Strymon, and the position of the city towards the north. As soon as Brasidas saw the Athenians in motion, he had descended from Cerdylum, and had entered the city, where he prepared to take advantage of the enemy's error. While yet, therefore, Cleon was enjoying the view of the city, Brasidas selected a band of 150 men, to make a sally upon the Athenians, while Clearchus was directed to support him with the main body of the army. They were stationed near the gates where they were to be led out, which was observed by the Athenians from above, and this being reported to Cleon, as he was unprepared for battle he immediately sounded a retreat. But Cleon had placed himself in a position from which it was impossible to retreat without danger, and this danger was increased tenfold by his setting the whole army in motion, and so as to expose the unshielded side of his soldiers. The experienced Brasidas marked his error, and hastened to take advantage of it. Ordering the nearest gates to be thrown open, he sallied forth with his picked men, and, running up the hill, charged the enemy's centre. At the same time, Clearchus followed, with the rest of the army, through another gate, and attacked the right wing, on the rear of the column. A scene of confusion and bloodshed followed. The centre of the Athenian army was almost immediately routed, and Brasidas was proceeding to the support of Clearchus, when he received a mortal wound. Cleon also, who thought of nothing but flight, was overtaken by a javelin, and perished. Still, after his death, the right wing, having the advantage of the rising ground, for some time defended themselves; but at length they were surrounded by the enemy, and completely routed. On the

part of the Athenians six hundred men finally fell, while on the part of the Peloponnesians only seven men were lost. But this slight loss was more than counterbalanced by the death of Brasidas.

He appears to have been highly esteemed by the Amphipolitans, for they interred him within their walls, which was an extraordinary honour in a Greek town, with a magnificent funeral, which was attended by the whole army. They also commemorated his death by annual games, offered sacrifices at his tomb, as to a hero, and conferred on him the honours of a founder, which they had hitherto paid to Agnon,* whose monuments were all destroyed.

Immediately after the battle of Amphipolis, those Athenians who escaped the slaughter returned to Athens. The effect of the battle was, that hostilities were suspended by tacit consent between Sparta and Athens, and early in the winter negotiations were renewed. The prospect of peace again dawned upon Greece, for the Athenians, alarmed by the spirit of revolt which they saw spreading among their allies, were more than ever disposed to treat on moderate terms, and the Spartans, notwithstanding their successes abroad, had been suffering the worst evils of war from the presence of the enemy in their country, and were in continual dread of the effect it might produce on their helot population. The Spartans had other motives, also, for desiring peace: they still longed to recover the prisoners of Sphacteria, their thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the cession of Cynuria was demanded as the first condition of its renewal, which they were not disposed to grant. All these arguments had powerful weight on both sides, and peace was now panted for as eagerly as war had heretofore been desired.

With the inclination of the citizens of both states, it fortunately happened that the temper and interests of their leading men concurred. After the death of the turbulent demagogue, Cleon, who, in the language of Aristophanes, had been, together with Brasidas, employed by the god of war to crush and confound the general prosperity and tranquility, Nicias was left first minister of the Athenian commonwealth. Nicias was a man of peace, and his inclination was increased by the accidental circumstance of his possessing a large patrimony, which, in the insecurity of the scanty territory of a Grecian republic, peace alone could enable him to enjoy. While war raged, indeed, his subsistence was at stake, for an unfortunate turn in affairs might deprive him of his all. These considerations led Nicias to seek the reputation of peace-maker to his country, while it could yet be made with advantage. On the other hand, the Spartan king, Pleistoanax, who had been driven into exile on the charge of receiving a bribe from Pericles, was at length recalled to Sparta, and his interest led him to be urgent for peace. His restoration was owing to the Delphic oracle, which had repeatedly enjoined the Spartans, with mysterious threats, to bring back the descendant of Hercules; which they did, after he had been in banishment for nineteen years. But Pleistoanax

* Agnon was the Athenian founder of the colony of Amphipolis.

had still enemies in Sparta, and these attributed the interposition of the oracle to his gold, and imputed every danger which threatened the state to the divine anger provoked by this impious fraud. Hence Pleistoanax was in danger of being again banished, and he saw that peace alone could give him an advantage over his enemies he therefore became its most strenuous advocate. Private interests were thus, in this instance, made subservient to the public welfare.

In order to conciliate the confidence of Sparta, Nicias softened the rigour of the captivity of her citizens at Athens. This was a wise and humane measure, and by it Nicias was enabled to assume the character of a mediator between the two states. Yet the negotiation was beset with difficulties, and the Spartans deemed it necessary to make a show of preparation for a fresh invasion of Attica, and for the establishment of a fortified post in the country, in order to urge the Athenians to bring it to a conclusion. This seems to have had the intended effect. The basis of a treaty was at length settled, in the spring of B. C. 421, on the footing of a mutual restitution of conquests made in the war, save that Thebes was to keep Plataea, and Athens to retain Nisæa, and soon after a treaty, formed on this basis, was ratified by the two leading states, and accepted by the allies of Sparta, with the exception of the Megarians, Ærotians, Corinthians, and Eleans, who were dissatisfied with its terms.

The treaty finally concluded was a treaty of peace for fifty years. Its first articles provided for the common and free enjoyment of the national sanctuaries, and for the independence of the Delphians, directing that all differences which might arise between the parties should be peaceably decided. The next article provided that Sparta should deliver Amphipolis up to the absolute dominion of the parent state, and that she should also set aside her claim to Argilus, Stagnus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, and Spartois, the inhabitants of which towns were to be allowed to withdraw, if they would, with their property, and they were to be subject only to the ancient tribute assessed by Aristides. By another clause, the safety of the towns of Mecyberna, Sane, and Simge, was provided for, but it was stipulated that the Athenians might do what they pleased with Scione, Torone, and Sermylus. Sparta also bound herself to restore Panactum, a fortress in Attica, while, on the other hand, Athens was to restore Coryphasium, Cythera, Mecythone, Pteleum, and Atalanta, to Sparta. A general exchange of prisoners was to take place on both sides. Finally, a power was reserved to the two leading states of correcting any oversight which might have been committed in the framing of this treaty.

Such were the terms with which the first ten years of this fatal war were concluded. After the best blood of Greece had been shed, and her treasures exhausted, the two leading states—aristocratical Sparta and democratical Athens—being mutually humbled, consented to return as far as they could to the state in which the quarrel found them. Each other's citizens and each other's towns were to be restored. But it was easier to agree than execute. In the very fulfilment of these terms, which were to have brought

peace to this faction-torn country, difficulties arose which set it aside, and added a fresh stimulant to the quick and revengeful passions of her sons. The secret is, there was a love of war in the universal breast of the Greeks, and no treaties could now bind them from exhibiting this feeling to the world.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DURING THE PEACE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA

B. C. 421—416

AFTER the ratification of the treaty between Sparta and Athens, one important question remained—to determine which party should take the lead in carrying it into execution. This was to be decided by lot, and the lot fell upon Sparta.

On the part of Sparta, there appears to have been a warm desire for peace, and a fear lest it should be set aside. Its government immediately proceeded to perform its part in the conditions of the treaty. Its prisoners were released, and three commissioners were sent into Thrace, with orders for Clearchus to deliver up Amphipolis, and to require the submission of the other towns which were to be resigned to Athens. These new allies of Sparta, however, rejected this demand, and Clearchus ventured to disobey the orders of the ephori, alleging that he was unable to carry them into execution. But Clearchus became apprehensive of the consequences of this disobedience, and he resorted to Sparta, accompanied by envoys from the Chalcidian towns, to vindicate his conduct, and to procure, if possible, an alteration in the articles of the treaty respecting those towns. The treatment he received from the Spartan government shows that it was in earnest in the matter. Clearchus was ordered to return immediately, and, if he could not give possession of Amphipolis to the Athenians, at least to withdraw the Peloponnesian garrison.

At the same time, the Spartans pressed their confederates, who had refused to accede to the treaty, to waive their opposition. In this they failed, and they were equally unsuccessful in their endeavours to accommodate matters with Argos. This was an alarming position to be placed in, and, in order to avert the danger which threatened them on their own ground, they sent proposals to Athens for a defensive alliance, which was hastily concluded. Each state bound itself to assist the other if its territories should be invaded, to treat the invaders as enemies, and not to make peace with them but with the other's consent. Athens also bound herself to aid the Spartans in quelling any insurrection which might take place in their helot population. When this treaty was ratified, the Athenians gave the surest pledge of their pacific intentions by releasing the prisoners which they had captured in Sphacteria.

However this league of the two powers, by

whose rivalry the Peloponnesian war was enkindled, by no means tended to establish peace. The treaties were inscribed on tables of stone or brass, and placed in the most celebrated sanctuaries; but they were, to all intents and purposes, a dead letter. Complex intrigues ensued among the Grecian republics, which the two leading states had neither the sagacity to avert nor the power to crush. The war had so reduced their strength, that they were no longer feared, as heretofore, and they were defied by their own allies. The example which they had set was one of the most baneful description. They had shown themselves ambitious of supremacy over the rest of Greece; and other states now saw no reason why they also should not contend for superiority.

One clause in the treaty of alliance reserved to Athens and Sparta the power of altering its terms without consulting their allies. This created general offence and alarm. It was thought to indicate designs which threatened the independence of the inferior states, and they looked out for some state which might oppose their pretensions. This was found in Argos, a state which had enjoyed a long period of tranquillity in the midst of the general commotion, and had therefore been daily gaining strength, while the rest of Greece was wasting its energies in a ruinous warfare.

Among the states which felt themselves aggrieved by the treaty, none were more incensed than the towns on the northern coast of the Ægean. Corinth, especially, still implacable in her hatred to Athens, was greatly irritated. That state had been active in promoting the revolt of the Chalcidian towns, and she was highly offended at their being again made over to Athens. She had expected, also, to recover Solium, and her important colony, Anactorium; but these were passed over in silence by the treaty, and left in the hands of the Acarnanians. This was an offence not to be forgiven, and the Corinthians turned their thoughts to a new alliance, and resolved to execute the threat with which they had instigated Sparta to commence the war. Accordingly, envoys were sent to Argos to open a negotiation for the purpose of founding a new confederacy, over which Argos was to preside.

It has been seen, in previous pages, that Argos and Sparta were ancient rivals, and that there was a prospect of a recommencement of the struggle between those two states, after the thirty years' truce, now on the point of expiring, was concluded. It is no wonder, therefore, that when the Corinthian envoys made the above proposition, their views were adopted by the leading men in the Argive state. The seeds of ambition were as thickly sown there as in Athens and Sparta; and that ambition, joined with the cherished enmity of the Argives to the Spartans, led them to pass a decree inviting every independent Greek state that might be willing, to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos, and then to appoint a select number of commissioners to treat with others, as opportunities offered. Twelve commissioners were appointed for this purpose; and they were empowered to treat with every Greek state, except Sparta and Athens,

which were not to be admitted into the confederacy, without the consent of the citizens of Corinth and Argos.

The states which spontaneously and from various causes joined the Argive confederacy, were Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and Chalcidice. The Boeotians and Megarians were equally enraged against the two leading states; but though they expressed their approbation of the confederacy, being aristocratical in their politics, they shrank from all friendly relations with the democratical government of Argos. Corinth made strenuous efforts to gain the Boeotians over to their cause, but negotiation failed in this respect, and envoys sent from Corinth and Argos were equally unsuccessful with the Tegeans. That people, attached to Sparta, both by ancient recollections and by their enmity to Mantinea, declined taking any step in opposition to their old ally.

While these intrigues were proceeding, in order to subvert the power of Sparta, that government was carrying on its undefined and arbitrary jurisdiction against the Mantineans by force of arms. The Mantineans had subjected Parrhasia, in Arcadia, to their sway, and this reduced people applied to Sparta for relief. They could not have asked anything which the Spartans would have more willingly granted; for the Mantineans were not only obnoxious to them for their recent connexion with Argos, but they were rendered doubly so for having placed a garrison in Cypsela, a fortress in the Parrhasian territory, near the borders of Laconia. Hence Pleistoanax was sent with an army to subdue the Mantineans, and he fulfilled his commission to the utmost extent. He restored the Parrhasians to independence, and destroyed the obnoxious fortress. The Argives assisted the Mantineans in their struggle against Pleistoanax, and though they failed in resisting his arms, their fidelity cemented the connexion between these newly allied states.

In the course of this summer, Clearchus arrived at Sparta with the troops which had fought under Brasidas in Thrace. The helot part of these troops were, for their valour and zeal, emancipated, and shortly afterwards transplanted to Lepreum, with others of a similar class, who, under the name of Neodamodes, or "new commoners," enjoyed a franchise which had probably been transmitted to them, by various degrees, from servile ancestors. The motive which induced the Spartans to transplant these men to Lepreum was, that the force of that town might be so increased as to resist the power of Elis, with which it was at variance. This measure, therefore, displayed the Spartan enmity to Elis for her alliance with Argos.

About this time, Scione, in Thrace, was compelled to surrender at discretion, and the decree which Cleon had framed was carried into execution. The male inhabitants were put to the sword, while the women and children were made slaves. The town and lands were given to the Platæans, who had lost all hopes of recovering their own territories.

Amid such acts of inhumanity, there is a difficulty in discovering any value in that fear of the gods, and that care about the concerns of what they called religion, which seem to have

been ever active in the minds of the Greeks. The late change in the fortune of war, and the losses sustained by the commonwealth, led the Athenians to imagine that the gods had taken offence at something in their conduct. They looked about for the cause, and the Delphic oracle aided them in their search. On a previous occasion, they had removed the Delians from their island in order to obtain the favour of the deity. It was now supposed that the pleasure of the god had been misunderstood, and this supposition being strengthened by the declared revelations of the Delphic oracle, which attributed the disaster that had been brought upon them by the incapacity of Cleon to their impious expulsion of the people of Apollo, they recalled the outcasts from Adramyttium, on the coast of Æolis, and reinstated them in their own island.

It would be unjust to suppose that the more enlightened among the Greeks could bow their minds to these vain imaginations, whence it is a probable conjecture of Mitford's, that some may have found their ends answered in thus amusing the minds of the credulous multitude. Throughout the whole history of Greece these tricks of state are observable. In the times of threatened commotion, when the personal influence of their leaders failed to stem the torrent, then the aid of the oracles and gods was called in for that purpose. It may, therefore, be safely concluded, that the operations of the leading men of Athens were, at this period, unpopular with the people, and that they had recourse to this miserable shift in order to divert an outbreak. The mischances in war were palmed upon their deities, and the people bowed their necks submissively to their anger. As their reverses were decreed by them, who could say aught against it? or who resist their will? Pagan superstition forbade even a remote complaint, and thereby became a shield of defence to the designing.

The punishment which the Athenians inflicted on the inhabitants of Scione failed in the effect intended, namely, terrifying other towns into subjection. On the contrary, it seems to have confirmed the resistance of Amphipolis, as well as that of the Chalcidians, who gained ground in the peninsula of Athos. The Athenians, however, do not appear to have observed this. Rather, they attributed the opposition they met with in those quarters to Sparta, and they began thereby to suspect that they had been deceived, and to regret that they had restored the prisoners of Sphacteria. To remonstrances sent to this effect, the Spartans replied, that they had given proof of their sincerity by their restoration of the Athenian prisoners, and by withdrawing the troops from Thrace; and they professed to be willing to do everything that lay in their power towards the execution of the treaty. At the same time, the Spartan government required the Athenians to evacuate Coryphasium, or, at least, to place an Athenian garrison there, instead of the Messenians and revolted helots, who infested its territory. After much altercation, the Athenians complied with this latter requisition, but, as they saw no step taken toward the fulfilment of the Spartan promises, either with respect to the putting them in possession of their revolted towns, or gaining the Boeotians and Corinthians,

and others of their allies, to accept the treaty, they only removed the garrison to the neighbouring island of Cephallenia.

The nonfulfilment of the promises which Sparta had made to Athens arose out of their inability to perform them. Hitherto, therefore, the suspicions of the Athenians were wholly unfounded. In the autumn, however, a change took place in the Spartan government, which gave rise to measures that gave real cause of complaint. At that time, the ephori, by whom the treaties had been concluded, went out of office, and among their successors were men adverse to their line of policy, and the alliance between Athens and Sparta. Two of these, Cleobulus and Xenares, after the breaking up of a congress which was soon after held at Sparta, drew the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies who had attended that congress into a private conference with some other Spartans of their party, and counselled the Bœotians, if they wished to avoid being forced into an alliance with Athens, to make common cause with Corinth, to enter into the Argive confederacy, and then to bring Sparta into that confederacy. That being effected, they observed, it would not be difficult to renew the connexion with Bœotia, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, and thus Sparta would become the head of its whole ancient confederacy, with the powerful commonwealth of Argos added thereto.

As the Bœotian envoys were returning, they met two of the chief magistrates of Argos, who had been waiting for them, in order to make a similar proposal. These urged them to unite with Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, in their league with Argos, holding out to them, as an inducement thus to act, the advantage which such a union would give them in their future transactions with other states, whether in the time of war or peace. The Bœotian envoys eagerly listened to overtures so nearly coinciding with the plan of their Spartan friends, and it was agreed that the Argives should send an embassy to Bœotia, to make the proposition to the Bœotarchs. Envoys were accordingly sent from Argos to Bœotia, and they obtained a promise from the Bœotarchs that an embassy should be sent to Argos from Bœotia to conclude a treaty.

The first step towards the execution of this plan of the Bœotarchs was, to make an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Corinth, Megara, and the Chalcidian towns, after which they proposed that Bœotia and Megara should become confederates of Argos. Accordingly the preliminary step was proposed in the four great councils of Bœotia, in which the Bœotarchs believed they should meet with a ready acquiescence. These councils, however, were filled by men who were adverse to any breach with Sparta, and as no mention had been made of the secret understanding with their Spartan friends, the measure was rejected. The treaty with Argos, therefore, was for the time set aside; for, under existing circumstances, the promised embassy could not be sent. The Bœotarchs, in truth, saw it was their wisdom not to make any mention of the Argive alliance, as, from the warm disposition shown by the council towards Sparta, they might have brought themselves,

into disgrace by mentioning an alliance of such a nature.

Shortly after this intrigue had failed, envoys came from Sparta to obtain possession of Panactum, and of the Athenian prisoners retained in Bœotia, for the purpose of exchanging them for those of Coryphasium. The Bœotian government was not averse to the delivering up of the fortress and the prisoners, but, before they were given up, it was required that Sparta should conclude a separate alliance with Bœotia, as she had with Athens. This was contrary to an article of the treaty between Sparta and Athens; but nevertheless, through the interest of the party connected with Cleobulus and Xenares, which desired a rupture with Athens, the treaty was concluded in the spring of B.C. 420. Yet, after all, the Bœotians deceived the Spartans: when Spartan commissioners came to take possession of Panactum, they found it dismantled, which had been effected by order of the government, on the plea that an ancient compact had been entered into between Bœotia and Attica, that the ground on which it stood should be held in common by both states. So little respect had the Greeks, in this season of turbulence, to the faith of treaties!

The intelligence of these proceedings reached Argos, and, as their real nature and objects were unknown, they caused much alarm in that state. It was supposed that they had taken place with the consent of Athens, and as the Argives foresaw that they must be overwhelmed by a confederacy which included Sparta, Athens, and Bœotia, they hastened to make peace with the former state. Envoys were sent thither with pacific overtures, and they finally prevailed on the Spartans to conclude a peace for fifty years, reserving each to themselves the liberty of calling upon the other at any time, when not engaged in war, or suffering from any epidemic sickness, to demand a combat for the possession of Cynuria, which was the chief point in dispute between those two states, like that celebrated in ancient legends for the exploit of Othryades*. The conditions of this battle were, that victory should decide the fate of the battle, but that the victors should not pursue the vanquished beyond the border of the disputed territory. Romantic as this proposition was, it seems to have accorded with the humour of the Spartans, and a treaty drawn up on these terms was sent to Argos for the approval of the government, and, if approved, it was to be ratified at Sparta during the approaching festival of the Hyacinthia. This transaction shows the effect which war had upon the minds of the Greeks at this period: they had at length learned to view a battle as a sport.

In the meantime, the Spartan commissioners appointed to deliver up Panactum met with a rough reception at Athens. It was in vain that

they endeavoured to demonstrate that the destruction of the place was equivalent to its restitution. This, as well as the separate treaty which had been concluded with Sparta and Bœotia, was set down to Spartan duplicity, and the commissioners were angrily dismissed.

At Athens, as at Sparta, there was now a party which desired the renewal of war between the two states, and the above transaction urged it to redouble its exertions. At the head of that party was a youth whose name now first appears in history, and who seemed formed for scenes of strife: this was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias.

Alcibiades was, both by his father's and mother's side, connected with the noblest of the Eupatrids. His paternal line was traced through Eurysaces, son of Ajax, to Æacus and the king of the gods! His mother belonged to the house of the Alcæmonids, and hence he reckoned Cleisthenes, the friend of the commonalty, among his ancestors. His paternal ancestor, Alcibiades, had distinguished himself as an enemy of the Pisistratids, and his father, Clinias, was renowned for having equipped a galley at his own charge in the Persian war. Clinias fell in the battle of Coronea, leaving Alcibiades, a child, under the guardianship of Pericles and his brother Arphion, who were related to him by his mother's side. The fortune which Clinias left his son was one of the largest in Athens, and it appears to have been so well husbanded by Pericles, that the amount was greatly increased.

To these advantages of birth and fortune, nature added still more rare endowments. Alcibiades was remarkable for extraordinary comeliness, and for the possession of a versatile mind, which adapted itself to every circumstance. But all this drew him into danger. Attracted by the graces of his person, the splendour of his fortune, and his high connexions, citizens and strangers alike vied in paying court to him, and it was feared that the power of flattery would destroy the fair bud of promise which his youth unfolded. The fear was founded upon right reason. "Flattery," says an old writer, "is an ensnaring quality, and leaves a dangerous impression: it swells a man's imagination, entertains his vanity, and drives him to a dotage upon his person." "Of all wild beasts," observed the cynic Diogenes, "the detractor bites worst, and, of all tame beasts, the flatterer."

Perhaps there is no situation in life in which a man can be placed wherein a wise counsellor was more needed, than that in which Alcibiades found himself by circumstances over which he had no control. He was happy in finding one possessing rare qualities. The wise Socrates, who had long instructed the youth of Athens in the duty of men to men, and, as far as unenlightened reason could discover, in the duty of men to God, justly considered Alcibiades as an object of his peculiar care, since his virtues or vices might be made an instrument of deciding the fate of his country. Happily for Alcibiades, he was not of a temper to rest satisfied with ignorance, and he became the willing disciple of this sage of Athens. He listened to his discourses, and by them was won from the paths of vice. Not only did they live for a time in intimate intercourse at Athens, but they were thrown

* This legend says, that three hundred Spartans and the same number of Argives disputed their respective right to Thyrea. Two Argives and one Spartan only survived the battle. The Argives returned home, but the Spartan, whose name was Othryades, who had been reckoned among the slain for the number of his wounds, recovered, and carried some of the spoils, of which he had stripped the Argives, into the camp of his countrymen, and, after he had erected a trophy, and had written *Victory* on the shield with his own blood, he destroyed himself, from an unwillingness to survive his countrymen.

together in situations calculated to strengthen the hold which the sage had taken on the affections of his youthful friend. They served together at Potidea and at Delium, in which battles each had an opportunity of saving the other's life, which greatly strengthened their mutual friendship. So singular was this friendship on the part of Alcibiades, that he received the reprimands of his sage tutor with the utmost docility, and would frequently shed tears when listening to his moral discourses.

Thus far all was well. Socrates had hitherto counteracted the evil effects of flattery, and had saved his pupil from enervating vice. But there still remained evil principles in the breast of Alcibiades which it was not in the power of Socrates effectually to restrain. Ambition called him, and its voice to Alcibiades became more charming than the siren philosophy of Socrates. Fearing to grow old at the feet of his master, while power, honours, and even pleasure, slipped from his grasp, he left Socrates and listened to others, who exhorted him to seize the good which lay within his reach, to cultivate those arts by which his desires would be gratified, and to place confidence in his own genius and energy. From that moment, he became an altered character. The loftiness of aim and the sincerity of soul which Socrates laboured to produce in his pupil were lost for ever. In the language of Plutarch, he became as the chameleon. There was no habit or pursuit, whether good or evil, which he could not and would not adopt, in order to obtain the end of his desires. He could be serious or gay, austere or affable, an imperious master or a grovelling slave, a friend to virtue or vice, and while he was insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights, he could support the most painful fatigues and toils. In fine, he could sometimes appear the pupil of Socrates, and sometimes the slave of his passions.

Predominant among the varied passions of Alcibiades, was his ambition. He could not brook either superior or equal. Hence he became reckless in the choice of means to gain superiority. Like Themistocles, he seems to have found a pleasure in artifice and intrigue, and even to have preferred a crooked path, when a straight one might have led him to the goal of his ambition. This was observable in the advice with which he is said to have urged Pericles to kindle the Peloponnesian war. He rather wished to wade through blood and slaughter to the summit of power, than to arrive at it by birth and station. Alcibiades exhibited the same feeling, when the peace-loving Nicias procured the treaty between Sparta and Athens. He opposed that treaty as the work of a rival, and earnestly sought to set it aside. In this he failed, but before the treaty was concluded, he carried a decree for raising the tribute of the allies, and, having himself been appointed one of ten commissioners for that purpose, he doubled the amount at which it had been fixed by Aristides.

In order, therefore, to humble his rival, Nicias, Alcibiades now stood forward in the Athenian government as an advocate for war. He had three competitors.—the lamp-maker, Hyperbolsus, who took the place of Cleon, Ando-

cides, who was a pleasing, though not powerful orator; and Pheax, who resembled Andocides. But these were almost beneath his notice, and his chief aim was, consequently, to overthrow Nicias. This effected, he was certain of taking the first place in the commonwealth.

It was in the affair of Panactum that Alcibiades first measured his strength with Nicias. In a general assembly, held soon after the Spartan ambassadors had been roughly dismissed, he inveighed against the faithlessness of Sparta, as though the demolition of Panactum had been concerted between that government and Boeotia. At the same time, to carry his point against Nicias, he professed zeal for the democratical interest, and the experience of his abilities as a speaker, added to the weight he derived from birth, property, and connexion, gained for him the ready ear of the multitude. Thus favoured, he continued his invectives against Sparta, which were increased by the league which the Spartans had made with Argos. Nothing but hostile intentions against Athens, he observed, could have induced them to form a connexion with such inveterate foes as the Argives, adding, that their purpose could be only to deprive Athens of a valuable ally, that so they might, with safer chances of success, renew the war. The people seemed convinced, and, from that time, the reputation of Alcibiades daily increased.

It appears that Alcibiades had many friends in Argos, and, being emboldened by his increasing popularity, he sent them word that the Athenians were now in a temper to listen to proposals for an alliance with that state. The Argives had been undeceived concerning the circumstances of the alliance between Sparta and Boeotia, and the supposed participation of Athens in that measure, and hence they became careless about peace with their ancient foe, and more inclined to renew their connexion with Athens. The message of Alcibiades, therefore, was gladly received at Argos, and the negotiation with Sparta was immediately dropped, and an embassy, accompanied by envoys from Elis and Mantinea, despatched to Athens.

The idea of such a formidable coalition as this alarmed the Spartan government, and it lost no time in endeavouring to set it aside. Three ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, were selected as personally acceptable to the Athenians, and were sent to make such apologies and offers as might obviate any league between Athens and Argos. Endius was an hereditary friend and guest of the family of Alcibiades, and he was probably sent for the purpose of soothing and winning the young statesman, but the consequence was, that Alcibiades now easily overreached him and his colleagues.

On their arrival at Athens, the Spartan ambassadors were introduced into the council of Five Hundred, where they declared that they were come with full powers to terminate all disputes. Their explanations and proposals were well received by the council, and Alcibiades became alarmed for the effect which they might produce in the assembly of the people which was to be held on the morrow. Taking advantage, therefore, of the confidence which he gained through his relationship to Endius, he took

him aside, and promised to obtain the restitution of Coryphasium, the main object of their mission, and which he had hitherto strenuously opposed, as well as the re-establishment of a good understanding between the two states, if the Spartan envoys would conceal the extent of their powers from the people. The Spartans fell into this trap. On the next day, they had an audience of the people; and, after they had declared the purpose of their mission, Alcibiades put this question to them.—“Whether they came with full powers, or with limited?” They answered, that their powers were limited, and Alcibiades, turning round upon them, convicted them of self-contradiction and, armed with such conclusive evidence of double-dealing, he inveighed more bitterly than ever against Spartan insincerity, and urged the people to break off all negotiation with them, and at once to make a treaty with Argos. His treachery would instantly have succeeded, had not the city been at that moment shaken by an earthquake, which interrupted the business of the day.

Nicias was ignorant of the secret correspondence between the Spartan envoys and Alcibiades, and therefore was both surprised and offended at their apparent double-dealing. Yet, on the next day, he endeavoured to heal the breach, and so far prevailed against Alcibiades as to persuade the people to send him to Sparta at the head of an embassy, which was instructed to demand satisfaction on three important points in which the Athenians felt themselves most aggrieved, namely,—the restitution of Amphipolis, the rebuilding of Panactum, and the dissolution of the separate alliance with Bœotia. The two former of these proposals might have been conceded, but Sparta was unwilling to give up her alliance with Bœotia; and when the Athenian envoys insisted on it as an indispensable condition—a condition on which Athens alone would decline to connect herself in like manner with Argos, Xenares and his party obtained a majority for returning a positive refusal. Nicias and his colleagues, therefore, were compelled to return to Athens without having effected one object of their mission.

Alcibiades now triumphed over his rival. On the return of Nicias, the people of Athens not only vented their indignation against Sparta, but against himself, as the author of the once desired and universally applauded peace, and when Alcibiades renewed his motion, a treaty was instantly concluded with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, for an alliance, offensive and defensive, which was stipulated to last a hundred years. By this refined stroke of policy, therefore, Athens usurped the place of Sparta. She became the leading power even of the Dorian states, and head of the Peloponnesian confederacy.

These transactions in history afford a lively picture of the workings of the human mind. How subtle in its motions; how perverse in its intentions! No act seems to have been considered by the Greeks too mean or too base for them to commit, in order that they might obtain honour and power. These were the legitimate steps by which they advanced in the path of glory, and their invention seems to have been ever on the rack, to devise means whereby they

might soar above the heads of their fellows. Among them, in truth—

“The shifting aims,
The moral interests, the creative might,
The varied functions, and high attributes
Of civil action yielded unto powers,
Formal, and odious, and contemptible”

WORDSWORTH.

The interests of the principal Grecian states were strangely implicated by the various treaties recently made. The treaty between Argos and Athens does not seem to have been considered as putting an end to that subsisting at the time between Athens and Sparta. It was not entered into by Corinth, but as the breach between Sparta and Athens became wider and wider, that state became more disposed to be reconciled with her old ally, Sparta, and she betrayed this change in her views by refusing to contract an offensive alliance, in addition to her former engagements, with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea.

These intrigues, therefore, did not produce an immediate war. Alcibiades had triumphed over Nicias, and he appears to have been satisfied for a time with his success, and perhaps the general disposition was still for peace. Looking at the great carnage which had taken place during the last ten years, and the bones of the slain which still whitened the soil of Greece, there may have been a general fear of renewing the slaughter. Yet, in the middle of the summer, the Peloponnesus was threatened with a general outbreak of hostilities from another cause. The Eleans, considering themselves grossly injured by the Spartans in the matter of Lepreum, attempted to gratify their revenge by an abuse of their authority as presidents of the Olympic festival. After the second truce for the festival of this year had been proclaimed in all the other states except Sparta, a Spartan force had marched to Lepreum, and had made an attempt upon a fortress named Phreus, which was either in Elis, or in the hands of the Eleans. This was seized upon as a pretext to sentence the Spartans to a fine, which, being according to the Olympic law proportioned to the number of the troops employed in the breach of the truce, amounted to thirty-three talents. The Spartans refused to pay this penalty, alleging that they were not bound by the truce until it had been proclaimed to them, and that the legality of their conduct had been virtually recognised by the Eleans themselves, since the truce was not proclaimed at Sparta till after their expedition. Still, the Eleans seem to have considered that the name of religion would be powerful enough to extort great concessions at Sparta, for they offered to remit the fine, if the Spartans would give up Lepreum. But the religion of the Greeks was one of convenience. Its dictates were only readily obeyed when self-interest was promoted, and when it was not they were evaded. The Spartans, therefore, promptly rejected this offer; and the consequence was, that the Eleans excluded them both from contending in the games at the approaching festival, and from partaking in the sacrifices. Those who did attend were only to be passive spectators.

It was known at Elea that the Spartans would

feel this exclusion keenly, and troops were stationed to guard the sacred ground, lest they might disturb the games by a forcible irruption. An occurrence which took place during the games redoubled the fears of the Eleans on this score. A Spartan, named Lichas, had sent a chariot to contend for the prize, and, as it was not permitted to enter the lists under the name of its owner, he caused it to be described as public property of the Bœotian confederacy. As such, it won the prize, and Lichas, who was present, then stepped forward, and made the real competitor known by placing a chaplet on the head of his successful charioteer. This was a breach of order at all times, and especially in a subject of the state which was excluded from the games, and Lichas was ignominiously chastised by the Eleian lectors. Such an affront, it was expected, would bring a Spartan army to Olympia, but the Spartans seem to have considered that, in the present state of public feeling, it was their wisdom to brook the offence, and so the games passed off without interruption.

Soon after this festival, the Argives and their allies made a fresh attempt to draw Corinth over to their confederacy. The Spartans sent envoys to counteract their efforts, but the debate was prematurely closed by an earthquake, which shook, but did no damage to Corinth. During the congress, however, the sentiments of the Corinthians were all concealed, and they soon after became manifest.

During the spring of B.C. 419, the Bœotians gave a proof of their zeal in the cause of their allies, which exhibits the depressed condition of Sparta. In the preceding winter, the Trachinian Heraclea had been attacked by the forces of several neighbouring tribes, and was so reduced thereby, as to be unable to repel its enemies. Its distress was aggravated by the mal-administration of the Spartan governor, Hegesippidas; and the Bœotian government, fearing that Athens might seize upon a place so important for the security of her northern possessions, and conceiving that Sparta was too much occupied for the protection of her colony, not only put a garrison into it, but sent Hegesippidas away as unfit for command. The Spartan government felt humiliated by this interference, but took no active measures for recovering their dominions in Heraclea.

Soon after this transaction, the Spartans were threatened in another quarter. Alcibiades had been appointed one of the ten generals; and, in the beginning of summer, having previously concerted measures with the leading men of Argos, he went, with a small force, into Peloponnesus, whence, with an addition of Peloponnesian troops, he made a progress through the cities of the confederacy within the peninsula. His professed object was to introduce or consolidate democratical ascendancy; and it was partly with this view, and partly to gain a firm footing for Athenian influence in Achaia, that he persuaded the people of Patrae to connect their city by means of long walls with its port. But this was the sum of his success. He attempted a similar measure at the Achaean Rhium, but he was prevented from carrying it into effect by the interference of Corinth and Sicyon.

Thus thwarted, Alcibiades turned his attention to another quarter. Epidaurus was obnoxious for its steady alliance with Sparta; and, in the event of a war, it was evident that it would prove particularly annoying to Argos, inasmuch as, from its situation, it would interrupt communication between Argos and Athens. Under these circumstances, a pretext was sought for on which they might invade the Epidaurian territory. This was soon found. In ancient times, the Epidaurians had sent a victim to the temple of Apollo, situated in the Argive territory, as a quit-rent for some pastures held by them of the Argives. This offering had been intermitted, and perhaps the ground on which it was held was obsolete, but the Argives resolved to take up arms in behalf of the god, and Alcibiades was willing to aid them in the struggle.

It was agreed that they should attack the Epidaurians just before the beginning of the Carnean festival, when their allies would be prevented from protecting them. Intelligence of their design, however, had reached Sparta, and, while they were making their preparations, king Agis set out with the whole of the Spartan force to cross the north-western border of Leuctra. The object of his march was kept a profound secret, but it was, doubtless, intended to protect Epidaurus. Notwithstanding, it was prevented by superstition. At Leuctra the sacrifices were declared unpropitious, and Agis led his troops back, giving his allies directions to hold their forces in readiness for an expedition as soon as the sacred month should have expired. The Argives now led their forces against Epidaurus, and commenced the plunder of its territory. The Epidaurians sent to their allies for succour; but the sacred month forbade them to march, and they were left to their own resources. Even after the festival no state came to their assistance. Yet the Argives failed in many attempts, during both the summer and winter, to take the town, and during the next spring, B.C. 418, the Spartan government, feeling that some exertion was necessary to maintain its credit, and apprehending that if it remained any longer a passive spectator of the evils which Epidaurus was suffering in its cause, it would soon see itself abandoned by those Peloponnesian states still in its alliance, took measures for its relief. It sent a summons to the Bœotians and its distant allies to assemble at Phlius, and about the middle of the summer Agis marched thither with the combined forces of Sparta, Tegea, and other Arcadian allies.

Informed of these proceedings, the Argives united their forces with those of Mantinea and Elis, and proceeded across Arcadia to intercept the Spartan forces before they should reach Phlius. They came up with them near Methydrium; but Agis set out on his march in the night, and, eluding the enemy, joined his allies at the appointed spot. Discovering this, the Argives marched back to defend their own territory, which they expected would be invaded by the road leading from Nemea into the plain of Argos. Agis, however, resolved to distract the enemy's attention by dividing his forces, and did so in such a manner as to separate the Argives from their city by his troops. Their situation

appeared alarming, and battle was hourly expected; but Thrasylus, one of their generals, and Alciphron, an Argive, connected by ties of public hospitality with Sparta, without consulting any of their countrymen, obtained an interview with Agis, and, holding out to him the prospect of a permanent peace, prevailed on him to grant a truce for four months to the Argives, to afford time for negotiation. Agis complied with their request upon his own discretion; and immediately, without disclosing his motives to any of his allies, drew off his forces.

While the troops of Argos vented their indignation against Thrasylus for not engaging the enemy, his colleagues, and most of the leading men in the Argive state, seem to have been well pleased with the truce and a prospect of peace. Shortly after, however, a body of troops arrived at the camp from Athens, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus, and accompanied by Alcibiades, as envoy. At first, the Argives were reluctant to grant this turbulent statesman an audience, but, persuaded by the importunity of the Eleians and Mantineans, who had not yet taken their departure, they at length consented. This was a fatal step. The eloquence of Alcibiades prevailed over their prudence, and it was resolved that the truce should be disregarded, and that the allies of Argos should march against the Arcadian Orchomenus. The town of Orchomenus was weakly fortified, and succour was uncertain, whence the citizens yielded to circumstances, and became members of the Argive confederacy. The allies now deliberated upon their next operation. The Eleians proposed the capture of Lepreum, and the Mantineans were desirous of gratifying their ambition and ancient animosity by the reduction of Tegea. This division of sentiment led to a division of forces. Tegea was adopted by the Argives and Athenians as the next point of attack, and the Eleians, offended thereby, marched home.

The Spartan ephori had severely censured Agis on his return, for the imprudent concessions he had made to the Argives, but when they discovered that Orchomenus was taken and Tegea threatened, their anger was still more violently inflamed. In the first emotions of their anger, they determined to pull down the house of Agis, and subject him to a heavy fine; but, by humble deprecations, he induced the ephori to pardon his fault, and pledged himself to make amends for it by his future services. Notwithstanding, they marked their displeasure and distrust by the appointment of a new council of war, composed of ten Spartans, without whose sanction he could neither act in the tent nor the field.

Having thus settled this dispute with their king, the Spartans assembled their whole force and marched to Tegea. Their Arcadian allies were required to meet them in that territory; and expresses were despatched to Corinth, Bœotia, Phocia, and Locris, for the forces of those provinces to meet them before Mantinea. The town of Tegea was quickly put into a state of defence, and Agis then marched into the Mantinean territory, and having encamped near the sanctuary of Hercules, began to ravage the plain.

The Argive army was at this time in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, and its leaders took up a strong position and prepared for battle. Eager to atone for his late error, Agis advanced to attack them in this position, and he was already within reach of the enemy's missiles, when one of his council reminded him, in the language of a Greek proverb, that he ought not to mend one evil with another. Struck by the remark, Agis suddenly halted, and gave orders for a retreat; and, marching back into the plain of Tegea, commenced turning the course of a mountain stream, which thence found a subterraneous discharge, so as to make its waters overflow the lands of Mantinea. He hoped, by the diversion of this stream, to draw the enemy from their position to give battle upon the even ground, and he was not disappointed. The Argive commanders descended from their position and encamped upon the plain, where they put themselves in battle array.

In the meantime, Agis was returning to ascertain the effect of his manœuvre, designing to occupy the ground from whence he had retreated. The Argives and their allies were concealed from his view by a projecting ridge, until, by a sudden turn, the head of his column came close upon them. Great consternation seized the Spartan army. yet, by their excellent tactics, they were enabled quietly and rapidly to form their line of battle, before the enemy could take any advantage of their proximity. Before the Argive commanders were ready for the onset, the Spartans were seen marching in that order which Milton, catching the true spirit of the description given by Thucydides, thus immutably portrays —

" Rose
A forest huge of spears, and thronging helms
Appar'd, and a rided shields in thick array,
Of depth immeasurable anon they move
In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
Of flutes, and soft recorders, such as raised
To height of noblest temper heroes' old
Arming to battle, and instead of rage
Deliberate valour breathed, firm, and unmoved
With dread of death to flight, or foul retreat "

The approach of the Argives and their allies was the reverse of calm deliberation. Animated by their leaders with the various motives likely to stimulate division, the Mantineans with the danger of their native land, the Argives with the hope of recovering supremacy, and the Athenians with that of disabling their foe from again invading Attica, they rushed forward with all the madness of fury. Yet was the victory divided. The Mantineans defeated the left wing of the Spartans, while their right wing obtained an easy victory over the Athenians and Argives. The extent of the slaughter, however, on the part of the Argives and their allies, predominated; while their loss amounted to more than 1,100 men, that of the Spartans was reckoned at about one-fourth of that number.

The chief fruits which accrued to the Spartans from this battle were, that it effaced the impression which their disaster at Sphacteria had made on the minds of the Greeks, revived their military reputation, and gave new confidence and strength to their allies. With these advantages,

they appear to have been satisfied; for they countermanded the reinforcements which were approaching from the north, and returned home to celebrate the Carnean festival. But their enemy was more alert. Soon after the battle, their loss was repaired by reinforcements from Elis and Athens, and they determined to make a more vigorous attack on Epidaurus. Accordingly, while the Spartans were keeping holiday, they resorted thither, and set about investing Epidaurus with a wall. The Athenians completed their portion of the fortification, but their allies wanted zeal to finish their tasks, whence, after putting a garrison, drawn from each division of the army, into the Heræum, they returned home.

The issue of the battle of Mantinea greatly strengthened the cause of aristocracy in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and the dreadful consequences of unsuccessful war among the Greeks, brought the Argive people into a temper to listen to an accommodation, while the inconvenience of democratical sway unbalanced, which had been bitterly experienced in the circumstances of the battle, disposed them again to entrust the executive government in the hands of a few. This determined the oligarchical leaders to form a project for overturning not only the present politics of Argos, but of all Greece. Their first measure was to persuade the people, for the sake of confirming peace, to make peace with Sparta. This was effected, and the oligarchs, taking advantage of the Carnean festival, entered into negotiations with Sparta, and, despite the exertions of Alcibiades, who sought to counteract their measures, it was agreed between the two belligerent states, "that all the Peloponnesian cities, both small and great, should be independent, as in ancient times, that the hostages in the hands of the Argives should be restored to their friends, that the siege of Epidaurus should be raised, that if the Athenians still prosecuted it, the Spartans and Argives should oppose them, and that they should equally oppose the interference of any armed force upon any occasion, within the peninsula."

This blow to the policy of Alcibiades and the interests of Athens was followed by an alliance, offensive and defensive, between Sparta and Argos, accompanied with a renunciation, on the part of the latter state, of the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea. This alliance was to be for fifty years; and it was to be open to all the other Peloponnesian states, with guarantees for their independence, and provisions for the pacific adjustment of all their differences.

As soon as this second treaty was concluded, envoys were sent to Athens to demand the immediate evacuation of the Epidaurian territory, and to declare that neither embassy nor herald would be received from the Athenians, while their troops remained in Peloponnesus. The Athenians, who saw the necessity of yielding to the storm which was rising in their political horizon, sent Demosthenes to bring away the Athenian forces. Demosthenes showed his usual ability in the execution of this commission: he saved the dignity of his republic by giving the affair the appearance of a favour granted by Athens to both Epidaurus and Argos; which at least conciliated the

favour of the Epidaurians, for they renewed their ancient friendly relations with Athens.

The Argives were not so easily conciliated. Animated by enmity to Athens, they sent envoys to Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, to join their confederacy, who, though he did not venture at once openly to break with the Athenians, was easily persuaded thus to act. At the same time, and from the same cause, the engagements into which Sparta had entered with the Chalcidian towns were renewed and ratified by the Argive government.

This change in the policy of Argos compelled the Mantinians to abdicate their sovereignty over their subject cantons, and to make peace with Sparta. They obtained this on condition that the Spartans should take upon themselves the regulation of the little republics of Achaia, so as to restore the Spartan influence where it had been subverted by a democracy, and to confirm it where it was doubtful. This was easily effected, and thus, before the end of winter, the effect of the treacherous policy of Alcibiades was brought to nought. Instead of being divided among themselves, as he desired, the Peloponnesians were united in political opposition to Athens.

Yet were these germs of hope in Argos that Athenian influence would again prevail in that state. The democratical interest still remained powerful there, and early in the spring of B.C. 417 a conspiracy was formed to overturn the oligarchy.

When the Argives began to cherish hopes of recovering their ancient supremacy, they had been tempted to maintain a standing army without political privileges, wishing to unite the advantage of an armed oligarchy with the equality of the citizens under a democratical constitution. This army consisted of a thousand men of good fortune, and the oligarchical faction appears now to have gained the thousand over to its views, and thereby to have given offence to the democracy. This offence was augmented, when, after a joint expedition to Sicily, which Argos and Sparta undertook, each with one thousand men, for the purpose of establishing oligarchy there, the Spartan troops were admitted into Argos, to aid the Argive government to abolish all the forms of the constitution, and to replace it by one conformable to the Spartan system. Such an act determined the democratical section of the Argives to overturn the government, and the time chosen for carrying it into effect was the season of the Gymnopodia, or naked games, at Sparta, when no aid could be expected from that quarter. But the secret became divulged. While an aristocratical faction in Greece appears to have had but one tongue, a democratical party had a thousand; and the Argive administration, therefore, had early intelligence of the design, and prepared for its defeat. They sent to the Spartans for assistance; and when the Spartan love of sport was discovered to be so strong as to prevent their march, they armed for the strife with the conspirators. The parties had already joined issue; when the Spartans, hearing that the insurrection had actually commenced, were induced to forego their sports, and to despatch a body of troops to the assistance of their friends. As these troops were on their march, however,

they discovered that the oligarchs were discomfited; and, though pressed by the Argive exiles to continue their route, they returned to finish their holiday. Still the Spartans determined, on some future day, to restore the Argive exiles, and when they found that the victors were actively employed in carrying down long walls to the city, in order to aid the landing of the Athenians, in whom they placed all their hope for succour, Agis led an army thither. He came in time to take and demolish the unfinished walls, and on his return he took Hysia, and put the Argive garrison to the sword. Argos itself, however, defied the efforts of Agis, and it remained in the hands of the democracy, by which it was virtually restored to the Athenian confederacy. But, in its present state, the restoration of Argos was only a small step toward the recovery of Athenian influence in Peloponnesus. Deprived by the civil war of the flower of its forces, threatened by the exiles, who collected near the frontier, at Phlius, and agitated by treachery within, it could not extend its power beyond its walls. Still the Athenians watched over Argos as a precious prize, for when they found, during the next spring, that a remnant of oligarchs was yet remaining in the city, and carrying on a correspondence with those without, Alcibiades was sent thither with twenty ships of war, and he carried away three hundred of the aristocratical faction, and lodged them in some of the islands near the coast of Attica, B. C. 416.

At this time the revolted towns on the coast of Thrace continued to defy the Athenian power. During the year B. C. 421, Olynthus had surprised Mecyberna, and the Chalcidians, encouraged by Sparta and Argos, had obtained possession of Dium, on the peninsula of Athos. An expedition had been prepared for the reduction of Amphipolis, and Nicias had been appointed to the command, while Perdiccas had promised his co-operation. Perdiccas was to march a force to aid Nicias, but his accession to the confederacy between Sparta and Argos defeated this plan. The Athenians revenged themselves upon Perdiccas by blockading the coast of Macedonia, but during this spring they returned home. Before they did so, however, they concluded an armistice, terminable at ten days' notice, with the Chalcidians. These important possessions were, therefore, still left unrecovered; but they were only left unmolested for a brief period, that Athens might commit an act of deep revenge.

It appears almost impossible that these events should not have drawn the two leading states, Sparta and Athens, again into collision. The Athenians were evidently desirous of such a consummation; but the Spartans were anxious for rest, if not for peace. Alcibiades saw this, and, as policy forbade any direct hostility against Sparta, he recommended everything that might provoke her to commence a struggle. To this end he advised the reduction of Melos, which had long irritated the pride of Athens by its independence, and which irritation was increased by its present attachment to Sparta. The advice of Alcibiades was adopted. An armament was directed to sail to Melos, to sweep away its power and its independence.

The armament sent against Melos was placed

under the command of Cleomenes and Tisias. When these generals arrived there, they did not commence immediate hostilities, but sent an embassy into the town, to induce the Melians to submit. They appear to have had hopes of creating a division among the people, which might favour their operations; but the Melian government, aware of this danger, refused the envoys permission to address the assembly, and would only admit them to a conference with the magistrates and some members of the oligarchy. It was not to be expected that this party could come to terms with the envoys of a democracy, whence, although, according to Thucydides, they long argued the point of the submission of Melos to Athens, the result of the conference was, that the Melians flatly refused to forsake their present allies, or to renounce an independence which had existed in the island for seven centuries.

Having received this answer, the Athenian commanders blockaded Melos both by sea and land. The Melians hoped to receive succours from Sparta; but in the meantime they exerted themselves to the utmost. Twice they succeeded in surprising a part of the Athenian lines, and introduced supplies into the town. But their valour proved unable to save the city. As no succours arrived from Sparta, where not so much as a thought was entertained of stirring for their relief, and as, toward the end of the summer a reinforcement was sent to the camp of the besiegers, which cut off all hope, the besieged surrendered at discretion.

Humanity shudders at the scene which followed. Although the Athenians had no pretence for attacking the Melians, but that they were more powerful, and although these islanders were connected by blood, habit, and form of government, with their allies, and had never given willing offence to Athens, yet was this most unjust aggression, the success of which might have satisfied the most rapacious thirst for revenge, crowned by an act of deliberate cruelty. The adult citizens were all massacred, and the women and children enslaved.

This atrocious crime was perpetrated in the country and age of philosophy and the fine arts—in a state where Pericles had spoken and ruled, where Thucydides, the greatest of all ancient historians, was then writing, where the sage Socrates was then imparting his instructions, where Xenophon, Plato, and Isocrates were receiving their education; and where painting, sculpture, architecture, and literature, formed the delight of the people. These advantages failed to raise the people above deeds that would have disgraced untutored savages.

The motive which induced the Athenians thus to trample upon the Melians is not clearly manifested. It is probable that they were instigated to the deed by their hatred of Sparta, rather than by resentment against the Melians themselves. But this cannot be looked upon as an extenuation of their treatment of the vanquished. Look at it in whatever light we may, the act is one of great moral turpitude, and unworthy of a civilized nation. Nor do the Spartans appear altogether free from blame in this transaction. By ancient historians, indeed, their abandonment

of the Melians is noted down as an act which brought disgrace upon their character. But this appears rather to have resulted from the insufficiency of their leaders, than from any lack of courage or right feeling in the mind of the people. And the Melians were not the only people suffering from the feeble policy of Sparta. Their Argive friends were still wandering up and down Peloponnesus as exiles. It is true that thrice, since the beginning of hostilities with Argos, a Spartan army had marched to the relief of the Argives, but they were stopped by unfavourable appearances in the sacrifices, and returned home. These appear to have been made as so many subterfuges to escape from the necessity of aiding their friends. At the same time the weakness of the government was manifested, for when able men were at the helm of the state, such religious tricks were almost unknown.

At length, however, in the course of this winter, the Spartans crossed the border, and they not only ravaged a part of the Argive territory, but took possession of, and lodged the exiles in, Orneæ. Before they departed, they concluded a truce between the two parties, but the Athenians did not permit this state of things to continue long. They sent a reinforcement of six hundred men to Argos, and with this aid the Argives laid siege to Orneæ. The place was ill prepared for defence, and, by a kind of tacit compromise, the exiles evacuated it, and the besiegers immediately razed it to the ground. Most of the inhabitants of Orneæ appear to have been transported to Argos, and to have been admitted into the full franchise of the city, and thus to have strengthened the Argive democracy.

During these military transactions, the Spartan government seems to have recovered a portion of its ancient vigour. It endeavoured to excite the Chalcidian towns of Thrace, whose present independency was owing to the Spartans, to join Perdiccas in hostilities against Athens. Before this, the Athenians had sent a body of cavalry to Methone, a town on the southern frontier of Macedonia, whence, with a number of discontented Macedonians, it infested the territories of Perdiccas. This induced the Spartans to exert themselves, on behalf of Perdiccas, with the Chalcidian towns, but the Chalcidians, no longer won by the abilities, activity, popular manners, and generous faith of a Brasidas, were not disposed to sacrifice themselves either for Perdiccas or the Spartans, and they continued to prolong their uncertain truce with Athens—a truce which Athens only maintained as a measure of convenience.

Such were the transactions of the war during this year. To all human appearance, its flames threatened to burst forth again with renewed vigour as soon as the opening of the next spring appeared. But it was not so. Sparta still slumbered, probably with a wish of regaining her lost strength. She might be likened to a giant, who, fatigued with his toils, gave himself up to rest. Athens saw this, and, taking advantage of the repose of her rival, which it was her policy not to disturb by direct hostility, resumed the projects of aggrandizement which the events of the war had compelled her to forego. Scorning repose, and ambitious of dominion, that republic

once more turned its eyes upon Sicily. It was considered a field of glory, and the people almost universally desired to embark in the enterprise. They had, indeed, ill brooked the disappointment which they had suffered through the sudden termination to which the quarrels of the Sicilian Greeks had been brought by Hermocrates, as related before; and an opportunity had been anxiously desired for renewing the enterprise, which was now afforded them by the supineness of the Spartans.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ATHENIAN EXPEDITION INTO SICILY

BC 416—413.

THE desire which the Greeks had to invade Sicily, as recorded in the last chapter, was inflamed by various events which transpired in that island. After the Athenian armament, commanded by Eurymedon, was withdrawn, the Leontines thought it expedient to prepare themselves against the attacks which they had reason to apprehend from Syracuse. With this view, they admitted a large body of new citizens into their community, and, that they might be sustained, a proposal was made for a new partition of land, which was adopted by the unanimous consent of the commonalty. By a natural consequence, the burden of this measure fell upon the rich, and, as it affected their interests, it was regarded by them as a grievance. Considering, however, that they were not sufficiently powerful to resist the measure alone, before any step was taken to dispossess them of their property, they called in the aid of the Syracusans, and ejected the commonalty. Still they did not feel safe, and they resolved to abandon Leontium, and to transfer their abode to Syracuse, where they were received as citizens. But the love of their country was still dominant in their breasts. Perhaps, also, though they were received with much kindness by the Syracusans, they found their new situation unpleasant, whence a party among them quitted Syracuse and returned, not, indeed, to the deserted city, but to two strongholds in the Leontine territory, called Phocæa and Bricinnia. Here they were joined by a great part of the expelled commonalty; and, being in want of subsistence, they carried on a predatory war against Syracuse.

As soon—as about the time of Cleon's last expedition—as this state of things became known in Athens, the Athenians sent two galleys, with three ambassadors, headed by Phæax, the rival of Alcibiades, to discover the strength of the Athenian interest in Sicily, and to promote a league hostile to Syracuse. Phæax possessed talents for negotiation, and he succeeded in his object at Camarina and Agrigentum, but he met with such a fierce resistance at Gela, that he stopped short in his mission. On his way back, however, Phæax stopped at Bricinnia to animate the resistance of the Leontines; and from thence he proceeded to the Italian coast, where he opened negotiations with several Greek cities,

and even concluded a treaty with Locri, after which he returned home.

Still, the negotiations of Phæax appear to have failed in their primary object—that of opening the way for a successful invasion of Sicily. Another embassy, headed by Andocides, which was sent not only to Italy and Sicily, but also to Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, whose purpose was the same, likewise failed. During the next six years, therefore, the invasion of Sicily was in abeyance. Soon after the reduction of Melos, however, brighter prospects opened in that quarter. A quarrel had arisen between the neighbouring cities of Segesta and Selinus, and while Selinus called in the aid of Syracuse, Segesta, after applying in vain for succour to Agrigentum and Carthage, finally had recourse to Athens.

When the envoys from Segesta arrived, Athens was more than usually agitated by faction. It has been seen before that the influence of Nicias and Alcibiades was nearly equally balanced, and that before them their rivals shrank into insignificance. The demagogue Hyperbolus, however, was by no means daunted; and at this time, despairing of rising into the place of Cleon so long as they both stood in his way, he devised a scheme of getting rid of one. He suggested that the power and dissensions of Nicias and Alcibiades were formidable to liberty, and that this was a case in which the ostracism, which had fallen into disuse, might be revived with advantage. There was a danger that he might succeed, but Alcibiades was no common politician, and he not only warded off the blow, but made it recoil upon the demagogue's own head. At the suggestion of Alcibiades, his rival Nicias united his strength with his own, and Hyperbolus himself was sent into banishment by the ostracism.

This coalition of parties, however, lasted no longer than to strike this blow against Hyperbolus. Nicias was still as stern an advocate for peace as Alcibiades was for war. But the latter prevailed. When the envoys arrived from Segesta, he received them in the most favourable manner, and warmly recommended their cause to the people. Nicias and his party used their utmost efforts to prevent any decision in favour of the Segestans, but at length their various arguments and repeated supplications, which Alcibiades seconded with his usual ardour, in some degree prevailed with the people. While the Melians were resisting the Athenian forces, and the Spartans establishing their Argive friends in Orneæ, commissioners were sent into Sicily to gain information on the state of the war with Selinus, and to ascertain whether the Segestans really possessed the treasures which the envoys had held out as an inducement to the Athenians to take up their cause.

The commissioners sent to Segesta returned in the spring of B.C. 415. With them came some Leontine exiles and other envoys from Segesta, who brought sixty talents in silver, about 15,000 pounds sterling, as a bait to entice the Athenians to take up their quarrel. To some in the assembly this sum appeared too trifling to tempt them to war; but the commissioners, who were devoted to Alcibiades, having represented that the sum produced bore but a small proportion to the

resources of the treasury of Segesta and the wealth heaped up in its temples, a decree was passed for sending an armament, consisting of sixty galleys, to its aid.

Having decreed war, the Athenians made due preparations for carrying it into effect. Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus were chosen commanders, and they were entrusted with discretionary powers for carrying the threefold object of the expedition into effect, namely, the relief of Segesta, the restoration of the Leontines, and the promotion of the Athenian interests in Sicily.

The principal motives for the appointment of Nicias appear to have been his hitherto uninterrupted good fortune, and the hope that his cool caution might counterbalance the fiery ardour of Alcibiades. But Nicias disapproved of his own appointment as much as he did of the expedition. Even after the decree for sending succours to Segesta had been carried, Nicias sought to open the eyes of the people to the rashness of the enterprise. In an assembly which was held five days after to deliberate on the strength of the armament to be equipped, he ventured to suggest, that, instead of entering upon the question they had met to discuss, they should review the previous hastily-adopted resolution. The speech which Nicias uttered on this occasion was replete with convincing arguments, and, as it will exhibit the true position in which the Athenians stood with reference to Sicily, an abstract of it is annexed—

“Athenians, your interest is concerned not in providing for the invasion of Sicily, but in examining the expediency of the project. It becomes you not to be moved by the arguments and entreaties of the Segestans and Leontines, since resentment and misery may have led them to act the part of deceivers. Nor should the vain phantom of glory and ambition engage you in a design which is at the present juncture peculiarly unseasonable, and may be found in the end impracticable. It would be madness to excite the flames of a new war while yet the embers of the old are alive. As for the plea of danger and self-defence, it is nugatory. Should the power of Syracuse be extended over the whole of Sicily, Athens will have nothing to apprehend, rather the event would increase her security. Particular cities may, indeed, be led by fear or interest to court the protection of the Peloponnesian confederacy, but victorious Syracuse would disdain to follow the standard of Sparta. And even if Syracuse should, by an effort of generosity, subject the dictates of her pride to the general safety and honour of the Doran name, policy would still prevent her from endangering the precarious empire which she had obtained over her neighbours by strengthening the confederacy of Peloponnesus. Fear, also, would deter the Syracusans from provoking the resentment of Athens, for her power was the more formidable to them from the circumstance that its effects were as yet unfelt by them. Hence it follows, that the expedition to Sicily may be foregone without danger; whereas, if the enterprise were injudiciously executed, or if a reverse should happen, Athens will be exposed to danger and her sons to disgrace and ruin: The result of such a delibera-

tion as this ought not to be committed to the rash decision of youths. They only view the war in Sicily through the medium of hope, vanity, and ambition. Disregarding the expense and danger to be incurred by the republic, they consider only the profits of military command, which may repair the wreck of fortunes, and supply a fund for the indulgence of pleasures. (One youth of this description especially I have in my mind—the principal author of the expedition, who is surrounded by a numerous band of adherents, determined to applaud his harangues and promote his measures. It becomes the wisdom and dignity of the Athenians to resist this juvenile conspiracy. In such a crisis it is the duty of the president to dispense with ordinary forms, and to act, not as the instrument, but the physician, of a diseased republic. The question, therefore, ought to be debated a second time, and the assembly ought to rescind a decree which had passed in the absence of several aged counsellors, and without due examination.”

Being thus singled out by Nicias, the ardent Alcibiades mounted the *bema*, or rostrum, to reply. In his speech, he acknowledged that he was ambitious of the command in Sicily, vindicated his extravagance as redounding to the glory of Athens, urged that youth had often effected what the policy of sage statesmen had in vain attempted, endeavoured to show that there was no fear of the Spartans, since the Peloponnesians were divided among themselves, argued that expense and danger ought not to be regarded where honour and renown were proposed as the reward, maintained that power was only to be preserved by seizing favourable opportunities of increasing and confirming it, and endeavoured to prove that Sicily would be an easy conquest, since it was peopled by nations without arms, discipline, patriotism, or union. The speech of Alcibiades had all the effect he could have wished. The assembly murmured applause, and confirmed the decree for the expedition.

Still Nicias made one more effort to render the expedition abortive. As first of the generals elect, it was his privilege to name the force he judged requisite for the present enterprise, and he thought to bring the people to their senses by naming a force unusually large for a distant enterprise. He observed that they were going to invade an island which contained a great number of independent cities, all well furnished with the means of defence, and especially Selinus and Syracuse, against which they proposed to employ their arms. And neither of these was wanting in public or private opulence. Great treasures were said to be lodged in the temples of Selinus, and Syracuse drew a revenue from her barbarian subjects. In particular, there were two points in which the Sicelots had a great advantage over Athens. They used corn of their own growth, and were strong in cavalry. Hence it would not be sufficient to send out a powerful fleet. It must be accompanied by a land force capable of withstanding the superiority of the enemy's horse, since they might find themselves unable to procure any cavalry, except such as the Segestans could furnish. Then, again, Nicias reminded the Athenians that they were going to a distant land, where, in the winter season, four

months might elapse before despatches from the army could reach Athens. Hence it was necessary to calculate its demands beforehand, and to make ample provision for them. They would have need of a strong body of heavy-armed infantry, of archers and slingers, and of a fleet which would keep undisputed command of the sea. As, also, they might be detained on their passage by contrary winds, they must load a sufficient number of vessels with corn, and press slaves into their service from the mills. Above all, they must not go empty-handed, for the vaunted riches of Segesta might yet prove but a shadow. Nicias concluded by asserting, that there was no prospect of success, unless they made preparations on such a scale as to give them a decided superiority over the enemy, by advising them to make their calculations as if they were sending out a colony in the midst of a hostile population, and by declaring his willingness to resign the command to any one in the assembly who entertained different opinions.

The impression which this statement of Nicias made on the assembly was the reverse of that which he intended. Instead of being discouraged by the magnitude of the preparations, the assembly conceived that they had now the fullest warrant of success that the experience and judgment of Nicias could give. The partizans of Alcibiades loudly applauded his prudence, and even the elder citizens, who had hitherto looked upon the enterprise with suspicion, began to share the confidence of the youthful and sanguine spirits who were attracted by the novelty of the enterprise, the remoteness of its object, and a conquest which would yield inexhaustible revenues. All desired the war, and it was determined that the generals should be invested with full authority to raise such sums of money, and levy such a number of troops, as they might deem necessary to ensure the success of the expedition.

Preparations for the invasion of Sicily immediately commenced. The public mind of Athens was engrossed by this one subject, and the contagion spread throughout Greece. The young at Athens, especially, eagerly longed to embark in the enterprise. They greedily listened to the descriptions with which the veterans who had already served in Sicily fed their curiosity. Instead, therefore, of finding any difficulty to complete the levies, the greatest difficulty consisted in deciding who were worthy by valour and merit to join in the expedition. The sage Socrates alone now ventured openly and boldly to condemn the enterprise, and to predict the future calamities of his country; but his voice was disregarded.

During this interval of anxious expectation, the desire of looking into futurity, always usual among the Greeks on momentous occasions, became general. And this was made the means of a trial of strength between Nicias, who yet longed to divert the public mind from war, and Alcibiades. Through the influence of Nicias, many of the Athenian priests announced a great number of auguries adverse to the expedition. Thus, an oracle directed the Athenians to fetch the priestess of Athens from Clazomenæ; and as it turned out that her name, *Hesychia*, signified “quiet,” it was interpreted as a declaration

that the gods forbade the expedition. Alcibiades, however, had diviners at his service, and these exerted themselves to keep up the spirits of the people. Answers which he obtained from the temples of Ammon and Dodona were particularly serviceable, for these oracles were by the vulgar deemed infallible. So the preparations for the voyage continued.

When everything was nearly completed, a circumstance, to which Grecian superstition alone could attach any importance, threatened to set the expedition aside. One morning, it was discovered that the numerous stone busts of Hermes, with which the private citizens of Athens, combined with public bodies, had adorned the streets, were almost all mutilated. Right reason would have interpreted this as the effects of a drunken frolic, or the contrivance of an enemy, for the purpose of preventing or delaying the expedition by the terror of an omen. The minds of the Athenians, however, were so clouded by their gross superstition, that they looked upon it as a mystery. Even those who granted that it might have been the act of evil-disposed men, considered it as an omen foreboding ill to the proposed expedition. Acting upon such a supposition, commissioners were appointed to examine into the affair, and great rewards were offered for a discovery of the perpetrators of the sacrilege. By the same decree, also, informers, of whatever condition—freemen or slaves, citizens or strangers—were invited, by a promise of impunity, to reveal any other act of impiety with which they might be acquainted.

The invitation contained in this decree had reference to Alcibiades. He had already incurred a suspicion of having sometimes, in a circle of his most intimate companions, celebrated certain profane and intemperate orgies. The precise nature of these revels was unknown, but the rumour, when connected with the subject which now gained popular attention, set the enemies and rivals of Alcibiades to work to fabricate charges against him. The first informations failed to affect him, but when the armament was nearly ready to sail, in an assembly held by the generals, one Pythonicus rose to lay a new information, which threatened to shake his credit with the people. He undertook to convict Alcibiades of divulging the Eleusinian mysteries by a profane imitation of them before the uninitiated, and he offered to produce a slave, named Andromachus, belonging to a friend of Alcibiades, who had been an eye-witness of his impiety, and who, if assured of impunity, would stand forward as his accuser. The evidence of Andromachus was received; and he described a mimic celebration of the mysteries, at which he had been present, with other uninitiated persons, in the house of Polytion, where Alcibiades performed the part of the Hierophant, and his companions represented the torch-bearer and the Herald, who executed the most solemn functions in the Eleusinian rites. This accusation told upon the minds of the people, and the blow was seconded by Androcles, a man who had acquired great influence in the assembly. Androcles declared himself ready to bring forward slaves and foreigners who could convict him of similar of-

fences against religion; and he endeavoured to connect these charges with the mutilation of the busts of Hermes, and to persuade the people that they were so many proofs that a plot had been laid by Alcibiades and his partizans against liberty.

Alcibiades had never before been in such a dilemma. And this he appears clearly to have discovered, for he displayed most consummate skill in his endeavours to avert the danger which arose from these well aimed blows of his adversaries. Perceiving that if he left his cause undecided he should not stand any chance of an acquittal, he put on a bold front, and demanded instant trial. If guilty, he observed, he was ready to submit to the death he deserved; if innocent, he ought to be cleared of the imputation, for it would be as imprudent as it would be unjust, to keep such a charge hanging over a man vested with so great a command. The secret is, Alcibiades knew that if he was put on his trial before the armament sailed, he should triumph, for, notwithstanding the feverish state of the popular feeling, the army was on his side, and it was more than probable that if he was condemned, those troops which had enlisted in the cause from Argos and Mantinea, chiefly through his interest, would abandon the expedition. This, also, his enemies foresaw; and, as they could not decently resist his demand of an immediate trial, they put forward some of their partizans, who were not so notorious in their enmity towards him, and who could advise, with an appearance of impartiality, that the expedition should not be delayed on his account, but that he should return to be tried on some future day. It was in vain that he protested against such a measure: his remonstrances were overruled, and it was decreed that he should proceed on his expedition with this grave charge still impending.

At length the day came which had been appointed for the embarkation. The spectacle which presented itself on the morning when the Athenian forces came down to the Piræus was such as had not before been witnessed in that proud republic. The whole city accompanied them on their march to the water side, and lined the shores of the harbour. And then came the partings of relatives and friends, which took place amidst mingled hopes and fears, the latter predominating. In the first glow of ambitious hope, and in the subsequent stir of preparation, there had been no display of patriotic anxiety for the safety of those who were about to engage in the enterprise; but now, when they were about to commit themselves to the dangers of a long voyage and a distant war, a general uneasiness prevailed lest the strength of Athens, which was embodied in the expedition, should perish. These thoughts excited their fears, and none were passive spectators save the strangers then at Athens, who enjoyed the scene. They gazed with wonder on the splendour of the armament, and marvelled at the boldness of the enterprise.

If Nicias, at this critical moment, could have proposed a counter-movement, there is little doubt that he would have prevailed. But it was too late. Silence was proclaimed by the sound

of the trumpet, prayers were offered to their false gods for a prosperous voyage; libations were poured out in every ship from vessels of gold and silver; the pean was sung, and the strength and the flower of Athens sailed on ward.

The Athenian fleet spread its sails for Ægina, and thence took its departure for Corcyra, where the allies and transports had been directed to assemble. These, combined with the force of Athens, made the whole armament amount to 136 galleys, which carried on board 5,000 heavy and 480 light infantry. Among these were 1,500 Athenians selected from the regular muster rolls, and 700 taken from the lowest class, the Thetes, to serve on board in sea-fights. The rest consisted of Argives, Mantineans, Cretans, Rhodians, and Megarians of the exiled party. Notwithstanding the warnings of Nicias, it was conceived that the Sicilians would afford sufficient cavalry, and hence only one transport, with a troop of thirty horse, accompanied the armament. The fleet was accompanied by thirty vessels laden with provisions, and having on board slaves employed in preparing it, and artificers with a store of tools for fortifications. There were many other vessels, of various burdens, but these chiefly belonged to merchants who followed on private commercial adventures.

From Corcyra, the generals of this armament sent forward three ships, to learn which of the Italian and Sicilian towns were willing to receive them, and to ascertain the real amount of the subsidy which might be expected from Segesta. After this, they divided their fleet into three squadrons, and, crossing over to the Iapygian foreland, proceeded, along the Italian coast, to Rhegium. As they passed along, none of the cities on the coast would either open their gates to the troops, or afford them a market. The same spirit of opposition was experienced, also, at Rhegium. As a city of Chalcidian origin, which had supported them in their previous expeditions, and was attached to their interests by its enmity to Locri, they had looked for a friendly reception and co-operation, but the Rhegians would neither admit them within its walls, nor agree to take any part in the war without the concurrence of the other Italians. Hence the Athenians were obliged to encamp in a sanctuary of Artemis without the walls, where they waited for the report which they expected from Segesta.

Information of the preparations which the Athenians were making had reached Syracuse through various channels, and deliberations commenced concerning resistance. Faction, however, was as rife in Syracuse as at Athens, and while yet the armament was at a distance, no steps were taken. Hermocrates, who had been the peace-maker of Sicily when harassed by internal war, was among the foremost to propose vigorous measures against foreign attack. He suggested the propriety of strengthening the Syracusan confederacy by conciliating the barbarians of the island; by extending alliances among the Italian Greeks; and by applying to Corinth, Sparta, and even Carthage, at this time the richest commonwealth upon earth. Hermocrates also advised, that the naval force which

the Sicilians were able to raise should be collected, in order to make an effort to stop the Athenian armament midway in its progress. But the advice of Hermocrates was disregarded. Many in the assembly of the people, directing the executive government, laughed at the idea of an invasion of Sicily with views of conquest, and Athenagoras, chief of the democratical party, embraced this opportunity for endeavouring to carry a point against the oligarchy. His opposition was so powerful that the assembly broke up without coming to any decision as to the preparations which should be made for resisting the invasion, and thus the Syracusans slumbered until they discovered that the invaders had reached Rhegium. Then it was deemed necessary that they should bestir themselves; party spirit was for a time given to the winds, and permission was granted to the leaders to make what preparations they deemed necessary to avert the threatened storm. Armed with this authority, the Syracusan leaders sent to conciliate some of the Sicel tribes, placed garrisons in situations to control others, prepared their cavalry, and sent troops to occupy some of the most critical posts for defending the Syracusan territory.

In the meantime, the three ships which had been sent forward from Corcyra arrived at Rhegium. The intelligence which they brought from Segesta confirmed the sagacity of Nicias, and disappointed his colleagues. The commissioners had been conducted to the temple of Venus on Mount Eryx, and had seen heaps of consecrated vessels, but they were silver, and they had been dazzled by the quantity of gold and silver plate which they saw piled on the sideboards of the principal Segestans, by whom they were entertained, but they were borrowed! Neighbouring cities had supplied them, and they had served in succession at all the banquets to which the Athenians had been invited, and when it became necessary for the Segestans to reveal their real condition, it appeared that they were only able to raise thirty talents, between seven and eight thousand pounds, to defray the cost of this expedition.

Thus disappointed, the Athenian generals conferred together upon the steps it would now be prudent to take. Nicias proposed that they should sail to Scimus, and call upon the Segestans to supply pay, if not for the whole armament, at least for the sixty ships they had required, and that, on this condition, they should stay until they had brought the Selinuntians to a compromise, and then return home. Alcibiades knew, however, that this would be like knocking at a beggar's door to ask an alms, and he, still intent upon war, represented that it would be disgraceful thus to retire, and advised that they should open negotiations with all the Sicelot towns, except Syracuse and Selinus; and that, if they could succeed in stirring up the spirit of revolt among them, then to attack those two cities. On the other hand, Lamachus suggested that they should sail at once to Syracuse, and endeavour to draw the enemy into a battle, before he had collected his strength, and then plunder the Syracusan territory. This effected, he urged that the other Sicilian cities

would be prevailed upon to decide in their favour.

As it was necessary that two of the generals should sacrifice their opinions, and as the plan of Alcibiades was a middle course between the two extremes, Nicias and Lamachus yielded. Alcibiades then crossed over in his galley to Messana, to try his arts of negotiation, but he only succeeded in obtaining the offer of a market for his troops outside the walls. Thus disappointed, he returned to Rhegium, after which the generals manned sixty galleys, with which Alcibiades and one of his colleagues, probably Lamachus, proceeded along the coast to Naxos. The people of Naxos were purely Ionians, and from of old adverse to Syracuse, whence they opened their gates to Alcibiades and his colleague, and concluded a league, offensive and defensive, with Athens. The Athenian generals then passed on to Catana; but there was a party in that town favourable to Syracuse, which was sufficiently strong to prevent its gates being opened, and the squadron proceeded to the mouth of the river Terias, where it was moored for the night.

While in the harbour of Terias, ten galleys were sent forward to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, to ascertain the state of the enemy's naval preparations, and to make observations on the general features of the town, harbours, and neighbourhood, which were to be the theatre of war. There was no hostile navy in the harbour of Syracuse, but a Syracusan galley fell into the hands of the Athenians, as it was crossing over to the town with some tablets, containing a list of the serviceable citizens, kept in a temple in the outskirts. After making this capture, which was interpreted, on a future day, as an ironical fulfilment of a prediction which had promised that the Athenians should take all the Syracusans, a herald proclaimed that they were come to restore the oppressed Leontines, who would be received as friends, and they then rejoined the fleet, and all returned to Catana.

During the absence of the Athenians, their partizans in Catana had so far wrought a change in the minds of the Catanian leaders, that they consented to admit Alcibiades into the town, to hear his proposals. While yet he was addressing the assembly, the troops, who had been stationed outside the gates, discovering a postern which was erected with slight materials, forced it, and proceeded, apparently without any hostile intentions, to the market-place. Their appearance struck the partizans of Syracuse with such consternation, that they withdrew from the city, and an alliance was consequently decreed between Athens and Catana. At the same time, the generals were invited to transfer their camp to Catana; and soon after the whole armament was brought over, and encamped there.

While in this position, the Athenian commanders received information which gave them reason to hope that a sight of their forces would induce Camarina to embrace their cause. But the information was premature: they sailed thither, and the Camarinians refused to receive more than one ship into their harbour, which was in accordance with an ancient compact between Athens and Camarina. On their return, the Athenians made a descent on the Syracusan

territory, in which they experienced their first defeat. Some of their light troops, which were scattered about in quest of plunder, were surprised by the Syracusan cavalry, and slain.

The success of the plan which had been adopted depended, in a great measure, upon its author, Alcibiades; but he was now stopped in his career. On his return to Catana, he found the state galley, Salamina, waiting to carry him back to Athens, together with some other officers, there to be put upon their trial, on charges relating to the mutilation of the Hermes busts, and the profanation of the Eleusian mysteries.

The absence of Alcibiades, as he foresaw would happen, had given his rivals and enemies an advantage over him. Immediately after the departure of the armament, they redoubled their efforts to inflame the passions of the multitude against him. His power, munificence, ambition, unprincipled conduct, and extravagances, were the constant themes of public conversation. At the same time, his abilities, and even his virtues, were compared with those with which the Pisistratids had acquired their supremacy. Hence, in a short period, every occurrence was made, by construction, to import a plot for establishing his power as a tyrant—for placing demagogical Athens under his feet.

Thus feeling was increased by several important discoveries, pretended or real, relating to the profanation of the mysteries and the mutilation of the busts. In addition to the evidence of the slave Andromachus, one Teucer, an alien, who had quitted his residence at Athens, and had retired to Megara, now offered, upon an assurance of impunity, to make important revelations concerning both these crimes, and, upon his information, some who were associated with Alcibiades were put to death. Diocles, also, an impudent and reckless impostor, stated before the council, that he knew the mutilators of the busts, and that they amounted to about three hundred persons. On the night of the sacrifice, he said, chance led him into the street near the theatre, and he had seen about that number of men enter the orchestra, where they stood in groups of fifteen or twenty; in which position, as he stood behind a pillar, and as the full moon shone in their faces, he was able to observe their features. He did not see any more of them during that night, but when the sacrifice was discovered, he concluded for what purpose they had assembled, and his supposition was confirmed by some of them offering him hush-money when he taxed them with the deed. This secret, he added, he had kept for a month, but, as they had not fulfilled their promises, he was now come to bear witness against them. This information was greedily received, and though it was proved, by the calendar, that on the night of the sacrifice no moon was to be seen, many that he named were arrested, and thrown into prison, while others, among whom were two of the council, fled from the impending ruin.

While suspicion and the popular rage were yet rife in Athens, news was brought that a Boeotian army was moving toward the frontier. This circumstance converted suspicion into certainty. It was immediately concluded that the enemy was in correspondence with the conspira-

tors, and, during the night, the whole of the citizens watched in arms. The panic spread even to Argos. It was suspected that there were designs against the democracy there, and although Alcibiades had placed three hundred favourers of oligarchy in secure custody in the Attic islands, yet were these men now massacred, as partisans of those who it was conceived entertained designs against the liberty of Athens.

Nor was this domestic tragedy yet concluded. Among the prisoners arrested upon the charge of Diocles was the orator Andocides. It had been remarked, as a singular occurrence, that one celebrated image, which had been erected by the Ægean tribes, and which stood near the door of Andocides, was left entire, and thus led to the full conviction that he had been privy to the sacrilege committed on the rest. Andocides saw his danger, and determined to escape by turning informer himself. Accordingly, he adopted the evidence of Teucer, combining it with a story by which he plausibly accounted for the preservation of the Hermes near his own house, and cleared himself and most of his friends of all participation in the sacrilege. His statement was received with the greater confidence, as the calendar demonstrated the falsehood of that of Diocles, and who now confessed that he had been suborned to give his evidence. He named several persons as his accomplices, and these fled the city, but Diocles found the death he deserved.

It does not appear that any deliberation was deemed necessary to carry the previous tragical transactions into effect. It was only for the informers to name, and the democratical dagger was ready to execute. Alcibiades, however, was nobler game, and to compass his death required some caution. It was feared, at first, that the army would revolt should he be arrested, but at length, regardless of every object but that of getting him into their power, the decree was passed, which the Salamina carried to Catania.

Least the army should become disaffected, orders accompanied the decree that Alcibiades should not be arrested, but only summoned to his trial. Hence he was permitted, together with the other persons involved in the same charges, to accompany the Salamina in his own galley. This was converted by Alcibiades into an opportunity of escaping. Foreseeing that his death was certain if he repaired to Athens, he went on shore at Thurri, a friendly town on the Italian coast, and there concealed himself till the Salamina had sailed away. When his escape became known at Athens, the sentence of death was pronounced against him, his property was confiscated, and the different priests and priestesses were ordered to curse him, according to ancient custom; that is, with their faces toward the west, and waving red banners.

A German author observes of the Athenian proceedings in the affair of the Hermes busts, that their like will hardly be found in any state of mature civilisation. To the same effect one of our own historians writes of the popish plot. In all history, he says, it will be difficult to find such another instance of popular frenzy. They appear, indeed, to be the very counterpart of each other, having the same origin, that of

superstition, and the same results, that of cruelty. Both exhibit in the most glowing colours the evil nature of superstition, and the deep necessity there is for the mind of man to be enlightened by the doctrines of Christianity. Classic Greece! What spirit-stirring words are these to the lover of learning. As he reiterates them, he fancies that her sons were among the most perfect of mankind, and yet the history of "classic Greece" unfolds to his view some of the most fearful and revolting transactions that have ever been committed by fallen man. And among these may be enumerated the transactions connected with the Hermes busts, which would be utterly inexplicable if the superstition of the Greeks were kept out of remembrance.

Alcibiades being thus called from the scene of action in Sicily, his two colleagues were left to make any change in their plans which they might deem necessary. Accordingly, they relinquished the plan of negotiation, and conducted the armament immediately toward Segesta and Selinus, as first proposed by Nicias. In proceeding westward, they made a vain attempt to negotiate with Himera, but they succeeded in an assault upon Hyccara, a Syconian town, whose inhabitants they appropriated to themselves for slaves, and then gave the place to the Segestans. After this, Nicias himself proceeded to Segesta, where he obtained thirty talents, and having opened a market at Catania for the sale of the people of Hyccara as slaves, he obtained one hundred and twenty more, with which he was enabled to keep the field. Thus even the sage and humane Nicias at length, through the hardening effects of war, sported with the life of his fellow-man as a thing of nought. He sold his prisoners into misery, and with the gains went forward to inflict misery on others.

Syracuse was now the main object of attack. It was autumn, however, before the generals prepared to move against it. In the meantime they sought aid of the Sicel tribes, and made an unsuccessful attempt on the town of Hybla. This delay raised the spirits of the Syracusans. Fear gave way to contempt of the invaders, and a general wish prevailed to attack them in Catania. The chiefs wisely refused compliance, but the horse-soldiers would sometimes approach the Athenian camp, and tauntingly ask, if, instead of restoring the Leontines, the Athenians intended to locate themselves in Sicily?

This excess of confidence, however, proved injurious to the cause of the Syracusans. Taking advantage of it, Nicias devised a plan for establishing himself in a position near Syracuse, where little was to be feared from the Syracusan cavalry. He sent a Catanian, whom the Syracusan chiefs imagined to be in their interest, to inform them that their partisans in Catania had laid a plan for burning the Athenian fleet, and to assure them that, if they marched to their aid by day-break, they would be enabled to make themselves masters of the camp and the whole armament. The device succeeded. The whole force of Syracuse marched at an appointed time for Catania, and while they were journeying onward, Nicias leisurely occupied a strong position near the shore of the great harbour between the river Anapus and the foot of a steep eminence,

on which stood a temple of Olympian Zeus, at about a mile's distance from the city. Here the Athenians were protected from the enemy's cavalry on one side by the cliffs of the Olympieum eminence, and on the other by trees, buildings, and the Lysimehan marsh, through which the Anapus discharged its waters into the sea. At a point called Dasoon, the Athenians, however, were still open to attack, and they threw up a hasty work for their defence, and then waited calmly for the enemy.

On discovering the deception, the Syracusans marched hastily back to their city. Although alarmed by seeing the Athenians in their stronghold, they boldly offered them battle, and their confidence revived when, on their offer, it was declined. Many of them were permitted to go home, under the impression that they were secure, notwithstanding they were in the presence of the enemy. It is probable that Nicias may have discovered this, for the next morning he drew out his forces for action. The Syracusan generals were surprised, but still nothing daunted. They hastily formed their line and commenced the strife. But they were deficient in those military tactics which could alone give them a chance of success with the disciplined Athenians. They struggled bravely, but they were defeated, and had not the cavalry, which had not been able to take any part in the battle, protected their flight, a great slaughter would have ensued. As it was, few fell, and they were enabled again to collect themselves on the Helorine Causeway, and to retreat in good order to their city.

The only end which the Athenian generals proposed to themselves in this enterprise appears to have been the restoration of their reputation for feats of arms. Hence, on the morrow after the battle, having given up the bodies of the dead, they sailed away from Syracuse, in order to negotiate with some of the Sicilian towns, which they now hoped to find more compliant. They attempted this at Messana, but failed, whence they deemed it prudent to retire to Naxos, where they took up their winter quarters. While at Naxos, the Athenian generals sent a galley to Athens, to solicit a supply of money and cavalry, that they might be enabled to resume operations in the spring.

In the meantime, the Syracusans, taught wisdom by defeat, listened to the advice of Hermocrates, and adopted it. He easily persuaded them that their disaster was not owing to any inferiority in valour, but to the defects of their military system and their discipline; and he prevailed on them to reduce the number of their generals, which hitherto had been fifteen, to three, and to enlarge their powers, which were before so limited that neither secrecy nor subordination could be preserved. Accordingly, three generals were elected, of whom Hermocrates himself was one, and unlimited authority was delegated to them and secured to them by an oath. At the same time, various other measures were adopted for placing the army on a better footing; and envoys were sent to Corinth and Sparta for succour, and to persuade those states to make a diversion in favour of Syracuse. It was probably, also, at the suggestion of Her-

mocrates, that the Syracusans, in the course of the winter, took precautions against a siege, which was to be expected, should the enemy, in the approaching spring, prove victorious in the field. They enlarged the circuit of the city wall, and fortified the deserted site of Megara, which lay to the north of the Olympieum, and where before there had been only an open space round the temple. The Syracusans also led their army against Catania, where they ravaged the land, and burnt the camp left by the enemy, and when it was known that the Athenians were renewing their attempt to draw Camarina into their alliance, Hermocrates was sent thither to defeat their negotiations. He so far succeeded in this mission, as to prevail on the Camarinæans to observe a strict neutrality. By his exertions, their eyes were opened to the ultimate designs of the Athenians, the subversion of the liberty of Sicily, and then the Athenian envoys returned to Naxos.

The Athenian envoys were more successful in other quarters. Almost all the Sicel tribes independent of Syracuse joined them, and even supplied them with corn and money. The success of their arms, also, drew offers of assistance from some of the Etruscan cities, which was accepted. About the same time, moreover, the Athenian generals sent envoys to Carthage, and as the winter wore away, they returned to Catania, where they repaired their camp, and prepared for operations on the first dawn of spring. As soon as the sun returned to gladden the heart of man and enliven the face of nature, they meditated dispensing misery and desolation to all around.

On the arrival of the Syracusan envoys at Corinth, which was the parent state of Syracuse, they met with the warmest reception. The leading men there ardently espoused their cause, and Corinthian envoys were sent with them to Sparta to second their application. The ephori of Sparta proved friendly to their mission, but while there they met with a new auxiliary, which proved more grateful to them than even the friendship of the Spartans. That new auxiliary was the chief author of their danger—Alcibiades!

It appears that Alcibiades had crossed from Thuri, in a merchant vessel, to the Elean port Cyllene, and that while there he had received an invitation from the Spartan government to proceed to Sparta. Having received a solemn pledge of safety, he proceeded thither, and he now stood forth in the Spartan assembly to advocate the cause of that state which he had sought to destroy. The Spartan ephori were of themselves well disposed to assist the Syracusans with their good wishes and exhortations, but this was not sufficient for Alcibiades. His heart owed a deep grudge to his parent state, Athens, and he longed to strike her in the most vulnerable point by defeating her projects against Sicily. Hence he endeavoured to stimulate the sluggish enmity of the Spartans against Athens, by disclosing dangers of which they had never dreamed. After apologising for his previous opposition to the Spartan interests, and indulging in a sneer at the Athenian constitution, he related the design with which the Sicilian expedi-

tion had been undertaken, and which perhaps had only really existed in his visions of greatness. The conquest of Sicily, he said, was only to be a step to that of the Italian Greeks, Carthage, and the Peloponnesus, over which empire Athens designed to reign supreme. Hence it followed, that if they wished to rescue Peloponnesus, they must fight before Syracuse, and he advised them, therefore, to lose no time in sending a body of troops to Sicily, under a Spartan commander, who would be of more use than a whole army, to direct the operations of their allies, inasmuch as the timid would thereby be encouraged, and the wavering decided. At the same time, he suggested that it would be their policy to carry war into Attica, in doing which they should endeavour to occupy Decelea as a permanent post. By thus acting, Alcibiades asserted that Attica would no longer belong to Athens, but to Sparta, for the landowners would then be completely deprived of the enjoyment of their property, and the working of the Laurian mines, the principal source of revenue, would be stopped. Such, he added, was the advice which the sincerity of a just resentment against a country which had cast him off dictated, and he expressed his readiness to co-operate with them in demolishing the tyrannical power which Athens had usurped.

The Spartan government had already meditated the invasion of Attica, and it now resolved to carry it into effect. At the same time, being awakened to a sense of its imminent danger by these representations of Alcibiades, it appointed Gylippus, a son of the exiled Cleandridæ, to sail to Sicily with such succours as he should be able to raise in concert with the Corinthians. With these he was to proceed immediately to the scene of action, and others were to follow.

Gylippus had no sooner received his commission, than he prepared for its execution. He directed the Corinthians to send two of their galleys to meet him at Asine, on the Messenian coast, that he might set forward without delay, while they completed their preparations for the relief of Syracuse.

While these events were transpiring at Sparta, the galley which had been sent to Athens for supplies and reinforcements arrived there. The Athenians voted three hundred talents—about 75,000 pounds sterling—and a squadron of 250 cavalry and thirty horse-bowmen, for the prosecution of the war. These succours were found at Catania, in the spring, by the Athenian generals on their return from an expedition against the Syracusan fortress at Megara, and the Sicel town Centuripa, over the latter alone of which they had prevailed. The Athenian succours, however, were without horses, and it was directed that they should be obtained in Sicily.

It was now resolved to lay siege to Syracuse. This was a difficult task, for, according to the art of attack adopted in that age, the place must be enclosed with a contravallation, and the extent of the town, and the form of a hill, over the skirt of which a suburb extended, were formidable obstacles against carrying this plan into effect. The hill in question was called Epipolæ; and the Syracusan generals, being apprised of the intentions of the enemy, aware

how important it would be to occupy this hill, determined to place a garrison of seven hundred men there, under the command of Dionilius, an Andrian exile, who, as a subject of Athens, was well versed in the Athenian discipline. On the night preceding this proposed step, however, the Athenian generals had embarked their whole army, and had passed undiscovered to a place near Syracuse, called Leon, where a body of infantry was hastily landed, which proceeded immediately to Epipolæ, and by a pass called Euryelus ascended the hill unopposed. Information of this surprise was quickly carried to the Syracusans, who were then occupied in the meadow of the Anapus, at the distance of three miles. Great consternation prevailed, but they, nevertheless, hastened to repel the invaders. They were unsuccessful. Steady discipline prevailed against tumultuous valour, and the Syracusans were defeated, with the loss of three hundred men, among whom was Dionilius.

Soon after this battle, the Athenian generals received the reinforcement they expected from Segesta, and they commenced the work of circumvallation on a slope of Epipolæ, near the city, and in a line which was the shortest distance between the great harbour and the bay of Thapsus. The work proceeded with such rapidity, that the besieged were struck with consternation. Their generals, however, made a show of resistance, but in approaching the enemy their order of battle became deranged, and it was in vain that they endeavoured to restore it, so that they prudently retreated into the city.

Hermocrates now renounced all thoughts of meeting the enemy in the field, and he advised the Syracusans to carry a counter-work across the line of circumvallation, which he conceived would baffle the besiegers. This advice was adopted. They commenced this counter-work near the new quarter Tementes, and, being interrupted by the Athenians, who were intent upon their own operations, they soon carried it forward as far as seemed necessary, and then returned to the city or their tents, leaving only a small guard at the counter-wall. The Athenian generals now determined to destroy the work of the Syracusans. They ordered a select body of three hundred men, with some light troops, to surprise it, while they themselves, with the rest of the army, in two divisions, prevented any succours from approaching. The enterprise succeeded. The Syracusan guard, overtaken by the languor of a sultry noon, was dislodged, and the work was destroyed.

To prevent the repetition of such an attempt, the Athenian generals commenced the fortification of that part of the line which lay between the foot of Epipolæ and the great harbour. In opposition to this, the Syracusans, who were still masters of the great harbour, commenced carrying a ditch and palisade across the marsh, nearer the shore. As before, the Athenians offered no interruption, that they might be enabled to carry on their own operations. But when their own work, which secured the south side of Epipolæ, was finished, they turned their thoughts to the destruction of this new counter-work of the Syracusans. At day-break, a body of their forces, under Lamachus, fell upon it,

and the Syracusans were dislodged. But they did not give up this, their last hope, without a struggle. A fierce conflict ensued, in which the Athenians were again victorious. It was in vain that they sought to restore the fortune of the day by surprising the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. Those who escaped the slaughter were compelled to retire into the city. At the same time, the Athenian fleet was seen entering the great harbour, and its appearance extinguished every remaining hope of obstructing the completion of the circumvallation. The Athenians lost some of their forces in this struggle, and, among the rest, their general, Lamachus, was slain.

The work of circumvallation was now carried on with fresh ardour, and every thing seemed to insure its completion. The news of the success of the Athenian arms brought supplies and auxiliaries into their camp from many quarters. Their prey seemed to be within their grasp, whence others longed to share with them the plunder of the besieged city. The Italians and those Siceliots who before wavered, now that the fate of Syracuse seemed certain, joined their forces to those of Athens. On the other hand, the Syracusans began to despair of safety. Despondency seized upon every mind, and, conceiving that their reverses were owing either to the treachery or the adverse stars of their generals, they deposited them from their office. No confidence, however, was placed in the three elected in their room, and the question of capitulation began to be discussed in the assembly. Overtures were indeed made to Nicias, and it seemed as if he had been deprived of his colleagues that he who had so warmly opposed the expedition might receive the honour of being named the conqueror of Syracuse and Sicily. There is nothing, however, certain in this fluctuating world, and this Nicias found. While he was preparing to enter the gates of Syracuse, the bosom of the mighty waters was bearing onwards its deliverers.

Gylippus had manned two Spartan galleys at Asine, and had been joined there by two others from Corinth, under the command of Pythen. With these they sailed to Leucas, where a rumour reached them that Syracuse was already completely invested. On hearing this, Gylippus gave up Sicily for lost, and he only hoped to be in time to counteract the influence of the Athenians among the Italian Greeks. While, therefore, the Corinthians were fitting out a squadron consisting of ten of their own galleys, two Leucadians, and three from Ambracia, he and Pythen pushed across to Tarentum. From Tarentum the two generals proceeded to Thurii, where, through his father, Cleandridas, who had been received as an exile there, he had connexions which Gylippus hoped might enable him to arm the Thurians against Athens. But in this he was disappointed. His small force, which seemed only fit for a piratical excursion, did not encourage them to accede to his wishes, and he proceeded on his voyage westward. Before he reached Locri, however, he was driven out to sea by a gale from the north, and he was compelled to return to Tarentum, in order to refit his ships.

Gylippus, having refitted his galleys, proceeded with his colleague along the coast to Locri. It was here that they discovered that Syracuse, though in extreme peril, was not past relief, but that an army might still be introduced into the town from the side of Epipolæ. Finding this, they determined to sail to Himera, and march across the land with what forces they could collect. They passed through the straits without interruption, touching at Rhegium, and at length reached Himera. Here they left their galleys, and they prevailed on the citizens to furnish arms for their crews, and to join their expedition. About the same time, Selinus was also directed to send her whole force to an appointed place of rendezvous. Gela was induced to supply a small body of auxiliaries, and some of the Sicel tribes veered round to their side. With reinforcements drawn from all these quarters, Gylippus found himself at the head of three thousand men, with whom he hastened to the relief of Syracuse.

Although Nicias had heard of the approach of Gylippus, and had taken no effectual measures to arrest his progress, his arrival in Sicily was not known at Syracuse. Despondency had given way to despair, and an assembly had been appointed to deliberate on terms of capitulation. At that critical moment, one of the Corinthian galleys, which had sailed from Leucas after the departure of Gylippus, having been detained there a little longer than the rest, entered the harbour. Its commander, Gongylus, announced to the besieged that succours had already reached Sicily, and that others were on the way, and soon after news arrived that Gylippus was approaching. Hope now succeeded to despair. All flew to arms, and went forward to meet their deliverer, with whom, through the supineness of Nicias, they effected a junction on that part of Epipolæ where the line of circumvallation was not yet completed.

Having thus succeeded in joining the Syracusans, Gylippus sent a herald to offer the Athenians permission to quit Sicily in five days with all that belonged to them. This offer was rejected with derision, and he then commenced offensive operations. He drew up his forces in front of the Athenian lines, and while he thus engaged the enemy's attention, he sent a detachment against Laddalum, where Nicias had erected a fort for the security of his baggage and treasures. This fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword, which had the effect of reanimating the spirits of the Syracusans. They now commenced a wall, which they proposed to carry up the slope of Epipolæ, across that part of the line of circumvallation which was still open. Seeing this, and conceiving that the interests of the Athenians in Sicily would be weakened by delay, Nicias wished to bring the fortune of the war to the decision of a battle. Gylippus accepted the challenge; but having imprudently placed the Syracusans in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, where neither their cavalry nor archers could be of any service, he suffered a defeat. Gylippus, however, acknowledged and promised to atone for his error. This promise he fulfilled. He took the earliest opportunity of offering battle on more favourable

ground, beyond the interval where the two walls converged toward each other, and posted his cavalry so as to fall on the left flank of the Athenians during the heat of the engagement. He was now successful the charge of the cavalry spread disorder through the Athenian ranks, and they were driven into their intrenchments. Thus victorious, the Syracusans assiduously prosecuted their counter-work, and it was quickly carried beyond the Athenian line, so that it became impossible for the Athenians to block up the city without forcing their ramparts.

The danger of the besiegers soon became more apparent. The Corinthian fleet entered the harbour, Gylippus collected auxiliaries from the interior, and naval succours from the maritime towns, envoys were despatched to Sparta and Corinth for fresh reinforcements, to meet those which the besiegers might receive from Athens, and the besieging soldiers who went out in quest of wood and water were cut off by the enemy's cavalry. Added to this, those towns which had supplied the Athenians with provisions while they were successful, now refused them, and they were compelled to depend for every necessary supply on the precarious bounty of the Italian cities.

Nicias saw the danger of his situation, and perceived that nothing but prompt and powerful succours could save the armament from utter destruction. Hence he resolved to lay the whole state of the case before the people. Hitherto he had sent only oral despatches, but fearing that his messengers might be wanting either in ability or courage to execute such an important commission, he described his distress, danger, and exigencies, in a letter, which, being brought to Athens, was read in the assembly.

In this letter, Nicias described and lamented the misfortunes and disorders of his army. The slaves, he said, deserted in great numbers, and the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and subsistence, preferred the more lucrative service of Syracuse. The Athenians themselves had become disgusted with the hardships of the war, and had abandoned the care of the galleys to inexperienced hands—to slaves brought from the spoils of Hyccara. This disorder he frankly acknowledged he was unable to check. But there was a calamity, he added, which was still more to be dreaded—that of their dependence for food on the Italian cities. If they should be induced to close their ports, the war would be ended in a few days without a battle. Under these circumstances, therefore, combined with the growing power of the enemy, he exhorted the assembly either to recall the armament, or send another equally powerful to second its operations.

It was a feature in the Athenian character not to be diverted by any obstacle from any undertaking in which they had once engaged, and, therefore, they would not give up their views of conquest in Sicily. An additional force was immediately voted to assist Nicias, and they appointed Demosthenes and Eurymedon as his colleagues to command the forces which they decreed to send. In the meantime, Menander and Euthydemus, two officers serving under Nicias, were invested with equal rank, to assist

him in his labours. To show that they were in earnest, Eurymedon was sent forward with ten galleys and 120 talents, and the promise of more ample succours under Demosthenes. At the same time, they despatched Conon, with a squadron of twenty galleys, to Naupactus, to intercept the reinforcements from Sparta and Corinth, which were to sail to Syracuse.

While the Athenians were thus muddily intent upon a distant conquest, a more serious attack than they had yet experienced was preparing against Attica. The success of Gylippus, the prospect of assistance from Sicily, the evident embarrassment of Athens, and the exhortations of Corinth, all combined in determining the Spartans to follow the advice of Alcibiades. Accordingly, in the spring of B.C. 413, Agis marched into Attica at the head of the Peloponnesian forces, and, after ravaging the plain of Athens, began to fortify Decelea. What Alcibiades had foretold came to pass. Having established a garrison there, the whole country became divested of everything that was valuable. Slaves, also, to the number of 20,000, and consisting for the most part of artisans, deserted to the enemy. The cavalry was worn out by incessant excursions to meet the enemy's forays, and the citizens scarcely rested night or day from watch and ward. Moreover, as the city depended entirely on the sea for provisions, their price was raised, while money every day became more scarce from the additional expense which attended water-carriage. Since the days of the plague, Athens had not been involved in such distress—it was in truth a besieged town.

Yet it was in the midst of these distresses that Demosthenes left Piræus with a fleet of sixty Attic and five Chian galleys, having on board twelve hundred Athenian infantry, designed to aid Nicias in the conquest of Syracuse. Demosthenes halted awhile at Argina, to collect lingerers, and he then proceeded to the coast of Argolis, to join a squadron of thirty galleys, under Charicles, which had been sent to Argos for her contingent. These sailed together as far as the Laconian Gulf, opposite Cythera, where they erected a fort on the Laconian coast, which was to be a refuge for runaway helots, and a rallying place, like Coryphasium, for marauding inroads into the country. Demosthenes then pursued his voyage, and Charicles, having left a garrison in the fort, returned to Athens, leaving the Argives in his way thither on their own coast.

During the winter, the Athenians had collected a body of 1300 Thracian targeteers, of the independent tribe called the Dians, who inhabited the highlands of Rhodope. These were designed to aid the Sicilian expedition, but they did not reach Athens till Demosthenes had sailed. Hence it was resolved that they should be immediately conducted home, and Dintrephes was charged with this commission, having orders to make use of them as any occasion might arise on their passage. Dintrephes made a cruel use of these orders. With these barbarians he plundered the neighbourhood of Tanagra, and then, having reached Chalcis, he transported them across the Eurpus, and attacked the Boeotian town of Mycalessus, the houses and temples

of which he plundered, and the inhabitants he delivered over to indiscriminate destruction. On his retreat, however, he was overtaken by a body of Thebans, who deprived him of his spoils, and slew about 250 of the merciless barbarians. It seems probable that Ditrephes was himself slain, for nothing more is recorded of him, save that Pausanias relates that he saw his statue at Athens, which represented him as pierced with arrows. If such was the case, he found the death his wanton barbarity merited.

In the meantime Gylippus was actively employed in Sicily. During the spring, he collected from the several Sicilian cities all who were inclined to favour the Syracusan cause and, on his return, he called an assembly, for the purpose of urging the Syracusans to man their ships, and try their strength in a sea-fight. This seemed an utopian proposition to the multitude, since Athens was still mistress of the seas; but, being ably seconded by Hermocrates, it was adopted. Eighty ships were manned, and it was concerted that while thirty-five of them should advance from the great harbour, the rest should sail round from the lesser harbour to join them. At the same time, Gylippus was to lead his whole force of infantry toward the Athenian forts at Plemyrum.

This movement, as regards the Syracusan fleet, became visible to the Athenians at the dawn of day, and they hastily manned sixty galleys, of which twenty-five were opposed to those in the great harbour, and thirty-five to those advancing from the lesser harbour. By sea the Athenians were successful: eleven Syracusan ships were sunk, and the rest were put to flight. While, however, the Athenians in Plemyrum crowded toward the shore to witness the action, Gylippus, who had begun his march during the night, arrived unobserved, and captured three forts. The result of this enterprise was, therefore, more advantageous to the Syracusans than to the Athenians: while the latter erected one trophy for their naval victory, the former raised three for the forts captured.

In some subsequent minor naval engagements the Athenians were still victorious, but want of success did not abate the resolution of the Syracusans to gain the command at sea. The hope of defending their country gave a stimulus both to their invention and activity. They strengthened the prows of their ships, in order to compensate for the defect of velocity, which was the characteristic excellence of those belonging to the Athenians; and they provided, also, a great number of smaller vessels, which might approach so near the hostile fleet that the light-armed troops with which they were to be manned might aim their darts against the Athenian mariners.

When all things were prepared, the Syracusans again offered the enemy battle at sea, and it was as readily accepted as offered. The two fleets met in direct conflict, and the Syracusans at this time prevailed. The solidity of their prows overpowered, as had been foreseen, the enemy's galleys; and the Athenians fell thickly, from the continual discharge of darts from the lighter vessels which hovered round them. After a severe contest, therefore, the Athenians were put to flight, and sought refuge by retiring be-

hind a line of merchantmen and transports, from the masts of which huge masses of lead, named dolphins, had been suspended, in order to crush the enemy's galleys, should they approach. Seven of the Athenian galleys were sunk, and many more were disabled, while the loss of life exceeded the usual proportion. The pursuers were arrested in their victorious career by the line of merchantmen, and they retired to erect their trophy, which they looked upon as an earnest of future success, both by sea and land.

The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice in their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when an armament sailed into the great harbour, to the sound of martial music. This was the second Athenian armament, under the command of Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

After his co-operation with Charicles, Demosthenes proceeded to Corcyra, and from thence he went to collect reinforcements among the allies of Athens in Western Greece: Naupactus, Cephalonia, Zacynthus, Alyzia, Anactorium, all contributed to strengthen the armament. At Anactorium he was met by Eurymedon, who brought with him provisions, together with the unpleasant news that Plemyrum was in the hands of the Syracusans. About the same time, Conon, who had the command at Naupactus, came to request a reinforcement to enable him to oppose the Corinthians; and, as the service was deemed important, ten of the swiftest galleys were granted him.

On his return, Conon found Diphilus at Naupactus, with five other galleys, and armed with authority to supersede him in the command of the armament, which amounted to thirty-three galleys. The Corinthians, also, augmented their force, so as to render it nearly equal with the enemy, and they stationed themselves in a bay off the town of Eroneus, in Achaia. Hence they advanced to meet the Athenians, who, strong in numbers, calculated upon an easy victory. But the Corinthians had strengthened the bows of their galleys by solid timbers, whence, when the vessels met prow to prow, those of the Athenians were stove in by the shock. Seven of them were thus disabled, yet they sank three of the Corinthians, and kept possession of the wrecks, which were carried by the wind out of the gulf. To whom the victory belonged seems doubtful: both sides raised trophies.

After having strengthened their armament with all the reinforcements they could collect on the western coast of Greece, Demosthenes and Eurymedon crossed the Ionian gulf to the Iapygian territory, in the south of Italy. They stopped there to renew the ancient alliance of Athens with Artas, a powerful chief of the Iapygian barbarians, through whom they obtained a small force of dart-men, of the Messapian tribe. Three hundred dart-men and three galleys also joined them from Metapontum, a Grecian town in the neighbourhood. The Athenian commanders then proceeded to Thurii, where they found that the party friendly to Athens had recently taken possession of the government, and had banished their opponents. From them, therefore, they obtained a reinforcement of seven hundred heavy-armed troops, with three hundred dart-men; and they then sailed forward to the

Rhegion port of Petra, from whence it only remained for them to cross over into Sicily.

It was with this armament, consisting in the whole of seventy-three galleys, having on board 5,000 heavy infantry and 3,000 light troops, that Demosthenes and Eurymedon sailed into the great harbour of Syracuse, to the sound of trumpet and clarion, immediately after the naval defeat of Nicias.

On the arrival of this formidable force, the Syracusans were dismayed. Reflecting that it had left Attica invaded by the Peloponnesians, they concluded that the resources of Athens were inexhaustible, and were ready to give up all hopes of deliverance. But a similar despondency pervaded the breasts of the Athenian generals. Although Demosthenes had sailed to the scene of action thus gaily, yet, when he came to inspect the state of affairs, he perceived that the conquest of Syracuse was by no means certain. He resolved, however, to act vigorously. Under the impression that it was necessary to strike an immediate blow to insure success, or determine the expediency of raising the siege, he proposed to make an attempt to recover possession of Epipolæ, which was now entirely in the hands of the Syracusans, and to dislodge the enemy from their counter-work, so that the circumvallation might be resumed and completed. Accordingly the army was led against the counter-work, and an attempt was made to storm it with the aid of machines; but the besieged poured combustibles from the walls, which burnt the engines, and repulsed the assailants. Demosthenes now turned his thoughts to the attack of Epipolæ. At this time Epipolæ was guarded by the garrison which manned the cross-wall, also by three camps near the city, by a body of six hundred men, posted higher up the slope, and by a fort still nearer the summit. To attack these forces in the day-time would have been madness, and therefore Demosthenes resolved to make the attempt under cover of the night. Thus sheltered, the whole army marched toward Epipolæ, to gain the top of the ridge, above the enemy's posts near Euryalus. The first attack succeeded. The Athenians surprised the fort, drove the garrison before them, and then marched forward to assault the Syracusan camps. But by this time Gylippus had formed the Syracusan troops, and had sallied out of his entrenchments to arrest their progress. As they had not yet recovered from their consternation, the foremost of these troops gave way, and the Athenians no longer apprehending resistance, advanced confidently, expecting to disperse the remainder. Their eagerness to secure the victory produced disorder in their ranks; and, while in this state, they were suddenly charged by a small body of Thespians, from Locri, who had kept their ground amidst the general confusion. This charge was fatal to the Athenians: their line was broken, and the confusion which it caused in the front spread rapidly to the rear, which had but just gained the top of the ascent. A scene of indescribable tumult followed: the moon shone brightly, but its light was only partial and bewildering: the Athenians could not distinguish their friends from their foes but by their watchword; and this soon became doubtful, amid the deafening

noise of the multitude. As the pean of the bands of the Dorian race resembled that of the enemy, it struck the ears of their allies as a hostile note, and hence they frequently turned their arms one against another. Finally, they were driven back toward the narrow pass by which they had ascended the heights; and as all could not find room in the path, some were forced down the cliffs. Even among those who reached the plain in safety, many, unable to find their way back, wandered about till the morning, when they were slain by the Syracusan cavalry. Between two and three thousand shields were found on the scene of action.

The hopes of the Syracusans were now revived, and despair again prevailed in the Athenian camp. Demosthenes saw that every reasonable hope of conquest and victory was cut off, and as sickness had begun to spread widely among the troops, and they were dejected by a series of disasters, he proposed that they should lose no time in moving, while yet the sea was navigable, and their fleet was at their command. He urged, also, that the force of their armament would be better employed in Attica, and that to linger at Syracuse was now becoming a mere waste of lives and treasures. It might have been expected that the opinion of Nicias would have coincided with that of Demosthenes, as it was both congenial to his character, and correspondent with his former conduct; but no, he was now reluctant to abandon the enterprise. He could not, he said, consent to raise the siege without the sanction of a decree of the people, and thus arose from his knowledge of the Athenian character. Some malevolent orator, and even the men who clamoured for their departure, might, he observed, charge the Athenian generals with corruption and treachery; hence he preferred meeting death from the hands of the enemy to the risk of an ignominious execution at Athens. Aware of the irascible temper of the Athenian assembly, Demosthenes and Eurymedon conceded this point, and proposed that the armament should at least remove to a more convenient station, Catania, whence, after the troops had recovered their health and spirits, they might harass the enemy by continual descents, until they obtained an opportunity of meeting him on the sea. But even this was opposed by Nicias. He knew, he said, from secret correspondence which he had with some in the city, that the finances of Syracuse could not much longer support the expenses of the war, and when those failed her, then her auxiliaries would take their leave, and her affairs would go rapidly to ruin. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with his stern opposition, which was so contrary to his previous disposition, and conceiving that he might rely on some more important ground of confidence, which he was unwilling to explain, they submitted to his opinions.

During this interval, Gylippus had been collecting fresh reinforcements from the Sicilian cities in the interior, and the troops so long expected from Peloponnesus had arrived in the harbour of Ortigia. These forces had sailed from Greece early in the spring, but they had been driven by stress of weather to the coast of Cyrene. At Cyrene they continued for some

months, that they might defend their Grecian brethren from the assaults of the Lydians; after which, having augmented their fleet with a few Cyrenian galleys, they proceeded to their point of destination. And now approached the final result of this long doubtful struggle. Thus reinforced, the Syracusans determined on renewing their attack both by sea and land.

At the time that the Syracusans came to this resolution, the Athenians were meditating a retreat. The ravages of sickness were every day spreading more rapidly through the armament, and Nicias himself, at length, admitted the necessity of breaking up the siege. Accordingly, orders were issued with the utmost secrecy, for all to be ready to depart on the first signal. All were soon ready, and the hour of embarkation was appointed. They might have departed in safety, for the sea was open, and no obstruction was threatened, but their progress was arrested by an eclipse of the moon!

On a similar occasion, Pericles, enlightened by the philosophy of Anaxagoras, had ventured to disregard an eclipse of the sun, and to remove the popular ignorance by an explanation of its real cause. The nature of an eclipse of the moon, however, was still generally unknown. One astronomer there was at Athens, Meton, who might have counteracted the vulgar error, but he, it is said, had feigned madness, that he might not be compelled to join the expedition. The Athenians were, therefore, obliged in their terror to have recourse to the augurs and soothsayers, and they declared, that to bring the heavenly powers again to a friendly aspect, required a delay of three nine days, or to the next full moon. Accordingly, Nicias, who was deeply imbued with the prejudices of the vulgar, listened with submissive credulity to their directions, and expressed his unalterable resolution of complying with this response. In this resolution, indeed, he met with no opposition. All, spell-bound by superstition, sat themselves quietly down in their camp.

It was not so with the Syracusans. They were rather encouraged by the portent, and being acquainted with the object of the Athenian preparations, they determined to bring them to an engagement while yet they remained in a situation where the very magnitude of the Athenian armament would favour the Syracusan arms. Accordingly, after some days' exercise of their fleet, they began by an attack on the Athenian lines, which led to a skirmish, in which they conquered. On the next day they were yet more successful. The squadron commanded by Eurymedon, having been separated from the rest, was destroyed, and he himself perished. Still the Athenians maintained the struggle with fixed resolution. By land, on the same day, roused to desperation, they repulsed their enemy; and, on the morrow, prepared their armament again for battle. But on that day the Syracusans captured eighteen galleys, and destroyed their crews, while they chased the rest to the shore, where, with their comrades, the Athenians raised one universal wail of despair.

