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Romania

GENERAL SURVEY

JULY 1970



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This General Survey was prepared for the NIS under the general direction of the NIS Committee. Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, and Armed Forces were prepared under the general supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Chronology, Introduction, Sociological, Political, Economic, and Scientific were prepared under the general supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by May 1970.

The NIS Basic Intelligence Factbook *provides semiannual updating of basic data of the type appearing in the Area Brief of this General Survey. A listing of all NIS units dealing with this and other areas is in the CIA-prepared* Inventory of Available NIS Publications, *issued quarterly and also bound into the concurrent* Factbook.

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GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	English	Romanian
ARLUS	Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society	*Asociatia Româna pentru Legaturile de Prietenie cu URSS*
ARSR	Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania	*Academia Republicii Socialiste România*
AVSAP	Voluntary Association for the Support and Defense of the Fatherland	*Asociata Voluntara Sportiva pentru Apararea Patriei*
CFF	Forestry Railways	*Căile Ferate Forestiere*
CFR	Romanian State Railroads	*Căile Ferate Române*
CSS	Council of State Security	*Consiliul Securitatii Statului*
FDP	People's Democratic Front	*Frontul Democratisi Populare*
FUS	Front of Socialist Unity	*Frontul Unitatii Socialiste*
GUTU	General Union of Trade Unions	*Uniunea Generala a Sindecatelor*
IAU	Air Work Enterprise	*Intreprindere Aero Utile*
IFA	Institute of Atomic Physics	*Institutul de Fizica Atomica*
NAVROM	Romanian Sea and River Navigation Organization	*Navigaţiume Româna*
OCLPP	Office for Contracting of Privately Owned Apartments	*Asociatia de Cooperare pentru Construirea de Locuinte Proprietate Personala*
RCP	Romanian Communist Party	*Partidul Communist Române*
RWP	Romanian Workers Party	*Partidul Muncitoresc Române*
SPC	State Planning Commission	*Comitetul de Stat al Planificarii*
TAROM	Romanian Air Transport	*Transporturile Aeriene Române*
UTS	Union of Communist Youth	*Uniunea Tineretului Communist*
...	Academy of Medical Sciences	*Acamemia de Stiinte Medicalc*
...	Institute of Fluid Mechanics	*Institutul de Mecanică Fluidelor Traian Vuia*
...	Liberal Party	*Partidul Liberal*
...	National Peasant Party	*Partidul National-Teranese*
...	Plowman's Front	*Frontul Plugarilor*
...	Securitate (security forces or secret police)	*Securitatii*
...	Social Democratic Party	*Partidul Social-Democrat*
...	United Workers and Peasants Bloc	*Blocul Muncitorese-Taranesc*

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Chronology (U/OU)

2d-3d centuries A.D.		Dacia, occupying the approximate territory of modern Romania, is a province of the Roman Empire.
13th century		Walachian and Moldavian principalities gradually emerge to form the nucleus of modern Romania.
14th-19th centuries		Romania is alternately subject to, or allied with, Hungary and Turkey.
1859	December	Union of the principalities of Walachia and Moldavia within the Ottoman Empire.
1878	July	Romania becomes an independent kingdom.
1918	November	Transylvania anexed from Hungary by Romania.
1920	October	Romania annexes Bessarabia from Russia.
1340	June	Russia annexes Bessarabia from Romania.
	August	Romania cedes southern Dobruja to Bulgaria and northern Transylvania to Hungary.
1941	June	Romania enters World War II against the U.S.S.R.
1944	August	Romania surrenders, is occupied by Soviet troops, and declares war on Germany.
1945	March	Communist-dominated Petru Groza government is formed.
1946	November	Controlled parliamentary elections provide overwhelming majority for Communist front.
1947	February	Romanian Peace Treaty is signed in Paris.
	December	King Michael is forced to abdicate.
1948	February	Communist and Social Democratic parties merge to form Romanian Workers Party.
1949	March	Collectivization of agriculture officially begins.
1952	May	Politburo members Ana Pauker, Teohari Georgescu, and Vasile Luca are purged from the party.
1955	December	Party adopts new statute along with second 5-year plan (1955-60).
1956	March	Party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej initiates de-Stalinization.
1958	June-July	Soviet occupation troops are withdrawn.
1960	April	U.S.-Romanian claims settlement is signed.
	October	Gheorghiu-Dej attends 22d CPSU Congress in Moscow.
1962	March	Farm collectivization is virtually completed.
	July-Sept.	Talks between Romanian leaders and other bloc leaders hint at growing friction between Romanian and bloc concept of economic integration.
1963	March	Enlarged party Central Committee plenum gives first indication of Romanian-CEMA dispute.

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	April	Romania unexpectedly returns its ambassador to Albania.
	June	Romania and Yugoslavia initial Iron Gate Project agreement.
	July	Gheorghiu-Dej attends CEMA summit conference, where Romania's economic policy on CEMA is stated.
	November	Gheorghiu-Dej visit with Tito makes Romania last bloc country to resume state-level relations with Yugoslavia.
1964	March	Premier Maurer heads Romanian delegation to Communist China in attempt to mediate worsening Soviet-Chinese relations.
	April	Manifesto proclaims Romanian regime's national, independent policies.
	May	Indoctrination campaign throughout country on April Manifesto has anti-Soviet tones.
	June	Romania and United States agree to raise legations to embassy level.
	September	In meeting with Gheorghiu-Dej, Tito supports Romania's independent position.
1965	March	Romania does not attend Moscow meeting of 19 pro-Soviet parties convened to discuss Sino-Soviet dispute.
		Gheorghiu-Dej dies and Nicolae Ceausescu is elected new party chief.
	April	U.S. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. announces decision to call off negotiations with Romania on construction of synthetic rubber plant.
	July	Romanian Workers Party holds Ninth (Fourth) Party Congress, changes name to Romanian Communist Party, adopts new statutes, and approves draft directives for the 5-year plan for 1966-70.
	August	Romanian Grand National Assembly unanimously adopts new constitution proclaiming the country a socialist republic.
1966	March	Ceausescu leads Romanian party delegation to 23d CPSU Congress in Moscow.
	May	In highly nationalistic speech on 45th anniversary of the party, Ceausescu declares military blocs "anachronistic."
	June	Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai visits Romania.
		Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meets in Bucharest.
		Romania directs strident attack against U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
		Romanian Communist Party approves the final form of the 5-year plan for 1966-70.
1967	January	Romania establishes diplomatic relations with West Germany.
	June	Romanians refuse to endorse Soviet position condemning Israelis for their part in the Arab-Israeli war.
	September	Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu becomes first Communist official elected president of U.N. General Assembly.
	December	National Party Conference outlines important changes in the structure of the party and government.

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		Ceausescu becomes President of the Council of State, thereby becoming the head of state as well as of the party.
1968	February	Romanian delegation walks out of the Budapest meeting preparing for international Communist conference.
	August	Ceausescu leads high-level delegation to Prague as sign of moral support for Dubček's leadership.
		Romania does not participate in Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia led by Soviet forces, and Ceausescu publicly denounces the action.
		Ceausescu meets Tito at Vrsac for contingency planning in wake of invasion of Czechoslovakia.
1969	March	Romanian delegation attends Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest.
	April	French President Charles de Gaulle visits Romania.
	June	Ceausescu defends absent Chinese at the international Communist conference in Moscow.
		New Chinese ambassador appointed to Bucharest after absence since 1967.
	August	U.S. President Nixon visits Bucharest; Soviets react to announcement by canceling the planned trip of Brezhnev and Kosygin for purpose of signing a treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation, which lapsed in February 1968.
		Romanian Tenth Party Congress held; Ceausescu's policies endorsed and his political position strengthened; draft directives for 1971-75 plan adopted.
1970	July	Premiers Kosygin and Maurer sign the long-delayed Soviet-Romanian friendship treaty in the absence of both party leaders, Brezhnev and Ceausescu.

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1. Introduction (S)

Romania, a perennially weak and foreign-dominated Latin country in the Balkans, has in recent years successfully followed a policy of greater independence from Soviet domination. A submissive satellite from 1945 until 1960, Romania under the dynamic leadership of Communist Party chiefs Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu has taken maximum advantage of its own rapid economic growth, as well as the Sino-Soviet ideological split and the East-West dialogue to pursue increased freedom of action in economic and political affairs. Romania's importance to the Soviet Union derives not only from its status as one of the largest states in Eastern Europe in area and population but also from its strategic position along the corridor between the Carpathians and the Black Sea—long a route of easy access into and out of the southern European part of the U.S.S.R.

Probably the most serious challenge to the Romanians' emerging independence—formally declared by the Romanian Communist Party in April 1964—came with the Warsaw Pact invasion of errant Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The invasion contravened all the fundamental principles of Romania's foreign policy as laid down in the April declaration. The most important of these stated that relations among all Communist states and parties must be based on national independence, equal rights, fraternal mutual aid, noninterference in the internal affairs of others, and respect for territorial integrity. Thus, the invasion of Czechoslovakia cast a new and ominous shadow over Romania's future position in the Soviet orbit.

Since that time Romania has continued to espouse publicly the basic principles of independence on a regular basis. Bucharest still opposes Soviet plans for economic integration of Eastern European countries under the umbrella of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), on the grounds that such plans would hamper Romania's ambitious industrialization program and relegate the country to a position of supplier of raw materials for the more developed Eastern European countries. Romania's rejection of this role has been made possible largely because of its self-sufficiency in foodstuffs, a good raw materials base, rapid industrial growth, expanding trade and credit ties with the West, tight party control over all important facets of social and economic life, and a unified party leadership. Bucharest has tried to balance its rejection of Soviet plans in this and other areas by agreeing with the Soviet position whenever it can do so without endangering its independent policy.

The groundwork for Soviet control in the postwar period—the latest episode in a long history of foreign interference with a people who have little tradition of resistance to conquerors—was laid in 1944 when the invading Red Army installed Communists in all levels of government. A puppet regime, largely trained in Moscow, was installed in March 1945, and the King was forced to abdicate in December 1947. Immediately thereafter, the Romanian People's Republic was established, and the U.S.S.R. abandoned the pretense of tolerating noncollaborationists in the government. In the meantime the U.S.S.R. began exploiting the economy through a transparent device known as the joint Soviet-Romanian companies (SOVROM's) and discriminatory trade agreements. The presence of Soviet troops in Romania until 1958 insured the regime's utter subservience to the U.S.S.R. as well as complete control over the population.

Despite the widespread dislike for communism, there has been virtually no overt opposition to the Communist regime. Moreover, the regime has gained some measure of popular acceptance since the early 1960's by fostering nationalism, instituting a slight relaxation of harsh police controls, and by maintaining its independence in foreign affairs. In one of its most popular moves, the regime has thoroughly expunged Russian influences throughout the country, especially in cultural matters. The Romanian people also welcome the expansion of contacts with the West, but the regime is aware of the dangers inherent in this policy and is keeping careful watch to see that such contacts do not produce pressures for a serious domestic liberalization.

Although the new policies in both domestic and foreign affairs had their beginnings in the early 1960's under the rule of Gheorghiu-Dej, who died in March 1965, they have been most fruitfully continued by the regime of his successor Nicolae Ceausescu. Ceausescu inherited from Dej not only the promising new policies of independence but the secret memories of dark Stalinist deeds as well. Ceausescu, in order to form a strong and unified leadership loyal only to himself, has openly exposed the previous Stalinist leadership, repudiating its violent and illegal acts. In thus starting with a relatively clean slate, Ceausescu has been able to commit himself and his regime to a more legal administration.

Although great strides have been made in industrialization, Romania remains a partially developed country with a relatively low per capita GNP. It has achieved about the same degree of economic development as Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Over half of the labor force still works in agriculture, which is now largely socialized. Although Romania's agricultural productivity is low relative to that of advanced Western countries, it has been regarded historically as a country with a high agricultural potential.

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Current levels of production, however, are high enough to normally permit export of grain, fruit, vegetables, livestock, and livestock products.

The country is well endowed with agricultural land, petroleum, natural gas, and timber; its hydroelectric potential is large but mostly unexploited. Romania is entirely or largely self-sufficient in the production of salt, sulfur, lead, and zinc, but relies heavily on imports of rolled steel, iron ore, coke and coking coal, and cotton. It also must import a large part of its machinery and equipment, especially that involving advanced technology.

The 5-year plan for 1971-75 is patterned essentially after previous plans, putting priority on rapid industrialization through centralized economic planning and administration. Because of its political and economic successes, the regime long exhibited no inclination to follow the U.S.S.R. and the East European Communist countries in trying to reform the traditional Communist economic system. With the establishment of industrial centrals in 1969, however, it became evident that Romanian planners have recognized certain problems endemic to their highly centralized system and have made some organizational changes to deal with them.

Romanian efforts toward achieving rapid growth and diversification of industry have met with considerable success. During the decade of the 1960's, value added in industry grew at an estimated average annual rate of 11%. This is the highest rate for any Communist country, with the possible exception of North Korea and North Vietnam whose industrial growth rates are not fully known, and it is certainly one of the highest in the world. This rapid industrial growth was in large part the result of a high rate of investment, the favorable effect of improved agricultural production, and large imports of advanced technology and equipment from non-Communist countries. Romania was able to pay for these imports partly by borrowing and partly by expanding its exports to these countries—chiefly foodstuffs, timber products, and petroleum products. This success has severely retarded the development of a viable consumer economy.

The Romanian armed forces, which number an estimated 186,000 (mainly ground forces), comprise one of the largest in the Warsaw Pact. The regime has shown dissatisfaction with its ties to the Pact since about 1964. Since that year Romania has participated in joint Communist military exercises only as an observer or with limited military involvement, and since 1962 it has resisted political pressure to hold exercises on Romanian territory. Nevertheless, the leadership accepts in principle Romania's obligation to participate in Warsaw Pact joint training.

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2. Geography

A. General

Romania, located in southeastern Europe and fronting on the Black Sea, controls the most easily traversable land route between the Balkans and European U.S.S.R. All the political capitals, industrial centers, and seaports of Europe are within 1,800 nautical miles of Bucharest, the capital and largest city (Summary map inset, Figure 108). The oilfields at the head of the Persian Gulf are within 1,500 nautical miles, and the Suez Canal is within 1,000 nautical miles. The only major Romanian port, Constanţa, is about 215 nautical miles from the U.S.S.R. Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol' and less than 185 nautical miles from the northern entrance to the Turkish straits. (U/OU)

Romania has an area of approximately 91,700 square miles, slightly smaller than the combined areas of New York and Pennsylvania; the population, estimated at 20.4 million, is about two-thirds that of the two states. The maximum east-west extent is approximately 450 miles,[1] and the maximum north-south extent is about 300 miles. (U/OU)

1. Topography (C)

About two-thirds of Romania consist of nearly flat to undulating plains that are mostly peripheral to a central, roughly U-shaped belt of hills and mountains (Figure 1). The mountains and hills separate the plains in the west from those in the south and east. The central part of the country contains broad, mostly flat plains and low ranges of hills and is nearly enclosed by the U-shaped belt of hills and mountains. The long rugged arc of mountains channelizes movement along established routes, influences settlement patterns, and provides a natural defensive position.

Needleleaf evergreen and broadleaf deciduous forests cover most of the sparsely populated mountains and hills. The plains have predominantly cultivated fields and grasslands, and there are scattered forested sections. A fairly well developed network of roads and railroads connects the numerous agricultural communities and the few large cities.

Nearly all the streams of Romania drain into the Danube. The surface drainage is characterized in the upper reaches by swift, turbulent streams flowing through numerous gorges; and in the lower reaches by slow, meandering streams that have swamps and marshes near their mouths.

2. Climate (U/OU)

Romania has a continental climate that is controlled primarily by the large, semipermanent pressure systems over Asia and the North Atlantic. In winter (November through March) the weather is cold and cloudy, and fog and snow are frequent. In summer (June through September) the weather is warm and mostly sunny, and thunderstorms and showers are frequent. At elevations up to about 2,000 feet, mean daily minimum temperatures in winter range mostly from the high teens (°F.) to the mid-30's, and at higher elevations the minimums are much lower. Most places have recorded absolute minimums between −5° and −30°. Summer mean daily maximum temperatures range mostly in the 70's and lower 80's at elevations up to about 2,000 feet and are much lower in the higher mountains. Most places have recorded absolute maximums of more than 100°.

