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MISSION #24 BANGKOK "CAPACIOUS 4"  
2 Jan 45

2-5239-54


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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

SECRET  
By Auth of  
DEFCOM 20AF  
18 Jan 45  
Date Initial



18 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report of B-29 Mission, 2 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Enclosed for your information and files is Tactical Mission Report of the B-29 strike against the Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand, on 2 January 1945.



2. Please accomplish original of the attached receipt and return to this Headquarters.

For the Deputy Commander:

*Leo I. Herman*  
LEO I. HERMAN,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Acting Adjutant General.

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Tactical Mission Rpt  
No. 24, dtd 12 Jan 45.

File No. 373.2 - XX 13C



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S E C R E T



SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JAN 29 1965	
HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	

SECRET

Office of the Deputy Commander, 13 and C  
 TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
 470 432

SUBJECT: Report of B-29 Station, 2 January 1965.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Inclosed for your information and files is Tactical Mission Report of the B-29 sortie against the Rama VI bridge, Bangkok, Thailand, on 2 January 1965.
2. Please accomplish original of the attached receipt and return to this Headquarters.


For the Deputy Commander:

*W. B. ...*  
 Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,  
 Acting Adjutant General.

1 Incl: 1 - Tactical Mission Rpt  
 No. 24, 2nd IS Jan 45.

4367

HEADQUARTERS  
 TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
 ADJUTANT GENERAL



JAN 29 1965

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# XX Bomber Command



## Tactical Mission Report

No. 24

DATE 2 JANUARY 1945

GENERAL H.H. ARNOLD

COPY No. 1

SECRET

2-5239-54



2-5239-54



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\* 12 Jan 45 / Initials \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of The Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION

REPORT

Field Orders No. 24

Mission No. 24

TARGET: RAMA VI RAILROAD BRIDGE

Bangkok, Thailand

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section  
XX Bomber Command

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\* By auth of DEPCOM 20 AF \*  
\* 12 Jan 45 \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of The Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

12 January 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 2 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING: The four Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 24 to participate in a medium-size strike on D-day against the Rama VI Railroad Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Col. W. H. Blanchard
444th	Dudhkundi	Col. A. L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Col. A. F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Lt. Col. J. V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 24.

b. Targets Specified:

- (1) Primary Target: Rama VI Railroad Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand (AAF Target No. 98.2-45).
- (2) Secondary Target: Central Station and Yards, Rangoon, Burma (XX Bomber Command Target 82.2D).
- (3) Last Resort Target: Railroad Yards and Warehouses, Bassein, Burma (XX Bomber Command Target No. 82.2F).

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Targets:

(1) Primary Target: Bangkok is now the principal control and supply center for troops and material being moved into the Burma theater of operations. With the mining of the Menam River water borne traffic has been restricted to small coasters and an occasional medium sized merchant vessel. In October of 1944 a 250' M/V observed at the new government docks was reported to be the first vessel of this size to enter the river since the previous May. Ocean going ships destined for Bangkok may anchor off the Koh Sichang Islands, 30 miles south of the mouth of the river, and tranship by lighters or unload at small ports along the east coast of the Malay peninsula and move their cargo to Bangkok by rail. Rail traffic has, therefore, become the critical factor in maintaining the Japanese war effort in the Burma-Thailand areas. There is one main line leading into Bangkok from French Indo-China from which point it branches in three directions. To North Thailand, to Burma and to the Malay peninsula and Singapore. Any interruption of rail traffic would be of utmost importance to the Japanese effort.

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(2) Secondary Target: Rail traffic from Thailand and Rangoon passes through this yard en route to Promé. As considerable activity has recently been observed on the Rangoon to Promé line, it would be desirable to delay the flow of enemy supplies along this route by destroying the Central Station and Yards at Rangoon. Any loss of locomotives and rolling stock caused by the bombing of this target will further decrease the capacity of the Japanese to supply their troops on the battlefronts in Burma.

(3) Last Resort Target: Although at present not an active center of Japanese activity, Bassein is strategically located in relation to areas of future military operations in Burma. Bombing of the rail yards and warehouses at Bassein will tend to discourage Japanese use of the town's facilities and hamper the movement of their supplies.

b. Details of Planning (See Annex N):

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) Reconnaissance photographs taken on 30 December 1944 showed that 2 Japanese Battleships of the Ise-Hyuga Class, a heavy cruiser of the Mogami Class, a 650-foot seaplane tender, 2 destroyers, 2 tankers, and a merchant vessel were anchored at Cap St. Jacques, Indo China. Plans were immediately made to bomb this task force; however, before our striking force could take off the Navy informed us that the battleships had been moved. As a secondary plan, a mission was scheduled against the Ywantung Railroad Yards in Burma. In order to obtain operational data, 4 flights of 12 B-29 airplanes each were to rendezvous over Chittagong Airfield, India with 2 squadrons of P-38s. This plan was also scrapped because of unfavorable weather at Ywantung, but 12 planes from each group had been loaded with 8 1000-pound general-purpose bombs each and were ready for take-off. The Rama VI Bridge at Bangkok was the only suitable target for bombing with 1000-pound bombs that existing in an area for which clear weather had been forecast. In order to avoid last minute confusion the groups were ordered to use the same plan that had been used on Mission Number 20 (against the same target) with exceptions as indicated in the following paragraphs.

(b) The bomb load of 8 1000-pound bombs loaded for the Ywantung Mission was not changed to the heavier bomb load of 12 that had been carried to Bangkok on Mission Number 20.

(c) Fuse settings were changed from instantaneous nose and none-delay tail to .1 second nose and non-delay tail.

(d) Each group was ordered to furnish 12 airborne aircraft instead of 15 as had been specified for Mission Number 20.

(e) The groups were given take-off times an hour later than the take-off times for the previous Bangkok mission. This was done because of weather forecasts indicating that the best target weather was predicted to occur an hour later than the time the Groups were over the target on Mission Number 20.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load: The field orders specified that each aircraft was to load 8 1000-pound (TNT or Amatol filled) general purpose bombs fused .1 second nose and non-delay tail. The bomb and fuzing employed were those recommended in the Report of the Army Air Forces Board on the "Selection of Bombs and Fuses for Bombardment Targets," dated 18 October 1944. Bombs were to be released in minimum train with release on the range and deflection sighting of the lead bombardier.



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c. Bombing Data:

(a) Bombing was to be accomplished by 12-plane formations on a heading of 68 degrees magnetic from the following pressure altitudes: 40th Group - 20,000 feet; 444th Group - 19,000 feet; 462nd Group - 21,000 feet; and 468th Group - 18,000 feet.

(b) If weather conditions were to prevent visual bombing of the primary target, aircraft were to proceed to and bomb the secondary target.

(c) Aiming points were established as follows: primary target - center of the Rama VI Bridge; secondary target - visual, center of southern edge of railroad station, and radar, slightly east of the strong signal from the city and approximately 4000 feet from the north bank of the Rangoon River (initial point was Kaingthaung Island and axis of attack was 47 degrees magnetic); and last resort target - visual, center of largest building in central river siding, and radar, northwest portion of signal from city.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annexes A and K):

a. Take-off:

(1) Times of take-off were planned for D-day minus 1 as follows: 40th - 012217Z; 444th - 012324Z; 462nd - 012330Z; and 468th - 012337Z.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C Off</u>	<u>Last A/C Off</u>
40th	13	2217Z	2249Z
444th	12	2325Z	2356Z
462nd	12	2330Z	2352Z
468th	12	2337Z	0015Z
Total	49	2217Z	0015Z

(3) The Field Orders called for 12 aircraft airborne from each Group. One aircraft of the 40th Group returned to base shortly after taking off and another aircraft was airborne in its place, 15 minutes after the last of the regularly scheduled aircraft had taken off.

(4) Weather at all bases at take-off was clear with visibility ranging from 4 to 8 miles at the various bases. Winds were reported for only one base (Kharagpur), where the winds were north northwest at 12 miles per hour.

b. Route Out:

(1) The route to the primary target was from base to Diamond Island to a separate assembly point for each Group to a common initial point at Mondhol Rajburi to the target.

(2) Deviations from the route to the primary target were few and minor. There were 5 cases of deviation, 1 aircraft bombing the last resort target, 1 bombing a target of opportunity, and 3 jettisoning their bombs. Three of these were by aircraft of the 40th Group and 2 by aircraft of the 462nd; the other 2 Groups had no deviations.



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c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 49 aircraft airborne on the mission, 44 bombed the primary target at Bangkok. The first formation (10 aircraft) released 79 1000-pound bombs at 0347Z from 21,100 feet true on a heading of 68 degrees magnetic, the second (12 aircraft) dropped 96 bombs at 0451Z from 19,000 feet indicated on a heading of 50 degrees magnetic, the third (10 aircraft) dropped 80 bombs at 0503Z from an altitude of 21,000 feet indicated on a heading of 70 degrees magnetic, and the fourth (12 aircraft) dropped 96 bombs at 0527Z from 19,100 feet true on a heading of 215 degrees magnetic. Formations over the target were from the 40th, 444th, 462nd, and 468th in that order. During this interval of one hour and 40 minutes, the four formations dropped 351 1000-pound bombs in the primary target area - a total of 178.8 short tons (using the actual weight of the bombs - 1019 pounds). All bombing was accomplished visually.

(2) Bombing altitudes varied from approximately 18,000 to 21,000 feet and indicated air speeds from 190 to 204 miles per hour.

(3) Visibility at the target was unrestricted with a few cumulus clouds present with tops at 5000 feet.

d. Last Resort Target: One aircraft of the 462nd Group dropped 8 1000-pound bombs on the last resort target at Bassein at 0352Z from 12,100 feet true on a heading of 205 degrees magnetic at an indicated air speed of 198 miles per hour. Hits were observed on buildings and approximately 200 feet east of the railroad tracks.

e. Target of Opportunity: One aircraft of the 40th Group dropped 8 1000-pound bombs on Pagoda Airfield (15°57'N-94°20'E) at 0250Z from 12,000 feet indicated on a heading of 300 degrees magnetic at an indicated air speed of 185 miles per hour. Results were unobserved due to 8/10 cloud cover.

f. Route Back:

(1) Aircraft proceeded from the target to Tavoy Point to Diamond Island to base with the exception of 3 aircraft of the 40th Group. One aircraft developed mechanical trouble after having bombed the primary target and left the formation escorted by 2 other aircraft. The aircraft in trouble finally landed at Cox's Bazaar and the escort planes then proceeded directly to Chakulia.

(2) Weather at bases on return was generally 5 to 8/10 overcast at 20,000 feet with visibility varying from unrestricted to 6 to 8 miles.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Meager and inaccurate to accurate heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft at the primary target from 0345Z to 0519Z at altitudes varying from 19,000 to 21,000 feet under CAVU conditions. Two aircraft reported phosphorous anti-aircraft bursts, 15 reported white, and all crews reported black. There was one report of "brownish" bursts. The number of bursts occurring at any one instant varied from 2 to 4 while the total observed in the sky was from 8 to 15. It is believed that continuously pointed fire was used. Automatic weapons fire was also reported at 0502Z and 0519Z at altitudes of 21,000 and 19,000 feet respectively.

b. Meager and inaccurate to accurate black and some white heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered from Den Muang Airfield at 0504Z and 0525Z at 21,000 and 18,000 feet respectively.

