

DEFENSE WITNESSES - UMEZU

DOC. NO.	NAME OF WITNESS	EXAM. ATTORNEY
2953	WAKAMATSU, TADAICHI	
2909	SHIMOMURA, SADAMU	
2908	NISHIO, TOSHIZO	
2965	INOUE, TADAO	
2954	AYABE, KENTARO	
2959	TAKEI, SEITARO	
2962	IKEDA, SUMIHISA	
2957	SHIBAYAMA, KENSHIRO	
2960	KOSAKA, YASUMASA	
2961	KANEMITSU, TSUNEO	
2963	TANAKA, RYUKICHI	



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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

29 August 1947

STATEMENT OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RE UMEZU, YOSHIJIRO

<u>Year</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1934	ISHIKAWA testified that UMEZU took command of the Chinese garrison in April, 1934, (being a personal friend of UMEZU) and that amongst other things, UMEZU stated to him, "I would rather prefer to be called a fool during my stay than have any trouble with China." (Record 20,783-5).
1935	SHIBAYAMA testified that he heard directly from General UMEZU that the 4th Battalion of Gendarmerie and terroristic elements of the Chinese army should be cleared from north China in order to make more peaceful the conditions there and that UMEZU talked to the Chinese authorities about moving them and the arrangement was later embodied in the UMEZU-HO-Ying-chien Agreement. (Record 20,778-9).
1935	ISHIKAWA gave a survey of evidence leading up to the HO-UMEZU Agreement and stated that UMEZU told him that he sent the Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI with "items desired by us to talk with representatives of the Chinese Government," and that the items suggested were briefly that the military forces and political party local chapter should be removed from the districts where Japanese residents are, and that as a result General HO-Ying chien accepted the items proposed by the Japanese Army and withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. ISHIKAWA further testified that on 29 May he heard that UMEZU's Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI, had called on General HO-Ying chien and submitted various "demands" to him. (Record 20,786-7).
1935	ISHIKAWA stated that in the middle of June at the incidence of the Chinese Vice Minister of the Department of Internal Affairs, he notified UMEZU that Kwantung Army airplanes were flying over the withdrawing central military forces, whereupon UMEZU wired the Kwantung Army and had it stopped. (Record 20,788).
1935	UMEZU was criticized by his Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI, because he rejected military oppression or coercion policies. (Record 20,789).
1937	Witness MITARAI under cross examination stated that UMEZU was Vice Minister of War in the HIROTA Cabinet and as such acted as subordinate to the War Minister, and that a statement made by him on 27 January would be by order of the War Minister. (Exhibit 2208, Record 17,834-5).
1937	Witness OKADA stated that when the War Minister realized the importance of the General Staff economic plan (Exhibit 841-2), opinion changed. UMEZU became positively interested in it at this point. (Record 18,312-3).
1943	ODAJIMA states in Defense Document 2173, paragraph 6, "General UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army, taking seriously to heart the POW's state of health and especially the number of epidemic cases among them, issued special instruction in February, 1943, to the Chief Supply Officer of



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the Kwantung Army and the officer in charge of the Kwantung Army's anti-infection and water supply main depot to the effect that the medical service at the Mukden POW Camp be strengthened by allotting or despatching many medical personnel to this camp, in order to take steps for the immediate restoration of the POW's physical strength, and to help and direct the medical service at this camp." (Defense Document No. 2003).



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STATEMENT OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE RE UMEZU, YOSHIJIRO

- Year
- 1934 ISHIKAWA testified that UMEZU took command of the Chinese garrison in April, 1934, and that among other things, UMEZU stated to him, "I would rather prefer to be called a fool during my stay than have any trouble with China." (ISHIKAWA was a personal friend of UMEZU). (Record 20,783-5).
  - 1935 SHIBAYAMA testified that he heard directly from General UMEZU that the 4th Battalion of Gendarmerie and terroristic elements of the Chinese Army should be cleared from north China in order to make more peaceful the conditions there, and that UMEZU talked to the Chinese authorities about moving them and the arrangement was later embodied in the UMEZU-HO-Ying-chien Agreement. (Record 20,77809).
  - 1935 ISHIKAWA gave a survey of evidence leading up to the HO-UMEZU Agreement and stated that UMEZU told him that he sent the Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI with "items desired by us to talk with representatives of the Chinese Government," and that the items suggested were, briefly, that the military forces and political party local chapter should be removed from the districts where Japanese residents are, and that as a result, General HO-Ying chien accepted the items proposed by the Japanese Army and withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. ISHIKAWA further testified that on 29 May he heard that UMEZU's Chief of Staff, Colonel SAKAI, had called on General HO-Ying-chien and submitted various "demands" to him. (Record 20,786-7).
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  - 1937 Witness OKADA stated that when the War Minister realized the importance of the General Staff economic plan (Exhibit 841-2), opinion changed. UMEZU became positively interested in it at this point. (Record 18,312-3).
  - 1939-1941 Witness IIMURA, Minoru, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from September, 1939 until October, 1940, and Commander of the 5th Army from October, 1941 until October, 1943, contends that in September, 1939 the first duty of persons under UMEZU was to settle the Nomonghan Incident in accordance with instructions from Tokyo. UMEZU, in an effort to prevent border incidents, issued the Border Guard Regulations, and according to the witness, not a single border clash occurred during his term of five years in the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit 2679 - Record 23,396-23,474).



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- 1939-1941 During the cross examination of IIMURA, Minoru, it was discovered that he had served in the Kwantung Army for only three years during that period, and that he did not know how the number of border incidents actually had been increasing from year to year. (Record 23,405-6).
- 1939 Witness IIMURA, Minoru quoted from memory two of UMEZU's speeches made in 1939, in one of which UMEZU allegedly refused to request reinforcement of the Kwantung Army notwithstanding the fact that it had suffered heavy losses in the Momonghan Area, and proposed to strengthen border fortifications and to avoid border troubles. (Record 23,402). (Exhibit 2679).
- 1939-1941 IIMURA, Minoru admitted that UMEZU had been in charge of the special funds of the Kwantung Army, and that he (UMEZU) issued instructions stipulating that the use of more than 10,000 yen of the special funds required his approval. (The funds were used mainly on subversive activities. (Record 23,407-10).
- 1939-1940 In his second affidavit, IIMURA, Minoru contends that the construction of fortifications in Manchuria was of defensive nature. He also admits that the Kwantung Army Staff had plans of construction of airbases and airfields, and that during the year from 1939 to 1940 there were not many airbases or airfields constructed. (Exhibit 2684, Record 23,473-4).
- 1941-1942 Witness TANAKA, Shinichi, Chief of First Division, Army General Staff, stated that the Japanese Army General Staff formulated plans of operations against the Soviet Union in 1941 and 1942. The witness admitted that in July, 1941, Imperial Headquarters gave instructions to the Commander of the Kwantung Army that the purpose of the Kantokuen was to strengthen preparedness of the Kwantung Army against the U.S.S.R. (Exhibit 2676, Record 23,303-23,339).
- 1941-1943 Witness YAMAMURA, Haruo, Commander of the 7th Independent Garrison Force from November, 1941 to August, 1943, stated UMEZU was especially selected as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army after the Nomonghan Incident for the purpose of insuring peace, and that he held several conferences of army commanders at which he instructed them not to cause or permit any trouble with the Soviet forces. (Exhibit 2680, Record 23,416-7).
- 1941-1945 Witness KASAHARA, Yukio, Commander of the 12th Division from May, 1941 to August, 1942, and Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from August, 1942 to April, 1945, testified that the Operations Plan of the Japanese Army was sent from Tokyo as instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army (UMEZU), and that plan of operations against the U.S.S.R. for 1942 provided for an offensive in the Southern Maritime Province and for attacking Soviet airbases. In 1942, UMEZU told the witness the Japanese policy should be: "Not to invade, not to be invaded." (Exhibit 2670, Record 23,190-217).



