

SECRET**PROBLEM**

7. To inform the American people of the problems, issues and U.S. commitments involved in Korea, and their relationship to overall U.S. foreign policy in order to obtain the popular support required to achieve our objectives in Korea.

INFORMATION THEMES

8. Background on Korea as Basis for U.S. Policy.

The effect on Korean people, and the country, of 40 years of Japanese domination should be presented factually. Korean sensibilities must be taken into account by recognizing the fact that they have an extensive cultural and historical background that is their own. It should be stressed at all times that Koreans are a liberated people. They should not be thought of in the same terms as Japan, as a defeated enemy. By living up to our commitments in Korea through the steadfast pursuit of our policy, the United States will be furthering its prestige in the Far East gained by our record in the war and the fact that we have implemented our promise to give the Filipinos their own independent government. It should also be stressed that by living up to our commitments and thus creating an effectively independent Korea, we are contributing to the stability and peace of East Asia which so vitally affects the economic and political welfare of the U.S. In this connection, it may be pointed out that a weak Korea has twice within the past half century been a cause of international conflict.

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9. Liberals. Emphasis should be placed on the encouragement now being given to liberals in South Korea (see paragraph 5b).

10. Korea as a Direct Point of Contact Between the U.S. and the USSR. The U.S. public has a limited interest for Korea as such, although as a phase of U.S.-USSR relations, it attracts attention. The fact that the U.S. intends to carry out its commitments without sacrificing the essential human rights for which it stands should be stressed. Such unilateral action as is being taken by the U.S. in its zone can be presented as constructive steps designed to fulfill Korean desires for a united, independent country. The success of these steps, and the effect of the constant pressure exerted by reason of our presence in Korea, may serve to convince the USSR that they should cooperate with us. It may be shown that our activities in south Korea and ultimate objectives for a unified, democratic Korea will in no way be a danger to the legitimate interests of the USSR in Korea or elsewhere. On the other hand, it may also be shown that vacillation on the part of the U.S. in this respect would have its effect not only in Korea, but in other areas of the Far East, and the rest of the world. Successful negotiations to accomplish the simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops would not in itself assure the unification of the country. In view of the sharply divergent political views in Korea, civil war might result. It is questionable whether Korea could automatically become a democratic and effectively independent nation subsequent to such withdrawal, particularly in view of obvious communist aims in north and south Korea. In addition

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to being a united nation, Korea must not only retain its political integrity, it must be healthy economically and socially before it is really free.

11. Soviet Obstructive Tactics. To effect anti-American propaganda and Soviet obstructive tactics, point up positive factors in U.S. occupation policies designed to fulfill our commitments for a unified, independent Korea. Anti-American propaganda and other obstructive tactics (see Appendix "A") should be treated by asking factual and timely statements, exercising due care not to jeopardize further negotiations. The reasons for the breakdown of negotiations in pursuance to the Moscow Agreement (paragraph 4 above) may be made clear.

12. Trusteeship. The U.S. is committed to the creation of some form of trusteeship over Korea under the U.S., the U.K., the USSR and China for a period of up to five years, unless there is general agreement among the four powers that conditions make this unnecessary. The word, "trusteeship", should be avoided as much as possible, because of the hatred of the Koreans for this word, which was used by the Japanese as a euphemism for their early rule over Korea.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

(Supplementing Existing Programs)

13. Timing. Flow of information should be stepped up immediately in view of Congressional appropriations hearings.

14. Background Conferences (off the record) for media representatives. Suggested participants: top officers of

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the three departments assisted by specialists in political, economic and cultural fields. In these conferences, care should be taken to give possible USSR views and actions (see paragraph 11 and ^{do} Appendix "A") perspective by relating them to facts, and to interpret these facts in the light of U.S. objectives and policy.

15. Prepared Press Conferences in which top officers of the three Departments, assisted by specialists, present material on specific developments affecting Korea. Transcripts could be worked into background summaries and given wider circulation to editors, writers, and commentators.

16. Possible Speech by General MacArthur. General MacArthur's public statements have had a profound influence on U.S. public opinion. A speech by him, perhaps in connection with a visit to Korea, would draw U.S. attention to Korea and bring popular support to current U.S. policies and objectives in Korea.

17. Speeches by Top Policy Officers and Specialists. Appropriate times and places should be selected when top officers of the three departments (State, War, Navy) and U.S. officials returning from Korea might cover current developments in Korea. Discussion and community groups should be encouraged to discuss Korea, and specialists should be provided by the departments, upon request, to contribute material on their particular fields.

18. Background Summary. War Department to furnish writer. Summary should include information on historical and cultural background of Korea. (See paragraph 10 above.)

