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INTERROGATION No. 488

PLACE: TOKYO

DATE: 27 Nov. 45

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Mil. Analysis Division.

SUBJECT: Japanese Army activities in China, Manchuria, and the Pacific

Persons Interrogated and Background:

General UMEZU Yoshihiro, Chief of Army Staff - Graduated Military Academy 1904, Army Staff college 1911. Participated Russo-Japanese War. Served as chief, military affairs section, War Ministry (1928), Director, general affairs bureau, Army general staff (1931-32); Vice minister of war (1936-38); Ambassador to Manchukuo (1939-44); appointed chief of Army general staff and ex-officio member of supreme Military Council 19 July 1944. Commanded troops in north China 1934-35, 1938; in Manchuria 1939; Cinc. Kwantung Army 1939-44.

Where Interrogated: Ministry of War.

Interrogator: Col Ramsay D POTTS, A C

Interpreter: Mr. IWAMOTO, a Japanese National

Allied Officer Present: Captain Dow PARKES, MI

COMMENT

It is the opinion of the interrogator and of the Allied officer accompanying him that General UMEZU during this interview made statements designed to whitewash the Japanese Army and to protect it from criticism. It is suggested that his statements be examined critically and that they be treated with reserve unless confirmed by reliable sources.

SUMMARY

1. Japanese operations in China: At the beginning of the Hostilities in China it was the objective of the Japanese Government to localize the operations and to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Chinese. In the Japanese Army and among Japanese civilians there were two groups, one supporting this view and the other opposing it; those opposed the idea insisted that it was time to strike a crippling, punitive blow against the Chinese. In the general excitement one thing led to another and the situation finally developed into a full-scale war. From the beginning of the hostilities until the end of the war Japanese forces in China were controlled by orders from Imperial GHQ in Tokyo.

2. Japanese Activities in Manchuria: The Nomonhan incident was caused by a local misunderstanding with regard to the location of the border line. A small Soviet force entered what the Japanese regarded as Japanese territory and Japanese troops therefore repulsed the Soviet troops. The Soviets then brought up reinforcements; in consequence of this, the Japanese troops in the area also were strengthened. These successive increases continued until the situation assumed serious proportions. Due to the fact that both the Soviet Gov't and the Japanese Gov't wished the fighting stopped, a peaceful settlement was negotiated in Moscow.

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The Soviet willingness to negotiate the settlement was due to the tension in Europe; the Japanese desire to end the battle was due to the government's wish to avoid a full-scale war with Russia. After the Nomohan incident the Soviets increased their forces in the area bordering Manchuria, and the Japanese made parallel increase until a peak Japanese strength of 700,000-800,000 troops was reached in 1942. However, at no time did the Japanese make plans to attack the Soviets. The Japanese Gov't repeatedly ordered Japanese troops in Manchuria to keep peace. The Kwantung Army was not independent but acted under orders from Tokyo. When the War situation in the Pacific became critical, the cream of Kwantung's army troops and weapons were withdrawn from Manchuria and dispatched to areas threatened by U.S. invasion. It was due to these withdrawals that the Japanese were unable to resist successfully the Soviet sweep through Manchuria.

3. Japanese Operations in the Pacific: The loss of the Marianas was serious to Japan because it exposed the home islands to direct air and sea attack. The loss of the Philippines was crippling to Japan because it served her sea route to the occupied areas in the south. In the Philippines the Japanese intended to hold their own, but not to fight a final decisive battle. The Japanese failure to hold the Philippines was due to insufficient land, sea, and air strength in the area.

4. Japanese Army-Navy Relationship: The Japanese Army and Navy, realizing that an all-out war was against the United States and Great Britain necessitated full cooperation of both services, made joint operational plans for both attack and defense during the course of the war. The military influence of both services was equal.

5. Japanese Army Plans for Ending the War: The Japanese Army High Command was in favor of ending the war, but it kept making all-out preparations up to the very end because it felt that such preparations would strengthen the hand of the Japanese when negotiations were opened. It was hoped that some local military success would be achieved and that subsequent to it a proposal to end further fighting could be made. However, no opening of this sort occurred. Finally the Emperor decided to stop hostilities. Had he not made this decision and had the war continued, the army would have expanded its underground aircraft factories, increased its aerial defense, and continued preparing for invasion and would have fought until the endurance of the people was exhausted.

