

1 Witness Ingersoll

2 And to find out so that this committee can ascertain the
3 facts. I am not passing upon whether or not this was a good
4 or bad agreement. That is not my province as a member of
5 this committee at this particular time. It is to only find
6 the facts and I am not now commenting upon the facts. I am
7 merely stating reasons why I have asked certain questions,
8 to make it crystal clear that in my humble judgment this
9 issue is material as to how Pearl Harbor happened, as to
10 whether or not the Army and Navy really knew, as Admiral
11 Stark said, "God alone knew", as far as he was concerned,
12 and he couldn't find out what we were going to do.

13 Therefore, I want to place upon the record these facts,
14 not as an apology, but merely to answer these insinuations
15 that there was an ulterior motive in asking these questions.
16 Let the record show that there is no ulterior motive. I
17 have no motive. I have not sat at this table for any other
18 purpose than to get all of the facts that the American
19 people and the world might know how this catastrophe could
20 happen to this great Nation of ours and that it shall never
21 nappen again.

22 (Applause)

23 The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

24 Are there any further questions of Admiral Ingersoll?

25 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one

Witness Ingersoll

1
2 statement.

3 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas.

4 Senator Lucas: I see we still have the same group
5 that come in every day to do the applauding. The committee
6 is very appreciative of that fact. It sounds like organized
7 propaganda of some kind to me.

8 However, Mr. Chairman, I am deeply appreciative of
9 this lecture that has been given here by the Senator from
10 Michigan. The Senator from Illinois was not born yesterday.
11 The Senator from Illinois does not apologize for anything
12 that he has said either. I have watched this proceeding from
13 the beginning, long before any hearings ever started. I
14 think I know what it is all about.

15 I, too, want the facts, but there are some folks who
16 want political facts. What the Senator from Michigan said
17 doesn't bother me one iota. I propose to go along from
18 here to the end in the same manner that I have in the past.
19 When I know the background of this thing, when I know of
20 the statements made upon the floor of the Congress, long
21 before hearings were started, and then when I hear about
22 a non-partisan investigation dealing with facts alone, I
23 am tempted to laugh.

24 I know what the evidence showed with respect to the
25 parallel agreements. I know what some people tried to prove

1 Witness Ingersoll

2 all the way through with respect to that. So far as I am
3 concerned I didn't care one iota if there was a parallel
4 agreement. It wouldn't make any difference to me. I was
5 interested long before Pearl Harbor in my country and the
6 defense of it and I did some things in the way of legislation
7 that didn't please a lot of people at that time.

8 We had a policy in this country and we followed it
9 through, and a lot of the same people who disagreed with
10 that policy previous to Pearl Harbor still are disagreeing
11 with it here, and that comes from some of those who are
12 applauding constantly when some point is made against what
13 this Administration did. But I will never defend Japan.

14 That is all.

15 The Vice Chairman: Are there any further questions
16 of Admiral Ingersoll?

17 Mr. Richardson: I have some questions.

18 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson is recognized.

19 Mr. Richardson: It is now 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

20 The Vice Chairman: Yes. We will take a recess until
21 1:30.

22 (Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the committee
23 recessed until 1:30 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 p.m.

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3 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
4 order.

5 Senator Ferguson.

6 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I think it is only
7 right and proper that I should make a few remarks to the
8 last remark of the Senator from Illinois, even though he is
9 not here.

10 The Vice Chairman: The Chair hopes we can go ahead
11 with our witnesses, Senator, as soon as possible.

12 Senator Ferguson: I think it is important, Mr. Chairman.
13 I found nothing in those remarks that was speaking of the
14 facts, but I do not think I should let stand his last
15 remark when he said that he shall never defend Japan.

16 No one would expect the Senator from Illinois, or any
17 other Senator on this committee, to defend Japan. I know
18 of no question that has ever been asked that was for the
19 purpose of defending Japan.

20 I realize that that remark was made for headline purposes,
21 and I feel certain that it was made from a feeling that
22 he resented what had been stated here from the official
23 record.

24 I know that my part here is only to bring out the
25 facts, and I shall always try to be non-partisan as far as

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Witness Ingersoll

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2 this hearing is concerned. I have definite ideas on politics,
3 but not in this hearing, because to me this is a hearing for
4 all American, by an all-American committee of both Houses
5 of this Congress, and it certainly should remain such, and,
6 for my part, it shall.

7 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Richardson will proceed.

8 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL,

9 (Resumed)

10 Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to read
11 into the record at this time a memorandum that I have from
12 Commander Baecher in answer to an inquiry made by Senator
13 Ferguson.

14 "29 January 1946

15 "MEMORANDUM

16 "To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

17 "Subject: Opnav dispatch 061743 December 1941.

18 "1. With reference to the request of the committee
19 for information concerning the time of transmission and
20 receipt of the subject dispatch, please be advised as
21 follows:

22 "2. Opnav dispatch 061743 was transmitted from
23 Washington to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p.m. 6 December 1941
24 Washington local time. (10:54 p.m. 6 December 1941 Greenwich
25 time).

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 "3. The records of the Commander in Chief, Pacific
3 Fleet, do not indicate the exact time of receipt of this
4 message nor do they indicate the time of delivery to
5 Admiral Kimmei.

6 "4. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has
7 been requested to check the files for this information. If
8 any further information is received you will be advised."

9 Admiral, there are one or two questions that came to
10 my mind during the examination by Senator Ferguson. There
11 was during part of 1941 and prior to Pearl Harbor what has
12 been familiarly called here a shooting war in the Atlantic.

13 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct. I termed it an
14 illegal or irregular war.

15 Mr. Richardson: That is right. And that condition
16 was due to the governmental decision to give aid to the
17 Allies against the Axis Powers in Europe, was it not?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

19 Mr. Richardson: And as a result of that it was recog-
20 nized, was it not, by the Navy that the Atlantic and the
21 activities in connection with the Atlantic became the
22 primary theater of Naval operations?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: In the general concept of the
24 war the Atlantic became the primary theater for the purpose
25 of defeating Germany and Italy.

1 Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

3 Admiral Ingersoll: And that our general attitude in
4 the Pacific was defensive, and the only operations we could
5 carry out in the Pacific of an offensive character were
6 those which our forces there would permit, and in the assign-
7 ment of forces in WPL-46 the difference in the strategic
8 conception between the Atlantic and Pacific was made on
9 that basis.

(2) 10 I do not wish the impression to be gained, however,
11 that because in the Atlantic the primary aim was to defeat
12 Germany and the strategic conception in the Pacific was
13 defensive, I do not wish to give the impression at any time
14 that the Pacific was not on our minds just as much as the
15 Atlantic, despite the broad strategic plan.

16 Mr. Richardson: I am not so immediately interested in
17 what was on your mind, but when it came to sending ships,
18 or guns, or munitions of war, the Atlantic was the primary
19 theater in which the Navy was operating, wasn't it?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: The distribution of ships between
21 the Atlantic and Pacific was that prescribed in WPL-46,
22 almost down to the last ship. That, in turn, was based
23 on ABC-1, which was a decision made on high political levels.

24 Mr. Richardson: I am not interested in your war plan
25 now, or WPL-46, I am stating, as a matter of general knowledge

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 to the Naval heads, that the primary theater of the war
3 was in the Atlantic in aid to defeat Germany and the
4 Axis?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: That was the first object of the
6 war plan.

7 Mr. Richardson: And that area, and the operations in
8 that area, had, in effect, what we may call a priority on
9 the assignment of ships and munitions of war, in order to
10 carry on that activity, is that not true? Is there any
11 dispute about it, Admiral?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: It had priority in a great many
13 things; not in everything, no.

14 Mr. Richardson: As a matter of fact, do you know that
15 up to December 1, 1941, there were 2,000 bombing planes sent
16 under Lend-Lease by the United States in connection with
17 the war against Germany and the Axis in Europe?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: I have stated that I have no
19 information of my own as to what was done under Lend-Lease.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, you knew that the bulk, the
21 great overwhelming bulk of our munitions of war that we
22 could move during 1941 and up to November was being put
23 into the operations which were being conducted in what we
24 may call the Atlantic Theater?

25 Admiral Ingersoll: I knew it from reading the papers, yes.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: All right. That is all I have been
3 asking about.

4 Now, then, there were no major ships taken out of the
5 Atlantic Fleet and put into the Pacific Fleet before Pearl
6 Harbor, were there?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: No. The distribution of ships
8 before Pearl Harbor was practically that in WPL-46.

9 Mr. Richardson: Well, in fact you depleted, if I may
10 use that civilian term, the already inferior Pacific Fleet
11 by taking away from it three battleships, four heavy cruisers
12 and a number of other accompanying ships, assigning them
13 to the Atlantic, did you not?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: That assignment, however, was
15 one made in accordance with the distribution of forces under
16 WPL-46.

17 Mr. Richardson: I don't care what it was done under.
18 It was done, wasn't it?

19 Admiral Ingersoll: It was done, yes.

20 Mr. Richardson: And the Naval authorities in Washington
21 had control of the war plans, did they not?

22 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, they had control of the assign-
23 ment of ships between the two oceans.

24 Hook
25 follows

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 Mr. Richardson: And the staff in Washington tried
2 to get another assignment out of the Pacific Fleet to
3 the Atlantic, according to Admiral Kimmel, and he blocked
4 it. Do you recall that?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know what assignment
6 you are talking about, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Admiral Kimmel testified here that
8 upon his return to Washington in the summer of 1941, he
9 was advised by his Naval superiors that it was proposed
10 to take from the then depleted Pacific Fleet an additional
11 consignment of battleships, carriers, and other ships for
12 assignment to the Atlantic, and he went to President
13 Roosevelt and convinced President Roosevelt that that
14 ought not to be done.

15 Do you have any recollection of such transaction?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: I know of no additional ships
17 that were expected to be taken away from the Pacific
18 Fleet, except the division of three battleships of the
19 New Mexico class, which did come into the Atlantic, and
20 which was in accordance with the distribution of ships
21 under the war plan.

22 I know of no other ships that we expected to take
23 away from the Pacific.

24 Mr. Richardson: Well, was your connection with this
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 picture, Admiral, of such a nature that any determination
2 by the Naval chiefs in Washington that there would be a
3 second division of the Pacific Fleet removed to the Atlantic
4 in addition to the one which took three battleships that
5 you referred to, would your position be such that any move
6 like that by the Navy in Washington would be known to you?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: I am certain it would have been.

8 Mr. Richardson: Then how do you account for Admiral
9 Kimmel's specific testimony as to his conversation with
10 the President in detail objecting to a plan of the Navy
11 to do just that?

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not account for it. I do not
13 know.

14 Mr. Richardson: Then that attempted assignment, if
15 it occurred, was unknown to you?

16 Admiral Ingersoll: The detachment of the aircraft
17 carrier, three battleships, the division of cruisers and
18 some destroyers, is the only one I knew about, and was
19 the only one which I knew was contemplated. Of course,
20 the object of that, I believe, as has been testified before
21 this committee was for the purpose of conducting an attack
22 on the Azores, or getting ready to do it.

23 Mr. Richardson: Were you familiar with the fact,
24 Admiral, that on June 10, Admiral Stark found it necessary
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 to advise the Secretary of the Navy, with a recommendation
2 that no further units of any kind be transferred from the
3 Pacific to the Atlantic at that time? That was way along
4 in June, long after the first consignment of ships had
5 been moved to the Atlantic.

6 What would be the occasion of Admiral Stark objecting
7 if there had not been any move to send some ships out of
8 the Pacific into the Atlantic. Have you any explanation
9 that occurs to you as to how it might have happened?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: No, I cannot recall that, because
11 there again it did not happen, and the distribution of ships
12 was in accordance with the plan.

13 If I did hear it, I have forgotten it.

14 Mr. Richardson: Was this plan that you refer to,
15 and which I am rather oblivious of, so sacred that under
16 no circumstances would anybody change it?

