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Hungary

March 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed in October 1972.

HUNGARY

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The Society

A. Historical background (U/OU)

In contrast to some of its immediate neighbors, Hungary has existed as a state and a cultural and political entity since the 10th century. This cohesiveness was hard won, in spite of numerous invasions, occupations, unsuccessful revolts, and two world wars. The fight to preserve the nation under difficult circumstances is deeply ingrained in the Magyar national consciousness, and it abides as an active political factor in present-day Hungary.

Originating in northeastern Europe and during their prehistory subject to considerable Turkic influence, the nomadic Magyar tribes settled in the Danube basin toward the end of the ninth century. Originally a society of semiwarlike nomads, the tribes coalesced in the middle of the 10th century in a loose kingdom under the leadership of Prince Arpad—known as *Arpad Apam*, Arpad our father, even by contemporary Hungarians. During the latter half of the 10th century Christian missionaries arrived in the area, and about the year 1000 King Stephen embraced Roman Catholicism, which became the state religion. This strong tie to the more developed West accelerated the growth of a feudal monarchy and quickly overwhelmed the remnants of the Magyar tribal system. The influence of the Catholic Church grew through its identification with the monarchy and its dominance of the educational and legal systems. This influence continued essentially unabated into the 20th century.

From the 13th to the early 15th centuries Hungarian dynasties grew in power, culminating in the reign of Matyas Corvinus, at that time one of Europe's most active royal patrons of culture and education. The economic and military power of the Hungarian kingdom dominated central Europe from Croatia to Silesia in the north and from Vienna to the Romanian Carpathians in the east. The promulgation of the Golden Bull in the early 13th century, which was similar to the Magna Carta issued at about the same time, marked the beginning of the growth of a constitutional-parliamentary system, which was established much earlier in Hungary than in other countries of Eastern Europe. The cohesion of the state was ultimately upset by rebellious local barons, and in 1526 a gradual debilitation of the monarchy's effectiveness ended in the defeat of the Hungarians by the Ottoman Turks at Mohacs[1] and the opening of the Great Plain to Turkish armies. Budapest itself was seized in 1541, and a century and a half of harsh occupation began.

The Turkish occupation, which lasted until 1699, not only halted development but also actually reduced the country to a situation similar to that found by the original Magyar tribes. Deforestation and depopulation of the Great Plain erased centuries of efforts to make it arable. The political structure was replaced by an Ottoman system whose most efficient function was the collection of taxes, and the Hungarian peasants lost every semblance of legal protection from exploitation. Despite this bleak oppression, some centers of Hungarian culture endured. The Szeklers, a fiercely independent Magyar subgroup in Transilvania, effectively fought off the Turks and in the end were instrumental in liberating Hungary from the Ottomans. Moreover, the church was allowed to function throughout the occupation, and, as in other areas of the Empire, some domestic leaders were allowed to continue in authority if they swore allegiance and delivered taxes regularly to the Turks. The devastation of Hungary was so complete, however, that rebuilding the national economy and political structure took several centuries.

Following the expulsion of the Turks, Austrian Habsburg influence predominated for the next two centuries. The Hungarians, nobles and peasants alike, who had contributed heavily to the liberation of the homeland, were disappointed in Austria's failure to set up home rule. Throughout the Habsburg domination the feudal system in Hungary was in turmoil, and enmity between landed gentry and peasants frequently broke out into bloody revolts which divided the Hungarians and helped to extend Vienna's rule.

The revolt against Habsburg domination sparked in 1848 by the idealist-nationalist Lajos Kossuth (Figure 1) was a major part of the democratic revolutions

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[1] For diacritics on place names see the list of names at the end of the chapter.



FIGURE 1. Lajos Kossuth (1802-94), leader of 1848 War of Independence (U/OU)

throughout Europe in that year. Strong anti-Slavic attitudes among the Magyars were reinforced when Tsarist Russian troops aided Austria in supressing the 1848-49 revolt; the crushing of the revolt by Soviet troops in 1956 seemed to many Hungarians a tragic instance of history repeating itself.

During the major part of their recorded history most of the Magyar population survived by engaging in subsistence-level agriculture. Small-scale industrialization did not come to Hungary until 1850, and it was not until the closing years of the 19th century that private artisans and businessmen became an important social class. As a result, the social structure has traditionally rested on agrarian foundations. Smallholder peasants, landless agricultural laborers, artisans, a small bourgeoisie, an administrative-professional intelligentsia, and a handful of medium and large landowners were the main groups in rural and provincial society. By the end of the 19th century, however, Budapest and its surroundings had developed into one of the three most important industrial areas of eastern Europe. During the period of industrialization the pressure of the labor influx from the countryside on industrial employment was kept under control, because the landowners were anxious to retain surplus agricultural labor on the land. For this reason the skilled Hungarian industrial worker led a tolerable prewar existence, but this was maintained mostly at the expense of the unskilled workers and the agricultural laborers. The skilled workers developed considerable organizational cohesion and strength during the first four decades of the 20th century and were able to maintain their Social Democratic-affiliated trade unions until 1941, in spite of increasing and finally overwhelming German Nazi influence and pressure. This was also true from 1945 until 1948, when the Social Democratic Party was forcibly fused with the Hungarian Communist Party, and the unions were reduced to instruments of the Communist regime.

During the period of the Austro-Hungarian (Dual) Monarchy (1867-1918) and the Horthy Regency (1919-44), social status, once its economic basis was established through fortunes made in commerce, industry, or banking, was usually formalized by at least a token purchase of land and adoption of the landowner's way of life. Conversely, status once based solely on landownership could be maintained to some degree by government employment coupled with appropriate social indicators of genealogical association with the landowning gentry. The imposition of communism after World War II brought about basic economic changes, rapidly transforming this social structure into a system closely patterned on the Soviet model. The propertied classes of Hungarian society were dispossessed: first, by means of land reform, which distributed the large and medium-sized agrarian holdings among landless and small peasants, though only as a step preliminary to forced collectivization; and then, through gradual nationalization of all industrial and commercial enterprises, with the exception of a small private sector consisting of craftsmen and artisans. The influence and prestige of the churches were markedly reduced, trade unions were turned into instruments of government control, and intellectual, cultural, and social organizations were transformed from outlets of popular expression into tools of the Communist regime.

The occupation of Hungary by Soviet troops, the subsequent infringement of individual liberties, and the imposition of political, economic, social, and cultural ideas and institutions patterned on Soviet models intensified traditional antipathies toward the Russians. The closure of parochial schools, restrictions on religious education, and stringent controls on religious activities provoked sharp resentment among the Roman Catholic and Protestant population, especially in rural areas. The suppression of the 1956 revolt further exacerbated the hostility of the Hungarians toward the Soviets. The Kadar regime's pro-Soviet political and economic orientation is a continuing obstacle to its obtaining widespread national support and is a dangerous incentive to renewed expressions of Magyar nationalism.

The Hungarian intelligentsia, by tradition an active source of nationalist political agitation, is well represented in the historical pattern of defiance and ultimate tragedy. For example, the idealist Kossuth fled from his country to America in 1849 after the failure of the revolt he inspired. Sandor Petofi, Hungary's most revered poet, also participated actively in the 1848-49 revolt, only to be subsequently slain by Russian troops; in 1956 his memory inspired the intellectual upsurge that helped articulate for Hungarians the goals of the uprising of that year. Hungary's greatest composer, Bela Bartok, fled to the United States during the Fascist years and died in New York City in 1945. Imre Nagy, the father image of the 1956 revolt, was arrested and subsequently executed in 1958. Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary, was convicted of "treason" in 1949 and spent 6 years in prison and 15 years in U.S. diplomatic refuge in Budapest before finally resigning himself to expatriation.

As a result of this tradition, Hungarian intellectuals have resisted, though not completely frustrated, Communist attempts to impose narrow ideological restrictions on cultural expression and to elevate supranational concepts over strictly national ideas. Since 1961 the regime has all but abandoned the arbitrary and vindictive cultural policies which characterized the Stalinist era and the reconstruction period after the 1956 revolt. In place of these repressive measures, the Kadar regime uses a system of censorship combining subtle threats and incentives to limit outright hostility to the barest minimum. Controlled expressions of discontent with the existing situation and the self-imposed silences of major literary figures are the usual forms of protest employed by leading members of the cultural milieu.

Communist rule has succeeded in eliminating organized political resistance but has failed to weaken the national will to resist, at least passively. Despite the basic social, political, and economic changes that have modified most traditional Hungarian values, imposed an alien ideology, and altered the social structure, the national identity and individuality of the Hungarians have not been undermined. Indeed, the people seem to have evolved a technique of national survival which alternates sporadic, open defiance with nearly pervasive, sullen public apathy toward the Communist leadership and its policies—a technique which frustrates efforts by the regime to win meaningful popular support for its goals and makes Hungary an uncertain quantity in the East European Soviet-oriented Communist states.

B. Structure and characteristics of the society (U/OU)

1. Ethnic composition and language

Hungarians (Magyars) are descendants of an ethnic group which once lived in northeastern Europe between the big bend of the Volga river and the Ural Mountains, and included the Magyars, ancestors of the present-day Finns, and other Finno-Ugrian peoples. There is some evidence suggesting that the Magyars originated beyond the Urals in Asia, but this view is still disputed and needs further corroboration. The Finno-Ugric tribes began dispersing probably toward the middle of the second millennium B.C., and by the end of the ninth century A.D. the Magyar tribes had settled the area of Pannonia, in the Danube basin. Over succeeding centuries, the Magyars successfully resisted repeated attempts by neighboring Slavic tribes to assimilate them, but they themselves assimilated various indigenous peoples. Thorough Magyarization of various latecomers to the area enabled the Hungarians to preserve their unique language and customs.

In their physical characteristics contemporary Magyars closely resemble other Eastern European peoples. Because of Mongolian, Tartar, and Turkish inroads from the 13th to the 17th century, a few unusual ethnic types do exist among the Magyars, but similar ethnic anomalies may also be found among other Eastern Europeans. Racial mixing brought through migrations, conquests, and Magyarization of minority groups has fairly effectively assimilated Magyar physical features with those of neighboring peoples. An estimated 25% of the population retains some vestiges of Magyar physical characteristics, but they are rarely found in pure form. The pure Magyar physical type tends to be dark haired, of medium to short stature, and dark complexioned. The incidence of such a type is more prevalent in the countryside than in the large urban areas.

The Magyar language belongs to the Ugrian branch of the Finno-Ugrian group of languages and is characterized by the prevalence of suffixes and postpositives, instead of the prefixes and prepositions that characterize the Slavic, Romance, and Teutonic languages of Europe that belong to the Indo-European linguistic group. The Magyar tongue, therefore, bears no resemblance to neighboring languages (except for limited reciprocal use of borrowed Slavic, Turkish, and Romance words), and even its familial relationship to modern day Finnish is remote, permitting no mutual understanding. The uniqueness of the Magyar tongue in Eastern Europe has contributed heavily to the cultural and national unity of the Hungarian people.

The most common foreign languages spoken are, according to the respective degree of usage, German, Russian, English, and French. Despite compulsory Russian language instruction in the schools, English and French have become increasingly popular electives, as Hungary's role in international organizations has grown.

As a result of the loss of two-thirds of its territory, including all border areas, after World War I, Hungary lost its multiethnic blend. Present-day Hungary is relatively homogeneous in that ethnic minorities constitute only about 6.6% of the total population. According to regime figures only 1.8% of the population speaks a language other than Hungarian as its native tongue.

The largest single minority is German and numbers a little more than 250,000. Ethnic Germans still cluster in a few scattered settlements along the western boundary of Hungary, but, for the most part, they have been assimilated into the industrial complexes of the north-central regions and the mining centers. The Gypsy minority, somewhat smaller, is dispersed throughout the country. Smaller groups of Slovaks, Romanians, Serbo-Croats, and others—such as Ruthenes and Ukrainians—inhabit areas contiguous to their national homelands. The 1949 Constitution and subsequent legal guarantees theoretically insure that minorities shall have the opportunity for education in their native tongues and for the development of their unique cultures. These provisions appear to have been honored by the Communists, but relatively little has been done to insure economic and political equality with ethnic Magyars. Except for the Gypsies, however, the minorities probably are content with the current situation, especially in view of past periods, when rigid Magyarization and suppression of minority cultures were state policy.

The Jewish minority, which numbered about 400,000 before World War II, now amounts to about 70,000, of which 90% lives in Budapest. Despite deep-seated anti-Semitic attitudes among the population, there are no overt restrictions on educational or career opportunities for Hungarian Jews who are willing to integrate. Orthodox communities which resist assimilation, however, are frequently targets of low-level harassment. Jews still constitute a disproportionately high percentage of Communist party membership, and from 1945 to 1956 the top layer of the party contained a large number of Jewish Communists who had spent the war years in Moscow and had risen to high positions during the Stalin era. Since the de-Stalinization of 1956, most top party posts have gone to Magyars, although there are significant and continuing exceptions to this rule. In 1971, for example, the regime promoted a Jew, Peter Valyi, to deputy premier responsible for relations with the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). This was the first promotion of any Eastern European Jew to such a high office since the mid-1960's.

The tenaciously separatist and conservative Gypsies, so romanticized in the West, constitute an embarrassing problem for the Communist regime. They are a distinct ethnic group, with their own language (Romany), tribal relationships, and traditional customs. Despite persistent efforts by the regime to settle them in permanent homes and improve their cultural and social being, most Gypsies continue to cling to a seminomadic way of life, existing in makeshift settlements where living conditions are subnormal.

Since World War II the population growth rate among Gypsies has been double that of the rest of the population. Of the 60,000 Gypsies reported as working in 1969, only 27,000 in fact had regular permanent jobs. In 1969 between 30% and 50% of the children in state-run children's homes and shelters were Gypsies. In addition, an estimated one-third of the Gypsy population is illiterate—compared with the national average of less than 3%—and many Gypsy children remain in school no more than 3 or 4 years. The official Hungarian policy of forced integration of the Gypsy population, announced in 1961, has generally been frustrated by indifference among local authorities and by widespread popular Magyar antagonism toward the Gypsies. The policy has been abandoned in favor of a more selective program of aid to Gypsies who willingly try to adjust to a settled life.

2. Social structure

Until the end of World War II Hungary—more than any of its neighbors—preserved its traditional social stratification, which was rooted in feudalism. Society was divided into an elite ruling class composed of the landed aristocracy and the clergy, a sizable class of gentry or lower nobility, and the numerous, impoverished peasantry. Local landed magnates exercised almost total authority over the areas they controlled and virtually isolated their domains from neighboring regions as well as from the central government.

In the mid-13th century many of these formerly disparate social entities coalesced to form towns; the development of numerous such communities encouraged interurban contacts and trade and constituted one of the major factors of lasting benefit to the economic and social structure. Throughout succeeding centuries the landed aristocracy and the gentry remained the dominant social forces; it was not until the latter half of the 19th century that an indigenous middle class of artisans and businessmen began slowly to develop and to assume a limited degree of social significance. The major social and political changes that followed World War I brought about the development of new and modified social classes, whose members enjoyed status on the basis of wealth, education, and occupation. Nevertheless, their social standing and national influence were greatly restricted by the still dominant landed aristocracy.

Hungary's social structure in the interwar years remained a semifeudal system: most peasants were landless, unorganized, and uneducated; the industrial working class was small and exerted little influence; power was concentrated in the hands of an elite which controlled the land or was descended from people who had once controlled it. The economic depression and the repressive practices of the upper classes during the 1930's further limited social mobility. Although a number of political parties and social organizations sought to remove or modify the social and economic barriers, little progress was made, and scant encouragement was given to the reformers by the nation's leaders. After the depression the country achieved a degree of prosperity, and the growing middle classes had, on the whole, a pleasant life, despite many unsolved social problems. Housing conditions were relatively good, food was plentiful, and arts and sports flourished.

World War II and the German occupation brought major social disruptions which heralded the end of Hungary's stratified, semifeudal social system. At the end of the war, Hungarian Communists, working in concert with the occupying Soviet troops, exploited the unsettled conditions to take over and consolidate political power. By 1947 they had begun systematically to reconstitute Hungarian society after the Soviet model. The Communists dispossessed the landed aristocracy, industrialists, financiers, small businessmen, and artisans; compelled religious, social, and intellectual groups to submit to state control; outlawed organized political opposition; and generally restricted social and economic advancement to those who met Communist political requirements or could be useful to the party. Since then, the party and government elite and intellectuals have formed the apex of the new social pyramid; next are the middle level party members, an increasingly influential group of nonparty economists and technical experts, government bureaucrats, enterprise managers, army officers, skilled workers, and professional people; at the base are the semiskilled, and unskilled workers and peasants, who are virtually without political power despite their numerical superiority.

Hungary—like other Communist countries—is developing rigid social stratification, although it theoretically has a classless society. The social elite is composed of the technocrats and the intelligentsia; its children are disproportionately represented in the universities and generally replenish the most prestigious positions. At the bottom of the social scale are the unskilled agricultural and manual laborers, who take little part in the cultural life of the nation and whose children rarely get beyond secondary schools. Those who manage to climb socially and economically tend to become even more class conscious, more jealous of prestige and social prerogatives—a "nouveau riche" mentality—than those long accustomed to life at the upper levels of the social scale.

Since 1930 Hungarian society has undergone a major restratification. The change has occurred in the reduction of the agricultural labor force and tremendous growth in the number of white-collar workers. As of 1971 there were 4.7 times as many white-collar and twice as many nonagricultural blue-collar workers as in 1930. From 1960 to 1970 the agricultural labor force was reduced by about half as a result of the socialization of agriculture, the migration of younger people to cities, and the retirement of older peasants. The steady increase of the white-collar labor force over these years reflects the growth of the intelligentsia and technocracy, as society shifted more and more to an industrial base. The growth of this social group decelerated between 1968 and 1970, however, and may be stabilizing at about 26% of the active wage earners. Figure 2 illustrates shifts in employment patterns.

A social phenomenon of the postwar period has been the considerable augmentation of the work force by women. The acute manpower shortages of the immediate postwar years, the low salaries of most workers (which make a husband's wages inadequate to maintain a family), and the general Communist theory of female emancipation have all contributed to the sharp increase in the female labor force. As of December 1970, women comprised 41.6% of socialist industry's labor force. However, wages paid to women

FIGURE 2. Distribution of economically active population by social groups (U/OU) (*thousands*)

YEAR	AGRICULTURAL Number	AGRICULTURAL Percent	NONAGRICULTURAL BLUE-COLLAR Number	NONAGRICULTURAL BLUE-COLLAR Percent	WHITE-COLLAR Number	WHITE-COLLAR Percent	TOTAL NUMBER
1930	2,025	54	1,440	39	272	7	3,737
1941	2,160	51	1,725	41	317	8	4,202
1949	2,190	54	1,495	36	400	10	4,085
1960	1,751	37	2,211	46	798	17	4,760
1963	1,361	29	2,386	51	902	20	4,649
1968	1,014	21	2,641	55	1,136	24	4,791
1970	912	18	2,802	56	1,287	26	5,001

are often 15% to 20% lower than those paid to males, and opportunities for employment or advancement in certain fields are severely circumscribed. The regime has shown an unusually open attitude toward women's rights and has dedicated itself to raising, as much as possible, the status of women in society.