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c. One conventional sausage-shaped barrage balloon was reported flying at an altitude of 5000 feet at 0525Z. The observation was made from 19,000 feet.

d. Although there were no sightings of or attacks by enemy aircraft prior to 0347Z it is probable that the enemy had early warning of the attack since the aircraft were tracked from the region of Pagoda Point to the target.

6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. Air opposition is rated as nil to weak with 2 Groups reporting no contact with enemy fighters. Of the 49 airborne aircraft, 12 reported enemy air action to the extent of 13 individual encounters, all of which occurred in the primary target area. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft are 1 probably destroyed and 1 damaged.

b. The first Group over the target met no air opposition. The first attacks occurred when the second Group over arrived more than an hour later.

c. Enemy pilots were not aggressive. Their breakaways were at no time under 100 yards and they are known to have fired in only 8 of the 13 encounters. The B-29's fired at short ranges in most instances. There were no reports of near collisions or attempts to ram.

d. No aerial bombs or rockets were observed and there were no reports of new enemy aircraft, armament, or tactics.

7. WEATHER: (See Annex D):

a. The weather encountered was substantially as forecast with base and target conditions extremely favorable.

b. En route over the Bay of Bengal more clouds than forecast were encountered with the result that some instrument flying was necessary.

8. COMMUNICATIONS: (See Annex E):

a. Communications during this mission were excellent. The comparatively short distance flown and the thorough briefing of crews on the contents of the Communications Section of the Tactical Doctrine are considered to be the main factors in this excellent showing.

b. All required traffic was handled satisfactorily with only 2 minor deviations from the Tactical Doctrine attributable to poor visibility on the inbound leg of the mission.

c. Seven requests for D/F aid were made, 5 of which were by the 44th Group for practice purposes. Of the 7 bearings given, 6 were Class I and 1 was Class II.

d. Air-to-air homing was used by 3 Groups but only one Group used it successfully.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. Bombing of all targets was accomplished visually. Radar was useful, however, as a navigational aid, particularly in aiding the navigation of formations through storm clouds.



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b. Serviceability of the radar equipment was above average with 91 per cent of the systems operational over the target.

10. RCM (See Annex G);

a. RCM activities were confined to searching with 7 km-equipped aircraft participating in the mission. The RCM Observers searched for enemy early warning equipment enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment in the target area. One RCM-equipped aircraft had a bottom-mount D/F antenna installed.

b. Radar intercepts were made as follows; a 69-mc radar site in the Rangoon area - enroute to the target; a strong 80-mc site and a 100-mc site in the Rangoon area - enroute to base. Other enemy radar activity was also noted but no intercepts with radar fire control characteristics were made.

c. One radio operator reported what was believed to be jamming. It was strongest in the target area.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H);

a. The CSFC system worked satisfactorily on this mission. There were only 5 malfunctions (2.1%) of the 235 turrets on aircraft reporting and only 6 malfunctions (1.3%) of the 470 50-cal. machine guns.

b. Total rounds of ammunition expended numbered 15,227, of which 8445 were used in test firing and 6782 in combat.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I); Fifty-three cameras of the K-17, K-18, K-20, and K-22 types were installed in the aircraft airborne. Of these, 4 cameras were in aircraft failing to bomb any target. Of the 49 cameras in aircraft bombing targets, 37 photographed targets, producing 254 usable negatives. There were 2 mechanical failures and 10 other cameras failed to get pictures for other reasons.

13. AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M);

a. There were no losses of any kind on this mission.

b. No major damage was sustained by any aircraft. Minor damage resulted to 1 aircraft from enemy air opposition. Four aircraft suffered operational damage, 2 from own guns and 2 from other causes.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and L);

a. Of the 49 aircraft airborne, 5 failed to bomb the primary target, all for mechanical reasons.

b. There were 86 malfunctions of equipment in flight (excluding 3 malfunctions that were related to failure of 5 aircraft to bomb the assigned primary target) as follows (1) power plant and accessory section - 15 (engines running rough or hot - 12); (2) propellers and governors - 14 (governors - 7); (3) oil system - 9 (oil leaks - 5); (4) fuel system - 4; (5) electrical system - 12; (6) instruments - 25 (tachometers - 7); and miscellaneous - 7.

c. Over-all averages in fuel consumption were; average - 4960, maximum - 5465, minimum - 4345. Averages by Groups were as follows; 40th - 5060 (maximum - 5400, minimum - 4475); 444th - 5010 (maximum - 5465, minimum - 4345); 462nd - 4900 (maximum - 5320, minimum - 4600); and 468th - 4870 (maximum - 5300, minimum - 4500).



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15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex I):

a. Assessment of damage was derived from excellent photos obtained by the 44th Group on 3 January 1945.

b. The attack was accomplished by four formations over the target from 0347Z to 0527Z. At least one direct hit was scored on the bridge as well as several near misses which rendered the bridge temporarily unserviceable.

c. A section of the west top chord of the northern approach span has been destroyed and part of the lateral bracing has been damaged. Shadow study clearly shows a definite sag in the span. In addition the railway platform and the east top chord have sustained damage and are seen to be buckled.

d. The north abutment received at least one direct hit which destroyed the rail line and both supporting girders. The approach embankment just north took several hits and near misses which probably severed the rail line.

e. Bombs falling wide of the bridge heavily damaged a large unidentified sawtooth building, completed the destruction of a long narrow railway siding shed, destroyed at least 55 small buildings and damaged 30 others.

*Curtis E. Lemay*

CURTIS E. LEMAY  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Deputy Commander

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

A

- I - Information on Take-Offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path\*
- IV - Bombing Data\*\*
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report\*
- IX - Information on Landings

\* Prepared by Staff Navigator.

\*\* Page A-IV-1 prepared by Staff Bombardier

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By AP NARA Date 11-15



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I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 24  
2 January 1945

Group	Planned Take-off*	First A/C off *	Last A/C Off *	Elapsed Time	No. A/C Airborne	Avg. Take-off Interval
40th	2217Z	2217Z	2249Z**	32 min.	13	160 sec.
444th	2324Z	2325Z	2356Z	31 min.	12	169 sec.
462nd	2330Z	2330Z	2352Z	22 min.	12	120 sec.
468th	2337Z	2337Z	0015Z	38 min.	12	207 sec.
Overall	2217Z	2217Z	0015Z	118 min.	49	-

\* All times D-day minus 1 (1 January 1945) except last off for 468th Group which is D-day.

\*\* Last off of scheduled 12 A/C was at 2234Z. A/C 579, replacement for A/C 738 that returned at 2252Z, took-off at 2249Z.

II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

Mission No. 24  
2 January 1945

A. Routes Planned

	40th	444th	462nd	468th
Base	Chakulia	Dudakundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur
1st Check Point	Diamond Island (15°52'N-94°17'E)			
Assembly Point	Tavoy Point 13°32'N- 98°08'E	North tip Tavoy Island 13°04'N- 98°19'E	South tip Launglan Bok Is. 13°47'N- 97°54'E	Cabusa Island 12°49'N- 97°53'E
Initial Point	Mondhol Rajburi (15°32'N-99°50'E)			
Target	Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok			
1st Return Pt.	Tavoy Point (13°32'N-98°08'E)			
2nd Return pt.	Diamond Island (15°52'N-94°17'E)			
Base	Chakulia	Dudakundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. 40th Group:

- a. A/C 582 blew a cylinder at 18°37'N-91°10'E and returned directly to Chakulia after jettisoning its bombs.
- b. A/C 233, after bombing the primary target with its formation, experienced mechanical difficulty at 13°45'N-99°35'E and left the formation escorted by A/C 620 and A/C 462. These aircraft

A - I - 1  
A - II - 1  
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passed over Maungmagon Island at 0444Z, Dawnyain, Burma, at 0539Z, 16°45'N-94°17'E at 0610Z, and arrived at Cox's Bazaar at 0806Z, where A/C 233 landed. The two escort planes then proceeded directly to Chakulia.

c. A/C 738 had a malfunction of the #4 engine prop governor immediately after taking off. Bombs were jettisoned in the river south of Chakulia.

d. A/C 579's #4 engine swallowed a valve at 15°30'N-94°54'E, making it necessary to feather its engine. A target of opportunity was bombed and the aircraft returned directly to Chakulia.

2. 444th Group: None

3. 462nd Group:

a. A/C 590's #1 engine would not put out full power. Aircraft proceeded to and bombed the last resort target.

b. A/C 472 experienced difficulty with its #1 engine. Bombs were jettisoned in the sea at 14°37'N-96°30'E.

4. 468th Group: None

A - II - 2


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
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Auth: CG XI BC

Initials JWW

Date: 9 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF BOMBARDIER

Date Prepared: 9 January 1945

Field Order No. 24

Date of Mission: 2 Jan 45

1. Visibility at the primary target permitted visual bombing in all cases. Enemy fighter and anti-aircraft opposition was not sufficient to constitute any source of error in bombing.

2. All bombardiers were briefed to release in minimum train interval on the leader. This was accomplished except in cases where electrical malfunctioning of racks occurred.

3. Malfunctions of bombing equipment were as follows:

a. 40th Group.

(1) One bomb failed to release from airplane #798 through the intervalometer or by electrical salvo. Cause: Bakelite insulation on A-1 connector was cracked and caused an electrical short.

b. 444th Group.

(1) Bomb bay doors failed to close with the normal system. (The emergency system worked O.K.) Cause: Unknown.

c. 462nd Group.

(1) Bombs in forward bomb bay failed to release from airplane #590. Cause: Safety fuse for forward bomb bay had been left out.

(2) Bombs failed to release electrically from airplane #506. (Salvoed O.K.). Cause: Unknown. Ground check revealed no malfunction.

d. 468th Group. (none reported)

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IV - BOMBING DATA (Continued)

A. Times of Bomb Release at FT:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. Aircraft</u>	<u>Time</u>
40th	10	0347Z
444th	12	0451Z
462nd	10	0503Z
468th	12	0527Z

B. Bombing Altitudes at FT:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. Aircraft</u>	<u>Altitudes</u>	<u>Briefed</u>
40th	10	21,100' True	20,000' Ind.
444th	12	18,400' - 19,180' I	19,000' Ind.
462nd	10	21,000' Indicated	21,000' Ind.
468th	12	19,100' True	18,000' Ind.

C. Axes of Attack at FT:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. Aircraft</u>	<u>Axes</u>	<u>Briefed</u>
40th	10	68° Mag.	68° Mag.
444th	12	50° - 55° Mag.	68° Mag.
462nd	10	64° - 70° Mag.	68° Mag.
468th	12	215° Mag	68° Mag.

