

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Dutch obstructive tactics practiced at nearly every conference and their repeated attempts to put the Good Offices Committee on trial by requiring it to explain its actions or lack of them, etc.

e. The GOC contributions to the stiffening Dutch attitude through:

1. permitting complex political issues to intrude into the preliminary meetings which were designed exclusively to bring a complete halt to military actions in order to bring about an atmosphere of good will for the discussion of the complex political matters of time-consuming nature.
2. taking a wholly "suggesting" attitude with no hint of firmness.

Part of the GOC weakness, it is believed, springs from:

(a) an inability to agree on definitions of terms appearing in the Security Council's 1 November Resolution (See LOG, 20 November onwards) even after these definitions were drawn up after the most careful and prolonged study by the military assistants. (It is now known that Dr. Graham accepted, Australia conditionally accepted and Dr. Van Zeeland could not accept)

(b) inability to agree wholeheartedly on the Christmas "suggestions" after the Dutch had indicated their unwillingness to comply with the provisions of Annex 2 thereof.

1700 Hours Combined Meeting on Cease Fire Order: Col. Myers had been asked by the GOC to call this meeting. It was to be composed of Dutch and Indonesian military and civil special committeemen who would draw up a draft of a common cease fire order for issuance to the troops of both sides. However, without Colonel Myers' knowledge, civil assistants of the GOC had mistakenly advised some members that there would be no meeting. Consequently, by the time the error was discovered, there was no sufficient time to prepare all delegates particularly Republicans. The meeting was postponed.

4 January, Sunday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Departure C-47 for Jogjakarta, eleven passengers. Returned 1220 hrs.
 Morning : Recreation.
 Afternoon : Informal conferences among Military Group and preparation of reports.
 Evening : Meeting, Col. Myers, Col. Mollohan, Lt. Colonels Ind and Dixon to review situation and decide upon the draft of a message for transmission to the G-2 Section of the Department of the Army and of G-2, GHQ, FEC, concerning the crisis here and the lack of American policy to back up Dr. Graham.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

DA and GHQ Messages: Because of the possibility that the negotiations here may break down more or less completely within the next 48 hours, it was considered advisable to transmit to the Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army and to A.C. of S., G-2, GHQ, FEC identical messages, summarizing the situation and warning of its gravity. This was done in a meeting Col. Myers conducted among his own personnel Sunday evening.

It was agreed:

- a. That there is a crisis
- b. That the Dutch answer to the GOC Christmas "suggestions" has taken the form of a virtual ultimatum to the Republic in that the Dutch state bluntly those

CONFIDENTIAL

parts which they will accept and those which they reject unconditionally, regardless of Republican acceptance of the whole document.

(c) that the Dutch have become arrogant in their by-passing of the "Renville" discussions as far as the establishment of political autonomies is concerned.

(d) that the Dutch frankly are discussing the taking of Jogjakarta by force.

(e) that part of the Dutch determination has sprung from a lack of U.S. policy or even moral support for Dr. Graham in his fight to insist that the whole of the Christmas suggestions be retained as an integrated, balanced program.

(f) that the pronouncement of a strong U.S. policy at this time would have a particularly sobering effect on the Dutch and on the Belgian delegate to the GOC and would strengthen the Australian delegate. It is the privately held opinion among members of the U.S. Military and Naval Group that should Dr. Graham fail in his efforts, the United States will have lost another "golden opportunity" to gain and retain the faith of some 70,000,000 people, and at the same time retain the respect of the Dutch to the end that all can unite against the common enemy, "communism". If the Military Group were asked for its private recommendations, it would unhesitatingly urge outright backing by both the Department of the Army and the State Department of Dr. Graham in such a manner that the other GOC delegates and their governments would know of a new and strong U.S. stand.

5 January, MondayI. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.
 0715 hrs. : Departure, Krawang Field Survey Party. Lt. Col. Dixon and Capt. MacNiel for the U.S. Group.
 0800 hrs. : Meeting, Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Ind to study drafts of messages discussed previous evening.
 1000 hrs. : Meeting, "Renville", GOC and advisors on recording of the Christmas Truce "suggestions" and action of GOC on Republican request for transmission to the Security Council of a protest on uninterrupted political activities by Dutch. Colonels Myers and Elliott, Lt. Col. Ind and Major Streyhorn. Dr. Graham chairman of the week.
 1150 hrs. : Dispatch of messages to G-2 Washington and GHQ, FEC.
 1330 hrs. : Conference, Dr. Graham, Col. Myers and General Spoor aboard the "Renville" concerning questionnaire put to Dutch commanders in connection with Madura survey.
 1530 hrs. : Meeting, Hotel des Indes, Madura Field Survey Party. Col. Elliott and Col. Mollohan for the U.S. Group.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

1000 hours Meeting of GOC: The outstanding result of this meeting was a confirmation of the breach that had appeared between Dr. Van Zeeland of Belgium and Dr. Graham, with Australia taking a firm stand this time against the Van Zeeland tactics of delay while the Dutch proceed with vigor on political moves.

On the agenda was the matter of making a formal record of the various "informal" matters that have become the pivots upon which the whole success of the GOC mission here and the peace in Indonesia may turn. These papers are the GOC Christmas Truce "suggestions" and the Dutch and Indonesian replies thereto. It will be recalled (see LOG for 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 December) that these "suggestions" were to be considered as "informal" drafts until such time as the replies of both parties had been received and incorporated into a final form

CONFIDENTIAL

acceptable to both. This then would be a "formal" document. Because of the great importance these "suggestions" have attained, together with the replies, Dr. Graham was determined that the GOC should at least make a formal record of them. Evidently suspicious that this was an attempt to make the Christmas "suggestions" an official document of the GOC with the resulting possibility of the Dutch being placed in the position of having refused a GOC request, Dr. Van Zeeland went into considerable detail before giving his assent. It was evident that Dr. Graham would have to proceed with utmost tact in handling the Belgian delegate.

Dr. Graham suggested that the Chairman of the week for the week past (Dr. Van Zeeland) draw up an historical resume of what occurred during that week, designating clearly what was formal and what was informal, and transmit the whole to the Security Council for study. He wanted to make certain that the "informal meeting aboard the Dutch ship, "Wilhelm Ruis" of the GOC "Big Three" with the Dutch Ministers be included, and that his own remarks at that time be made a part of the record. These remarks, he hastily wrote down on paper and handed it to Dr. Van Zeeland, said: "I stand by Annex 1 and Annex 2 and will be willing to stand by them before all the world."

Dr. Van Zeeland said he would draw up such a resume.

Then Mr. Critchley of Australia said he desired to call the meeting's attention to a communication from the prime minister of the Republic dated 21 December protesting the uninterrupted activities of the Dutch in establishing independent political states out of areas conquered by the use of force in defiance of the Security Council's cease fire orders and requesting that the matter be brought before the attention of the Security Council. It was said by the GOC secretary that the letter had been referred to the Dutch for reply. This reply had not been made by the Dutch, except for an acknowledgement. In the meantime, the GOC had told the Republicans that it did not feel that its good offices extended to the transmission of protests to the Security Council.

Mr. Critchley was in disagreement with the attitude that the matter should not be reported to the Security Council, and in concise, emphatic terms stated that as he saw it, the Netherlands certainly was taking advantage of gains accruing to them purely as a result of their successful violation of the Security Council's orders to cease using force, and also of the practice of the Netherlands of by-passing the "Renville" discussions. "I believe", he said, "that this body must take action and that the matter must be called to the attention of the Security Council as soon as possible."

Dr. Graham then said: "I stood before on my convictions that all activities of military and political nature must cease, I stand on them now and I will stand on them in the future."

At this the Belgian delegate somewhat heatedly asserted that he considered it "unfair" to discuss these matters at this time, when informal replies which had been invited by the GOC actually were in the hands of one or the other of the disputants for their consideration and report to the GOC.

Mr. Critchley persisted, saying: "I think I would agree with Dr. Van Zeeland's point, except that things are moving too fast and everything is being made more difficult by the Dutch activities. I find it difficult to understand how the Dutch can say they agree with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement and at the same time move energetically to create independent political states out of territory taken by police action."

Dr. Graham said that the Christmas "suggestions" called for a cessation of these activities.

Dr. Van Zeeland immediately turned this back upon Dr. Graham by saying that it was GOC intention that the suggestions be considered as a balanced, integrated whole (Dr. Graham's strong contention) and that accordingly, Dr. Graham would have to give as much attention to the body of the suggestions as to the Annexes. In the body, it was said that as soon as agreement had been reached by both parties, then all conditions would go into immediate effect, including the cessation of political activities pending further discussions. With the rejection of the document as a whole by the Dutch, no agreement had been reached, therefore, no immediate implementation could be undertaken and accordingly the Dutch were not guilty of bad faith or improper actions. "I stand on that!" he said emphatically.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Critchley said that he could understand that, but here was a situation in which the Dutch refused to agree, and were at the same time making agreement impossible.

Dr. Van Zeeland: "I must object to these points being discussed now. They are entirely out of order when the GOC does not have in hand the replies which it has invited from the parties."

The Belgian declined to discuss the matter further, and agreed to support a motion calling upon the Netherlands for a quick reply to the Republican charges. American and Australian delegates agreed.

Mr. Critchley then said he would like to know something of what would be the attitude of the GOC within the next few days in case (a) the Republicans agreed to the Dutch ultimatum (b) the Republicans rejected the Dutch ultimatum.

Dr. Graham agreed that such forward thinking was advisable.