Q. What were the objectives of the Army in China in the early stage of the war with China after the first incident there?

A. At the outset of hostilities the Japanese Gov't intended not to increase the magnitude of the operation, but to limit it to local warfare; as a result the Japanese Army tried to enter into negotiations with the Chinese local authorities so as to limit operations as much as possible.

Q. Why were the Japanese unable to limit the operations?

A. At the time, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. TASHU, tried seriously to localize the hostilities. The military operations were under the charge of his Chief of Staff and the Staff Officers. There were two factions in the Army, one mild and the other radical. The radical group proposed that a blow be dealt with the idea of punishing Chinese troops, who had been insolent toward Japanese troops and Japanese nationals for a considerable length of time. The mild faction were willing to adopt a course of action which would lead to mitigation of the hostilities. Lt. Gen. TASHU belonged to the radical group; he was in favor of serious punishment. Later on a commander-in-chief was sent to replace him.

Q. Who was the New Commander-in-Chief?

A. Lt. General KAZUKI.

Q. What date was this?

A. It was in 1937 when the general excitement was at its tensest.

Q. With respect to the situation in China, what was the policy of the gov't here in Japan?

A. The Japanese gov't as a whole was against increasing the scale of warfare also was on the side of the mitigating situation. Among the Japanese Nationals there were two factions, one believing that a blow should be dealt, the other holding that the anti-Japanese sentiment by the Chinese would never be mitigated by the use of armed forces, but should be mitigated by increasing friendship. In the first place, the gov't was united on the policy of localizing hostilities, but the general excitement and development of things just pushed one thing led to another.

Q. What was your mission when you went to North China in 1938?

A. When I went to China, the north China Army, commanding the 1st Army and the 2nd Army, was stationed there. Lt. Gen. KAZUKI was CG of the 1st Army. I was sent there to replace him when he became CG of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Were you sent in purely military capacity?

A. I was sent as a purely military, not a political commander.

Q. What were you charged with doing with your troops?

A. When I was dispatched to North China, the Japanese Army in Northern China was holding a front along the Yellow River, and I was supposed to secure this line. While I was there I had no orders to advance, so I practically remained within this line.

Q. Did all of the orders to conduct operations come from Tokyo or did they sometimes come as a result of independent decisions on the part of Army Commanders in China?

A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in Northern China received orders from Tokyo; then he would issue orders to me,

Q. Did that condition hold in China all the way through the War until 1945.

A. Yes, When the China expeditionary Army was established in Aug 39, it received orders from Tokyo and relayed them to its subsidiary commands.

Q. Were the actions of the Japanese Army in China always controlled by orders from Tokyo?

A. Theoretically, I suppose, that is true.

Q. Then whatever operations that were conducted in China could essentially be said to be the responsibility of Imperial GHQ?

A. Yes.

Q. During the period when you were in China what was the connection between the troops in Manchuria and the troops in China, especially North China?

A. There was no direct connection between the two groups, although they were stationed in adjacent areas.

Q. Were they independent commands?

A. Yes.

Q. When were you appointed commander of the Kwantung Army?

A. September, 1939.

Q. What was your objective during the period you commanded the Kwantung Army?

A. My main mission, for five years, was to keep order and peace. First I was charged with stopping the hostilities in the Nomonhan area. Later a neutrality pact was signed between the two countries. I adhered to the provisions of the treaty and for five years I obtained my objective.

Q. How did the Nomonhan hostilities begin?

A. At first, perhaps one company of Soviet troops invaded our territory over the Manchurian border line, and, I think, perhaps the border line was not quite a clear in the Soviet's mind; where we thought the Japanese border line was, was not, according to the understanding of the Soviets, the correct border line. The Japanese had repulsed them, using two companies, then the Soviets commenced to use more and more forces, and we would oppose them with greater forces, and soon. Then perhaps, they must have sent a report to the gov't of Tokyo when those incidents took place. The Japanese gov't thought, perhaps, the borderline should be guarded, but as the situation went on, and more and more forces were employed, it was the Japanese gov't intention to stop it, and for this reason I was sent to Manchuria to stop it, localize it.