By these victories, the Syracusans became masters of the sea; and, believing themselves secure on that side, after collecting the wrecks

and the dead, they sailed thence to the city, and erected their trophy. While they were thus employed, and their orators were calling upon them to complete the work of destruction, the Athenians turned all their thoughts toward an immediate retreat. This was to be commenced in the course of the following night; but their design was suspected at Syracuse, and Hermocrates urged the expediency of taking immediate precautions against it. His advice was, that all the passes should be secured by which the enemy might retreat. But although the magistrates acknowledged the wisdom of the proposal, it was found impossible to put it into execution. The whole body of the Syracusans were absorbed in revelry, under the double pretext of celebrating their triumphs and of honouring Hercules, whose festival happened on that day. Hermocrates, therefore, resorted to another expedient to secure his prey. He knew that Nicias had agents in Syracuse, and he sent some of his friends, as soon as it grew dark, with a party of horse to the Athenian lines, to warn the Athenian general, in the name of his Syracusan partisans, to beware of beginning his retreat in the night, as the enemy were guarding the roads it would be better, they added, to make due preparations, and march forward in the morning. This device of Hermocrates succeeded. Nicias postponed his retreat till the morning, and, when the morning came, it was thought best to defer their departure till the morrow, that everything useful for the men in their retreat might be collected.

In the meantime the Syracusans had recovered from their debauch, and were again active in seeking the destruction of their enemy. Their fleet sailed to the Athenian naval station, and, meeting with no resistance, burnt some of the ships they found there, and carried off the rest in triumph to Syracuse. At the same time, Gyliippus marched out with his army, and occupied all the principal passes round the Athenian camp and that line of country which it was thought probable the enemy might traverse.

It was on the third day after the battle that the Athenians began their retreat. Language cannot describe the bitterness which they felt in the hour of departure. The failure of their enterprise—the sight of the unburied dead, which were thickly strewed around them, and which in their ears called aloud for sepulture—the sick and the wounded, whom they were obliged to leave behind—and the thought that ruin hung impending over Athens through their discomfiture—all combined to cast down their spirits. Such was their accumulated weight of misery, says Thucydides, that it threw the whole multitude into tears, and, absorbing the apprehension of future danger, almost took away the desire and the power to move onward.

At length the march commenced. The host still appeared formidable, for the whole multitude of all classes amounted to no less than forty thousand men. But its numbers did not raise its confidence. It seemed to itself, indeed, not an army ready to face an enemy, but a garrison making its escape from a besieged city. And its numbers were soon diminished. Being mostly slaves, they deserted openly; and the greater

part, therefore, soon disappeared. Those who remained were no longer to be trusted, and hence the soldier, both in the infantry and cavalry, was compelled to carry his own provisions—a burden which to a Greek was intolerable.

In this hour of distress, the aged Nicias supported the dignity of his character and situation with remarkable fortitude. Though ready to sink under the pressure of bodily and mental sufferings, he exerted himself to cheer the troops with all the topics of conversation he could devise, and to impart hopes which he could not appropriate to himself. He resorted to every part of his army, crying aloud that matters were not yet desperate, that other armies had escaped greater dangers, that they ought not to grieve for disasters they had not occasioned, that if they had offended the gods, their vengeance was satisfied by past sufferings, and they were now the objects of compassion, that fortune would become tired of persecuting them, that their courage would still render them formidable, that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they thought proper, that they had only to take care of themselves, and that, by a prudent retreat, now then only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also yet become the hope and stay of Athens. But these exhortations were fallacious. The sword of the enemy was before and behind them, and it was used with unsparring vengeance.

The actions of Nicias were as prudent as his exhortations. Instead of leading the army towards Naxos and Catania, in which direction many secret ambushes of the enemy might be dreaded, he conducted them, by the western route, towards Gela and Camarina, by which measure he might hope to find provisions and to elude the latent snares of the Syracusans. His troops were formed in a hollow square, inclosing the baggage and the followers of the camp. Nicias led the van, and Demosthenes the rear. In this order they marched to the river Anapus, where they found a body of Syracusans prepared to dispute the passage with them. These, however, they put to flight, and then pursued their march on the opposite side of the river, but being harassed by the enemy's cavalry and light troops, they were not able to proceed more than five miles on their journey before night-fall. During the next day they advanced only half that distance, being invited by the openness of the country to encamp, for the purpose of collecting all the provisions they could seize, and obtaining a supply of water for the next part of their march, which lay through an arid country.

Meanwhile, the Syracusans had fortified a narrow ridge between two deep ravines, which the Athenians had to cross, in order to issue from the valley of the Anapus. On the next day, the Athenians marched forward to force the passage; but they were so galled by the hostile cavalry and dartmen, that they could not even reach the ridge, and they were compelled to fall back upon the plain where they had before encamped. Provisions now became scarce, and the presence of the enemy precluded the

possibility of their obtaining more. With a prospect of famine before them, therefore, the Athenians set out early in the morning to make a desperate effort to storm the ridge. An assault was made, but it proved vain. The Athenians forced their way to the ridge, and long braved a shower of missiles poured on them by the Syracusans from behind a wall which they had built, but a thunderstorm came on, and, in their despondency, they interpreted it as an ill omen, and retreated into the plain, where they again encamped. The next day they moved forward to make a second attempt, which again proved abortive. Galled by the enemy, who dealt his deadly blows with perfect impunity, they found themselves at night but little more than half a mile from the place of their last encampment.

The distress of the Athenians was now extreme. Numbers were suffering from wounds, and all from want. It seemed certain that they would all perish if they persisted in proceeding by the route laid down, and therefore Nicias resolved to steal a night's march on the enemy, and descend by the way of the coast as far as the valley of the Caeyparis, by which route he hoped to reach the interior, where he might join the Sicel allies. Accordingly, fires were lighted in the camp to deceive the Syracusans, and the army marched forward. Nicias led the van in good order into the Helorus road, and along it to the banks of the Caeyparis, but the troops in the rear were seized with a panic, which disordered and delayed them, so that the two divisions were completely separated. Nicias found a guard of Syracusans employed in blocking up the passage of the Caeyparis with a wall and palisade, but he overpowered them, and then, by the advice of his guides, proceeded toward the valley of the Erineus. The rear, under Demosthenes, followed in the same track, but still divided by an interval of several miles from the van.

As soon as the Syracusans found that their prey was escaped, they accused Gylippus of treachery, but as they had no difficulty in discovering the road which the fugitives had taken, they pursued them with all speed, and before noon they overtook the division under Demosthenes. Instead of pressing forward, Demosthenes put his troops in fighting order, and waited for the attack. This gave the Syracusan cavalry an opportunity of passing his lines, and their infantry coming up soon after, his division was completely surrounded. Discovering his error, Demosthenes took up his position in a hollow place, which proved to be an olive ground, inclosed by a wall, and commanded on two sides by an upper road. Neither the enemy's cavalry, nor heavy-armed infantry, could attack him in this position; but the light troops plied the Athenians with their missile weapons with such deadly effect, that he was compelled to capitulate in behalf of his troops, by which their lives were guaranteed. None were to suffer death, either through violence, chains, or hunger. On these terms six thousand men laid down their arms, and gave up all their money, which, says Thucydides, filled four shields.

By this time Nicias had crossed the Erineus,

and had encamped on a neighbouring height. On the following morning, he was overtaken by a body of Syracusan cavalry, who informed him of the surrender of Demosthenes, and invited him to accept the same conditions. At first he was incredulous; but having ascertained the truth of the statement by means of a horseman whom he was permitted to send, he proposed that he should be suffered to retreat under an engagement that Athens would indemnify Syracuse for the whole cost of the war, and in the meanwhile he would leave Athenian citizens as hostages—a man for every talent of the stipulated sum. This offer was rejected, and the Syracusans encircled his troops, and, during the day, unceasingly annoyed him with missile weapons. In the night the Athenians made an attempt to escape, but the enemy was watching their motions, and immediately sang the pæan of battle. Hearing this, Nicias gave up the design and remained in the camp, but a body of three hundred men broke through the Syracusan lines, and went off unmolested. In the morning the Athenians once more moved forward, amidst showers of darts from the enemy. In this manner they approached the banks of the Asinarus, which flowed at the bottom of a deep hollow. Here a scene took place which will remind the reader of the passage of the Beresina by the French troops, on their retreat from Moscow. The Athenians conceived that their sufferings would end could they but reach the opposite banks of the Asinarus, and the desire of assuaging their burning thirst encouraged them to proceed through its waters. They rushed with frantic disorder into the rapid current, but it proved to them an enemy with which they could not contend. Many were borne down by the stream, and when at length the weight of their numbers stemmed the torrent, a new horror presented itself. The eagerness with which all strove to gratify their thirst turned the bed of the river into a scene of a fatal struggle, in which numbers perished by the hands of their comrades. They fought with each other for a draught of the muddy and blood-stained waters! The sight of this terrible scene melted the firmness of Nicias; and when the Syracusans poured down upon them, he surrendered to Gylippus, only requesting that he would put a stop to the carnage. Gylippus ordered that quarter should be given, but before his commands could pervade the army, many of the soldiers had, according to the practice of the age, seized their prisoners and slaves, and more fell into their hands, and were reserved by them for slavery, than were carried to Syracuse as property of the state. There were some who made their escape, but the three hundred who fled in the night were pursued and taken in the course of the day.

And now came the crowning act of vengeance. On their return to Syracuse, the fate of Nicias and Demosthenes was one of the first subjects of deliberation in the Syracusan assembly. Gylippus desired to carry them back with him to Sparta, in order that he might exhibit, as trophies of his triumph, Demosthenes, the conqueror of Sphaacteria, and Nicias, the author of the peace for which Sparta, at a previous period, was so deeply indebted. But the Syracusan

vengeance would not entertain such a proposition. And even the partisans of Nicias, fearing that he might be led to betray them, exerted all their influence and arts to ensure his destruction. The fears of the Cornuthian envoys, at Sparta, that he would injure their interests, led them also to clamour for his death. Hence, when the demagogue Diocles proposed a decree for their execution, it was immediately carried into effect.

It had been stipulated that the army captured under Demosthenes should not suffer death; but now the Syracusans added perjury to vengeance. The same decree which ordered the execution of Nicias and Demosthenes doomed the other captives to slavery and imprisonment. For the first two months, indeed, all were subjected to the same treatment. The whole multitude, amounting to more than seven thousand, were confined in a vast quarry, hollowed in the side of Epipolæ to the depth of a hundred feet below the surface. Humanity shudders at the sufferings they there endured. Exposed to the beams of a scorching sun and to the chilly damps of the autumnal nights, deprived, also, of nourishment sufficient for their support, hundreds perished, and their unburied corpses still adding to the ever-growing stench of the crowded dungeon, daily added to the torments of the survivors. At length, however, after the lapse of seventy days, their misery was somewhat alleviated by the diminution of their numbers. Those destined for slavery were then sold; but the Athenians and Sicelots were detained six months longer, and then it is probable they shared the same fate.

Some of these Athenian slaves and those fugitives who wandered about Sicily experienced mild treatment, and finally returned to Athens. At that time the works of their popular poet, Euripides, were more celebrated than known in Sicily, and they gained their freedom and hospitable treatment by repeating his strains, which they had stored in their memory, to their Sicilian masters. Plutarch says, that on their return to Athens, the grateful captives walked in procession to the house of the poet, to relate what kindness they had received in slavery, and what relief in their wanderings, for the pleasure they had imparted by reciting or singing his strains. This is one of the triumphs of genius triumphs far more exalted in their nature than all the conquests obtained by the edge of the sword, by those whom the world calls "heroes."

Such was the disastrous issue of the attack upon Syracuse. Perhaps it teaches one of the most emphatic lessons on the madness of ambition that can be found in the pages of ancient history. And for this reason. The expedition was not called into being through the ambition of one man, but of a whole commonwealth. It is true that Alcibiades, who yet was safe on the theatre of Greece, appears as its prime mover. In truth, however, he only applied the match to those elements which had long been preparing for conflagration. The eye of Athens had long been cast upon Sicily as a prize worthy of her most strenuous exertions; and how eagerly she pursued the prize is manifest by the narrative. But her energies proved vain. The great Dis-

poser of nations decreed that a check should be placed upon her ambition. He "who stilleth the noise of the seas, and the noise of their waves," hushed to silence the tumult of the hosts which Athens poured forth to inflict desolations upon this distant island. They went forward in all the pride and pomp of war, but the few that returned were clothed with shame.

CHAPTER XVIII.

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO THE RECALL OF ALCIBIADES

B. C. 413—411.

THE Athenians had been so long accustomed to success in war, and their hopes of the conquest of Sicily were so intense, that it appears the first messengers of the news were treated with contempt. They could not believe that the proud armaments which they had despatched to Syracuse had failed in the enterprise. At length, however, the tale was confirmed by eye-witnesses who had escaped the scene of action, and then the arrogance of incredulity was abashed, and the whole republic smitten with consternation. The piercing cry of woe extended throughout the city, and the populace sought relief by throwing the blame on the orators who had advocated the expedition, and on the soothsayers who had promised a happy issue to the enterprise. They forgot, in their rage, that it was their own ambition and cupidity which fitted out the armaments, and that their superstition had recalled from the scene of action the only man fitted for securing the conquest.

That which struck the Athenians with dread gave unspeakable joy to the rest of Greece. They had long been subjects of fear, hatred, or envy, to the states around, and while their avowed enemies were encouraged by their disasters to second them by striking a more deadly blow at their power, their allies, or, rather, subjects, were determined to cast off their yoke. Even those states which had hitherto remained neutral hastened to share the triumph of their foes, which they supposed to be at hand. All combined to compass the downfall of proud, aspiring Athens!

The magnitude of the impending danger stifled recrimination and regret in the Athenian commonwealth; and although scarcely a ray of hope appeared, yet the people commenced preparations for warding off the blow. And this they did with a spirit worthy of the best days of the Persian wars. They calmly applied themselves, first of all, to examine their wants and resources and then to silence the clamour of turbulent demagogues, and call aged wisdom and sage experience to the direction of their councils. A new board of elderly citizens was created for the special purpose of providing for the present exigencies; and under their rule, which bears the aspect of an oligarchical institution, new levies were raised, and the remainder of their fleet equipped for service. For this purpose all superfluous expenses were cut off, and

the people willingly contributed their substance. At the same time the motions of the colonies were watched with anxious solicitude, and every expedient employed that might appease their animosity, or render it impotent. Their adversity had so sobered down the madness of the Athenians, which had been engendered by long success, that, if ancient historians may be credited, they now appeared to be a commonwealth of sages. There may be exaggeration in their statements, but it appears certain, that as before Athens stretched every nerve for conquest, so now she stretched every nerve for self-preservation.

Sparta had a long list of grievances to revenge, and she now stood forward as the most prominent opponent of her rival. She had reason to expect a naval reinforcement from Sicily, and she prepared to make an unusually strenuous effort to urge the downfall of Athens, and secure her own ascendancy. A requisition was accordingly sent to her allies for the fitting out of a hundred galleys. Of this number, half were to be furnished by themselves and the Boeotians, fifteen were assigned to the Corinthians, and as many to the Phocians and Locrians; ten to the Arcadians and Achæans of Pelene and Sicyon; the rest were to be supplied by Megara, Epidaurus, Træzen, and Hermione.

During the period in which these contingents were preparing, Agis made an expedition northward from Decelia, to obtain contributions from the allies of Sparta. He also ravaged the territories of the hostile Etæans, and collected a large booty, which they redeemed with money. After this, he committed an act which ill accorded with the Spartan professions of moderation and justice. Advancing still northward, he compelled the Achæans of Phthia, with some other tribes dependent on the Thesalians, to deliver hostages and pay contributions, regardless of their remonstrances. But in this affair Agis seems to have acted upon his own responsibility, although it is probable his conduct may have had the sanction of the government, for, while he commanded at Decelia, he was in a great measure free from the restraint of the ephori. And hence it was, that when the general tendency to revolt began to manifest itself among the allies of Athens, applications for assistance were first made to him. Eubœa and Lesbos both resorted to him for aid, and were both listened to with favour, though, as regards the Eubœans, they were finally deceived. They were promised three hundred neodamode troops to assist them in their revolt; but when the Lesbians applied for succour, these troops were sent to them, instead of the Eubœans.

In the meanwhile other embassies came from the east, with similar proposals to Sparta. The Chians and Erythræans were eager to renounce the Athenian alliance, and they sent envoys thither for aid. These envoys were accompanied by an ambassador from the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, who had recently been appointed by Darius to the government of Caria and Ionia, and who saw in the passing events a favourable opportunity of recovering the dominion of the Greek cities on this coast for the court of Persia, and therefore gladly joined his interests to that

of the Chians and Erythraean. At the same time, two Greeks, Calligetis, a Megarian, and Timagoras, of Cyzicus, both exiles from their native cities, arrived with proposals from Pharnabazus, who was hostile to Athens on like grounds with Tissaphernes in respect to the tribute of the Greek towns on his part of the Asiatic coast; and he was no less anxious for the honour of gaining the alliance of Sparta for Darius. While, therefore, the envoy of Tissaphernes offered Persian pay for any forces which the Spartans might send to Ionia, the agents of Pharnabazus offered five-and-twenty talents to defray a part of the cost of a fleet to the Hellespont.

From these circumstances, the assembly of Sparta became the scene of an active competition between the ministers of the rival satraps of Persia. The ephori held many consultations among themselves and their allies, but at length they were persuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tissaphernes and the Ionians to that of Pharnabazus and the Hellespontines. Yet the Spartan government would not take any active step until they had sent an agent to Chios, to ascertain whether the aspect of affairs corresponded with the representations of the envoys. At length they admitted the Chians and Erythraean into their alliance, and engaged to support them with a squadron of forty galleys; but subsequently, on pretence that an earthquake, which happened about the time of the expedition, foreboded evil, that number was reduced to five galleys.

This want of energy in the councils of Sparta alarmed the Chians. They apprehended that intelligence of their negotiations would reach Athens, and that they might be attacked before sufficient succour would arrive for their protection. Hence, towards the spring of B.C. 412, they sent again to Sparta, urging the necessity of early and effectual assistance, and their second application being supported by Alcibiades and Endius, one of the ephori, it was resolved that the whole fleet in the Corinthian gulf, including the squadron prepared by Agis for the expedition to Lesbos, should be drawn over the isthmus, and proceed for Chios.

Before this resolution was carried into effect, it was thought expedient to hold a congress of the confederacy at Corinth; and in this congress the plan of operations in the Ægean was more distinctly traced out. It was resolved that Chios should be the first object, that as soon as Chios should be secured, the expedition should proceed to Lesbos, and that a squadron should sail, under the command of Clearchus, to the Hellespont.

The squadron designed for the expedition amounted to thirty-nine galleys, but in order to divide the attention of the Athenians, it was ordered that twenty-one should put out to sea first. It was supposed that the weakness of Athens would prevent their offering any resistance to the sailing of this division, and that the one left behind would be sufficient to keep her in awe. But Athens was still strong in energy, and their measures were thereby rendered abortive. The first squadron was drawn over the isthmus, and the Spartans were anxious that it should sail without delay; but the Corinthians

refused to embark before the Isthmian festival, which was to take place in May; nor would they consent to a proposal of Agis, who thought to remove the impediment by taking the responsibility of the voyage on himself. In the meanwhile, rumour aroused the suspicions of the Athenians, and, knowing that activity alone could ensure their success, they sent Aristocrates, one of their generals, to Chios, to demand explanation and securities. As yet it appears that the proposed revolt was a measure of the oligarchy. It had not been communicated to the general assembly, or to any in the democratical interest, and, therefore, the leaders did not dare to avow their designs; but, on the contrary, sent seven galleys with Aristocrates, as a pledge of their loyalty to Athens.

At the Isthmian festival, however, the Athenians, who, by virtue of the sacred truce, were permitted to attend it, gained information which confirmed their suspicions. They discovered that the squadron of twenty-one galleys was ready to sail from the port of Cenchrea, under the command of Alcámenes, and they instantly manned an equal number, including the seven Chians, to arrest its progress. The Peloponnesians were not prepared for opposition; and accordingly, when the Athenian fleet hove in sight, they turned back. This gave the Athenians an opportunity of strengthening their squadron with sixteen additional galleys, and with this force, when the Peloponnesians again ventured out, they chased them as far as a desert harbour, named Piræus, on the confines of the Corinthian and Epidaurian territories. One galley was overtaken; and when, at length, the remaining twenty were moored in the harbour, they were attacked by sea and land, and many of them suffered great damage. Alcámenes, with some of his people, also, was slain.

When the Spartans received the tidings of this disaster, they were so disheartened, that they began to think of abandoning their designs upon Ionia. Alcibiades, however, and his friend Endius, endeavoured to counteract their despondency. The reckless refugee, whose enmity to Athens seemed implacable, represented to them that their five galleys, if they sailed immediately, would reach Chios before the disaster of the other squadron was known there, and that nothing was wanting but the assurances of the weakness of Athens, and of the zeal with which Sparta espoused their cause, to kindle a general revolt among the Ionian cities. These assurances he proposed, if they would allow him, to make himself, since they would be received with more confidence from him than any one else. In private with Endius, he enlarged upon the honour which would result to his administration, if with a force sent exclusively from home, he should accomplish the two great objects of detaching Ionia from Athens, and of uniting Persia to Sparta. He also represented that if Endius did not avail himself of this honour, it might be earned by their common rival, Agis. This was sufficient. Endius entered zealously into his views, an appeal to the ephori prevailed, and Alcibiades was despatched with Chalceides, the commander of the five galleys, for Ionia.

The result of this expedition proved the saga-

city of Alcibiades. On the arrival of this small squadron, Chios, Erythra, Clazomenæ, and Miletus, all revolted from Athens, and prepared to defend themselves against her power.

This was a blow aimed at the very vitals of Athens, and as such she appears to have felt it. Her danger, indeed, appeared so great, that it was deemed necessary to put forth all her remaining strength, and to make use of her last resources. The Athenians voted the expenditure of a thousand talents, which, in their day of prosperity, had been deposited in the citadel, under the sanction of a decree of the senate and people for an occasion of extreme danger. This seasonable supply enabled them to increase their fleet. By it they were enabled to send off twenty galleys to the coast of Asia—eight under the command of Strombichides, and twelve under Thrasycles. At the same time, the seven Chian galleys were withdrawn,—the freemen on board of which were thrown into prison, and the slaves emancipated,—and others were sent to Piræus, so as to make up a number equal to the Peloponnesian squadron, which they had blocked up there ever since the death of Alcámenes. Preparations, moreover, were made for manning thirty more.

On reaching the Asiatic coast, the first care of Strombichides was to prevent the revolt from spreading to Teos, but he had not been long there before he was chased to Samos by the Spartan admiral, Chalcideus. At the same time, the land force of Clazomenæ and Erythra marched to Teos, and demolished a fortification which had been built by the Athenians for the protection of the city on the land side. Soon after the united squadrons of Strombichides and Thrasycles sailed to the harbour of Miletus, in hopes of restoring that city to the allegiance of Athens, but not being admitted, they sailed away, and took their station at Lade.

It was about this time that a treaty was concluded between Sparta and the king of Persia. It was contracted between Tissaphernes, in the name of the Persian monarch, and Chalcideus, in that of the Spartans. Its terms were adapted to promote the interests of Alcibiades rather than the honour of Sparta. They read thus—“That all the cities which had belonged to the predecessors of Darius should belong to him, that they should co-operate to prevent the Athenians from drawing tribute or any other benefit from these cities, that the revolted subjects of the king should be treated as enemies by the Peloponnesians, and the revolted allies of Sparta should be considered as enemies by the king, that they should carry on war in common against Athens, and that neither party should make peace without the consent of the other.”

By this treaty, the downfall of the tottering dominion of Athens might appear to have been secured; but, in reality, the power of Persia, though great, was unwieldy, and party divisions and constitutional inertness prevailed in Sparta. Such was the unanimity which danger had forced into the councils of Athens, such the energy of her administration, and such her resources, that she was already again approaching to her ancient power as mistress of the sea.

While at Lade, the Athenian forces were

strengthened by the arrival of sixteen galleys, under Diomedon, who, on his way thither, had captured four Chian galleys. In the meanwhile, the Spartans and their allies engaged Lebedus and Eræ in revolt. Tissaphernes also marched to Teos, and completed the destruction of the fortifications. Notwithstanding, when the satrap had retreated, and Diomedon appeared with ten galleys, the Teians returned to their alliance with Athens.

About this time an advantage of much greater importance to Athens was gained at Samos. The commonalty rose against the oligarchical party, killed two hundred, sentenced twice that number to banishment, and took possession of their lands and houses. As this event afforded a pledge of the loyalty of the Samians, they were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian assembly, which declared them independent. The Samians were assisted in this atrocious massacre by the crews of three Athenian galleys at that time in the harbour of Samos, but there does not appear any reason for charging the Athenians with the guilt of bloodshed.

This success in the Ægean was in some degree counterbalanced by a reverse nearer home. Twenty Peloponnesian galleys suddenly sallied out against the observing squadron at Piræus, defeated it, and sailed away with four prizes to Cenchrea. Here they were soon after joined by Astyochus, who was directed to assume the command in chief of the fleet, and to sail to Asia.

The exertions of the Athenian government, however, still proved effective. Leon having brought a fresh reinforcement of ten ships from Attica, he and Diomedon proceeded to Lesbos, and though Astyochus arrived in time to interfere, they were enabled to recover the whole of that important island. The same success also attended them at Clazomenæ, and at the same time the squadron of twenty galleys, under Strombichides and Thrasycles, made a descent from Lade on the territories of Miletus, and defeated the Peloponnesian troops under Chalcideus, who was slain.

The naval superiority of Athens was now complete, and it was resolved to make an attempt to recover Chios. The Athenians landed at several points of the coast, and having defeated the troops which marched against them, they compelled the Chians to keep within their walls, while they ravaged their rich fields, which, since the Persian wars, had never been trodden by the foot of an enemy. This turn of affairs led to a conspiracy for restoring the supremacy of Athens, but the government, being apprised of it, sent to Astyochus, who was at Erythra, with four galleys, to concert measures with him for averting the danger.

Late in the summer a fresh and powerful reinforcement arrived at Samos from Attica, under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. From Samos these commanders sailed to the Milesian territory, where they landed. Here they met the united forces of the Milesians and Peloponnesians, led by Alcibiades, and a force of Asiatic infantry and cavalry, led by Tissaphernes. In a battle which ensued the Athenians were again victorious, and as the Milesians

were a second time driven within their walls, the victors prepared to invest the city. Finding however, that an armament composed of thirty-three Peloponnesian galleys, twenty from Syracuse, and two from Selinus, was advancing to Miletus, they retired again to Samos, from whence they resolved to continue offensive operations.

The Peloponnesian armament arrived at Miletus on the morrow after the Athenians had departed. Having stayed a day there, they sailed back with the twenty Chian galleys, which were commanded by Chalcideus at the time of his death, to Tichussa, a Milesian town, on the coast of the bay of Iasus. Here they were met by Tissaphernes, who prevailed on them immediately to sail against Iasus, which was the stronghold of his rival, Amorges. This town was captured, and, together with Amorges, was given up to Tissaphernes for a stipulated sum, after which the fleet returned to Miletus, where Philippos was stationed as governor, and whence Pedaritus was sent in the same capacity to Chios.

During the autumn the Athenians were reinforced by thirty-five galleys under Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Their whole force, which was collected at Samos, amounted to a hundred and four galleys, and they now determined to divide it into two squadrons, and to send one of thirty galleys, under Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, to Chios, while seventy-four remained to command the sea, and to carry on operations against Miletus.

In the meanwhile, Astyochus, who was at Chios, busied in exacting hostages, and taking other precautions against the plans of the disaffected, having heard of the arrival of Theramenes with reinforcements from Peloponnesus, and being ignorant of the large succours received by the Athenians, thought the Peloponnesian interest in the island sufficiently secure, and he sailed with a squadron of ten Chian, and as many Spartan galleys, to make an attempt upon Clazomenae. In this he failed. He was repulsed in an attack he made upon the town, which was unwall'd, and compelled to sail away to Cuma. While here, he received an application from Lesbos, which being refused, was again made after his return to Chios. Astyochus himself was willing to aid the Lesbians, and advocated their cause; but the Chians conceived that they had need of all their forces for their own defence, and Pedaritus refused to concur in the enterprise. Offended at this rebuff, Astyochus threatened that whatever distress might come upon the Chians, they should receive no succours from him; and he hastily sailed away, to take the command of the armament at Miletus.

About this time, a squadron of twelve galleys, one a Lacomian, one Syracusan, and ten from Tharri, arrived at Cnidus, under the command of Doriæus, a Rhodian exile. Cnidus had been induced by Tissaphernes to revolt from Athens, and half of these galleys remained to guard it, while the rest took their station at the Troopian foreland, for the purpose of intercepting some corn ships, which were known to be on their way from Egypt. Information of this being given to the Athenian fleet, a squadron

was detached from Samos, which captured the six galleys at Troopium.

The first object that engaged the attention of Astyochus, when he came to Miletus, was the revision of the treaty which Chalcideus had concluded with Tissaphernes. The satrap had recently reduced the rate of pay which he had promised to their seamen; and although it was yet sufficient, and regularly furnished, it was deemed expedient to bind him by articles more explicit than those of the former treaty. Accordingly a new one was framed, which altered this article materially; for it provided that Darius should maintain all the forces he might send for, as long as they remained in his dominions. The other articles were altered, but the alterations were verbal, and did not affect their principles. Thus, the clause in the first treaty, which declared the king entitled to all the territories and cities which his ancestors possessed, was yet retained, with a slight variety of expression. But this afterwards became a subject of contention.

When this new treaty was ratified, Theramenes, who had hitherto been commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian fleet, resigned his command to Astyochus, and departed, but venturing to cross the Ægean in a small vessel, he was shipwrecked, and perished.

In the meantime, the Athenian squadron, designed for the siege of Chios, after losing three gallees in a storm, commenced operations. Being superior both by sea and land, its generals began to fortify a place called Delphinium, not far from the city. Dispirited by their past defeats, and distrustful of one another, the Chians did not venture to interrupt the enemy's works, but sent to Astyochus for aid. At first Astyochus turned a deaf ear to their request, but when he found that the besiegers began to entrench themselves in a permanent position, and that the Chian slaves were emboldened thereby to desert, he listened to the remonstrances of the governor, Pedaritus, and, foregoing his resentment, prepared to sail to the relief of Chios. As he was on the point of sailing, however, he received advice from Caunus, that a squadron of twenty-seven galleys had arrived there from Peloponnesus, having on board eleven Spartan commissioners, who were empowered to aid him with their counsel, or remove him from the command, as they should deem expedient, accordingly, Astyochus dropped the design of the expedition to Chios, and proceeded southward, for the purpose of escorting the squadron and his assessors to Miletus. As he passed the island of Cos, he took advantage of a terrible earthquake, which had recently thrown down a great part of the principal city, to complete its destruction, and to deprive the islanders of their property. This effected, hearing that the Athenian admiral, Charminus, was stationed, with twenty galleys, on the south-east coast, to look out for the squadron that had just put into Caunus, he held on his course to the isle of Syme, where the Athenians lay. A part of his fleet having been separated in the night from the rest, presented itself in the morning to Charminus, who immediately attacked it, sank three galleys, and disabled others. But the victory of

Charminus was suddenly interrupted by the main body of the Peloponnesian fleet, which, coming up to the scene of action, began to surround his small squadron. Victory now changed sides. Charminus lost six galleys, and it was with difficulty that he escaped with the rest to Halicarnassus. After this, Astyochus sailed to Cnidus, where he was joined by the squadron from Caurus; and then the united armament proceeded to erect a trophy on Syme.

While at Cnidus, Tissaphernes came to confer with the Spartan commissioners on their common interests. It was on this occasion that the first signs of a rupture took place between Persia and Sparta. This arose out of the large concessions which had been made to Darius in the first treaty. Lichas, one of the commissioners, argued that if the king was acknowledged to have a right to all the territories his ancestors had ever possessed, not only all the islands of the Ægean, but Thessaly, Locris, and Beotia, must again be parts of the Persian empire, and that Sparta, instead of restoring liberty to Greece, would replace the yoke of the barbarian on her neck. Accordingly, it was resolved that the Spartans could no longer receive pay for their troops on such terms, and that, if the treaties were not altered, negotiations must cease. But it was no part of the policy of Persia to curtail her dominion. Tissaphernes, indeed, would neither alter nor explain the obnoxious clause, and he broke off the conference with that haughty anger which marked the Persian character.

Before this conference, some of the principal Rhodians, desirous of breaking off their connexion with Athens, had made overtures for an alliance with Sparta, and as the accession of this flourishing island to the Spartan confederacy would open a prospect of reinforcements for their fleet, and of supplies which might enable them to maintain it without the aid of Persia, it was resolved that their overtures should be accepted. The fleet, therefore, sailed from Cnidus, and suddenly appearing before Camirus, induced the inhabitants, with those of Lindus and Ialysus, the two other principal towns of the island, to revolt. Soon after, the Athenians at Samos sailed to Rhodes, in order to recover it, but it was too late the island was completely in the power of the enemy, and they laid up their fleet there for the rest of the winter.

Up to about this period, Alcibiades appears to have been seriously bent on serving the cause of Sparta against Athens; but now transactions took place which entirely changed his views and his conduct.

Although Alcibiades had attracted great admiration at Sparta by his talents and address, and especially by the flexibility with which he adapted himself to the national character and habits, yet had he made himself one implacable enemy in king Agis. He deeply injured that warlike Spartan in his domestic relations, and Agis resolved to take revenge for that injury. For this end he found no difficulty in making instruments. The very success of Alcibiades among the Asiatic Greeks, though immediately subservient to the interest of Sparta, was sufficient to awaken the jealousy of the Spartan leaders; and hence, when Agis represented him

as a dangerous person, it was resolved that he should be put out of the way. Orders to this effect were sent to Astyochus; but Alcibiades having received timely notice of it, withdrew from their armament, and attached himself wholly to the court of Tissaphernes.

The position of Alcibiades being thus altered, he adopted a new line of policy, in which his chief aim was to recover his lost station at Athens, that he might rescue her from the perilous situation in which she had been placed by his wild ambition and unnatural revenge. At the same time, he was desirous that the Athenians, before they received his assistance, should feel their need of him, and should look up to him as their benefactor. These objects he hoped to accomplish through the favour of Tissaphernes, and he sought to ingratiate himself in the satrap's good opinion by those arts of flattery of which he was a profound master. In this he succeeded, and having made himself not only agreeable but necessary to him, he began to draw Tissaphernes into the train of measures which he had planned for his own ends, under the pretext that they were indispensable to the satrap's safety and prosperity.

One of the weak points in the character of Tissaphernes was his avarice. Alcibiades saw this, and in order to effect a wider rupture between him and the Peloponnesians, he counselled the satrap to contract the supplies which he had hitherto furnished for the maintenance of the Peloponnesian fleet. Tissaphernes greedily listened to this advice, and he reduced the pay of the seamen from a drachma a day, first, to three-fifths, then to one half of that amount, and he became gradually less and less punctual in his payments. At the same time, Alcibiades undertook to answer all the applications made to the satrap by the revolted cities for pecuniary aid. The Chians were dismissed with a sharp rebuke. Wealthy as they were, he observed, they ought to be ashamed of calling upon others for resources for the defence of their liberty. The others were answered in similar strains, and for all he had one specious pretext to cover the rejection of their demands. The war, he asserted, was carried on with the private funds of Tissaphernes, which compelled him to use economy; and that whenever he received a sufficient supply from the king, he would be both just and liberal. In order to silence complaints among the commanders and orators, Alcibiades suggested that a small sum of money should be distributed among them; and such was the effect of this measure, that none but Hermocrates, the Syracusan who commanded the Siceliot contingents, dared to betray the interests of their troops. All beside him were corrupted by gold, thereby justifying the words of the satrap, that

"Money is the only power
That all mankind fall down before"

This measure was followed by another equally subtle and equally successful. Hitherto Tissaphernes had been sincerely anxious to overthrow the power of Athens, and had been preparing to bring an armament from Phœnicia

to aid the cause of the Peloponnesians. In order to counteract this, Alcibiades represented that his sovereign would be threatened by a new and greater danger if the same state should acquire the ascendancy in Greece, both by sea and land. So long as Greece was divided between two rival powers, he said, neither could be formidable to Persia; but if the empire of the sea should be united to that of the land, the king might be brought into a dangerous struggle with the sole mistress of Greece. His advice, therefore, was, that the Greeks should grind down each other in a protracted conflict. But if it were necessary that the king should side with either party, he suggested that his interests were less at variance with those of Athens than with those of Sparta. And for these reasons. The views of Athens were mainly directed to the establishment of her maritime dominion, for the sake of securing which she would probably be willing to resign the sovereignty of the Asiatic Greeks to the king. Whereas Sparta stood forth as the champion of Grecian liberty and independence; and therefore, if victorious, could not consistently suffer the Greek colonies in Asia to remain subjected to the Persian empire. It should, hence, he added, be the object of Tissaphernes first to extort what he could from Athens, and then to cast off his alliance with Sparta.

This deep cunning of Alcibiades prevailed. Tissaphernes relinquished all intentions of bringing the Phœnician fleet into the Ægean, and resolved only to use it as a pretext for keeping the Peloponnesians inactive by the constant expectation of being joined by a force which would overwhelm the Athenians, until every opportunity for subduing them was lost for ever. At the same time, Alcibiades obtained a still deeper footing in the satrap's favour.

The knowledge of his influence with Tissaphernes having produced a great effect in the Athenian camp at Samos, he now thought it advisable to intimate to some of the leading men that his resentment was not implacable, and that he would be no less willing than able to render important services to his country, if he might return to it with safety. And now came one of those master strokes of his genius which scarcely finds a parallel in the range of history. He knew that he could not be secure so long as the government was in the hands of the democratical party, which had driven him into exile, and hence he proposed to the leading men, that he, together with them, should overthrow this constitution, and establish an oligarchy in which they should be among the principal members. This was a bait too delicious to be resisted. Those to whom this message was sent eagerly caught at the prospect which it held out, and some of them crossed over to the continent, and had an interview with Alcibiades, which confirmed their hopes and quickened their resolution. He assured them that he would engage Tissaphernes in the Athenian interest, and, through him, lead the king himself to an alliance with Athens, which event would supply the deficiencies of their exhausted treasury; and they resolved to endeavour to compass this great design. Immediately, therefore, on their return

to Samos, they communicated with their friends, and settled the form of an oath for all who should be admitted to their councils, by which oath they bound themselves to mutual support and protection.

This step was followed by an open declaration that the king of Persia would become the ally of Athens, and furnish money for the war, on condition that Alcibiades should be restored, and the government changed to an oligarchy. It might have been expected that the Athenians would generally have spurned such a proposition as an insult to the majesty of the people. It was not so. The hum of disapprobation was at first heard, but the hope of Persian pay softened the murmur, and the majority soon declared their ready acquiescence in the project.

One sturdy opponent, however, appeared in the person of Phrynichus, the general, who was a clear-sighted, yet unprincipled adventurer. Phrynichus declared that he placed no confidence in the intentions of Alcibiades, or in his ability to fulfil his promises, and that their scheme was fraught with danger. But, notwithstanding his stern opposition, the oligarchical party at Samos adhered to their first resolutions, and sent a deputation to Athens, headed by Pisander, one of those persons who had been most active in keeping up the public alarm in the affair of the Herms busts, to negotiate for the recall of Alcibiades, the abolition of democracy, and alliance with Persia. Perceiving their purpose was fixed, Phrynichus began to think his own position dangerous, and he sought to counteract it by intrigue. He sent to Astyochus, the Spartan admiral, to inform him of the injury that Alcibiades was doing to the Peloponnesian cause, and of the attempts he was making to gain Tissaphernes for Athens. By this treachery Phrynichus hoped to stir up the Spartan admiral to commence offensive operations, but Astyochus had sold himself to the interest of Tissaphernes, and he repaired to Magnesia, where the satrap was residing, and communicated the contents of the letter to him and Alcibiades. On discovering this, Alcibiades wrote to the principal officers at Samos, complaining of the treachery of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should be put to death. Alarmed at this, Phrynichus wrote again to Astyochus, complaining of his want of caution, and offering to betray the Athenian armament into his hands, with the town of Samos. Astyochus delivered this letter also to Alcibiades, and a fresh charge was sent to Samos against Phrynichus. Before his dispatch was received, however, Phrynichus, who had either discovered or foreseen the conduct of Astyochus, announced that the enemy was preparing to surprise their encampment, and gave orders for fortifying Samos, by which act the charges of Alcibiades were rendered harmless—were, indeed, made to appear as malicious fabrications.

In the meanwhile, Pisander was executing his commission at Athens, and in this, strange as it may appear, he was successful. Having arrived there, he exhibited in the popular assembly the prospect which was now opened of overcoming the Peloponnesians with the aid of Persia, and stated the terms on which this benefit

was to be purchased—that Alcibiades should be recalled, and a change made in the constitution. This was, in effect, a proposition to a sovereign people to surrender their powers, and submit to be governed by their principal men, over whom they had long acted the part of tyrants. It is no wonder, therefore, that indignant clamour and sullen murmurs followed this proposal. The ardent friends of democracy, the personal enemies of Alcibiades, and the priestly families of the Eumolpids and Ceryces, which filled the most important offices in the Eleusian mysteries, were all vehement in their opposition. Pisander, however, was neither moved by the indignant protestations of the demagogues, nor by the solemn adjurations of the priests, but calmly called on his opponents to answer this plain question,—whether they saw any hope of safety from the commonwealth, now that the Peloponnesians had raised a navy as powerful as their own, which was maintained by Persian gold, and were masters of more cities than remained attached to Athens, unless they formed an alliance with Persia? To this question no satisfactory answer could be given, and Pisander triumphantly continued,—“In such circumstances, then, the object for consideration is not what form of government you would choose, but under what form the commonwealth can exist. And here there is no choice remaining. It must be a government placed in such hands, and armed with such authority, that the king of Persia may be induced, by the confidence he reposes in it, to become your ally. This may appear a great evil, but can you hesitate in your choice between certain ruin and what will, at worst, be but a passing evil? When peace and safety are restored to the commonwealth, the people can restore, if they please, the ancient form of government.” Pisander prevailed. Urged by the necessity of the case, and soothed by the hope of resuming its concessions on a future day, the people passed a decree by which Pisander and ten other commissioners were invested with full powers to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. At the same time, orders were issued for the recall of Phrynichus and his colleague Scironides, and Leon and Diomedon were sent to supply their places.

In this assembly Pisander did not venture fully to disclose the nature of the changes he had in view, nor did he mean to rely on the people for bringing them about. He had other and better instruments at his command. At Athens, as in most of the Greek states, the ambition of individuals, or the conflicts of parties, had given rise to a number of private associations called *Synomoses*, the purposes of which were either wholly or mainly political. Most men of rank or substance in Athens were members of some *synomosis*; and the very principles on which these clubs were founded were favourable to the views of Pisander. The mutual attachment of the associates was stronger than the ties by which they were bound to the state, and even than those of blood; while the law of honour which generally prevailed among them required that they should neither shrink from sacrifice nor crime, when they were required by

the common interest. Hence these associations were hotbeds of sedition and revolutionary projects, and Pisander found it easy to engage them on his side. Before he left Athens, he had organised an extensive conspiracy among them for the subversion of democracy.

On the arrival of the commissioners at the court of the Persian satrap, affairs were no longer in the state in which Pisander had left them when he was deputed by the oligarchical party at Samos to Athens. Tissaphernes was then apparently wavering between the two belligerent powers. He was fearful of the Spartans, and unwilling to render the Athenians too powerful. Hence he recurred to the plan which had been suggested by Alcibiades, namely, of letting both powers use themselves with the sword. Alcibiades marked this change, and, fearing that he could not lead the satrap beyond the line of neutrality, he devised a scheme for saving his credit and extricating himself from his engagements. In the conferences which ensued between Tissaphernes and the commissioners, Alcibiades, who spoke for the satrap, made such extravagant demands, that they indignantly put an end to the negotiation and returned to Samos.

As soon as Pisander and his colleagues had departed, Tissaphernes proceeded to Causus, to renew negotiations with the Peloponnesians. With them he finally concluded a new treaty, which reads thus:—

“In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, and in the epiphoracy of Alexippidas in Sparta, a treaty was concluded in the plain of the Menander, between the Spartans and their allies on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes and the sons of Pharnaces on the other, concerning the affairs of the king and those of the Spartans and their allies.

“Whatever Darius possesses in Asia shall be his, and he shall direct the affairs of his own country according to his pleasure. The Spartans and their allies shall not injure any place within the king’s dominions, and if any among them shall attempt such injury, the Spartans and their allies in common shall prevent it. So, also, if any of the king’s subjects shall attempt any injury to the Spartans or their allies, the king shall prevent it.

“Tissaphernes shall continue to pay the fleet, in the manner heretofore agreed, until the king’s fleet shall arrive. After that, it shall rest with the Spartans and their allies to pay their own fleet, or to receive the pay still from Tissaphernes, upon condition of repayment when the war shall be concluded. The fleets, when combined, shall carry on operations under the direction of Tissaphernes and the Spartans and their allies.

“No treaty shall be entered into with the Athenians but by mutual consent of the contracting parties.”

As soon as this treaty was concluded, Tissaphernes executed one part of its conditions by an immediate payment of arrears, and assumed the appearance of actively preparing to bring up the Phœnician fleet, to which the contending parties had been looking forward with anxious expectation. But the whole transaction was but a feint devised for soothing the Peloponnesians,

and for carrying out the wily suggestions of Alcibiades before mentioned.

During these negotiations, Leon and Diomedon, having taken the command of the fleet, sailed to Rhodes, to inspect the enemy's condition. They found the Peloponnesian fleet still laid up; but they made a landing, and gained a victory over some troops which marched against them, and then stationed themselves at Chalcæ, to watch the motions of their enemy.

While Leon and Diomedon were at Chalcæ, Pedaritus sent to Rhodes, to announce that the Athenians had completed their works, and that Chios could only be saved by the immediate succour of the Peloponnesian armament. Before it could sail, however, he collected all his land force, and made a sudden attack on the enemy's naval camp, and succeeded in storming it, but the Athenians bringing up their main force, he was defeated and slain. The siege, therefore, became closer both by sea and land, and the Chians were reduced nearly to extremity. In this distress, Leon, a man of enterprise, conducted a squadron of twelve galleys to the relief of Chios. Informed of his approach, the Chians manned twenty-four galleys, and went out to meet him; while their infantry made a diversion by an attack upon the Athenian works. When they had joined, their fleet advanced against the enemy, and a warm engagement ensued, in which the Chians were so far successful as to conduct the twelve Peloponnesian galleys into their harbour, and Leon was received as commander, in the room of Pedaritus.

This success was followed by a happy change in the state of the affairs of the Chians. Early in the spring of the 411, Derxylidas, a Spartan, marched from Miletus, whither the Peloponnesians had recently removed, at the request of Tissaphernes, with a small body of troops toward the Hellespont to excite the cities in the straits of Pharnabazus to revolt from Athens. The cities of Abydos and Lampascus opened their gates to him, on hearing of which, Strombichides sailed from Chios with twenty-four galleys to retake these cities. This he effected, but in the meantime the Chians became decidedly superior to the enemy by sea, and Astyochus had sailed along the coast with two galleys, and had brought away the squadron with which they had been last reinforced to Miletus.

When the Spartan forces removed from Rhodes, the Athenian commanders, Leon and Diomedon, quitted Chalcæ, and resumed their station at Samos. Soon after Astyochus had brought away the squadron from Chios, he appeared with his whole armament, amounting to upwards of a hundred sail, before Samos, to offer battle to the Athenians. The state of affairs at Samos, however, did not permit them to accept his challenge, and he therefore sailed back to Miletus.

The state of affairs which prevented the Athenians from accepting the challenge of Astyochus arose out of the issue of their negotiations with Tissaphernes. On the return of Pisander and his colleagues to Samos, nothing daunted, they had both strengthened the resolutions of the oligarchical faction in the fleet, and had formed a new oligarchical party among the Samians,

who had so recently overpowered their own nobility. Thus encouraged, they resolved to renounce all dependence on Alcibiades, but, in proceeding in their original purpose of a change of government at Athens, to rely upon their own strength for the conduct of both the domestic and public affairs of the commonwealth. Accordingly, they first raised a large subscription for the support of their measures, and then sent Pisander, with five of his colleagues, home to prosecute the work which he had begun there, while the other five were despatched on the like mission to other quarters. Pisander and his colleagues were also instructed to establish oligarchical government in all the subject cities at which they might stop in their voyage, and wherever they touched in their way they found no difficulty in establishing oligarchy. The same success attended Diotrophes, who was appointed to the superintendance of the affairs of Thracia, but the result of the change he effected at Thasos was different from that which its authors expected. Having stopped at that island, he succeeded in superseding the sovereignty of the people there, but within two months after he had left, the Thasians began to fortify their city and resume their independence. The exiles of the oligarchical party, which the Athenians had banished on a former occasion, were restored, and Thasos became a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Such, also, Thucydides observes, were the consequences in most of the states in which revolutions were effected.

On his arrival at Athens, Pisander discovered that great progress had been made there towards the completion of the work he had commenced. The associates had been actively employed in removing all impediments, and had even resorted to the foul crime of secret assassination to effect their purpose. Thus Androcles, a powerful demagogue, fell, and others, who were deemed irreconcilably hostile to their plans, shared his fate. This bold daring had awed the multitude. Under fear of the oligarchical dagger, which was sure to reach the heart of every one who opposed the wishes of the associates, they usurped the entire management of affairs, and were the only speakers in every debate. Not a measure was brought forward which had not been privately discussed in their clubs, and what they proposed, that they carried. The conspiracy was too wide spread to be crushed. None knew that any man he met, whether friend or stranger, was not privy to it, whence mutual confidence among the citizens was destroyed, and every murmur of indignation, and all counsels of resistance, stifled. All classes of the citizens were struck with terror, and they were prepared passively to submit to the will of the party which wielded such fearful instruments. The truth is, the friends of democracy were at this time suffering from those evils which they had previously inflicted on the friends of oligarchy. They had themselves used the dagger, and it was now turned with a keen edge towards their own breasts. All stood aghast with the terror of its execution.

In such a fearful state Pisander found Athens, and he proceeded to complete the revolution. His chief coadjutors were Antiphon, Thera-

menes, and Phrynichus, who, seeing that the establishment of oligarchy, instead of furthering the restoration of Alcibiades, would be an effectual bar to it, became one of its warmest advocates. Thus supported, in a deliberation concerning the means of restoring the prosperity of the commonwealth, Pisander proposed the election of ten men, who should be charged with the important trust of preparing resolutions to be on an appointed day laid before the assembly of the people. When that day arrived, the ten came forward with the simple proposal of a law, the burden of which was to obviate illegality in the future measures of the people. It stated that every citizen should be free to offer his opinion, however contrary to law, without fear of impeachment or trial. This was passed into a decree, and Pisander and his party then boldly declared that neither the spirit nor the forms of the established constitution suited the present crisis. Then it was that the principal articles of the new constitution were brought forward. Pisander proposed, "That five presidents should be chosen by the people, that these should elect a hundred, and that each of the hundred should elect three, that the council of Four Hundred thus formed should be elected with full power to direct the executive government, and that the supreme authority should reside in a body of Five Thousand citizens, to be assembled at the discretion of the council." This proposal was accepted without opposition. The partisans of democracy dreaded the strength of their opponents, and the multitude, dazzled by the imposing name of Five Thousand, a number which exceeded the ordinary assemblies of Athens, yielded up that liberty which they had enjoyed since the expulsion of the Pisistratids.

The first act of the Four Hundred exhibited the spirit in which they meant to rule. On the day appointed for the expulsion of the old council of Five Hundred, they armed themselves each with a short sword, and, escorted by a hundred and twenty of the younger conspirators, whom they selected as a permanent guard, proceeded to the council-chamber. They carried with them the arrears of salary due to the Five Hundred, and, making a tender of it, required all to withdraw. They obeyed in silence, each receiving his pay at the door, and the Four Hundred then quietly installed themselves with the religious ceremonies usual on such occasions, and drew lots for their presiding members, under the constitutional title of prytanes.

This new government, being hostile to the great body of the people, could only reign as it had begun—by terror. Accordingly, obnoxious citizens were removed, some few being executed, and others imprisoned or exiled. Every vestige of ancient freedom was destroyed by the Four Hundred, and they employed mercenary troops from the islands of the *Ægean* to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate their enemies. Still they were aware that they had no chance of permanently keeping their ground without foreign support; and hence one of their first objects was to make peace with Sparta. Overtures to this effect were addressed to Agis; but the Spartan king, conceiving that these proposals were the effect of conscious weakness, marched

down from Decelea to Athens, hoping to surprise and take the city. In this, however, he was disappointed. Although divided among themselves, yet the Athenians were firm in their opposition to the invaders. As he came near to the city, the foremost of his troops were charged by a body of cavalry, and being thus convinced of his error, Agis listened to a second application from the oligarchs with more complaisance: he advised them to send an embassy to treat for peace with Sparta.

One of the measures which commonly accompanied a revolution in a Greek city was wanting on this occasion. It was usual to recall the exiles, but although many of these might have proved useful auxiliaries, yet were they left in banishment, lest Alcibiades should be provoked by excepting him from a general act of indulgence. Some, as Phrynichus, were interested in his exclusion, and the rest, imagining that they did not require his assistance, were no longer willing to admit that superiority which must have been yielded to him. Hence, to avoid giving opportunity for any measure in his favour, they made a merit of supporting the decrees of the people—they resolved that none should be restored whom the people had banished.

That which they designed to prevent by their craft was brought about, however, by their cruelty. Soon after their establishment, the Four Hundred had sent ten deputies to Samos, to gain the concurrence of the army. This deputation, however, was stopped on its way by intelligence of some untoward events which had occurred at Samos during the time that the Four Hundred were establishing their dominion at Athens, and it was induced to wait at Delos until it should discover an opportunity of executing its commission with a more certain prospect of success.

The untoward events which had occurred at Samos were these. It has been seen that Pisander had formed a new oligarchical faction there in the bosom of the commonalty itself. These soon grew into a band of about three hundred conspirators, and they thought themselves strong enough to overturn the democratical government. In this they were aided by their Athenian friends, and, together, they proceeded to acts which were the very counterpart of those which preceded the revolution of Athens. Assassinations were the order of the day, and these were to be followed by a greater enterprise. In the meantime, however, the commonalty discovered its danger, and applied to some of the Athenian commanders, and other leading men known to be adverse to the plans of the oligarchs, for assistance. The generals, Leon and Diomedon, and two officers of inferior rank, named Thrasylulus and Thrasylus, lent a ready ear to their application, and they exerted their influence with the soldiers and women to engage them to resist the threatened attack. Accordingly, when the conspirators made the attempt they were repulsed and overpowered. Thirty were killed in the commotion, and three of the principal ringleaders were punished with banishment: the rest received a free pardon and amnesty.

As the revolution which took place at Athens about the same time was not yet known at Samos, Chæreas, one of the persons who had taken the most active part in these proceedings, was despatched on board the state-galley *Paralus*, to announce it to the government. It was expected that this news would have been very agreeable; but, on the arrival of the galley, the Four Hundred threw two or three of the most obnoxious among the ship's company into prison, and transferred the rest to another galley, which was ordered to a station on the coast of Eubœa. Chæreas himself escaped, and having arrived at Samos, he there spread such an exaggerated report of the tyranny of the new government, that the Athenians and Samians bound themselves together by oath not only to persevere in the war with the Peloponnesians, but to preserve an implacable hatred toward the Four Hundred.

Soon after this, an assembly was held in the camp, in which Leon and Diondion, and some of the officers who were suspected of disaffection, were removed, and their places filled with men of approved fidelity to the cause of democracy. Thrasylulus and Thrasylus were raised to the chief command, and thus a civil war was declared.

Thrasylulus appears to have been one of the leading men on this occasion. He exhorted the soldiers not to despan of effecting in the capital the same revolution which they had produced in the camp. Even if they failed, he said, they ought no longer to obey a city which could neither send them good counsel nor supplies. They were themselves more numerous than the subjects of the Four Hundred, and better provided with all things necessary for war. They possessed an island, which had formerly contended with Athens for the empire of the sea, and which they might hope to defend against every foe, domestic and foreign. And even if they were compelled to forsake it, with such a naval force as they possessed, they had their choice of many cities and territories, where they might find a new home. Finally, Thrasylulus counselled them that it was their interest to recall Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the Four Hundred, and who not only felt, but could resent his own and his country's wrongs. This advice of Thrasylulus was approved. He was commissioned to fetch the exile from the court of Tissaphernes, and he brought him to Samos, where he was received by an assembly held for that purpose.

Nearly four years had elapsed since Alcibiades had spoken in an Athenian assembly. Being presented by Thrasylulus to his fellow-citizens, he began by lamenting his exile as inflicting injuries on himself and his country. Next, he adverted to present circumstances, and, after that, he dwelt largely on the brighter prospects of public affairs through his restoration. "Nothing," he said, "was wanting to induce Tissaphernes to take an active part in the affairs of Athens but an assurance of good faith in her government. Nor was it a secret what he would require. He had often declared that he would freely treat with Alcibiades, if the affairs of the commonwealth were in his hands. And, in that case, not only the revenues of the satrap would

supply the wants of the Athenians, but the Phœnician fleet, which was at Spendus, would be at their service." The assembly readily believed what they wished to be true, and they immediately saluted him general of the whole army, retaining Thrasylulus and Thrasylus as his colleagues. At the same time, Alcibiades was entrusted with the sole management of the negotiations with Tissaphernes.

It was the general wish of this assembly to take immediate revenge upon the Four Hundred. Despising the Peloponnesian armament, it was proposed that they should sail forthwith to attack Piræus. Alcibiades, however, checked this temerity, and declared that his first duty was to treat with Tissaphernes. Accordingly, as soon as the assembly was broken up, he set off for the court of the satrap—anxious, says Thucydides, at once to exhibit to him his new dignity, and to raise his credit with the Athenians.

When the news of the recall of Alcibiades reached Miletus, the Peloponnesian forces, long clamorous and discontented, broke out into open mutiny. They bitterly inveighed against the duplicity of the satrap and the treachery of Astyochus, and then proceeded to destroy the Persian fortifications in the vicinity of Miletus. The garrison was put to the sword by them in their rage, and Astyochus would have shared the same fate, had he not taken refuge at an altar. The tumult was not appeased until he was recalled, and Mindarus arrived from Sparta to assume the principal command.

Having confirmed Tissaphernes in the line of policy marked out by his own suggestion, Alcibiades returned to Samos. His presence seems to have encouraged the ministers of the Four Hundred, who had stopped at Delos, to continue their voyage to the camp. On their arrival, an assembly of the Athenian citizens in the armament was summoned, and they were admitted to an audience. It was some time before clamour dropped its voice that they might be heard, but when the tumult was hushed, they defended the conduct of the Four Hundred and the changes which had taken place at Athens, and endeavoured to remove the impressions which had been made by the exaggerations of Chæreas. The assembly, however, instead of being conciliated, was only infuriated. They demanded loudly to be led to Piræus, that they might destroy the Four Hundred. But Alcibiades again interposed to prevent the consequences of such a rash act. He knew that by it all Ionia and the Hellespont would have been left in the enemy's power, and, therefore, he dismissed the envoys with a firm but mild answer. He required, he said, the immediate abolition of the council of Four Hundred, and the restoration of the ancient council of Five Hundred—as to the Five Thousand, he did not wish to deprive them of their franchise. All measures of retrenchment by which revenue was spared, he observed in continuance, should have his approbation, and he exhorted his countrymen to persevere in resisting the enemy. As long as they continued to defend themselves against foreign attacks, there was good hope their domestic quarrels would be composed, but if a blow should be struck against either Athens or the armament at Samos, the

disposition for reconciliation would come too late.

Although Tissaphernes had adopted the policy suggested by Alcibiades toward the Peloponnesians, he was still as anxious as ever to avoid an open breach with them. Accordingly, when the suspicions of his allies had been raised to their greatest height by the restoration of Alcibiades, he thought it necessary to attempt to recover their confidence by reviving their hopes. For this purpose he proceeded to Aspendus, with the avowed object of bringing the Phœnician fleet to join the Peloponnesians. This seemed to offer a decisive test of his sincerity, and it was apparently confirmed when, after his arrival there, he sent for a Spartan officer to take charge of the Phœnician armament. But Alcibiades knew both his character and designs better, and, when the news reached Samos, he declared his intention of following the satrap to Aspendus, and he engaged either to return with the Phœnician fleet, or prevent it from aiding the Spartans. In the latter respect he succeeded, as will be hereafter seen, and he also by his deep art disturbed the councils and measures of the Peloponnesians, by giving an additional impetus to the jealousy and mistrust they had long entertained of Tissaphernes.

The reply which the deputies of the Four Hundred brought to Athens from Samos produced an impression very unfavourable to the interest of the oligarchical leaders. The subordinate associates had begun already to clamour against the new government. Disappointed in their views and hopes, and finding that they were but instruments in the hands of others, they now clamoured against the oligarchy as loudly as they had before exclaimed against the democracy. At the head of the discontented were Theramenes, one of the generals, and Aristocrates, who also held a high military office. These men, foreseeing that the commonalty would again triumph, demanded that the *Four Hundred* should be no longer a mere name, but a real and active body, and, affecting to fear that the embassy which had been lately sent to Sparta had been secretly instructed to concert measures for betraying the city into the hands of the enemy, they urged the necessity of coming to terms with Alcibiades and the fleet. They appeared, therefore, before the people as patriots, but they were in reality dissatisfied with the subordinate places they occupied in the new system, and hoped to rise by its fall. Like most of the leading men in power at the present time, they covered their selfish ends under a show of regard for the public benefit.

The oligarchical leaders, however, were too cautious of power thus easily to resign office. They determined neither to resign nor to relax their authority, and prepared to meet the storm. Under the pretext of guarding the city against the attack with which it was threatened by the armament at Samos, they fortified the mole called *Ectonea*, which formed one side of the outer entrance of Piræus, with a tower at its extreme point by the harbour's mouth, and a wall, which ran from this point along the shore of the harbour. The tower connected the new

the land-side, and enabled a handful of men to command the entrance of the port. This new fortification also took in a large building, which was converted into a public granary, where all the corn-dealers were compelled to deposit their stock of grain, and the masters of the corn-ships to deposit their stores.

Things were in this state when the answer arrived from Samos. And then it was that the oligarchical leaders saw that their fortifications would be useless. On its announcement, several of their most active partisans deserted, and the tide of public opinion set in fast against them. Hence they began to look to an accommodation with Sparta as their only sure ground of hope, and, as the first embassy had miscarried, Antiphon and Phrynichus, with ten colleagues, set out to negotiate a peace on the best terms they could procure. It was the opinion of Thucydides, that though the Four Hundred had wished to rule Athens as an independent state, they would have consented to concede her cities, ships, and walls, if they could obtain no better condition. Hence there appears to have been good ground for the suspicions of Theramenes and his party, that the works at *Ectonea* were designed not to exclude their domestic adversaries, but to admit the enemy into Piræus. Nor did the failure of the second embassy allay their suspicions: it was interpreted as a sign of some secret agreement to betray the city to the Spartans.

Intelligence was received about this time, that a squadron of forty-two galleys was collected on the coast of Laconia, under the command of the Spartan Hegesandridas, which greatly strengthened these suspicions. Although this squadron was collected with the avowed object of acting against Eubœa, where the aid of the Peloponnesians had been solicited, it was represented as more probable that the real object of the expedition was connected with the works which were proceeding at *Ectonea*, and that the enemy was only waiting for their completion to enter Piræus. Then it was that the first signal blow was aimed at the Four Hundred, and it was given by the dagger. Phrynichus was assassinated in broad day, in the agora, while it was thronged with people, and at a short distance from the council-chamber, which he had just quitted. The murderer escaped through the crowd, but his accomplice was arrested and put to the torture. He proved to be an Argive, but no tortures could wring from him any information concerning the authors of the plot, except that sundry meetings were held in private houses. But this clue not being followed up by the government, Theramenes and his partisans were encouraged by this tacit confession of its weakness to engage in a bolder enterprise.

The proceedings of Theramenes and his party were quickened by the movements of the Peloponnesian squadron. Instead of proceeding to Eubœa, it soon after appeared in the Saronic gulf, overran the island of *Ægina*, and then anchored in the harbour of Epidaurus, as if threatening Athens itself. Theramenes interpreted this as a clear proof of the secret correspondence between the government and the enemy, and urged

• // with the old wall, which protected Piræus on

his friends no longer to remain passive. They responded to his call, and, being joined by the troops, the buildings of Eetionea were thrown down, while the whole multitude clamoured for the downfall of the Four Hundred and the rule of the Five Thousand.

After the troops had demolished the fortifications, they marched up to the city and posted themselves in the sanctuary of the Twins. Alarmed at their promptitude, the Four Hundred sent a deputation to soothe them with promises and entreaties. These deputies assured them that the list of the Five Thousand should soon be made out, and that to this body the election of the Four Hundred would be committed, according to such rules as it might think fit to adopt. The deputies also exhorted them to wait patiently for the satisfaction of their doubts, and to forego a tumult, which would endanger the public safety. (Almed, as much by the consciousness of their strength as by the arguments addressed to them, the troops declared themselves willing to accede to an amicable compromise, and a day was fixed for an assembly to be held for this purpose in the sanctuary of Bacchus.)

The day appointed having arrived, the people were already moving to the place of meeting, when news was brought that the Peloponnesian squadron was advancing along the coast to Salamis. The suspicions which Theramenes had so often expressed now seemed fully confirmed, and his party congratulated themselves on the destruction of the fortress. Party spirit, however, was absorbed by the care of defending the city. The whole population of Athens rushed down with one accord to Piræus, to man the ships, guard the walls, and secure the harbour. If the Peloponnesians had any design upon Athens, which seems probable, on perceiving this show of resistance, they changed their course. They made no attempt upon the Attic coast, but doubling Snuum, they proceeded to Oropus.

The danger which now appeared to threaten Eubœa created almost as great an alarm as that which had just been felt for Athens itself, for if that island was taken, their chief means of subsistence would be lost to the Athenians. A squadron of thirty-six galleys was therefore immediately manned, and sent, under the command of Thymocharès to Eretria, where it joined that which had before been stationed on the coast of Eubœa. But these galleys were, for the most part, ill prepared for action, and they had scarcely reached Eretria, before they were forced into a premature combat. The Eretrians were in the interests of, and in secret correspondence with, the Spartan admiral, and they took measures to prevent the Athenians from finding provisions in the ordinary market, by which they were compelled to go in quest of them to the outskirts of the town, at a great distance from their ships. While thus employed, a signal was made to the Peloponnesians, who hastily pushed across the channel from Oropus. The Athenians perceived their danger, and hastily embarked; but being in disorder when the enemy arrived, they were soon put to flight. Some took refuge in Eretria, and were almost all slain by the Eretrians themselves, others

took shelter in a neighbouring port which was held by an Athenian garrison. fourteen galleys escaped to Chalcis; but twenty-two fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians, and the crews were all either destroyed or made prisoners. This action was followed by a revolt in Eubœa, and Oreus alone remained attached to Athens.

The consternation which the intelligence of this disaster created at Athens surpassed that which followed the defeat in Sicily. By it the state was on the very brink of ruin, and had the Spartan commander followed up his advantage by proceeding to Piræus immediately, the final blow might have been given to Athenian independence. But he lingered; and although scarcely a glimpse of hope was left, the Athenians prepared to defend themselves as they could. Twenty galleys yet remaining in Piræus were manned, and it was resolved that should the enemy appear, to oppose his landing to the last extremity.

While discord remained within the city, there could be no hope of safety. The Athenians perceived this, and applied themselves to the important task of healing it. An assembly was held in the Pnyx, the place of meeting which had been used ever since the expulsion of the tyrants, and a decree was passed which declared, "That the council of Four Hundred should be dissolved, that the supreme authority should be committed to five thousand citizens, that all the men in Athens upon the roll of the heavy-armed should belong to that council, and that no man in any office under the commonwealth should receive any pay for public services."

The fall of oligarchy was no sooner thus brought about, than many of its principal supporters, as Pisander, Alexicles, and Aristarchus, quitted Athens. Most of them sought shelter among their friends at Decælea. Aristarchus revenged himself by striking a blow against his country. When the cause of his party became hopeless, he quitted the city, with a few bowmen taken from among the rudest barbarians in the Athenian service, and proceeded to the border fortress of Enoë, which was besieged by a force consisting of Corinthians and Bœotian volunteers, the former of whom had come to avenge the defeat which a body of their troops had suffered from the Athenian garrison while on its way home from Decælea. On his arrival, Aristarchus deceived the garrison by stating that an agreement had recently been concluded at Athens with Sparta, and thereby induced it to surrender the fortress to the Bœotians. His treachery went unpunished for four or five years, but at that time he fell into the hands of justice, and Alexicles appears to have suffered at the same time, though on a different charge—that of participating in the guilt of Phrynichus. Antiphon and Archeptolemus, also, were condemned to death, and their property confiscated, their houses razed to the ground, and their descendants doomed to perpetual infamy.

All opposition to Theramenes and his associates appears to have ceased upon the flight of the more active leaders. Hence many assemblies of the people were successively held in the Pnyx,

which resulted in the establishment of a constitution in which the supreme authority was divided between the many and the few. A decree was also passed which recalled Alcibiades and all those who had absented themselves from their country through the affair of the Hermes-busts.

The mixture of intrigue and strife already recorded in this mazy period of Grecian history may well create astonishment. All the Greeks were descended from that being whom the Almighty made in his own likeness and placed in Paradise. But oh! how fallen! The innocence and holy love which beamed in his breast before the fall, descended not to them; but they manifested those evil passions which sin introduced into his nature. They stand before the reader as the children of Adam, and the slaves of Satan. And yet there is, at the same time, something captivating in their actions. How majestic were the conceptions of Alcibiades—how lofty his plans of enterprise! But they all tended to evil. They were not devised for the glory of his Creator and the happiness of his species, which should be the spring of every human action, but to serve his own ambition. And this seems to have been the ruling motive of every master spirit acting on the theatre of Greece at this period. All sought their own interests, and that by the worst means. A man may laudably seek to benefit himself by a proper use of the faculties with which God has endowed him, but when the sword and the dagger are appealed to, the evils which sin has wrought in the human breast appear in their most hideous colours. And such were the deadly instruments which the Greeks had long been using, and still grasped in their hands, in order to raise each one himself above his fellow. It is a dark picture of human nature which they have thereby compelled the historian to delineate, and a portion only of the features of which have, as yet, been traced.

CHAPTER XIX.

FROM THE RECALL OF ALCIBIADES TO THE BATTLE OF NOTIUM

B. C. 411—407.

DURING the recent revolution in Athens, the operations of the hostile fleets, which had hitherto been opposed to each other on the south coast of Ionia, were transferred to the Hellespont. It being no longer doubtful that Tissaphernes was a treacherous ally, the Spartans courted the protection of his rival, Pharnabazus, to whose province they sailed with their principal armament, leaving only a minor squadron at Miletus to defend their southern acquisitions. On discovering this, Thrasylbus and Thrasylus proceeded northwards in pursuit of them, and the straits which join the Euxine and Egean seas became, and long continued, the scene of conflict.

In these seas the Athenians prevailed in three successive engagements, the issue of which became continually more decisive.

The first of these engagements took place in the narrow channel between Sestus and Abydos.

Thrasylus having come to anchor at Eleus with an armament of seventy-six sail, resolved to attack the enemy then in the harbour of Abydos. Accordingly, all things being prepared, he moved forward in a single column along the shore toward Sestus. Here he was met by the Peloponnesians, who perceived his approach, and who were as willing to accept as he was to offer battle. At first the Athenians were worsted, Mindarus, putting himself at the head of his swiftest galleys, attacked the Athenian centre with such impetuosity that it was overpowered. Several galleys were driven aground, and the Peloponnesians landed to follow up their victory on shore. Soon after, however, Thrasylus, who commanded the left wing, and who had been opposed to the Syracusans with success, came up to the relief of the centre, and the tide of victory was turned. The whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight, and twenty-one galleys were captured the Athenians themselves lost fifteen.

Having left their prizes at Eleus, the victors, after refitting their ships at Sestus, sailed northward to reduce Cyzicus, which had lately revolted. On their way they fell in with eight galleys, which were part of the squadron with which Helixus, the Megarian, had recently taken possession of Byzantium, and they captured the whole. On their arrival at Cyzicus, also, success attended their operations. The city, being unfortified, made no resistance, and was forced to pay for its rebellion. In the meanwhile, however, the Peloponnesians had recovered all their serviceable galleys at Eleus, and had despatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, in order to bring away the squadron of Hegesandridas.

It was about this time that Alcibiades rejoined the Athenian fleet with thirteen galleys. He brought with him an assurance, that he had diverted Tissaphernes from his purpose of permitting the Phœnician fleet to join the Peloponnesian, and had conciliated him to the Athenian interest. The wily satrap, however, had not aided him with his gold, and he, therefore, manned nine additional galleys, and proceeded to Halicarnassus, where he levied large contributions, ordered Cos to be fortified, and appointed a governor there.

While Alcibiades was thus employed, Tissaphernes, still wavering as ever, and being uneasy at the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus, sailed for the Hellespont, to remonstrate and confer with its commanders. On his journey he stopped at Ephesus, to sacrifice to Diana, the great goddess of the Ephesians, an event probably arising out of the double cause of superstition and policy. Tissaphernes might have thought that by so doing he should at once conciliate the gods and the sons of Greece!

With the narration of this event the history of Thucydides breaks off abruptly, and that of the historian Xenophon, who follows him, begins with equal abruptness. It seems certain that the beginning of Xenophon's history is lost; and it is equally clear that an interval of five or six weeks intervened between the last event related by Thucydides, and that with which the narrative of Xenophon commences. There is good reason to believe, however, that no events of importance occurred during this period; and

hence, without noticing the doubtful information which Diodorus supplies to fill up this blank, we pass on to the narrative upon the authority of Xenophon.

The first fact recorded in the annals of Xenophon is, that Thymocharis, the Athenian commander in the action near Eretria, arriving with a few galleys from Athens, ventured a second action with the Spartan Hegesandridas, and was again defeated. It is not said when this action took place, but it was, perhaps, while Hegesandridas was on his way to the coast of Thrace, where, it will be seen, he was soon after stationed.

During this period the hostile fleets in the Hellespont had been watching each other's movements. At length, however, the second memorable engagement alluded to took place. Towards the end of September, the Thurian commander, Doreius, sailed from Rhodes to the Hellespont with fourteen galleys. Information was given of his approach to the Athenian commanders, who were encamped at Madytus, on the coast of the Chersonesus, and they put out with twenty galleys to intercept his progress. But Doreius ran his squadron aground near the headland of Rhæteum, and so bravely defended himself that the Athenians were compelled to retire.

At the time of this action the Spartan admiral, Mindarus, was sacrificing to Athena, in the citadel of Ilum, which commanded a view of the coast, and a sight of it roused him to action. He left the shrine of the goddess abruptly, and hastened to embark and join Doreius with his whole fleet. On observing his approach, the Athenians came out from Madytus to meet him, and an engagement ensued near Abydos, which lasted with varied success till the evening. At that time Alcibiades was seen entering the straits with eighteen galleys, and victory then became no longer doubtful. The Peloponnesians fled precipitately, and the Athenians not only succeeded in carrying off thirty of their galleys, but recovered those which they themselves had lost at Sestus.

This victory was an important one to the Athenians, and, could they have followed it up, the Spartan fleet must have been annihilated. Want of money, however, was so pressing, that, while Thrasyllus sailed to Athens to announce the good tidings and to procure reinforcements, other officers were despatched various ways to collect contributions: only forty galleys were left at Sestus.

It was at this juncture that Tissaphernes arrived in the neighbourhood of the Hellespont. Still reckoning upon his friendship, and calculating that it would be heightened by the recent victory, Alcibiades went to meet him with presents, which were at once offerings of friendship and a tribute of homage. He found himself deceived. The faithless satrap professed that he had orders from the king to treat the Athenians as enemies, and he arrested Alcibiades and sent him prisoner to Sardis. After a month's imprisonment, however, Alcibiades contrived to escape to Clazomenæ, whence, with six galleys, he returned to his fleet in the Hellespont.

While Alcibiades was thus absent and the

Athenian fleet thus scattered, Mindarus, having received reinforcements, proposed to attack the forty Athenian galleys left at Sestus. On discovering this, the Athenians withdrew by night to Cardia, on the isthmus of the peninsula. Here they were joined by Alcibiades, and, although inferior in numbers—the enemy having sixty galleys—he resolved to seek an engagement. As he was on the point of sailing, Thrasybulus and Theramenes arrived, each with a squadron of twenty galleys, which confirmed him in his purpose. He spread his sails to overtake the enemy, and arriving early the next day at the island of Proconnesus, he discovered that Mindarus was at Cyzicus with Pharnabazus and his troops. It was here that the third engagement took place. Alcibiades set sail in the midst of a heavy rain and thick mist for Cyzicus, and surprised the Peloponnesian armament in the midst of its warlike exercises. A general action ensued, and the Athenians were victorious. Mindarus fell, and the whole fleet, except the galleys of the Syracusans, which they fired, fell into the hands of the victors, who carried them away to Proconnesus.

Perceiving the capture of their fleet, those Peloponnesians who were at Cyzicus fled, together with the satrap Pharnabazus, and the next day Alcibiades landed, and laid the inhabitants under heavy contributions.

Having remained twenty days at Cyzicus, Alcibiades proceeded to the Bosphorus. On his way thither he was admitted into Perinthus, and he obtained money from Selymbria. Arriving in the Bosphorus, he fortified the town of Chrysopolis on the eastern coast, opposite Byzantium, and established a custom-house there, where he compelled all vessels which passed from the Euxine to pay a tithe on their cargoes, after which he returned to the Hellespont.

While Alcibiades was thus reaping the fruits of the victory of Cyzicus, the Peloponnesians were suffering great distress, as discovered by a letter written to the Spartan government by Hippocrates, on whom the command devolved at the death of Mindarus. This letter was intercepted by the Athenians, and carried to Athens, where it was copied by Xenophon. It consisted of these four laconic sentences:—"The tide has turned, Mindarus is dead, the men are starving, we are straitened."

The embarrassment of the Peloponnesians, however, was not of long continuance. Pharnabazus, as true as Tissaphernes was faithless, and as generous as he was selfish, came forward, and clothed and fed them. He also stationed them to guard the coasts of his province, and then, calling the officers together, bade them set about building new galleys at Atandrus, for which he advanced the money, and gave them leave to cut down the timber from the woods of Ida.

Notwithstanding this opportune relief, however, and the hope it afforded the Spartans that they might yet retrieve their affairs, the loss of the fleet created so much alarm at Sparta, that an embassy was sent to Athens, with Endius at its head, to make overtures for peace. Endius proposed, as the conditions of peace, that each party should retain the places which it possessed; that the troops should be withdrawn

from each other's territory, and that their prisoners should be exchanged. It is probable that this offer would have been accepted, had not Cleophon, an upstart demagogue, taken the same course which Cleon had pursued on a similar occasion. Through him the offer was rejected, and the war continued.

While the Peloponnesians were building their fleet at Atandrus, news were brought to Hermocrates and his colleagues, in the Syracusan command, that they had been condemned to exile by an adverse faction, now predominant in that state. The conduct of Hermocrates on this occasion was truly noble. Having called an assembly, he deplored his hard fortune, but recommended implicit obedience to the authority of the republic. The soldiers, however, were clamorous for him and his colleagues to retain their office, and it was with difficulty that Hermocrates could restrain them from revolt. It was only by his consenting to remain in command till they were super-seded by the new generals, that their discontent was hushed, and when, at length, Demarchus, Myseon, and Potanus, the admirals named by the state, took the command of the Syracusan forces, the soldiers pledged themselves, by solemn oath, to revoke the sentence of exile when they should return to Syracuse.

After the disastrous battle of Cyzicus, Pasippidas, a Spartan, had been collecting as many ships as he could obtain from the allies of Sparta in the north. While at Thasos a revolution took place, in which the Spartan governor, Leonicus, with all the partizans of Sparta, were expelled. Tisaphernes was suspected of concerting this revolution, and it was thought that Pasippidas was in his secret, whence he was condemned to perpetual exile. At the same time, Cratesippidas was sent out as admiral, in the room of Mendarus, and he found the galleys which had been collected by Pasippidas at Chios.

Meanwhile Thrasylus was raising a powerful armament at Athens. An advantage, of minor importance, which he gained over Agis, in the fields of Attica, animated the people the more readily to intrust him with the forces he required, namely, one thousand heavy infantry, one hundred horse, and fifty galleys.

While Thrasylus was busied with his preparations, Agis, struck by the sight of the corn ships which were constantly sailing into the Piræus, advised that Clearchus should be sent to the Bosphorus, to use all his influence at Byzantium and Chalcedon, for the purpose of interrupting the Athenian commerce in that quarter. Accordingly, fifteen vessels were fitted out from Megara, and after having lost three at the mouth of the Hellespont, by an Athenian squadron of nine galleys, stationed there, Clearchus made his way to Byzantium.

Thrasylus sailed from Piræus, with his newly collected armament, in the spring of B.C. 409. He hoped to render the twenty-third campaign as glorious to the Athenian arms as the preceding. At first his operations were successful. he took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia; and returned to the shore, driving before him crowds of slaves, and carrying away much valuable booty. Thus encouraged, he proceeded

to attack Ephesus, then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionian coast. But Tisaphernes had discovered his designs, and he aroused the population of the adjacent region for the defence of the goddess. Some Sicilian troops, then at Syracuse and Selinus, were also collected for this purpose when, therefore, Thrasylus landed his forces, which he did in two divisions, under cover of the night, he met with a vigorous resistance. Both divisions were defeated, and the Athenians fled to their ships, with the loss of about four hundred men.

After burying the dead at Notium, Thrasylus sailed away to Lesbos. During his voyage thither he fell in with the twenty-five Syracusan galleys, four of which he captured, and chased the rest back to Ephesus. He then pursued his voyage northward, and joined the squadron which was lying, under the command of Alcibiades, at Sestus. From Sestus, the whole fleet soon after crossed over to Lampacæus, which they fortified, designing to make it their head-quarters for the winter. In the course of this season, Alcibiades made an expedition against Abydus, and routed a strong body of cavalry under Pharnabazus. Several inroads were also afterwards made into the interior, to ravage the provinces of that satrap.

During this winter the Spartans relieved themselves from the garrison which Demosthenes had planted in Coryphasium. Their stronghold was besieged by a great land force, and blockaded by a squadron of eleven galleys, and they capitulated, with permission to withdraw. But this success was, in some degree, balanced by a disaster which the Spartans experienced about the same time, at their colony of Heraclea. The Spartan harmost,* Labotas, was slain there, together with seven hundred men, in a battle with the Clæans, through the treachery of their Achaean comrades, who had been admitted to the franchise against the spirit of the original institutions. On the other hand, the Athenians lost Nisæa, which was felt not less keenly than that of Coryphasium. It was captured by the Megarians, who were reinforced by some Syracusan prisoners who had recently fled from Athens.

In the spring of B.C. 408, the Athenian fleet moved toward the Bosphorus. Alcibiades began operations with the siege of Chalcedon, where Hippocrates had been recently made harmost by the Spartan government. On the approach of the Athenian armament, the Chalcedonians removed all their property, which was of a movable kind, out of the country, and intrusted it to the care of the Bithynian Thracians. Discovering this, Alcibiades advanced to the Bithynian border, and demanded it, and the Thracians surrendered their charge, and gave pledges of their submission. On his return to Chalcedon, he began to invest it with an intrenchment

* The harmosts were governors whom the Spartans sent into their subject or conquered towns, partly to keep them in submission, and partly to diminish the democratical form of government, and establish in its stead one similar to their own. They generally acted like kings, or tyrants, whence Dionysius thinks that harmosts was but another name for kings. It is uncertain how long their office lasted, but it seems probable that it was only for one year.

surmounted with a palisade, which he carried from sea to sea, and which was interrupted only by the bed of a river which flowed near the town. These works were nearly finished when Pharnabazus came up with an army, and encamped in the sanctuary of Hercules, near the town. Encouraged by his presence, Hippocrates made a sally, while Pharnabazus attempted to join him by forcing his way through the opening with which the circumvallation was broken by the river. Their movements proved unsuccessful. Hippocrates fell, his troops were driven back into the city, and Pharnabazus was compelled to retreat to his encampment.

After this action, Alcibiades set off on an expedition to the Hellespont to raise money. In his absence, his colleagues entered into a negotiation with Pharnabazus, who, finding that the Peloponnesians were not able to protect his province from the Athenians, became desirous of peace. It was agreed that he should pay the Athenians twenty talents, and give safe conduct to an embassy which they were to send to the Persian court, that until these ambassadors returned, they should suspend their operations against Chalcedon, and that, in the meanwhile, the Chalcedonians should pay their ancient tribute and all arrears due since their revolt from Athens.

This convention was ratified by all the generals except Alcibiades, who, while these negotiations were pending, had taken Selymbria, and had proceeded to reduce Byzantium. Pharnabazus required that he should ratify the treaty, and Alcibiades demanded that the like ceremony should be executed on the part of the satrap to himself. Accordingly, two commissioners were appointed by Pharnabazus to receive the oath of Alcibiades at Chrysopolis, and two agents were appointed by Alcibiades to receive the oath of Pharnabazus at Chalcedon. After this, envoys proceeded to the court of Persia, and they were conducted thither by the satrap himself. They were accompanied, also, by an embassy which was appointed to guard the interests of Sparta and her allies. In truth the satrap, who was of a generous disposition, seems to have meant equal friendship to both parties, and to have proposed no further advantage to himself, than the protection of his province, which their strife endangered.

In the meanwhile Alcibiades made several attempts to carry Byzantium by assault. These were all baffled; but, having carried a circumvallation across the land-side of the town, the provisions of the besieged soon began to fail, and Clearchus having crossed over to Asia for the purpose of collecting an armament strong enough to draw the Athenians from the siege, the inhabitants opened the gates on the land-side to Alcibiades and his troops, and Byzantium was taken. The garrison was obliged to surrender; but the citizens enjoyed immunity from the horrors which in those days usually followed the capture of a city.

As Pharnabazus and the rival envoys were proceeding on their way to the court of Persia, they were met by another Spartan embassy returning from thence. These announced that they had been successful in their application to the king; and their assertions were confirmed by

the presence of Cyrus, the younger son of Darius, who was invested with a commission of supreme authority over the whole maritime region of Asia Minor. The Athenian envoys were desirous of continuing their journey, and when this was refused, they demanded leave to return home. Cyrus, however, desired Pharnabazus to detain them for a time, that the Athenians might remain in ignorance of their danger, they were accordingly kept in custody for three years, at the end of which time they were released at the suit of Pharnabazus.

Having achieved so many important conquests, Alcibiades deemed this a favourable opportunity of returning to Athens. Accordingly, soon after the reduction of Byzantium, he sailed to Samos with the greater part of the fleet, and thence proceeded with twenty galleys to levy contributions on the coast of Caria, which he did to the amount of one hundred talents. Thrasybulus was sent with eighty galleys to the coast of Thrace, where he restored the Athenian sovereignty in most of the revolted cities, Thasos included. Thrasyllus conducted the rest of the armament to Athens, probably to prepare the way for the return of Alcibiades. But his exertions were not wanting, for the people had already elected him as one of their new generals, with Thrasybulus and Conon. Alcibiades heard of this while at Gythium, whither he had sailed in order to gain information as to the state of public feeling towards him, and his doubt being thereby removed, he soon after sailed into Piræus.

It would appear that Alcibiades displayed his natural love of ostentation on his return to Athens. In his train were two hundred vessels which he had captured, and his own squadron was both richly adorned with glittering spoils, and attended by transports laden with spoils and booty. The crowd which flocked to the shores of the Piræus resembled that which saw him embark for Sicily, and he was now the only object of public curiosity. The sentiments they entertained of him were of a mixed character. The majority regarded him as the victim of the envy and animosity of ambitious and turbulent rivals, but there were others who considered him as the sole author of past calamities, and of the dangers which still hovered over Athens. And these did not fail to observe that the day of his return was one of evil omen. And, in truth, it happened to be on that day when the image of the tutelary goddess of their idolatrous city was stripped of its ornaments, for the sake of the needful reparations and ablutions, and was veiled from public view. Hence it was marked in the Attic calendar as one of evil omen, and no religious Athenian would transact any business on that day. It is probable, however, that few took any note of these circumstances, the many were, doubtless, absorbed in the contemplation of the victories and conquests by which Alcibiades had raised his country from the depths of humiliation to her then present lofty position.

As for Alcibiades, his breast seems to have been filled with doubts and fears from a more rational source than those who regarded the day as one of evil omen. Convinced by observation and experience of the waywardness of the Athe-

man character, he hesitated yet to plant his foot again on the Attic soil. When his galley came alongside the quay, he did not venture to leave the deck until he observed his cousin, Eurypolemus, and a strong body of kinsmen and tried friends ready to escort him into the city. Then it was that he landed; and he was greeted by the crowd with all the tokens of that enthusiasm which the sight of an old friend could not fail to rekindle. Garlande were showered upon his head, the air rang with acclamations, and the throng pressed around to gaze at and salute him.

On arriving in the city, Alcibiades presented himself successively before the council and assembly. There he asserted his innocence and bewailed his misfortunes. He also complained of his wrongs, but, like an arch-politician as he was, he did not impute them to the Athenians who had inflicted them. Fortune and the higher powers were made by him to bear the blame. After this, he dwelt on the fair prospects which were now open for Athens and the people, touched, flattered, and excited by his address, decreed that the records of the proceedings against him should be sunk in the sea, that his property should be restored, that the priests should recant their curses, that he should be rewarded with a crown of gold, and that he should be appointed commander-in-chief of all the forces of the commonwealth both by land and sea. Thus, the man who had been persecuted by them with an implacable hatred through the affair of the Hermes-busts, at length was exalted over them all by their own consent. But the favour of the Athenians was a precarious possession.

The first use Alcibiades made of his authority was politic. Since Agis had been in possession of Decelea, the Eleusian rites, and many ancient observances and popular amusements, had been discontinued, through fear of hostile interruption. Alcibiades resolved at once to display his zeal for religion, his contempt of the enemy, and to conciliate the superstitious prejudice he had offended by conducting the mystic procession under a military escort to Eleusis. This resolve was carried into effect, and Agis either did not feel himself strong enough to offer any interruption, or else he was restrained from the attempt by religious scruples.

The effect which this military pilgrimage had upon the Athenians was great. It soothed their pride as well as their superstition, and they voted Alcibiades an armament of one hundred galleys, 1500 infantry, and 150 horse, with leave to nominate his colleagues. Within four months this armament was in readiness, and he sailed again from Athens with Aristocrates and Adimantus.

In this new expedition Alcibiades first bent his course to Andros, which was in a state of rebellion; and where, having landed his troops, he defeated the enemy, and shut them up within their walls. He then set sail again for Samos, leaving one of his colleagues with a small force to harass the enemy. But he was soon called upon to meet an antagonist more skilful in his movements than any with whom he had yet contended. This was Lysander, son of Aristoclitus, who succeeded Cratesipidas in the office of admiral when his year of office had expired.

On his arrival at the scene of action, Lysander strengthened the squadron with which he was sent out by reinforcements from Rhodes, Cos, Miletus, and Chios, which raised its numbers to seventy galleys. He then sailed to Ephesus, and there waited with the Spartan envoys, who had just returned from the Persian court, till he heard that Cyrus had arrived at Sardis, and then proceeded thither. Cyrus received Lysander with peculiar favour. When he requested him to exert himself in their behalf, Cyrus assured him that he was prepared to carry the king's instructions into full effect, that he had brought five hundred talents with him; and that, if this sum was not sufficient, he was prepared to spend his private revenues, and even to melt down the precious metals that adorned the throne on which he sat to give them audience. Nor were these empty words. Cyrus raised the seamen's wages one obolus per day; and before Lysander left Sardis, he received not only the arrears then due, but a month's pay in advance. The effect of this supply soon became visible. The spirits of the men were raised, and the fleet was augmented to ninety galleys.

On discovering the position of Lysander, Alcibiades, having likewise augmented his forces, stationed himself at Notium to watch his movements. The Peloponnesian fleet was inferior in numbers, and needed repairs, and Lysander had it hauled on shore to refit, while he waited for an opportunity of action. That opportunity came unexpectedly, and through the imprudence of Alcibiades. While at Notium, being in want of supplies, to prevent his men from yielding to the attraction of Persian gold, he went on a marauding excursion to Cuma, leaving his fleet, under the command of Antiochus, with strict injunctions to avoid an engagement, even if the enemy should offer battle.

Of all the men in the fleet, Antiochus appears to have been the most unfit for such an important trust. He had, indeed, only recommended himself to Alcibiades by his boisterous spirits and nautical buffoonery. It was, therefore, to a boon companion that Alcibiades committed the hope of Athens, and it was soon discovered to be an error of the greatest magnitude. Presuming on his familiarity with his commander, Antiochus neglected his orders, and endeavoured to provoke the enemy to battle. He conceived that if the enemy could only be drawn out of the harbour of Ephesus, he should be sure of victory, and hence he sailed from Notium to Ephesus, taking only one galley in company with his own; and as he passed close by the prows of the Peloponnesian fleet, offered every kind of contumely that could provoke an attack. His insults were, for a time, unheeded, but Lysander, at length, ordered a few galleys to give him chase. This drew on a general battle, and the result was, that Antiochus was slain, that fifteen galleys were destroyed or taken, and that the rest were chased to Samos.

On discovering the disaster, Alcibiades himself came to Samos, and soon after sailed out with his whole force toward Ephesus to offer battle. He was still superior in numbers, and hence Lysander would not risk the honour of his recent victory. Alcibiades, therefore,

returned to Samos; shamed rather by the caution of Lysander, than gratified by his declining to risk a battle.

From his recent victories, the Athenians appear to have expected still greater things at the hands of Alcibiades. They expected daily to hear that Chios and all Ionia were subdued; and hence, when the news arrived that their fleet had fled before an inferior force, with the loss of fifteen ships, the popular fury knew no bounds. The multitude began to ask what Alcibiades had in reality done, and his enemies, taking advantage of this change in the public feelings replied, that while he abandoned the charge of the great armament with which he was intrusted to a companion of his debaucheries, he was enriching himself, and supplying the demands of his luxurious habits with the contributions he extorted from the allies of the state. At the same time, the people were informed that he had built a stronghold in the neighbourhood of Pacte in the Thracian Chersonesus, and it was hinted that this indicated consciousness of guilt or a treasonable design. This aroused the public indignation to the utmost. Alcibiades was removed from his command. He fell, no more to rise in the public favour.

Thrasylus was involved in the disgrace of Alcibiades, and thus the two men who were perhaps above all others in the world best qualified to relieve the commonwealth of Athens in its present circumstances, were dismissed from their employments, and that without giving them an opportunity of defending themselves. Conon was permitted to remain in office, and with him were associated nine new colleagues, namely, Diomedon, Leon, Pericles, Hissmidus, Aristocrates, Archestratus, Protomachus, Thrasylus, and Aristogenes. This list of names possesses an unusual interest on account of its connection with many of the leading events in the ensuing history.

On discovering his disgrace, Alcibiades sailed away to his fortified domain in the Chersonesus. On his retirement, he left Greece involved in commotions, which if his ambition did not cause, it greatly increased. Hence, although the Athenians acted toward him with great injustice, the reader may nevertheless discern a righteous retribution in his fall. No man has ever yet endeavoured to build up his house on the general ruin and really prospered. There is an unseen Power that finally brings the counsels and the strivings of these sons of ambition to nought. What man, knowing this, would be ambitious?

CHAPTER XX

FROM THE BATTLE OF NOTIUM TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PÉLOPONNÉSIAN WAR

B. C. 407—404

AT the time of his appointment, Conon was employed in the siege of Andros. A second decree of the Athenian people directed him to proceed immediately to Samos, with his squadron

of twenty galleys to take the command. On his arrival, he found the fleet under his command superior in numbers to the enemy, but despondency was prevailing among the men, partly arising from the recent defeat, but chiefly owing to the want of regular pay, and to the contrast which they saw between their own prospects and those of the Peloponnesians who were provided for from the riches of the Persian treasury. From these circumstances many deserted, and Conon found himself compelled to reduce the numbers of his armament from above one hundred to seventy galleys, and to employ himself in expeditions as Alcibiades had done before him, which had no other object than plunder in view—to obtain spoils of the fields, and gold to keep up the spirits of his troops.

In the meantime, Lysander waited quietly at Ephesus. He probably did not feel himself able to cope with the enemy, but his attention was also deeply engaged by affairs of a different nature. Lysander was ambitious, but his ambition was not such as commonly animated the spirit in breast—that of glory carried in the service of Sparta. His views were chiefly directed to his own aggrandisement, and he employed the autumn and winter in negotiating with the oligarchical factions in the Greek cities of Asia in order that they might forward any design for which he might employ them. By the spring of B. C. 406, he had indeed placed himself at the head of powerful enterprising and unscrupulous factions by whose means he hoped to return his station through which if one he should be enabled to carry out his concealed views. But in this he was disappointed. The Spartan government does not appear to have been satisfied with his inertness, and when his year of office expired, Callitridas was sent to supersede him in his command.

Callitridas was a Spartan of the old school. Unlike Lysander he was zealous for the public service without selfish ends, and was keenly alive to his own and his country's honour. Lysander exhibited great chagrin on his arrival, and exerted his utmost effort to thwart, discredit, and dishonour him. He therefore sent all that was left of the Persian subsidy back to Cyrus, and on retaining the fleet to Callitridas, bade him remember that it was victorious and in possession of the sea. Callitridas saw through his conduct, and bluntly replied to his boast by desiring him to conduct it to Miletus, and to prove his assertion by keeping Samos, where the Athenian fleet was lying, on his left hand. Lysander excused himself by alleging that in so doing he should interfere with the province of another, since he was no longer commander.

After the departure of Lysander, Callitridas drew reinforcements from Chios, Rhodes, and other quarters, and having collected 140 sail, he prepared to seek the enemy. Want of money, however, interrupted his operations, and when he sought to secure supplies, he discovered the machinations of Lysander and his adherents, and the murmurs by which they questioned his capacity. It was natural that Callitridas should wish to secure the active co-operation of his own countrymen, and when, therefore, he dis-

covered his true position, he assembled them at Ephesus in a council of war, in which he noticed the complaints gone abroad, and desired their advice, as to whether he should stay or return home, to report the state of affairs to the Spartan government. All present exhorted him to persevere in the discharge of his duties, to which he agreed, and, as a first step towards their performance, he repaired to Sardis to seek fresh subsidies at the hands of Cyrus.

Callicratidas expected that fresh supplies would be forthcoming as a matter of course. But intrigue had been at work in the Persian court. On arriving at Sardis he applied for an audience, and was ordered to wait till the day after the morrow, at which time he was again put off and the same conduct was repeated towards him day after day. Plutarch represents him as standing at the gate of Cyrus during the banquet, and as replying to the attendants, who informed him that their master was drinking, that he would wait till he had finished his draught. But Cyrus, though young, had learned to drink deeply, and he waited in vain. At length the patience of Callicratidas was worn out, and he quitted Sardis without having obtained an audience. As he departed, he deplored the wretched condition of the Greeks, who were reduced to cringe to barbarians for money, and declared that, if he lived to return home, he would use his utmost exertions to heal the breach between Sparta and Athens. A noble resolve, but one which he did not live to put into execution.

On his return to Ephesus, the first measure of Callicratidas was to conduct his fleet to Miletus, whence he despatched some galleys to Sparta to procure supplies. Miletus was one of those cities in which Lysander had formed a party, and which had hitherto thrown every impediment it could in the way of Callicratidas. Nothing daunted, however, he called an assembly, and urged the Milesians to relieve his wants. His arguments prevailed. The Milesians granted him money out of the public treasury, in which the partisans of Lysander were among the first to concur. Callicratidas also obtained an additional sum from the Chians, by which he was enabled to exert the force of his superior numbers.

Having obtained these reasonable supplies, Callicratidas first shaped his course towards Methymna, whither it is probable he had received an invitation. Diodorus relates that the town was betrayed to him, which may be consistent with Xenophon's statement—that an Athenian garrison and Athenian influence compelled him to take it by storm. The plunder was given up to the troops, and the captives were reserved as public property. The allies proposed that the Methymnæans should be sold; but Callicratidas declared, that while he commanded no Greek should be made a slave. Instances of such a spirit of liberal patriotism as this are rare in Grecian history, and therefore raise the character of Callicratidas far above his countrymen in general. It stands recorded to his honour that the Methymnæans were set at liberty.

It appears that the Athenian admiral, Conon, made an attempt to save Methymna, but ar-

rived too late. Having discovered that Callicratidas was already master of the town, he anchored for the night off a group of small islands, lying between the coast of Lesbos and the main, called the Hundred Islands. When Callicratidas heard of this, he declared that he would put a stop to Conon's "dalliance with the sea," and he sailed in quest of him. On his approach, Conon fled for Mytilene; but the Peloponnesian rowers exerted themselves with such vigour, that they both entered the harbour together. Thus compelled to fight with superior numbers, Conon lost thirty galleys, and the remaining forty, of which his fleet was composed, were only saved by being hauled under the battlements of the town, which Callicratidas blockaded by sea and land.

The immediate result of this success was a voluntary supply of money from Cyrus. That prince now treated the man whom he had lately despised, and deemed it prudent to allay any outbreaks of his wrath by his gold.

Mytilene was ill-provided for a siege, and Conon saw that unless intelligence was speedily carried to Athens, he must surrender. He therefore drew down two of his fastest galleys, and manned them with the best rowers in the fleet, for the purpose of sending one to Athens, and the other to the Hellespont, with the intelligence of his situation. Accordingly, while the crews of the galleys stationed to guard the mouth of the harbour were taking their meal on shore at noon, these two Athenian galleys suddenly pushed out. They were pursued, and one of them was overtaken, but the other outstripped its pursuers, and finally reached Athens.

As usual, the Athenians were roused, by the new emergency, to extraordinary efforts. In thirty days a hundred and ten galleys were equipped and manned. Every hand that could be spared from the defence of the city was employed in this service. The equestrian class, who were usually exempt from such duty, common freemen and slaves, invited by the promise of freedom, joined in the expedition. All the colleagues of Conon, except Archedestratus, who died at Mytilene, and Leon, for whom Lysias was substituted, took the command in person. At first they sailed to Samos, and having strengthened themselves there with ten Samian galleys, and with thirty more from other quarters, they then proceeded to seek the Pelopon-

On his part, Callicratidas was no less desirous of meeting the Athenians. When, therefore, he received intelligence that a powerful fleet from Attica was arrived at Samos, he left fifty galleys under Eteomeus to continue the blockade of Mytilene, and went with 120 to meet the enemy. He stationed himself at Malea, the southernmost headland of Lesbos, and on the evening of the same day, the Athenians arrived at the Arginusee, three small islands near the Æolian coast, over against Malea. On the next day the fleets met, and the action was long disputed in line; and though order was no more, yet the battle was maintained for some time with nicely-balanced equality. At length Callicratidas, who commanded on the right wing of his fleet, in the shock of his striking one of the enemy, fell

overboard and perished, after which event the Peloponnesians were completely routed. Some fled toward Chios, and some to Phœcia, and more than seventy galleys were either destroyed or captured, among which were nine out of the ten which composed the Spartan contingent. The Athenians themselves lost twenty-five galleys, and all at such a distance from the shore, that the crews had no chance of safety but by clinging to the wrecks.

Little time appears to have been spent in pursuit of the vanquished, and the Athenian generals, having returned to their station at Arginusæ, held counsel on the course next to be adopted. Much discussion arose, but it was finally resolved that forty-six galleys should remain to collect the wrecked, under Theramenes and Thrasybulus, while the generals proceeded with the rest of the fleet to the relief of Conon at Mitylene. A violent storm prevented the execution of either of these plans on that day, and in the meanwhile, Eteonicus received intelligence of the event of the battle by means of a boat which had been kept in readiness for that purpose. To deceive Conon, he directed the men who brought the news to sail out again privately, and then to return to the camp with garlands on their heads and shouts of joy, announcing that Callicratidas had conquered, and that the Athenian armament was destroyed. By this stratagem he succeeded in making a retreat without molestation, the fleet sailing away to Chios, and the land force marching, under his own direction, across the island to Methymna.

On finding the harbour clear, Conon set sail towards the Arginusæ, and met the friendly armament, which proceeded first to Chios, and then to their old station Samos. Conon, with two of his colleagues, Protomachus and Aristogenes, remained with it, but the other six—Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasimides, returned to Athens.

The news of the victory of Arginusæ elated the Athenians in an extraordinary degree. And under the first impression produced by the joyful tidings, they exhibited one indication of a right feeling: they rewarded the slaves who had served in the expedition with immunities similar to those which had been enjoyed by the Plataeans, and which placed them nearly on a level with the citizens. But here their wisdom vanished. The issue of the battle caused extreme dejection among the Spartans, and the party among them which viewed the war with feelings like those expressed by Callicratidas, when repulsed at the court of Cyrus, took advantage of the despondency to propose another embassy to Athens to renew the attempt which had failed after the battle of Cyzicus. Accordingly, envoys were sent with overtures of peace. The conditions they offered were, that Decælia and the Attic territory should be evacuated, and they required the Athenians to resign their claims upon their revolted colonies. But these overtures were made when Athens was in a state of mad intoxication, and they were scorned. Hence it was, probably, that Aristotle represents Cleophon, the principal orator on this occasion, as appearing in the assembly excited with wine and clothed in armour. But however this may be,

it seems clear that the grounds on which Cleophon contended against the Spartan proposals have been correctly reported. There was again a prospect, he argued, of Athens reducing her rebellious subjects to obedience; and it was not expedient for her to renounce her dominion over them. With such a message were the Spartan envoys dismissed from the Athenian assembly.

This was only one rash act which the Athenians committed in the excitement of success. There was another which exhibits one of the most extraordinary, disgraceful, and fatal strokes of faction recorded in the pages of ancient history.

It was manifest from the despatches of the generals that many lives had been lost, which, under ordinary circumstances of the same nature, might have been preserved; and it does not clearly appear that it might not have been prevented by a little more activity. The thought that hundreds of those who had most contributed to the victory had been suffered to perish by neglect, and had been deprived of the rites of burial while their comrades looked on, was well calculated to arouse the popular resentment against those who might be deemed culpable. When, therefore, Theramenes, who had been sent home immediately after the action with despatches, basely charged the then absent generals with remissness in the affair, a decree deprived the whole of office except Conon, and appointed Adimantus and Philocles as his colleagues in their stead.

It was at Samos that the generals heard of this proceeding at Athens, and it does not appear that it was considered by them as anything more than a mark of the forfeiture of the confidence of the people. But when the minds of the Athenians were chafed, it was dangerous to trust to their mercy. Protomachus and Aristogenes seem to have remembered this, and fear prevented their return. The other six, however, unconscious of danger, returned home, as before recorded. Then it was that they discovered gradually that plots had been laid for their destruction. Archdemus, a popular leader, who had risen to eminence from a low station, and who held an office which gave him some control over the generals with reference to their administration of the public money, first stood forward as their accuser. He laid a fine, by virtue of his office, on Erasimides, and then called him to an account before a court of justice on a charge of malversation with respect to some money due to the treasury, which had come into his hands while he was commanding in the Hellespont. In the course of this accusation, he introduced incidentally, and by way of aggravation, some other charges relative to the general's conduct, and among these, the alleged negligence which he and his colleagues displayed after the battle of Arginusæ towards those who perished. Archdemus knew that he need only mention this topic, and a flame would be lit up in the breasts of his hearers that could only be extinguished by the blood of the generals. And so it came to pass. The immediate result of this trial was, that Erasimides and his colleagues were committed to prison to answer to the charge of

having sacrificed the lives of many of their troops.

Soon after an assembly was held to consider the case of these generals. Theramenes appeared foremost among their accusers, and he insisted chiefly on their own despatch, by which, as they did not charge any one else with neglect of duty, they had admitted that they alone were answerable for the fate of the wrecks. The generals who were present made each a brief defence, and pleaded that if there were any blame to be attached to any one, it could only fall on Theramenes himself, with the other commanders which they had ordered to look after the wrecks while they pursued the enemy. At the same time, they observed, they imputed no fault to any of their officers, since the state of the weather prevented them from proceeding to their destination, as many competent witnesses could prove. This statement produced its natural effect upon the audience, and they would doubtless have been acquitted had not the lateness of the hour prevented the votes from being taken, there not being sufficient light to count the show of hands. This was fatal to their cause. A notion was made that the assembly should be adjourned, and that at its next sitting, the council should bring in a proposition for regulating the form in which the generals should be tried. This motion seemed an innocent one, but it was made by the enemies of the generals, and was fraught with danger.

The day appointed for the adjourned deliberation fell, either through chance or design, on the festival of the Apaturia, which was chiefly consecrated to the maintenance of the ancient ties by which the citizens of the purest blood were united, as members of one family, with all the children of the state. On the third day of the festival the members of the phratries and of the houses met to register the children born within the year, and the youths entitled to admission into citizenship. This was the day on which the assembly was held, and on which the doom of the generals was sealed.

During the interval between the two assemblies, Theramenes had, with the other enemies of the generals, been active in reviving and inflaming the popular prejudices which had been allayed by their defence. But this was not deemed sufficient to insure their destruction. Hence, on the day of final trial, a number of persons were hired to attend it dressed in black, and with their heads shaved, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost at Arginusæ. The appearance of these people was designed to supply the hostile orators with topics for moving declamation; and it had the desired effect. Callixenus stood forward as the accuser of the generals; and after haranguing the multitude, he moved a proposition for a decree, that as their cause had already been fully heard in the previous assembly, all Athenians should vote on the simple question whether the generals had done wrong in not taking up their men who had been left in the waves of the sea after the battle, and that their votes should be taken in two urns which were to be set for each tribe to receive the ballots of acquittal or condemnation. Contrary as this proposition was both to law and

justice, it was adopted; and it was agreed that if the defendants were found guilty, they were to be put to death, their property confiscated, and a tenth consecrated to the goddess of Athens.

It now became evident that the generals were in extreme danger, and their friends bestirred themselves on their behalf. Euryptolemus, cousin of Alcibiades, boldly stood forward and declared his intention of prosecuting Callixenus as the author of this unjust decree. A part of the assembly applauded his spirit, but the majority was not in a mood to listen to technical objections, and when a man was brought forward who pretended that he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-tub, and that his sinking comrades charged him to tell the Athenians that their generals had left the brave defenders of their country to perish, a loud cry was raised against Euryptolemus, and one Lyseus moved that the persons who now attempted to control the assembly, if they did not withdraw their opposition, should be subjected to the same process, which was to decide the fate of the generals. Thus awed, Euryptolemus was constrained to renounce the design of prosecuting Callixenus. Finally, one man alone in Athens was firm enough to declare that he would only act as the law permitted, and that man was Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.

Still, although this point was thus settled, Euryptolemus ventured to ascend the bema again, to plead the cause of the generals. His arguments were cogent, and his appeal to the feelings of the people powerful. The assembly was, indeed, so wrought upon by his oratory, that when he moved that the prisoners should be brought to trial, under the decree of Cannonus, which directed that any one charged with treason under its most general description of wrong done to the people, should be brought to trial before the popular assembly, and held in fetters while pleading his cause, the motion was carried. Yet so fickle were the multitude, that when one Menecles raised some legal objection to this course, and put the question between this and the proposition of the council, the majority proved in favour of the latter. Then it was that the votes were taken, and the fatal vase pronounced sentence of death against their eight victorious generals. The six present were executed.

Before the sentence of execution was carried into effect, Diomedon, one of the condemned generals, demanded to be heard. Being permitted, he exclaimed,—“Athenians, I wish the sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the ruin of the republic. One favour I have to ask of you on behalf of my colleagues and myself, namely, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves. We are not in a condition to discharge them, and it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained over the enemy.” This appeal was a touching one to the Grecian breast, and it elicited the tears of all who possessed right feeling; but they were permitted to perish with their vows unpaid.

It must not be supposed, however, that the motives of the accusers of the generals arose simply from a desire to have them punished for

their neglect of the lives of their troops. This was only the instrument which they wielded on the occasion. The secret of the conspiracy was party spirit. Among the accused generals, all of whom anything is known, as Pericles, Diomedon, and Thrasylus, were more or less intimately connected with Alcibiades, which of itself was sufficient to condemn them in the opinion of the multitude. Hence it was that Theramenes, Callicleus, and the other orators who took the lead in the proceedings against the generals, sought their downfall. They lent themselves as tools to the oligarchical party, as is rendered pretty certain by the sequel of their history. It was natural for that party to suppose that after their victory the generals would become men of great note in the state, and they might, therefore, have eventually possessed sufficient influence to obtain Alcibiades' recall. Such an event, therefore, being dreaded by his enemies, who were also ambitious of power, they deemed it necessary to provide against it by conspiring the death of these his victorious friends. Life appears at this period of Grecian history, as it was in the days of the Revolution in France, but of a secondary consideration. And there appears to have been a considerable analogy between these two states at the time they committed such enormities. As in France so in Athens, there does not seem to have been any settled form of government when its citizens conspired against the lives of their fellow-citizens. It is an acknowledged matter of uncertainty whether the scenes described took place under that form of government on which Thucydides pronounced a high eulogy, or whether the old democracy had been previously restored with all its abuses. History is silent on this point; it may be presumed, therefore, that they took place during a struggle between the two parties. But this cannot be stated as a fact, and hence, leaving the discussion which the subject invites, and which could lead to no satisfactory conclusion, we pass on to the narrative.

The first historical fact presented to view is, the righteous retribution which awaited the conspirators. The generals had scarcely been executed, when the truth penetrated through the tissue of calumnies with which it had been intercepted by their enemies. It was discovered that they had fallen victims of party spirit, and indignation was roused against the men who had practised on the credulity of the people. A decree was passed, directing proceedings to be instituted against those who had deceived the people, and that they should give sureties for their appearance at the trial. Accordingly, Callicleus and four others were impeached and kept in custody by their sureties; but it would seem that they had friends who enabled them both to evade a trial, and, finally, to make their escape. Theramenes, however, was as yet more fortunate. He contrived not only to avoid a legal prosecution, but retained his place in popular favour. His punishment was reserved for an after date.

Of the populace of Athens at this period, Plato observes:—"It is an inconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason; and thus is no wonder, as it is composed of the dregs of a city,

and is a monstrous assemblage without form or order." This lively picture will enable the reader to understand whence the scenes described arose. And he will understand them better if he recalls to mind the fallen nature of man. That was the grand source and spring of these foul actions which mar the page of history. To the mind of a contemplative Christian they afford much matter for useful reflection. They should cause him to lift up his heart with thankfulness to Almighty God that he has fallen on better days—that his lot is cast in a land where, enlightened by the Book of Revelation, just and equitable principles prevail, and where the hydra-headed monster, party spirit, is not permitted to work the death of any member of the community. This is a triumph over human depravity to which the civilization of the Greeks cannot lay claim. Let us bless God for the Holy Scriptures, by which he has bestowed on us these advantages.

While these events were transpiring in Athens, her fleet rode the sea without a rival. The fragments of the Peloponnesian navy were confined to the ports in which they had taken refuge, and the troops were at Chios earning their sustenance by labouring in the vineyards. The Chians appear to have treated them with extreme kindness, permitting them freely to enjoy the fruits of the season. When the winter came on, however, these resources failed, and their commander, Eteonicus, not being able to supply them with either food or clothing, many of them formed a conspiracy for the overthrow of their benefactors. They resolved to make themselves masters of Chios, and it was agreed, that, on the day when they intended to carry the plot into execution, each should carry a reed for the purpose of mutual recognition. But this foul crime was prevented by the activity of Eteonicus. Hearing of it, he set out, accompanied by a band of fifteen men, armed with daggers, and, as he passed through the town, killed the first man he met with carrying the reed, who happened to be suffering from ophthalmia, and had just come out of a surgeon's house. On hearing the report of this, the conspirators all threw away their tokens; and Eteonicus then assembled the Chians, and acquainted them of the danger they had just escaped, and exhorted them to relieve his men, and secure their own lives and property by a voluntary subsidy. The Chians supplied him with a month's pay to the fleet, and Eteonicus took the opportunity of cheering the men with language which made them believe that he was ignorant of their design.

This was not the only result of this adventure. Warned by it, the Chians and the other allies of Sparta on the Asiatic coast held a congress at Ephesus, in which it was resolved to send envoys to Sparta, with a request that Lysander might be appointed to the command of the navy. This embassy was accompanied by another from Cyrus, having the same end in view; and although it was against the law of Sparta that the same person should hold the office of admiral twice, an expedient was devised for reconciling this law with the wishes of the allies. The title of admiral was conferred on Aracus; but Lysander was sent out with him, invested by the secret orders of the government with supreme authority.