D. Indicated Air Speeds at FT:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. Aircraft</u>	<u>IAS</u>
40th	10	195 mph
444th	12	190 - 203 mph
462nd	10	195 - 204 mph
468th	12	190 mph

E. Aircraft Bombing Other than FT:

<u>Tgt</u>	<u>A/C</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Time of Release</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Axis of Attack</u>	<u>IAS</u>	<u>1000 - pound Bombs Dropped</u>
T.O.*	579	40th	0250Z	12,000' I	300° M	185	8
LRT	590	462nd	0352Z	12,100' T	205° M	198	8

\*Pagoda Airfield at 15°57'N - 94°20'E.

A-IV-2

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

V - BOMB LOADING\*

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. Bombs Per A/C</u>	<u>Aircraft Airborne</u>	<u>Bomb Load</u>	<u>Total Pounds**</u>	<u>Short Tons</u>
40th	8	13	104	105,976	52.988
444th	8	12	96	97,824	48.912
462nd	8	12	96	97,824	48.912
468th	8	12	96	97,824	48.912
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>392</b>	<b>399,448</b>	<b>199.724</b>

\* Field Orders specified 8 1000-pound (TNT or Amatol filled) bombs, fused .1 second nose and non delay tail, were to be carried in each aircraft.

\*\* Actual weight 1019 pounds.

VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total		Short tons
	A/C	#	A/C	#	A/C	#	A/C	#	A/C	#	
All Targets	11	87	12	96	11	88	12	96	46	367	186.986
Rama VI Bridge(PT)	10	79	12	96	10	80	12	96	44	351	178.834
Bassein (LRT)	-	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	1	8	4.076
Pagoda AF(T of O)	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	4.076
Jettisoned	2	16	-	-	1	8	-	-	3	24	12.228
Brought Back	-	1a	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	.510
<b>Airborne &amp; Bomb Load</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>392</b>	<b>199.724</b>

a. A/C 798 dropped 7 bombs on PT and brought 1 back to base.

A-V-1

A-VI-1

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VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

A. Formations Planned

1. The 12-plane formation as defined in the Command's Tactical Doctrine was the formation specified in the Field Orders.

B. Formations over the Primary Target

1. Formations over the PT were carried out in general in accordance with the plan. Two Groups (the 444th and 468th) placed 12-plane formations over the target, and the other two placed 10-plane formations over the target. The first over was at 0347Z, the second at 0451Z, the third at 0403Z, and the fourth at 0527Z with the 40th, 444th, 462nd and 468th going over the target in that order. The fourth formation made 2 runs over the target, the first on a heading of approximately 60° and the bombing run on a heading of 215°, both magnetic.

2. The diagrams below are intended to indicate relative position only. "W" represents an aircraft of the 40th Group; "X" the 444th Group; "Y" the 462nd Group; and "Z" the 468th Group. Formations are all for Primary Target.

First formation:

W (798)\*  
W (752) W (739)  
W (620) W (859) W (396)  
W (233) W (462) W (589) W (498)

Time : 020347Z  
Altitude : 21,100 ft. True  
Heading : 68° Magnetic  
No of A/C : 10  
Bombs dropped: 79 1000-pound bombs  
\* Dropped 7 on PT and returned 1.

Second Formation:

X (226)  
X (730) X (724) X (538) X (492)  
X (731) X (451) X (485) X (376) X (507)  
X (580) X (202)

Time : 020451Z  
Altitude : 19,000 ft. indicated  
Heading : 50° Magnetic  
No of A/C : 12  
Bombs dropped: 96 1000-pound bombs

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Third Formation:

Y (503)  
Y (457) Y (454)  
Y (450) Y (252)  
Y (254) Y (506)  
Y (301)  
Y (463)  
Y (800)

Time : 020503Z  
Altitude : 21,000 ft Indicated  
Heading : 70° Magnetic  
No of A/C : 10  
Bombs dropped: 80 1000-pound bombs

Fourth Formation:

Z (486)  
Z (704) Z (542) Z (714) Z (703)  
Z (208) Z (487) Z (442) Z (691)  
Z (469)  
Z (494) Z (429)

Time : 020527Z  
Altitude : 19,100 ft. True  
Heading : 215° Magnetic  
No. of A/C : 12  
Bombs dropped: 96 1000-pound bombs

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Auth: CG XX BC

Initials:           

Date: 5 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 7 January 1945

Field Order #24

Date of Mission: 2 Jan 45

1. Navigation on this Mission was excellent. All navigators seem to have made excellent use of sun lines and in many cases crossing sun lines with radio bearings to obtain fixes. The amount of celestial work is worthy of comment since it indicates an increased tendency on the part of navigators to do more celestial work on the mission.

a. Average navigation time out and back, with time for group assemblies follows:

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>TIME BACK</u>	<u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u>
40th	5h 20m	5h 48m	26m
444th	5h 04m	4h 53m	12.5m
462nd	5h 17m	5h 00m	22m
468th	5h 33m	4h 59m	23m

b. The following navigational aid work was reported:

	<u>CEL</u> <u>LOP'S</u>	<u>COMB.</u> <u>FIXES</u>	<u>RADIO</u> <u>FIXES</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
40th	40	9	5	0
444th	24	0	0	4
462nd	23	0	8	0
468th	50	0	9	2

c. Forecast winds to first turning point were reported as good, with some variance between actual and forecast winds from this point to target. Reported winds are as follows

	<u>DIAMOND</u> <u>ISLAND</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DIAMOND</u> <u>IS (BACK)</u>
40th	5000' 243-17K	20000' 156°-14K	15000' 259°-20K
444th	5000' 226°-13K	19000' 135°-18K	17000' 268°-21K
462nd	4500' 210°-12K	21000' 95°-18K	16000' 260°-22K
468th	7000' 249°-15K	18000' 103°-15K	15000' 247°-21K

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d. Navigators, for the most part, had exceptional cooperation from the Radar operator, getting fair drift over terrestrial areas and satisfactory winds.

2. Comments by Groups:

40th Group - No comment  
444th Group - No comment  
462nd Group - No comment  
468th Group - No comment

3. The recommendation to have the C.F.C. hand set moved so that the navigator can set it properly without getting out of his chair was again mentioned. It is recommended that action be taken on this, in order to enhance the accuracy of adjustments of the equipment.

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IX - INFORMATION ON LANDINGS

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

A. Landed at Home Bases

1. <u>Aircraft Bombing PT:</u>	<u>40th</u>	<u>44th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Over-all</u>
a. First down	0907Z	0951Z	1000Z	1027Z	0907Z
b. Last down	1009Z	1004Z	1022Z	1043Z	1043Z

2. Aircraft Failing to Bomb PT:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 582 - 0219Z - jettisoned bombs.
- (2) A/C 738 - 2252Z - (D-Day Minus 1) - jettisoned bombs.
- (3) A/C 579 - 0609Z - bombed opportunity target.

b. 44th Group: None

c. 462nd Group:

- (1) A/C 590 - 0655Z - bombed last resort target
- (2) A/C 472 - 0745Z - jettisoned bombs.

d. 468th Group: None

3. Landed at other than home bases:

- a. A/C 233 (40th) landed at Cox's Bazaar at 0806Z with prop governor malfunction after having bombed the PT

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ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Flak Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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\*\*\*\*\*  
\* S E C R E T \*  
\* By Auth of the C.G. \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* / / \*  
\* Date Initials \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

7 January 1945

P R E L I M I N A R Y R E P O R T

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 24, (DAYLIGHT), 2 JANUARY 1945

Primary Target - BANGKOK, Secondary Target - RANGOON  
Target of Last Resort - BASSEIN

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. BANGKOK (13°45'N - 100°30'E)

Meager and inaccurate to accurate heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered by all aircraft from 0345Z to 0519Z at altitudes varying from 19,000 to 21,000 feet under CAVU conditions.

Bombing was accomplished by four formations as follows:

Formation	Aircraft	Altitude feet	Heading, °M	Bomb Release	Fire En- countered	Remarks
1	10	21,000	68	0347Z	0345-48Z	Meager-inaccurate
2	12	20,000	50	0451Z	0449-52Z	Meager-inaccurate
3	10	21,000	70	0503Z	0501-05Z	Meager-inaccurate
4	12	19,000	215	0526Z	0519Z	Meager-inaccurate to accurate

Formation #4 made two runs over the target (Rama VI Bridge), the first at approximately 60° and the second and bombing run at 215°M. HAA fire was encountered only during the first run when two aircraft were reported as struck, 1 as rocked with bursts within 150 feet of four aircraft in the formation. This formation also passed over DON MUANG A/D while on the second bomb run and encountered fire, see Part (2) below.

Two aircraft reported phosphorous antiaircraft bursts, approximately 15 reported white, and all crews observed black heavy antiaircraft fire, in addition to one report of "brownish-smoke" bursts. The phosphorous bursts were further described as having the characteristic tentacles which extended above the white spherical bursts.

Following are reports of accuracy, intensity, and deviations. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below:

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck . . . . .	2 ( 5 percent)	Intense . . . . .	0 ( 0 percent)
Rocked . . . . .	1 ( 2 percent)	Moderate . . . . .	1 ( 2 percent)
Within 150' . . . . .	9 (20 percent)	Meager . . . . .	43 (98 percent)
Outside 150' . . . . .	32 (73 percent)		

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Reports of Deviations

Above . 11 (19 percent) Ahead . . 5 (10 percent) Left . . 5 (12 percent)  
Level . 23 (40 percent) Abreast . 14 (29 percent) In Line. 4 ( 9 percent)  
Below . 24 (41 percent) Behind. . 30 (61 percent) Right. . 34 (79 percent)

The number of bursts occurring at any one instant varied from two to four while the total observed in the sky was from eight to fifteen. It is believed that Continuously Pointed type of fire was used. The majority of the crews in the second formation observed "4 bursts appearing in a string behind and below" while those in the first formation reported "irregular patterns" indicating Continuous Pointed fire. However, it is still possible, because of lack of conclusive evidence, that the enemy resorted to Barrage or Predicted Concentration types.

Three enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude, one at 0347Z and two biplanes at 0519Z, but there was no change in the accuracy or intensity of fire at these times as compared to periods when no "thistle" aircraft were observed.

Automatic weapons fire was also reported for times of 0502Z and 0519Z from altitudes of 21,000 and 19,000 feet. At 0502Z AW fire was observed originating "from the center of BANGKOK and bursting at 12,000 to 15,000 feet", while at 0519Z flashes were seen "between BANGKOK and the BANGKOK River."

Gun flashes were also seen from a site on the north side of town, from the south end of the RAMA VI Bridge, and from southeast of the bridge, between the river and the town. Identified on strike photos is a new 3 gun heavy AA (75mm) site located approximately 1800 feet due south of the East end of the RAMA VI bridge. This site is still under construction and when finished will probably consist of from 4 to 6 HAA guns.

Although this site is within the dispersion area for bombs dropped on the bridge during this attack and that of 14 December 1944, it indicates that the Jap will immediately adapt his antiaircraft defense to changing conditions. It is also probable that his lack of heavy antiaircraft equipment has forced him to locate this site within 1800 feet of the bridge to provide opposition on all headings of attack, and it is indicated that he has considered our prior headings by placing it south of the bridge.