Precipitation in general is light to moderate. Greatest mean annual precipitation, near 50 inches, falls in the mountains; and least mean annual precipitation, about 15 inches, falls along the coast (Figure 2). The largest amounts of precipitation occur from early May through August, when thunderstorms and showers are most frequent. Snow generally falls in the period from November through March. Except on the Black Sea coast, snow cover is present at least 30 days, and several places have from 50 to 75 days with snow cover. January has the greatest number of days of snow cover at most places. Snow depths generally exceed 1 foot in the mountains and are less than 1 foot elsewhere.

Mean cloudiness is greatest (55% to 80%) in November through May and least (25% to 65%) in June through October. With few exceptions, mean relative humidity is highest during winter mornings, 80% to 95%, and is lowest during summer afternoons, 40% to 65%. Visibility is generally poorest during winter, when fog is the major restriction; it occurs on 2 to 10 days per month at most places. Fog is most frequent in the basins and valleys of the mountains, in the southern and eastern plains, and in the Transylvanian Basin.

Surface winds generally are weak except at higher elevations in the mountains and in lowlands near the Black Sea. At most places, the mean monthly surface wind speeds are greatest in March through May; however, mean speeds are mostly less than 8 knots even in these months. Strong winds (22 knots or greater) occur on less than 8 days per month in all seasons, although in many places there are as many as 40 to 55 days with strong winds annually.

B. Military geographic regions (C)

There are four military geographic regions—the West Romanian Plain, the Danube-Prut Plains, the Transylvanian Basin, and the Romanian Mountains (Figure 1). The combination of environmental conditions within each

[1] Distances are in statute miles unless nautical miles are specifically indicated.

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

FIGURE 1. Military geographic regions and terrain (C)

region has a relatively uniform effect on military operations, but there would be marked differences between adjacent regions.

1. West Romanian Plain

The mostly flat to rolling plains of western Romania range in elevation from about 400 feet in the north to 270 feet in the south. The rolling plains slope gently westward from hillocks along the eastern margin to broad, nearly flat lowlands. Differences in elevation between valley bottoms and adjacent crests of the hillocks generally are less than 300 feet, and slopes are mostly less than 10%; in the western part of the plains, differences in elevation of over 70 feet are uncommon, and slopes generally are less than 1%. Except for scattered areas of swamp and marsh, the plains are well drained by

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

FIGURE 2. Precipitation, snowfall, relative humidity, cloudiness, temperatures, and thunderstorms (U/OU)

numerous westward-flowing streams which connect with a major tributary of the Danube. The major streams are mostly 50 to 300 feet wide and from 3.5 to 10 feet deep. Meadows, cultivated crops, scattered orchards, and stands of broadleaf deciduous trees are the main types of vegetation.

This region is fairly well suited for conventional ground operations. The road and railroad networks afford access to most parts of the region. Construction of new roads generally would be easy, especially in the west where grades would be low and alignments unrestricted. In most of the region, conditions are fair for offroad dispersal and cross-country movement. Locally, however, irrigation and drainage ditches in the west, scattered wooded areas in the east, and areas of wet ground in the north constitute obstacles to movement. Seasonally, offroad dispersal and cross-country movement would be impeded by mud during thaws in March and after heavy rainfalls (mostly from early May through August). Concealment from air observation would be provided by scattered forests. Cover from flat-

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trajectory fire and concealment from ground observation would be provided by the hillocks along the eastern edge of the region. Almost all of the region is well suited for the construction of bunkers, but because of the low relief, the region is unsuited for tunnel-type installations.

The West Romanian Plain region is well suited for airborne and airmobile operations. There are numerous sites suitable for parachute drops, helicopter landings, and the landing of assault-type aircraft on unprepared surfaces. Approaches to sites are clear except from the east, where they are over mountains. The few existing airfields are mainly in the southwest. Airfield construction would be fairly easy, particularly in the west where little grading would be required and where runway orientations generally would be unrestricted.

The region is poorly suited for irregular force operations. The very sparse forest vegetation and flat to rolling, cultivated terrain provide few opportunities for cover and concealment, and troop movements could be easily detected. Concealment from air and ground observations and cover from small arms fire would be best in the widely scattered stands of broadleaf deciduous trees from mid-April to October. Cultivated foods, mainly cereals and garden vegetables, are readily available from midsummer to early autumn. Population density is high and villages and towns are relatively evenly distributed. Water should be considered contaminated. Shelter, shelter materials, and natural fuels would be most plentiful in wooded areas. Supply by air would be relatively easy.

2. Danube-Prut Plains

The plains of southern and eastern Romania have elevations of generally less than 800 feet; however, in the east and northeast there are several hilly areas, one of which reaches an elevation of 1,944 feet. Most of the plains are nearly flat to gently rolling (Figure 3); differences in elevation between valley bottoms and drainage divides are generally less than 325 feet, and slopes are mostly less than 5%. The terrain in the northeast and in parts of the area east of the Danube is rolling to hilly; differences in elevation between valley bottoms and hill crests exceed 1,000 feet in places, and slopes of up to 20% are common. The major streams flow south or southeast to the Danube across broad flood plains that are bordered in many places by high, steep bluffs. These streams have meandering courses and widths that range from 100 to 500 feet. Most major streams are from 1.5 to 6.6 feet deep. Marshes and swamps are extensive in the Danube Delta and are common along the courses of the large streams. Grasslands and cultivated crops are the principal types of vegetation, although forests of predominantly deciduous trees grow on many hilly areas in the east and northeast and on slopes adjacent to the Romanian Mountains region.

FIGURE 3. Flat plains near Bucharest (C)

This region is mostly well suited for conventional ground operations. The road and rail networks facilitate year-round movement, and the construction of new roads would be fairly easy except in the hilly areas, in the Danube Delta, and along the courses of some of the major streams. In most of the region, offroad dispersal would be fairly easy; in places, however, it would be hindered by swamps and marshes. Conditions generally are favorable for cross-country movement; the chief hindrances are the major streams (especially during the spring thaw), steep slopes in the hill areas, and extensive marshes in the Danube Delta. Elsewhere, scattered areas of forest are local obstacles, but they can be bypassed easily. Concealment from ground observation and cover from flat-trajectory fire would be provided by surface irregularities, particularly in the hilly areas. Some concealment from air observation would be afforded by the predominantly deciduous forests. The region generally is well suited for construction of bunker-type installations; the main exceptions are the poorly drained Danube Delta and some poorly drained areas along other large streams.

The region is mostly well suited for airborne and airmobile operations. On the plains there are numerous sites suitable for parachute drops, helicopter landings, and landing of assault-type aircraft on unprepared surfaces. Construction of airfields would be fairly easy, with little grading required and runway orientations unrestricted. In most of the northeastern part, however, and in scattered areas in the west and east, sites are few because of steep slopes or swamps and marshes. Several airfields suitable for the landing of assault-type aircraft are mainly in the southeastern part of the region.

The coast of the region is generally unsuited for large-scale amphibious operations. Nearshore approaches are partly obstructed by sandbars, shoals, rocks, jetties, piers, and groins; bottom slopes are relatively flat; and much of the coast is backed by cliffs, bluffs, or headlands, and lacks good exits. The area most suitable for amphibious operations is immediately north of Constanţa. Most of the coast north of Constanţa is backed by the extensive lagoons and marshes of the Danube Delta.

The Danube-Prut Plains provide fair to unsuited conditions for irregular force operations. Small elements of foot troops would have few opportunities for cover or concealment in the sparsely forested, nearly flat to gently rolling plains. Scattered stands of broadleaf deciduous trees provide some cover and concealment, and in the south and east marshes and swamps provide good to fair concealment in the dense, tall reeds and sedges mixed with small stands of trees. The region is densely populated and

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contains numerous cities and towns that are connected by a fairly well developed transportation network. The settlement pattern is very dense near Bucharest and Ploieşti. Cultivated foods, mainly cereals and garden vegetables, are readily available from midsummer to early autumn. In the areas of swamps and marshes, fish, berries, and most wild animals are edible. Water should be considered contaminated. Shelter, shelter materials, and natural fuels would be most plentiful in wooded areas. Supply by air would be relatively easy, but coastal conditions are generally unsuited for supply by sea.

3. Transylvanian Basin

This region consists of nearly flat valley floors and several large, nearly flat to rolling plains separated by scattered low ranges of hills and ridges (Figure 4). Elevations range from less than 600 feet in the nearly flat plains to over 1,900 feet in the hills in the northwest. In the interior of the basin, differences in elevation between the generally flat valley bottoms and the crests of hillocks and low ridges are usually less than 325 feet, and slopes commonly are less than 10%. In many places where the basin merges with the foothills of the mountains, differences in elevation from valley bottoms to hill crests exceed 1,000 feet, and slopes are commonly as much as 30%. Several large streams flow through the basin; all originate in the neighboring mountain ranges and foothills. Inundation of their flood plains is common during the spring thaw in late March and early April. Nearly all of the basin is cultivated; the more rugged and hilly slopes are forested, mostly with deciduous trees.

This region is moderately well suited for conventional ground operations. Existing lines of transportation utilize the flatter valley floors and provide access to most of the region. The roads, however, are generally in poor condition, and extensive maintenance would be required to keep them passable for prolonged heavy military traffic. Construction of new roads would be fairly easy through the valleys; it would be more difficult in the hilly areas, where grades would be steep and alignments restricted. Offroad dispersal would be fairly easy; cross-country movement would be feasible most of the year except near the mountains, where steep slopes make cross-country movement difficult year-round. Seasonal hindrances to movement occur in the spring thaw period, usually between mid-March and mid-April, when wet ground and flooding are common, and from early November to mid-March, when mud, snow, and extreme cold would hinder operations. Some concealment from air observation would be provided by the forests, although year-round concealment would be provided only by the scattered stands of coniferous trees. Cover from flat-trajectory fire and concealment from ground observation would be available in the areas of hills, hillocks, and ridges. Conditions mostly favor construction of bunker-type installations. In general, sites are readily accessible and could be easily worked; shoring, however, would be required. Conditions generally are not suited for construction of tunnel-type installations, but a few scattered sites are available in the northwest hills.

The region is moderately well suited for airborne and airmobile operations. There are many sites in the wider valleys and large plains suitable for parachute drops and the landing of helicopters; however, sites for landing assault-type aircraft on unprepared surfaces are limited. In places, particularly near the mountains, approaches to sites are restricted by adjacent high elevations. Conditions generally are not favorable for the construction of airfields, and the few existing airfields are concentrated mainly in the larger valleys and plains in the southwest.

Conditions for irregular force operations in this region are poor to fair. Concealment and cover from flat-trajectory fire are mostly poor because cereal crops and grass are the predominant vegetation. Some cover and concealment is available on the more rugged and hilly slopes, which are covered mainly by deciduous trees. The population density is high. The numerous agricultural settlements in the basin are widely distributed, but the larger towns and the major roads and railroads are concentrated in the broad, nearly flat valleys. Cultivated foods, mainly cereals and garden vegetables, are readily available from midsummer to early autumn. Safe water is available from mountain streams and springs, but water near settlements should be considered contaminated. Shelter, shelter materials, and natural fuels would be most plentiful in wooded areas. Supply by air would be relatively easy.

FIGURE 4. Transylvanian Basin in central Romania (U/OU)

4. Romanian Mountains

In this roughly U-shaped area of hills and mountains, elevations generally exceed 1,500 feet. Maximum elevations are 7,560 feet in the north and 8,343 feet in the south. In the mountainous parts (Figure 5), particularly in the south, differences in elevation between valley bottoms and adjacent ridge crests are mostly more than 2,000 feet, and slopes generally are between 20% and 30%; some slopes exceed 45%. Less rugged parts (Figure 6) consist mainly of rounded hills, broad valleys, and intermontane basins, and most slopes are less than 20%. The hills and mountains are drained by streams that are shallow in most places and generally swift flowing in mountainous areas. The streams, commonly frozen in winter, are usually less than 200 feet wide and less than 3.5 feet deep except during high water in spring and early summer. Extensive forests occupy the slopes; stands of broadleaf deciduous trees are common at the lower elevations and needleleaf evergreen trees are on

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FIGURE 5. Rugged mountains in Transylvanian Alps (U/OU)

FIGURE 6. Hills in eastern Romania (U/OU)

the higher slopes. Above the forests, brush and scrub are common, and there are scattered clearings used for summer pasture. Elsewhere, areas of low slopes, intermontane basins, and the broader stream valleys are cultivated.

This region is mainly unsuited for conventional ground operations. Most vehicular movement would be confined to the few existing transportation facilities. Movement along the predominantly earth roads would be difficult because of snow and ice in passes from early November through March, narrow bridges, steep grades, numerous sharp curves, and a lack of alternate routes. In addition, many roads become muddy and impassable during late March and early April. Except in the basins and the wider valleys, offroad dispersal, cross-country movement, and construction of new roads would be difficult because of steep slopes and dense forests. The numerous surface irregularities provide good cover from flat-trajectory fire. Concealment from air and ground observation would be provided by the dense forests; on the lower slopes, however, these forests lose much of their concealment value when the deciduous trees are leafless. Conditions in most of the area generally are suitable for the construction of tunnel-type installations. Along the eastern and southern margins of the region, deep soil and soft rock are suited for bunker-type installations.

The Romanian Mountains region is unsuited for large-scale airborne and airmobile operations. Only in the wider river valleys and basins are there sites suitable for airdrops, helicopter landings, and landing of assault-type aircraft on unprepared surfaces; however, approaches to such sites would be difficult because of the surrounding high terrain. Construction of airfields would be confined to the larger valleys and basins. A few existing airfields are suitable for landings of assault-type aircraft.

The Romanian Mountains provide fair to good conditions for irregular force operations. Small elements of foot troops could move undetected in the rugged mountain terrain and dense forests. Concealment from air and ground observation is available year round in the needleleaf evergreen forests on the higher slopes and seasonally in the broadleaf deciduous forests on the lower slopes. Natural cover from flat-trajectory fire is abundant. The basins and valleys contain most of the population and transportation facilities. There are numerous villages and towns and a few cities. Food is generally available in all but the most rugged areas; it is most easily obtained in cultivated sections scattered along valleys and basins. Crops mature from midsummer to early autumn. Water from mountain streams and springs is safe, but water near settlements is usually contaminated. Shelter and shelter materials are available in forests, and shelter is available in caves. Wood is the most plentiful natural fuel. Very few sites are suitable for supply by air.

C. Strategic areas (S)

There are two strategic areas in Romania—Bucharest and Ploieşti (Figure 11). They are significant as transportation, industrial, and agricultural centers; and as sites of military installations.

1. Bucharest

This strategic area (Figure 7) in the southern part of the country contains Bucharest (population about 1.5 million), the capital and largest city (Figure 8). Bucharest is the principal administrative, cultural, commercial, industrial, and transportation center of the country, the headquarters of the armed forces, and the heart of the telecommunications system. The city is a center of production of motor vehicles, agricultural equipment, electrical and electronic equipment, machinery, and machine tools. Other products of importance include diesel engines, construction equipment, cement, rubber products, chemicals, optical instruments, and pharmaceuticals. Also significant are railroad yards and repair shops. This area is the focal point of the rail and road networks of the country. An international civil airfield is immediately north of the city, and a large civil/military airfield is about 4 miles farther north; in the 1970's this field is to become Bucharest's international airfield. Billeting facilities for about 40,000 troops and extensive storage facilities including large refrigerated storage and refined petroleum products storage estimated at 225,000 barrels, are available in the strategic area.

2. Ploieşti

This strategic area (Figure 9) contains Ploieşti (population about 150,000) and encompasses the oilfields (Figure 10) and gasfields scattered around the city. It is the largest single oil-producing field in Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., and the largest petroleum refining center in the country. Several pipelines transport petroleum products from Ploieşti to Bucharest and Giurgiu, in the south; to Constanţa, on the Black Sea coast; and via Galaţi to the U.S.S.R. The principal industrial plants manufacture equipment for the petroleum industry and

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

FIGURE 9. Ploieşti strategic area (C)



FIGURE 10. Oilfield near Ploieşti (U/OU)

routes, but conditions in all routes are poor to unsuited for a 2- to 6-week period in March and April because of miry ground or flooded streams. Detailed information on the selected routes is presented in Figure 12.