It was in the spring of B.C. 405 that Lysander arrived at Ephesus. He brought with him thirty-five galleys, which he had collected from the European allies; and he immediately sent to assemble those which were lying at Chios and other ports. While these were refitting, he also directed new ones to be built at Atandarus, which he was enabled to complete by a fresh supply which he obtained from Cyrus. That prince, being about this time recalled, bade Lysander, before his departure, spare no expense to ensure his superiority, for either in the royal treasury, or in the prince's private coffers, he would find unfauling resources. At the same time, he not only assigned a sum of ready money in his hands, but assigned the revenues which he drew for his private use, from the cities under his government, for the prosecution of the war with Athens.

Before Cyrus returned to the Persian coast, he cautioned Lysander not to risk a battle unless his forces should be greatly superior to those of the enemy. This caution was not forgotten by Lysander; for although he proceeded soon after to act on the offensive, he sailed to the south coast of Caria, in order to avoid a collision with the Athenian fleet. On his passage he touched at Miletus, where he established oligarchy, and he then continued his voyage to the Ceramic gulf, where a town named Cedreæ, inhabited by a mixed race of Greeks and barbarians, maintained its alliance with Athens. This town he destroyed, exterminating the men, and consigning the women and children to slavery. After this cruel act, Lysander touched at Rhodes, from whence he shaped his course toward the Saronic gulf. His motive for this appears to have been two-fold—partly from a desire of avoiding the Athenians stationed at Samos, and partly for the purpose of raising his own reputation by the appearance of commanding the sea within view of the enemy's shores. He made descents on Ægna, Salamis, and even on the coast of Attica itself, where he received a visit from Agis. But this display only lasted until information of his movements reached the Athenian fleet at Samos when he discovered that this fleet was in pursuit of him, he retired to the Asiatic coast.

It was about this time, and perhaps arising from this menace, that three new generals, Menander, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus, were associated in command with Conon, Philocles, and Adimantus. It is also probable that it was on this occasion that a decree was passed, on the motion of Philocles, for mutilating the prisoners who should be taken in the sea-fight which it was resolved should take place on the earliest opportunity. This barbarous policy was designed to counteract the attraction of the Persian gold among the Greeks, who had once helped to man the Athenian fleets. Hence, it was directed by this decree, that the prisoners should lose their right hands. This was another of the downward steps which the Athenians were rapidly taking in their career of political turpitude.

On leaving the Attic territory, Lysander sailed to Abydos. While here, he ordered all the troops he could collect to march against Lampascus, while he sailed to attack it by sea. Lampascus was taken by storm, and given up to pillage;

but the citizens were set at liberty. It had just fallen when the Athenians entered the Hellespont with 180 galleys, and anchored at Eleus, whence, finding that Lampascus was lost, they moved on to Sestus, and then proceeded to a place nearly two miles farther to the north, called Ægospotami, facing Lampascus. The Peloponnesian fleet was still in the harbour, and Lysander ordered that dispositions for a sea-fight should be made, but at the same time directed that no ship should move from its place. The two fleets menaced each other for several days, but at length the Athenians, seeing their challenge declined, grew careless of the enemy, and wandered farther up the country in quest of victuals. It is said that Alcibiades, whose fort was so near this part of the coast that he could perceive all that took place from the top of his towers, came down to the sea-side, and, pointing out to the generals the error they were committing, advised them to transfer their camp to Sestus, where they would enjoy the same advantages which the enemy derived at Lampascus. But this advice was disregarded, chiefly, perhaps, because it proceeded from the lips of Alcibiades, and, daily growing more negligent of the enemy, they at length suffered for that negligence. While thus scattered, Lysander suddenly pushed across the channel with his utmost speed. Of the six Athenian generals Conon alone was on the watch, and his own galley, with eight others, were soon manned. But this only enabled them to make their escape. The rest fell into the hands of Lysander, while Thorax and his troops scoured the country, and made the greater part of the men prisoners. Seeing all lost, Conon sailed away with eight galleys to seek an asylum in Cyprus, which was governed by his friend Evagoras the ninth, which was the Paralus, made for Athens, to carry the tidings of utter, irretrievable ruin.

The sails of the Peloponnesian fleet had never been spread more proudly than when Lysander returned to Lampascus. With him he carried all his prizes and prisoners, including every Athenian general except Conon. His first care was to call a council of the allies to deliberate on the fate of the prisoners. And this was a fearful one. Exasperated by the Athenian decree for the mutilation of the captives, and by the recollection that Philocles had ordered the crews of an Andrian and a Corinthian vessel which had been recently captured, to be thrown down a cliff, a general cry for vengeance was raised, and Lysander readily responded to the demand. It was resolved that all the Athenian prisoners, except Adimantus, who, it appears, had opposed the barbarous decree, should perish. Lysander, after bathing and dressing himself as if for sacrifice, gave the signal for slaughter by despatching Philocles with his own hands. His example was readily followed by the multitude, and it is calculated that 3,000 Athenians, at the lowest computation, thus perished. So cruel is the spirit of revenge.

Lysander had now only to direct the course of his victorious fleet, and to take possession of the Greek cities. He first made himself master of Sestus, and then proceeded to Byzantium and Chalcedon, which opened their gates to him.

He afterwards returned to Lampsacus, where he stayed a short time to refit, and then sailed out of the Hellespont with an armament of 200 galleys. In his progress toward the south, his chief employment was to settle the government of the cities now subject to his will on an oligarchical model, which enabled him to place the whole authority in the hands of those who were in his interests. A council of ten, or, as it was commonly called, a *decarchy*, was the ordinary substitute for all the ancient forms of polity. Such a change was wrought at Lesbos, and, while here, Lysander despatched Eteoncius with ten galleys to the coast of Thrace, where every town subject to Athens submitted. There was not a town throughout Greece and the *Ægean* which entertained a thought of resistance. Namos alone resolved to maintain itself in open defiance of his power, but, taking no notice of this demonstration of impotent enmity, he sent to Agis and to Sparta to announce his approach, and not long after, while the land forces of the Peloponnesian confederacy encamped in the groves of the Academy, he himself appeared with 150 galleys before the mouth of the Piræus.

It was in the dead of the night when the Paralus arrived at Athens with its heavy tidings. They soon, however, spread from Piræus to the upper city, for the wail of grief and despair, as it passed from mouth to mouth, was loud and deep. The streets and the public places were rapidly filled with groups of citizens who assembled to learn or deplore the fate of their friends and their country. It appeared certain that the cause of Athens was for ever lost, yet it was deemed possible that a show of desperate resolution might induce the conquerors to content themselves with such terms as would leave the state, though shorn of its power, still in the enjoyment of internal freedom. Hence it was resolved, in an assembly held in the morning, to block up the entrance of all the harbours but one, and to take all the precautions necessary to sustain a siege. In this attitude they awaited the arrival of the victors.

Shortly after the appearance of Lysander, negotiations were opened with the besiegers, and terms of peace were proposed. They were, in the main, reasonable and moderate, but one demand was fatal to their adoption. It was required by the conquerors that the long walls should be pulled down to the length of above a mile on each side, and thus was universally opposed by the two leading parties, by the democrats because they were their very bulwarks, and the concession required nothing less than the sacrifice of the constitution, and by the oligarchs, whose hopes had been revived by the public calamity, because they foresaw that opposition to these terms would end in the final ruin of democracy. Cleophon, it appears, was the foremost to oppose the demands of the enemy; and *Æschines* reports that he was so violent on the occasion, as to threaten to stab any one who should make mention of the name of peace.

During this year it seems certain that the council at Athens was chiefly filled with men subservient to the views of the oligarchs. *Archestratus* was one of its members; and he,

having declared himself in favour of the enemy's offers, was put in prison, while a decree was passed forbidding any one to renew this proposal. These measures seem chiefly to have been dictated by the oligarchs, whose aim was to prostrate Athens to its rule. Hence it was that they went hand in hand with the democracy on this occasion. It was deemed by them the surest road to power, and they cared but little what desolation was caused in Athens so that they might attain their desire. And yet all their movements were made with a show of concern for the national honour. It was from such motives that they opposed the demolition of the long walls; and the urgency of the public danger furnished a fair pretext for suggesting a measure, which, while it was professedly designed to promote concord and allay discontent, was designed, in reality, to strengthen the oligarchical faction. One *Patrochides* moved a decree which restored many citizens who had been wholly, or partially disfranchised, to the full enjoyment of their political rights. It does not appear that any exiles were recalled by this decree, which marks the extreme caution of the oligarchical faction not to excite the jealousy of the people. It seems probable, however, that *Critias*, who had long been absent from Athens, returned through this decree; and on his arrival, became the leader of the oligarchical faction, and gained the confidence of the clubs which still formed its principal strength. Under his guidance, the oligarchical faction so swelled its numbers, and obtained such influence in the state, that at length they only waited for an opportunity of striking a decisive blow.

It seems scarcely credible that while the enemy was knocking at the gates of Athens, while certain ruin hung impending over her temples and her homes, such unworthy motives should sway her citizens. The love of power must indeed have been dominant in their hearts that they should thus act. Men swayed by just and honest principles would have scorned such unworthy proceedings, and have united with ardour in obtaining the welfare of their country. But honest patriots were, at this date, rare at Athens. Self-interest swayed and degraded all the people.

It was on a solid foundation that the oligarchs built their hopes of trampling upon democracy. Athens was not prepared to meet a long siege, and scarcity soon began to be felt. Then it was that the Athenians began of themselves to think of negotiation. Envoys were sent to Agis to propose alliance with Sparta, without any condition but that of retaining the walls and Piræus. Agis directed them to resort to Sparta; but on the borders of Laconia they were stopped by a message from the ephori, who called upon them to state the proposal which they brought; and who, on hearing it, ordered them to depart, and not to return until they should be better advised. This answer created general despondency at Athens; but none yet ventured to propose concession to the first terms offered by Sparta.

While Athens was in this state of suspense, *Themamenes* devised means of escaping from the city; and he intended to remain away from it till

the storm was over. It was generally deemed necessary that some step should be taken, and Theramenes offered to go to Lysander and ascertain the real intentions of Sparta, and the object for which she insisted on the demolition of the long walls. His proposition was warmly opposed by several speakers; but it was finally adopted, and he set out, designing not to return until the city should have been reduced to a state of weakness which would leave it no choice as to any conditions that might be offered, or his own partisans should have gained undisputed ascendancy.

Theramenes stayed upwards of three months in the camp of the enemy; and, doubtless, made use of this opportunity of communicating the plans of the oligarchs to Lysander. In the meantime, Athens was the scene of violent tumults. The oligarchical faction was actively employed in extending its influence and removing or overawing its adversaries. Their boldest adversary, Cleophon, fell before them. It appears that he held some military office, which afforded a pretext for charging him with neglect of duty; and on this charge he was tried by his enemies, condemned, and put to death. This triumph of party hastened the return of Theramenes. On his arrival, he announced that he had been till then detained by Lysander, and had at last been directed to apply to the government at Sparta, which could alone possess authority to decide such questions. It was not a time for scrutinizing the conduct of Theramenes, for famine was raging throughout Athens, and therefore he was sent with nine colleagues to Sparta, invested with full powers. As before, this embassy was stopped by a message from the ephori; but it was permitted to proceed on declaring itself authorized to conclude a definitive treaty.

On the arrival of Theramenes and his colleagues at Sparta, an assembly was held to deliberate on the terms which should be granted to the vanquished enemy. It was attended by deputies from the allied states, many of whom urged the Spartans to exercise the right of conquest to its utmost extent—to exterminate Athens from the face of Greece. Among these were the allies of Corinth and Thebes. But the Spartans, if not too generous, were at least too prudent to gratify the resentment of their allies by this impolitic and inhuman revenge. They declared that they would not consent to extirpate a people which had once rendered great services to Greece when surrounded by danger, and they finally dismissed the envoys with these conditions of peace:—"That not only the long walls, but the fortifications of Piræus should be destroyed; that every ship, except twelve, should be delivered up, that the exiles should be restored; and that Athens should be annexed to the Peloponnesian confederacy"—that is, should be subjected to Sparta.

At the time of the return of Theramenes and his colleagues, famine was extending its ravages with fearful rapidity. The multitude were therefore prepared to accept terms of peace at any price. Still, when the assembly met to receive and deliberate on the report of the embassy, many, including some of the generals and

other officers, opposed the terms. But Theramenes and his party were now sufficiently strong to bear down all opposition. These men were charged with a conspiracy to obstruct the peace, and were all arrested, and committed to prison for trial. After this, the treaty was adopted, and Lysander sailed into Piræus.

The first objects of Lysander were the demolition of the long walls and the fortifications of the port. The work of destruction commenced in the midst of joyous music. The foreigners were crowned with chaplets, as for a festival, they deeming that day the beginning of liberty to Greece. Their triumph was shared by a band of Athenian exiles, who saw with the oligarchs at large, in this their country's deepest humiliation, the beginning of their power and the earnest of their revenge. To them it was a day no less welcome than to Sparta and her allies, who had long felt Athens a piercing thorn in their sides.

This work of destruction being effected, Agis returned to Sparta with the Peloponnesian army, including the garrison of Decelea; and Lysander conducted the fleet to Samos. The people of that island sustained a siege for some time, but at length they capitulated, upon condition that they should be permitted to depart in safety whither they pleased. They carried with them only the apparel they wore: their lands, houses, slaves, cattle, and all they had possessed, were given to the oligarchical faction. After this, Lysander dismissed his allies, and returned to Sparta.

Such was the consummation of this most fearful war—a war which, for inveteracy and duration, has no parallel in the pages of history. How many of the sons of Greece perished in its baneful strife! But it was a war that was not only to be deplored on this account: it was destructive in its moral still more than its political consequences. Under its influence party spirit had usurped the place of patriotic feeling, and national prejudice that of national energy. The very nature of the war led to fatal evils. Although Greece was divided into several states, each having their own laws and institutions, yet, strictly speaking, it was a civil war, than which nothing is so disastrous to a country, nothing so destructive to its prosperity, nothing so demoralising and degrading to a community. When the hand of neighbour is raised against neighbour,—that of the father against the son, and of the son against the father,—of the brother against the brother, and of the servant against his master,—such a conflict must ever end in confusion and destruction. This truth is conveyed throughout the whole narrative of this dread struggle. And yet the actors in it learned not wisdom. For one peace-loving man like Nicias, there were a thousand like Alcibiades, whose cry was for war. And for what was the cry? For glory—a glory which never yet has imparted satisfaction to the mind. It is melancholy, in perusing the records of past ages, to observe how universally depraved is the nature of man. Each spring of human action is turbid and corrupt.

To the sons of Greece, at this period, the language of the poet concerning Javan, their ancestor, may well be applied —

"Then glory's opening field they proudly trod,
 Forsook the worship and the ways of God,
 Round the wide world pursued the phantom Fame,
 And cast away their birthright for a name."
 MONTGOMERY

CHAPTER XXL

FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR TO THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS

B. C. 404—403.

BEFORE Lysander departed for Samos, he assisted the oligarchs in overthrowing the Athenian constitution. A day was appointed for an assembly, to consider the question of reform, and when that day arrived, Theramenes proposed that the supreme power should be lodged with thirty persons, who should be authorized to draw up a new code of laws. The nature and the tendency of this proposition were sufficiently intelligible to the assembly, and the murmur of disapprobation was heard, but Theramenes treated it with contemptuous defiance, and Lysander referred to his troops, and all was hushed. The proposition of Theramenes was adopted without farther hesitation, and the Thirty were appointed. Their names were Polyarches, Critias, Melobius, Euclidas, Hippolochus, Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Diocles, Arenas, Phaedrias, Churilus, Piso, Ametius, Sophocles, Eratosthenes, Charicles, Onomacles, Theognes, Æachmes, Theogenes, Cleomedes, Erasistratus, Phido, Ipracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, and Mnesithides. Besides these, also, a board of Ten was appointed to govern Piræus.

The real character of the domination of the Thirty was soon unfolded. Their first care was to provide themselves with instruments suited to their purpose. Every important post was filled with their creatures, and the council soon became the sole tribunal for state trials. Although invested with full powers to new model the whole constitution at their pleasure, yet they did not use this privilege to its full extent. They availed themselves, from time to time, of this branch of their authority, to promulgate laws or regulations of police, either by way of caution or pretext; and they exercised a censorious control over the occupations and conduct of their subjects, but it seems to have been the farthest from their thoughts to publish any code of laws which might limit their power.

Strange as it may appear, the leading aim of the Thirty was, to reduce Athens to the rank of a petty town, cut off from the city, without colonies or commerce, and to render her incapable of resisting the will, or exciting the jealousy of Sparta. It seems unnatural that Athenians should treat their parent city thus, but in this alone was the safety of the oligarchs; and this, therefore, was the line of policy adopted by the Thirty. Hence it was that they altered the position of the benches, from which the orators addressed the assembly in the Pnyx, that it might no longer command a view of the sea and Sala-

mis, and hence it was that they sold the materials of the magnificent arsenal, which had cost one thousand talents in building, for less than a third of that sum, to a contractor who undertook to demolish and clear it away.

For a brief period the proceedings of the Thirty were generally acceptable. Even their first prosecutions, being directed against a class of men held in universal contempt, namely, the informers, or sycophants, as they were called at Athens, gave satisfaction to all honest men. All desired to be rid of these pests of society, who had gained an infamous livelihood by the extortion which they practised on wealthy and timid citizens, but the form of proceeding by which they were condemned gave cause to fear that the innocent might one day be exposed to the same fate. Two tables were placed in front of the benches which they occupied, to receive the balls or tokens by which the counsellors declared their verdict, and which were openly deposited on the board, so that the Thirty might see which way every man voted. By this means, therefore, the voters were under control, and as the Thirty soon made themselves objects of terror, whatever victim they might select from the ranks of the citizens was sure to be destroyed.

The first victims judicially murdered by the Thirty were those persons who had been arrested for expressing their attachment to the constitution. These were charged with a conspiracy against the state, and were executed. At this point some of the Thirty would have stopped; but the majority, and above all Critias, exhibited greater bloodthirstiness, and perhaps they might, by this time, have thought it necessary to crush the multitude, lest the multitude should crush them. This appears to be indicated by their precautionary measure of sending to Sparta for a body of troops to garrison the citadel. These were obtained, the ephori sent the force they desired under the command of Callibus, who was invested with the authority of harmost.

The arrival of Callibus released Critias and his colleagues from all restraints imposed on them by the fears of their fellow-citizens, and a piece of good service they did him soon after his arrival enabled them to exercise the wantonness of tyranny to their heart's desire. An Athenian, named Autolyceus, of good family and condition, having offended Callibus, he, according to Spartan usage, raised his truncheon to strike him; but Autolyceus prevented the blow by bringing him to the ground. For this act of self-defence, the Thirty soon after gratified Callibus by putting Autolyceus to death; and they were rewarded, in their turn, by Callibus, who placed his troops at their disposal, for the purpose of dragging whomsoever they would to death.

The number of victims now offered up at the shrine of oligarchy became fearfully great. Citizens of all orders and ranks perished: whoever opposed their injustice and violence became their victims; and riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, that the Thirty might divide the prey. The scenes which were daily transacted were the very antitypes of those committed in that period of French history called "The Reign of Terror."

All stood aghast, and asked where these executions would end? what were the motives of the executioners? and what form of government would at length be established?

Some light may be thrown on the policy of the oligarchs by the case of Leon, of Salamis, who, together with a great number of his townsmen, were dragged from their homes, and consigned to the executioner. After the arrival of the Spartan garrison they had begun to dispense with the assistance of the council, and Leon was put to death without any form of trial. But in his case they did not use the aid of foreign troops. In order to implicate Athenians of the opposite party in the guilt and odium of their proceedings, when they resolved on his destruction, they sent for Socrates and four other persons, and ordered them to go and fetch him from Salamis. As his innocence was equally manifest with the fate that awaited him, Socrates, on leaving the presence of the Thirty, returned home. The rest were mean enough to execute their commission.

It appears that Theramenes was early aware of the danger into which his colleagues were rushing; as soon, therefore, as he discovered the effect which these three-multiplied executions had upon the people, he remonstrated with Critias on the imprudence of creating enemies, by putting men to death, for no other reason than because they had filled eminent stations or performed signal services under the democracy. Critias contended that they were in a position which could only be maintained by terror, and that every man not in their interests must be treated as an enemy. This argument satisfied Theramenes for the time, but as the deeds of blood increased with fearful rapidity, and as the murmurs of the citizens began to find vent in private circles, he again warned his colleagues that it would be impossible for the oligarchy to subsist long on its present basis. His advice was now heeded; but, at the same time, recollecting that Theramenes might be meditating placing himself at the head of a new revolution, as in the days of the Four Hundred, they determined to strengthen themselves by an expedient similar to that which had been adopted by the former oligarchy. They made out a list of three thousand citizens, who were to enjoy some kind of franchise not defined, but whose most important privilege was, that none of them should be put to death without a trial before the council. The rest of the community were outlawed, and left to the mercy of the Thirty, who might deal with them and their property as they thought fit. That they might not be able to defend themselves from the effects of this most cruel measure, under a pretext of a review, all the citizens were deprived of their arms, except the knights and the three thousand.

The Thirty deeming themselves secure now went a step farther in crime. Being in want of finances to support the Spartan garrison, it was suggested by Piso and Theognis, that several of the resident aliens were known to be ill-affected towards the oligarchy, and that this afforded a pretext for plundering the whole class. This suggestion being favourably received, they then proposed that each of the Thirty should have one of

the wealthy aliens assigned to him, whom they should put to death, and of whose property they should take possession. On hearing this monstrous proposition, Theramenes observed, that the Sycophants, who had rendered democracy odious, had never taken away both money and life, and he apprehended that such a measure would render the aliens hostile to the government. His colleagues, however, were not disposed to listen to the morality of the question, or to fear provoking the aliens, and the proposition was adopted. Theramenes himself was invited to single out his prey with the rest, but he refused to stain his hands with innocent blood, which is a redeeming point in his character.

It was resolved to begin this work by taking ten lives, and, for the sake of covering the real motive, two of the victims were to be poor men, who would therefore be supposed to have suffered for some political offence. One scene only in this act is handed down to us, but that, doubtless, is the counterpart of the rest. Cephalus, a Syracusan, had been induced by Pericles, and by faction in his own state, to migrate to Athens. Two of his sons, Lysias and Polemarchus, had afterwards joined the colonists sent out to Thurii, where the former, then a boy of fourteen, found opportunity of cultivating his talent for oratory, under the guidance of eminent orators. When the disasters of the Athenians in Sicily had ruined their interests on the coasts of the Italian cities, Lysias and his brother were compelled to return to Athens, then under the rule of the Four Hundred. Here they carried on a flourishing manufacture of shields, employing 120 slaves as workmen. By their opulence they were enabled to contribute largely to the service of their adopted country. But their opulence proved the cause of their ruin: it excited the cupidity of the Thirty, and they were, therefore, selected among the first victims devoted to destruction on the motion of Piso and Theognis. Piso himself undertook to seize Lysias and his property. He was at supper when Piso entered, and he was immediately arrested by him, while Melobius and Mnesithides proceeded to take possession of the manufactory. Lysias prevailed on Piso, by a bribe, to promise to save his life; but, notwithstanding the most solemn oaths, after having seized all the gold in his coffers, he gave him up to the custody of Melobius and Mnesithides. He was led by them to the house of one Damnippus, where Theognis was guarding some other prisoners, and to whose charge he was consigned. Damnippus happened to be his friend, and while he was endeavouring to bribe Theognis, who was known to be vulnerable on that point, Lysias made his escape, and embarked for Megara. His brother Polemarchus, however, was not so fortunate: he was compelled to swallow the hemlock draught, which was the ordinary mode of capital punishment, and the whole of his property was confiscated, the very ear-rings of his wife being brutally torn from her by Melobius.

Guilt is ever impatient of a monitor. Hence, after these transactions, the colleagues of Theramenes resolved to rid themselves of him. Accordingly, they concerted a plan for an open attack upon him, and, to ensure its success, they surrounded the council-chamber with a band of

the most daring of their younger followers, armed with daggers. Critics then stood forward as the accuser of Theramenes. He vindicated the frequency of the executions, enlarged upon the benefits of the existing constitution, and, finally, charged Theramenes with being a traitor, and an enemy to oligarchy. Theramenes replied at length to Critias; and he so demonstrated the expediency of the measures which he had always advocated, and the iniquity and danger of those pursued by his accuser, that the majority of the Council were in his favour. This was a critical situation for Critias to be placed in, for his own ruin would scarcely fail to follow the acquittal of Theramenes. But his instruments were at the door. After conferring a few moments with the Thirty, he called in his armed auxiliaries, and he then told the councillors, that he thought he should be wanting in the duty of his station if he suffered his friends to be misled; and that the persons they now saw before them would not suffer a man who aimed at the ruin of the oligarchy to escape with impunity. He added:

"In the new code it is enacted, that none of the Three Thousand shall be put to death except by a sentence of the council, but that all who are not included in that list may be sent to execution without any form of trial by the Thirty. I, therefore, with the unanimous consent of my colleagues, strike the name of Theramenes from the list, and condemn him to death."

On hearing this sentence, Theramenes rushed to the altar of Vesta, which stood in the middle of the room, and conjured the Council not to allow Critias thus to dispose of life, but to claim the benefit of a legal trial both for him and themselves. "As for this altar," he observed, "I know it will not protect me. I have only fled to it that the impiety of my enemies may become as manifest as their injustice. And yet I cannot but wonder that you, who know that your own names may just as easily be erased as mine, should abandon me to the pleasure of Critias."

Theramenes had proceeded thus far in his appeal when the herald of the Thirty summoned in the ministers of penal justice, called the Eleven. They entered with their attendants, headed by Satyrus, the most reckless instrument of the Thirty; and Critias bade them apprehend Theramenes, who had been lawfully condemned, and lead him away to punishment. Accordingly, Theramenes was dragged away from the altar, and hurried across the agora to prison. Arriving there, the hemlock cup was given him, and, when he had taken its contents, he dashed the last drop on the ground, in imitation of a sportive convivial usage, in which the player accompanied the sound of the falling liquor, which he threw into another vessel or on the ground, with the name of the object of his affections, and added, "This libation is for my beloved Critias."

Such was the end of Theramenes. He had before treacherously encompassed the death of rivals, and now he fell before a rival. His death was one of the most awful on record. Thoughtless and light-hearted he might be, and profane historians may hence exalt his name, as Xenophon does in glowing colours; but when a man is on the borders of eternity it becomes him to be serious. Yet Theramenes is to be had in

honour for the bold stand he made against the atrocious deeds committed by his colleagues. And this will appear more manifest when viewed in connexion with their after deeds. Released from all restraint, they now proceeded to bolder measures. Every one who was not on the list of the Three Thousand was prohibited from entering the city, and emissaries were sent out to seize the persons and confiscate the property of the citizens who were, through that prohibition, scattered over Attica. There was at length no safety for them but in exile, whence Argos, Megara, and Thebes, were soon crowded with Athenian wanderers. The vengeance of the oligarchs would have followed them thither, for, being alarmed at their proximity to them, they applied to the Spartan government to interpose, for the purpose of averting future danger; and the Spartans issued an edict which empowered the Thirty to arrest the exiles in every Greek city, but at Argos, and Thebes, and probably in other cities, they were protected, sheltered, and entertained by the citizens. The Thebans, especially, exhibited a noble contempt for the Spartan proclamation, by issuing a counter decree, directing that the persecuted Athenians should be received in all the Bœotian towns, that if any one should attempt to force them away, every Bœotian should lend his aid to rescue them, and that they should not be obstructed in any expedition they might undertake against the oligarchy at Athens. This measure, however, it is to be feared, was not dictated so much by justice or compassion toward the exiles, as by jealousy and resentment toward Sparta, for the Thebans had hoped to share in the spoils of Decelea, and the treasures captured by Lysander, and had been disappointed. Sparta was the strongest, and appropriated all to her own purposes.

It would appear that at an early period of the government of the Thirty Tyrants many eyes were fixed on Alcibiades as a deliverer. But their hope was soon cut off. Alcibiades had been driven from his Thracian fortress by the terror of the Spartans, then masters of the Hellespont, and had acquired a settlement under the protection of Pharnabazus, in the little village of Grynum, in Phrygia. Here for a time he lived unmolested, but at length he was cut off by a violent death. A house in which he slept was set on fire in the night, and, when he rushed out, he found himself surrounded by barbarians, who despatched him with their missiles.

The accounts which the ancients give of the immediate occasion of this event are various, and it is now impossible to ascertain the truth. The most probable, however, is, that the Spartan government required the exile's life, either to secure itself and its Athenian friends, or to gratify the animosity of Agis. And yet the compliance of Pharnabazus with such a requisition is not easily reconciled with his hitherto recorded manly and open character. The account must, therefore, still remain involved in mystery.

Such was the end of Alcibiades: a man whose character can only be truly represented in the vicissitudes of his life and fortune, and who, though adorned with the advantages of birth, wealth, valour, and eloquence, and endowed with rare gifts of nature and art, was yet so deficient

in discretion and probity," as to involve his country in the deepest calamities. His death is strongly marked with the lines of retributive justice. He fell before he had attained his fortieth year.

"Evil shall hunt the violent man to overthrow him."
Ps cxi. 11.

Although the hope of the exiles was cut off, as regards Alcibiades, yet a deliverer was at hand. Among those whom the tyranny of the Thirty had early driven into exile was Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, whose name has already been conspicuous in this history. He was at Thebes when their tyranny began to drive the citizens into exile by hundreds, and the temper then prevailing in that city encouraged him to undertake the deliverance of his country. Accordingly, having obtained a small supply of arms and money from the Thebans, he crossed the border with a band of seventy refugees, and seized the fortress of Phyle, which stood on an eminence projecting from the side of Mount Parnes, about twelve or thirteen miles from Athens.

Such an enterprise appears at first view to bear the stamp of a rash adventure. And so the Thirty looked upon it. Confident that they should soon be able to crush so feeble an enemy, they marched against them with the Three Thousand and their equestrian partisans. As soon as they arrived at the foot of the hill of Phyle, the younger troops were directed to attack the fortress. But this assault was repulsed, and as they were proceeding to reduce the place by blockade, a heavy fall of snow compelled them to abandon the design and return into the city. In their retreat, Thrasybulus and his little band fell upon their rear, and cut off a number of the camp-followers, and made themselves masters of part of the baggage.

After their mischance at Phyle, the Thirty seem to have apprehended nothing from the garison beyond excursions for plunder. To prevent this, they sent out the Spartan auxiliaries with two squadrons of horse, who encamped in some ground covered with wood or bushes. By this time the force of Thrasybulus had increased from seventy to seven hundred, and with these he fell upon the auxiliaries at daybreak, when they were for the most part dispersed at a distance from their arms, and killed 120 of the infantry, and put the rest to flight. Then, after erecting a trophy, and collecting all the arms of the vanquished he could find, he returned to Phyle.

The Thirty now began to be alarmed. They saw that it was possible they might be dislodged from Athens, and determined to provide themselves with another place of refuge. To effect this, one of the most atrocious crimes on record was committed by them. At the instigation of Critias, he and his colleagues, with their cavalry, proceeded to Eleusis, with the professed intention of inspecting and registering the military force of the place, under the pretext of providing for its defence. Their followers were posted by the sea-side, near a postern, through which the citizens of the best condition were ordered to pass, and they were all arrested. The

same scene was acted at Salamis, and three hundred prisoners were carried to Athens, as the fruit of this expedition, to be immolated. They all perished under the pretence that such a step was necessary for the preservation of the constitution.

Four days after his victory, Thrasybulus, having increased his numbers to one thousand men, marched by night into Piræus, where he found the whole population ready to aid him. The Thirty immediately assembled their forces, and issued from the city. Thrasybulus did not attempt to repel the enemy, but awaited their approach on a road which led up the hill of Munychia. As they drew near, Thrasybulus came forward, and animated his men by the recollection of their recent success, and the prospect of a just vengeance. Pointing to the advancing ranks at the foot of the hill, he exhorted them to seize the propitious moment, in which victory was certain, and death glorious. As he ceased, a soothsayer, by whom he was attended, enjoined his friends not to begin till one of their side should be slain or wounded, assuring them that the result would be happy for them, though fatal to himself. To fulfil his own prediction, he rushed forward to charge the advancing foe, and perished, and then the battle began. The issue was not long doubtful. The troops of the Thirty fled before the shower of missiles which poured down upon them from Munychia, and were pursued into the plain. The humanity of the victors prevented a great slaughter. Only seventy of the common men were slain; but the day was rendered memorable for the death of that vile and detestable leader of the Thirty, Critias, his colleague Hippomachus, and his kinsman Charmides, one of the Ten of the Piræus.

The troops of Thrasybulus, with a noble tenderness, abstained from stripping their slain countrymen, except of their arms. The restitution of their bodies led to an interchange of words between the adverse ranks. Cleocritus, herald of the Mysteries, took the opportunity of proclaiming silence, and then of addressing an affecting remonstrance on the part of the exiles to their adversaries. "Why," he asked, "do you drive us from our homes? Why seek the lives of your fellow-citizens?—of men who have never wronged you, and who have shared with you your holiest sanctuaries and sacrifices, your most cheerful festivals, the pursuits of peace, and the dangers of war? Even in this unnatural civil war, excited and fomented by miscreants, who have shed more blood in the course of eight months than the Peloponnesians in ten years of war, we have lamented your misfortunes alike with our own; nor is there a man whom you have left on the field of battle over whom we have not wept with their friends."

Dreading the effect of a proclamation so well calculated to sow the seeds of disaffection among their troops, the commanders led them off hastily to the city. Notwithstanding, this proclamation had its effect upon the minds of the multitude. On the next day, the remaining members of the Thirty met, and consulted concerning their affairs, while the Three Thousand were disputing in various parts of the city. Those who had

been forward in the late violences advocated opposition to the utmost against Thrasybulus and the exiles; but the majority, being less obnoxious, insisted on the necessity of an accommodation. With these different views an assembly was held, in which the Thirty were deposed, and a new College of Ten, one from each tribe, appointed in their stead. Two of the Thirty, Phido and Erasteshenes, became members of this new college, but the rest retired with their most devoted partisans to Eleusis.

It was known that the men thus raised to power were bitter enemies of Critias, and it was hoped that an accommodation would follow; and Phido earnestly advocated such a measure, as one which could alone heal the wounds of Athens. It was soon discovered, however, that these hopes were groundless, and that the Ten were resolved to overpower the exiles in Piræus, and to exclude the faction of Eleusis. Thrasybulus, therefore, made preparations for prosecuting his success. He was the more incited to this because the former inhabitants of Athens, of every rank and order, now flocked to his standard. For the most part, however, they brought only their persons to his aid. They had been disarmed by Critias, and, therefore, had no means of self-defence. But this deficiency was gradually supplied by the liberal contributions of the wealthier citizens, and by the active ingenuity of the rest. Thus, Lysias, out of the wreck of his fortune, and, perhaps, aided by foreigners, supplied his friends with 200 shields, 2000 drachmas, and 300 mercenaries. The men, also, substituted shields of wood or wicker, whitened over, for metal armour; and, in the course of ten days, a numerous body of heavy and light infantry was ready to take the field, and they began to make foraging excursions from Piræus. Every day, the exiles gained new strength and spirits, and they at length ventured to bring engines against the walls; and, to retard their approach, the besieged barricaded the road leading to the city from the Lyceum with great blocks of stone.

The danger became so pressing, that the Ten deputed Phido to seek assistance from Sparta. Envoys were sent at the same time thither, and, with the like objects, by the Eleusian faction, whence it seems probable that they had composed their differences with the oligarchs at Athens. Phido was supported in his application by Lysander, and though the government declined sending out an army, he succeeded in procuring himself to be appointed harmost, and in obtaining permission to raise troops for the purpose of suppressing the insurrection. At the same time his brother, Libys, was created admiral, and was ordered to blockade Piræus, and Lysander obtained a loan of 100 talents from the Spartan treasury for Phido's colleagues.

Lysander repaired to Eleusis, and soon attracted a large body of Peloponnesian troops into his service. This was a natural consequence of the long war which had just concluded. Military adventurers now abounded in all parts of Greece, and they were very willing to take up arms again for a subsistence. War had become their trade; and hence Lysander was soon enabled to confine the exiles within Piræus, while his brother Libys prevented them from receiving

supplies by sea. They now saw nothing before them but a repetition of the miseries which had preceded the capitulation of Athens, and a renewal of the scenes that followed; but relief came from a quarter to which they could least have looked for it—from Sparta!

At this time the success, fame, honours, and influence of Lysander, had excited jealousy in the breasts of several of the leading men of Sparta. Their very kings and ephori felt themselves insignificant when compared with him; hence it was suggested that his new expedition was one in which the state had no interest, and could only serve his private ends, by showing the importance of his patronage to the faction ruling at Athens. The suggestion was plausible; and soon after his departure measures were concerted by Pausanias, with three of the ephori, for baffling his enterprise. They did not deem it expedient, however, to announce any change in the policy of Sparta toward the Athenian parties, but agreed to send Pausanias at the head of an army into Attica, with the avowed purpose of co-operating with Lysander, but with the secret intention of defeating his purpose. Accordingly, Pausanias collected a large army, marched into Attica, and encamped near Piræus, as if to carry on the siege in conjunction with Lysander. On his arrival he ordered the chiefs of the exiles to disband their forces, but as he did not disclose his friend's intentions, they refused compliance. He then made a feint of attempting to storm the town, but retired at the first show of resistance. The next day he advanced with the professed design of reconnoitring the ground with a view to circumvallation. As he was retiring he was attacked by a party of the besieged, who compelled him to turn his whole force against them. He pursued them into the town as far as the theatre of Piræus, where the main body of the exiles were assembled. Their targeteers immediately began a brisk attack on the Spartans, and compelled Pausanias to fall back for about half a mile, on some rising ground, where he halted, and ordered the other divisions of his army to join him. Thus reinforced, and having formed a phalanx of unusual depth, he again advanced toward the exiles, who now fled, with the loss of 150 men.

Pausanias raised a trophy after this victory, but had no intention of following up his success, on the contrary, he sent a secret message to the exiles, by which they discovered his views. In this message he directed them to depute some of their members to himself and those ephori who accompanied him, and suggested the language which they should use. Knowing, also, that there was a large party in the city desirous of peace, he encouraged them likewise to meet in the largest numbers they could collect there, and to address him with a declaration of their sentiments. Both these parties readily obeyed his suggestions; and Pausanias, with the approbation of the ephori, concluded an armistice with the exiles; and sent their deputies, as well as those of the party opposed to the measures of government in the city, to plead their cause at Sparta.

As soon as the Ten heard of this embassy they sent deputies of their own to counteract it.

On their arrival, these deputies urged, that as they resigned themselves and the city to the absolute disposal of the Spartans, so, if their adversaries professed to be equally loyal to Sparta, they ought to be called upon to surrender Piræus and Munychia. But this suggestion was disregarded; and, after all the envoys had been heard by the ephori in the ordinary assembly, fifteen commissioners were appointed, with full authority, in conjunction with Pausanias, to settle with impartiality the existing differences of the Athenian parties.

The terms which these commissioners prescribed were liberal and wise. They published a general reconciliation, which was secured by a complete amnesty, from which none were excluded but the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had been governors of Piræus. And even these, and all other citizens who might fear to return to Athens, were allowed to live unmolested at Eleusis. This treaty was ratified between the two parties, and Pausanias disbanded his forces, while the exiles entered the city in triumph, and marched under arms to the citadel, to sacrifice to Minerva.

Sacrifice being performed, an assembly was held, in which the citizens met as in former days. Their glory was, indeed, departed, and their prospects were gloomy; but, freed from domestic tyranny, they were not without hopes that, when the wounds inflicted by war and civil discord should be healed, their country might recover some portion of her ancient vigour. With such hopes, the constitution, as it stood before the appointment of the Thirty, was, at the suggestion of Thrasylbulus, re-established. Some feeble attempts were made to subvert this order of things, by the faction at Eleusis, but these were averted by the activity of the government, and if Xenophon may be credited, they resulted in their complete overthrow and death. He states that the oligarchical leaders were drawn into a conference, and put to death, but as such an act of deliberate treachery does not accord with the wise moderation and exemplary good faith of the restored exiles, the statement should be received with hesitation. It seems more probable that, finding themselves unable to accomplish their purpose, they forewent the struggle. They might even have been among the number of those seceders who, through the mediation of their friends and relatives in the city, accepted an offer of reconciliation, and returned home. These seceders were all comprehended in a new act of amnesty, which was as faithfully observed, as it was wisely and nobly granted,—a triumph which redounds to the honour of Thrasylbulus and his friends. They had learned wisdom in adversity.

It may be asked, what was the primary cause of these evil doings? There must have been some very bitter principles at work, that the order of society could have been thus effectually uprooted. In Greece, the parent of these crimes was Paganism—infidelity engendered by Popery produced similar effects in France. These, acting upon the universally depraved nature of man, gave birth, in the one, to *Critias*; the other, to *Robespierre*—men whose names must be abhorred to the end of time. Companions they

had, but they far outstripped them in the work of desolation, and thereby gained for themselves an unenviable notoriety in the records of history. They stand recorded there, as evidences that there is no crime too foul for the nature of man to commit when left to himself—when unrestrained by the power of true religion. What a contrast to the horrible scenes here recorded would obedience to the principles of Christianity produce? Even a nominal profession of it has lessened the horrors of war greatly, and we look forward to the time when “war shall be no more.” What a glorious era will that be, when one song shall employ all nations, and all shall cry—

‘Worthy the Lamb, for he was slain for us’

Come, then, and, added to thy many crowns,
Receive yet one, the crown of all the earth,
Thou who alone art worthy! It was thine,
By ancient covenant, ere Nature's birth,
And thou hast made it thine by purchase since,
And exalted its value with thy blood,
Thy saints proclaim thee King, and in their hearts
Thy title is engraven with a pen
Dipp'd in the fountain of Eternal Love
Thy saints proclaim thee King, and thy delay
Gives courage to their foes, who, could they see
The dawn of thy last advent, long desired,
Would creep into the bowels of the hills,
And fly for safety to the falling rocks.

• • • • •
Come, then, and, added to thy many crowns,
Receive yet one, as radiant as the rest,
Due to thy last and most effectual work,
Thy word fulfill'd, the conquest of a world.”

COWPER.

CHAPTER XXII.

FROM THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IN ATHENS TO THE RESUMPTION OF WAR BE- TWEEN SPARTA AND PERŒIA

B C 403—399

THE historian at this point of Grecian history, like a traveller, who, after having wandered about in a desert, comes suddenly upon fields of fruits and flowers, rejoices at the sight, and hastens to enjoy the pleasures which the prospect affords him. We have long dwelt upon scenes of war, whose fruits, like the apples of Sodom, are full of ashes and bitterness; we are now, however, invited to the pleasant scenes of peace. Heroes and warriors have occupied many a previous page, sages and orators, for a brief period, at least, now take their place, and will chiefly occupy our attention during a short political calm.

The first object of public attention, after the termination of the Anarchy—as the year of the Thirty was now called, to mark that these tyrants were not legally appointed—was the state of the laws. For some ages there had been only one complete copy of the laws of Solon. This was kept with great care in the citadel, where all might have access to it for the purpose of transcribing any parts that were required. But this was felt to be an inconvenience, and hence, in the midst of the internal troubles which preceded the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, a decree was passed for a second copy of the

whole code for public use, it being deemed necessary for the security of civil order. The important task of transcription was committed to Nicomachus, a man of rank, connected with the oligarchical party, and it was expected that the work would be completed within four months. Nicomachus, however, had not completed his task before it was interrupted by the establishment of the oligarchy. In this new order of things Nicomachus took a part, and hence the work was laid aside. But notwithstanding the services which he had rendered to the oligarchical faction in the case of Cleophon, he does not appear to have been so cruel in heart as the oligarchs in general, for he had been compelled by the Thirty to quit Athens, and he returned with Thrasybulus. His work being left incomplete, one of the first measures of the restored assembly was, to direct that a legislative committee should be appointed by the council to examine the existing laws, and to propose any changes which they might think proper. These alterations, or additions, were to be published within a month, when they were to be submitted to the inspection of the Council and of another legislative body appointed by a more popular mode of election; and it was expressly stipulated that any private citizen might assist them with his counsels. When passed, the whole code was to be transcribed on the walls of a portico which had before been used for this purpose, and, as before, Nicomachus was to be intrusted with this task. That the laws in their new form might be a perpetual monument of the epoch at which they were transcribed, it was decreed that they should be written in the Ionian alphabet, which had only recently come into use in Attica, and was now for the first time employed in state documents. Another clause directed, that, when the laws should have been enacted, the council of Areopagus should watch over them and see that the magistrates carried them into execution, and, in the meanwhile, a kind of privy council, consisting of twenty persons, was appointed, with extraordinary authority, as guardians of the public peace.

The transcription of these laws appears to have occupied a longer time than was expected, and the delay was imputed to Nicomachus. During its progress he was called to account by a client of the orator Lysias, on a charge of wilful tardiness and arbitrary interpolations, committed both before and since the Anarchy. This charge, however, seems to have fallen to the ground, and at length the new code was finished. When completed other enactments were annexed to it, for the purpose of guarding it from infringement and abuse. Thus the magistrates were forbidden to make use of an unwritten law; the law itself was declared to be of higher authority than the decrees of the Council and the assembly; and no law was to be passed affecting a single individual except by a majority of 6000 votes.

About the same time a law was revived—which had been first proposed by Pericles, but had either been repealed or had fallen into disuse—for limiting the franchise to the children of Athenian parents. A new decree was also inscribed on a pillar in the Council-chamber, which

authorized any one who discovered another to be aiming at tyranny, or at the subversion of democracy, to kill him with impunity. Thirlwall justly remarks, that if this decree had been passed at any other time, it would have been at once a monument of extravagant folly and of atrocious injustice. But, recollecting the cruel rule of the Thirty, there can be no wonder that such a decree was enacted, or that the citizens took an oath to exercise this dreadful license. The minds of all were naturally impressed with horror at the past scenes, and this was deemed necessary to prevent their renewal.

How scrupulous the Athenians were in the administration of the laws for some time after the Anarchy, appears on record in many transactions. A minute violation of its letter was sufficient to turn the verdict against the defendant, as seen in the following case. Lysias, by his sufferings, services, and talents, appears to have been a worthy object of the Athenian franchise, and Thrasybulus moved a decree for so rewarding him, which was carried. Unfortunately for Lysias, however, Thrasybulus, confiding in his acknowledged merits, deemed it unnecessary to procure the preliminary vote of the Council which the law required. This was fatal to his cause. Archinus, of Cœle, his personal friend and companion of his exile, impeached him on this ground, and Lysias lost the franchise.

It has before been remarked that the amnesty between the oligarchical factions and the democracy was religiously observed. Xenophon says that the two parties continued to live in concord together, and the party which had triumphed to abide by its oaths. This testimony is confirmed by a remarkable fact, which strikingly indicates the excellent temper which prevailed in the popular assembly as well as in the courts of justice. The Spartans were not prevented, by the distress which followed the Anarchy, from demanding the reimbursement of the sum they had advanced to the oligarchs for the purpose of overpowering that party which was now predominant, and when payment was delayed, they assumed a threatening aspect. The government of Athens could not be rightly required to pay this sum, and they might justly have refused compliance with the demand, or have compelled those who received the subsidy, or for whose benefit it was intended, to refund it. This latter was the course which many speakers in an assembly held to deliberate on this question suggested, but nevertheless, the assembly charged itself with the repayment of the subsidy, and decreed that it should be raised by an extraordinary general contribution. Testimony, equally forcible as to the good faith of the people, may be gathered from the pages of the orator Andocides, who states that several of the worst tools of oligarchy—men stained with innocent blood, and objects of universal abhorrence—remained at Athens, relying on the amnesty, and enjoying its protection. All this tends to prove, at the same time, that mild measures are far more effectual for the maintenance of peace than mere terror. The former disarms rage, while the latter exasperates even men of peaceable intentions.

These assertions, however, as to the fidelity with which the amnesty was observed, must be

only considered true in a general sense. It would have been strange indeed if there had not been exceptions; for the iron rule of the Thirty had left indelible marks on some which could never be erased. It is not so easy for man to forgive the wrongs he has endured, or to drop resentment against his persecutors. Revenge is a sweet morsel to the unregenerate, and hence many attempts were made at Athens to violate the public compact. The sycophants, moreover, although thinned, were not exterminated by the oligarchs, and their temper was such, that, goaded by the poverty now so universally experienced, they were tempted to recur to their old trade for profit. The laws of Solon, just, as they were, in the main, were impotent to allay the bad passions of human nature. Nor could the spirit of concord displayed in the government prevent individual attempts to procure revenge. Still, both these combined, prevented any flagrant outbreak which might otherwise have taken place, and the result proves the utility of wholesome laws in society. Were every man his own magistrate, as an old writer observes, and intrusted with the power of punishing, there would be strange confusion in a short time, and the world would be ruined by doing justice. If ignorance and ill-nature might condemn and execute at discretion—if spleen and pride might play without control, and resentment make a sally upon every pretence,—the four winds of heaven might better be loosed upon us than all the passions of such a liberty.

Hence it will be seen that whenever an Athenian was incited to revenge after the period of the Anarchy, he was compelled to seek it through the medium of a public prosecution. This is distinctly unfolded in the orations of Lysias. That orator was himself an advocate by profession, and his pen was at the service of every suitor. And the records he has left tend to prove that if the oaths and laws which guarded the amnesty were not formally broken, they were nevertheless sometimes eluded, and that, the sycophants began by degrees to lift up their heads during the period following the Anarchy. They tend to prove, also, that the advocates of Athens were not very scrupulous as to the measures they pursued, in order to gain their purpose. Their chief weapon, however, was their eloquence, by which, according to Xenophon, they often procured the condemnation of the innocent, and the acquittal of the guilty. Out of two hundred and thirty orations which Lysias delivered, it is said two only were unsuccessful.

Among the early objects of prosecution with which Lysias was connected, was the son of Alcibiades. It appears that the Athenians had decreed a military expedition*, and the generals were empowered to name the citizens who should serve upon it. Party interest, or party resentment, influencing these generals, they called upon several men of rank and property to serve as common soldiers. Some obeyed the mandate; but young Alcibiades dared to refuse, and this was made a pretext for prosecution. Lysias was the advocate who opposed him, and

his oration does not convey a favourable opinion of the rhetorician himself, or of the prosecutor for whom he wrote, or of the court which could listen to him. The speaker openly avows that his motive is hereditary and personal enmity toward the defendant, enters into a history of his early life, and dwells at length on the political offences of the father as a ground for condemning the son. From one allusion it appears that the young man, when a child, was in danger of being involved in the same sentence with his father by the fury of the people, or the malice of the adverse faction, and that, among the reports which were spread about the causes of the disaster of *Egos-potami*, one attributed it to the treachery of Alcibiades. This the orator assumed was a fact, and he thus contrived to represent him as a man author of the late calamities, and as deserving a share of the hatred duo to the Thirty. But all this was wholly irrelevant to the proper question. In approaching this, the orator cited three penal laws—one against cowardice in battle, another against omission of service with the infantry, and a third against presuming to act with the cavalry without the previous approbation of the Council in the scrutiny called *dokimasia*. By a violent construction, the accuser endeavoured to persuade the court that Alcibiades was obnoxious to the first of these laws, because he had disobeyed the mandate, and he called for sentence to be pronounced on him accordingly. But although the court listened to the orator, it did not agree with him, for if he only lost two causes, this was one—Alcibiades was acquitted.

About the same time that Alcibiades was prosecuted, three nephews of his colleague in command, Nicias, was brought to trial. What crimes were laid to their charge, however, is not stated, and hence we pass on to the notice of the prosecution of Andocides on a charge of impiety.

Andocides had been released from prison after the information with which he had allayed the popular ferment in the affair of the *Hermes busts*. Some time after, however, notwithstanding the assurances of impunity which he had received, he was branded with ignominy by a decree which excluded him from the *Agora* and the temples. Residence at Athens under such privations was almost insupportable, and he went abroad. While the Athenian fleet lay at *Samos*, he used the interest which he had made with *Archelaus*, king of *Macedonia*, to procure some naval stores which it wanted, hoping thereby to conciliate the good-will of his countrymen. After this he went to Athens to claim the reward of his services, but the *Four Hundred* were then presiding in the city, and he was arrested by them at the instance of *Pisander*, and narrowly escaped with his life. When the democracy was restored, he applied a second time for the repeal of the ignominious decree, but without success, whence he retired again from Athens, to which he did not return till the expulsion of the *Thirty*. He now began again to take an active part in public affairs, but was twice called upon to defend himself against a criminal information grounded on the decree. It is to the second of these occasions that the

* History does not state the objects of this expedition.

oration in which Andocides defended himself, and from which the facts are gathered, refers.

The accusation appears to have comprised several heads, and to have been set on foot by several persons who were his private enemies. Among them was Callias, the chief of the noble family which possessed the superintendence of the Eleusinian mysteries, and who filled the office of torch-bearer. According to the defendant's oration, Callias was provoked by the resistance which he experienced from him in an iniquitous attempt; and he had not only suborned a sycophant named Cephisius to lay the information, but had forged another charge against him, of a breach of a sacred law relating to the sanctuary called the Eleusinion. His other accusers stand charged by Andocides, of owing him a grudge because he had thwarted them in their contract for a part of the revenue, out of which they had been accustomed to make considerable gain. Having thus laid bare the motives of his accusers, Andocides proceeded to his own vindication in the affair which caused his disgrace, and to urge arguments as to the claim he had to the benefit of the amnesty. If a verdict should be given against him, he observed, the same principle would apply to many citizens then living in secure alliance on the public faith, and who were chargeable with political offences much greater than those attributed to him. "Make this precedent," he added, "and every one of this number will be in danger either from private enemies or from sycophants." Andocides was acquitted, but the decree was still held in force against him.

Many other examples might be added to illustrate the manner in which private revenge worked at this period, while the government preserved general good faith. Sycophancy grew every day bolder and bolder. And the evil was greatly aggravated by the poverty of the state and of individuals. This not only whetted private rapacity, but it sharpened the rigour of the tribunals in all cases affecting the interests of the treasury. According to Lysias, indeed, there was a large class of prosecutions arising out of the wants of the treasury. Thus, there is on record an instance of one being prosecuted for having received alms of the state when he was able to get his own living;* and the remuneration which had hitherto been given to the poets, whose ingenuity furnished the best part of the public entertainment, was reduced. This latter measure took place at the suggestion of Agyrius; and it is said that his motive for it was the desire of revenge for the dramatic satire under which he had smarted. And this seems probable, for, at the suggestion of the same demagogue, the pay for attendance in the assembly was raised from one obolus to three, which proves that the poets were not thus persecuted from motives of economy. How rigorous the government of Athens became in matters of finance is seen in the fact, that a new board of magistrates was appointed immediately after the

Anarchy, under the title of Syndics,[†] and that when the property of a delinquent had been confiscated, if it did not prove equal to the expected amount, his nearest relatives and friends became objects of suspicion, and liable to a charge of secreting it, which it was difficult to repel. Thus Philocrates was accused of embezzling the property of Ergocles, and he was called upon to prove either that others were in possession of it, or that the sentence under which Ergocles had suffered for peculation and treasonable designs was unjust.

These instances, to which many more might be added, discover a very low tone of morals; but the comedies of Aristophanes exhibit his fellow-citizens in a still more unfavourable light. From his writings it may be gathered that gross vices had become so common, that they were scarcely thought to need concealment, and the women in particular are objects of unsparing and indiscriminate satire. This appears to have been particularly the case among the lower classes. Xenophon asserts, that the contrast between the upper and the lower classes was equivalent to that between vice and virtue. The rich, says he, are the worthy, the excellent, and the wise; the poor are the ignorant and depraved; and hence the two classes are irreconcilably hostile to each other. But this appears, for the most part, to have been the fault of the rich themselves. Aristophanes represents them as standing aloof from the great body of the citizens, and as nourishing a secret hatred to the constitution, and anxiously waiting for an opportunity of overthrowing it, and avenging themselves for past injuries and humiliation. Xenophon himself, also, bears his testimony to this estrangement between the rich and the poor. The common people, he says, will not be governed by the counsels of the wise and virtuous, because, ignorant and foolish as they are, they still have sense enough to know that good men are their mortal enemies; and that, if they were intrusted with power, they would very soon deprive them of their liberty. All this, however, appears to have been considered by Aristophanes as the pernicious effects of the war, and it may, therefore, be considered as an apt illustration of its evils.

These evils were powerfully combated by Aristophanes in his satiric verses. Also, he looked upon the changes which had recently taken place in the education, habits, and modes of thinking of the higher classes, as fraught with equally dangerous consequences; and he laboured to counteract them with as much zeal as those of the lower classes of citizens.

When Aristophanes entered on his dramatic career, Athens had been, during half a century, securely seated on that eminence of glory and power to which she rose immediately after the Persian war. This was a period of great intellectual activity; and the course of education under which the conquerors of Marathon and Salamis had been reared was no longer deemed sufficient for the noble among the Athenian youth. Under the fostering care of Pericles,

* At Athens there was a kind of poor-law, by which an indigent citizen, who, through infirmity, was unable to maintain himself, obtained a small daily allowance.

† These functionaries were created to exercise a jurisdiction concerning confiscated property.

therefore, the Ionian and Eleatic schools became established; and soon after, a new class of men arose, under the name of Sophists,—men who made a profession both of philosophy and rhetoric, and who exhibited their art, and communicated their knowledge, to all who were willing to purchase their lessons.

The first who became eminent at Athens as sophists were foreigners. Such were Gorgias of Leontium, Prodicus of Cos, and Hippias of Elis. All these acquired considerable riches by their profession, and their success encouraged numbers to follow their example, so that Athens soon abounded with sophists. They frequented all places of public resort—the agora, gymnasia, the public walks, and the porticoes; and they recommended themselves to notice by an ostentatious display of their abilities, in disputations one with another, or with whoever would converse with them. What were their peculiar tenets does not clearly appear. It does not seem certain that they had any, for, while they combated the vulgar errors, they substituted nothing valuable or solid in their stead. Thus, according to the avowed doctrines of Protagoras and Gorgias, no truth could claim any higher value than that of a plausible opinion. Their principles were, therefore, those of knowing nothing and disputing all things.

It was from these characteristics that Aristophanes, in common with all Athenians who loved and regretted the ancient times, regarded the sophists as demagogues and sycophants, and their schools as seats of impiety and licentiousness. Aristophanes closely watched all the workings of the sophistical spirit, and he dipped his pen in gall to overturn the new sect. Euripides, the last of the three tragic poets who are known by their works, appeared to him as one of the most dangerous sophists, and hence he became one of the first objects of his biting satire. But Euripides occupies only a subordinate place among the disciples and supporters of the sophistical school whom Aristophanes attacked the person whom he selected as its representative, and on whom he sought to throw the whole weight of the charges which he brought against it, was Socrates.

The comedy in which Aristophanes brought Socrates before the multitude, was that entitled "The Clouds." In this he introduces the philosopher hoisted up amidst the air and clouds in a basket, from whence he delivers the most ridiculous subtleties. The story is of a young spendthrift, who, having involved his parent in debt by his passion for horses, and having been placed under the care of Socrates, is enabled, by his instructions, not only to defraud his creditors, but also to regard filial obedience and respect, and piety to the gods, as groundless and antiquated prejudices. Now all this was in direct opposition to the truth. It is difficult to determine the precise relation in which the opinions of Socrates stood to the Greek polytheism. Sometimes he spoke of the gods with reverence, and conformed to the rites of the national worship; while at others he acknowledged one Supreme Being as the framer and preserver of the universe, and he used the singular and plural number indiscriminately concerning the object

of his adoration. The truth, however, appears to be, that Socrates did not deal in metaphysics, but in morals. Man was the chief object of his philosophy; and he meddled only so far with God, or the gods, as providence and motives to a good and virtuous life were concerned in it. The aim, therefore, of his philosophy, was to raise the moral character of his species; and when he stood charged by Aristophanes with corrupting the listening youth—than which no charge can be more grave, it was by a gross calumny. Yet the poet wrought such a firm conviction in the minds of his hearers that what he represented of the object of his attack was true, that the calumny was greedily received; and when the representation of the comedy was concluded, they ordered the name of Aristophanes to be set down above all his competitors.

It is supposed by Thirlwall that the young man introduced into "The Clouds" was Alcibiades; and that it was to his powerful protection that Socrates owed his escape from immediate prosecution. This seems very probable, for the character perfectly suits Alcibiades in the outline, and at the time it was acted he was in the zenith of his power. His protection, however, could not have been long afforded; and, as Socrates continued unmolested to the end of the Peloponnesian war, it may be concluded that his poverty, and the favourable impression which was generally produced by intercourse with him among all classes, likewise co-operated to shield him from persecution. But "The Clouds" was not forgotten, and, after the Anarchy, the state of public feeling was changed in a manner which tended to raise a strong prejudice against him. Superstition had gained ground in the great body of the people, as is clearly disclosed in the affair of the Hermes busts, and many new rites, all of a mystic and enthusiastic nature, and belonging to foreign and barbarous modes of worship, were either newly imported into Athens, or had attracted a greater number of devotees than before, especially among the females. Such were the orgies of the Thracian goddess, Cotyto, those of the god Sabazius, the Phrygian Bacchus, and the worship of Cybele and of Adonis, some of which appear, like the Roman Bacchanalia, to have been used as a cloak for the grossest licentiousness, and others to have afforded an opportunity to impostors of profiting by vulgar credulity.

It was at such a period as this when Socrates was brought to trial upon the charges alleged against him in "The Clouds." Great zeal was professed for the revival of the ancient institutions, civil and religious, under which Athens had attained her past grandeur; and all who traced the public calamities to the neglect of the old laws and usages were led to consider Socrates as a dangerous person. This emboldened Melitus, on the part of the priests and the poets; Anytus, on the part of the politicians and artists; and Lycon, on the part of the rhetoricians and philosophers, to stand forward as his accusers.

According to Socrates himself, these were all instigated by merely personal resentment, which he had innocently provoked by his ordinary habits. His friend Chærephon, it appears, had consulted the Delphic oracle, to learn whether he

could find any master wiser than Socrates, and the oracle replied in the negative. Socrates, however, who was deeply conscious of the imperfection of his own knowledge, was only indignant, by the answer of the oracle, to scrutinize the pretensions of others more closely; and was thus, by degrees, convinced that his superiority consisted in a clearer insight into his own ignorance. Among those whom he thus convicted of this empty profession of knowledge, he says, were Melitus, Lycon, and Anytus.

The nature of the indictment was threefold. It reads thus "Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods which the state believes in; of introducing new divinities, and of corrupting the young." The case was one in which the prosecutor was allowed to propose the penalty which he thought due to the crime; and Melitus proposed death.

Before the cause was tried Lysias composed a speech in defence of Socrates, and brought it to him for his use; but this was declined, as too artificial for his character, and he resolved to defend himself. In his apology he represents himself as labouring at once under the obloquy which had been thrown upon him by Aristophanes, and under the ill-will which he had provoked by the performance of that which he considered as a service due to the Delphic god. The first head of the indictment he meets with a direct denial, observing that he had been calumniously burdened with the doctrines of Anaxagoras and other philosophers. The second he id he does not positively contradict, but only gets rid of it by a question which involves his adversary in an apparent absurdity. His answer to the third charge is also somewhat evasive, and it seems to show that he did not understand its real drift, and yet it was on this the event of the trial mainly turned. He had been the instructor of Alcibiades and the blood-thirsty Critias, and though their vices could not be laid to his charge, as may be discerned in his tender solicitude for the one, and his bold defiance of the other when he commanded him to arrest one of his victims, yet this was sufficient to condemn him in the sight of his judges. Still it is probable that Socrates would have been acquitted, had his defence been conducted in the usual manner, and that even after his conviction he would not have been condemned to death, if he had not provoked the court by a deportment which conveyed an idea of profound contempt of their authority. When the verdict had been given, Socrates was informed that he might demand an abatement of the penalty, and change the condemnation of death into banishment, imprisonment, or a fine. He replied that he would choose neither of these punishments, as by so doing he should acknowledge himself guilty; and he added, "Athenians, as you oblige me to sentence myself according to what I deserve, I condemn myself for having passed my life in instructing yourselves and your children; for having neglected for that purpose my domestic affairs, and all public employments and dignities; for having devoted myself to the service of my country; for having laboured to render my fellow-citizens virtuous;—I condemn myself, I say, to be maintained in the Prytæum, at the expense of the republic,

during the rest of my life!" Incensed by this bold conduct, his judges condemned Socrates to drink hemlock.

The injustice of this sentence excited the indignation of the numerous disciples and friends of Socrates present, but it awakened no other feeling than that of pity in the breast of the illustrious sage. Addressing his judges, he observed. —"I am going to suffer death by your order, to which nature had condemned me from the first moment of my birth; but my accusers will suffer no less from infamy and injustice by the decrees of truth. Did you expect that I should have employed, according to the custom, flattery, and the pathetic expressions, and the timorous and grovelling behaviour of a suppliant, in order to deliver myself out of your hands? In trials, as well as war, an honest man ought not to use unworthy means for the preservation of his life. It is dishonourable, both in the one and the other, to ransom it by prayers and tears, and those abject methods which you see practised every day by people in my present condition."

To that part of the court who had been favourable to him, Socrates observed —"I consider you as friends, and would converse with you for a moment on the event which has happened before I am summoned to die. Since the commencement of the prosecution an unusual circumstance has attended all my words and actions. On ordinary occasions my guardian demon has ever restrained me from saying or doing anything that would be hurtful, but during the whole progress of this business I have never been withheld from following the whole bent of my inclinations. For this reason I suspect that the fate which the court has decreed me is, though they meant it for evil, a real good. If to die is only to change the scene, then it must be an advantage to remove from these pretended judges to Minos and Rhadamanthus, who, through their love of justice, have been exalted by the Divinity to this important function of government. What delight to live and converse with the immortal heroes and poets of antiquity! It becomes you, also, my friends, to be of good comfort with regard to death, since no evil can befall virtuous men, whose true interest is in heaven. For my part, I am persuaded that it is better for me to die than to live, and, therefore, I forgive my judges. I entreat you all to behave towards my sons, when they attain the years of reason, as I have done to you; not ceasing to blame and accuse them when they prefer wealth, or pleasure, or any other object, to virtue. If they think highly of their own merit, reproach them, Athenians, as I have done you. By so doing, you will behave well to me and my sons. It is now time for us to part: I go to die, but you to live, which is best is known only by the Divinity."

After uttering this speech, which contains many fine lessons, although there is much that is fallacious when tried by the standard of the doctrines of a greater Teacher than Socrates, the sage was led to prison. As he entered, he observed that it had lost its terrors, and that it would become the residence of virtue and probity. In this prison he remained thirty days, during which time he conversed cheerfully with his friends concerning

death and the immortality of the soul. The cause of this delay was the departure of the *Theoris*, the sacred vessel which carried the yearly offerings of the Athenians to Delos. From the moment the priest of Apollo had crowned its stern with laurel until its return, the law required that the city should be kept pure from all pollution, and, therefore, that no criminal should be put to death. The opening ceremony had taken place on the day before the trial of Socrates, and hence he was kept in prison until its return, which gave him an opportunity of unfolding his sentiments on the above important subjects, and of displaying great magnanimity.

It is the custom of the enemies of revealed religion to place Socrates on a level with the great Founder of Christianity—to assert, that his unassisted reason discovered the same truths, by a train of philosophical reasonings, which have been graciously made at sundry times and in divers manners to fallen man by a succession of prophets, and finally and fully manifested by Jesus Christ. The source whence these representations arise is clearly manifest—it is from that bitter hatred which the unregenerate heart exhibits to the gospel of Jesus Christ. No statements can be more unfounded, or receive a plainer contradiction by matters of fact. That Socrates was far in advance of his countrymen, in respect of his knowledge on great and important truths, is not to be denied, but it cannot be maintained that he unfolded the way of life, or had clear ideas of death, judgment, eternity, heaven, and God. Even what he did know consonant with Divine truth, as will be shown in a future page, was more than probably derived from the forerunners of the Messiah, the Jewish prophets; but his knowledge was so indistinct on these great truths, that it is not worthy to be compared with the profound doctrine of Divine revelation. This will be proved by a narration of the last conversations which Socrates had with his admiring disciples. On the return of the *Theoris*, which was the signal for the death of Socrates, all his friends, except Plato, who was ill, repaired to his prison early in the morning. They spent the day with him, and the subject chiefly turned upon the immortality of the soul, which was well suited for the occasion. The conversation arose out of this question: Whether a true philosopher ought not to desire and take pains to die? in other words, Whether he might not lawfully commit suicide? Socrates maintained, that though it were better for a wise man to die than to live, because there was reason to believe that he would be happier in a future than the present state of existence, yet it could never be allowable for him to perish by his own act, or to lay down life without a sufficient motive, such as that by which he was influenced,—namely, a respectful submission to the laws of his country. He then enlarged upon the subject of the immortality of the soul. In his discourse he observes, that of two things equally uncertain, wisdom enjoins us to choose that which is the most advantageous. “If what I advance,” said he, “upon the immortality of the soul proves true, it is good to believe it; and if, after my death, it proves false, I shall still have drawn

from it in this life this advantage—of having been less sensible of the evils which generally attend human life.” Having uttered this exordium, in which the reasoning is sound, the sage proceeds: “My friends, there is one thing which it is just to believe, that if the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for life, but for eternity, since the least neglect in this point may be attended with fatal consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers by it, as being delivered at once from their bodies, souls, and vices; but, as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor of safety for itself, but in becoming good and prudent, for it carries nothing away with it but its good or bad deeds, its virtues or vices, which are the consequences of the education it has received,* and the causes of eternal happiness or misery. When the dead are arrived at the rendezvous of departed souls, whither they are conducted by their demon, they are all judged. Those who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they are doomed to suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till, being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their crimes, who commit sacrileges and murders, and other great offences, the fatal destiny that passes judgment upon them hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. But those who are found guilty of crimes great indeed, but worthy of pardon—who have committed violence in their transports of rage against their father or mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented, these suffer the same punishment, and in the same place with the last, but for a time only, till, by their prayers and supplications, they have obtained pardon from those they have injured. On the contrary, those who have passed through life with peculiar sanctity of manners, delivered from their earthly abodes as from a prison, are received on high in a pure region, which they inhabit, and, as philosophy has sufficiently purified them, they live without their bodies in a series of delights and joys indescribable throughout eternity. This will suffice to prove that we ought to endeavour strenuously to acquire virtue and wisdom, for you see how great a reward and how high a hope are proposed to us. And though the immortality of the soul were dubious, instead of appearing a certainty as it does, every wise man ought to assure himself that it is worth his trouble to risk his belief of it in this manner. And, indeed, can there be a more glorious hazard?”

The Christian reader will perceive the wide difference existing between these doctrines of Socrates and those unfolded in the Bible. They

* This argument of Socrates does not hold good, for if the education of Alcibiades or Critias formed their minds, then was the sage justly censured. But neither the vice of the one nor the other can fairly be attributed to the lessons he imparted to them, and, therefore, his argument is fallacious.

are but little more sound than those taught by Homer; how, then, can it be asserted, that he anticipated these great and important truths by his own investigations? Whoever makes such an assertion must be ignorant of that book in the *Odyssey* which describes the descent of Ulysses into Tartarus. And, in truth, the discourse of Socrates coincides with the spirit of that description. Ulysses is said to have held conversations with Egeonor, Tiresias, his mother, Anticlea, Agamemnon, Achilleus, and other heroes and heroines who appear to have been undergoing that state of probation to which the sage alludes, till at length he is scared away by the apparition of horrid spectres, and the cries of the wicked in torments, who may be supposed to represent those whom Socrates describes as having sinned past forgiveness. The discourse of the sage may, therefore, be looked upon as little more than a comment upon the verse of Homer. This remark is fully justified by the closing scene in the explorations of Ulysses, which is as follows. —

“Curious to view the kings of ancient days,
The mighty dead that live in endless praise,
Resolved I stand, and haply had survey’d
The godlike Theoclis, and Pirithous’ shade,
But swarms of spectres rose from deepest hell,
With bloodless visage, and with hideous yell,
They scream, they shriek, and groans at dismal sounds
Stun my scared ears, and pierce hell’s utmost bounds.”

Surveying the doctrines of Socrates in this light, it will be seen that the enemies of Christianity have totally failed, by their comparison of Socrates with Christ, to bring the doctrines of the everlasting gospel into contempt. The sage was a great moral teacher, but not a Divine messenger.

When Socrates had finished his discourse, Crito desired him to give him and the rest of his friends his last instructions concerning his children. “I shall recommend nothing to you this day,” he replied, “more than I have always done, which is to take care of yourselves. You cannot do yourselves a greater service, nor me and my family a greater pleasure. Soon after the fatal cup was brought to him, and he drank it with as much composure, and as little regret, as a draught at a cheerful banquet.

Thus died Socrates, whom his disciples declared they could never cease to remember, nor admire. “If any man,” says Xenophon, “who is a lover of virtue, ever found a more profitable companion than Socrates, I deem that man the happiest of human kind.” That man is the Christian. Wisdom, doubtless, hung upon the lips of Socrates, but the Great Teacher, at whose feet the Christian sits, speaks as never man spoke. He unfolds, what the greatest philosopher was never able to ascertain by his own unaided reason, the true way of salvation. There is no ground for doubting the information he imparts, while doubt was a conspicuous feature in the instructions of Socrates. His words are clothed with Divine authority, for he is “God manifest in the flesh,” and happy are those who believe in him as having died for their offences and risen again for their justification, and who show their faith by keeping his commandments.

It is said by some ancient writers that the

Athenians repented of their crime immediately after the death of Socrates, and that they inflicted punishments on his prosecutors. But this does not seem to be so well attested as the alarm it excited among his disciples. They, considering his destruction as the sign of a general persecution, took refuge in Megara and other cities. Among their number were Plato, Antisthenes, Æschines, and Critobolus. But the storm seems soon to have passed over, and the number of the disciples of this heathen philosopher soon greatly increased. Even those who rejected his doctrines styled themselves Socratic philosophers.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND

ABOUT B.C. 400.

BEFORE proceeding with the history of the period following the close of the Peloponnesian war, transactions occurred in Asia which demand attention.

On the death of Darius Nothus, king of Persia, his eldest son, Artaxerxes, surnamed Mnemon, from the strength of his memory, ascended the throne. His younger brother, Cyrus, was stimulated by the queen dowager, Parysatis, to claim the kingdom, on the ground of his having been born the son of a king, while the birth of Artaxerxes took place when Darius was in a private station. While governor of Lower Asia, Cyrus had earned the gratitude of Lydia and the Spartans, by supplying them with money to carry on the war against Athens, and in return for this timely aid he obtained their permission to raise an auxiliary force in Greece to assist him in his rebellion. Thirteen thousand adventurers enrolled themselves under his standard, and with these auxiliaries, and an army of one hundred thousand of his own provincials, Cyrus invaded Upper Asia, and advanced into Babylonia. Here he encountered his brother’s immense host in the plains of Cunaxa, and rashly charging the centre of the royal guards, he was slain by the hands of that brother whom he sought to dethrone.

The full particulars of the above transactions will be found narrated in the History of the Persians at this point the historian is called upon to describe the Retreat of the Ten Thousand.

After the death of Cyrus, the Greeks found themselves in the very heart of the Persian empire, surrounded by a numerous and victorious army, and they had therefore no way to return into Greece but by forcing their retreat through a vast tract of the enemy’s country. Clearchus was their leader, and under his command they crossed the plain of Babylonia in a south-easterly direction. As they were proceeding, they fell in with some of the beasts of burden belonging to the royal army, whence they concluded it was not far off. Clearchus, however, did not deem it prudent to seek the enemy; but he no less

cautiously avoided the appearance of shunning an engagement, and pursuing his line of march without any deviation, halted for the night at the first villages he reached, which he found stripped of everything by the king's troops. But it appears that the one army was as much in fear as the other, for at day-break envoys came from Artaxerxes to conclude a truce. Clearchus, who was inspecting his men, kept the Persian ministers waiting till he had drawn up his forces so as to present the most imposing aspect, and he then came forward, accompanied by his colleagues, to give them audience. After hearing the proposal of the envoys, Clearchus bade them tell their master, that the Greeks must fight before they treated, they having nothing to eat. With this answer they departed, but they soon returned, and said that the king consented to assign guides to the Greeks, who should lead them into plentiful quarters, as soon as they had concluded a truce with him. This proposal was accepted, and guides were appointed to lead the army to the villages where it was to find provisions. In their route they had to cross several canals and trenches too deep to be forded, and without bridges, and which, as it was now the season for irrigating the plain, Clearchus suspected had been recently filled with water, for the purpose of trying the courage and pertinence of the Greeks with a specimen of the obstacles which they were to encounter. Still these were readily surmounted, the palm-trees, which grew near in abundance, supplied materials for rafts, and the impediment being overcome, they came to some villages well stocked with provisions.

In these villages the Greeks remained three days, in the course of which period they received a visit from Tissaphernes, who was accompanied by the queen's brother and three other persons of rank, all of whom were attended by a numerous retinue. Tissaphernes came to assure them of his friendship, and of the good offices he was seeking to do them with the king, whom he was endeavouring to prevail upon to let him conduct them home in safety. Artaxerxes, he said, had promised to take his request into consideration, and, in the meantime, he had sent him to inquire what was the motive which had engaged them in the expedition. To this question Clearchus replied, that they had not set out with any hostile intentions against the king, but had been drawn into the service of Cyrus under various pretences, and had been induced to accompany him without knowing his real object before it was too late, in honour, to retreat. Now that he was dead, they had no wish to molest the king, nor to do any damage to his territories, and if they were not molested, they would return home quietly. With this answer Tissaphernes went away, and returning on the third day, he informed the Greeks that he had, with great difficulty, obtained his petition, and that the terms now offered to them were, that they should have a safe-conduct to their own country, and a market on the road; that wherever none was furnished them they should be allowed to take such necessities as they could find; and that, on their part, they should engage to do no mischief to the king's territories beyond taking provisions

where none were offered them, and should pay for all they procured from the market. With these terms the Greeks were well satisfied, and the treaty was ratified in the most solemn manner, after which Tissaphernes departed, promising, as soon as he should have finished preparations for his journey to his satrapy, to return and escort them to Greece.

Tissaphernes returned in twenty days. He was accompanied by Orontes, the king's son-in-law, each with a body of troops under his command, and immediately began the march. A market was regularly provided for them, but circumstances soon arose which excited suspicions that their leaders were not in reality friendly disposed towards them. This they took no pains to conceal, for they marched apart from the barbarians, and encamped at the distance of several miles from them.

The road by which Tissaphernes led the Greeks, still following a southerly direction, brought them first within a great rampart called the Wall of Media, which stretched across the plain for about eighty miles. They then crossed two canals issuing from the Tigris, and at the end of the fifth day's march they arrived at Sance. At this place the Tigris was crossed by a bridge, and the barbarians passed over to the other side, while the Greeks encamped in the outskirts of the town and near the edge of a spacious and thickly-wooded park. They remained here in camp for three days, at the end of which time Clearchus was informed that Tissaphernes intended to attack them in the night, and the Greeks prepared to avert the blow, but the information proved false, and the next day they proceeded along the left bank of the Tigris, and came to Opis, a large and populous city on the Phisyus, near its confluence with the Tigris. Here they met a half-brother of Artaxerxes, who was on his way from Susa and Ecbatana with a numerous army, which he was proceeding with to the aid of the king. Soon after some Median villages belonging to Parysatis were abandoned by Tissaphernes to the Greeks to be plundered, ostensibly with a view of insulting the memory of Cyrus, but in reality to bring odium on the Greeks by making it appear that they bore no respect to the faith of treaties.

The Greeks next came to the banks of the Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, where they halted for three days. The journey from Opis to Zabatus was performed in eleven marches. It was through a wild and desert country, and it is clear that Tissaphernes chose this route in order to harass and fatigue them as much as possible. He might have led them along the great high-road considerably to the east of the Tigris, where the country is of a contrary character, being both fertile and pleasant, but, instead of this, he led them along near to the banks of the Tigris, where it is extremely rough, wild, and hilly, and much infested with lions, especially between the two Zabs. It is probable, as Rennel observes, that they crossed the rugged ridge of the Hamerine hills, which cross the Tigris at Senn and stretch south-east to Susanna. In truth, the country on the east of the Tigris, over which the Greeks marched, is so rugged, that travellers studiously avoid this route.

By the time that the Greeks arrived at the Zabatus, they had been marching nineteen days in company with Tissaphernes, and no material ground of complaint had occurred between them. A general feeling of suspicion, however, prevailed among the Greeks, and Clearchus resolved to try whether mutual explanations would not increase their confidence. For this purpose he sent to request an interview with Tissaphernes, which was readily granted. In this interview mutual expressions of good faith were exchanged, and each agreed to point out publicly those in their own ranks who had endeavoured to excite suspicion in each other's breasts. After this Clearchus supped with Tissaphernes, who loaded him with marks of kindness and respect, and the next morning he returned to the camp with the most agreeable impressions of the satrap's disposition towards him. "But all was false and hollow."

On his return, Clearchus called upon his officers to accompany him to the proposed interview, that the authors of the calumnies which had done so much mischief might be detected and punished as traitors to the army. Such a proposition spread great alarm among the Greeks. Officers and common soldiers alike remonstrated with Clearchus, and pointed out the imprudence of committing all their officers to the power of a man whom they had hitherto been treating as a covert enemy. It is probable Clearchus would have listened to them if his judgment had not been perverted by those two evil principles, which have wrought so much mischief in the world—ambition and revenge. He had persuaded himself that Meno, whom he believed to be his enemy and rival, was the person who had traduced him to Tissaphernes, for the purpose of supplanting him in command, and he hoped to witness his shame and his punishment. Under these circumstances, he disregarded all counsel, and insisted that his officers should accompany him to the proposed interview. Nevertheless, he could not prevail on more than four of the generals and twenty of the inferior officers to attend him, and with these he presented himself before the tent of Tissaphernes. He was followed by about two hundred of the private soldiers, who came either for the sake of purchasing food, or out of curiosity.

On his arrival at the satrap's tent, Clearchus and the four generals were admitted within, while the subalterns remained at the door. And now was seen the real intentions of Tissaphernes. Casting off the mask of friendship, he directed a signal to be given, and while the generals were arrested, a massacre was commenced among their countrymen who accompanied them. At the same time a squadron of barbarian cavalry was seen scouring the plain, and cutting down every Greek they could discover. Those who were in the camp beheld this movement, and were wondering at the cause, when Nicarchus, an Arcadian, came up all covered with wounds, and explained the deed of treachery.

On discovering this, the Greeks flew to arms, expecting that the enemy would immediately fall upon them. They were in this attitude when Arsites and two other generals who had

been in the service of Cyrus, and a brother of Tissaphernes, with about three hundred cuirassiers, drew near. As they approached, they desired that some Greek officer should come forward and listen to the message which they had brought from Artaxerxes. Accordingly, two of the remaining generals, Cleanor and Sophaneus, accompanied by Xenophon, advanced duly guarded, and when within hearing, Arsites informed them that Clearchus had been punished with death for perjury and breach of treaty, but that Proxenus and Meno, who had revealed his treachery, were had in honour. He added, that Artaxerxes now required the rest of the army to surrender their arms, which, as they had belonged to his subject Cyrus, he claimed as his own.

Cleanor answered Arsites, in the name of his colleagues, in strains of the bitterest reproach. Deceit, perjury, and baseness, he said, might have been expected from Tissaphernes, but not from the friends of Cyrus. Arsites attempted to vindicate himself by repeating the charge against Clearchus, upon which Xenophon observed, that "Clearchus was guilty of the offences imputed to him, he had suffered justly, but since Proxenus and Meno had conferred an obligation on the Persians, it was reasonable they should be restored to their troops, and, if so, they would abide by their counsels." Arsites was at a loss for a reply to this proposition, and, without giving any answer, he, with those who accompanied him, withdrew to the Persian camp.

The fate of Clearchus and his fellow-prisoners seems to have been long unknown to the Greeks. It appears, however, that all of them were conducted alive into the presence of Artaxerxes, and, with the exception of Meno, were soon after beheaded. Meno was spared for a death of lingering torture, such as is scarcely known but in the chronicles of ancient Persia. He was kept in a wretched confinement for a whole year, and then executed as an ordinary malefactor.

The Greeks were now at open war with Tissaphernes, and it is here that the Retreat of the Ten Thousand commences.

The loss which the Greeks had sustained in the person of Clearchus seems to have been considered by them as irreparable. On discovering it, dejection and dismay pervaded the whole army. During that evening, says Xenophon, few attended the parade, few fires were lighted, many touched no food, and many would not even go to their tents, but threw themselves on the ground, not to sleep, but to call up the images of their homes, parents, wives, and children, whom they expected never to see again. Their despair seemed justified by the prospect before them. They were now left at the distance of at least 1200 miles from Greece, without provisions, without guides, without a single horseman, and they had to find and fight their way through an enemy's country, and to cross unfordable rivers, with a hostile army hanging upon their rear, and ready to seize every opportunity of falling upon them with advantage above all, they were without a chief. But hope was not universally stifled, and the emergency called forth a man endowed with all the qualities needed for meeting it: that man was Xenophon.

Xenophon had accompanied the expedition as a private adventurer, and was without any military rank. His youth had been spent in familiar and habitual intercourse with Socrates, who, it is said, being struck with his promising appearance, had drawn him into his society by gentle constraint. He was sitting at the philosopher's feet, when Proxenus, who is said to have been a disciple of Gorgias, and who had entered into the service of Cyrus, wrote to him from the court of Sardis, offering to introduce him to the prince, whose favour he himself valued above anything that his country had to offer. Such an invitation had powerful attractions for Xenophon, who seems to have had a desire for travelling, and he communicated this proposal to Socrates, as if for his advice. Socrates, struck with the effect which such a step was likely to produce on the minds of the Athenians, was averse to his accepting the proposal. He did not, however, otherwise dissuade him than by pointing out the danger which would accrue to the Athenian citizens, from his seeking his fortune in the patronage of a man who had shown himself their implacable enemy, and had been the chief author of their recent calamities, and by advising, that, before he decided, he should consult the Delphic oracle, which, by its authority, might either put an end to the project, or give a better colour to the proceedings. Xenophon, however, was bent upon the enterprise, and instead of submitting his plan to the decision of the oracle, he only inquired about the religious ceremonies by which his adventure might be brought to a happy issue. On his return, Socrates gently censured him for having shown greater concern about the success than the expediency of the enterprise, but made no further opposition to it, and Xenophon, having observed the rites which the oracle had prescribed, embarked for Asia, and joined the army of Cyrus, at Sardis. On his arrival he was immediately introduced to Cyrus, who pressed him to accompany the expedition, which he pretended was designed against the Persians, the prince assuring him that he should be at liberty to depart as soon as it was ended. He consented, and when the army arrived in Cilicia, the real purport of the expedition being unfolded, Xenophon was one of the many who, from a sense of honour, was induced to proceed, which he did merely as a volunteer and the friend of Proxenus.

Xenophon, like the rest of the Greeks, was much cast down at the melancholy circumstances by which they were surrounded. A great part of the night, he says, was spent by him in gloomy reflections, but having at length dropped into a short slumber, he had a dream, which left an impression on his mind that the god from whom, according to the Homeric theology, all dreams proceeded, called upon him to rescue the Greeks from their danger. Accordingly, on awaking, he sprang from his bed, and called together the officers of Proxenus, and addressed them. In his speech he first pointed out the magnitude of the evils which they had to apprehend, unless some provisions were instantly made for defence. He then turned their attention to another more animating view of their situation. Ever since they had concluded the treaty with Tissaphernes, he

said, he had observed with envy the riches of the barbarians, and had lamented that his comrades had bound themselves by treaty to abstain from appropriating them to their own use. Now, however, they were released from the restraint which they had imposed on themselves, the treasures of the Persians might henceforth become the prizes of their valour. He added, that the gods whom their enemies had provoked by their perjury would be the arbiters of the contest, whence he exhorted them to appoint some commander to lead them onward to Greece.

This speech of Xenophon was well calculated to awaken the ardour of his countrymen, and his hearers unanimously requested him to place himself at their head. Xenophon accepted this pre-eminence, and all the officers of the army being soon after assembled, he repeated his address, and proposed that all the vacancies which had been made by the massacres should be filled up. This proposal was seconded by Chirisophus, and they immediately proceeded to the election, which resulted in Timasion, Xanthicles, Cleonor, and Philestas, an Achaean, being chosen. At the same time Xenophon's own appointment was confirmed.

The election was scarcely over when day began to dawn, and the men were called to a general assembly. They were first addressed by Chirisophus, who spoke of the loss they had suffered, of the fruitless condition in which they were left, of the doom which awaited them if they should fall into the power of their enemies, and of the necessity there was to make up their minds for victory or death. He was followed in a similar strain by Cleonor, who dwelt upon the perfidy of the king and Tissaphernes, and the baseness of Arctus, as motives which should induce them to place no trust in the faith of barbarians, but to meet their fate with swords in their hands. After he had finished, Xenophon rose, and his language breathed hope and confidence. Taking up the topic on which Cleonor had insisted, he observed, that they would have great cause for despondency if they thought of entering into fresh treaties with the barbarians, but if it was their purpose to avenge the death of their murdered friends, they had reason to hope for the happiest issue.

At this point of Xenophon's harangue he was interrupted by an omen, which, ever since the days of Homer, had been regarded by the superstitious Greeks as an intimation of the divine blessing. One of the soldiers—sneezed, and his comrades with one accord addressed the god who had sent the propitious sound! The speaker caught up the general joy, and he proposed that since in their consultations on the means of deliverance they had been cheered with such an augury—an augury which could only have proceeded from Zeus the deliverer—they should join in a vow of thanksgiving sacrifice to this god, to be offered as soon as they should reach a friendly soil. The vow was made, a psalm sung, and the orator proceeded.

Among the arguments which Xenophon used in the conclusion of his harangue was one which probably had a greater effect upon the minds of the soldiers than the omen itself. He told them that henceforward their swords might supply the

deficiency of their purses; and that in the rich country they were to traverse, they might take, as from enemies, whatever they could lay their hands upon. This spoke home to their hearts, and, perceiving the effect it had upon them, Xenophon advised them to take such precautions as would enable them either to march in safety, or to fight with advantage. For this purpose he suggested that they should burn their wagons and tents, and should get rid of all that was superfluous in their baggage, but, above all, he exhorted them to observe the strictest discipline, as the slightest breach might be fatal to their cause. This suggestion was adopted, and Xenophon next proposed regulations for the order of the march. He advised that they should move in four divisions, so as to enclose the baggage in a hollow square, and he proposed that the honour of leading the van should be conferred on Chersiphon, as a Spartan, that the command of the two flank divisions should devolve on the two oldest generals, and that the rear, being the post of danger, should be intrusted to the two youngest, which were himself and Timasion. This was approved and ratified, and the assembly being dismissed, the men immediately proceeded to burn the wagons and the tents, with the superfluous baggage.

Before the Greeks resumed their march, a Persian, named Mithridates, who had been an adherent of Cyrus, rode up with about thirty horse, and, having obtained an audience of the generals, he represented himself as threatened with great dangers on account of his attachment to Cyrus, and as willing to join them with his followers, if he found that the course they designed to pursue was one that held out to him a prospect of success as a friend, therefore, he desired them to disclose their plans to him. Chersiphon replied, that, if they were not molested, they meant to pass onward without doing more damage than could be avoided, but that if any one should attempt to impede their progress, he would find them prepared for contest. Mithridates then endeavoured to convince them that resistance was hopeless, and thus discovered himself to be an emissary of Tissaphernes. Warned by this occurrence, the generals passed a resolution, that, so long as they remained in Persia, they would receive no overtures from the enemy.

The Greeks now set forward on their perilous march. They crossed the Zabatus without interruption;* but they had not advanced far beyond the river when Mithridates again appeared, with about 200 cavalry, and 400 bowmen and slingers; and as soon as he had approached sufficiently near, began to assail them with a shower of missiles. As the arrows and javelins of the light troops failed to reach the assailants, Xenophon was induced to charge them with the heavy infantry and targeteers which he commanded. He was not able, however, to overtake them, and his troops were both galled by the arrows

which the bowmen scattered behind them as they fled, and hotly pressed in their retreat toward the main body. After fighting the whole day, therefore, the Greeks had advanced only about three miles, and they reached their halting-place tired and dispirited.

Chersiphon and the elder generals censured Xenophon for his imprudence in making a hazardous and unavailing charge. He did not endeavour to vindicate his conduct, but he urged the necessity of forming a body of cavalry and slingers capable of repelling the assaults of the enemy. There were a few horses in the camp, and some Rhodians in the army who understood the use of bullets, and could send their missiles twice as far as the Persians. Before the morning, therefore, a troop of about fifty horse was raised and equipped with cavalry armour, and 200 Rhodians were selected as slingers. Hence, when Mithridates again appeared with a larger force, which he had obtained from Tissaphernes, on a promise that he would deliver the Greeks into his hands, he was repulsed with considerable loss. Knowing the character of the enemy with whom they had to deal, in order to heighten the dread of their valour, they mutilated the slain—a barbarous measure, which cannot be justified even by the perilous situation in which they were placed.

During the rest of the day the Greeks pursued their march without molestation, and halted on the banks of the Tigris, near a large decayed city, which Xenophon calls Larissa. The next day they came to another large city, named Mespila still being unmolested. The day after, however, Tissaphernes came up, with a numerous host, composed of his own cavalry and a detachment of the royal army, the troops of Orontes, and those which the Greeks had met at Opis. But Tissaphernes did not venture to charge the Greeks. He only endeavoured to annoy their rear and flanks with his slingers and bowmen, and these were repulsed by the Rhodians and a few Scythian archers, for the rest of the day, therefore, Tissaphernes followed the march of the Greeks, without doing them any mischief.

Having, at the close of the day, come to some villages, where they found an abundance of provisions, the Greeks halted, and they spent the next day in enjoyment. Resuming their march across the plain, Tissaphernes still hovered on their rear, and he appears to have annoyed them so effectually that it was deemed expedient to make a change in the order of their march. Six battalions, of one hundred men each, were detached from the main body, and placed under separate officers, to serve as any emergency might arise in the course of their march. In this way they marched four days, threatened, but not harmed, by the enemy's cavalry. On the fifth they were attracted by the residence of a satrap in the midst of a cluster of villages, at the foot of a mountain, from which they were parted by several ranges of minor hills. To this they made their way, but when they began to descend from the top of the first ridge which they had to cross, they found themselves galled by showers of missiles poured upon them from above, which compelled even their own archers and slingers to take refuge behind the ranks of the heavy

* Xenophon does not say how they passed this river which is to be regretted. There must have been much trouble attending it, for it is a deep and unfordable stream, of rapid course. Xenophon himself estimated its breadth at 400 feet, and modern travellers allow it to be half the bulk of the Tigris at Mosul, near which it was crossed by the Greeks.

infantry. The enemy was soon dislodged by a charge of the heavy-armed; but the troops employed on this service suffered as before, when they descended to the main army, so that when they reached the top of the third ridge, a body of targeteers was sent to occupy the higher ground on their right, in order to protect them. Their appearance prevented the approach of the enemy, and, moving in a line with the main body, along the skirts of the mountain, they at length came to some villages near the satrap's residence.

In these villages the Greeks remained three days, as well on account of the wounded, as to provide a store of provisions. On the fourth, when they descended into the plain, they were again overtaken by Tissaphernes, who harassed them so much that they halted at the first village. They now stole a march upon their pursuer in the night, by which he was left so far behind that they did not see him again for three days. On the fourth day, however, they found that Tissaphernes, who had passed them in the night, occupied a part of the mountain which commanded the road. He was, however, dislodged from his position, and the Greeks came down upon a rich plain, stretching to the Tigris, which was studded with villages, in which they found abundant supplies. In the afternoon, Tissaphernes, who had taken a different route, suddenly appeared again, and cut off some of their stragglers. He also burnt some of the villages in their front, which was a tacit acknowledgment that the country was in the possession of the Greeks. As such they seem to have considered it. But notwithstanding this encouragement, both the generals and the army were a little alarmed by the new attempt, for they were enclosed between the mountains and the river Tigris, to the margin of which they had now arrived.

At the north end of the plain, precipitous cliffs, descending into the bed of the Tigris, stopped their passage, and as the stream was unfordable, it became necessary to change their line of march. They adopted the only alternative left them, which was, to enter the mountainous region on the right, which was inhabited by the fierce Carduchians, who had once maintained their independence against the great king, and had destroyed an army of 120,000 men, sent to invade their territories. When Tissaphernes, who had watched their retrograde movement, saw them strike into the Carduchian mountains, he gave up all further pursuit—he left them in the hands of a more formidable enemy.

The Greeks crossed the plain to the foot of the hills in the dark, and they found the passes unguarded. Through these they passed, and came to some villages in the recesses of the mountains. As they approached, the inhabitants fled, but having recovered from their first surprise, they collected a part of their forces, fell upon the rear of the Greeks, and, with their missiles, made some slaughter among the last troops which issued, in the dusk of the evening, from the long and narrow defile. In the night the watch-fires of the Carduchians were seen blazing on the heights of the surrounding mountains, which warned the Greeks that they might expect an attack from the collected forces of the Car-

duchian tribes. During the next day's march the enemy hung upon their rear, while others occupied the summit of the only pass which seemed to cross the rugged mountains before them. Their situation was one of extreme danger, but two of the natives having been taken, one of them, after seeing his fellow put to death, undertook to guide them to another pass. By this discovery a detachment of volunteers were enabled to dislodge the enemy from his first position, and the Greeks passed onward. Still they were not freed from danger. The enemy refused to listen to overtures of peace, and they were obliged to contest every pass during their march through the Carduchian territory. This march lasted seven days, and the Greeks suffered more from the resistance of the Carduchians than from all the efforts which Tissaphernes had made to arrest their progress, so that they were glad when, descending from the mountains, they encamped on the banks of the Centrites, which divided the land of the Carduchians from Armenia.

Orontes, the satrap of Armenia, had heard of the approach of the Greeks, and he assembled his own troops, with some of the neighbouring independent tribes, to oppose their passage over the river. The Greeks found that the Centrites was too deep to be forded with safety in the face of such an enemy, and with the Carduchians hanging upon them in their rear, and they again felt themselves to be in imminent danger. The next day, however, Xenophon received information of a ford about half a mile off, which was not accessible to the enemy's cavalry, and they passed over. No enemy now appeared until, having passed the sources of the Tigris, they came to the river Telebon, or river of Moosh—the ancient Moxane, on the frontier of the Western Armenia, the satrapy of Teribazus.

On the approach of the Greeks, Teribazus came with a small retinue, and proposed a truce on condition that the Greeks, in passing through his province, should do no unnecessary damage. These terms were accepted, but it was now discovered that an army was watching their movements, and designed to occupy a pass which was their only outlet through the mountains on the western side of Armenia. On hearing this, the Greeks fell suddenly on the camp of Teribazus, dispersed his forces, and made themselves masters of his tents, with a part of his household. They were thus released from fear of the enemy, but in their march through the Armenian highlands, they had to struggle with the inclemency of the season and the climate. The desert through which they had to pass was covered with snow, which obliged them to quarter in the adjacent villages. While here, a fresh fall of snow took place, so that when they resumed their march it lay six feet deep on their road, and several of the men perished through the intensity of the cold, which was sharpened by a fierce north wind which blew in their faces. The men suffered so much, that it was often with great difficulty, and not without violence, that Xenophon could induce them to proceed. At length, however, they arrived in safety on the banks of a river which Xenophon calls Phasis, but which was in fact the Araxes;

and this passed, they pursued their march in safety, until they were stopped before a pass which they found guarded by the Chalybes, Tachians, and Phasians. This obstacle was surmounted by a detachment, which gained a higher point in the ridge, and drove the enemy from his position. Soon after, however, they had to encounter a still more formidable resistance from the Tachians, who defended their fortresses with desperate valour, and, in their last retreat, flung themselves, with their wives and children, headlong from the rocks, to avoid falling into the power of the enemy. In the same manner they had to force their way through the land of the Chalybes, the most warlike of all the tribes whose countries they traversed. But these were overcome, and among the next people whose land they entered, the Scythians, they met with a friendly reception. Their chief sent a guide to them, who promised, in the course of five days, to lead them to a place within view of the sea. He led them through the territory of a hostile tribe, and invited them to ravage it, which invitation unfolded the motive of the chief's friendly behaviour; but he fulfilled his engagement, and on the fifth day, as the army was ascending mount Theche, Xenophon observed an unusual commotion in the front of the army, and presently a loud exclamation was heard from every lip—“The sea! the sea!”

The Euxine spread its waters before the eyes of the Greeks—waters which rolled on to the shores of Greece, and which washed the walls of many Greek cities on the nearest coast of Asia. This sight was a glad one indeed. Officers and men embraced one another with tears of joy, and a pile of stones was raised on the summit of the mountain, and crowned with captive arms and other offerings, as a testimony of gratitude for their deliverance.

Before their guide left them, he pointed out a road toward the coast. This road the Greeks followed, and it brought them to the confluence of two rivers, one of which divided the Scythians from the Macrones. This tribe posted themselves on the opposite bank, and threatened, by their gestures, to dispute the passage. Their shouts, however, struck one of the Greek soldiers, who was a freed slave, as a familiar sound, and it proved to be the land of his birth. Through his mediation, therefore, his countrymen were induced to lay aside their hostility, and to conduct them to the borders of Colchis. After another struggle with the barbarians, who were in possession of a difficult pass of their mountains, they descended to the coast, and reached the friendly walls of Trapezus, where they were hospitably entertained, and where they celebrated votive sacrifices and solemn games.

The prevailing desire of the army was to return by sea, as soon as possible, to Greece. They would then have done, as one of them observed, with the watches and labours of the camp, and be carried home, like Ulysses, stretched in soft slumbers on the deck. For this purpose Cheirisophus, who was acquainted with Anaxibius, at this time admiral of Sparta, and stationed at Byzantium, was commissioned to obtain transports

to fetch them away from Trapezus. Cheirisophus, however, lingered so long, that the Greeks, after a dangerous expedition on which they were led by the Trapezuntians, against the Drise, one of the most warlike tribes on the Euxine, found themselves compelled to shift their quarters. They proceeded to Cerasus, also a colony of Sinope, in the land of the Colchians. Here they remained ten days, during which time they committed some outrages on a neighbouring tribe of friendly barbarians, which excited alarm at Cotyora, where the army, after having traversed the territory of the savage Mosynoecians, next arrived, and the citizens refused either to afford them a market, or to admit their sick within the walls. This led to a greater outrage. The Greeks forced their way into the town, compelled them to receive the sick into their houses, and plundered the surrounding country. The Sinopians expostulated with them on their conduct, but Xenophon defended it on the plea of necessity, and repelled the threats thrown out by the chief of the embassy in a tone which procured the Greeks a more favourable reception at Cotyora. Nor was this the only effect which the bold tone of Xenophon procured. The anxiety of the envoys to get rid of their formidable guests was so great, that they engaged to provide transports for the whole army, and three deputies were sent back with them to Sinope to fetch the vessels.

During the stay of the Greeks at Cotyora, which lasted forty-five days, Xenophon exhibited a desire for planting a colony on the coast of the Euxine. His men, however, were generally averse to this design, and he found it necessary to abandon it. The rumour of this design enabled Timasion and Thorax to work upon the fears of some merchants from Sinope and Heraclea, who were present in Cotyora, by whose reports these two cities were induced to offer to provide pay as well as vessels for the troops, on condition that they should sail away to Greece, but when it was discovered that Xenophon had abandoned the design, the Sinopians and Heracleots deemed it no longer necessary to fulfil these promises, and they sent the transports without the money. Timasion, who, relying on these assurances, had made large promises to the soldiers, dreading their disappointment, would have persuaded Xenophon to resume his project, and to join him and the other generals in an attempt to found a colony on the banks of the Phasis. This excited the jealousy of Neon, who commanded for Cheirisophus in his absence, and the whole army soon became divided in views, and mutually jealous of each other. The men were on the point of breaking out into a mutiny, and to prevent it, all the art and address which Xenophon possessed were required.

At length a sufficient number of transports were collected for the embarkation of all the troops, and a fair wind brought them, in the course of two days, to Harmene, the port of Sinope, where they were hospitably entertained. Here they were found by Cheirisophus, who returned with only a single galley, but who brought a message of congratulation from Anaxibius, and a promise that he would provide

employment, and pay for them as soon as they left the Euxine.

The Greeks had now left almost all obstacles behind them; but one absorbing care took possession of their breasts. As they came nearer home they were less anxious to reach it, for they had not wherewith to support themselves in ease and credit. Hence they began to think of employing their united strength for the purpose of plunder, and, as a preliminary step, they raised Xenophon to the chief command, and he declining the honour, it was bestowed upon Cheirisophus, who seems to have been endowed with authority to lead them wherever he pleased.

On being appointed, Cheirisophus intimated his design of sailing to Heraclea, and, accordingly, the next day the army re-embarked, and a fair wind carried it into that port. The Heracleots sent a present of flour, wine, sheep, and oxen, sufficient to supply the wants of the Greeks for two or three days, but this hospitable treatment only served to inflame their cupidity, and they demanded a large subsidy from the Heracleots. Xenophon and Cheirisophus strenuously remonstrated against this injustice, and hence, when the Heracleots refused compliance, and made preparations for defending their city, they became the objects of the resentment of those who proposed the measure. They persuaded the Arcadians and Achæans, who formed more than half the army, to separate themselves from the rest, and to try to mend their fortunes under generals of their own. Accordingly the army left Heraclea in three divisions. The Arcadians and Achæans, under the command of ten generals, eager for the spoils of Bithynia, embarked first, and landed at Port Calpe, Cheirisophus, with a second division, marched along the coast toward the same point, and Xenophon, with a third body, sailed as far as the confines of Bithynia, and then struck into the interior. Finally, they all met again in Port Calpe, where, having gained wisdom by the recent disaster, they agreed never more to part company—to go hand in hand in the work of plunder.

From the unpropitious appearance of the vic-tus, the Greeks were detained at Calpe several days, during which time Cheirisophus died of a fever, and was succeeded in command by Neo. Soon after, Neo, having led out 2,000 men on a foraging expedition, in spite of the adverse omens, was surprised by the cavalry which Pharnabazus had sent to the aid of the Bithynians, and lost five hundred of his troops. After this, the sacrifices being no longer unfavourable, the Greeks ventured upon an expedition, in which they revenged themselves by a complete victory over the forces of the satrap.

Xenophon relates, that when the division took place in the port of Heraclea, he was inclined to throw up his command, but that he was induced to retain it, partly by the appearance of the sacrifices, and partly by the prospect of embark-ing under the protection of Cleander, the Spartan harmost of Byzantium, who was expected with a squadron at Calpe. Soon after the victory of the Greeks over the forces of the satrap, Cleander arrived, but he brought out with him only two galleys of war. He was accompanied by Dexippus, who had been long seeking to undermine

Xenophon's credit with Cleander. The Spartan, on his arrival, became convinced that he had been deceived, admitted Xenophon to his friendship, and took the army under his protection. The army, then marching forward, traversed Bithynia unmolested, but finding no plunder in the direct road, they turned and collected a large booty of slaves and cattle, which they brought to Chrysopolis, over against Byzantium.

While at Chrysopolis the Greeks received two invitations from different quarters to cross over into Europe, the one from Anaxibius, who repeated the promise which he had before made through Cheirisophus, and the other from Seuthes, an Odrysian prince, who wished to engage them to assist him in the recovery of his dominions, from which he had been recently expelled. The Greeks accepted the invitation of Anaxibius, but when they landed at Byzantium, they discovered that his only aim was to draw them out of Asia, he being bribed to act thus by Pharnabazus. Anaxibius would immediately have dismissed them, without either pay or provisions, to make their way into the Thracian Chersonesus, where he informed them they would find employment under the command of Cyniscus, who was probably another Spartan officer. Incensed by this conduct, the Greeks took possession of Byzantium, and would have retained it, but for the counsels of Xenophon, who represented the folly of braving the power of Sparta. He himself at this time resigned his command, and sailed away to Parium, on the Asiatic coast. The other generals were divided in their interests and views, and while they lay before the walls of Byzantium, many of the men, disgusted, at length, with their contentions, withdrew from the camp, sold their arms, and either sailed away, or took up their abode in Byzantium and other neighbouring cities.

It was with pleasure that Anaxibius saw the army of the Greeks dwindle away, as he hoped the sooner to receive the reward of Pharnabazus. Soon after, however, he was superseded by a new admiral, while Aristarchus came to succeed Cleonor, as harmost of Byzantium, and he found himself neglected by the satrap. On discovering this he turned all his thoughts upon revenging himself on the satrap. He sent to Xenophon, and urged him to sail with all speed to the army, and induce it to cross over to Asia and invade the satrap's province. Xenophon gladly executed this commission, and the men as readily embraced his proposal, but the threats of Aristarchus, who was no less venal than Anaxibius, and had become equally devoted to the interests of Pharnabazus, compelled them to forego the enterprise.

In the meantime, Xenophon had received another invitation from Seuthes, and he now entered into a treaty with the Thracian prince, and engaged the whole army, except a division of eight hundred, under Neo, in his service. After a hard winter's campaign, Seuthes was restored to his dominions by the aid of the Greeks, and would then have defrauded them of the pay which had become due to them if it had not been for the vigour of Xenophon, as it was they only obtained a portion of the bounty promised.

' ~~this passed~~ were again left without occupation. But the din of war had not yet ceased in the world. Sparta herself was on the eve of measuring swords with Persia, and what force was there so calculated to assist in her enterprize as that which had so successfully braved the armies of the Great King in the very heart of his country? Hence they had scarcely sheathed their swords when they were engaged for this enterprize, and they embarked to be incorporated with the other Spartan levies.

Xenophon himself was resolved to return to Athens; but was persuaded by his friends to accompany the army into Asia, and to consign it to the Spartan officer under whom it was henceforth to serve. He arrived at Lampsacus with the esteem and gratitude of his comrades, but with so scanty a provision for his own wants that he was compelled to sell a favourite horse, to supply himself with the means of journeying homeward. Soon after, however, he led the troops on a marauding excursion in Lydia, from which they returned with large booty, and the portion which fell to his share made him "rich enough to be bountiful to others!" The army returned to Pergamus, there to wait the orders of the Spartan commander, and Xenophon returned to Greece. He designed to take up his abode in his native city, but this was not his lot. Excited by revenge, as well for the share he took in the expedition of Cyrus, as for the services he had rendered to Sparta after his return, he found himself banished by his fellow-citizens. The Spartans, however, rewarded him for his attachment to them with the title of proxenus, and with a grant of land and a house near Scyllus, in Triphylia, in a pleasant valley adjacent to the plain of Olympia. Here he took up his abode, and spent many happy years, dividing his time between his literary occupations, the pleasures of the chase, and the society of his family and friends. It does not appear, however, that he ended his days here, for, according to one author, he was driven away by an inroad of the Eleans, and took refuge in Corinth, where he died, while another statement asserts he was restored to his native city by a decree moved by the orator Eubulus, who had been the author of his banishment. As the time came when to be a friend of Sparta was no longer an offence to Athens, perhaps the latter statement may be deemed most probable.

Such was the retreat of the Ten Thousand. Historians are wont to speak of it as "glorious," forgetting the original guilt, which nothing can excuse or extenuate. Cyrus could have no claim upon the Greeks which would justify them in aiding him to dethrone a kind brother. How monstrous was it, then, for them to enlist under his banner for such a purpose! But this was the natural consequence of the Peloponnesian war. The Greeks had been so long accustomed to deeds of rapine and slaughter, that, when the day of peace arrived, it brought with it no charms. Home, at the very sound of which the heart of the true citizen beats with joy, was to them but a name, and the first sound of the voice of ambition called them away.

CHAPTER XXIV.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN SPARTA AND PERSIA, TILL THE RENEWAL OF WAR WITHIN GREECE.

B. C. 399—394.

On the downfall of Athens, her victorious rival, Sparta, arrogated to herself the sovereignty of the islands and of the European cities, while the dominion of the Ionian cities in Asia fell to the share of the king of Persia. This had been acknowledged in a treaty between the Spartans and the Great King, and therefore, as soon as Tissaphernes returned from the pursuit of the Ten Thousand, he was sent down to the west to receive the reward of his services. In addition to his own satrapy, he was appointed to the government of the provinces which had before been subject to Cyrus, and invested with the like superintending authority that had been given to the fallen prince.

The appointment of Tissaphernes to the government of the Greek cities of Asia gave great umbrage to the citizens. He had long been unpopular among them, and his recent treachery had rendered him the object of confirmed hatred. On the other hand, they had provoked his displeasure by the preference which they had shown for Cyrus, and hence they were the objects of his resentment. From all these causes, therefore, they were led to seek deliverance from the barbarian yoke they refused to acknowledge the satrap's authority, and they sent envoys to the Spartan government, as the acknowledged head of the Greek nation, to solicit aid.

Considering that the part they had taken in the cause of Cyrus had broken the bonds of friendship between Sparta and Persia, and finding, from the issue of the retreat of the Ten Thousand, that the power of that unwieldy empire was more of a shadow than substance, the Spartans gladly embraced the opportunity thus offered of extending their conquests. Thembron was sent, with the title of harmost, to undertake the defence of the Greeks of Asia, at the head of an army consisting of 1,000 Neodamodes, or emancipated Helots, about 4,000 Peloponnesian troops, and 300 Athenian cavalry, the services of which Sparta was now in a condition to command.

On his arrival in Asia, Thembron collected reinforcements, to the amount of about 3,000 men, from the Greek cities, where, says Xenophon, the will of a Spartan at this time was law. With these forces Thembron commenced operations; but little was effected till he incorporated the remnant of the Ten Thousand with his own, which he did soon after their arrival at Pergamus. Thus strengthened, Thembron felt strong enough to face the enemy on open ground. Pergamus, and several other towns in this region, submitted to him, and he took some other places by assault; but, he was detained so long before Larissa by the vigorous resistance of the besieged, that he received orders from the ephori to march into Caria, and carry the war to the very doors of Tissaphernes.

Thembron obeyed these orders; but on his arrival at Ephesus he was superseded in his command by Dercylidas, the Spartan govern-

ment having received complaints from the allies that he suffered his troops to plunder the country. Dercyllidas was a Spartan, of the school of Lysander; and was so notorious for his mastery in the arts of stratagem and intrigue, as to have obtained the nickname of Sisyphus. His first act discovered his character: knowing that great jealousy existed between Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, he concluded an armistice with the latter, on condition that he should turn his arms against his rival satrap, and while he was thus employed, Dercyllidas bent his march northward, toward the midland district, called Æolis, from the Æolian tribe which peopled it.

Æolis included a part of the skirts and of the upper valleys of Mount Ida, and was subject to Pharnabazus. The government of it had been committed by the satrap to Zenis, a Greek of Dardanus, and when he died he was succeeded by Mania, his widow, who reduced three of the adjacent maritime towns, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonus, to her sway. In the midst of her prosperity, however, she was murdered by her son-in-law, Meidias, who was instigated to the foul act from motives of ambition. At her death he made himself master of Scepsis and Gergis, where the greater part of the treasures of Mania were lodged; but the other towns, which were garrisoned by Greek mercenaries, refused to submit to his rule, and continued to acknowledge the authority of Pharnabazus. Meidias applied to the satrap for the government which his crimes had made vacant, but the answer he received was one which held out to him a prospect of sure vengeance.

Such was the state of affairs in Æolis when Dercyllidas arrived. On his approach the three towns which Mania had conquered submitted to him. He sent to invite those of Æolis to assert their independence, and to enter into an alliance with Sparta, and his proposals were immediately accepted by three of them, and Cebren was induced to follow their example, after sustaining a brief siege. Dercyllidas then marched against Scepsis, and Meidias, conscious that he would one day fall into the hands of Pharnabazus, thought it safest to come to terms with the Spartan conqueror. He offered to repair in person to the Spartan camp, on receiving hostages for his security. Dercyllidas gave him as many as he required; but when he had him in his power, he stripped him of his usurped authority and ill-gotten treasures. Both Scepsis and Gergis submitted to the Spartan, and when the fallen tyrant asked where he was to reside, he received this taunting reply, "In your native town, Scepsis, on your patrimony."

Having thus made himself master of Æolis, and provided treasures wherewith to pay his troops, Dercyllidas was anxious to preserve his conquests without burdening his allies by remaining among them during the winter. Accordingly, he proposed a truce with Pharnabazus, which was accepted through fear that the enemy might proceed from Æolis into the heart of his territories; and Dercyllidas then marched into the country of the Bithynian Thracians, where he wintered, living upon the plunder of their villages.

