Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

GHQ/SCAP Records (RG 331, National Archives and Records Service)

Description of contents

(1) Box no. 277

(2) Folder title/number: (17)
Police Reorganization #10: Information

(3) Date: ? - Sept. 1947

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
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(5) Item description and comment:

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(7) Film no. Sheet no.

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Conf/J137

28827

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
Public Safety Division

APO 500

23 SEP 1947

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Japanese Police Reorganization

TO: C-in-C

1. Please note tabulated variations of points toward planning reorganization of the Japanese police force, proposed by the Japanese Government, Public Safety Division and Government Section.

		JG	PSD	GS	C
a.	Co-existence of national and local entity.....	X	X	-	X
b.	Administrative supervision of the Diet.....	X	X	X	X
c.	National police of 30,000 men.....	X	X	-	X
d.	National police distributed in rural areas.....	X	X	-	X
e.	Local police distributed in municipalities.....	-	-	X	X
f.	Gradual progressive reorganization.....	X	X	-	X
g.	Immediate application to cities over 200,000.....	X	X	-	X
h.	Later application to cities over 50,000.....	X	X	-	X
i.	Hdqs sub-division in six areas.....	-	X	-	X
j.	Designate Cabinet Minister of Public Safety.....	-	X	-	-
k.	Over-all strength 125,000 (30,000 Nat'l Police).....	X	X	-	X
l.	Further provisions for coast guard.....	X	X	X	X
m.	Establish Public Safety Commission at Nat'l and municipal levels.....	-	X	X	X
n.	Immediate decentralization cities and towns 5,000....	-	-	X	X
o.	Complete decentralization within 90 days after enactment of enabling legislation to 2009 cities and towns	-	X	X	X
p.	Administrative control of Nat'l police under Public Safety Commission.....	X	X	-	X
q.	Tactical control of Nat'l rural police under prefecture governor in matters pertaining to local law enforcement, except in emergencies and matters of national interest.....	-	X	X	X
r.	Nat'l police to establish offices in cities and towns as required for administrative and tactical control	-	X	X	X
s.	Nat'l police to have complete jurisdiction in rural areas and limited jurisdiction in cities and towns	X	X	X	X
t.	Decentralize police immediately and completely to prefectures. Prefectures to determine further decentralization.....	-	-	X	X
u.	Abolishment of a National police force.....	-	-	X	-

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Memo, subj: "Japanese Police Reorganization", to C-in-C.

	JG	PSD	GS	C
v. Transfer police to six large cities and prefectures, national government to retain schools, identification bureau, communications net and special detective corps. Emergency powers, in certain instances to the Prime Minister.....	-	-	X	X
w. Maintain present national police system and decentralize only to cities of 200,000 population..	X	-	X	X

C.A.W.

2 Incl
~~Ltr to Prime Minister, dtd 16 Sep 47.~~
Police Reorganization Plan for Japan.

~~RESTRICTED~~

BRIEF

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
NND 775009
By MM Miller NARS, Date 10-30-79

SUBJECT: Police Reorganization Plan for Japan, under GO 13, SCAP 1945

1. a. SCAP Staff Memo No. 63, 1947 (TAB C): Channels for police matters to Eigthth Army and CIS, G-2.

b. G.O. No. 13, SCAP, 1945 (TAB B) directs CIS/G-2, to make recommendations for police force in Japan.

c. CLO No. 1277, 28 Feb 47 (TAB A) submits a Japanese Police Reorganization Plan and an increase from 93,935 to 125,000 in police strength. This is a plan recommended by the previous Japanese Government. PSD was in agreement.

2. a. The plan now submitted (TAB E) is in accord with the recommendations of Messrs. Valentine (TAB F) and Olander (TAB I) and other police specialists (TABS F through M) viz:

b. Begin decentralization not later than 1 January 1948.

c. Immediate experimental decentralization in Chiba Prefecture.

d. Decentralization to Metropolitan Police areas, over 50,000 population.

e. A national Department of Public Safety to cover national law enforcement needs and serve areas not policed by local metropolitan forces.

3. Note that crime incidence (TAB D) has tended upward since termination of hostilities.

4. Note that Police remains only stabilizing force available to Japanese Government since dissolution of armed forces and Gendarmerie.

5. Proposed strength gives Japan a ratio of: 1 to 585 population. Compares favorably with U.S., England, and North Ireland, though the latter also maintain armed forces or militia.

6. Recommend Japanese Government be authorized to implement reorganization of Japanese Police by proposed Memorandum and Annex (TAB O) which:

a. Directs implementation in accordance with plan outlined in (TAB E).

b. Authorizes increase to 125,000 for Japanese Police Force.

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3. Note that crime incidence (TAB D) has tended upward since termination of hostilities.

4. Note that Police remains only stabilizing force available to Japanese Government since dissolution of armed forces and Gendarmerie.

5. Proposed strength gives Japan a ratio of: 1 to 585 population. Compares favorably with U.S., England, and North Ireland, though the latter also maintain armed forces or militia.

6. Recommend Japanese Government be authorized to implement reorganization of Japanese Police by proposed Memorandum and Annex (TAB O) which:

a. Directs implementation in accordance with plan outlined in (TAB E).

b. Authorizes increase to 125,000 for Japanese Police Force.

7. Concurrences: G-1, G-3, G-4, PH/W, PM, CCS, ESS, and CTS. GS: Nonconcurs.

C.A.W.

TAB A - CLO Ltr No. 1277, 28 Feb 47
TAB B - G.O. 13, SCAP, 2 Oct 45
TAB C - SCAP Staff Memo No. 63, 19 Aug 47
TAB D - Crime Statistics
TAB E - Valentine-Clander Plan for Japanese Decentralization
TAB F - Valentine Report (Summation)
TAB G - PSD Report on Metropolitan Police (Summation)
TAB H - PSD Report on National Police System (Summation)
TAB I - Clander Report (Summation)
TAB J - PSD Report on Typical Prefecture Police Organization (Summation)
TAB K - PSD Report on Fire Section Bureau of Police (Summation)
TAB L - PSD Report on Police Communication System (Summation)
TAB M - PSD Report on Police Training School (Summation)
TAB N - PSD Memorandum: Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security
TAB O - Proposed Memorandum to Japanese Government

BRIEF
~~RESTRICTED~~

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RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

I. THE PROBLEM:

To approve and implement a plan from the Japanese Government which provides for the decentralization of police, and fulfills requirements of national, metropolitan and rural needs for law enforcement.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. Central Liaison Office Letter No. 1277, dated 28 February 1947, requests approval of the plan of the Japanese Government for the reorganization of the police force and an increase in police strength to 125,000 (Tab A).

B. General Order No. 13, SCAP, 1945, subject: "Civil Intelligence Section", directs that CIS/G-2 make recommendations relative to measures which will provide a civil police system in Japan adequate for the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation forces (Tab B).

C. SCAP Staff Memorandum No. 63, 1947, delineates the relations of General Headquarter agencies with the Japanese Police and specifies that CIS/G-2 is the normal contact for GHQ/SCAP on policy matter affecting the Japanese police (Tab C).

D. Messrs. Valentine and Olander, police specialists, were brought to Japan for the purpose of studying the Japanese Police System and recommending reorganizational plans along democratic lines. Their reports, and the reports of other police specialists (Tabs F through M), include recommendations to:

1. Provide for a national police system capable of fulfilling the needs of the national government and protecting the interests of the occupation.

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B. General Order No. 13, SCAP, 1945, subject: "Civil Intelligence Section", directs that CIS/G-2 make recommendations relative to measures which will provide a civil police system in Japan adequate for the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation forces (Tab B).

C. SCAP Staff Memorandum No. 63, 1947, delineates the relations of General Headquarter agencies with the Japanese Police and specifies that CIS/G-2 is the normal contact for GHQ/SCAP on policy matter affecting the Japanese police (Tab C).

D. Messrs. Valentine and Olander, police specialists, were brought to Japan for the purpose of studying the Japanese Police System and recommending reorganizational plans along democratic lines. Their reports, and the reports of other police specialists (Tabs F through M), include recommendations to:

1. Provide for a national police system capable of fulfilling the needs of the national government and protecting the interests of the occupation.

2. Educate the existing police force in the democratization and modernization of its administration, practices and procedures.

3. Eliminate extraneous functions currently being performed by the police.

4. Decentralize to local police in cities capable of supporting autonomous police organizations in accordance with patterns which are reflected by trends in the United States and other democratic countries.

E. Crime Statistics (Tab D) during the twenty year period prior to the cessation of hostilities show a downward trend. Coincident with the end of the war, the curtailment of police authority, and the removal of many of the restrictions on human rights, there was a sharp increase in crime rates. Future trends are largely unpredictable due to the

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many obvious uncertainties of the future.

F. During the occupation period the police system is the only available means of maintaining internal stability short of employing occupation forces. The Japanese Government has been directed to maintain law and order. Hence, a force must be available to the national government to insure compliance.