- 1942-1943 Witness HANAWA, Yoshiyuki, former Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, stated that Ambassador UMEZU's first principle was the maintenance of peace and order in Manchukuo, and the policy of having no trouble with the Soviet Union. He further stated that in July, 1942 during the talk with the German Minister Wagner, UMEZU expressed the opinion that it would be most advantageous for Japan to concentrate on the Greater East Asia War even though the question of Japan's joining the Russo-German War was a matter for Tokyo to decide. (Exhibit 2678, Record 23,391-3).
- 1942-1943 Witness KOZUKI, Yoshio, Commander of the Second Army from July, 1942 to May, 1943, stated that UMEZU instructed him to avoid border trouble with the U.S.S.R. (Exhibit 2683, Record 23,458-465).
- 1943 Witness ODAJIMA, Tadashi stated, "General UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army, taking seriously to heart the POW's state of health and especially the number of epidemic cases among them, issued special instruction in February, 1943, to the Chief Supply Officer of the Kwantung Army and the officer in charge of the Kwantung Army's anti-infection and water supply main depot to the effect that the medical service at the Mukden POW Camp be strengthened by allotting or despatching many medical personnel to this camp, in order to take steps for the immediate restoration of the POW's physical strength, and to help and direct the medical service at this camp." (Exhibit 3109, Record 27,814).
- 1943-1944 Witness MATSUMURA, Tomokatsu, stated that he was under the command of General UMEZU from August, 1943 to July, 1944 and that during that time UMEZU often said to him that his chief policy was to keep peace with the Soviet Union and to prevent the occurrence of border disputes. (Exhibit 2673, Record 23,212).



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

23 June 1947

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11/19/47

STATEMENT OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AS TO UMEZU, YOSHIJIRO

Born: 4 January 1882 (5th year of Meiji)  
Former last name: KORENAGA  
1904 Mar. 18 Appointed sublieutenant. Attached to the First Infantry Regiment.  
1904 May 17 Granted the Senior Grade of the Eighth Court Rank  
1905 June 30 Appointed lieutenant  
1905 Aug. 18 Raised to the Junior Grade of the Seventh Court Rank  
1906 Feb. 13 Relieved of the former office and assigned to the post of adjutant of the First Infantry Brigade  
1906 Apr. 1 Decorated with the 5th class of the Order of the Golden Kite  
Decorated with the Sixth Order of Merit of the Order of the Single Rays of the Rising Sun  
1907 July 20 Relieved of the former office and attached to the First Infantry Regiment  
1907 Dec. 21 Relieved of the former office and assigned to the post of adjutant of the First Infantry Brigade  
1908 Dec. 11 Ordered to enter the Military Staff College  
1909 Jan. 12 Relieved of the former office and attached to the First Infantry Regiment  
1910 Sept. 30 Raised to the Senior Grade of the Seventh Court Rank  
1912 Mar. 25 Appointed Captain (Cabinet). Relieved of the former office and appointed company commander of the First Infantry Regiment  
1912 June 1 Relieved of the former office and assigned staff officer of the General Staff Office.  
1913 Apr. 22 Relieved of the former office and ordered to reside in Germany to study military affairs (the War Ministry)  
1913 May 31 Decorated with the Fifth Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure  
1914 Aug. 23 Appointed an officer attached to the General Staff Office.  
1914 Nov. 28 Appointed commissioner for the War Prisoners Information Bureau (The War Ministry)  
1915 Mar. 1 Relieved of the same (the War Ministry). Relieved of the post as an officer attached to the General Staff Office, and ordered to reside in Denmark for the purpose of studying military affairs (the War Ministry).  
1915 Oct. 30 Granted the Junior Grade of the Sixth Court Rank  
1915 Nov. 7 Decorated with the Fourth Order of Merit with the Small Cordon of the Rising Sun. A grant of money, ¥ 500. Granted the war medal in commemoration of the War 1914-1915.  
1917 May 8 Relieved of the duty in Denmark (the War Ministry). Appointed a staff officer of the General Staff Office (the War Ministry)  
1918 Feb. 5 Appointed member of the State Examinations Committee for Higher Civil Service in foreign language.  
1918 June 1 Appointed Infantry Major of the Army (Cabinet)  
1918 July 24 Concurrently appointed a Marshal's Adjutant. Attached to Marshal Count OKU, Yasutsuyo (The War Ministry).



- 1919 Feb. 5 Ordered to make an official trip to Europe (Cabinet)
- 1919 Apr. 1 Relieved of the additional post (the War Ministry)
- 1919 July 26 Relieved of the duty as member of the State Examinations Committee in foreign language.
- 1919 Sept. 2 Relieved of the former principal duty and appointed an officer attached to the General Staff Office (the War Ministry)
- 1919 Nov. 1 Relieved of the post as an officer attached to the General Staff Office. Appointed a Military Attache to the Japanese Legation in Switzerland (Cabinet). Ordered to supervise resident-officers in Switzerland (the War Ministry)
- 1920 Nov. 30 Granted the Senior Grade of the Sixth Court Rank
- 1920 Nov. 1 Granted ¥ 2,400 as a reward for meritorious services during the war of 1915 to 1920
- 1921 June 13 Relieved of the former principal duty (Cabinet). Appointed as a staff-officer of the General Staff Office (the War Ministry)
- 1922 Feb. 8 Appointed Infantry Lieutenant-Colonel of the Army
- 1922 Mar. 29 Decorated with the Third Order of Merit of the Order of the Sacred Treasure
- 1923 Mar. 17 Relieved of the former principal duty. Appointed an officer of the Ordnance Bureau of the War Ministry concurrently appointed an officer of Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and Instructor of Military Science at the Army Staff College (War Ministry)
- 1924 Dec. 15 Appointed Infantry Colonel (Cabinet). Appointed Third Infantry Regiment Commander (War Ministry)
- 1924 Dec. 27 Granted the Junior Grade of the Fifth Court Rank
- 1925 Dec. 1 Relieved of the former duties and appointed Section Chief of the General Staff Office (War Ministry)
- 1927 Apr. 15 Concurrently appointed Instructor of Military Science at the Army Staff College (War Ministry)
- 1927 Apr. 21 Concurrently appointed member of the Research Department of the Army Communications School (War Ministry)
- 1927 Aug. 23 Appointed a councilor of the Army Technical Council (Cabinet)
- 1928 Aug. 14 Appointed an official of the Coronation Ceremonies (Commissioner of the Coronation). Ordered to serve in the Ceremonies Department (Commissioner of the Coronation)
- 1927 Oct. 12 Ordered to make an official trip to Kyoto prefecture (Commissioner of the Coronation)
- 1928 Oct. 29 Ordered to accompany the Emperor to the Coronation Ceremony (Cabinet)
- 1928 Dec. 28 Decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun (a reward for services during the enthronement ceremonies)
- 1928 Oct. 10 Appointed Chief of the Military Affairs Section, Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry, without change with regard to the former additional post as member of the Research Department of the Army Communications School (War Ministry)
- 1929 Jan. 15 The Office of the Commissioners of Coronation abolished (in red ink)
- 1930 Feb. 1 Granted the Senior Grade of Fifth Court Rank
- 1930 Aug. 1 Appointed a major-general (Cabinet). Appointed commander of the First Infantry Brigade (War Ministry)
- 1930 Aug. 9 Relieved of the former office of councilor of the Army Technical Council (Cabinet)
- 1931 Aug. 1 Appointed Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff Office (War Ministry)