Early in the spring of B.C. 399, Dercyllidas

quitted Bithynia, and marched southward. He came to Lampascus, where he was joined by three Spartan commissioners, who were sent to inspect the state of affairs in Asia, and to announce that his command was to be prolonged for another year. Dercyllidas escorted these commissioners as far as Ephesus, and he then left them to continue their progress through the Greek cities, while he himself went to superintend the erection of a wall across the isthmus, in order to protect the Greeks of the Thracian Chersonesus from the incursions of the barbarians. This wall, which was about four miles in length, was finished by the autumn, and Dercyllidas then returned to Asia. On his return he was detained eight months by the siege of Atarneus, a strong fortress, held by a body of exiles from Chios, but having at length overcome them, he put a garrison in the place, under the command of Draco, an Achean, of Pallene, and then returned to Ephesus.

In the meantime, Tissaphernes remaining unmolested, renewed his demands on the Greek cities of Caria, and they again sent envoys to Sparta for relief. These envoys represented that he might be brought to acknowledge their independence, if he found himself attacked in Caria. The ephori yielded to their arguments, and they gave orders that Dercyllidas should invade Caria by land, while their admiral, Pharas, concerted with him on the coast B.C. 398.

It appears to have been the wish of Pharnabazus to live in peace with Tissaphernes; whence, as soon as he discovered that Caria was threatened, conceiving that danger would dispose him to change his conduct, Pharnabazus waited upon him, and declared his readiness to co-operate in measures for driving the Greeks out of Asia. Tissaphernes readily listened to his proposition, and the two satraps went together into Caria, and having provided for the security of that province by placing garrisons in the Carian strongholds, they returned to carry hostilities into Ionia.

Dercyllidas had already crossed the Meander on his way for Caria, when he discovered that all his labours for the welfare of the colonies were upon the point of being rendered vain. He consulted with Pharas, and they resolved to repress the Meander. It was supposed that the enemy was far in advance, but as the Greek army marched along the vale of the Meander, it one day found itself in the presence of the united forces of the satraps, which consisted of Carians, Greek mercenaries, and a numerous cavalry. Although taken by surprise, Dercyllidas put his troops in order of battle, but the Asiatic Greeks were so much alarmed by the enemy's superiority, that they dropped their arms and fled. The situation of Dercyllidas was now a critical one, but he was relieved from it by the interested cowardice of Tissaphernes. His colleague was desirous of giving battle, but Tissaphernes, knowing that his property in Caria was no longer in danger, and dreading an engagement with troops whom he believed to be invincible, sent a message to Dercyllidas to propose a conference. The crafty Spartan received the envoys in front of a body of picked men, and affecting to have little regard for their proposals, demanded an

exchange of pledges. These were given, and the two armies then separated; the Greeks taking up their quarters at Leucophrys, and the barbarians at Tralles.

On the following day the chiefs met, and a negotiation was opened. Dercylidas insisted on this simple proposition, "that all Grecian cities should be independent." To this the satraps consented, on the conditions that the Spartans should withdraw from the king's territories, and their harmosts from the towns. These terms were not complied with, but it was agreed to conclude an armistice until answers should be brought from Sparta and the Persian court.

During the year *n c* 399—the year in which Dercylidas took the command in Asia—a war occurred between Sparta and Elis. This was commenced by the Spartans. Determined to revenge themselves for the affronts which they had suffered from Elis during the struggle with Athens, as well as to carry out their leading maxim of dividing and weakening the Peloponnesian states, they demanded a contribution from the Eleans towards the expenses of the Peloponnesian war. This demand was rejected, and Agis was ordered to invade the Elean territory.

Agis obeyed the command, but an earthquake which happened soon after he had crossed the border induced him to withdraw, and disband his forces. During the respite thus afforded them, the Eleans endeavoured to rouse some of their neighbours, known to be ill affected toward the Spartan government, into active hostility, but the dread of the Spartan power was such that the attempt failed. When, therefore, Agis appeared the next year, which he did with contingents from all the allies of Sparta, except the Boeotians and Corinthians, they had to brave his attack alone.

Agis directed his march to Triphylia, and he had no sooner crossed the borders of Messenia, than Lapreum, Matustus, and Epitalium revolted from Elis, and, on the other side of the Alpheus, he received the submission of three of the towns of Pisatis. Agis next proceeded to Olympia, where, on a previous occasion, he had been prevented from celebrating a sacrifice enjoined by some oracle, on the pretence that prayers could not be duly performed there for victory in a war between the states of Greece. Agis now performed that rite; and he afterwards advanced towards Elis, ravaging the country through which he passed, and carrying away herds of cattle and a multitude of slaves. He continued his devastations as far as the outskirts of the capital; but abstained from attacking the city itself, and turned aside, and prosecuted his ravages along the plain, as far as the sea-coast.

The motives which induced Agis to turn aside from the capital appear to have been, that he expected an easier conquest with the aid of one of the factions within its walls. There were grounds for such an expectation; for, while he was pursuing his ravages, Xenias, a man of great wealth, and attached to Agis and the Spartan interests, made a vigorous effort, with his partisans, to overpower the democracy, and to reduce their country under subjection to Sparta. This attempt, however, failed. Thrasycleus placed him-

self at the head of the commonalty, who gained a complete victory over their opponents, and forced them to take refuge in the enemy's camp. Still Agis did not make any attempt upon the city, but retreated across the Alpheus with his booty, and, having left a garrison under Lysippus, a Spartan harmost in Epitalium, he disbanded his forces and returned home.

During the remainder of the year the Elean territory was exposed to incessant inroads from the garrison of Epitalium, which was found so galling that Thrasycleus sued for peace. It was obtained on condition that the Eleans should demolish some fortifications recently built for the defence of the city, and renounce their sovereignty over most of their subject towns. Thus shorn of power, Elis was admitted among the allies of Sparta, the tyrant mistress of Greece.

As the Spartans commenced this war under the imputation of impiety—at least from the Eleans—they appear to have been urged thereby to a more ostentatious display of respect for the gods at its conclusion. Agis was deputed to consecrate a tenth of the spoil to the oracle of Delphi! This was his last act. In his return, he was taken ill at Hera, and died a few days after he had arrived at Sparta, where he was buried with unusual honours, which was by no means pleasing to the various states of Greece. Circumstances arose out of the death of Agis which convey a very unfavourable impression of the internal condition of Sparta. The throne was claimed, according to the law of descent, by Leotychides, who had hitherto passed as the only son of the deceased monarch Agis, however, had disowned him, and though he altered his language on his death bed, yet this recognition did not stifle the suspicion before excited. The title of this dubious prince, therefore, was disputed by Agesilaus, the younger son of Archidamus, and half-brother of Agis, who aspired to the throne. His cause was warmly espoused by Lysander, and evidence was offered which confirmed the declaration of Agis as to Leotychides. This reduced the friends of the young prince to the necessity of seeking for some flaw in the title of Agesilaus, and one Diopenthes, a man of eminent learning in the science of divination, cited an oracle which warned Sparta against a "halting royalty." Now Agesilaus was lame in one foot, and therefore the oracle was ingeniously applied to him. Lysander, however, turned it against Leotychides himself. He remarked that the defect which they were cautioned against lay not in the person, but in the blood of their kings, who must be genuine descendants of Hercules. This reasoning prevailed, and Agesilaus was elected.

Such puerile proceedings as these are by no means calculated to raise the character of the Spartans in the estimation of the reader, and they prove that while they were "heroes" in the field, they were yet but children in council. Sparta, indeed, was never so celebrated for learning or wisdom as was her far-famed rival Athens. The chief object of her government, as may be seen in "The Laws of Lycurgus," was to train up her sons for war, and where such a disposition prevails there is little room

left for intellectual enjoyments or improvement.

Agæsilæus had not been seated on the throne a year when a conspiracy was detected at Sparta, which brought the state to the verge of a revolution. The leader of this conspiracy was Cinadon, a young man of some pretensions, and the nature of it may be seen in the information which was given by one of his accomplices to the ephori. Cinadon, he said, having met him one day in the agora at an hour when it was thronged with people, drew him aside and bade him count the Spartans that were to be seen there. He only saw one of the kings, the senators, ephori, and other magistrates, in all about forty persons, and observing this to Cinadon, he continued,—"These you must consider as your enemies, the rest of the multitude assembled here, whose numbers exceed theirs a hundredfold, are all allied with you against them." Cinadon then bade him notice the passengers in the streets, where he would find a like proportion between the number of his friends and his enemies, and he reminded him that the case was the same throughout the country—each Spartan landowner lived surrounded by a host of aliens. Cinadon then informed him that a plot had been concerted for the destruction of their oppressors—that helots, neodamodes, provincials, citizens of the lower order, would be of their party, for they were all alike inspired with a bitter hatred towards their masters. He added, that the conspirators had arms of their own, that the multitude might obtain others from the iron market, and that a day was fixed for the execution of the plot.

Convinced of its reality and of the urgency of the danger, the ephori took prompt measures to ensure deliverance. They called the senators together, and after a long deliberation, it was agreed that Cinadon should be sent on pretence of public service with a small command to the frontiers. Cinadon had been often employed by the ephori in commissions which demanded energy and address, and therefore he did not suspect a discovery. On arriving at the frontiers, however, he was arrested, and the names of his principal companions being elicited from his own lips, their persons also were secured with the same secrecy and promptitude. Cinadon was brought to Sparta and examined, and when he had confessed the whole plot, and confirmed the information he had given against his accomplices, he was asked what had been his object. He replied, "Not to be inferior to any man in Sparta." He was executed, together with those he had implicated in the guilt of the intended conspiracy, and the Spartans, or peers, thereby retained the enjoyment of their ancient privileges. But they did not make the yoke of their subjects less bitter, and the same feeling of hostility yet pervaded the whole multitude.

Soon after the above transactions, a Syracusan named Herodes, who had just returned from Phœnicia, informed the Spartans that he had witnessed great preparations in the Phœnician ports for an armament, which, he had learned, was to consist of three hundred galleys. He had been unable, he said, to ascertain its ob-

ject, but he had thought it so important to the welfare of the Greeks that they should know of the transactions, that he had taken his departure in the first ship in order to give them intelligence thereof. The Spartans were alarmed, and they called on their allies to meet in congress, to deliberate on preventive measures. To Lysander, the intelligence afforded an opportunity of resuming his ambitious plans, and recovering his influence among the Greeks of Asia. For this purpose he resolved to make use of his friend Agæsilæus, and he easily prevailed on him to undertake, with a small force, to give such employment to the Persian arms in Asia as would secure Greece from the threatened invasion. Agæsilæus accordingly offered to take the command of an expedition to Asia, for which he required only 2,000 neodamode troops and 6,000 allies. At the same time he desired to be accompanied by a council of thirty Spartans, particularizing Lysander as one of the number. This offer of Agæsilæus was accepted, and six months' pay was promised for the army.

Preparations were immediately made for this expedition. The allies were directed to send their contingents, and all obeyed except Corinth, Thebes, and Athens. These, from various causes, excused themselves, but this formed no obstacle to the enterprise, for in the spring of B.C. 397, Agæsilæus set sail for Aulis, in Bœotia, which was the appointed place of rendezvous for the troops.

Aulis was famous for the sacrifice of Agamemnon, and the departure of the united forces of Greece for the Trojan War. Willing to associate his enterprise, therefore, with the recollection of that heroic adventure, Agæsilæus made a point of sacrificing at Aulis. He was already in the midst of the ceremony when the Bœotarchs, at the head of a considerable force of horse, interfered, and scattered the parts of the victims which they found on the altar, and forbade the sacrifice. Agæsilæus, surprised and incensed, imprecated the vengeance of the gods upon the Bœotians for the impious violence; but unable to resist, he proceeded to Geræstus, whence he conducted his army to Ephesus. The insult was apparently passed over, but its remote consequences, as will be seen, were fatal to both Sparta and Bœotia.

Plutarch, in extenuation of this insult, says that Agæsilæus had infringed the established usage by employing a soothsayer of his own on this occasion, instead of the Bœotians, to whom the superintendence of the ceremony belonged. Xenophon, however, infers that the interruption was an indication of the hostile spirit with which this expedition was viewed by the Bœotian government. If so, Agæsilæus had, indeed, reason to dread the omen. It was one which he could not misinterpret.

Shortly after the arrival of Agæsilæus in Asia he received a message from Tissaphernes, demanding the cause of his expedition. Agæsilæus replied that his aim was to restore the Asiatic Greeks to the enjoyment of that independence which their brethren possessed on the other side of the *Ægean*. On hearing this, Tissaphernes proposed a truce, until the king's pleasure could be taken on such a demand. This proposal was

ceeded to on the part of Agesilaus, but while each took an oath of security in the meantime, their thoughts were not for peace. On the contrary, Tissaphernes sent to the king for a reinforcement, to enable him to take the field, and Agesilaus, aware of his intentions, busied himself in making preparations for the inevitable strife.

During this interval a breach occurred between Lysander and Agesilaus. The arrival of Lysander rekindled the flames of discord which he had lit up in the Asiatic cities during the latter period of the Peloponnesian war, and when he came to Ephesus, his door was besieged by a crowd of petitioners, who desired license to oppress their countrymen under his patronage. Lysander had reason to expect that such would be the case on his appearance in Asia, for ever since his victory at Egospotami he had been courted with extravagant servility by the Asiatic Greeks. Not only had they offered him the ordinary honours of a conqueror, as golden crowns and statues, but they had raised altars, offered sacrifices, sang psalms, and consecrated festivals to him as a god! Hence he was prepared for the exhibition of their feelings, and he calculated on the subservieney of Agesilaus, that he should be able to obtain their desires, and, through them, further the ends of his own ambition. In this he was disappointed. His colleagues, the rest of the Thirty, felt that the homage paid to him was derogatory both to their own and the king's dignity, and they complained to Agesilaus of his presumption. Agesilaus listened to their representations, and he resolved to check it in a manner which would deeply wound the feelings of Lysander. Every application made to him through Lysander's interest was rejected, and his purpose at length became so manifest, that Lysander was compelled to inform his suitors that his intercession would only obstruct their suits. At the same time he stifled his resentment, and requested to be removed from the scene of his humiliation, and Agesilaus sent him to the Hellespont, where he found an early opportunity of doing a service acceptable to the king. He prevailed on a Persian of high rank, named Spithridates, to revolt from Pharnabazus, and to come with his family, treasures, and two hundred horse, to Cyzicus, and thence he sailed with him and his son to Ephesus, where he presented them to Agesilaus, which had the effect of producing an apparent reconciliation.

About this time Tissaphernes received such an addition of troops as gave him hopes that he should be able to overpower Agesilaus, and he threw aside the mask. He sent a declaration, that, unless his forces were immediately withdrawn from Asia, he must prepare for war. The council and the allies were awed by this bold tone; but Agesilaus, who had expected it, desired the envoys to carry back his thanks to Tissaphernes for the advantage he had given to the Greeks by his perjury. He then directed the troops to put themselves in readiness for a long march; sent word to the towns which lay on his road to Caria to lay in provisions for the use of his army; and called on the cities of Ionia, Eolia, and the Hellespont, for their contingents.

As Caria contained the principal source of his revenue, and as it was a country ill suited for the operations of cavalry, in which his chief strength lay, Tissaphernes naturally thought that this threat would be verified, and he therefore concentrated all his forces of infantry there for its protection, while he posted his cavalry in the valley of the Mæander, to arrest the enemy's progress. Agesilaus foresaw this result, and, instead of seeking him in Caria, he marched in the opposite direction, toward the provinces of Pharnabazus. As this invasion was not expected, he found the towns on the road unprepared for resistance, and he penetrated nearly to Dascylium without meeting an enemy, and collected an immense booty. Near this place, however, he was met by a body of Persian cavalry, which in a skirmish gained some advantage over him, and the next day when he sacrificed, the victims being found imperfect, he gave orders for retreat towards Ephesus.

Xenophon relates this latter circumstance as though it were a providential warning, but there can be no doubt that Agesilaus saw that he was not able to withstand the Persian cavalry, and, therefore, caused the sacrifices to be reported unpropitious, that he might make his retreat with a good grace. And this is proved by his conduct at Ephesus, where he wintered. During the whole of that season he was making preparations for the next campaign, and he particularly applied himself to the raising of a body of cavalry, which he perceived was indispensable to the success and even safety of future operations. This is one of the many instances, therefore, in ancient history wherein merely human contrivance is made to appear as the will of the gods. In the hands of the crafty these sacrifices were but tools with which they worked upon the fears and the hopes of the multitude.

Before Agesilaus took the field again, *Æc* 395, Lysander and his colleagues were superseded by a new body of counsellors, at the head of whom was Herippidas. On their arrival, Agesilaus gave notice that he intended taking the shortest route into the richest part of the Persian dominions. As before, Tissaphernes thought that Caria was threatened, and he repeated the dispositions of the previous campaign. But this was not the intention of the wily Spartan. While Tissaphernes was waiting for him with his cavalry in the vale of the Mæander, Agesilaus marched toward the plains of Sardis, which were the richest of Western Asia. He traversed them three days without meeting an enemy, but on the fourth he was met by a body of Persian cavalry, and an engagement ensued, in which the Persians, notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, were defeated. The victors followed up their advantage, and made themselves masters of the enemy's camp, in which they discovered ample treasures. Among the booty were some camels, which were sent to Greece, as a rarity.

When this disaster occurred, Tissaphernes was in his palace at Sardis, and his countrymen bitterly censured him for leaving them unprotected; and complaints were made at court of his conduct, which was represented as emanating from treachery. He had at court one powerful and implacable enemy in the scendish Parysatis, who

thirsted to revenge herself on him for the death of her favourite Cyrus, and, according to the most probable account, in compliance with her request, Artaxerxes directed the death of Tissaphernes. The execution of this sentence was committed to Tithraustes, who was appointed to succeed him in his satrapy. Tithraustes effected the death of his victim in the Turkish style, by the hands of an underling, who surprised Tissaphernes while in his bath. Such was the end of this cruel and treacherous satrap. As he had done unto others, so did it happen unto him.

Tithraustes was invested with power to open a negotiation with Agesilaus, and, as soon as he had established himself in the satrapy, he sent envoys to treat with the Spartan king. In his message he affected to consider Tissaphernes as the author of the quarrel between Artaxerxes and the Spartans, and, as he was now dead, he proposed that Agesilaus should return home. At the same time, he intimated that Artaxerxes was willing to acknowledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks, on condition that they would pay their ancient tribute. Agesilaus professed himself willing to treat, and promised to transmit the Persian overtures to Sparta. Meanwhile Tithraustes was anxious that hostilities should be suspended in his province, and he adopted the crooked policy of his predecessor. Pleading his own merits in the execution of Tissaphernes, he begged Agesilaus to turn his arms against Pharnabazus; and he even defrayed the expenses of his march. Thirty talents were given to Agesilaus to go and invade another part of his master's dominions, that Tithraustes might rule in peace an exhibition of selfishness far outstripping that displayed by Tissaphernes, for although he had not scrupled to conclude a separate truce, he had not paid the enemy a subsidy for carrying war into the territories of his rival satrap.

While on his march toward the territories of Pharnabazus, the Spartan king received a flattering testimony of the approbation with which his proceedings were viewed at Sparta, as well as encouragement to follow the path of ambition. A commission arrived, putting the fleet under his command, equally with the land forces, and authorizing him to appoint whom he would to the office of admiral. This was an unexampled mark of confidence, and an indication of the energy which ambition had infused into the counsels of Sparta. It was ably seconded by Agesilaus, who immediately took measures for raising a fleet, which he effected, but he was unfortunate in the choice of an admiral, for, consulting his private affections, he appointed his wife's brother, Pisander, who was utterly unfit for the command. After this fleet was raised, which consisted of 120 galleys, in addition to those already manned, Agesilaus continued his march to the satrapy of Pharnabazus.

The preparations made by Agesilaus convinced Tithraustes that he had only purchased a temporary relief, and that the Spartan king designed the conquest of the empire. Accordingly he thought himself how he might employ his gold to greater advantage. He resorted to bribery. A Rhodian, named Timocrates, was sent to Greece with a sum of fifty talents, which he

was charged to distribute among the leading persons in the states which might be most easily induced to kindle a war against Sparta, that so Agesilaus might be recalled. Xenophon relates that he found willing receivers in Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, and he names the recipients; but though Persian gold may have roused the enemies of Sparta to greater activity in those cities, it was certainly not the cause of their enmity or the events which followed. Those three cities were only waiting an opportunity of displaying open hostility, and their citizens needed no corrupt influence to excite them.

A disposition for war already existed, and nothing but a pretext for commencing it was wanting. And this was now devised. The Locrians of Opus were induced by the anti-Spartan party at Thebes to make an incursion upon a tract of land which had long been the subject of contention between them and the Phocians. The Phocians retaliated for this invasion, by marching into the Opuntian Locris, and the Thebans then took part with the Locrians and invaded Phocis.

It was expected that the Phocians would apply to Sparta for succour, and that the Spartan government would gladly embrace this opportunity of endeavouring to humble Thebes. And so it came to pass. War was decreed, and Lysander sent into Phocis, with instructions to collect all the forces he could raise there and among the tribes seated about Mount Cita, and to march with them to Halartus, in Bœotia, where it was agreed he should be joined by the Peloponnesian troops under Pausanias. Lysander discharged his commission with his usual activity, and succeeded in inducing Orchomenus, which was subject to Thebes, to assert its independence, and Pausanias crossed the borders of Læconia, and waited at Tegea for the contingents which he had demanded from the allies. These came in but slowly, and Corinth refused to take part in the expedition.

Thus threatened, the Thebans sent an embassy to prevail on the Athenians to espouse their cause against Sparta. There were many feelings to be overcome at Athens before such a resolution could be adopted. There were the recollections of a long hereditary grudge between Athens and Thebes, of the animosity displayed by Thebes during the last war, and the sense of weakness induced by their recent calamities. The Theban orators, however, so effectually soothed, incited, and flattered the minds of the Athenians, that they readily listened to them, and when they represented that Athens might now place herself at the head of a confederacy more powerful than the empire which she had lost, and that the Spartan dominion would be more easily overthrown than the Athenian had been, the assembly was unanimous in favour of the alliance with Thebes. Thus Athens and Sparta again commenced a struggle for the empire of Greece.

Having collected all the forces he could raise in the north, Lysander marched to Halartus, where Pausanias was to have joined him. Pausanias, however, did not appear, and, as it was not the character of Lysander to remain inactive, he attempted to make himself master of the town,

At first he tried negotiation to engage it to revolt; but there were some Theban and Athenian troops in the place, whose presence overawed the disaffected, and this failed. Lysander then resolved to venture on an assault; but in the meanwhile his movements were known at Thebes, and a Theban force was sent to relieve the town. It came, and it conquered. A battle took place near the walls of the town, and Lysander was slain, while his troops betook themselves to the hills of Helicon in search of refuge. The conquerors pursued them with great vigour, but, incautiously pressing forward up the rising ground, the fugitives turned upon them and assailed them with a shower of missiles, rolled down fragments of rocks on their heads, and drove them down into the plain with the loss of two hundred men.

The army of Lysander was dispersed, and the Thebans erected their trophy under the walls of Haliartus; but their exultation was damped in the course of a few hours by the appearance of Pausanias. The next day, however, their spirits were again raised by the arrival of an Athenian army under Thraxybulus, and their confidence was heightened when they perceived that Pausanias avoided an engagement. The situation of Pausanias was one of great embarrassment. Greek usage demanded the recovery of the bodies of the slain either by force or consent of the victors, but the greater part lay so near the town walls, that an attempt to carry them away by force unasked would be one of great difficulty and danger, if he should prove victorious. Under these circumstances he held a council of war, and the majority came to the decision to apply for permission to carry away the dead, who are said to have amounted to a thousand. Elated with this confession of their superiority, the Thebans refused to grant a truce except on condition that the invaders should withdraw from Boeotia. These terms, humiliating as they must have been to Spartan pride, were accepted by Pausanias, and, after they had interred the dead, they returned to Sparta. The army deeply felt the disgrace, and their dejection was increased by the haughty behaviour of the Thebans, who attended them in their retreat, and inflicted personal chastisement on all who deviated from the strict line of the highway.

It does not appear that the disastrous issue of this expedition could be fairly imputed to Pausanias, yet, on his return to Sparta, so deeply was the dishonour felt, that he found himself the object of a capital prosecution. He did not appear at the trial, which gave his enemies an advantage over him. He was condemned to death, from which he sought shelter in the venerated sanctuary of Athena Alea, at Tegea, where he ended his days. He was succeeded on the throne by his son Agesipolis.

While the above events were transpiring in Greece, Agesilaus was carrying on the war in Asia with complete success. On his march into Bithynia he was accompanied by Spithridates, who urged him to advance into Paphlagonia, in order to gain the alliance of Cotys, king of that country. Cotys was one of those powerful hereditary vassals of the Persian king whose subjection was merely nominal, and he had recently

renounced even the appearance of submission to Artaxerxes. Nothing, therefore, could be more agreeable to Agesilaus than the opportunity of gaining such a powerful ally. He eagerly accepted the mediation of Spithridates, who not only brought Cotys to the camp on the borders of his territory to conclude an alliance with Sparta, but prevailed on him to augment the Spartan forces by a reinforcement of 1,000 cavalry and 2,000 targeteers.

After this, Agesilaus returned to take up his winter quarters in the territory of Pharnabazus, and in the satrap's own residence of Dascylium. The winter was spent here in ease and plenty, while Pharnabazus was forced to range about as a houseless wanderer, carrying with him his family and his treasures. He was not even safe in his tent. On discovering that he was encamped in the village of Cava, Herippidas, fired with the hope of making himself master of his camp and person, requested Agesilaus to grant him a body of troops for this purpose. Agesilaus responded to his request, and he arrived at day-break at the encampment of Pharnabazus. A body of Mysians was overpowered at the outpost, but their resistance afforded time for the escape of Pharnabazus and his family. His camp, however, with its great treasures, fell into the hands of Herippidas.

Herippidas was accompanied in this adventure by Spithridates and the Paphlagonians. These hoped to share the spoils, but Herippidas was resolved to deliver the whole into the hands of the officers in the Spartan army, who answered to the Roman questors. This produced a breach between them. Indignant at the treatment, Spithridates and the Paphlagonians deserted the camp in the night, and, repairing to Sardis, entered the service of Ariæus, who had a second time revolted, and was at war with Artaxerxes.

Agesilaus was more deeply affected by this loss than by any mischance he had met with in the course of his expedition. But not long after, a prospect seemed to be opened to him of gaining a much more valuable ally. A Greek of Cyzicus, who was connected by ties of hospitality with Pharnabazus, and had recently entered into a similar relation with Agesilaus, proposed to bring him into an interview with the satrap. This mediation was accepted, and a place of meeting appointed in the open air. To this place, Agesilaus came, accompanied by the Thirty, and they seated themselves on the grass to wait for Pharnabazus. He came, attended by a train of servants, who proceeded to lay down a carpet and cushions for their master, after the Persian fashion. The fallen satrap, however, struck by the contrast of the Spartan simplicity, though so much more prosperous than himself, ordered them to be removed, and he took his place on the green sward by the side of Agesilaus.

After the forms of a friendly greeting had been interchanged, the satrap, as the elder, began the conference. He opened it with an expostulation of the hard treatment he had received at the hands of the Spartans. He reminded his hearers of the services he had rendered Sparta in the war with Athens; that he had neither spared expense, nor shrunk from

riak in her behalf; and that he had never, in any of their transactions, subjected himself to the charge of double-dealing like Tissaphernes. "And yet," he continued, "Spartan hostility has reduced her to such a condition, that even in my own territory I do not know how to find a meal except such as I can collect, like a dog, from the orts and leavings of your rapine. Even my mansions, woods, and parks, have been all burned, felled, and spoiled." He added, "If it is my ignorance which makes me unable to reconcile such conduct with the obligations of justice and gratitude, I desire that you, Spartans, will enlighten me."

This address, says Xenophon, struck the Thirty with shame, and it was some time before Agesilaus could make reply. He stood convicted of having spared the faithless Tissaphernes, all stained as he was by the blood of the Greeks, in order to fall upon the ancient and tried ally of Sparta. When, however, he had recovered from this blush of shame, he made a plausible reply "Private friendship," said he, "must always give place to reasons of state," and the Spartans, being at war with the king of Persia, were therefore compelled to treat all his subjects as enemies, including himself. Agesilaus added, "With regard to yourself, as an individual, we should be glad to gain you for our friend. Not that we should wish you to exchange one master for another. Rather we would propose that you should at once become our ally, and independent of every superior—that you should hold your present command in independency, and, forming alliance with us, make rich additions to it by conquest over your master's dominions." To this suggestion, teeming with the spirit of rebellion, Pharnabazus frankly replied that if Artaxerxes should attempt to place any other general over him, he would then accept the offer of the Spartan king, but if his master intrusted him with the supreme command in that quarter of his dominions, he would defend them to the utmost. Under the excitement of a generous feeling, Agesilaus grasped the hand of the satrap, and, assuring him of his warmest regard, promised to withdraw his arms from his territories, and not to return so long as he could find employment in other quarters. And thus the interview ended.

In accordance with his promise, Agesilaus withdrew his forces from the satrapy of Pharnabazus. And, indeed, as spring was advancing, (A.C. 394,) and he was known to be meditating a new expedition, he might have otherwise withdrawn them, and therefore little credit can be given him for his good faith. He had moreover stripped the satrapy of Pharnabazus of everything that was valuable, while a rich prize laid before him in the interior. It was thither that he bent his steps; and he had already proceeded to the plain of Thebes, when he received a message from the ephori, who apprised him of the turn of affairs in Greece, and summoned him to march with all speed to the defence of Sparta! This was a blow to the ambition of Agesilaus, for it stopped him at the outset of the most brilliant career that had ever been opened to the eye of a Greek. Yet he obeyed it with alacrity, comforting himself with the hope that he would be

one day able to resume his plans of conquest in Asia. Such, he announced in an assembly of the allies, was his intention, as soon as he should have despatched the business which called him away; and that this might be the sooner effected, the allies determined to send their forces with him into Greece. With these he passed over into Europe, but never returned to Asia.

CHAPTER XXV

FROM THE RENEWAL OF WAR WITHIN GREECE TO THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS.

B.C. 394—387.

THEIR was great occasion for the recall of Agesilaus into Greece, for the result of the battle of Halartus had encouraged the enemies of Sparta to lift up their heads. About the same time, indeed, that he received the mandate, a congress was held at Corinth by several states, in which it was resolved "to stifle the hornets in the nest"—to carry their arms at once into the territories of Laconia.

The allies were yet debating on the mode of sharing the command among them, and on their order of battle, when the Spartan army, under Aristodemus, the guardian of the youthful Agesipolis, strengthened by the forces of Tegea and Mantinea, crossed the frontier, and reached the territory of Sicyon without opposition. Here they found the defile called Epicea guarded by a body of light troops, but these they dispersed, and pursuing their march eastward, finally encamped in the face of the enemy near Corinth.

In numbers the confederates were considerably superior. While they had brought 24,000 heavily armed into the field, the forces of Sparta and her allies amounted only to 13,600. The number of cavalry also bore the same proportion to each other. But there was a want of union in the field as well as in the council. Xenophon says that the Thebans were not so desirous of victory as they were concerned for their own safety, and that to secure this, they did not scruple to sacrifice their allies and endanger the common cause. He charges them with having delayed to engage so long as they occupied the left wing which faced the Spartans, and intimates that they alleged the unfavourable aspect of the victims as their excuse, till the Athenians took their position and they were opposed to the Achæans, when they announced that the sacrifices were propitious, and issued orders for the battle to commence. Even then they neglected the regulations which had been adopted by common consent, and the result of their conduct was a general defeat. The Spartans themselves lost only eight lives, though their allies lost 1,100, of the confederates, 2,800 fell; the rest took their position behind the bed of the torrent or rivulet called the Nemea.

Agesilaus had made his way through the

Thracian tribes, and was at Amphipolis when he received the news of this victory; and his hopes were so much elated by it, that he sent the bearer forward to convey it to the Greek cities in Asia, with a renewal of the promise he had made at his departure. He then continued his march through Macedonia, where he overawed all opposition as he had done in Thrace. In Thessaly, however, he had to endure the fierce opposition of the Thessalians, who, as the hereditary enemies of the Phocians, were in alliance with the Bœotians, but these were finally overcome, and he crossed the chain of Othrys, when he had a friendly country to traverse as far as the borders of Bœotia.

While in this friendly territory, Agesilaus received intelligence of an event which affected him both as a private and public calamity, and which threatened ruin to the most cherished of his ambitious projects. This was the defeat and death of Pisander, who had encountered a Persian fleet, under Conon and Pharnabazus, near Cnidus, a maritime city of Asia Minor. By this event the newly-gained superiority of the Spartans by sea was annihilated.

Agesilaus knew what an unfavourable effect the tidings of this disaster would have upon his Asiatic troops, inasmuch as it would give them uneasiness for the safety of their homes, and therefore he announced that, though Pisander had been slain, his fleet was victorious, and he confirmed the falsehood by offering a thanksgiving sacrifice to the gods. He appeared at the altar with a lie in his right hand, yet was his artifice permitted to succeed. His troops were so elated by his feigned success, that soon after, meeting the whole force of the hostile confederacy in the plain of Coronea, they defeated it and erected their trophy. Agesilaus then proceeded, with a few followers, to Delphi, to sacrifice a tenth of the spoil, amounting to one hundred talents, which he had collected in the course of his Asiatic expedition. While thus employed, Gylis was ordered to invade Lœris, and he plundered the country; but on his return, was attacked in the dark and slain, with many of his officers and men. The timely arrival of their allies alone rescued the rest from utter ruin. The army, after this, was disbanded, and Agesilaus returned by sea to Sparta.

Still Corinth continued to be the theatre of war. A Spartan garrison occupied Sicyon, and made frequent incursions into the Corinthian territory, while the confederates retaliated by making inroads into Laconia, *b. c.* 393.

The calamities which Corinth thus endured were great, but they were rendered still greater by its internal divisions. There was a party among the Corinthians who, on political grounds, desired to renew their connexion with Sparta; and they derived new motives from their disasters to encourage them in their designs. Accordingly, they began to hold private meetings to concert measures for restoring peace. But the leaders of the democracy soon became aware of their danger, and did not scruple about the means of its prevention. They anticipated the design by committing one of those atrocious measures which so frequently disfigure the pages of Greek history. On the

last day of the Eucleian festival, at a certain signal, the aristocratical party were assassinated in the circles of conversation, the public walks, and the theatre, while the judges on the bench and the priests at the altar fell beneath the murderous dagger. The assassins ceased not till they had destroyed all whom they deemed willing or able to oppose their measures.

Suspicious had been previously entertained of this plot by Pasimelus, one of the prosecuted party, and at the time of the tumult, a body of the younger citizens was assembled with him outside the walls of the city. On discovering that their fears were realized, they immediately ran up to seize the Acrocorinthus, where they maintained themselves for a long time against their enemies. An unpropitious omen, however, combined with a sense of weakness, made them resolve to withdraw and seek safety in exile, but they were restrained from carrying this into effect, first by the lamentations of their wives and children, and then by the declaration of the assassins that they intended nothing more than to deliver the city from traitors.

It is probable that the hope of revenge may have been the most powerful inducement to these Corinthians to return to their homes. If not, it is evident they soon after exhibited a disposition to run any risk for the sake of a change. They were perhaps the more excited to this by the after conduct of the opposite party. They went so far in their zeal for democracy as to endeavour to establish a complete unity, both of civil rights and of territory, between Corinth and Argos. Thus they removed the landmarks which separated the two states, so that the name either of Corinth or of Argos might be applied to the whole, they abolished the Corinthian assemblies, and every characteristic of a distinct government; annulled even the name of Corinthian, and decreed that the two people were henceforth to be called Argives. These measures caused the aristocratical party to resolve on a desperate effort for restoring Corinth to her former rank among the states of Greece, and for recovering their own lost station.

Alcmanes and Pasimelus took the lead in this enterprise. These obtained an interview with Praxitas, the Spartan commander at Sicyon, and proposed to admit him within the walls that joined Corinth with her port of Lechaëum. Praxitas embraced this offer, and coming, in the dead of the night, to a gate where the conspirators had contrived to get themselves placed on duty, was introduced without any opposition. As the force he had brought with him was but small, Praxitas threw up a slight entrenchment to secure himself until some succours he expected should arrive. During the next day he remained in quiet, but on the day following some Argive forces arrived, and these, confident in their numbers, immediately sought the enemy. They were supported by their Corinthian partisans and a body of mercenaries, commanded by Iphicrates, an Athenian general. But the Spartans, though inferior in numbers, still maintained their superiority in war. As they approached, the Argives took to flight without offering any resistance, and made for the city; but meeting with the Corinthian exiles, who had defeated

the mercenaries, they were driven back, and were slaughtered as a flock of sheep by the Spartans: a few only escaped by ladders over the walls. The consequence of this victory was that the port of Lechæum was taken, and soon after being joined by the expected contingents, Praxitas, having demolished the long walls, crossed the isthmus, and took and garrisoned the towns of Sidon and Cômmyon. Returning thence, he fortified the heights of Epiceea, and he then disbanded his army and returned to Sparta.

At this time two important consequences of the long series of hostilities in which the Greek states had been engaged became apparent. These were, that the number of persons who were thrown upon war as a means of subsistence, had so much increased, that the contending powers were able to carry on the struggle with mercenary troops, and war begun to be more and more studied as an art.

Among those who were led to devote their attention to improvements in this dreadful art was Iphicrates, a general of Athens. Iphicrates formed a new body of targeteers, which combined the advantages of the heavy and light troops, and was adapted for combat and pursuit. For this purpose he substituted a linen corselet for the ancient coat of mail, and he reduced the size of the shield, while he doubled the length of the spear and sword.

At the head of such a corps as this Iphicrates made frequent incursions into the Peloponnesus. In the territory of Phlius he surprised the forces of that state, and made such havoc among them, that the Phliasians were compelled to seek the aid of the Spartans for the security of their town. In Arcadia, also, such was the terror inspired by the troops of Iphicrates, that they were suffered to plunder the country unmolested. Notwithstanding, they were themselves kept in awe by the Spartans. They found, by experience, that they were not safe within a javelin's throw of the heavy-armed infantry, some of the younger soldiers having overtaken them, on one occasion, at that distance.

While Iphicrates was thus employed, a Spartan mora, stationed at Lechæum, accompanied by the Corinthian exiles, ranged the country round about Corinth. At the same time, it was not able to prevent the Athenians from repairing the breach made by Praxitas in the long walls, which they regarded as a barrier that screened Attica from invasion. The whole serviceable population of Athens sallied forth to the isthmus, and quickly completed its restoration, but it was only repaired to be again destroyed. In the course of the summer Agesilaus undertook an expedition into Argolis; and having carried his ravages into every part of that territory, marched to Corinth, stormed the newly-repaired walls, and recovered Lechæum.

During his stay at Lechæum, Agesilaus met his brother Tegeatas, who had been appointed to the command of the fleet in the room of Pisander, and whose appearance in the Corinthian gulf was connected with events more important than any which had taken place in Peloponnesus, since the return of the Spartan king from Asia, as future pages will unfold.

In the course of the ensuing spring, Agesilaus

made a fresh expedition, for the purpose of cutting off one of the chief resources of the Corinthians, hoping thereby to bring them to terms. At this time Corinth was principally supported by flocks and herds, which were collected from various parts of the Corinthian territory, and herded in the fortress of Piræum, at the foot of Mount Geranea, on the Western gulf. To deprive the enemy of this supply was deemed a worthy object for an expedition, and Agesilaus placed himself, or rather was placed by the ephori, at the head of the enterprise.

The season selected for this expedition was that of the Isthmian games, which, in the Peloponnesian war, had been considered as a season of peace. When Agesilaus arrived, the Argives were celebrating these games in the place of the Corinthians, the legitimate presidents. The Argives were neither prepared for attack nor surprise, and therefore they abandoned the festival, and fled to the city. The victims had been already slain and the preparations complete; whence Agesilaus put the Corinthian exiles in possession of these, and remained encamped on the isthmus while they completed the sacrifice. Xenophon relates, as a circumstance interesting to the Greeks, that, after his departure, the Argives celebrated the games afresh, and that many of the late competitors returned to the contest, and were again successful.

On arriving at Piræum, Agesilaus found it so strongly garrisoned, that, doubting of success by assault, he had recourse to stratagem. He feigned an intention of marching upon Corinth, which drew away most of the garrison, and, among the rest, the greater part of the corps of Iphicrates. They passed his camp in the night, and at daybreak he returned to Piræum. He now detached a division of the army to occupy the heights which commanded the fortress, while he encamped with the rest of his troops below. This movement was crowned with success: the garrison, seeing the enemy above them, considered their case as hopeless, and therefore evacuated the fortress, with the women, slaves, and all the property therein, and took shelter in a neighbouring sanctuary of Hera. But there was no refuge for them, even under the protective wing of the goddess. They were soon after compelled to surrender to him unconditionally; and, while he gave up those concerned in the massacre of Corinth to the vengeance of the exiles, the rest, with all the property, were exposed for sale.

While yet the captives and the booty were passing in review before Agesilaus, envoys from various states, and, among the rest, from Thebes, waited upon him, to ascertain what terms of peace Sparta would grant. That he might enjoy their humiliation, Agesilaus affected to take no notice of their presence, but just at this juncture a horseman came up, all covered with foam, and informed him that the garrison which he had left in Lechæum had been intercepted and cut off by Iphicrates and his targeteers. In itself the action was trifling, but it led to momentous results,—it checked the desire of peace on the part of the envoys, and deprived Agesilaus of the means of commanding it.

The occasion was also remarkable on another account. It was customary for the inhabitants

of the Laconian canton of Amyclæ, whenever they were employed in military service, to return home to sing the pæan at the Hyacinthian festival. As this was approaching when Agesilaus was on his march against Piræum, he had left all the Amyclæans in his army at Lechæum, directing the commander of the garrison to escort them with a mora of infantry and a troop of cavalry through the enemy's territory. Zealous in what he deemed a sacred duty, the commander accordingly escorted them on their route with a mora of Spartan infantry, consisting of about six hundred men, and another of cavalry, which was probably less numerous. He took the road to Sicyon, and having proceeded within four miles of that territory, he committed the Amyclæans to the care of the cavalry, and returned with the infantry toward Lechæum. But the movements of this band were observed from Corinth. Iphicrates was in the city, with his targeteers; and Callias, son of Hipponicus, was there also, with a body of heavy infantry. These undertook to cut off the enemy's retreat, and when they appeared the targeteers of Iphicrates dealt such deadly destruction among them by their missiles, that 250 perished, while the rest were only saved by escaping in boats sent out for the purpose, or by means of some cavalry which came up to their rescue.

As soon as Agesilaus heard the news of this disaster he marched toward the scene of action. Before he reached Lechæum, however, he was met by some horsemen, who informed him that the slain had been recovered, he therefore returned to Heræum, and proceeded with the sale of the plunder, and captives taken from Piræum. This effected, he called in the Bœotian envoys, desiring them to discharge their commission. They came in, but having heard of the enemy's recent calamity, they made no mention of peace, and merely requested leave to visit their troops quartered at Corinth. Agesilaus perceived their motives, and promised that he would take them along with him, that they might judge what advantage their friends had gained by their victory. He fulfilled this promise the next day, during which he searched the country, without meeting an enemy, and he then sent the envoys by sea to Cræsus. Yet all this was but affected. There was deep grief of heart prevailing in the army, and Agesilaus having accomplished the object of his expedition, returned to Sparta. He took with him the remnant of the defeated mora, and left another at Lechæum in its stead. How deeply the disgrace was felt is seen by his movements as he marched onward. He took care to enter the friendly towns where he was forced to rest late in the evening, and to leave them again at break of day, that the fact might be concealed from their knowledge. At Mantinea he would not stop even at night, lest his men might have to endure the insulting joy of these ill-affected allies.

On the contrary, Iphicrates was emboldened by this success to aim at fresh advantages. He recovered Sidus, Crommyon, and CEnoe, where Agesilaus had left a garrison; and thus all the territory northward and eastward was recovered for Corinth, and the command of the isthmus no longer remained in the hands of the Spartans. Operations were chiefly carried on, for the rest

of the year, by the Corinthian exiles, who took up their abode in Sicyon, and who crossed over the gulf, and landed near Corinth, as often as they saw opportunity of giving annoyance.

It is probable that this victory of Iphicrates—which was deemed worthy to be mentioned in the same page with Marathon and Plataea—put a stop to a negotiation which was proceeding at the same time between Athens and Sparta. An extant oration of Andocides sets forth that he had been sent on an embassy to Sparta during this year, with full powers to conclude a peace; but that, though the Spartans satisfied him and his colleagues, they deemed it advisable to lay their proposals before the Athenian assembly, and they returned to Athens accompanied by Spartan envoys. They were met, he says, on their way, by ministers from Corinth and Argos, who came to urge them to continue the war, and although there were many in Athens who were favourable to the proposals of Sparta, yet was the negotiation broken off, and it seems certain that this was the result of the victory of Iphicrates. So violent was the reaction, that Andocides was banished for the part he took in the transaction.

Shortly after his victory Iphicrates withdrew from this scene of action, but from what motive and on what pretext is not known. Xenophon simply relates that he was dismissed by the Argives after he had put some of the Corinthians of their party to death.

During the next year, a. c. 391, Agesilaus turned his arms against Acarnania. He was induced to do this from the hostility displayed by the Acarnanians toward the Ætolian town of Calydon. The inhabitants of that town demanded aid from Sparta, and Agesilaus marched to overawe or chastise the aggressors. Before he crossed their frontier he sent a message, threatening to lay waste the whole country, unless they immediately joined the Spartan confederacy. This was refused, and, watching his opportunity, he came suddenly to a plain on the margin of a lake, where almost all the cattle were collected for pasture, and he captured a great part of the wealth of Acarnania. Soon after this he encountered the Acarnanian targeteers, whom he defeated, and during the rest of the summer he ranged over the country at pleasure. So much did the Acarnanians suffer from his ravages, that, when in the spring of the next year he was preparing for a second invasion, they sent envoys to deprecate it, and to treat for peace they submitted to the terms which Agesilaus had first dictated.

During the same year, Ageapolis, the young king, who had reached his majority, was intrusted with the command of an expedition against Argos. He had reason to believe that the Argives would avail themselves of the presidency which they claimed over the Isthmian games to stop his march, under a religious pretext; and, fearing the influence this might have upon the superstition of his followers, he consulted the ministers of the Olympic god, whether he might invade Argolis without impiety under such circumstances. The god was made to reply, that the truce iniquitously offered might be religiously refused. But even this did not satisfy

the scruples of the young monarch, and he repaired to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, if he was of the same opinion as his father! Apollo confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Agesipolis then proceeded to Phlius, which he had appointed as the place of rendezvous, and thence led his army toward Argolis.

The foregoing transaction will doubtless appear ridiculous to the reader, but Mitford observes that it was a beneficent superstition that could occasion but a pause in prosecuting the ravages of war. Notwithstanding, the benefits of this superstition must not be appreciated too highly. There is not an instance on record of its having so far allayed the evil passions of the heart as to cause the Greeks to desire peace, so that after all it was "but a pause." Strictly speaking, indeed, the various games of Greece, which, by a misnomer, are called Religious Rites, were so many breathing seasons, in which the Greeks recovered their strength, and then returned to their work of slaughter with fresh ardour. And in some instances they were ineffectual even to work this momentary benefit, as will be seen by the succeeding paragraph.

As Agesipolis was on the borders of Argolis he was met by two heralds, who announced the commencement of the sacred truce, during which they claimed the same exemption from hostile inroads as the Eleans enjoyed during the celebration of the Olympic festival. Agesipolis replied, that the gods had decided against their claim, and he passed on towards the capital, spreading terror around him. While thus employed an earthquake was felt in his camp, and the Spartans raised a loud psalm to Poseidon, the earth-shaking god. This appears to have been the sum of the effect which this visitation produced upon the Spartans on this occasion, for when the allies urged that it was a warning for them to retreat, as Agis had done from Elis on a like occasion, Agesipolis interpreted the omen as an encouragement, because it occurred after he had crossed the border, and so the work of plunder continued. Yet was not Agesipolis superior to the influence of superstition. When he had driven the Argives within their walls, the unfavourable aspect of the victims prevented him from fortifying a post on the border, which might have been as annoying to Argos as Decelea had been to Athens. Plunder alone was the fruit of this expedition.

While the foregoing transactions were transpiring in Peloponnesus, Athens had been taking some great steps towards securing her independence, and recovering a portion of her ancient power. After their victory at Cnidus, Pharnabazus and Conon cruised about the *Ægean*, and expelled the Spartan harmosts from most of the maritime cities, the citizens of which the satrap won over to his cause, by an assurance that their citadels should not be occupied by foreign garrisons, and that they should enjoy domestic liberty. Having effected this great change, Pharnabazus landed at Ephesus, where he left the greater part of his fleet, and directing Conon to meet him at Sestus with forty galleys, he proceeded to his straits by land. Before he and Conon, however, met in the Hellespont, Dercylidas, who

had been sent forward by Agesilaus from Amphipolis, as before related, happened to be at Abydus when he received the tidings of Pisander's defeat, and he not only secured the fidelity of that city by an appeal to its fears and hopes from the Spartan power, but also induced the people of Sestus to give shelter to the ejected harmosts and other friends of Sparta, who flocked thither from the various parts of Chersonesus, and to defy the attacks of the Persian armament. Pharnabazus endeavoured to detach these two cities from the Spartan alliance by threats, but it was in vain: they defied his power, and he turned aside from them to retaliate upon Sparta for the injuries he had suffered from that state.

During the winter Conon drew contributions from the various cities on the Hellespont; and in the following spring, *n. c.* 394, having collected a great fleet, he embarked with Pharnabazus, and sailed to the coast of Laconia. They entered the Messenian gulf, where they ravaged the rich vale of the Pamisus about Phere, and, making descents at many other points, did much damage. Hence they made for Cythera the inhabitants of which town capitulated and withdrew to Laconia. Leaving Nicopolis there with a garrison, as harmost, they sailed to the Isthmus, where, exhorting the deputies of the allied states, whom he found there, to carry on the war with vigour, and, leaving them a subsidy, Pharnabazus prepared to return home.

Before Pharnabazus set sail for Asia, Conon requested that the fleet might be placed at his disposal, and proposed to employ it in a work which, he said, would be felt by Sparta as one of the deepest wounds she could suffer. This work was to restore the long walls of Athens and the fortifications of Piræus! The satrap eagerly adopted so easy a mode of gratifying his resentment, and not only granted the request of Conon, but furnished him with money to complete his design. Conon then sailed for Athens, where, by the exertions of his crews, the aid of their allies, who a few years before had done their utmost to level the city with the ground, and of workmen hired with the gold of Persia, he restored a great part of the walls.

While Conon was proceeding with this work, the Corinthians fitted out a squadron with the subsidy they had received, and with which their admiral, Agathinus, scoured the Corinthian gulf. The Spartans sent out Polemarchus, Pollis, Herippidas, and Teluttias, successively, to oppose him, and the latter recovered the complete mastery of the gulf, by which he was enabled to meet and co-operate with Agesilaus, at Lechæum, as before related.

Conon had completed his work before the return of spring, and was proceeding to restore the Athenian dominion on the coasts and in the islands of the *Ægean*. The Spartan government viewed his operations with alarm, and perceived that it was necessary to change its policy with regard to the court of Persia—to drop the design of conquest in Asia, and to confine itself to the object of counteracting the efforts of the Athenians, and establishing its own supremacy among the European Greeks. To this end Antalcidas was sent to Tiribazus, who occupied the place of Tithraustes, in Western Asia, to negotiate a

peace. This mission was looked upon with alarm by the hostile confederacy, and envoys were sent from Athens, Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos, to support their interests at the satrap's court. Antalcidas, however, made such liberal proposals to Tiribazus, and accompanied them with such arguments as convinced the satrap that his master's interest was to side with Sparta, and, although he did not venture openly to enter into an alliance with that state, he did not scruple to supply the Spartan ambassador with money for the purpose of raising a navy to carry on the war with the states which were still acknowledged allies of Persia. His leaning was more strongly manifested in his conduct towards Cozon. Having drawn that able admiral to Sardis, he threw him into prison, on the pretext that he had abused his trust, and had employed the Persian force for the aggrandisement of Athens.

But the views which Tiribazus had formed of the Spartan proposals did not coincide with those of the Persian court. Having repaired thither to report his proceedings, and to consult the royal pleasure, Tiribazus was detained at court, and Struthas sent down to fill his place.

Struthas adopted a different line of policy to that of his predecessor. As soon as he arrived at Sardis he made known his intention of taking part with the Athenians and their allies. On discovering this, the Spartan government concluded that the prospect of peace with Persia was closed, and they determined to renew hostilities in Asia. Accordingly Thimbron was sent thither, and he made incursions from Ephesus and from the lower vale of the Mæander into the satrapy of Struthas with effect. But Thimbron was addicted to the pleasures of the table, and while he was thus enjoying himself, would suffer his troops to range over the country for plunder, without any regard to their safety. Struthas discovered this, and one day when he was thus situated the satrap suddenly appeared at the head of a superior force, slew him and Thersander, a flute-player, and defeated his army as it came up, with great slaughter.

Thimbron was succeeded in his command by Diphridas, who proved much superior to him in energy. He soon repaired the consequences of his predecessor's misconduct, and kept Struthas in awe. Among the advantages gained by Diphridas was the capture of Tigeaneus, son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife and family: their ransom afforded him a rich supply for the payment of his troops.

When the Spartan government sent Diphridas to Asia, they also sent Ecdiceus with eight galleys to wrest Rhodes from the sway of Athens. On his arrival at Cnidus, that admiral found the Rhodians superior both by sea and land, and hence he remained inactive. As soon as his situation became known at Sparta, Teletus was ordered to sail to Asia, with the twelve galleys he had with him in the Corinthian gulf, to supersede Ecdiceus. On his way his force received some additions at Samos, and, soon after, he fell in with a squadron of ten galleys, sent by the Athenians to aid Evagoras, which he either captured or destroyed. The Athenians now sent Thrasylbulus, with forty galleys, to check the operations of Teletus. But Thrasylbulus found on his arrival at

Rhodes that the democratical party did not need protection, and therefore thought he might render more important services to Athens in the north of the *Ægean* and the *Hellepont*. He accordingly sailed first to the coast of Thrace, where he composed the feud of two *Odrysian* princes, *Amadocus* and *Seuthes*, and engaged them both in a treaty of alliance with Athens, which was a step toward the revival of Athenian influence in the Greek cities on their coasts. Thrasylbulus then proceeded to Byzantium and Chalcedon, both of which cities he brought over to an alliance with Athens. On his return, he stopped at Mitylene, from whence he led a small army, composed of Mityleneans and about four hundred of his own men, against Methymna, which was held by the Spartan harriot *Thermachus*. An engagement ensued, in which *Thermachus* was defeated and slain. Thrasylbulus then reduced several of the Lesbian towns, and collected plunder from others. From thence he sailed eastward, to levy contributions on the southern coast of Asia, where his career was terminated. He anchored in the *Eurymedon*, near *Aspendus*, where he obtained a supply of money, but his men having committed some lawless ravages on their territories, the *Aspendians* were so incensed, that they fell upon him by night and slew him in his tent.

Alarmed at the success of Thrasylbulus in the *Hellepont*, the Spartan government sent *Anaxibulus* thither with a few galleys, and money sufficient to raise 1,000 mercenaries. On his arrival, *Anaxibulus* waged a successful war with the towns subject to *Pharnabazus*, or allied to Athens, so that the Athenians were at length induced to send *Iphicrates*, with eight galleys and about 1,200 targeteers, to counteract his movements. *Iphicrates* laid in ambush for *Anaxibulus* as he was passing from *Antandrus* to *Abydus*, and he was surprised by it and slain with a few of his Spartan companions, while the rest fled in disorder to *Abydus*.

These successes of the Athenians were in some measure counterbalanced by reverses nearer home. Hitherto they had maintained peaceful intercourse with *Ægina*, but the Spartans resolved to use the island as a medium of infesting the coasts of *Attica*. Accordingly they encouraged the *Æginetians* to infest the *Attic* trade and pillage the coast; and *Ægina* thereby became once more "the eyesore of *Piræus*."

The incursions of the *Æginetians* compelled the Athenians to send *Pamphilus*, with ten galleys and a body of heavy-armed troops, to besiege *Ægina*. This called forth the interference of the Spartan government. *Teletus* sailed thither, and, on his approach, the Athenian squadron retired, though *Pamphilus* kept possession of the fort. Soon after *Teletus* was superseded by *Hierax*, and returned home. *Hierax* sailed to Rhodes, leaving *Gorgopas*, his vice-admiral, with twelve galleys, at *Ægina*. *Gorgopas* was so active in his operations, that the Athenians in the fort soon suffered more than the *Æginetians* in the city, and a strong squadron was sent from Athens to carry them home. The excursions of the *Æginetan* privateers were now renewed, and the Athenians ordered *Eunomus* to repress them. He took his station near the

coast for that purpose with thirteen galleys, but by a surprise in the night, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the rest to seek shelter in Piræus.

About this time the Spartan government resumed its project of obtaining its object by means of negotiation. Accordingly Antalcidas was chosen admiral, in the room of Hierax, and was escorted to Ephesus by Gorgopas and his squadron, which returned back to Ægina. The remainder of his fleet, which joined him at Ephesus, the new admiral placed under the command of his lieutenant, Nicolochus, while he proceeded to the court of Artaxerxes.

Soon after the return of Gorgopas to Ægina he was slain by Chabrias, who had been sent thither with a squadron of ten galleys and 800 targeteers, and the Attic commerce was thereby freed for a time from annoyance. But they soon encountered a more formidable enemy. When the Spartan government heard of the death of Gorgopas, they sent Teledastus to take the command, who, the first night after his arrival, manned twelve galleys, and crossed the gulf toward Piræus. He remained within about half a mile of the harbour till day-break, and then sailed in and captured many ships of war, merchant-vessels, and prisoners. On retreating he proceeded along the coast to Sunium, making many captures in his way, which he did the more readily, as his squadron, having been seen to issue from the port of Athens, was believed to be friendly. At Sunium he found a number of vessels laden with corn and other merchandises, and taking possession of them, he sailed away to Ægina.

Antalcidas returned to Ephesus from the Persian court in 387. He had been treated with marks of distinguished favour by Artaxerxes, and was accompanied by Tiribazus, who was furnished with authority from his court to engage in offensive alliance, for the purpose of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace. On arriving at Ephesus, Antalcidas discovered that Nicolochus was blockaded in the harbour of Abydus by Iphicrates, and hastened thither to his relief. On his way he captured eight Athenian galleys, which Thrasylbulus, of Colytus, was bringing from Thrace to the Hellespont, and was soon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy, and by others from Ionia and the satrapy of Pharnabazus. These additions raised his fleet to eighty sail, and gave him the complete command of the sea, so that the commerce of the Euxine was diverted from the ports of Athens to the ports of the allies of Sparta.

The Athenians now felt a desire for an honourable peace, in which they were joined by most of their allies. The Spartans, also, who had to maintain a garrison both at Orchomenus and Lechaum, and were kept in continual anxiety by their allies to protect the weak, and to guard them against the disaffected, were equally tired of war. Hence, when Tiribazus summoned a congress of deputies to listen to the proposals which he was commissioned to announce, all the belligerents sent their envoys to the congress. The decree which Tiribazus read in this assembly, after having shown the royal seal, ran in the annexed imperial style.—

“ Artaxerxes, the king, thinks it right that the Greek cities in Asia, the peninsula of Clazomenæ, and the island of Cyprus, should belong to his dominions, but that all the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scyros, which, as of old, should belong to the Athenians. If any state refuses to accept this peace, I will make war against it, by land and sea, with ships and money.”

The treaty, founded on these conditions, was ratified by all the parties almost without opposition. A little demur was made by the Thebans, who were reluctant to part with the sovereignty they had exercised over many of the Boeotian towns, but, overawed by the hostile demonstrations of Agesilaus, they also acquiesced in the measure, and signed “ The Peace of Antalcidas.”

Notwithstanding the Corinthians and Argives had signed this peace, they showed a disposition to preserve the union of the two republics, and it was only when Agesilaus threatened them with war, that they consented, the one to dismiss, and the other to withdraw, the Argive garrison from Corinth. The departure of this garrison was attended by an immediate reaction in the affairs of Corinth. Those who had been exiled returned thither, while those who had been most active in promoting the connexion between the two states, with others who had been concerned in the massacre which preceded it, left the city, and took refuge for the most part in Athens. Argos and Corinth therefore became, as formerly, two distinct republics.

This peace was established throughout Greece. Armies were disbanded, fleets were laid up, and, as far as discordant passions, and the arts of exiles from the various states, would allow, friendly and commercial intercourse was resumed among the various republics. Yet, after all, this peace proved to be more of a shadow than substance. The seeds of war were still scattered thickly over the soil of Greece.

CHAPTER XXVI

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO THE ELEVATION OF THEBES TO SUPREMACY OVER THE STATES OF GREECE BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA

371.

ALTHOUGH the peace of Antalcidas did not restore to Sparta all that she had lost in the interval subsequent to the Peloponnesian war, yet it placed her in a situation in some respects more advantageous than that in which she stood at the beginning of this period. Athens was once more independent and powerful, and Thebes was lost as an ally, but the Peloponnesus, now that Corinth was restored to the aristocratic party, was more than ever at the beck of her ancient mistress, and Persia was on her side. It only remained for her, therefore, to have carried out the plans necessary for the character which she had assumed as conservator of peace, and she

would then have become firmly established in power. But her very first measure was one which tended to give general umbrage, inasmuch as it was avowedly the beginning of a series of retaliations by which she proposed to chastise those of her allies who had given offence during the war, and thus she provoked the just resentment of the different states, which led to deep and lasting disgrace. The maxim of Agesilaus, therefore, that Sparta would always be powerful enough, if the Greeks were prudent, might be inverted; Greece might have been powerful, had Sparta been prudent.

The first victim selected as an example of this newly-adopted policy was Mantinea. It was alleged, that during the war the Mantineans had supplied Argos with corn; that they had sometimes evaded their share of service in the Spartan army, under false pretexts, and that they had discharged their duties with manifest reluctance and ill-will. On these accounts, it was required of them that they should throw down their walls, and when they refused to give this pledge of obedience, preparations were immediately made for invading their territory.

However contrary to the spirit of the peace of Antalcidas this invasion might be, yet it does not appear to have violated the Greek international law, for a truce concluded between the two states, after the battle of the year 418, had expired. Notwithstanding, Agesilaus opposed the expedition, and declined the command on the plea that the Mantineans had rendered important services to Sparta in the last Messenian war, which had been conducted by his father Archidamus. His colleague Agesipolis, however, was not so scrupulous. Although his father Pausanias was connected by ties of personal friendship with the chiefs of the democratical party at Mantinea, against whom, in reality, the blow was aimed, he accepted the command of the expedition with cheerfulness.

Agesipolis effected the usual ravages over the Mantinean territory, and thus failing to produce the required obedience, he proceeded to invest the town with a trench and a wall. The Mantineans had been favoured with an abundant harvest during the preceding summer, and therefore, they prepared to sustain a siege. Agesipolis saw this movement with concern, and dreading the cost and tediousness of a long-protracted siege, resorted to a fresh expedient. The river Ophis, which at times was swollen to a considerable size, flowed through the town, and Agesipolis taking advantage of such an occurrence, raised an embankment, by which he forced it back and laid the low grounds at the foot of the adjacent walls under water. As they, like the houses, were built at their basements of unbaked bricks, the natural consequence was that they soon began to totter. The Mantineans propped up their sinking walls with buttresses, but when they found that the water was gaining upon them, and that there was no hope of escape, they sent an offer of submission. But the prospect of success made the Spartans more arrogant. The Mantineans were informed that the conquerors were no longer to be content with the destruction of the walls; that Mantinea should cease to exist as a city, and that the population should be

dispersed among the four villages out of which it had been anciently collected. It was too late to dispute the matter, and these unjust conditions were accepted.

The chiefs of the popular party expected no mercy at the hands of the conquerors, but Pausanias exerted his influence with his son Agesipolis on their behalf, and they were permitted to go into exile. About sixty took the benefit of this indulgence; and the conditions were then executed. The fortifications and the houses of Mantinea were thrown down. Xenophon observes that the aristocratical Mantineans regretted the destruction of their dwellings, which put them to the expense of building new ones; but they were consoled for this loss by the power they acquired in the villages near which their estates lay, and by their deliverance from the power of the democracy. Hence they cheerfully acquiesced in the measure, and willingly contributed their contingents to the Spartan levies. Their power was completely broken, for the Spartans treated each village as a separate state, sending an officer to each to collect its forces.

The effect which this policy of Sparta produced among the Grecian states soon became manifest. All those who were discontented with the affairs at home, and desired a change consistent with the interests of Sparta, were induced by it to address themselves to her for assistance. The exiles of Phlius were the first to make such an application, and the ephori heard them with favour. In this case, however, they assumed an air of mildness and moderation. They sent a message to Phlius, stating that the exiles were friends of Sparta, and had been guilty of no offence, and soliciting their recall as a favour. The government of Phlius saw what would follow if they refused, and they not only repealed the decree of banishment, but agreed to restore their confiscated property to the exiles.

Two years now passed away without any recorded event of note. During that period Greece rested from crime and from war. But this quiet was broken in the spring of B. C. 382, by the arrival of envoys at Sparta from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace, who came to solicit protection against the power of Olynthus, which was threatening their independence.

The city of Olynthus was situated in a fertile district between the rivers Olynthus and Amnias, which flow into the Toroneus gulf. It was the largest of all the Grecian cities in Thrace, and when the issue of the Peloponnesian war released the inhabitants from all control and apprehension with regard to their old mistress and enemy, Athens, and left them at full liberty to regulate their own concerns, Olynthus took a proud station among them. In the year following the peace of Nicias she strengthened herself by the acquisition of Mecyberna, a post town between two and three miles off; and not long after the end of the war, succeeded in forming a confederacy among the kindred cities, of which she was the acknowledged head. Against this usurpation, however, Acanthus and Apollonia protested, and it was to avert the threat of war

for their contumacy that the embassy was sent to Sparta.

How great Olynthus had become may be seen by the speech which the Acanthian minister addressed to the Spartan ephori, and the deputies of their confederates, who had been called together to deliberate on the matter:—"It is a matter of concern to you that the Bœotians should not coalesce into one state, but you have overlooked a growing disorder, which threatens, like a pestilence, to infect and pervade Greece. The ambition of the Olynthians has increased with their power. By the submission of the minor cities in their neighbourhood they have been enabled to subdue the more powerful. They have even wrested the most valuable provinces from the king of Macedonia. Pella is already theirs, and Amyntas is on the point of abandoning the remainder of his dominions, being unable to defend them. There is not a community in Thrace capable of resisting their progress. The independent and warlike tribes of that country court the friendship of the Olynthians, lest they should be tempted to extend their dominion. They have but to stretch out their hands, and the gold mines of Pangæus will be theirs. And if this should be effected, what can prevent them from acquiring superiority by sea or land? And if they should enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes, which they contemplate doing, what will become of the pre-eminence, nay the independence and safety of Sparta? The present emergency, therefore, by every motive of interest and honour, solicits the activity and valour of your state. By yielding a seasonable supply to Acanthus and Apollonia you will save two peaceful communities from oppression, and check the ambition of a usurping tyrant. The reluctant subjects of Olynthus will court your protection, and the Chalcidian cities will be encouraged by it to revolt. As yet, therefore, it is not too late; but should their connexion become confirmed by intermarriages and intermixture of possessions, it will then be difficult to dissolve it." The Spartan government was already disposed to favour this application, but they affected to leave the decision of the question to its allies. Its inclination, however, to comply with the request of the Chalcidians was generally known, and many of the deputies were eager to pay court to it, by anticipating its wishes, hence war was declared, and 10,000 men were ordered to be sent against Olynthus.

The influence of Sparta was no less manifest in the arrangements adopted for carrying this resolution into effect, than in the proposition itself. It was agreed that any state of the confederacy might compound for the personal services of its citizens at the rate of three Ægean obols—about fourpence—per day for the foot-soldier, and four times as much for the trooper; and that every state which withheld its contingent was to be liable to forfeit a stater—about one pound sterling—per day for each man. This plan, therefore, gave employment to those who made war their occupation.

The Chalcidian envoys were well pleased with the prospect of this efficient force, but they observed that the levying of it would demand considerable time, and that it would be

advisable to send a smaller force without delay to the scene of action. Accordingly, about 2000 Spartan troops were ordered to march forthwith, under the command of Eudamidas, with the promise that the remainder should follow under the charge of his brother Phœbidas. Eudamidas proceeded to the Chalcidian peninsula, where he was received at Potidea, which he made his head-quarters, and notwithstanding the smallness of his force, not only carried on hostilities against Olynthus, but placed garrisons in other towns.

Soon after Phœbidas set out on his expedition, but instead of proceeding direct to Thrace, he engaged in an enterprise which set fire to a train of evils which terminated in the overthrow of Grecian independency.

In his march Phœbidas stopped at Thebes, and encamped near the walls. Now, although in military affairs the Thebans might nearly vie at this time with the Spartans, yet the civil government was still as ill constituted as most of the states in Greece. Faction was rife in the city, and the parties were so nearly balanced in power, that two contending chiefs, Ismenias and Leontiades, were associated together as polemarchs. As Ismenias headed the democratical party, he avoided all communication with Phœbidas, but, on the contrary, Leontiades, who represented the old oligarchical faction, paid great attention to the Spartan commander. He, doubtless, expected that the presence of the Peloponnesian army would have some influence on the minds of the people, and that such influence would be advantageous to the views of his party. But he was mistaken. The party of Ismenias, active in counteracting such a result, procured a decree which forbade any Theban to engage in the expedition against Olynthus.

Thus disappointed in his views, and fearing the loss of power, Leontiades offered to put Phœbidas in possession of the citadel. In making this proposition, he represented that if this were effected the whole force of Thebes would be at his disposal, and that he would have achieved a conquest of far greater importance than even Olynthus. Phœbidas, anxious to effect a brilliant exploit, embraced this offer without hesitation, and it was concerted between them that he should set forward as if on his march, but that, at the proper juncture, Leontiades should overtake him and conduct him into the citadel.

The day selected for this enterprise was the festival of Demeter, the Thesmophoria, when the Theban women celebrated the mystic rites of the goddess in the citadel, and the council which commonly met there sat in the portico of the agora. Accordingly, in the stillness of a sultry noon, when the crowd sought shade and repose, and the streets were left almost empty, Leontiades rode out after Phœbidas and conducted him into the citadel. Leaving him there, Leontiades then proceeded to the council, where Ismenias was transacting business. He bade the counsellors not to be alarmed because the citadel was in the hands of the Spartans, for that they were not come with hostile intentions toward any of the peaceable citizens and added, that, as the law empowered a polemarch to arrest any

one chargeable with a capital offence, he should exercise authority and commit Ismenias to prison as guilty of stirring up war. Then suing the action to the word, he commanded Ismenias to be arrested; and his partisans, struck with consternation, fled, to the number of four hundred, and took refuge in Athens.

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party of Leontiades, a new polemarch was chosen in the person of Archias, and Leontiades then repaired to Sparta, to obtain the sanction of the Spartan government to these proceedings. The decision of the Spartans justified the assertions made by the Athenians in the conference at Melos, that "of all states, Sparta had most glaringly shown that in her political transactions she measured honour by inclination, and justice by expediency." While they assumed the office of avengers of wrong, they determined to preserve the fruits of inquiry. Phœbidas was fined 10,000 drachms, and deposed from his command, for exceeding his commission; but the citadel was retained in their possession, and a commission, composed of three Spartan judges and of one from each of the confederate states, was sent to Thebes to sit in judgment upon Ismenias. At the same time, Lysanoridas, with two colleagues, were appointed in the room of Phœbidas.

The charges brought against Ismenias were that he had accepted Persian gold; that he had devoted himself to the interests of Artaxerxes, and, together with Androchidas, had been a prime mover of the late war; and that he stood pledged to injure Greece. Ismenias refuted these charges, but being unable to convince his judges that he was not a formidable enemy to Sparta, he was condemned to death. Leontiades, Archias, and their faction, therefore, remained masters of Thebes under the control of the Spartan government.

The Spartans were now enabled to prosecute the war against Olynthus with increased activity. Teletias, the brother of Agesilaus, was appointed to the command, and he immediately prepared for its subjugation. While he was raising his troops, he sent to Amyntas, king of Macedonia, urging him to raise as many mercenaries as he could, and to engage the neighbouring princes by subsidies either to espouse his cause or to remain neutral. He also sent to Derdas, prince of Elymia, representing the danger with which his principality was threatened, and exhorting him to aid in the conquest of Olynthus. Both these applications were successful; and while yet on his march, he was joined by Macedonian troops and about four hundred cavalry from Elymia, at the head of which was Derdas himself.

Thus reinforced, Teletias advanced against Olynthus. He found the enemy drawn up under the walls to receive him. A battle ensued, in which the Peloponnesian forces were routed, but Derdas arriving with his cavalry, which had been placed on the left wing, made a movement towards the gates, which induced the Olynthians, through fear of being cut off from the town, to make a hasty retreat, and to take shelter behind the walls. Teletias then reared a trophy, and,

on his return to Potidæa, ravaged the territory through which he passed, which was the principal advantage gained in this campaign. Soon after, he dismissed his Macedonian and Elymian auxiliaries.

During the winter, the Olynthians made frequent inroads on the allies of Sparta, but in the spring of B.C. 381, Teletias being again joined by Derdas, kept them in awe, and they were again nearly confined to their walls, and were able to cultivate only a small part of their territory. Somewhat later in the season he took the field, and renewed and completed the devastations of the year before. As he approached the town, however, the Olynthians sent their cavalry to meet him, and a general engagement took place, in which Teletias was slain, and his army routed with great slaughter. They fled to the nearest friendly cities, and Olynthus thus, for a time, triumphed over Sparta.

This mortifying disaster, however, did not cool the ardour of the Spartans for gaining possession of Olynthus. On the contrary, fearing that it might induce the defection of their allies, they were aroused by it to increased exertions. Agesipolis was sent thither with a powerful reinforcement, and his arrival revived the hopes of the vanquished, and confirmed the attachment of the Spartan allies. Agesipolis invaded and ravaged such parts of the Olynthian territory as had been spared by Teletias, and captured Torone; but, in the midst of his successes, he was seized with a fever which put an end to his life, at Aphytus, in the peninsula of Pallene. According to the Spartan custom, his body was immersed in honey, and was thus carried home for a royal burial. His death seems to have been considered a great loss to his country; for even his rival, Agesilaus, hardened warrior as he was, shed the bitter tears of grief. He was succeeded in his throne by his brother Cleombrotus, and in his command by Polybiades.

While Agesipolis had been employed in Thrace, Agesilaus had reduced another of the refractory allies of Sparta to complete subjection. On the return of the exiles of Phlius they expected to be put into complete possession of their confiscated possessions, according to the terms of agreement. In this they were disappointed. The Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons either holding their property, or connected with those who held it, and their demands were rejected. The adverse party would not even submit to foreign arbitration, and therefore the aggrieved once more had recourse to Sparta for redress. But this only increased their difficulties. Their opponents, conceiving that Sparta would be unable to afford them relief, ventured to condemn them to a penalty for having gone thither without a public commission.

The hope that Sparta would not interfere was fallacious. The ephori resolved that the refractory Phliasians should be chastised; and Agesilaus, who had some personal and hereditary connexions among the exiles, willingly undertook the command. He was already on his way to Phlius, when he was met by several deprecatory embassies from the party in power, who offered him money to purchase his forbearance. Agesilaus

had disregarded the rights of justice in the matter of Thebes, for he had pleaded the cause of Phœbdas with great earnestness in the senate, but he now altered his conduct. He told the envoys, with peculiar solemnity, that he was not come to wrong any one, but to succour the oppressed. The envoys then professed their readiness to make any sacrifice he required to avert the invasion. "Professors," he replied, "could find no credit, when deceit had already been practised;" and he insisted on being put in the possession of the citadel. This was refused, and Agesilaus proceeded to besiege their town.

Among the Spartans in the camp, there were many who, not being biased by similar feelings in favour of the exiles, loudly expressed their disapprobation of an enterprise undertaken against Phlius, which was able to arm 5,000 men, for the sake of a few individuals. To silence these murmurs, Agesilaus directed that the Phliasian refugees should give the most liberal reception to all those who might be drawn, by ties of blood or friendship, to come out and join them. This was made known, and their numbers were soon increased to more than 1,000 men, who, being well equipped and disciplined, formed a valuable reinforcement to the Spartan army, and the remonstrants were thereby silenced.

Still the besieged Phliasiens, by dint of extraordinary abstinence, patience, and courage, were enabled to hold out against Agesilaus for a year and eight months. One Delpho, moreover, with a band of 300 devoted followers, annoyed the enemy with frequent sallies, and kept those disposed to capitulate in awe. Even when food grew scarce, and hope faint, he repressed the disposition to surrender, and when, at length, resources failed, he braved Agesilaus, by sending a herald to demand a truce, that envoys might be sent to Sparta with offers of unconditional submission.

Although piqued at the slight thus put upon him, Agesilaus granted a safe conduct to these envoys, but at the same time exerted all his influence to be appointed arbiter of peace. In the meantime, he redoubled his precautions to prevent the escape of the besieged. Nevertheless, Delpho, and a slave who had frequently given proof of his courage and dexterity in carrying away arms from the enemy's camp, contrived to elude the vigilance of the sentinels, and escaped. The rest received orders from the Spartan government to submit to such conditions as Agesilaus should dictate. The terms he dictated were, that one hundred commissioners should be chosen, one half from the exiles, and the other from the besieged, with power to put to death or banish as many of their fellow-citizens as they would, and then to frame a new constitution. Before he marched away, he placed a garrison in the citadel, with pay for six months, and with a command to remain there until this business should be accomplished. The immediate result of this measure is unknown, but the effect was to render Phlius a devoted vassal of Sparta.

During the same year, B.C. 379, the Olynthians being pressed by Polybiades both by sea

and land, sent envoys to Sparta to sue for peace. It was granted, upon the usual terms of subordinate alliance; that the friends and enemies of Sparta should be friends and enemies of Olynthus, and that the Olynthians should serve in arms under the Spartans, wherever they should require their services.

Sparta had advanced, at this time, many steps nearer than she had ever been before to a complete subjugation of Greece, but her ascendancy was not established upon secure grounds. Her measures against Mantinea, Phlius, Olynthus, and above all, Thebes, had rendered her more odious than she had hitherto been in the sight of the Grecian states. So glaring an act of injustice was the seizure of the citadel of Thebes, that even at Sparta no attempt was made to defend it, but on the score of expediency, and hence, when she fell from her lofty station, the Spartans consoled themselves by the consideration that their reverses were owing to the anger of the gods for this foul act. Their historian for Xenophon at this period may be considered as such plainly directs his readers to the manner in which Sparta fell from her palmy state to one of deep degradation, as a signal proof of a superintending Providence. It was so, and Thebes, which had suffered the wrong, was chosen as the instrument of her punishment.

At this date, Thebes possessed two great men, who were destined to take a prominent part in the affairs of Greece—these were Epaminondas, a Pythagorean philosopher, and Pelopidas, a man of noble birth, ample fortune, and enlarged connections.

Epaminondas and Pelopidas had long been associated together, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of their characters and circumstances, in the strictest bonds of friendship. No shocks of war, no agitations of faction, could sever those bonds. Time and space could not diminish their attachment, and when Pelopidas accompanied the fugitives to Athens, on the seizure of the citadel, they kept up a secret correspondence. Epaminondas, who remained in the city, related all that passed therein, and his communications tended to increase the impatience of the exiles to return, and take vengeance on the traitors. Every new account which the exiles received stimulated them, with fresh eagerness, to make an attempt to overturn the power of the traitors.

The opposite qualities of Leontiades and Archias, polemarchs of Thebes, seem to have concurred to aggravate the burden which their government imposed upon the citizens. Leontiades was a vigilant party leader, who devoted his whole attention to public affairs, for the security of his government. On the contrary, Archias was a man of pleasure, who desired power that he might obtain the means for sensual indulgence, while, therefore, the one was employed in guarding against the machinations of the friends of the exiles, and consequently oppressing them, the other was raising enemies by the gratification of his passions, at the price of the dishonour of the most reputable families. These provocations ripened the wishes of the Theban exiles into a plan for the recovery of the city;

and this may have been accelerated by the efforts which their adversaries made to counteract their wishes. While Leontiades sent private emissaries to Athens for the purpose of cutting off the principal exiles by secret assassination, the Spartan government endeavoured, by an imperious mandate, in the name of the Peloponnesian confederacy, to induce the Athenians to dismiss the whole from their city. Both failed in their designs; and they quickened the desire of revenge in the breasts of the exiles against their persecutors.

Pelopidas was the first to form the design of conspiracy against Leontiades and Archias. The exiles readily joined him, and then communicated their intention to their friends at Thebes. Epaminondas was urged to lend his aid to the common cause, but though he desired the downfall of the tyrants, he would not actively engage in an enterprise in which he foresaw, from the violent character of some of the conspirators, that there would be much innocent blood shed. Hence he resolved to await the issue of the event before he took any prominent part in public affairs. He even persuaded his friends not to join in the conspiracy, but notwithstanding, his brother Cephias entered with ardour into the undertaking. The most important confederate of the party at Thebes, however, was Phyllidas. This man, according to Xenophon, having been sent to Athens on business, urged the exiles to the attempt, and yet so completely concealed his sentiments from the government of Thebes, that he filled the office of secretary to the polemarch, and was in special favour with Archias, because he pandered to his sensual appetites.

At length a day was fixed for the attempt. It was concerted that a small party of the exiles under Pelopidas—Plutarch says twelve, and Xenophon seven—should join their associates in Thebes, while the main body, headed by Pherenicas, should post themselves in the Thriassian plain. At the same time, two of the Athenian generals undertook, on their own authority, to march, with an Athenian force, to the frontier, and thence afford them aid as occasion might require.

Pelopidas and his companion assumed the garb of hunters, and in this disguise they reached Mount Cithæron. While here, they despatched a messenger to Thebes to announce their approach, and to make arrangements for their reception. Charon, one of their most resolute partisans, offered his house as a hiding-place for them and a general rendezvous for the conspirators. With this information the messenger returned; and Pelopidas and his party having crossed Cithæron, took different roads, and entering the city unobserved, met safely in Charon's house, where they were joined by their partisans, the whole number of whom amounted to forty-eight.

The evening on which the conspirators met in Charon's house was appointed by Phyllidas for a banquet which he was to give to Archias and Philippus, one of his colleagues, either under the pretext of a public festival, or of celebrating the termination of their year of office, which was near at hand. He promised Archias that he

would endeavour, towards the close of the entertainment, to procure the presence of some lewd women, and as Leontiades would not have approved of such orgies, Archias had desired that he should not be invited.

The conspirators had not been long assembled before they were threatened with danger. A message came from Archias to summon Charon into his presence. It seemed probable that the plot was discovered; but Archias had only heard that some of the exiles were concealed in the city, and had sent for Charon to make inquiries on the subject. Charon denied any knowledge of the circumstance, and Archias and Philippus were already too much heated with wine to think seriously of danger. Soon after, they were exposed to greater peril. A letter was brought to Archias from an Athenian of the same name, who was at this time hierophant, or the appointed interpreter of mysteries, communicating to him the details of the plot, but though the bearer conjured him to read this letter, inasmuch as it unfolded some grave concerns, Archias, heated and stupified by his debauch, laid it aside unopened, exclaiming, "GRAVE CONCERNS TO-MORROW," and expressed his impatience for the appearance of the Theban women.

This was the moment chosen for the attack. One Mellon and a few of the conspirators were at the door in disguise as women or revellers, and Phyllidas admitting them, after a brief struggle, they despatched Archias, Philippus, and the other guests.

How aptly does this conduct of Archias shadow forth that of men in general. Although warned to be serious, and to think of their latter end, yet, immersed in pleasure or business, the universal cry is, "GRAVE CONCERNS TO-MORROW," and death comes upon them and finds them unprepared. If, reader, you are among this giddy number, remember the fate of Archias, and be warned in time. Reflect, that the sun may never again dawn upon your eyes, "For what is your life? It is even a vapour that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away." These are wise words of Solomon, and deserve to be engraven on the heart of every one —

"Boast not thyself of to-morrow,
For thou knowest not what a day may bring forth."
Prov xxvii. 1

To-day, therefore, while it is called to-day, seek peace with God through the atoning blood and the all-sufficient merit of the Lord Jesus Christ.

While the work of slaughter was proceeding in the house of Phyllidas, other of the conspirators, under Pelopidas, repaired to the house of Leontiades. They found Leontiades reclining after a temperate meal, while his wife was spinning by his side. Leontiades seeing his danger, seized a weapon, with which he slew Cephinodorus, but he at length fell by the hand of Pelopidas. They then closed the door of his house, and proceeded to that of Hypatea, another leading member of the government, who at first made his escape, but was overtaken and despatched. About the same time Phyllidas went to the prison where a number of the friends of the

exiles were imprisoned, and set them at liberty; and then it was that the conspiracy became known. All armed themselves, and rushing through the streets, proclaimed the fall of the Tyrants, and invited all Thebans to rise in the cause of freedom.

Not knowing what to believe, the citizens remained quiet during the night, but the Spartan commanders in the citadel sent to Thespiæ and Platæa for succours, and the insurgents despatched couriers to their friends in Attica.

The morning unfolded the events of the night. Pelopidas and the other champions of freedom, among whom Epaminondas now took his place, called an assembly, which they entered in solemn procession, accompanied by the priests, who bore the sacred symbols of suppliants, and they conjured the spectators to fight for their hearths and their altars. They were hailed with shouts of applause as the deliverers of their country; and Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon were placed at the head of the government, with the title of *Bœotarchs*. Soon after they were joined by the Athenian generals, and immediately commenced the siege of the citadel. This was soon captured. The Spartan commanders proposed terms of capitulation, and they were allowed to march out armed. Several Thebans, however, who had taken refuge among them, were arrested and put to death; and such was the fury of the exiles, that they would have exterminated their families had not the Athenians humanely interposed as it was, many of their children fell innocent victims of their implacable revenge.

"The news of the Theban insurrection," says Thirlwall, "was received at Sparta with the vexation which men commonly experience when they are deprived of the fruits of their injustice. This was displayed in the decree by which the governors who had surrendered the citadel, were commanded to be put to death. At the same time, an army was ordered to march against Thebes, under the command of Cleombrotus. The Spartans were urged to this by the partisans of the tyranny, who were now, in their turn, driven into exile, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the same step would have been taken by them, from a consideration that they were threatened with the loss of the supremacy of Greece."

Cleombrotus seems to have engaged in this expedition with feelings similar to those which influenced his father, Pausanias, when he marched against the Athenians under similar circumstances. He crossed the mountains by the pass above Platæa, where he defeated a small Theban force, but he remained in Bœotia sixteen days without committing any damages even to the territory, and then retired. He left Sphodrias as harmost at Thespiæ, with a third part of the allied forces, and then descending to the sea coast on the gulf of Crenisus, pursued his march along the mountain road toward the isthmus. In his route, he was assailed by a storm of wind, which carried a considerable quantity of arms and baggage, with the beasts of burden, into the sea;—an event which Xenophon interpreted as an omen of the impending political tempest.

Fruitless as this expedition of Cleombrotus was with regard to the Thebans, it seems to have made an impression at Athens unfavourable to the cause of Thebes. Although the wishes of the people at large were strongly in favour of the independence of that state, the two generals who had aided in the recovery of the city were brought to trial; and while one of them was put to death, the other, who did not appear, was outlawed.

This apparent turn in the public mind at Athens gave great alarm to the new government at Thebes, and its members resorted to a stratagem in order to counteract it. Taking advantage of the well-known venality of the Spartan character, they induced Sphodrias, the harmost of Thespiæ, to march into Attica, as if with the intention of surprising Piræus. He advanced as far as the Thriasian plain, but his men being struck with superstitious terror by a blaze which seemed to issue from the temple of Eleusis, after indulging them with havoc and plunder, he led them back to Thespiæ.

The news of the approach of Sphodrias caused the citizens of Athens to fly to arms, and when he retired, they sent envoys to Sparta to complain of the outrage. The Spartans made a show of offering them satisfaction. Sphodrias was recalled, and, not venturing to return home, he was tried in his absence. His doom seemed certain, but Agesilaus, though convinced that he had sold the interests of the state by his imprudence, from motives of pity pleaded his cause, alleging that it would be hard and unwise to put a man to death whose previous conduct had been irreproachable, and Sphodrias was acquitted.

Indignant at the sanction thus given to the conduct of Sphodrias, Athens now entered into a close alliance with Thebes. Active preparations were made for withstanding the common enemy, the fortifications of Piræus were completed, a new fleet of one hundred galleys was put on the stocks, and, as if aroused by this shock from her lethargy, Athens began to think of recovering her ancient maritime dominion. In this she was encouraged by the voluntary act of some of the maritime states. About this time, weary of the impetuous and oppressive rule of the harmosts of Sparta, the cities of Chios, Byzantium, Mitylene, and Rhodæ, sought Athenian protection, and these formed the nucleus of a new confederacy, which gradually embraced a great number of insular and maritime states, over which Athens was to preside, not as a sovereign, but in the spirit with which Aristides regulated the constitution of the original league. It seems to have been in a congress of these states, with which Thebes was also included, that the Athenians passed a decree that an army of 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry should be raised, and that a fleet of 200 sail should be equipped, for the purpose of carrying on the war.

The danger with which Sparta saw herself threatened by the defection of her maritime allies, induced her to treat the rest more mildly, and to adopt a new system for the regulation of her contingents. The whole confederacy was divided into ten classes, which assumed this order:—Sparta; the Arcadian states, which formed two classes;

Elis; the Achæans; Corinth and Megara; Sicyon, Philus, and the towns of the Argolic Acté; the Aœnanians; the Phocians and Locrians; Olynthus, and the other cities on the coasts of Thracæ. What other arrangements were made is unknown, except that one heavy-armed soldier was deemed equivalent to two light-armed, and one trooper to four heavy-armed, which probably implies that each state was permitted to determine the quality of its contingent.

The above arrangements having been made, and while yet the Athenians were busied in making their preparations, the Spartan government prepared for a fresh expedition against Thebes. Agesilaus was invited to take the command, and he no longer thought it indecorous to accept it. It seems, indeed, to have been welcomed by him at this time; for although years had rolled away since he was insulted by the Bœotarchs while in the act of sacrifice, his heart beat quick with resentment, and he longed to gratify that passion.

The first care of Agesilaus was to secure the passes of Cithæron, and for this purpose he took advantage of a war which was carried on between the Arcadian towns of Cleitor and Orchomenus, in which the former employed a band of mercenaries. He bargained with Cleitor for the use of this little army, which was sent forward to occupy Cithæron, and Orchomenus was enjoined to suspend hostilities during their absence. Agesilaus then crossed Cithæron without interruption, and passed through Thespiæ to the Theban frontier. He found it guarded by the Theban cavalry, but passed through their lines, which were ill defended, and spread havoc over the fertile plain, which was nearly ready for the harvest. But here his success ended. He found an Athenian army, under Chabrias, and the Theban troops, under the Bœotarch Gorgidas, posted on the range of hills two miles south of the city, and, after two vain attempts to dislodge them, he thought it prudent to sound a retreat. Agesilaus passed through Thespiæ on his return, where he assisted the inhabitants to repair the fortifications, then leaving Phœbidas there as harmless, he returned home.

In the course of the year, Phœbidas annoyed the Thebans so much by frequent incursions, that at length Gorgidas was sent to invade the territory of Thespiæ. He was checked in his meditated ravages by the activity of Phœbidas, but as the Spartan general was pursuing him, the Theban cavalry made a charge, in which Phœbidas fell, and his troops fled in disorder to Thespiæ. This success encouraged the Thebans to renew their invasion of the Thespiæ territory, and to make attempts upon other Bœotian cities, so that the Spartans were compelled to send another general, with a reinforcement, to their succour.

In the spring of B.C. 377, Agesilaus again took the field. In this campaign, having passed Cithæron, he descended to Platæa, and from thence marched down the vale of the Asopus, and having ravaged the eastern side of the Theban territory as far as the confines of Tanagra, he turned to the westward until he reached a pass named Graoastethos, where the Thebans were waiting to receive him. The post which they

occupied was so formidable that he did not think it prudent to attempt to dislodge them by force, but, changing his front, moved towards the city. Alarmed for their safety, the Thebans quitted their position, and having gained some slight advantage over Agesilaus in a skirmish, caused him again to retreat. He passed on to Thespiæ, thence crossed over to Megara, where he met with an accident, which was the beginning of an illness that long detained him at Sparta.

These two expeditions had destroyed two successive harvests, and scarcity began to be felt at Thebes. Corn, however, was purchased at Pagasæ, and the damage which the Theban agriculture suffered was, perhaps, more than compensated by the military experience which the Thebans gained from these incursions. The terror of the Spartan name was greatly lessened thereby, and the great men who conducted their affairs were encouraged to make increased exertions for working out their effectual deliverance. Among other expedients to which they resorted for cherishing the martial ardour of the citizens, one was, the institution of a military brotherhood, consisting of three hundred men, who were selected not merely with regard to their personal qualities, but to their mutual intimacies. These were to be maintained at the public expense, to be in constant training and readiness for action, whence they acquired the name of the Sacred Band.

On the other hand, the Spartans were disheartened by their recent failures. Agesilaus was reproached by Antalcidas "for teaching the Thebans to conquer." Notwithstanding, they entertained no thoughts of peace. In the spring of B.C. 376, Agesilaus being still confined to his chamber, Cleombrotus was ordered to take his place at the head of an army which was again to invade the Theban territory. But he was less successful than Agesilaus. Having neglected to secure the passes of Cithæron, when he arrived there he found them occupied by Theban and Athenian troops, and, looking upon the obstacle as insurmountable, he led his army home a measure which excited loud murmurs at Sparta, not only among his fellow-citizens, but among the allies, who, in a congress held soon after his return, complained of the manifest want of energy in the Spartan operations.

In this congress, the allies observed that no use was made of their naval superiority which would enable them either to starve Athens into submission, or to transport an army to one of the Bœotian or Phœcian ports, so as to attack Thebes at the proper season. This suggestion was adopted. A fleet of sixty galleys was fitted out, and placed under the command of Pollis, who was instructed to cruise among the Cyclades, and intercept the corn-ships bound for Piræus. But the Spartans were equally unsuccessful by sea as by land. An Athenian fleet of eighty galleys was quickly manned, and placed under the command of Chabrias, who, for the purpose of forcing the enemy to a battle, undertook the siege of Naxos. Pollis sailed to relieve this town, and, in a naval engagement that followed, was defeated, with the loss of more than half his fleet, which not only relieved Athens from the prospect of famine, but encouraged the

people in their hopes of regaining the dominion of the sea : at the same time the event still more disheartened the Spartans.

In the spring of B.C. 375, Sparta renewed her preparations for the invasion of Bœotia, but was diverted from it by the operations of the Athenians. Encouraged by the victory at Naxos, a fleet of sixty galleys was sent, under Timotheus, the son of Conon, round Peloponnesus, which compelled the Spartans to look to the preservation of their own territories. Timotheus did not attempt to do any mischief on the coasts of Laconia, but bent his course to Corcyra, of which island he made himself master. The Corcyreans renewed their ancient connexion with Athens, and the same success attended Timotheus, at Cephallenia and Acarnania, and he even drew Alcetas, king of the Molossians, whose authority extended over a great part of the Epirot tribes, into the Athenian alliance. The Spartans sent out a fleet to withstand him under Nicolochus, but he gained no advantage over him. Two naval engagements took place, in which each commander triumphed in turn, but Timotheus having received some addition to his force from Corcyra, which raised it to seventy sail, Nicolochus returned to Laconi.

Thus freed from invasion, the Thebans directed their attention to the consolidation of their power in Bœotia. Most of the towns renewed their ancient connexion with Thebes, but Plataea, Thebes, and Orchomenus still held out, and it was resolved to reduce them by force. Orchomenus had received a garrison of two Spartan moras, and Pelopidas hearing that this garrison was absent on an expedition into Locris, put himself at the head of the Sacred Band, with a small troop of horse, and marched thither with alacrity, hoping to surprise the city in its absence. On his arrival, however, he found that a sufficient force had been sent to supply the place of the absent garrison, and that it was prudent to retreat. He took the road which skirted the north-east corner of the Copaic lake, and was marching along the foot of the hills on the eastern side, near Tegyra, when he was suddenly encountered by the two moras, as they were returning from Locris. His followers were dismayed, but Pelopidas, despising fear, led them against the enemy, and the two Spartan generals, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, being slain at the onset, their troops were completely routed. Pelopidas, however, did not think it prudent to follow up his success, fearing that he might be overtaken by fresh troops from Orchomenus, and therefore he returned to Thebes.

The battle of Tegyra contributed more than any previous event to raise the martial courage of the Thebans. It encouraged them to bolder enterprises; and in the spring of B.C. 374, they undertook an expedition against Phocis. But this enterprise proved abortive the Phocians applied for succour to Sparta, and Cleombrotus was sent with an army, which he transported across the Corinthian gulf, upon the approach of which the Thebans retreated, and remained upon the defensive within their own frontier.

At this juncture, a warning voice reached Sparta, revealing a danger which threatened

Greece from a quarter which, in their strifes, every state had overlooked.

Thessaly, hitherto divided into many petty states, had now become the seats of two governments, that of Pheræ, under the dominion of Jason, and that of Pharsalus, under Polydamus. Jason was a man of active ambition, whose views of dominion were stretched not only over Greece, but the vast empire of Persia. To whatever quarter he looked, indeed, he saw no barrier to his ambition, which he did not feel himself able to surmount. But the first step which he had to take was to acquire the title of tagus, and to unite all Thessaly under his authority. As he was at the head of the Thessalian cities of the first rank, he might have accomplished this by feat of arms; but knowing the character of Polydamus, he believed that his object might be attained by negotiation. For this purpose, he desired a conference with Polydamus, and when they met, he frankly unfolded his schemes, pointed out the means which he possessed of carrying them into effect; and, on the ground of necessity, urged him to submit to his rule. Polydamus met this proposal with equal candour, and informed Jason that the greatest difficulty was, his reluctance to abandon his ancient alliance with Sparta. Jason applauded his loyalty, and gave him leave to resort to Sparta, and lay the whole state of the case before the Ephori, and then ask if they were prepared to defend his territories. Accordingly, Polydamus proceeded to Sparta, where the subject was gravely discussed. Polydamus disclosed his own danger in common with all Greece, described Jason's character, plans, and resources, and demanded to know whether they could send a force sufficient to encourage the Thessalians to assert their independence. The government took three days to deliberate, and then, looking at their present difficulties, they came to the conclusion to reply in the negative, and they advised Polydamus to make the best terms he could for himself and Pharsalus. He thanked them for their candour, and adopted their advice. On his return to Thessaly, he begged Jason to permit him to keep the citadel of Pharsalus for those who had committed it to his custody, but promised that he would exert his influence with his fellow-citizens to induce them to own him as tagus. Jason consented to these terms, and soon after assumed the desired title with universal consent, and immediately commenced the regulation of the force of the country for future enterprises.

About the time the above transactions occurred, one of the belligerent states of Greece became desirous of peace. Wearied, disappointed, and jealous of her successful ally, Athens sent envoys to Sparta, and concluded a treaty with her. But this peace was of brief duration. Timotheus having received instructions to return home, stopped to land a party of democratical exiles on the coast of Zacynthus, and, placing them in a stronghold near the city, furnished them with the means of annoying their adversaries. The oligarchical Zacynthians made complaints to Sparta, and Athens refusing to make satisfaction, this was held a sufficient ground for renewing the war, and a decree was passed for

raising a fleet of sixty galleys from the maritime states of the confederacy.

It appears that a squadron of twenty-five galleys was sent, in the autumn of the same year, to the relief of Zæcynthus; but early in the next spring, *a. c.* 378, the remaining thirty-five were sent to Corcyra, in compliance with the solicitations of a body of refugees who had been encouraged, by the hope of Spartan protection, to rise against the popular government. This armament was placed under the command of Mnasiippus; who, on his arrival at Corcyra ravaged the country, cut off all communication between the city and the rest of the island, and blockaded the port. In their distress, the Corcyreans sent envoys to Athens to implore succour, and a fleet of sixty sail was decreed, and Timotheus appointed to the command. Before he arrived, however, the Corcyreans, driven to despair by famine, ventured to march out against the enemy, and Mnasiippus was slain, and his army utterly routed. They fled to their ships, and intelligence coming soon after that an Athenian armament was close at hand, Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasiippus, set sail for Leucas.

The Athenian armament had been delayed by financial embarrassments, which led to a change in the command. Not being supplied with the means for equipping it, Timotheus had sailed from Piræus in the spring, to collect men and money from the islands and coasts of the *Ægean*. In the meantime, the people grew impatient, and at length Iphicrates and Callistratus formally accused him, and he was recalled to answer their charges. Before his trial, however, he was removed from the command of the fleet, which was conferred upon Iphicrates, Chubrias, and Callistratus; and from the cause of their absence, combined with the intercession of the Epirot king, Aleetas, and Jason of Pheræ, who made a journey to Athens for the purpose of interceding in his behalf, he was acquitted. It is probable that another motive, foreign to the case, may have had some weight in his favour. The king of Persia, who was at war with Egypt, offered him employment; and the prospect of advantage which Athens might derive from his interest at the Persian court may have operated upon the assembly in their decision.

Iphicrates exhibited greater activity than Timotheus. He collected a fleet of seventy galleys, with which he sailed for Corcyra; but when he arrived at Cephallenia he heard of the death of Mnasiippus, and of the events connected with it. He rested a while at Cephallenia, which he brought over to the Athenian alliance, and then proceeded to Corcyra. While there, he captured a squadron of ten galleys, which Dionysius of Syracuse had sent to the aid of the Spartans; after which he crossed over, with his military forces, to Acarnania, which was divided between the Athenian and Spartan interest. He carried on the war there with various success, then returned to Corcyra, and thence sailed to Cephallenia, where he stayed some time raising contributions, and meditating the invasion of Laconia and other parts of the enemy's coasts, as opportunities offered.

In the spring of *a. c.* 371, however, a prospect

of peace was again unfolded. With the consent of Iphicrates, his colleague Callistratus returned to Athens for the purpose of procuring a supply of money, or bringing about a peace. One leading motive of Iphicrates, in wishing to put an end to the war in Greece, appears to have been, because the state of the Persian empire held out opportunities for a more brilliant and lucrative enterprise. His views, however, seem to have coincided with the wishes of the Athenians, for they were more than ever dissatisfied with the conduct of the Thebans. While they had been exhausting their strength against the common enemy to little purpose, Thebes had been aggrandizing herself at the expense of the old allies of Athens. In the latter part of *a. c.* 373, Platæa and Thespiæ had been erased by them from the list of the Bœotian cities. The inhabitants of Platæa took refuge in Athens, while those of Thespiæ occupied a stronghold, named Cereus, situated on a rocky spar of Mount Helicon; and their complaints and supplications helped to rouse the indignation of the Athenians against Thebes, on which account, combined with the views of Iphicrates, it was decreed that an embassy should be sent to negotiate peace with Sparta.

To avoid the appearance of breaking with their present allies, the Athenians invited the Thebans to become parties to the treaty. This was accepted, and Epaminondas was chosen as their envoy. The Athenians sent Callias, the Torchbearer, an account of the connexion between his family and Sparta, and five others, together with Callistratus, who appears to have attended without the title of envoy. A general congress was held to receive them, and Agesilaus himself appeared on the part of Sparta. After the orators on each side had concluded their harangues, in which all desired peace, the terms of the treaty were discussed and adjusted. It was agreed that the Spartans should withdraw their harimots from the various towns they then occupied, that the armies should be disbanded on both sides, and the fleets laid up; that every state in Greece should be left in the enjoyment of independence, and that if the treaty should be infringed to the injury of either of the contracting parties, any of the rest should be at liberty to obtain redress by force of arms. This treaty was ratified by the Spartan government in the name of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and by the Athenian envoys for Athens and their allies. Epaminondas then stood forward, offering to sign in the name of the Bœotians. "Athens," he observed, "had signed for all the inhabitants of Attica, and the Spartans for her Peloponnesian allies; Thebes, therefore, was entitled to the same prerogative over her dependent cities, which had anciently acknowledged the power of her kings, and had recently submitted to the arms of her citizens." The demand was just, but Agesilaus inquired, "Whether it was the intention of the Thebans to admit in the terms of the treaty the independence of Bœotia?" Epaminondas demanded, "Whether it was the intention of Sparta to admit the independence of Laconia?" Avoiding this question, Agesilaus then asked, "Whether the Thebans would permit the Bœotian towns to ratify for themselves?" "As soon," replied Epaminondas, "as you re-

store freedom to Laconia, Messenia, and the oppressed communities of Peloponnesus, whom, under the name of allies, you retain in rigorous servitude." Ageilaus then declared that he would allow the name of Thebes to stand there on no other condition, and bade him take his choice. Epaminondas persisted in his resolution, ably showing the cruel mockery by which Thebes was insulted; and the Thebans were thus left exposed to the hostility of all parties.

The Athenians and Spartans then proceeded to execute their part of the treaty. The Athenian garrisons were withdrawn, and Iphicrates recalled, while the Spartan harposts and garrisons were directed to repair to Sparta. But war was not yet ended. Cleombrotus, who had continued in Phocis from B.C. 374, was instructed immediately to invade Bœotia if Thebes did not withdraw her pretensions. The Thebans ratified the determination of Epaminondas, and Cleombrotus accordingly began his march toward the Bœotian frontier.

Cleombrotus found the pass near Coronea occupied by a division of the Theban forces, and Epaminondas, and, therefore, crossed the mountains, so as to come down upon Creusis, and then took the road which leads up to the plain of Leuctra, where he encamped. As soon as they discovered his movements, the Thebans reunited their forces, and occupied a rising ground in his front. They were commanded by Epaminondas as Bœotarch, with six colleagues of the same title, while Pelopidas was appointed to the command of the Sacred Band. Their forces were very unequal, for while the Spartan army is said to have consisted of 10,000 heavy infantry, with 1,000 horse, and the usual complement of light troops, the Thebans are said to have been only 6,000 strong, which, perhaps, did not include their cavalry.

The superior numbers of the enemy, combined with the recollection of the Spartan valour, inspired apprehensions in the Theban army, and the aid of superstition was called in to awaken its courage. A report was spread through the camp that the arms of Hercules, which were hung up in the temple at Thebes, had been suddenly carried away by invisible hands, from which it was inferred that the ancient heroes were coming to aid the people in the approaching struggle. A still more distinct intimation of victory was obtained from the oracular cave of Trophonius at Lebadea; and the superstitious hopes of the multitude were, also, strongly excited by a local legend, which was revived and made the basis of a favourable prophecy. The plains of Leuctra had, it was said, been the scene of an act of violence offered by some Spartans to daughters of the land, who had killed themselves, and were buried there; and their father, Seodasus, having in vain sought satisfaction from the Spartans, had likewise destroyed himself, uttering imprecations against Sparta with his latest breath. A Spartan exile in the camp assisted Pelopidas in adapting this story to the occasion. He attested that his countrymen had been warned by oracles, that their commonwealth would suffer a great visitation at Leuctra; and Pelopidas represented that the shade of Seodasus appeared to him in the night,

and demanded a sacrifice for the tomb of his daughters. This story raised the spirits of the Thebans; propitiatory rites were performed at the fatal monument, and the multitude were eager for the battle.

Before conducting them to the engagement, however, Epaminondas, who is said to have expressed his contempt for omens which forbade a citizen to defend his country, in the language of the Trojan hero—

"Without a sign his sword the brave man draws,
And asks no omen, but his country's cause,"

employed some nobler expedients for rousing the energies of his countrymen. As there were troops in his army from various parts of Bœotia suspected to be disaffected to the cause, he proclaimed that all who would were at liberty to quit the camp. The Thebians and others are said to have availed themselves of this permission, and thus their numbers were greatly lessened. Still they resolved to stand by their leader, and their resolve was rendered more permanent by the representation of Epaminondas that the Spartans intended to raze Thebes to the ground, destroy her citizens, and enslave her women and children.

While the Theban leaders were thus employed in animating their army, the Spartan king required movement from those whom he commanded. Notwithstanding his superior numbers he would fain have declined an engagement, and it was only after he had been warned that if he spared the enemy, as heretofore, he had nothing to expect but ignominy and exile, that he came to the resolution of sustaining a battle.

Historians generally have dwelt minutely upon the dispositions made by Cleombrotus and Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra, but it will be sufficient to state the results. It began by a charge of the Spartan cavalry upon the Theban forces, but it was repulsed, and in its retreat created some confusion in the phalanx. This was increased by an impetuous onset of the Sacred Band, and Epaminondas, availing himself of the advantage, bringing his mass to bear upon the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus. Here a fearful struggle took place. The Spartans rallied round their king, covered him with their shields, and defended him with their spears and lances. But it was in vain. Cleombrotus fell, and it was only through the rage of despair that his troops were enabled to bear his mangled remains from the field. With him perished 400 Spartans—more than half the number present in the army, and more than 1,000 of his allies the rest retreated, and the Thebans raised their trophy.

The messenger who carried these tidings to Sparta found the citizens engaged in the celebration of the great festival of the *Gymnopædia*. And here the character of the Spartans is fully developed. The ephori would not interrupt the performance, or abridge the amusements of the day; and when they communicated the names of the slain to their friends, they enjoined the women to refrain from the customary wailings. Their injunction was not needed. The friends of the fallen thronged the streets with

countenances of joy, and the only visible signs of grief were shown by the relatives of the survivors!

There was yet occasion for exertion. The defeated army was still in the vicinity of the victors, and the whole remaining force of the city was ordered to march to its relief. These were placed under Archidamus, and he was joined by reinforcements from Tegea, Mantinea, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the Achæans, all of which states being oligarchical, felt themselves involved in the danger which threatened Sparta.

At the same time the Thebans were exerting themselves to profit by the victory. A herald crowned as a messenger of joy was sent to Athens, to call upon the people to avail themselves of the opportunity which now offered itself of taking vengeance for the injuries they had received from Sparta. The Thebans also sent envoys to solicit succours from the kings of Thessaly, and Jason complied with their request, though with views widely different from those who requested his aid. He marched through Phocis with a large army, and came to the field of Leuctra; but when urged by the Thebans to join in an attack, he represented the danger of driving the enemy to despair, and offered his mediation. The Thebans were averse to such a measure; but he had less difficulty with the Spartan commanders. They requested him to conclude an armistice for them, and taking advantage of it they set out in the direction of Creusa, and pursuing their march all night, reached the Megarian town of Agosthena, where they met with Archidamus, who marched back to Corinth, and disbanded his army.

Thus was Sparta, by a righteous retribution, shamed in the sight of all Greece by the state she had so unjustly oppressed. But this was only the beginning of her sorrows. The events arising out of the battle of Leuctra were more degrading and fatal to her interests than the battle itself.

CHAPTER XXVII.

FROM THE ELEVATION OF THEBES BY THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA TO THE FAILURE OF HER ATTEMPT TO EXTEND HER SUPREMACY OVER GREECE

B.C. 371—367.

ALTHOUGH, from their hereditary hatred of the Thebans, the news of the battle of Leuctra was received by the Athenians with ill-humour; and although the invitation which called upon them to take revenge on Sparta sounded at first like mockery, yet they proceeded, without delay, to take advantage of the shock which had thus been given to Spartan influence. In common with the other states of Greece, they believed that the Spartan power had suffered a fatal blow; and conceiving that the time had arrived when Athens might step forth as the guardian of the peace of Antalcidas, and might transfer all the advantages which her rival had reaped from that title to herself, they assembled

a congress in their own city, to which they invited deputies not only from their old allies, but from all the states of Greece which were willing to adopt that peace as the basis of their mutual relations. This congress was attended by many members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and the resolution to which it came was thus expressed in the oath by which each state ratified the compact:—"I will abide by the treaty sent down by Artaxerxes, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any attack be made on any one of the states which take this oath, I will succour it with all my might." The congress then determined that every town, small or great, should be alike independent, and commissioners were sent round to exact an oath to this effect from the government of each state. It was taken by all but the Eleaus, who declined it from an unwillingness to resign their claims to the sovereignty of the Triphlian towns.

One of the first effects of this battle of Leuctra seems to have been a revolution which overthrew the Mantinean aristocracy. The declaration of the congress at Athens was interpreted by the democratical party as a license to restore their political union, and to rebuild the city which the Spartans had destroyed. This work was immediately begun, and it appears to have had its due effect upon the Spartan government. It saw that if Mantinea was restored, it would prove to all Greece that Sparta was no longer formidable even to her neighbours. In its anxiety to escape this humiliation, it resorted to a step which still more betrayed its weakness. Agesilaus was sent to use all his hereditary influence at Mantinea to stop the work, and he was instructed to undertake, that, if it was deferred, he would procure the consent of the government and some help toward defraying the cost of its erection. Agesilaus repaired to Mantinea, but was informed that the decree of the people rendered it necessary to proceed without delay, and no opposition was offered. Mantinea was restored, and it was so constructed as to be secure from such attacks as had been fatal to the ancient city.

Similar effects were soon manifested in the other states of Greece. The principles of the peace of Antalcidas encouraged the partisans of democracy on every hand to establish their ascendancy, and confiscations, expulsions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of assassination and massacre, became a marked feature in Grecian history. Such scenes were transacted in Argos, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Corinth, Tegea, and Phigalia, where the oligarchical factions were trodden, with deep malignity, under the broad foot of democracy.

The spirit of hostility thus let loose toward Sparta by the battle of Leuctra soon displayed itself in a much more important event, historically considered. The chiefs of the parties opposed to Sparta in the principal Arcadian towns concerted a plan for securing the independence of Arcadia. A project was formed to unite the Arcadian people in one body; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which was to be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, and to establish a military force for mutual protection.

Accordingly, within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all the principal states was held to deliberate on this measure; and according to its decree, a body of colonists collected from various quarters proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and to be called Megalopolis, or the Great City.

The site chosen for this new city was on the banks of the Helisson, a small tributary stream of the Alpheus, in the upper part of the plain through which the river flows, and at a short distance from one of the passes leading into the vale of the Eurotas. In order to establish this colony, ten commissioners were appointed, who were honoured with the title of founders, and as there was reason to apprehend that Sparta might attempt to interrupt their operations at the beginning, the Thebans sent Pammenes with 1,000 troops to guard and assist the colonists. No opposition was offered at Megalopolis, but at Orchomenus and Tegea violent contests arose between the advocates and adversaries of the new measure. So violent was the contest at Tegea, that the aid of the Mantineans was called in by the democracy, by whom several of the oligarchs were slain, and the rest, to the number of 800, fled to Sparta, which again led to war.

Among the Tegean refugees were several of the private friends of Agesilaus and other leading Spartans, and these solicited redress and revenge against the Mantineans and their political adversaries. They were listened to with favour by the Spartan government, and the interference of Mantinea in the civil feuds of Tegea was construed as a violation of the principle of the peace of Antalcidas, and war was accordingly declared against the state on this ground. It was probably also deemed necessary that some effort should be made to restore confidence and cheerfulness at home; for the citizens had not yet recovered from their despondency, and hence an army was collected, and Agesilaus, who was now recovered from his illness, was appointed to the command.

Agesilaus was joined by troops from Herma and Lepreum, and he sent for mercenaries from Orchomenus, which had recently been collected at Corinth, under the command of one Polytropus—probably a Spartan—for the defence of the oligarchs in that city. In the meantime the Arcadians collected their forces at Asea, near the frontier of Laconia, all but the Mantineans. These did not think it safe to leave their city exposed to the attack of Polytropus, and therefore first marched against Orchomenus. The Mantineans were compelled to retire from the town, but in their retreat they made a successful stand against Polytropus, who was pursuing with his light troops, killed him, and dispersed his followers with some slaughter. At this time Agesilaus was in the small Arcadian town of Euxea, which he had found defenceless—for all the men of military age were in the camp at Asea—and when he heard of the death of Polytropus, he continued his march towards Mantinea, thereby leaving the Arcadians in his rear. They followed soon after in his track; and although he

might have attacked them before they joined the Mantineans, he suffered them to effect the junction unmolested. Agesilaus was soon after reinforced by troops from Orchomenus, and Philus and the enemy were joined by a body of Argives. But neither side was willing to engage Agesilaus, because he wished to husband the strength of Sparta; and the Arcadians, because they received intelligence that a Theban army was marching to their assistance. It was probably the same intelligence that caused the Spartan king to return home, which he did with the utmost speed, after having ravaged the plain of Mantinea.

It was prudent in Agesilaus thus to retreat. The victory of Leuctra had so completely changed the position of the Thebans, that they had almost all the forces of northern Greece, except Attica, at their command, whence they soon after joined the Arcadians with so large a force, that the whole number assembled at Mantinea amounted, according to Diodorus, to 50,000, or, according to Plutarch, 70,000 men, of whom 40,000 were heavy armed.