G. Any plan to reorganize the police system must take into account the fact that a national government must have some enduring means of maintaining its national authority. The applicability of the balance of power concept to the democratic state must be recognized and the Japanese Government provided with an adequate internal security power implement (Tab N).

III. DISCUSSION:

A. The plan submitted by the Japanese Government is in accord with the recommendations of Messrs. Valentine and Olander. In accordance with SCAP General Order No. 13, 1945 and SCAP Staff Memorandum No. 63, 1947, this plan has been developed into a two phase plan which proposes that:

1. The existing organization be prepared for decentralization to be initiated prior to 1 January 1948.

2. In Phase I reorganize, modernize and vitalize the police educational system; remove extraneous functions from police jurisdiction; limit police activities to enforcement of law and order; create six Regional Headquarters to facilitate administration, operation and control: and establish an experimental reorganizational project in Chiba Prefecture immediately upon approval of plan.

3. In Phase II initiate decentralization of the present police forces to ever more than

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and Olander. In accordance with SCAP General Order No. 13, 1945 and SCAP Staff Memorandum No. 63, 1947, this plan has been developed into a two phase plan which proposes that:

1. The existing organization be prepared for decentralization to be initiated prior to 1 January 1948.

2. In Phase I reorganize, modernize and vitalize the police educational system; remove extraneous functions from police jurisdiction; limit police activities to enforcement of law and order; create six Regional Headquarters to facilitate administration, operation and control; and establish an experimental reorganizational project in Chiba Prefecture immediately upon approval of plan.

3. In Phase II initiate decentralization of the present police forces to over more than 100 municipalities and establish a national rural police force or Department of Public Safety to serve areas outside of local autonomous police jurisdiction.

B. Independent forces will not be established simultaneously but decentralization will be gradual to insure continuity in the efficiency of the police to maintain law and order.

C. The Department of Public Safety is designed to fill the national need for an internal security implement and to police the rural areas of Japan and those cities financially unable or nondesirous of maintaining independent police agencies. The head of this department is appointed by the Prime Minister. Upon completion of decentralization, the remaining elements of the present national force will constitute the Department of Public Safety. The Regional Headquarters mentioned above and the central identification bureau and criminal laboratory will be retained in this

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department to facilitate its operation. It is intended that this Department of Public Safety will be the coordinating agency between the local police forces in matters of mutual interest, i.e., criminal identification, uniform crime reporting, etc.

D. The Japanese Government, Messrs. Valentine and Olander, and police specialists of the Public Safety Division have given careful consideration to the national and local police needs with respect to basic requirements of government, economic and social conditions, the upward trend in crime incidence, and the unpredictable effect of complete decentralization upon the stability of government.

E. It is necessary, as requested by the Japanese Government, to authorize an increase in police strength from 93,935 to 125,000 to provide for the replacement of personnel during the retraining period, the recruitment required for the effectural establishment of local municipal forces and the rural police force, and the maintenance of internal security. Authorization of 125,000 police for Japan gives a ratio of 1 to 585 population which compares more than favorably with the ratio of 1 to 598 in the United States, 1 to 670 in England, and 1 to 441 in North Ireland, in that these countries maintain armed forces or militia in addition to their police forces.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Japanese Government be authorized to implement the reorganization and decentralization of the Japanese Police Force by the proposed memorandum and annex thereto, (Tab O), which:

1. Directs implementation in accordance with the two phase plan set forth in Tab E which will:

   a. Maintain the status quo while preparing for the decentralization by retraining of present personnel, removal of ex-

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC NO. 775009

[illegible] during the retraining period, the recruitment required for the effectural establishment of local municipal forces and the rural police force, and the maintenance of internal security. Authorization of 125,000 police for Japan gives a ratio of 1 to 585 population which compares more than favorably with the ratio of 1 to 598 in the United States, 1 to 670 in England, and 1 to 441 in North Ireland, in that these countries maintain armed forces or militia in addition to their police forces.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that the Japanese Government be authorized to implement the reorganization and decentralization of the Japanese Police Force by the proposed memorandum and annex thereto, (Tab O), which:

1. Directs implementation in accordance with the two phase plan set forth in Tab E which will:

   a. Maintain the status quo while preparing for the decentralization by retraining of present personnel, removal of extraneous functions and structural modification to facilitate the transformation to meet metropolitan and rural police requirements.

   b. Initiate decentralization of police authority, not later than 1 January 1948, to cities of over 50,000 population.

   c. Establish a Department of Public Safety to serve the national needs in law enforcement and those areas not policed by local autonomous police forces.

2. Authorize an increase to 125,000 for the Japanese Police Force.

C.A.W.

RESTRICTED

BASIC: PSD Plan for Japanese Police Decentralization

Concurrences:

G-1	Concurs	(W.A.B.)
G-3	Concurs	(C.A.R.)
G-4	Concurs	(M.V.P.)
PM	Concurs	(W^m G.P.)
ESS	Concurs	(W.F.M.)
PH/W	Concurs	(C.F.S.)
CCS	Concurs	(G.I.B.)
CTS	Concurs	(F.S.B.)
GS	Non-concurs	(C.W.)

Tab A - CLO Ltr No. 1277, 28 Feb 47.
Tab B - G.O. 13, SCAP, 2 Oct 45.
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Tab K - PSD Report on Fire Section Bureau of Police (Summation).
Tab L - PSD Report on Police Communication System (Summation).
Tab M - PSD Report on Police Training School (Summation).
Tab N - PSD Memorandum: Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security (Power Implements, 5 Aug 47).
Tab O - Proposed Memorandum to Japanese Government.

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Tab D - Crime Statistics.
Tab E - Valentine-Olander Plan for Japanese Decentralization.
Tab F - Valentine Report (Summation).
Tab G - PSD Report on Metropolitan Police (Summation).
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GHQ F E C
1 MAR 1947
AGO RECORDS

IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICE

TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force.

2873

12126

C.L.O. No. 1277(PHW) 28 February 1947

1. Herewith is submitted for your approval a plan for reorganization of the Japanese Police system, as a temporary measure, which was adopted at the Cabinet Meeting on 27 February 1947.

2. As this proposed measure is intended to be introduced in the present session of the Diet which is expected to be closed within a short period because of the impending general election, it is requested that the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers be good enough to give an early consideration in this matter.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

K. Asakai

(K. Asakai)
Director of General Affairs,
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosure: A plan as indicated in Para. 1. above.

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Principles for the Reorganization and Increase in the Strength of the Japanese Police Force and Temporary Measures Thereof.

1. The Japanese Government believes that the most important point in the reorganization of police system is its democratization and by so doing strengthening its efficiency. That is to say that the tendency of excessive centralization of the police system be corrected and it be decentralized as far as possible and those functions which should not come under the police force be transferred to other suitable agencies, and fundemental police methods be strengthened with the modernization of its institutions and techniques, and police officials' standards be raised.

2. The Japanese Government, based on the above principle, in July 1946, made public a "Tentative Plan for the Reformation of Police System", and at the end of the same year obtained a report on the subject from the "Police System Investigation Committee", and is in possession of tangible plan for that purpose.

The Japanese police authorities, as far as the police administration is concerned, have been making every effort for the raising of the material standards and efficiency of the police by adopting these plans as a reference and by bringing into effect such organization that could be made without altering any fundamental or basic laws.

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3. As to the measure for the decentralization of the police, the Japanese Government has a plan that police administration be entrusted, in principle, to the local public bodies and at the same time a national police force be established for the purpose of executing and taking charge of matters that may concern the national interest or on a national scale, and of maintaining contact with and regulation of the police activities of the local public bodies, thus enabling, by mutual co-operation of both national and local police authorities, to promote efficiency, preserve the peace, law and order, protect life and property.

National police shall have a strength of 30,000 uniformed police officials under a central headquarters. There shall be established eight regional headquarters at the important localities throughout the country. The chief shall be appointed or removed from his office under a strict procedure in order to establish and maintain the impartiality of the police administration by separating and making it independent from the interest of political influence.

4. Functions of police are primarily a stabilizing force for the promotion of law and order and enforcement of the laws.

Accordingly,

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Accordingly, in the reorganization of the police force, there is much reason to believe that the hasty reorganization of the fundamental system may not only bring about confusion and inefficiency of administration, but also will affect the functioning of other administrative agencies, creating public unreast and confusion in law and order, through the nation.

5. With the enforcement from May 3rd of the New Constitution, there will occur drastic changes in the local administrative system and accordingly much authority of the Central Government will be transferred to local government. The Japanese Government as well as the whole nation desires that the transition period, be carried out peacefully with tranquility and stability. Until the foundation of the local administrative bodies is established and their employees acquire experiecne in the technique of local administration and fulfill their responsibility, and have passed through the most critical period, it is required that the most stabilized condition of the nation should prevail.

