

# Joint Military Intelligence College

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## INTELLIGENCE WARNING TERMINOLOGY



*The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and encourages  
research on intelligence issues that distills lessons and improves  
support to policy-level and operational consumers*

*<Russell.Swenson@dia.mil>*  
**Editor and Director, Office of Applied Research**  
**Joint Military Intelligence College**

# **INTELLIGENCE WARNING TERMINOLOGY**

**JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE  
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should be forwarded to the author by calling  
(202) 231-3370 or DSN 428-3370;  
e-mail: [jan.goldman@dia.mil](mailto:jan.goldman@dia.mil)**

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## Foreword

When the current Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, testified at his confirmation hearing, he was asked how he defined his job. His response was that he was hired “not to observe and comment, but to warn and protect.” Pearl Harbor was first and foremost a failure of warning, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community were created primarily to ensure that the U.S. would never again be surprised by such a sneak attack.

The Intelligence Community expanded greatly during the decades of the Cold War, and there was a clear understanding of the direct threat to the United States represented by the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as a clear understanding of the strategic warning responsibilities of the various intelligence agencies and components. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat has become less clear and more indirect, and the associated warning responsibilities more diffuse and vague.

Indeed, much of the time of most intelligence analysts is spent doing current intelligence reporting or longer term assessments and predictions of the future. The warning message, if any, is often ill-defined or absent altogether. And where there is a clear understanding of the need to warn, such as for terrorist attacks or threats to U.S. forces, the warning is often tactical rather than strategic in nature. As the definitions in this publication make clear, strategic warning is intended to allow enough time for preventive measures.

Tactical warning normally allows only time enough to react rather than preempt. For example, strategic warning is that Iraq is threatening Kuwait and may eventually invade. Tactical warning is that Iraq is poised to attack Kuwait at any time.

In this era of less clearly defined threats and more diffuse warning responsibilities, it is ever more important to remind ourselves that the primary mission of intelligence is still to warn. Therefore, it behooves all intelligence professionals, as well as those who make policy, to understand just what warning is, and isn't. This publication is a valuable tool to promote that understanding.



**Robert Vickers**  
**National Intelligence Officer for Warning**  
**National Intelligence Council**

## INTRODUCTION

*The warning given to Louis XVI: “No, sire, this is not a rebellion, it is a revolution,” accents the essential difference. It means precisely that “it is the absolute certainty of a new form of government.” Rebellion is, by nature, limited in scope. It is no more than an incoherent pronouncement. Revolution, on the contrary, originates in the realm of ideas. Specifically, it is the injection of ideas into historical experience, while rebellion is only the movement that leads from individual experience into the realm of ideas. While even the collective history of a movement of rebellion is always that of a fruitless struggle with facts, of an obscure protest which involves neither methods nor reasons, a revolution is an attempt to shape action to ideas, to fit the world into a theoretic frame. That is why rebellion kills men while revolution destroys both men and principles.*

— Albert Camus (1913-1960), French-Algerian philosopher. *“Historical Rebellion,” The Rebel*, translated by Anthony Bower. New York: Knopf, 1956.

*When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.*

— Humpty Dumpty, by Lewis Carroll. *Through the Looking Glass*. New York: Signet Books, 1960, 186.

Recently the California Prune Board changed its name to the California Dried Plum Board. Market research, surveys and public opinion polls show that Americans do not like the word “prune” regardless of its taste or nutritional value. In an attempt to increase sales and portray a better public image, the board that is responsible for overseeing the promotion of this product decided it was time to act. The name was changed. This was not the first time a name change occurred for produce. Earlier, the fruit industry changed the name “Chinese gooseberry” to “Kiwi.”

So what does fruit have to do with national security and the process of intelligence warning. Well, nothing and everything. Humans are dependent on words to convey meaning. Strategic warning is the highest application and use of intelligence. Information and data are collected, resulting in analysis and the production of an accurate, actionable assessment that is quickly transmitted to its audience. Time is critical.

However, processing intelligence into warning is never simple. It is at times delayed, muted, or misunderstood. To speak of “warning” is to borrow words from the academe and from other quarters of the Intelligence Community—from sociology, economics, technology, and psychology, as well as from analysis of its relationship to basic, current, and estimative intelligence. Thus, warning depends on familiarity with use of myriad sources. Unfortunately, casual acquaintance with the national intelligence environment has strengthened the notion of some policymakers, as well as some practitioners and students of the national security community, that warning is only a by-product of rudimentary intelligence analysis.

A shared but sometimes ambiguous vocabulary exists that has often failed to distinguish between the job responsibilities required by an all-source intelligence analyst, a threat manager, or a senior watch officer. Adding to the confusion is that the duties and responsibilities of these positions greatly overlap in some organizations. Existing glossaries pay scant attention to the language and knowledge associated with the different job requirements. Does it really matter if we call finished written intelligence products “warning” or “intelligence?”

This warning lexicon is a compilation of the terms and concepts associated with such areas as intelligence readiness, threat and crisis management, and indications and warning analysis. It seeks to highlight the concept of warning as a distinct activity within the intelligence profession. Over 200 words in this glossary were chosen because they are used in the context of discussing or implementing intelligence-based warning. Some commonly used terms such as “indications and warning,” “assessment” and “fabrication” pertain to the role of intelligence in detecting and warning of a surprise attack at the strategic, operational or tactical level. Other words pertain to systems or events that have had an impact on the Intelligence Community and how we view surprise and warning. These would include such examples as The Fall of the Shah in Iran, the Korean War and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But choosing specific events indicative of warning is less complicated than choosing words for this lexicon.

The words for this handbook were chosen for their relevancy and common usage inside and outside of the military and Intelligence Communities. Some of the words and phrases are anchored in everyday speech and referenced from a standard dictionary. This allows understanding of the common usage of such words as “indicator” and “indication” which some may see as a derivative of each other even if no such relationship exists. Other words are anchored in the military and Intelligence Community jargon, which reflects knowledge based on experience. These words or phrases are commonly found in U.S. government documents, technical manuals, or other publications. Examples include such terms as “mission creep,” Delphi method,” “passive deception,” or “terms of reference.” Finally, some commonly used words exist in the vernacular of the warning community but they have no formal definition. These words and phrases are used informally within the Intelligence Community. Although some words may yet have no standard definition, I have sought to create one here. Such words or phrases include “clientitis,” “pride of previous position,” and “CNN effect.”

Additionally, the numerous books in the annotated bibliography focus specifically on strategic warning and threat management. Some may argue that all intelligence books are related to warning. However, including all intelligence books would only reinforce the notion that warning is a subset of the intelligence production process. The books briefly reviewed here can enlighten the reader about how intelligence was used either by analysts or policymakers specifically for the act of warning (or in some books, the failure to warn or to respond to the warning.) Nearly all of the concepts and words noted in the glossary section are revisited in these books.

The final section of this handbook briefly reviews some of the theses written at the Joint Military Intelligence College that have addressed strategic warning and threat management. Some theses review intelligence episodes from which warning lessons can be learned. Other, evaluative studies seek to improve warning methods and institutional development.

Hopefully, this handbook will allow the reader a better understanding of the complexity of the warning process by sorting out the contextual meaning of key terms, phrases and words. If nothing else, an intelligence analyst or an informed policymaker will now be able to discern the difference between an “indicator” and an “indication” and not believe that no greater difference exists between them than between a “prune” and a “dried plum.”



**Jan Goldman**  
**Washington, DC**  
**September 2001**

*Biographical note:* Jan Goldman has almost 20 years of experience in teaching about and performing intelligence warning duties at the strategic and tactical levels.



## GLOSSARY OF WARNING TERMS

**A-Team, B-Team concept:** an experimental method developed within the Intelligence Community in the mid-1970s to improve the quality of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) on important warning problems through competitive and alternative analysis. The "A-team" usually included U.S. intelligence analysts, while the "B-team" consisted of members outside of the Intelligence Community. Both teams would look at the identical warning problem and take different sides of an issue.<sup>1</sup>

**A-type deception:** purposeful intent to increase ambiguity by surrounding a target with irrelevant information; confusion based on a lack of certainty. Its aim is to keep the adversary unsure of one's true intentions, especially an adversary who has initially guessed right. A number of alternatives are developed for the target's consumption, built on misinformation that is both plausible and sufficiently significant to cause the target to expend resources to cover them.<sup>2</sup> It may be that Saddam Hussein felt that the U.S. was conducting A-type deception on him as he prepared Iraq to invade Kuwait. "The problem of deterring Saddam, even assuming that Western intelligence assessed an attack on Kuwait as a distinct probability, subsequently became mired in diplomatic ambiguity, with the U.S. trying to stand firm and yet at the same time weakening its tough stance by issuing curiously contradictory 'clarifications.' For example, when the U.S. moved KC-135 tanker aircraft and ships to the Gulf on 21 July 'to lay down a marker for Saddam Hussein,' in the words of the Pentagon, an aide to the Secretary to the Navy rushed to 'clarify the situation' by telling the press that the ships were not on alert. On 24 July, when the Pentagon stated that the 'U.S. was committed to...supporting the self-defense of our friends in the Gulf,' officials specifically refused to confirm whether the U.S. would go to Kuwait's aid if Kuwait were attacked."<sup>3</sup> [See also: M-type deception; active deception; denial and deception; passive deception.]

**absolute surprise:** a theoretical notion that an event or act can occur without any indications. Mostly relegated to science-fiction novels and movies when men and machines suddenly appear "out of nowhere." For example, "The U.S. and Canadian response to the Bears [Russian aircraft] comes in the wake of Russian boasts earlier this month that its warplanes buzzed the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk in the Sea of Japan on October 17 and November 9. The Russian SU-24 reconnaissance planes and SU-27 interceptors flew close enough to the USS Kitty Hawk in the Sea of Japan to take photographs of the carrier." Russian air force chief General Anatoly Kornukov told the

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<sup>1</sup> This concept is discussed in more detail in a report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *A Report: The Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives*, 95th Congress, 2d sess., 1978.

<sup>2</sup> Michael Dewar. *The Art of Deception in Warfare*, used throughout the book. (Newton, Abbot, Devon, UK: David & Charles, 1989). Additional authors who discuss this type of deception are: Daniel, Glad, Knorr, Sutherland and Svenson (full citations in "References.")

<sup>3</sup> John Hughes-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1999), 329.

Interfax news agency that the aircraft's approach came as an *absolute surprise* to the Kitty Hawk, "which didn't raise their fighters into the air until the second flight."<sup>4</sup>

**accelerator:** any event, action or decision by an influential person that becomes a catalyst to an impending threat scenario. For example, as cited in one report, "Any new discriminatory laws or restrictive actions imposed by the dictatorial government are accelerators that will ultimately bring down the government."<sup>5</sup>

**active deception:** measures designed to mislead by causing an object or situation to seem threatening when a threat does not exist. *Active deception* normally involves a calculated policy of disclosing half-truths supported by appropriate "proof" signals or other material evidence. The intelligence network of the deceived must pick up this information. The deceived must "discover" the evidence himself; he must work hard for it to be more convinced of its authenticity and importance. (Frequently, information that is easily obtained appears to be less credible and of doubtful value.)<sup>6</sup> For example, during World War I Great Britain used *active deception* in the form of dummy airfields and flare paths. These phony installations had a dual purpose of attracting German strafing and bombing raids and consequently diverting the enemy airplanes away from the real Allied airfields. Additionally, these bogus installations also exaggerated the number of operational airfields, which deceived the enemy about Allied military strength in the sector. [See also: A-type deception; denial and deception; passive deception.]

**alert center:** a site for the review of all incoming current intelligence information that possesses, or has access to, extensive communications for alerting local personnel. An additional responsibility may include the ability to task appropriate external collection assets within the system. [See also: indications center; warning center; watch center.]

**alert fatigue:** a condition that exists when a command and its troops are constantly at a state of alert, resulting in their deteriorating readiness for action. When the Israelis launched their sudden attack into Lebanon in 1982, Palestinian surprise was due in part to "alert fatigue" or the "cry-wolf" syndrome. This phenomenon results from the desensitization of an entity's warning capability because the threatened attack or event did not occur. On possibly as many as four occasions prior to the June attack, Palestinian forces predicted and prepared for the expected Israeli attack. Each time the attack never came. It is not surprising, therefore, that the PLO saw the events in early June as a repeat of previous Israeli saber rattling. Arafat's presence outside of Lebanon on the day before the attack dramatized this point."<sup>7</sup> [See also: cry-wolf syndrome.]

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<sup>4</sup> "U.S. & Canadian Jet Fighters Move To Counter Probes By Russian Bombers," *Sierra Times*, 6 March 2001, URL: <<http://www.sierratimes.com/arafp120100.htm>>, accessed 6 March 2001.

<sup>5</sup> Statement not associated with a factual document or report, but one intended for training purposes only.

<sup>6</sup> Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and Deception" in John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (eds.) *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise* (Newark NJ: Frank Cass & Co, Ltd. 1982), 134.

<sup>7</sup> Mark G. Ewig, "Surprise From Zion: The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon," *Airpower Journal* 35, no. 6 (Sept-Oct 1984): 48-57. URL: <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/sep-oct/ewig.html>>, accessed 11 February 2001.

**alert memorandum:** correspondence issued by high-level intelligence officials to policy-makers to warn them about developments abroad that may be of major concern to the country's national security; a memorandum coordinated within the Intelligence Community if time permits.

**analysis:** the process of separating intelligence data into distinct, related parts or elements and examining those elements to determine essential parameters or related properties. Often the word "analysis" is incorrectly interchanged with the word "assessment." To understand the difference one may remember that "analysis is what you know, assessment is what you believe." [See also: assessment; Joint Pub. 1-02]

**areas of concern:** specific issues or incidents within a warning problem that require identifiable attention by the analyst, commander or policymaker.

**assessment:** the process of combining all intelligence data into a unified, specific judgment; the result of analysis formed within the context of the intelligence environment. [See also: analysis; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**basic intelligence:** the compilation of all available data and information on several subjects of broad interest to policymakers and other members of the Intelligence Community; fundamental, comprehensive, encyclopedic and general reference-type material relating to political, economic, geographic and military structure, resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign nations. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02]

**basic measures of military preparedness:** minimal precautionary efforts, likely considered routine actions, against a potential future attack. [See also: emergency measures of military preparedness.]

**Bayesian (decision) analysis:** a technique developed by the Reverend Thomas Bayes in 1763, in which he advanced the proposition that subjective probabilities should be combined with frequency probabilities via what has come to be called Bayes' theorem, a very simple formula using conditional probabilities. According to the formula, the prior probability  $P(H)$  of proposition  $H$  is revised to posterior probability  $P(H/D)$  when the datum  $D$  is observed—and  $P(D/H)$  AND  $P(D)$  are known—as follows:

$$P(H|D) = \frac{P(H) \cdot P(D|H)}{P(D)}$$

In this formula,  $P(D/H)$  is the *likelihood* of the same information  $D$  given that proposition  $H$  is true. Even in this simple form, Bayes' theorem has apparent applications in international relations forecasting.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Richard Ashley, "Bayesian Decision Analysis in International Relations Forecasting: The Analysis of Subjective Processes," in *Forecasting in International Relations*, ed. Nazli Choucri (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1978), 149-171.

**bean-counting assessment:** mostly used as a pejorative term for estimates and forecasting based on quantitative or empirical analysis.<sup>9</sup> General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in a briefing to the press on NATO's ability to stop Serb aggression said: "From the very beginning, we said we didn't believe in battle bean-counting as a way of measuring the effects of air power, although many continuously sought to go back to the old body count, bean-counting approach. Meanwhile, some accused of us of flying too high, of not wanting to risk our pilots while others chose to believe that we would strike only decoys or perhaps would hit nothing at all. The short answer of what we struck is clear. How much did we strike, and how much did we destroy? We destroyed and struck enough."<sup>10</sup> [See also: palm reading assessment.]

**bootlegging:** informal agreements by intelligence officers to share data outside established, formal channels; seen as a practice between analysts to share data by bypassing more formal channels of communication. [See also: stovepipe warning.]

**camouflage:** the act to employ or re-deploy material that seeks to confuse or mislead. "During the Indian nuclear tests in 1999 that took much of the world by surprise, the Indians knew exactly when the spy cameras would be passing over the testing facility near Pokharan in Rajasthan Desert and, in synchrony with the satellite orbits (every three days), scientists *camouflaged* their preparations."<sup>11</sup> [See also: deception.]