Under the Communist regime social mobility has been stimulated by the expansion of the economy and by rapid industrialization. The size of the industrial working class doubled between 1949 and 1963, largely because of the increased number of peasants, youths, and women who sought employment in new establishments. During the same period, the regime imposed discriminatory policies favoring party members and the former "exploited class" of workers over persons of bourgeois origin and even the technically competent. The criteria of party membership and social origin, however, proved inadequate to cope with the many technical programs of the economy and the persistent need for skilled manpower; as a result, the Kadar regime gradually deemphasized such factors in determining career advancement and granting educational opportunity. Positions of importance in industrial enterprises have become available to technically skilled nonparty personnel, and social origin has been abolished as a determinant for admission to higher educational institutions.

The policy of national reconciliation under Janos Kadar has emphasized the need for party and nonparty members to work together in order to achieve the goals of the economy, and great stress has been placed on the assignment of competent personnel to leading economic positions, regardless of party affiliation.

At the Ninth Party Congress, in November 1966, Kadar reaffirmed his commitment to national reconciliation, once again upgrading experts over party loyalists. In essence this move assured openings for more technically oriented individuals to take an active part in the management of the economy. It also caused anguished cries from party stalwarts, who feared loss of their favored status if education and expertise were further upgraded as yardsticks for promotions. The regime's periodic fluctuations in its public attitude toward this question stem from the contradictions involved in attempting to implement far-ranging economic reforms without advancing parallel reforms in the political system. Kadar seems to have decided on a course aimed at pacifying party dissidents, while gradually increasing the role of the experts. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which was inaugurated in 1968, contains the seeds of an eventual confrontation between political expediencies and economic priorities.

Another aspect of social stratification is the contrast between life in cosmopolitan Budapest and rural communities. The understandable popular preference for living in Budapest or other urban centers has not been diminished by regime efforts to restrain movement to the cities. Some intellectuals prefer manual work in Budapest to pursuing their professions in the countryside, and at least 20% of the workers interviewed in a 1967 survey indicated that they took a cut in pay to live in Budapest.

Until the early 1960's describing Hungarian society was at best an amorphous task because of the lack of objective data and the tortured ideological justifications imposed on sociological studies. Ignorance of and indifference to objective sociological problems were common among the party leadership, particularly during the Stalinist period, and these factors were, in part, instrumental in fostering the disaffection which exploded into the 1956 revolt. During the early stages of his leadership, Kadar concentrated on rebuilding the party and state apparatus from the ravages of the revolt. Having achieved stability in the early 1960's, Kadar became seriously interested in long-range planning, and the official attitude toward sociological research began to change. In 1962, Andras Hegedus, a Stalinist official in the Rakosi era, advanced the first public call for objective sociological research with the dictum:

> **Planning cannot be rational as long as the real structure of Hungarian society is not known, and further disguise of the facts can only do harm to socialist construction.**

Since Hegedus opened the way, great strides have been made in raising sociological research to a professional level, where it can be used in the planning process. Because there is still a strong circle of opposition to sociological research as a "Western fad" which infringes on Marxist-Leninist principles, most sociologists are careful to avoid potentially explosive political studies, although on rare occasions amazingly frank surveys of attitudes are openly published. As the use of computers grows and the sophistication of research improves, sociologists are able to supply more exact information and descriptions of trends in Hungarian society. Sociological research groups are now operating in many large factories and in most of the larger state administrative regions. The Hungarians claim that this input into the decision-making machinery maintains an open line of communications between the party and the workers, and that the leaders' self-isolation, which led in part to the 1956 revolt, will not be repeated.

3. National attitudes

Basic Hungarian attitudes are characterized by an entrenched sense of nationalism coupled with strong antagonism toward the Slavs and Romanians, latent hostility to Communist ideology, and a traditional Western orientation. Many factors have operated to fortify these basic attitudes, among them the strength of Catholicism, which is embraced by just over two-thirds of the population; the presence of a strong, Western-oriented Protestant minority; the traditionally conservative outlook of the Hungarian peasant; and the struggle for national survival that has characterized the bulk of Magyar history.

Despite their long history of foreign domination—indeed, because of it—Magyars have often risen in spontaneous rebellion, a characteristic fully appreciated by former Soviet leader Khrushchev, who called them "those eternal rebels on the Danube." These tragic rebellions, undertaken in a geographically disadvantageous area and invariably against superior forces, have left the Magyars with a legacy of romantic but fatalistic nationalism, characterized by the historical, national self-image of martyr-protectors of Western civilization struggling against uncivilized Turks and Slavs. The Communist regime has tried to diffuse the potentially explosive problem of Magyar nationalism, especially in view of its anti-Soviet expression during the 1956 revolt (Figure 3).

The general philosophical outlook of most Hungarians is at least superficially one of pessimistic materialism. Most of the population still has bitter memories of the suppression of the 1956 revolt, and, for the young and the forgetful, there is the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Hungary to hold nationalist fervor in check. Moreover, since the major political issues of the day are "decided at higher



FIGURE 3. Hungarians burning Soviet literature during 1956 revolt (U/OU)

levels," most Hungarians avoid political topics except in discussions with their intimates. Currently riding a consumer-oriented boom, the Hungarians are also eagerly—if a little self-consciously—indulging themselves in the pursuit of such luxuries as cars and refrigerators. The people are publicly cynical about the slow evolution toward "socialism with a human face," but the earlier bitterness toward the regime has ebbed drastically. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 shocked the Hungarians and created an almost palpable appreciation for Kadar's gradualist reforms. This positive trend continued into the early 1970's, as more Hungarians found themselves making distinctions between Soviets and their own party leaders, and much preferring the latter. The Hungarians are reasonably well informed, and, despite a show of cynical indifference, they appreciate as well as any other Europeans the history-making potential of developing detente in Europe, the Chinese-U.S. rapprochement, and other indications of a changing international scene. In 1969 a Hungarian survey of persons between 16 and 25 years of age showed only 10% expressing dissatisfaction with economic conditions and prospects within Hungary, while 72% thought that young people in general were dissatisfied with political conditions around the world.

Hungarians are very receptive to the influences of Western modernism, while influence from Moscow is generally limited to rearguard defenses of socialist realism and other orthodoxies. The neutral status of Austria, Hungary's physical and traditional link with the West, provides an important contact with current trends outside the Communist world. Charles de Gaulle's bloc-busting tactics in the mid-1960's found official favor in Hungary, resulting in an increase in cultural exchange with France and greater prestige for France among Hungarians. As an ally of the Axis powers during World War II, Hungary's experiences with Nazi Germany were far less bitter than those of subjugated Eastern European countries, and there is not the same degree of anti-German sentiment among Hungarians that prevails among Poles or Czechoslovaks. Furthermore, West Germany's industrial and technological progress serves as an attraction to Hungarian economists and managers, who dream of replacing their antiquated and inefficient industrial plants with products of West German manufacture.

The traditional Hungarian antagonism toward neighboring Slavs and Romanians was intensified after World War I by Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Romanian territorial acquisitions at the expense of Hungary. In particular, concern over the status of the Magyar minority in Transilvania has long exacerbated traditional enmities between Hungarians and Romanians. Popular antagonism toward Czechoslovakia moderated somewhat in 1968, because most Hungarians had hoped that Prague's liberal experiment would lead to greater freedom in Hungary. At the same time, Hungarians are generally sympathetic toward the Poles because of their centuries-old connections, traditional Roman Catholicism, and mutual antagonism toward Soviet expansionism.

A survey on attitudes conducted in 1969 showed Hungarians holding positive images of Americans, whom they considered practical, generous, hard-working, and "advanced," while Soviets were generally viewed as domineering and backward, and the Romanians even more so. Although the irridentist-fueled antipathy toward Romania is deep seated, the Hungarian regime itself has sought to improve relations with Romania, especially in the 1969-71 period, when Romania suffered Soviet ire because of its maverick foreign policy.

As in most other Eastern European countries, anti-Semitism has deep historical roots in Hungary. In 1360 the Jews were blamed for the advent of the plague, and in 1526 they were made scapegoats for the defeat at Mohacs, when the Turks consolidated their hold on Hungary. The Communist regime has made considerable effort to condemn and eradicate anti-Semitism, and, at least among the youth, anti-Semitism seems to be decreasing. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 there were open expressions of support for the Israelis—a phenomenon probably enhanced by the great pleasure most Hungarians took in the humiliation of Soviet arms and the embarrassed rationalizations of party leaders. The regime was very careful during this period to differentiate between anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic propaganda, and later in 1968 it played down the anti-Semitic aspects of the Polish purge of "Zionists."

C. Population

1. Composition (U/OU)

The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis estimates the population to be 10,405,000 as of 1 January 1973. Among its Eastern European neighbors, this places Hungary ahead of only Bulgaria and Albania in population.

Hungary is almost completely homogeneous in its ethnic makeup. Unabsorbed minorities (those speaking a mother tongue other than Hungarian) constitute less than 2%. The ethnic minorities, their approximate size in thousands, and their percent of the total population are as follows:

Germans	260	2.5
Gypsies	250	2.4
Jews	70	0.7
Serbo-Croats	40	0.4
Slovaks	30	0.3
Romanians	20	0.2
Other	20	0.2
Total	690	6.6

2. Population trends (U/OU)

Hungary's annual rate of growth since 1970 has been among the lowest in the world. According to official statistics, the rate of natural increase reached its nadir in 1962 (2.1 per 1,000), rose slightly in 1963, and dropped to 2.4 per 1,000 in 1965, the lowest in the world at that time. By 1967 the rate of natural increase rose to 3.9 per 1,000 for the first time since 1961, but slipped in 1969 and again in 1970 (Figure 4). Since net migration is negligible, the rate of natural increase and rate of population growth are the same.

Unlike in most other European countries, Hungary's birth rate remained relatively static in the immediate postwar years but increased in the 1953-56 period, when the regime of Matyas Rakosi improved maternity and family benefits and increased bachelor taxes. In June 1956, however, the liberalization of formerly strict controls over abortions brought immediate and startling results; the number of abortions rose from 78,500 in 1955 to 162,800 in 1957.



FIGURE 4. Vital rates (U/OU)

Since 1959 the number of legal abortions has exceeded the number of live births, and in 1964 more than 184,000 abortions were performed, making the abortion rate 1.39 times higher than the live birth rate. In 1969 there were 239,056 recorded abortions (a little over 23 per 1,000 population) and only 154,318 live births (a rate of 15.0 births per 1,000 population). No change in this bizarre pattern is in sight.

The abortion rate is due to a combination of factors, among them the lack of adequate housing, the necessity for both husband and wife to work in order to live above the subsistence level, and the relative ease with which abortions are obtained. The attraction of expensive luxuries also weighs against having children; quite often this problem is expressed as "a baby or a car," and, more often than not, "cars" have been favored.

Between 1956 and 1966 the regime was reluctant to interfere in matters relating to population growth because of past failures in this type of venture. Attempts to affect population trends in the early 1950's, e.g., a childless couple tax and liberalized maternity benefits, produced a population bulge (Figure 5) derisively known as the "Ratko Wave." (The policies that brought a sharp increase in the birth rate in the years 1953-56 are ascribed to Anna Ratko, Minister of Health, 1950-53.) The disproportionately high number of children born in this period placed an extraordinary strain on Hungary's school system, which, though adequate for average influxes of new students, could not cope with such an increased demand. By 1972 the young people born during the Ratko Wave, aged between 15 and 18, were entering the labor market, which was already oversupplied with unskilled labor.

In 1966-67 the regime came to feel that it could no longer temporize in responding to the population



FIGURE 5. Population by age and sex, Hungary and the United States, 1970 (U/OU)



FIGURE 6. Vital rates, Hungary and selected countries, 1970 (U/OU)



FIGURE 7. Population by major age groups (U/OU)

problem and reportedly considered many types of solutions, including a return to stiff restrictions on abortions. The authorities finally decided to initiate an incentive system rather than a restrictive one, which would antagonize the people and risk uncontrolled growth similar to the Ratko Wave. The child allowance system adopted in May 1967 provided for 2½ years of subsidized leave for working mothers after confinement. This system almost eliminates the problem of lost income resulting from pregnancy, and, considering that in Budapest alone almost 75% of the adult female population holds full-time jobs, the child allowance program has a very wide application. The system of paid leave was also expected to help correct past deficiencies in home care of infants which contributed to their high mortality rate. In 1968, the first full year application of the child allowance system, there was an increase of 50% in the birth rate, and the regime claims that this program is responsible for the increase in population growth after 1967. However, the momentum apparently quickly stabilized, and by 1970 the birth rate again dropped below 15 births per 1,000 population.

3. Vital statistics (U/OU)

Hungary's death rate declined steadily in the years following World War II, largely as a result of improved medical facilities and techniques, the increased availability of health services, and a general improvement in sanitation.

Between 1955 and 1967 the death rate fluctuated close to 10 per 1,000 population but has risen steadily since then. In 1970 a total of 119,954 deaths was reported, a rate of 11.6 per 1,000 population. Consistently high in recent years, in 1970 Hungary had the highest suicide rate in the world, almost 34 per

100,000 population. The infant mortality rate (deaths in the first year of life per 1,000 live births) has declined from 116.5 in 1946 to 35.6 in 1970. Nevertheless, the infant mortality rate remains among the highest in Eastern Europe. A comparison of the vital rates of Hungary and other countries is presented in Figure 6.

The marriage rate per 1,000 has ranged between a high of 11.7 in 1949 and a low of 8.1 in 1962, but since 1954 the general trend has been downward for marriages and upward for divorces. In 1970 there were 96,552 marriages, a rate of 9.3 per 1,000 population. Divorces, however, rose steadily from 12,556 in 1948 to about 22,900 in 1970. It is estimated that Hungary has the highest rate of remarriage in Europe, with one of every four persons married in the decade of the 1960's having had a background of at least one divorce. Divorce is highest among women 20 to 25 years of age, and is five times as prevalent in Budapest as in the rest of the country.

The age-sex structure of the population has been profoundly affected by events of the past 70 years, including migrations prior to World War I and in the high male mortality suffered during both world wars and the 1956 insurrection. As of 1 January 1970, women outnumbered men by 319,000, a ratio of 94 males per 100 females.

The age structure of the population (Figure 7) shows the effects not only of migrations and wars but also of declining birth and death rates. The median age increased from 24.6 years in 1921 to 32.4 years in 1966. The percentage of persons 60 or more years old rose from 10.7% of the total population in 1941 to 17% or 1,753,338 in 1970. Probably 75% of them were on some form of government pension.

The phenomenon of declining birth and death rates is perhaps the most serious long-range social and economic problem. Both rates have been declining for so long that the working-age population is barely increasing rapidly enough to offset the increases in the ranks of retirees. Western estimates indicate that the age group under 15 years will decrease slightly, from 21% of the population in 1970 to about 20% in 1981. Although the projected increase in retirees levels off after 1981, the high number of pensioners is expected to place a significant burden on the pension system

FIGURE 8. Population density (U/OU)


Borsod-Abaúj-
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Zala
Somogy
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Tolna
Pécs City
Baranya
Kecskem
Bács-Kiskun
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Debrec City
Hajdú-Bihar
Population and Administrative Divisions
Persons per square mile
0 155 181 233 389
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Persons per square kilometer
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and on the economy itself. The decreasing ratio of young adults also has serious implications for the growth of industry, which is already feeling a manpower shortage in critical skill areas. Some long-range solutions are being attempted, such as the child allowance plan and long-range housing construction plans, but by the time these measures take effect they may be outstripped by the extent of the problem.

4. Population density (U/OU)

The overall population density as of 1 January 1973 was about 290 persons per square mile, the third highest in Eastern Europe (after East Germany and Czechoslovakia). The expansive lowlands east of the Danube are the most populous area of the country and contain approximately three-fifths of the population; the smaller hilly area bordering Czechoslovakia, however, has the highest population density because of its concentration of urban industrial centers (Figure 8). The urban population constitutes almost 45% of the total population; Budapest alone accounts for almost 20% of the total. A population of about 2 million makes Budapest the largest city in Eastern Europe. Four other Hungarian cities exceed 100,000 in population; 10 others exceed 50,000 (Bekescsaba, Gyor, Hodmezovasarhely, Kaposvar, Kecskemet, Nyiregyhaza, Szekesfehervar, Szolnok, Szombathely, and Tatabanya); and 27 others exceed 25,000. Figure 9 lists estimated population by administrative unit (*megye*).

The trend of migration to urban centers was very pronounced in the 1950's, and although it slowed down a little in the early 1960's, there is still a significant movement toward urban resettlement. In the period 1960-66 urban population increased by 418,000, while total population increased only 220,000. In the period 1960-70, population in towns and villages decreased 2.4%, while the city of Budapest showed an increase of 7% (135,000 persons) for the same period. The government has attempted with only limited success to control this mass influx of

FIGURE 9. Estimated population of counties and cities with county status, 1 January 1970 (U/OU)

MAJOR SUBDIVISION	LAND AREA	PERSONS PER SQUARE MILE	POPULATION	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION
			Thousands	
Budapest* (city)	203	9,556	1,940	*18.8*
Debrecen (city)	172	872	150	*1.5*
Miskolc (city)	86	1,977	170	*1.7*
Pecs (city)	60	2,466	145	*1.4*
Szeged* (city)	43	2,744	118	*1.2*
Baranya*	1,694	168	279	*2.8*
Bacs-Kiskun	3,228	174	573	*5.6*
Bekes	2,189	204	447	*4.4*
Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen	2,712	224	608	*5.9*
Csongrad	1,602	201	323	*3.1*
Fejer*	1,699	234	388	*3.8*
Gyor-Soppon	1,549	261	405	*3.9*
Haju-Bihar*	2,226	168	375	*3.6*
Heves	1,404	247	348	*3.4*
Komarom*	870	345	301	*2.9*
Nograd	983	245	241	*2.3*
Pest	2,465	352	870	*8.4*
Somogy	2,349	155	364	*3.5*
Szabolcs-Szatmar	2,292	257	592	*5.7*
Szolnok	2,151	208	449	*4.3*
Tolna*	1,384	187	259	*2.5*
Vas	1,289	218	281	*2.7*
Veszprem*	2,002	204	409	*4.0*
Zala	1,267	210	267	*2.6*
Totals	35,911	287	10,315	*100.0*

NOTE—Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
*Incurred population loss since 1 January 1967.

migrants by advertising the opportunities available in the countryside and by gradually raising the standard of living for workers on farm cooperatives. Since 1968 the government has followed a policy of giving preference to applications for credit to be used for the construction of new manufacturing plants outside Budapest. In the long run this policy will be somewhat effective in reducing the disproportion between the size of Budapest and smaller urban centers. The Budapest City Council has gone even further by applying arbitrary population ceilings, primarily through controls of the movement of labor, to limit the growth of the city. This has meant that a relatively large number of people live in the city illegally and are subject to deportation.

Indeed, the major population centers of Budapest, Pest, Veszprem, and Somogy showed slight declines in population between 1969 and 1970. For the first time Budapest's share of the total Hungarian population declined—by 0.6% over the preceding year. This would indicate that checking the influx to the already overcrowded urban centers may be finally succeeding. (The population data for the years 1961-69, however, were based on estimates rather than on a census and could be subject to revision.)

