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5

Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

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December 13, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Thursday, December 13, 1945

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Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2       The Chairman: Congressman Keefe, I believe, was in the  
3 process of examining General Marshall. He will now proceed.

4       The committee will come to order.

5                   TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

6                                   (Resumed)

7       Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, when did you first learn  
8 of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the 7th day of December, 1941,  
9 at what time?

10       General Marshall: I don't remember the exact time, sir.  
11 It was very closely after the attack started. The message  
12 came in and --

13       Mr. Keefe: Were you at your office?

14       General Marshall: I don't know that. General Dean, who  
15 was one of the secretaries of the General Staff, states that  
16 I was home at lunch, and my Orderly states I was at the office.  
17 I am in between the two.

18       Mr. Keefe: Do I understand you put in a call for Hawaii  
19 then?

20       General Marshall: At some time, yes. My dim recollection  
21 of the situation is that some -- in the first place, they  
22 opened the direct line and kept it open for quite a while  
23 and some word came in, that is my dim recollection, that the  
24 Japanese were attempting a landing near Barbers Point, I have  
25 a recollection of some such assertion at the time, and I think

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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it was in connection with that that I called up and endeavored to speak to General Short, and I am not certain whether the Barbers Point incident provoked the telephone message or not.

Mr. Keefe: Would there be a record of that telephone call?

General Marshall: I assume there would be. My dim recollection is that the phone was kept open.

Mr. Keefe: But you cannot associate that call with the actual placing of it?

General Marshall: No, sir. It was after we knew about the attack, I think possibly during the second run the Japanese made. I am guessing at that.

Mr. Keefe: I can well appreciate that in the excitement incident to that moment that that might easily be overlooked, General.

Now, in my examination of you heretofore I discussed the 1940 alert. I wonder if you have this morning the material which you have been seeking which furnishes the basis for that 1940 alert?

General Marshall: I have not. I was informed this morning that they had exhausted the search, they think, of the files in the War Department, of magic and other sources, and that did not bring up the papers which, the information which General Strong felt had animated his recommendations for the alert. He, incidentally, is in New York, and they didn't

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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get ahold of him until after 11:00 o'clock last night. I think that is it. We had the information in the War Department regarding diplomatic affairs and regarding Japanese Army affairs. General Strong thinks that the information pertained to the Japanese Fleet and they are now moving over to go through the Naval files and the State Department files to see if they can obtain it.

I might add that there has been a very extensive search of all files and a collation of information regarding Pearl Harbor, but there has been no previous search and collation and quite a number of people are involved.

Mr. Keefe: I am especially interested in that subject, General Marshall, because of the testimony of Admiral Richardson which seemed to give credence to the fact that the Navy was not alerted at that time, it was just an Army alert, and I am rather interested to find out, if I can, what there was in the picture that caused an all-out alert on the part of the Army and no corresponding alert on the part of the Navy.

There doesn't appear to be any message from the Navy alerting Admiral Richardson and his Fleet. Can you give us any information on that?

General Marshall: No, sir, I cannot. I think some of the data that has come up shows the Navy Department and the Chief of Naval Operations was aware of the matter. I believe

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 Admiral Richardson's own testimony shows that he received  
3 communications from them. I believe also the record shows  
4 the Naval shore, that is, the shore installations, were coop-  
5 erating with the Army in the alert. I do not recall the  
6 reason why there was not a Naval message sent for the alert  
7 or there were not some specific instructions to the Fleet.

8 Mr. Keefe: What aroused my interest was the fact that  
9 in 1941 there was a specific order or an alert issued by the  
10 Navy and a specific order for an alert ordered by the Army.  
11 There were two separate alert messages that went out.

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: I haven't been able to identify any such  
14 procedure as that in the 1940 alert.

15 General Marshall: I do not think in the record there is  
16 any Navy alert as such.

17 Mr. Keefe: Now, in discussing that matter with you the  
18 other day, General Marshall, there was read into the record  
19 the message from you to General Herron, which was rather brief  
20 and to the point. That message which you sent to Herron in  
21 1940 produced the result which you expected, namely, an all-out  
22 alert, did it not?

23 General Marshall: I think it did, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: There was no other alert ordered at Hawaii  
25 prior to the 1940 alert that you know of, was there?



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2           General Marshall: Not during my tenure as Chief of  
3 Staff.

4           Mr. Keefe: During your tenure as Chief of Staff. So,  
5 so far as you know, during your tenure as Chief of Staff the  
6 first all-out alert order was the one that was sent on the 17th  
7 of June 1940 to General Herron?

8           General Marshall; That is my recollection, sir.

9           Mr. Keefe: And as a result of that message to General  
10 Herron in 1940 an all-out alert resulted promptly and he re-  
11 ported immediately as to what had taken place; was that not  
12 true.

13           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14           Mr. Keefe: When the subject of an all-out alert or  
15 further alert came up in 1941, why didn't you use the same  
16 language that was used to produce the alert on the 17th of  
17 June 1940?

18           Why was all the additional language put in the alert  
19 order?

20           General Marshall: Because it was felt necessary -- in  
21 the first place you had to include instructions of the President  
22 regarding overt acts.

23 Hpok  
24 follows.  
25

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: If you will pardon me just a moment,  
3 General. There was in the alert order of June 17 1940  
4 no such provision?

5 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: You had no order at that time from the  
7 President that the first overt act must be committed by  
8 Japan?

9 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: But when you came to issue the alert  
11 order in November, 1941, you were faced with a direction  
12 from the President that Japan must commit the first overt  
13 act?

14 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: So you had to include that in the telegram?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: Now, General Marshall, I asked you the  
18 other day, I have forgotten whether it was yesterday or  
19 the day before yesterday, a question which you answered  
20 in substance that if an enemy plane, or a foreign plane  
21 or a Jap plane had flown over this area, under the alert  
22 that was in force on the 17th of June and thereafter,  
23 that plane would have been fired upon and shot down, if  
24 possible?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: And I asked you the question as to  
3 whether or not firing upon a plane of another country  
4 under those circumstances would constitute an overt act  
5 on our part.

6 My recollection is that you stated that it would be  
7 an overt act.

8 General Marshall: I would say it would be an overt  
9 act. The Japanese, of course, had fired on a gunboat  
10 of ours, and sank it.

11 Mr. Keefe: Pardon me?

12 General Marshall: Had fired or bombed a gunboat of  
13 ours and sank it. That was an overt act.

14 Mr. Keefe: Yes, that was in 1937.

15 General Marshall: But it did not become an act of  
16 war.

17 Mr. Keefe: It was an act that might have been con-  
18 sidered an act of war?

19 General Marshall: Depending upon the tension and  
20 public policy at the time.

21 Mr. Keefe: Yes. It did not result in war; they paid  
22 some indemnity, and it was sort of forgotten for the time  
23 being. You are referring to the sinking of the Panay?

24 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: But, I want to be certain, if Jap planes

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 had come over in 1940, merely flown over the island  
3 under that alert, they would have been subject to being  
4 shot down, under the order that was given?

5 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: Now, then, when you gave this alert order  
7 in 1941 which contained the language that Japan was to  
8 commit the first overt act, suppose, General Marshall,  
9 that your commanders, Naval and Army, out there at Hawaii  
10 had had a patrol out and actually found a concentration of  
11 four or five carriers, 400 miles away from Hawaii, and  
12 they knew they were there. Would you have been able to  
13 bomb those carriers under that alert, unless Japan had  
14 done something that could be considered to be an overt  
15 act?

16 General Marshall: I will read this alert and then try  
17 to analyze the situation.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: I want to get your judgment on that question.

3 General Marshall: (Reading)

4 "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United  
5 States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.  
6 This policy should not be construed as restricting you  
7 to a course of action that might jeopardize our defense.  
8 Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to  
9 undertake such reconnaissance," and so forth.

10 "This policy should not be construed as restrict-  
11 ing you to a course of action that might jeopardize your de-  
12 fense." If, as you suggest, our reconnaissance had developed  
13 the Japanese carriers, then the question is was that an  
14 overt act and were those planes under this alert justified  
15 and required, in effect, to bomb those carriers?

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, General Marshall, right on that  
17 point so that there can be no misunderstanding about it?  
18 There has been a reference to an order issued by the Presi-  
19 dent creating certain restricted waters. Do you recall now  
20 far that ran the line around the Hawaiian Islands?

21 General Marshall: No, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Was it three hundred miles, do you remember,  
23 Mr. Counsel, so that we may have it in the record?

24 Mr. Mitchell: We will get it for you.

25 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 General Marshall: I do not recall just what it was.

3 Mr. Keefe: But you know that there was an order issued  
4 by the President along some time prior to this setting up  
5 certain restricted waters?

6 General Marshall: Well, I lost track of it and you have  
7 reminded me of it. I recall it now.

8 Mr. Keefe: And in my question I intended to locate the  
9 rendezvous of these carriers beyond and outside of the area  
10 of the so-called restricted waters.

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: And then I want your opinion as to that.

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir. Well, that is all right.  
14 Let us assume that it was beyond but within reach of our  
15 particular over water reconnaissance range of our planes.

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

17 General Marshall: That presents, of course, a very  
18 difficult proposition for the officers in command of those  
19 planes. My own reaction would be the sudden unannounced ap-  
20 pearance of a Japanese carrier group in that portion of the  
21 Pacific would have been an overt act and they would have been  
22 justified in bombing and they would have been backed up by  
23 the country in that bombing.

24 Mr. Keefe: I don't think there would have been any  
25 question about their being backed by the country, but I was

Witness Mars hall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

wondering --

General Marshall: That presents a very technical question and it is very difficult for the man in the air at the flash moment to decide. He would have to make the decision right then. I think if he had decided to bomb he would have been doing the right thing.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then, supposing a flight of planes just came over the islands, just flew over, did not drop any bombs or anything, would the mere flight of the planes be considered an overt act justifying --

General Marshall: I think clearly so, sir, because this states, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense."

It certainly, in my opinion, would jeopardize his defense to have Japanese planes fly over that island under the circumstances of this time of this alert message. What they were going to do might still, you say -- no, it remains to be determined but it is too late after they have done it. Therefore, they would be fully justified; they would be required to take hostile action against those planes.

Mr. Keefe: Well, then the mere flight of planes, whether they were Jap planes or any other planes other than

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2 our own, under your interpretation without actually imple-  
3 menting beyond flying over the islands that would be a suffi-  
4 cient overt act, in your opinion, to have justified bombing  
5 them out of the air?

6 General Marshall: In relation to Japan, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: In relation to Japan?

8 General Marshall: Because at that time a German plane  
9 appearing in the same place, though this order relates to  
10 Japan, would have probably been treated in the same fashion.

11 Mr. Keefe: That put a pretty heavy responsibility upon  
12 the commander, did it not, to determine at just what point  
13 you are going to say that an overt act is committed?

14 General Marshall: He always has that responsibility but  
15 in this particular case it would put a very heavy responsi-  
16 bility upon the junior officer.

17 Mr. Keefe: The fellow that is out there manning a gun?

18 General Marshall: He has to make the decision on it  
19 at the moment. He cannot consult anybody.

20 Mr. Keefe: He is on a patrol plane or bomber.

21 General Marshall: Yes. He cannot go to court for his  
22 determination. He has got to act.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, there was no such situation as that  
24 involved in the 1940 alert, was there?