17 Admiral Ingersoll: No. If the circumstances were
18 such that it was to be changed, it would be changed. For
19 example, when the ships were destroyed at Pearl Harbor,
20 they immediately sent back to the Pacific the three ships
21 that had come around in June.

22 We had to make distribution according to circumstances.
23 There was nothing at that time that I can recall which
24 would have required a redeployment of forces other than
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 that as prescribed in the war plan.

2 Mr. Richardson: Now, when the original fleet was
3 sent to the Pacific, it was far too inferior in strength
4 as compared with the Japanese Fleet to undertake a real
5 offensive operation against Japan in the Far East, was
6 it not?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct.

8 Mr. Richardson: And when this first detachment that
9 you refer to was sent to the Atlantic, that situation was
10 intensified, was it not?

11 Admiral Ingersoll: It was intensified, except that
12 the remaining ships were considered by the Chief of
13 Naval Operations adequate to carry out the tasks which he
14 had assigned to the Pacific Fleet, without those additional
15 ships.

16 Mr. Richardson: All right.

17 Now, it was part of the war plan that immediately
18 upon a state of war, Kimmel should move his fleet into a
19 raid on the Marshalls, was it not?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: May I see the plan?

21 He was directed, I believe to seize a position in the
22 Marshalls, and to conduct raids there.

23 Mr. Richardson: All right. That is all I want.

24 Now, would it be necessary, Admiral, in connection with
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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such a raid, with the distance that the Marshalls are from Oahu, for that raid to have the protection of patrol bombers?

Admiral Ingersoll: If somebody can give me the distance from Midway and Johnston and Palmyra to the Marshall Islands, I can answer the question a little bit more accurately.

This is snap strategy now, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Maybe you can tell from that map (handing map to Admiral Ingersoll).

Admiral Ingersoll: Your distance from Pearl Harbor to Johnston, which is the closest, is 716 miles, and the distance from Johnston to the Marshalls looks to be at least, oh, 1,000 or 1200 miles.

The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere in the neighborhood of a 1200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate.

They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnson and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them. That is 600 miles from those positions.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Admiral Bellinger testified here that the plan contemplated in connection with the raid was to base patrol planes on Wake and Midway for the purpose of scouting the advance of the raid into the Marshalls, and that it would not be possible, from the standpoint of proper naval strategy, to undertake the raid unless those patrol planes were available for the purpose of proceeding in front of the raiding squadron for its information and protection.

Now, is that good strategy, or is that good tactics, or isn't it?

Admiral Ingersoll: It is protection for the vessels, to inform them whether there are any enemy vessels or submarines in the area, but if they are based on Wake -- or Midway, I should say, and based on Johnston, they could only protect to one-half of their total flight, and that means they would have to go back the minute they had gotten out as far as they could.

If their raid was 1200 miles, they could protect to 500 miles and no more.

Mr. Richardson: Leaving out the question of how far they could go, was it necessary for the Admiral, in order to make the raid, to use his patrol bombers as far as they would go?

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 Admiral Ingersoll: If there were enemy forces in
2 the area which could have interfered with fast-moving
3 task forces like a carrier group or submarines, it
4 would have been very doubtful to have them.

5 Mr. Richardson: In the week prior to December, 1941,
6 would you say from your information gained on the General
7 Staff that Admiral Kimmel could have attempted a raid on
8 the Marshalls without the aid and support of his patrol
9 planes?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: The answer, of course, is that
11 whenever you undertake an operation, it is desirable to
12 use all the force and strength you have in order to aid
13 in its success. However, when the war warning was sent
14 out, and there was a possibility -- I only say a possi-
15 bility -- of an attack, and he was not going to undertake
16 the raid immediately -- and I do not know when he contem-
17 plated setting out on that -- I think the first thing
18 should come first, and I think the security of his fleet
19 was the first consideration.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, you told him to get ready
21 to execute WPL-46 in the very dispatch you sent him, did you
22 not, Admiral?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: That is correct, yes.

24 Mr. Richardson: WPL-46 would take him nearly 2,000
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1 to the Marshalls, would it not?

2 Admiral Ingersoll: It would for the raids, yes.

3 Mr. Richardson: To make that trip to the Marshalls
4 he had to have his patrol planes, did he not?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not say that he had to.
6 I say it would be desirable to have had them, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Would you think the patrol planes
8 should have been left at home if he undertook such raid?

9 Admiral Ingersoll: I think the patrol planes should
10 have assisted to the extent he could use them, yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: That was because the use of those
12 patrol planes would offer material protection to such
13 operation?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: To the extent that they could fly
15 out and accompany them, yes.

16 Mr. Richardson: And if they started from Wake,
17 they could fly clear to the Marshalls, could not they?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: If they were based on Wake, they
19 could have flown from there to the Marshalls and back.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, if Admiral Bellinger is
21 right in his statement that they proposed that two squadrons
22 of their patrol planes should be based on Wake, then
23 those patrol planes would be in a position to scout practi-
24 cally the entire trip of the task force in the raid, would
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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not they?

Admiral Ingersoll: If the task force had departed from Wake, but it could not possibly have departed from Wake because there is no harbor at Wake.

Mr. Richardson: Oh, no.

But if the task force left Oahu, when it went by Wake there would not be any particular difficulty of the patrol planes joining it, would there?

Admiral Ingersoll: There is no question about that.

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Witness Ingersoli

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: That seems perfectly obvious.

2 Now let me ask you this: Was there anything, Admiral,
3 from a Naval standpoint, essential to the defense of the
4 Fleet at Pearl Harbor except long-distance reconnaissance,
5 adequate anti-aircraft gun defense, radar and a state of
6 readiness in the Fleet itself to repel an attack? Can you
7 think of any other thing that would be essential out there
8 in the defense of the Fleet at the base than those four
9 things?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: Radar, distant reconnaissance, the
11 deployment of the guns and the fighting aircraft?

12 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

13 Admiral Ingersoll: The Army fighting aircraft on the
14 islands in a state of readiness?

15 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

16 Admiral Ingersoll: And sufficient warning?

17 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

18 Admiral Ingersoll: By all of these means to permit the
19 ships to go to general quarters, as we call it, that is
20 man all their batteries, they simply could not stay up all
21 day and night to man their batteries. I think Admiral
22 Kimmel's arrangement whereby he had condition 3 -- that
23 is what we continued to have all during the war unless an
24 enemy was present -- was the proper state of readiness, as
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 far as his ships, that is the battleships and cruisers, and
2 so forth, were concerned.

3 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, the evidence here dis-
4 closes, I think without contradiction, that Admiral Kimmel
5 had available to him 48 patrol planes of the Navy and six
6 patrol planes of the Army, making 54 patrol planes.

7 Now you recognize, do you not, that the use of such
8 planes continuously in long-distance reconnaissance wears
9 the planes out?

10 Admiral Ingersoll: I certainly do.

11 Mr. Richardson: And it requires, in order to conduct a
12 constant reconnaissance, a frequent replacement of crews?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: We endeavored to get two or three
14 crews just before the war, so that they could work the plane
15 more than they could the crews.

16 Mr. Richardson: I know that. In fact they had not
17 been gotten to Hawaii by December 7, had they?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: I do not know just what the
19 proportion of crews to planes was at that time.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now do you regard it as essential for
21 Admiral Kimmel to have put his Fleet in proper condition to
22 move with a declaration of war under the War Plan?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: That was the aim which everybody
24 was trying at, to get in the very best possible state of
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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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readiness both in materiel and training to carry out what they had to do.

Mr. Richardson: Did you contemplate that immediately on a declaration of war, which you sensed was in the very immediate future, Admiral Kimmel should have his Fleet in shape to move directly, under War Plan 46, on this raid to the Marshalls?

Admiral Ingersoll: There was nothing in the War Plan which required him to initiate that movement on December 7, or the date of the declaration of war, or any other date.

Mr. Richardson: I did not ask you that.

Admiral Ingersoll: No. I say he could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.

If I can digress a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified,

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence
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3 base their plans.

4 As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out
5 of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connection
6 with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I
7 believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor.

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10 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, do you seriously intend
11 to tell this committee that this language in the dispatch
12 of November 27 where you say "Execute an appropriate defensive
13 deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned
14 in WPL-46", means that Kimmel was to stay cooped up in
15 Pearl Harbor with his Fleet in order to make use of the 54
16 patrol planes he had to defend the space by distant re-
17 connaissance?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: I didn't make any such statement
19 and I didn't wish it to be implied.

20 Mr. Richardson: All right. What did you mean?
21 You have told me that he could go to the Marshalls when he
22 pleased and that he shouldn't go to the Marshalls, in effect,
23 until everything was ready at home. You have agreed that if
24 he used his planes in long-distance reconnaissance that it
25 would wear them out.

Admiral Ingersoll: No, I didn't say that.

Mr. Richardson: Well, what happens to planes constantly

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 used in distant reconnaissance?
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3 Admiral Ingersoll: You can't use planes all the time
4 continuously without at the end of a certain period, of course,
5 changing engines and replacing the crews. The crews cannot
6 stand it even if the planes could. But I didn't intend to
7 infer that all of his ships should remain in port simply to
8 conduct an aerial reconnaissance. He could also have con-
9 ducted some sort of a protective screen with his destroyers.
10 He had lots of destroyers and submarines.

11 I am not trying to state exactly how he should have
12 taken protective measures. I am not trying to state that
13 he had sufficient strength there even in the most dangerous
14 sector to have a complete defense, but I think he should
15 have done something when the war warning dispatch went out
16 to improve the security of his Fleet, and I don't know that
17 he did anything except to station one or two destroyers in
18 the defensive sea area immediately outside of Pearl Harbor.

19 Mr. Richardson: Did you, in Washington, representing
20 the Navy Chiefs, regard training and preparation of the
21 Fleet for war tasks as more important or less important than
22 using the Fleet and the planes for base defense?

23 Admiral Ingersoll: Up until the time that the war
24 warning dispatch was sent the primary tasks of the Fleet
25 out in the Pacific, assuming that the Atlantic was engaged

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 in war operations, was to prepare itself for war by
2 training and getting itself in the best material condition
3 that it could get. They were engaged at that time in imple-
4 menting the anti-aircraft batteries. Up to that moment
5 the task was training. But once the war warning went out
6 it seems to me, and I have stated before in the Court of
7 Inquiry, that thereafter training was not the primary task
8 and had to go along as operations would permit.

9 As a matter of fact, all during the war we were doing
10 training, one of the primary tasks was training ships, all
11 during the war, for the Pacific. You can't stop operations

12 for training, but you have to make a reasonable adjustment.

13 Mr. Richardson: Just what training advantages from
14 the Atlantic got into the Pacific?

15 Admiral Ingersoll: I mean all during the war after
16 Pearl Harbor we had to continue training. All during the
17 war.

18 Mr. Richardson: The point of my question is that
19 Admiral Kimmel testified here that he had to make a choice
20 between using his planes for the development of War Plan 46
21 or using his planes for the defense of the Fleet in the base,
22 that he couldn't do both, and that he made the choice to
23 prepare the Fleet and not use the planes for distant
24 reconnaissance.
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Now, I am asking you as a Naval official if you were
3 confronted with the issue that Kimmel states he was confronted
4 with whether it was permissible for him to reach the con-
5 clusion which he reached?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: As I have stated before, I think
7 up until the time that the war warning dispatch was sent
8 that his primary mission was to train his Fleet and to get
9 his ships in the best material condition. After that dis-
10 patch was sent I think training took a secondary importance.

11 Mr. Richardson: You realized in Washington, Admiral,
12 that the most precious defense position we had in the
13 Pacific was that Fleet?