Mr. Critchley then said that there was little hope for agreement on the Christmas "suggestions". However, both parties had been able to accept the GOC truce plan of 3 December (See LOG 7 December, pg. 103) and that accordingly steps should be taken to ascertain if these plans could not be put into effect. (Note: These plans actually were the GOC version of the Military Advisors' original recommendations for the early implementation of a cease fire. This, in turn was based upon the U.S. Group's recommendations reported under the LOG of 2 November and included in the final draft as "Phase 1". Later the GOC altered this Phase 1 to include some highly controversial matters. This was done against the advice of the Military, which was fearful that inclusion of controversial matter would cause the whole program to bog down. This is exactly what occurred. See LOG, 2 December, and Military Group's Restatement, 3 December. The complexity of the question involving the exchange of prisoners -- included by the GOC -- is reviewed in the LOG for 17 December, page 130.

Again Dr. Van Zeeland found himself unable to go along with his colleagues. He said: "I think the proposal is entirely out of time. I cannot accept it and will not speak until I see what are the developments I have alluded to before."

Finding Dr. Van Zeeland immovable in these matters, the chair turned to the matter of the Madura reports. Mr. Brandis reported that he hoped to have the report ready within 24 hours, but he reminded the GOC that the Dutch authorities had not yet answered the questionnaire put to it. (See LOG 14 and 16 December). Dr. Graham said he would see Gen. Spoor about the matter in the very near future.

The meeting was adjourned.

Graham-Spoor-Myers Meeting: The matter of the questionnaire concerning the Madura survey appeared to have been settled during this meeting, when Gen. Spoor came aboard the "Renville" for a conference with Dr. Graham and Col. Myers. The latter had been endeavoring for some time to get these two together. It was his belief that only benefit would spring from a frank discussion between ~~two~~ men of keen minds and broad outlooks. This proved to be the case. General Spoor again mentioned his "plan" (reported in the LOG of 22 December) and agreed to give it to Col. Myers in the Dutch if he could not get interpreter service on it soon. He then said that there was a letter in route Col. Myers explaining the questionnaire matter. He was sure it would be satisfactory.

Messages to Washington and GHQ: Dr. Graham again questioned Col. Myers as to whether General MacArthur had been particularly advised concerning the situation here. Col. Myers reiterated that GHQ was being informed in detail through the LOG. But he then said that he had a signal which he proposed to file immediately. He showed it to Dr. Graham. The latter said that it reflected the true situation. Col. Myers turned it over to Capt. Tyree for transmission.

Capt. Tyree of the "Renville" then confidentially told Col. Myers that he felt compelled to file a signal to his chief (Admiral Cook) indicating his own observations. Independently he had arrived at conclusions which the Military Group had listed. Capt. Tyree's message said in substance that it appeared to him that while the Dutch were observing all the amenities of suave diplomatic exchange, they were, in fact, ignoring both the GOC and the "Renville" to a considerable extent which he considered was an insult to the U.S. They were holding at least some of their most important meetings elsewhere. He stressed that a crisis was at hand.

CONFIDENTIAL

In support of the "Renville" captain's stand, the following communique was issued officially by the Dutch and released to the press:

"This morning at 1000 hours a meeting took place between the Netherlands Ministers and the Lt. Governor-General on the one side and the representatives of the under-mentioned political units and organizations on the other side. The latter representatives had already consulted together yesterday, the outcome of which consultation is embodied in two resolutions.

"These resolutions read as follows:

- I. The conference of representatives of:
 1. The Negara Indonesia Timor
 2. The Federation of Self-Governments of Kalimantan Timur
 3. The Dewan Dayak Besar
 4. The Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat
 5. The Daerah Bangka
 6. The Daerah Riouw
 7. The Negara Sumatra Timur
 8. The Komite Daerah Istimewa Sumatra Selatan
 9. The Komite for the preparation of the Negara Djawa Barat
 10. Komite Indonesia Serikat

meeting on 3rd January 1948 at Djakarta;
has the honor to present the following resolution to the Netherlands government:

The Conference most urgently suggests that immediate steps be taken for

1. the formation of an interim Government for the preparation of the Sovereign United States of Indonesia;
2. the arrangement of the right of the Interim Government to have a say in the employment of the military forces in Indonesia as a government organization for the maintenance of safety in the interior;
3. the revision of the Netherlands Constitution.

Copies of this resolution will be presented to:

1. the Netherland Indies Government
2. the Committee of Good Offices
3. the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at Djocja
4. the Netherlands parliament.

II. The Conference of Representatives of:

1. the Negara Indonesia Timur
2. the Federation of Self-governments of Kalimantan Timur
3. the Dewan Dayak Besar
4. the Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat
5. the Daerah Bangka
6. the Daerah Riouw
7. the Negara Sumatra Timur
8. the Komite Daerah Istimewa Sumatra Selatan
9. the Komite for the preparation of the Negara Djawa Barat
10. Madura
11. Komite Indonesia Serikat

brings to the notice of the Government of the Republic Indonesia the resolution presented to the Netherlands Government, copy of which is appended hereto, and invites the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to join the Sovereign United States of Indonesia.

CONFIDENTIAL

Djakarta, 3rd Jan. 1948

After ample discussion and elucidation of the decisions laid down in the resolutions, the Netherlands Prime Minister, who presided today's meeting, approved of the gist of the first resolution. He also expressed his expectation that the second resolution will be able to contribute considerably to the solution of the difficulties with the Republic and to a satisfactory result of the work of the Committee of Good Offices.

Starting from this assumption the implementation of point 1 of the first resolution will be commenced immediately by the Lt. Governor General together with several territories and groups, and with representatives of the minorities.

As will be generally known a revision of the Constitution is in course of preparation in the Netherlands."

Madura Field Survey Party Meeting: This meeting was unable to produce its report owing to the inability of the Belgian Observers to agree with either the Brandis draft (LOG December) or the independent American reports (Annex 1 of LOG, Period 14 to 27 December). Because these maneuvers have come to typify the relationships between the Belgians and other members of the COC and its committees, it is believed advisable to report this meeting in some detail. The minutes follow:

"The representatives examined the notes taken by the Secretary of the Observation Team at Soerabaya and Madura during the meetings it held between themselves and the Dutch civil and military authorities.

Mr. Brandis suggested that, if any corrections should be made of these notes, the representatives should submit them to the Secretary.

Mr. Vanderstichelen (Belgium) believed that the inclusion of the remark made by Captain Kampinga to the effect that, he could convert Chandra Hassan to be pro-Dutch in two weeks time, might indicate that the Dutch are exercising a certain pressure on Chandra Hassan which fact had not been ascertained. However, he did not object to include it in.

The representatives examined both the United States-Australian joint report and Mr. Vanderstichelen's personal paper on the Madura enquiry; the latter later withdrew his paper. Mr. Brandis said he would agree on certain points mentioned in Mr. Vanderstichelen's paper, but there were other points which he did not think the Observation Team should go into as regards the standpoint of the Security Council's resolution. Mr. Vanderstichelen replied that according to the Committee of Good Offices letter to the parties, the enquiry would be conducted for the purpose of acquainting itself with the general situation. Mr. Brandis agreed with Mr. Vanderstichelen on this point; however, he mentioned that as far as the Madura case was concerned the Republican Government had also requested for an investigation of the violations of the cease fire. As it had been previously agreed to by the Committee of Good Offices this matter was also to be investigated.

Mr. Vanderstichelen believed that, compared with Mr. Brandis' draft report submitted at the first meeting upon the team's return from Madura, the United States-Australia draft report was more acceptable to the Belgian delegation in order to draw up an unanimous report.

Commander Chesterman suggested that Mr. Vanderstichelen present his views on those points in the joint United States-Australian report on which he could not agree.

Mr. Vanderstichelen expressed his regret that right from the beginning the Belgian delegation had been kept out by the United States and Australian delegations in the drafting of a report. Mr. Brandis said he could not agree to this statement and reminded Mr. Vanderstichelen that at the first meeting he had been given a copy of the United States draft report and had requested time to study it. At the second meeting, Mr. Vanderstichelen stated that he could not agree on those points beyond the first two paragraphs of the United States draft report. On the other hand, the Australian delegation was ready to accept this report in its entirety. Consequently, it was decided during the second meeting that there should be a separate Belgian report and a joint United States-Australian report. Mr. Vanderstichelen accepted that explanation.

CONFIDENTIAL

The representatives agreed that, as a matter of procedure, in the future all documents would be submitted to the Secretary who would then circulate them to each representative."

6 January, Tuesday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.
 0900 hrs. : Second meeting, Madura Field Survey Party to try to produce unanimous report. Col. Elliott and Major Strayhorn for the U.S.
 1000 hrs. : Brief conference, Capt. Tyree of "Renville" and Lt. Col. Ind concerning message sent to Admiral Cook on crisis here.
 1000 hrs. : Meeting, GOC and advisors, to further discuss "formalizing" the records in connection with "informal" documents, and to deal with some phases of Madura Group report. Col. Myers, Capt. McCallum, Col. Elliott, Major Strayhorn for the U.S.
 Noon : Conference, Dr. Graham, Mr. Brandis, Mr. Scott, Mr. Ogburn, Col. Myers concerning framing of emergency message to State Department.
 Noon : Submission by Col. Mollohan of report dealing with transportation in the U.S. C-47 of certain biologicals between Jogjakarta and Batavia.
 Afternoon : Continuous informal discussions and preparation of reports.

II NARRATIVE SECTIONSecond Madura Group Meeting:

An impasse appears to be developing between the Australian-American section of the Madura Field Survey Party and the Belgians. Although they have not revealed their report up to this time, the Belgians have indicated that they cannot agree with the Brandis report. This report is a tentative concensus, except for the Belgians. Mr. Brandis' efforts to find points of agreement so far have failed and the meeting today ended in an atmosphere of hostility.

Dr. Graham's Parting Visit with the Dutch Ministers:

Determined to salvage something of the GOC hopes for a Dutch agreement to some plan which would lead to an eventual settlement of basic differences between the Dutch and Indonesians, Dr. Graham is known to have drawn up in the rough a series of "principles" which he showed to the Dutch ministers last night on the eve of their departure. (The four dignitaries left today by air for Holland.)