25 General Marshall: Not to my knowledge.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: Now, yesterday there was introduced in evi-  
2 dence an order to Admiral Richardson with respect to the  
3 disposition of his fleet. You recall that, General Marshall?

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I recall that.

5 Mr. Keefe: And there was some reference to sabotage in  
6 Panama?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: Now, just so that the record may be clear  
9 may I say I have tried to make some independent investigation  
10 of that situation since yesterday and I am wondering if I  
11 am correct in the assumption that at that particular time  
12 the Army had Panama alerted?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir, this was a simultaneous  
14 alert of both Hawaii and Panama.

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Panama was already --

16 General Marshall: As a matter of fact, - this is hear-  
17 say, - I understand from General Short, but I have not seen  
18 that, that he made the statement that he was more fearful  
19 then regarding Panama than he was regarding Hawaii at the  
20 time of the 1940 alert.

21 Mr. Keefe: The Army through its Intelligence had some  
22 information, did it not, that extensive sabotage was threat-  
23 ened of the canal in the event we tried to move any part of  
24 the fleet through the canal?  
25

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1  
2           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3           Mr. Keefe: And this order was sent out to have the fleet  
4 moved out of Pearl Harbor at that time and give the Japs the  
5 idea that they were going to move through the canal into the  
6 Atlantic?  
7

8           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

9           Mr. Keefe: And it was then the thought that if these  
10 saboteurs or Jap spies down on Panama got that information  
11 they might spring into action and Panama being on an all-out  
12 alert, looking for them, they could gather them in and ar-  
13 rest them?

14           General Marshall: They would expose their hand and  
15 their method, their technique.

16           Mr. Keefe: Now, wasn't that the exact reason for the  
17 order as you now understand it?

18           General Marshall: Yes, sir, that is my understanding  
19 and that is my recollection of it.

20           Mr. Keefe: It was merely done for the purpose of con-  
21 fusing the Japs and trying to the Jap agents and saboteurs  
22 to expose their hand?

23           General Marshall: If they had any such plan up to meet  
24 that plan at a time we were ready for it, so that we could  
25 learn what it was and be able to throw the thing off center.

          Mr. Keefe: That was in 1940?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

4 The Vice Chairman: Are you through, Mr. Keefe?

5 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

6 The Vice Chairman: Any other questions of General  
7 Marshall?

8 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman.

9 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois wants to  
10 inquire.

11 Senator Lucas: I want to ask a few questions.

12 General Marshall, in view of a good many conflicting and  
13 distorted stories that have been issued by various individuals  
14 and printed in certain segments of the press and that are  
15 being used by some radio commentators I want to ask just a  
16 few direct and simple questions near the close of this hear-  
17 ing.

18 Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior  
19 to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon  
20 Pearl Harbor?

21 General Marshall: Not to my knowledge, sir; none that  
22 I so construed.

23 Senator Lucas: In your opinion did General Miles, your  
24 G-2 officer, or General Gerow, or the War Plans Division  
25 possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1 pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

2  
3 General Marshall: In my recollection they made no re-  
4 ports to me which would indicate that they did possess in-  
5 formation that convinced them of the probability of an attack  
6 on Pearl Harbor.

7 Senator Lucas: And it was their duty to so do if they  
8 did have such information?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: Did you have any specific and advanced  
11 information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would  
12 attack this country or the British or the Dutch?

13 General Marshall: Only in so far as the message of De-  
14 cember 7th from the Japanese Government directing the de-  
15 livery of the fourteen part statement at a specific hour on  
16 a Sunday afternoon to the Secretary of State. The implica-  
17 tions in that is the only thing we had.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, that message, the fourteenth part  
19 of that message was an implication that something serious  
20 was going to happen at one o'clock that day?

21 General Marshall: Somewhere.

22 Senator Lucas: Somewhere. But even the fourteenth  
23 part of that message did not give to you or to any other  
24 official of this government any precise point or any precise  
25 place where they were going to attack at one o'clock?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 General Marshall: I do not think it did, sir. As I  
3 testified the other day, I have never read the complete  
4 message except on that day. I got about three-fourths of  
5 the way through it the other day but I did not get finished,  
6 so I am not quite clear on the reaction of the fourteenth  
7 part on my mind because immediately thereafter I came to  
8 hand with the one o'clock message.

9 Senator Lucas: Now, General Marshall, all the informa-  
10 tion that you obtained through G-2 and through the War Plans  
11 Division upon any and all important matters dealing with  
12 this critical situation at that time was discussed, I take it,  
13 with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson?

14 General Marshall: Did you say any and all information?

15 Senator Lucas: Well, practically any and all informa-  
16 tion of importance dealing with this situation I presume you  
17 discussed.

18 General Marshall: I think that that would be correct.  
19 I know I followed this practice, that in particular in con-  
20 nection with magic, that where I thought a particular paper  
21 had some special importance, specially important significance  
22 or information of great importance I would bring that myself  
23 to the Secretary's attention to make certain that he had  
24 read it because there was a great deal of magic and there  
25 was always the possibility that he would not read the par-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 . ticular paper that I had in mind, so we had that procedure at  
3 that time. I think I discussed with him the important in-  
4 formation that came up from time to time, I am quite certain  
5 that I did, and I know on his side that he did that with me  
6 because we were talking together very frequently during  
7 practically each day.

8  
9 Senator Lucas: In other words, any important problem  
10 that arose during this crisis was mutually discussed between  
11 you and the Secretary of War?

12  
13 General Marshall: Yes, sir, with this qualification,  
14 that I did not usually discuss with him the technique of im-  
15 plementing this or that as carried out in a military way.

16  
17 Senator Lucas: I understand. Now, what is true with  
18 the Secretary of War insofar as these important conversations  
19 are concerned I take it is also true with the President of  
20 the United States at that time. In other words, he knew, -  
21 the Secretary of War and the President of the United States  
22 knew what you knew so far as any real matters of importance  
23 were concerned involving this critical period?

24  
25 General Marshall: I think that is correct, sir.

26  
27 Senator Lucas: General Marshall, I desire to ask just  
28 a question or two with respect to the much discussed "winds"  
29 message. I have had an opportunity over night to take a look  
30 at it for the first time and I want to get your interpreta-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 tion of it, if I may. I take it you have seen the Jap  
3 winds message?

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I have seen it.

5 Senator Lucas: The Federal Communications Commission  
6 around the 20th of November 1941 intercepted a message from  
7 Tokyo to their Japanese diplomatic representatives to the  
8 effect that:

9 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off  
10 diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of interna-  
11 tional communications, the following warning will be  
12 added in the middle of the daily Japanese language  
13 short wave news broadcast.

14 "(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger:  
15 HIGASHI NO KAZEAME." East wind rain.

16 "(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI."  
17 North wind cloudy.

18 "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE  
19 HARE." West wind clear.

20 Now, did you understand that in the event that a winds  
21 message of that character had been transmitted from Tokyo  
22 to the Ambassador in this country or any other place, that  
23 such a message meant war under the interpretation of that  
24 language?

25 General Marshall: Not necessarily. It refers to rela-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

tions.

Senator Lucas: It refers definitely to the cutting off of diplomatic relations?

General Marshall: We terminated diplomatic relations, as I recall, in the last war with Germany an appreciable period of time before a declaration of war followed.

Senator Lucas: And in this case diplomatic relations were not broken off until practically at noon December 7th, just a short while before the bombs struck, isn't that true?

General Marshall: I am not aware of just how they were terminated unless it was the presentation --

Senator Lucas: I guess they were not terminated until afterwards probably. In other words, the envoys that were sent here by Japan were discussing peace terms with the Secretary of State at the very time, as I understand it, that the bombs fell.

General Marshall: They were having a diplomatic discussion, sir.

Senator Lucas: Yes. General Marshall, did you ever obtain or see any message following this one that was sent on November the 20th implementing this winds code message which had been received by the Navy?

General Marshall: Not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator Lucas: In other words, if there was a message



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

of that character did come through and was picked up by the Navy, decoded and translated by them, it was never brought to your attention prior to the attack on December the 7th, 1941?

General Marshall: Not to my knowledge then or later.

Senator Lucas: General Marshall, who was in command of the forces in the Philippines at the time of this attack?

General Marshall: General Douglas MacArthur.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: General Marshall, now referring again to Exhibit 32 on page 9, which is a copy of the message that was sent by you on November 27 to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, and then on November 28, 1941, you received this reply from General MacArthur, which says:

"Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four Air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy Stop Ground security measures have been taken Stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense Stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy."

General Marshall, do you know what time the Japs struck the Philippine Islands?

General Marshall: I do not recall right now, sir. I know that shortly after the announcement of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a communication by General MacArthur by telephone -- and I think this can be testified to by General Gerow -- that in that discussion he made some reference to Japanese planes having made reconnaissance. However, General Gerow can give you that.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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2 Then, at a later time, - and I believe in the Philip-  
3 pines, it was afternoon, - a very heavy air attack was  
4 made on Clark Field.

5 Senator Lucas: In other words, immediately following  
6 the attack at Pearl Harbor, you had a conversation with  
7 General MacArthur over the telephone?

8 General Marshall: I did not, sir; General Gerow did.

9 Senator Lucas: General Gerow, and he reported at  
10 that time that planes were over the island.

11 General Marshall: I do not remember precisely what  
12 he said, but my recollection is that he reported Japanese  
13 planes coming in and being fended off -- but General  
14 Gerow can testify to that directly.

15 Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

16 Do you know how many planes he had in the Philippines  
17 at that time?

18 General Marshall: I recall specifically how many four-  
19 engine flying fortresses we had, which is 35. I will have  
20 to get you the figures on the interceptors, or fighter  
21 planes. I have forgotten just what it was. I think it  
22 was something towards 100.

23 Senator Lucas: And how many air fields did we have  
24 there at that time?

25 General Marshall: I cannot tell you how many at the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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time. The main field, of course, was Clark Field. I do not know how many subsidiary fields in that particular section had been developed.

The next field to the south was Nichols Field on the outskirts of Manila. There were certain fields in the Islands, and particularly on the plateau of Mindanao. That data can be obtained.

The actual situation was we were just coming out of the wet season and the difficulties of building air strips capable of supporting a four-engine bomber were very great during the rainy season. We were just coming out of the rainy season at the time this event occurred. However, the data on that is easily obtainable.

Senator Lucas: We will get all of that through General Gerow, I take it.

General Marshall: Yes, sir, and he can obtain it from the War Department.

Senator Lucas: General Marshall, do you know how many bombers were on Clark Field at the time the Japs struck there the following afternoon?

General Marshall: I do not recall, sir.

Senator Lucas: Can General Gerow give us that information also?

General Marshall: He can obtain it, I am quite certain.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Where was Admiral Hart's Fleet at the time of the attack, if you know that? I will just withdraw that. It is not important. I will get it from somebody else.

General Marshall: I assume a portion of it at least was in Manila Bay, probably in the vicinity of Cavite. I know it had been our endeavor to obtain the antiaircraft guns for the defense of the Cavite anchorages, particularly the accumulation there of long-range submarines which had reinforced Admiral Hart's Fleet shortly before this attack.

