[H.A.S.C. No. 109–97]

U.S. MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS IN IRAQ

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 7, 2006

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
32–990 WASHINGTON : 2007

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, *Chairman*

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan
CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TIM RYAN, Ohio
MARK E. UDALL, Colorado
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, *Staff Director*
STEPHANIE SANOK, *Professional Staff Member*
MARK LEWIS, *Professional Staff Member*
REGINA J. BURGESS, *Research Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2006

U.S. MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS IN IRAQ

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

WITNESSES

APPENDIX

U.S. MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS IN IRAQ

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, December 7, 2006.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. WELDON. The full committee hearing will come to order, and I have the honor on my last hearing of chairing at least the opening of this hearing on behalf of Chairman Hunter, who is on his way here, and with the approval of my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Skelton, I would like to make some opening comments.

I guess there is only one thing more embarrassing to a politician in Congress than getting your American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) membership card when you turn 50, and that is being presented this packet from the United States Association of Former Members of Congress. Because it finally sinks in—and you all will have to go through this one day. It finally sinks in that you are now a former Member, and so I have my card.

I will not be able to fight you for parking spaces except in the horseshoe, but I will be able to come on the House floor and hassle you because I am not going to be a lobbyist, and I have no intention of lobbying because that is not my forte, but I will be around to be with my good friends.

And so I wanted to make a few comments after 20 years, now as a former Member—soon to be—of the importance of this committee and the work that I have seen done for 20 years in a bipartisan manner.

First of all, Chairman Hunter has been absolutely outstanding. There has been no individual more dedicated to the individual soldier and his or her welfare than Duncan Hunter: everything from making sure that we were doing the proper response on uparming Humvees, traveling over the theater, assigning staff to go out and meet with industry leaders.

Duncan left no stone unturned. He is a tireless advocate for the warfighter and making sure that our soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen have the best equipment, the best training and the best technology that money can provide; and I guess that comes from both his combat experience and the experience of his sons. And it is going to be a sad loss when Duncan leaves the chairmanship for

the ranking membership, but we have a good and decent and fair man coming in in January.

Perhaps no one do I have a higher respect for in terms of issues involving this committee than Ike Skelton. When I came and sat down there in the first row and used to look up here at these gray-haired, old men and think to myself—actually, Pat Schroeder was here, too, so there were women here—I did not think I would ever make it to the day to get up on the top row. But Ike was one of those people you could always look to to do the right and straight thing for what was important for our troops.

Ike's leadership on education and training issues is one that will go down in the history books. He has done more unseen, behind-the-scenes work for the education, the training, and the professionalism of our troops than, I think, any other one single Member of Congress in the history of the Nation.

And so, Ike, you are going to be an outstanding Chair. I wish I could serve under you and with you, but I will be here in spirit.

For my other members, I have varying degrees of thoughts. Some of them are my best friends. I cannot tell you all of the stories of Solomon Ortiz and Silvestre Reyes and Roscoe Bartlett and the rest of my training partners because it would be X-rated—no, I am only teasing—but from the first meeting with Qadhafi in the tent in Libya, and for the first time in 40 years where we had a chance to break ground and open the door for what is now a normalized relationship to our meetings with the North Koreans on two occasions where Condoleezza Rice did everything she could to stop us.

But you know what? In the end, the Constitution prevailed, and Condoleezza Rice lost because this body has the ultimate responsibility of checks and balances, and no Secretary of State or no Secretary of Defense, regardless of Democrat or Republican, has the ability to silence and muzzle the people's body; and even though she pulled the rug on the first plane, we got that plane because Colin Powell and Andy Card overruled her.

She won the second battle, but when they wanted my vote for the Medicare resolution, they understood that I was absolutely incensed. I would not talk to them because they denied this Congress the appropriate role of trying to support the Administration while bringing peace to the Korean peninsula. And, God willing, I will be going back to North Korea within the next two months to continue that dialogue, again supporting our President's policies.

What I have seen most about this committee is the fact that we have to continue the process of checks and balances, and it does not matter whether you have a Democrat President or a Republican President. The bureaucracies in both parties seek to do the same thing in forwarding the will of the Congress; and we have a responsibility—and you who will be here next year have a responsibility—to do what we have done so proudly for the past 20 years that I have been here.

In the next quarter the V–22, the first unit of Marines, goes into combat. That program would not be here if it were not for this Congress because the Secretary of Defense and leaders at the time cancelled the program that the Marines said was absolutely essential. Well, three months from now, that unit will be in combat, and our V–22s will be in action, protecting our Marines.

The Predator would not be armed because it was this Congress, not the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or not Special Operations and the Air Force; it was this committee that required and mandated that the Predator be armed because of what we saw as the future.

Our readiness would not have been what it was if Ortiz and Reyes had not joined in a whirlwind tour where we did 15 states and 24 military bases in 4 days. They said it could not be done, but we did it to highlight not the admiral's quarters or the general's lunchrooms, but to showcase the barracks where the soldiers were taking showers with raw sewage floating around their feet, where there were schools with asbestos peeling off of the walls for the children of the kids—for the children of the people in armed services. The spoiling of the concrete on the runways that threatened the safety of our aircraft, the problems with housing and maintenance and readiness and that 15-state tour with 24 bases helped to allow us to increase readiness funding by $5 billion in that 1 year.

The President is given the credit for the work on missile defense. It was not President Bush. It was this committee that in 1998, two years before he was elected, passed H.R. 4, with my good friend John Spratt as a lead cosponsor with 35 other Democrats. We passed that bill in the House with a veto-proof margin in spite of the President's objections. That was in 1998, and this committee was again the leadership.

It was this committee in the leadership of the China technology scandal. They did not steal our technology; we gave it away as a wholesale auctioning-off. And as a member of the Cox Committee, I saw all of the classified evidence of how that took place; and that is why our vote was nine to zero. But our security was severely harmed by the transfer of that technology to China in the mid–1990's even though the administration tried to hide it by arresting Wen Ho Lee and then nine months later releasing him.

The Arrow program for Israel would not be in existence today if it were not for this committee's standing up and funding Arrow as opposed to the Libyan fighter when Duncan Hunter and I first did that letter 20 years ago.

The privatization of housing was instigated by this committee. The personnel issues that give our military the quality of life they have today in their pay and benefits were largely instigated by this committee.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program was maintained because of bipartisan support of this committee. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) would not be the issue it is and will be for the next 15 years without the efforts of this committee, as well as nuclear strategy concerns; and we would not have been transferring that technology to our first responders if we had not passed my resolution back in 1998 crediting the Gilmore Commission, which issued three reports before 9/11. The 9/11 Commission takes all the credit, but 40 percent of their recommendations had already been made by the Gilmore Commission before 9/11 ever happened.

The thermal imagers that our soldiers and military use today are now being used by firefighters in every firehouse and station in America. The transfer of technology continues. And it was this

committee that traveled to Vienna to negotiate the framework to end the Kosovo War. It was Neil Abercrombie who led the effort on the Democrats' side and convinced Madeleine Albright, when we returned, and Strobe Talbott, that there was a way to stop the bombing and get Milosevic out of power.

It was this committee, along with Jim Ryun of Kansas and Jim Saxton of New Jersey who joined me and six other Members of Congress—five Democrats and five Republicans—to lay the foundation for the G–8 countries to reach the agreement and to bring back the three prisoners of war (POW) that we were offered, but refused to go to Belgrade to pick up, because the Speaker and the State Department had asked us not to travel to Belgrade, and we abided by their wishes.

And it was this committee, as I said, who opened the door to Libya and has continued with three successful trips, including a major conference a year ago with 29 other countries to bring Libya into the family of nations.

It was this committee who had consistently reached out to try to achieve peace as opposed to having to send our warfighters into harm's way, but I want to also say that this committee has met with consistent challenges by administrations of both parties.

Some would say that my problems this year were partly caused by me pushing the envelope. In fact, *National Journal,* I guess, summed it up best when they put me on their front cover, and they called me the "Troublemaker" in the last week of September. I guess that is my legacy in Congress; I am the troublemaker. But you know what? I would not have it any other way.

I was happy to see Lieutenant Colonel Tony Shaffer when he came to me and told me that we had identified key cells of al Qaeda two years before 9/11 ever happened. The Defense Intelligence Agency destroyed Tony Shaffer's career even though he is a Bronze Star recipient. The only vindication for me, for Tony Shaffer—and you were all here for that hearing—is when CIA trashed him when they issued their report in mid-September, publicly releasing it before they even briefed us on the committee, saying Tony Shaffer was not worthy of having a security clearance.

But on November 4th, two days before our reelection, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer was brought back onto active duty. His security clearance has been restored, and he is now commanding a unit in operation today in Iraq.

Isn't it amazing how, in the end, the truth prevails? This dedicated career military officer, trashed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, politically trashed by the acting inspector general, is now back on active duty; and his counterpart, who ran Able Danger, is now commanding the La Salle, our destroyer at sea, where Scott Philpott is doing great work on behalf of our Nation.

What was their only crime? They told the truth. They told the truth that our government did not want to hear about—evidence that we had—just like the government did not want to hear back in 1999 from this committee, that we needed to have an interoperable data collaboration system two years before 9/11. The CIA refused it. Today, it is called the "NCTC Operational."

I would challenge this committee and my good friend Ike Skelton in the future to make sure that we continue the aggressive over-

sight role. It was in 2004 that we—in 2003 that we first told the CIA, Solomon Ortiz and I, that Muqtada al-Sadr was being funded by the Iranians with $70 million, and the CIA did not want to hear it. No one knew the name "Muqtada al-Sadr" back then—today, it is a household name—just like they did not want to hear about Iran cooperating with North Korea, their nuclear program and the other acts of destabilizing Iraq. Today, it is all fact, and it is the reason why the election was so decisive this past November. This committee, again, was in the forefront of those issues.

Mr. Incoming Chairman, I have a challenge for you because I think the ultimate vindication is yet to come for this committee. There was a book released last week, written by an award-winning journalist by the name of Peter Lance. I would encourage you all to get a copy of it. It is 670-pages long. Peter Lance is an award winner. He received five Emmys when he worked for ABC News and a Robert F. Kennedy award for journalism, and in his extensive documentation—it took five years—he tells the story that nobody wanted the American people to hear, that the man that Patrick Fitzgerald called in 1997, and I quote, "the most dangerous man I have ever met; we cannot let this man on the street" was at one and the same time an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an agent for the CIA, who joined our military and was transferred to our Special Warfare Command J.F. Kennedy School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

So now we have the information out that no one wanted to hear, the fact that we had him on our payroll in the military, a guy that Patrick Fitzgerald has said was the most dangerous man in the world, who today is locked up in a Colorado prison where the Justice Department will not allow anyone to talk to him, who was at one and the same time an agent for al Qaeda and bin Laden while he was working within the military of our government, training our Special Operations officers at Fort Bragg, a command officer getting access to classified information he should never have had.

It is all here, and it is all documented in the 670-page report that is going to shake this country to its roots. And, you know, when we had that hearing on Able Danger and the staffers did not want those charts to come out because they said, "Show us the beef! Show us the beef!" It was not about Mohamed Atta alone, and I said that then; it was about Ali Mohamed. If you go back and check the charts—and I have those 1999 charts, and one of them is in the book—Ali Mohamed is on every chart, and he is linked into bin Laden.

So the man who was working in our Special Forces Command training school at Fort Bragg, the man who was an informant for the FBI, the man who was an informant for the CIA while working for bin Laden, who is now in jail in Colorado and who Patrick Fitzgerald has called the most dangerous man that he has ever met, is now in jail in Colorado. I do not think he has ever had a trial. When Peter Lance tried to interview him, both times he was refused, and the response, which is in a letter in this book, says, "We think it will present security concerns for the country."

This committee needs to continue to play the aggressive oversight role. As troubling as it is, that is the responsibility in the

checks and balances of this country that this committee has to be the champion of.

I am proud to leave this committee and the great members, outstanding members, who have always done the right thing; and I am proud, in the 12 years I served as subcommittee chairman, we never had one vote in any subcommittee that I chaired where a Democrat had to offer an amendment, not one. Marty, when you were Chair or a ranking member, Silvestre, when you were, Solomon, when you were, and John, when you were, not one split vote.

That is the way this committee needs to operate, in a bipartisan manner that lets the Executive Branch understand that we will do what it takes to get the truth out and to confront those issues that need to be addressed even if they fly in the face of what is politically correct in the conventional wisdom that some would have us believe.

So, with that, I am happy to be here until my good friend arrives, and I will now turn to my distinguished ranking member, Mr. Skelton.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Curt, thank you for your excellent comments. We thank you for them. There is a Scottish song that is to the tune of "When Johnny Comes Marching Home," and the title of it is "Johnny, I hardly got to know you."

Curt, thank you for your passion, your knowledge, your persistence, what you have meant to this committee. You have been a polestar for all of us. I just cannot thank you enough, but most of all, I know everyone joins me in saying thank you for your friendship through the years. It has been solid and sincere.

As sailors would say, we wish you fair winds and following seas, and God bless you.

Mr. WELDON. I thank the distinguished ranking member, and I would be remiss if I did not mention our staff on both sides of the aisle. We have the best staff in the Congress. They work well together. We rely on each other; there is no level of distrust. It is openness and candor, and that is the hallmark of the Armed Services Committee.

I want to especially thank Doug Roach, who has been my lead staffer. He has been to some crazy places. If I asked any of you where Kalmykia was, you would say, "I have no idea." Well, Doug can tell you where Kalmykia is because it was our stop on the way to Beslan.

But, Doug, you have been an outstanding professional.

I want to thank my personal staff and put it on the record—Russ Caso, a former Navy person who is my chief of staff; John Tomaszewski; Sarah Beatty; Chris Phelen; Margaret Lemmerman; and Yevgeny Bendersky—fantastic, hard-working individuals.

And, with that, I have done enough of my swan song.

So now we will turn to the business at hand, which is standing up robust, capable Iraqi forces as our top goal of the coalition of the Iraqi Government; and today, we have a distinguished panel of our transition team—Major General George Flynn from the Marine

Corps, Commanding General, Training and Education Command; from the Army, Major General Carter Ham, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division; and from the Army, Lieutenant General James Lovelace, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–3.