**capability:** the collective military, economic, political, and scientific and technical means, methods and capacity of a nation. [See also: threat; intention; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**Cassandra:** one who prophesies misfortune or disaster. In a warning context, the term refers to anyone who, like Chicken Little, announces that "the sky is falling" when in fact, only very ambiguous indications of a disastrous event actually exist. Concept and name derive from the daughter of King Priam of Troy, a prophetess of evil. [Term is usually capitalized; see also: Pollyanna.]

**circular intelligence:** information that is reported as an unconfirmed fact or assessment that is subsequently repeated in another agency or analyst's assessment as a true report. The first agency or analyst sees it in someone else's report and seizes on it as independent proof that his or her own information has been confirmed by another source. For example, prior to the Yom Kippur War in 1973 between Israel and Egypt, circular intelligence was a contributing factor to lull Israeli intelligence into a false sense of security. "When the Israelis saw that the U.S. was not worried by the build-up, they confirmed their earlier judgements. If Washington was unruffled, concluded Mrs. Meir [the Prime Minister of Israel] and her inner policy group on 5 October, then why should they be? It was a classic and vicious example of 'circular intelligence.' (Washington was not worried about

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<sup>9</sup> Sam Adams, *War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir* (Vermont: Steerforth Press, 1994). Discussed throughout the book.

<sup>10</sup> Press conference held on 16 Sept 1999 on the results of the NATO air campaign against Serb military and police forces in Kosovo and in southern Serbia.

<sup>11</sup> Loch Johnson, "Spies," *Foreign Policy* 120 (September/October 2000): 22.

Egypt's military buildup because they received intelligence from the Israelis that there was nothing to worry about.) Everyone left the 5 October meetings uneasy and with a feeling that something was wrong."<sup>12</sup> Egypt attacked the next day. [See also: hugger-mugger.]

**clientitis:** overly sympathetic analysis of events in the target state; an unrealistic attempt to understand the motivations and values of the target country's leaders or major groupings from the perspective of the target. "More than ever before, the State Department cannot afford to have 'clientitis,' a malady characterized by undue deference to the potential reactions of other countries. I have long thought the [U.S.] State Department needs an 'America Desk.' This Administration will have one — and I'll be sitting behind it."<sup>13</sup>

**CNN effect:** the immediate rise of a real or perceived crisis that sustains public awareness and urges policymakers to take action. The acronym CNN stands for Cable News Network, which has come to symbolize all forms of mass media that focus and magnify a single action, event or decision by publicizing it worldwide. "Resisting the 'CNN effect' may be one of the most important requirements of U.S. policymaking in the coming period."<sup>14</sup> The "CNN effect" of televised images of suffering has generated public demands for action; it has been a key definer especially of humanitarian problems. (Television depicts only poorly the political complexities that produce such suffering, leading to inappropriately narrow or erroneous problem identification.)<sup>15</sup>

**cognitive dissonance:** the rejection of factual information or reality because it does not conform to previously held beliefs — mostly used by psychologists. "A classic example is the case of 'Yellow Rain,' and discovery of lethal toxins in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the early 1980s. In spite of the overwhelming weight of confirmatory evidence accumulated over eight years, the findings continue to be challenged and contested, sometimes with offerings of bizarre scientific counter explanations that utterly defy common sense. The extreme reluctance to accept the evidence at face value cannot be attributed simply to the fact that intelligence could never meet the rigorous laboratory standards for evidence. Rather, it must surely lie in the unpleasantness of the implications insofar as they raise doubts about the viability of arms control agreements."<sup>16</sup>

**combat information:** unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to a tactical unit, which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be pro-

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<sup>12</sup> John Hughes-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders*, 251.

<sup>13</sup> Warren Christopher statement at the Senate Confirmation Hearing of Secretary-Designate Warren Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in Washington, DC, on 13 January 1993.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Seeking A National Strategy: A Concept For Preserving Security And Promoting Freedom-Phase II Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 2000)

<sup>15</sup> John A. Gentry, "Complex Civil-Military Operations: A U.S. Military-Centric Perspective," *Naval War College Review* 53, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 60.

<sup>16</sup> Harold Ford, *Estimate Intelligence: the Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 330.

cessed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the customer's tactical intelligence requirements. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**combat intelligence:** knowledge of the weather, the enemy, and geographical features required by a unit in the planning and conduct of combat operations. [See also: tactical intelligence; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**combat readiness:** synonymous with operational readiness, with respect to missions or functions performed in combat. [See also: operational readiness; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**complex emergency:** a natural or manmade disaster with economic, social and political dimensions. A humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going United Nations country program.<sup>17</sup>

**concentrated warning:** the responsibility of warning held by a singular body of analysts, focusing on threat management, whose sole duty and purpose is to communicate and forecast a possible threat. [See also: distributive warning.]

**conditioning and cover:** routine or repetitive acts used to cloak intentions; for example, holding routine military maneuvers as cover for aggressive action.

**conflict prevention:** those measures that can be implemented before a difference or dispute escalates into violence, designed to counter the spread of conflict into other geographical areas, and finally those measures that prevent violence from flaring up again after the signing of a peace agreement or a cease-fire.<sup>18</sup>

**consequence analysis:** forecasting the *implications* of an event or *result* of an action rather than predicting when the event or action will occur. [See also: consequence management.]

**consequence management:** Sometimes confused with "crisis management." "Consequence management comprises those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services and activities may include transportation, communications, public works, and engineering, fire fighting, information sharing, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy."<sup>19</sup> "Historical analysis of patterns of behavior of CBW terrorists, such as the choice of agent and delivery system,

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<sup>17</sup> United States Agency for International Development, *Conflict Early Warning Systems: Terms and Concepts*. (News Orleans, LA: Tulane Institute for International Development, May 1999), under the term "complex emergency."

<sup>18</sup> Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Preventing Violent Conflict: The Search for Political Will, Strategies and Effective Tools," seminar held 19-20 June 2000 in Sweden.

<sup>19</sup> U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," 18 February 1997, paragraph E2.

can also help improve the effectiveness of medical countermeasures and other *consequence management* [italics added] activities. Although some planning for worst-case scenarios is justified, the types of chemical and biological terrorism against which federal, state, and local planning should be primarily directed are small- to medium-scale attacks. Such a threat assessment is not the stuff of newspaper headlines, but the historical record surely justifies it.”<sup>20</sup> [See also: crisis management.]

**correlates of war theory:** according to this approach, national capabilities consist of demographic, industrial, and military characteristics, measured by comparative percentages. These characteristics include total national population; the number of cities with populations of 20,000 or more, the coal-ton equivalent of energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditures, and armed forces numbers excluding reserves.<sup>21</sup>

**correlation analysis:** deciphering whether a relationship exists between two seemingly independent parameters or events. Time-based correlations are of fundamental importance when building a threat scenario.

**counterintelligence:** passive (personnel and property security activities) and active (counter subversion of counterespionage) defense efforts against foreign intelligence activities.

**creeping normalcy:** the methodical increment of a country’s military capability so that its more capable posture is unnoticeable and accepted over time by outside observers.

**crisis:** the convergence of rapidly unfolding events in an outcome that is detrimental to national security; the outcome is to some degree indeterminate, which could create elements of both threat and opportunity; critical timing and decisionmaking under extreme personal and organizational stress. According to Joint Pub 1-02, “An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.” [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**crisis management:** an organization’s ability to prepare for perceived catastrophic events — such as terrorism — and its capacity to employ appropriate force and specialized capabilities to minimize damage to U.S. interests. Domestically, crisis management also employs every resource at the disposal of federal, state, and local governments. [See also: consequence management.]

**critical indicator(s)** (also known as key indicators): represent those actions or decisions that will immediately and directly affect a threat scenario; constitute a small portion of the overall number of indicators which can easily be monitored. “Detection of excessive ammunition production and export would be a *critical indicator* of impending armed

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<sup>20</sup> Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 4 (July/August 1999): 46-52.

<sup>21</sup> J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, *Measuring the Correlates of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 11.

conflict, since no military operation can succeed without adequate ammunition supplies, despite adequate numbers of weapons.”<sup>22</sup>

**critical intelligence:** intelligence that requires immediate attention by a commander or policymaker and which may enhance or refute previously held beliefs about hostilities or actions, leading to a change of policy.

**critical intelligence message** (also known as CRITIC): information about a situation that so critically affects the security interests of a country or its allies that it may require the immediate attention of the government’s highest official.

**cry-wolf syndrome or crying wolf:** the desensitization of observers after previous warnings have been issued without threatening consequences. “In 1968, CIA analyst Hovey’s bull’s-eye analysis of North Vietnam’s ability to strike at U.S. troops had made the rounds among the CIA’s top brass and it was even dispatched to the White House, where President Johnson read it 15 days before the attack. However, a note from George Carver, a top CIA official, shot down Hovey’s warning. Carver said Hovey was *crying wolf* [italics added].”<sup>23</sup> [See also: alert fatigue.]

**current indications:** activities relating to information, in varying degrees of evaluation, which bear on the intention of a potentially hostile force to adopt or reject a course of action; or which bear on an impending crisis.

**current intelligence:** intelligence information of all types and forms concerning events of immediate interest characteristically focusing on descriptive snapshots of generally static conditions; highly perishable information covering events that is disseminated without delay and lacks complete evaluation, interpretation, analysis, or integration. The fall of the Shah in Iran (1978) is a classic case of intelligence warning with current intelligence. CIA and State Department daily reports, the primary vehicles for political intelligence, consistently failed to draw Washington’s attention to Iran in the early spring and summer of 1978, following the worst rioting in a decade. Early identification of factors such as the Shah’s vulnerability and mounting dissidence could have prevented the crisis that evolved between the two countries. [See also: near-real time; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**current operational intelligence:** intelligence required for final planning and execution of all operations; especially important to military commanders in executing a tactical operation.

**daily intelligence summary (DINSUM):** a report that has daily analysis of possible crisis situations and a summary of relevant intelligence information that was disseminated within the past 24 hours.

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<sup>22</sup> Edward J. Laurence, “Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict Early Warning Factors and Preventative Action,” *Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Report* (1998), URL: <<http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/weapon/weapon.html>>, accessed 11 February 2001.

<sup>23</sup> This quote pertains to the 1968 Tet offensive; Adams, xiii.



**dangerous assumption:** a conceptual framework that makes sense of complex and disparate data by providing intellectual shortcuts and an anchor for interpretation, to the detriment of security considerations. For example, “This reality adds to the risks associated with President Clinton’s nuclear testing bridge-leap insofar as he makes the *dangerous assumption* that he will be able to ‘direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress’ in the event another nation conducts a nuclear test before the end of September 1994. The human talents and diagnostic skills necessary to prepare and conduct such tests are no more immutable [sic] to change over time than are the weapons themselves.”<sup>24</sup>

**decapitation strike:** a planned attack on key government buildings and installations with the purpose of rendering useless the command and control functions of enemy forces. It is this type of strike that intensifies the element of a surprise attack by enhancing the notion of a “leaderless victim.” The concept of “decapitation” refers to the metaphor of separating the “head from the body” and is similar to the “removal of the Intelligence Community and senior leadership from the warfighter. “A clandestine nuclear detonation in the city [Washington, DC] would likely doom the U.S. president, the vice president, Cabinet members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members of Congress who were there at the time. The chaos that such an attack would cause would be difficult to overstate. One of the more difficult questions to answer in the hours after such a [nuclear, biological and chemical terrorist] *decapitation attack* would be ‘who is in charge here?’ This chaos would be compounded if the headquarters housing the U.S. regional CINC [Commander-In-Chief] and his staff also were to suffer a similar *decapitation strike* at the same time. It is possible that the national leadership and the regional military forces of the United States would be plunged into chaos for some time.”<sup>25</sup>

**deception:** the practice of employing various ruses to disguise real intentions and true capabilities. Commonly known as having the ability to provide misleading or false information in order to achieve the element of surprise; however, there is more to deception than that which meets the eye. For example, it is those measures designed to mislead by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce a reaction that is prejudicial to the victim’s own interest. There are three main reasons to conduct deception. One type of deception attempts to misdirect the enemy’s attention, causing him to concentrate his forces in the wrong place. By doing this, the deceiver tries to make his adversary violate the principle of concentration of forces. An example would be the Allied deception plans that diverted German attention from the beaches of Normandy to Norway and Pas de Calais as possible landing sites for an Allied invasion. A second type of deception makes the adversary violate the so-called principle of economy of force, which causes the opponent to waste resources. An example of this would be any artificial radar signal that

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<sup>24</sup> “New Democrat Watch #8: Clinton Bungee Jumping On Nuclear Testing Endangers National Security,” *Decision Brief* No. 93-D58. (Washington, DC: The Center For Security Policy, 6 July 1993).

<sup>25</sup> Barry R. Schneider, “Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future,” *New Era Warfare? A Revolution in Military Affairs*. URL: <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/ov-2.html>>, accessed 11 February 2001.

draws enemy firepower and attention such as when during World War II the British led the Germans to attack non-existent airfields and factories by setting up phony targets and interfering with German electronic navigation aids. Finally, a third type of deception is designed to surprise an opponent by creating a situation that will later catch him off-guard and unprepared for action with it occurs. Hitler's policy toward Russia until the eve of his attack on the country (BARBAROSSA) in June 1941 would be a perfect example. It should also be noted that this third type of deception is also related to the two mentioned earlier.<sup>26</sup> [See also: A-type deception; active deception; passive deception; denial.]

**defense automated warning system (DAWS):** the only automated software package used within the U.S. Department of Defense Indications and Warning System to monitor, produce, and record I&W database message traffic. It automatically updates I&W matrix/status boards and historically files electronic messages by I&W report type, permitting rapid recovery of I&W data. DAWS also has an integrated message handling capability and a message generation template package.

**Defense Intelligence Agency:** "The Defense Intelligence Agency issues a number of periodic and special warning reports designed to give guidance on threats to the U.S. commands around the world. The *Weekly Intelligence Forecast* and the *Weekly Warning Forecast Report* include assessments from the various commands. The *Quarterly Warning Forecast* reviews a broad range of potential developments that could have an impact on U.S. security interests. In addition, DIA and the Unified Commands, as members of the Defense I&W system, publish two ad hoc products as issues arise: the *Warning Report* is an assessment of a specific warning issue; the *Watch Condition Change* is a notification of a change—either up or down—in the threat level presented by a specific warning problem. The *Warning Report* is the vehicle by which the Department of Defense's indications and warning system communicates warning intelligence that is worthy of the immediate, specific attention of senior U.S. officials within the Washington area."<sup>27</sup>

**Delphi method:** "[A method] designed to deal with cases where several experts are available to contribute and pool their opinions on some particular issue. First used in the early 1950's by the RAND Corporation for military estimation problems. Depending on the complexity of the subject matter, ten to fifty experts/specialists are required. A questionnaire (or interview) is prepared asking for the probability of occurrences of certain events (such as technological breakthroughs by a certain date—or alternatively, for the date by which the occurrence is judged to have a given probability, or even for an entire probability distribution over time.)

Round 1: A first set of estimated answers is solicited. Sometimes the respondents are asked to select only the questions about which they consider themselves especially com-

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<sup>26</sup> Michael Handel I., "Intelligence and Deception," in *Military Deception and Strategic Surprise*, eds. John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter (London, UK: Frank Cass & Co., 1982), 124-125.

<sup>27</sup> John Pike, *Defense Intelligence Agency Products*, URL: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product>>, accessed 1 May 2001.

petent. Alternatively, answers to all questions may be requested, accompanied by a self-rating of relative competence for each question.

Round 2: The participants are then provided with the Round 1 response distribution which is usually presented in terms of the median and the first and third quartiles. And new, possibly revised, responses are solicited.

Round 3: The resulting response distribution is fed back, together with a summary of the argument, defending relatively deviant responses. Again, the participants are asked for reestimates.

Round 4: Again, the new response distribution and a summary of the counter arguments are fed back, and a final set of answers is issued based on due considerations of all arguments and counter-arguments that were presented.