19. Documentary Film: War Department has requested the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, to have filmed a

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minimum of 5000 feet of documentary motion pictures on the occupation of Korea. It is understood that upon receipt, this film will be reviewed and releasable footage will be offered to civilian motion picture agencies and private discussion groups.

20. Exclusive Interviews. Series of exclusive interviews on different aspects of Korean problem arranged for influential columnists with selected officials returning from Korea, as soon as they arrive.

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SECRET**SECRET****APPENDIX "A"****EXPECTED COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA**

1. The project of educating the U.S. people on the necessity of achieving U.S. objectives in Korea will encounter considerable opposition from Communist, and directly or indirectly Communist-inspired, propaganda. This propaganda, already active, may be expected to devote maximum attention to efforts to curtail Congressional appropriations for Korea. It will exploit, magnify or create the following and other considerations in an effort to confuse American thinking with regard to Korea:
- a. The proximity of Korea to the Soviet Maritime Provinces proves that the security of the U.S.S.R. is more directly involved in Korea than is that of the U.S.;
 - b. The direct clash of interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Korea is of such a nature as to create incidents and tension which may eventually generate a new world war;
 - c. No progress towards real independence for Korea can be expected until both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. withdraw from Korea;
 - d. The U.S. occupation of Korea is an imperialist venture supported by self-seeking U.S. capitalists;
 - e. The cost of U.S. occupations throughout the world is a vast and unwarranted burden on the U.S. taxpayer, the reduction of which should immediately be initiated in Korea, the least important area occupied by U.S. forces;
 - f. Unless the current stupendous military budget of the U.S. is cut drastically other nations may doubt our peaceful intentions; cutting occupation costs, particularly in Korea, will help reduce the size of that budget and consequently reassure the other nations of the world;

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g. The U.S. occupation of southern Korea has failed, particularly in comparison with the successful results of Soviet occupation of northern Korea; proof is contained in such factors as:

- (1) Inability to obtain the high-caliber personnel necessary to carry out our occupation policies,
- (2) Poor handling of riots in south Korea,
- (3) Preferential treatment of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans,
- (4) Lack of social reform in south Korea,
- (5) Occupation personnel, and policies instituted by them, favor the wealthy classes and discriminate against the poor,
- (6) U.S. occupation authorities have, for selfish reasons, backed expatriate reactionaries against progressive native liberals in the struggle for political power,
- (7) Lack of results in negotiations with the U.S.S.R.,
- (8) Instances of misbehavior of U.S. troops,
- (9) Lack of progress in economic affairs in south Korea, resulting in greater hardship than at any time under Japanese rule,
- (10) Poor handling of "trusteeship" question.

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SECRETCOPY NO. 7FPI 2/115 January 1947SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATIONPUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM ON
KOREAN OCCUPATION POLICYSITUATION

1. U.S. policy towards Korea is based on the following basic objectives: (1) To establish a self-governing sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations; (2) to insure that the national government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent, democratic state.

2. Korea is at present a country occupied by the Armies of the United States in the south and the USSR in the north. However, the United States, United Kingdom, China and the USSR are committed to the eventual independence of Korea. On December 1, 1943, the United States, United Kingdom and China in the Cairo Declaration stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent". The same powers in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 declared that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out. In its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the USSR joined in the Potsdam Declaration.

3. In an attempt to clarify the procedures to be followed in carrying out their earlier commitments, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, USSR and Great Britain met in Moscow in December, 1945. An agreement on Korea was reached

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(See Appendix "G") to which China subsequently subscribed.

4. It has so far been impossible to proceed with setting up a Korean Provisional Government and with the other measures indicated by the Moscow Agreement, negotiations of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission having broken down because of the Soviet stand that a limited number of Koreans should be consulted; and in the final analysis, only those Koreans favorable to the USSR (see Appendix "A"). Since May 8 when the Joint Commission adjourned sine die the U.S. Command in Korea has taken the initiative on several occasions to press the Soviet Command for resumption of negotiations on a basis not inimical to essential individual rights.

5. Divergent policies pursued by the occupying forces of the United States and the USSR have served to create in Korea an intensification of the division of that country during the past 17 months.

In the Soviet occupied zone of Korea, "people's committees" have been formed under the supervision of the "interim people's committee of north Korea". These committees have subordinated to themselves all other political parties or organizations insofar as their influence is felt in the administration of the area. Soviet direction of the committees is complete, and "elections" held in the north during September, 1946 reveal an unreal unanimity of opinion by Koreans residing in the Soviet zone. The Soviet political pattern as developed in other countries has been followed in the north.