Senator Lucas: General Marshall, has there ever any report been made to the War Department as to why these bombers that had been destroyed on Clark Field on the following afternoon were still on the ground?

General Marshall: I do not think there has been, sir.

Senator Lucas: I think that is all.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: I want to put this question first to counsel. Do we have available page 85 of the Army hearings, the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings?

Mr. Gesell: The transcript?

Mr. Murphy: Page 85.

Mr. Gesell: Do you mean the top secret part?

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5 2 Mr. Murphy I mean the testimony of Colonel Bratton,  
3 the regular Army report.

4 (The document was handed to Mr. Murphy.)

5 Mr. Murphy: General Marshall, there is just one thing  
6 I want to clear up in the top secret report of the Army  
7 Pearl Harbor Board. There is a statement on page 13  
8 of Exhibit 63, reading as follows:

9 "Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall's  
10 quarters at 9 a.m."

11 Do you have any knowledge of any call having been  
12 placed at 9 a.m., to your quarters?

13 General Marshall: My only knowledge in the matter is,  
14 I think I was taking a shower, or going into a shower at  
15 the time I received notification that Colonel Bratton had  
16 telephoned, that he wished to come out to Fort Myer and see  
17 me, and I told them to reply not to come out, that I was  
18 going to the War Department immediately.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Do you know, or did you learn from anyone,  
3 as to whether or not prior to the time that you got the message  
4 about Colonel Bratton liking to come out, or wanting to come  
5 out, if he had tried to contact you at your home or your  
6 quarters before that that morning?

7 General Marshall: I have no knowledge of that, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: Do you have any knowledge as to whether or  
9 not Colonel Bratton requested that one of your orderlies be  
10 sent out to find you while you were horseback riding?

11 General Marshall: I have not heard of that, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: General Marshall, I would like to ask this  
13 one last question. During the month of August or September  
14 of 1941 there was before the Congress of the United States  
15 the question of continuance of the Selective Service Act and  
16 it passed the Congress by but one vote -- or it passed the  
17 House by but one vote.

18 I would like to ask what, in your opinion, would have  
19 been the effect on the United States Armed Services if that  
20 one vote had been otherwise and that Act was not continued?

21 General Marshall: Existing law at that time was such  
22 that the National Guard would have had to have been recalled  
23 from its various stations so that it could have been released  
24 from active service within one year of the time it had been  
25 inducted. That varied for the various units. Also the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Gearhart

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2 individuals who had been inducted under Selective Service,  
3 who were in various National Guard and Regular Army units,  
4 would have had to have been released from those units, from  
5 the service at the end of one year.

6 The National Guard, of course, and Selective Service men,  
7 composed the larger portion of the military forces.

8 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I want to reserve until a  
9 later time in the hearing going into this question of what  
10 happened on the alert.

11 The Chairman: Is that all now?

12 Mr. Murphy: That is all.

13 The Chairman: Are there any other questions?

14 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

16 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the statement of General  
17 Marshall about the continuance of the Selective Service Act,  
18 I am glad that I cast that one vote in favor of continuance  
19 of the program.

20 In conclusion, General, I would like to propound to  
21 you a supposititious situation and ask your opinion upon it.

22 Preliminarily, though, to illustrate the importance of  
23 the question, I might ask you is it not true that when Wash-  
24 ington authorities have in their possession very important  
25 information they should transmit that information to the



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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commanders in the field that that might affect, if that information can be transmitted without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General Marshall: Not necessarily so, sir, unless we undertake to set up in the headquarters of each commander in the field a complete service to evaluate the composition of all these various items of information, diplomatic, military, FBI, we will say, and so on.

Mr. Gearhart: But if you had in your possession specific information which was important for a commander of an outlying force to know, is it not the duty of the Washington authorities, or any others in the Army and Navy, to transmit that information to the commander of an outlying post, information which is important to him, if you can transmit it without affecting adversely the security of the country?

General Marshall: That information, as you say, which is important for him to know, the answer is "yes, sir."

Hook  
follows

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: And if that kind of information, im-  
3 portant to the commander of an outlying post of station  
4 cannot be transmitted without endangering the national  
5 security, in that event what responsibility devolved on  
6 the shoulders of the one having that important informa-  
7 tion?

8 General Marshall: That he should be given such informa-  
9 tion as is possible under the circumstances.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And if it is not possible to transmit  
11 any information a directive should be sent; is that not  
12 correct?

13 General Marshall: I think that is approximately cor-  
14 rect, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Now, my supposititious situation is  
16 this: If you had informed General Short and Admiral Kimmel  
17 immediately after the 9th day of October, 1941, the day  
18 which the intercept was translated, that Tokyo, in an  
19 intercept, had divided Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian waters  
20 into five areas and had requested reports in respect to  
21 those areas and in accordance with that allocation of the  
22 territory and waters of Hawaii into areas, in respect to  
23 where ships were docked, where they were anchored, and in  
24 respect to other dispositions of our fighting forces, with  
25 especial reference with regard to warships and airplane

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 carriers; if you had advised General Short and Admiral  
3 Kimmel on the 10th day of October, 1941, which was the  
4 date of the translation of an intercept that Honolulu had  
5 reported to Tokyo:

6 "1. Repair dock in Navy Yard" - that certain codes  
7 be used in reporting upon repair docks in Navy Yard, the  
8 Navy dock in the Navy Yard, moorings in the vicinity of  
9 Ford Island, alongside in Ford Island, and west sides  
10 will be differentiated by A and B respectively, and so  
11 on; if you had reported promptly on December 3, 1941, to  
12 General Short and Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese, in a  
13 message from Tokyo to Honolulu had directed:

14 "As relations between Japan and the United States are  
15 most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular,  
16 but at a rate of twice a week. Although you are already  
17 no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy;  
18 assuming further that you have reported on the 6th day of  
19 December, 1941, which was the date of translation of an  
20 intercept from Honolulu to Tokyo, the following message  
21 had been received from Washington:

22 "The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were  
23 as I told you in my #219 on that day.

24 "Area A<sup>b</sup> -- A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered  
25 and one tanker left port.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 "Area C<sup>c</sup> -- 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class  
3 were at anchor"; an intercept which also contained this  
4 information:

5 "On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The  
6 carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C.  
7 Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensa-  
8 cola class were tied up at docks 'KS'. Four merchant  
9 vessels were at anchor in area D.

10 "At ten a.m., on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers  
11 were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as  
12 follows: in a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters  
13 apart, at a speed of 3 knots per hour; they moved into  
14 Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through  
15 area B to the buoys in area C to which they were moored,  
16 they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees.  
17 The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these  
18 destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir  
19 on the eastern side."

20 And if you had transmitted the information to General  
21 Short and Admiral Kimmel that an intercepted message came  
22 from Tokyo which was translated on the 5th day of December,  
23 1941, to Honolulu, as follows:

24 "Please report on the following areas as to vessels  
25 anchored therein: Area 'N', Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay" and

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h4

1  
2 in longhand "Honolulu," -- "and the areas adjacent thereto."

3 Suppose you had reported to General Short and Admiral  
4 Kimmel that you had intercepted a message from Tokyo on  
5 the fourth day of December, translated on that day which  
6 was marked "strictly secret," and read as follows:

7 "Please investigate comprehensively the Fleet -- bases  
8 in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation."

9 Suppose you had reported to Admiral Kimmel and to  
10 General Short that you had intercepted and translated on  
11 December 5, 1941, a message from Tokyo which read as fol-  
12 lows:

13 "We have been receiving reports from you on ship move-  
14 ments, but in future will you also report even when there  
15 are no movements."

16 Now, assuming that promptly upon receipt and transla-  
17 tion of those intercepted messages which I have adverted  
18 to, that you had promptly advised the commanders in the  
19 Hawaiian area, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, of their  
20 substance and effect, do you think that the Fleet would have  
21 been lined up in the harbor like sitting ducks, with their  
22 fighting capacity greatly reduced by various types of  
23 inspection, or do you believe they would have been out to  
24 sea in fighting trim and order?

25 General Marshall: It may be that if all of the messages

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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you recited, or a portion of them even, had been communi-  
cated to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, that their --  
or at least General Short's reaction to a command to alert  
his command might possibly have been different.

All of those messages, and many more of somewhat similar  
character were coming in regarding American war vessels  
all over the world. It certainly must have been evident to  
both Admiral Kimmel and to General Short that the Japanese,  
who could see every portion of Pearl Harbor and had the  
free use of the cable and the telephone, which we were for-  
bidden to tap, and they could have reported every move that  
was going on, it would have been assumed, I think, by both  
of them under those circumstances, it would be a normal  
procedure, something which we would have given a great deal  
to be able to do regarding the Japanese ships, something  
which we could not manage at all.

When you consider the messages came from all portions  
of the world, relating to naval shipping, it is a question  
of how much involves a check on where our ships are, and  
how much involves a plan for a specific operation at a  
certain place. That is a matter of opinion.

Mr. Gearhart: But you, as Chief of Staff, and Admiral  
Kimmel, as Chief of Naval Operations --

General Marshall: Admiral Stark.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: -- Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval  
3 Operations, had this information on your desks, did you  
4 not?

5 General Marshall: That is the presumption that I did,  
6  
7 sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: And don't you think that Admiral Kimmel  
9 and General Short would have been better informed in res-  
10 pect to the responsibility that was theirs, if you had trans-  
11 mitted promptly the information which you had, and which  
12 Admiral Stark had at the time you received it?

13 General Marshall: I am not at all certain as to that,  
14 sir. It depends on the mass of information we gave them.  
15 They were given general summaries, and they were given --  
16 I say "they" -- I mean General Short was given a definite  
17 direction.

18 Mr. Gearhart: He was given a definite direction which  
19 was in the nature of a circular letter that was sent to  
20 all of our outlying posts, and stations; is that correct?

21 General Marshall: He was given an alert order.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Exactly the same kind of an alert order  
23 that was sent to all of the others, with one exception,  
24 that they were cautioned not to do anything which would  
25 alarm the people or reveal the intent?

General Marshall I think the same proviso was in the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 alert message to the West Coast commander, which included  
3 Alaska.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And in all of the messages that  
5 were sent from G-2 to Hawaii never was there any special  
6 warning of any special interest which the Japanese were  
7 displaying in the Hawaiian Islands, was there?

8 General Marshall: I do not recall the details of all  
9 the messages. I do not remember such a message.

10 Mr. Gearhart: But you have been reminded, since you  
11 have been in this room, by the questions that have been  
12 propounded that there were seven or eight specific inter-  
13 cepts which were placed on your desk in accordance with  
14 your order by G-2, and by the Planning Division, which  
15 pointed directly to Hawaii, and revealed an inordinate  
16 interest by the Japanese in the situation which existed  
17 in the Hawaiian Islands?

18 General Marshall: That is your view, sir, I take it.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Well now, do you think that is my view?

