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ART. I.—*Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. 1854.*

DEBATES in Parliament rarely afford an opportunity of re-viewing the whole, or nearly the whole, of an extensive case. The unfairness of party statements on one side, and the but partial correction which it is often possible to give upon the other, together with the interruptions from personal attack and personal reply, make it difficult to render any narrative of events really complete, or to adhere to any line of argument which is consecutive and direct.

This alone would justify an attempt to review in a more complete form the history and causes of the war with Russia. But there is another reason for doing so. The debates in Parliament are themselves a part of the case with which we propose to deal. It is impossible not to ask, with scrupulous and anxious care, how far it has been shown with success that, without the sacrifice of essential objects, the extreme resort of war might have been avoided by any other course than that which has been actually pursued.

To arrive at a just conclusion upon this subject, it is indispensable to trace the course of events in chronological order, and to weigh the questions of policy which successively arose for the consideration of the Government with strict reference to dates.

The papers which were first presented to Parliament commence with a date as remote as 1850. But the great bulk of them refer to the period which elapsed between 1852 and the Declaration of War, in March, 1854. The 'Secret and Confidential' correspondence which subsequently appeared involved no date earlier than January 1853. Practically there is no necessity of going farther back. But an artificial importance having been given in debate to an earlier document—the memorandum of 1844—it is necessary to begin with it.

It appears then that during the Emperor of Russia's visit to England in 1844, the long-familiar 'Eastern Question' became the subject of conversation between his Majesty and some members of the then existing Government. No particular difficulty respecting it had then arisen or seemed impending. No action was called for in regard to it. The communication made by the Emperor was accordingly nothing more than an explanation of the general principles of policy to which he professed his anxiety to adhere. After the Emperor's return to Russia the substance of this communication on his part was embodied in a Memorandum, which was transmitted to Lord Aberdeen, then Minister for Foreign Affairs. Being simply a memorandum of verbal communications, and not being a document on which it was asked or proposed that any action should be taken, it appears to have been shown only to those Ministers with whom the conversations had been held. Lord Derby, in his speech on the Address to the Throne, truly observed that of these Ministers Lord Aberdeen is now the only survivor. Lord Derby might have added that if there had been any other survivor, he would not have ventured to make use of this memorandum as he attempted to do. The two other Ministers were Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington; and if the terms of that document had remained still unknown, these three names, or any one of them, would have been a sufficient guarantee that it contained nothing which it was unbecoming an English Minister to receive.

Accordingly it may be safely said that if the Emperor of Russia had adhered to the principles he professed in this memorandum, the present war would never have arisen. It contains these main propositions:

That the maintenance of the Porte, in its existing independence and its existing extent of territory, is a great object of European policy: that, in order to this maintenance, the several Powers should abstain from making demands upon it, conceived in a selfish interest, or from assuming towards it an attitude of 'exclusive dictation:' that in the event of the Porte

giving to any one of the Powers just cause of complaint, that Power should be aided by the rest in its endeavours to have such cause removed, so that all occasion of conflict should be avoided: that all the European Powers should urge on the Porte the duty of conciliating its Christian subjects, and should at the same time use all their influence with those subjects to keep them to their allegiance: that in the event of any unforeseen calamity befalling the Turkish Empire, Russia and England should agree together as to the course to be pursued: lastly, the Memorandum suggests that it would be wise to provide against such an event by anticipation, and to come in respect of it to some previous agreement.

No such agreement was come to in consequence of this Memorandum. It remained simply as a declaration and explanation of the ideas entertained by the Emperor of Russia on a subject of great interest to Europe. It was communicated as such by Lord Aberdeen to the French Minister. It was transferred to the hands of each Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who succeeded to office: it has passed in turns through the hands of Lord Palmerston, of Lord Granville, of Lord Malmesbury, of Lord John Russell, and of Lord Clarendon. Lord Malmesbury informs us that within forty-eight hours of his appointment this Memorandum was brought under his special notice by Baron Brunnow. But he appears to have treated it very much as it had been treated before—as a document containing a declaration of very excellent principles to which it would be most satisfactory that the Emperor of Russia should continue his adherence, but which called for no action or decision whatever on the part of the English Government.

It is obvious that until some event happened, or some dispute arose which was likely to disturb the relations of Turkey with one or more of the European Powers this must have continued to be the view taken of the Russian Memorandum. And when any such dispute should arise, the only practical use of the Memorandum would be to remind Russia of her own principles, and to help her to put them into practice. It was not until nearly six years after the visit of the Emperor of Russia to England, in 1844, that any such event or dispute arose.

That cloud, then 'no bigger than a man's hand,' which now darkens Europe, rose over the Holy Land. France, the earliest of the Christian nations to enter into diplomatic relations with the Turk, had secured by early treaties an interest in the privileges of the Latin monks in Syria. During the course of several generations those privileges in respect to the custody of buildings and Holy Places, had come to be somewhat divided



with rival communities of the Eastern Church. The restoration of those privileges to the Latins according to the strict letter of ancient Treaties was the demand of France. The continuance of the existing state of things was the demand of the Greeks.

It was on the 20th May, 1850\*, that Sir S. Canning wrote to inform Lord Palmerston that the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek Churches in the East were likely soon to come into collision in respect to the Holy Places. In the beginning of 1851† the Russian Minister at Constantinople is first mentioned by Sir S. Canning as appearing in the quarrel on behalf of his Government, and protesting in the Emperor's name against any change in the *status quo*.

Fully aware of the dangerous contest which such a dispute was likely to raise between the Powers who assume a protecting interest in the rival Churches, the Porte endeavoured by every expedient of delay to avoid committing itself on either side. Such expedients are not unfamiliar with any official authorities: with all Eastern Governments they seem to be inexhaustible. The whole of 1851 and the early part of 1852 were passed in negotiations without any determinate result. Lord Palmerston's instructions to the English Minister were to watch and report the progress of the quarrel; but to hold himself absolutely neutral between the contending parties.

In March, 1852, it seemed as if a settlement had been arrived at; and on the 19th of the month, Sir S. Canning wrote to Lord Malmesbury 'to announce the termination of the long-pending question of the Syrian Sanctuaries.'‡ The despatch reached England on the ominous date of the 1st of April; the evasive measures to which the Porte resorted speedily opened the whole question in an aspect more serious than before, and ere the end of the autumn Lord Malmesbury was informed by Sir H. Seymour§ from St. Petersburg, and by Colonel Rose|| from Constantinople, that the question had become one of real anxiety, from the menacing position assumed towards the Porte by the Powers interested in its solution. Lord Malmesbury adhered, nevertheless, to the policy of his predecessor in office, and in a despatch dated December 14. 1852, directed Colonel Rose to abstain from 'any direct or official interference in a question with which, in itself, Her Majesty's Government have nothing to do.'¶

As this was the state of matters when the present Government succeeded to office, and substantially the same policy was

No. 1.  
No. 45.

† No. 12.  
|| No. 50-1.

‡ No. 40.  
¶ No. 52.

pursued by them in respect to the question of the Holy Places, we desire to make here an observation on the principle involved in it. The right of France to claim a legal interest in the privileges of the Latin Church in Syria rested on specific treaties or capitulations. It was not simply the desire of a great Roman Catholic Power to protect the Roman Catholic Church. But the right of Russia to support the rival claims of the Greek community did not rest, or profess to rest, on any such specific obligations. It was founded on a sort of traditional and qualified protectorate, and on the habit of the Porte in communicating to Russia, from time to time, firmans and promises issued in favour of the Greeks. Such a protectorate, even in respect to the question of the Holy Places, was, unquestionably, not free from objection in point of principle; and to assume, upon the strength of it, a right to menace the Porte, did obviously involve a claim very easy of indefinite extension. Still, the Government of Lord Derby felt, as the preceding Government had also felt, that it was no part of the duty or the policy of England to take part against Russia on this abstract ground; and that, as the difficulty had not then been raised at her instance, and the specific demand she made was not in itself unreasonable, it would be unwise and unsafe for Turkey to question that qualified and limited watch over Greek interests in the East, on which alone she could pretend, even as regarded the Syrian Sanctuaries, to make any demand at all.

Although, therefore, the question of the Holy Places had thus assumed a very serious aspect during the latter months of Lord Derby's Government,—and although it did undoubtedly involve, or rather because it did involve, the dangerous question of a Russian interest in the privileges of Christian subjects of the Porte,—there can be no doubt of the substantial wisdom of the course which that Government pursued in instructing the British Minister to hold himself absolutely aloof from both the contending parties.

It does not appear to have occurred to Lord Malmesbury when in office, that any different light was thrown on this policy by the Memorandum of 1844, which was then in his own keeping. He can hardly have forgotten it. Though rather an old story to the succeeding Ministers, to him at least it was a new document; and his special attention had been called to it by Baron Brunnow. Yet, the principles laid down in that Memorandum were not without an important bearing on the ominous question which had arisen in the East. That of which the Emperor spoke, in 1844, as a distant and only possible contingency, had actually occurred in 1852, and called for the decision of the

**English Government.** Two great Powers, one of them being Russia itself, felt their honour and interests compromised in opposite directions by the conduct of the Porte. Each of them was inclined to suspect the other of assuming towards the weakness of Turkey what the Memorandum of 1844 called an attitude 'of exclusive dictation.' There could be no doubt that a collision of these opposing interests would involve serious dangers to the peace of Europe, and as little doubt that those dangers might ultimately precipitate the fate of the Turkish Empire. The case, then, had actually arisen contemplated in the Memorandum; and the principles on which Russia therein professed her desire to act, became a matter of immediate interest. Yet these principles, as there explained, do not seem to have alarmed Lord Derby, or to have induced him to alter his policy of non-interference.

Bearing these facts in mind, it is not difficult to estimate the character of those strictures which have been passed upon the conduct of the present Government, when, within twenty days after Lord Malmesbury's last despatch\*,—under precisely the same circumstances and in reference to the same state of affairs,—the same views and principles were repeated by the Emperor in his confidential communications with Sir H. Seymour.

It is not true, as was pretended in the late debate, that this communication was first made by the Emperor in immediate and gratuitous connexion with his congratulations on the formation of a new Government, or on the return of any one Minister to office. This is simply a mis-statement of facts. Sir H. Seymour specially relates that the usual and natural courtesy on the part of the Emperor, with reference to that event, ended without any allusion to Eastern affairs; that he, Sir H. Seymour, himself introduced the subject of the Eastern question, and that the Emperor evinced some reluctance to enter upon any discussion with regard to it.†

The first of these communications took place on the 9th of January.

The prevailing idea throughout the Emperor's language is that of the alleged decrepitude and decay of the Turkish Empire. The prevailing wish and desire professed is, that of maintaining with England a perfectly open understanding on the policy to be pursued towards the Ottoman Porte. There was nothing surprising in the fact that he should renew these intimations in the circumstances and at the time. For whether the long-cherished opinions of the Emperor on

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\* Dec. 21. 1852. No. 56.

† Confid. Corresp. No. 1.

the instability of Turkish rule in Europe, arising from internal causes, were just or not, it was undeniable that the complications which had then actually arisen might speedily involve the Government of the Sultan in dangers of the most formidable kind. Those circumstances had actually occurred which, it had been long foreseen, involved most peril to its safety. Supposing, therefore, that the Emperor was sincere in his desire to deal openly with England, and that at the same time he felt his honour or his traditional claims compromised in respect to the Holy Places, nothing could be more natural than that he should reiterate convictions which had long been familiar to his mind, and which must have risen with fresh force before it in the existing position of affairs. The fact of his doing so did not necessarily imply any desire on his part to precipitate the difficulties against which he had so long professed his anxiety to provide: and his emphatic declarations were to the effect that it was not his intention or desire to do so.

The account of the conversation of the 14th January reached England on the 6th February. It was the duty of the Government, of course, in the first place, to decline entering into any previous engagement with Russia apart from the other Powers of Europe, in a matter which was of equal interest to them all. But this having been done, the immediate policy to be pursued in the circumstances of the time, was in no way affected by that communication. There were two suppositions possible as to the language of the Emperor. The declaration of his desire to act with perfect openness towards England, and to abstain from any steps calculated to precipitate the fate of Turkey, might be sincere, or it might be deceptive. If it was sincere, as Sir H. Seymour believed it to be, the duty and the policy of England would be to aid in the speedy solution of that dangerous question which was then pending in the East, and which was every day committing more and more deeply the honour and interests of two powerful nations in antagonism to each other and to the Porte. If, on the contrary, the Emperor was insincere, it was equally important that that question should be settled, under cover of which it was alone possible for him to conceal the object of his ambition, and the nature of his designs.

Here then, we would observe, once for all, that this necessarily continued to be the position and the policy of England until the final settlement of the dispute respecting the Holy Places. She had no interest in it, except in so far as it might involve ulterior consequences. The great object was to avoid entering

into the merits of that dispute at all—to urge moderation on both sides, and to maintain a position of entire impartiality—acting solely in the interests of European peace. In pursuance of this line of policy it was the especial duty of the English Government to deprecate on both sides those threatening movements of fleets and armies with which each party might be disposed to back its diplomatic agents; because such movements had the double effect of committing them more deeply to a spirit of mutual hostility, and of exposing the Turkish Empire to imminent internal and external dangers.

The reply of Lord John Russell to the Emperor's confidential communication was dated on the 9th February, and it laid down those principles, in so far as it was then requisite to declare them, with equal dignity and precision.

The same principles determined the position of the English Government, not only with respect to Russia, but with respect to France. To have identified ourselves at that time with the cause of France, would have been to compromise our hopes of successful mediation. Exactly the same language was held to both in respect to the urgent necessity of arresting every threatening movement which might tend to implicate farther the honour of either party, and of settling by compromise and negotiation the difficulties which had arisen.\*

No definite indication had at that time been given on the part of Russia of any ulterior designs. Even if it had, it is clear that the policy of England would have been still the same—to remove out of the way as speedily as possible those disputes on which she could not assume an absolute identity with the policy of France, in order to unite cordially with her on those in which the two nations were thoroughly agreed.

Lord J. Russell's reply reached St. Petersburg on the 20th February, and was read to the Emperor on the 21st. It was on this occasion that His Majesty entered into those details with respect to the ultimate disposal of the Turkish territory which have excited so much attention. However suspicious that language may have been, it is but just to remember that it was accompanied with declarations as emphatic as before, that he neither wished nor intended to bring about the fall he anticipated, and that he connected that expectation principally with the dangerous aspect of the contest respecting the Holy Places.

The account of this second conversation did not reach England until the 6th of March; and it is important to observe

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\* No. 77.

that more than a week before this date Lord Stratford had been sent, with his instructions, to Constantinople.

These instructions, of date the 25th February\*, effectually disprove the assertions made in the House of Lords, that that Minister was armed with no definite policy, and that no general understanding was come to with France for timely co-operation in the East. In respect to the Holy Places, Lord Stratford was instructed to give in Paris the same counsel of moderation and forbearance as regarded the use of menace, which had already been urged at St. Petersburg, and to offer his best exertions to effect a settlement of that question by peaceful means. On the general principles of policy in respect to Turkey, and what has been called the 'Eastern Question,' he was instructed to assure the French Government of our belief in a perfect identity of interest between the two nations; 'and that nothing, therefore, need prevent their cordial co-operation in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.' And lastly, in the event of any danger to the Ottoman Empire appearing imminent, he was authorised to call for the assistance of the fleet at Malta.

Lord Stratford had not left England many days, when the Russian special Envoy reached his destination at Constantinople. The account of this event reached England on the 19th March†; and it appeared that the circumstances of that arrival had been so threatening in the estimation of Colonel Rose, that, on the 7th, he had despatched a message to our fleet to approach the waters of the East.‡ Considering the lesson which the English Government had just been inculcating on others—that hasty naval and military movements were, above all things, to be deprecated in the interest of Turkey and of Europe—it did not seem probable that Lord Stratford would have approved of such a step; and it soon appeared§ that within a few days Colonel Rose had himself seen reason to take a calmer view of the state of affairs, and had despatched a second message to Malta to countermand the first.

Lord Stratford, having gone by Paris and Vienna, did not reach Constantinople until the 5th of April, and the account of his arrival did not reach England until the 19th.

In the meantime, however, some important communications had taken place. On the 6th of March Lord Clarendon had received the Emperor's observations on the reply of Lord John Russell to his first confidential communication, and these were more formally recorded in a memorandum received on the 19th.¶

\* No. 94.

† No. 102.

‡ No. 105.

§ No. 123.

¶ Confid. Corresp. Nos. 6-7.

The Emperor disclaimed entirely 'either plans of partition or 'conventions to be binding beforehand.' He admitted that 'no 'real crisis had arisen to render the fall of Turkey imminent.' He professed that if France would act with moderation towards the Porte, he also would abstain from menace; and, finally, renewed his protestation of a desire to act with entire openness towards the English Government. Next, on the 4th April, Lord Clarendon received from Sir H. Seymour a report of the reply given by the Russian Government to his inquiries respecting the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission. That reply\* conveyed a specific assurance that 'an adjustment of the difficulties respecting the Holy Places would settle *all matters* in 'dispute between Russia and the Porte;' and 'that the Chancellor was not aware that Prince Menchikoff had any other 'grievances to bring forward.'

As reports, however, continued to reach Lord Clarendon of military movements observable in the south of Russia, he directed Sir H. Seymour, on the 5th of April, to ask an explanation of them from the Russian Government. On the 11th† he heard from Colonel Rose that the Russian Ambassador was reported to have proposed to the Porte a secret treaty; and on the 15th‡ he received from the same source certain particulars which seemed to give to that report some definiteness and authenticity.

It was on the same day that Baron Brunnow communicated to the Government the most formal and explicit assurances of his Court—not merely, in general terms, that the Emperor's 'desire and determination were to respect the independence and 'the integrity of the Turkish Empire;' but specifically, that 'all the idle rumours to which the arrival of Prince Menchikoff 'in the Ottoman capital had given rise, the occupation of the 'Principalities, hostile and threatening language to the Porte, ' &c., were not only exaggerated, but even destitute of any sort 'of foundation;' and lastly, 'that the mission never had, and 'had not then, any object but that which had been communicated to the British Government.'§ With such assurances as these nothing remained but to await the arrival of Lord Stratford at Constantinople,—his report, and his advice.

The news of his arrival reached England on the 19th, and his first detailed despatch on the 26th of April. On the one hand, it was satisfactory to know that the Turkish Government 'had 'every appearance of understanding that the interests of the

\* No. 124.

† No. 133.

‡ No. 136.

§ No. 158.

‘Porte had been more judiciously consulted by the detention of the fleet, than by its appearance in the waters of the Archipelago.’ On the other hand, it seemed no longer open to doubt that Prince Menchikoff had indicated the existence of some ulterior demands, beyond the settlement of the question respecting the Holy Places.

In the anxiety which the confirmation of this fact occasioned, Lord Stratford’s opinion was not wanting to the Government; and it was in strict conformity with the general principles on which, as before explained, they were predisposed to act. To the Ministers of the Sultan he reported himself as having used the following language: — ‘Endeavour to keep the affair of the Holy Places separate from the ulterior proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia. Should they be found, on examination, to carry with them that degree of influence over the Christian subjects of the Porte, in favour of a Foreign Power, which might eventually prove dangerous or seriously inconvenient to the exercise of the Sultan’s legitimate authority, his Majesty’s Ministers cannot be denied the right of declining them, which would not prevent the removal, by direct sovereign authority, of any existing abuse, or the more strict execution by the Porte itself, of any treaty engagement affording to Russia a fair ground of remonstrance.’\* A second despatch from Lord Stratford, dated three days later, inclosed a copy, ‘at least, in substance,’ of the secret treaty which Prince Menchikoff had proposed to the Porte, and indicated his opinion on the dangers it involved.

But there was a preliminary point, quite as important as the nature of these new proposals on the part of Russia, on which the Government must have looked with care to the opinion and impressions of Lord Stratford. The fact of such proposals being made at all, if made with the authority of the Emperor, implied a very loose understanding on his part, to say the least of it, of the repeated assurances he had given. It was hardly possible that such proposals could have been made without authority; but it was quite possible that along with the authority to make them, there was also an authority to depart from them, if necessary or advisable. The secret mode in which they were made, as if to avoid committing, in the face of Europe, his Government to their support, seemed to favour such a supposition. If it were so, it would be the interest and the object of all concerned not to commit Russia more than she herself desired to be committed. What then was the impression of Lord Stratford at that time?

\* No. 150.



In his first despatch of the 6th, reasoning on general principles, he reported himself as having used this language to the Porte: 'The personal character of the Emperor Nicholas, and his obligations in common with the other great Powers of Christendom, and his frequent declarations of respect for the independence of the Turkish Empire, exclude the suspicion of any attempt to carry his point by mere arbitrary force. He lies under the restraint of moral, as well as political considerations. He could not throw off the mask and compel the Porte to accept, on no distinct grounds of treaty, propositions materially affecting the Sultan's relations with a large portion of his subjects, and consequently to a certain degree his position in the general scale of power, without exposing himself to severe censure, and risking interests of the most important description. Were it, however, to turn out, contrary to all reasonable calculation, that his ambassador was authorised to proceed to extremities, the Porte would still have the resource of reserving its compliance until it had consulted with those of its allies, who, together with Russia, were parties to the treaty of 1841.'\*

Five days later, on the 11th†, he reported the tone of the Russian Ambassador as considerably softened; 'that his object was to reinstate Russian influence in Turkey on an exclusive basis, and in a commanding and stringent form; but that there was no question of a defensive treaty, and *unless as a consequence of the late naval movement from Toulon, no thought of military intimidation for the present.*' He reported farther a very favourable account of the conciliatory disposition of the French Ambassador; and added, in respect to Austria, that, 'although there was still a leaning towards Russia, she would not support Prince Menchikoff in any proposals tending to increase the influence of that Power at the expense of Turkish independence. Upon the whole,' Lord Stratford concluded, 'there is reason to hope that the clouds which have hung over Turkey of late will finally disperse without a storm, though not, perhaps, without some further causes for anxiety, and the interference of friendly counsels.'

Up to this date, then, it will be observed that England was still restrained from identical action with France, by the necessity of preserving her mediatorial character in the question of the Holy Places, and by well-founded hopes that her mediation would succeed. All danger of violence on the part of Russia, all the military preparations within her own frontier, had, up to

\* No. 150.

† No. 153.

this time, been apparently connected with the conduct of her rival in that question. But Lord Stratford, with much judgment and ability, had made use of the new designs now betrayed by Prince Menchikoff, to impress successfully on the French Minister the immense importance of an early settlement of that question, so that when it should be out of the way, France and England might bring their united influence to bear against the ulterior aims of Russia.

It was not until the 9th May that the Government were informed that this great object had been effected; and that about the 25th April the question of the Holy Places had been definitively settled to the satisfaction of the French and Russian embassies.\*

Immediately thereafter, Lord Clarendon addressed the Russian Government expressing surprise at the new and unexpected demands advanced by Prince Menchikoff in its name, and warning it that England would strictly adhere to her ancient policy of assisting the Sultan to maintain his independence. On the 18th† the Government further heard that Prince Menchikoff, having, to some extent, altered and modified the proposed Convention or Treaty, had made a more peremptory demand for its acceptance. Within three days thereafter, on the 22nd‡, farther accounts arrived from Lord Stratford which involved his opinion on the most important of all questions at the time,—viz. how far it was wise for the Porte, or for England, in its interest and support, to assume an attitude likely to precipitate a crisis. Lord Stratford says:—‘I advised the Turkish Government ‘to open a door for negotiation in the Note to be prepared, and ‘to withhold no concession compatible with the real welfare and ‘independence of the Empire. In rising to take leave, I was ‘asked by the Grand Vizier, whether any reliance could be ‘placed on the eventual approach of Her Majesty’s squadron in ‘the Mediterranean. I replied that I considered the position in ‘its present stage to be one of a moral character, and conse- ‘quently, that its difficulties or hazards, whatever they might be, ‘should be rather met by acts of a similar description, than by ‘demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resent- ‘ment.’ In this policy and opinion Lord Stratford was cordially supported by the French Minister. ‘I left him,’ says Lord Stratford in the same despatch, ‘with the impression that we ‘were both on the same ground; that he, no more than myself, ‘contemplated an appeal to the squadrons without express ‘orders from home; that he disapproved of the proposed Sened

\* No. 169.

† No. 179.

‡ No. 184.

‘ (or Convention); that he fully appreciated the dangers involved  
 ‘ in the terms of its first and second articles, and deprecated the  
 ‘ peremptory attitude assumed by the Russian Ambassador, at  
 ‘ the same time that he entered into all those considerations  
 ‘ which naturally result from the weakness of the Turkish Em-  
 ‘ pire.’

It has been asserted in Parliament, that if the English Govern-  
 ment had listened to the advice of France, a more energetic  
 course would have been taken at an earlier time. This, however,  
 is a total misrepresentation of the fact. It is true that France,  
 during the controversy respecting the Holy Places, had, very  
 naturally, been more disposed than the English Government to  
 a policy of action and alarm. But even in that question, in  
 which her own feelings were so much concerned, she had, for  
 some time, acted on the advice of the English Government; she  
 had accepted its assistance with entire good faith, and with an  
 honourable desire to escape from the difficulties of her position  
 without endangering the peace of Europe. And the moment  
 that controversy had been settled, and her judgment became free  
 from a necessary bias, her opinion united itself still more firmly  
 with that of England, respecting the wisest course to be pursued  
 in the interests of Turkey, and of European peace. Accordingly,  
 the French Cabinet now came to precisely the same conclusion  
 as that reported by the Ambassadors on the spot. Indeed the  
 language of the French Government was even more decided  
 in its tone of conciliation than that of the English Minister.  
 Lord Cowley on the 23rd May† reported that M. Drouyn de  
 Lhuys ‘ recommended prudence and conciliation. While admit-  
 ‘ ting the validity and force of the objections taken by the Otto-  
 ‘ man Ministers to Prince Menchikoff’s demands, *he could not*  
 ‘ *assume the responsibility of advising the Porte to reject them.*  
 ‘ He had recommended that those objections should be carefully  
 ‘ stated, and laid before the Great Powers of Europe.’ The  
 Turkish Ministers having indicated a hope of active assistance  
 from France, ‘ *this hope,*’ says Lord Cowley, ‘ *had not been en-*  
 ‘ *couraged by M. de la Cour,* who appears to have abstained from  
 ‘ doing more than recognising that the Porte would be perfectly  
 ‘ justified in refusing the demand of Prince Menchikoff, with-  
 ‘ out, however, advising her to adopt that line of conduct.’

On the same day on which the despatch was received, formal  
 assurances were exchanged between the Governments of France  
 and England of their mutual desire to co-operate in upholding

the Turkish Empire, and to act with this view in 'cordial concert.'\*

Four days after the date of these assurances, on the 28th of May, the Government heard by telegraph of the final rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, and of the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople.

Although Lord Stratford's impression in reference to this possible event, had been to the effect that there was no danger of any hostile aggression as to the result of the failure of the pending negotiations, yet his last despatch had implied fears which it was impossible to overlook. He spoke of the expected withdrawal of the Russian Embassy as 'giving ample room for the worst conjectures, and even the most painful apprehensions.' There was still much to be said, indeed, for continuing to abstain from naval and military movements. Such movements are essentially an appeal to arms, and when once begun, they can be rarely stopped until the final issue to which they point is tried. Yet, on the other hand, the rupture of diplomatic relations might result in immediate war; Turkey was weak and comparatively exposed; it was, at least, possible that Russia might entertain the violent designs which had so often been attributed to her. Her late assurances had certainly not been kept; there was the most solid ground for suspicion and alarm. No Government could incur the responsibility of not taking such precautions as were possible against sudden violence on the part of Russia. The immediate decision of the Cabinet, therefore, after hearing of the rupture of diplomatic relations, appears to have been to direct the fleets to approach the waters of the Archipelago, and to place them, with more specific instructions than before, at the disposal of Lord Stratford. In addition to the general discretion left to him, it was specially explained by Lord Clarendon that 'a declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, the embarkation of troops at Sebastopol, or any other well-established fact, denoting intentions of unmistakable hostility, would, in the opinion of the Government, justify him in sending for the fleet.'†

This was on the 30th of May; and in about a fortnight afterwards the combined fleets of England and France were at anchor in Besika Bay.‡ As this movement of the fleets to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles was undoubtedly a critical stage in the transactions which have ended in war, it is right to consider, with close attention, the exact position of affairs, and the precise object which was then in view.

There could be but two objects in that movement, — the one

special and definite, the other general, but easily understood. The specific object was to be at hand in case of any sudden attack on the capital of the Turkish Empire, or on its immediate neighbourhood, by the naval forces of Russia, or by the combined action of a fleet and army. The general object could only be what Nesselrode called a 'démonstration comminatoire;' that is to say, an intimation to both parties that the Western Powers were prepared to support the Sultan against a policy of violence on the part of Russia.

For the first purpose it is enough to say that the movement of the fleets was not made earlier than was imperatively demanded by the responsible position in which the Government would have stood, if, by any possible accident, such a movement had been made too late.

The second purpose is that respecting which by far the most important and critical considerations arise. Would it have been better, with this purpose in view, to have made a naval demonstration at an earlier time? It has been common to say, in defence of the Government, that it is impossible to found any sure opinion on *ex post facto* speculations as to what would have happened, if such and such supposed measures had been taken. We are disposed to take stronger ground. It is true, indeed, that no speculative conclusion of such a kind can ever be susceptible of actual proof. But in this case, whether judged by probabilities as they were then seen, or by actual results as they subsequently appeared, the course taken seems to have been clearly right. Let it be remembered that there are certain great general principles on which those who are charged with the conduct of affairs in times of difficulty and danger are bound to act. Governments are not at liberty to play a game of hazard on the dreadful issues of peace and war. It is their duty to found their conduct on the known laws which affect the wills of men. Now there are two opposite motives which may be brought to bear on the policy of States. There is the fear of danger: there is the fear of being supposed to fear it. With great and powerful nations the last of these two influences, if once brought to bear, is very apt to extinguish every other. It is not a leading but a compelling force. It ceases to be a motive, and becomes a necessity. This is true of such States under all forms of Government. But it is especially true of such as are ruled in the way most subject to the impulses of pride and passion, viz., Despotisms and Democracies. It was on this ground that England had so perseveringly inculcated forbearance, not merely in the use, but in the show of force. To bring the mere fear of danger to bear successfully upon a

Power like Russia, it must be indicated in a way not too apparent to itself, and as much as possible concealed from others. This had been done already. Russia was perfectly aware of the view which the English Government would take of her new attempt on the independence of Turkey. It was therefore that she had concealed that attempt, and denied it to the last. It was therefore that she had so often reiterated her assurances, and renewed her promises; and it was under no other influences that Prince Menchikoff had thrice abated his terms before he broke off relations with the Porte. On general principles, therefore, as well as with reference to the condition of Turkey, it had seemed wise up to that time to abstain from threatening demonstrations. Subsequent events have gone far to prove the truth of that conclusion. For the particular purpose for which the fleets were moved, their presence in the neighbourhood of Constantinople was, for ought we knew then, and for ought we know now, absolutely required. For any more general purpose of intimidating a Power whose strength is in armies, and to which the most obvious field of aggression against Turkey was in inland and defenceless provinces — it did not seem likely then, and it is quite certain now, that that movement could have exercised no real effect. Prudential considerations in favour of the same causes arising out of the condition of the Turkish Empire, had, up to the last moment, been reported to the Government by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

It was on the very same day—the 30th May, on which the English Government ordered the departure of the fleet from Malta, that the Emperor of Russia committed himself to the occupation of the Principalities, if, within eight days, the Menchikoff ultimatum were not accepted by the Porte. This fact is of itself sufficient to dispose of two arguments, one used by the Emperor of Russia, the other by those who, in this country, have blamed the conduct of the Government. Russia afterwards asserted that she was driven to make this threat, and to execute this movement, by the counter threat and the counter movement of the combined fleets. This is simply false, as the above facts and dates demonstrate. But the same facts and dates are equally effectual to disprove the argument of those who maintain that either a more decided movement of the fleets at that time, or a threat to pass the Dardanelles if the Pruth were crossed, would have prevented the occupation of the Principalities. For, as the French Government observed in one of those subsequent despatches which do so much credit to their ability as well as to their honour — ‘on the 31st of May this decision (*viz.*, that of ‘occupying the Provinces’), was adopted with a degree of

‘solemnity which left no room for a Government jealous of its dignity, to modify it.’ This is obviously true, and the presence of the combined squadrons in the waters of the Bosphorus, or even in the Black Sea, could have had no possible effect on the passing of the Pruth. It is needless to dwell on the prior difficulty that until the Pruth had been crossed, or otherwise the Porte was at declared war with Russia, it would have been a violation of Treaties for the fleets to have passed the Dardanelles.

From the date of the order to the fleets to repair to Besika Bay, to that of the declaration of war against Russia on the part of Turkey, there is an interval of four months. This last event did not take place until the 4th of October. These four months were mainly occupied by active preparations for war on both sides, and by unremitting exertions on the part of the four great Powers to bring about a settlement of the quarrel by means of negotiation. And having now traced the policy of the English Government in respect to the employment or the show of force up to the point at which we have now arrived, let us examine with equal care the principles which had guided and continued to guide their diplomatic efforts in the cause of peace.

As soon as the question of the Holy Places had been settled, it only remained to deal with the new proposals which had been indicated by Russia. These proposals called for the most serious consideration of the Government as to the policy to be pursued by England, as well as that which she was to recommend to the adoption of the Porte. Two vital questions arose respecting them: first, as to the nature and effect of those proposals in themselves; secondly, as to the mode in which they might be most wisely met. In regard to the first of these questions there was one great general principle to which the necessity of adhering was apparent from the first. It has been weakly argued that none of the demands made by Russia last spring could have involved the Turkish Government in any danger comparable with that to which they would be exposed by war. But even if this were true as regards the interests of the Turks, it is not true either of the interests of the countries of which they are the present rulers, or of the interests of Europe in respect to them. The actual seizure of Turkey by Russian armies was not the only form of possession which it was the ancient interest and policy of Europe to prevent. The peculiar condition of Turkey gave facilities for absorption by another process, and if that process were allowed to proceed without control, every step in advance would render it more and more difficult to resist successfully the ultimate design. If, therefore, the new demands of Russia were of a nature to indi-

cate the commencement of such a process, and to give to the Emperor of Russia a legal right of constant criticism, of interference, and ultimately of control over the internal government of Turkey, they could be regarded in no other light than as a march in the most formidable of all directions towards the Empire of the East.

But there was another great principle to be remembered too. It has been contended on another side, with equal confusion as to the real point at issue, that Europe was bound to plunge into immediate war rather than permit the Sultan to compromise, by any promise or intimation whatever, some abstract theory of Turkish Independence or right 'to do what they will with their own' Christian subjects. But those conditions of the Turkish Empire which exposed it to danger in the peculiar form to which we have referred, were conditions which lay in the nature of things, and were not to be altered or removed by a mere refusal to acknowledge their existence. Exceptional in their nature, they had long been necessarily and instinctively recognised as involving exceptional relations between that Empire and the Christian Powers of Europe. Even in times when Mussulman force was yet unabated, the Sultans had consented to recognise the natural interest of those Powers in the Christians who were subject to Mussulman dominion; and they had entered into engagements, more or less limited, with a view to its satisfaction. The gradual decline of Turkey during a hundred and fifty years,—a decline written in indelible characters on the history of Europe, and measured by the difference between her position then and her position now,—had not rendered such an acknowledgment less natural, or diminished the number of engagements corresponding with it. They had been entered into with France and Austria; and one such promise, vague and general in its terms, had been given to that Great Power, whose weight had been heaviest upon her in the period of her decline, and which had gained almost all the territories she had lost. That engagement with Russia did not differ in principle from any similar promise given to any other Power. Greater danger attached to it in her case from the alliance between the forms of Christianity in Russia and in Turkey, and more from the traditional tendencies and hopes of Muscovite ambition. Those who were interested in defeating the further aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Turkey, as all Europe was, might regret that any such promises had been ever given, or that the principle involved in these promises had ever been conceded. But this was only to regret that Turkey should be what Turkey is. It was not to assert abstract principles, from which



the nature of her position had long led her to depart, any more than to restore to her territories which she had lost in the course of centuries, that Christian Powers could be called upon to endanger the cause of European peace. For many years it had been the utmost hope of their policy to maintain the *status quo*—a state which, in the opinion of many, had been found not incompatible with a rapid improvement, during late years, in the condition of Turkey, and with a gradual admission into her system of government, of the principles of Western civilisation.

It followed from the balance of these fundamental considerations, that if the new demands of Russia were of a nature to confer upon her, in definite and legal form, rights of protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, they were demands which called for the resistance of Europe. But if on the contrary they either were—or could be reduced to—a simple re-affirmation of existing treaties, it would be well to leave Russia this method of retreat from designs which she had indeed betrayed, but to which she was not yet openly committed.

The Government then must have looked with anxiety to the advice and opinion of Lord Stratford on this vital point. That opinion was very plainly intimated in the very same despatch which announced the settlement of the question respecting the Holy Places. Referring to the result of a conference he had had with the Turkish Minister, he says: ‘Were Prince Menchikoff to prefer a simple confirmation of the articles of existing treaties concerning the Greek religion, to no convention at all, it might, we thought, be more advisable, on the whole, to meet his wishes in this respect than to hazard the consequences, whatever they might be, of his retiring in disgust.’

Such were the general principles as well as the special grounds on which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advised the Porte that if the demands of Russia could be reduced to a mere re-affirmation of existing treaties, or to giving her, in the form of a Note, some assurance of a nature not more entangling, it would be wise and prudent to settle the dispute on such a basis. It is not true, as has been most superficially asserted, that the complications which then threatened, and have since arisen, were the consequence of those existing treaties. The real causes of difficulty and embarrassment in the ‘Eastern Question’ lie far deeper in past history and in existing facts. The insufficiency of those treaties for the objects of her ambition was the very want which Russia felt, and which impelled her to these new demands. The argument of the Porte against Russia was, that the Government of the Sultan had violated no existing treaties, and that there was no pretence for the charge that she had sought to evade

or to infringe them. It is true that Russia professed to rest her demands on an existing treaty; but it is equally true that as they went far beyond that treaty, the obvious policy of those who resisted them was to bind Russia to her own profession,—to deny her what she really wanted by offering her what she professed to ask.

We need hardly say that the terms which it was fitting and wise to offer for the purpose of *preventing war* have nothing to do with the terms which may be demanded after war has been begun, and when it shall have proved successful. But to have proclaimed at that time that a departure from existing treaties was the object of Turkey, would of course have been to declare war at once. We are not interested in proving that war might not have been begun sooner, or rendered inevitable at an earlier time. There is no doubt of that.

Now let us look closely to the facts with which the diplomatists of Europe had to deal in the negotiations of the summer and autumn, and in the application of the general principles to which we have referred. Stipulations relative to religious matters in the existing treaties between Russia and the Porte were all, with one exception, strictly limited with reference to particular buildings and localities, or to the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, which in this as well as in almost all other respects, stood in most anomalous relations with the Suzerain Power. There was, however, one exception,—the Treaty of Kainardji,—and it was on this exception that Russia pretended to justify her conduct. Now the only words in that treaty which have reference to this subject are few and simple. They are these: ‘The Sublime Porte promises constantly to ‘protect the Christian religion and its churches.’

It is obvious that these words import nothing more than a general engagement to exercise toleration towards the Christian faith. They recognise nothing more on the part of Russia than that general interest in the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, which was a necessary and natural feeling with every Christian Power. They neither give nor imply any right on her part to interfere with the ordinary relations between the Porte and its Christian subjects. Some of these relations are necessarily of a very delicate kind, in which the smallest foreign interference would be highly dangerous. This is especially true of those ecclesiastico-political relations which subsisted between the ancient hierarchical system of the Greek Church and the authority of the Imperial Government. The design of Russia, therefore, in her new demands, was to obtain a footing for interference in those relations. The real and essential object of

Turkey and of those who desired to help her, was to frustrate this design. Russia did not care for what she already had,—a general interest in the toleration of Christianity,—and every one of the popular arguments which have been directed to the assertion of the abstract principle that even this interest ought not to be formally admitted, have been arguments not merely waste and useless as regarded the real point at issue, but positively useful to Russia as enabling her to cover, under the plausible defence of her old rights, the real treachery of her new demands.

In the light of these obvious considerations, let us look to the first proposals of Russia, and the manner in which Lord Stratford advised that they should be met.

The secret treaty, first proposed by Prince Menchikoff, went directly to secure the real aim of Russia. The first Article stipulated that the ‘Greek religion should be always protected ‘in all the churches,’ and that Russia ‘should have the right, as ‘in times past, to give orders to the churches, both in Constantinople and in other places and towns, as well as to the ‘ecclesiastics.’ The second Article secured to Russia, partly in the insidious form of a narrative of existing customs, and partly by direct stipulation, a right of watching over the election to the four great Patriarchates of the East, and expressly included the ‘temporal advantages’ as well as the mere spiritual privileges which they had enjoyed, as matters of engagement towards the Emperor of Russia. The third Article goes into still greater detail, in regulating, on the same principle, the relations between the Porte and those great depositories of ecclesiastical and political influence and power.\*

When Prince Menchikoff found that those demands would be resisted by the Porte, and that in that resistance it would be supported by the Western Powers, he was authorised by his Government to modify his terms.† Accordingly, on the 5th May, a new Convention was proposed, with the avowed declaration, however, that the ‘bases of the arrangement were substantially the same.’ The three long and detailed articles of the treaty first proposed, were now all condensed into one short and comprehensive formula:—

‘Article 1.—No change shall be made as regards the rights, ‘privileges, and immunities, which have been enjoyed by, or are ‘possessed *ab antiquo* by the orthodox churches, pious institutions, and clergy in the dominions of the Sublime Ottoman ‘Porte, which is pleased to secure the same to them in perpetuity, on the strict basis of the *status quo* now existing.’

\* Project of Secret Treaty, No. 153, Inclosure.

† No. 179 and Inclosure.

A second Article was added, stipulating that whatever advantages might have been, or might be conceded to other Christian rites, should be conceded also to the Greek Church.

As the Porte had been told that this one compendious Article included bases 'substantially the same' as the former Articles which were so much more specific, it naturally scanned the words rather narrowly. It was clear that the 'rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed *ab antiquo*' by the clergy of the Greek Church were words large enough to cover everything that gave, or had ever given, power and influence to that Hierarchy. It was not a mere promise of toleration towards their faith, or in respect of their purely spiritual rights.

Acting on the principles before explained, Lord Stratford suggested to the Porte, on the 14th of May, that it should meet this demand which was dangerous, by an offer which should be safe. He supplied the Imperial Government with a form of words which 'exhibited in substance the extent to which concession might be carried without serious danger.\*' It was as follows:—

'The orthodox religion of the East and its clergy, as well as those of other Christian denominations, shall continue, *as regards spiritual matters*, to enjoy under the sovereign protection of His Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities which have been granted to them at different times by the Imperial favour. Their Churches and their other possessions, legally acquired, shall be respectively preserved to them.'

We need hardly point out how skilfully the sting of the Russian proposal was extracted in this form of words. The limitation of the promise to merely spiritual privileges, and the expunging of the vague words '*ab antiquo*,' would have left the Porte perfectly free to deal, as the exigencies of its own administration might require, with the ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions, as well as with the political influence of the Patriarchs and Clergy.

Prince Menchikoff, finding that his second form of treaty was met with the same refusal as the first, broke off diplomatic relations with the Porte, but at the twelfth hour offered to resume them at the expense of yet one more concession in point of form, if not of substance. The form of a Treaty was abandoned. A Note would be sufficient; and the principal clause was worded thus:—

'The orthodox religion of the East, its clergy, its churches,

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\* No. 193.

‘ and its possessions, as well as its religious establishments, shall  
 ‘ enjoy for the future, without any detriment, under the protec-  
 ‘ tion of his Majesty the Sultan, the privileges and immunities  
 ‘ which are secured them *ab antiquo*, or which have been granted  
 ‘ to them at various times by the Imperial favour, and on a  
 ‘ principle of high equity, shall participate in the advantages  
 ‘ accorded to the other Christian sects, as well as to the foreign  
 ‘ legations accredited to the Sublime Porte, by convention or  
 ‘ special arrangement.’

The same objections, however, to the substance of this engagement remained. The essential limitation imposed upon the promise by the use of the word ‘spiritual’ was wanting; and the fact of insisting on the words ‘*ab antiquo*,’ interpreted in connexion with this omission, might be construed as implying a determination to include ancient and dangerous ecclesiastical jurisdictions.

The form of words suggested by Lord Stratford reached England on the 30th May, the same day on which the resolution to send the fleets from Malta was taken by the Government. The form of the Menchikoff ultimatum became known to the Government a few days after—on the 3rd June.\* On the 10th, the further important information was received, how far the Porte had been disposed to accept Lord Stratford’s advice, by offering some assurance to Russia in a safer form. On that day, Lord Clarendon was informed of the Turkish ultimatum which had been offered to Prince Menchikoff. The corresponding paragraph was in these words:—‘ With reference to the religious  
 ‘ privileges of the Greek Churches and clergy, the honour of the  
 ‘ Porte requires that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted  
 ‘ under the Sultan’s predecessors, and confirmed by his Majesty,  
 ‘ should be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in  
 ‘ force; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards  
 ‘ its subjects, demands that any spiritual privileges whatever  
 ‘ granted henceforward to one class of Christian subjects, should  
 ‘ not be refused to the Greek Clergy.’†

This was a very satisfactory document, under the circumstances of the case. It ran more than parallel with the suggestion of Lord Stratford. It not only gave the promise required as regarded ‘spiritual’ privileges, but it declared further that to the maintenance of these the Sultan was bound by honour.

Such was the state of the information in possession of the English Government respecting what might safely, and probably would be willingly conceded by the Porte, when, on the 27th

\* No. 210.

† No. 239. Inclosure.

June the French Government proposed the plan of settlement which ultimately assumed the form known under the title of the Vienna Note. The following were the terms in which, according to the opinion of the French Government, the Minister of the Sultan might be advised to address to Russia an assurance on the subject in dispute :

‘ The Undersigned has accordingly received orders to declare  
‘ by the present Note that the Government of his Majesty the  
‘ Sultan considers itself bound in honour to cause to be observed  
‘ for ever, and to preserve from all prejudices, either now or here-  
‘ after, the enjoyment of the *spiritual privileges* which have been  
‘ granted by his Majesty’s august ancestors to the orthodox  
‘ Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by  
‘ him ; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the  
‘ Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other  
‘ Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.’\*

The language of this paragraph was so closely analogous to that which had been suggested by Lord Stratford, as well as with that which had been offered by Reshid Pasha himself, that the English Government, though not hopeful as to the success of France in effecting an arrangement on this basis, willingly assented to her endeavours in that behalf.

In the meantime while this and other projects conceived in a similar spirit, and directed to the same end, were being proposed and sent to the various distant capitals of the Powers concerned, the English Government continued to receive from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advices which strongly confirmed the wisdom and prudence of the line of policy which was being thus pursued. On the 3rd July a despatch was received from that Minister giving an account of the advice which, in concert with M. de la Cour, he continued to give to the Porte, in the immediate prospect of the threatened occupation of the Principalities.† He says :

‘ The preservation of peace, so long as it is possible to pre-  
‘ serve it with a chance of settling by negotiation the existing  
‘ difference, is of such deep importance that I have not hesitated  
‘ to advise forbearance on the approaching invasion of the Otto-  
‘ man territory. It is notorious that the Principalities are placed  
‘ under circumstances of a peculiar character with reference to  
‘ the neighbouring Powers, and the consequences of a foreign  
‘ military occupation within their limits are in practice by no  
‘ means so likely to disturb the interests of the Porte as if a  
‘ similar act of aggression were committed against those parts

‘ of the Empire which are directly administered by this Govern-  
 ‘ ment. It may be added that, in a military point of view, re-  
 ‘ sistance could not be offered to Russia in that quarter under  
 ‘ present circumstances with any prospect of success.’

This despatch was rapidly followed, on the 8th, by another \*, if possible, still more important. In addition to the considerations arising from the comparative weakness of Turkey, he now presented another motive of paramount obligation. The anxiety of the German Powers had been at last aroused, and their Representatives at the Porte now manifested a desire to assist France and England in the peaceful solution of a question so dangerous to themselves. Lord Stratford had therefore proposed a meeting of the four Representatives. He explained his views,—first, ‘ the importance of keeping every  
 ‘ chance of accommodation open as long as possible,’—next of  
 ‘ having it clearly understood, at the same time, that there could  
 ‘ be no question of ceding the diplomatic engagement required  
 ‘ by Russia.’ Lord Stratford added this important account of the impression left upon his mind: ‘ It is but justice to state  
 ‘ that I found the French Ambassador, the Austrian Inter-  
 ‘ nuncio, and the Prussian Envoy, animated as to these several  
 ‘ points with sentiments of the most satisfactory description;  
 ‘ and I infer from the harmony which prevailed among us that,  
 ‘ whatever difference of opinion, arising from difference of posi-  
 ‘ tion, may exist *as to the ulterior means* of supporting the Sultan  
 ‘ in his struggle with Russia, your Lordship will find little  
 ‘ difficulty in directing the *joint moral action* of the Four Powers  
 ‘ towards the adjustment of the present question.’ But that conference of the Four Powers had not ended in impressions merely; they drew up a Memorandum of their advice to the Porte, and that advice, framed at the suggestion of Austria, and assented to by Lord Stratford, was nothing less specific than this: ‘ We have decided on suggesting to the Sultan’s Minister  
 ‘ for Foreign Affairs to cause a draft of communication to be  
 ‘ prepared, founded on the idea of blending Prince Menchikoff’s  
 ‘ draft with that of Reshid Pasha, in the hope of devising a form  
 ‘ of Note which might be acceptable to Russia, without departing  
 ‘ from the principle which the Porte has deemed to be essential  
 ‘ for the maintenance of its sovereign rights.’ †

If this advice should be acceded to by the Porte, it seemed probable that the contemplated note could not fail to be substantially the same with one or other of the proposals which had now for some time been on their way. It must have seemed hopeful,

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\* No. 321.

† Inclos. 2. No. 321.

therefore, that the only doubt suggested by Reshid Pasha as to this advice, was a doubt as to the proposed document being such as would be accepted by Russia.\* It must have seemed still more hopeful when, on the 20th of the same month, the Government received from Lord Stratford the announcement that ‘the Austrian suggestion adopted, as I mentioned before, by the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain and Prussia, has been laid before the Sultan, and, after an unexplained delay of several days, returned to Reshid Pasha with His Majesty’s sanction.’† It could not fail, therefore, to be doubly mortifying that Lord Stratford went on to say that no subsequent communication had been made to him upon the subject; and that he feared this particular proposal would have to be abandoned as offering no prospect of success. No explanation was given of the reasons on which that fear was founded. It seemed to arise simply from the slowness and immobility of the Porte, for as the principle of the suggestion had received the Sultan’s assent, it could not be any objection on the part of the Turkish Government to the suggested basis.

Such was the position of affairs—every day of additional delay adding strength to the impulses of war, and rendering more hopeless the prospect of a peace which yet, in theory and in principle, seemed almost within reach,—when, on the 25th July, the Government heard from Vienna that the French proposal of the 27th June was considered in that capital as affording a very probable basis of successful negotiation; and that the Austrian Cabinet proposed to the Representatives of the Four Powers to frame a Note upon it. Coupling that announcement with the very favourable report lately received from Lord Stratford of the disposition evinced by the Austrian Government through their Minister at Constantinople, and with the fact that it came from the same Cabinet whose suggestion had been there so well received;—considering also that the French Note seemed closely to answer the description of the Note which the Sultan had already sanctioned, viz. : a ‘blending of Prince Menchikoff’s draft with that of Reshid Pasha’:—considering further the difficulties and delays which seemed to be impeding the success of Lord Stratford on the spot, it would have been in the highest degree culpable of the English Government to have closed the favourable opening which thus suddenly and opportunely appeared in the direction of Vienna.

The assent of the Government was therefore at once given to the holding of a Conference with the view proposed. It was

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\* Inclos. 3. in 321.

† No. 357.



speedily found that the alterations proposed at Vienna in the original form of the Note were few, and not important. It was therefore assented to by Government, as it had been assented to a month before; and on the 31st July the Note, thenceforward called the Vienna Note, was finally adopted by the Conference of the four Representatives, and immediately forwarded to both the Powers more immediately concerned.

The important paragraph in the Vienna Note, corresponding to that in all the other projects of negotiation, ran as follows:—  
 ‘The Undersigned has, in consequence, received orders to declare, by the present Note, that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and that His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice, either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty’s august ancestors to the orthodox Eastern Church, and which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.’\*

Now it will be observed that on the main and essential point which had been in dispute, viz., the strict limitation of the promise given to merely *spiritual* privileges, both by the express insertion of that word, and by the expunging of the obnoxious phrase *ab antiquo*, the language of the note was scrupulously intended to guard the interests of the Porte. It is to be remembered what stress had been laid, and justly laid, upon this point by both parties. It was this limitation which Prince Menchikoff had refused in terms of arrogance and menace, at the moment when he brought his mission to a close. This, therefore, was the point to which friendly Governments mainly looked as of essential value, and on this the language of the Vienna Note was held to be definite and clear. The only addition to the Note as originally drawn up by the French Government, was in the preliminary promise to remain faithful to the spirit and the letter of the existing Treaty of Kainardji. As that Treaty had respect only to the general principle of toleration towards the Christian faith, this was an assurance which might, indeed, be superfluous, but could not be open to any other objection. The English Government had suggested a verbal alteration in the original draft of the Note, the object of which was to disconnect the promise given as to the

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\* No. 31. Inclosure 10.

future, and as to the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church in particular, from the previous assurance with respect to the Treaty of Kainardji. This had been agreed to, and the wording of the Note, in this matter of argument, specially excluded the Russian plea, that that Treaty had entitled the Emperor to make any farther demand whatever.

On the 11th of August the Government heard from St. Petersburg that the Emperor accepted, and would abide by the Vienna Note.

It now only remained to know its reception by the Porte. But in the meantime, on the 18th of August, an important despatch was received from Lord Stratford, dated on the 4th, which stated in detail the grounds on which he was then still recommending to the Sultan a moderate and pacific policy. These were, the desirableness of postponing actual hostilities — the opening of new chances of peace — the value of additional time for purposes of defence, and its value also for maturing the public opinion of Europe.

It was not until the 29th August that the Government heard of modifications in the Note being required by the Porte; and not till the 31st that they heard of the final vote of the General-Council, and Lord Stratford's detailed statement of the objections made to the Note as it then stood. The principal objection of the Porte did not concern the main paragraph which had been the previous subject of discussion: but had reference to the general promise appended at the end, to give to the Greek Rite whatever advantages might be given to other Christian Rites by convention or special arrangement. This as connected with the general principle of equal toleration towards all forms of Christianity was not unnaturally considered as about the best and safest promise that could be given on the subject of Religion. But special circumstances in the history of Turkey, and in particular special arrangements which she had concluded with Austria respecting certain Roman Catholic communities, appeared to the Porte to be capable of bringing a dangerous meaning to bear on the phraseology of the Note. We cannot here follow the verbal discussion which arose. But the substance of the communications respecting the Vienna Note may be very shortly stated. The language of the Turkish Government was to this effect:— 'The Note as it now stands 'seems to us to be open to certain interpretations not intended by the Powers, but against which we think it 'necessary to guard more distinctly. With this view we 'propose certain alterations in the wording of the Note, and 'if these be admitted we are willing to adopt it.' To this the

first reply of the Powers was that the interpretations feared by the Porte did not appear to them to be really open on the terms of the document: that it would not justify the supposed construction; that they regretted, therefore, changes which involved the risk of re-opening the whole question when it seemed so near a settlement; that, nevertheless the Sultan had a paramount right to criticise closely the import of a document which he was himself to sign; and that as the proposed modifications were in themselves perfectly unobjectionable, and consistent with the original intentions of the friendly Powers, they would willingly urge upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburg the acceptance of the Note in its new form. Thereupon the Government of Russia returned a reply refusing to accept the modifications proposed by the Porte and resting this refusal upon grounds, as well as expressing it in terms, which were in the highest degree objectionable and offensive. In the first place it was urged, that as the Emperor had accepted the Note without seeking to alter a single word in the form as it was proposed to him, so he had a right to expect the same acceptance, pure and simple, on the part of the Sultan. This, of course, was a gross misconstruction of the relative position of the two parties. The Sultan was the one whose interests and independence were concerned. The Emperor had nothing at stake except that mixture of obstinacy and pride which men sometimes miscall their 'honour.' Again it was a misconstruction as gross, of the position of the intervening Powers. In the Conference at Vienna they had not acted as in an arbitration, by the result of which both parties were bound literally to abide. Their part had been simply to tender good offices to each, and to suggest what they might hope, or might have reason to expect, would be accepted by both. But the refusal of the Russian Government was defended also on another ground, more objectionable still. Count Nesselrode entered on the merits of the particular alterations proposed by the Porte — criticised them in the intemperate language of wounded pride, and argued that the interpretations which the Porte sought to exclude were such as Russia would insist on attaching to the Note, and would not suffer to be specially denied.

On receipt of this answer by the Western Powers, they had but one course to pursue—that of abandoning wholly and at once the Note which they had proposed, as no longer one which they could press with honour on the adoption of the Porte.

The justice and necessity of this decision being clear, it ceased to be any longer a matter of living interest to discuss verbally the terms of a Note which had been cast away. Any defence of the original terms of that Note came to be looked upon with

suspicion, as indicating a desire to force it after all on the reluctant Turks. The vulgar notion, and the language of opposition in Parliament, therefore, came to be, that the Vienna Note was discovered at last to have offered to Russia 'all that she had ever asked,' or at the very least, that some decisive advantage was conceded by its terms. The necessity of its abandonment is attributed to this discovery, and much wonder has been wasted how so many eminent diplomatists could be thus deceived. But the truth is that the justice and necessity of abandoning the Vienna Note did not in the least depend on, or imply any assent to, the justice of the interpretation which was feared upon one side, and was afterwards claimed upon the other. The fact that offensive meanings have come, by the force of external circumstances, to be associated with such a document, is quite as fatal to its value, as the discovery that, in its own terms, it may really bear an interpretation which was not at first perceived. In such international transactions the circumstances under which any engagement is asked and given, are often quite as important as the mere terms of the promise itself. The language held by Russia, in refusing to the Porte the liberty of requiring modifications in the Note which the Sultan was himself to sign, implied a denial to that Sovereign of the commonest rights of an independent Crown. The effect of that language extended to the Note respecting which it was employed; and, however just or natural may have been the belief of the Powers that its original terms were in themselves honourable and safe, it is certain that from the moment of the Russian reply, the acceptance of them had practically ceased to be so. This result was announced to Lord Stratford on the 20th September.

The abandonment of the Vienna Note did not alter the facts on which it had seemed desirable to so many Cabinets, to avoid, in the interests of Turkey and of Europe, the outbreak of war. The reports forwarded to the Government by Lord Stratford, in the various consular reports respecting the state of the provinces, and the notorious inability of Turkey to sustain such a war alone, rendered it a duty not less incumbent than before to procure if possible a peaceful settlement. The Turks, however, had now so far completed their preparations that they were naturally less sensible of this necessity than before; whilst the warlike spirit and just indignation of that people, placed their Government under a pressure which it would probably have been unsafe for them to resist. Accordingly Lord Clarendon was informed by successive communications, on the 25th September and the 2nd October, that an immediate declara-

tion of war had been determined on by the Turkish Government. This resolution was come to against the advice of Lord Stratford, and against also the professed opinion of the immediate Ministry of the Sultan. But whatever might be thought of the prudence of this determination, or of the wisdom of intrusting a decision on such a matter to an assembly under the influence of Muftis and Ulemas, there could be no doubt whatever of the clear right of the Sultan to act upon it, or of the provocation and injustice by which he was driven to its adoption.

The duty of the Western Powers was therefore clear. They were not called upon, nor would they have been justified, in following implicitly in the wake of a Turkish Grand Council. Their own determination on a great question of a European war could not be guided by such a body. But, on the other hand, it was their duty to stand still closer by the side of Turkey, and to see that no fatal blow should be struck against her by Russia, as the consequence of a declaration of war, which, whether imprudent or not, was unquestionably justified.

The immediate decision of the Western Powers, therefore, was to send the combined fleets up to Constantinople if the Porte should require their presence, and this whether war should be actually declared or not. The despatch of the English Government was dated the 8th of October, and was precise in the instructions it conveyed to Lord Stratford. He was authorised to use the fleets in any way and at any place he chose 'for the defence of Turkish territory against direct aggression;' and it was added specifically, 'If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol the fleets would then, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus' — that is, enter the Black Sea.\* Short of actually joining in the resolution of the Turkish Grand Council, and making themselves principals in a contest which they were still striving to settle by mediation, it was impossible for the allied Governments at this time to have gone farther or done more.

The renewed endeavours of France and England to effect a specific settlement of the question were now mainly directed to securing the continued co-operation of the German Powers. Considering the geographical position of the provinces which were likely to become the theatre of war, this was quite as important with a view to that ultimate result, as with a view of adding weight to any new proposals in the interest of peace.

One of the risks involved in the abandonment of the Vienna Note was that of losing the concurrence of Austria in the future

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\* No. 133.

course of the Allied Powers. That Power had acted in the matter with entire good faith, and with a sincere desire to secure an accommodation which should be acceptable to the Porte. She conceived that the Note, originally framed in France, and modified at Vienna, settled in favour of the Porte the prominent points which had been in dispute, and involved a total retreat on the part of Russia from her first demands. It was difficult for her to appreciate the importance, as compared with the risks of war, of the new difficulties which had been raised by the subsequent correspondence. She naturally, therefore, departed with difficulty and reluctance, from the hope that that Note might still be made the basis of a possible arrangement, and that objections which, to her, seemed to have little other foundation than suspicion on one side and irritation on the other, might be removed by personal assurances of a friendly kind. Such was the nature of the hope to which Austria still clung, and which was expressed in the proposals which came from the Conference at Olmütz in the end of September. The Western Powers, however, were compelled to dissent from these proposals; and the Turkish declaration of war, which did not actually take place until the 4th October, speedily intervened to convince the Austrian Government that neither that nor any other Note would suffice to re-establish a peace which had once been broken.

On the 22nd October the Austrian Minister communicated to Lord Clarendon a despatch from his Government, intimating that they must now wait to see how far the future course of other Powers would enable Austria to continue with them the 'common work of mediation and reconciliation,' which, it was added, she was most anxious to be able to do. The importance of securing the assent and, if possible, the co-operation of the German Powers, was not the only reason for persevering in the determination to exhaust every hope of peace. Lord Stratford, in urging on the Turkish Government arguments against the declaration of war, had not failed to point out to them the obvious fact that even the entrance of the fleets into the Black Sea could have no immediate or direct effect on a contest on the Danube.

On the 9th of November, an urgent request was addressed by Austria to the English Government, that the Four Powers should collectively demand from Turkey the conclusion of an armistice, with a view to negotiation. To this Lord Clarendon returned an immediate reply, that an armistice at that moment seemed to be favourable to Russia alone: that it could not, therefore, be demanded of the Turks, but that the Four Powers might join in a collective question to the Turkish Government

as to the specific terms on which they would be prepared to resume negotiations. On the 12th, France intimated her concurrence in this course. On the 16th, Lord Clarendon stated in detail to Lord Westmorland, for the information of the Austrian Cabinet, not only the precise form which this collective question should assume, but also a general outline of reply, specifying conditions which ought to be demanded by the Porte. On the 22nd, he received the intimation that the Austrian Government agreed to act with the Western Powers in the course proposed, both as regarded the form of question, and the suggested heads of reply.

This last assent could not be too highly valued. It went far to implicate Austria, not merely in the expression of a general desire for peace, but in agreement with the Western Powers in the conditions which Russia ought to be called upon to accept. One of these was 'that the Porte should not be required to accede to any demands to which she had already objected.' On the 29th, Lord Clarendon forwarded to Vienna, in concert with the French Government, the draft of a collective Note and a Protocol of Conference to be signed by the Four Powers, placing on record the general principles on which this common policy was founded. It was signed on December 4th.

It is unnecessary to point out the great importance of procuring the concurrence of Austria and Prussia to such a document as this, declaring, as it did, that 'the existence of Turkey 'in the limits assigned to her by Treaty, is one of the necessary conditions of the balance of power in Europe: and the undersigned Plenipotentiaries record with satisfaction that the existing war cannot in any case lead to modifications in the territorial boundaries of the two empires, which might be calculated to alter the state of possession in the East, which has been established for a length of time, and which is equally necessary for the tranquillity of all the other Powers.\*'

It was while the negotiations were proceeding, which were founded on the question thus addressed to the Porte, and on the answer recommended by the Powers, that that event occurred which in its necessary consequences, went far to extinguish the last hopes of peace,—we refer to the destruction of the Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope.

No part of the blame connected with that catastrophe can be justly thrown either on the Ambassadors at Constantinople, or on the instructions with which they had been armed by their respective Governments. As respects the instructions it is

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\* No. 282. Inclosure.

certain that these would have entitled the Ambassadors to use the fleets against any attack such as that made at Sinope, if they had known beforehand of its being about to be made, and of the point to which it was to be directed. 'Your Lordship's instructions to me,' says Lord Stratford most fairly, in a subsequent despatch\* to Lord Clarendon, 'are positive as to the employment of Her Majesty's squadron for the protection of the Sultan's territory from direct aggression, and they are equally clear as to its passage into the Black Sea in the event of the Russian fleet coming out of Sevastopol.' But no such intelligence reached the Ambassadors in time, and even if it had, they might very probably have directed the movement of the combined squadrons to the European shores of Turkey in the Black Sea, which were the more immediate object of solicitude. There can be no doubt, therefore, of the conclusion to which Lord Stratford comes, that 'the blame of that disaster does not rest anywhere but on the Porte and its officers. They alone, or their professional counsellors, were cognisant of the miserable state of the land defences of Sinope. They alone are answerable for the obvious imprudence of leaving so long in helpless danger, a squadron exposed to attack from hostile ships of far superior force.'†

The first intelligence of the disaster at Sinope reached England on the 12th December, in a despatch from Berlin, enclosing the announcement made respecting it by Prince Menchikoff to Prince Gortchakoff. It is remarkable that that announcement put prominently forward a false statement of the facts. It asserted that the Turkish squadron had 'been pursued by a division of the Russian fleet to the harbour of Sinope,' implying that it had been met at sea, and asserting farther that it was 'destined to land troops at Soucoum Kalé.'

On the following day a telegraphic despatch was received from Lord Stratford, intimating that after the return of the steam frigates which had been sent to report on the facts, 'the two squadrons, according to all probability, would enter the Black Sea.' On the 17th Lord Clarendon wrote to that Minister in reply, that if the Turkish squadron had been at anchor in the harbour of Sinope, which was Turkish territory, such an act would come entirely within the instructions of the 8th October, and added, 'Whatever may have been the motive of the attack, the dignity of this country, and the interests of Turkey alike require that the most effectual means should be taken to guard against the recurrence of a similar disaster. We have under-

\* No. 371. Pt. II.

† No. 371. Pt. II.



‘ taken to defend the territory of the Sultan from aggression, and that engagement must be fulfilled.’\*

On the 24th † the entire concurrence of the English Government in the course now more formally proposed by the Government of France, was intimated to Lord Cowley. That course extended the protection of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, not merely to the territory, but specifically to the flag of Turkey, and was, in fact, the complete and exclusive possession of that sea by the Western Powers. The intimation of this course was sent to Russia on the 27th, and Count Nesselrode was informed ‘ that in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters as that at Sinope the combined fleets will require, and if necessary compel, Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol, or the nearest port.’

It is well worthy of remark that this step of the naval occupation of the Black Sea was taken, though with no intentional reference to the fact, during a negotiation which was still pending. Its result upon that negotiation, if it had any effect at all, is therefore a practical test of the value to be set upon the opinion of those who contend that the same step, if it had been taken earlier, would have been useful in the interests of peace. Reasoning on general principles, the Allied Powers had never thought that measures of obvious menace could have had any other effect than that of rendering it more difficult for Russia to retreat from her position, if at any time she had wished to do so. Nor was it because, but in spite of, negotiations being then on foot, that the occupation of the Black Sea was resorted to, at last. Possibly, and perhaps probably, that negotiation would have failed in any case. But it is not the less true, that the value of naval coercion to diplomatic success with Russia was practically put to trial. That trial took place, too, under very favourable circumstances. It took place when another and more immediate object than that of menace, could be truthfully stated by France and England, and when proposals of peace were about to be made with more than usual unitedness on the part of the Four Great Powers of Europe.

It was on the very day on which the announcement of the naval occupation was despatched to Russia, that Lord Clarendon heard from Constantinople that Lord Stratford ‡ had succeeded in inducing the Porte once more to think of negotiation, and that on the 19th December, after a stormy debate, the Grand Council had voted in favour of a treaty on certain specified bases. This vote had been come to before the arrival of the

\* No. 330.

† No. 334. Pt. II.

‡ No. 350. Pt. II.

collective Note from Vienna, and the bases were founded not on the suggested reply which was to accompany that document, but on a previous 'note' drawn up by the English Government. Those bases were, however, in all respects substantially the same. On reaching Vienna, they were adopted by the Conference of the Four Powers, and its adoption of them was recorded in a second Protocol which was signed on the 13th January. Another step was thus taken towards implicating the united opinion of Europe against the conduct of Russia. 'After full 'deliberation,' the Four Powers declared their unanimous opinion 'that the conditions on which the Porte declared 'its readiness to treat for the re-establishment of peace with 'Russia were in conformity with the wishes of their Govern- 'ments;' that they were 'proper for communication to the 'Cabinet of St. Petersburg,' and 'afforded to the belligerent 'parties an opportunity for coming to an understanding in a 'suitable and honourable manner, without Europe being any 'longer grieved by the spectacle of war.'\*

The proposals thus made under the sanction, and with the support, of the Four Powers, were not only set aside by the Emperor of Russia, but set aside with an ostentatious denial of the right of Europe to intervene in the negotiations between himself and the Porte. The counter-bases which Count Orloff was authorised to offer, were prefaced by this announcement:— 'The Imperial Cabinet attaches to them the essential and irrevocable condition that the definitive negotiation should be 'carried on directly between Russia and the Porte, either at 'head-quarters or at St. Petersburg.' We need hardly say that even if the proposed bases had been in themselves open to no objection, the principle involved in this 'irrevocable condition' was one which above all others it was the duty of Europe to meet with an equally irrevocable refusal. Again therefore, on the 2nd February, was the united opinion of the Four Powers formally expressed in a third Protocol† condemnatory of the demands of Russia.

All hopes of successful negotiation having now ended, the final step of summoning Russia to evacuate the Principalities was taken by France and England on the 27th February: the Western Powers, in this as in all previous steps, carrying with them the approval and support of the Austrian Government. The declaration of war followed as a matter of course, at the end of March.

\* No. 403. Inclosure, Part II. † No. 32. Inclosure 1. Pt. VII.

We have now traced the history of the negotiations from their commencement to their close. That history appears to us to furnish the Governments of France and England with a defence in every point complete. If it be true, as some conclude, that Russia intended war from the beginning, the only logical conclusion is, that any earlier use of armed menace on the part of the Western Powers could have had no other effect than that of precipitating the war, before either they or Turkey were physically so well prepared, and at the risk of losing altogether the moral and material support of the rest of Europe. But simple and sufficient as this defence would be, it is not the one on which we are ourselves disposed to stand. Great events in the history of the world are very rarely determined only by causes so simple and so easily defined. In this case there is the strongest evidence in the whole course of the transaction that the Emperor of Russia has been led on, step by step, under the force of circumstances, to consequences which he did not foresee, and to measures which he did not at first intend. Of course many of the influences which bore upon his conduct most powerfully were internal, — that is to say, proper to himself, to his own character, to the position of his country, to the traditional ambition of his race. But some circumstances, also of much influence on the course of events, were external — accidental; and, amongst others, that which was the immediate occasion of the embroilment, viz. the occurrence of the dispute respecting the Holy Places. In that controversy lay all the elements of a dispute, which, in its religious bearings, is old as the division between Greek and Latin Christianity, and of which the political importance had been rapidly growing during recent centuries. Of the causes internal as regards the history and character of Russia, there were more in operation that we need enumerate. Every instinct of her ambition was wounded by the course of events respecting the Syrian Sanctuaries. The mere settlement of that dispute could not restore her equanimity, because all the circumstances attending it showed the direct and rising influence of the Western Powers over the government of the Porte. Then, that Government was believed to be the government, not merely of a declining, but of an expiring Empire. Its actual dissolution might be a little nearer, or a little more remote; but it was time to provide for Russia a stronger position against that event. Prince Menchikoff was therefore sent with a general commission to re-establish Russian influence, and, if possible, to secure for it a firmer footing on definite stipulations, and sanctions under the forms of law. But the facts of his

mission, its secrecy, and the repeated changes not merely in the form, but in the extent and scope of his demands, confirm the truth of Lord Stratford's impression at the time, that it was his object to avoid risking extreme consequences, and that the policy of Russia was her old policy, viz. that of gaining what could be gained by threats and fraud without having actual recourse to violence. But pride and obstinacy prevented an entire retreat when it came to be conducted under the fixed regard both of Europe and the East. All that we contend for on behalf of the policy of France and England is, first, that it was the policy best adapted to turn aside the current which, through so many channels, was setting irresistibly to war; and, next, that it was the policy best adapted to strengthen, in the meantime, the lines of European defence whenever diplomacy should give place to arms.

But we cannot forget that there are some who object to the policy which has been pursued on much broader grounds. They do not care to dispute that everything may have been well and wisely done to save a policy of interference from terminating in war. But they hold that that policy was wrong from the beginning; that we ought not to have interfered at all in the quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and that whatever might have been the consequences of that quarrel to the existence of the Ottoman Empire, it was no part of our duty or our policy to prevent them. We are not disposed to treat this opinion lightly because, at present, it is that of a very small minority, or because the opposite sentiment has overwhelming prevalence and power. That minority, though small, are high in ability and in character: and we suspect that any untoward event in the progress of the war, or even the burdens of its prolonged continuance, would rapidly swell their ranks. The question which they raise is not one especially affecting the conduct of any Government. It will be admitted by those who maintain this view that it could not have been taken consistently with the national feeling and opinion; and we cannot bring this article to a close without expressing our own firm conviction that it could as little have been taken consistently with national honour, with national policy, or with the safety and interests of Europe. It is perfectly true that there is no specific Article of any Treaty which binds us to the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire. But it is equally true that the duty of that maintenance, as far as it may be possible against external violence, has been long an admitted principle of policy among the European Powers. Nay more—the assertion of it is solemnly narrated in the preamble of a treaty to which England

and Russia were both parties in 1841. Even if this preamble did not exist, the virtual obligation arising from our position in Europe, and our duty of upholding the admitted principles of its public law, would have been practically binding. To have evaded it would have been injurious to our influence and derogatory to our honour; — to our influence, we mean, not in any mere selfish sense, but to that legitimate influence which is the most solemn trust of nations, and which it is the special duty of England to guard as a gift given to her for the advantage and civilisation of the world.

We cannot here adequately discuss whether the political danger to Europe which would arise from the possession of Constantinople by Russia has been exaggerated or not. The question both of duty and of policy rests in a great measure on independent grounds. But if there had ever been any doubt of the substantial truth of the traditional maxims on this subject, so long received by all European statesmen, that doubt ought to be effectually dispelled by the events of the last few months. It has been said that though the strength of Russia is great for defensive, it is small for offensive purposes. Even if this were true as regards her present extent of territory or geographical position, it does not follow that it would continue to be true if that territory were extended to the Dardanelles. But what force or truth is there in this assertion, even as matters now stand? It may be true that England and France have little to fear from any direct attacks of Russian power. But what proofs have we not seen of the tremendous pressure she exerts upon every one of the Continental States which are flanked by her vast lines of frontier. The aims and the policy of Russia in the East of Europe are directly injurious to the political and commercial interests of Germany. They have met with the condemnation of every cabinet, and excited the alarm of every people. Yet we have seen the difficulty of arousing any one of those Powers to independent and worthy action. Not only is the influence of Russia in every Court, but the fear of her is on every Government, from Stockholm to the Bosphorus. Nor is this fear without reasonable ground. Austria is exposed without a natural frontier on a very vulnerable side, and Russian armies on the borders of Galicia might threaten her capital itself. Prussia is flanked by the army of Poland residing on the strong fortresses of the Vistula; whilst her maritime provinces are at the mercy of the fleets which issue from the Gulf of Finland. The Scandinavian nations, but for the protection of the Anglo-French squadrons, would be effectually checked by the naval force of Russia in the Baltic; and without the same intervention

her command of the Black Sea is absolute and complete. It is worse than idle to talk of a Power in such a position, and actually exercising such a sway, as weak for purposes of offence. With her own centre of Government geographically remote and comparatively inaccessible, she can cast all her strength into her extremities, and in these she holds ready-made approaches to some of the leading capitals of Continental Europe. If such is her position and her power now, what would it be if she were allowed to entail upon herself the rich inheritance of the Ottoman Porte? The inaccessibility of her northern and more barren dominions is an admitted element of her present strength. With the possession of Constantinople she would not only add to her dominion some of the richest provinces of Europe, and the absolute command of all the commerce of the Danube and the Euxine, but she would secure for these possessions an impregnability such as physical geography has never before lent to any empire in the world. How long such an empire would hold together is a question which, however interesting, is not one of any immediate bearing. If we are to speculate on some distant future, it is not probable that Russia, even in her present vast extent, will continue for ever under a single Government. But there is nothing in the countries or the peoples of European Turkey which may not for an indefinite period of time readily fall under the sway and add to the resources of a great military Empire.

And if politically the influence upon Europe of such an Empire would be dangerous and oppressive, what would be its influence on morals and religion? Other great empires have compensated mankind for many evils by the spread of noble languages or the planting of invaluable laws. But Russia,—what has she to give? The superficial civilisation which she is herself capable of receiving is borrowed from the nations which she aspires to govern, and the peoples whom she already ventures to control. The despotism of her political system is not sustained by any sentiment of intelligent loyalty; but rests rather on the superstitious subjection of the barbarous East. Her religious intolerance is unfortunately more after our old western type, yet standing in closer alliance with irresistible means of temporal oppression. Her dominion threatens at once the progress of political freedom and of religious truth with a terrible combination of the powers of Pope and Czar.