- 1932 Oct. 6 Appointed a temporary member of the Horse Administration Investigations Commission (Cabinet)
- 1933 Aug. 1 Attached to the General Staff Office (War Ministry)
- 1933 Sept. 4 Decorated with the Second Order of Merit of the Order of the Sacred Treasure
- 1933 Sept. 25 Relieved of the post of temporary member of the Horse Administration Investigations Commission at his own request (Cabinet)
- 1934 Mar. 5 Appointed Commander of the Army stationed in China (War Ministry)
- 1934 Aug. 1 Appointed Lieutenant-General (Cabinet)
- 1934 Sept. 1 Granted the Junior Grade of the Fourth Court Rank
- 1935 Aug. 1 Relieved of the former post (War Ministry)
- 1934 Apr. 29 Decorated with the Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun as a reward for meritorious services during the Incident (1931-1934)
- 1936 Mar. 23 Relieved of his principal office (War Ministry). Appointed Vice-Minister of War. Promoted to the First Rank of the Higher Civil Service (Cabinet)
- 1936 Mar. 23 Appointed Chairman of the Army Munitions Investigations Council (Cabinet)
- 1936 Apr. 8 Appointed a councilor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. Appointed a member of the Central Statistics Commission. Appointed a member of the National Resources Investigation Council. Appointed a member of the North-Eastern Districts Development Investigation Council (Cabinet). (Abolished by Imperial Ordinance No. 176 - 1938)
- 1936 Apr. 14 Appointed a member of the Steel Industries Investigation Commission (Cabinet). Appointed a member of the Council for the Peers' School (Ministry of the Imperial Household)
- 1936 Apr. 18 Appointed a member of the Home Products Encouragement Commission. Appointed a member of the Weight and Measure System Investigation Commission (Cabinet)
- 1936 Apr. 22 Appointed acting Chief of the Army Arsenal (War Ministry)
- 1936 Apr. 30 Appointed a member of the Temporary Romaji Investigation Committee (Cabinet). Appointed member of the 2600th Year Anniversary Celebrations Preparation Commission (Abolished 1 July 1936)
- 1936 May 2 Appointed Government Commissioner in charge of War Ministry Affairs (during the 69th session of the Diet) (Cabinet)
- 1936 May 4 Appointed a member of the State Property Investigation Commission (Cabinet). Appointed a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Construction of the Central Government Buildings (Cabinet). Appointed a member of the Investigation Committee for Horse Administration (Cabinet)
- 1936 June 30 Appointed a member of the Engineer's Conference (Cabinet)
- 1936 May 12 Appointed member of the Council for Educational Reform (Cabinet)
- 1936 July 1 Appointed a member of the Committee for the Celebration of the 2600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Empire (Cabinet)
- 1936 July 1 Appointed a member of the Information Committee (Cabinet) This was abolished by Imperial Edict No. 519 issued in 1937.
- 1936 July 13 Appointed a councilor of the Information Bureau (Cabinet). Appointed councilor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau.
- 1936 July 30 Appointed a member of the Committee for the Establishment of the Formosan Colonization Company Ltd. (Cabinet).



UMEZU, Yoshijiro

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- 1936 Sept. 9 Appointed a member of the Automobile Manufacturing Business Commission (Cabinet)
- 1936 Aug. 1 Relieved of the post of Acting President of the Army Arsenal (War Ministry)
- 1936 Nov. 28 Relieved of the post of member of the Committee for the Establishment of the Formosan Colonization Company, Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1936 Dec. 24 Appointed Government Commissioner in Charge of War Ministry Affairs during the 70th Session of the Imperial Diet (Cabinet).
- 1937 May 10 Appointed part-time Special member of the Temporary Price Control Commission (Abolished 3 December 1937)
- 1937 May 14 Became Councilor of the Cabinet Investigation Bureau (Abolished according to Imperial Ordinance No. 192 issued in 1937)
- 1937 July 1 Appointed temporary member of the Central Economic Society (Cabinet). (Abolished according to Imperial Ordinance No. 85 issued in 1938)
- 1937 Sept. 16 Appointed a member of the Establishment Committee for the Imperial Fuel Industries Company, Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1937 Sept. 25 Appointed a member of the Cabinet Information Bureau (Cabinet)
- 1937 Oct. 1 Appointed a member of the Shipping Control Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Nov. 16 Appointed a member of the Central Air Defense Committee (Cabinet)
- 1937 Nov. 26 Appointed a councilor in the Planning Board (Cabinet)
- 1937 Dec. 10 Appointed a member of the Education Research Society (Cabinet)
- 1938 Jan. 15 Appointed a member of the Commission for the Protection of Sick and Wounded Soldiers (Cabinet)
- 1938 Jan. 20 Relieved of the post of member of the Establishment Committee for the Imperial Fuel Industries Company Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1938 Jan. 25 Appointed a member of the Liquid Fuels Commission (Cabinet)
- 1938 Feb. 16 Appointed a member of the Central City Planning Committee (Cabinet)
- 1938 Feb. 19 Appointed a member of the Planning and Research Committee (Cabinet)
- 1938 Apr. 15 Appointed a member of the Science Research Committee (Cabinet)
- 1936 July 10 Decorated with the First Order of Merit of the Order of the Sacred Treasure as a reward for meritorious services during the Incident 1931-1934.
- 1938 Apr. 22 Appointed a member of the Central Price Control Commission (Cabinet)
- 1938 Apr. 30 Appointed a member of the Establishing Committee for the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company, Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1938 May 18 Appointed a member of the Estimating Committee Regarding Government Investments in the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company, Ltd. (Cabinet)
- 1938 May 25 Appointed a temporary member of the Electric Power Research Society (Cabinet)
- 1938 May 30 Relieved of his principal office at his own request (Cabinet). Appointed Commander of the First Army (Cabinet). (Not recorded in the Official Gazette). Automatically relieved as member of the Peer's School Council because of his being relieved of the post of Vice-War Minister at his own request.
- 1938 June 3 Relieved of his post of Chairman of the Army Munitions Investigations Council (Cabinet)
- 1938 June 15 Decorated with the 4th Court Rank of the Senior Grade



UMEZU, Yoshijiro

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1938 Nov. 2      Granted a set of silver cups for his services rendered in concluding German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

1939 July 11     Decorated with the Order of the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun

1939 Sept. 7     Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary (Cabinet). Ordered to reside in Manchukuo (Cabinet). Appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army (Cabinet) (Not recorded in the official gazette). Relieved of his principal office.

1940 Aug. 1      Promoted to General

1940 Aug. 8      Decorated with the 3rd court rank of the Junior Grade

1940 Apr. 29     Decorated with the 2nd class merit of the Order of the Golden Kite for services in the China Affair.

1942 Oct. 1      Appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. ( Not recorded in the Official Gazette)(Cabinet).

1943 Sept. 1     Decorated with the 3rd Court Rank of the Senior Grade.

1944 July 18     Relieved of his additional offices (Cabinet). Appointed Chief of the Army General Staff (Cabinet). (Not recorded in the Official Gazette)

1945 Oct. 15     Appointed Supreme War Councilor (Cabinet). (Not recorded in the Official Gazette).



- 1928 UMEZU was Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry. (Exhibit 129)
- 1931-1934 UMEZU was Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff. (Exhibit 129)
- 1931-1934 As Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff, UMEZU bears a measure of responsibility for the illegal seizure of Manchuria in violation of treaties and assurances.
- 1934-1936 UMEZU was Commander of the army stationed in China from 5 May 1934 to 26 March 1936. (Exhibit 129).
- 1934 UMEZU was decorated for his services in the Manchurian Affair on 29 April 1934. (Exhibit 129).
- 1934-1936 UMEZU was one of the authors of the autonomous movement and was responsible for the HO-UMEZU Agreement of June, 1935, which resulted in the taking over of the four northern provinces by Japan. (Exhibit 2206-A, Record 2033-5).
- 1934-1935 While Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army in China, UMEZU exerted pressure to coerce China to accept the terms of the HO-UMEZU Agreement. (Exhibit 194, Record 2,274-6).
- 1934-1935 The Northern Chahar Incident was negotiated under Japanese pressure and threats by DOHIHARA as a representative of UMEZU as Commander-in-Chief of the North China Army. (Record 2,311-17).
- 1934-1935 Japanese airplanes illegally flew around Peiping and Tientsin while UMEZU was Commander-in-Chief. (Exhibit 213, Record 2708-2711).
- 1936-1938 UMEZU was Vice Minister of War from 23 March 1936 to 30 May 1938, and as such, carried responsibility for Japanese aggression against China. He was one of those responsible for the Military Clique's refusal to permit General UGAKI to form a Cabinet in 1937. (Exhibit 2208-A-E) (Exhibit 705).
- 1936-1938 While UMEZU was Vice Minister of War, he was concurrently Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, and as such, he bears responsibility for the establishment of the Japanese Military Base for an attack on the USSR. (Exhibit 723 and 835).
- 1936-1938 Extension of military service of troops in Manchuria and the increase of strength of the Kwantung Army for use against the USSR were authorized by UMEZU; also the establishment of meteorological service system in Chahar and Mongolia for military operations against the USSR. (Exhibit 719-A).
- 1936-1938 UMEZU took measures to maintain secrecy of air line connections between Germany and Japan. (Exhibit 770).