6. The police force is the only stabilizing influence available to the Japanese Government for the enforcement of law and order, therefore the control of the police force should remain as at present.

There is no doubt that the presence of the occupation forces is contributing to the preservation of stability, but the Japanese Government realizes that it is the duty and responsibility of the Japanese Government to supervise the enforcement of the national and local laws of Japan, except in extreme emergency.

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7. Realizing the importance of its responsibility, the Japanese Government request the approval to carry into effect the following measures;

(1) Strengthen the culture and education of police officials and acquire the democratic police technique and raise the standards and efficiency.

(2) Remove from the present police system unrelated functions of government and transfer same to the appropriate local self-governing body as soon as possible.

(3) Devote entirely for the preservation of peace and order, protection of life and property and prevention and detection of crime, in accordance with the prescription of law.

(4) Clarify the procedure and authority of investigating crimes by police officials.

(5) Separate the Fire Organs from the present police system at the earliest possible occasion.

(6) Retain the regional unit of local police administration in present prefectural region, and for the time being, the administration of such local police shall be placed under the charge of the elected governor. Authority for the supervision and control of the prefectural police department, and its executive staff appointments and removals shall be retained by the Home Minister as heretofore

(7) Retain the administration, organization and expenses of the Tokyo M.P.B. as its present existence.

(8)

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(8) The expenses shall be defrayed jointly by the national and prefectural governments as heretofore.

(9) When local government officials have demonstrated proficiency in self-government, reorganize the police forces, in cities with populations capable of supporting them, into police departments controlled and operated by the local self-governing bodies.

(10) Commence the establishment of the national police force immediately in order to be prepared for the national needs when complete decentralization of the present system occurs.

8. In order to preserve the aforementioned law and order, maintain the national authority, protect national and local interests, the Japanese Government further request that the overall police strength be increased to 125,000 total.

9. It is respectfully requested that the above plan be approved.

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TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force.

C.L.O. No. 1277(PHW) 28 February 1947

1. Herewith is submitted for your approval a plan for reorganization of the Japanese Police system, as a temporary measure, which was adopted at the Cabinet Meeting on 27 February 1947.

2. As this proposed measure is intended to be introduced in the present session of the Diet which is expected to be closed within a short period because of the impending general election, it is requested that the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers be good enough to give an early consideration in this matter.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

(K. Asakai)
Director of General Affairs,
Central Liaison Office.

G.H.Q. A.P.O. 44

Enclosure: A plan as indicated in Para. 1. above.

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R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
2 October 1945

GENERAL ORDERS)
:
NO.....13)

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. The Civil Intelligence Section is established as a Special Staff Section in this headquarters to advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on policies relating to civil public safety agencies in Japan and Korea and to conduct such investigations relating to compliance with orders and instructions to the Japanese Government as may be directed.

2. The functions of the section are to:

a. Maintain contact with, arrange for and coordinate surveys and reports on, and inform the Supreme Commander concerning:

(1) The police, prison and fire control organizations and systems in Japan and Korea.

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

b. Make recommendations relative to policies to be adopted or measures to be taken which will:

(1) Provide civil police, prison and fire control organizations and systems in Japan and Korea adequate for the accomplishment of the objectives of the Occupation Forces.

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

c. Conduct such investigations relating to compliance with orders and instructions to the Japanese Government as may be directed from time to time.

****

By command of General MacARTHUR:

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

R. K. SUTHERLAND
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. W. Allen for
/t/ B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Adjutant General.

COPY

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
AND
FAR EAST COMMAND

AG 300.6 (19 Aug 47) SGS

APO 500
19 August 1947

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
:
NO.....63)

(SCAP & FEC)

RELATIONS OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
AGENCIES WITH THE JAPANESE POLICE

1. Rescission. Staff Memorandum 21, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and United States Army Forces, Pacific, 16 August 1946.

2. The delineation of responsibilities and the channels of communication to be used for those authorized to exercise direct or indirect control of the Japanese Police are summarized as follows:

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Civil Intelligence Section), has the following missions:

(1) Advises the Japanese Government on policies and matters concerning the organization, training, and functioning of the Japanese Police.

(2) Determines the effectiveness of the functioning of the Japanese Police by surveillance and observation of their operations. This mission does not include the issuance of operational instructions.

(3) Is the normal contact for General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command agencies and subordinate commands concerning police matters affecting the Japanese

exercise direct or indirect control of the Japanese Police are summarized as follows:

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Civil Intelligence Section), has the following missions:

(1) Advises the Japanese Government on policies and matters concerning the organization, training, and functioning of the Japanese Police.

(2) Determines the effectiveness of the functioning of the Japanese Police by surveillance and observation of their operations. This mission does not include the issuance of operational instructions.

(3) Is the normal contact for General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command agencies and subordinate commands concerning police matters affecting the Japanese Police.

b. The operation of the Japanese Police has been assigned as the responsibility of the Commanding General, Eighth Army. The Provost Marshal, Eighth Army, has primary interest. Operational instructions to the Japanese Police are issued only by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, or his representative.

c. The Provost Marshal, General Headquarters, Far East Command, is the normal contact for General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command agencies concerning matters affecting the operation of the Japanese Police.

3. No section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Far East Command, has the authority to influence the activities of the Japanese Police except through channels indicated above.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDG NO. 775009

(SM)63)

PAUL J. MUELLER,
Major General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ R. M. Levy
R. M. LEVY
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3/402/ NNDC No. 77509

Crime Statistics Charts

GRAPH 1 - Japanese Crime Statistics, Offenses Against the Criminal Code.

a. 1924-1946

b. January 1945 - June 1947

GRAPH 2.- Japanese Crime Statistics, 1924-1946. Number of cases reported of:

Murder
Rape
Robbery
Arson
Embezzlement

1. Graph 1-a affords a long-term perspective from which to interpret current Japanese crime statistics, showing the gradual rise from 1924 to a peak of 1,566,435 offenses reported in 1934. A consistent decrease is evident from 1935 until the end of the war. Social and psychological conflicts and a disrupted economy have produced an unsettled condition in postwar Japan in which offenses reported have broken sharply upward to over 1,400,000 in 1946.

2. Graph 1-b shows in detail the monthly movement in offenses reported from January 1945 through June 1947. This includes the critical time factors of the closing year of the war, the war's end, and from the initial stages of the Occupation to date. Crime incidence increased sharply immediately following the surrender. A peak seems to have been reached in September 1946, from which point the offenses dropped off through January 1947. The peak last September of 147,000 offenses reported was greater than the monthly average of the previous high point in Japanese crime, the years 1933-1935 (129,000 offenses). The number of offenses has settled at approximately 115,000 per month since March 1947, about 65 percent greater than the 1941-1945 level.

3. Graph 2 shows the movements in certain specific offenses during the period 1924-1946. Murder, rape, robbery, arson, and embezzlement all increased appreciably with the end of the war. Armed robbery has increased 500 percent over its presurrender incidence. This focuses attention on one of the current problems with which the police must cope.

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4. The current level of criminal activity is not unique in the history of Japan. It compares with the previous high reached during 1933-1935. This high incidence of conduct prejudicial to the public safety and welfare, however, comes at a time when the only law enforcement arm of the Government is and will be the police. It is at this juncture that the problem is perceived as unparalleled in Japanese history.

5. There is a high level of criminal activity. The economic and ecologic factors which have given rise to this will not be quickly changed. There is no immediate prospect of a substantially lower level of criminal activity.

6. The only force at the disposal of the Government and the people to protect themselves from such activity will henceforth be the police.

7. Therefore, Japan has a more acute need than ever before for a large, well-trained, well-equipped, and efficient police force.

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Graph 1

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
OFFENSES AGAINST THE CRIMINAL CODE

A. 1924 — 1946



B. JANUARY 1945 — JUNE 1947



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

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

Graph 1

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Graph 2

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
1924 – 1946
NUMBER OF CASES REPORTED

MURDER AND RAPE



"MURDER" INCLUDES ATTEMPTS, INFANTICIDE, AND MURDER CONNECTED WITH ROBBERY.