We decline to follow the arguments of Lord Grey and of Mr. Cobden in respect to the corruption of the Turkish Government, or the ultimate fate of Mussulman dominion in Europe, simply because they are wholly irrelevant to the question at

issue. There is but one relevant inference from the assertions of those speakers, even if they were all admitted, and that is the difficulties of a contest in support of Turkey. This may be and was an excellent reason for trying to avoid that contest, if the essential object could be peacefully obtained. But it is no reason for declining that contest when all other measures failed. Obligations do not cease to be obligations on account of being onerous.

We willingly admit that much that has been said on the other side has been equally irrelevant, and, for the most part, far more untrue. There may be much hope of the regeneration of Turkey, if it be not suffered to fall into the hands of Russia; we have no belief in the regeneration of the Turks. This, however, matters little. That great question, whatever may be the truth in regard to it, is one which Russia has no right to take upon herself to solve. It is the disposal of those countries—not the fate of that race or Government—that is the real object of European interest and concern. The remarkable and enduring courage which the Turks have ever shown, and which was never more remarkably displayed than at the present moment, calls for the sympathy and admiration of Europe. Under the influence of this feeling we may at moments be almost tempted to doubt the truth of conclusions which have long been firmly established in the popular mind of Christendom, and which are unconsciously betrayed even in the smooth phrases of diplomacy. Nor is it perhaps untrue that the elements of vitality may be stronger than they appear to those who judge by a standard which in some respects may not be strictly applicable. But it is impossible to mistake the permanent operation of causes which no armies can resist, and no diplomacy control. They date from a long distant past; they are tending, perhaps, to a not distant future. Their working is written as legibly on past history and on existing facts as was the handwriting of old on the Babylonian wall. Meanwhile that Empire is serving no unimportant ends. In respect to religion, equal toleration towards all Christian sects is not less valuable because it may have been founded on indiscriminate contempt. It has been the policy of Turkey during her days of power; and it may yet be established, on better principles, under the shadow of her decline. This is no small advantage. It is one which would be much endangered—sad as it may be to say so—if the Government of that country fell into some ‘Christian’ hands. Again, as regards civil government, the system of the Porte, bad and corrupt as it may be in many ways, has yet been found compatible with the rise of a rich and

increasing commerce. That commerce is almost exclusively in the hands of its Christian subjects. To their gradual improvement and amalgamation in the course of time, and the natural progress of events, we had looked for the peaceful solution of a question, of which the very prospect has long perplexed the world. But whether it be now precipitated in the shock of a general war, or whether it be yet allowed to work itself out, from natural causes, at least one thing, we trust, has been now secured. In either case that great problem with which so many historical interests are connected, and on which so many future interests depend, will engage the active intervention and concern of united Europe. No one Power will be allowed to steal or to force a march on the capital of the East. In war we cannot doubt that the allied forces will be able to enforce their determination against Russian aggression. In peace, Turkey has now formally demanded to be admitted within the circle of European Treaties, and to be afforded the protection of its international system. At one of the late Conferences of Vienna the Four Powers gave it as a reason for rejecting the last proposals of Russia that they were incompatible with the principle of this demand. So far, therefore, it has received their sanction. But Europe, in accepting such an obligation, will accept along with it another obligation also. For we agree with the able Minister who is the representative of England at Constantinople, that 'with a view to the condition of the non-Mussulman communities in this Empire, and the development of those resources on which the Porte's independence must ever mainly rest, it would not be safe to hedge round the Ottoman Empire with European guarantees, unless the Porte engaged at the same time to realise and extend her system of improved administration in good earnest.'\*

ART. II.—1. *An Act for the Suppression of Drinking Houses and Tippling Shops.* Passed by the Legislature of the State of Maine, June 2. 1851. Portland, U. S.: 1851.

2. *An Act to prevent the Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors.* Passed by the Legislature of New Brunswick, April 7. 1852. Fredericton: 1852.

3. *Discourse on behalf of a Law prohibiting the Liquor Traffic.* By the Rev. H. BARNES of Philadelphia. London: 1852.



4. *The Physiology of Temperance.* By W. CARPENTER, M.D. London: 1853.
5. *Autobiography of J. B. Gough.* London: 1852.
6. *The Temperance Cyclopædia.* By the Rev. W. REID. Glasgow: 1851.
7. *Scottish Temperance Prize Tracts.* Glasgow: 1853.
8. *Temperance Hymns*, 4th edition. London: 1853.
9. *An Essay on Solomon's Use of Wine.* London: 1853.
10. *Harmony of Teetotalism with the Divine Word.* Leeds: 1853.
11. *American Prize Essay.* By the Rev. H. KITCHEL. London: 1853.
12. *Maine-Law Tracts.* London: 1853.

IT is said, that when a youthful member of Parliament scoffed at a certain popular movement as 'a mere tea-party agitation,' a veteran statesman silenced him by the retort, that 'every great measure for the last thirty years had been carried by 'tea-party agitation.' This dictum was, of course, exaggerated. The Reform Bill, and Catholic Emancipation, are two obvious exceptions. Yet, with all deductions, there remains enough of truth in the assertion to point the moral, which warns us against despising a storm in a tea cup.

In recognising this characteristic of our times, we are far from thinking that it reflects any discredit on the epoch to which it applies. On the contrary, it is a sure proof of advancing civilisation, when political triumphs can be won by peaceful speeches and philanthropic tracts. Such victories bespeak an age of softened manners and kindly feelings. Nor can a pervading sense of religion and morality be wanting in the community which can thus be moved by appeals addressed to its love of mercy, truth, and righteousness.

It must be owned, however, that there are certain ludicrous features connected with these amiable agitations. Platform oratory is among their necessary elements; and this, of course, involves large and repeated doses of bombastic declamation, illogical argument, and maudlin sentimentality. And if such ingredients flavour other movements which derive their force from the mild inspiration of the tea table, much more may we expect to find them in that where tea supplies the very sinews of war, and furnishes both the watchword of the camp, and the motto on the banners. It is true, that the absurdity of the advocates does not prove the absurdity of their cause. The grotesque antics of vulgar agitators could not make the crusade

against slavery contemptible, nor render free trade permanently ridiculous. Yet, even a statue of Phidias may be disguised by a drapery of motley. The best of causes may be so travestied by the imbecility of its champions as to wear for a time the colour of their livery. And the follies often perpetrated by the advocates of Temperance have been so preeminently extravagant, that we cannot wonder if they have made the name of Teatotalism almost synonymous with Monomania in the opinion of the majority of their countrymen.

These follies may be classed under two heads; first, the isolated eccentricities of individuals; and, secondly, the absurdities which occur in publications sanctioned by the whole Society. Follies of the former kind are incidental to every similar movement; it is only the latter class which can justly injure the character of the collective association.

Thus it would not be fair to charge Teatotalers, as a body, with the responsibility of endorsing the following argument, which was used upon one of their platforms to prove the pernicious character of alcohol:—

‘I offered a glass of spirits to a dog (said the speaker), and he turned tail upon it—to a donkey, he curled up his lips and brayed at it—to a sow, and she grunted at it—to a horse, and he snorted at it—to a cow, and she showed her horns at it. And shall that be good for man, which beasts won’t touch? which a cow horns at, a horse snorts at, a sow grunts at, a donkey brays at, and a dog turns tail at? Oh, no.’\*

This was only the effusion of an individual, which must not be ascribed to the society of which he was a member. And so it would be a mistake to conclude, because a certain Teatotal champion signs himself ‘yours in the bonds of total abstinence,’ that therefore his brethren have abandoned the signatures of ordinary mortals.

Again, if the announcements of ‘female temperance meetings’ wear somewhat of a farcial appearance, still we have no right to intrude with Clodius into the secret assemblies of the sex; even though we may feel tempted to profane the mysteries, when we catch through door or window such fragments as the following:

‘Temperance Sisters! now we meet  
In our hallowed cause to greet  
All who feel for drunken men,  
All who pledge, and cry *Abstain!*

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\* A writer in Blackwood’s Magazine for April 1853 asserts that he heard this at a Teatotal meeting.

‘*Temperance Sisters! onward go,  
Think of myriads sunk in woe,  
Be determined, ne’er refrain,  
Urge the pledge, and cry Abstain!*

‘*Temperance Sisters! firm unite,  
Keep your armour ever bright;  
Till the monster foul is slain  
Urge the pledge, and cry Abstain!*

(*Temperance Hymns*, 31.)

‘*Ye Sarahs, now arise;  
Ye Miriams, come forth!  
With Hannahs, truly wise,  
Now prove your genuine worth.  
No power like yours, save that above,  
To teach sobriety and love.’*

(*Ibid.* 38.)

It is true, that no one can be expected to maintain his gravity when he first hears at a Temperance meeting the teatotal phrases of popular ditties; when, for example, he recognises Moore’s well-known melody disguised as follows:—

‘*Where is the drunkard lowly,  
Condemned to chains unholy,  
Who, could he burst  
His chains at first,  
Would pine beneath them slowly?*

‘*What soul, when wine degrades it,  
Would wait till time decayed it,  
When our plighted vow  
Would free it now,  
And please the God who made it?  
Then ere in guilt you sink  
Away with maddening drink!’*

(*Ibid.* 75.)

But after all, the Teatotalers are not the inventors of this fashion of divorcing airs long married to Bacchanalian verse, and wedding them anew to graver strains. In this they have only followed the example set them by Rowland Hill, and other divines of still older date.

Such casual and incidental eccentricities reflect (we repeat) no discredit on the leaders of the Temperance agitation. But they may be justly reproached, in so far as they have sanctioned the systematic use of bad arguments and uncharitable invective, in the authorised publications of their body. It is because we mourn over the national vice of intemperance, and admire the benevolence of those who are striving so earnestly to extirpate it,

that we regret they should countenance exaggerations which repel the sober-minded more than they stimulate the fanatical. It is not for the sake of diminishing their zeal, but of inducing them to crown it with discretion, that we proceed to mention instances where that quality has been wanting in their proceedings.

First, then, a reasonable advocate for abstinence from intoxicating liquors will content himself with asserting that the harm done by these agents exceeds any good which they can possibly accomplish; and, therefore, that the world would be a gainer if their use were abandoned. But very few Teatotalers are content with this rational mode of defending their position. Every species of fermented drink, every liquid containing the slightest admixture of alcohol—be it only a spoonful in a gallon—must be pronounced actual poison, on pain of excommunication. A speaker at a Temperance meeting, who should venture to express a doubt of this fundamental verity, would find as little mercy as Mr. Gorham from a synod of Tractarians, or Dr. Pusey from a convention of the Protestant Alliance. To illustrate this, we abridge from one of the organs of Teatotalism the following account of a periodical meeting held last year at Birmingham:—

‘The usual festival of the Birmingham Temperance Society was held in the Town Hall, on Easter Monday. 600 persons sat down to tea. Mr. A. Bird, the chairman of the Society, occupied the chair. After tea, the chairman proceeded to address the meeting; and so far forgot his position as to contend that *a glass of ale would do a man no harm*, and that it *was not poison (!)*. He was followed by the two Messrs. Cadbury, who both ably refuted the strange assertions of the chairman. [After reporting the other proceedings of the meeting, the editor subjoins]: We understand that the chairman has since resigned his position, if not his membership, in the Society. Indeed, it appeared to be full time. He is either ‘a very silly person, or was acting a very disgraceful part.’ (*Progressionist*, No. 17.)

From this toxicological doctrine, the more strenuous Teatotalers (forgetting that all medicines are poisons) very illogically infer that alcohol can never be useful in medical treatment. Hence the abuse of the medical profession for prescribing it, is a favourite theme in their assemblies. We have ourselves heard a teatotal orator relate with approbation the conduct of a female abstainer, who, when her child was ordered port wine, during a recovery from typhus, had administered raspberry vinegar instead. ‘If people can’t live without alcohol,’ said the enthusiastic sponter, ‘why then I say, let ’em dic.’ It is fair,

however, to add that this latter folly is discountenanced by the more educated members of the Society.

The motive which leads Teatotalers to insist so obstinately on this doctrine of poison, is their desire to prevent even the smallest indulgence in fermented liquors. They know from experience that moderation is impossible to the drunkard; and in their anxiety to reclaim him, they would persuade the world that moderation in the use of liquor is in itself an impossibility. Thus they assert *moderate drinking* to be an expression as self-contradictory as *moderate lying* or *moderate stealing*. Indeed, the more zealous members of the sect show far greater abhorrence for moderate drinkers than for actual drunkards. The latter are represented as victims, the former as seducers; the drunkard being tempted into guilt by the example of the moderate. This is illustrated by the following comparison: —

‘A father amused his children by pretending to swallow a knife, enjoining them not to repeat the operation. When he retired, one of the younger children attempted to imitate him, was injured, and died. Every one blames the father, and justly.’ (*Scotch Tracts*, 8.)

Moreover, the moderate drinkers are described as so heartlessly selfish that they prefer their own sensual indulgence to the salvation of their brethren. They are introduced dramatically expressing their feelings towards their drunken fellow-creatures, as follows: —

‘We pity thee, poor drunkard, and we tremble lest thy soul  
Should be sacrificed and perish through the Bacchanalian bowl;  
And we fain would snatch thee from the bane which would thy  
spirit slay,  
But *e’en for thy soul’s sake, we will not fling our drink away.*’  
(*Ibid.* p. 7.)

If the poor *moderate* remonstrates against this hard judgment and pleads that he has been in the habit of taking a glass of ale with his dinner for the last thirty years, and that it would now be a great sacrifice to give it up, he is answered: —

‘No one would feel it a great sacrifice to give up strong drink who had not acquired a *love* to the liquor. *Any one* who has got so far, is on the high road to intemperance. Reader, if this be your case, we implore you to cast the Circean cup away. Fling it from you, as you would a viper which is aiming at your life, a scorpion preparing to sting your soul.’ (*Ibid.* p. 6.)

It is, indeed, high time to follow this advice, if, as we are told in another tract, ‘the use of intoxicating agents *invariably* tends to engender a *burning thirst for more.*’ So that —

‘He who indulges in them shall do it at the peril of contracting

a passionate and rabid thirst for them, which shall ultimately overmaster the will of its victim, and drag him unresisting to his ruin. *No man can put himself under the influence of alcoholic stimulation without incurring the risk of this result.* (*American Prize Essay*, p. 15.)

So that every man who has once swallowed a glass of wine, must 'invariably' become either an entire drunkard, or a total abstainer.\*

We learn also that the most moderate of drinkers is guilty of daily idolatry. For —

'It may be said of the Christian professor who takes fermented liquor in this enlightened age, as the inspired historian says of Solomon, that *he does not fully follow the Lord* (1 Kings, 11.). For though he does not go after Ashtaroth, Chemosh, and Moloch, yet he daily sacrifices to Bacchus, the drunkard's god. And the consequence of divine anger will be as serious as it was to Solomon and his descendants, with the people over whom they reigned.' (Jer. ix. 10.)  
(*Essay on Solomon's Use of Wine*, p. 15.)

The argument of this last extract can only be paralleled by that of the French drinking song which tells us that: —

'Tous les méchants sont buveurs d'eau ;  
C'est bien prouvé par le déluge.'


After the above statements it will not surprise us to learn from the same writers that even the salvation of the moderate is imperilled by their tampering with the demon of drink. So the Temperance hymnist exclaims: —

'Help us to show each hidden snare,  
To rescue custom's slave,  
To snatch the drunkard from despair,  
And moderate drinkers save.'

(*Hymn 2.*)

Nay, so nearly desperate is the condition of this lukewarm class, that their guilt is pronounced equal to that of the sellers of intoxicating liquors themselves: —

\* The 'Temperance Advocate' (a paper published in New Brunswick) is rather more moderate: 'We admit' (says the editor) 'that there are some men *possessing master minds*, who may be able to control appetite.' (*T. A.*, Jan. 18. 1854.) This newspaper is described in the heading at the top of its columns as 'Devoted to Temperance, Virtue, Literature, and General News;' a delicious anticlimax, which is followed by the Teatotal Arms, consisting of a bottle

rampant, menaced by a hammer, thus:—

‘We ask you (says one of these tracts to its reader) are you a total abstainer from all strong drinks? For, until you are, you are as culpable in supporting other men in a wicked calling, as though you conducted it yourself.’ (*Scotch Tracts*, 11.)

The full force of this denunciation will be better understood, when we give a specimen or two of the tremendous anathemas hurled by the Temperance press against the nefarious men who are engaged in this branch of commerce:—

‘The dealer [in liquor] is a trader in tears, blood, and crime. His shop is a repository, where all the immoralities and iniquities are kept, and sold on commission from the pit. . . . . He knows that if men remain virtuous and thrifty, his craft cannot prosper. But if the *virus* of drink can only be made to work, swift desolation will come of it, and every pang will bring him pelf. Each broken heart will net him so much cash; so much from each blasted home,—so much a widow,—so much an orphan . . . . . There *are* profits, doubtless. Death finds it the most liberal purveyor for his horrid banquet; Hell from beneath is moved with delight at the fast coming profits of the trade; and the Dealer also gets gain. Death Hell, and the Dealer—beyond this partnership none are profited.’ (*American Prize Essay*, 28.)

‘These wretches’ (says an orator at Cincinnati), ‘for such they are, feel proud that they have reduced a fellow creature to the level of the brute, and stifled, perhaps for ever, each elevated sentiment of his nature. From an example so pregnant with horror, the arch-fiend himself would revolt, and hurry howling back to his native hell. . . . . If on the morrow he (the speaker) were to fall, and again become a drunken idiot, would not the public-house-keepers be rejoiced, and throw up their hats and shout, until the infernal imps in the nethermost hell would waken up, and wonder why their ancients were creating so terrific an uproar.’ (*Maine Tracts*, No. 4.)

After this, we cannot wonder at the doom which is denounced in the Temperance hymn-book, against Messrs. Bass, Alsop, and their coadjutors:—

‘Warn the *makers* of strong drink,  
And the *sellers*, lest they sink,  
With an aggravated doom,  
To perdition’s deepest gloom.’

(*Hymn* 153.)

It might naturally be expected that men so far gone in iniquity would not scruple at increasing their gains by adulterating their produce. Yet we should have thought they might have found a cheaper ingredient for their purpose than vitriol, which we learn with dismay that they habitually employ, according to the following statement:—

‘A poor woman, having gone into a spirit shop a short time since

to buy a glass of spirits, spilt a little of it on a shoulder of mutton, which was in a basket in her hand. On reaching home, she found a black hole burnt in the meat, where the droppings of the spirit glass had fallen upon it; and thus detected the presence of *vitriol*.’ (*Scotch Tracts*, 3.)

The above example of Teatotal argumentation may be regarded as simply laughable. But when the advocates of temperance, in their zeal to prove the divine right of abstinence, insist upon demonstrating their principles from Scripture, they too often become profane as well as ridiculous. We will not refer, in this connexion, to the doctrines taught by some among them concerning the marriage-feast of Cana, and the Holy Communion; but will content ourselves, as far as the New Testament is concerned, with the following specimen of their biblical interpretation. Every reader of the Epistles must remember the passage where St. Paul warns the Colossians against adopting those Jewish ordinances which forbade the ‘touching, tasting, or handling’ of certain kinds of food. A friend of ours once told us on his return from a Temperance meeting, that he had heard a speaker refer to this passage as prohibiting fermented liquors. ‘They tell us,’ said the orator, ‘that we have no Scripture warrant for total abstinence. They forget St. Paul’s command to the Colossians, *Touch not, Taste not, Handle not*. Can anything be plainer or more positive?’ We confess we hardly believed this anecdote, but supposed that our friend must have misunderstood the speaker. To our great surprise, however, on looking over a bundle of Temperance tracts and hymns, we found the text in question actually thus applied, not once only, but frequently.\*

It must be said, however, in excuse for these perversions of Scripture, that some of the silliest have been provoked by equal folly in the opponents of Teatotalism, who drag both the New Testament and the Old into the controversy, and draw from each, but especially from the latter, the most illogical conclusions. Thus some have been weak enough to argue that it must be right for a Christian to drink wine, because such was the practice of Noah, David, and Solomon. To this argument, so far as it refers to the latter monarch, one of the teatotal champions replies as follows:—

‘When did Solomon take to wine of the fermented species? When did he give himself to it? When did he make the dangerous experiment of investigating the properties of alcoholic liquor by a personal use of it? Did he do this in youth, in manhood, or in old age? To this interrogative it may be replied, that it appears

\* See, for example, *Scotch Tracts*, 9; and *Hymn Book*, 152.



that Solomon made the experiment in question in his advanced years, and within the last seven or eight of his reign. I acknowledge that this statement cannot be demonstrated, but there are some circumstances stated in the biographical notice of Solomon in the Old Testament, which sanction the supposition . . . . . He was an eminent naturalist, botanist, and horticulturist. He understood the nature and the peculiarities of the fruits of Palestine better than any other man. And it cannot be questioned that he obtained a *must* from that fruit which, when fermented, yielded a more delicate and superior-flavoured alcoholic wine than can be found in the cellars of Buckingham Palace or Windsor Castle. . . . . Under these circumstances, under the exciting influence of alcoholic liquors, it is probable, it is highly probable, that Solomon sanctioned the erection of the High Places for Chemosh, Ashtaroth, and Moloch; and licensed the idolatrous worship of his wives; and even out of his own purse contributed to the support of their idolatry. And under the same influence he doubtless committed all the unlawful acts that he was guilty of.\*

As a set-off against Solomon's inebriety, the same author cites an opposite precedent, no less royal and equally scriptural, in the firm abstinence of King Lemuel.

'It is not for kings, O Lemuel, it is not for kings to drink wine, nor for princes strong drink. These were the words of King Lemuel, the prophecy that his mother taught him. (Prov. xxxi. 1-4.) Lemuel was probably the ruler of some country near the land of Judæa; who, when on a visit to Solomon, might relate the circumstance of having been brought up a Teatotaler; which interesting fact is recorded in the Book of Proverbs, and shows that many centuries ago there were other kings, as well as Solomon, who had been brought up Teatotalers, among whom Lemuel was one. Happy Lemuel! more happy in being brought up a Teatotaler than in being born heir to a kingdom.' †

Another writer goes further, and carries the war into the enemy's country, by proving from the book of Genesis (i. 29.) that it is sinful to turn a solid into a liquid.

'The process of manufacturing alcoholic drink by brewing and fermenting, not only manifests discontent with the finished dietetic arrangements of God, but it involves a direct and needless violation of the divine law. . . . . Men foolishly inquire, why God gives us the barley and the grape? For *meat*, says Scripture, not *drink*; and therefore it is solid. What a strange insanity to suppose the Creator to grow a solid which the creature must convert into fluid before it is usable.' ‡

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\* Essay on Solomon's Use of Wine, p. 14.

† Ibid. v. 30.

‡ Harmony of Teatotalism with the Divine Word, p. 19.

This is surely an unfortunate argument in the mouth of a teatotaler, considering that coffee is the favourite beverage of the most orthodox abstainers. We can only hope that the writer himself has the consistency to abstain from this *fluidisation* of a natural solid; and that he either grinds the berries of Mocha between his teeth, or (which would be more strictly logical) swallows them as pills.

Such follies as these (of which we might give many more examples if it were necessary or desirable) are so generally diffused through the writings and speeches of the abstainers, that the Temperance movement is identified with them by the world at large. And probably nine people out of ten believe every teatotaler to be a fool. Yet this contemptuous conclusion is falsified by facts. Both in England and in America some of the leaders are men of great ability; and what is more, are sober-minded reasoners, who can state their views with moderation, and defend them without either eccentricity or extravagance. It is only to be lamented, that they want the moral courage to rebuke openly the indiscretion of their followers. In America the political results which they have accomplished, in shrewd and calculating New England, may be accepted as sufficient evidence of their common sense. And on that side of the Atlantic, their views are advocated by such writers as Mrs. Stowe, the authoress of *Uncle Tom*, and Mr. Barnes the commentator, whose works, though less celebrated than hers, have also obtained a European reputation. In England their cause is defended with considerable power of reasoning by Dr. Carpenter, a medical writer, whose professional eminence is proved by his appointment as medical examiner in the University of London.

Nor are even the public meetings of Teatotalism scenes of unmitigated folly. From water-drinkers on provincial platforms we have heard speeches full of good sense and manly English feeling. We have heard working men set forth the benefits of Temperance with rude but genuine eloquence; and have marked the effect produced upon their audience by the strong and living argument of their personal experience. 'See what it has done for me' was their most effectual eulogy of the system. We have convinced ourselves by a private inquiry that these speeches were not empty claptrap; but that the speakers had borne a good character for many years, and thriven by steady industry, and by a wise investment of those gains which their fellow workmen lavished in sensual indulgence. This was ascertained from the testimony of their neighbours; the evidence of one's eyes and ears gave proof enough that their water diet had not hindered the fullest development of lungs and muscle. It was impossible not to

feel that the existence of a few such sturdy and prosperous converts fully accounted for the rapid spread of *Teatotalism* among the labouring classes.

The opinions which are popularly designated by this strange term\* may be summed up in two propositions; the first being that the world in general would be benefited by disuse of fermented liquors; and the second asserting that it is the duty of every individual to abstain from these stimulants. We shall endeavour to give an impartial view of the arguments for each of these propositions. The former is maintained as the necessary result of evidence which demonstrates that intoxicating drinks injure the health, exhaust the resources, and cause the crimes of the people. Let us then, in the first place, examine the sanitary portion of the question.

As to the deleterious effects of intoxication all medical authorities are agreed. And probably there are few who would deny the assertion of Sir A. Cooper, that '*spirits and poisons* are synonymous terms:' indeed, as the distilled spirits commonly drunk contain more than 50 per cent. of pure alcohol, and as a pint of alcohol is sufficient to kill a man on the spot, it seems no misnomer to call such compounds poisonous. And though other intoxicating beverages contain a much smaller proportion of alcohol (wine containing about 20 per cent., ale and cider about 7 per cent.) yet, when they are taken in sufficient quantities to produce actual intoxication, the alcoholic ingredient has obviously exercised a noxious influence on the system. Hence we should *à priori* expect that habitual drunkenness would shorten life; and this expectation is borne out by experience. Thus in the report of the chaplain to the Preston House of correction for 1847, a statement of Mr. Hayes the coroner is given to the effect that; 'excluding inquests on children and colliery accidents, 'nine tenths of the inquests he has held during the last twenty 'years have been on persons whose deaths are attributable to 'drinking.' So out of 1,500 inquests annually held in the western division of Middlesex, 900 are attributed by the coroner to hard drinking.

\* The name *Teatotalism* is said to have originated in the stammering of a speaker at a Temperance meeting, who declared that, 'nothing would satisfy him but Tea-total abstinence.' The audience eagerly caught up the pun, and the name was adopted by the champions of the cause. We observe that they have now taken to spell it *Tee-total*, instead of *Tea-total*; but they had far better give up the name altogether. The pun, no doubt, is poor enough; but the new spelling makes the adoption of the term seem like absolute imbecility.

Where it fails to kill, this vice causes the most frightful diseases, especially in the nervous system, on which alcohol exerts a peculiar action. One of the most common of these, and perhaps the most terrible, is *delirium tremens*, the effects of which are described as follows by one of its victims:—

‘For three days I endured more agony than pen could describe, even were it guided by the hand of a Dante. Who can tell the horrors of that horrible malady, aggravated as it is by the almost ever-abiding consciousness that it is self-sought? Hideous faces appeared on the walls, and on the ceiling, and on the floors; foul things crept along the bed-clothes, and glaring eyes peered into mine. I was at one time surrounded by millions of monstrous spiders, who crawled slowly—slowly, over every limb; whilst beaded drops of perspiration would start to my brow, and my limbs would shiver until the bed rattled again. Strange lights would dance before my eyes, and then suddenly the very blackness of darkness would appal me by its dense gloom. All at once, whilst gazing at a frightful creation of my distempered mind, I seemed struck with sudden blindness. I knew a candle was burning in the room—but I could not see it. All was so pitchy dark. I lost the sense of feeling too, for I endeavoured to grasp my arm in one hand, but consciousness was gone. I put my hand to my side, my head, but felt nothing, and still I knew my limbs and frame *were* there. And then the scene would change. I was falling—falling swiftly as an arrow far down into some terrible abyss; and so like reality was it, that as I fell I could see the rocky sides of the horrible shaft, where mocking, gibing, fiend-like forms were perched; and I could feel the air rushing past me, making my hair stream out by the force of the unwholesome blast. Then the paroxysm sometimes ceased for a few moments, and I would sink back on my pallet drenched with perspiration, utterly exhausted, and feeling a dreadful certainty of the renewal of my torments.’ (*Gough’s Biography*, p. 19.)

We find from the Registrar-general’s reports, that no less than 500 persons die annually of *delirium tremens* in England, and of course a far larger number are attacked by the disease. Besides this, a very great proportion of insanity is caused by drunkenness. This proportion is stated by Dr. Carpenter as being about 27 per cent. in the Edinburgh Lunatic Asylum, 25 per cent. in that of Glasgow, 17 per cent. in that of Aberdeen, 50 per cent. in that of Dublin, and 32 per cent. in nine private asylums which he mentions.\* On the whole, probably one third of the insanity in the country may be set down to intemperance. Idiocy also is often due to the same agency: the children of drunkards being very frequently idiotic. Thus in a report lately

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\* Carpenter, p. 53.

made to the legislature of Massachusetts, it is stated that out of 300 idiots, 145 were the children of habitual drunkards.

It is needless, however, to dwell long on the proofs that intoxication injures health; a truth which is almost universally acknowledged. The controversy between the advocates of total abstinence and their opponents is on a different question; namely, whether the habitual use of alcoholic stimulants is noxious or beneficial to those who indulge moderately therein; who drink, but are not drunken. For the indictment, it is argued that an agent such as alcohol, which contains the elements of no bodily tissue or fluid, cannot benefit the healthy body. And further, that it cannot be simply harmless, because it exercises a marked chemical effect upon the components of the body. It must therefore be noxious, when the system is in its normal state; and if at any time beneficial, can be so only as a remedy for some abnormal condition. It is acknowledged that alcohol acts as a powerful stimulus upon the muscular and nervous systems, and that it thus revives the flagging powers, and enables a man, when exhausted by fatigue, to renew his exertions, and do double work. But it is contended that this temporary advantage is more than neutralised by the subsequent reaction of languor and depression which must inevitably follow. It is admitted, however, that there are special emergencies when it is worth while, for the sake of accomplishing a pressing object, to encounter this necessary result. But the habitual use of such a stimulus must (it is alleged) be ultimately injurious, unless it be needed as a corrective for some permanent disorder. 'What good,' says Dr. Carpenter, 'can arise from habitually exciting an organ that is already in a state of healthful activity? It would be as rational for a man who already sleeps soundly through the whole night to take an habitual narcotic.' The effect of such treatment on the digestive organs is to increase the appetite artificially, and thereby to cause the consumption of more food than the system requires. As to the result upon the nervous system, the same writer tells us that 'an habitual course of over-exertion may be maintained for a longer time with the assistance of alcoholic stimulants than without them; and thus the delusion is kept up that the strength is not really over-tasked; when the fact is, the prolongation of the term of over-exertion by the repeated application of the stimulus is really expending more and more of the powers of the nervous system and preparing for a more complete prostration hereafter.' The effect of alcohol in accelerating the circulation is also likely (it is argued) to produce evil effects, by occasioning a tendency to local congestions, and increasing any natural irregularity of the circulation. Moreover,

since the presence of alcohol in the blood obstructs the removal of the fatty matter, it is probable that the 'fatty degeneration' of the tissues, which causes some of the worst diseases of advanced life, is promoted by the habitual use of alcoholic liquors.

These arguments are answered by high medical authorities on the other side of the question as follows. First, they admit that fermented drinks do no good in the long run, because if by stimulation they supply any extra vigour, it is only borrowed from the future. Secondly, they allow that if the habitual use of beverages in a moderate quantity did cause an habitually recurring stimulus, it might possibly tend eventually to produce morbid action, and to develop disease. But thirdly, they deny that the daily consumption of two or three glasses of wine or ale is felt by a healthy man as any stimulus at all. No perceptible excitation is thereby produced, and no reaction follows. Hence they conclude that fermented liquors, taken constantly in small quantities, are perfectly harmless to a sound constitution. And they add that, though no benefit results from them where the system is in its normal condition, yet that where there is a weakness in the digestive organs, these beverages exert a beneficial action, by increasing the power of the stomach to appropriate the aliment needed by the body. This latter use of alcoholic stimulants is fully admitted by Dr. Carpenter, and by all other rational advocates of total abstinence, although denied by the fanatical partisans whom we have formerly quoted. Dr. Carpenter also acknowledges the medical utility of alcohol in cases of temporary shock, in the stage of convalescence from fevers, and in some other cases.

Thus it would seem, upon the whole, that the difference between physicians as to the sanitary view of the question is less than is usually supposed. All appear to agree that, on the one hand, alcoholic liquors are not needed by the healthy system\*, and that, on the other, they are useful remedies in certain morbid conditions. But the teatotal doctors assert that entire abstinence from alcohol (except when medicinally employed) will make men healthier than the moderate use of it; while their opponents contend that the health of the moderate and the abstinent will, *cæteris paribus*, be equal.

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\* 2000 medical men (among whom are Sir B. Brodie, Sir J. Clarke, and others of great eminence) have signed a certificate which has been published, declaring their opinion that 'total abstinence from intoxicating beverages would greatly conduce to the health, the prosperity, the morality, and the happiness of the human race.'

It is not easy to bring this dispute to the test of practical experience; for there are, as yet, no separate teatotal life insurances, nor does the Registrar-general distinguish the deaths of abstainers from those of other men. We have only seen one document which furnishes any statistical evidence bearing upon the question. This is a Government Return of the sickness and mortality of the European troops in the Madras Army for the year 1849. In this return the soldiers are classed under the three heads of *Total Abstainers*, *Temperate*, and *Intemperate*. Dr. Carpenter gives the tabular statements, which are striking. The result is, that the annual deaths of the teatotalers were in the proportion of 11 in 1000; of the Temperate, 23 in 1000; and of the Intemperate, 44 in 1000. In other words, the deaths of the *Intemperate* were four times as numerous, and the deaths of the *Temperate* were twice as numerous, as the deaths of the *Abstainers*. The teatotalers of course exult in this confirmation of their views. But it is obvious that we cannot implicitly rely on a general conclusion which rests upon so limited an induction. We must admit, however that the advantage of this debate remains, on the whole, rather with the assailants of alcohol than with its defenders. For the latter allow that a teatotaler will be not less healthy than a moderate drinker, while the former affirm that he will be far more healthy. Thus they have the same superiority over their opponents which Henri Quatre ascribed to the Catholics over the Huguenots, when the Romanist denied the salvability of the Protestant, while the Protestant admitted the salvability of the Romanist.

But whatever doubt may be entertained concerning the effect of strong drink on the physical health of the population, its noxious influence on their moral health admits of no dispute. This will be at once allowed by every one who has the slightest knowledge of the labouring classes. Yet we confess that we were not prepared to find so overwhelming a proportion of crime directly caused by intemperance; and we think the Temperance Society has done good service by the evidence which it has published on this branch of the subject. The testimonies of the Judges are strikingly unanimous and conclusive.\* Thus Judge Coleridge says—‘There is scarcely a crime comes before me that is not, directly or indirectly, caused by strong drink.’ Judge Patteson observes to a grand jury—‘If it were not for this drinking, you and I would have nothing to do.’ Judge Alderson says—‘Drunkenness is the most fertile cause of crime; if it were removed,

\* See a paper entitled *Intemperance the Cause of Crime* in the proceedings of the Temperance Convention. London, 1846.

‘this large calendar would become a very small one.’ Judge Wightman says — ‘I find in this, as in every calendar, one un-failing cause of four fifths of the crimes is the sin of drunkenness.’ Judge Erskine goes further, declaring (at Salisbury, in 1844) that ‘ninety-nine cases out of every hundred’ are from the same cause. A more recent testimony to the same effect has been invested with a mournful solemnity. It was given literally with the expiring breath of Judge Talfourd. In the charge with which he opened the last Stafford Assizes, after lamenting the unusual heaviness of the calendar, and the atrocity of the offences therein contained, he went on to say that these crimes might in most cases be traced to the vice of intemperance. He lamented the degraded state which this implied in the working classes, and spoke strongly of the duty incumbent on the higher ranks to endeavour by kindness and sympathy to wean their poorer neighbours from such sordid sensuality. He was still dwelling with great energy on this subject, when he was silenced by the stroke of death. Would that his dying words might find an echo in the hearts of his countrymen.

To these statements respecting England, may be added evidence from Scotland, which shows that its case is similar or worse. One of the Judges at the Circuit Court of Glasgow stated that out of eighty criminals sentenced to punishment, almost every one had committed his crime through the influence of intoxicating liquors. So the chaplain’s report of the Glasgow prison for 1845 affirms that ‘to the habit of drunkenness may be traced the offences of at least three fourths of those that come to prison.’ The Governors of a large number of prisons both in England, Scotland, and Ireland, give similar evidence. Again, every one must have remarked that the numerous cases of woman-beating which have come before the police courts under a recent Act, are occasioned by the brutalising effect of the same agency. These conclusions are corroborated by the concurrent opinion of all the witnesses examined by the late Admiralty Committee, which was appointed to consider the propriety of diminishing the issue of spirits to the Navy. These witnesses were naval officers of various grades, not likely to be prejudiced in favour of Teatotalism.\* But they all agreed in the opinion, that a state either of actual intoxication, or of irritability arising out of half drunkenness, causes from three fourths to nine tenths of the punishments incurred on board ships of war. The Committee in consequence recommended that the allowance of spirits should be reduced one half; and Dr.

\* 50 witnesses were examined, of whom 45 held various grades in the Royal Navy.



Carpenter states, on the authority of the admiral commanding the Mediterranean fleet, that since this recommendation was adopted, the number of punishments has been diminished to the extent of seventy per cent.\*

Such facts as these leave no doubt that intoxicating liquors are among the most powerful incentives to crime. It may, indeed, be urged, that it is the abuse, not the use, of these stimulants which leads to such results. The crimes are committed not by temperate, but by intemperate drinkers. But it must be remembered, that amongst the labouring classes temperate indulgence is the exception. The man who spends his evening in the ale-house seldom returns from it in a state of absolute sobriety. The poor have not often sufficient self-command to take the middle path between abstinence and excess.

But there is another effect of liquor more universal, and therefore more extensively injurious in debasing the people, than even its agency in producing actual crime. The prevalent habits of drinking cause the masses to squander on a momentary sensual gratification those funds which, if wisely employed, might double their household comforts and innocent amusements, and raise them almost indefinitely in the scale of intelligence and civilisation. Mr. Porter (of the Board of Trade), in a very important paper read before the British Association for the Promotion of Science, calculates the expenditure of the working classes on spirits and malt liquor at fifty millions per annum. He shows that the average quantity of distilled spirits annually consumed by an adult male is, in England, above 2 gallons; in Ireland, 3½ gallons; and in Scotland, no less than 11 gallons. Besides this enormous sum spent in drink, nearly eight millions are wasted on tobacco. So that the self-imposed taxation of the people, for articles either useless or harmful, exceeds the whole amount of taxes paid to the Government, and is double the interest of the national debt. There is one feature of this expenditure which peculiarly shows its brutalising tendency. It is almost entirely spent by the men on their own selfish appetites. Their wives and children have no part in the enjoyment. On the contrary, they are too often left to starve at home, and their only share of these convivial pleasures is a sound beating from their drunken lord, when he returns from the ale-house. The amount which a labouring man thus lavishes on selfish indulgence, is calculated by Mr. Porter at from one third to one half of his earnings. No other class in the community spends anything like this proportion of income on gratifications which the family cannot share with its head. When

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\* Carpenter, p. 37.

we realise the moral change that would follow, if the gains of labour were diverted from the pockets of the publican to those of the grocer and the butcher, the tailor and the shoemaker, the schoolmaster and the bookseller, we cannot help wishing that every working man would become a water-drinker.

But this aspiration is met by a formidable objection. The labouring man, it is said, requires the support of stimulating drink, and cannot sustain severe bodily exertion without it. To this assumption the teetotaler opposes a flat denial. He contradicts both the fact asserted, and the theory on which it rests. Theoretically he shows, by the reasons already given, that no permanent support can be derived from alcohol. And practically he undertakes to prove that, in the long run, more work can be done without strong drink than with it. On such a point, facts are the best arguments. And of facts the temperance writers have collected a formidable array, to show that the most trying kinds of labour are well performed by men who never taste fermented liquor. We will select a few specimens of this evidence. The first shall be the case of a metal worker at Birmingham, described by Dr. Carpenter as follows:—

‘When visiting Messrs. Boulton and Watt’s celebrated factory some years since, I was much struck by the Herculean aspect of a particular workman, who was engaged in forging the steel dies (used in coining) into the massive blocks of iron in which they are imbedded. This, I was informed, was the most laborious occupation in the whole factory, requiring a most powerful arm to wield the heavy hammer whose blows were necessary to ensure the union of the two metals; and involving also constant exposure to a very high temperature. The day was sultry and oppressive; and the additional heat of the forge was, to my own feelings, almost unbearable. But I stood awhile watching this gigantic labourer, the girth of whose chest seemed twice that of any ordinary man, whilst, naked to the waist, and with the perspiration streaming down his head and body, he dealt the rapid and skilful blows of his ponderous hammer upon the heated mass. At the first pause, I asked him (from mere curiosity, for teetotalism was then scarcely talked of) what liquor he drank; and he replied by pointing to a whole row of *ginger-beer* bottles behind him, the contents of one of which he imbibed every ten or fifteen minutes. He stated, upon further questioning, that he found it quite impossible to drink alcoholic liquors whilst at his work; their effect being to diminish his strength to such a degree as to render him unfit for it.’

This instance, though striking, is only the case of a single individual, and would not justify any general conclusion. The next is less limited in its application. It is a declaration signed by thirty-four workmen at Leeds, employed as furnace-men at foundries and gas-works, and in other laborious occupations.

'We, the undersigned, having practised the principles of total abstinence from all intoxicating liquors during periods ranging from one to ten years, and having, during that time, been engaged in very laborious occupations, voluntarily testify that we are able to perform our toil with greater ease and satisfaction to ourselves (and we believe more to the satisfaction of our employers also) than when we drank moderately of these liquors; our general health and circumstances have also been considerably improved. (*Carpenter*, p. 118.)

The next example is a return of the regular labour during a whole year of two sets of brickmakers at Uxbridge, the one set consisting of Teetotalers, the other of moderate drinkers.

'Out of upwards of 23,000,000 of bricks made in 1841, by the largest maker in the neighbourhood, the average per man made by the beer-drinkers in the season was 760,260; whilst the average for the teetotalers was 795,400—which is 35,131 in favour of the latter. The highest number made by a beer-drinker was 880,000; the highest number made by a teetotaler was 890,000—leaving 10,000 in favour of the teetotaler. The lowest number made by a beer-drinker was 659,500; the lowest number made by a teetotaler was 746,000—leaving 87,000 in favour of the teetotaler. (*Ibid.* p. 122.)

A very circumstantial account of a trial of this kind has been published by Mr. Hunt, an agriculturist in Gloucestershire; who having let eighty acres of grass to mow, harvest, and stack, to seven abstainers, records the following result:—

'The whole of the work, without the least exception, was performed more to my satisfaction than ever was the case before. During the progress of it, they gave abundant proof that they were equal to as much work as any seven men in the neighbourhood; and also to as much as they themselves had been equal to at any time whilst taking intoxicating drinks. They were not picked men; four of them about the respective ages of 55, 41, 30, and 29, having worked for me for several years; the others, aged 41, 30, and 20, having been engaged at various times in the spring, without any intention of retaining them during the summer; and that they were not of more than average strength may be inferred from the fact, that I was told before they began.—“We know very well how your experiment will end; for there are but two men out of the seven that can do a day's work; they will be knocked-up before they have mowed two hours.” At the end of the first day's mowing it was found, however, that they had done more than any other men in the neighbourhood; and as they thus proceeded without being knocked-up, the tables were turned, and I was told then that they performed so well in consequence of their “good living.” This “good living” was simply the result of the expenditure of the money-value of the cider usually allowed, upon solid food, with tea and cocoa for drink.' (*Ibid.* 120.)

The next example of Teetotal labour is of a less peaceful kind. It is furnished by the experience of our troops, who so

eminently distinguished themselves in the almost desperate defence of Jellalabad against the victorious Affghans. They endured the incessant toil and hardship of that terrible winter without any allowance of spirits, or other intoxicating liquor.

‘I will not mention this last as a privation,’ writes Sir Robert Sale, in his official despatch, ‘because I verily believe that this circumstance and constant employment have contributed to keep them in the highest health, and the most remarkable state of discipline.’ (*Ibid.*)

To Sir Robert Sale’s testimony may be added that of a private of his brigade, who writes as follows:—

‘From the 12th of November to the 18th of April, our men had no liquor; they worked six hours a-day for a long time, and almost every day, besides three hours’ digging trenches, building walls, &c.; add to this, being on duty six or seven nights out of eight, with short rations. With all this hardship we were very healthy, and not a non-commissioned officer was reduced during the time, nor was a man tried by court-martial. These facts are so striking, that officers and men acknowledged that we were much better off without the ration of ardent spirits than we could possibly have been with them.’ (*Ibid.*)

But at any rate, urges the advocate of alcohol, if not requisite in ordinary labour, spirituous liquors are needed by those whose calling exposes them to the extremes of cold or heat. Even this concession, however, is refused by their opponents. As to the endurance of heat, indeed, few would now maintain the old notion, that brandy-punch is an indispensable specific against the lassitude caused by tropical climates. It is now generally acknowledged that the diseases of Europeans in hot countries are caused, not cured, by such indulgence. And physiological reasons would lead us to suppose that the mischief of such stimulants is increased, in proportion to the elevation of the temperature. The assumption that they are useful in extreme cold is more plausible. The alcoholic stimulus does unquestionably, for the moment, increase the warmth of the body. Yet this temporary accession of heat is followed by a reaction, so that it is ineffectual when continued cold must be endured. The true method prescribed by animal chemistry for enabling the system to support excessive cold, is an oleaginous diet. And this, with hot drinks, such as tea and coffee, is found in practice more efficient in sustaining bodily warmth than any amount of alcohol. Thus Dr. Carpenter informs us, that

‘The Rev. Richard Knill, for many years a Missionary at St. Petersburg, stated in a public meeting, in regard to the delusion which prompted people to use ardent spirits “to keep out the cold,”

that the Russians had long since found out the injurious effects of taking them in very cold weather. When a regiment was about to march, orders were issued over-night that no spirits were to be taken on the following morning; and to ascertain as far as possible that the order had been complied with, it was the practice of their corporals carefully to smell the breath of every man when assembled in the morning before marching, and those who were found to have taken spirits were forthwith ordered out of the ranks, and prevented from marching on that day; it having been found that such men were peculiarly subject to be frost-bitten and otherwise injured.— Every soldier in the Russian service, it may be remarked, has an allowance of *oil* as part of his regular rations; experience having shown its value as a constant supporter of heat.’

In the mercantile navy, also, the rule of abstinence from spirituous drinks is gradually superseding the ancient dispensation of grog. In the American trading vessels this reform is almost universal. The following statement on this subject was made to the Admiralty Committee before-mentioned, by the captain of an American liner.

‘For the last twelve years I have sailed on the strict principle of temperance, and have found it work well, and no complaint among the men; they were always ready to do their duty, and do it cheerfully, which I did not always find to be the case when spirits were allowed them. The American merchant-ships nearly all sail upon the temperance principle. Even in our whaling-ships, of which there are nearly 700 vessels, there is not one in twenty in which spirits are allowed.’\*

It was the unanimous opinion of the witnesses examined by the above-named committee, that the moral disadvantages of the spirit ration were not compensated by any physical benefit. It should also be observed, that in the case of sailors, abstinence from spirits is equivalent to abstinence from all fermented liquor; for no other alcoholic drink is substituted, when the spirit ration is discontinued. Dr. Carpenter remarks with justice, that the seaman is, above all other classes of men, exposed to extreme and rapid vicissitudes of temperature, which are more trying to health than the lengthened continuance either of heat or cold. In the course of a single voyage, he is often doomed, like Milton’s lost angels,

‘To feel by turns the bitter change  
Of fierce extremes, extremes by change more fierce.’

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\* Dr. Carpenter states that in the Arctic Expeditions lately sent out by the British Government, no alcoholic liquors have been supplied to the crew. This, however, is a mistake. We have ascertained that the ships forming these expeditions have been supplied with rum as usual, so as to allow their crews the authorised quantity of half-a-gill per man daily.

If, then, he can work better, and live healthier, without than with intoxicating stimulants, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these are of no advantage in enabling the body to withstand the effects of climate.

But while the Teatotalers are thus triumphantly refuting the physical objections to their system, they are encountered by a more formidable class of adversaries, who assail them with charges of heresy and irreligion. They are accused of substituting Abstinence for Christianity, and of preaching Temperance in opposition to the Gospel. They reply that, in some cases, temperance must precede religion; because the man who is never sober, neither will nor can listen to religious teaching. He must cease to be a brute, before he can learn to be a Christian. They assert, moreover, that these charges against them are mere hypocritical pretences, brought forward by those who seek an excuse for self-indulgence, and oftener prompted by love of rum than of religion. In this retort there may be a certain amount of truth. But it cannot be denied that some Teatotalers have committed grave mistakes, (to call them by no harsher name) which have laid them open to these accusations of impiety. One or two of their hymns, for example, are parodies on those used in religious worship, and transfer the adoration from its original object to the idol of 'Temperance.'\* And still more offensive has been the conduct of certain advocates of their cause, who have even objected to receive the wine in the Holy Communion; an example of superstitious formalism which it would be difficult to parallel. It has also been with justice remarked, that too many of the reformed drunkards who speak at Temperance meetings, far from expressing the slightest penitence for their past iniquities, seem to glory in the narrative of their shame. But the more judicious advocates of the system justly aver that they are not responsible for these and such like extravagances. And they point to the unquestionable fact, that their more conspicuous leaders are distinguished by the truest piety; and that it is the earnestness of their religious zeal which has led them to take so prominent a part in a movement, which they believe calculated to promote the happiness and virtue of their brethren.

But their most effectual mode of answering all such imputations, is to point to specific instances where their efforts have reclaimed the outcasts of society, and turned the hearts of the

\* As an example, it may suffice to mention hymn 149:—

'Rise and shine through every nation,  
'O thou Temperance star divine.'

disobedient to the wisdom of the just. Particulars of many such cases have been published; but we have seen none more striking than that detailed in the autobiography of John Gough, who is now the most popular advocate of total abstinence in America. We refer to this the rather because it refutes the statement that all drunkards reclaimed by Teetotalism make their former iniquities a subject of boasting instead of shame. No one can read the narrative of which we speak, without feeling that its writer is far from this fault. It is true that in him it would have been peculiarly inexcusable, since his errors were unusually aggravated by the careful education he had received from religious parents. Mr. Gough, though an American by adoption, is an Englishman by birth. His father was a private soldier, who served in the Peninsular war; his mother was the village school-mistress at Sandgate on the coast of Kent. She was a pious woman, attached to the Methodist persuasion; and her position enabled her to give more attention to the early teaching of her child than can generally be done by persons in her circumstances. Her boy's progress in learning repaid her efforts; but he was weakly in constitution, and unfitted by an accidental injury for agricultural labour. So that when he was twelve years old, his father, seeing the difficulty of providing for him in England, made an agreement with some neighbours who were emigrating to America, by which they undertook to take him with them, teach him a trade, and maintain him till he should attain the age of twenty-one. He thus describes the parting scene:—

‘The evening I was about to depart, a neighbour invited me to take tea at his house, which I did. My mother remarked to me afterwards, “I wish you had taken tea with your mother, John;” and this little circumstance was a source of much pain to me in after years. The parting with my beloved parents was bitter. My poor mother folded me to her bosom, then she would hold me off at arm's length, and gaze fondly on my face, through her tearful eyes, reading, as only a mother could, the book of futurity for me. She hung up, on the accustomed peg, my old cap and jacket and my school-bag, and there they remained until, years after, she quitted the house. At length the parting words were spoken, and I quitted the home of my childhood, perhaps for ever.

‘As I passed through the streets, many a kind hand waved a farewell, and not a few familiar voices sounded out a hearty “God bless you.” One old dame, of whom I had frequently bought sweetmeats at her green grocery, called me into her shop, and loaded me with good wishes, bull's eyes, cakes and candies, although, poor affectionate soul, she could ill afford it. I mounted the roof of the London night coach, and was quitting the village, when, on turning round to take a last look at it, I saw a crouching female form, by a low wall, near the bathing-machines. My heart told me at once that it was my mother,

who had taken advantage of half an hour's delay at the inn door, to proceed a little distance, in order to have one more glance at her departing child. I never felt I was loved so much as I did from that time.'

The emigrants sailed from London, and it happened that, after their ship passed Dover, it fell a dead calm, and she was obliged to anchor off Sandgate, our hero's native place.

'I afforded some amusement to those around me, by the eagerness with which I seized a telescope, and the certainty with which I averred that I saw my old home. During that day, boat after boat came off to us from the shore, and friends of the family I was with paid them visits; but I was unnoticed — *my* relatives did not come. After long and wearily watching, I at last saw a man standing up in a boat, with a white band round his hat. "That's him! that's my "father!" I shouted. He soon got on deck, and almost smothered me with his kisses, from which I somewhat shrank, as his beard made very decided impressions on my smooth skin. I heard that my mother and sister (it being Sunday) had gone to a place of worship, at some distance from Sandgate, which I regretted much. When evening came on, our visitors from the shore repaired to their boats, which, when a few yards from the ship, formed in a half circle, and we sang a parting hymn. Boat after boat then vanished in the gloomy distance, and I went to my bed. About midnight, I heard my name called, and going on deck, I there found my beloved mother and sister, who, hearing on their return home that I was in the offing, had paid half-a-guinea (money hardly earned but cheerfully expended) to a boatman, to row them to the ship. They spent an hour (O, how short it seemed!) with me, and then departed with many tears. Having strained my eyes until their boat was no longer discernible, I went back to my bed, to sob away the rest of the morning.

'As we voyaged on, I soon began to feel a difference in my new situation; and often did I bitterly contrast the treatment I received with that to which I had been accustomed at home. I wished myself back again; but the die was cast. Occasionally, on looking over my little stock of worldly goods, I would find little billets or papers, containing texts of Scripture, pinned to the different articles. In my Bible, texts of Scripture were marked for me to commit to memory. Fifty-four days from the time of sailing we arrived off Sandy Hook, and, O how I longed, as we sailed up the Narrows, to be on deck, and survey the scenery of the New World! I was not permitted to do this; for, whilst I could hear the shouts of delighted surprise which burst from the lips of the passengers who crowded the vessel's sides, I was confined below, occupied in blacking the boots and shoes of the family, that they might be landed in good order.'

The emigrants landed at New York, where, after a few years, Gough set up for himself as a journeyman bookbinder, and was soon earning money enough to invite his parents to join him in the New World. His mother and sister came, and the trio lived



happily together for some time, till the home circle was broken up by the mother's death. Up to this time Gough had gone on steadily, and maintained an excellent character. But now a lamentable change came over him. He fell into low theatrical company, whom he pleased by his lively and sociable qualities, and his musical talents. At length he became a singer of comic songs, and an actor of farces, at second-rate theatres. The dissipated companions among whom he was thrown, tempted him to indulge in every kind of excess. Habits of intemperance rapidly gained upon him. He became a confirmed dram-drinker; and at length was never happy unless a bottle of spirits was within reach of his hand. Of course, he soon lost employment and friends, and was at length reduced to the extremity of distress.

'At length nothing remained on which I could raise a single cent, and I found, in the lowest depths of poverty, a lower still.

'I have in several parts of this narrative referred to my vocal talents and my ventriloquial acquirements. After every other resource had failed me in my utmost need, I was compelled, as the only means of getting a little rum, to avail myself of these aids. Accordingly, my custom was to repair to the lowest grog-shops, and there I might usually be found, night after night, telling facetious stories, singing comic songs, or turning books upside down and reading them whilst they were moving round, to the great delight and wonder of a set of loafers who supplied me with drink in return.'

Finally his wife and child were taken ill and died after a short sickness, aggravated by the want of all those comforts which the husband and father ought to have provided.

'Then came the terrible feeling that I was utterly alone in the world. I drank now to dispel my gloom, or drown it in the maddening cup. And soon it was whispered from one to another, till the whole town became aware of it, that my wife and child were lying dead, and that I was drunk. Yet if ever I was cursed with the faculty of thought in all its intensity, it was then. During the miserable hours of darkness, I would steal from my lonely bed to the place where my dead wife and child lay, and in agony of soul pass my shaking hand over their cold faces; and then return to my bed, after a draught of rum, which I had hidden under my pillow. Many a time did I wish to die. My frame was enervated, my reputation gone, and all my prospects blighted. After the funerals of my wife and child, I knew not what course to pursue; for wherever I went I failed not to see the finger of scorn pointed at me, and I writhed in agony under a sense of my shame.'

To add to his other miseries, he was now a victim of *delirium tremens*, and we have before cited the vivid description which he gives of his sufferings in that hideous disease. He began to

despair, and was several times on the verge of suicide. But in this crisis of his fate, he fell in with some benevolent Teatotalers, who persuaded him to sign their pledge, and encouraged him by kindness and sympathy, at a time when all the world besides gave him nothing but frowns or scoffs. This was the turning point in his destiny. By a violent effort he broke the chains which so long had bound him. By persevering in sobriety, he was gradually restored to the health and reputation which he had forfeited. After a time he gained celebrity by speaking at Temperance meetings; for he possesses real eloquence, although it is sometimes disfigured by the bombastic taste of his adopted country. Finally he was appointed by the Temperance Society to be a travelling lecturer in their cause; and in that capacity he spent last year in England.

No one can wonder if men circumstanced like Mr. Gough, who have been rescued from the lowest depth of misery and degradation by the pledge of abstinence, should attach an exaggerated importance to the instrumentality by which their deliverance was accomplished. It is natural that, in their enthusiasm, they should think the medicine which healed them the only cure for human ills. Hence we can easily understand the zeal wherewith they maintain the second article of the Teatotal creed; the doctrine that every individual is bound to abstain absolutely from all fermented liquors; or, in other words, that the most moderate drinker is violating a moral duty. To defend this tenet, they cite facts to show that drunkards cannot be reclaimed by anything short of total abstinence; that the only cure for the habit of intemperance is the entire removal of the temptation. They infer that, for the hope of turning drunkards into abstainers, every temperate man is bound to drink no more. The 'moderate' might reply by admitting their premise, and denying their conclusion. He might allege that the disease of the drunkard required a remedy not needed by the temperate. He might argue that temperance is more virtuous than abstinence, and that he was setting an example of using pleasure without abusing it. Moreover he might pledge himself to become a total abstainer, if ever he should fall into intoxication; and would still be quite consistent in urging a drunkard to adopt total abstinence without delay. The Teatotalers, however, assert that such exhortations would gain no converts; and that the only way to induce a drunkard to renounce his liquor is to set him the example of renunciation. This is obviously an *ex-parte* statement; yet considering the horrible and wide-spread misery caused by intoxication, and the blessedness of saving even a single victim

from the curse, we cannot deny that there is considerable force in the following appeal.

‘There is no case in which the superiority of example over mere precept is more decided and more obvious. “I practise total abstinence myself;” is found to be worth a thousand exhortations; and the lamentable failure of the advocates who cannot employ this inducement, should lead all those whose position calls upon them to exert their influence, to a serious consideration of the claims which their duty to society should set up, in opposition to their individual feelings of taste or comfort. There is surely no case that more imperatively demands the exercise of that Christian self-denial which was practised and enjoyed by the Apostle Paul; who felt himself called upon to abstain from every indulgence, however innocent in itself, which could endanger a brother’s soul. For though he regarded flesh and wine as “good creatures of God,” yet he nobly lays down as his own rule — “If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no meat while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend.” And this same rule he urges upon the individual members of the churches he addressed. “Take heed,” he says to the Corinthians, “lest by any means your liberty become a stumbling-block to those who are weak.” In a like spirit he enjoins the Romans “not to put a stumbling-block, or an occasion of falling, in a brother’s way;” and he gives to this general precept the following special application: — “It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak.”

‘Surely there never was a case to which these warnings had a more special or pointed application, than they have to the use of alcoholic beverages, as ordinarily practised in this country; for these, even if they could be proved to exert no prejudicial influence on such as employ them in “moderation,” must be admitted to become most fatal stumbling-blocks to myriads, with whom “moderation” in their use is practically impossible.’ (*Carpenter*, p. 4.)

But whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the moral obligation of total abstinence, every one must rejoice in the diminution of intemperance which it has effected. Its advocates inform us that there are more than three millions of pledged abstainers in Great Britain and Ireland.\* And although the ‘*Temperance Chronicle*’ states that fifty in every hundred break their pledge, yet if only a million and a half remain steady to their resolution, the mass of crime and pauperism is perceptibly reduced. To prove that this reformation is not imaginary, they cite the diminished consumption of spirituous liquors, as proved by the excise returns. The amount sold is now less (by above a million of gallons) than it was in 1836; whereas if the consumption had kept place with the increase of population, it should be

several million gallons more than in 1836.\* This improvement, however, may in part be ascribed to the increase of education among the poor. Just as the same cause has produced so enormous a change in the habits of the rich, since the days of Squire Western, when three gentlemen out of four went to bed oftener drunk than sober. Yet no doubt there is action and reaction in this matter. If you can make men less brutal, they will cease to get drunk; but, on the other hand, so long as they persist in getting drunk, they will keep themselves brutal.

But while Teetotalers exultingly refer the improvement (unhappily but slight) in the morals of the poor, to the signature of their pledge, the achievement on which they most justly pride themselves, is their suppression of the liquor traffic in America. The laws which they proposed for this purpose, form a new epoch in the history of their cause. For it is only very recently that the Temperance movement has assumed a political character; and since its leaders have adopted this change of tactics they have met with a success which is truly marvellous. For some years † they confined themselves to exhortations against drink, and persuasions to sobriety, without producing any very sensible effect. At last they resolved on bolder measures; and put forward a definite political object as the end at which they

\* This diminution in the consumption of spirits has been much exaggerated by the advocates of Temperance. We have ascertained from the Parliamentary Returns that the amount of spirits of all kinds (Imported and Home Made) on which duty was paid in the United Kingdom was 30,164,641 gallons in 1853, and 31,402,417 in 1836. On the other hand, the consumption of malt liquors has rather increased; for the malt made in 1853 was 5,254,968 quarters, and in 1836 was 4,279,468 quarters. We regret also to find (from a Return dated 28th March 1854) that the consumption of spirits has steadily increased, during the last three years, both in Great Britain and in Ireland. The most striking and sudden diminution was that produced by Father Matthew's preaching in Ireland; where the consumption of spirits fell from twelve millions in 1834, to six millions in 1841. This effect, however, has not been altogether permanent; for in 1853, the consumption had risen to two-thirds of what it was in 1834.

† The first Temperance society was founded in America (at Boston) in 1826; but its members were only pledged to abstain from *spirits*; and even spirits were allowed on the American festival of July 4th. Total abstinence originated in England in 1832 (at Preston), but was soon adopted as the rule of the American Societies. In 1838, laws were passed by Massachusetts and some other States, restricting the retail trade in spirits. But the agitation for the entire suppression of liquor shops did not begin till 1841.

aimed. This was nothing less than the legal prohibition of the sale of intoxicating drinks, including the entire suppression of alehouses and liquor shops. It was at first believed that nothing short of a Quixotical delusion could give them the hope of gaining what they sought. But the result has proved their policy no less wise than bold. In little more than ten years, the legislation which they demanded had already been adopted by three American States, and (under a modified form) by a neighbouring British Colony.

The first legislative body which ratified their demands was that of Maine, the northernmost of the New England States. In June 1851, it passed an Act 'for the suppression of drinking houses and tipping shops,' of which the following are the chief provisions:—(1.) The manufacturing, selling, and furnishing of intoxicating liquors is prohibited; except for sacramental, medicinal, chemical, and mechanical purposes. (2.) The alcoholic liquors required for the above purpose may only be sold by one agent (who must not be the keeper of a house of entertainment) in each town. This agent is to be appointed (with a fixed salary) by certain municipal authorities, and to hand over the profits of the sale to the municipality. (3.) Fines are imposed for every illegal sale of intoxicating drinks, with imprisonment for the third offence. (4.) Liquors kept for sale may be seized and destroyed. (5.) Premises where such liquors are suspected to be concealed, may be searched. (6.) Drunkards are to be arrested, and kept in custody, till they disclose the place where they obtained the liquor. Thus the only legal way in which an inhabitant of Maine can procure fermented drink, is by importing it wholesale, or by making it at home. The use of home-brewed liquors is not prohibited.

Laws substantially identical with this have been since passed by the States of Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and Michigan, and by the Territory of Minnesota. And the proposal for similar legislation is now the leading question at issue in the elections for New York and Pennsylvania, and the other States of New England. In March last, the Maine Law was passed by the legislative body of New York, and only thrown out by the veto of the Governor. An Act carrying out the same policy, in a less stringent way, has been also passed by the adjacent English Colony of New Brunswick, and received the assent of the Crown in 1852. It differs from the Maine Law, in still permitting the sale of malt liquors and cyder. A prohibitory law of the same kind was recently rejected by a bare majority in the Canadian legislature. In addition to those named above, the American States of Illinois and Ohio have forbidden all sale

of liquors 'to be drunk on the premises;' and Iowa has prohibited the sale by the glass or dram.

The first impression on English politicians, when they hear the doings of these transatlantic lawgivers, must be a kind of incredulous astonishment. The notion of imposing new restrictions upon trade seems so alien to the ideas of our epoch, that we are inclined to treat it as something absolutely Utopian. It will therefore be neither useless nor uninteresting to state the arguments which have persuaded so many republican commonwealths to renounce the glorious right of intoxication; and that, too, in the mother land of mint julep and sherry cobbler.

Unquestionably the first instinct of an Anglo-Saxon, both in New England and in Old, is to resist any extraneous power, whether calling itself King or Kaiser, Pope or People, which attempts to interfere with his concerns, or to forbid his coming and going, buying and selling as he will. The advocates of these prohibitory laws were therefore assailed at once with the cry, 'What has the State to do with our private pleasures? We are free Americans, and no one shall hinder us from dealing and drinking as we please.' To meet this clamour, they were forced to revert to the first principles of political philosophy. They were required to prove that the natural liberty of man is necessarily limited by his social condition; and that society imposes such limitations, either to protect itself against evil, or to farther the ends for which it exists. As to the particular subject-matter of the present discussion,—the right, namely, of buying and selling,—the State should (they allowed) leave it free and unrestricted, whenever that is possible; and most States have interfered with it more than was either necessary or desirable. But still there are certain cases where all civilised States must limit it by legislation. The State may thus interfere with commerce, either to raise a revenue or to avert a danger. Examples of the first case are the fetters imposed on trade by customs and excise: of the second, the restrictions on the sale of gunpowder, and the laws which prevent unqualified persons from exercising the business of a medical practitioner. The regulations to which the vintner and tavern-keeper are subjected by the licence system, stand on both these grounds; being enforced partly for purposes of revenue, partly to guard against disorder. And it is especially absurd to protest against the right of the State to interfere with this particular branch of trade, as if such interference were a novelty. For the law, as it stands at present, not only interferes therewith, by duties on the importation of wines and spirits, by excise regulations, and by various enactments concerning the retail business, but it absolutely

prohibits this traffic to all but a selected few among its citizens, specially licensed for the purpose. Is it not absurd, then, to demand that dram shops, created by the law, should be exempt from legislation?

But farther, there are some trades to which the State applies not restriction merely, but prohibition. Thus the business of coining money is utterly suppressed by the laws of all civilised States; thus the opening of lotteries is a commercial speculation forbidden by the law of England. If it be asked on what grounds the State is justified in annihilating these branches of industry, it must be answered, as before, that society may put down what is dangerous to itself; *salus populi suprema lex*. Any trade, employment, or use of property, detrimental to the life, health, or order of the people, is by English law a *public nuisance*. And in suppressing it the State assumes the right of sacrificing private interests to the public good. And this, not only when the detriment is physical or economical, but also when it is moral. Thus, unwholesome graveyards are shut up, and noisome vitriol works pulled down, for their physical noxiousness; private coining is made illegal for economical reasons; slave-trading, lotteries, cock-pits, bear-gardens, gambling-houses\*, brothels, and obscene print-shops, are prohibited on moral grounds. Now the liquor traffic, and particularly the retail branch of it, is a public nuisance in all three respects; both physically, economically, and morally. By its physical consequences it causes death to thousands; reduces thousands more to madness or idiocy; and afflicts myriads with diseases involving the most wretched forms of bodily and mental torture. Considered in its economical results, it impairs the national resources by destroying a large amount of corn, which is annually distilled into spirits†; and it indirectly causes three

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\* The Attorney-general, on proposing in the House of Commons, (March 23. 1854) the new measure for the suppression of private gambling houses, (which renders it penal even to *delay* the entrance of the police into a suspected house) gave the following reason for the measure: —“Every day brought to light some fresh instance of young ‘men of hope and promise being led into these establishments, and inveigled into play, by which they were made the dupes of designing persons, their fortunes injured or ruined, and their prospects in life seriously damaged.’ If such severe enactments are justifiable, to save the rich and educated from temptation, it is hard to say, why the poor and ignorant should not be shielded from similar danger by similar protection.

† Paley expresses (in his *Moral Philosophy*) an opinion that this distillation of corn is criminal; because it is a wanton destruction of

fourths of the taxation required by pauperism, and by criminal prosecutions, and prison expenses; and farther, it diminishes the effective industry of the working classes, thereby lessening the amount of national production. Thirdly, viewed in its moral operation, it is the cause (as we have previously shown) of two thirds of the crime committed; it lowers the intelligence, and hinders the civilisation of the people; and it leads the men to ill-treat and starve their families, and sacrifice domestic comfort to riotous debauchery.

On the above grounds, it is contended that the State ought no longer to content itself with restricting this traffic, but ought to suppress it; for public nuisances should not be regulated, but removed. And it is predicted that, as civilisation advances, this will share the fate of some other moral nuisances (such as lotteries and bear-gardens), which were formerly tolerated, or even encouraged, but which are now prohibited by law.

In spite of these arguments, the most formidable outcry was raised against the measure demanded by the Teetotalers. It was stigmatised as a sumptuary law, interfering in a man's household concerns; although, in fact, it left men free to drink what they pleased, and only forbade them to sell their drink. It was urged also that persuasion, not legislation, was the proper cure for moral evils; to which the other side rejoined that persuasion had not been relied on for the suppression of the slave trade. It was also alleged that such prohibitory laws were 'unconstitutional.' This question, however, was settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, which has the power of disallowing laws passed by any of the States which it may judge contrary to the general principles of the constitution. To this court an appeal was made against an Act passed by Massachusetts to prohibit the retail of spirits; when the court decided that such enactments were perfectly constitutional.\* But perhaps the objection most formidable to the mind of New Englanders, was the financial argument. What is to become of the revenue, if we cut off its most fruitful branch? It was answered, that the loss caused by the proposed law would be more than repaid by

that which God designed for the sustentation of human life; on the same ground that it would be wrong for the owner of a wheat-field to set it on fire for his amusement. It is calculated that the grain annually consumed in Great Britain and Ireland for distillation and malting amounts to six million quarters, and would feed five million people. The greater part of the nutriment contained in this quantity is entirely lost.

\* See 5 Howard's Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court U. S., pp. 504—633.



the saving effected through its operations; for that the expenses incurred in maintaining paupers pauperised by intemperance, and criminals created by intoxication, exceeded the revenue derived by the American States from the duties on liquor. So that the Government, in maintaining the traffic, was penny wise and pound foolish.

The contest lasted about ten years from its commencement, till the champions of temperance gained their first signal victory in the passing of the Maine Act. We have seen how rapidly that success has been followed by similar triumphs in the adjacent States. The time which has elapsed since the adoption of this policy is not sufficient to enable us to judge of its success. But the evidence of experience seems, so far as it goes, to be in favour of the new legislation, at least in the State of Maine. The violent reaction which was predicted has certainly not yet occurred. On the contrary, the elections which took place after the law had been for a year in operation, resulted in an increased majority for its maintenance. And the legislature again elected in 1853, has confirmed the law by additional provisions. Moreover, its continued popularity appears proved by the fact that the neighbouring States have, one after another, adopted it into their code.

The statements published concerning the moral improvement consequent upon the passing of the measure, must be received with caution, as they proceed from its warm supporters. The mayor of Portland (the capital of Maine) asserts that the number of persons imprisoned has diminished fifty per cent., and that pauperism is already considerably reduced. We learn also that in the winter half year before the passing of the Act, there were arrested for riotous conduct in the streets of Portland 332 persons; and in the corresponding half year after the passing of the Act, only 152 persons. We are also told that a new jail and almshouse were about to be built at the same town before the Act, which now, being no longer wanted, have been countermanded.

On the other hand, it is alleged that the new law is so much evaded as to be practically inoperative. This allegation, however, applies principally to New Brunswick. And the Teetotalers urge, with some show of reason, that the lukewarm character of the law passed by that colony, (which, it will be remembered, forbids the sale only of wine and spirits,) offers great facilities to evasion; for a publican may easily give his customer a tumbler of grog under the name of porter. The Maine Law must, at least, have suppressed all public tipping houses; although probably, those who are so inclined may obtain a private and surreptitious

glass of gin from some illicit store. We imagine that the chief object of the promoters of the measure was to remove temptation from the poor. And if this has been done, it matters little that those who are determined to drink can gratify their propensity in secret.\*

The political success of their brethren in America has led the British Teatotalers to imitate their tactics. For declamations on the sinfulness of alcohol, and the immorality of moderation, they have substituted an organised agitation for the suppression of the liquor traffic. '*Guerre aux châteaux, Paix aux chaumières*'—Peace to the home-brewed, and war to the gin-palace—is now their motto. A new bond of union has therefore been established, of a much more comprehensive nature than their ancient creed. Those who join their banner will be no longer required to forswear temperate indulgence, or to take the vow of water-worship. It is obvious that much of the folly which has hitherto cast ridicule on their cause, will be eliminated by this change of policy. Last year a society was established calling itself 'the Alliance for the Suppression of Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors';† and this has been already joined by many who have never signed the pledge of total abstinence. The practical object at present contemplated is to abolish the retail trade in spirits; but the Society makes no secret of its hopes ultimately to incorporate all the prohibitions of the Maine Law into the British statute-book.

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\* We have lately seen a private letter from America, which states that, since the passing of the Maine Act, little china receptacles for spirits are manufactured at Portland in the shape of books, and lettered on the back Prayer-book or Holy Scriptures. The writer adds, however, that he has not himself seen these bottles.

† This is hailed by the following characteristic letter from the apostle of Irish Temperance, Father Matthew:—

MY DEAR FRIEND,

With rapture I hail the formation of the "United Kingdom Alliance for the Suppression of the Traffic in all Intoxicating Liquors."

I laboured for the suppression of Intemperance, until I sacrificed my health and little property in the glorious cause. My labours, with the Divine aid, were attended with partial success. The efforts of individuals, however zealous, were not equal to the mighty task. The United Kingdom Alliance strikes at the very root of the evil. I trust in God, the associated efforts of so many good and benevolent men will effectually crush a monster gorged with human gore.

My dear Sir, I have the honour to be your devoted Friend,  
THEOBALD MATTHEW.

To the Hon. Sec. of the United Kingdom Alliance.'

Few disinterested persons would deny, in face of the evidence which we have adduced, that the peaceable accomplishment of such a revolution would be a blessing to the country. Yet we must remember that the enormous revenue derived by the State from intoxicating liquors cannot be suddenly abandoned by this country, as it can by the small and unburdened commonwealths of the American Federation. It is most true that money ought not to be weighed for one moment against morality. But nevertheless, the proposal to subtract fifteen millions\* from the budget would, we fear, render our Chancellors of the Exchequer exceedingly slow to perceive the force of moral evidence. More especially as the compensation for this loss of revenue, which the American States expect to find in the diminution of their expenses for pauperism and crime, would not much benefit our public treasury; since our poor rates, and great part of our criminal expenditure, fall not on the Crown but on local resources. The revenue would, however, no doubt receive a compensation of a different kind, in the increased consumption of custom-paying and excisable articles, which would be purchased by the money saved from the clutches of the publican. Yet the experiment is on too great a scale to be hazarded hastily. The progress must be gradual, in order to be safe. There is, however, it must be confessed, no reason to fear that the new-born agitation should meet with too rapid a success, when we remember the powerful interests by which it is opposed. It is clear that no legislation on the subject could be even attempted,

\* The total revenue derived from intoxicating liquors of all descriptions, (according to the annual finance accounts for the year ending January 5. 1854), in the year 1853 was as follows:—

|                               |         |           |                    |
|-------------------------------|---------|-----------|--------------------|
|                               |         | £         | £                  |
| Spirits, Foreign and Colonial | - -     | 2,689,324 |                    |
| „ Home made                   | - -     | 6,864,449 |                    |
|                               |         | <hr/>     |                    |
| Total on Spirits              | - -     | -         | 9,553,773          |
| Malt                          | - - - - | 5,418,417 |                    |
| Hops                          | - - - - | 440,578   |                    |
|                               |         | <hr/>     |                    |
| Total on Malt and Hops        | - -     | -         | 5,858,995          |
| Wine                          | - - - - | -         | 1,924,972          |
|                               |         | <hr/>     |                    |
| Total Duty in 1853            | - -     | -         | <u>£17,337,740</u> |

Of this about fifteen millions would be lost by the passing of a 'Maine Law.'

in this country, till it was demanded by a great majority of the people. Meanwhile there can be no harm in that full discussion of the question which will be elicited by pressing it on the attention of Parliament. Every one must rejoice that efforts should be made to convince the masses of the penalties which they entail upon themselves by intemperance. Nor can we condemn the attempt to persuade the English constituencies to restrain themselves by law from a brutalising self-indulgence, whereto they are proved by the report of every Election committee to be so lamentably addicted. If such efforts fail, they leave the people no worse than they found them. If they succeed, they make them wiser and better.