Q. Were the Russian ground troops better equipped and were they better fighters than the Japanese had anticipated?

A. The Soviet forces sent through large numbers and the Japanese increased their numbers too, of course; but my own opinion is that I could not say that the Soviets had superior equipment; however, they had excellent equipment and their morale was high, but not to the degree that the Japanese could not cope with them, but rather, if Japan should increase her forces gradually, the scale of battle there would increase until there would be full-scale war between the Soviets and Japan, and this would be improper.

Q. Were the Russian troops good fighting troops?

A. Very good troops.

Q. Were the Russian Air Forces as good or better than expected?

A. The air forces I thought very good, but not to the extent that the Japanese could not cope with them. The reason that hostilities were stopped is that, while we were engaged with the Chinese, to fight with the Soviets would be too difficult.

Q. Did Japan have any intention at this time of going to war with Russia? If it had been found in the actions that Russia was very weak, would the Japanese have continued the operation?

A. I was in China at the time. I received an order to go to Manchuria and I left the next day, so I do not know for sure the intention of the Japanese gov't. However, I think that if the Japanese had been temporarily successful in pushing forward, still the Soviets would have brought up greater forces, and it is my belief that the Japanese gov't thought that it was not wise to spread the incident any further and to fight a full-scale war with the Soviets. I was of the same opinion and that was the reason, when I received the instructions, I went right ahead and did my best to stop the hostilities.

Q. As a result of the battle of Nomonhan, did the Army make any change in its tactics, either on the ground or in the air?

A. I think that the Japanese Army learned only minor tactical points, such as the use of artillery (because the Soviet artillery forces were quite superior) and the replacement of supply. Japan felt that her tactics should not be changed.

Q. Did Japan feel that her use of airplanes there had been handled as well as could be expected?

A. I remember that both sides did not use Air Forces to the extent that influenced in any considerable way the development of warfare.

Q. Do you have the figures on the losses of ground troops, artillery pieces, and airplanes during the period of fighting there?

A. I do not have it at present, but I think that the figures are available.

NOTE: A request was made of Gen. UMEZU at this time to obtain, if possible, figures representing losses for both sides, Japanese and Russians in personnel, artillery and aircraft, during the course of the battle and also on the total quantities of each involved.

Q. Was the Nomonhan incident governed in any way the tension in Europe at that time?

A. I think that the thoughts of the Government were thoroughly concentrated upon stopping this incident as soon as possible rather than to create any disturbance.

Q. Did the events in Europe in any way effect this decision?

A. My personal opinion is that the Soviet agreement to close the incident was due to the European tension.

Q. At the time you arrived on the scene, what was the nature of the situation and how long did it take you to effect a solution to the problem.

A. When I reached Manchuria, the instructions the Japanese gov't gave to the commanders on the spot was to stop hostilities and so hostilities had ceased before my arrival. What I actually did was to withdraw Japanese forces away from the Russian line, and the Russian did the same thing. I arrived there on the 8th and about the 17th or 18th it was completed. I want to add to that that the truce itself was conducted in Moscow.

R E S T R I C T E D

Interrogation No. 488. (contd)

Q. Did you deal directly with the commanding gen. of the Russian Forces?
A. The armistice between the two commanders was done on the spot.

Q. Where were the actual terms of the settlement drawn up?
A. The truce was made in diplomatic circles in Moscow.

Q. Do you have any papers which describe the battle in detail or operational orders that were issued to the troops before you took command?
A. Those documents must have been kept in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army and I personally do not what happened to them.

Q. The Gen. was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army for a long period. During this time did the Kwantung Army always take orders from Imperial GHQ in Tokyo?
A. Yes.

Q. It was thought at one time that the Kwantung Army was acting independently; in other words, without orders from Tokyo. Can you tell me if this was true during any period, even though it may have been for just a very short period?

A. Theoretically, at no time did the Kwantung Army act independently from Imperial Headquarters. However, before I was made Commander-in-Chief there were some periods, some occasions, or something that gave the impression that the Kwantung Army was independent of Imperial Hqs. While I was in command I tried not to give even an impression of this sort to foreign countries. I believe firmly that my efforts to hold my junior commanders in a tight grasp so that they would not run amok, were successful during my tenure.

Q. It was thought at one time that the Kwantung Army was going to be the nucleus of an independent Manchurian Army. Can you tell me what basis there is in fact for this belief?