The ostensible object of this expedition was to defend Mantinea, and as it was freed from danger, and the season being mid-winter, several of the Theban commanders proposed to return to Thebes. Epaminondas and Pelopidas, however, who were both in command as brothers-in-law, proposed using their united forces for crushing or humbling Sparta. They had some difficulty in obtaining the consent of their colleagues; but while they were thus divided, they received invitations from Laconia itself, and were encouraged, by some of the provincials who came to the camp for that purpose, to expect that their appearance would produce a general revolt among the helot population. Hence the invasion of Laconia was unanimously resolved upon, and they set forward on their march.

In order to distract the enemy's attention, the invaders seem to have entered Laconia by different routes. The Thebans took the road which led through Caryæ into the valley of the Cynus; the Arcadians crossed the border more to the west, and traversed the district called Sciritis; the Argives made a circuit, which brought them through the Thyreatis over Mount Parnon; and the Eleans marched by a road which led into the upper vale of the Eurotas. In their route, the Argives were opposed by a body of troops under a Spartan named Alexander, and the Arcadians by some neodomadæ troops under Ischolaus; but these were defeated in both cases with great slaughter, and the four divisions effected a junction at the appointed place of rendezvous, Sellasia. Having plundered and burnt Sellasia, the united forces descended to the banks of the Eurotas, and pursued their march along the left bank of the river until they reached the bridge which crossed it directly over against the city. They were deterred from attempting the passage by a body of heavy-armed troops which appeared on the other side, and they proceeded along the bank of the river to plunder and destroy the dwellings which were scattered in the neighbourhood of the capital, and which seem to have consisted chiefly of the villas of the more opulent Spartans. It was the first time since the

possession of Sparta by the Dorians, that the fires of an hostile army had been seen from the city; and the wail of grief heard therein was loud, long, and deep. Tradition had taught them to regard their soil as inviolate, and their unvalled city as impregnable: these were now proved by experience to be fallacies.

The danger of the Spartans was sufficient to shake even their proverbial courage. There was only a handful of forces that could be depended upon for the defence of an open city. In this emergency all eyes were turned on Agesilaus, and he did all that could be done for its deliverance. He determined to remain strictly on the defensive, and, in case of an attack, to take advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and of the position of the streets and buildings in the outskirts of the town. Accordingly the Spartan forces were thus disposed, but, when they were distributed over the wide range, they made so poor a show that defence was deemed impracticable. Under these circumstances the government resorted to an expedient, the very thought of which made it tremble. But there was no alternative, and the helots were promised emancipation if they would serve in the defence of the city. Charmed with the thought of liberty, 6,000 volunteers presented themselves, and arms were placed in their hands. But they were employed with distrust until a force collected from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Epidaurus, Træzen, Hermione, and Halia, arrived, which gave more confidence to the government.

In the meantime, the invading army having ravaged the eastern side of the plain as far as Amyclæ, crossed the river and marched towards Sparta. For three or four days they devastated the country, while the Spartans looked on from their defensive attitude. At the end of that time, the invaders, wishing to rouse their choler and to draw them from thence, directed a body of cavalry to advance towards the city. The main body of the Spartans, however, still kept within their intrenchments; but they sent a small body of cavalry to repel the assailants. These were already engaged, when a body of about 300 of the young Spartan infantry, who had been concealed in an adjacent building, which was consecrated by tradition as the house of the tutelary Twins, issued forth, and this unexpected attack threw the advancing squadrons into confusion, and they retreated, and stopped not till they had reached the Theban phalanx.

While thus assailed from without, the Spartans were in little less danger from within the city. Two conspiracies were discovered, in which many of the Spartans themselves were implicated; and although these were crushed in the beginning, and their leaders executed, yet there was small hope of preserving obedience while the enemy remained in sight. But the government was at length relieved from its fears by the retreat of the invaders. Although a report of the state of affairs in Sparta was brought to Epaminondas by deserters, he was not encouraged to repeat the attempt of the cavalry, or to prolong his stay in the vicinity of the capital. He directed his march southward, and ravaged the vale of the Eurotas as far as the coast; but after a stay of some weeks, the Peloponnesian troops

withdrew with their booty, leaving the country almost exhausted.

The main object which Epaminondas had in view in withdrawing his troops from Laconia was, to strike a blow much more destructive to the power and prosperity of Sparta than the invasion of her territory: this was to deprive her of her ill-gotten possessions in Messenia.

Epaminondas had already sent to the various regions in which the scattered Messenians had taken refuge to invite them to their ancient home. The thought of home was still dear to these heroic people, and they eagerly responded to the invitation. Pausanias relates that some of them had already arrived in Peloponnesus, and were consulted by Epaminondas on the site of the city he was about to erect for them. Be this as it may, this was his first object after he had recrossed the borders of Laconia, and the site of Ithome was adopted for the new city, Messene. Its foundations were laid with the utmost solemnity, and the most approved architects were employed upon the plan, and the most skillful workmen in the execution; so that the city arose like a phoenix from the ashes of the ancient stronghold of Ithome. The solid and beautiful masonry of the fortifications of Messene in after ages excited the admiration of Pausanias, and the remains which are yet standing justify his praise.

The population of this new capital did not consist wholly of those Messenians who were recalled from foreign lands by the invitation of Epaminondas. Among the Spartan helots there were many descendants of that people, and these, no doubt, contributed the largest share to the population of Messene. Pausanias and Diodorus relate, indeed, that they formed the core of the colony, and that the Spartans affected to treat the whole as a mass of revolted helots. Hence it arose, together with the fact that the government of the new colony was founded on the principles of democracy, that the event was considered as a death-blow to the Spartan power. The whole country, however, was not immediately wrested from the dominion of Sparta—some of the towns, as Asine, were still guarded by Spartan garrisons,—but all the lands, which had hitherto been in the hands of the Spartans, became the property of their cultivators and new settlers, in the division of which, as well as in the share of power in the government, the exiles seem to have been more favoured than those who had been degraded by ages of servitude under the Spartan government. Their portion included the most valuable part of the inland districts, while that which belonged to the subject-freemen lay chiefly near the coast. But this does not appear to have created any dissensions in the new colony: the serfs had become free, and with their freedom they were satisfied. Some of the exiles, moreover, traced their descent to Aristomenes and his sons, and the exiles were naturally had in honour, from the recollection of his exploits at Ithome combined with his lineage.

As soon as the fortifications of Messene had been carried so far that the presence of his army was no longer needed, Epaminondas set forward on his march to Thebes. An enemy awaited him at the isthmus. In their distress the Spar-

tians had sent to Athens for succour, and their envoys were accompanied by others from the Peloponnesian states which still adhered to their cause. As there was already a disposition among the Athenians strongly adverse to the supremacy of Thebes, after these envoys had been heard in the assembly, they decreed that the whole force of the commonwealth should march to the relief of Sparta, and Iphicrates was appointed to the command. Accordingly, an army was raised, and Iphicrates marched forward, and after having attacked some places in Arcadia, for the sake of plunder, he posted himself at the passes of the southern extremity of the isthmus to oppose the Thebans when they should march homeward. It does not appear, however, that his operations produced any effect on the Theban army. Through some oversight, he left open the most convenient pass—that on the side of Cenchreæ—and the Thebans penetrated without opposition to the isthmus. Epaminondas returned with triumph to Thebes.

It might have been expected that Epaminondas would have been had in universal honour among the Thebans. His services were generally duly appreciated by his fellow-citizens, but they excited the envy of some who felt themselves eclipsed by his lustre, and the expedition into Laconia afforded them the pretext of assailing him. Soon after he entered the Peloponnesus, the year of his office as *botarch*, together with that of Pelopidas, expired, and because they ventured to retain it three or four months longer without the sanction of the government, they were charged with a capital offence. Both, however, were acquitted in the most honourable manner, and the attempt recoiled upon the heads of their accusers. While the philosopher smiled at their impotent efforts, Pelopidas, less magnanimous, remembered the deed, and he afterwards employed the forms of law to crush them.

Although the storm had thus passed over Sparta, it still appeared in the horizon, and it was justly feared that it would return again with redoubled violence. One of the first measures of the Spartan government was, therefore, to send an embassy to Athens, for the purpose of cementing the alliance between the two states, and of concerting plans for mutual defence. As before, their envoys were accompanied by those of other Peloponnesian states, and, in compliance with their views, the Athenian council proposed a decree to the assembly, by which it was to be declared that the naval armaments of the confederacy were to be under the control of Athens, while the land forces were to be under the command of Sparta. This arrangement met with general approbation at first, but an Athenian orator, named Cephisodotus, succeeded in rousing the jealousy of the Athenians against their old rivals. He represented to them that they placed themselves under a disadvantage, inasmuch as, while they would have to serve under Spartan generals, none but helots, or subjects of Sparta, would man the Laconian contingents in the fleets of the allies. Accordingly, it was proposed that the command by sea and land should be assigned to each state, alternately, for five days; and the Peloponnesian envoys, who were conscious that they appeared in the character of

suppliants, were forced to comply with this proposition, although it was manifest that it would tend to defeat the purposes for which the alliance was formed.

In the spring of B.C. 368, Epaminondas again marched at the head of his army to invade Peloponnesus. By this time, the forces of Athens, under Chabrias, had joined those of Sparta and her allies, and had taken up their position behind an entrenchment which stretched across the isthmus between Cenchreæ and Lechæum. But they formed no obstacle to the progress of Epaminondas. Having gained a partial advantage over the enemy by surprise, he then descended unmolested on the plain of Sicyon, where he was again met by his Peloponnesian allies. Their first operations were made against Sicyon and Pellene, and they compelled both these cities to renounce their alliance with Sparta; after which, to gratify Argos, they proceeded to ravage the territory of Epidaurus. On his return to the isthmus, Epaminondas made an attempt upon Corinth, which was repulsed by Chabrias; and, soon after, a Syracusan squadron sailed into Lechæum with a body of mercenaries from Gaul and Iberia, which were sent by Dionysius to the aid of his allies. Among these troops was a body of about fifty horse, which distinguished itself above the cavalry of Athens and Corinth in the skirmishes which took place while the enemy remained at the isthmus. But this was not long. In the course of a few days, from a cause related in an after page, Epaminondas returned to Thebes, and the troops of their allies were disbanded.

In the autumn of this year, an attempt was made by the Persian satrap of the Hellespont, Artobazanes, in the name of Artaxerxes, to bring about a general pacification. A Greek of Abydus, named Philiscus, was employed for this purpose, and he convened a congress at Delphi, which was attended by deputies from the states of both confederacies. But their consultations proved fruitless. The Thebans refused to renounce their claims of sovereignty over the Bœotian cities, unless Sparta would acknowledge the independence of Messenia, and this being rejected, Philiscus dropped the character of a mediator, and, affecting to consider the Thebans as the enemies of peace, began to levy troops for the service of the Spartans.

It was not a period at which it could be expected that the Thebans would make any concessions derogatory to their new dignity, for they had been lately extending their influence in another quarter. After the battle of Leuctra, a series of revolutions had taken place in Thessaly, which opened a way for Theban intervention, and gave the Thebans great weight in the affairs of that country and Macedonia. While meditating an expedition to Delphi, where he intended presiding over the Pythian games, Jason was assassinated by seven young men, who pretended to appeal to him for the settlement of some private differences. He was succeeded by his brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron; but the former soon shared the fate of Jason, and the latter then remained sole *tygus*, and by his administration converted the office into a tyranny. He slew the estimable Polydamas and eight other principal

citizens of Pharsalus, and compelled many to go into exile from Larissa. After the reign of a year, however, Polyphron was murdered in his turn by his nephew, Alexander, who succeeded to the government, and was equally tyrannical. In cruelty he far outstripped his uncle Polyphron; for, having been offended with the citizens of Melibœa and Scotussa, he surrounded the popular assembly in each town, at the same time, with his troops, and massacred all the citizens present. These atrocities inspired all classes of his subjects with terror, and the Aleuadae of Larissa sought protection from Alexander II., of Macedonia. The Macedonian king complied with their request, and succeeded even beyond their wishes. He not only relieved them for a time, but took possession first of that town, then of the citadel, and afterwards of Crannon, which he occupied with his garrisons. The power of Alexander, however, was not securely established at home, and he was soon compelled to withdraw his troops from Thessaly. The Aleuadae, finding themselves exposed to the vengeance of the tyrant of Phœræ, applied for aid to Thebes, and, while Epaminondas was engaged in the second expedition to Peloponnesus, Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly.

Pelopidas was admitted into Larissa, and Alexander, awed by his presence, sought a personal interview with him, seeming at first willing to submit to his mediation; but the discoveries with regard to his character to which this meeting gave rise so exasperated Pelopidas, that the tyrant trembled for his safety, and broke off negotiations by a clandestine retreat. Pelopidas, therefore, was left supreme arbiter of the affairs of Thessaly, which he settled on an apparently firm footing, after which, being invited into Macedonia by the rivals, who were then contending for the crown, he went thither, and having restored tranquillity, returned to Thebes.

The order which Pelopidas established in Thessaly was but of brief duration. Soon after his return, fresh complaints were sent to Thebes, and in the course of the same summer, Pelopidas and Ismanias were sent, in the quality of ambassadors, to take cognizance of Alexander's conduct. But the tyrant committed an outrage upon their persons. Having unexpectedly fallen in with him, they imprudently placed themselves in his power, and he threw them into prison.

Aware of the danger to which he exposed himself by this step from the resentment of Thebes, he sent an embassy with proposals of alliance to Athens. The imprisonment of Pelopidas seems to have been viewed there as an auspicious event; and as Alexander might prove a useful ally, his proposal was accepted, and it was decreed that Autocles should sail with thirty galleys and 1,000 men for his defence. At the same time, having received liberal subsidies from the coffers of the tyrant, they requited his munificence with a statue erected to his honour.

On discovering the situation of their envoys, the Thebans resolved to send an army to recover them and to avenge the insult offered them. As the tried friend of Pelopidas, and the most able general among them, the command of

an expedition for such a purpose could have been intrusted to no one so well fitted for it as Epaminondas. But Epaminondas had still enemies at Thebes, and they chose this occasion to endeavour to secure his downfall. It was represented by them that he might have pushed the advantage which he gained in the passage through the isthmus much further, and they so far prevailed as to induce the people to remove him from the office of *boetarch*, and the command devolved upon Cleomenes and Hypatus. The conduct of Epaminondas on this occasion was both magnanimous and tender. Anxious for the delivery of his friend, he accompanied the expedition as a private soldier.

Alexander had made preparations for a vigorous resistance; and his superiority in cavalry enabled him to reduce the enemy to such straits, that the Theban generals were compelled to retreat. But this step was one of difficulty and danger. Being reinforced by the Athenian troops, and by many Thessalians who had hitherto stood aloof from the struggle, Alexander hung upon their rear, obstructed their march, and made great slaughter among them with the missiles of his light troops. In this emergency Epaminondas was called upon by the soldiers to take the command, and his tactics, combined with the terror of his name, saved the whole army from destruction, and they at length reached Thebes. On their return Cleomenes and Hypatus were fined for their failure, and Epaminondas was reinstated in the office of *boetarch*.

This enterprise was again renewed under the command of Epaminondas, and, alarmed at the consequences, Alexander made no resistance. To avoid the impending storm, he consented to release the prisoners, although, in return, he obtained nothing more than the suspension of hostilities for thirty days. It does not appear clear, however, that they were resumed, for soon after we find Epaminondas had returned to Thebes, and no account is given of further operations.

While Epaminondas was absent on this expedition, a barbarous measure, which he had on a previous occasion successfully deprecated, was carried into effect by the Thebans. Soon after the battle of Leuctra, it had been proposed in the Theban assembly to destroy Orchomenus, once the sovereign, and long the rival, of Thebes. This design had been dropped through his influence, but the project had not been abandoned by its authors, and now either an accidental combination of circumstances favoured its execution, or a most atrocious plan was concerted to bring it to pass. It was reported that a conspiracy was formed by a party of Theban exiles to overturn the democratical constitution, and that the conspirators were to be aided by a body of 300 Orchomenian cavalry then in Thebes. The tale was greedily received by the magistrates and people, and while the Orchomenians were arrested and put to death, an army was sent against the city, which rased it to the ground, put the men to the sword, and carried the women and children captive. On discovering this event, Epaminondas, who seems to have been as humane as he was valiant, could

not suppress his grief. It is recorded to his honour, and it no less redounds to his praise, that his absence was chosen by the Thebans for the indulgence of their malignant passions. It was profound homage paid to his virtues, and such as does not again occur in the annals of Grecian history.

Early in the spring of B.C. 367, another body of auxiliaries arrived in the Corinthian gulf from Syracuse. On their arrival, they were ordered to sail round the coast of Laconia, to join an army under the Spartan king Archidamus. His first operations were directed against Caryæ, which was stormed, and every man therein slain. Archidamus then crossed the border, and proceeded to ravage the territories of Megalopolis, but on the approach of an army consisting of Argives and Arcadians, he retreated westward, and encamped near the Arcadian town of Medea. From thence he marched toward Sparta, but his progress was again intercepted by the Argives and Arcadians. A battle now ensued between the hostile parties, in which the Spartans once again triumphed, and such was the effect of the news at Sparta, that Agesilaus, the senators, and the grave ephori, who in days gone by would have received the intelligence motionless as statues, shed tears of child-like joy. They looked upon it as an omen of returning honour in the feat of arms. Thebes, also, and Elis rejoiced, for the spirit which the Arcadians had exhibited was looked upon by them as arrogance, and their success viewed with a jaundiced eye. Of such discordant materials were the states of Greece composed. The success of an ally was sufficient to convert each friendly state into an enemy.

As soon as Pelopidas and Ismenias were restored to liberty, the Theban government, intent upon securing its supremacy, sent them on a mission to the court of Persia. The Persian monarch had already shown, by his treatment of Antalcidas, that his favours were dispensed to the Greek states in proportion to their political preponderance, and it was thus he acted on this occasion. Pelopidas and Ismenias were met at the king's gate by envoys from Sparta, Athens, Elis, Arcadia, and Argos, but they were distinguished by Artaxerxes with peculiar honours. As for the courtiers, they gazed upon them with admiration, reflecting that their state had humbled the haughty mistress of Greece, whose power had once shaken the throne of Artaxerxes. And the same disposition was shown in the council. While Pelopidas obtained everything he asked, the other envoys were heard with little attention. At his request Artaxerxes acknowledged the independence of Messenia, and he procured the king's sanction for disarming the naval power of Athens: an article was inserted in the royal rescript by which the Athenians were enjoined to lay up their fleet.

The real success of this embassy, however, was manifested not in Persia, but in Greece. Thebes hoped thereby to have taken the position which Sparta occupied by means of the peace of Antalcidas, but she found that there was neither a charm nor fear attached to the edicts of the great king. The general impression left on the minds of the Greeks by this mission was

that which was expressed by Antiochus, the Arcadian envoy;—namely, that “the celebrated golden palm tree would not give shelter to a grasshopper.” Hence, when, in a congress held at Thebes, a Persian commissioner exhibited the royal seal, and read the document to which it was affixed, and the Theban government called upon the other states to bind themselves by oath to comply with its contents, the demand was answered in a strain of irony. The envoys observed that they were not sent to swear, but simply to listen to the great king's message! Thus thwarted, the Thebans sent envoys to each state separately with the same demand, hoping by this means to obtain their wishes; but Corinth, whither they first repaired, rejected the oath, and the rest, emboldened by it, followed her example. The whole project, therefore, which Thebes concerted for establishing her supremacy fell to the ground.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FROM THE FAILURE OF THE ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE SUPREMACY OF THEBES TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEM OF GREEK CONFEDERACY.

B.C. 367—361.

“ Shall enmity and strife,
 Falshood and guile, be left to sow their seed,
 And the kind never perish? Is the hope
 Lallacious or shall righteousness obtain
 A peaceable dominion, while as earth,
 And we're to fall? Shall that bless'd day arrive
 When they, whose choice or lot it is to dwell
 In crowded cities, without fear shall live
 Studios of mutual benefit, and be
 Whom morn awakens, among dew and flowers
 O'er every clime to till the lovely field,
 Be happy in himself?”

WORDSWORTH

Such a consummation was yet far distant from the shores of Greece. Scenes of strife have occupied many a previous page more remain to be recorded.

In the transactions last narrated, the Arcadian envoys had assumed a bold tone. Being treated at the court of Susa as of inferior moment to the Eleans, they refused to accept the king's presents, and at the congress of Thebes they denied her right to summon it, and when this was resented, they abruptly withdrew from the council. This conduct was remembered by the Thebans. They deemed it necessary, from such a circumstance, that they should strengthen their influence in Achaia; and in the spring of B.C. 366, Epaminondas undertook a third expedition into the Peloponnesus for that purpose. Under Spartan patronage oligarchy had obtained the ascendancy in the Achaean cities, and this form of government had not been disturbed by the last Theban invasion. Hence, on the appearance of Epaminondas, the leading men threw themselves on his forbearance, and by assurances of fidelity induced him to return home. After his departure, however, the democratical Achaeans and the Arcadians complained that he had left Achaia in a state favourable to the renewal of Spartan

ascendency; and the Thebans sent harlots to the Achaean cities, who instigated the commonalty to expel the oligarchs and establish democracy. But this change was soon followed by a counter-revolution; the exiles collected their forces, recovered possession of the cities, and openly renewed their alliance with Sparta, and annoyed their Arcadian neighbours exceedingly.

At Sicyon affairs took a different turn. On the departure of Epaminondas from Achaia, one Euphron, an able and enterprising man, who had enjoyed the confidence of the Spartan government as the leader of the oligarchical party, from motives of ambition, proposed to renounce his connexion with his old friends, and to introduce democracy at Sicyon. The Argives and Arcadians gladly lent their aid, and the revolution was effected without difficulty. But Euphron soon abused his power. Those citizens suspected of being favourable to Sparta were deprived of their wealth by confiscation, while some of his colleagues were removed by the dagger, and the rest driven into exile. Euphron became, both in name and deed, tyrant of Sicyon.

The rule of Euphron, however, was but of brief duration. From some unknown cause, Æneias, the general of the Arcadians, who had assisted the tyrant, resolved to overthrow his authority, and to re-establish oligarchy at Sicyon. In this he appears to have been assisted even by the Theban harlot who held the citadel, and Euphron, from the effects of their combined power, was compelled to make his escape. He fled to the port of Sicyon, and, sending for Pasi-nielus, the Spartan officer who was at Corinth, delivered it up to him, and renewed his connexion with Sparta. It would have been well for him had he stopped here, but he was ambitious still, and his ambition led to his ruin. The discord which prevailed in the city, between his partisans and the party which Æneias had restored, enabled him, with the aid of some Athenian auxiliaries, to regain possession of Sicyon. The citadel, however, was still occupied by a Theban garrison; and conceiving himself still in danger, he resolved to go in person to Thebes, in the hope of re-establishing his authority. He was followed thither by some of his enemies, and when they perceived that he had a fair chance of success they assassinated him in the Cadmea, near to the place where the council was assembled. The perpetrators of the outrage were brought to trial; but one of them so forcibly exposed the character and conduct of Euphron that they were acquitted, the act was sanctioned, therefore, by the Theban government.

During her reverses, Phlius remained firmly attached to Sparta. On this account it was exposed to the hostility of its powerful neighbours, by which it was often placed in extreme peril. Several attempts were made on the town and territory; and when these were baffled, the Phliansians were threatened with still greater annoyances by the erection of two fortresses on their frontier, one called Tricaranum, which was built by the Argives; and the other called Thy-smia, which was commenced by the Sicyonians. But this latter fortress was wrested from its builders by the Athenian general Chares, who had been sent to the relief of Phlius in the year

a.c 366, and the fortifications were carried on as a bulwark for Phlius against Sicyon.

While Chares was lending his aid to this work he was called away to the defence of Attica. The town of Oropus, which, on account of its position with regard to Euboea, was of great importance to Athens, had seven years before been restored to them through a revolution which drove a number of its citizens into exile. They took refuge in Eretria, now under the rule of Themison; and by his aid they crossed the channel, and recovered possession of their city. It was for the purpose of dislodging them that Chares was recalled, and being joined by the Spartan garrison, which at this juncture was driven from Sicyon by the Sicyonians and Arcadians, the Oropians were so alarmed that they proposed to commit their town to the keeping of Thebes, as neutrals in this quarrel, until their claims should be peacefully adjusted. The Athenians consented to this compromise, chiefly by the advice of Chabrias and Callistratus; but the Thebans afterwards refused to surrender Oropus, which tended to widen the breach between the two states, and proved fatal to one of its authors.

During the negotiations between the Oropians and Athenians, the latter vented reproaches upon their allies, who had failed them in the hour of need. This state of their feelings soon became known in Arcadia, and it was hoped by the Arcadians that Athens might be gained over to their interest. Accordingly, Lycomedes, of Mantinea, undertook the negotiation; and he concluded a separate alliance with the Athenians, the assembly conceiving that it was no breach of its engagements with Sparta, since Arcadia was at variance with Thebes. But this alliance with Arcadia had at least the effect of separating Corinth from the alliance of Athens. The Corinthians no sooner heard of it than they dismissed all the Athenian troops that were stationed in various posts within their territory; and when Chares soon after appeared before Cenchrea with a squadron, and offered his services to protect the city from some attack with which he asserted it was threatened, he was thanked, but not permitted to enter the harbour.

If the Corinthians were at this time threatened, as does not appear certain, they adopted a wiser measure for averting the danger. They turned their thoughts towards peace, and having ascertained that the Theban government was not averse to it, and having obtained leave to sound their allies, they first applied to Sparta. Their envoys called upon the Spartans to say whether they saw any prospect of safety for Corinth, if the war should be much longer protracted; adding, that the Corinthians would gladly see Sparta sharing the blessing of peace with them; but if this might not be, they begged leave to save themselves from ruin that they might one day be again able to serve Sparta. In reply, the Spartans admitted the urgency of the case, and advised the Corinthians to make peace, and permitted their other allies, who were weary of war, to join them. At the same time they expressed their fixed resolve never to renounce their claims to Messenia, and to wage war so long as that was made the condition of peace.

Acting upon this permission, the Corinthians now sent envoys to Thebes to make peace. They were accompanied by others from Phlius, and some of her other allies, and peace was granted on the simple basis of mutual restitution. The practical operation of the treaty almost amounted to a general peace, for Sparta remained on the defensive; and the jealousy existing between Thebes and Arcadia shielded her from attack.

There was another cause which operated more powerfully for the present safety of Sparta than even the jealousy of Thebes and Arcadia, namely, the disunion of her enemies. This appears to have been one of the leading causes which induced the Spartans to decline the invitation of the Corinthians to become a party to the peace with Thebes. They hoped that this disunion would produce a war among them, and their wishes were in some degree fulfilled in the year after the treaty of Thebes, B.C. 365, when the jealousy which had been long smouldering between Elis and Arcadia, burst out into the flames of war.

The animosity between these two states arose out of their rival pretensions to the Triphylian towns, but it was fostered by their politics, Elis now being an oligarchy, and Arcadia a democracy. The first act of hostility was connected with both these causes. A party of Arcadian exiles that had taken refuge in Elis with the connivance of the government, surprised Lason, one of the Triphylian towns, and took it. The Arcadian government applied to Elis for restitution, and this being refused, an army was sent to reduce it. The Eleans marched with a small force to its relief, but these were defeated, and the Arcadians pursued them, taking several places in their route, until they finally reached the very market-place of Elis. They took possession of it, but were dislodged by the oligarchical troops, who earned the honours of a trophy. Their presence encouraged the democratical leaders to seize the citadel, but in this they were also baffled by the vigilance of their adversaries, and were forced to quit the city with many of their adherents. This party soon afterward took possession of the Elean Pylus, and was there joined by many others from the capital. By their persuasions the Arcadians were induced to make another inroad into the Elean territory during the same year, but the Eleans being joined by the inhabitants of Pellene, after ravaging the plain, withdrew into Achaia, where they took Olurus, a place belonging to Pellene, which they were soon after compelled to surrender to the oligarchs.

During the next spring, B.C. 364, the Arcadians invaded Elis. At this time the renewed their alliance with Sparta, and a Spartan named Soclidas had been sent to head their forces. An engagement ensued, in which the Eleans were defeated and Soclidas slain, upon which Sparta was induced to send an army into Arcadia, under Archidamus, to make a diversion in their favour. Archidamus took the town of Cromnus, and having left a garrison there, returned home. Discovering this, the Arcadians having ravaged Elis, marched against Cromnus, and laid siege to it. Archidamus was dispatched to its relief, but in a battle which

ensued he was repulsed by the Arcadians, who retook the town. In the meanwhile the Eleans had recovered Pylus and another of their conquered towns. As soon as they had recovered Cromnus the Arcadians directed their whole force against Elis, and occupied Olympia. As the Olympic festival was approaching they resolved to display their strength, and to mortify the Eleans by celebrating it under the presidency of Pisa. But the Eleans could not tamely submit to resign their rights to the rustic inhabitants of that small canton. They summoned their Achaean allies to their aid, and in the midst of the games appeared in battle array on the banks of the Cladaus, the western boundary of the Altis. The Arcadians, who had been reinforced by 2,000 Argives and 400 Athenian cavalry, perceiving them, drew up their troops within the sacred precincts, and an engagement ensued in which the Eleans were victorious. Looking upon their enemies as sacrilegious intruders, they fought with such irresistible fury that they bore down all before them: the Arcadians were compelled to throw up an intrenchment to secure themselves from a fresh attack, and the Eleans, not deeming themselves sufficiently strong to contend against the advantageous position of the enemy, returned to the city.

Being in want of money to pay their forces, the heads of the Arcadian government had recourse to the treasures of the Olympian temple. This act gave great umbrage at Mantinea. A decree was passed condemning the sacrilege, and directing that the money required for the pay of the Mantinean contingent should be drawn from the treasures of the city. The members of the supreme government complained that the authors of this decree were disturbing the national union, and summoned them to appear before the Ten Thousand, which was the ruling body in the union. This summons was disobeyed; and when a body of troops was sent to arrest them, the Mantineans shut their gates against it. This example animated several members of the national assembly to express similar sentiments, so that the Ten Thousand were compelled to give orders that the sacred treasures should be no more employed. This led to peace. When this supply was stopped, that part of the soldiery which depended on it for subsistence quitted their ranks, and their places were filled by volunteers of the higher ranks. This change in the composition of the army alarmed those who were liable to be called to an account for the spoliation of the temple, and they sent a warning to Thebes that Arcadia was on the point of returning to the Spartan alliance. On hearing this, the Theban government began to prepare for an expedition into Peloponnesus; but the party which now ruled in the Arcadian assembly prevailed upon the Ten Thousand to send an embassy to Thebes to deprecate the threatened intervention, and then to conclude a treaty of peace with Elis. This treaty was ratified by deputies from all the Arcadian cantons, and also by a Theban officer, who had been stationed at Tegea with a garrison of three hundred troops.

The ratification of this treaty took place at Tegea, where it was celebrated with general rejoicings by the Arcadians. In the midst of their

festivity, the Theban commander was persuaded by the Arcadian magistrates, who dreaded the effects which the peace would have on their private interests, to send his own men, together with some of the Arcadian soldiery, to shut the city gates, and to arrest a great number of the higher class. This outrage excited great indignation at Mantinea. The Mantineans called upon the other Arcadian towns to put themselves in a posture of defence, and sent envoys to Tegea to demand the release of their fellow-citizens, and to require that no Arcadian should either be put to death or kept in prison. This firmness alarmed the Theban. He released his men, and endeavoured to justify his conduct, the pretence that he had received information a plot to betray Tegea to the Spartans.

Although the excuse of the Theban was notoriously false, as his conduct was a violation of justice, yet the Arcadians would not take the revenge into their own hands, but sent envoys to Thebes to require that he should be punished for the outrage. Thebes was now as arrogant as Sparta had been in her prosperity. Even the hitherto wise, humane, and high-minded Epaminondas defended the delinquent, and vindicated the deed. "He had acted," he said, "more properly when he arrested the prisoners than when he released them;" and he held out a threat of war against the Arcadians, for concluding a separate peace without the consent of the allies who had engaged in the strife on their behalf. This language created a general alarm throughout Peloponnesus. It was conceived that it was the object of Thebes to reduce it to the lowest stage of weakness, in order the more easily to subject it to her dominion, and every state therein began to prepare for the approaching struggle; Argos, Messenia, Megalopolis, and Tegea, excepted, which still remained bound by their peculiar interests to Thebes.

The army with which Epaminondas took the field in the spring of B.C. 362, included the whole force of the Theban confederacy except the Phocians, who alleged that their alliance did not bind them to assist the Thebans in an attack upon foreign states. It was also reinforced by auxiliaries from Thessaly, for, two years before, and soon after Pelopidas returned from Persia, he had gained a great battle over Alexander of Phera, although he fell in the struggle. The tyrant then entered into an alliance with Thebes, by which he bound himself to furnish troops for her service, in whatever war she might engage. With this army Epaminondas proceeded without interruption to Nemea, and thence continued his march to Tegea. He remained here for some time, while the Arcadians were collecting their forces at Mantinea, and his situation at length became embarrassing. A limit had been prescribed to the duration of his expedition; the term was drawing near, and he had done nothing. He seems to have been perplexed by this circumstance, but in the midst of his perplexity an opportunity presented itself for action. It was told him that a Spartan army was on its march to join the allies at Mantinea, and when it had reached the frontier he set out in the dusk of the evening, and having marched all night, arrived early the next day before

Sparta. He expected to find the city defenceless; but Agesilaus had received intelligence of the danger, and had either returned with a part of his forces, or had sent advice to Archidamus; and preparations had been made for defence. The aged and the young were posted with missiles on the roofs of the buildings in the skirts of the city, and the avenues were guarded by some few troops. Epaminondas crossed the Eurotas, and attempted to enter the city from the north-east. He carried an eminence near the river, and thence descended upon the agora; but Archidamus, at the head of a chosen band of about one hundred, defended its passes with such desperate valour that the assailants were baffled, and Epaminondas, deeming it imprudent to wait until the Spartans should have received reinforcements from Arcadia, determined to retreat. He recrossed the Eurotas, and, by the next morning occupied his previous position at Tegea.

On his arrival at Tegea, discovering that the Mantineans and the confederates were absent from the city, Epaminondas sent the cavalry forward thither with the object of plunder. But this force met with an unexpected resistance. When the Theban army broke out from Nemea the Athenians abandoned their intention of sending troops to Laconia by sea; and their cavalry had already taken up its quarters in Mantinea when that of Epaminondas made its inroad. This cavalry, therefore, sallied out to protect the Mantinean fields, and, notwithstanding the superiority of the Theban and Thessalian forces, after a hard fought action, it put them to flight.

The second repulse caused Epaminondas to resolve to strike a blow at the allied forces before his time expired. Accordingly, they having soon after returned to Mantinea, he took up his position at the foot of the hills west of that city, and made dispositions for battle. His example was followed by the enemy, and a great battle was fought, in which Epaminondas was victorious. In the moment of victory, however, he received a mortal wound.

With the death of their leader, the spirit which animated the Theban army departed. No one attempted to follow up the victory, the routed only fled till they found they were not pursued, and the Athenians now remained masters of a part of the field, and the slain. The very honour of the battle was disputed. Both parties raised trophies, and both were forced to send heralds to recover their dead.

With the account of the battle of Mantinea, Xenophon concludes his history, observing that greater confusion prevailed after than before the battle. But it was not so fruitless as this observation would imply. Having heard of the death of Iollidas and Daiphantus, two Theban officers, Epaminondas had declared, before he died, that it was time for Thebes to make peace.

This suggestion seems to have been acted upon. The battle was followed by a negotiation, in which the Thebans and their Arcadian confederates gained an important advantage in favour of Megalopolis. They induced the allies of Sparta to acknowledge the independence of Messenia; and the Spartans, swayed by the

counsels of Agesilaus, still refusing to treat on this basis, were excluded from the peace made and ratified by all the other states in the year B. C. 361. The sceptre was thus finally torn from their hands, but at the same time it was shivered to pieces. The Thebans were compelled to abandon the thought of that supremacy for which they had been struggling, and to confine their views to the sovereignty of Bœotia, and the strengthening of their influence in Phocis and Thessaly. The battle of Mantinea extinguished every hope which the Spartans might have cherished of recovering their lost position in Greece; and the Athenians, from internal weakness, and from the divided state of the democracy, were obliged to relinquish all thoughts of recovering the empire. The ancient system of confederacy was therefore dissolved. The struggle which Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had been making at the expense of the blood and the treasures of Greece ended in mutual disappointment, shame, and defeat. Each state was left to its own government and its own resources. But, alas! this did not bring peace. Hostilities upon any considerable scale were suspended through general lassitude and debility, but indecision, trouble, and confusion, generally prevailed. Greece was still like a house divided against itself, and its divisions were preparing the way for its final subjection to foreign dominion.

It may be mentioned that Artaxerxes took a part in the treaty which followed the battle of Mantinea, and that he opposed Sparta in her wish to recover Messenia. This gave great offence; and to punish the Persian king, Agesilaus led an army into Egypt, where he supported one rebel after another, and acquired considerable wealth. On his return home, he died in an obscure port on the Cyrenaic coast. Xenophon dwells eloquently upon his merits, but there are two facts which prove that he was not deserving of the praise of the historian. At the commencement of his reign Sparta had attained the summit of its greatness, at its close she had sunk into irremediable weakness. And whence arose her misfortunes? Chiefly from the ambition, obstinacy, and perfidy of Agesilaus. Induced by these, her enemies rose up against her, and rested not till they had laid her in the dust. The proud city of Lyncurgus was reduced to such a state of weakness, that she was defended only by the weariness of war which pervaded the inimical states. Like the rest of the states, she enjoyed independence, but it was an independence without power.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FROM THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ANCIENT SYSTEM OF GREECIAN CONFEDERACY TO THE END OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

B. C. 361—355.

ON the final downfall of the power which Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had exercised, an event occurred which had a preponderating effect on the

future destinies of Greece. During its turbulent and bloody contests the majesty of the Amphictyonic council had degenerated into an empty pageant. Its deliberations were confined to matters of form, it regulated superstitious ceremonies, superintended games and spectacles, and preserved order among the crowd of strangers that presented themselves to ask counsel of the oracle of Apollo. But the members of this council had not forgotten its primary intent; and hence, on the overthrow of the states that attained the supremacy, they assumed their ancient prerogative. The general states of Greece assembled once again according to their national and hereditary forms, and spurned the imperious dictates of any single community.

While this event strengthened the union of the Grecian states, and tended to restore their primitive equality, circumstances occurred to revive the aspiring ambition of Athens. A rupture took place between her and her allies, which is known in history under the term of "The Social War."

The origin of this war is wrapped in obscurity, and this obscurity chiefly arises from the fact that it had been kindled some years before, though it was not till this period that its flames burst forth. The attempt which Epamondas made to detach Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium from the Athenian confederacy in the year B. C. 363, implies that these states were at that period meditating a separation, or that the conduct of Athens had at least incurred their jealousy and resentment. In the year following, also, the Byzantians took some strong measures to relieve themselves in a time of dearth, which excited hostile feelings at Athens. In common with Chalcedon and Cyzicus, they detained the corn ships on their passage out of the Euxine, and a number of vessels so freighted, and belonging to Athenian owners, were stopped by the dread of this violence at the mouth of the Euxine, which had the effect of raising the price of corn in the Athenian market. Hence it was that a squadron was sent out, under Meno and Timomachus, to the Hellespont to protect the shipping. And this measure seems to have had the effect of widening the breach. The Byzantians repeated their aggressions after Timomachus had succeeded to the command, and Chares was sent out from Athens clothed with unlimited power, not only to re-establish Athenian ascendancy in Eubœa, but in the Hellespont. The former object he effected, and Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium then combined to guard against his attacks. Cos, also, which had risen into a prosperous community, made common cause with them, and Mausolus, the vassal king, or hereditary satrap of Caria, became their ally. These all set the power of Athens at defiance.

Hostilities appear to have begun on the part of the Athenians with the siege of Chios. Diodorus observes, that "Chabrias was joined with Chares in the command, and conducted the operations of the fleet, which consisted of sixty sail, while the land forces were led against the city by Chares." Chabrias led the way into the harbour of Chios; but not being immediately followed by the rest, was overpowered by the enemy and slain. The immediate consequence

of this attempt, therefore, was that the attempt upon Chios was defeated, and the allies became masters of the sea. Under these circumstances, the Athenians equipped another fleet of sixty sail, which was commanded by Iphicrates and Timotheus, who were associated with Chares.

In the following year, *B.C.* 356, Samos appears to have been the principal scene of hostilities. It is, however, difficult to determine the precise course which the commanders took in their operations. While Diodorus relates, that the allies ravaged its territories and laid siege to the city, from which they were called away to the relief of Byzantium, which the Athenians besieged for the purpose of effecting a diversion; other accounts inform us that Samos had likewise revolted, and that its territory was ravaged by Iphicrates. But howsoever this may be, it seems certain that the Athenian commanders united their forces near the Hellespont, within such a distance of the allies, that preparations were made on both sides for a general engagement. Chares was eager to meet the enemy, but on the day when he proposed to make the attack his colleagues declined it, on account of the state of the weather. This refusal produced an open breach between them, and Chares wrote a letter to the people, in which he charged them with treachery, and the result was that they were recalled, and were afterwards brought to a trial, while Chares was left intrusted with the sole management of the war.

But Chares, though left uncontrolled, did not venture to attack the enemy. Being unable to find subsistence for his troops by the means which he had hitherto been used to employ—that of piracy—he hired himself to Artabazus, then in rebellion against Darius Oechus, king of Persia. By his valour he gained a victory which extricated the satrap from his dangerous position; but this completed the ruin of the Athenians. The king of Persia sent an embassy to Athens to complain of his conduct; and his complaints were accompanied by a threat, that the king would support the confederates with his maritime power. Accordingly, orders were sent to Chares to break off his connexion with Artabazus; and, soon after, hearing that the Persian court was fitting out an armament of 300 galleys for the purpose of co-operating with the enemies of Athens, the Athenians became desirous of peace. Peace was obtained, but it was at the price of the freedom and independence of the confederate states.

It does not appear certain how many states besides Rhodes, Byzantium, Chios, and Cos, were included in the treaty, but it seems that Athens lost a great number of her principal allies; for it is said she only retained the smaller islands, and that the amount of the yearly contributions was reduced to forty-five talents. But her losses in the *Ægean* were made greater by one in the west, of which the Social War was rather the occasion than the cause. In the island of Corcyra there had long been an oligarchical party eager for a revolution, and they embraced this opportunity of effecting it; and that state separated itself from the Athenian alliance.

The effect of these losses appears to have been greatly felt at Athens. Her finances were in a depressed condition, and her commerce greatly reduced. Isocrates describes the city at this period as deserted by the foreign merchants and resident aliens. But these were wounds which time might have healed. The loss of the three great commanders, however, who had revived the power of the commonwealth, could never be repaired. Chabrias was dead, and the services of Iphicrates and Timotheus were sacrificed by means as dishonourable as they were disastrous to Athens. Iphicrates was brought to trial first, and acquitted, chiefly, it would appear, from the bold air which he assumed before his judges. Timotheus was then arraigned, and, if Iphicrates was innocent, there could have been no just charge against him, and yet he was fined one hundred talents, which being unable to pay, he retired to Chalcis, where he died not long after. Iphicrates, also, it would appear, disgusted with the treatment he received, either withdrew from Athens, or lived in retirement; and thus the services of both were for ever lost to their ungrateful country. But this conduct of the Athenians need not excite wonder. The old abuses which had been repressed by the public calamities, and partially reformed, had sprung up again with the partial prosperity of Athens, and had become more extravagant and odious. Athens was infested at this period with shameless, active, and venomous sycophants. The wealthy were exposed to continual vexation by their charges, and the men whose business it was to dispense justice seem to have been in league with them. Isocrates himself complains much of the annoyance which he had suffered from the sycophants. No one, in truth, who possessed wealth was at this time safe in Athens. Bribery and extortion were common, and there was no man possessing sufficient influence to bring about a reform.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE SACRED, OR PHOCIAN WAR.

B.C. 355—346.

The flames of the Social War were not yet extinguished, when those of another, more sanguinary in its spirit, more protracted in its duration, and more important in its consequences, were lighted up in the heart of Greece. It broke out between Thebes and Phocis, and became one of the most memorable in ancient history, under the name of the Sacred War.

Animosity had long been rankling between these two states under a show of peace and amity. The Phocians had taken part with Sparta and Athens as long as they dared, and when they went over to the Theban side it was with evident reluctance. They withheld active co-operation as much as possible, and, as before seen, they took advantage of the letter of the

treaty to refuse it altogether in the campaign which ended with the battle of Mantinea. All this, doubtless, excited resentful feelings, and they appear to have been aggravated by their after conduct. The result of the battle of Mantinea encouraged the subject Bœotian towns to revolt from Thebes, and the Phocians to come to their aid. They ravaged Bœotia, and the Thebans resolved to effect their destruction. But they did not venture to assail them single-handed: they resolved to use the Amphictyonic council as the instrument of vengeance, or, in other words, to arm all Greece against Phocis.

It has already been recorded, that, after the supremacy of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, had successively passed away, the Amphictyonic council had resumed its ancient functions. As the most powerful state yet existing in Greece, Thebes appears to have possessed the greatest weight in that august assembly. The Thebans had already made use of their ascendancy to obtain a sentence which condemned Sparta to a penalty for the seizure of their citadel. Sparta paid no regard to this sentence, and it was not deemed expedient to enforce it, but it suggested the thought that a similar engine might be pointed with more effect against Phocis.

Having taken in a portion of the fruitful plain which had been doomed by the decree of the Amphictyons, in the first Sacred War, to perpetual sterility, the Phocians had laid themselves open to a charge of sacrilege. The Thebans did not put themselves forward to make this charge, but instigated the Thessalian members of the council thereto, and they were condemned to pay a heavy fine. The delinquents took no notice of this judgment, and, when the council next met, it was followed up by a fresh decree, which declared, that, unless the fine was paid, the Phocians should forfeit the territory to the god whom they defrauded of his due—a clause, also, was added to it, which threatened Sparta with a similar penalty, if she persisted in her contumacy.

Thus threatened by the Amphictyonic decree, and by enemies who were eager to execute it, the Phocians saw the need of a vigorous effort, and were ready to listen to any bold counsellor who might stand forward in the emergency. Such a man was found in Philomelus, of Ledon, who seems to have held some high office—probably that of general—in the commonwealth. In a public assembly, held to deliberate on the state of affairs, Philomelus pointed out the injustice of the decree; the disproportion between the penalty and offence, and urged the necessity of resistance. In order to render it ineffectual, he said, they had only to assert their ancient rights, and take possession of Delphi, where they were entitled to the presidency of the oracle, and which presidency would enable them to reverse the proceedings of the Amphictyons. He offered to bring this to a successful issue; and he was either created or confirmed in the office of commander-in-chief of the national forces for that purpose.

The first step which Philomelus took was, to proceed to Sparta and communicate his plans to Archidamus. The Spartan king declined openly to sanction his views, but he promised all the aid

he could give, short of avowed co-operation, and furnished him immediately with a subsidy of fifteen talents. With this supply, combined with private resources, Philomelus raised a body of 1000 Phocian soldiers, and about the same number of mercenary troops, with which he marched to surprise the city of Apollo. He appears to have met with no resistance from the mass of the inhabitants, but the ruling families, which bore the name of Thracidæ, conceiving themselves the hereditary guardians of the temple, made an impotent struggle, and were put to death. The Delphians were alarmed for their safety; but Philomelus declared that he came with no hostile disposition against the inhabitants, nor with sacrilegious designs against the temple, but only to emancipate both from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons, and to assert the ancient prerogative of Phocis, to be the patron and protector of the Delphian shrine. B.C. 357.

The Ozolian Locrians were the first to take the field against the Phocians. Hearing of the event, they immediately marched to the deliverance of Delphi; but were met by Philomelus, who defeated them with great slaughter, and drove the survivors back beyond their frontier.

After this victory, Philomelus proceeded to destroy the records of the Amphictyonic decrees against Phocis. At the same time he publicly declared, that he did not intend to rob the temple, but only to restate the Phocians in their ancient rights, as its legitimate guardians. It seems probable, however, that his actions did not accord with his declaration—that he soon began to meddle with the sacred treasures. He required considerable sums, for he not only continued to enlist mercenaries, to whom he promised large pay, but he fortified the temple with a new wall. Notwithstanding, he may not have taken more than was necessary, for, soon after, he invaded Locris, partly with the view of retaliation, but chiefly for the sake of plunder.

In this expedition into Locris the peculiar character of the war began to display itself. In a skirmish which ensued, the Locrians were left in the possession of a few of the enemy's slain, and when the herald applied for them, they refused to give them up, alleging, that, according to Greek usage, men guilty of sacrilege were not entitled to funeral rites. Philomelus, however, soon after gained a victory, and compelled them to consent to an exchange of the dead; and he then led his army back laden with the spoils of Locris.

It was natural for Philomelus to suppose that whether he robbed the temple or not, the guilt of sacrilege would be imputed to him both by his followers and his enemies. In order to avert this, he determined to employ the oracle in his favour. He compelled the prophets to mount the tripod, and pronounce a declaration that his proceedings were agreeable to the will of the presiding deity, and that he might do whatever he pleased. If this declaration did not silence his enemies, it had, at least, the desired effect on his followers. It was read to the soldiers and the general assembly of the people, and Philomelus exhorted them to cheerful courage, and to proceed valiantly and faithfully under the

sanction of the god; and by this their scruples were quieted. Propitious omens were likewise promulgated, all tending to serve the cause of Philomelus.

With these appeals to superstition Philomelus coupled less ambiguous expedients for strengthening his cause. He sent envoys to all the principal states, not excepting Thebes, to defend his conduct. These were instructed to declare that he had only taken possession of Delphi to do justice to Phocis—that he did not intend robbing the temple—and that he was ready to produce a minute inventory of all its treasures. In the meantime he levied fresh troops; and, in order to preserve a show of adherence to his declaration, and to punish his bitterest enemies, he laid heavy contributions on the wealthy Delphians. For the same purpose he again invaded Locris in the spring of B.C. 354, and once more defeated the Locrians with great slaughter, and then plundered and wasted their territories.

The reception which the envoys of Philomelus met with accorded with the previous feelings of the states to which they addressed themselves. At Athens and Sparta they were received as allies, but at Thebes they were dismissed with hostile threats. On the other hand, envoys from Locris were heard with attention by the Thebans, and they responded to their request for aid with eagerness. They sent envoys to Thessaly to rouse the Thessalians and all the minor tribes in that quarter which had a voice in the council, to arm for the Sacred War. These all obeyed the summons, and Philomelus soon witnessed almost the whole of northern Greece in league against him. His enemies surrounded him on all sides; and they were urged to the utmost exertions by the powerful motives of interest, passion, prejudice, and, above all, religion, or superstition.

The situation of Philomelus was a critical one, for Athens, weakened by her Social War, and Sparta, with Messene and Megalopolis at her side, could afford but little aid. But he had a powerful engine in his hands, and determined to use it for his relief. He opened the treasures of Delphi, and adventurers flocked to his standard from every part of Greece, so that his forces soon amounted to more than 10,000 men. With these he again invaded Locris, where the enemy had already been joined by some Theban troops, and he defeated them, and gained another victory after they had been reinforced by 6,000 men from Thessaly. After this, an army from Bœotia, consisting of 13,000 men, having arrived, Philomelus took up a position, where he remained on the defensive.

The two armies were encamped over against each other for some time without coming to action. But events occurred while they were thus situated which increased the animosity of both parties. Confident in their strength, the Thebans brought out some mercenaries whom they had taken in foraging excursions, and, having made a proclamation that the Amphictyonians condemned them to death, as guilty of sacrilege, destroyed them in the presence of both armies. The soldiers of Philomelus demanded vengeance for this atrocity, and having collected as many prisoners as he could, Philomelus led them out to public

execution according to the example set by the Thebans; and thus the exasperation of the two armies was mutually embittered. Such was the state of feeling when, soon after, from some movements not preconceived, they met near the town of Neon, or Tithorea, which lay at the foot of a precipice in one of the upper valleys of Parnassus. The enemy was far superior in numbers, and the engagement which followed ended in the defeat of the Phocians and the death of Philomelus, who, according to Justin, died fighting in the thickest of the battle. Though the Phocian army was defeated, it was not destroyed. Onomarchus, a younger brother of Philomelus, who had commanded a division in the army, collected many of the fugitives, and led them back to Delphi. On arriving there, he immediately called an assembly to deliberate on the state of affairs. The army was at this time divided in opinion. Some were desirous of peace, from the peculiar character of the war, and the consequences which were to be apprehended even from the most favourable event; many were struck with religious scruples by the spoliation of the temple, and therefore wished to lay down their arms, and others were jealous of the power which the war, if brought to a successful issue, would confer on a single family. But the popular feeling seems to have been with Onomarchus, and he was elected successor to Philomelus in the conduct of the Phocian army.

Onomarchus appears to have been a more reckless character than his brother. There were no scruples in his mind as to what part he should take with reverence to the sacred treasures. From the first, he seems to have regarded them as his patrimony, and as a mine from which his wants could be supplied. The common metals of the sacred offerings furnished arms, and the gold and silver pay for his troops, and bribes, by which he endeavoured to gain partisans, conciliate enemies, and quicken the zeal of his friends throughout Greece. At the same time, the domestic administration of Onomarchus assumed a despotic character. Philomelus had treated the Delphians with rigour, seizing upon their property, but Onomarchus laid rude hands on the principal Phocians of the opposite party, put them to death without trial, and confiscated their estates. All this enabled him to recruit his army, and probably to increase it, so that the confederates, having disbanded their forces after the victory over Philomelus, thinking the Phocian power might have been broken, he was enabled to fall upon them singly at a great advantage. He invaded the western and eastern Locris, where he reduced the towns of Thronum, Amphissa, and Doris; and then advanced into Bœotia, and made himself master of Orchomenus. He next besieged Chæroneia, but was compelled to raise the siege by the approach of a Theban army, and to retire, with some loss, into Phocis.

At this juncture a monarch entered into the contest whose eagle eye had long been fixed on Greece as lawful prey, and who had been actively working his way to the scene of action: Philip of Macedonia.* B.C. 352.

* See the history of the Macedonians. life of Philip.

Philip had just removed the last obstacle that lay between him and the Thessalian frontier by the capture of Methone, and was marching southward, at the request of the northern Thessalians, against Lycophron, who had succeeded to Alexander of Phæræ. As Phæræ had taken no part in the Sacred War with the rest of Thessaly, as soon as Philip entered that country Lycophron sent for succours to Phocis, with which it seems probable he had already entered into an alliance. Accordingly, Onomarchus ordered his younger brother, Phayllus, to join him with a body of 7,000 men. Phayllus marched into Thessaly, but he was defeated by Philip, and compelled to retreat home. After this, Philip made himself master of the important town of Pagasæ, the seaport of Phæræ, and this conquest, which cut off Lycophron's communication with the sea, rendered his situation alarming. As Onomarchus thought the alliance of the tyrant a valuable counterpoise to the hostility of the other Thessalians, he determined to march thither with all his forces to his relief. Philip was inferior in numbers to the enemy, but did not shrink from an engagement. Two battles were fought, and in the second, the victory was so decidedly in favour of Onomarchus, that Philip was compelled to retire into Macedonia.

Onomarchus did not avail himself of his success for any further enterprise in Thessaly, but leaving Lycophron to recover Pagasæ, and humble his enemies as he could, he again carried the war into Bœotia. He had already gained a victory over the Thebans and reduced Coronea, when he received intelligence that Philip had re-entered Thessaly with a more numerous army, and was preparing to renew his attack upon Lycophron. At this time the forces of Onomarchus amounted to 20,000 men, and he immediately led them back into Thessaly. Philip was also at the head of an equal number of infantry and 3,000 cavalry, and a conflict ensued, in which the Phocians were routed. Most of the fugitives fled to the sea-coast, off which Chares was cruising with an Athenian squadron, and many of those who reached it cast away their arms, and attempted to swim to the friendly vessels. Six thousand were here slain or perished in the waters, and 3,000 were captured. Onomarchus himself was among the slain, and, according to Diodorus, Philip ordered his body to be fastened to a cross, and caused all his prisoners to be drowned as men guilty of sacrilege.

Philip now became master of Thessaly. Lycophron surrendered his capital to him, stipulating for leave to depart with 2,000 mercenaries to join their allies in Phocis. Having settled affairs at Phæræ, Philip began his march towards Greece. He advanced to Thermopylæ, the possession of which pass would have given him a free passage into Greece, especially into Attica. But here he was doomed to receive a severe check. As there was every reason to expect that he would speedily advance to dictate terms of peace to the Athenians and their allies, an armament was promptly equipped and despatched to the Malian gulf; and when Philip reached Thermopylæ, he found the pass strongly guarded. Accordingly, he led his army back to his former

station, and subsequently to Macedonia. His designs were for the time frustrated, but he still kept his eye on his prize.

In the meantime the Phocians repaired their losses by means of the treasures of Delphi. Phayllus, the surviving brother of the ruling house, was appointed to succeed in the command, and immediately began to make fresh levies. He also called upon his allies for assistance, and, as his applications were seconded by munificent presents, his call was not in vain. Sparta sent 1,000 men; Achaia sent 2,000, and Athens an army of 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, under the command of Nausicles.

Thus reinforced, Phayllus found himself in a condition to invade Bœotia. Three successive battles took place the first near Orchomeus, the second on the banks of the Cephissus, and the third near Coronea. Diodorus describes Phayllus as having been defeated in these conflicts, but it would seem that the Thebans only so far succeeded as to protect their own land from invasion, for Phayllus did not retreat homeward, as might have been expected had he been defeated, but marched into the Epicnemidian Loeris, where he captured every town, except Naryx, which he besieged.

While Phayllus was before Naryx, the Thebans made an inroad into Phocis, and having thereby drawn away his main force from that town, marched upon it, to raise the siege. But in this they were defeated. Phayllus suddenly appeared again before the place, routed their army, and then stormed the town, which he razed to the ground. But this was his last act. In the course of the same year he was carried off by a disease, which his enemies considered as a punishment from heaven.

The office of Phayllus at this time does not appear to have been considered as elective. It passed, by inheritance, to Phalaicus, a son of Onomarchus, who was so young as to need a guardian. This guardian was Mnaseas, who prosecuted the war as his lieutenant. But Mnaseas was soon after slain in one of the night combats which had become frequent, and his ward then took the command in person.

Previous to Philip's intervention the Athenians had not felt any deep interest in the Sacred War. They were anxious that the Thebans might not prevail, but refrained from interfering. Sparta, however, felt a livelier interest for the Phocians, and took this opportunity of endeavouring to reduce, first Megalopolis and then Messene. At this time these two new states depended chiefly on Theban protection; for the elements of which they were composed were so diverse, that there was no unity among them, and where there is no union there can be no security. As soon, therefore, as the Sacred War began to take a turn unfavourable to Thebes, Sparta bent her arms against Megalopolis; and, finding her strength insufficient for the conquest, called on Athens for assistance. In order to gain the concurrence of the Athenians, the principle she put forth was a general recognition of ancient rights. Elis was to recover that part of Triphylia which she claimed, Phlius, the fortress of Tricaranum; and Athens,

Oropus, Thebes, and Plataea. Her own views,—the dissolution of Megalopolis and the reduction of Messene—appear to have been concealed as much as possible; but to the Megalopolitans, at least, they were evident.

In order to counteract the views of Sparta, notwithstanding their connexion with Thebes, the Megalopolitans sent envoys to Athens to oppose her application, and to solicit the Athenians to espouse their cause. They were ably seconded by Demosthenes, an orator who had recently taken a leading part in the affairs of Athens. Demosthenes argued that the interest of Athens required that both Thebes and Sparta should be allowed to waste their strength. "The situation of Thebes," he said, "was very critical at this juncture, and the general belief in Greece was that she would sink in the struggle. On the other hand," he observed, "if Sparta should succeed against Megalopolis, she would find it less difficult to reduce Messene, and this addition to her strength would destroy the balance which Athens must wish to preserve." On these grounds, therefore, he supported the proposal of alliance with Megalopolis—and though he did not carry his point, no aid was afforded to Sparta.

At the same time, the Megalopolitans sent to Thebes for aid. As at that period the Thebans had just defeated Onomarchus, they were able to send a body of 4,500 infantry and 500 cavalry; and they were joined by all the forces of Argos, Sicyon, and Messene. The Spartans also received a reinforcement from Phocia of 1,000 infantry and 150 of the Thessalian cavalry, who had followed Lycophron from Pheria. The two parties were so evenly balanced, that after two campaigns, in which several engagements took place, the Spartans consented to a truce with Megalopolis, and thus tranquillity was restored to the Peloponnesus.

After the death of Mnaseas the two principal belligerent states, Phocia and Thebes, continued to spend their strength in unavailing efforts. Each party in minor engagements, by turns, was victorious. The Phocians maintained their ground in Boeotia, continuing to make attempts on the towns still subject to Thebes, and the Thebans regularly invaded and ravaged Phocia, though, it would appear, with more loss than gain. They were aided in the war by the Persian king, who sent them a subsidy of 300 talents, partly as the price of their forbearance, and partly of the succours which they sent to him in his expedition into Egypt. The burden of the war, however, became more and more oppressive as the prospect of success became dimmed. Want also began to stare the Phocians in the face. The treasures of Delphi, though great, had been scattered with a lavish hand, and they were now nearly exhausted. The pay of the soldiers became irregular, and loud murmurs were soon heard in the camp. This brought about a revolution. A party in the state which had opposed Onomarchus before his accession, was encouraged by these murmurs to renew its attacks on the ruling dynasty, and they were now successful. Phalæcus was charged with embezzlement, and with the impiety of having caused excavations to be made in the innermost sanctuary of

Delphi, for treasures which were believed, from the authority of Homer, to have been buried there. This charge, whether well founded or not, had the desired effect. Phalæcus was compelled to abdicate his office, and three new generals were elected in his stead. B. C. 347.

The first act of the new government of Phocia was to institute a rigid inquiry into the mode of the application of the treasures of Delphi. It was alleged that they would have been still sufficient for the pay of the army, if they had not been diverted to the private use of Phalæcus and his friends. Accordingly, one Philo, who had been intrusted with the largest portion for the public use, was put upon his trial. Philo was convicted of malversation; and having been put to the torture, he disclosed the names of his accomplices. All these were obliged to refund as much of the spoil as remained in their possession, and they then suffered the punishment for sacrilege. It was with this money, and by the confiscation of the property of the offenders, that the government of Phocia resolved to carry on the Sacred War.

Having thus secured the means of carrying on operations, the triumvirate sent deputies to Athens to request assistance. As an inducement to the Athenians to act promptly and effectually, they offered to deliver up to them the towns of Thronium, Alponus, and Nicæa, which gave to their possessor the command of the straits of Thermopylae. This offer was accepted. The assembly passed a decree that fifty galleys should immediately be sent to sea, under Proxenus, and that all citizens under thirty should hold themselves in readiness to embark on this expedition. But before Proxenus could reach the neighbourhood of Thermopylae, a complete change had taken place in the Phocian government. By means of a counter-revolution Phalæcus was reinstated in his office, and, either suspecting that the Athenians had been concerned in his deposition, or being at this moment negotiating with Philip of Macedonia, he refused to give up the keys of Thermopylae, and threw the envoys, whom the triumvirate had despatched to Athens, into prison. Still further to display his animosity, he dismissed the heralds who were sent from Athens to announce the approaching celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries with contempt, and, in the name of the Phocians, he rejected the customary safe-conduct, which was offered to all Greeks who designed to be present at the sacred rites.

The Phocians had now maintained the war against the Thebans and their allies for ten years, but the scene was about to close upon them in darkness. At the recommencement of hostilities they sustained a check which revived the hopes of their adversaries. A division of their troops was attacked at Abs by the Thebans, and was dispersed. A part of the fugitives saved themselves by flying to the neighbouring cities. About five hundred of them, whose retreat was intercepted, took refuge in the temple of Apollo, where they held their assailants at bay, but a fire broke out in the temple, and they perished in the flames. This disaster was construed by their enemies as indicative of the wrath of the god; but so far from proving ominous of

worse evil, it was followed by a series of successes on the part of the Phocians. They compelled the Thebans to raise the siege of Neon, defeated them at Hedyllum, routed their cavalry in a third engagement, and pushed their exertions with so much vigour, that the Thebans suffered exceedingly.

And now came the catastrophe. The Thebans had, in their recent conflicts, been aided by some troops from Macedonia, but, convinced that their present force was inadequate to defeat the Phocians, they resolved to solicit Philip for more efficacious succour. Accordingly, a Theban embassy was despatched to Pella, and Philip now secretly resolved to take an effectual part in the Sacred War.

The Theban envoys could have had but few difficulties to encounter in this mission. Ever since his repulse at the pass of Thermopylæ, Philip had kept his eye steadily on Greece, and had been engaged in a series of conquests all tending to further his views in that faction-torn country. Athens had pierced through the veil of mystery which hung over his proceedings, and had opposed him with all her might, both in the council and the field. Her orators and her warriors alike—save those which were in his pay, as *Æschines*—had been arrayed against him, but to no purpose. He had triumphed over *Olynthus*, and had made the conquest of the whole of the *Chalcidian peninsula*. At the very time that the Theban envoys arrived at Pella, where Philip was, there was an embassy from Athens—the second which had been sent—trating on the terms of peace, which was concluded favourably to the views of the ambitious monarch. But though peace was concluded, the request of the Theban envoys opened a vista through which Philip gazed at his prey with delight, and he took measures for securing it*.

The Phocians were sensible of their coming danger, and prepared to meet the storm. Envoys were sent to the court of Philip, and, at the same time, to strengthen themselves in the field, they applied for aid to Sparta. The politic *Archidamus* readily complied with their request, less, perhaps, from regard for the Phocians, than from a wish to be at hand to support, in case of their fall, an ancient Spartan claim to the presidency of the *Delphic temple*. Accordingly, he led a body of 1,000 heavy-armed infantry into Phocis, which was probably accompanied by the usual proportion of light troops. *Archidamus* also sent envoys to Pella, to assist in thwarting the plans of the Theban deputies.

But though the Phocians displayed this vigour, they were no longer animated by the same spirit as they exhibited at the beginning of their career, nor were they any longer unanimous in their efforts. The protracted duration of the war had produced the usual concomitants,—discouragement and lassitude. Moreover, although *Phalæcus* had recovered his authority, he was regarded by many with an angry eye, as a man of stained reputation, and an obstacle to peace. The secession of Athens, through his harsh conduct, and the known determination of Philip to interfere, and, still more, the decree of Philo-

crates, denouncing hostilities in case the temple was not given up to the *Amphictyons*, must have convinced many that any further recourse to arms would be an act of temerity. *Phalæcus* himself was so far from being disposed to carry his opposition to extremities, that he was ready to purchase his own impunity at his country's expense. It was his interest to treat speedily, for the terms which he might procure while at the head of an army would be sternly denied him as soon as want of means compelled him to disband his troops. It seems to have been chiefly with this view that he occupied the pass of *Thermopylæ* with 8,000 men.

While in this position, an offer was made by *Archidamus*, the acceptance of which might have enabled the Phocians to negotiate with advantage, although his motives for making it were doubtless selfish. He offered to garrison the towns of *Thronum*, *Alponus*, and *Nicæa*, the keys of *Thermopylæ*, by which measure *Archidamus* would have been pledged to resist all invasion from northern Greece, and the force under *Phalæcus* would have been at liberty to act in other quarters. But it did not suit the views of *Phalæcus* to relinquish this position, for it was the hope on which he rested for securing his safety. By surrendering it to Philip he meant to provide for his own escape, whence *Archidamus* was thanked in a strain of sarcasm, and the Spartan king, offended thereby, led back his troops to Sparta.

The progress of Philip was marked with consummate skill. Prudence forbade him yet to unfold his designs with respect to Phocis. *Thermopylæ* was held by *Phalæcus*, *Halius* held his power at bay, *Phereas* exhibited signs of a refractory spirit, discontent was manifest in other parts of *Thessaly*, *Proxenus* was hovering on the coast with his squadron, and he feared that Athens, which had long been a thorn in his side, would be roused into action. He therefore adopted the expedient of exciting the hopes of all parties. To the *Thessalians* and *Thebans* he held out the prospect of revenge and aggrandizement, to the *Spartans* and *Athenians* the expectation that *Thebes* would be humbled, and to the *Phocians*, on whose destruction he was resolved, that he would shield them from danger. So far did he carry this base dissimulation, that he expressed a wish, either to give up the task of settling the affairs of the *Phocians*, or to share it with those who were inclined to favour them. The *Spartans* and *Athenians* were successively invited by him to undertake the arrangement, but they declined: the former having discovered his duplicity, the latter from some motives hard to be understood, and difficult to reconcile with sound policy. Had the *Athenians* acted promptly and vigorously on the suggestion of Philip—had they sent a sufficient force into the field, and ordered *Proxenus* to second it with his fleet, the weight which they would have thrown into the scale would have counterpoised that of the *Thebans* and *Thessalians*, and, to all human appearance, would have saved *Phocis*. But this opportunity was thrown away, and ruin came upon the *Phocians*, and Greece was finally enslaved.

The time approached when Philip could safely carry his plans into effect. *Halius* surrendered,

* See the History of Macedonia. Life of Philip

and its inhabitants were driven into exile; Thesaly was quieted; and all his resources and those of his allies became available. Yet one obstacle remained in his path. Phalæcus still held the pass of Thermopylæ, and it was necessary that he should be removed to prevent delay and loss. This was no difficult task. The views of Phalæcus have been stated, and the art of Philip, seconded, perhaps, by his gold, easily effected his removal. Negotiations were entered into, Phalæcus was permitted to retreat to Peloponnesus with the mercenaries under his command, on condition that he should deliver up the keys of Thermopylæ. He afterwards crossed over into Crete, where, after several vicissitudes, he was killed while besieging Cydoma—his enemies say by fire from heaven, but, according to other accounts, by one of his own soldiers.

Philip took possession of Alponus, Thronium, and Nicæa, and advanced without delay into the heart of Phocis. No conditions had been made on behalf of the Phocians, and, on his approach, most of the towns surrendered at discretion, and those that resisted him were taken by storm and razed to the ground. He then proceeded to take possession of Delphi, and convened a council of the Amphictyons to sit in judgment on those who had incurred the guilt of sacrilege.

The tidings of this event roused the Athenians from a pleasing dream to a bitter feeling of disappointment, fear, and resentment. They had hoped to have seen Thebes humbled, but now Philip was manifestly on their side. Hence, in their panic they conceived that Attica was threatened, and preparations were made to avert the storm. It was decreed that the fortresses on the frontier should be put into a posture of defence, that the fortifications of Piræus should be repaired, that the women, children, and movable property, should be brought within the walls, and that a festival of Hercules, which usually took place in the country, should be celebrated within the walls. This afforded Philip occasion for expostulation. He wrote a letter to the Athenians, in which he calmly apprised them of the manner in which he had occupied Phocis, and how he had acted. He was informed, he said, that "they were preparing to succour the Phocians, and wrote that they might spare themselves the trouble." He added, that "it was not just, after they had made peace, thus to prepare for battle; especially as the Phocians were not comprehended in the treaty, so that all they would gain by their interference would be the shame of bootless aggression."

The ordinary time of the Amphictyonic meeting was in the autumn, but as the Thebans and Thessalians were burning for revenge, at their request Philip collected as many members as he could on the spur of the moment, and proceeded to deliberate on the doom of the Phocians. The council first deliberated on the penalty due to their impiety. All the members present, except those of Athens, were bitter enemies of the conquered people, and no mercy could therefore have been expected. But none exhibited such violent animosity as the deputies of the tribes of Mount Ceta. They proposed to inflict the extreme punishment of sacrilege—that of precipitation

from the rock—on the whole adult male population of many of the Phocian towns. Their doom was milder than this, but still it was one of unjustifiable severity. It was decreed by the council that all the Phocian cities, except Abæ, twenty-two in number, should be levelled with the ground, that the population should be dispersed in villages at a certain distance from each other, and never to contain more than fifty dwellings, that they were to pay a yearly tribute of sixty talents to the temple of Delphi, until they should have restored the whole amount of plundered treasure, which was estimated at 10,000 talents; that in the meantime they should not be allowed to possess arms or horses, and that those who had taken part in the spoliation of the temple, and who had taken refuge in flight, should be pursued and brought to justice. Finally, the Phocians were deprived of all access to the temple, and their seat in the Amphictyonic council, and the two votes which they had possessed, were to be transferred to Philip and his successors. At the same time, Sparta was deprived of her share in the Amphictyonic privileges of the Dorian race, and Philip was associated with the Thebans and Thessalians in the presidency of the Pythian games.

The task of putting this sentence into execution was committed to the Thebans, and they were not slow in performing the work of vengeance. Demosthenes says that when he passed through Phocis to Delphi, at a subsequent date, the appearance of Phocis baffled description. On every hand ruined houses, walls overthrown, and ravaged fields, made up the picture of desolation, with here and there a few women, and children, and dejected and feeble old men, on whom the soldiers of Thebes and Macedonia were quartered, for the purpose of stifling the voice of complaint, and enforcing the payment of the fine imposed by the Amphictyonic council.

According to Demosthenes, Thebes was permitted to add a part of Phocis to her territory, but it does not appear clear whether his statement is to be understood literally, or had any real foundation. It is certain, however, that Thebes recovered Orchomenus, Coronea, and whatever other towns she had lost in Bœotia. Neither Thebes, nor Athens, nor Sparta, ever recovered their lost empire in Greece. By this transaction, Philip had gained such a footing as enabled him gradually to unmask his long-cherished designs, and finally to trample upon the liberty of Greece—that liberty over which she had been for ages so jealous, and which she had been able to maintain against the power of the Persian empire by the valour of her sons.

Bitter as the various wars of Greece had been, whether we regard the spirit displayed therein, or their fatal consequences, this was the most bitter. Vengeance was increased by the consideration that it was waged on behalf of Apollo notwithstanding the lying oracle had declared that he could take care of his own. Offence had been given to the Thebans, and in the rage of disappointment in the struggle for power, they looked about for a pretext to ensure the destruction of their enemies, and the imputation of the guilt of sacrilege was justly deemed by them the most likely to effect that object. From the earliest

ages, sacrilege was deemed by the Greeks a crime that could not remain unpunished. Their poets, the orations of their orators, and, above all, their priests, enjoined vengeance for the act. Hence the feeling was imprinted on the hearts of the superstitious multitude, and they were ready to employ themselves in the work of vengeance.

Yet it is remarkable that so many thousands should range themselves under the standard of the Phocian leaders, not only to defend, but to participate in the crime. From every part of Greece mercenaries flocked to Delphi to share in the plunder of its treasures. Made reckless by the long wars in which Greece had been involved, they cast aside the fears of superstition, and spoiled its most time-hallowed shrine. But this may be looked upon as a retributive act of justice. The shrine of Delphi was stained with blood, and around it were hung the spoils of states and nations. It was by war that it became enriched, and by war was it spoiled. Anarchy was the distinguishing characteristic of the oracle of Apollo. Its priests saw in the broils of Greece their own gains, and they craftily fostered them, and the spoliation of their celebrated oracle immediately preceded the wreck of Greece. In all the divinations, and in all the strifes of the Grecians, the only true God observed their idolatry, ambition, and cruelty: their oracles and the land alike were spoiled by his permission who awards to nations, as well as individuals, punishment for their crimes.

CHAPTER XXXI

FROM THE END OF THE SACRED WAR TO THE APPOINTMENT OF PHILIP TO BE GENERAL-
ISSIMO OF GREECE IN THE PERSIAN WAR,
BY WHICH ACT HIS ASCENDENCY OVER
GREECE WAS FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED

B C. 346—338

HAVING concluded the Sacred War so favourably to his interests and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, and assisted in the sacrifices offered to Apollo in gratitude for his success. On this occasion his feelings must have been gratified and his ambition inflamed. In the sacred pœans, sung in honour of the god, his name was associated with that of Apollo! But this empty honour was followed by others more tangible in their nature. All his transactions were ratified by the Amphictyons, and they decreed that a statue should be erected to his honour in the temple of Delphi, and, by a solemn decree, acknowledged the kingdom of Macedonia as the principal member of the Hellenic states. After this he returned home, carrying with him, as Diodorus says, a great increase of reputation. The Thessalians and Thebans extolled the gratification of their revenge and ambition as a work of piety!

It seems to have been soon after Philip's return to Macedonia that Isocrates addressed his celebrated oration to him called the Panegyric, the purport of which was to recommend the cessation of hostilities at home, and the direction

of the combined forces of Greece and Macedonia against Persia. The prize was glittering, and Philip kept it in view, but he saw that it would be more easy to secure it when he had extended and consolidated his own dominions and reduced the Grecian states to absolute servility. To these objects, therefore, he addressed himself with all his might using the force of his deep policy and power to attain that position.

The first open measure which Philip took shows that he was earnest in securing the supremacy over Greece. His kingdom being incorporated by the Amphictyons with the Grecian states, he appointed deputies to preside at the Pythian games, the celebration of which was approaching. Most of the Grecian states sent their representatives, but the Athenians, stung with indignation and regret, abstained from taking part in the festival. This conduct endangered the public peace, and therefore the Amphictyons sent envoys to Athens, requiring their concurrence with the measures recently adopted by the general council of Greece, and remonstrating against their displeasure at the aggrandizement of a prince with whom they had so recently contracted an alliance. The effect of this requisition and remonstrance was all that Philip could have wished. Convinced by Demosthenes, who had hitherto clamoured for war, of the absurdity of contending with the combined power of Philip and the Amphictyons about "the shadow at Delphi," the Athenians in a general assembly decided for peace. Thus a new rupture between Philip and Athens was for the time suspended.

Being now set at liberty, Philip seems to have endeavoured to extend his power on every hand by negotiation. In the Peloponnesus he succeeded almost without an effort to the sway which Thebes had won through the victories of Epaminondas. All the states assiduously courted his friendship. He espoused their cause without reserve, declared himself the protector of Messene, and called upon the Spartans to renounce their claims upon that state, and when his demand was rejected, he both supplied his allies with troops and money, and announced his intention of leading a large force into the Peloponnesus in person. These favours and promises rendered Philip highly popular throughout the confederacy of which Messene, Megalopolis, and Argos were the leading members: he was extolled as the friend of liberty and the champion of the oppressed. Demosthenes says, that "about three years after the end of the Sacred War many Arcadian commonwealths, together with Argos, had decreed brazen statues and crowns to his honour, and had resolved, if he should enter Peloponnesus, to admit him into their towns."

These proceedings soon became known at Athens, and, although nominally at peace with the Macedonian monarch, an embassy was sent from thence into Peloponnesus, with Demosthenes at its head, to counteract the progress of his influence. Demosthenes appears to have visited several cities, as Messene and Argos, but though he unmasked the character of Philip in glowing language, his mission produced no practical effect. The Peloponnesians listened to him and applauded his harangues, but still yielded to Philip their confidence.

Philip deemed it imprudent to let these attempts pass unnoticed. He therefore sent an embassy to Athens, headed by Python, and accompanied by envoys from Messene and Argos. As Demosthenes had in his recent mission accused Philip of perfidy, Python was instructed to expostulate on the groundless accusation, and to deny that Philip had ever broken his word to the Athenians; while the Peloponnesians had reason to complain of the countenance which Athens had given to the attempts of Sparta against their liberty. The reply to this mission has not been preserved; but the tone of the speech which Demosthenes uttered on the occasion would lead to the conclusion, that it was by no means conciliatory, yet it appears so far to have satisfied Philip and his allies, that an open rupture was avoided.

Philip may have been the more easily satisfied, because he was at this period engaged in an expedition against the Illyrians, which was attended with complete success, *b.c.* 343. After this, circumstances called him into Thessaly, where he modelled the government in such a manner as to render it subservient to his ambitious projects. The influence he gained in Thessaly rendered him still more dangerous to the liberties of Greece.

While in Thessaly, Philip made an attempt in another quarter, which, had it succeeded, would have brought him another step nearer to supremacy over Greece. Megara was at this time divided, as it had always been, between two factions. The contending interests, however, do not appear to have been those of democracy and oligarchy, but democracy and monarchy. Philip had partisans there among the most powerful citizens, who hoped with his aid to rise to the sovereignty, which they would have been contented to hold under his sway. According to Demosthenes, one Pteodorus, the principal man in Megara by birth, wealth, and reputation, was at the head of a conspiracy for the purpose of placing the city in the hands of Philip, and had opened a correspondence with him, in which he employed another Megarian, Perilaus, as his agent. But this plot was discovered, and as there was a strong party which opposed them, and looked to Athens for protection, it fell to the ground. Perilaus was brought to trial for his unauthorized dealings with a foreign court, but was acquitted through the influence of Pteodorus, who sent him again to obtain a body of Macedonian troops, while he prepared for their reception at Megara. But the opposing party was on the alert, and the plot was again baffled by some vigorous measures of the Athenians. Phocion was sent to guard the city, and though he could not secure it from treachery within, he took the most effectual measures to prevent a surprise from without. He fortified Nicæa, and again annexed it to the city by two long walls, thus the attempt of Pteodorus failed, and Philip's hopes were for a time frustrated.

The object which Philip appears to have had in view in wishing to gain possession of Megara was twofold,—to gain a position which would enable him to annoy Athens; and to open a communication with Peloponnesus. Having been defeated in this attempt, he turned his attention

to another quarter, where he saw a prospect of accomplishing this and several other objects at the same time. He marched from Thessaly and wrested Naupactus from the Achæans, which he assigned to the Ætolians. After this he ravaged the Cassopian territory in Epirus, took the three towns of Bucheta, Pandosia, and Elatrea, which had been founded at a very early period by Elean colonists, and gave them up to Alexander, the brother of his queen, Olympias, who was already in possession of a part of that country. Having effected this, Philip found some pretext—but what, is unknown—for marching against Ambracia.

As Philip had won the friendship of the Ætolians by the cession of Naupactus to them, the possession of Ambracia would have opened the way for him into Acarnania and Ætolia, and he might thus have been enabled to have crossed over to the western side of Peloponnesus, where the troubled state of Elis afforded a pretext for his intervention. Notwithstanding the efforts of its adversaries, the oligarchical party at Elis had maintained its ascendancy, and Philip had gained several partizans among them who cherished hopes similar to those which animated his adherents at Megara. Hence there arose a struggle between the parties, and many citizens were forced into exile, while the government fell into few hands. These exiles appear to have been of the oligarchical party, adverse to monarchy, and, after the death of Phalæcus, in Crete, a body of his mercenaries were brought over by them to make war on the oligarchical rulers. They would probably have been successful, had not the democratical Arcadians, who viewed them as the enemies of Philip, thrown their weight into the opposing scale. As it was, the exiles were defeated in a battle, and while many of the mercenaries were slain, 4,000 were taken and distributed among the allies. The Arcadians sold their prisoners for slaves, but the Eleans massacred theirs, under the pretence that they were guilty of sacrilege; they having been engaged in the Sacred War.

This event established Philip's predomance at Elis, but, notwithstanding, affairs still continued in such an unsettled state, as to afford an occasion for his presence in Peloponnesus, and it was from this motive chiefly that he coveted the acquisition of Ambracia and Leucas. He had partizans in both these places on whom he founded his expectations, but they were disappointed through the energy which now displayed itself at Athens. An embassy was sent both into Peloponnesus and Acarnania, which was strengthened in its negotiations by Callias, the Eubæan, and brought back large promises, both of men and money, from some of the Peloponnesian states—from Megara and Acarnania.

Thus encouraged, a body of troops was sent from Athens to Ambracia to defend it against Philip, and to secure it against domestic treachery. At the same time, chiefly, perhaps, for the sake of a diversion, another Athenian force, under the command of Aristodemus, marched into Thessaly, and made an attempt on Magnesia. Aristodemus was unsuccessful; but, nevertheless, Philip was obliged to drop his designs,

from these causes, both against Ambracia and Leucas.

Philip, however, did not give up his idea of conquest. Though checked in the south, he resolved to carry his arms eastward, where he might enlarge his dominions and sustain a numerous army without exciting the suspicion of the Grecian states. Before he proceeded, he attempted to reconcile himself with the Athenians, that his kingdom might be secure during his absence. For this purpose he dispatched envoys to Athens with a letter, in which he offered Halonnesus to the Athenians, to submit a dispute existing between the Cardians and Athenians to the decision of an umpire, and proposed a treaty for regulating the commercial intercourse between the two nations. These offers were well calculated to betray the Athenians into listless security, and, during its discussion at Athens, Philip engaged in an expedition to Thrace, which he finally rendered, in effect, a province of Macedonia.

While thus engaged, a circumstance occurred in the south of Thrace which widened the breach between Philip and Athens. A colony was sent by the Athenians to the Chersonesus, under the command of Diopthes, who, provoked by the protection which Philip had recently given to the Cardians, and, perhaps, invited by the Thracians, invaded the maritime territory of Philip, stormed the towns of Crobyle and Tristasis, and carried off a considerable booty and many prisoners to the Chersonesus. Not being able to avenge himself at the moment, Philip contented himself with making complaint by letters on the subject, but the conduct of Diopthes was sanctioned by the government of Athens, and, emboldened by this success, the Athenians also decreed that vigorous measures should be taken in other quarters.

Offence having been given to the Athenians by the towns on the Pagassan gulf, allies of Philip, Aristodemus and Callias were sent to chastise them, and the towns were taken and plundered. Philip complained of these hostilities in vain, his remonstrances were scornfully passed over, while the public thanks were given to the commanders for their services. Emboldened thereby, under the sway of the stern Demosthenes, the Athenians proceeded to further acts of hostility. The encircling of Athens by a barrier of friendly states was meditated, rendering Eubœa her outwork towards the sea, Bœotia toward the north, and Megara and other neighbouring states on the side of the Peloponnesus. Alliances with Byzantium, Perinthus, Abydus, Chios, Rhodes, and Persia, were also meditated, in order to cut off, as far as practicable, the resources of hostile powers, and to procure for Athens all those of which she stood in need.

The most important of these projects was that of converting Eubœa into a bulwark of Athens, and circumstances concurred to render it successful. Philip was already master of the chief cities therein, over which he had placed governors, but the tyranny of these rulers, supported by the power of Philip, had made them obnoxious to the citizens, and they sent a deputation to Athens, under Callias, to propose a new alliance. This was no difficult task. The Athe-

nians recognised the complete independence of the Eubœan cities, and sent troops, under the command of Phocion, to secure that independence, which was effected.

The suppression of his influence in Eubœa must have been bitter news to Philip, but it only had the effect of causing him to change his sphere of action. He still sought the extension of his power and the subjection of Greece.

At this time the Athenians chiefly relied, for their supplies of corn and other necessaries, on the countries bordering on the Euxine, and an extensive commerce was therefore carried on by them with Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium. Philip saw that if he possessed himself of these cities he should have the means of distressing Athens, and of carrying into effect his projected invasion of the Persian empire. Accordingly, an army of 30,000 men was collected, with which Philip marched forward to Perinthus. On his way the monarch turned aside to take vengeance upon Diopthes, commander in the Chersonesus, who was making an inroad into the territory of Cardia. Diopthes was defeated and slain, and Philip then hastened to Perinthus. b. c. 340

Philip was long baffled in his designs upon Perinthus by the obstinate defence of the citizens, who were aided by reinforcements from Persia and Byzantium, and he drew off a part of his forces and invested Selymbria, now Selivria. This brought Philip and the Athenians into direct collision. Viewing with alarm the dangerous project of the monarch with regard to the Hellespontine cities, Laomedon, the Athenian admiral on the Propontic station, was directed to sail thither secretly with twenty merchant vessels, laden with corn for the relief of the Selymbrians. But this measure proved unsuccessful. These vessels were seized by the Macedonian admiral, and when Philip refused to restore them, the Athenians resolved to rescue the Hellespontine cities from his grasp, and a fleet was sent for that purpose under the command of Chares. b. c. 349

In the meanwhile Philip had changed his sphere of action. Being still baffled at Perinthus, he had converted the siege into a blockade, and had marched with the greater portion of his army to Byzantium. Chares soon after appeared before that city, and being refused entrance, resolved to attack the Macedonian fleet then lying off Chaleedon, on the Asiatic coast. A severe sea-fight took place, and he was defeated, with the loss of several vessels.

When news was first brought to Athens of this disaster, and that the Byzantines, with the other cities, had refused to admit Chares, they were indignant at the supposed insult offered them, and were ready to leave them to their fate. Had it not been for Phocion, they would thus have acted; but, through his exertions, they decreed that a fresh armament should be raised, and that the conduct of it should be committed to Phocion himself. A formidable squadron was raised, consisting of 120 sail, and Phocion sailed with this force to Byzantium. The Byzantines, who had only refused to admit Chares because they could place no confidence in him, received Phocion with open arms; and, by his

zeal, activity, and talent, he inspired them with new spirit. They defeated the troops of Philip in several encounters; and the monarch at length, despairing of accomplishing his purpose, raised the siege.

In order to throw the Athenians off their guard, Philip directed his attention to Western Scythia, a peninsula situate on the lower part of the Ister, near the Euxine. The Athenians, however, considering the siege of Byzantium as an open declaration of war, continued their preparations. They had been recently strengthened by the alliance of the republic of Megara, which, added to that of Eubœa, rendered Athens comparatively secure. But these events would have been trivial in comparison, had a plan, formed by Demosthenes, been carried into effect. Demosthenes journeyed into Acarnania and Peloponnesus, to negotiate with the states in those quarters; and he, together with Callias of Colchis, prevailed upon the Peloponnesians and others to join in a confederacy against Philip. They made large promises both of men and subsidies, but Demosthenes and Callias were not in this field alone. The dread of Philip, the influence of his gold, and the jealousy and doubt of each other, combined with a variety of circumstances incident to all extensive coalitions, destroyed the confederacy while yet in its infancy. A congress which had been promised, never assembled, and consequently neither the troops nor subsidies were forthcoming.

Still the Athenians continued their hostilities. And their superiority at sea at this time was such as seemed to warrant them in their proceedings. They entirely destroyed the commerce of Macedonia. No vessel could enter or depart without being intercepted by Athenian cruisers, by which the Macedonians not only sustained loss from the suspension of traffic in their productions, but suffered from their inability to import the necessaries of life. At the same time the Athenian market was supplied with provisions at very low prices.

This was an alarming state of affairs for Macedonia, and so Philip seems to have considered it, for he sought to subvert by one blow the maritime ascendancy of Athens, and that by the hand of an incendiary in his pay. The renegade Antiphon, who had been expelled from Athens for having exercised the functions of a citizen without a legal right, and who had been for some time concealed in the Piræus, was to set fire to the naval arsenals of Athens. The plot was discovered, and Antiphon was condemned to death; and thus this base design of Philip failed.

Although Philip was thus baffled, he was soon after favoured by the Athenians themselves in his one great project of gaining supremacy over Greece. While he was yet warring in the wilds of Scythia, Æschines was elected, in conjunction with Diagnetes, Meidias, and Thrasycles, all, it would appear, in the pay or interest of Philip, as deputies to the Amphictyonic council. This was a fatal election for Athens, for it led to the Amphissian, or the third Sacred War, and to the final triumph of Philip over the Grecian states.

As soon as this council met, a question was mooted by Æschines whether the Locrians of

Amphissa had not been guilty of sacrilege in ploughing the fields of Cyræa, in the neighbourhood of the temple of Delphi, and which were visible from the place where the council held its sittings. Æschines, with impassioned voice and gestures, pointed out to the council the re-cultivated land, dwelt on the potency and sanctity of the decree which consigned them to perpetual desolation, touched upon every topic which could excite superstitious dread in the minds of his hearers, and declared that whatever might be the decision of the council, he would support the rights of the god with his entire soul, body, property, and power; and would thus save himself, his family, and his country, from being participators in the sacrilege of the Amphissians.

Æschines prevailed. Instead of looking forward to results, searching for evidence, administering justice in a conciliatory spirit, and giving the Amphissians an opportunity for vindication or apology, roused by his appeal, the council became impatient to punish the offenders. A proclamation was made, summoning all the Delphians who were of military age, both freemen and slaves, to meet the next morning at day-break with spades and pickaxes, and notice was given to all the members of the council to lend their aid in behalf of Apollo and his land!

Early in the morning this motley crowd, headed by the Amphictyons, marched down to the sea-side, destroyed the harbour, set fire to the adjacent houses, and ravaged the interdicted territory. The Amphissians, however, were not disposed to suffer their loss unavenged, but as the spoilers returned, issued with their whole force from Amphissa, and their enemies narrowly escaped from their vengeance by a precipitate flight to Delphi.

On the morrow, Cottyphus, the president of the council, convened a general assembly to deliberate on the measures which now ought to be adopted. As this assembly was composed of nearly the same persons whose lives had been so recently threatened, it could not have been expected that these measures would be conciliatory. Many accusations were brought against the Amphissians, and the result was a decree, which fixed a day before the regular time of the next meeting, when the deputies were to assemble at Thermopylae with proposals, sanctioned by the states that sent them, for bringing the Amphissians to justice.

On his return to Athens, Æschines exerted all his eloquence to procure the concurrence of the Athenians with the resolutions passed by the Amphissians. His proceedings were received with general approbation, but there was one dissentient voice, and it was that of Demosthenes. Addressing his rival orator, he observed,—“You are bringing war into Attica, Æschines, an Amphictyonic war;” and he sternly opposed him on this ground. But the opposition of Demosthenes was vain: partly from religious feelings, and partly, perhaps, from the misrepresentations of Æschines, with reference to the hostile designs of the Amphissians, the people decided in favour of the proposition. Notwithstanding, Demosthenes obtained a decree that the deputies should repair to Delphi and Thermopylae at those seasons only which

were prescribed by hereditary usage, which virtually rescinded the vote for war against the Amphissians. To render this the more effectual, Demosthenes added a clause which forbade the deputies to take any part in the deliberations, acts, and proceedings of the Amphictyons at Thermopylae. This was a complete triumph over his rival, Æschines, for the deputies remained at Athens while the council held its extraordinary meeting.

The council was attended by all the other states except Thebes, and war was decreed against the Amphissians, and Cottyphus appointed to the command of an Amphictyonic army, in order to reduce them to obedience. Cottyphus accordingly marched with all the forces he could collect, and succeeded in his enterprise. Weakened by intestine discord, the Amphissians submitted to a fine laid on them to be paid by instalments. At the same time, one party, charged with the "sacrilege," was forced to go into exile, and another, called the "pious," was restored. But this submission on the part of the Amphissians appears only to have been a feint. The Amphictyonic forces had not long withdrawn before the exiles were recalled, and the "pious" again sent into banishment the fine, also, remained unpaid, and the lands were re-cultivated.

Although thus braved, the council acted with greater moderation during the next sessions. It simply decreed that the consecrated lands should be marked out by pillars, and that the Amphissians should be warned to desist from its occupation. But this was of no avail. Encouraged by the hope of receiving succour from Athens and Thebes, the Amphissians attacked the deputies who came to set up the boundary, and prevented them from carrying their design into effect.

The Amphictyons now prepared for war. Either in the ordinary autumnal meeting at Thermopylae, B C 339, or that at Delphi in the spring of B C 338, summonses were issued to the various states to furnish their quota of troops, and many of these not being forthcoming, Philip was elected general of the Amphictyons, and requested to carry the decrees of the council into effect against Amphissa.

No arguments were required to persuade Philip to accept this invitation. He had recently returned from his Scythian expedition, and he quickly set out on his march towards the south, with the professed intention of waging war with Amphissa. As he passed through Thessaly his presence overawed all opposition, and he probably received all the reinforcements the country could afford. After he had crossed the ridge which separated the territory of the Epicnemidian Locrians from the vale of the Cephissus, his road passed by Elatea, the chief town in the east of Phocis, and so situate as to command the defiles which open to Phocis and Bœotia from the north. And now his design became manifest. Instead of proceeding westward, he took possession of Elatea, and began to repair its dismantled fortifications, which was an unequivocal sign that his views were directed toward Bœotia and Attica.

When the news of this event reached Athens, the prytanes were at table in the council-hall,

and the citizens enjoying the repose of the evening. On hearing it, the prytanes instantly rose and gave orders betokening a crisis of imminent danger. The market-place was cleared of the petty traders, the generals were summoned; and the trumpeter ordered to be in attendance, to call the people to a general assembly early in the morning. His attendance was not needed, for all were alarmed, and all waited impatiently for the morning. At daybreak the people flocked to the Pnyx, where the five hundred were already assembled, and the seats were soon crowded with a curious and anxious multitude. At length the council entered, and the bearer of the news was produced and made to repeat his story. A calm succeeded, and then followed the invitation of the herald: Who will speak? All were silent. The herald reiterated his question, but no one came forward, until, after another long pause, Demosthenes ascended the bema.

The great object of the speech which Demosthenes uttered on this occasion was, to disabuse the public mind of the suspicion that Philip was acting in concert with the Thebans, and to prove that it was their wisdom to cast aside all feelings of rivalry and hostility, and to conclude an alliance with that commonwealth. As a preliminary step, he advised that they should make a display of strength, which would encourage the friends of liberty at Thebes,—that, while their whole force, infantry and cavalry, should march out as far as Eleusis, ten ambassadors should be appointed to go to Thebes, whose language should be that of men who were not asking a favour, but conferring a benefit.

The proposal of the embassy was unanimously adopted. Five envoys were chosen, and the orator himself was one, with Hyperides, Mnesithedes, Democrates, and Callæchrus. These repaired to Thebes without delay, but they found an adverse embassy already there, composed of Macedonian and Thessalian ministers, with those of some other states, who demanded either the co-operation of the Thebans against Athens, or a free passage through Bœotia. Against these Demosthenes exerted his eloquence, and prevailed. The Thebans accepted the proffered alliance of Athens, and passed a decree inviting the Athenians to send their forces to their assistance. Their enthusiasm carried them even beyond this point. They admitted some Athenian succours into their city, thereby acknowledging the Athenians as guardians of their wives, children, and city.

The result of this negotiation caused Philip to change his operations. Not deeming it advisable to invade the Theban territory immediately, or to force his way into Attica, he resolved to strengthen himself with such reinforcements as he could obtain from Peloponnesus, and, in the meanwhile, to turn his arms against Amphissa. At the same time he sent envoys to negotiate a peace at Athens, which was indignantly refused. The temples of Athens were thrown open, sacrifices were offered, religious processions made, and the sound of war was heard on every hand. Nor was his application to his Peloponnesian allies much more successful. But few Peloponnesian auxiliaries joined him; for the envoys of Athens and Thebes were also

in the field, and counteracted his efforts, and even obtained a reinforcement from the Corinthians and Achæans to aid in the struggle against their common enemy.

When the Amphissians saw that war would be certainly waged against them, they sought assistance from Athens, and it appears that, through the influence of Demosthenes, a body of 10,000 mercenaries, who were at this juncture so much needed for Athens, were placed at their disposal. According to Polyænus, the Athenian and Theban generals, Chares and Proxenus, hoped to entangle Philip in the defiles leading to Amphissa, but that Philip drew them out of their position and defeated them, and made himself master of the city. On the other hand, Demosthenes passes over this disaster in silence, and speaks of two engagements in which the allied forces gained some advantage over Philip, sufficient to cause public rejoicings at Athens. However this may be, it would seem that Philip renewed his application to his Peloponnesian allies, and made another attempt at negotiation with Thebes, where his party, though it had been forced to yield, was still powerful, and might still be strengthened by bribes and persuasions. He made known to the Thebans his wish to avoid hostilities, and had not Demosthenes exerted all his powers of eloquence to prevent it, the popular cry would have been for peace. By his exertions, however, the Theban government was deterred from listening to Philip's overtures.

Although this danger was averted, it seems to have proved the necessity of risking a battle while yet the alliance subsisted. Another stroke of Philip's deep-laid policy might have dissolved it, for he had friends in every state, and rich treasures of gold in his coffers. Accordingly, the military council of the allies resolved to seek the enemy without delay, and when the Athenian forces next left the city, it was with a general expectation that it would be followed by a decisive engagement. It was with this intention that the allied forces, amounting nearly to 30,000 men, took up their position in the plain of Chæronea, whither Philip, having crossed the Boeotian frontier, advanced to meet them; his army consisting of 32,000 men.

While in the presence of each other, some omens were interpreted as unfavourable to the cause of the Greeks, but the only really adverse omen was, that they had neither a Pericles nor an Epaminondas at the head of their army. Thebes possessed no general of note except Theagenes, who proved a traitor, and the Athenian generals, Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles could inspire little confidence. It was against such generals as these that Philip, who was the most renowned captain of his day, had to contend, and the result was such as might have been expected. The Macedonian veterans proved victorious, and Greece was laid prostrate at the feet of Philip. More than 1,000 Athenians were left upon the field of battle, and above 2,000 taken prisoners: the loss was equally severe on the side of the Thebans; and the Sacred Band formed by Epaminondas was cut off to a man fighting on the spot on which they were posted. This battle was fought B.C. 338.

The event of the battle of Chæronea broke up the confederacy which had been formed against Philip, and each of the allied states was left at his mercy. Hence the consternation which prevailed at Athens when the tidings reached that city, and which was probably greater than had ever been known there, except after the loss of Ægos-potamia. Still, although individual instances of flight took place, and the orator Isocrates, now ninety-three years of age, was induced by it to put an end to his life by voluntary abstinence, Athens was not yet deserted by the ancient spirit which had borne her up under so many reverses. In the first dismay an assembly was summoned, and a decree passed, on the motion of Hyperides, directing a series of measures for the defence of the city. These measures were that the Five Hundred should go down in a body armed to Piræus, that the women, children, and sacred treasures, should be lodged there, that the generals should have power to exact the service of both citizens and foreigners to keep guard, and that the slaves should be emancipated, the resident aliens admitted to the franchise, and the citizens who had been degraded restored to their privileges. Soon after Demosthenes returned and carried a decree which assigned a sum of ten talents for the repairing of the walls, and for a new ditch and rampart, over which works he was appointed to superintend. They were carried on in a spirit of patriotic devotion. No hand was idle, no property spared the groves and olive-grounds supplied timber, the tonibs stones, and the temples arms. Demosthenes himself never exercised greater influence than in this season of alarm and distress, and although he had his enemies—men who accounted him the author of the calamity—and was assailed with repeated prosecutions, he passed triumphantly through all. Not long after, he received the most signal token that could be given of public confidence and esteem—he was chosen by his fellow-citizens to deliver the funeral oration over the ashes of those who fell at Chæronea.

It was, perhaps, this show of desperate resistance, combined with his artful policy, that induced Philip to treat his conquered enemies in a manner that excited general surprise. He dismissed his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and sent Antipater to bear the bones of their dead to Athens, with offers of peace on terms such as could not have been expected, and which were well calculated to disarm the hostility of the Athenians. Athens was required to resign a great part of her foreign possessions, but she was left in undisturbed possession of all her domestic resources, and her territory was enlarged by the addition of Oropus, which Thebes was forced to resign. These terms were gladly, if not thankfully, accepted by the Athenians, chiefly through the exertions of Demades, the orator, who had been taken in the battle and sent by Philip to aid in the negotiation, and Athens was thereby in effect annexed to the kingdom of Macedonia.

The value of the concessions to Athens was enhanced by comparison with the conditions of peace granted to Thebes. The sovereignty of all the Boeotian towns was taken from that state,

and she lost not only power, but freedom. A Macedonian garrison was placed in the citadel, and the exiles were restored, from whom a council of Three Hundred was selected, and invested with supreme authority both legislative and judicial. Thebes was thereby reduced to the dominion of Philip.

The Macedonian monarch now saw his way open to Peloponnesus, and he proceeded to Corinth. While here, Philip convened a congress, avowedly to settle the affairs of Greece, and to put an end to intestine feuds by the authority of a supreme council, but in reality for the purpose of projecting an enterprise against Persia. This congress was attended by envoys from every Greek state except contumacious Sparta, and all showed by their submissive conduct that Philip had effectually placed his yoke upon their necks. Every proposal that he made was adopted. War was declared against Persia, and Philip was chosen generalissimo of the united forces with which it was to be waged. Each state was to contribute its contingent of men and ships, according to the nature of its resources.

One object only now remained for Philip to effect while yet in Greece. He had before promised his Peloponnesian allies that he would make Sparta feel the effects of his displeasure, and her late contumacy confirmed him in this resolution. Accordingly he marched through Arcadia into Laconia. He was peacefully received in his route, and even the Elans, though they had not joined him at Cheronia, were induced, either by fear or resentment, to co-operate with him in this invasion. Archidamus, the king of Sparta, had recently been sent to the aid of Tarentum against the Lucanians, in Italy, where he had been slain, so that there was not a man among the Spartans capable of opposing Philip. He advanced, therefore, without meeting any enemies, ravaging the country as far as the sea-coast, near Gythium. It does not appear, however, that he made any attempt upon the capital, for his object was not to crush the power of Sparta—for it strengthened his own by the jealousy it inspired—but to humble it, and to secure his allies against its encroachments. And this seems to have been effected to the utmost. It is said that Sparta submitted to the terms he prescribed, and that he did not evacuate her territory before he had contracted its limits by concessions which he forced her to make to Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos. The three leading states of Greece, Athens, Thebes, and Sparta, were, therefore, effectually and finally humbled by the Macedonian monarch.

Having effected this last object, Philip pursued his march through Olympia and Elis. Success awaited him at every turn. The western states, beyond the isthmus, acknowledged his authority—the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party in Acarnania were driven into exile—Ambracia consented to receive a Macedonian garrison—and Byzantium entered into an alliance with the conqueror, which was but another term for subjection. Thus having overcome every obstacle, and having established his power on the surest foundation in every part of Greece, Philip returned to Macedonia, to prepare for the great enterprise which Isocrates had suggested, in order

to . . . which he saw were impending over his country. Greece acknowledged his sway, but Greece was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of Philip's insatiable ambition—Persia must be annexed to his empire, and the humbled Greeks must aid him in the enterprise! Such were his designs, but before his preparations were made Philip was assassinated, and the work devolved upon his son, Alexander, as predicted by the prophet. See Dan. vii. 5—8, and xi. 2—4*.

In every page of the history of Greece the workings of the fallen nature of man—ambition, envy, malice, revenge, subtlety, cruelty, and superstition, are disclosed. And all this, it must be remembered, took place in a land exalted above all others for civilisation—a land of poets, orators, and philosophers, whose pre-eminence for learning, refinement, and wisdom, is proverbial to this day. There Lycurgus, Solon, and Pericles gave laws, there Socrates, Plato, Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Zeno, Plutarch, Pythagoras, and Epaminondas taught ethics and morals—there Demosthenes and various other orators charmed the ears of the multitude with their harangues—there Homer, Æschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles breathed their classic songs. But all this availed not to correct the evil passions of fallen human nature. It rather deepened its corruption. The lawgivers legislated for war, the orators inflamed the evil passions of ambition and revenge, the philosophers were the blind leading the blind, and the poets sought to shed a halo of glory over deeds of rapine, slaughter, and vice. Among the many great minds which Greece produced, there was not one found able to redeem his country from oppression and wrong. Hence the people went on step by step in the path of moral turpitude, till the day of righteous retribution overtook them—till, as a nation, they were known no more.

Nor in this brief review of this section of Ancient History must the religion of Greece be forgotten. We learn from its baneful results how little mere human reason can effect. The very gods of Greece were made to minister to the evil passions of her sons and daughters. What wonder is it, therefore, that the stamp of final dissolution was indelibly marked on the fabric of Greek society? It seems to us that it would have been easy to have foreseen that internal divisions and unhallowed wars would work her ruin, yet it is remarkable that none of her sages appear to have reflected upon this, and that they should not have endeavoured to establish peace upon some surer foundation than their superficial treaties. The value of peace seems to be nominally acknowledged in the national institutions which were established to preserve unity and concord, and these might have been looked upon by the Greeks as so many beacons to warn them of the rock by which they were in danger of being shivered to pieces. Indeed, in the

* The preceding pages of this chapter must be considered only as a broad outline. For more ample details and full development of character the reader is again referred to the history of the Macedonians' life of Philip. The remaining portion of history, also, relating to Greece will be there found in the lives of his successors, for after the above events Greece became a section of the Macedonian monarchy.

earliest ages they might have had in such influence. But, as time rolled on, the veneration which the Greeks had for their national institutions began to wane; and these finally became in effect a dead letter. The passions by which they were swayed were of far greater force than the restraints put upon them by their institutions. The heart remained unaffected by them, and hence the universal exhibition of depravity throughout the coasts of Greece. Here lay the root of the evil. When the descendants of Javan entered Greece, they carried with them a fallen and corrupt nature, and in the lapse of ages that corruption increased. They had departed from the living God, and their descendants went still further astray, until

"Each city claim'd
Presiding deities, and built her fanes
For monuments imag'd out of monstrous thought,
Where dark pollution fed her secret ares"

But although the stamp of dissolution was set upon the fabric of society which the Greeks had in their wisdom erected, it is no less certain that it was dissolved under the direction of the Almighty Ruler of nations. The date thereof was marked in his word of prophecy. It was not the might and subtlety of Philip that subdued the once valorous sons of Greece to his sway. These

were but instruments rendered subservient to a righteous purpose. And that purpose was twofold—the subjugation of Greece, and then the destruction of that unwieldy and thrice-guilty empire, Persia, by the Macedo-Grecian power. Ages anterior to the date when "that old man eloquent," Isocrates, inflamed the ambition of Philip by pointing out this ample field wherein he might gain glory and renown, the voice of prophecy had pointed out "the kingdom of brass"—the "leopard with four wings and four heads"—the "swift he-goat from the west with a great horn"—the mighty "king of Grecia," Alexander, who should overthrow the king of Persia. The ambitious Philip may, therefore, be looked upon as a pioneer to prepare the way for the accomplishment of this great work. By his example he had excited the ambition of Alexander to undertake the conquest of Persia, and, by his conquests, had bequeathed him power adequate to his design. How harmoniously do the pages of ancient history agree with the word of God—that word which abideth for ever and ever! The fulfilment of past events, as predicted by the Scriptures, teems also with hope for the future—it is an earnest of the fulfilment of that prophecy which assures us that the world shall one day be governed by the Prince of peace, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

THE POLITY, NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, RELIGION, MANNERS AND CUSTOMS, ARTS, AND SCIENCES OF THE GREEKS.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE POLITY OF GREECE IN THE HEROIC AGES

THE GOVERNMENT.

THE form of government existing among the Greeks in the heroic ages was monarchical, the origin of which is ascribed, by Aristotle, to the free choice of the people, who first conferred the regal dignity on the man who had rendered some important service to the public by the introduction of new arts, by martial achievements, or who had collected a body of settlers, and had assigned to them portions of his own or of conquered lands. This latter supposition, however, carries us back to the very commencement of civil society, and hence is without historical foundation. It is, however, probable that the monarchical form of government arose from the patriarchal, with and without the warlike character of the heroic age, and that the royal houses may sometimes have been founded by wealthy and powerful strangers who had grown, by insensible degrees, into reputation and authority. That the nation was divided into several distinct bodies, each under a chief, may be gathered from the pages of Homer, wherein Nestor advises Agamemnon to marshal his army according to the larger or smaller bodies, in which families were collected, in these words —

“But now, O monarch! all thy chiefs advise,
Nor what they offer thou thyself despise
Among those counsels, let not mine be vain,
In tribes and nations to divide thy train
His separate troops let every leader call,
Each strengthen each, and all encourage all
What chief, or soldier, of the numerous band,
Or bravely fights, or ill obeys command,
When thus distinct they war, shall soon be known,
And what the cause of Ilion not o’erthrown,
If Fate resists, or if our arms are slow,
If gods above prevent, or men below.”

Not to be included in one of these tribes, was the mark of an outlaw. Thus Nestor, when Agamemnon, defeated before the walls of Troy, proposed to the Greeks to quit the siege and return to their country, is made to exclaim,—

“Cursed is the man, and void of law and right,
Unworthy property, unworthy light,
Unfit for public rule or private care,
That wretch, that monster, who delights in war,
Whose lust is murder, and whose horrid joy
To tear his country, and his kind destroy.”

It is probable that in the heroic ages these tribes and clans were regarded more as natural than political associations, and that, in a yet earlier period, the heads of each exercised a patriarchal rule over its members. It is also probable that the public sacrifices, which formed the bond of their union, were celebrated by the chief of the principal family, and that these priestly functions were one of the most ancient branches of the regal office. This seems to be borne out by the *Odyssey* of Homer, the third book of which represents Nestor and his sons sacrificing at Pylus to Neptune, Nestor being officiating priest. The persons to whom the priestly functions belonged would naturally assume regal dignity as occasion required, but the causes which determined the precedence of a particular family in each tribe and in a state, when several tribes were united into one body, may have been infinitely varied, and, generally speaking, beyond the reach of historical investigation.

The three main functions of the heroic kings, according to Aristotle, were the command in war, the performance of those sacrifices not appropriate to particular priests, and the administration of justice. It was from the first of these functions that they derived the greatest part of their power. Notwithstanding, that power was limited, of which fact the *Odyssey* furnishes innumerable proofs. The soldiers fought and

conquered under their leaders, but it was for themselves; and Ulysses, on many occasions, great and brave as he is represented to have been, puts himself on an equal footing with his followers. The same limited power is also observed in their judicial character. According to Homer, the heroic kings did not usually try causes alone; and in the representation of a trial, which fills one compartment in the shield of Achilles, no king appears to preside. The king only seems to have occupied the most distinguished place on these occasions, as when Telemachus, in the absence of Ulysses, convened an assembly in Ithaca, he took the seat in the market-place on his paternal throne, while the elders, or judges, reverently make way for him

"Now redd'ning from the dawn the morning ray
Glow'd in the front of his ash'n, and gave the day,
The youthful hero, with returning light,
Rose anxious from th' inq'ntude of night
A royal robe he wore with grateful pride,
A two edged falchion threat'nd by his side,
Embroider'd sandals glitter'd as he trod,
And forth he mov'd majestic as a god
Then, by his heralds, restless of delay,
To council calls the peers, the petulant boy
hoon, as in solemn form, the assembly sate,
From his high dome himself descends in state
Bright in his hand a pond'rous javelin shined,
Two dogs, a faithful guard, attend behind,
Pallas, with grace divine, his form improves,
And gazing crowds admire him as he moves
His father's throat he fill'd, while distant stood
The hoary peers, and aged wisdom bow'd"

In the scene presented on the shield of Achilles, the elders are seated on a ring of polished stones, which were ranged in a sacred circle in the market-place, and Telemachus and his peers must be conceived here to occupy such a circle, himself taking the seat of honour. From this scene it may be presumed that a ring of stones was a common and permanent ornament of the public places where all assemblies were held, and it marks the limits of the kingly power. From this it appears evident that the kings transacted no affairs in their judicial capacity without the authority and sanction of the chiefs. Even the multitude by whom they were surrounded on these occasions seem to have had influence by their clamours on all proceedings. Homer thus speaks of Ulysses as silencing the multitude —

"But if a clamorous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd, or tamed with blows
'Be still, thou slave, and to thy betters yield,
Unknown alike in council and in field!
Ye gods, what dastards would our host command!
Swept to a bar, the lumber of a land
Be silent, wretch, and think not here allow'd
That worst of tyrants, an usurping crowd
To one sole monarch Jove commits the sway
His are the laws, and him let all obey"
With words like these the troops Ulysses rild,
The loudest silenced, and the meekest cou'd"

Among the advantages arising from the kingly office, in the heroic ages, beyond those enumerated, were the domains, which, as they were originally the gift of the people, seemed to have been attached to the station. Thus Telemachus, who retained the domains of Ulysses in his absence, among other rights of the crown, is described as in danger of losing them should he

not be permitted to succeed his father. Presents for the administration of justice and voluntary contributions constituted other parts of the royal revenue, and the banquets to which the kings were invited are frequently noticed as a valuable and agreeable appendage to their station.

According to general usage, the crown was hereditary. This is confirmed by the circumstance of Ulysses reigning over Ithaca in the lifetime of his father Laertes, who had not sufficient vigour for maintaining the regal dignity. Peleus, king of Thessaly, also sank into a private station from the same cause, yielding the reins of government into the hands of his son, Achilles, who was superior to all the Greeks in valour and intrepidity. From this it may be inferred that the king's legal prerogatives were but feeble restraints on the independence of the nobles—if they were not supported by personal qualities,—by valour, prudence, vigour, and, above all, munificence.

Heeren says the preservation of the dignity of a king required an almost unbounded hospitality. His house was the place of assembly for persons of the upper class, who almost always sat at table with him. To turn away strangers who asked for shelter would have been an unexampled outrage, as we learn from Menelaus' reproach of Etoneus, for proposing to send the strangers elsewhere —

"Insenate! with a sigh the king replies
Too long, misjudging, have I thought these wist
But sure relentless folly averts thy breast,
Obdurate to reject the stranger guest,
To those dear hospitable rites a foe,
Which, in my wand'rings, oft relieved my woe
Fed by the bounty of another's board,
I all pitying Jove my native realm restored—
Straight be the courses from the ear released,
Conduct the youths to graze the genial feast"

ODYSSEY

This circumstance recalls to mind the apostle's injunction—"Be not forgetful to entertain strangers," and affords a fine lesson on the rites of hospitality.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

The same simplicity which regulated the political system of the Greeks maintained their civil rights. The word answering to *law* does not occur in the pages of Homer, nor are there any allusions which would justify the supposition that the Greeks, in those early ages, ever met in assembly for the purpose of legislation. Every right, human and divine, was fixed by usage, confirmed and expounded by judicial decisions, and, generally speaking, the judges had no guide but principles of natural equity.