20 General Marshall: I say that is your view, sir, I take  
21 it.

22 Mr. Gearhart I ask you, is that your view?

23 General Marshall: I stated my view, sir, that this  
24 information was being collected by the Japanese all over  
25 the world, regarding all shipping; that we were aware, and



Witness Marshall

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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certainly it was the assumption that every move made by our shipping in Hawaii was under observation by the Japanese, and they had a perfectly free method of communicating that to their own war office, or naval headquarters in Japan. That was the most ordinary assumption of the condition and that was the great embarrassment under which we were working everywhere, in the Philippines, in Hawaii, and in Panama at that time.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, directing your attention to the message you sent on December 7, but which did not arrive there until it was too late, in that message you told Admiral Kimmel and General Short that the Japanese were going to deliver a message at one o'clock which amounted to an ultimatum. That was the information that you gave them or sought to give them in that belated message, is that true?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. I have the message here, if you wish me to read it. "What amounts to an ultimatum."

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now that was information that you  
3 were conveying in that message, was it not?

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: And you also went one step further and  
6 conveyed, or sought to convey still more information, and that  
7 was in reference to the significance of the 1:00 o'clock refer-  
8 ence in the intercepted Japanese message.

9 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: You indicated that that had caused some  
11 comment and some speculation among the high authorities in  
12 military and naval circles in Washington, and you relayed the  
13 situation on and directed them to fasten their attention to  
14 what the significance of the 1:00 o'clock message might mean,  
15 did you not?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Why did you send that message?

18 General Marshall: Because this, to my mind, was a very  
19 significant message of theirs, relating to a specific hour  
20 for some specific act somewhere. Apropos of that, we sent  
21 another message in early July of somewhat the same nature  
22 that related to the Panama Canal, in which we gave specific  
23 information from magic regarding shipping in the Panama Canal.  
24 It was felt that that was necessary to do at that particular  
25 time, to put that into a direct message of this character.

AL-2

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Here the thing came again when it seemed clear to me, and  
3 to the others concerned, that this had some very special,  
4 definite significance, relating to that hour, and I therefore  
5 endeavored to send it, and I did as quickly as I became aware  
6 of it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Don't you think the specific inquiry from  
8 Tokyo in reference to ship movements in Honolulu and in Pearl  
9 Harbor was not sufficiently important to convey to the  
10 commanders in Hawaii?

11 General Marshall: I can only answer that, Mr. Gearhart,  
12 by repeating again what I am saying, that this information  
13 was coming in regarding many points in the world. It is very  
14 significant in the light of the knowledge of what the Japs  
15 actually did, it is very significant as to that, but at the  
16 time there were a great many messages about a great many  
17 places, and there were a great many people involved in  
18 evaluating those messages. Certainly none of them, certainly  
19 no one of them, was endeavoring to avoid an evident indication  
20 of just where the Japanese were going to strike, if they were  
21 going to strike. That did not so register; that did not so  
22 register.

23 Mr. Gearhart: General, you do not justify yourself for  
24 not sending specific information to Admiral Kimmel and  
25 General Short to which they were entitled simply because you

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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failed to send to other commanders and other generals in other areas information to which they were entitled?

General Marshall: Will you repeat that, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

General Marshall: No, sir. I am speaking about the evaluation of that, as to what it meant, what its significance was at the time the messages came in.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: If there had been a specific inquiry  
3 from Tokyo intercepted by us in respect to ship disposi-  
4 tions in Panama, would it not have been your duty, as the  
5 possessor of that information to advise the commanders  
6 of Panama that the Japanese were showing an inordinate  
7 interest in the situation there, and tell them what that  
8 interest reflected?

9 General Marshall: If it did not seem to be a portion  
10 of their routine inquiries regarding our shipping and our  
11 fleet, wherever the shipping was, or wherever the fleet  
12 was.

13 Mr. Gearhart: In the light of the fact that Hawaii had  
14 been bombed, with a terrific result, don't you think now,  
15 that you should have sent the information in these seven  
16 intercepts in respect to Japan's inquiry into the shipping  
17 arrangements at Hawaii?

18 General Marshall: That is asking a very definite back-  
19 sight. I do not necessarily think so. I am still in the  
20 position of feeling that when you give a command to a high  
21 officer you expect to have it executed.

22 Mr. Gearhart: But don't you think that you were with-  
23 holding vital information from Admiral Kimmel and General  
24 Short when you did not advise them of these particular  
25 seven messages?

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 General Marshall: It did not appear vital at that  
3 time. It appeared to be a portion of a general resumé by  
4 the Japanese doing what we eventually thought they would  
5 do all over the world.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Will you tell us now, General, why, at  
7 that time that information did not impress you as vital?

8 General Marshall: I could not answer that, sir. As  
9 a matter of fact, I testified that I did not have a definite  
10 recollection of these particular messages. I must assume  
11 that I saw them. They did not register on my mind accord-  
12 ing to your reaction as stated here by you.

13 Just what their reaction was I do not know. There  
14 was no evaluation of them brought to me by G-2 of the  
15 character that you have indicated.

16 Mr. Gearhart: But you had already directed G-2 to  
17 bring you the original material by direct order, had you  
18 not?

19 General Marshall: That was during the summer, from  
20 that time on, but that did not in any way cancel the ques-  
21 tion of the evaluation of the information they obtained,  
22 because I never saw all the magic.

23 Mr. Gearhart: After you had directed, in August, G-2  
24 and War Plans to bring you the original material, that  
25 imposed on you by voluntary assumption of the responsibility,

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 the duty to read, to understand, to evaluate, and to act  
3 upon the messages that were laid before you; is that not  
4 true?

5 General Marshall: No, sir. That direction did not  
6 terminate at all the evaluation of information for me by  
7 G-2, which is the function, one of the main functions of  
8 that section of the General Staff. That direction gave  
9 me the opportunity to see for myself, so far as I found  
10 the opportunity to see what the actual messages were, as  
11 a check against what G-2 was doing, and as additional  
12 information for me. It was just exactly the same thing  
13 as from time to time I inspected the various installa-  
14 tions of the Army. They had orders to do certain things  
15 and I went there to see, myself, from time to time, when  
16 opportunity presented itself.

17 In this case, these messages were coming in, and I  
18 thought it was better that I saw the entire message, in  
19 the case of the important ones, and not merely trust the  
20 evaluation.

21 Mr. Gearhart: That is quite correct. That gave you  
22 the benefit of other men's views in respect to what the  
23 messages indicated, but it did not relieve you of the  
24 final responsibility.

25 General Marshall: I am never relieved of that, sir.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: The responsibility of reading, of  
3 understanding, or evaluating and acting upon those mes-  
4 sages.

5 General Marshall: I would not say that is correct,  
6 Mr. Gearhart. If I am supposed to have the final respon-  
7 sibility of the reading of all magic, I would have ceased  
8 to be Chief of Staff in practically every other respect,  
9 so that was an absolutely impractical proposition. It  
10 was very difficult for me to read magic sufficiently,  
11 even as it was. There was a great deal to it. It occupied  
12 the entire time of a certain group of officers. I could  
13 not give all of my time to one activity.

14 As I say, if I had complete responsibility for reading  
15 all the magic I would have had to cease to function as  
16 Chief of Staff, except in that one particular division.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Let me point out, General, I am not  
18 expressing any criticism at all. I am asking you for  
19 your opinions.

20 General Marshall: Well, I am giving them, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, is not magic one  
22 of the objects of special interest in the office of the  
23 Chief of Staff?

24 General Marshall: It was a subject of very special  
25 interest.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: And wasn't it to you?

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General Marshall: It was to me, and that was the reason that I directed that they bring me the originals of these messages that they were evaluating where they felt they were particularly important.

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Mr. Gearhart: Then your answer is as you gave it first, that if these seven messages had been transmitted to General Short and Admiral Kimmel at the time they were received, things might have been different at Hawaii?

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General Marshall: Things might have been different. The same instructions, however, were sent literally to the Philippines, and they were sent also to Panama, and the alerts were executed, and the additional information was not sent.

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Mr. Gearhart: And if the alert messages that related to Panama, and related to Manila had been transmitted, and an attack had occurred there first, things might have been different in those areas?

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General Marshall: What was the first part of the question?

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Mr. Gearhart: I am just enlarging the question that I asked you. I am asking you about the other areas.

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General Marshall: What I was stating was that the alert messages were given to Panama and were given to the

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Philippines.

3 Take Panama, for example. These various communica-  
4 tions were not sent there, and the command was alerted.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Assuming that the first attack came at  
6 Panama, and you had a lot of intercepts showing a special  
7 interest of the Japanese in Panama, don't you think the  
8 Commanders in Panama would be in a better position to de-  
9 fend their posts and appreciate the danger they were in,  
10 if those intercepts had been transmitted to them for their  
11 inspection, for their consideration and for their evaluation?

12 General Marshall: I assume the lieutenant general in  
13 Panama was aware of the Japanese interest in that canal.

14 Mr. Gearhart: But if you had information, did you have  
15 the right to withhold that information from them, assuming  
16 that they would know what the substance of that information  
17 was?

18 General Marshall: It depends entirely on the circum-  
19 stances, the information, the evaluation, and the procedure  
20 generally.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Then your answer is you do not think  
22 there was any obligation to keep your outlying commanders  
23 in the field informed in respect to all of the information  
24 you had that was of benefit to them?

25 General Marshall: Well, if you qualify that at the

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 end of your question by saying "of benefit to them," of  
3 course that is correct.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Would you say it would not have been  
5 of benefit to Admiral Kimmel, and it would not have been  
6 of benefit to General Short to know that the Japanese had  
7 charted the area, divided it into areas, and were asking  
8 for ship reports, and for every movement that occurred,  
9 even for reports where no movement occurred, would you  
10 say that was of interest to your outlying commanders?

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I would say it was of  
12 interest to them, but the assumption must have been, ex-  
13 cept for subdivisions of the harbor, that the report of  
14 the movement of that fleet was made direct to Japan by  
15 ordinary cable, or by radio.

16 Mr. Gearhart: And yet the fact still remains that  
17 that information was not transmitted; that is correct,  
18 isn't it?

19 General Marshall: I think that is correct, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

21 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

22 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will  
23 inquire.

24 Senator Ferguson: Is it my turn?

25 The Vice Chairman: Have you finished, Senator Lucas?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Lucas: Yes.

3 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson will again in-  
4 quire.

5 Senator Ferguson: General, you have had experience  
6 as Chief of Staff with investigating boards in the Army?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: Do you recall any conversation you  
9 had with anyone about this board -- I am talking about the  
10 Grunert Board -- shortly after it was appointed, about  
11 its make-up?

12 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not recall. I recall  
13 very distinctly General McNarney, who was then Deputy Chief  
14 of Staff, who was handling the matter, I believe, for the  
15 Secretary of War, speaking to me about the time limit that  
16 had to be imposed upon the Board in order that its report  
17 would be available to the Secretary of War with sufficient  
18 time for him to survey it and still make his report re-  
19 quired, I believe, by Congress, on a certain date. I have  
20 a distinct recollection of that.

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Witness Marshall

questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Do you have a recollection that the  
3 Secretary of War had to make a report to Congress?

4 General Marshall: That was my impression. There was  
5 some limiting date. Whether it was December 7 or not I don't  
6 know. But I know General McNarney consulted with me as to  
7 how much time there would be, and he was speaking of the  
8 length of time required to go out to Hawaii, the number of  
9 witnesses. That is a definite recollection. Something of  
10 that sort.

11 Senator Ferguson: Counsel, do you have the order that  
12 created the Board?

13 Mr. Murphy: It is in the Clausen Report. Mr. Greaves  
14 has it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Can the Congressman tell me about  
16 where it is in the Clausen Report?