Dr. Graham, it is thought, was not acting entirely on his own, and likely had shown his list of "principles" to both Judge Kirby and to Dr. Van Zeeland, prior to revealing it to the Dutch at a farewell meeting last night. The exact nature of the list is not known to the Army group at this time. However, it is known that the ministers appeared to have been won over to the suggestion contained therein to the extent of agreeing to bring them up for consideration at the Hague.

Dr. Graham immediately cabled his report to the State Department. He hoped that these suggestions might be favorably received in Washington to the extent of eliciting a State Department backing for his efforts to win over the Dutch to complete acceptance.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tyree-Ind Meeting: This meeting was for the purpose of reviewing messages sent by the Military and Capt. Tyree to determine the exact extent of agreement. Capt. Tyree explained that he was not in the position of observer, but had felt obligated to notify proper naval authority that there existed a reasonable doubt as to whether "Renville" was being utilized by the Dutch to the extent the United States had hoped and had a right to exact. The Captain was apprehensive that should the press seize upon the manner in which the "Renville" was being by-passed by the Dutch, there would be a public outcry which would reflect unfavorably on the Navy for maintaining the expensive set-up in the face of polite but definite ignoring by one of the parties. He privately agreed with the contents of the message sent to Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army and to G-2 GHQ by Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Dixon the previous afternoon. (Note: Filed 1400 hours Batavia time)

GOC Meeting: This was called in an attempt to further bring the records of the GOC up to date and to agree upon how "informal" documents should be recorded. Reference is made to the meeting of 1000 hours, Monday, 5 January, aboard the "Renville", inasmuch as this session was almost a repetition of that unsatisfactory meeting. Again Dr. Van Zeeland, the Belgian delegate to GOC, grew histrionic, this time to the extent of seeming to become quite inarticulate with anger that Dr. Graham and Mr. Critchley again would bring up the matter of discussing GOC attitudes to the reactions of the disputing parties to the Christmas Truce "suggestions" when these reactions were being studied at the moment in Jogjakarta. It finally was agreed that both parties would be notified that the GOC was proposing to enter the "informal" documents bearing on this vital subject on the official record of the GOC, but that before it did so, both parties should indicate their suggestions for any corrections of the minutes and relevant papers. The fact that important business has been effected during unscheduled "meetings" at places other than in the "Renville" has contributed to an unsatisfactory state of the records. One of these meetings occurred between the chief GOC delegates and the Holland Ministers aboard a Dutch ship, "Wilhelm Ruis" on Saturday, 27 December. On the other hand, an informal meeting of importance had occurred at the residence of Dr. Gani, Republican vice premier (now absent) at a later date. A third meeting occurred New Year's Day at the Palace with Dutch ministers and local leaders. Minutes for all of these will be drawn up and submitted to the parties concerned for correction, then will be incorporated within the official record of the GOC. Dr. Van Zeeland became very emphatic that GOC strike out any mention of a meeting occurring 3 January between representatives of the Republic and representatives of the Netherlands to consider the tentative Republican truce draft. His claim was that the meeting was not authorized and no recognition could be made of it. He carried his point.

The failure of the Madura Group's second meeting to produce a joint report was discussed. The Belgians suggested that they confer with their military and civil observers on the matter to see if a common report could not be reached. This was agreed to.

Dr. Graham reported that Gen. Spoor appeared ready to answer the questions put to him three weeks ago by the Madura Group and By Col. Myers. Dr. Graham suggested that the Military Group again go over the questionnaires to determine exactly what they wanted answered. So much time has elapsed on this matter that the report now has doubtful value, and accordingly, it was decided that the GOC would receive any answers Gen. Spoor might have ready and was willing to provide, otherwise, the GOC would not press for them at all.

Graham Message to State Department: Frankly disturbed by the adamant stand taken by the Dutch, Dr. Graham called his civil advisors and Col. Myers into consultation at noon to decide upon the draft of an emergency message to the State Department. In substance he said:

- a. the collapse of the Republic was imminent in the face of further political strangulation by the Dutch and the strong possibility of renewed military action.
- b. the Republicans almost certainly now stood to lose much more than they had signed away in the Lingardjati Agreement.

CONFIDENTIAL

c. such a critical future as now seemed assured was almost certain to force the hands of the moderates in Jogjakarta with the result that regardless of the kind of agreement that might be reached on the "Renville" within the next few days upon the return of delegates from the Republican Capitol, violence and "scorched earth" advocated by the militants was almost sure to increase rather than stop.

d. the corner into which the Republicans had been forced would be looked upon in many parts of the world as a virtual betrayal of the Republicans by the GOC and particularly by the United States in its pivotal position in the GOC. Criticism of the U.S. could be expected to be severe and of the Dutch to be so severe as to jeopardize even their just claims in the dispute. Accordingly, all stood to lose in one serious way or another unless the hand of the Republican government was not forced so drastically.

e. Dr. Graham therefore strongly urged State Department to give immediate support to his plan to try to get Dutch agreement to a softening and to at least a partial agreement to Annex 2 of the Christmas suggestions. This would involve guaranteeing the continuance of the Republic as an independent state in the UNI scheme, but subject to Crown dispensations as might be agreed upon along the general terms of the Lingardati document.

Transport of Biologicals: Because it has been pretty well established that certain Dutch political interests (headed by Jhr. Van Vredenburg) have sought to prejudice the Dutch military, the Dutch ministers and even other members of the GOC against the United States Group, extra care is taken in the matter of air transportation of personnel and material between Jogjakarta and Dutch territory. For purposes of the record, a report on the request for the movement of certain biologicals is made here by Col. Mollohan acting for Col. Myers:

Memo for: Col. Myers

Batavia, 3 January

Subject: Transmission of certain medical supplies from Batavia to Jogjakarta via U.S. Military Observers Group Airplane.

1. On the evening of 2 January, 1948, Dr. Sutomo, Republic of Indonesia Medical service, Jogjakarta, came to Col. Mollohan with a request for assistance in securing authority to send parcels of smallpox vaccine and dysentery-cholera-typhoid vaccine from the Institute Pasteur in Klaten to Batavia via the U. S. Military aircraft as it makes its shuttle runs. He further asked to send parcels of drugs, mainly penicillin and sulfa-drugs and arsenicals from Batavia to Jogjakarta. He stated no parcel would weigh more than 30 lbs. and most would be much smaller. Dr. Sutomo requested that the parcels be sent from Indonesian Red Cross, Jogjakarta to Indonesian Red Cross, Batavia, and vice versa. He was told that it would probably be impossible to get approval to send the materials through the channels requested as the Dutch authorities would object to direct traffic between Indonesian organizations in the two cities as there would be no neutral control of contents, but that an effort would be made to secure permission for the transactions using the International Red Cross, Batavia, as the Regulating Agency.

2. On 3 January, 1948, a conference was held in the office of Dr. Leutenegger, Batavia head of International Red Cross, between Col. Mollohan and officials of the IRC. It was agreed that the IRC would be the regulating agency provided all packages going in both directions were delivered to the IRC addressed to the Indonesian Red Cross in the city of destination through the IRC, Batavia, and bearing a manifest of contents on the outside signed by a responsible doctor or official. This to be subject to the approval of Prof. Van Wulfften-Palthe, Director and Coordinator of Medical Affairs, NEI Government.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. At a conference at 1200 hours, 3 January, between Prof. Palthe and Dr. Van Tricht of the Medical Coordinator's Office and Col. Mollohan approval of the plan was granted by Prof. Hulfften-Palthe.

4. Late in the afternoon the scheme was explained to Col. Myers and he gave verbal approval for the pilot of the plane to accept and transmit the parcels. The method of transmittal was explained to Dr. Sutomo the evening of 3 January with emphasis on following the approved plan to the letter. The first parcel of drugs, properly listed and marked, departed from Batavia to Jogjakarta 4 January 1948.

/s/ C. S. Mollohan
Col., M.C.

7 January, WednesdayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.

0705 hrs. : Departure, American C-47 for Jogjakarta. Nine passengers and small amount of approved freight.

Morning : Informal meetings, evaluations of developments and preparation of reports, including preliminary meeting of Krawang Field Survey Party. (Note: this party had been returning to Batavia nightly during the inquiry)

1400 hrs. : Return of both American and Australian C-47 airplanes with members of the Indonesian delegations including Amir Sjerifuddin.

1600 hrs. : Closed meeting, the GOC and ranking Indonesian delegates aboard "Renville" reference Indonesian reactions to Dutch ultimatum.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Krawang Survey: This investigation appears to have been conducted in an efficient manner, with seeming unanimity among the three-power delegates as to findings. It is not expected that these findings will be pleasing to the Dutch. Work has been started on drafting a report.

Afternoon Meetings on "Renville": At the request of senior members of the GOC, the meetings in "Renville" upon the return of ranking Indonesian delegates from Jogjakarta, all advisors refrained from coming aboard ship. This was done because the prime minister had requested absolute confidence in these critical sessions. It is known that the discussions were to (a) determine whether the Republicans could accept the Christmas Truce message even if the Dutch demands for elimination of Annex 2 were to be considered seriously by the GOC, but provided the GOC put up alternative suggestions to the Dutch for the substitution of Annex 2 details without sacrificing basic principles (b) the part the Republic might be agreeable to playing in an interim government plan for a United States of Indonesia as being actively promoted by the Dutch, and which they apparently will be able to put into effect regardless of the GOC.

It is known that the Republicans are not completely against participating in the latter plan, if it is a last resort, but provided only that a neutral third party such as the GOC supervise and advise.

8 January, ThursdayI. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.

Morning : Informal reports and preparation of reports.

0930 hrs. : Third Meeting of Madura Field Survey Group to try to arrive at agreement on drawing up of final report.

Afternoon : Informal conferences and preparation of reports.

1600 hrs. : Receipt by GOC of answers to questionnaire submitted to Dutch reference Madura Field Survey (see Narrative section).