"The state," says Thirlwall, "does not appear to have interfered in private differences, unless the parties agreed to submit their cause to a public tribunal." A circumstance expressly mentioned in the description of the trial in the shield of Achilles. The whole community, however, was interested in suppressing quarrels which threatened to disturb the public peace, whence those who had suffered a wrong were compelled to accept the compensation, established by cus-

tom, from the aggressor. The prosecution of murderers belonged to the relations of the deceased, but even their vengeance might be redeemed at a stipulated price. Thus Ajax blames the obstinacy of Achilles for refusing such compensation for an affront, as a man sometimes accepted for the murder of a son or a brother.—

“Stern and unpitying’ If a brother bleed,
On just atonement we remit the dead,
A sire the slaughter of his son forgives,
The price of blood discharged, the murderer lives
The haughtiest hearts at length their rage resign,
And gifts can conquer ev’ry soul but thine
The gods that unrelenting breast have steel’d,
And cursed thee with a heart that cannot yield.”
ILIAD

If the resentment of relatives, however, was too violent to admit of such composition, they were entitled to the assistance of all the members of their tribe, who either punished the murderer with death, or compelled him to leave the society. Herodotus says that the manslayer withdrew sometimes into a foreign land, as was the practice among the Lydians and Phrygians, and did not return to his country till he had been purified by some expiatory rite. Homer notices this species of exile, and ancient legends describe a voluntary servitude as part of the expiation. To the person of the fugitive, a kind of sanctity appears to have been attached. Unlike the case of Cain, upon whom his brethren looked with horror, it was deemed almost sacrilege to refuse him shelter.

Offences against the community appear to have been of rare occurrence, and it was only in extraordinary cases that they were visited with capital punishment. When this happened, in order to avoid the pollution of bloodshed, they buried the criminal alive, with a small portion of food at his side—a usage which was followed by the Roman vestals. For great public offences they buried the offender under a heap of stones, and victims devoted to propitiate the anger of the gods were hurled headlong from some mountain precipice.

The same indefinite principles were observable in the mutual dealings of independent states. Thus piracy was everywhere an honourable occupation, and though restitution was sometimes demanded, in the name of a state, for piratical aggressions which injured persons of high station, if the sufferers were of inferior rank they appear to have been left to right themselves as they could. Sometimes these aggressions led to war between different states, and to retaliation by sudden inroads into the aggressor’s territory. Thus Nestor performed his first feat of arms by retaliating upon the Eleans for a predatory attack upon Pylus. The bond of brotherhood seems to have been slender indeed, it was only occasionally that they regarded each other’s rights, or when two states were not only in peace with each other, but in alliance or intimate amity. Individuals were by no means restrained from attacking the members of another community between which and their own no declared hostility had existed. The strong seemed to consider it right to prey upon the weak, when they

could do so with impunity. Hence it was that among the Greeks in the heroic age, as in general throughout the East, a numerous progeny was esteemed a blessing. Such was always a powerful family, and it could not only do justice to itself but injure others, if unanimously so inclined.

These usages show the ideas of the Greeks concerning criminal jurisdiction to have been rude and imperfect, and the result was cruelty, violence, and oppression. The present manners of the East are precisely the same, for, while bodily strength and courage decide most conquests, craft, cunning, and surprise, are the legitimate weapons of the weak against the strong. The ancient and modern history of the East, indeed, is a continued scene of bloodshed and treachery. It exhibits man in a state of nature, and, as Scripture represents him in that state, working “evil from his youth.”

REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE DUTIES OF DOMESTIC LIFE

The history of the manners of a people is inseparably connected with their laws and institutions, and with reference to the Greeks in the heroic ages, we shall find, in the present section, much that is pleasing and interesting, blended with much that is revolting. In their manners indeed, the national character is most clearly unfolded.

There was much simplicity displayed in the respect which the stronger sex paid to the weaker. Before marriage, young persons saw each other only in public, and at a distance, except on the occasion of a festival. Then, as we learn from the *Iliad*, they met together promiscuously, still retaining their proverbial simplicity, which at a later period gave way to licentiousness.

The simplicity of the heroic way of life frequently drew the maiden out of doors, to discharge offices afterwards confined to slaves. It was deemed no degradation for a young princess to carry her urn to a fountain. Thus, in the *Odyssey*, the wandering Ulysses is represented as meeting the daughter of Antiphates, king of *Æolus*, on the margin of “*Artacia’s silver streams*,” whether she had come for water, in the same manner as Jacob met Rachel, the daughter of Laban, and Moses the daughters of Reuel, priest, or prince of Midian. It was to an occasion still more homely, according to European ideas, that Ulysses is represented as owing his first meeting with the daughter of the opulent king of Phœacia, a country famed for luxury and industry. Young, beautiful, and high-born as she was, she went with her maids, in a carriage drawn by mules, to a sequestered fountain to wash the clothes of her family. Young women of the highest quality appear to have attended on the guests of their parents.

Marriage was considered a necessary step to the attainment of domestic felicity, and the institution of marriage was ascribed by tradition to the bounty of the gods. The father disposed of the maiden’s hand, but it does not appear that the marriage contract was considered as a bargain

or sale; presents were interchanged, which were probably proportioned on both sides to the means of the parties. If wealth and rank were not sufficient to recommend a suitor, strength, courage, and dexterity in sports and manly exercises, were oftentimes made the qualification, and these qualities were often tried by a public competition, or by undertaking some difficult adventure, of which we find corresponding instances in Scripture. Thus Othniel undertook the conquest of Kirjath-sepher, in order to obtain the hand of Achah, daughter of Caleb, and Saul offered his daughter, with the freedom of his father's house, to the man who should slay Goliath (See Judg. 1. 12, and 1 Sam. xvii. 25.)

Adultery was considered as a crime of the deepest dye, and is always mentioned with the same horror as murder. Death was the punishment awarded to this crime, but this was frequently avoided by voluntary banishment, and sometimes the guilty party purchased impunity. In many cases the crime was avenged by the tribe which had received the injury. If the wife was unfaithful, her friends were bound to restore what they had received, and if the wife, or widow, was compelled without fault to return to her father's house, she was entitled to the portion she had brought her husband.

There are many pleasing pictures in the pages of Homer of maiden simplicity, filial tenderness, and conjugal devotion, which command respect and admiration. They may be overwrought, but it cannot be doubted that they have their foundation in truth, and they clearly show that female purity was held in high estimation. The same inference may, indeed, be deduced from those instances recorded in the same pages of shameless impudence, though they are surrounded by much glitter of sentiment, which would seem to favour vice. Bad women have in truth, Homer's utmost reprobation, as in the case of Clytemnestra. His sentiments, however, in favour of virtue in the female character sink into insignificance when compared with the sublime ideas discovered in Scripture.

"Who can find a virtuous woman?
 Far her price is far above rubies.
 The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her,
 So that she will have no need of spoil,
 She will do him good, and not evil,
 All the days of her life." *Prov. xxxi. 10-12*

In the heroic ages females enjoyed more freedom, and communicated more in business among men, than has been usual in those eastern countries in subsequent ages. Thus, in the *Iliad*, both Helen and Andromache are represented frequently in company with the Trojan chiefs, and entering freely into their conversations. Both Homer's eloquent eulogues and Hesiod's biting sarcasms prove females to have been important members of society among the Greeks in the heroic ages. They were far more so in these ages than at Athens in the flourishing times of the commonwealth. The wife was generally considered a housewife and nothing more. "Even the sublime Andromache," says Heeren, "after that parting which will draw tears as long as there are eyes to weep and hearts to feel, is sent

back to the apartments of the women, to superintend the labours of the maidservants.—

The soften'd chief with kind compassion view'd,
 And dried the falling drops, and thus pursued —
 'Andromache! my soul's far better part,
 Why with untimely sorrows heaves thy heart!
 No hostile hand can antedate my doom,
 Till fate condemns me to the silent tomb
 Fix'd is the term of all the race of earth,
 And such the hard condition of our birth,
 No force can then resist, no flight can save,
 All sink alike, the fearful and the brave,
 No more—but hasten to thy tasks at home,
 There guide the spindle and direct the loom "'

ILIAD

The simplicity of the ancient Greeks was equally remote from the tyranny of savages, which condemns females to servitude, and the refinement of luxury and vice, which regards them as mere instruments of pleasure. The equal rights of the sexes produced the most delicate affections. Hence those moving scenes, delineated by Homer, of domestic felicity, and anxious solicitude of tender love, and painful message of separation, manifested by the Greeks.

The sentiments of parental affection were proportionably as strong and ardent as those of conjugal love. The offspring of the Greeks in the heroic ages exhibit patterns of filial duty. The reverence of children for their parents, indeed, approached their veneration for the gods. The most violent and impetuous heroes submitted without reluctance to the severest dictates of paternal authority. Even in concerns that might seem to affect themselves alone, they relinquished their inclinations, disavowed their own wills, and committed all to the wisdom and goodness of their parents. The same filial respect was also shown to the aged; and even among brothers, nearly of the same age, the younger yielded to the elder, and it was an acknowledged principle of religion, that the Furies defended by their authority the sacred rights of superior years. This pleasing trait in their character has ever been observable in the nations of the East from the patriarchal ages to the present day. In Scripture there are many pleasing instances on record of a more exalted nature than can be found in the Homeric pages, as the conduct of Isaac to Abraham, and of Jacob, and even the erring Esau to Isaac. All acknowledged, and bowed their heads submissively to parental authority.

One of the noblest traits in the Greek character, both in the heroic ages and in later times, was the readiness with which it lent itself to contract friendships. The heroic companions, celebrated by Homer and by tradition, seem to have had but one heart and soul, with scarcely a wish or an object apart, and to have lived, as they were always ready to die, for one another. Such were the friendships of Hercules and Iolans, of Theseus and Pirithous, of Orestes and Pylades; and the argument of the *Iliad* chiefly turns on the affection of Achilles for Patroclus. All these illustrate the sentiment of Aristotle, that "Friendship is one mind in two bodies."

Hospitality is another fine trait in the Greek character. In the unsettled state of society of the early ages every stranger was looked upon

as an enemy or a guest ; but if he threw himself on those among whom he came, no other title was requisite to insure him the rites of hospitality. Whenever a traveller appeared at the threshold of a princely hall, the only anxiety of the master of the house was, lest he should have been kept waiting at his gate. No questions were asked concerning his business until he had partaken of the best cheer, and then the inquiries implied friendly curiosity rather than distrust. When Telemachus arrived at Pylus by sea, after he had partaken of a banquet, Nestor interrogated whether he was voyaging with any fixed object, or as a pirate. If the stranger was a suppliant, he was regarded with still greater respect "he was looked upon as a brother," as Alcemon observed to Ulysses. Another motive for observing the laws of hospitality mentioned by Homer was, that the gods sometimes visited mankind in the likeness of strangers. Of Ulysses it is said, when he appeared "wandering poor" at his own court, where, being unknown, he was despised.—

—"In this low disguise

Wanders, perhaps, some inmate of the skies
This—curious oft of mortal actions—deign,
In forms like these, to round the earth and main,
Just and unjust recording in their mind,
And with sure eyes inspecting all mankind."

A somewhat similar and a just idea, because founded in truth, is discovered in the apostle Paul's sublime injunction to the Hebrew converts "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers for thereby some have entertained angels unawares," Heb. xiii. 2.

If the suppliant could seat himself at the hearth his person was deemed sacred, and it was looked upon as impiety to reject his request. There are many such instances on record, which sometimes led to a close connexion between families and states, which was transmitted throughout many generations. The ties of hospitality which subsisted between the houses of an Argive and a Lycian chief are represented as of sufficient force to restrain them from conflict, though they were before personally unknown to each other. An interchange of armour ratified an agreement thenceforward to shun each other's path in battle.

Hospitality was not confined to the opulent among the Greeks. While the wealthy Axylus kept open house by the way-side, Eumæus, the humble servant of Ulysses, speaks of the relief which he afforded to the wanderer as an object of the first importance, next to providing for his own wants. None but shameless and impious men ever treated the poor and destitute with disrespect, for it appears to have been a prevalent opinion that the gods were ever watching to avenge such wrongs.

Slaves appear to have been generally well treated. This is observable in the kindness shown by Laertes and his wife to their domestics:—

"To him the king —' Reciting thus thy cares,
My secret soul in all thy sorrow shares —
But one choice blessing, such as Jove's high will,
His sweeten'd all thy bitter draught of ill,
Tera from thy country, to no hapless end,
The gods have, in a master, given a friend.

Whatever frugal nature needs is thine,
(For she needs little,)—daily bread and wine."*
ODYSSEY

It is true Ulysses punished the wantonness of his slaves; but even his severity implies that their condition demanded a regard which they could only forfeit by misconduct.

In this particular the Greeks, afford a lesson to Christian masters and mistresses. The laws of the country prevent their laying violent hands upon servants, but it is not alone in corporal punishment that humanity suffers. Unkind words often strike home to the heart, and haughty airs convey to the mind of a servant that sense of degradation which makes servitude become a bitter yoke. Let such masters reflect that they "also have a Master in heaven."

The temperance of the Greeks, in the heroic ages, as to drinking, forms a striking contrast to the intemperance of their posterity. Their fare, and that in the houses of the great, was of the most simple kind, as seen in the description which Homer gives of the banquet of Alcemon. This consisted of sheep, hogs, and oxen, which were slaughtered for the occasion. After the cravings of nature had been satisfied, the bowls were replenished with wine, and libations poured out to the gods, but the glories of the feast did not depend on a lengthened carouse: its chief ornaments were the song and the dance. It is remarkable, that Homer, in all the accounts which he gives of convivial meetings, only once makes express mention of drunkenness, and then the anecdote is a forcible lesson to deter from that vice, showing, by a terrible example, that persons of the highest rank and most respectable character, if they yield to intemperance, reduce themselves for the time to a level with the lowest and most profligate, and become liable to every indignity. Even the suitors, who are continually feasting at the table of the absent Ulysses, are never represented as drinking to excess, and among the abusive epithets which the enraged Achilles applies to Agamemnon, the most bitter and reproachful is the charge of drunkenness.

Notwithstanding these amiable traits in the character of the Greeks, they were fierce in anger, and, as enemies, ruthless. They were, however, rather resentful than vindictive, and though easily provoked, they were as easily appeased. Even for deep injuries they were frequently willing to accept compensation. Still, so long as their resentment lasted, it overpowered every other feeling, and they rushed furiously into the most mad excesses. Even the great Ulysses is represented as having lain in wait with a companion in the dark to assassinate a person who had sought to deprive him of his share in the booty brought from Troy. This violent feeling exhibited itself more strongly in battle. Quarter was never given to a foe, unless with a prospect of ransom, whence Agamemnon reproached Menelaus with softness when he was on the point of sparing a fallen enemy, and he himself slew the suppliant. Nor

* In these lines may be discovered the germ of a celebrated couplet —

"Man wants but little here below,
Nor wants that little long" GOLDSMITH.

did their hostility end at this point. The dead body frequently became the object of an obstinate struggle, and it was not unfrequently mutilated. Thus Achilles offered indignities to the body of Hector, as Hector himself had intended to have done to the corpse of Patroclus. Juno is represented as addressing Achilles thus —

"Rise, son of Peleus! rise, divinely brave!
Assist the combat, and Patroclus save
For him the slaughter to the field they spread,
And fall, by mutual wounds, around the dead
To drag him back to Troy the foe contends
Nor with his death the rage of Hector ends
A pry to dogs he dooms the corpse to lie,
And marks the place to fix his head on high
Rise and prevent, if yet you value fame
Thy friend's disgrace, thy own eternal shame!"

ILIAD

It is mentioned as a rare occurrence, and as a mark of respect paid by Achilles to Eetion, that, after slaying him he had abstained from mutilating his remains, and honoured them with funeral rites.

The fate of a captured city was still more dreadful than that of a fallen foe. Every man capable of bearing arms was slain, and the women and children were divided among the victors as slaves. The evils of slavery were often aggravated by the members of a family being scattered over distant quarters of a foreign land.

The sanctuaries of the gods, however, sometimes afforded an asylum from the rage of the conquerors. For instance, Maro, the priest of Apollo, was saved with his family, when the Ciconians of Ismarus were destroyed by Ulysses. Notwithstanding, he was required to pay a ransom.

The revenge displayed by the Greeks exhibits a very awful picture of human nature. Even Homer, although he has adorned its foul displays with the trappings of poetry, is constant in his reprehensions of their conduct. War itself has called forth the indignant denunciations of the poet. While he sung the feat of arms, he saw the evils attendant on war—that it called revenge and cruelty from the innermost recesses of the human heart. If, therefore, this heathen poet lifted up his voice against war, how ought Christians to deprecate it, and to pray for that day when its sound shall no more be heard in the world, when mankind shall have rest under the sceptre of the Prince of peace.

The belief in some superior beings, and the adoption of certain rites of worship, invocations, and sacrifices, prevailed generally through the heathen world. The Greeks especially were fruitful in the invention of deities, and in devising religious rites and ceremonies. What the apostle Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, said of the ancient pagans generally, is peculiarly applicable to them:—"Professing themselves to be wise they became fools." The mythology, indeed, connected with the rites and ceremonies of the Greeks, affords a melancholy picture of human folly, and is a fearful proof of the departure of mankind from original righteousness.

Among the Greeks there never was a distinct caste of priests, nor even a separate order of

priesthood. Nevertheless, they had a religion of the initiated, the mysteries of which were as ancient as the popular religion. Each must be considered by itself before any general conclusion can be drawn respecting the influence of religion on the character of the Greeks.

The popular religion of the Greeks consisted in a belief in superhuman beings—in the influence exercised by them over the destinies of mortals—on the fear of offending them—and on the custom of worshipping them. The origin of these deities has been a subject of much inquiry. The priests of Dodona informed Herodotus that the Hellenes received their gods from the Pelasgians, while the Pelasgians, who at first worshipped their gods without giving them particular names, took the names of their divinities from the Egyptians. This account is very contradictory, and as unsatisfactory as the assertion which he afterwards makes—that to Hesiod and Homer belongs the invention of the Grecian theogony. To suppose Homer or Hesiod to have been the authors of the theology and mythology contained in their poems, would be as unreasonable as to imagine that they first taught the Greeks to read and write. It is more reasonable to suppose that they introduced into their poems, by way of machinery and with poetical decorations, theological legends, contrived in more rude and ignorant times, and sanctified by hoary age. Nevertheless, it was so. The works of Homer were probably written many years before those of Hesiod, and belong to totally different classes. In the poems of Homer the history of the gods is only introduced incidentally, while the design of Hesiod's Theogony is to relate their origin, and that of the world. His work contains a series of rude speculations on the universe, in which its several parts are personified, and the order of their production represented under the figure of successive generations. And this was evidently not the fruits of his own invention. Although his poems breathe "the firstlings of Greek philosophy," they are but the echoes of an earlier and deeper strain, or, in other words, the transcript of long told legend. This truth is stamped indelibly upon his pages, as may be seen from the following extract, wherein he describes the various gods said to have been produced by Night —

"Now darksome Night fruitful begun to prove
Without the knowledge of connubial love,
From her black womb sad destiny and fate—
Death, sleep, and num rous dream, derive their date
With Momus the dark goddess to us again,
And Care, the mother of a doleful train,
The Hesperides she bore, far in the seas,
Guarda of the golden fruit and fertile trees
From the same parent sprung the rigorous three,
The goddesses of fate and destiny,
Clotho and Lachesis, whose boundless sway,
With Atropos, both men and gods obey,
To human race, they, from their birth, ordain
A life of pleasure, or a life of pain,
To slavery or to empire, such their power,
They fix a mortal at his natal hour,
The crimes of men and gods the Fates pursue,
And give to each alike the vengeance due,
Nor can the greatest their resentment fly,
They punish ere they lay their anger by
And Nemesis from the same fountain rose,
From hurtful Night herself the source of woes,
Hence fraud and loose desire, the bane of life,
Old age, vexations, and corroding strife."

The truth appears to be, that the Greeks derived their notions of some of their gods from Egypt, the inhabitants of which country were proverbially superstitious, while the greater part were the creations of their own fancy. Left in the darkness of human nature, they knew not the ONE TRUE GOD, and hence they sought for imaginary deities in his works. The earth, the skies, the ocean, rivers, storms, and other surprising natural objects, excited the sentiments of religious awe in their bosoms. They discovered deities on every hand, although for a long time they were probably not distinguished by name, from the objects in which they supposed they saw their presence. Thus Agamemnon, in calling on the gods to witness a solemn contract, mentions none by name but Jupiter of Olympus after him he invoked the all-seeing, all-hearing sun, and the rivers, earth, and lastly the gods who punished perjured men in the realms below. It is probable that ages elapsed before appropriate names were given to their gods, and though the genius of Homer, and especially of Hesiod, may have contributed to that end, they certainly were not the founders of the gods of Greece. Sages and poets alike contributed to that wild and disjointed mythology, which nourished a blind and gross superstition, and whence Greece has been aptly termed the "land of false gods." It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the religion of the Greeks was, in the main, "home-sprung."

In conformity to the view here taken, Thirlwall observes, "it is probable that the deities of the earliest Pelasgian period were those whose presence and power appeared to be displayed in the operations of nature, and that as the aspects of nature, and consequently the conceptions formed of the gods, differed widely in different regions, so in each region it might be long before the spheres of the several deities were fixed, and their characters and attributes determined." It is, perhaps, to this period that Herodotus refers when he speaks of the "nameless gods" of the Pelasgians. To them appears to have belonged the task of distinguishing the provinces and functions of the divine agents. Still, two important steps remained in the formation of the Greek mythology first, that by which the invisible powers were brought down from their spheres, and clothed in human form, and second, that by which the local deities of the several tribes were reconciled and united into one family.

The Pierian Thracians appear to have been the people in whose poetry Olympus was first celebrated as the common seat of the gods, hence the greater share in the process of combination and adjustment may probably be ascribed to them. It appears, however, to have been in the heroic age that the principle of personification was most active in exhibiting the gods in human shape, and in drawing them forth from obscurity into familiar intercourse with mankind. And, as regards the religious character of the Greeks, this may be considered as a line of demarcation between the earlier and the heroic period.

Plato records an ancient tradition, well deserving notice "Once," says he, "it was re-

ported that one God governed the universe, but a great and extraordinary change taking place in the nature of men and things, infinitely for the worse—for originally there was perfect virtue and perfect happiness upon earth—the command devolved upon Jupiter, who had many inferior deities, to preside over different departments under him." This change in human nature, and in the state of all things on earth, is darkly defined by Hesiod, in his "Works and Days." Thus, his Golden age, which is foreign to all Grecian history, bears remarkable analogy to the Scripture account of the terrestrial paradise, and the state of man before the fall.—

"Soon as the deathless gods were born, and man,
A mortal race, with voice and endow'd began,
The heavenly powers from high their work beheld,
And the first age they style an age of gold
Men spent a life like gods in Saturn's reign,
Nor felt the rugged and the narrow body pain,
From labour free, the careless sense enjoy
Nor could the ill of time their peace destroy
In banquet they delight, removed from care,
Nor troublesome old age intrudeth there
They die, or rather seem to die, they seem
From hence to be transported in a pleasing dream
The fields as yet untill'd, their fruits afford,
And full and sumptuous and ununsat'd board
Thus crown'd with happiness the happy day,
Serene and joyful pass'd their lives away."

The Silver age of Hesiod is no less remarkably consonant with the Scripture account of the antediluvian world after the fall of Adam—

"Worse than the first, a second age appears,
Which the Celestials call the silver years
The golden age's virtues are no more,
Nature grows weaker than she was before,
In strength of body most is much decay,
And human wisdom seems to fade away
A hundred scars the cruel daimon's employ,
Before they form'd to man the unpolish'd boy,
Who, when he reach'd his bloom, his age a prime
Found measure'd off by his joys, but short his time
Man prone to ill, denud the gods their due,
And by their follies made their days but few
The altars of the best neglected stand,
Without the offerings which the laws demand,
But angry Jove in dust this people laid,
Because no honours to the gods they paid."

In his description of the third race of men, called the Brazen age, Hesiod comes home to his own country, and represents the state of things of which Plutarch has given a minute account in his life of Theseus—

"And now a third, a brazen people rise,
Unlike the former, men of monstrous size
Strong arms extensive from their shoulders grow,
Their limbs of equal magnitude below,
Fierce in arms, and dreadful at the spear,
They live injurious and devoid of fear
On the cruelest flesh of beasts they feed alone,
Savage their nature, and their hearts of stone,
Their houses brass of brass the warlike blade,
Iron was yet unknown, in brass they trade
Furious, robust, impatient for the fight—
War is their only care and sole delight—
To the dark shades of death their race descend,
By civil discords—an ignoble end!
Strong though they were, death quell'd their boasted might,
And forced their stubborn souls to leave the light."

It was in this "brazen age" that the gods of Greece became so multiplied "that nobody any longer undertook to say how many there were

not." Beside Juno, Vesta, and Themis, which were added to the principal divinities derived from the banks of the Nile, every Grecian mountain acquired its Oreades, every wood its Dryads, every fountain its Naiads, the sea its Triton and its Nereides, and every river its god. The variety of the seasons were likewise made to produce the hours, and the Muses and the Graces had their origin in the genius of the people.

The attributes of the gods of Greece are a strange compound of majesty and weakness. Even Jupiter, before whose tremendous nod all the inferior gods and goddesses are made to bow as he sat upon his Olympian throne, is not omnipotent, omnipresent, or omniscient. He is also described as being under the control and the protection of Fate, as apprehending danger from the inferior deities, as being subject to various weaknesses, and as liable to be overcome by passion. Atë, the goddess of mischief, was said to be his eldest daughter, and the inferior deities are represented as being more disposed to disturb than assist his government. His strength alone gained him reverence, otherwise they would have confederated against him, and have hurled him from his mountain-throne. Fear of the thunders with which he shook the air, and the lightnings which he wielded as the instruments of his wrath, were the only means by which he kept them in subjection.

Thirlwall has drawn the following picture of the synod of gods, who were said to have kept their court on the summits of Olympus — "The Olympian deities are assembled round Jupiter as his family, in which he maintains the dignity of a patriarchal king. He assigns their several provinces, and controls their authority. Their combined efforts cannot give the slightest shock to his power, nor retard the execution of his will, and hence their waywardness, even when it incurs his rebuke, cannot ruffle the serenity of his soul. The tremendous nod with which he confirms his decrees can neither be revoked nor frustrated. As his might is irresistible, so is his wisdom unsearchable. He holds the golden balance in which are poised the destinies of nations and of men. From the two vessels that stand at his threshold he draws the good and evil gifts that alternately sweeten and embitter mortal existence. The eternal order of things, the ground of the immutable succession of events, is his, and therefore he himself submits to it. Human laws derive their sanction from his ordinance, earthly kings receive their sceptres from his hand, he is the guardian of social rights, he watches over the fulfilment of contracts and the observance of oaths, and he punishes treachery, arrogance, and cruelty. The stranger and the suppliant are under his peculiar protection, the fence that incloses the family dwelling is in his keeping, and he avenges the denial and the abuse of hospitality.

"Yet even this greatest and most glorious of beings, as he is called, is subject, like other gods, to passion and frailty, for, though secure from dissolution, though surpassingly beautiful and strong, and warmed with a purer blood than fills the veins of men, their heavenly frames are not insensible to pleasure and pain, they need the refreshment of ambrosial food, and inhale a

grateful savour from the sacrifices of their worshippers. Their other affections correspond to the grossness of their animal appetites. Capricious love and hatred, anger and jealousy, often disturb the calm of their bosoms, the peace of the Olympian state might be broken by factions, and even by conspiracies formed against its chief. He himself cannot keep perfectly aloof from their quarrels. He occasionally wavers in his purpose, is overruled by artifice, blinded by desire, and hurried by resentment into unseemly violence. The relation in which he stands to fate is not uniformly represented in the Homeric poems, and probably the poet had not formed a distinct notion on that point. Fate is generally described as emanating from his will, but sometimes he appears to be no more than the minister of a stern necessity, which he wishes in vain to elude."

Such are the heterogeneous materials of which the Greeks, blinded in their imaginations, have created the chief of their gods. He is represented after their own likeness. Some attributes assigned to the gods are superior to any with which mankind are endowed, but these fall infinitely short of the idea of a perfect being—which a being, to be a god, must be. The Bible alone unfolds to us the true nature of deity, -- holy, just, and good, without any admixture of evil.

Equally erroneous were the conceptions of the Greeks as to the dealings of the gods with mankind. They conceived the inhabitants of Olympus accessible to prayer, but no invariable rule was ascertained for securing their favour. They knew of no mediator between them and mankind. A hero of the most exalted virtue was supposed to be liable to the persecution of a god innocently provoked. Pride and insolence were represented as generally odious to them, and an open affectation of independence and equality was a crime which they seldom failed to visit with signal punishment. A long course of prosperity was sufficient to rouse their envy of the man whom it brought too near to them in point of resemblance, though he might bear his fortunes meekly. No quality was so pleasing to them as pious munificence, and no actions so meritorious in their sight as the observances that related to their service.

The distinguishing attribute of the gods of Greece was vengeance. Even the twelve divinities of superior rank, who presided over the active principles of the universe and the leading virtues of the mind, were subject to the unrelenting power of vengeance, and the Fates are represented as pursuing the crimes both of men and gods, and never ceasing from their wrath till they had inflicted just punishment on the guilty sons of earth and heaven. The certainty of their vengeance was firmly established in the Grecian creed, and its operation was supposed to be so immediate and palpable, that it was impossible for men to overlook or elude its force. The "god vindictive" is an expression every where discovered in the Homeric page. The daring violations of the sacred law were supposed to be speedily overtaken by manifestations of Divine displeasure. Judgments inflicted on guilty communities were so familiar to the minds

of men, that Homer introduces them by way of similes.—

"Not with less noise, with less impetuous force,
The tide of Trojans urge their desperate course,
Than when in autumn Jove his tempest pours,
And earth is laden with incessant showers,
(When gull's mortals break their martial laws,
Or judges, bribed, betray the righteous cause.)
From their deep beds he bids the rivers rise,
And opens all the flood-gates of the skies.
The impetuous torrents from their hills obey,
While fields are drowned, and mountains swept away.
Loud roars the deluge till it meets the main,
And trembling man sees all his labours vain!"

Every important event, prosperous or adverse, which happened to individuals or nations, appeared to the Greeks as either the reward of virtue, or the punishment of vice. The merit of the father also, was frequently acknowledged in the protection of the son, and the crimes of a guilty progenitor were often visited on his descendants. Thus Minerva is represented as protecting Iphimachus on account of the merit of his father Ulysses, and in the tragedies of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, the misfortunes of the royal families of Thebes and Argos are described as visitations of Divine vengeance for the sins of their parents.

Homer's description of the office of the Fates, or Furies, is painted with terrific grandeur. Their very dwelling-place, which was in the depths of the invisible world, is made an object of horror to the blessed gods, whose residence was in the eternal sunshine of Olympus. From this abode of darkness they went forth to execute their work of retribution on all who dishonoured age, rebelled against parental authority,—on those guilty of perjury, and all offences proscribed by public opinion. In this work they were represented as inexorable, which may have acted as a wholesome check to the levity which the capricious government of the Olympian gods tended to encourage, for, as it has been observed, it would have served little purpose to oppose salutary laws to the licence of barbarians, without guarding those laws by powerful sanctions.

The idea of retribution was almost wholly connected with this life. Homer looked upon man as composed of soul and body, but represents the latter as void of life without the former, and the former as having no strength without the latter. Hence, when he speaks of the death of his heroes, he consigns their souls to Hades, or "the invisible," while their bodies remain a prey to dogs and birds of prey. It is true that Hercules is said to enjoy the banquets of the immortal gods, while his shade is among the dead, but it is inferred that his virtue had been rewarded with an imperishable body and a divine soul.

Funeral rites were not accounted a necessary condition of the entrance of the soul into Hades, but it is represented as not enjoying any rest there till they had been performed. From this belief it was, that Priam made such desperate efforts to recover the corpse of Hector, even descending to kneel before Achilles, his destroyer, to implore his restoration. The shade of Patroclus, in accordance with this belief, is made to appear to Achilles as he slumbered on the sea-shore after the funeral feast, and to address him thus.—

"And sleeps Achilles—thus the phantom said—
Sleeps my Achilles, his Patroclus dead!
Living I seem'd his dearest, tenderest care,
But now forgot, I wander in the air
Let my pale corpse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below.
Till then the spirit finds no resting place,
But here and there th' unbidden specter chace
The vagrant dead around the dark abode,
To burrow to cross the irremovable flood
No give thy hand for to the further shore
When once we pass, the soul returns no more
When once the first funeral flames ascend,
No more shall meet Achilles and his friend—

Hear then, and as in fate and love we join,
Ah, suffer that my bones may rest with thine
Together I've we lived together died,
One house received us, and one table fed
That gods in us thy goddess mother gave
May mix our ashes in one common grave."

The immortality assigned by Homer to his heroes has been well designated "gloomy, discontented, and nugatory." The soul is made to retain the shadow of its former self, and to pursue the empty image of its past occupations and enjoyments. Thus the great Achilles retains his pre-eminence among his dead companions, but he would gladly exchange the honour for the bodily life of an ordinary man. The soul is reduced to a state of senseless imbecility, for although Tereus is said to enjoy a degree of mental vigour, that instance forms an exception to the general rule,—he enjoys such only by the special favour of Proserpine. It is not till their strength has been renovated by the blood of a victim that they are said to recover partial reason, can recognise their living friends, and feel anxiety for the welfare of those whom they left on earth.

A somewhat different fate, however, awaited great offenders. They were consigned to the torment of unavailing toil and never-satisfied desires. The enemies of Jupiter were waded by the poet to the abyss of Tartarus, which was as far below Hades as earth is from heaven, where they were fast secured by iron gates, and lodged on a brazen floor, while, on the contrary, a few favoured heroes, instead of descending into Hades, were transported to some delicious plain or island, cooled by perpetual western zephyrs, and never experiencing the change of seasons.

Such were the gloomy prospects which the religion of the Greeks in the heroic ages unfolded to them after death. The soul, with some few exceptions, lightened of its fleshly encumbrances, became still more oppressed, and pined in a dreary and joyless state of existence. How different the prospect unfolded in the Bible! An eternity of active, intellectual enjoyment, of bliss unalloyed, is set before the true Christian. The gloomy prospects of the Greek appear to have had no influence on his character. Throughout the pages of Homer, there are no traces of his desiring immortality or sighing for Hades. His conduct was far different. The very heroes seem to shudder at the thought of Hades. "Alas!" exclaimed Achilles, as he wept over the dead body of his much-loved Patroclus, "even in Hades there remains a ghost, and an image of the dead, but the mind has for ever vanished." Not even Homer could

enter into that feeling which aspires after an endless rest: but the child, taught by revelation, can rejoice in the prospect of salvation through Christ, who hath brought life and immortality to light.

The means by which the Greeks chiefly hoped to obtain the favour of the gods were worship and sacrifice. This was the sum of the duty of men to the gods; and it was because due honour was paid to him on his altars that Jupiter expresses his particular affection for the Trojans, and especially Hector. Hymns are said to have been grateful to the gods, but sacrifice alone was efficacious. Hence, every meal was accompanied with a sacrifice and libation. The manner of such sacrifice is thus described by Homer in the *Iliad*.—

“But mindful of the gods, Achilles went
To the rich coffer in his shady tent
There lay on heaps his various garments roll'd,
And costly furs, and carpets stiff with gold,
(The presents of the silver-footed dame)
From thence he took a bowl of antique frame,
Which never man had stain'd with ruddy wine,
Nur raised in offerings to the powers divine,
But Pelcus' son and Peleus' son to none
Had raised in offerings but to Jove alone
This tinged with sulphur, sacred first to flame,
He purged, and wash'd it in the running stream
Then cleansed his hands, and fixing for a space,
His eyes on heaven, his feet upon the place,
Of sacrifice, the purple draught he pour'd
Forth in the midst, and thus the god implored ”

In many of the Greek rites, as in those of domestic worship, in the libations that accompanied the social meal, in the harvest offerings, and in the votive locks which youths and virgins frequently dedicated to a guardian deity, the prevailing character was symbolical. These were probably the earliest forms of worship known among them. When earthly kings, however, were deified, the efficacy of sacrifices was believed to depend on their value, and expensive offerings were presented to these deities. “This persuasion,” says Thirlwall, “was cherished by two popular prejudices—by the notion that the gods were capable of envy and jealousy, which men might allay by costly profusion in their gifts, and by the view taken of a sacrifice as a banquet for the gods, which was the more agreeable in proportion as it was rich and splendid.”

Such evil notions led to the sacrifice of human life. It was supposed that on some extraordinary occasions the divine wrath was not to be appeased but by the blood of man. This practice appears to have been of high antiquity, although not expressly mentioned by Homer. According to legend, human victims were occasionally, and even periodically, offered in some temples long anterior to the heroic age, and there is no reason to believe that the sentiments of the Greeks were altered on this point in the days of Homer. He appears strongly to confirm the testimony of later writers, that the heroic age was stained with the blood of human victims, when he informs us that Achilles immolated twelve Trojan prisoners at the funeral pile of Patroclus, in order to soothe the shade of his departed friend:—

“His slaughtering hands, yet red with blood, he laid
On his dead friend's cold breast, and thus he said:—
‘All hail, Patroclus! let thy honour'd ghost
Hear and rejoice on Pluto's gloomy coast,
Behold! Achilles' promise is complete,
The bloody Hector stretch'd before thy feet.
Lo! to the dogs his carcass I resign,
And twelve sad victims of the Trojan line,
Sacr'd to vengeance, instant shall expire,
Their lives effused around thy funeral pyre ”

I L I A D

The preceding may be termed the *ceremonial* part of the Grecian religion,—the *moral* was more extensive, inasmuch as it included the principal offices of life, and the qualities of the mind. Thus courage is represented as acceptable to the god of war, and the virtues of charity and hospitality as pleasing to the more amiable divinities. Hence the swain Eumæus is made to say, when Ulysses sought refuge in his cottage,—

—“It never was our guise
To slight the poor, or aught humane despise,
For Jove unfolds our hospitable door,
‘Tis Jove that sends the stranger and the poor ”

O D Y S S E Y

The submission of subjects to their prince; the duty of a prince to preserve the rights of his subjects inviolate, the obedience of children to their parents, the respect of the young for the aged, and the laws of truth, justice, honour, and decency, were inculcated and maintained by the authority of religion. Even the ordinary transactions in life were consecrated by the Greeks. They neither undertook a voyage nor a journey without soliciting the aid of their protectors; and the common forms of politeness and the customary observances of civility were defined, according to Homer, by the voice of the gods. Thus, Alcinous, king of the Phæacians, did not seek to detain Ulysses longer than he pleased, lest he should offend the gods, and the same feeling is observable in the behaviour of Ulysses and Telemachus, in the cottage of Eumæus.

Dr Gillies says, that “the creed of the Greeks, thus adorned and enlarged, became a happy antidote against the resentment, cruelty, and fierce spirit of sullen independence, which usually characterize the manners of barbarians.” This is not borne out by their history. Their laws, sacred and profane, often proved feeble barriers against their impetuous rage. The vengeance of the human heart was ever exhibiting itself in deeds of horror. As before related, the death of an enemy was not sufficient to satisfy their cruelty. They burned with desire to shed his blood, and to expose his mangled remains to indignities, said by Homer to be equally abominable in the sight of gods and men. In this spirit Achilles is represented as addressing Hector on the field of battle, thus —

“Talk not of oaths, the dreadful chief replies,
While anger flash'd from his disdainful eyes—
‘Detested as thou art and ought to be,
Nor oath, nor pact Achilles plights with thee—
Such pacts as lambs and rabid wolves combine,
Such leagues as men and furious lions join,
To such I call the gods! one constant state
Of lasting rancour and eternal hate
No thought but rage, and never-ceasing strife,
Till death extinguish rage, and thought, and life ”

During the heroic age there appear to have

been priests who devoted themselves exclusively to their vocation. Such were Calchas, Chryses, Maro, and Dares; and it may be presumed, that whenever a temple or tract of ground was consecrated to a god, a priest was appointed to minister to him there. These priests, however, appear but seldom, and their influence over the rest of the people was evidently inconsiderable. The rites of worship were not performed by them alone, and they were not even required at their public solemnities. Generals and commanders offered sacrifices, performed prayers, and observed the signs or omens which indicated the result of an enterprise. In a word, the kings and generals were at the same time priests. Examples of their offering sacrifice are found throughout the pages of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Nestor, for instance, is represented as offering sacrifice to Minerva in a passage which well illustrates the manner of ancient victim-sacrifices. After describing the adornment of the victim, the poet says —

“Stratus and Echephon the victim led,
The axe was held by warlike Thrasymed,
In act to strike, before him PERCUS stood,
The vase extending to receive the blood
The king himself initiates to the power,
Scatters with quivering hand the sacred flour,
And the stream sprinkles from the curling brows
The hair collected in the fire he throws
Soon as due vows on every part were paid,
And sacred wheat upon the victim laid,
Strong Thrasymed discharged the speeding blow
Fell on his neck, and cut the nerves in two
Down sunk the heavy head
• • • • •
From earth they rear him, struggling now with death,
And Nestor's youngest stops the vents of breath
The breath for ever flies on all sides round
Streams the black blood, and smokes upon the ground
The beast they then divide, and disarticulate
The ribs and limbs, observant of the rite
On these in double cauls involved with art
The choicest morsels lay from every part
The sacred sage before his altar stands,
Turns the burnt offering with his holy hands,
And pours the wine, and bids the flames aspire
The youths with instruments surround the fire
The thighs now sacrificed, and entrails dressed,
The assistants part, transfix, and broil the rest.”

ODYSSEY

Traces of these ancient regulations, says Heeren, were preserved for a long time among the Greeks. The second archon, at Athens, who presided at the public ceremonies of worship, was called the king, because he had to prepare the sacred rites, which were formerly regulated by the kings. Still the sacerdotal character seems to have been merely incidental to the public station of the Homeric heroes. They were not priests in the sense in which the term is usually understood—men devoted to the service of religion. In poetical language they might be called regal priests, or priestly kings, as Anius is said by Virgil to have been at once “king of men” and “priest of Apollo,” but this expression is not definite. It can only be inferred, therefore, that kings were priests in a subordinate sense; that is, they occasionally engaged in the service of the gods. When, however, a temple was erected for the tutelary god of a tribe, it no doubt often happened that the ruling family was invested with the charge of it, consequently this would become an hereditary office, and might frequently survive the civil pre-eminence out of which it

arose. Still, such cases were not universal; for the regulations respecting priests, proposed by Plato in his laws, distinctly show that the office of priests should not long be filled by the same family. “Let the election of the priests,” says he, “be committed to the god, by referring the appointment to lot; those on whom the lot falls must submit to an examination. But each priesthood shall be filled for one year and no longer, by the same person, and he who fills it may not be less than sixty years old. The same rules shall apply to the priestesses.” Homer himself, also, indicates the mode in which such offices were usually conferred, when he mentions that “Theano was made priestess of Athene by the Trojans.”

The priestly office in itself, says Thirlwall, involved no civil exemptions or disabilities, and was not thought to unfit the person who filled it for discharging the duties of a senator, judge, or warrior, either on the ground that these occupations were displacing to the gods, or that their service claimed the attention of their whole faculties. In later ages, however, the care of a temple often required the continual presence of its ministers, who therefore lived in seclusion, and apart from the ordinary pursuits of their fellow-citizens. Even then the Greek priests never formed an organized body, and they remained in the same State an insulated people, without the means or motives for incorporating themselves into any kind of hierarchy. In the most palmy days of the Grecian states they appear powerless and insignificant, nor are there any traces of a party-spirit of fellow-feeling among them, even on occasions wherein they might have been expected to have exhibited an unity. Yet the ministers permanently attached to a temple had interests at stake, and priestcraft, as will be seen hereafter, had as large a field in Greece as elsewhere. Hence arose, in process of time, the invention of legends, the fabrication of relics, and other modes of imposture.

The qualifications required for the priesthood were as varied as the aspects of religion itself, so that they cannot be defined. Persons of both sexes and every age were eligible, and the choice seems to have been determined by accident or caprice. The duties of the priests were very light. They had no theological dogmas to expound, nor were they required to deliver moral precepts. The repetition of some trifling liturgical form made up the sum of their intellectual duties, whence Isocrates has ironically observed, that “some men deem the kingly office within the compass of every one's ability, as if it were a priesthood.” The moral character of priests, however, was expected to be good, for Homer intimates that the service of the gods required clean hands and a pure heart. Even celibacy was, sometimes required, but, generally speaking, the aged, in whom the passions had subsided, were elected to the office.

Conspicuous among the tenets of the Greeks was the belief in oracular powers. The gods were supposed to possess a variety of agents and vehicles for conveying the secrets of their wisdom to man. Sometimes they were supposed to impart the gift of prophecy as a permanent gift,

to some person or family, and sometimes to attach to it a certain place, the seat of their immediate presence, which is thence termed an oracle. The most ancient of these were Dodona and Delphi, the latter of which is described by Homer, by the name of Pylho, as renowned and wealthy before the Trojan war. The shades of the dead were likewise believed to possess the power of revealing the future, and there were some oracles where they might be consulted. These appear, however, to have been of more modern creation, for Homer's writings convey the idea that the dead interfere no more with the affairs of earth. The great source of prophetic inspiration is ascribed to Jupiter, and Apollo was considered to be the interpreter of his will and the dispenser of his presence. The former assumed this prerogative after his supremacy over the Olympian family was acknowledged, but when or how Apollo became his deputy is not stated.

Omens and divination formed other important features in the creed of the Greeks. Every variation from the common tenor of life was regarded as an omen importing a change of events, and it was observed with deeper interest when it coincided with a momentous occasion, as, for instance, the utterance of a word associated with a pleasing or unwelcome thought, might suspend or determine the issue of a debate in a grave assembly. The phenomena of thunder, lightning, or eclipses, and even the flight of a bird, was witnessed with grave concern at a critical juncture, and the appearances of a victim in the several stages of a sacrifice were supposed to indicate the mind of the deity to whom it was offered. The flight of birds, the changes of the atmosphere, and the heavenly bodies, were sometimes consulted to discover the will of the gods. Finally, dreams were held to proceed from Jupiter, and the art of interpreting them gave name to a separate class of diviners.

In the later ages divination afforded employment for a large class of soothsayers, but accidental omens are frequently noticed by Homer. The poet, however, does not seem to have been a firm believer in them, for he makes Hector say,—“One omen is the best, to fight for our country.” The interpreters of the signs in victims, which were sacrificed on the eve of an expedition or a battle, or other noted occasions, professed to found their predictions on rules discovered by experience, but their art was never reduced to scientific exactness, as it was among the Tuscans.

Belief in demons, or guardian angels, was very prevalent among the Greeks in the heroic age. Hesiod says there were thirty thousand, and he conveys the idea that they were the spirits of those who died in the golden age.

The idea of guardian angels was by no means an unworthy one; but perhaps it may have been borrowed from tradition, that angels had appeared to mankind in remote ages. Scripture speaks of such circumstances with reference to Abraham, Lot, Jacob, Balam, and Manoh, and it is not too much to suppose that the fame thereof had reached Greece, especially if it may be considered that among the earliest settlers there was a colony from Egypt, where much of

Hebrew history must have been learned during the residence of the sons of Israel in that country. That the idea is founded in truth may be gathered from Scripture. The apostle Paul speaks of angels as “ministering spirits, sent forth to minister unto the heirs of salvation” a cheering truth for the Christian as he passes onward to his eternal rest.

With the Greeks, however, the sentiments concerning guardian angels were very debased. They are represented as always active, and sometimes beneficent, but very frequently wanton and mischievous, reminding us strongly of the fairies and goblins of other mythologies. The general notion of them comprehended every species of mysterious supernatural agency which the imagination had not embodied in a distinct form. Abstract properties and relations were converted into demons, as excellence, singularity, beauty, and the like. Thus, the people of Segesta erected a chapel, and instituted sacrifices at the grave of a slain enemy, on account of his extraordinary beauty. It was under this feeling that the Greeks became so proverbially lavish of heroic honours. Everything in nature or man which excited admiration or wonder acquired such intense influence as to lead them into idolatry.

This feeling belongs rather to the later than to the heroic ages. In the days of Homer, idolatry does not appear to have been known in Greece; and even temples, notwithstanding those of Minerva at Athens, and Apollo at Delphi, seem to have been of some standing, were not common. Sacrifices were performed on altars raised in the open air, and prayers were addressed to deities unseen. Thus Nestor sacrificed to Neptune on the sea-shore, and to Minerva before the portico of his palace, and although Homer mentions the fanes of Apollo at Delphi, and Minerva at Athens, it is in terms that favour the supposition that they were uncovered, like the venerable remains at Stonehenge. The great objects of worship appear to have been Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, and Minerva, which Aristotle says were, together with Fate, originally but different names for ONE God, considered with respect to different powers, functions, or attributes, as “the divine wisdom,” “the god of light and life,” “the creator and ruler of all things.” The mass of Greek gods, goddesses, and deified heroes, accumulated as ages rolled onward.

Concerning the influence which religion had upon the states of Greece, Heeren observes “As in Greece the priests never formed a distinct order, and still less a caste, religion was never united with the state to the same extent as in other countries. It was sometimes subservient to public policy, but never became its slave. The dry prosaic religion of the Romans could be used or abused to such purposes; but that of the Greeks was much too poetical. The former seems to have existed only for the sake of the state; and the latter, even when it was useful to the state, appears to have rendered none but voluntary services. The patricians confined the popular religion of Rome within the strict limits of a system, but in Greece religion preserved its freedom of character.”

Such were the leading features of the religion

of the Greeks in the heroic age. Historians have been lavish in their praises of it and, compared with the abominable ceremonies of the Bacchanalia, the dangerous power of oracles, and all the wild and wicked inventions of the later periods of paganism, it is comparatively pure. It inculcated, at least, moral duties, but still the germ of every religious principle and institution afterwards established however evil, is visible in it—it contains palpable traces of the depraved mind of fallen man. Every tenet was created by fancy, save that one universal impression not yet lost among mankind, that the actions of men are observed, and rewarded or punished by an unseen power. But even this tenet was clothed with ideas unworthy of the subject. The sublime was swallowed up in the ridiculous, for the weaknesses of their deities are rendered more conspicuous than their majesty. Even when they reward or punish, it is after the manner of men, upon momentary impulse, and not from any fixed principle of unerring justice. The gods of Greece in the heroic age were shadowed forth by the Greeks themselves. To a close observer there appears to have been but very little difference between them, and some of Homer's heroes might have challenged a superiority over, or, at least, an equality with them. Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, are all represented as taking a part in the Trojan war. And how trifling is the difference in their character? Gods and men alike thirsted for human blood.

Opposed to such a system, how transcendently glorious is the religion of the Bible! God and man are there represented in a becoming relation to each other. God is placed upon his throne of majesty in heaven, and man is made to bow before his footstool. God is represented as ruling all things in heaven and in earth, and man as dust and ashes. Still he does not exult over man's weakness, nor thirst for vengeance because of their transgressions. Great, holy, and just though he be, yet is he still exhibited to mankind as their tender and beneficent Father, who is ever ready and willing to pardon the truly penitent, and to adopt him into his family. Love is his distinguishing characteristic, an idea which the Greeks never entertained of their deities. Could the founders of the Grecian religion come among us, and learn that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life," it would be a matter of astonishment. And yet such is the God with whom we have to do. May we never despise his grace!

THE MILITARY.

The art of war was the principal employment of the Greeks in the heroic age, and in this dreadful occupation they displayed their noblest and their worst qualities. In the earliest ages they were led to cultivate this art from circumstances, or as some historians have termed it, necessity. Greece was divided into little states, the capital of each of which, with the greater part of the territory, was generally within a day's march of states which might be enemies, or treacherous friends; whence it became usual for

every individual able to bear arms to be a soldier, and for the community to pay constant attention to military affairs. Hence, in the days of Homer the Greeks had improved considerably in the military art, and even excelled many barbarous nations who had prided themselves in that art for centuries. In this they were aided by their religion; for their occupations, whether of peace or war, were under its direct influence.

The Greeks were not acquainted with those disciplined evolutions which give harmony and concert to numerous bodies of men, and enable armies to move with the alacrity of single combatants. Notwithstanding, Homer's descriptions of marches indicate, that there were orders of battle formed in ranks and files, and the steadiness of the soldier, which distinguishes an army from a mob, is represented by the poet as perfect. "The Grecian phalanges," he says, "marched in close order, each leader directing his own band. The rest were mute, inasmuch that one would say there was no voice in the multitude. Such was the silence with which they watched for the word of command from their leaders."

What the Greeks wanted in skill they supplied by courage. At the word of command they rushed impetuously to the attack, and closed with the enemy. Each warrior was firmly buckled with his antagonist, and they strove for the mastery as if the fortune of the day depended on their single arm.

The principal weapon of the Greeks was the spear, which resembled the Roman *pilum*, and which would often penetrate the firmest shields and bucklers. When they missed their aim, or when the stroke proved ineffectual, they drew their swords, and darted impetuously on their foe. This mode of combat was common to the soldiers and generals, who mingled with those whom they commanded.

Besides the spear and the sword, the Greeks had bows, slings, and arrows, intended for the practice of distant hostility, but the use of these weapons was confined to warriors of inferior renown, and those who used them were subject to reproach, thus Teucer is frequently mentioned by Homer as "a vain archer."

The defensive armour of the Greeks was remarkably complete: a bright helmet, adorned with plumes, covered the head and face, a firm corslet defended the breast, greaves of brass descended to the feet; and an ample shield, loosely attached to the shoulders, turned in all directions, and opposed resistance to every hostile assault. It was only the leaders, however, who were thus equipped, whence they are often represented as a host in themselves. They frequently stood in their chariots of war—for cavalry was still unknown—and fought with each other in the space between the armies, and he who was victorious spread panic before him, since it was easy for him to break through the ranks of his opponents. In the Homeric armies no chief was without his chariot, and they were generally drawn by two, but sometimes by three horses.

Dr. Gillies well observes, that "the close, compact combats of the Greeks were calculated to excite the most furious passions of the heart, and

Metallic fabrics appear to have limited the progress of the fine arts in the heroic ages. There is no mention made of painting nor of marble statues; but the metal statues imply a knowledge of the art of drawing, for they were not mere figures—they possessed expression.

The art of weaving was carried on very extensively among the Greek women at this period, and it was not deemed an unworthy employment for females of the highest rank. Homer speaks of the art with reverence to the females in the court of Alcinoüs —

"Some ply the loom,—their busy fingers move
Like poplar leaves when Zephyr fans the grove
Not more renown'd the men of Scheria's isle,
For sailing arts and all the naval toil
Than works of female skill, their women's pride,
The flying shuttle through the threads to guide
Pallas to these her double gift imparts,
Inventive genius and industrious arts"

The poet also speaks of the "golden distaff" of Helen, and the

"rich vase, with living sculpture wrought,
Which heap'd with wool, the beautiful Phylö brought"

ODYSSEY

The cloths of the Greeks were generally of wool and linen, but it is not known how far cotton was manufactured in Greece in those early ages. Mention is made by Homer of "silken fleece empurpled by the loom," whence it is probable that articles of silk were made in Greece, but still, garments of foreign manufacture, as those of Egypt and Sidon, were esteemed the most beautiful, and hence were the most highly valued. Of the mechanical arts, indeed, weaving was the best understood, but this, as well as the other employments, qualified by the appellation of sedentary, were practised by the Greeks standing upright, which indicates an imperfect state of improvement.

HUSBANDRY.

The different branches of agriculture had made great progress in the heroic ages, whence husbandmen formed a large class in the community. Property in land was universal, which is discoverable in the pages of Homer from the fact that the boundaries were fixed by measurement and marked by stones. Homer describes the various labours of farming, ploughing both with oxen and mules, sowing, reaping, binding the sheaves, and treading out the corn by oxen on the threshing floor, in the same manner as we read of threshing in Scripture. He also mentions the culture of the grape, the cultivation of gardens, and the various duties of the husbandman. Such subjects are represented on several compartments in the celebrated shield of Achilles. —

"A field deep furrow'd next the god design'd,
The third time labour'd by the sweating hind,
The abating shares full many ploughmen guide,
And turn their crooked yokes on every side.
Still, as at either end they wheel around,
The master meets them with his goblet crown'd,
The heavy draught rewards, renews their toil,
Then back the treading ploughshares cleave the soil
Behind the rising earth in ridges roll'd;
And sable loak, though form'd of molten gold.

Another field rose high with waving grain,
With bended stalks stand the reaper train
Here stretch'd in ranks the level'd swarths are found,
Sheaves heap'd on sheaves here thicken up the ground.
With sweeping stroke the mowers strew the lands,
The gatherers foll' w, and collect in bands.
At last the children, in whose arms are borne
(Too short to grasp them) the brown sheaves of corn,
The rustic monarch of the field describes
With silent glee the heaps around him rise

Next, ripe in yellow gold, a vineyard shines,
Bent with the ponderous harvest of its vines,
A deeper dye the dangling clusters show,
And, curl'd on silver props, in order glow
A darker metal mix'd intrench'd the place,
And pales of glittering tin the enclosure grace
To this, one pathway, gently winding, leads,
Where march a train with baskets on their heads,
(Fair maids and blushing youths) that, smiling, bear
The purple product of the autumnal year
To these a youth awakes the warbling strings,
Whose tender lay the fate of Linus sings,
In measure'd dance behind him move the train,
Tune soft the voice, and answer to the strain

Here herds of oxen march, erect and bold,
Rear high their horns, and seem to low in gold,
And speed to meadows on whose sounding shores
A rapid torrent through the rushes roars
Four golden herdsmen as their guardians stand,
And nine sour dogs complete the rustic band
Two lions, rushing from the wood, appear'd,
And scold a bull, the master of the herd
He roar'd. He saw the dogs, the men withouted,
They tore his flesh and drank his sable blood
The dogs (oft cheer'd in vain) desert the prey,
Dread the grim terrors, and at distance bay

Next this, the eye the art of Vulcan leads
Deep through fair forests, and a length of meads,
And stalls, and folds, and scatter'd flocks between,
And stilly flocks that whiten all the scene" ILIAD

Allowing for poetic ornament, this extract may be considered as exhibiting a picture of rural occupations in the heroic ages. Although, therefore, war was essentially the genius of the Greek community at this period, yet they were not unacquainted with agriculture. Heeren says, "it may be doubted whether the soil was much better cultivated in the most flourishing period of Greece," and if the poet's description of the garden of Alcinoüs may serve as a specimen for those of Greece, there is much truth in the observation

"Close to the gates a spacious garden lies,
From stornus defend'd, and inclement skies
Four acres was the allotted space of ground,
Fenced with a green enclosure all around,
Tall thriving trees conies'd the fruitful mould,
The reddening apple ripens here to gold
Here the blue fig with luscious juice o'erflows,
With deeper red the full pomegranate glows,
The branch here bends beneath the weighty pear,
And verdant olives flourish round the year
The balmy spirit of the western gale
Eternal breathes on fruits untaught to fall
Each dropping pear a following pear supplies,
On apples apples, figs on figs arise
The same mild season gives the blooms to blow,
The buds to harden, and the fruits to grow
Here order'd vines in equal ranks appear,
With all the united labours of the year
Some to unload the fertile branches run,
Some dry the blackening clusters in the sun,
Others to tread the liquid harvest join,
The groaning presses foam with floods of wine.
Here are the vines in early flower descried,
Here grapes discolour'd on the sunny side,
And there in autumn's richest purple dyed,
Bees of all various herbe far over green,
In beauteous order terminate the scene."

ODYSSEY.

The implements of husbandry among the Greeks were very imperfect, notwithstanding the great perfection to which agriculture had apparently arrived. The plough itself was composed of wood; but this appears to have arisen rather from the scarcity of iron, than from any lack of mechanical ingenuity. Shears for shearing sheep were invented in the time of Hesiod, before which the fleece waited the season of its annual separation by nature. The invention of mills was unknown, and the grain underwent several tedious operations, in order to prepare it for use, its final preparation was by bruising it between two large stones.

Herds and flocks appear to have constituted the principal riches of the Greeks in the heroic ages. In the scarcity, or probably the non-existence of coin, cattle were the usual measure of the value of commodities. Thus the golden armour of Glaucus was valued at a hundred oxen, the brazen armour of Diomed, at nine, the tripod, the first prize for wrestling at the funeral of Patroclus, at twelve, and the female slave the second prize, at four. The opulence of Ulysses, also, is represented by the rustic Eumæus, as consisting of herds and flocks.

Such are the main features of the heroic, or Homeric form of society. If it be objected, that information drawn from the pages of poets cannot be relied upon, we answer, in the words of an eminent historian, that "the Homeric world is not a region of enchantment, called into existence by the wand of a magician, it is at once poetical and real." The details which the poet relates are facts, and though he may have adorned them with the charms of poetic fancy, they yet may be relied upon. His two great works, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, faithfully represent the state of society at that period of which they treat, namely, the heroic age. This is confirmed by the light of historical analogy, etc., which is placed in juxtaposition with his sentiments, throughout this article.

Perhaps, however, the strongest confirmation of the veracity of Homer may be traced in his representations of human nature, which remarkably accord with the Scripture statement, that "God made man upright," but that he has "sought out many inventions." In the most perfect of his heroes, human depravity is traced in the most legible characters. The same awful state of human nature is also discoverable in the social institutions, and the moral and religious sentiments of the age, which the poet describes. Beneath the garniture of poetry, the hydra-headed monster sin, everywhere discovers itself. Revenge, revellings, murders, deceit, and such like, are too frequently the leading characteristics of the Greeks, whom the poet has described in his captivating verse. Sometimes he has wrapped up vice in silken folds; but they are of too flimsy a texture wholly to conceal its deformity.

CHAPTER II.

RELIGION OF THE GREEKS

It has been already seen what the religion of the Greeks was in the heroic age—that, from worshipping one God, they descended into the depths of idolatry. As time rolled on, different gods were added to those then worshipped, until they became so numerous as to justify the description written by the poet Wordsworth.—

"The lively Grecian in a land of hills,
Rivers and fertile plains, and sounding shores,—
Under a cope of sky more variable,
Could find commodious place for every god,
Promptly received as prodigally brought,
From the surrounding countries, at the choice
Of all adventurers. With universal skill,
As nice observers furnished hints
For studious fancy, his quick hand bestow'd
On flint operations a hard shape,
Metal or stone idolatrously served."

A description of the gods of the Greeks belongs to the page of mythology: it will be only requisite here to describe those features of the Greek religion which tended to preserve, in common with the national institutions, the band by which the states were held together as a nation. These features were two fold, religious feasts, and oracles, auguries, and divinations.

RELIGIOUS FEASTS.

There were many religious feasts celebrated in the several states of Greece, especially at Athens a description of the three principal: the Panathæna, the feasts of Bacchus and Eleusis will be sufficient to enable the reader fully to understand the nature of the rest.

The Panathæna.—This festival was celebrated at Athens in honour of Minerva, the tutelary goddess of that city, to which she gave her name, *Athené*, as well as to the feast. There were the greater and the lesser Panathæna, the latter of which originated with Theseus when he united the several towns of Attica into one city, on which occasion the name of the festival was altered to that known in history. The greater Panathænean festival was celebrated every five years, but the lesser annually.

Originally this festival was made up of religious rites and sacrifices, or, in other words, in performing homage to the tutelary goddess. The Greeks, however, superstitious as they proverbially were, loved amusement, so that in later ages their religious rites were universally blended with various games. Thus in the feasts of the Panathæna, racing, gymnastic combats, and contests in music and poetry, formed a conspicuous feature, as in the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian festivals. These exercises were followed by a procession, wherein was carried a sail embroidered with gold, on which the actions of Pallas against the Titans and giants were delineated. The sail was afterwards affixed to a vessel, bearing the name of Minerva, and it was then conducted from the Ceramæus to the temple of Eleusis by machines which put the oars in motion and made the vessel glide along. The procession consisted of persons of all ages and

both sexes, who followed each other according to their age. The aged carried olive-branches in their hands; those in the prime of life were armed at all points, and had bucklers and lances, and the young men wore vests, with crowns upon their heads, and these as they marched along sang a hymn in honour of the goddess. The women followed in the same manner. Among them the aged carried olive-branches, the middle-aged carried vessels in their hands for drawing water; and the young carried baskets in which were placed the sacred utensils used in the ceremony. Interspersed among them were foreigners, the men among whom carried instruments used in tillage, and the women, umbrellas and seats for the Athenian ladies. The leading design of the festival was for the Athenians to place themselves under the protection of Minerva; to pray for prosperity at her hands, and to renew their vows of fealty to her in acts of worship.

Some features in the games of the Panathenea differed from those performed in the national institutions. Thus, in the foot-race each of the competitors carried a lighted torch in his hand, which he repeatedly exchanged for others as he passed along, without interrupting the race, and the first who came to the goal without having put out his torch was declared victor. The conqueror, whether in the racing, gymnastic, or musical contentions, was rewarded with a vessel of oil. This prize, simple as it was, seems to have been warmly contested, especially among the musicians and poets, it being deemed highly glorious to be declared victor in this contest. It is said of Æschylus, that he died of grief because the prize was adjudged to Sophocles, a younger poet, with whom he on one occasion contended.

The feast of Bacchus.—This feast was held on the 20th of the month Boedromion, which answers to our October. It seems to have been of Thracian origin, but was metamorphosed by the fertile fancy of the Greeks, who, giving loose to inordinate licentiousness, rendered it one of the most abominable festivals in the annals of paganism.

There were two feasts of Bacchus established at Athens, called the greater and the lesser feast. The latter were celebrated in the open field, about autumn; and were named *Lenæa*, from a Greek word, signifying a wine-press. The great feasts were usually denominated Dionysia, from one of the names of Bacchus, to whom they were consecrated; and these were solemnized in the spring, within the city.

In each of these feasts, games, shows, dramatic representations, musical and poetical contests, had their place. The feasts lasted several days, during which season the whole city was given up to drunkenness and licentiousness; whence Plato, speaking of the Bacchanalia, says that he "had seen the whole city of Athens drunk at one time."

In the ceremony of the festival, the Bacchanalia, or worshippers of Bacchus, covered themselves with the skins of wild beasts; carried a thyrsus in their hands; had drums, horns, pipes, and other instruments, calculated to make a great noise; and wore upon their heads wreaths of ivy, branches of vine, and other trees sacred to Bacchus. Some of the Bacchanalia represented

Silenus, some Pan, and others the Satyrs, with whom their mythology abounded. Many of them were mounted on asses; while others dragged goats along for sacrifices, because they spoiled the vines. A figure of Iacchus, or Bacchus, was carried from the Ceramiacus to Eleusis, crowned with myrtle, and having a torch in its hand. During the procession they sung a hymn in honour of the god, which hymn was also called Iacchus, and in which they often repeated the word Iacche. Before the image the "mystical fan" was carried, which Servius thus curiously explains—"The fan was carried in procession before Bacchus, because those who were initiated into his mysteries were purified as corn is by the use of the fan." Yet the senate, when they were introduced into Rome, put a stop to the feasts by banishing their votaries, first from Rome, and afterwards from Italy. From this may be seen what an erroneous idea the Greeks had formed of purity of heart. None of their religious festivals were calculated to elevate the mind, or allay the evil passions of human nature; rather, springing from that corrupt source, they were instrumental in fostering folly and vice in all the prevailing forms.

Concerning the story of the birth of Bacchus, his mother Semele's fatal wish, his imprisonment in the thigh of his father Jupiter, and his various adventures, we forbear to enlarge. All this emanated from fertile fancy, and was made subservient to unhallowed ends. His very origin is surrounded by licentious ideas, and it can be no wonder, therefore, that his rites of worship were equally licentious.

The feasts of Eleusis.—In all the varied feasts of Pagan antiquity, none are so celebrated as those of Ceres Eleusinia. By way of eminence they were called "the mysteries," they being, according to Pausanias, as much above all others as the gods are above mankind. They appear, indeed, to have been far superior to other festivals, for the general purpose and design of the institution of these mysteries, as well as the doctrines inculcated, were pregnant with important consequences.

The origin and institution of these mysteries are attributed to Ceres herself, who, in the reign of Erectheus, coming to Eleusis, a small town of Attica, in search of her daughter Proserpine, whom Pluto had carried away, and finding the country afflicted with famine, invented corn for the inhabitants, as a remedy for that evil. But her goodness did not stop here. Greek fable relates that she instructed the Eleusians in the principles of probity, charity, civility, and humanity, whence her mysteries were called *Thermophogia*, or "a festival in honour of Ceres," and *Initia*, or "the mysteries."

This story of Ceres afforded an opportunity to represent the three particulars about which the mysteries were concerned, namely, the rise and establishment of civil society, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; and the error of polytheism and the principle of the unity. Thus the legislation of the goddess in Sicily and Attica—in both which places she is said to have civilized the savage manners of the inhabitants—gave birth to the first; her search

for her daughter Proserpine in Hades, to the second, and her resentment against the gods for their permission of the abduction, or connivance at it, to the third.

To enter largely into these particulars would lead into a path foreign to history; but it may be interesting to take a brief view of the two branches into which these mysteries were divided—namely, the lesser and the greater—in order to show the reader what they were.

The lesser mysteries laid the foundation of the hidden doctrines, and prepared for the greater. Their leading principle was the belief of a providence and a future state, and its consequence on practice, an inducement to a virtuous life. But, unhappily, the vicious examples of their gods were an insuperable obstacle to a life of purity and holiness among the Greeks. Throughout their whole history they were represented as possessing like passions with their votaries. Poets and painters alike held them up to the view of mankind as debauchees. So also did grave philosophers, whence the Greeks gave a loose to their appetites, and not only deemed themselves excused by the example, but even drawn by a divine impulse of their gods to work wickedness. Nay, philosophy taught that it was right mankind should, after the example of Jupiter, indulge their passions, when they could do it decently, and the licentious rites in the open worship of their gods confirmed the sad and debasing doctrine. Thus Plato forbade drinking to excess, unless during the feasts of Bacchus, and in honour of that god, and Aristotle blamed all lewd and obscene images and pictures, except those of the gods, which religion had sanctified.

Still, when the Pagan philosophers were shown by the early Christians that such doctrine did much mischief to the morals of the people, they were invariably answered that these things were only taught in the fables of the poets, which an initiation into the greater mysteries would rectify. And there appears to have been the semblance of truth in their defence, for when any one was initiated into these mysteries, he ascertained that the whole he had been taught before was mere delusion! He was taught that Jupiter, Mercury, Bacchus, Venus, Mars, and the long list of licentious deities, were but *dead mortals*—that they had been subject in life to the same passions and infirmities with themselves, but that, having been benefactors to mankind, grateful posterity had deified them, and had canonized their vices, indiscreetly, with their virtues. Having thus uprooted all the faith of the initiated in the fabulous gods, they were taught there was one Supreme Cause of all things, who pervaded all things by his virtue, and governed all by his power. Still the discovery of this Supreme Cause was made to be consistent with the notion of local tutelary deities, who were represented as beings superior to men and inferior to God, and as set by him over the several parts of his creation. What, therefore, the *Aporreta*, or "mystics," overthrew in their reformed theology, as taught in the greater Eleusinian mysteries, was the vulgar polytheism—the worship of dead men.

Such was the nature of the lesser and greater

mysteries. From the time that the initiated received an insight into the latter, he had the title of *Epoptes*, by which was meant one that sees things as they are, and without disguise, whereas, before, he was called *Mustes*, which has a contrary signification. And this appears to have had a two-fold effect. It not only tended to prevent vice, but it excited the initiated to acts of heroic virtue, by showing them what honours the benefactors of nations had acquired by the free exercise of it; it had raised them, according to their theology, to the rank of tutelary deities. Hence it was that princes, statesmen, and leaders of colonies and armies, aspired to be partakers of the greater mysteries.

The initiated were taught that they should be happier in a future state than all other mortals—that while the souls of the profane, or the uninitiated, at leaving the body, stuck fast in mire and filth, and remained in darkness, the souls of the initiated winged their flight to the happy islands, and the habitations of the gods. At the same time, they were led to believe that this consummation was only to be obtained by leading a virtuous life. "The end and design of initiation," says Plato, "is to restore the soul to that state from whence it fell, as from its native seat of perfection." Hence it arose that the philosophers who taught this doctrine contrived that everything should tend to show the necessity of virtue. "It is thus," says Epictetus, "that the mysteries become useful, thus we seize the true spirit of them, when we begin to apprehend that everything was instituted by the ancients for instruction and amendment of life."

Some of the moral precepts enforced in the mysteries were, that the initiated should honour their parents, offer up fruits to the gods, and show mercy to animals. For the accomplishment of this purpose, it was required, in the aspirant to the mysteries, that his character should be unblemished, and even free from the suspicion of notorious crimes. Hence it was that Nero, after the murder of his mother, when he took a journey into Greece in order to be present at the Eleusinian mysteries, was deterred from the attempt by the consciousness of guilt. Hence it was, also, that Marcus Antoninus, when he would purge himself to the world of the death of Avidius Cassius, sought and obtained initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries, it being notorious that none were admitted into them who laboured under a just suspicion of heinous crimes.

The aspirants for initiation were obliged, before their reception, to purify themselves in the lesser mysteries, by bathing in the *Iliussu*, by saying certain prayers, by offering sacrifices, and by living in strict continence during a stated period. That period was employed in instructing them in the principles of the doctrine of the great mysteries. When the time arrived for their initiation, they were brought into the temple; and, to inspire the greater reverence and terror, the ceremony was performed in the night amidst mock supernatural scenes devised by art and superstition. These nocturnal rites gave birth to many disorders which the severe law of silence imposed on the

initiated, prevented from becoming public. To divulge the secret of initiation was deemed the greatest crime, as may be gathered from Horace.—

"To silence due rewards we give,
And they who mysteries reveal
Beneath my roof shall never live,
Shall never hoist with me the doubtful sail
When Jove in anger strikes the blow,
Oft with the bad the righteous bleed
Yet with sure steps, though lame and slow,
Vengeance o'ertakes the trembling villain's speed"

For divulging the secrets of this feast, Diagoras, the Melian, was proscribed, and a price set upon his head, and Æschylus and Alcibiades were both disgraced for having spoken too freely of them. From the same cause, Pausanias, after describing some of the ceremonies practised in the temple of Eleusis, stops short, and declares he cannot proceed because he had seen a vision. Well has it been asked, "What cannot superstition effect upon the mind of man when once his imagination is heated?"

The president of the ceremony of initiation was called *Hierophantes*. He wore a peculiar garb, and was not permitted to marry. In connexion with him, there was one who carried a torch, another whose office it was to pronounce some cabalistic words, and a third who attended the altar. One of the principal magistrates of the city also attended, in order to see that all the ceremonies of the feast were minutely observed. He was called the king, and his business was to offer prayers and sacrifices. He was attended by four immediate assistants, and had, besides, ten other ministers to assist him in the discharge of his duty, and particularly in that which pertained to sacrifices.

The feast of Eleusis was of nine days' continuance. It commenced on the fifteenth of the month Bedromion. The first three days were occupied in ceremonies and sacrifices. Upon the fourth, in the evening, the procession of the basket commenced. This was laid upon an open chariot, or car, drawn by oxen. It was followed by Athenian women, all bearing baskets, in which something was carefully concealed from the public eye. The design of all this was to represent the basket into which Proserpine was said to have put the flowers she was gathering when she was borne away by Pluto. The fifth day was called "the day of the torches," because at night the initiated ran about with them, in imitation of Ceres, who having, as it is said, lighted a torch at the fire of Mount Ætna, wandered about from place to place in search of her daughter. The sixth day, which was the most celebrated, was called *Inochus*, from Bacchus, son of Jupiter and Ceres, whose statue was then brought out, crowned with myrtle, and holding a torch in his hand. The procession began at the Ceramiacus, and passing along a way called "the sacred way," leading across a bridge over the river Cephissus, it continued to Eleusis. As the multitude passed on, musical instruments were played and hymns were sung in honour of the goddesses, and were accompanied with dancing and other marks of rejoicing. The seventh day was solemnized by games and gymnastic combats, in which the victor was rewarded with a measure of barley,

which had reference to the belief that Ceres first taught the method of raising, and the use of that grain. The two last days were employed in ceremonies similar to those with which the feast commenced, none of which were important or remarkable.

During the celebration of these mysteries the initiated were enjoined the greatest sanctity and the highest elevation of mind. The same degree of purity, also, was required for their future conduct. And, indeed, the mysteries themselves were supposed to have possessed healing virtue. Proclus says that they drew the souls of men from a material, sensual, and human life, and joined them in communion with the gods. So deeply rooted was this error, that the early Christians combated it with all the force of argument and eloquence, showing it to be one of the delusions by which the arch-enemy of mankind led souls to destruction. They rested on initiation, as many at the present day do on the sacraments of religion, for time and eternity—forgetting that no outward rite can cleanse the heart from its corruptions.

Under this discipline, and with these promises and prospects, the initiated were esteemed the only happy amongst mankind. "On us," says Aristophanes, "only does the sun dispense his blessings, we only receive pleasure from his beams, we who are initiated and perform towards citizens and strangers all acts of piety and justice." The longer any one had been initiated the more honourable and happy was he deemed. Not to be initiated was accounted impious, and however virtuous such persons might be, they were suspected by the people. Hence it was that the religion of Socrates was suspected; for, like Diogenes, he would not believe that the souls of Agesilaus and Epaminondas, who were not initiated, would fallow in filth and mire, whilst the vilest Athenians, because they had been initiated, possessed the most distinguished places in the regions of the blessed.

With such advantages held out to them in the mysteries, it is no wonder that the ever-superstitious Greeks should in later ages universally aspire to initiation. Men, women, and children ran to be initiated, and they seemed to think the rite as necessary as Christians did baptism. Some had the same superstitious notion in its observance as many Christians had of baptism—they deferred it till the approach of death, and used it as a passport to the regions of the blessed. The fondness of the Athenians for the mysteries became so great, that when the public treasury was low the magistrates had recourse to a tax laid on the initiated as a fund to supply the exigencies of the state. In the days of Aristogeiton, when money was scarce, a law was promulgated which ordained that in Athens a certain sum should be paid for initiation.

It has been recorded that the initiated were enjoined to secrecy, and that disgrace, and sometimes death, awaited those who unfolded any part of the mysteries. The reasons for this were twofold; first, to invite the curiosity of the people; and, second, from a necessity of teaching the initiated some things improper to be communicated to all. Thus, Varro says that there were many truths which it was incon-

venient for the state to be generally known, and many things, though false, it was expedient the people should believe, and that the Greeks, therefore, shut up their mysteries in their sacred enclosures.

This latter fact exhibits one of the darkest features in the history of the Eleusian rites. For if the mysteries were so conducive to virtue and happiness, why should they not have been made known to all mankind? No state-reasons should be taken into account when the matter of endless weal or woe is concerned. The philosophers who devised and supported these tenets are open to the suspicion of having some sinister motives in view. motives which set aside all good faith and the notions of philanthropy. To keep a nation in darkness when a lamp was supposed to be in their hands by which they could guide it to heaven, was more than selfishness—it was cruelty and a crime.

Christians should beware of acting in the spirit of these pagan philosophers. It is the will of God that the whole world should be made acquainted with the doctrines of the gospel, and he cannot be a true Christian who has not the interest of his fellow-sinners at heart. "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother," says the apostle John, "he is a liar, for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" All mankind are brethren to the true Christian, and the divine and imperative command of Christ is, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." To use an emphatic figure of the apostle Paul, the Almighty might wink at the ignorance exhibited in Pagan superstition, but a woe is denounced upon those Christians who use not the talents committed to them for his glory and the salvation of mankind. "But cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall he weeping and gnashing of teeth."

It may be mentioned that during the festival of the Eleusian mysteries, it was prohibited, under very heavy penalties, to arrest any person, or to present a bill of complaint to the judges. The festival was celebrated every fifth year, and, after its establishment, it does not appear to have been interrupted except upon one occasion—that of the capture of Thebes by Alexander. The mysteries appear to have been of Egyptian origin, and the same was performed in that country in the days of Alexander, as the following remarkable account of them from one of the early Christian writers proves. Contrasting the mysteries of Greece with those of Egypt, he says—"Of the same nature are those things which Alexander wrote to his mother as revealed by Leo, chief hierophant of the Egyptian mysteries, whereby it appeared that not only such as Picus, Faunus, Æneas, Romulus, Hercules, Æsculapius, Bacchus the son of Semele, and Castor and Pollux, with others of the same rank, had been advanced from the condition of mortal men into gods, but that even those deities of the higher order, the greater gods of the nation, such as Jupiter, Juno, Saturn, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, and many others, were in truth only deceased mortals. But the priest being under great fears and apprehensions while he was disclosing this, as conscious that he was betraying the secrets of the mysteries, begged

of Alexander, when he found that he intended to communicate it to his mother, that he would enjoin her to burn the letter as soon as she had read it." At what period the mysteries were introduced into Greece is not certain,* but they were suppressed by Theodosius the Great, as were the rest of the pagan solemnities. The flimsy web which philosophy had weaved, and which was, nevertheless, sufficient to ensnare the wise Greeks, was by him demolished without ceremony. The dust of antiquity covered it, but he regarded it not, as an instrument of the Almighty, he reached it down and brought it to nought.

Still, though these mysteries must be looked upon as essentially pagan, it cannot but appear surprising that, amidst surrounding darkness, they should have disclosed so many wholesome truths. Figuratively speaking, the philosophers, or the founders of these mysteries, appear to have approached the temple of truth, or, in other words, to have lit a taper at the fire of the altar of the One True God. Dr. Hales may furnish the true solution of this problem. Speaking of these mysteries, he says, "They were ultimately borrowed from the Jewish feast of tabernacles, which was celebrated precisely at the same season, beginning on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, corresponding to Ændromion, and lasting a week. This was designed to commemorate, with gratitude and thanksgiving, God's bounties of the harvest and vintage, when collected and brought home, and was preceded by the preparatory rites of purification, and confession of sins, on the great day of Atonement, which was held on the tenth day of the same month." Some of the analogies which this learned writer has drawn between the Jewish and Grecian rites are very remarkable, as will be shown by the following particulars.

1. The genius of the Egyptians and Grecians turned the elements of corn and wine, on account of their utility to mankind as "the stuff of life," and as "making the heart glad," into the pagan divinities of Ceres, the goddess of agriculture, and Iacchus, the god of the vintage, and Proserpine, the daughter of Ceres, who was stolen by Pluto, the king of Hades, was emblematical of the new grain that springs up again after the old, when the seed sown is corrupted or dies in the earth, figuratively denoting the resurrection of mankind after death,—of the good to Elysium, and of the bad to Tartarus. 2. The mystic Iacchus was the primitive or patriarchal God of the Hebrews, *Iah*, or *Iach*, strongly aspirated, and stripped of its Greek termination *us*. This may be seen from the Clarian oracle—instituted before the Trojan war—in answer to the inquiry, "Of the gods, which is he to be held, who is called *Iao*?"

"The initiated are bound to conceal orgies not to be inquired into,

But in disguise is small understanding and a feeble mind

Learn then that *Iao* is God supreme of all.

Pluto in winter. Dia when spring begins;

The Sun is summer, in autumn bounteous *Iao*."

* Dr. Hales supposes that they were introduced into Attica from Egypt about a c. 1500, by Erætheus, the principal founder of the popular religion, along with the worship of Neith, the "goddess of wisdom," at Sais, whence Athénæ, reversed, or read backward, the tutelary goddess of Athens.

All these inferior gods, therefore, were expounded as signifying the energies or emanations of the One Supreme God, under different names, in the various physical functions of his providence.

3. The third analogy is drawn from the "torch bearer," and "the herald," who carried the "mystical fan of Iacchus," on the sixth day of the festival, to winnow, as it were, the chaff from the corn, or the bad from the good, and to burn the chaff with his torch. These emblematical ceremonies were used at the feast of Tabernacles, to which John the Baptist alludes in his description of Christ: "Whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire," Matt iii 12. The poets, Homer and Virgil, have given popular illustrations of this leading feature of the mysteries, in the descents of Ulysses and Æneas to Hades, where they saw the good in Elysium, the wicked in Tartarus.

4. The fourth analogy is drawn from the name Semele, which the Greeks, in latter ages, gave to the flutuous mother of Bacchus. In the festival of the wine-press, which corresponded to the feast of the wine-press, the torch-bearer cried out to the people, *Kaleite Theon*, "Call ye upon God," and they answered, *Semele Iacche ploutodota*. As the term Semele neither admits of a grammatical nor an intelligible construction of this sentence, and, as it is connected with the Hebrew *Iach*, Dr Hales deems that it denotes the Hebrew *Shemah*, "Hearken to me," as in Levit. xxvi. 21, etc. This would give consistency to the people's response, as it would read thus, "Hearken to me, O *Iah*, thou giver of wealth." Not knowing, or forgetting, the meaning of the Hebrew phrase *Shemah*, "Hearken to me," the Greeks metamorphosed it into a woman, Semele, the mother of Bacchus, who was supposed to have expired at the sight of Jove, arrayed in all the terrors of his glory, as the people trembled at Sinai, thus contradicting their primitive tradition, that Iacchus was the son of Ceres and the brother of Proserpine. This conjecture is supported by the fact, that a number of Hebrew words and phrases were used in the ceremony of the Grecian festival of the wine-press, which were unknown to the commentators.

5. After the initiated entered the mystic temple of Eleusis they washed their hands in holy water, in token of purification; and then the sacred mysteries were read to them by the priest of the altar, out of a book called *petroma*, from *petra*, "a stone," which was composed of two stone tablets joined together, to be their future rule of conduct. After this, mimic thunderings and lightnings, frightful noises and apparitions, appalled the spectators. This appears to have been a pantomime exhibition of the promulgation of the Decalogue on Mount Sinai, in all its terrors, written afterwards with the finger of God on two stone tablets, the substance of which was thus inculcated on the initiated. This seems to be confirmed by two of the Bacchanalian odes of Horace. In these there is evident reference to the delivery of the law on the craggy precipices of Sinai, and to the plenary inspiration of

God with his thyrsus, or the rod of Moses, turning the course of the river Jordan and the Red Sea, etc. Thus, describing the recent terrors he had endured in the temple of Eleusis, he says,—

"I saw, let future times believe,
The god of wine his lectures give
Midst rocks far distant was the scene—
With ears erect the satyrs stood,
With every goddess of the wood,
Listening the instructive solemn strain.

"Give me to sing, by thee inspired,
Thy priestesses to madness fired
Fountains of wine shall pour along,
And melting from the hollow tree,
The golden treasures of the bee
And streams of milk shall fill the song

"Indus and Ganges own thy sway,
Barbaric as thy power obey,
And o'er the pithless mountain's height
(Her head with horrid snakes enroll'd,
Which harmless writhe their angry fold)
Thy raptur'd priestess speeds her flight"

6. During the festival, it was unlawful to arrest any person for debt, or to commence a lawsuit, under penalty of a thousand drachmas, and ladies were not permitted to ride in chariots, under penalty of six thousand drachmas. This has evident reference to the remission of debts, and perfect freedom and equality of rich and poor, prescribed by the Levitical law during the sabbatical years and jubilees, which began the Jewish civic year at the seventh month.

From all this, it seems evident that many of the ceremonies practised in the Eleusian mysteries were gross parodies on those of the Hebrews in the feast of Tabernacles. And as such is the case, it may readily be believed that those doctrines taught the initiated, which are superior to pagan imagination, were derived from the same source.

The Almighty occasionally raised up some shining lights among the heathen world, who kept alive, in their writings and laws, the doctrines of the patriarchal religion. So that St. Paul, in his apology before the supreme court of Areopagus, could make an appeal to his hearers from doctrines which were acknowledged by the best and wisest among themselves.

The apostle thus commenced his defence: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For, as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you." Acts xvii. 22, 23.

In this exordium the apostle refutes the charge which had been brought against him by the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, of being "a setter forth of strange gods, because he preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection," by showing, even from their own altar, that he introduced no strange, but the old established God, whose worship they had debased by the worship of a multitude of gods, whom their fathers knew not, and whose hidden nature, implied in the inscription, required and justified explanation.

The apostle then proceeds, in the first part of his argument, to explain the nature and worship of the one true God:—"God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is

Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation, Verses 24—26.

This explanation has evident reference to the Old Testament account of the supremacy of Jehovah in the creation and disposal of mankind, as recorded Gen. xi. 1—32, and Deut. xxxii. 8, 9, after which he asserts that the grand design of man's creation was that he should be a religious being.—“That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us for in him we live, and move, and have our being, as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring,” Verses 27, 28.

The apostle, who was well skilled in Greek lore, seems to have borrowed the idea to “feel,” or grope after God, from Socrates, who uses it in a parallel passage of Plato's *Phædo*, wherein he censures the blindness and stupidity of the philosophers of his age, for ascribing to second causes the works of the First Cause, and for forgetting the Creator and worshipping the creature. The passage reads thus:—“They are unable to distinguish, that it is one thing to be the cause of the existence of something, and another to be that cause without which the other could not be a cause at all. In this respect, indeed, the many seem to me groping as it were in darkness.” This finely exposes the absurd Cosmogonies of the Greeks; some supposing, with Aristotle, that the world was uncreated or eternal, others, with Epicurus, that it was made by chance, while the popular belief was, that they themselves sprang from their own soil, thus forgetting their Creator, according to primeval tradition.

The foregoing citations, “For in him we live, and move, and have our being,” and, “For we are also his offspring,” are derived from two ancient Greek poets, Aratus and Cleanthus, as is evident from the following extracts:

“From Jove let us begin, of whom we men
Ought not to be silent for all are full of Jove,
The ways and haunts of men, the seas and lakes,
Jove's bounties everywhere we all enjoy,
For we also are his offspring.” ARATUS.

“Most glorious of immortals, thou many-named,
Always almighty, prime ruler of nature,
Governing all by law, Jove, hail!
For mortals all thee to address is meet,
For we are thy offspring. But the lot
Of puny mortals, who upon this earth
Do live and creep, is only like
The image of a voice.
These will I hymn, and ever praise thy power
These the starry world obeys, revolving round
The earth, and following where thou leadest.
For thou, with hand invincible, dost wield
A thunderbolt, two-edged, flaming, and ever living,
The stroke of which all nature shudders.”
CLEANTHUS.

Having taken this triumphant and unanswerable position, the apostle proceeds to show the folly and the madness of idolatry:—“Forasmuch

then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device.” Then, supposing that his hearers were convinced of their folly, he proceeds to explain the subjects of his preaching.—“Jesus and the resurrection.” “And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent: because he hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead.” Verses 29—31. God was pleased to regard with pity their gross corruptions in religion and morals, and now at length to send his Son Jesus, that Divine Teacher so earnestly desired by the wisest of their own philosophers, to teach the world the right worship of God, and to save those who trust in him. For that some of the philosophers among the Greeks had a glimpse of the light about to burst in full splendour upon the world, by the coming of the Saviour of mankind, is evident from their writings. Thus, Socrates maintained the insufficiency of human reason for the discovery of divine truth, and the necessity of some Divine reason or oracle, which Oracle he explained to his favourite pupil, Alcibiades, to be a person, and even a man. The poet Eupolis, also, another pupil of this Grecian sage, imbibed the same idea from his master, as is evident from his hymn to the Deity, wherein he shows that this Oracle, or Divine Teacher, was to be associated with the Deity. It reads thus.—

“Author of being, source of light,
With unfading beauties bright,
Fulness, goodness, rolling round
Thy own fair orb without a bound.
Whether thee thy supplicants call
Truth, or Good, or One, or All,
Ei, or Iao, thee we hail,
Essence that can never fail,
Grecian or barbaric name,
Thy steadfast being still the same

“Thee, when the morning greets the skies
With rosy cheeks and humid eyes,
Thee, when sweet declining day
Sinks in purple waves away,
Thee will I sing O parent Jove!
And teach the world to praise and love.

“And yet a greater hero far
(Unless great Socrates could err)
Shall rise to bless some future day,
And teach to live, and teach to pray
Come, UNKNOWN INSTRUCTOR, come!
Our leaping hearts shall make thee room:
Thou with Jove our vows shalt share,
Of Jove and thee we are the care

“O Father, King, whose heavenly face
Shines serene on all thy race,
We thy magnificence adore,
And thy well-known aid implore,
Nor vainly for thy help we call,
Nor can we want, for thou art all!”
WESLEY'S translation.

If these wise Greeks so ardently longed to receive such a Divine Instructor, how thankful ought we to be that he stands and knocks at the door of our hearts, waiting to be received; and how bitter will be our portion if we do not give Him a hearty welcome!

OF ORACLES, AUGURIES, ETC.

Ancient history is replete with accounts of oracles, auguries, and divinations. Occasions, great and solemn, as well as trifling, are described as having called them into action. No war was undertaken, no colony settled, etc., without consulting the gods. And this was not peculiar to one nation, but to many. Egypt, Assyria, Greece, and Rome, all had their oracles.

The question naturally arises, whence did this custom become so prevalent? Before the deluge which swept away a guilty world, save Noah and his family, the Almighty was pleased to reveal his will to mankind by different methods, as he has since done to his people. Sometimes he spake with them face to face, as to Abraham; sometimes he deputed angels to convey his will to them; while at other times he appeared unto them in the visions of the night. All this was known to the immediate descendants of Noah, who had himself been thus specially favoured; and accordingly, when they were dispersed into different regions they carried this tradition with them; and it was everywhere retained, though it became greatly altered and corrupted by the darkness and ignorance of superstition.

The principles upon which the ancients founded the necessity of consulting the oracles and auguries are well stated by Xenophon. He represents that man, of himself, is ignorant of what is advantageous or pernicious to him; that he is neither capable of penetrating the future nor comprehending the present; that his greatest designs can be frustrated by the slightest obstacles; that the Divinity alone, to whom all ages are present, can impart a knowledge of the future; that no other being has power to facilitate the success of the enterprises of mankind, and that he will enlighten and protect those who adore him with affection, invoke him with constancy and fidelity, and consult him with sincerity and integrity. It was, doubtless, from some mixture of such feelings as these with their own vain imaginations that the Greek nation paid so much attention to oracles and "lying divinations."

Oracles.—No country ever gave birth to more oracles than Greece. They abounded on every hand; but it will be only necessary to describe the most celebrated.

The most ancient oracle of Greece was at Dodona; and it appears to have been founded by Dodon, the son of Javan, or Iacon, or Ion, and the grandson of Japheth, or Japetus, who settled there with his family. At that time their theology was pure and their worship simple; but in process of time the oracle degenerated: it became corrupted with Egyptian polytheism, and with the lascivious rites of the Lingam, or Priapus, etc., which were likewise celebrated at Samothrace.

These features of the Dodonean oracle are well described by Herodotus:—"Formerly, when the Pelasgi prayed to the gods, they sacrificed all things to all in common, but gave none of them either name or surname; for they were

hitherto unacquainted with either. They only called them *theoi*, 'disposers,' because they disposed and held in order all things and all countries. It was not until a long time after, that from Egypt they learned the names of the gods. Upon this subject they consulted the oracle of Dodona—at that time the only one in Greece—whether they might, with propriety, adopt those names from the barbarians? The oracle answered that they might; and from that time the Pelasgi invoked their gods under distinct names, which were transmitted from them to the Greeks."

After this reference to the priests of Dodona, Herodotus proceeds to deliver his sentiments concerning the gods. He says, "From whence each of these gods derived his origin, or whether they have been from all eternity, were matters unknown till yesterday, or very recently; for, in my opinion, the first persons who framed a theology or genealogy of the gods, and gave them surnames, distinguishing their honours, functions, and appropriate forms, were Hesiod and Homer; who lived, I believe, four hundred years, and not more, before myself;" about B. C. 884.

It has been shown before, that it is by no means certain that Homer and Hesiod framed the theology of the Greeks: rather, it would appear that they first recorded their genealogy from tradition. It is doubtless true, that the first settlers worshipped only the patriarchal God, as the sole Creator and Disposer of the universe. This idea is discovered in the pages of Sophocles, born about B. C. 497, who thus records the true patriarchal cosmogony, as distinguished from the false cosmogony of later ages.—

"There is One, in truth but One God,
Who made the heaven and spacious earth,
And azure waves of sea, and blasts of winds"

In consequence of the success of the oracle of Dodona, oracles were, in remote ages, attempted in various places. Thus appears to have arisen from the fact, that the pretension to the gift of prophecy, as a dispensation of the Deity to man, was a lucrative occupation; whenever, therefore, means occurred for establishing the belief that a deity favoured any particular spot with his presence, and would deign there to communicate with mortals, priests and soothsayers banded themselves in establishing oracles, just as the Romish priests embrace every opportunity of establishing their shrines of saints. From this cause many were established, which, like the oracle of Olympian Jupiter, succeeded for a time, and then passed away. An exception to the general rule, however, is to be found in the oracle of Themis, or Justice, at Delphi, which afterwards merged into that of Apollo, and became the most celebrated of all the oracles of Greece.

Apollo was worshipped at Delphi under the name of the Pythian, a title derived from the *serpent Python*, which Apollo is said to have killed, or from a Greek word *pythethai*, that signifies to inquire, because the people came thither to consult him. Dr. Hales deems this serpent, "the old serpent, the devil, and Satan,"

who deceived the whole world, and says, that he made this "his chief seat."

Of the origin and progress of this celebrated oracle, so many fables are related that it is difficult to ascertain what is true. The following account seems the most probable. On the southern side of Mount Parnassus, within the western border of Phocis against Locris, and near the seaport towns of Crissa and Cirrha, the mountain crags form a natural amphitheatre, difficult of access, and in the midst of which was a deep cavern, discharging, from a narrow orifice, a vapour that affected the brain of all those who came within the sphere of its influence. This was first discovered by a goatherd, whose goats, browsing on the brink, were thrown into singular convulsions. This circumstance was made known in the neighbourhood, and the superstitious ignorance of the age immediately attributed it to a deity residing in the place. The spot became an object of intense curiosity. It was said to be the oracle of the goddess Earth, and the rude inhabitants from all the neighbouring parts resorted to it for information concerning futurity. To obtain this, some one among them intoxicated himself with the vapour, and then whatever he uttered passed for prophecy. The function of prophet, however, under these circumstances, was dangerous, for many, through the intoxication, appear to have fell into the cavern and perished. In consequence of this, an assembly of the neighbouring inhabitants was convened, and it was then determined that one person alone should receive the inspiration, and render the responses of the deity, and that the security of this person, or prophet, should be provided for by a frame placed over the chasm, through which the vapour might be safely inhaled. A virgin was preferred for this office, and she acquired the title of Pythia or Pythoness, from the same circumstance as the oracle acquired that of Pythian. The importance of the oracle being now fully established, a rude temple was built over the cavern, and priests were appointed, ceremonies prescribed, and sacrifices performed. To support these, all those who would consult this oracle, must come with offerings in their hands; and from this cause the priests became the guardians and owners of the oracle.

This appears to have been the turning point of the success of the oracle of Delphi. Self-interest being the ruling motive of the priests, whenever their profits failed a change of divinities took place. Thus, when the fame of the goddess Earth began to wane, the god Neptune was associated with her, and after this the goddess Themis was said to have succeeded her mother Earth in her inheritance. Still new incentives to public curiosity and credulity became in the lapse of time necessary, and Apollo was brought from Gnosus, in Crete, where he had been long held in high repute, to preside over the oracle of Delphi.

"Under Apollo, through the skill of his ministers," say historians, "the Delphian oracle recovered and increased its reputation. Local circumstances and the craft of the priests combined to establish its celebrity."

Delphi being near the centre of Greece was now reported to be the centre of the world; and

miracles were invented to prove this circumstance; and it was henceforth deemed the navel of the world. About the same time the Pythian games were instituted, and not long after, athletic exercises and chariot races were introduced in imitation of the Olympian. Hence Delphi became a considerable town, and the temple received an accession of celebrity. According to the hymn to Apollo, ascribed to Homer, the temple of the deity was built of stone in that early age. Soon after it received increased importance from the protection which the Amphictyonic council extended to it. The Dorian conquest, however, seems to have been the fortunate circumstance that principally spread its fame and enlarged its influence. From that period, nothing of moment within the states of Greece was undertaken without first consulting the oracle of Delphi. In circumstances of doubt, anxiety, and distress, Delphi was the refuge!

Some of the responses of the oracle of Delphi appear at first sight extremely remarkable; and Dr. Hales adduces them as a proof that the Almighty sometimes interposed, as in the case of the Persian war, when the Athenians were fighting for their religion, laws, and liberty, and when the Pythoness after having made a terrible response, relaxed in her vigour, and uttered this —

"Pallas, in vain, the fix'd decree of Jove,
With much entreaty, and with anxious care,
Decreates of adamant almost is my reply
When all the rest is lost within the bounds
Of Cecrop's hilly land, and of Cithæra's mount,
To Pallas still all-seeing Jove reserves
A wooden wall, alone impregnable
Thee, and thy children too, this shall protect
Stay not, nor wait the approach of horse and foot,
A mighty army from the continent [of Asia] retire,
And turn thy back, the time will come,
When thou shalt fate them yet O Salamis divine,
The sons of women shalt thou destroy [by sea]
Whether Ceres shall scatter or collect [by land]"

Remarkable as this may appear, there is nothing but what may be accounted for. The sagacious Themistocles is said to have interpreted this ambiguous oracle thus — "the wooden walls to denote their fleet, and that victory was promised to the Athenians because of the epithet "divine," which, otherwise would rather have been styled the unfortunate Salamis. But what says the more sagacious Plutarch? That he shrewdly suspected the Pythian was indoctrinated by Themistocles, on this occasion, to suggest the most advantageous stand for their scanty fleet, in the narrow seas against the Persian armada. Themistocles saw that these narrow seas afforded the only chance of success against so powerful an enemy, and therefore he adopted this plan to revive the drooping spirits of his countrymen. To ascribe such responses as these to the Almighty appears to be fallacious, if not impious.

The prophecies appear to have been delivered with great caution and judgment. care was taken that the event should correspond with the prediction. There were only a few days in the year on which the god might be interrogated, and these the priests contrived to have variable at their discretion. Previous sacrifices, moreover, were necessary, and if the victims were not favourable no response was given. Thus the priests had it always in their power to deny,

delay, or give answers direct, as they judged most advantageous for the credit of their oracle. And even when they gave answers they would often give them in a doubtful sense, or in a manner in which there might be a double interpretation applied to them. With frequent opportunities, therefore, of ensuring a true reply, the Oracle avoided all risk of being convicted of giving one that was false. And it was this that raised the merit of the Delphian oracle above all others in Greece: the priests were more clever and judicious than the priests of other temples.

The Pythoness was chosen from among mountain cottagers. Originally a young girl was adopted, but afterwards it was ordained that no Pythoness should be appointed under fifty years of age. The office appears to have been very far from desirable. Priests, entitled prophets, led her to the sacred tripod, and held her there till her phrenzy rose to the desired height. To secure themselves from the noxious vapours was not difficult; but there are accounts of Pythonesses expiring almost immediately after they had quitted, and even on the tripod. The broken accents which the poor creatures uttered in their agonies were collected and arranged by the prophets, or priests, and then promulgated, generally in verse, as the answer of the god. Perhaps in very few instances were their ravings given entire, and if they were it may be suspected that they had been before instructed what to utter. The substance might have been given them which they were only able from their agonies to deliver in fragments.

Among the other remarkable oracles of Greece were those of Trophonius in Bœotia; the Branchids, in the neighbourhood of Miletus, and the oracles of Bacis, Claros, and Amphiaraus. The responses were given in all these under similar circumstances to those given at Delphi. All were under the immediate influence of "the father of lies," who was suffered thus to deceive the pagan world. For whether the responses were dictated by demons, as some suppose, or wicked men, they emanated from that grand deceiver of mankind,—“the old serpent, the devil, and Satan.” Thus the Almighty, showing the falsehood of the predictions of diviners, says of them, by the prophet Isaiah,—

“I am the Lord that maketh all things,
That stretcheth forth the heavens alone;
That spreadeth abroad the earth by myself,
That frustrateth the tokens of the liars,
And maketh diviners mad.”—*Casp.* xlv. 24, 25.

And again, in allusion to the fact that the heathen gave their oracles in secret places and in the obscurity of caves, he says, by the same prophet,—

“I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth.”—*Casp.* xlv. 19.

“I have not spoken in secret from the beginning.”
Casp. xlvi. 16.

And this difference is made manifest throughout the wide range of sacred history. The accounts of the lively or divine responses communicated to Adam, Gen. iii. 10—20; to the Antediluvians, Gen. vi. 3; to Noah, Gen. vi. 7, 13—22, vii. 1—5; to Job, xxxiii. 14—30; to Abraham, Gen. xii. 1, xv. 1—15, etc.; to Abimelech, Gen. xx. 3—6;

to Rebecca, xxv. 23; to Isaac, Gen. xxvi. 2—5, 24; to Jacob, Gen. xxviii. 12—17, xxxii. 1, 2, xxxv. 1—15, etc.; to Laban, Gen. xxxii. 24; to Moses, Exod. iii. 1—22, iv. 1—16, etc.; to Balaam, Numb. xxii. xxiii.; to Joshua, Josh. v. 13—15; to Gideon, Judges vi. 11—18; to Manoah and his wife, Judges xiii. 2—20; to Samuel, 1 Sam. iii. 4—14; to Nathan, 2 Sam. vii. 4—16; to Solomon, 1 Kings, iii. 5—14; to Elijah, 1 Kings, xviii. 1; to Isaiah, Isa. vi. 8—13; to Nebuchadnezzar, Dan. iv. 4—27; to Belshazzar, Dan. v.; to Daniel, Dan. vii., viii., ix.; to Christ at his baptism, transfiguration, and near the close of his ministry, Matt. iii. 16, 17, xvii. 1—7; Luke xxii. 43; to Paul, Acts ix. 4—19; and to John in the Apocalypse,—show that the Almighty either appeared face to face with man or in visions of the night, or communicated his will to man through the medium of angels, his ministering spirits. When he communicated his will, also, through his servants the prophets, unlike the priests of the heathen oracles, they gave their divine answers in an equal and calm tone of voice, and with holy tranquillity and dignity.

The overthrow of oracles occurred at the commencement of the Christian era. Thus Strabo, who was contemporary with Christ, says, “Divination and oracles were formerly more in estimation among the ancients, but are now held in much indifference. wherefore the oracle of Ammon, which was formerly esteemed, has almost ceased; and the sacred oracle at Delphi is neglected, which before was exceedingly esteemed.” Plutarch, also, who died A. D. 119, writes to the same effect:—“It is needless to inquire here about the cessation of oracles, since we see a failure of them all, except one or two; the rest being silent or wholly deserted.” Though ignorant of the cause of this happy consummation, these pagan writers, nevertheless, saw, and wondered at the change. So true is the word of the Most High, and so marvellous are the ways of his providence. Before Him both the pagan and the Christian world must bow in humble silence, and confess their ignorance and impotence.

It has been seen that in the Homeric age the Greeks were firm believers in accidental omens. Thunder, lightning, eclipses, and even the flight of a bird at a critical juncture, were observed with intense anxiety. After this, the various appearances of a victim in the several stages of a sacrifice were believed to indicate the mind of the deity to whom it was offered. Hence arose a system of experimental divination, which, in later times, afforded employment for a large class of soothsayers. A victim was sacrificed on great occasions, as the eve of an expedition or a battle, for the purpose of ascertaining the event by the inspection of its entrails. The interpreters who observed and explained these signs did not usually pretend to inspiration, but professed to found their predictions or explanations on rules discovered by experience. And this sometimes extended to the flight of birds, the changes of the atmosphere, and the heavenly bodies. All these were occasionally subject to deliberate consideration. Thus, some birds fur-

nished omens from their chattering, as crows, owls, etc.; others, from the direction in which they flew, as eagles, vultures, hawks, etc. An eagle seen to the right was fortunate; a raven seen on the left hand was unfortunate. The sight of an eagle was supposed to foretell to Tarquinius Priscus that he should obtain the crown; it predicted also the conquests of Alexander, and the loss of their dominions to Tarquin the proud, and Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse.

That such superstitious as these should exercise the sagacity and acuteness of philosophers and scholars may well excite surprise. It is a reproach to human reason, that it should thus regard the absurd reasonings of augurs and soothsayers, and espouse with blind devotion such ridiculous puerilities. Generals, politicians, philosophers, and monarchs, have all become slaves to such absurd imaginations. Even the estimable and sage Plutarch relates that he abstained from eating eggs on account of a dream!

Notwithstanding, there are many instances on record in which the minds of pagans rose superior to this popular and degrading superstition. Cato maintained that one soothsayer could not look at another without laughing, Hannibal wondered at the simplicity of Prusias, whom he had advised to give battle, upon his being diverted from it by the inspection of the entrails of a victim, and Cicero, in one of his treatises, proved to demonstration, the falsity, contrariety, and impossibility of the art of divination.

At the same time, those sages or generals who disbelieved the science of augures maintained its utility. Policy taught them to observe its most trivial ceremonies, in order to subject the minds of the vulgar to themselves, and to reconcile them to their own purpose. They knew that superstition was a mighty engine, whereby they could impel the minds of the mass to work out their designs, and therefore, though they laughed behind the scene, when they stood before the people they joined in the absurd ceremonies of divination with a grave countenance. Even Cicero, in the midst of all his cogent arguments, takes occasion to blame those generals who on important conjunctures had contemned the prognostics, and to maintain that the use of them, though in itself an abuse, ought nevertheless to be respected out of regard to religion and the prejudices of the people. So wise to work evil was the pagan world!

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENTS IN GREECE

It has been seen what forms of government existed among the Greeks in the heroic ages: in this chapter we shall describe those forms which prevailed in the later ages among the various states which composed the Greek nation.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SPARTA.

The government of Sparta before the days of Lycurgus may be described as a democracy

with two hereditary magistrates or kings at its head. The first *Astro* or laws which he established tended to restore the mild moderation of the mixed government which distinguished the heroic ages. They confirmed the hereditary honours, but abolished the despotism of kings; they enforced the obedience, but vindicated the liberty, of the people.

The change in the constitution of Sparta appears to have been thus brought about. For two centuries after the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus, history exhibits little else than the repeated wars of the Spartans with their Argive neighbours. These domestic broils, however, which were occasioned by the unequal division of property, by the frauds and the diminished power of the kings, were the origin of that constitution to which Sparta was principally indebted for her subsequent splendour. It was formed at the end of that time, about B. C. 880, by Lycurgus, the uncle and guardian of the minor king Charilaus, in order to prevent the fatal consequences which it was evident to him would otherwise occur.

"The laws of Lycurgus," says Muller, "were calculated to found on the ruins and wishes of all other men, and with the appearance of rude and barbarous manners, an heroic character, in which the pride of being Lacedæmonians was the only sentiment." It is probable that he obtained this idea from Lycus, in Crete, where he had family connexions, as Minos himself received instruction from the Egyptians. It is probable, also, that a secret association—a powerful instrument of revolution—facilitated the change he desired in the public opinion. A more powerful instrument in his hands, however, was superstition. Before he exercised his authority as a reformer, he went to Delphi to procure the sanction of the oracle to his institutions, and he received this reply—"That he was singularly favoured by the gods, himself more god than man, and that it should be given him to establish the most excellent of all systems of government." Fortified by this authority, Lycurgus proceeded, first, to remodel the government of Sparta; secondly, to regulate wealth and possessions; and thirdly, to reform education and manners. The constitution of Lycurgus thus formed is described by Thirlwall as a prodigy of art, on which we gaze as on an Egyptian pyramid.

The first of the ordinances for which Lycurgus procured the sanction of the oracle, directed, that assemblies of the people should be held periodically in a field near the city, and that the magistrate who convened them should have the right of proposing measures, and the people assembled the power of approving or rejecting. It appears, however, that the assembly could only express the general will by its vote, and that this assembly did not comprise the whole people. The license of amending a proposition was assumed by the assembly; but this was a departure from the principles of the constitution, and it was subsequently abolished. The ordinary business of this assembly appears to have been the election of magistrates and priests; and to decide questions of war and peace, and their necessary concomitants, imposts, treaties, and such like. Changes in the constitution, and

disputes concerning the succession of the throne, were also decided by the same authority.

Thirlwall supposes that these assemblies of the people had been held for ages at Sparta, and that Lycurgus only regulated them on the authority of the oracle. In like manner he supposes that there had been a council of elders at Sparta from time immemorial; although the Spartan council, called the *gerusia* or senate, is said to have been first instituted by Lycurgus. There is no ancient authority to rest upon in this matter; and, although such may have been the case, it is evident that it was Lycurgus who placed the institution of the senate on a firm basis.

The senate of Sparta was composed of thirty members,—the two kings and twenty-eight nobles. The former possessed an hereditary right to sit in the council, but the latter were elected by the people, without regard to any qualification besides age and merit.

The mode in which the election of these members of the senate took place breathes a spirit of truly primitive simplicity. The candidates, who must be sixty years of age, presented themselves in succession to the assembly, and were received by their fellow citizens with applause proportioned to the esteem in which they were held. These manifestations of feeling were noted by umpires shut up in an adjacent room, where they could hear the shouts, but not see the competitors. He who, in their estimation, had been greeted with the loudest applause, was elected to the office.

The senators held office for life, no provision being made for either decrepitude or dotage. Their functions were threefold. deliberative, judicial, and executive. They prepared measures for the decision of the popular assembly, they exercised a criminal jurisdiction, with the power of inflicting death or civil degradation, without the restraint of written laws, and interposed a kind of patriarchal authority to enforce the observance of ancient usage and discipline.

The two kings were entitled, as in the heroic ages, to be the hereditary presidents of this tribunal. In council, however, the voice of each told for no more than that of the senators. In their absence their place seems to have been supplied by the senators of the same tribe, and it appears probable that the king of the elder house possessed the privilege of giving a casting-vote.

The kings of Sparta also presided in a separate tribunal, which, before the rise of the ephori, seems to have exercised a more extensive civil jurisdiction, but was subsequently confined to questions of inheritance and legal forms connected with the patriarchal character of the kings.

The ephori, which consisted of five annual magistrates, was instituted in order to prevent the kings from arrogating to themselves the whole legislative and executive authority. These magistrates were invested with a temporary power to inspect and control the administration of government, and to maintain the spirit and vigour of the established constitution. To them it belonged to convoke, prorogue, and dissolve the greater
session of the people. Nor was

liberty endangered by this limited prerogative of the kings. Every month they exchanged solemn oaths with the ephori, swearing for themselves to observe the laws of Sparta, while the ephori engaged to maintain the hereditary honours of the Herculean race,—to respect them as ministers of religion, obey them as judges in peace, and to follow them as leaders in war.

Like the kings of the heroic ages, the kings of Sparta, under the constitution of Lycurgus, were the high-priests of the nation, or priests of Jupiter. They had likewise the important charge of consulting the Delphic oracle by officers of their own appointment, and of preserving the answers received.

Although the question of peace or war rested with the nation, the kings of Sparta appear to have had originally the direction of all military operations in conjunction with a council of war. Their military authority seems to have been almost unlimited, especially in foreign expeditions. even at home they were permitted to provide for the maintenance of public roads, and to appoint officers to protect the interests of strangers.

The honours attached to the kingly office exceeded its power. They were not only regarded as the first magistrates, but as persons allied to the gods by their heroic descent. They were not, however, servilely obeyed, as were the Assyrian, Persian, and Parthian monarchs. The Spartans revered their monarchs as became freemen, without degenerating into adulation. Hence the ensigns of the regal dignity were simple. The kings of Sparta were not even distinguished from their fellow-citizens either by dress or mode of living. They were subjected to the laws which regulated the diet of the common freemen; but the state made provision for their maintenance, and for a species of hospitality which they exercised in their capacity of priests. For this purpose, besides the domains assigned to them in the provincial districts, they were entitled to payments in kind, which enabled them to sacrifice to the gods and to entertain their friends.

At every public sacrifice offered by the citizens the kings of Sparta were of right the most honoured guests. To them, also, belonged the highest seat in every assembly, and, before the institution of the ephori, every one rose up at their approach. In the camp they were surrounded by greater state than at home. They were guarded by a chosen band of a hundred men; at their table the principal officers were entertained at the public expense; and to them belonged the right of conducting the general operations of the campaign.

On the accession of the kings of Sparta the public joy was expressed by a release of all debts due from individuals to the state. On their decease the royal obsequies were celebrated by a ten days' intermission of business, and by a general mourning, in which the helots and the provincials were compelled to take the most active part. Thousands of the subject-class, as well as of the helots, attended the funeral, rent the air with their wailings, and proclaimed the virtues of the deceased. "These usages," as Herodotus observes, "have rather an Oriental than a Hellenic aspect, and it is not improbable that they were

derived from the East, whence the people of Greece originally emigrated."