5. Emigration (C)

Strict border controls and rigid controls on population movements imposed during most of the period since World War II have reduced emigration to a trickle. In March 1956, however, border controls were relaxed, and in some areas physical barriers were dismantled. The collapse of the control system during and immediately following the revolt resulted in an exodus of almost 200,000 persons between November 1956 and March 1957. After the Kadar regime reimposed strict border controls in 1957, emigration declined to its prerevolt level. Following the amnesties of the early 1960's and the general loosening of restrictions as a result of Kadar's national reconciliation policies, almost 25% of the refugees involved in the revolt returned permanently to Hungary.

In early 1962 the government revised its attitudes toward passport policies and began to permit its citizens access to areas outside the Communist world. Large numbers of Hungarians visited the West during the mid-1960's, and relatively few of these legal travelers chose to defect. In 1965, however, the authorities became concerned over a sharp increase in defections by highly trained professional and technical workers who had obtained passports for legal travel to the West. Since then, professionals as well as youths of military age have been frequently denied passports in what seems to be an effort to reduce the drain on skilled manpower resources.

D. Manpower, labor conditions, and labor relations

1. Manpower resources (U/OU)

The labor force totaled 5,001,200 in 1970, according to official Hungarian data,[2] accounting for 48.5% of the total population and 76.1% of the working-age population. Females accounted for 41.6% of the 1970 labor force. Government efforts to expand the manpower supply have resulted in almost a 25% increase in the economically active population since 1949, despite an increase of only 10% in the working-age population. Approximately 937,000 persons were added to the labor force between 1949 and 1970, while the proportion of the population within the working ages (15-64 years)[3] declined slightly, from 67.6% to roughly 63%. Figure 10 shows the labor force by branch of economic activity for selected years.

The 1970 labor force participation rate (percentage of a population group who are economically active) of 48.5% of the total population compares with rates of 47.3% in 1967, 47.2% in 1960, and 45.1% in 1949. The increase between 1949 and 1960—when over 700,000 persons were added to the labor force—reflects the success of government measures to tap the previously underutilized manpower reserve. The labor force growth in this period is attributable chiefly to greater participation by women, who accounted for 87% of the increase. The increase from 1967 to 1970 was probably sustained because of the unusual effect of the demographic distortion known as the Ratko Wave. Population projections indicate that this type of increase will not recur, and that declines in the participation rate are to be expected in the 1970's.

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[2] Estimates by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for the total labor force usually take into consideration all gainfully employed persons, including the military and the temporarily employed. Such an estimate, however, militates against statistical comparisons with other, related Hungarian data, so for the sake of internal consistency Hungarian statistical data on the labor force are used. These figures usually understate by as much as 5% such categories as agricultural workers and workers in the private sector, and they omit members of the armed forces and some classified occupations, such as full-time party workers.

[3] The standard U.S. definition of the working-age population (15-64 years) is used in this subsection, rather than the Hungarian definition (males aged 14 to 59 years and females aged 14 to 54 years).

FIGURE 10. Labor force by branch of economic activity, in thousands (U/OU)

	1949		1959		1966		1970			
								Percent		
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Total	Male	Female
Agriculture.......	2,134	*51.9*	1,925	*40.8*	1,493	*30.9*	1,285	*25.7*	*62.0*	*38.0*
Industry.........	797	*19.4*	1,290	*27.3*	1,559	*32.7*	1,830	*36.6*	*58.7*	*41.3*
Construction......	125	*3.0*	256	*5.4*	315	*6.5*	370	*7.4*	*84.4*	*15.6*
Trade............	218	*5.3*	303	*6.4*	336	*6.9*	390	*7.8*	*39.5*	*60.5*
Transportation and communications.	165	*4.0*	280	*5.9*	312	*6.4*	350	*7.0*	*77.9*	*22.1*
Other............	666	*16.2*	654	*13.8*	813	*16.8*	776	*15.5*		
Total..........	4,106	*100.0*	4,709	*100.0*	4,830	*100.0*	5,001	*100.0*	*54.4*	*41.6*

NOTE—Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Labor force participation rates for females have risen consistently since 1949, as indicated in the following percentages:

	MALE	FEMALE
1949	66.7	25.2
1960	65.6	32.9
1963	62.8	33.4
1967	62.4	38.3
1969	60.0	40.0
1970	58.4	41.6

The main reason for the decline in male participation rates is a consequence of the increase in the proportion of school-age males who are enrolled in school for a longer period of time than their fathers. However, it also reflects the unfavorable age structure of the population, which is heavily weighted with males past working age. The increase in female participation since 1949 has occurred for the most part in the 20- to 54-year-old age group, because Hungarian women, like men, tend to stay in school longer and to retire earlier. The number of economically active women per 100 women in the total working-age group rose from 36.9 in 1949 to 63.7 in 1970, while for males this ratio was about 99.8 in 1949, falling to 93.1 in 1967, and to 87.7 in 1970.

The average age of the labor force is increasing as a result of a long period of declining birth and death rates; certain age brackets show a marked deficit due to the impact of wars and migration. Young males made up a significant portion of the emigration which followed the 1956 revolt. The aging of the labor force is expected to continue well into the 1980's; after 1975 aging workers will scarcely be replaced by young labor force entrants born in the 1960's, when birth rates were exceptionally low.

Official data on unemployment are not available, but estimates based on 1960 census data indicate that it is insignificant, involving not more than 0.7% of the labor force. Underemployment, largely as a result of featherbedding, is prevalent in all branches of production, although it is less in agriculture, where sporadic labor shortages have been noted.

The labor reserve—economically inactive persons of working age who would enter the labor force in case of national emergency—has declined since 1949 as labor force participation has increased. The working-age population outside the labor force is employable to only a limited degree and would be drawn largely from the dwindling number of unemployed women, and to a lesser extent from the ranks of full-time students. Only a small percentage of pensioners would be able to function effectively in full-time employment. Of the disabled and handicapped persons, relatively few could take up gainful employment without extensive special training.

2. Characteristics of the labor force (C)

Since the Communist takeover, government efforts to accelerate economic growth have transformed the economy and effected a major change in the industrial and occupational distribution of the labor force. Industrialization of the traditionally agricultural economy took place at a rapid rate throughout the 1950's, and agriculture has been replaced by industry as a prime employer and prime contributor to the gross national product. Agricultural employment declined by over 33% during 1949-70. Only 25.7% of the labor force was engaged in agriculture in 1970, as compared with nearly 52% in 1949 (Figure 10). Although the shift to nonagricultural activities has lessened persistent problems of agricultural underemployment, it has deprived the work force in agriculture of some of its most productive members, for young people are most prone to seek employment elsewhere. The rise in the average age of the agricultural population is a matter of particular concern to the government.

The growth of the industrial labor force (i.e., in mining, manufacturing, and electric power) to more than 36% of the total labor force in 1970 is chiefly the result of the government's policy of channeling the major proportion of its investment funds to industrial expansion and modernization. While the total labor force engaged in industry increased by 90% in the 1949-67 period, the number of females increased by 285%. Females accounted for 41% of the industrial work force in 1970, as compared with only 23% in 1949. Paid employment in industry in December 1970 totaled 1,830,432 persons, some 96% of whom were employed in the socialist sector (1.5 million in state-owned enterprises and 250,000 in cooperatives); the remaining 4% worked in small establishments in the private sector.

Of the total industrial employment in 1970, over 48% was accounted for by branches which comprise heavy industry—mining, metallurgy, engineering, electric power, building materials, and chemicals. The remaining 42% worked in light industry, including 10% in the food processing industry. Of the total number employed in state industry, the largest individual branches in January 1970 were engineering, followed by food processing, as shown in the following tabulation:

	PERSONS (*thousands*)	PERCENT
Mining	**149.3**	*8.3*
Electric energy	**36.1**	*2.0*
Metallurgy	**102.6**	*5.7*
Engineering:		
Machinery	**156.6**	*8.7*
Vehicles	**129.6**	*7.2*
Electric machines	**57.6**	*3.2*
Telecommunication equipment	**84.6**	*4.8*
Precision equipment	**54.0**	*3.0*
Iron and metal products	**84.6**	*4.7*
Total	**576.1**	*31.6*
Building materials	**84.6**	*4.7*
Chemicals	**113.4**	*6.3*
Wood	**94.0**	*5.5*
Paper	**18.0**	*1.0*
Printing	**18.2**	*1.2*
Textiles	**154.8**	*8.3*
Leather and fur	**70.2**	*3.9*
Handicrafts	**93.6**	*5.2*
Food processing	**180.1**	*10.0*
Other light industry	**147.6**	*8.2*
Grand total	**1,800.4**	*100.0*

The growth of the labor force in construction reflects the high level of capital investment between 1949 and 1960. Males predominate in construction, transportation, and communications. Women are dominant in trade and textiles.

Members of the regular armed forces and security services numbered approximately 133,000 in 1970. (This number is excluded from the published labor force total of 5,001,200.)

The distribution of the labor force by class of workers has undergone major changes in the postwar period as a result of the socialization of the economy. The proportion classified as employers, self-employed, and unpaid family workers fell drastically from more than 54% in 1949 to less than 5% in 1970. The number of cooperative (collectivized) peasants, which was negligible prior to 1949, increased sharply as a result of the intensive collectivization effort of 1960-61. By 1963 there were more than 1 million collective farmers, or approximately 21% of the labor force. During the 1963-65 period disillusionment with the collectives set in, and a rapid drain in membership ensued; by 1966 collective membership fell below 20% of a considerably larger labor force than in 1963. The regime implemented investment plans to aid the collectives in 1967-68, however, and by 1970 collective farm membership reached a new high of 22% of the total labor force. Wage and salary earners increased sharply after the socialization of the economy, but since the early 1960's they have stabilized at about 75% of the labor force.

The long-term (15-year) economic plan envisages a decrease of about 22% of the agricultural labor force, to about 1 million workers in 1985. It also projects a slower rise in the industrial labor force, by about 10% of the 1970 level, which will result by 1985 in about 2 million industrial workers. The planners also forecast a large increase in employment in service industries.

3. Productivity and working conditions (C)

Because of the slow growth of the labor force, the government in pursuing its program of economic expansion places heavy reliance on increasing labor productivity. To obtain increases, it seeks to improve organizational efficiency, to promote mechanization and technological advance, to increase the technical competence of management and workers through expanded training programs, and to improve worker incentives. This program has achieved only limited success, however, because of the obsolescence of many industrial plants, because of poor planning and administration, and because of the unenthusiastic response of the work force. Most of the gains in labor productivity made since 1949 have resulted from an expansion of the capital-intensive branches of the economy, heavy industry in particular.

The efficient allocation and utilization of manpower resources are of the utmost concern to economic planners. Responsibility for the overall determination of manpower balances, for the identification of new sources of labor, and for the determination and satisfaction of training and education needs rests with the Ministry of Labor, working in close cooperation witn the National Planning Office and the economic ministries. The Ministry of Labor is also responsible for devising measures to correct shortages or surpluses which its manpower balances may reveal, to tap manpower reserves that it has uncovered, and to assure that educational programs meet technical training needs.

Relatively little difficulty was encountered in encouraging the movement away from agriculture, and by the mid-1960's the magnitude of the shift—which went far beyond that planned by the government—aroused official concern for the future level of agricultural production. Although the amount of labor employed in agriculture is still excessive by the standards of more highly developed countries, it is barely adequate for farming at the Hungarian level of technology. Because rural youth tends increasingly to reject a career in agriculture, the agricultural labor force is heavily weighted with older workers; by 1965, 40% of collective farm members were above the age of 60. This trend has continued, although more recent data are unavailable. The migration to urban industrial centers, moreover, has led to a surplus of unskilled labor in the cities and has intensified the shortage of urban housing. The government is, therefore, trying with some success to induce young people to remain on, or to return to, the land.

Apart from the influx from the countryside, there has been little geographical redistribution of the labor force since 1949. Because industrial activity is very heavily concentrated in Budapest and a few other cities, the shift of urban workers from low-priority to high-priority industrial branches has not, as a rule, required a change of residence. Relocation has been necessary, however, in the case of mining, metallurgical, and construction workers recruited for work in remote areas, and of physicians, teachers, and agronomists working in rural areas. The government has encountered difficulty in attracting qualified workers to positions outside the principal cities. Wage differentials have failed to secure a stable work force for distant mining and industrial centers. Labor turnover in these areas is excessive, largely because of inadequate living and working conditions.

In 1957 the government abandoned the use of compulsion and direct controls to bring about labor mobility and has since relied on indirect controls. Wage differentials constitute the principal means of securing shifts of workers in accordance with the government's objectives, but other methods of promoting mobility are also used. The nationwide system of employment offices provides the government with an opportunity for channeling registered jobseekers to high-priority industries and occupation, and the law permits enterprise management to transfer workers to other jobs and other locations, but only with the workers' consent.

Within the industrial sector, job shifting (nomadism in Communist jargon) reached almost 50% before 1964, and the widespread lack of skilled labor forced many enterprises to compete for skilled workers by offering bonuses and other illegal incentives. This trend was temporarily arrested in late 1964, when the regime took strict countermeasures. One of the provisions of the NEM, however, reinstated the right of each worker to change jobs after a reasonable period following notice of intention. The NEM also gives the enterprise managers the right to fire excess or inefficient labor. Because of the legalization of jobshifting and the increased power of management, the initial stage of the NEM's operation showed a dramatic increase in labor displacement, and various administrative obstacles to job changing were introduced as a stopgap measure.

The only legal placement agency in Hungary is the Ministry of Labor, operating through its extensive network of employment offices. Neither workers nor employers are ordinarily compelled to use these offices, but many do. Hungarian workers also find jobs through their own efforts. Enterprises exercise considerable initiative in order to satisfy their labor needs, sometimes to the extent of ignoring or manipulating legal restrictions on hiring. They advertise job openings by posting notices at the factory gate and on kiosks and street bulletin boards, and they use newspapers and the radio as well. Job applicants are required by law to submit their workbook, which provides a continuous record of all employment, to a prospective employer.

In 1967 the government for the first time signed an agreement providing for the employment of Hungarians in a foreign country. Under its terms, 2,500 Hungarian workers—most of them young, unmarried, and with 1 or 2 years' job experience—took up employment in East Germany in late 1967 for a 3-year period. The stated purpose of this experiment is to train workers in skills that are in short supply in Hungary. By 1970, 3,500 young Hungarians were entering the program annually. The regime envisages a total of 25,000 workers eventually to sign up for the program. A limited number of Hungarian workers are employed in regions of Czechoslovakia which border on Hungary.

Physical working conditions reflect the antiquity of much of Hungary's physical plant; safety devices are rare and accident rates are high. Even in newly constructed enterprises, little attention has been devoted to safety. Although some progress has been made in priority fields, such as silicosis research and shop ventilation, hygiene and safety are neglected in most factories.

Considerable emphasis is placed on psychological and material incentives as a means of increasing labor productivity. The publicity surrounding the "Stakhanovite" system of the early 1950's and the more recent "socialist competition" movement has, however, been grossly disproportionate to their economic significance. The objective of the trade union-sponsored "socialist competitions" is to increase productivity and exceed production targets, most often through technological innovations or improved methods of organizing the production process. Competitions are organized with great fanfare, and publicity, honors, medals, and monetary awards are bestowed upon outstanding workers and successful brigades of workers.

The NEM introduced a system which rewards all the workers in an enterprise when it shows a profit. Under the NEM, productivity bonuses are paid out of the profits made by the individual enterprise. A certain percentage of all profits is returned to laborers and management in year-end or semiannual bonuses. This "bonus fund" must meet central requirements setting maximum and minimum limits on its size, but the exact size of the bonus fund is decided by collective agreement between the labor union and the enterprise management. Experience with the bonus system has been mixed. As originally drawn up, the system offered factory managers large potential bonuses but also a high degree of risk, since failure to meet planned targets was also penalized by loss of income. The workers, by contrast, had only minimal participation in the fund (15% was allocated for worker bonus payments), but they took no risk, since their income was not reduced by shortfalls in production.

In 1968 and 1969 the economy was relatively successful, and many managers received unusually high bonuses. Workers, on the other hand, received only minor benefits, and there was considerable grumbling over the unequal situation; demonstrations occurred in some factories (in one case, workers at a Dunaujvaros steel plant reportedly rolled the manager's new Mercedes-Benz limousine into a blast furnace). The regime moved quickly to remedy the situation and in 1969 adjusted the worker participation rate in bonus fund payments to a more flexible system which sets a ceiling for all bonuses at 25% of the normal salary. The new rules award bonuses by a point system. Points are allotted for seniority, overfulfillment of norms, and good work discipline. In this manner the regime has tried to adapt the financial incentives program into a useful tool against job shifting and absenteeism.

Nevertheless, malingering and deliberate slowdowns contribute significantly to the relatively low level of labor productivity, although open industrial conflict does not. Strikes occur infrequently. Many strikes and slowdowns reported over the years have been protests, not so much against enterprise labor policy as against government economic policy; in December 1965, for example, a rash of walkouts occurred to protest an announced increase in food and consumer goods prices. The most outspoken protesters were jailed.

To combat absenteeism and malingering, the regime also relies heavily on the imposition of disciplinary measures; social pressure is also used, but is less effective. Absenteeism, loafing, and tardiness are punishable in accordance with the Labor Code, which prescribes the following penalties, applied at the discretion of management, for violations of labor discipline: 1) oral reprimand, 2) written reprimand, 3) loss of privileges and benefits, 4) demotion, and 5) dismissal. The enterprise collective contract also prescribes penalties for tardiness, carelessness, and similar breaches of labor discipline. Absenteeism is usually punished by loss of pay for the time not worked, cancellation of lunch hours for a month, and/or forfeiture of pay on public holidays for a year. Management's authority to discipline workers was strengthened in 1964, and, as a result, unjustified absenteeism has declined. Management displays a tendency, however, to impose disciplinary penalties in an arbitrary and capricious manner which frequently violates the law.

Social pressure to enforce labor discipline includes censure for unsatisfactory performance and praise for outstanding performance. This method of encouraging high standards of labor discipline reached its zenith in the early 1950's, lessened somewhat during the New Course era, and since 1956 has fallen off considerably. Some enterprises continue to post on blackboards and wall newspapers the names of workers accused of loafing, lagging, absenteeism, pilfering, and waste. "Social courts" run by the trade unions deal with minor offenses committed by workers, both within the factory and outside it. Their activity and effectiveness, however, are limited. Since 1965 many of the social courts have been virtually inactive. Management rarely refers disciplinary cases to these courts, regarding its own proceedings as simpler. Trade union officials are reluctant to initiate disciplinary cases, because this serves to increase the unpopularity of the unions among the workers. Most of the cases heard by enterprise social courts, therefore, are referred by government prosecutors. Public media—blackboards, wall newspapers, house organs, and the trade union press—are used to honor workers whose performance is exceptional; such workers may, in addition, be rewarded with special privileges, decorations, and cash bonuses.

Hungary has been following a program of reduced working hours for a number of years. By 1964 about one-sixth of the work force worked less than 48 hours per week. By 1967 this proportion had increased to one-fifth of the workers, most of whom, however, were employed in hazardous occupations.