2000 hrs. : Meeting, Dr. Graham, Mr. Brandis, Lt. Col. Ind reference arrangements for concentrating Republican leaders for important conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

2100 hrs. : Same, but with Premier Amir Sjarifuddin added.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Madura Group Meeting: Present: For Australia - Mr. Moore, Commander Chesterman, Sqdn. Ldr. Kroll; For Belgium - Mr. Vanderstichelen, Mr. Van den Block, Capt. Paul Symins; For the U.S. - Capt. McCallum, Colonels Elliott and Mollohan and Mr. Brandis.

Although it had been clearly understood by all at the meeting of the previous day that the Belgians would be prepared to submit a minority report in view of their inability to agree with the report found acceptable by the U. S. and Australian delegations, the Belgians did not come prepared with their report. Accordingly, little was again accomplished except to draw up and agree on the historical resume of the Madura survey. This will serve as the covering letter of the two reports when the Belgians announce that they are ready to submit theirs. Modification of the "Brandis" report of this survey, included in the LOG for December, has been ready for some days awaiting the pleasure of the Belgians.

Questionnaire "Answers": The history of the "answers" to the questionnaires submitted to the Dutch military authorities has become almost as complicated as the whole Madura Survey. The latest development brought forth a typical result. Dr. Graham asked General Spoor about the matter of the delayed answers 5 January. The General said he had understood that the civil authorities were handling the matter. The civil authorities in turn said they understood the matter had been dropped. Both promised action. Today "answers" were sent via courier by Gen. Spoor to the GOC. They proved to be answers to a segment of the "Elliott" questionnaire-guide for Madura Survey parties when interviewing unit commanders. They were not answers either to the main questionnaire submitted to the commanding general at Soerabaya (and later referred by him to General Spoor) or to the questionnaire submitted by Col. Myers to Gen. Spoor at approximately the same time in Batavia. Dr. Graham has indicated that he does not plan to press the matter further as the usefulness to the GOC of the answers even if they were to be made in full now would be slight.

Conference Arrangement Meetings: The GOC ranking delegates and leading Republican authorities including Amir Sjarifuddin held meetings in private aboard "Renville" during the day. It was asked that only this small group participate in hopes that the Republicans would speak freely during these critical times. In consequence, it was decided that all ranking Republicans should be concentrated for final decisive meetings to be held as soon as this concentration could be effected. These meetings would be for the purpose of considering the Dutch "ultimatum" and prepare a final answer to it.

It was Dr. Graham's hope that "Renville" could be made available in Republican waters for the purpose. The bring Mr. Sjarir and Mohammed Hata from Singapore and Sumatran territory respectively, it was proposed to utilize the American C-47. This aircraft would make the run to Singapore early Friday morning remaining there overnight for a pre-weather run into Pakenbarroe on Saturday, then fly to Batavia. The next morning the passengers would be flown to Jogjakarta. In the meantime, the Australian C-47 would have transported the remainder of the delegates from Batavia to Jogjakarta.

Dr. Graham had to abandon plans to use the "Renville" owing to a promise made to the press two months ago that whenever "Renville" put to sea, the press would be represented. It was the request of Sjarifuddin that the meetings be absolutely confidential. Accordingly, the presence of pressmen would be considered a breach. This meant the "Renville" could not be used.

Amir Sjarifuddin and Mr. Ali Salim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were to accompany the American plane on the Singapore-Sumatra run. Lt. Col. Ind was placed in charge by Col. Myers, who decided to remain in Batavia close to the GOC during days when far reaching decisions were being worked up.

CONFIDENTIAL9 January, FridayI. The LOG

0530 hrs. : Alert.

0830 hrs. : Meeting, Batavia airport, Amir Sjarifuddin, Dr. Graham and Lt. Col. Ind with Dutch Liaison Officers, reference refusal of Dutch government to permit Sjarir or M. Hata to remain in Batavia. The GOC was to contact the Dutch and in the meantime flight plans would be made for a run directly from Sumatra to Jogjakarta if possible.

1000 hrs. : Meeting, the GOC and advisors concerning the manner of reporting to the Security Council and the report of the Madura Field Survey Party. For the U.S., Col. Myers, Major Strayhorn, and Messers Graham, Brandis, Abbey, Ogburn and Scott.

1035 hrs. : Arrival, C-47, Kallang Airport, Singapore.

1400 hrs. : Conference, Lt. Col. Ind and Major Hoey reference "cover" of the NEI. front and the impending visit of a Typographical Unit from Clark Field to assist in the air mapping of the NEI.

Evening : Informal discussions among members of the U.S. Group.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Dutch Refusals on Indonesian Leaders: The plan to bring the Indonesian Leaders, Sjahrir and Hatta to Batavia via the U.S. C-47 received a set-back when the Dutch government notified the GOC it would not permit or extend diplomatic hospitality to these men. Dr. Graham was to see the Palace officials to endeavor to effect a reconsideration of this attitude in case the C-47 could not make its Sumatra pick-up of Dr. Hatta and return to Jogjakarta the same day. Extremely unfavorable weather conditions prevail in these latitudes at this time of year after noon and an inland flight is almost certain to meet with closed-in conditions. However, the C-47 took off with the intention to overnight at Singapore and make the run to Pakenbarroe early Friday to pick up Dr. Hatta and then, if possible, run direct to Jogjakarta.

GOC Morning Meeting: At this time a number of items on the agenda were disposed of. First, Mr. Abbey reported that the Special Committees had agreed that parties for general field observations would not be recommended at this time, pending the return from Jogjakarta of GOC and Indonesian officials to consider final answers to Dutch ultimatum demands.

Mr. Brandis reported on the status of the answers to the Madura Group's questionnaire. (See LOG 6 January) Reference Madura, the Belgians, who have not been able to submit their report as yet, mentioned their intention to revisit certain Madura areas should the GOC approve, this to be done before finalizing their report. This was received unfavorably by the Americans and Australians, who pointed out (a) that the Madura survey had already extended itself and its reporting period over an unreasonably long time (b) that at the time the party was in Madura, explicit questions concerning the identical areas and interviews the Belgians now proposed to make had been brought up and rejected. This suggestion trailed off when the Belgians were not able to present a well-organized request. It was suggested by Mr. Critchley of Australia that the Austro-American observers exchange their reports with the dissenting Belgians and each group study the other's reports to note points of difference and to question or comment thereon. Then the reports would be taken back by the original groups and questions would be answered. Thus points of difference would have to be defended or dropped. This was agreed to and meetings of the Madura Groups were arranged.

Mr. Brandis now asked that he be relieved as chairman. He said that the press of other work demanded all his full attention. While it is true that Mr. Brandis is to be returned to Washington soon and much clean-up work awaits him, he also believed that relationships with the Belgians would be improved if he withdrew from the Madura group. This probably is true. In fairness to the Belgians however, it should be said that the Madura survey never had been well organized under GOC direction. No use was made of the U.S. Observer Group's experience in these matters, such as its insistence on directives, and report forms etc. Col. Myers had protested that the Madura Group had not appeared to be well organized and this has proved true. Reluctantly the GOC agreed to relieve Mr.

CONFIDENTIAL

Brandis and named Mr. Abbey in his place.

Dr. Graham once more introduced his request that the GOC consider its course of action should the two parties be unable to accept the Christmas Truce message. Hitherto, Dr. Van Zeeland had dramatically refused to consider such a course of action until the answers had been received, studied and either adopted or dropped. Now, however, he supported the idea that a drafting committee submit a list of "principles". This list would include both broad principles which the GOC would suggest for adoption by both parties. In effect, this set of principles would be a last-minute expression carefully designed to bring out only those things upon which there was a chance of quick bi-lateral agreement, and yet be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace a wide range of strong points which the GOC could justly champion before the world. The drafting committee was to present a document in the very near future.

10 January, Saturday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert, Patavia.
 0445 hrs. : Alert, Singapore.
 0645 hrs. : Departure, C-47, Kallang Airport, Singapore, for Pakenbarroe.
 Passengers included Amir Sjarifuddin, Ali Salim and Dr. Sjahrir. (Departure - delayed, account, weather.)
 0900 hrs. : Meeting, Madura Group, Mr. Abbey, Chairman, to consider final reports.
 0950 hrs. : Put-down, Pakenbarroe.
 1209 hrs. : Take off, Pakenbarroe for Bukittinggi (Ft. de Kock)
 1310 hrs. : Arrival Bukittinggi.
 1600 hrs. : Meeting, GOC and advisors, Hotel des Indes, to discuss a more formal draft of Dr. Graham's "principles". Col. Myers and Major Strayhorn.
 1511 hrs. : Take-off from Bukittinggi for Singapore. (All routes east and south weathered in)
 1721 hrs. : Arrival, Singapore.
 Evening : Informal meetings and notification of acceptance of Dr. Graham's "principles" by the Dutch central government.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Singapore Departure: Forecasts of unfavorable flying conditions delayed the Singapore take-off for half an hour. These forecasts were fulfilled over Sumatra when weathered-in conditions were encountered the whole way to Pakenbarroe and over the airstrip, which at best is grass-covered and without radio beacon or radio contact. Over an hour was lost circling the location of the airstrip. It finally was decided by Pilot Lt. Chapman to go down through. A perfect landing was made.

Dr. Hatta Not at Pakenbarroe: Dr. Sjarifuddin was distressed upon landing to be informed that the Vice President had not arrived from Ft. De Kock and that it was unlikely that he would, since 120 kilometers of road had been inundated in floods or covered by landslides. (severe flood conditions were noted from the air over Malaya and Sumatra). The prime minister called conferences. He was most reluctant to go on to Jogjakarta without the vice president. However, he was informed that every moment's delay lessened the chances of being able to reach the Republican capital at all, as weather conditions were worsening. The chances were considered to be less than 50-50. He had the alternate, then, of (a) going to a Dutch airport such as Batavia, with Dr. Sjahrir and risking his arrest, or (b) returning to Singapore for an early-morning run to Jogjakarta. He unhesitatingly adopted the latter. However, with that decision, it was agreed that departure should be delayed until noon in case of some word from Dr. Hatta. This proved to be a wise delay, for word came that there was a chance that the C-47 might be able to land at Bukittinggi, since weather had improved somewhat and the field was considered sound enough to support the aircraft. Bukittinggi was advised to mark the field carefully. In the meantime Dr. Sjarifuddin went into the

CONFIDENTIAL

flooded village of Pakenbarroe and made a speech. There was tremendous enthusiasm. (Note: the condition of the people has worsened as far as textiles are concerned. The floods have brought suffering and disease, but food seems plentiful. The Republican "transportation" system hardly exists any more and all vehicles were in deplorable state.)