The medians of the responses of this final round are then accepted as the group's position, representing the nearest thing to a consensus that is attainable. A report on the outcome usually also includes an indication of the residual spread of opinions, as well as of minority arguments in defense of deviant opinions, particularly in cases where sizeable dissent remains."<sup>28</sup>

**demonstration:** activity to divert a victim's strength and attention from the real or primary operation; to fix the enemy's local forces by actual combat, hopefully drawing forces into irrelevant battle. [See also: diversion; fabrication, feint; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**denial and deception** (also known as D&D): denial is the ability to prevent or impair the collection of intelligence by the enemy and deception is the ability to mislead intelligence gathering by providing a distortion of reality. "Precise forecasts of the growth in ballistic missile capabilities over the next two decades — tests by year, production rates, weapons deployed by year, weapon characteristics by system type and circular error probable (CEP) — cannot be provided with confidence. *Deception and denial* efforts are intense and often successful, and U.S. collection and analysis assets are limited. Together they create a high risk of continued surprise. The question is not simply whether we will have warning of an emerging capability, but whether the nature and magnitude of a particular threat will be perceived with sufficient clarity in time to take appropriate action. Concealment *denial and deception* efforts by key target countries are intended to delay the discovery of strategically significant activities until well after they had [sic] been carried out successfully. The fact that some of these secret activities are discovered over time is to the credit of the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, the fact that there are delays in discovery of those activities provides a sharp warning that a great deal of activity goes undetected."<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> This explanation comes from one of the designers of this method, Olaf Helmer, "The Use of Expert Opinion in International Relations Forecasting," *Forecasting in International Relations*, ed. Nazli Choueri (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1978), 116-123.

<sup>29</sup> U.S. Congressional Commission, *Report of the U.S. Congressional Commission To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States*, 15 July 1998, paragraph F.

**disaster alert:** the period from the issuing of a public warning of an imminent disaster to its actual impact. The period during which pre-impact precautionary or disaster containment measures are conducted.<sup>30</sup>

**disaster preparedness:** measures that ensure the readiness and ability of a society to forecast and take precautionary measures in advance of an imminent threat and respond to and cope with the effects of a disaster by organizing and delivering timely and effective rescue, relief, and other appropriate post-disaster assistance.<sup>31</sup>

**disaster prevention:** originally defined as “measures designed to prevent natural phenomena from causing or resulting in disaster or other emergency situations.” The term has now been largely replaced by “mitigation” in the recognition that few disasters can be prevented definitively.<sup>32</sup>

**disaster relief:** the provision of external relief supplies and services, which assists a state to meet the immediate needs of those affected by a disaster.<sup>33</sup>

**disaster response:** a sum of decisions and actions taken during and after disaster, including immediate relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.<sup>34</sup>

**disaster team:** multidisciplinary, multi-sectorial group of persons qualified to evaluate a disaster and to bring the necessary relief.<sup>35</sup>

**distant early warning** (also known as the “DEW line”): a radar network constructed by the United States and Canada to ensure a four-hour warning of a Soviet air attack.

**disinformation:** false and irrelevant information made available to deceive. “Iraq’s disinformation charges usually originate in their media and have been widely and often uncritically repeated by sympathetic media in Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and, to a lesser extent, media in Pakistan, Morocco, Mauritania, Bangladesh, and other countries. Iraqi disinformation is often picked up and disseminated by otherwise responsible news media that fail to verify a story’s source or facts. Iraqi ambassadors and embassy spokesmen have also made blatant disinformation claims in media appearances worldwide. *Disinformation* is a cheap, crude, and often very effective way to inflame public opinion and affect attitudes. It involves the deliberate production and dissemination of falsehoods by a government for a political purpose. *Disinformation* differs fundamentally from misinformation—unintentional errors which occur when facts are unclear and deadline pressures are urgent—in its clearly misleading and propagandistic purposes. Iraq’s disinformation strategy is predictable. Its leaders have tried to make it appear that: Iraq is strong and the multinational coalition is weak; Israel

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<sup>30</sup> UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNHA), *The Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets in Relief Operations Reference Manual* (New York: United Nations Press, 1995), under “disaster alert.”

<sup>31</sup> UNHA, under “disaster preparedness.”

<sup>32</sup> UNHA, under “disaster prevention.”

<sup>33</sup> UNHA, under “disaster relief.”

<sup>34</sup> UNHA, under “disaster response.”

<sup>35</sup> UNHA, under “disaster team.”

is part of the multinational coalition; Allied Forces are committing crimes against Islam and atrocities in general; the United States is at odds with various countries in the coalition.”<sup>36</sup>

**distributive warning:** the process of warning, emanating from several analysts or agencies, whose focus may overlap, and whose duties may have other purposes than to communicate and forecast a possible threat. [See also: concentrated warning.]

**diversion:** an act perpetrated for the purpose of turning attention or interest from a given area. Two modes of diversion are feints and demonstrations. [See also: demonstration, fabrication and feints.]

**double blind:** slang term that usually refers to a condition to describe an analyst who purposely skews information or intelligence to support an already-held contention or perspective, to further advance a theory or scenario. [See also: clientitis.]

**drivers** (also known as key variables): uncertain factors that analysts judge most likely to determine the outcome of a complex situation. “Late last year the NIC published a report called *Global Trends 2015* which presented the results of close collaboration between U.S. government specialists and a wide range of experts outside the government, on our best judgments of major *drivers* and trends that will shape the world of 2015.”<sup>37</sup>

**elements of national power:** all the means available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives as determined by available indicators. [See also: national power.]

**emergency:** an extraordinary situation in which people are unable to meet their basic survival needs, or there are serious and immediate threats to human life and well-being. An emergency situation may arise as a result of a disaster, a cumulative process of neglect or environmental degradation, or when a disaster threatens and emergency measures have to be taken to prevent or at least limit the effects of the eventual impact.<sup>38</sup>

**emergency medical system:** the aggregate of material resources and personnel needed to deliver medical care to those with an unpredicted, immediate health need outside established medical facilities.<sup>39</sup>

**emergency medicine:** the specialized institutional system and resources required to meet immediate and unexpected medical needs.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Todd Leyenthal, “Disinformation Integral Part of Iraqi Strategy,” Backgrounder from USIA, 4 February 1991, URL: <<http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1991/910204-171055.htm>>, accessed 1 Sept 2001.

<sup>37</sup> Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology (as prepared for delivery) *Statement for the Record for the Joint Economic Committee Cyber Threat Trends and U.S. Network Security*, 21 June 2001. URL: <[http://www.cia.gov/cia/public\\_affairs/speeches/gershwin\\_speech\\_06222001.html](http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/gershwin_speech_06222001.html)>, accessed 1 Sept 2001.

<sup>38</sup> UNHA, under “emergency.”

<sup>39</sup> UNHA, under “emergency medical system.”

<sup>40</sup> UNHA, under “emergency medicine.”

**emergency operations center:** officially designated facility for the direction and coordination of all activities during the response phase of a disaster. <sup>41</sup>

**emergency response:** the action taken immediately following a disaster warning or alert to minimize or contain the eventual negative effects, and those actions taken to save and preserve lives and provide basic services in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, and for as long as an emergency situation prevails.

**emergency measures of military preparedness:** additional efforts undertaken to buttress the basic measures of readiness, usually in response to strategic warning, to counter a massive attack. [See also: basic measures of military preparedness.]

**estimate:** analysis of a situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets its significance, and appraises the possibilities and the potential results of the various actions that might be taken; an appraisal of a nation's capabilities, vulnerabilities and potential courses of action. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**estimative intelligence:** a type of intelligence that projects or forecasts potential foreign courses of action and developments and discusses their implications for the host nation or its allies; predictive judgment on a possible course of action by a potential enemy in any area of interest to decisionmakers (such as weapons development, weapons employment strategies, overall military tactics and policies, economic capacities, and the like); an appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action.

**exceptional theory:** projecting an adversary's behavior based heavily on explanations of the past in specific incidents, where unusual possibilities may turn out to be relevant; assuming deviance of behavior rather than continuity.<sup>42</sup> [See also: normal theory.]

**fabrication:** a deceptive practice of creating a totally unreal event or situation. [See also: demonstration; diversion; feint.]

**fact:** an event or action that has occurred and has been verified by two independent sources.

**feint:** an act intended to divert a victim's attention from the main target of an attack by contriving a mock attack where actual combat is not intended; in other words, simulating a buildup for an imminent attack. During World War II, General Eisenhower's headquarters developed a feint, codenamed FORTITUDE, to distract German attention from the real landing area in Normandy. Allied radio messages were broadcast in such a way as to divert attention from the south of England to a spoof headquarters in Scotland. "A very busy signals staff contrived, by sending out the right sort of dummy wireless traffic, to

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<sup>41</sup> UNHA, under "emergency operations center."

<sup>42</sup> Richard Betts, "Warning Dilemmas: Normal Theory vs. Exceptional Theory," *Orbis* 26 (Winter 1983): 828-833.

assemble a fictitious 4th Army in Scotland. The “wireless training” of this army contained some purposeful indiscretions. By these furtive, impressionistic and devious indiscretions, FORTITUDE sought to let the Germans convince themselves of what they had always wanted to believe anyway—that the invaders would pour across the Channel at the narrowest point, from Dover to the Pas de Calais; the build-up in Scotland itself suggested a preliminary feint-like assault on southern Norway. In fact, so conclusive did the evidence seem to be that more than a month after the invasion in Normandy, Hitler declared that ‘the enemy will probably attempt a second landing in the 15th Army sector’ — the zone of the Pas de Calais.”<sup>43</sup> [See also: deception; demonstration; diversion; fabrication.]

**fig leaf:** an event or activity of seemingly minor consequence used for the justification of a larger or more important and significant action; often used as an excuse. “He [Secretary of State Dean Rusk] said he felt we might be confronted by serious uprisings all over Latin America if U.S. forces were to go in, not to mention the temptation that the commitment of such forces in Cuba would provide elsewhere in the world. In this connection he again mentioned the possibility of a physical base on the Isle of Pines for a provisional government that we could recognize. This he thought would be a powerful step forward. What we needed was a ‘fig leaf.’ A Cuban provisional government on the Isle of Pines, for example, could sink Soviet ships carrying supplies to Castro with less danger than would be the case with direct involvement of U.S. forces.”<sup>44</sup>

**forecast:** this term should not be confused with prediction. Whereas predictions assert the occurrence of some event with certainty (“insurgents will capture the city next year”), a forecast is a probabilistic statement (“there is a 3-1 chance that the insurgents will capture the city next year”). A prediction may be viewed as a limiting case of a forecast, where the assigned probability reaches the level of certainty; however, forecasts very rarely take the form of predictions. Also, forecasts may refer either to events or to trends, and these changes must be verifiable if forecasts are to be operationally meaningful. “This puts a special strain on forecasts in social science areas as opposed to, say, technological forecasts, because the terminology we tend to use (‘risking dissatisfaction,’ ‘détente,’ ‘nationalism’) does not always have the crispness necessary to allow unambiguously verifiable assertions. As a consequence, forecasts, in order to be meaningful, sometimes have to be formulated in terms of certain indicators. If possible, these are social or political indicators whose values are objectively measurable.”<sup>45</sup> “[South Korean] Seoul-based banks demand that the government honor the payment guarantee at the earliest date possible, as they have failed to receive the loans from Russia. But analysts *forecast* that the government payment is unlikely within the year. And the banks may even fail to get the payment

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<sup>43</sup> David Kahn, *The Code-Breakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communications from Ancient Times to the Internet* (New York: Scribner Press, 1996), 508-509.

<sup>44</sup> U.S. Department of State, Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, 19 January 1961. (Planning an invasion of Cuba), *Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962.*

<sup>45</sup> Helmer, 117.

by next year, given the protracted negotiations regarding the state budget toward that end.<sup>46</sup> [See also: predication and indicator.]

**generic indicator directory (GID):** any source document that contains a listing of a general set of indicators from which to choose in developing a specific indicator list for a given warning problem or concern.

**Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS):** located under the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the system provides annual reports with a global perspective on the production, stocks and trade of cereals and other basic food commodities. Publications contain analyses of trends and prospects of hunger worldwide and statistical information on developments in the world cereal markets, export prices and ocean freight rates. GIEWS also produces “special reports and alerts” that describe the food supply and agricultural situation in countries or sub-regions experiencing particular food supply difficulties. They also alert the international community on measures to be taken. [See also: Humanitarian Early Warning System.]

**holy grail:** a specific, mostly notional, indication that clearly delineates the exact time, location or intention of a future course of action (such as an attack); a singular piece of data that fully validates all previous existing intelligence analysis or assessments. For example, although the U.S. had intercepted Japanese message traffic prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, not one of the messages was the *holy grail* that stated the day, time and avenues of approach of the attack.

**hugger-mugger:** term of unknown origin meaning secret or stealthy. It also means confused or disorderly, in reference to intelligence operations; also refers to the manipulation of information that produces false signals which are believed to be true indications. *Hugger-mugger* occurred among watch officers in the 1970’s when the CIA generated stories detrimental to Chilean President Salvador Allende, creating so much activity that U.S. watch centers began picking up false information that the CIA itself had planted, and reported it back to Washington. “Thick and unwholesome in their thoughts and whispers//For good Polonius’ death, and we have done but greenly// In hugger-mugger to inter him: poor Ophelia// Divided from herself and her fair judgment// Without the which we are pictures, or mere beasts”<sup>47</sup> Finally, in another example, “Most reporting from Kosovo still tilts toward the Albanians and against the Serbs even though, for many months, the real story has been about NATO’s failure to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Serbs. Why should this be? One reason is that many of the reporters in Kosovo are old Balkan hands that first reported Serbian atrocities in Bosnia and then Serbian excesses in Kosovo. They are *hugger-mugger* with Albanian intellectuals such as the journalist Veton Surroi. Their mindset is such that they find it very difficult to see the Serbs as victims. In a sense they are reporting the last war rather than what is going on now.”<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Shim Jae-yun, “Seoul Banks Ask Gov’t to Repay Russian Debts,” *Korea Times*, 19 December 2000, B1.

<sup>47</sup> William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act IV, Scene V, lines 83-87.

<sup>48</sup> Stephen Glover, “The Serbs are still being presented as the bad guys. So what’s new in the news from Kosovo?” *The Spectator* 284, no. 8952 (4 March 2000): 28.



**Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS):** developed in 1994 in the United Nations' Department of Humanitarian Affairs. HEWS was the first database program designed primarily to collect quantitative information on a number of countries highly susceptible to complex emergencies. However, due to a shortage of personnel to update and maintain the database this system became a major disappointment and it was unable to provide sufficient early warning.<sup>49</sup> [See also: Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture.]

**immediate message:** a precedence category reserved for messages relating to situations that gravely affect the security of national or allied forces or people and requires immediate delivery to the addressees. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**incident:** an event directly affecting a country's personnel or interests that may have broader repercussions and lead to a crisis.

**indication:** a specific act or decision an enemy has taken as part of an aggressive action. An expected action or decision that if, or when it occurs, signifies the unfolding of a threatening scenario. [See also: signposts; indicator; intention.]

**indications analysis:** a deductive process for evaluating the significance of observed intelligence against an established list of indicators to signify an increase in the hostile policy/attitudes of an aggressor. These factors are logical or plausible moves or acts, based on Western reasoning or observed during past conflicts or crises, or based on the results of intelligence assessments of enemy strategic offensive military doctrine and strategic standard operating procedures.

**indications and warning (I&W):** a generic term usually associated with intelligence activities needed to detect and report time-sensitive knowledge on foreign events that could threaten a country's allies, its citizens abroad, or the country's military, economic, or political interests.<sup>50</sup> [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**indications and warning intelligence:** information that alerts or warns of an impending course of action by a foreign power that is detrimental to the interests of a country. This information is the product of recognition and correlation of threat indications and the synthesis of a threat posture.<sup>51</sup> [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**indications and warning systems:** a network of intelligence production facilities with analytical resources capable of contributing to or developing indications and warning intelligence, and disseminating this product within their own command and to other facilities, organizations, or commands. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

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<sup>49</sup> United Nations General Assembly, "Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations," *Report of the Secretary-General* (2 September 1994): A/49/177.

<sup>50</sup> Bruce Watson, Susan Watson and Gerald Hopple, *United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1990), 594. Hereafter cited as: Watson.

<sup>51</sup> Watson, 286.

**indications center:** an intelligence situation room distinguished by around-the-clock operations, comprehensive communications, concentration on all aspects of possible enemy attack or other situations which might require action by the military, and adherence to procedures established for operation within an indications and warning system. Sometimes it may be the focal point for performing the operational intelligence functions for a command. [See also: alert center; warning center; watch center.]