In a meeting with President Bush this week, Duncan and our colleagues talked about his getting more Iraqi battalions in the hotspot areas on an accelerated basis for the combat operations experience, to test their capabilities and to gain confidence. Too many Iraqi forces are in relatively calm areas. Only about 35 to 114 Iraqi combat battalions operate in notoriously violent areas such as Baghdad and the Anbar Province, while over 30 other units are in quieter areas that experience 2 or fewer attacks each day.

To ensure that Iraqi Security Forces are positioned for success and can benefit from much-needed combat experience, Coalition forces must help Iraqis develop key skills and capabilities. Military transition teams are advising the Iraqis on the unfamiliar challenges of counterinsurgency operations. They are also serving as a useful conduit to logistic support, intelligence information and combat support such as heavy artillery and air support the Coalition forces can provide.

If we get the transition team piece right, the effort to produce capable, battle-tested Iraqi forces stands a greater chance of success. So the focus of today's hearing is the manning, training and equipping of these teams, and it comes at a time of renewed emphasis by the services—U.S. Central Command and the Multi-national Force-Iraq.

Many experts share the belief that these Transition Teams are pivotal. The Army, to its credit, has met the demand for hundreds of Transition Teams. The dedication of an entire infantry division to train teams underscores the Army's emphasis on this effort.

The Marine Corps continues to shoulder its fair share of this mission.

In testimony before this committee last month, General Abizaid of Central Command signaled his intent to expand the size and capabilities of the teams, and the Iraq Study Group recently recommended increasing the number of U.S. trainers in Iraq to 10,000 or even 20,000.

During his confirmation hearing earlier this week, incoming Secretary of Defense Gates asked a crucial question, and I quote, "If our focus is on training and bringing up the Iraqi army, do we have enough trainers to do that job in Iraq?" end quote.

So the question before the committee today is just that: How many transition teams are required, how many personnel, and what skills do they need, and what training should they receive? This hearing comes at a good time to take stock of how the transition teams have evolved over the last two years and to reevaluate how best to organize this endeavor in the future.

Recent media reports indicate that some team members feel that they are not receiving or providing the most relevant training or the right equipment. I hope the committee will hear how we can help you to strengthen the ability of the advisors to better train and secure Iraq's security forces. Only when we can successfully conclude such efforts can we be sure that the departure of Amer-

ican forces from the Iraq nation will not result in massive instability and violence.

Before we turn to our witnesses, I, again, turn to recognize our good friend and ranking member, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I ask for unanimous consent to put my statement in the record at this point.

Mr. WELDON. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

Mr. SKELTON. I will be very brief. However, I would hope the witnesses would help answer the question, "Should Iraqi unit performance be considered a reflection of the training teams' proficiency?"

You know, I really worry about the situation in Iraq. Time marches on. I think time is of the essence, and here we are three and a half years into this effort, and we are now looking at doing a better job at training their forces. Where have we been for the last three and a half plus years?

I also think the linchpin of the efforts in Iraq are the Maliki government's getting its act together and making substantial progress swiftly, working with you hand in hand swiftly. If not, we Americans and our Coalition partners are feeding a dead horse.

Would you help enlighten us today, gentlemen? Because it is dire and serious. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us this morning, and General Flynn, the floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GEORGE J. FLYNN, COMMANDING GENERAL, TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General FLYNN. Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the Marine Corps' efforts to train transition teams for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Before I begin, I would like to thank the committee for your sustained support of our men and women in uniform, especially for those in harm's way.

I have submitted a written statement that outlines the Marine Corps' approach to Transition Team training, and I would ask that it be included in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. General Flynn, absolutely, and without objection, all written statements will be taken into the record, so feel free to summarize in the best way possible.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. I would like to now highlight briefly some of the key aspects of our approach.

Our transition teams advise, train and mentor Iraqi and Afghani security forces and provide access to Coalition capabilities such as fires, logistics, engineer, medevac, and intelligence operations. In order to do this, we assign quality Marines with the right skills and background to succeed. Our team members have the leadership, the combat skills and occupational specialty to live, work, operate, and fight with their Iraqi and Afghani counterparts.

The key challenge we face in manning these teams is that there is no specific forcestructure for these mission requirements, and therefore, the teams must be manned from our existing personnel structure. They are all leaders in high-demand specialties. As with all Marine Corps training, our Transition Team training is standards based. It is designed to capitalize on every Marine's being first as riflemen as well as taking advantage of our institutional understanding of the combined arms approach—the power of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The end state of our training is team members with cultural and language skills who have the ability to train and advise in all six battlefield functions and all lines of operations to include kinetic actions to eliminate insurgents and nonkinetic actions for engagement with the local populace and civilian leaders.

Our transition team training is guided by our predeployment training guidance, and it is realistic with role players and live fire throughout. Just like our unit predeployment training, we use a building-block approach that is based on mission-essential tasks with assessment and feedback provided to operational commanders prior to deployment. Transition team training begins at home stations with individual skills and combat operation/environment training, and in the majority of cases, it moves to one of our training centers for mission-execution training.

Last, our transition team training is evolutionary. It is constantly being modified as the result of lessons learned and changes in the assigned mission and operating environment. In the future, our intent is to provide even more standardized training at our training centers. We currently have a revised training plan which we will be testing in January that should enhance the training currently being provided today.

I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General Flynn.

[The prepared statement of General Flynn can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. And General Ham and General Lovelace, do you have statements at this time? General Ham?

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CARTER F. HAM, COMMANDER, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, FORT RILEY, U.S. ARMY

General HAM. Sir, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Skelton and members, again, thanks for this opportunity to come talk with you about how we are conducting transition team training at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In June of 2006, the Army, Air Force, and Navy consolidated transition team training at Fort Riley in order to standardize the training and economize on the use of resources. Through December of this year, 50 teams—about 500 personnel—will have trained and deployed to Iraq from Fort Riley, and we have an additional 1,400 currently in training at the base now.

The transition team training prepares teams to advise, teach, mentor Iraqi and Afghanistan security forces. Each team trains at Fort Riley for about 60 days. We train soldiers from the active Army, from the Army Reserve, from the National Guard, as well as sailors and airmen.

Training consists of individual skills as well as cultural training advisor skills and collective tasks. Throughout the training period, each team member receives over 40 hours of formal classroom language instruction conducted by Defense Language Institute instructors. We train—we are currently training Dari for Afghanistan and an Iraqi dialect of Arabic in our training base. In addition to the formal classroom instruction, we exercise language skills in all of the vignettes and the training environments that the teams encounter each day.

The training, as General Flynn mentioned, is modified frequently to meet the constantly changing conditions in theater. Recent changes include updating the training of improvised explosive device tactics, the recent introduction of countersniper training and the adaptation of tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by teams that are now in country.

In the coming year, the 1st Infantry Division will train approximately 6,000 officers and noncommissioned officers. They will train teams of varying sizes and missions ranging from the 11-person standard battalion transition team to teams as diverse as garrison support units that help Iraqi and Afghan forces establish and operate their own bases. Currently, the 1st Infantry Division headquarters and the leadership of two combat brigades are dedicated to training these teams.

About 75 percent of the trainers operating at Fort Riley have recent combat experience. In addition, we expect, as the teams rotate back at the completion of their mission, that a number of them will stay at Fort Riley to become part of the training cadre to ensure we are continually refreshing and updating the experience base. In addition to all of that, one of the assistant division commanders of the 1st Division, Brigadier General Dana Pittard, is forward-deployed in Iraq and is dual-hatted as the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group.

The training at Fort Riley is vital to our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division are dedicated to fully supporting the combatant commander's mission requirements.

I look forward to your questions and dialogue, and I would welcome members or your staff to come see us at Fort Riley to gain firsthand experience as to how we are conducting the training.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General Ham, thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Lovelace.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES J. LOVELACE, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3, U.S. ARMY

General LOVELACE. Sir, very quickly, Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, distinguished Members of Congress, first off, on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, Dr. Harvey, and on behalf of the Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, I just want to say thanks. Thanks for your support. Thanks for the passion that Congressman Weldon talks about. It makes a difference. Our troops realize it, and day in and day out they realize your support for this very criti-

cal mission, this critical mission and the larger mission in whole that they are accomplishing in theater.

I am here today—I am the G3; I am in charge of operations. There is not very much I do not touch.

The institution of the United States Army, its resources, its leaders are all dedicated to this mission that we are talking about today. They are fully behind it. That is why we have dedicated a pretty sizable amount of resources here to ensure that our soldiers get what they need and not only what they have now, but in the future.

We welcome this opportunity. There is a lot of mess out there, and it does a disservice when they talk about the quality of the leader in place that is in question. These are young men and women who raised their right hands and dedicated themselves to the oath of office to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, to well and faithfully do their duties.

They are reading in the paper these kinds of things that talk about who they are or how good they are not. These are great young men and women, and I think we have a great program offer, and I reiterate the opportunity to come out to either Twentynine Palms or out to Fort Riley, Kansas.

And to Congressman Skelton's point, I think we are accomplishing the mission. We are getting our job done. It is maybe taking a little bit longer than people want, but these great young men and women in the breach each day are doing what is required of the combatant commander in theater.

So I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

[The prepared statement of General Lovelace can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

The CHAIRMAN. And gentlemen, thank you for being with us. The Study Group's recommendations and their discussion of the transition teams and also the initiatives that are coming out of the Pentagon and all the discussions, to some degree—peripherally or in central part—refer to the Transition Teams and their importance to the stand-up of the Iraqi military upon which everything depends in terms of the security apparatus in Iraq. Let me ask you a couple of basic questions.

If you are an Iraqi battalion, what do you have right now in terms of U.S. personnel, transitional personnel or advisory personnel, in your companies? If you are an infantry battalion or an armored battalion, what do you have embedded presently in the companies down to the company platoon level? What have you got?

General Lovelace, can you pull that microphone up a little bit?

General LOVELACE. I will sit closer to it, sir. Is that all right?

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General LOVELACE. Sir, the team composition, and it is in the written testimony, basically is about 10 to 15 people. The lowest that the teams go down to is to battalion level. They will have about 10 or so people in that formation who then work with that entire battalion—all right?—but not every battalion might necessarily merit—meaning, by that, because of their level of readiness—might or might not have a battalion team with it, and that is the status of play.

I do not have a specific number right now of battalions that are covered, and I will be happy to get it for you.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

What have you got if you are an Iraqi battalion? Let us presume you are in the Sunni Triangle or in Baghdad; you are making some contact with the adversary; you have got your companies deployed.

With respect to the American presence, the American advisor presence, I take it you have got the team then in battalion headquarters, and that team has, among other things, the ability to call in direct fire/artillery fire to provide for medevac assistance; and I presume that means you have got choppers available for medevac. You have got some logistics and communications advice. What will you have?

General Flynn, can you give us an idea of what an Iraqi battalion will have today in terms of the American presence on the ground with them?

General FLYNN. Sir, the teams that we are training that go with the Iraqi battalions are normally 11-man teams, and the composition is usually 2 infantry men, usually a relatively senior captain or a senior major and also a senior enlisted, and they also have a fires individual, somebody who is skilled in the art of calling in fires, both an officer and enlisted. We have logisticians, again an officer/enlisted breakdown. We also have two intelligence individuals and also a communicator and a corpsman.

The other piece, sir, is a mission essential function (MEF) list right now in-house. Those teams are being boosted up to about 20 individuals to provide some of the drivers and additional communicators, but that is not part of the training package right now. We are not training a 20-man team leaving Continental United States (CONUS). We are training an 11-man team, and then they get augmented when they get in theater, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So there is a difference between this concept of having this team that is basically an advisory team, and also—it also gives you some leverage in terms of medevac and direct fire with battalion and the concept that is inherent in Special Forces where you have people that are cross-trained in disciplines of communications, weapons, et cetera, who actually train the indigenous personnel themselves.

So this is essentially the training team you are talking about which, for practical purposes, it is an advisory team for the battalion leadership, and it does not go down to the lower levels, and it provides those leverages in those certain places like bringing in direct fire, medevac, et cetera.

Is that a general description of what they do?

General FLYNN. Sir, these advisors do train, though. They mentor. And also by their presence, sir, they are setting a personal example by being there, but they just do not sit there and advise. They also have skill sets to be trainers and to teach some of these skills, sir. The logistician would teach how to do tactical logistics as well as enabling it, so I think they have a dual role.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Gentlemen, do you gentlemen have personal experience watching the teams that are present in Iraq work

with the Iraqi military? Have you been on the ground with them there?

General HAM. Yes, sir, I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us your assessment of how effectively they work.

General HAM. Sir, quite obviously, the performance of the Iraqi units is across the spectrum, but the teams, in addition to their advising and mentoring role, do participate. They go with the units when they are with the Iraqi units, as they are conducting operations, so that they can bring to bear those effects that may be needed whether it is fires or air ambulance or other support, so they are out with the—they are out with the units, conducting operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I have got a few other questions, but let us move down the line here to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

General Lovelace, to your knowledge, when did we begin training Iraqi troops?

General LOVELACE. Sir, the training of the Iraqi soldiers started almost immediately in 2003. It was done at a very small level, and in or around the summer time frame is when they disbanded the military and began to stand it back up.

They started with a very humble beginning of about two battalions; therefore, it was handled internally by forces being in theater. And so, as we walked our way forward into 2004, as the size of the Iraqi security force began to grow, we moved from what was a national guard into an actual active force of the Iraqi security force, and the numbers began to grow.

It was previously handled inside the Army specifically. I would have to defer to the Marine Corps here how they did it, but when we had Pete Chiarelli who had command of the 1st Cavalry and then the 1st Infantry Division.

Sir, then what happened was that they were handling that mission essentially internally. Only then when it became a little bit more visible, which was some extensive request for forces by General Casey that was codified in February of 2005, did then it become very visible as far as the external commitment that I think we are talking about today.

So that is a quick Reader's Digest rundown, sir, if that is helpful.

Mr. SKELTON. General, how many Iraqi forces are fully trained and capable of sustaining themselves today?

General LOVELACE. Sir, let me do this. I probably have the information with me.

I do not have that specific——

Mr. SKELTON. Could you give me your best judgment?

General LOVELACE. Sir, right now, they have—when you are talking about Iraqi forces, I am assuming that you are talking about the police and the army.

Mr. SKELTON. I am talking about those that can operate on their own and go after the insurgents or the sectarian violence or whoever is out there.