A. I don't think that there was anything like that. There was more probability, if anything should happen, that trouble would be caused along the border of Manchuria, so I always wanted to better the equipment of the Kwantung Army, or if possible, to increase its numerical strength, but I could not carry out my wishes.

Q. During the entire period of your office as Commander of the Kwantung Army, did the Russians have very large forces deployed along the Border?

A. As the Soviets increased their forces along the Border the Japanese had to increase their forces; it was just a gradual, successive increase on both sides taking place, and the increase of personnel in the Kwantung Army was really motivated by the increases on the Russian side.

Q. What peak strength did the Kwantung Army attain--the largest number of soldiers that it ever had under its command?

A. The peak reached was between 700,000 to 800,000.

Q. At what time?

A. Nineteen forty-two.

R E S T R I C T E D

Q. Can you get for us the battle order, disposition and strength of the Kwantung Army during the various years of the war from 1939 through 45?
A. (General UMEZU replied affirmatively.)

Q. During the buildup along the border, was the Kwantung Army used as a training organization for new troops which were sent over from Japan in exchange for more experienced troops to be put in battle areas?

A. The new recruits of three or four months training at home were sent to Manchukuo, and there received further training, while the mature soldiers were sent back home. This system continued from the time of my arrival there up to the time I became Chief of Staff. Toward the end of my tenure of duty, some raw recruits were sent to Manchuria and trained from the beginning, but not all the time.

Q. As well as indicating strength of the troops in Manchuria, will you indicate also the time when the new ones came in and the more experienced ones were sent out and where they were dispatched to?

A. Since these movements were complicated, I do not have certain figures but I can get the information for you.

Q. When Germany was making progress in her war with Russia during 1940 and 1941, did the Kwantung Army at any time consider an invasion of Siberia?

A. It was the intention of the Japanese gov't to adhere strictly to the neutrality pact between the two countries. I was in agreement with this idea.

Q. Did the Third area army in Eastern Manchuria construct an attack line north of Hunchun which was contemplated to be used for an attack on VLADIVOSTOK?

A. I deny any such intention or plan.

Q. Were there certain elements in the Japanese Army who favored an attack on Russia while Russia was involved in the war with Germany?

A. There may have been some who harbored privately such a desire or plan; however, I have not heard that they have any vent to their desire or made any move to this effect.

Q. Did Germany at any time to your knowledge urge Japan to attack Russia?

A. I think it was possible that the Germans wanted Japan to attack Russia, but I really did not hear anything about it. What I mean is that the Japanese Ambassador to Germany may have received some such urge on the part of the Germans.

Q. Were those urges ever communicated to you or to the Kwantung Army?

A. During the tenure of my duty as the Commander in Chief there, I had occasions to come back to Tokyo; however I never received any instructions to take any aggressive attitude towards the Soviets, and in fact I received personal instructions--letters--strong, emphatic messages--from the Emperor to keep the border quite and peaceful and not to assume any aggressive attitude.

Q. The Emperor gave you those instructions personally?

A. Yes.

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Q. Did he give these instructions periodically or at a particular time?

A. When I reported to the Throne the conditions in Manchukuo, the Emperor personally gave me instructions; and when the Chief of Staff received instructions (the Emperor told him to keep peace on the border) and the Chief of Staff relayed this command to me.

Q. At what time were you given those instructions?

A. Throughout the tenure of my duty I received such instructions directly or indirectly; particularly three months after my assuming the post there, I came back to Tokyo to report to the throne about the termination of the Nomonhan incident. The Emperor told me to keep peace. When I came back here and was relieved of my duty, the Emperor told me emphatically to maintain peace in Manchuria, and I relayed the Emperor's orders to the commander there.

Q. Then was that the policy from the time you became Commander in Chief until you came back to Tokyo in 1944? During this whole period was it the firm policy to maintain peace on this border?

A. I firmly believe, and I can give my word, that this was the fixed policy of the Japanese government.

Q. Why then was it necessary to have 700,000 to 800,000 troops there?

A. It was my opinion that only balanced armed forces can maintain actual peace. The Soviets increased their forces, so Japan had to increase her forces.

Q. Was the increase of Japanese Forces in Manchuria always caused by an increase on the part of the Russian Forces?

A. Roughly speaking, this was the case.

Q. Later during the war, in 1943 and in 1944, when it became apparent that the Japanese needed more troops in certain areas--New Guinea, Solomons etc.--why didn't you shift some of the troops from Manchuria to these areas to fight American troops?