ROBBERY



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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

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ROBBERY



GRAPH NO. 1

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

JAPANESE CRIME STATISTICS
1924 – 1946
NUMBER OF CASES REPORTED





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

GRAPH NO1

SOURCE: MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

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VALENTINE-OLANDER PLAN FOR
JAPANESE POLICE DECENTRALIZATION

1. The plan set forth herein for the implementation of democratic ideologies in the Japanese police system is the considered opinion of Messrs. Valentine and Olander. This plan recognizes certain factors as basic principles required to bring about democratic procedure and technique in the operation and administration of public safety agencies. The principle determining factors are:

a. The necessity for a law enforcement and peace preserving organization as an adjunct to any form of stable government.

b. The measure of success in the conduct of the occupation depends upon continued stability and efficiency of the Japanese Government.

c. Complete police decentralization would confront the Japanese Government with a situation wherein the effectiveness of the enforcement of laws and regulations on land would be impaired to an undesirable degree in that there is no Japanese army, navy, or other force available with police power. (Separate recommendations have been submitted relative to law enforcement on the territorial waters of Japan.)

d. The situation which the complete decentralization of law enforcement organs would create for the development of ideologies inimical to the occupation and the nation.

e. The stability of the existing economic and social situation and its chaotic potential in an unpredictable future.

f. The continental practice of centralized law enforcement does not provide sheriff and constable systems such as is characteristic of the Anglo-American concept.

g. The decided upward trend in the crime curve attributed primarily to a more liberal interpretation of individual rights, the shortage of food, consumer goods, and the low point in industry employment.

h. The experience of the United States with decentralization

Government with a situation wherein the effectiveness of the enforcement of laws and regulations on land would be impaired to an undesirable degree in that there is no Japanese army, navy, or other force available with police power. (Separate recommendations have been submitted relative to law enforcement on the territorial waters of Japan.)

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e. The stability of the existing economic and social situation and its chaotic potential in an unpredictable future.

f. The continental practice of centralized law enforcement does not provide sheriff and constable systems such as is characteristic of the Anglo-American concept.

g. The decided upward trend in the crime curve, attributed primarily to a more liberal interpretation of individual rights, the shortage of food, consumer goods, and the low point in industry employment.

h. The experience of the United States with decentralization of law enforcement in the Philippine Commonwealth which finally crystalized into a strong national military police force.

2. Considering the best interests of the occupation, of the Japanese Government and of the people, the reform required to bring about democratic procedure and technique in the operation and administration of public safety activities should be implemented gradually over a period of time. The transition period from national to local government should, of necessity, be one of tranquility and stability.

3. The only arm of authority available to the Japanese government for law enforcement and supporting the national will is the Japanese civil police. Since it is not contemplated or desirable to use occupation troops, except in extreme emergencies, for the enforcement of Japanese national or local laws, there is no other reasonable or logical alternative except to provide the Japanese Government with a law enforcement agency on a national level capable of maintaining law and order.

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4. Messrs. Valentine and Olander have recommended elimination of, addition to, adjustment and changes in Japanese police operations, structural organization and administration. Specific reference was made to the limitation of the responsibilities of the police which should be confined to (1) prevention of crime, (2) suppression of criminal activities, (3) detection and apprehension of criminals or violators of the criminal laws, (4) protection of life and property, (5) preservation of peace and order, (6) control of traffic and traffic safety, and (7) serving of warrants, subpoenas and other court instruments as directed by competent authority. Such limitations would remove from police control the functions of extraneous police activity currently being performed. The plan recommends the removal from the police department of the Sanitation Section, Fire Department, Census Bureau, Economic Controls and many others, presently thoroughly enmeshed in the police structure. This plan does not envisage that the functions of civil police personnel will include special guard activities such as performed by railway guards, bank guards, occupation guards, etc.

5. The Valentine-Olander plan has as its primary objectives the maintenance of internal stability in Japan conducive to a tranquil occupation, and the development of strong and democratically healthy autonomous municipal governing bodies. It is designed to be adapted to whatever legislation is evolved through subsequent experience and then evidenced need. The plan recommended is divided into two phases which will:

a. Initiate decentralization of the present national police system prior to 1 January 1948, and

b. Provide for the metropolitan and rural needs in law enforcement and police protection.

6. Phase I, during which the structure of the police organization will temporarily maintain the status quo, as a transitory measure, is designed to:

a. Prepare the existent bodies for decentralization.

b. Reorganize, modernize, and vitalize the police educational system.

c. Initiate the progressive education of all police officials.

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a. Prepare the existent bodies for decentralization.

b. Reorganize, modernize, and vitalize the police educational system.

c. Initiate the progressive education of all police officials.

d. Reorganize and train the executive, administrative and operational divisions of the police force along modern democratic lines.

e. Improve personnel selection for entry into the police force, promotion, retirement and welfare.

f. Remove from the present police system, as other agencies are made available to absorb them, unrelated functions of government and adjust police power and functions analogous to those of Anglo-American concept.

g. Establish under governing laws and regulations police practices in the detection and prevention of crime, protection of life and property and the preservation of law and order, comparable to those of other democratic nations.

h. Create six or more regional or district organizations to facilitate the administration, operation and control of the present and of the proposed future forces.

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7. The program embodied in Phase I proposes the use of a perpendicular organizational structure which, while temporarily maintaining the status quo of the present organization, makes certain modifications and adjustments necessary to fulfill the aims of the occupation in preparation for an uneventful transition to Phase II, decentralization. The technicalities of the interim reorganization, the number of bureaus and districts, the physical equipment and similar matters are of concern only to those persons implementing the changes and are not enumerated herein. However, the structural organization to be used during Phase I is as follows:

a. A National police system headed by a Director General, with six or more Regional Districts, 46 Prefectural Divisions, and approximately eleven hundred sixty-four (1164) Police Districts. (Incl 1)

b. The Director General, located at National Headquarters (Incl 2) will be the head of the National police system. He will be responsible for the administration, operation, control and performance of the department and shall have authority commensurate with his responsibilities. He will be directly under the Prime Minister, i.e. the head of responsible parliamentary government.

c. A Regional Director will be in charge of each regional district and responsible to the Director General for proper law enforcement and for the performance and activities of police units within the regional jurisdiction. He will coordinate the prefectural police divisions relative to current police problems and promote uniformity of activity and procedure. Close liaison will be maintained with the Prefectural Governors and other Prefectural officials, cooperating with them in consonance with national policies, laws, rules and regulations in carrying out local policies concerning police problems.

d. A Prefectural Superintendent will be in charge of each Prefectural Division (Incl 3) and responsible to the Regional Director, and during Phase I to the Prefectural Governor, for all law enforcement and the proper management and performance of police duties and personnel under his jurisdiction.

e. Each Prefectural Division is divided into a number of Police Districts; from the District the responsibility is further and finally delegated to Police Boxes, the lowest echelon of responsibility. Police Districts (Incl 4) as they now exist will be headed by a Police Captain

parliamentary government.

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e. Each Prefectural Division is divided into a number of Police Districts; from the District the responsibility is further and finally delegated to Police Boxes, the lowest echelon of responsibility. Police Districts (Incl 4) as they now exist will be headed by a Police Captain responsible to the Prefectural Superintendent for general law enforcement in the respective areas and for the proper control and performance of police duties and personnel under his jurisdiction.

8. Phase II will be initiated not later than 1 January 1948. This phase may be initiated as soon as development in the respective local government indicates to the interested SCAP sections that the following factors have been satisfied to the extent that Phase II should be placed into operation with some degree of assurance:

a. That local municipal officials have demonstrated capacity in the management of local government.

b. That local or national revenue be provided to maintain metropolitan and/or rural forces.

9. Coincident with the approval of this plan decentralization of police power and operation of a rural police force will be effected on an experimental basis in Chiba Prefecture.

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10. Phase II, while continuing the general pattern of Phase I, provides for the gradual decentralization of the present national system and reorganization of the police force into over one hundred (100) police departments controlled and operated by the local municipalities with populations of approximately 50,000. This is the essence of the Valentine recommendations.

11. This Phase also provides for the establishment of a national rural force, or Department of Public Safety, in the Japanese Government to serve all areas of the country falling outside of the boundaries of municipalities operating independent autonomous police departments. This is the essence of the Olander recommendations. The department will initially consist of approximately 30,000 uniformed police, organized into a Headquarters and six or more major Regional Subdivisions for reasons of efficient administration, operation and control (Incl 5, 6, 7). The Director of the Department of Public Safety is to be appointed by the Prime Minister. The Director is to be separate and independent of any ministry control. The structural framework of the existing police system as indicated in paragraph 7 above is designed to facilitate its absorption by the Department of Public Safety with the accomplishment of decentralization.

12. To provide the necessary police personnel to accomplish the above, maintain law and order, preserve and enforce national authority and protect national and local interests will require approximately 125,000 police as the overall strength of the Japanese police force. (Incl 8). This includes personnel for the 30,000 uniformed police of the Department of Public Safety whose recruitment and training should start immediately in order to prepare for the national and rural needs when decentralization of the present national system becomes effective.