One caution, however, we will add. The working classes are now attracted to the tippling house by finding there (what they seldom find at home) both comfort and amusement; in the shape of well-lighted rooms, newspapers, and social intercourse. Now all these things might be supplied them without ale or gin. We would therefore urge upon the benevolent agitators who seek to suppress the ale-house and the gin-palace, the necessity of providing the poor with public reading rooms and coffee-houses, free libraries and museums, cheap concerts and exhibitions for the winter season; and open parks, zoological gardens, and cricket grounds for the summer. If in the petitions for restrictive legislation which they are now preparing, they would incorporate proposals for supplying innocent recreation to the people, they would obtain a far more extensive support from those whom they desire to benefit, but who now too often regard all enactments tending to the promotion of public morality, as the tyrannical interference of the rich with the amusements of the poor.

With this proviso, we wish God speed to the champions of Temperance. In these days, there is more reason than ever to welcome every means which may tend to refine and elevate the democracy of England. They who are carelessly indifferent to the welfare of their brethren, and feel no Christian sympathy in their moral progress, should now promote it, if only from selfish motives. The political changes which are looming in the distance, whatever shape they may take, cannot fail to give added power to the poor. As years pass on, the Sovereign People is likely to become more and more absolute in its sovereignty. If Lemuel was right, it would be best for all parties that King Demos should be a water-drinker. And in the prospect of his reign, the rich have assuredly every reason to desire an appeal from Demos drunk to Demos sober.

ART. III. — *Æschyli Tragœdiæ*. Recensuit GODOFREDUS HERMANNUS. 2 vols. Leipzig: 1852.

IN venturing to pass an unfavourable judgment on this work, it is scarcely necessary to say that we are animated by no prejudice against continental scholarship. Few educated men, we should hope, would be found at the present day to acknowledge such a feeling. Whatever may have been the case sixty years ago, the imputation of being 'sadly to seek in Greek' is now much more applicable to the English than to the Germans. Even Porson himself, were he among us again, would scarcely, we think, hazard a repetition of the taunt, in the face of the schools of philology and exegesis which have arisen since his time, mainly through the zeal and energy of foreign labourers: at any rate, he has left no successor who could take it up without exposing himself to ridicule.\* For Hermann in particular

\* We observe with satisfaction that another attempt is being made to establish a Philological Journal in England. Its title is the 'Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology,' so that it includes not only philology, commonly so called, in its widest sense, but biblical and patristic exegesis, and ecclesiastical antiquities. The prospectus informs us that it is to appear three times a year at Cambridge, under the superintendence of a resident managing committee. The *locale* is certainly well chosen, as no other place in England can boast a numerous and compact body of residents devoted to philological pursuits: and the names of the Committee are such as to afford every hope that the effort made will be thoroughly vigorous and well sustained. One of them, Mr. Mayor, of St. John's College, has recently distinguished himself by the publication of a school edition of Juvenal, which, for really ripe scholarship, extensive acquaintance with Latin literature, and familiar knowledge of continental criticism, ancient and modern, is unsurpassed, we do not say among English school books, but among English editions generally. The first number, published last March, contains several papers of great interest, some rather elaborate, others partaking of the nature of 'Notes and Queries.' An article of the former class, on Lucretius, by Mr. Munro, of Trinity College, induces us to hope that 'the greatest of extant Latin poets' may ere long find an English editor not unworthy to follow in the steps of Lachmann. Foreign philological periodicals are laid under requisition, materials being extracted or abstracted from several of them, while a *resumé* of the contents of all is given at the end of the Number. Germany, we trust, will not be slow to return the compliment. In the Second Number, which has just appeared, a paper on Mr. Grote's view of the Sophists, and

we have long cherished the most unfeigned respect, as one who, years before his death, was the acknowledged head of the scholars of his generation. When every deduction has been made on account of the rashness of youth, or the over-subtlety of age, it must be confessed that hardly any one has done so much for the study of the Greek tragedians, not to mention his services, however desultorily rendered, to other departments of classical literature, and especially to Greek grammar as such. His *Sophocles* is, in our judgment, his most successful effort, as a specimen of textual and explanatory criticism combined; though it may be doubted whether he did not keep his hand too long on the tablet, and efface by additional touches in the later editions of the plays some of the features which gave most value to the earlier. *Æschylus* had already derived considerable benefit from him when the present publication appeared. His *Observationes Criticæ*, so long ago as 1798, though full of things which were rejected by his own maturer judgment no less than by that of subsequent editors, contributed mainly in at least one memorable instance (that of the *κομμῆς* in the *Choephoræ*) to the restoration of order and harmony where all before was chaos and unintelligible discord. His review of Müller's *Eumenides*, though it may have failed to discredit the antiquarian or æsthetical value of the work against which it was directed, was probably of more substantive importance as a critique on the text of the play than any regular edition. A few unquestionable corrections of passages in the extant plays are scattered up and down the *Opuscula*, which also contain various dissertations on the lost dramas, uniting the minute sagacity of a verbal emendator with something of the imagination of a reconstructive artist. A complete edition of *Æschylus* was understood to have been the labour of his life—the point to which his earliest and latest studies, however widely extended, alike converged. He regarded it as his own ground; and the rough language in which he occasionally broke silence to warn off trespassers, far from being generally resented, was accepted by common consent as evidence of legitimate proprietorship. If the disappointment is great, it is precisely because the hopes were high. We supposed that Hermann could tell us more about *Æschylus* than any other man; and now that the oracle has spoken, it is mortifying to find so much

another on the Martyrdom, and the chief *pièces de resistance*. We recommend the undertaking strongly to the support of our classical readers.

that we should gladly forget, and so little that we should care to remember.

We are aware that even this expression of disappointment, though the feelings from which it springs are those of previous gratitude and admiration, may appear to some no less unreasonable than undutiful. Mr. Paley, in the preface to the new edition of his *Eumenides*—one of a series which we desire in passing to commend to the best attention of our readers—has already anticipated such a complaint as we have taken upon ourselves to make. ‘Video,’ he says, ‘non defuturos, qui cum nostri poetæ reliquias tanquam ab altero *Æsculapio* e mortuis excitatas expectassent, nunc inani spe decepti iniquius in magnum virum inchantur. Quod potuit ille efficere, et quantum humanæ doctrinæ concessum erat, ut quæ vel in linguæ ac metri leges peccata, vel contra poetæ mentem mutata a librariis sibi viderentur indicaret, id quidem officium *Æschylo* scite et diligenter præstitisse putandus est, quod non potuit, ut amissa revocaret, vitiata in integrum certa conjectura ubique restitueret, judicio in omnibus probo nec postea ab aliis in dubium vocando uteretur, hæc ab eo sani homines non flagitabant.’ For ourselves, we have only to deny the positions on which this counter plea is based. No one, so far as we know, ever expected Hermann to achieve impossibilities, to restore every passage with infallible certainty, or to pass irreversible judgments on every controverted point. What was expected was, that his would be the edition of *Æschylus*, surpassing those of his predecessors in proportion to the pre-eminence of his rank in the literary hierarchy, and the protractedness of the labour bestowed. It is doubtless true that he has exposed and corrected what *he* conceived to be at variance with the language, the metre, or the sense: but we cannot accept this result as a measure of the capacity of human learning, or, indeed, as anything more than is commonly performed by every editor of a classical author, however insignificant. The question is, whether his conceptions of the evils and their remedies are such as would commend themselves to other critics as right; and to this we hope to give some answer as we proceed. If we admit that even the most eminent scholars are not to be judged by a transcendental standard, we contend no less that even the most eminent scholars are not to be allowed to give laws to themselves.

With regard to the general requisites for an edition of *Æschylus* there can hardly be much difference of opinion. The peculiarity of the author, if he can be said to have any, is that he, more than most of the classics, requires and repays labour;

the labour of constituting the text, and the labour of interpreting it. The history of *Æschylean* criticism alone might form a moderately sized volume. Even within the last fifty years great advances have been made. The celebrated Glasgow *Æschylus*, though not what Porson would have made it, was deservedly accepted at the time as a standard text; but no one now would dream of reprinting it. For the reformation which has since been made, we have to thank not only the sagacity of the critic, but the industry of the collator. Till very lately, the original text, as generally received, the *corpus vile* on which editors made their experiments, was not the text of the MSS., but the text as arranged by the early editors, Turnebus and Vettori. The MSS. had indeed been examined, not only by those editors, but by subsequent scholars: but the collations were very imperfect and not always acted upon, even when everything was to be gained by attending to them. Even Wellauer's edition, which deserves to be commemorated as the first systematic attempt to construct a text upon external evidence, is not to be trusted as an exponent of the authority to which it appeals; while Blomfield's *apparatus criticus* is nearly valueless, except as regards some of the inferior copies. The great desideratum of all, a scrupulously accurate examination of the oldest MS., the Medicean, can only now be said to have been achieved, the collation made for Weigel in 1827, though an improvement upon Salvini's in the last century, being disfigured by a singular inadvertency on the part of the scholar undertaking it, who allowed his readers to suppose that the MS. sanctioned certain novelties in the edition (Schütz's), with which he unfortunately chose to compare it. Whether it will be necessary to subject the other MSS. to an equally searching investigation is itself a disputed point, which has been already ruled in one way at Leyden, and in another at Leipsic.\* In strictness of procedure, experiment ought to begin only where observation ends: practically, however, we cannot wonder that critics should have called in the aid of conjecture before they had exhausted manuscript resources. The result is that much is constantly done that requires to be undone again; but much also remains unshaken. In not a few cases the true reading has

\* Cobet (*Oratio de Arte Interpretandi*, pp. 105-6.), declares his positive conviction that *all* the MSS. of *Æschylus* may be shown to have been derived from the Medicean copy, which consequently he thinks the only one worth consulting. Haupt, on the other hand, (*Hermann*, vol. i. p. ix.) speaks of three MSS. (the Venetian, the Florentine, and the Neapolitan) as belonging to a different family.



been found to have been actually anticipated by the 'divination' of the philologer; in other instances, his conjectures maintain their own ground, not weakened, if not confirmed, by subsequent discovery. We shall not attempt to decide which of these two constituent powers has contributed more during the period we are speaking of to the restoration of *Æschylus*' genuine text, where both have done so much. In themselves they are perfectly harmonious, though, as a matter of fact, human one-sidedness rarely allows them to be wielded by the same individual, so that we have to balance the acuteness of a Blomfield against the scrupulousness of a Klausen, and obtain a *tertium quid* different from either. For the future, we can hardly doubt that it is to conjecture we must mainly look to teach us what *Æschylus* wrote in the many passages where 'time, and chance, and worse ignorance' have effaced his autograph. Manuscript stores are essentially finite; conjecture, even when most strictly limited to the materials placed before it, is nearly inexhaustible. The more obvious restorations have been made already; indeed, it would be strange if the three hundred and thirty years that have passed since *Æschylus* became the property of a reading age had not effected at least thus much; though even there, from time to time, accident reveals to us something which was lying all the while close to the surface. But operations may still be carried on further underground: palæography has as yet done little for us, compared with what it might do if once it were studied systematically, as the Leyden school of critics would recommend: and any one who would combine the comprehensive research of the German archaeologists with that practised textual acumen which they wanted or disdained, might, we are persuaded, produce results which would be as informing to the disciples of Hermann as to those of Müller.

If we have hitherto dwelt exclusively on the text of *Æschylus*, its condition and its requirements, it is not that we wish to undervalue the other great department of editorial duty, that of interpretation. Strange, indeed, it would be if the language of those whom we are accustomed to call classic authors were really of more importance than the matter—the husk than the kernel which it contains: strange, too, if in an edition of one confessedly among the most difficult of Greek writers, the text alone should require attention, while the meaning might safely be left to make itself clear to the reader. In fact, as we have just hinted, a deep and thoughtful insight into the sense of *Æschylus* is absolutely necessary, if only to determine what his words are likely to have been. Many a rash and confident

guess would have been spared if its promulgator had only taken pains carefully to consider the passage which he proposed to amend, to observe the comparative significance of each member of the sentence, and even of each word, as indicated by its order, and to examine the connexion of the sentiment with that of the speech or strophe of which it forms a part. Nor are there wanting instances where verbal results, which critical sagacity, though disciplined by palæography, might have looked for in vain; have suggested themselves to a mind enabled by experience and sympathy to realise the type on which the author was working. But we are discussing *Æschylus* with reference to Hermann; and Hermann's annotations unfortunately cannot be called exegetical. This is indeed one of the grounds on which we have conceived ourselves entitled to express our disappointment with them. It will hardly be denied that there was some reason to argue *à fortiori* from Sophocles to *Æschylus*, and expect that an editor, who had attempted with success an explanation of most of the obscurities in the easier writer, would undertake to deal with those presented by the more difficult. In general he has not chosen to do so. His notes are little more than a series of decrees about the text, not unlike Dindorf's, except that the legislative 'scribendum' is occasionally exchanged for the executive 'scripsi.' Sometimes he is at the pains to translate, though he rarely enters into arguments to vindicate, his own conjectural readings. Sometimes, too, he has a grammatical or lexicographical note, which reminds us of his better manner, discussing a word or analysing a phrase. But a commentary in the proper sense of the term — 'commentarius, quem vocant perpetuus,' as Elmsley said, — he has not written. Possibly the scoffs levelled by the Müller school at 'notes of the ordinary sort,' induced him to maintain as a point of honour what may originally have been as much a matter of accident as one of principle. Whatever may have been the cause of his determination, we cannot hesitate to pronounce it an unhappy one. In the comparatively few instances where he has written an exegetical note, we are sometimes inclined to question his judgment; but we should certainly have wished to see that judgment exercised more frequently. As it is, there is something mortifying and almost irritating in following him through such a play as the *Choephora* (on the *Agamemnon* he is much more explicit) without hearing a word about the great majority of the questions which an interpreter might be expected to answer. He may have thought that the exegetical part of the work, as a whole, had been sufficiently performed by Schütz, on whom he seems to have looked with

some respect, possibly from early association; but why did he not say that he wished to be understood as agreeing with his meritorious but tedious predecessor in all cases where dissent was not expressed? Questionable as the preference would have been, as against Klausen, the commentator of all others (we borrow the language of our southern contemporary\*) 'who has entered into the spirit, and laboured to unravel the thoughts, of his author,' the course pursued would at any rate have been intelligible. As it is, Hermann has, to say the least, laid himself open to the suspicion of having regarded the whole duty of an interpreter with a contempt which cannot but recoil on its subject. Felicity in textual criticism is a rare gift, the absence of which need not derogate from the sterling value of an edition, as Klausen's example shows: painstaking and thoughtful exegesis is a requisite for every day use, such as every annotator is bound to provide. Hermann has neglected the safer course: has he succeeded in the more perilous?

One important admission we are glad to be able to make at the outset. As exhibiting the MSS. data for the formation of a correct text, this edition is superior to any that have preceded it. It gives us, for the first time, what would seem to be a satisfactory collation of the Medicæan MS. throughout, an office which Franz had already performed in part in his Greek and German *Orestia*. The readings of the inferior copies are also presented, some of them from collations or excerpts made for the purpose: and three MSS. of separate plays (the *Supplices*, the *Prometheus*, and the *Septem contra Thebas*), none of them of any great value, have been examined for the first time. A full account of these MSS. authorities is given in the preface, which is written by Maurice Haupt, Hermann's son-in-law and literary executor. We wish we could say as much for the completeness of the work as a *resumé* of the suggestions of former scholars — the other section, as it may be termed, of the historical department of textual criticism. In this respect it does at once too much and too little. We hear a good deal of Schütz, most of whose conjectures, whatever may be thought of his interpretations, the world has long since agreed to forget. Blomfield, too, occupies rather a disproportionate place, being not only mentioned frequently, but occasionally glanced at with an indirect dexterity of allusion which presumes, as it betrays, such knowledge as only a rival is likely to possess. Whether the Bishop of London has more cause to feel flattered or aggrieved by this persevering attention, it is not for us to say:

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\* Quarterly Review, vol. lxiv. p. 375.

even a casual reader, however, may perceive that he is singled out for disparagement, as a representative of English scholarship, and in particular as a follower of Porson. That great man himself, we may observe in passing, is repeatedly adverted to with an asperity which argues ill for Hermann's magnanimity, and sometimes discredits his judgment. Thus, in a note on *Agam.* 713. (here, as elsewhere, we follow Hermann's own numeration), he says, 'Porsonus ἀκασκαῖον δ' edidit, quem omnes secuti sunt: Porsonus enim si præsul solœcismum facit, quis non redamtruet olli?' and then proceeds to lay down a canon of his own, confirming it by an arbitrary correction of a passage at variance with it: while on v. 817. of the same play he rejects one of Porson's most self-evident corrections with a similar sneer at the applause with which it has been greeted—'Inutilis est ista conjectura, obsequium ridiculum.' On the other hand, we can distinguish very few references, direct or indirect, to anything which has appeared in the last twenty years. This, of course, was to a certain extent inevitable. The *Supplices*, as Haupt informs us, is the only play which had been finally prepared for the press at the time of his death: the notes on some, at least, of the others were evidently written much earlier—judging from internal evidence we should say between 1820 and 1830, not long after the appearance of Blomfield's various editions. But it is clear that he occasionally *did* alter what he had then written, sometimes inserting second thoughts of his own, and those not always the best, sometimes incorporating the remarks of others. Where he refers to a book on one passage, we may fairly presume that he looked at it, however slightly, on others; so that he must be supposed to ignore what he does not mention. As a matter of fact, however, we find that he scarcely ever acknowledges the existence of subsequent critics, except to note their coincidence with his own unpublished views: and even there, as Mr. Paley has shown, his attention is sometimes at fault. It is little to say that he constantly passes over *sub silentio* conjectures far exceeding his own in plausibility, such as Paley's ἀσυχη for εὔχη in *Choeph.* 56., or Linwood's εἰσόντω — ἴρων for ἔς τὸ πᾶν — οἰκῶν in *Eum.* 1024.: yet this would be enough greatly to detract from the utility of an edition laying claim to completeness. But there are cases where he betrays no consciousness, in text or notes, of unquestioned or unquestionable restorations, such as it would be equally perilous to an editor's reputation to challenge and to pass by. The most glaring instance of this kind is in *Agam.* 1081., where Dindorf's emendation, made more than twenty years ago, and accepted universally, καρία for καὶ δορία, is absolutely ignored,

and γὰρ δορί, an infelicitous guess of his own, proposed originally in the appendix to Humboldt's version, enthroned in the text. From the stress which he lays in his note on the absence of the καί as an advantage peculiar to his own reading, we are inclined to suppose that he was not at the time aware of anything better: but it is simply marvellous that in retouching, as he evidently did, his notes on the play, he should have been guilty of so flagrant an omission. Another correction, equally certain, though of later date, of which, as the reviewer of Franz's book in the *Wiener Jahrbücher*, he must have been aware, but of which his notes contain no mention, is Franz and Ahrens' κλύτε δὲ γὰρ χθονίων τε τιμαί, for τὰ χθονίων τετιμαί (the original reading of the Med. M.S., altered by a later hand into τετιμέναι): and this when he has actually thought it worth while to repudiate τιτηνά, his original conjecture, ingenious as it is, and accepted by most of the later editors, who wrote before the discovery of the true reading, in favour of another fancy of far less plausibility, πρότιμα. Of course in censuring the shortcomings of a posthumous work, which was never subjected to a final revision, we must always be more or less judging in the dark: but we think we can see that this contemptuous want of deference to the labours of his younger brethren was as much the result of design as of accident. Innovating as was his spirit, he did not choose entirely to disconnect himself from those who preceded him: Schütz, as we have said, he treats with decency and attention: to Auratus he more than once (*Agam.* 900. 1396.) assigns a preeminence which does not seem to us altogether merited: and on one unhappy occasion (*Agam.* 1131.) he adopts a conjecture of Canter's, which our respect for that father of Æschylean criticism would have led us to bury in oblivion, changing θερμόνους, a word unmistakeably genuine, into θερμὸν οὖς, and thus making Cassandra talk of pressing her glowing ear (!) to earth. But in his own generation he preferred to stand alone as a restorer of the text of Æschylus: the process was to go on exclusively within the precincts of the Leipzig Augusteum, and the re-edified marble was to be inscribed with no name but his. 'Godofredus Hermannus sic cogitavit.'

There is indeed no lack of material for estimating Hermann's own labours on the text. His notes consist almost entirely of verbal criticism, for the most part very briefly expressed, and the volume which contains them is one of 674 octavo pages, printed in small type. So far as bulk goes, no one need be otherwise than satisfied with this work of

a life-time. We doubt whether any previous critic — except those whose *prurigo corrigendi* has been their infamy rather than their fame, — has attempted so complete a reconstruction. He may fairly be said, in language which we have heard employed eulogistically, to have made *Æschylus* a new book. These alterations, nearly without an exception, are incorporated into the text, which occupies the whole of the first volume. The result is a recension which differs as much from Dindorf's (we are speaking of Dindorf's first edition, not of that of 1851,) as Dindorf's differs from the readings of the MSS. The whole aggregate of the corrections which, introduced by preceding editors, have been finally sanctioned by the common consent of the critical world, does not, we are persuaded, exceed in importance — probably not in numbers — those which Hermann has brought in by his own authority. Readers who wish to see what changes may be wrought by a great critic upon a great author must be referred in future, not to Bentley's *Horace*, but to Hermann's *Æschylus*.

One of the easiest and at the same time least satisfactory ways of removing difficulties in the classics, is to suppose their texts to be imperfect. Emendation, which is commonly stigmatised for its facility, is really, when properly regarded, a difficult exercise of ingenuity, as it involves the discovery of a word or words at once probable internally and externally resembling the original reading: but the hypothesis of a *lacuna*, at least in the dialogue of a play, as a general rule requires nothing more than that the critic should not see any connexion in the passage as it stands, and should see a connexion somewhere else in his own imagination. The limits which the *litera scripta* ordinarily imposes on editorial fancies are here entirely removed, the annotator being at liberty to insert as many or as few lines as he pleases, and thus to give the sense any direction that may suit his pleasure. So simple a method of dealing with language could hardly be expected long to remain the peculiar property of philologists: accordingly we find it exemplified daily in street hand-bills, in which the words in large capitals, the uncial letters in short, bear one meaning if read by themselves, and another if taken in connexion with the intermediate lines in smaller type which make up the rest of the advertisement. We do not mean to say that the existence of *lacunæ* is abstractedly impossible or even unlikely, nor that critical acumen may not obtain a legitimate triumph by detecting them, finding regulation for itself in the unmistakable indications supplied by the passage which it assumes to be fragmentary: but we know that in *Æschylus*

scarcely a single case of the omission even of a single line in iambs, trochaics, or anapæsts, not proclaimed, as in the solitary instance at the beginning of the *Choephoraë*, by an obvious deficiency in the MSS., can be said to have been established to the general satisfaction of the critics.\* Consequently, we do not think it raises a presumption in Hermann's favour that he should have availed himself of this licence of conjecture far more unsparingly than any editor within our knowledge. The continuity of his text is broken by upwards of forty supposed *lacunæ*, not more than a fourth of which have made their existence suspected before his time. We cannot stop to discuss all these new discoveries, but we will take those which occur in the first play in the volume, the *Supplises*, as specimens of the class. On v. 218. Hermann says, 'Aliquot versus post hunc excidisse, quibus adventum regis indicabat Danaus, ostendi in Annalibus Vindobonensibus, vol. C. p. 179.' We are unfortunately unacquainted with the article referred to: but we can perfectly understand that an editor may consider the transition from v. 218. to v. 219. rather abrupt, and think that some verses announcing the arrival of the King would form an appropriate bridge. The point however is, Does the passage as we find it in the MSS. involve any such *saltus mortalis* as *Æschylus* is not likely to have taken? We cannot think that it does. Danaus in his first speech mentioned the distant approach of the royal *cortège*, nor was he called upon to repeat the announcement, especially after having given it so conspicuous a place, as the fact on which his subsequent injunctions were to depend; while vv. 219, 220. come in naturally as a conclusion of the whole subject, serving to connect the second speech with the first, the *στιχομυθία* being a kind of digression. The second instance, which supposes the omission of a line after v. 296., deserves more consideration than we can at present give to it, coming as it does from a passage which we have already in our last note ventured to pronounce confused: we must remark, however, that Hermann's supposition necessitates a very questionable alteration in v. 293., so that there is at least one strong argument against it. The next passage (vv. 463. sqq.) we would explain as it stands, by connecting *κλάδους τε τούτους* with *θές*, so as to introduce the familiar *Æschylean* construction of *τε* and a finite verb with a participle; but

\* The only decided exceptions of which we are aware occur in *Ayam.* 1650., *Supp.* 210. 315. (ed. Dindorf), in each of which a line is apparently required for the *στιχομυθία*. The two latter, we may remark, show signs of some further confusion.

even failing this, we think it would be less hazardous to suppose a slight corruption with other commentators than to supply a line with Hermann. The insertion after v. 740. we need not notice, as it is not Hermann's own but Mr. Paley's, who himself in his second edition speaks less confidently of it. Still more gratuitous is the supposition, that two lines have been lost in the dialogue between the King and Herald (vv. 882. sqq.) Whatever be the reading of v. 882., we can see no objection to taking it, as all the commentators have taken it, as the natural retort to v. 882. The King tells the Herald that he is not conducting himself like a *ξένος*: the Herald replies, that in committing the act complained of, he is only reclaiming his own. Of vv. 913. sqq., where the passage is first transposed and then pronounced imperfect, we shall have a word or two to say below. The *lacuna* after v. 940. (originally indicated by Wellauer) is supposed to be established partly by metrical considerations, as the King's speech is thought to be antistrophic to that of the Chorus, partly on grounds of sense, v. 944. being considered too abrupt for the opening of an address: both reasons, however, will vanish if (as has been suggested in an article in the 'Christian Remembrancer' for April 1852), we assign vv. 944—948., no less than the preceding lines, to the Chorus, an arrangement which will further obviate the necessity, otherwise imperative, of adopting Hermann's change of *δμωίδες* into *δμωίδας* in v. 496. The passage from v. 968. to v. 972. is another which may, we think, be set right without inserting a line after v. 969., but we must reserve the details for a note.\*

\* We would propose to read the passage thus:—

Θῆρες δὲ κηραίνουσι καὶ βροτοὶ (τί μῆν;)   
καὶ κνώδαλα πτεροῦντι καὶ πεδοστιγῆ   
καρπώματα στάζονθ', ἃ κηρύσσει Κύπρις,   
κἄωρα κωλύουσιν, ὡς μένειν ὄρφ.

The reading of the first three lines, which, though not identical with Hermann's, is singularly confirmed by it, has been already suggested in the article in the 'Christian Remembrancer' just referred to. In the fourth, we have profited by Hermann's correction, *ὡς μένειν ὄρφ*, which he explains, 'ut maneat intra terminum,' *κωλύω* being constructed with *ως*, and the infinitive as in Thucyd. 7. 36. He does not, however, appear to us to have seen the full value of his own conjecture, as he understands the expression *μένειν ὄρφ* of beasts remaining within their bounds. We think it is to be explained by a reference to *Eumen.* 927, 8. (ed. Herm.) *Φλογμός τ' ὀμμαποστερήε φυτῶν, τὸ μὴ περᾶν ὄρον τόπων*, from which we are inclined to infer a technical use of *ὄρος*, as signifying the bounds which a plant is supposed to break when it develops. Thus the sense is, that the spoilers damage the ripe fruit, and hinder the unripe from coming to maturity.



This closes the list of instances from the *Supplices*, in which, as our readers will have seen, there is only one that, in our judgment, shows any signs of a *lacuna*: and even those, as the passage stands, are exceedingly equivocal. So far as we are aware, the specimens chosen have been rather favourable than the reverse. The play, as we have said, is the only one for the publication of which Hermann is entirely responsible: it is also the one in which he appears to us to have succeeded best; and, what is of still more importance, it is, though not the most difficult, nor, on the whole, the most corrupt, the play where there is most cause for suspecting mutilation. We are reflecting not on Hermann, but on the system which he has pursued; not on his ill success in looking for *lacunæ*, but on the principle of looking for them at all. In one respect, however, he appears to us to have laid himself open to special censure; and we mention it the rather because the offence is almost entirely confined to the *Supplices*, so that it would seem to have been the result of his latest thoughts: we mean that he more than once inserts lines of his own composition in the text—a piece of temerity which we scarcely know how to characterise. It is true that he distinguishes them from their neighbours by asterisks: but that is hardly sufficient. An intruder into a house may not be disguised as one of the family; but he is an intruder still.

With respect to *lacunæ* in the choral parts, the case is different. Their existence rests on tangible external evidence, that of the metre, the correspondence of strophe and antistrophe acting as a check upon arbitrary hypothesis. It is true that this evidence is not absolute, but only presumptive, as where strophe and antistrophe differ, it may be that the one is redundant, not that the other is imperfect—a point pressed some years ago in a pamphlet by Mr. Thomas Dyer, who remarks on the great numerical disproportion between the *lacunæ* in the Choral Odes of *Æschylus* and those in the dialogue, and proceeds with some ingenuity, though not always in a felicitous or scholarlike manner, to remedy several of the more important of the former class by the omission of words which he judges superfluous. The fact of the disproportion, as exhibited in every edition before Hermann's, is plain, but its argumentative value is rather questionable, as Mr. Dyer on his hypothesis has to account for the preponderance of interpolations in the lyrical parts, and the consideration which he would doubtless adduce—the greater comparative ignorance of the metre on the part of the transcribers—would explain subtractions at least as well as additions. Thus it is only by the style and sense of the pas-

sage under dispute in each case that the plausibility of either supposition can be tested: and as a matter of fact we believe that critics are generally agreed that the text of *Æschylus'* choruses has suffered more from omission than from insertion. Here, accordingly, Hermann's text does not differ so materially from that of his predecessors as to call for special notice. We have to remark, indeed, especially in the *Supplices* and the *Persæ*, the same practice which we censured just now,—that of patching up the rents in the author with shreds from the wardrobe of the critic. The effect is less offensive in the present than in the former case, because the proceeding itself is in general less arbitrary. The deficiency is mostly a recognised fact, not an individual crotchet: and the attempt to supply it rarely extends beyond a word or two, so that it seems scarcely bolder than an ordinary conjectural emendation. Instances might be quoted in which the missing word is so plainly pointed out by the metre and the sense of a passage, that an editor is justified in inserting it *proprio periculo*. But these are very rare, and we are not sure that Hermann's *Æschylus* can be said to supply any of them. As commonly practised, there can be no doubt that the habit is a dangerous one, and ought to be protested against by all who, like ourselves, desire to see classical texts preserved in their purity.\* In one or two extreme cases

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\* We are sorry to say, that some very grave offences of this kind have recently been committed under the auspices of the University of Oxford. The delegates of the Clarendon Press have, as is well known, for a long time employed Professor Dindorf to edit classical texts. That scholar had acquired considerable reputation by editions of the Greek Dramatists, published first in Leipsic and afterwards at Oxford, the guiding principle of which was understood to be a faithful and in some cases superstitious regard to the text as it stood in the MSS. Lately, however, he has put forth editions of *Æschylus* (1851), and *Sophocles* (1849), which are distinguished, to a degree scarcely paralleled, by the opposite characteristic of rash and ill-advised conjecture. We give an instance from each in which he has, without a shadow of external authority or internal plausibility, obtruded a word of his own on the text of his author. In *Æsch. Eum.* 352., the MSS. give *παλλεύκων δὲ πέπλων ἄμοιρος ἄκληρος ἐτύχθη*, the antistrophic verse being *Ζεὺς γὰρ αἰματοσταγὴς ἀξιόμισον ἔθνος τῶδε λέσχαρ*. In the Oxford edition we read, *παλλεύκων δὲ πέπλων ἄμοιρος μόννα ἐτύχθη*, and *Ζεὺς γὰρ ἀξιόμισον πᾶν ἔθνος τοδὲ λέσχαρ*. In *Soph. Phil.* 1131., the Professor has substituted *τὸν Ἱράκλειον ξύνημον* for *τὸν Ἱράκλειον ἄθλον*, or *ἄθλιον*. These, our readers will see, are not conjectures of the ordinary sort, where the words supplied resemble those which they supersede. The critic has simply treated his author as a tutor treats the exercise of his pupil, striking

the result has been a mere *rifacimento*. The conclusion of the *Persæ* has been regarded by all previous critics, and formerly by Hermann himself, as monostrophic, — an epode, such as not unfrequently ends a lyrical system. He now considers it antistrophic, on no metrical ground that we can discover, except the recurrence of one line, which, after all, he has to remove from its natural and authorised connexion in order to complete his scheme: and on the strength of this he proceeds to manufacture four strophes and four antistrophes, nearly half of the materials being purely and entirely his own. Even though he were right in his view of the metrical requirements of the passage, which we doubt, he surely was not called upon to do more than indicate the parts which he supposed to have been omitted. In his note he says, ‘*Studui hos versus ita conformare, ut dignus Æschyli arte tragœdiæ finis evaderet, quanquam in iis, quæ asteriscis inclusa addidi, singula verba præstare non possum.*’ We wonder that the same notions of editorial duty did not lead him to attempt a restoration of the lost plays.

Another distinguishing feature in Hermann's *Æschylus* is the extent to which he has indulged in the transposition of lines. This expedient is of course chiefly applicable to the dialogue; in the choruses, such changes are for the most part either absolutely necessary or absolutely inadmissible, so that a critic has rarely an opportunity of suggesting them. The facility of hypothesis is not so fatal here as in the case of *lacunæ*: the order of the lines in a passage cannot be altered at random, nor are the productions of great poets in general so written that they may be read either backwards or diagonally, or in alternate verses, at the reader's pleasure. Owing to the salutary operation of the limit thus imposed, we rarely find editors proposing transpositions which are positively extravagant or purely arbitrary; while there are not a few cases—and we are happy to give Hermann credit for two of them at least (*Agam.* 1243., *Cho.* 115.)—in which the suggestion, once made, has been immediately seen to be indisputable. It is, moreover, an hypothesis which has always some external plausibility, as we know, that the copyists were in the frequent habit of transposing lines accidentally,

out one word and putting in another which he thinks better. He has not even had the decency to distinguish his own suggestion from the rest of the passage by asterisks or brackets. To notice all the cases of violence done to the text would require a separate article. It is with regret we add, that these editions are the text books now in use in the public examinations at Oxford.

and that the marks by which they endeavoured to rectify their error when discovered were such as may easily have been obliterated. Nevertheless, we are compelled to think that in this, as in other respects, Hermann has injured the text of *Æschylus* far more than he has benefited it. We alluded a little while since to a place in the *Supplices* (vv. 913. sqq.), which he has disfigured at once by a transposition and a lacuna, the former in part originally suggested by Schütz. The passage is perfectly intelligible as it stands in the common editions, except that the reading in v. 913., for which he has himself suggested a good conjecture, σοὶ μὲν τόδ' ἡδύ, is not quite settled. The Herald, after inquiring to whom he has been speaking, intimates rather abruptly, but not unnaturally, that the question will be made not one of talking, but of hard blows. The King in reply takes no special notice of the threat, but, in declaring that he and his people have made up their minds, implies with sufficient plainness that they are ready to bear the consequences. The Herald briefly retorts, in two lines of defiance, which are answered as briefly by the King, in a manner which shows that the 'scoff' and the 'counter-scoff' were alike intended by the poet to be 'fiery short.' Hermann, however, thinks differently, and gives the Herald's concluding speech as follows:—

εἴ σοι τόδ' ἡδύ πόλεμον αἶρεσθαι νέον,  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 οὔτοι δικάζει ταῦτα μαρτύρων ἔπο  
 Ἄρης, τὸ νεῖκος δ' οὐκ ἐν ἀργύρου λαβῇ  
 ἔλυσεν, ἀλλὰ πολλά γίγνεται πάρος  
 πεσήματ' ἀνδρῶν κάπολιτισμοὶ βίων.  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 εἴη δὲ νίκη καὶ κράτη τοῖς ἄρσεσιν.

A similar case of manipulation occurs in *Cho.* 95. sqq., a passage which has hitherto presented no difficulty to any of the editors, except perhaps Schütz. The Chorus, invited by Electra to give their opinion whether she ought to make any address to her father while pouring the libations on his tomb, and if so, what, offer to do so, saying that they will speak sincerely, and as in the sight of the dead. Electra accepts the assurances, and bids them proceed, when they at once advise her to pray for blessings on her friends. Such is the substance of the dialogue, with which we should have thought it difficult to find fault. Hermann, however, first complains of v. 95., λέγοις ἄν, εἴ τι τῶνδ' ἔχεις ὑπέρτερον, in which Electra repeats the invitation already given, as being tame and unnecessary, and then goes on to condemn more emphatically the assurance

given by the Chorus, and Electra's acceptance of it; saying, in effect, that no one wanted to know what the Chorus *felt*, but what they *thought*. This being premised, he reforms the whole passage, so as to produce what he considers worthy of *Æschylus*, 'Videor autem mihi quod dignum esset *Æschylo* effecisse ita 'his versibus conformatis omnibusque choro redditis:'

ΧΟ. αἰδουμένη σοὶ βωμὸν ὡς τύμβον πατρὸς  
 λέξω, κελύεις γάρ, τὸν ἐκ φρενὸς λόγον.  
 λόγους ἂν ὡςπερ ἠδέσω τύφον πατρὸς  
 στέγοις ἂν, εἰ τι τῶνδ' ἔχεις ὑπέρτερον\*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 φθέγγου χέουσα σεμνὰ τοῖσιν εὐφροσιν.

We will not stop to criticise details, such as the frigidity of the comparison, βωμὸν ὡς, where the Chorus are supposed merely to be acknowledging Electra's sentiments, not expressing their own, but leave it to our readers to say whether here, as in the last instance, independently of the violence of the changes involved, the new arrangement is not greatly inferior to the old in propriety and poetical spirit. We are not aware of any examples of rash and tasteless transposition so conspicuous as these: but many remain behind which could be shown to be utterly needless, as well as unauthorised. Those who choose to pursue them may be referred to *Supp.* 437., *Pers.* 13. 684. (note), 777., *Theb.* 553. (note), 785., *Cho.* 504. 548. 683., *Eum.* 238. One or two others, which at first sight appear sufficiently specious, such as *Cho.* 285., *Eum.* 675. (both of which have been published before, and received with approbation\*), when more carefully examined, will be seen to injure

\* In the passage from the *Choephora*, the old order is shown to be the true one by the words τὸ γὰρ σκοτεινόν, which, as Klausen remarks, points to ἐν σκότῳ preceding. In its present condition the passage is of course unconstructable, but a very slight change, we think, would set it perfectly right, without any transposition. But the considerations which our conjecture involves, are too wide to be opened out, even in a note. In the lines from the *Eumenides*, there is an evident connexion between πρώτας δίκας and ἔσται ἐξέ και τὸ λοιπόν, which would be broken by Hermann's proposed insertion. Meineke's transposition of *Cho.* 977. seq. (ed. Herm.), which Hermann adopts, is, to say the least, equally unwarrantable. The objection to the old order, the confusion between Clytæmnestra and the robe with which she slew her husband, is really its strongest recommendation. The madness has begun to work in Orestes' brain, and he actually identifies his mother with the instrument of death. *νῦν*, in v. 977. is Clytæmnestra, as the preceding words show.

the context which they were thought to improve. We need hardly say, though it is a thing which should be remarked, that, excepting in two or three cases, these transpositions are not confined to the notes, but take their full effect on the text.

A further peculiarity, which will strike the readers of these volumes, is the new disposition which has been attempted of many of the speeches in the dialogue, lines which have hitherto been supposed to be spoken by one character being assigned to another. There is much to be said in favour of this species of reform, which frequently produces very important results at the expense of a very slight change, and that precisely of the nature which is most warranted by the state of the extant MSS. Accordingly, it has been going on more or less extensively ever since the commencement of *Æschylean* criticism, till whole scenes, which, if not absolutely unintelligible, used to yield a very vague and confused sense at best, have become instinct with poetic beauty and dramatic propriety. We have already alluded to a signal service of this kind rendered by Hermann in his early days, the effect of which was to convert a scene which, even in the Glasgow edition, appears as a sort of irregular monopolylogue, undramatic and unmetrical, into a harmonious whole, in which passion is not weakened but intensified by being distributed among the various acting personages, agreeably to the more intricate laws of choral symmetry. He has now introduced a number of redistributions, chiefly in the iambic portion of the dialogue, which has been for some time past regarded as, for the most part, settled to the satisfaction

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Precisely the same identification, in language as nearly parallel as possible, is made by 'the wild Cassandra,' *Agam.* 1073.

ἔ εἰ, παπαῖ παπαῖ, τί τόδε φαίνεται;  
 ἢ δακτύον τί γ' Αἴδου;  
 ἀλλ' ἄρκυς ἢ ξύνευρος, ἢ ξυναιρία  
 φόνου.

There is an inspiration in the frenzy of Orestes as well as in that of Cassandra: if the latter is a prophetess, the former speaks under Divine sanction as an avenger of blood: and accordingly the identification is not a mere confusion, but contains a truth. When we consider that the *Agamemnon* and the *Choephora* are parts of the same whole, and were represented together, we may almost say that *Æschylus* intended the two passages to witness to each other's meaning. Tasteless, however, as this transposition is, it is infinitely preferable to such criticism as Dindorf's, who actually marks vv. 977—984., — in themselves, apart from the context, as thoroughly characteristic of the Poet as anything in the seven plays,—for omission as spurious.

of critics. These, we think, are decidedly to be classed among the happiest of his innovations: most of them are plausible and ingenious, and such as may be conceived of without difficulty as commending themselves to succeeding editors. Indeed, Mr. Paley has already taken one or two of them under his patronage, in the new edition of his *Agamemnon*, *c. g.* vv. 467—478. (τάχ' εἰσόμυσθα κ.τ.λ.), which Hermann, after Wellauer, gives to the Chorus, and vv. 591, 592., (τοιόσδ' ὁ κόμπος κ.τ.λ.), which he assigns to Clytæmnestra, as the conclusion of her speech. The first is open to the obvious objection that, in that case, σοί, v. 474., which, in the mouth of Clytæmnestra, contains a sneer levelled at the Chorus, would be simply unmeaning, so that Hermann has to change it, not very felicitously, into του. The speech is well suited to the pretended *εὐνοία* of Clytæmnestra; nor do we see any real difficulty in the ordinary supposition, that after thus delivering herself she retires to the side of the stage, as it were to study her part, while the Chorus is receiving the Herald, and then comes forward again with a set oration. The assertion that the Chorus is generally the first to discover arrivals may be met by a reference to *Supp.* 162. sqq., 680. sqq., where Danaus describes appearances which, like that of the Herald here, are supposed to have come in sight while the singing has been going on. The second change we are disposed to accept, as the new arrangement would be most appropriate in itself, and the words αὐτῇ μὲν οὕτως εἶπε, v. 593. seem, if anything, intended closely to follow the speech to which they refer. Grammatically, too, Hermann appears right in saying that τοιόσδ' ὁ κόμπος could not be spoken by any one but Clytæmnestra, the position of the article showing that τοιόσδε must be taken as a predicate, 'such is my 'boast, full of truth, and no unmeet one.' He might have added that Clytæmnestra elsewhere expresses herself in a similar way, v. 870., τοιοῖσδέ τοί νιν ἀξιῶ προσφθέγμασιν, a line which, like the present, comes in at the end of an elaborate address, as a kind of summary, and so accords well with her formality and self-consciousness. We may compare also the manner in which she concludes a previous speech, v. 333., τοιαῦτά τοι γυναικὸς ἐξ ἐμοῦ κλύεις, as well as another passage from her congratulatory oration to her husband, v. 853., τοιάδε μέντοι σκῆψις οὐ δόλον φέρει, which supplies a yet closer parallel, and is, if possible, still more in character, as expressing not only self-consciousness but self-justification. On the other hand, we cannot agree with Hermann that there is any impropriety in giving the speech to the Herald, who need not be supposed to answer his mistress, but to speak

of her after her departure, just as we have had the Watchman talking, though not with the same sentiment of respect, of her *ἀνδρόβουλον κέαρ*. Almost equally plausible is the redistribution of *Prom.* 972, 973., *κρείσσον γὰρ οἶμαι κ.τ.λ.*, assigning those lines to Hermes, not to Prometheus—a notion which would be improved by adopting Mr. Paley's independent suggestion, that *οἶμαι* is to be taken parenthetically. Yet it may be answered, and we think with force, that while the new arrangement suits the first of the two verses equally well with the old, it is less appropriate to the second, the language of which can hardly be other than ironical, and therefore is not very likely to be applied by Hermes to his own position. Either disposition makes one of the speakers accept the taunt implied in the words of the other; but while Prometheus might dwell, even with pride, on his servitude to the rock, Hermes would hardly talk of himself as born the trusty messenger of Zeus, especially as his *birth* to service, which, under such circumstances, could only be mentioned contemptuously, had not been alluded to by his enemy. The following lines, too, seem to us decidedly to negative Hermann's view: v. 974. would not be a natural answer to the supposed taunt of the younger God, which could not fairly be taken as a serious expostulation; nor could v. 975. be referred back to vv. 970, 971., separated as they are by two intervening speeches, even if its language did not clearly point out vv. 972, 973. as those to which it is intended to apply. The *Choephora* contains two passages, in which the necessity of redistribution is rested on grounds not of dramatic fitness, but of supposed artistic symmetry. The one is vv. 252—260., which is given to Electra, instead of Orestes, that the pair may speak nine lines each; while the other, vv. 494—505., a speech commonly supposed to belong to Electra, is broken up into five small sections, to carry out a similar theory. There can be no doubt that such a notion of symmetry was occasionally present to the minds of the tragedians in constructing their dialogues\*: but the

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\* In one remarkable instance from this very play an attention to the principle of symmetry would have saved Hermann from the responsibility of a long series of offences against the text of *Æschylus*. We allude to vv. 106—211. (ed. Dindorf), where vv. 106—152. answer to vv. 165—211., eighteen lines of dialogue in each case being followed by twenty-nine spoken continuously. Not perceiving or not recognising this, Hermann first transposes and alters vv. 105—108. (95—98.) in the manner which we have already described, next assumes two *lacunæ* at v. 130. and v. 189. respectively, then takes vv. 201—204. from Electra to give them to the Chorus, and ends with another supposed *lacuna* at v. 208. Here again he has sinned not



facts will not warrant our assuming it as a habitually guiding principle. In the first scene referred to, that which begins v. 208., we see no traces of it beyond the *στιχομυθία* in v. 210. sqq.; for it is only by supposing a line to be omitted after v. 228. that a correspondence can be made out between vv. 221—231. and vv. 232—242.; and even Hermann does not pretend that the final speech of Orestes, v. 266. sqq., has anything to answer to it. The case of the second scene is less defensible: there is a proportion observable in its opening lines, vv. 473—490., as there is later, vv. 520—528., but that is no reason for obtruding it elsewhere; the words *λοισθίου βοῆς*, v. 494., naturally imply that the speech where they occur is really the last: and, finally, which is a fatal objection, Hermann's hypothesis compels him to tamper with the text of v. 504., and reverse the order of the two following lines — lines which he had himself, many years ago, the merit of placing in their true light by a slight emendation, after Porson had failed. These are, we believe, the most important instances of this class of alterations. Our deliberate judgment inclines us to decide against most of them; but it would be uncandid not to admit that, with scarcely an exception, they show a sobriety and thoughtfulness, as well as a sagacity, which command respect even when they fail to procure assent. *Si sic omnia!*

It will not be expected that a critic who has done so much to reform his author by methods comparatively less obvious, at least to recent editors, should have neglected the ordinary means of amelioration by verbal correction. Here, accordingly, as elsewhere, Hermann's activity has been very conspicuous. He cannot be said to have outrun his predecessors to the same degree either in the extent or in the variety of his innovations: that the nature of the case precluded. But the field is a very large, in fact, an unlimited, one: and he has laboured in it as assiduously as any single workman is ever likely to do. We should have been glad to examine this part of his performance more at length, constituting as it does the real substance of his recension — the staple with which *lacunæ* and transpositions and redistributions are interwoven, so closely indeed, that in giving samples of the one we have already been compelled to introduce a specimen or two of the other. To do full justice, however, to all, or even to a considerable part of these novelties,

only against his author but himself, as the symmetry in question is actually owing to one of the undoubted discoveries made by his own earlier and better judgment, the transposition of the line *κῆρυξ μέγιστε κ. τ. λ.*

would require a commentary as long as Hermann's own, if not longer, as a simple assertion is pretty sure to be briefer than a disproof of that assertion; so we must content ourselves with a handful from each play, discussing some and indicating others, in the hope that our readers will give us credit for a candid and conscientious selection.

One class of alterations we may dismiss at once, though our convictions are not less strong because we are compelled to write shortly — those made for metrical purposes. We are not disposed to challenge Hermann as a great, perhaps the greatest, authority on choral metres, or to deny that the metre in choruses, no less than in dialogues, occasionally suggests a correction of which there can be no reasonable question. These cases, however, are comparatively rare; and where they do not occur, we cannot think that mere discrepancy of metre can justify the introduction of a change, not otherwise highly probable, into strophe or antistrophe. Let the discrepancy be noted, but not remedied, at least in the text. Yet this consideration, obvious as it seems, Hermann repeatedly disregards — more frequently, we are inclined to think, than any one who has dealt with the tragedians since choral metres began to be understood, though we write with a recollection of Dindorf in our minds. We have already glanced at his practice of restoring the metre by a patchwork process, reconciling a spondee and an iambus by putting a new iambus before the one, and a new spondee behind the other. Yet this is better than the common custom of supplanting one word by another, probably not so good, at any rate, not to be accounted for on any sound critical principle, simply because of a want of metrical conformity, real or supposed, in the text as it stands. What can justify the substitution of *στέρξης* for *φιλείς*, or *φίλοις* (Lachmann's almost certain conjecture), *Supp.* 781.; *δύσοιστον* for *δύσφορον*, *ib.* 786.; *ἀστραφή* for *ἄγναμπτον*, *Prom.* 163.; *μηδὲ τοῦ με κρεισσόνων θεῶν ἔρωσ προσδράκοι ὄμμ' ἄφυκτον* for *μηδὲ κρεισσόνων θεῶν ἔρωσ ἄφυκτον ὄμμα προσδέρκοι (προσδράκοι) με*, *ib.* 904.; *προλέγων* for *λέξας*, *Pers.* 703.; *κλάγξω δ' ἀρίδακρυν ἰαχάν* for *κλάγξω δ' αὐ γόνον ἀρίδακρυν*, *ib.* 924.; *ὑπορίνεις* for *ὑπομιμνήσκεις*, *ib.* 960.; *πάγκακον* for *διαπρέπον*, *ib.* 978.; *καὶ πλέον πλέον μὲν οὖν* for *καὶ πλέον ἢ παπαὶ μὲν οὖν*; *ib.* 1001., *σαοῖ* for *ὄρθοι*, *Theb.* 212.; *κλύδων* for *δαίμων*, *ib.* 686.; *γαῖα* for *χθονία*, *ib.* 717.; *μᾶψ ἔρχεται* for *παρέρχεται* (*μᾶψ* being moreover a word unknown to Greek tragedy), *ib.* 749.; *πεπλαγμένους καὶ δόμοισιν ἐννέπειω* for *πλαγὰν δόμοισι καὶ σώμασι πεπλαγμένους ἐννέπω*, *ib.* 870.; *πήματα παλμάτων* for *τριπάλτων πήμάτων*, *ib.* 967.; *ἄναξ Ἐτεόκλεις σὺ δ' ἀρχαγέτας* for *κακῶν ἄναξ Ἐτεόκλεις ἀρχηγέτα*, *ib.*

981.; ξὺν δορὶ πράκτορι ποιναῖς for ξὺν δορὶ δίκας πράκτορι (καὶ χερί πράκτορι), *Ag.* 110.; πέλας πατρώους χέρας βρέθροισ for βρέθροισ πατρώους χέρας βωμοῦ πέλας, *ib.* 197. ('*Ἀργείων* in the strophe having been changed into '*Ἀργούς*); παραλλάγαίσι for παραλλάξασα, *ib.* 405.; προσέμολε for προσέβα, *ib.* 746.; καὶ παῖς νεόγονος for νεογνὸς ἀνθρώπων, *ib.* 1122.; ὅπως δάκει for ὑπὸ οὐ ὑπαὶ δῆγματι, *ib.* 1123.; φοβερόθροα for κακὰ θρεομένας, *ib.* 1124.; στᾶσα τότ' ἐν δόμοισιν ἐριδματος τις for ἦτις ἦν τότ' ἐν δόμοισ ἐρις ἐριδματος, *ib.* 1428.; ἡ μέγα δώμασι τοῖσδ' αἴμονα for ἡ μέγαν οἴκοις τοῖσδε δαίμονα, *ib.* 1449.; παρῆσι φοίνις διωγμός for παρῆσι φοίνισσ (φοίνιοις) ἀμνημοῖς, *Cho.* 24.; καθαρσίωσι ἴοιεν ἄν for καθαίροντες ἴουσαν, *ib.* 65.; τάνδ' for δούλιον, *ib.* 68.; μὴ' μαῖς for μὴ δίκαια, *ib.* 73.; δίπαις δέ σ' ὄδ' for δίπαις τοῖς (τοῖς), *ib.* 330.; τὰ δ' ἄλα' ἀμφανεῖ χρήζων for πολλὰ δ' ἄλλα φανεῖ χρήζων κρυπτά, *ib.* 802.; νέον ἄλμα for ὑφ' αἵματος νέου, *Eum.* 354.; αὐ φρενῶν ὁ πάμφιλος for φρενῶν ὁ πᾶσιν φίλος, *ib.* 527.; all of which are inflicted on the text of *Æschylus*, and form part of the recension? To argue against them severally would be quite needless, even if we had space to do so: to enumerate them is to pronounce their condemnation.

We will now turn to the seven plays in succession, and notice some of the more remarkable of the emendations, without attempting to classify the grounds on which they have been introduced. The order we follow is Hermann's own.

The *Supplikes*, as we have already remarked, is the play where Hermann's critical power appears to us to be displayed to the best advantage. It had been finally revised by him, and was about to be published, when his fatal illness intervened, so that Haupt concludes, with some show of justice, that if the same benefit had been extended to the other plays, they would have profited by it in the same proportion. What difference was actually made by this final revision, we are not informed, and of course cannot divine: meantime we suspect the superiority of this part of Hermann's labour to be greatly owing to the fact, that the play is one for which less has hitherto been done than any other of the seven; recent critics, from an exaggerated notion of the hopelessness of its corruptions, having mostly declined to touch it. As a matter of fact, we find that no play contains so many instances in which he has been anticipated by other scholars in the publication of his suggestions, if not in the suggestions themselves. The correction *ἀγνός*—*Σπρυμῶν τὸ πρὸς δύναντος ἡλίου* for '*Ἄλγος Σπρυμῶν τε* (v. 241.) is due, as Dindorf tells us on the authority of Dr. Gaisford, to J. Wordsworth, who also discovered τὸ to be the original reading of the Med. MS. *Οἰκτίσας, ἰδὼν τάδε* (v. 470.) was pro-

posed ten years ago by Linwood in his *Lexicon*. Πρὸς πόλεως, in v. 603., which is restored summarily in the place of the old πρὸ πόλεως ('Id hic nihili est. Quare correxi.),' belongs to Paley, or rather to a writer in the 'Quarterly Review'\* forty years back. Ἄγ γύαλα (v. 534.), and πολὺψυμμον (v. 836.), are again Paley's. Notice has already been taken of some instances of partial coincidence between Hermann's views and those of a contemporary reviewer, the latter of which appeared just before the publication of this edition. Other coincidences, of more or less importance, occur in v. 97., where Hermann extracts δι' ἄνοιαν from the Scholiast, though he does not adopt it; v. 617., τὰν ἄχορον for τὸν ἄχορον; v. 926., where they agree in recognising the truth of Bothe's εἰ θυμός ἐστιν for εὐ θυμόν ἐστιν, though ignored by all subsequent editors, its original promulgator included; and vv. 958-9., where the restorations proposed are precisely the same, except that Hermann alters ἐμοῦ into θέμις, and the reviewer into νόμος.† This list, we are bound to say, absorbs a considerable proportion of the cases of successful treatment which distinguish the *Supplices* from the rest of the edition, and doubtless it might have been increased if the play had been as frequently handled as others. Another fact which militates against Haupt's assumption is, that in the case of the *Eumenides*, where we are able to compare the Hermann of 1836 with the Hermann of 1848, the difference is by no means invariably in favour of the latter, whom advancing years appear to have made subtle rather than sagacious, increasing his scepticism without improving his faculty of reconstruction. But we must leave our readers to judge for themselves, and turn to the *Supplices* in detail. Βαθύτιμοι for βαθύτιμοι, v. 24., is a futile correction, as, though we quite agree that the sense requires honoured heroes, not avenging gods, that sense is equally possible with the old reading, which, besides, is a word already existing in the language with a kindred signification. Γονέων, instead of τὰ τε νῦν, v. 50., is bolder, and not more necessary, νῦν being obviously confirmed by πρόσθε, and τε the favourite Æschylean construction with a finite verb after a participle, which Hermann himself was the first to point out (*Ag.* 97., and Hermann's note). On the other

\* See an article on Butler's *Æschylus*, in 'Quarterly Review,' vol. iii. The same writer has there anticipated one of Wellauer's happiest emendations, τὸν γάιον, v. 138.

† For some additional instances we may refer our readers to Mr. Burges' 'Appendix to the Prose Translation of *Æschylus*, published in Bohn's Classical Library,' which we have only seen since this article was written.

hand, *γαυνόμοισι δ'*, v. 51., is happy, and deserves attention, though the word is an unknown one, and the counter claims of Porson's *ἄτ' ἀνόμεν' οἶμαι* rather strong. In v. 59., *ἀπὸ χλωρῶν πετάλων ἐγρομένα* takes the place of *ἀπὸ χάρων ποτάμων τ' εἰργομένα*, with the remark, 'a quibusdam locis? et num aquatilis 'avis est luscinia?' interrogations which will rather surprise scholars, who know that *χάρων* is synonymous with *ἠθέων*, as in *Apoll. Rhod.* 2. 1242. (actually quoted by Schütz), *Soph. Trach.* 144., and lovers of poetry, who remember the nightingale which, though not a waterfowl, sings all day long by Bendemeer's stream, and those which in Sophocles' celebrated chorus about Colonus form part of the same picture with the springs of the Cephissus. *Νέοικτον οἶτον* for *νέον οἶκτον*, v. 60., besides being objectionable, as introducing an unauthorised word, is a correction which might have been avoided by adopting Bamberger's far simpler emendation of the strophe. *Δεῖμι μένουσα* for *δειμαίνουσα*, v. 68., is another change of the same kind, spoiling a good reading in the strophe when the MSS. rather point to a corruption in the antistrophe. *Στέγοντες*, v. 73., is far worse than *στυγούντες*, which is exactly paralleled by v. 512. Of a very different sort are the two next corrections, *νόμοις*, v. 73., and *ἰθείη*, v. 78., both highly plausible externally and internally, though not free from all doubt, and proposed where change really seems required. We soon, however, come again to rash and ill-considered conjectures, such as *βίαν δ' οὔτις ἐξαλίξει τὰν ἄπονον δαιμονίον*, v. 88., *μνήμαν*, v. 90., *Ἄρτεμις*, v. 128., *ἀσχαλώσ'* v. 130., of which the best thing that can be said is that they are not worse than the corrupt text which they supplant. *Γυνή*, v. 187., *ἐχθρῶς ὄμαιμον καταμαιόντων γένος*, v. 212., *συνήσεται*, v. 230., and *καὶ τᾶλλα πού μ'*, v. 231., are changes of a more wanton kind, apparently for change's sake. *Μηνιταί' ἄκη*, v. 253., is a sufficiently bad guess, doubtful in point of language, not very appropriate in point of sense, and coming, too, where more than one good guess has been made already. *Ἄντήσας*, v. 309., has at first sight some plausibility, as it is actually found in the margin of the MSS., and *Soph. Ant.* 981. is quoted for the supposed use of *ἀνταῶ*; but the voucher itself requires vouching for, and the epithet *Ἄργείου* is, we think, fatal to the new view. *Φιλῶν* for *φίλους*, v. 322., again, is an attempt to correct what has already been corrected with greater probability; but we incline not to accept either change, as both assume that the answer required to v. 321. is not *τὸ μὴ θέμις*, which the context seems to point out, but *κατ' ἐχθραν*. V. 431. is a difficult part of a difficult passage; few, however, we suspect, will agree with Hermann that *Æschylus* began a line with *μὴ ἀλγεῖν ᾗ*, and that

*ἀλγεινὴ* is a correction due to the better taste of a transcriber. *Δακνιστήρα*, v. 449., is a new coinage, and one not very well adapted for currency, even if the old reading were not defended by Hesychius. *Ἄψ*, v. 465., like *μύψ*, is an obtrusion on the tragedians of a form to which they were not partial, without any warrant from the sense, which requires *forthwith*, not *again*. *Πολυξέστους*, v. 480., is a reading which, on all accounts, ought to have been kept out of the text, as it pretends to be nothing more than a *locum tenens* for the lost word which the repetition of *πολιτισσούχων* has extruded. *Ἀνάρκτων* for *ἀνάκτων*, v. 498., was quite worth recording; but, though the Chorus might speak of themselves as *ἀναρκτοί* in the absence of their father (comp. v. 11.), the King would not naturally do so, and the words, so corrected, being in the form of a general sentiment, could hardly refer to anything but the terror produced by political anarchy, a very different thing. *Γεναρχᾶν*, v. 515., is extremely ill-advised, the word being itself unwarranted, and the objection to the common text, *τὸ πρὸς γυναικῶν*, founded on a misunderstanding of its meaning, which is not 'the woman's descendants,' but 'the woman's cause,' opposed to *ἀνδρῶν ὕβριν*. *Ὅρων*, v. 535., is a good correction, and one which should have been made before, being found in the margin of the Escorial MS., and naturally suggested by the old reading *ὄρων*, to which it is certainly preferable. In v. 540. Hermann is so far right that a participle seems to be wanted agreeing with *Io* and constructed with *βέλει*; but after saying 'talía complura inveniri possunt,' he ought never to have assumed that *Æschylus* wrote a word so remote from the reading of the books as *ἐγκεχρημένα*. *Δύα* for *βία*, v. 560., and *ἀποσχάζει*, v. 562., are both worse than useless. The poet intended to contrast the violence of *Io's* madness with the tranquillising power of *Jupiter*, while the shedding of womanly tears is, with great truth, made the first sign of recovered humanity. A few such instances as this go far to discredit a critic's capacity for entering into the feelings of his author. But we shall weary our readers if we run even thus rapidly through the rest of the play: so we will simply commend to their attention three of Hermann's better thoughts — but a small percentage, we fear, on the whole — *φλεόντων* for *φλεγόντων*, v. 643., *θάλοιεν* for *λάβοιεν*, v. 663., and *στνυγερῶν* for *στνυγρόν*, 1003.; the second as plausible, the two others as nearly certain, though we are not sure what ought to be done with *γεμόντων*, v. 642., and quite sure that *προβούλοισ* ought not to have been thrust, *ex more Hermannii*, into its place.

The changes in the text of the *Prometheus* are fewer, and generally of much less importance. *Ἵπερτέρους* for *ὑπερέχοντας*

or *ὑπερσχόντας*, v. 215., and *φίλοισιν οἰκτρὸς* for *φίλοις ἐλεεινὸς* or *ἐλεινός*, v. 248., are sufficiently infelicitous attempts to extract something totally new from slight MS. variations which have long since been understood and accounted for. *Πᾶσι δ' ἀντίεστη θεοῖς*, v. 356., is perhaps as good as any correction of *πάσιν ὅς* that has been proposed, though it is not satisfactory, being one of those which rather cut than solve the knot. *Προσσελούμενον*, v. 439., is a conjecture which almost attains to the dignity of a hypothesis, and as such has to be unfolded in a very long note; but the argument turns too much on other conjectural corrections, to be more than probable, and it may be questioned whether the data are such as to warrant any conclusion approaching to certainty. *Φύσεις*, v. 459., may suit *δυσκρίτους* better than *δύσεις*, but *ἀντολὰς* makes it sufficiently clear that, of the two, *Æschylus* must have written the latter, the similarity of the words constituting, in fact, the strongest argument against the alteration. *Ὀδοῦς* would be far more likely, if an error on the part of *Stobæus* were not more likely still. The change in vv. 474-5., by striking out *πλανᾶ* after *φρενῶν*, and inserting *κακοῖς* before *ἀθυμεῖς*, perhaps need hardly be even thus cursorily mentioned. *Λίφνιδια* for *αἰφνίδιος*, v. 681., would be probable enough, if there were no other corrections equally easy of a reading which has not yet been proved to be indefensible. *Κατουρίσας*, v. 969., is ingenious but not necessary, as the common reading is quite as good, and sufficiently supported even by those MSS. which do not actually contain it. Nor can we conclude by giving in our adhesion to the new emendation of the oft-emended line, v. 1061., *εἴ γ' οὐδ' εὐχῆ τι χαλαμανιῶν*, not believing that *Prometheus'* speech would be called *εὐχῆ*, except in the sense of a boast, with which *οὐδε* would not agree, and feeling some difficulty about *εἰ οὐδέ* as the less usual construction, even after the dogmatic assertion, which we had hardly expected to hear from the annotator on *Viger*, that *εἰ μὴ* can only mean *except* or *unless*.

Turning to the *Persæ* we are met at once by a rather startling change in the very difficult words *νέον δ' ἄνδρα βαύζει*, v. 13., *νέον* being turned into *νέων* so as to be constructed with *ισχύς ἄνδρα* expunged, and *ἐε βαύζει* transferred to v. 11., where we are told to read *ὀρσολοπείται θυμός, ἔσθθεν δὲ βαύζει*. Fortunately *Hermann* has himself supplied us with language which may seem to characterise such an alteration, in speaking of a much more modest conjecture of *Valckenaer's*: '*Audaciorem manum, sed parum feliciter. admovit. Doleas hic, ut non semel alibi, obrutum doctrinæ copiâ iudicium viri præstantissimi.*' *Πήδημ' ἄλλης εὐπετῶς ἀνάσσω*, v. 96., is a needless correction,

originating in a mistaken preference of Turnebus' ἀνάσσω to ἀνάσσω, the reading of the MSS. Φραστός, v. 164., is an unknown word, and the objection to ἀφραστός is mere special pleading, as Atossa might well say that there was an unspeakable division in her mind (μέριμνα apparently used in its strict sense), referring to the two clauses that follow. Οἶδε γὰρ ἐν μιᾷς πέσος, v. 308., is an ingenious but scarcely probable way of getting rid of the unaugmented aorist, which we fear must be allowed to remain, unless the whole line be judged spurious. Καυχήμασι, v. 422., is a purely wanton innovation, as there is no call whatever to connect κωκύμασι with ὁμοῦ. Meantime it is right to mention that in v. 461. Hermann defends the common reading εὐαγῆ in a very long and very learned note, which is, in fact, a monograph on the subject. In v. 762. we see no reason to think that Æschylus wrote ἐξερήμωσεν πέσος, (ἐξερήμωσεν too without an augment!) when the MSS. tell us that he wrote ἐξεκείνωσεν πέσον. Ἐκκεινώω may very well have been one of those Ionicisms, like μοῦνος, in which the tragedians occasionally indulged, especially in a case of metrical necessity, and πέσον is sufficiently defended by the ordinary use of πίπτειν for the happening of an accident. In v. 817. Hermann entirely fails to overthrow Schütz's most felicitous correction, ἐκπιδύεται for ἐκπαιδύεται, which has been deservedly embraced by every succeeding editor. Κρήπις is a foundation, but that does not prove that it must mean a beginning, when everything else, the clause itself included, suggests the notion of an end. Indeed, if it be taken as a beginning, it is hard to see what sense is to be put upon the passage, or how it accords with Hermann's own ἐκμαιεῖται. Παιδὶ πειρασώμεθα, v. 852., is a most reckless endeavour to avoid the elision of the final iota, with no excuse beyond a slight variation in the MSS. The changes in the remainder of the play we have already glanced at more than once. Generally they are of the most violent kind, but one or two deserve more respectful mention, such as ἀδοβύται for ἡδαβύται or ἄδαβάται, v. 904., which, by a mistake, has hitherto been attributed to Passow, and δέδρακεν for δέδορκεν, v. 978.

The alterations in the early part of the *Septem contra Thebas* are chiefly metrical, and of no great moment, being happily slighter than usual. Perhaps the most ingenious is ἀπύα for αὐτάς, v. 132., though the explanation of the scholiast, as has long ago been seen, certainly points to a different reading. Not less ingenious is τῷ γυναικείῳ φντῶ for τῷ γυναικείῳ γένει, v. 169., from φύλω, or φύλω, a gloss or various reading in some of the MSS.; but the common reading must not be set down



as indefensible, being supported by v. 239. 'Ορμαίνει, v. 375., is summarily declared to be neither a tragic word, nor appropriate in sense, and ὀργαίνει substituted. The first assertion is disposed of by *Agam.* 1348., where Hermann intrudes ὀρυγάνει, a doubtful word from Hesychius: the second we are surprised to see hazarded, as impetuous agitation is precisely the notion wanted. In v. 557., Hermann follows in the steps of Dobree, deviating from him, however, so far as to read καὶ τὸν σὸν αὐθις ἐς πατρός μοῖραν κύσιν, a most suicidal course, as if Dobree's view of the kind of corruption which has taken place in the line is right, there cannot be two opinions about the singular felicity of his restoration, which virtually accounts for every letter of the original. Χαλαρωτέρω, v. 688., for θαλερωτέρω, is plausible; if, however, any change is necessary, we should prefer θελεμωτέρω, as agreeing better with the explanation of the scholiasts, ἡμερωτέρω, χαριστέρω, μαλακιωτέρω (θέλεμον οἰκτρὸν, ἥσυχον, Hesych.), and with the reading of the Med. MS. θαλλωτέρωι, where the letters αλ stand in the place of an erasure. One of the MSS. gives θαλερόν, for θέλεμον, *Supp.* 997. Νίκη . . . καὶ κακόν for νίκην . . . καὶ κακὴν, v. 697., is uncalled for, νίκη κακή standing for a dishonourable victory—here for a victory where the victor does not risk his life (compare vv. 664-6.), in *Eum.* 890. (where Hermann wrongly reads νείκης) for a victory obtained in civil war. In v. 744. there is great probability in Ἄρει, which is found in the margin of our MS.; but it is too much to say of the common reading, 'frigidissimè, imò turpissimè additum est εὔρει.' Τεθραμμέναι, v. 773., is much worse than τεθραμμένοι, the latter being simple, while the former would be frigid. It says little for Hermann's judgment, that he should have been apparently misled by a tasteless suggestion of one of the scholiasts, who was simply anxious to extract more meaning out of τεθραμμένοι than it was meant to contain. Hermann might have seen, too, that φορούμενοι, v. 801., could easily be explained by a reference to v. 671., φορουμένοι κατ' εὐχίς being like φορουμένοι κατ' οὔρον, according to a very natural metaphor. His own word, φρουρούμενοι, independently of the harshness of the active usage, would cohere but indifferently with κατ' εὐχάς, which, from its position, ought to qualify it. The rest of the play we may pass over, as in the case of the *Persæ*, and for the same reason, having already adverted to it in speaking of the alterations made for the sake of metre.

The *Agamemnon*, as was to be expected, has produced various corrections of more or less consequence, though not to the same extent as the *Supplices*. The first, τί μὴν; for ἐμήν, v. 14.,

is altogether superfluous, the objection to the position of *ἐμήν* being answered by v. 1185. *Κρίναι* for *κρᾶναι*, v. 136., though a slight change, is not recommended by the sense, as Artemis would more naturally ask Zeus to fulfil the omen, than Calchas to interpret it. *Οὐ λελέξεται*, v. 158., is unlikely interfering as it does with the natural rendering of *πρὶν ὧν*, 'in that he is 'of the past.' In v. 230., *ἔμελλεν* is pronounced 'aperte 'ineptum,' and *ἔμυχθεν* substituted, but the argument against the old reading tells, in fact, strongly in its favour. If singing at feasts in the time of *Æschylus* was confined to immodest women, we see at once why he should have discriminated *Iphigenia* by the words *ἀγνα* and *ἀταύρωτος*—a remark made, if we remember rightly, by Paley. In v. 313. Hermann substitutes *τεκόντων* for *γερόντων*, asking why old men should be mentioned among the slain, as if such an event were not at once likely to happen during the sack of a town, and likely to be mentioned by a poet who felt the pathos of his subject. *Ἀλήμονες*, v. 321., strikes us as a very bad conjecture, departing considerably from the old reading, and yielding a sense which, whatever may be its intrinsic value, is quite inconsistent with the feeling of the passage, and with the tone of *Clytemnestra*. Hermann, indeed, half rejects it himself, after sanctioning it with the official 'scripsi,' adding 'incerta tamen res est,' and going on to propose *ἀδειμονες*. *ὡς δ' εὐδαίμονες*, Stanley's emendation, is, we have little doubt, the right reading, though *δυσδαίμονες*, the word of the MSS., might very well be explained with reference to the previous sufferings of the Greeks, such as the Herald afterwards describes, if only it stood by itself, or could be brought into construction with the words about it. *Ὅπερ τὸ βελτιστον*, v. 362., is altogether needless; the Chorus was not called upon to characterise retribution as the best thing possible, and the sentiment does not naturally cohere with what follows, at the same time that the sense of the old reading is perfectly just and appropriate. Vv. 394-5. Hermann pronounces to be 'non adeo conclamati quam visum 'est criticis,' having a new restoration, *πάρεστι σιγᾶς ἀτίμους ἀλοιδόρους αἰσχιστ' ἀφειμένων ἰδεῖν*, to supersede the one which he formerly proposed. Here, as elsewhere, we fear he is too sanguine, and doubt whether 'beholding the dishonoured, yet 'unreproachful silence of the deserted,' though not unpoetical, is the thought required to unite the two sentences which respectively precede and follow it. *Ἥισθ'* for *ἦλθες*, v. 489., is a happy correction, as *ἦσθ'*, the other possible reading, accounts neither for *ἦλθες*, nor for the accusative, *παρὰ Σκάμανδρον*. Hermann might have compared Horace's *Lenis incedas*. In

v. 517. the attempt to overthrow *τεθνᾶναι* is a bold one, in the face at once of grammatical authority, which may testify to a fact even when it cannot account for it rationally, and of the line as it appears in the MSS. The new line, *χαίρω, θεοῖσι τεθνᾶναι δ' οὐκ ἀντερῶ*, may certainly be recommended as a means of escaping the supposed false quantity, but that is all. 'Confidenter posui *στύγος φρενῶν*' (v. 525.), is not very wisely said, when no plausible explanation is afforded for the corruption of *φρενῶν* into *στράτω*. The carelessness of a copyist would, at most, only prove that *στράτω* is wrong. *Ποιμένος κακοστρόβου*, v. 635., could hardly, in the present position of the words, be constructed with *τυφῶ*, and the sense which Hermann requires is at least as well given by the old reading. In v. 640., *ἐξηρήσατο* is so far probable that it would cohere well with *οἰακὸς θηγῶν*; but there is nothing absurd in saying that a god may have begged the ship off, any more than in saying that he may have stolen it away, as any reader of the *Iliad* or *Æneid* may see. "*Αγαισιν*, v. 704., is a *vox nihili*, and one which, if it existed, would scarcely be defended by *ἱερέυς τις ἄτας* just below. Of vv. 736-7. Hermann says, 'improbabilia multa de his versibus prolata sunt, neque nunc probo quæ ipse olim proposui.' Had he lived to revise the *Agamemnon*, he might have said the same of his latest attempt, *νέα ραφᾶ* for *νεαρὰ φάους κότον*. Blomfield long since pointed out that no correction would be true, or even probable, which did not introduce an opposition between the new *ὑβρις* and the old. *Χρείος*, v. 784., a very neat emendation, if emendation be required, was proposed by Symmons thirty years ago. This Hermann ought to have known, as in his notes on vv. 10. 1531., he mentions Symmons's work. *Ἐφραξίμεσθα* also, v. 790., had been already published by Paley, whose edition, as appears from v. 338., Hermann had likewise seen, though probably not till after the commentary had been completed. *Θυηλαί*, however, v. 786., is a restoration of undoubted originality, and scarcely less undoubted certainty. The common reading, *θύελλαι*, introduces a disturbing metaphor, which moreover, as Hermann remarks, would scarcely be applicable to a city already captured. Vv. 863. 867. bring us to two gratuitous and improbable alterations, *βουστάθμων* for *τῶν σταθμῶν*, and *γαληνόν* for *κάλλιστον*, intended, so we are informed, to set right a passage of Shaksperian exuberance of imagery. *Δείσασαν*, v. 900., we do not presume to characterise, as we do not understand it. In v. 909., *ἢ οὐ καὶ σύ*, is founded on a misconception of the sense, which is, as Paley has shown, 'do you too value this kind of victory (τὸ νικᾶσθαι, the victory which goes against you)?' *Χρόνος δέ*

τοι for χρόνος δ' ἐπεί, v. 950., does not seem to us to remove the difficulties of a difficult passage. Το πᾶν for τοι, v. 965., would be plausible, if the same words had not immediately preceded. Ἔλλεται for στέλλεται, v. 1092., is good, but perhaps not better than the common reading, which expresses th Latin, 'vox missa ex adytis,' and agrees well with φέρουσιν just below. Θροεῖς—ἐπεγγέας, v. 1096., is altogether unlikely; γάρ would have no meaning, and the Chorus had not yet been mourning for Cassandra, much less mixing her lot with that of any other person. Ματήρ, v. 1229., is a thoroughly perverse suggestion: the word only exists in Hesychius, and its signification is not very appropriate here, while μάτην is easy and natural. In v. 1281. the objection to ῥῆσιν ἢ θρήνον is futile, as the words, though simple, are not feeble or foolish, and the correction, οὐ θρήνον, is inapplicable, as Cassandra may fairly be supposed to chaunt her own dirge in the words ἰὼ βρότεια πράγματ' κ. ἔ. λ., where, under the form of a general sentiment, she describes the two changes to which she has been doomed, from prosperity to adversity, and from adversity to extinction. Πᾶς τις, v. 1334., belongs not to Hermann, but to Bothe, and proceeds, moreover, from a mistake of the meaning of the words ἐχθροῖς ἐχθρά πορσύνων. Again we pass over the conclusion of the play, stopping merely to notice a singular piece of criticism on vv. 1531—1533. Hermann had long since corrected ῥᾶον into ἀραῖον, which succeeding editors at once received, supposing the sense to be 'who can drive out the cursed brood (or brood of 'curses) from the house?' a most natural sentiment, and confirmed by vv. 1145. sqq., by the following speech of Clytemnestra, and indeed by the whole scope of the play. It now turns out that he meant the passage to be understood 'who would drive out his daughter to destruction?' with reference to Iphigenia; and, accordingly, he bids us read κεκόλληται γένος προσόψει, 'a child is allied to its parents by likeness of 'feature,' sneering at those who have adopted Blomfield's πρὸς ἄτα as having neglected to explain wherein its appropriateness consists. Probably they did not think it necessary; but they will now see themselves to have been mistaken.