17 Mr. Murphy: Yes. It is right in the beginning, about  
18 the third or fourth page. Right in the front part. You will  
19 find it in the index.

20 Senator Ferguson: I want to read that to you, General.

21 "That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes,  
22 resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations affecting the  
23 possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or  
24 civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December  
25 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that  
3 operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or  
4 punishment of any person or persons in military or civil  
5 capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl  
6 Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any  
7 other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or  
8 offense against the United States, are hereby extended for  
9 a further period of six months, in addition to the extension  
10 provided for in Public Law 208, 78th Congress."

11 Now, section 2. That is the statute limitations part.  
12 I will read section 2.

13 "Section 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of  
14 the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with  
15 an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe  
16 described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings  
17 against such persons as the facts may justify.

18 "Approved June 13, 1944."

19 Now, the statute of limitations would expire, the six-  
20 months period, on the 7th of December, 1944.

21 Do you know when the Board completed its findings?

22 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not. That is a matter  
23 of record, though.

24 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when they filed their top  
25 secret and other report?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Marshall: No, sir, I do not know offhand. I believe I testified, I am sure I did, the other day that General Handy, the day he became Deputy Chief of Staff, received a copy of that on its first delivery, I believe, to the War Department, and came to me in regard to it.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you recall then only one conversation with General McNarney about the time limit?

General Marshall: The Board, I presume, must have received a directive from the War Department by direction of the Secretary of War as to its procedure and as to the time in which it would file its report and that is what I have a definite recollection of General McNarney consulting me in regard to.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any other conversation with anyone in relation to the Board, the make-up of the Board?

General Marshall: I don't recall, sir. I have a vague recollection, Senator, now that you have asked me that question, I have a vague recollection of saying something about having them all officers on the active list, but I am not quite certain of that.

Senator Ferguson: After they were named did you confer with anyone in relation to the make-up of the Board?

General Marshall: I don't recall, sir.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1           Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted as to the members  
2           on that Board?

3           General Marshall: I don't recall that, sir.

4           Senator Ferguson: Well, is it customary or do you know  
5           of any other case where a Board had been appointed and failed  
6           to consider all matters pertinent to the investigation, that  
7           the matter was taken away from them and given, for instance,  
8           to a Major like Major Clausen, in this case, to make an in-  
9           vestigation, had that ever happened in the War Department  
10          before?

11          General Marshall: I don't recall a similar situation  
12          to that before. I do recall, however, in connection with  
13          this, and this is purely hearsay, hearing the Secretary of  
14          War comment, I think at the time of the release of the Pearl  
15          Harbor report to the press, whenever that was, I have a re-  
16          collection, I think, of the Secretary of War stating, either  
17          to me directly or to people in his office, of whom I was one,  
18          that he was, that he felt that the message of effecting the  
19          release was not correct, in that the Congress had imposed  
20          upon him an obligation to do a certain thing and it was his  
21          report and the Board was his, one of his methods of obtaining  
22          the information.

23          Now I am indulging in pure hearsay.

24          Hook  
25          follows



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2           Senator Ferguson: General, here is a Board that is  
3 appointed in 1944, the statute is passed in 1944, the  
4 six-months statute of limitations is up in December of  
5 1944, and then extended at that time, again extended in  
6 1945, but the report is not made public until August the  
7 28th or 29th, 1945, this year.

8           General Marshall: That is correct.

9           Senator Ferguson: So, there was nothing done, no  
10 report made to Congress, or no report to the public within  
11 any six months period, but made after the close of the war.

12           You understood that?

13           General Marshall: Yes, sir, I understood that.

14           Senator Ferguson: Now, we have this case where the  
15 Board hasn't filed its report so far as the public is con-  
16 cerned, and a major is sent out to complete the work of  
17 the Board.

18           What I want to get from you, as Chief of Staff, did you  
19 ever know of a similar position, similar case, let's say?

20           General Marshall: I don't recall such a case, and I  
21 think I testified a little earlier in this hearing that I  
22 did not know of Major Clausen, I never saw him until, I  
23 think the day before the public release of the report. I  
24 believe the affidavit he came to get from me was not, had  
25 not been submitted to the Secretary of War at the time the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

report of the Board was released to the public.

That was my first knowledge of Major Clausen as an individual; sir.

Senator Ferguson: General, is it the custom in the War Department to follow the old idea of a jury of your peers, to have officers of equal rank investigate officers?

General Marshall: We generally make an effort, if it is practicable of arrangement, to have a senior officer do it, but in the Inspector General's Department that very often is not practical.

Senator Ferguson: Isn't it the old idea of having a jury of their peers, that you have superior officers, or at least of equal rank on the Board that is doing the investigation?

General Marshall: I do not say specifically just what the basic reason is. My own reaction is that that is very embarrassing for a junior officer to be inspecting a senior officer because he doesn't know what day he will be under the senior officer.

Senator Ferguson: We have the case of a major completing an investigation against all senior officers; I mean many men who were senior. There isn't any question that your department was being investigated, is there?

General Marshall: No, sir.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1           Senator Ferguson: And you were a senior officer?

2           General Marshall: Yes, sir.

3           Senator Ferguson: General officer. There isn't any  
4           doubt that General Short was a senior officer to a major  
5           or a lieutenant colonel?

6           General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

7           Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know of a case where you  
8           ever completed an investigation by an officer of this many  
9           grades lower in rank, where there had been a board set up  
10          of equal or senior officers to make an investigation?

11          General Marshall: I do not recall a similar case.

12          Senator Ferguson: General, you mentioned the other day  
13          in relation to some material being furnished to Borneo,  
14          Port Morseby, and some others. Did we build airports there  
15          prior to December 7?

16          General Marshall: We endeavored to have the existing  
17          strips sufficiently improved to make them, make it possible  
18          to land and take off with a B-17.

19          Senator Ferguson: Was that upon your order, or where  
20          did that order come from?

21          General Marshall: That was upon my order to General  
22          MacArthur.

23          Senator Ferguson: Had you conferred with anyone in  
24          relation to that prior thereto?  
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Marshall: I certainly must have because while that was my desire, to have it done, I would have felt, I am quite certain that I should get the o.k. of the higher Government officials because I was involving contacts with other governments.

Senator Ferguson: And who would those higher Government officials be?

General Marshall: Oh, it would be the Secretary of State -- first the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President. Whether one or all, I don't know. I should imagine the most normal thing would have been the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson: And prior to sending any material, that is, I am talking about bombs and ammunition --

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You would confer with the Secretary of State or the President, or Secretary of War?

General Marshall: My assumption would certainly be that I would not have given those instructions to General MacArthur unless I had gotten a clearance at least from the Secretary of War, but more probably from the Secretary of State, and I may have gotten a direction from the President, I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson: General, do you recall of any report

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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submitted to the War Department which came to your attention in December of 1940, and revised in April of 1941?

To refresh your memory, I hand you some papers. You needn't read them aloud. I just want you to go through them enough to be able to say whether or not you ever saw such a report.

It involves the oil in the Netherlands Islands.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Lucas: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Is that an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson: No.

Senator Lucas: What report is it in?

Senator Ferguson: I am asking the General about it.  
Do you want to see it, Senator, first?

Senator Lucas: No. I was just interested in knowing  
whether it was an exhibit. Who makes the report?

Senator Ferguson: The report is not signed.

General Marshall: Also has no heading on the paper where  
it came from.

Senator Lucas: It seems to me a little unusual to refresh  
someone's recollection upon an anonymous report.

Senator Ferguson: If the Senator will look at it, it  
purports to be a copy of a report filed with restricted offices,  
and the Army is one of the offices.

General Marshall: What was the question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: After looking that over, had that ever  
been called to your attention?

General Marshall: I don't recall specifically that it  
had. I know that we were very much interested in what the  
Japanese, what the resources were for Japan in that region,  
and to what degree they would be destroyed.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that one of the things, at least, that we considered Japan wanted to go into the Netherlands Islands for, was to get oil for war purposes, there had been questions up before you and the various officials about oil, whether an embargo on oil would defeat them?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, was there anything brought to your attention that there was one way to keep them from moving into these Islands to get oil and that was to prepare so that those oil wells should be destroyed either prior to them going down or at the time they were coming, full preparation being made, and they being advised on that point, did you ever hear of that before?

General Marshall: Will you please read the first part of the question?

(First part of the question read.)

General Marshall: That is sufficient.

It was brought to my attention a number of times the factor of oil as it affected the Japanese in their capacity to make war, as it might affect the Japanese by our strictures on the supply of oil for the United States, and as it would affect the Japanese in making war if they had available Borneo and other Indonesian fields, and as it would affect them if we were able to destroy those fields so that the oil would

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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not be usable for a considerable period of time. All those facts were discussed, were brought to my attention, and I think I asked a number of questions regarding them.

(4) Senator Ferguson: General Bundy was in your department?

General Marshall: Mr. Bundy was a special assistant to the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson: A special assistant?

General Marshall: He was a civilian and a lawyer from Boston.

Senator Ferguson: General, were you familiar with the capacity to manufacture refinery equipment machinery by the Japs?

General Marshall: I think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was that taken up with you?

General Marshall: I think I saw some statements of that nature because the whole oil thing was examined fore and aft, the whole oil question was examined fore and aft.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know a Lieutenant Colonel John H. Levell?

General Marshall: Not to my knowledge.

Senator Ferguson: Was Mr. Bundy a civilian or was he an officer?

General Marshall: He was a civilian, as I say, a lawyer from Boston, who had been, I believe, at one time assistant

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Secretary of State, when Mr. Stimson was Secretary of State, and he came into the War Department, I believe, at the same time Mr. Stimson did, and remained in the War Department until Mr. Stimson resigned as Secretary of War, and then he, Mr. Bundy, left shortly thereafter.

Senator Ferguson: As of April 29, 1941, would this refresh your memory as to whether or not you have ever seen this before:

"It is interesting to note that of the \$560,000 worth of drilling equipment which were shipped to Japan all but \$16,000 of this was exported after my report was sent to the Department."

General Marshall: I don't recall that.

Senator Ferguson: Had that ever been called to your attention?

General Marshall: Not to my specific knowledge. Could you tell me where that paper came from? I mean this, where Mr. Stimson received some report, and that evidently is one to him, he usually initialled it over to me to look at. There is no such initialling there, is there?

Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

General Marshall: He usually initialled the report over to me to look at. I didn't see any initials of that character on that report. Did this come to his office?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel -- I thought if  
3 you could identify it it could be used -- I will give it to  
4 counsel and I will ask counsel if he will look up and see  
5 whether or not we can locate in any official files this report  
6 and as to whether or not he can ascertain to what departments  
7 it was delivered.

8 Mr. Gesell: You mean official files of all Departments  
9 of the Government, Senator?

10 Senator Ferguson: I mean first the War Department.

11 Mr. Gesell: What other Departments of the Government  
12 do you want us to search?

13 Senator Ferguson: Let me see the paper.

14 The War Department, Navy Department, State Department,  
15 Lend-Lease.

16 They are on the top of the memorandum.

17 General, you have read, have you, the top secret report  
18 of the Army?

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I read that night before last.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to make any comments on  
21 it whatever?