E. Approaches

The perimeter of Romania consists of 141 miles of coastline and 1,845 miles of land boundaries. Romania claims territorial jurisdiction 12 nautical miles offshore. Figure 13 presents more detailed data on the perimeter of the country. (U/OU)

1. Land (C)

Conditions for movement across the borders range from good to unsuited. The best conditions for cross-country movement are on the plains which extend into Romania from Hungary, from Yugoslavia north of the Danube, and from eastern Bulgaria. More than half of the borders with Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. are delineated by sections of two rivers, the Danube and the Prut, which are natural obstacles to movement. In most other places, cross-country movement would be precluded or severely hindered by steep slopes in mountains or hills. Roads approaching or crossing the borders are most numerous on the plains; elsewhere they are generally confined to valleys or small areas of plains. Free movement across the borders is prohibited and security measures, such as barbed wire, plowed strips, minefields, observation towers, and border patrols, are employed to prevent illegal crossings. The approaches shown in Figure 11 and described in Figure 14 are the best means of access from adjoining countries.

2. Sea (C)

Approaches by sea are across the Black Sea, reached from the Mediterranean via the Turkish straits. Offshore approaches are clear. Nearshore approaches are generally clear to the 6-foot depth curve, except for scattered shoals and bars. Shoreward of the 6-foot depth curve, approaches are partly obstructed by sandbars, shoals, rocks, jetties, piers and groins. North of Constanţa, the coastline is low, sandy, and backed by numerous lagoons and marshes; south of Constanţa, rocky coastal cliffs and headlands are interspersed with sandy shores. The best stretch of coast for amphibious landings extends northward from Constanţa and consists of one sandy beach that is about 9½ miles long and 70 to 200 yards wide. The beach is immediately backed by a sandy strip of lowland about 400 yards wide. The resort town of Mamaia is built on the sandy strip behind the south half of the beach. Seawalls 2 to 3 feet high front the resort. A large lake backs the sandy strip in the south, and a cultivated plain containing a large lake backs the sandy strip in the north. Beach exits are directly to hard-surfaced streets of Mamaia that lead to a hard-surfaced road 50 to 400 yards behind the south half of the beach and to a loose-surfaced road 400 to 1,200 yards behind the north half. These roads lead to the main port of Constanţa, 3½ miles south of the south end of the beach. Sea approaches are clear except for nearshore bars and a breakwater off the north end. Nearshore bottom material is sand, and gradients are flat but irregular because of submerged sandbars. The tidal range is negligible. Surf 4 feet or higher occurs 5% of the time January through March, 6% April through September, and 7% October through December.

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FIGURE 7. Bucharest strategic area (C)

produce ammunition, textiles, ceramic goods, and leather products. In addition, Ploieşti is an important transportation center and has railroad and highway connections to all important parts of the country. An airfield used primarily by a paramilitary unit is west of Ploieşti. Billeting facilities for about 10,000 troops in military barracks and extensive refined petroleum products storage facilities, which have a capacity of 5,460,000 barrels, are in the strategic area.

3. Other important areas

Although less significant than the two strategic areas, the following urban areas are important industrial, commercial, transportation, or military centers:

NAME AND LOCATION	IMPORTANCE
Constanţa..... 44°11′N., 28°39′E.	Population about 151,000. Most important seaport in Romania; largest ship repair yard in country; ranks second in shipbuilding. Important producer of chemicals, cement, farm machinery, textiles, and cellulose. Only major railroad terminal on Romania Black Sea coast; rail facilities include repair yard. Major telecommunications center. Military/civil airfield near city. Extensive refined petroleum products storage, totaling 5,800,000 barrels, and other storage facilities. Billeting for about 15,000 troops.



FIGURE 8. Modern section of Bucharest (U/OU)

NAME AND LOCATION	IMPORTANCE
Galaţi..... 45°27′N., 28°03′E.	Population about 152,000. Important industrial and transportation center in eastern Romania. Site of large iron and steel combine, ore-sorting facility, largest shipbuilding yard in country, food-processing plant, and distilleries. Other industrial products include sheet steel, steel wire, railroad car components, concrete products, and textiles. Strategic transportation center; inland port on Danube at railroad and highway focal point only 6 miles from U.S.S.R. border. Refined petroleum products storage, capacity more than 15,000 barrels, and ammunition storage available. Billeting for about 10,000 troops.
Timişoara..... 45°45′N., 21°13′E.	Population about 175,000. Largest industrial center and focal point of transportation facilities in western Romania. Most important industrial products include agricultural machinery, electric motors, railroad and telecommunication equipment, and motor vehicles. Also contains chemical plants, textile mills, shoe factories, and food-processing plants. Road and railroad junction on main routes to Yugoslavia and Hungary; terminus of navigation canals from the Danube. Large railroad classification yards and repair shops. Large military/civil airfield northeast of city. Refined petroleum products storage capacity 60,000 barrels; ammunition storage available. Headquarters for Air and Air Defense Command; billeting for about 15,000 troops.

D. Internal routes (C)

The internal routes (Figure 11) afford the easiest avenues of movement from the borders and the coast to strategic areas and between strategic areas. All routes contain surfaced roads, and most include 4′8½″-gage railroads for all or much of their length. Conditions for offroad dispersal and cross-country movement differ in individual

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

FIGURE 11. Strategic areas, internal routes, and approaches (C)

3. Air (U/OU)

Approaches by air[2] to Romania are mainly over mountains in the south, plains and mountains in the west and north, and plains and the Black Sea in the east. The best approach is from the east. From the south, approaches are over mountainous terrain, where maximum elevations reach nearly 9,600 feet in Bulgaria and 8,865 feet in Yugoslavia within 100 to 140 nautical miles, respectively, of the Romania border. From the west, maximum elevations reach nearly 9,400 feet in the mountains of northern Yugoslavia and eastern Austria, within 275 and 290 nautical miles, respectively, of Romania; closer to the Romania border, however, the approach is over the low Hungarian plain. From the northwest and north, the chief terrain hazards to flying are the Carpathian Mountains, where maximum elevations reach nearly 9,000 feet in Czechoslovakia and about 7,000 feet in the U.S.S.R. within 130 and 15 nautical miles, respectively, of the border. From the southeast, a maximum elevation of nearly 8,500 feet occurs in the mountains of western Turkey within 225 nautical miles of the Romania border.

Weather conditions in all approaches are most favorable in summer, when mean cloudiness is at a minimum (20% to 60%) and visibility is best. However, thunderstorms occur on 3 to 10 days per month in this season and heavy icing may be encountered in convective clouds above 10,000 feet. Weather conditions in all approaches are least favorable in winter, when intense migratory lows and associated fronts cause widespread and multilayered cloudiness (50% to 80%), low ceilings, poor visibilities, and frequent moderate to heavy icing conditions. In all approaches the mean height of the freezing level varies between the surface and 7,000 feet in winter, and between 10,000 and 15,000 feet in summer. Winds aloft are predominantly westerly in all approaches throughout the year. Mean wind speeds increase with height; the strongest mean speeds, near 50 knots, occur in winter in the southern approaches at 40,000 to 45,000 feet.

[2] The discussion zone for air approaches extends approximately 300 nautical miles beyond the borders of Romania.

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FIGURE 12. INTERNAL ROUTES (C)

ROAD AND TERRAIN	ROAD	RAILROAD	OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND VEHICULAR CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT
U.S.S.R. border near Galaţi to the Ploieşti strategic area. Flat to rolling, cultivated or grass-covered plains except the marshy flood plains of the Prut, Danube, and Siretul rivers near the border.	Two lanes, bituminous, good condition. Low-capacity timber bridge over small stream near Filimon Sîrbu.	Single track except double track between Galaţi and Barbosi and Buzău and Ploieşti. From border to Galati, site of major transloading stations, railroad is dual gage (4′8½″ and 5′0″).	Generally good, but poor to unsuited throughout year in marshy and sandy areas.
U.S.S.R. border near Iaşi to Bucharest strategic area. Rolling plains to the nearly flat valley of the Siretul, then nearly flat plains of southeastern Romania.	Two lanes, bituminous, good condition, but some curves.	Single track except double track for 9-mile stretch west of Iaşi and stretch between Adjud and Buzău. From border to Iaşi, railroad is dual gage (4′8½″ and 5′0″) and there are several transloading stations.	Generally fair from border to a few miles south of Adjud; good from south of Adjud to Bucharest. Locally unsuited in areas of marsh and swamp.
U.S.S.R. border near Halmeu to Ploieşti. Nearly flat plains near the border, rolling plains and hills in the Transylvania Basin and rugged mountains and high hills in south-central Romania.	Two lanes, bituminous, in good condition. Ferry across Someşul, low-capacity timber bridges in northern part of route.	Mainly single track; double track from Apahida to Cluj, from Apahida to Războieni, and from Braşov to Ploieşti; electrified between Braşov and Ploieşti. From border to Halmeu, site of inactive transloading station, railroad is 5′0″ gage, single track. Railroad parallels road in most of route.	Mostly fair except unsuited in high hills and mountains.
Hungary border near Oradea to Hamleu-Ploieşti route at Sebeş. Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated plains; several areas of forested hills north of the Mureşul.	From border to point 30 miles north of Deva and from Deva to Sebeş, two lanes, bituminous, in fair to good condition. Thirty miles north of Deva, one to two lanes, bituminous, in fair to good condition. Bottlenecks are sharp curves, steep grades, and a one-lane timber bridge over the Crişul Alb.	Single track except double track from Deva to Vinţu de Jos. No railroad between Vaşcău and Deva except for a 15-mile section just north of Brad.	Generally fair, but unsuited in areas adjacent to steep forested slopes.
Hungary border near Sînnicolaul Mare to internal route from near Oradea at Deva. Nearly flat, cultivated or grass-covered plains except for a short distance in forested hills west of Deva.	Two lanes, mostly bituminous, gravel section between Lugoj and Deva, in good condition. Sharp curves and steep grades east of Timişoara.	Single track except double track between Ilia and Deva (15 miles).	Generally fair, but hindered or precluded in areas of steep forested slopes or grass-covered loose sand.
Yugoslavia border near Moravita to southern-most route from Hungary at Timişoara. Nearly flat, cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, bituminous, in good condition.	Single track.....	Generally fair.
Bulgaria border near Turnu Măgurele to Bucharest. Cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, bituminous, in good condition. No bridge or ferry crossing Danube.	No direct rail connections.....	Fair to good except in perennially marshy and swampy areas.
Bulgaria border near Giurgiu to Bucharest. Cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, bituminous, in good condition.	Single track, parallels road.....	Fair to good except in perennially marshy and swampy areas.
Bucharest strategic area to Ploieşti strategic area. Nearly flat, cultivated or grass-covered plains with scattered patches of forest.	Two bituminous two-lane roads (one west and one east of railroad) in good condition.	Double track, electrified.....	Generally fair except in forested areas.
Connects amphibious landing area near Constanţa to route from U.S.S.R. border near Iaşi at Urziceni.	Two lanes, bituminous, in good condition. Danube crossed by ferry and one-lane ponton bridge.	Single track west of Giurgeni..	Good except in marshy valleys of the Danube and Ialomiţa.

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FIGURE 13. BOUNDARIES (C)

BOUNDARY	LENGTH	STATUS	TERRAIN
	Miles		
Bulgaria	380	Demarcated, undisputed, scattered light fortifications.	Boundary is formed for four-fifths of its length by the Danube, which flows across a flat-to-rolling, cultivated or grass-covered plain. In the east, the remainder of the boundary crosses cultivated or grass-covered rolling terrain.
U.S.S.R	840	Demarcated, undisputed, no fortifications.	Boundary mostly is on plains in the east, but in hills and mountains in the west. More than half of the border is delineated by sections of two rivers, the Danube and the Prut. The Danube flows across a level, marshy plain and the Prut flows in a marshy and swampy valley across cultivated and grass-covered rolling plains and hills.
Hungary	275	*do*	Boundary is entirely across nearly flat to gently rolling cultivated plains.
Yugoslavia	350	Demarcated, undisputed, scattered light fortifications.	Boundary crosses nearly flat to rolling plains except for an area in the south-central part, where it crosses high, forested hills. For the most part, the plains are cultivated or grass-covered. In the hills, and on the plains east and south of the hills, the boundary is formed by the Danube.
Black Sea coastline	141	Territorial jurisdiction claimed 12 nautical miles offshore. Scattered light fortifications.	North of Constanţa the coast is mostly low, sandy, and backed by numerous lagoons and marshes. South of Constanţa, rocky coastal cliffs and headlands are interspersed with sandy shores, and the coast is backed by a cultivated plain.

FIGURE 14. LAND APPROACHES (C)

APPROACH	ROAD	RAILROAD	OFFROAD DISPERSAL AND CROSS-COUNTRY MOVEMENT
From Bolgrad, U.S.S.R. Cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, improved earth, fair condition.	Single track, 5′0″ gage, generally parallels road.	Mostly poor. February through May, muddy ground or streams too deep to ford.
From Bel'tsy, U.S.S.R. Cultivated hills and dissected plains.	One lane, bituminous, fair condition.	*do*	Generally poor. Deeply dissected plains. Unsuited from early March through April, when streams are too deep to ford.
From Beregovo, U.S.S.R. Cultivated, flat-to-rolling plain.	Two lanes, bituminous, good condition.	*do*	Fair except unsuited during April and May, when streams are too deep to ford.
From Berettyóújfalu, Hungary. Nearly flat, cultivated plains.	*do*	Single track, 4′8½″ gage	Generally favorable except in March and April, when soils may be miry or streams too deep to ford.
From Szeged, Hungary. Nearly flat, cultivated plains.	Two lanes, gravel, fair condition.	Single track, 4′8½″ gage. Does not cross border.	*Do.*
From Vršac, Yugoslavia. Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated plains.	Two lanes, bituminous, fair to good condition.	Single track, 4′8½″ gage	Fair except poor to unsuited from early December to mid-April because of miry soils.
From Nikopol, Bulgaria. Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, bituminous, good condition. No bridge over Danube.	*do*	Generally fair except for short periods in March and April when miry soils severely restrict movement.
From Ruse, Bulgaria. Nearly flat to rolling, cultivated or grass-covered plains.	Two lanes, stone block, good condition. Combined road and railroad bridge across Danube.	*do*	*Do.*

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3. Transportation and Telecommunications

A. General (S)

The transportation and telecommunication (telecom) systems of Romania are adequate for the country's growing economic needs. In terms of density and distribution both systems generally compare favorably with those of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but are not as extensively developed as those of Hungary.

The rail and highway networks radiate primarily from Bucharest in southeastern Romania and Timişoara in western Romania, both serving most urban areas and concentrated largely in the southern half of the country. Also located in southern Romania are the Ploieşti-centered pipeline and Bucharest-centered telecom networks. The commercially significant Danube forms most of the country's border with Bulgaria.

In the mountainous central and northern areas the roads tend to be below Western standards. The alignments of both the roads and rail lines in these areas follow the geographically easier avenues, and the movement and supply of forces could more easily be effected in an east-west direction rather than north-south. Principal east-west aligned rail, road, and waterway routes also service most of southern Romania, and good pipeline, rail, and road facilities extend eastward from the strategic Bucharest-Ploieşti complex to Constanţa on the Black Sea and Galaţi on the Danube.

The government owns, controls, and operates the transportation and telecom facilities through departments and agencies of the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The highways are used primarily in short-haul feeder services, and in 1968 they accounted for nearly 70% of the freight tons moved overland. Railroads, the most important means of long-haul transport, carried 28% of the 1968 freight. The long-distance haulage via waterways amounted to slightly less than 1% of the total, while pipelines carried 1.5%.