No part of the volume has disappointed us so much as the commentary on the *Chœphoræ*, though no play stood more in need of explanation and correction. Hermann's early services to the play led us to expect far better things. Τορὸς δὲ φότος, v. 31., is unlikely, as the parallel passage, v. 917., points to φόβος, as does the Scholiast. Δακρύων ὑφεμάτων, v. 73., is a forced and unnatural construction substituted for an easy and obvious one, to satisfy an apparently unfounded crotchet about

the metre. Ἀπλώσσι for ἀπλῶς τι, v. 112., is another gratuitous coinage. Εἶτα for εἶχε, v. 195., introduces a harsh construction, on the ground that εἶχε cannot be put for ἐδύνατο. That εἶχε in a connexion like this is virtually equivalent to ἐδύνατο is clear from *Prom.* 475., *Supp.* 362. The matter is a very simple one: the infinitive is really an accusative after ἔχω, which bears its ordinary sense. Τὰς δ' αἰνῶν νόσους for τάσδε νῶν νόσους, v. 276., is a superficial attempt to remove one of the difficulties of a passage which requires a very different remedy, to say nothing of the interposition of a participle between the article and substantive. Δριμυστάκτου for δριμύς ἄνται, v. 387., is a corruption of a sound text to satisfy the supposed metrical requirements of the antistrophe, the outlines of which had been satisfactorily established by Blomfield. The Chorus vv. 579—638, is made the *corpus vile* for many unsuccessful experiments, some of them, such as βρύουσι, πλάθουσι for βροτοῖσι πλάθουσι, βλαστοῦσι, λόγγι . . . φράσει for λέγοι . . . φρέσιν, spoiling a good text, others, such as that in v. 614—620., where ἀκαίρως δέ is turned into ἀκαιρος δ' ὁ, ἐπικότηρ σέβας into ἐπικλύτῳ σέβων, τίων (τίῳ) δ' into τίων τ', and the whole into one vast parenthesis, not improving a bad one. Ὀμπνίων for ὀμμάτων, v. 657., is another of those words which we are sorry to see obtruded on *Æschylus* on the authority of Hesychius. Ἐκαθῶς, v. 677., which is meant to convey a double sense, would be exceptionable, even if Bamberger's εἶπας ὡς were not demonstrably right. For θετοσκυθρωπόν, a most happy emendation of v. 725., we have to thank Erfurdt. Ἡ εὐδούση for γηθούση, v. 759., is another change equally deficient in external and internal probability. Εὐδούση φρενί has great propriety and beauty in the well-known fragment of Sophocles, but γηθούση is much more suitable here, and in keeping with φρονεῖς εὐ. Most of the remaining alterations in the play affect the metre rather than the sense. There is, however, an emendation in v. 1046., introduced in full confidence that it alone is worthy of *Æschylus*, ποῖαι γυναῖκες αἶδε instead of δμῶαί γυναῖκες, αἶδε. 'Quis vero sibi persuadeat Orestem, quum Furias conspicerere sibi videtur, tam frigida uti posse chori compellatione? Hæc tantum dignam *Æschylo* vim habent.' Tastes differ; but to us the simplicity of δμῶαί γυναῖκες appears quite natural, while γυναῖκες, as applied to the Furies, would strike us as feeble, and we like the abrupt αἶδε, 'here they are,' or 'look at them 'here,' better than the regular ποῖαι, 'who are these?' The priestess in the *Eumenides* calls them γυναῖκες, and then correcting herself, compares them to Gorgons: but in the sense of Orestes the full horror of the impression has to be expressed at once.

The last play on the list, the *Eumœnides*, comes only partially under our consideration, as we have been obliged to confine ourselves almost entirely to noticing how new matter and the bulk of this part of the commentary had substantially been given to the world in the review of Müller, of which mention has more than once been made. In v. 21. Hermann now returns, as Dindorf has returned, to *προναία* or *προνάα*, which seems to be established beyond a doubt by two Delphic inscriptions, greatly, we confess, to our satisfaction: he changes, however, *ἐν λόγοις* into *ἐλλόγως*; apparently ignoring the distinction between *εὐχή* and *λόγος*, and thus asserting for Pallas an absolute, not a relative preeminence, contrary to the purport of the speech. *Μεγιστοσωφρόνως*, v. 45., appears almost an impossible compound, having nothing in the context to justify it, whereas in *Suppl.* 679. *μεγιστότιμος* may be said to be demanded by the strength of meaning. In v. 95., the MSS. reading *ἐκνόμων* is restored, and explained with great probability by a gloss in Suidas and Zonaras as equivalent to *παρανόμων*. *Ἰσθῶδ'*, v. 142., is quite out of the question at the end of a verse, especially as it appears to involve a transposition of the two following lines. *Ἐκείνου*, in v. 177., is now changed into *ἔστιν ὄν*, the effect of which is to dispel any lingering feeling in favour of *ἔστιν οὐ*, and establish the certainty of Scholefield's *ἐξ ἐμοῦ*. *Ἦκέ σοι*, v. 212., is an ingenious conjecture, but less likely than several already in the field. *Ψόγῳ* for *λόγῳ*, v. 226., was a change not worth making. *Ἐὼνδε δαιμόνων*, v. 299., for *δαιμόνων* *αῖν* is unlikely in the last degree: Hermann, however, has done well to abandon his former punctuation, which connected *δαιμόνων* with *σκιάν*. The truth is, *βόσκημα δαιμόνων* is not to be taken actively, the food of gods, but passively, the fatted victim of the gods, which, unlike man's victims, is prepared for sacrifice by torture and exhaustion. This gives force to *ἀναίματος*, and agrees with *τραφεῖς* and *ζῶν με δαίσεις*. *Μαυροῦμεν νέον αἷμα*, v. 354., independently of the strange violence which it does to the text, yields a very harsh sense, as explained in the note, 'obscuramus quamvis validum adhuc juvenilem saltum.' \*If we must choose between two arbitrary alterations, *νέον αἷμα* was certainly the better. *Μοῖρ' for θεῶν δ'*, v. 356., is a further piece of boldness which it is scarcely a matter of congratulation that Hermann should have lived to achieve. In vv. 465—467. we are now told to read *δρομοῖς* for *ὄμως*, *ἐμοῖς* for the second *ὄμως*, omitting *δ'*, after Linwood and Franz, and *δ' αἰδοῦμαι* for *σ' αἰρούμαι*; none of them quite satisfactory, though all are ingenious, and the correction *αἰδουμένους* for *αιρουμένους* is one which may possibly require to be made just

below, v. 474., on a comparison of v. 702., where the variation is found in the MSS. Τὸ δεινὸν αὐτῆς . . . δειμανεῖ, v. 510., is less probable, because inviting a greater change than Hermann's previous correction, δεῖ μένειν. Κάμοιγ' ἄρωγούς for πέποιθ', ἄρωγούς δ', v. 588., is utterly without authority, and certainly cannot be proved from the Scholiast, who is merely commenting after his own fashion. Ἐὶ γάρ, v. 593., is not wanted, if only the line is rightly understood as conveying a taunt. Ἀσμένω μένει, v. 642., would be awkward in any poet: ὑσθμαίνων μένει is highly characteristic in *Æschylus*. Δαίτων σταλαγμάτων . . . αἰχμάς, v. 791., is very questionable, though we profess neither to explain nor to correct δαιμόνων σταλάγματα. Οἰχρεῖν is, we think, less forcible than οἰκεῖν, v. 825., as the Furies would naturally dwell rather on their dishonoured state than on their dishonoured exit. In v. 947., Hermann seems to have given up his own certain correction, θεαὶ τ' ὦ, for the old reading θεαὶ τῶν, supposing that he has identified the hitherto unknown *ματροκασινγήται* of the Fates with the Charites and the Hours: but it is not quite certain what was his final view. That he should have changed is only too likely; and that he should treat an indubitable correction of his own as he had accustomed himself to treat the indubitable text of his author, was at any rate a just retribution.

We have now finished our remarks, which have been as irksome to ourselves as we fear they must have been to our readers. We could hardly have expected to avoid a great deal of tedious detail; but wider limits would have enabled us to vary our critical phraseology by illustration and discussion, which relieve dogmatic statement while they substantiate it. Our object has been not so much to dwell on the particular instances in which Hermann appears to us to have failed most signally, as to justify the expressions of general disappointment with which we set out, and which represent our most abiding feelings. It is indeed a disappointment to those who have not only been students of *Æschylus*, but admirers of Hermann, to turn over page after page and to find scarcely anything of moment added to their knowledge of the language or the thoughts of their favourite poet. Hermann has, we repeat, done much in his day to make us understand *Æschylus*; but it now appears that nearly all his wisdom found its way to the world in his lifetime, and that the remainder, from which we were told to hope so much, copious as it is, and great as are its pretensions, contains comparatively little that the next generation is likely to quote, except to point the ordinary moral of the delusions to which eminent men occasionally surrender themselves. That moral

we will not enforce, but rather turn to the more gratifying reflection, that the results of criticism do not depend on individual infallibility. No writer can be named in whose case this truth has been exemplified more forcibly than in that of Æschylus. Though he is essentially one of the most difficult of ancient authors, and accidentally one of the most corrupt, yet the study of three centuries has, we would hope, fathomed most of his thoughts, unravelled most of his intricacies of language, and corrected most of the errors of his text; and for this we have to thank not any single scholar of surpassing intellect or acquirement, but a long series of labourers widely differing in capacities—a series which includes Pauw as well as Stanley, Scholfield as well as Porson.

ART. IV.—1. *Correspondence with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope relative to the state of the Kafir Tribes.* Parliamentary Papers. May 31st, 1853.

2. *Further Correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory.* Parliamentary Papers. May 31st, 1853.

3. *Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Kafir Tribes.* August 2nd, 1851.

4. *Further Correspondence relative to the state of the Orange River Territory.* April 10th, 1854.

Two years ago Kafir Blue Books had doubtless much greater attractions than they have now. Then Cape news interested us. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was forced to keep his Budget an open question, dependent on the Cabinet Council of the Kafir Chiefs; and upon their plan of operations was formed the campaign of the tax reformers for the Session. Then tax-payers were wondering how long British troops would be kept at bay by a band of naked savages—ill-armed, and not very superior in numbers: and ‘Friends of the Black’ were becoming more and more fearful lest American slave-owners should ask them whether, after all, it was so much worse to own a black man, than to spend millions in clumsy but desperate attempts to kill him. Not only our pockets, but our military glory and our philanthropy,—our pet pride and our pet virtue,—were at stake in the Kafir war.

Now, however, not only has the Kafir war for several months been ended, but in the excitement of *the* war, it may well be forgotten. Philanthropy to either Blacks or Whites is, we fear, scarcely the fashion of the day; and to fight the



Russians we gladly give Mr. Gladstone more money in a month than we should have grudgingly doled out to him for a year's expenditure at the Cape.

Nevertheless a little war will not be less vexatious or burdensome, but more so, because a great war is raging at the same time; and it may be well, therefore, to bear in mind that this last Kafir war was not the *first*, but the *fifth* since our conquest of the colony from the Dutch,—each war more prolonged, more costly, and more destructive than its predecessor. There are many persons, and not a few of them practical men, who think that the only security against these Kafir outbreaks would be the extermination of the Kafirs; if so, our position is still not a little dangerous, for with all our expenditure of men and money we are not supposed to have succeeded in killing off more than at most twenty per cent. of the Gaika Kafirs, and the fighting men of this tribe—the one which bore the brunt of the last war—are said to be not ten or even five per cent. of the Kafirs who might fight us. Let us then try to turn our thoughts for a time from the Black Sea and the Baltic to the Cape, in order to consider how far it is probable that this fifth war will be the last, and that we shall not be compelled to send to the banks of the Kei the troops which we shall want on the Danube.

There is another ground on which Cape affairs may claim our attention. It is a common cause of congratulation that, now that Old England has such hard work to do, her numerous children give her so little trouble. Canada prosperous and loyal, Australia paying our troops with her gold, even Jamaica scarcely complaining, we doubt whether, among the manifold dependencies for the peace and well-being of which our Ministers are responsible, South Africa is not the only one respecting which they need at present be anxious; and even there, their anxieties, it must be confessed, are much less complex than were those of their predecessors. The colony itself is prosperous, the colonists contented; still grateful for a Constitution for the popular form of which they have already shown themselves prepared. The manner in which they are conducting the elections to their Parliament is an example to the mother country; and the choice which they have already made of Councillors gives us a ground of hope that we shall have no more Kafir wars, which counterbalances many reasons for fear. The putting at the head of the poll Sir Andries Stockenstrom in the Eastern Division, and Mr. Rutherford in the Western, is indeed a guarantee that, at any rate, the constituents of the Cape Parliament intend its Kafir policy to be conducted on

consistent principles of justice and prudence. As yet, however, the power to make a Kafir war remains with the officers sent out by the Home Government;—we Englishmen are still responsible through our Ministers for the ‘Frontier Policy’ at the Cape, and therefore the history of past wars is worth studying by those who would have to pay by far the largest proportion of the cost of a fresh one.

A few words, first, on Kafir characteristics and customs;—and the closer we look at them the more curious and inconsistent do they seem. These black Piets, wearing over their ochre-daubed skins scanty ox-hides, which they dispense with in war; dwelling in huts into which they can scarcely creep; having absolutely no religion—not even a Fetish worship,—no superstition, save a vague belief in witchcraft and rain-doctors, and a still vaguer reverence for the memory of their ancestors; having thus, as Herr Teufelsdröck might say, the scantiest possible garment for body or soul, are yet bound together in a well-organised community with chiefs of defined but acknowledged powers, and with laws well understood and very fairly obeyed. If their painted bodies remind us of the ancient Piets, their conduct and customs recall to us still more the Highlander of ’15 or ’45. Forget the colour, and fancy the kilt instead of the kaross, and when we hear of Sandilli or Macomo dispensing Kafir law, or debating peace or war with his ‘Amapakati,’ or councillors, and know that in distress and defeat no price could tempt their starving followers to betray or disobey them, we can almost imagine that we have before us a Highland chief with his devoted Duinhéwassels and faithful clan. Again, there is the same local attachment. Macomo has been four if not five times driven out of his haunts in the Winterberg Hills, always asking, ‘Why am I kept out of my land?’ and Fergus Mac Ivor could not cling more closely to his glens than does Sandilli to the Amatolas. The relation of the minor to the paramount chiefs reminds us also of the species of submission which the Highland chieftains paid to their Sovereign—the same strange mixture of independence and devotion. When Sir Harry Smith, in 1848, flattered himself that he had made Kaffraria a peaceful British province by assembling the Chiefs to go through the ceremony of swearing subjection to our Queen, Pato, the head of a clan 10,000 strong, explained their unanimity by saying, ‘Wherever the great Chief Sandilli churns his milk, there will the little Chiefs be to eat the butter.’ And this metaphor reminds us of what after all is the great peculiarity of the Kafirs,—their love of cattle, and passion for their possession. No Rob Roy could be more skilful in driving, nor, we fear, in stealing herds;

but their pride and delight in them can only be equalled by that of the Arab in his horse. Each man reckons his wealth not by acres but by herds: they buy their wives with them (one of the most frequent complaints of the colonists is against the 'lifting' inroads of the young Kafir lovers), they run races with them, they even talk in cattle language. When Kreili swore amity with Sir Harry Smith, he did it by sending a dun ox; and the mode by which the Tambookies acknowledged this same Kreili as their superior, was, by their ambassadors' bringing back a bull from his 'great place,'—it being understood that wherever that bull roamed, with him went Kreili's power.

It will not be difficult then to guess the feelings with which the Kafir must regard the white man, when we see on looking back through the colonial history, that, spite of the cattle-stealing with which he is constantly charged, he has lost far more cattle than he has gained. Under the old 'commando' system the Boer almost always managed to get back more 'head' than he had lost; and in all the wars down to the last expedition across the Kei, when Sir George Cathcart brought away 10,000 head from Kreili, the great business of our troops has been to 'lift' cattle by the thousand.

Farther to the east we find the power of the Chiefs become more despotic: Faku rules his Amapondas to the west of Natal more rigorously than does Sandilli his Gaikas on the border of the colony; and the lawless tyranny of the Zoolah Kings exceeds the atrocities of the Kings of Ashantee or Dahomey, or the most bloody of the Oriental despots.

And yet, compared with other savages, African or Indian,—compared even with our own barbarian ancestors,—the Kafirs can not be called especially cruel or revengeful. All the Missionary Journals are full of touching proofs of the heroism, kindness, and generosity of their converts; and even as heathen they not seldom set an example which their Christian neighbours would not do ill to follow. Notwithstanding all the outcry that has been made against Kafir treaties, Sir George Cathcart tells us that, 'in justice it must be admitted that this remarkable 'people have a strong sense of the moral obligation of good 'faith, and if they enter into any agreement at all, are seldom 'found to promise one thing and do another;\*' and a missionary, for many years a neighbour of Sandilli, the head Chief of the Gaikas, lately told us, that he never knew him break his word, or try to exculpate himself at the expense of another.

Almost all travellers inform us that however openly they may have professed stealing cattle from the colonists, as did the Gael from the Saxon, yet that if property be placed under their protection or care, they preserve it with honourable fidelity. Their habit of begging for small presents of Europeans gives an unfavourable impression of them at first as vainglory, but if they beg, they also give; almsgiving being, according to Mr. Backhouse, the Quaker Missionary, so much their custom, 'that a man's wife and children often go to work in the garden ' that the begging stranger may be supplied.'

Their martial qualities of skill, activity, daring, and endurance, our soldiers have only too well proved: and our officers tell us, that another campaign or two of lessons would teach them our tactics almost as well as they have already learnt from us to ride on horseback, and to use firearms instead of assegais. Indeed, their intellectual powers generally seem good: a perusal of the Blue Books would prove to any one that a Kafir Chief is in diplomacy no bad match for an English General; and we have the testimony of Mrs. Ward, no friendly witness, that 'they are the cleverest logicians in the world, and have always ' an answer more suitable to their own purpose than we could ' possibly anticipate.'

There is, however, one most striking and all-important peculiarity in which they differ from almost all the aboriginal tribes with which our colonists have come in contact. To the Red Indians and New Zealanders, the Australians, and even their own Hottentot neighbours, Christian civilisation has been as an Upas tree, destroying them by its diseases, or still more fatally poisoning them by the infectious contamination of its drunkards and debauchees: but the Kafirs have shown that they can live on the borders of a civilised community; and unless killed off by war, or by famine caused by war, they keep up their numbers.

The history of European civilisation has indeed but too plainly proved how hard it is for a strong race to do more for a weak race than to bestow upon it its vices: and too quickly deducing from the sad facts of this history the conclusion that that which is hard must be impossible, there are many persons who advocate severe measures against the Kafirs, as against all savages, on the principle that it is more humane to kill them quickly with powder and shot than slowly by drink or disease.

The Boers, we are told, are great readers of the Old Testament; and comparing themselves to the Israelites, as did the Puritans of New England, they shoot a native on the strength of a text out of Joshua; in like manner, not a few of our

present political *doctrinaires* justify injustice and atrocity by their interpretation of their Gospel — ‘the theory of human ‘progression:’ the interpretation is in both cases equally at fault: but even granting its truth, as regards the Kafirs the facts are against them. They are not a drunken people: they make, it is true, a mild almost harmless beer among themselves, and some of their chiefs have become drunkards from disappointment and from the temptation of Europeans; but Mr. Backhouse, himself a zealous tee-totaller, who complains greatly of the drinking habits of many of the Hottentots, tells us, as the result of his keen observation, that ‘few of the Kafirs, even on ‘the frontier, drink intoxicating liquors,’ a statement confirmed by the testimony of other missionaries. Even more important is the jealous care with which they preserve themselves from the effects of European profligacy, so fearfully fatal to the South Sea islanders.

In a word, the Kafir race has in itself strong elements of continuance, and a power of co-existence with civilisation which ought to add strength to the efforts to civilise, inasmuch as it makes these efforts more hopeful: missionaries and philanthropists not being among them, as they often are, haunted by the conviction that death dogs their footsteps; while, if they really be the ‘irreclaimable savages’ they are so often called, there is little hope of exterminating them except by the old-fashioned method of fire and sword. How far, with what success, and on what grounds this method has been tried, it will be needful, in order to understand our present relation with them, briefly to consider.

The Dutch found the Kafirs as far West as the Gamtoos, 200 miles within the Kei, the present border of the British territory. How long they had been there, and whence they came, it is impossible to ascertain, and needless, for our purpose, to discuss. All their traditions tend to affix to them an Eastern origin; and there are some ethnologists who think that in their features, their rites — such as circumcision — and their pastoral habits, as much relationship can be traced to the Arab as to the Negro. Most probably they are akin to the Abyssinians and Gallas.

The constant changes in frontier policy which have had so injurious an effect upon the natives, seem to have begun very early. We find the Dutch government, in the middle of the last century, sometimes prohibiting the Boers from even trading with the Kafirs, sometimes permitting them to enter into Kafir land to hunt elephants, and again ordering ‘all settlers beyond ‘the Gamtoos to decamp, on pain of confiscation.’ Though

even more thinly scattered over their vast pastures than they are now, we find that the Boers had already acquired their habit of 'trekking' over the border, partly, no doubt, in order to avoid the colonial tax-gatherer, but chiefly from a true Backwood-man's passion for seeking out new and more pleasant locations. If the white man seized the black man's grazing ground, the latter, not unnaturally, retaliated by seizing the herds of the former; and cattle stealing on the one side, revenged by commandoes on the other, became the normal position of frontier policy. These 'commandoes,' or forays of armed and mounted Boers into Kafirland, only do not themselves strike us as cattle-stealing expeditions, because we are more struck with the wholesale destruction of the native graziers, and because the thefts were committed on so magnificent a scale. By help of horse and musket, the Boers brought back thousands in place of hundreds; for example, Maynier, Landroost of Graaf-Reinet, in 1792, tells us that he witnessed the distribution of 30,000 head as the result of one of these incursions. No wonder, he adds, that he was convinced that the complaints of the Boers about the Kafir depredations were 'always exaggerated, originating from a design to enrich themselves.'\*

Still the commando system had its disadvantages — it made the natives, with their sharp assegais, uneasy and unpleasant neighbours; and fearing their revenge, the settlers reiterated requests to the governors to extend the colonial frontier. Von Plattenberg, in 1780, shifted it on paper 100 miles to the east, to the Great Fish River; but it required British arms to give his proclamation substantial force. Our first conquest from the Dutch was in 1795; and in 1798 Von Plattenberg's proclamation must have been forgotten, for we then find Lord Macartney declaring 'the Great Fish River the proper boundary between the colony and the Kafirs,' — 'no exact limits,' he says, 'having hitherto been marked out; and, in consequence, several of the inhabitants of the more distant parts having united in injuring the peaceful possessors of those countries, reducing them to misery and want, and compelling them to the cruel necessity of having recourse to robbery to support life.' This proclamation candidly confesses to the true explanation of the continuous extension of a territory always so under-peopled and difficult to defend. It was not that the natives were such bad neighbours that they must be driven back, but the outlying settlers had got in amongst them; and the Government being too weak physically to force these emigrants to return, and, morally,

to disown them, extended the border to exclude them. To get the natives over the Fish River was no easy task — it took fourteen years of effort ending in the first Kafir war of 1811–12; after which year began what was called ‘the military system;’ that is, the Fish River was guarded by military posts; and orders were given that ‘Kafirs found on the right bank of this river should be followed up and shot.’\* These orders were obeyed, many Kafirs were thus shot, but those who remained only became the more dangerous and revengeful; so, in 1817, the Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, thought he would try to make such terms as would ensure permanent peace.

The intention was praiseworthy: would that we could say as much of the mode of fulfilling it. With a disregard of the customs of the people with whom he had to deal, which, if the result of ignorance rather than recklessness, reminds us of Lord Cornwallis’s attempt to turn Hindoos into country gentlemen by his ‘permanent settlement,’ Lord Charles Somerset chose to consider Gaika, who was merely a chief of a clan, as King of all Kafirland, simply because Hintza, the real Paramount Chief, being not so near the border, it would have been more troublesome to negotiate with him.

The result of this mistake, and of the consequent false position of all parties, was the second Kafir war of 1819, in which, in alliance with our late foes, the Gaikas, we fought the Tslambies, our present friends, because they would not submit to the king we invented. This war began with a commando of the allies under Colonel Brereton, in which, in the words of Tzatzoe, the Kafir chief, ‘they took a great many cattle (23,000 head) from Tslambi’s tribe, and shot a great many people. Gaika got a few old cows, and the government all the fat cows and fat oxen;’† and it ended with another invasion of Kafirland, in which the troops and burghers, after ravaging the country with fire and sword the whole summer, brought back some 30,000 more head of cattle; though, between these two invasions, the Kafirs had had *their* commando, coming down into the colony 10,000 strong, under their patriot prophet, Mokanna, and attacking and almost taking Graham’s Town.

We must hasten quickly over the period of sixteen years elapsing between the second and third wars, the chief events marking which were; first, the attempt of Lord Charles Somerset to make a ‘neutral territory’ of the country between the

\* Major Dundas’s Evidence, Abor. Com., 1836, p. 133.

† Abor. Report, 1836, p. 570.

Great Fish River and the Keiskamma \*: secondly, the infraction of this treaty by the Governor afterwards granting locations to settlers in this neutral territory: and lastly, the repeated expulsion of Macomo from his settlement on the Kat River. This chief was Gaika's eldest and most energetic son, though not his heir, not being the son by the 'great wife,' who, according to the custom of the tribe, must be a Tambookie. He had pitched his kraal just over the border in the north-east extremity of the territory said to have been ceded by his father; and our persistence in driving him out, and the severity with which we did so, by making him our determined enemy, doubtless did much towards causing not only the third, but the last two Kafir wars.

To call the state of things during this period peace would be a misnomer: there was almost unceasing feud on the border; but probably open war would have been postponed, if not prevented, and the constant succession of commandoes and patrol forays into Kafirland would not have been varied by that invasion of the colony, which began the campaign of 1835,—had it not been for an outrage on one of the chiefs, which excited the clan to ungovernable fury.

A patrol seized some cattle belonging to one of Gaika's sons; his brother asked the officer, 'Why do you take the oxen? there is no war between us; have you traced the track of cattle or horses into Kafirland?' Probably the question might have been asked in a threatening manner; at any rate the answer was a shot in the head. 'You see the necessity of prayer,' said his missionary to the wounded chief; 'you might have been killed, and died an unconverted man.' But this was hardly the lesson which the clansmen drew from the occurrence. 'Every Kafir who saw Xo-Xo's wound went back to his hut, took his assegai and shield, and set out to fight;' and said, 'It is better that we die than be treated thus.†' This war, which cost a

\* This absurd arrangement, by which a district twenty-five to thirty miles broad and sixty long, of the best soil in South Africa, was tabooed from the occupation of either white man or black man, and devoted to the lions, was made at a treaty with Gaika in 1819; respecting which treaty, owing to its never having been written, there is much dispute; the only fact which appears clear being, that if Gaika really did thus cede this country, which he denied, by far the largest portion of it was never his to cede.

† Report of the Aborigines Committee, 1836, pp. 564. 567. Jan Tzatzoe's Evidence. Tzatzoe, who fought on our side during this war, says distinctly in his evidence, that he 'believes the shooting of Xo-Xo to have been the cause of it, the Kafirs,' he adds, saying, 'life is of no use to us if they shoot our chiefs.'



quarter of a million of money (a trifle for a Kafir war now-a-days, but then thought an enormous sum), ended with a proclamation by the governor, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, in which, in order to remove these 'treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a 'safer distance,' he extended the eastern boundary of the colony to the right bank of the river Kei, declaring 'Macomo, &c. to 'be for ever expelled from their old country,' not only west of the Keiskamma, but also west of the Kei, and that they shall be 'treated as enemies if found therein.'

Thus we see that so early as 1835 the British territory had reached its present eastern limit, viz. the Kei; but in that year the tide of conquest received a most unexpected check. Hitherto the Home Government, not perplexing itself with any attempt to understand the Kafir side of the question, had carelessly endorsed all the acts of its governors. But just at this time the philanthropists were in full force; elated with their victory over slavery, they were agitating for 'justice to aborigines.' A Committee of the House of Commons was then sitting to inquire into our national treatment of Native Tribes, before which officers, governors, missionaries, even natives, were examined; representations were made to the Colonial Secretary; all the secrets of the Cape History were pried into, and the result was that early in 1836 Sir Benjamin D'Urban was surprised by a despatch from Lord Glenelg, stating that, so far as he could learn, 'the original justice' in the last war was on 'the side of the 'conquered, not of the victorious party;' and that therefore justice demanded, what he believed also policy required, that the conquered territory be restored.

The conquest was restored; our troops retired over the • Keiskamma, Sir Benjamin d'Urban's new province of Adelaide again became Kafirland, treaties were made with Macomo and his fellows as independent chiefs, and, for the first time, we believe, in the history of nations, the conquerors restored to the conquered their despoiled dominion at the demand of justice.

The objections to these acts of generosity, since known by the name of the Glenelg policy, were, as may well be imagined, manifold, nor were they less influentially than earnestly supported. Sir Benjamin d'Urban sent in his resignation, leaving behind him a strong protest against the measures which he refused to carry out; and the cry in the colony, especially on the frontier, was almost universal, that treaties were absurd and impossible with savages, who were too ignorant to understand them, too treacherous to keep them, and too impulsive to resist any temptation to break them,—that the chiefs would have too bitter and jealous a hatred of the Colonial Government, and

their followers too great a longing for colonial cattle, to keep faith, — and that the Quixotic restoration of territory would be attributed to fear, or viewed as a permission to continue their depredations.

And now these prophets point to the events of the last few years as proofs of the correctness of their foreodings: — ‘ After ‘ ten years,’ they say, ‘ of peace preserved by connivance at ‘ cattle-stealing, and employed by the thieves in getting fire- ‘ arms, and learning how to use them, we have had two wars ‘ more costly and destructive than any of the preceding ones, ‘ compelling, as their necessary consequence, the subjection of ‘ the Kafirs, and a return to that policy, which, however stern ‘ it may appear, yet being in accordance with the laws of ‘ Nature which rule the relations of civilised men with savages, ‘ is really much more just and merciful to the latter than those ‘ measures of specious and spurious philanthropy which have ‘ proved as lavish of life as of British money.’

That philanthropy has not kept peace is evident enough, but before we declare it a failure we must prove that it has had a fair trial. Certain treaties were made, and war could not follow except from their infraction, which might proceed from the conduct of any one of four parties, — the Colonial Government, the Kafir chiefs, the frontier colonists, or the Kafir people. Either of the two former might of course at any time directly break them, either of the two latter might by disobedience to their respective rulers make it impossible to keep them. Did the chiefs themselves send out cattle-stealers, or were they unable to punish and restrain them? Did the governors try to take from their black neighbours their lands or liberties, or did their white subjects bring on war by individual encroachment, or deeds of injury and insult? Now the fact which strikes us most forcibly, both from its novelty and importance is, that, so far as we can learn, the last question can be answered decidedly in the negative. Few persons, we think, will deny that before 1836 the lawless selfishness or violence of individual colonists had been a most fruitful source of frontier disturbances; still fewer persons who have studied the Cape history in the intervening years will dispute the general correctness of Sir Peregrine Maitland's declaration in 1846, that ‘ during at all events the ‘ last seven years, not one act of violence, outrage, or injustice ‘ had been committed by any colonist in Kafirland,’\* — a declaration confirmed by the admission of Sir Andries Stockenström and Mr. Freeman in their evidence before the Parliamentary

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\* Report of Com. on Kafir Tribes, 1851, p. 356.

Committee of 1851, and endorsed by the Bishop of Cape Town in his published Report of his visitation. Whether owing to the efforts of the philanthropists or not, this much is evident, that since 1836 there has been a note-worthy change in the respect paid to the rights of the natives, evinced by the determination of the authorities to enforce fair regulations, and by the growth of just and generous feelings among the colonists themselves. The responsibility, therefore, lies between the Kafirs and the Government: let us see how we can apportion it between them.

It cannot but be allowed that the Glenelg or Treaty System had a fair start. Sir Andries Stockenström—upon whose suggestions to the Parliamentary Committee the new treaties were mainly framed, and by whose name they have since been known,—was appointed Lieutenant-governor of the Eastern Province, in order to institute and superintend their operation; and in many respects he was of all men in the world best fitted to the task. Born in the colony,—his father a landdrost under the Dutch Government,—his interest, as well as his early training and prepossessions, enabled him to understand and make allowances for the feelings of the settlers; while a life's acquaintance with the Kafirs in peace and war—not only as a frontier farmer, but as a most able magistrate and military officer,—gave him a perfect knowledge of the good and bad points of their character: his own father had been killed by them, while he himself, when taken suddenly ill in the war of 1836, had had his life saved by a Kafir foe, who had brought assistance to him upon finding him alone and unable to move.\* That such a man with such antecedents should so energetically support the theories of the philanthropists by his practical experience, had doubtless great effect in inducing the Colonial Office to espouse them, but in the colony itself it excited against him such an outburst of indignation as made it almost impossible for him to fulfil the duties of his office. 'He tried in every way to do his duty,' says Sir George Napier, who succeeded Sir Benjamin d'Urban, 'but he was thwarted by every one in every possible way that they could thwart him;' so much so, that in 1849 he was superseded by Lord Normanby solely on the ground of his unpopularity, and with the fullest acknowledgment of his merit. His dismissal was a victory for the opposing party; nevertheless his successor, Colonel Hare, together with Governor Napier, honestly tried to carry out his treaties.

The most important feature in these treaties was the abolition

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\* Pringle's Residence in S. Africa, p. 99.

of the patrol system introduced in 1817, by which the frontier farmer could require troops to seize for him cattle which might have strayed, from natives who very possibly were not the thieves, — which system, be it remembered, had been protested against by many of the most influential of the colonists so early as 1820; and the substitution in its place of an arrangement by which the chiefs were made responsible for all cattle stolen, provided the owners could prove that they had been duly guarded, that they had been traced into Kafirland, and that due notice of their loss had been given to the district authorities. The difference of opinion, or, indeed, of statement of fact, with regard to the effectiveness of the new system, is strangely wide. The party opposed to its introduction never ceased to complain of its operation, and constantly published in the Cape newspapers, and forwarded to the Governor, statistical returns of the increase of cattle-stealing. On the other hand, Sir A. Stockenstrom denies most positively the correctness of these returns, and appeals from them to those furnished officially by Mr. Hudson, the agent-general appointed by Sir B. d'Urban, which would, he says, 'show a very different result.\*' In this statement he is supported by Mr. Stretch, at that time the diplomatic agent on the frontier, who states that the chiefs did their part in restoring all reclaimable cattle, and that the amount of depredation was on the whole diminished.† Mr. Hudson's returns not being in the Blue Books, it is impossible for us to decide between these conflicting statements; but this much is evident, that during the operation of the Stockenstrom treaties the frontier was more than usually peaceful‡; and we have Sir George Napier's authority that they could not have entailed on the settlers much increase of loss of property, for having ordered monthly returns of thefts to be made, and calculating, on the one hand, that the 'greatest amount of property lost by the depredations of the Kafirs was 4000*l.* per annum,' and, on the other, that 'during the first six weeks of a war no power could prevent their darting into the colony and committing enormous ravages. I thought to myself,' he says, 'is it worth while for such an amount of loss to encounter all the damage that will be done by going to war?' And therefore, though 'urged over and over again to go to war with them, I resisted

\* Report Parl. Com. 1851, pp. 239. 242, &c.

† See Letter in 'Colonial Intelligencer' of July, 1852.

‡ See Sir A. Stockenstrom's Evidence, and Sir G. Napier's Despatches.

‘it.’<sup>a</sup> In order, however, to meet in some measure the complaints of the colonists, and thinking himself that some of the articles of the treaties were unfair to the latter, he modified them in favour of the settlers in 1841, but with the consent of the natives, whom he found in a good humour, probably because, as he wrote to Lord Glenelg, he ‘invariably treated all the chiefs as his equals.’<sup>†</sup> Nevertheless, it is only fair to Sir Andries to say that he considered these alterations, notwithstanding they were thus obtained, to have been ‘injurious.’ But a much more serious change was effected in 1844 by Sir Peregrine Maitland, in a much more questionable manner, to which Sir Andries chiefly ascribes the bitter feeling which led to the war of 1846. Sir Peregrine Maitland succeeded Sir George Napier in 1844, and, yielding to the representations of the Anti-Stockenstrom party, he soon after his arrival summoned the Gaika chiefs to Fort Beaufort, and, backed by a strong body of troops, insisted upon their submission to a new treaty, by which it is true stolen or strayed cattle were made more quickly recoverable, but, at the same time, it was made less incumbent on the farmer to exercise due care in guarding them; and the jealousy of the chiefs was excited by a provision, that any Kafir charged with the commission of outrage or theft within the colony should not be tried by his own chief or laws, but be sent into the colony for trial there. During the two years which intervened between the arrival of Sir P. Maitland and the beginning of the fourth war, the suspicion and animosity on both sides were constantly increasing. There was more than usual restlessness in Kafirland, owing to sufferings from long-continued drought; this restlessness excited alarm among the colonists, which alarm again was aggravated, Colonel Hare informs us, by ‘exciting rumours wickedly and extensively circulated throughout the border by persons always ready and desirous for the work of agitation.’<sup>‡</sup> Again the new Gaika chief, Sandilli, was young and rash and easily excited by the young men who, grown up since the last war and eager to use their muskets, inveighed against what they considered the infraction of the treaties. Doubtless the war feeling and the

\* Rep. Parl. Com. p. 201. It must not be supposed that the war party was confined to the frontier graziers. Sir G. Napier adds, ‘The Committee must be aware that there are a great many people in the colony who make a great deal of money by wars and by the troops, whose constant cry was, “have troops over:” that was the great reason why they wished to go to war.’ (P. 282.)

† Parl. Papers, Kafir Tribes, June, 1851, p. 41.

‡ Parl. Papers, Feb. 1847, p. 55.

war party on both sides the border were more than usually strong. Still a perusal of the Blue Books forces us to infer, that if the Governor had had tact and experience of the native character equal to his intention to act fairly, and had comprehended that there was no medium course between conquering the Kafirs and treating them with the consideration due to an independent people, war might at least have been averted.

In February 1846 it was very near breaking out, in consequence of a survey for a fort which, against the approval of Colonel Hare, Sir P. Maitland ordered to be made in the Gaika country, and some collision with a trader acknowledged to be 'extremely rude and insolent.' Sandilli sent an offensive message to the Governor, which would have been replied to by an invasion had it not been for his almost immediate apology, an extract from which may be worth quoting:—'I swear war is not in my heart, but confusion I hear prevails in my country and your country, and we sleep in the bush for fear;'<sup>\*</sup> and again, in reply to the acceptance of his apology, he says, 'I thank the Governor for his word, and, I repeat, there shall be no war. This word comes from my heart. I will say no other. The only thing I now see which is bad in this world is the drought. The cattle are dying.' We are well aware that in Kafir, no more than in civilised negotiation, are mere words of much value. These Kafirs have a saying which might serve for many diplomatists, that 'underneath the top-word there is always a bottom-word,' and Sandilli's professions of peace may have concealed preparations for war; still it must be remembered that the war when it did come, whether in Sandilli's heart or no, was begun not by him but by the Governor. The actual *casus belli* was this:—a Kafir charged with stealing an axe in the colony was sent by an English magistrate straight to Graham's Town for trial. On his way he passed by a kraal,—either his own or that of one of his tribe;—some young men rushed out and rescued him, and during the rescue his brother and one of the Hottentot police were killed. A demand was made upon Tola, the immediate chief (who by the by gave immediate notice of the rescue to the British officers), and afterwards upon Sandilli, the Paramount Chief, for the delivery of both the original prisoner and the murderer, which was evaded; whereupon a force of 1500 men was sent into the Amatolas to punish these chiefs and their confederates, and the war began. Now according to the Kafirs' side of the story, in the first place, they said that the constable fired first on the rescuers, killing the

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<sup>\*</sup> Parl. Papers, Feb. 1847, pp. 52. 59.

prisoner's brother, and in the second place, Sandilli declared that he did not understand that the treaties required that 'Kafirs who stole any small thing, such as an axe or beads, were to be sent to Graham's Town;' but even granting these statements to be false,—and if true they were certainly not of much moment,—yet surely Sandilli's reply to the Governor's demand, viz., 'The Governor must not be in haste with forces in this case; let us first speak about it that we may understand it,'\* was not so unreasonable as to need an immediate invasion for its punishment; nor do we suppose that it would have been so considered had it not been seized, to use Colonel Hare's words, as 'a most favourable opportunity for inflicting a severe chastisement on this ungrateful and troublesome people, and impressing upon their whole nation a salutary lesson for another generation.'† Possibly this lesson might have been postponed had the teachers been aware that it would last eighteen months, and cost two million of taxes, especially had they consulted the tax-payers as to the propriety of giving it at so great a cost; but at any rate, with the despatches before us, we cannot but be surprised at Lord Grey's assertion that the attack made upon the colonists by their savage neighbours had been entirely unprovoked.‡ This inroad by the Kafirs upon the country round Graham's Town was, in fact, a reply to the invasion of the Amatolas, and as such foreseen and guarded against, though imperfectly, by the Colonial Government.

The results of this war were most important. Sandilli surrendered in October, and Pato in December, 1847, (for in this outbreak, though not in the one following it, the Gaikas were helped by the Tsambies,) and on the 23rd of December Sir Harry Smith issued a proclamation declaring those tribes, as well as all the other Kafirs west of the Kei, British subjects; and again extending the British border up to that river, thus resuming the conquest by Sir Benjamin D'Urban, which had been relinquished by Lord Glenelg.

The new territory was not incorporated with the Cape Colony, nor subjected to colonial law, but was taken military possession of, under the name of British Kaffraria, while at the same time the eastern frontier of the colony proper was extended from the Great Fish River to the Keiskamma, by the addition of Lord Charles Somerset's 'Neutral Territory,' now called the province of Victoria. Out of the north-east corner of this province Macomo and his people were again expelled, and along

\* Parl. Papers, Feb. 1847, p. 87.

† Ibid. p. 89.

‡ Lord Grey's Colonial Policy, vol. ii. p. 198.

its frontier were located military colonies of discharged soldiers, as well as friendly natives, Hottentots, Fingoes\*, and the followers of the Christian Kafir chief Kama.

The great difficulty in the new *régime* was what to do with the chiefs. Despite their faults and follies, their clansmen still followed and served them with all the devotion of deeply-rooted habit. Except through them it was scarcely possible to bring our laws home to the understandings of the people, much less to reach their inclinations or affections, and yet these chiefs were instinctively our enemies, because our rule could not but deprive them of both revenue and power. Plainly our plan was, as Sir H. Smith himself expressed in his first instructions to Colonel Mackinnon, to 'rule through their instrumentality;' but for this, two conditions were requisite; first, that they should keep their power over their people; and, secondly, that they should be willing to use it in our behalf. By studiously and publicly degrading them, Sir Harry Smith tried his best, both to weaken their power and to induce them to use it to our hurt; but unfortunately for peace, the second of these two consequences was the only one that he succeeded in effecting.

Many years previously Macomo, when complaining of his expulsion from the Kat River, dictated a letter to Dr. Philip, ending with, 'We do no injury to the colony, and yet I remain 'under the foot of the colony.' Macomo could hardly have foreseen that his figure of speech would become a fact by the Governor, soon after his landing, ordering him to kneel prostrate before him, and when he had done so, placing his foot on his neck, saying, 'This is to teach you that I have come hither to teach Kafirland that I am chief and master here, and this is 'the way I shall treat the enemies of the Queen of England.'† Mrs. Ward tells us this story as proving how well, in her opinion, Sir H. Smith knew how to deal with the Kafirs; but she forgets to add Macomo's speech, when he got up and said, 'I always thought you a great man till this day:'‡ and she leaves us to imagine how far such teaching would induce that chief to persuade his fellow Gaikas to submit quietly to their expulsion from the Victoria Province.

Again, the Governor in his first interview with Sandilli was, as he writes himself, 'dictatorial in the extreme.' But the grand display of his peculiar mode of pacification was on the day on

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\* These Fingoes were a tribe subject to the Kafirs, but emancipated from their control by Sir B. D'Urban, in 1836.

† The Cape and the Kafirs, p. 214.

‡ Abor. Com. 1851, Mr. Renton's Evidence, p. 387.



which he met the assembled tribes, and informed them that he and not Sandilli was their own 'Inkosi Inkolu,' or Great Chief. A graphic report of this demonstration is given in his own despatch, where Lord Grey is admitted behind the scenes and told how the Kafirs, after being informed that God had especially blessed the interview with a copious shower the night before, were supposed to join in a prayer humbly confessing to the 'unjust and cruel war' they had carried on; and then how he himself made them a long speech, calling them fools, and making them touch his stick of office as a token of submission (in a former interview he had made them kiss his feet); and how the 'astonishment was excessive' when a waggon was blown up, to signify how he would blow them up if they rebelled; and how he ordered them to 'shout for joy to the great Queen 'of England for taking them out of the Bush;' and especially how 'tremendous' was the 'roar' when he told them to shout for Peace, Peace!

All this comedy would be amusing enough could we forget its consequences, and how truly generous-hearted and noble-minded was the veteran who was thus degrading British authority. The most curious part of the whole affair is the extent to which he deceived himself as to the effect of these proceedings. 'The day was stormy; the wind blew very strong;'\* was all that could be got out of the shrewd old Chief Botman, when asked what he thought of one of these interviews, and yet we doubt not that Sir H. Smith was quite right when he wrote to Lord Grey, 'This style of language and practical method of demonstration these people fully understand and will never forget.† We have seen how Macomo understood it. It is, indeed, difficult to overrate the ill effects of such imprudence. With the utmost tact and forbearance it would have been a hard task to conciliate the chiefs to the working of the new system, even the beneficent features of which could not but tend to excite their suspicion and hostility. Their followers were encouraged to appeal from their unjust and capricious decisions to the English Commissioners; and they could no longer, by the help of a witch-doctor, rob or 'eat up' a rich clansman. Little wonder, then, if with insults such as we have described, in place of endeavours to soften to them their loss of power, or indemnify them for their loss of income, Sandilli and Macomo became intriguing agitators rather than contented subjects. Nevertheless, so great and so evident were the advan-

\* Mrs. Ward, *the Cape and the Kafirs*, p. 222.

† *Parl. Papers*, July, 1818, p. 48.

tages to the Kafir people of peace, order, and absence of oppression, that we do not believe that these agitators, notwithstanding their hereditary influence, could have fomented, or would, indeed, have attempted actual rebellion, had it not been for two contingencies; first, an unusual drought, which, in the autumn of 1850 spread throughout Kafirland hunger, and with it there, as well as everywhere else, discontent; and, secondly, the policy of the Governor, which made the war party the predominant one, and provided it with a pretext.

In September, 1850, we find a despatch from Colonel Mackinnon, which, instead of reporting, as for some time previously, a peaceful progress in civilisation, mentions the alarm of the frontier colonists in consequence of the appearance of a new prophet, Umlangeni, who was said to be covertly preaching war against the white man, and prophesying victory to the Kafirs; and ends with the ominous paragraph, 'We are terribly ill off for want of rain: the country is as dry as a bone, and the cattle like skeletons.' The prophet's hut had been destroyed in August, but he himself not arrested, because 'so weak and emaciated,' probably through fasting for effect, that 'he could not leave his kraal without assistance;' and on October 3, Colonel Mackinnon writes his opinion that the attempt to seize him should not be repeated, because he 'had committed no overt act to justify a seizure, and because such seizure would cause great irritation among the Kafirs generally, and at the present most trying season, when they are in a state of great destitution, and nevertheless abstain wholly from marauding in the colony, might endanger tranquillity.\*' As, however, Sandilli was said to be in communication with Umlangeni, Mr. Brownlee, the Gaika Commissioner, was very properly instructed to summon him and the other Gaika chiefs, and warn them of the consequences of any conspiracy. We must beg our readers to take note of Mr. Brownlee's observation in his report of this interview, 'that the Kafirs appear to have been in as great terror as the colonists;' as also of these words in Sandilli's reply to his address, viz., that 'they had heard that the Governor wished to seize all the chiefs, and had they been called either to King William's Town or Fort Hare, they would not have gone;' at the same time 'he denied any intention of making war, or that he had gone to see Umlangeni.' Bearing in mind this fear on the part of the Kafirs, and also the fact that Colonel Mackinnon writes, on the 14th of October, 'That the Kafirs are perfectly submissive. that there is little or no

\* Parl. Papers, March, 1851, p. 17.

‘marauding,’ and that the desertion of their farms by the Kafir servants — the symptom most alarming to the colonists — was to be explained by fears of the colonists themselves which infected their servants, — we come to the appearance of the Governor himself on the scene of action.

Sir H. Smith arrived at King William’s Town on the 20th of October, and forthwith summoned both the Gaika and Tslambi chiefs to meet him there. There was a good attendance of the latter, and some of the former; but Sandilli did not come, sending an excuse through ‘his great councillor that he had ‘fallen from his horse.’ The excuse was a fiction; the real reason he gave in his answer to a messenger who was sent to urge his attendance:—‘No, I cannot come in; I dare not.’ The Governor then sent him a despatch, dated the 29th October, in which he says, ‘Now I have been patient with you, and I ‘send Brownlee with my “word” that unless you come here, ‘or show Brownlee your wound which prevents you, I will ‘throw you away — not know you; — you shall not be a chief, ‘but an outcast, your property confiscated and given to your ‘people.’ The tenor of this word was scarcely likely to allay the fear or reassure the suspicions of the chief; nor does it seem to us surprising that Mr. Brownlee was compelled to report, that while ‘solemnly denying any intention of making war, and ‘defying any man to prove the contrary;’ and though ‘greatly ‘dreading to offend His Excellency, he fully believes he is to ‘be apprehended, and with the dread of his former confinement ‘before his eyes, he fears placing himself in a position again to ‘lose his liberty or his life.’ Whence then this fear? it may be asked; if not an excuse for disobedience, surely it must have arisen from a guilty conscience. The Governor seems to have given it this interpretation, and to have acted accordingly; but we wonder at his doing so, with the following explanation by Mr. Brownlee before him:—‘There can be no doubt,’ Mr. Brownlee writes, ‘that Sandilli’s fears have been worked upon ‘by wicked and designing persons; he has from many sources ‘received information that it is the intention of Government to ‘seize him; *the thing is so constantly spoken of in the colony, and ‘so generally desired, that there is no wonder he should hear of ‘it:’\** and, we may add, that having heard of it, there is no wonder that he should fear to subject himself to imprisonment, the fate most dreaded by a Kafir; especially when he could not but remember how a former Governor, Lord Charles Somerset, had tried to seize his father, Gaika, and how the

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\* Parl. Papers, 1851, p. 41.

death of Haintza, the head of his family, had years ago followed a surrender, under promise of safe conduct, to Sir Harry Smith himself; and when he himself declared that his own capture, at the end of the previous war, had been in consequence of an assurance that 'if he went into the camp to make peace nothing should be done to him,' and that trusting to this assurance he had left his hiding place.

Nevertheless, on the 30th October, the very day on which he received this report of his Commissioner, the Governor, instead of making allowance for fears not in themselves unreasonable, or attempting to show that they were unfounded, punished them by a proclamation deposing Sandilli from his rank as a chief, and immediately afterwards wrote a despatch, in which he begs Lord Grey 'to observe the deliberate and temperate manner in which I have dealt with the chief, who is a weak-minded man, possessing neither influence nor respect among his people.' Sir H. Smith's appreciation of Sandilli's powers has been proved by the late war to be no more correct than that of his own deliberation and temper; but for that mistake Sandilli's then antecedents were sufficient justification. But it is extraordinary that a man with Sir Harry's experience of the character of the Kafirs, and consequent knowledge of their clan-feeling, could thus underrate the influence of an hereditary chief, whatever his individual powers, or suppose that it was possible for him to depose him from his habitual rule over the hearts of his clansmen.

It would seem, indeed, that the Governor's scenic displays at the inauguration of his rule were not altogether without effect. Instead of appearing in his true position as the representative of their conquerors, exercising over the Kafirs a just and beneficent though a foreign sway, he claimed to be their Great Chief, their Father, their own 'Inkosi Inkolu;' and it is hard to say whether it was more unfortunate that these clansmen did not believe in his chiefdom, or that he did believe in it himself, and acted on his belief. He supposed that he had appointed Sandilli and the other chiefs: that was just what he could not do. He could appoint Commissioners and compel obedience to them; he could have appointed the chiefs British agents, and have made them his assistants by paying them; but as Sandilli himself said afterwards, 'I was not made a chief by Englishmen: your Queen makes men chiefs, she made Smith a chief; but,' he added, 'God made me a chief.\*' That was his faith,

\* Speech to Mr. Renton. See Miss. Record of the United Presbyterian Church, 1852, p. 57.

and his followers have proved to our cost that it was theirs also: a faith inconvenient, if not absurd, we may say, that they should thus prefer a black tyrant in his leopard-skin, to an English general in his epaulettes; but hardly more absurd than the vain attempt of the General to ape the Chief instead of acting the Governor,—to hide or adorn the epaulettes by the leopard-skin.

The proclamation, however, which the Governor issued on his return to Cape Town from this deposition, was a no less curious comment on his proceedings than the above-quoted despatch. For in it he not only assured the colonists that they had no cause for alarm, but stated that ‘After every search for information, it was apparent to him that no design of renewing the scenes of savage warfare was at any time entertained.’ Why then the deposition, in which the Governor had quoted the charges against Sandilli of ‘preparing for war,’ and ‘tempting to spread abroad among the Kafir people disaffection?’ Nevertheless, in little more than a month, we find the Governor again on the frontiers, brought back by reports of some attempts to rescue cattle seized by the Kafir police as fines for trespass; attempts causing uneasiness, not so much in themselves, as because they were the first cases of resistance to the new police, and evidenced a general irritation. And though they do not appear to have been directly traceable to Sandilli’s instigation, it began to be thought that a ‘demonstration of force’ was needed to counterbalance his influence, which could no longer be despised. Accordingly Sir H. Smith, ordering ‘the troops in British Kafiraria and Graham’s Town to move so as to make this demonstration,’ went himself to Fort Cox, in the Amatolas, and there summoned another meeting of the Gaika chiefs and their followers, who attended it 3000 strong. Here he made a long speech, in the course of which he imputed, as he wrote to Lord Grey, ‘every blame to Sandilli and his half-brother, Anta;’ declared positively that the rescues had been ordered by them (though the evidence detailed in the Blue Books only tends to cast suspicion on them); and ended with proclaiming them both outlaws, and offering a high reward for their capture, leaving the meeting with the comfortable conviction that his acts and speeches had again secured peace.

Hitherto our narrative of the events immediately preceding the last war has been collected solely from the despatches of the Governor and their enclosures; but we must now quote from another Blue Book, the report of this meeting and of its result, as given by the Rev. H. Renton, the delegate to South Africa of the Glasgow Missionary Society, in his evidence be-

fore the Commons' Committee in 1851.\* Mr. Renton's statement is as follows:—

'Unfortunately, besides this declaration,' (the one reported in the despatch), 'His Excellency indulged in an extemporaneous harangue, and so expressed himself as to excite, I fear, distrust and suspicion in the minds of the Kafirs, as to the declaration he had made to them. To a question which was put by one of the Pakati to the Governor, "If he believed that they did not desire war, and if he did not desire war, and if he was not going to hunt Sandilli, "what did he mean by those camps?" referring to the men that were immediately behind him, some infantry, and the Cape mounted rifles: that question, which struck me as a pertinent and natural one under the circumstances, the Governor answered rather quickly and angrily, by merely saying that he had said he was not going to send out any red-coats to hunt Sandilli, and that was enough. Then several of the chiefs, along with the protestation to maintain peace, intimated that he had not produced proofs of Sandilli's defection to justify his deposition or his being cast off; and that they should like the proofs. This was met by affirming that he had information from Toise, another chief, and from some other party that he could credit. The appeals for mercy for Sandilli were met by very strong expressions of indignation at such a request, stating that he would lose his head if he showed mercy to Sandilli,—that the Queen would chop off his head,—and could he be such a fool as to lose his head for Sandilli, upon whom he poured out all manner of vituperative epithets. And he spoke of Macomo, who was present, in terms of a very irritating nature; stating that he did not care whether he touched the stick of peace to-day or not; that he might have been a great man, but he was now a drunken beast and had to be turned out of the colony, and a number of things which I lamented, as they seemed to be uncalled for; and knowing the feudal attachment of the Kafirs, I thought very likely to ruffle their feelings. . . . On going home that evening, I was surprised to find that some of the Kafirs, whom I knew to be tolerably well affected towards the British Government, did not concur with me in the views now of peace. They said they saw there was to be war; I asked what put that into their heads? they said, "O, the Governor is going to hunt Sandilli." I said, "The Governor is going to do the very reverse: he said, you Kafirs "must hunt Sandilli, so that unless some of you catch him he is a "free man; the Governor had said, not a red-coat should hunt him, "and you have quite misunderstood him."

It would appear, however, that the misunderstanding was more on Mr. Renton's part than on theirs. The Governor made his speech on the Thursday, and on the following Tuesday he despatched Colonel Mackinnon up the gorge of the Keiskamma, 'in the direction of the supposed concealment of Sandilli, be-

\* Abor. Com. Rep. p. 385.

lieving,' as he writes, 'that if a patrol showed itself, he would either surrender himself or flee the country.' The missionaries did not share in this belief; they, 'as well as all who knew the Kafirs, esteemed this act as one of the utmost imprudence, unless it was meant as a declaration of war;'\* and they were right; the Kafirs did understand it as such declaration.

Six months afterwards Sandilli sent word to Pato that he, Sandilli, wishes Pato to know that he consented to his chieftainship being taken from him, but that the troops after this went to where he was in the bush, in consequence of which he was obliged to fight;† and what could his clansmen do but fight for him? They attacked the rear of Colonel Mackinnon's troops; several of the soldiers were killed, — for by a strange fatality they were unprepared for the attack, their muskets not even loaded, — and thus broke out our last Kafir war.

The day after this attack, Christmas-day, came the fearful and bloody massacre of the soldier settlers in the frontier villages: the Gaikas rose to a man, many of the Kafir police joined them, refusing to fight against their countrymen, or expecting them to succeed; and Sandilli and Macomo taught the Governor to estimate their power by shutting him up in Fort Cox, out of which he cut his way on the last day of the year with great gallantry but at fearful risk — a risk which may account for the excited wording of the proclamation he issued the instant of his arrival at King William's Town, calling on the colonists to rise *en masse* to aid Her Majesty's troops to destroy and exterminate these most barbarous and treacherous savages, who for the moment are formidable.‡

We are well aware that there may be readers who will have little patience with this detailed history of the events which preceded, and in our opinion mainly produced, this last Kafir war. 'All this attempt to show how the outbreak began is mere waste of words,' they may say. The Governor's conduct might have given the pretext, but the real cause was the hatred and treachery of the Kafirs: the chiefs wanted licence; their followers wanted plunder; they all hated the white man, as these black barbarians always have hated and always will hate him. Sir Harry Smith, underrating their hatred and treachery, reduced the number of the troops, who alone kept peace; the Kafirs seized the opportunity, and hence, in reality, the war. 'This foolish economy,' these gentlemen would add, 'was Sir

\* Abor. Com. Rep. Mr. Renton's Evidence, p. 386.

† Parl. Papers, Feb. 1852, p. 101.

‡ Parl. Papers, March, 1851, p. 77.

‘ Harry Smith’s mistake ; he did not err in being too overbearing to these savages in manner, but in not sufficiently overpowering them in fact ; it was all very well to put his foot upon their necks, but he should have never let them think he was going to take it off.’ A word or two on this objection, the more important as, by Cape newspapers now before us, we observe that any reduction in the enormous force now employed at Imperial cost at the Cape, has been inveighed against as certain to cause a fresh Kafir war, in like manner, it is said, as it caused the last. A comfortable prospect this is indeed, that we must either suffer these barbarians to overrun our borders, acknowledging our inability to defend our own dependencies, or else, whatever our home need of men or money, continue to keep peace in South Africa, at a cost which would almost enable us to do so in Europe.

‘ But if the colonists keep our soldiers they must pay for them,’ it may be said, ‘ else why their Constitution and all its tax-voting machinery?’ They will not pay for them : first, they cannot, they have not the money ; or, if they had the money, we could not get it from them, except by the help of these very soldiers themselves. They say Imperial policy and Imperial governors brought upon us the former wars ; out of one war springs the feeling which may produce another, which makes peace impossible without an army to preserve it, and therefore while this policy lasts, we look to the Empire to furnish this army. And the colonists are right : if the Governors we send out are to continue to act towards the Kafirs as they have done, our Chancellor of the Exchequer must find them the means to do so. It may, nay, will be difficult to change this policy, for it implies a change, not only in our relations with the Kafirs, but with every other savage or half-savage people with whom we come in contact ; but changed it must be, unless we make up our minds to spread civilisation in South Africa by war and famine, until all the Kafirs and Zoolahs and Bechuanas are either exterminated like the Bushmen, or trampled down like the Hottentots. The change required is simply this : we must determine to treat these savage or half-savage tribes with the same forbearance and the same consideration as that which we now use towards civilised nations. It may be called absurd, or sentimental, or Quixotic, to require that a Cape Governor should conduct his relations with Kafir chiefs according to the rules of international law, or follow Sir George Napier’s example in treating them as though they were his equals : it may be said that in so doing he would put both British and Barbarians in a false position, because he would treat the latter as though they



were strong, whereas his object ought to be to prove to them that they are weak. But here lies the moral of all these Kafir wars; they show what a powerful nation has to pay in money, blood, and reputation, if, forgetting that inequality of might does not constitute inequality of right, it commits the blunder of supposing that a weak people—a people infinitely inferior to it in every qualification for strength—has not the same claim upon its consideration as a nation equally powerful with itself. It is a common saying, that we cannot afford to negotiate with savages, to discuss with them, much less in the slightest degree to concede to them, because every concession, every deliberation, will be misconstrued by them as a sign of weakness or a symptom of fear. It is also a common conviction, that whenever we come into contact with uncivilised neighbours, we cannot live by the side of them in peace,—we cannot leave them in independence,—we must subject, or expel, or exterminate them; and this last conviction is in truth a necessary and logical consequence of the other. Depend upon it, we shall have Afghan and Burmese wars in Asia, and Kafir wars in Africa, until our troops are stopped by the ocean or the desert, or cross bayonets with those of some other Christian nation bent upon a like mission; unless we take as much pains to avoid an Asiatic or an African, as we now do to avoid an European or an American war. The negotiations of this last winter and spring have abundantly evidenced the earnestness of our peace-preserving efforts within the range of Christendom, but why thus restrict them, for beyond this range they are needed yet more? In our intercourse with Americans or Europeans, their good sense or good principle may supply our deficiency; but with the ignorant and impulsive Africans or Asiatics, if we do not keep our temper, we cannot expect to keep peace. Again, if there be one law which Christianity has made more incumbent than another upon nations as well as upon individuals, it is that the strong should use their strength not to trample down but to help up the weak; that they should be tolerant of their temptations, and sympathising with their sufferings, and forbearing with their faults;—and inasmuch as there is no law which has not its penalty, these wars, with all their disgrace, and degradation, and destruction of life and property, are our punishment for making that strength which enables us to be forbearing, our excuse for not showing forbearance.

We say, that if we provoke these Kafirs to fight with us, disgrace and degradation will be, as in every Kafir war yet waged they have been, our punishment. We do not mean the disgrace of being beaten by these savages, but the yet more

degrading disgrace of being forced to fight them as if we were savages ourselves. The Blue Books are full of encomiums by both Governors and Colonial Secretaries on the gallantry and endurance of our officers and soldiers; and no one can deny that these encomiums have been most fully earned. If any of our readers wonder how it was that so many thousand of our best troops—well instructed in the art, and well provided with the machinery of civilised destruction—were so many months in subduing a horde of naked, half-armed, wholly undisciplined savages, not greatly superior to them in number, let them study these Blue Books, and they will learn that so courageous were these Kafirs, so impenetrable their fastnesses, and so well did they know how to avail themselves of their advantages of position, that it needed all the pith and daring of British soldiers to drive them out of the inaccessible Anatolas, or the indestructible Fish River Bush. And how at last has this work been accomplished? Not by the application of any of the new modes of civilised warfare, but by a condescension to the old fashion of laying waste by fire and sword. These Gaikas were conquered, not by our cannon, nor by our discipline, but were starved into submission by the destruction of their crops, the despoiling of their cattle, and the burning of their huts. And in order to do this, British officers were degraded into cattle-lifters, and were obliged to order their men to excel their foes by ravages more dreadful because more systematic.

Lord Glenelg, in his oft-quoted despatch to Sir Benjamin D'Urban, adverted very strongly on Sir Harry (then Colonel) Smith's report of his devastation of Kafirland during the war of 1836; remarking, that such 'desolation of an enemy's country, not in aid of military operations, nor for the security of the invading force, has been invariably followed by universal reprobation.' Had Lord Glenelg been Colonial Secretary in 1851, he would have found himself compelled, as doubtless was Lord Grey, to quell his instinctive indignation when called upon to approve of similar devastations, because military operations *did* need their aid, and, indeed, could hardly have succeeded without them. Sir H. Smith thus writes to Lord Grey in July, 1851:—

'1500 head of cattle, 42 horses, and nearly 1000 goats were captured by the second division; 350 head of cattle by the first, and 300 by the force under Captain Tylden, while large stores of corn were destroyed, as well as numerous recently constructed huts. To be compelled thus barbarously to prosecute war, ever cruel in even its most mitigated form, is revolting to the Christian mind. But no other course is open.'

Again, in January, 1852, he writes:—

‘My next step will be, the moment the men are somewhat refreshed, to fill the Amatolas with troops, and to carry on systematically that devastation, the horrid result of savage war, which will reduce the people to submit to my terms.’

And accordingly, in arranging the movements for so doing, we find the following order:—

‘The object of this disposition of the troops is to spoil the Gaika cattle, to burn all his kraals, the fences of his cornfields, and destroy the cornfields themselves. The troops will be provided with sickles, dragoon and rifle swords, and will move at daylight in the prosecution of this devastation, as locality and circumstances direct.’\*

How completely such orders were executed will be proved by the following extract, from among many we might quote, of the officers’ reports. Colonel Eyre, during a foray against the Tambookies in 1851, writes as follows:—

‘This completes the narrative of my proceedings up to this date. Our labours and exertions have been great, but the result only moderate. We have captured in all 6345 head of cattle, exclusive of those lost and killed; a few horses, and several thousand goats; and burned and destroyed most of the huts and kraals on our route.’

And this ‘moderate’ punishment, it may be as well to remark, was inflicted, not on the ‘contumacious Gaikas,’ but upon their allies, the Tambookies, respecting whom Sir George Cathcart, in a despatch in 1853, admits that their ‘war with us may have been at its commencement aggravated, if not provoked, by unjustifiable aggression on the part of certain individuals of the burgher population of the North-eastern districts.’† But enough of details. Sir H. Smith, in his despatch‡ immediately after his recall, thus sums up the ‘punishment’ which he had inflicted on these ‘most formidable barbarians,’ as the ‘result of that horrid war which they so wantonly commenced:’—

‘During the prosecution of this war, 6000 warriors, according to the Kafirs’ own statement, have fallen, including 80 chief men, all of them of some distinction. 80,970 head of cattle and innumerable goats have been taken from the Gaikas, Tambookies, and from Kreili, the latter having suffered an additional loss by the removal of 7000 of the enslaved Fingo race, bringing with them 15,000 head of cattle. Many arms and nearly 900 horses have been captured. The enemy has been driven with great loss from the strongholds which he so determinedly held, and throughout the whole of their locations *the crops of the Gaikas have been utterly destroyed.*’

\* Parl. Papers, May, 1853, p. 27.

† Parl. Papers, 1853, p. 219.

‡ Ibid. p. 73.

Not that we would by any means ascribe especial severity to Sir H. Smith's mode of Kafir warfare; we could make similar quotations from the despatches of his successor, as of all generals who have waged Kafir wars. Nor do we dispute the military justification of these instructions to slay and burn, for, as every male Kafir of an age to bear arms was a foe, so all the food in Kafirland, all the corn and the cattle, might be considered as a military magazine.

It is not, therefore, in order to find fault with the orders of Cape Commanders-in-chief that we distress our readers by dwelling on them, but in order to insist on the responsibility which rested on them as Governors, which will rest upon all future Governors, if they do not strive their utmost and bear their utmost to prevent wars which need such orders to conclude them. It is a grievous thing that millions of money should be wrung from the toil of English tax-payers, in order to support a struggle from which England can derive neither pecuniary advantage, nor political power, nor national renown. It is yet more grievous than this, that a strong, civilised, and Christian nation — a nation priding itself on its philanthropy, and pre-eminently on its philanthropy to black savages — should use its strength in enraging and rendering yet more savage, if not in exterminating, a race of men not without natural noble qualities or capacity for civilisation, but which does get thus treated precisely because, being our neighbours, they are also black savages. But it is most grievous of all to arrive at this result by forcing English soldiers to imitate these savages, and English gentlemen to consider how they may best 'systematise devastation.' And if it be said that these savages brought these evils upon themselves,—that they were but the consequences of their own conduct,—we can only again repeat, in reply, that looking at the European wars which we have warded off, and at the Kafir wars which we have waged, we believe that had these heathen Kafirs been Christian Europeans, they might have felt and shown towards us much more hostility than they did, and yet no war would have ensued. From the close of the previous war up to 1850, the official despatches prove that the Kafirs kept the peace. Doubtless there was discontent; the chiefs felt that they were falling, and had not forgotten that they had been insulted; the people were suffering from drought, and hunger helps Kafir as well as English Chartism; but spite of drought or incitements by chief or prophet, spite also of the alarming rumours which reached them from the colony, they had committed no overt acts of war or rebellion, nor even of marauding; nor did they, until the Governor, outraging all their ideas and

habits and convictions of honour, patriotism, and loyalty, forced them to choose between war and the surrender of their Chief to the mercy of a man, who had deposed him because he feared to surrender himself, and had set a price on him without giving proofs of his guilt.

Nor let such provocation be imputed to the impulsiveness of Sir Harry Smith rather than to the system of our policy. We have seen how, when Sandilli sent word with respect to the rescue dispute, 'The Governor must not be in haste with forces in this case, let us first speak about it; that we may understand it,' Sir Benjamin Maitland 'hastened to reply' to Col. Har's letter containing this message, by ordering the invasion which began the war of 1846. And we will now beg our readers to observe how the sense and temper of a savage chief saved Sir Harry Smith's successor from inflicting on us a sixth war, which bid fair to be as costly as any of the preceding ones.

In the 'Sovereignty'—that district within the fork of the Orange River from which Sir George Clerk is now withdrawing the British rule which Sir Harry Smith proclaimed—the most powerful body of natives is the Basutos, a tribe of Bechuanas, a people not strictly speaking Kafirs, but resembling them in language, customs, and character.

The chief of these Basutos is Moshesh, decidedly the most noteworthy native in South Africa. Sir George Cathcart, in the despatch in which he declares his intention of marching against him, describes him as 'the son of an inferior chieftain of an inferior tribe, who, by his own energy and enterprise, supported by good fortune, managed ultimately, out of the wreck of petty nations, to become a centre of aggregation, and to establish a powerful sovereignty, selecting a well-chosen and defensible mountain fastness, "Thaba Bossiou," as his seat of government.'

Mr. Freeman, writing in 1849, tells us that 'not more than thirty years ago he had not so much as a suspicion of the existence of white nations, and had never seen either a gun or a horse; but was then perhaps possessed of the greatest number of fire-arms and horses of any chief in South Africa;' and how well, in 1852, he was able to use them, our troops found to their cost. Two stories which Mr. Freeman relates may be worth giving, as instances of his shrewd originality and reforming spirit. Finding the 'witch-smellers' the great bugbears in the way of Bechuana progress, he feigned to be ill; and when these doctors, with their customary incantations, had smelt out the persons who caused his illness, and pronounced their doom, he exposed

their imposture by declaring his own excellent health. Again, cannibalism is proved by abundant authorities to have existed, if not in his own immediate tribe, in some of the tribes dependent on him. Before the missionary came into the country, he determined to stop it; and finding famine to be its cause, he did so by providing the villagers, among whom it prevailed, 'with corn to sow their land, and milch cows to supply them 'with milk till their fields yielded a harvest.\* Nor while thus setting himself against savage superstition and atrocities did he, as is usual, adopt civilised vices. Mr. Backhouse, who visited him in 1839 (finding him, by the by, with an abundance of European clothing, a young Hottentot brushing his clothes), was delighted to discover that he did not even take tobacco or snuff, much less spirits; saying, when pressed to drink, 'If I 'were to drink, I should be talking folly before my people.' †

There can be no question that, for many years, this clever chief, seeing how desirable it was for him to keep on good terms with the Colonial Government, had done his best to do so, refusing, for example, repeated solicitations from the emigrant Boers to abet them in their rebellion. Nor can we, after a wearisome search through Blue Books, Cape newspapers, &c. &c. for the causes of our quarrel with him, find them more correctly described than by Sir George Cathcart himself a few weeks after his return from his expedition against him. Describing what had been the state of affairs on his arrival, he writes as follows:— 'In the Sovereignty, although no open hostilities 'had occurred, a mistaken policy on the part of the Resident 'had provoked a system of petty warfare between the burgher 'population and the powerful Basuto people along their whole 'extensive frontier; . . . a state of things which, if suf- 'fered to continue, must inevitably result in a war more diffi- 'cult to manage, and more expensive, because more remote, 'than the Kaffrarian war, and one in which it is very questionable

\* Freeman's 'Tour in South Africa,' pp. 312. 334.

† Backhouse's Narrative, pp. 368; 372. If the new rulers of the Orange River Territory follow Moshesh's advice, they will do well enough. In the course of a very sensible address delivered by Moshesh to the members of the Provisional Government, who had invited him to a friendly dinner, the Chief said:—

'My coming among you with Moroko may satisfy you that I am 'anxious to live at peace with you and him. . . . And although 'I have no right to teach you, I however earnestly desire that 'drunkenness may not prevail either among blacks or whites, and 'that you may establish your Government in the fear of God, and of 'his commandments.' (*Cape Commercial Advertiser*, April 21. 1854.)

‘ whether justice and good faith would be found to be on the side supported by the British Government.’ \*

To quiet these disturbances thus originated, the Governor, as soon as he had cleared the Amatolas, and cowed Kreili, determined to proceed himself to the Sovereignty; and accordingly, in December, 1852, he marched into Moshesh’s country with 2000 troops, accompanied by his two sub-commissioners, Major Hogge and Mr. Owen. These gentlemen fixed the fine which Moshesh should pay in compensation for losses consequent upon a warfare acknowledged to have been forced upon him, at 10,000 head of cattle and 1000 horses; and on the 14th of December, the Governor wrote him a letter, ordering him to deliver them within three days’ time, or on the fourth day prepare for war. The day after receiving this letter, Moshesh, in reply, came to talk with the Governor; and we wish we could give the whole of the conversation as reported by the Governor, for it is suggestive, not to say instructive. Suffice it to say, that after saying that ‘ the time was short and the cattle many,’ and asking, therefore, for six days, to collect them, and stating that he ‘ had not now control enough over his people to induce them to ‘ comply with the demand, however anxious he might be to do ‘ so;’ and then, when the Governor talked of war, saying, ‘ Do ‘ not talk of war, for however anxious I may be to avoid it, you ‘ know that a dog when beaten will show his teeth,’ he ended with saying, ‘ I will go at once and do my best, and perhaps ‘ God will help me;’ and on the 18th instant, the appointed day, his son came in with 3500 head of cattle. †

Considering the Governor’s own opinion of this chief’s grievances, character, and conduct, it might have been supposed that he would have accepted this part payment as earnest for the whole, and not have proceeded immediately to compulsion, especially as we find from the reports of the French Protestant missionaries, whose station was at Moshesh’s ‘ great place,’ that it was true that he had very great difficulty in prevailing upon his people to give up any of their cattle. Nevertheless, on the 19th, no more cattle appearing, three columns of troops were ordered to march ‘ to chastise Moshesh;’ and the result was

\* Parl. Papers, 1853, pp. 219—223. By the Blue Book on the Orange River Territory just presented to Parliament, we find that the information recently obtained both by Sir G. Cathcart and Sir G. Clerk entirely confirm the opinions expressed above, both as to the character of Moshesh and the merits of the Basuto quarrel. Parl. Papers, Orange River Ter. 1854.

† Parl. Paperz, Orange Riv. Ter. 1853, p. 98.

the engagement of Berea on the 20th, the most of a pitched battle we have ever had at the Cape.