14 Admiral Ingersoll: It was one of the most important
15 elements.

16 Mr. Richardson: It was the great important element,
17 was it not?

18 Admiral Ingersoll: It was, of the Navy.

19 Mr. Richardson: Yes. And it was based at Pearl Harbor?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: It was.

21 Mr. Richardson: It never had at Pearl Harbor a sufficient
22 consignment of patrol planes to enable 360 degrees proper
23 reconnaissance around the base, did it?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: As far as I know it did not, and
25 I don't know what it ever had during the war.

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Mr. Richardson: Well, it had very quickly after
3 Pearl Harbor an immense increase in planes, did it not?
4 Nearly 300 percent, wasn't it?

5 Admiral Ingersoll: Not immediately.

6 Mr. Richardson: Well, within a month; by the first
7 of January?

8 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't know what it had by the
9 first of January. I recall we endeavored to replace by
10 depleting the Atlantic the number of planes that were re-
11 quired to be there by the War Plan. We took planes out
12 of the Atlantic and sent them to Pearl Harbor because Pearl
13 Harbor was defenseless so far as Navy planes were concerned.
14 We had to weaken ourselves to a greater extent than we
15 wanted to in the beginning of the war.

16 Mr. Richardson: The same thing was true up to December
17 7, wasn't it, Admiral, with reference to fighters for the
18 Army, they never had enough fighters for a proper defense
19 of that base, did they, up to December 7?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I can't answer that question as
21 to whether they had enough. I believe the Army did not
22 have the number of planes in Pearl Harbor that they stated
23 they wanted to have there, that were assigned to that place.

24 Mr. Richardson: Isn't it also a fact that up to
25 December 7 neither the Army -- it would be the Army -- never

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 had the number of anti-aircraft guns of various calibers
2 that would be fairly required to efficiently defend that base?

3 Admiral Ingersoll: I can't answer whether they had
4 enough to efficiently defend the base. I seem to recall
5 that the last information that we had from the War Department
6 was to the effect that they did not have at Pearl Harbor
7 a short time before December 7 the number of anti-aircraft
8 guns that they planned to have there.

9 Mr. Richardson: You recall, do you, Admiral, the
10 letter that Admiral Nimitz wrote in which he advised the
11 forces in the Pacific that they were sitting pretty, that
12 the war, the big war was in the Atlantic?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: I don't think I ever saw such a
14 letter.

15 Mr. Richardson: I am referring to --

16 Admiral Ingersoll: Was that written while he was
17 Chief of the Bureau of Navigation or Personnel?

18 Mr. Richardson: The statement is -- there is another
19 document that I can't lay my fingers on at the moment --
20 but the statement is:

21 "In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor we received
22 an official letter stating 'I know you would like to have
23 20,000 men. We would like to give them to you.' As I
24 remember the exact wording 'The war is in the Atlantic and
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the
2 Pacific'."

3 Would that be in your mind a fair picture, for a layman,
4 at least, as to the attitude in the Navy Department with
5 reference to the Atlantic and the Pacific?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: May I ask again who wrote the letter,
7 sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Nimitz. That is in the
9 record. Mr. Chairman, that is in the record.

10 Mr. Richardson: I tried to find it this noon and couldn't
11 put my hands on it.

12 Admiral Ingersoll: If I may answer this way: Assuming
13 that the Chief of Personnel, which was the Bureau of
14 Navigation at that time, wrote that letter, I assume he
15 is referring only to the percentage of personnel that
16 Admiral Kimmel had on his ships and to nothing else.

17 Mr. Richardson: Well, I am only assuming that Washington
18 wrote to Hawaii stating "You are sitting pretty at Pearl
19 Harbor, the war is in the Atlantic." I am asking you whether
20 from your recollection of the picture, Admiral, that is a
21 fair run-of-the-mine definition of the attitude the Navy
22 had with respect to the war in the Atlantic and the war
23 in the Pacific?

24 Admiral Ingersoll: The date was what?
25

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Mr. Richardson: It says a few days after Pearl Harbor.

2 Senator Ferguson: It is dated the 25th of November 1941,

3 Mr. Chairman. It is right in the note there.

4 Mr. Richardson: This is in the testimony and I was
5 looking for the letter.

6 Senator Ferguson: It is there.

7 Mr. Richardson: Yes. The examining officer identified
8 the letter as being in the form of a Personnel letter from
9 the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral Kimmel dated
10 25 November 1941. A copy now on file in the secret confi-
11 dential file room, Washington, D. C.

12 Admiral Ingersoll: I think, if he is referring only
13 to Personnel, that perhaps that is an accurate statement,
14 although I am just guessing at it now, that the percentage
15 of men on the snips as regards their full war complement
16 was probably as good in the Pacific, if not better, as in
17 the Atlantic. I do not think it reflects the proper attitude,
18 simply because we were at that time engaged in operations
19 in the Atlantic, that the Navy had no concern for the Pacific.
20 As a matter of fact we were very much concerned in the
21 Pacific.

22 Mr. Richardson: Was your concern based at all on the
23 fact that you knew there had been no proper protection supplied
24 for the base at Pearl Harbor?
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Admiral Ingersoll: The Navy Department had been after
3 the War Department since February to get Pearl Harbor ready
4 and more planes and more ships and radar out there.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, it needed all of that for a
6 proper defense of the base?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: It was certainly a minimum require-
8 ment that they set up at that time.

9 Mr. Richardson: You recognized, did you not, Admiral,
10 that it primarily would not be the duty of the Fleet to
11 provide its own defense in the base, that would be the duty
12 of the Army, would it not?

13 Admiral Ingersoll: That is laid down in the joint
14 action as a division of responsibilities between the Army
15 and the Navy. It doesn't mean, however, that if the Navy
16 is present that it should go to sleep and let the Army
17 defend the base. It should use everything it has to help
18 defend it while it is there. But it means, for example,
19 that if a ship going into a place like Pearl Harbor, that
20 you can take the power off of the ship and repair that
21 ship and not have to keep her guns manned in order to defend
22 the place; and also ships like submarines, when they come
23 back from a long cruise, the crews have to rest, and the
24 submarines have to have work on them. The crew should
25 not be required to defend their own ship while in that port

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 although if an attack came they would do all they could.
2 But not have the responsibility for doing it.

3 Mr. Richardson: Well, that is true, but you were
4 familiar at Washington with the Joint Defense Plan that
5 was built up between the Navy and Army in Hawaii?

6 Admiral Ingersoll: Which particular plan are you re-
7 ferring to, the Coastal Defense Plan or the so-called
8 Bellinger?

9 Mr. Richardson: It is that plan, Admiral, which
10 contemplated that in time of emergency both the Army and
11 Navy would join their facilities in common defense.

12 Admiral Ingersoll: Yes, sir, I am familiar with it.
13 Not only that, but we thought it was so good that we sent
14 it out to the other Naval Districts as a pattern for them
15 to follow.

16 Mr. Richardson: That plan was based entirely on the
17 fact that neither the Army or Navy had sufficient equipment
18 at the base to permit the Army to assume its primary duty
19 of furnishing defense?

20 Admiral Ingersoll: I doubt if any plan was ever drawn
21 up where anybody thought he had enough to do what he was
22 supposed to do.

23 Mr. Richardson: Well, that doesn't quite answer the
24 question. I will state it again and see if I can do better.
25

Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 The point that I am making is that this Joint Plan
3 that I talked about was an emergency plan which had its
4 origin in the fact that there had not been supplied to the
5 base in Hawaii sufficient defensive equipment to enable the
6 Army to carry on its full duty of defending that base?

7 Admiral Ingersoll: The Army, with the planes that it
8 had, could not have carried out a long-distance reconnaissance
9 with Army planes. I believe they had six.

10 Mr. Richardson: I think that is all the questions I
11 have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D.C.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, we are --

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one of two questions.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, was the person who made the delivery of the 13th part message on the night or very early morning of the 6th of December, 1941, in Navy clothes? Was he in Navy uniform?

Admiral Ingersoll: I testified the other day, sir, I couldn't remember who it was. I talked with Captain Kramer and he said that he did not deliver the message to me.

I seem to recall that whoever brought it to my house asked for an identification from me.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate, would it not, Admiral, that he was not from the Department?

Admiral Ingersoll: Oh, no, it would mean that that particular officer who brought it did not know me personally -- in a bathrobe, probably; that he didn't recognize me as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations when I went down in the middle of the night in a bathrobe.

Senator Ferguson: You can't recall whether he was in Navy uniform or not?

Admiral Ingersoll: I think we were not put into uniform until after Pearl Harbor occurred.

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Witness Ingersoll

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Did you know the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral Ingersoll: The Navy Department always knew what ships were in the Hawaiian area. We knew when such task forces as Halsey's and Newton's left for, you might say, distant operations, to Midway and Wake. We did not know local movements; that is, we did not know what ships were in Pearl Harbor or might be over at Lahaina or out in an operating area if they were within, say, a hundred miles of Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson: That explains it. That is all.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have included in the record at this time, the letter from Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy under date of June 10, 1941, being Serial 066912, which has reference to matters that have been taken up by Admiral Stark with Admiral Kimmel.

The Vice Chairman: You want it spread on the record at this point?

Mr. Richardson: Yes. Copies have been distributed to the members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman: It will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

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1 Op-12-CTB

2 A16-3

3 Serial 066912

4 SECRET

June 10, 1941.

5 Memorandum

6 From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

7 To: The Secretary of the Navy.

8 Subject: Discussion of existing strategic situation in
9 the Pacific Ocean.

10 1. I desire to invite your attention to the fact that
11 the strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean has very recently
12 shparly deteriorated with respect to the combined interests
13 of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the
14 Netherlands East Indies. The particular elements which have
15 recently arisen to favor Japan are the following:

16 (a) The United States has reduced the strength of the
17 Pacific Fleet by three battleships, four light cruisers,
18 one aircraft carrier, eighteen destroyers, 4,000
19 marines, and four combat-loaded transports. The
20 truth is probably now apparent to Japan that the United
21 States Pacific Fleet is no longer strong enough for
22 sustaining an effective offensive against the centers
23 of Japanese military power. It is, however, still
24 strong enough to cause serious difficulty for Japan,
25

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1 and to constitute a threat which will probably
2 not permit Japan to exert its full naval strength
3 in Malaysia.

4 (b) By its rash naval action around Crete in the
5 Mediterranean, the British Commonwealth is now not
6 able to bring any important strength to India or
7 Malaysia. So long as the British Mediterranean Fleet
8 was intact, Japan could not dismiss the possibility
9 that it might suddenly be transferred to the vicinity
10 of Singapore. Consequently, a Japanese southward
11 offensive at this time would encounter resistance
12 from only minor naval and air forces.

13 (c) A breakdown in Dutch-Japanese trade negotiations
14 seems to have occurred. Forcible Japanese action
15 against at least a part of the Netherlands East Indies
16 is a distinct possibility in the immediate future.

17 (d) Japan seems to have made progress in her forti-
18 fication of the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Her
19 position there has been decidedly strengthened.

20 (e) The Japanese Army has recently had some important
21 successes in China. Chinese morale is considerably
22 lower than it was three or four months ago.

23 (f) Definite indications have been received that
24 the continued diplomatic pressure by Germany and Italy
25

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1 is having an effect in inclining Japan to take
2 positive action to the South.

3 2. While it would be desirable, in case of war,
4 for the strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet to be
5 greater than it now is, recent British successes against
6 German naval forces in the North Atlantic have reduced
7 the probability of successful German raider action, parti-
8 cularly by regular naval surface units. Furthermore, the
9 situation in the Atlantic would not be particularly im-
10 proved by the transfer there of additional capital ships.
11 Without question, additional cruisers, destroyers, and
12 aircraft, could be usefully employed in the Atlantic,
13 but the tasks of the Pacific Fleet in war, so tremendously
14 increased in difficulty by the recent defeat of the British
15 Mediterranean Fleet, require at least an initial strength
16 as great as it now is.