The railroads and highways make international connections with all neighboring countries. The Danube, one of the world's great waterways, provides through navigation from its mouth on the Black Sea upstream to Ulm, West Germany. In and bordering Romania the lengthy river has only three major crossing sites—the Cernavodă rail bridge, the combination rail/highway bridge between Giurgiu and Ruse, Bulgaria, and the railroad car ferry between Calafat and Vidin, Bulgaria.

The pipeline system for both crude oil and refined products is extensive and has one international connection with the U.S.S.R. The natural gas system serves the entire country and has a connection with Hungary.

The merchant marine fleet has 49 oceangoing ships of more than 1,000 gross register tons, and since mid-1966 it has experienced a 120% increase in total deadweight tonnage. In 1968 the fleet carried about 20% of Romania's seaborne trade, the total volume of which is adequately served by the one principal, three secondary, and four minor ports. Constanţa, the principal port, and Mangalia, a secondary port of naval importance, are seaports on the Black Sea. The others are located inland on the Danube.

Civil aviation is becoming increasingly important and gradually less dependent on the U.S.S.R. than heretofore. The flag carrier, Romanian Air Transport (TAROM), has 41 major aircraft—including four of recent British manufacture. TAROM provides international services to six Communist and eight non-Communist European capitals, and to five capitals in the Middle East. Romania has increased the number of operational airfields, from 36 in 1967 to 66 in 1970. The current total includes nine military, nine joint, and 48 exclusively civil.

The expansion and modernization of Romanian transportation will undoubtedly continue, although in some cases the main emphasis of development is on improvement of existing facilities rather than on new construction. Railroads are being strengthened by renovation of track bed, rails, and structures, and slow advances are being achieved in electrification and use of automatic block signaling. Highway modernization is underway and consists generally of improvement of the national routes; completion of a highway bridge over the Danube at Giurgeni will significantly enhance the means of direct overland passage between Bucharest and Constanţa. Substantial progress, including a recently opened navigation lock, is being made at the Iron Gate dam project on the Danube near Turnu Severin.

A 240-mile refined product pipeline is believed still under construction between Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Constanţa, and at Constanţa work continues on a long-range project designed to eventually add more than 5 miles of new wharfage and double the port's size. The growing merchant marine is expected to reach a deadweight tonnage goal of 570,000 by 1971, thus giving the fleet a capability to carry 30% of the nation's seaborne trade.

One of the two major Bucharest airfields and several others to the north have been substantially enlarged and improved with new facilities. TAROM plans to acquire additional major Western-built aircraft.

The Romanian telecom system, centered on Bucharest and linking the capital with other major cities, is predominantly a carrier-equipped, open-wire network supplemented in high-density population areas by radio-relay links, underground cables, and radiocommunication stations. Bucharest-originated radiobroadcast and TV

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programs reach all sections of the country; radio-relay links and extensions of the domestic intercity wire network provide the main international telecom connections. Plans call for expansion of installations in larger cities and construction of new automatic exchanges.

B. Railroads (C)

The Romanian State Railroads (CFR), an agency under the Ministry of Transport, operates a total of 6,850 route miles of track, and it is the country's primary means of long-haul transportation. In addition to the CFR, many industrial lines of less importance are operated by the Forestry Railways (CFF) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Radiating principally from Bucharest and Timişoara, the rail system is most extensively developed in the southeastern, central, and western regions. The most heavily traveled lines are Bucharest–Braşov, Bucharest–Constanţa, and Bucharest–Turnu Severin. Some of the principal east-west routes traverse the Transylvanian Alps, others cross the Moldavian Carpathians; in those mountain areas the rail lines have steep grades, sharp curves, numerous bridges and tunnels, and deep cuts and fills. Passes in the Carpathians range from 1,640 to 1,970 feet in elevation, and those in the Transylvanian Alps exceed 6,000 feet. In southeastern Romania the Danube and its marshes limit rail access to the seaboard plain and its port areas.

As of 1 November 1969 the CFR network consisted of about 6,430 miles of standard gage (4′8½″), 400 miles of various narrow gages, and about 20 miles of 5′0″ broad-gage track. The 2,850 miles of CFF lines are narrow gage, chiefly 2′6″ gage. Although predominantly a single-track network, standard-gage CFR lines have about 420 miles of double track, mostly in the southeast around Bucharest and Ploieşti. CFR electrification continues and currently consists of 103 miles of standard-gage and 43 miles of narrow-gage lines in the vicinity of Arad.

International connections include seven with the U.S.S.R., three with Bulgaria (one by rail ferry), two with Yugoslavia, and four with Hungary. Standard-gage lines exist on both sides of all frontier connections, except those with the U.S.S.R., where direct interchange of rolling stock is precluded by the difference in gage and freight transfer is necessary. Soviet-Romanian freight is transloaded at eight yards, located two each at Sighetul Marmaţiei, Dorneşti, Iaşi, and Galaţi. The yards range in size from approximately 10 to 30 tracks and contain both standard- and broad-gage track. Transloading facilities at the Halmeu connection are believed not to be in use. One of the three connections with Bulgaria is made via the cross-Danube railroad car ferry operating between Calafat and Vidin, Bulgaria.

The standard-gage Romanian equipment can be interchanged freely with that of neighboring countries. The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) freight-car pool, formed in 1964 by railroads of the U.S.S.R. and East European Communist countries, went into effect with an inventory of 92,700 cars, of which Romania contributed 8,000 initially—with 3,000 additional freight cars to follow at a later date. The pool now has more than 110,000 cars in service among the seven member countries.

The rail network has more than 4,000 bridges 12 feet and over in length; they total about 200,000 feet in length. Several are major structures, but only about 5% of the total are over 250 feet. The longest is the 7,296-foot railroad and highway bridge over the Danube at Giurgiu. Most bridges 66 feet or longer are of steel. Truss construction predominates in spans of over 100 feet; shorter spans are usually girders. Only two rail bridges cross the Danube—the international bridge connecting Giurgiu with Ruse, Bulgaria, and the Romanian bridge at Cernavodă. Of an estimated 130 tunnels, totaling about 139,000 feet in length, the 14,334-foot structure northeast of Braşov is the longest on the network.

The track structure is in moderately good condition and is being improved constantly (Figure 15). Some secondary lines remain in poor condition because of inferior ballast and worn rails. Rails are the standard T section, mostly weighing from 75 to 99 pounds per yard. During the 1957-67 period the CFR laid approximately 1,000 miles of continuously welded rail, and it planned to add from 180 to 220 miles annually between 1967 and 1970. Wooden ties, primarily of treated beech, are being gradually replaced by prestressed, reinforced-concrete ties. Most track has crushed-rock ballast. On several



FIGURE 15. Double-track railroad section between Ploieşti and Buzău. Newly renovated track with welded rail, prestressed reinforced-concrete ties, and crushed rock ballast alongside older track (right) with wooden ties. (C)

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The network density is 0.52 mile of highway per square mile of area. This is a slightly higher ratio than that of neighboring Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The ratio in the Soviet Union is considerably lower, near 0.12. Romania is serviced by international highway connections with all adjacent countries.

The total highway mileage is approximately 48,000. About 7,200 miles are classified as national highways, most of which are bituminous surfaced. The national highways include principal through routes, connecting roads between the national and regional capitals, and access roads to important economic centers. The network also has about 5,000 miles classified as regional roads, 11,700 miles as district roads, and 24,100 miles of unclassified or local roads.

About 16% of the highways (7,600 miles) are paved. Most of these are bituminous surfaced and are classified as national highways. Some 34%, or 16,300 miles, are crushed stone or gravel roads. The remaining 24,100 miles (50%) are earth.

Road surface widths range from 12 to 36 feet, but most paved roads (Figure 17) have a minimum width of 18 feet, and only a few are wider than 22 feet. Base construction is generally of sand and gravel and ranges in thickness from 6 to 26 inches. Shoulder widths are as great as 10 feet, but generally there are less than 6 feet. The condition of the paved national highways varies from fair to good, about 65% of them being in good condition. Highways through the mountains are narrow and have numerous steep grades and sharp curves. Many of the worst bottlenecks are being eliminated gradually by the highway modernization program.

The highway system has an estimated 1,100 bridges. Most bridges on more important highways are of steel, reinforced concrete, or masonry. The few timber bridges still in use are being replaced gradually by reinforced-concrete structures. Most of the older long-span bridges are of steel; those of intermediate length are of masonry. Most new bridges have a minimum horizontal clearance of 16 to 20 feet, a minimum vertical clearance of 12 feet, and, on main roads, a capacity of 40 to 60 tons.

The significant highways have no tunnels or fords. The most important ferries cross the Danube, which has only one highway bridge crossing—that between Giurgiu and Ruse, Bulgaria. Consequently, the Danube ferries are potentially a critical transportation factor.



FIGURE 17. Two-lane, bituminous-surfaced road. This type is the kind most prevalent among national highway routes. (U/OU)

Traffic in mountainous areas is impeded by washouts caused by heavy rains during the period May-August and by steep grades, sharp curves, narrow passes, and landslides. Rainfall in conjunction with melting snow in the spring may cause highway flooding in lowland areas, and heavy snow (November-March) may restrict traffic through the mountains.

Highway transport services are provided by transportation agencies under the control of the Ministry of Transport's General Directorate of Automobile Transport. The larger, more important state-owned industrial enterprises operate their own motor transport fleets, and buslines operate between population centers.

In 1968 some 401.5 million short tons of freight were carried and 3.7 billion short-ton-miles were produced. Among the principal goods shipped by highway are construction materials, lumber, foodstuffs, and light industrial products. The traffic volume is greatest on the national highways radiating from Bucharest.

Precise motor vehicle inventory statistics are not available for Romania. It is estimated that close to 120,000 motor vehicles are in use, including some 73,000 trucks, 11,000 buses, and 35,000 or more passenger cars. Trends in truck production indicate that trucks of 5-ton capacity or more will soon dominate the truck fleet. A relatively large percentage of the motor vehicles are of recent manufacture, and most are probably in fairly good condition.

Romania produces trucks, buses, and passenger cars. Until quite recently Romania imported passenger cars from the U.S.S.R. and some Eastern European Communist countries; however, by recent agreements Western European auto companies have established assembly plants in the country, and Romania is no longer totally dependent on importation for passenger cars. Renault, of France, has built a plant in Colibaşi which eventually is to have a capacity to produce 50,000 vehicles yearly. MAN (*Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg A.G.*), of West Germany, has agreed to produce utility vehicles in Romania. Romania has recently begun to export tractors, buses, and small trucks to other East European Communist countries and the U.S.S.R.

The Ministry of Transport is responsible for carrying out the government's highway construction policies and providing the guidance for highway construction, modernization, repair, and maintenance. Construction and maintenance work is performed by both civilian and military personnel.

The major problems of construction and upkeep arise primarily from adverse topography and weather—rugged terrain and snow in the mountains and periods of flooding in the lowlands. Maintenance is a constant problem because road bases and surfaces, in many cases, are not strong enough to withstand traffic during the winter, and by spring they are generally in need of repair. Romania possesses adequate supplies of construction materials such as gravel, bitumen, and cement.

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main lines the axleload limit is 21 short tons, and on the Bucharest–Braşov line, 23 short tons. Other principal lines have axleload limits of 20 short tons; on secondary lines the limit is generally 17 short tons but as low as 13.

More than 500 miles of lines are equipped with an automatic-block system; however, most train operations continue to be controlled by manual-block systems. Within the CFR network 120 main railroad yards are equipped with light signals and locking installations, which permit electrical operation of approximately 4,000 switches. Train movements over manual block sections are probably controlled by the countrywide CFR telephone system, or by telegraph. Radio contact between railroad stations and locomotives was scheduled to begin in 1968.

Diesel oil, the chief source of locomotive power, is available in ample domestic supply. Water is plentiful throughout the year in most areas, and it is used with treatment only in the larger yards and rail centers. Water consumption declines as greater use is made of diesel and electric locomotives.

In 1968 the railroads, which employed about 159,000 persons, carried 162.3 million short tons of freight and produced 27.6 billion short-ton-miles. During the same year they carried 303 million passengers and produced 10.0 billion passenger-miles. In 1968 diesel and electric traction accounted for 68% of the total traffic, and the average gross weight of freight trains on the network was more than 1,300 short tons. The principal commodities carried were quarry and wood products, coal, construction materials, and petroleum.

Steam locomotives production ceased in 1959, and the locomotive fleet is being modernized rapidly through the acquisition of diesel and electric locomotives. Through licensing agreements with Western European manufacturers, Romania obtains the benefit of advanced designs, production techniques, and methods of operation. Under Swiss license, 2,100-horsepower diesel electrics (Figure 16) have been in continuous production since 1960 by the Electroputere Works in Craiova, where a finished locomotive is now turned out every 3 days. Of 800 built by June 1969, 560 were turned over to the CFR, and the others were exported mainly to Bulgaria and Poland. Since 1967, diesel-hydraulic locomotives have been produced under West German and Swiss license at Bucharest. The Swedish-licensed production of 5,100-kilowatt electric locomotives continues at Craiova, following the purchase of 10 units from Sweden in 1965-67. As of November 1969 Romania had an estimated 2,400 steam, 650 diesel, and 30 electric locomotives.



FIGURE 16. 2,100-h.p. diesel-electric locomotive. The units have a maximum axleload of 21 short tons and are in wide use on many main lines. (U/OU)

In January 1969 the freight car inventory totaled about 79,500, predominantly two-axle cars with screw couplers. The Arad Railroad Car Plant accounts for 72% of the annual domestic production and builds nearly all types of railroad cars. The two other builders are the Grivita Rosie Works of Bucharest, the leading producer of tank cars, and the Mechanical Works of Turnu Severin, a key producer of gondola and bulk cement cars. About 50% of the freight cars produced are exported—the recipient countries totaling 14.

Passenger cars, all four-axle first-, second-, and third-class coaches, are manufactured at the Arad Railroad Car Plant.

Most of the major repairs to locomotives and rolling stock are accomplished at the manufacturing plants. The Craiova Diesel Electric Repair Plant, under construction near the Electroputere Works, is expected to perform general and/or major repairs on 115 locomotives per year. A new repair facility for diesel locomotives was opened in 1967 at Iaşi. Additional large repair plants are at Constanţa and Galaţi. Shops for minor repairs are at railroad junctions and major yards.

The Deva Regional Railroad Directorate, one of eight CFR directorates, offers a 13-week course for yard engineers, switchmen, and brakemen and a 27-week course for mainline engineers, conductors, and guards.

Maintenance and modernization of the existing rail network, rather than new construction, continues to be implemented on principal lines; short industrial feeder lines and bypass lines have been constructed to alleviate heavy traffic bottlenecks. The major emphasis is on renovation of the track bed and structures and the laying of welded and heavier rails and concrete ties.

The current 5-year plan (1971-75) continues some of the programs of previous plans—reducing steam traction to the point where it will account for only 20% of all rail haulage, extending dieselization to secondary lines, electrifying the 164-mile Craiova–Caransebeş–Cîlnic line, and raising the production of diesel and electric locomotives to more than 200 units annually. Additional programs call for extending the use of automatic block signaling and the installation of centralized traffic control (CTC) on main lines.

C. Highways (S)

Highway transport, the principal carrier of freight in Romania, is used primarily for short hauls, serving as a feeder system for the railroads and meeting local transportation needs. The 48,000-mile network is adequate for present requirements, but rugged mountainous terrain and seasonally adverse weather factors would restrict the movement and supply of large military forces by road.

With the exception of mountainous areas, the road net is fairly evenly distributed, the densest portion being in the southeast around Bucharest. Several important through routes radiate from Bucharest to the borders, and others extend along the country's perimeter. They are generally good bituminous-surfaced roads at least two lanes in width.

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A greater supply of construction and maintenance equipment will be required to fully implement the highway modernization program. Domestic production provides some of the basic equipment such as bulldozers and graders, but the more advanced machinery is imported—principally from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S.S.R.

