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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2546

5 August 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Affidavit of General ISHIHARA, Kanji,  
Aggressive Plans of KWANTUNG Army - 1929-1936.

Date: 24 July 1946 Original  Copy  Language:  
Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes  No   
Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ISHIHARA, Kanji

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ISHIHARA, Kanji; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; TOJO

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparations for War;  
Relations with USSR.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

ISHIHARA, states that as member of the First Section (operations) of the General Staff, he aided in the planning of operations against Russia and the United States.

In particular, plans for war against Russia were made by the First Section in 1936, 1937, and 1938, which plans he outlines in detail, including the disposition of thirty divisions in MANCHURIA.

Strategic plans were approved and coordinated by the Navy whose role in the 1938 Incident was to be the bombardment of Vladivostok.

Plans annually received the approval of the Emperor, says ISHIHARA.

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

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Title: Affidavit of General ISHIHARA, Kanji

THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHERS

AFFIDAVIT RE: ARAKI, Sadao and Others

I, Lieutenant General ISHIHARA, Kanji, born in Meiji 22 /1889/, will make the following statement.

I served as an operations staff officer of the Kwantung Army from 1928 to 1932 (Showa 3 to Showa 7) and was attached to the General Staff Headquarters from 1932 to 1933 (Showa 7 to Showa 8). I held the post of Section Chief in the General Staff Headquarters from 1935 to 1937 (Showa 10 to Showa 12) and after March, 1937, I served as Chief of the First Section in the General Staff Headquarters. Moreover, I served as Vice-Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from October, 1937, to December, 1938.

I hereby confirm that I have come to know the following facts during these periods which was in connection to my aforementioned duties.

The major duties of the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters were in the formulation of operation plans against the U.S.S.R. and the United States, which were then seen as being prospective enemy countries.

The plans of operations against U.S.S.R. in Showa 3 /1928/, Showa 4 /1929/ and Showa 5 /1930/ were of the same substance. I made these plans at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army by order of the Chief of the General Staff and later received the approval of the Chief of General Staff. The main objective of the plan of operations for these years (namely: 1928 - 1930) was to occupy Harbin and Tailai and thus to use these points as the bases for war against the U.S.S.R. This plan was not changed until 1931 -- when all of Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese troops as the result of the Mukden Incident.

The plan of operations against Russia in Showa 11 /1936/ was made by the First Section (operations) of the General Staff Headquarters. This plan has been scheduled to transfer almost the whole of the Japanese troops, namely 20 - 30 divisions, to Manchuria in the event war broke out between Russia and Japan. Troop transport was scheduled by ships to Fusan and Dairen, and then to the point of arrival by railways. All troops arriving were to be concentrated in the Harbin area, and thereafter the Kwantung Army Headquarters were to station them at the

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necessary points. Only after the military strength in Manchuria became sufficient would the attack begin; the plan being to occupy the Soviet Far Eastern occupied territory. In order to assure the success of the operations as scheduled by the plan of Showa 11 /1936/, various measures have been adopted in Manchuria in areas destined for major operations.

Many railways, barracks and warehouses were constructed and the methods of communications were strengthened. Fortification constructions were carried out on points along the northern frontier; namely, in the various areas of Heiho, Suifenho and Tunkning. Numerous airfields were built, but among them the major ones being Mitanchiang, Chiamusi, Harbin, Suihua, etc. Thus, after being occupied by Japan, Manchuria gradually changed into a base for war against Russia.

The plan of operations in 1937 was unchanged to that of the above-mentioned plan of 1936.

In the plan of operations against Russia in 1938, the KWANTUNG Army planned to amass its forces in the first stages of the war along the Suifenho-Tunkning line and in Kulin on the opposite bank of the Iman River, leaving a part of the troops to remain at Hailar and Heiho and await the arrival of the main Japanese forces. When the main force arrive from the homeland, it was scheduled to have a military strength of 12 - 13 divisions in Suifenho area and two or three divisions in the Khailar-Heiho area.

All the troops amassed were to be used for the occupation of Soviet Primorye, excepting those few garrisons in Heiho and Khailar. It was planned to advance operations along the both shores of Hsingkaihu Lake and, after defeating the Russian frontier troops, to besiege and occupy Vladivostok. Similar to the plan of 1937, plans were made to attack Vladivostok and Kharbarovsk in the first phase of the war, and then to annihilate Russian troops in these areas together with the occupation of these cities.

What I have said, as aforementioned, regarding the plan of operations, is none other than an outline of the operations that was planned. Since the situation could not be perceived clearly until the outbreak of war, it seems that only an outline of the plan of operations was made.

The plan of operations of the Army was connected to the Navy's operations through the cooperation of the General Staff Headquarters and the Naval General Staff. The major duties of the Navy were the transportation of the Army and the blockade of Vladivostok.

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The plan of operations was submitted for Imperial sanction annually. Prince Kanin, Chief of the General Staff Headquarters, reported the plan to the Emperor.

Signed and sealed by

ISHIHARA, Kanji

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**ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР  
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио**

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AFFIDAVIT # 2246  
ISHIHARA KANJI  
24 July 1946

CERTIFICATE

I Kato officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity; chief of Public Safety Section, Home Ministry hereby certify that I have received direct word from the chief of Police in Yamagata Prefecture that Ishihara, Kanji who is now living in Yamagata Prefecture is unable to travel to Tokyo due to his health condition.

