

HEADQUARTERS  
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234 c/o PM, San Francisco

INTERROGATION NO. 388

Place: Tokyo, Japan

Division of Origin: Military Analysis

Date: 20 November 1945

Subject: Amplification of Answers to Questionnaires submitted to the War Ministry.

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED AND BACKGROUND OF EACH:

Lt Col TANAKA Koji - Graduate of Military Academy 1933; commissioned 2d Lt. Studied aeronautics at TOKOROTAWA, graduating in 1937 as military pilot. Now has 500 hours to credit. Graduated Military Staff College 1939. April 1941 entered Military Affairs Section of War Ministry. Sept 1942, Staff Officer, 8th Aera Army, Rabaul. Sept 1943, jointed Section 2 (Operations) of Sambo Hombu (GHQ). Aug 1945, attached to War Ministry after abolishment GHQ.

Where Interrogated: Japanese War Ministry

Interrogator: Major Edwin McELWAIN, GSC

Interpreter: Major SHIVELY, USMC

Allied Officers

Present: Major BRAUCHER, GSC

SUMMARY

Lt Col TANAKA supervised the preparation of the answers to all Questionnaires submitted by the Military Analysis Division to the War Ministry through the Central Liaison Office. He showed himself very familiar with all aspects of those answers and cleared up many omissions and discrepancies in them. He was most cooperative and apparently completely reliable, except that he was somewhat reticent about events prior to PEARL HARBOR. No knowledge of English.



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QUESTIONNAIRE NO 1

- Q. When was the Imperial Rescript issued authorizing the preparations for attacks against PEARL HARBOR, the PHILIPPINES, and SOUTHEAST ASIA
- A. The Imperial Rescript authorizing the attacks was not issued until 8 December 1941. I do not know anything about Imperial authority for the plan. I was in the War Ministry at the time and was not familiar with operations. I will try to get this answer for you.
- Q. You state that the 2d Flying Regiment (HIKO SENTAI) and several other units were held in reserve in MANCHURIA at the beginning of the war. The chart of units shows the 2d Flying Regiment in Japan. Can you explain?
- A. Those figures held in reserve in MANCHURIA are the number of regiments; thus two Flying Regiments of reconnaissance planes were held in reserve, not the 2d Flying Regiment, and similarly for other types of planes.
- Q. You refer to a planned attack on KUNMING to take place before the invasion of THAILAND and MALAY. Was such an attack ever carried out?
- A. No. This plan was simply a feint not intended to be carried out. It was a security measure designed to conceal our purpose from everybody including people in the Japanese Army.
- Q. We have been told that reconnaissance of the PHILIPPINES was carried out by the Navy in the latter part of November 1941. Did the Japanese Army ever carry out such reconnaissance before the war?
- A. I do not believe that the Army was concerned. I will find out the answer more definitely.
- Q. You stated that Army aircraft had a shorter range than Navy aircraft. For general planning purposes what did you consider the effective range of Army planes.
- A. The Type 97 Heavy Bomber (SALLY) had a maximum range of 800 KM with a bomb load, but usually did not operate further than 700 KM. The range of other types was also about 800 KM although reconnaissance planes could go as far as 900 KM. Headquarters reconnaissance planes (DINAH) made a reconnaissance at extreme range from KOEPANG to PORT DARWIN but could not go the 1050 KM from RABAUL to GUADALCANAL.

QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2

- Q. You state that the Army and Navy agreed that the Army would operate to the West of 108° E. and the Navy to the East of this line. How long was this agreement in effect?
- A. Only during the initial stages of the war. It stopped about the time the 3d Flying Brigade (HIKODAN) moved to MALANG in March 1942.
- Q. Were there any other Army paratroop operations besides the one at PALEMBANG?
- A. The Army planned a paratroop operation against LASHIO, BURMA at about the time when LASHIO was occupied, but weather prevented carrying it out. The only actual paratroop operation was at PALEMBANG. KOEPANG and MEIADO were Navy paratroop operations.

QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 3

- Q. The 1st and 11th Flying Regiments (HIKO SENTAI) had Type 97 fighters (MATE) in the MALAY campaign, Type 1 Fighters (OSCAR) at RABAUL. When was the change made?
- A. In the Spring or Summer of 1942 while the units were in Southeast ASIA before they operated in BURMA. The units never went back to JAPAN but received the new type planes while they were in Southeast ASIA.