- 1936-1938 UMEZU authorized Manchukuo's entering the Anti-Comintern Pact. In his telegram he stated in part, "It is best to take on the formality of 'Manchukuo requesting entry into the Pact on her own will and having Japan assist her in that respect' by seizing a favorable opportunity soon." (Record 3,001).
- 1936-1938 Japan illegally invoked the so-called HO-UMEZU Agreement while UMEZU was Vice Minister of War, as the excuse for its attack on north China. (Lytton Report - Record 3,300 et seq.)
- 1936-1938 As Vice Minister of War UMEZU bore responsibility for successive Japanese aggression against China during 1937 and until 30 May 1938. (Record 3,430, Exhibit 254).
- 1936-1938 "Essentials of 5-Year Program of Important Industries, War Ministry 29 May 1937, included the following, "Should ingeniously take the initiative in economical exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources;" and also, "the requisite industries (for national defense) should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of right works in the right place, with Japan and Manchuria as a single sphere and in consideration of their necessity in our national defense;" and "ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia." (Record 8,264-5, Exhibit 842).
- 1936-1938 UMEZU was paid 150,830 Yen from the Manchurian Incident Funds, Secret Expenditures on 8 March 1938. (Record 15,811, Exhibit 2212).
- 1936-1938 On 2 November 1938 UMEZU was granted a reward for services in concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact. (Exhibit 129).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU was Commander of the Kwantung Army from 7 September 1939 to 18 July 1944 (later Commander-in-Chief) and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo. As Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army he bears responsibility for the ill-treatment of the POW held in Manchukuo and for the illegal use of POW in war work. (Exhibits 1970-A, 1905, 1906, 1912 and 1913).
- 1939-1944 The Kwantung Army directed the activities of the Kyo-wa-Kai Society set up in Manchuria with the view of using it in the preparation of war against the USSR. (Exhibit 699, 679 and 723).
- 1939-1944 Compulsory mobilization of laborers in Manchuria according to Kanto-Kuen plan for use in war industries, and the construction of military bases were initiated by UMEZU. (Exhibit 670).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU directed the development of Manchuria as a military base for operations against the USSR and ordered the training of White Russians as propagandists, scouts and saboteurs. (Exhibit 723).



- 1939-1944 During this period the "Otsu" operations plan of the Kwantung Army of 1942 was directed against the USSR and provided for seizure of the Soviet Far East up to Baikal. (Exhibit 885).
- 1939-1944 The 1942 operations plan of the Kwantung Army provided for the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Provinces and was signed by General UMEZU. (Exhibit 836 and 838).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU was responsible for the illegal sentences and illegal trials of POW held by the Kwantung Army. (Exhibit 1998).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU advocated the theory of "the world under one roof." (Record 4,000).
- 1939-1944 As Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was responsible for the economic monopoly and narcotization in Manchuria. (Record 4,024).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU executed the policy of Japanese emigration to Manchuria and the displacement of Chinese, and the conscription for hard labor of Chinese and Manchurians. (Record 4,037).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU controlled PU-YI and also his visit to Mukden. (Record 4,147).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU ordered PU-YI's visit to Japan, and the Kwantung Army controlled everything in Manchuria. (Record 4,157).
- 1939-1944 The "Manchukuo Rescript" of 8 December 1941 to ally with Japan was ordered by UMEZU. (Record 4,286).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU, as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, was responsible for the atrocities against the Chinese in Jehol Province in August, 1941. (Record 4,655, Exhibit 360).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU's speech at the All-Manchuria Extraordinary Congress of 1942 advocated the liberation of East Asia from Anglo-Saxon influence. (Record 7,609-12, Exhibit 731-A).
- 1939-1944 UMEZU was responsible for the conscription of Chinese labor in Manchuria of those between the ages of 18 and 45 to render service to the Japanese Army. They were used for opening highways and digging mines. (Record 4,037).
- 1944-1945 UMEZU was Chief of Staff of the Imperial Army from 22 July 1944 to 15 October 1945, and as such was responsible for the execution of eleven members of the American air crews after alleged trial and Court Martial on 11 July 1945 (Exhibit 1994); for the illegal execution of two American fliers on 18 July 1945 (Exhibit 1995); for the putting to death in July and August 1945 of thirty-eight American fliers without trial (Exhibit 1922); for instructions issued by the War Ministry in March, 1945 regarding the disposing of POW contrary to



treaties and assurances and to the laws and customs of war. (Exhibits 2012-2013); for the illegal orders issued from the War Ministry in March, 1945 placing no limit on the hours of work of POW (Exhibit 2014); for the order from the War Ministry of 17 March 1945 providing for "emergency measures regarding POW," and among other things, providing for keeping POW at work even in areas being bombed. (Exhibit 1978).

1944-1945 While UMEZU was Chief of Staff, the invasion of Kweilin and Liuchow took place in November 1944. (Exhibit 234); he was responsible not only for this but for the atrocities committed by the Japanese in the Kweilin and Liuchow areas in the winter of 1944. (Exhibit 352).

1944-1945 UMEZU was responsible, as Chief of Staff, for the maltreatment of POW by the army not only in Japan proper (Colonel Mornane's Summary - Pages 26-27, Exhibits 1916-1932; 1935-1949; 1951); but also for the maltreatment of POW held by the Japanese Army in occupied territory (Colonel Mornane's Summary of Evidence).



7/11/47

International Prosecution Section  
Soviet Division

Memorandum

11. July , 1947

*1 copy letter  
stated to  
Col Woodworth  
7-11-47*

TO : Mr. Tavenner,  
Chief Prosecutor *at* the  
International Military  
Tribunal for the Far East

FROM : Major-General Vasiliev,  
Associate Prosecutor  
for the U.S.S.R.

I submit to you an outline of the evidence produced ~~to~~ the Tribunal relating to the accused Umezu, Yoshijiro in connection with the count of the Indictment dealing with "The Japanese aggression against the U.S.S.R."

This outline does not include evidence produced to the Tribunal on the question of Umezu's activities during the time of his holding the following posts:

1. Commander of the Japanese Army in China from March 5, 1934 to August 1, 1935.
2. Commander of the 2nd Division from August 10, 1935 to March 23, 1936.
3. Commander of the 1st Army from May 30, 1938 to September 7, 1939.



- 2 -

Besides, the outline does not include evidence of Umezu's activities during his service in the Japanese War Ministry and General Staff which ~~were~~ introduced during other, not the Soviet, phases of the prosecution case.

Material dealing with these questions should be summarized by Colonel Woolworth according to your instructions and our arrangements with Mr. Sutton and Colonel Woolworth.

I ask you to instruct Mr. Sutton to give me, when ready, the summary with complete enumeration of evidence relating to the accused Umezu so that I could make further use of it.

*A. N. Vasiliev*  
A. N. Vasiliev

Associate Prosecutor for the  
U.S.S.R. at the I.M.T.F.E.



Outline of the evidence produced by the  
Soviet Prosecution concerning the defendant Umezu.

From August 10, 1928 till August 1, 1930

Umezu held the position of chief of the Military Affairs  
Section, ~~B~~Bureau of Military Affairs <sup>of the</sup> War Ministry.  
This section was in charge of general problems of Japan's  
national defense and of the ideological preparation of  
the population for war. The Bureau of Military Affairs  
effected the liason between the War Ministry and the  
General Staff on organizational, strategic and operational  
tactical matters, in particular, as to securing opera-  
tional strategical plans directed against the Soviet  
Union, which at that time were being drawn up by the  
General Staff of Japan.

Exb.	P.p. of the transcript
74	504, 582, 583
2244	16140 - 16 142
2240	16121 - 16 123

T Testimony of the witness Tanaka -p.15859

As to the contents of the above mentioned plans - the  
information in regard to it is given in Exb, N699(pp.  
of the transcript 7501 - 7502) and in Exb. N839-A (pp.  
of the transcript 8175 )

From August 1, 1931 Umezu, then in the rank  
of major-general held the position of Chief of the



General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff ~~Office~~, and from August 1, 1933, till March 5, 1934, in the rank of a general was attached to the General Staff office by the War Ministry.

During Umezu's tenure of office as Chief of the General Affairs Department Japan's General Staff ~~Office~~ adopted the decision to have the preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. concluded by the early part of 1934. (Prosecution document 1654, Exb. N 702, p.p. of the transcript 7510, 7515)

Matters pertaining to Army personnel, the organization and mobilisation of the Army with which Umezu as Chief of the General Affairs Department of the General Staff ~~Office~~ was concerned had direct bearing on the issues of preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. which was being carried on in that period of time. (Exb. N 78, p.p. of the transcript 505, 588)

From March 23, 1936 till May, 1938 Umezu was Vice-Minister of War and concurrently a member of Bureau of Manchurian Affairs. During Umezu's tenure of that office in August, 1936, a conference was held of 4 ministers, among whom was also the War Minister.

At the conference of August 7, 1936 a decision was adopted entitled "Foreign Policy of the Empire",



in which it was specifically provided that "China should be made anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese" and that "Japan should exert every effort in bringing the European powers to its advantage, especially in restraining the Soviet Union.