General LOVELACE. Sir, there are about 80-plus battalions at this time who are able to operate in the lead.

Mr. SKELTON. How many are there all together in the training program today?

General LOVELACE. Sir, when we have got it, I will get right back with you.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, can you tell us before the end of the hearing?

General LOVELACE. Oh, yes, sir. I am saying somebody behind me is going to hand me the answers.

Mr. SKELTON. One last question.

Generally, should the Iraqi unit performance be considered a reflection of the training team's proficiency?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I am taking a while just to think about how to answer that. I mean, it is a lot——

Mr. SKELTON. Just tell the truth. That will work.

General LOVELACE. Sir, that is what I am about to do.

Sir, any job——

Mr. SKELTON. I have Fort Leonard Wood in my district.

General LOVELACE. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. SKELTON. I have Fort Leonard Wood in the 4th District of Missouri, and the product that those drill sergeants put out is a reflection as to how good those drill sergeants are. You will agree with that?

General LOVELACE. Sir——

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask you again.

Should an Iraqi unit's performance be considered a reflection of the training team's proficiency?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I think that the training team is trained and equipped, and what they are capable of doing in some measure is a reflection of the capability of the transition teams. That is correct.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me.

Mr. Skelton, I did not realize you were going to give up. I am a little confused here. The gentleman said that he was going to give you an answer on these numbers. What the hell——

Mr. SKELTON. He will in a few moments.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. He said a few moments. That was a few moments. You have got somebody right there. They are writing numbers down there. We do not even know what we are talking about.

Mr. SKELTON. Has someone given them to you yet, General?

General LOVELACE. Sir, nobody has given me numbers yet, no.

The CHAIRMAN. When the General gets the numbers that the gentleman from Missouri requested, we will give him every opportunity to——

Mr. SKELTON. Just raise your hand, all right?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I will. I am not trying to keep any information from anybody. I mean, I just do not have it——

The CHAIRMAN. General, get closer to the mike. We cannot hear you.

Mr. SKELTON. Just raise your hand when you get the numbers, please.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. The gentleman will provide that when he receives it.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hostettler, is recognized, and I think the gentleman from Pennsylvania wanted to ask him to yield for one brief second here for a clarification.

Mr. WELDON. I thank my colleague.

Yes, Mr. Reyes is not here. I was going to make this in the opening statement, but Mr. Reyes' integrity has been impugned by a retired CIA station chief from Paris by the name of William Murray, who was quoted in the *Wall Street Journal* as saying that Mr. Reyes was at a meeting with Mr. Ghorbanifar. That is a blatant, outrageous, unequivocal lie.

This is the second time that Mr. Murray has been out there trying to cover his own failures as a CIA station chief in Paris. It is absolutely wrong that we would allow the *Wall Street Journal* to impugn the integrity of Mr. Reyes with an absolute, total, complete, unadulterated lie; and I would ask the follow-on Congress to investigate Mr. Murray's ties of whether he has contracts with the CIA now and remove him if that is the case. He should not be allowed to get away with impugning the integrity of Mr. Reyes.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And continuing this line of questioning, Mr. Hostettler, do you have any questions you would like to ask?

Mr. HOSTETTLER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much for your testimony.

About a year ago, a little bit longer perhaps, we were given the formulation that our troops would be stood down as their troops were stood up, and the charts we were shown for the development of about 135 battalions would have led one to believe that somewhere toward the end of this calendar year most of their troops would be stood up at least to the first phase of operational capability.

It does not seem like we are tracking those expectations in two respects. Number one, we have only got 80 battalions which can be called ready at the first phase of operational capability; and number two, it appears that they are not truly autonomous, and there are some significant missing elements, particularly in the area of combat support and combat service.

What is it going to take to get the Iraqi army up to the levels that we deem to be sufficient in terms of equipment, personnel, commitment on our part and time?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I am not sure what information specifically you received. I know that the strategy is that as we build the capacity for the Iraqi security force, then we would begin to reduce the size of the footprint. That is still the strategy. The buildup of the Iraqi forces, you know, that was in theater as recently as August—as to their plan, they are generally on schedule.

Now, they do have a change in that they are adding in about another 31,000 soldiers at the request of the prime minister, and so—but you are right, as far as the intent here, as far as the reduction in the footprint, that has not occurred.

To your point about the equipment, sir, the equipment is coming in generally as fast as it can.

Mr. SPRATT. Do we have a process for determining equipment that we would otherwise leave behind that can be refurbished and brought to utility for these Iraqi troops to inherit from us?

General LOVELACE. Sir, they go through a foreign military sales program no different than what any other country would.

Mr. SPRATT. Oh, okay.

General LOVELACE. So that is how they secure it.

As far as leaving behind equipment, U.S. equipment, if it is appropriate and it is excess and in accordance with the law—and the law only allows us to render any equipment which is in excess. And so, right now, we do not have—we have some, and that equipment which is in excess we have then conveyed to the Iraqi forces, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Let me ask you along a different line of questioning because time is limited, are you concerned as we shift to this role of fewer Americans involved in direct combat and more involved in advisory capacities that our advisors themselves could be in danger, that if we could find ourselves with units on the ground, this could be Beirut all over again?

Do you have units that are not sufficient to protect themselves if they were subject to some kind of attack; or they might be in a hostile situation and might find themselves embedded with a unit, and somebody within that unit would—that those could be critically dangerous situations, too?

Does that concern you, and if so, how do we handle that problem?

General FLYNN. Sir—I will take a shot at that, sir.

I think the key part is to making sure that we train them correctly and we man them correctly, and they have the right equipment not only for their own force's protection but to be able to be effective advisors in training.

So it is a high-risk assignment, sir. In many ways, these individuals are out there alone and unafraid. It just speaks to the quality of the men and women who are in uniform, and it is our responsibility to make sure, before we send them out the door, that they have all the skills necessary to survive on the battlefield and to execute their mission, but the mission does come with risks, sir, and the best we can do is to train them the best we can to mitigate that risk.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Folks, we have about 5 minutes left on a 15-minute vote.

General LOVELACE. Real quick, just one addendum. Sir, one of the other important pieces is, that is why then we equip that force clearly with communications so that it has that life line back to a QRF, Quick Reaction Force. That is a very mindful piece because nowhere that the Iraqis are, are they not then close by some kind of U.S. force that can react and provide that kind of Quick Reaction Force, sir, so that is another quick addendum piece of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

We will resume in about ten minutes. We have one vote, folks, with about five minutes left.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, folks, we will come back to the hearing here. And the gentleman, I think it was on the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons, a great veteran of Vietnam in both

Army status and with one of our great intelligence agencies, and a guy with a lot of insight into this process. And I have to say, Rob Simmons has been a guy who has been pushing the idea of embedded teams and using that as an important tool for the standup of the Iraqi armed forces.

So, Rob, you told me you wanted to talk to these gentlemen, here they are.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you Mr. Chairman and I thank you very much for tolerating my repeated comments about the importance of embedded advisers, especially at this time in our involvement in Iraq. And I thank you for holding this hearing on just this subject. And I thank General Ham for taking my call a few months ago, a cold call to see how things were going out in Fort Riley because I am a believer in what you folks are doing. I served in Vietnam for two and a half years as an adviser. I was with Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in the military, and then I was private first class (PFC) with MACV Civil Operations Rural Development and Support (CORDS) with the Central Intelligence Agency.

I was embedded. I spoke the language. I lived off the economy in the culture with a counterpart as part of a very small team. And I am reminded when I look at my dog tags that there are two Buddhist symbols or medallions on the dog tags that were given to me by Vietnamese Buddhists to keep me safe because one of the issues always is, if you are embedded as an adviser, are your host country troops going to take care of you? Are you just going to become another kind of a target? And my experience was, I provided logistics. I supported—I provided training resources, intel, certain types of what you call coalition services. And they very much wanted to keep me alive and keep me healthy because I could help them perform the task. And I fit in. I didn't run off to my military base every night. I slept and ate and worked with the people that I was embedded with.

So I think it is a winner. And I think it is a winner especially now. And I point out for the record that the Iraq study report says in the executive summary, the Iraqi government should accelerate resuming responsibility for Iraq's security. While the process is underway, the U.S. should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops embedded in and supporting Iraqi army units. It is right in the book that just came out this week. It is something I have been advocating for a long time. Recommendation 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to embedded teams, and the U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel.

Now, in your testimony, you indicated that 18 percent of two Fort Leavenworth classes of officers decided to go this route, which is good, but I don't think it is the good enough.

And I guess my question to the witnesses would be, does the—for you, General Ham, does the first division have what it needs to accomplish the training task of 6,000 of these highly skilled senior personnel hopefully with at least one combat tour? And I understand that only 50 percent now have prior redeployment experience. And I think that is a weakness.

Do we have the people we need? Can we keep the teams in scale? You don't want them too big. If they are too big, they don't work. If they are too small, they are ineffective and at risk. So you have to keep them in a proper scale. And my experience is one good adviser is worth more than five mediocre advisors. So scale and quality of personnel is really important.

And then for General Lovelace, is this a career-enhancing assignment? A lot of people referred to me as going native. "He went native. He is up in the boonies, up in the country. He is speaking a funny language. He is eating funny food. He is not part of the mainstream."

Are your career military officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCO) going to be rewarded for this assignment? Or this is going to be sort of something that you do, but it is not going to be really career enhancing? It has to be career enhancing.

And finally, to the committee, have we planned a Congressional Delegation (CODEL) out to Fort Riley to see how they are doing. Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Before they answer it, let me just tell you, I think we have our first volunteer on that CODEL, and in case, you didn't know it——

Mr. SIMMONS. He better hurry up and do it before the end of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. In case you didn't know it, you are leading it, and which day of the week would you like to take off next week?

Mr. SIMMONS. How about tomorrow night?

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, you got it.

We handled that one.

Gentlemen, you want to answer those questions?

General LOVELACE. I will start off here. Just some interesting statistics here. You talk about, sir, whether it is career enhancing to have been an adviser. It is kind of interesting. Let me trace back here very quickly for the past 15 years, General Reimer, former Chief of Staff of the Army has a Combat Infantryman's Badge (CIB). Former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sullivan, has a CIB. And then General Boomer also has a CIB.

Those leaders are not infantry. Two of them are artillery, and one of them is armor. They got those in Vietnam because they were advisers just like yourself, sir.

So when you talk about whether the Army accepts and rewards and incentivizes, those are three leaders right there who rose to the pinnacle of the senior leadership inside the United States Army. And so I think that is a little bit of a reflection, and it is a little bit of facts.

So the other thing is that, you know, when we say 18 percent, we didn't offer that up as if that is just an end all, be all. It was a representation of what is the best and the brightest of who are the most recently schooled individuals of a professional education system who have come in right from that opportunity to move into what are these very important assignments. And that is all we were trying to do with it.

These are leader rich organizations. I am not sure everybody understands the personnel management of this: 10 percent of the cap-

tains in the United States Army—it takes 10 percent of the captains who are signal corps to fill out these formations.

It takes 10 percent of the captains in the inventory to fill out what are military intelligence.

It takes 10 percent of the captains in the inventory of the United States Army to handle the logistics.

It is just under for artillery, under 10 percent, and it is about 5 percent of the infantry. That just gives you an issue of the magnitude of what Human Resources Command (HRC) has to do. And then you have to weigh this in with the fact that, you know, we have to manage this also by dwell, individual dwell, because all of a sudden, an individual comes out; you want to give them some time back. You want to give them some time, so they can be professionally developed, have an opportunity to be with their family.

So we are balancing all these things. And so that is why I think, sir, if you could leave tomorrow night, it would be great. I don't care what Carter Ham has to do on the weekend. But it would be great to have people come out because what you can see is the power of the institution in the United States Army that has gotten behind this thing for which people are volunteering.

I guess the last piece, sir, is that the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, we are embracing leaders that are not only skilled in warfighting, but we call them pentathletes. I am not sure you have all heard the Chief and the Secretary use that word or not. But it is about being a pentathlete. In other words, they are multi-skilled individuals. They are not just skilled and able to handle warfare; they are able to handle also nonkinetic solutions like they are having to embrace now.

And so that is the broadening of the aperture and the skill sets that we want to now have to manage and manifest itself across the United States army.

The Marines have already embraced this.

And I wish Mr. Skelton was here, because I think what is absolutely imperative, this foundation, rock solid foundation, for both our noncommissioned officers and our officers, is the education system. That is what makes our Army so great. We have the best noncommissioned officers in the world. And it is because they matriculate through a system of professional development. The officer corps does it also. And we will stack our leaders up—just like the Marines will—against anybody else in the world. And that is what gives them this opportunity to be agile and address the challenges out there. Longwinded answer, sir, but thanks for asking.

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate that.

And General Ham.

General HAM. First, Congressman Simmons, you are indeed welcome.

Mr. Chairman, whenever you would like to send someone, either Members or staff, out to Fort Riley out to see us, we would welcome that. And whatever schedule works for you works for us.

You asked, sir, if we have the resources to conduct the training, and I will tell you that, thanks to the committee and for my own Department of the Army, we do have the resources to execute this mission. The most important resource is the leadership officer and noncommissioned officer leadership of a division headquarters and

of two combat brigades that are dedicated to this. They are very, very capable of executing this mission.

Key among the resources to execute this training are linguists and foreign-language-speaking role players. And we need, specifically, Iraqi dialect, Arabic role players and Dari for the Afghan piece of our training as well. That is probably the toughest resource to get. Those are scarce, scarce supplies. But we so far have been able to do that to the requisite standard.

One resource that we are trying to get that we don't presently have is to get actual Iraqi and actual Afghan leaders to come participate in the training with us.

Now, obviously, those, the key leaders, the kinds of leaders that we would like to have at Fort Riley are exactly the kinds of leaders that are fully engaged inside Iraq and Afghanistan. But we are trying to find some way to get real—to get serving Iraqi and Afghan leaders to come talk to our teams as they are going through the training. We think that is important.

Sir, you also asked about the experience based. It is, about 50 percent of the individuals going through training have prior deployment experience.

I would say, though, that is less important to me than the individual previous deployment experience is to make sure that each team has the requisite degree of experience resident in that team. It is not necessary that all 11 members of a battalion team have previous experience, as long as enough of them do that they can share that experience, and we endeavor, with the human resources command as they build those teams, to ensure that is the case.