- Q. Why did the 12th Flying Brigade (HIKODAN) with the 1st and 11th Flying Regiments (HIKO SENTAI) go to RABAU?
- A. The Navy at RABAU was not strong enough and needed reinforcements. The decision to send the 12th Flying Brigade was made in TOKYO.
- Q. Did the Navy ever demand that Army planes be sent from MANCHURIA to reinforce RABAU?
- A. The Navy made such a demand many times, but the Army could not release all its strength in MANCHURIA for two reasons: (1) The threat of the Russians; and (2) the need to keep some reserves. Actually a little strength was dispatched from MANCHURIA several times but substantial strength remained in MANCHURIA until May 1944 when the Allied threat against the PHILIPPINES developed.
- Q. Was there a unit at RABAU known as the "Decisive Battle" force?
- A. The 12th Flying Brigade might have been called by this name as they were very competent, but I don't know of it. The Advanced Training Flying Brigade (KYODO HIKODAN) which came from MANCHURIA to RABAU was not so competent, being only a training organization

QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 4

- Q. Your answer does not refer to the 20th, 32d, 38th, 74th, and 95th Flying Regiments in HOKKAIDO. Would you explain when they were sent and why?
- A. The 20th Flying Regiment went to HOKKAIDO first in February 1944 from OSAKA. The 32d, 74th, and 95th were also sent in February from MANCHURIA. The 38th was formed in HOKKAIDO in April 1942. The Navy air units in the area had moved out by February 1944 in order to reinforce the South Pacific, and beginning in the summer of 1943 we feared that you would occupy one of the KURILE Islands from which TOKYO could be bombed. All of these units were later sent to the PHILIPPINES after the Allied landings on LEYTE.
- Q. What happened during the so-called "Battle of the BISMARCK SEA in March 1943?
- A. The whole force of troops was sunk at 0800 on 3 March. Eight transports and eight destroyers were sunk leaving two destroyers which returned to RABAU. There were no attacks on the first of March; on the 2d, only reconnaissance planes appeared; the whole thing was sunk on the 3d.
- Q. What Japanese air units were involved?
- A. The first and 11th Flying Regiments with about 60 planes and about 60 Navy fighters of the 11th Air Fleet were protecting the convoy. The Army and Navy took alternate days, and the 3d of March was the Navy's day. About one-half or two-thirds of both Army and Navy planes were lost, and those remaining were useless because of battle damage. It is possible that those planes inflicted no losses on Allied planes, since the Japanese planes were patrolling and not attacking.

QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 6

- Q. You show a number of planes lost by the 60th and 62d Flying Regiments during the operations against BATAAN and CORRIGIDOR. What was the cause of those losses?
- A. They were shot down by anti-aircraft fire.
- Q. Were there any other attacks on DARWIN by Japanese Army planes besides the two shown in June 1943?
- A. No.
- Q. What were the targets of those two attacks?
- A. The targets were grounded planes, and a secondary objective was port instal-

lations. The reason the Japanese Army never attacked ships and other such targets in general was that attacks on aircraft were necessary in order to protect our transport ships. After LEYTE that changed, and the primary objective became shipping. Before LEYTE, the Army did not feel competent to make attacks on ships. Airfields rather than ships were the primary targets at SINGAPORE, RANGOON, and generally, except for one occasion near PENANG when we sank some ships.

- Q. What was the largest offensive air operation of the Japanese Army?
- A. I do not know exactly which operation. It was not over 100 to 150 planes. The attacks on SINGAPORE were made by 100 to 150 planes; MAGWE was attacked by about 100. The CALCUTTA attacks involved only about 20 planes.
- Q. Col MATSUMAE has told us of a plan to bomb shipping in CALCUTTA. Can you tell us when this attack was to take place and why it was never carried out?
- A. This plan was drawn up in about the summer of 1942 and was to take place at the end of the monsoon. It was a joint Army-Navy plan, and when the Navy pulled out of the area, the Army did not have enough power to carry it out alone.
- Q. What were the Army Air Depots south of MANILA when you were at RABAUL?
- A. DAVAU, GALELA, LIANG, MALANG.
- Q. What types of repairs could be carried out by those depots? Could they change engines?
- A. They could repair bullet holes and make minor repairs. Engines could not be changed at DAVAU. GALELA and LIANG could have made engine changes but never did. Engines for the whole EAST NETHERLANDS, EAST INDIES, were changed at MALANG.
- Q. What about NEW GUINEA and RABAUL?
- A. A few Army engines were changed at RABAUL. The Navy had good repair facilities at RABAUL but the Army and Navy installations were separate and not used by each other. Depots were set up at HOLLANDIA and WEWAK. A few engines were actually changed at HOLLANDIA, but installations there were never completed as the facilities at HOLLANDIA were continuously damaged by moisture.
- Q. A large number of planes at HOLLANDIA and WEWAK apparently never flew and were finally destroyed on the ground. Why?
- A. Planes were damaged by moisture and no adequate repair facilities existed. Dispersal to avoid air attacks made this situation even worse. The same thing was true at TRUK.
- Q. What were the most important factors in the failure of repair facilities in this area?
- Q. First, poor equipment for repairing, and second, lack of skilled mechanics because of malaria. Spare parts and engines were available, although they did not meet the demand; this was not so important a factor, as the lack of facilities and personnel.

End of Interrogation