Umezu and his subordinates in the War Ministry took part in the elaboration of the draft of the decision and in its further implementation (Pros. document #1857, Exb. N 704, p/p. of the transcript 7523, 7878)

Again in 1936, when Umezu was Vice Minister of war of Japan, the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed. By the Pact the military political alliance of aggressive nations against democratic countries, and first of all against the U.S.S.R., had become officially recognized. In 1937 - 1938, Umezu contributed to Manchukuo's joining the Anti-Comintern Pact and exchanged letters on that matter with the command of the Kwantung Army. On September 2, 1938 Umezu was granted with silver cups for his services in the signing of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact.

Exb. N- 36	p.p. of the transcript	499, 693
Exb. N-242	"	3001
Exb. N-129	"	798, 803

Umezu, Vice Minister of War received a top secret telegram sent to him and to the Chief of the Japanese General Staff by Tojo, Chief of Staff of



the Kwantung Army in which he, in analysing the situation in China from the viewpoint of a preparation for war with the Soviet Union, considered that the most expedient policy was to deal a blow upon the Nanking Government and to remove the threat to the rear of the Kwantung Army (Pros. doc. №1841, Exb. N 672, p. of the transcript 7336).

Less than a month afterwards the Japanese troops dealt a blow on the Nanking Government, about the expediency of which Tojo had written to Umezu and to the General Staff (Pros. doc. №1984, Exb. N 705, p. of the affidavit 8 of the English text.)

On January 24, 1938, Ueda, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, submitted to the War Minister a report "Outline of the policy for the establishment of a New China."

As it may be seen from an inscription in the original document, in the War Ministry, the report was studied by Umezu. In that document, it was provided for calling upon the population of the "new China" to cooperate in the preparation of the imminent war with the Soviet Union. Inner Mongolia and Hsinking were considered to serve as bases for the invasion of Outer Mongolia. In the document of the



commander-in-chief Northern China was regarded as a stabilising Zone in the rear of Manchuria which bears evidence to the fact that for that state the front was considered to be the Soviet Union. (Prof, doc. 751C, Exb. 762, p. of the transcript 7838)

In 1938 Umezu, Vice Minister of War, corresponded with Tojo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, on matters relating to the preparation of an attack against the Soviet Union, strengthening the Kwantung Army, the acceleration of the construction of the Manchurian military base against the U.S.S.R. and the endorsement of the measures, planned in this field by the Command of the Kwantung Army. The correspondence is contained in the diary of the Japanese War Ministry on Manchuria, which was produced at the trial. (Prof, doc, N 751, Exb. N719, p.p. of the transcript 7560 -7567)

The War Ministry diary contains among others the following document:

A top secret plan of the location of the meteorological service system in the province of Chahar-Isui-Yan, drawn up by the Kwantung Army Staff in December, 1937, by which measures for the strengthening of the aeronautical meteorological service system were planned with the specific purpose of preparing military operations against the U.S.S.R. (Exb. 719-A, p. of the transcript 7560)



A telegram from Tojo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to Umezu, Vice Minister of War, of January 12, 1938 about the establishment of meteorological service system in the areas of Chahar and Mongolia from the viewpoint of events in China and military operations against the U.S.S.R. In that telegram Umezu was requested to additionally attach officers - meteorologists to the Army Staff, to transmit necessary funds for urgent military expenditures and to select and train the personnel. (Esb. N 719-A, p.p. of the transcript 7561-7562)

At the beginning of 1938 Umezu, Vice Minister of War, and the Japanese General Staff acting upon the request of Tojo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, adopted extraordinary measures to increase the Kwantung Army forces by lengthening the term of active military service for the soldiers in Manchuria. Having received a top secret telegram of January 11, 1938, from Tojo (about lengthening the term of active military service for the units stationed in Manchuria) Umezu informed the General Staff on January 25, 1938 about his decision as to the advisability of lengthening the term of service for soldiers under the command of the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. The General Staff not objecting to that, Umezu on January 29, 1938 sent instructions to Tojo,



Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to the effect of lengthening the term of military service for soldiers called up in 1935 (Esb. N719-A, p.p. of the transcript 7562-7565)

On January 17, 1938 ~~Tojo~~ Tojo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, reported to Umezu, Vice Minister of War, about the necessity of keeping the air-line connections between Japan and Germany strictly secret from third states. On January 24, 1938 Umezu advised Tojo in a telegram of the supplementary steps taken by him to safeguard the secrecy of the air-line connections between Japan and Germany (Pros. doc. N751-D, Exh. N770, p. of the transcript 7871 )

The participation of Umezu in settling the matters connected with the construction of fortified regions on the border line with the U.S.S.R. in 1938, is confirmed by the secret telegram, sent to him and to the Japanese General Staff by Tojo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, on February 11, 1938. In the telegram Tojo points out that "the establishment of anti-Soviet fortifications is scheduled to be made during 1938 and 1939 on the spots not yet started as well as the spots regarded as specially important among the locations mentioned in Special Order N 301" and requests the urgent dispatch for 2 years of additional personnel (Exh. N719A, p.p. of the transcript 7565-7566)



Along the lines of preparing for war against the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic the Kwantung Army Staff made and published ~~sketch~~ <sup>sketch</sup> maps ~~area~~ <sup>the</sup> of Soviet Far East, Siberia and Outer Mongolia. In January 1938 the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army sent those maps to Umezu, Vice Minister of War.

Pros. doc.751,		p. of the transcript
	Exb.NN 719	<del>719</del> 23717
	719-d	23718
	719-b	23717
	719-e	23842

From September 7, 1939 till July 18, 1944, Umezu was commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army and Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo (Exb. N 129, p. of the transcript 798)

The appointment of Umezu as commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army was connected with the developments in the area of the Halhin-Gol river.

The ruling clique of Japan, one of the military leaders of which was Umezu, before 1939 had expressed its aggressive designs directed against the Mongolian People's Republic and elaborated plans of seizing the Mongolian territory and using it as a particularly important military base in the war against the Soviet Union.



Pros. doc. N. 724-b;	Exb. N 212	(p. of the transcript)	
623	273	_____	2705
643	274	_____	3679
1466	761-a	_____	3689
2627	760-a	_____	7830
751-c	762	_____	7828
		_____	7838

In the spring of 1939, the Kwantung Army, attacked the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of Halhin-Gol river, using for that as a pretext, the false allegation that the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo runs along the Halhin-Gol river and not cost of the river as it is correctly shown on the official Chinese map, published by the Directorate General of Posts of China in Peking. (Exb. N 763) and on the official Japanese maps, published before 1935 (Exb. NN 764-A, 2709-A, 2710-A, 2711 and others)

The Soviet Union in virtue of its treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic rendered help to the friendly nation that was subjected to an aggressive attack. As the result of large-scale clashes occurring in the course of the summer of 1939, the Japanese and Manchurian troops who had occupied part of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, on the eastern bank of the Halhin-Gol river and who attempted to seize the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic west of the river,



were defeated by the Mongolian and the Soviet troops.

The Japanese Government and the High Command of the Army considered General Ueda to be unable to implement the policy they had in view and released him from his duties as Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo and commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. (Pros. doc. N 2238, Exb. N723, p. of the transcript 7580)

Instead of Ueda, it was Umezu who was appointed to those posts as a general who was in a position to ensure that the policy line adopted by the Japanese government, should be carried out. In the situation existing at that time, after the Kwantung Army had suffered defeat several times <sup>and</sup> after the failure of the operation plans of occupation,, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters and Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, deemed it expedient to check the further development of the conflict and to take steps for its settlement.

On September 16, 1939, hostilities were ceased. On June 9, 1940, the Molotov-Togo agreement was signed, according to which the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo in the area of Lake Buir-Nor was reestablished in accordance with the assertion of the Soviet-Mongolian party, that is, east of the Halhin-Gol river. (Pros. doc, N 2747, Exb. N 767, p. of the transcript 7849)



The settlement of the Halhin-Gol conflict, undertaken with the participation of Umezu, and caused by the hopelessness of continuing the fighting that was not warranted by preliminary ~~adequate~~ preparation, served for a more intense transformation of Manchuria into a military base for an attack against the Soviet Union under the direction of Umezu. Umezu's activities in his position of commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army manifested themselves in an intricate system of a particularly intense and carefully disguised preparation of the Kwantung Army for an attack against the Soviet Union.