In 1968 the principle of a 44-hour workweek was more generally applied, and by 1969 some 40% of the industrial sector enjoyed this reduced schedule. The change brought about a reduction of some 65 million hours, or 3.2% of the total working time for that year. About 55% of the loss in time was made up for by technological-organizational changes. It was claimed by the regime that "the compensation for the lost time did not necessitate an unhealthy increase in work intensity."

At the time a massive reduction in hours was contemplated, some Hungarians expressed fear that enterprises would try to overcome the losses in working hours by resorting to more overtime work. Early experience discounts these fears, but the subject continues to elicit a strong debate in Hungary. In 1969 overtime hours actually dropped from 2.4% to 2.2% of the total working time.

Most of the enterprises effected the reduction by giving workers every other Saturday off. Although data are not available beyond 1969, it was projected in that year that by the end of 1970 only about 10,000 workers, mostly in the service sectors, would remain ineligible for the 44-hour work week. The regime's long-term economic plan forecasts that by 1985 virtually the whole economy will be on a 5-day, 40- to 42-hour, week.

4. Income

In 1970 average monthly wages and salaries in the state sector are shown in the following tabulation (in forints)[4] (official exchange rate, Ft11.74 = US$1.00):

	1960	1967	1969	1970
Construction	1,655	2,015	2,198	2,300
Transportation and communications	1,493	1,846	2,057	2,184
Industry	1,617	1,896	2,013	2,097
Agriculture	*na*	1,669	1,966	2,081
Trade	1,418	1,725	1,878	1,929

In addition to these substantial differences in rates, pay varies with the widely differing distribution of skills within broad sectors. Wages in mining were raised sharply at the beginning of the industrialization drive and since 1950 have outranked those in all other branches of industry. In 1971 the average monthly earnings of wage earners in mining were 39% higher than those in industry as a whole, and 63% higher than those in apparel manufacture, the lowest paid in selected state industries, as shown in the following tabulation (in forints):

Mining	2,994
Metallurgy	2,198
Machine building	2,073
Electric energy	2,089
Vehicles	2,101
Precision engineering	1,996
Building materials	2,022
Chemicals and rubber	1,949
Printing	1,971
Paper	1,950
Metal products	1,904
Wood processing	1,885
Telecommunication equipment	1,853
Food processing	1,835
Leather, furs, and shoes	1,771
Handicrafts	1,643
Textiles	1,769
Apparel	1,609

Wage differentials are maintained, not only to encourage the rapid development of high-priority economic branches (construction and heavy industry being the most favored), but also to encourage the acquisition of skills and high productivity. The maximum wages for experienced, highly skilled workers is usually two to three times the starting rate for unskilled workers.

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[4] In each case these forint values account for the workers' base pay, overtime, and bonus payments. Income from second jobs and other inputs to total income were not reported before 1968. These additions indicate that in 1968 total income averaged 4.9% higher than the announced figure, and by 1969 total income was 7.3% higher than the base-pay-plus-bonus figure.

Basic wage rates for occupations in construction and industry reflect skill requirements and the arduous or hazardous nature of the work. An elaborate classification system establishes six skill categories, each of which is subdivided to reflect varying degrees of difficulty or danger; the minimum rate in each skill category is paid for work requiring normal efforts and performed under normal working conditions.

Bonuses and various other incentive payments supplement the worker's base pay to a substantial degree, as do second jobs. In the case of salary earners, bonuses alone vary from 10% to 40% of basic salaries, usually averaging about 20%. Numerous fringe benefits (hidden earnings) include subsidized housing and canteens, lunchrooms, and child-care facilities (for working mothers), and a comprehensive system of social insurance, which provides relief for sickness, old age, and disability, and also maternity benefits, family allowances, and coverage for funeral expenses.

In the postwar period real wages of industrial and agricultural workers increased until 1949 (when they were slightly higher than prewar levels), declined approximately 18% between 1949 and 1953, and reached the 1949 level again in 1956. The real wages of other workers (clerical, commercial, and educational workers in particular) declined until the mid-1950's. Between 1956 and 1965, as part of the domestic policy of reconciliation, the Kadar regime allowed living levels to rise beyond the ability of the economy to finance. The level of prices was maintained through extensive subsidies for basic consumer goods and was indirectly paid for by massive loans from the U.S.S.R. Limited efforts to adjust prices to reflect actual production costs were introduced in early 1966 as part of an overall long-term economic reform program. Thus, consumer prices for certain agricultural products were increased from 15% to 50% and solid fuels by 25%. Major areas of costly subsidization still remained, however, in certain food prices, housing costs, medical services, and other categories. In an effort to minimize the effect of the increases, prices of such staples as bread, flour, rice, and sugar remained unchanged, while the prices of lard and bacon were reduced. The price increases were only partially offset by increased wages and social benefits. Disaffection over the increases and the underhanded manner of their introduction—spokesmen denied there was to be a price hike until its announcement—caused a serious reversal to Kadar's domestic image, which had peaked during the good years of 1962-65.

The lessons learned during this austerity campaign stood the regime in good stead during the introductory years of the economic reform. From the NEM's inception in early 1968, the government made sure that the changes in the economic system did not threaten the workers' standard of living. In 1968, in fact, the regime diverted investment funds to increase the flow of consumer goods. In both 1968 and 1969 increases in salaries were limited to about 2%, but bonuses and income from second jobs added about 4% more to the average worker's real income. By 1970 the industrial managers' demands for more investment resources resulted in about twice the increase of the previous year, but the regime still refused to cut significantly into the income and consumption increases which the workers had come to expect. In general, throughout the course of the NEM, the percentage of the increments to national income that was distributed to workers in their pay-packets has been much higher than immediately before the reform went into effect.

Since the real wages/income of Hungarian workers are obscured by hidden savings (low rent, medical care, and social services subsidized by the state) and arbitrary price fluctuations, both quantitative and qualitative judgments on real income have little meaning. A more useful gauge of the relative sufficiency of income is available through comparison of consumption patterns over the years (Figure 11). The basic features of these statistics indicate that in 1969 Hungarians spent less on the basic necessities (food, clothing, and housing) than they have since the Communist takeover. Furthermore, the percentage of income spent on cars and household goods increased steadily throughout the period 1964-69.

A relatively new but potentially important development in consumption patterns is the growth of leisure-associated expenditures: they have increased almost 10% faster than total expenditures since 1960. The new 44-hour workweek will cause even more growth in them, with corresponding pressures on other segments of the family budget.

5. Labor problems (U/OU)

The regime's economic experts have warned the leaders that continued inefficient operation of national industries could lead to serious long-range problems, including an overall decline in economic growth and resultant unemployment. Some contributory factors to this alarming prognosis are low labor productivity, poor-quality workmanship, inefficient allocation of labor, and chronic shortages of skilled labor. The regime has attacked most of these problems in its economic reform program, the NEM, but the

FIGURE 11. Consumption patterns in percent of income spent by category of commodities (U/OU)

	FOOD, BEVERAGES, TOBACCO	CLOTHING	HOUSING, RENT, HEAT, MAINTENANCE	HOUSEHOLD GOODS	REFRIG-ERATORS*	HEALTH, CLEANING	TRANSPORT COMMUNICA-TION	PRIVATE CARS*	EDUCATION, CULTURE	OTHER
1938	40.0	9.0	31.0	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
1957	50.4	17.8	8.5	7.3	na	3.4	2.0	na	2.0	8.7
1964	49.6	13.1	7.3	6.7	.9	5.8	4.9	1.4	9.8	2.4
1965	49.1	13.1	7.9	6.9	1.0	5.8	5.0	1.5	9.6	2.6
1966	49.5	12.4	7.7	7.0	1.2	5.8	5.4	1.7	9.6	2.6
1969	49.1	11.7	6.7	7.2	4.3	6.1	3.2	2.1	15.5	3.3

NOTE—Figures may not add because of rounding.
na Data not available.
*Also included under Other.

problems are so deeply ingrained in the economy that their resolution will take a considerable amount of time and dedicated effort.

Industrial efficiency has always been low, particularly because of the system of assured subsidies for industry and the relatively low level of managerial skills common throughout the economy. Furthermore, featherbedding and other similar forms of entrenched inefficiency have flourished. Poor-quality production often reflects the vicious cycle which sees low-quality raw materials fed into obsolete machinery by inefficient labor. As a result, the country's ability to compete in foreign markets has been hampered, despite warnings by economists that a viable export program is necessary to assure continuous growth.

Nonemergency manpower reserve has been largely used up as a result of the substantial increase in the labor force which accompanied the all-out industrialization drive of the 1950's. The harsh labor policy which prevailed until the inauguration of the loosening policies of the New Course in mid-1953 and the less coercive policies of recent years brought about a massive shift from agriculture to industry and sharply increased the number of women among active earners. A period of labor scarcity lies ahead. Hungary's population structure is badly distorted as a consequence of two world wars, the 1956 revolt, and a declining birth rate. By the mid-1970's the relative scarcity of new entrants to the labor market will constitute a serious and continuing threat to economic expansion. The anticipated labor shortage accentuates the need for drawing even more women into the labor force, especially into skilled trades, and a more efficient allocation of labor than has previously been the case.

Particularly critical problems are shortages of skilled labor, waste of manpower, and job shifting among the younger workers. They want to take advantage of new opportunities under the NEM: better wages, more opportunities for advancement, and positions more directly in line with individual interests and skills. During the first 9 months of the NEM's operation, 24% of the workers engaged in state industry changed jobs. This was twice the rate for the 4 previous years. According to the government's Central Statistical Office, during the 1968-69 period 30% to 40% of all the workers under 26 years of age changed jobs at least one time; 24% of those 26 to 35 years old, and 10% to 20% of those over 35 years old. With the introduction of the NEM, several restrictions on labor mobility were eliminated. In particular, compulsory staff quotas were abolished, and the new Labor Code discontinued the administrative restrictions on job shifting. This enabled the low-paid workers, including most younger workers, to increase their income by changing jobs rather than by doing more and better work where they were.

Throughout the 1970's the principal manpower problem is to increase the number and competence of skilled workers. Since unskilled labor is in surplus, the government has created incentives and opportunities for increasing technical training in an effort to draw as many unskilled laborers as possible into more productive trades. Although the government has increased training facilities and has reduced the cost of such training in higher educational institutions, only half of the young people entering the labor force each year have received training beyond the elementary school level. The remainder, a large proportion of whom are females, enter the labor force as unskilled workers.

6. Labor legislation (U/OU)

The Hungarian Communists, in the manner of other ruling Communist parties, have considered labor law an instrument for marshaling and allocating manpower resources in accordance with economic and political objectives. Labor regulations, therefore, were drawn up to cover virtually every aspect of the employment relationship. Although there were many humanistic features in the first postwar Labor Code promulgated in 1951, it was in reality an enumeration of workers' responsibilities to the state, with little attention given to the protection of workers' interests. Wages, hours, and working conditions were not subject to negotiation, but were fixed according to the ebb and flow of government objectives; restrictions were placed on choice of occupation, and legal sanctions were provided for infractions of labor discipline. When the government first embarked on its program of rapid industrialization, coercion was used to induce the movement out of agriculture and to restrict turnover in industry; careers were determined by regime-imposed criteria of party membership and social origin, and forced labor was used extensively in mining, construction, and agriculture.

The most draconian features of labor relations during the 1950's have, however, disappeared. One of the main reasons was the universal resentment they generated among the workers, as demonstrated in the 1956 revolt. Although the spontaneously formed workers' councils of late 1956 were gradually emasculated by controls after the revolt, there was no return to raw coercion. Labor policy still follows fluctuations in economic policy, but for political reasons the regime tries to minimize unpopular moves.

For example, restrictive measures aimed at eliminating job shifting during a 1966 austerity drive were rescinded under terms of the economic reform that went into effect on 1 January 1968.

The new 1968 Labor Code, which replaced the long outmoded code of 1951, was enacted as part of the economic reform of 1968 and reflects the basic principles of the NEM. The NEM charts a trend away from command direction of the economy and the gradual replacement of administrative controls by more sophisticated monetary and fiscal instruments. Decentralization of economic decisionmaking is its characteristic feature and entails greater autonomy for local enterprise management in resolving daily problems. Central authorities retain control over general economic policy through their authority to issue binding guidelines to national industries. For example, decisions on such issues as the size of the bonus fund are made within centrally imposed maximum and minimum limits, and the trade unions and management must agree on the exact amount of profits to be earmarked for the fund.

The new Labor Code provides more liberal arrangements for entering into or terminating employment for both management and individual workers, a move designed to allow the labor market to function without arbitrary, and often ill-conceived, meddling from central authorities. Within the limits of national economic policy, most issues directly affecting the workers, such as wages, hours, work norms, and promotions, are negotiated between management and the union in the form of a collective contract for each enterprise. Trade unions were also given authority to veto managerial directives that are in violation with the code. In practice the veto has been used only in cases affecting a group of workers, such as the adoption of new work norms caused by the introduction of new machinery. The new Labor Code also includes the regulations granting special protection to minors and female workers, as well as more responsive grievance procedures. It does not explicitly prohibit strikes.

Major responsibility for enforcement of the Labor Code rests with the trade unions, which now also participate actively in drafting labor legislation and issuing legally binding regulations. Evasions, infractions, and manipulations of the law are fairly common; they generally occur because of the arbitrary action of individuals, because of a shortage of resources (e.g., evasion of installations of prescribed safety equipment), or because of the pressure of tight production schedules. The validity of collective contracts, originally designed to be negotiated annually, has been extended at times.

Although the trade unions still retain their character as an arm of state power rather than independent representatives of the workers, the codification of the trade unions' responsibilities to the worker substantially changes their roles. The opening paragraphs of the 1968 Labor Code call for:

> **the cooperation of workers through their trade unions in the regulation of questions pertaining to their living and working conditions, and in the development and supervision of the activities of the enterprise.**

The call for cooperation and implied promise of shared responsibility for economic decisionmaking contrasts with the 1951 code's exhortation by the state to the workers to perform diligently in the interest of building a socialist society. The future role of unions and the question of whether they will develop into effective instruments of the working class is one of the most difficult questions facing the economic planners.

In the fall of 1971 legislation was passed to raise the status of the collective farms. At that time they had over a million members and (with the household plots of members) accounted for 70% of all agricultural production; industrial cooperatives had 250,000 members and supplied 16% of the national industrial product. The new legislation gave the property and assets owned communally by the member of the cooperatives the same legal status as property owned and managed by the state. It also gave the members the same legal rights and privileges—such as welfare and retirement benefits—as state industry workers. Separate legislation passed in 1968 also gave cooperatives the right (power) to purchase land, first from absentee owners and then from members.

E. Health (C)

Medical facilities in Hungary are relatively good by Eastern European standards, but are inferior to facilities of most Western European countries. The major reason for this lag is that the bulk of medical investments has been devoted to correcting the poor facilities inherited from the prewar regime. Since 1949 annual budget allocations for expansion of public health services have gradually increased, and authorities have emphasized the modernization of existing facilities as well as the expansion of facilities into rural areas previously ignored. Despite this program, the number of medical facilities throughout the country, particularly in rural areas, is still insufficient to meet health needs. The government's long-range health plan projects correction of these deficiencies by about 1980.

Public health and epidemiology stations located throughout the countryside exercise close control over subordinate local health facilities and maintain records on disease and mortality rates. These stations are authorized to mobilize teams of physicians and nurses to provide medical treatment in the event of national disaster or epidemics. Under the national civil defense planning program, these stations would function as the principal source of emergency first aid. Training of medical personnel to respond to such emergencies has not been uniform, however, and in some areas it is doubtful that adequate emergency services could be provided.

In 1970 there were 83,754 hospital beds or 83 beds per 10,000 population, as compared with 80 in 1968, 71 in 1960, and 51 in 1938. The number of physicians increased from 10,590 in 1938 (11.6 per 10,000 population) to 20,373 or 20.3 per 10,000 population in 1970. The urban-rural disbalance in the availability of medical care—a situation common in most Eastern European countries—is illustrated by the high ratio of doctors to population in Budapest as of 1970, with 45.5 per 10,000, compared with the rest of the country, where the ratio stood at 17.2 per 10,000.

One of the most serious problems in medical institutions is the rate of postadmittance infections resulting from poor hygienic practices. A government inspection in 1967 revealed that 16 of 18 operating areas in Budapest were contaminated with harmful bacteria. One estimate of yearly postadmittance infections runs as high as 100,000.

Patients entitled to social insurance benefits pay only 15% of the doctor's fee (plus the inevitable extra "tip" for such favors as recommending sick leave) and receive free hospitalization for periods up to 1 year, depending on the nature of the illness. Patients must accept treatment from a doctor specified by the local public health authority in order to qualify for low-cost medical care. Those wishing the services of a particular physician or institution must bear all expenses themselves.

Although Hungary has no unusual health problems, several persistent deficiencies include inadequate sewage disposal facilities in rural areas, lack of pure water, poor nutrition, and unsanitary practices in handling food. Even in large cities the existing sewerage systems are overtaxed and serve only portions of the areas concerned. Chemical treatment of sewage is practiced only in some urban areas, and the passage of untreated sewage into rivers creates health hazards to downstream communities, which frequently derive their water supplies from these rivers. In rural areas the rather primitive methods of waste disposal often contaminate water supplies. Food inspection, supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, is admittedly unsatisfactory, and poor refrigeration, storage, and transportation facilities have further aggravated this problem. A few meatpacking plants have passed rigid U.S. inspection standards, but the majority of food produced for domestic consumption is still subject to only the barest minimum of control. As a result, cases of food poisoning and related maladies are fairly common. Indeed, government statistics show that in 1970 infectious hepatitis was Hungary's second most prevalent infectious disease (after tuberculosis), with 9,107 reported cases.

Data on the incidence of specific diseases maintained by local public health and epidemiology stations are regularly reported, but national statistics on diseases are often inaccurate and misleading. The most common infectious diseases are tuberculosis, hepatitis, dysentery, venereal diseases, and the various children's diseases. According to official data, in 1970 there was a total of 1.7 million hospital admissions, with an average case length of 15.3 nursing days and a mortality rate of 2.6%, compared with 1.3 million patients, an average case length of 16.5 days and a mortality rate of only 1.9% in 1960. The practice of preventive medicine has a firm basis in planning, but personnel and facilities are as yet inadequate for comprehensive inoculation programs. As abilities to cope with needs in therapeutic medicine approach adequacy, more resources will be available for extending preventive medicine programs.

The highest incidence of mortality in the last decade was from heart disease and cancer. Cardiovascular disease has increased sharply from 19.8 per 10,000 population in 1955 to 30.2 in 1968, but improved treatment has lowered the actual mortality rate for cardiovascular victims under 60 years of age to less than 15% of those stricken. The cancer mortality rate has also increased from 12 per 10,000 in 1955 to 21.4 in 1970. At least a portion of this increase, however, may be attributed to the expansion of medical diagnostic facilities and the more nearly accurate determination of the cause of death. Since 1945 improved treatment facilities and detection techniques have contributed to drastic reductions in the tuberculosis mortality rate, from 112 per 10,000 population in 1938 to 2.1 per 10,000 in 1966. In 1970 there were 80,000 registered tuberculosis patients, compared with 88,667 in 1969 and 111,629 in 1965.

Compulsory immunization has drastically reduced the mortality rate caused by smallpox and poliomyelitis. In 1970 a compulsory measles vaccination program was also introduced for children

1 to 6 years old, reportedly resulting in an 80% reduction in measles cases compared with 1969.