General FLYNN. Representative Simmons, I would like to add one thing about whether this is good for a Marine's career. Marines traditionally have valued combat as a key part of how you are measured amongst your peers. And I think one of the key indications that we are seeing right now is, as we are doing advisers more than one rotation now, as we are seeing former battalion commanders going into the higher level of being brigade or division advisers, and likewise we are seeing individuals who are majors, who are getting out command-screened to be battalion commanders. So the proof is there.

We went back when we set up our adviser program, the first—our training program—and the first thing we did is, we went back to some of the legends of the Corps who had done this in Vietnam, individuals like Colonel Ripley, Colonel Turley; and Colonel Boomer and said, okay, how should we do this? What were your lessons learned so we can do it right?

So the experience is valued. I tell you this, from running a training and education program, I love getting these guys back and putting them in the training and education establishment because they spread their knowledge and they spread their experience. And because of that, we rise—we raise up the quality of the whole force that way.

Mr. SIMMONS. I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying, our soldiers did a magnificent job in defeating a conventional force quickly and efficiently. And our soldiers have done a magnificent job of providing security in Iraq to stand up a provisional govern-

ment, to conduct three elections, and to stand up a permanent government.

I think we are doing a great job now of—I think we have the possibility of doing a great job now of moving from a strictly security role to a robust advisory role, security to advisory. And I think that is entirely appropriate. And I think the time is right for that. The time is right. The time wasn't good two or three years ago for this kind of a program. But I think the time is right for this program.

I have every reason to believe that our military, that I consider to be the best in the world and certainly the best I've seen in my 37 years of service, is ready to take this on, and I wish you all the best. Thank you for your testimony.

General LOVELACE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman and I thank the gentleman for his great service on the committee, as well as the gentleman from Colorado here, Mr. Hefley, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, who spoke a few minutes ago.

And as a—I would just say that I think you probably, as an adviser in the U.S. military and in a combat operation, and your voice and your experience should be one that we look to in the days ahead with respect to this issue. Very critical issue for us.

The gentleman from Texas, distinguished gentleman who has spent a lot of time in the combat theaters, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have been in this war for too long, three and a half years. I know its history about what happened in the beginning, 2003. The Iraqi army was disbanded in 2003.

Was that a mistake that we made? And was this mistake that we made, in my opinion and the opinions of other people, by disbanding it, was this made by our civilian authorities like Paul Bremer who was there, or was this made by the military?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I accept your question, I am not in a position to answer—I don't have the knowledge, I mean, this is a policy issue. Things were made—decisions were made in theater. I was not there at the time.

So, I apologize. I am not personally able to address your question.

Mr. ORTIZ. And the reason I ask is, because we hope that if this was a mistake, that we do not make this mistake again. This is why this is very, very important at least to me.

But how many of the old Iraqi personnel are now fighting coalition forces or now with the insurgents? I am pretty sure that when you take somebody prisoner or detain somebody, you ask, you question them.

Do we have this information as to how many of the old army are now fighting our coalition forces?

General FLYNN. Sir, I just say one thing on that. I don't think we have that information. And but the other part I say, I think one of the things that goes back to the issue raised on disbanding the Army, one of the key rules that we have learned in counter insurgencies over the years is, never create more enemies than you already have. And that is one key part of it.

So I think part of the answer to your question probably lies in that, is you need all of the friends you can get in counter insur-

gency. And one of the ways you can get there is by assigning quality advisers to that because that shows a commitment to raising that capability. So that is how I would answer your question, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Now talking about advisers, I was going through some of the statements, and I understand that they go through 35- to 40-day training. In your opinion, do you think this is sufficient training? And the advisers who are embedded with the troops, have they been deployed before? Have they seen action in Iraq?

General FLYNN. Sir, as I said in my opening statement, the training is standards based. We in the Marine Corps, very similar to how the Army does it, we use a building block approach. To say specifically there is a time limit on that, on how we do it, no, because the end product when you go through your final block of training is an assessment of how well you can do your mission.

If you fail that mission—if you fail that mission assessment, we don't deploy you. We put you through remediation to make sure that you are ready to do deploy. It is exactly the same procedures we follow with our units. If a battalion, when it goes through its predeployment training failed its assessment, we don't deploy, and they have to go through remediation. And they have to then go back to the Operating Force Commander who is responsible for their deployment and to make sure that they have corrected all their shortcomings.

So it is a standard based program. And the key part on where we do our final 30 days of training is, that is really the mission execution rehearsal. The block one and block two training could take a lot longer than that which are the individual skills training as well as training in the operating environment.

Mr. ORTIZ. Because what I see, I think you embed anywhere from 10 to 15 to 20, and the list that I saw, they are mostly senior, either lieutenant colonels, majors, sergeants. When they are embedded, what is the casualty rate of those that are embedded with the troops? With Iraqis?

General LOVELACE. Sir, if I could and what I like to do is—I don't have the casualty rates. We will—matter of fact, one of the things we watch very carefully, I think it relates to the risk question that was asked earlier, about the level of risk and the dangerousness of the mission, that is one of the things that we follow very carefully to make sure that those individuals are not being targeted; you know, there is not any trend on this. I don't have the casualty rates, but we will take it for the record and get you that information.

Sir, if I could, to follow in reference to the training, and especially with Congressman Skelton here who has championed and been a real standard bearer across all the services, reference, professional development, the leader training and all that goes on, you know, talk about these days, whether it is 65 days—it is about 60 days now worth of training.

The issue is that that is placed on top of a foundation of what is experience, education and training that has gone out through that individual, that leader's career. And that is what it is built on top of it. So it is just not that one period or moment in time. While we see it that way, it is a level of professional development and experience and training that has gone on. So I offer that up to keep

it in a perspective because we do focus on—what we tend to do inside the service ourselves is focus on a very narrow window in time.

Mr. ORTIZ. See, and the reason I asked about the casualty rate, because you don't know who they are going to be embedded with. They could turn against our own soldiers. And to me, this is why this is very important. The casualty rate of those that are embedded. Can we trust the guys that they are going to be working with? And I know that seems to be a problem, but I know, Mr. Chairman, my time has run out.

The CHAIRMAN. My friend from Texas, we will get that casualty rate for the embedded personnel to date. We will try to get that for you today. I think that is an important statistic to get.

General FLYNN. Yes, sir, I will give it to my manpower folks, sir.

General LOVELACE. Mr. Skelton, I do have an answer to his questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say, Mr. Skelton has, as an answer and he had a few comments, too.

General LOVELACE. Sir, the question that you asked me was the numbers of units that are in the lead. There is a total of ten divisions in the Iraqi security force at this time. Right now, there are six division headquarters, 27 brigades and 88 battalions in the lead. That is 88 of what are about 140 battalions that are in the armed forces.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. One quick comment, General, we all know whether it is insurgency, counter insurgency, force on force, the side that always wins is the side that has the will to win.

And I know there is no measurement as to whether those that you are training have the will to win or not.

But do you have any judgment from talking to your trainers and to your people in the field that are working with the Iraqis as to whether they have the gut-wrenching feeling, will to win?

General HAM. Sir, I will take a shot at that. In my discussions, very frequently, with the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, who is in Iraq and spends time with these teams, while there certainly are exceptions, generally the feedback from the teams is that the attitude of their counterparts, of the commander, the Iraqi counterparts with whom they are working, is very positive.

They are—they, the Iraqi commanders, are concerned about their own capabilities. They are concerned about whether or not they will be fully supported by their government. They have lots of concerns. But they understand the role that they must play in order to provide for stability inside their own country.

So I think, generally, the teams would report that the feedback from the Iraqi counterparts is quite positive.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for being here. I have two questions I want to get out, so I will ask them quickly and I am looking for a quick answer, particularly the first one.

You are putting together teams, and the numbers vary. The composition varies. And so the first question is, do you, the Marine Corps, or you, the Army, do you have a formal request, a require-

ment from the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander or the commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq for these teams, something in writing?

General FLYNN. Sir, the way we source the teams, they are already a result of a request for forces, or an RFF, which delineates the mission for the team as well as the composition to include both the specialties and the rank structure. So it is done by a request for force.

Mr. KLINE. From whom?

General FLYNN. From the theater commanders.

Mr. KLINE. General Lovelace?

General LOVELACE. Sir, the same, and they also prescribe training, the training standards and the program construction that we train back in the States, and we complement what they do in theater.

Mr. KLINE. So that, since that request for forces, apparently you both have the same one; the team should then look the same, is that right? We have had—I am sorry, but General Flynn, you gave an answer; sometimes it is 11; maybe it is 20; sometimes there are drivers——

General FLYNN. Sir, that is being done independently in the multinational force. They have been adding up. They have been adding some additional support personnel to the teams. But the basic structure of the team is 11, which is the same.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. We had the opportunity to chat a little bit during the break, so to speak. Unfortunately, I left before I heard the complete answer to Mr. Skelton's question, and I would like to get back to that, the question being, is the performance of the Iraqi—and I may miss this a little bit, Mr. Skelton, but is the performance of the Iraqi battalion, the army battalion, is that a direct reflection on the competence and capability of the embedded team?

If you would just take the remaining 2 minutes and 48 seconds, either one of you, and talk about what that relationship is and how that would work?

General LOVELACE. I will start off. My hesitation was to make sure I understood the question, and I apologize, Congressman Skelton.

Whether the performance of the Iraqi forces, my opinion, is not a reflection of the capability, competence and performance. There are too many other variables that go into this, one.

Second is that one of the questions that you all are interested in is the assessment done on the readiness of the unit. It is done dually, and it is done that way for a reason.

It is done dually up the Iraqi chain of command, and it is done up the U.S. side through the U.S. from the battalion to the brigade to the division. And it is reconciled. And so therefore what you want is you want someone who can talk and assess independently because they have to now be able to now truthfully say what they are exactly capable of doing.

And I know having—although this is one year removed, after having talked to J.R. Vines, who had been the commander prior to General Chiarelli, this is a big emphasis on their assessment, independent assessment, of the U.S. of the capability of the Iraqi secu-

rity force. You want that. And so therefore what you—if that is the case, then what you don't want is that a thought in the transition team that they own the performance of—you want them to coach, teach and mentor to make them better, but don't own them and accept it is your responsibility if they did not succeed.

Mr. KLINE. If I could just interrupt for a second. This is a point that we were discussing earlier. It seems to me that what you don't want is a tight marrying of the performance of that Iraqi battalion with the progress reports, if you will, the efficiency reports of those embedded teams. So that team commander has got to be able through his U.S. chain of command to say, this battalion really needs work, it is not doing well, and not have that report reflect adversely on his own chances for promotion.

General LOVELACE. No, sir. That is exactly right, sir. You helped me say it much better. Thank you.

Mr. KLINE. I have been thinking about it. Thank you.

And incredibly, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing. I know of your continued interested in this issue, Mr. Chairman, but I think that the whole committee and the Congress and the American people will have an ongoing interest in this topic. And I expected that this hearing today was just going to set the beginning for what will be a very vigorous ongoing look and oversight over the next several years.

General Lovelace, at the conclusion of your opening statement today, you demonstrated the admirable quality of defending your troops against public criticism. And I assume you are referring to a couple of press articles that we saw today. And I appreciate your comments.

On the other hand, I think it is really important that we fully and publicly air any kind of shortcomings that we may see because we want this thing to be successful as best it can be. To me it seems like step one is we have to have the right troops, and you can have certainly an excellent person in their military occupational specialty that may not just not be a good trainer, they may not just be a good teacher, they may just not have the personality, as Mr. Simmons was talking about, to go native. They may just not have that temperament. That is part of your job to sort that out.

The second component of that is to have the right training. And so, for example, when I hear like 40 days of, or 40 hours of language training, we are really not kidding anybody here. Basically you are doing greetings and which way to the bunker and which way to the bathroom. That is as far as we are going to get with these languages.

I have some years ago made the comment that we ought to start language training in boot camp when we actually have a captive audience and just declare this platoon as Dari and that platoon as Arabic and have that training stick with people as they go through.

But the third component is—you have the right troops and the right training—is you have to set them up with the right opportunity for success. And again, this has been part of this discussion of safety. If we start doing this swapping out, pulling back all the—

a lot of our U.S. troops, we could have these folks isolated out there unintentionally and may perhaps set them up for danger. Or it may be that the units they are embedded with really are the kind of units, some of them, that there is no chance for success. All those kind of things, the issue whole issue of which way is Iraq going.

So I think what this committee is about is trying to do everything we can to help you, and at times that may be having very public discussions about, well, it turns out we have some wrong people in there, or it turns out we have to do a better job of training in this capacity.

I have some specific questions I will go into now.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned, and they did a report on their advisers in Iraq, came out with what they thought was the skills set necessary, and it seemed to some viewers that it is very close to the Special Forces. And so my question is should we just be focusing on what has already occurred in the Congress, of dramatically increasing the number of Special Forces with the idea they all become these kind of trainers? Is that another way to get at this?

General LOVELACE. Sir, the Special Forces' core competency is foreign internal defense. In the past, the conventional forces have also been used, and just like we did in Vietnam, we have used it to advise, and they have done quite well.

And so, sir, if I could, because I think it is important, one of the things that we do do, we get information from what we are not doing as well as we need to do, and we bring that back into the force. And Carter can talk about that.

But we also do things that we want to sustain. And all in all, the better than 2,400 young men and women that we have that are doing this in general are doing a good job. That was my somewhat defensiveness about—because perhaps, you know—and very small samples of N, N equals two or three, we might see things that are going wrong. And so——

Dr. SNYDER. I think these are very wonderful young men and women that are doing these things.

General LOVELACE. To get to your question, what we also have is a growing level of maturity and experience inside the conventional force that we don't want to have lost either.

And so I am not saying we are catching up in the conventional side with the Special Forces, because those are very selective, hand-picked, they go through quite a regimen to provide. But on the other hand I think we have a strategy that with time can be effective.

Dr. SNYDER. General Ham, you refer to numbers 10 to 50. Do they all train together as a unit?