Incls.
1. Map, Proposed Distribution of Japanese Police
2. Chart, 119 Local Autonomous Police Forces
3. Chart, Japanese National Police Department
4. Chart, National Headquarters Organization
5. Chart, Prefectural Headquarters Organization
6. Chart, Police District Organization

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7. Chart, National Rural Police
8. Chart, District Headquarters Organization, National Rural Police
9. Chart, Troop Headquarters Organization, National Rural Police

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PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POLICE



DISTRICT I
1,860 RURAL POLICE
4,750 TOTAL

DISTRICT II
7,890 RURAL POLICE
16,373 TOTAL

DISTRICT III
7,200 RURAL POLICE
24,112 TOTAL

PROPOSED PERSONNEL STRENGTH

TOTAL —— 125,000 INCLUDING
RURAL POLICE 30,000

CURRENT PERSONNEL STRENGTH (15 OCT 46)

AUTHORIZED - 93,935
ACTUAL —— 89,022

NUMBER INSIDE PREFECTURE
INDICATES TOTAL PROPOSED POLICE STRENGTH

PROPOSED POLICE RATIOS

ONE POLICEMAN PER 585 POPULATION
ONE RURAL POLICEMAN PER

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RURAL POLICE 30,000

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NUMBER INSIDE PREFECTURE
INDICATES TOTAL PROPOSED POLICE STRENGTH

PROPOSED POLICE RATIOS

ONE POLICEMAN PER 585 POPULATION

ONE RURAL POLICEMAN PER 1,697 RURAL POPULATION



DISTRICT II
7,890 RURAL POLICE
16,373 TOTAL

DISTRICT III
7,200 RURAL POLICE
24,112 TOTAL

DISTRICT IV
6,600 RURAL POLICE
33,910 TOTAL

DISTRICT V
1,920 RURAL POLICE
4,597 TOTAL

DISTRICT VI
4,530 RURAL POLICE
15,975 TOTAL

LEGEND

COMMAND CHANNELS

HEADQUARTERS TO REGION ———

REGION TO TROOP ———

$(\text{PROPOSED STRENGTH})_n = \frac{4}{3}(\text{AUTHORIZED STRENGTH})_n + \delta$

$(\text{PROPOSED RURAL POLICE STRENGTH})_n = \frac{\{(\text{TOTAL POPULATION})_n - (\text{URBAN POPULATION})_n\}}{\sum_{n=1}^{n=46}(\text{RURAL POPULATION})_n} \cdot$ TOTAL PROPOSED RURAL POLICE STRENGTH $+ \epsilon$

N = PREFECTURE NUMBER

δ, ϵ = CORRECTION FACTORS

GHQ · SCAP

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RURAL POLICE 30,000

CURRENT PERSONNEL STRENGTH (15 OCT 46)
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

DISTRICT II
7,890
RURAL POLICE
16,373
TOTAL

DISTRICT III
7,200
RURAL POLICE
24,112
TOTAL

DISTRICT IV
6,600
RURAL POLICE
33,910
TOTAL

DISTRICT V
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RURAL POLICE
4,597
TOTAL

DISTRICT VI
4,530
RURAL POLICE
15,975
TOTAL

LEGEND

COMMAND CHANNELS

HEADQUARTERS TO REGION

REGION TO TROOP

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N = PREFECTURE
δ, ϵ = CORRECTION FACTORS

GHQ · SCAP

NUMBER

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

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

GHQ · SCAP NUMBER

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JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT



JANUARY 1947

PREPARED BY: PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

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NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS



JANUARY 1947

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PREFECTURAL HEADQUARTERS



JANUARY 1947

PREPARED BY PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION

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POLICE DISTRICT



NOTE:

THE RANK OF STATION COMMANDERS, RANK AND NUMBER OF SUBORDINATE OFFICERS WILL VARY ACCORDING TO LOCATION, AREA INVOLVED, AND POLICE PROBLEMS OF THE INDIVIDUAL DISTRICT STATION.

JANUARY 1947

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Incl 7



NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

Incl 7



NOTE:

* Sections will maintain files of information pertinant to district.

DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
ORGANIZATION

NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

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

NOTE:

* Number of sub-sectors to be determined in individual troops by number of policemen employed.
One Ass't Inspector to 50 Policemen suggested.

TROOP HEADQUARTERS
ORGANIZATION

'NATIONAL RURAL POLICE

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BRIEF OF THE VALENTINE REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division survey of police organization and operation in metropolitan Japanese cities (over 50,000 population) made by Mr. Lewis J. Valentine indicates a need in Japan for local police departments responsible to autonomous municipal governments, and capable of performing public safety and crime prevention functions in accordance with local needs which vary with the size of each municipality and its geographic location.

2. Japanese police organizations subsequent to the occupation were responsible through prefectural governors to the Home Ministry. They entered into and largely controlled every phase of Japanese life, were highly paternalistic, and were keyed to enhancing the political welfare of high governmental officials.

3. The proposed reorganization of metropolitan police departments in Japan follows the effective American standards as evidenced in the function, organization and operation of the New York City Police Department and encompasses the removal of police intervention from every phase of public and private life of the people, the evolving of a police organization to be the servants - not the masters - of the Japanese people, and the raising of the morale of the policemen wherein they become proud of their position in the community, respected by their fellow townspeople and instilled with a desire to adequately serve their community.

4. The objectives of reorganization can be secured through an adequate municipal civil service for administrative and operating personnel, a police commission responsible to the elected municipal government, provision for adequate recruit and in-service training, improvement in equipment and facilities and modernization of organization and techniques as specifically emphasized in the report.

5. It is therefore recommended:

a. That municipal metropolitan police departments be established in cities over 50,000 population, responsible through a police commission to the elected head of the municipality.

b. That the organization, operation and functions of the New York City Police Department be followed as a model for the reorganization.

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BRIEF OF METROPOLITAN POLICE REPORT

1. The survey and study made by Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on the Metropolitan Police of Japan indicates that there is a definite need in Japan for a complete reorganization of the police system, in order that law enforcement may function properly under the new constitution, be free from the influence of local politicians, that public respect may be gained by the Japanese police for the first time and that the taxpayers may secure the utmost in protection of life and property for the money expended for this purpose.

2. The present Metropolitan Police law enforcement program and system is antiquated with a complicated functional organization existing at national, prefectural, and district levels. The Japanese police have operated under feudalistic concepts, enforcing the laws of the nation with the support of courts that dealt with the liberty of the Japanese in a merciless manner. It was not found necessary to advance police science in order to keep abreast of advancement in criminal techniques. Accordingly, there is a definite lack of transportation, modern communication, and investigative facilities, which in turn promotes poor police efficiency. The lack of adequate police salaries, retirement provisions, and employee benefits does not attract young men and women of higher intelligence to the police force.

3. It is recommended that:

a. The Metropolitan Police Departments in cities of over fifty thousand (50,000) population should be managed by a single head, assisted by a vice-administrator, operating through an established chain of command.

b. All duties now performed by the police that have no place in the accepted category of police responsibilities should be transferred to other agencies as agencies for the handling of such duties are organized and placed in operation.

c. A separate civil service system should be established comparable with American standards, associated with an adequate pay scale, retirement, and sick benefits.

d. Police training, both recruit and in-service, should be strengthened and instruction in modern police methods be substituted in police school curriculums for subjects that are of no importance in developing efficient and well trained police officers.

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BRIEF OF
NATIONAL POLICE PLANNING GROUP REPORT

1. The existing Japanese Police System is a quasi-National-Prefectural organization, operating under the rather loose supervision of the Home Minister, with the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry functioning as a staff, major policy-making, coordinating body without actual line or operational control over the Prefectural Police Departments. Clear-cut channels of command and responsibility are lacking.

2. The rules governing police operations, selection, promotion and removal of personnel, as well as salary scales, are not uniform, varying in the individual Prefectures.

3. The Japanese police are engaged in numerous extraneous activities far beyond the American conception of police functions.

4. A new democracy is being created in which the people are inexperienced in self-government and not sure of their fundamental rights and privileges under the new system. Japan has neither army, navy, nor militia to control wide-spread lawlessness or serious domestic disorders. If the police of Japan fail, the opposition can take over, be they racketeers, gangsters or anarchists. Crime is national in scope and must be approached on a uniform national basis.

5. To meet present day police problems Japan needs a well-trained, mobile, efficient, and economical National Police Department, free from the ravages of local politicians, capable of effectively enforcing the laws, preserving peace and order, and of guaranteeing the people those rights and privileges incorporated in the new constitution.

6. It is recommended that:

a. A National Police Department be created, using the present personnel, facilities and equipment as a nucleus, to be supervised by a qualified Executive Head, appointed by the Prime Minister with the approval of the Diet.

b. The authority, jurisdiction, duties and responsibilities of the Police Department be clearly defined, and all extraneous duties transferred to other appropriate governmental agencies.

c. A modern pyramid-type organizational structure be set up with clear-cut channels of command and responsibility.

d. The personnel management system be modernized to attract and keep men of character and ability in the police service.

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BRIEF OF THE OLANDER REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division survey made by Mr. Oscar G. Olander proposes an organization for a rural police force (to include cities of less than 50,000 population). The organization as presented presupposes enactment of legislation authorizing a rural police force at either national, which is recommended, or prefectural level and metropolitan police forces for cities of over 50,000 population, and the establishment of agencies to absorb certain non-police activities.

2. Review of the existing police system indicated a low efficiency in the functioning of the police. They had "lost face" among their own countrymen, their equipment was in disrepair and they operated with inefficiency induced by extraneous and duplication of functions.