This distribution of power was accompanied by a division of property. It is scarcely possible, however, to ascertain the exact proportion in which the Lacedæmonian territory was distributed in the days of Lycurgus, but it is probable that the tendency of his agrarian regulations was towards a general equality of landed property. It is not clear that for this purpose he was obliged to remove all ancient landmarks, and to make an entirely new partition. On the contrary, he might have found it sufficient to compel the wealthy to resign a part of their dominions for the support of the community; and which might have been lands uncultivated, or unlawfully possessed by them.

According to Plutarch, the whole of Laconia was distributed by Lycurgus into 39,000 parcels, of which 9,000 were assigned to as many Spartan families, and 30,000 to their free subjects. It was a question, however, among the ancients, whether the 9,000 Spartan parcels were all contained in Laconia, or included those acquired in the subjugation of Messenia. There are two accounts on this subject—according to one, 6,000 parcels were assigned by Lycurgus himself, and 3,000 were added by king Polydorus at the end of the first Messenian war; according to the other, the original number was 4,500, which was doubled by the conquests of Polydorus. The latter opinion seems to be confirmed by the plan of the unfortunate Agis, who proposed to divide the Spartan territory into 9,000 allotments, while he assigned 15,000 to the rural population of Laconia. Aristotle also says of the Spartan territory in Laconia, that it was capable of maintaining 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. All this would tend to disprove that the land was originally divided into 39,000 parcels, as Plutarch intimates.

According to Aristotle, the greater part of Laconia was occupied by the Spartans; and Isocrates observes that their share was the most fertile and valuable. This appears to be correct, if we may judge from the vast population which it supported. At the battle of Plataea each Spartan was attended by seven helots, and it is said that at this period the helots were as three to one to the free Lacomans. Besides, the whole of the land was not in private hands. The state possessed considerable domains, and another portion was set aside for the service of the numerous temples, in the sacrifices of which a large portion of the fruits of the earth was consumed.

The design of this agrarian law seems to have been to introduce an equality in the manner of life among the Spartans, and to destroy the seeds of luxury. But it does not appear to have been deemed sufficient to effect this. The accumulation of what the Greeks called invisible property, *i. e.* gold and silver, might enable the rich to command the services of the poor, and, according to the natural progress of wants and inventions, encourage the pursuits of debilitating pleasure. Hence it was that Lycurgus forbade the use of gold and silver, and made pieces of vitrified iron the current specie.

Some authors say that gold and silver had long been the ordinary measure of exchange in

Sparta; and tradition relates that there was a great accumulation of the precious metals in the hands of individuals. If such was the case, the restriction must have been introduced later than the days of Lycurgus; for it seems probable that the coinage of silver money was unknown to the Greeks for more than a century after; and gold, down to the Persian wars, was so rare as to be out of the reach of a Spartan. Many accounts are given of the introduction of coined money into Greece; but it seems most likely that the Greeks received the art from Lydia, where, as Herodotus informs us, gold and silver were first coined. It is well known that Lydia abounded in gold, and that the most flourishing Greek colonies were situated on the Lydian coast.

At whatever time, however, this restriction was introduced into Greece, it would seem that it only applied to private Spartans. For the provincials, who were often engaged in commerce, gold and silver must have been indispensable; and it cannot be supposed that the legislator imposed any such restriction on the state itself. The kings, indeed, possessed the privilege, in later ages, of amassing wealth; but this may have resulted from subsequent changes in the commonwealth.

The prohibition, doubtless, contributed to preserve their simplicity. At the same time it was attended with a consequence frequently injurious to the public interests. It is in the nature of man to long for objects placed beyond his reach; and it is probable that this was the secret origin of that venality which distinguishes the Spartan character. Avarice was a vice to which a Spartan was most prone, and money, although he had little use for it, a bait which seldom failed of corrupting the noblest patriot in the commonwealth. This would appear a paradoxical statement, if we only regard the proverbial simplicity of the Spartan character, but it is nevertheless true, and proves that the passion of avarice is "all-pervading, and co-extensive with human depravity." The sin of covetousness is not peculiar to a few individuals—the miser who would sell his soul for gold—it pervades the universal breast of man, and unless vanquished by the influence of religion, it will vanquish religion. Our Saviour knew this of mankind, and therefore put these unanswerable questions, "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Matt. xvi. 26.

The usefulness and scarcity of iron rendered it, in early times, an ordinary and convenient measure of exchange. As such it was employed in the heroic ages; though for the most part, where Homer speaks of barter, it is effected in kind. It was also used for the same purpose in Byzantium and other Grecian cities, and that for a long period. And, indeed, the necessity of cooling it in an acid, in order to diminish its worth, indicates its high value even in the time of Lycurgus. The tradition, also, which relates that leather was at one period applied to the same purpose, indicates this fact. The restriction, therefore, was not so violent a measure as some writers imagine. Iron answered the purpose for procuring necessaries; and elegancies and refinements had no existence in Greece during the

age of the Spartan legislator. Notwithstanding, as Gillies observes, "it may reasonably be believed that the use of iron money, which continued permanent in Sparta alone, after the vices of wealth and luxury had polluted the rest of Greece, necessarily repelled from the republic of Lycurgus the votaries of pleasure, the slaves of gain, and the miserable retinue of vanity and folly. That wealth is little coveted which neither gratifies vanity, nor promises the means of pleasure, nor administers to the appetite; whence the current specie of Sparta became the subject of banter and ridicule, when wealth in gold and silver, and universal luxury, had spread over the rest of Greece."

The Spartans, from the earliest ages, were distinguished from the other Greeks by their usages in civil and domestic life; and it is in these that the influence of Lycurgus is generally considered to be the most conspicuous. He seems, however, for the most part, only to have reduced habit and custom to rule and law. He modified and corrected the Spartan manners, and occasionally introduced some new features; but, in the main, the Spartan institutions had their origin in the circumstance, that a handful of men were placed in the midst of a dense population over which they were determined to rule. The essential principle of these institutions was, that the citizen was born only for the state, that his substance, time, strength, faculties, and affections might be employed for its welfare and glory. This principle, however, was not introduced by Lycurgus; he may have embodied it, but he found it already in existence; and the whole system may be very properly termed "the laws of Lycurgus."

The former laws of Lycurgus struck at the root of luxury: his third ordinance aimed at the destruction of every scattered seed, at the annihilation of the use of wealth, and at the desire to possess more than others. It ordained that all, from the kings to their meanest subjects, should eat at public tables only, at which the strictest moderation and frugality should be observed. It is said that none of his laws gave so much offence as this, and that he lost an eye in a tumult arising therefrom; but the historian gravely intimates that, with the aid of Apollo, he established the measure, and even went beyond it; for the more completely to insure equality, and to repress every desire of superfluities, he directed that none should refuse to lend whatsoever he was not using; and that any might take, unasked, whatsoever he wanted, being bound only to replace it unharmed. Private property was, therefore, nearly annihilated by the laws of Lycurgus.

"In thus abolishing distinction of rank," historians say, "Lycurgus sought the elevation of the character of his countrymen; to give every Spartan advantages which in other states fall to the lot of the few; to make the whole people one family, every brother of which should receive a liberal education and live in a liberal manner." *The whole tenor of the Spartan laws seems to have required that every Spartan should be a gentleman. The exercise of mechanical arts, and even of agriculture, was forbidden to them; the*

alone, and for this he was educated in peace and in war. The helots, or slaves, provided for his wants by their industry. The helots, indeed, may be considered to have been the real owners of the land, since they were charged only with the payment of a stated quantity of the produce, with which their lord was to support his household. And this does not appear to have been by any means exorbitant; for the average amount of the rent was no more than was required for the maintenance of a family of six persons. Hence it is evident that the interest which a Spartan had in the lands assigned to him was very limited. Still he lived without labour, which by the Spartans was deemed a happy consumption.

Having established institutions against internal evils arising from wealth—so frequently the source of corruption—Lycurgus provided against external violence; that is, he ordained laws tending to make the Spartans, hitherto warlike, a nation of warriors. He began with the care of children before the birth, by enacting that the mothers should not be engaged in sedentary employments, but should be exercised in running, wrestling, and other gymnastic exercises, etc. As soon as the child was born it was examined by persons appointed for the purpose, and it is said that only the vigorous and well-formed were preserved—those in whom any defect in shape or constitution appeared were exposed to perish in a glen of Mount Taygetus! That ignorance and prejudice might not corrupt what nature had produced excellent, those who were deemed worth preservation were delivered to the care of nurses publicly provided, and properly instructed in the rearing of infants.

Here let us pause for a moment. Lycurgus has been exalted by historians as one of the wisest of mankind, and his laws have been held up as a model of perfection. That the lawgiver was wise cannot perhaps be doubted; but his wisdom, in one feature of his laws, was blended with an ignorance and barbarity unparalleled in history. It has not even expediency for a paltrative, for at that period the Spartan commonwealth had not a superabundant population, and if it had, they might have been easily discharged by the ordinary expedient of colonization. The destruction of infants, therefore, was one of the thousand evils attendant upon the system of paganism; and it was an evil of no ordinary magnitude. To stretch forth the hand of violence against an infant, who should excite affection and pity, bespeaks men dead to natural feeling. It sets forth, in gloomy colours, the depth of human depravity, and at the same time exalts the morality of the Christian religion far above all pagan systems.

At the age of seven years the Spartan boys were placed at public schools, no one being permitted to educate them otherwise than according to the mode prescribed by law. The masters of these schools were always persons of the highest consideration, and the schools were the common resort for those of more advanced age, being enjoined thereto by a principle of patriotism which Lycurgus took pains to inculcate—that they were to consider themselves fathers not of their own children only, but of all those of the common-

wealth. Acting upon this, they were attentive to watch the behaviour of the young, to assist in preserving good order, and to promote the acquisition of the accomplishments that were most highly esteemed. Under the superintendent there were a number of youths, just past the age of twenty, chosen for courage and discretion, who exercised a more immediate command over the classes into which the boys were divided. The leader of each class directed the tasks and sports of his pupils, but was held responsible to his elders for the mode in which his office was discharged.

The Spartan education was simple in its object. its one great aim was to train men to encounter difficulty and danger, and to obtain rule over others. It sought to develop the physical rather than the intellectual powers. The body, the mind, and the character of a Spartan were formed for the defence of himself and his country, and all that was foreign to this main end was rejected in his education. He was probably neither taught to read nor write, and the elements of arts and sciences were almost unknown to him, but he could run, leap, wrestle, hurl the disk or the javelin, and wield other weapons with a vigour, agility, and grace which no Greek could surpass. His fortitude was also brought into lively action. He was taught to suffer with firmness. From his earliest infancy his life was one continued trial of patience. Course and scanty fare, a light dress, a bed of reeds, blows exchanged with his companions, and stripes inflicted by his governors, inured him to every form of pain and hardship.

The following test of passive fortitude was much extolled by the ancients — anterior to the Dorian conquest human victims were offered in Laconia to an image of Artemis, which Orestes was said to have brought from Scythia. This rite was abolished by Lycurgus, but he substituted for it a ferocious contest, in which youths, standing on the altar, presented themselves to the lash, and frequently expired under it without a groan, in order to exhibit their hardihood and to gain the applause of the multitude.

Another usage, equally celebrated, tended to train the youth of Sparta at once to suffering and action. They were compelled, either by the cravings of hunger or by the command of their master, to go out upon foraging excursions. He who was successful gained applause with his booty; but he who was detected was made to smart for the failure. It might seem, indeed, that this practice tended to encourage theft, but if it did, it was intended as a preparation for the hardships of a military life. It is probable that the *Cryptas* was a similar institution to this, but this was made subservient to political purposes.

As the Muses had been made instrumental in the execution of his scheme of reformation, so Lycurgus enlisted their aid in his scheme of education. Like the hero of the *Iliad*, the young Spartan was instructed in music and poetry. He was taught to sing and to play on the flute and the lyre; but the strains with which his memory was stored, and to which his voice was formed, were for the most part martial. It was because they cherished the sentiments of a warrior, that the Homeric lays were early welcomed

at Sparta, and for the same reason the warlike strains of Tyrtæus were held in honour. It is said of the Grecian Orpheus and Tyrtæus that their strains could civilize a multitude, or animate an army to victory.

It is supposed by Thirlwall, that it was for promoting presence of mind and promptness of decision that the Spartan youth were trained to answer all questions proposed, with that sententious brevity which proverbially characterised Spartan conversation. This formed a distinguishing feature in their system of education. The lessons, however, most sedulously cultivated were those of modesty, obedience, and reverence for age and rank. Xenophon observes that the gait and look of the Spartan youths breathed modesty and reserve. In the presence of their elders they were silent as statues, never speaking except when asked a question. The same respect was paid by them to the laws; so that they shrank from dishonour as the most dreadful of evils, and met death calmly when they were fighting for those laws.

When the young Spartan had attained the age of twenty, he was released from the discipline of classes, but was not permitted to appear among the men in the assembly till after he was thirty. During that period it is probable he was employed in all military service required within the frontier, and in seasons of peace his time was principally divided between the exercises of the palaestra and the toils of the chase, lest indolence should unfit him for the duties of a citizen and warrior. These exercises were continued until his sixtieth year, which closed the military age, and even then he did not give himself up to inactivity. If not engaged in the affairs of state, which was his usual reward, he found employment in the superintendence and direction of the young. When all his powers of activity ceased he still enjoyed the society of his equals in the *lesche*, a place dedicated to meetings for public conversation, where he might talk over the scenes of his early youth.

Thus a martial spirit pervaded the whole system of a Spartan's education. His city resembled a camp, and war was the atmosphere which he breathed. It seemed essential to his existence, and when he went to meet his foes he dressed his hair and crowned himself for the strife as for a feast. When he advanced to the mortal struggle, he was calm and cheerful as when he entered the lists for a prize at the public games.

It is perhaps to these characteristics of the Spartan warrior that the apostle Paul alludes, when he exhorts the Christian soldier in his struggle with his three mortal foes, the world, the flesh, and the devil, to "fight manfully," to "endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ," and to make a firm "stand" against them. By bearing in mind what has been said of the Spartan warrior, the Christian may understand what an invincible spirit he should manifest in his spiritual struggle.

The system of Spartan tactics well accorded with the spirit inculcated by the system of education. *The Spartans preserved the same weapons and defensive armour that had been adopted in the heroic ages, reducing only the length of the sword, which was two-edged, pointed, many,*

and designed for cutting or thrusting. Their troops were divided into regiments, consisting of five hundred and twelve men, subdivided into four companies, which companies were divided by their respective officers. The soldiers were attended by artisans and slaves who furnished them with necessary supplies, and were accompanied by priests and poets who flattered their hopes and animated them to valour. A body of three hundred cavalry always preceded their march; they encamped in a circular form; employed out-sentries and videttes; and performed their customary exercises every morning and evening. The strength of the Spartan army lay in its heavy-armed infantry, and no other service was thought equally worthy of the free warrior. The name of a horseman was indeed one of honour; but, notwithstanding the title, they fought on foot, and, if they were mounted, used their horses only on a march, or in executing the king's commissions; whence their title appears almost nominal. From this principle the Spartans shrank from the assault of fortified places, lest they might fall ingloriously by the hands of a woman or child; and hence, also, the sea was an element never congenial to the spirit of Spartan warfare. In the latter service the helots were mostly employed, as they were in the capacity of light troops on land. The superiority of the Spartan infantry, says Thirlwall, depended on a nicely graduated system of subordination, by means of which the orders of the general were rapidly transmitted, and executed with ease and precision. The leader of the *enomoty*, or lower subdivision, was at once the organ which communicated the word of command to his company, and the pivot of the various movements by which its position was adapted to the exigencies of the march or the field. The promptness with which its evolutions were performed and the harmonious combination of the movements of the several subdivisions were promoted greatly by the choral dances, more especially the Pyrrhic war-dance, in which the Spartan youths were constantly exercised.

When the Spartans resolved to attack an enemy, the king usually rose before dawn to seek the favour of the gods by prayer and sacrifice. These duties performed, he communicated his orders to charge in full line, or in columns, according to the nature of the ground and the numbers and disposition of the enemy. As they approached the enemy, the king again offered up sacrifice, the music struck up, and the army advanced with a slow and steady pace and with a cheerful countenance. The watchword of each was "victory or death," or, as the Spartan matron is said to have expressed it, her son was to bring his shield home, or be brought home upon it. To survive the loss of their shield was to incur lasting ignominy; and he who had separated his lot from that of his fellow-combatants in the day of battle became a butt for public scorn and insult throughout life, which many were willing to escape from by voluntary death.

It was one of the maxims of the Spartans to avoid repeated conflicts with the same enemy; and it was a rule with them not to pursue a flying foe further than was necessary for securing

the victory. This does not appear to have arisen from motives of humanity, but from prudence; and to the same principle may be ascribed another injunction peculiar to Spartan warfare, which enjoined that the slain should not be stripped before the end of the battle. When they were stripped, proper officers were appointed to receive and divide the spoil, and to decide the contested prizes of valour.

In the wide range of history there is not another such instance of the hardening effects of war upon the human mind as that which is displayed in the Spartan commonwealth. In the days of their glory they were so seldom defeated that they were little elated by success. They looked upon it as a matter of course that they should trample upon their foes; whence even an important victory was only celebrated by the sacrifice of a cock, and the bearer of the tidings procured no greater reward than a dash of meat from the table of the ephori.

It is not known how far the treatment of slaves among the Spartans was prescribed by Lycurgus. If, however, he did not define those hateful laws, afterwards so prevalent in the commonwealth, they proceeded from his system. In the Grecian states slaves were derived from two sources they were either purchased barbarians, or descendants of subdued Greeks. All the Spartan slaves appear to have been of this latter kind. The institutions of Lycurgus must necessarily have occasioned an alteration in the condition of these slaves. Thus, husbandry and mechanical arts being assigned to them alone, their consequence in the state must have been increased; but as private property was nearly annihilated, every slave became the property of freemen. In proportion, however, as their consequence increased, it was thought necessary to look upon them with a jealous eye, and thus every helot was narrowly watched. This feeling of jealousy continued to grow stronger and stronger, until a system of cruelty towards them was established by law. They were treated not only with universal contumely, but the hateful *Cryptia* put the dagger into the hands of the youthful Spartans to destroy by stealth all those helots in whom any superiority of spirit or genius had been observed, and thus thousands perished.

Such were the leading features of the laws of Lycurgus—laws which have been lauded with so much eloquence by the pens of historians from the earliest ages. There is doubtless much pagan wisdom displayed therein, and they bear the stamp of a master genius; but, when tried by the laws of the gospel, they not only sink into insignificance, but the mark of shame must be branded upon them. These observations apply with peculiar force to the immodest enactments of Lycurgus concerning the education and the marriage of the weaker sex. Of these unchaste laws we blush to speak; but compare them with the commands of God, which are pure, (Pa. xix. 8.) and the dignity and excellence of the Christian religion are illustrated by the contrast. The same pre-eminence appears if we compare the most admired part of the institutions of Lycurgus with the precepts of the gospel. With the sword in his hand the Spartan legislator reduced the commonwealth to a kind of voluntary poverty;

but the Christian legislator, by a simple precept, has stimulated thousands in all ages to deny themselves and to follow him—well contented to bear his cross in poverty and want. The one system was human; the other, Divine.

It is said that Lycurgus did not commit any of his laws to writing, and even enjoined that they should never be inscribed upon any other tablet than that of the memory of his countrymen. He doubtless perceived that their security depended, not on stones nor parchment, but upon the national feeling; and it was, perhaps, with the view of preserving this in its full vigour and purity that the citizens were forbidden to travel without leave of the magistrates, and that the presence of foreigners was discouraged.

Lycurgus, having established this constitution, is said to have summoned an assembly of the people and addressed them thus.—“The laws which I have founded prove, upon experience, good, and will go far towards insuring virtue and happiness to my fellow-countrymen. I have yet one thing to propose which I will not venture to do till I have consulted the oracle. For this purpose I will go to Delphi, and in the meantime you shall promise not to alter anything before my return.” This was agreed to by solemn oath; and after Lycurgus had consulted the oracle, he sent its response, which was, that the constitution of Sparta would insure happiness and glory to the state as long as it remained entire. He determined never to return he had completed what he esteemed sufficient for his life; and, agreeably to the doctrine and spirit of the age, and to the Stoic philosophy of after-times, he submitted to a voluntary exile, or, as some assert, a voluntary death. Lycurgus was influenced by a conviction that the duration of the government which he had established would be better secured by the sanctity of an oath, than by the influence of his own personal interference. This showed at least his sagacity, for the event corresponded to his expectations. His constitution existed, without any material change, for four hundred years, in the midst of the strife which rent in pieces the other Grecian states. Thus, however, chiefly arose from the Spartans’ success in arms. Formed by education for the camp, they, as may be seen in the narrative, stood for the most part firm against the shocks of the various wars in which they were involved, and hence their constitution remained undisturbed. When at length they were subdued, then the whole fabric which Lycurgus had erected passed away for ever.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS.

The government existing at Athens in its palmy days was that which is usually called the laws of Solon. The main object of his new constitution was to abolish the oppressive aristocracy which had existed in Athens from the earliest ages of its civil history. His laws were twofold—provisional and fundamental; under which heads they may be here described.

Provisional laws.—In proceeding to this first part of legislation, Solon held a middle course between two extremes. At the time he commenced his task the rich tyrannised over the poor, and the

poor continually threatened the safety of the rich. The rapacity of creditors was unlimited. They compelled their debtors to cultivate their lands like beasts of burden, and to transfer to them their sons and daughters, whom they exported as slaves to foreign countries. Thus oppressed, the populace had determined no longer to submit to such rigour, and, before the wisdom of the lawgiver interposed, they had resolved to elect a leader, to exterminate their oppressors, and to establish an equal partition of lands. And even when they had chosen Solon to arbitrate their differences, the needy desired that all debts should be cancelled, and that the lands of the rich should be confiscated and divided among them. Solon, however, resisted these demands. He maintained the ancient division of property, and enacted a law for the relief of debtors, not so much by cancelling their debts, as by diminishing their amount by a rise in the value of money; that is, he established the rate of interest at twelve per cent., and forbade that the debtor should become the slave of his creditor, or be compelled to sell his children into servitude. It would also seem that those who had sold their debtors into slavery were compelled to procure their freedom at their own expense, and that the debt itself in such cases was held to be extinguished. Solon, moreover, released the pledged lands from their incumbrances and restored them to their owners. This had a happy effect in Attica, as may be gathered from a poem Solon afterwards composed, wherein he speaks of the numerous citizens whose lands he had discharged and whose persons he had emancipated from the bonds of hopeless slavery.

Having effected this great measure, Solon proceeded to abolish the statutes of Draco—those against murder excepted. These were, in fact, not introduced, but retained by Draco, and hallowed by time and religion. As a natural consequence of this measure, he also published an amnesty, which restored those citizens who had been deprived of their franchise for lighter offences, and recalled those who had been exiled. This indulgence was probably extended to the house of Megacles, called the *Alemonids*, as well as to the partners of his guilt and punishment. The city, being freed from anarchy, might be supposed to be no longer endangered by their presence, while it was liable to be disturbed by their machinations so long as they remained in exile. Their enmity was converted into friendship by their restoration.

Fundamental laws.—These laws had reference to the constitution, and to private life and private rights.

In ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the slaves were four times more numerous than the freemen; and of the latter it may be computed that little more than one half were entitled to any share in the government. Strangers, and all who could not ascertain their Athenian descent, were totally excluded from the assembly and courts of justice. Solon somewhat modified this state of affairs. While his regulations tended to preserve the pure blood of Athens, he admitted foreigners to the rank of citizens, if they abandoned their native country for ever, and professed the knowledge of some useful or

ingenious art. They were, however, to be chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six thousand Athenians.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to property:—The *Pentakosiomedimni*, or those whose estates yielded a net yearly income or rent of five hundred measures* of dry or liquid produce. 2. The *Equites*, whose estates yielded four fifths of this amount. 3. The *Zeuigia*, who had three fifths. And 4. The *Thetes*, whose yearly revenue fell below that of the third, and who, according to their name, consisted of hired labourers in husbandry.

All these four classes of citizens were alike admitted to vote in the public assembly and in the courts of judicature. None but citizens of the first three classes, however, could sit in the senate, decide in the Areopagus, or hold any other office of state. The institutions of the senate and of the Areopagus were established or confirmed, in order to secure the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, which might arise from putting so much power into the hands of the multitude.

The senate, or council of four hundred,† enjoyed the prerogatives of convoking the popular assembly; of examining all matters before they were committed to the decision of the people; and of making laws by its sole authority, which had force during a year. Besides this general superintendence, the senate were also invested with various branches of the executive power. Thus they alone had the power of building ships, they equipped fleets and armies, seized and confined state criminals, and examined and punished offences not expressly forbidden by the judicature. The president of the senate, moreover, had the custody of the public archives and treasury.

As the institution of the senate, so the foundation of the Areopagus is attributed to Solon; but it is certain that Mars' Hill, whereon they sat, had been, from time immemorial, the seat of a highly revered criminal court of justice. He made, however, some important changes in its constitution which entirely altered its aspect in the page of history. Hitherto it had been a mere tool in the hands of the aristocracy; but Solon rendered it the keystone of his constitution.

As Solon constituted it, the Areopagus was composed of retired archons; and it remained not only the supreme tribunal in capital cases, but was likewise charged with the superintendence of morals, with the censorship of the archons who went out of office; and it had the prerogative of amending or rescinding the measures that had been approved by the people. "The power of this court," says Heeren, "might at first have been thought too extensive, had not

experience shown the fatal consequences of the reduction of that power by Pericles." He adds, "This alloy of aristocracy and democracy gives proof of a deep insight into the nature of republican constitutions; but Solon is not less entitled to praise for his endeavours to place the helm of government in the hands of the most enlightened and prudent citizens."

The principal magistrates of Athens were the nine archons. The first of these gave his name to the year, and presided in the civil courts of justice, where a committee of the people, chosen from all classes by lot, sat as judges and jury; except where it belonged to the archon and a body called assessors, who were appointed by suffrage, and acquainted with the forms of law, to prescribe the form of action, give the ballot, and receive and declare the verdict and sentence of the court. The archon next in dignity had the appellation of king, and presided in causes respecting religion and sacred things, which formed an important branch of Athenian jurisprudence. The third archon in dignity, with the generals of the army, who were constituted his assessors, presided in military matters. The six remaining archons heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the six courts, in which criminal causes were examined and determined. As before the days of Solon, these archons were chosen annually; and, like all other Athenian magistrates, were, at the expiration of their office, accountable to the people for their conduct. If they merited public approbation and gratitude, they were elected as members of the Areopagus.

Such are the leading features of the constitution established by Solon. By it every citizen enjoyed the privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to which he had given his assent. Although the legislative and judicial powers were in the hands of the people, men of wealth and ability alone were entrusted with the administration of government; and this tended to give an impulse to industry, and to foster frugality. The citizens, seeing that wealth paved the road to power, stretched every nerve to become entitled to a share of those honours to which persons of estate only could hope to attain. Contentment was also engendered thereby; for, as the meanest saw that power was within his grasp, he envied not those who had already gained that proud pre-eminence.

The laws of Solon were of an extensive nature: they not only comprehended rules of right, but of private life. In them are discovered maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts for agriculture. To describe these would be explaining those familiar principles concerning marriage, succession, testaments, the rights of persons and things, which, through the medium of the laws of the Romans, have been introduced into the jurisprudence of civilised Europe; a few of their leading features, therefore, only require notice.

In the education of the Athenian youth, Solon was by no means so rigid in his regulations as the Spartan lawgiver; but showed himself more liberal and wise. He did not train them for war alone, although the state of society required that this should form a feature in his

* These measures exceeded our bushel by six pints and a fraction.

† Although this council is uniformly attributed to Solon, yet he appears only to have changed its constitution. Thus the case of the Almoenida was referred to an aristocratical tribunal of three hundred persons, which proves that similar institutions existed in the earlier ages. It may, therefore, be said that he improved, and not created it; that is, he enlarged their numbers, etc., as Cleisthenes did in later ages.

system; nor did he neglect the more noble, useful, and polite arts. He seems to have desired to train them up as citizens, not only of Athens, but of the world.

The youth among the Athenians were left to the care of their parents and guardians till the age of sixteen, when the state compelled their attendance for two years, at the gymnastic schools, where they were trained to manly exercises under approved masters. At the age of eighteen they became masters of their patrimonies, and entered upon what may be deemed the commencement of their military service. They were sent into the country to keep watch and ward in the towns and fortresses on the coast and frontier, and to perform any task required for the protection of Attica. This service lasted two years, at the end of which time they were permitted to share the rights and duties of citizens, as regards voting and speaking in the general assembly.

But while the body was trained for military exercises, the Athenian lawgiver did not neglect the mind. Reading and learning by heart the precepts and examples of the poets, made way for the more rigorous studies of eloquence and philosophy. Music, geometry, and drawing, seem also to have entered into the plan of education. Conceiving rightly that music is calculated to calm the passions, soften the manners, and humanize even barbarous nations, the Greeks in general, at a later date, considered music as an essential part of education. Socrates learned the art at an advanced age; Themistocles, though otherwise esteemed, was deemed deficient in polite accomplishments because he could not play upon the lyre; and the great Epaminondas was praised for dancing and playing skilfully upon the flute.

This passion for music and the dance led, however, to great evils in the state. At first they were confined to the feasts and ceremonies of religion and the field of battle; but, in process of time, they took possession of the stage, and were made to administer to voluptuousness and sensual pleasure.

Pintarch, in lamenting that the art of dancing was much fallen from the merit which rendered it estimable to the great men of antiquity, observes, that it was corrupted by a vicious kind of poetry, and a soft effeminate music, which had taken place of the ancient poetry and music, which had something noble, majestic, and heavenly in them. He adds, that being made subservient to voluptuousness and sensuality, it exercised, by their aid, a kind of tyrannical power on the stage, which had become a public school of criminal passions and gross vices.

The love which the Greeks possessed for theatrical amusements in the later ages seems to have had a great effect upon the national character. By it they became enervated, and no longer the stern sons of liberty as in ancient times. It was from this cause, perhaps, that Philip finally triumphed over their liberties; for, had they possessed the patriotic sentiments of their forefathers, when Xerxes in vain endeavoured to put the yoke of Persia about their necks, it would scarcely have been possible for him to have triumphed over the Greek states.

Hence the reader may learn how great danger there is in giving up the heart to sinful amusements. When the Spartan Demaratus was asked his opinion of a celebrated singer, he replied, "that he seemed to trifle very well." But this "to trifle" may lead to the most baneful consequences. A Christian poet writes.—

"With caution taste the sweet Circean cup.
He that sips often at last drinks it up.
Habits are soon assumed, but when we strive
To strip them off, 'tis being flay'd alive.
Call'd to the temple of impure delight,
He that abstains, and he alone, does right.
If a wish wander that way, call it home,
He cannot long be safe whose wishes roam.
But if you pass the threshold, you are caught—
Die then—if power Almighty save you not."

COWPER

How many souls have been ruined to all eternity by our public places of amusement! Religion, and even morality, have been undermined by them, and the bud of youthful promise withered by their influence. How carefully, then, should such places of public amusement be avoided! for desires once gratified there may lead to final and irrevocable ruin. Many have probably conceived a wish to visit them once for the sake only of observing their nature, and from that ill-conceived wish have dated their ruin. The path of moral turpitude is a downward course, and he who takes one step in it will be more likely to proceed onward than to retrace that false step. For the pleasures of the world have more charms in them for man in a state of nature than the pleasures of religion and virtue, although there can be no comparison between them as to the true delight they bring to the soul here, and their final results. The pleasures of the world have "vanity and vexation of spirit" stamped upon them, but the pleasures of religion bring with them solid satisfaction and lasting peace. Oh, how little do they know of the true measure of enjoyment, who can compare the delights of a life of godliness with the frivolous and transitory pleasures of dissipation or the coarse gratifications of sensuality! As the reader, therefore, values the happiness of his soul both in time and in eternity, let him, like Moses, choose "rather to suffer affliction with the people of God than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season, esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt, for he had respect unto the recompense of the reward."—Heb. xi. 25, 26.

Solon made regulations for the government of females, the general objects of which were to restrain the license they had possessed before his time, and which they had often abused to the injury of public morals. Officers were appointed to enforce the observance of these regulations, and they tend to show that the Attic women were far from being subject to that jealous exclusion which history generally represents. While their liberties were abridged, it appears to have been in a wholesome manner. For instance, they were forbidden to pass through the streets by night, except in a carriage, and with a light carried before them; to disfigure their persons, and to wail with frantic or studied vehemence at funerals; and to go abroad with more

than three changes of apparel, and a stated quantity of provisions.

Solon appears to have been the first to perceive the peculiar advantages of the maritime position of Attica. He also laid the foundation of the Attic navy, by charging the forty-eight sections, called *naukracies*, into which the tribes had been divided for financial purposes, each with the equipment of a galley, as well as with two horsemen. He likewise gave active encouragement to trades and manufactures, and with this view foreigners were invited to settle in Attica, by the assurance of protection, and by larger privileges. This protection and these privileges, however, seem scarcely to have been extended to them. In Athens, as throughout Greece, although foreigners were permitted to settle, they were still distinguished by a broad line from the citizens. They were restrained from acquiring property in land; were compelled to purchase the shelter they received from the state by the payment of an annual sum, in default of which they were liable to be sold as slaves: and obliged to place themselves under the guardianship of a citizen, who was their formal representative in the courts of justice. Certain duties, also, which these resident aliens were subject to, marked the inferiority of their condition. Thus, at the Panathenaic festival they were compelled to bear a part of the sacred utensils, and their wives and daughters waited on the Attic women. But all this appears rather to have been an innovation of a later date, when the value of the civic franchise had been increased; for Solon, as before recorded, admitted many to the freedom of the city, and placed them, with respect to taxation, on a level with the citizens.

Other laws of Solon related to quarrels, dissensions, marriages, adultery, testaments, arts, trades, industry, idleness, the rewards at the Isthmian and Olympic games, etc. Many of these, however, are ill-defined, and in some there is a great mixture of light and darkness, knowledge and error. For instance, in his laws concerning slaves, he recognised the atrocious cruelty of allowing evidence to be wrung from them by torture, without even the excuse of necessity or probable advantage. For though they might offer that evidence freely, it was rejected as worthless, unless it came through the medium of the rack.

It is said by Plutarch, that Solon enacted his laws to remain in force for a century only. This is disproved by the provisions he made for their revision and amendment. They were inscribed on wooden tablets arranged in pyramidal blocks turning on an axis, and were kept at first in the Acropolis, and afterwards, for more convenient inspection, in the Prytaneum, which stood below the Acropolis, and near the Agora.

The usurpation of Pisistratus, though it destroyed for a period the political liberty of Athens, gave stability to most of the laws and forms introduced by Solon, whence their establishment cannot be ascribed to the measures of the lawgiver. The most wise and prudent cannot provide against the contingencies of the future. Events are ever occurring in this world which set all human wisdom and counsels at naught; and though these contributed for a brief season to establish the laws of Solon, yet, as

regards Athens, they were ultimately overthrown.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ELIS.

The Eleans were in a great degree a secluded people. Mostly attached to rural business and rural pleasures, they confined their ambition to the privilege allowed them of taking precedence in the splendid assembly of the principal people from every Grecian state at the Olympian festival, and to the respect in which their character was universally held. Their very territories were held to be hallowed; and when the armies of Greece had occasion to cross any part of them, they surrendered their arms on entering, in trust, to receive them again when they had passed the borders. Yet restless spirits were among them, for they often engaged as auxiliaries in the wars of other states, especially in those waged in the cause of religion.

During several generations the government of Elis was monarchical. Its various cities were united under one form of government in the line of Oxylius. At length, however, the spirit of democracy prevailed there as elsewhere. Every considerable town claimed independency, and Pisa and Elis became separate commonwealths, under two chiefs, who held the dignity of *hellanodices*, and who were the judges in the Olympic games. Thus matters continued until Pisa was destroyed, through the strife arising from this division when the *Hellanodices* were selected by lot from Elean officers. The constitution of Elis was evidently rigidly aristocratical. Thus, Aristotle says that the whole number of citizens exercising any political function was small, and Thucydides confines that number to six hundred. The senate was originally composed of ninety members, who held their office for life, but the numbers before the Persian war had been gradually reduced to a few. At that time the inhabitants of many villages were collected in the precincts of Elis, and another change took place in its constitution, rendering it more democratical. Henceforth the number of the *Hellanodices* corresponded to that of the tribes or regions into which the Elean territory was divided, as were the matrons who presided at the games in honour of *Heré*, in which the Elean virgins contended at Olympia. These tribes, or regions, appear to have varied in number at different times, which may have arisen from the chance of war. At first there appears to have been twelve, but afterwards there were nine; whence also there was a variation in the number of the *Hellanodices*. Pausanias, indeed, speaks of nine, in the room of two, who held that office for a long time; but his text manifestly requires some correction—it is evident that the twelve ruled first, and then the nine. Of the twelve regions, four belonged to Elis, four to Pisa, and four to the Triphylian states; and it was these last that often changed masters in the wars between Elis and her neighbours, and thereby caused the confusion.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ARCADIA.

It is not certain whether Arcadia was ever subject to a single king, which seems to be inti-

mated by some accounts of its early history. If at all, it was, as in Thessaly, by an occasional election, or a temporary usurpation. Still the title of king was not everywhere abolished, until a much later period, for it was retained at Orchomenus even in the fifth century B.C. Perhaps Mitford may be correct when he states that Arcadia was early divided into many small states, of which some long retained the regal form of government; or, to use terms more analogous to circumstances, they were under the rule of chiefs, like the Scottish highland lairds. Afterwards, it would appear that the principal Arcadian cities collected on their sides several villages, and established a form of government half aristocratical and half democratical. Thus five villages were united to Mantinea, and nine to both Tegea and Heræa. The history of these states, and their peculiar form of governments, are, however, wrapped in deep obscurity, which was broken in the fourth century B.C. by the foundation of a new capital. This arises chiefly from the country being wholly mountainous, and the people mostly herdsmen, whence the towns were small, and the manners of the inhabitants rude and unpolished.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ACHÆA.

According to Polybius, the regal dignity in Achæa was transmitted in the line of Tisamenus down to Oxyges, whose sons, affecting despotic power, were deposed, and the government was changed to a democracy. Strabo confirms this testimony; but from Pausanias it would seem that the title of king had been held by a number of petty chiefs at once, and what they term a democracy may have been a liberal form of oligarchy. Their republic was composed of twelve cities, namely, Patræ, Dyme, Pharæ, Tritæa, Leontium, Ægira, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Ceryneæ, Olenus, and Helice. These were all standing in the time of Polybius except the two latter, and they were united as a republic until after the death of Alexander, when the union was dissolved by various contests and dissensions raised among them, chiefly through the arts of the kings of Macedonia. Of the details of the republic, however, nothing is known, nor is the relation in which the twelve principal cities stood to the hamlets, of which each had seven or eight in its territory, recorded.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGOLIS.

The government of Argolis is said to have become republican as early as the death of Crisus, son of Temenus the Heraclid. But this does not appear to be correct. Regal government subsisted in Argos down to the Persian wars, although the line of the Heraclid princes appears to have become extinct toward the middle of the preceding century.

The causes which led to the downfall of monarchy in Argolis are briefly these. About the year B.C. 750, Pheidon extended the power of Argos further than any of his predecessors, and at the same time stretched the royal authority so much that he was looked upon as a tyrant. Accordingly, after his death, his successors were regarded with suspicion. They were unable,

indeed, to maintain the ascendancy which he had gained over his Dorian subjects; and the royal dignity was little more than a title. From this cause, when the ancient line failed, about B.C. 560, Ægon was elected to the throne, with limited authority; and finally, there was an entire change in the form of government. The substance of power rested with the Dorian freemen, but in what manner it was distributed among them is unknown. One thing, however, is certain; Argolis was as unhappy under its republican government at home, as it was impotent abroad. Eventually every little town resisted the Argive dominion. Mycenæ long asserted independency; Asinæa and Nauplia were preserved only by the expulsion of the inhabitants; and Hermione, Trœzen, Epidaurus, Phlius, and Sicyon, members of the state under the Heraclid dominion, early separated after the abolition of hereditary monarchy, and always maintained themselves as self-governed republics.

Epidaurus is celebrated for its connexion with the island of Ægina, over which it long held dominion. Towards the end, however, of the seventh century B.C., and the beginning of the next, this union was broken, and the Æginetans retaliated on the Epidaurians for the degradation they had suffered under their rule. About the same time Epidaurus became subject to a ruler named Procles, who is styled a tyrant, and who was allied with Perander, tyrant of Corinth. This was, perhaps, the event which afforded Ægina the opportunity of shaking off the yoke of Epidaurus, although the Æginetans appear to have possessed the power of accomplishing this single-handed; for at that time the island was rapidly outgrowing the mother country, being strong in an enterprising and industrious population—a population enriched by the arts of peace, and skilful in the art of war.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CORINTH.

The descendants of Aletes retained the power and title of royalty at Corinth during five generations, after which, according to Pausanias, the sceptre passed into another family, called the Bacchiads, from Bacchis, the first king of their race. This also continued for five generations, when Telestes, the last king of this race, having been murdered, monarchy was abolished, and in its place yearly magistrates were elected from the house of Bacchis, with the title of Prytanæ.

Although oligarchies were generally odious in Greece, yet Corinth flourished under the Bacchiad prytanæ. Syracuse and Coreyra appear to have been subjected to Corinth under their administration. But the Bacchiads seem not to have been sufficiently careful to preserve the respect of their subjects, and where respect is forfeited there will be no adequate control. From this cause, about B.C. 660, Cypselus, a man of an opulent and ancient family of Æolian nobility, overthrew the Bacchiad dynasty, and in his own person restored monarchy, or, as it became popular to phrase it, tyranny.

Cypselus ruled Corinth for thirty years; and when he died he was succeeded by Perander, his son, a man famed for his wisdom, and frequently numbered among the seven most

eminent sages of the age in which he lived. The administration of Periander is said, by Heracles, to have been prudent, just, mild, and paternal; showing a tender solicitude for the prosperity and for the moral well-being of his subjects. On the other hand, some writers describe him as a man incapable of self-command, who made himself and others miserable by the indulgence of his passions; and as a rapacious, oppressive, and cruel despot in his government. These accounts cannot be reconciled; but it appears to be true that his wisdom could not govern his temper; for, in a fit of anger or jealousy, he killed his wife, the daughter of Procles; afterwards took a fearful revenge on the persons who had instigated him to the deed, and sought refuge from remorse in the dark rites of superstition. The latter part of his life was embittered by the aversion of a favourite son, to whom Procles had revealed the secret of his mother's death, and by the enmity of noble families, and the loss of the affections of his people, induced, probably, by the same cause. In order to guard against these multiplied foes, he secured his person by a guard of mercenaries, and strengthened his state by alliance or friendship with foreign tyrants, and even barbarian monarchs. The force he maintained must have been considerable, since by various expeditions, among which was that against Epidaurus on behalf of Procles, he earned the praise of Aristotle for his military skill. Through this force he was enabled to retain his throne during life. He was succeeded by a nephew, or a cousin, Psammetichus, the son of Gordias, with whose reign, which only lasted three years, the dynasty ended, being overpowered by Sparta, about 582 B. C.

This revolution was followed by the establishment of a more comprehensive oligarchy than that of the Bacchiads, the exact constitution of which is unknown. It long kept Corinth in close alliance with Sparta, but the highest period of prosperity at Corinth seems to have closed with the Cypselid dynasty, which does not speak much for the vigour of the new commonwealth. The loss of Corcyra, soon after its establishment, was a blow from which Corinth never recovered.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SICYON.

At what time royalty was extinguished at Sicyon, and what form of government succeeded it, is unknown. As, however, there was a class of bondsmen, answering to the helots, and distinguished by peculiar names derived from their occupation, it seems certain that the Dorian system was established there, and that it subsisted until an adventurer named Orthagoras, or Andreas, overthrew the old aristocracy, and founded a dynasty which existed for a century. His successors were Myron, Cleisthenes, and others not mentioned, the most celebrated of whom was Cleisthenes. This prince introduced various political and religious innovations, the precise nature of which is now but imperfectly understood. One of the most celebrated was a change in the names of the Dorian tribes, for which he substituted others from the domestic animals, as the sow, the ass, and the pig; while a fourth tribe, to which he himself belonged, was distinguished

by the title of the *Archelai*, or "the princely." Herodotus conceives that Cleisthenes meant by this act to insult the Dorians, which seems more probable than the opinion of some—that he took this method of directing their attention to rural pursuits. It is very likely that a leading feature in the rule of this dynasty was to oppress the Dorians, which led to their overthrow. At what time this occurred cannot be stated, but it was probably about the same time that the Cypselids were overthrown at Corinth, and that it was brought about by the intervention of the same power—that of Sparta. After this, the Dorians gradually recovered their predominance, but not so completely as to lord it over the commonalty, as in the earlier ages of their rule.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MEGARA.

Royalty is said to have been abolished at Megara before the Dorian conquest. According to legend, its last king was Hyperion, son of Agamemnon, who fell by the hand of a provoked enemy, and another legend seems to indicate that the elective magistrates, who took the place of kings, bore the title of *æsymmetes*. The Dorians of Megara were for some time kept in subjection to those of Corinth, and the Megarian peasantry were compelled to solemnize the obsequies of the Bacchiads with that kind of respect which the helots of Sparta were obliged to pay to their deceased monarchs. This yoke at length was broken, and the Megarians, assisted by the Argives, recovered their independence. After this the government remained in the hands of the Dorian landowners, who became so many petty sovereigns, and Megara seems to have flourished under their rule. She sent out colonies east and west, and was able to carry on war in their defence. Still the commonalty was oppressed, and this led to insurrection and to a change of government. Theagenes, a bold and ambitious man, placed himself at the head of the popular cause, and, after committing an outrage on the property of the wealthy citizens, was invested with supreme authority. This occurred about B. C. 620; but after a few years he was expelled from Megara; whether through the discontent of the commonalty, or the efforts of the aristocratical party, is not stated. A long period of anarchy now ensued; during which Aristotle says, that the Megarian demagogues procured the banishment of many notable citizens for the sake of confiscating their estates. But this measure proved, in the end, to be against themselves; for the exiles became so strong a body, that they were enabled to reinstate themselves by force, and to establish a narrow oligarchy. This, probably, occurred about B. C. 600; but, according to Theognis, the Megarian poet, a new revolution soon took place, and anarchy again prevailed. Theognis himself, with others of the aristocratical party, was stripped of his fortune, and driven into exile. How deeply he felt his wrongs, his poem betrays. In the true spirit of a heathen, he longed to drink the blood of his enemies, and even wished that some usurper might make himself master of the city, and "strike it with the sharp goad, and plant the hard yoke on its neck." It seems probable,

however, that Theognis was one of those who were averse to all change, salutary or otherwise, and that his exile was caused or prolonged by this line of conduct. In his fragments he speaks with abhorrence of the class who, in the good old times, had worn the goat-skin as the badge of its condition, and had kept aloof from the city, but who now were admitted into assemblies and courts to take a part in the administration of the laws.

THE GOVERNMENT OF BŒOTIA.

As Bœotia was conquered by a people who had quitted their native land to avoid subjection, it seems that royalty was early abolished there. It is probable, indeed, that Xanthus, who is called sometimes king of the Bœotians, and sometimes of the Thebans, was nothing more than a temporary leader. The most sacred functions of the Theban kings were transmitted to a magistrate, who bore the title of archon, and resembled in his office the archon king of Athens. After the death of Xanthus, who was slain about 500 B.C. by the Attic king, Melanthus, the constitution of Thebes continued rigidly aristocratical. About the thirteenth Olympiad, however, discontents arose among the ruling caste itself from the inequality which had arisen in the division of property, and soon after Philolaus, one of the Corinthian Bacchiads, who resided at Thebes, was invited to frame a new code of laws. A leading feature in this code was the prevention of the accumulation of estates, and the establishment of those into which the Theban territory was then divided, in the hands of their present possessors and successors for ever. It is probable that Philolaus was the author of the law which excluded from public offices every Theban who had exercised any trade within the space of ten years, and that his code embraced regulations for the education of the higher class of citizens, in which music made an essential part. He seems also to have established a law by which indigent parents were relieved from the support of their offspring, but this is not accurately described by ancient historians.

Concerning the internal condition of the other towns of Bœotia, less is known than that of Thebes. It may be presumed, however, that it resembled that of Thebes, since at Thebes it is said that every kind of industrious occupation was degrading to a freeman; a spirit which doubtless prevailed throughout Bœotia.

The different Bœotian states were united in a confederacy, which was represented by a congress of deputies. These met at the festival of the *Pambœotia*,* in the temple of the Itonian Athênâ, near Coronea, for religious purposes, but there were other national councils, which deliberated on peace and war, of nearly equal antiquity. It is not mentioned how these councils were constituted, but the chief magistrates of the league, called Bœotarchs, presided in them, and commanded the national forces. These Bœo-

tarchs were, in later times, elected annually, and restricted to their term of office. The number of them is not known, but the ancient festival of the *Dadala*,* in which fourteen wooden images were carried up to the top of Cithæron, indicates that there were originally fourteen Grecian states, whence the number of the Bœotarchs was probably the same. This number was, however, afterwards, reduced, and Thebes appears then to have had the privilege of sending two, one of whom was superior to the others, and was probably president in the councils.

THE GOVERNMENT OF EUBŒA.

In the two principal cities of Eubœa, namely, Chalcis and Eretria, an aristocracy of landowners had prevailed. Both states were wealthy and powerful. This is proved by the great number of colonies which Chalcis sent out, and from the fact that Eretria was mistress of several islands, as Andros, Teos, Céos, etc. Still they became rivals, and a tract called the Lelantian plain, which contained copper-mines, afforded constant occasion for strife. This appears to have been the cause of the downfall of oligarchy in these states, but how it occurred is not known with certainty. Thucydides says, that "their quarrel finally drew all the Grecian states into war, some states taking the part of Chalcis and some of Eretria," and this may have led to the establishment of democracy, which about the period he mentions was certainly introduced into Eubœa.

THE GOVERNMENT OF LOCRIA.

Very little is known of the institutions of the Locrians. The use of slaves appears to have been unknown to them in early ages, which would indicate that they were for the most part aristocratical. This would seem to be confirmed by Pindar, who speaks—in the fifth century B.C.—of Opus as being the seat of law and order, and as being governed by noble families—of which a hundred were more distinguished than the rest, perhaps by political privileges, who claimed descent from its ancient kings.

"To princely Opus now the silver lyre
Awake, and chant her son's athletic worth
Opus, where Themis, with her daughter, reigns,
Divine Eunomia. Mindful of his birth,
He decks the capital of Locria's plains
With every flower on Alpheus' brink that grows,
And every blooming wreath Castalia's citrue bestows."

THE GOVERNMENT OF PHOCIA.

The territory of Phocia, though neither extensive nor fertile, was divided between twenty and thirty commonwealths, which were united, like the Achæans and Bœotians, by councils. Delphi, however, disclaimed all connexion with the Phocian states, and had a government peculiar to itself. This government was purely aristocratical, and it was in the hands of those who had the

* This was a national festival, and during its celebration no war was allowed to be carried on. If it existed, a truce was always concluded. The principal object of the meeting was the worship of Athênâ Itonia.

* This was a festival celebrated in honour of Hera, in remembrance of the reconciliation between her and her husband, Zeus. Pausanias was told that it was celebrated every seventh year, but he believes it took place at shorter intervals.

management of the temple, from the revenues of which the citizens were chiefly supported. In early times the chief magistrate of Delphi bore the title of king, but it was afterwards changed to that of *prytanis* - a council of five, however, who held their offices for life, and who were chosen from families which traced their origin to Deucalion, conducted the affairs of the oracle, under a name peculiar to themselves, and which marked their sanctity

THE GOVERNMENT OF THESSALY.

Thessaly, for some time after its conquest, appears to have been governed by Heraclid princes. Under one of these, Aleuas, it was divided into four districts, namely, Thessalotis, Pelagiotis, Phthiotis, and Hestæotis, and as this division was retained to the latest date of its political existence, it is probable that each was united in itself under its own form of government. Thus, however, is not certain, for all that is recorded is, that the principal cities exercised dominion over the smaller adjacent towns, and that these cities were the seats of noble families, descended from the ancient kings, which generally ruled over them. Thus, for instance, Larissa was subject to the house of the Aleuads, who were considered as descendants of the ancient Aleuas.

These nobles appear to have had large estates and numerous flocks and herds, and to have had under them a great number of serfs, called *penestæ*, who served them as husbandmen and herdsmen in times of peace, and as soldiers in the time of war. They also maintained a princely state, drew poets and artists to their court, and appeared with magnificence in the public games of Greece. It is not certain whether there were any institutions which provided for the union of the four districts, but history speaks of a chief magistrate, whose title was that of *tygus*, elected by the nobles from their own body. Nothing, however, is known of his authority except that it was rather military than civil, whence it is probable he was only elected in times of war, or, like the dictator at Rome, on an emergency, to subdue any insurrection of the commonalty.

Between the nobles and the serfs there were two other classes of society in Thessaly. The largest class were free subjects, although they were not admitted to the rank of citizens. Above these stood a third class, who, though they could not boast of an heroic descent like the Aleuads, etc., were entitled to some share in the administration of government. Between this class and the ruling families contests frequently arose, and at Larissa the aristocracy were under some restraints through them by law. What these restraints were, however, is not definitely known. Aristotle speaks of magistrates at Larissa who bore the title of guardians of freemen, and who exercised a superintendence over the admission of citizens. They were elected by the people out of the privileged order, whence, from their servile obsequiousness to the multitude, oligarchy was greatly endangered. Such was the state of Larissa from the feuds of conflicting parties, that the city was finally committed to the care of an officer by the consent of all parties. This officer

seems to have been chosen from the commonalty, and his office was to mediate between the opposite factions; but being intrusted with a body of troops, he was able, when they were refractory, to restrain them from violence. About two generations before the Persian war one of these officers usurped the sovereignty, but the usurpation was of brief duration, for the factions of Larissa form one of the features of Grecian history down to the latest period.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ÆTOLIA.

The early form of government in Ætolia is unknown. In later days it was formed upon similar principles to that of Achæia, being governed by a general assembly, a prætor, and other magistrates of inferior rank. The general assembly usually met in the autumn, but the power of enacting laws, making war, and concluding peace and alliances, being lodged in that court, the prætor was empowered to summon it on an emergency at any period of the year. Besides this great council of the nation, there was another council, composed of the most eminent men, who appear to have been supreme magistrates. Their office was to assist the prætor, and in his absence to transact all state affairs. How many of these there were is not known. Another council was the ephori, which was introduced in imitation of the Spartans. Their office was similar to that of the Spartan ephori, but they acted in subordination to the general assembly and the prætor. The two principal officers next to the prætor were the general of the horse and the public secretary. These were held in great esteem, for in the last alliance the Ætoliæns concluded with the Romans, they were allowed to choose forty hostages out of the whole nation, without excepting any but these officers, which tends to prove their importance.

THE GOVERNMENT OF EPIRUS.

Like most of the other Grecian states, Epirus was anciently governed by kings. This form of government was changed for want of an heir to sit on the throne soon after the days of the celebrated Pyrrhus. The Epirots then formed themselves into a republic, which was governed by magistrates elected annually by a general assembly of the whole nation.

THE GOVERNMENT OF ACARNANIA.

The Acarnanians did not take a part in the affairs of Greece till a comparatively late period. At that time Acarnania was a free state, governed by a prætor, a general assembly, and other subordinate magistrates, of the same nature and authority as those of the Achæans and Ætoliæns.

The features which history presents to our view of the constitutions of the Grecian states are brief and imperfect, but it appears from them that a great variety of forms, assemblies of citizens, senates, and public offices, were established in the Grecian commonwealths, and that the preservation of freedom and equality among the citizens formed their chief object. The Greeks,

however, did not attain the consummation they so devoutly wished. Their precautions were unable to save the Grecian cities from the usurpation of individuals, who were invariably called tyrants. Few cities, either in the mother country or the colonies, escaped this fate. The reader will recall to mind the dynasty of Orthogoras at Sicily, and that of Cypselus at Corinth, which will illustrate this assertion. Still, though this happened in many cities, the supreme power was seldom retained for a long time in the same family. The love of liberty was so deeply implanted in the breast of the Greeks that they were impatient of restraint, and hence they uniformly embraced the first opportunity of recovering their freedom. It was this continued struggle that called forth master-minds by opening to them a wide field for action. As Heeren observes, there was no room in Greece for indolence and inactivity of mind. Each individual felt that he existed only through the state and with the state, that every revolution more or less affected his interests, and that his security of person and property was at stake, whence his energies were aroused to the utmost for self-preservation or the freedom of the state. It was from this cause that, of the hundreds of Grecian cities, perhaps there were no two constitutions perfectly alike, and none whose internal relations had not changed in form. And whence did all this strife, and bustle, and constant change, arise? From the circumstance that the constitutions of the Grecian commonwealths were devised by human wisdom, all the devices of which, sooner or later, are brought to nought by the counsels of Him who sitteth on high and ruleth over all. All these changes may be looked upon as so many links in the chain of His eternal purpose. Short-sighted man may not be able to trace the counsels of Jehovah in the passing events of human life, either in past or present days, but

" Where reason falls
With all her powers,
There faith prevails
And love adores "

CHAPTER IV.

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, ETC.

ALTHOUGH the Grecian states were so heterogeneous in their forms of government, yet were there institutions tending to embody the Greeks into one nation. These were the Amphictyonic council, and the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian festivals, each of which we now proceed to describe.

THE AMPHICTYONIC COUNCIL.

Notwithstanding Homer makes no mention of the Amphictyons, it is nevertheless certain that they existed in the heroic ages. This has been seen in a previous page, where the features of the institution, as it existed at that date, have been described. It remains, therefore, to inform the reader what its features were after the Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesus.

The cause which led to the perpetuation and extension of this ancient institution was this:—The subdivision and distraction of the Grecian states, on the universal overthrow of monarchy, oppressed as they had been by their kings, the Greeks were still more oppressed by their archons, or magistrates. Their little fingers were thicker than the loins of their monarchs, and under their rule, as the reader has seen in the preceding chapter, each town and district maintained war with its neighbours. Under this state of affairs, it was necessary that some measure should be adopted, some institution established, to prevent an universal slaughter, and the Amphictyonic council, which had been originally intended, in the northern parts of Greece, to prevent foreign invasion, having been found equally useful in promoting domestic concord, was perpetuated, for that purpose, upon a scale which embraced the whole of the Grecian states—Arcadia, Elis, Achaia, Aetolia, and Acarnania excepted.

The constitution of this council rested on the supposition of a perfect equality among the tribes represented by it. According to Æschines there were twelve members, although he enumerates but eleven, namely, the Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhebians, Magnesians, Phthiots, Malæans, Phocians, Cetræans, and Lœrians. The twelfth state was, probably, the Dolopians. Every city belonging to these nations had the right of sending deputies, and although some cities were of greater note than others, yet were their deputies all equal. Of the Ionians, says Æschines, the deputies from Eretria in Eubœa, and from Priene * in Asia Minor, were equal to those from Athens, of the Dorians, those of Dorium in Laconia, and of Citium at the foot of Parnassus, had as much weight as those of Sparta. The votes, however, were not counted by cities, but by tribes: each tribe had two votes, and the majority decided.

The council appears to have been composed of two classes of representatives, the *pylages* and *hieromnemons*. The functions of these classes are not accurately distinguished, but it is probable that the former body was intrusted with the power of voting, and that the latter consisted in preparing and directing their deliberations, and carrying their decrees into effect. At Athens there were three *pylages* annually elected, and one *hieromnemon* was appointed by lot: the practice of the other states is unknown.

The number of members seems to have varied at different periods. After the abolition of royalty there were generally about one hundred. Thus, in the Persian wars, thirty-one Amphictyonic cities undertook the defence of Greece. As one half of the states on that occasion either remained neutral or sided with the enemy, if each city sent two members to the Amphictyonic council, the whole would amount to one hundred and twenty-four. As some cities enjoyed the right of being represented in that council, however, only in conjunction with others, this would reduce the number of members to that before stated.

The functions of the Amphictyons were

* It is evident from this that the colonies enjoyed the same privilege as the Grecian states.

various. Their first duty was to take charge of the temple of Delphi, its property, offerings, and sanctity. From this it follows, that they possessed judicial powers. Persons who had committed sacrilege against the temple were summoned before its tribunals, where judgment was passed, and fines and punishment decreed. Thus a decree was issued by them against the Phocians at the beginning of the last sacred war, and afterwards against the Locrians, the particulars of which are related in the narrative of those events.

Some have questioned whether the Amphictyons had political power delegated to them. That such, however, formed a main branch of their functions is evident from the oath they took when they were installed into the council, and which is thus recorded by *Æschines*—"I swear that I will never destroy any of the cities honoured with the right of sitting in the Amphictyonic council, nor cut off their streams, whether in war or peace, and that I will punish, to the utmost of my power, those who commit such outrages. Moreover, if at any time any one shall commit sacrilege in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, or abet others in committing that crime, I will use all my powers to avenge such sacrilege." This oath was attended by dreadful imprecations, such as could proceed from the minds of pagans alone, whence the dreadful extremities to which the Amphictyons proceeded in their *sacred wars*.

The religion of an oath was of great force in the pagan world; and in this they were right. The performance of oaths is enjoined on mankind by the sacred penmen, but much depends on the nature of the oath taken. If it tends to enkindle the flames of war, or to work for evil in any other way, it should never be taken. Now the oaths of the heathen generally worked for evil, and yet were they scrupulously performed. Life itself was not dear to them in their performance; they would rush into the arms of death rather than be perjured. Present shame alone induced them to adhere to their oaths with fixed and steady purpose. This affords an example for professed Christians. How careful ought they to be to perform the oaths and vows which they have made! In seasons of affliction, perhaps, they have vowed that upon their recovery they will walk in the ways of God, but, alas! how many make a jest of breaking the most solemn vows. And the vows of the afflicted, especially, too often prove, when health is restored to them, but vain words—they pass away forgotten, until they are called to remembrance by a jealous God. "This is the thing which the Lord hath commanded if a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth," Num. xxx. 1, 2.

Respecting the utility of the Amphictyonic assembly, *Heeren* observes. "To him who measures the value of this assembly only in the influence it had in preventing wars among the tribes that took part in it, its utility may seem very doubtful, as history has preserved no proofs of such influence. But even had this existed in the earlier ages, it must have ceased of itself when single states of Greece became so powerful as to assume a superiority over the rest. Sparta and Athens

no more referred the decision of their quarrels to Delphi, than Prussia and Austria to Rastubon. But it would be wrong to impute the blame of this to the members of the council. They had no strong arm, except when the god extended his to protect them; or rather, some other power took the field in their behalf. But it is a high degree of merit to preserve principles in the memory of mankind, even when it is impossible to prevent their violation, and when we observe that several ideas relating to the law of nations were indelibly imprinted on the character of the Greeks, if, in the midst of all their civil wars, they never laid waste any Grecian city, even when it was subdued, may not this be attributed, in some measure, to the Amphictyonic assembly?"

The general residence of the Amphictyons was at Delphi. Before they proceeded to business, they sacrificed an ox, cut into small pieces. Their decisions were sacred, and without appeal. They met twice in the year, in the spring at Delphi, and in autumn at Thermopylæ. From this latter fact *Thirlwall* supposes that there were originally two distinct confederations, one formed of inland and the other of maritime tribes, and that, when these were united by the growing influence of Delphi, the ancient places of meeting were retained, as a necessary concession to the dignity of each sanctuary. He grounds his conjecture upon a legend which couples the name of *Acrisius*, king of Argos, with that of *Amphictyon*, in the history of the council. *Acrisius* is said to have formed the assembly at Delphi, in emulation of that which *Amphictyon* had founded at Thermopylæ, and then to have combined the two, and regulated them by new laws. There are other points in the legend, however, which render this supposition extremely doubtful.

Beside the council, which held its sessions either in the temple or in some adjacent building, there was an Amphictyonic assembly, which met in the open air, and which was composed of persons residing in the place where the congress was held, and of strangers drawn to it by curiosity, business, or devotion. But it was only called together on particular occasions, as, for instance, when aid was required for carrying the measures decreed into execution, or when it was deemed necessary to appoint a convention between the regular meetings of the council.

THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL.

In order to give the reader a distinct idea of this "national institution"—a character which the Amphictyonic council affected, but never really obtained—it will be necessary to trace briefly the remote causes which led to its establishment.

As early as the heroic ages it was a custom to celebrate the funerals of illustrious men by such ceremonies as were deemed pleasing to their shades. The tombs, around which the manes were supposed to hover, very naturally became the scene of such solemnities. The ghosts of departed heroes were entertained there—as the Greeks supposed—by exhibitions of strength and address. Around the tombs were the chariot-race, the fight of the cestus, wrestling, the foot-

race, darting the javelin, the single combat, the discus, and shooting with arrows—all of which were performed round the tomb of Patroclus, as described at length in the twenty-third book of the *Iliad*.

Upon the same principle, the gods, though inhabiting the broad expanse of heaven, were worshipped by prayers and sacrifices in the several places which the fancy of the Greeks had assigned for their favourite residence on earth. The lofty chain of Olympus, from peculiar circumstances connected with it, early obtained that honour ascending above the regions of storms and tempests, its winding sides are diversified by woods and intersected by torrents, while its fantastic tops reflect the rays of the sun during the day, and sometimes brighten the gloom of night with the lambent splendours of the aurora borealis. Observing these wonders, the Greeks made this mountain the principal terrestrial habitation of the gods. Along its recesses each divinity had his appropriate palace, while Jupiter took his seat on its highest summit, whither he often assembled the heavenly council, and whence the protectors of mankind descended, veiled in a white gleam, to perform the offices assigned them.

Olympus, however, was not the only seat of these fancied beings. Delphi was deemed fit for the seat of Apollo; and the Corinthian territory, since it had been the principal centre of Grecian navigation, was consecrated to Neptune.

Such were the remote causes of the establishment of the Olympic festival. This will be seen more clearly when viewed in connexion with the received account of the immediate causes of the origin of that festival.

According to tradition, the fruitful and picturesque banks of the Alpheus, in the province of Elis, had been consecrated to Jupiter before the Dorian conquest. It may be gathered, indeed, from Homer, that athletic sports similar to those celebrated at the tomb of Patroclus had been on many occasions exhibited in that territory with unusual solemnity. After the Dorian conquest the Dorians renewed the consecration of that delightful province. Their ceremonies and exhibitions, however, were soon afterwards set aside by their wars with the Athenians and their internal dissensions. So deep were the calamities which afflicted or threatened the Peloponnesus, that Iphitus, a descendant of Oxylus, to whom the province of Elis had fallen in the partition of the peninsula, applied to the Delphic oracle for aid. The pythonesse replied that the festivals anciently celebrated at Olympia on the Alpheus must be renewed, and an armistice proclaimed for such states as desired to avert the vengeance of heaven. Thus strengthened by the oracle, and being assisted by Lycurgus, measures were taken by Iphitus to restore and perpetuate the Olympic solemnity. The injunction of the oracle was published throughout Greece; the armistice was proclaimed in Peloponnesus; and preparations made for the ceremonies.

In the heroic ages gymnastic exercises were instituted in honour of the deceased warriors, while hymns and sacrifices were reserved for the gods. Through the flexible texture of Grecian superstition, however, Iphitus was enabled to

unite both these in his new institutions; and it is, perhaps, from this cause that it became so popular, and tended to preserve or promote harmony between the Grecian states. It is in the very nature of man to be pleased with pageantry, and by this union of gymnastic exercises with those of devotion, the Olympic festival was rendered attractive in the highest degree.

The Olympic festival lasted four days, and the period which intervened between the returns of the seasons was called an olympiad. It would not appear that the northern Greeks were at first expected to take any share in the festival, or that they were even consulted in its establishment, but it gradually enlarged the sphere of its fame and attraction till the whole nation was attracted thither and induced to take part in its games. The sacred truce was proclaimed by officers sent to all parts of Greece by the Eleians, and it put a stop to warfare from the time of the proclamation for a period sufficient to enable strangers to return home in safety. During this period Elis was regarded as inviolable, and if an armed force had dared to traverse it they would have been deemed guilty of sacrilege and punished by the Amphictyons. The Eleians, indeed, pretended that their land and persons had been made sacred for ever, and entitled to enjoy perpetual peace; but this is questionable, since they themselves did not at certain periods abstain from the use of arms. It is more certain that after the fiftieth olympiad the Eleians had the whole regulation of the festival, which it is probable they had shared previously with the citizens of Pisa, and that they appointed the judges of the contest, who were instructed in the duties of their office by Eleian magistrates. Those who presided possessed a jurisdiction in all matters connected with the festival. Thus they imposed penalties on individuals and states, and were empowered to exclude all who resisted their decrees. Thus, however, it must be remembered, was a trust delegated to one tribe for the benefit of the whole nation, to which the festival belonged.

The immediate object of the Olympic festival was the exhibition of various trials of strength and skill, which became in the end so multiplied as to include every mode of displaying bodily activity. They included races with horses and chariots, and on foot, contests in leaping, throwing, wrestling, boxing, and others, in which several of these exercises were combined. The nature of all may be seen in the following account of the *athleta*, or combatants, and the principal games.

The Athleta, or Combatants.—The term *athleta* is derived from the Greek word, *athla*, signifying "labour," or "combat." It was given to those who exercised themselves with an intention to dispute the prizes in the public games. The art by which they formed themselves for these encounters was called gymnastic, from the circumstance that the *athleta* practised naked.

Those designed for this profession frequented, from the earliest dawn of infancy, the *gymnasia*, or *palæstra*, which were academies maintained at the public expense. Here they were placed under different masters, who employed the most effectual methods to inure them to fatigues and prepare them for combats. Their regimen was

very severe: dried figs, nuts, soft cheese, and coarse bread, made up the sum of their nourishment. Temperance was strictly enjoined upon them, to which there is an allusion in Horace.—

“Who in the Olympic race the prize would gain
Has borne from early youth fatigue and pain,
Excess of heat and cold has often tried,
Love's softness banish'd, and the glass denied.”

It is to this severe training that the apostle Paul alluded when he exhorted the Corinthians, near whose city the Isthmian games were celebrated, to self-denial and temperance. “Every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things” and he endeavoured to confirm them in this course by the consideration that the athletes underwent great privations in order to obtain a corruptible crown, while they, in common with himself, looked forward to one that should never fade away. This latter clause will obtain further notice hereafter, but concerning the former it may be remarked that the following passage in Epictetus affords a fine illustration of the apostle's injunction: “Would you be a victor in the Olympic games? So, in good truth, would I; for it is a glorious thing. But pray consider what must go before, and what must follow, and so proceed in the attempt. You must live by rule, eat what will be disagreeable, and refrain from delicacies, you must oblige yourself to constant exercise, at the appointed hour, in heat and cold, you must abstain from wine and hot liquors, in a word, you must be as submissive to all the directions of your master as to those of a physician.”

Before their exercises the athletes were rubbed with oils and ointments, to make their bodies supple and vigorous. At first they made use of a belt and a long scarf attached to it, but this being found inconvenient it was shortened. In some exercises, indeed, the athletes were naked, as in wrestling, boxing, the pancration, and the foot-race. They practised a kind of novitiate in the gymnasium for ten months, and when the celebration of the games drew nigh they were constant in their exercises.

None but Greeks by birth could contend in the public games. It was also required that their manners should be good, and that they should be freemen. That foreigners were not admitted to contests in the Olympic games is proved by the circumstance that Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, was not allowed by the judges to dispute the prize till he had proved his descent from the Argives.

Equestrian contests, particularly those of the four-horsed chariots, were by their nature confined to the wealthy, but the greater part of the games were open to rich and poor. Thus Glaucus, of Carystus, one of the most celebrated pugilists, had originally followed the plough, and the most illustrious family in Rhodes, the Diagorids, of the line of Aristomenes, boasted of having produced many successful competitors for the like prize. Neither birth nor station could, therefore, affect the dignity of these contests, in which the ancient heroes so much delighted.

And thus it is with the Christian world. All classes of society, from the king on his throne to the peasant in his cottage, may enter the lists,

and contend for the crown held out to their view in an eternal world. “God is no respecter of persons.”

The persons who presided in these games were called *Agonotheta*, *Athlotheta*, and *Hellano-dora*. These registered the names and the country of each combatant, and attended to the minutiae of the combats. Upon the opening of the games, a herald proclaimed the names of the competitors. After they were made to take an oath that they would observe the several laws prescribed, and act according to the established orders and regulations of the games. All fraud, artifice, and even excessive violence, were prohibited only a legitimate use was to be made either of their skill or their strength.

The Foot Race—Among the exercises which the athlete cultivated, none were held in greater repute than the races. With these the Olympic games generally commenced, and when Iphitus instituted the festival, the foot-race, which was distinguished by the name of *Stadion*, was the only game exhibited. Afterwards, at the fourteenth Olympiad, a more complicated foot-race was added, called the *Diasulos*, which is that generally known in history.

The place where the athletes exercised themselves in running was called the *Stadion*, as was that also wherein they contended for the prize. The place where the athlete contended, however, was called *Scamma*, from the circumstance of its being lower than the rest of the stadium, on each side of which, and at the extremity, there were terraces on an ascent, upon which the spectators were seated.

The most remarkable parts of the stadium were its entrance, middle, and extremity.

The entrance of the course whence the competitors started was marked at first by a line drawn on the sand across the stadium, after the manner adopted by our youth in their ordinary pastimes. This was at length superseded by a cord strained tight in front of the athlete, and finally by a bar of wood. Against these the competitors, at the moment of starting, pressed, and when it was removed they commenced the struggle.

The middle of the stadium was chiefly remarkable for having the prizes allotted to the victors exposed to view, a circumstance from which one of the early Christian writers draws a fine comparison. “As the judges,” says he, “in the races and other games, expose the crowns to the combatants in the midst of the stadium, so, in like manner, the Lord, by the mouth of his servants, has placed in the midst of the course the prizes which he designs for those who have the courage to contend for them.” By the ministers of the gospel, the prize of his high calling is constantly set before the eye of the Christian, and sinners are invited by them to pursue the same heavenly race, and strive for the same crown. But, above all, the Bible may be considered as the grand medium whereby the heavenly prize for which the Christian contends is constantly exposed to his view. Therein he is encouraged to pursue his Christian course with an assurance that if he faints not his reward is sure.

At the extremity of the stadium was a goal

where the foot-races ended. This was generally a pole set up in the ground, and sometimes surmounted by the leafy crown, which was to be the prize of the victor. It is to this that the apostle Paul alludes when describing his own earnestness in seeking the eternal reward of his Christian course he says, "I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." It may be that he also alludes to the eager and agonistic grasp with which the victorious racer laid hold of the post, when he says, in the same description, "I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus." This seems the more probable, from his saying that he counted not himself to have apprehended the prize, intimating that death alone could put him in possession of his heavenly crown, and that if he relaxed in his endeavours he might yet lose it. If, then, the apostle Paul had cause to fear, how ought Christians in general to "work out their salvation with fear and trembling."

Whilst the competitors in the foot-races of the Olympic festival waited the signal, they practised, by way of prelude, various motions to awaken their activity, to which there is an allusion in the *Thebais* of the poet Statius—

"They try, they rouse the rapid with various arts,
Their languid limbs they prompt to act their parts,
Now sit bent hams amidst the practis'd crowd,
They sit now strun their lungs and send out loud,
Now a short flight with hery steps they trace
And with a sudden step abridge the mimic race."

Upon the signal being given, the competitors flew towards the goal, which was to decide the victory, with a rapidity scarcely to be followed by the eye. They pressed forward with no other thought or object than to be the first to reach the goal. To this feature of the Grecian foot-race the apostle Paul also makes allusion. After confessing that he had not yet attained the object of his Christian course, he says, "But this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark," etc. See Phil in 12. 14. The word *epeteino*, translated "reaching forth," expresses the manner in which the racer stretched his head and hands forward in anxiety to reach the goal. From antique sculptured representations, it is evident that this was their usual mode of struggling for the prize. In them the head is bent forward, eagerness sits in the eye, and the hands are outstretched to grasp the pole or post.

In the simple race the extent of the stadium was run but once, at the end of which the victor obtained the prize. In that called the *Diavlos*, the competitors ran twice that length, that is, after having arrived at the goal, they returned to the barrier. To these may be added a third race, called the *dolichos*, which, as the name implies, was the longest race. It was, in fact, composed of several *diavlos*, sometimes consisting of twenty-four stadia backwards and forwards, or twelve times round the goal.

The Horse Race.—The race of a single horse with a rider was less celebrated among the ancients in general than the foot race, but it had its patrons among the nobles, and was attended

with no common honour to the victor. One feature of the ancient horse race presents a humane picture when compared with those existing in Europe, and even in England, at the present day. There was no whip used, but all was left to the free and noble nature of the animal itself. In general one horse only was used among the ancients, as among the moderns, but sometimes the rider led another horse by the bridle, and the horses were then called *desaiton*, and their riders *desaitors*, because, after a certain number of turns in the stadium, they changed horses by vaulting from one to the other.

The Chariot Races.—Chariot-races were the most renowned of all the exercises in the games of the ancient Greeks, and from these the victors derived most honour. The cause of this is manifestly derived from the ancient custom of princes, heroes, and great men, fighting in battle upon chariots. The pages of Homer abound with instances of this kind, and the custom being admitted, it followed that in later ages persons considerable for rank, riches, employments, or great actions, sought to emulate their ancestors by chariot races in the Olympic games. Kings themselves aspired to this glory, from the belief that the title of victor in these games was little inferior to that of the ancient conquerors, and that the Olympic palm added a new dignity to their diadem. Thus Philip of Macedonia had these victories stamped upon his coins, and was as much gratified with them as with those obtained against the enemies of the state.

The chariots were generally drawn by two or four horses, ranged abreast. Sometimes, however, mules supplied the place of horses, and then the chariot was called *apane*. Pindar celebrates one Psaumis, who had obtained a triple victory, — one by a chariot drawn by four horses, a second one drawn by mules, and a third by a single horse —

"Fair Camarina, daughter of the main,
With gracious smile this choral song receive,
Sweet fruit of virtuous toils, whose noble strain
Shall to the Olympic wreath new lustre give
This Psaumis, whom on Alpheus' shore
With unabating speed
The harness'd mules to conquest bore,
This gift to thee decreed,
Thee, Camarina, whom well peopled towers
This Psaumis rears'd great in fame,
When to the twelve Olympian powers
He led with victims the triumphal flame
When the double altars round,
Slaughter'd bulls beat straw'd the ground,
When on five selected days,
Jove survey'd the lists of praise,
While along the dusty course
Psaumis urged his straining horse,
Or beneath the wical yoke
Madd the well match'd coursers smoke,
Or around the Elean goal
Taught his mule drawn car to roll,
Then did the victor dedicate his fame
To thee and bade the herald's voice proclaim
Thy new establish'd walls, and Acron's honour'd name."

The chariots, in these ancient races, started together from a place called *Carceres*. Their places were regulated by lot, which was by no means an indifferent circumstance as to the victory, for, as they were to turn round a boundary, the chariot on the left was nearer the goal than

those on the right, they having to fetch a compass round. It would appear, from Pindar and Sophocles, that they ran twelve times round the stadium, and he that came in first the twelfth round was victor. The chief art consisted in taking the best ground at the boundary. If the charioteer drove too near it, he was in danger of dashing the chariot to pieces; and if he fetched too large a compass, his nearest antagonist might dash between his chariot, and get before him. It was to avoid this danger that Nestor gave the following advice to his son Antilochus:—"My son," said he, "drive your horses as near as possible to the boundary, for which reason always incline your body over your chariot; get the left of your competitor, and encouraging the horse on the right, give him the rein, whilst the near horse, hard held, turns the boundary so close that the nave of the wheel seems to graze upon it; but have a care of running against the stone, lest you wound your horses, and dash the chariot in pieces." Accidents of this kind rarely happened, but one example is given in the *Electra* of Sophocles. The pretended Orestes, at the twelfth and last round, having only one antagonist, the rest being thrown out, broke one of his wheels against the boundary; and falling out of his seat, entangled in the reins, the horses dragged him with them in their impetuous career, and he was torn in pieces. It was, perhaps, from the variety and the vicissitudes of the race—for in pursuing their course round the stadium many changes must have occurred—that the spectators derived their chief diversion.

There is an allusion to the manner in which these races were conducted in the pages of Horace, from which it may be gathered that chariot racing was not conducted with the humanity which characterised the race of the single horse.—

"Thus from the goal when swift the chariot flies,
The charioteer the bending lash applies
To overtake the foremost on the plain.
But looks on all behind him with disdain."

It was not required that those who aspired to the victory should drive their chariots in person. Philip and Hiero both sent horses and chariots to run for the prize, while they themselves were absent. Philip was at Potidæa when the news of his victory arrived, and he was equally delighted with it as he was with the fall of that city, and the news of the birth of a son. In order to secure the victory, sometimes persons sent several chariots to contend for the prize. Thus Alcibiades sent seven at once, on which occasion he obtained the first, second, and third prizes, a circumstance which has been celebrated by the poet Euripides, in a fragment preserved by Plutarch, as of rare occurrence.

In later ages it appears that females took part in the Olympic games, and that many obtained the prize. The example was set by Cynisca, sister of Agesilaus, king of Sparta, who, on her first trial, was proclaimed conqueror in the race of chariots with four horses; an event which was celebrated by the poets, and by a magnificent monument erected to her honour in Sparta.

Wrestling.—This trial of strength is one of the most ancient of which we have any knowledge.

At first, wrestling, both among the Greeks and other nations, was practised with great simplicity; the weight of the body and the strength of the muscles having more share in it than address and skill. Their manner is well expressed by Homer, in his description of the struggle between Ajax and Ulysses:—

"Scarce did the chief the vigorous strife propose,
When tower-like Ajax and Ulysses rose
Amid the ring each nervous rival stands,
Embracing rigid, with implicit hands,
Close lock'd above, their heads and arms are mix'd,
Below, their planted feet at distance fix'd
Like two strong rafters which the builder forms,
Proof to the wintry wind and howling storms,
Their tops connected, but at wider space
Fix'd on the centre stands their solid base.
Now to the grasp each manly body bends,
The humid sweat from every pore descends,
Their bones resound with blows sides, shoulders,
Thighs,
Swell to each gripe, and bloody tumours rise.
Nor could Ulysses, for his art renown'd,
Overtum the strength of Ajax on the ground,
Nor could the strength of Ajax overthrow
The watchful caution of his artful foe
While the long strife e'en tired the lookers on,
Thus to Ulysses spoke great Telamon
'Or let me lift thee, chief, or lift thou me
Prove we our force, and Jove the rest decree.'
He said, and straining, heaved him off the ground
With matchless strength, that time Ulysses found
The strength to evade, and where the nerves combine
His angle struck the giant fell supine;
Ulysses, following, on his bosom lies;
Shouts of applause run rattling through the skies
Ajax to lift Ulysses next essays,
He barely stirr'd him, but he could not raise
His knee lock'd fast, the toe's attempt denied,
And grappling close, he tumbl'd on his side
Defied with honourable dust they roll,
Still breathing strife, and unobdured of soul
Again they rage, again to combat rise;
When great Achilles thus divides the prize —
'Your noble vigour, O my friends, restrain,
Nor weary out your generous strength in vain
Ye both have won.'"

In after ages Theseus reduced this game to method, and refined it by rules of art. Then, before the wrestlers began the combat, they were rubbed all over in a rough manner, and afterwards anointed with oils, which added to the strength and flexibility of their limbs. As this unction, however, rendered it difficult for the wrestlers to take hold of each other, they rolled themselves in the dust of the palaestra, or threw a fine sand over each other.

Thus prepared, the wrestlers were matched two against two; and sometimes several couples contended at the same time. Their aim and design was to throw their adversary upon the ground, and for this purpose they seized each other by the arms, drew forwards, pushed backwards, and used a variety of distortions and twistings of the body to secure the advantage. The most considerable advantage of the wrestler was to make himself master of his adversary's legs, of which a fall was the immediate consequence. Hence it is that Plautus, speaking of the power of wine, says, "He is a dangerous wrestler, he presently trips up the heels." One of these arts appears to have consisted in stooping down to seize the antagonist under the soles of the feet, and in raising them up to give him a fall.

The fall of a wrestler secured the prize to him who still maintained his ground. It sometimes

happened, however, that the wrestler who was down drew his adversary along with him, either by art or accident, and then the combat continued on the sand. The antagonists grappled with each other till one of them got uppermost, and compelled the other to acknowledge he was vanquished.

There was a third kind of wrestling, called *acrochusmos*, from the athletes only using their hands in it, without grasping the body. This exercise served as a prelude to the greater combat. It consisted in intermingling their fingers, and in squeezing them with all their force; in pushing one another, by joining the palms of their hands together, and in twisting their fingers, wrists, and other joints of the arm, without the assistance of any other member. The victory was awarded to him who obliged his opponent to ask quarter.

The apostle Paul makes allusion to the game of wrestling in his description of the warfare of a Christian. Speaking of the foes with which he has to contend, he says, "For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." Ephes vi 12. These are, indeed, formidable foes; and it becomes Christians to be "strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might," lest their adversaries should obtain the advantage over them.

The Cestus.—The *cestus*, or boxing, was a combat of blows with the fist, from whence it derives its name. The combatants covered their fists with a kind of offensive armus called the *cestus*, and their heads with a leathern cap to defend their temples and ears, which were most exposed to blows. The *cestus* was a gauntlet or glove made of straps of leather, and plated with brass, lead, or iron. Their use was to strengthen the hands of the combatants, and to add violence to their blows.

The general features of this game are well described by Apollonius Rhodius, in his account of a combat with Amycus, king of the Bebrycians, and Pollux, one of the Argonauts —

"New force to force the combatants apply,
Before their fronts they mix their hands on high
The king appears, a wave abrupt and dark,
That breaks with fury on the labouring bark
Beasts with his skill th' intrepid pilot saves
The vessel buoyant o'er the numerous waves,
From the deep gulf escaped, on either hand,
Like walls immense, where heap'd-up waters stand
Thus he with direful threats the youth pursued,
Yet, mock'd by skill, no blood his hands imbrued
No rest—no pause—the youth with vigour bounds
From side to side, and shuns the impending wounds
With dauntless courage, and unerring sight,
He weighs and speculates the future fight,
Marks the defences of his giant foe,
The points unguarded that invite a blow
There, there he presses, there his hopes are fix'd,
And hands with hands, and blows with blows are mix'd
As skillful carpenters the wedges drive
When timbers destined, and for some shew they rive,
With noisy sway the hammer's weight descends,
Wedge after wedge a forceful passage rends,
Stroke follow'd stroke, nor interval, nor pause,
Their cheeks resounded, and their crashing jaws,
And loud their grinding teeth. The fight prevail'd
Without remission till their forces fail'd
With woery pantings painful beneath they drew,
Apart they stood, and wiped the briny dew
Roll'd copious from their fronts. With doubled rage
Again they close, again in fight engage.

Bebrycia's king stood raised, in act to wound,
Like those that fell stout oxen to the ground,
With weight enormous a dire stroke sped,
The youth avoids it with inclining head,
And, bending forward, as the foe advanced,
His elbow lightly on the shoulder glanced
Now, closing firmly, knee to knee was press'd,
Arm twined with arm, and breast encounter'd breast,
Above his ear, with quick, relentless blow,
The gallant stripling smote the foe
The bones within were shatter'd by the wound,
He sunk in anguish kneeling on the ground
With loud acclaim that deed the Minæ view,
In gushing blood th' indignant spirit flew

As in this instance, death was frequently the result of this barbarous game; and when the combat was not thus concluded, some considerable fracture generally punished both the victor and the vanquished. It was, indeed, common with them to quit the field crippled for life.

The Discus.—The *discus* was a kind of quoit, of a round form, made either of wood, stone, lead, iron, or brass. Those who used this exercise were called *discoboli*, or "fingers of the discus." They were men of great strength, for the epithet *caromadius*, signifies to "bear upon the shoulders," whence it is evident that it was too weighty ordinarily to be carried about in any other manner.

In hurling the discus the athlete put themselves in the posture best adapted for that purpose that is, they advanced one foot, upon which they leaned the whole weight of their bodies. They then posed the discus in their hands, and whirling it round almost horizontally several times, threw it with the joint strength of hands, arms, and body. He that flung it farthest was the victor. Homer describes a contest of this kind which took place at the funeral rites of Patroclus —

"Then hurl'd Achilles, thundering on the ground,
A mass of iron, an enormous round,
Whom weight and size the circling Greeks admire,
Rude from the furnace, and but shap'd by fire.
His mighty quoit Action went to rear,
And from his whirling arms dismiss in air
The giant by Achilles slain, he stow'd
Among his spoils this memorable load
For this he bids those nervous artists vie
That teach the disk to sound along the sky
'Let him whose might can hurl this bowl arise,
Who furthest hurls it, takes it as his prize
If he be one enrich'd with large domain
Of downs for flocks, and arable for grain,
Small stock of iron needs that man provide,
His hinds and swains whole years shall be supplied
From hence, nor ask the neighbouring city's aid
For ploughshares, wheels, and all the rural trade.'
Stern Polyx tes step'd before the throne,
And great Leonteus, more than mortal strong,
Whose force with rival forces to oppose,
Uprose great Ajax, up Epeus rose.
Each stood in order first Epeus threw,
High o'er the wondering crowds the whirling circle flew
Leonteus next a little space surpass'd,
And third the strength of bold Ajax cast
O'er both their marks it flew, till fiercely flung
From Polyxetes' arm the discus sung
Far as a swain his whirling sheephook throws
That distant falls among the grazing cows,
So past them all the rapid circle flies
His friends, while loud applause shake the skies,
With force conjoin'd heave off the weighty prize."

The Pancratiun.—The *pancratiun*, so called from two Greek words, *pan*, *crates*, which signify that the whole force of the body was required to ensure success. The game or combat united boxing and wrestling; borrowing from one its

manner of struggling and flinging, and from the other the art of dealing and avoiding blows. Greater latitude was afforded the combatants for ensuring the victory than in the two games whence it was derived; even barbarity being allowed. Thus, in wrestling, it was not permitted to strike with the hand, nor in the dreadful *cestus* to seize each other in the manner of the wrestlers; but in the pancratiast it was allowed to make use of all the grips and artifices of wrestling, and the hands, feet, and teeth, might be employed in the contest. To what results this led may be seen in the case of Arrachion, a pancratiast in the Olympic games. Being almost suffocated by his adversary, who had seized him by the throat, at the same time that he held him by the foot, Arrachion broke one of his antagonist's toes, the extreme anguish of which compelled him to ask quarter at the very instant that Arrachion himself expired. Arrachion received his honours in death.

The Pentathlon.—This was a game composed of five others; probably of wrestling, running, leaping, throwing the dart, and the discus. It is supposed that this kind of combat was decided in one day, and that to obtain the prize it was required that the combatant should be the victor in all those exercises, one prize being common to all.

The above were the principal games in the Olympic festival, those of leaping, throwing the javelin, etc., being of minor importance. In the heroic ages archery seems to have formed one of the principal games of the Greeks. Thus Homer describes Achilles, at the funeral games of Patroclus, as tying "a milk-white dove" to the top of a mast, and offering "twice ten axes" to him whose arrow should pierce the "fluttering mark." Meriones and Teucer, both skilful in the bow, contested for this prize. Teucer shot first, but not having sacrificed to Phœbus, "patron of the shaft and bow," as the poet intimates, his arrow "erred from the dove," yet severed the cord that bound it to the mast. Merion was more successful. Having vowed to render to the god "firstling lambs and grateful sacrifice," as the dove flew in airy circles amid the clouds he let fly his arrow, and—

"The wounded bird, ere yet she breathed her last,
With flapping wings alighted on the mast,
A moment hung, and spread her pinions there,
Then sudden dropp'd, and left her life in air."

This latter exercise of skill, however, does not appear to have obtained notice among the more modern Greeks, as nothing is recorded of such a practice in the Olympic games.

The games of the Olympic festival were in themselves at once nugatory and cruel, but yet they led to important consequences. The festival, however, did not answer the purpose of a bond of national union, for which it was originally instituted. Small efficacy did it possess to soften the asperity of human nature. It might lessen the effusion of human blood during the few days it lasted, but there its utility ended. As soon as it concluded the animosity of warring tribes again ruled dominant in the heart. It is not too much

to suppose that the games gave a fresh impetus to the love of war from their warlike character. Thus historians generally relate, that the exercise of leaping and throwing the javelin contributed to the formation of a soldier by making him agile and expert in flinging the spear and dart. It is evident that the spectators would emulate the example of the athletes, and that they would carry the effects of that example into the arena of human strife. Besides, the very business of the festival itself ministered fuel to the evil passions of rival cities. Each of them felt its honour concerned in the success of the individual competitors, and this gave occasion to a spirit of emulation, which degenerated into envy, jealousy, and strife. This is indicated by the separate treasuries which were built at Olympia, as at Delphi, by several states for the reception of their offerings, thus manifesting their mutual enmity. (On every hand there was much to recall the political disunion of the Greeks to remembrance, whence the institution was in this, its primary design, useless.

A more important result of the Olympic festival was the share it had in forming the national character. By it the Greek was forcibly impressed with the consciousness of the distinctions which separated him from barbarians, inasmuch as he was surrounded with those objects only which recalled the most peculiar features of the religion, arts, and manners of his countrymen. All foreigners were excluded from competition at Olympia. This result may, however, have led to evil consequences. By establishing the barrier between the Greeks and the rest of mankind, as to character, it appears to have taught them to consider Greeks to be a superior race, and, hence, to hold themselves ready at any time to engage in war with other nations.

It is probable that the remote and contingent effects produced by the festival were more important than its leading results. In later ages Olympia, during this season, was a mart of commerce, where productions of both manual and intellectual labour were exchanged. By the events of the contest, also, an impulse was given to poetry and statuary, which were employed to perpetuate the fame of the victors. Statues were erected to them in the Olympian plain, on the spot where they had been crowned, and frequently in the city to which they belonged, at the expense of the nation. These have passed away, but the poetry which emanated from that source is still extant. Among the most remarkable poets of this order is Pindar, who has celebrated the Olympian, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games, in various odes. From his second Isthmian ode it may be gathered that it was usual for the poet to receive money for his compositions on these subjects. He himself apologises for condescending to receive it, and offers his poverty as an excuse.—

"As yet the muse, despising sordid gain,
Strung not for gold her mercenary lyre,
Nor did Terpsichore adorn her strain
In gilded courtesy and gay attire,
With fair appearances to move the heart,
And recommend to sale her prostituted art."

"But now she suffers all her tuneful strain
Far other principles to hold,

And with the Spartan sage maintain,
 'That man is worthless without gold.'
 This truth himself by sad experience proved,
 Deserted in his need by those he loved."

The victor whom Pindar celebrated on this occasion was Xenocrates, whom he extols for his benevolence, public spirit, devotion to the gods, and his constant course of hospitality in all changes of fortune.

Still it must be evident that the victories at Olympia were greatly overrated by public opinion, and that neither a religious sanction nor charms of art can ever ennoble a display of animal powers. Some of the Greek sages looked at the festival in this light, and condemned the games as pernicious—as tending to unfit the competitors for the common duties of citizens. On the other hand, however, there were those among the Greek sages who believed that the gymnastic games were connected with the whole system of national education, and that the honours conferred on them were well applied, as they encouraged the cultivation of war, like exercises to which the Greek youth devoted the greatest part of his time. Looking at the Greeks, indeed, as a nation of soldiers, it cannot be denied that these games greatly tended to form their warlike character, but whether this was a desirable effect demands a doubt.

Although exhibiting much barbarity, yet viewed as a spectacle designed for public amusement, and indicating the national taste, the Olympic games rank far above the bloody and unmanly sports of a Roman or a Spanish amphitheatre.

THE PYTHIAN FESTIVAL.

The Pythian festival was sacred to Apollo Pythius, and was so called from the serpent Python, said to have been killed by him. The origin of the games was of ancient date, but, like those of Olympia, they had been interrupted by war, and when they were re-established, the festival was made a national institution, and was celebrated at Delphi every four years.

The date at which the Pythian games were re-established was about B.C. 590, after the conclusion of the first sacred war. The Criseans had plundered the temple of Delphi, and the Amphictyons, bound by their oath to avenge sacrilege, made fierce war against the republic, and at length the impious and devoted citizens were either put to the sword, or dragged into captivity, while Crissa itself was razed to the ground, its harbour choked up, and its fruitful plain turned into a wilderness.

It was believed by the Amphictyons that they were indebted to the admonitions of Apollo for the success of the war, and consequently bound to render him service. Accordingly, the Pythian games, which in ancient times had been consecrated to that god, having been interrupted by a long train of wars and calamities, they were restored with additional splendour. At the same time, it may be supposed that the Amphictyons had entertainment in view, for while this

festival, as that of Olympia, afforded scope for superstition, it was made subservient to the natural demands of pleasure. Religion and amusement were blended.

The Pythian festival, as re-established by the Amphictyons, is distinguished by two remarkable features. Instead of the trifling rewards usually distributed among the competitors at other public solemnities, the spoils of the cities of Crissa and Cirrha were divided among those who contended for the Pythian prizes. Rewards for instrumental music and poetry were also proposed, which had a great effect upon the national taste for those arts. In the festival of Olympia there were prizes offered to and contended for by poet-musicians, but these do not appear to have formed a prominent part of the festival, and, moreover, the laurel crown was only awarded to those who could unite the kindred arts—those who enjoyed the compositions of genius by the sound of the lyre. The Amphictyons separated these arts in the Pythian games, proposing prizes for instrumental music unaccompanied with poetry, and prizes for poetry unaccompanied with music, and thus afforded an opportunity for poets and musicians to display superior merit in their respective arts. It was, indeed, natural that poetry and music should form a leading feature in the Pythian festival, since in heathen mythology they were two of the arts which Apollo, to whom the festival was dedicated, is said to have invented. As the god was supposed to have also presided over these sister arts, he is often represented as sitting on mount Olympus with the nine Muses, to which there is an allusion in Pindar's first Pythian ode—

"Hail, golden lyre! whose heaven invented string
 To Phoebus and the black haired Nine belongs,
 Who, in sweet chorus round their tuneful king,
 Mix with the ir-sounding chords the ir-sacred songs
 The dance, gay queen of pleasure, these attend
 Thy bound strains her hinculing feet inspire
 And each melodious tongue its voice suspends
 'Till thou, great leader of the heavenly quire,
 With wauton art preludest givest the sign—
 Swells the full concert then with harmony divine."

According to the poet's description, the effects of this harmony were such as to disarm Jupiter of his thunderbolt, to soften the vengeful ire of "the birds' fierce monarch," (the eagle,) and even to lull the furious breast of the "stern god of violence and war," (Mars,) while celestial minds heard it with rapture, and the wicked with horror.

A contention for prizes in poetry and music was very early established among the Greeks, and when connected, as it frequently was, with some ceremony of religion, multitudes assembled to witness the contest. Both Homer and Hesiod speak of such contentions. When this worship, also, was carried from the islands of the Aegean to Delphi, a prize for poetry was instituted; whence the Amphictyons, in making this a leading feature in the Pythian games, only re-established an ancient custom.

THE NEMEAN FESTIVAL.

The Nemean festival derived its name from Nemea, a city of Peloponnesus, in Argolis. It

* This sage was Aristodemus. In the original it is, "Money, money is the man," which answers to the English proverb, "Money makes the man."

was celebrated every two years under the presidency of Argos. Like the Pythian and Olympic games, it claimed a very high antiquity, though the form in which it was established was of late institution. The games were such as those at Olympia, only they were neither upon so large a scale, nor equally honourable. This may be seen from Pindar's first Nemean ode, which is inscribed to Chromius of Ætna, a city of Sicily, who gained the victory in the chariot race at the Nemean festival. As it was the first of that kind gained by Chromius, the poet styles it the basis of his future fame, laid by the co-operation of the gods; and he adds, if fortune continued to be favourable, he might arrive at the highest summit of glory, by which is chiefly meant, gaining more prizes in the great or sacred games, particularly the Olympic, where the muses constantly attended to celebrate and reward the conquerors.

THE ISTHMIAN FESTIVAL.

The Isthmian festival was sacred to Neptune, who, according to Greek mythology, was also the creator of horses. Like that of the Nemean, it was celebrated every alternate year, and founded on the same principle of gratitude as that of the several institutions already described. The nature of the games, also, was essentially the same. Pindar, celebrating the victories of Xenocrates, speaks of his having gained the prize in the chariot races of Olympia, Nemea, and the Corinthian isthmus, where the Isthmian games were celebrated. The sameness of the games is also exhibited in the eleventh Nemean ode, where the poet, celebrating the honours of Aristagoras, speaks of some of the gymnastic exercises as common to the Nemean, Pythian, and Olympic festivals.

The honours and rewards of the victors in the Olympic and other festivals.—In the days of Homer, valuable prizes were proposed for the games then celebrated. In the funeral games of Patroclus, oxen, mules, horses, vases, tripods, golden talents, etc., were distributed to the various victors according to the celebrity of the games. At the date, however, when the four festivals described became national institutions, the immediate prizes were of a simple nature. In the Olympic games, it was a wreath composed of wild olive; in the Pythian, of laurel, in the Nemean, of green parsley, and in the Isthmian, of the same herb dried, or, as some say, of pine leaves. Still, other honours and advantages were annexed to the triumph of victory. Influenced by pride or policy, every city regarded an Olympic victory gained by one of its citizens as reflecting additional lustre on its name, and the victor was even sometimes solicited to allow himself to be proclaimed citizen of a city to which he did not belong. Thus at Athens, the citizen who had gained such a victory was rewarded with five hundred drachmas, and with the right to a place at the table of the magistrates; and Hiero of Syracuse induced Astylus of Croton, who had won the foot-race in three successive Olympiads, to transfer the honour of his last two victories to Syracuse. Besides this, they often had the honour of a statue

erected to their memory on the very spot where they received their wreaths of olive; whence the *Alta*, as the ground consecrated to the games was called at Olympia, became covered with the statues of victors of all ages. And it was usual to celebrate the event, both at Olympia and the victor's home, by a triumphal procession, in which his praises were sung, and often coupled with those of his ancestors and his country. The most eminent poets lent their aid on these occasions to exalt the victors in the estimation of their countrymen.

Thus it followed that the glory of being conqueror in these games was the highest with which the Greeks were acquainted. "A victory at Olympia," says Cicero, "rendered the victor no less illustrious than his consuls the Roman consul." Hence it was that they struggled so ardently for the prize.

If the Greeks struggled thus ardently to obtain a crown and honours which soon passed away, how much more should Christians strive to gain that prize which awaits them at the end of their course, and which is eternal! Such are the sentiments of the apostle Paul. "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible," 1 Cor. ix. 25. There can be no comparison between the leafy crown, and the honours annexed to it, which the Grecian victor obtained at his national festival, and that crown, with its attendant honours, which awaits the Christian in heaven. And yet how supinely does he often act, how sluggishly move onward in his Christian course. Now attracted with the baubles which this world holds out to view, and now doubting whether he shall ever obtain his promised reward, he is ready to halt midway in his race. He is outstripped in ardour by a Grecian athlete panting for his wreath of leaves! To such the injunction of the apostle is peculiarly applicable—"Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the prize. So run that ye may obtain" As there were certain rules prescribed in the race, which the competitors were obliged to observe, so in like manner Christians, in running the heavenly race, must observe all the rules prescribed in the Scriptures, otherwise he cannot hope to receive the prize. Let the believer also remember the spectators of his course. "Wherefore, seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith." Heb. xii. 1, 2.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS OF ART AND LITERATURE FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE PERSIAN WAR

"O GRACES! thou sapient nurse of finer arts!
Which to bright Science blooming Fancy bore;
Be this thy praise, that thou, and thou alone,
In these hast led the way, in these excell'd,
Crown'd with the laurel of assenting time."

THOMSON.

It has been already stated that several arts.

subservient to the enjoyment of the great and affluent, were cultivated in the heroic ages. As the Greeks arose from a state of barbarism it may easily be conceived that these arts improved in an increased ratio. They were, in truth, the necessary appendages of liberty and civilization.

The increase of wealth and refinement appears to have been more rapid in the Asiatic colonies than in the mother country. This was more especially the case in the Ionian cities, for Lycurgus is said by Plutarch to have visited them in order to observe the difference between their magnificence and the Cretan simplicity. In the midst of luxuries the Ionians cultivated the arts and pursued commercial adventures into unknown regions with an active spirit, with at least few exceptions. The fall of Magnesia, on the Mæander, is ascribed to effeminate habits, but, generally speaking, the Ionians rose superior to the pleasures of sense, and cheered and adorned private and public life by their skill in arts

SCULPTURE, PAINTING, ETC.

Schools of art were more common in the Dorian than in the Ionian cities. The origin of drawing, painting, and moulding figures, is ascribed to the Corinthians, to which the poet Pindar bears his testimony —

“Corinth, on thee the blooming hours bestow
The envied wreaths from manly deeds that flow,
And teach thy Dædal sons with careful heart
First to explore the way of many a useful art”

Sicyon, however, disputed the honour of some inventions with Corinth, and was more celebrated for her school of sculpture. The cities of Argos, Laconia, Rhodes, and Crete, and, above all, Ægina, were early renowned for their skill, while Athens was for a long time barren in great works and illustrious names connected with the arts. They boasted of a Dædalus, but the marvellous stories related of his art by the poets, divested of poetic ornament, amounts to no more than that he was the inventor of the wedge, many mechanical instruments, and the sails of ships. no mean inventions, but inferior to those of painting, drawing, statuary, and architecture.

Although the Dorians took the lead in arts of design, the Ionians were early in the field of invention. Emulation in the magnitude and splendour of their sacred buildings led to several important improvements. The temple of Hercules, at Samos, which was erected about the eighth century B.C., was built in the Doric style, and this soon after generally gave way in the Asiatic temples to the lighter Ionic. The architect who invented this was Rhæcus, a native of the island; and his son Theodorus was equally celebrated as the builder of the Lemnian labyrinth, and the author of casting metal statues, which had previously been wrought with the hammer and nailed together. The art of painting, also, seems to have made considerable progress in Ionia, while Corinth was still employed in its first rudiments. Pliny says that the Lydian king Candaules purchased a picture representing the destruction of Magnesia, on the Mæander, which was painted in the eighth century B.C. by Buzarochus, for his weight in gold. Notwithstanding,

Corinthian tradition asserts that the earliest essays in colouring were made by Cleophrantus, a citizen of Corinth, at the time of the overthrow of the Bæacids.

The art of sculpture appears to have advanced with more rapid strides at this period than any other of the arts of Greece. Within this period, indeed, it arose nearly to the summit of its perfection. This may have arisen partly from renewed intercourse with Egypt, although it is certain that the Greeks were celebrated for statuary in the Homeric age. The Egyptians, therefore, may have taught the Greeks various technical processes before unknown, but the art was essentially of Greek origin. Independently of the evidence afforded by the Homeric poems, that sculpture had attained to great perfection in the heroic age, there are descriptions of several elaborate works which appear to belong to the period preceding the renewal of intercourse between Greece and Egypt. There were other causes, also, which operated more efficaciously to urge the rapid progress of statuary in the century preceding the Persian wars. Among these causes may be mentioned the substitution of brass and marble for wood, of which statues were anciently made; and the overlaying of wood, when used, with more precious substances, as ivory and gold. This substitution, however, did not involve change of style, and a more important cause may be found in the enlargements which statuary experienced in the range of its subjects and the multiplicity of its productions. One idol alone had hitherto been admitted into the interior of the temples of Greece, but now the superstitious people began to fill these temples with groups of gods and heroes, strangers to the place, and guests of the power properly invoked there. This gave a great impetus to the art, and the custom of honouring the victors at the public games with a statue may have contributed still more powerfully to its perfection. All this opened a wide field for emulation, and, through its influence, so rapid was the progress of this art, that the final union of truth and beauty, which is expressed by the term *ideal*, was at this period accomplished in the school of Phidias, at Athens. To what a degree of perfection the Greeks had attained in this art is well described by the poet Thomson —

“Thy fair ideas, thy delightful forms,
By love imagined, by the Graces touch'd,
The boast of well-pleas'd nature! Sculpture seized,
And bad them ever smile in Parian stone

Peoples a nation, they for years on years,
By the cool touches of judicious toil
Their rapid genius curbing, pour'd it all
Through the live features of one breathing stone
There, beaming, full it shone

Minutely perfect all! Each dimple sunk,
And every muscle swell'd as Nature taught
In tresses, braided gay, the marble waver'd
Flow'd in loose robes, or thin transparent veils,
Sprung into motion 'soften'd into flesh,
'Was fired to passion, or refined to soul”

It may be conceived that, from the perfection to which sculpture arrived, the sister art of painting would be greatly improved. Hence correct design was studied; this was eminently displayed in the “Helen” of Zeuxis, and the

"Queen of Love," painted by Apelles of Rhodes, for whose famous picture called "Ialysus," Demetrius, when he besieged Rhodes, spared that part of the city where it was deposited, lest the painting should be destroyed.

POETRY.

The same spirit of emulation which so greatly tended to improve sculpture and painting gave birth about the same period to new forms of poetry. Before the heroic age, the names of Orpheus, Linus, and a few others, are recorded as sons of song. The first period of Greek poetry, however, known to us by writing, is entirely filled by the names of Homer and Hesiod. The former of these appears to mark the beginning, and the latter the close of the period. Their verse, and the verse of those who immediately followed, strictly preserved the character of narrative. All of them were employed in celebrating the actions of heroes, whence they are considered as having stood on an equal footing with them, and as belonging to their number. This was the essential character of Greek poetry for two centuries, and the poets of that period are usually comprehended under the title of Cyclical, or poets of the cycle, which probably denotes a collection of epic poems, as the Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the Works, and Days, and Theogony of Hesiod; the Argonauts of Apollonius Rhodius, etc. At the end of two centuries, however, the public taste began to be satiated with these subjects, and the poetical genius of the nation took a new direction. It did not, indeed, abandon the epic style, but it ranged with greater freedom, and explored many fresh regions, so that it may be said to have changed its name for that of the lyric.

During three hundred years the masters of lyric song were continually enlarging and enriching the sphere of their art. Great names occurred among them, but they are little known, on account of the loss of their works, those of Pindar and a few fragments excepted. This circumstance is greatly deplored, for the Greek lyrical poetry affords a lively picture of the nation, political, religious, and domestic, from the greatest to the minutest features, for two or three centuries, during which little historical information has reached us. This is abundantly testified by the portion now extant, which displays the thoughts and feelings belonging to the various occasions of life, public and private, sacred and profane—thoughts which were designed to awaken the sympathy of a social circle. Thus, as new dynasties and new forms of government were continually springing up, as commerce was spreading and luxury increasing, and as discoveries and inventions were rapidly multiplying, all these changes ministered fresh occasions and subjects for lyric song.

In the Dorian states poetry appears to have been looked upon as a part of education. So also was music; and hence poets and musicians were under the surveillance of magistrates and the law. The themes of the poets were chiefly religious, martial, and political. In Crete and Sparta the spirit of the laws and the maxims of the constitution were delivered in verse. Poets were, in fact, called in to the aid of the legislator.

Tyræus and Terpander seconded the views of Lycurgus, by describing and commending his institutions, and the Spartans at all times, though they disdained the labour of poetical composition, encouraged such foreign poets as were willing to adapt their strains to Spartan principles. The same may be said of those whom the Greeks denominated tyrants: they likewise cherished the lyric muse, though in a different manner, and from different motives. They patronised them in order that they might cheer their banquets, applaud their success, and extol their magnificence. In the same manner they were encouraged by the victors in the Olympic games, and all the main epochs and leading stations in the life of the great were considered as requiring the aid of song to enliven them. Poetry was used to celebrate the war march, the religious and convivial procession, the nuptial ceremony, the feast, and funeral rites: all demanded and obtained this accompaniment.

The above, however, only affords a view of one kind of lyric verse: there was a great mass of lyrical poetry which breathed only the thoughts and feelings of individual minds. Such were the strains of Archilochus, Hipponax, and Alceus, whose muse, kindled by private or public quarrels, gave vent to their rage in sarcasm and invective. Such also were the strains of Anacreon, Iliyus, Mimnermus, and Sappho, who recorded the delights of the senses in glowing language. After these, Theopis and his successors gradually unfolded the Attic tragedy, and, during the same period, a considerable body of didactic poetry, under the forms of fable, proverb, pithy sentences, or moral lessons, were invented by numerous Greek poets.

What effect these varied forms of poetry had on the manners of the Greeks is observable throughout their whole history. In the hands of these mighty masters of song it was an instrument both for good or evil, good, as it was sometimes made subservient to virtue, and evil, as it was frequently employed to excite the evil passions of war, revenge, and the various bad passions which characterise human nature.

PROSE LITERATURE.

Although Greek poets had for ages written with a view to recitation, it was long before any one wrote for the satisfaction of individual readers. About the sixth century B.C., however, a new era dawned on Greek literature. Seeking to convey knowledge, or reasonings, authors adopted the style of familiar discourse, which was gradually ennobled and refined, till in the art of composition it vied with poetry itself.

Opinions are divided as to who was the first prose writer in Greece. A late tradition confers the honour upon Pherecydes, a native of the isle of Scyros, who flourished at the above period; but Anaximander, who lived somewhat earlier, is probably better entitled to that honour; and if Polyseus, a Messenian, wrote his history in prose, his claims would be stronger than those of Pherecydes and Anaximander. Cadmus, of Miletus, is said to have applied prose to an historical subject before any other Greek writer.

In the early ages of historical composition, however, history did not present the features of plain, sober statement, which is, or ought to be, its characteristic. It was then subordinate on the one hand to poetry, and on the other to the study of nature. Thus Strabo, speaking of Cædæmus, Pherecydes, and Hecateus, says that they got rid of the metrical restraints of their poetical predecessors, but adhered to them so closely in other respects, as even to retain the character of their diction.

Another class of works written at this period seems to have been somewhat like modern works of geography and topography. According to Dionysius, these writers confined themselves to local limits, and recorded the legends, whether sacred or profane, of each district, without any regard to historical truth. This latter feature is, indeed, observable in the works of the later Greek historians. For none of them became celebrated for critical acumen, whence it arises that modern historians find a greater difficulty in sifting truth from fiction than they would have done had Greek writers led the way. Even the pages of the generally sober Herodotus are marred by his records of the marvellous. It could not have been expected, however, that the Greek writers would have been able, any more than modern historians, to unravel the legendary webs with which the earlier portion of Greek history is entangled.

PHILOSOPHY.

Philosophy began to dawn among the Greeks in the earliest period of their history. Thus traces of a connected investigation of cause and effect are discovered in the pages of Hesiod. The sixth century B.C., however, is considered as the period in which philosophy took its rise, inasmuch as it then began to be separated from poetry and religion, with which it had been previously blended. At that time it was cultivated not by bards, priests, or seers, but by men known solely under the name of philosophers, who thought and expressed their thoughts as they listed, like the Encyclopædists of France.

The first attempt towards moral philosophy, as independent of religion, seems to have been made in the fables of Æsop, wherein useful lessons are derived from the instinctive sagacity of animals. The lively imagination of that renowned fabulist put into the mouths of the animal world lessons of practical wisdom, which were not only useful and entertaining to the age in which he lived, but have continued so to the present time.

The distinguishing character of the first age of philosophy is marked by the fame of the Seven Sages. These wise men—as Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, Periander of Corinth, Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylene, Bias of Priene, and Cleobolus of Lindos—were all engaged in the affairs of public life, as statesmen, magistrates, and legislators; and while thus engaged, drew lessons of practical wisdom from observation on men and manners, which they imparted in maxims or proverbs.

One of these seven sages, Thales the Milesian,

established his fame on a basis more broad and permanent than the fluctuating interests of perishing communities. Many of the elementary propositions of Euclid were first discovered by Thales. He also directed the acuteness of his mind, with equal success, to astronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones, discovered the equinoxes and solstices, delineated the *Ursa Minor*, and observed and nearly predicted eclipses. His chief fame, however, rests in having founded the Ionian school, which was the first Grecian school of philosophy.

The Ionian School—Thales is said to be the founder of the Ionian school, inasmuch as he introduced a method which, notwithstanding their theories greatly varied, was retained by his successors. The chief point on which the philosophers of this school agreed was, that they fixed their attention on a primeval state of things, to which they ascended by various steps, and from which they endeavoured to deduce the later order of nature. This would seem to indicate that their systems were founded upon the poetical cosmogonies, the legendary form of which they discarded.