Take-off between storms was achieved.

The landing at unknown Bukittinggi airstrip - a short, grass field surrounded with high hills - was made expertly despite mud and spume. Again tremendous enthusiasms greeted the prime minister and a political rally was held in the crowded city. (Here the people appeared to be well off, prosperous and enthusiastic; there were numerous fair cars). By the time it was possible to pull the officials away from the noisy crowds, all possibility of running south or east had disappeared. Storms were on every hand except to the north-east. The run-out was made in this direction. A Dutch airfield station, Padang, refused to provide weather data until an adamant message was sent explaining that the C-47 was a United Nations plane and that in any event, a U.S. Air Force plane was entitled to data as provided for by international regulations. After some delay, the station complied. The run to Singapore was turbulent and an exceptionally hazardous landing was made with roughness. Accomodation was secured and all warned to protect Dr. Hatta's presence from the press, as considerable Dutch irritation had been noted in the Saturday morning press in reply to interviews published after our arrival with Dr. Sjarifuddin the previous day. No U.S. officer or man allowed himself to be interviewed on Friday; the comments all were of Indonesian origin. (Note: Dr. Sjarifuddin is known to have had a long conference with the British Foreign Office representatives Friday afternoon).

Late at night messages were received from Batavia advising that the plane would return to Batavia the next day instead of running to Jogjakarta and would pick up GOC delegates for Jogjakarta. A departure for 0500 hours was requested in these messages. This was found to be impossible as Kallang would not clear on account of bad surrounding weather until at least 0600 hours.

The highest credit is due the aircrew for their performances during a day of exhausting and hazardous flying.

Madura Group Meeting: Under Mr. Abbey's chairmanship, the Madura Group was able to make some progress along the lines suggested by Mr. Critchley the day before. Each group will study the other group's report and where differences of opinion are noted, they will be listed and the opposite group will be required to defend its statements or drop them. The chairman called for the submission of reports by noon of this date. The American report was ready. It is essentially the same as the "Brandis" report submitted in the LOG earlier and amplified in Annex 1 of the LOG for the period 14-27 December. The Belgian report has been made ready in draft form. It will be presented, or extracted, with its points of difference when the Austro-American group has studied it and submitted its list of question for Belgian answers (likely early next week).

GOC 1600 Hours Meeting: This meeting was primarily to make more formal the "principles" list outlined by Dr. Graham to the Dutch ministers on the evening of 5 January (See LOG, 6 January) and to receive, if possible, a report from Messers Scott and Ogburn who were discussing the list with Jhr. Vredenburg and Dr. Van Mook at the Palace.

(Note: it is known that Dr. Graham had received encouragement from the State Department on his appeal of 6 January that the Department back him up in his attempts to win adoption of the principles outlined in this list. The encouragement was conditioned on the Dutch acceptance, it being indicated that if the Dutch approved, the U.S. policy would embrace these principles and announcement thereof would be forthcoming.)

It was agreed that this list should receive the official title of: "Principles for the Negotiations Toward a Political Settlement."

Evening Informal Meetings: It was learned during the course of the evening that the Dutch had accepted the "Principles". It was further disclosed to Col. Myers during a brief talk with GOC representatives that instructions to this effect had come from the Hague. Van Vredenburg was obviously considerably upset by the Hague action, which had taken the matter out of his hands.

CONFIDENTIAL

It now is believed that this set of principles may become the new pivot upon which negotiations may be carried on, and that the extremely critical period through which the situation has been passing may be considerably eased. The GOC promised an early release of the document to include certain curtailments included in the final draft.

11 January, Sunday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert, Batavia.
 0445 hrs. : Alert, Singapore.
 0600 hrs. : Take off Kallang, for Batavia.
 0957 hrs. : Arrival Batavia.
 1040 hrs. : Take off - Batavia, Jogjakarta; nine passengers added, including Dr. Graham, Messers Scott and Ogburn and Lt. Col. Dixon. (Note: the Australian Dakota and Beechcraft have been conveying Indonesian delegates back to the capital.)
 Afternoon : Krawang Field Survey Report Logged and extracted.
 Afternoon : Reception of GOC document of "Principles".

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

C-47 Flight: Arrival at Batavia was delayed by poor flying conditions. A collision with another C-47 circling the airport in clouds was narrowly averted by the alert American crew. The Dutch eased their strict control at the airfield and allowed the delegates and their Batavian supports to mingle for 15 minutes while the plane was being reconditioned for the onward flight in poor weather. Refuelling was delayed until the return trip, when Semarang was to be contacted. The aircraft must be grounded for three days now as it is over its 50-hour inspection requirement.

Lt. Chapman's Retention: A signal has been received from COMGEN, FEAF ordering Lt. Chapman's retention here until the completion of the mission. The signal cited a request from the Secretary of State.

"Principles" Document: The Graham "principles" formally adopted by the GOC and agreed to by the Dutch appears below:

SIX PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
 ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING ON 10 JANUARY

The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that the following principles, among others, form a basis for the negotiations towards a political settlement:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebescite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebescite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the Committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebescite.
5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.
6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.


Krawang Field Survey Report: This party, largely organized under Lt. Col. Dixon's direction, has been able to perform and report in a manner that contrasted sharply with the Madura Survey Group. The unanimous report, in the preparation of which the Belgian delegate was active and co-operative, has been extracted for this LOG. It will be found as Annex II of this LOG.

The Log

Period: 28 Dec., 1947-- 11 Jan., 1948 Incl.

ANNEX 1

"Good Offices Committee
Interim Report
to
The Security Council"



RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
31 December 1947
Original: English

SECURITY COUNCIL
COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

1. The United Nations Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question was established, pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council of 25 August 1947, to assist in the pacific settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. At an informal meeting of the Committee convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at Lake Success on 8 October, at which were present the Honourable Dr. Herbert Evatt, representing Australia, the Honourable Mr. Paul van Zeeland, representative of Belgium, and the Honourable Dr. Frank P. Graham, representative of the United States of America, it was decided that the Committee should proceed with its Secretariat, as quickly as arrangements could be completed, to Sydney, Australia, to meet with the Honourable Mr. Justice Kirby and organize its future work. The Committee, thereafter, assembled in Sydney on 19 October. At its first official meeting held on 20 October, it was agreed that the members of the Committee would not represent either of the contending parties, but act as a Committee in the spirit of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was also decided that the chairmanship of the Committee would be held in turn by the three members, each holding office for one week.
2. The Committee held three official meetings in Sydney and decided, after the receipt of invitations from the Prime Ministers of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, to proceed to Indonesia as quickly as transportation arrangements could be completed in order to acquaint itself with the situation on the spot and meet with the parties as an essential preliminary to the commencement of its duties. While in Sydney, the Committee adopted the practice of holding informal meetings frequently in order to study the problem and discuss possible methods of approach to a settlement of the dispute. Leaving Sydney on 25 October, the Committee arrived in Batavia on 27 October and immediately thereafter met separately with the two parties.
3. First among the problems that faced the Committee was the determination of a site mutually agreeable to the parties for the holding of political discussions. As indicated by the Committee's cablegram of 1 December, this problem was solved by the parties accepting the suggestion of the Committee, which made on the request of the parties after they had failed to agree on a mutually acceptable site. After exploring several possible sites with the parties, the Committee suggested as a last resort that political discussions be held on board a public ship of the United States. The parties are now meeting with the Committee on board the U.S.S. Renville in Java waters.
4. Soon after its arrival in Java, the Committee found it necessary to state to the parties its views on its responsibilities under the terms of the resolutions of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question and its procedure for assisting the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia in the pacific settlement of the dispute.

RESTRICTED
S/AC 10/79
Page 2

5. As regards its responsibilities under the terms of the Security Council's resolutions, the Committee conveyed its views formally to the parties in a document dated 19 November, the substance of which had been conveyed informally on 7 November, to the Committee representing the Netherlands Government. In that document the Committee stated that it would render all assistance possible to the parties in reaching a political settlement. In that connection, the Committee would assume any and every task devolving upon it as the result of agreements or requests made by the parties from time to time. Nothing the Committee might do would bind either party, except under circumstances where two conditions were fulfilled, namely (1) that both parties asked the Committee to make recommendations, and (2) that both parties stated in advance that they would regard such recommendations as binding. However, under the terms of paragraph 4 of the Security Council's resolution of 1 November on the Indonesian Question, the Committee considered itself directed by the Council to offer its assistance to the parties, in the absence of any direct agreement between the parties, in reaching agreement or an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, without awaiting a request by either party that the Committee offer such assistance.

6. Far from conceiving its assistance as having a binding character, the Committee considered that its duties could be fulfilled only through agreement between the parties themselves. The Committee stated, however, that, should the parties reject the Committee's assistance, the Committee's responsibility to the Security Council would be acquitted by reporting to the Security Council.

7. In reply to a question put to the Committee by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia regarding its procedure for assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute, the Committee stated the following on 30 October:

"(1) The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question considers it, as among its first duties, to take note of all the wishes of the parties and also to take note of any suggestions either party would wish to make.

(2) The Committee desires to make it clear that it is ready, for its part, to make suggestions to the parties, if and when the Committee is requested to do so by the parties. In particular, the Committee would be prepared if and when so requested by the parties, to offer its suggestions to the parties on appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, as well as on such basic matters as are related to procedures for the settlement and terms of settlement.