The number of hospital admissions for psychiatric treatment reportedly increased 164% in the 1960's. In 1968—the latest available figure—half of the total consumption of medicines reportedly was for "nervous complaints." The Hungarians themselves point to the problems of adapting to a technological-industrial urban society since World War II as the cause of such growing "neuroses." Most alarming, however, is an official report that an annual average of 5.6 nervous disorders occurs among every 100 elementary school children, compared with only 1.55 cases of infectious tuberculosis.

The Ministry of Health controls nearly all public health facilities through an extensive network of county, district and city health departments. The ministry is responsible for the administration of all medical services, including health inspection and epidemiology, training all medical and paramedical personnel, and treatment under the social insurance program. It coordinates and guides the health activities of other ministries and supervises the administration of all civilian hospitals, clinics, and related medical institutions, their personnel and equipment. A separate medical service for employees of the Hungarian State Railways is administered by the Ministry of Transportation and Postal Affairs. The Ministries of Defense and Interior maintain independent medical services for military and security personnel, although research and supply programs are coordinated with the Ministry of Health through the Scientific Health Council. Administration of maternity and sick leave, workmen's compensation, and similar social insurance programs is controlled by the Social Insurance Center of the National Trade Unions Council, but the Ministry of Health is responsible for the actual dispensing of medical services.

According to official statistics, the level of nutrition in Hungary is comparable to the Eastern European average. The per capita daily caloric intake reportedly averaged 3,164 in 1969, about the same as in 1958 and only 8% higher than in 1950. The protein content of the average diet has increased slightly since 1950—from 88.7 to 96.1 grams—but the consumption of meat, milk, vegetables, and eggs remains insufficient. Bread is the basic item of diet, and over two-thirds of the meat consumed is pork, which contributes to an unhealthy predominance of fats. Alcoholic beverages, particularly wine and beer, are widely consumed. Differences between rural and urban areas in the amounts of food consumed are no longer significant.

Animal diseases remain a significant problem, although they are not as widespread as during the early postwar years. Bovine tuberculosis is the most extensive livestock disease, but important losses are also caused by brucellosis, fascioliasis, and echinococcosis and pasteurellosis. Type O hoof-and-mouth disease, endemic throughout Eastern Europe, broke out in 1964-65, causing serious losses to livestock. Outbreaks of hoof-and-mouth disease were reported in 1968 and 1969, but none has been reported since. During the early spring each year there is a rash of reported cases of rabid wild animals (mainly foxes) attacking domestic animals. Veterinary medicine generally emphasizes therapeutic treatment, although a few intensive vaccination campaigns have been directed against the most common animal diseases.

F. Welfare and social problems (U/OU)

1. Social security and public welfare

The concept of social welfare was well rooted in Hungary long before the advent of the Communist regime. The first social welfare program was organized for miners in 1505. A national insurance program for industrial workers was relatively well advanced before World War II, and by 1967 the Communist regime had extended the program, in one form or another, to 97% of the nonagricultural population. The government has committed itself to full extension of social insurance to the agricultural population by 1975.

All social security and welfare programs are administered by the state or regime-controlled organizations. The social security insurance system (Hungary's designation for social security) is administered by the National Trade Unions Council, with health and medical services under the supervision of the Ministry of Health.

Social insurance is compulsory for all employees in the socialist sector of the economy. As was true of the prewar program, private farmers and artisans are not covered. Farm workers on state-run cooperatives are covered by sickness benefits, but financial aid appears to be below average. Future planning, however, includes the stipulation that in social insurance benefits cooperative workers will receive parity with industrial workers.

Hungary has a very extensive pension system, which at the beginning of 1971 paid benefits to more than 1.45 million people. Revisions of pension laws were effected in 1959 and again in 1966, raising allowances and extending the eligibility for benefits to more industrial workers. In early 1967 pension coverage was extended to agricultural cooperative workers. According to the 1959 revision male industrial workers qualify for a pension at 60 years of age and female workers at 55. Since November 1967 male agricultural workers qualify for a pension at 65 and females at 60. The minimum length of service necessary to qualify was put on a sliding scale in 1959; in 1970 it became 25 years.

In 1966 all pensions below 750 forints a month were raised by 10%; approximately 700,000 persons benefited from this increase. At the same time, widows' pensions were raised to between 250 and 400 forints monthly. Although subsequent increases have pushed widows' pensions close to the 500-forint mark, most widows must depend on relatives for help or find employment to supplement their meager income.

In 1970 the average retired industrial worker received 1,024 forints monthly, or roughly half of the average wage in industry. Pensions for agricultural cooperative retirees were significantly lower, but in many cases were augmented by additional payments, such as rent for the land the pensioner brought with him when he joined the cooperative. The regime has committed itself to equalizing pensions for the industrial and agricultural sectors. This is a long-range program, however, which may not be realized until the end of 1975, when the current 5-year plan expires. Probably the worst off of all pensioners are those whose emoluments were set before the advent of Communist rule. Since these pensioners are in their late eighties or nineties, they are generally unable to hold those small jobs that would augment their meager incomes; as a result, they are generally supported by their families.

Most pension fund contributions are a charge against the employing institution, but a small percentage of the employee's wage is also deducted. In 1954 the employee contribution was raised from 1% to 3% of the basic wage, regardless of the amount earned at secondary occupations. On 1 February 1966 a new system of progressive deductions was passed: from 3% for those earning up to 1,800 forints a month to 10% for those earning more than 7,000 forints a month. Under this system, contributions are based on total income, so that persons with more than one source of income—a considerable number—may no longer make contributions solely on the basis of their major occupation.

The 1.45 million people receiving pension aid in 1971 represented 14% of the total population. This was more than double the figure in 1960, when only 636,000 persons received pensions. The total funds allocated annually have increased even more in the 10-year period, from 4,426 million forints in 1960 to 13,000 million in 1971.

In August 1971 concern by the regime for the welfare of retired workers was reflected in an article in *Nepszabadsag*, the party daily, that lamented the plight of pensioners. A total of 150,000 to 180,000 old people was said to receive no pension of any kind, because they had not completed the necessary number of work years to become eligible or else had worked as individual farmers or artisans. Enterprises were also criticized for failing to look properly after their retired workers, as were adults who abandoned all responsibility for their parents or grandparents.

Allowances for dependents were increased in 1966, affecting more than 600,000 families. Monthly allowances were increased to 300 forints for families with two children, 510 forints for three children, and 170 forints for each additional child. Payment for funeral expenses, averaging 1,400 forints, is also provided under social insurance. Unemployment benefits, payable for a maximum of 6 months, range from 300 to 600 forints, plus 40 forints for each child. Sick pay benefits average 65% to 75% of the monthly income, but less if the worker is hospitalized. Workers disabled in industrial accidents receive a fixed pension, without regard to length of service or income at the time of the accident.

2. Social problems

The traditional social structure was all but destroyed after World War II by the forced imposition of Soviet-style communism. Mindless imitation of the Soviet model in the Stalinist era hammered Hungary's basically Western-style institutions into alien forms consistent with the all-pervasive orientation toward Moscow and without regard to preserving cultural traditions. The suppression of the 1956 nationalist uprising caused an even deeper breach between the people and their government and left a considerable residue of hatred and distrust. Since 1956 Kadar's peculiar balancing act between permissiveness and authoritarianism has been accepted as politically and economically necessary. Yet, at the grass roots it has frustrated initiative and spontaneity and has contributed to the social malaise in the country.

The deterioration of traditional sources of moral authority, caused by Communist harassment of churches and by the adverse effects on family relationships of the rapid change to an urban industrial society, has been instrumental in the reduction of the standard of public morality and the increasing incidence of crime.. Widespread dissatisfaction with the regime and apathy toward its goals generally result in scanty popular support for government drives to control crime.

Until 1957 the Communist regime issued no statistics on crime, and public information media virtually ignored this problem. In 1957 official statistical yearbooks began to carry data on convictions, and since then this annual accounting has been the only source available for gauging crime in Hungary. There are no published statistics on reported and unsolved crimes. Although changes in the number of convictions for certain crimes may be indicative of stricter enforcement rather than a real increase in incidence, marked changes usually indicate serious problems and thus are useful in describing trends.

Reported convictions and sentences for selected crimes committed by adults in the year 1970 are shown in Figure 12, together with the overall trend since 1960. These figures indicate a continuing decline in crime since 1965, with "criminal negligence at the place of work" apparently the most prevalent offense. This might be accounted for by the stress throughout the society on greater economic productivity and efficiency. Rape and murder are not reported by the Central Statistical Office, but it was admitted by Justice Minister Mihaly Korom in November 1971 that convictions for rape and "crimes of violence" had increased every year from 1966 to 1970. In 1969 a 6.4% decrease was reported in the aggregate number of detected crimes for the year. Press releases by the Supreme Prosecutor's Office in 1971 claimed that the "basic structure of crime" had not changed in the period 1965-71. In 1971 a Deputy Minister of the Interior stated that between 110,000 and 120,000 crimes were detected by police in 1970, a 10% increase over 1969. Crimes against individual citizens, accounting for 15% to 20% of all crime, were reported to be on the rise. Of the reported crimes in 1970, 49% were committed in Budapest and the county capitals.

In response to these upward trends, the Presidential Council in 1971 made the first revision of the 1961 Penal Code. The new legislation generally provides stiffer sentences as a deterrent to crime. The minimum jail sentence for lesser crimes was increased from 6 months to 1 year. The death penalty was retained, and life imprisonment was made a legitimate punishment for those convicted of "crimes against social property."

Juvenile crime is apparently becoming more rampant and critical each year. Convictions of juveniles (Figure 13) showed an increase from 1969 to 1970. Theft apparently is by far the most prevalent offense among youth. It was stated in a September 1971 press interview by the Minister of Interior that 60% of all current crimes against property were committed by persons between 18 and 25 years of age. In 1970 the ratio of youth among the total number of individuals committing crimes against property rose by 40%, and those guilty of "rowdiness" by 50%. Fifteen percent of the juveniles brought to court in 1970 also had a record of previous arrest.

The number of civil court cases (Figure 14) has increased since 1968. Divorce suits and the related matter of family support after divorce rank first among all civil disputes. Hungary has the third-highest divorce rate in the world, after the United States and the U.S.S.R., and the rate continues to rise each year.

The national suicide rate, admitted by the Hungarian press to be the highest in the world, is perhaps the most dramatic indicator of the gap

FIGURE 12. Adults convicted of selected crimes and sentenced (U/OU)

YEAR	TOTAL SENTENCED	IMPRISONMENT			CORRECTIVE LABOR	FINES
		Total	Less than 1 year	Suspended sentence		
1960	52,050	27,672	23,450	14,101	3,814	20,040
1965	63,936	33,411	28,977	15,020	9,618	20,898
1969	53,240	29,796	25,015	12,167	6,873	16,567
1970	46,036	27,187	21,458	8,864	5,551	13,292
Specific crimes, 1970:						
Assault and battery	5,846	3,457	3,220	1,614	405	1,984
Theft	4,971	4,494	2,716	1,029	438	39
Criminal negligence at place of work	6,008	2,596	2,199	1,510	1,909	1,503
Slander	2,759	87	87	61	23	2,649
Rowdiness	4,189	3,719	3,310	895	297	173
Embezzlement	1,521	1,341	989	482	168	12
Violence against officials	1,471	1,330	1,095	356	93	48
"[illegible]ing"	774	710	402	160	46	18

FIGURE 13. Juveniles (under 18 years) sentenced for selected crimes (U/OU)

YEAR	TOTAL SENTENCED	EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (REFORM SCHOOLS)	IMPRISONMENT			EDUCATIONAL WORK	FINES
			Total	Less than 1 year	Suspended sentence		
1960	3,523	1,822	1,250	1,104	769	117	334
1965	5,037	2,140	2,115	1,902	1,091	452	330
1969	4,700	1,874	2,091	1,835	1,012	444	291
1970	4,942	2,143	2,294	1,791	926	301	204
Specific crimes, 1970:							
Theft	1,470	736	640	452	213	67	27
Rowdiness	738	139	515	475	227	56	28
Damage to property	353	118	178	168	88	28	29
Violence against officials	91	15	67	50	26	5	4
Embezzlement	32	10	19	14	10	2	1
Slander	35	18	2	2	1	4	11
"Cheating"	19	7	10	8	8	1	1

FIGURE 14. Selected civil court cases (U/OU)

	1968	1969	1970
Selected categories:			
Divorce	30,905	32,325	33,663
Paternity suit	3,403	3,199	3,257
Support	38,187	37,882	38,540
Property damage (other than real estate)	6,215	6,078	6,056
Contract violation	11,630	10,821	12,074
Eviction	5,866	5,134	5,114
Pension claim	3,000	2,686	2,152
Producer cooperative rights benefits	1,485	1,920	1,726
Total number of proceedings	165,171	168,790	170,664

between officially fostered socialist optimism and popular feelings of frustration. It is estimated that in 1970 some 10,000 Hungarians attempted suicide, of whom nearly 3,400 were successful.

Alcoholism has also been a constantly expanding problem. In 1965 the regime revealed that Hungarians were spending as much on alcohol as on clothing—about 15% of their gross expenditures—and that public drunkenness had become a "national scandal." Between 1965 and 1969 sales of alcoholic beverages increased by 26%. In Budapest "sobering up stations" for those found drunk in public cared for nearly 7,000 persons in 1967, one-third of whom were women. Budapest's chief of police reported that in 1969 drunkenness was involved in 63% of the city's violent crimes and in 57% of "hooliganism" cases.

In 1971 Hungary became the eighth largest per capita consumer of alcohol in the world. The Budapest press report that made this admission also charged that in heavy industrial areas saloons opened before factories, and that many grocery stores sold more liquor than food. According to government statistics, per capita consumption of raw alcohol rose from 6.8 liters to 8.6 liters between 1965 and 1970. Figure 15 shows the increases in alcoholic consumption during the 1960's.

The consequences of such heavy drinking, from loss of labor productivity and accidents to widespread divorce, are well recognized by the regime. In 1971 the government estimated that there were 150,000 alcoholics among the population. Seventy-one clinics had been established for the treatment of alcoholics as of September 1971. In 1970, 106,000 persons were reported to have received such treatment.

Like juvenile delinquency in general, excessive drinking among younger persons is a problem of particular concern for the regime. It was reported that in 1970, 41% of the persons between ages 20 and 29 involved in crimes were intoxicated; 7% of those were 18 to 19 years old, and 4% were 14 to 17. It is common practice for both parents to work, thus leaving thousands of youngsters to spend their leisure time outside the family environment. In addition, a large proportion of the students who complete basic schooling each year cannot be placed in jobs for several months; they are frequently undisciplined and uncontrolled. Especially in urban areas this has resulted in the formation of juvenile gangs, which often indulge in various kinds of theft and drunkenness.

The generation gap is very real in Hungary. Speaking of the appeal of revolutionary rhetoric and



FIGURE 15. Per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages (U/OU)

its romantic illusions, a November 1970 article in *Nepszabadsag* said:

> **It (i.e., the appeal of revolution) is the devotion, self-sacrifice, and the magnificence of armed battles that are embodied in it. It is, perhaps, for this reason that many of our young people, under the present peaceful conditions, feel that they have been defrauded of all these things by the preceding generation, practically stealing from them all the laurels of the legendary struggles. What remains for them is nothing but work, grey norms, plan fulfillment, and colorless vegetation.**

This "colorless vegetation" is a valid description of a symptom, but the roots of the problem go deeper. Hungarian young people are essentially deprived of any meaningful say in the long-range political decisions that determine their future. Even the most capable of them find it difficult to find satisfaction in a career because of the relatively few top positions open to members of their generation. Exhorted by their elders to be patient, and yet very aware of the dynamics of the Western youth culture, Hungarian youth take refuge in mocking apathy. They condemn their elders' pursuit of the good life and simultaneously reject as inhumane and unsophisticated the Communist zealotry in which the older generation indulged during the Stalinist era. With little chance of achieving any personal goals, Hungarian young people appear to drift from one frustration to another. The high suicide rate among the younger generation reflects this cynical malaise.

The regime is very circumspect about releasing data on drug usage, a fact that tends to preclude a sound estimate of the problem. It is highly likely that some pharmaceutical products slip onto the black market. Furthermore, the route of illegal drug traffic from Turkey to Western Europe runs through Hungary, and some drugs inevitably are siphoned off for the Hungarian illegal market. While drugs may be obtained, it is generally assumed that the difficulty of maintaining steady sources of supply and the strict police measures against illegal drug trafficking have kept the drug problem within manageable limits.

In 1950 Hungary closed its brothels and outlawed prostitution. The regime, claiming that prostitution—as one of the "remnants of capitalism"—could not exist in a socialist country, was generally able to ignore the problem throughout the 1950's and early 1960's. However, in line with the Western trend of looser personal moral standards, by 1971 prostitution had become big business in large cities and tourist areas. An article in *Elet Es Irodalom* in 1971 quoted spontaneous interviews with citizens who saw prostitution as a positive thing, because it helped the tourist industry. A radio series reported in the fall of 1971 that Hungary's prostitutes, especially girls "17 and 18 years old," had drawn a flood of male Italian visitors that summer. Said the commentator:

> **Some people believe that Hungarian girls are the cheapest in Europe, that they will go to bed with anybody for the smallest foreign trinkets and this news has reached Italy—which is why so many Italian tourists visit Hungary. No specific data on the incidence of venereal disease are available.**

No specific data on the incidence of venereal disease are available.

G. Religion (C)

Christianity was introduced to Hungary in the 10th century by King Stephen I (Figure 16), who was canonized after his death and, as Saint Stephen, remains the patron saint of Hungary. As a result, the institutional church was a central fiber in both social and political affairs until the Communist takeover.

In the later Middle Ages, the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, the Prince Primate, was not only



FIGURE 16. Statue of King Stephen, near the Matyas Cathedral in Budapest (U/OU)

the nation's spiritual leader but also served as Regent and personal mentor of royal children in line for succession. Appointed for life as the Pope's intermediary with the state power, the Prince Primate often aspired to and at times did command as much authority and respect as the king himself. No king was considered a legitimate ruler until crowned by the Prince Primate with Saint Stephen's crown (Figure 17). According to popularly accepted tradition, the hallowed crown was presented to King Stephen by Pope Sylvester II after the Hungarian nobles were converted to Catholicism in 1000. In 1945 it fell into U.S. Government hands, where it remains.

Despite 25 years of Communist rule, the Hungarian population continues to respond to traditional religious influences. Approximately 68% of the population is still at least nominally Roman Catholic (including Uniat Catholicism), 20% is Calvinist (Hungarian Reformed), and 5% is Lutheran. As a result of the genocide of World War II and of postwar



FIGURE 17. Saint Stephen's crown, the symbol of Hungarian nationhood (C)

FIGURE 18. Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty (C)

migration, the Jewish minority was reduced from 4% of the population (about 400,000) before the war to less than 1% (about 70,000) in 1970.

Because of its historical role in national affairs, its structural and ideological strength, its supranational organization, and the number of its adherents, the Roman Catholic Church has been a chief target of the Communists in their campaign to eliminate sources of opposition in Hungary. Following the seizure of power in 1947, the Communist regime launched a series of attacks on "clerical reactionaries," which culminated in the arrest and imprisonment of numerous religious dignitaries on charges ranging from collaboration with the Nazis and the Hungarian Fascist Arrow-Cross Party to currency violations and treason.