The distinguishing tenet of the philosophy of Thales was, that water, or some liquid element, was the origin of all things, an idea which may be traced in the pages of Homer. The biblical reader need not be reminded that such a dogma is utterly fallacious, since he there learns that it was from the fiat of an Almighty Being that the heavens and the earth were created. Still Thales had the appearance of reason on his side, as may be gathered from the pages of Aristotle. That acute writer conceives that the philosopher came to this conclusion from observations on the uses of moisture in the nourishment of vegetable and animal life, which were probably connected with a traditional belief that the earth rested on an abyss of waters bounded by the ocean, and which was the immediate cause of earthquakes. Now it is well known that without water vegetation perishes, and that it is essential even to the life of man. But water is not a creative, but a nourishing power, not the creator, but the creature. In assuming, therefore, that it was the *first* principle of nature, Thales opposed the popular belief, as taught in the pages of mythology, that the world and all things therein owed their origin to the unseen gods, who presided over their works.

By a similar process, Anaximander of Miletus, who belonged to the Ionian school, substituted a new principle for the liquid element of Thales. As air encompassed the earth, and was thought by them to sustain the heavenly bodies, and appeared also as the universal source of life, Anaximander conceived that it was the origin of all things. By analogy, Heraclitus of Ephesus preferred fire for the same purpose, not indeed the visible element, but some more subtle fluid unseen by mortal eyes. This philosopher was a bold and original thinker. He endeavoured to reconcile the constant flux of all sensible objects with the permanency of one intelligible substance. The whole order of nature appeared to him as the momentary equipose of conflicting impulses, which he illustrated by the tension of the bow and the lyre, or as the *play* of an infi-

nita Being from whom all things proceed, and to whom all things return. There were other philosophers who held similar notions: but their various opinions concerning the origin and destruction of worlds, as well as of the magnitudes and distances of heavenly bodies, must be considered only as the dreams of inquisitive men, whose ambition for knowledge carried them beyond the sphere of experience and the clear deductions of reason.

Still, the speculations of these philosophers, and especially those of Leucippus of Elea, and Democritus of Abdera, unveiled the feeble majesty of Grecian superstition, whence they were fraught with important consequences. They paved the way, indeed, for the more sublime notions of Anaxagoras of Clazomene, who first announced to the heathen world a self-existent, all-perfect mind as the great cause and disposer of the material world. Diogenes of Apollonia had before regarded the universe as issuing from an intelligent principle, by which it was at once vivified and ordered; but he did not recognise any distinction between matter and mind. Anaxagoras, on the contrary, acknowledged a supreme mind distinct from the chaos to which it imparted motion, form, and order. This was a blow aimed at the very root of Grecian superstition; and as it was irreconcilable with the prevailing opinions, it drew upon the philosopher hatred and persecution. He was accused of impiety to the gods, and condemned to die!

Notwithstanding, it must not be supposed that Anaxagoras derived this luminous idea from the light which the conceptions of previous philosophers unfolded, or that it was the result of his own unaided reason. His fanciful and absurd notions concerning the heavenly bodies proved him to have been a wild theorist possessing no just powers of conception. Hence, as he had travelled into Egypt for improvement, it would rather seem that he had collected a notion of the Deity there, which he was bold enough to promulgate in Greece in opposition to the popular belief.

The diffusion of this principle was followed by an investigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and by a deduction from them of the great duties of morality. This might have produced a general revolution in the opinions of the Greeks, if its tendency had not been counteracted by the prejudices of the vulgar and the dangerous refinements of the sophists. These were powerful barriers to the diffusion of morality in Greece. The sophists were a race of men who, by their eloquence and fallacies, long vitiated the Grecian morals, and it required all the subtlety of the mind of a Socrates to unmask their characters. This he did by attacking them covertly, and by appearing rather as an inquirer than as a teacher, which gave rise to the way of disputing by interrogation, called the *Socratic*. His confutation began in doubt, was carried on by turning their own arms against them, and ended in advancing nothing of his own.

While philosophy was taking root in Ionia, two schools were founded in the Western colonies of a widely different character. These were the Eleatic and the Pythagorean.

The *Eleatic School* took its name from the town of Elea, on the western coast of southern Italy, a settlement of the Phocæans. It was founded by Xenophanes, who migrated thither from his birth-place, Colophon, in Ionia, about 536 B.C. Its history, in one important point, presents a striking contrast to that of the Ionian philosophy, for it began where that ended, namely, with the admission of a supreme intelligence. As Thales saw gods in all things, so Xenophanes saw all things in God. "He gazed upon the whole heaven," says Aristotle, "and said that the One Being was the Deity." This was the leading principle of his system. Subordinate to this, he taught that nothing could come into being or could cease to be. It does not appear, however, that he denied the reality of external objects, or regarded their diversified aspects as mere illusions, but the mode in which he attempted to reconcile their multiplicity and transformations with the unity and identity of the Deity, who, though all mind, was still one with the world in his system, cannot be ascertained.

Apart from these ontological speculations, Xenophanes studied nature, and, from geological observations, taught that earth and sea were once mingled in one mass. He supported this opinion by referring to sea-shells found in mid-land regions and in the bowels of mountains, to the impressions of fish in the quarries of Syracuse, and to similar phenomena observed in the island of Pharos. Besides this, Xenophanes was the first Greek philosopher who openly rejected the popular superstition. He did this by referring it to its true source, the tendency of man to assimilate the objects of his worship to his own likeness, and by inveighing against Homer and Hesiod for attributing actions unworthy of the divine character to the gods. Xenophanes also attacked several doctrines of other philosophers; but seems rather to have sought the refutation of their opinions than the establishment of any of his own.

Xenophanes was followed by Parmenides, a native of Elea. Parmenides, however, differed from his predecessor in one important point. While Xenophanes promulgated the idea of Deity, he taught the notion of being. His system was grounded on the distinction between sense and reason, as means of arriving at truth; and he denied the reality of time, space, and motion, while at the same time he admitted a real foundation for the appearances of nature. How he reconciled these seemingly inconsistent views is unknown: it is said that he constructed a peculiar physical theory to explain them, but it is lost.

The successors of Parmenides were Zeno and Melissus, of Samos, who combated, with dialectic subtlety, the dogmas of other philosophers and the opinions of the vulgar, in doing which they often descended to sophistical paradoxes. Zeno was sometimes ranked among the sophists; and thus the Eleatic school, which commenced its career by a religious philosophy, finally amalgamated with men who sought the subversion of both religion and philosophy.

The *Pythagorean School*.—This school was founded by Pythagoras, whose history is obscured by legend. Pythagoras, it appears, was

born at Samos, about 570 B.C., where he was educated, and that in his early youth he travelled in Egypt. On his return from thence he found his native country governed by Polycrates, a tyrant whose power was so firmly established that there were no hopes of its subversion. Accordingly, Pythagoras resorted to European Greece, where he gained great honours at the Olympic games. From Olympia and the republic of Elis he went to Sparta, where he studied the laws of Lycurgus and the manners of the people, and thence retired to Crotona, in Lower Italy.

Pythagoras was both a political and moral reformer. The former has been before referred to; and Heeren remarks upon the latter, that "self-government was the grand object of his moral reform." This was intimately connected with his political views, and it may have contributed not a little to the formation of those firm friendships which he effected between the Italian Greek states.

One great means which Pythagoras used to work a moral reform was, by the force of example. His fame had arrived at Crotona before him; for whoever distinguished himself in the general convention at Olympia was speedily celebrated in the remotest provinces of Greece. Pythagoras knew this, and, having his plans formed in his clear and capacious mind, proceeded on his arrival at Crotona to extend and establish his celebrity. Having seen that the rites and ceremonies of remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and wisdom, were employed to avert the displeasure or to gain the good will of the gods, he resolved to use this instrument of policy to excite respect for his person and reverence for his instructions. He frequented the temples at an early hour; made regular purifications and sacrifices, at no food but of the purest kind, that no corporeal stain might interrupt the fancied communication with the gods, and dressed himself either in the sacerdotal dress of the priests of Egypt, or that of the Athenian magistrates and nobles, in the early and more pious times of their republic. These artifices—seconded by his previous celebrity, his venerable aspect, harmonious voice, and animated eloquence—promoted his designs. The citizens crowded to hear the lessons of the admired stranger, who pleased their taste and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners and reproached their vices. The effects were astonishing. The women laid aside their ornaments; the youth preferred duty to pleasure; and the aged sought to improve their understandings to the neglect of their fortunes.

But it does not appear that Pythagoras worked single-handed in the matter of reformation. Soon after his arrival at Crotona, he chose a select number of his most ardent admirers, whom he formed into an order. Their number amounted, or was confined, to three hundred, and they were chiefly persons of weight in the republic, whose temper, character, and views were congenial to his own. None were admitted into this order who did not possess qualities and endowments worthy of that honour; and, in order to confirm it, as well as to obtain the purposes for which it had been instituted, Pythagoras employed the symbolical writing and other secrets which he

had been taught by the Egyptian priests. His scholars, also, were taught certain signs by which they might know each other, and they could correspond, though separated by place, in an unknown character.

Thirlwall observes of this order, that it was at once a philosophical school, a religious brotherhood, and a political association. All these characters appear to have been united in the founder's mind, whence he chose for his condisciples persons whom he deemed capable of grasping the highest truths which he could communicate. The cultivation of their intellectual faculties was regarded by him as a necessary preparation for the work to which he destined them. He instructed them in religion, the various branches of mathematical and physical science, and the various subjects which occupy the human mind.

It is difficult to give a clear idea of the philosophy of Pythagoras, as he does not appear to have committed it to writing, and as it has been disfigured by the dreams and chimeras of later Pythagoreans. Not that the doctrines, which Pythagoras is known to have taught, can be considered profound. The one great feature of his system, that of the transmigration of souls, is as wild a chimera as ever issued from the minds of his disciples. In this he taught that souls, previous to their entering into human bodies, floated in the air, whence they were inhaled by the process of breathing at the moment of birth. At death they descended into the lower world, where they were supposed to dwell a certain period, and whence they again rose into the upper world and floated in the air until they entered into new bodies. When by this process their purification had become complete they were raised to higher regions, where they continued to exist and to enjoy the company of the gods. The souls of men were described by the Pythagoreans as light particles of the universal soul diffused throughout the world. The souls of the gods were considered as proceeding directly from the central fire, which the Pythagoreans conceived was placed in the centre of the universe, and which was thence called "the mother of the gods." The souls of men were said by them to have proceeded from the sun, which was a mere reflex of the central fire. They were supposed to have consisted of three parts, two of which, as the rational half of the soul, had their seat in the brain; and the third, which was the animal half, had its seat in the heart.

Whence Pythagoras derived these fugitive notions concerning the soul of man— notions which hardly deserve the name of philosophy—is unknown. The doctrine does not appear to have originated among the ancient Greeks; Pythagoras may therefore have derived it from some of the then existing mysteries of Greece and other countries, in which he was well versed. These institutions retained within their precincts many doctrines untaught to the vulgar, as their very name implies; and the soul of man, which is a mystery in itself, would naturally form a prominent feature in those mysteries. The inquisitive minds of the Greek philosophers, in attempting to grasp subjects of this nature, were led into such wild speculations as above recorded. What the soul of man is, the pagan mind, acute though

it was, could never discover. And even in the clearer light by which we are surrounded we must on many points confess our ignorance. We are, however, taught in the book of revelation that the soul proceeds from and returns to its Maker—and that it will exist for ever in bliss or woe. In bliss, if it has an interest in the atoning sacrifice of Christ: in woe, if his grace is rejected.

The moral precepts of the Pythagoreans were greatly superior to their philosophical speculations. With them virtue was a harmony, unity, and an endeavour to resemble the Deity. They taught that the whole life of man should be an attempt to represent the beauty and harmony displayed in the order of the universe; that the mind should have the body and the passions under perfect control; and that the gods should be worshipped by simple purifications, offerings, and, above all, by sincerity and purity of heart.

It appears that Pythagoras taught several doctrines which he did not believe, merely on account of their utility. He propagated the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments as necessary to society. Thus he endeavoured to blend with his popular doctrine of the metempsychosis, according to the express testimony of that ancient Pythagorean, Timæus of Locris. After having said that the doctrine of rewards and punishments was necessary to society, he observes: "As the body is sometimes cured with unwholesome remedies, when such as are most wholesome have no effect, so we restrain those minds by false relations which will not be persuaded by the truth. Hence there is a necessity for instilling the dread of foreign torments, as that the soul shifts and changes its habitation; that the coward is thrust into the body of a woman; the murderer is imprisoned within the fur of a savage, the lascivious is condemned to inhabit swine; the vain and inconsistent are changed into birds, and the slothful and ignorant into fishes. The dispensation of these things is committed in the second period to Nemesis the avenger, together with the furies, the inspectors of human actions, to whom the Sovereign Lord of all things hath committed the government of the world, replenished with gods, and men, and animals; all which were formed after the perfect model of the eternal and intellectual ideas." But the connexion between the doctrines of the metempsychosis and the future state of rewards and punishments, which the sage Pythagoras thus formed, is vague and unmeaning. The former, indeed, tends to destroy the latter, as Ovid has shown, where he makes Pythagoras, in delivering the esoteric doctrine of his school to the Crotonates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments on the very principle of his own metempsychosis:—

"Pleased as I am to walk along the sphere
Of shining stars, and travel with the year,
To leave the heavy earth and scale the height
Of Atlas, who supports the heavy weight;
To look from upper Right, and thence survey
Mistaken mortals wandering from the way,
And wanting wisdom, fearful for the state
Of future things, and trembling at their fate!

"These I would teach, and by right reason bring
To think of death as but an idle thing.
Why thus afflicted at an empty name,
A dream of darkness and foolishness same?"

Vain themes of wit, which but in poems pass,
And fables of a world that never was!
What feels the body when the soul expires,
By time corrupted, or consumed by fires?
Nor dies the spirit, but new life repeats
In other forms, and only changes seats.
"W'en I, who these mysterious truths declare,
Was once Euphorbus in the Trojan war,
My name and lineage I remember well,
And how in fight by Sparta's king I fell."

All this places the character of Pythagoras in no very favourable light: it represents him, in fact, as practising upon the credulity of the multitude with true pagan craft. Superstition was made by him subservient to the foundation and establishment of the order which he had instituted, and all his skill was called into action for that purpose. He instituted among his disciples a sacred worship, or mysteries, which are frequently called Pythagorean orgies, and the science of numbers, geometry, and music; and even medicine, gymnastics, and dancing, were closely connected with the sacred rites. His mysteries appear to have been, in the earliest period of his career, open to persons who were not members of the political society. Even women seem to have been admitted to them, or, at all events, to hear his lessons, whence history unfolds the names of a long list of female Pythagoreans.

It is not certain whether Pythagoras formed any definite political theory, or that he wished to see his disciples placed in public offices, though the state was to be their proper and highest sphere of action. Respecting his political views, it is stated that they were aristocratical, which is, indeed, evident from the events of his history. He is said to have thrown his influence into the scale in order to restore this form of government in some Italian states where it had bowed before tyranny and democracy. His chief object, however, was to form a supremacy of minds enlightened by philosophy and purified by religion; but no system of paganism could thus operate. Such a state of things never did exist in Greece, whence it cannot be stated that Pythagoras preferred any one form of government to another for its intrinsic merits, but only so far as he thought some institutions more suitable to form basis for his own.

Those candidates who sought admission into the order underwent an examination by Pythagoras himself, who is said to have been a master in the art of physiognomy. Those whom he adopted were submitted to a period of regular probation and discipline. During two years they bore the name of *acoustics*, or hearers, they not being allowed to speak for that period. After this they were called *mathematici*, or scholars; and they were then allowed to ask questions, and to make objections to what they heard, as well as to write about what they had learnt in their period of silence. In the third stage they received the name of *physici*; and they were then admitted to the last secrets in religion, as well as in philosophy and politics. Mention is made of two other divisions of his disciples, the *esoteric* and *exoteric*. The former of these names seems to have had reference to the three hundred from whom no kind of knowledge was kept secret; and the latter either to those passing through the

first stages of noviceate, or to persons who were not initiated into all the secrets which Pythagoras had to unfold, and perhaps received no instruction of a religious nature. Other divisions are mentioned, as *Pythagorici*, *Pythagorei*, and *Pythagorata*, but their real character is shrouded in mystery.

All the candidates, upon entering their noviceate, had to exchange their former mode of life for one laid down by Pythagoras himself. Their diet seems to have been a subject of his especial attention; though little dependence can be placed on the stories told of the abstinence he prescribed. Some authors represent him as forbidding all animal food, others all kinds of fish, and others beans; but Aristoxenus asserts that he preferred beans to all other vegetables. There can be no doubt that he sought to preserve the vigour of body and mind of his disciples by strict temperance; and it is probable that he restricted the diet of his followers by several prohibitions which had a symbolical meaning, and were intended to impress some moral or religious truths. Ovid represents him as seeking to confirm his doctrine of metempsychosis by inculcating abstinence from animal food, lest they should disturb the soul of a parent or a brother in destroying the life of the animal —

“ Then let not piety be put to flight
To please the taste of glutton appetite,
But suffer inmate souls secure to dwell,
Lest from their seats your parents you expel.
With rabel hunger feed upon your kind,
Or from a beast dislodge a brother's mind.”

In order to establish this doctrine, it seems to have been necessary for Pythagoras to enjoin abstinence from animal food, otherwise he would have undermined his credit with his disciples, for the anomaly would soon have been discovered, had he allowed, at least, its indiscriminate use. He could then only have been deemed a persecutor of his species, or an unbeliever in his own doctrine!

In its external arrangements, the order which Pythagoras instituted presents some analogy to the institutions which he had seen in Crete and Sparta. All the members lived and took their meals together, and the unity and attachment among them are said to have been so conspicuous as to excite the jealousy of their relations. This was diligently cultivated by Pythagoras; and he also laid great stress on conscientiousness and uprightness in all the affairs of life.

It has been seen that Pythagoras aimed at establishing a rational supremacy of minds enlightened by philosophy and purified by religion, and characters fitted to maintain an ascendancy over others by habits of self-government. Success, at first, seemed to accompany his efforts; but in the end they proved a signal failure. The overwhelming influence which himself and his order gradually acquired in Croton and other Italian states, where branch institutions were established, induced the aristocratical party of Crotona to avail themselves of his services; but in the end it excited their jealousy, and by one great shock it was suddenly overthrown.

Civil dissensions had long prevailed in the neighbouring state of Sybaris; and about B. C.

510 they broke out into a general insurrection against the oligarchs. The insurgents, headed by a leader named Telys, compelled their lords, to the number of five hundred, to quit the city; and when the exiles took refuge at Crotona, they sent an insolent message to demand that they should be surrendered. Pythagoras and his order exerted their influence with the senate and the people of Crotona, to induce them to reject this demand, and it was accordingly rejected. This led to a war between Sybaris and Crotona. They joined their forces against each other, which formed issue on the banks of the Trionto, where victory declared itself in favour of Crotona. Cruel in victory, the Crotonaites resolved to sweep Sybaris away from the face of the earth. They hastened to the city, and sacked and razed it to the ground the river Crathis even was turned through the ruins, to obliterate all traces of its departed greatness.

Both the senate of Crotona and the Pythagorean associates seem to have fancied that this victory was the triumph of their cause, and that they alone were to divide the spoils. They refused to concede any share of it, or the conquered territories, to those who had earned it by their toil and their blood. This armed the commonalty against the Pythagorean order, who were presumed to have had the chief share in the measure. Under the command of Cylon, who is believed to have been rejected by Pythagoras, when he sought to be admitted among his followers, the populace set fire to the house of the Crotona general, Milo, where the Pythagoreans were assembled, and many of them perished, while the rest found safety only in exile.*

This rising at Crotona appears to have been followed by similar scenes in several other cities in Italy, as at Caulonia, Locri, and Tarentum. The Pythagoreans were driven thence, and took refuge in Greece. Here they remained till tranquillity was restored by the mediation of the Achæans of the mother country, when sixty of them returned. Their presence, however, seems to have given rise to fresh troubles, probably from their opposition to the democratical institutions which Crotona and other cities adopted from Achæa. At a later period, some celebrated Pythagoreans, who had been driven out of Italy, sojourned in Greece, where they partially revived the ancient influence of their order.

Such were the systems of philosophy unfolded in Greece during the ages which intervened between the Homeric age and the period of the Persian wars. How vague and indefinite were many of the notions of the various philosophers who figured during that period, is palpable to the Christian reader. Seeking, by the light of reason, to account for causes and effects which can only be discovered by the light of revelation, they were led into the most extravagant theories ever promulgated by the mind of man. Their intellects may, indeed, have been acute, but being perverted, they could not arrive at the truth. They could not discover where truth lay;

* It is not known whether Pythagoras himself was at Crotona at this time. The general belief is, that he died not long after at Metapontum, and if so, he may have been one of the exiles.

and they must appear to the enlightened Christian, as men groping in the dark for hidden treasure, which is far beyond their reach.

The apostle Paul, in his epistle to the Corinthians, finely shows the vanity of the wisdom of the Greeks, and how it bowed before "the foolishness of preaching," by the power of the gospel. "The preaching of the cross," he says, "to them which are saved it is the power of God. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness, but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." 1 Cor. i. 18—24. To the same effect he bears testimony to the power of the gospel in his address to the elders of Ephesus "Ye know," said he, "from the first day that I came into Asia, after what manner I have been with you at all seasons, serving the Lord with all humility of mind, and with many tears and temptations, which befel me by the lying in wait of the Jews and how I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you, and have taught you publicly and from house to house, testifying both to the Jews, and also to the Greeks, repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," Acts xx. 18—31.

And yet the Greeks have imitators in every successive age and every country. Even with the light of Revelation shining around them, there are "spruce philosophers," who seek to explain cause and effect by their own unaided reason. But the truth is,—

"God never meant that man should scale the heavens
By strides of human wisdom in his works,
Though wondrous he commands us in his word
To seek him rather where his mercy shines
The mind, indeed, enlighten'd from above,
Views him in all, ascribes to the Grand Cause
The grand effect, acknowledges with joy
His manner, and with rapture tastes his style.
But never yet did philosophy tube,
That brings the planets home into the eye
Of observation, and discovers, else
Not visible, his family of worlds
Discover him that rules them. Such a mist
Hangs over mortal eyes, blind from the birth,
And dark in things divine Philosophy, baptis'd
In the pure fountain of eternal love,
Has eyes indeed, and viewing all she sees
As meant to increase a God to man,
Gives *Ætis* his praise, and forfeits not her own."
COWPER.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE GREEKS.

The manners and customs of the ancient Greeks are peculiarly interesting. By a knowledge of

them the reader will be best able to form a right judgment of the people. In the chapters containing their civil and military history an account of the Greeks, as warriors, has been given. But this is only a one-sided view of the Greek character. It is by an acquaintance with their manifold usages alone that the Greeks can be come familiar to our minds as a people, and in this chapter our object will be to exhibit those usages as regards their domestic life, from their cradles to their graves.

By the laws of Lycurgus, certain of the children born to a Spartan were not allowed to live. Nor was infanticide confined to Sparta alone. That crime, at which humanity shudders, prevailed throughout civilized Greece, not excepting the polite and elegant Athens. Even there the father who could be so lost to the tender sentiments of natural pity might destroy his children in cold blood, or expose them in jars in desert places or the thronged city, without fear of being brought to justice for the deed. The laws of Solon, it is true, did not sanction the crime as did those of Lycurgus, but they did not forbid it, nor punish the guilty.

Infanticide, however, did not prevail among all classes of the community. While the poor, goaded by poverty, or the vicious, to hide their shame, imbued their hands in the blood of their offspring, the wealthy celebrated the birth of a child with a succession of banquets and rejoicings. On the fifth day from the birth, a ceremony, called *Amphidromia*, was performed, in which the child was initiated in the rites of religion and placed under the protection of the fire-goddess, Hestia; and on the seventh day it received its name, and the festivities of another banquet. This latter custom and feast, however, were sometimes deferred till the tenth day, as appears from Euripides, who, writing of the natal-day, which was solemnized annually, as the anniversary of the child's birth, asks this question:—

"Say, who, delighting in a mother's claim,
Mid tenth-day feasts bestow'd the ancestral name?"

It was the prerogative of the father to bestow the name upon the child, and he appears to have possessed the power of altering it if he thought proper. In the days of antiquity the name was often derived from some circumstance attending the birth of the child or the history of its parents. Sometimes, also, their own deeds, or some misfortune which befel them, suggested a name. Thus, the son of Achilles was first called Pyrrhos, from the colour of his hair, and afterwards Neoptolemos, "the youthful warrior," from his engaging at an early age in the siege of Troy.

Of the agents employed in the formation of character the nurse is peculiarly important. The ancients generally appear to have been convinced of this, and especially the Spartan helots and the Athenian women. The former were particularly celebrated throughout Greece for their tender care both of the body and mind of their infant charges. While they carefully guarded their

delicate frames from all accidents which might injure them, they aimed at forming the manners, regulating the temper, and laying the foundations of virtuous habits. So successful were they in rearing the child up into the man of a generous and frank character—in fortifying the mind against the terrors of superstition, which is the bane of childhood in every age and country—that these Doric nurses were in great request throughout Greece.

Generally speaking, several nurses were employed in the nursery of a wealthy Greek. But whatever might be the number of her assistants, the Greek mother usually suckled her own offspring.

The cradles in a Greek nursery were of various forms. Some resembled those in use among our cottagers, others were suspended, like sailors' hammocks, from the ceiling, while a third description resembled little portable baskets. According to Theocritus, the young Alcides and Iphiclus were lulled to rest in a shield—

"Soon as Alcmena bade her pleasing care,
Wash'd, and with milk well fed, for rest prepare—
Alcides, who ten months had seen the light,
And Iphiclus, just younger by a night—
She gently laid them on the brazen shield,
(Which great Amphitryon, in the tented field,
From Pterilas had won,) on either head
Placed her fair hands, and, fondly smiling, said
"Sleep—sleep secure, my boys the night away,
Sweet be your easy rest till dawning day.
She spoke, and straight their heavy eyelids yield
To slumber, as she rocks the cradling shield"

The lullaby which Alcmena is said to have uttered or sung on this occasion, may be taken as a specimen of those which Greek nurses were in the habit of singing over their infant charges, in accordance with the established usages of nations throughout the world. Among the Greeks, indeed, every class of the community had its song, whence it was natural that the nurse should appropriate one to herself. This melody was technically denominated *katabaulousis*, of which scraps and fragments are alone preserved.

In remoter ages, beside the mother and the nurse, a *baulaw*, or nurse-father, was engaged in the work of education while yet the child was in the nursery. Their chief care was to fortify the mind against vice. The means which they took to effect this, however, were of a questionable nature. Such, for instance, was their practice of teaching the child to dread Empusa, or Onokolon, the monster with one human foot and one of brass, who dwelt among the shades of night, and stole through dark chambers and passages to devour "naughty children." The only effect such a mode of tuition was calculated to produce was a spirit of fear, such as prevails among the children of the uneducated in our own country, who are too frequently tutored to believe in imaginary monsters. This was seen among the Greeks in after-ages, for it was common for them to wear a piece of jasper, either set in a ring, or suspended from the neck, in order to protect themselves against this demon.

Apart from Empusa, the Greek children were taught to dread the *Lamia*, the ancestress of our "white ladies," as well as a race of wild and grotesque spirits called the *Kobaks*, who still subsist in our woods and forests under the name

of goblins and hobgoblins. All these were represented as wandering about their paths to do them harm unless they were "good children."

This practice of enforcing obedience in their offspring is a pleasing trait in the character of the Greeks. It must be borne in mind, however, that they were involved in the darkness of human nature. The light of reason alone was their guide, and hence it is no wonder that they erred in the education of their offspring. For it is by revelation only that the children of men can find their way into the paths of virtue and holiness. That has opened a highway over which "the unclean shall not pass," and in which wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err.

Although by the laws of Lycurgus the weakly children were murdered at Sparta, offerings were made annually to the gods in favour of the robust. The ceremony took place during festivals denominated *Tithenidia*, and the banquet, which was called *Kopia*, took place on the banks of the Tinae, near the temple of Artemis Corythalis. On the day of the festival, the nurses proceeded thither with the male children, and, presenting them to the goddess, offered up a number of sucking-pigs. After this, dancing-girls performed choruses in honour of the goddess, and, in some places persons in wooden masks, who were called *Agrittas*, made sport for the guests.

THE TOYS AND PASTIMES OF THE GREEK YOUTH.

The earliest toy amongst the Hellenes was the familiar rattle, which was succeeded by balls of many colours, with little chariots, purchased frequently at a fair held at Athens during the feast of Zeus. These gave place to the whipping *bembys*, or top. The open spaces at the junction of several roads afforded space for this play. Thus Callimachus says,—

"Where three ways meet there boys with tops are found,
That ply the lash and urge them round and round."

But sometimes the whipping of a top took place on the pavement of a court, to which there is an allusion in the pages of Tabullus. Lamenting his sickness, he says,—

"Of late I boasted I could happy be,
Resume the man, and not my Delia see!
But boasts of manhood and of bliss are vain,
Back to my bondage I return again,
And like a top am whirl'd, which boys, for sport,
Lash on the pavement of a level court."

The hoop also formed one of the playthings of the youthful Greek, as among our own school-boys. This was sometimes made of bronze, about three feet in diameter, and, like some modern wooden hoops, was adorned with spherical bells and moveable rings, which caused a gungling as it rolled. The instrument used to urge it round in its course was crooked, like those in modern use, and it was called a *plectron*. Rolling the hoop formed a part of the exercises of the palaestra, which were performed sometimes by very young children.

Another game among the Greeks was the *msinda*, which resembled our "Blindman's-buff,"

and which was played in various forms. Thus in one form a boy moved about with his eyes bandaged in search of his companions; in a second, he groped after them while they concealed themselves; and in a third, the bystanders struck or touched him until he could declare whose touch it was he felt. It was probably in allusion to this latter game that the cruel Roman soldiers, when they blindfolded our blessed Saviour, smote him and cried out, "Prophecy who smote thee." Added to these, there were two other varieties of "Blindman's-buff," as the *kollabumos*, in which one boy covered his eyes with his own hands while another gave him a gentle blow, leaving him to guess with which hand he had been stricken; and the "brazen fly," in which a boy, having his eyes bound with a fillet, went groping round, calling out "I am seeking the brazen fly," until he laid hold of one of his companions who danced round him, striking him with the cords made of the inner bark of the papyrus.

In the game of *ephedromos*, a stone called the *dioros* was set up at a certain distance, and aimed at with bowls or stones. The one who missed took the successful player on his back, and was compelled to carry him blindfolded until he went straight from the standing-point to the *dioros*. A variety of this sport, called *encotyle*, was the "pick-back" of English boys. This game was also called the *hubesinda* and *hypas*, though, according to some, the latter name signifies the well-known game of "leap-frog."

The Greek game called *chytrinda* was the English "hot cockles," "selling of pears," or "how many plums for a penny?" A counterpart of this was the *cheli chalone*, or "the tortoise," which was peculiar to girls, and in which one girl sat on the ground, and was called the tortoise, while her companions, running round, inquired, "Tortoise, what art thou doing in the middle?" She replied, "Spinning wool, the thread of the Milesian woof." They continued, "And how was thy son engaged when he perished?" And she answered, "He sprang from his white steeds into the sea."

Other games of the Greeks were the *hymninda*, the form of which sport is little known, and the *epotrahimos*, which was what our youth call "ducks and drakes." The *akinetada* was a contention between boys, in which some of them endeavoured to maintain their position unmoved. In the *achenophulada*, or "hiding the rope," a number of boys sat down in a circle, and one of them having a rope concealed about his person, endeavoured to drop it secretly beside one of his companions; and if he succeeded, the hapless boy was started round the circle, his enemy pursuing and using the rope about his shoulders. The *basinda* was a sport which has passed down to our age in the game called "forfeits," which was formerly denominated "questions and commands," "the choosing of king and queen on Twelfth-night," etc. The *diallusinda* consisted in two parties of boys laying hold of each others' hands, and pulling till, one by one, the stronger had drawn the weaker to their side of the ground. The *phryginda* was a game in which fragments of pottery were held between the fingers of the left hand, while they

struck them with the right, so as to produce slight harmony. In the game called *lyndalimos* considerable strength and skill were required. A baton, or stick, was placed upright in a loose soil, and other batons were thrown at it from a distance; whence the proverb is derived:—"Nail is driven out by nail, and baton by baton." Of the game of *accolimos* there were several varieties; such as hopping on one foot to see which would go furthest, hopping to overtake a companion, and hopping to see which would maintain his position longest, or take the most springs. Another variety was to fill skins with wine or air, and having oiled them, place them on the ground, and he who could plant his foot firmly upon it carried off the prize. The game of *Trygodiphemus*, *Tantalidus*, "bobbing for cherries," was a game belonging exclusively to the rustics, and answering to the "rolls and treacle" of an English wake.

Among the Greeks, playing at ball was a very common game; and, as in our youthful communities, it afforded several varieties of game. Its several names were the *epuskyros*, *phanunda*, *aporrasu*, and *ourania*. The *epuskyros* appears to have answered to the English game of football, the *phanunda* consisted in making pretence to throw the ball at one person, and immediately sending it to another, the *aporrasu* consisted in throwing the ball against the ground and repelling it as it rebounded; and in the game called *ourania*, one threw the ball into the air, and the whole party contended for the honour of catching it as it descended. The Greek children likewise played at ball as do the English against the wall, in which game he who kept it up longest won.

In the game called *skaperda*, a post was set up with a hole near the top, and a rope passed through it. Two young men then seized each one end of the rope, and turning their back to the post, endeavoured to draw each other up to the beam. The *humantelimos* was a very ingenious game. It consisted in doubling a thong, and twisting it into labyrinthine folds, which done, one put the end of a peg into the midst, in search of the point of duplication. If he dropped it into the right ring, his peg was caught and the game won, but if he missed it, the thong unwound without entangling the peg, and the game was lost. The game of *chalumos*, which was not confined to children, consisted in twirling a piece of money round rapidly on a board, and placing the finger on its upper edge, so as to stop its motion without permitting it to fall. A variety of this game was the *pentaltika*, which was played by females, as it is still in some remote provinces of our island, where it is called "dandies." This game consists in five astragals—knuckle-bones, pebbles, or little balls—which being gathered up rapidly, are thrown into the air, and attempted to be caught on the back of the hand, or between the fingers. If any fall, the player is allowed to pick them up with the fingers of the same hand on which the other astragals rest. The game of the *astragalimos* has its representative in the English "cockall," which is too well known to need description. There appears to have been a kind of divination by astragals, the bones being

hid under the hand, and the one party guessing whether they were "odd or even," a practice in use among our youth. Sometimes the game was played with beans, walnuts, almonds, and even golden statera. The game called *es omilian* consisted in drawing a circle on the ground, and pitching the astragals into it, those who were the most successful winning. Another form of this game was to place a trained quail within a circle, out of which the point was to drive it by tapping it with the middle finger. If the party succeeded in effecting this, the owner of the quail lost his wager. The game called *tropa* was performed with astragals, which were pitched into a small hole, after the manner of an English game of marbles. The *ephitunda* resembled this. It consisted in pitching an ostrakan into a circle so as to cause it to remain there. In the game called *skeptnda* an ostrakan, or a piece of money, was placed on the ground, and another pitched at it, so as to turn its position.

One amusement of the Greeks, which was shared by the children with their elders, was afforded by puppets. Ludicrous and frolicsome images, about eighteen inches in height, were carried round from village to village, as the "Punch and Judy" of our days, and of which they may be considered the ancestors. By touching a secret string the itinerants could put their mute performers into action, causing them to move every limb, either in a natural or grotesque manner, to the delight and astonishment of the audience.

A less innocent amusement of the Greek youth was spinning goldchafers. This insect appeared when the apple-trees were in bloom, and it was a common practice to tie a linen thread about its feet, and letting it loose, it would then move in spiral lines through the air, as it was twisted by the thread, while its tormentor enjoyed this movement as sport. A similar sport is practised throughout England in the month of May with the May chafers; thus showing that the heart of man, in its natural state, is inclined to cruelty in all ages of the world. Puffed up with a sense of his own superiority over the brute creation, he deems them unworthy of his care, and uses them as he pleases. But God, who cares for and feeds each creature that has life and breath, marks such deeds; and it is not too much to suppose that those who make not mercy the rule of their conduct,—

"Shall seek it, and not find it in their turn"

THE SCHOOL DAYS OF GREEK YOUTH.

Among the Greeks children were retained in the nursery till they were seven years old. At that age they were sent, under the care of a governor, to a public school, which they found to be a very different thing from a nursery. According to Lucian, they rose with the light, and having washed away all remains of slumber from their eyelids with pure water, and breakfasted on bread and fruit, they called forth to school. The following is a graphic picture of a troop of Attic lads, marching on a winter's morning to their accustomed resort, as delineated by Aristophanes:—

"New will I sketch the ancient plan of training,
When Justice was in vogue and wisdom flourish'd
First modesty restrain'd the youthful roves,
So that no brawl was heard. In order rang'd,
The boys from all the neighbourhood appear'd,
Marching to school, naked, though down the sky
Tumbled the flaky snow, like flour from sieve
Arriv'd, and seated wide apart, the master
First taught them how to chant Ithaca's praise,
'Pallas unconquer'd, stormer of cities,' or
'Shout far-resounding' in the self-same notes
Their fathers learn'd. And if, through mere conceit,
Some innovation hunter strain'd his throat,
With scurril lays, mining and quavering,
Like any Siphnian or Chian son—
As is too much the fashion since that Phrynia
Brought o'er Ionian airs—quickly the scourge
Rain'd on his shoulders blows like hail, as one
Plotting the muse's downfall."

Plato said of boys, that of all wild beasts they were the most audacious, plotting, fierce, and intractable. In this assertion the sage seems to have breathed the sentiments of the whole Greek community. The Athenians, especially, believed, that in order to reduce the stubborn will to obedience masters must be armed with the power of correction, and hence their teachers, gymnastarchs, and governors, combined to rule their youthful charges by coercion. The well-founded theory of the moderns, that boys may be kept in order by reason and persuasion, would have sounded to them like an idle tale. So stern an advocate for severity was Plato, that he would have had inspectors in schools whose duty should be to punish the governors themselves for neglect of discipline. In this, however, the views of the age may have been sound; for they were, for the most part, slaves, and they often proved unworthy of the trust reposed in them. Thus, in the "Fellow Deceiver" of Plato, a father is introduced reproaching the governor in these words:—

"The youth, O wretch, whom I entrusted to thee,
Thou hast perverted, teaching him vile habits,
Once stranger to his mind, for now he drinks
Even in the morning, which was not his wont."

(On the contrary, Lucian, speaking of these governors in the palmy days of Athens, describes them as an "honourable company of men, who followed their young masters to the schools, bearing their many-leaved tablets and lyres.")

During the stormy period of the history of Greece men of virtue and ability were often purchased as slaves, and entrusted with the education of their masters' sons. In this manner Diogenes became slave to a rich Corinthian, whose children he educated with the utmost diligence. So faithful was he to his charge that he grew old in the family, and they performed over him the rites of sepulture.

When youth were educated at home, the father and the mother, whose authority over their offspring seems to have been equal, took part with their tutors in restraining them from evil. If they lost their parents the republic took them under its protection, not deeming it safe to entrust them to the guidance of masters alone. The republic also kept a watchful eye over those public schools established for the advancement of good morals. By law they were compelled not to open before sunrise, nor to remain open after sunset, and no one was permitted to enter their portals during the day, besides the teachers and scholars. Still further

to protect their morals, ten magistrates, called *epitroustai*, one from each tribe, were elected by the people, in order to watch over them. In like manner, a gymnasiarch, another magistrate, was entrusted with the superintendency of the *gymnasia*.

Schools for the humbler classes appear to have been held in the portico of a temple, or some sheltered corner in the street. Sometimes, also, both the schoolmaster and philosopher taught their pupils in fields, gardens, or shady groves. For the most part, however, the opulent had spacious structures raised, which were well furnished with tables, desks, forms, and whatever else their studies required. In the interior there was commonly an oratory adorned with statues of the Muses, where, in a kind of font, a supply of pure water was kept for the students.

The apparatus for a Greek schoolroom was multifarious. It consisted of mathematical instruments, globes, maps, charts of the heavens, boards whereon to trace geometrical figures, tablets of boxwood, fir, or ivory, books, paper, skins of parchment, wax for covering the tablets, rulers, reed-pens, pen-cases, pen-knives, pencils, and the awful rod, by the strokes of which all the other parts of the school-apparatus were kept in constant use.

The schools at Athens were generally private speculations, and the terms were regulated by the reputation the master had acquired and the fortunes of his pupils. Some were very moderate in their demands, for we find that at the school of Hippomachos an Attic *mina* only—about £4. 1s. 3d.—was required on entrance, for which sum the scholar might remain as long as it was thought proper by his parents. Hence, as in our own country, schoolmasters in Athens were proverbially poor, though sometimes, when their scholars became very numerous, they rose to wealth. Occasionally it would appear that they received payment in kind, for it is related of the slave Chritheia, that she spun and wove the wool which Phemos, her master, received in payment from his scholars.

As in our own schools, the earliest task imposed at school among the Greeks was to gain a knowledge of the alphabet, after which they proceeded to spell and read, and, finally, to store their minds with knowledge and to acquire accomplishments. In teaching the art of writing, the master traced with a kind of pencil a number of characters on a tablet, and the pupil followed these characters with a pen. In reading, unlike the plan commonly adopted among ourselves, poetry preceded prose, whence in part arose the imaginative character of the Greeks in general. Arithmetic and geometry were carefully taught, as tending to perfect them in the art of war; and astronomy, also, was pursued with avidity for its usefulness in husbandry, navigation, and even in military affairs. Nor were philosophy and music forgotten. These studies were sedulously pursued, and no one could be deemed educated without them. Music was employed in education to effect several purposes: namely, to soothe and mollify the fierceness of the national character; to enable the citizens to perform their part in the amusements of social life with gracefulness; to render them capable of joining in the sacred

choruses used in their religious rites; and to inflame their martial spirit in times of war by enabling them to sing the pæans, or hymns, which preceded the shock of fight. So partial were the Greeks to music, that they conceived it to be able to cure diseases both of the body and mind. Thus, the sounds of the flute were supposed to remove epilepsy, sciatica, faintness, fear, and even madness, as did the harp in the case of the Hebrew monarch, Saul.

Teachers of music were divided into two classes, namely, the *citharists*, who merely played, and the *citharadi*, who accompanied their music with a song. Like the common schoolmasters, the humble and poorer among these taught in the corners of the streets; but there were some who had schools of music, and others who gave lessons in the private dwellings of the opulent.

During the latter days of the commonwealth, drawing and the elements of art formed a part of the studies of Greek youth, chiefly as acquirements.

The preceding has reference chiefly to the mode of education at Athens, or among the Hellenes. A different picture is presented to us by the education of the Spartans, which aimed chiefly at unfolding the powers of the body, as recorded in the section on the laws of Lycurgus. Similar plans were adopted by the Cretans, Arcadians, and others of the Dorian race. Their sons were trained up to the dreadful art of war, success in which being in their estimation true glory. For this they compelled them to endure hardships at which our youths would tremble. They were accustomed to labours and arms, and taught to despise heat and cold, rough roads and cliffs, and the blows they received in the gymnasium and mock battles. Acting upon the Galenian maxim, also, that "a fat stomach makes a lean wit," they were compelled to live abstemiously, that so, if the chances of war should reduce them to the necessity of subsisting on famine rations, they might be able to endure it without a murmur. Moreover, they were obliged by the laws of Lycurgus to trample with the naked foot on ice and snow and the sharpest rocks, and, as incipient soldiers, to lie on hard pallet beds made with the tops of reeds collected from the banks of the Eurotas. To this was added in winter, as an especial indulgence, a quantity of thistle-down, in which it was supposed there was much warmth. The hunger which they endured caused them to be little delicate in the choice of their provisions. They would eat anything from a sea-hedgehog to a snail, so that they could hardly be placed in any situation in which they could not find food, if not palatable, at least digestible. When hunger grew troublesome, however, the youth of Sparta were permitted to steal provisions to allay it, if they could do so without being detected. In this Xenophon observes that the object of the legislator was to nourish all the useful habits commonly found in a thief, such as the power to watch by night, to wear the mask of honesty by day, to lay snares craftily, and to set spies upon the individual about to be plundered. It seems more likely that the principal motive of the legislator was to teach these the habits of plunder so natural to the soldier,

both in civilized and uncivilized communities. The whole aim and scope of his laws was to rear the tender boy into the hardened warrior, that he might prey upon his species without feeling the compunctions of natural pity. And yet they are held up to the gaze of posterity as examples of profound wisdom! Brute beasts act in a less ferocious manner: while they breathe slaughter upon all animals differing in form from themselves they nobly spare their own species. The lion, rampant with hunger, meets its fellow-brute in the heart of the desert, and yet passes onward for other prey. He scorns to do violence upon his own species.

The intellectual cultivation of the Dorian race was very limited. Writing and arithmetic were almost wholly disregarded in Sparta, though some individuals among them possessed these accomplishments. This might arise from the circumstance that the whole people were taught to chant their laws as well as their songs. In Crete, however, letters were viewed with a more favourable eye than at Sparta. In addition to their body of legal poetry, their youth were taught to sing hymns in honour of the gods and the illustrious dead. In music, also, they were permitted to make some proficiency, though not to the same extent as the Athenians. The indifference of the Spartans to literature is almost proverbial. Absorbed in their military education, they laid no great stress even on the ability to read, and as for poetry and eloquence, they were considered accomplishments of but little value. In music, however, they were learned, for it was deemed essential to inflame their passions in the field of battle. Xenophon, comparing their system of education with that of the Athenians, observes, that "the latter sent their children to school that they might learn their letters, music, and the exercises of the palaestra, while the former placed them under the care of a grave man, who might inculcate modesty and obedience by stripes in lieu of accomplishments." With reference to oratory, they waged war against it as an art dangerous to the state. All the arts which beget and foster eloquence were banished from among them, and if any citizen of Sparta acquired abroad the skill to wield a syllogism or a trope he was subjected to punishment. In fine, no knowledge except that which had reference to war was esteemed by them. To this one art they made all those into which they sought to gain an insight subservient. Even music and dancing, which others made to add minister to pleasures, rational or licentious, were rendered by them purely military. As much might be said of the Cretans and "rough Arcadians," whose inclinations led them to the field of battle rather than to seats of learning. To all these races the speculations of the Academy and the logic of the Lyceum were equally strangers they cared for none of these things. To excel in arms was the one great end of life.

EXERCISES OF THE GREEK YOUTH.

In the Homeric age, that intricate and artificial system of exercises, denominated gymnastics, constituted the principal object of education. The passion for these exercises descended unim-

paired to the Spartans, whose polity, as before shown, was framed solely for the acquisition of glory in war. Throughout the whole of Greece, however, gymnastics were deemed worthy to be enumerated among the studies of youth; and at Athens, in later ages, were reckoned as necessary to the formation of the body, as learning was to the development of the mental powers.

The several exercises of the gymnastics were taught in places called gymnasia. Of these establishments there were many at Athens, of which the Academy, Lyceum, and Cynosarges, were the most celebrated. The principal parts of them were the *ephebeion*, where the youth exercised—the *apodyterion*, or undressing room—the *konisterion*, where a fine yellow sand was kept for the purpose of sprinkling over the wrestlers after being rubbed over with oil tempered with wax—the *palaestra*, the place set apart for wrestling—the *sphaeristerion*, in which they played at ball—the *aleopterion*, where the wrestlers anointed themselves with oil—the *area*, consisting of the great court and certain spaces in the porticoes, which were used for running, leaping, or pitching the quoit—the *axylon*, in which was a pathway, where, sheltered from the weather, and separated from the spectators, the young scholars exercised themselves in wrestling—the *balneia*, or baths, where the young men bathed before anointing themselves, or after their exercises—and the *stadium*, appropriated to those who competed for prizes in the races.

The first step in gymnastics was, to accustom the youth to endure heat and cold, for which purpose they were compelled to stand naked during summer and winter while performing their imitative exercises. The next step was wrestling, which was always regarded as the principal among gymnastic exercises from the skill which it demanded and its utility.

The first and most simple exercise was the *dromos*, or course, which was performed in the area of the stadium. The end of this was to prepare them for the vicissitudes of war, for pursuit after victory, or the rapid movements of retreat. Hence, in order to present the greater difficulty to the racers, the ground was covered with soft and yielding sand, and still further to increase the labour, they were sometimes made to run in armour.

The manner of these races may be gathered from the pages of Homer. Speaking of that between Oilean Ajax, Odysseus, and Antilochus, three heroes in the Trojan war, he says—

"Ranged in a line the ready racers stand,
Pelides points the barrier with his hand.
All start at once, Oileus led the race,
The next Ulysses, measuring pace with pace,
Behind him diligently close he sped,
As closely following as the mazy thread
The spindle follows, and displays the charms
Of the fair spinster's breast and moving arms
Graceful in motion, thus his foe he piles,
And treads each footstep ere the dust can rise,
The glowing breath upon his shoulder plays,
The admiring Greeks loud acclamations raise,
To him they give their wishes, heart, and eyes,
And send their souls before him as he flies.
Now three times turn'd, in prospect of the goal,
The nesting chaf'd to Fallos his foe assail;
Assid, O goddess, (thus in thought he pray'd,)
And present at his thought descend the maid;
Euc'd by her heavenly force he seems to swim,
And feels a pinion lifting every limb."

The next exercise was leaping, in the performance of which the Greek youth usually sprang from an artificial elevation upon a bed of soft mould. The better to poise their bodies, and to enable them to leap to a greater distance, they carried in their hands metallic weights, bearing the form of a semi-disk, and having on their inner faces handles through which the leaper passed his fingers. The feats related of these ancient leapers exceed the bounds of credibility, some of them having, it is said, cleared fifty-five feet at one bound.

To leaping succeeded pitching the quoit, which in the Homeric age consisted of large stones or rude masses of iron. In later times it varied in size, shape, and materials; but in general it appears to have been a cycloid, swelling in the middle, and growing thin towards the outside. Occasionally it had a hole in the centre, and was hurled to its point of destination by a thong.

Other gymnastic exercises were, shooting with the bow at wisps of straw upon a pole, and darting the javelin. Of wrestling there were two kinds: the one called *orthopale*, and the other *anaclinopale*. In the former the antagonists threw their arms about each other's body, and endeavoured to bring one another to the ground. In the latter, the one who distrusted his strength voluntarily threw himself down, bringing his adversary along with him, in order to compel him to yield by pinching, scratching, and biting, with every species of annoyance he could devise.

Another species of gymnastic exercise was boxing. This was sometimes practised with the naked fist, but more frequently with the *cestus*, which consisted of a series of thongs bound round the hand and arm as high, and sometimes higher, than the elbow.

In winter, when it was necessary to remain under cover, walking on the tight-rope was a gymnastic exercise. This feat was, in fact, a great favourite among the youths of antiquity, whence they applied themselves to it with assiduity.

An important branch of gymnastics consisted in the various forms of dance. To excel in this accomplishment was, indeed, considered necessary by nearly all the Greeks, either as a preparation for war, sustaining a part in the religious choruses, or as a means of developing the beauty of the form, and conferring ease and elegance of manners.

To these various branches of gymnastic exercises the Greek youth applied themselves with ardour, not only while under the care of masters, but after they had quitted school. They were regarded by them as a preparation for victory in the Olympic and other games, as well as the best means for developing their physical powers; hence they devoted a considerable portion of their time to perfecting themselves in the several gymnastic exercises.

THE SPORTS OF THE GREEKS.

A prominent feature in the sports of the Greeks was the chase. In remoter times, herdsmen and shepherds considered it a part of their occupation. And this was natural. The coun-

try being infested with wild beasts, it was essential to the preservation of their flocks that they should be skilful huntmen.

In process of time, however, as population increased, there was no longer a cause for skill in hunting. The lion, the bear, the wild goat, and the wild boar, vanished from before the battle-axe and the lance, by which they were pursued, and the flocks grazed in their pastures in peace. But the passion for hunting still remained in the breasts of the Greeks; and from pursuing the ferocious, they turned their thoughts to the destruction of the innocent. The fawn and the stag, the hare and the rabbit, all became, in their turns, the objects of animated pursuit.

The manner of hunting among the ancient Greeks may be seen in the following description of a lion hunt derived from the Homeric page:—

“ He turn'd to go, as slow retreats the lion from the
 stall.
 Whom men and dogs assault, while round a shower of
 javelins falls.
 They all night watch about their herds, lest he, intent
 on prey,
 Should bear the flower of all their fields, the fattest
 bulls away
 Onward impetuously he bounds, the hissing javelins fly
 From daring hands, while torches send their blaze far
 up the sky.
 He dreads, though fierce, the dazzling flames thick
 flashing on his sight,
 And hungry still, and breathing rage, retires with
 morning's light ”

In the civilized ages of Greece, hunting was a far different sport from that above described. Then the principal sport of the Greeks was hunting the hare. In this they made use of dogs, to the breed of which they paid great attention. Some, indeed, were sought to be rendered famous by heroic and fabulous associations. Thus it was asserted that the *castorides* sprang from a breed to which the twin god of Sparta was partial, and the *alopecidae* were part dog, part fox, which were preferred as harriers. Other kinds of hounds derived their names from the persons who reared them, as the *menelaides* and *harmodiae*. The whole breeds of certain countries were, in truth, famous; as the Argive, Locrian, Arcadian, Eretrian, Hyrcanian, Lacomian, Molossian, and others.

Xenophon thus describes the chase of the hare.—“ I behold the hounds, jovous and full of fire, spring forward in the track of the game. They pursue it eagerly and ardently. They traverse—run about in a circle—advance in a straight line—now bound away obliquely—and now plunge into the thickets, across the glades, through the paths known or unknown, burying one before the other, shaking their tails, their ears hanging low and their eyes flashing fire. Drawing nearer to their game, they indicate it to their master by their movements. They then kindle up into a warlike humour, bound emulously forward, now in a body, now singly, till, reaching the hiding-place of the hare, they spring toward it simultaneously. In the midst of shouts and barking, the swift animal glances from her form with the hounds at her heels. Wrapping his chlamys in his left hand, the huntsman follows, staff in hand, animating his dogs, but carefully avoiding to head his game.”

The chase of the rabbit appears to have been chiefly confined to the Balearic isles, and it was adopted there from necessity. Those animals so multiplied there, that they almost destroyed every herb and plant by biting their roots; whence the inhabitants sought, and found, a remedy for this evil. Ferrets were imported from Africa, which were let loose in the rabbit warrens; and they, creeping into the holes, scared forth the inmates, which were caught by the sportsmen.

In the chase of the fawn and the stag, the Greeks made use of Indian dogs, which were animals of great speed, courage, and strength. Sometimes they were taken by snares set in the ravines of mountains, around meadows, near the streams, and in thickets. Pitfalls, also, were dug, as in Africa for the lion; and most of those stratagems were resorted to which the Nubians and Egyptian Arabs practise against the gazelle. In the chase, the huntsman used the javelin, with which he destroyed his prey after the hounds had placed it within his reach.

The chase of the wild boar required complicated preparations. The dogs of India, Crete, Locris, and Sparta, were all used in it, and the sportsman was armed with strong nets, javelins, hunting poles, and snares. Foot-snares of great strength were also set at intervals, in which the boar might be entrapped. This sport was dangerous, and hence huntsmen pursued their game in parties, taking care to keep close together, lest the foe should prove too much for them singly.

In the chase of the wild goat, which was chiefly practised among the mountains of Crete, the bow was employed, and so skilful were the Cretans in handling it, that they would bring down their game from the pinnacles of the loftiest cliffs to the depths of the valleys beneath.

According to Athenæus, fowling entered into the list of amusements. Their usual method of taking fowls was by spreading nets and setting guns for their feet. Notwithstanding, when pressed for provisions, they would fetch down a thrush, pigeon, or dove, with great dexterity, as they winged their way through the air.

In the fowling of the Greeks in modern times, they make use of great cruelty. Pigeons, turtle doves, and partridges, are commonly blinded, to be used as decoys; and in this condition they sometimes live, and are employed in fowling for several years.

In the days of the ancients, as at the present time, quails frequented Greece in vast numbers, and numerous contrivances were resorted to for catching them. One of the most successful was during pairing time. Mirrors were set up in the fields with snares in front of them, and the quail, hastening towards the imaginary bird, was there entrapped.

Fishing appears to have been practised among the ancient Greeks both with nets and the hook. Several passages in the *Odyssey* of Homer, indeed, prove, beyond a doubt, that the Greeks derived a great part of their sustenance from the sea even in those early ages. The Homeric heroes appear even to have understood the value of oysters, which, according to the *Iliad*, were

procured by diving. Notwithstanding, the ancient Greeks delighted chiefly in the chase of the larger animals, as being the more animating and manly sport. In this some of the more modern agreed, as Plato, who considered all other kinds as unworthy of men.

WOMEN IN THE HEROIC AGES.

It is difficult to define the character and condition of females in Greece. In the heroic ages, they appear, from the pages of Homer, to have enjoyed great liberty, and to have been held in high estimation. Married females lived at large with their husbands and families, and were, in the modern sense of the word, mistresses of the house and all that it contained. They banqueted and associated freely with strangers at the tables of their husbands, and took part in the general conversation.

From the glimpse which Homer affords of Nausicaa, we learn what the condition and occupations of a princess were in those times. It was a mixture of splendour and simplicity. Though daughter to a king, she had the care of the family wardrobe, and not long before her nuptial day she piled it on the royal car drawn by mules, and mounting the seat, whip in hand, departed with her maids to wash it in a distant rivulet. Their labours occupied them but a portion of the morning, and when concluded, and while their robes were drying on the pebbly beach, they dined on wines and viands, and played at the game of *Phanuda* the princess herself taking part, and laughing and singing with the rest. So ardently did she enter into the game that she sent the ball into the river, which excited so loud an exclamation from her maids that it awakened *Olyseus*, who, wandering from his home, and oppressed with fatigue, had laid himself down to rest on the margin of the rivulet.

The conversation which ensued between *Olyseus* and *Nausicaa* suggests a high notion of female education at this period. And how this was obtained it is not difficult to comprehend. Wandering poets, those teachers of the infancy of humanity, scattered far and wide the seeds of civilization, and they were welcome visitants on the hearths of princes. Both youths and maidens imbibed the wisdom their songs contained, and with their sprightly strains, enlivened their lighter moments when alone, or delighted the guests at their father's board, as did *Nausicaa*.

Although an Homeric woman was the type of her sex for form and beauty, and although her attire was magnificent, yet was she domesticated. She thought nothing beneath her which could contribute to the comfort or adornment of those she loved. She could even take part in the labours of the loom; and carding and spinning also entered into the list of her occupations. How skilful they were in the construction of their fabrics may be gathered from the pages of Homer. He represents them as employing with singular felicity the arts of design in them—as tracing in colours, brilliant and varied, cities, landscapes, human figures, and the complicated movements of war. Their work-baskets, according to the same authority, were formed of

beaten gold, chased with figures richly wrought, and grouped with great taste and judgment.

It would not appear that Homeric matrons took part in the operations of the kitchen. These were performed chiefly by slaves, who, guided, perhaps, by the nature of the climate, preferred the cool of the night for their labours. To them, also, as in Lydia and Persia, belonged the office of making bread, which custom prevailed to a very late period.

In the pages of Homer there are many pictures of princesses descending to the fountain with their urns, in common with the female slaves and women of inferior rank, in order to draw water. Even among the Athenians, where refinement of manners was first known, and civilization made the most rapid strides, the daughters of the citizens used to descend to the fountain of Callirrhoe on that errand. This will serve to remind the reader of those interesting scenes recorded in Scripture of patriarchal manners.—scenes in which the daughters of Bethuel or Laban, and of Jethro, priest of Midian, are represented as coming forth to draw water for their flocks.

WOMEN OF SPARTA, ETC

It has been clearly shown that the education, laws, and manners of Sparta received from the laws of Lycurgus a military impress. This extended even to the women. From their tenderest years, instead of being instructed, as in other communities, to entwine all their feelings round the domestic hearth, girls were taught to consider themselves as the future wives of a nation of soldiers. To this end the legislator sought to subvert the power of love, by obliterating from the female mind every trace of maidenly modesty, by bringing them into incessant contact with men initiated in immoral habits, which is the peculiar characteristic of the soldier in every state and every age.

Aristotle affirms that while the men of Sparta conformed to the design of the constitution of Lycurgus, the women refused to bend their neck to the yoke, and persisted in the enjoyment of a freedom akin to licentiousness. This was but the natural result of the system which the law-giver adopted to reduce them to the power of the laws, and it does not appear that he ever had a moral purpose in view when he legislated for females. From childhood they were subjected to a degrading and demoralizing discipline. Like boys, they frequented the gymnasia, and then in a shameful state of nudity exercised themselves in wrestling, running, pitching the quoit, and throwing the javelin. They also contended in the ring with men, bound the cestus on their clenched fists, and boxed with their future husbands. These acquirements, with horsemanship, the sword exercise, and the rough sports of the chase, completed the circle of female studies in Sparta: unless may be added, the song and the dance, which were made subservient to wantonness and licentiousness.

From such an education as this, what could have been expected but habits not only essentially un-feminine, but vicious? Such were at least its consequences. Læconian ladies of the first rank attended to the breed of horses, and contended

at the Olympic games in the chariot-race with men. They were even addicted to the foul habit of swearing, mingling their conversation with oaths by Castor and Polydeukes. Moreover, they were given to drunkenness, a vice which could not fail to engender licentiousness, for which, in the age of Socrates, they were notorious. Thus, by the whole tenor of their education, modesty was undermined, and they present to posterity an unlovely picture of female character, on which it pains the mind to dwell. Even marriage was rendered by it an unmeaning ceremony, or, in other words, a lax union.

It is difficult to define the marriage ceremony which prevailed among the Spartans, as ancient accounts are contradictory. It would seem, however, that young women who had dowries to bestow upon their husbands were carried away from their companions by force, while those who were portionless were shut up in a spacious edifice, into which the youth of Sparta were introduced, in the dark, to scramble for partners. Notwithstanding, there are authors, as Scobius, who speak of public ceremonies which took place on the occasion. But whatever may have been the ceremony, by the laws of Lycurgus the bond was annulled, for they made them the property of the state, and not of their husbands. The very Spartans themselves, who travelled into other parts of Greece, and compared their own morals with those of other states, are said to have blushed frequently for their country's institutions.

Historians are loud and almost unanimous in their praise of the stern virtue and patriotism of the Spartan women. Their very indifference which they, sometimes exhibited on learning the death of their sons in battle has, indeed, been esteemed a virtue. This is false reasoning. The honour of a woman is her affection, and such conduct may more properly be termed stoical apathy, a feeling which was naturally begotten by the laws of Lycurgus. By them women, as well as men, were rendered rough and stern as the bear of the forest. Nay, more so, for the she-bear, savage though she may be, yearns over her offspring with affection, protecting them while living, and sorrowing over them when dead.

Notwithstanding the Spartan women are represented as being lavish of the blood of their children, they frequently set them an example of cowardly fear. When the fortunes of war turned against them they lost their presence of mind in a moment, and instead of encouraging their husbands and sons to deeds of valour, would fill the air with effeminate wailings. Such was their usual conduct, but nevertheless, the annals of Sparta contain some striking examples of female heroism. Thus, the wife of Panteus met her death at Alexandria, by the orders of Ptolemy, with magnanimity, and Chelons chose rather to endure exile with her husband Cleombrotus, than remain with her affectionate father, Leonidas. The conduct which they displayed, however, cannot be ascribed to the laws of Lycurgus: it was rather nature, rising above that degrading level to which those laws reduced the female character in Sparta.

In the other Dorian states, female heroism

seems more generally to have prevailed than at Sparta; for many instances will be found recorded in the preceding sections of their having been roused to action in times of danger, and of their devoting themselves to destruction rather than be taken captive by their assailants.

THE WOMEN OF ATHENS, ETC.

It is a prevailing notion that women occupied a mean position in society at Athens. This is erroneous. That they were not in the condition designed them by nature may be true, but if not highly social, they were at least domesticated.

Till the age of seven years boys and girls mingled in the nursery. At the end of that time they were separated, the girls still remaining where they received their education. What this education was is not plain, but it is certain that they were taught to read and write, and were initiated in the rites of the Grecian religion. So particular were the mothers of Attica on this latter point, that they often called upon their daughters to officiate in the rites of Artemis Brauronia, even at the early age of five years. In these rites they were initiated in the mysteries of their national religion, accompanied by the charms of music.

In this custom the Attic mother affords a fine lesson to the Christian parent. If it was thought important to bring the girls of Athens to the shrine of the heathen Artemis Brauronia at the early age of five years, surely it is more important to bring children to the foot of the cross at their earliest infancy in these days of gospel light. It is a duty rendered imperative and sacred by the worth of the immortal soul, and those parents who neglect it will one day have to answer for the deed before the tribunal of a just and unerring Judge.

At the festival of Artemis Brauronia, all the ceremonies were performed by virgins not exceeding ten years of age, and at another religious festival, called the *Arrhephoria*, which was celebrated in honour of Athena, by youthful virgins, it was required that the sacrifices should be between the ages of seven and eleven.

It does not appear that the women of Athens were taught anything beyond the foregoing before marriage. With this superficial education they were sent from the nursery to be the heads of families, and this event often happened in very early life. From the age of fifteen, indeed, an Athenian girl might look to become the mistress of a family. And this, from their secluded manner of living, was not the result, in general, of that primary law of nature, love. As in modern times, prudential calculations were made before the ceremony took place, and if these did not answer the expectations of both parties, it was frequently set aside. Interest, however, was not always the sole motive for marriage: it sometimes happened that when Athenian girls were permitted to be seen in public, as they were in the various ceremonies of their ancestral religion, in processions to the temples, and on numerous private occasions, such as funerals, marriages, etc., youths would fall in love with them, and seek their hands from pure affection. But

such instances appear to have been rare, for they afforded matter for the pens of comic writers. Still, it cannot be doubted that occasions were afforded men for becoming acquainted with the tempers and character of their future partners in life, and that, while they sought gold, they were not forgetful of their happiness. That they had these opportunities, and that there were among them some who, in reality, sought a union from motives of true affection, is proved by the fact, that the walls, columns, and every plant tree in the Academy, Cereamicus, and other public walks, had engraven thereon the language of the passions, and the names of those who were beloved for their beauty, supposed or real. Verse, also, was frequently employed to convey the language of the heart, and they sometimes made known their sentiments by suspending garlands of flowers, or performing sacrifices before the door where the person beloved resided.

In the earliest ages of Greece, very elevated notions of love prevailed. The passion was even personified, and reckoned among the most ancient gods of its mythology. This was natural, for their fables and their poetry teem with ideas and examples of the loftiest and purest love, and hence, in due time, they converted it into a god. Of Odysseus it is said, that he preferred the sunshine of a wife's affection to immortality and the smiles of a sensual goddess, and Hæmon is made to spurn not only the blandishment of empire, but the very laws of duty and nature, and to lie down in the grave of his beloved Antigone. But such were not the prevailing sentiments of the modern Greeks: the few loved virtuously—the many were corrupted and profligate.

When marriage was determined on, let the ruling principle be what it might, the business part of the transaction was delegated to a female match-maker, as in China. She it was who carried the young man's proposals to the family of the maiden he sought, and through her the matter was settled.

In the earliest ages of Greece polygamy prevailed, but in more modern times ordinary individuals were at least restrained from the usage by the laws at Athens, for, unlike the Spartans, marriage was looked upon by the Athenians with reverence, and as a means of civilisation. Hence both polygamy and celibacy were in disrepute. For a man ambitious of public honour, indeed, the possession of a wife and children was indispensable, but then he must only be the husband of one wife.

Concerning the impediments to marriage arising from consanguinity little is known. In the heroic ages, all unions, except those with children, were considered lawful, if we may judge from facts. Thus, Iphidamos wedded his mother's sister, Alcinoos was united to his brother's daughter; Deiphobos took possession of Helen after the death of Paris, and the seer Helenus was united with Andromache, the widow of his brother Hector. In later ages the marriage of brothers with their sisters was considered illegal; but the union with half-sisters by the father's side was allowed.

Solon appears to have enacted in his laws that no one should take upon him the burden of

a family before he was about thirty-five years of age. This law, however, was frequently broken, as may be gathered from the pages of historians and poets, which constantly allude to early marriages. Demosthenes speaks of one Mantitheos, who married at the age of eighteen, in obedience to his father's wishes. Hence it would appear that the law of Solon in this point was not very stringent—that of nature proved the strongest.

The celebration of marriage usually took place in the winter month of January, thence called the "nuptial month," that being regarded as the most auspicious season of the year. Attention, also, was paid to the lunar influences. It was usual to be married on the full of the moon, when the festival denominated *Theogamia*, or "nuptials of the gods," was celebrated, in order that religion might appear to sanctify the union. Thus, Agamemnon is made by Euripides to declare that his daughter Iphigenia should be married—

"When the blest moon its silvery circle fills"

It was usual for parents to betroth their children at an early age, and young women whose parents were deceased were settled in marriage by their relations or guardians. Strange as it may appear, husbands sometimes disposed of their wives on their deathbeds. Thus, the father of Demosthenes bequeathed Cleobula, his wife, to Aphobos, whom he appointed guardian of his children. Thus, also, Phormio, a slave, having showed great fidelity to his master, an opulent citizen, received at once freedom and his master's widow.

On the day before the marriage several ceremonies were performed by the maiden Artemis, the virgin-goddess of the woods, to whose train she had hitherto been attached, was implored, in the midst of offerings, to permit her to transfer her worship to the altar of Hymen. Offerings were likewise made to the nymphs, to Athena, the tutelary goddess of the state; and to Hera and the Fates, whose duty it was, as the Athenians imagined, to watch over the marriage-state, and to punish those who transgressed its sacred laws.

On the morning of the eventful day, having performed certain domestic ceremonies, the bride, accompanied by her paranymp, or bridesmaid, was led forth into the street by the bridegroom and a friend, who placed her between them in an open carriage, and made their way to the temple where the ceremony was to take place. On arrival there, they were received at the door by a priest, who presented them with a small branch of ivy, as an emblem of the close ties by which they were to be united. This done he conducted them to the altar, where the sacrifice of a heifer was made, and a long list of Grecian gods and goddesses invoked. On some occasions, however, the ceremony was interrupted by superstition. The victim having been opened, the gall was taken out and thrown behind the altar, after which the soothsayer inspected the entrails, and if he pronounced the appearance alarming, the nuptials were either broken off or deferred. When favourable, the rites proceeded as under the auspices of the gods, and in the midst of

these the father gave his daughter to her husband, and they took a mutual oath of fidelity.

The rites of a marriage ceremony were so numerous that the shades of evening appeared before the bride could be conducted to her future home. This was done amidst the blaze of torches, and the music and dancing of light-hearted youth, who surrounded the nuptial car. Arrived at home, she had to wend her way through the various symbols of domestic labours, as pestles, sieves, etc., beyond which she was met by the greetings of friends, who ushered her with mirth and delight into the banqueting-room, where both sexes partook of the feast prepared, but, as in Egypt, at separate tables.

Having entered upon her domestic duties, the authority of an Athenian woman over her household became absolute. She was queen of everything within doors. All slaves, male and female, were under her control, and compelled to obey her. The same authority likewise extended to the children. On the mother devolved their early education, the first training of their intellect, the first rooting of their morals, and the first shaping of their principles. But this may be said to have been done under the superintendence of the husband, for he it was who fitted her for the task. Taking her, as he usually did, from the nursery, a raw and inexperienced girl, his first and leading care was to instruct her in her duties as he would wish them to be performed. Hence, in general, the ruling power may be considered as emanating from the husband.

Such was the condition of women at Athens in the prosperous times of the republic. Towards its decline a change seems to have taken place. Instead of rising in the morning with the lark, and distributing to all their tasks as well as superintending the nursery, they became universally conspicuous for luxury and vanity. Such, at least, is the united testimony of the comic poets, and although they may have used the language of hyperbole, yet the pages of history point to the same declension in manners. From that source proofs may be deduced that, among the Athenian ladies, there were numbers whose idle and luxurious lives produced loose principles and dissolute manners. They roamed abroad gaudily attired, merely to attract the gaze of men, and so notorious did they at length become for indecency in dress, that laws were enacted to enforce modesty upon them, and magistrates, denominated "regulators of the women," appointed to ensure obedience of those laws.

To the baneful influence which women of this description had over their children is ascribed that love of power, trifling distinctions, and unmanly pleasures, which infected the Athenians towards the decline of the republic. In vain did philosophers strive to stem the evil. The springs of education were poisoned, and those evil principles of inordinate artificial desires originated in the nursery which finally convulsed and overthrew the state. For as by righteousness a nation is established, so by sin it is destroyed.

The corruption of the morals of the Athenian youth, however, must not be attributed to their mothers alone. It is a dreadful fact that they commenced the unhallowed work, but it was

completed by other causes. They were far outstripped in immorality by the *hetairæ*, or "strange women," and these exerted a powerful influence over the morals and destinies of the state. By them youth were led astray,—

"As an ox goeth to the slaughter,
Or as a fool to the correction of the stocks"
Prov. vii. 22.

And there were none to deliver Philosophy, indeed, sought to win them back to the paths of virtue, but her voice was impotent to save. So, also, was the lash of satire, which was freely applied. Borne along, as it were, by a mighty torrent, the Athenians hastened on to destruction, carrying with them their loved and vaunted republic in their downward career. Yes, Athens as well as

"Nineveh, Babylon, and ancient Rome,
Speak to the present time, and times to come
They cry aloud in every careless ear,
Stop, while ye may 'suspend your mad career
O learn from our example, and our fate,
Learn wisdom and repentance ere too late"

THE COSTUME OF GREEK WOMEN, ETC.

It has been well observed, that the costume and ornaments of a people afford important aid towards comprehending the national character. Dress is, in reality, a kind of practical commentary on the mental habits and tone of morals prevailing in a nation at any given period. An example of this may be seen on every hand. A humble mind is not likely to be found under a showy, vain, and extravagant exterior.

In the best ages of the Athenian commonwealth the attire of ladies was conspicuous for elegance. It was costly, but it was so arranged that no appearance of a wish to dazzle was indicated thereby. This elegance, however, gave place to luxury, so that the war-robe of an Athenian lady presented a long list of articles. Apart from the *chiton*, worn by all Greeks, there was the *epomis*, a robe with sleeves—the *exomis*, without sleeves—the *diphidion*, an ample cloak, or mantle—the *hemidiphidion*, a more scanty mantle—the *katastiktos*, a mantle adorned with flowers or figures of animals—the mantles called *katagogis*, *epibema*, and *peplos*, all varying in form and size—the *zoma*, a vest fitted close to the shape, and adorned at the bottom with a fringe—the *paraphes* and *paralourges*, robes adorned on either side with a purple stripe—the *crocotos* and *crocoton*, saffron robes of ceremony differing only in size—the *omphakion*, a robe of the colour of tarrife grapes—the *hilos*, a sea-coloured dress—the *stys*, a thick, heavy cloak—the *corcobaphes*, a scarlet robe—and the *amphimallus*, a cloak which was hairy on both sides, and had a double warp. The head-dresses of an Attic lady were also numerous. There was the *ampyx*, a fillet of gold embroidery which confined the hair in front—the *pylaon*, *hekruphalos*, and *plekteanadesme*, which were all articles of an ambiguous character—the *halys*, or golden syrinx, or reed, which passed like a ring over each several tress to keep it separate—the *strophion*, a band or fillet which confined the hair—the *sphendone*, which was chiefly worn on the stage, and which resembled

a sling, being broad and elevated in front, and terminating in narrow points at the back of the head, where it was tied—the *anadesme*, a diadem of gold which encircled the forehead—and the *ranion*, supposed by some to have been a comb, and by others some talismanic idol, worn as a spell against an evil eye. The variety of earrings worn by Grecian women was very great, as were their necklaces, armlets, and bracelets. They had also ornaments for the breast, and displayed upon their fingers a profusion of rings, some of which were set with signets, and others with brilliant jewels. The Athenian ladies likewise displayed their taste for luxury and splendour in their shoes and sandals. These were generally home-made, but there was an elegant sandal, ornamented with gold, which was imported from Patara, in Lycia.

Athenian women of lax morals are said to have usually spent the whole morning in the business of the toilette. They were attended by a group of maids, some holding the silver basin and ewer, and others the boxes of tooth-powder, black paint for the eyebrows, rouge-pots, the essence-bottle, or the powder of the head, the jewel-cases, or the mirrors. The hair appears to have received the chief attention. Auburn being considered the most beautiful, dyes were invented, in which the hair being dipped and exposed to the sun, it acquired that colour, and fell in golden curls over the shoulders. Others, who were contented with their own black hair, augmented its gloss by steeping it in oils and essences. Then ringlets were produced by curling-irons heated in ashes, after which, by the aid of jewelled fillets and golden pins, they were brought forward over the smooth white forehead. To painting the face they were much addicted.

While thus employed at the toilette all improvement of the mind was forgotten by the Athenian matrons. To shine as beauties was their sole desire. Let not such be the conduct of the female reader. Let not her adorning "be that outward adorning of plaiting the hair, and of wearing of gold, or of putting on of apparel, but let it be the hidden man of the heart, in that which is not corruptible, even the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, which is in the sight of God of great price" 1 Pet. iii. 3, 4. It was after this manner, while yet mankind were mindful of the favour of God, that holy women adorned themselves, and it would be well if they would now act with such beautiful primitive simplicity.

At Athens the dress of men included many of the garments worn by the women. Thus, they wore the *chiton*, of which there were several kinds, some with and some without sleeves. Over this, in the days of Homer, the *chlaina*, a short cloak resembling the highlander's tartan, was thrown. Some persons appear to have worn skin cloaks, especially in foul weather. Thus, Anaxagoras is represented as putting one on when he foresaw rain.

The above dress, however, rather refers to the more healthy age of morals at Athens. Like the females, the Athenians themselves took a pride in dress during the decline of their state. They appeared abroad in flowing robes of fine linen, dyed with purple and other brilliant colours. Beneath these they wore various kinds of tunics,

and they also affected much variety and splendour in their rings. In their very girdles and shoes the Athenians betrayed their love of splendour. Moreover, they wore their hair long, and it was braided and built up in glossy masses on the crown of the head, or arranged along the forehead by grasshoppers. In journeys or promenades, during hot weather, hats formed a necessary part of the costume, but generally the head was bare.

The wardrobe of the Spartans was very different to that of the Athenians. The sole garment of their women was the *chiton*, or chemise, made of woollen stuff and without sleeves, but fastened on either shoulder by a large clasp, and gathered on the breast by a kind of brooch. This robe seldom reached more than half way to the knee, and it was, moreover, left open on both sides, which rendered it not only an unbecoming, but indecent garment. This was more especially the case when it was gathered tight by a girdle about the waist, but when that was loosened, it reached nearly to the feet, and, but for the side slits, would have been equally as becoming as the *chiton* of the modern Egyptian women. Such was the dress of a Spartan maiden, as well as of the married woman. In it both walked abroad, custom only requiring of the latter that they should be veiled.

The dress of the men in Sparta was even more scanty than that of the women. Their only garment was the *tribon*, which was a variety of the *chiton*, and which, like the cloak of gentlemen in Spain, was so meagre that it would scarcely conceal their persons. In this particular the Spartans were under the restrictions of law. Lycurgus made it imperative on them to dress simply, but at the same time, as in many other instances, he outstepped the bounds of modesty. Had he, indeed, legislated with the view of encouraging immorality, he could scarcely have done so with more success. His whole system of laws displays a total disregard to the morals of the people for whose welfare and glory he legislated. This is distinguishable in every part, but perhaps nothing shows it more than the enactment on costume. Since sin and shame are inseparable, it is necessary that the human form should be duly clad. This was the first lesson which our first parents learned when they fell from innocence.

DWELLINGS AND FURNITURE OF THE GREEKS.

At a very early age the Greeks seem to have been celebrated for domestic architecture. Homer speaks of the chiefs and nobles as already beginning to live in spacious edifices elaborately ornamented. Their houses, however, were not such as the wealthy occupied at a later date. Simplicity had not yet been banished from their manners, for the greatest among them applied themselves to agriculture, and their dwellings were surrounded by the *signs* and implements of their pursuits. In front of them was the farm-yard, inclosed by walls surrounded by battlements, within which were heaps of manure, ploughs, carts, wagons, etc. Hither, also, their flocks and herds were driven in the evening, to protect them from nightly marauders.

Along the walls of the inclosure cattle-sheds

appear to have been ranged. In later times these gave way for suites of chambers for the domestics, and piazzas or colonnades to serve as covered walks in hot or rainy weather. A similar change took place, also, with regard to the porch, which was anciently erected in the inner extremity, for it was succeeded, especially at Athens, by a peristyle or colonnade, where the inmates walked to enjoy the morning sun. At Athens there was usually a peristyle on both sides of the house—one for summer, and the other for winter; and a door generally opened from the women's apartment into that communicating with the garden. In the mode of building, likewise, a great change took place. At first, for instance, the ceilings consisted merely of beams, rafters, and planks, which supported layers of earth or straw, but finally, it consisted of fretted cedar-work or cyprus-wood, or was covered with paintings in blue and gold, and supported on lofty and deeply-fluted columns. This change took place as early as the Homeric times, and, as years rolled away, the style became considerably refined. So gorgeous were the dwellings of the rich in later times, that the outer gates were left open for passers-by to witness the splendour of the owner.

The principal divisions of a Greek dwelling were halls, saloons, the *domus*, in which were the picture galleries, libraries, etc., the *thalamos*, or harem, in which females, married or unmarried, lived, upper chambers, in which the young men of distinction usually slept, and bathing rooms. Their kitchens appear usually to have been separate small buildings in the court-yard.

The walls of a Greek mansion were usually constructed of stones or bricks. In the framework a great variety of wood seems to have been employed. The principal were oak, fir, elm, cedar, cyprus, and the citron wood. But sometimes these were superseded by iron, bronze, ivory, brass, marble, and even the precious metals.

The movables in a Greek mansion were thus characteristically divided—1, everything used in domestic sacrifices, 2, the whole apparatus of female ornaments worn on solemn festivals; 3, the sacred robes and military uniforms of the men; 4, the hangings, bed furniture, and ornaments of the harem, 5, the furniture of the men's apartments; 6, the shoes, sandals, slippers, etc.; 7, the arms and implements of war, which were mixed up with looms, cards, spinning wheels, and embroidery frames, 8, the baking, cooking, washing, and bathing vessels; and 9, the breakfast and dinner services, porcelain, plate of silver and gold, mirrors, candelabra, and the varied articles made use of in the toilettes. In some families a second division was made of those articles which were required for daily use from those displayed at entertainments.

In their furniture, the Greeks showed the same taste and love of splendour as in their dwellings. Porcelain, glass, crystal, ivory, amber, gold, silver, and bronze, with numerous varieties of precious woods, were wrought up with great taste into articles of use or luxury. Their tapestry, also, was rich in the extreme. The following verses of an early English poet may

indeed be taken as a representation of the furniture of every rich citizen at Athens —

"My house within the city
Is richly furnished with plate and gold,
Basins and ewers to lave her dainty hands
My hangings all of Tyrian tapestry
In ivory coffers have I stuff'd my crowns
In cypress chests my arras, counterpanes,
Costly apparel, tents, and canopies,
Fine linen, Turkey cushions boss'd with pearl,
Vallances of Venice, gold in needlework,
Fewter and brass, and all things that belong
To house or house-keeping."

From the magnificence which the Athenian citizen displayed in his furniture, it would seem that, generally speaking, he considered his wealth inexhaustible. But such was not the case. Profusion is the parent of poverty, and so in the decline of the republic it was found. It may, indeed, be considered one of the causes of that decline, for—

"Profusion eats up all
That gives society its beauty, strength,
Convenience, and security, and use
Makes men mere vermin, worthy to be trapp'd
And gibbeted, as fast as catchpole claws
Can seize the slippery prey unties the knot
Of union, and converts the sacred band
That holds mankind together, to a scourge
Profusion, deluging a state with lusts
Of grossest natures and of worse effects,
Prepares it for its ruin hardens blinds,
And warps the consciences of public men,
Till they can laugh at virtue, mock the fools
That breast them, and in the end disclose a face
That would have neck'd Credulity here, if
Unmask'd, vouchsafing this their sole excuse, —
Since all alike are a fish, why not they? —
This does profusion" (COWPER)

THE FOOD OF THE GREEKS, ETC

Ælian, describing the food of nations in remote antiquity, says that "the Arcadians lived upon acorns, the Argives upon pears, and the Athenians upon figs." This appears to have been essentially true, though by acorns must be understood not the fruit of the oak, but the fagus. To this fare some writers on the ancient inhabitants of Hellas, add food much more revolting than acorns, for they represent them as devouring one another.

In the Homeric age, however, the Greeks appear to have fared more sumptuously. Civilization brought with it bread, beef, kid, mutton, pork, venison, the flesh of the wild goat, fowls of various kinds, and fish. Fruits and potherbs were also already in use, for there are many allusions to orchards in the pages of Homer. Thus Alcinoüs is represented as possessing one well replenished with fruit trees of every kind, and the poet makes the shadowy boughs of another covered with golden fruit wave over Tantalus, in Hades, while blown by the wind they elude his eager grasp.

In the earlier ages, the Greeks, doubtless, quenched their thirst in the running brook. Homer himself alludes to this habit, but in his day, wine appears to have been in common use. One of his heroes speaks of it in conjunction with bread, as the chief root of the strength and vigour of man. Their very women were permitted the use of it, and boys met with similar

indulgence. From this free use of wine arose its abuse. All-potent as the Homeric heroes are said by the poet to have been, by copious libations they are frequently represented as being rendered powerless.

The food of the more modern Greeks appears to have been essentially the same as in the Homeric times; but flesh and fowl were rendered more delicious by the arts of cookery. As to fish, they seem to have partaken of every kind, from the shark to the small semi-transparent aphyre caught along the Attic shores. In the historical ages, fish became so desired a luxury, that comic writers employed their wits to hold up the gourmands to ridicule. They represent them as going out in the morning with a slave and basket at their heels, in order to purchase fish, and as hastening to the agora with anxious steps, lest any impassioned fish-eater should clear the stalls of the best anchous, or thumny, before they could arrive.

The fish consumed by the Athenians were obtained from various parts. Thus Archestratos, enumerating the best shelled fish, couples each with the name of the place near which they were caught in these words —

For mussels you must go to *Ænos*, oysters
You'll find best at *Hydros*. *Parion*
Bjonces in its urchins, but if cockles—
Gargitic and sweet-tasted you would eat,
A voyage must be made to *Mitylene*,
Or the *Ambra* in gulf, where they abound
With many other dainties. At *Messina*,
Near to the *Faro*, are *plorion conchs*,
Nor are those bad you find near *Ephesus*.
For *Teuthian* oysters, go to *Chalcidon*."

The poultry brought to table at Athens was almost as varied as the fish. It is less difficult to say, in truth, what was eaten than what was not, since almost all the winged tribe seems to have afforded a repast to the Athenian. Even the thrush, chaffinch, blackbird, jackdaw, ring dove, jay, etc., were welcome morsels at their banquets.

With a variety of puddings and soups the Athenians seem to have been plentifully provided. The latter were made both with beans, flour, pearl-barley, or groats, etc. They even converted gruel into a delicacy, but the best gruel was made at *Megara*.

The vegetables eaten by the Greeks were exceedingly varied. Lupines, pomegranates, kidney beans, horse-radish, the dregs of grapes and olives, radishes, etc., all formed part of an Athenian entertainment. Among wholesome vegetables, Diocles of *Carystos* enumerates the rû beet, mallow, dock, nettle, orach, the bolbos, and mushroom. Their herbs were also various, as were their fruits. Of the latter, every kind of fruit known to the ancients appears to have been held in repute.

For grapes, Greece has always been celebrated. From these they produced various wines, which were usually called after the names of the places in which they were made. Thus, there were the wines of *Thasos*, *Eretria*, *Cos*, *Myndus*, *Halicarnassus*, and the *Mareotic* wines, etc. The made or mixed wines of the Greeks were numerous: they even extracted them from the fig, the palm, and roots.

GRECIAN ENTERTAINMENTS.

With such a variety of provisions before them, as unfolded in the preceding article, the Greeks could scarcely fail to make rich repasts. This they did on ordinary days, but there were seasons, as on the occasion of grand entertainments, when all their culinary skill was called into action.

These repasts were divided into three classes,—the public dinner, the pie-nic, and the marriage feasts. On the former of these, which they called *clapnæ*, it will be sufficient to enlarge.

When a citizen desired to entertain his friends he despatched a domestic to their houses with a tablet, whereon their names and the day and the hour fixed upon for the banquet were inscribed. Brothers, however, and other near relations, came uninvited, and so did another class of men, who, living at large upon the public, were denominated "flies."

Arrived at the house of their host, they received a hearty welcome, and those who possessed beards had them perfumed over burning censers of frankincense. This done—as the Greeks regarded every meal in the light of a sacrifice, at which the first and best portion should be offered as an oblation to the gods, with invocations and prayer—they approached the altar of Zeus, which stood in the midst of every dining-room, and performed those ceremonies, at the same time pouring out libations of wine. They then sat down to dinner, upon which water was presented to them in silver layers and ewers of gold, in which they might wash their fingers, with which they ate, as is still the practice in the Levant between every course. The guests took their places in the earlier ages on chairs, but afterwards on rich sofas, or divans on which they reclined in various positions. Thus, when the guests were numerous, the chief in dignity, throwing off his shoes, placed himself on the upper end of the divan, next the host, reclining on one elbow, supported by soft cushions, while the head of another reached nearly to his breast, and the feet of the first extended down behind him. The same position was taken by others on the same sofa, on which sometimes five individuals were seated.

The order of arranging the guests seems to have been according to the views of the host. Some would pay deference to rank and wealth, but there were others who grouped them together according to age, and others according to temper, in order to produce general harmony. Thus, the fiery-tempered were placed beside the meek and gentle; the silent beside the loquacious, and the man of learning beside those who needed and thirsted for instruction.

A great number of dishes were served up in succession at a Grecian banquet, and as pleasures of all kinds were supposed to promote digestion, the ears of the guests were pleased with songs and music. The dancer, also, exercised his art for the entertainment of the guests, and the buffoon exercised his wit, while the juggler played off his tricks to excite merriment. When philosophers were present, however, amusement was not allowed to occupy the sole attention of

the guests—it was then alternated with useful conversation.

After the Greeks had taken sufficient solid viands, the tables were removed, and others were brought in, on which the censers, goblets, and silver or golden ladles for filling the smaller cups were arranged, while capacious bowls of wine were placed on the sideboard. The goblets were filled by cupbearers of both sexes, selected for their youth and beauty. This done, they were delivered to the guests, who could only drink when the chairman, or, as he was now called, "king of the feast," pleased. It was supposed that he could determine better than themselves how much and how often they should drink. This would have been a good custom, if the "king of the feast" had always been chosen for his love of sobriety. Unfortunately, however, he seems generally to have been a lover of the bowl, for he allowed them to drink so often and so deeply that the whole company became inebriated. This was more especially the case on occasions at which the Muses were honoured with toasts. The goblets were then filled so frequently that a scene of drunkenness became the inevitable consequence, for, having drunk deeply before in honour of friends of other days, or their mistresses, nature became overpowered by the prolonged potations. The very maxima of the Greeks were sufficient, indeed, to induce general drunkenness. As the presence of sober persons must always be a tacit reproach to drunkards at a feast, the law of what was termed then, as it is now, "good fellowship," was "Drink, or be gone." There was, therefore, no alternative left the guests but to become partners in the general crime. Hence may have arisen, in part, the notoriety which many Greeks obtained for the unenviable capacity for drinking large quantities. This applies especially to the followers of Alexander. These spent their days in the slaughter of their species, and their nights in rioting and drunkenness, the "hero" himself acting the part of the "king of the feast."

At the dinner of an Athenian there were usually many individuals present who have been termed "half-guests, half-parasites," men who used to extract merriment out of the dinner materials, that they might render themselves so agreeable as to insure a future invitation. Every dish served at table was converted by them into an occasion for reciting old proverbs, or poetical quotations, having reference chiefly to the dainty. The Athenians, however, were not solely dependent for amusement upon such unworthy characters as these; they knew how to entertain themselves; and sometimes, in their hilarity, would descend to puerile enjoyments. Charades, enigmas, conundrums, and stories of witches and hobgoblins were heard on every hand, and any song accompanied the barbitos or the lyre. A more pernicious custom to which they resorted for amusement was the various games of *kottabos*, invented in Sicily, which answers in principle to the chessboard, and card or billiard table. The Greeks, however, did not carry the art of gaming to such an excess as to ruin one another. The prizes for which they contended were very simple, being merely a cake,

nothing similar. The chief evil attendant on it was loss of time—that most precious gift of God to his creature man, bestowed to enable him to prepare for a blissful eternity.

THE GREEK FARM-YARD. PTV

When agriculture had arrived at perfection in Greece, the farm presented a very pleasing picture of the domestic manners of the Greeks, for it is self-evident that the appearance of a country shows the habits of the people. Where industry prevails there will be order and prosperity stamped upon everything around, but around the footsteps of the idle there must ever be the thorn and the thistle.

An Attic farmer, of the genuine kind, so to have resembled an old English farmer. In his house he harboured bins of corn, piles of cheeses, bundles of dried figs or rusins, racks of ham, and fitches of bacon, strings of melons, corbels, filled with olive dregs, and piles of dressed skins. His wife, also, had her apartment, in which was the loom, spinning-wheel, carding apparatus, work-baskets, and cradle. In the kitchen might be seen both ducks and geese picking up spilled grain, and not unrequently a pig was kept in an inclosure within its precincts.

The inmates of a Greek farm-yard were various. There were geese, ducks, barn-door fowls, peacocks, pheasants, guinea fowls, partridges, quails, and the *attagis*. Thrushes and other small birds were bred in warm rooms with slight perches projecting from the walls, and every farm-yard had its colubary and dove-cotes, which were sometimes sufficiently large to contain five thousand birds. Even jackdaws were kept, and had perches set up for them like common tows.

Horses, being both rare and expensive in Greece, were seldom used in agriculture. The mule and the ass were, however, much employed in rural labours, the former in the cart or the plough, and the latter in drawing small tumbrils, or in bearing wood and other produce of the farm to the city.

The Greek farmer was very celebrated for his management of swine. Ptolemy says in his *Memoirs*, that he saw in *Assos* "a milk-white hog two cubits and a half in length, and of equal size." He adds, that "king *Eumenes* gave four thousand drachme, or nearly two hundred pounds, for a male swine of this kind, in order to improve the breed of pigs in his own country."

As in the present day, oxen were used in ploughing, treading out the corn, drawing manure to the fields, and bringing home the produce of the harvest. This custom prevailed throughout the East, of which there are many pleasing notices in the sacred writings.

The milk cows of the Greeks were commonly fed on *cythus* and clover. The usual milking times were in the dawn of the morning and the close of twilight in the evening. Of the cream they made both butter and cheese, but the former was not celebrated for its properties, and it probable that the latter, though a favourite food

among soldiers in Attica, was not of such good quality as that used in England.

The Greeks employed a succession of articles in fattening cattle. Thus, at first they fed them on cabbage chopped small and steeped in vinegar, then with chaff and gurgions, and, finally, with barley. With these ingredients they were fed both in winter and summer, being allowed three meals daily.

The industrious bee formed a necessary companion to the varied hive-stock of a Greek farmhouse. In Attica this branch of rural economy was carried to great perfection, and the natural history of the bee was studied with enthusiasm by the Greeks generally. There were, in truth, professed bee-keepers, who laid out grounds for them with particular care, surrounding the hives

with flowers and odoriferous shrubs. With what success they attended their industrious charge history unfolds. Aristotle says, that "when the honey was taken from them about the summer solstice, some hives would produce five, others ten, and others fifteen quarts of honey, still leaving sufficient for winter consumption" and mention is made of a person who obtained five thousand pounds weight of honey annually.

In the cultivation of his lands the Greek farmer exhibited great skill. In the first place, he applied himself ardently to obtain a knowledge of his soil, and generally, as well as of the soil, which was essential to his purpose, since, without it, he might have scattered his seed in vain. He was careful, also, to obtain a knowledge of many precepts which were in circulation among the Greeks, and which, of particular utility to husbandmen. These precepts are scattered through the works of Hesiod, and their chief aim appears to have been to excite to industry, that so prosperity and contentment might prevail. For instance, one precept was, "I don't confide fertility on flocks and herds, and is the parent of opulence," and another, "Produce heaps up that which profligacy dissipates." Some of the precepts articulated good fellowship, and answer to the humane law which the Hebrew lawgiver laid down concerning the poor, as this, "Be hospitable to the stranger for he who rejects the suppliant from his door is no less guilty than the adulterer, the despoiler of the orphan, or the wretch who blasphemous his aged parent on the brink of the grave. The end of such men is miserable. Zeus will rain down vengeance upon them in recompense for their evil actions." Added to this knowledge, the Greek farmer studied other branches which comprehended something like the elements of natural philosophy. He sought to obtain a knowledge of the influence of the sun and moon, the rising and setting of the stars, the motion of the winds, the generation and effects of dews, clouds, meteors, showers, and tempests, the origin of springs and fountains, and the migration and habits of birds and other animals. Moreover, he deemed it necessary that he should be acquainted with certain superstitious practices which had existed from remote antiquity.

A knowledge of the origin of springs and fountains was essential to the Greek farmer, since both fields and gardens were chiefly irrigated by means of wells. Where these did not

exist, therefore, the matter became a serious one. Necessity, however, is the mother of invention, and in this extremity rain-water was collected and preserved in cisterns. For this purpose, in some farm-yards, troughs ran along the eaves of stable, barn, and sheep-cote, as well as the dwelling of the family, and the water caught in these troughs was conveyed through wooden pipes to the cisterns, which were commonly situate in the front court. Hence it arose, perhaps, that the Greek farmer was so studious of the signs of the weather. Nothing more obviously interested him than the arrival and departure of rains, everything connected with them was carefully observed, and scrupulously treasured up in his mind.

In the actual labours of the farm, and the implements by which they were carried on, the Greek husbandman displayed much ingenuity. Smiths, carpenters, and potters, were usually kept on the establishment or in its immediate neighbourhood, and their wagons, carts, harrows, and ploughs, were therefore constructed on the spot. In addition to these, they possessed winnowing-fans, scythes, sickles, pruning-hooks, braken-scythes, saws, hand-saws, which were used in pruning and grafting, spades, shovels, rakes, pickaxes, hoes, mattocks, dibbles, fork-dibbles, and grubbing-axes. Before mills were invented they had a large mortar scooped out of the trunk of a tree, which was furnished with a pestle upwards of four feet in length, for the purpose of reducing corn into flour.

On the preparation and use of manure the Greeks appear to have bestowed much attention with great success. They kept it in pits, every kind being thrown together, and, when entirely decayed, it was taken out and spread upon the land on scientific principles. Thus, in lean lands,—which required most the aid of art, it being considered that their prolific virtue would be consumed by heat, they were careful to avoid excess in its employment, spreading it frequently rather than copiously.

There was a great variety of practice in ploughing the land in Greece. When the soil was light a kind of spade-husbandry was employed. Most lands, however, were ploughed three times: first, immediately after the ingathering of the harvest; secondly, when a convenient time offered itself, and, thirdly, in the sowing season. At the third time of ploughing the ploughman scattered the grain in the furrows as they were laid open, while a boy followed with a hoe with which he broke the clods and covered the seed, that it might not be devoured by birds. In extremely hot weather the farmer ploughed all night; partly out of consideration to the oxen, and partly to preserve the moisture and richness of the soil, and by the aid of the dew to render it more pliable. (On these occasions it was customary to use two pair of oxen and a heavier ploughshare, in order to produce the deeper furrow.)

The Greek farmer was very careful to adapt the grain to the soil. Thus wheat was sown on rich plains, which, in the interval, was cropped with vegetables; barley was sown on middling grounds; and lentils, vetches, lupins, and such other pulse as were cultivated on a large

scale—peas and beans excepted—were cultivated on the poor lands. The principal sowing time was autumn, or as soon as the equinoctial rains had moistened the earth. Wheat was scattered some time in November, or about the setting of the constellation, called the Crown. In this operation they were careful to avoid the time when the south wind blew, and generally all ungenial weather, as it was considered to render the earth unfruitful.

The harvest usually commenced in Greece about the rising of the Pleiades. At Athens, when that season arrived, those citizens who lived by hard labour ranged themselves in bands in the agora, whither the farmers in the neighbourhood resorted to hire them. Being hired, they proceeded to the field, where, separating into two divisions, they stationed themselves at either end of the piece of corn to be reaped, and worked toward each other, both parties striving to reach the centre of the field first. As they advanced, they laid the corn behind them in long lines upon the stubble, and two other classes of harvesters followed, whose task it was to bind it into sheaves and pile it up into mows. As in our own country, in some parts of Greece the women joined in these labours the practice, however, of females labouring in the harvest-field was not general. The implement used in cutting wheat seems always to have been the sickle, but with barley and the other inferior grain the scythe was used.

As before mentioned, in separating the grain from the straw, the ancient Greeks made use of cattle, which trod out the corn on a thrashing-floor. When the farmer happened to be short of cattle, he made use of a thrashing-machine, which consisted of a kind of heavy sledge, toothed below with sharp stones or iron. Sometimes, also, in winter the flail was used.

In winnowing, when there was a breeze, the Greeks simply threw the grain up into the air with a scoop, until the wind had blown away the chaff, a figure which the Psalmist adopts to show the utter destruction of the wicked when God arises to judgment —

“ They are like the chaff which the wind driveth away.”
Psa 14

When the weather was serene, they had recourse to a winnowing machine, which was turned by the hand, and which possessed sufficient power to cleanse even vetches and beans. To receive the chaff, pits appear to have been sunk all round the thrashing-floor. The corn not designed for immediate use was stored in granaries. The whole was closed with a festival in honour of their rural gods, Demeter and Dionysus, a festival which may be deemed a Greek harvest-home. In the observance of it, oblations of cake, with other offerings, designed at once to express their gratitude for past blessings, and to render the gods propitious to them in future, were offered up. This festival took place in Attica in the great temple of Eleusis, and it continued during several days, as the reader has seen in a former page, where the various Greek festivals are described at large.

THE GARDEN AND ORCHARD OF GREECE.

The Greeks seem to have inherited, by nature, a passion for that delightful solitude which is to be found among plantations, flower-beds, arbours, hanging vines, fountains, and umbrageous walks. This passion must have been nourished by the scenery and fertility of the country of Greece in its "age of woe," a modern poet, smitten by its loveliness, asks with evident rapture.—

'Know ye the land of the cedar and vine,
Where the flowers ever blossom, the beams ever shine,
Where the light wings of Zephyr, oppress'd with per-
fume,
Wax faint o'er the gardens of Gul in her bloom
Where the citron and olive are fairest of fruit
And the voice of the nightingale, never is mute
Where the tints of the earth, and the hues of the sky,
In colour though varied in beauty may vie,
And the purple of ocean is deepest in dye?
Where the virgins are soft as the roses they twine,
And all save the spirit of man, is divine?"

No distinct description of a Greek garden has reached our age. From the varied productions of the country, however, the gardens of Cimon, Pausanias, Pericles, and Epicurus, whom Pliny speaks of as being masters in horticulture, must have been exceedingly lovely. Almost every kind of ornamental and sweet-smelling shrubs and flowers, of umbrageous trees and fragrant herbs, were there cultivated. Out of these they formed lawns, shrubberies, thickets, arcades, avenues, and umbrageous arches, wherewith to delight the senses. The cool shades were refrigerated by splashing fountains, whose waters poured through numerous channels straight or winding, over the whole garden, refreshing the eye and sustaining a perpetual verdure. Odoriferous shrubs were usually clustered round a pomegranate tree on elevated spots, that being exposed to the winds, they might diffuse their sweetness more freely. In many gardens it was the custom to plant each kind of tree and flower in separate groups. Thus there were beds of white violets, of hyacinths, of carnations, of the gold cynosure, of irises, etc. This custom is now generally adopted in Holland, and in some of our own gardens a similar plan is pursued.

A Greek orchard appears usually to have been surrounded with hedges of black and white-thorn, brambles, and barberry bushes, as it is at present by the Indian cactus. On the banks of these hedges there were found various tribes of plants and wild flowers, such as the enchanter's nightshade, the red-flowered valerian, the ground ivy, the bright yellow scorpion-flower, the penny-cress, etc. Within the enclosure were most of the trees reared in England, together with others which cannot exist in our climate. The principal were,—the apple, the pear, the cherry, the damascene, and common plum, the quince, the apricot, the peach, the nectarine, the walnut, the chestnut, the hazel nut, the filbert, the medlar, the mulberry, the white, purple, and red fig; the pomegranate, the orange, the citron, the lemon, the date-palm, the pistachio, the almond, the service, the cornel-tree, etc. These trees were usually planted in lines, forming a series of umbrageous avenues, thereby

uniting pleasure with profit. Sometimes these avenues opened, here and there, into the lawn, or vineyard, which generally formed a part of a wealthy Greek's grounds, hence, when the orchard was decked in its summer pride with foliage of emerald, and ruddy, purple, and golden fruit—when the notes of the thrush, nightingale, turtle, and greenfinch, floated through the branches, and the perfume of odoriferous plants breathed on all sides, it gave the beholder an idea of an earthly paradise.

Sometimes common foot-paths traversed the orchards and vineyards of the Greeks, and passers-by were permitted to pick and eat the fruit, as was the custom in Palestine.

Of the manner of cultivating fruit-trees in the earlier ages, very little is known. The art of properly training and grafting them seems to have been unknown in the Homeric age, but afterwards it was brought to great perfection. No fruit was esteemed excellent unless the tree had been grafted, and the following are some of the rules they observed in this process: the fig was grafted only on the plantain and the mulberry; the mulberry on the chestnut, beech, apple, terebinth, wild pear, elm, and white poplar; the pear on the pomegranate, quince, mulberry, almond, and terebinth; the apple on all sorts of wild pears, quinces, and plantain; the walnut on the strawberry-tree, the pomegranate on the myrtle and the willow; the laurel on the cherry and the ash; the white peach on the damascene and almond; the damascene on the wild pear, quince, and apple; the chestnut on the walnut, beech, and oak; the cherry on the terebinth and peach; the quince on the oxycanthus; the myrtle on the willow; the apricot on the damascene and Thasian almond; the vine on the cherry and myrtle; and the citron on the apple, pomegranate, and mulberry.

The rules observed by the Greeks in the propagation of fruit-trees were numerous. The pistachio, filbert, almond, chestnut, white peach, damascene, pine-tree, palm, cypress, laurel, ash, maple, and fig, were usually renewed by seed; the apple, cherry, rhamnus juguba, common nut, dwarf laurel, myrtle, and medlar, were propagated by suckers; and the almond, pear, mulberry, citron, apple, olive, quince, poplar, ivy, vine, willow, and others, were raised from branches selected from among the new wood on the topmost boughs of a tree. Sometimes they bent long pendant boughs to the ground, and covered a part of it with heavy cloths until it had taken root, when it was severed from its parent tree, while at other times the points of boughs were drawn down and fixed in the ground, which even thus took root and sent its juices backward, after which it was cut off and a new stock produced.

The orchards of Greece were not entirely devoted to fruit-trees. It seems to have been a custom to lay out the whole in beds and borders for the cultivation of vegetables, which beds were edged with parsley and rue. They consisted of turnips, cabbages, onions, lettuces, endive, succory, asparagus, broad beans, lentils, pea, kidney-beans, artichokes, cucumbers, water-melons, gourds, etc. In the production of fine vegetables the Greek gardeners appear to have delighted,

and, aided by a luxuriant soil, they succeeded wonderfully. They also sought to produce some without seed, and others of extraordinary shape. Thus, some cucumbers were made to grow without seed by covering the newly-formed plant with earth three times, and others to run to an extraordinary length by placing vessels of water daily within a few inches of their points, which, exciting, by attraction, a sort of misus in the fruit, caused their prolongation.

The garden-herbs cultivated in Greece were very various. The principal were—the cistus, the blue eringo, rocket, crosses, bastard parsley, penny-royal, anise, water-mint, sea onion, monk-rhubarb, pursi un, coriander, hellebore, bush-organy, fox glove, brank-ursine or bear's-foot, chervil, skirwort, cleampane, giant-fennel, dill, mustard, wake-robin, cumin, pepperwort, etc. The Greek gardener also sedulously cultivated the mushroom, it being an article in great requisition among the opulent. It was eaten together with the truffle and morille, which were produced during the rains and thunders of autumn, and continued to flourish in the earth a whole year.

Such is a brief picture of a Greek garden and orchard. By it the reader will understand somewhat of the loveliness of that country so celebrated in history. It forms a striking contrast to the character of its inhabitants as displayed in a previous section. While the natural world was replete with beauty, and waited its odours around to the delight of the senses, human nature presented a sickening scene of depravity, which must be depicted in the page of history till time shall be no more. Rent in pieces by faction and passion, through almost every period of their existence as a nation, the Greeks present the unlovely picture of one large family divided among themselves. At such times, with clashing swords they would overrun the face of the country from the one end of it to the other, having no regard for its fertility or loveliness. As the effects of their rage,—

"Naked plains and rav'd fields
Succeed to smiling havens, and the fruits
Of peaceful olive, lust'rous fig, and vine."

THE VINEYARDS OF GREECE, &c.

Ancient Greece was very celebrated for its vineyards. The culture of the vine was, indeed, one of the principal branches of husbandry there from the days of Homer to its latest date of prosperity.

There were three remarkable varieties of the vine in Greece. The first consisted of plants always kept short, and supported on props, the second of tree-climbers, and the third of a plant which grew chiefly in steep and stony places, and spread their branches over the earth.

Much care was exhibited by the Greek husbandman in the selection of the site for a vineyard. When selected, he encircled the spot with a hedge, which was made both thick and strong, for the purpose of repelling the flocks and herds, as well as goats and foxes, which loved to prey upon the vine. His next operation was to root up the wild plants and weeds. After this the husbandman trenched the ground, throwing it into lofty ridges, that the summer sun, combined

with the rain and the wind, might make it mellow. The ground remained in this state for one whole year, and then its surface was levelled, and a series of shallow furrows traced for the slips by line, which on rich alluvial plains were somewhat close. With the slip some grape-stones were usually cast into the furrow—those of the white grape with the purple vine, and those of the purple with the white—in order to cause it the sooner to propagate. To produce grapes without stones the lower end of the slip was split and the pith carefully extracted, after which it was bound round with a papyrus-leaf, thrust into a sea-onion, and thus planted. Vines producing medicinal grapes were obtained by withdrawing the pith and introducing certain drugs into the hollow, closing up the extremity with papyrus, and thus planting it in the earth. The Greeks were also in the habit of producing white and purple grapes on the same cluster. This was done by taking a slip of the white and purple grape, and, having split them down the middle, carefully to fit the halves to their opposites, so that the buds when divided should meet. They were then bound together with papyrus-thread and placed in the earth in a sea-onion, the juice of which aided the combination of the severed parts.

Concerning the best season for planting, opinions were divided, as Virgil hints in his *Georgics* thus—

"When winter frosts constrain the field with cold,
The fainty root can take no steady hold,
But when the golden spring reveals the year,
And the white bird returns whom serpents fear,
That season deem the best to plant thy vines,
Next that, as when autumnal warmth declines,
The heat is quite decay'd or cold begun,
Or Capricorn admits the winter sun."

In planting the vine, the ancient Greeks not only took notice of the season, but of the phases of the moon, whose influence over vegetation they believed to be very powerful. Thus some planted during the four days preceding the new moon, while others extended their labours through the period intervening between its birth and its maturity. The operation of pruning was carried on when the moon was in its wane.

In those vineyards where the vines grew upon props, or trees, the spaces between the rows were not allowed to be fallow. Sometimes they were planted with fruit-trees, and at other times with vegetables. The rules observed in pruning resemble those still in use.

The season of vintage was regulated by law. In Attica this usually coincided with the heliacal rising of the constellation Arcturus. At that time, the magistrates declared that the season of vintage was come, and men and women were soon employed in separating the rich clusters from the vine, and carrying them to the wine-press in baskets of osier or reed. Their labours were performed in the midst of mirth and revelry. Intoxicated by pleasure, and the fumes of the new-made wine, they sang aloud their ancient lays to the honour of Bacchus, the fabled god of wine, and the patron of inebriety.

The wine-press among the Greeks usually consisted of two upright, and many cross beams, which, descending upon the grapes, squeezed

forth all their juices, which falling upon a species of strainer, upon an inclined slab, were poured through a small channel into a large vessel communicating with the vat. These juices were made into wine, which was lad up in skins, or large earthen jars, until required for use. All the produce of the vineyard, however, was not appropriated to the making of wine. Great quantities were reserved for the table, or converted into raisins, by being dried in the sun on a smooth raised terrace, or by twisting the stem of the cluster and allowing them to dry on the vine.

When the labours of the vintage were over, the husbandman turned his attention to the olive-yard, and the making of oil, which was a matter of great importance. The olives were picked by the hand, and when as many were gathered as could be conveniently pressed during the following night and day, they were spread loosely and sparingly on fine hurdles. Towards evening a little salt was scattered over them and they were then put into a clean mill, which bruised them in such a manner as to leave the stones untouched. They were then conveyed in small vessels to the press, where they were covered with hurdles of green willows, upon which a moderate weight was first placed, and afterwards a greater, by which means the oil was completely extracted from the olives.

The Greeks possessed a variety of other oils besides that of the olive. Among these may be enumerated walnut-oil, and the oils of sea-mum, turbinth, almonds, Palmi Christi, saffron, Indian laurel, dittusa, lentisk, mastic, myrtle, and mustard. They had, also, the subtle refined oil of Sicily, beside imitations of the Spanish and Italian oils. Moreover, they possessed the art of extracting perry from pears, and cider from apples, as well as a species of wine said to have been of a delicate flavour, from the pomegranate.

The methods of preserving fruit among the Greeks so as to insure a supply throughout the year were both curious and various. Thus citrons, pomegranates, apples, quinces, and pears, were preserved in heaps of sand, grapestones, or sawdust, which was sometimes sprinkled with vinegar, chopped straw, wheat, barley, or the seeds of plants. Mulberries were preserved in their own juice, and figs were plunged into honey, so as neither to touch each other, nor the vessel in which they were placed. But there appears to have been no rule laid down for the preservation of fruit, since different husbandmen used different methods, each adopting that which he deemed the best. Most of them, however, seem to have been effectual, for the market was abundantly supplied during the year, though at some seasons fruits were more expensive than at others.

THE PASTORAL HABITS OF THE GREEKS.

In the earlier ages, the life of the Greeks appears to have been almost solely nomadic. In process of time, however, their habits became changed. The attention of the mass was divided between the two simplest and most primitive occupations of life—namely, the shepherd and the husbandman.

The great Bacon considered the pastoral state preferable in some respects to the agricultural. And, indeed, the voice of society in all ages speaks to the same effect. In Greece, especially, the pastoral life was held in great honour. The most eminent strains of the poets flowed in its praises. By them shepherds and shepherdesses were held up to posterity as models of perfection. They were, however, anything but divine, for their morals in reality were very lax. All the pictures of pastoral life, therefore, described by the Grecian poets may be pronounced ideal; they existed only in their own fertile and wonderful imaginations. Of men and women groveling in iniquity upon earth, they made gods and goddesses, and placed them in the third heavens.

In the Homeric ages the sons of princes superintended their fathers' flocks. Thus Bucolon, son of Laomedon, and Paris, and Anchises led the flocks of their sires to pasture. And this is the case in the East at the present time. Among the nomadic nations of Asia, the sons of chiefs still follow their flocks in the wilderness. At the same time men of inferior rank were employed, and these formed the great body of shepherds in the lower ages. Where the number of the sheep required the care of several men, a chief shepherd was appointed to overlook the rest. And the number of attendants must, in ancient times, have been considerable, for twenty sheep were then thought to require the attention of a man and boy. In modern times, however, a flock of five hundred were entrusted to the care of three men and a boy, with four or five dogs.

From the remotest ages the shepherd availed himself of the use of dogs, the breed of which was—at least in later times—the Molossian. Two other necessary accompaniments in his employment were the *donax*, or common river-reed, and a flute crooked at the top, polished finely, and rubbed with bees-wax. With these the Grecian shepherd wild away his hours, which would otherwise have hung heavily upon his hands, after the same manner as the youthful David played upon his harp. But there was this difference in their strains the one tuned his pipe to love, and the other strung his harp to the praise of Him whose hand he saw in every tree, rock, mountain, and spring.

Glimpses of the pastoral life are very frequent in the pages of Homer. Whenever his subject admitted it, he seemed to embrace the opportunity with gladness of bringing the image of a shepherd before his readers. Thus Hector, while lifting a large rock, is compared to a shepherd bearing the fleece of a ram, and Aeneas, followed by the Trojan forces, suggested to his mind the idea of a ram going to a rivulet to drink, while an innumerable flock bounded after him. But his pictures are very insignificant when compared with those drawn from the character of an Oriental shepherd in the Hebrew Scriptures. There the Almighty Father and the eternal Son of God are compared to the kind and gentle shepherd in their dealings with fallen and sinful creatures. He watches over them, guides them through this world, and brings them to his fold in heaven. Such a grand idea as this,