The highway modernization program, incorporated in the 6-year plan (1960-65) and continued in the 5-year plans for 1966-70 and 1971-75, emphasizes work on improvement of existing highways rather than on new construction. Improvements generally consist of widening, resurfacing, and realigning roads and replacing low-capacity bridges. By 1969 about 20% of the entire road network had been modernized. Most efforts were expended on the national route system, where 75% of the roads (5,475 miles) have been improved. Major projects under construction include a highway bridge across the Danube between Giurgeni and Vadu Oii, the Vadu Oii–Constanţa Expressway, and a limited-access highway between Bucharest and Piteşti. The Sibiu circumferential highway was recently completed. The Giurgeni–Vadu Oii bridge is scheduled to be opened for traffic by 1971.

D. Inland waterways (C)

Romanian waterways transport a relatively small volume of the national traffic. Domestically, they afford effective routes for exporting bulk cargo, mostly carried via the Danube. Internationally, the Danube provides an important through route in southeast Europe and forms a major part of the Romanian boundary with Bulgaria; it also gives Romania a dependable connection northwestward to countries in central and western Europe. There are 1,445 miles of navigable waterways, 932 of which are on the Danube and its anabranches and delta distributaries.

In and bordering Romania the Danube is suitable for lengthy east-west movements of military supplies and equipment. Tactically it remains a formidable barrier to rapid land movement, either northward to or southward from the country.

The Danube provides a 1,608-mile international navigable route between the Black Sea and Ulm, West Germany. Via the Braţul Sulina, the main delta navigational channel, the lower Danube is navigable by 6,500-ton oceangoing vessels to Brăila, 106 miles above Sulina, and by 2,500-ton river craft to Turnu Severin, 578 miles above Sulina. The Iron Gate (gorge), and the middle Danube from Turnu Severin to the limit of Romanian territory at Baziaş, are navigable by fully loaded 1,000-ton barges.

The Prut, a Danube tributary forming most of Romania's eastern boundary with the U.S.S.R., is the only other waterway of significance. Entering the Danube east of Galaţi, the river is used primarily for transporting agricultural products and timber rafting. The Prut is navigable at low water by 300- to 500-ton barges for 248 miles above its mouth to Ungheni-Prut (Ungeny, U.S.S.R.), and at high water for 275 miles upstream to Sculeni.

The numerous ports on the Danube range in size and importance from those with quays and basins, direct rail and road clearance, and mechanical handling equipment to small improvised installations using the natural riverbank. The main inland waterway ports are: Sulina, primarily a river-to-ocean transshipment point for grain, ores, manufactures, sulfur, and cement; Galaţi, important for timber floated down the Siretul and as a river-to-rail transshipment port; Brăila, a grain-handling center and the upstream terminus of navigation for maritime vessels; Giurgiu, a transshipment point for Ploieşti petroleum; Turnu Severin, a river-to-rail transshipment point and the upstream limit of navigation for 2,500-ton barges; and Orşova, a regrouping point for barge trains operating through the Iron Gate and a transshipment point of raw materials destined for the industrial complex at Reşiţa. There are no Romanian ports of significance on the Prut.

The Danube is spanned by only two fixed structures, the rail bridge at Cernavodă and the rail/highway bridge connecting Giurgiu with Ruse, Bulgaria. Additional crossing sites include highway ferries, and the important railroad car ferry between Calafat and Vidin, Bulgaria. At the Iron Gate dam construction site the first of two planned lock installations was recently put into operation. The installation (Figure 18) is situated on the Romanian (left) bank and has two tandem chambers, each measuring 112 feet in width and 1,017 feet in length. The lock, coupled with closure of the river at the damsite and the beginning of water retention above it, has probably rendered unnecessary the continued use of locomotives and other towing aids heretofore required for the upstream passage of vessels.

Freezing is a major traffic interruption factor, and river navigation may be impeded by seasonal water-level fluctuations. Each year ice conditions stop Danube traffic for 30 to 40 days, and the traffic on other waterways for 47 to 90 days. The Iron Gate section of the Danube is vulnerable, and through navigation would be seriously handicapped or halted by extensive damage to the lock and dam complex or by breakdowns of craft in the navigational channel.

FIGURE 18. Iron Gate project. Near site of recently opened lock on Romanian shore of Danube. (U/OU)

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In 1968 the inland waterways carried about 4.0 million short tons of freight and accounted for 855 million short-ton-miles. Total inland waterway traffic, most of which is international trade, represented slightly less than 1% of the total freight carried in Romanian surface transport and about 3% of the national performance in ton-miles. Principal commodities carried are crude oil and petroleum products, coal, grain, and lumber.

In 1967 the Romanian Danube fleet, with over 95% of all waterway craft in the country, consisted of four self-propelled barges, 807 dumb barges, and 240 tugs. The barges, mostly bulk cargo units, supplied a total capacity of 436,071 short tons, and the tugs and self-propelled barges provided a total of 75,721 horsepower. The fleet is generally adequate in numbers and condition for meeting current traffic demands. Since 1960 the tempo of vessel construction, conversion, and rate of retirement has increased steadily.

Romanian waterways are controlled by the General Directorate of Civil Navigation in the Ministry of Transport. The principal inland waterway carrier, the government-owned Romanian Sea and River Navigation Organization (NAVROM) is subordinate to the ministry and operates all Romanian maritime and river cargo and passenger vessels. International Danube navigation between Austria and the Black Sea is regulated by the Danube Commission. The commission, established in 1948 at the U.S.S.R.-sponsored Belgrade Convention, represents all riparian states except West Germany. Principal functions are the planning of waterway improvement projects; promulgation of operating regulations; coordination of maintenance procedures, regulations, and services; and publication of navigation information.

Maintenance activities consist largely of efforts to overcome silting in the Brațul Sulina, prevention of damage during the spring ice breakup, and general improvement of the waterways. On the Danube bordering Bulgaria most of the navigation channel is in Romanian waters, with routine maintenance largely performed by the latter.

The most significant waterway development underway is the Iron Gate project, on which major construction commenced in 1964 and which is scheduled for completion in 1971. A joint Romanian-Yugoslav endeavor, the project includes damming the Danube about 585 miles from the mouth, and constructing navigation locks and hydroelectric powerplants. The reservoir behind the dam will eliminate strong crosscurrents and shallows in the Iron Gate section, and allow unhindered, two-way, day and night traffic by fully loaded 1,000-ton barges through the section. The reservoir is to eventually increase the controlling depth upstream to Belgrade from 6.2 to 11.5 feet, thus rendering the Yugoslav capital accessible to 5,000-ton river-seagoing vessels. A lock installation identical to that now operating on the left bank is planned for the opposite (Yugoslav) bank.

Other important developments underway are expansion of port facilities at Galați and Turnu Măgurele and construction of new port facilities at Orșova, the relocation of which was made necessary by the Iron Gate project. At Galați work is continuing on a new industrial port basin and a 5-mile canal connecting the basin to the Danube; the project is scheduled for completion in 1971. The new facilities at Turnu Măgurele are expected to have a capacity of more than 2.5 million tons by 1975.

E. Pipelines (S)

Romania has an extensive pipeline network located principally in the central and southeastern sections of the country. The crude-oil and refined-products pipelines have a total length of about 2,200 miles. Romania also has an extensive natural-gas pipeline network estimated to be 2,500 miles long; this network extends throughout the country and to other Communist countries of Eastern Europe.

Romania has two major crude-oil pipeline systems. The longer extends from the Oltenia oilfields region of southwestern Romania to a pipeline distribution system encircling the Ploiești area. Including the feeder lines in the oilfields and the distribution pipelines to the refineries at Ploiești, the total length of this system is about 1,600 miles. The other major system originates in the Moldavian oilfields and carries crude oil south to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

There are four major refined-products pipeline systems. One system consists of two parallel lines extending from Băicoi through Ploiești to Făurei. A third parallel pipeline is proposed for this system. A second major system carries refined products from Făurei through Galați to Reni in the U.S.S.R. The third major system extends from Făurei to Constanța. Various sections of this system reportedly have dual lines. Future plans include an additional parallel line from Făurei to Constanța. A 240-mile product pipeline from the Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej refinery to Constanța is believed still under construction. The fourth system consists of two parallel lines from Cîmpina to Bucharest, where one line terminates. The other continues to Giurgiu on the Bulgaria border.

The largest natural-gas pipeline network originates at Noul-Săsesc gasfield in central Romania and extends to Bucharest. A second major system originates at the Zău de Cîmpie gasfield and connects with the Hungarian terminal at Dió:györ. About 145 miles of the line are in Romania. A third major system extends from the Nadeș gasfield to Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.

Details of selected existing and planned pipelines are summarized in Figure 19.

F. Ports (S)

Romania has one principal, three secondary, and four minor ports. Constanța, the principal port, and Mangalia, a secondary port of naval importance only, are on the Black Sea coast. The secondary ports of Galați and Brăila and the minor ports of Sulina, Tulcea, Chilia Veche, and Isaccea are on the Danube.

Constanța can accommodate oceangoing ships with drafts of up to 32 feet and is considered the port most adaptable to military use. It handles two-thirds of the total maritime trade and will handle an increasingly higher proportion as the various stages of the extensive port development program underway are completed.

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FIGURE 19. SELECTED EXISTING AND PLANNED PIPELINES (S)

TERMINALS		LENGTH	DIAMETER	PRODUCTS TRANSPORTED	CAPACITY	REMARKS
FROM	TO					
		Miles	*Inches*		*Bbl./day*	
Oltenia oilfields	Ploieşti	120	2–8	Crude	*na*	Pumping station at Băicoi.
Moldavian oilfields	Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.	62	2–10	*do*	*na*	
Băicoi	Făurei	81	9–10	Refined	*na*	Pumping stations at Ploieşti, Buzău.
Do	*do*	81	10	*do*	*na*	*Do.*
Do	*do*	81	*na*	*do*	*na*	Planned.
Făurei	Constanţa	106	10	*do*	20,000	Pumping stations at Hagieni, Cernavodă, Palas.
Do	*do*	106	*na*	*do*	*na*	Planned.
Do	Reni, U.S.S.R.	68	10	*do*	14,000	Pumping station at Galaţi.
Cîmpina	Giurgiu	99	5	*do*	*na*	Pumping station at Ploieşti.
Do	Bucharest	55	5	*do*	*na*	*Do.*
Ploieşti	*do*	37	10	*do*	*na*	
Do	Constanţa	176	10	*do*	*20,000	Planned.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej	*do*	*240	*na*	*do*	*na*	Believed still under construction.
Măneşti gasfield	Bucharest	40	*na*	Natural gas	*na*	
Gura Şuţii gasfield	*do*	47	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Sărmăşel gasfield	Aiud	81	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Şincai gasfield	Zău de Cîmpie	12	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Zău de Cîmpie gasfield	Hungarian border	143	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Singeorgiu de Pădure gasfield	Tîrgu Mureş	25	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Nadeş gasfield	Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.	118	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Şaroş gasfield	Tîrgu Mureş	25	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Cetatea de Baltă gasfield	Şaroş	19	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Bazna gasfield	Hunedoara	87	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Copşa Mică	Avrig	62	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Noul-Săsesc	Bucharest	220	*na*	*do*	*na*	Includes 102 miles of dual line.
Boldeşti oilfield	Ploieşti	6	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Moreni oilfield Gura Ocniţei oilfield Aricești-Rahtivanii oilfield	Cîmpina, Ploieşti	75	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Ţicleni	Jiu Paroseni	47	*na*	*do*	*na*	
Moineşti oilfield group	Dărmăneşti	47	*na*	*do*	*na*	

na Data not available.
*Estimated.

Practically all of remaining maritime trade is handled at Galaţi, Brăila, Tulcea, and Sulina.

The Romanian Black Sea coast is fairly regular and lacks natural harbors; those at Constanţa and Mangalia are artificial. The Danube ports have natural harbors that have been improved by dredging; the harbors at Galaţi and Brăila have been augmented by construction of artificial basins. Oceangoing ships can proceed 92 nautical miles upstream as far as Brăila. Maritime shipping on the Danube is hindered by: 1) a controlling depth of 24 feet over the bar at the entrance; 2) a considerable seasonal variation in the river water level, normally amounting to 9 feet; and 3) ice conditions, with ships seldom venturing above the river mouth in January and February because of the danger of becoming icebound. The lack of direct alongside berthing facilities in the river ports also causes difficulties; ships in most instances have to berth at offshore pontons or breast off with the aid of poles, barges, or fenders, and transfer cargo over gangways and catwalks.

Ports are under the control and management of NAVROM, the state agency subordinate to the Ministry of Transport. Operational aspects are administered by regional maritime directorates, offices of which are found in the more important ports.

Constanţa, about 25 miles north of the Romania-Bulgaria border, is a terminus of highway and rail lines that lead to all parts of the country. Petroleum pipelines connect the port with the Ploieşti oilfields. The port has extensive facilities for storing and handling general cargo, petroleum, and grain, and it is the site of the largest Romanian ship-repair yard. Annual trade volume is about 7,000,000 tons; principal shipments are petroleum, lumber, wood, processed food products, ores, chemicals, and cement; principal receipts are iron ore, coal, manufactured goods, cotton, hides, rice, and citrus fruits. The harbor, which is protected by the configuration of the land and by two breakwaters, consists of seven basins, has a total water area of 165 acres, and general depths of 20 to 36 feet. Some 20,000 feet of wharfage provide

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alongside berths for five large, 19 standard, and seven small ocean-type cargo vessels. four standard and two small coaster-type cargo vessels, six lighters, and three standard and five small ocean-type tankers. The roadstead outside the port provides numerous anchorage berths for all classes of vessels. Estimated military port capacity is 20,400 long tons. The largest drydocking facility is a floating drydock with a lifting capacity of 15,000 long tons. The first stages of an ambitious long-range program to extend the port southward and more than double it in size are well under way, with the eventual goal of adding more than 5 miles of new wharfage. Immediate plans call for adding a new quay for unloading iron ore, grain silos, warehouses, cranes, vegetable-oil tanks, a cold-storage building, new access rail lines and paved roads, and more stacking space for general cargo. Some of the new wharfage to be built will have depths of up to 43 feet alongside and will have specialized terminals for petroleum and ores.

Details of the secondary ports are summarized in Figure 20.

G. Merchant marine (C)

In late 1969 the Romanian merchant fleet comprised 49 ships of 1,000 gross register tons (g.r.t.) or over, totaling 343,192 g.r.t. and 497,416 deadweight tons (d.w.t.). This is an increase since 30 June 1966 of 36% in the number

FIGURE 20. SECONDARY PORTS (S)

NAME; LOCATION; ESTIMATED MILITARY PORT CAPACITY*	ACTIVITIES	HARBOR**	BERTHS
Brăila..... 45°16′N., 27°59′E.; on Danube 92 nautical miles from mouth. 3,500	Head of maritime navigation on Danube; important transshipment port and industrial center. Principal receipts: construction material, wood and wood products, grain. Principal shipments: metal, processed goods, wood and wood products, grain. Three shipyards construct and repair various types of river vessels.	Well-protected river harbor with 2 divisions: river section 3 miles long, 1,000 ft. wide, depths 19 to 100 ft.; basin 1,800 ft. long, 450 ft. wide, least depth 19 ft. Port approached from Black Sea through main branch of Danube, limiting depth 24 ft.	Alongside—For 17 small ocean-type cargo vessels, 7 standard coaster-type cargo vessels, 2 lighters, 3 standard coaster-type tankers. Mooring berths—For 8 standard ocean-type cargo vessels.
Galaţi..... 45°27′N., 28°03′E.; on Danube 80 nautical miles from mouth. 4,100	Important transshipment port and industrial center; site of largest shipbuilding yard, capable of constructing vessels up to 12,500 d.w.t.; emergency ship repairs only; largest drydocking facility, marine railway with hauling capacity of 2,000 tons; shipyard to be expanded and wharfage to be added to serve timber, coal, and ore storage depots; small basin to be constructed to serve new metallurgical combine. Principal receipts: metals, textiles, iron ore, coal, grain, lumber, wood products, machinery. Principal shipments: lumber and wood products, slag, ores, grain, foodstuffs.	Well-protected river harbor with 3 divisions: river section 3 miles long, 1/4 to 1/2 mile wide, depth 27 ft.; timber basin 1,800 ft. long, 250 to 800 ft. wide, depth 16 ft.; dock basin, length 1,730 ft., width 340 to 1,000 ft., depth 15 ft.; port approached from Black Sea through main branch of Danube, limiting depth 24 ft.	Alongside—For 2 standard and 20 small ocean-type cargo vessels, 17 small coaster-type cargo vessels; and 7 lighters. Anchorage—For several vessels at fixed positions along N. river bank. Mooring berths—Several buoys.
Mangalia..... 43°48′N., 28°35′E.; on Black Sea coast 4 miles N. of Bulgarian border. 3,000	Headquarters and principal operating base of Romanian naval forces; landing, shipyard, supply, ordnance, communications, training, housing, and medical facilities; numerous material storage buildings and underground storage areas for ordnance and petroleum products; ship repairs effected at either of 2 yards; largest drydocking facility, sidehaul marine railway with capacity of 200 to 300 tons; no commercial activities.	Two harbor divisions: breakwater-protected Old Port, 45 acres, depth 30 ft. in fairway, shallow elsewhere; Lacul Mangalia, 4 miles long, 1/8 to 1/4 mile wide, depths 7 to 120 ft.; entrance dredged to 30 ft.	Alongside—For 2 destroyer escorts, 1 submarine, 7 minesweepers, 10 motor torpedo boats and 3 standard coaster-type tankers. Anchorage—Exposed, temporary anchorage outside of port in Black Sea for all classes of vessels. Mooring berths—Several Mediterranean-mooring berths for small craft.