Among those imprisoned during this period was Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty (Figure 18), who had become Prince Primate of the Catholic Church in Hungary in 1946. An outspoken anti-Communist, the Cardinal was convicted in 1949 of "treason" and sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time of his arrest he declared audaciously that "a dead Cardinal may be worth more to the cause of freedom than a live one." His persecution attracted wide international attention; Hollywood even made a movie on his plight (Guilty of Treason, 1950).

Mindszenty, released from prison by the insurgents in 1956, gave one rousing speech from the steps of Parliament. After the suppression of the revolt, he sought and was granted refuge in the U.S. Legation (now the U.S. Embassy), where he remained for 15 years. In September 1971, after years of goading by the mutually embarrassed Kadar regime and the Vatican, the 79-year-old Cardinal finally consented to leave his beloved Hungary. He was greeted in Rome by Pope Paul, presented with a gold ring, and given a standing ovation by the then convened Synod of Bishops. Immediately thereafter Mindszenty departed to live in permanent exile at a residence for Hungarian priests in Vienna.

Other steps taken to reduce religious opposition have included the nationalization of all denominational schools, expropriation of church lands, dissolution of most religious orders, and the curtailment of the training of new clergy. Communist "name giving" ceremonies, "socialist" marriages, and atheist funeral services were inaugurated to substitute for religious functions, but such tactics have had only limited success. The so-called Peace Priest Movement, based on priests who associate themselves with the regime policies, had some initial success in confusing some members of the laity, but the rest of the Hungarian clergy's contempt for peace priests has diluted any long-term effectiveness of the movement. One of the most effective mediums of control over the church is the yearly state allotment, which is a very effective tool for punishing obstreperous clergymen and controlling the physical growth of religious organizations.

From 1951 through 1956 jurisdiction over religious matters was vested in the State Bureau of Church Affairs. In 1956 this bureau was abolished, and until 1959 there was no formal government body for regulation of church affairs, although there may have been one in the central party apparatus. In 1959 the State Office for Church Affairs was established under the Council of Ministers to resume the duties of the old bureau, including financial and legal affairs. This office exercises control over all religious bodies through state-approved governing bodies, assignment of its own representatives to diocesan posts, and through an extensive network of lay informers and peace priests. All pastoral appointments, diocesan religious programs, and religious publications must be approved by the office or its representatives. In 1968 the authority of the office was enhanced when its head was granted the title of secretary of state, a position which gave him more local prestige and more authority in meetings with Vatican representatives.

In 1962 Kadar's regime adopted a somewhat more lenient attitude toward the Catholic Church. Several bishops were released from house arrest, although they were not permitted to resume their pastoral duties, and some members of the Bench of Bishops were permitted to visit the Ecumenical Council in Rome. In September 1964, after lengthy negotiations between the Vatican and the State Office for Church Affairs, a limited agreement was concluded: the first ever between the Vatican and a Communist state. Among other things, the agreement authorized the appointment of new bishops, but because the regime delayed implementation, it produced little or no improvement in the church's status. In January 1969, however, a number of episcopal sees in Hungary were filled by Vatican-appointed church dignitaries acceptable to the Hungarian Government. Of the 11 Catholic episcopal sees in Hungary, two were headed by archbishops, four by bishops, and only five by apostolic administrators, most of whom were titular bishops.

Throughout this period Cardinal Mindszenty remained in his refuge in the U.S. Embassy, while his "impeded" archepiscopal see of Esztergom continued to be governed by an apostolic administrator. On 28 September 1971, the very day of the Cardinal's departure for Rome, a new administrator, flexible enough to satisfy both the regime and the church, was appointed to this diocese.

From 1965 through 1967 repressive measures were reinstituted against priests and laymen, especially those engaged in youth activities. Reports of harassment, e.g., searches for unauthorized religious materials and increased surveillance of clerics, were frequent. In 1968, when religious groups in Czechoslovakia made public demands for more religious freedom, the specter of a similar movement in Hungary was briefly raised.

Despite the persistent efforts of the regime to diminish religious influence, the prestige of the churches remains high, and church attendance, particularly in rural areas, is considerable. The churches generally avoid politics, and the parishioners worship in quiet reverence. There are indications, however, that the church finds it difficult to fend off the subtle incursions of the state, as well as to maintain its moral authority among youth, which is increasingly influenced by a rationalist, materialistic outlook.

As of June 1969 there were 4,014 Catholic priests in Hungary. The clergy however, is becoming top-heavy with aging prelates; 31% of all priests in 1970 were between 51 and 60 years old, and 21% between 41 and 50. Until 1969 the regime consistently obstructed the replacement of deceased bishops; the situation in the highest ecclesiastic authority, the Bench of Bishops, had deteriorated so sharply that its session in early 1968 had to be chaired by a Uniat bishop who represented only a small fraction of Hungary's Catholic laity.

Partly in recognition of the problem of an aging clergy, a landmark agreement was concluded in June 1971 between Hungary and the Vatican whereby the State Office for Church Affairs relinquished some control over clerical appointments. Under the agreement, replacement of parish priests requires only the "assent" of the office, rather than the hitherto formal process of long negotiation preceding official government appointment of all parish clergy.

In line with the improved church-state climate resulting from Mindszenty's departure from Hungary, the Vatican announced in late 1971 the repeal of a decree issued by Pope Pius XII in 1957 dictating excommunication for any priest actively participating in the political affairs of the state. Nevertheless, by 1971 three peace priests had become members of Parliament in spite of the injunction. The papal repeal of the decree gave the Hungarian Bench of Bishops independent authority to decide whether priests should be allowed to join the Parliament, and the three excommunicated peace priests were reinstated in the church.

The smaller Hungarian religious communities generally suffered the same pressures as the Catholics during the early stages of the Communist era. Drastic administrative limitations on education of new clerics—the Reformed Church has two seminaries and the Lutheran and Jewish communities only one each—continue even to the present. Stern legal measures, particularly against the Protestant (Evangelical) clergy, have been taken by the regime in cases of proscribed religious education of young people. The Reformed Church appears to have reached a relatively successful *modus vivendi* with the Kadar regime in the latter half of the past decade, but only through the offices of Bishop Janos Bartha, probably the most compliant of the high-ranking clergy in Hungary.

The Kadar regime has kept a sensitive eye on the foreign impact of its church policy. It does not wish to earn the enmity of the international religious communities and has consequently tried to avoid overt repression of the Hungarian churches. In several cases, such as the 400th anniversary of the founding of the Evangelical Church in Hungary in 1967 and the millenium celebration of the Hungarian Catholics in 1969, the regime encouraged national celebrations and even dispatched government officials to attend the ceremonies.

This concern with Hungary's international image also extends to the Jewish community. In 1970 the regime permitted the Jews to hold a memorial for the Hungarian victims of the Nazi genocide. The Jewish question, however, makes problems for Kadar. Frequently he has been forced to condemn publicly the anti-Semitic slanders common among Hungarians in general and even within the party ranks. His efforts to keep the lid on this dark force in the Hungarian character have been complicated and compromised by examples of unvarnished anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Poland. Kadar thus cannot be too openly critical of anti-Semitism, for such a policy would implicitly condemn his allies. Lacking the will to challenge his allies openly, Kadar has chosen more subliminal guarantees that the atrocities of 1945 will not be repeated. He maintains Communists of Jewish extraction in important party and government posts as visible signs of his intentions and has strongly opposed suggestions from domestic and foreign sources that he remove them from power.

The regime permits each of the religious communities to publish a journal on matters of internal interest. These publications, however, are reviewed in depth for signs of opposition to communism, and there are pressures, usually in the form of threats to reduce the regime's financial support, for articles supporting the party's stand on internal and international affairs.

Ecumenism in Hungary has made few inroads in lessening the suspicion and hostility with which the different religions have traditionally viewed one another. Calvinist and other Protestant churches have come the closest to cooperation, but the Catholic Church, partly as a result of the views of its conservative and aging hierarchy, seems to have remained aloof from the ecumenical spirit of Vatican II (1962-65). As a younger group of clergymen takes over the Catholic hierarchy, there may be a stronger evidence of efforts to join together in confronting regime pressures.

H. Education (U/OU)

1. Background

All aspects of education are under the direct control of the central government and have been modified to further Communist political and economic goals. Under the basic principle of "education for work," the Hungarian system seeks to involve citizens of all ages and classes in a generally continuous program of study permeated with Marxist-Leninist teachings and directed toward the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge. The individual has only limited freedom of opportunity in choosing postelementary training, which is largely geared to meet personnel needs as determined in long-range economic plans.

Prior to World War II Hungary's educational system was based on the intellectual traditions of Western and Central Europe. Though conservative and nationalistic, the system was relatively well organized and maintained high standards of scholarship. Universities were traditionally autonomous and trained students for professional careers in the humanities and science; commercial and industrial training was shunned. The system favored the middle and upper classes and discriminated somewhat against women and Jews. Before World War II, 56% of all Hungarian schools were owned and operated by religious organizations, most of them by the Roman Catholic Church. In secondary education, at least, educational standards maintained by the church-operated schools were generally superior to those of the state-run system.

The complete transformation of the educational system along Soviet lines began immediately after World War II and was accelerated after the Communist assumption of power in 1947. All schools were nationalized in 1948 (except for a few schools authorized by the state to remain under church control), compulsory religious education was abolished in 1949 in favor of courses in Marxism-Leninism, and universities lost their autonomy in 1950. Western intellectual influences were replaced by Soviet pedagogical techniques, which became the cornerstone of the new system. Textbooks were rewritten to glorify the Soviet Union and its achievements, and Russian language study was made obligatory. Children of workers and peasants were given priority in secondary school and university training.

The stringent controls over educational policies exercised by the Ministry of Culture were slightly relaxed between 1953 and 1955 and again at the time of the 1956 revolt. Further revisions of the educational system were made in 1957, a new basic educational law was promulgated in 1961, and major modifications in the 1961 law were enacted in 1965.

The educational law of December 1961 introduced a system which combined academic study with practical work in industry or agriculture. Dubbed the "5 plus 1 system," it required all pupils from the age of 14 to spend 5 days per week in regular school work and 1 day at work in a factory or on a farm. The system never achieved notable success, and by 1965 it was virtually abandoned. Under the 1965 education law the gymnasiums were to concentrate on academic training and general work orientation to prepare the student for university studies. Beginning in 1966-67 the vocational secondary schools were to emphasize general professional training rather than specific technical skills, because long-term planning could not successfully predict the needs in specific occupational fields. Moreover, apprentices were to be transferred in large part from formal schools to on-the-job training in factories and enterprises.

The 1965 education law established the National Council of Education, with similar bodies at the county and communal level, to coordinate the political, pedagogical, and professional aspects of education, and to supervise the mechanism controlling admission to higher education. The law also effectively froze the number of secondary schools at the 1965 level, despite the growing number of elementary school graduates, in an apparent effort to force students into various forms of apprentice training. The opportunity to pursue secondary and higher education was limited until late 1962 by a quota system of selecting students "according to social origin." This qualification was abolished at the Eighth Party Congress (November 1962), and the following year entrance examinations were initiated and opened to all university candidates. The 1965 revision of the education law reaffirmed the competitive system of university admissions, but charged that the broad social spectrum reflected in the student body resulted in unsatisfactory ideological training in universities.

Since 1969 there has been much talk of educational reform, and educators themselves have achieved a more prestigious status. There have been rumors of plans to expand compulsory education from 8 to 10 years for all children, but as of mid-1972 no concrete program had been announced.

2. Educational system

The educational system is based on 8 years of elementary and 4 years of secondary schooling (Figure 19). There are three types of secondary schools—


University
Technical/Vocational Colleges
AGE
17
16
15
14
Gymnasium (Academic)
Vocational Secondary Schools
Technikum (Agricultural, Industrial, and Economic Colleges)
Apprentices (3 years)
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
Primary School (Compulsory, 8 years)
5
4
Kindergarten

FIGURE 19. Educational system (U/OU)

gymnasiums (academic), vocational and technical schools, and skilled worker apprenticeship training schools. Higher education is open to all graduates of these schools except for apprentices. Graduates of gymnasiums may enter any department of a university; vocational school graduates and technical school graduates may enter an advanced trade school. Apprentice training in secondary schools, however, represents only 3 years of work and does not qualify the graduate for university entrance. Indeed, a graduate apprentice must attend 2 to 3 years of additional night study to qualify for the basic secondary school diploma.

The heavy emphasis on "education for work" and the production of a technically minded citizenry are evident throughout the system. Figure 20 indicates the stress placed on science and mathematics in the curriculums of both elementary and secondary schools. Furthermore, a large number of Hungarian youths are diverted into trade schools at a very early age; almost one-third of each fifth-grade class is directed into trade schools, and by the ninth grade almost two-thirds of the students are involved in trade or apprentice programs. The apprentice programs are the only sector of the school system to show a steady increase since 1949/50, an indication of emphasis on training skilled labor.

Inequalities in educational opportunities are built into the educational system. Early tracking tends to favor children from the upper class with a richer cultural background than children from worker origins. As a result, generally only half of university students are from a working class background, despite the numerical majority and nominal political power of this class. Indeed, by the 1970/71 school year only 50.4% of the secondary school pupils were children of manual workers. Students from rural areas which have less developed educational facilities are doubly handicapped when forced to compete for jobs or for places in the university. The regime appears satisfied with its record of improvement over the prewar educational system. Economic and social expediencies indicate that it will continue the semielitist trends in its educational system.

During 1970/71 over 2.1 million students were enrolled in school, about the same as in 1960/61

FIGURE 20. School curriculums (U/OU)
(sessions per week)

SUBJECTS	ELEMENTARY GRADES								SECONDARY (GYMNASIUM) GRADES			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4
Reading	10	5	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Writing		2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spelling	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grammar, orthography	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Study of surroundings	1	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathematics	5	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	0	0	0	0
Mathematics (descriptive geometry)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	5	5
Hungarian language and literature	0	0	0	0	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
Practical occupations	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Foundations of ideology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Russian language (plus literature at secondary level)	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Second foreign language and literature	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	2	2
History	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3
Geography	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
Physics	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	3	4	5
Chemistry	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	3	3	0
Botany, zoology	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
Biology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2/0	2
Psychology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/2	0
Singing, music	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0
Drawing (plus art appreciation at secondary level)	0	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	1
Physical culture	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Teacher-pupil consulation (with teacher in charge of form)	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1



FIGURE 21. Total school enrollment (U/OU)

(Figure 21). The increase in kindergarten enrollment under the Communists can be attributed to an expansion of facilities; the decrease in primary school enrollment is caused by the low birth rate. The reduction in university attendance since the mid-1960's may be the result of purposeful government policy.

The number of secondary schools increased from 419 in 1960/61 to 589 in 1967/68 but declined to 547 in 1970/71. Universities are faced with more applicants than they can accept. In 1971, there were 54,890 applicants, an increase of 7,000 over 1970. In 1971, for example, there were 13 times as many applicants to the College of Industrial Arts as could be accepted, and 44 times as many to the College of Stage and Film Arts. There were 19 institutions of higher learning in 1949; this figure rose to 43 in 1960/61 and 92 in 1967/68. About 9,791 educators were employed in universities and higher technical schools in 1970/71.

The regime's most frequent criticisms of higher education are aimed at qualitative deficiencies, such as poor preparation on the part of professors and liberal grading policies which encourage laxity on the part of students. Most of the elementary and secondary schools in major population centers are of postwar construction (Figure 22) and are adequately equipped. The regime seems to be satisfied with the physical facilities in higher education, and most future planning is aimed at improving the quality of education by increasing professional discipline, introducing more modern syllabuses, and increasing the emphasis on independent research. Some principles of the economic reform are reportedly to be carried over into higher education, including decentralization of authority over lesser policy decisions to university officials and increased contacts



FIGURE 22. Model secondary school in Dunajvaros (C)

between industrial directors and university heads in setting up new curriculums and directing students into fields of study. Under the reform, graduating university students are legally free to choose their own employment, a departure from past policy, which frequently committed university graduates to a certain enterprise for several years of service. In 1971, 326 scholarships were granted for undergraduate study abroad—237 of which were for study in the Soviet Union; 1,700 individuals applied for postgraduate scholarships to the United Kingdom and Sweden—more than twice the number for 1969.

The most pressing problem for the educational system is a teacher shortage. In June 1971 there were 3,670 vacant teaching positions, but only 2,877 new graduates qualified as teachers. Moreover, many with teaching credentials often seek opportunities to enter more lucrative job sectors than teaching. Only 50% of the 1971 graduates qualified as teachers reportedly entered the field. Another problem is a shortage of kindergarten facilities. In 1971, there were 3,457 kindergartens with a total capacity of 227,000 children; this represented only 57% of all the children eligible to attend kindergarten at the time.

Hungarian youth generally display the same disinterest in politics and the same absorption in their private affairs as do their elders. Student activities—at least those divorced from officially sponsored organizations—are generally apolitical. In 1968, for example, Hungarian students were generally indifferent to the Polish student riots and gave no overt support to Czechoslovak students who were in the vanguard of liberalization in the spring of that year.

Part of the reason for political apathy among students is the extremely efficient work of the Interior Ministry's network of informers, which allows the regime to anticipate developments and isolate potential ringleaders. Occasionally "plots" are revealed in the press to bring home to restless youth and would-be "plotters" the futility of any schemes. The political hue of these "plots" has ranged from pro-Maoist to anti-Communist, but there does not seem to be any one trend commanding significant student attention. In 1968 a small group of youths was arrested and tried for Maoist activities. In March 1972 another small group was arrested for disrupting official observances taking place at the Sandor Petofi statue on 15 March. During these same years a running debate between older intellectuals and younger ones facing such problems as punishment occasionally broke into print. These isolated incidents, however, do not contradict the overall pattern of apathy and indifference which pervades Hungarian youth.

A 1970 poll of Hungarian students traveling abroad revealed that 72% agreed that "the young people of today are in a mood of protest because they are dissatisfied with the state of the world." Yet, only 30% would go so far as to express dissatisfaction with the political situation in Hungary. In 1971 a sample of 669 young people was asked in an official government poll "where they could discuss political questions most openly and express their opinions." Although 57% predictably answered that this could be best done within the Hungarian Communist Youth League (KISz), the percentage identifying the KISz as the best forum dropped as the age of respondents increased. Only 19% of those with university degrees said they saw the KISz as a channel for free political expression, while 49% explicitly stated that the KISz was not the place where they felt free to express personal political opinions. Of the total sample, 62% said they felt most freedom "among friends," and this increased to 89% for those with university degrees.

If this survey is reliable, it would indicate that Hungary's university graduates—much like those of the West—are becoming more disenchanted with established institutional structures and norms, as well as more willing to express that disenchantment. The regime is well aware of the danger of permitting latent political dissatisfaction among students and intellectuals to fester as it did in 1956. In 1969 the regime initiated a campaign for a new "Youth Constitution," and in the fall of 1971 a meeting of parliament produced a rash of rhetoric praising the maturity of youth and calling for better ways to bring them directly into decisionmaking processes in the party and the government. The dilemma inherent in this ostensible goal, however, is that if youth is in fact disenchanted with current institutional vehicles, then a more active political role for students and graduates might become counterproductive from the regime's standpoint.