**indications watch officer:** an intelligence watch officer or duty officer who serves in an indications center; trained to identify indications of hostilities and cope with other intelligence matters requiring immediate action.<sup>52</sup>

**indicator:** a generalized, theoretical statement of a course of action or decision that is expected to be taken in preparation for an aggressive act and that can be used to guide intelligence collection resources. Commonly, indicators are developed from enemy doctrine, or from previous military operations or exercises, and an analyst's ability to apply logic and common sense. "The progress that the Government of Lebanon is making in counternarcotics through the steps being taken toward acceding to the 1988 Convention on Narcotics and the drafting of laws addressing money laundering schemes, constitute grounds for cautious optimism. The *willingness* [italics added] of the Government of Lebanon to pursue the prosecution of a member of Parliament is another indicator of its increased seriousness in its counternarcotics efforts."<sup>53</sup>

**Indicator, critical:** [See also: critical indicator.]

**indicator, hard:** any generalized, theoretical action, usually focusing on capabilities that can be linked without a doubt to intentions of an aggressor. For example, the forward deployment of tanks, armored personal carriers or the sudden expansion of medical facilities or beds in a hospital would be *hard indicators* that a target country is planning, without a doubt, aggressive action.

**indicator, soft:** a generalized, theoretical action that focuses on capabilities and may be linked to possible intentions of an aggressor. For example, an increase in the number of military personnel for a scheduled training exercise would be a *soft indicator* that the country may be planning to go to war. [See also: hard indicator; indicator.]

**indicator element:** a term used mostly in communications and signals intelligence analysis to distinguish message traffic; not considered a strategic indications and warning term.

**indicator list:** a list of the factors or acts (military, political, economic, diplomatic, and internal actions) a foreign power might be expected to take if it intended to initiate hostilities; these factors are logical/plausible moves or acts based on ostensive evidence, that

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<sup>52</sup> Watson, 287.

<sup>53</sup> U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *U.S. Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, March 1995. URL: <<http://dosfan.lib.unc.edu/ERC/law/INC/1995/09.html>>, accessed 17 February 2001.

have been observed during past conflicts and crises, and that result from intelligence assessments of enemy strategic offensive military doctrine and strategic-level standing operating procedures.

**indicator organization:** a counterintelligence term for a model group or organization that represents several other groups or organizations seeking the same political or ideological goals. In instances where counterintelligence and security assets are limited, the prototype would be targeted for extensive surveillance, and the results would be considered applicable to the other organizations in the set.

**infrastructure attack (IA):** an attack designed to significantly compromise the function of a whole infrastructure rather than individual components. “Attacks against infrastructure are relatively new and are of interest in the study of information warfare. In considering infrastructure vulnerabilities, threats to both individual systems and the infrastructure itself must be evaluated when considering criminal activity. Both share similar enablers as a pre-requisite to compromise, however, infrastructure attacks require a more concerted and coordinated effort and provide better data points for indicator and warning analysis.”<sup>54</sup>

**inferences:** conclusions derived from facts or from other inferences; that is, from forecasts, predictions, extrapolations and estimates.

**information:** unevaluated material, at all levels of reliability and from any source, which may contain intelligence information.

**information warfare (IW):** actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems, while defending one’s own information, information-based processes, and information systems.

**instability indicator (I2):** a specific issue or factor that may represent a potential threat to mission force operations and protection. [See also: indicator.]

**intelligence:** the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.

**intelligence assessment:** a phenomenon that encompasses most analytical studies dealing with subjects of policy significance; thorough in its treatment of subject matter but, unlike estimative intelligence, an assessment may not attempt to project future developments and their implications; usually coordinated within the producing organization but may not be coordinated with other intelligence agencies. [See also: estimative intelligence.]

**intelligence collection plan:** a plan for gathering information from all available sources to meet an intelligence requirement. Specifically, a logical plan for transforming specific

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<sup>54</sup> Kent Anderson, *Intelligence-Based Threat Assessments for Information Networks and Infrastructures: A White Paper* (Portland, OR: Global Technology Research, Inc., 1998): 4.

requests for information (possible indicators) into orders to collection sources within a required time limit. [See also: indicator; scenario; JCS Pub 1-02]

**intelligence day (I-DAY):** the day on which the Intelligence Community determines that, within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs which may signal a heightened threat, although the scope and direction of the threat may be ambiguous. The Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

**intelligence estimate:** an appraisal of elements of intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition in order to determine a target's courses of action, as well as their probable order of adoption; a prediction of future events, developments or courses of action and their implications and consequences. [See also: national intelligence estimate; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**intelligence failure:** this generic term is often used to lay blame on the Intelligence Community when an unexpected event or action occurs that may have an impact on U.S. foreign policy. However, not all intelligence failures are warning failures. An intelligence failure encompasses all or parts of the intelligence process and system. "Despite our best intentions, the system is sufficiently dysfunctional that intelligence failure is guaranteed. Though the form is less important than the fact, the variations are endless. Failure may be of the traditional variety: we fail to predict the fall of a friendly government; we do not provide sufficient warning of a surprise attack against one of our allies or interests; we are completely surprised by a state-sponsored terrorist attack; or we fail to detect an unexpected country acquiring a weapon of mass destruction. Or it may take a more nontraditional form: we overstate numerous threats leading to tens of billions of dollars of unnecessary expenditures; database errors lead to a politically unacceptable number of casualties in a peace-enforcement operation; or an operation does not go well because the IC is not able to provide the incredibly specific data necessary to support a new generation of weapons. In the end, we may not suffer a Pearl Harbor, but simply succumb to a series of mistakes..."<sup>55</sup> "While these surprises have often been cited as *intelligence failures* [italics added] — and admittedly there were some serious inadequacies in collection and assessment — gross misperceptions and errors in judgment by policymakers and military command were the real causes of failure. There is no better example of the principle that warning is useless unless it results in action to forestall disaster."<sup>56</sup> [See also: warning failure]

**intelligence readiness:** creation of optimal organizational and procedural conditions to manage security threats, achieved through information management for timely, expert analysis, tailored synthesis, and provision of support to consumers.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Russ Travers, "The Coming Intelligence Failure," Unclassified *Studies In Intelligence* 1, no.1 (1997).

<sup>56</sup> Cynthia M. Grabo, "Warning Intelligence," *The Intelligence Profession Series*, no. 4 (McLean, VA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1987).

<sup>57</sup> Russell G. Swenson, *An Office Manager's Guide To Intelligence Readiness*. Occasional Paper Number Three (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, June 1996).

**intention:** an adversary’s purpose, plan, commitment, or design for action as possibly exhibited by a leader, decisionmaker, nation, or a nation’s foreign policy. [See also: indicator; indications; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**Iran, Fall of the Shah:** “It is incontrovertible that in 1978 a major intelligence failure occurred—of great consequence for U.S. interests—when the Intelligence Community did not warn American policymakers that the Shah was about to fall, and that there was significant chance that a fundamentalist, radically anti-Western regime would come to power in Iran. This delinquency was not the monopoly, however, of the National Intelligence Officers, or of the estimative process, or even of the entire U.S. Intelligence Community. Rather, it was a **U.S.** failure. In short, it was the result of certain mind-sets, shared widely throughout the Government, which tended to (1) take the Shah for granted; (2) overestimate Iran’s stability; (3) place domestic trends within Iran down the list of U.S. intelligence priorities there; (4) underestimate the disruptive effects of forced modernization in Iran, the growing revolutionary pressures, the increasing grievances against the West, and the embodying of these disruptive forces in a then-exile in Paris, the aged Ayatollah Khomeini; and (5) fail to consider what the enormous consequences for U.S. interests would be in the event America’s ally, the Shah, did fall from power.”<sup>58</sup>

**key drivers:** variables within a threat scenario that seemingly have a dynamic influence on the environment or the success or failure of the outcome of a particular scenario.

**key indicator** (also known as **critical indicator**): those actions or decisions that will immediately and directly affect a threat scenario, constitute a small proportion of the overall indicators, and which can easily be monitored.

**key questions:** basic, “so-what” kernels of the particular estimative situation that should be fashioned at the very outset of any estimate. Framing such key questions is usually a much more difficult task than the novice might assume, and in practice many [estimates] have been rushed into with no clear picture of what the really essential elements of the situation were in which the policymaker would be most interested.<sup>59</sup> [See also: key judgments; principal conclusions.]

**key judgments:** extraction of the overall situation and likely outcome based on an extensive review or research of a given situation; encapsulation of a lengthy estimate, found in the first few pages of an estimate. [See key questions; principle conclusions.]

**Korean War:** “[A] watershed in U.S. national estimating because intelligence failed to ring alarm bells either in June 1950 when the North Koreans were about to invade South Korea, or in November when the Chinese Communists had infiltrated great numbers of combat troops into North Korea in preparation for launching a massive offensive against U.S.-UN forces. This failure to warn led to the creation of the Office of National

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<sup>58</sup> Ford, 121.

<sup>59</sup> Ford, 36.

Estimates and of a system of more effective national intelligence estimating that has endured essentially unchanged to this day.”<sup>60</sup>

**linchpin assumptions:** premises that hold the argument together and warrant the validity of the conclusion.

**local indicator list:** a supplementary collection guide, developed for select activities and specific commands, which can be activated whenever there exists a need to acquire I&W-related information during critical periods; this list specifies local activities that can significantly impact a warning problem.

**M-type deception:** achieving a reduction of ambiguity, as perceived by the intended target, by building attractiveness of a wrong alternative; may be more difficult than A-type deception because it requires time and carefully orchestrated resources to build a series of misleading false signals. A deception program may start out as an M-type ploy to confirm the adversary’s expectations about what is going to happen based on what he expects on the basis of logic and experience. However, since most adversaries are prudent enough to consider other possibilities (of which one may be the real solution), the deceiver also may employ an A-type program to increase the number of alternatives. This, if effective, causes the deception target to spread his remaining resources over a number of possibilities.<sup>61</sup> [See A-type deception; active deception; denial and deception; passive deception.]

**manipulation:** a deceptive practice of quoting factual information out of context or reporting only part of a given situation.

**military intelligence:** in the context of warning, this term means information that is analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted and that describes and defines a nation’s military capabilities for both offensive and defensive postures. Information used to estimate the probable use of military strategy, tactics, and doctrine; provides decisionmakers, planners, and commanders with data needed to choose courses of action required to counter foreign military threats, and to conduct operations if necessary. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**mirror-imaging:** a belief that leaders of a nation will behave in the same manner as leaders of another nation, particularly in a tense and confusing situation. Example: mirror-imaging occurred prior to the bombing of the U.S. Naval Base in Pearl Harbor in 1941 when U.S. personnel reasoned that the United States had far greater military, economic, and industrial strength than Japan; thus the Japanese would recognize that they could not win a war against this country. In a sense, U.S. analysts perceived a Japanese attack as irrational based on American perceptions and assumptions.<sup>62</sup>

**missile gap:** American perception during the 1960 presidential campaign, fueled by candidate John F. Kennedy, that a gap existed or would soon exist between the number of

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<sup>60</sup> Ford, 44.

<sup>61</sup> Dewar. *The Art of Deception in Warfare*, 84.

<sup>62</sup> Ladislav Fargo, *The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation Magic” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1967), 284.

U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the operational number of Soviet ICBMs. Reportedly, a U.S. Air Force estimate had 600-800 Soviet missiles, CIA had an estimate of 450 missiles, and the U.S. Navy had an estimate of 200 missiles. Proponents of the “missile gap” thesis were able to put public pressure to increase defense spending and a greater procurement of newer ICBMs. Over time the differences in estimates of Soviet ICBMs force levels were attributed to differing methodologies, changes in information collection and varying strategic perceptions by the agencies involved.<sup>63</sup>

**mission creep:** any military mission lacking clear goals or objectives that in the continuance of that mission slowly evolves into additional duties and responsibilities. Not to be confused with the term “creeping normalcy.” “National-level orders may contain internal inconsistencies that make a mission especially difficult or even impossible. By analyzing their directives, commanders can (though the literature suggests they rarely do) largely predict what the courses of their operations will be if guidance is not modified. Flawed specifications lead, if not to failure, to changes in missions while they are in progress. The United States has a term for such adjustment to intelligence, policy, planning, and operational shortcomings: *mission creep*.”<sup>64</sup> [See creeping normalcy.]

**national intelligence estimate (NIE):** an assessment of a situation in the foreign environment which is relevant to the formulation of foreign economic and national security policy, and which projects probable future courses of action and developments; may be structured to illuminate differences of view. A strategic estimate of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W):** principal point of contact between the Director of Central Intelligence and intelligence consumers below the cabinet level; primary source of national-level substantive guidance to Intelligence Community planners, collectors, and resource managers. One of 13 National Intelligence Officers of the National Intelligence Council.

**National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) Alert Center:** located at the Pentagon, this 24-hour watch center monitors incoming current intelligence of national security value.

**national power:** a broad assessment of the means available to a nation in pursuit of its objectives. [See also: elements of national power.]

**National Signals Intelligence Operations Center (NSOC, pronounced “n-sock”):** located at the National Security Agency, this 24-hour watch center monitors incoming intelligence of national security value. Not to be confused with NSOC, Navy Satellite Operations Center.

**near-real time:** the reception of data and its analysis that has been processed and communicated in close duration to the actual event. [See also: current intelligence.]

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<sup>63</sup> Edgar M Bottoms, *The Missile Gap* (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickenson University Press, 1971), 155.

<sup>64</sup> Gentry, 61.

**net assessment:** comparative review and analysis of opposing national strengths, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

**noise:** the quantity of irrelevant or inconsistent signals and signs that lead to the misinterpretation of a threat. [See also: signal.]

**normal theory:** projecting an adversary's objectives, capabilities and propensity to risk based on problematic thinking and making the best possible estimates about numerous instances of behavior over time.<sup>65</sup> [See also: exceptional theory.]

**Office of National Estimates (ONE):** Central Intelligence Agency's research office that was to be limited to economic intelligence when it was created in 1950; however, in subsequent years it began dealing with political intelligence. The National Intelligence Council replaced it in 1973. [See also: Korean War; National Intelligence Officer for Warning.]

**operational readiness:** capability of a unit/formation, ship, weapon system or equipment to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or designed. This term may be used in a general sense or to express a level of readiness. [See also: combat readiness; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**operational warning:** required for effectively counteracting any major military operation that would hinder the ability to execute those military operations needed to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

**opinion:** a value judgment regarding a future course of action that cannot be directly observed; most heavily relied upon for warning in lieu of factual data. [See also: analysis; assessment.]

**palm reading assessment:** mostly used as a pejorative term for estimates and forecasting based on qualitative or intuitive judgment. The term received widespread use among U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers during the Vietnam War in the 1960s.<sup>66</sup> [See also: bean-counting assessment.]

**paradox of warning:** enemy counteraction based on action taken as a result of a warning that alters the enemy's initially intended course of action. The warning thus appears to be wrong on the basis of the change in enemy action. Also known as the "warning paradox."

**passive deception:** measures designed to mislead a foreign power, organization, or person by causing an object or situation to appear non-threatening when a threat does exist; downplaying capabilities or intentions to look less threatening. "*Passive deception* is primarily based on secrecy and camouflage, on hiding and concealing one's intentions and/or capabilities from the adversary. Some experts view *passive deception* as inferior and not likely to succeed against any competent intelligence organization...[which] is not

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<sup>65</sup> Betts, 828-833.

<sup>66</sup> Discussed at length in Sam Adam's book.



necessarily true [italics added].”<sup>67</sup> A classic example is the Trojan Horse incident in the second millennium. Troy’s soldiers accepted a seemingly innocuous gift from their enemy. However, inside the wooden statue of the giant horse were Greek soldiers ready to attack while the city slept. Today, the term “Trojan Horse” resurfaces in the lexicon of cyberwarfare. Most cyber viruses use passive deception to enter into a computer’s operating system by hiding inside another program or e-mail. [See also: A-type deception; active deception; denial and deception.]

**pattern recognition:** an inductive process of recognizing a commonality or trend in an aggregate of indications from which a plausible explanation or model can be developed.

**Pearl Harbor:** considered the greatest failure of strategic warning. Refers to the Japanese dropping bombs on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941; the beginning of the modern U.S. military intelligence warning era, when warning became recognized as a separate and distinct intelligence mission.

**phases of warning:** stages of a surprise attack that can degrade a nation’s defense. The three phases of warning are political, strategic, and tactical, although other analysts label these phases strategic, operational, and tactical. [See also: political warning; strategic warning; tactical warning.]