Before the battle, however, it seems that Moshesh made yet another effort to avoid fighting, which Sir George Cathcart does not mention in his despatch. On the 19th the French missionaries inform us that, seeing the soldiers in motion, he sent his brother, together with one of their number, 'pour supplier le Gouverneur de suspendre encore les hostilités, vu que le chef travaillait encore de toutes ses forces à rassembler du bétail. Son Excellence parût d'abord fléchir, mais dans la nuit l'ordre fut donné de traverser la rivière au point de jour.'\* This visit of his brother and the missionary is confirmed by a letter† we have before us, from one of the officers engaged, who adds, that when galloping with Colonel Eyre's column to the Berea Mountain, the next morning, they were again met at the foot of it by Moshesh's brother, who told Colonel Eyre the cattle were all ready, and to come and take them, but not to fight. 'Catch us not fighting,' writes the officer,—a sentiment honourable enough to British gallantry, but one which, we fear, tends to account for many a Kafir war we have had to pay for; and, accordingly, 'the Colonel answered him in anything but a polite manner, and called out, fire away my boys!'

The fight lasted all day; and certainly, if the result was victory on our side, it was a victory which, on the night after the battle, was considered in either camp as anything but decisive. The Basutos mustered 'from 5000 to 6000 cavalry; and, it is said, 2000 infantry, well armed generally with firearms as well as assegais; the cavalry all clothed in European costume, and with saddles: in short, their military efficiency little inferior to irregular Cossacks or Circassians.‡ This efficiency, indeed, is evident from the fact that, notwithstanding the length of the engagement and the gallantry of their attack, so small a number were killed by the muskets, shells, or cannon of our troops. Sir George Cathcart guesses their killed and wounded at from 500 to 600, but he does not write with confidence; and the French missionaries, who had every means of counting, estimate them at only twenty wounded and as many killed: on the other hand, they say, 'Il faut malheureusement ajouter à cette dernière catégorie un plus grand nombre de femmes et

\* 'Journal des Missions Evangéliques,' Mars, 1853, p. 86. See also 'Cape Commercial Advertiser,' Jan. 26. 1853.

† See 'Norwich Mercury,' May 21. 1853.

‡ Sir G. Cathcart's Despatch, Jan. 13. 1853.



‘d’enfants tués par les soldats.’\* It is only just, however, to General Cathcart to state, that he desired one of the missionaries to express to Moshesh his regret, ‘Que des femmes avaient été massacrés, sans doute par quelques soldats loin des yeux de leurs officiers.’ Our loss was reported at fifteen wounded and thirty-three killed; and the spoils of the day were, it is true, some 5000 or 6000 head of cattle; but this could hardly be considered a trophy, as, on the first attack, Colonel Eyre’s column alone had succeeded in capturing at least 30,000 head of cattle, all of which, however, but 1500, he was obliged before the end of the day to abandon.†

Hitherto this Basuto business had, allowing for a more than usual amount of skill and success on the part of the barbarians, been transacted according to our established mode of dealing in such cases. Our Governor, though believing Moshesh to be the aggrieved party, set to work to ‘chastise’ him. Such chastisement was considered the way to prevent war, at all events the way in which the dignity of the British Crown was to be supported. It would have been incompatible with this dignity to examine into the excuses of a savage, or to condescend to test the statements of a missionary that he was doing his best to pay his fine, and had really risked his own position among his people in endeavouring to do so; and so, in short, war was begun in order to prevent war; and had we had to contend with a Sandilli or a Krcili with Moshesh’s power, but without his sense, this war would probably have had the usual duration of twelve months, at the usual cost of some two millions. To the surprise, however, both of our officers and the missionaries, and, we doubt not, considerably to the relief of the Governor, Moshesh determined to take advantage of his stout resistance to make peace;—his intelligence, says M. Cassalis, not permitting him ‘de se faire illusion sur le succès partiel que ses guerriers avaient obtenu.’ At midnight he made his son write a letter to the Governor, which he sent the next morning, in which he asks him to content himself with what he had taken, asks for peace, and to be no longer considered an enemy of the Queen, and ends by saying, ‘I will try all I can to keep my people in order for the future.’ The Governor lost no time in accepting this ‘full and humble submission,’ as he terms it, and within three weeks he was back again at Graham’s Town, first, however, issuing a proclamation which—whoever be the

\* ‘Journal des Missions,’ p. 89. See also ‘Cape Commercial Advertiser,’ Jan. 26. 1853.

† See Colonel Eyre’s Report, Parl. Papers, Orange Riv. Ter. p. 100.

future rulers of the 'Sovereignty'—will, we fear, turn out an unfortunate legacy to that region. Many of the whites, he says, were disappointed that he did not, 'notwithstanding his submission, cut up and destroy the chief Moshesh, in order that his rich lands might fall into other hands;' but, as some sort of satisfaction, he gave the burghers full license for the protection, security, and recovery of their property according to the Commando system; further declaring, 'that if in pursuit of their stolen property they killed the thief he would bear them harmless.\*' Considering what Cape history has proved to be the meaning of a Commando license, this permission to the burghers of 'the Sovereignty' to use it at their will is as curiously inconsistent with the Governor's recorded opinion of their previous conduct, as is his estimate of Moshesh with his acts towards him.†

Surely with facts before us such as those contained in the above narrative, we should hesitate to conclude that it is our destiny to wage war with our weaker neighbours, because between them and us there chance to exist what are termed the elemental differences of race, colour, and civilisation. It has of late years been the boast of our policy that it tries to neutralise or destroy these differences, and thus to remove the caste hatred arising from them. In so far as this policy has been fairly tried it has succeeded, but it never will be fairly tried, nor can it fully succeed, until its administrators work as hard to prevent war as they would if these elemental differences did not exist. Alas! in the wars which we, as well as other Christian nations, have waged with savages, the rule has been, that the civilised Christians have been the aggressors; nor can we be surprised

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\* Parl. Papers, Orange Riv. Ter. p. 104.

† The following extract from a recent newspaper published in the Orange River Territory will show what is the meaning of a Commando under its new Government:—'During the past week, a party of about fourteen Boers residing in the neighbourhood of the Modder River, went out in search of two Bushmen, who were charged with murdering a Koranna, and stealing cattle in that quarter. Hearing that they had taken shelter at a Bushman kraal at Espag's Kop, near the farm of Van Zyl, they proceeded thither, and after shooting two women and three men, they took between twenty and thirty prisoners, who they divided amongst them, but did not find the two men of whom they were in search. We understand the Bushmen did not offer the least resistance. One of the women was found lying dead, with a living infant by her side.' (*Bloem Fontein Gazette*, March 11. 1854.)—Because two natives are suspected of murder, five others are shot, and twenty made prisoners for division among their captors!!!

that it should have been so, for, however ignorant the savages, the strength of civilisation is too evident for them not to acknowledge, and fear to attack it. Whence, then, these civilised aggressions?

History furnishes us with three principal reasons. The civilised men have either as a community tried to take from the savages their land or their freedom; or as individuals they have committed acts of outrage, and then as a community refused redress or revenged retaliation; or, lastly, the civilised authorities have not given to the savage authorities the consideration which they demanded from them; that is, the Christian rulers have not done to the savage chiefs as they would be done by. Now, looking back along the records of our own, as, indeed, of all other colonies, we shall, we fear, find that the two first of these causes have been so universally and powerfully in action, that the last has rarely had opportunity to show itself; and therefore, when to it we trace almost entirely our share in the late Kafir wars, we do so with a trust in the future, because the eradication of the two former causes proves that the true principles of justice and wisdom have taken such hold both of the colony and of the mother-country, that there is good reason to hope that this last cause of conflict only needs to be clearly defined to be eradicated in like manner.

Lord Glenelg's despatch, much as it has been derided and decried, did in truth mark a crisis, not only in the Cape, but in our general colonial policy. What the old policy had been we have in measure attempted to show;—Hottentots serfs on their native soil, Bushmen exterminated, Kafirs forced by commandoes into foes;—these were its results. The acknowledgment by all parties that no outrage of individual colonists preceded either of the two last wars, and the evident wish of the Colonial Government not to extend the colonial border, prove what our policy has been since. And yet—with individuals restrained by both law and public opinion, with governors anxious to keep peace, and aware that war would bring them neither glory nor praise nor popularity,—wars have been provoked, or at least not—as they could have been—prevented; because, though our humanity has compelled our selfishness to acknowledge that a Kafir has a right to his land and his freedom, it has not yet forced our pride to allow that a Kafir chief has feelings. But now we are not without hope that its new *régime* will help the South African commonwealth to set an example to other colonies in its inauguration of a more considerate, as it already has set the example of a more just and less selfish policy. The elective qualification is by the new Constitution so low,

that almost every householder, whatever his race or colour, has a vote. There has long been in the colony an active and increasing party who know the natives well, and know that the only way to manage them, either as subjects or neighbours, is by justice and consideration. The Kafirs, moreover, by their prowess and organisation, have proved their claim to be considered; and we doubt not that in the Cape parliament men like Sir Andrius Stockenstrom will reply to the assertion by Downing Street that the colony is to pay for its own wars, by telling whatever general officer Downing Street sends out as Governor how to preserve peace.

There are, however, one or two questions which we suppose the Home Government will not consider within the province of the new Colonial Authorities to decide, and which yet are so important that they must affect the whole future of the colony.

(1.) Hitherto we have hardly touched upon the position or prospects of Natal, nor will our space allow us to do more than advert to the present crisis of that settlement,—a crisis threatening a war more costly and destructive than any of the previous ones, and which would quickly spread from the frontiers of Natal to Kaffraria and the Orange River. The population of Natal is computed to contain only some 5000 whites as compared with 100,000 blacks. Of these last, chiefly Zoolahs, about 40,000 we found there as aborigines; about 35,000 had fled to our rule for refuge from the cruelty of the native tyrants Chaka and his successors; and the remainder, having been originally aborigines, but driven away by these same tyrants, who at one time had possession of Natal, have also now returned to live under our protection.\* For a time, while the white settlers were so few in number as to need labour more than land, these refugees seem to have been welcomed. Now, however, the best locations are becoming scarce; the whites are looking enviously on the lands not only of the immigrant but of the aboriginal population; each race is beginning to trespass upon the other, and these causes of irritation are not lessened by the fact that many of the whites being the remnants or relatives of the Dutch Boers, from whom we by force took the colony, they devoutly disbelieve the right of a native to hold land, and as patriotically inveigh against any British governor who may try to protect him in his holding. The Bishop of Cape Town in his journal of his visitation tour writes as follows:—‘If we are to pursue the system which we have already

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\* See ‘Evidence of Mr. Shepstone, native agent, before Natal Commission, ‘Cape Commercial Advertiser,’ Jan. 19. 1853.

‘in some degree adopted towards the native tribes, the same judgments from a just God which have already overtaken the Boers for their cruelties and injustice towards the poor heathen will assuredly come upon us. I fear we are treading in their steps.’ And after stating that it was proposed ‘to fix the whole coloured population of Natal in ten locations,’ he adds, that ‘unless all land set apart for the natives be vested in trustees for their use, they will be gradually deprived of their land, *no local Government will be able to withstand the restless and insatiable demands of the white man.*’\* The Bishop wrote this in 1850; whether all the locations he alludes to were formed we cannot discover—we think not. At any rate, some of the present locations are so densely peopled as to have forty-five souls per square mile†; and yet even these locations are so much coveted, that, not content with thus cooping up the natives, there is now a great attempt to expel them altogether.

During the winter before last there was a Commission sitting at Natal, composed of the principal settlers and some of the officials, for the purpose of inquiring into the ‘past and present state of the Kafirs in the colony, and reporting on their future Government.’ And certainly if the opinions and wishes expressed by some of the members of this Commission be any index of the prevailing feeling among the white population, especially of Dutch descent, we can better understand both the Cape history before Lord Glenelg’s despatch, and to what use the British power in Natal will be turned if the Dutch settlers have the direction of it. A Mr. Potgieter, a member of the Commission, proposes not only that the main body of the Kafirs should be driven to the extreme border of the colony, if not beyond it, but that there ‘should be a law obliging them to furnish their young men to be labourers to the colonists; inasmuch as he thinks that compulsory labour would tend to civilise them.’ Another member of the Commission, a Mr. Scheepers, goes further than his colleague, for he would ‘remove all the Kafirs, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal, beyond the Umzimkulu,’ that is, altogether out of the colony: he ‘would abolish the present locations altogether,’ and if the Kafirs caused a force to be assembled and expense incurred in order to compel them to remove, he ‘thinks a good punishment’ to them for having ‘refused originally, even though they should after all remove without coercion,’ would be to ‘take from them and apprentice

\* Bishop of Cape Town’s Journal of Visitation Tour, p. 59.

† See ‘Cape Commercial Advertiser,’ Feb. 16. 1853.

‘ for a period, say five years, all boys between ten and fifteen years of age.’

No wonder that this gentleman states that ‘ the Boers emigrated from the old colony in consequence of the oppression by Hottentots and Kafirs,’ seeing that he afterwards explains such oppression by his statement that ‘ one of the reasons which led to the emigration was that black and white were subject to the same laws.’ Again, a Mr. Pretorius says, ‘ he would make a law for the Kafirs that every man having a Kafir should be allowed to flog him when he misbehaved, of course in a moderate way.’ Mr. Peppercorne, magistrate for the Natal tribe, describes as follows to the Commission the natives thus proposed to be expelled or enslaved:— ‘ I find among them many moral qualities; I find great respect for their chiefs and elders, and therefore, I infer, to constituted authority. There is also an absence of rude or brutal behaviour, and therefore a deference to each other in manners; I have hardly ever been met by an untruth, and they punctually perform their engagements when they have previously understood them, and have not been intentionally deceived or entrapped. . . . There must be great mental obliquity in any one who can deny their general honesty, or they would not be trusted as domestic servants to an extent that is not often practised in civilised communities. To designate these people as irreclaimable savages is the libel and pretext of those who seek to rob them of their birthright as human beings.’\* This character of the natives has been confirmed to us by the experience of private settlers; but we must now conclude our extracts from the evidence of this Natal Commission with the two following statements:—1st. That a Mr. Preller calculates in his evidence that 500 Boers, supported by, *say 5000 or 6000 British troops*, would be required to clear

• Natal of the Kafirs; and, 2ndly, Mr. Shepstone, the chief superintendent of the natives, hands in a report which he made to the Government Secretary, December 9th, 1851, in which he says that the Lieut.-Governor had already ‘ commenced the removal of the natives from their locations, by selling at public auction, in allotments, a portion of land to which a chief and tribe have an original claim, extending uninterruptedly through all the vicissitudes of native warfare, over several generations, and by far the strongest in the district.’

‘ Sir George Clerk, it has been stated, is to proceed from the Orange River Territory to Natal to settle affairs there, and we

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\* See ‘ Cape Commercial Advertiser,’ in different numbers of which are extracts from the report of this Commission.

think we have said enough to show the necessity of his not leaving that settlement until he has made it impossible that either British Governors, or British troops, or British money, can be employed in abetting that robbery and oppression which, to our honour, we have prevented at the Cape. We are glad, however, to learn by a Cape newspaper\*, that he will find that an officer has been 'busily employed assigning lands in the Kafir 'locations to the Kafirs to hold in their individual right;' an arrangement, probably, in furtherance of an excellent suggestion from the Duke of Newcastle, that the natives should thus be assisted to acquire votes before a constitution be given to Natal, and one also more likely to lead to their civilisation than the old practice of assignment to them of lands in common; which, therefore, we should be glad to see imitated, both in Kaffiaria and Victoria. The fact reported in the same newspaper, that in one location 3000*l.* had already been paid by the Kafirs in hut taxes for one year, and that fully 10,000*l.* was expected from the locations generally, may well have encouraged the local Government to take this step.

(2.) Urgent and important, however, as will be the duties which Sir George Clerk will have to perform in Natal, those which he has to fulfil in arranging the relations of the colony with the Emigrant Boers, and with the Provisional Government of the 'Territory,' are no less so.

Our readers are already aware of the tendency which the Cape farmers have shown, ever since the formation of the colony, to 'trek' over the border, to the great inconvenience of the Government, which could not divest itself of the responsibility of their actions. In this manner, long before 1836, the country north of the Orange River had become thinly dotted with farmers, shifting for themselves among Griquas†, Bechuanas, &c., as they best could. In 1836, however, there was a large organised emigration; partly out of Dutch hatred to British power, partly out of di-like to the new mode of dealing with the natives, and very much out of dissatisfaction with the emancipation of the slaves, and with the mode and amount of compensation, they went off in large bodies to Natal, where, after fierce conflict with the ferocious and treacherous Zoolah tyrant, Dinguan, they established themselves as an independent community, renouncing their allegiance to the British Crown. A

\* Commercial Advertiser, Aug. 25.

† These Griquas are the descendants of Dutch fathers by Hot-tentot mothers, who, many years ago fled to the wilderness, driven thither by the prejudice against colour then rampant in the colony.

small body of troops was in consequence sent against them, and, in 1842, after a desperate conflict, lasting for many months, and in which the Boers showed the most obstinate bravery, the British flag was hoisted in Natal, some of the Boers remaining as British subjects, but many of them marching under the leading of Pretorius, a farmer of great bravery and energy, over the Drakenberg Mountains into the country beyond the Vaal, to which already some few of their compatriots had wandered. It is impossible to refuse admiration to the gallantry with which these emigrants faced danger and privation rather than submit to a yoke which they hated. Not a few were in comfortable circumstances, but, selling off their property at any sacrifice, they packed the remnant of their goods in their waggons and wandered off to seek a new home in the wilderness. But mingled with this courage there is a most fierce and ignorant fanaticism. The Bishop of Cape Town tells us that some of them regard the English Government, and others the Queen herself as Antichrist; and that some of them encouraged themselves in their journeyings by the belief that they were on the way to Jerusalem, and, indeed, deceived by the apparent nearness of Egypt in the maps of their old Bibles, thought themselves not far off the Promised Land. No wonder that, spite of their proverbial hospitality, the English bishop, on his visitation tour, was refused a night's lodging by these Dutch Calvinists. Their conduct also to the natives, judging both from their public addresses and from their acts, appears to have been prompted, and may in measure be palliated, by their evidently honest conviction that between the white and the black man there is an irreconcilable difference; and the natural result of this conviction has been constant appeals to the colonial authorities from the black and coloured races to prevent these renegade colonists from robbing them of their lands, or making them slaves. Up to 1845, however, little or no attempt was made towards their control, except the enactment, in 1836, by Parliament, that 'Every British subject committing crime between the confines of the colony and the twenty-fifth degree of south latitude, was liable to be apprehended, tried, and punished, exactly as if he had committed those crimes in the colony itself.' This act, of course, was waste paper without efforts to enforce it; and, accordingly, in 1845, Sir Peregrine Maitland placed for that purpose a British resident beyond the Orange River with a small body of troops. This was the state of things in the beginning of 1848, when Sir Harry Smith, having, as he supposed, settled Kaffraria into a peaceful British province, went from King William's Town over the Drakenberg



into Natal. Personally, he was popular among the Boers; they liked his open-hearted soldierlike manners; they believed in his mode of dealing with the natives, and not a few of them had fought under his gallant leading in the war of 1836. The district also through which he passed was that which had been longest peopled, in which there were not many of the fierce Natal men, and where, from the power of Moshesh and the organisation of the Griquas, under Adam Kok, the settlers were less unwilling to be British subjects if they could be backed by British power. Taking therefore at their word those who gathered round him, stating that they wished for a strong Government, with its accompaniments of peace, law, and order, Sir Harry Smith took possession of the district occupied by those of the emigrants whom he believed to be desirous of British rule, leaving the more hostile band of Pretorius and his followers still in their anomalous position of subjects to the Queen, though dwelling beyond her empire, and themselves disowning her authority. Hence arose, on the one hand, the Orange River Sovereignty, and, on the other, the Trans-Vaal Republic. How far Sir Harry Smith duly estimated the loyalty of the inhabitants of the former district it is hard to say; upon the whole we are inclined to think that he did not much overrate it, and that they would have remained faithful had it not been for the intrigues and actual invasion of Pretorius. As it was, a few of them joined the invaders; the Governor met them at Boem Plaats, in August, 1848; they fought with their characteristic bravery, but were defeated. A price was put on the head of Pretorius, as a rebel, and for more than three years after this battle, these Trans-Vaal outlaws continued gradually forming themselves into some semblance of an organised community, with Pretorius as their commandant-general, constantly intriguing against us with the Zoolahs, Bechuanas, &c., and keeping the Governor in fear lest they should even join the Kafirs. It was in this state of suppressed but moody hostility that Sir George Cathcart found them, and effected an entire change in their relations with the colony. The Commissioners, Major Hogge and Mr. Owen, were instructed, when on their mission to the Sovereignty in January, 1852, to listen to their proposals for peace; their outlawry was cancelled, and their independence officially acknowledged by a formal treaty.

To the second clause of this treaty we must especially draw the attention of our readers. It declares that 'Her Majesty's Assistant Commissioners hereby disclaim all alliances whatsoever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations north of the

‘Vaal River.’\* Even if the new republicans had never been charged with injustice towards their and our native neighbours, this clause, shutting ourselves out from all friendly relations with the latter, would certainly have been an extraordinary one; but to those who have perused the former Cape Despatches, with their abundant proofs and complaints of such injustice, thus to make peace with our enemies, at the price of handing over to their mercy our allies, cannot but seem most strange. If we refer, however, to a despatch from Lord Grey to Sir Harry Smith, in November, 1850, we shall find an explanation why the Boers required this clause, and also a striking instance of the contradictions in our frontier policy. In this despatch his Lordship, remarking on the lawless violence with which the Boers had stopped some traders and travellers on their way to the newly discovered Lake Ngami, sketches out a system by which he conceives that, at very small cost, the native chiefs might be united under the guidance of a British officer, so as ‘to put a final and complete check to the proceedings of the ‘Boers;’ and by ‘planting civilisation in that part of Africa, ‘to prevent their spreading over the continent, and their oppression and extermination of the native races.’ Whether it was desirable thus to try to prevent native extermination might possibly be questioned; but it is curious that Sir George Cathcart, with this despatch before him, should sign a treaty with these very Boers; giving them, in fact, a license to subject, if not exterminate, these natives. Nor does it seem that he was ignorant of the mode in which the Boers were likely to avail themselves of this license. The following month Lieutenant-Governor Pine, of Natal, writes to complain that —

‘From the reports which have reached me from authentic sources, I learn that Mr. Pretorius and his associates beyond the Vaal River, imagine that the treaty with her Majesty’s assistant commissioners, has placed the Chief Panda and his country under their exclusive control, and that henceforth this government is not to enter into any diplomatic relations with that chief, who is to be considered the ally, or rather subject, of the Trans-Vaal Boers. The Boers seem to ground this view of the matter upon the part of the treaty which leaves to them the management of the natives beyond the Vaal River, and they further assert that it was so understood when the treaty was executed.’ †

To which letter the Governor replies, that: —

‘Forasmuch as we should object to the Boers beyond the Vaal

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\* Parl. Papers, Orange Riv. Ter. 1853, p. 36.

† Ibid. p. 66.

River forming alliances with Moshesh for instance, or any other coloured natives south of that river, which might be prejudicial to the interests of her Majesty's subjects, so it appears to be just, that we should disclaim alliances with those north of the Vaal River, amongst whom the Boers can only live by *exercising a requisite supremacy for their control*; and therefore reciprocal non-interference is equitable and indispensable.\*

The following extract from a letter from Dr. Livingstone, a medical missionary who has been eight years amongst the tribes north of the Vaal, will show how the Boers are already exercising this 'requisite supremacy.'

'Frequent attempts were made by the Trans-Vaal Boers to induce the chief Sechele to prevent the English from passing him in their way north, and because he refused to comply with this policy, a commando was sent against him by Mr. Pretorius, which, on the 30th September last, attacked and destroyed his town, killed 60 of his people, and carried off upwards of 200 women and children. I can declare, most positively, that except in the matter of refusing to throw obstacles in the way of English traders, Sechele never offended the Boers by either word or deed. They wished to divert the trade into their own hands. They also plundered my house and property, which would cost in England at least 335*l*. They smashed all the bottles containing medicines, and tore all the books of my library, scattering the leaves to the winds; and besides my personal property, they carried off or destroyed a large amount of property belonging to English gentlemen and traders. Of the women and children captured, many of the former will escape, but the latter are reduced to a state of helpless slavery. They are sold and bought as slaves; and I have myself seen and conversed with such taken from other tribes, and living as slaves in the houses of the Boers. One of Sechele's children is among the number captured, and the Boer who owns him can, if necessary, be pointed out.'\*

The clause in the treaty following the one above alluded to, states, 'that it is agreed that no slavery shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the 'emigrant farmers.' Therefore, by the statement of Dr. Livingstone this treaty was broken, and if the clause meant anything, an appeal rested from the sufferers from its breach to the Colonial Government, as one of the contracting parties. Dr. Livingstone's assertion of such infraction cannot of course be considered conclusive evidence, but it has been confirmed by the

\* Parl. Papers, Orange Riv. Ter. 1853, p. 67.

† Parl. Papers Orange Riv. Ter. 1853, p. 126. Dr. Livingstone's name will be well known by all who take an interest in African discovery, as that of a scientific and most enterprising traveller, and as one of the first Englishmen who visited the Lake Ngami.

protest of two other missionaries, Messrs. Inglis and Edwards, who were for protesting expelled the Trans-Vaal territory; and also by the official report by Messrs. Frere and Surtees, the Slave-Trade Commissioners at Cape Town, who in their memorial to Lord Clarendon, say, 'Your Lordship will perceive that the capture of children does not appear to have been denied by the Boers, but was rather justified as productive of benefit to them, and that they were stated to have been inboeked or apprenticed, the females till twenty, the males till twenty-five years of age.\*' Nevertheless, upon the chief Sechele appealing to Sir G. Cathcart for redress, he does not even ask the new republic for explanation, but simply informs the chief of the improbability of the British Government 'sanctioning interference in any quarrels between the Trans-Vaal emigrants and the aboriginal nations north of the Vaal River.†' At least, however, it might be expected that the British Government should not sanction quarrels, and yet we find Mr. Green, the British Resident in the Sovereignty, replying to a letter from Pretorius informing them of the attack on Sechele, by a letter which ends with 'reciprocating good wishes in desiring every success to the Trans-Vaal country,' and says that, as he fears, the attack on the tribe of the chief Sechele may so enrage the natives in the interior against the whites as to endanger the lives of the colonial traders at present at the lake and its vicinity, he begs therefore he (Pretorius) will have the goodness to issue instructions to any commando he may have in that neighbourhood to afford them protection as far as practicable.‡

With these Despatches before us, we cannot but fear that there is some ground for Pretorius's statement, as reported by Mr. Inglis, that when he met with the Commissioners 'they said it was all right to take the Kafir children and make them useful,§' and for Dr. Livingstone's statement in his memorial that the Trans-Vaal Boers universally declare, that when they asked what was to be done with missionaries, Mr. Commissioner Owen replied, "You may do as you like with them."|| Nor is this instance which we have given a solitary one; we find but too much proof, both in the Despatches and in the reports from missionaries and travellers, that there is not a tribe in the neighbourhood of these fanatical republicans which does not fear, and with reason, for their own lives, and for the liberty of

\* Parl. Papers, Orange Riv. Ter. 1853, p. 120.

† Ibid. p. 112.

§ Ibid. p. 122.

‡ Ibid. p. 75.

|| Ibid. p. 126.

their wives and their children; and we cannot wonder that the missionaries have protested against the withdrawal of British rule from the Sovereignty, in the belief that its probable result and that already contemplated by Sir George Cathcart, viz., the annexation to the Trans-Vaal State of the Orange River territory\*, would be the signal of their own expulsion and of an exterminating war in place of present efforts to civilise and Christianise.†

(3.) Whatever the grounds of this protest, it has turned out of no avail. The abdication of the 'Sovereignty' is now a *fait accompli*, and unless or until the Colony and the 'Territory' express through their respective representatives a desire to reunite, it is useless to discuss the disadvantages of disunion. The sole question now is, how can our Government withdraw its rule in such a manner as to give its old subjects, whether Whites or Blacks, Boers or Bassutos, every chance of amalgamation into a peaceable community? We confess that a perusal of the Blue Book just presented to Parliament, induces us to fear that the arrangements now making with the new State are little calculated to produce such a result.

Sir George Clerk in his Despatches describes two parties in the Territory, a minority consisting chiefly, as he says, of English land speculators, desirous to remain British subjects, and a majority, mostly Dutch, anxious for annexation to the Trans-Vaal Republic. For one condition, however, both parties stipulate, viz. that the British Government, in withdrawing its rule, shall cancel all treaties with the natives.‡ This condition is doubtless borrowed from that clause in the Trans-Vaal treaty to

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\* The Boers at their late Volks-raad have shown their intentions and aspirations by changing the name of their State from 'Trans-Vaal Republic' to 'South African Republic,' at the same time showing what manner of republic it will be by passing a law 'excluding from their community persons of all religious denominations, except the Dutch Reformed Church.' See 'Cape Commercial Advertiser,' January 21. 1854.

† What this Territory or any other South African District may expect to lose by substituting for the influence of the missionaries the supremacy of the Boers, can be estimated by the following statement by Colonel Maclean, successor to Colonel Mackinnon as chief commissioner of British Kaffraria, who annexes to his summary of Mission Reports for Kaffraria for 1853 the remark, 'that the whole of the Mission population (numbering 2523), with the solitary exception of one Kafir, remained faithful throughout the war, and in many instances realised considerable property by their industry, and their conduct has given universal satisfaction.'

‡ Parl. Pap. Orange Riv. Ter. 1854, pp. 45. and 62.

which we have objected; and considering the consequences which have already followed from this clause, we cannot but express our surprise that Sir George Clerk appears to accede to its adoption; still more do we wonder and regret that, spite of the information which he must have received from the Despatches above quoted, the Duke of Newcastle should instruct Sir G. Clerk that 'the articles agreed on by the Trans-Vaal Boers 'appear to furnish a ready precedent for a Convention,' upon which can be arranged 'the basis of separation.'\* By another of these articles, which also appears considered worthy of imitation, it was agreed that while the Colonists should be allowed to supply ammunition to the Emigrants, all trade in firearms, &c. should be prohibited with the natives.†

Now, what will be the probable, nay almost the certain result of these arrangements? Between the Boers, reinforced as they will be by the Emigrants, who are as reckless as they are brave, and the natives suspicious of fresh aggression in the remembrance of past, and conscious of the temptation presented by their fertile pastures‡, conflicts are sure to arise. Sir George Cathcart foretells 'border warfare between the Basutos and the Zoolahs on 'the one part, and the Boers on the other, if the latter will covet 'their neighbours' goods;' and therefore he advises the Colonial Government to stand by and look on, stating that 'both parties 'are much less likely to quarrel when left to themselves.'§ We doubt whether under any circumstances this non-intervention policy would be practicable, but certainly neither Governor nor Commissioner appear to be endeavouring to practise it. We do not leave the disputants to themselves, when, in order to make treaties with the one side, we cancel treaties with the other; when we provide how the one party shall get arms, and the other shall be hindered from getting them; when, for example, Sir G. Cathcart refuses to continue a treaty with Waterboer's people—'Hottentot refugees,'—who, he says, 'have ever 'been faithful to their alliance,' because 'the stipulations in it in 'respect to the supply of arms, gunpowder, &c., would be in- 'compatible with the convention entered into with the Trans-

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\* Parl. Pap. Orange Riv. Ter. 1854, p. 88.

† Ibid. 1853, p. 37.

‡ The district yet occupied by Moshesh and his Basutos, much diminished as it has been by the encroachments of the settlers, is acknowledged by both Sir G. Clerk and Sir G. Cathcart to be still the most fertile, and, therefore, the most desirable in the 'Territory.' Parl. Pap. Orange Riv. Ter. 1854, pp. 27 and 38.

§ Ibid. p. 7.

‘Vaal Emigrants.’\* Whatever the prohibitions of the Colonial Government, the natives will get arms as they have done before from the Colonists or other Europeans; the ‘border warfare’ Sir G. Cathcart foresees, will break out, but it will not be restricted to the borders of the ‘Territory;’ not only will Panda and his Zoolahs join the Basutos and the Bastards, but within Natal the 100,000 blacks will take one side, the 5000 whites the other. Possibly the Colonial Government may for a time postpone its participation in the war, by allowing the annexation of Natal to the South African Republic; but, first or last, the Colony will certainly be involved. Even if the Dutch Colonists can be withheld from helping their kinsmen, this war of races cannot rage around the Kafirs, subject or independent, without their gladly seizing the opportunity to rise. Kreili and Sandilli, to say nothing of the Hottentots, will take care to make our neutrality impossible; and if we are cowardly or selfish enough to buy friendship with former foes or subjects, by thus handing over old allies to their mercy; if we thus shrink from our duty, which is to keep the peace in South Africa, our punishment will be the alternative of waging a bloody and expensive war in order to restore peace, or of flying from South Africa altogether. Surely, then, it is no less our interest than our duty to make it known to all our South African neighbours, be they former subjects, or rebels, or allies, that whatever their race, or colour, or history, the Colonial Government will give them equally its aid and its friendship, so long as they refrain from aggression upon one another, and no longer.

We have now attempted to glance at the chief features of this complicated subject, and those of our readers who have had patience to accompany us thus far will not, we think, dispute our conclusion, that neither Colonial Secretary, nor Colonial Authorities, nor British Parliament, can hope to prevent Kafir wars in future, except, first, by looking the facts of our relations with the natives fairly in the face; and secondly, by determining to deal with these facts in a spirit as fair to the natives as to ourselves. At this distance from the scene of action, and with the ignorance which such distance must involve, it is not for Parliament to decide, much less for us to suggest, solutions of questions of detail. But there are in the records of the past two or three lessons so clearly written, that

\*Parl. Pap. Orange Riv. Ter. 1854, p. 2. By late accounts we learn that our long existing treaty with the Griquas, another tribe of mixed breed, who have often done us good service in our wars, is also annulled.

it would be hard for any impartial observer not to apply them to the present and the future. From the earlier of these records we learn, that the ill-gotten gains of individual colonists have cost the Empire ten times their value to preserve; and that the bitter feelings which acts of former injustice have sown, will yet take years of just government to root out. Let then the penalty which the Cape has had to pay for its former permission of injustice, be a warning to Natal. In like manner it has been proved, that whatever we have taken from these Kafirs in land, we have been obliged to give back in soldiers, and that of the two the soldiers cost most. A generous provision for the conquered Gaikas, an allotment of land large and fertile enough for them to live on, will therefore turn out the best economy. Again, if we have succeeded in making our readers share our conviction, that of late years the treatment of the Kafir Chiefs has been such as at least to give them a pretext for war, if not to provoke them to it, surely it needs no argument to show that neither the interests of the Empire, nor the dignity of the Crown, can be consulted by a policy which provides such pretexts; and that by no bribe of a Constitution will the Home Government, so long as it continues this policy, be able to induce the Colony to bear the sole burden of its consequences. Lastly, if the Government persists in the policy of patching up a peace with successful rebels, or purchasing the forgiveness of forsaken subjects, by conniving at their attacks upon their unoffending neighbours, it will do well to remember how inflammable have been proved to be the passions of these Africans, whether Christian Dutch, or Heathen Kafir; and how all history has proved yet more plainly, that no nation can get rid of responsibilities, or shirk duties, by simply refusing to fulfil them, or escape sharing in the penalty of crimes the commission of which it sanctions.

ART. V.—*An Essay on the Relations between Labour and Capital.* By C. MORRISON. London: 1854.

WE incline to think that Mr. Morrison has done considerable injustice to his work both by the title he has bestowed upon it, and by the time which he has chosen for bringing it out. It is really a practical and most interesting treatise on the great social and political problem of the age; and he has given it a name calculated to repel all readers save those who have been inured to the driest, dustiest, most trodden pathways of Economic Science. He has also sent it forth into the world at a mo-



ment when three years of unexampled prosperity have somewhat dulled the edge of our sensibility to questions connected with the condition of the labouring class, and when the tumult of war, and the interest of a struggle for civilisation and for justice will scarcely allow any other voice to be heard or any other interest to be felt. A few years ago, when distress among our working population was, if not general, at least chronic and severe, when the public mind was at once wounded by startling disclosures of misery, and distracted by still more startling projects for relieving it, the book before us would have excited immediate and extensive attention. A few years hence, probably, when the stirring excitement and the noble enterprise of war shall have again given place to the more beneficent pursuits of peace, and when, possibly, a check to our prosperous career, arising out of war, shall have again awakened our vigilance to those symptoms of social disorder which we are apt to neglect in ordinary times, the book may take the rank it appears to us to deserve. At present, we fear, it is likely to be read chiefly by those to whom the subject of which it treats is a favourite *specialité*: our good word, however, must not be wanting to give it currency, and to speed it on its way.

In truth, the great problem it proposes to discuss and elucidate is one of more permanent and mighty interest than any other, however much transient convulsions may throw it into the back ground, or transient intervals of repose and comfort may lull us into a belief that it is solved or shelved. It is not long since public attention was thoroughly aroused to all that was deplorable, indefensible, and dangerous in the condition of the mass of the population: we were daily made aware that, as a fact, the supply of labour was usually in excess of the demand, and that much local and occasional suffering was the consequence; but it was not till the Irish famine, and the similar visitation in the Western Highlands, the severe distresses in the manufacturing districts of England in 1847 and 1848, and the painful and undeniable, even though over-coloured, revelations of the state of many thousand artisans of various trades in the Metropolis, had alarmed us into inquiry and reflection, that the public mind began to comprehend either the magnitude and imminence of the evil it had to investigate, or the difficulty and complication of the problem it was called upon to solve. Then came a perfect inundation of suggestions, treatises, and projects: empiric philanthropists insisted on their anodynes and salves; energetic workmen started co-operative schemes; benevolent Socialists, Pagan and Christian, propounded their theories, and hard-headed economists demonstrated their futility; — but little was done towards a systematic study or exposition of the question. Men of

political science treated it only incidentally; men of active benevolence treated it unscientifically, and therefore unsoundly; and the chapters devoted to its discussion by Mr. McCulloch, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Greg, rather opened the subject than exhausted it; and though full of correct principles and useful suggestions, left a wide field for any one who felt disposed and competent to undertake the matter as a whole. This vacant niche in our literature Mr. Morrison has modestly and ably attempted to fill. Trained to the severe reasonings of Economic Science, firm in his allegiance to its great principles, and full of faith in their beneficent power and their universal applicability, he sets out from this starting point to discuss the condition of the labouring classes, and their relation to their employers; the mode in which this condition can be permanently elevated, and this relation rendered sound and satisfactory; and, as a cognate problem, the method, 'by which the growing political importance and probably eventual, though, it is to be hoped, still distant political ascendancy of the working majority of the nation, may be rendered consistent with the stability of our national institutions, the security of property, and the predominance of high and refined intellects in the government.'

Both problems we believe to be capable of solution. We believe also that in all our recent history no times have occurred so favourable as the present for a practical advance towards their solution. The late vehement contest in the North of England between labour and capital for the command over their joint exertions, and for a re-distribution of their joint earnings, has clearly shown that the operatives, at least — improved and intelligent as they are — do not yet understand the conditions of the question between them and their employers, and that, while much of their old violence has disappeared, many of their old fallacies still keep their ground. It is obvious that we can have no security against a recurrence of such profitless and wasteful strifes till the causes which regulate the well-being of the several classes of the community shall be thoroughly comprehended by each, and till all shall bow, as to the unchangeable ordinances of nature, before those eternal laws of economic science against which all rebellion is childish, futile, and suicidal. It is plain, too — and the circumstances of the Preston strike must have forced it upon the observation of the most careless — that such internecine struggles in a free country like ours become every year more dangerous in proportion as the working classes become more wealthy, more instructed, better organised, and in consequence more powerful; and that if the time shall ever come when, as the electoral franchise becomes more widely diffused among those classes, the same command of funds,

the same stubborn resolution, the same skilful organisation, the same mighty agencies for persuasion and intimidation, which we have seen turned against their masters and directed to the extortion of pecuniary advantages, should be turned against the authorities of the State, and directed to the extortion of political demands, the very foundations of our now firm and well-ordered social fabric may be shaken. We have seen a body of many thousand workmen carrying on a contest with the industrious capitalists who had employed them — maintaining the struggle for a period of thirty-six weeks, and with a spirit of unyielding obstinacy, which for a while made it very doubtful whether they would not eventually succeed, though supported only by their own small savings and the contributions of their fellow-workmen in other districts — levying on other sections of the labouring community a revenue, partly voluntary partly forced, amounting to 3000*l.* a week — preserving decent order and scrupulous peace (a considerable degree of subterranean compulsion excepted) among crowds whose privations must have often been most severe — enduring these privations with admirable constancy and patience — persisting in their course, in defiance of the reprobation of almost the entire press of the country, and the still heavier opposition of a price of provisions high almost beyond example — and only not succeeding because success was economically impossible, because their time was singularly ill-chosen, because their demands were utterly irrational, because their case was hopelessly bad; — and because they had made it to their employers a struggle not merely for wages, but for mastery, for safety, for dignity, for future peace.\*

\* We have received a statement of the pecuniary mischief of the Preston strike, which we annex:—

|   |         |
|---|---------|
|   | £       |
| Estimated trading loss to the employers -                     | 50,000  |
| Loss by depreciation, interest, &c. -                         | 67,000  |
| Unavoidable expenses in wages, fuel, &c., during the strike - | 28,000  |
| Loss in working machinery with too few or inferior hands -    | 20,000  |
|   | 165,000 |
| Loss of wages to operatives -                                 | 250,000 |
| Loss to contributors to the Strike Fund -                     | 97,000  |
| Estimated loss of profits to shopkeepers and publicans -      | 11,250  |
| Estimated loss to ancillary employments -                     | 10,000  |
|   | 533,250 |

If trade had been brisker, if provisions had been lower, if their demands had been less obviously unfair, if their projects of dictation had been less insolently and incautiously asserted, it is by no means impossible that they might have succeeded in overpowering the Preston manufacturers first, and then in subduing all others in turn, as was their avowed design. And if the majority of them had possessed the suffrage, if their union had extended over the whole country, if their contributions had been levied on all branches of industry instead of on a few, and during a period of universal employment instead of one of partial stoppage, and if this organisation and these funds had been devoted to the attainment of some political privilege, or the triumph of some pet crotchet or favourite dogma — all which possibilities are on the carpet — it is hard to say *how* they could have been baffled, or whether, indeed, they could have been withstood at all.

Moreover, if the struggle between labourers and capitalists for the lion's share of profit and of power should, ever in this country, assume a chronic, general, and systematic form, it will, as Mr. Morrison has well pointed out, be conducted on a scale and be attended with consequences of which no other country can furnish an example. Our middle class, it is true, is numerous, our upper class is strong, and the union between them in all important crises is cordial and instinctive; socialist theories find small currency among us; the feelings of the masses are, on the whole and usually, generous and sound; and the idea of employing the agency of the State to better the condition of particular classes by a redistribution of wealth or a regulation of intercommunal relations, has not yet become as familiar to us as to our neighbours.

‘But though the prospect of political danger from this cause is happily distant in this kingdom, it should not be overlooked that there are circumstances in our condition which would make the difficulty even more unmanageable here than in France, if it should hereafter overtake us. In France the number of proprietors of land is so immense, that if we add to them the members of their families, the classes possessed of personal property, those living by intellectual labour, and the immense army of persons in the employment of the state, the class of manual labourers living on wages received from capitalists is seen to be only a minority, and not even a large minority of the nation. And as the collection of large masses of this last class into great centres of manufacturing industry is carried to a much smaller extent in France than in England, and it is only when so collected that they have hitherto been able to combine for great political objects, the class of working men, who instilled and supported the revolutionary government in 1848, was only a small part of this

minority. The 11,000,000 of landed proprietors [5,500,000 only of proprietors] were an insuperable bar to any legislation against property; and the immense preponderance of the rural population over the few hundred thousands of revolutionary *prolétaires* of Paris and Lyons limited the ascendancy of the latter to the time required by the former to comprehend their position, to find leaders and a definite course of action, and to apply to this the right of universal suffrage which the revolution had given them.

‘But in England and Scotland the classes living by wages form the majority of the population. Not only is the division of the nation into a minority of possessors of property, and a majority of working men having little or no property, more complete than in France or most continental countries, but both the wealth and the labour are collected into masses in a greater degree than elsewhere. Hence, if the improvement of the relations between capital and labour by the authority or with the favour of Government, should ever become a practical political question, it will assume dimensions unknown in most other countries. It will be a direct appeal to the interests and passions of the majority of the whole nation against a minority; and there will be no third party capable of holding the balance between them.’ (Pp. 7, 8.)

It is obvious that the most effectual, if not the only guarantee against the prospective danger here pointed out, as against the minor evils which constantly arise from the mitigated form which alone the strife between the two great elements of production has as yet assumed in this country, must be sought by instilling into the operative classes not only a theoretical conviction, but a living faith, that the laws which govern the distribution both of power and wealth between them and their employers are as fixed and unbending as the laws of nature — like them, plain, and discoverable — like them, proving their existence and supremacy by rewards to those who study and obey, and penalties to those who violate or neglect them — like them, inexorably deaf to passion or complaint — like them, mightier than parliamentary authority — like them, more enduring than human theories. Much has already been done towards inaugurating this conviction; many false doctrines have been shaken from their hold; many dark places, wherein malignity nestled with delusion, have been irradiated by the light of reason, and, on the whole, we are not sure that sound principles and clear comprehension of political economy are not making more way among the intelligent operatives of our great centres of industry — strong as are the barriers of misconceived personal interest which they have to surmount or batter down — than among the speculative philanthropists of the higher and more cultivated classes. Still, the full bearing of these prin-

ciples is not perceived, nor their application to the questions and conflicts of the day unreservedly admitted, nor the strict and cogent sequence with which unwelcome deductions flow from them recognised and established. Unhappily also, clear exposition and irrefragable proof of these points are not the only things wanted; if they were, Mr. Morrison's book would do the business and set the matter finally at rest. The real, and at present nearly insurmountable, difficulty is to bring such expositions home to the people who most need them; to make them read what we write or listen to what we say; to persuade them to turn from the turbid draught and the worthless garbage proffered them by their own scribblers and declaimers, to the wholesome food and crystal stream which are pressed upon them by their real friends; but, alas! too uniformly, pressed in vain.

There is and has long been a deep-rooted and wide-spread dissatisfaction among the operative classes with the actual state of the relation between themselves and their employers — sometimes with the relation itself — more commonly with one feature of that relation; viz. the portion assigned to themselves in the division of the profits of production. They believe that, in the distribution of that wealth which their labour and the capital of their masters combine to create, they receive an unfair and insufficient share. The opinion is natural, bears a *prima facie* appearance of probability, and has been sedulously inculcated at various times by three distinct sets of misleaders — their own chiefs, who either share in their delusions, or seek to make pecuniary profit by fostering them; public men, who do not scruple to make 'political capital' out of popular discontents; and benevolent men, with hearts full of tender sympathy for social suffering, and heads full of wild schemes for its extinction. The conviction on the part of the working class is, therefore, not at all to be wondered at; nor in itself is it to be regretted, since it is the first step towards the amelioration of evils and defects which unquestionably call for and will admit of amelioration: it is only when erroneous theories of the cause of these evils begin to be formed, and unwise plans for their removal to be mooted, that delusion and danger creep in. Those, therefore, are at once the most servicable abettors of social order, and the best friends of the labouring poor, who, agreeing that the relation between them and their employers admits of improvement, and that their share of profit admits of augmentation, point out to them at the same time the futile and suicidal character of all their own pet schemes for effecting those desired objects, and by

whipping them off all false scents, drive them at last upon the true one:

The English manufacturing operative—shrewd and observant, but with an intelligence naturally quick rather than trained or cultured by regular instruction, by no means accustomed to consider that ‘whatever is, is right,’ nor to regard his master as a being of higher nature or of claims superior to his own—sees the few broad facts that lie upon the surface and are forced upon his attention every hour;—he sees that *he* lives in an unsatisfactory, cramped, often ill-drained and ill-ventilated cottage or cellar; that he fares hardly, has few holidays, rare luxuries, and scarcely any recreation; that his children run about in the dirt, or that he is pinched to pay for their schooling; that when times of depressed trade come, he is either put upon short time, or thrown out of work altogether, and reduced with his family to short commons, or to absolute distress, or to parish aid;—and all this, though he works twelve hours a day, and is willing to do so, and has done so ever since he can remember. He sees again, on the other hand, that his employer—who perhaps only works six hours a day and whose work to all appearance consists in watching others work, or in writing letters, or in drawing plans, or in buying cotton and selling goods, (and that often by deputy,)—lives in a grand house beautifully furnished and advantageously situated; fares sumptuously every day; takes pleasure trips whenever he pleases; sometimes goes to the sea-side, sometimes to the continent; has ample leisure for the cultivation of his mind; and when bad times come bears them without any apparent privation, lives as before, or at most lays down a carriage, or postpones a journey. He knows too that his master and himself, whose fates seem so different, are yet joint labourers in the production of an article out of the net proceeds of the sale of which both are maintained,—he in penury, his master in opulence; and he naturally jumps to the conclusion that there must be something *awry* (and here he is quite right), and something *unfair* (and here he is quite wrong) in a mode and principle of distribution which assigns such unequal portions in the thing produced to the two collaborating producers, in the relation which admits such inequality, and in the social and political arrangements which sanction and enforce that relation. Sometimes he wishes to abolish the relation of capitalist and workman altogether, and becomes a theorist, a communist, a ‘co-operator:’ more commonly he desires only a different distribution of profits, some regulation which shall secure to him that larger share which he imagines he deserves, and then he becomes a trades’ unionist, or a clamourer for go-

vernment interference either with the hours of labour or with the remuneration of labour. And it is at this point that his most serious mistake, and the peril to social peace arising from it, commence: — that change in the position of matters which he feels, and we admit, to be desirable, he would seek by artificial instead of by natural means, and at the expense of others instead of by his own industry and virtue—by meddling with effects in place of rectifying causes—by quarrelling with, carving and paring the matured but bitter and unsound fruit, instead of remounting to the source of what is wrong, and setting it right there.

Mr. Morrison deals admirably with this part of the subject. He expounds with a clearness and conciseness which we have never seen surpassed the great indisputable truth which lies at the bottom of this whole question — viz. that the rate of wages must always—in spite of interfering Governments or recalcitrant people — depend on the proportion between the fund available for the employment and remuneration of labour and the number of claimants on that fund; that in one form or another it must be divided among *all*, since — in a country like ours, where the law does not allow men to starve — if, in order to afford higher payment to the employed, some are left without employment, these last must be supported in idleness and supported out of the same fund. From this elemental truth follows the practical and irrefragable conclusion — the conclusion with which operatives, and all who would mend their condition have to deal, within whose adamantine limits all their efforts must be confined, in submission and conformity to which all their schemes must be formed — viz. that only two ways exist of augmenting the labourers' remuneration, and that no genius can discover and no power can invent any third way: — either the fund which provides that remuneration must be increased, or the number of claimants upon it must be reduced; — or, to state the case more accurately if less broadly, that the fund must be increased faster than the claimants, by stimulating the increase of the one, or repressing and controlling the increase of the other.

Now, the annual increase of this fund obviously is to be measured by, and indeed consists of, the annual savings or accumulated wealth of the country — the yearly surplus of production over expenditure. The chapter in which this point is treated is one of the most valuable in Mr. Morrison's book, and compels attention to a branch of the subject which has not yet obtained adequate consideration. Since, in a land like ours, of unbounded energy and numberless outlets, capital never lies long or absolutely idle, whatever increases the annual savings



of the nation increases the fund by which labour is employed and remunerated, and consequently the amount received by every individual labourer; and it admits of indisputable proof that the existing relation between labour and capital, if not the precise distribution of created wealth actually existing, has a greater tendency to increase these annual savings than any other arrangement which could be devised or conceived—human nature and English nature remaining what they are; and that all the various schemes propounded by the working classes and their friends for bettering their condition would tend to diminish these annual savings, and consequently to reduce the remuneration of labour by lessening the fund available for its employment.

The net annual addition to the capital of the community by savings out of income is estimated by the best authorities at not less than 50,000,000*l.*,—an enormous sum, which goes to augment the earnings of working men as an aggregate class, which would greatly augment their individual earnings were their numbers not permitted to increase so rapidly, and which does actually augment these earnings in no inconsiderable degree. Now by whom is this saving effected? out of the incomes of what class? Clearly out of the incomes of the middle class—the industrious tradesman, the enterprising merchant, the manufacturing capitalist—the great employers of labour, in short, against whom especially the clamour and envy of the operative are directed. The upper classes, the nobles, the landed gentry, we know are rarely economisers or accumulators; their system, as a rule, is to spend their whole income; few among them leave their families richer than they found them—many poorer; often their land passes by sale into the hands of thriving individuals of the middle class. The labouring class, those who work for wages, are, with honourable exceptions, by no means given to saving—that is, to accumulation. They subscribe indeed largely to friendly societies, sick clubs, and the like; but these subscriptions are only meritorious insurances against a rainy day, a provision against slack work, a mode of equalising the earnings of a life. It is rare indeed for workmen to leave property behind them; it is considered enough if they support their families decently while they live, without providing for them after death. As a rule, they, like their superiors at the other extremity of the social scale, spend their entire income within the year. The Savings' Banks offer no contradiction to this statement; for in the first place, the increase of deposits does not exceed a million a year, and in the second place not above half this sum belongs to individuals properly describable as be-

longing to the working classes. That these classes do not save, and would not save were a different division of profits between them and their employers greatly to increase their earnings, is painfully obvious from many facts most ably brought to bear by Mr. Morrison in his fourth chapter. Periods of prosperity, of brisk trade, general employment, and high wages, are invariably marked by a signal increase in the consumption of imported and excisable articles — an increase which takes place almost wholly among the labouring poor. This feature of good times is so constant and certain that it is counted upon by the Chancellor of the Exchequer with at least as much confidence as the proceeds of the income-tax; and it is one which never deceives him. The two years ending with the summer of 1853, were marked by unexampled earnings on the part of the operative classes — work was never so universal or so well paid; and accordingly we do not find that the accumulated property of those classes has increased, but we do find that the consumption of bread, beer, spirits, tobacco, tea, coffee, and sugar, has been beyond all precedent. Again, wages were so high that colliers found they could earn as much in four days' as formerly in six; the result was, not that they laid by two days' earnings, but that they took two days' holiday; and the supply of coal accordingly fell off, though the demand for it increased.

'The very limited possession of reserved funds among the manufacturing operatives, which the recent strikes have brought to light, are unfavourable to the idea that the habit of saving has been carried to any great extent. The chance of success of these strikes depended upon the ability of the operatives to maintain themselves without wages for a considerable time. If they possessed this power, the injury to their employers from a prolonged inaction would probably compel them for a time to compliance with the demands of the men, whatever might be the ultimate effect on the condition of the latter, and on the prosperity of the trade, of such an interference with the natural laws by which wages are regulated. But the operatives appear to have been dependent from the first weeks of the strike upon subscriptions for their support from the operatives of their own and other trades.

'Another indication that the practice of saving is carried to a very limited extent among the working classes, may be found in the fact, that the plan of co-operative associations for carrying on manufactures and trades, in which the working men may be their own masters and retain for themselves all the profits of business, has not been resorted to on a great scale. There may be great reason for doubting whether the operatives would benefit themselves by thus dispensing with the capitalist-employer — whether his profit is more than an equivalent for the immunity from risk of loss and the use of his commercial skill, which they obtain from their connection

with him. But it is certain that very great numbers of the working classes, especially those who join in strikes and sympathise with declamations against the employers, do not feel any doubt upon the subject. Independently of the expectation of increased income, the substitution of the democratic for the autocratic principle of management, the idea of being entirely their own masters, must be very attractive to them. The principle of co-operation has now been recommended and practised in particular cases for so long a time, that the leaders of this portion of the working classes, and all the active-minded individuals among them, must be familiar with the principle and its application. Yet, although there are many co-operative establishments in this country, they have not multiplied to an extent corresponding in any degree to the attractiveness of the principle to men who suppose that the employer retains for himself an exorbitant share in the proceeds of their labour. The explanation must be, that the practice of saving is not sufficiently common among them to furnish the funds required even for a first trial of co-operation.' (P. 42.)

Another confirmation of the same fact—the preponderance among the working classes of the disposition to spend over the disposition to accumulate—is to be found in the vast annual consumption by those classes of needless and noxious luxuries. It was shown by the late G. R. Porter, of the Board of Trade (a most competent authority), that the amount they spend in spirits, malt liquors, and tobacco, is upwards of 50,000,000*l.* a year. *That is to say, they waste annually as large a sum as their employers annually save.*

'Facts like these' (as Mr. Morrison well observes) 'do not merely prove that, in the case of a large proportion of the working classes of Great Britain, a reduction for their benefit of the present rates of profit of their employers would be the diversion of funds from a class who save a very considerable portion of them to men who would not save at all. They also show that the increase of the income of the working men would be, as regarded a very large number of them, a positive evil, unless preceded by improvement in their tastes and habits; for when the disposition to spend all that can be spared from a man's earnings in drink exists, the larger the surplus available for this object, the greater will be the mischief. This is no argument against the desire that working men should *be put in a position to increase their incomes* to the utmost possible extent, provided the increase among them of habits of self-restraint, industry, and mental cultivation, is an essential part of the process by which this result is to be produced. But it tends to show that the indiscriminate augmentation of their incomes, *brought about by any process of abstraction from the profits of their employers*, and not by their own improved self-management, would be far from an unmixed good, even in its direct and immediate effects.'

Fifty millions a year saved out of their earnings by indus-

trious capitalists to increase the fund for the employment of labour; and fifty millions a year spent out of their earnings by the working classes in smoking and drinking! These are two related facts which merit a few moments' pause to consider their significance and bearing. If the operatives loved like their employers, the annual addition to the fund out of which labour is remunerated would be at once doubled: if the employers spent like their operatives, there would be no addition to that fund at all. This *rapprochement* should flash upon the working class, as with a blaze of sunlight, both the reason why the position of their masters seems so much more luxurious and enviable than their own, and the mode by which they may obtain that amendment of their condition for which they speculate and scheme and sacrifice so much. Their employers grow rich while they keep poor, live plentifully while they live scantily, float easily through the hard times which press so heavily on them, not because the share of profit enjoyed by the former is unreasonably great, or indeed at all larger than their own, but because a portion of it is saved instead of all of it being spent—because the former lay by for future use what the latter spend in present gratification. If any operative doubt this explanation, let him remember that all capital is only accumulated profit—*saved earnings*, that is—either by the actual possessor or his predecessors; that many capitalist-employers were in the present or the last generation frugal and hoarding workmen, and that he might himself become a capitalist if he would. Let him consider what would be the position of his master in bad times or during strikes, if he, like his workmen, had always spent his entire income; and what would be his own position in such conjunctures, if he, like his employer, had always on an average laid by one-third of his earnings. The comfort, the independence, the success, the victory of the two parties would, it is evident, be in that case reversed. The operative might soon become a capitalist if he would emulate the economy of his master; the capitalist would soon be reduced to the condition of an operative, if he were to imitate the spendthrift habits of his men. Is it not then obvious enough that any artificial interference with the present division of profits, whether by the regulation of authority, or the dictation of trades' unions and strikes, which should shake the accumulating spirit of the manufacturer by menacing the amount or security of its reward, or should give a larger portion of those profits to him who would spend it instead of saving it, would ultimately be—the question of justice or injustice, possibility or impossibility apart—a positive loss of

wages to the working class, by trenching on the fund out of which those wages must be paid?

The various schemes current among the working classes for augmenting their receipts out of the fund for the employment of labour without either increasing that fund or reducing the number of claimants upon it, may all be ranged under two heads:— regulation of wages by some external authority or means other than the simple operation of bargain;—and co-operative associations whereby workmen combine and monopolise in their own hands the profits both of capital and labour. The notion of regulating wages by Act of Parliament, once a favourite one, is now abandoned even by the most ignorant of the operatives, and may be considered as put out of Court. The plan of regulating wages and settling disputes respecting them by a council of 'Prud'hommes' or Arbitrators still lingers, but almost exclusively among theorists who look at facts from their closet, and can scarcely be seriously entertained by any one who has given a few moments' consideration to the details of such a plan when brought into actual operation. Mr. Morrison states the project very clearly, and disposes of it very ably; and a few words on the subject, condensed from his ninth chapter, will not here be out of place.

Such a scheme for regulating the division of profits between the operative and the capitalist, demands as its pre-requisite two things—neither easily discovered—a competent regulating authority, and an intelligible and admitted regulating principle. If the arbitrating authority in order to secure impartiality, were composed of individuals wholly unconnected with the locality and unacquainted with the parties, their ignorance and incapacity would probably be as great as their impartiality, and neither side would feel confidence in their decision. If on the contrary, the arbitrating council were a body composed of men and masters in given proportions, in the first place disputes would be certain to arise as to those proportions; and in the second place, supposing these harmoniously settled, we should only have given another form to that direct discussion of their respective interests between masters and men which is at present attended with so much difficulty.

But the difficulty of selecting the regulating authority is as nothing compared to the impossibility of discovering rules by which its decisions are to be governed. All proposals for regulation must proceed upon the recognition of the principle *either* that the market rate of wages, as fixed by the action of supply and demand, is the only true standard; *or* that there is some

‘natural rate,’ some fixed and fitting proportion in which profits should be divided between capital and labour, existing and discoverable; or that the wants of the workmen are to be the measure of his remuneration. In the *first* case, every day’s experience of commercial transactions shows that the market value of anything is soon found between buyer and seller, without the intervention of arbitrators, and more truly and readily than any arbitrators could determine it. If this is not at present invariably the case with respect to wages, the chief cause is to be found not in the difficulty of applying the rule *but in the imperfect recognition of it*. The market rate of wages depends, as we have seen, on the ratio between the labour-fund and the number of claimants upon it. The subdivision of this fund among different classes of labourers depends on proportions as definite, though more complicated. These definite proportions between different quantities necessarily lead to definite numerical results. To arrive at these by calculation would indeed transcend the power of human intelligence and knowledge, and ‘baffle the sagacity of any arbitrators. But the competition of the market, if left to itself, brings out results in accordance with them without any calculation whatever.

To the *second* case — which is that pointed to in the phrases, ‘a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work,’ a ‘fair and reasonable division between employers and employed,’ and which assumes that there is some natural rate of wages independent of and different from the actual market rate — it is sufficient to reply that no one has ever pretended to point out what that ‘natural rate’ is, nor by what calculation it can be discovered, nor on what principle it is to be sought. In truth, every thoughtful man sees at once that no such rate does or can exist.

The *third* principle of division — that wages ought to be regulated by men’s wants — is seriously held by communists alone. Indeed, the mere statement of the formula is its own sufficient condemnation. Men’s wants are not a fixed quantity, but vary indefinitely and incessantly according to the habits, means, and disposition of individuals, and the example of those around them. The wants of a cultivated labourer are greater than those of a more uncivilised, though possibly more productive one. The wants of a married labourer are greater than those of the single man. Is he, therefore, to have higher wages? But this is the very obsolete monstrosity of the old poor law administration. Again, when the condition of a class is improving, their wants are constantly on the increase. If they have any aspirations after improvement the only real measure of their wants in their own minds is the condition of the class im-

mediately above them. As soon as this is attained their standard is again raised a step higher. This indefinite elevation of man's standard of requirements is in truth the origin of human progress. The day on which his wants should become a fixed and measurable quantity the advance and the life of the world would be at an end.

'There is, indeed, one standard of man's wants which admits of being ascertained with some approach to accuracy. This is that minimum rate of income which will furnish him with the absolute necessities of life, *i. e.* with the cheapest and scantiest supply of food, clothing, and shelter, on which he can sustain life and health. But as all schemes for regulating wages in the interest of the working man are intended to give him much more than this minimum, it can obviously be of no use in furnishing a foundation for them.' (P. 94.)

There is yet another objection, one at once of principle and detail, which is fatal to the application of any scheme for the artificial regulation of wages to manufacturing industry, and, indeed, to industry of nearly all kinds. If the wages were weekly wages, the regulation would inevitably confound the skillful and the clumsy, the indolent and the laborious, in one common scale of remuneration,—which would be to commit an injustice, a folly, and a mischief. If, on the contrary, the wages were assigned, as they now commonly are, according to the quality and amount of work done; what authority, not alike omniscient and omnipotent, could determine the several rates of payment to be adopted in factories where the machinery was of different degrees of age and excellence, where the raw material was of different qualities and facilities of manipulation, where circumstances were variously favourable or the reverse. What power of wisdom could decide what 'price per piece' should be paid to the weaver according to the speed of the loom, according to the superiority of its construction, according as the warp was strong or brittle, very strong or very brittle, moderately strong or moderately brittle, well-dressed or ill-dressed, well *beamed* or full of cross threads, according as the weft was soft or hard, weak or tenacious, well or ill-*copped*. All these matters are now easily settled between individual masters and individual men; it would be wholly impossible to arrange them justly and satisfactorily, or, indeed, to arrange them at all, by the intervention of the wisest Parliament or the most honest Wittenagemot that ever sat.

Intelligent operatives know all this as well as we do, and far better than their theorising patrons; and, accordingly, they have concentrated their whole strength and thought upon the third means of artificially controlling wages, *viz.*, by combinations

and strikes, or schemes for extorting from their employers, by united action, a higher rate of wages than the latter are willing to give them (as they express themselves), than the natural interaction of supply and demand would assign them, or than the profits of trade can afford (as the masters would phrase the same idea). The mode in which trades' unions and strikes arise and operate; the irrationality of their design; the impossibility of their ultimate success; the fundamental error on which they are based; and the serious social mischiefs and perils which flow from them, are all sketched by Mr. Morrison with a masterly hand. His tenth chapter, confirmed by a series of papers published a few months ago in the 'Morning Chronicle,' and evidently by one of the initiated, should settle the public conviction on these points for ever. But the question has been so amply discussed in various quarters, and to state it fully and conclusively would occupy so many pages, that we can only refer our readers to the two writers just named. Two points, however, in Mr. Morrison's remarks under this head, appear to us so novel and important as imperatively to call for special notice. The first is this: that strikes and combinations, the favourite remedies of the working classes for the removal of their grievances, and the chief engines on which they rely for improving their condition, operate most forcibly and directly, by dissipating and discouraging accumulation, to prevent that augmentation of the labour fund, on the amount of which their remuneration has been shown to depend, and more especially that increase of *their* portion of it on which they must rely for becoming capitalists themselves and their own employers.

'If the working classes are to make any great advance, either in domestic comfort or in social position, one condition of this must be a great increase in the habit of saving and accumulating. But so long as combinations and strikes continue in favour with them, there will be a disposition to apply their savings, and when these are gone, their credit, to furnishing the means of a more prolonged struggle. This is fatal to the successful practice of accumulation. During the late Lancashire strike, funds have been drawn from benefit societies to assist in maintaining the contest. The evil is the greater, because, as the chance of success in these measures depends entirely on the unanimous action of the operatives, every motive of class opinion and class prescription is brought to bear for the purpose of forcing every individual into them. Hence a minority who might be anxious to use the method of saving and accumulating, rather than that of strikes, to effect a permanent improvement in their condition, are compelled to exhaust their savings in the enforced idleness of a turn-out.'



The second point is this:—The evils inherent in trades' unions and strikes are far more extensive and formidable than at first sight appears. It is in the essence of combinations among operatives, for the purpose of enforcing an advance of wages, to extend and consolidate their organisation. The workmen of one master combine against him; they soon find, however, that he obtains other hands, and that they can succeed only by securing the co-operation of their fellow-labourers in the district. That done, the master would be defeated unless he could obtain the support of the other masters; accordingly, as recently at Preston, he obtains this support, and the operatives are beaten in their turn. In order once more to become the stronger party, they must call in the aid of other districts and of other trades, which again enlarges the area of the masters' counter-combination, till it is found that ultimate success can only be achieved by an organisation which embraces and obtains contributions from the entire body of the working classes throughout the kingdom.

'Accordingly the leaders of the Lancashire strikes finally found themselves driven to the plan of a meeting of delegates from the workmen of the kingdom at large, to be held in London, to which they gave the significant name of a Labour Parliament. If this idea could be effectively realised, the whole of the working-classes of the nation would be combined under a government of their own for the express purpose of forcing the possessors of property to concede to them a larger share of the national income than they at present possess, and of imposing upon them such other regulations as might be decided by such an authority to be just and advantageous to the poor. It is easy to see the political tendency of such a scheme; how infallibly demagogues would avail themselves of the irritation in the minds of the delegates and of their constituents to divert such an assembly, from purely industrial arrangements, to the discussion of the political rights of the working classes, and how inevitably the experience of the delays, failures, and sufferings involved in the attempt to coerce the masters by the systems of strikes, would suggest the idea of political change as the means of placing a more effective instrument in the hands of the working class. . . . It is true that no benefit could result to them from any attempts of this kind; not only because the strength and union of the upper and middle classes are in this country so great, that any movement among the masses beneath them would be crushed as soon as it became too serious for further forbearance; but because all schemes for imposing higher rates of wages than those produced by the law of supply and demand, are from the nature of the case impracticable. But much uneasiness, disturbance, and even bloodshed might occur before the conclusion of an agitation of this kind. Even without any reference to the political purposes to which such an organisation might be

perverted, its costs would be sufficiently serious if were exclusively confined to its immediate object. It would amount to the banding together of the working classes for the express purpose of coercing the classes possessed of capital. And if the latter were to combine in self-defence, the whole of these two great classes of the nation would be drawn together into two hostile camps, each bent on ruining or starving the other into submission. Such a state of things would be opposed to all the conditions on which the good working of any social system depends. There is, indeed, no probability of the efforts of the leaders of trades unions being adequate to producing any results of this magnitude at present. But the mere fact that measures directly leading to it have been suggested by them, is sufficient to show the real nature and ultimate tendency of the system of strikes and combinations.' (P. 104.)

After showing, in the clearest manner, that all plans for regulating wages by external authority, or enhancing them by external pressure, or making them depend upon anything except the skill, concentration, energy, and actual *bonâ fide* value of the service rendered, must ultimately tend to *reduce* the remuneration of labour, to lower wages instead of raising them, inasmuch as the obvious operation of all such attempts must be to relax the springs of industry and invention, and weaken the motives to strenuous and unremitting exertion, and therefore to diminish the productiveness of labour, and the accumulated surplus constituting the fund out of which labour must be paid;—and that any interference on the part either of Government or popular organisations, with that security of capital, that confidence in the undisturbed freedom of its operation and the undisturbed enjoyment of its earnings, which is essential to commercial or industrial enterprise, would imperil the extension of manufactures in this country, and thereby menace not only the prospects of the operatives for the improvement of their condition, but even the continuance of such well-being as they at present enjoy;—and further, that any such increase of the cost of production as may well arise from machinery being thrown idle by frequent strikes, or from forcing wages up beyond their market price, might easily, in the present close competition between England and other countries, turn the scale against us, and be fatal to our manufacturing supremacy, and consequently to our manufacturing extension;—Mr. Morrison proceeds to discuss the probable benefits which the operatives would derive from those schemes of co-operation by which they hope either to share the profits of their masters by adopting the plan of fluctuating instead of fixed wages, or to engross them altogether by becoming themselves capitalists and their own employers. We have already explained this subject so fully in

this Journal on three previous occasions\*, that we need not enter upon it again. Mr. Morrison agrees in, and confirms, all the conclusions at which we had arrived; viz. that though these schemes, in their improved form, contain nothing at variance with the sound principles of political economy, the *pecuniary* benefits which they will secure to the operatives will be found to have been vastly over-estimated, if not to be altogether *nil*; that as soon as repeated failures, on which much capital will be wasted, shall have taught the people the right way of managing them, — as soon, that is, as they shall have agreed to work them under the direction of one competent and skilful person carefully selected and *adequately paid*, and have set aside a proper sum for the interest of money and the replacement of old or worn machinery, — they will discover that the residue accruing to themselves, (*i. e.* their weekly advances in lieu of wages, *plus* their share of the annual profits, and *minus* their share of the annual losses,) does not exceed, and probably falls short of, the regular earnings they received, while working for a master whose profits they used to deem so excessive; while in point of convenience, regularity, and safety, the old arrangement was incomparably preferable. On the other hand, the social and moral advantages of an extensive trial of the co-operative system would probably be as great as the economic advantages would certainly be small. It would diminish and discourage strikes; it would disabuse the operatives of their erroneous notions as to the disproportionate profits of their masters; it would teach them a truth which they will never believe till they have worked it out for themselves, — ‘the usefulness of ‘rich capitalists to poor working men;’ it would cultivate among them habits of saving, of calculation, and of self-restraint, and prepare them for the innoxious possession, and the righteous and serviceable use, of that increased political and social power which sooner or later must be theirs. Every legal facility should, therefore, be afforded to the working classes to try co-operative schemes; for their success or their failure would alike be favourable to the cultivation of popular wisdom, and the spread of social harmony.

All these schemes, however, for securing to the working man higher wages, *i. e.* a larger share in the profits of production than he now enjoys, are neither more nor less than contrivances for effecting that artificially which it is in his power to effect naturally — for making others do that which can be best done

by himself, and by him alone — for securing his aim at the expense, and by the sacrifice of others, instead of by his own exertions and self-denials. They are stratagems for *taking* what he ought to *earn*. He, and not his employer, is responsible for low wages; he, and he alone, can increase those wages; his employer cannot; or at least can only do so in an inappreciable degree. Mr. Morrison shows, by a careful estimate, that if the whole employing class were to confer *half* their actual expenditure on the labouring poor in the form of increased wages, this enormous and impossible sacrifice would only raise these about one shilling a week. In the workman's hands lies the control of the three great elements which decide the amount of his remuneration, — the surplus or accumulated fund by which labour is employed and paid; the productiveness of industry by which that surplus is augmented; and the number of labourers among whom that fund has to be divided. He may save, so as to add to the available capital of the community; he may work intelligently and diligently, so as to increase the effectiveness of his industry; and he may abstain from adding to the number of claimants, and so augment the share of each. His future is in his own power; for by these means, and by these only, can it be determined.

‘If all that political economy could do for the working classes (says Mr. Morrison) were to demonstrate the impossibility of elevating their condition by attacks upon the property or interference with the free action of other classes, such a negative result, though very necessary to be established, could not be a satisfactory resting-place to the mind.’

But happily it does much more than this; it points out to him how he may attain all his righteous and rational desires; it displays them to him all within his reach; it indicates the solution of the great social problem. It proves to him with irresistible clearness, that all he needs in order to become as prosperous and comfortable in his sphere as the employers and merchants whom he assails and envies are in theirs, is that he should imitate their prudence, their abstinence, their sense, their habit of always living within their income, their customary postponement of marriage till marriage becomes safe and wise. It says to him: — ‘Wouldst thou be as these are — *live* as they.’

A few obvious considerations will show that this position is strictly true, and not one iota overstated. In the *first* place, if the 50,000,000*l.*, now annually expended by the operative classes in drink and tobacco, were — we do not say saved, but —

spent in adding to the comforts of their home, in procuring for their children a good education, in getting their wives and sisters instructed in domestic economy and enabling them to stay at home to practise it, in obtaining for themselves an hour or two of daily leisure for recreation or for books, — what a vast, immediate, and blessed metamorphosis would come over nearly every humble household — a change amounting in itself to a complete social revolution. No one can deny this: no one conversant with facts will doubt it for a moment. In the *second* place, suppose that only half this sum were saved — accumulated for future use — as it is notorious that it easily and advantageously might be (not by any sacrifice of comfort, but by simple abstinence from impairing their health and lowering their character by intemperance), the hoarded capital of the working classes would in ten years amount to 250,000,000*l.*, even allowing them to spend every year the interest of their previous savings. *‘Now a capital of this amount would be sufficient to effect the universal substitution of co-operative associations of working men for the existing system of employers and employed, to make the working population their own masters and managers, and thus to set at rest all questions about the rights of labour and capital for ever.’* Whether this would be the wisest mode of applying their capital is another question: it is enough to show how entirely their own objects are within their own power, if they will only take the right way to reach them. *Lastly*, consider what would be the effect (combined with, or independent of such an augmentation of the labour-fund as we have just supposed and shown to be feasible) of such a reduction of numbers as would result from the establishment among the poor of the same views with regard to marriage as prevail among the easy and the rich. If every workman did what every tradesman, merchant, gentleman, and younger branch of the aristocracy does now — postpone marriage till he has saved enough for the wedding outlay, and till he sees a clear prospect of being able to support a family according to his own standard of decency and comfort, — in a single generation the operative classes would be able to command the very highest rate of remuneration which the productiveness of industry could afford them. They would have the control of the labour market, and nobody could gainsay them. Whereas at present it is notorious that the poorest and least provident are always the first to marry, and the quickest to multiply; that the agricultural peasant marries earlier than the artisan\*, the artisan than the tradesman, the tradesman than

See the Eighth Annual Report of the Registrar General — from

the noble or gentleman. The self-denial involved in the voluntary postponement of marriage is no doubt great; *but it is the price which nature has fixed for the object desired*; it is the condition of the blessing; it is the price which every other class has to pay — the condition which every other class has to fulfil: and why should the workman only be exempted from the common lot — be exonerated from the exercise of those virtues which are imperative upon all other ranks? Nay, in his case the self-restraint *now* needed is less than in the case of his superiors, for emigration has opened a new resource which removes nearly all the hardship of the demanded effort. If, when he has laid by a sum sufficient for his wedding outfit, he sees no prospect of being able to maintain a family at home, the same sum will carry him to the new world, where industry and prudence will always secure him a sustenance and a future. Therefore we are amply warranted in saying that the working classes of this country — the operative portion of them at least — have their fate in their own hands; they command their own condition; they make their own bed; and all their complaints and demands when rigidly analysed resolve themselves into a claim *to have their object given them instead of paying for it*, — to obtain it in defiance of the rights of others, and in spite of economic laws, which are the laws of nature.