3. The recommended and proposed structural organization at national level would have a Headquarters with three major subdivisions under an appointed Director. Functional operation would be from National Headquarters through six Districts, further subdivided into Troop Areas contingent upon population and geographical boundaries, and operated by Civil Service personnel. Provision is made for a National Police Academy open to rural and metropolitan police; an adequate communication system to include voice radio equipment; a traffic safety bureau handling traffic control, accident prevention, licensing of drivers and traffic education; and a Criminal Investigation (detective) Division embracing all known specialized methods of crime detection and prevention.

4. If enabling laws limit rural police to prefectural level, the organization would be patterned after the proposed national system, but on a reduced basis. However, should the rural police be established at prefectural level, there should be established a National Police Academy, a National Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, a National Bureau of Identification, and a National Police Communication System for efficiency of operation.

5. It is therefore recommended:

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5. It is therefore recommended:

a. That a National Rural Police System be established to serve rural areas and cities of less than 50,000 population and with police power to operate anywhere in Japan.

b. That operation of a National Rural Police System be through an appointed head responsible to an elected government official and with career personnel under civil service.

c. That the organization, operation, and functions of a Rural Police System, as outlined in the Olander report, be adopted.

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BRIEF OF THE SAITAMA POLICE SURVEY REPORT

1. The survey of the Saitama Police, conducted with the aim of becoming thoroughly acquainted with a predominantly rural prefecture, resulted in compilation of information relative to police organization, operation, administration, personnel, equipment, installations and facilities as they exist in the rural areas of a typical prefecture.

2. It was found that terrain conformation, wherein 25% of the total area is mountainous, results in 92% of the population (over 1,500,000 people) centering in the remaining 75% (approximately 1113 sq. miles) or lowlands of the prefecture.

3. Police organization, administration and operations, as practiced in Saitama's twenty-seven (27) police districts, indicate a lack of uniformity in the police structure and wholesale duplications of effort, specifically in administrative matters. Motor vehicle equipment is for the most part reserved for transportation of higher police officials, while the major portion of police work is performed on foot or bicycle. Weapons are available for about 30% of the personnel, however, they are generally maintained in a reserve status. Communications when in repair, are adequate for the present type of organization but are not suited to a rural police force as such.

4. Police treatment of detained suspects, while not physically brutual, is, in combination with lock-up conditions, generally conducive to early confessions of guilt. Police chiefs exercise their summary power to levy fines up to ¥20 and/or to adjudge confinement up to 30 days. Procurators seldom exercise their legal control of the so-called "judicial police".

5. The individual policeman, technically on twenty-four hour duty, operates similarly to a small town policeman in the United States. He is required to perform duties connected with police station maintenance, i.e., night switchboard duty, lock-up duty, etc., for one-quarter to one-third of his time. During his absence the policeman's family, residing in the police box, constitute the only police contact within the community.

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BRIEF OF REPORT OF FIRE BRANCH

1. The Public Safety Division surveys conducted by Mr. George W. Angell present a reorganization which presupposes legislation establishing a national Japanese fire defense system.

2. Japan's vulnerability to fire cumulates from a fatalistic viewpoint placing fires among things inevitable. Existing water facilities, city planning, building laws, fire prevention codes, fire apparatus and equipment, administrative organization, training schools and personnel standards negate efficiency and make conflagrations ever imminent.

3. Need for an efficient fire defense, incorporating the broader phases of fire suppression and prevention, to curtail the losses now affecting the economic structure is evidenced by a loss equivalent to 4.8% of the 1946 national budget.

4. To provide for an adequate Japanese fire defense, it is necessary that: (1) fire departments be a distinct component part of government, (2) water supplies be increased, (3) transmission of fire alarms be reliable and prompt, and (4) properly equipped apparatus be provided.

5. A review of implementing requirements disclosed that divided, overlapping and dual enforcement of fire responsibilities by unqualified police officials presents no valid reason for maintenance of status quo; that the basic principles of democracy suggests municipal controls; and that accrued advantages of national control in mass purchasing power, simplification in dealing with a single government agency and establishing essential mutual aid plans between cities is essential.

6. The proposed organization coordinates under a National Fire Defense Board all related fire defense functions and provides for effective enforcement of fire regulations; standardization of facilities, apparatus and equipment; and uniformity of fire suppression techniques.

7. It is therefore recommended:

a. That a National Fire Defense Board, which will consolidate under civil service reforms all activities pertinent to Japan's fire security, be established within the Home Ministry.

b. That present facilities be remodeled to insure adequate fire flow and an ample rapid response of fire apparatus.

c. That a program be initiated which will provide all Japanese fire departments with sufficient modern fire apparatus.

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BRIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS REPORT

1. The survey made by the Public Safety Division of the existing Japanese Police Communications System (radio and wire nets) indicates that definite readjustments are necessary to provide more adequate police communication coverage for Japan within the aims of the occupation.

2. The Japanese Police Communications System has little in common with accepted police communication standards as it carries non-police traffic concerning control of health, welfare and general national problems. Little maintenance has been exercised on the wire systems or terminal equipment (switchboards, repeaters, telephones) since Japan went on a full-war basis. Hence, there is evidence of disintegration of preventative maintenance routine. The police wire system is separate from any other agency and is completely government owned. The fairly new radio system, a war adjunct to the badly damaged wire system, is in good working order, with a satisfactory degree of operational efficiency. It is nationally owned and controlled by the Home Ministry. Plans for the expansion of the radio net have been ready for months with two hundred and thirty-seven (237) tertiary (3rd level) stations ready to operate upon SCAP authorization. There are also one hundred and twenty-seven (127) tertiary stations now in the planning stage.

3. A good police communications system should be fast, dependable and accurate, with a degree of secrecy. The Japanese system now has the basic principals of these factors.

4. Accordingly, it is recommended that:

a. A program of general repair, replacement and maintenance of present wire facilities be inaugurated.

b. Steps be taken to place wire communications in satisfactory operation between all police installations and the supervising police districts; the advisability of leasing commercial lines rather than reconstructing certain damaged police lines should be investigated.

c. The police be authorized to operate the tertiary radio stations that are now completed and equipped, and to further develop and complete this radio net-work.

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BRIEF OF JAPANESE POLICE TRAINING REPORT

1. The Public Safety Division Survey and Report on Training the Japanese Police indicates that police methods will have to be changed to meet the aims of the Occupation. Policing under a democratic system is more complex and requires many more skills than were formerly required under an autocratic system.

2. The present Japanese training is neither uniform nor coordinated. Present instructors do not understand or teach democratic police methods. All police training should be stopped except in certain basic subjects because it is doing more harm than good.

3. The overall efficiency of police must be raised for effective democratic law enforcement. This can be accomplished through the coordination of selection, promotion, training, and welfare activities, by the establishment of a personnel agency within the police system on national and prefecture levels and the adoption of a long range training program based on a job analysis of police duties.

4. It is therefore recommended that:

a. Present police training be stopped until a key group of instructors and administrators can be trained to form the nucleus of training instructors necessary to accomplish this mission.

b. All 93,000 police personnel be retrained in democratic police methods.

c. A central personnel agency be established within the police system to coordinate selection, training, promotion, and welfare of employees.

d. Police Administrators from Public Safety Division skilled in modern police training methods advise, observe and study the training program in operation in order to correct deficiencies that develop, meet new problems, and recommend such changes in personnel as conditions indicate.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
Public Safety Division

APO 500
5 August 1947

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security Power Implements

1. The purpose of this paper is to point out to proponents of complete decentralization of government the impracticability of universal application of such a principle. Also, that full consideration should be given all factors to include the years of recorded historical precedent in states government before final judgement is made to deny Japan the proper internal security power implements.

2. The post war surrender policies adopted by the Far Eastern Commission state in part as follows:

a. "Japan is not to have any army, navy, airforce, secret police organization, gendarmarie, or any civil aviation, but may have adequate civilian police forces".

b. "The judicial, legal and police system shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies adopted by the FEC, and it shall be the duty of all judicial, legal and police officers to protect individual liberties and civil rights".

c. "According to the judgement and discretion of the Supreme Commander the Japanese Government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration".

3. Government Means Power

a. The basic functions of government are simple in essence and are characterized in most states in a three

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3. Government Means Power

a. The basic functions of government are simple in essence and are characterized in most states in a three compartmented structure as LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL and EXECUTIVE. These expressions broadly define the powers which people in modern democratic states have found it expedient to delegate to government, for the purpose of relieving the people of those responsibilities which must be provided for, in order that individuals may pursue their normal vocations without undue fear of oppression or violation of individual rights and liberties.

b. In order to establish and perpetuate representative government, it is necessary that the form of government, laws and activities by which the people are governed, be determined and crystalized in a basic document usually termed a Constitution. Implementation of the basic principles thus established come under periodic scrutiny by elected representatives of the people. These activities are known generally by the term "politics". All forms of government involve politics. The words GOVERNMENT and POLITICS are inseparable, and by the same token, the words GOVERNMENT, POLITICS and POWER bear great analogy each to the other.