From 1939 till 1943 general Umezu, following the instructions of the General Staff, personally directed the drawing up of offensive operation plans of war against the U.S.S.R. and was in charge of all the military preparations made by the Kwantung Army for the attack against the U.S.S.R.

According to article 2 of the Kwantung Army Headquarters Regulations which came into force as early as June 12, 1919, "The commander shall be under the delegated command of the War Minister in the matters of military administration and personnel affairs and under the same command of the Chief of the Army General Staff in the matters of military operations and mobilization plans and similarly under the Inspector-General of the Military Education in the matters of



military education." (Exb. N 2415, p. of the transcript 19554)

In 1939 the basic strategic design of the Japanese command in their plan of war against the U.S.S.R. was to concentrate the main forces in Eastern Manchuria and direct them against the Soviet Far East. The Kwantung Army was to seize Voroshilov, Vladivostok and Iman, and then Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk and Kuibyshevka. (Pros. doc. N 2673, Exb. N 834, p.p. of the transcript 8096 and 8111)

In 1940 the operations plan of the attack against the Soviet Union, worked out by the 1st Department of the General Staff, ~~Headquarters~~ sanctioned by the Emperor and sent to the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, provided for operations in the direction of Khabarovsk with the object of cutting off and seizing the Soviet Primorie, then for operations for the capture of Chita and of the Soviet territory up to Lake Baikal. (Pros.doc. N1984, Exb. N 705, p. of the transcript N 7527.

In 1940, in Kharbin, a conference of the chiefs of the Special Service Organizations was held under the leadership of the chief of the Kharbin Special Service Organization who was directly subordinated to Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, and acted upon his instructions. In this document under the heading



"Revision of the Anti-Soviet Sabotage Activities and the guidance of White Russian) in keeping with the revisions", it was pointed out that such revision was indispensable for making the sabotage work more effective. In the document measures were set forth for the guidance of white emigrants and for the training of a staff for the administration of the Soviet territory, which was to be occupied by the Japanese troops. (Pros. doc. N 1968, Exb. N 736 A, p. of the transcript 7662).

In 1941, according to the operations plan, the Kwantung Army was to concentrate its main forces in the direction of the Soviet Primorie. The towns of Voroshilov, Vladivostok, Blagoveschensk, Iman, Kuibyshevka and the Bikhlovo district were planned to be taken at the first stage of the war. During the second stage of the war it was supposed, depending the situation, to occupy Northern Sakhalin, Petrogavlovsk-on-Kamchatka, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Komsomolsk and the Soviet Gavan (Pros. doc. N 2673, Exb. N 834, p.p. of the transcript 8097, 8111).

At the beginning of June 1941, in Hsinking Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, received prince Urachi and in his talk with him stressed that "he welcomed the Neutrality pact Japan-Russia for the moment. Since, however, the Tripartite Pact is the



✓ unchangeable basis of Japanese *Foreign* Policy, Japan's  
attitude toward the Neutrality pact must undergo a change  
just as soon as the hitherto existing German-Russian  
✓ relations undergo an alteration!" (Pros. doc. N 4061 B,  
Exb. N. 1086, p. of the transcript N 9986)

On July 2, 1941, after Germany had attacked  
the Soviet Union, an Imperial conference was held at  
which a decision was adopted, which showed that both  
the conference and Umezu similarly estimated the  
Tri-partite pact to form the basis of Japan's foreign  
policy, at the same time defining her attitude toward  
the Soviet Union. The resolution passed at the  
conference reads: "Though the *spirit* of the tripartite  
axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the  
German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while,  
✓ but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms  
against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Diplomatic nego-  
tiations will be continued with detailed precautions, and  
should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress  
favourably to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the  
northern problems, there~~y~~<sup>y</sup> by securing stability in the  
Northern regions."

✓ According to the resolution of July 2, 1941,  
the Kwantung Army was *des*igned in the first place  
to use arms against the Soviet Union at a moment most  
✓ favourable <sup>for</sup> that. Hence to carry out the decision of the



conference about the preparation of war against the Soviet Union was the main task of General Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. Japan's preparation for an attack against the Soviet Union in the period of the German-Soviet war is shown by a number of documents submitted to the Tribunal. Some of them will be referred to here; they describe certain stages of the preparation and the role of the Kwantung Army.



In a telegram of July 4, 1941, in referring to a Japanese source of information the German military attaché reported to Berlin from Tokyo that "Japan's entry into the war against Russia with a view to gaining the coastal provinces, including North Sakhalin, is imminent. It is to be carried out by means of the Kwantung Army and the home forces without any weakening of the China front." (Exb. N639A, p. of the transcript 9986).

On the same day, July 4, 1941, Ott, German ambassador, in a telegram to Berlin reported that "Military attaché reports following personal impression from conversation with Japanese General Staff. Japanese Army is zealously preparing and under emphatic secrecy... to a surprise, - though not rush - commencement of hostilities against Russia, with the seizure of the coastal province as the first goal." (Exb. N638, p. of the transcript 7964-7965)

The Kwantung Army under the command of General Umezu was not only making speedy preparations for a war against the Soviet Union, but at that time was also fulfilling the task of diverting the armed forces of the Soviet Union from the West to the Far East, and in this way made it easier for Germany to wage war against the U.S.S.R. Thus, on July 3, 1941 German



ambassador Ott sent a telegram to Berlin in which he reported that the Japanese Government had always contemplated the extension of military preparations also with the view of ~~tying up~~ the forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East, which the U.S.S.R. might have used in the war with Germany (Pros.doc. N4062 A, Exb. N636, p.p. of the transcrip 7963-7964)

At the beginning of July 1941, on behalf of the Japanese General Staff a report was made to the German High Command about the willingness of the Japanese General Staff to carry on sabotage work against the U.S.S.R. in the Far East from Mongolia and Manchukuo and primarily in the area adjoining Lake Baikal. (Pros doc. N4062A, Exb. N 798, p. of <sup>the</sup> transcript 7965)

As may be seen from Exb. N 723 the contents of which are given below, the direction of such sabotage activities in those regions was concentrated in the hands of Umezu, Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

The preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. carried on since July 1941 by the War Ministry, the General Staff and Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, was conditionally called the Kantukuen plan. Such preparation manifested itself first of all in the strengthening of the Kwantung Army. The witness, ~~Sejima Riuzo~~<sup>Sejima Riuzo</sup>, former officer of the 1st Department



of the Army, ~~General Staff Office~~, testified before the Tribunal, that in summer 1941 he, personally, had seen an official copy of the Imperial Command about the dispatch of two new infantry divisions to the Kwantung Army and a printed copy of the Imperial ~~military~~ order about the reorganization of all 15 infantry divisions of the Kwantung Army on a semi-war-time basis. To strengthen the Kwantung Army a secret mobilization was carried out and the dispatch of troops was effected secretly. (Pros, doc. N 2673. Exb. N834, p. of the transcript 8101)

In the telegram of Ott, German ambassador to Japan, sent to Berlin on July 12, 1941 there is a reference concerning the steps, taken by Japan in Manchuria along the lines of preparing for war against the U.S.S.R. and it is pointed out that the replenishment of the Kwantung Army for a future war with the Soviet Union ~~was~~ taking place in the Shanghai and Tsint~~ing~~ areas, to which reservists and 2 Japanese divisions have been transferred. (Pros. doc. N 4062C, Exb. N799, p. of the transcript 7966)

Since July, 1941 the discharge from military service, upon expiration of the term, was suspended. (Exb. N 833)

In the telegram of July 25, 1941 from Tokyo to Berlin ambassador Ott and Kre~~ch~~mer, the military attaché, reported to the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht and to the Supreme Army Headquarters about the drafting



of reservists, the transfer of troops to Manchuria and the contents of Japanese operation plan. They assumed that the Japanese should not confine themselves to an offensive in the Vladivostok district and north of it, but should simultaneously launch an offensive in the direction of Lake Baikal, along the railway line Manchuria - Chita, and from the Kalgan area through Outer Mongolia. General Okamoto, Chief of the General Staff Department, stated several times, that Japan would only start when the German units would have reached the Volga. (Pros.doc. N4052A, Exb. N830, p. of the transcript 8071).

The witness Kusaba stated in his affidavit that Umezu together with ~~Todjo~~ and Sugiyama Gen were those <sup>who</sup> had decided the Kantokuen plan and in 1941 had prepared the Kwantung Army for an invasion of the Soviet territory- Umezu was a supporter of a military alliance between Japan and Germany directed against the U.S.S.R. (Pros. doc. N 1982, Exb. N838, p. of the transcript N 8162).