(3) As regards the question raised by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the meeting of the Committee with the Republican Government relating to the choice of a suitable place for conducting discussions on substantive matters, the Committee desires to make clear that it is ready to offer its suggestions, if so requested by the parties.

(4) Finally, the Committee desires to emphasize that it will welcome and consider any suggestions made at any stage by either party, and will be ready to use its good offices to secure the best consideration of such suggestions as may be made."


RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 3

8. On 31 October, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated the agreement of his Committee with the interpretation of the functions of the Committee of Good Offices as stated by it in its reply to a question put to it by the delegation of the Republic Of Indonesia (see paragraph 7 above). On 8 November, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated that his committee was very willing to receive suggestions from the Committee of Good Offices on questions of procedure. He stated further that, with regard to "a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement" which the Committee might be prepared to suggest upon being requested to do so by the parties, it would seem to the Netherlands committee to be premature to discuss that matter at that point. That did not mean that the Netherlands committee rejected the idea. The Chairman of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, in a memorandum to the Committee dated 6 November, stated that the Republic of Indonesia undertook to carry out all the resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. He further expressed the satisfaction of his delegation with the attitude taken by the Committee of Good Offices and drew the attention of the Committee to the following question put to the Committee earlier by the Indonesian delegation and the Committee's reply to it. The Indonesian delegation asked whether the Committee did not think that it should look to a common basis to be suggested to the Dutch authorities in order to make further talks possible. To this the Committee replied that it could probably best assist the parties if it were invited by both to make suggestions as regards (1) a meeting place, (2) procedures or methods of adjustment, and (3) a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement. The Indonesian delegation accordingly invited the Committee to take such steps as would render possible and accelerate negotiations and guarantee their smooth progress.

9. The Committee and the parties to the dispute agreed that every effort should be made to bring about as soon as possible a suitable atmosphere in Indonesia in order to increase the chances of a political settlement. To this end, both the parties submitted their respective suggestions.

10. The suggestions of the Committee representing the Netherlands Government dated 1 November, were as follows:

- "1. Both parties have stated that it is imperative to create an atmosphere in which discussions can be held which may lead to a peaceful settlement of the present conflict.
2. In order to create this atmosphere - and thus to enable fruitful discussions to be held in a spirit of goodwill - this Committee considers it essential that the following conditions be fulfilled:
 - a. the cessation of inimical action - with the inclusion of deeds of violence to persons and property, acts of destruction, sabotage;
 - b. the cessation of threats directed towards persons and property of such as are not on the side of the Republic, as well as of their relatives;
 - c. the cessation of incitement to the actions referred to sub.a. and b.



RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 4

3. In the opinion of this committee the following measures should be taken in the near future, as a first step that may lead to the fulfillment of the aforesaid conditions.

The parties undertake to present to the Committee of Good Offices as from.....:


- a. the texts of all broadcasts intended for the public, transmitted by the wireless stations;
- b. at least two copies of all press publications."

11. The suggestions of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, dated 4 November, were as follows:

"To end all hostile actions or incitements to activities which contravene the purposes of the resolution of the Security Council dated 1 November 1947, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that, apart from military measures, the following measures should be considered and effectively put into operation:

- a. All activities directly or indirectly aimed at separatism are to cease.
- b. All measures directly or indirectly taken by the Netherlands to suppress all forms of pro-Republican activities and expression, such as the singing of the national anthem "Indonesia Raya", the hoisting of the red and white flag, the use of the red and white badge, the "Merdeka" salute, etc., are to cease.
- c. Communications between Republican and Dutch-occupied territories and territories isolated by the Dutch occupation, as well as communications with the foreign countries, are to be restored and remain unhampered.
- d. Republican officials and adherents detained by the Netherlands authorities are to be released.
- e. Officials and adherents of the Republic not willing to work for the Dutch Government are not to be arrested nor subjected to any form of pressure.
- f. The Dutch Government should return the goods and the money belonging to the Republic of Indonesia, their officials and adherents.
- g. Republican central and branch offices, schools and other institutions are to be opened and allowed to continue their activities freely. Related functions, for instance the circulation of money, the provision of material required for work and the daily necessities of life are to be allowed to function freely.
- h. The Dutch Government are to abolish all measures and remove such pressures as hamper the circulation of Republican money, and they are to put an end to forcible methods of bringing into circulation Dutch money in Dutch occupied territories.
- i. The Dutch Government are to cease all forms of propaganda and other efforts which may be regarded as being in the nature of incitement against or insults to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

12. In accordance with the terms of the resolution of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question dated 1 November, the Committee prepared to discharge the additional responsibilities placed on it for assisting the parties to reach agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution, after it had become obvious that the parties concerned could not agree to consult with each other



RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 5

directly as to the means to be employed to give effect to the Council's cease fire resolution. Pending an agreement between the parties, the Committee called the attention of the parties to the necessity of ceasing any activities, or incitement to activities, which contravened that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property.

13. In a memorandum to the Committee dated 4 November, the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia stated its preparedness to comply with the Council's resolution of 1 November. Following are excerpts from its memorandum:

- "(1) The Indonesian delegation, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, herewith expresses its preparedness to abide by the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council, wishes to call attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic, for its part, has made sufficient efforts to take the necessary measures to implement the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1 August 1947 calling upon the parties to cease hostilities; however, relations between the parties, as the consequence of the Netherlands military action did not permit the establishment of a contact for negotiations.
- (2) Holding the Security Council's resolution of 1 November 1947 in high esteem, the Indonesian delegation believes that in the present circumstances the most effective means of implementing the resolution calling upon the parties to cease hostilities would be to arrange for negotiations between the parties concerned, guided and actively assisted by the Committee of Good Offices, which would also supervise the execution of the agreement reached.
- (3) To that end each part should create a Special Committee whose exclusive duty will be to work for the implementation of the resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities to the extent of the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947. It is most desirable that on both sides this Committee has high level authority in order to arrive at quick decisions.
- (4) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has therefore established a Special Committee for the purpose described above.....
- (5) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that this Committee should forthwith embark on its duties and function at the same time as, but independently of, the Indonesian delegation to the Committee of Good Offices.

Further, it is the intention of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that this Committee should plan its own work independently of the work of the Indonesian delegation, so that no time is lost and a solution may be found as quickly as possible."

14. Similar views were conveyed by the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government, in a memorandum that he submitted informally to the Committee of Good Offices on 9 November and which was placed on record with the Committee on 28 November. The Netherlands committee's memorandum read as follows:

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 6

(1) "We gladly accept the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices in reaching an agreement on an arrangement which will assure the observance of the cease-fire resolution.

(2) We are furthermore willing to take into consideration suggestions the Committee might be willing to make in this connections.

(3) The Netherlands Government is prepared to start discussions immediately in order to obtain a better observance of the cease fire resolution than has been possible hitherto, the more so as we are convinced that, unless this resolution is observed to a reasonable extent, discussions on substance, that is to say on political questions, will be of no avail.

(4) We are willing to start these discussions with the Committee of Good Offices and also with the Republican authorities.

(5) Details will have to be worked out, for instance concerning the question where these discussions will take place.

(6) We believe that it would be best to instruct experts to work out these details. We are prepared to appoint these experts forthwith.

(7) I would finally like to point out that discussions of a political nature should as a rule be excluded from the discussions regarding the implementation of the cease-fire resolution."

15. The Committee decided that its primary duties, namely, assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute and assisting the parties to reach on an agreement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, could best be discharged by getting the parties to meet with each other to carry on political discussions as well as discussions leading to the implementation of the Council's resolution of 1 November. It was considered opinion of the Committee that the discussions by the parties concerning implementation of the resolutions regarding the cease fire and the discussions looking towards a political settlement has a bearing on each other. It was further the opinion of the Committee that both discussions should be undertaken with all possible speed, as any measure of agreement reached in either discussion would facilitate the reaching of agreement in the other. It was believed that any insistence that either discussion should have reached a specified stage of agreement before the other discussion was undertaken might easily result in stalemate as to both. Therefore, while the Committee continued its preparations for holding the political discussions between the parties on board the U.S.S. Renville as soon as she arrived, the Committee arranged with the parties that they appoint Special Committees for the implementation of the Council's resolution on 1 November. On 12 November, the Committee appointed six representatives two from the delegation of each member of the Committee, to assist the Special Committee of the parties. Three of the six representatives of the Committee comprise senior military officers attached to delegations of the representatives on the Committee.

CHAPTER IIWORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 1 NOVEMBER 1947

16. The Special Committees held their first meeting in Batavia on 14 November, electing a civilian representative of the United States delegation as permanent Chairman. After both Special Committees had asked that the Committee of Good Offices make suggestions on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution on 1 November, the representatives of the Committee, on 15 November, submitted eight suggestions. These suggestions were revised through informal discussions with both Special Committees and re-submitted as follows:

- a. To refrain from broadcasts or any form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians;
- b. To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publications of lists of individuals (giving names, number and home address) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action;
- c. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the cease fire orders to be issued in identical terms by both parties;
- d. In order to maintain the military status quo, existing military positions will not be altered in any area from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon;
- e. Not to engage in any hostile military, naval or air activities including air reconnaissance or air patrolling against or over the areas occupied by the other party, or to engage in naval activities against or over areas controlled by the other party;
- f. To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including the destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end;
- g. To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussion with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party;
- h. Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices."

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 8

17. The Special Committee also requested the Committee to initiate a series of radio-broadcasts to the inhabitants of Indonesia concerning the tasks and functions of the Committee. In compliance with this request, the three representatives on the Committee have broadcast from Radio-Jogjakarta and Radio-Batavia, to explain the Committee's views on the situation and to make an appeal that killing and destruction cease at once.