**political intelligence:** pertaining to foreign and domestic policies of governments and the activities of political movements.

**political warning:** a forecast of increasing tensions between two or more countries that raises the possibility that deterrence can fail, leading to an unforeseen crisis; usually can range over a period of days or months. [See also: strategic warning; tactical warning.]

**Pollyanna:** one who sees and reports only positive outcomes from current indications, regardless of the message read into the same indications by less biased analysts. Term originates from the American novel *Pollyanna* (1913) by Eleanor Porter. [Term is usually capitalized; see also: Cassandra.]

**possible:** that which can occur, or may happen, or could come true.<sup>68</sup> Sometimes confused with probable, a statement of likelihood. For example, “Their having the capability is *possible*, but the estimate of an opponent’s intention to use that capability is *not probable*.” [See also: probable.]

**post-surprise measures:** planned methods and activities to deal with a sudden attack once it has taken place. [See also: emergency measures; basic measures.]

**Potomac fever:** a slang term derived from the river that runs adjacent to the Pentagon, this is a pejorative term used to describe those who seek to provide intelligence or information they think senior-level leaders want; more generally, any analysis or assessment

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<sup>67</sup> Handel, 133.

<sup>68</sup> *Random House Dictionary* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 697.

produced with the guiding principle to please as many and offend as few as possible; warning production used solely to further the ambition and career goals of an individual.

**power intangibles:** factors, such as ideology, a government's ability to mobilize resources and manpower, the maintenance of ruling coalitions, or a fear of domestic revolutions or opposition movements, that have an independent impact on political intentions.

**precision acquisition intelligence:** required intelligence needed to create a valid assessment in an environment of ambiguity and uncertainty in a given crisis situation or warning problem. For example, data collected on reserve military medical technicians with advanced training in chemical or biological warfare may be the *precision acquisition intelligence* needed to understand a nation's readiness for certain types of warfare. [See also: precision engagement.]

**precision attack/engagement:** any attack of a target by weapons employing guidance, with sufficient spatial and temporal accuracy, that seeks to achieve its required effect with minimum expenditure of munitions and a reduced risk of collateral damage. "It is a scalpel approach to all types of military operations using lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force. In conventional warfighting, *precision engagement* is the ability to forgo brute force-on-force tactics and apply discriminate force precisely where required. One B-2 dropping 16 precision-guided weapons and destroying 16 key targets epitomizes *precision engagement*. It also redefines the traditional military concept of mass. In military operations other than war, *precision engagement* may be the rapid response of airborne resources, space assets or troops for monitoring peacekeeping operations or the timely airlift of relief supplies for humanitarian operations [*italics added*]."<sup>69</sup> [See also: creeping normalcy; salami tactics.]

**prediction:** a statement of the expected time, place and magnitude of a future event. [See also: forecast.]

**preemptive attack:** when a state initiates an attack because it believes it must act immediately or lose the opportunity to retaliate.

**Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56):** After several failed crisis interventions in Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti, U.S. strategic planners had to improve techniques regarding participation in such missions. President Clinton signed this directive in 1997 to address the need to focus on complex emergencies. Although this document remains classified, in a press release the White House outlined its goals and objectives. The directive orders the National Security Council to work with the National Defense University, Army War College, Pentagon, State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies to develop and conduct a multi-agency training and planning program focused on complex emergency issues.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Colonel Ronald Baughman, USAF, "The United States Air Force Perspective," *Rusi Journal* 145, no. 6 (December 2000): 75-76.

<sup>70</sup> U.S. President, Presidential Directive-56, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," 20 May 1997, A1-A7.

**preventive attack:** when senior-level leaders believe that an armed confrontation is not imminent, although it is likely to occur at a later date, and it is decided that by attacking now they would seize the initiative. [See also: preemptive attack.]

**preventive diplomacy:** diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence before it occurs. When a nation acts with political and economic tools, in concert with others, to head off conflict before it reaches the threshold of mass violence or military intervention. “The UN mission in Macedonia has been used as a part of a strategy of *preventive diplomacy* [italics added], and it is perhaps best known within a range of different preventive efforts undertaken within a longer period in this country.”<sup>71</sup>

**pride of previous position:** when an analyst has already expressed a viewpoint and is extremely reluctant to change it for fear of admitting error. [See also: double blind; clientitis.]

**principal conclusions:** those conclusions of a report or estimate that are emphasized to elicit a specific action or point to a clear understanding of a potential threat or action; based on basic intelligence. If done poorly or with bias, it can have a disastrous effect. Prior to the Korean War in 1950, General MacArthur’s own estimates by his G-2, Major General Charles Willoughby, were purposely slanted. “MacArthur did not want the Chinese to enter the war in Korea. Anything Mac Arthur wanted, Willoughby produced intelligence for ...In this case, Willoughby falsified the intelligence reports.”<sup>72</sup> [See also: key judgments; key questions.]

**probable:** likely to occur or prove true; supported generally but not conclusively by the evidence.<sup>73</sup> Commonly confused with *possibility*. According to a U.S. national warning estimate of 1966, “Intelligence is not likely to give warning of *probable* Soviet intent to attack until a few hours before the attack, if at all. Warning of increased Soviet readiness, implying a possible intent to attack, might be given somewhat earlier.”<sup>74</sup> [See also: possible.]

**querying:** the exchange of information between analysts of different organizations with a common mission; also, requesting additional or amplifying information on specific collection activities.

**raw intelligence:** information that has been collected but that has not been processed for validity. According to U.S. Army Personnel Command, “MI [military intelligence] Officers lead, manage, and direct intelligence planning and operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels across the operational continuum. At all levels, MI Officers

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<sup>71</sup> Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska, “Between Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: The Macedonian Perspective on the Kosovo Crisis,” paper presented at the International Studies Association 40th Annual Convention, 17-20 February 1999 (Washington, DC, 1999).

<sup>72</sup> Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 377.

<sup>73</sup> Random House Dictionary, 712.

<sup>74</sup> Cynthia M. Grabo, “Strategic Warning: The Problem of Timing,” *Studies In Intelligence* 16 (Spring 1972): 79.

plan, supervise, and conduct collection and analysis of *raw intelligence* information. From this information, MI officers produce and disseminate finished all source intelligence products for commanders and other intelligence consumers.”<sup>75</sup> [See also: finished intelligence.]

**reach-back capability:** an organization’s ability to provide additional detailed analysis to deployed units. Example: In an attempt to help the Russians rescue their sunken submarine, the U.S. Secretary of Defense said, “we have proposed having teams of experts who have a so-called *reach-back capability* [italics added] to well-organized mission specific expertise.”<sup>76</sup>

**readiness:** the level of capability within a predetermined time period with which an actor can adequately respond to an attack. “Historically, *readiness* of U.S. military forces at the unit level has been measured using the Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS), under the sponsorship of the JCS. Under SORTS, units report their overall readiness status as well as the status of four resource areas (personnel, equipment and supplies on hand, equipment condition, and training). The readiness status of a unit is reported by assigning capability, or “C,” ratings as follows: C<sup>1</sup> — Unit can undertake the full wartime missions for which it is organized or designed. C<sup>2</sup> — Unit can undertake the bulk of its wartime missions. C<sup>3</sup> — Unit can undertake major portions of its wartime missions. C<sup>4</sup> — Unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime missions, but if the situation dictates, it may be required to undertake portions of the missions with resources on hand. C<sup>5</sup> — Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared to undertake its wartime missions. While SORTS still provides the basic underpinning to readiness assessments, both OSD and JCS have established senior oversight groups in recent years to focus on readiness issues at a higher level and provide a more comprehensive assessment of *readiness* [italics added].”<sup>77</sup>

**reciprocal fear (of surprise attack):** the possibility that crisis conditions may trigger automatic mobilization responses, loss of control, and preemptive attacks, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy.

**salami tactics:** the incremental attainment of an objective in a slow, methodical way by reducing capabilities in one location, while increasing capabilities in another location. Recently, this term appeared in the editorial pages as “The selling of [President] George Bush’s tax cut relies heavily on *salami tactics* [italics added]—slicing away opposition a bit at a time. To understand how fundamentally misleading that sales pitch is, we must look at the whole salami.”<sup>78</sup> [See also: creeping normalcy; precision attack.]

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<sup>75</sup> U.S. Army Personnel Command, Military Intelligence Branch, URL: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/perscom/opmd/mi/>>, accessed 17 April 2001.

<sup>76</sup> Robert Suro, “Up In Arms: The Defense Department; Zeroing In On Zero Casualty Syndrome,” *Washington Post*, 21 August 2000, A19.

<sup>77</sup> Mark E. Gebicke, Director, Military Operations and Capabilities Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, appearance before the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives on 11 March 1997, published as GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107.

<sup>78</sup> Paul Krugman, “Slicing The Salami,” *New York Times*, Outlook Section, 11 February 2001, 17.

**scenario:** a narrative, timeline estimate of one significant path or development that may be followed by opposing or friendly strategic forces, offering key indicators for intelligence and actionable threats or opportunities for supported decisionmakers. [See also: threat scenario]

**security dilemma:** any action by a nation or a decision by that nation's leadership to enhance security that may also lead to a shift in a systemic power balance that could be perceived to endanger other nations.<sup>79</sup>

**sensitivity analysis:** a process of determining the significance of changes or variations in the base level of identical, similar or related types of activity over a period of time; trends are shifts in base level over an extended time period, while anomalies are sudden variations or non sequential types of changes in the base level. [See also: creeping normalcy.]

**signal:** information accurately interpreted as evidence that points to an adversary's future action or intention. [See also: noise; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**signposts:** intermediate developments indicating that events may not be unfolding as expected; also known as indicators of change.

**sounds of silence paradox:** when a quiescent international environment acts as background noise which, by conditioning observers to a peaceful routine, actually covers preparations for war. [See also: creeping normalcy.]

**Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE):** specific policy problems that need to be addressed in the immediate future; generally unscheduled and prepared more quickly than national intelligence estimates.

**spot report:** a brief narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions that may have an immediate and significant effect on current planning and operations. A spot report is accorded the fastest means of transmission to the watch officer.

**stoplight chart:** a graphical representation depicting the different levels of warning or activity within a country or region. The term originates from the typical warning chart found in most military command headquarters. For example, countries that are color coded green represent normal military activity within the country, yellow coded countries represent unusual military activity within the country and red coded countries represent extremely unusual military activity that is occurring within a country. However, "the often-used but crude '*stoplight charts*' [italics added]-red-amber-green 'metrics' of easily observable variables — may be useless or even counterproductive if they oversimplify complex situations, inaccurately and incompletely measure key variables or address peripheral ones, or stimulate unwarranted confidence about how well the situation 'outside the wire' is understood."<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> This definition is expanded upon in Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979) and Joseph M. Grieco, *Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 28-29.

**stovepipe warning:** an administrative process that transmits information through a predetermined set of guidelines and that does not allow the information to be shared outside the organization or within the organization among departments. For example, in response to NATO's accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, "House Intelligence Committee Chairman Porter Goss (R-Florida) suggested the problem might be what he called '*stovepiping*' [italics added]. Goss, a former CIA employee, told CNN: 'In the Intelligence Community, everyone does his job and you don't share the information unless there is a need to know. This could be a case where the right compartments didn't talk to each other.'"<sup>81</sup> [See also: bootlegging.]

**strategic depth:** the elements of space and time, which when accommodated by intelligence analysis, provide a means for timely warning.

**Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC):** located in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) headquarters building in Washington, DC, this crisis center is the agency's worldwide connection to the DoD, other governmental agencies, and the FBI's network of field offices in the U.S. and abroad. In operation since 1998, the center can handle four international crises at once.

**strategic intelligence:** intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Its components include such characteristics as biographic data, economic, sociological, transportation, telecommunications, geography, political, and scientific and technical intelligence. [See also: tactical intelligence.]

**strategic warning:** a forecast of a probable attack or a forecast that enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent; warning must be received early enough to permit decisionmakers to undertake countermeasures (military, political, or diplomatic) prior to actual hostilities; usually can range from a few weeks to several days. "For strategic warning, the key problem is not when attack may occur, but whether the enemy is preparing to attack at all...Strategic warning is not a forecast of imminent attack. *Strategic warning is a forecast of probable attack* [original italics] and it is this above all which the policy official and commander need to know."<sup>82</sup> [See also: tactical warning; political warning.]

**strategic warning lead time:** that time between the receipt of strategic warning and the beginning of hostilities. This time may include strategic warning pre-decision time and post-decision time. [See also: strategic warning post-decision time; strategic warning pre-decision time; chart.]


**strategic warning post-decision time:** that time after a decision is made in response to strategic warning and the order is executed. This time ends with the start of hostilities or termination of the threat. [See also: strategic warning lead time; strategic warning pre-decision time; chart.]

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<sup>80</sup> Gentry, 71.

<sup>81</sup> Cable News Network broadcast on 11 May 1999.

<sup>82</sup> Grabo, *Strategic Warning*, 92.



**strategic warning pre-decision time:** that time which begins upon receipt of strategic warning and ends when a decision is ordered and executed. [See also: strategic warning lead time; strategic warning post-decision time; chart.]

**synthesis:** the assembly of essential facts, data, opinions, and other elements of information into a whole or plausible intelligence explanation or model in a form suitable for a particular consumer.

**tactical intelligence:** intelligence that is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Essentially, tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view and level of employment. [See also: strategic intelligence.]

**tactical warning:** short-term warning that an attack is imminent or that forces are in motion; primarily intended for military commanders who must respond to it with usually no time to re-deploy defensively; primarily the responsibility of operational forces. Detection of the initial movements of the attack itself, before combat occurs; time can range from minutes to hours depending on the distance from the ground force assembly area or missile launch site to target. [See also: strategic warning; political warning; JCS Pub 2-0.]

**tasking:** the levying of specific requirements on intelligence collection assets.

**technological surprise:** the unilateral advantage gained by the introduction of a new weapon (or by the use of a known weapon in an innovative way) in war against an adversary who is either unaware of its existence or not ready with effective countermeasures, the development of which requires time. “The post-Cold War political climate does not guarantee any army’s arsenal to come from a single supplier state. S2’s [intelligence officers] cannot template capabilities based on a single (normally Russian) model. Such diversity not only complicates Order of Battle study; it also provides opportunities for technological surprise. *Technological surprise* is the bogeyman for TECHINT [technical intelligence] analysis: the specter of U.S. commanders encountering optics, weapons ranges, or armor more sophisticated than they thought an opponent possessed. The key to preventing technological surprise is training soldiers ahead of time to look for, recognize, and report on new or modified weapons on the battlefield. The 203rd MI Battalion responds to such spot reports with a TECHINT Collection Team, which photographs and often retrieves the new systems off of the battlefield for further study. This cycle of recognition, reporting, retrieval, and analysis is fundamental to avoiding *technological surprise* [italics added]...”<sup>83</sup>

**terms of reference (TRs):** those elements that define the subject matter of a report or estimate to include: context, scope and timeframe. According to Sherman Kent, *terms of reference* “focus the forthcoming estimate on the new major points which were discerned as the principal concern of the requestor; aimed to ask the questions (irrespective of anyone’s ability to supply factual answers) which would direct research and cogitation to the general area of these major points. In a word, it was a statement of precisely what was wanted and a polite message to the community’s expert research analysts, telling what was wanted of them.”<sup>84</sup>

**threat:** the extant military, economic, and political capability of a foreign country with aggressive intentions to use such capability to undertake any action whose consequences will be detrimental to another country. In the context of surprise, *threat* is the culmination of a country’s capabilities and intentions.

**threat condition** (also known as “threat con”): a designated scale used to convey a situation in a particular country or region as it pertains to terrorist activity. *Threat conditions* are measured by military commanders in the field based on intelligence reports and local conditions. There are five threat condition levels, each of which carries suggestions about vehicle inspections, personnel alerts and identity checks. Local commanders decide what to do under each condition. The five levels of threat condition are:

- *Threat Condition Normal:* no threat of terrorist activity is present

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<sup>83</sup> Richard H.M. Outzen, “Technical Intelligence: Added Realism at the NTC,” *Technical Intelligence* — newsletter of the National Ground Intelligence Center (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: Technical Intelligence Unit) 4, no. 1 (January-February 1999), 11.

<sup>84</sup> Sherman Kent. “The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate,” *DCI Miscellaneous Studies*, MS-12 (February 1976): 43; declassified February 1994.