A. At first, there were troops enough in the mainland to cover the needs, but toward the end the Kwantung Army did dispatch troops to the south.

Q. Was the Kwantung Army prevented from sending troops into these areas, because of a lack of troops transport at any time?

A. First of all, it took time to send Kwantung troops down to the south. They would have to board ships at Dairen or Fusan and then sail south, and it was shorter and easier to send troops from elsewhere. The second reason was that anything might happen to the border, even if Japan had no intention of aggression against the Soviets, so I tried to maintain the forces in Manchuria as much as possible until the critical period was reached.

Q. Was the Kwantung Army ever ordered to send troops into the south that they did not send?

A. Absolutely not; they were always sent. While I was Commander-in-Chief there, in any small affairs I strictly adhered to the orders of the Imperial GHQ.

Q. Right down to the smallest detail, then, you were under the control of Tokyo?

A. Yes, I particularly guarded myself against giving an impression that the Kwantung Army ran amok, because in the past there was some rumor or impressions given to the foreign to this effect.

- Q. From mid-1944 on, a large number of divisions, the best in the Japanese Army, were sent from Manchuria to the Ryukus, Philippines, Formosa and Japan. What policy change was involved in the decision to withdraw these divisions from Manchuria?
- A. I just followed instructions by the Japanese Government and I was aware that the sending of the pick of the soldiers down there would weaken the position of the Kwantung Army. However, I understood that there must have been some necessity to do this, so I sent my troops as ordered.
- Q. At the end of this time what was the strength left in Manchuria?
- A. I am not very certain as to the figures, but perhaps a little less than half a million, and I tried to recruit among the Japanese residents in Manchuria to replenish the troops. Perhaps not so much the personnel strength was weakened as the armaments--and this was the reason that the Kwantung Army could not resist the Soviet push at the last stage of hostilities.
- Q. To return briefly to the China affair, we have been told that the policy of Japan in China was to constantly seek for some diplomatic political solution by making offers to Chiang Kai Shek to get him to cooperate with Japan under which arrangement hostilities could be called off, can the General give me some background on this? Is this true? Was that always the policy in China and if you have any knowledge of negotiations that were conducted with Chiang Kai Shek?
- A. I really don't have any certain knowledge concerning this, but I heard through private channels that the negotiations were being continued.
- Q. Can you tell me who in the High Command, either military or diplomatic circles, would know about the negotiations that were attended and the plan that was intended to be followed with regard to the China incident throughout the entire course of the war?
- A. The Prime Minister and/or Foreign Minister, I think were the persons who would conduct these.
- Q. Then would TOJO know about the negotiations during this period?
- A. During the period when he was Premier, I understood that he was to do it personally, so he must know. I feel this way: that some Chinese would come over saying that he was the personal envoy of Chiang-Kai-Shek; however, it may have not been so, and the Japanese may have not been holding negotiations with the Chinese, and they may not have reached the Japanese.
- Q. In the period prior to operations against the United States, almost all of the Japanese military successes were army success. Does the General know whether this caused any envy in the Japanese Naval circles because they weren't in the limelight quite as much as the army?
- A. During the China incident I think the Navy took an active part in the incident, so I do not think there was any reason why the Navy should envy the Army's success or anything like that.
- Q. Were the plans that were laid in 1940 and 1941 to attack the United States whole-heartedly concurred in by both Army and the Navy?
- A. I cannot give a very definite opinion on this because I was in Manchuria. However I understood that both the Navy and Army were in agreement in drawing up the plan for the assault and also in conducting the actual operations. The army and navy were in realization that this was the difficult part of the war, so I think they must have been in accord beforehand in planning and operating.