17 3. It is my opinion that any further weakening of
18 the Pacific Fleet at this time is almost certain to precipi-
19 tate action by Japan against the British Fleet and the
20 Netherlands East Indies. The difficult tasks that the
21 Pacific Fleet would have on the outbreak of war give an
22 additional reason for maintaining our naval deployment
23 approximately as at present.

24 4. I therefore recommend that no further units of
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any kind be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this time. In this recommendation Admiral Kimmel fully concurs.

H. R. STARK.

The Vice Chairman: There being no further questions, Admiral, the committee thanks you for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, as well as your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could in this investigation.

Admiral Ingersoll: Thank you.

The Vice Chairman: Do you have any further statement that you desire to make to the committee that would give any information that has not been called for by the questions?

Admiral Ingersoll: I think I have no further information of my own knowledge that I have not given to the committee, or previously given in the investigation by Admiral Hart, or in the Naval Court of inquiry.

The Vice Chairman: We thank you for your appearance and the information you have given us. You may be excused.

Admiral Ingersoll: Thank you.

(Witness excused)

WARD O PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

1 The Vice Chairman: The Chair recognizes counsel.

2 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, we desire to present
3 Colonel Clausen of the Army.

4 The Vice Chairman: Colonel Clausen, please come
5 forward.

6 TESTIMONY OF COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN

7
8 (Colonel Clausen was sworn by the Chairman.)

9 Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, when were you separated from
10 the Army?

11 Colonel Clausen: January 18, 1946.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And prior to that time how long had
13 you been in the Army?

14 Colonel Clausen: Since June, 1944.

15 Mr. Kaufman: And where do you live now?

16 Colonel Clausen: San Francisco, California.

17 Mr. Kaufman: You have been asked to come here from
18 San Francisco to appear as a witness?

19 Colonel Clausen: Yes.

20 Mr. Kaufman: With what branch of the service were
21 you connected?

22 Colonel Clauson: The Judge Advocate General's Depart-
23 ment.

24 Mr. Kaufman: Now, referring to the Army Board of
25

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1 Witness Clausen Questions by: Mr. Kaufman
2 of Inquiry, the so-called Grunert Board, what was your
3 connection with that Board?

4 Colonel Clausen: I was assistant recorder.

5 Mr. Kaufman: By whom was that board made up?

6 Colonel Clausen: Lieutenant General George Grunert;
7 Major General Walter H. Frank, Major General Russell,
8 Colonel West, Colonel Toulmin, and myself.

9 Mr. Kaufman: And when did that board commence its
10 hearings?

11 Colonel Clausen: In July, 1944, as I remember.

12 Mr. Kaufman: How long did the Board continue to
13 hold hearings?

14 Colonel Clausen: For about three months.

15 Mr. Kaufman: And during the hearings before the Board
16 was magic brought to the attention of the Board?

17 Colonel Clausen: It was in the, I believe, last week
18 of the Board's proceedings.

19 Mr. Kaufman: After the completion of the taking of
20 testimony by the Board, were you requested to make a further
21 investigation into the Pearl Harbor matter?

22 Colonel Clausen: I was.

23 Mr. Kaufman: And will you tell the committee the
24 circumstances under which you were appointed, and what
25 you did in furtherance of that appointment?

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Colonel Clausen: That is a rather broad question, but perhaps I can highlight it in this way:

The Grunert Board did not obtain the details of the magic until the last week of the Board's proceedings. I understood after proceedings had been terminated that on the first hearing of the Chief of Staff that he did acquainted the general officer members of the Board with magic, in general.

It became obvious after the Board's proceedings developed the magic phase which was in the last week that further investigation into this phase should be conducted, and there were also other what we called in the Office of the Judge Advocate General, unexplored leads.

So I was instructed to conduct the additional investigation for the Secretary of War in conformance and compliance with the Public Law 339.

Mr. Kaufman: And did you hold hearings, or did you go into the field to see the various men that you desired to interview?

Colonel Clausen: The war was then on and as the Secretary of War stated in his public report which was given to the press on the conclusion of the Board's proceedings, it was necessary for someone to interview the additional witnesses in the various theatres of active operation, and also, of course in Washington and elsewhere in

Witness Clausen
the United States.

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 So I therefore had some witnesses come to see me
3 who were available locally, but for the major portion,
4 I suppose, I went to them.

5 Mr. Kaufman: And what procedure did you follow in
6 getting information from them? Did you interrogate them,
7 or did you get the information and then prepare affidavits
8 for them to sign?

9 Colonel Clausen: I talked with them, found out what
10 I could from them as to their knowledge of the facts, and
11 then I proceeded to take testimony in the form of affidavits.

12 Mr. Kaufman: And after you collected your affidavits,
13 did you make a report to the War Department?

14 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Kaufman: I will show you these eight volumes and
16 ask you whether they are photostatic copies of the affidavits
17 that you procured from various persons together with the
18 exhibits?

19 Colonel Clausen: I prepared a large volume, one similar
20 to that that you have on your desk there, which is what I
21 called the report, together with, I believe eight volumes
22 of exhibits.

23 There should be eight volumes of exhibits in addition
24 to the large volume.
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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Mr. Kaufman: Eight volumes of exhibits, plus the

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Colonel Clausen: Yes.

Mr. Kaufman: Plus your report and affidavits?

Colonel Clausen: Well, the exhibits are part of the report.

Mr. Kaufman: You will find reference to the volume, this light-covered volume, to the exhibits.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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honestly and correctly and more correctly state that which he conceived to be the fact.

I can, for example, call to the attention of the committee that some of the witnesses who appeared before the so-called Grunert Board at the time they testified stated that they would like to verify or press their recollection by perhaps an examination of documents or in some other form indicated that they would like time to reflect upon some of the answers.

I recall, for example, Colonel Bratton when he testified before the Grunert Board did say something to that effect. In other words, I have a very distinct impression that the witnesses, when they appeared before the Grunert Board and especially in the last week, were either then not allowed to give the Grunert Board the magic features and details or exhibited some indication that they would like to press their recollection further.

I mean to state clearly that there is not a single person who I interviewed against whom any claim should be made of any invidious character because of the fact that he may have given me revised testimony. He either had his recollection refreshed or he was, when he was interrogated by me, permitted to go into the magic features, and that included the high and the low.

Mr. Kaufman: Colonel, at the beginning of the volume

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

2 in front of you is a list of so-called unexplored leads.
3 Did you in the course of your investigation complete the
4 investigation of all of these so-called unexplored leads?

5 Colonel Clausen: The answer to that will have to be
6 that some of these were later not followed to a final con-
7 clusion for various reasons, but in the main they were com-
8 pleted, and by completed I mean sufficient to a point to
9 satisfy the Secretary that he could follow out the request
10 of the Joint Resolution of the Congress which was to inquire
11 into the facts of Pearl Harbor and, as I recall, specific
12 emphasis being placed upon an inquiry sufficient to allow
13 him to decide whether there should be court martial proceedings
14 instituted.

15 And in connection with this document which you have
16 referred to, three-page document on pages 10, 11 and 12 of
17 my report, that was prepared on my return from San Francisco
18 where I had gone because my mother was ill. This paper
19 was handed me and after this paper was handed me I had
20 discussions with Mr. Harvey F. Bundy, Special Assistant to
21 the Secretary of War, as to following out these leads and
22 what should be done first. So that if you will go to the
23 portion of my report that contains my periodical reports
24 to the Secretary of War through Mr. Bundy and to the first
25 one you will find that my method of proceeding with regard

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Mr. Kaufman

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2 to subjects was set forth on these sub-reports, the
3 first one of which was 17 February 1945.

4 Mr. Kaufman: I have no further questions.

5 The Vice Chairman: The Chair is advised that there is
6 only one copy of this exhibit that has been presented, so
7 it will have to be used by the printer and we will follow
8 the course we did with one other exhibit --

9 Mr. Kaufman: There are two copies, Senator. Senator
10 Ferguson has one copy of the report. There are two copies
11 of affidavits and report. There is only one copy of the
12 exhibits. Senator Ferguson has one copy of the report and
13 affidavits.

14 Senator Ferguson: I received this last night from
15 counsel.

16 The Vice Chairman: One copy of the report and the only
17 available copy, as I understand it, of the exhibits, will
18 have to be used for the printing.

19 Mr. Kaufman: Correct.

20 The Vice Chairman: So they will not be available
21 until released by counsel.

22 Mr. Kaufman: Yes.

23 The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

24 Now, Colonel, allow me to ask you this question.

25 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 The Vice Chairman: To see if I clearly understand
2 the situation.

3 You were connected with the Army Pearl Harbor Board of
4 Inquiry?

5 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: And at the conclusion of the work
7 of that Board in order for the Secretary of War to be able
8 to comply with the resolution passed by Congress he thought
9 certain additional points should be investigated with a view
10 of clearing them up so that he could make the type of report
11 that that resolution required?

12 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. Specifically, sir, the
13 magic. We -- that is, I say we -- the Pearl Harbor Board,
14 the Grunert Board, I recall had gone to the office of
15 Admiral Murfin and the Murfin Board was going to conduct
16 its inquiry. We asked for the Hart report, the so-called
17 Hart report which we knew had been made by Admiral Hart.
18 We were not given this report. We therefore didn't have
19 that before us. Meanwhile we went to Hawaii after conducting
20 hearings in Washington, and when we came back we learned
21 that the reason it had not been given to us was that the,
22 I believe the Under Secretary of Navy, Bard, had ruled against
23 it but Secretary Forrestal had overruled Secretary Bard.

24 So we then were given the Hart report. And, sir, when
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 you read that and came to the testimony of Captain Safford
3 you found a great many new aspects to the Pearl Harbor disaster
4 and one of those that especially should be followed down
5 was where Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral
6 Hart mentions some dozen or so officers as being able to
7 cast light upon this so-called winds code implement message.

8 Well, somebody should, from the Army, go and talk
9 with these Army people.

10 Now, if I had that before me, for example, the Admiral
11 Hart Safford testimony, I could show you that those officers
12 listed there by Captain Safford were later interviewed by
13 me and testimony taken by me from them as to what they knew
14 about this wind code intercept.

15 Then in addition to that the whole subject of magic,
16 sir, being opened up in the final week of the Board pro-
17 ceedings, meant that somebody should go like to General
18 Miles, to General Gerow, and all of the people that had
19 testified before us at a time when they were under compulsion
20 not to reveal the details of magic and ask them all about
21 magic.

22 The Vice Chairman: Then when you began this investiga-
23 tion under direction of the Secretary of War you found
24 that many witnesses who had appeared before the Board were
25 then in the field and were holding responsible positions in

Witness Clausen

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 in my report here.

3 The Vice Chairman: Then from a practical standpoint,
4 Colonel, it being found necessary by the Secretary of War
5 to have this additional evidence secured from these witnesses,
6 we couldn't stop the war to assemble all the witnesses in
7 a room again and get their testimony, you had to go wherever
8 you found them?

9 Colonel Clausen: That is correct, sir, and also, sir,
10 that by doing it that way, it kept the knowledge of this
11 magic to a minimum.

12 The Vice Chairman: I assume as you were connected
13 with the Army Board investigating Pearl Harbor, the Pearl
14 Harbor attack, that you found that there were a number of
15 things in connection with the evidence presented to that
16 Board that should be clarified or brought up to date, and
17 that this supplemental investigation of the Secretary of War
18 directed you to make was necessary for him to have sufficient
19 information to act under that resolution of Congress?

20 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

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Shefner
follows

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. George

2 The Vice Chairman: Senator George of Georgia will in-
3 quire.

4 Senator George: You were not a member of the Army Board.
5 You were not a member of the Board, were you?

6 Colonel Clausen: I was designated -- not a member of
7 the Board, sir. I was designated as being on the Board but
8 in the capacity of an assistant recorder, - the assistant re-
9 corder. There were two recorders, sir, Colonel West and my-
10 self, and in the Army the recorder's job is a job more or
11 less like your counsel here, except that we did not do so
12 much questioning, except that I did most of the questioning
13 when it came to Colonel Wyman.