- *Threat Condition Alpha*: there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations, building locations, and/or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.

- *Threat Condition Bravo*: There is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

- *Threat Condition Charlie*: An incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating some form of terrorist action is imminent

- *Threat Condition Delta*: A terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that action against a specific location is likely.

“Threat Condition Delta is appropriate “if you really do have information that you think is specific and credible and presents a real possibility of danger to your forces at the local level,” Rear Adm. Craig Quigley told journalists this afternoon [coming after the attack on the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen.]<sup>85</sup>

**threat management**: provides warning of war and instability to support planning and the development of contingency measures to deter, avoid, deflect, and manage threats before they inflict damage on persons or a country’s interests and to support early readiness measures so as to minimize the damage should deterrence fail; to provide warning support throughout the duration of the crisis management phases, through to the restoration of normal conditions.

**threat perception**: derived from another nation’s behavior, and is a function of both estimated capabilities and intentions.

**threat scenario**: a sequence of events that when completed represent an unambiguous threat; provides the basis for the formulation of an indicator list.

**value added**: additional analysis or commentary in a report that significantly redirects or confirms an assessment for a warning effort. For example, an individual who has lived in a target country recently may have input that would impart *value added* to current intelligence operations.

**voice-in-the-wilderness**: a forecast or warning given within the context of receptive ambiguity, negligence, or denial by the consumer; an assessment or report that is contradictory to an overwhelming consensus.

**warned exposed**: vulnerability of friendly forces to nuclear weapon effects in which personnel are assumed to be in a position that all skin is covered with minimal thermal protection provided by a “two-layer summer uniform.” [See also: warned protected; JCS Pub 1-02]

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<sup>85</sup> Barbra Starr, “US Military on High Alert,” ABCNews.com, URL: <<http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/terror001024.html>>, accessed 12 April 2001.

**warned protected:** vulnerability of friendly forces to nuclear weapon effects in which personnel are assumed to be in a position against heat, blast, and radiation afforded in a closed armored vehicles or crouched in foxholes with improvised overhead shielding. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02]

**warning:** a notification of impending activities that may, or may be perceived to, adversely affect U.S. national security interests or military forces.

**warning center:** a site where strategic intelligence assessments are made in support to, and as a part of, a larger warning system. [See also: alert center, indications center; watch center.]

**warning day (w-day):** the day on which the Intelligence Community judges that a potential adversary's preparations (political, economic, and military) suggest that a decision to initiate hostilities occurred. This term may also be used to designate a specific day when conditions represent a growing threat. For example, "Environmental groups say Athens has taken a tepid approach to the problem, afraid of angering industrial and business interests. Already this year, the city had to call a *warning day* in early March. 'You actually smell it. You touch it and taste it and feel it in your head,' the executive director of Greenpeace Greece, says of the high-pollution days."<sup>86</sup>

**warning failure:** an unanticipated action or event or a decision by a foreign leader that results in detrimental consequences to another nation's national security. Often related to the failure to forecast events before they happen. However, not all *warning failures* are solely the responsibility of the Intelligence Community. Intelligence is used to influence decisions that may result in a specific action. For example, if a policymaker receives intelligence that a specific act will likely occur, and the policymaker implements no preventative action, is that a warning failure? "On 14 April 1997 the following letter was sent to William Daley, the secretary of commerce, expressing concerns about the proposed cuts in the budget of the National Weather Service: Dear Mr. Secretary: The recent announcement of significant cuts in the budget of the National Weather Service and their impact on the Weather Service's capability to warn of severe weather and flood hazards to protect life and property is cause for deep concern. The effect of the budget reductions has been to force the Service to hold a large number of vacancies as well as reduce the number of key employees. This thinning of the Weather Service staffing increases the risk of *warning failures* [italics added] with potentially tragic consequences. There is no need to cite the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the blizzard of 1996, the recent tornadoes in Arkansas and the flooding in the Ohio River valley to illustrate the importance of timely warnings. While nobody can specifically identify when and where a warning will fail, we can say, with assurance, that the risk of *warning failure* [italics added] is now substantially increased. As maintenance of critical equipment degrades because of a lack of personnel and spare parts, the chances of failure increase. As meteorologists and other professionals

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<sup>86</sup> Ilene R. Prusher, "Will the air over Athens be Olympic-ready?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, 20 May 1999, 8.

are eliminated, or positions remain vacant, the forecast and warning load on those that remain becomes excessive.”<sup>87</sup> [See also: intelligence failure.]

**warning intelligence:** an intelligence product upon which to base a notification of impending activities on the part of foreign powers, including hostilities, which may adversely affect military forces or security interests.<sup>88</sup>

**warning intelligence appraisal:** provides in-depth analysis and assessment. It is prepared, printed, and disseminated on an urgent basis whenever a short assessment of imminent development is of considerable interest to high-level officials. An alerting document on a developing intelligence and warning situation.<sup>89</sup>

**warning judgment:** a forecast of the anticipated course of action that a threat will take; an appraisal of a future course of anticipated events or estimate of the likelihood (probability) of occurrence of a current or potential threat.

**warning lead time:** that time between the receipt of warning and the beginning of hostilities. This time may include two action periods: warning pre-decision time and warning post-decision time. For example, the TET cease-fire (by North Vietnam), its subsequent cancellation and the difficulty of reaching commanders going off for holiday leave compounded the problem of disseminating intelligence warnings. In the words of one U.S. communications officer, “Really we needed 36 to 48 hours [*warning lead time*] to get a message down to everybody [U.S. military forces in Vietnam]. The U.S. had just eighteen hours to alert the whole of MACV [Military Assistance Command in Vietnam]. As a result the majority of units were surprised by the attack when it came on the night of 31 January 1968.”<sup>90</sup> [See also JCS 1-02; strategic warning lead time; strategic warning post-decision time; strategic warning pre-decision lead time.]

**warning net:** a communications system established for the purpose of disseminating warning information of enemy movements to all affected commands. [See also: JCS Pub 1-02]

**warning of attack:** a warning to national policymakers that an adversary is not only preparing its armed forces for war, but intends to launch an attack in the near future. According to Presidential Decision Directive 63, which discusses the newly formed National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), “All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the NIPC and provide such assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by law. All executive departments shall also share with the NIPC information about threats and *warning of attacks* and about actual attacks on critical government and private sector infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law.”<sup>91</sup> [See also: warning of war; JCS Pub 1-02.]

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<sup>87</sup> “Past Presidents of AMS Voice Concern About Cuts In The National Weather Service Budget,” *American Meteorological Society (AMS) Newsletter* 18, no.4 (April 1997): 1.

<sup>88</sup> Watson, 594.

<sup>89</sup> Watson, 594.

<sup>90</sup> Hughes-Wilson, 214.

**warning of war:** a warning to national policymakers that a state or alliance intends war or is on a course that substantially increases the risks of war and is taking steps to prepare for war. “The 1938 Nazi Party Congress put the might of Hitler’s fearsome Wehrmacht on full display to the world and made clear what a forceful hold the Führer had on his people. Delivering his fiery speeches to the well rehearsed formations, he gave Europe an implicit *warning of [the] war* [italics added] which would erupt one year later.”<sup>92</sup> [See also: warning of attack; JCS Pub 1-02.]

**warning order:** a preliminary notice of an order or an action that is to follow; designed to give subordinates time to make the necessary plans and preparations; commonly referred to as a “heads up” notice. According to some Department of Defense documents, this term may also refer to “a crisis action planning directive issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that initiates the development and evaluation of courses of action by a supported commander and requests that a commander’s estimate be submitted.” [See also: JCS Pub 1-02.]

**warning paradox:** enemy counteraction based on friendly action taken as a result of a warning; alters the enemy’s initially intended course of action. The warning thus appears to be wrong on the basis of the change in enemy action. [See also: cry-wolf syndrome.]

**warning problem:** an identified potential threat that when translated into threat scenario(s) postulate a sequence of events, which, when this process is completed, represents an unambiguous threat. Warning problems are usually never eliminated but are considered inactive, once the threat no longer exists, to foster an “institutional memory.”

**warning synthesis:** the building of a plausible threat model from specific (indications intelligence) facts and opinions and the development of a warning judgment based upon this threat model; an inductive process wherein the warning judgment on the threat model is refined as new intelligence becomes available or when the validity of existing intelligence options is upgraded.

**warning systems:** arrangements to rapidly disseminate information concerning imminent disaster threats to government officials, institutions and the population at large in the areas at immediate risk.

**warning threshold:** a level of activity, specific actions or decisions by key personnel that result in the implementation of a heightened sense of awareness and action.

**warning time:** a designated period of time deemed necessary to adequately prepare prior to an attack or an outbreak of hostilities; the period of time necessary to move troops to a

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<sup>91</sup> Prepared testimony of Ronald L. Dick, Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the House Committee on Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on Thursday, 5 April 2001.

<sup>92</sup> World War II Nazi Rally photograph, quotation, *Electric Library Plus*, URL: <<http://www.elibrary.com/sp/plus>>, accessed 1 May 2001.

possible area of conflict; this term is used when the proper term is “warning lead time.” [See also: warning lead time; strategic warning lead time.]

**watch center:** a location for the review of all incoming intelligence information and which possesses, or has access to, extensive communications for alerting local intelligence personnel and contacting appropriate external reporting sources and other nodes in the indications and warning system. [See also: alert center; indications center; warning center.]

**watch condition (watchcon):** an operational and intelligence alerting mechanism and shorthand expression of the reporting organization’s degree of intelligence concern regarding a particular warning problem.

**watch officer:** a person in the command’s intelligence element trained to identify indications of hostilities and to cope with other intelligence that requires immediate attention; senior officer who is the duty representative of the commander in intelligence matters.

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## ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS ON WARNING

Adams, Sam. *War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir*. South Royalton, Vermont: Steerforth Press, 1994.

A detailed and lengthy exposure of the purposeful misinterpretation of analysis in the Vietnam War and the incorrect assessments that resulted from it. The author was a CIA analyst who contributed to these estimates. This book shows that threat assessments based on quantitative analysis can be manipulated with deadly consequences. In this case study, Adams shows how the CIA and senior-level military officials misled the Congress, the media and the American people about North Vietnam's capabilities before the TET Offensive. According to Colonel David Hackworth, the most decorated soldier of that war, "Had the truth about the enemy's strength and intentions been revealed before the Vietnamese New Year in 1968 [TET Offensive], 2,200 American casualties could well have been prevented. A flawed and manipulated intelligence system cut these brave men down almost with the precision of machine gun fire.... When commanders expecting 100 men to attack were hit by a thousand instead, it was the grunt who paid the grim price for fraudulent bookkeeping."<sup>93</sup>

Aker, Frank. *October 1973: The Arab Israeli War*. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985.

A detailed examination of the Yom Kippur War from the events leading up to the conflict through its conclusion. The easy victories the Israelis experienced in previous wars, and the construction of defensive posts along the Golan and the Suez, led to a complacent environment in Israel ripe for strategic surprise. This was despite public statements by Arab leaders about the impending war. The introduction of SA-6 missiles by the Arab forces came as a technological surprise following Israeli raids (in which the Israelis executed tactical surprise by wearing Egyptian uniforms and using Soviet tanks and personnel carriers) to destroy the Egyptian posts.

Alexseev, Mikhail. *Without Warning: Threat Assessment, Intelligence, and Global Struggle*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

The author, a former Soviet journalist, develops a theory on asymmetric threats by stating "incumbent world powers and their challengers have had systematically different priorities for assessing threats and opportunities... [and thus,] global events stem from asymmetric decisions." He discusses the evolutionary logic of asymmetric threats by using three case studies: Mongol challenges to the Chin and Sung empires in the thirteenth century, French-British wars of 1792-1815 and the Cold War struggle between Soviet (KGB) and U.S. (CIA) intelligence agencies from 1975 to 1985. Alexseev concludes that world powers perceive security primarily in military and economic terms while their adversaries focus on political vulnerabilities. The result is apparent opportunities viewed by only one side and unnoticed and incomprehensible to the other side. Additionally, the convergence of such asymmetric interpretations of threat results in one side being surprised. (submitted by Robin L. Burns, DIA).

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<sup>93</sup> Adams, XI.

Ascher, William. *Forecasting: An Appraisal for Policy-Makers and Planners*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

The book covers the theory and practice of forecasting, to include many examples of successful and unsuccessful forecasts. The author gives an assessment of the future of forecasting in the areas of modeling, surprise-sensitive forecasting, and normative forecasting.

\_\_\_\_\_, and William H. Overholt. *Strategic Planning and Forecasting*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983.

A systematic treatment of forecasting and risk assessment that recognizes the role of political forecasting as part of the complex process of strategic planning. The book also offers recommendations for presenting political forecasts based upon understanding the politics and psychology of the forecaster-policy maker relationship.

Betts, Richard K. *Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981.

Five phases of the warning process are identified: data acquisition, correlation, the intelligence professional's decision to warn, communication to the decisionmakers, and the decision to respond. Obstacles to warning encountered during the warning process are examined along with the limits of predictability, for example: the enemy's response to successful warning can look the same as a warning failure. Indecision, fluctuations, false alerts, and deception are studied as signals that can confuse and cause deferment of the warning decision. The book concludes with a brief discussion of both technical and doctrinal surprise.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1982.

A review of why surprise is important on the battlefield. Examines surprise in World War II, the Korean War, the Sinai Crisis, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Intelligence as a counter to surprise is given a cursory look in an examination of why surprise works. In his conclusion, Betts reasserts the need for intelligence to provide warning, but points out the presence of intelligence has historically not been enough to prevent surprise when psychological and political influences interfere with warning process.

Breuer, William B. *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

The author is a veteran of the D-Day landing at Normandy who has written more than 20 books on World War II. He treats the reader to an extremely detailed account of the deception plan that paved the way for the unprecedented success of Operation OVERLORD.

Buchanan-Smith, Margaret, and Susanna Davies. *Famine Early Warning and Response: The Missing Link*. Southampton Row, London, UK: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995.

A methodology to examine and warn of famine was implemented over the last two decades by the international community. However, the authors believe the famine warning

process has not necessarily improved the response for prevention or relief. Case studies include famine in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Kenya.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive Summary*. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, December 1997.

A three-year project involving a panel of international experts and designed to be both educational and motivational. The commission conducted a series of studies and undertook initiatives to raise the level of commitment to and understanding of the problem of “deadly conflict” by leaders and interested publics. This report endorsed the establishment of a UN rapid reaction force and an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council.

Chuyev, Yu. V. and Yu, B. Mikhaylov. *Forecasting in Military Affairs: A Soviet View*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980.

This translated book offers the Soviet thinking on the subjects of scientific planning, forecasting and decisionmaking as it relates to the military. The authors find that the success of any military operation or engagement is largely determined by how accurately the enemy’s intentions and concrete plan of operations have been foreseen.

Clutterbuck, Richard. *International Crisis and Conflict*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.

An examination on the experience of crisis management and war in history, mainly through 24 case studies. Among the surprise attacks covered: Arab-Israeli War of 1973, Falkland Islands Conflict, and Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Critchley, Julian. *Warning and Response: A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20th Century and an Analysis of Its Lessons for the Future*. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1978.

An historic look at examples of surprise includes the Blitzkriegs of World War II, Pearl Harbor and other Japanese attacks, the Korean War and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. From these, he draws conclusions about the then-current military relationship between NATO and the Soviet Union and the fact that intelligence acquired is rarely evaluated properly, resulting in surprise. This occurs because of an inability to interpret intentions (in spite of the ease in capability interpretation) and a predisposition by analysts to mirror image. He concludes by recommending strategy changes, cautionary deployments, an emphasis on speedy collection and dissemination of intelligence, and planning for preemptive attack to allow NATO to incorporate preparations for surprise.

Cruikshank, Charles. *Deception in World War II*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Contrary to the inclusive title, this book focuses mainly on the successes and failures of British deception operations in support of Allied operations in North Africa, the Mediterranean, the English Channel and the Scandinavian countries. German and Soviet deception operations are limited to a chapter each, American deception operations are limited to those tactics leading to Operation OVERLORD, and there is no mention of the war in the Pacific. Nevertheless, the author is realistic about the strengths and limits of deception

operations, points out errors in planning these operations, and shows why some deception techniques are still successful today. (submitted by SSG Robert E. Hagen, USA)

Daniel, Donald C. and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. *Strategic Military Deception*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

The editors gathered a multitude of works that cover both theoretical perspectives and deception as it has been practiced. The chapters on theory look at cognitive reasons for deception, to include bias and groupthink, whereas the chapters on application look at various operations and tactical battles.