- Q. Was the Navy perhaps pushed into operations by the stronger political influence of the Army?
- A. I think that both services had equal amount of authority, so that actuality neither command or influence over the other, so in conducting this all-out difficult war they must have been in accord.
- Q. In other words, a national operation of this magnitude had to be wholeheartedly concurred in by both Army and Navy?
- A. That is my opinion.
- Q. Why does the general say that the political influence of the two services was approximately equal?
- A. When I made that statement I was thinking about the military influence of both services--and there may be some persons who think that perhaps TOJO coming from the Army and still Premier, perhaps the Army had more political influence than the Navy, but I was not really thinking that when I made the previous statement--I was thinking of the Military authority. When they had to make joint decisions, the Naval was precisely equal.
- Q. I have noticed that the Grand Chamberlains and the various close advisors of the Emperor usually are Naval People. Would this tend to balance the political influence that the Army had during this period?
- A. I never thought of it myself, and I cannot say anything more.
- Q. I'd like to go now to a discussion of the period during which you were the Chief of Staff of the Army: Will you give us a description of the background of your appointment--who appointed you, why you were appointed, and what objective you were given assuming office?
- A. The appointment of the Personnel of the higher rank officers was done by the War minister and the Inspector-General of Army education; they consult with each other and then make an appointment. They never ask beforehand the opinion of the appointee, so that I just received the cable to come for the purpose of assuming the post of Chief of General Staff.
- Q. Does the Prime Minister have a hand in making this appointment?
- A. Theoretically the appointment should have no relations with the Prime Minister, but General TOJO was the Prime Minister then, so he knew of my appointment. On my trip back home, TOJO resigned as Prime Minister.
- Q. Were you appointed before General TOJO resigned?
- A. I received a telegram to come back and was summoned to Tokyo for assuming the post; my official appointment had not taken place. When I reached Tokyo I discovered that Premier TOJO had tendered his resignation; but while it was being tendered, he (TOJO) carried on with his duties.
- Q. In other words he had tendered his resignation but it had not been accepted at this time?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When you assumed the post of Chief of General Staff did the War Minister give you certain objectives?
- A. I received no instructions from the War Minister.

- Q. Did the Emperor give you any special instructions?
 A. No specific instructions were given to me by the Emperor either.
- Q. When you took over this position, what assessment did you make of the military position of Japan at this time?
 A. I perceived that Japan's military position was in critical condition and that it would be a hard task to continue operations.
- Q. What plans did you make at this time to overcome this weakness and to carry on war?
 A. Before my arrival, I was of course in favor of recovering strategic positions, increasing the air forces, and increasing the number of troops and just continued along those lines.
- Q. What joint plans did you make with the Navy to defend the inner perimeter--that is, Philippines, China, Formosa, the Ryukus, home islands?
 A. I gradually increased the number of forces along this line.
- Q. Was it your intention to fight a decisive battle in the Philippines?
 A. It was not my idea to fight a final decisive battle, but my intention was to hold our own in the Philippines, and the measures were taken along this line.
- Q. Did you consider that the loss of the Philippines would be decisive and crippling to Japan's economy in any way?
 A. Because the loss of the Philippines would mean Japan's being cut off from the South, we thought that the loss of the islands would be a serious loss to Japan in an military and economic sense.
- Q. How would the loss of the Philippines cut you off from the Southern resources region?
 A. The occupied region would be isolated because of the sea routes being severed.
- Q. Do you mean that the sea route would be severed by our air patrols over the South China seas?
 A. By both airplanes and submarines.
- Q. What coordinated plans did you make with the Navy to defend this inner perimeter?
 A. It was the understanding that the Navy would concentrate its largest forces along this line and also that the Army and Navy Air forces would defend this line to hold in check the enemy forces.
- Q. Beyond that, did you make any specific plans for an all-out, coordinated stand, in the Philippines, let us say?
 A. Both Army and Navy concentrated as much as possible in the Philippines.
- Q. Can you give me an idea of why the effort to hold the Philippines failed?
 A. Naval operations did not go as well as we expected, and the battle of the air forces was against Japan; and replenishment of the personnel of air and land forces in the Philippines was not sufficient. Those were the reasons why the Philippines failed.