Signed at Tokyo on the  
10th day of October 1946.

*Y. Kato*

Signature of official  
Chief of Public Safety Section,  
Police Bureau  
official capacity.

Witness *J. Kobayashi*

極東國際軍事裁判所  
亞米利加合衆國其他

荒木貞夫其他に対する

供述書

私は一八八九年（明治廿二年）生れの陸軍中將石原莞爾  
ですが、次の供述を致します。私は一九二八年から一九三三年（昭和  
三年から昭和七年）に至る間は関東軍の作戰參謀を勤め、  
一九三三年から一九三五年（昭和七年から昭和八年）に至る間は參  
謀本部附でありました。一九三五年から一九三七年（昭和十年  
から昭和十二年）に至る間は參謀本部の課長の職にあり、  
一九三七年三月以来は參謀本部や一部長を勤めました。  
さらに一九三七年十月から一九三八年十二月に至る間は関東軍  
參謀副長をやりました。

この間に右の職務と関係して次の諸事実を知ること  
つたことを茲に確認いたします。

日本參謀本部や一部（作戰部）の主要任務は、當  
時敵國たりうると見做してゐたソ聯邦および米國に對  
する作戰計畫の作成でありました。

一九二八年（昭和三年）、一九二九年（昭和四年）、一九  
三〇年（昭和五年）の對ソ作戰計畫は同一内容であり  
ました。これらの作戰計畫は參謀總長の命をうけて  
関東軍司令部において私が作成し、後に參謀總長

石原莞爾

9.22.1



②  
の確認をえたものです。ニホリ諸年度（即ち一九二八年乃至一九三〇年）の作戦計画の主要目標は、哈爾濱および奉天を占領し、  
以つてニホリの地味を対ソ戦における基地として利用すること  
にありました。この任務は、一九三一年——即ち奉天事件  
の結果として全満洲が日本軍によつて占領された年までは  
變りませんでした。

一九三六年（昭和十一年）の対ソ作戦計画は参謀本部が  
一部（作戦部）によつて作成されました。本作戦計画は、  
日ソ開戦の場合には日本軍隊の殆ど全部、即ち二十万  
至三十箇師團を満洲に移行することを豫定してのまし  
た。軍隊の輸送経路は、釜山および大連までは船、  
それより到着地までは鉄道と豫定されました。到  
着した全軍隊はまづ哈爾濱地区に集結し、後に關東  
軍司令部が必要を方面へ配置することになった。いまし  
た。そして在満兵力が五分になったところで攻勢をはい  
め、ソ聯領沿海州を占領するといふ計画でした。

一九三六年（昭和十一年）の計画によつて豫定された作戦  
の成功を確保するため、満洲の主要作戦方面においては  
種々の対策が講ぜられました。多数の鉄道、  
兵營、倉庫が建設され、通信手段が強化された。  
した。北部國境諸地帯、即ち黒河、綏芬河、東寧の

防壁を築く

③

諸地区については築城工事が実施されました。幾多の飛行場が建設されましたが、そのうち主要なるものをあげますと牡丹江、佳木斯、哈爾濱、綏化等のそれぞれあります。斯様をわけ日本に占領されて以後、滿洲は漸次対ソ戦のための基地に転化しました。

一九三七年の作戦計画は右にのべた一九三八年の計画と殆ど相異ありません。

一九三八年の対ソ作戦計画は、関東軍は関東初頭に兵力の一部を海拉爾および黒河に残して綏芬河―東寧の線およびマン河の対岸にある虎林に集結し、皇軍主力の到着を待期するといふ計画がありました。内地から軍隊が到着すると、兵力は綏芬河地区が十二乃至十三個師團、海拉爾―黒河地区が二乃至三個師團と豫定されておりました。

集結された全兵力は、黒河および海拉爾の若干の警備隊を除いて、ソ聯領沿海州の占領に利用されることになっておりました。興凱湖の兩岸に沿って作戦を進め、ソ聯の国境軍を粉砕した後、浦塩を包圍し占領する予定がありました。一九三七年の計画と同様に戦争が一段階

石原莞爾

④  
における浦塩および哈府の攻撃、二本ら諸地区におけ  
る露軍の殲滅および二本ら諸都市の占領が予  
定されました。

以上に私が作戦計画について述べましたことは、計画  
された作戦の概略にすぎません。それは開戦までは  
状況が明らかでないから作戦計画は概略しかたてら  
れてゐなかつたからです。

参謀本部と軍令部との協力によつて陸軍の  
作戦計画は海軍の作戦と結びつけられておりました。  
海軍の主要任務は陸軍の輸送と浦塩の封鎖  
でした。

作戦計画は毎年天皇陛下の御裁可を仰  
ぎました。参謀總長閑院の宮が陛下に作  
戦計画を上奏しました。

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer  
by the above-named ISHIHARA, Kanji, at the Teishin Hospital  
Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 24th day of July, 1946.

JOHN F. HUMMEL  
Major, J.A.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Pfc. Mike Azuma, HEREBY CERTIFY that I am fully conversant with  
the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Ishihara,  
Kanji, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath  
in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration  
of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly  
translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully  
understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 24th day of July, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan  
*Pfc. Mike Azuma*