3. Adult education and illiteracy

Hungary's extensive adult education program is administered by the Ministry of Culture and the National Council for Adult Education, which coordinate educational programs between other government and nongovernmental groups. Most adult education is aimed at three goals: updating and extending professional knowledge, promoting culture, and assuring "proper" ideological development. Both correspondence and evening courses are offered. In 1970 there were almost 4,500 houses of culture (a Soviet innovation combining bandstand, library, and lecture hall) and about 65 mobile centers which were used as facilities for conducting adult education courses. It is difficult to estimate the number of people the program reaches—one subsection alone claims to have reached almost 5 million people over a 2-year period—because of the partial and evasive statistics issued by the local organizations. Party study courses, often obligatory for advancement, are frequently integrated into the adult educational system.

Census data for 1960 were used in supporting claims that illiteracy had been eliminated, but subsequent studies have admitted that there is still a hard core of illiterates. U.N. estimates indicate that approximately 2% to 3% of the population is illiterate, mostly the very old and the Gypsy minority. The regime has offered cash awards to tutors who have helped illiterates pass a literacy test, but this measure has had little effect.

I. Artistic and cultural expression

1. Literature (C)

The cultural heritage of Hungary is closely linked with its political vicissitudes; throughout history notable figures in cultural life have frequently been outstanding participants in political affairs as well. Thus, Hungarian artistic expression reflects the deep-rooted sense of Magyar nationalism, strongly influenced by Western cultural and religious ideals. In literature and music, especially, Hungary has made extensive original contributions to European culture.

Hungarian literary efforts date from the 11th century. Later literature was closely associated with the intellectual, social, religious, and political upheavals which accompanied the Renaissance and the Reformation in Europe and the Turkish invasion of the Balkans. The Magyar struggle against foreign oppressors, first the Turks and then the Habsburgs, was clearly reflected in literature, such as Miklos Zrinyi's strongly nationalistic epic poem (1651) on the struggle against the Turks. Toward the close of the 18th century, reaction to the Habsburg rule gradually stimulated a literary revival, strongly influenced by rationalist and romanticist ideas from the United Kingdom and France. This Renaissance produced significant developments in poetry and also resulted in the establishment of the Hungarian National Theater. Much of the literature in the early 19th century centered on the struggle for political and social reform leading up to the 1848-49 revolution. Foremost among the persons who combined literary talents with revolutionary fervor during this period was the poet Sandor Petofi (Figure 23), whose works rank among the masterpieces of world literature. Petofi disappeared in one of the final revolutionary battles of 1849 and is believed to have been killed by Russian troops; his name was invoked in 1956 by Hungarian writers whose Petofi Circle embodied the revolutionary ideals of the poet and constituted the core of the intellectual ferment which in part precipitated the 1956 revolt.


FIGURE 23. Sandor Petofi (1823-49), Hungary's greatest poet (U/OU)

With the collapse of the 1848-49 revolution there began a period of "patriotic romanticism," which set the pattern and tone until the appearance of the literary periodical *Nyugat* (West) in 1908. A bold venture in literary experimentation, heavily influenced by the French symbolists, *Nyugat* soon became the rallying point for modernist Hungarian writers. In the years before World War I it established high literary standards and advocated full freedom of expression for all writers. Zoltan Ambrus, one of the early contributors to *Nyugat*, was a particularly outspoken partisan of literary freedom. One of his articles was quoted in May 1965 in a Hungarian provincial literary journal, as follows:

> **the right to criticize cannot be restricted by anything. . . . Freedom of thought is the first of the rights of freedom. It is followed immediately by freedom of the press. It is one of the safeguards of public freedom that everyone should be allowed to spread his ideas freely, by means of the press.**

Ambrus' comments were as applicable in early 1969 as in the early years of the 20th century.

The greatest poet to emerge from the literary renaissance stimulated by *Nyugat* was Endre Ady (1877-1919), founder of the Hungarian symbolist school, whose influence on 20th-century poetry and politics was comparable to that of Petofi during the preceding century. Ady was an impassioned nationalist critic of the pre-World War I establishment. His sensuous love poems struck a new chord in literature and dominated the style (which eventually degenerated into imitative mannerisms in the hands of his epigones) of lyric poetry until the rise in the 1920's and 1930's of a new school of modernists. Ady's antitraditionalism manifested itself also in his espousal of the sociopolitical objectives of the pre-World War I bourgeois radicals and Social Democrats. Before and during the first world conflict he castigated militarism, attacked the ruling Hungarian squirearchy, voiced the protests of the peasants and industrial workers, and called for a common front with non-Magyar nationalities against the existing order of things. With a mind clouded by disease, he died at the pinnacle of his influence as the poet of the revolution, during the short-lived republican regime following the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The interbellum period was characterized by considerable literary activity, from which emerged some of the outstanding modern writers, including Lajos Kassak, a leader of the *avant-garde* movement, Gyula Illyes (Figure 24), Hungary's greatest living writer, Laszlo Nemeth, a prominent playwright, and Sandor Weoros, a gifted poet. Another proletarian writer, Attila Jozsef, whose suicide in 1937 marked the end of a tragic life dominated by extreme poverty and by frequent disputes which culminated in his expulsion from the Hungarian Communist Party, is considered the outstanding poet of this period. The most important literary development of these years was the emergence of the populist movement, which was dedicated to a loosely formulated ideology and emphasized the role of the peasantry and folk culture in social development. Among the populist writers of this period, Gyula Illyes, Laszlo Nemeth, and Peter Veres remain prominent. A later generation of writers, who somewhat modified the trends of the populist movement, included Laszlo Benjamin, Ferenc Juhasz, Lajos Konya (an outspoken liberal poet), and Ferenc Santa, an outstanding novelist.



FIGURE 24. Gyula Illyes, contemporary author (C)

Several literary conferences were held at Balatonszarszo in 1942-43 and were attended by leading populist writers, political figures, and many young authors who later achieved public stature at the time of the 1956 revolt. Their announced goal was to develop a program to produce a cohesive, articulate peasant elite in opposition to the extremist elements prominent in Hungarian affairs at that time. The conferences again reflected the close relationship at critical times between political trends and the literary movement; no comparable assembly had been held since the time of the 1848 revolution, and none would follow until the establishment of the Petofi Circle in 1956. The conferences failed to develop a concrete program of action but provided the Communists with an opportunity to exert considerable influence over the younger generation of writers. The disillusionment of many populist intellectuals after the conferences created an atmosphere in which they were highly receptive to Marxist dialectics, and a number of young writers were temporarily drawn into the Communist camp.

Following World War II Hungarian cultural expression suffered a grave setback with the imposition of rigid Communist dogmatic controls over every form of intellectual life. The populist writers, whose ideals had undergone further modification during the war years, were joined by various Communist writers who often had no qualification except adherence to the party line. Among the few Communist writers of outstanding talent were Tibor Dery, Zoltan Zelk, Gyula Hay, and the world-renowned Marxist philosopher, Gyorgy Lukacs. The need to comply with the doctrinaire requirements of "socialist realism," however, was alien even to the dedicated Communist writers of ability, and gradually they ceased to conform to the regime's authoritarian demands. As early as 1952 Tibor Dery was publicly censured; the others also became participants in the intellectual ferment leading to the 1956 revolt and were all imprisoned by the regime. The New Course (1953-55) provided only temporary relief from the harshness of the cultural dictatorship, and nearly all writers of significance gradually became associated with the opposition forces which crystallized in the debates of the Petofi Circle between March and June 1956.

Opposition to the repressive policies of the Kadar regime following the 1956 revolt was expressed by most writers through the weapon of silence. The gradual introduction of more liberal cultural policies starting in 1959 and the eventual release (by 1963) of most writers imprisoned after the 1956 revolt ended the period of literary silence. Tibor Dery reappeared in print in 1962, and within the next 2 years most of the other silent writers had resumed publication.

Literary trends in the postrevolt period have generally followed the patterns established before World War I and are characterized by opposition to Communist dogmatism and bureaucracy, indifference toward regime goals, and frequent appeals for greater freedom of expression. Existentialism has been a prominent influence over many contemporary writers. In addition, some dissident Soviet literary themes have been reflected in Hungarian writing. A neopopulist group of younger writers has developed, largely disillusioned with communism and favorably influenced by the West; notable among these are Gyula Csak, Endre Fejes, and Sandor Somogyi-Toth. A modernist group, which can be traced back to the *avant-garde* movement led by Lajos Kassak and Attila Jozsef, has become a powerful literary force since the late 1920's. These writers include Lajos Maroti, the most characteristic young modernist poet, Gyorgy Timar, and Mihaly Sukosd. Other writers of note include Magda Szabo, a talented novelist, Gabor Garai, Sandor Csoori, and Erzsebet Galgoczi, writers of literary village sociography.

Although the conservative-dominated security apparatus still regards intellectuals, and particularly writers, as basically untrustworthy elements in society, Hungarian writers since the early 1960's have worked in an atmosphere comparatively free from overt censorship. Some forms of it, however, still exist—editors "suggest" revisions of certain writings, and "guidelines" are still issued to the press—but the arbitrary and absolute censorship of the 1950's is no longer in evidence. The greatest single restraint on writers is their fear, nourished by periodic warnings, that outright defiance will result in a return to strict "administrative measures." By placing responsibility for the continuation of liberal censorship policies on the writers themselves, the regime has almost succeeded in changing censorship from a state function to a personal discipline. Writers who practice such self-discipline receive tangible favors, including higher pay for their work from state-owned publishing houses, free vacations, trips abroad as members of cultural delegations, or opportunities for subsidized study. Since the system does not require mindless adulation of communism so much as neutrality, it is not particularly abrasive to artistic sensibilities; by writing on introspective or "safe" nonpolitical themes and by ignoring the traditional interplay between polemical literature and political development, most writers can assure themselves of a secure career.

Although most writers have apparently adjusted to the system, they have not been permitted to forget their historical responsibilities. During a 1967 interview, Gyula Illyes, whose longstanding reputation gives him a degree of self-assurance rare among lesser literary lights, outlined the historical responsibilities Hungarian writers must face up to:

> **Literature plays a most important role in the life of people like the Hungarians. There was a period when the state, its policies, and the administration were all foreign; what is more, they were hostile. Under such circumstances, only the language, literature, had any credit. It was all that the people could believe in. They do not forget it even after a century. That is exactly the historical burden to be borne by Hungarian writers; to shoulder, at all times and in all places, the burden of telling the truth. . . .**

Illyes' comments reflect the continuation among the literati of an active—although rarely expressed—interest in polemical nationalist literature. This movement survives even among writers with a decidedly Communist viewpoint. Gyorgy Lukacs, a perennial thorn in the side of the authorities, led a vigorous campaign aimed at completing the process of de-Stalinization. In this drive, Lukacs crashed head on with party cultural watchdog Gyorgy Aczel, who represented conservative fears that carrying de-Stalinization to its logical conclusion involves serious political risks for the regime and especially for those conservatives still holding power. The influence of Lukacs' ideas on younger writers has continued beyond his death in 1971.

In the early 1970's Hungarian literature began to show the increasing effects of Western literary styles, particularly the influence of existentialism. Frank indifference to the "socialist-realist" pablum ground out by regime-approved writers and a deeper introspection into the individual's conflict with the modern world are the hallmarks of this prose style. Neopopulism also thrives, with partial regime sanction. A massive project by the writers' union, called the "Discovery of Hungary" movement, was initiated in the late 1960's, and talented writers have accepted commissions to write artistic profiles of remote areas of the country which have been bypassed by modernization. This has in turn revived interest in the neglected peasant heritage and in traditional religious attitudes.

At their union congress in 1970, writers who had long boycotted the literary scene made an unprecedented return to the fold. Major talents, like Laszlo Benjamin, Sandor Csoori, Laszlo Nemeth, and Sandor Weoros, were among a long list of once-hostile intellectuals who accepted posts on the union's steering committee. This unprecedented accomodation between the intellectuals and the regime occurred without discernible friction. The motivation of both sides for the move is still unclear, but it is possible that the regime had reached a fundamental decision to allow the best writers more influence in cultural affairs.

The same year, 1970, saw the founding of a new literary journal, *Mozgo Vilag* (Moving World), designed specifically as a vehicle for young writers with experimental styles and little previous recognition. This was a timely extension of a regime policy which had neglected the youngest generation of writers in favor of those in their mid-forties who had their early careers blighted by Stalinist cultural repression.

Another phenomenon with a significant impact on the cultural scene is the increasing availability of contemporary Western literature. In 1970, 150 foreign titles were translated and published, but even greater numbers of books in the original language circulate freely in Hungary. Modern French, German, and to a lesser extent American literature are readily consumed by the Hungarian literati, most of whom read at least one major Western language.

Literary criticism is well developed in Hungary, and there are frequent examples of political boldness in the genre. In 1969, Maria Juhasz, a noted journalist, reviewed Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich for the literary journal *Kortars* and went quite far in condemning the Stalinist system and praising the portrayal of "the heroism of the antihero." Mrs. Juhasz, however, did find it expedient to ignore the fact that the Soviet regime had banned the book, and that it had systematically harrassed the author. In another example, a protracted debate took place in 1970 between *Kortars* and the party daily on the question of "patriotism" in Hungarian literature. *Kortars* argued that more critical, even deviant, literature should be published for the sake of stimulating thoughts on the issue. The party journal reverted to paternalistic platitudes on "serving the good of the nation" and clearly came off second best in the debate.

2. Music and drama (U/OU)

The Hungarian theater of the interbellum years was largely dominated by foreign contemporary and classical writers; the most popular Hungarian playwright of the period was Ferenc Molnar, whose works have achieved international acclaim. Hungarian music, which had not produced a composer of world stature since the time of Franz Liszt, found its greatest exponent in Bela Bartok (Figure 25).



FIGURE 25. Bela Bartok (1881-1945), composer (U/OU)

Combining the ancient musical idiom of Hungarian folk melodies with modern European, especially French, impressionistic techniques, Bartok created an authentic and original national music on the level of the highest European musical expression. Bartok's colleague, Zoltan Kodaly, attained somewhat lesser international acclaim but nevertheless was highly respected for his work in advancing the status of folk music. Kodaly devoted most of his life to teaching and was principally responsible for the introduction of folk music as the basis for instruction in Hungarian schools. Kodaly's funeral in March 1967 was marked by national mourning and the largest assemblage of Hungarian intellectuals since the 1956 revolt. To the chagrin of the party and government representatives, Kodaly was eulogized aloud as "the greatest contemporary Hungarian" and, in whispers, as "the last of the great Hungarians."

Theaters have retained their popularity despite the initial decrease in attendance which accompanied the advent of television. Two of Budapest's best theaters, the National Theater and the Comedy Theater, have excellent companies and extensive repertoires consisting of classical, modern, and national plays. Open-air theaters on Margaret Island in Budapest and on the steps of the cathedral in Szeged are also very popular in the warmer months. Satirical theaters abound in urban centers. In Budapest, the State Opera and the City Opera cater to music lovers, as does the National Symphony.

3. Fine arts (U/OU)

Hungarian achievement in architecture, painting, and sculpture further reflect the national assimilation of Western cultural forms, though a uniquely Hungarian element predominates in the folk arts. Since the 12th century Hungarian architectural design has been dominated by Italian, French, or German models. The Italian Renaissance provided the model for Hungarian artisans (Figure 26) and for court architecture of the late 15th century, during the reign of the Hungarian "Renaissance king," Matyas Corvinus, founder of the famous Corvina Library. During the Turkish occupation, through the end of the 17th century, nearly all of the art treasures created since the 12th century were destroyed, and Turkish styles were introduced. The neo-Byzantine influence disappeared with the departure of the Turks, however, and Hungary adopted baroque styles imported by the ruling Habsburgs.

The revival of Hungarian nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries deeply influenced the fine arts and gave impetus to experimentation with a variety of European styles. In sculpture and art, national heroes shared predominance with traditional folk themes. Hungarian artists, who normally sought their training in Paris and Munich, reflected the prevailing styles of Western Europe. Though no Hungarian artist has achieved the stature of the poet Petofi or the composer Bartok, several have attained a measure of international recognition. Mihaly Munkacsy was one of the first Hungarian painters to receive acclaim in Paris, and Pal Szinyei-Merse introduced the impressionist school to Hungary.



FIGURE 26. Gold chalice, made in 1440, is in the treasury of the Esztergom Cathedral (U/OU)

About the beginning of the 19th century an art colony was founded at Nagybanya (now Baia Mare, Romania) and fostered the development of Hungary's golden age of painting. These painters sought to express contemporary artistic styles in terms of



FIGURE 27. Castle Hill and Landchid (Chain Bridge) in 1945 and 1970. In the background is Buda Castle, originally built in 1255 and rebuilt about 1900, on the Buda side of Budapest. (U/OU)

traditional Hungarian ethnic and scenic milieus. Noteworthy among them were Karoly Ferenczy and Aurel Bernath; other important artists of this period were Janos Tornyai and Tivadar Csontvary, whose unique style developed independently of all schools and currents.

Since World War I Hungarian art has been influenced by the shifting trends of Western European painting, particularly impressionism, symbolism, and Italian naturalism. The work of Gyula Derkovits, who has received top honors from the Communist regime, reflected the strong influence of German expressionism during the interbellum period.

The imposition of Communist artistic criteria after World War II caused greater deterioration in the standards of contemporary Hungarian art and architecture than in the fields of literature and music. Nevertheless, wartime damage to architectural monuments and other structures deemed to be vital components of national culture has been painstakingly repaired (Figure 27). The principles of "socialist realism," which are still nominally the major guide for contemporary artists, have produced a body of artistically tasteless, stylistically monotonous imitations of Soviet paintings. Between 1945 and 1960 few Hungarian artists of talent were permitted to exhibit in Budapest, and architecture remained almost totally subservient to the neoclassical, pseudofunctional Soviet models. Hungarian artists who flourished in France in this period included Lajos Vajda, Endre Balint, and Jeno Barcsay.

Kadar's liberalized cultural policy has provided scant encouragement to innovationist trends in the fine arts; critics have repeatedly castigated abstractionism and other influences from Western Europe as alien to Communist cultural doctrine. Somewhat greater freedom has been permitted since 1960, however, and a number of artists have begun to produce and to exhibit works reflecting traditional European influences. Notable among them are the abstractionist Ferenc Martyn, Piroska Szanto, and Janos Orosz. Balint and Barcsay have also exhibited in Budapest, and the latter was represented at the 1964 Venice Biennale. Modern art, of course, suffers from the lack of official sanction. Since there is little or no opportunity to display or sell modern art, most artists experiment with it only as a diversion. The incomes of established artists are fairly high, as the result of a robust demand for landscapes, portraits, and sentimental rural still lifes.



Hungarian folk art, whose antecedents date back to pre-Christian times, concentrated on the representation of traditional peasant themes, customs, and superstitions in native dress, implements, and building decorations. Widely different artistic styles and characteristics developed in numerous regions of Hungary, reflecting the variety and stratification of peasant cultures. Despite this diversity, several basic themes—such as floral designs, geometric patterns, and sharply contrasting color schemes—dominate all Hungarian folk art (Figure 28).