*The estimated military port capacity is the maximum amount of general cargo—expressed in long tons—that can be unloaded onto the wharves and cleared from the wharf aprons during a period of one 24-hour day (20 effective cargo-working hours). The estimate is based on static cargo-transfer facilities of the port existing at the time the estimate is prepared and is designed for comparison rather than for operational purposes; it cannot be projected beyond a single day by straight multiplication.

**Depths at Galaţi and Brăila refer to low river stage.

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of ships, 112% in g.r.t., and 120% in d.w.t. The composition of the fleet on 30 November 1969 was as follows:

Type	No.	G.R.T.	D.W.T.
Dry cargo	33	111,919	155,652
Bulk cargo	10	153,798	228,400
Tanker	4	69,313	110,564
Passenger	1	6,850	2,300
Training ship	1	1,312	500
Total	49	343,192	497,416

The fleet is relatively young, and 43 ships less than 10 years old represent 90% of the total d.w.t. Four dry cargo ships, 10 bulk cargo ships, and four tankers are each over 12,500 d.w.t. and with a total of 394,192 d.w.t. account for 79% of the fleet's total. With the exception of one oil-fired steamship, all units are diesel powered. Speeds range from 9.0 to 22.0 knots.

Augmenting the oceangoing ships are five dry ships (under 1,000 g.r.t.) totaling 3,017 g.r.t. and 3,342 d.w.t. and four fish factory trawlers (over 1,000 g.r.t.) totaling 13,146 g.r.t. and 7,853 d.w.t.

The significant growth of the merchant fleet is attributed mainly to an expanding ship production capability of the domestic shipbuilding industry, and of 49 ships in the fleet, 29 are Romanian built. However, during the period 1 January 1966 to 30 November 1969 the significant increase in the fleet tonnage is attributed primarily to the purchase from Japan of eight bulk cargo ships totaling 203,400 d.w.t. and two tankers totaling 72,220 d.w.t., which represent 55% of the total fleet tonnage. During the same period two dry cargo ships totaling 29,435 d.w.t. were built to Romanian order in the United Kingdom, and domestic shipyards constructed eight dry cargo ships totaling 33,115 d.w.t. and two bulk ore carriers totaling 25,000 d.w.t.; only three dry cargo ships were withdrawn from service, including one laid up (final disposition is unknown) and two sold to Communist China.

Romania's 5-year plan (1966-70) called for a merchant marine of 70 ships totaling 570,000 d.w.t. by the end of 1970, an increase of nearly 200% over the fleet tonnage on 1 January 1966. As of 30 November 1969 nearly 90% of the tonnage goal had been met. Domestic shipyards should be able to add another 60,000 d.w.t. by 1971, thus fulfilling 98% of the tonnage goal.

The importance of the domestic shipbuilding industry has increased substantially since 1960, when the Galaţi shipyard completed a 4,500-d.w.t. dry cargo ship—the first Romanian-built, oceangoing merchant vessel. In ensuing years domestic shipyards have constructed 61 1,000- to 12,500-d.w.t. dry cargo ships and timber and bulk carriers, with 23 exported to the U.S.S.R., eight exported to Communist China, and the remaining 30 delivered to the Romanian fleet. The main shipyard, at Galaţi, was greatly expanded and rebuilt to permit application of the latest shipbuilding techniques, and as a result Romania is now building 12,500-d.w.t. ships. A vast expansion and development program is currently underway at Constanţa, which also has a large ship-repair capability. It is planned to build ships of 35,000 d.w.t. when the new building ways are completed in 1971. As of December 1969 Romanian shipyards were building or had orders to build 41 ships as follows:

Type	Unit d.w.t.	No.	Total d.w.t.	Recipient
Bulk carrier	12,500	3	37,500	Romania
Timber carrier	3,750	*5	18,750	U.S.S.R.
Dry cargo	12,500	1	12,500	Communist China
Do.	4,500	2	9,000	*Do.*
Do.	4,500	2	9,000	India
Bulk carrier	14,000	10	140,000	*Do.*
Refrigerated cargo	1,600	6	9,600	Iran
Do.	1,990	12	23,880	Poland

*It is believed the U.S.S.R. has placed a new order for an additional 23 timber carriers.

Romania's seaborne foreign trade is predominantly with countries of Western Europe and those bordering the Mediterranean Sea. In 1968 the volume of trade reached an estimated 14.4 million short tons, 18% of which was carried in domestic ships. Assuming continued and rapid growth, the fleet should be able to carry 30% of the trade by the end of 1970, when the volume is expected to exceed 15.4 million short tons. Romanian merchant ships are mostly employed on scheduled and nonscheduled routes from the Black Sea to Mediterranean and Western European ports, but a few make extended voyages to Asia and to North and South America. In 1968 ships of the merchant fleet made 850 calls at 160 ports. The one passenger vessel is employed as a cruise ship to ports in the Black and Mediterranean Sea areas.

The Romanian merchant marine would be able to provide only limited logistic support and very limited troop transport for any military operation. Thirty-three dry cargo and 10 bulk cargo ships have a combined lift capability of about 384,000 long tons of cargo. The capability could be supplemented by units of the small coastal fleet. None of the vessels has a large hatch (over 50 feet in length), and only one has a heavy-lift capability of 60 tons. The four tankers can transport about 97,000 tons (739,000 barrels) of petroleum products. The passenger ship would be able to transport about 1,760 troops under emergency conditions.

The state-owned Romanian merchant marine is under the control and management of NAVROM, the Romanian Sea and River Navigation Organization, an agency subordinate to the Ministry of Transport. Operational control of the merchant marine is delegated to the Maritime Directorate at Constanţa; NAVROM controls training and licensing of personnel and administers maritime training schools.

The merchant marine employs an estimated 2,500 persons, all Romanian nationals. To overcome difficulties in obtaining sufficient shipboard personnel, the authorities recruit seamen from the army and navy and reportedly are offering salaries reasonably comparable to those in European maritime countries. All personnel may be required to affiliate with a Bucharest-headquartered trade union known as the *Sindicatul Port Transport*, the functions of which are to promote labor discipline, and administer the social insurance system, training programs, and the various safety, health, and welfare plans.

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Political indoctrination of maritime personnel is the function of Communist Party representatives aboard ship. The political officer has no authority in overall ship operations; however, his adverse reports may result in the dismissal of personnel by the shipping company. Currently, membership in the Romanian Communist Party is not required for employment, and it is no longer mandatory that a shipmaster be a party member.

The Marine Technical School at Constanţa, established in 1949, offers a 4-year course covering navigation, engineering, and naval construction. Admission is based on competitive examination and the normal enrollment is 180 students, all of whom attend under a scholarship program. In 1966 an officers' maritime academy was opened in Bucharest. The first full 4-year term commenced in 1967.

H. Civil air (S)

Romanian civil aviation is directed and controlled by the government. All aircraft belong to the state, and with the exception of a small air fleet operated by the Security Police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, all civil aviation activities are conducted by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport. At the operational level, two DGCA elements provide civil air transportation. One, the Air Work Enterprise (IAU), provides miscellaneous airwork services for the ministries responsible for agriculture, forests, and health. These operations encompass mainly crop dusting and spraying, and the air movement of medical patients and supplies. The second element is Romanian Air Transport (TAROM), the country's single flag carrier, which is responsible for almost all passenger and cargo transport operations—both domestic and international. TAROM's main base of operations has been Bucharest/Baneasa airport, but by mid-1970 it will transfer to the greatly improved Bucharest/Otopeni airport. The latter will handle almost all international flights, and Bucharest/Baneasa will probably retain only domestic operations.

By 1968 TAROM transported nearly 670,000 passengers, more than 50% of whom traveled on international routes. During the summer, the peak period of operations, scheduled domestic passenger services offer about 155 round trip flights weekly between Bucharest and 15 other cities and towns. In winter the same number of points are served, but the number of flights, especially those to Black Sea and mountain resort areas, is reduced to about 120 round trips per week. Most points are served at least once daily throughout the year. Scheduled international passenger services total about 25 round trip flights weekly to 19 points, including Moscow; the Eastern European Communist capitals of Budapest, Warsaw, East Berlin, Sofia, and Prague; eight Western European capitals; and five Middle Eastern capitals. In addition TAROM operates nonscheduled transport flights and domestic and international cargo services and administers and operates the Romanian civil airfields, including the nine operated jointly with the Romanian Air Force.

TAROM's major transport fleet is estimated at 37 Soviet-manufactured aircraft, including 14 COOT's (Il-18), three COKE's (An-24), 14 CRATE's (Il-14), and six CAB's (Li-2); the fleet also includes four new British-manufactured BAC One-Eleven aircraft. The BAC One-Eleven (Figure 21) represents Romania's first purchase of transport aircraft from the West, and TAROM, was expected to operate six of the aircraft by early 1970. All of the 41 major transports are based at Bucharest/Baneasa and are used in scheduled and nonscheduled transport operations. In addition, there are about 130 light aircraft, principally of Romanian origin but including some of Soviet, Polish, Czech, and World War II German manufacture. These are based at airfields throughout the country, and almost all are assigned to the IAU for agricultural airwork or air ambulance service.

With the exception of the COOT's which are returned to the U.S.S.R. for major overhaul, TAROM's engineering department accomplishes most aircraft maintenance and overhaul at its principal facility at Bucharest/Baneasa, and at routine maintenance facilities throughout the



FIGURE 21. The BAC-One-Eleven, TAROM's first Western-manufactured aircraft. (C)

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country. TAROM's dependence on the U.S.S.R. for spare parts has proved satisfactory in the past. However, because of Romania's purchase of Western aircraft, the Soviet Union may not be as accommodating, and the repair and maintenance of the Soviet-manufactured aircraft may become more difficult. The purchase agreement for the new BAC One-Elevens includes a supply of spare parts, and presumably TAROM has or is developing a capability to maintain these aircraft. Romania produces the aviation fuels and petroleum products necessary to satisfy TAROM's requirements, making TAROM less dependent on U.S.S.R. imports than the other Eastern European Communist carriers.

TAROM employs about 160 multiengine-qualified transport pilots and copilots, 100 pilots for light aircraft, and 115 other aircrewmen among a staff of approximately 1,000 persons. Most of the transport pilots are former Romanian Air Force Command pilots, but some have been recruited from the ranks of experienced single-engine pilots engaged in airwork. The latter have had basic training with the aeroclubs and then have been further trained by TAROM in multiengine aircraft.

The aeroclubs in Romania provide basic aviation training and sports flying under the authority of the Voluntary Association for the Support and Defense of the Fatherland (AVSAP), the national paramilitary youth organization. Regional and local aeroclubs provide pilot training in gliders and single-engine aircraft. TAROM maintains no formal pilot training institution but provides operational pilot and navigator training for most aircraft types by its instructor-qualified personnel. This includes transition training for the Coot's, which was initially carried out in the U.S.S.R. Training of pilots and technical crews for the BAC One-Eleven's is probably being conducted in the United Kingdom. Flight engineers and flight radio operators undergo formal courses of instruction at Bucharest/Baneasa airport. Groundcrews receive on-the-job training.

With the purchase of British aircraft, combined with Romania's international aviation dynamism and development of an increasingly sophisticated training and maintenance capability, the role played by the U.S.S.R. in Romanian civil air transportation is gradually declining. TAROM is party to the "Six-Pool Agreement," a multilateral accord with the air carriers of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, which encourages, among these Communist carriers, the pooling of revenues on parallel air services and a mutual exchange of supporting services. On 30 May 1965 Romania became a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), having become signatory on 30 April 1965 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944 Chicago Convention), the latter a prerequisite to membership in ICAO. The Chicago Convention established a framework for the orderly and standardized development of international civil air transportation. Romania is also signatory to the 1929 Warsaw Convention, which primarily concerns the liability of carriers for damages incurred in aircraft accidents.

Romania has concluded bilateral air transport agreements and arrangements with the U.S.S.R. all the Eastern European Communist countries except Albania, and about 17 non-Communist nations. It is under the terms of some of these agreements and arrangements that TAROM operates its services abroad, and that six Communist carriers and the national flag carriers of the Netherlands, Italy, France, Switzerland, Belgium, West Germany, Israel, and Austria operate scheduled services to Bucharest.

The organizational structure of Romania's civil aviation enterprise and a close association with the air force render it readily available for military operations in a national emergency. Many key personnel are former military officers, and most of the transport pilots have reserve military status. In addition, almost all other flight and ground personnel have had some military training. It is believed, however, that the military reservists do not have mobilization assignments. TAROM's major transports, combined with a fairly effective capability to operate and maintain them, could provide considerable airlift assistance. The significant number of light aircraft in the country could provide support in such areas as reconnaissance, training, and maintenance of domestic air services.

I. Airfields[3] (S)

The Romanian air facilities system consists of 66 operational airfields with lengths ranging from 2,000 to 11,999 feet. Nine of the airfields are military, nine are jointly military and civil, and 48 are exclusively civil.

Of the 66 airfields, 21 are classed as major facilities with runways 6,000 feet or more in length; 17 of these have hard-surfaced runways, three are of improved graded earth, and one is grass surfaced. One airfield is capable of supporting jet heavy bombers on a sustained basis, four can accommodate jet medium bomber operations, six can sustain jet light bombers, and each of the 21 major facilities can support regular jet fighter operations, assuming the use of mobile support equipment in some instances.

The Romanian Air Force Command controls both the nine military air bases and the nine joint usage airfields. Five airfields are operated by AVSAP in premilitary flight training, soaring, and parachuting. The remaining 43 airfields are under the control of TAROM, being used in scheduled and charter services or in utility functions. Thirteen of the civil airfields, while not classed as major facilities, possess concrete or graded-earth runways measuring between 4,200 and 5,999 feet and could be used by military aviation with little advance preparation under emergency conditions.

The heaviest concentration of airfields is in the south, with Bucharest serving as the focal point for both military and civil aviation. Over 40% of the airfields, including eight of the nine military facilities, are located within a 100 nautical mile radius of the capital.

International civil air service centers on Bucharest/Otopeni and Bucharest/Baneasa; Constanta/Mihail Kogalniceanu and Arad/Ceala are also international airports. Over

[3] Detailed information on individual Romanian airfields is contained in Volume 15, *Airfields and Seaplane Stations of the World*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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the past 4 years Bucharest/Otopeni has been virtually rebuilt. The concrete runway has been strengthened and extended to 11,500 feet and additional taxiways and aircraft parking areas have been constructed. Other new facilities include passenger and freight terminals, airfield lighting, navigational/landing aids, and fuel storage. When the airfield is opened to regular service, probably around mid-1970, it is to handle all of Bucharest's international civil air traffic. Bucharest/Baneasa probably will continue as the headquarters for TAROM's domestic air services.