- Q. Was the failure of the land forces to put up the stand that they were supposed to make due to the sinking of the transports in ORMOC bay as they tried to reinforce Leyte?
- A. The sinking of the Japanese Transports at ORMOC Bay was one of the significant reasons why it failed.
- Q. On the Army side, who can give us a complete appraisal of the Philippines operation?
- A. Lt. General MIYAZAKI, he is here in Tokyo now.
- Q. Was General YAMASHITA in complete charge of this operation?
- A. He was in complete charge.
- Q. At the time you were made Chief of the Army General Staff, the Marianas had just fallen. What in your mind was the significance of the loss of the Marianas?
- A. There was very serious effect because of the fact that it was one of the key points of Japan's inner defense.
- Q. Why did the loss of the Marianas mean that Japan would suffer?
- A. From the military standpoint, the loss of the Marianas was very serious because then Japan was exposed to direct attack against the homeland.
- Q. Direct attack by B-29's?
- A. Yes, and also Japan would be within range of the fleet as well as the Boeing planes.
- Q. How would Truk and Rabual be affected?
- A. The direct supply route to Rabaul would be threatened. New Guinea was still in Japan's hands, but the line including the Marianas and the Truk islands would not hold after the Marianas fell. Japanese forces which had been working behind this line would suffer. Also, the American forces based on the Marianas could bomb directly strategic points, so from the military view it was very serious.
- Q. At what point did the General consider the war had been lost?
- A. The fall of the Marianas made me think that the serious stage of it had been reached, and the loss of the Philippines strengthened my premonition that it would be very difficult to regain any strategic position Japan had held before this.
- Q. Did the Army contemplate bringing the war to a conclusion?
- A. I personally urged the Government to bring the war to a termination.
- Q. At what time did you urge this?
- A. Since my return from Manchuria, I urged the Government to bring the hostilities to a termination, through diplomatic and other channels.
- Q. Was there the opinion of the Army High Command at that time just a personal conviction that you were trying to get across?
- A. I and the Army High Command were in accord and in agreement to carrying this out.

Q. We have been told that in making plans for bringing the war to an end, the Army kept holding out and saying, "No, we must fight to the bitter end and in the caves and in the mountains until every man is exterminated." What the general says seems to contradict this, and I'd like to get the whole thing straight, what the background of those plans were?

A. I think that those two views are in harmony because, in order to carry out that diplomatic measure to success it has to be backed by military preparations and military achievement; so, as the army as a whole was conducting preparations and saying, "We must fight to the end," however, at the same time, the Army High Command was in full realization that it had to be terminated.

Q. What was the date that the Army High Command realized that the war would have to be brought to an end?

A. It was the Army's idea that as casualties would mount that both sides would think--particularly the Americans would think--that it would be better to terminate the war than to continue losing thousands of men.

Q. Did the Army High Command favor bringing the war to an end at this point?

A. The Army's idea was to get some local success. There was no opening before August 15 to propose peace or anything like that; unless they attained some sort of military success, Japan's position would be very unfavorable, so they could not find any opportunity to offer truce or accept any truce.

Q. Did the Army consider making an unconditional surrender?

A. Nobody knew what would happen because of some sudden change in the situation. I wanted to terminate the war with unconditional surrender, but thought that some local success would give Japan better position.

Q. What finally convinced the Army that it would be better to go ahead and bring the war to an end regardless of the terms?

A. Despite the desire to fight until the end, they perceived that the national strength had been exhausted. However, the Army realized that if they carried on fighting, they still had some power left to fight, but among the cabinet members are those who thought that it ought to be stopped; then the Emperor decided to stop hostilities.

Q. Was the war stopped purely because the Emperor so directed?

A. It came to that.

Q. Did the army have any consideration for the bombing of the industries of Japan, the bombing of the transportation system which they knew would come, and such matters as that? Did they consider those matters significant enough to end the war?

A. It is a fact that the bombing was serious. However, it was not a sufficient reason to end the war.

Q. What plans did the Japanese Army have to repel the continuous and increasing bombing that would have gone on?

A. We planned on concentration of the Air Forces. My idea was that means of aerial defense ought to be expanded, but aircraft and surface were kept in preparation for the repelling of the landing forces, so we could not use them to full advantage, which I regret,

- Q. What plans would the Army have made if the United States Command had announced that it did not intend to invade, that it was simply going to increase by ten, twenty, a hundred-fold, the tempo of the air attacks on Japan?
- A. I would have increased the aerial defense and also expanded the underground factories where more aircraft would have to be built, and this would have tightened up the air defense. We would have gone on fighting as long as the nation could stand. Land warfare would be the last phase of any war, so I would have continued preparing for it. However, the stage where the nation would be unable to bear the brunt of it any more, would have been reached.
- Q. Would you then have committed to the air defense those planes that had been earmarked to become Kamikaze?
- A. It was planned to save the planes to attack the transports in the landing operations at KYUSHU, and perhaps they went too far in earmarking planes for Kamikaze attacks against transports: so toward the end of the hostilities they brought out some of the planes to fight B-29's; but, as far as I know, there were no especially earmarked planes for B-29s.
- Q. Other than these few they brought out?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Will you give me your estimate of what were the decisive factors in bringing about the defeat of Japan during the war?
- A. Insufficient national strength.
- Q. Did you mean by insufficient capacity, raw materials, etc?
- A. Yes, In the insufficiency of national strength should be included the insufficient development of our science.