Davis, John L. and Ted Robert Gurr. *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*. Lanham, MD: Rowman Books, 1998.

The book addresses early warning processes and systems put in place over the last decade to anticipate such events as refugee flows and displacements, state failures, ethno-political conflicts, food crises, environmental conflicts, arms flows, and intra-state conflicts. The book is the result of the Workshop on Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems held at the request of the Joint Warfare Analysis Center in 1996.

Dewar, Michael. *The Art of Deception in Warfare*. London: David and Charles Publishers, 1989.

This look at modern deception in warfare starts with a review of deception in history focusing mainly on the efforts undertaken in the first and second world wars. This review forms the basis for deception theory as it exists today. Interestingly, deception is described in economic terms, with examples from the correlation of forces along the NATO-Warsaw Pact common border, its use in unconventional warfare, and psychological operations and propaganda. Although dated, the book is a fine examination the need for military deception, capturing its essence while acknowledging the timelessness of the art.

Dupuy, Trevor N. *Numbers, Predictions, and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles*. London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1979.

A major effort to measure the variables of offensive or defensive posture, surprise, logistics, weather, terrain, communications, firepower, morale and leadership, among others, in recent and historical battles in an attempt to predict a group's success or failure and likely battle outcomes. His theoretical model accounts for 92 to 95 percent agreement with historical outcomes.

Erfurth, General Waldemar. *Surprise*. Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraphy Press, 1943.

General Waldemar Erfurth was a German general officer during World War I who believed surprise was the "key to victory." Surprise is examined in detail from various WWI battles. The book focuses on the use of surprise on the battlefield as a force multiplier to achieve localized mass or concentration of force without the expenditure of men and equipment. The author also discusses surprise from an historical perspective and how the attainment of surprise is a fortuitous happenstance rather than a planned event. The book focuses on the art of tactical maneuver but provides no information on how to detect or counter it.

Fearon, James Dana. *Threats to Use Force: Costly Signals and Bargaining in International Crisis*. Ann Harbor, MI: University of California, Berkeley, 1992.

The use, interpretation, and effects of military threats employed in international disputes are examined. One important contribution to understanding surprise is the author's assertion of the impact of "private information" on a state leader's willingness to use force in crisis bargaining.

Ford, Harold P. *Estimative Intelligence: Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating*. Maryland: University Press of America, 1993.

This book can be approached by the reader in several different ways. First, this is an historical book that follows the role of estimates within the U.S. government beginning with Pearl Harbor; second, this publication can be used as a workbook that has several exercises to further enhance analytical thinking and discussions; third, it is a critical analysis of what can go wrong between the analyst and the policymaker in providing warning within a political environment. Overall, this contribution provides a better understanding of the estimative process in the U.S. government — warts and all.

Ford, Ronnie E. *Captain, USA. Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise*. London: Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1995.

Captain Ford details the change from guerrilla warfare to the support of conventional armed struggle in Vietnam as put forth by Mao Tse Tung. This change in warfare was anticipated by U.S. intelligence. What is less known is the discussion among the North Vietnamese leadership about the execution of the Tet attack. Viet Cong leaders in the south were less than enthusiastic about the plan and the ensuing execution of the attack was less coordinated than planned. However, the attack was far more coordinated than U.S. intelligence had anticipated. Tet represented not a total surprise but surprise as to the level of involvement from the north. This book is the product of a thesis written while Ford was a student at the Joint Military Intelligence College.

Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). *A Manual for Early Warning and Early Response*. London, UK: International Alert Press, undated.

FEWER founding members include representatives from international agencies, academia, and non-governmental organizations. This manual draws on the experiences of earlier warning projects as well as current theory of early warning. It serves as a provisional framework for understanding trends in areas of potential and actual conflict, as well as identifying approaches for conflict prevention.

George, Alexander L., ed. *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.

A comprehensive and systematic analysis of the phenomenon of "inadvertent war," which the author defines as a war that neither side wanted or expected at the outset of a diplomatic crisis, but that nonetheless occurred during the course of crisis development. He hopes that an understanding of these factors can avert war or at least surprise.

Hammel, Eric. *Six Days In June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992.

An exhaustive look at the events leading up to an actual battle of the 1967 war from the Israeli perspective. He seems to blame the war on hostilities stemming from the 1964 National Water Carrier project which would have increased the water flow to Israel at the expense of its Arab neighbors, Jordan and Syria. Hammel, a renowned military historian, strongly suggests the Soviets purposely provided poor warning to the Syrians to promulgate their influence in the region, resulting in further spending by the Arabs on Soviet military equipment. (submitted by TSGT Anthony P. Gillis, USAF)

Handel, Michael. *Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War*. Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1975.

No matter what the availability of information, advanced technologies, and human effort invested, there is little that Israel or any country can do to prevent or forestall an impending surprise attack. The author points to five paradoxes that prevent a country from ever reaching a fail-safe position.

\_\_\_\_\_, ed. *Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War*. London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1987.

This compilation of articles by various authors looks at deception and its resultant surprise in theater and battlefield operations. Acts of deception include the 1943 strategic active M-type deception creating the impression of an impending cross-channel invasion to pin down German forces, active M-type deception efforts that kept the Germans from predicting the correct location of the actual invasion, and Soviet conduct of battlefield deception. The book also reviews articles about U.S. deception efforts in the Pacific, German perceptions allied deception efforts, and the use of double agents by MI5 to actively deceive the German Abwehr (FORTITUDE). A good look at deception from the allied side but offering nothing about the enemy side.

Hersh, Seymour M. *The Target is Destroyed*. New York: Random House, 1986.

One in a series of well-known “muckraking” books by the author. Hersh provides an overview of the U.S. intelligence system’s actions during and in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s order to shoot down Korean airliner KAL 007 in 1983. In the breadth of its coverage of the Intelligence Community, the book transcends the question of whether tactical warning might have been given to the pilot of that airliner. Instead, Hersh’s focus is on whether the Community was ready to provide operational and strategic intelligence where it was needed. The book epitomizes the concept of intelligence readiness, and the difficulty of maintaining such readiness. In this case, Hersh finds a lack of readiness in the U.S. National Foreign Intelligence Community to tie intelligence information to news service information, to manage the interaction of intelligence organizations in presenting a “Big Picture” to crucial decisionmakers, and to anticipate policymakers’ and senior-level government officials’ sometimes faulty interpretations of events and their ramifications. (submitted by Dr. Russ Swenson, JMIC)

Hopple, Gerald W. and others, eds. *National Security Crisis Forecasting and Management*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984.



The book identifies the central problems of crisis research, assesses the progress of work in the area, and discusses prospects for the future. Key sections in the book include warning forecasts, computer-based early warning and intelligence for policymaking.

Hybel, Alex R. *The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986.

An attempt to move beyond all previous books in explaining surprise by investigating both the aggressor's and the victim's roles and motives. The intent is to craft a differential theory of surprise that focuses on why international actors opt for surprise, opt for one surprise strategy over another, and to establish to what extent the actor's actions contribute to the surprise itself. Eleven case studies are dissected to include the Yom Kippur war, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Operation BARBAROSSA, and Pearl Harbor.

Janis, Irving L. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982.

A classic book that shows how groupthink — the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups — contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascoes and surprises of the 20th century. When groupthink dominates, the members of a decisionmaking group share a sense of complacency and fail to respond to warnings.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton: NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Another classic book, this one examines the causes and consequences of misperception in the international arena. It is these misperceptions that lay the groundwork for strategic surprise and can become deadly in conjunction with groupthink.

Johnson, Robert H. *Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

The author advances a cyclical, alarmist view of U.S. assessments in the Cold War that he believes regularly exaggerated the Soviet threat, costing the American taxpayer billions of dollars. The author suggests that all citizens must review these past mistakes so that a more realistic view can be taken against the more numerous but lesser threats of today and tomorrow.

Kam, Ephraim. *Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective*. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Eleven case studies of surprise attack are used to support the thesis that the victim of a surprise attack has only himself to blame for vulnerability to the surprise. In each case Kam identifies the indications of war that were available to the victim-nation, and the human and organizational obstacles in the warning process that may have prevented that nation from recognizing and preparing for the attack. Unlike Betts' book (with almost the same title), the author identifies conceptual problems of the warning process at the strategic and the tactical level and how human frailties contribute to this failure.

Koch, Scott, editor. *CIA Cold War Records: Selected Estimates on The Soviet Union, 1950-1959*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

A collection of 27 declassified estimates that appraise the Soviet Union's capabilities and intentions during the 1950's. These documents provide unique insight into what U.S. senior-level policymakers and commanders were reading on the perceived communist threat. All the estimates are well reasoned and conservative in assessing Soviet leadership and their motives. The book is divided into four sections: internal issues, foreign policy, global issues and nuclear arms control.

Knorr, Klaus, and Patrick Morgan. *Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983.

Choosing more than twenty cases of strategic surprise drawn from the past 120 years, the authors of this volume present a systematic analysis of the nature of incentives that lead states to attempt such attacks, the kinds of capabilities that attackers draw upon, and the factors that make states vulnerable to strategic surprise. The book classifies strategic surprise into three categories of action: "the unexpected initiation of hostilities, the unexpected extension of war to a new theater, and the unexpected use of a new mode of warfare." The book concludes with a list of vulnerabilities that make a defender susceptible to surprise.

Leon, Maurice. *How Many World Wars? The Warning of Foch*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1942.

This book was written from a partisan (Republican) political point of view and suggests that the actions taken by President Wilson at the close of World War I should be viewed as warning for a second Pan-German War. France's Marshall Foch understood and was vocal about the implications of Wilson's decisions; however, the President ignored him. Some recommendations are made for the actions to be taken to prevent a third Pan-German War (providing the Allies defeat Germany in this war as this was written during WWII).

Levite, Ariel. *Intelligence and Strategic Surprise*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

A definition of strategic surprise is "the sudden realization that one has been operating on the basis of an erroneous threat perception." The author argues that intelligence can overcome supposedly insurmountable barriers to receptivity by policymakers and provides suggestions for improving this receptivity even further. Surprise concepts are integrated into warning theory, perception of the threat and the decisionmaker's response. Conclusions reached include that some countries are more susceptible to surprise in general whereas others are more susceptible to certain types of surprise.

Merglen, Albert. *Surprise Warfare: Subversive, Airborne, and Amphibious Operations*. London George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1968.

A unique and personal account of the preparations and development of several surprise operations. The vast majority of these operations are drawn from World War II.

Phillips, Warren R., and Richard Rimkunas. *Crisis Warning: the Perception Behavior Interface*. New York: Gordon And Breach Science Publishers, 1983.

Research reported here was done through computer-aided mathematical modeling of the crisis-warning environment in the United States Government. The book concludes that "threat perception is contagious" and that political indicators and interpretations should be added to the Department of Defense's crisis management methodology. Another conclusion is that multiple viewpoints are vital for a more accurate interpretation of indicators.

Petit, Michael. *Peacekeepers at War: A Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe*. Boston: Faber and Faber, Inc., 1986.

Petit was a U.S. Marine Corps corporal serving in Beirut when his barracks was bombed, resulting in the death of 241 men. There was no warning of this specific suicide truck-bombing mission that destroyed the barracks, despite indications the U.S. Marines were in danger. According to the author, several factors must be considered to explain why intelligence failed to warn the Marines of the impending attack to include: underestimating the enemy and their intentions, a confusing and ambiguous U.S. chain of command and a lack of mission objectives. Although intelligence about potential terrorist attacks was provided to the commanders in Beirut, timely and specific intelligence that would have met their needs was not provided. Commanders held the dangerous assumption that only the diplomatic community was a target despite over 100 identified suspected car bombs months before the attack. The Intelligence Community provided information on pieces of the threat, but apparently there was a lack of all-source intelligence analysis and resulting assessments needed to paint a complete picture.

Rupesinghe, Kumar and Michiko Kuroda. *Early Warning and Conflict Resolution*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

A collection of 11 papers by U.S. and foreign authors on warning issues from the perspective of the mission of the United Nations. Topics include famine, population migration, collapsing governments, human rights, and conflict resolution. Political and cultural factors are also discussed and socio-political indicators are identified.

Singer, J. David, and Michael D. Wallace, eds. *To Auger Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979.

An attempt to provide indicators that a foreign state would activate if it was about to start a conflict. The book draws from three studies: those that attempt to forecast international outcomes from the observation of a whole over a long period of time; those that construct early warning indicators based on certain attributes of the states themselves; and those that deal with early warning indicators based on national behaviors.

Steury, Donald P., ed. *Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.

Sherman Kent, chairman of the Board of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967, is considered a major influence in shaping the Intelligence Community in general and the Central Intelligence Agency specifically. The book contains previously classified articles on the Soviet Union's deliberate attempt to sabotage the Khrushchev-Kennedy Paris Summit

Conference in 1960 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Several articles pertain to the methodology of warning. Overall, this book is part memoir and part textbook on the production of estimates and foreign policy implementation during the height of the Cold War.

Whaley, Barton. *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Studies, 1969.

This four-volume effort is one of the most definitive and encompassing of all the books on warning. The books provide the standard from which all other books on surprise and warning must be judged.

Wohlsetter, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. California: Stanford University Press, 1962.

The front cover boasts “The best book by far on the question of why we were surprised at Pearl Harbor,” and it would be hard to argue otherwise. Winner of the Bancroft Prize in 1963, this book is considered the definitive book on the Japanese attack on 7 December 1942. Recently, senior military leaders were exonerated of this attack, which confirmed what this book pointed out years ago. The author highlights the institutional behavior and organizational conflicts within the government and U.S. policymakers’ indecisiveness in taking action, which ultimately lead to this disaster.

Wirtz, James J. *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

The author believes American misperceptions, rather than any scarcity of information, prevented American intelligence from anticipating the surprise of the Tet offensive. The book details the sources of the American biases and how they missed the available signals.

## SELECTED JMIC THESES ON WARNING

*The following unclassified theses are among the holdings of the John T. Hughes Library at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The library may be visited by anyone affiliated with the Intelligence Community.*

Brockington, Darin L. *AIDS in Africa: A Strategic Warning*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, July 1993.

A central argument in this thesis is that acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) should not be treated as though it were just any other disease. This study sets out to demonstrate that AIDS mortality will be a threat to the national security of the most severely afflicted African nations. The intention of this thesis is to suggest that the application of indications and warning methodology in the development of a strategic warning problem for the AIDS epidemic in Africa could prevent an intelligence warning failure. To this end, warning assessment of the impending AIDS disaster involves two sets of considerations. These considerations are physical specifications of the virus (such as the environment and the population at risk) and the application of the principles of strategic warning.

Casey, John J. *The Four Horsemen in the New Millennium: Can the Intelligence Community Predict the Next Complex Emergency?* MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, March 1993.

The Intelligence Community (IC) has taken on the additional requirements of not only providing intelligence support to these operations, but also the task of predicting where and when the next complex emergency will occur. This thesis explores the question: "How could the National Intelligence Council broaden its methods of producing estimates on global humanitarian emergencies to enhance the quality of humanitarian early warning for policymakers?" It reviews current philosophies and strategies regarding early warning for complex emergencies and outlines some of the most promising techniques used by foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary and international organizations. The thesis explores the possibility of the National Intelligence Council's leveraging existing humanitarian early warning models to establish a common framework for analysts; humanitarian early warning systems to monitor potential hot spots; and humanitarian early warning networks to share information among organizations worldwide. The findings of this thesis indicate that there are certain aspects of the entire process of humanitarian early warning that need to be addressed with greater vigor by the Intelligence Community.

DeMattei, Lou Anne. *Developing a Strategic Warning Capability for Information Defense*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1998.

The vulnerability of the nation's information system to a strategic cyber attack is increasing. Information systems are becoming more complex and more broadly networked and critical infrastructures are becoming more dependent on information networks. The nation's information networks are difficult to defend and will remain so for the foreseeable future. This stems from the unique aspects of the information environment, current information system architecture approaches, and deficient system security practices. Addition-

ally, this vulnerability will be exacerbated at the turn of the century. These deficiencies have rendered the warning system ineffective in its ability to detect cyber attack precursor and launch activities.

Elliott, V.L. *From Cooperative Order to Collective Violence: An Inquiry into the Political Consequences of Rational Actions and the Context of and Basis for Strategic Early Warning On Instability*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 2000.