To avoid resulting increases in fire volume brought about by shifts in the enemy's defenses which are based on past tactics of our forces, varied headings of attack, as demonstrated by this one case, should be used for subsequent missions directed against the same target in any one area. Under ideal conditions of complete and up to date photo cover, however, an analysis of the HAA defense would result in the same recommendations.

2. DON MUANG AIRDROME (13°57'N - 100°36'E)

Meager and inaccurate to accurate black and some white heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered by Formations 3 and 4 at 0504Z and 0525Z at altitudes of 21,000 and 18,000 feet respectively under CAVU conditions.

In formation #4 one aircraft was reported as struck and bursts were reported within 150 feet of 5 aircraft, otherwise flak was inaccurate. The number of new bursts observed at any one instant varied from 4 to 8 while the total observed in the area varied from 4 to 21.

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Deviations of fire were generally level or below, abreast or behind, and either left or right. The type of fire could not be determined and no enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude. Gun flashes were reported from an unstated section of the airdrome.

3. RANGOON (16°46'N - 96°11'E)

No aircraft were over this area.

4. BASSEIN (16°47'N - 94°45'E)

One aircraft bombed this area at 0352Z at 12,100 feet altitude under CAVU conditions but no antiaircraft opposition was reported.

B. BARRAGE BALLOONS

One conventional "sausage-shaped" barrage balloon flying at an altitude of 5000 feet was observed at 0525Z from 19,000 feet.

C. HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS, SMOKESCREENS

None reported.

D. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Although three aircraft were reported as struck and one as rocked, subsequent examination of aircraft resulted in no reports of flak damage.

E. WARNING NETS

Although there were no sightings of, or attacks by enemy aircraft prior to 0347Z, it is probable that the Jap had prior warning of the attack against Bangkok as aircraft were tracked from approximately Pagoda Point to the target.

*F. L. SCOTT, JR.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Lt. Col., Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section

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ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

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* * * * *
* Prepared by: *
* Operational Intelligence Unit *
* XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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S E C R E T



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I. JAPANESE FIGHTER TACTICS - MISSION NO. 24

TARGET: Bangkok, Thailand.

TIME: Day Mission.

DATE: 2 January 1945.

1. Air opposition was rated nil to weak, with 2 of the 4 Groups participating reporting no contact at all with enemy fighters. Of the 49 B-29's airborne, 12 reported enemy air action to the extent of 13 individual encounters - all of which occurred in the primary target area. No B-29's were lost and only 1 suffered minor damage due to enemy air action. Preliminary claims against enemy aircraft were 1 probably destroyed and 1 damaged. Of the total of 13 encounters, 11 were made by OSCARS, 1 by a TONY, and 1 by an unidentified single-engine aircraft. It was estimated that 6 to 8 enemy aircraft, the majority OSCARS, attacked B-29 formations. From 10 to 15 additional enemy aircraft, all single-engine but unidentified as to type, were reported airborne in the target area but did not attack.

2. The first Group over the target met no air opposition; and, it wasn't until the second Group arrived, more than an hour later, that the first attack occurred, at 0452Z. All of the second Group's encounters (8) were after bombs away. The third Group over the target had no air opposition, but the last Group had 5 encounters, all before bombs away. The final encounter was at 0525Z.

3. Eight of the 13 encounters were made by either 1 or 2 teams of 2 OSCARS, in coordinated attacks from 4, 10, and 11 o'clock, high, coming in line astern. They did no damage. Direction and level of approach for all encounters is shown in Table No. 1 which follows.

Table No. 1 - Direction and Level of Approach

Direction and Level	Front			Right			Rear			Left			Total
	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
High	3	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	5	12
Level	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Low	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	2	5	13
		3			3		0			7			

4. Japanese pilots were not aggressive. At no time were their break-aways under 100 yards and they were known to fire in only 8 of 13 encounters,

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notwithstanding the fact that B-29's fired at short ranges in most instances. There were no reports of near collisions or attempts to ram.

5. There were no aerial bombs or rockets observed, nor, were there any reports of new enemy aircraft, armament, or tactics.

6. One Group reported that 3 Stearman-type enemy aircraft attempted to make several passes at their formation, but they always faded to the rear due to their slow speed, and never came closer than 1000 yards. The altitude was reported as 18,000 feet.

7. Details of combat in regard to preliminary claims against enemy aircraft of 1 probably destroyed and 1 damaged are as follows:

<u>Enemy Aircraft</u>	<u>Claim</u>	<u>No. of B-29's in Formation</u>	<u>Direction and Level of Approach</u>	<u>B-29's Opened Fire (yards)</u>	<u>Distance E/A Brokeaway or Disintegrated (yards)</u>
OSCAR	Prob Dest	12	11 high	500	400
OSCAR	Damaged	12	9 high	800	100

8. Enemy Aircraft Markings: Most aircraft were reported either silver finish or the conventional olive-drab. Two OSCARS, new and shiny in appearance, were silver finished with yellow cowling, and did not have the usual roundels. Another OSCAR was described as camouflaged earthen brown. The 3 Stearman-type biplanes were black.

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ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and as Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

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* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* Weather Section *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* * * * *
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I - WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base at Take-Off	9/10 cirrostratus at 26,000'. Scattered altocumulus at 9000'. Visibility 6 miles in haze.	CHAKULIA: Clear. Visibility 6 miles; KHARAGPUR: Clear. Visibility 6 miles in haze. Wind NNW 12 miles per hour. DUDHKUNDI: Clear. Visibility 8 miles PTARDOBA: Clear. Visibility 4 miles in haze.
Route Out	Base to 20° N: Same as base. 20° to 16° N: 8/10 altostratus base 9000' tops 12,000'; 8/10 altostratus base 16,000' tops at 20,000'; 8/10 stratus at 1500', tops 4000'; light rain showers. Visibility over 10 miles except in rain. 16° N to Target: 4/10 cirrostratus at 29,000'; 4/10 stratocumulus base 2500' tops 4500'.	Base to 20° N: Clear to coast then scattered altostratus at 12,000'. 20° to 16° N: Broken stratocumulus top 3000', occasionally overcast in showers; broken to overcast altostratus and nimbostratus with bases variable 7500' to 9000' and lowering to 6000' in showers. Thin altostratus overcast base 16,000' tops 19,000'. Most aircraft reported flying in soup at 5000' by the time 17° N. latitude was reached. Light rain showers were encountered at 19° N; steady drizzle started at 18° N. Heavy rain accompanied by severe turbulence occurred from 17° to 16° N. The top of this system was 11,000' to 12,000' with moderate turbulence at 14,000'. 16° to 15° N: Cloud system broke rapidly to 5/10 altostratus base 16,000' tops 19,000' with light rim icing and 3/10 cumulus with tops at 4000'. 15° N to Target: 2/10 cumulus top variable 7000' to 10,000' over water becoming 4/10 cumulus top 10,000' over west coast hills and 2/10 cumulus at the I.P.
TARGET	3/10 cirrostratus at 29,000'; 2/10 stratocumulus top 4500'; Visibility more than 10 miles.	Few cumulus top 5000'; visibility unrestricted.
Return Route	No change except middle cloud deck extending back to base area	Target to 16° N: Scattered cumulus over land with tops to 10,000'; scattered patches of altocumulus base 8000' tops 10,000'. 16° to 17° N: Mixed cumuliform and stratiform system with light clear ice and moderate turbulence above 15,000'. Top of system was 20,000'. Broken cirrus layer with base at 22,000'.

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	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base on Return	Altostratus overcast base 6000' tops at 12,000' with occasional breaks. Visibility unrestricted.	<p>17° to 20°N: Scattered cirrus at 22,000'. Top of cloud system at 15,000' becoming broken altocumulus at 15,000' between 19° and 20°N.</p> <p>20°N to Base: Scattered cirrus above 20,000'.</p> <p>CHAKULIA: High broken altocumulus. Visibility 6 miles.</p> <p>KEARAGPUR: 8/10 cirrostratus above 20,000'; visibility 8 miles; wind NNW 9 miles per hour.</p> <p>DUDHKUNDI: 5/10 cirrostratus above 20,000'; visibility unrestricted.</p> <p>PIARDOBA: 6/10 cirrostratus above 20,000'; visibility 6 miles in haze; wind NNW 11 miles per hour.</p>

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	Base to 19 Deg N.	19 Deg to 16 Deg N.	16 Deg N. to Target
1,000'	300 deg - 05K	300 deg - 05K	100 deg - 08K
5,000'	280 deg - 15K	250 deg - 15K	90 deg - 10K
10,000'	280 deg - 15K	260 deg - 12K	120 deg - 08K
15,000'	270 deg - 20K	250 deg - 16K	110 deg - 10K
20,000'	260 deg - 25K	240 deg - 20K	100 deg - 12K
25,000'	260 deg - 35K	240 deg - 25K	100 deg - 15K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	16 Deg N.	Target
5,000'	250 deg - 15K	
17,000'	250 deg - 15K	
18,000'		115 deg - 13K
21,000'		110 deg - 12K

C. Target Temperatures

As Forecast

Altitude	Temperature
Surface	29 deg C.
1,000'	27 deg C.
5,000'	21 deg C.
10,000'	12 deg C.
15,000'	4 deg C.
20,000'	-6 deg C.
25,000'	-14 deg C.

Mean temperature surface to 21,000': 11 deg C.

As Encountered

Altitude	Temperature
18,000'	-6 deg C.
19,000'	-7 deg C.

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
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
By AN NARA Date 11-15




**SECRET**  
**XX Bomber Command**  
**Weather as Forecast**



**Weather as Encountered**  
**ROUTE OUT**



**Weather as Encountered**  
**ROUTE BACK**



**SECRET**

19.40




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ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

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* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* Communications Section *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* * * * *
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:Auth: CG, XX BC :  
:Initials: KCH :  
:Date: 9 Jan 45 :  
:.....:

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS (RADIO) OFFICER

Date Prepared: 8 January 1945      Field Orders No: 24

Date of Mission: 2 January 1945.

1. Communications for mission number twenty-four (24) were considered excellent. The comparatively short distance flown and thorough briefing of crews on the contents of the Tactical Doctrine are considered to be the main contributing factors.

2. As in the past, a practice message was transmitted from the Command Post to further acquaint communications personnel with the procedures involved in handling a Target Change message. A time study of the handling of this message is contained as Annex Number One (1) to this report.

3. All required traffic was handled satisfactorily with two minor deviations from the Tactical Doctrine. These are attributable to poor visibility on the inbound leg of the mission, which, in these instances, caused a duplication of position reports. A considerable increase in the number of position reports on the part of the 462nd and 468th Groups was due to the wide dispersment of aircraft on the inbound leg of the mission.