In truth, there never was a time so favourable, in all its conditions, for turning over a new leaf in the annals of an old community. All the material difficulties in the way of inaugurating a happier order of things are removed, or in the course of being so; only mental and moral obstacles remain. The combined effects of the Irish famine, extensive emigration, and free trade, have solved the problem which a few years ago seemed insoluble — if only we will accept the solution. The labour-market is no longer over-crowded. The supply no longer exceeds the demand. In every branch of industry, from agriculture to domestic service, the consequences have been felt. The average wages of every sort of labour have risen. The average price of every article of consumption has fallen. The cost of living is no longer high. The means of obtaining a livelihood are no longer difficult. Masters and employers no longer dictate terms; they are often compelled to accept them. In place of a regular influx of labourers from Ireland to flood our western counties, and reduce both the remuneration of

which we gather that in the manufacturing districts about 10 per cent. of persons married are under twenty-one years of age, and in the agricultural about 14 per cent.

labour and the standard of comforts and of character, there is the reverse operation of an actual efflux—though as yet a tentative and scanty one—towards the sister country. In place of an inadequate demand for manufacturing productions, and an inadequate supply of the foreign articles of food they purchase, we have seen our exports double in fifteen years, and the daily consumption of our working classes increase beyond all precedent or parallel. Every one now may have ample employment, ample wages, ample food. Emigration, stimulated partly by the fearful visitation of 1846 and 1847, partly by the timely discovery of Australian gold, has done and is doing wonders. It has done for the working classes what they had not resolution to do for themselves—reduced their numbers below the demand for them. It has given them the future command of the labour market, if only they will abstain from too rapidly filling up the hiatus it has made. We cannot yet estimate the full effect produced upon the numerical strength of our population by this unexampled exodus, partly because we have no register of births and deaths for Scotland and Ireland, and partly because it is too early to discover its operation on the relative fertility of marriages in this country; but we know that the effect must be greater than mere returns of emigrants can show, because these consist mainly of young married or marriageable people, on whom we depend for the increase of our population. Probably we are within the mark when we assume that the numbers in the whole kingdom are rather on the decline than otherwise.\* The work-

\* We may assume that the excess of births over deaths in Scotland is about in the same ratio as in England. In Ireland, allowing for greater mortality, and for the fact of the enormous emigration, consisting chiefly of the young married or marriageable, we believe there to be no excess at all. On this assumption, the increase of the population, by natural means, in the ten years ending 1852, will have been 2,123,016, and its decrease by emigration 2,132,686, leaving a balance of diminution of 9,670. In the last four years, however (1849—1852), the account would stand thus:

|                   |   |   |           |
|-------------------|---|---|-----------|
| Emigration        | - | - | 1,285,077 |
| Natural increase  | - | - | 931,777   |
|                   |   |   | 353,300   |
| Actual diminution | - | - | 353,300   |

Even in England and Wales, where the emigration has been so much less than in Ireland, the average fecundity of marriage has fallen off.

|  |   |   |              |
|--|---|---|--------------|
| Thus, from 1841—1844, the ratio of births to |   |   |              |
| marriages was                                | - | - | 4.22 to one. |
| From 1845—1848                               | - | - | 3.94 —       |
| 1849—1852                                    | - | - | 3.975 —      |
| 1853.  | - | - | 7.33 —       |

ing classes have now, therefore, before them such an opportunity as is seldom afforded twice in the lifetime of a nation; the labour fund has been enormously augmented; the claimants on that fund have been enormously reduced: to neither result have the operatives contributed much either by their frugality, prudence, or self-restraint; but the effect is produced notwithstanding, and stands there ready for them to take advantage of if they are wise enough. Will they do so? So far, it must be avowed, appearances are not promising. We know simply that wages and consumption have greatly increased; that savings have been foolishly wasted, and productive powers been suffered to lie idle; that extra prosperity has led rather to extra indulgence than to extra economy; and that marriages in the last six years have increased 17 per cent., and births nearly 16 per cent.

The chapter in which Mr. Morrison develops his view of the ideal condition of the working class, and shows how completely that ideal lies within the reach of possible realisation, is very interesting, to some extent new, and in our opinion quite sound. Casting aside, as childish and exploded, all communistic dreams of the reorganisation of society and the redistribution of its wealth; proving that the condition of men working 'on their own account,' whether as peasant proprietors or as manufacturing producers, is by no means the happiest conceivable; he expounds in a few clear paragraphs how independence, property, comfort, leisure, and mental cultivation are within the reach of all who will take the due means for their attainment. If the ruling and guiding classes do their part (which we believe most of them sincerely desire to do) in bestowing on the poor a really serviceable education, which shall include not merely the rudiments of book learning, and instruction in the moral law and its religious sanctions, but an acquaintance with the laws whether economical or physiological, which govern their material well-being; and in removing all artificial restriction upon the most productive employment of their industry, and the most profitable investment of their earnings, — the working classes may do the rest themselves. By saving those surplus earnings which they now waste in drink, they will not only become capitalists themselves, but will add to that fund which is ever accumulating for the utilisation and remuneration of labour. By postponing marriage and multiplication (or carrying it on out of the country) they will reduce the numbers among whom this labour-fund has to be divided, so as to secure a larger amount as the individual share of each. By the two operations combined they will raise the rate of wages to its maximum and reduce the rate of interest and profit to its minimum. Their position would



thus become not only better positively, but better in proportion to that of the employing classes; and the social inequalities so much complained of would be diminished by a double operation. At the same time, improved habits and improved education would elevate their condition and increase their comforts in another way: it would enable them to lay out their earnings to greater advantage — to make them go further. At present, as is well known, the retail profit paid to dealers by the poor far exceeds that paid by the middle classes, because they buy less at a time, and buy from small shopkeepers whose *per-centage* of profit is often enormous to repay them, both for a scanty business and risky customers. Mr. Morrison estimates that by carrying skill and management in this point to its maximum, nearly one-fifth of the working man's income might be saved. These advantages gained, the operatives have their choice whether to employ them in adding to their accumulations, in augmenting their enjoyments, or in reducing the duration and intensity of their labour — whether to employ them in the purchase of wealth, of luxury, or of leisure. In any case they have attained their end; and if, as might be hoped, they made the wiser and nobler choice, and selected the latter blessing, they might surmount the only remaining barrier, the only *essential* difference, between themselves and those above them in the social scale — viz. superiority of education and refinement. There is nothing in bodily labour, when moderate in hours and in severity, incompatible either with polished manners or with intellectual culture; while to health and happiness it is unquestionably favourable; — and when once working men are possessed of ample earnings, hoarded capital, mental cultivation and refined behaviour, they will be the equals of their employers in social as in political position, and will have nothing further to envy or to desire.

These glorious visions, this bright ideal, it lies with them, and them alone, to realise, by abjuring all misleading paths and steadily treading in the right one. One only condition of success can they with a shadow of plausibility deem a hard one — habitual restraint on marriage and multiplication. The following considerations, however, should suffice to remove their impression of its severity, and to make it seem just and easy, if not absolutely welcome. It is the condition to which their superiors are subjected, and by virtue of which they have attained and preserve their superiority. It may be greatly mitigated by the cultivation of that frugality, moderation in desire, and skill in making small means go far, which even now enables some persons to marry prudently upon 100*l.* a-year, while to others marriage on

three times that income would be a questionable step. And it may be evaded almost or altogether by removing to those thirsty countries where children are a blessing and a wealth in place of being an anxiety and a burden. And as soon as the annual emigration has reached a certain limit, all restrictions upon the marriage of those who remain may be safely withdrawn or greatly relaxed. As to what may occur when the demand of America and of our colonies for labourers is satiated, and they become as full as we are, and can no longer drain off our annual increase, we need not trouble ourselves to inquire. That day is far distant; and when it shall arrive it will probably bring with it the counterbalancing salvation of that secondary law of population — as yet barely recognised and scantily operative — in virtue of which fecundity diminishes as comfort, luxury, abundant nourishment, and plethoric health increase.

The possibility of solving the political problem connected with the working classes depends on the satisfactory solution of the social one. The latter successfully disposed of, the management of the former ceases to be difficult or formidable. Still it is of the utmost importance to face it, to understand it, and to prepare for it in time. Its conditions here are materially different from those which obtain both on the Continent and in the New World; from those which have obtained in any other period of the world's history. In most if not in all European states, constitutional government — the supremacy of the easy and aristocratic classes — seems to be declining or extinct. Those nations lie between two antagonistic dangers, unlimited despotism and unlimited democracy; sometimes they are menaced with a greater peril than either, viz., the union of the two. Their danger, too, is imminent and immediate; ours, as yet, is only distant and contingent. Still it is obvious that our tendency is towards a larger and larger infusion of the democratic element into our constitution, towards an extension of the political power of the masses, towards a diminished and perpetually diminishing preponderance of the influence of the middle and upper ranks of the community. It is a mere question of time. It may be years, it may be generations, it may be, perhaps, centuries before the working classes of the nation have attained to equal political privileges, and, therefore, to a numerical majority of votes, and, therefore, to political supremacy; but every movement is in this direction, and every step brings us nearer to the goal. If it should be reached soon, or before vast social changes have taken place, this country will present a spectacle of which, hitherto, the world has seen no

example; of a nation whose government is in the hands or under the control of the receivers of weekly wages; of a nation surpassing all others in the number and wealth of its capitalists, yet, in which those capitalists are in a position of political subjection and virtual disfranchisement. In the democracies of antiquity the working men were slaves and had no participation in the rights of citizenship. The republics of the Middle Ages were republics of nobles, merchants, and burghers only. The continental republics now are republics of peasant proprietors. The great American democracy, to say nothing of its slaves, is a republic of capitalists, or of operatives who are easily able to become so, and are verging towards that consummation. In all these States universal suffrage, or that which is called such, may be practicable and safe. Universal suffrage in England would the supremacy of day-labourers. On the peril of such a position, it is superfluous to enlarge; of the use that working men would make of their supremacy, if it found them in their present state of feeling and enlightenment, we have had many indications:—the solution of the problem lies obviously in the combination of two endeavours—we must alter that state as soon and as completely as we can, and we must postpone their political supremacy till such alteration is effected.

The means by which this double purpose is to be achieved are neither difficult nor recondite. We must disseminate among them, by every contrivance in our power, those sound views on the relation between capital and labour, which it is the object of Mr. Morrison's 'Essay' to inculcate. Let the simple principles of political economy be an indispensable portion of that popular education which is every day extending and improving. 'Instil into them a knowledge of the real laws on which their condition depends. Let them clearly apprehend that the increase of capital is necessarily the increase of the fund to be distributed as wages, and that its decay is necessarily the diminution of that fund. Let them understand that capitalists cannot, if they would, depress the aggregate remuneration of labour below the amount of the capital available for that purpose; that the working classes cannot, if all the powers of Government were at their disposal, permanently elevate that remuneration above the same limit.' Such instruction is not only not unsuitable for them; it is of all kinds the most suitable and the most necessary. Considering their present temper and the prospect of their future power, it is far more important, both for their own happiness and the well-being and peace of the community, that the rising generation should be made to understand 'what gives them high wages, what would make

‘their wages low, and what would prevent them from getting any wages at all, than that they should be able to pass the most satisfactory examination in geography or astronomy.’ Science is to them of far more consequence than literature, and no science is so essential as that which bears upon their home interests and their daily life.

We must next do all that exhortation, encouragement, and legislative facilities can do to promote among them those habits of accumulation which will end in their becoming capitalists themselves, and thus attaining to sympathy of interests and community of views with those that are. The man who has 100*l.* laid by has far more unison of feeling in political and social matters with the possessor of thousands than with the possessor of nothing; he has more in common with the millionaire than with the pauper. And, as we showed a few pages back, with sound views, with established temperance, with habits of prudence and economy, with the accumulation of small capitals, will come leisure; with leisure will come higher aspirations and better tastes, and the means of satisfying both; and intellectual cultivation and social refinement will follow in their train. When this happy consummation is reached, no danger need to be apprehended from the extension of political power to such men as the working classes will then consist of, even though they still remain, for the most part, labourers for hire.

To grant political power only to such among them as have attained this fit condition — to extend it gradually, and only as this condition is approached, to withhold it from the great mass till this condition has become general or universal, — two postulates alone are needed. *First*, That no party in the State shall be so shortsighted, factious, and immoral as to make political capital out of popular discontent, or to propose a large extension of the electoral suffrage to the masses in order to defeat or supplant their rivals; and *secondly*, that every party in its turn of power, and all parties combined, shall conscientiously and diligently use that legislative supremacy which the Constitution gives them, for the purpose of conferring on the people every benefit, and removing from them every grievance, which wisdom and justice can suggest, and which parliamentary omnipotence can reach. By such courses steadily pursued — by educating the working classes sedulously and governing them righteously — we shall disarm those dangers which now look so formidable in the distance; because when the day of their complete political emancipation, and their consequent political supremacy, shall have arrived, they will have learned to desire nothing that Parliament ought not to grant, and Parliament will already have granted all

they ought to desire. They will have attained political power only to discover that it can bestow upon them no blessing which they do not already possess, or cannot already command.

But, if we neglect the warnings of the past, and make no provision for an inevitable and an obvious future; if we continue to allow religious dissensions and religious prejudices to impede and cripple the education of the strengthening and multiplying masses; if, either from bigotry or fear, or a cowardly truckling to either, we exclude from that education its most practical and imperative elements; if our statesmen do not honourably use their exclusive power for the benefit of the excluded millions, and as honourably abstain from calling in the passions and hopes of those millions to further their own miserable aims, or to secure their own transient victories; then assuredly our sin will be as great, and our punishment as certain, as will be those of the labouring class themselves, if they in their turn do not abstain from seeking unrighteous objects by unsuitable and suicidal means; if they do not learn that in temperance, in economy, in docility, in self-restraint, and not in combinations, strikes, communism, or the charter, they must seek their elevation and their welfare — their true dignity and their real mission.

- ART. VI.—1. *Her Majesty's Declarations, Proclamations and Orders in Council with reference to the Commencement of Hostilities against the Emperor of all the Russias.* April, 1854.
2. *A Practical Legal Guide for Sailors and Merchants during War.* By WILLIAM ADAM LOCH, of the Hon. Society of Lincoln's Inn. 1854.
3. *A Manual of the Law of Maritime Warfare.* By WILLIAM HAZLITT and HENRY PHILIP ROCHE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. 1854.
4. *Story on the Law of Prize and Prize Courts.* By FREDERICK PRATT, LL.D. London: 1854.
5. *Commentaries on International Law.* By ROBERT PHILLIMORE, Esq., M.P., LL.D. Vol. I. London: 1854.
6. *Des Droits et des Devoirs des Nations Neutres en Temps de Guerre Maritimee.* Par L. P. HAUTEFEUILLE, Avocat, &c. Paris: 1849. 4 vols.
7. *Règles Internationales et diplomatiques de la Mer.* Par M. T. ORTOLAN, Lieutenant de Vaisseau. 2 tomes. Paris: 1845.

UPON the near approach of a declaration of war against one of the greatest of the European Powers, after an interval of

almost forty years, a variety of questions, both of policy and of law, pressed upon the consideration of the Government, in relation to subjects which our statesmen and our jurists had allowed to slumber since the conclusion of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Ghent. Whoever will consider the manifold effects of a state of war upon the social relations of mankind and the commercial intercourse of nations, especially as those effects have been determined by the legal construction of belligerent rights in former contests, will perceive that the shock of armies and the conduct of a campaign are not the only, or perhaps the most important, consequences of a rupture between civilised nations. Whilst our fleets are equipped for foreign seas, and our troops sent forth for foreign service, with that energy which the active operations of war demand, a change of almost equal magnitude takes place in many of the internal duties of the State and of the community. The national finances are no longer regulated with strict economy, but a lavish though inevitable expenditure disspates in a few months the savings of former years, and the hope of further reductions in taxation. The laws of trade are to a certain extent suspended, and every national interest becomes subordinate to the one paramount object of distressing and weakening the enemy. In the present instance, our commercial relations with the Russian Empire, which have been carried on almost uninterruptedly for three centuries, are suddenly stopped. The advances of capital, to the amount of at least six or seven millions sterling from this country, by which the raw produce of Russia is habitually purchased and paid for, before the opening of the season for Northern navigation, were already checked last year by the menacing aspect of affairs. The prices of the staple articles of the Russia trade rose in proportion. The ships and seamen employed in the Baltic and White Sea trades, in former years, found their occupation gone. Had the laws of war been applied in all their rigour, in endeavouring to cut off the trade of the Russian Empire, we must have imposed on ourselves, our own merchants and our own revenue, privations and burdens not much inferior to those we are seeking to inflict on the enemy. But what, it may be asked, is the full rigour and extent of the laws of war, and how far are the rules established by the British Maritime Courts in the last war applicable to the present state of the world, transformed and enlightened as it is by nearly half a century of peace, prosperity, and progress? Everything else is changed. The objects of Government are become more popular. The doctrines which regulate our commercial policy are totally inverted. Mechanical ingenuity has rendered many of the restrictions and limitations of former times

physically impracticable, since railroads and electric telegraphs cannot be placed under the laws of blockade. Nation is united to nation by a thousand ties of interest and intimacy never known before: and it may be presumed that, if the sagacity of our statesmen, the discussions of Parliament and of the press, or a more enlightened sense of public interest, had been directed to the theory of our advantage in war as keenly as they have been applied to promote the progress of the nation in peace, the belligerent rights and laws of England would not have remained stationary in 1854, at the point they had reached in 1814. It has been the fate—we may venture, with reference to many of the eminent men who have shared in former times in the labours of these pages, to say that it has been the glory — of this Journal to anticipate, by force of argument, most of those political and social reforms which have reflected honour on this age, and have now long since received the sanction of Parliament, of the nation, and of mankind. Amongst the questions discussed by our founders we look back with pride to the humane and judicious policy which it was their desire to see more extensively applied in mitigation of the laws of war. One eminent and learned colleague of Jeffrey and of Macintosh still survives, whose first exploit was the revocation of the memorable Orders in Council of 1807 and 1809, which was accomplished in 1812 mainly by the eloquence and perseverance of Lord Brougham. If on the present occasion no such contest is likely to be renewed, it is because the Government has anticipated at the outset of this war, the just and irresistible demands that could be addressed to it by neutrals abroad, or by the community at home, and the Ministers of the Crown have shown an earnest and intelligent desire to adapt the exercise of our belligerent rights to the present condition of the world.

We shall endeavour to show, in explaining the course and effect of these measures of the Governments of England and France, the extent of the changes which have thus been introduced into our maritime law, and to point out the advantages which those changes are calculated to procure to British interests. But we may at once observe that, in the present conjuncture of affairs, there were other causes which powerfully contributed to urge upon the British Government the immediate settlement of these questions on the most liberal basis.

For the first time since the Crusades we found ourselves entering upon a war in close alliance with France, a State which had adopted as long ago as 1778 the principles of a liberal policy to the neutral flag; and we had the greatest possible interest in waiving all controversy on these disputed sub-

jects, not only with our allies, but with all the neutral Powers. The principles of the Armed Neutrality of the North, in defence of certain propositions of maritime independence, were precisely those which Russia herself had used on two occasions, in 1780 and 1800, to form a league of neutral States against this country. And, in the present state of the world, the effect of pledging ourselves to maintain, to their full extent, the rules formerly enforced by our cruisers and our courts of maritime jurisdiction, must have been to ally the Russian Government to several of the Maritime Powers on questions arising out of the exercise of belligerent rights, and to alienate from ourselves several of those Powers whose sympathy and co-operation is one of the chief elements in our present advantageous position.

Another reason of a local and peculiar nature furnished an additional motive to the adoption of these concessions, at least in the temporary and exceptional form in which they have been made. The sea coasts of the Russian Empire offer peculiar facilities to blockade. The ports of Russia may be easily and entirely closed against all trade whatever by the presence of an effective blockading squadron, during that part of the year when the navigation is free from ice. We know that the whole foreign trade of the empire must be carried on during war, either by land or by some of the adjacent neutral ports, and consequently that the attempt to pursue and capture the enemy's property under the neutral flag would be superfluous or abortive, since it might in every case, and with remarkable facility, be transferred to the neutral agent at an intermediate port with whose dealings the belligerents have no right to interfere. To these motives were added considerations based on the views of commercial policy now entertained in this country, all of which tend rather to the mitigation of the rights of war on the grounds both of interest and humanity, than to the assertion and exercise of a system of restriction and prohibition at once oppressive to neutrals, and inconvenient if not injurious to ourselves.

Maritime hostilities inevitably give rise to a conflict of rights and a collision of interests between two parties, both of whom are entitled in their respective positions to be protected by law. The belligerent Powers assert and exercise their undoubted right of attacking the trade of the enemy, in order to embarrass and weaken him in his internal resources, and to deprive him of the supplies he requires from foreign countries. The neutral Powers, on the contrary, continue in the possession of their right to trade with the enemy, subject only to such restrictions and limitations as may be imposed even on neutrals by



the laws of war. Of these the most obvious and uncontested are the right of blockade, the right of seizure and confiscation of contraband of war carried to the enemy's use, and the right of search to ascertain the nationality of a ship and the nature of her cargo. But to these admitted and universal practices the law of nations as enforced and established by the highest traditions of judicial authority, unless suspended by express contract, adds many other rights of a more controverted character. Thus our own and the American Courts have uniformly held that the neutral flag does not protect the property of the enemy, unless under the authority of treaties. The French Courts and edicts maintained the same doctrine down to 1778, and although they have relinquished it since the American war, they have invariably held till the present time the converse proposition that the enemy's flag will condemn even neutral goods. Again, during the last century it was a doctrine of our courts that neutral States had no right to lend the shelter of their flag in time of war to any species of trade from which they were excluded by law in the time of peace. Hence arose the celebrated 'rule of 1756,' which refused to recognise the right of neutrals to carry on during war the trade between the enemy and his colonies, that trade being forbidden to neutrals in time of peace by the close system of prohibition, which obtained at that period in the colonial trade of all the European States. For the same reason the coasting trade of the enemy, or trade *in transitu* from port to port of the enemy's country, has been denied to neutrals, because they are debarred from it in time of peace, and it was argued that if neutrals were allowed to engage in it in time of war, their ordinary rights would be extended in order to supply the necessities of the enemy.

The history of these questions which have so often aggravated the horrors of war, and extended them to nations unconnected with the origin of the quarrel, may usually be traced to the relative force and power of belligerents and neutrals—the former constantly endeavouring to exercise their rights of war in the greatest vigour, the latter to circumscribe them within the narrowest limits. In the last great war, which was one of unexampled fury and duration, the cause of neutrals utterly perished. In fact, the States which had in former times asserted the rights of neutrals with the greatest consistency, and even combined in 1780 and 1800 for their defence, such as Holland, Denmark, and Russia, had either sunk under the authority of one or other of the contending parties, or had engaged as principals in the contest. The United States alone remained positively neutral, and the hardships to which they were subjected

drove them to a rupture with this country, and even enabled them many years later to extort an indemnity of a million sterling from France. The interests of the neutral States being thus destroyed, either by the all-devouring influence of the French Empire on land; or, by the rigorous application of British maritime law by sea, a system of belligerent restrictions sprang up far exceeding in severity all that the world had ever before endured. Indeed, the result, if not the fundamental principle of Napoleon's continental system, of his Berlin and Milan decrees, and of the British orders in Council, was the extinction of all neutral trade; until we were led to strain the law of nations to a paper blockade, and to enforce the arbitrary rules laid down on both sides by the confiscation of ships and cargoes being neutral property.

It would be superfluous at the present time to revert to the elaborate discussions and the passionate controversies excited by these topics during that memorable conflict, and we shall only allude to them on the present occasion to show how widely the measures taken by the British and French Governments at the commencement of the present hostilities differ from the rigorous, and we may even say unscrupulous, policy pursued by all the belligerents down to the close of the last European struggle. The great authority, the penetrating sagacity, and the inimitable style of Lord Stowell, who filled the chair of the High Court of Admiralty of England during the whole of that period, have served to vindicate the system of law which he administered, and even to palliate acts of severity which a judge of inferior reputation might have hesitated to enforce. But the jurisprudence of international courts would fail to perform its high duties in regulating upon legal principles the differences of empires, if it were not so guided and administered as to meet the wants of a progressive age, and to apply to these delicate questions the more humane and temperate maxims which have happily prevailed in every other branch of public affairs. The judicial duties of the high legal officers whose province it is to determine these questions in the maritime courts, are of a most peculiar character. They are not bound by written laws, except in as far as they must carry into effect special acts of State; but the authority they invoke rests on the best writers of a science in which much is still disputed and ill-defined. The law of nations, as administered by the Judges of Prize in any particular State, means the law of nations as interpreted by that State, in conformity with the meaning and precedents most respected by that nation: but there is no supreme authority to give uniformity to these decisions, to

settle disputed points, or to give a universal sanction to their decrees. Beyond them lies nothing but the sense of justice and the science of law prevalent among Christian nations, and their sentences can only be reversed by the public opinion of mankind and of posterity. To that opinion Lord Stowell more than once eloquently appealed, and the veneration in which his name is still held in both hemispheres, is the best proof that he administered the system of law which he found established in this country with an uprightness and a wisdom which have not been surpassed. But the jurisdiction of these Courts in legalising acts of violence, which nothing but the state of war can justify, must be limited by the political necessity of the case; for, as Count Portalis observed, in opening the *Conseil des Prises*, 'it is their province to do in peace as much good 'as they can, and in war as little harm.'

In former times commerce was regarded as a species of unilateral contract, in which all the benefit was on the side of the seller and the disadvantage on that of the purchaser, insomuch that the net profits of commercial exchange were computed upon what was termed the balance of trade. Applying the same fallacy to a state of war, the whole power of the country was exercised to prevent the enemy from selling his commodities, by pursuing and confiscating his property under every form, and even under the neutral flag. But the fact was less clearly perceived at that period than it would be now that the loss inflicted on the intercourse of the enemy with this country is commensurate to the loss accruing to the interests we might ourselves have engaged in his trade. The means of exchange were denied us, — commercial intercourse was stopped, — in striking the producers of these articles abroad, we afflicted the consumer at home, — the cost of war was enormously enhanced by the increased prices to be paid for every article of consumption which fell under these restrictions, and when these articles consisted of raw material, the want of them might paralyse the industry of the country. The first question then to be determined in dealing with this subject is, whether we do most injury to the enemy or to ourselves, and whether the advantages derived from the pressure we may put upon him are greater than the evils and inconveniences by which they are purchased. The laws of war, as applied to trade, amount to absolute and universal prohibition in all that concerns the enemy or his goods, if these laws are applied in all their rigour. All contracts with the enemy or his subjects are void; all commercial intercourse is not only suspended, but illegal; the enemy's goods may be seized and

confiscated under all circumstances and in every part of the world except on neutral territory. It has been laid down by some of our greatest lawyers that trade with the enemy is a misdemeanour; and the right of blockade excludes even neutrals from maritime commerce with the enemy's ports.

'In my opinion,' said Lord Stowell, in delivering judgment in the case of *The Hoop*, where he reviewed the authorities on this subject, 'there exists a general rule in the maritime jurisprudence of this country, by which all trading with the public enemy, unless with the permission of the Sovereign, is interdicted. It is not a principle peculiar to the maritime law of this country; it is laid down by Bynkerschoeck as an universal principle of law, — *Ex naturâ belli commercia inter hostes cessare non est dubitandum*. Valin states it to have been the law of France, whether the trade was attempted to be carried on in national or in neutral vessels. It appears from the case of the *Fortuna* to have been the law of Spain; and it may, I think, without rashness be affirmed to have been a general principle of law in most of the countries of Europe.' This rule has been enforced even where strong claims, not merely of convenience, but almost of necessity, excused it on behalf of the individual; it has been enforced where cargoes have been laden before the war, but where parties have not used all possible diligence to countermand the voyage after the first notice of hostilities; and it has even been enforced not only against the subjects of the Crown, but against its allies in the war, on the ground that allies have a right to apply a rule of such strong and universal application to each other's subjects.

In the case of *Potts v. Bell* (8 Term Reports), the whole question was fully argued before Lord Kenyon; and it was contended by counsel, that trading through the medium of a neutral might not be illegal, inasmuch as the goods thus procured are necessary to the manufactures of the country, and supply us with the resources of war. Indeed, as it would have been legal to purchase such a commodity from a neutral Power without any consideration of the country from whence the neutral originally obtained it, it is much more advantageous to the subjects of this country to import the commodity directly in a neutral bottom from the country of its growth. But these arguments did not prevail. Sir John Nicholl (then King's Advocate) was heard on the other side, and asserted with considerable force the established doctrine of the Courts and the books, that there is no such thing as a war for arms and a peace for commerce; and that it is criminal in a subject to aid and comfort the enemy, especially by trade, which furnishes the

very sinews of war to the hostile Government. The Court concurred in this view, and it may be considered the established law of this country in its civil and maritime Courts, that all trade of a British subject with an enemy is illegal, unless protected by the express licence of the Crown.

Starting, then, from this absolute prohibition of trade with the enemy, when not authorised by a special act of the Crown, it devolves upon the constitutional advisers of the Crown to limit the application of this principle; and it is their duty strictly to confine it within such limits as appear to be necessary for the public service and conducive to the national interests, as has been done by the Order in Council of the 15th April, 1854.

We shall now proceed to follow in the official publication before us, the series of measures taken for this purpose.

The first of these documents is a Proclamation of Her Majesty, issued as early as the 18th of February, for the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, military and naval stores, and especially of machinery adapted to, or capable of being adapted to, the purposes of marine engines. This proclamation was put forth several weeks before the declaration of war, and it is important to bear in mind that it is a measure of purely municipal authority, under the powers given to the Crown by the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, and is not a measure resting upon belligerent rights. This proclamation, and the orders subsequently issued by the Privy Council in relation to it, do not affect the subject of contraband of war, as defined by the law of nations, except that some of the objects specified in it are prohibited articles, both by this municipal enactment and by the general maritime law. The object of the Government in putting in force this prohibition was to check the export of warlike stores and of marine machinery, which was notoriously going on for the use of the Russian Government. Several of the large English and Scotch engineering establishments for the manufacture of these articles were known to be finishing large contracts, on which considerable payments had already been made. The Treasury took care that no unnecessary restrictions should be imposed on the foreign trade of the country in these articles, but the export to Russia was stopped, bonds were taken that the prohibited articles, when allowed to be exported at all, should be landed and entered at an innocent port of destination; and in consequence of these measures the Government was enabled, on the declaration of war, to seize several engines destined for the Russian Government. The British makers are understood to

have behaved with great openness and propriety, and their work has been completed at the expense of our own Admiralty for the use of two of Her Majesty's frigates, which are, we are told, to bear the appropriate names of the 'Cossack' and the 'Tartar.'

It was never intended, however, as has been erroneously supposed and stated by many persons, and among others by the authors of the 'Manual of the Law of Maritime Warfare' (p. 258.), that this prohibition should be construed into a fresh declaration of contraband of war. It rests with the courts of maritime jurisdiction to determine that question; and we presume that, as steam machinery has become an important element of navigation and maritime warfare since the last war, the parts or materials of this machinery, when transported to an enemy's port, or for the use of the enemy, will be as liable to condemnation as sail-cloth, cordage, or spars have been in former wars, when not excluded by treaty with neutrals. The most critical test of contraband of war is the destination and probable application of the article. We have treaties with Sweden, and one with Holland of a very early date, determining what is to be considered contraband under the flag of those countries. Other States may extend or restrict those articles, for there is no general or paramount law on the subject, and it has continually been made a topic of negotiation with neutrals.

The power of the Crown to declare articles to be contraband of war with reference to the defence of the country and the exigencies of the war, has been asserted by high legal authority. Lord Erskine said, in his speech on the Orders in Council (8th March, 1808), that, 'the King, having by his prerogative the power to promulgate who are his enemies, is bound to watch over the safety of the State; he may therefore make new declarations of contraband, when articles come into use as implements of war which before were innocent; this is not the exercise of discretion over contraband, and it is the *usus belli*, which, shifting from time to time, make the law shift with them.' Steam machinery and the articles connected with it fall naturally into the new category of articles of contraband.

A question has been much discussed, whether *coals*, which are destined to play so essential a part in modern warfare, are to be held to be contraband; but it is of so much importance to our own cruisers to be able to take in coal at neutral ports, which they would not be able to do if coal was universally regarded as a prohibited article, that we should probably lose more than we can gain by contending for the prohibition. Coals, however, have been stopped on their way to an enemy's port in the Black

Sea, though it appears, from an answer given in the House of Commons by Sir James Graham, that coals will be regarded by our cruisers as one of the articles *ancipitis usus*, not necessarily contraband, but liable to detention under circumstances that warrant suspicion of their being applied to the military or naval uses of the enemy.

The original proclamation of the 18th of February contained a general prohibition of the export of the articles specified, which was, as we have observed, relaxed prior to the declaration of war by a Minute of the Lords of the Treasury. Subsequently to the 29th of March, when the Lords of the Privy Council had resumed their ancient and traditional jurisdiction over those questions which concern the defence of the country and emanate from the prerogative of the Crown, their Lordships confined the application of the Order to exports of the prohibited articles to Europe and part of Asia; and, by a further modification, bearing date the 24th of April, they reduced the prohibited articles to three classes only, viz. —

Gunpowder, saltpetre, and brimstone.

Arms and ammunition.

Marine engines and boilers, and the component parts thereof.

The export of these articles was prohibited to all parts of Europe north of Dunkirk and of the Mediterranean Sea east of Malta, without a special permit of the Privy Council; to all other places the export goes on with the sole restriction of a bond. The importance of stopping the conveyance to Russia of articles of machinery, in which that country and its navy are singularly deficient, may justify this prohibition for a time. But the facilities the Russians may have for obtaining similar articles from Belgium and the United States, if any of their ports were open, must greatly impair the effect of such a restriction; and for this, as well as for many other purposes, it is upon the vigilance and efficiency of the blockade that the Allied Powers must chiefly look for success. It should be clearly understood, that the order for the exportation of the prohibited articles to the north and east of Europe which are granted by the Privy Council are merely permits to authorise the British customs officers to allow these articles to be shipped. These orders do not operate as a licence for the transport of contraband at sea, and are unconnected with the control which may be exercised by the cruisers over vessels laden with prohibited articles. The trade in contraband of war is free to all vessels under a neutral or friendly flag as long as they are not obnoxious to

the suspicion of carrying prohibited articles to an enemy's port or indirectly to the enemy's use. But where such a suspicion exists, no vessels, whether of our own or any neutral flag, can receive protection; all are liable to be brought in, and the Court of Admiralty can alone decide on their guilt.

We now proceed to the more important documents in the official collection before us. On the 28th March, the day before the declaration of war, the Queen of Great Britain made the following declaration, which was inserted in the *Gazette* of that evening, and appeared at the same time, in the name of the Emperor of the French, in the *Moniteur*:—

‘ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having been compelled to take up arms in support of an ally, is desirous of rendering the war as little onerous as possible to the Powers with whom she remains at peace.

‘ To preserve the commerce of neutrals from all unnecessary obstruction, her Majesty is willing, for the present, to waive a part of the belligerent rights appertaining to her by the law of nations.

‘ It is impossible for her Majesty to forego the exercise of her right of seizing articles contraband of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing the enemy's despatches; and she must maintain the right of a belligerent to prevent neutrals from breaking any effective blockade which may be established with an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, or coasts.

‘ But her Majesty will waive the right of seizing enemy's property laden on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war.

‘ It is not her Majesty's intention to claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemy's ships; and Her Majesty further declares, that being anxious to lessen as much as possible the evils of war, and to restrict its operations to the regularly organised forces of the country, it is not her present intention to issue Letters of Marque for the commissioning of privateers.

‘ Westminster, March 28. 1854.’

Some exception may perhaps be taken to the form of this document, which is that of a State Paper or Notification, rather than a specific Order of the Crown binding on the Courts. It expressed, however, the intentions of Her Majesty, and an Order in Council, passed in the usual form on the 15th April, gave to these intentions a more precise form and binding authority; and the Declaration now claims our notice as one of the most important and extensive concessions yet made to the liberal opinions and growing interests of this age.

It limits in fact the belligerent rights to be exercised by the Crown at present in this war, in as far as they concern neutrals, to two points:—



1. The seizure of articles contraband of war, including despatches, or persons in the naval or military service of the enemy;
2. The maintenance of an effective blockade established by an adequate force against the enemy's forts, harbours, and coasts.

The first of these rights of course implies the exercise of the right of search for contraband of war or despatches, under circumstances which warrant reasonable suspicion after the nationality of the vessel has been ascertained from her papers.

The second of these rights implies the condemnation of neutral ships for the offence of breaking blockade, after it has been duly notified and effectively established.

Having laid down these positive rights, the belligerent Powers expressly announce that they will waive the right of seizing enemies' property on board a neutral vessel, unless it be contraband of war; and that they will not claim the confiscation of neutral property, not being contraband of war, found on board enemies' ships. In other words the British Government consents to act upon this occasion on the principle, that 'the neutral flag covers the enemy's merchandise,' or that 'free bottoms make free goods:' whilst the French Government consents to abandon the converse proposition, not inseparably connected with it, but constantly maintained by France in former wars, that 'the enemy's flag condemns neutral goods.' So that on both sides, and under both the opposite systems of Maritime Law which have for centuries been a fruitful source of juridical argument and of naval warfare, a concession has been made favourable to the claims of neutrals and the general interests of trade. And this concession has been made by the two greatest Maritime Powers of the world, at a moment when their union rendered them the absolute sovereigns of all seas—compelled to no surrender of their principles, but ready of their own free will to take those measures which they conceive to be most favourable to the cause of civilisation and humanity.

These great concessions, however, by no means exhaust the series of changes to which we are adverting. As we have already observed, one of the questions most keenly disputed during the last century, was the right of belligerents to stop neutrals *in transitu*, when on the coasting or colonial trade, under what was termed the 'rule of 1756,' which held that neutrals were not to claim or exercise in war any rights they did not possess in peace, inasmuch as they obtained such rights for the benefit of the enemy rather than for their own. This

belligerent interference is, however, tacitly abandoned, and the first proposition of the Empress Catherine's Declaration thereby admitted. It was, however, contended by Lord Grenville in 1801, that the Third Article of the Treaty with Russia of that year had already opened the coasting trade to neutrals, and this restriction has more than once been abandoned and reasserted. In the case of Russia, as she has no colonies, the rule of 1756 is inapplicable: and, indeed, since the colonial trade of England and Spain has become free, the theory on which that restriction was based, falls to the ground. It is needless to revert to the other points of the Declaration of the Armed Neutrality of 1780,—such as the actual effective character of blockades, making it dangerous to enter the blockaded port,—which was already acknowledged to be the Law of Nations; and the vexed question of convoys may be allowed to rest in a contest with a Power from whose cruisers we have nothing to fear. The course of events has now brought us to adopt the most liberal principles ever advanced by Catherine II. or the Baltic Confederacy, and, as we shall presently show, *a great deal more*; but it is remarkable that a war with Russia should have been the occasion of a change in our maritime policy, on the very topics on which we have twice been warmly opposed to the Court of St. Petersburg.

It would be superfluous at this time, and inconvenient in this place, to renew, or even to trace, the protracted controversies to which these questions have given rise; for, after all, the policy to be pursued by belligerents towards neutrals during war can never be reduced to a fixed proposition of eternal justice, or a rule of positive law.

It is not our intention to embark in a discussion on the fundamental principles of these belligerent rights upon the abstract ground of natural justice and equity; and we are not tempted by the elaborate treatise of M. de Hautefeuille to quit the beaten track of legal tradition and political expediency, by which, after all, these questions must be decided. Disposed as we undoubtedly are to limit the application of belligerent rights to strict necessity, and to recognise the claims of neutrals, it is impossible to set up pretensions founded only on preconceived notions of public equity, against the precise obligations which have been sanctioned by the practice of nations and the decisions of maritime courts. Writers like M. de Hautefeuille and M. Ortolan (who, however, is not a lawyer, but an officer of marine) do not advance their cause by shifting it from the groundwork of positive law; and, indeed, the former of these writers appears to us to give up the whole of his argument as far as it is based on legal authority, by the admission, that, with

the exception of Hubner, 'all the jurists who have defended the 'rights of neutral nations belong to the 19th century.' (*Haute-feuille*, vol. iii. p. 306.)

The question has, in fact, been variously dealt with for the last two centuries, according to the relative power and interests of belligerents and neutrals, or of the same States being at different times in one or the other of these conditions. The rules of international law are those originally incorporated in the *Consolato del Mar*; but these rules have been subjected to exceptions by treaty as often as governments conceived it to be their interest to restrict their application, which was practically the case in a large proportion of the treaties of peace and navigation of the 16th and 17th centuries. This relaxation, however, was a matter of expediency in each case. Thus, just after the British Government, in 1655, had acceded to the terms favourable to neutrals in its treaty with Portugal, the same point was raised by the Swedish ambassador in London; but to this Lord Commissioner Whitelocke replied, 'We were *against* that proposition, that a free ship should make free goods, which the Secretary said would increase their (the Swedish ships) exceedingly; and other nations would sell or build their ships to colour the carrying of contraband goods to our enemies.'\* In point of fact, nothing is more difficult than to establish a general proposition in the law of nations, except by special agreement; because there is no universal binding sanction to enforce respect and obedience to such laws; and we can hardly accede to Dr. Phillimore's proposition in his very learned and eloquent commentaries, that the law derived from the consent of nations is practically subordinate to the law derived from God; inasmuch as the laws of God are essentially immutable, and the law of nations has been frequently adapted to the convenience and interests of society.

The only restraint which can be applied to the abuse of superior maritime power, is the dread of ulterior consequences and the dread of public opinion; but both these restraints have not unfrequently been broken through and defied by powerful States pursuing important national objects. The true principle to mitigate the rigour of this part of the Law of Nations, is a more dispassionate consideration of the rights of others, aided by a more enlightened perception of our own national interests; and we trust we may arrive at a time when it will be acknowledged and received as a maxim of state that the interest of the country is best secured, not by applying the

\* Whitelocke's Memorials, p. 639.

rights of war in all their rigour to our own subjects and to neutrals, but, on the contrary, by circumscribing those rights within the narrowest limits which are consistent with the effective prosecution of hostilities.

If we are to look to the Middle Ages for the sources of our maritime law, and to invest the traditions of the Law of Nations with the veneration due to antiquity, the *Consolato del Mar* unquestionably supports the jurisprudence of the British Maritime Courts to the fullest extent. It has been shown by M. Pardessus that this compilation of the earliest recorded usages and laws of the sea, was drawn up at Barcelona about the end of the fourteenth century, in the bastard Latin, which was the basis of the language spoken to this day in Catalonia. The same principles were recognised by all the Maritime Republics which flourished in that and the preceding century on the shores of the Mediterranean. These principles may be reduced to two leading propositions.

1. Goods belonging to an enemy, and laden on a friendly or neutral ship, are liable to capture, and may be confiscated as prize of war.
2. Goods belonging to a friend, laden on an enemy's vessel, are not liable to confiscation.

Such are the fundamental doctrines which have been established for centuries by the exercise of belligerent rights and the decisions of maritime jurisprudence, from the Middle Ages down to the eighteenth century. They have been constantly recognised by our own Courts; and they are recorded with equal respect by the American jurists, Wheaton, Kent, and Story, who rank amongst the first writers on International Law of the last half century.

But whilst we confidently assert that these principles are the historical basis of the whole system of maritime capture, we readily admit that the tendency of successive ages has been to modify the application of them. It is a common opinion, that this country has uniformly been opposed to all relaxations of these rules, and has invariably enforced them with the power of its maritime ascendancy. It is also a common opinion, much repeated by continental writers, that France has been the great champion of the opposite doctrine, and the protectress of the rights of neutrals and the liberty of the seas. We undertake to show that both these opinions are unfounded. With reference to the former proposition, it is not true that the recognition by this country of the doctrine that 'free ships make 'free goods,' is an unprecedented novelty; it is equally untrue

that France originated that principle. With reference to the second proposition that goods belonging to a neutral are not condemned on board an enemy's vessel, this country has generally held the doctrine most favourable to the neutral owner, and France has almost invariably maintained the opposite and more severe doctrine.

The earliest treaty by which England recognised a departure from the usage of the Law of Nations, that the neutral flag does not cover enemies' property, was that concluded in 1654, between the Crown of Portugal and the Commissioners of the Commonwealth. This treaty was held by Lord Stowell to be still in force in the early part of the last war, and he gave the benefit of it to Portuguese ships carrying enemy's goods by virtue of the XXIII. Article, which runs in the following terms:—

‘ That all goods and merchandise of the said republic or king, or of their people or subjects, found on board the ships of the enemies of the other, shall be made prize together with the ships, and confiscated to the public; but all the goods and merchandise of the enemies of either on board the ships of either, or their people or subjects, shall remain untouched.’

The principal writers on international law, and especially Mr. Wheaton, in his *History of the Law of Nations*, have stated that the first treaty on this subject concluded between England and Spain is that signed at Madrid in 1667, and that, although this treaty provided that neutral and friendly property is liable to confiscation on enemy's ships, it does not establish the converse proposition, that free ships make free goods. But all these writers have overlooked a previous treaty of 1665, which is given in the 1st vol. of Abreu's *Spanish Collection*, and quoted in *Hauterive's Collection*, vol. ii. p. 383. This treaty contains the following articles:—

(29.) ‘ It is expressly agreed, that any thing which shall be shipped by the subjects or inhabitants of the dominions of one of the two Sovereigns on ships belonging to the enemy of the other (although the same be not merchandise of contraband) shall be confiscated, together with all the goods found on such ship without exception.

(30.) ‘ On the other hand, all the goods found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of one of the two Sovereigns, shall be free reciprocally, although a part or the whole of the cargo be the property of an enemy of the allied Powers, except only merchandise of contraband.’

The same principle was established by the Commercial Treaty between France and England, signed at St. Germain in 1677. The Dutch, who, as the chief carriers of Europe, had strongly contended for neutral rights, and had obtained the admission of the doctrine, that their neutral flag should cover enemies' property from Philip IV. of Spain in 1650, insisted on the adoption of the same principle by Sir William Temple, in his negotiations with De Witt. The commercial articles of the Treaty of Breda in 1667, provided:—

‘Quod id omne quod a subditis S. M. alieni navi Dominorum Ordinum pertinenti illatum erit, etiamsi ex genere mercium interdictarum haud fuerit, fisco applicatur una cum omnibus et singulis illic repertis. Contra vero iterum *immune et in tuto sit id omne quod navibus ad subditos S.M. pertinentibus invenietur*, quamvis iis imposita aut pars eorum ad hostes Dominorum Ordinum pertinuerit.’

And the same stipulation was repeated in the treaty of peace with England in 1674. The principle was maintained between this country and the United Provinces until 1756, when Great Britain refused to acknowledge it any longer, in consequence of the conduct of the Dutch at the breaking out of the Seven Years' War, and in the commercial questions of that period. The concession of the principle to the Dutch was the more important, inasmuch as they were, by position and by trade, the most considerable of the maritime states whose neutrality was maintained during some of the contests of that period.

Whilst this was the policy of England, in her relations with her nearest allies in Portugal and in Holland, that of France was diametrically opposite. Francis I., in 1543, had decreed, not only that the neutral flag did not cover enemies' goods, but that enemies' goods found on a neutral vessel confiscated the whole cargo, and the ship itself. This edict far exceeded in severity the original doctrines of the *Consolato del Mar*, on which it was built, yet it was for nearly two centuries incorporated into the maritime jurisprudence of France. The Dutch, indeed, in their negotiations with the French, had stoutly combated these pretensions. De Witt reported in 1658, that he had obtained the surrender ‘de cette prétendue loi Française que *la robe d'ennemi confisque celle d'ami*,’ but he renounced all hope at that time of obtaining the assent of France to the converse proposition, that *free ships make free goods*. It was not until the Peace of Nymeguen, in 1678, that the Dutch succeeded in inducing the Court of France to make this concession; but, in fact, it was not made in sincerity, or adhered to as

the rule of the French Council of Prize. For in 1681, three years later, Louis XIV. promulgated his celebrated Ordinance of the Marine, which asserted the belligerent rights of the Crown against neutrals in the most violent and imperious form. The VII. Article of that Ordinance is in these words:—

‘ *Tous navires qui se trouveront chargés d’effets appartenants à nos ennemis, et les marchandises de nos sujets et alliés qui se trouveront dans un navire ennemi, seront parcellément de bonne prise.*’

It would be difficult to express in a more succinct form the two extreme propositions of the law of prize; for, in the first place, the Law of Nations has never sanctioned the universal confiscation of neutral and friendly *ships*, merely because they are found carrying enemies’ property; and, in the second place, the confiscation of neutral and friendly property because it is found on enemies’ ships, is a practice which the Law of Nations, as we hold it, has never authorised. In the former of these cases, the old maritime law of England would hold the property to be liable to confiscation, but not the ship; and in the latter case, the ship, but not the property. Louis XIV., in both cases, pronounced both ship and cargo good prize. Such was the Maritime Law of France for a very considerable period. In July, 1704, another Royal Ordinance was passed which decreed that —

‘ *S’il se trouvait sur des vaisseaux neutres des effets appartenant aux ennemis de sa Majesté, les vaisseaux et tout le chargement seront de bonne prise.*’

And it was not till 1744 that this extraordinary edict with reference to neutral ships was abrogated by an ordinance, which provided that enemies’ goods should still be liable to seizure under the flag of a neutral, but that the neutral ship should be restored.

The first important relaxation of this law was that introduced by the Commercial Treaty of Utrecht, concluded with England in 1713, in the following Article:—

XVII. ‘ *It shall be lawful for all and singular the subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, and of the most Christian King, to sail with their ships, with all manner of security and liberty, no distinction being made who are the proprietors of the merchandises laden thereon, from any port to the places of those who are now or shall be hereafter at enmity with the Queen of Great Britain, or the most Christian King. It shall likewise be lawful for the subjects and inhabitants aforesaid, to sail with the ships and merchandises aforementioned, and to trade with the same liberty and security from the places, ports,*

‘ and havens of those who are enemies of both, or of either party, without any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only directly from the places of the enemy aforementioned to neutral places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy to another place belonging to an enemy, whether they be under the jurisdiction of the same prince, or under several. And as it is now stipulated concerning ships and goods, that free ships shall also give a freedom to goods, and that every thing shall be deemed to be free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the confederates, although the whole lading, or any part thereof, should appertain to the enemies of either of their Majesties, contraband goods being always excepted.’

It may be observed, with reference to stipulations of this nature, that they have commonly been introduced into treaties at the conclusion of a general peace, when they can be of no practical effect, inasmuch as they relate to the state of war; and that on the recurrence of war they have as frequently been thrown aside or forgotten. This remark is the more applicable to such agreements between England and France, inasmuch as those States have been too often engaged as direct enemies and principals in war to have attended much to their reciprocal rights of neutrality, or to the terms of such a maritime alliance as we now happily witness.

But notwithstanding the stipulations of 1713, neither England nor France had departed from the general law of prize. The Seven Years’ War was conducted with the full exercise of belligerent rights, by sea as well as by land, and the question of the neutral flag was aggravated by that of colonial trade. Indeed, as late as 1779, when a French plenipotentiary was sent to negotiate a treaty with the Duke of Mecklenburg, it was expressly provided, that enemies’ property taken under the Mecklenburg flag should be confiscated\*; and even the ordinance of

\* Great stress is laid upon this remark by M. Koch in his edition of Schöll’s treaties; but although this provision occurs in Art. XV. of the Mecklenburg treaty, Article XXI., contains a material departure from the old French law in the following terms:—

‘ Les vaisseaux Mecklenbourgeois sur lesquels il se trouvera des marchandises appartenantes aux ennemis de S. M. ne pourront être retenus, amenés ni consignés, non plus que le reste de leur cargaison, mais seulement les marchandises et denrées de la qualité spécifiée’—that is, contraband of war and enemies’ goods—‘seront confisquées, S. M. dérogeant à cet égard à tous usages et ordonnances contraires, même à celles des années 1536, 1584 et 1681, qui portent que la robe ennemie confisque la marchandise et le vaisseau



Louis XVI. in 1778 maintained the essential principles of the ordinance of 1681, with the exception of a mitigation of the law on the subject of the transport of contraband of war.

Thus far we hold it to be demonstrated that the doctrine of 'free ships make free goods,' had found no support from France, but that the opposite doctrine had been applied with rigour, and even united to the converse proposition that the enemy's flag condemns neutral goods. But towards the close of the eighteenth century, a great revolution in maritime law, as in many of the other institutions of the world, was at hand. The United States of America had declared their independence. France was intoxicated by the prospect of their success. Franklin was American minister at Versailles; and on the 6th February, 1778, a treaty was signed between the King of France and the United States of North America, which provided (Art. 23.) that the subjects and citizens of both countries should be at liberty to frequent the harbours of the enemies of the contracting parties, or of either of them, and to trade not only directly from the ports of such enemy to a neutral port, but also from one enemy's port to another; and it was further stipulated that free ships should make free goods, and that all goods shall be considered free on board the ships belonging to the contracting parties, even though the cargo, or part thereof, should belong to the enemies of one of them.\*

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'ami.' This curious clause proves beyond all doubt what the French law had been to that time.

\* The American statesmen of that time, however, never contended for these principles, except as the result of express stipulations; and Mr. Jefferson's language on the subject deserves to be remembered. In 1793, when that eminent man was Secretary of State, he wrote to M. Genet, French minister at Washington, in these terms:—

'I believe it cannot be doubted but that, by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an enemy are free, and the goods of an enemy found in the vessel of a friend are lawful prize. It is true that sundry nations, desirous of avoiding the inconvenience of having their vessels stopped at sea, ransacked, carried into port, and detained, under pretence of having enemies' goods aboard, have in many instances introduced by their special treaties another principle between them; that enemy bottoms shall make enemy goods, and friendly bottoms friendly goods—a principle much less embarrassing to commerce, and equal to all parties in point of gain or loss. But this is altogether the effect of particular treaty, controlling in special cases the general principle of the Law of Nations, and therefore taking effect between such nations only as have so agreed to control it.'

If these pages should be read beyond the Atlantic, where these

Whatever might be the intrinsic value of principles of maritime law such as these, they were hateful to George III. and to his ministers and his people as the basis of an alliance between the American colonies and the Court of France; and they served at that moment only to add virulence to the hostilities which were raging. Ere long, however, the Northern States, whose interests were more concerned in the defence of the neutral trade than the belligerents themselves, found means to make their claims heard; and a formidable combination was organised in their defence. It was owing to an accident and a cabinet intrigue that Catherine II. placed herself, in 1780, at the head of that league which was termed the Armed Neutrality of the North; for the Empress had at first expressed to Lord Malmesbury her intention of supporting the views of England; and the means by which Count Panin turned the tables on Prince Potemkin and the British ambassador, are related with spirit in the memoirs of Goertz. Catherine had been provoked by the seizure of two Russian ships by Spain; and her minister adroitly insinuated, that, in defending her own wrongs, she might assume the position of a champion of neutral rights throughout the world.

A maritime convention was concluded on the 9th July, 1780, between the Empress of all the Russias and the King of Denmark, to carry into effect the principles which Catherine had already proclaimed by her ordinance of the 19th May of the same year. Strictly prohibiting trade in contraband of war, these acts and treaties peremptorily asserted the right of neutrals to carry all other merchandise whatsoever, and to whomsoever it might belong, even to one of the belligerent Powers, in neutral bottoms, and under the protection of the neutral flag. These principles were afterwards expressed in four propositions:—

- I. That every ship may sail freely from port to port, and along the coasts of States at war.
- II. That goods belonging to the subjects of States at war are free in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband of war.
- III. That to determine what constitutes a blockaded port, this denomination is only given to a port where, by the arrangement of the Power attacking it with vessels sufficiently near, there is an evident danger in entering.
- IV. That neutral ships are not to be stopped without just

topics are warmly and not always correctly discussed, we hope our friends in the United States will give due weight to Mr. Jefferson's accurate and authoritative statement.

grounds and evidence against them, and that they be judged when stopped without delay; and, if acquitted, should be entitled to a complete satisfaction.

A similar treaty was shortly afterwards signed between Russia and Sweden. The States of Holland acceded to the same conventions on the 9th September, and proudly recalled the fact that they had obtained the recognition of similar principles from Spain in 1650, from France in 1739, and from Great Britain in 1674. Prussia followed in the same course in May, 1781. The Emperor of Germany acceded to the league in October, 1781; and Portugal signed a treaty with Russia on the same basis in July, 1782. The Court of Versailles, though, as one of the belligerents, less directly interested in the neutral question, declared by its note of the 25th April, 1781, that it accepted these principles of maritime law; and Louis XVI. rejoiced in the widely extended application of these views, to which the prevailing opinions of the age, and the influence of the American plenipotentiaries in Paris, had given extreme popularity. England alone resisted, but she was drawing to the close of an unsuccessful war, under a series of feeble governments, and in no condition to renew hostilities against every maritime Power in Europe. She acted more wisely, and joined the great conspiracy, which she could not hope to dissolve. The American treaties negotiated by Franklin with France, Sweden, and some other Powers, contained a distinct recognition of the rights of neutrals, and of the doctrine that free ships make free goods. But when, in 1786, Mr. Eden went to Paris to retrieve the consequences of an unfavourable treaty of peace by an admirable treaty of commerce, *he was instructed by Mr. Pitt to consent to a formal recognition of the great principle of the freedom of the neutral flag*, which was accordingly set forth at length in the Twentieth Article of Mr. Eden's Treaty. It is a circumstance worthy of note, and which has not to our knowledge been pointed out by any writer on this subject, that this Twentieth Article of the British Treaty of 1786 with France is identical in effect and almost in terms with the Twenty-third Article of Franklin's Treaty of 1778 with France, and with the Seventh Article of Franklin's Treaty of 1783 with Sweden; so that, in an interval of eight years, the Government of Mr. Pitt adopted the principles of maritime law, and even the phrasology of those stipulations to which the previous ministers of George III. and this country had been mortally opposed. It is true that none of these conventional arrangements which had been intended to mitigate the exercise of belligerent rights, survived the con-

vulsion of the revolutionary wars. The United States concluded a treaty with England in 1794, which recognised the seizure of enemies' goods under the neutral flag. The French Directory decreed on the 12 Nivose an V. that enemies' property found in American bottoms were good prize, and by another ordinance of the 29 Nivose an VI. all neutral vessels carrying enemies' goods were to be seized and condemned. The attempt to revive the league of the Armed Neutrality in 1800 was dissipated by the first attack on Copenhagen. The death of Paul, and the subsequent events of the war, led to the application of belligerent rights in their fullest extent, unrestrained by treaty or by law.

These facts sufficiently establish the proposition, that if the principles adopted by the British Government, in conjunction with that of France, during the present hostilities, are at variance with those acted upon during the last war, they are at least not without precedent. It may, indeed, be asserted that the progress of more liberal principles in maritime warfare had been steady and continuous from 1660 down to the French Revolution of 1789, when that fierce revolutionary contest, which overturned all law and all tradition in so many parts of Europe, threw us back upon practices and traditions which could only be justified by an appeal to the harsh usages of much earlier times. Those traditions constitute, in fact, no binding authority upon ourselves. The circumstances under which they were resorted to, have not recurred, and are not likely to recur. A period of forty years has elapsed since these questions have been debated in our Courts of Law and our Houses of Parliament; and if the Government of Queen Victoria sought for a precedent to guide the maritime policy of the country, they had more reason to take that precedent from the liberal treaties of 1654 and 1786 than from retaliatory measures such as those of 1807 and 1809. They obtained, moreover, from France, a distinct renunciation of the old French doctrine that the '*robe d'ennemi confisque*' '*marchandise d'ami.*' The less severe portion of both systems has been retained; the more severe maxims have been rejected; so that neutrals are placed to the full in as favourable a position as was ever claimed for them by the confederacy of 1780; and though the Crown still asserts the existence of the belligerent rights it formerly enforced, and which may legally be exercised in case of necessity, they are for the present waived and suspended.

But the concessions and relaxations of belligerent rights which have accompanied the late declaration of war do not stop here, and it will readily be perceived that they could not stop at this point. Under the former system of maritime law adminis-

tered by the British Courts and assisted by the vigilance and power of the British fleet, all commerce in the property of the enemy was prohibited. That property might be seized under the flag of the neutral vessel, and all dealings in it, whether direct or indirect, were severely interdicted to British subjects. In other words, to render the commerce of the enemy as difficult and dangerous as possible, we did not hesitate to subject the neutral who engaged in it to considerable vexation, and upon the same principle we punished by confiscation such of our own subjects or ships as were found to be carrying it on.

But from the moment that the trade of neutrals with the enemy is recognised and the transport of enemies' property allowed under the protection of the neutral flag, with the sole limitations of blockade and contraband of war, the motive for this severity of prohibition on our own subjects is at an end. We concede to the neutral, by this waiver of strict belligerent rights, permission not only to enter the enemy's ports, not being blockaded, but also to take his produce and property on board, and to bring it for sale to this or any other country. But by the law of England, it would have been illegal for a British subject to take on board a cargo of enemies' property even in a neutral port without the licence of the Crown. All trade, direct or indirect, was strictly prohibited, on the principle of universal law we have already quoted from Lord Stowell. Indeed, the grand disqualification of commercial intercourse still remains in force, that, by the law of almost every country, the character of an alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, or, in other words, to enforce contracts and recover debts by process of law—a disqualification which can only be removed, we apprehend, by statute.

If this prohibition to British subjects had continued in force after the 28th of March, both the neutral and the enemy would have found themselves in a better position for all the purposes of trade than our own merchants; for the neutral could alone have carried on these transactions, and the enemy would have thrown all the advantage of them into his hands. The effect of the declaration of the 28th of March would have been that, although Russian property, engaged in direct trade with this country in neutral bottoms, would be safe from English cruisers, English property, engaged in direct trade with Russia, would be liable to seizure and confiscation by our own cruisers, and, indeed, by French and Turkish cruisers; for a co-belligerent may seize the property of his ally engaged in trade with the common enemy, because such trade is considered a violation of their duty to each other. To meet this difficulty, two courses

were open to the Government; either to grant licences to trade with the enemy, by virtue of the prerogative of the Crown or to promulgate a general order which should, to a great degree, suspend these restrictions.

The system of licences\* was largely practised in the late war, when it was employed on both sides, by the English and French Governments, to mitigate in some degree the effects of their own prohibitive edicts. Licences were an unavoidable evil, when every species of commercial restriction was enforced with excessive rigour, but they unquestionably gave rise to the most pernicious abuses and frauds. The privilege they conferred on a particular trader was continually transferred by sale. Whilst M. de Bourrienne was French agent at Hamburgh, his office was notoriously a mart for permits to evade the Continental System, and even in our own North American Colonies, it is recorded in Stewart's Reports, that 'Sidmouth's Licences' sold for 100 dollars, and 'Foster's Licences' for 10 dollars. It is true, the inferior article was in reality quite invalid and worthless. Sometimes conditions were annexed to the granting of licenses which were absurdly evaded at the expense of the consumer:—thus the French Imperial Government required that every ship licensed to bring in a cargo of British goods should export an equal value of French goods. The outward cargo was duly taken on board, and the vessel cleared, but as no French goods could be brought into England without a separate licence from the British Government, the more common practice was to throw the exported cargo into the sea, go in ballast to a port where English goods were to be obtained, and charge the price of both cargoes on the articles brought in for the use of the French consumer. Neutral ships sometimes were allowed to sail under double licences from both belligerents, in order to effect an exchange in commodities essential to their existence. • Thus, in 1813, Great Britain required corn on any terms on which it could be

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\* The authors of the 'Manual of Maritime Law' have fallen into several considerable errors on this subject, which we have not space fully to examine or correct (*Manual, &c.* p. 372.). But we must observe that the power to make Orders in Council, or to grant licences for the liberty of trade, is *not*, as they suppose, derived from special Acts of Parliament, or of a limited nature, but is an undoubted part of the Prerogative in limiting the exercise of the belligerent rights that appertain to the Crown. These gentlemen appear to have hastened their compilation through the press before the important modifications introduced upon the declaration of war were known or understood. Mr. William Loch's 'Practical Guide,' contains a more faithful and accurate compendium of the law as it now stands.

procured; and France permitted corn to be exchanged for colonial produce, which she equally wanted; but these transactions were privileged speculations of a very precarious and gambling character, in which the consumer paid a large additional premium to cover the cost of the licence or the risk of the importer.

The theory on which licences to trade with the enemy were granted is that of public utility, and not of private advantage; but each licence creates a privilege in favour of the grantee, who can command a monopoly price for his articles. If, on the contrary, licences are granted without discrimination, they serve to set at nought the restriction which should be no longer imposed. Moreover the enormous development of modern trade, the infinite varieties and facilities of intercourse, and the ramifications by which every want of human society is supplied, have rendered it physically impossible to act otherwise than by general rules founded on public principles. On these grounds the Allied Governments are understood to have come to the resolution to grant no special licences at all, but to leave the operations of trade as much as possible to their natural course, subject only to the positive operations of war. Of these the most important, in a commercial point of view, is, of course, blockade, and it has also been determined, that a blockade, once being established, should be rigorously maintained. Indeed, since by a blockade the belligerent Powers exercise the right of excluding all ships from the ports of the enemy, it would be contrary to sound principle and natural justice, if these Powers gave to their own subjects, or to the subjects of their allies, a permission to break that chain by which even neutrals are excluded. For this purpose, too, no licences are to be granted. It becomes a question, however, of some nicety and importance to determine how far our cruisers and our courts will allow ships to come out of blockaded ports for the purpose of bringing away British or neutral property purchased before the declaration of war. According to the course of trade in Russia, very large advances are habitually made by British, Dutch, and other merchants, to buy up Russian produce, which is thus paid for before it is shipped and brought down to the seaports of Archangel, Riga, or St. Petersburg, to await the season of navigation. There is a case in the American Courts (*The Rapid*, 8 Cranch), quoted in Mr. Wheaton's excellent Treatise on International Law, which would throw great doubt on the right of our own subjects to bring away their property from the enemy's dominions after a declaration of war. But our own courts have never sanctioned so extreme a doctrine. Many of our treaties give British sub-

jects an express term for the removal of their property; and according to the law as laid down by Lord Stowell, ‘ A neutral vessel, having *already taken on board a cargo before the blockade begins*, may be at liberty to retire with it, but she can only take away a cargo *bonâ fide purchased and delivered before the commencement of the blockade*. It is obvious that a contrary rule would only inflict loss on our own merchants, by depriving them of the means of removing their property, but, at the same time, a line must be drawn to prevent fraudulent removals of property through a blockade subsequent to the notification of it. On this point Mr. Loch observes:—

‘ Licences to enter into blockaded ports for the purposes of traffic, are, beyond doubt, the most noxious of all licences. Weighing all these serious objections to the system, the Government determined not to issue any licences at all, not even for the limited and special purpose of enabling parties to bring away British goods said to be locked up in the ports of Russia, and which the Order of the 29th of March would not effectually relieve.

‘ The reasons which induced our Government not to yield on this point, even though pressed to do so by that of France, were that the Law of Nations would sufficiently cover those cargoes purchased and shipped previous to the commencement of hostilities; and that with regard to contracts subsequently entered into, and which affected but a very limited amount of property, as the parties had entered into them knowingly, and with the palpable design of speculating on the chance of large profits, it was not held that they were entitled to much consideration. In order, however, to facilitate the removal of British property from the ports of the Baltic and the White Sea, which were frozen up at the date of the order of the 29th March, further leave was given, by another order in Council, dated 15th April, to Russian vessels to come out of those ports, to any port of Her Majesty’s dominions, and, after discharging their cargoes, to continue their voyage to any port not blockaded.’

Since then, on the one hand, the concessions made to neutrals had already relaxed the stringency of the laws of war, and left a door open to the trade of the enemy, whilst, on the other hand, the manifold abuses and injustice of the licensing system deterred the Allied Governments from reviving that practice, the only course which remained open to them was *to legalise trade with the enemy*. The order in Council of the 15th April accordingly declared that ‘ all vessels under a neutral or friendly flag, being neutral or friendly property, should be permitted<sup>s</sup> to import into any port or place in Her Majesty’s dominions all goods and merchandise whatsoever, *to whomsoever the same may belong*, and to export in like manner to any port, ‘ not blockaded, any cargo or goods not being contraband of war or not re-



‘quiring a special permission.’ The effect of this most important order, which may be considered the Charter of Trade during hostilities, is in fact to do away with all inquiry as to the origin or ownership of property under a friendly or neutral flag, by legalising the import and the export trade. It therefore goes far beyond any of the former stipulations in favour of the neutral trade, which were made chiefly out of respect to neutral rights; but this order expressly recognises, and so far encourages, trade in the property of the enemy himself under our own flag as well as under that of neutrals. ‘All goods and ‘merchandise whatsoever to whomsoever the same may belong,’ are words including Russian property, which may be shipped under any flag but the Russian, and it is open to all traders to take such cargoes on board in any port not being blockaded. The same order goes on to declare, ‘that all the subjects of Her ‘Majesty, and the subjects and citizens of any neutral or friendly ‘State shall and may during and notwithstanding the present ‘hostilities with Russia, *freely trade* with all ports and places ‘not being in a state of blockade,’ with the sole exception that no British vessel shall, under any circumstances whatever, enter or communicate with an enemy’s port.

This important measure is described in the following terms by Mr. Loch:—

‘The effect of this order is, therefore, to leave the trade of this country with neutrals, and even the indirect trade with Russia, in the same state it was during peace, as far as the law of our Courts Maritime is concerned, and the doctrine of illegal trading with the enemy is at an end. The restrictions henceforth to be imposed are solely those arising out of direct naval and military operations, such as blockade, and those which the enemy may think fit to lay upon British and French property. As far as we are concerned, except that British ships are not to enter Russian ports, which it is obvious that they could not do without incurring the risk of a forfeiture of their property and the imprisonment of their crews, and which may otherwise be objectionable on certain grounds of policy into which it is not necessary to enter in this place, the trade may be lawfully carried on in any manner which the ingenuity and enterprise of our merchants can devise.

‘It is not easy to convey to the mind of the mercantile classes of the present generation, who have had no practical experience of the state of war, the extent of the change which is thus effected in their favour. The vigilance of our cruisers and the acuteness of our lawyers were incessantly employed in all former contests in tracking out the faintest scent of enemy’s property on board every vessel met on the seas. The character of enemy’s property was regarded as an infection, and reprobated with all the terms ordinarily reserved for guilty practices. The mercantile ingenuity of the country, pressed

by the increased demand and exorbitant prices of prohibited articles, was strained to evade by every species of fraud these prohibitions, and a warfare was carried on within our own Courts of Justice between the pitiless exactions of the laws of war and the irresistible impulse of those of trade.

‘From many of these perplexities and difficulties the order in Council of the 15th of April, 1854, will for the present relieve us.’

The only advantage therefore which the neutral retains over the national flag under this order is that of entering Russian ports, from which we are obviously excluded; but in all other respects trade with the enemy is still as free to British subjects as it is to neutrals. Should Russia exercise her belligerent rights, it is clear that British ships could never enter Russian ports without risk of capture, and they would further be exposed to the danger of desertion of seamen. This apparent advantage to neutrals — of entering Russian ports — is further materially abated by the fact, that the allied fleets have it in their power to close every port of Russia by blockade when they are not closed by ice. On the other hand, the limitation placed by this state of war on the enemy is the exclusion of his own flag from navigation and the condemnation of his property under that flag. In other respects the sovereign power which declares war has given a general licence to trade notwithstanding hostilities, and so far suspended the exercise of belligerent rights. It is, therefore, as Bynkershoeck expresses it, *pro parte bellum, pro parte pax inter subditos utriusque principis* — and the Allied Governments have set the example of that experiment which appeared monstrous and unheard of to the elder jurists, — namely, a partial commercial peace in the midst of a political war; for it is impossible to recognise freedom of trade with the enemy during war without recognising and protecting his private rights of property, and there is no medium between the absolute condemnation of his property wherever found, and placing the ships and goods of the Allied Powers in their mercantile relations with the enemy on the same legal footing as those of the neutral trader, except when affected by positive acts of war. In the language of the law, it will be for our courts to decide how far this Order in Council extends protection to the property and rights of those who would otherwise be considered as alien enemies; and it is not easy to foresee to what extent the relations of mankind will be affected by so novel and comprehensive a principle. Neither shall we venture to affirm that it would be practicable to apply the same principle in countries less liable than Russia to the pressure of a close blockade, for in proportion as we have reason to expect that her ports can be

hermetically closed by our cruisers, we are enabled to forego the exercise of other modes of coercion.

It is unnecessary to advert at length to the other Orders in Council passed at the commencement of the war, because they were of temporary application, and were intended merely to secure a time of grace to Russian vessels on their way to British ports, which were allowed to come in, discharge their cargoes, and depart without molestation, down to the 10th of May. The Russian ships afloat in different parts of the world were, however, placed in a position of great difficulty, for their own ports were closed against them by ice or by blockade. Some of them fell into the hands of our cruisers, not being protected by these orders; the greater number sold themselves in neutral ports. At the breaking out of hostilities there were but *two* British ships in the Northern ports of Russia, and these were detained for some weeks on political grounds, though not confiscated. It has in times of peace been usual for twenty or thirty British ships to winter at St. Petersburg; and the returns of the number and tonnage of the ships entering that port show that more than half were British; thus in 1838, the total number of ships, in and out of St. Petersburg, (including the Russians themselves) was 1310 vessels of 261,680 tons; of these 725 vessels of 163,812 tons were British. But the whole of this trade had been brought to a close or thrown into other channels before the declaration of war.

The declaration of the Emperor of Russia differs from that of the Allied Governments in two important particulars. He does not pledge himself to issue no letters of marque of privateers, and he announces that *vessels* carrying contraband to war will be seized, whereas the cruisers of England and France will seize the contraband articles only. It would be superfluous for us to enter upon a defence of the laudable attempt of the Allied Powers to discountenance the practice of commissioning privateers. Vessels equipped under letters of marque carry on the savage and predatory usages of war in their worst forms and for the worst purposes. They are, for the most part, beyond the control of the State in whose name and under whose commission they rove the seas. Their depredations are, in fact, a remnant of more barbarous times, and are utterly at variance with the more enlightened principle, that war should be exclusively carried on by the regular forces of the belligerents. It will be an immense boon to the true interests of mankind if this example should be followed, and the system of privateering abandoned for ever: This country and the United States, as the two great trading nations of the earth, are especially interested

in repressing the practice of this clandestine warfare, and the next step to abandoning it ourselves will be to refuse to recognise it in others. Already the legislation of the United States, and of almost every civilised nation, renders it penal to accept commissions of marque from a foreign Power against the property of a country not at war with the State to which the holder of such a commission belongs. If Russia issue letters of marque at all, it must be to foreign privateers, inasmuch as her own ports will be closed, and she would have no means of bringing in her prizes for condemnation. Even in the Eastern Archipelago, where great injury might be done to our trade, Russian privateers would not easily find a port of refuge; but if any of her letters of marque should be taken up by foreign adventurers, we hope they will be treated with the severity they deserve.

An opinion is entertained by some persons who applaud the liberal spirit in which the Allied Governments have applied themselves to these questions, that it is possible to carry this toleration and remission of belligerent rights still further, and to renounce the practice of maritime captures of private property altogether. Why, they argue, should the plunder of industrious merchants, which is thought disgraceful on land, be encouraged and legalised at sea? Is the advantage we derive from the interruption we can inflict on the operations of these persons commensurate to the evils their losses must impose on society at large? These are questions which may hereafter be solved in the same liberal spirit which has already mitigated so many of the evils of war. But we must observe, that the contrast drawn between the respect habitually paid to the rights of property on land and the capture of enemy's property at sea, is not unsupported by a substantial distinction. The seizure of an enemy's ships is not dictated by a desire to plunder him of his wealth; but it is the means employed, and the only means that can be employed, to exclude his flag from the ocean, to cut him off from the supply of those articles he draws from maritime commerce, except in as far as they can be conveyed to him by neutrals; and, if the war be prolonged, to destroy that maritime population which serves to recruit his navy. The hardship inflicted on individuals by the capture of their property, is a thing to be regretted rather than desired; and the Russian seamen taken in some of the prizes made at the outbreak of this war were astonished at the kindness and liberality with which they were treated. But this infliction is the only mode of accomplishing an important national object. It mattered little whether a few Russian brigs carrying cargoes of salt from Setubal were brought into the Thames; but the loss of that salt

is a severe blow on the population of the North, for it is used by them in their fisheries, and the want of it tends to increase that pressure by which we hope eventually to reduce the enemy to sue for peace. The stoppage of the foreign maritime trade of Russia is an enormous object; for the bulky nature of her produce, such as timber, hemp, tallow, &c., renders it unfit for land carriage; and when the export of it is stopped, she loses her means of exchange.

On the other hand, her ungenial climate and soil render her peculiarly dependent on foreign countries for many of the necessaries, and all the luxuries, of existence. The import of British coal into St. Petersburg exceeds 40,000 tons a year; and as none of this essential commodity is found in the northern governments of the empire, or can be procured except by sea, the blockade cuts off in this single article not only an important commodity for warlike purposes, but the means of giving light to the streets of the capital, and activity to many branches of manufacture. In like manner, the prevention of the direct importation of cotton twist, of colonial produce, and of wine, must enormously increase the price of these commodities. To relax any of the rights which tend directly to reduce the enemy to terms, would, in fact, be a mistaken act of humanity, since it would prolong the war.

But to effect these objects, it is on the blockade that the Allied Powers have mainly to rely, since they cannot by any other means prevent the neutral flag from supplying the wants of the Russian empire; it is therefore highly desirable that the blockade should be strictly enforced during the present season, but it may become a question hereafter, whether it be not expedient to allow cargoes of certain articles of Russian produce to pass out of the blockade, though this concession would probably only be obtained by allowing these ships to carry in articles of demand in Russia. In a war like the present, begun solely by the wilfulness and ambition of one man, without any real national interest at stake in the quarrel, it must never be forgotten that the pressure we may be able to inflict on all classes of society in the Russian empire is one of the most powerful means we possess of crippling the Russian Government by producing a reaction of interest and opinion against the head of it.

Modern science has enormously augmented the force of our naval armaments, and enables us to concentrate large bodies of men and immense batteries of heavy artillery with a promptitude and precision unknown to our forefathers. It remains to be seen whether the science of defence has made equal progress,

and whether the resistance will be equal to the attack. But it cannot be doubted that the evils of war would be considerably diminished if the sharpness and irresistible violence of an attack on some decisive point of the enemy's dominions could become the test of victory and defeat, instead of extending the disabilities and miseries of war to all the relations of social life, and all parts of the globe. That point we have not yet reached, and in the struggles of great empires, it is not often that the supremacy of one side and the subjection of the other can be obtained except by the exhaustion of one of the combatants. But the measures which we have now passed in review are calculated to promote our national interests in the widest sense by keeping up that industrial activity and commercial prosperity which are the principal resources of the country—by enabling us liberally to apply our national wealth to the contest—and by removing many of those vexatious and oppressive restrictions which aggravated the evils of war to this community, and served to embroil us with the other Powers of the world.