End of Interrogation

(Note: It was determined that Lt. Gen. MIYAZAKI has copies of notes on conferences of the Japanese Army General Staff.)

R E S T R I C T E D

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APPENDIX "A"

Report submitted by
GENERAL UMEZU

I. Japanese and Soviet losses in the NOMONHAN Incident.

	Soviet (estimated)	Japanese
Personnel	35,000 men	22,000 men
Killed		7,000
Wounded		15,000
Guns	100	110
Planes	1,200	130 (combat losses only) (50-70 pilots lost)

Note: Estimated from Memory.

II. The total Japanese troops and the number of divisions stationed in Manchuria from 1939 to 1945.

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
No. of troops	250,000	300,000	800,000	600,000	500,000	400,000	700,000
No. of Divisions	8 DIV.	9 DIV.	14 DIV.	15 DIV.	16 DIV.	9 DIV.	21 DIV. (Almost all newly activated div'ns)

Note: Since this was written from memory, there are bound to be errors.

2. The total number of Japanese aircraft in Manchuria from April 1941 to August 1945.

Date	Number of Aircraft
August 1939	500 - 600
" 1940	600 - 700
" 1941	800
December 41	250 - 300
August 1942	500 - 600
" 1943	400
" 1944	100
" 1945	80 - 90

Note: Since this was written from memory there are bound to be errors. The above figures include only operational planes from combat units. They do not include a comparatively large number of rear echelon reserve air craft because this figure is very difficult to estimate.

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(1) Appendix A

APPENDIX "A" (cont'd)

3. Japanese Divisions activated in MANCHURIA from 1939 to present.

Division number	Date of Activation	Division number	Date of Act'n
23	1939	124	Jan 1945
24	October 1940	125	" 1945
25	" (?) 1940	126	" 1945
28	Aug (?) 1940	127	Mar 1945
29	" (?) 1941	128	Jan 1945
71	May 1942	134	Jul 1945
107	" 1944	135	" 1945
108	July 1944	136	" 1945
112	" 1944	138	" 1945
119	October 1944	139	" 1945
122	January 1944	148	" 1945
123	" 1945	149	" 1945

NOTE: Since this was written from memory, there are bound to be some errors.

III. The four maps enclosed give the following troops dispositions:

- A. Japanese troops in MANCHURIA as of August 1941.
- B. " " " CHINA " " " "
- C. Japanese troops in MANCHURIA as of August 1945.
- D. " " " CHINA " " " "

IV. The Army groups transferred from MANCHURIA:

UNIT	AREA TRANS. TO	DATE OF MOVEMENT
51st Div.	New Guinea	Oct 42 - Nov 42
20th "	" "	Dec 42
27th "	China	Feb 44
29th "	Central Pacific	" 44 - Mar 44
(Expeditionary Force)	(Guam)	" " " "
14th Div.	Palau	" " " "
30th "	Philippines	Apr 44 - May 44
28th "	Ryukus	Jun 44 (Shanghai) - Jul 44
9th "	Ryukus to Formosa	Jun 44 - Aug 44 - Jan 45
68th Brigade	Ryukus	Jun 44 - Jul 44
24th Div	Ryukus (Via Japan)	Jun 44 - Aug 44
1st Div	Philippines	Sep 44
8th Div		
(2nd Armored Div)	Philippines	Aug 44 - Sep 44
10th Div	Formosa to Philippines	Aug 44 - Sep 44 Nov 44
23rd Div	Philippines	Oct 44 - Nov 44
19th "	"	Nov 44 - Dec 44
12th "	Formosa	Dec 44 - Jan 44
71st "	"	Jan 44 - Feb 44
25th "	Japan	Mar 45
11th "	"	" 45
57th "	"	Apr 45

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(2) Appendix "A"