14 Senator George: You did not participate in the conclu-
15 sions reached and findings of fact?

16 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. My position was very much
17 subordinate to doing a thing of that kind.

18 Senator George: Did you make a finding of fact after you
19 had completed your tour of duty about the world?

20 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. My position was subordinate
21 to that. I was the collector of facts, the digger after of
22 facts, not the fact finder. The fact finder was the Secre-
23 tary. I was in the capacity of the gentlemen here from the
24 FBI who might go out and get evidence and bring it into the
25 United States Attorney, sir.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator George: So you reported to the Secretary?

3

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

4

Senator George: All right. I have no further questions.

5

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark of North Carolina will in-

6

quire.

7

Mr. Clark: I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

8

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois.

9

Senator Lucas: Colonel, before you started upon this mission of obtaining additional evidence with whom did you discuss your assignment?

10

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12

Colonel Clausen: I discussed my assignments with many people, sir. I discussed it with the Secretary himself, with Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, his special assistant, with my superior officer, General Myron C. Cramer, the Judge Advocate General, with -- I see Captain Ford over there. He participated in some of the analyses after the Grunert Board had completed its proceedings. With Colonel William J. Hughes; a great many people, sir.

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Senator Lucas: What was your special mission as outlined originally by the Secretary of War?

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Colonel Clausen: To follow up these so-called unexplored leads and they are set forth in sub-heads in my periodic reports to him through Mr. Bundy.

23

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Senator Lucas: Was that a written order?

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, there was no written direc-
3 tive except in a general way. The Secretary had stated in
4 his public statement of 1 December 1944 -- do you want me
5 to read that portion of it, sir?

6 Senator Lucas: I would like to have it in the record.

7 Colonel Clausen: All right. He said:

8 "In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Ad-
9 vocate General, I have decided that my own investigation
10 should be further continued until all the facts are
11 made as clear as possible and until the testimony of
12 every witness in possession of material facts can be
13 obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to
14 accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be
15 much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in ac-
16 tive Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be
17 reviewed when the investigation has been finally com-
18 pleted.

19 Senator Lucas: Now, let us take one witness and see
20 how you operated. As I recall, there was some discrepancy in
21 the testimony of General Gerow and the affidavit that he gave
22 to you while he was fighting in France. Do you recall that?

23 Colonel Clausen: I read over, sir, while I was waiting
24 to appear here as a witness very brief portions of General
25 Gerow's testimony, but I recall that he made some reference

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 to the affidavit that he made before me, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: Well, did you examine his affidavit in
4 line with his previous testimony that he had given, to see
5 where the discrepancy was there?

6 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. What I did when I talked
7 with a person, - and it varied some with different witnesses, -
8 for example, General Fielder out in the Pacific I took with
9 me to the Philippines from Honolulu and when he returned he
10 dictated his own affidavit and General Bedell Smith called
11 in a stenographer and dictated his own, but with General Ge-
12 row, I interviewed him at Bad Naurein along the Rhine where
13 he had his Fifteenth Army headquarters and we arranged to
14 meet again in a day or so.

15 Well, when I called him in a day or so he had gone down
16 to the Riviera. I therefore went to him there and since there
17 was no stenographer available, I took down in longhand the
18 answers he made to my questions and then I put it in the form
19 of an affidavit, which would be the same as in making a bill
20 of exceptions after the trial of a case. It is a much more
21 laborious way of getting evidence but it sometimes makes it
22 much more accurate because after I made a draft for General
23 Gerow I gave it back to him to study over to make sure that it
24 was correct and he made several revisions. I personally typed
25 that myself.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: In other words, after he made the revisions, why, you proceeded to re-type another affidavit?

3
4 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: Which he finally signed?

6 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, now, what was there about Gerow's
8 testimony originally which was not full and complete that you
9 desired to get from him when you went to France?

10 Colonel Clausen: The magic advice, all the magic advice,
11 sir. I had with me the Top Secret exhibit "B" before
12 the Grunert Board. That Top Secret "B" came to us, as I say,
13 I believe in the last week through General Russell, which he
14 had given to G-2 and we had then given him these questions.

15 Senator Lucas: In other words, the Board operated
16 throughout the hearings without magic until the last week of
17 the hearing?

18 Colonel Clausen: That is right, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: And because of that fact you were unable
20 to produce, or you were unable to obtain all of the information
21 which pertained to Pearl Harbor?

22 Colonel Clausen: That is right, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: So, consequently, when it was decided by
24 the War Department that the magic should become a part of the
25 hearing, then it became your duty under this assignment to

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 supplement the evidence that had already been obtained by the
3 Board?

4 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir, and then, sir, there were
5 some additional leads also in addition to magic.

6 Senator Lucas: Yes, you have testified to that in giv-
7 ing us an example with respect to Captain Safford's testimony.

8 Colonel Clausen: Well, it dealt with magic, sir, but
9 another unexplored lead was, for example, General Short's
10 5 November 1941, SCP. I believe the record was confused about
11 it that was in the War Department, - as to whether that was
12 in the War Department before Pearl Harbor and somebody could
13 look that up and find it, so that is the reason that we ran
14 that down also, and you will find all of the affidavits
15 here by Colonel Jansen and others references to that.

16 Another secret file lead was this: G-2 had sent a wire
17 to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department on, I believe, 5 November
18 1941 and General Fielder had I believe off the record given
19 information to General Russell but there was nothing in the
20 record about that and it appeared as though the wire had not
21 been sent.

22 Now, Colonel Bratton testified that he had drafted it
23 and to all intents and appearances it had gone to Hawaii.
24 Well, somebody could have gone to Hawaii and found out whether
25 it was actually there, whether it had been received and I ran

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 it down and find out if all the steps had been taken to send
3 that wire. That is another example.

4 Senator Lucas: But in the main magic was the primary
5 reason for your particular assignment?

6 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: Now, before you started this tour to ob-
8 tain this additional evidence was there any officer in the
9 Army or the Navy who gave you any particular instructions as
10 to what you should do when you interviewed these witnesses?

11 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, except that Mr. Bundy and I
12 discussed the most feasible way of getting the facts in an
13 accurate, objective and impartial method and I had at one time
14 been an Assistant United States Attorney and I always liked
15 the way the FBI would get the statements from the witnesses
16 in the form of statements and then you could examine the
17 witnesses from those statements. After the witness made
18 the statement the statements were read back and they would
19 sign them. So we discussed as to the method of conducting
20 this additional investigation and it was agreed that I should
21 receive the evidence in the form of affidavits.

22 Senator Lucas: Before you started it was obviously
23 necessary that you go over the testimony of each and every
24 one of these witnesses who had testified before the Board.

25 Colonel Clausen: Well, they had testified before me.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 sir. I had been on the Board.

3 Senator Lucas: In other words, you were familiar with
4 the testimony that the Board had received up to that time?

5 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: Now, in your conversations with the
7 Secretary of War or -- who was it, General Bundy?

8 Colonel Clausen: Secretary of War? Colonel Stimson.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, I know, but the next man.

10 The Vice Chairman: Colonel Bundy.

11 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, he was a civilian. Colonel
12 H. Bundy was a lawyer.

13 Senator Lucas: All right. And in your conversations
14 with the Secretary of War or any of these other officers that
15 you had before you started on this assignment was there any
16 particular piece of evidence that was discussed which they
17 thought was vital one way or the other, that they told you
18 to make a particular investigation upon to have it changed?

19 Colonel Clausen: You mean to slant the investigation?

20 Senator Lucas: That is right.

21 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. I would not have conducted
22 it if they had.

23 Senator Lucas: In other words, there were no conversa-
24 tions of any kind as to what you should do in the way of
25 attempting to have a witness slant or change his evidence when

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 you went out there?

3 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, did you follow that?

5 Colonel Clausen: Sir, I was just as accurate and impar-
6 tial and objective as I could be because I felt that this
7 was an opportunity to get facts for the American nation and I
8 would not have been a party to it; but furthermore than that
9 I am quite sure that Colonel Stimson would never have author-
10 ized any such instructions and if he had I would not have car-
11 ried them out.

12 Senator Lucas: Was there a single witness that you
13 talked to in your long investigation that you attempted in any
14 way to influence or to have him change or slant his testimony
15 different than what he testified before the Board?

16 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, not in the slightest, but
17 other witnesses told me, - and Colonel Bratton, I believe,
18 will bear me out, - Colonel Bratton said to me when he fin-
19 ally left me in Paris that I was the easiest lawyer to talk
20 to that he had ever talked to in his life.

21 Senator Lucas: That is quite a compliment.

22 Colonel, it was charged by a member of this committee,
23 and the press carried it as follows:

24 "Colonel Henry C. Clausen was sent around the
25 world by Army to have officers change their Pearl Harbor

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 testimony given originally to the Roberts Investigating
3 Committee."

4 Do you care to comment on that statement?

5 Colonel Clausen: If I was an advocate, sir, I would
6 comment one way but I am in the position here of a witness.
7 All I can say, sir, is that it is not borne out by the facts.
8 The press comment to which you refer I read and when I read
9 it I dispatched letters to the gentlemen who had in the press
10 supposed to have made such statements and I told them that
11 they were not correct.

12 Now, I am a Republican. I don't suppose that has any-
13 thing to do with the case.

14 Senator Lucas: No, but it is interesting.

15 Colonel Clausen: And I have always been a Republican,
16 sir. Now, Colonel Stimson is a Republican. The impression
17 that I had of Secretary Stimson was that he was a man who
18 certainly under no stretch of the imagination would at his
19 point in his career have been a party to any such performance.

20 I recall one other newspaper comment something like
21 this:

22 "Why did they send a lowly Major all over the world
23 to get this testimony when this lowly Major had all his
24 Army career ahead of him?"

25 At the time I read that the lowly Major was back in San

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Francisco practicing law. I at no time -- they said I was
3 a Reserve officer. I at no time was ever a Reserve officer.
4 I volunteered my services when the war broke out. I cannot
5 talk too much about the fact that I know that Secretary Stim-
6 son would not have been a party to any such thing.

7 As to my own part in this proceeding I can assure you,
8 sir, that at no time did I try to get any witness to say
9 anything but what they thought was the fact and that is one
10 reason why I adopted the affidavit method of interrogation,
11 because I realized that if you give the affidavit to the
12 person to revise and correct or change, - and you will find
13 throughout here that corrections were made in their handwrit-
14 ing, - that that makes for a more accurate way of getting
15 the testimony. I was not a War Department "Yes man."

16 Senator Ferguson knows when the War Department was on
17 the pan with respect to the Truman Investigating Committee,
18 the Truman committee investigation of Air Corps derelictions
19 and the Wright Aeronautical Corporation military men at Cin-
20 cinnati, Ohio, the War Department assigned me to prosecute
21 those men and I had the Senator as one of my witnesses and
22 I also had Senator Kilgore as one of my witnesses and the
23 men were convicted.

24 Now, the Truman committee proceedings gave the War De-
25 partment -- or, rather, was critical of the War Department

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 and stated in the same proceedings that they were very well
3 satisfied with the way I had conducted that investigation.

4 In other words, if you read that, sir, you would see that
5 Clausen was no stooge of the War Department. Similarly with
6 respect to Colonel Theodore Wyman, whom I investigated in
7 connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster. If I was a War
8 Department stooge I would not have conducted the interrogation
9 that you will find in the proceedings before the Grunert
10 Board and the Board I am quite sure would not have come to
11 the conclusions that were reached by the Board.