In 1965 Romania embarked on a program of modernizing eight of its civil airfields. In the ensuing 5 years concrete runways measuring from 4,400 to 6,200 feet were constructed on Baia Mare/Tautii Magherus, Cluj/Someseni, Iasi North, Oradea, Suceava/Salcea, and Tirgu Mures/Vidrasau. At the two remaining airfields, Deva/Saulesti and Sibiu/Turnisor, construction of concrete runways has begun. Each of the airfields has been equipped with a concrete aircraft parking apron and concrete link taxiways, a combination tower/terminal, a weather station, a new fuel storage facility, and new navigational/landing aids. The improvements are significant, since they provide the air force with additional facilities for emergency operations in areas away from the congested southern portion.

The airfield system is adequate for military requirements. The military and joint usage facilities are well maintained. Aside from the Bucharest airfields, however, the civil airports are less well maintained. Although steady progress has been made in the past few years in the areas of flight control, navigational/landing facilities, and support services, the continued lack of adequate mobile support equipment tends to tie the air force to operations from established bases.

In line with developments in the other Warsaw Pact countries, during the last 2 years the air force has constructed earthen aircraft revetments at airfields containing tactical-type planes. Although antiaircraft artillery is present at some of these airfields, there has as yet been no evidence of stepped-up active defenses to coincide with the improved passive defenses.

Details of 11 of the most important airfields are summarized in Figure 22.

FIGURE 22. SELECTED AIRFIELDS (S)

NAME AND LOCATION	LONGEST RUNWAY: SURFACE; DIMENSIONS; ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL	LARGEST AIRCRAFT NORMALLY SUPPORTED	REMARKS
	Feet		
Arad/Ceala 46°11′N., 21°16′E.	Concrete 6,600 x 200 360	Il-18 (Coot)	Civil. International airport capable of jet fighter use.
Bucharest/Baneasa 44°30′N., 26°06′E.	Concrete 7,200 x 200 295	Il-18 (Coot)	Civil. International airport capable of jet light bomber use.
Bucharest/Otopeni 44°34′N., 26°06′E.	Concrete 11,500 x 300 300	Tu-104 (Camel)	Air force, civil. International airport capable of jet heavy bomber use. Air force transport base; Il-14 (Crate), Li-2 (Cab), Mi-4 (Hound).
Caracal New 44°05′N., 24°25′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 280 275	MiG-19 (Farmer)	Air force. Major all-weather fighter base; MiG-21 (Fishbed), Farmer, MiG-17 (Fresco). Could support jet medium bombers.
Cocargeaua 44°24′N, 27°44′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 260 185	Il-28 (Beagle)	Air force. Major reconnaissance, fighter base; Beagle, Fishbed, Farmer, Fresco. Could support jet medium bombers.
Constanta/Mihail Kogalniceanu 44°22′N., 28°29′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 260 320	Camel	Air force, civil. Major all-weather fighter base; Fishbed, Fresco. International airport. Could support jet medium bombers.
Craiova 44°19′N., 23°53′E.	Concrete 6,600 x 200 625	Fresco	Air force, civil. Day fighter base, Fresco. Regular TAROM domestic stop.
Ianca 45°10′N., 27°26′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 260 140	Fresco	Air force. Day fighter base, Fresco. Could support jet light bombers.
Luizi Calugara 46°31′N., 26°55′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 200 590	Beagle	Air force, civil. Major air force depot for aircraft maintenance. Could support jet light bombers. Regular TAROM domestic stop.
Timisoara Northeast 45°49′N., 21°20′E.	Concrete 8,200 x 200 330	Coot	Air force, civil. Major all-weather fighter base; Fishbed, Farmer, Fresco. Could support jet light bombers. Regular TAROM domestic stop.
Zilisteanca 45°13′N., 26°59′E.	Concrete 7,900 x 260 365	Fresco	Air force. Advanced flight training base; L-29 (Maya), MiG-15 (Fagot), Fresco. Could support jet light bombers.

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J. Telecommunications (S)

The telecommunications (telecom) system in Romania is designed to meet government, commercial, and military requirements, but service available to the general public is limited. The system is less developed than systems of most other Eastern European Communist countries, surpassing only those of Albania and Bulgaria. Domestic services include facilities for the public telephone and telegraph systems, network facilities for some special-purpose systems, and facilities for distributing radio, TV, and wired-broadcast programs. Open-wire lines extend to all sections of the country and are the predominant transmission means in the telecom network. In some densely populated areas these lines are supplemented by low-capacity underground cables, radio-relay links, and radiocommuncation stations. Multiconductor cables are used primarily in eastern Romania. Carrier equipment is used extensively on both open-wire lines and multiconductor cables. The major trunk routes radiate from Bucharest. A separate radio-relay network provides channels for the distribution of domestic TV programs and the exchange of TV programs with other Eastern European Communist countries.

All telecom facilities are owned by the government and controlled through the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. Important special-purpose systems are operated by government and military organizations for meteorological, press, maritime, and aeronautical communications. Romania participates in international telecom activities through its membership in the International Telecommunication Union, the Organization for Telecommunication Cooperation, and the International Radio and Television Organization.

The more important switching centers for telephone service are Arad, Bacău, Braşov, Bucharest, Cluj, Constanţa, Craiova, Galaţi, Iaşi, Oradea, Ploieşti, Sibiu, and Timişoara. Service in large urban areas is expedited by automatic and semiautomatic switching facilities. In June 1969 the estimated number of telephones was 550,000 instruments, or about 2.7 telephones per 100 population.

Domestic broadcast services are provided by 15 AM, eight FM, and 20 TV broadcast facilities and by a wired-broadcast network. The most powerful AM broadcast stations are at Braşov, Bucharest, and Timişoara. Radiobroadcast and TV programs, originating from studios in Bucharest, are transmitted to stations in all sections of the country by a radio-relay network and circuits in the domestic intercity wire network. Bucharest is linked with Eurovision by a radio-relay network. From Bucharest the network extends northward to Iaşi and then over two western legs via Timişoara and Oradea to Yugoslavia. Eurovision programs are transmitted over radio-relay links from Iaşi to Kishinëv, U.S.S.R., and from Bucharest to Ruse, Bulgaria. As of January 1969, approximately 3,000,000 radio receivers were registered, and in January 1968 there were about 1,115,000 TV receivers in use. An extensive wired-broadcast network provides service to most urban areas and to a large part of the rural population. Radiobroadcast programs and locally produced programs are distributed to loudspeakers in homes, public buildings, and parks.

The manufacture of telecom equipment is of minor importance and ranks behind that of most other Eastern European Communist countries. Radio and TV receivers and some telephone equipment are assembled locally, but production is heavily dependent upon imported components. Complex equipment, such as automatic telephone exchanges and multichannel radio-relay equipment is imported.

Courses in telecommunications are offered by institutions of higher education, and most of the schools are in the metropolitan area of Bucharest.

Mountains in the central and north-central parts of Romania restrict the use of wire networks but are well suited for radio-relay facilities. The terrain and climate of Romania do not cause any great difficulty in construction, operation, and maintenance of telecom facilities, but the marshy areas of the southeast make laying of underground cable impractical. Heavy snows retard access by maintenance crews to some radio-relay sites and open-wire lines in the higher elevations.

International telecom services to distant countries are provided by radiocommunication circuits. Wire lines and radio-relay links are used for telecom traffic to adjacent countries. The main international telecom center is Bucharest. Extensions of the domestic intercity wire network provide the basic international connections between Romania and other Eastern European Communist countries. Submarine cables cross the Danube into Bulgaria and from Tulcea to Izmail, U.S.S.R. A Gentex (automatic telegraph) system extends into neighboring countries.

Security guards are posted at many of the more important facilities. To reduce the possibility of disruption of telecommunications, alternate means are provided training routing messages by radio and wire. The capital and nine other major cities have ring cables constructed around them. These cables, equipped with reserve automatic switching centers, provide a bypass for intercity and international traffic in case the main facilities are inoperative or destroyed.

The major priorities in the country's telecom developments are focused on constructing new automatic exchanges, expanding existing installations in larger cities, and modernizing the interurban telephone network.

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4. Sociological

A. General (S)

Geographically and historically Romania has often served as a crossroads between East and West, and ethnographically the Latinized Romanians have found themselves hemmed in and overrun by numerous other peoples, mostly Slavs. Since the conquest of the area in the second century by the Roman legions of Trajan, the Romanian plains have witnessed the onslaught of successive hordes of Mongols, Turks, Germans, and Slavs. The struggle of the Romanian people for national identity has been long and harsh, and they have succeeded primarily because of geographic contiguity and linguistic identity. The Romanian language with its Latin roots has survived through the centuries reasonably intact and is spoken throughout Romania with only minor differences in dialect.

An intense feeling of nationalism has also played its part in the cohesion of the Romanian people. The Romanians' sense of being distinctly different from the surrounding peoples—intensified by the rediscovery of the Greco-Latin roots of their language and culture in the 18th century—contributed greatly to Romanian nationalism. Moreover, the natural linguistic ties of the Romanians to the West were reinforced by carefully fostered political and cultural ties during the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries.

Until Romania became a state in 1878, the people had only been members of a folk nation. Subsequently, symbols such as the monarchy, parliament, elections, the army, treaties in the name of the Romanian nation and people, and the barrage of political slogans together served to coalesce ethnic Romanians. Such symbols also contributed to a sometimes militant nationalism and the estrangement of minority groups. It was to this nationalism that Romania's pre-World War II rulers made their appeal for support, and it is this same nationalism which Romania's Communist regime has both moderately stimulated and exploited in recent years.

After the Communists gained control of Romania in 1945, Romanian nationalism was severely criticized and repressed by regime leaders, who emphasized "proletarian internationalism"—that is, allegiance to Moscow. Nationalism, however, reemerged as a powerful unifying factor not long after the death of Stalin in 1953. The regime of Romanian party chief Nicolae Ceausescu continues to play on the nationalistic propensities of the people to gain support for its policies.

Although Communist control of the country has altered the composition of Romanian social classes, it has not significantly influenced traditional values. Romanians continue to place considerable emphasis on family ties, even though urbanization, industrialization, and the regime collectively act to weaken these ties. Anti-Semitism and other ethnic hostilities (for example, distrust of Magyars and Gypsies) remain divisive forces, but the regime has made a concerted effort to lessen divisive ethnic consciousness and has declared that the country is a national state and not a multinational one.

Despite the harsh manner in which communism was imposed on Romania, Communist regimes have gained a certain amount of popular acceptance because of specific domestic programs. Educational opportunities have been extensively broadened over their prewar levels, even though the regime still lacks a sufficiently large number of educated personnel for its labor force. Enlarged educational opportunities have in turn contributed to greater social mobility; the country, however, remains largely peasant in character.

Medical care also has been significantly expanded, although its quality is inconsistent and medical facilities are heavily concentrated in the cities to the disadvantage of rural dwellers. The regime also has been successful in providing a slowly improving level of living for a larger proportion of the population, despite the fact that Romanians, by Western standards, continue to lead a rather austere existence. The regime's programs for maternity leave, social insurance, and social security have proved acceptable to the population.

In cultural affairs the Ceausescu regime has somewhat loosened censorship and other restrictions on artistic activities, primarily in an effort to gain further popular support. Emphasis has been on a rehabilitation of earlier Romanian history, literature, and art and on a renewal of access to certain Western literature and art. The regime insists, however, that contemporary creative efforts must remain clearly identified with orthodox Communist ideology and support state goals. Nevertheless, even this small relaxation marks the sharpest overt departure from the repressive domestic measures of the period from 1945 until the early 1960's, and it has been well received by the Romanian public. It remains to be seen how far this cultural thaw will be permitted to develop; the regime has made clear that, for political and ideological reasons, it is not prepared to relinquish any meaningful control over cultural matters.

B. Population (U/OU)

1. General

Compared with the other Eastern European countries,[4] Romania is second only to Poland in area

[4] In this section, Eastern European countries refers to East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, and, unless otherwise specified, excludes Albania and Yugoslavia.

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and population—20,283,000 persons as of 1 July 1970. Romania's attainment of 20 million in population places it ninth in Europe and 27th in the world population list. According to U.S. Census Bureau estimates, Romania's population is growing at an annual rate of 0.6%. The Romanians, however, claim a growth rate of 1.8%, based on the dramatic increase in live births since late 1967, when the regime decreed measures on abortion, divorce, and taxes designed to encourage population growth. Since 1950, Romania's population has increased by 20.6%, which compares with a decline of 7.1% for East Germany and an increase of 30.7% for Poland, figures which represent the Eastern European extremes over the period.

According to Romanian sources, the total population of Romania in 1859—within its present borders—was approximately 8.2 million. By 1891 it had reached 10 million; 78 years later this figure had doubled. The highest rates of growth in the population occurred during the periods 1930-41 and 1948-56. The following tabulation based on Romanian data shows the vicissitudes in the growth of the population resulting from rapid natural growth interrupted by the devastations of the two World Wars:

Date of census	Total population	Average annual increase	Average annual rate of growth, in percent
19 December 1912*.	12,768,399	0	0
29 December 1930..	14,280,720	84,000	0.63
6 April 1941..	16,126,063	167,000	1.18
25 January 1948..	15,872,624	36,200	−2.2
21 February 1956...	17,489,450	202,000	1.21
15 March 1966.....	19,103,163	160,000	0.88

*The figures for Transilvania (Transylvania), Banat, and northern Moldavia date back to 1910.

The impact of World War II was severe on most of the countries in Eastern Europe, but Romania did not fare as badly as other areas, especially Poland. Despite 460,000 war-related deaths and a net loss of about 350,000 persons resulting from population exchanges and other movements, Romania's population registered a slight gain between 1938 and 1950. War deaths consisted of 300,000 military casualties and 160,000 Jews executed. The wartime migratory picture is extremely cloudy, but it appears that the major outward movements were to Hungary, Israel, and what is now the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. These flows were counterbalanced to a small extent by the net gain in population exchanges with Bulgaria, and as a result of the flight to Romania of some persons living in areas ceded to the U.S.S.R.

Emigration has had negligible effects in Romania since the late 1940's, and it has never been as devastating as was the case in East Germany. The implied emigration of 241,000 persons from Romania during the years 1950-67 was largely accounted for by the movement of Jews to Israel. Israeli data show that 88,700 Romanian Jews emigrated in the 3 years immediately following the war, but a restrictive emigration policy has been in effect in Romania since 1953. Population estimates which take account of births and deaths imply a net emigration of from 10,000 to 25,000 for each year between 1958 and 1965, and again most of them apparently were Jewish emigrants.

2. Distribution

Romania has an area of 91,700 square miles—about the size of France—which means a population density of 221 persons per square mile. Eastern Europe as a whole (excluding Albania) has a population density of 266 people per square mile; only Bulgaria, with a figure of 195, has fewer persons per square mile than Romania. The population density in Eastern Europe is significantly higher than that for Western Europe, mainly because of the very high concentration of people in East Germany—409 per square mile.

The population of Romania is divided into two major aggregations by the Carpathian Mountain range, which extends from the north-central border southward into the heart of the country, then turns westward and crosses the border into Yugoslavia. The heaviest population settlement is in the arc of plains along the southern and eastern borders in the traditional regions of Walachia and Moldavia (Population inset, Summary Map, Figure 108). The second area of dense settlement is north and west of the Carpathians in the Someş Plateau of Transilvania, along the Someş River to the Hungarian Plain, and in the westernmost part of the Banat. The most sparsely settled parts of the country are in and along the curve of the Carpathians and in the lowlands of Dobruja. The average number of persons per square mile of arable land (44% of total land area) is approximately 507.

Bucharest, the capital and largest city, is located in Walachia, directly to the south of the curve in the mountain range where the Moldavian Carpathians turn sharply to the west to become the Transylvanian Alps. In 1967 Bucharest Municipality comprised a total population of almost 1.5 million, according to Romanian statistics based on the March 1966 census. Thirteen other urban centers in Romania have populations of 100,000 or more, but Bucharest has more than six times the population of the next largest city (Figure 23).