18. At the third meeting on 23 November held at Kalioerang, near Jogjakarta, the Special Committees were able to agree in principle to paragraphs a, b, f, g, and h of the Committee's initial suggestions. Both Special Committees considered that final agreement on all points depended on agreement on para. d, and the Committee's representatives asked each Special Committee to submit a memorandum setting forth its views on this point. The Committee's representatives also submitted further suggestions which were of a military nature and called for agreement on the following points:

"a. The established of a demarcation line;

At this stage; the Committee is not yet in a position to offer suggestions; it has been informed of the views expressed by the military assistants on 10 November 1947, namely, that the opinion expressed by the military assistants on 2 October 1947 should be made to conform to the resolution of 1 November 1947. In addition to other reasons the express reference made by them to the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947 makes it necessary to come to a clear interpretation of the will of the Council as expressed in that resolution. Such an interpretation can best be made by the Committee of Good Offices with the help of the verbatim records of the meetings of the Security Council. In the meantime, considering that the rights and claims of either party could not possibly be prejudiced, modified or jeopardized, it is hoped that the parties will forthwith take steps to come to agreement on any practical solution which might meet their views.

b. The determination of a demilitarized zone;

This demilitarized zone should be created between the positions of the two forces along the line. It is suggested the width of the zone not exceed ten (10) km.

It is to be understood that movement of troops of either party which may have to move from the zone in order to demilitarize it may move with arms, equipment and all other warlike stores. It is further to be understood that troops of either party in isolated positions not in the demilitarized zone will be repatriated likewise.

c. The period of time granted to each party to evacuate the area agreed upon, the means of carrying out this evacuation, and provision for the observation of these activities by the military assistants.

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 9

d. Provision for the observation and reporting by the military assistants of conditions prevailing in the demilitarized zone;

e. Arrangements for civil administration in evacuated areas;

f. Provision for the improvement of communications and transportation between the territories occupied by the parties;

g. Provision to allow reciprocal economic intercourse at fixed points through the demarcation line."

19. The Netherlands Special Committee, in its memorandum on para d dated 28 November, expressed its opinion that the only way to settle the problem was, a) to declare the "stand fast" order applicable only to the forward areas where there were indeed "opposing forces"; b) to evacuate to Republican territory all those Republican fighting groups which were still in the areas occupied by Netherlands forces; c) to restrict the patrolling activity of the posts of both parties in the "forward areas" to one kilometre in the direction of known posts of the opposing party, with the proviso that this restriction could be maintained only for short successive periods (14 days at most), subject to renewal. The Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic, in its memorandum dated 1 December, stated its agreement to the text of para. d, as submitted by the Committee's representatives.

20. At the fourth meeting held in Batavia on 2 December, the Committee's representatives presented the following redraft of para. d which included a clarification drawn up by the Committee's military representatives:

"d. In order to maintain the military status quo in Java, Sumatra and Madura, existing military positions will not be altered in any areas from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon; present patrolling activities to be continued but restricted to one (1) kilometre."

The new text was not discussed at this meeting and both Special Committees agreed that discussion of the further suggestions of the Committee would not be worth while until agreement had been reached on para d.

21. At the fifth meeting held in Batavia on 3 December the Netherlands Special Committee pointed out that the redraft of para. d omitted any reference to forward positions and did not limit the restriction on patrolling activities to these forward positions. The new text was therefore unacceptable to the Netherlands Special committee because the police duties of the Netherlands Army made it impossible to restrict patrolling activities of all troops to the mere tactical protection of their own encampments. At this same meeting the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the redraft of para d. The Republican Special Committee stated that it could not accept the view of the Netherlands Special Committee that

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 10

the stand fast order should apply to the "forward positions" and that such an interpretation would mean that the Security Council's resolution would not be applicable to thousands of Republican troops and officials in vast territories of Java, Sumatra and Madura.

22. When it appeared that an impasse had been reached, the Committee instructed its representatives, on 3 December, to forward to both Special Committees a new plan, the adoption of which the Committee considered would bring about a speedy and effective truce. It was explained that the adoption of this plan was only of a provisional nature and would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. The new plan read as follows:

"1. That each party would present a map to the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices on which it defines the demilitarized zones that it submits should divide Netherlands-occupied and Republican-occupied areas.

2. That each party should present arguments to the representatives of the Committee in support of its contention that the demilitarized zones should be established as claimed by it.

3. That each party, in addressing its arguments and making its submissions to the representatives of the Committee should have regard to the following factors:

- (a) the military positions of the various elements of both forces as at 4 August 1947;
- (b) the welfare of local population;
- (c) the administrative areas in existence as at 4 August and 20 November in or near to the demilitarized zones suggested by both parties;
- (d) the geographical and topographical features of the proposed demilitarized zones and surrounding districts;
- (e) the fact that zones in different areas may vary in width when the matters in (b), (c) and (d) above are taken into account.

4. That the parties should be at liberty to present their arguments and submissions partly by writing and partly orally, and that the written documents in support of a party's arguments and submissions should be delivered without delay to the representatives of the Committee and to the other party; and that the oral arguments and submissions be made to the representatives of the Committee in the presence and hearing of the duly designated representatives of the other party.

5. That in the event the parties do not agree, the representatives of the Committee should propose to the parties delimitations of the demilitarized zones which the parties would be asked to accept.

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 11

6. That the representatives of the Committee, in arriving at these proposals, should carefully consider the arguments and submissions of the parties having regard to the matters set out in paragraph 3 above.
7. That on the parties agreeing to this plan, each party should have its troops stand fast and cease fire in their present positions.
8. That the matters agreed upon at that date by the parties through their Special Committees should be incorporated in this agreement and put into immediate effect.
9. That the parties should agree that as soon as the demilitarized zones mentioned above are accepted by the parties:
 - (a) there should be an immediate resumption of normal trade and intercourse between the demilitarized zones, all Netherlands-occupied areas, and all Republican-occupied areas; and as far as practicable the parties should endeavour to facilitate such trade and intercourse;
 - (b) all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, should under supervision of military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zone.
10. That the representatives of the Committee should further make suggestions concerning the methods of control of, and maintenance of law and order in, the demilitarized zones."

23. By letter dated 6 December, the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the new plan. At the sixth meeting held on board the U.S.S. Renville on 9 December, the Netherlands Special Committee stated its willingness to proceed at full speed with the discussion of the new plan, which it believed contained valuable ideas, based on common sense and on which agreement could be reached, provided always that the present suspicions were allayed. Believing that considerable time would be needed to implement the plan, even if it were agreed to in principle, the Netherlands Special Committee suggested that the military and civilian aspects of the problem be separated and proposed to put into effect immediately the following points of the Committee's initial suggestions as revised (see paragraph 16): f, a, c, (changing the words following "compliance" to read "with provisions sub 1 and 2"), h, b, and g. The Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee had agreed in principle to all the Committee's initial suggestions (see paragraph 16) and that the Republican Special Committee was also ready to accept the new plan (see paragraph 22).

24. On 10 December, following a request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting, the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices met with the Netherlands military representatives, and on 12 December received from them a memorandum containing specific questions concerning the new plan. On the basis of these questions the Committee's representatives on 16 December submitted to both Special Committees the following explanatory annex:

"Paragraph I - A demilitarized zone is defined for the purposes set forth in the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce as a zone from which all personnel of all military units, together with their arms and equipment, have been withdrawn.

The term military units does not apply to civil police. Suggestions as to the control, type and armament of police charged with the maintenance of law and order in the demilitarized zones would be submitted by the Committee of Good Offices if requested by the parties, as indicated in paragraph 10 of the new plan.

Paragraph 3 (a) - The positions of the troops of the two parties on 20 November 1947 is not a factor to be taken into account by the two parties in their submissions to the Committee of Good Offices with regard to the delineation of demilitarized zones.

Paragraph 3 (b) - Welfare refers not only to law and order but to living conditions of the population. The welfare of the local population is a term to be given a common-sense definition.

Paragraph 4 - It is recognized that each party, in making its submissions and advancing its arguments before the Special Committee of the other party in connection with the delimitation of a demilitarized zone, will necessarily take into account considerations of military security. The Committee of Good Offices will consider verifying in the field, within the limitations of its available personnel, the data supplied by the parties if the parties so desire.

Paragraph 7 - 'Present positions' means the positions of troops in any area of Java, Sumatra and Madura. This paragraph has for its intention the cessation of all troop movements of a hostile nature calculated to gain a military objective. It is not the intention of this paragraph to preclude the movements of troops for purposes of military administration or supply or the operations of civil police forces in the maintenance of law and order within the territories occupied.

Paragraph 9 (a) - It is recognized that many technical problems are involved in the resumption of normal trade and intercourse among the various areas and that these problems would require solution by agreement between the parties with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, if requested.

Paragraph 9 (b) - This paragraph applies to both parties. The question of whether the withdrawal of the troops of only one party or of both would be required could only be answered following the determination of the location of the demilitarized zones."

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 13

25. In a letter dated 14 December, the Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee could not accept as a separate plan the proposal made at the sixth meeting by the Netherlands Special Committee. He pointed out that the suggestions contained in the ~~Neth~~ Netherlands proposal were automatically provided for if both parties accepted the Committee's new plan and that these measures if detached from the other measures outlined in the Committee's plan, could not effect a general cease hostilities.

26. At the seventh meeting on 18 December, the Head of the Netherlands Special Committee stated that until the facts were established with respect to the pockets of resistance, the existence of which the Republic claimed and the Netherlands denied, his Government was of the opinion that it was useless to carry on the cease fire discussions. On the instructions of his Prime Minister, he formally requested the Committee to investigate these pockets immediately. He considered that the proposal made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting concerning the immediate implementation of those points in the Committee's initial suggestions upon which agreement had been reached in principle would have constituted an important improvement on the present unsatisfactory situation, and he requested the Committee of Good Offices to sponsor this proposal.