The maritime power and the commercial prosperity of this country depend mainly on the fact, that we combine to an extent which no other State ever possessed, a large mercantile marine with a large military navy; and it is therefore essential to our national interests to maintain both these elements of our power in the fullest activity which is consistent with the occurrence of a state of war. To curtail our import or our carrying trade would, in fact, be to contract the resources with which we are enabled to carry on the contest. On the other hand, the policy adopted by the Government gives the greatest possible latitude to commerce, whilst it maintains the right of blockade to the fullest extent in the hands of a Power which has the naval force required to blockade an extensive line of coast in an efficient manner. These appear to be the conditions most favourable to the conduct of maritime war by this country; and the result of the application of more liberal principles has already been, that the industry and trade of the nation have been very slightly affected by the present hostilities, and that we have inexhaustible means of carrying on this contest to a glorious and successful termination.

ART. VII.—*Minorities and Majorities, their relative Rights: A Letter to the Lord John Russell, M.P., on Parliamentary Reform.* By JAMES GARTH MARSHALL. London: 1853.

THE appearance of this well-written pamphlet induces us to recur to a question which has been already discussed more than once in our pages\*, but to which the proposition in the Government Reform Bill of this session has imparted a new and practical importance. The question to which we allude is the representation of minorities in the constituent bodies which return members to Parliament. It is material that this subject should be well understood in a constitutional country; and for this reason we propose to examine it, not with reference to the merits of any particular proposition, or in connection with any complex plan, but upon general principles, and on its own ground.

Every free government, however constituted, depends upon the decision of a body of persons, determined by the votes of the majority. Every free government therefore recognises the maxim, that, for legal purposes, and in questions of voting, the majority prevails over the minority. The recognition of this principle is a necessary condition for the creation and the continuance of a free government: whereas it may be altogether rejected in a despotism. In an Oriental State, for instance, no vote is ever taken: from the sovereign down to the lowest tax collector, the entire civil government is arranged on a graduated system of simple command and obedience, like the military or naval organisation of an European State. But wherever power is vested in a body, and is shared between different persons standing on an equality with each other, votes must be taken, and where votes are taken, the larger must prevail over the smaller number. It is unnecessary for us here to enter into the reasons why practical questions of government are decided by the votes of a majority, and why, in matters of opinion, and questions of the mere truth or falsity of propositions, numbers are not allowed to prevail: but we confine ourselves to the fact, that the preponderance of the majority, in legal decisions, is the fundamental principle of a free government, and has been so, since the time when free governments were first introduced by the Greeks. The question which we have to consider, is, in what manner ought that majority to be determined.

Every supreme legislative assembly, whether it be, like the House of Lords, independent of popular election, or whether, like the House of Commons, or the American federal and state legislatures, it consist of members chosen by a popular vote,— must decide by a majority; either of any number more than half, or according to some other proportion. In such a body, a minority can never exercise any power independently of a majority; except by the permission of the majority.

But, in applying the principle of decision by a majority to the election of members constituting a popular legislative body, a different method has been followed. Both in England, and in other countries possessing parliamentary institutions, an endeavour has been made to render the representative chamber an exponent of the varied interests, opinions, and feelings of the entire community, and not merely of the more limited interests, opinions, and feelings which happen to predominate at the time when the vote is taken. If it were desired to elect a chamber which should faithfully represent the existing opinions of the majority of the people, the proper course would be to enable every elector to vote for as many persons as there are members, and to take a national vote upon a single list of candidates. In the United Kingdom, for example, every elector would be entitled to vote for 658 candidates—the votes would be collected and added up as in the elections of Louis Napoleon as president and emperor; and, whatever might be the number of candidates voted upon, the 658 persons having the largest number of votes would be returned. Now, under this system, many local and partial interests, many limited, nascent, or unpopular opinions, which now obtain a few organs in the House of Commons, would be wholly unrepresented. Even important minorities might be excluded from all representation, if a well-organised national election committee, supplied with large funds, retaining agents over the whole country, and operating through the metropolitan and provincial press, were to keep up an effective agitation, and canvass for a particular list. It is conceivable, for example, that the Protestant feeling of the country might be so worked upon, that every Roman Catholic would be excluded by the predominance of the English and Scottish electors: or that a coalition between the Dissenters of England, the Presbyterians of Scotland, and the Roman Catholics of Ireland, might exclude every candidate who was a member of the Anglican Church. It is still more conceivable that, at times when the interests of classes were arrayed against each other,— agriculture against trade, landlords against tenants, capitalists against workmen,—



one class would make an attempt to exclude all the candidates of another class. It is quite certain that at seasons of alarm (such as that which existed during the French revolution), candidates who did not share the prevailing fears and antipathies of the day would, by such a method of election, be effectually placed under the ban. A more efficient system of centralisation could not well be devised, than a general election worked under the influence of a central metropolitan election committee. A House of Commons so elected would doubtless be a very harmonious body. The great elements of dissent would be excluded. There would be few debates and divisions on important questions. But it would be unable to govern the country. The various defeated minorities, though unrepresented, would not be silent. The House of Lords, as containing persons of opposite views, would rise in importance, and would constitute itself a new organ of opinion. But the real conflict would be transferred elsewhere, and it would soon be found that a representative assembly which contained within its circle the representatives of none but the predominant sections in the country, was an imperfect institution, destitute of political life and vigour.

A different system has however been followed in this and other countries; which, though originally the result of accident rather than of design, has been long tried by the experimental proof, and has thus manifested its expediency. Instead of throwing all the electors into one reservoir, and taking their votes as a single body upon one list of candidates, the country has been parcelled out into certain territorial districts, each containing a limited number of voters—the voters in each of these districts form an electoral unit, and a majority of their number chooses one person, or a few persons, to be members of the representative assembly. Thus in the United Kingdom there are counties and boroughs, which form two marked classes, but whose circumstances again vary almost infinitely. In different places, the interests of town and country, of agriculture, manufacture and commerce, of wholesale and retail trade, alternately preponderate. Religious opinions likewise have a geographical distribution; and the same partition secures a fair division of power not only between the constituent parts of the kingdom, between England, Scotland and Ireland, but also between less remote districts, as between the northern and southern, the eastern and western counties.

Now, in each of these electoral districts—in each county, city, and borough—the majority of the electors is a minority of the electors for the whole kingdom. It expresses the predomi-

nant opinion of the particular district, but it does not express the predominant opinion of the entire country, though it may accidentally concur in that opinion. The aggregate result is, that when the various members meet in the House of Commons and assume a corporate form, it is found that they reflect pretty faithfully the prevailing opinions of the entire country, according to their proportionate prevalence. Interests which are weak in one place are strong in another; opinions which are nearly unknown in one place have taken root and borne fruit in another. The compound result of the local and unconnected elections is, that the House of Commons is a mirror, or miniature copy, of the entire country; it is the microcosmus of the great world which it represents. It collects into a focus the scattered rays of opinion and feeling, which are first brought into mutual conflict, but are afterwards harmonised and reduced to a practical unity.

The formation of electoral units, each one, separately, deciding, by the votes of its majority, may indeed be so arranged, that the prevailing opinions of the community are not fairly represented. The representative principle may be nominally preserved, and virtually defeated; as was the case in the system of the Roman centuries, which were organised by king Servius, so as to secure to the minority of the voters a preponderance of political power, though the principle of decision by a majority was formally respected. 'Curavit,' says Cicero, 'ne plurimum valeant plurimi.' Before the Reform Act, a similar result was produced in England, by placing the nomination of numerous seats in a few hands, and by excluding the larger masses of population and centres of industry and intelligence. Since the Reform Act, a general agreement has existed between the predominant opinions of the country, and the predominant opinions of the House of Commons. Further improvements may be, and doubtless are, practicable in the constitution of the House of Commons. We are not arguing that it is perfect; but we maintain that the principle upon which it is founded is not the representation of the opinions of a mere majority of the people, but the representation of the opinions of the entire people; that the House of Commons is a place where minorities, heresies, oppositions, remonstrances, and protests of all sorts are represented and entitled to a hearing, and that it is intended to comprehend and not to exclude them. Our representative system rests on a basis of incorporation, not of proscription. If the House of Commons is to be the mainspring of our government, and to retain its political and moral ascendancy, it ought to contain in its ranks the leading men of all opinions. We should regard it as a

misfortune if able and fair men belonging to all the parties in the State were not present at its discussions. We do not share the political opinions of Sir J. Pakington or Mr. Walpole, but we should be sorry if such respectable and capable exponents of conservative opinions were not in Parliament. The affairs of the country are best transacted by making the House of Commons a great mart of political business; a great clearing-house of political ideas: and we would no more seek to exclude from it the most eminent leaders of the various parties, or the ablest representatives of opposite opinions, than we would exclude the great capitalists from the Royal Exchange.

The difference between the supposed plan of electing the 658 members of the House of Commons from a single list, by an aggregate vote of all the electors of the United Kingdom, and the actual plan of electing them by a large number of separate electoral districts, may be illustrated, on a smaller scale, by a comparison between the mode of voting for a parish vestry, and the mode of voting in the larger municipal boroughs. The vestry of Marylebone consists of 120 members, of whom 40 go out every third year by rotation: they are elected by all the ratepayers of the parish in a single list, and consequently every ratepayer at a contested election is entitled to give 40 votes, for as many candidates. On the other hand, every large borough, under the Municipal Corporation Act, is divided into wards, varying from 16, the number of wards in Liverpool, to a smaller number. Each of these wards elects a fixed number of town councillors, instead of all the borough electors voting for all the town councillors in one list. A division of wards, similar to that presented by the Municipal Corporation Act, exists in the City of London for the election of aldermen and common councilmen: so that each ward elects an alderman, instead of all the city voters together electing all the aldermen.

At present the representation of minorities, or of limited portions of the people, so as to produce a House of Commons reflecting the general opinions of the country, and not merely the opinions of the majority, is effected only in one way; namely, by a territorial division. Electoral districts are formed; and the majority of voters in each district elect their member or members. In conducting this election, however, it is a universal rule, that every elector is entitled to vote for as many candidates as there are members. He has not as many votes as there are members; for he cannot cumulate his votes; he cannot give more than one vote in favour of any candidate; but he may vote for as many candidates as there are members, if he

thinks fit. What the origin of this rule may be, we do not know, but it is recognised by our law; and those who have lately discussed the question of majorities and minorities appear to regard it as an unchangeable and inscrutable principle of legislation; as something engraved on the heart of man, and demanded by the eternal fitness of things. To us it appears a rule not less arbitrary than the rules which prescribe the rates of the custom duties on sugar, or the colours of the uniforms of the army. It may, or may not be, expedient according to circumstances; but we must be allowed to question its necessity and universality, without being liable to the charge of political heterodoxy.

It has been proposed that in a case where several members are returned by the electors of a single district, every elector should either be permitted to cumulate his votes, by giving as many votes as there are members to a single candidate; or that each elector should have a smaller number of votes than there are members; for example, that he should have only one vote, or that if there are three members, he should have only two votes. The effect of this arrangement would be, that a number of persons, being less than a majority of the electors of the district, would be able sometimes to return a member. Suppose, for example, that an electoral district contains 10,000 electors, and returns three members; that a contested election takes place, between three candidates on one side, and two candidates on the other; and that the three candidates each poll 5000 divided votes, and the two candidates each poll 4000 divided votes. According to the present plan of each elector being entitled to give three votes, the three candidates of the same party would be returned. But if each elector could only give two votes, the 5000 votes would be exhausted upon two out of the three candidates, and one of the other two candidates would stand third upon the poll, and would be returned. The result of the latter mode of voting would be, that a number of persons, less than a majority of the electors of the entire district, would return a member. This is true; but precisely the same effect might be produced, if instead of limiting the number of votes given by each elector, the district were divided; and two members were given to one portion of it, and one member to another. Yet those who consider the representation of minorities as something monstrous or unnatural would consider the latter arrangement quite consistent with sound principle: though virtually the two arrangements amount to the same thing. Liverpool now returns two members. What difference would there be, in principle, between giving it three members, and restraining each elector to

two votes; or dividing the town into two districts of unequal size, the larger returning two members, and the smaller returning one member? We would, moreover, ask those who regard it as an institute of the law of nature that an elector should vote for as many candidates as there are members, whether they do not consider it contrary to nature that an elector should cumulate his votes on one candidate; that he should have as many votes as members, to dispose of as he thinks fit. If this distinction between voting for as many candidates as there are members, and giving a cumulative vote to a single candidate, is written on the heart of man, we can only say that the writing is very indistinct; for everybody who has had any experience of canvassing knows that voters often suppose that they can give two votes to one candidate, even under the present law.

The mistake of those who hold that the proposal made in the late Reform Bill was something strange, unnatural, and irrational; that it was unconstitutional, oligarchical, and anti-popular, is, it seems to us, founded on the supposition that the representation of minorities is unknown to our parliamentary system; whereas, in fact, our parliamentary system is exclusively founded on this principle. It is exclusively founded upon the representation of minorities of the entire body of electors: not a single member of the House of Commons is elected by a national vote, by a vote of the whole body of electors. Every member is now elected by the majority of a minority. The question is, how that minority and that majority are to be determined. For settling this question, the objectors to the proposed plan make two assumptions. 1. That it is an inflexible canon of legislation, and a fundamental rule of a representative system, that an elector should be entitled to as many votes as there are members. 2. That the representation of minorities, or electoral units of the community, may be effected by a territorial division, but in no other manner. Both these doctrines seem to us founded upon narrow and partial views. We can see no reason why the minority, or electoral body, should not be a varying number of electors, determined by the limitation of the number of votes given by each elector, rather than a fixed number, determined by territorial limits. We can see no reason why a majority should invariably be formed by giving to each elector a capacity of voting for as many candidates as members. Under the proposed plan, every member would equally be returned by a majority; but the majority would be calculated on different principles from those now established.

The subject which we have been considering is illustrated by the following remarks of Mr. Hickson, an intelligent witness examined by the late City Commission, whose writings on

various municipal and administrative subjects are deservedly held in high esteem.

‘Another point which occurs to me has reference to the principles of representation. When we are considering how a new municipal franchise is to be carried out, we have to determine what share in the representation should be given to each elector. It now greatly varies. In some wards of the City an elector votes for four, six, or eight members of the Court of Common Council; in other wards, for fourteen and sixteen; and it is one of the curious anomalies of our representative system, that in the neighbouring district of St. Marylebone every elector has the power of voting for 116 members of the governing body. Now, if the principle be right, that an elector should have a voice in the election of 116 representatives, a system which limits him in Farringdon Without to the choice of sixteen cannot be equally right, nor that which limits him in other wards to the choice of four or six. It is time we thought of laying down some consistent rule on the subject.

‘Is not the rule a very simple one, namely, that each elector has as many votes as there are persons to be elected?—That applies only to the question of equality in the representation, not of fitness.

‘In a district where the number of persons to be elected is smallest, the number of electors is smallest, is not it?—It is so; but something more is required. I think that all elections should be so conducted that every voter should be put in a position to exercise an intelligent choice. In the case of election by large batches it is impossible for an intelligent choice to be exercised. The list system followed in Marylebone and in the ward of Farringdon Without I regard as essentially bad; and as applied in France it was the means of destroying the fruits of the revolution of 1848. It threw the elections of that country into the hands of different factions, the public at large voting completely in the dark. In Paris every elector was required to vote for thirty-four candidates, none of whom perhaps he knew personally. Marylebone is practically governed by a self-appointed body, for no one person knows the whole of the 116 vestrymen for whom he is requested to vote.\*

‘What you object to is the system of voting for candidates by lists?—Yes. I would recommend, in place of that, that every elector should have but one representative.

‘Would you give him one representative, by subdividing the City into wards or districts?—I would divide the City into wards; but I do not think a subdivision of the wards would be necessary. I should suggest ten wards as sufficient; and there might be ten candidates elected in every ward, but every elector in each ward should vote for only one of them. I would draw your attention to the importance of providing for a representation of the minority in a municipal assembly

\* By 35 Geo. 3. c. 73. the Marylebone Vestry consisted of 123 members, who were annually elected. The parish is now governed by Hobhouse’s Act.

as well as the majority. That is a principle as yet but little understood, but which will one day be seen to be indispensable to any system of real representation. I have always passed for a radical reformer, and have no objection to be called one at the present moment; but I do not at all regret the delay which has taken place in reference to the improvements required in our Parliamentary representation, on this account. The public mind is scarcely yet sufficiently awakened to a number of important questions connected with the subject; among others, this of the minority having a place in every deliberative assembly appointed for either local or national objects. We have talked a long while about the extension of the suffrage, and vote by ballot, which I would not undervalue; but the only effectual way by which corruption at elections, and all that party strife and bitterness which now disgraces them, can be made to cease, is by allowing the minority their fair share in the representation. In a national assembly the representation should be a reflex, as much as it can be rendered, of the nation itself. The nation itself consists of majority and minority, and in the minority the most intelligent part of the nation is often found.' (*Appendix to Report of Commissioners of Enquiry into the Corporation of London*, p. 319.)

We agree with Mr. Hickson in thinking that the proposed principle of voting is quite consistent with popular principles, and that the subject deserves an attentive consideration. Mr. Marshall argues that our present system works ill, and prefers another plan on grounds of expediency.

'It is true that the evils of the common mode of voting are palliated by the division of the voters into many local constituencies of limited extent, in which political parties will exist in different proportions, so that the minority in one place may be a majority in another. If the separation of parties according to locality were complete, so that each constituency consisted entirely of one party, then a just weight of representation might be secured by each, or if the number of constituencies in which any given opinions prevailed were proportioned to the general prevalence of these opinions. But we know how far this separation of parties falls short of completeness in point of fact; and how widely and generally large political parties are scattered and intermixed throughout the country. This intermixture is greater in reality than it appears to be on a hasty and superficial view; for from the very prevalence of the evils of the present mode of voting, we are apt to class this or that constituency as almost exclusively protectionist, conservative or radical, because the minorities are habitually swamped and voiceless, when a true statement of comparative numbers would often show a very respectable, but, at present, a silenced minority. And when we speak of indirect palliation to this mischief, we must remember how monstrous, unjust, and unbearable the unabated evil would be, if it existed in its full proportions; nor can any palliations be well suggested, or relied on, that will not leave, without relief, a great weight of inequality

and injustice. That such inequalities, with their attendant evils, do extensively exist at present, I think the experience of every one who is conversant with political matters will prove. Take, for instance, the common case of a conservative minority entirely swamped in a large town constituency, and that of a liberal minority equally swamped in a county; and see what mischief is wrought in either case. The minority in both instances labour under a constant, and often a sore feeling of injustice and oppression, which tempts them, either to abandon in disgust all attempts to maintain their opinions in the public exercise of their political rights, or to use fraudulent and violent means in struggling against what they feel to be an injustice; but one for which the constitution gives them no lawful remedy. The majority in both cases having a monopoly of power, and no wholesome check or restraint, become, almost necessarily, tyrannical and bigoted, and will not even listen to any opinions adverse to their own. Can it be seriously argued that, to balance one great mischief against another, is as wise and safe a mode of proceeding, as the endeavour to avert both? Is it not a pressing duty of Parliament to secure to all parties the just and equal exercise of their political rights, as the surest way of teaching each to respect the other, and of rubbing off much of the error and animosity on both sides." (Pp. 19—21.)

The expediency of importing into our system the principle embodied in the late Reform Bill, will, as it appears to us, depend mainly upon the choice between retaining small constituencies with one or two members, and the creation of large constituencies with an increased number of members. If, in order to avoid the evils inseparable from small constituencies, large constituencies with three or four members are created, and if the present system of allowing each elector to vote for as many candidates as there are members be universally introduced, then the result will be, that large local minorities will go permanently unrepresented, that coalitions of three or four candidates will produce unfair contests, and that the reflexion of the opinions and feelings of the people at large in their representative assembly will be less complete and faithful than it would be under a different system.



- ART. VIII. — 1. *Report of the Superintendent of the Census for December 1. 1852*; to which is appended the *Report for December 1. 1851*. Printed by Order of the House of Representatives of the United States. Washington: 1853.
2. *Notes on Public Subjects made during a Tour in the United States and Canada*. By HUGH SEYMOUR TREMENEERE. London: 1852.
3. *Reports of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners*. Printed for both Houses of Parliament.
4. *Letters on Irish Emigration*. By EDWARD E. HALE. Boston: 1852.

NATIONS, like individuals, have their times for self-examination, when they pause, survey their positions, glance back upon the past, study the lessons of experience, and gird themselves up for the future. In the summer of 1850, about a year before the last enumeration of the population of Great Britain and Ireland, the Marshals of the United States of America were occupied simultaneously throughout the Republic in ascertaining the number, colour, nativity, sex, occupation, habits, and wealth of its scattered population, and in collecting information concerning its resources. The full results of this work still rest in the official receptacles; but the Report of the Superintendent made in December, 1852, gives an abstract of what the 'Seventh Census' will be when finished. The complete work, for some unknown cause, is yet unpublished.

A large part of Mr. Kennedy's Report is occupied with the subject of the foreign immigration into the United States. Although incomplete and sometimes, we believe, inaccurate, it furnishes the means for arriving at conclusions as to what has been and is, and gives us grounds for speculation as to what will be.

Most readers are familiar with the chart prefixed to modern editions of 'Gibbon's Decline and Fall,' exhibiting the march of the barbarian tribes upon Rome. The exaggerations of the press have accustomed us to speak of the modern 'Exodus' from famine, want, and plethora of labour, as if it were a similar movement. As ship after ship leaves Liverpool, London, Havre, Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Bremen, crowded with emigrants for America, we picture that country yielding itself a prey to an ignorant peasantry. We see them in imagination transferred to its shores, and invested by the magic of an oath, with the attributes of citizenship; and we turn with

sorrow from the contemplation of the probable annihilation of the principles of Constitutionalism in the clashing with Democracy. Nothing can be more unfounded than such fears.

The United States' Census of 1790, taken before any acquisition of territory, exhibited a population of 3,221,930 freemen, and 697,897 slaves. There were then thirteen States, in twelve of which it appears that slavery existed: its feeble life in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island has long since been extinguished. In 1803, the French province of Louisiana, including most of the country west of the Mississippi, was added to the Union. Florida was purchased from Spain in 1819; Texas annexed in 1844; and New Mexico and California acquired by conquest and treaty in 1848. Five slave States, two free States, and six territories have been created out of all this country. Two new free States have also been admitted to the Union from the territory of New England since the formation of the Federation, and 5 free and 4 slave States from the country west of the Alleghanies assigned to the Republic by the treaty of 1783; thus making in all at present 16 free States, with 142 representatives in Congress, and 32 senators; and 15 slave States, with 91 representatives and 30 senators.

The total population of the United States in 1850 was over twenty-three millions, of which nearly eighteen millions were native whites, over two millions were foreign born, 39,000 were of unknown nativities, and 3,200,000 were slaves. It appears that between 1840 and 1850, 1,569,850 foreigners arrived in the United States; from whence we should conclude, even in the absence of other evidence, that the emigration before 1840 was comparatively small. It began on a large scale only in 1847. From 1820 to 1830 the average number arriving was only 20,000 a year; from 1830 to 1846, about 70,000 a year. In 1847, the famine desolated Ireland; and the revolutions on the Continent, which unsettled the channels of labour, followed the next year. The immigration increased, under the pressure, to 240,000 in 1847, and to 300,000 in 1850; and it is now estimated at the Census Office that the 'total number of emigrants into the United States since 1790, 'living in 1850, together with descendants, amounted to '4,304,416,' which we shall assume to be the complete foreign addition to the population of the country between 1790 and 1850.\*

\* It appears by the last report of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners that the total Irish emigration from 1847 to 1850

All this has, and is to have, a great effect upon the relations between slave and free labour. The free coloured population appears to have increased 10·96 per cent. during the decade just past. The slave population, 28·81 per cent.; and the whites, 38·28 per cent.

The regular decrease in the augmentation of the free blacks is one of the remarkable features of the progress of races in America. From 1790 to 1810, the Northern States, under the

inclusive, was 833,692, nearly all of which was for North America. The Hamburg Emigration Society report the German Emigration during the same time as 356,684, of which we assume 96 per cent. to have gone to the same quarter. The Canada and New Brunswick immigration during the same period amounted to 210,904; and assuming that the emigration from the United States into Canada was equal to that from Canada into the United States, which Mr. Kennedy justifies us in doing, we have as the total German and Irish emigration to the United States from 1847 to 1850 inclusive, according to European authority,

|                                     |   |   |   |   |   |                 |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------------|
| Irish                               | - | - | - | - | - | 833,692         |
| German                              | - | - | - | - | - | 341,426         |
|                                     |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> 1,175,118 |
| Deduct Canada and New Brunswick im- |   |   |   |   |   |                 |
| migration                           | - | - | - | - | - | 210,904         |
|                                     |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/> 964,214   |

The total number of immigrants of *all* nations returned by the United States authorities during the same time, was 1,037,771, which agrees substantially with the European statistics. The same European authorities return the emigration of 1851 and 1852 to the United States as follows:—

|                | 1851.               | 1852.             |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| United Kingdom | - - 267,357         | 244,261           |
| Germany        | (estimated) 111,052 | (settled) 144,528 |
|                | <hr/> 378,409       | <hr/> 388,789     |

The arrivals at New York alone, in 1852, were 296,438, of whom 118,134 were Irish, and 118,706 were Germans, being a decrease from the year before of 45,122 in the former, and an increase of 48,623 in the latter.

Dr. Chickering, who is excellent authority, estimates the foreign addition since 1790 at 5,000,000, instead of 4,000,000; and the Hamburg Society estimates the German element alone at 4,397,763, — a very wild statement. We have adopted the official estimate in preference to Dr. Chickering's; but the difference is of little moment, as the actual foreign-born element remains at 2,000,000, and the results we point out would be substantially the same in either event.

influence of climate and the spirit of freedom, engendered by the revolution, were emancipating, or preparing to emancipate, their slaves; and the ratio of increase of the free coloured population consequently greatly exceeded that of the whites or slaves. The following decade the percentage diminished; but was increased again, from 1820 to 1830, by the entire abolition of slavery in New York, and a large emancipation in New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. In the succeeding decade it fell off again; and in the last, as we see, it fails to reach 11 per cent.; and this, notwithstanding the manumission of 1500, and the flight of 1000 slaves a year, if the year 1850, for which alone returns on this head are made, be an example of the general course of things. In some of the States—New York for instance—the number has actually diminished; in others—like the New England States—it has done little more than remain stationary; while, in others, on the Canada borders, and with strong abolition sympathies, -- Michigan and Ohio for instance -- it has decidedly increased.

There can be but one solution to this—the degraded social position into which the Negro is forced by the prejudices of the whites of the North, and particularly of European immigrants. There is no physical reason why the black race should not increase as fast, and faster even, than the white. The experience of the slave States proves this, where, in spite of a degradation for which no amount of personal comfort can compensate, they faithfully fulfil the Divine command to ‘multiply and replenish the earth.’ Sambo is naturally a jovial, good-natured, laughing fellow, full of fun, not without a relish for a practical joke, and ready always for a dance and a bit of banjo music in the open air—especially if Dinah be there; for whom it must be confessed he has a strong liking. He is too fond of his ease to be out of temper for a long time; too much a man of the world to work unless obliged to do so; and by far too much a gentleman to trouble his woolly pate with thinking a great deal. He is a bit of a ‘swell,’ we are sorry to say, and loves to deck his ebon beauties in bright reds, and blues, and yellows, but not without a rude idea of taste and harmony of colours—if such a thing may be seriously suggested; and so long as Dinah likes it, he cares little whether it be according to the rules of art. He has a certain natural delicacy in the midst of his coarseness which contrasts very favourably with the beer-drinking rudeness of the labourer of some countries nearer the meridian of Greenwich, and a remembrance of good treatment, which ensures his master against ‘strikes,’ as long as he does not strike first. And when he and

Dinah at length become one, there seems to be naturally no good reason why woolly-pated 'piccaninnies' should not be as thick around his cabin as ever carrot heads were on an Irish potato patch. In Massachusetts, for instance, they would seem to have every thing in their favour — freedom, plenty of work, equality of laws and rights; and yet his family has increased only 4·5 per cent. in the ten years. The truth is, free Sambo in the United States, with all his freedom and political equality, has no reality of either. His colour stamps him for ever in unjust popular prejudice, which is stronger than law, with the caste of labourer; and not labourer alone, but degraded labourer, whose mother, and brother, and cousin are slaves, and who ought to be one himself; and, if the truth must be told, all this makes Sambo rather a good-for-nothing fellow. He neglects his family, is unthrifty, gets behind-hand, and before long finds himself quite at the foot of the social ladder. Meanwhile Pat has been coming in from Ireland, and has stepped over him; and, in astonishment at finding somebody underneath himself, he becomes the worst tyrant that the poor black has to endure. The inveterate dislike of an Irishman to a Negro is as well known as it is remarkable.

But, while the free black of the North, in spite of his theoretically better condition, has barely held his own in some of the States, his southern cousin has been increasing his family at a great rate. Whether it be that, with plenty to eat, and, in the absence of care, his shackles sit lightly on him, or whether it be that he stifles his sorrows in domestic pleasures, we do not stop to inquire. It appears that, from some cause, the natural increase of the slaves has been as great, and greater even, than that of the whites; so that, without foreign immigration, the relative numbers of the two races, and the relative weight of the two sections of the Union, would not have been materially changed in the sixty years. We do not take into account the trifling difference in the proportion made directly by the acquisition of territory, as the total number of slaves and freemen was small in each case at the time of the annexation, and the effect upon the general result was more than balanced by the abolition of slavery in the North. Annexation has undoubtedly strengthened the 'institution,' by giving it new States to govern and new fields to cultivate; but not essentially by an actual addition to the number of slaves. Neither do we take into special account the larger percentage of the slave increase from 1800 to 1810, created by the prospective abolition of the Slave Trade in 1808; because the proportion of slaves to whites of native descent, in 1810, was almost exactly the same as in 1850.

In 1800 the proportion was as 1 to 4.94; in 1810 as 1 to 4.78; and in 1850 as 1 to 4.76, deducting in each case the number of immigrants and descendants of immigrants since 1790 from the total white population. This great increase of a population held unjustly in a state of bondage, with freedom and activity all around them, is a remarkable feature in history, and suggests the possibility at some future day of an attempt at a forcible reclaimer of their rights, when they shall decidedly outnumber their masters. If such a struggle should ever come it would be short-lived and deadly, and could terminate only in the annihilation of the weaker black.

Before 1794 it seemed that this species of labour was about to die out in the natural course of events. In three of the Northern States it had perished; in five more it lived only upon sufferance; and in the South public sentiment would have abolished it if a feasible way had been proposed. Whitney then invented the cotton-gin; and the export of cotton, in 1793 less than five hundred thousand pounds, trebled in 1794, increased to six millions in 1795, reached eighteen millions in 1800, two hundred and eighty millions in 1830, and nine hundred and twenty-seven millions in 1850. African bondage became profitable. The planters of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and the Carolinas bear the sin before the world; but Liverpool, Lowell, Manchester, and New York furnish the money which prolongs and extends the system.

In spite of these influences so favourable to slavery, the foreign immigration is gradually affecting the balance of power in the Federation. In 1800 the total population of the Slave States was 48 per cent. of that of the Union, and their representation was 45 per cent. of the House. In 1830 they had but 45 per cent. of the population, and 41 per cent. of the representation; and in 1850 but 41 per cent. of the former, and 39 per cent. of the latter. It requires no prophet to foresee that the same disturbing causes will continue as long as the peasants and artisans of Europe can command cheap homes, high wages, and an improved social position in the New World as easily as they now do. The census enables us to follow their track across the Republic, and to see in what communities they rest. The results are curious and not altogether expected.

1. It appears that the immigration rests almost entirely in the free States. Of the 2,200,000 foreigners resident in the Union, only 305,000 are in the Slave States; and of these 127,000 are in the comparatively northern corn-growing States

of Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, and 66,000 in the commercial State of Louisiana.

2. It travels principally due west in a belt reaching from 36° or 37° N. to 43° or 44° N., including the central and southern parts of New England, the middle and north-western States, Maryland and Delaware, and the central and northern part of Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. The climate and production of this country are similar to those of Europe; the general ratio of health and average of life is higher notwithstanding the great floating European population, and the name of labourer is not degraded by a comparison with slaves.

3. Less than one-third of the total immigration has entered the Lake Country and the Valley of the Mississippi. The proportion of foreign population in New York and in Massachusetts is greater than in any western agricultural State except Wisconsin. It is also nearly as large as in California, a gold-seeking community from the world at large.

4. It principally consists of Irish, Germans, and English.\*

Of the English nearly five-eighths are to be found in the Atlantic free States, about one-third in the States of the north-west, and nearly all the residue in the northern slave States.

Three-fourths of the Irish stay in New England and the middle States (principally in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania), where the commercial and manufacturing interests are seated; and they are found in the south and west only where there are great public works in construction. They change their soil and their allegiance, but keep their nature intact. Unwilling in the New, as in the Old World, to guide their own destinies, they stay where another race furnishes food for their mouths, and labour for their hands, and takes to itself the substantial fruits of their industry. One love, however, is entirely weeded from their hearts. Their experience with the impoverishing potato-patch seems to have given them a distaste for agriculture; and, in a country where there is plenty of land and a sure harvest, they avoid almost entirely the pursuits to which they cling so tenaciously in Europe. Their numbers did not in 1850 reach a million,—not two-thirds of the decrease in the Irish population during the last ten years.

The Germans are more energetic, or, rather, bring their energy to a better account. More than half their number are spread over the north-western States, Missouri and Kentucky, and more than one-third in New York and Pennsylvania. They stay, indeed, in the towns in great numbers, devoting them-

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\* Their respective numbers in 1850 were—English, 278,625; Irish, 961,719; German, 573,225.

selves to mechanical arts and to trades; but a large proportion, also, if the census speaks truly, are to be found in the agricultural districts, where they fell the forest and turn up the prairie for themselves. Some years ago we remember to have seen a colony of German emigrants landed on the unfinished pier of an unbuilt city in Wisconsin. The pier has doubtless since been completed, and the city has its thousands; but then, a few driven piles and a quantity of scattered lumber marked the place of the former, and rectangular streets strewn with fresh felled timber, stretching into a primeval forest, showed where the latter was to be. The emigrants were bundled out upon the pier, and their boxes, chests, willow-fans for winnowing wheat by hand, spinning-wheels and primitive spades, scythes, and ploughs were tumbled after them. The poor women sat upon the boxes in the hot sun (it was in August) and cried at the desolate appearance of this, the gate to their Paradise, and the men tried in their rough way to comfort them. We leaned upon the 'guard,' looking at them as the boat steamed up Lake Michigan, and admired the simplicity which could bring their miserable utensils to such a country. Long before this the men have chased away the young grouse with American ploughs, and have fattened their cattle on the long grass of the prairie, and the women, putting away the spinning-wheels as relics of a by-gone existence, sit in the summer evenings under the honeysuckle and bignonia, which twist themselves over the porch, and sing to their children of the *Vaterland* without a sigh of regret.

The valley of the Mississippi and the Upper Lake Country has not only gained in an unexampled manner, but has been almost created within the half-century. Where, in 1800, there were less than 400,000 persons clustered around the rude forts that protected them from the Indians, with only 7 per cent. of the representation in Congress, there are now nearly ten millions cultivating 53,000,000 acres of improved land, and represented by 42 per cent. of the House. If the European immigration has remained in the Atlantic States, the inquiry naturally arises, Whence comes this western population?

The oracle of the census again responds. All the while there has been a native emigration twice as great as the foreign. Washington Irving's pleasant sketch of the Yankee seems to be literally true,—a discontented being, unwilling to stay quietly in the home of his birth, and seeking an unknown better in some new sphere. Just when he begins to grasp it,—when the 'stumps' are uprooted and the corn grows plentifully,—when his finished barns are filled, and his log cabin takes to itself some look of comfort,—he sells his 'improvements' at a profit,



shoulders his axe, harnesses his horse to a covered cart, into which he packs his wife and a staircase of children, and marches to some spot still further West, where he may begin anew. Thus the whole country is in motion; Massachusetts removes to Maine, and Maine to Massachusetts; New York visits Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania returns the compliment. Virginia crosses to Kentucky, and Kentucky pushes over into Illinois. Yet the whole migration appears to be governed by fixed laws, producing ascertainable results.

1. In the free States the general movement is due west,—from New York, for instance, to Michigan and Wisconsin, and from Pennsylvania to Ohio. From Maine and New Hampshire it goes principally to Massachusetts, from the other New England States more to New York than elsewhere: but natives of all are found in the free north-west States in large numbers. The middle States are also represented there by an aggregate of 758,020, in addition to which they interchange very extensively with each other; the people of the small States, particularly, going to the great cities of their neighbours. The emigration from the northern Atlantic States into the six north-western States amounts to nearly 1,200,000. And so strong is this passion for motion, that the West itself supplies a population to the still further West. Ohio sends 215,000 to the three States beyond her; Indiana retains 120,000 from Ohio, but sends on 50,000 of her own; Illinois takes 95,000 from Ohio and Indiana, and gives 7,000 to young Iowa; and that State, though not twenty years redeemed from the Indians, gains nearly 60,000 by the restlessness of the three, and, in its turn, breaks over the too feeble barriers of the Rocky Mountains to supply Utah and Oregon with 1,200 natives of Iowa.

2. The native emigration from their central slave States follows the same general law of a due westerly movement: but whether governed by the wish to escape from slavery, or by what other motive, it takes also a partial north-west direction into the free States. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Kentucky, furnish 360,000 of the native population of the north-west.

3. The movement in the planting States has been mostly within themselves, taking a south-westerly and westerly direction from the older lands of South Carolina and Georgia, to the uplands of Alabama and Mississippi. The emigration from South Carolina alone is nearly 68 per cent. of the white population remaining within her borders.

4. The American-born population of Texas comes principally

from the slave States, that of California from the free States, and that of the territories more from the free than from the slave.

5. It appears from a study of the course of both emigrations, that they mainly benefit the belt of country above described. New England loses nearly 400,000 of native population; but the foreign elements reduce the actual loss to 52,000. The middle States lose 600,000 of native population, but have so large a foreign addition, that the balance-sheet shows a gain of nearly 414,000. The central slave States lose 600,000 natives; the foreign emigration reduces their actual loss to 400,000. The planting States and Texas gain 300,000, of which nearly 200,000 are native. The north-west gains 1,900,000, of which 1,330,000 are native.\*

It is apparent that the political influence of the emigrant is greatly exaggerated. If three or four hundred thousand uneducated peasants, unused to govern their own affairs, and much less acquainted with affairs of State, were annually transferred to the United States, placed in communities by themselves, apart from the influence of more intelligent minds, left without schools, cultivation, or capital, to raise themselves as best they could, and admitted nevertheless to the dignity of citizenship, and to a share in administration, it would be irrational not to fear the result. But we see a process quite the reverse going on. These ignorant beings—ignorant, indeed, some of them are, and thickheaded and obstinate—are taken by the hand on arrival, and sent, not into the forest, but into a more thickly populated country than the one they left, with towns as large as any in Europe except the two capitals, with schools better than any of the same grade here, maintained at the public expense, with work enough for everybody, skilful and unskilful, and with better educated persons than themselves to tell them what to do. They labour constantly with Americans, their children sit daily side by side with American children, reading from the same books, playing the same games, and learning to think the same thoughts. Mr. Treemenheere in his excellent work complains that all history in the public schools is ignored except that of the Republic, and gives us a list of twenty-one questions prepared for the examination of candidates for admission to the high school of Lowell, all of which refer only

\* To reach these results we have in each case ascertained the total number of natives from the particular section resident in the Union, and from that have deducted the total free native population residing in that section, or *vice versa*; the result shows the loss or gain by emigration.

to events connected with the American continent. We are not sure that the honest clergymen of the land of the Puritans have not been found guilty of a profound policy in this. The child of the English or Scotch machinist in Massachusetts, of the German or Irish labourer, of the French or Italian artisan, in New York or Philadelphia, learns with the language and the institutions, the history which tells him the greatness of his new country; and, forgetting that he ever had another, he feels with a pride, that even Lord Palmerston might envy, '*civis Romanus sum.*' If the first generation is never quite denationalised, the second is transformed by this process into very good Yankees. The fathers, too, soon get a little property (for there is plenty of labour and little pauperism), and thenceforth are identified with the stability of their new country; and by the time they become citizens, they have some just sense of the dignity they acquire, and of the responsibility it entails.

The same fact removes all apprehension of a disproportionate increase of Papal power in America. The Roman Catholic population being so completely identified with the older States, and impregnated with the spirit of their institutions, any pernicious influence from that quarter will be impossible. We hear often of the power of Jesuitism in America, and of the spread of Catholicism in the valley of the Mississippi; but the facts in the census indicate no such thing.\* We are assured by those best able to judge, that so far from fearing the undue influence of the Romish Church, its conservative influence over the emigrants within its pale is regarded with favour. The Americans have a sufficient protection against the inroads of any sacerdotal despotism in their healthy English-born institutions, in the spirit of free inquiry which they have inherited from this country, and, above all, in their free schools, at which four millions are educated—one-fifth of the free population.

The schools of the States have been made patent to English eyes during the contest concerning the various educational systems proposed for adoption here, and they certainly seem to answer the demands of a state of society bearing little ressem-

\* There are in the Union 36,011 churches of all denominations, affording accommodation for 13,849,896 persons, of which only 1,112 are Roman Catholic, with accommodations for 620,950. In the lake country and valley of the Mississippi, out of 13,661 churches, accommodating 4,891,002 persons, only 551 are Roman Catholic, accommodating 276,291.

blance to this. Indeed, in all the comparisons between the two countries, the fact of the great social difference is lost sight of. The similarity of political institutions, from the municipal parishes to the national legislatures,—the community of language, literature, and of ancestry, so far as the Americans can get a tombstone and parish register acquaintance with their ancestors in England,—the common elements of wealth,—the resemblance, and, in the main, identity of pursuits, are pictured glowingly by after-dinner orators, when the wine has mellowed the heart. Long may both nations remember these things! And far distant may the day be when the difficulties arise which philosophy teaches us they engender. But there is another side of the picture, less dwelt upon, and equally true, —the vast social gap between an old country, with a cultivated artificial society, founded on great landed possessions, and a new country with no aristocracy, unless we give that name to the feeble remnant of colonial families overshadowed by recent wealth, or to the expiring gentility of the ‘Southern Chivalry.’ The British merchant labours, accumulates, buys land, is made a peer in the second generation, and is identified thenceforth less with the town than with the country. The American merchant accumulates, invests in stocks and city lots, perhaps becomes a member of Congress, dies, and leaves his property to his children in even portions. In a generation or two it is scattered, and his poor descendants begin to climb the ladder anew. The inhabitants of no neat rural village point with pride to his well-stocked parks and wooded drives. He may have a cottage on Staten Island, the banks of the Hudson, the Delaware, or the Schuylkill, or he may amuse himself with dilettante farming in Dorchester. But the non-producing landed proprietor, identified for generations with the soil, is unknown in America. The ‘people,’ owning each his little farm, or his house and garden, take the management of their own affairs into their own hands.

The public schools are the legitimate offspring of the social status, and return to it no small share of the stability which it enjoys. They were established in New England, at the settlement of the country, for the education of the children, and the conversion of the Indians. About the time that the wearers of black doublets and steeple-crowned hats, who fled from oppression here to establish a Calvinistic despotism, whose influence still draws down the chins of their descendants, — about the time that they re-enacted the Mosaic code, penalties and all, with marginal references to chapter and verse, they partitioned the public land into parishes, on the English system, and

assigned a part to the commonage, a part to the Church, and a part to the schools. In process of time the common land has generally ceased to be pasturage, and is, in many places, planted with trees, and made into public walks; the Church fields have disappeared with the State organisation; and the portion assigned to the schools has been absorbed in the settlement of the country, and exchanged for the right of general taxation,—which right, as the sum to be raised is determined each year by each town for itself, and as suffrage is nearly universal, means the right of the poor to educate their children as they see fit at the expense of the tax-payers. The system has been extended from New England more or less through the free States, and works to the satisfaction even of the property-holders, who must be sometimes heavily mulcted by it. Mr. Tremenhoc, for instance, tells us, that in a town near Boston, ‘the whole real property of which is valued at only 500,000 dollars, not less than 17,000 dollars were expended last year in the erection of five new school-houses, besides the ordinary expenses of maintaining their three grammar and two primary schools.’ Boston pays \$15.42 per head for the children educated in her schools (free for all without charge): New York, \$10.62; St. Louis on the Mississippi, \$9.50; and Cincinnati on the Ohio, \$6.37. These taxes are cheerfully submitted to by the property-holders, who require no argument to be convinced that, without education universal suffrage would be destructive to political liberty, to social virtue, and to property on which both must lean. They feel that the schools are essential even for the native children with American homes, and doubly so for the foreigners, sometimes with worse than no home at all.

Thus the moment the emigrant arrives and is settled, he and his children are cared for. He finds persons on the pier waiting to employ him, and he pockets at once his four shillings a-day; or if he be ill, there is a hospital to receive him, where skilful surgeons and kind nurses minister to his wants. Schools say to his children, ‘Come to us and be taught;’ and they go. It was found some years since, in a manufacturing town of Massachusetts, with a population nearly one-third of which was Irish, that of about 3000 children between the ages of three and sixteen, only nineteen were not attending school somewhere, and that sixteen of the nineteen stayed away because they had no good clothes; clothes were given, and the non-attendants reduced to three. The proportion throughout the Union is not as large as this; but yet large enough to change the character of the whole foreign population. There is no greater mistake than that the characters of nations and races are unchangeable: leading

minds mould the popular will to their pleasure. Catholic England under Henry VII. became Protestant England under Henry VIII. The freedom of Arragon died under the heel of the Inquisition. Louis XIV. was troubled but once in his reign by the spirit of a free parliament. Can there be a greater contrast than between the ages of Elizabeth and Cromwell? or of Milton and Congreve? William III. made the English noblemen Dutchmen; George IV. beau-Brummelised society; and the present Court of England has set an example of purer and more refined manners. In the same way the character and purposes of the emigrants are changed. They are fashioned by the influences which surround them; and in the second generation become completely identified with the country of their adoption.

Mr. Tremenhère objects that no provision is made for religious education. In the United States such a provision would be the sacrifice of the system. The children of a million of Irish Roman Catholics attend the public schools and strive for the honours they give; the clergy of that denomination are placed by popular suffrage on the committees chosen to superintend the schools and prescribe the course of education; only on the implied understanding that the religious education shall be left to other hands. We cannot believe, in spite of Mr. Tremenhère's fear to the contrary, that the community which takes such care of the secular education,—which provides one grade of schools for the infants, another for those who have crossed the Rubicon of knowledge and are battling with its elements, another yet higher for those who are preparing for the ordinary duties of life in the humbler middle classes, and one still beyond, fitted with libraries of elementary books and with scientific apparatus, where the studies of the University even may be pursued by the humblest child, free of cost,—would make no provision elsewhere for religious instruction. It is just to add, that the schools we have in view as we write are in Massachusetts, and have attained a degree of excellence beyond those in other States. But the West will not be long behind the East in this respect. Mr. Tremenhère's work, although pretending to be no more than a sketch, gives an excellent picture of the working of the system throughout the Northern States, accompanied by the impressions it created on an intelligent mind of conservative tendencies. If we do not agree with him in all his conclusions, he himself furnishes us with reasons for differing: We gather from him that the schools of Pennsylvania and New York are inferior to those of New England, and that the average attendance is decidedly

less. But it also appears that those who have charge of them are alive to the deficiency, and are using every means to repair it. We close our remarks on this subject with a short extract concerning the schools of Connecticut:—

‘Any one from England visiting those schools would be also greatly struck with the very high social position, considering the nature of their employment, of the teachers, male and female; he will observe with pleasure their polite and courteous bearing, of such importance as an example of good manners to the children; he will admire the complete order, quiet, and regularity, with which the whole system of instruction is conducted, by the exercise of mild, temperate, and generally speaking, judicious authority; and he will perceive how great an amount of elementary secular instruction is given to those who stay a sufficient length of time to derive the full benefit of the opportunities of improvement then afforded. And I must confess that he will be likely to feel it as a just subject of reproach to his own country, that her very tenderness and zeal in the cause of religious truth, her very apprehension lest in her desire to attain an acknowledged good she may be betrayed into a step fraught with evil—or, to descend to lower ground, her religious jealousies and animosities—should interpose to keep all education, both secular and religious, from the minds of tens of thousands of our fellow-citizens, at a time too, when secular education is more than ever needed as a means of temporal prosperity and advancement, and when socialism and a vast and dangerous flood of “revolutionary literature” of the worst kind, is occupying the ground left bare for its reception by the absence of all culture, secular or religious. How long, it may be well asked, is the Government of this country to be paralysed by sectarian jealousies? and to what further extent are the very foundations of religion, truth and social order to be undermined, while the dispute rages as to the best method of preserving them?’ (Pp. 57, 58; 59.)

The provisions for the mental health of the emigrant are rivalled by those made for his physical. In their efforts to prevent intemperance, laws are passed in some of the States more arbitrary than the decrees of the most absolute European Government, prohibiting—without always preventing—the sale of intoxicating drinks. To keep him clean, aqueducts, exceeding in magnificence, expense, and profuseness of supply those whose ruined arches bridge the Campagna, bring pure water to his door, and force him to take and use it by assessing a compulsory rate upon the house he occupies. Unfortunately filth, ill ventilation, and dense population are the accompaniments of vice, and too often of poverty, in large towns. Crime always tries to hide its head in such burrows. The cities of America are not without their vicious population, dwelling in haunts not unlike the *terra incognita* of Whitechapel, whose impurities

and wretchedness, occasionally revealed for a moment by the picture of a passing visitor, astonish us at their fearful contrast to Pall Mall and St. James's. The 'five points' of New York, as it formerly existed, with its three tiers of underground apartments, and its dancing-room under the street, where black, white, and grey mingled in impure orgies, was equal in its way to anything within the jurisdiction of Scotland Yard. The 'Old Brewery' was only two or three minutes' walk from Broadway, within a stone's throw of Stuart's Marble Palace, filled with the richest fabrics of the world, the terror of husbands and papas. It is now removed, and a charitable institution occupies its place. But as long as the weeds of vice grow in the human heart, dens of infamy will exist in large towns, which the philanthropist can improve but not eradicate. The Americans have taken the first step towards cleansing these places by supplying them freely with water. The 'Cochituate Aqueduct' brings water twenty miles from one of the pretty lakes that dot the surface of Massachusetts, and distributes it in every street and alley of its prim metropolis. The magnificent 'Croton Aqueduct' of New York was built by the city at a cost of nearly 3,000,000*l.* sterling. The Croton river is brought fifty miles in a covered channel of masonry and granite, and rolls into New York over a bridge whose lofty arches would span the shipping, if there were any, on Harlem River. Every house in the city contributes by rates towards its support, and has the option of taking it for those rates. Water has consequently become a necessity among high and low. Bathing rooms in chambers, and water cocks, with hot and cold water, in every room, are found in the Bowery as well as in the Fifth Avenue. The receipts have not yet equalled the interest on the debt. In a few years they will; and in a few more will become a profitable source of revenue to the city. Philadelphia is still more fortunate. A dam thrown across the Schuylkill, at her very doors, drives pumps which deliver water on the top of Fairmount, by the river's bank: from hence an unlimited supply is distributed over the city. We can testify to the correctness of Mr. Tremmenheere's description:—

'It is rather tantalising to one who leaves London in the beginning of August, to find himself in ten days in cities across the Atlantic, where bath-rooms are almost as numerous as bed-rooms, in every private house of any pretensions to the comfort that even a moderate competency can command, and where the purest of water is let in at the highest habitable part of every building, in unlimited quantity, and for a most moderate payment. It is somewhat amusing, too, to



see the Irish maidens in Philadelphia (in their usual vocation of housemaids there, as elsewhere) tripping out in the early morning, upon the broad brick foot-pavement, and screwing a small hose of an inch in diameter to a brass cock concealed under a little iron plate near the kerbstone; then, with an air of command over the refreshing element, directing a copious shower against the windows, shutters, front door, white marble steps, elegant iron railing, green shrubs, small and much-cherished grass plots, heavy blossomed creepers hanging on neat trellis-work, and, finally, upon the grateful acacias, or the silver maple, or the catalpa, or the acanthus, or the mountain-ash above her head. Next advances a graver character, whose business it is to "lay the dust." He drags after him a snake-like hose some fifty feet long, one end of which he has screwed upon the stop-cock fixed to a post by the side of the pavement, while from the brass pipe of the other end, which he holds in his hand, he throws a strong jet over the street, and a considerable distance beyond the point at which he has arrived when he has come to "the end of his tether." He then removes the screw end to the next cock, which is at the proper distance to enable him to reach, by the jet from the hose, the point where he left off.

Other cities, great and small, make similar provisions. In the manufacturing towns, also, the streets are generally broad, and planted with trees, and the houses built with reference to the comforts of the occupants. The same may be said of the residences of the poorer class throughout the country. In New York, for example, if the portion, occupied by the wealthy is less metropolitan, and the streets narrower, worse paved, and dirtier than those of most European capitals, the houses of the poor and the emigrant are more spacious, better ventilated, better provided with water, and cleaner than those occupied by similar classes here.

The 'Modern Exodus' ceases to be a wonder in view of these things; we are only astonished that, like the Exodus of old, famine and pestilence were necessary to it. The Irish peasantry fled before the scourge of 1847, not singly nor by families, nor by villages even, but by whole districts; and yet two must have fallen where one escaped to a foreign shore. The priests in some places say that they ceased almost to minister, except to the dying, and that their services have been little wanted since by the bride. Liverpool was crowded with emigrants, and ships could not be found to do the work. The poor creatures were packed in dense masses, in ill-ventilated and unseaworthy vessels, under charge of improper masters, and the natural result followed. Pestilence chased the fugitive to complete the work of famine. Fifteen thousand out of ninety thousand emigrants to Canada in British bottoms, in 1847, died on the passage or soon

after arrival. The American vessels, owing to a stringent passenger law, were better managed; but the hospitals of New York and Boston were nevertheless crowded with patients from Irish estates. The attention of Parliament was called to these things, and an Act somewhat similar to that of the United States was passed, which has done much to prevent the recurrence of such misery. The number of passengers is restricted, the space to be allowed to each, the size of the berths, the character of the decks, the quantity of provisions and water per passenger, are all prescribed by the various Acts; and it is made the duty of the Emigration Commissioners to enforce the law.

Under these Acts the Irish emigration has grown into a systematic and well-conducted business in the hands of persons who receive the wanderers at Liverpool from all parts of Ireland, even from Sligo. The main movement, however, is from Cork, where they arrive by car or rail from the southern and western counties, and are thence transported to Liverpool in steamers, to await, at their own expense, the sailing of the vessel. When a number are about to leave, the whole village — the old (above sixty) against whose free emigration the passenger laws of some of the States interpose impediments; the well-to-do, who have no need to depart; the beggar whose filthy shreds cannot be called a covering; the youngest children even, — gather in a tumultuous group about the car holding the smiling faces whose happy lot it is to leave for ever their native land. With the wildest signs of grief for the departing as if for the dead, with waving of hands, beating of the air, unearthly howls, tears, sobs, and hysterics, they press confusedly around the carriage, each one struggling for the last shake of the hand, the last kiss, the last glance, the last adieu. The only calm persons in this strange scene are the subjects of it all, to whom this moment is the consummation of long hopes and many dreams, who have talked of it and sang of it (for the songs of the peasantry now dwell upon it), till it has become a reality.

Before going on board the ship at Liverpool they are subjected to a strict inspection by the medical authorities; and the same persons examine the medicine chests to see that the vessel is properly secured against maladies.\* They are then put on board.

\* In 1847, before the passage of the British Act establishing medical inspection, the mortality was 17½ per cent. of the embarkation. In 1848, it was less than 1 per cent. It is claimed by the advocates of the Bill, that it produced this result. We are inclined to think that good food and the absence of pestilence has more to do with it than medical examination. Within the last six months, the

the first vessel of the line sailing after their arrival; and we have the authority of Mr. Hale for saying, that they sometimes cross and land without knowing her name. When on board they are assigned to certain berths, their chests are hauled into the little compartments, opening on the deck, in which their berths are situated; they are furnished with cooking-places for the preparation of the stores which they take in addition to the ship's rations, the messes are made up for the voyage, the pilot takes the ship below the bar, search is made for *stowaways*, the pilot leaves, taking with him all secreted persons whom the search exposes, and the waters of the Irish Channel are breaking against the bows. There is even less sentiment in this parting than in the former; little of the regret so natural in leaving for ever the land of nativity. That comes later, when, in full employment, with plenty of money, a clean comfortable home, a tidy wife, children at school, and the old folk and the brothers and sisters brought out, Pat tells the Yankees of the jewel of a land he left behind, and wishes (the rogue) that he may just lay his old bones once more there before he dies. There is no such feeling when the ship sails—not a wet eye, not a sigh, not a regret—all is buoyant hope and happiness.

The German emigration has also been greatly stimulated by the same system. It comes from all parts of Germany (possibly at present more from the Rhine, Wurtemberg, and Prussia, than from Bavaria, where obstacles are now thrown in the way of it,) and from Switzerland even, and is managed by commercial houses in the North Sea ports, in Havre, in London, in Liverpool, and in New York. The Dutch have little to do with it: their ships are employed in their own commerce and in the British trade with Australia. But the Germanic free towns, the British-American houses in London and Liverpool, and the American houses in Havre, whose ships do not carry out so bulky cargoes as they bring back, have embarked largely in it. Agencies of these various houses are established throughout Germany (every August tourist knows them by the big eagle, and shield with thirteen bars over the door), who are charged to collect the wanderers at some convenient point, — say Mann-

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cholera has raged with great severity in ships that had been carefully inspected and pronounced to have a good bill of health. Sometimes it would appear the second or third day out, sometimes at the end of a week or ten days. When the wind blew from the south, it would rage with violence; when it veered to the north-west it would almost or entirely disappear, and perhaps the vessel would come into port without a case on board. Neither the presence nor the absence of disease in this virulent form can be attributed to a sanitary measure.

heim for the Rhine and Danubian country, and Bremen or Hamburg for the centre and north,—where they pass into the hands of the contractor, and thenceforth have no care over themselves. A part are paupers sent by the Governments of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemberg, and Switzerland. But we are assured that these bear a small proportion to the whole. ‘I have known,’ writes one well-informed gentleman, ‘hundreds of German families who have taken out with them to the United States sums of money varying from ten to forty thousand florins each family. It may be admitted as a fact that out of twenty German emigrants, nineteen take out with them to the United States money enough to enable them to establish themselves in the inland States.’ We confess we had supposed that the pauper emigration bore a larger relative proportion to the voluntary. The latter moves generally in families, and often by villages. Accompanied thus by their clergyman and their doctor, and loaded with quantities of useless farming and household utensils, which they bring with them at a great expense and discard on arrival, these simple agriculturists leave the dreary stone houses which served as a home for their cattle, their horses, and themselves, and as a storehouse for their produce: bid good-bye to the heavy tower and bright bulbous dome of the venerable church; take a last look at the fields which have so long borne linseed, and wheat, and maize to them and their fathers; and set out joyfully on their voyage. Or, if they be mechanics and tradesmen (and the Hamburg statistics return 71 per cent. of the emigration of 1852, and 48 per cent. of that of 1851, as of these classes), they are still more content to go to a country where they anticipate ready employment and high wages. And if they be paupers, they certainly have nothing to lose by the change. Many are doubtless doomed to disappointment; for some of the town labour is overdone and ill paid—the ever-oppressed needlewoman for instance—even in energetic America. But we are credibly informed that they are gradually taking possession of many of the branches of industry in the large towns, as they can work and live for less than the Americans. They take leave of their country with a little more sentiment than the Irish, but yet without sorrow. The legends of forests which yield them no bread, and of mountains from whose vineyards no wine is pressed for their lips, the memories of the grass-grown streets and decaying fountains of Augsburg, the departed greatness of Nuremberg,—

‘Quaint old town of toil and traffic,  
Quaint old town of art and song,’—

the dull magnificence of Berlin, the Anglified elegance of Dresden, the small-beer architecture of Munich, even the national waters of the 'wide and winding Rhine,' and the old Germanic glories of Cologne, are little to them at the moment of leaving for the land of plenty. The same want of capital, and of an active, energetic middle class, to stimulate industry and make a division of labour, which has produced in Ireland the voluntary emigration of its best labourers, is causing the same results in the centre of Europe.

At Mannheim, or Hamburg, or Bremen, or wherever it may be, the emigrants surrender themselves and their fates to the shippers who contract to take them to New York; but not before a careful Government has seen that their comfort and health have been reasonably provided for. And, in truth, they require some looking after, for they and their luggage are generally in too filthy a state for a sea voyage. They are then brought to the sea-shore, from whence they are either shipped directly to America, or to Havre, to London, or to Liverpool, by way of Hull. Twice as many sail from Bremen as from any other continental port. Next in rank is Havre, which they reach under charge of agents, either by rail from Cologne, or by steam from the northern ports. Hamburg, Antwerp, and the English ports, all take large numbers. Fifteen or twenty thousand came to London last year to take passage hence for New York. Whoever crossed from Rotterdam within the year probably saw from one to three hundred of these people in the forward cabin, principally young men and women in the vigour of life, with their children. After passing the Bricille or the Helvoetsluys, he lost sight of them during the day. The women were below ill, from the unaccustomed motion of the vessel, and the men were either ministering to them, or were lazily stretched on the piles of Dutch produce which lumbered the deck to the tops of the paddle-boxes. When the sun had sunk behind the purple horizon, and the tranquil waters of the usually turbulent ocean began to reflect the rays of the moon breaking through the clouds, he probably saw these not very tidy men and women creeping up from below to breathe the fresh air; and before long the harmony of a trained chorus, singing the songs of the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, struck his ear. If he were curious to know more of them, he would have found, on inquiry, that they were peasants from Bavaria, or Baden, or Nassau, or Westphalia, or Saxony; or artisans from the towns of the Rhine and the Central States. He would have observed that, though untidy even to filthiness, they were by no means poor, rude, or absolutely unlettered. Their music

alone would have told him of a certain amount of cultivation; the gold upon their persons would have satisfied him that they were not without means to take care of themselves; and the Bibles distributed in the various families would have shown him their sense of the importance of those treasures which neither moth nor rust can corrupt, and which thieves cannot break through and steal. If he felt disposed still to follow their fortunes, he would have seen them landed in London; and after going through the necessary formalities at the Custom House, transferred to a boarding-house at Wapping, under charge of the agent, to await, at the contractor's expense, the sailing of the vessel. He would have seen them subjected the next day to the examination of the health officer; and then, going on board the vessel, he would have found that they were comfortably provided for in the manner which we have already described. Thus cared for without trouble to themselves, surrounded with friends and old neighbours, and provided with plenty of tobacco, he must have left them convinced that they would make the voyage with little risk of serious illness or death by the way, and with as much comfort as the unusual necessity of keeping clean would permit. Or if, to follow their fortunes still further, he had taken passage with them, he would have witnessed himself the comfort and harmony of the little community on the voyage, and would have seen its members on arrival taken in charge by the Commissioners of Emigration, and either supplied with work in some part of the country needing their services, or sent to colonise the West.\* And he

\* The Emigration Commissioners of New York are charged with the distribution of a large fund annually raised from the emigrants. It appears by the report for 1853, that they received 'commutation money' on 284,945 emigrants during the year, being 16,047 less than in 1852. The fund at their disposal during the year amounted to \$594,464, of which they expended \$586,859; \$122,135 went to counties in the interior, and \$214,077 was on account of the great Hospital at Ward's Island in the East River off New York, which accommodates 3000 patients; 20,197 were temporarily relieved by food, money, &c., 24,317 temporarily supplied with food, board, and lodging, 271 sent back to Europe at their own request, and 14,334 supplied with situations at the Intelligence Office, conducted by the Commissioners. This office was once put to a use little contemplated by its philanthropic founder. A farmer came in in search of a servant girl. A buxom Irish lass presented herself, bundle in hand, to go with him. One of the clerks jokingly said, 'she would make you a good wife.' The farmer thought the same, proposed, was accepted, sent for a magistrate, and was married on the spot.

would probably have admired the wisdom of the machinery which quietly, humanely, and profitably transports nations from regions where want makes them anarchists, to a country where, if demagogues would let them alone, plenty would soon turn them into conservatives.\*

It would be interesting to inquire the probable effect of this shifting of population upon the old world. If the movement had been confined to redundant labour, the result could be nothing but beneficial. But in Germany we see agriculturists of property and artisans of skill emigrating by tens of thousands; and in England the pioneer pauper migration is dragging a better class after it, by an annual remittance of a million and a half sterling. The movement to America has not yet made any material impression upon the manufacturing districts. That it will cannot reasonably be doubted. Nearly one-fifth of the population of the manufacturing State of Massachusetts is of foreign birth. The gold fields of Australia also tempt from a life of unceasing toil the men who, by industry and foresight, have accumulated enough for the passage. Whether this efflux will equalise the rates of wages on the two sides of the Atlantic remains to be seen.

It cannot be denied that Ireland has been purified by the purging. But what a picture the story presents—a fertile country, with a healthy climate, but with a deficient stock of capital, renovated only by the loss of young and strong labourers, whose work was valueless at home. They find occupation enough in America, and become in time industrious, peaceable, and comparatively temperate and money-saving citizens. Their old habit of abusing England sticks to them; but, fortunately, wind is plentiful in their adopted land, with no law to forbid it blowing where and as loud as it listeth; and the ill temper finds vent in expletives, not always in the best taste, but which wise people set down at their real value.

Whatever the effect on Europe, the great emigration must benefit the United States. We have already said that we do not share the fears of those who see destruction to the Republic in this increase to its numbers. No country was ever made worse by an addition of healthy labourers, while there was work

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\* It would repay the curious to inquire how far the existing democratic element in Germany has been created by the correspondence of the emigrants with their native land. The Irish are less speculative than the continental people, and being more under a controlling religious influence are not so much tinctured with sentimental democracy.

for them to do, and heads to direct them. The United States are emphatically in this condition. The native population is shrewd and intelligent, and has shown itself abundantly capable to direct the foreign element. That element, in return, proves one of the greatest resources of the State, furnishing it with the thing it most needs — labour — to develop its resources, to put down its fixtures, to open its ways for transportation, to subvert its virgin soil, to uncover the hidden wealth of its mines, to run its spindles, to hammer its iron, even to trim the sails of its ships, and to work the engines of its steamers. 400,000 creators of wealth now arrive annually in the United States, the men generally in the prime of life, the females even more so. Out of 245,000 persons arriving at four ports in 1850, 32,000 only were under ten years of age, and 22,000 only over forty; being less than one-half the proportion of native inhabitants under and over those respective ages. They are consequently strong, capable of much work, less liable to mortality, than the natives, and with a greater proportionate power of reproduction. It would be absurd to doubt that in the course of time they will affect the so-called Anglo-Saxon race in America. But it is yet too soon to measure the character or extent of their influence. We do not think they will essentially modify the constitutional institutions and educational systems it has established, which they learn, in a single generation, to respect as their own.

So, too, it would be idle to suppose that this supply will never be greater than the demand. In the natural course of events the United States will become thickly populated, great fortunes will accumulate, capital will become more plentiful than now, and labour will be less sought for, and consequently less paid. Doubtless also the European emigration hastens that time. But it is yet far distant, and will continue so while land is as abundant and as cheap as now. Notwithstanding the rapidity of the settlement of the West; notwithstanding the amount of land taken up by speculators; notwithstanding the profuseness with which the public domain has been granted by Congress, 1387 millions of acres remain unsold and unappropriated — six times the whole amount alienated by the Federal Government during the present century; and probably two-thirds, at least, of the amount alienated is in the market at a price not much above the Government rate. With such a quantity of land at five shillings an acre, capable of being brought into production the first year, there is no necessity for an unhealthy overplus of labour; for it not only attracts population to the West, but also keeps down the price



of farming lands in the East, where the principal markets are. With the exception of tracts close to the large towns, farms in New England sell now at about the same rate at which they did in the beginning of the century. In Massachusetts, even, the average value is 6*l.* 10*s.* per acre for the freehold; and in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, it is less than in Ohio. It is greater in Michigan and Indiana than in any southern state except Louisiana. While the present state of things can be maintained, no probable annual addition to the country by emigration will affect the labouring classes unfavourably.

It is plain also, that if the emigration continues as at present it will soon give the North a greater preponderance in the nation; but we do not regard that as a source of future weakness, rather of strength. There is no sympathy between the foreign labour and the slave labour to make the North and South immediately antagonistic. On the contrary, the emigrant seems to have an inherent antipathy to the black, and allies himself as soon as he becomes a citizen to the political party supposed to have Southern tendencies. The past shows that the dangers to the American Union have come, and are to come, not from Northern but from Southern increase. The Missouri contest grew out of Southern annexation, and the supposed dangers in 1850 had their origin in the desire of the South to impose slavery upon the free soil of California. The North has never required political stimulus to aid its growth, nor has its advance been marked by accessions of territory. It is the slave power which took to itself Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, which grasped after California and New Mexico, and which now wants Cuba. A gradual and peaceable increase in the industry, wealth, and population of the North, which shall give to it at length, without annexation or war, an incontestible preponderance in the Union, will be submitted to by the South, with scarcely a consciousness that it has taken place, and will perhaps check the thirst for acquisition, which, if unrestrained at home and unopposed abroad, may sow serious dissensions, and threaten the existence of the Republic.

Under the stimulating influence of this cause the industry and resources of the United States have made an almost fabulous advancement. We had purposed to show its effect upon the principal branches of the national wealth, but are prevented by the unexpected length to which the subject has carried us. The tonnage of the country increased in the ten years ending in 1852 from 2,000,000 to over 4,000,000, the imports from 100 millions of dollars to 213 millions, the customs from 18 millions to 45 (yielding the Federal

Treasury an annual surplus of 15 or 20 millions). The cotton crop increased in the ten years ending in 1850 from 800 to 1000 million pounds; the rice crop from 80 to 215 millions, and the sugar from 155 to 281 millions; the wheat from 77 to 100 million bushels, and the maize from 400 to 600 millions. The potato alone, blasted by disease, sank in production. Thirteen thousand miles of constructed railway, and as much more in progress, all built by emigrants' hands, are opening up the rich, but before unsaleable, lands of the West, bringing their cheaply produced bread stuffs and choked-up mineral wealth to Eastern markets. Of cottons the Americans now manufacture three times more in value than they import, and the export of their own manufactures is two-fifths of the foreign importation; and their woollen manufactures exceed the imports of similar articles as three to one. In all articles of clothing, in carriages, furniture, materials for house decoration, books, paper, iron utensils, agricultural implements, hand tools, they are substantially independent of all other countries, and in the coarser cottons they are not only independent, but have become exporters to compete with British fabrics in South America, Africa, and Central Asia. There can be little doubt that they will advance to the manufacture of more delicate fabrics. The country is full of skilful designers from the Continent, who will not fail to impress their taste upon the national productions, and give them a currency throughout the world. Side by side with this the mineral wealth of the country will be developed. California had yielded 50 millions sterling by the close of 1852. Other mining interests had been less prosperous. But the high prices of iron and coal are opening the Pennsylvanian furnaces; and emigration, favoured by joint stock companies in New York and London, is finding its way to Lake Superior, where the pure copper lies in masses six feet in thickness, and weighing from sixty to seventy tons. These important results merit a more extended notice, and are full of suggestions for the future.

With such an unexampled growth in material prosperity, we are not surprised to see the conceit natural to the English race swell into a sometimes undue proportion in the Transatlantic branch of the family, and make Jonathan foolishly long to thrust his fingers into all kinds of political pies. Within the half century he has removed nearly all the Indians from the east to the west of the Mississippi, planted them on the sources of the Arkansas and the southern branches of the Missouri, and provided them with schools, missionaries, fields, and money; marching beyond them, he has invaded the territories of the Sacs and

Foxes, and pitched his camp in the hunting lands of the Sioux; the scouts of his forces have penetrated the fields of the Pottawotomics and the Kanzas, and his army of emigrants, following in their track, has crossed to the Pacific, established itself there, and opened a constant communication between it and the Atlantic. He has brought his commercial marine to the second, and nearly to the first rank in the world; he has made his country the principal cotton and a permanent corn-growing state; he has covered it with a network of railways; he has founded a manufacturing power, which begins to compete with the wealthy and skillful establishments of Europe; he has discovered boundless fields of coal and iron, of lead and copper, and has possessed himself of rich tracts of gold, which enable him to open and use them all; he has increased his family sixfold, and his annual income fifteenfold, and finds few paupers on his estates except those sent in by less fortunate landlords; he has built houses and barns, and planted fat orchards and rich corn-fields for his family, and has founded schools and educated teachers for his children. What wonder that he feels a little pride and more conceit!

These fruits, however, though great, are entirely material; and if the energy of a free and vigorous people is to end in money-getting and the worship of Mammon,—if a fevered struggle in a business city is to be the object of the young men's life, and the reputation of wealth their ambition,—if arts are not to gild, letters soften, and the love of country pursuits chasten social life,—better would it be for them, when there are no more fields to be subdued, and when unemployed hands shall be stretched out for bread, that they had never risen from the cradle of their political infancy. In the rapidity of their 'development' the Americans have had little time for the elegant idleness of European society. Every man's shoulder has been wanted at the wheel of the social car. But now wealth, cultivation, travel, and the leisure afforded by emigrant labour, are producing higher results than mere material prosperity. The possessors of money are learning to love the country and its healthy pursuits. Literature has become a profession, and authors are well paid. Transatlantic sculptors have attained a European reputation, and efforts in the kindred branch of the Fine Arts are favourably known. Architects flourish among them, and have plenty to do. The national Government gives a liberal though not always judicious aid to scientific research, and publishes the results of expeditions undertaken by its directions. In this way the labours of Frémont, Stansbury, Wilkes, Owen, Maury, Foster, Andrews, and Sabine have been given to the world. The Smithsonian

Institution, founded at Washington on the liberal bequest of an Englishman, is laying a broad foundation for future usefulness. The generosity of the late Mr. Astor gave to New York the most liberally endowed public library in the world, which in the course of half a dozen years has collected together nearly a hundred thousand volumes. An eminent American gentleman, connected with the first commercial house of Europe and the world, and universally respected for his intelligence and worth, has founded a similar institution in Boston. Another well-known American merchant in London has been equally liberal to his native town in Massachusetts. In all the markets of Europe the Americans are the great buyers of scarce books, by means of an agency maintained in London by the Smithsonian Institution and by private collectors, and directed by a gentleman who is always on the look-out to secure 'rarities' for his countrymen.

It cannot be doubted that, versatile as they are, they will soon give the same attention to Art which they now give to more solid but less graceful matters. The incorporation into the community of so large an amount of emigration from continental cities, educated in the arts of design, and contributing by the pencil and the chisel to the national love of show, will hasten such a result. When, in no very distant day, the prairies of the Lake country and the valley of the Mississippi shall be peopled with fifty millions, gathered from all nations, but guided by the English race and governed by English traditions; when the slopes of the Alleghanies and the Green Mountains shall be covered with sheep, and their valleys filled with the best bred stock; when the plains of the South shall be entirely devoted to the production of cotton (let us hope without the curse of slavery); when the higher and more delicate branches of manufactures shall have taken root in Massachusetts, and the mechanical arts found a firmer stay in Pennsylvania; when the white man shall have driven the buffalo from the fields which each setting sun shadows with the peaks of the Rocky Mountains; when cities shall fringe the Pacific, towns line the banks of the Oregon, and farms dot the surface of California and the valley of the Willamette; when skill shall have subdued the mineral wealth of Lake Superior; when commerce shall whiten every lake and ascend every river of the country, and shall carry its productions to every clime; when railroads shall unite the Atlantic with the Pacific, and bring every part of this vast nation into close contact with every other; when opulence shall have given a home to Art in their cities, and Literature shall have created the traditions which they lack; — what a spectacle

may they not present to the world if, despising the allurements of ambition, and disregarding the erroneous advice of interested leaders, they are content to reap the rewards of their peaceful industry, and to enjoy the blessings which Providence places within their reach!

- ART. IX.—1. *The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829.* From the German of Baron Von MOLTKE, Major in the Prussian Service. London: 1854. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 476.
2. *Marmont's Turkish Empire.* Translated, with Notes and Observations on the Relations of England with Turkey and Russia, and brought down to the present Time. By Sir F. SMITH, K. H., F. R. S., of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Second Edition. 1854.
3. *The Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1828 and 1829, with a View of the present State of Affairs in the East.* By COLONEL CHESNEY, R. A., D. C. L., F. R. S. London: 1854. 1 vol.

THE struggle which commenced with the Turkish declaration of war against Russia has assumed such proportions, and become so thoroughly European in character, that at times we are almost tempted to forget the party principally concerned. As we have ourselves gone to war with Russia, and assumed all the responsibility of the issue of the quarrel, the attitude of Turkey before and since the first outbreak of hostilities, has ceased to have the primary interest it possessed in the autumn of 1853. Yet we cannot forget that during the first months of the campaign, and even since the note of preparation was sounded in this country, a certain section of politicians possessing a very considerable following among the public, sought to alarm us with predictions of the sudden advent of the enemy at the gates of Constantinople. We were told on the contrary by another party, perhaps not a very influential one, that if Omar Pasha, at the outset, had not been hindered in his projects by the Allied Governments, he would have had no difficulty in establishing himself at Bucharest, or indeed in driving the forces of Prince Gortschakoff back across the Pruth, without foreign assistance. On the one side we were given to understand that the patient we were called in to assist, was a vigorous man of middle age, who had parted with none of the strength peculiar to that time of life, on the other, that he was the veritable 'sick man' of the Imperial correspondence.