In the American occupied zone, a military governor, who is a U.S. Army officer on the Staff of the U.S. Commander, U.S. Military personnel, and Korean employees, constitute the

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U.S. Military Government in control of the governmental structure. Emphasis is being placed upon the treatment of Koreans as a liberated people, and measures are being adopted which provide for Korean participation in forward looking programs in political, economic and cultural affairs. An interim legislative assembly for south Korea was convened December 12, 1946 which is designed to give expression to Korean views and aspirations. Criticism from within south Korea, and from abroad, levelled against the U.S. Command (see Appendix "B") has been met by the increased emphasis upon Korean participation, and responsibility for their own affairs. The Command in Korea has made it clear at all times that, while encouraging legitimate Korean aspirations for their own government, the Command does not intend to shirk its responsibilities as chief executive or transfer its executive power to any other agency until a provisional government of unified Korea is formed.

6. Unless the U.S. people, and consequently Congress, support present U.S. policy and programs for Korea, it will not be possible to obtain the funds on which the programs depend. The success or failure of U.S. policy towards Korea thus appears to depend, in large part, on informing the U.S. people of the issues involved.

PROBLEM

7. To inform the American people of U.S. commitments on Korea, the reasons for them, and the importance to general U.S. policy that these commitments be fulfilled in order to obtain Congressional support required to achieve our objectives in Korea.

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INFORMATION THEMES

8. Background on Korea as Basis for U.S. Policy The effect on Korean people, and the country, of 40 years of Japanese domination should be presented factually. Korean sensibilities must be taken into account by recognizing the fact that they have an extensive cultural and historical background that is their own. It should be stressed at all times that Koreans are a liberated people. They should not be thought of in the same terms as Japan, as a defeated enemy. By living up to our commitments in Korea through the steadfast pursuit of our policy, the United States will be furthering its prestige in the Far East gained by our record in the war and the fact that we have implemented our promise to give the Filipinos their own independent government. It should also be stressed that by living up to our commitments and thus creating an effectively independent Korea which will not in the future, as it has in the past, be a cause for international rivalry, we are contributing to the stability and peace of East Asia which so vitally affects the economic and political welfare of the U.S.

9. Korea as a Direct Point of Contact Between the U.S. and the USSR. U.S. and USSR commitments on Korea are certain and definite. The U.S. public has a limited interest for Korea as such, although as a phase of U.S.-USSR relations, it attracts attention. The fact that the U.S. intends to carry out its commitments without sacrificing the essential human rights for which it stands should be stressed. Such unilateral action as is being taken by the U.S. in its zone can be presented as constructive steps designed to fulfill Korean desires for a united, independent country. The success of these steps, and the effect of the

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constant pressure exerted by reason of our presence in Korea, may serve to convince the USSR that they should cooperate with us. It may be shown that vacillation on the part of the U.S. in this respect would have its effect not only in Korea, but in other areas of the Far East, and the rest of the world. Soviet anti-American propaganda (see Appendix "B") should be exposed by factual and timely statements taking the following into account where practicable: We have no assurance that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from southern Korea would mean the withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Korea and a consequent unification of the country. And even if it would, it is questionable whether Korea would automatically become a democratic and effectively independent nation. In addition to being a united nation, Korea must be healthy economically and socially before it is really free. A country faced with starvation cannot build either independence or freedom. A country 60% illiterate, as Korea was left by the Japs, is not fertile ground for the seeds of democracy. A country which for 35 years has been practically a slave country, the very years in which the rest of the world was making the most progress in technological development and new social and governmental procedures, cannot suddenly come out of bondage and overnight become, solely by its own efforts, a democratic, free and independent nation in any real sense of these words. We must help the Korean people far enough along the road so that when we leave they can stand alone and be required to ask favors of no one. This need not take an undue time. Our military government people report they have found the Korean people generally to be intelligent, hardworking and anxious to learn.

SECRETINFORMATION OPERATIONS

(Supplementing Existing State Department Program)

10. Timing Flow of information should be stepped up immediately in view of Congressional appropriations hearings.
11. Background Conferences (off the record). For media representatives. Suggested participants: Assistant Secretaries Hilldring and Peterson assisted by specialists in political, economic and social fields. In these conferences, care should be taken to give possible USSR views and actions (see Appendix "B") perspective by relating them to facts, and to interpret these facts in the light of U.S. objectives and policy.
12. Prepared Press Conferences in which the Secretary or Under Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary Hilldring, assisted by specialists, present material on specific developments affecting Korea. Transcripts could be worked into background summaries and given wider circulation to editors, writers and commentators.
13. Speeches by Top Policy Officers and Specialists. Appropriate times and places should be selected when Assistant Secretaries Hilldring and Peterson, Mr. Vincent and U.S. officials returning from Korea might cover current developments in Korea. Discussion and community groups should be encouraged to discuss Korea, and specialists should be provided by the Department, upon request, to contribute material on their particular fields. Suggested speakers: Mr. Hugh Borton, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. John E. Williams and Mr. Frank Schuler.
14. Background Summary War Department to furnish writer. Summary should include some information on historical and cultural background of Korea. (See paragraph 10 above).