27. On 21 December the Committee received a memorandum from the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic concerning the request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the seventh meeting for an investigation of the pockets of resistance. This memorandum pointed out that the Republican Special Committee had repeatedly suggested that it would be better for the outcome of such investigations if a general cease fire and stand fast order were issued first. If, however, the Committee insisted on this investigation, the Republic would ask that it be consulted on the locations to be visited and given the guarantee that the situation of Republican troops and officials in these locations would not be aggravated. In the meantime, discussions of the Committee's new plan should proceed.

28. On 21 and 23 December the Committee received memoranda from the Special Committees of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic setting forth in detail their views on the Committee plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce. These memoranda are attached to this report as Annexes I and II.

29. The Committee, on being requested by the parties, offered its suggestions through its representatives with the Special Committees with regard to requests of the parties for investigations into allegations of violations of the Council's cease fire resolution. The Committee's statement of its policy issued on 29 November to the parties read as follows:

1. The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that requests for investigation into allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution should primarily and, as a rule, come from either or both of the Special Committees of the parties concerned;

2. The Chairman of the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices with the two Special Committees will nevertheless possess discretion to take up allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution on his own initiative with either or both of the Special Committees;

RESTRICTED
S/AC.10/79
Page 14

3. In the investigation of such allegations, the representatives of the Committee should be given the right to insist on all facts being made available to them by both parties;
4. The representatives of the Committee and their military assistants should have the right to make observations in the territories of both parties;
5. The parties should cooperate with each other, under the auspices of the representatives of the Committee, in works of rescue and in carrying out other humanitarian activities;
6. In the case of situations which might lead to a violation of the cease fire resolution, it is the opinion of the Committee that neither the Committee nor its representatives should be expected to receive information under conditions which bind them to silence. It is clear that the work of the Committee and its representatives in connection with the implementation of the cease fire resolution should be carried on with the full cooperation of both parties and that this cooperation will be possible only if both parties have available to them all the information available to the Committee and its representatives;
7. In order to discharge properly its functions, the Committee is of the opinion that the parties should agree to inform the Committee or its representatives fully and promptly on any situation which either party may consider as necessitating the movement of elements of its armed forces beyond their present advance positions, and that the advice should be given prior to any such movement."

CHAPTER III

OTHER PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

30. On 28 November the Republic of Indonesia submitted a memorandum on the economic situation in the Republic (see Annex III). The Committee transmitted this memorandum to the other party and on 13 December received a reply from the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation enclosing copies of a report drawn up by competent authorities of the Netherlands Indies Government. On 22 December the Committee received a further letter from the Netherlands delegation concerning this memorandum of the Republic. These letters are given in Annex IV of this report.

31. In a letter addressed to both parties on 11 December 1947, the Committee stated that its limited staff resources had prevented it from studying conditions on the spot as fully as it would have liked and that the Committee now hoped to be able to spare some of the assistants of each delegation to acquaint themselves with conditions in Java, Sumatra and Madura, and to report to the Committee. It was explained that the Committee intended to ask its assistants to arrange for observation and inquiries into the specific situations which the parties called to the attention of the Committee, but because of the limitations of the Committee's staff, it might be possible to meet the parties' requests only in some specially selected cases. The Committee invited representatives from each of the parties to accompany its assistants. Pursuant to the policy stated in this letter, the Committee sent an observation team to the island of Madura on 15 December, where it was alleged by the Republic that the Netherlands troops had by hostile action taken over almost the entire area of the island after 4 August. Since the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee that the Government of the Netherlands Indies was of the opinion that the visit of Republican representatives to territories where the maintenance of law and order was ensured by civil and military authorities of the Netherlands Indies could not be admitted, as long as the campaign of intimidation and provocation conducted by the Republican Government continued, the Committee's assistants were not accompanied by representatives of either party. However both parties submitted lists of persons on the island of Madura whom they considered would be of assistance to the Committee's team. The Committee is awaiting the report of its observation team and contemplate sending similar teams to other places in Java and Sumatra.

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By ST NARA Date 11-28-11


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Period: 28 Dec., 1947--11Jan., 1948 Incl

ANNEX 2

" KRAWANG FIELD SURVEY PARTY
UNANIMOUS REPORT"



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INTRODUCTION.

On 26-December-1947, the Good Offices Committee at its fiftieth meeting, instructed that an investigation be made of the KRAWANG area as requested by the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic. This Observation Team conducted preliminary meetings and inquiries in Batavia, and on 5 and 6 January, 1948, visited the Krawang area and interviewed both Dutch and Indonesians.

SECTION I

GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA

The Krawang area is located about 70 kms. by road, almost due east of Batavia. Civil Administration in the area has followed the same pattern as before World War II despite the Japanese Occupation, the Republican Administration and the Dutch "police action". The area is particularly fertile and noted for the fine quality rice it produces. It is connected with Batavia by a main road (in bad repair) and a railway line.

The population is composed of peasants with a very small sprinkling of Chinese merchants. The land is owned by the government and is on perpetual lease to the peasants who own outright all that is produced from the land. Education is primitive and due to the unsettled conditions at the present time, almost non-existent in the area. Rawahgedeh, the focal point of the investigation is considered a probable headquarters for the underground movement in that area.

SECTION II

BACKGROUND OF INCIDENTS IN THE AREA

Following the Japanese capitulation, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence and organized an army known as the TRI. However, many separate groups within the Republic organized separate "irregular" forces and created a situation that after the Linggadjati Agreement, became so delicate that a National Army of Indonesia was formed by the Republic, the TNI, and these "irregular" forces were given an opportunity to join. In the Krawang area some of these "irregulars" did not wish to cooperate and the TNI carried out suppressive actions that disarmed most of them and broke up their control of the area. However the area remained administratively unstable.

The Dutch, then, by their "police action" dispersed the Republican military and civil control of the area and for the following two months the area was extremely quiet. Two months prior to the incident investigated, lawlessness increased and appeared to be caused by an underground movement inspired by the Republic, as well as by individual bands of looters.

The Observation Team investigated Dutch reports of "gang" activities and atrocities in and near Rawahgedeh linking them with this loosely organized underground movement.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

SECTION III

THE RAWAHGEDEH INCIDENT -- 9 DECEMBER 1947

On the night of 8-9 December 1947, a force of approximately 90 men from the 3rd Infantry Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade, of the 7 December Division, divided into three (3) groups, all under the command of Major Wynen, moved from Krawang to the vicinity of Rawahgedeh, and after surrounding it on the North, East and South sides, attacked the village at 0530 on 9 December 1947. The Dutch claim to have been fired on first. The attack ceased at 1300 on 9 December 1947. Netherlands troops employed used mortars, automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, rifles, etc. No casualties were suffered by the Dutch, who stated that they killed 150 Indonesians and wounded 4. The village Mohammedan priest estimated the number killed by the Dutch as 433. Both Dutch and Indonesians stated that no women, children or old men were killed or wounded.

No weapons (firearms of any kind) were found on Indonesians, either dead, wounded or prisoners. A total of 15 Indonesians prisoners were turned over to the Dutch. Commanded at the conclusion of the action. One Indonesian witness stated that he saw 7 Indonesians interrogated and then shot by a Netherlands soldier. The Dutch Commander stated that out of 12-13 men turned over to him by one of his sergeants, 4 were shot after being interrogated, because they were Indonesian soldiers, and supposedly pointed out to him by a spy in his employ who stated that he had been maltreated by these men. The Dutch Commander then turned the remaining 8 Indonesian prisoners over to his Commanding Officer and stated that they were later released.

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The Observation Team, having considered all statements and documents placed before it and after having visited on two occasions the area concerned, submits the following findings:

1. Restlessness has been, at least since August 1945, a characteristic of this area which is situated approximately 55 km. east of Batavia in an agricultural area which produces the best rice quality grown in Java.
2. Early in 1947, the Republican Government attempted to restore central control by disarming "irregular" forces, but achieved only limited success.
3. Immediately following the Netherlands "police action", Republican military and civilian control appeared to have completely disintegrated.
4. A loosely organized underground movement is now operating.
5. This underground movement aims to isolate the people by "removing" loerachs of dessoas and terrorizing other Indonesians sympathetic to Netherlands control, and to render motorized patrolling ineffective by road obstructions, demolitions, etc.
6. Rawahgedeh appears to have been a probable headquarters for this underground movement. The Loerah of Rawahgedeh, who disappeared since the action seems to have taken an active part in these activities.
7. The standard of living in Rawahgedeh is most primitive by Western standards and must be considered as an important factor influencing the condition of this area.
8. The action taken by the Netherlands Army was deliberate and ruthless as evidenced by the following:
 - a. There were no Dutch casualties, either killed or wounded.
 - b. The Netherlands Army authorities reported 150 Indonesians killed and only 4 wounded.
 - c. Women, children and old men were waved aside and in this manner separated from those to be killed.
 - d. Not one weapon (firearm) was found on Indonesian prisoners or casualties (either dead or wounded).

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- e. A force of Indonesians armed with 40/60 rifles and one automatic weapon was reported by Dutch authorities as the resisting force. This force, according to Major Wynen, opened fire on his party when it was approaching the village. An Indonesian who had been maltreated and held prisoner in Rawahgedeh by this Indonesian group reported a force of approximately 100 men armed with three rifles, twenty pistols, knives and hand grenades, assembled in the vicinity of the Loerah's home at Rawahgedeh on the evening prior to the action. He also reported that after firing two shots (immediately after the Dutch mortar fire) this group fled.
- f. No medical facilities were left in the village for treatment of Indonesians possibly wounded and in hiding.
- g. Four Indonesian soldiers were interrogated and ordered to be shot by the Commander of Netherlands troops after their being properly delivered to him by one of the sergeants in his command.
- h. According to a statement by an Indonesian, seven Indonesian soldiers (TRI ?) were shot at Djamantri by a Netherlands soldier with an automatic weapon. Major Wynen and his sergeant deny this statement.