12 Senator Lucas: Colonel, when were you an Assistant
13 United States District Attorney?

14 Colonel Clausen: I resigned, sir, eight months after the
15 Democrats came into power.

16 Senator Lucas: You came in the Army as a volunteer after
17 the war broke out?

18 Colonel Clausen: Yds, sir; in June 1942.

19 Senator Lucas: And you went directly, I take it, into
20 the Judge Advocate's Department?

21 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: And you stayed there how long?

23 Colonel Clausen: Over three years, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: And you are now back in California prac-
25 ticing law?

Witness Clausen

Questions by Sen. Lucas
Mr. Gearhart

1
2 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: And you do not expect any promotions in
4 the Army from Major on up?

5 Colonel Clausen: Sir, they wouldn't give me any if they
6 could because they would be afraid to.

7 Senator Lucas: That is all.

8 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy is not present. Senator
9 Brewster would be next. He is not here. Mr. Gearhart of
10 California will inquire, Colonel.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Colonel Clausen, I have the very nice let-
12 t er you wrote in which you very gently take me too task for
13 saying something about you and I was not conscious that I had
14 said anything about you at all, because I had had no news-
15 paper called to my attention that mentioned your name.

16 Could you have mixed me up with some other person who
17 is a member of the committee?

18 Colonel Clausen: Well, Mr. Gearhart, the press evident-
19 ly misquoted you.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Well, let it go at that, but I never read
21 it.

22 Colonel Clausen: But the San Francisco Chronicle and
23 Call and Daily News carried your name to the accusation which
24 was to the effect that Senator Lucas had mentioned.

25 Mr. Gearhart: All that that he said?

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Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Colonel Clausen: No, not all but the impression I had was that you thought I had gone around the world with a great, big club in my hand and by force and duress had forced these people to sign statements.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I am not conscious of ever having mentioned your name, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen: Well, I have got the clippings, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Colonel.

Senator Ferguson: Colonel Clausen, did I understand you to mean that the leads were not in writing? You did not mean that, did you?

Colonel Clausen: I meant, Senator, that if you go to my periodic reports you will find more particularly the leads that I explored.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, but I am talking about the leads beginning on page 10.

Colonel Clausen: Well, those are in writing, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: They are in writing and signed by General Cramer, are they not?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the Grunert Board --

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 as you and I will refer to the Grunert Board we mean the
3 Army Board under the statute, is that correct?

4 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: That is, General Grunert was the
6 chairman of the Board.

7 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: When did you first learn that you
9 were to continue the investigation of the Grunert Board?

10 Colonel Clausen: I believe it was just about this time
11 of the -- when I returned from an emergency leave to San
12 Francisco, Senator. It was about the 1st of December or the
13 early part of the next year, I don't remember exactly, and
14 during the interim I had been assisting the Judge Advocate
15 General.

16 Senator Ferguson: The investigation of the Board had
17 been closed, is that correct?

18 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. They were limited, Senator,
19 to ninety days by the order of appointment.

20 Senator Ferguson: Not by statute?

21 Colonel Clausen: No. Congress did not limit them, no,
22 sir, but Congress passed Public 339, Joint Resolution of the
23 Congress. Following that the Secretary, who was required
24 under the law to conduct the investigation, appointed this
25 Grunert Board and the order of appointment, Senator, had

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 "ninety days" in it.

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I understand. The Secretary of
4 War limited his own board to ninety days.

5 Colonel Clausen: I think it was General McNarney that
6 did that, Senator.

7 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And General McNarney had been
8 on the Roberts Commission?

9 Colonel Clausen: That is the same one.

10 Senator Ferguson: So it is assumed that at the time he
11 knew about the size of the investigation.

12 Now, do I understand that the Board had not finished its
13 work and were compelled to close their investigation because
14 of a limitation placed upon them by the Secretary of War?

15 Colonel Clausen: I would not say that, Senator, for the
16 reason that if the Board had felt that I assume as you assume,
17 I assume they would have written in to the Secretary and so
18 stated. In other words, they would have said they could not
19 make their findings because of the limitation of time.

20 Senator Ferguson: They did not do that to your knowledge?

21 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, but they did have comments,
22 Senator, in the report to the effect that there should be
23 further explorations of leads.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, the Board never made any com-
25 plaint to you or to anyone that you knew that they were going

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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to be compelled to file their report without being able to go into this matter completely?

Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: So, then, you assumed that when the Board did file their report and you were one of their members looking up evidence, and so forth, that they had completed their job as far as they saw their job?

Colonel Clausen: Well, I would rather, Senator, not answer what was in the minds of the general officers but the impression I had was that they were pretty sick and tired of Pearl Harbor and wanted to get finished.

Senator Ferguson: Did you get the same way?

Colonel Clausen: I certainly did. I think it is time to given to conclude, in the words of the poet.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, on page 15 I find that you had a certain limitation placed upon you. The Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War:

"It being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry" -- talking about you -- "to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster."

Colonel Clausen: That is right, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: In other words, the Navy said to you:

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 "Now, stay out of this investigation as far as it affects any
3 Navy personnel, any Navy organization or action upon the part
4 of the Navy as to the disaster." Is that correct?

5 Colonel Clausen: As I understand, Senator, the Army was
6 to concern itself through me with whatever had to do with
7 Army personnel, action or responsibility, and Admiral Hewitt
8 on the Navy side was to concern himself with the Navy phases.

9 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, I am coming to the
10 limitation next. The Secretary of War put the same limitation
11 in his directive as the Secretary of the Navy did; that the
12 Navy said that you were not to do anything or find any facts
13 or go into any facts as far as the Navy was concerned.

14 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: The Secretary of War said that you
16 could not do the reverse, is that not true?

17 Colonel Clausen: That is right, Senator, otherwise it
18 would be duplicitous.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, how could you make
20 this investigation when they had a joint command out there in
21 Hawaii, you had joint intelligence to a certain extent here?
22 How could you make the investigation to ascertain the facts
23 that you had stated entirely away from the facts as it re-
24 lated to the Navy?

25 Colonel Clausen: Well, I didn't have to do that, Sen-

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 ator, at all and I do not mean to imply and you could not
3 interpret these instructions in that way.

4 Senator Ferguson: Well, how should you interpret it?

5 Colonel Clausen: Well, this way, Senator, this is the
6 way: Wherever it pertained to the Army and went into the
7 Navy I was to go there and I did go there, and I was to enter
8 on it and I did enter on it. One of the first things that
9 I did when I arrived in Pearl Harbor conducting this addi-
10 tional investigation was to check in with Admiral Towers
11 for the purpose of running down all these intercepts and
12 winds code messages and this super-duper radio stuff.

13 Senator Lucas: What was that Admiral's name?

14 Colonel Clausen: Towers, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Did the Secretary of
16 War that I read -- no, that was to the Secretary of War. Now,
17 the one to the Secretary of the Navy read almost identically:

18 "I have also been happy to comply with your re-
19 quest that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be
20 given Army information which is relevant to your investi-
21 gation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy
22 inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing
23 on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action
24 may have had in the disaster."

25 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Now, what was your interpretation of
3 that limitation?

4 Colonel Clausen: Why, just the same, Senator. In other
5 words, if the Navy wanted to interrogate Army people that was
6 perfectly all right and they did do so. Admiral Hewitt, for
7 example, went to Hawaii and did interrogate Army people there
8 and you will find on page 2 of my report that I had these
9 Navy people down that I did interrogate. There is Captain
10 Rochefort, Captain Layton, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins,
11 all Navy people, interrogated here. Colonel Woodrum and
12 others.

13 Senator Ferguson: Were you able to draw conclusions
14 as to that testimony?

15 Colonel Clausen: You mean myself?

16 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

17 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, I did not draw any conclusions
18 except the periodic reports that were made which set forth
19 what I thought were running comments of ideas that I had as
20 to the way the investigation was unfolding and what might be
21 pursued as leads.

22 Senator Ferguson: That was really conclusions upon your
23 part?

24 Colonel Clausen: Well, yes, they were opinions of my-
25 self.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Major or Colonel -- when were you
3 promoted from a Major? When I knew you at Cincinnati you were
4 a Major.

5 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. I did not get my promotion,
6 Senator, until the other men in my same group block were
7 promoted and that was about March, I suppose, of 1945.

8 Senator Ferguson: 1945. You were still working on the
9 investigation at that time?

10 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. I finished --

11 Senator Ferguson: The so-called Sonnett investigation
12 or the --

13 Colonel Clausen: That was the Hewitt.

14 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- started in May, did
15 it not?

16 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. The Army had a great deal
17 more investigating in this additional investigation, Senator,
18 than the Navy for the reason that the Navy had this super-
19 duper stuff and the Army did not have it.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, we are talking about super-duper
21 as magio-ultra?

22 Colonel Clausen: That is right.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right.

24 Colonel Clausen: Colonel Bratton calls it "boogie-
25 woogie".

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Diplomatic messages of the Army that
3 we have. As I understand it, exhibit 1 is made up from the
4 Army copies.

5 Colonel Clausen: Yes, Senator, but before the Murfin
6 Board, that is the Navy Board of Inquiry, this magic informa-
7 tion came out, it developed into a much finer point and
8 with greater detail than the Grunert Board ever got it. I
9 repeat it was not until about the last week of the Grunert
10 Board's proceedings that we were given this information. The
11 Navy was not in that position.

12 Senator Ferguson: Will you tell me, Colonel, who wrote
13 the unexplored leads on pages 10, 11 and 12? Who is actually
14 responsible for drawing them up?

15 Colonel Clausen: Oh, I suppose they were drawn up by
16 Colonel Hughes.

17 Senator Ferguson: We haven't had Colonel Hughes on the
18 record. Who was Colonel Hughes?

19 Colonel Clausen: Colonel William J. Hughes is an officer
20 on the staff of -- was an officer on the staff of the Judge
21 Advocate General and these were drawn up by him and others
22 while I was -- as I repeat -- on this emergency leave to
23 San Francisco.

24 Senator Ferguson: Well, where did he get the information,
25 for instance, Hughes? He is a Washington lawyer, is he not?

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

2 Senator Ferguson: Do you know what firm he is with?

3 Colonel Clausen: I think he is with William Leahy.

4 Senator Ferguson: Who drew these charges?

5 Colonel Clausen: You mean these leads?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes, these leads?

7 Colonel Clausen: Well, I say I think it was Colonel
8 Hughes and others from the Judge Advocate General, whoever
9 assisted him.

10 Senator Ferguson: Well, where would Hughes get these
11 facts?

12 Colonel Clausen: Well, he had assisted in the Pearl
13 Harbor inquiry for the Judge Advocate General. Senator,
14 when we, the Grunert Board went to Hawaii, Colonel Hughes
15 was left in charge, sir, sort of in charge of the office
16 during the time we were gone.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, he was really an assistant then
18 to the Board?

19 Colonel Clausen: You would not call him an assistant
20 except in that capacity during the time we were away he was
21 supposed to see that things went all right at home.

22 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, the one I want to
23 talk about is on page 11:

24 "Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941
3 compact for a joint warning to Japan."

4 Where would Hughes get that information that there was
5 a joint action agreement?

6 Colonel Clausen: He would pick that out of the testi-
7 mony. Here is what happened, Senator: The Board wanted
8 somebody to review the testimony in anticipation of a final
9 report, so that reason Colonel Toulmin had charge of a group
10 of officers and this group of officers, - I don't know,
11 there must have been twenty or thirty all in all, including
12 some Waacs, - who went over the testimony from day to day
13 and the information, of course, as to the joint action agree-
14 ment would, I assume, be brought out from the testimony
15 given in the proceedings before the Board.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, you had heard about the joint
17 action agreement, had you not?

18 Colonel Clausen: General Marshall, it is my recollec-
19 tion, Senator, testified about it.

20 Senator Ferguson: In your opinion was there or was there
21 not a joint action agreement?

22 Colonel Clausen: You want my opinion?

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes. I want your evidence if you
24 have got any evidence on it.