On September 16, 1941, Umezu, Yoshijiro, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, signed the instructions on supplementary education of Army <sup>Russian</sup> interpreters ~~on Russian language~~ for the Kwantung Army, intended to be used after the implementation of the Kantokuen plan had started: (Pros. doc. 1973, Exb. N832, p. of the transcript 8080).



On September 17, 1941, General Oshima, Japanese ambassador in Berlin, stated that in view of the time of the year military operations against the Soviet Union could take place only on a limited scale and that at ~~that~~ that time of the year any attack on Vladivostok as well as any advance toward Lake Baikal was scarcely possible *and* would under present circumstances have to be postponed till spring, (Exb. 655, p. of the transcript N7982)

The witness Tominaga stated in his affidavit, that the operation plan of the General Staff ~~Headquarters~~ which had been drawn up by him in 1940 had served as a foundation for the Kantokuen plan, the only change being that all the blows upon the Soviet Union were supposed to be dealt simultaneously. His participation in the work on the Kantokuen plan consisted in the formation of the committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied Soviet territories, in the recruitment of the unit officer <sup>personnel</sup> ~~staff~~ to the Kwantung Army and in the formation of two ~~area~~ *area* army staff ~~Headquarters~~ in Manchuria (Pros, doc. N1984, Exb. N705 p, of the transcript 8082).

The witness Takebe Rokuzo stated in his affidavit, that he had learnt about the Kantokuen plan at the beginning of July 1941 from Kurokawa, Chief of the 4th Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters as well as from Umezu, Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung



Army, who in his talk with him told him about the increase of the Kwantung Army and set a task of providing the troops with food stuffs. Various demands of the Kwantung Army to the government of Manchukuo on matters referring to political and economic steps were made in the preparation for military operations against the U.S.S.R. On such matters Takebe received instructions from Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. Thus, the compulsory mobilization of labourers in Manchuria, in compliance with the Kantokuen plan, was carried out on Umezu's initiative, and the labourers were used for the construction of the military base and in war industry (Pros.doc.N2239, Exb. 670, p. of the transcript 8078)

The witness Yanagita Genzo stated in his affidavit, <sup>that</sup> in the <sup>e</sup> period of 1939 till the summer of 1944 General Umezu was busy dealing with matters pertaining to the construction of a military base in Manchuria. In August, 1941, Yanagita received a written order from Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, about the work of the Kharbin Special Service Agency according to the Kantokuen plan, that called for the preparation for war against the Soviet Union. In compliance with Umezu's order the Board of Information, headed by Yanagita, was to have elaborated and carried out supplementary measures on scouting, propaganda and sabotage



against the U.S.S.R. by the early part of October 1941. Upon the instructions of Umezu the Special Service Agency had to train <sup>and</sup> prepare white emigrants as propagandists, scouts and saboteurs. They also served for the formation of a sabotage military unit "Asano". Upon the instructions of Umezu the "Asano" unit was at first included into the Manchurian Army and up to 1941 it was the Manchukuo War Ministry that paid it; as soon as the Kantokuen plan was drawn up in 1941, the "Asano" unit was supported by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. Uniforms of Soviet servicemen were provided for the unit. (Pros. doc. 2288, Exb. N723, p.p. of the transcript 2580, 7704 and 7860).

In 1942-43 general Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, continued to guide the preparation for an attack against the Soviet Union.

In a telegram of the German ambassador Ott sent to Berlin on January 29, 1942, it was reported: "According to very confidential information, however, military preparations against Russia are underway in Manchuria. Influential circles here are of the opinion that after the conquest of Port Darwin Japan must turn against Russia and seize Vladivostok, the coastal province and North Sakhalin in order definitely to make itself also secure in the north."



(Exb. 806, p. 7983)

As far as the operation plan of war against the U.S.S.R. for 1942 was concerned, testimony before the Tribunal to that effect was given by the witness Matsumura Tamakatsu, former major-general of the Japanese Army, who personally knew about the Chief of the Army General Staff having given directives to draw up a plan and about an operation plan of war against the U.S.S.R. for 1942, formed by the Kwantung Army Headquarters. "The *Army General Staff instructed the Kwantung* directives of the Army Headquarters to form an operations plan against Soviet Russia with the occupation of the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia and the destruction of the airbases in the Maritime Province as the general objectives and also to focus the principal attack upon Voroshilov. It was also written in the directives that the Kwantung Army should make preparations for further operations after occupation of the Maritime Province." "The operations plan against Soviet Russia for 1942 was signed by Umezu, commander of the Kwantung Army..."

In that plan "in the item of the distribution of military strength, it was planned that the First Front, the Second Front and the Sixth Army should participate in the operation against Soviet Union. The first front comprised 4 armies (the 2nd, 3rd, 20th, 5th, Army) consisting of 15 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions." "In the item concerning the tasks of the different fronts



and armies, the task of the First Front was indicated as follows: that the Second Army should attack from Chientao Area toward the Southern Ussuri Area; that the Third Army should attack from Tungning Area toward Voroshilov, that the Twentieth Army should attack from the area to the west of Lake Khanka toward Voroshilov; that the Fifth Army should attack from Hutow Area toward Iman Area and thereby cut off the enemy's communications extending from south to north and have another part advance southward to facilitate the attack of the main forces on Voroshilov."

The plan remained in force in 1943 and up to <sup>of</sup> spring 1944 (Pros doc. <sup>207c</sup> Exb. N 836, p. of the transcript <sup>8139</sup>)

The witness Sejima Ruizo stated under examination: "The Chief of Staff after reporting and receiving the sanction of the throne, would send directions with respect to the operational plans to the ~~Chief of~~ Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, who adopts it <sup>on</sup> the basis of the plan forwarded to him and formulates his plans." (p. of the transcript 8111)

The same witness also sets forth the contents of the operation plan of war against the U.S.S.R. drawn up for 1942 by the General Staff and points out that the plan, as all the preceding ones, was an offensive plan and that the war against the Soviet Union was to begin unexpectedly. At the first phase of the war the



Japanese troops were to occupy ~~the~~ the Soviet towns in Primorie, and Blagoveschensk, Svobodny and Kuibyshevka. Besides that, the forces that were on the island Hokkaido, were to occupy Northern Sakhalin, and one division from the island Honshu was to occupy Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka. (Pros. doc. 2673, Exb. N834, p. of the transcript 8099)

In 1942 the strength of the Kwantung Army was brought to 1,000,000 men and was 4 times as large as its strength in 1937 (Exb. 706, p.p. of transcript 7531 & 8084)

By that time the number of tanks in the equipment of the Kwantung Army reached 1,000 and the number of <sup>planes</sup> ~~increased~~ increased to 1500 (Exb. N706, p. of the transcript 7531)

Particulars concerning the construction of a military base for an attack against the Soviet Union, which was carried on from 1937 till 1945 under the General guidance of Umezu when he was Vice Minister of War and later Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army and Chief of the General Staff, are given in Exb. NN712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, and 718). These data bring to light the construction of various military objectives in Manchuria, among other, strategic railways, fortified districts, ~~andromes~~, barracks, ammunition dumps.

During Umezu's tenure of office as commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army until 1943 the number of cases of the U.S.S.R. state frontier violation by the



Japanese was steadily increasing. In 1940 the number of cases of the U.S.S.R. state frontier violation by the Japanese soldiers and officers reached 59; in 1941 - 136; in 1942 - 229; in 1943 - 414 cases. In the same period of time the number of cases of Soviet frontier violation by the Japanese planes amounted to: in 1940 - 56; in 1941 - 61; in 1942 - 82; in 1943 - 119; and in 1944 - 171 cases. (Pros. doc. N 1953, Exb. N750)

General Umezu, commander in-chief of the Kwantung Army, gave much attention to the issues of ideological and military preparation of the population of Manchuria for war against the U.S.S.R. That purpose was served by the organization *Kyowakai*, created by the Japanese, which was the channel through which the racial theory of a "new order" and the domination of the Japanese people in Asia and in the whole world was disseminated, and which was a propaganda centre of the Japanese militarism. In October 1941, general Umezu attended the opening of the All-Manchurian congress of the *Kyowakai*. It was for the first time that delegates from the Russian white emigrants were invited to the congress which was the first congress of the *Kyowakai* after Germany had attacked the Soviet Union and which was held in the midst of a speedy preparation of the Kwantung Army for a war with the U.S.S.R.