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15. Documentary Film War Department and State Department will consult on possible approaches to March of Time to see whether they would be interested in doing a film on Korea similar to one that it is understood they are doing on Germany. The two Departments will also consult in working out arrangements for a documentary length film.

16. Special Trip of Writers to Korea A trip of editors and publishers to Korea is being planned. The group will leave for Korea on the 17th of January.

17. Exclusive Interviews Series of exclusive interviews on different aspects of Korean problem arranged for influential columnists with selected officials returning from Korea, as soon as they arrive.

SECRETAPPENDIX "A"REASON FOR BREAKDOWN OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. NEGOTIATIONS

On March 20, 1946, the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission provided for in the Moscow Agreement met for the first time. It was the U.S. view that the formulation of plans for the creation of a provisional Korean Government was the first and most pressing task before the Commission.

From the beginning the Soviet position was that the Provisional Korean Government would be formed after consultation with only those political parties and social organizations fully in favor of the Moscow Agreement including its provisions for a trusteeship for Korea. The Soviet position would have had the effect of excluding from consultation all parties save the Communist party and its fellow travelers, even though, until indoctrinated with the "party line", Communists in south Korea, like those in the north, initially opposed trusteeship. The Joint Commission finally agreed that it would consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which were truly democratic in their aims and methods and which would cooperate with the Joint Commission in carrying out the aims of the Moscow Agreement.

The Soviet delegation then insisted that if any of these Korean parties were represented by any individuals who had expressed opposition to the Moscow Agreement, and particularly to the provision for trusteeship, these individuals should be declared ineligible for consultation with the Joint Commission. The United States delegation did not accept this proposal on

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Appendix "A"

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the ground that such an exclusion would constitute a violation of the principle of the freedom of speech. As it became evident that no progress could be made, the Commission adjourned sine die on May 8th.

The U.S. Command has taken the initiative and on several occasions pressed the Soviet Command for resumption of negotiations on a basis not inimical to essential individual rights.

SECRET**APPENDIX "B"****EXPECTED COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA**

1. The project of educating the U.S. people on the necessity of achieving U.S. objectives in Korea will encounter considerable opposition from Communist, and directly or indirectly Communist-inspired, propaganda. This propaganda, already active, may be expected to devote maximum attention to efforts to curtail Congressional appropriations for Korea. It will exploit, magnify or create the following and other considerations in an effort to confuse American thinking with regard to Korea:

a. The proximity of Korea to the Soviet Maritime Provinces proves that the security of the U.S.S.R. is more directly involved in Korea than is that of the U.S.;

b. The direct clash of interests of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in Korea is of such a nature as to create incidents and tension which may eventually generate a new world war;

c. No progress towards real independence for Korea can be expected until both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. withdraw from Korea;

d. The U.S. occupation of Korea is an imperialist venture supported by self-seeking U.S. capitalists;

e. The cost of U.S. occupations throughout the world is a vast and unwarranted burden on the U.S. taxpayer, the reduction of which should immediately be initiated in Korea, the least important area occupied by U.S. forces;

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f. Unless the current stupendous military budget of the U.S. is cut drastically other nations may doubt our peaceful intentions; cutting occupation costs, particularly in Korea, will help reduce the size of that budget and consequently reassure the other nations of the world;

g. The U.S. occupation of southern Korea has failed, particularly in comparison with the successful results of Soviet occupation of northern Korea; proof is contained in such factors as:

(1) Inability to obtain the high-caliber personnel necessary to carry out our occupation policies,

(2) Poor handling of riots in south Korea,

(3) Preferential treatment of Japanese and pro-Japanese Koreans,

(4) Lack of social reform in south Korea,

(5) Occupation personnel, and policies instituted by them, favor the wealthy classes and discriminate against the poor,

(6) U.S. occupation authorities have, for selfish reasons, backed expatriate reactionaries against progressive native liberals in the struggle for political power,

(7) Lack of results in negotiations with the U.S.S.R.,

(8) Instances of misbehavior of U.S. troops,

(9) Lack of progress in economic affairs in south Korea, resulting in greater hardship than at any time under Japanese rule,

(10) Poor handling of "trusteeship" question.

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APPENDIX "C"

MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS

DECEMBER 27, 1946

KOREA

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean Government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a joint commission consisting of representatives of the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean Democratic Government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people

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the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea.

The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.

4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States Command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.