25 Colonel Clausen: Well, I was going to point out, Sen-

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 ator, that there were certain notes concerning the -- I
3 think they called it the A-B-C-D bloc. Is that correct?

4 Senator Ferguson: At times it was referred to as a
5 bloc.

6 Colonel Clausen: Well, if I may have my exhibit number
7 2 I can point something out.

8 Senator Ferguson: All right.

9 Colonel Clausen: One of the men, Senator, I interviewed
10 in Washington was Colonel Bicknell and he told me that it
11 was very necessary in order to get the full facts on Pearl
12 Harbor to get to his former office and there obtain various
13 documents, so I did that.

14 Senator Ferguson: Bicknell?

15 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir, Bicknell; B-i-c-k-n-e-l-l.

16 Senator Ferguson: What was his position at this time?

17 Colonel Clausen: Well, at the time of Pearl Harbor he
18 had been General Short's assistant G-2, he had charge of
19 what was known as the contact office, the downtown office.
20 It would be more or less similar to combat intelligence.

21 Senator Ferguson: Well, he had some opinions then on
22 the joint action agreement?

23 Colonel Clausen: Well, he mentions it here in one of
24 the papers I got out of his office and that is what I was
25 going to show you.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Let me see what you have got.

3 Colonel Clausen: In the way of these exhibits, Senator,
4 that I have got, there are eight volumes that are indexed
5 at the start. Page 51 and 53 -- from page 51, Senator, to
6 page 53 are excerpts from all the digests prepared in the
7 contact office and you will find a reference there --

8 Senator Ferguson: Will you read us what the reference
9 is?

10 Colonel Clausen: Do you want me to read the whole thing?

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, I want to get all I can on this
12 joint action agreement.

13 Colonel Clausen: Well, I am going to start. He started
14 his comment that on "November" --

15 Senator Ferguson: We have had great difficulty getting
16 anything on it, so if you will just give me what you have.
17 That is why I have questioned you.

18 Colonel Clausen: I don't mind reading it, Senator, but--
19 well, I had better read it.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

21 Colonel Clausen: All right. (Reading)

22 "November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest).

23 Now, what he is referring to there is a digest that he
24 prepared for the use of the Hawaiian command. He was over
25 there and prepared these digests from time to time based on

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 sources of information that came to him from many places.

3 This is what he says:

4 "While the international situation centering in the
5 Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been
6 somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during
7 this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other
8 contiguous areas - Thailand, Indo-China and Eastern Si-
9 beria - of strong indirect concern to the United States,
10 have continued to deteriorate.

11 "The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the
12 appointment of Saburo Kurusu as Special Envoy to Wash-
13 ington for the avowed purpose of making a final diplo-
14 matic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese
15 problems and effect an easing of tension in the Paci-
16 fic. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed
17 in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission,
18 the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.

19 "The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that
20 Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she
21 could not back down without incurring serious internal
22 trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand,
23 had even less reason to compromise its well-known re-
24 manis which were diametrically opposite to those of
25 Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 to failure before they started. This opinion moreover
3 appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events
4 began to unfold.

5 "Concurrent with the conversations in Washington
6 came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in
7 Indo-China, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japan-
8 ese home press intensified its anti-American attitude.
9 The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extra-
10 ordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with
11 unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to
12 evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii).
13 Total mobilization in Japan proceeded" --

14 Senator Ferguson: So far I don't follow you. I don't
15 find any evidence about this joint action agreement.

16 Colonel Clausen: Well, he comes to it in the next one,
17 Senator.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right, give us the next one.

19 Colonel Clausen: That is on page 52. He has got here,-
20 there is a "2 (Conclusions)" and then he has sub-paragraph
21 "C-4, Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers."

22 You have really got to read the whole thing in order
23 to get this.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right, read it.

25 Colonel Clausen: I am omitting the part that I was

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 going to read.

3 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead and read it straight through,
4 Colonel. We will get a better understanding of it if you
5 do.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right. I thought we would save
7 time.

8 Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

9 "Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated
10 and with an ever increasing tempo - involving even boys
11 and girls down to 14 years of age.

12 "The foregoing together with many other reported
13 actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sin-
14 cerity of the Japanese government, and led many to be-
15 lieve that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler's
16 favorite strategem of utilizing peaceful gestures to
17 confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effec-
18 tive opposition to an early contemplated military move.

19 "There is no marked change in the local situation.
20 The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dic-
21 tates an extreme desire for peace. And while local
22 Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism,
23 their statements are frequently spiked with a note of
24 despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their
25 attitude is near at hand.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 "It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and
3 eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in
4 Hawaii."

5 Then he inserted here, this is his wording here but it
6 is not the digest.

7 "Let us now turn to a few statements in official
8 documents which represent definite action of this office,
9 taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by
10 certain other information at hand.

11 "From the G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese)
12 Situation, H.H.D., Army Contact Office" -- that means
13 Headquarters Hawaiian Department -- "Army Contact Office,
14 Honolulu, 17 Oct. 1941 - 1200."

15 Now, this is a quote from that estimate prepared at that
16 time. (Reading)

17 "1. a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet,
18 the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new
19 high...

20 "b. The situation is generally admitted as being
21 extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain,
22 due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has
23 not been completed...

24 "c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various
25 sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain un-
3 changed; and it is expected that Japan will shortly an-
4 nounce her decision to challenge militarily any nation
5 or combination of nations which might oppose the execu-
6 tion of said policies - irrespective of what means she may
7 choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their
8 achievement.

9 "2. CONCLUSIONS.

10 "c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.

11 "While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers
12 would violate the principle mentioned above (the princi-
13 ple of defeating one opponent at a time - famous with
14 her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a
15 possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war
16 with the United States to be inevitable as a result of
17 her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe
18 that she may decide to strike before our naval program
19 is completed. An attack on the United States could not
20 be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the
21 entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility
22 that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at
23 whatever points might gain for her the most strategic,
24 tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents."

25 Then the next, Senator, is --

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2

Senator Ferguson: That is where he mentions the ABCD bloc?

3

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

4

Senator Ferguson: That would be America, Britain --

5

Colonel Clausen: China and the Dutch.

6

Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- China and Holland?

7

Colonel Clausen: The Dutch.

8

Senator Ferguson: The Dutch. So there was evidence there

9

that there was -- some evidence that there was an ABCD bloc?

10

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

11

Mr. Clark: Senator, would you permit me to inquire?

12

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13

Mr. Clark: Who made that report and to whom?

14

Senator Ferguson: Bicknell.

15

Colonel Clausen: It was from -- it was made by General

16

Short's assistant G-2 in Hawaii, Colonel Bicknell.

17

Mr. Clark: Made to General Short?

18

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. It was designated to the --

19

I have in other places in these eight volumes copies of at least one or more of those with General Short's handwriting on it as having seen it. Colonel Bicknell pointed that out to me as being his initials.

21

22

23

Mr. Clark: That is all I wanted to know.

24

25

Senator Ferguson: Now, you thought it was important to find out whether or not General Short knew about this joint

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 action agreement, is that right?

3 Colonel Clausen: I used to call it, Senator, the ABCD
4 bloc.

5 Senator Ferguson: All right, we will call it the ABCD
6 bloc. It would be important to the investigation to find
7 out whether or not there was an ABCD bloc?

8 Colonel Clausen: I think so.

9 Senator Ferguson: And that would be true, would it not,
10 to ascertain that if we knew there was going to be an attack
11 upon one of the bloc that we should expect an attack upon all
12 of the bloc?

13 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir, just like Colonel Bicknell
14 said.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So that it became a very important
16 question for all of our officials from the top to the bottom
17 to know the contents of an ABCD bloc agreement because it
18 would give them information that if we had direct information
19 of an attack upon Britain we could have anticipated an attack
20 upon America, is that correct?

21 Colonel Clausen: I think that is the function of the
22 committee to decide that question, but I am glad to answer,
23 Senator.

24 Senator Ferguson: Is that what you were trying to find
25 out?

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Colonel Clausen: I was trying to find out, Senator, ex-
3 actly what I am telling you here and that is why I asked
4 General Miles and he said something in his affidavit concern-
5 ing that same thing.

6 Senator Ferguson: General Miles said that he knew that
7 there was an agreement between the American and British and
8 Dutch. Would you get us General Miles' affidavit, if you can?

9 Colonel Clausen: I am doing that now, Senator.

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Colonel Clausen: There is an item on page -- I think it
12 is page 215, Senator, of my report.

13 Senator Ferguson: Will you just read us what he said
14 about the bloc?

15 Colonel Clausen: (Reading)

16 "Further, concerning the intercepts mentioned as
17 contained in Top Secret exhibit 'B' and those which re-
18 lated to joint action by the ABCD bloc or members thereof,
19 I knew at the time about the joint action agreement. "

20 Senator Ferguson: Which gave you some more information
21 that there had been an agreement. Did you ever trace it down
22 as to whether or not General Short knew about it?

23 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, I did not get that far.

24 Senator Ferguson: So you did not carry out --

25 Colonel Clausen: Senator, I assumed that the G-2 estim-

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 rate of Colonel Bicknell, which was prepared by General Short's
3 subordinate and being read by General Short would, of course,
4 apprise him of the existence of that which his assistant G-2
5 knew.

6 Senator Ferguson: But you made no further attempt to
7 answer that unexplored lead except the Bicknell matter and
8 the General Miles matter?

9 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, I did more than that.

10 Senator Ferguson: All right, I want to find out what you
11 did.

12 Colonel Clausen: Well, I remember I reviewed the testi-
13 mony of General Marshall. He had testified on the subject
14 before the Grunert Board and I suggested at the end that this
15 led to the White House. In other words, the existence of an
16 agreement of this kind would lead to the White House and I
17 was told that it was beyond the scope of my functions to
18 investigate there.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, I understand that you
20 finally got to the door of the White House in this ABCD block and
21 you were told that you could not enter the White House as far
22 as your investigation was concerned, is that correct?

23 Colonel Clausen: I was told, sir, not that I could not
24 enter --

25 Senator Ferguson: Well, of course, we understand each

1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 other.

3 Colonel Clausen: (Continuing) -- but that the scope of
4 my investigation will not go that far.

5 Senator Ferguson: All right, the scope of your investi-
6 gation will not go to the White House.

7 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. I was supposed, as you
8 pointed out, Senator, to be concerned with the investiga-
9 tion that the Secretary of War was conducting under Public
10 339 and for the purpose of determining what Army officer,
11 if any, should be court martialed.

12 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, was that the only purpose
13 of the investigation, just to ascertain --

14 Colonel Clausen: No, I said "and". It had two pur-
15 poses as I read that: First, to get the facts concerning
16 Pearl Harbor and to find out what, if any, Army officer
17 should be court martialed.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right.

19 Colonel Clausen: Senator, if you will allow me to point
20 out --

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I don't want to cut you off.
22 We are both lawyers and we will both be lawyers on this.

23 Colonel Clausen: Well, we never had much trouble be-
24 fore.

25 Senator Ferguson: No. I meant that-- -- I am not out-

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 ting you off; I am not outting in.

3 Colonel Clausen: You were one of my best witnesses,
4 Senator, I say that sincerely. There was a lot of error
5 claimed by the defense about calling two Senators, one being
6 a Republican and one being a Democrat.

7 Senator Ferguson: We were bi-partisan.

8 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir, but you were very good.

9 Senator, the first part of Public 339 dealt, as you will
10 recall, with the extension of the Statute of Limitations.

11 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

12 Colonel Clausen: The second part of Public 339 would
13 appear to be court martial proceedings.

14 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, who is the person
15 that told you that you were not to enter into into the White
16 House with your leads?