	<u>40th Gp</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
a. Aborts:	2	0	2	0
b. Bombs Away:	2	1	2	1
c. Position:	2	3	9	10
d. Attack:	0	0	0	1

4. Compliance with the provisions of Tactical Doctrine was considered excellent with the exceptions listed in paragraph 3, above.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
NND 740120  
By: CD/MT NARS, Date: OCT 21 1975

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By: AN NARA Date 11-15



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5. A comparative study of the readability, signal strength and noise level of the frequencies in use, divided into two (2) hour periods is as follows: Time indicated is GMT:

AIRCRAFT TO GROUND STATION

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2200-0000</u>	<u>0000-0200</u>	<u>0200-0400</u>
2807.5 kcs	S4 R4 W0	-----	-----
4785	S1 R1 W4	S5 R5 W5	S2 R1 W5
4825	S3 R3 W4	S2 R5 W4	S3 R3 W2
4995	S4 R4 ---	S4 R5 --	S4 R5 ---
8260	S2 R2 W3	S4 R4 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310	S5 R5 ---	S4 R4 --	S4 R4 --
8495	S5 R5 W2	S3 R3 W2	S4 R4 W2
8545	-- -- --	S4 R4 W5	S4 R4 W4

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0400-0600</u>	<u>0600-0800</u>	<u>0800-1000</u>
2807.5 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4825	S3 R3 W2	-- -- --	S4 R4 W2
4995	S3 R5	-- -- --	-- -- --
8260	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310	S5 R5 --	S3 R4 --	-- -- --
8495	S4 R4 W2	-- -- --	S4 R4 W2
8545	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W0	S5 R5 W0

GROUND STATION TO AIRCRAFT

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>2200-0000</u>	<u>0000-0200</u>	<u>0200-0400</u>
2807.5 kcs	S4 R4 W2	S2 R2 W2	--- -- --
2900	S1 R4 W5	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785	S2 R2 W4	S4 R4 W3	S2 R1 W5
4825	S5 R4 W2	S4 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2
4995	S5 R5 --	S4 R5 W2	S5 R4 W2
8260	S3 R3 W2	S4 R4 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310	S3 R4 W4	S4 R4 W2	S4 R4 W1
8545	-- -- --	S5 R5 W3	S4 R4 W3
12285	-- -- --	S3 R3 W4	S5 R5 W2

<u>Frequency</u>	<u>0400-0600</u>	<u>0600-0800</u>	<u>0800-1000</u>
2807.5 kcs	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
2900	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4785	-- -- --	-- -- --	-- -- --
4825	S3 R5 W2	S3 R3 W2	S4 R4 W2
4995	S5 R4 W2	S3 R4 W5	-- -- --
8260	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1
8310	S5 R4 W2	S5 R5 W2	S5 R5 W2
8545	S5 R5 W3	S5 R5 W0	S5 R5 W0
12285	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1	S5 R5 W1



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6. The following statistical data was compiled regarding the use of aids to air-navigation; all distances are in statute miles.

a. Radio Homing Beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Chakulia (AF)	6	400	550	--
Chittagong (NR)	4	241	450	302°
Khargpur (CK)	7	283	500	300°
Dudhkundi (FN)	5	70	90	264°
Piardoba (ML)	8	233	520	300°
Dum Dum (CM)	2	350	450	300°

b. Radio Ranges: :

<u>Location</u>	<u>No of A/C Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>	<u>Average Track</u>
Khargpur (CK)	1	25	25	307°
Dum Dum (CM)	6	217	430	301°

c. The following D/F facilities were utilized:

<u>Station</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>No of Requests</u>	<u>Type bearing given</u>		
			<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>
444th-4E3	12285	4	4		
444th-4E3	8495	1	1		
468th-3S3	8260	2	1	1	

(1) The QDM's by the 444th Group were for practice purposes, to familiarize new operating personnel with the existing D/F facilities.

d. Air-to-Air Homing:

40th Group: - Air-to-Air Homing was not utilized as rendezvous was accomplished visually at assembly point.

444th Group:- A/C 5226 transmitted his ETA and altitude at assembly point prior to arrival thereat, and transmitted homing signals twice at rendezvous point for a total of twenty-seven (27) minutes. No A/C intercepted the ETA and altitude message, and only one (1) A/C picked up the homing signals at a distance of fifteen (15) miles. Since this is the first failure to date of air-to-air homing, it is believed that it can be attributed to a faulty transmitter.



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468th Group - A/C 4486 transmitted homing signals on 1340 kcs one (1) hour. No A/C reported picking up these signals. (No reason listed in Group Communications Specialist Report). Successful rendezvous was accomplished visually.

462nd Group - A/C 503 transmitted homing signals for thirty-three (33) minutes, commencing twenty (20) minutes prior to arrival at rendezvous point. Seven (7) A/C utilized these signals in homing on the formation leader at an average distance of sixty-eight (68) miles, with an extreme distance of two hundred and forty three (243) miles. The remaining A/C of the formation homed visually

7. No reports of attempted jamming were logged; however, a minor amount of man-made interference was reported on 2900 and 4995 kcs. Heavy atmospherics were encountered by A/C when passing through heavy cloud formations, but communication was never entirely disrupted.

8. No violations of cryptographic security were logged.

9. Malfunctions of equipment:

a. 40th Group:

- (1) A/C 498 had bad fuse in liaison dynamotor; replaced in flight. Radio compass inoperative, with the indicators spinning constantly. Radio compass sense antenna lead-in broken.
- (2) A/C 798 - liaison transmitter and receiver out; short in power cables.

b. 444th Group:

- (1) A/C 507 - Locking bars on AN/ART-13 transmitter slipped and detuned master oscillator; not repaired in flight.
- (2) A/C 731 - Radio compass sense antenna lead-in broken; not repaired in flight.
- (3) A/C 724 - Sense antenna broken; not repaired in flight
- (4) A/C 580 - AN/ART-13 transmitter out; unable to tune in flight.
- (5) A/C 4452 - All receivers inoperative; bad tachometer in no. 3 engine; not repaired in flight.

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c. 462nd Group

- (1) A/C 354 - Command receiver inoperative; not repaired in flight.
- (2) A/C 503 - Radio compass lead in from flat top antenna broken; used jumper to command set antenna.
- (3) A/C 503 - Homing transmitter began to smoke after transmitting homing signals for thirty-three (33) minutes.
- (4) A/C 590 - reported bad tubes in command receiver; tubes replaced in flight.

d. 463th Group:

- (1) A/C 4487 - Liaison receiver out; not repaired in flight.
- (2) A/C 714 - Had broken fixed liaison antenna, which was jarred loose while in bad weather; not repaired in flight.







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Time of first transmission: 0212Z - Repeated three times  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0214Z  
Time of receipt by last A/C : 0234Z  
Total elapsed time: 22 minutes.  
Average transmission time : 7.77 minutes.

(2) 444th Bomb Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
730	Direct	0220Z	
376	Direct	0220Z	
724	Direct	0220Z	
451	Direct	0220Z	
731	Direct	0220Z	
202	Direct	0220Z	
492	Direct	0220Z	
226	Direct	0230Z	
507	Direct	0231Z	
538	Direct	0235Z	
560	Not Received	--	New operator claimed inter- ference on receiver was bad. Pilot could not be contacted on command set.

Time of first transmission: 0217Z Transmitted again at  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0220Z 0220Z  
Time of receipt by last A/C : 0235Z  
Total elapsed time: 18 minutes.  
Average transmission time: 6:66 minutes.

(3) 462nd Bomb Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
503	Direct	0305Z	
450	Direct	0230Z	
254	Direct	0234Z	
506	Direct	0230Z	
454	Direct	0230Z	
472	Direct	0230Z	
590	Direct	0234Z	
457	Direct	0230Z	
403	Direct	0230Z	
801	Direct	0306Z	
800	Direct	0230Z	
252	Direct	0305Z	

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Time of first transmission: 0230Z                      Transmitted again at  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0230Z                      0305Z  
Time of receipt by last A/C : 0306Z

Total elapsed time: 36 minutes  
Average transmission time: 10:09 minutes.

(4) 468th Bomb Group:

<u>A/C Call Sign</u>	<u>How Received</u>	<u>Time of Receipt</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
4486	Direct	0216Z	
691	Direct	0217Z	
4487	Direct	0224Z	
5208	Direct	0219Z	
704	Direct	0226Z	
4494	Direct	0215Z	
469	Direct	0215Z	
429	Direct	0230Z	
703	Direct	0230Z	
714	Direct	0220Z	
542	Direct	0221Z	
442	Direct	0225Z	

Time of first transmission: 0214Z                      Simultaneously on three  
Time of receipt by first A/C: 0215Z                      frequencies  
Time of receipt by last A/C 0230Z  
Total elapsed time: 16 minutes  
Average transmission time: 7:08 minutes



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ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - Radar Information

- Section A - Navigation and Bombing
- Section B - Scope Photography
- Section C - Serviceability

II - Radar Tables

- Table A - Bombing Data
- Table B - Photographic Results
- Table C - Navigational Ranges
- Table D - Serviceability
- Table E - Malfunctions

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Radar Section \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

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SECRET  
.Auth: CG XX BC  
.Initials Q&  
.Date 7 Jan 45  
. . . . .

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared 7 January 1945 Field Orders No. 24  
Date of Mission 2 January 1945

I - Radar Information

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. Bombing of the targets on this combat training mission was entirely by the visual method. Radar Operators received experience, however, in target sightings and synchronizing on the bombing run. The Chao Phraya River was reported appearing clearly on the radar scope while identification of the primary target, Rama VI Railroad Bridge, was reported difficult.

2. Navigation of formations through storm clouds was reported in addition to use for aiding in identification of check and assembly points.

B - Scope Photography

1. Five (5) sets of useable photographs were returned on this mission. The bombing run could be traced on three (3) sets of photographs, while identification of check and assembly points was possible on the other useable sets.

2. The quality of photographs received was satisfactory; however, much better results were obtained from previous missions.

C - Serviceability

1. The number of malfunctions was comparatively few. Only five (5) systems were inoperative over the target, providing an operational percentage of ninety-one (91%) per cent operational systems. A few systems were reported inoperative, however, on ground checks found to be in operating condition. This was due primarily to the inexperience of the new radar operator gunners in operating the radar equipment.

2. There was one (1) SCR-695 malfunction reported.

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II - RADAR TABLES

A - Bombing Data

Total A/C Bombing - 46  
 Total A/C Bombing Visually - 46  
 Total Radar Bombing - 0

B - Photographic Results

DATA	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
No. Cameras Installed	4	--	3	--	3	--	9	--	19	--
K-35 Cameras	2	--	0	--	1	--	4	--	7	--
K-24 Cameras	2	--	3	--	2	--	5	--	12	--
No. Cameras in Abort, Early Return & Missing A/C *	0	0	0	0	1	33	0	0	1	5
No. Cameras Completing Mission *	4	100	3	100	2	67	9	100	18	95
No. Cameras in Radar & Camera Malfunction A/C #	1	25	2	67	0	0	1	11	4	22
Sets Pics Returned #	1	25	1	33	2	100	4	44	8	45
No. Negatives Ret.	26	--	27	--	48	--	119	--	220	--
Sets Pics Useable **	1	100	1	100	2	100	1	25	5	63
Sets Pics Tracing Bomb Run **	1	100	0	0	1	50	1	25	3	38

\* Percentage based on cameras installed.  
 # Percentage based on cameras completing mission.  
 \*\* Percentage based on sets of pictures returned.