22 General Marshall: No, sir, I have no comments to make.

23 Senator Ferguson: Was there any contention in the War  
24 Department that we were trying to solve our problems by  
25 committees and not allowing men who had the responsibility

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 for decisions to make their decisions, that committees made  
3 decisions rather than individuals? I am talking about prior  
4 to December 7.

5 General Marshall: I don't recall any such controversy,  
6 sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: You have no recollection then of any  
8 controversy or ideas in the Department that that was inter-  
9 fering with the decisions by particular men because it was  
10 necessary to go to committees and not formal committees but  
11 merely a group of individuals to decide cases?

12 General Marshall: I don't recall anything specific on  
13 that, sir. There was always this, of course, in the War  
14 Department, any act you took affected other interests and  
15 it was necessary to get clearances, and the individual who  
16 was trying to put his particular purpose through the machine  
17 was always impatient of the length of time it took to obtain  
18 the clearances from the other sections, we will say, of the  
19 General Staff, or maybe, though this would not come to my  
20 attention, the other groups of subdivisions within a particular  
21 activity. That has always been the case. That still remains  
22 the case.

23 Senator Ferguson: Genera, isn't it true that in effect  
24 these alerts were drawn by committee action, isn't that true?

25 General Marshall: The alerts, where they were both Army

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 and Navy, involved both Army and Navy, were drawn by a  
3 committee that might only consist of two men, or it might  
4 consist of more, but it would be the Army planning responsible  
5 agent or the one designated to represent him and the Naval  
6 opposite.

7 I had such a paper this morning where the two had to get  
8 together. That comes all the time.

9 Senator Ferguson: Isn't it true in relation to the alert  
10 to General Short that the President had said that one provision  
11 had to be in it, in relation to the first overt act?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: The Secretary of War had called the  
14 Secretary of State and the first provision, about diplomatic  
15 relations being broken off or not, had to be changed. So  
16 that in effect it was not the idea of one man who was re-  
17 sponsible for the alert, which would be you, isn't that true?

18 General Marshall: That is true, sir, but there are  
19 very few documents that go through the War Department that  
20 are --

21 Senator Lucas: A little louder, General.

22 General Marshall: That is true, but there are very few  
23 documents of importance that come out of the War Department  
24 that are wholly and completely the act of one man. It is  
25 his responsibility but as a rule a number of different

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 interests are involved and they are represented and he makes  
3 the decision. That is what happens.

4 I might illustrate it this way. I am asked a question  
5 or I have a desire, in either case I see that that goes to  
6 the several agencies of the War Department concerned and they  
7 give me their views. Then I decide what I am going to do,  
8 having heard the various implications that are involved.

9 In this particular case that alert message, and General  
10 Gerow can testify to this, on the Army side was probably  
11 first drafted in the section headed by Colonel Bundy, it  
12 was then brought, I presume, to General Gerow, and he went  
13 over it. He may or may not, he can testify to that, have  
14 taken it up with his Naval opposite to see if they had any  
15 comments in regard to it, to make certain they didn't get  
16 off on the wrong foot with regard to the other, and then  
17 the Secretary of War, because of conversations with the  
18 President, sent for General Gerow, who I think brought him  
19 in a draft.

20 I don't think there is anything abnormal in that pro-  
21 cedure, sir.

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23 follows  
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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: General, up to that date had there  
3 been the custom in an alert?

4 General Marshall: There are very few alerts here. The  
5 only other alert was the one of the previous year and I do  
6 not know what the procedure there was but in all probability  
7 the proposal for the alert was either discussed with me  
8 first by General Strong of the War Plans Division, or he may  
9 have brought me the actual proposal in writing, in which case  
10 I would have gone over that to see if it was acceptable in  
11 the form in which he had it.

12 Now, in relation to the actual message that we endeavored  
13 to get to General Short regarding the one P.M. delivery of  
14 the fourteen part message, there I wrote the message myself  
15 before anyone knew of just what I might say. Then I read it  
16 aloud and got their reactions.

17 Senator Ferguson: But in this fourteen part message, let  
18 us say the one that went out at noon on Sunday, the 7th of  
19 December, you did not confer with the State Department about  
20 that alert message?

21 General Marshall: No, sir, I did not.

22 Senator Ferguson: You did not confer with the President  
23 about it?

24 General Marshall: I did not.

25 Senator Ferguson: The only one that you conferred with

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 were the officers of the Army plus Admiral Stark of the Navy  
3 Department?

4 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, that was an alert and it  
6 did not include the President's directive about the first  
7 overt act, did it?

8 General Marshall: You say that was an alert?

9 Senator Ferguson: Was it an alert? I will put it that  
10 way.

11 General Marshall: It was not a command message except  
12 that he was to be --

13 Senator Ferguson: This is on page 21, General, of  
14 exhibit 32.

15 General Marshall: (Reading)

16 "But be on alert, accordingly."

17 That is with relation to one P.M.

18 Now, there, of course, there was no opportunity for or-  
19 dinary procedure. I recall very distinctly that my writing  
20 is not very impressive looking and I did this on a rough  
21 scratch pad and when I read it aloud General Gerow said, "I  
22 will have it typed," and I told him no, there wouldn't be  
23 time, it would go in this form to the message center. So  
24 there was an informality and an immediacy in procedure that  
25 was undoubtedly not the case at all in the alert of the pre-

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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vious summer. Those were the only two alerts in which, I recall, I participated in the War Department while I was Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson: But on the 27th it was necessary to confer with the Secretary of State as to whether or not there was a breaking off of relations, but you personally found on the 7th at noon that an ultimatum was delivered.

Now, how do you account for in the one case you had to confer with the Secretary of State; in the other case you personally determined that what amounts to an ultimatum?

General Marshall: Time was the deciding factor here, very much so. This was my interpretation of the moment. There was no opportunity to discuss this with anybody else and it was quite evident if it was to be of any profit it had to be dispatched immediately. Therefore, I took the responsibility of stating that and of sending that message immediately. I checked with Admiral Stark in regard to it and my decision had already been made that I was going to send it.

Senator Ferguson: General, in the letter of the 27th, exhibit 17, I just want to ask you a few questions about that, the second paragraph from the top. (Reading)

"After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or  
3 directly threatens the territory or mandated territory  
4 of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the  
5 Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move  
6 forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10°  
7 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty  
8 Islands."

9 Now, that is a definite statement, is it not, to the  
10 President --

11 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- that we had agreed  
13 that that action would be taken?

14 General Marshall: Your use of the word "we" I do not  
15 think is correct, Senator.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, the United States?

17 General Marshall: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Who does it mean, "we" ?

19 General Marshall: It says: "After consultation with  
20 each other, United States, British, and Dutch military au-  
21 thorities in the Far East agreed."

22 Senator Ferguson: United States military authorities?

23 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Had agreed?

25 General Marshall: They had no authority to commit the

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 government.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, in the next to the last paragraph:

4 (Reading)

5 "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand" --  
6 well, going back to the other paragraph. Now, the military  
7 authorities having agreed in that particular paragraph that  
8 I read, the information that you obtained from Winant at  
9 10:40, it came in to the Secretary of State, on the 7th of  
10 December 1941, indicated that there was going to be an in-  
11 vasion similar to the lines stated there because they would  
12 go into the Kra Peninsula, would they not?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir. They would go into the  
14 Gulf of Siam.

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes. So that at that time we knew  
16 under this agreement that at least the military authorities, --  
17 that the Japanese were violating that?

18 General Marshall: I do not believe I quite understand  
19 the question. I will endeavor to explain my view of this  
20 particular matter.

21 General MacArthur sent an officer at our direction to  
22 Singapore. We already had a liaison officer at Singapore.  
23 They were directed to confer with the British and the Dutch  
24 in regard to the situation in the Far East and what might be  
25 a workable basis for the three different countries in the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 event that the Japanese broke the peace in the Pacific.

3 They made their report. They agreed, those individuals,  
4 on that report. It was submitted. Now, I stated, I am cer-  
5 tain, in the hearing the other day that I could not recall  
6 just what my own individual action in regard to that report  
7 was. After that I checked it in the War Department and I  
8 found what it was. In a joint memorandum signed by Admiral  
9 Stark and myself, of which I will read the first three para-  
10 graphs to indicate the general tenor of the reaction to this  
11 report of these individual Army and Naval officers who among  
12 themselves agreed as to what should be the proper course, -  
13 this memorandum from Admiral Stark and myself is dated  
14 July 3, 1941. It is from the Chief of Naval Operations and  
15 the Chief of Staff of the Army. (Reading)

16 "To: The Special Naval Observer, London.

17 The Special Army Observer, London.

18 "Subject: Comment on the report of the American-  
19 Dutch-British Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941.

20 (Short title "A.D.B.")

21 "References: (a) United States - British Staff  
22 Conversations, ABC-1.

23 "1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs  
24 of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the  
25 Chief of Staff regret that they are unable to approve

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 the subject report, because in several major, as well as  
3 numerous minor, particulars, it is at variance with re-  
4 ference (a)." -- which is the United States-British  
5 Staff Conversations, ABC-1.

6 "(2) The major differences between the two reports  
7 may be summarized as follows:

8 "(a) The Singapore report contains political  
9 matters which must be omitted from this military agree-  
10 ment. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of  
11 Staff are unable to recommend approval, as being beyond  
12 the scope of their authority, such political proposals  
13 as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25, 26, 27, and 78.  
14 These should be taken up by the political departments  
15 of the governments, should these departments deem it  
16 possible to arrive at definite agreements.

17 "(b) The scope of the naval strategic matters dis-  
18 cussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to set  
19 up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1.  
20 The 'Eastern Theater,' and the 'Commander in Chief, Far  
21 Eastern Fleet,' though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the  
22 basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report.  
23 Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its  
24 naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces  
25 as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 British naval strategic direction only for employment in  
3 the Far Eastern area. The United States has not agreed,  
4 and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter  
5 into any commitment for the employment of the naval  
6 forces of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of  
7 the Far Eastern Area, except as to limited operations  
8 having a direct relation to those in the Far Eastern  
9 Area. Should it become necessary in the future to retire  
10 from that area, further plans may then be concerted.  
11 This subject is discussed in detail in a subsequent para-  
12 graph."

13 It is a rather lengthy memorandum.

14 Senator Ferguson: Well, General, I will ask you then  
15 in the light of that instrument -- first, was that delivered  
16 to the President?

17 General Marshall: The distribution list on it shows it  
18 went to Cincaf, Cincpac, Commanding General Philippine Depart-  
19 ment, the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, to the  
20 CNO for dispatch. That is all, sir. It evidently did not go  
21 to the President.

22 Senator Ferguson: In the light of that statement that  
23 you have read, General, why would you put the paragraph in  
24 this report to the President on the late date of the 27th?

25 General Marshall: That was a statement of fact. "After

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 consultation with each other, United States, British, and  
3 Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed."

4 In other words, they had a meeting of the minds on that  
5 particular date. (Reading)

6 "---that joint military counteraction against Japan  
7 should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or di-  
8 rectly threatens the territory or mandated territory of  
9 the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Ne-  
10 therlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces  
11 into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10  
12 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the  
13 Loyalty Islands."