General HAM. They do, sir. When they come to Fort Riley, they come from disparate locations, but they are formed as a team at Fort Riley and go through that together.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Let me follow up on Mr. Snyder's question for a minute. A few weeks ago the Ranking Member Mr. Skelton pointed out a book that talked a lot about insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the nature of insurgencies and the difficulties

in carrying out the counterinsurgency. And I must say that as I read the book, I thought a lot about the Iraqi soldiers and the Iraqi battalions that we are putting together to try to have them carry out the role of counterinsurgency. And so today's hearing is very meaningful from the perspective of those of us who have tried to understand how this process works.

And let me just ask you this. The folks that are training the American soldiers that you are training to be embedded with Iraqi units obviously possess some pretty unique skills, and that is good, and we thank you for everything that you have done to help develop those skills.

But I am curious about your impressions of how the interface takes place with the folks that we are training also in Iraq. I guess my questions start with wondering about the nature of the Iraqi society and the effect that it has on the individuals who become Iraqi soldiers. We know that part of the process is showing up at the recruiting center. And we know about the recruiting centers because we have seen that they are oftentimes targets of improvised explosive devices (IED) and folks that want—insurgents who want to inhibit the process of our counterinsurgency.

We know that there is a training process. Most of us who have been to Iraq have seen that training take place with Iraqi soldiers on one or more occasions. Early on it was fairly rudimentary training, and as we saw the latter stages of the latter opportunities that we have had to see the training, it looks a whole lot different than it did in the beginning, and that is a good thing. And some of us have even seen some operational capabilities of the Iraqi soldiers.

So I guess my—what I would like you to do, and I think this is very important for all of us on the committee to understand this, and it is important for the American people to understand this as well, give us your impression of the Iraqi units. What motivates them; what societal elements there are that may motivate or inhibit them? And how are they doing generally?

General HAM. Sir, the feedback that we have gotten from the early deploying transition teams was that the number one task that they thought that they needed additional training on was cultural awareness, and specifically in Iraq, so that we could better prepare them to cope with the conditions that they would encounter being embedded with an Iraqi unit. And, of course, it is quite a different culture than our own. And in preparing our officers and noncommissioned officers for that environment, we have spent—we have repeatedly added additional training to make sure that they are prepared for that, to understand the nature of the tribal construct, to understand the influence of Islam through all of Iraqi life.

So we do spend considerable effort to make sure that they are doing it. They are different than us. This is something that we try to make sure the advisors understand. We are not trying to build a mirror image of the American Army in Iraq.

Mr. SAXTON. Let me ask you this. You say that we have had to make some changes in the way we train our folks because some of the things that they found when we got there we didn't anticipate. Give us some examples of some things that you had to change be-

cause we found some things that were different from what we expected.

General HAM. Sir, we focus heavily now in the training to make sure that the teams, for example, understand the hierarchy of a tribe. So there may be a sheikh there who is not in any official position inside an area in which their unit is operating, but yet he wields significant influence. The same for an imam at one of the mosques. So that is a little different from the American culture.

They have to understand that the soldiers, that the commanders that are serving in the Iraqi Army are influenced by others that may not be necessarily in official positions. And we have to be aware of that, attuned to that, so that we can help that Iraqi commander make good choices.

So it is those kinds of awareness opportunities that we try to embed in not only our formal classroom instruction, but more importantly in the training vignettes that we conduct throughout the 60-day model.

Mr. SAXTON. General Lovelace, do you have anything for us?

General LOVELACE. The other thing I was going to ask was General Ham to sort of a follow-on piece, because you had talked about the skill sets would be, sir—to have General Ham address some of the—when people do not have the skill sets that Dr. Snyder was talking about, we do attrit them from the course. They do not make it into theater. And so I think that is a reconciliation to address the point that you are talking about.

General HAM. The good news is our attrition rate through training has been about four percent. It has been quite low. And the largest reason for attrition through training has been medical. I think that is a testament to something General Lovelace mentioned earlier, and that is the ability of the officers and noncommissioned officers, in the case of Fort Riley, Army, Air Force, and Navy. They are so good because the education systems in the services are good that they come with a skill set that allows them to assimilate these new capabilities and be successful as advisers.

General FLYNN. One thing we have learned in lessons learned in this is the importance when you pick advisers is they have to be patient. You know, we have a lot of type A personalities, surprisingly, in the Marines, and you have to teach a little bit of patience.

The other part is a realization that personal relations trump all other metrics in dealing with them.

And last, sir, I would say that as we have trained advisers, we come back and we have a systematic approach where they have lessons learned so that we can change the way we are doing things to make it better.

General LOVELACE. One quick last point on this is that we, throughout the force, basic training right on up to senior levels inside the noncommissioned officer education system and in the officer professional development system, we are now laying a foundation for cultural awareness.

You know, we were an army that focused essentially two places in the world. Basically it was in Europe, and then it was in Korea. And so we have shed that. And now we have people that are looking at and then well beyond. And these are people who are trying to learn, and right now we might be focused a little bit on Iraq and

Afghanistan, but rightfully so, because that is a very critical region for our national security. And it captures the kinds of things we have all been talking about here, so——

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here and for your extraordinary service. I think some of the issues that we discussed are ones that were very much on my mind. And one of the articles that Mr.—I am going to say this wrong—Mr. Krepinevich wrote some time ago did focus on this and some of the issues that have arisen over the course of time, and I wonder if you could just address them.

Partly you have talked about the fact that the ability to promote individuals who take on this task is more recognized today than it was, I think, perhaps a year ago. That that has changed.

But one of the other issues that was addressed is to take away from the adviser some of the responsibilities, be it paperwork, whatever it is, that sort of burdens sometimes our people out in the field so that they really are freed up to do a different task. And if you could address that.

But also the ability of them to work with their Iraqi counterparts so that they can ferret out corruption within the units, and that they can then hopefully be able to still enable people to do what they really want them to do.

How does that affect their work in the units? And how are we training them to work with that issue particularly and perhaps to take some of that burden away?

The other thing I would just like you to address is our training of police officers and border agents and whether or not that is also within this effort with training advisers as well as.

General FLYNN. Ma'am, a couple of things. One of the things that helps with the training now is now we are starting to see advisers come back who now have conducted training. And that is one of the things that are—those skill sets have been able to evaluate somebody to root out those things that are bad in the unit that you are in just based on the experience.

We do have a training responsibility. We train—this year we were responsible for training 10 border transition teams and 4 national police transition teams. So in addition to the military transition teams, we are training the others, and that one of the things we are doing currently right now, for example, on the border transition teams out on the west coast, we have had them work with the border patrol to learn how the border patrol does border operations. So we try to go out and take advantage of skill sets that already exist so that we can help in the training.

And one of the things when our—when we are working on——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Excuse me, are any of our border agents going over to Iraq then and actually being embedded, as well or our police officers?

General FLYNN. Ma'am, I wouldn't know the answer to that question. I am not sure about that at all.

But when we do our training in January, our new revised training, the mission exercise will be focused on what type of team you are going to be. So we will be able to evaluate that necessity. And

again, this is part of the process of always making the training better. You know, we are never declaring that we got it right. We also always have to make it better.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Freeing folks of the kind of paperwork that has always been required, is that something we have been able to work through and do a better job at?

General FLYNN. I haven't heard of anybody being burdened with paperwork. I don't think they think Marines can do paperwork. Maybe that is the problem.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. In reflecting on the police task as well, we know that in the communities this has been a far greater need in some areas than even in training the military. Is it appropriate—have you found that it is appropriate for us to be using the military to train their police, and where have you seen that there are problems with this, whether it is in the approach, how we apply the science, whatever that may be?

General LOVELACE. Let me do this. If I could capture a couple of quick points. The Krepinevich article. We have been engaging with him because from our perspective, from the Army's perspective, he is using dated information, one, and he is looking at a point in time when in February all of a sudden we are asked to have in theater 60 days later formations, large numbers, that begin to populate and then embed inside of the Iraqi security force.

And so basically what happened then was—is that we did a small amount of training here in the States. Theater said they would do the preponderance of training in theater. That was the handshake. That was the agreement. And so from about the time that we got the mission until they showed up in theater, it was less than 90 days.

I think that is pretty admirable to react to a combatant commander. Was it perfect? No. Is it better the month after that? Yes. And each month it has gotten better.

And so I see these articles, and I take issue with them.

One of the kids that went over there in May 2005 was my executive officer. He volunteered. This is a successful brigade commander, combat veteran. And so when Dr. Snyder asked with a little bit of emotion, I can get behind here with a little bit of emotion, because I see it. I can touch it. Under the G–3 itself we pushed about 14 kids who raised their hands who wanted to go over out of the Pentagon. Now, that might have been incentive now for them to try to get out is to go because—but——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are they having any extended tours beyond what might be expected?

General LOVELACE. I think the point is good because that is why when we invite people to go to Fort Riley, one of the reasons we have focused on the post—I know we are running over. This is an important point.

Why we focus on Fort Riley is because we allowed that force and the management of it, as you then came back, you came back to Fort Riley, and then what you are going to be allowed to do was you were going to allow to impart what you had learned on those units that were going on over next. It just makes good sense. And so that is why I think we have a great story to tell.

I know the Marines have a great story to tell. I would love for you all to come see us.

But the police—real quickly, because I did make a trip into theater, a couple this past year, one of the focuses was on this is the year of the police. So there has been a huge focus, because what they want to do in the strategy is to allow the communities now and the community base to have the Iraqi police be in charge, or the Iraqi military be less visible.

And, you know, we have young men and women, great young—we have a military police who have great skills. They take care of the law enforcement, the kinds of things that then are relevant and just what we want the Iraqi police to be like. What better examples of the young men and women that we put into these formations than to model themselves after the young men and women who are in uniform? So the skill sets pretty much overlap, ma'am.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Generals, thank you very much for being here today. I am very appreciative of your troops and what they have meant to helping protect the American people, and I am particularly pleased with the military transition teams as you all have reviewed, their courage and their effectiveness.

And, General Ham, the 1st Infantry Division, I know firsthand of your ability to train and work not only with foreign troops, but the South Carolina Army National Guard. We are very grateful that the 218th Mechanized Infantry has been trained for years, and cotraining for the preparation of their deployment to Afghanistan soon, and I want to thank you for that.

I do share with Congressman Ortiz concern about the level of risk of our team members who will be with the Iraqi units. And it has been something I have learned about the interpreters who also accompany the troops and their ability to assist with breaking the language barrier and also the cultural barriers.

Could you tell us about the interpreters, and are they available? And how many are available?

General HAM. Yes, sir, I could.

During the training, as I mentioned, the teams do get some language training, but as Congressman Snyder indicated, it is very rudimentary. We get to a capability where they can have a simple conversation with their counterpart or with someone that they meet. But we advise the teams that when they go into formal discussions, operational discussions, with their counterparts, they must do so through their interpreter. And each team does have an interpreter, and we train on that and practice on that.

We have contracted language speakers in the training base who perform that mission, because using an interpreter is in and of itself a skill set which the teams must have. So we focus hard on that through the conduct of training.

Mr. WILSON. And I learned of that, and one of my sons served for a year in Iraq, and he was always impressed with the dedication of the interpreters, their courage, their insight, and how they

certainly have helped and enhanced the security of our troops. And so I appreciate very much your bringing that—explaining to us the significance of interpreters.

Another concern that I have had—and I am very pleased that there are now 88 combat battalions in the lead of the Iraqi Army. The level of equipment with the transition teams working with troops, do we feel that they have proper equipment to meet the challenge of the terrorists?

General HAM. Sir, I am confident that the teams—if you are talking about the teams having the equipment they need, absolutely.

Mr. WILSON. The teams and the Iraqi forces.

General LOVELACE. First off, the teams do have what they need. That is a priority fill of equipment for those units going into the theater. They get up-armored Humvees, they get the electronic countermeasures, et cetera, radios. It has to be. They are alone and unafraid out there, so they have to get the right stuff. The soldiers are equipped with the latest in a rapid equipping initiative that we have. You all have seen that on the soldiers that are over there, so they do have.

On the Iraqi forces, sir, in preparation, the only comment I could render at this time is I know they are equipped to about 85 percent of what they need. That is the little bit I know right now.

Mr. WILSON. So it wouldn't be inhibiting to them as to their resourcefulness because they don't feel like they have proper equipment.

General LOVELACE. Roger, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you gentlemen for being here and for your service to our country.

I am curious—and this question is based on some training exercises that we have had with other countries. I have always been curious if we track how long these people we train stay in that nation's service. Colombia came to mind where it seemed like every time I was going down there, you know, we were training guys up, and in some instances it turned out they went over to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) after our Nation had spent a good deal of money to train them up.

So my question is what is the length of service of an Iraqi now? The people that we are training, are they conscripts? Are they volunteers? Where do they fall in the officer/enlisted pecking order? And is there any effort to track them to see if we are just not training soldiers for al Sadr's army?

General LOVELACE. Let me tell you what I know, sir, and I will have to take for the record as far as how we track. I don't know in general, because I thought that was the first part of your question was in general how we track.

I know that in some cases that we do some schools. I know specifically that—I am very familiar with we do track the careers of individuals. But I have to get back with you as far as the army.

As far as the length of service, sir, they are a volunteer force. They have no—and I guess it is really kind of a reflection of their will to fight is that they are standing in line to enlist in the armed forces. I think that is a reinforcement because what we give them is hope. They can see tomorrow because we give them hope. And I think that is what bolsters not only their will to serve, but their will to fight.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 71.]

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, more to that point, I know that, for example, when people apply for Special Forces training within our Army, they make a commitment to serve a while longer. When people apply for our nuclear schools in the Navy, they make a commitment to serve a lot longer because we are investing so much in them. This I would think would be sought after in that same way as those two specialties within our forces.

So the question is is there any commitment that comes on the part of the Iraqi to get this kind of training? And if there is, who tracks it?

General LOVELACE. Sir, can I take it for the record?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Please.

General LOVELACE. I can't answer.

Mr. TAYLOR. So no one has tracked the retention; no one has tracked whether these guys immediately take their training, go over to other side——

General LOVELACE. Sir, I didn't say nobody was. All I said was I don't have that information. I am sure that probably somebody in theater is tracking those kinds of statistics, but right back at the Department of the Army, sir, I don't.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

With the time I have remaining—I can hardly yield to the gentleman from Arkansas, can I? But if you could get it for the record, I would be very much interested in that.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

And next will be Dr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. I have no questions.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your service and for your testimony here today.