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c. States and governments exist to exert power for the maintenance of order, the administration of justice, the defense of the community against aggression and the government against violent usurpation of its delegated power.

d. In theory, democratic governments always use delegated power solely for the best interests of the governed. One of the major premises in a syllogistic attack on Communism is that the communist state does not use power for the best interests of the governed. The democratic concept of good in government can only mean good for individual liberty and happiness. The communistic concept of good in government means only good for the state. But that power, be it little or great is always in government and will be used toward some end, be it good, bad, or indifferent. In every state the government is strong or weak. In the world at large there are Major Powers and Minor Powers. In each state and in the world at large is a stable balance of power or an unstable balance of power or no balance of power at all. But there is always power. POWER NEVER VANISHES. IF A STATE DOES NOT CHOOSE TO RETAIN OR WIELD THIS POWER, SOME FACTION OR GROUP WILL.

4. Forces of Democracy

a. Modern economic life involves group struggle in any sovereign state. Sharecroppers against landowners, farmers against milk distributors, industrial unions against trade unions, labor unions against employers, industrial corporations among themselves and in recent years, unions against government. Such strife is one of the basic aspects of life and an element of all relations between individuals, groups and states. A world without struggle or a country without struggle would be a world or a country in which life had ceased to exist. An orderly world or an orderly state is not a world or state in which there is no conflict, but one in which strife and struggle are led into political and legal channels and away from the clash of arms. In effect, transferred from the battlefield or labor

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b. Groups which operate within the state must conduct their external policy within the limits of the permissible methods. IN THEORY THE STATE RESERVES TO ITSELF THE LEGAL MONOPOLY OF PHYSICAL FORCE, and only those forms of coercion which are free from physical violence are permitted internal opposing groups. When we accept the theory that physical violence among opposing democratic forces within the state is to be prohibited, we admit the necessity for a preponderance of power in the state government. Such preponderance of power among nations is THE BALANCE OF POWER. The treaty of Westphalia, 1648, which brought to a close the Thirty Years War, defined this as the modern state system, based upon the Balance of Power concept between nations. It was not a new concept. Hammurabi was fully aware of these potentialities within and without the state when he established the Babylonian Empire. That there must be a balance of power within the state is basic. That the government should wield the balance of power within a democratic state is irrefragable.

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c. A government with delegated powers presupposes a MEANS OF ENFORCING THIS POWER to express the will of the people as conceived by the Legislative Body, interpreted by the Judicial Body, and enforced by the Chief Executive.

5. Balance of Power Within the State

a. The delegation of power to the state requires checks and balance against abuse. Democratic peoples have been so reluctant to delegate the NECESSARY POWER IMPLEMENTS to their government that they have been frequently very vulnerable from within and from without. In the case of the First French Republic the people emasculated the police power of their government to such an extent that they destroyed it. In the case of the United States, the first Washington Administration was hailed by many world powers as evidence of the republic's forthcoming failure. The first Federal administration actually demonstrated the necessity for power and implements of power in the central government.

b. The mandate of power delegated to government by the people of a state, or to the international state by sovereign nations, is useless if no device is created to assist the Executive Group to enforce the will of the people or the will of the nations. This implement of government is POLICE POWER. History does not reflect that any government has endured without police power consisting of forces organized and available for use under the chief executive. As surely as WAR lurks in the background of the international scene, Revolution lurks in the background of the domestic scene. There are few European or Asiatic countries where, at some time during the past thirty years, potential revolution has not been an important factor in politics.

6. Historical Examples of Power Implements and Their Employment in Government

a. History is replete with examples of failure and

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6. Historical Examples of Power Implements and Their Employment in Government

a. History is replete with examples of failure and success in national and international scenes which were dependent upon the recognization and enlightened employment of power implements within states and between nations. Analysis of the success of the weak states of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, who preserved themselves through centuries by recognizing and implementing the principle of power and power implements in government. The failure of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues to recognize this principle in dealing with the menace of Macedonia caused Carthage, Egypt and Macedonia to fall to Rome. Genghis Kahn in China; the initial success of Caesar Borgia against the Italian States; the dominant position of the House of Hapsburg under Charles V; Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler in their march to power, all furnish enlightening evidence of the importance of adhering to sound established principles history has recorded through centuries of experience.

b. The classical story of all time, and one that has had far reaching effects upon the history of peace

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b. The mandate of power delegated to government by the people of a state, or to the international state by sovereign nations, is useless if no device is created to assist the Executive Group to enforce the will of the people or the will of the nations. This implement of government is POLICE POWER. History does not reflect that any government has endured without police power consisting of forces organized and available for use under the chief executive. As surely as WAR lurks in the background of the international scene, Revolution lurks in the background of the domestic scene. There are few European or Asiatic countries where, at some time during the past thirty years, potential revolution has not been an important factor in politics.

6. Historical Examples of Power Implements and Their Employment in Government

a. History is replete with examples of failure and success in national and international scenes which were dependent upon the recognization and enlightened employment of power implements within states and between nations. Analysis of the success of the weak states of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley, who preserved themselves through centuries by recognizing and implementing the principle of power and power implements in government. The failure of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues to recognize this principle in dealing with the menace of Macedonia caused Carthage, Egypt and Macedonia to fall to Rome. Genghis Kahn in China; the initial success of Caesar Borgia against the Italian States; the dominant position of the House of Hapsburg under Charles V; Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Lenin, Mussolini and Hitler in their march to power, all furnish enlightening evidence of the importance of adhering to sound established principles history has recorded through centuries of experience.

b. The classical story of all time, and one that has had far reaching effects upon the history of peace

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among nations, is that of the League of Nations. Conceived by idealists who closed their minds to the realities of the practical world in which they lived. The effort pursued a course which historical experience indicated was foredoomed to failure. Had the idealists been not so overmuch given to mawkish sentimentality over the individual rights of man, a basic error of the French philosophers, or had they been more lucid of the practical considerations in a world of eternal conflict, they could have created an enduring edifice for world peace. At the time of creating the League of Nations and during its early history when it was still expected that the new organization may develop into an important agency of international government, there were many struggles for control between the large and the small powers and competition between individual states for seats in the council and on the important committees. It appeared for a while as if the struggle for power on the battlefield might in fact, be transformed into a struggle for power in the council room. When it became clear, however, that the council room was merely a place for deliberation and the League only a forum for debate, interest began to deteriorate. IT WAS FUTILE TO TRY TO CONTROL A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD NO IMPLEMENT OF POWER.

7. Power Implement for the United Nations

a. General Marshall, Secretary of State for the United States, is striving to save the United Nations from the ignominous fate of the League of Nations by providing A WORLD POLICE FORCE under the direct control of the United Nations Security Council. Soviet Russia seeks to prevent the organization of such a formidable implement of power. Such a course would interfere with the communist tactics of infiltrate, alienate, divide and conquer procedure. They prefer such implements of power to remain under control of the local autonomous nations where this power cannot be employed without time consuming maneuver.

b. The communist saboteurs in the United Nations

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b. The communist saboteurs in the United Nations are employing the same technique which they have evolved for procedure within a sovereign state. In the former as in the latter they disrupt the central government coordinating unit and deny, destroy or wrest from it the police power. A government thus weakened finds itself unable to prevent the usurpation of its authority and power by these organized militant minorities and are surprised and appalled through the ruthless methods in which even the most primitive virtues are entirely absent.

8. Power Devices Within Democracies

a. The essential difference between the international community and the national community as conditioning environments for group behavior, is the absence in the former of a governmental organization capable of preserving order and enforcing law.

b. The power implements of a democratic state are essentially the same as those within any state. The chief executive in a democratic state cannot employ the

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major implements of power in war without consent of the legislative branch. Major implements of national power are Army, Navy and Militia. Minor implements of power, employed constantly for internal security and the maintenance of law and order, consists of the civil police forces of all echelons of government. The trend in the U.S., brought about by necessity for additional Federal police, has made increases so enormous that it has been thought expedient to refrain from disclosing the actual number.

c. Recourse to power implements by the Federal Government in United States has occurred more and more frequently within the past decade. This is due to the opposition forces flowering into full strength in an adult republic. Labor unions and every other group within the democratic state devote themselves not merely to the pursuit of their objectives but also the constant improvement of their strength. Should any of the groups become so preponderantly strong that they could successfully oppose the will of the people expressed through the government, they would thereby gain the balance of power and become, in fact if not in word, the government.