The exaggerated character of either opinion might be considered sufficiently apparent, after a cursory examination of the events of the present contest. It might be supposed, conviction had arisen on the fact, that Russia is not altogether a victim of the inherent weakness assigned to her at one time by Mr. Cobden, and that Turkey, although displaying signs of age, is not absolutely sunk in the feebleness of decrepitude. Without exactly agreeing in the glowing panegyric of Lord Palmerston on the internal resources and self-acting power of renovation, we cannot but be certain of the presence of a strong vitality, in the empire of the Sultan. Without slavishly following the later deductions drawn by Mr. Cobden from what we must be at liberty to call erroneous premises, we may take for granted, that in a prolonged struggle, the Porte must have inevitably yielded at last to the reiterated assaults of the Czar, if that Power had been left single-handed, to meet so great an antagonist. Such is the very ample justification of the Government for cautious negotiations, the carefully drawn conventions with Allies, and rigid attention to proper formalities in affairs of vast importance. There was no immediate demand for instant action, but Turkey could not be left without assistance, if Russia showed a determination to persevere. For the time Turkey could be trusted to her own resources, and means were taken for securing efficient aid to her, if ultimately necessary, on the safest and broadest grounds.

It would appear however, that what has passed lately before our eyes, has not sufficed to modify the extreme views above alluded to. Government has been taxed with supineness, with incapacity, and by some wild interpreters of events with collusion, for not having anticipated the rupture with Russia; for not having performed acts of war, when we had no war upon our hands; for not having warded off disasters incurred by the Porte in consequence of faith in the declarations of a Power, with which we were at peace. We should have hardly thought it worth while to refer to these attacks, the injustice and the failure of which are so apparent to the unprejudiced, but for the belief that they have obtained a certain value, and have carried a certain weight, where there has not been sufficient information, to counteract erroneous opinion. The operations of the Black Sea fleet, and more particularly the tactics of Admiral Dundas, have been criticised in a most unfriendly and impatient spirit; and the latter, as a professional man, has had an early experience of the fate to which all British commanders are doomed, unless they grasp and secure brilliant victories like ripe fruit, immediately after an outbreak

of hostilities, or as in this case, even before such an event. That such impatience and bitter criticism are not to be ascribed to mere factious intention and party-spirit, we are quite willing to admit. On the contrary, it is beyond doubt, that a large portion of it is prompted by an intense wish for the success of the cause nationally espoused, and a strong patriotic feeling for the national honour. A necessity of action being assumed for the furtherance of these two objects, obstacles of execution vanish from the minds of those who are not concerned in it, and the natural advantages of position, the experience of former wars, the physical and moral qualities of those we are bent on assisting, the great difficulties attendant on the progress of the enemy, are alike overlooked; or, if not overlooked, put aside in the heat of argument, as things of little moment, and hardly bearing on the question.

In the history of the campaigns of 1828 and 1829, we have the requisite information. This explains the course of the war, as prosecuted until the date of the armed intervention of the two Powers. Perhaps we shall be excused for calling the attention of the reader to that, till lately, almost forgotten struggle. But an apology is hardly necessary, as a glance at the events of those years may be more conducive to an adequate estimate of what has been done, and what can be done now by the belligerents, than perhaps even a zealous attention to the accounts of partial correspondents, and the reasoning of public writers, on events the facts of which may be still in want of confirmation.

The Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1828 and 1829, described by the Freiherr Von Moltke, Major on the Prussian General Staff, is a work of great value, whether it be considered as a scientific military memoir of the transactions he treats of, or on account of its strict impartiality. It is impossible to trace a feeling of superior favour for either Russian or Turk; and after perusing the book, we rise with the satisfaction, of having travelled professionally with a professional man, who has been influenced by little except the study of his profession. If there be something of the dryness of the military report, there is also its exactness and freedom from bias. Such a merit is great in any case, but in this one of Russians and Turks, after our late experience of the value of their reports, it is indeed inestimable. An excellent translation of this work, which has recently been published, renders it accessible to the English public.

At the opening of the campaign of 1828, Turkey stood absolutely on the brink of ruin. Exhausted by a contest of six years with the Greeks, — her fleet destroyed, — an army half

organised according to the new fashion introduced after the destruction of the Janissaries, — without an ally — she stood alone, apparently but to receive the *coup de grace*. The force put in movement by her antagonist was about 100,000 strong, after making due allowance for the difference between paper strength and effective strength. The Russians organised, disciplined; moving with certain obedience and unmitigated devotion to the will of the Emperor: the Mussulmans exhibiting an absolute contrast, and echoing the words of the Sultan: — ‘Gather up thy spirit, for Allah knows we are in great danger.’ Might it not have been supposed, with some show of reason, that the Russians would have had little but a summer’s march across the Balkan?

But there were elements of strength then in Turkey, which were formerly overlooked by the Russians, as by some of us at the present time. The Russians in earlier wars, when they contended for Bessarabia, seldom met with a check from the Osmanli, if they had an opportunity of deploying their regular infantry on open ground, without being exposed to the fury of the Turkish cavalry charge. Confident in their organisation and regularity, the advantages of which they had so often proved, they never scrupled to attack very superior numbers. The traditions of former wars were not forgotten by them; and throughout the contests of the campaigns under consideration, we see them actuated by the same spirit, and displaying a like contempt for numerically stronger forces arrayed against them, — even when the enemy, as was almost invariably the case from the defensive system adopted, enjoyed the advantages of chosen and intrenched positions.

But in one respect the Russians had mis-reckoned. They had forgotten that such simple tactics of bold attack, under any circumstances, though suitable to the certainty of operation in a plain country, might involve them in great danger in a more intricate one, there being nothing more certain, than that the more mountainous and difficult the seat of war may be, the more formidable does it become for defence, by wild and irregular troops. Under such conditions the individual man recovers his separate value, which among disciplined troops is often merged in the whole, and is lost altogether among the rabble of untaught levies, which a general may rashly attempt to deploy on flat ground, in the face of a more instructed soldiery. The Russians were quickly undeceived; — what promised so fairly in the outset, became daily more arduous. Unforeseen impediments presented themselves: detachments to cover or mask various points were necessary; difficulties arose in providing the troops



and horses; in short, obstacles of every kind rose up around them. The delays and sluggishness of the Turkish administration caused but apparent danger to the Porte, and time was gained to garrison fortresses, to raise levies, and organise a rude but tolerable system of defence. Every day increased the numbers of the Turkish army, and added something, however slight, to its efficiency.

To understand the difficulty of the Russians, it is necessary to take a glance at the country they were invading. They commenced with the occupation of Wallachia, extending their right flank to the neighbourhood of Kalafat, as was done by Gortschakoff during last autumn. To this no opposition was made. The Wallachian fortresses had been dismantled by the Turks after their final defeat in Bessarabia. They had determined, and wisely, not to undertake the defence of any line beyond that of the Danube. It may be assumed, that no river ever yet stopped a resolute general. But the Danube presents great difficulties, and after it is crossed, the strong places on the right bank, on the line of operations, must be either invested or taken, before the grand obstacle of the march to Constantinople across the Balkan can be attempted. This great stream, after cutting through the chalk mountains which stretch from north to south between the Carpathian and the Balkan ranges, is altered in character. Instead of a narrow channel full of rapids and encumbered with rocks, we have a broad flowing river, intersecting thick alluvial soil, and passing through a valley nearly a hundred miles in breadth. In Little Wallachia, as far as the Aluta, the country is traversed by ridges, the spurs of the high mountains; but this region, as well as the wide extended plains of Great Wallachia, must be considered in general as flat. The banks of the Danube display a marked contrast. That of Bulgaria, from Widdin downwards, is every where high and steep, and often completely commands long reaches of the river. The Wallachian bank, on the contrary, is marked by a low shore and wide swampy meadows. The branchings of the streams form many marshy islets, and at seasons of high water, the adjacent country is constantly flooded. As the traveller proceeds downwards, he finds the islands larger and more numerous, the meadow flats wider and more swampy. After Rustchuk no firm ground is found on the left bank, till the spot in front of Turtukai is reached. Opposite to Silistria a good road from Kalarash to the Danube is always open. At Brailau, for the first time the left bank becomes important. Below Isaktchi the river breaks through the Delta in three arms, of which the Sulina, the only one navi-

gable by vessels of much draft, is from one hundred and fifty to two hundred paces broad. In the vale country, the force of the stream averages about two miles and a half in the hour.

To any one considering the character of the Danube carefully, the difficulty it affords to an invader, and the advantages it presents on the right bank for defence, must be apparent. There it is high, precipitous, and firm. On the left there are but a few points in the line of operations of an invading army on which troops can be assembled. These points are for the most part guarded by fortresses or temporary entrenchments, as is the case at Turtukai. It is, as lately shown at the last-named place, difficult to force them in front without a combined movement from the left flank, by the march of a force up the right bank thrown across the river lower down. We in consequence observe, that the invader has been always obliged to carry his first passage of the river towards its mouth, which is too far removed from the Turkish centre of a system of defence, formed on Silistria, Varna, and Shumla, to be held strongly. This was done in 1828, and again lately by General Lüders, the operation on both occasions requiring much forethought and previous arrangement, and entailing a certain amount of bloodshed; but on neither occasion could a doubt be entertained, as to the success of the Russians, Isakteki and Matschin being usually held as outposts. Other causes for selection of the first passage of the river at this point, are the facilities afforded for bridging, and the advantages conferred by the neighbourhood of the Pruth, the Black Sea, and Galatz.

Before quitting this part of the subject, we should consider the line of the Danube held by the Turks, not only for purposes of defence, but also as a base whence to advance against an enemy. It is evident that an army having occupied such a line, sacrifices the advantages of position by a general forward movement. The communications before so easy, and to the eastward of Nicopolis so concentric, would now depend on the strong occupation of every point, by which the lately invading army might have threatened to cross. In case of reverse and retreat, it would be necessary to destroy the unity of the force, by dividing it into various and diverging columns, to be directed on these several points. The necessity for the nicest combination to ensure them from destruction in detail is apparent. Such delicacy of manœuvre would require the steadiest troops, and the most experienced commanders in the wide Wallachian plains, where a numerous hostile cavalry would be very dangerous to them. The *entrain* and spirit of a force of such character as the Turkish levies would suffer by the knowledge, that general

safety depended on reaching in time the isolated points, where the passage could be effected. In such case the enemy would have no difficulty in forcing the river in pursuit of the retreating battalions, and in all probability many of the river fortresses would be yielded shamefully. The line of a river may be maintained in the first instance with success by an irregular army, which when engaged amidst the dispiriting circumstances of retreat will sometimes vanish without a struggle, at the first appearance of their pursuers on the opposite bank. The plan of defence therefore, adopted by the Turks in 1828, and by Omar Pasha in the present war, was the only wise course to adopt.

Let us suppose the Danube forced, and the Turks obliged by circumstances, still to remain on the defensive, debarred from action in the open field. The invading general must now narrowly examine his maps. He has a range of mountains before him, not very high, but affording only a few passes, of which the most practicable are hardly suited for military purposes. The celebrated Hills, separating Roumelia from Bulgaria, after running due east dip suddenly on the Black Sea. Westward at the sources of the Jantra and Tundscha the summits are clothed with snow in June. Thence towards the east the elevation does not exceed 5000 feet as far as the source of the Kamtschie, and as the eastern extremity is approached, the height of 3,500 feet is rarely found. The descent on the southern side is rugged and precipitous, whilst the northern face is concealed by a system of lower hills which stretch unequally towards the valley of the Danube. The latter are often crowned with plateaux. These, in many instances, form the most admirable military positions for entrenched camps, being rarely accessible except by narrow paths, the eminences being revetted, as it were, by natural walls of rock, varying in height from ten to a hundred feet. They are in general well wooded, although they do not possess the magnificent forest trees of the higher Baikan range. On the plateaux and slopes we find a thickly set jungle of dwarf oak and other shrubs, and stretching far into the plain, an endless extent of intractable briars. Apart from the inequality of the ground, the march and deployment of troops would find very serious obstacles in the superabundant forest and jungle growth. Such is the great natural obstruction to the advance of an enemy, arising not so much on account of the height of the range as of the difficulty of access, the paucity of mountain passes, the admirable positions for defence ranged one behind another, the absence of made roads as well of those appliances of life and civilisation, to be met with in the Alpine districts of Germany and Switzerland. Without giving the names or tracing the

exact course of the passes, we may simply state that they are six number, between the source of the Jantra and the Black Sea, the three towards the east, between Shumla and Burgas, being those naturally chosen by an army advancing from Bessarabia. In the mountains there are no cross paths between the passes. In some of the valleys military communications may be maintained.

During the war of 1828 the fortresses on the river and Black Sea played a more important part than is likely to be the case during the present one, if we except Silistria. Though imperfect in design and of insignificant profile, none of them dignified with the denomination of regular fortresses, they sustained lengthened sieges or investments, and reduced the Russian army almost to ruin. It has been said, and with truth, that when the Turks are in good heart their defence often becomes most obstinate, at the moment when more regular combatants will surrender a place. That which with us is considered an element of weakness, is with them one of strength. The larger the number of the population of a town, exclusive of the garrison, the longer and more tenacious will be the defence. In the smaller fortresses, where the soldiery has not been aided by the people, it has been rarely respectable. In those of more considerable area, in which the crowd has taken arms, the garrison have found themselves reinforced by men as capable and as willing as themselves in defending the tottering walls.

On the 8th June of 1828 the Russians crossed the Danube, near its mouth, at Satunovo, and within six weeks of that time had taken Braila on the left bank, never afterwards restored, and had penetrated so far, as to be in the centre of the triangle formed by Silistria, Varna and Shumla. On the 20th of July a resultless action was fought, after which an attempt was made to invest Shumla; we say an attempt, as the means at the disposal of the Russians were never sufficient to command the roads in the rear, and at no time was the Turkish communication with Adrianople interrupted. Shumla is the ordinary point of assembly of the Turkish army in a war against the Russians. It is backed by a chain of mountains which encircle it to the north, west, and south in the form of a vast crescent, and has on the eastern front a marshy ravine which empties its waters into the Kamtschic. It is only accessible from the east. The extensive slope of the hills on that side is somewhat gradual and glacislike. The upper plateau, round which run the works—a position intended as it were by nature for an intrenched camp,—the group of hills, of which it forms a part, being separated from the Balkan range by the valley of the Kamtschic—is elevated above

the Bulgarian plain from 600 to 800 feet. The town is built in a confined and low valley terminating in steep ravines. It is quite open. The lines of the intrenched camp run along the crest of the hill glacis to the left from the height of Strandscha, to the right leaning on that of Tchengell. These lines overtop Shumla to the north and south, and they have been carried in some parts on the verge of the steepest precipices, where they are of no use, and present the appearance of an aqueduct. They are of earth-work, and have a narrow but deep ditch. Their extent from Strandscha to the heights of Tchengell is about 8000 paces, and there is ample space to cover completely an immense army.

The few roads by which an enemy can approach are defiles many miles long, terminating in a few difficult paths up the wall-like rocks, where there can be neither combination of the different arms, nor deployment of masses. But the height of Strandscha is vulnerable. It possesses revetted forts, but is by no means secure against assault. If the summit of that height be won, Shumla can no longer be held. It is only accessible on that part, and from the marshy raviny nature of the ground approach is not easy even in that direction. It is said in some quarters, that Shumla has gained a greater reputation than it deserves. The Turks have already experienced that it could be turned by a determined adversary, after Varna had been taken. But its position, not only on the direct route from Rustchuk and Silistria, but also at the head of the valley which debouches on the Gulf of Varna, must, until the fall of the latter, give it a first-rate military importance; and in any case, as will be shown hereafter in allusion to the campaign of 1829, utterly disconcert a Russian commander, however successfully he may have turned it, and have actually reached Adrianople by communicating with the Black Sea.

The Russians, in their extreme confidence in 1828 tried their hands on Shumla, thinking thus to take the shortest cut across the Balkan, and secure their rear, the fortresses of Varna and Silistria being yet surmounted by the crescent. The attempt failed, though in the first instance directed by the Czar in person. From various causes of sickness, necessity of detachment, the masking of Silistria, and the investment of Varna, the Russians discovered that they had attempted an impossibility. The besieging and blockading force quickly dwindled to a less number than the enemy it sought to shut up. They soon began to intrench themselves, and to depend on lines of redoubts. At the end of July it was already evident that no favourable result could ensue. Frequent combats and surprises took place during the

following month. The assailants were decimated by exposure to the heat, and the fatigue of procuring forage from a distance, till at length, on the 10th of September, they acknowledged their defeat, by the determination of General Count Wittgenstein to convert the so-called investment into a mere process of observation, and to concentrate his troops in Seni-Bazar. Had the Turkish commanders displayed at that time but moderate activity, there would have been an end of the Russian *corps d'armée*. The grand vizier advanced from Adrianople with 14,000 picked men, but he did no more. The Russian division, which, during the months of August and September had been in a most critical situation, was in consequence saved from destruction by his apathy and supineness.

The siege of Varna had been commenced in form by Prince Menschikoff on the 6th of August. The Russians, masters of the sea, were promptly assisted by their fleet in the conveyance of troops and stores of all kinds for the siege. In the actual prosecution of the operations, the shallowness of the harbour of Varna prevented much advantage being gained from its presence, beyond the strict blockade, and interruption of communication with Constantinople. The town had an old Byzantine castle, which was used as a powder magazine. The principal enceinte, having a circumference of about two miles and a quarter, is an earthen rampart, without much command, connected with the rocky precipice jutting on the sea to the north, and running round Varna to the Dewna river. It was flanked by ten small bastions, the faces of which were pierced for two guns, and the flanks for one. The curtains, owing to their narrowness, did not admit of guns; the ditch was small, wet at the eastern extremity, otherwise dry; the scarp and counterscarp revetted with brick-work: in the front of the rampart there were scarcely any permanent works, not even a covered way. Three lunettes had been hastily thrown up 500 paces in advance of the west front, and an intrenchment 1500 paces from the north side of the place.

It is not easy to conceive a more imperfect *place d'armes*. Yet in this the Turks managed to maintain themselves till the 10th of October, and it would not have fallen then, but for the same cause which saved the force under Wittgenstein after the failure before Shumla,—the incredible apathy which distinguished every Turkish commander during that war, excepting two or three in command of fortresses. The Czar, believing that the relief of Varna would be strongly attempted by Omar Vrione, who had been detached by the grand vizier from Shumla for that purpose on the 24th of September, caused him to be attacked on the

heights of Kurtepe. In vain the Russian commander alleged want of means to assail a numerous enemy in a strong position: the order was peremptory. The previous skirmishes had been bloody and danaging; success could hardly be looked for. A furious attack was made; the Russian soldiery displayed an ardour and discipline under extreme difficulty which have never been surpassed, and suffered a loss of 1400 men; but the object was not obtained; Omar Vrione maintained the heights; the Prince of Wurtemberg was compelled to retreat. The former had it in his power at once to relieve Varna; he would make no effort. For a fortnight he was within sight of the place, allowing the Russians quietly to continue their assaults and contemplating the defence of the garrison. At length, the example of Jussuf Pasha shook the firmness of the garrison. They surrendered on the 11th of October; Omar Vrione, as he richly deserved, was then beaten back by the besieging force, which he had abstained from molesting, when he could have done it with so much ease and advantage.

During this campaign, the investment of Silistria, owing to bad management and want of troops, consequent on such varied operations, was a failure from beginning to end. With the fall of Varna the campaign came to a close. The eastern part of Bulgaria had thus fallen into the hands of the Russians, who occupied the position between Shumla and the sea. This was the sole result of the long and uninterrupted campaign of three months, posterior to the passage of the Danube, and, as it has been observed, was the consequence of an apathy so suspicious, that we must refer it to treacherous intention. But for this cause the Russians must have retreated from Varna, as they did from Shumla. The whole object of their undertaking would have been missed. As it was, they were brought to the verge of calamity, by the mere force of inaction on the part of the Turks. For that can hardly be called a systematic scheme of defence, of which the only apparent feature in the conduct of the commanders, not in command of besieged fortresses, was the most apathetic sluggishness, which abandoned places to their fate when almost the raising of a hand would have saved them; which refused to seize the advantage when it had been won, through the overweening confidence and rashness of the Russian autocrat. But the truth is, if there was not treachery, the traditions of former wars were against the Turkish leaders, and they knew that science failed them. They believed more in the skill of their enemy, than in their own capacity for resistance. Their energy died within them. There was a marasmus of their vital power. This fatal disease was ultimately spread among

their followers. When they were not under its influence, at the first sieges of the war, at Brailau on the left bank of the Danube, at Varna, at Silistria, and in many of the skirmishes and battles, their bearing was good, and often heroic. During the early part of the second campaign they still merited praise. Their defence of Silistria, from the 17th of May till the 29th of June, in 1829, was admirable. It was certainly a great feat of arms to defend the place for six weeks; for the ramparts were insignificant, the flanking defences so indifferent that it was possible to look into the fortress, and to enfilade the greater part of the curtains; while permanent outworks, with the exception of those connecting the city with the Danube, were altogether wanting. The ditch did not exceed from eight to ten feet in depth, and could not be flooded, the bottom of it being above the level of the Danube. On the day that Silistria was invested, an attempt was made at Eski Arnautlar, by Reschid Pacha, to turn a Russian position, and the advantage apparently remained with the Turks. He retreated, after an engagement which had lasted for fifteen hours, but halted on a spot from which, his left flank being in connection with Shumla, he threatened the Russians with renewed attack. It was but a threat. The fight had been a very bitter one, and had been so energetically conducted by the Moslem, that it reminded those present at it of the impetuosity of the old Turkish onslaught. At the great battle of Koslewtscha, in which Field-marshal Diebitsch commanded against the Grand Vizier in person, on the 11th of June, the attempt being made to cut off the latter from his camp at Shumla, the same impetuosity was visible for a time. But quickly came the reverse, and the Turks, who at the commencement of the assault had shown the boldest courage, displayed, when pressed back and reduced to defend themselves, a most craven spirit. The army was broken up, and lost in the woods. The Russians could not make prisoners amidst the pathless forests; and in the course of a fortnight the remains of the Ottoman host were again assembled at Shumla, not much reduced in numbers, but henceforth useless as an army. Their patience and fortitude had now utterly vanished. There was a race of pusillanimity and folly between leaders and soldiery. Such however, was the difficulty of the country, so great the impediments to the advance of troops, to the provisioning of them, the establishment of hospitals for the sick and wounded, that when, by admirable skill and boldness, Field-marshal Diebitsch found himself at Adrianople, after a campaign which had lasted from the 17th of May till the 20th of August, there having been a pause of a month in the operations after the battle of Koslewtscha, he



was convinced that nothing but speedy and unmolested retreat could save the remnant of his victorious army. Rustchuk, on the Danube, and Shumla were still held in his rear. An army of irregulars threatened his right. His forces, so feeble in numbers when he adventured on his undertaking of the passage of the Balkans (under 20,000 men), were losing hundreds daily from sickness. By skilful demonstrations, by carefully masking his real condition, by acting on the fears of the Turks and their surprising ignorance, and perhaps in some instances with the connivance of a section of the negotiators at Constantinople, headed as they were by Baron Müffling, he succeeded in securing the terms of a conqueror instead of incurring durance as a prisoner of war. But this was owing to the genius of the man, aided by the infatuation or the treachery of his opponents and their advisers. The time and the circumstances were favourable to him; but if a lesson on the obstacles in the country in which he had operated may be learned by any means, it must be in the consideration of the fact, that the Russian army of 70,000 actual combatants which began a campaign in May, its flank secured by the Black Sea, the operations of which were conducted on the most strictly scientific principles, their base running parallel to, and having been secured by the fleet before the field was taken, — an army which, from first to last, never met with a reverse, the *morale* of its enemy being for the time utterly lost, was, in September, in a position of difficulty, whence it could alone be rescued by a subtle diplomacy. No term but that of rescue, can adequately convey the idea of its happy extrication from a situation of almost overwhelming peril.

As is said by Von Moitke, 'If the difficulty of crossing the Balkan was formerly much over-estimated, the result of the campaign of 1828-9 has caused many persons to imagine that it is no impediment. We must not, however, forget that in that year the mountains were not defended at all.' Yet it is calculated, the loss of men by death was, in the Russian army, about 60,000 in number; that one-seventh of the original force returned to tell of the glorious campaign, of which the grand feature was the passage of the Balkan by a detachment of the former. As an instance of the dreadful mortality in the Russian ranks, we give two items, officially authenticated—viz. in the general hospitals: from March to July, in 1829, 28,746 deaths occurred among 81,214 patients; and of the 6000 men left sick at Adrianople, on the retreat of Diebitsch, 5,200 died. In one word, the army had been annihilated, though it had never met with a check.

After this brief consideration of the difficulties of an invader

of Turkey coming from Bessarabia, exemplified by the actual experience of a struggle prosecuted on the same ground, with everything in favour of the Russian, we may now approach the subject of the present war, and appreciate more fully what are the prospects of the contest under the different circumstances. In 1828 Turkey was single-handed, without a fleet, and with hardly more than the skeleton of a regular army; indeed, it may be said, of any army. In 1853, when she issued her declaration of war, she was backed by powerful allies—she possessed fleets and armies. Although neither of the latter may bear comparison with those of the Christian Powers, they have decidedly shown, since the commencement of the contest, that they are not untrustworthy. In 1828 the Black Sea was a Russian lake; since the affair of Sinope it has been closed to Russian vessels. In 1828 and in 1829, the Black Sea was the real base of the hostile operations. It may be averred, that the Russian invasion of that period was almost a naval one. There can be no doubt the main strength of it lay in the active proceedings of Admiral Greig's fleet, which victualled the army, was constantly employed in ferrying over stores, siege trains, and detachments, and forereached on the land movements so much, as actually to seize Sizopolis on the 15th of February, 1829, or three months before Diebitsch was in a condition to commence operations. The map shows the importance of such a position, to the south of the eastern extremity of the Balkan. But for the possession of the seaboard, the Russian general must have been contented with the siege of Silistria, and another attempt to blockade Schumla, which would have probably ended in failure in the autumn of that year, as it did in that of the preceding one. A Russian army advancing now would have an incredible train of guns, ammunition, food, and hospital stores to drag painfully along in its rear. What the difficulty of conveying such heavy trains over plains without roads, and rugged mountain passes, was sufficiently understood by Diebitsch and his lieutenant, General Roth, when they found themselves frequently obliged to cut their paths as they advanced, such labours not being disturbed by the panic-stricken enemy. And the number which effected the passage of the Balkan was under 20,000 men, and unincumbered with more than a few days' provisions, and without siege-guns.

Under the present circumstances, if we suppose the campaign to have been as favourable to the Czar in this year as it was in the earliest part of 1829, as regards Silistria, no Russian forward movement could have been successful, unless, in despite of natural obstacles, Omar Pacha's army, the remaining for-

troops on the Black Sea and the Danube, and of the Allies, the Czar had succeeded in placing at least 100,000 men in Adrianople, well provided with stores, which could not come from the sea, well provided with an enormous train of artillery, every gun and shell of which must have been dragged by main force across the mountains, and well provided, until he reached the plains of Roumelia, with a perfect and amply supplied commissariat, which a Russian army never yet possessed. We really believe that, even unopposed except by the difficulty of the country, he could not have succeeded in placing a force there sufficiently strong for self-protection, during a short campaign, against such means as would have been now brought against him, under many months from the date of passing the Danube. For he must have been prepared to operate with large armies, where Diebitsch inspired abject terror with a slender and sickly detachment.

The different position of the Czar in 1854 as compared with that of 1829, when his successful operations conducted him so near to disgrace and disaster, is worth consideration. As before stated, the Black Sea, then his own, is closed to him. Odessa, but lately the granary of his forces, has been bombarded, and mourns over a ruined trade. His army, now engaged in Asiatic Turkey, must depend altogether on Tiflis, and what may come thither from the Caspian Sea by way of Derbent. The labours of Prince Paskiewitsch in the previous war have been wasted. The communication then so laboriously established with the Black Sea, to facilitate the arrival of stores and troops by a more convenient line than the mountainous routes of Georgia, is no longer of any avail. In this respect the Russians are thrown back a hundred years. We observe that, in the regions where these extensive affairs are now to be carried on, the armies will be operating on lines removed at a great distance from the central basis whence come their supplies. The forces in Wallachia, and directed against Bulgaria, must lean on Bucharest, which is fed from Galatz, whence, with great labour and expense of land carriage, the ammunition, stores, and reserves must come. And in the conduct of the war on the Asiatic side, the like supplies have a still longer and more circuitous road to travel over.

To the great change effected in the Czar's position by the allied occupation of the Black Sea, the most effective and practical testimony was the voluntary destruction and abandonment of the coast forts. Defeat had commenced before a shot was fired, and there was actually retreat. It was a commencement of relinquishing the object of twenty years of war with the Circas-

sian tribes—the fond desire of connecting all the provinces of Russia which had been gained since 1774—the object of imperial consolidation, of preparation for further progress. To sum up in a few words. Russia is put on the defensive—Constantinople is not only safe, but the Balkan can neither be reached nor turned. A Russian advance is now out of the question. The idea of invasion must cease altogether. Russia must everywhere look at home.

It is not easy to arrive at anything like an accurate statement of the present strength of the respective armies, Turkish and Russian. But of one thing we are certain. The former is better trained, better armed, and more numerous than it was a few years back. The artillery is acknowledged to be admirable, and we do not hear of any complaints except among the wild levies of Asiatic horsemen. It would appear that the numbers at present actually disposable by Omar Pasha, are about 120,000 of regulars and irregulars, in which are included the garrisons of Widdin, Varna, Kalafat, Silistria, and Adrianople. The force at Shumla may be considered as that held ready for field operations. When actual hostilities first broke out, the Turkish army laid along the line of the Danube did not, according to the calculations of Colonel Chesney, much exceed 70,000 men. Since then, Omar Pasha having increased it to about double the number, has been able to throw sufficient garrisons into the strong places, retaining under his immediate command, and concentrated at Shumla and Pravadi, an army about equal in strength to that, with which the autumn campaign was commenced. The outlying divisions which retreated before the advance of General Lüders in the Dobrudscha, in March, are included in this array. We may fairly suppose that the *morale* of the Turkish forces generally is very different from what it was. When standing alone against the Czar, they could not but feel themselves wanting in the balance. Such difference of feeling alone, there being corresponding causes for depression in the hostile ranks, is almost equal to another army. We hear of confidence in the commander Omar Pasha, and, making every allowance for distance and exaggeration, of general good conduct of the troops before the enemy. There have been no damaging defeats on the Turkish side. The first actions of the war were decidedly favourable; and, considering the slow progress of General Lüders after he forced the passage of the Danube, the loss incurred being about equal on both sides, we must, even in the early period of the war, consider the merits of the combatants to have been about on a par, whatever may be our opinion of the strategical combinations of the commanders in

chief. The retreat of the Turks on their main body appears to have been deliberate and dangerous to the invaders. It could not be asserted anywhere, except in a St. Petersburg journal and in a Russian church, that a positive advantage had been gained. It was clearly not so considered by the Turkish commander, who proceeded quietly with his arrangements of putting the defences of Shumla, Pravadi, and Varna in order, in his concentration of troops on the intrenched camp at the first of these places, and in the discipline and organisation of his army. It seems to us, judging from a distance, that he has not shown himself wanting in forethought. He has adhered to a system of defence which was carefully considered and arranged in its details. He has turned to good account the time sought to be gained by the Czar in the long-protracted negotiations with the Western Powers.

If delay in the declaration of war by the allies of Turkey was advantageous to the enemy in the outset, the advantage has been in great measure lost by the determined countenance held on the Danube, the opportunity so afforded for military organisation, and the confidence infused into the Turks. Omar Pasha has thus gained time for Government nearly to double the numbers in the ranks, and has inspired the world with the belief—and doubtless the whole Mussulman population—that the time has not yet arrived, when Fate has decreed the submersion of the Turk under the Russo-Greek. To this may be attributed the failure of the many attempts of the enemy to excite disaffection in the provinces to his left and rear. We sometimes hear from military travellers, lately returned from a hasty visit to the Ottoman Empire and the seat of war, very depreciatory comments on the Turkish soldiery, the rude organisation, the want of strict discipline, and those external complements of a soldier, we think so necessary in our more regular armies. We are perfectly willing to admit there is a very great difference, but we are by no means sure it is greater than we have a right to expect, or that it is so deplorable, or so pregnant with dangerous results, as may appear to some of our military reporters, whose experience has not been gained among Orientals, and perhaps in some instances, does not extend beyond the neatness and precision of parade tactics. Our own opinion is, that at present the Turkish army—believing, as we do, that it is in good heart, and has faith in those by whom it is now backed—may be safely trusted in a war of Positions, but that it would be unwise for the commanders to hazard it alone in campaigns, in which combinations and manœuvres would be necessary, requiring exactness of discipline in the force at large,

and strict punctuality, unswerving obedience, and devotion to detail among the subordinate commanders. As in the case of other Orientals with whom England has been in the habit of dealing, the war of Positions is that which would seem most germane to the military genius of the Turk. As long as he was a conqueror, this of course could not be so; but with fading energy, relaxed military system, and the corrupting influences of belief in predestination, which is no longer vivified by a passion for Propaganda of a faith, he has lapsed into that mode of making war, which ever precedes ruin and defeat. For an age he has not felt that he was 'going in to win.' To use the language of the ring, he has only been able to distinguish himself as a 'glutton for punishment.' We conceive, that the military reforms have not gone sufficiently far, or at least, have not yet been sufficiently stamped with the seal of success, for us to doubt, that until the troops of the Allies come fairly into the field, it would be safe for Omar Pasha to depart from the Fabian system, which he of all men must know to be most favourable to the army under his command, while by steadily adhering to it, he has paralysed the Russian forces during a campaign of eight months' duration. At the top of a hill, or behind a difficult river, he is dangerous in the extreme. A rash exposure in the plain, however superior might be his numbers—an advantage by no means certain or even probable, if we consider the many strong places he is called on to garrison, would entail certain present defeat, and a very serious complication of the disorders of his suffering country. Yet we would remind our military critics, that for such purposes of position and defensive war as we have indicated, the Turkish regulars, and even irregulars, are by no means bad troops, and are probably in many respects very superior to the enemies we have been accustomed to meet in our Eastern provinces, whose prowess in combat and endurance in war English generals have 'not been slow to acknowledge.

According to the testimony of Von Moltke, who wrote so long ago as 1845, the only fortress of those taken and ruined by the Russians in the previous war, which had been rebuilt, was Varna. He did not approve of the plan of the new fortifications, but it may be presumed to be considerably stronger artificially than it was at the time of that memorable siege. Silistria, even if neglected till the last passage of the Pruth took place, must have been put into a respectable condition, as shown by recent events. Kalafat and Turtukai, though partaking but of the nature of field-works, speak for themselves. Shumla was permanently strengthened by the erection of roomy mas-

sive barracks, hospitals, and magazines. The walled forts of *Strandscha*, *Tchally*, *Fehdai*, and *Tchengell* were also renovated and improved. The heights above *Pravadi* on the road between *Shumla* and *Varna*, the importance of which was so well appreciated and applied by the Russians before, have been fortified. It was this position, seized and held subsequently to the fall of *Varna*, which enabled *Diebitsch*, in 1829, to devise his brilliant plan for the defeat of the Turks at the battle of the *Koslewtscha*, and ultimately led to the turning of *Shumla* on the eastern side, and the bold march across the *Balkan*.

We are assured *Omar Pasha* is well impressed with the importance of this point, and has left no means of skill untried to add to the natural defences both of that position and the approaches to *Shumla*. A glance at a good map will be enough to convince the reader, that the line of defence furnished by *Shumla*, *Pravadi*, and *Varna* must, under any circumstances, stop the march of an army 70,000 strong for many months; in short, supposing the preparations of the Allies to be only now in their commencement, that it is a sufficient answer to those who attribute omnipotence for movement, combination, and recruitment to the enemy, and sheer debility to that Power which, as yet, has not been worsted in this contest. Unfortunately, the map is not always sufficiently studied. After what has passed, it is hardly necessary to retreat with the reader to the position within twenty miles of *Constantinople*, where the 'march of *Attila* was stayed, and *Belisarius* defeated the *Huns*.' That which naturally occurred to the panic-stricken inhabitants of *Constantinople* and the able negotiators in 1829, would be waste of time under the present circumstances. But as nothing in war should be left to chance, and as it is necessary to anticipate the possibility of an enemy's success, the probability of which may be almost beyond the bounds of our conception, the Turkish Government dares not solely rely on the obstacles of the *Balkan*, and the possession of the *Black Sea*. It has been truly pointed out by *Marshal Marmont* and all the best authorities on the military topography of *Turkey*, that the position of *Adrianople* is one which can, on no account, be neglected. If we suppose *Shumla* taken, the heights of *Pravadi* and the eastern passes leading to *Aidos* held on one side, the great heights and the course of the *Tundscha* on the other, a hostile army engaged in traversing the range on the road from *Nicopolis* east of *Sofia*, the presence of a well-intrenched camp at *Adrianople* would yet be sufficient to make the invaders cry a halt. This city, placed at the confluence of

the Tundscha, the Maritza (the ancient Hebrus), and a smaller stream called the Arda, commands all the roads leading to the Balkan towards the north and east, to Philipopolis and Sofia to the west, Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora to the south. There is the position whither the forces beaten from the Balkan would naturally converge, and thence it is that an army pivoting on its centre, would be directed on the point of real attack, while the enemy was still engaged in debouching from the passes, whether to the eastward or the westward. Marmont, so favourable to Russia, and so impressed with the idea of her invincibility, says, 'If a French and English fleet were to pass the straits of the Dardanelles, and arrive at Constantinople, and if at the same time a corps of 50,000 men of the Alliance, Austrian or French, were to take up the position of Adrianople and establish the intrenched camp of which I have spoken, then the Russians would have immense difficulties in dislodging their enemies.' There can be no doubt of it. The force originally holding the position augmented by the numbers retreating from the mountains, could not but exceed in strength what the most successful invader would have brought with him. The peril of the latter would be indeed great. If opposed with ardour and courage, he would probably not return. So doubtless would think the Russian generals.

If it be difficult to attain proximate accuracy in the estimate of Turkish numbers, we are driven altogether to rely on conjecture when we attempt it with their opponents. There is a general belief in this country, that Russia has no more difficulty in producing a force of 200,000 trained soldiers on any given point, than a 'Wizard' in pouring a shower of bouquets out of a hat. We hear it sententiously stated that she has an army of upwards of a million; the numbers of her battalions and squadrons are readily quoted from the Gotha Almanac; and it is assumed that her vast resources of men and materiel are ever ready for the purposes of offence and invasion. Yet if we consult the history of former periods, her efforts beyond the frontiers of her empire have not been in proportion to the power so constantly asserted in words and figures; and when she has done anything on a large scale, it has been as one of a band of allies. Subsidies have been secured, her diplomacy has triumphed, her armies have been victorious. But there never has been displayed an intolerable superiority in numbers. Her course has rather been distinguished by its uniform and gradual character, by the process of slow deglutition, rather than of imposing attack. When she has displayed great armies, it has, with the solitary exception of 1814 and 1815, been in the immediate



neighbourhood of her frontiers. Great skill cannot be denied in the management of her resources, which has made every new acquisition a base for further extension. To this, in the province of Wallachia, have her energies been applied during the last winter, yet Bucharest and Fokshani can only be considered entrepôts. There is no place of manufacture for war stores in the neighbourhood, and considering the enormous expenditure now going on, the expense, both in time and treasure, of supplying such temporary depôts with munitions, guns, and recruits, must be very great, irrespective of the march of fresh divisions.

In 1835, till the moment of real action arrived, Europe and Turkey were alarmed at the tales of the immense host which was pouring into the Principalities. When the contest commenced, it appeared there were not above 50,000 men fit for duty under the command of Prince Gortschakoff. He was everywhere crippled for want of means. Since then he was joined by the corps of Osten-Sacken, said to amount to 40,000 men, and by that of General Lüders. The strength of the latter may be about 30,000 men, and we hear of more reinforcements from Bessarabia. Let us now assume that the casualties of the autumn and spring have been replaced by a military Power not likely to neglect such precautions, in addition to the corps of Osten-Sacken and Lüders. This we understand to be the meaning of the grandiloquent but somewhat uncertain expression, of 'moving the reserves,' without any exact definition of divisional arrangements or command. Including the garrisons at the mouth of the Danube, we may estimate the force employed on the line from Galatz and the Pruth, to Bucharest and the Aluta, to have been, at the outside in round numbers, about 150,000, prior to the commencement of the siege of Silistria.

We are not of opinion that it will be in the power of the Czar to increase the numbers of his army of operations in Wallachia. It will be very much, and will considerably increase our respect for the military resources of his country, if he be able to maintain that force in its present form, condition, and strength. Odessa, according to Admirals Hamelin and Dundas, has a garrison of 30,000 men. That point, after what has taken place, will not be weakened. Troops, either in the Crimea or on their march thither, cannot be diverted from their original intention. The army in Asia must be reinforced. Prince Woronzoff was already crying for more men during the last autumn, and the long lines of communication in the untamed countries of Asiatic Russia must be strictly guarded. In addition, the armies of Austria are threatening; Poland must be watched;

the garrisons in the Baltic are strengthened; the garrison of Petersburg has marched to Finland; battalions have been drawn from the interior to replace the Imperial guards; the strictest ward must be maintained everywhere. The admirers of Russia and Russian system, forgetting the difference between the power of inertia and strength for action, are apt to mistake space for force, and disseminated numbers for an expression of strong combative energy. They omit to consider, that in States, the power of executing the difficult resolves of a grasping ambition, is in exact proportion to the power of concentrating the resources of a country, whence the world is threatened with offence. That the governors of Russia know where her weakness lies, is evident enough from the pains taken to mask the resources she possesses, under every form of exaggeration and illusion, which may impose upon others. With a certain appearance of Imperial liberality to men like Marshal Marmont or Lord Londonderry, they are remarkably jealous of the visits and remarks of travellers, and they are never so well satisfied, as when they interpose a thick veil between her and the rest of Europe, leaving the latter to ruminate over her vast but unknown resources, till at length every one is infected with a panic fear, for which there is absolutely no reason whatever.

How this panic fear has affected our Eastern policy in former times, it is not necessary here to mention. No long period has elapsed since we were led into woful errors by the effects of it, and we yet deplore the consequences of those errors. We do not on this account depreciate the present resources of Russia. We are aware of the struggle we are entering upon, and of its magnitude. But we would have the simple military principle recognised, — that eccentric action for defence of world-wide frontiers, is a means of weakness, rather than of strength in a State, which from its nature is compelled to such a resort, and is the very reverse of the exhibition of inert power displayed by Russia in 1812, when the single line of attack against her was known, and the resources of defence converged and thickened, as it were, the more the invaders penetrated the country. Every attack now made on any point of the Russian frontiers, is a diversion in aid of the resistance to the forward movements of the invader, whether against Bulgaria or Asiatic Turkey, and to a certain extent diminishes his power to aid those movements. In 1828 and 1829 no diversion in favour of the Turks was possible, and then it was that Pozzo di Borgo bore witness to the imminent risk, so cleverly avoided by Marshal Diebitsch.

It is asserted, and among others by the Baron Von Haxt-

hausen, that Russia can move 500,000 men beyond her frontiers. It is hardly necessary to combat so wild an estimate, when we take into consideration for one moment the amount of the resources of Russia. In truth, those indulging in such fancies on the power of a country omit to reckon the difference between paper and effective strength, and the expense of moving troops and materiel, even after the tyrannical and cheap fashion of Russia. Baron Von Moltke, who is certainly not hostile to that country, enters into some curious calculations and statements which are worth quotation, as bearing directly on the question of the effective and imputed strength of her armies.

After detailing by battalions and squadrons the army of operations in the year 1828, he says, 'In a country where the maintenance of troops is so endlessly difficult, where large masses consume themselves, this army would have been perhaps enough, if the establishments had been complete in numbers. According to the "State of Strength," the three corps should have possessed about 120,000 men. But this was by no means the case. In every army there is a considerable diminution necessary from the number of actual combatants, but particularly in a Russian one, in which any colonel can take six denkschiks as private servants from the ranks. What may have been the strength of the army in South Russia is not our business. We have only to do with the number of bayonets and sabres actually ready on the scene of action. According to the reports of careful witnesses at a review before the Emperor in March 1826, the Infantry had only thirty files in a company, and the Cavalry fifteen in a troop. In 1827, shortly before the departure of the army of operation, the battalions of the first and second army corps had only 400 or even a less number of bayonets. In June 1829 the second corps left Silistria with only 30 files in a company, and from 100 to 120 men in each squadron. Russian accounts, which give the numbers of separate divisions and corps of which the army was formed on various occasions, all agree in stating that even at the beginning of the campaign the average strength of battalions did not exceed 600 combatants.'

We are prepared to allow that improvements have taken place since 1829; but this statement is very important, applied as it is to a country, where as we are informed by every one, there is no check except the Imperial eye, and a host of officials, whether in or out of military uniforms, ekes out infinitesimal rates of salary by robbery of the Government. It matters little for the efficiency of the army, if the robbery be among the stores of the arsenals and the commissariat, or by the substitution of

paper for effective men: the former is probably more general than the latter, as being less liable to detection, but is equally fatal, and during war produces a like diminution of real strength.

But advantages possessed by the Czar in 1829 are possessed by the Czar still: his resolute will and the admirable devotion of those who owe him military allegiance. There cannot but be unity in council, strict subordination in execution, and unscrupulous employment of whatever may be possibly available under the circumstances of the empire, and the perils by which it would appear to be surrounded on every side. Without resorting to Russian statistics, we must be convinced that a Government and an army animated by a spirit of discipline, devotion, and obedience to which we can find nothing analogous, if it be not in the institution of the Jesuits, are exceedingly dangerous. We have a strong man to deal with, and this strong man was never yet disobeyed by his followers with impunity. He knows not what it is to be thwarted, and he has never yet tolerated the slightest opposition to his will. How far his pride and obstinacy are in the present instance buttressed by superstitious belief in his mission, as the head of the Greek Church, we cannot determine. His actions and words have a colour, showing far more than the accidental tinge supplied by a subtle diplomacy, or the impulses of an evanescent ambition. It was not to be expected that demonstrations would succeed against such a character, when argument had failed, and we must not hope for the conclusion of the contest we are now engaged in, before the strength of the man is worn down by the exhaustion of his imperial resources. A blow here, a success there, will not terminate this war. Fatigue and inanition must have been first produced.

Perhaps the bearing of individual character, and the aspect assumed by the question in the country at last at open war with the Western Powers, and in a state of unconcealed antagonism, although as yet of unavowed hostility against those of Germany, has not been sufficiently estimated among us. We have, for the most part, been unwilling to grasp the reality of the peculiarly Russian nature of the quarrel, the Czar Nicholas being the first absolutely '*Russian*' monarch since the time of Peter the Great, whose moral strength exists and is now in action during the present reign. So wrote the Marquis de Custine of Nicholas as far back as 1839.

Throughout his reign, from his very first assumption of power, when he quelled the mutinous soldiery by the terror of his eye, and the gallant but calm serenity of his bearing,

while he has shown himself to be equal to great emergencies, to meet imminent danger with instant action, he has displayed a perfect consistency with the traditional policy proper to his country, and derived from the most celebrated of his predecessors. In token of this policy, St. Petersburg has been well called a bivouac of the Imperial Camp, till the time should arrive, for its final establishment at the head-quarters of the old Greek Church on the Bosphorus. And at no time has he ever been more consistent than he is at present,—as displayed by the long patience, the subtle and far-reaching negotiations, the conversations hazarded from time to time during many years, his commencement of actual war which he declared to be no war, the use in certain documents of almost the same expressions, as those employed, at the date of the aggression of 1828; and lastly, as shown by his pertinacious resolution, when the Western Powers gave him to understand, that the resources of former times would no longer stand him in stead at the present, that on this occasion they were not prepared to wait till ‘remonstrances would be too late, and Europe would patiently suffer what it could no longer prevent.’\* That which was not very well known when De Custine wrote has been for many years a commonly recognised fact. It is one of which no secret is made, but is rather a subject of self-glorification with the Czar. Yet it was entirely overlooked lately, both in this country and in France, and is rarely if ever alluded to amid discussions on the nature of the quarrel, the chances of its duration and the probable issue of the contest. On reflection however, it will be found, that what we have most to fear is the obstinate Muscovite feeling, of which the Czar in the plenitude of his autocratic power is the great representative, for the development of which he has lived, for the advancement of which in the extension of the Greek Church and the seizure of Constantinople, the dreams of his forefathers at one time and so nearly realised in his own, he is prepared to encounter the hazards of ruin and even of death.

Until the declaration of war by the Allies, the contest between the Russians and Turks was without any very marked feature or character, except that the commander of the latter was bent on carrying out a system of defence of which previous wars had furnished him with an example. The ultimate object of the Russians beyond the occupation of the Principalities, was by no means clear. They were not sufficiently strong for a forward

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\* Despatch from Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode. London, June 1. 1829.

movement across the Danube, yet they brought on the action of Oltenitza, which, if it possessed an object, was to alarm their enemy for the safety of his post at Turtukai and induce a retreat from that point. Their right was extended so far, and in such force to Krajova and the neighbourhood of Kalafat, that the Turks felt properly sensitive on their left flank, and threw up a series of works on which no little commendation has been bestowed. The Turkish sallies seem in general to have been effective, and, according to the most authentic accounts, the affair of Citate was really brilliant. From time to time skirmishes occurred along the whole line of operations, for the most part insignificant, and partaking of the nature of harassing partisan warfare, rather than affording evidence of combination on the part of the commanders. But in February it became evident that a change of operations was contemplated by the Russians. Preparations were made in anticipation of the coming events. The corps of Osten-Sacken, although that general is now at Odessa, had, after a previous announcement of many months, closed on Prince Gortschakoff. The greatest general of Russia, Field-Marshal Prince Paskiewitsch, had been appointed to the command-in-chief of all the forces employed against Turkey, and was hastening to assume the duties of his office. What reinforcements could be spared were ordered to be despatched, and it is asserted a great addition is in the course of being made to the cavalry arm, in which, reversing the case of former wars, Russia on this occasion very much outnumbers her opponents.

The passage of the Danube was effected by General Lüders late in March, without very much difficulty or risk, the Turks, who were far outnumbered, having retired without greater loss than they inflicted in return. The panic-stricken in Constantinople, and many persons in this country, uttered the rather craven cry, that, as usual, Russia was carrying all before her, that she had gained enormously by the protraction of negotiations; that even if the Allies did attempt to act, they could do no good; that it was too late; that the Balkans would be passed; that the city of the Sultan was in danger. As usual, events have proved the cry got up at Constantinople from fear, and at home by a too active, but somewhat ignorant sympathy, had not much in it. The movements of General Lüders, after his successful operations on the Danube, were slow and uncertain. He had discovered that his great difficulties were commencing after his first success had been accomplished. Amid the haze of uncertain reports of the general retreat of the Turks on Shumla, and of the Russian advance, it is evident hard fighting took place, and by no means always to the advantage of the

latter. In June, Rassova, which two months before had been announced to be in the hands of General Lüders, held its own, and a junction with his commander-in-chief opposite to Silistria, was but tardily effected. It appears that he was really worsted at Czernavoda on the 22nd of April, although more importance has been attached to that affair, both at Bucharest and at Vienna, than it would seem to have deserved.

The first orders of Prince Paskiewitsch on surveying the positions of the men placed under his command, were what was to be expected from an officer of his reputation. The radical fault of the extended line adopted by General Gortschakoff, except for the mere purpose of occupying the Wallachian provinces, and alarming the Turks by their influence in Servia and Bosnia, an object no longer compatible with the altered situation of affairs, was appreciated, and directions were instantly given for the withdrawal of the right of the Russian army on Bucharest. It will be seen on the map, that the army executing this movement moves along the chord of the great sweeping curve displayed in the course of the Danube, from Widdin to Rustchuk. The garrisons of Kalafat and Widdin were diminished in consequence, one body of the Turks having been engaged in pursuit of the retreating Russians, and another ordered to join the main body at Shunda. It appears that the outposts of the former, after carrying on a very active, and, to the enemy, annoying pursuit from the 19th of April till the 25th, have been established in the vicinity of Krajova and the Aluta, Little Wallachia for the time being again in Turkish hands. Since then an active system of annoyance has been kept up by the Turks on the enemy. The Russians also met with a reverse in the neighbourhood of Nicopolis, not one, however, of much importance. In the meantime Silistria was heavily threatened in front, and had been bombarded under the immediate direction of Marshal Paskiewitsch, preparations being made to throw large masses across the Danube, there as well as at Oltenitza. A general movement on Silistria was expected, but the execution by no means equalled in rapidity the anticipations and alarms of Constantinople. That fortress was finally invested, according to Admiral Dundas, by a force of about 80,000 men. The defence has been most gallant, the Turks having again displayed the best military qualities in their heroic struggle. The Russian attack has failed, contrary to every expectation, as the force employed in the siege is so much more numerous than in that conducted by Diebitsch in 1829. A relief could not be attempted with safety by Omar Pasha. By the end of April the British and French contingents, although as yet not complete either in guns or cavalry, were

established at Gallipoli and Scutari, and every day was adding to their strength. An active employment of them cannot be far distant. The Duke of Newcastle and Sir James Graham have both shown that a fleet of more than a hundred transports, a considerable proportion of them being possessed of steam power, is maintained ready in the Black Sea, and at the disposal of the general and the admiral. It would be superfluous to enlarge on the obvious advantages presented by such an arrangement. The British and French commanders-in-chief arrived in Constantinople early in May, and have since held a conference with Omar Pasha. The strength of the contingents under their command is now about 80,000 men of all arms. A strong depôt has been formed at Gallipoli, lines have been constructed, and a garrison will be kept there. In the same manner Constantinople will be secured by intrenchments from the Sea of Marmora to Durkos on the Black Sea. It is to be assumed an allied garrison will be maintained at the capital as well as at Gallipoli, and we shall probably see a force of about 60,000 men take the field to operate against the Russian armies, Varna being the first place of assembly of the contingents. The mosquito-like annoyance of the Hellenic Government has been quelled by the joint intervention of the Western Powers, and it will be no longer necessary for the Sultan to reinforce Fuad Effendi, King Otho having promised to cease from his intrigues. It will not be prudent to remove the pressure imposed on his Hellenic Majesty, till the restoration of peace. He has never been famous for adherence to terms, when the power, whether democratic or foreign, which had imposed them, ceased to be alarming to him. If the Montenegrins give serious trouble, we may fairly look for an Austrian movement. Omar Pasha and the Allies at present, therefore, have only to deal with the real enemy.

The task, however, before the allied generals is by no means an easy one. They have the means of locomotion by sea, but, according to all accounts, the provision of carriage to enable them to move by land is scanty in the extreme. It must be laboriously gathered from Asia Minor, European Turkey having been already swept by the Turkish levies. Eventually this great want of an army will be supplied, but time is necessary as well as money, and it is right that the great obstacle to early action on the part of the Allies should be properly estimated by the public. The concentration of the Russian troops on the border of the Bukowina will not have escaped notice. Hasty intervention on the part of the Austrian Government cannot be looked for so long as the Danube has not been crossed in force by Marshal Paskiewitsch, if even then. A heavy loss or even



check sustained by the latter might cause the immediate diversion of strong divisions from the army, the ostensible object of which is menace to Austria. Its strategical position for either purpose is admirable, and must form a capital feature in the designs of Paskiewitsch. The intervention of Austria at this juncture would be as fatal to the Russians as her conduct in 1813 was to France; but we have no certainty that she is about to merge her neutrality in action, and the arrangements of the allied generals and Omar Pasha cannot but be dictated by the immediate state of affairs. M. de St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan will perforce have to consider the army now threatening the Carpathian Passes, as part of the strength they may have to meet. The successful defence of Silistria may render their attention to these points still more urgent than before, if it should involve a still further retrograde Russian movement.

We arrive therefore, at the conclusion that unless the Russians offer battle on the Bulgarian side of the Danube, or there be a decisive Austrian intervention, we can hardly look for a great blow from the allied land forces during this year. A system of annoyance, of general threat and attack can be pursued at sea, the Circassians assisted, the remaining forts on the eastern shores of the Black Sea molested, for which operations have been now for some time in progress; but on the land, they are not so far advanced in their preparations as to admit of a strong initiative being taken. Had they only to do with the forces in their front, the case might be different, but the uncertainty of German politics forbids such a confidence. In the meantime a defensive line must be maintained, similar to, but stronger and more menacing than, that adopted by Omar Pasha hitherto. The lines of defence now are, that of the Danube; 2nd, that of the Balkan; 3rd, of Adrianople. The positions of Gallipoli and Constantinople are at present but a base whence the two last may be supplied. It is needless to forestall or hazard predictions on movements subsequent to the advance on Varna, which must be guided by the disclosure of the plans of the enemy.

The attempt was made in a preceding page to come to a rough estimate of the force under the orders of the Russian Field Marshal on the Danube. After allowing for the arrival of every corps of which we have received any information, we arrived at a result of about 150,000 men. This is doubtless a very considerable army, and whether the aggregate be something more or something less, the allied generals and Omar Pasha must consider it, as a whole, tolerably concentrated for action. These troops, since the evacuation of Little Wallachia,

may be generally directed on the line of operations between Bucharest, Kalarash, and Silistria, the objects of that line having been the seizure and occupation of the last-named place, for which the advance of General Lüders up the right bank of the Danube was a combined movement in aid.

From what has been already advanced it will have been remarked, that even under the most untoward circumstances, a serious impression on the mountain position of the Turks was improbable; but the gallant defence of Silistria, the successful defiance by its garrison of the great Russian army during many weeks, when relief was impossible, till at length the gathering of the Allies at Varna and the concentration effected by Omar Pasha at Shumla, had insured its safety, have in some measure taken all of us by surprise. We are happily freed from the alarms so widely propagated at Constantinople and even in England. Had there been ground for them originally, we could not but have seen Russian masses thrown across the Danube at whatever cost, and a formidable advance while the Allies were still at sea. In such case, as has been believed and asserted by many very respectable authorities, if Prince Gortschakoff had been 'quick,'—so ran the phrase,—he would have been in Shumla at the end of March, and the worst fears would have assumed objective form. But after our experience of the former war, to which reference has been made, backed as it has been by the tardy transactions on the side of the Russians we have lately witnessed, it is surely right to attribute the apparent tardiness to something besides the want of quickness in Prince Gortschakoff or General Lüders. The former of these officers commanded a division with distinction, under Diebitzsch, in 1829, and, of all men, must be thoroughly acquainted with the physical difficulties of the country in which he is engaged, and the capacity for resistance belonging to his adversaries. We cannot but believe, either that the inaction of the Russians has formed part of a general plan, or that it has resulted from an inability to press forward, we are little prone to suspect in our enemy. Possibly something of both causes may have combined to produce what has been ground for much surprise with many of us, namely, that on the one hand, the Russian commanders were inclined to a tactic of delay by the political uncertainty which weighed so much on ourselves, and that on the other they had to overcome no ordinary difficulties in the prosecution of a forward movement. May we not believe they were jealous of placing a difficult river between themselves and their immediate base of operations, at a time when troops and generals were about to appear, whom they know to be

at least not inferior to the men they can themselves produce? We confess to such a belief. The movement of the Russian left up the right bank of the Danube, and the siege of Silistria had for us but a defensive meaning. It appeared to be the assumption of a position which, while it secured a most important *tête-de-pont*, would cause the Turks and the Allies to come and seek them on ground of their own choosing,—a considerable advantage, doubtless, but which serves to show how different is the character of the war, as compared with the last one, the onus of assault being thus thrown on those who have been threatened with invasion.

If this view of the matter be taken, we can hardly overestimate the importance of Silistria, or the advantages secured by the successful defence. An early contrary result of the Spring Campaign would have entailed in all probability the fall of Rustchuk and Nicopolis. We should then have seen three important *têtes-de-pont* in the possession of the enemy, who would have had all the advantages afforded by the river on his side. The Allies would have been encumbered with siege operations on one point, while called on to meet the forces which would have been poured on them from the others. Till very lately it has always appeared to us, that the risk and danger of the campaign were to be found in such considerations. There was the risk of the moral effect on the native population of Bulgaria, to be feared from the presence of the Russians as masters along the right bank of the Danube; and there was every probability of a long protracted campaign to accomplish that finally, which would appear to have been now successfully achieved. There was indeed a great danger, not for the Balkan, not for the ultimate safety of Turkey, but such military danger as is incurred by a vast hostile lodgment, which has its communications secured by the possession of fortified places. If Silistria had fallen now, after our hopes for its safety had been so much excited, we should not have had to deplore the grave consequences we must have looked for, had the garrison yielded to the first attacks of the Russians. The precious time had been gained which precludes ulterior advantage on the part of the enemy. We have heard it alleged, advice was given to Omar Pasha by men of high authority to abandon some of the fortresses on the ground of his not being able to relieve them, if they were attacked. It is hardly possible to conceive a more suicidal course. In war, to the party engaged in defence, delay is every thing. The siege of each fortress takes much time. Even if undisturbed, it occupies a *corps d'armée* for six weeks. If even there be but the chapter of accidents to trust to, it is generally as

well to try the virtue of delay, spun out as long as it may be. But when the arrival of a regular army, of nearly 100,000 trained combatants on the scene is merely a question of time, we are at a loss to conceive how the proposition to abandon posts of defence, each of which is an element of delay to the enemy could be entertained by any man. Fortunately Omar Pasha saw the matter rightly, and paused to abandon positions prematurely, the loss of which now we should deplore as a great calamity.

There are ideas, perhaps rather vague, floating about on the practicability, and the necessity of an immediate joint land and sea attack on the Crimea and Sebastopol, by way, it is said, of diversion. And no doubt, were we further advanced in the great objects of the war, a very powerful diversion it would be, as the occupation of the Baltic, and the blockade of the Gulf of Finland are now. But we must not be led away rashly from the objects immediately in view; and before we practise an operation of military diversion, or entertain the idea of it seriously, we are bound to examine very narrowly the conditions under which the combinations have to be made, and whether we are not rather beginning a new series of actions, certainly bearing heavily on the general issue of a war, though perhaps not nearly so much on the campaign actually in course. It is submitted, that on examination and careful reference to distances, the latter will be found to be the case in the matter of the Crimea. The Black Sea being held by the allied fleets, the Russian one being shut up, the position of Prince Paskiewitsch on the Danube is almost irrespective of Sebastopol. He has altogether ceased to lean on it for supplies. His reserves, his stores of war, his recruits must come to him from the depôts in the interior of Russia. The blockade of the fleets, and their attitude of menace are sufficient to prevent the diminution of the garrison of the port; indeed, we may be quite certain of the truth of the report, that reinforcements have been directed towards it. Thus the object of diversion, by their alienation from the Danube and Asiatic Turkey, is gained already. Therefore, as far as the immediate aim of the contest is concerned, which we take to be the retreat of the Russian army from the Principalities, the present occupation of the Crimea by the Allies at this early stage, and the consequent deduction from their forces available for the assistance of Omar Pasha, would be to tamper with the invasion we have determined to resist, and a source of just disappointment and irritation to the ally, whose auxiliaries we have declared ourselves to be. It appears imperative to direct our grand primary effort towards the offensive defence of the lines now held by the Turks. If the Allied Powers choose to send another corps to the Crimea,

besides that already landed at Varna, or if there be truth in the rumour, that the Austrians have signed a convention with the Porte, for the immediate occupation of the Principalities, the case is of course altogether different. What has been advanced has been on the assumption, that at this juncture, no such enlargement of the efforts to carry on the struggle is contemplated.\* The allied contingents, amounting to 80,000 men, when complete, will be by no means too numerous for the duties before them, or to meet the concentration of troops effected by the Russian general.

The war carried on in Asiatic Turkey during the last autumn was without any positive result; and, as yet, since the breaking up of the winter, there has not been any actual resumption of hostilities. Several thousands of men, and a large supply of guns and stores, were landed at Batoum under the protection of the allied squadrons, before the declaration of war by the Western Powers was received by the admirals. Report attributes certain success to General Guyon in his attempts to introduce a better organisation among the forces in Armenia, but we cannot repose much faith in what reaches us on this score. We still must trust to the difficulties of the country; and in the hope, that amidst the great demands made on all sides, Russia will have but slender means to lavish on this ungrateful war. In 1829, Kars, Erzeroum, and Baipoort were occupied by Paskiewitsch. We do not anticipate such progress now, although we cannot but recollect that since 1829 Achalchick has remained in Russian hands. They commence their operations, therefore, nearer to the objects of their attack than was the case formerly. On the other hand, they are threatened by Shamil Bey, the Prophet-leader of the Circassians, and we may not unreasonably hope for a general insurrection of the wild Mussulman tribes of Daghestan under his influence, and the contagious effects of a general war on such a population. Fear for their own communications, will probably render the Russian generals jealous of again hazarding the bold strategy of Prince Paskiewitsch, which was before crowned with such decided success. It is impossible to survey the latest picture we have of Armenia,—its snowy hills and savage people,—from the pen of Mr. Curzon, without being struck with the difficulties opposed by such a country to an aggressive army, and without a growing

\* It has been alleged that Admiral Hamelin has proposed the embarkation of a corps of troops from France for special service in the Crimea, and that he has been favourably listened to by his Government.

admiration for the military genius and resolution of the Russian Field Marshal who overcame them, and now, in his old age, is about to prove the abilities of Lord Raglan and M. de St. Arnaud. If his energy be not chilled by age or his late illness, he is indeed a worthy antagonist. They will find a man of great courage, of enlarged experience, and of strong resolution; one not burdened with scruples, or slow to sacrifice his own troops in the pursuit of what he believes to be an advantage, who, as shown by his practice in the capture of towns, has no notion of humanity towards those, in whom there is yet latent a spirit of resistance. His conduct may at times have been barbarous and cruel, but for the consummation of military objects, was consistent, and more conducive towards ultimate success than its opposite, which, on the score of merey, does not utterly quell the spirit and efforts of resistance, thus enabling an enemy to claim advantages because he has not acceded to the demands made upon him. We must understand that war and peace cannot be carried on together. Where there are elements of resistance, and capitulation is refused, we must proceed with destruction till the former are no more, and the latter ensues: otherwise we fail in a military sense.

And here, properly, we ought to stop; but there is a point in the issue now being tried between this country and the Czar of Russia, which must not be overlooked. It is no longer the quarrel of Turkey, but it is one in which England steps forward as a principal party. We must look to the amount of injury we may receive, and whence and whither it may come. As long as our present alliances and arrangements with neutral Powers hold good, we are intangible on what has been called our own element. Our Colonies, and mercantile shipping are safe; and according to all human probability, the commerce of the Black Sea will be put on a more certain footing hereafter, than that which has hitherto obtained. But it has been asserted, and in many quarters there is a fixed belief, that Russia has the power of inflicting signal wounds on us in our Indian dominions, either by altogether cutting off our Egyptian route, if her designs against Turkey be successful, or by direct invasion through Persia or Central Asia during the course of a great war, in which she may engage with us. Of the former it is hardly necessary to speak. Even supposing we had waited in apathy and lethargy, till the Greek rite was again celebrated within the walls of St. Sofia, and had culpably neglected our international duties and the interests connected with them, it is hardly to be deduced from the experience of our history, that we should have tamely sat down under a great *material* injury to ourselves.

The most peaceful among us would have been the first to don their armour, and to excite the combative spirit for which their representatives are so famous, whether within or without the houses of Parliament. In such a case commercial jealousy and activity might have been fairly left to take care of themselves, and we cannot admit it to be a logical sequitur, that the surrender of Constantinople to the Czar, would have entailed that of Egypt to the same Power. That such was not the thought of the autocrat, we gather from his conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour. He is sufficiently well acquainted with this country, to have once remarked, 'I have learnt that in England, it is of no use to gain either the one party or the other, which are constantly in and out of power. We must have the people with us.' He probably guessed that the security of our communications with India through Egypt, was the most alluring bribe he could offer to that people, and that this country would be sure to meet him in arms, and so defeat his immediate object, if its commercial safety were threatened by his policy.

On the other hand, we are assured by some politicians, that in the event of a war with Russia, we have everything to fear in the way of direct invasion; which, be it remarked, the sea being closed, and Persia inclining to British rather than Russian influence, can only reach India through Central Asia, by way of Khiva and Balkh. Colonel Chesney gives his authority in favour of this view. We quote his own words. 'The Author conceives there cannot be a doubt entertained of the possibility of invading India, and it is his belief that attempt will be made in the event of a general war.' No mail arrives from India without fables of impossible treaties and alliances, the gist of all of which is favourable to our enemy. Although so evidently based on fiction, they are undoubtedly believed in some quarters, and the prevalent idea of Russian attack in the East is strengthened by them. The assumption is current in France, that we have determined to fight the battle of India in the Black Sea and on the Danube. The ground taken by the opponents of the present dynasty in that country is, that our policy is a purely selfish one, with which France is not concerned.

If our empire in Hindustan were really in the feeble and threatened state, periodically asserted in Parliament and the Press, which is never really believed to be the fact in this country, but obtains very general credence on the Continent, a war in the Black and Baltic Seas would doubtless be the best diversion we could hit upon. It would afford us time to put our affairs in better order in the East, if the country were able to carry

on such a war. We may presume, however, that when our provincial administration shall have reached such a condition of effete-ness, there will be small stomach at home for anything but the resignation of cowardice. The days of decline will have begun in England, when a distant and magnificent empire, which depends for maintenance on the constant infusion of fresh British blood into the system, but which being so constantly fed, has as yet met with no check to its progress, no obstacle to its development, shall be pronounced by those best acquainted with it, to be in 'real danger' from invasion. Stress should be laid on the term 'real danger.' Abortive attempts at annoyance, intrigues with barbarous tribes, on long and distant frontiers, and harassing but to the empire innocuous border warfare, should be carefully distinguished, in our judgment, from the idea of 'real danger,' from positive invasion. The one can hardly be, except from growing feebleness at home; the other must be taken as a condition of our dominion, and of a state of hostility with numerous border tribes, who may be excited by a great aggressive Power, which has not been slower to avail itself of the artifices of intrigue than the shock of arms. Yet we will not deny that a serious check in the Black Sea to this aggressive Power, and a renovation of the Turkish elements of resistance in Armenia, are in some measure favourable to us in Asia. They will not only tend to strengthen Turkey, but also to prolong the existence of Persia as a nation. That cannot but be an important consideration to us.

We would, however, put a question to those who attribute such might to the *aggressive* power of Russia, not only against uncivilised hordes, but against the nations from whom she has gathered her imperfect acquaintance with civilisation. Is a time when she has to meet the Western Powers in arms, for the defence of her marine frontier; when she is engaged in forward movements necessitating the maintenance of an army of upwards of 200,000 men, irrespective of her defensive forces; when her ocean commerce is annihilated, and the supply of some of the necessaries of life rendered precarious; when on every side we hear of countries, hitherto trammelled or chained by her rule,—some lately conquered, others groaning under a more lengthened servitude,—some allied to the Roman Catholic Church in resistance to the usurpation of the Greek, others banded and vowed to war under the Crescent,—all alike crying for vengeance or enfranchisement,—is this a time when we are to fear a fresh undertaking, an expedition across Central Asia, which, to ensure a chance of success, must rival in its proportions the preparations of Napoleon in 1812? We can conceive, at some distant date,



Persia gradually subdued and Russianised.\* There is nothing impossible or improbable in the idea. The movements of Russian extension have been steady in that direction since the beginning of the century, but they date from a much earlier period. Persia feels herself to be in the toils. We can imagine, but this is more difficult, an eventual subjugation of the wandering tribes inhabiting the wastes which stretch from the Caspian to Khiva, and from Khiva to Afghanistan; and when that has been achieved, it is possible also to imagine a general movement of

\* This point has been well reasoned on by the Baron de Beaujour, in his very able work, the '*Voyage Militaire dans l'Empire Othoman; ou, Description de ses Frontières,*' &c. :

'The possession of Georgia not only opens Turkey but Persia to the Russians. The latter, masters of the great plateau which commands Asia, they can descend, at their will, on either of these empires. Natural or artificial obstacles can no longer stop them. The lines of the Phasis and of the Bathys are turned; those of the Kour and the Araxes pierced at many points; and a Russian army can now march across Asia Minor to Constantinople, or Media to Teberan, without meeting any other obstacle than certain streams of water, or some fortresses incapable of resisting artillery. Georgia, in giving the Caucasus to the Russians, has afforded them a commanding point in Asia, as Dalmatia enables the Austrians to threaten Albania from Monte Negro, one of the summits of Mount Skardus. And as the latter can descend from Mount Skardus, on Turkey in Europe, so the former can in a like manner descend from the Caucasus, on Turkey in Asia. But the occupation of Georgia is more burdensome on the Russians than that of Dalmatia is on the Austrians. The one can guard Dalmatia with a handful of men; while Georgia demands forty or fifty thousand men from the other, as their army must be distributed over an immense space, and is surrounded on every side by nomad races. It is not an easy matter to support so immense an army, for it will be necessary to transport recruits and war stores, either by the Black Sea or across the Caucasus. Georgia, therefore, can only serve Russia as a point of attack against Turkey or Persia. But as long as Persia is not conquered, it cannot be a point of departure whence to send an army against the British in India, as these latter have a force of 100,000 men, trained with European science, and because it is impossible to go and attack such an army across a hostile country 400 leagues in extent, and unprovided with any thing. The British have nothing to fear from the Russians established beyond the Caucasus. The Russians have rather reason to dread the arrival of a British fleet under the walls of St. Petersburg,' &c. &c.

This was written in 1829. The argument is accurate enough, except that attention is not given to the mountains of Armenia. But the writer was perhaps sufficiently justified by the successes of Paskiewitsch, to which allusion has been made in the text.

the barbarous hordes of Central Asia on Hindustan, incited by Russia, now become the suzerain of all, which should be supported by regular armies. We say it is possible to imagine a vast movement of this description, which should rival in the magnitude of its scope the immigration of the barbarians upon the Roman empire. But it is not possible to conceive the realisation of such gigantic projects, or even the attempt at realisation, when the country where they are supposed to originate is in a state of defensive war, and must distribute its forces on every side, to meet the contingency of attack.

Really, on calm reflection, it is impossible to characterise ideas of positive invasion of India by Russia at this juncture, but as the idlest phantasies of the brain. Our feeling is one of astonishment at fancy, which can so exaggerate the strength and resources of an enemy, which can attribute to him omniscience and ubiquity. It is indeed strange. Our Indian Empire has still all the vigour of youth. It can hardly be restrained from dancing from one acquisition to another. It can be reinforced from home with the utmost certainty: every circumstance connected with it shows that it is passing into a state of permanence and solidification. It is a curious system which participates in the vitality of the free constitution of Great Britain by the constant influx of fresh blood, while it is fenced by military precaution and armed by administrative concentration. Much as there may be to correct, inseparable as abuse must be in some cases, we have faith in the system and in its effects. Even were the attempt at invasion made, sufficient energy would be found to strike it on the head, sufficient means to roll it back. On the contrary, we cannot have faith in the omnipotence of the opposite system, also resulting for the most part from the right of conquest,—a system begotten on serfdom, nursed in corruption, and swathed in iron bands,—a system which for sheer existence, must be clumped and rivetted as the granite blocks in the quays of the Neva, to meet the winter frosts. We believe we have a strong will opposed to us, and that great resources for defence are at the disposal of that will. But we do not believe in the power of great resources for attack, except by the slow undermining process, which has been so insidiously worked by the *condottieri* of diplomacy, since the foreign policy of Russia was fashioned by Peter the Great. As the Western Powers have at length become fairly alive to the scope of that policy, at which they had either hitherto indirectly connived by the faint utterance of profitless remonstrances, or had assisted by blind acquiescence—and as they are determined to repress the growing usurpation, we cannot admit the present

existence of a danger, to which a more timid course of action now, might have eventually given birth, although not in the present age.

Till the 14th of June, the duty of bringing affairs to a settlement in the East, by active intervention, had devolved solely on the Western Powers. The attitude of the German courts was so uncertain, and their negotiations were so tardy, that the Governments engaged in war with Russia have been compelled to arrange their plans on the hypothesis that a friendly neutrality could alone be expected from Austria and Prussia, which might abet the general European policy in theory, but refused to support it by action. To this, however, an end has suddenly been put. Since the foregoing pages were in type, the Russian army has commenced its retreat from the positions so long occupied. We cannot ascribe this retrograde movement merely to the successful stand made at Silistria. That has had a great importance; but the date of the order given to the Russian army to break up from its positions was prior to the latest and heaviest checks incurred by the besieging forces. Important as the concentrations at Varna and Shumla may be, it cannot be supposed that the Czar would have yielded without a blow to a demonstration in his front in Bulgaria, to meet which his preparations had been made, had he not become acutely sensitive for his rear in Wallachia. It is beyond a doubt that we must look for the causes of the Russian retreat in the menace of Austria, and the visible signs that the course of events was bringing about a change from neutrality to participation in the active policy of the Maritime Powers.

The convention signed on the 14th of June, by the representatives of Austria and the Porte, is an open declaration to that effect. It is alleged, and apparently with truth, that Austrian divisions will proceed immediately to occupy Wallachia, and guard the Danube from further Russian aggression. When this is done, the events will have occurred to which allusion has been already made in the discussion of the feasibility of operations in the Crimea. The Allied contingents will be disengaged, and the Turkish Government will be able to reinforce the levies in Asiatic Turkey, which, according to all accounts, are in want of additional strength.

## NOTE TO ART. II. OF No. 202.

IN a note to p. 327. of our last Number, we referred to a letter of sympathy addressed to the followers of Joseph Smith by some English 'Irvingites' in 1835. The letter is given at full length in Joseph Smith's autobiography. It begins as follows:—'Dear Brethren in the Lord,—At a council of the pastors of our church, held March 28th, 1835, upon the propriety of the Rev. John Hewitt visiting you, it was resolved that \* \* \* he should have, as he desired, the sanction of the council.' The letter proceeds to express sympathy in the Mormonite movement, and is signed 'Thomas Shaw, Barnsly, April 21. 1835.'

Since the publication of our last Number, we have received several letters from correspondents who belong to the (so called) 'Irvingite' sect, all of whom express their belief that the above-mentioned letter was forged by John Hewitt. One gentleman (who signs himself W. R. Caird) asserts that Mr. Hewitt was believed by the late Mr. Irving to have been guilty of forging letters of recommendation from America; and he further asserts that there never was any Irvingite church at Barnsly.

No proofs have been furnished to us in support of these assertions: and there is certainly no internal evidence of forgery in the letter presented by John Hewitt to Joseph Smith. At the same time we think it right to mention that its authenticity is now denied by several members of the sect from which it professed to emanate.