I would like to start by following up, looking a little more in detail at the question—the answer you gave to Mr. Skelton's question with respect to the number of Iraqi combat battalions who are actually combat-ready and what capacity they are serving in.

General Lovelace, you responded by saying there are approximately 80 Iraqi combat battalions that are operating in the lead, yet in the lead doesn't mean the highest level of readiness. In the lead actually means working operating with some U.S. assistance as opposed to operating completely independently of U.S. assistance.

Can you more specifically tell us of those 80 that are operating that are combat-ready, you said they are in the lead, how many are actually operating independently?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I will have to turn to the people who have the books behind me and see if I could—if I could give you a wait out and see what I have with me today. Some of those are absolutely working independently, some are not, and I will make sure I get you that information. If I can't get that before I leave, then I will take it for the record, sir.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. I appreciate that, because obviously that is key to us finally, once and for all, being able to transition security operations to the Iraqis, and I think we all need to know how many are actually operating independently.

And on that point, on the scale of one to four used for Iraqi Security Force readiness assessments, what are the biggest challenges right now preventing units from moving to—from a two rating, where they are operating in the lead with assistance, to a level one, where they are operating completely independently?

General LOVELACE. Sir, again, the questions are things that theater would track here. I do not have that—we do not have that information. I apologize. We can seek to get it from theater and take it for the record, but that is a theater question.

Mr. LANGEVIN. You don't know the biggest challenges right now that are preventing us from moving from a level two to a level one?

General LOVELACE. No, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. If you could get those for the record, those are important things to know.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 71.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, are you tracking—with respect to the number of facilities, our units that we have doing the training, is our operation there sophisticated enough where we are actually tracking metrics so that we know which facilities or which units are having the most success in actually training and transitioning and moving the Iraqi forces through the various levels of training, and perhaps being able to learn from those units that are doing the best in terms of training and those that are lagging?

General FLYNN. Sir, I can answer that a little bit. I know that the adviser teams report up through the chain of command on their readiness assessments. That is one of the functions of an adviser is to do that assessment and to provide that up to the chain of command. And in the case of the majority of the Marine Corps' military transition teams, they report that assessment information through the operational chain. It goes through Multi-National Force West, and then it goes up to the Iraqi Advisory Group. And from there, you know, I am sure that is where the lessons learned are and all the information is kept.

But, again, I don't have access to that information, but I can tell you that that is how we do the assessment process. It is done by the chain of command, and it is done through the operational chain, and we do take the lessons learned. That is one part that is very active.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. And while I still have some time, hand in hand with the training and making sure that the Iraqi Security Forces are operating at maximum level and are successful in being able to provide security for Iraq, only the training is going to be, obviously, having the right equipment, and to what degree are the Iraqi Security Forces sufficiently equipped so that they are operating at a superior level to the insurgents who are attacking them? Because I have heard, and I know members of the committee have heard, that the Iraqi Security Forces are conducting operations in very light-armored vehicles, pickup trucks and the like, and do not have the heavy-armored vehicles that will put them in a superior position over the insurgents.

Can you address that?

General FLYNN. Sir, again, I would have to pass on that one. That is best up to the operational commanders to address because I do not have visibility on that from my role on this.

General LOVELACE. Sir, just to reiterate a point—I know you have heard this—they have about 85 percent of their equipment. They do have some up-armored Humvees. They do not have, you know, the thousands that we have, but they do have some up-armored Humvees.

Sir, if I could come back to your question a little bit, the only thing I would say is—you know, what is the difference between going from a level two to a level one? Some of it is just time. It is just the increase and the opportunities. Not every battalion is going to—I mean, you will understand this. Not every battalion is going to progress at the same rate, and so some of it is just time and patience to give them an opportunity, because the will is there, the experience, and they do want to win, so——

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Thank you, General Lovelace, and at this time, Mr. Marshall of Georgia.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the struggles that we have had in Iraq is that our force is largely conventional. It is an unconventional fight. We were very successful at the conventional part of it. That was predictable, it lasted three weeks, and then it was fairly predictable that there would be a gradual deterioration, and then we would be in this awkward position of having a conventional force in a foreign country, constrained by our rules, and it is appropriate that we be constrained that way, and consequently, we have a very difficult time obtaining security and peace as it gradually worsened.

My impression is that we are largely, our embeds—which I think is a great way to head, and I have argued for it for some time. I have also argued that we do not need more soldiers over there, we probably need fewer. But the embeds, it seems to me, are principally geared toward training a conventional force. We put uniforms on them. They all look alike. I guess we are teaching them to march in formation—I mean, just things like that—and yet, that conventional force has the same challenge we have, which is an unconventional one; it is a counterinsurgency. And so I am wondering what thoughts we have had about that kind of dilemma, you know, training this force for a counterinsurgency, for a policing action, and are we doing that?

I guess I have a second question, and I would like each of you—you know, please do not say, I do not have that information right here, because it is just calling for your opinion. If we went and talked with those who are embedded with Iraqi forces, who have had experience working with the Iraqi forces, and we asked them whether or not the Iraqi—"In your opinion," you know, "Officer, Sergeant"—you name it—"will Iraqi forces be ready to take over security of the country in about 15 months from now," what would their answer be?

So those two questions. The nature of our training, are we just creating the same image that we have of ourselves and consequently setting up a conventional force for some real challenges? They have got advantages that we do not have. They speak the language; they can drink the water without getting sick; you know, they can sleep there; they can mix in with the population as long as we do not force them into uniforms and Humvees and, you know, those sorts of things. That is one question.

The second question is what do you think those guys would say about the Iraqi forces being ready to do this in 15 months?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I will talk first.

The answer to your first question is I would not say that just because we are putting them in uniform, that now they are a conventional force. When you look at the fact that the 3rd Infantry Division went in in 10/2003, went into Baghdad, that force came back about 15 months later, it was more than a—it was more than a high-intensity force. It was a—it had become—it began to be a full-spectrum force, a force that was able to handle high intensity to include a counterinsurgency.

When the 4th Infantry Division came back—and now they are just leaving, the 101st the same way, the 1st Cavalry that is going in now, the 25th Division—those units that are going back into the conflict are going back in with greater skill sets to be able to address a counterinsurgency. Those kinds of skill sets are being imparted on the force that they are working with because these transition teams—the training of the Iraqi Security Forces does not rest just narrowly in the transition teams. They are both internal and external teams, and like with General Flynn, we also inside the Army provide more forces to help train the Iraqi force than just those teams themselves, all right?

And so I think that what is not seen necessarily is this broadening of—the broadening of the training and education that goes on. They have their own human intelligence (HUMINT) teams. That is something that we in the Army got rid of a long time ago. It became a vestigial function. Yet we now are now regrasping it, and we are building a capability very rapidly. They have it already resident in their force and are taking advantage of it, and that is a skill that you look for especially in a counterinsurgency.

So, sir, what I would offer is, while we might be putting uniforms on them, they are still operating and understanding how to operate in a counterinsurgency, and for all the reasons that you just said——

Mr. MARSHALL. Let me interrupt. I suspect that the other witnesses are going to be relieved of the responsibility of answering the first question.

Could each of you very briefly—because I am about out of time—very briefly, what is your opinion, 15 months, if the embeds were asked will they be ready to do this in 15 months?

General LOVELACE. Sir, the answer to 15 months—I mean, I do not know. The embeds would say this?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes.

General LOVELACE. That the Iraqi Security Force eventually will be able to stand up, and——

Mr. MARSHALL. Eventually. Fifteen months?

General LOVELACE. Sir, I do not—you are giving me——

General FLYNN. Sir, my honest answer to that is the enemy gets a vote in this, so I say it is event-driven rather than time-driven. So every action we take is going to have a reaction, and I think you have to take a look at it as event-driven, and, again, we are not the only one driving the train here.

General HAM. Sir, I would say the key factor for the Iraqi Security Forces would be the full support of their government. If they have got that, that will be the key move forward.

And if I may, sir, just really quickly on the counterinsurgency training, we spend a lot of time with the instructors, the trainers, cycling through the Counterinsurgency Academy that General Petraeus and his staff run in Fort Leavenworth. We do counterinsurgency training for the teams, and the Iraqis run their own counterinsurgency training inside Iraq for the Iraqi leaders. So there is clear recognition that this is a different kind of fight and, increasingly inside Iraq, effort to train—to make sure the leaders understand the nature of the conflict in which they find themselves.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. Cooper of Tennessee.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For anyone listening to this hearing, they are going to be wondering why the war is going so badly if our training is going relatively well. The Iraq Study Commission report is out today, and if you read pages six through nine, the report conveys quite a different impression of the training activities than the one we have heard of today.

They say, "Point, units lack leadership. Point, units lack equipment," and they point out that our entire appropriation for Iraqi forces is $3 billion, or less than we spend on our own troops every two weeks in Iraq. It goes on to say that units lack personnel, and it says, "Units lack logistics and support," but other than that, everything is fine, and then it says that the police forces are doing even worse. But let me dwell on the personnel section for a second because I am wondering if essentially we have asked you to train the untrainable.

It says here that Iraqi soldiers are on leave one week a month so that they can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave (AWOL). Unit readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or

less. So it sounds like the Iraqi forces can kind of come and go at will if there is no penalty for being AWOL.

How do you help troops like that? That is a culture that is so different than anything we are accustomed to that I am worried that we have asked you to do an impossible job, and I appreciate your valor and energy in approaching it, but when I read in General Lovelace's testimony that they are working to reward our embeds, and that one idea is we are working to provide incentives or a choice of assignment after their embed assignment, is that a sufficient incentive for us to attract troops to what may be the most dangerous assignment going?

There is an article today in the *Financial Times* that says, "The position is only going to become more hazardous." So I am just worried there is a disconnect here. You are working hard. You are trying to make it work. You have been given, possibly, an impossible assignment. The Iraq Study Group says, you know, it is a disaster that is not waiting to happen; it is already happening.

How do you train troops who can come and go at will? My colleague's question, Mr. Taylor, he wondered whether we were effectively training militia members because, when they are gone, we do not know if they have, in fact, joined up with the enemy. You just disclosed to my colleague, Mr. Marshall that we do not apparently even track—or at least the numbers aren't at our fingertips, you know—absentee rates, where these folks are. It just sounds like it is in chaos, and the President's main strategy was stand up the Iraqis, and then we will stand down. Now the Iraq Study Group is saying stand them up, or we will leave.

What is going on here? We surely have better answers than this from our great Pentagon, and I worry, as I say, that it is the fault not of our troops and generals like you, but of the civilian leadership who have asked you to do a possibly impossible job. Comments.

General FLYNN. Sir, I will take one shot at that.

In my personal opinion, we are undertaking, I think, one of the largest scales—larger-scale foreign internal defense operations that we have ever done in our Nation's history, and it is not—it does not just have a military solution. Part of foreign internal defense is also the operations of civilian agencies as well as military agencies. What we are here today for—I come from the Training and Education Command, and you were right, sir. We do a very good job of training our U.S. military advisors, and I think they do a good job of training the forces that they have been assigned to train, but it is a difficult problem.

It is much more than a military solution, and, you know, I think the men and women who we have doing this job are doing their part, and we are getting—we train them well, and they are prepared to execute their mission. But again, it is more than just the military aspect, there are other parts of it, and I do not feel that, you know, I have all of the details on that to give you the full answer to the question that you are asking.

General LOVELACE. Sir, I want to—this is not meant to be a flippant answer, but from what you just described, it could have described the Continental Army of this country over 200 years ago. I mean, that is what it was. I mean, this was people who fought

and had to go home and tend to crops. I mean—and those are the conditions under which we are asking. This is an army that does not have a personnel system. It does not have a pay system. It is a country that does not have checks to bank, and so we have to accept those conditions and work within them.

I do not know what the answers are, but I know what the missions are that have been given us, and we were asked whether we thought we could be successful. Yes, the enemy does get a vote, and I realize there are some cultural differences here that we have to understand and accept and work within, but is there one at the end of the road that we can see success? We think there is.

Mr. COOPER. But, General, in the Continental Army, we weren't worried that our soldiers were leaving to go fight for the British for a couple of weeks and then come back to our forces, and we weren't worried, you know, about a number of other things like—it is, I think, a false analogy.

You need to tell us, you know, if you have been given an impossible job, because some marvelous generals have led this training effort. General Petraeus is one of the finest to ever put on a uniform. He is a gentleman who is a fine, patriotic American, but in reading this 3–1/2 years into the war about 50 percent or less readiness rates, how many years will it take?

Mr. Marshall's question, you know, can we guarantee, you know, the probability of—capability in 15 months? There is no assurance here. There is no—where is the traction?

General Ham, I didn't want to interrupt you if you were reaching for the button.

General HAM. Sir, I was just going to say one thing.

I think, appropriately, the initial focus of the training and advisory mission was at the combat unit level, recognizing that logistics and sustainment and other systems are necessary for the formation and function of a good military. We are now building and embedding advisory teams at the highest levels of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to help them build those kinds of systems so that you do not have to have a system where the soldiers have to go home, you know, a week out of every three to take their—to take pay home. But building those kinds of systems, an institutional army, building the institutional basis for the Ministry of Interior clearly will take some time, but we are, in fact, building the advisory teams and deploying the advisory teams to help the Iraqis build those systems.

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time has expired. I thank the indulgence of the Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.

Ms. Bordallo of Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon, gentlemen.

As you know, I represent Guam, and our island has a proud—a very proud national guard equipped with many skills from their civilian lives. Because of my particular passion and faith in the broad skills of the national guard personnel, I am puzzled by the fact that the military transition teams are utilizing only active duty personnel. It seems to me that national guardsmen bring an

especially valuable skill set to serve as embedded officers because of their skills.

Have you considered requesting particular types, active or reserve forces, for the mission, and can you comment on why we are focusing on only active duty forces for this mission? I guess whichever one of you would like to——

General FLYNN. Ma'am, I know on our transition teams we use both active and reserve forces.

Ms. BORDALLO. So you will be including them?

General FLYNN. We have in the past, yes, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right.

My second one——

General HAM. Ma'am, we do in the Army as well. We have significant participation by Army Reserve and Army National Guard as members of the transition teams. It is not active duty only.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Thank you.

My second question, Major General Ham: You command a traditional infantry division, and you have been given a task to train and prepare these teams, but you have not been told to transform your division from a traditional division to a dedicated military transition team (MiTT) organization that will endure.