9. An Example of Power Group Defiance of Government

a. In the United States the labor unions have become predominately stronger under the pro-labor policies of the Roosevelt Administration. Members of the Comintern, recognizing in the mushroom growth of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, a device which could be used to overturn the balance of power within the state, infiltrated the organization in force. The result, the forces which were carefully built up during the years of World War II, has been open defiance of the central government. The Federal Government, finding its laws inadequate to fully maintain the balance of power, passed the Taft-Hartley Labor Law designed to curb and control generally the power of labor unions by increasing its own power of maneuver. Should the unions succeed in defying the central government of this world power, the Comintern will have succeeded

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10. Basic Premises Deduced from Human Conduct Patterns Considered

a. The following premises deduced from study, research and analysis of the historical record of government and people, appear to be basic in concept, pertinent and applicable in regard to the weight that should be given internal security implements in formulating a stable democratic government:

(1) Government is power designed to regulate the affairs of human conduct.

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Memo, subj: "Democratic Stable Gov't & Internal Security Power Implements", dtd 5 Aug 47.

(2) The balance of power concept has been the recognized working hypothesis upon which the relations within the state and between major powers has been conducted since the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648.

(3) The principle failure of the balance of power concept has been due to the fluctuating strength of nations involved (productivity and armed potential) which overturned the existing balance.

(4) That the balance of power concept is applicable and practical to peaceful control of opposing forces within a democratic state.

(5) That the balance of power within the state is constant since it rests in the government and is not dependent upon a system of bi-lateral or uni-lateral treaties.

(6) A Democratic Government is the controlled essence of delegated regulatory power stemming from the people. If the government is to endure it must hold the balance of power sufficiently implemented to enforce the will of the people regardless of the desires of any minority group or combination of groups within the state, which represent less than a majority of the adult franchised citizens of the state.

b. Conclusion:

THE BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN A STATE IS PROPERLY VESTED IN THE GOVERNMENT WHICH CANNOT ENDURE WITHOUT INTERNAL SECURITY POWER IMPLEMENTS.

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11. Japanese Government

a. The above conclusion is basic in principle and applicable in the formulation of a stable government and the democratization of Japan. It is obvious from the adopted policies of FEC that there is no intent to limit the initiative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in determining the civilian police forces adequate for a democratic Japan.

b. Plans for reorganization of the Japanese police force have been developed on the presumption that it is the intent of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to establish enduring democratic government in Japan. These plans steadfastly hold to the basic needs for adequate law enforcement, a stable government and an implement for internal security.

c. Recommendations

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(1) THAT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER CONCEPT TO THE DEMOCRATIC STATE STRUCTURE OF JAPAN BE RECOGNIZED AND APPLIED.

(2) THAT THE DEMOCRATIC STATE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN BE PROVIDED WITH AN ADEQUATE INTERNAL SECURITY POWER IMPLEMENT.

12. The above analysis has a direct bearing upon the composition of future Japanese police forces. Therefore, it is of vital importance that this analysis be considered and given due weight before decision is announced as to whether or not basic principles incorporated in PSD Police Reorganization Plan will be followed. The situation has developed two schools of thought, viz:

a. Decentralization of the police to prefectural level is a necessary adjunct to democratization of Japan. The central government cannot be permitted to have direct control over the civil police forces; that all law enforcement controls, both local and national, should be delegated to prefecture and below in consonance with Japanese law concerning Local Autonomy (Diet Law No. 67, 17 April 47).

b. Decentralization of the police force should be accomplished through severance of municipal forces from the national force. That the residue of the national force plus a reasonable increase, should constitute a National Rural Force under control of the Prime Minister. That the national government must have an internal security power implement if the nation is to endure.

13. This paper explains fully the concept upon which the PSD, CIS, G-2, Police Reorganization Plan has been developed.

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H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Public Safety Division

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500

AG 091.1 ( )CIS/PSD
( )

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force

1. Reference is made to CLO Memorandum No. 1277 (PHW), 28 February 1947, subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

2. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers approves the plan for reorganization and increase in strength of the Japanese Police Force to 125,000, indicated in annex attached hereto.

3. The responsible agencies of the Japanese Government will communicate directly with Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on all matters pertaining to the explanation, interpretation or implementation of this directive.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Annex 1 - Police Reorganization Plan.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ANNEX I

to

Memorandum for the Japanese Government, file AG 091.1 (47)CIS/PSD (SCAPIN), dated , subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

POLICE REORGANIZATION PLAN

1. The reorganization plan is divided into two phases, and will:

a. Initiate decentralization and reorganization of the present national police system, not later than 1 January 1948,

b. Terminate decentralization and reorganization of the national police system not later than the effective date of the Peace Treaty, and

c. Provide for the metropolitan and rural needs in law enforcement and police protection.

2. Note pertinent factors incorporated in this plan pertaining to the adjustment and changes in Japanese police operations, structural organization and administration in keeping with democratic ideology. Specific reference is made to the limitation of the responsibilities of the police which will be confined to (1) prevention of crime, (2) suppression of criminal activities, (3) detection and apprehension of criminals or violators of the criminal laws, (4) protection of life and property, (5) preservation of law and order, (6) control of traffic and traffic safety, and (7) serving of warrants, subpoenas and other court instruments as directed by competent authority. These limitations will remove from police control the functions of extraneous police activity currently being performed, such as the Sanitation Section; Census Bureau; economic controls; the fire department and all fire defense activities; special guard activities; railway guards; bank guards; occupation guards, etc.

PHASE I

3. Phase I will temporarily maintain the structure of the police organization in status quo as a transitory measure, and is designed to:

a. Prepare the existent bodies for decentralization.

b. Reorganize, modernize and vitalize the police educational and training system.

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BASIC: Annex I, to Memo for the JG, file AG 091.1 (47)CIS/PSD (SCAPIN)
dated , subject: "Reorganization and Increase in Strength of Japanese Police Force".

c. Initiate the progressive education of all police officials.

d. Reorganize and train the executive, administrative and operational divisions of the police force along modern democratic lines as currently being performed, aided by PSD/CIS/G-2/SCAP.

e. Improve personnel selection for entry into the police force, promotion, retirement and welfare.

f. Remove from the present police system unrelated functions of government and adjust police powers and functions.

g. Establish police practices in the detection and prevention of crime, protection of life and property, and the preservation of law and order, comparable to those of other democratic nations.

h. Create six Regional District Organizations to facilitate the administration, operation and control of the present and future forces.

4. Phase I utilizes a perpendicular organizational structure which, while maintaining temporarily the status quo of the present organization, makes certain modifications and adjustments in preparation for an uneventful transition to Phase II, decentralization. This organizational structure is as follows:

a. A National Police System headed by a Director General, with six (6) Regional Districts, forty-six (46) Prefectural Divisions, and approximately eleven hundred sixty-four (1164) Police Districts.

b. The Director General, located at National Headquarters, will be the head of the National Police System. He will be responsible for the administration, operation, control and performance of the department and shall have authority commensurate with his responsibilities. He is directly under the Prime Minister, i.e. the head of responsible parliamentary government.

c. A Regional Director will be in charge of each regional district and responsible to the Director General for proper law enforcement and for the performance and activities of police units within the regional jurisdiction. He will coordinate the prefectural police divisions relative to current police problems and promote uniformity of activity and procedure. Close liaison will be maintained with the Prefectural Governors and other Prefectural officials, cooperating with them in consonance with national policies, laws, rules and regulations in carrying out local policies concerning police problems.

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d. A Prefectural Superintendent will be in charge of each Prefectural Division and responsible to the Regional Director, and during Phase I to the Prefectural Governor, for all law enforcement and the proper management and performance of police units coming under the jurisdiction of the Prefectural Division.

e. Each Prefectural Division is divided into a number of Police Districts; from the District the responsibility is finally delegated to the Police Box, the lowest echelon of responsibility. Police Districts as they now exist will be headed by a Police Captain responsible to the Prefectural Superintendent for general law enforcement in the respective areas and for the proper control and performance of police duties and personnel under his jurisdiction.

5. Immediate decentralization of police power and operation of a rural police force will be coordinated with the Public Safety Division, Civil Intelligence Section, G-2, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and effected on an experimental basis in Chiba Prefecture.

PHASE II

6. Phase II will be initiated not later than 1 January 1948.

7. Phase II continues the general pattern of Phase I and provides for the gradual decentralization of the present national system and reorganization of the Police Force into over one hundred (100) police departments controlled and operated by local municipalities with populations of approximately 50,000.

8. The establishment of a limited national rural force, or Department of Public Safety, in the Japanese Government to serve all areas of the country falling outside of the boundaries of municipalities operating independent autonomous police departments. The Department will initially consist of approximately 30,000 uniformed police, organized into a Headquarters and six or more Regional Subdivisions for efficient administration, operation and control. The Director of the Department of Public Safety will be appointed by the Prime Minister. The Director will be separate and independent of any ministry control.

9. Police personnel to accomplish the plan is authorized at 125,000. This includes personnel for the 30,000 police of the Department of Public Safety whose recruiting and training should start immediately in order to prepare for the national and rural needs when decentralization of the present national system becomes effective.