The Cold War's end brought unprecedented willingness by world governments for international cooperation on the problem of internal disintegration leading to state failure. As other countries' stability declines the probability of future deployments of U.S. forces to restore order becomes certain unless alternative methods of intervention can be used. Getting results from these alternatives takes time and they must be applied early to be effective. Current warning methods do not consistently provide sufficient time. To increase warning time, analysts must know how vulnerable a society is to instability and whether this erosion will progressively get worse. This thesis proposes a definition that allows analytical consideration of both preference-revealing decisions individuals make, and of decisions made collectively and revealed by traditional market indicators. The proposed definition of rationality has broad application in economics and the social sciences.

Fila, Brian D. *The Warning of Political Instability Model: A Contribution to the Defense Indications and Warning System*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1997.

Using descriptive research methodology, this thesis examines the question of whether a "warning of political instability methodology" can contribute to the U.S. government warning effort. This study reveals that the keys to understanding instability lie in understanding the complexity of humans. Rather than focusing on the behavior of individuals in far-off places, analysts must first begin by understanding themselves. They must gain a professional understanding of what they bring into the analytic process, and how their personal experiences have colored their perceptions of the world.

Gadd, Thomas J. *Nuclear Conflict in the Middle East: An Analysis of Future Events*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1996.

Several countries in the Middle East have already shown an interest in developing nuclear weapons. However, at the present time, only Israel is believed to actually have nuclear weapons. Israel's two greatest enemies, Iraq and Iran, are the only Middle Eastern countries believed to have active nuclear weapon development programs. As each country develops a nuclear capability, the prospect for a nuclear conflict becomes greater. The potential is therefore growing for a local conflict to escalate into a regional nuclear war, and possibly involve the United States and Russia. Using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), the future actions of Israel, Iraq and Iran are analyzed as Middle East conditions evolve in the next twenty to twenty-five years.

Graves, David L. *Bayesian Analysis Methods for Threat Prediction*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, March 1993.

The purpose of this thesis is to compare several methods of Bayesian analysis so the methods most suited to political-military intelligence problems could be determined. Although a specific intelligence scenario was used, it is not the purpose of this thesis to develop a complete assessment of that specific scenario; the scenario was used solely as a means to compare the various methods with the expectation that the resulting lessons would be applicable to other intelligence problems. Bayesian analysis is a tool that is used to revise the explanation for, and probability of, a situation based on the existence of new evidence. The objective nature of such mathematical tools allows the analyst to recognize changes faster than an analyst operating on subjective assessments alone. Bayes methods help the analyst overcome the natural tendency to maintain a subconscious bias toward the status quo and to only slowly revise initial perceptions in light of new evidence.

Koebke, Kent D. *The U.S.S. Pueblo Incident: Warning Cycle*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1984.

The question asked in this thesis is "What intelligence lesson can be learned from the 'warning cycle' of the U.S.S. Pueblo Crisis?" The methods used in the study were an historical examination of the "warning cycle" and a quantitative evaluation of three portions of the cycle. These three portions are: risk assessment, the actual warning and the communications. The importance of the thesis is that it can be used as an initial step in studying intelligence collection crises. By comparing trends in this and other crises, it may be possible to detect common problems. With such a background, current procedures could be more effectively studied to detect flaws.

Koloian, Richard C. *A Myth of History: The American State Department Warning of Operation BARBAROSSA*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, July 1988.

It is conventional belief that the American government knew of Operation BARBAROSSA (the German invasion of the Soviet Union during World War II) six months before the occurrence of the actual event. Though widely accepted, this conventional belief is untrue. Recently discovered primary documentation used in this thesis contains no information that could have justified any warning of Operation BARBAROSSA.

Litvinas, Anthony J. *A Warning Framework for Chinese Border Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, December 1983.

The United States' warning effort in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was generally considered a success because the United States had somewhere between four and six weeks prior warning that a Chinese-initiated invasion would occur. While this amount of time may be considered adequate for American decisionmakers to formulate a response in this case, could the warning of an impending Chinese attack on one of its border states have been issued earlier? To answer this question, an examination of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 was made in order to identify any parallels in the political indications of conflict in both cases. These indications of conflict were then compared in the context of the principles of warning in order to establish a warning framework to assist in warning of future Chinese conflicts involving border states.

O'Shaughnessy, John F., Jr. *The Chinese Intervention in Korea: An Analysis of Warning*. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, November 1985.

The Chinese Communists achieved complete actual surprise with a counter-offensive directed against United Nations forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, between 24-26 November 1950. The event is often described as one of the classic surprise attacks in U.S. military history. This thesis analyzes this event from the perspective of the warning available to the American hierarchy prior to the Chinese intervention. The following issues were considered. First, was this surprise caused by an intelligence failure? Or, if the intelligence was not faulty, then what warning intelligence was available and did it result in a warning that was credibly communicated to appropriate decisionmakers? Finally, what actions were taken, given the available warning, and could those actions be considered adequate under the circumstances?

Rizzio, William E. *The 1972 North Vietnamese Spring Offensive: A Surprise Attack Postmortem*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1993.

On 30 March 1972, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) commenced a major surprise attack against South Vietnam. This highly coordinated twelve-division offensive was the largest conventional combined-arms operation conducted by Hanoi up to that date. Moreover, the NVA introduced numerous new weaponry that was to influence significantly the initial course of events on the battlefield. The 1972 Spring Offensive was not a complete surprise to the allies. U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence had forecast the possibility of an enemy attack and provided early warning. Allied decisionmakers responded to the threat by raising alert levels, instituting certain defense measures, and initiating preemptive air and ground operations. Nonetheless, the enemy offensive caught the allies overwhelmingly unprepared. This is a case study of surprise attack. The central problem is to explain why allied intelligence failed to estimate accurately "when," "where," and "how" the North Vietnamese would attack in the spring of 1972. The study concentrates on U.S. intelligence activities in South Vietnam and examines the cognitive processes that affected intelligence analysis. Based extensively on recently declassified U.S. government documents, information sheds some light on why allied intelligence failed to predict correctly the critical dimensions of the North Vietnamese attack.

Saelid, Per I. *Surprise and the Lessons of Operation WESERUBUNG*. MSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, July 1997.

The first step to understanding surprise is recognizing its methods of occurrence. To do so, historical case studies are the most informative. Operation WESERUBUNG, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, is an excellent study in surprise. On 19 March 1940, less than two months after Adolph Hitler had given its execution order, Germany launched a surprise invasion of Denmark and Norway. The attack, launched though the heart of British strength, the North Sea, caught the British completely flatfooted. Denmark fell almost immediately, and Norway lasted just two months. In this campaign, the German military leveraged surprise, along with excellent planning and execution, to defeat a superior military force. In hindsight, some scholars have suggested that the British surprise in Norway was due to an intelligence failure. In this thesis, this belief is challenged and shown to be erroneous. Instead, the actual causes of the defeat lay in British communication failures



and a fundamental lack of psychological, rather than military, readiness. The British failure in responding effectively to Germany's Operation WESERUBUNG in 1940 offers lessons for avoiding similar failures today.

Sebenick Timothy M. *Strategic Intelligence and the United Nations: Early Warning, Fact-Finding, and the Secretary-General*. MSSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1995.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in the number and scope of UN operations. It is unlikely that this trend will diminish. The success of future UN operations is contingent upon sound strategic decisionmaking. However, it is unclear how UN strategy is created and what mechanisms exist to support the decision-making process. This paper explores the relationship between strategic intelligence and strategic decisionmaking within the UN. There is a quasi-intelligence architecture, which subsequently influences the creation of the organization's policy and the decisions made in the Security Council.

Siedlarczyk, Laura J. *Pearl Harbor from a Japanese Operations Security Perspective: A New Take on an American Tragedy*. MSSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1999.

This study represents the first concerted attempt to analyze Pearl Harbor strictly from a Japanese operations security (OPSEC) perspective to show that Japan's success is at least as attributable to its consistent and comprehensive application of OPSEC practices and methods as it is to any deficiencies on the part of the United States. This study required analysis of primary-source information written by Japanese individuals intimately involved with the mission — information that can provide true insight into Japanese use of OPSEC measures throughout the Pearl Harbor operation, from the initial planning states to execution. Though several breaches in OPSEC occurred, Japan managed its risk of detection quite well. If Japan had not employed such an intensive OPSEC program, more indicators would have been evident, and the United States would have been far more likely to piece together the information and realize that an attack was imminent. The evidence demonstrates that Japan's resounding success at Pearl Harbor must be attributed as much to its comprehensive and diligently employed OPSEC program as to U.S. failures.

Stevens, Dennis D. *Between Order and Chaos: An Analytic Methodology for Warning*. MSSSI Thesis. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, August 1995.

Recent research in the rapidly emerging fields of complexity and chaos studies indicate that some principles in these disciplines may be applied to the analysis of natural, as well as physical, systems to include those based on human interaction. In this thesis, selected principles of chaos and complexity are adapted to a proposed model that defines a methodological approach to analysis of indications and warning situations. This model is applied to four past and recent case studies where U.S. interests have been affected. They include the fall of the Shah of Iran, Cuba since the breakup of the Former Soviet Union, the current conflict in the former state of Yugoslavia, and a view of possible near-term world futures. The analysis based on an application of chaos and complexity theory did lead to insights into the processes, functioning and possible vulnerabilities to change

exemplified by the case studies. Such insights could contribute to a more refined and actionable ensemble of warning forecasts. But the thesis points out that there remains a problem in communicating the results of the analysis to the end users—the policy and decisionmakers at strategic and executive levels. Once intelligence has provided a sound basis for formulation of policy, such consumers expect continued support on implementation of those policies, an area in which the approach to understanding based on chaos and complexity theory provides only small, incremental, advantages.

## **ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ASSOCIATED WITH WARNING**

*Some abbreviations (such as “DA”) have multiple meanings; those meanings unrelated to intelligence or warning are not included in this list.*

ACOM:	U.S. Atlantic Command (acronym formerly “LANTCOM”)
ACS/C <sup>4</sup> I:	Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
ACSI:	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
AIA:	USAF Air Intelligence Agency
AIG:	GENSER Address Indicator Group
ALPHAID:	5-Digit Alphabetical Identification (“short title” of a Warning Problem)
ANALIT:	DIWS Analyst-to-Analyst informal message
AO:	Area of Operations
AOI:	Area of Interest
AOR:	Area of Responsibility
AR:	Administrative Report
ASD/C <sup>3</sup> I:	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
BDA:	Battle Damage Assessment
CAJIT:	Central America Joint Intelligence Team
CAT:	Crisis Action Team
CCP:	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CBR:	Chemical, Biological, Radiological
CENTCOM:	U.S. Central Command
CFA:	Category Functional Area
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC:	Commander-in-Chief
CIO:	Central Imagery Office (incorporated into NIMA)

CJCS:	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CNO:	Chief of Naval Operations
COMINT:	Communications Intelligence
COMSEC:	Communications Security
CPR:	Command Position Report
CSP:	Contingency Support Package
CSS:	Central Security Service
DA:	Delegated Authority
DAG:	DSSCS Address Group
DAWS:	Defense Automated Warning System
DCCC:	Defense Collection Coordination Center
DCI:	Director of Central Intelligence
DCID:	Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DCSINT:	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DDCI:	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDI:	Duty Director for Intelligence; Deputy Director for Intelligence
DDO:	Deputy Director for Operations
DEA:	Drug Enforcement Administration
DEFCON:	Defense Readiness Condition
DEFSMAC:	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
DGWS:	Defense Global Warning System
DI:	Directorate of Intelligence (CIA and DIA)
DIA:	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA/J2M-1:	DIA's Threat Management/Warning Division; DIWS
DIAC:	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
DIO:	Defence Intelligence Organization (Australia); Defense Intelligence Officer (DIA)

DIRNSA:	Director of the National Security Agency
DIWS:	Defense Intelligence Warning System
DMA:	Defense Mapping Agency (incorporated into NIMA)
DNI:	Director of Naval Intelligence
DO:	Directorate of Operations (CIA)
DoD:	Department of Defense
DoE:	Department of Energy
DR/DIA:	Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
DSN:	Defense Switched Network (formerly AUTOVON)
DSSCS:	Defense Special Security Communications System
EEI:	Essential Elements of Information
ELINT:	Electronic Intelligence
EO:	Executive Order
EUCOM:	U.S. European Command
FAA:	Federal Aviation Agency
FBI:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GDIP:	General Defense Intelligence Program
GID:	Generic Indicator Directory
GRG:	Gridded Reference Graphic
GENSER:	General Service Communications System
HPSCI:	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
HUMINT:	Human-source Intelligence
I&W:	Indications and Warning
IC:	Intelligence Community
ICC:	U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center
IL:	Indicator List

IMINT:	Imagery Intelligence
INFOSEC:	Information Systems Security
INR:	State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
INSCOM:	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
INTSUM:	Intelligence Summary
ITF:	Intelligence Task Force
IW:	Information Warfare
J2:	Director for Intelligence (joint command)
J3:	Director for Operations (joint command)
JAC:	Joint Analysis Center
JCS:	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDISS:	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JIC:	Joint Intelligence Center
JMITC:	Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
JSCP:	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOC:	Joint Special Operations Command
JWICS:	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LIC:	Low-Intensity-Conflict
MASINT:	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MDITDS:	Defense Intelligence Threat Data Migration System
MIB:	Military Intelligence Board
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA:	National Command Authority
NDIC:	National Defence Intelligence Centre (Canada)
NFIB:	National Foreign Intelligence Board
NFIP:	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIC:	National Intelligence Council

NIE:	National Intelligence Estimate
NIMA:	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIO:	National Intelligence Officer
NIO/W:	National Intelligence Officer for Warning
NIST:	National Intelligence Support Team
NMCC:	National Military Command Center (J3/JCS)
NMIC:	National Maritime Intelligence Center; also, former acronym for National Military [Joint] Intelligence Center (now NMJIC)
NMJIC:	National Military Joint Intelligence Center (DIA)
NOIWON:	National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network
NORAD:	North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPIC:	National Photographic Interpretation Center (now within NIMA)
NSA:	National Security Agency
NSC:	National Security Council
NSOC:	NSA's National Security Operations Center (formerly National SIGINT Operations Center)
NWS:	National Warning Staff
OB:	Order of Battle
OICC:	Operational Intelligence Coordination Center
ONI:	Office of Naval Intelligence
OOTW:	Operations Other Than War
OPG:	Operations Planners Group
OPS:	Operations
OPSEC:	Operations Security
OPSMAN:	DoD Indications & Warning System Operations Manual
OSD:	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSP:	Operational Support Package
PACOM:	U.S. Pacific Command

PDB: President's Daily Brief  
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive  
PGM: DIWS Planning Group Meeting  
POC: Point of Contact  
RII: Request for Intelligence Information  
SCR: Status Change Report  
SECDEF: Secretary of Defense  
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence





# Notes

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strategic warning feint camouflage combat intelligence creeping  
correlation analysis pattern recognition querying M-type deception  
crisis instability indicator bootlegging passive deception tasking  
organizational information assessment information warfare  
power  
watch officer Estimate tasking technological surprise double blind  
mirror-imaging signal warning paradox linchpin assumptions intelligence  
combat intelligence creeping normalcy warning order basic measures  
querying M-type deception signposts preventive attack threat perception  
bootlegging passive deception tasking watch condition warning  
combat information assessment information warfare national intelligence  
message analysis holy grail NIE creeping normalcy incident emergence  
tasking technological surprise double blind opinion watch center  
warning paradox linchpin assumptions intelligence readiness measures  
creeping normalcy warning order basic measures of military preparedness  
deception signposts preventive attack threat perception normalcy  
intelligence creeping normalcy warning note hugger mugger combat  
preparedness correlation analysis pattern recognition querying M-type  
theory national crisis instability indicator bootlegging passive deception  
wilderness indicator organization inferences combat information  
warning NMJIC national power tactical immediate message assessment  
operational warning watch officer Estimate tasking  
center Office of National Estimates mirror-imaging signal warning  
strategic warning feint camouflage combat intelligence creeping  
correlation analysis pattern recognition querying M-type deception  
power crisis instability indicator bootlegging passive deception  
indicator organization inferences combat information assessment  
national power tactical immediate message analysis holy grail NIE  
warning watch officer Estimate tasking technological surprise double  
Estimates mirror-imaging strategic warning feint camouflage