14 That informed the President of what the view was by  
15 those joint meeting of British, American and Dutch officials  
16 of the military hierarchy in Singapore. Later on in the docu-  
17 ment we give bur, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief  
18 of Staff, specific recommendations.

19 Senator Ferguson: And you disagreed with it?

20 General Marshall: We disagreed with it in part. We  
21 agreed with it to this extent: (Reading)

22 "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan  
23 be warned by the United States, the British, and the  
24 Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated  
25 may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 opposition be undertaken."

3 Now, that is more or less in agreement with the pro-  
4 posals of this group.

5 Senator Ferguson: Do you have a map before you, General?

6 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I know where the places are.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, on this map, you said in the  
8 next to the last paragraph:

9 "In case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan  
10 be warned by the United States, the British, and the  
11 Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated  
12 may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military  
13 opposition be undertaken."

14 Now, that was not said in relation to the Kra Peninsula  
15 or Singapore or the East Indies, the Netherlands East Indies.  
16 That was only said as to part of Thailand, the great part of  
17 which was west of the line 100 east, isn't that true?

18 General Marshall: Yes, that is true.

19 Senator Ferguson: That is correct?

20 General Marshall: I think that is correct.

21 Senator Ferguson: So that if they went into the Kra  
22 Peninsula no warning was to be given, action was recommended  
23 on that, but if they went into Thailand, a great part of which  
24 was west of 100 degrees east, - in fact, one of the reports  
25 recommended at one time to let them go in there and they would

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 eat up their resources, and so forth, did it not?

3 General Marshall: I do not recall that.

4 Senator Ferguson: Pardon?

5 General Marshall: I do not recall that at the moment.

6 Senator Ferguson: You do not recall that?

7 General Marshall: No.

8 Senator Ferguson: But only in the one case was a notice  
9 to be given. In the other cases you did not recommend no-  
10 tice, isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair interpretation  
11 of that letter to the President?

12 General Marshall: In the other cases, Senator, meaning  
13 what?

14 Senator Ferguson: Meaning down into the Kra Peninsula  
15 and into Singapore, no notice was to be given by the govern-  
16 ments in that case?

17 General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, General, do you know whether or  
19 not the President ever saw the Winant message about the ships  
20 going into the --

21 General Marshall: No, I do not, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: You never had any discussion with him  
23 on that?

24 General Marshall: No, sir, not to my recollection.

25 Senator Ferguson: Do you know, General, when Singapore



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 was alerted as far as the British were concerned?

3 General Marshall: I do not know that, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether it was printed  
5 in the papers here, in New York at least, that Singapore on  
6 Saturday was alerted, it was announced in the Saturday papers  
7 that they were alerted, full alert and they sent trucks out  
8 to get them?

9 General Marshall: I do not recall.

10 Senator Ferguson: You cannot recall any information on  
11 that?

12 General Marshall: I cannot recall. Your comment on  
13 that now is the first time I have heard it mentioned in the  
14 last year.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, General, on a sabotage alert  
16 wouldn't the airplanes on the field be in an entirely differ-  
17 ent position than a full alert for action?

18 General Marshall: I would presume so, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: On an alert of sabotage?

20 General Marshall: I said I would presume so, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, isn't it true that on such an  
22 alert the planes would be massed so that the men could guard  
23 from action immediately in the vicinity, like the throwing  
24 of bombs across the fence?

25 General Marshall: Well, that is what was done. That

2S13

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 varies, of course, according to the place and conditions.

3 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

4 General Marshall: But that was quite evidently the means  
5 taken there to alert against sabotage.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, normally an alert of sabotage  
7 would make your air fields, as far as the planes are con-  
8 cerned and ammunition in them and the bombs in them en-  
9 tirely different than you would if you were on a full alert  
10 to go out to the enemy?

11 General Marshall: Certainly. If there was no indica-  
12 tion of any other form of alert except against sabotage  
13 that would be, roughly, the case.

14 Senator Ferguson: Because if you put the bombs in and  
15 then you had some sabotage you may cause great damage to your  
16 own field?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir. We have had that accident  
18 occur in our experience.

19 Senator Ferguson: General, were you consulted by the  
20 Secretary of War in relation to the removal of General Short?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: He was the only officer removed.

23 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was consulted by the  
24 Secretary of War, I think, after the return of Colonel Knox  
25 from Hawaii.

2814

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2           Senator Ferguson: Did you confer with the Secretary of  
3 War and the Secretary of the Navy?

4           General Marshall: I don't know whether the Secretary  
5 of the Navy was present but I am quite certain, I am ab-  
6 solutely certain that Mr. Stimson discussed the matter with  
7 me after Colonel Knox returned.

8           Senator Ferguson: What kind of a release was he given?

9           General Marshall: He was relieved from command and  
10 ordered to the United States and I do not remember just what  
11 the terms of the order were as to his further duties but he  
12 was relieved from command in Hawaii on the arrival of his  
13 successor, General Emmons, and to report to the United  
14 States and, I presume, to the War Department. The order will  
15 show that, of course.

16           Senator Ferguson: I notice he is here in civilian  
17 clothes. When you say removed from command, does that mean  
18 that he is out of the Army?

19           General Marshall: No, sir, and I think General Short--

20           Senator Ferguson: I wish you would explain that on the  
21 record.

22           General Marshall: I think General Short's status now  
23 is a retired officer.

24           Senator Ferguson: Do you retire on full pay or half  
25 pay, or what is it?

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 General Marshall: Three-fourths of the base pay.

3 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not he is on  
4 full pay, or had been for any length of time?

5 General Marshall: I do not know what his status is  
6 here, whether he was ordered in and re-ordered giving him  
7 active duty or not, but that is a matter that can be easily  
8 determined.

9 Senator Ferguson: I just want your knowledge of it.

10 General Marshall: But unless he was ordered on active  
11 duty to report to your committee here his pay would continue  
12 at three-quarters pay. General Short can tell you that in a  
13 moment.

14 Senator Ferguson: When did he become a retired officer?  
15 What was the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about?

16 General Marshall: The Secretary of War's order that I  
17 spoke about --

18 Senator Ferguson: What did the Secretary of War's order  
19 that you spoke about do?

20 General Marshall: The Secretary of War's order that I  
21 spoke about brought General Short back from Hawaii, relieved  
22 him from all responsibility of command in Hawaii, directed  
23 him to report to some point in the United States, we will have  
24 to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the  
25 question was whether he would be given another assignment or,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 as actually developed, his retirement, which I believe was  
3 at his request; I do not recall that.

4 Senator Ferguson: Were you consulted on that, as to  
5 whether or not he would be given another assignment?

6 General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?

8 General Marshall: I presume so.

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

10 Mr. Keefe: Yesterday when I examined General Marshall  
11 I requested counsel to present the order with reference to  
12 General Short and I wonder whether that is here today, whether  
13 we have received it.

14 Mr. Mitchell: It has not been handed to us yet by the  
15 War Department.

16 General Marshall: The procedure in General Short's case  
17 was handled by the Secretary of War.

18 Mr. Mitchell: The War Department just hands me some  
19 documents.

20 Senator Ferguson: Do you want to see it, General?

21 Mr. Mitchell: No, I have no interest in them.

22 Senator Ferguson: They have not more than one copy.

23 Would this refresh your memory, General? (Reading)

24 "For General Short only. By direction of the Presi-  
25 dent, you will stand relieved from command of the Hawaiian

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Department upon the arrival there of Lieutenant General Em-  
3 mons who has been directed to assume command of the Depart-  
4 ment. Acknowledge.

5 "MARSHALL."

6 "OFFICIAL: SECRET

7 (Sgd) R. G. Hersey,

8 Adjutant General."

9 It is dated 12/16/41.

10 Does that refresh your memory that you signed such an  
11 order?

12 General Marshall: Well, I know such an order was sent  
13 and I assume also that there is another order which directs  
14 his return to the United States, which followed that.

15 Senator Ferguson: Does counsel have any other order?

16 General Marshall: You see, that does not involve any  
17 travel in the requirements of that. That is just the noti-  
18 fication to him of what is going to happen, that he will  
19 stand relieved when General Emmons arrives. Now, there  
20 would have to be a formal order bringing him back to the  
21 United States and that is what I was referring to.

22 Senator Ferguson: This is signed by you?

23 General Marshall: Yes.

24 Senator Ferguson: And it says, "By direction of the  
25 President."

2818

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 General Marshall: Yes.

3 Senator Ferguson: Did you confer with the President  
4 on this action?

5 General Marshall: I do not recall that I did.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any other order where  
7 a man was removed that you signed an order on the direction  
8 of the President to remove a man?

9 General Marshall: I will have to check on that, sir.  
10 Using that "By direction of the President" is a technical  
11 procedure because of the rank given to the commander in that  
12 particular place. I will have to check up on that. You see,  
13 the command in Hawaii carried a certain rank with it. The  
14 termination of the command terminated that rank. Now, it  
15 may be, - but that is readily ascertainable, - that the ex-  
16 pression "By direction of the President" was necessary in  
17 order to meet that particular involvement, because that is  
18 used very frequently. I think in the promotion of all tem-  
19 porary officers up to the grade of Colonel, that is, where no  
20 confirmation is necessary, the technical requirement is it  
21 must state "By direction of the President." Now, there may  
22 be some such involvement there. If not it would mean that  
23 the President himself personally had directed him relieved.  
24 I do not know which it is, Senator.

25 Senator Ferguson: But at least you do not recall that

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 he personally directed you to?

3 General Marshall: I do not recall that he personally  
4 directed me to, no, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, can you tell us as near as pos-  
6 sible the conversation that you had with the Secretary of  
7 War as to why this was issued, why he was relieved of that  
8 command? What was the reason?

9 General Marshall: I do not recall the conversation.  
10 My recollection of the incident is that on the return of  
11 Colonel Knox, who had gone out personally to Pearl Harbor  
12 to view the conditions and what had happened and what the  
13 existing situation was, that after his return to Washington  
14 he and the Secretary of War conferred, - the Secretary's  
15 testimony will be, certainly, the best evidence on this,  
16 and as a result a decision was reached for the relief of  
17 both Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

18 Now, that is just my recollection of the conditions at  
19 the time. I think probably Mr. Stimson's diary would tell  
20 us more directly just what happened. Now, what conversation  
21 they had with the President or if they had a meeting with the  
22 President I do not know.

23 I had directed a Major General of the Air Corps and  
24 Colonel Bundy, the officer in charge of Far Eastern affairs,  
25 to Hawaii by air as rapidly as possible in order to personal-



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 ly report to me what the conditions were and what in their  
3 opinion the requirements were. Those two officers were  
4 killed on that flight, so they did not arrive there. Colonel  
5 Knox did arrive there and then returned, the first person to  
6 come back to Washington who had actually been present after the  
7 attack.

8 Senator Ferguson: You do not recall then any conversa-  
9 tion with Secretary Knox?

10 General Marshall: I do not recall talking to Colonel  
11 Knox on the subject at all.

12 Senator Ferguson: But you and the Secretary of War did  
13 have a conversation?

14 General Marshall: Yes, undoubtedly, Senator.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, were there any specific reasons  
16 stated for his removal? What was the cause of his removal?

17 General Marshall: I do not recall the specific statement  
18 of the reasons. I will have to enter into almost a guess as to  
19 what they probably were. I have no clear recollection at  
20 this time, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: Was it disobedience to the alert order  
22 of the 27th?