C - Navigational Ranges

CHECK POINT	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Number Reporting	Average Range	Total No. Reporting	Weighted Average Range
Mapping Range	9	55	10	52	10	53	12	45	41	51
Bangkok City (PT)	2	22	8	20	-	-	1	45	11	23
Rangoon (ST)	-	-	-	-	1	90	-	-	1	90
Mondhol Rajburi (IP)	1	20	10	27	-	-	9	17	20	22
Launglon Bok	-	-	7	35	7	49	1	20	15	41
Bassein River	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	25	1	25
Bay of Bangkok	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	20	2	20
Cabusa Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	32	12	32
Cheduba Island	-	-	-	-	1	45	-	-	1	45
Dalhousie Island	-	-	-	-	1	65	-	-	1	65
Diamond Island	10	39	6	35	8	42	12	30	36	36
Pagoda Point	-	-	2	35	4	40	12	35	18	36
Preparis Island	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	50	1	50
Subarnahkar River	-	-	2	18	-	-	1	15	3	17
Tavoy Island	1	30	9	30	-	-	12	37	22	34
Tavoy Point	8	47	4	34	-	-	12	42	24	42



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D - Radar Serviceability

	40th Gp		444th Gp		462nd Gp		468th Gp		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
A/C Airborne	13	--	12	--	12	--	12	--	49	--
A/C Reporting	10	--	12	--	12	--	12	--	46	--
APQ-13 Operative at Take-off *	9	90	11	92	12	100	12	100	44	96
A/C Bombing	11	--	12	--	11	--	12	--	46	--
A/C Reporting Bombing#	10	100	12	100	11	92	12	100	45	98
APQ-13 Operative over Target #	8	80	11	92	10	91	12	100	41	91
APQ-13 Unrepairable Failures #										
Completely Inop.	2	20	2	17	1	9	2	17	7	15
Partially Inop.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2	20	2	17	1	9	2	17	7	15
APQ-13 Repaired in Flight *	1	-	1	-	0	-	0	-	2	-
SCR-695 Failures	1	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	1	-
SCR-729 Failures	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-
Total	1	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	1	-

\* Percentage based on A/C reporting.

# Percentage based on A/C reporting bombing.

E - Malfunctions

DATA	40th Gp	444th Gp	462nd Gp	468th Gp	Total
At Take-Off					
No Xmtr Current	1 (a)	-	-	-	1
Inverter	-	1	-	-	1
Total	1	1	-	-	2
Between Take-Off & Target (All Completely Inoper.)					
Pressurization	1	-	-	-	1
Cable Failure	1 (a)	-	-	-	1
F-1105 (Circuit Short)	-	-	1	-	1
Total	2	-	1	-	3
Between Target & Landing (All Completely Inoper.)					
Xmtr Failed	-	1	-	-	1
Tuning Failed	1	-	-	-	1
F-1108 (Circuit Short)	-	-	-	1	1
Antenna Rotation ceased	-	-	-	1	1
Total	1	1	-	2	4
Repaired in Flight					
Loose Grid connection in Modulator	1 (a)	-	-	-	1
Turned Down Xmtr Current	-	1	-	-	1
Total	1	1	-	-	2
Auxiliary Equipment					
SCR-695	1	-	-	-	1
SCR-729	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1	-	-	-	1

(a) Failures took place in same set.



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ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

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* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* RCM Section *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
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SECRET  
.Auth: Dep Com 20th AF .  
.Initials: KCP .  
.Date: 8 Jan. 45 .

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

8 January 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report # Combat Mission No. 24, Bangkok, Thailand  
2 January 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,  
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

RCM activities on this mission were confined to searching. Seven RCM equipped aircraft, each with one RCM Observer, participated in the mission. The RCM Observers searched for Enemy Early Warning Equipment enroute to and from the target and for Radar Fire Control Equipment in the target area. One RCM equipped aircraft was equipped with a bottom mount D/F antenna.

B. Results

1. The first radar intercept on this mission was again the 69 Mc. radar site located in the Rangoon area. (Verified by D/F cuts). The majority of the search aircraft made this intercept at approximately 95° 30' E 15° N, while gaining altitude. One search aircraft reported the radar site weakly searching at 92° 25' E 17° 32' N. Enroute to the target this site was logged as far as the assembly point. No intercepts of this radar site were made enroute home, possibly due to malfunctions in the enemy radar equipment.

2. The radar site at Mergui, previously reported to be operating on 192 Mc., was not intercepted this time. Instead, a radar site operating on 198 Mc., with similar areas of intercept, was found to be in operation. It is possible the 192 Mc. and 198 Mc. radar sites are the same, the change in frequency due to retuning or maintenance modifications. This site was intercepted prior to reaching the assembly point and was constantly switching from one formation to another. The signal strength was strong at the target. RCM search aircraft enroute home, logged this signal to 96° 15' E 15° 50' N.

3. The strong 80 Mc. radar site located in the Rangoon area was not intercepted enroute to the target, but enroute home, after crossing the Malay Peninsula in the Tavoy area, the

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signal was intercepted strong and steady, and logged past Pagoda point to  $92^{\circ}30'E$   $19^{\circ}N$ .

4. The 100 Mc. radar site located in the Rangoon area and previously reported on Mission No. 14, was intercepted enroute home. The station was searching most of the time, switching from one formation to another. It is possible that this radar site is a "Stand By" for the 69 Mc. radar site located in the same area. This is the first intercept of this signal since Combat Mission No. 14, 3 November 44.

5. 103/ / This radar site was intercepted by one observer while enroute to the target. Possibly the same radar site reported on Mission No. 20, thought to be located in the Andaman Island area.

6. The 100 Mc. radar site located in the Bangkok area and previously reported on Mission No. 18, 3 December 44, was not intercepted on this mission.

7. There were no intercepts made with Radar Fire Control characteristics.

8. On Mission No. 18, 3 December 44, two radar sites with characteristics similar to radar sites located in the Rangoon area, were D/F'ed to the Andaman Island area. The locations were carried as "Suspected" pending further verification. It was later found that the Solsyn Transmitter was in error and upon replotting the cuts, the following locations were obtained:

78 (79)/500/39  $96^{\circ}10'E$   $16^{\circ}20'N$  Rangoon area.  
68 (69)/520/29  $96^{\circ}30'E$   $16^{\circ}30'N$  Rangoon area.

A few bearings at 192 Mc., when replotted, placed the radar site at the following location:

192/860/12  $98^{\circ}25'E$   $12^{\circ}30'N$  Mergui Area.

C. Resume of Intercepts

69/515/40

Rangoon area. Previously D/F'ed to  $96^{\circ}30'E$   $16^{\circ}30'N$ . Intercepted enroute to the target only.

198/1000/10

Mergui Area. Possible new frequency for 192 Mc. radar located in Mergui area. D/F'ed to  $98^{\circ}25'E$   $12^{\circ}30'N$  on Mission No. 18.

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79/500/45

Rangoon area. D/F'ed on this mission to approximately 95°50'E 16°45'N intercepted enroute home only.

100/800/20

Rangoon area. Reported on Mission No. 14. Intercepted enroute home only.

103/ /

Possibly Andaman Island radar site.

D. Enemy Countermeasures

1. Bad atmospherics were again encountered on this mission.
2. One Radio Operator reported what he thought to be jamming; described as noise and strongest in the target area.

E. Equipment

A PE-218 Inverter operated in an erratic manner and was readjusted during flight, after which operation was normal.

For the Deputy Commander:

*Leo I. Herlihan*

LEO I. HERLIHAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adjutant General

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* Staff Gunnery Officer \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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Auth: CG, XX BC

Initials:    

date: 5 Jan 45

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
XX BOMBER COMMAND GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 7 January 1945

Field order #24

Date of Mission: 2 Jan 45

1. On the mission directed by Field Order No. 24 only two groups had encounters with enemy aircraft. The fighter opposition was very weak with less than a dozen passes reported. It is evident that the targets in this area are very lightly protected. Enemy pilots were not aggressive as only one coordinated attack was made and the lead fighter of this attack is claimed as probably destroyed.

2. The mission in regards to the gunnery phase is considered as very satisfactory.

3. The following statistical data is submitted.

	<u>49th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Ammunition used test firing	1049	1467	4629	1300
Ammunition used in combat	0	662	0	6120
Malfunctions of C.F.C. system	0	1	4	0
Total turrets on mission	60	60	55	60
Malfunctions of Cal. .50 M.G.s	1	0	3	2
Total Cal. .50 M.G.s on mission	120	120	110	120

Total aircraft (included in report) 12 12 11 12

Total percent malfunctions all Groups C.F.C. 2%, Cal. .50 M.G. 1%.

Claims by our gunners

Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
0	1	2

There was no damage or losses to our aircraft.

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ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

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CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 24  
 2 January 1945

SECRET

I-I-1

	40th				444th				462nd				468th				Total					
	K18	K20	K22	Tot.	K-18	K-20	K-22	Tot.	K-17	K-18	K-20	K-22	Tot.	K-18	K-20	K-22	Tot.	K17	K18	K20	K22	Tot.
No. cameras airborne	2	8	6	16	4	5	3	12	3	3	5	1	12	3	5	5	13	3	12	23	15	53
No. in A/C failing to bomb any target	1	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	4
No. in A/C bombing targets	1	6	6	13	4	5	3	12	3	3	4	1	11	3	5	5	13	3	11	20	15	49
No. photographing targets	0	1	6	7	4	5	3	12	3	3	1	1	8	2	3	5	10	3	9	10	15	37
Failure to photograph mechanical	1-a	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1-d	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	2
Failure to photograph other	0	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	2	0	2	0	0	10	0	10
No. usable negatives	0	10	126b	136	8	0	8	16	9-c	17	0	3	29	13	7	53	73	9	38	17	190	254

SECRET

- a. Sheared pin in the case drive
- b. One aircraft took photos but no usable negatives as a result of oil on the filter.
- c. One aircraft photographed last resort target at Bassein producing 3 usable negatives.
- d. Failure of camera doors.



ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Note: There were no battle or operational losses and no missing aircraft on this mission. For details of battle and operational damage by aircraft, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

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ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

I - Functioning of Equipment

II - Performance Data\*

\* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer.

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I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 24

2 January 1945

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. A/C airborne   | 49 |
| 2. Less: A/C failing to get over the PT - mechanical  | 5  |
| a. Bombed last resort target (1):   |    |
| (1) A/C 590 (462nd): #1 cylinder head temperature high; #1 engine would not put out full power. |    |
| b. Bombed target of opportunity (1):  |    |
| (1) A/C 579 (40th): #4 engine failure; hole in piston of #1 cylinder.                           |    |
| c. Jettisoned bombs (3):  |    |
| (1) A/C 582 (40th): #16 cylinder broke off from crank case; #4 propeller feathered.             |    |
| (2) A/C 738 (40th): #4 prop governor failure.   |    |
| (3) A/C 472 (462nd): #2 engine cutting out and propeller feathered; #3 propeller overspeeds     |    |
| 3. A/C bombing primary target   | 44 |

K-I-1

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SECRET

Auth: CG XX BC  
Initials: *Cam*  
Date: 5 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 4-B

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Date Prepared: 5 January 1945

Field Order Number 24

Date of Mission: 2 Jan 45

1. A summary of the performance of aircraft that bombed the primary target and returned their own base is contained in the attached table

2. The aircraft were loaded for a target other than the one hit which resulted in bomb loads being much lower than can be carried to this target.