Some elements of folk art have maintained their significance under the Communist regime. The traditional folk costumes—perhaps the highest form of Hungarian popular art—are still worn on special occasions, and many peasants continue to favor traditional styles of daily costumes (Figure 29). Other aspects of folk art—the production of artifacts, modern wearing apparel, wood carvings, and the like—are now mainly produced in folk art cooperatives under government direction for the foreign market. State regulations, in requiring conformance to the objectives of the Communist regime, have robbed folk art of much originality and spontaneity.

Some of Hungary's cultural institutions date back to the 11th century, when clerical orders first began assembling their Latin libraries. The Bibliotheca Corvina, assembled by the Renaissance king Matyas Corvinus in the 15th century, was the first sizable secular library in Hungary, and at the time was second in size only to the vast Vatican library. The National Szechenyi Library (established in 1802) is the largest in Hungary, containing over 4 million books, journals, and manuscripts. The library of Eotvos Lorand University is the central library for the network of university libraries, and the Library of the Academy of Sciences is the central source for most academic research. In addition, there is an extensive network of local public libraries and specialized libraries. Museums are also numerous, and they range from the largest, the National Museum in Budapest, to the specialized museums maintained by the separate ministries and local organizations.

J. Public information media (U/OU)

In the 19th and early 20th centuries the Hungarian press was more or less an open forum in which varying political views contended in public. Although many newspapers were tied into large publishing combines, their varying political viewpoints produced lively debate, and independent papers were very much a part of the journalistic scene. During the interwar era, under the Fascist regime of Admiral Miklos Horthy, leftist and Communist papers were forced to shut

FIGURE 28. The art of decorating walls is handed down from one generation to another in the Kalocsa region of the Great Plain (U/OU)

down or go underground, although the Social Democratic press was allowed to function until Hungary entered the war as a German ally. After World War II the political press again flourished, as many different parties opened papers to express their views on the future. Immediately after the Communists took power in 1947, they initiated "press reform" which closed down every major non-Communist paper and changed the press into a monolithic voice of the party. Since de-Stalinization censorship has been relaxed, but truly independent papers have not reappeared, because bureaucratic restraints—such as the restrictions on allocation of newsprint—remain in the hands of the party.

The high rate of literacy and the increasing concentration of population in urban complexes have favored rapid development of the mass media. In 1971 there were 29 dailies, 53 weeklies, and 80 biweeklies published in almost 1,050 million copies. The chief daily press organs are *Nepszabadsag*, *Magyar Nemzet*, and *Nepszava*. In January 1968, *Magyar Hirlap* (Hungarian Herald), a government organ, also began publication. Data on selected Hungarian newspapers and periodicals are contained in Figure 30.

In addition, 303 monthly journals are published, providing extensive coverage of the social sciences, art, sports, literature, medicine, philosophy, and natural and applied sciences. The literary journals published in Budapest and in provincial capitals are among the most influential components of the periodical press.

The Kadar regime has permitted these journals a degree of freedom of expression rare in Eastern Europe, and they are frequently embroiled in literary and political controversies. In 1956 Andras Hegedus, a former Stalinist Premier of Hungary and then editor of the social science journal *Valosag* (Reality), was harshly attacked by the regime for publishing articles of questionable ideological content, and he was finally removed from his editorial post. However, no criminal action has been taken against recalcitrant writers since 1957. Even Hegedus has continued to publish his views in other journals, including *Elet es Irodalom*, a major literary periodical.

In 1968 the editorial board of *Kortars* decided to publish a controversial article by Gyorgy Lukacs rather than allow liberal Yugoslav or Czechoslovak journals to print it first. In this instance, the editors (obviously under guidance from higher authority) avoided possible charges of muffling dissent while creating some basis for claims to "freedom of the press." The flexibility and sophistication of this action demonstrate the difference between the earlier heavyhanded Stalinist measures and those of the Kadar regime. In line with the new subtlety, Hungarian periodicals frequently engage in running debates on topics ranging from long hair to the nature and feasibility of modern war.

The Hungarian News Agency (*Magyar Tavirati Iroda*-MTI), has a network of regional and foreign collection points. In 1971 the MTI had full-time correspondents in 18 world capitals, including six in the West and four in less developed countries. The MTI has agreements for cooperation with 20 wire services, including *Agence France Presse*, the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters.

A 1971 survey on personal sources of current events information showed that for international events radio was the most widely used source, while the press was slightly more influential for domestic news. The percentage of the sample's respondents identifying one



FIGURE 29. Traditional peasant dress. The bride in the village of Tard wears the Matyo costume for her wedding. (U/OU)

or more media as the major source of their information is shown in percentages in the following tabulation:

SOURCE	WORLD EVENTS	DOMESTIC EVENTS
Radio	*80*	*44*
Newspapers	*66*	*46*
Television	*23*	*8*
Own experience	*na*	*27*
Friends, relatives	*2*	*9*
Other or no answer	*2*	...
Total	**173*	**134*

* NOTE—Many respondents named more than one source.

About one-fourth of all radio receivers are located in Budapest. In 1972 Hungary operated 11 AM and seven FM transmitters, of which four AM and two FM were located in Budapest.

TV facilities have been expanded dramatically since 1960 (Figure 31). In January 1970 one-third of the TV subscribers lived in Budapest, where the central transmitter is located. Hungary began experimental color broadcasts with French-Soviet SECAM equipment in March 1969. The use of the SECAM system facilitates cooperation with other Warsaw Pact countries that have adopted it.

The radio and TV network is administratively subordinate to the Government Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers, with the Ministry of Transportation and Postal Affairs having jurisdiction over technical facilities and operations. Hungary belongs to Intervision, an Eastern European and Soviet regional network which coordinates exchange of programs. Occasionally programs are also exchanged with Western Europe's Eurovision network.

Both the quality and the variety of radio and TV broadcasts have improved since 1960, although they remain far below Western standards. In the early 1960's authorities consciously attempted to raise the cultural level of their programs in order to frustrate the growth of "pop" music and other Western influences. As of 1972, however, Hungary's TV schedule presented a broad mixture of educational, cultural, and light entertainment programs. Many educational and cultural programs, including the Leonard Bernstein young people's concerts, were broadcast in schoolrooms. Such U.S. TV programs as "Bonanza"

FIGURE 30. Selected newspapers and periodicals, 1970 (U/OU)

NAME	PLACE OF PUBLICATION	FREQUENCY	CIRCULATION	PUBLISHER
Newspapers:				
Delmagyarorszag (Southern Hungary)	Szeged	Daily	41,000	Csongrad County Party Committee and Szeged City Party Committee.
Dunantuli Naplo (Transdanubian Journal)	Pecs	....*do*	68,000	Baranya County Party Committee and County Council.
Esti Hirlap (Evening Herald)	Budapest	....*do*	252,000	Budapest Party Committee.
Eszakmagyarorszag (Northern Hungary)	Miskolc	....*do*	52,000	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP), Borsod County.
Hajdu-Bihari Naplo (Hajdu-Bihar County Journal)	Debrecen	....*do*	53,000	Hajdu-Bihar County Party Committee.
Hetfoi Hirek (Monday News)	Budapest	Weekly	211,000	"Supports policy of the Patriotic People's Front."
Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian Herald)	....*do*	Daily	48,000	Government.
Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian Nation)	....*do*	....*do*	111,000	Patriotic People's Front.
Nephadsereg (People's Army)	....*do*	Weekly	*na*	Ministry of Defense.
Nepszabadsag (People's Freedom)	....*do*	Daily	756,000	Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.
Nepszava (People's Voice)	....*do*	....*do*	277,000	National Trade Unions Council.
Radio es Televizio Ujsag (Radio and Television News).	....*do*	Weekly	808,000	Hungarian Radio and Television.
Szabad Fold (Free Land)	....*do*	....*do*	373,000	Patriotic People's Front.
Periodicals:				
Alfold (Lowland)	Debrecen	Monthly	*na*	Independent literary journal.
Elet es Irodalom (Life and Literature)	Budapest	Weekly	25,000	The major independent literary journal.
Figyelo (Observer)	....*do*	....*do*	28,000	Independent review of economic policy and statistical analysis.
Ifju Kommunista (Young Communist)	....*do*	Monthly	*na*	Journal of the Central Committee, Communist Youth League (KISz).
Ifjusagi Magazin (Youth Magazine)	....*do*	....*do*	226,000	Youth Journal for Teenagers, published by KISz; began publication in November 1965.
Jelenkor (The Present Age)	Pecs	....*do*	*na*	Independent literary journal.
Katolikus Szo (Catholic World)	Budapest	Biweekly	*na*	Journal of the regime-sponsored Catholic Committee of the Nation Peace Council.
Kereskedelmi Szemle (Commercial Review)	....*do*	Quarterly	*na*	Journal of the Domestic Trade Research Institute.
Kortars (Contemporary)	....*do*	Monthly	13,000	Literary journal of the Hungarian Writers Federation.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Journal of the Economics Institute, Hungarian Academy of Science.
Kritika (Criticism)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Journal of the Literary History Institute of the Academy of Science, the Hungarian Literary History Society, and the Hungarian Writers Federation; critiques of Hungarian and world literature.
Kulkereskedelem (Foreign Trade)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Journal of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce.
Ludas Maty (Matyi, the Gooseboy)	....*do*	Weekly	590,000	Independent, popular, illustrated satire magazine.
Magyar Ifjusag (Hungarian Youth)	....*do*	....*do*	226,000	Youth Journal of KISz.
Magyar Jog (Hungarian Law)	....*do*	Monthly	*na*	Journal of the Hungarian Lawyers Federation.

Magyar Kozlony	....*do*	Irregularly	*na*	The Official Gazette, published by the Council of Ministers.
Magyarorszag (Hungary)	....*do*	Weekly	121,000	Independent political journal dealing primarily with international affairs.
Magyar Tudomany (Hungarian Science)	....*do*	Monthly	*na*	Professional journal of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Mozgo Vilag (Moving World)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Literary journal for young writers.
Muszaki Elet (Technical Life)	....*do*	Biweekly	*na*	Journal of the Federation of Technical and Natural Science Associations; for and by the technical intelligentsia.
Nagyvilag (Great World)	Miskolc	Monthly	17,000	Independent philosophical journal.
Napjaink (Our Days)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Independent literary.
Nepmuveles (Popular Culture)	Budapest	....*do*	*na*	Official organ of the Ministry of Culture; intended as a practical aid to cultural workers.
Nok Lapja (Women's Weekly)	....*do*	Weekly	610,000	Journal of the National Council of Hungarian Women.
Orszag Vilag (Land and World)	....*do*	....*do*	224,000	Journal of the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society.
Partelet (Party Life)	....*do*	Monthly	95,000	Party organizations journal of the Central Committee, HSWP.
Polgari Vedelem (Civil Defense)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Journal of the National Headquarters of Civil Defense.
Statisztikai Szemle (Statistical Review)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Official statistical journal of the Central Statistical Office.
Tarsadalmi Szemle (Social Review)	....*do*	....*do*	36,000	Party theoretical journal of the Central Committee, HSWP.
Tiszataj (Tisza Region)	Szeged	....*do*	*na*	Literary journal of the Southern Writers Group, Hungarian Writers Federation.
Tukor (The Looking Glass)	Budapest	Weekly	164,000	Independent, popular, illustrated journal.
Uj Elet (New Life)	....*do*	Semimonthly	*na*	Independent Jewish religious journal.
Uj Ember (New Man)	....*do*	Weekly	*est.* 61,000	Journal of Catholic religious affairs, published by Actio Catholica.
Uj Iras (New Writing)	....*do*	Monthly	17,060	Independent literary journal.
Valosag (Reality)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Domestic social science journal of the Society for the Propagation of Scientific Knowledge (TIT).
Vilagossag (Light)	....*do*	....*do*	*na*	Atheist propaganda journal of TIT.

NOTE—Daily newspapers do not publish on Monday, except *Esti Hirlap*, which does not publish on Sunday.
na Data not available.



FIGURE 31. Radio and television subscribers (U/OU)

and the "Flintstones" have been dubbed into Hungarian and are shown regularly. Hungarian officials admit that there is pressure from viewers for more situation comedies and adventure series. When television was first introduced to Hungary, antennas near the Austrian border were turned toward Vienna; now, the story goes, the Austrian frontier sets are turned in to Budapest.

Despite the increasingly sophisticated approach of the regime to political and social issues as reflected in better radio and TV programing, the propaganda content of most media is still pervasive. There is no good measure of its effectiveness. It can be said, however, that inasmuch as propaganda accurately portrays reality and concrete achievements, it is accepted. Insofar as it reflects regime goals, particularly support of international Communist goals, it has not been accepted, even by many rank-and-file party members.

In domestic propaganda, the regime uses the media to persuade the population to accept Hungary's alliance with the Soviet Union, to remind the people of the party's primacy over society, to hail the "superiority" of the "socialist system," to denigrate many things Western, and to press for further participation in the pursuit of regime goals. Now that the 1956 revolt is receding into history, especially as far as youth is concerned, the amount of propaganda concerning the origins of the revolt (reactionary counterrevolutionaries at home aided by U.S. Fascist-imperialists abroad) has decreased. Instead, domestic propaganda is directed at what the regime considers its most pressing problems, such as the ideological training of young people, getting them to make a personal commitment to Hungarian society; countering "negative" Western ideological and cultural influences; and pushing the achievement of economic goals. Counterreligious and atheist propaganda, never very effective, has been abandoned.

Radio serves as the principal medium for the dissemination of information directed into Hungary. The chief broadcasters are the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The primary purposes of Western broadcasts are to maintain a semblance of a Western presence among the Hungarian people, keep alive traditional friendliness toward the West, and combat the image presented by regime media of developments both within Hungary and in the outside the world. The full effectiveness of Western broadcasts into Hungary cannot be determined, but most Hungarians seem to view them as a useful means of crosschecking the information supplied by other media. Hungary stopped jamming Western broadcasts in February 1964.

The publishing industry consists of 16 publishing houses, all run by the state. In 1970 they produced 28,000 works in 85.5 million copies (including such items as maps and sheet music). Publishing houses printed 4,763 titles in 47 million copies in 1970, a ratio of 47 titles per 100,000 citizens, which is surpassed in Eastern Europe only by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Figure 32 depicts the distribution, by type, of books printed in 1970.

The output of the film industry, highly developed and internationally respected prior to World War II, considerably diminished in quality under the Communist regime. The subordination of artistic elements to ideological objectives, the dismissal of talented but politically unreliable personnel, and the establishment of elaborate bureaucratic production



NOTE: "*Other*" *government publications, etc., about 3,500,000 copies*

FIGURE 32. Publishing, by type of book (U/OU)

procedures severely hampered the development of the industry during the 1950's. Since 1961, however, there has been gradual improvement in the quality of Hungarian films, commensurate with a decrease in ideological content. Several films have won awards at international film festivals in both Eastern and Western Europe.

The rapid spread of television, however, has led to decreased motion picture attendance. For example, in 1967 Hungary had 4,448 motion picture theaters, but by 1970 there were only 3,879. In 1960 over 140 million people patronized movies, but in 1970 the number dropped below the 80 million mark. Despite this pattern, in 1970 the state film industry produced 64 feature films, compared with 41 in 1969, and only 23 in 1965. In 1970, 392 documentaries and newsreels were also produced in Hungary, and 151 foreign films were imported. Of this number 67 were imported from non-Communist countries, and 25 of these were U.S. films.

The legitimate theater in Hungary has traditionally received wide support and attendance from the literate population. There are 20 major theaters in Budapest and 14 in provincial cities, with a total capacity of 13,088 and 8,269 respectively. During 1970 Budapest theaters gave 5,049 performances, and provincial theaters gave 6,940 performances, compared with 5,500 and 7,700 respectively in 1967. As with movie attendance, the small decline is probably due to the growth of television. Foreign plays predominate in the Hungarian repertoire, with Western plays being consistently the biggest box office successes.

K. Selected bibliography (U/OU)

There is an exhaustive literature on premodern Magyar history and society, but most of it is unavailable in English translation (most often cited among these works are Geza Roheim's *Hungarian Popular Beliefs and Customs*, Ignac Acsady's *History of the Hungarian Serfs*, and E. Lederer's *Structure of Hungarian Society Before the Middle Ages*. Ferenc Eckhardt's *Short History of the Hungarian People* (London, 1931) is probably the best English-language introduction to the premodern period.

For the modern period, C. Z. Macartney's *History of Modern Hungary, 1929-45* (two volumes, London, 1957) is the standard classic. For an interpretation of Hungarian history, politics, and culture from the regime point of view, see the mammoth *Information Hungary*, edited by Ference Erdei, the late Vice President of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Oxford, 1968)

Gyula Illyes' *People of the Puszta* (Budapest, 1967) is an excellent sociological portrait of rural peasant society before the 1930's, by one of the most gifted Magyar writers of this century. Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera's *The Green Shirts and the Others* (Stanford, 1970) offers a thorough treatment of the rise of fascism in Hungary from 1919 until 1945. Hugh Seton-Watson's *East Europe Between the Wars, 1918-41* (Cambridge, 1946) puts Hungary in the perspective of surrounding events and powers in this period.

There is a paucity of objective literature on the temper and direction of Hungarian society since the Communist takeover—and especially since the 1956 revolt. Paul Zinner's *Revolution in Hungary* (New York, Columbia, 1962) is generally considered the best treatment of the revolt itself and has two excellent sections (over half the book) on the rise of communism from 1945 until 1956. *Revolt of the Mind* by Tomas Aczel and Tibor Meray (New York, 1959) is an excellent treatment of the role played by writers and intellectuals in fomenting the revolt, as is Istvan Csicsery-Ronay's *Revolution of the Poets* (Vienna, 1957).

There is an abundance of literature on current attitudes and social problems. An interpretation of the artistic-intellectual mood is in A. Alvarez, *Under Pressure: The Writer in Society, East Europe and the US* (Penguin, Baltimore, 1965), which contains interviews with leading Hungarian writers. For the casual student, a general flavor of contemporary Hungary can be gleaned from the mass consumption magazine *Hungarian Review* and the literary-sociological journal *New Hungarian Quarterly*, both of which are available in English. The latter often publishes articles dealing with such specific problems as birth, crime, and housing, as well as poetry, fiction, and book reviews. The government itself publishes the annual *Hungarian Statistical Pocketbook* in both Hungarian and English. In addition, the catalog *Books from Hungary*, published quarterly, lists all current Hungarian works available in English translation.

Places and features referred to in this chapter (U/OU)

	COORDINATES			
	°	'N.	°	'E.
Békéscsaba	46	41	21	06
Budapest	47	30	19	05
Danube (*strm*)	45	20	29	40
Debrecen	47	32	21	38
Dunaújváros	46	59	18	56
Győr	47	41	17	38
Hódmezővásárhely	46	25	20	20
Kaposvár	46	22	17	48
Kecskemét	46	54	19	42
Miskolc	48	06	20	47
Mohács	45	59	18	42
Nyíregyháza	47	57	21	43
Pécs	46	05	18	14
Pest (*sec of Budapest*)	47	30	19	05
Somogy	46	07	18	19
Szeged	46	15	20	10
Székesfehérvár	47	12	18	25
Szolnok	47	11	20	12
Szombathely	47	14	16	37
Tard	47	53	20	37
Tatabánya	47	34	18	25
Veszprém	47	06	17	55