In February, 1942, Umezu as Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Japanese Empire to Manchukuo and commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, participated in the work of the extraordinary congress of the Kyowakai. In a directive speech delivered at the Congress Umezu pointed out that the aim of the ~~the~~ Great East Asia war was the establishment of a "new order" in East Asia and the materialization of the *Hakko-ichiu* ~~idea~~-idea. Japan's victories in the Pacific war were estimated by Umezu as a gigantic step in the direction of the establishment of the "new order" in Asia. Umezu defined the aims of Kyowakai under the conditions of war and called upon the delegates of the congress to be the vanguard in the movement ~~for~~ for explaining to the masses "the great aims of the sacred war" and to contribute to the development of the state production and the power of the empire (Pros. doc. N2329, Exb. N731-A, p. of the transcript 7605)

In 1945 the membership of the organization Kyowakai was 4.5 million. Being assigned taxes by the military command the members of the Kyowakai took part in the construction of different military objectives; for action in a military situation the organization formed special fighting groups, named "Sem-po dan". Those groups were designed for sabotage activities in



Red Army rear, for terrorist acts, setting on fire ammunition dumps etc. (Pros. doc. N1950, Exb. N699, p.p. of the transcript 7596-7598) The society Kyowakai contributed to the transformation of Manchuria into a military base for the preparation of war with the U.S.S.R. (Pros. doc. N2239, Exb. N670)

In June 1943 in Kharbin the 2nd *Information* Department conference of the Kwantung Army was held, the Chief of which, major-general Doi, was directly subordinated to Umezu, Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army and acted upon his instructions. In the document of the conference entitled "Instructions pertaining to the Sabotage Activities, Education and Training for 1943" signed on June 16, 1943 it was pointed out by Doi Akio, chief of the *Information* ~~Intelligence~~ Department of the Kwantung Army, that those instructions were based on the directions of the Kwantung Army Headquarters "Education and Training of special detachments for 1943" (Pros doc. N1962, Exb. N737, p. of the transcript 7669)

Another document of the conference under the heading: "The directions in relation to the guidance of the white Russians" states, that the White Russians "whether they are men or women or whether they wish it or not, shall be used powerfully and to the maximum degree for the war with the Soviet Union, especially for the



secret war with the Soviet Union." (Pros doc. N1956, Exb. N738, p. of the transcript N7669)

A document of the same conference, entitled "The Principles of the Japanese Propaganda Campaign against the Outer Mongolia" refers to propaganda methods against the Mongolian People's Republic and the U.S.S.R. and "Outbreak of a Russo-Japanese war at a certain time" is defined as an ultimate objective. (Pros. doc. N1957, Exb. 740, p. of the transcript 7670)

From July 1944 till 1945 general Umezu was Chief of the Japanese General Staff and, being responsible for the actions of the Japanese Army on all the fronts, he continued the preparation of the Kwantung Army for war against the U.S.S.R.

During Japan's surrender all secret documents and records of the General Staff were burned down in Tokyo. It occurred in the period between August 13, 1945 and the day when the order of the Allied forces, prohibiting the destruction of the documents, was received. Among the documents, destroyed by the fire, there were documents referring to mobilization plans, military operation plans, documents referring to the guidance of war, records of the Supreme War Council conferences and others. At the time when documents were being



destroyed general Umezu, Chief of the General Staff, was in Tokyo (Pros. doc. 2660, Exb. N742, p.p. of the transcript 7676, 7683)



9 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge Nyti; Dr. Ao; Mr. Sutton  
FROM: EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT: Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT  
- DOHARA

The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

UOZU, Yoshijiro

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN



General Yoshijiro UMEZU: Chief of Army General Staff.

1882 Jan.	Born Oita Prefecture; 2nd son of Homel Umeru.
1904	Graduated Military Academy; 2nd Lt. of Infantry.
1905	1st Lt., Infantry; participated Russo-Japanese War.
1911	Graduated with honors from Army Staff College.
1912	Captain, Infantry.
1918	Major, Infantry.
1922	Lt. Col., Infantry.
1924	Colonel, Infantry.
1928	Chief, Military Affairs Section, Bureau of Military Affairs, War Ministry.
1930	Major General.
1930	Commander, 1st Infantry Brigade, Tokyo.
1931-32	Director, General Affairs Bureau, Army General Staff.
1934	Commander of troops in North China; Lieutenant General.
1935	Commander 2nd Division (Sendai).
1936 Mar.-	
1938 May	Vice Minister of War.
1938	Commander of troops in North China.
1939	Commanding General, 8th Division, Manchuria.
1939 Sept-1944	Commander in Chief, Kwantung Army, and concurrently Ambassador to Manchukuo.
1940 Aug.	Full General.
1944 July 19	Appointed Chief of Army General Staff, Tokyo; ex officio member Supreme Military Council.

Reputedly one of the most influential men in the Japanese Army. General Umeru's success in military administration combined with wide experience in command positions qualified him for his present post as Chief of Staff. A long-term commander of the pivotal Kwantung Army, Umeru has been identified with the Ugaki clique. He is also reported to be a good friend of Field Marshal Sugiyama. (10)

As Army Commander in China, General Umeru engineered the Ho-Umeru agreement of 1935 whereby the Japanese Army gained virtual control of North China without resort to arms. Again in 1938 he returned to North China and helped form the Peking "Provisional" Government which eventually grew into the puppet North China Political Affairs Commission. (152)

In the cabinet reshuffle of 1938 Umeru was ousted as Vice Minister of War and replaced by Tojo, supposedly because his views were not in harmony with the Army's drastic plans for the conduct of the China War. (72) In July 1944 he replaced Tojo as Chief of Staff.



SUMMARY OF INTERROGATIONS OF  
UMEZU, GENERAL YOSHIJIRO

15 March 1946

In the course of five separate interrogations it has not been possible to elicit from General UMEZU any information which tends to directly implicate him in any offense. General UMEZU has a reputation for extreme caution - he is said to be a man who would rap stone on a stone bridge to test it - and his answers to questions have been restrained and unrevealing in the extreme.

He states that he never had anything to do with politics but devoted his undivided attention to the Army. He gave no details concerning the Ho-Umezu Pact, except that it was the result of his friendship with Ho, that it was not in writing and that its purpose was to promote peace and tranquillity in North China, which object it accomplished. He says that while in command of the Army in Manchuria he settled the Nomohau affair by negotiations. He says that his mission in Manchuria was to preserve peace and neutrality with Russia, which he accomplished. He says that he did not favor the war with China. As to war with the United States he says that he knew nothing about it until it had begun but was of the opinion that Japan should not fight America. His policy with regard to war prisoners was to treat them as guests and heroes, the sentiments expressed in this regard being even in advance of the requirements of the Geneva convention. He has admitted no complicity in any of the incidents which occurred during the period covered. His testimony might perhaps be characterized as whitewash. His interrogations give only a faint idea of the influence which he undoubtedly possessed, and are cleverly phrased to conceal his real connection with events.

He can be implicated, so far as indicated by his interrogations to date, only by reason of the key positions which he held and the great power which these show that he probably exercised, and by other evidence elsewhere summarized.



Summary of Interrogations of  
UMEZU, General Yoshijiro, cont'd.

From 1931 to 1945 he occupied the following offices:

- 1931 - Chief of General Affairs Department,  
General Staff.
- 1934 - Commander of Chinese Expeditionary  
Force.
- 1935 - Commander of Second Division, China.
- 1936 - Vice Minister of War.
- 1938 - Commander of the First Army, China.
- 1939 - Commander Kwangtung Army.  
Ambassador to Manchukuo.
- 1944 - Chief of Staff under General Tojo.

B. M. McMullin, Comdr. USNR



7 April 1947

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Mr. Douglas Waldorf, Chief, Documents Section  
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT : Re: The Witness ISOGAYA, Rensuke (ISOGAI, Rensuke or Tensuke)

1. ISOGAI, Rensuke appears as a witness for DOHIHARA.
2. ISOGAYA, Rensuke appears as a witness for UMEZU.
3. On the list which you furnished to me ISOGAI Tensuke is carried as a witness for DOHIHARA and UMEZU.
4. Please ascertain and let me know whether these names represent one and the same person and if so the correct name, and make appropriate changes on your records.

D. N. SUTTON  
Assistant Counsel