Attached: 1 Table.

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Authority *NND 760063*

By *AP* NARA Date *11-15*



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SUMMARY OF ALL GROUPS

F. O. #24

Group		Overall	40th	444th	462nd	468th
Target		Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary
*Number of A/c		43	9	12	10	12
Total time		10:41	11:00	10:21	10:51	10:40
Time to target		5:33	5:24	5:28	5:37	5:42
Fuel Burned	Ave	4960	5060	5010	4900	4870
	Max	5465	5400	5465	5320	5300
	Min	4345	4475	4345	4600	4500
Fuel Carried	Ave	6145	6000	6205	6380	6000
	Max	6400	6000	6300	6400	6000
	Min	6000	6000	6200	6200	6000
Burnable Reserve	Ave	1195	940	1195	1505	1130
	Max	1900	1525	1855	1900	1500
	Min	600	600	735	1080	700
**Air Miles		2520	2495	2460	2472	2638
Ground Miles		2305	2350	2300	2325	2254
**Gal/Air Miles		1.94	2.25	1.93	2.1	1.85
***Bombing Altitude		19,500	20,500	19,000	21,100	18,000
	Ave	126,780	125,500	127,400	128,105	126,000
T.O. Gross Weight	Max	129,354	127,331	128,841	129,354	126,786
	Min	123,408	123,408	125,980	125,095	125,138
Weight of Bombs	Ave	8160	8160	8160	8160	8160
	Max	8160	8160	8160	8160	8160
	Min	8160	8160	8160	8160	8160
No. of Bombs	M-65	8	8	8	8	8

\* Number of Aircraft for which logs were available and returned to their own base  
 \*\* Air miles are of doubtful accuracy due to difficulty in determination  
 \*\*\* Pressure altitude.

SECRET



S E C R E T

ANNEX

L

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

```
* * * * *
*
*   Prepared by:
*
*   Target Intelligence Unit
*
*   XX Bomber Command
*
* * * * *
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

17 January 1945

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 34

TARGET: Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand. (13° 49'N - 100° 31'E).

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight attack by 44 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command on 2 January 1945. A total of 175.5 short tons of GP bombs were dropped. Assessment of damage was derived from excellent photos obtained by the 444th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command, on 3 January 1945.

The attack was accomplished by four formations over the target from 0347Z to 0527Z. At least one direct hit was scored on the bridge as well as several near misses which rendered the bridge temporarily unserviceable.

A section of the west top chord of the northern approach span has been destroyed and part of the lateral bracing has been damaged. Shadow study clearly shows a definite sag in the span. In addition the railway platform and the east top chord have sustained damage and are seen to be buckled.

The north abutment received at least one direct hit which destroyed the rail line and both supporting girders. The approach embankment just north took several hits and near misses which probably severed the rail line.

Bombs falling wide of the bridge heavily damaged a large unidentified sawtooth building, completed the destruction of a long narrow railway siding shed, destroyed at least 55 small buildings and damaged 30 others.

REFERENCES: (1) Preliminary Damage Assessment Report No. FM(S) 337, C.P.I.C., SEA.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK: 44 Aircraft  
358 1000# GP

PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike Photos 4MB24, 2 January 1945, quality and scale variable.  
(2) XX Bomber Command 5MRL, 3 January 1945, scale approximately 1:13,000, quality excellent.

PREVIOUS PHOTO COVER: XX Bomber Command Mission 4MR38, 23 December 1944, scale 1:8500, quality excellent.

ANNEXES: (1) Annotated Photo and Bomb Plot.  
(2) Artist's Sketch.

REMARKS:

Numbers preceding statements below refer to corresponding numbers on the attached annotated photo, Annex 1.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

- (1) A section of the west top chord of the northern approach approach span has been destroyed and part of the lateral bracing has been damaged. Shadow study clearly shows a definite sag in the northernmost span. In addition the railway platform and the east top chord have sustained damage and are seen to be buckled.

The north abutment received at least one direct hit which destroyed the rail line and both supporting girders.

- (2) The northern approach embankment took at least four hits or near misses which probably severed the rail line.
- (3) A large sawtooth-roof factory type building was severely damaged by three direct hits.
- (4) Bombs falling east of the bridge destroyed at least 32 small buildings, largest 75' x 120', and damaged 10 others.
- (5) The 800' x 40' railway siding shed, damaged by a previous attack, was being dismantled. Additional hits destroyed the remainder of the building. Four nearby buildings averaging 30' x 30' were destroyed and three others were damaged.
- (6) A previously wrecked complex of small buildings just west of the bridge took additional hits and is now virtually obliterated.
- (7) Four small buildings, largest 115' x 45', sustained additional damage from near misses.
- (8) Ten to twelve small buildings destroyed and two others damaged.
- (9) At least five small sheds completely destroyed and two others severely damaged.
- (10) Two small buildings in the south bank of the river sustained additional damage and are now largely destroyed.



*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*

FRANK L. SCOTT, JR  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L







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10TH PHOTO TECH UNIT

DECLASSIFIED


Authority AND 260063

By AP NARA Date 11-15




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SIDE VIEW



OBLIQUE VIEW




ARTISTS CONCEPTION OF  
DAMAGE TO RAMA VI BRIDGE,  
XX BOMBER COMMAND ATTACK  
OF 2 JANUARY, 1944.

# RAMA VI BRIDGE BANGKOK

ANNEX 2  
DA REPORT NO. 34  
BANGKOK THAILAND

TARGET UNIT, INTELL. SEC.  
XX BOMBER COMMAND





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S E C R E T

ANNEX

M

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