23 General Marshall: I could not say that, sir. It was  
24 the general status of affairs in Hawaii as viewed, presumably,  
25 by Colonel Knox following his trip.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: You then have reasons to believe that  
3 the cause of removal was brought back by Colonel Knox?

4 General Marshall: That is my vague recollection of what  
5 occurred, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 General Marshall: I had sent two officers to go out  
8 and determine for me what they believed was the situation and  
9 the requirements of the situation from a number of points of  
10 view. They were to get at what we were to do to reconstitute  
11 the defenses and all other matters in connection with the  
12 future security of Hawaii and they did not reach there.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I understand, General, that you  
14 did not base this order upon any of your own findings. You  
15 based it upon what somebody else found.

16 General Marshall: I based that order on the direction of  
17 the Secretary of War.

18 Senator Ferguson: That is right, on his direction rather  
19 than on your own findings of facts.

20 General Marshall: Yes. I did not obtain any findings  
21 because my people never reached there.

22 Senator Ferguson: And did Colonel Stimson at the time  
23 that he asked you for this order or directed it, whatever  
24 the fact is, did he state his reasons for relieving Short from  
25 command?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2  
3 General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir. I mean he  
4 undoubtedly did, and undoubtedly I gave him an opinion and  
5 probably his diary might show exactly what occurred.

6  
7 Senator Ferguson: Well, do you recall that you did give  
8 him an opinion?

9  
10 General Marshall: Well, I would assume that he would  
11 ask me.

12  
13 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, he would tell you, would  
14 he not, the facts he had upon which you were basing an opinion?

15  
16 General Marshall: Presumably so, yes, sir.

17  
18 Senator Ferguson: Can you give any of those facts? Can  
19 you recall any of those facts --

20  
21 General Marshall: I do not.

22  
23 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- as to the reasons for  
24 his action?

25  
26 General Marshall: I do not, sir.

27  
28 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand the reason that  
29 you could send out the alert on sabotage without consultation  
30 with anyone, or one of the reasons, at least, was that it  
31 was such an emergency but in case that you wanted  
32 or amend the order in relation to the alert on the 27th which  
33 had the provision in there from the Secretary of State and  
34 the one from the President, that you would have to confer at  
35 least with the President and the Secretary of State before

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 they would be amended?

3 General Marshall: I do not want to confuse the issue,  
4 Senator, but I regarded the message that was intercepted from  
5 the Japanese regarding the one o'clock as of great signifi-  
6 cance. It was therefore my responsibility, in my opinion,  
7 to get that hour into all the various commanders in the  
8 Pacific as quickly as possible. I doubt if I even considered  
9 questioning anybody else, the President, the Secretary of  
10 War, the Secretary of State. The issue in my mind was clear.  
11 It was a very important message and time did not admit of  
12 any discussion. I took time, however, which absorbed very  
13 little time, to make a quick contact by telephone with Ad-  
14 miral Stark.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you know, General, whose language,  
16 or the reason for the insertion of the last few words of that  
17 message about alerting all essential officers? I want to  
18 get the exact words.

19 General Marshall: It is page 21, I think, Senator.

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes. "Limit dissemination of this  
21 highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

22 Whose language is that, or whose order? It is your  
23 order because you signed it.

24 General Marshall: What page are you on now?

25 Senator Ferguson: It is on page 7 of exhibit 32. It

2924

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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is on that page, General.

Mr. Mitchell: Is that the one you are referring to, the one o'clock and the warning message?

Senator Ferguson: No, I am not talking about the one o'clock.

General Marshall: I have got it straight now. It is on page 7.

Senator Ferguson: "Information to minimum essential officers."

General Marshall: Now, the question?

Senator Ferguson: Whose order is that? That is a directive that he is to only give this to the minimum essential officers. Whose directive was that? Was that on your own or was that in consultation with somebody else?

General Marshall: I do not recall that, sir. Of course, I was not present during the final form of this message. I think that is on there to maintain the secrecy of the magic. I do not know whether that would have been suggested by ~~me~~ would have been included automatically by General Gerow or his assistants or whether that would have been on the recommendation of General Miles, the G-2, but it is quite evidently for the purpose of protecting the sources of the information.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, that being in the message

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1  
2 and General Short being responsible for some reconnaissance,  
3 at least jointly with the Navy, would this information about  
4 the overt act go to the pilots in the planes if it was re-  
5 stricted to the minimum essential officers, that no overt  
6 act was to be done upon our part but the first one upon the  
7 part of the Japanese?

8 General Marshall: Reading the sentence as it is written  
9 here, "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information  
10 to minimum essential officers", it may be that that includes  
11 the portion of the message which refers to the overt act.  
12 I am quite certain the intention was to limit the dissemin-  
13 ation of this highly secret information, they are talking  
14 about the information and not the protection.

15 Senator Ferguson: Well, I am trying to see what an  
16 ordinarily prudent officer under the circumstances, how he  
17 would interpret that. Would he interpret it as to the whole  
18 instrument and, therefore, only give it to minimum essential  
19 officers, and that would not include anyone who had anything  
20 to do with the reconnaissance, probably, below General Mar-  
21 tin?

22 General Marshall: That is a question, sir. I would  
23 say that in sending out the various forces that the senior  
24 would have to know this portion of the message that refers to  
25 the overt act. He would not necessarily have to know about

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all prac-  
3 tical purposes."

4 Senator Ferguson: But he certainly would have to know  
5 about the overt act part?

6 General Marshall: Yes, sir, he would have to know  
7 about that.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Did you think at the time that  
9 it was a restriction upon Short in his command, as far as  
10 giving this to all officers in case he was on a real alert?

11 General Marshall: That did not occur to me, sir. I  
12 might say in connection with that that when we put out any  
13 operation almost invariably we are involved in restricting  
14 the knowledge of the operation to a very few people. We  
15 have to do that practically every time. That is always an  
16 embarrassment to the officers that are carrying out the oper-  
17 ation.

18 I can go clear back to the St. Mihiel operation, for ex-  
19 ample, to the pleadings of various corps commanders and par-  
20 ticularly the chiefs of staff, to permit a wider dissemin-  
21 ation of the knowledge preliminary to the launching of the  
22 operation, which General Pershing was unwilling to have dis-  
23 seminated. The same thing occurred in the Normandy opera-  
24 tion, the same thing occurred in connection with the African  
25 operation.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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2 It would be a much simpler thing from the point of view  
3 of the military authorities if everyone knew exactly what was  
4 planned, but in almost all those cases it is not a practical  
5 procedure or else you will certainly leak information.

6 So that that restriction would not impress me as impos-  
7 ing any insuperable difficulties as to the carrying out of  
8 the order.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now, we are trying to find out, Gen-  
10 eral, and I would like to have your help on it, one question,  
11 of what an ordinarily prudent officer would do under the  
12 same or similar circumstances having the knowledge that he  
13 had.

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: And how any confusion could be had  
16 upon that message and no confusion could be had upon the one  
17 that came back that he was alerted only to sabotage. Do you  
18 understand what I have in mind? Here.

19 Well, counsel is shaking his head that you do not under-  
20 stand, that is, Mr. Gessell.

21 Mr. Gessell: I am shaking my head that I do not under-  
22 stand.

23 Senator Ferguson: Well, I wasn't asking you the ques-  
24 tion. I want to ask the General the question again.

25 You have said that there apparently was confusion on



1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 this order, on this one order that went out there. Now, what  
3 caused the confusion, in your opinion? Was it the wording of  
4 the order or the information that he had?

5 General Marshall: I do not know, sir. I have testified  
6 to this in relation to this apparent confusion, evident  
7 confusion, that I have never known just why that up to  
8 certain point the interest was against air attack, against  
9 submarine attack, with almost no mentions of sabotage and  
10 suddenly that became the significant expression in the light  
11 of this particular order which dealt with reconnaissance,  
12 which dealt with defensive measures and which indicated the  
13 probability of a state of war.

14 Senator Ferguson: Now, General, how could anyone, any  
15 ordinarily prudent officer be confused about his reply?

16 General Marshall: The fact remains a number of people  
17 were confused by his reply.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, I want to know the reason why?

19 General Marshall: And I think those individuals are  
20 prudent officers.

21 Senator Ferguson: Have you anything to say from the  
22 instrument itself as to how an ordinarily prudent officer of  
23 the rank that would be handling that message could be con-  
24 fused as to Short's interpretation of the alert?

25 General Marshall: The fact remains, Senator, they were

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

confused and I consider the officers prudent officers.

Senator Ferguson: I am just asking if you have any reasons that you can state.

General Marshall: I thought I had already stated the reasons, sir, in my previous testimony, that nothing had been suggested at all as there being foremost in the mind of the commander of the Army forces in Hawaii the great consideration, the primary consideration of the matter of sabotage. All of his communications had devoted themselves almost exclusively to other matters and in particular to the type of attack which actually occurred and which had been referred to by me in my letters to him and in the previous plan of maneuvers of the Department.

A command directive was sent to him in the form of an alert, which in the opinion of the people who drafted it, responsible individuals, men of considerable reputation, certainly men with considerable experience, was sufficient to alert that command. I have never understood why it did not alert the command to any greater extent in the light of the interchange of all that had taken place before this time, in the light of the character of this particular order and in the light of certain provisions that he had made for liaison with the Navy, that there was the confusion which undoubtedly occurred. Beyond that I cannot explain the circumstances at all.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: General, my question really was how they could confuse his reply.

General Marshall: And that is what I am talking about. I am explaining the state of mind of the officer reading the reply, in the light of all that occurred at that time.

Senator Ferguson: That a man reading the reply, having that in mind, would misinterpret the reply?

General Marshall: The fact is he did misinterpret the reply, he and those that dealt with it.

Senator Ferguson: Who would you say misinterpreted the reply?

General Marshall: I would say Colonel Bundy and whoever his assistants were that handled it, General Gerow, myself, and presumably the Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson: General, one question on the Winds message.

Were you familiar with the Dutch reply, or the Dutch information that we had about the Winds message?

General Marshall: I do not know that I was, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In Volume 5, Top Secret, Navy --

Mr. Murphy: Is this the one from Batavia?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, the one from Batavia.

General Marshall: Do you wish me to read it?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, and then I will ask you later

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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to refresh your memory.

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General Marshall: "Addressees for action OPNAV; date CRO 222. From Thorpe, for Miles. War Department.

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"Code intercept: Japan will notify her Consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcast as weather report at end

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7

East Wind rain United States: North Wind cloudy Russia:

8

West Wind clear England with attack on Thailand and Dutch

9

East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass

10

directions only. In this case words will be introduced five

11

times in general text."

12

Then there is a paragraph not in the message.

13

Senator Ferguson: That is not part of the message, and I understood you have read the whole message, haven't you?

14

15

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I have read the whole message.

16

17

Senator Ferguson: Now, General, the Dutch had interpreted the so-called Winds message that if it came it was to be a war decision?

18

19

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General Marshall: That is what it states here.

21

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Was that ever called to your attention? It apparently came to Miles. Would you say he was the man in the first sentence?

22

23

24

General Marshall: Yes, I presume so.

25

Senator Ferguson: Was that ever called to your attention?