Do you think that we should consider converting at least one Army division into an enduring, full-time and dedicated organization for training MiTT teams and for having these teams as permanent, organized elements of the unit; in other words, a conventional Special Operations unit, you might say?

Why are we treating the need for training and organizing MiTT teams as a momentary requirement when all conventional wisdom indicates that future warfare will look like Iraq? And when the Army has finally embraced its role in Phase four peacekeeping and nation-building operations, do you believe the need for these teams will endure beyond Iraq?

General LOVELACE. It is me. Although you would like for him to answer, I——

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, General Lovelace.

General LOVELACE. General Ham can answer it any way he wants. I am going to answer for the Army, ma'am.

The pursuit of the 1st Infantry Division is a—we gave them a mission, and we gave the power of a post and an institution. We do not have on the backside an end-of-mission statement. He does not know, nor do the follow-on commanders know, when that will stop, and so what we wanted to do was embrace this.

We have to now get after and analyze exactly what we want to have as an enduring aspect of this, and so it is not where we have not embraced it for the long term. We now have a solution set that allows us to now understand what now it needs to be, what kind of structure we might need to have inside the Army. We have the Special Forces, who have done the foreign internal defense admirably, and it is their forte, but we also have grown from that experience, and it has been a very meaningful experience inside the conventional force.

And so I think that it is premature to say that we have not—I would say that we are—and I would think that you would want

us to be as deliberate as we are in getting to some kind of final end state, and now I will let Carter answer.

General HAM. Yes. I would say that the 1st Infantry Division is now specifically tailored for this mission. If you look at my division headquarters, it is not like any other division headquarters in the Army. It is tailored for this mission. Those functions that are necessary for full-spectrum operations are not all—not wholly resident, but we have other additions. For example, we have Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers as part of our headquarters, not normally found in a division, but because of this unique mission, we have that. Similarly, the brigades that are conducting this training have been specifically organized for this mission.

Ms. BORDALLO. So then you feel it should endure?

General HAM. I will defer to General Lovelace. I know the mission that—I feel comfortable that the mission that I have matches the organization of my unit for now.

General LOVELACE. Ma'am, whether we keep it at the 1st Infantry Division or not, I already know that we have every intention of modulizing his headquarters and the formations there at Fort Riley, Kansas, and so at some point we now have to understand institutionally where we will do this and how we want to embrace it for all of the reasons that you just indicated, because, as we are looking at this, we have to now—just like I was speaking earlier, we talked about how we are trying to mature, develop the force, the leader skill sets. You know, what we want to do is be able to train on one of those skill sets that units need to bring into a force at the Phase four and five levels. Right.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you very much for your answers, and I do feel, with the state of affairs the way they are in the world today, we should have an enduring force. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.

And we have a second round, and, Mrs. Davis, if you have any further questions.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We have been at this for a while, and I think that we are doing a better job, as you described, in trying to train the advisors, but I still am kind of grappling with what is so different, and how can we say that greater effort is necessarily going to yield the kind of results that we are looking for right now? Is it numbers? Is it the escalation of training of our own advisors that is going to make that difference? Clearly they have been in there doing, you know, a remarkable job already. What is really different?

General HAM. I will try first.

I think there are a couple of factors, ma'am, that are at play. We are better now at the training of advisors and the preparation of advisors than we were at the start. We understand this; we understand this better, and as we gain experience, we are doing it. More importantly, the Iraqi units, I think, are, over time, gaining experience, and it really is their performance that will make the difference. This is experience that sometimes only time can bring.

So I think we would all wish it to be faster, but we must also be careful not to make it so fast that we put units in harm's way before they are ready. But from my standpoint, we are continually

improving the preparation and the training of those who will have this advisory mission, and I think that will help make a difference.

General LOVELACE. Ma'am, if I could, it is interesting as you ask the question, because we can put a unit together. We can take a unit and mobilize it from the reserves or a unit like in the Army and build a module formation and one year later deploy it, but the foundation for that is the wealth of experience in those leaders. It is the investments that you all have supported us in making in the soldiers, in the leaders, the experience, the training and all. That is the foundation.

That foundation is not resident in this force that we are trying to now bring forth, and we have had some starts and stops. I mean—and we started off on a very humble beginning, like I said earlier, of about two battalions, and now this thing is moving. It is gaining momentum.

That is why Mr. Marshall's question is very good. When is it? I do not know to put a time on it, but I know that we are moving this in the right direction toward success because the foundation is being laid. Not only are we training these units to be able to handle the full spectrum; specifically in this case, we are training them to be counterinsurgency forces. They are not being trained in order to now be able to be used beyond its own boundaries. We are also developing a Noncommissioned Officer Corps. We are trying to develop its own NCO Corps. We are trying to develop a military academy.

So we are trying to lay the institutional pieces that are going to now continue to get it above a threshold level of existence, and so that is why Carter says time is patience, and it is hard right now to be patient. And so I think it gets a little bit—at your question a little bit, so——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Do you see that effort beyond the military as well? I mean, that has got to be frustrating to feel that so much of this burden is on you.

General LOVELACE. Sure, I do.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And where do you see that specifically where folks have stepped up to the plate and provided the other kinds of support that you need?

General LOVELACE. Right now everybody is—you know what the equation is—diplomatic information, military and economic—and right now, the large "M" in here, military, is what is looming, and the diplomatic and the economic and the information clearly have to catch up with us. And so—but that is understood, and so—and that interagency "sequentialization" is what you are getting at. I mean, that is really what you are talking about, and that is what is necessary in order to have the long-term success.

When Carter talks about the government, I mean we are mentoring the government, whether it is in the Interior or in the Department of the Ministry of Defense. All of those agencies are going to set the conditions so that the military can be successful, but even the government, it has only been minted for about two years now, you know, and it is going through the rights of passage. And so——

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I appreciate that.

Thank you all.

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Mr. Skelton and then Mr. Marshall.

Mr. SKELTON. General you were speaking about the Government of Iraq. Is the government fully supporting this effort? It sounds to me like you gave a qualified comment a moment ago.

General LOVELACE. Sir, I am not sure—I am not sure exactly what comment you are referring to. The way I——

Mr. SKELTON. Well, is the government fully supporting this effort, or is it kind of supporting this effort?

General LOVELACE. Sir, all I was referring to—I was not qualifying the support as given the military.

All I was saying is that in all of these ministries, as they are standing up, understanding what their responsibilities are and the maturity of their roles and missions and the development of what their vision is, that that will begin to set. As it codifies, it will start to set the conditions that will help this. And so that is why I was only saying, as we have gone through the transitional phases of the government and now have a government in being, it is embraced to set the conditions that we are talking about, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. I am glad Mr. Cooper, a moment ago, corrected you on comparing this group with the American Revolutionary Minuteman. I think you were comparing apples and oranges, and not that I am a great historian, but I think it would behoove you to take a look at the comparison. I think you will agree with Mr. Cooper and me.

General LOVELACE. Sir, I am not an historian either. I was only trying to reference——

Mr. SKELTON. General, I think every military person should be an historian, and I am dead serious. I will let it go at that, sir. I have one last question.

The bottom line is are they winning? What proof is there that these people who are being trained and graduate from our training are winning on the battlefield?

General LOVELACE. Sir, that is a question that—and I will speak for the three of us. I mean, I would love to be able to answer that question for you. That is a question that really has to be asked of the people who are using and deploying those forces in theater, and I apologize for not being able to answer that question, sir, to your satisfaction.

Mr. SKELTON. That is the bottom line—when are you not—and if these folks are incapable of winning, we in Congress should know about it. The American people should know about it because this is serious business.

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. SAXTON. We want to thank you for being here this morning. We have been at this for almost three hours, and so we thank you for your forthcoming answers and for your indulgence, and we look forward to seeing you again real soon. Thank you.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

DECEMBER 7, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 7, 2006

Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton (D-MO)
Ranking Member, House Armed Services Committee
Hearing on U.S. Military Transition Teams in Iraq
07 December 2006

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today.

I hesitate to say that we are entering "a critical phase" in Iraq simply because the phrase has been used so many times for so long that it's lost some of its meaning. Nevertheless, it is clear that the forces of history are moving in such a way that long-awaited, much-needed changes in this nation's Iraq war policies could finally be forthcoming. Ultimately, those changes will have far reaching ramifications for our nation and the world. So, I guess, "critical phase" is not an overstatement.

As I told General Abizaid two weeks ago when he was here, it is vitally important that Congress and the administration find a bipartisan way forward that allows for the redeployment of

American forces as quickly as possible—this must be done in a way that accounts for our interests in the region and allows us to attend to the current dire state of readiness in the American military. Since that hearing, we've seen a remarkable evolution in the public dialogue about the war. First came the leak of the National Security Advisor's memo to the President, which expressed doubts about Prime Minister Maliki's capacity to control the sectarian violence that is wracking Baghdad and other parts of the country. Then, Secretary Rumsfeld's memo was leaked, and it indicated a surprising willingness to accept that we have a serious problem – something that had been sadly lacking for quite some time. His memo offered a wide set of options for dealing with Iraq, including several – some offered by Members of this body - that were dismissed by the Administration earlier. And yesterday, amidst great speculation, the Iraq Study Group released its report. They have undertaken a careful, thorough assessment of the situation in Iraq, and I am reviewing their findings with the same level of consideration.

However, regardless of one's position on Iraq and one's prescription for the way forward, it seems that the common thread in everyone's assessment is the acknowledgement that the Iraqis must take greater responsibility for their own security. This is essential if the Maliki government is going to demonstrate to all Iraqis that it can look after their welfare and create a society in which all Iraqis can live and flourish. To do that, Iraq needs to develop robust military and police forces capable of meeting the very serious security challenges it is facing and will face in the future. Up to this point, the result of the effort to develop these forces has been mixed at best – and in some cases, downright disappointing.

Therefore, in order for this effort to succeed, we must put the best, combat experienced American military personnel toward this mission and assign them in large enough numbers to have a lasting impact. These cannot be dead-end assignments – they must be valued by the Services and made career enhancing. These teams

must be properly formed and the trainers themselves properly trained in how to build Iraqi units that will fight and win together. And both these teams and the Iraqi Security Forces must have the equipment they need to fight and win.

All of these decisions – the manning, training and equipping of these teams and the way they are employed will be inputs – the output must be more capable and reliable Iraqi security forces in as short a time as possible. Therefore, we must have ways not only to measure the progress of the Iraqi forces, but also to monitor the suitability of our "inputs" in achieving the desired result. For example, if 15 U.S. advisors per team are not sufficient, what is the right number and how do we know? Are the training tasks for building these teams actually the right ones they'll need in the field? If not, how will we know? Should Iraqi unit performance be considered a reflection of the training team's proficiency? If not, why not? We must always be questioning our assumptions and tweaking the program.

All of that is just a fancy way of saying that I do not want us to put together an advisor program and invest a lot of time and resources, only to find this time next year that we didn't get it right and those Iraqi forces are no more capable than they are today. I want to get it right from here on out and through your testimony today, gentlemen, is how you can help us make sure that this happens.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF

MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE J. FLYNN

COMMANDING GENERAL, TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND

U.S. MARINE CORPS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CONCERNING

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM TRAINING

ON

December 7, 2006

Major General George J. Flynn
Commanding General, Training and Education Command

Major General Flynn graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from Salve Regina College, a Master of Arts Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, and a Master of Science Degree in National Security and Strategy from the National War College. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff and the National War College.

Major General Flynn's command assignments include: Commanding Officer, HQ Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines; (1979-1980); Commanding Officer, L Battery, 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines (1980); Commanding Officer, P Battery, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1984-1985); Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1992-1993); Commanding Officer, Officer Candidates School (1999-2001), Commanding General, Training Command (2002-2004).

Major General Flynn's staff assignments include: Forward Observer, Fire Direction Officer, Battery Executive Officer and S-4 A, 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (1976-1979); Officer Selection Officer, Manchester, New Hampshire, (1981-1984), Operations Officer, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines (1985-1986), Plans Officer, Plans Policies and Operations Department, Headquarters Marine Corps (1987-1989); Junior Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (1989-1991); Assistant Fire Support Coordinator, 2d Marine Division (1991-1992); Future Operations Officer, III Marine Expeditionary Force (1994-1995); Military Assistant to the Executive Secretary to the Secretary of Defense (1995-1997); Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (1997-1998); Head, Strategic Initiatives Group, Headquarters Marine Corps (1998-1999); Military Secretary to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (2001-2002); Deputy Commanding General, Training and Education Command (2002-2004), Chief of Staff and Director, Command Support Center, United States Special Operations Command (2004-2006).

Introduction

Critical elements of the Global War on Terror are Transition Teams (TT), serving in advisor and training missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In all, the Marine Corps has nearly 28,000 Marines deployed in support of OIF/OEF. Over 700 of these deployed Marines are part of the security transition teams in Iraq and Afghanistan that are working to increase the proficiency, combat effectiveness, and internal security capacity of these countries. The current TT training mission for the Marine Corps will prepare over 80 teams during the current FY for tasks as military, border security and national police Transition Teams.

Pre-deployment Training Program

All Marine Corps forces deploying overseas for combat operations train in accordance with the guidance contained in the Marine Corps Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP). Formalized in April of this year, PTP institutionalized the building block approach that OIF/OEF deploying Marine Forces go through prior to deployment. The same building block approach designed for major combat, combat support, and combat service support units is also applied to the training of our Transition Teams.

When Transition Team missions were first identified in 2003, they were sourced from a variety of Marine units both active duty and reserve, and training was conducted in a variety of venues. As the numbers of Transition Teams increased, and they increasingly assumed roles as advisors and not just trainers, Transition Team training also evolved. As the demands and complexity of the Transition Team mission expanded, Transition Team training required additional skills to support their increasingly stand alone mission. The evolution of the Transition Team mission and increasing training requirements led the MEF Commanders to work with TECOM to assist in establishing a uniform, standards based training package for Transition Teams which is consistent with our unit PTP approach. TECOM established a Mission Essential Task List, an economical division of training labor to maximize Transition Team training while minimizing

time away from home station, and a venue in which to assess Transition Team capability prior to deployment.