17 Colonel Clausen: That was General Cramer, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: General Cramer?

19 Colonel Clausen: Through Colonel Hughes.

20 Senator Ferguson: Through who? Colonel Hughes?

21 Colonel Clausen: Through Colonel Hughes, yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: And, therefore, when it came to fol-
23 lowing an unexplored lead as to the joint action agreement
24 or, - we will take that same wording -- "or of the Roosevelt-
25 Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan", you

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 stopped there because General Cramer told you through Colonel
3 Hughes that you were not to go into the White House?

4 Colonel Clausen: He did not say it in that way, Senator.
5 He said that he did not think that my investigation extended
6 to that point.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right. And, therefore, you did
8 not follow it into the White House?

9 Colonel Clausen: No, that is not the only reason.

10 Senator Ferguson: What is another reason?

11 Colonel Clausen: Japan had then been defeated and, in
12 addition, that it meant that the Congress of the United States
13 could conduct the investigation itself in perhaps a much more
14 thorough fashion than an independent individual by the Army
15 or by the Navy.

16 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, when did you get the
17 notion at the time you got this unexplored lead that Congress
18 would have resisted with what you and the Board had done to
19 conduct its own examination? Because we did not get back
20 here until September of 1945 and we got your report of the
21 Army Board on August 28th or 29th of 1945 and this is back
22 in March or back in the early part of 1945.

23 Colonel Clausen: Well, Senator, let me make very clear
24 that this conversation that I had with Colonel Hughes occurred
25 at the tail end of my investigation. In other words, that

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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was around September 1945 and it was after the Japanese had been defeated, peace had been made and it was then apparent that there was no reason why the Congress itself could not conduct the investigation which the Congress had wanted in Public 339.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, Colonel, did you in any part of this investigation go into the State Department, the diplomatic messages?

Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir. I did not get in there, I did not go in the State Department but I had the State Department diplomatic messages.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Did you have any correspondence or any information, memorandums between the President and Mr. Churchill?

Colonel Clausen: I did not see any, Senator, that I recall.

Senator Ferguson: All right. And you certainly could not go into a joint action agreement which concerned Britain if you did not get to the Executive offices to get your papers, could you?

Colonel Clausen: Well, I imagine what I would have done, Senator, if I had been pursuing the lead myself and war had not ended, I would have gone through the regular channels starting with the State Department.

Senator Ferguson: I haven't any doubt that if you had

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 been permitted to go into the White House to make the investi-
3 gation that you would have used every possible means to get
4 all of the information, I do not question that at all. I am
5 just trying to find out what information you did get on the
6 joint action agreement.

7 Now, the next thing mentioned in there was the Roosevelt-
8 Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan.
9 Now, the only place you could get that was in the White House,
10 isn't that true?

11 Colonel Clausen: Well, I don't know where it might be
12 found, Senator.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, you would expect to find it
14 there, isn't that correct?

15 Colonel Clausen: I would expect there would be a copy
16 there if there is such a document, yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Did you ask anyone for that
18 joint compact?

19 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Can you tell me why when it was in your
21 leads?

22 Colonel Clausen: Well, for the same reason, Senator,
23 that I just mentioned. In other words, that falls in the
24 same category.

25 Senator Ferguson: All right, the same reason that Colonel

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Hughes gave you?

3 Colonel Clausen: That plus the fact -- this second
4 reason is very important because war had ended and the Con-
5 gress could conduct its investigation if it had desired
6 it to be conducted pursuant to Public 339.

7 Senator Ferguson: Then you know of no reason why Con-
8 gress cannot go into this question that was not investigated
9 by either the Board or by you?

10 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that correct?

12 Colonel Clausen: I see no reason, no, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes. And it was not investigated by
14 the Board or by you but you had the lead on it?

15 Colonel Clausen: Well, as I pointed out, Senator, there
16 were certain aspects of that that I had in my papers and I
17 am sure that you can find further references to them, but in
18 answer to your question it was not investigated to finality,
19 surely.

20 Senator Ferguson: That is right, you couldn't get the
21 finality, did not get the finality?

22 Colonel Clausen: That is right, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, let us go over on
24 page 12. (Reading)

25 "c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-
3 U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would
4 have known that a 'War with Britain' message would ne-
5 cessarily have involved the United States in war."

6 Now, did you find out -- you did find out directly in the
7 affidavit of General Miles, did you not?

8 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: That he knew something about it?

10 Colonel Clausen: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: But wasn't he quite hazy as to what it
12 was?

13 Colonel Clausen: Well, there seemed, Senator, to be a
14 unanimity of opinion that the nations who opposed the aggres-
15 sor nations, such as America, the British, the Dutch and the
16 Chinese, having mutual objectives, would all be overrun, of
17 course, if the aggressor dictator nations were permitted to
18 conquer them one by one.

19 Senator Ferguson: There is no doubt about that. That
20 is what Hitler started out to do and was quite successful in
21 the beginning, isn't that right?

22 Colonel Clausen: Divide and conquer.

23 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So, then, you say that General
24 Miles, having that in mind, that he knew about this agreement.
25

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Now, let us go to Admiral Noyes. Did you find out as to
3 what his knowledge was about this joint action agreement?

4 Colonel Clausen: No, sir, I did not proceed that far. I
5 will tell you what I did in that respect, Senator.

6 Senator Ferguson: All right.

7 Colonel Clausen: I read over the Navy proceedings for
8 the testimony of some of these incidents and it more or less
9 boiled down to what the Admiral testified this morning. I
10 cannot recall specifically who said what to who, but that is
11 just about what it amounted to, that there was no binding agree-
12 ment but that there was an informal agreement. Now, if that
13 makes sense to you, I don't know. It don't make sense to me.

14 Senator Ferguson: It makes sense to me. We might say,
15 in referring to these kinds of agreements, that the present
16 agreement between Russia and the United States and Britain in
17 relation to the Kurile Islands was not a binding agreement.
18 Is that what you have in mind?

19 Colonel Clausen: Well, I don't know the details of that
20 agreement, sir. From reading the papers I assumed that it
21 was, oh --

22 Senator Ferguson: An understanding?

23 Colonel Clausen: A moral commitment made from which you
24 could not recede.

25 Senator Ferguson: All right, an understanding. Is that

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 what you have in mind?

3 Colonel Clausen: No. From my understanding, sir, I
4 would mean a binding agreement.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, how do you distinguish this kind
6 of an agreement? You are a lawyer. Now, what was this agree-
7 ment?

8 Colonel Clausen: Well, I don't know what the agreement
9 was, Senator.

10 Senator Ferguson: You never found out?

11 Colonel Clausen: Well --

12 Senator Ferguson: You never found out, I understand that,
13 because of what you were told, but did you get any testimony
14 on it as to what it was?

15 Colonel Clausen: Well, I pointed out some places here,--
16 I don't know where it is; it might appear in my proceedings.
17 I don't know where else it might appear in my proceedings.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you come down into
19 this joint action agreement here, "In which case they would
20 have known" -- you are talking about these officers -- "that
21 a 'War with Britain' message."

22 What message are you talking about?

23 Colonel Clausen: Well, he had in mind there I suppose
24 whether there was an authentic intercept which was an execute
25 message to the winds code.

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And if it only applied to Britain?

Colonel Clausen: Then it would hook us in.

Senator Ferguson: It would put us in anyway under this joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen: That is right.

Senator Ferguson: Isn't that true?

Colonel Clausen: That is right.

Senator Ferguson: All right. That is, I think, exactly what he said there, "would necessarily have involved the United States in war."

So that if we knew by any means that Britain was going to war with Japan, whether it was by a wireless code execute message or in any other manner, that would necessarily have involved the United States in the war; that is what that says, isn't it?

Colonel Clausen: That is what it says there.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. All right. Now, did you follow a lead to find out whether that was true or not?

Colonel Clausen: Well, just like I told you. Senator, and after looking over the situation I am pretty sure it was a -- I will say it boiled down to a unanimity of opinion that if England were pounced upon that America would come to her rescue.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. You took, then, from what you

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1 Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 found out in this investigation that Mr. Churchill was entire-
3 ly right in what he said in his speech to the Parliament on
4 the 27th of January 1942 which I read into the record this
5 morning. Were you here when I read it in?

6 Colonel Clausen: I was here, Senator, but I may not have
7 heard it.

8 Senator Ferguson: Will you look at it? It is on page
9 607 of the official documents of the House of Commons. (Hand-
10 ing document to witness)

11 Colonel Clausen: What is the question, Senator?

12 Senator Ferguson: Now the question is, your understand-
13 ing of this joint agreement is stated by Mr. Churchill in
14 what he says?

15 Colonel Clausen: No, Senator. You want my opinion now
16 and here is what it is.

17 Senator Ferguson: From what you found out in the evidence
18 and then we will try to find the evidence.

19 Colonel Clausen: Well, it is simply this, that the
20 United States, Britain and the Dutch and the Chinese stood
21 for the free way of life, the dictator nations stood for an
22 opposite way of life. We realized that we had common objec-
23 tives. Therefore, if we did not stand together we would be
24 killed separately.

25 Senator Ferguson: And then we come to that last line then;

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Therefore, war with one, with Britain, would necessarily
3 have involved the United States in war and we could have
4 anticipated that, is that correct?

5 Colonel Clausen: Well, not necessarily. I think that
6 is going too far. If you mean that --

7 Senator Ferguson: I am just taking your words.

8 Colonel Clausen: Those are not mine, Senator.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, you were working under them.
10 They were kind of a directive to you.

11 Colonel Clausen: I don't want to quibble with you. Let
12 us say they are anybody's at all. Senator, any opinion
13 given here you don't want to assure that when there is, let
14 me say, unanimity of purpose in stopping aggressor nations,
15 that the President would violate the Constitution in declar-
16 ing war or taking steps without going to the Congress.

17 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now go to part "1":

18 "Whether the partial implementation 'War with Britain'
19 was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's
20 attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Oper-
21 ations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Ac-
22 tion Policy."

23 Now, there wasn't any doubt in your mind that General
24 Marshall knew of this joint action policy, was there?

25 Colonel Clausen: Senator, my knowledge on the subject

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 of what the Chief of Staff knew was from his own testimony.
3 He said, you will recall, that there was no binding contract.

4 Senator Ferguson: But he said there was a contract, is
5 that right?

6 Colonel Clausen: Senator I would rather -- I haven't
7 read his testimony from then on. I would rather read the tes-
8 timony if there is any question about what he said.

9 Senator Ferguson: But here didn't you have a personal
10 conversation with him later?

11 Colonel Clausen: Yes, I had several, Senator.

12 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, you had a personal
13 conversation with him about this joint action agreement?

14 Colonel Clausen: Senator, he told me that it was as he
15 had previously testified.

16 Senator Ferguson: Is that all he said about it?

17 Colonel Clausen: Well, that is all I can recall aside
18 from the fact that he mentioned the previous testimony that
19 he had given on the subject.

20 Senator Ferguson: Now, did he say anything about that
21 it would not be necessary to follow any more leads on the
22 joint action?

23 Colonel Clausen: No, no, not at all. In no way did he
24 attempt to --

25 Senator Ferguson: I don't mean attempt, but that you had

Witness Clausen

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 full knowledge of it, that the Secretary of War had full
3 knowledge on it?

4 Colonel Clausen: What is the question, Senator?

5 Senator Ferguson: Did General Marshall tell you that the
6 Secretary of War had full knowledge on the question of the
7 joint policy?

8 Colonel Clausen: I don't recall.

9 Senator Ferguson: You cannot recall that?

10 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: Did you talk to Admiral Stark on that
12 question?

13 Colonel Clausen: No, sir. I read the testimony of Ad-
14 miral Stark over that he had given before the Naval Board of
15 Inquiry.

16 Senator Ferguson: But you did not question him on it?

17 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: As to whether he knew about the joint
19 action agreement?

20 Colonel Clausen: No, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever talk to General Cramer,
22 who signed this instrument that I was reading from?

23 Colonel Clausen: Oh, I talked with the General many
24 times, yes, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: On this question of joint action agree-