```
* * * * *  
* Prepared by: *  
* Statistical Control Section *  
* XX Bomber Command *  
* * * * *
```

S E C R E T



**SECRET**

**XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Four  
 2 January 1945**

**SECRET**  
 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:  
1-7-45 SR  
 Date Initials

Table I and II - Aircraft Participating \*

Group	Mission No.	Field Order No.	** A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target							Time Of First Takeoff	Time Of Latest Return	Average Time of Flight ***	
				Total No.	Percent	Reason							A/C Bombing Primary	Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary
						Mech.	Pers.	Wea.	Not in Form.	Misc.				
40th	24	24	13	3	23%	3					2217Z	1009Z	10:53	3:55
444th	24	24	12	0	-						2325Z	1004Z	10:21	-
462nd	24	24	12	2	17%	2					2330Z	1022Z	10:31	7:39
468th	24	24	12	-	-						2337Z	1043Z	10:44	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>5</b>					<b>2217Z</b>	<b>1043Z</b>	<b>10:37</b>	<b>5:24</b>

\* Mission was run from Rear Area bases; Tables I and II Consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.  
 \*\* Field Order #24 requires each group to have 12 aircraft airborne on mission.  
 \*\*\* Excludes A/C which landed at other fields.

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**XX BOMBER COMMAND**  
**CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY**  
 Mission Number Twenty Four  
 2 January 1945

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1-7-45 SR  
 Date Initials

Table III - Bombing Runs

Group	No. of A/C Bomb- ing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bombing		Radar Bombing		On the Leader	Aircraft Dropping On	
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sighting For R & D	Range	A/C Sighting For R & D	Range		AFCE	Manual
40th	10	Bangkok	0347Z	0347Z	21100	21100	1				9	1	9
	1	Opportunity	0250Z	0250Z	12000	12000	1					1	
444th	12	Bangkok	0451Z	0451Z	19180	18400	1				11		12
462nd	10	Bangkok	0503Z	0503Z	21000	21000	1				9	1	9
	1	Bassein	0352Z	0352Z	12100	12100	1					1	
468th	12	Bangkok	0527Z	0527Z	19100	19100	1				11	1	11
TOTAL	44	Bangkok	0347Z	0527Z	21100	18400	4				40	3	41
	1	Bassein	0352Z	0352Z	12100	12100	1					1	
	1	Opportunity	0250Z	0250Z	12000	12000	1					1	

Primary Target - Bangkok.  
 Secondary Target - Rangoon.  
 Last Resort Target - Bassein.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Four  
 2 January 1945

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 Date Initials

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A.			On Targets			Bomb Disposal			
		Fusing		Average No. Loaded	Total Loaded	Bangkok	Bassein	Of Opportunity	Jettisoned	Returned	Unknown
		Nose	Tail								
40th	1000# GP	.1	ND	8	104	79		8	16	1	
44th	1000# GP	.1	ND	8	96	96					
462nd	1000# GP	.1	ND	8	96	80	8		8		
468th	1000# GP	.1	ND	8	96	96					
TOTAL	1000# GP	.1	ND	8	392	351	8	8	24	1	

\* 1000# G.P. - AN-M (65)  
 AN-M (44) Actual weight 1018.4 pounds.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Four  
2 January 1945

Title V - - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

Negative Report.

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

Negative Report.

Minor Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24582				X	#4 Ring Cowl torn by #16 Cyl being driven through it. 1
444th		None.				
462nd		None.				
468th	24429			X		Bomb Bay door (Left forward).
	65208				X	Upper forward turret gun enclosure destroyed due to wind.
	24487	X				Left wing behind #1 engine.
	24494			X		Bomb Bay doors damaged by own guns.
		1		2	1	
<hr/>						
TOTALS		1		2	2	

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Four  
2 January 1945

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Commanding General:  
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Date Initials

Table VI - Attacks & Passes by Enemy Aircraft

DIRECTION	ALTITUDE															
	HIGH				LOW				LEVEL				TOTAL			
	40th	44th	462nd	468th	40th	44th	462nd	468th	40th	44th	462nd	468th	40th	44th	462nd	468th
0800																
0900				2												2
1000		5												5		
1100				3												3
1200																
0100																
0200																
0300																
0400		2				1								3		
0500																
0600																
0700																
TOTAL		7		5		1								8		5

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Twenty Four  
 2 January 1945

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 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:  
 1-7-45 *SK*  
 Date Initials

Table VII - Personnel Losses

Crew Position	Killed				Missing				Seriously Injured				Slightly Injured				Total Casualties				Total Participating			
	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468	40	444	462	468
Pilot																					13	12	12	15
Co-Pilot																					13	12	12	12
Navigator																					13	12	12	12
Bombardier																					13	12	12	12
Flt. Engr.																					13	12	12	13
Radar																					13	12	12	12
Radio																					13	12	12	12
CFC Spec																					13	12	12	12
Right Gnr																					13	12	12	12
Left Gnr																					13	12	12	12
Tail Gnr																					2			1
R C M																								
Unknown																					1	8	3	4
Others																								
TOTAL																					146	140	135	141

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Four  
2 January 1945

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By Authority of the  
Commanding General:  
*[Signature]*  
Date Initials

Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

Group	Ammunition Expended Per Plane In Combat Flying					Total Expended	Claims Against Enemy Aircraft			Per 1000 Pounds Expended in Combat		
	Upper Front	Lower Front	Upper Rear	Lower Rear	50 Cal. Tail		Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
40th	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
44th	4	4	7	35	4	652	-	-	-	-	-	-
462nd	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-
468th	105	50	115	100	140	6120	-	1	1	-	.16	.16
TOTAL	27	13	20	39	95	6772	-	1	1	-	.15	.15

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Four  
2 January 1945

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By Authority of the  
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1-7-45 SR  
Date Initials

Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

Group	Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff	Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff	* Average Gallons Consumed on Mission		* Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission	
			Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
40th	125350	6000	5058	2208	941	3792
444th	127121	6208	5015	----	1194	----
462nd	128160	6367	4900	3943	1460	2458
468th	126208	6000	4872	----	1128	----
TOTAL	126682	6141	4957	2902	1185	3258

\* Excludes A/C which did not return directly to home fields.

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By Authority of the  
Commanding General:

1-7-45 JK  
Date Initials

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Twenty Four  
2 January 1945

Table X - Airborne Aircraft Failing to Bomb Primary Target

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Ser. No.</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
40th	24582	#16 Cyl broke off from crank case #4 Eng feathered.
	24579	#4 Engine failure. Hole in Piston of #1 cylinder.
	24738	#4 Prop governor failure.
444th	None.	
462nd	24590	#1 Cyl head temp high. #1 eng would not put out full Power.
	63472	#2 Engine cutting out. Feathered. #3 prop Overspeeds.
468th	None.	

Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

		<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
POWER PLT & ACCESSORY SECT	Engine running rough	2		1		3
	Engine running hot			1		1
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Feathered Props	1		1		2
	Governor	1		1		2
TOTALS		4		4		8

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

- 1 -

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By Authority of the  
Commanding General:

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Date Initials

TABLE XI (cont'd)

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT	Engine running rough	6		1	1	8
	Engine running hot	1		3		4
	Turbo Superchgr &/or Turbo Control System			1	1	2
	Excessive Oil Consumption		1			1
-----						
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Feathered Props	2		1		3
	Governor	2		2	3	7
	Prop Pitch Switch	4				4
-----						
OIL SYSTEM	Oil leaks	1		1	3	5
	Oil Temp Regulator			1	1	2
	Oil pressure low				1	1
	Oil pressure high				1	1
-----						
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel transfer system	1				1
	Fuel pressure high	1			1	2
	Fuel booster pumps		1			1
-----						
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	Generators				3	3
	Voltage regulator	1			1	2
	Formation lights		1			1
	Bomb Bay Door Motor		1			1
	Inverter	1				1
	Instrument Lights	3				3
	Identification Lights			1		1
-----						
INSTRUMENTS	Flux Gate Compass				1	1
	Carb. Air Temp. Gage				1	1
	Cyl. Head Temp. Gage	1			2	3
	Nose Oil Press. Gage		1			1
	Rear Oil Press. Gage		1			1
	Radio Compass				1	1
	Static System			1		1
	Tachometer	1	2		4	7
	Vacuum System		1	1	1	3
	Gyro Compass		1			1
	Flight Indicator				1	1
	A F C E			1	1	2
	Magnetic Compass	1				1
Airspeed indicator	1				1	
-----						
MISCELLANEOUS	Pressurization			1	1	2
	Life Raft Door		1			1
	Oxygen System	2	1			3
	Defroster System	1				1
-----						
TOTALS		90	12	15	29	86

NOTE PERTAINING TO BOTH PART I AND PART II

Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering malfunction all malfunctions have been listed.

S E C R E T



**SECRET**

**XX BOMBER COMMAND**  
**CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY**  
 Mission Number Twenty Four  
 2 January 1945

**SECRET**  
 By Authority of the  
 Commanding General:  
*1-7-45* **JR**  
 Date Initials

Table XII - Utilization of Useful Load  
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

Group	No. of Ground Miles	Number of A/C Considered	Type of A/C	Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff For Mission	Aver Basic Weight of A/C	Aver. Useful Load	Aver. Number of Bombs Loaded	* Aver Weight of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal	Average Miscellaneous Weight
40th	2350	10	Center Wing Tanks	125394	74780	50614	1000# GP 8	8147	36000	6467
444th	2300	12	Center Wing Tanks	127121	75459	51662	1000# GP 8	8147	37250	6265
462nd	2325	10	Center Wing Tanks	128106	74966	53140	1000# GP 8	8147	38160	6833
468th	2254	12	Center Wing Tanks	126125	74765	51360	1000# GP 8	8147	36000	7213
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2305</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>Center Wing Tanks</b>	<b>126680</b>	<b>75004</b>	<b>51676</b>	<b>1000# GP 8</b>	<b>8147</b>	<b>36832</b>	<b>6697</b>

\* 1000# G.P. - AN-M 65 or AN-M 44 equals 1018.4 pounds.

**SECRET**



S E C R E T

ANNEX

N

FIELD ORDERS

All Field Orders material in the following Annex originally classified as TOP SECRET is hereby reclassified as S E C R E T

By authority of DEFCOM 20 AF

12 January 1945                       
Date Initials

S E C R E T



SECRET

SECRET  
Auth: CG, XX BC  
Initials: CC  
Date: 1 Jan 45.

NOT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE AIR  
ON COMBAT MISSION

FIELD ORDERS )  
:  
NUMBER 24 )

XX Bomber Command  
APO 493.  
1 Jan 45 - 0900Z

MAPS: AAF Aeronautical Charts: 558, 557, 675, 676, 677, 679, 678, 798, 799,  
or equivalent International Maps of the World.  
AAF Long Range Air Navigation Charts: INDIA (26) BENGAL (38) or equiv-  
alent Naval Aviation Charts, V-30 Series.

1. Omitted.
2. This Command conducts a daylight attack on D-Day against AAF Target 98.2-45.  
ROUTE OUT: Base area - DIAMOND ISLAND (15°52'N, 94°17'E) - Assembly Point -  
IP. (MONDHOL RAJBURI, 13°32'N, 99°50'E) - Target. Immediately after  
take-off aircraft will climb on course to 5,000'.  
BASE ALTITUDE: 12,000' pressure altitude.  
ROUTE BACK: Target - TAVOY POINT (13°32'N, 98°08'E) - DIAMOND ISLAND  
(15°52'N, 94°17'E) - Base Area.  
AXIS OF ATTACK: 68° Magnetic.  
AIMING POINT: Center of Bridge.  
METHOD OF BOMBING: By 12 plane formation.
3. a. 40th Group: TAKE-OFF: Beginning at 2217Z on D minus one.  
ASSEMBLY POINT: TAVOY POINT (13°32'N, 98°08'E).  
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: An odd thousand feet.  
BOMBING ALTITUDE: 20,000' pressure altitude.  
BREAKAWAY: To the left.
- b. 444th Group: TAKE-OFF: Beginning at 2324Z on D minus one.  
ASSEMBLY POINT: North Tip TAVOY ISLAND (13°04'N, 98°19'E).  
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: An even thousand feet.  
BOMBING ALTITUDE: 19,000' pressure altitude.  
BREAKAWAY: To the right.
- c. 462nd Group: TAKE-OFF: Beginning at 2330Z on D minus one.  
ASSEMBLY POINT: South Tip LAUNGLON BOK ISLAND (13°47'N,  
97°54'E).  
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: An odd thousand feet.  
BOMBING ALTITUDE: 21,000' pressure altitude.  
BREAKAWAY: To the left.

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- d. 468th Group: TAKE-OFF: beginning at 2337Z on D minus one.  
ASSEMBLY POINT: CABUSA ISLAND (12°49'N, 97°53'E).  
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: An even thousand feet.  
BOMBING ALTITUDE: 18,000' pressure altitude.  
BREAKAWAY: To the right.
- x. (1) If weather conditions prevent visual bombing of the primary target, planes will bomb the secondary target.
- (2) SECONDARY TARGET: XX Bomber Command Target 82.2 D.  
VISUAL AIMING POINT: Center of Southern edge of Railroad Station.  
RADAR AIMING POINT: Slightly east of strong signal from city and approximately 4,000 feet from north bank of Rangoon River.  
INITIAL POINT: KATHAUNG ISLAND (15°42'N, 95°02'E).  
AXIS OF ATTACK: 47° Magnetic.
- (3) LAST RESORT TARGET: XX Bomber Command Target 82.2-F.  
VISUAL AIMING POINT: Center of largest bldg in central river siding.  
RADAR AIMING POINT: Northwest portion of signal from city.
- (4) BOMB TYPE: Eight 1,000# (TNT or Amatol filled) bombs fuze .1 second nose and non delay tail will be carried in each aircraft.
- (5) Each Group will furnish 12 airborne aircraft.
4. No change.
5. a. No change.
- b. Command Post: Headquarters, XX Bomber Command, APO 493.
- By command of MAJOR GENERAL LEMAY:

JOHN E. UPSTON  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

*Joseph J. Preston*  
JOSEPH J. PRESTON  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Deputy Chief of Staff,  
Operations.

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- 1 - CG, XX Bomber Command
- 2 - Chief, Intelligence Section
- 1 - Chief, Operations, Plans & Training Section, XX BC
- 3 - Chief, Communications Section, XX BC
- 3 - CO, 40th Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 444th Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 462nd Bomb Group
- 3 - CO, 468th Bomb Group

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S E C R E T

ANNEX

0

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

For target information, aids to visual bombing, aids to radar bombing, and antiaircraft information, see Annex 0, Supplemental Information, XX Bomber Command Tactical Mission Report No. 20, dated 26 December 1944. This mission is almost an exact counterpart of Mission No. 20 and the information contained in Annex 0, Mission No. 20, is applicable to Mission No. 24.

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

DISTRIBUTION - MISSION NO. 24

2 January 1945

Copy No.

1	Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force
2	Commanding General, XX Bomber Command
3	Chief of Staff, XX Bomber Command
4	Chief, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command
5	Commanding Officer, Forward Echelon Detachment, Headquarters, XX Bomber Command (Attn: Intelligence Officer)
6	Commanding Officer, 40th Bombardment Group
7	Commanding Officer, 444th Bombardment Group
8	Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group
9	Commanding Officer, 468th Bombardment Group
10 - 39	Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Attention: AC/AS Intelligence, Collection Division
40	Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence
41	CINCPAC (Thru DEPCOMAF Twenty)
42	COMCENIOA (Thru DEPCOMAF Twenty)
43	Air Commander, Eastern Air Command, Attention: DCAS, OPTI
44	Chief, Air Evaluation Board, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, United States Forces, India Burma
45	Commanding General, Tenth Air Force
46	Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force
47	DEPCOMAF Twenty
48	Chief of Staff, Twentieth Air Force
49	Joint Intelligence Collection Agency
50	ALUSLO, c/o XX Bomber Command
51	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area
52	Commanding General, United States Forces, India Burma Theater (Attn: War Room)
53	Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force
54	Statistical Control, XX Bomber Command
55	Communications (Radar), XX Bomber Command
56	Photo Interpretation, XX Bomber Command
57	Operational Analysis, XX Bomber Command
58	Special Projects, XX Bomber Command
59	Historical Officer, XX Bomber Command
60	Operational Intelligence, XX Bomber Command

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
ADJUTANT GENERAL



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