The model for this Transition Team training was the time tested template in which Marine units learn shoot-move-communicate skills at home station, and then deploy for a 3 to 4 week course established at MAGTFTC (29 Palms) to immerse units in a language and culture environment in which they must demonstrate their mastery of unit skills. Infantry battalions go through this training, known as *Mojave Viper*, and a similar program designed specifically for Transition Teams is being established. Currently, TECOM plans to conduct this course at 29 Palms for OIF Transition Teams and will conduct a test course in January. It takes advantage of the Marine Corps' training resources and capacity that already exist at 29 Palms. Similarly, a course designed specifically for OEF Transition Teams will combine the advantages of training at 29 Palms and MWTC Bridgeport.

Transition Team Training

Transition Teams are currently made up primarily of field grade officers and staff non-commissioned officers. As relatively senior Marines, they require additional skill sets normally executed by more junior Marines in platoon and larger size units. Skills such as tactical vehicle driving and expedient communication equipment repair must be learned. Additionally, refresher training ranging from medevac procedures to artillery call-for-fire must take place. These skills are currently all taught at home station and identified in the Mission Essential Task List as essential skills for Transition Teams. They are taught during a 30-45 day training package by the MEFs. Our plan for the future includes all Transition Teams then deploying to 29 Palms for an intense 24 day course of immersion in both language and culture while executing scenario based training events to improve and hone their skills. Training will include High Risk of Capture (HRC) training, foreign weapons training, IED defeat, and live fire convoy operations. Most importantly, Teams will be trained in how to "Advise" their foreign counterparts to build their host units skills and confidence. They will face daily scenarios in problem solving unique to their advisor missions, whether they be a military, border, or national police Transition Team. Finally

each Team will go through a final assessment of their skills, with the result briefed to their MEF Commander.

The planned curriculum is based on the training requirements directed in the Request for Forces (RFF), experience of units and teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will be refined through a formal process of Lessons Learned to insure currency and relevancy of training to keep pace with the changing mission and environment on the battlefield.

Joint Training Opportunities

During this process TECOM has coordinated with the U.S. Army at Fort Riley, Kansas to find common ground for training opportunities and share best practices. Due to differences in Team sourcing, mission evolution, and service culture, the current Fort Riley program does not fit Marine requirements at present for Transition Team training. However we are exploring the possibilities of sharing training venues for Transition Teams destined for Afghanistan. Lessons learned for Afghan Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) continually stress the importance of training in the mountain environment, and sharing of training sites may show benefits for all.

Conclusion

The Marine Corps continues to adapt to the changing requirements of Transition Team training to insure we provide our Marines the most relevant and demanding training available, not only to enable them to accomplish their mission, but to ensure their survival on the battlefield.

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

MAJOR GENERAL CARTER F. HAM
COMMANDER, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND FORT RILEY
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

2ND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

TRANSITION TEAM TRAINING

7 DECEMBER 2006

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT BY
MAJOR GENERAL CARTER F. HAM
COMMANDER, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND FORT RILEY

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to address the Transition Team training mission at Fort Riley, Kansas.

In June of 2006, the US Army, Air Force and Navy consolidated transition team training at Fort Riley, Kansas in order to standardize training and maximize resources. Through December 2006, 55 transition teams (500 personnel) have trained and deployed to theater from Fort Riley. Additionally, 1400 personnel are in training now and preparing to deploy.

Transition Team training prepares teams to advise, teach, and mentor Iraqi and Afghan security forces. Each team trains at Fort Riley for approximately 60 days. We train Soldiers from Active Duty, the Army Reserve, and National Guard as well as Sailors and Airmen. Training consists of individual Soldier skills, cultural training, advisor skills, and collective tasks. Individual tasks such as weapons proficiency, use of communications equipment, and medical tasks prepare the team members. For more complex unit tasks, we incorporate challenging vignettes in order to build cohesive advisory teams.

Throughout the training period, each team member receives over 50 hours of formal classroom language training conducted by Defense Language Institute instructors. We currently train Dari and Iraqi Arabic and exercise these language skills in daily training tasks. We also incorporate cultural awareness as the teams teach and advise their counterparts (tasks accomplished by role players), supervise training, and instruct on military planning.

Training is modified frequently to meet the constantly changing conditions in theater. Recent changes include updated training of Improvised Explosive Device tactics, the recent introduction of counter-sniper training, and adaptation of tactics, techniques and procedures developed by teams now in country.

From October 2006 to September 2007, the 1st Infantry Division will train approximately 6000 officers and noncommissioned officers. We will train teams of varying sizes and missions, ranging from the standard 11-person Battalion Transition Team to such teams as Garrison Support Units that help Iraqi and Afghan forces establish and operate their own base.

Currently, the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters and the leadership of two combat brigades are dedicated to training these teams with the most recent experience possible. Approximately 75% of the trainers have combat experience, most of which has occurred in the past two years. Each team undergoing training is coached by a permanent officer and noncommissioned officer team. A select number of transition team personnel in theater will redeploy to Fort Riley and become part of this cadre to ensure the most up-to-date tactics and experience are available. In addition, I have one of my two Assistant Division Commanders in theater, serving as the commanding general of the Iraq Assistance Group and providing a critical link between the Transition Team mission in Iraq and the training at Fort Riley.

The training at Fort Riley is vital to our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Soldiers of the 1st Infantry Division are dedicated to fully supporting the combatant commander's mission requirements in both theaters. I look forward to answering your questions and would welcome you or your staff at Fort Riley to see firsthand how we are accomplishing the mission. Thank you.

A STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES J. LOVELACE, JR.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3, UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON THE STATUS AND TRAINING OF MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS FOR OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

December 7th, 2006

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, on behalf of our Secretary, Dr. Francis Harvey, our Chief of Staff, General Pete Schoomaker, and the active and reserve component Soldiers that comprise our Army, thank you for the opportunity to report to you on the status and training of military transition teams for Iraq. Transition teams are critical to the enhancement of security force capability and professionalism, and the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi government. The Army has an enduring commitment to building the Iraqi national security forces while assisting with reconstruction of the country – we will stay as long as necessary, with the forces necessary, to ensure their stability. The bipartisan support of Congress has enabled us to meet the needs of current global operations and to continue to develop the capabilities and capacities required to prevail in the complex 21st Century security environment. Every day our Soldiers in transition teams and elsewhere answer the Call to Duty, serving the Nation in this time of war along with our joint and coalition partners.

To fully understand where we are today with respect to transition teams, one must remember where we began. While I will focus on the chronology of events in Iraq, it is important to highlight that we are making similar progress in Afghanistan also. In May 2003, the Iraqi Army and many other elements of the former state security forces were disbanded and Coalition forces had to begin rebuilding the Iraqi security forces (ISF) from scratch. In June, Coalition Joint Task Force -7 (CJTF-7) stood up the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) headquarters to organize the rebuilding effort and in September CJTF-7 tasked the Joint Special Operation Task Force to train 500 Iraqi commandos as part of the initial effort to create new Iraqi Security Forces. In

the year that followed, CMATT Headquarters continued to grow and provide increasing direction toward building the planned nine light brigades of the new Iraqi Army and rebuilding all of the institutions such as Officer/NCO candidate schools, police academies and other training facilities required to field capable security forces. Concurrently, conventional units were tasked to form the para-military Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) units, usually company-sized or smaller, to assist in providing law and order along side the Iraqi Police. However, the performance of these forces indicated that security force development would require a more deliberate effort and significantly more resources.

In June 2004, CJTF-7 now Multi-National Corps—Iraq (MNC-I) tasked the two rotational divisions, 1st Cavalry and 1st Infantry Division, to form and train two brigades of Iraqi National Guard to replace the ICDC. The conventional forces then became increasingly involved in recruiting, training and mentoring the fledgling Iraqi military and police forces with training teams they provided from within their own ranks, or "out of hide." These conventional forces "partnered" with the ISF units they were building and eventually the US and Iraqi units began to conduct combined operations together. As the size of the ISF grew, so did the size of the force required to train and organize it. In June 2004, MNF-I established Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a higher headquarters to CMATT, and assigned MNSTC-I the overall responsibility for all aspects of building the ISF. By November, the total number of forces committed to ISF training had risen from the 36 original Special Forces Soldiers to over 1100 transition team members sourced predominantly from within the ranks of the units on the ground. These teams performed admirably, but the scope of the

mission and the number of forces required quickly grew beyond what the rotational units could provide using their internal and limited external resources.

In spite of these initial efforts to keep up with the growing demands, the mission required an even larger and more comprehensive effort. To meet this demand, Multi-national Force-Iraq commander, General Casey presented an expanded concept for training Iraqi Security Forces to Secretary of Defense in December 2004. This plan represented a fundamental shift toward substantially increasing the self-reliance of Iraqi security forces and recommended that the size of the Iraqi Army grow from just over three to a total of nine divisions. It also more than doubled the requirements for dedicated trainers to over 2600. Subsequent to this announcement, in February 2005, MNF-I issued a request for the1505 additional forces required to meet this new strategy.

The Army responded quickly to the request for forces from the combatant commander and searched the ranks to find the best qualified individuals available to fill the newly forming transition teams. Meeting this sharply increased manning requirement for these leader-rich teams was a challenge for the Army. The 1505 additional Soldiers requested represented a demand of over five brigade combat teams (BCTs) worth of captains, majors and lieutenant colonels and a host of senior NCOs at a time when we already had over 20 full BCTs committed to Iraq and Afghanistan and 15 more preparing to rotate in. This obviously stressed our personnel system to meet these operational requirements as well as our other global commitments.

Further, training indigenous forces like the ISF is a core competency of our Special Operations Forces, so to expand this capability to our conventional forces, we had to design a training program, training facilities, and resource units to train the trainers.

Building this capability was not without its challenges, but the Army is a learning organization and we continued to adjust the plan as we met and overcame each new obstacle. Within approximately 100 days of the Army's receipt of the increased transition team mission, we had the first group of newly identified transition team members through their 74 day training and transition period and on the ground training Iraqi Forces—a testament to the agility and adaptability of our Army.

During the remainder of 2005, we continued to adjust our training and manning methods to meet the changing requirements placed on us by Theater through the Joint Staff. By October 2005, the Army decided to consolidate the transition team mission under one headquarters and directed Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to develop a concept and implementation plan. FORSCOM recommended that the Army consolidate transition team training at Fort Riley, Kansas and the Army announced its new strategy to the Congress for sourcing transition teams on 28 February, 2006. On June 1st, 2006, 1st Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the training, manning, equipping, deployment, redeployment, and reintegration of organized transition teams preparing to serve in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. These moves placed a two-star commander, his entire staff, and two brigade combat teams' worth of leaders and personnel in charge of executing all efforts to man, train, and equip transition teams. This dedicated training effort led by the great professionals in 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Kansas has been so successful that just last month the 1st ID began training teams for the OEF Theater of operations.

After stateside training under the 1st ID control, all transition teams travel to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility where training continues. The initial stop is at

Camp Buehring, Kuwait for in-theater orientation training. Next they fly to Camp Taji, Iraq, for instruction in the practical application of their skills through case studies and vignettes at the Phoenix Academy – the transition team "finishing school." Following completion of the Phoenix Academy, the teams enter the final and most critical stage of their training – a 10-day overlap with the team they are to replace. This phase is commonly referred to as "RIP TOA" which stands for "relief in place, transfer of authority (RIP/TOA)." A successful RIP TOA is critical to the continuity of the relationship with Iraqi counterparts.

Once transition teams assigned to Iraq arrive in theater, they fall under the administrative control of the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) which oversees all team training and operations. What is unique about this relationship is that while their in-country command structure indicates the teams belong to the IAG, the 1st Infantry Division's Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver commands the IAG and provides the critical link between the transition team mission in Iraq and the training at Fort Riley. The IAG determines team assignments, oversees personnel management in areas such as replacements, evaluations, and awards processing; identifies new equipment requirements and oversees equipment accountability. This arrangement provides for better all around support to the mission, the Soldiers and the Soldier's family than resourcing the teams solely through individual replacements.

The transition teams advise, coach, teach, and mentor Iraqi Security Forces, and provide direct access to Coalition capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical evacuation and intelligence gathering. They also help to develop capabilities of the Security Forces so they become capable of independent, effective security operations.

They also work with their counterparts to enhance the understanding of the rule of law and fundamental human rights. The teams are usually comprised of 11-15 highly qualified senior officers and noncommissioned officers with a wide range of combat and combat support specialties to include: operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, engineering and security. Teams are multi-functional by virtue of their individual fields of experience, and usually have significant combat experience. Teams are provided the tools (communications equipment), the training, and the in-country capability to ensure they are afforded the maximum security possible.

The Army only selects fully qualified officers and NCOs to fill these critical positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience match, balanced with their individual Dwell Time. Resourcing these teams with the right Soldiers is Manning Priority #1 for the Army and we are committed to filling the Transition Team authorizations to 100% by grade and skill set. Assigning officers directly from our premier intermediate education institution to the TT mission is an example of that. The last class to graduate from Ft Leavenworth – 30 officers or 18% of that class – went directly to transition team assignments, vice unit assignments. Of the enlisted Soldiers already in TTs or on orders to team assignments, roughly half have prior deployment experience. Army Human Resources Command is coordinating with TRADOC to recognize these assignments as key developmental positions and we are working to provide incentives for transition team members. One such incentive is giving Soldiers choice of assignment upon return from their deployment, consistent with Army requirements and their professional development needs.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DECEMBER 7, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, more to that point, I know that, for example, when people apply for Special Forces training within our Army, they make a commitment to serve a while longer. When people apply for our nuclear schools in the Navy, they make a commitment to serve a lot longer because we are investing so much in them. This I would think would be sought after in that same way as those two specialties within our forces.

So the question is is there any commitment that comes on the part of the Iraqi to get this kind of training? And if there is, who tracks it?

General LOVELACE. The Iraqi Army is an all-volunteer force. Enlistments are for 3 years. The approximate personnel breakdown is: 7.5% officers; 19.l5% NCOs; and 73% enlisted soldiers.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. On the scale of one to four for Iraqi Security Force readiness assessments, what are the biggest challenges right now preventing units from moving to—from a two rating, where they are operating in the lead with assistance, to a level one, where they are operating completely independently?

General LOVELACE. Logistics and leadership are the biggest challenges facing Iraqi Army units.