Romania has witnessed a striking increase of 73% in its urban population since the end of World War II, despite a net gain of 451,000 in its rural population since 1949, according to U.S. Bureau of the Census data.[5] The Romanians claim that about 40% of the population resides in urban areas. The primary cause of the increase in numbers and size of cities has been the strong emphasis on rapid industrialization and the resulting internal migration.

However, like Bulgaria, Romania has pursued a conscious policy of locating industrial activities throughout the country rather than in the large established cities. Some urban centers, such as Baia Mare, have developed from

[5] Romanian data show a decline in rural population, probably accounted for by different criteria for defining "urban" and "rural."

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FIGURE 23. URBAN CENTERS WITH A POPULATION EXCEEDING 100,000 (1966 CENSUS) (U/OU)

	WITHIN CITY LIMITS	MUNICIPALITY, COMMUNE, OR DISTRICT
Arad	126,000	136,900
Brăila	136,600	144,300
Braşov	163,300	263,200
Bucharest (1,511,400*)	1,365,900	
Cluj	185,800	222,700
Constanţa (199,400*)	150,400	
Craiova	148,800	173,300
Galaţi	151,300	
Hunedoara	68,300	101,000
Iaşi	160,900	194,800
Oradea	122,500	134,900
Ploieşti (190,700*)	147,000	
Reşiţa	56,700	121,500
Sibiu	109,500	
Timişoara	174,400	193,000
Tirgu Mureş (104,900*)	86,500	

*Population or designation of the metropolitan area including suburbs.

large villages in 20 years' time. The ratio of rural to urban population in 1967 was somewhat less than 3 to 2, whereas in 1930 it was approximately 11 to 3. The urban population appears, therefore, to be growing at a much faster rate than the rural population; from February 1956 to July 1965 the number of urban dwellers increased by 17%, while the rural population grew by only 5%. In four other East European countries the rural population actually declined by varying percentages during the same period. Figure 24 shows a breakdown of the urban and rural population in Romania by county.

3. Composition and trends

As in neighboring Eastern European countries, Romania's population, traditionally relatively young, has aged markedly in more recent decades. This reflects primarily a decline in the death rate as a result of improved living conditions and medical care and, until 1967, a steady decline in the birth rate. Thus, the median age has risen from 22.6 years in 1930, to 30.2 years in 1965, and to 30.8 years as projected for 1969 by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The working-age group—ages 15 through 64—increased from 8.8 million in 1930 to an estimated 12.5 million in July 1965. As a percentage of the total population, however, this group has increased from only 61.5% in 1930 to a calculated 65.6% in 1969. Projections indicate that because of a declining birth rate in the past, the population's working-age group will continue to grow in absolute numbers but at a declining rate, at least through 1990. The median age will also decline, in contrast to the past trend, largely because of the effects of the dramatic rise in the birth rate beginning in 1967.

The age-sex pyramid of the Romanian population (Figure 25) shows a somewhat greater regularity than those for many other Eastern European countries, where war casualties and emigration have had more traumatic effects. The relatively smaller numbers of persons in

FIGURE 24. POPULATION BY COUNTY: URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 1967* (U/OU)

	TOTAL	URBAN AREAS	RURAL AREAS
		Thousands	
Alba	381	134	247
Arad	481	190	291
Argeş	555	140	415
Bacău	609	208	401
Bihor	589	257	332
Bistriţa-Năsăud	267	50	217
Botoşani	455	52	403
Brăila	342	142	200
Braşov	451	307	144
Buzău	485	94	391
Caraş-Severin	360	156	204
Cluj	636	321	315
Constanţa	478	246	232
Covasna	177	56	121
Dîmboviţa	406	131	275
Dolj	692	203	489
Galaţi	481	184	297
Gorj	299	71	228
Harghita	284	91	193
Hunedoara	483	332	151
Ialomiţa	364	77	287
Iaşi	631	185	446
Ilfov	753	78	675
Maramureş	435	189	246
Mehedinţi	310	78	232
Mureş	571	189	382
Neamţ	477	139	338
Olt	479	70	409
Prahova	707	399	308
Satu Mare	361	109	252
Sălaj	263	51	212
Sibiu	420	254	166
Suceava	582	150	432
Teleorman	522	93	429
Timiş	616	279	337
Tulcea	238	68	170
Vaslui	436	81	355
Vilcea	373	82	291
Vrancea	354	70	284
Bucharest Municipality	1,484	1,461	23
Total	19,287	7,467	11,820

*Computed on basis of March 1966 census.

the age groups 21 to 28 and 49 to 54 reflect lower birth rates during the two World Wars. In other respects, the present population structure reflects a long-range decline in the death rate and a relatively recent but rapid decline in the birth rate, until 1967 when the birth rate shot up.

Figure 26 compares Romania's vital rates with those of selected other countries in the Western world for 1967, the latest year available. The extremely high live-birth rate of 27.1 per 1,000 persons—of those countries selected only Albania's is higher—is misleading. Since 1938, when Romania's birth rate was 29.5, at that time one of the highest in Europe, the rate has declined sharply. In 1965 it was 14.6, which was just slightly less than the Eastern European average (excluding Albania). The high birth rate for 1967, however, appears to be a sharp departure from the long-term trend, the result

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

FIGURE 25. Age-sex pyramid comparing Romania and United States (U/OU)

FIGURE 26. VITAL RATES, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1967 (U/OU)
(Per 1,000 persons)

	BIRTHS	DEATHS	NATURAL INCREASE
Albania	34.0	8.6	*25.4*
Bulgaria	15.0	9.0	*6.0*
U.S.S.R	17.4	7.6	*9.8*
United States	17.9	9.4	*8.5*
Yugoslavia	19.5	8.7	*10.8*
Poland	16.3	7.7	*8.6*
Austria	17.4	13.0	*4.4*
Sweden	15.5	10.1	*5.4*
ROMANIA	27.1	9.3	*17.8*
Hungary	14.5	10.7	*3.8*

of a drastic change in the abortion laws. Figure 27 plots the monthly birth rate for 1965-69 and shows the rate again declining and leveling off in 1968-69, although apparently not down to the previous low level.

In Romania, as in Eastern Europe generally, the decline of the crude birth rate between 1955 and 1966 has been essentially due to decreases in age-specific fertility rates and not to changes in age structure. That is, the childbearing population has limited the size of families voluntarily as a result of adverse social conditions; it does not mean that there are fewer women of childbearing age. Crowded living conditions, the prevalence of working wives, and, in the past, liberal abortion and divorce laws, have all contributed to the low birth rate. Changes in the marriage rate apparently are not responsible for the declining birth rate, since the former was stable in Romania until 1958, then dropped sharply. The low marital rate persisted through the period from 1966 and 1967, when the birth rate doubled.

The decline in fertility is indirectly related to the reduction in infant mortality throughout Eastern Europe, which in Romania's case has been striking. With improved medical care in the cities, couples apparently do not feel the compunction to produce large families to compensate



FIGURE 27. Birth rate, by month, 1965-69 (U/OU)

for the feared infant deaths. In three decades Romania's infant mortality rate has declined from 179 deaths per 1,000 live births (1938) to 47 (1967), a net reduction of 74%.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that although the latter figure is in line with similar percentage reductions in the other five East European countries over the same period, Romania has always had and still has one of the highest infant mortality rates in Europe. In 1967 only Portugal had a higher rate. As an indicator of social well-being, the infant mortality rate points to the fact that Romania's standard of living is really more comparable to most of the European Mediterranean countries than to its northern socialist fraternal allies. East Germany, for example, with the lowest rate in Eastern Europe, registered 21 infant deaths per 1,000 in 1967; even the average for the southern European states along the Mediterranean is slightly less than Romania's. Romania compares quite unfavorably, of course, with the northwestern European area, which had an average rate of 19 babies die per 1,000 live births in 1967. Figure 28 compares infant mortality in Romania with five other East European countries.

As might be expected, the crude death rate also has dropped sharply in Eastern Europe, with the exception of East Germany where the rate was already relatively low. Romania's has been cut almost in half, dropping from 19.1 per 1,000 persons in 1938 to 9.3 in 1967, despite an actual increase of 7% in the crude death rate between 1960 and 1967. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, this general decline is not peculiar to Romania or Eastern Europe but part of a postwar decline throughout the world, resulting from the introduction of antibiotics and insecticides, improved sanitation practices and nutrition, and the extension of public health facilities.

These same factors have produced a phenomenal 26-year gain in life expectancy in Romania since 1932. On an annual average basis this increase amounted to about three-fourths of a year. Romanian official data give the average life expectancy of a newborn infant in 1932 as 42 years; in 1963 it was 68.3 years. As in most other countries of the world, mortality of females

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

FIGURE 28. Infant mortality rates, six Eastern European countries, 1950-67 (U/OU)

in Eastern Europe has declined more rapidly than that of males. Thus in 1956, the earliest year for which a breakdown is available, life expectancy for males was 61.5 years and for females 65 years. By 1963 these figures had increased to 65.4 years and 70.3 years, respectively, an increase of slightly less than 4 years for males but more than 5 years for females.

Marriage and divorce ratios remained fairly stable for the decade following 1930. The marriage rate varied from 8.1 to 9.5 per 1,000 population annually and the divorce rate never rose above 0.75 per 1,000. Statistics are not available for the war years, but from 1946 through 1960 the marriage rate stayed around 11 per 1,000; since 1961 it has fallen back to the prewar level. In 1967, eight Romanians for every 1,000 persons got married. The divorce rate, on the other hand, has generally increased since the end of the war, although during the 1960's the ratios varied considerably, the highest occurring in 1962—2.04 persons per 1,000.

4. Population policies and problems

Romania has only recently begun consciously to influence changes in its population. As was the case in other East European countries, Romania liberalized its abortion laws in 1956, but this was merely a case of following the leader. In November 1955 the U.S.S.R. had enacted pioneer legislation in this field by repealing restrictive legislation on abortions which had been enacted in 1936. Shortly thereafter, in Romania, as in Bulgaria and Hungary, abortions became available upon request of pregnant women. During the next decade Romanians apparently took full advantage of this policy, thereby reinforcing the steady downward trend in natality.

Statistics on abortions in Romania are fragmentary. About 112,000 abortions were reportedly performed in 1958, the first full year after abortions were legalized, and 219,000 in 1959. After that, no data appeared until the startling figure of 1,115,000 was announced for 1965—a total of four abortions for each live birth, the highest incidence of abortion ever reported. In the absence of other data, it is impossible of course to evaluate the validity of this extraordinary figure.

The Romanian Government certainly was alarmed over this very low birth rate. In October 1966 severe measures were adopted "to regulate abortions and promote the birth rate," and a press campaign was started lauding the virtues of large families. The regime also decreed restrictions on divorce, increased taxes on persons over age 25 without children, provided subsidies to families with three or more children, granted housing priorities to families with the largest numbers of children, and prohibited abortions in all but exceptional circumstances. The result, as already noted, was a dramatic jump in the birth rate (Figure 27), from 12.1 per 1,000 in December 1966 to a high of 39.9 in September 1967.

The Romanian situation is a clear-cut case of a population having been almost completely dependent on abortion as its means of birth control. The regime's policy of discouraging abortions to raise the birth rate has certainly been effective in the short run, but it is too early to tell whether it will be equally successful over the long run. Presumably the childbearing population will resort increasingly to contraceptive devices—sometimes available on the black market—or illegal abortion; the gradual decline in birth rates following the peak in September 1967 probably indicates that this is already happening.

The crux of the matter is simply that Romanians do not want large or even moderately sized (by American standards) families. It is generally agreed among demographers that the underlying reason for increasingly low fertility rates has been the incorporation of the small-family ideal among a large proportion of the population and the availability of the means to attain this ideal. The desired family size in Eastern Europe is exceptionally

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small, especially in Romania. The average desired family size in Bucharest is only 1.3 children, and among the professional classes the number falls to 0.7—figures without parallel elsewhere in the world. The omnipresent housing shortage undoubtedly contributes to this disinterest in children, but probably more important is the socioeconomic situation. A Polish writer, speaking of Eastern Europe generally, summed it up this way:

> People earning above-average incomes can live decently even with two children, but to them 'decently' means something more. They do not want to lower their standards and would rather buy an automobile or take a trip abroad than have children. And this is what they do. People in those countries which had a hard time during the war, after the war, and during the ascetic Stalinist period, give full rein to their appetites now that there is stability. . . .

The standard of living in Romania has improved over previous levels, but it is still not up to the comfortable level enjoyed in much of Western Europe, nor even as high as that in most of Eastern Europe. The average urban Romanian couple has just tasted these comforts; the only way to attain the amenities of life is for both to work and to avoid or put off having children. The government has flatly declared its intention to raise the birth rate to ease its worries about the future labor force. Most high-level government officials, in fact, take the tack "the more Romanians the better" and are not in the least swayed by social and economic arguments expressing concern over the quality of life or the general danger caused by the world's burgeoning population. The resentment of the Romanian people against the new policy, however, may bode ill for the government's long-range plans.

5. Population projections

Assuming that fertility remains essentially at the 1968 level, Romania's population is expected to number more than 27 million by 1990, an increase of 37% (Figure 29). Even if fertility declines, however, the total population may be expected to increase by 17% to 27% over the same time period. The number of children under age 15 is expected to increase by 62% over the projection period and to make up 30.4% of the total population in 1990. Babies born during the 1967-68 boom will double the kindergarten age group between 1970 and 1975 and increase by 44% the number of children of primary school age between 1975 and 1980. These figures could be reduced by as much as half if fertility declines, but in any case the educational system is likely to be severely strained during the 1970's.

The working-age group—those between 15 and 64 years of age—can be expected to expand about 26% in absolute terms, if fertility rates remain at 1968-69 levels. In relative terms, however, the size of the working-age group is declining. In 1990, when the "baby boom" of 1967 (and after) will have begun to affect the labor market significantly, the working-age group will encompass 60.2% of the total population, compared with an estimated 65.6% in 1969. These data justify somewhat the regime's concern over declining manpower in the future, especially since the social security system is likely to be overtaxed



FIGURE 29. Population projection to 1990, by age and sex (U/OU)

by an expected increase of 48.9% in the number of nonproductive citizens—those 65 years and over. As a result, Romania may expect to have a high dependency ratio: 660 persons under age 15 and over age 64 per 1,000 persons in the middle age bracket, the same ratio as Poland's in 1965.

Romania is the only country in Eastern Europe (excluding Albania) which is expected to acquire an excess of males over females, though admittedly slight—in percentage terms, 100.7% in 1990. In the working-age group the breakdown between males and females will be roughly equal, with a slight edge enjoyed by the former.

C. Structure and characteristics of the society

1. Ethnic composition (S)

Approximately 87% of the total population is ethnically Romanian. The remainder is made up of various ethnic minorities, giving Romania one of the largest national minority populations of any East European country. The distinct Latin background of the Romanians distinguishes them from these minority populations and also from their Slavic and Finno-Ugric neighbors in surrounding countries. Romanians are proud of their descent from the ancient Dacians, who were subjugated and civilized by the Romans in the second century A.D. When the Roman legions withdrew from Dacia 175 years later,

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the Latinized Dacians remaining behind survived to pass on their Latin language and heritage through successive generations to modern Romanians.

The ethnic characteristics of Romanians vary according to the different geographic areas of the country. Natives of the Transilvania region and the Carpathian Mountains area have the typical Dinaric stature (averaging 5 feet, 8 inches), accentuated broad head, slender build, aquiline nose, dark brown hair, and blue-gray eyes. At the same time, distinctive Latin types are found in these as well as in other areas of the country.

Slavic characteristics are much more common, though not predominant, particularly among the Romanians of Moldavia where the people have been strongly marked by centuries of Slav migration and interbreeding. Their shorter stature, longer narrower head, and other physical characteristics show a great similarity to the inhabitants of the Slavic countries to the north, but Latin influences are nevertheless often evident in their oval face, medium body build, and dark hair and eyes.

The brunet type in the Banat in western Romania attests to large-scale migration from Mediterranean areas, while one of the most ethnically mixed populations of Europe lives in Dobruja in the southeast. The ethnic heterogeneity in the latter region, strategically located between the Danube and the Black Sea, is attributable to its occupation in the past by Bulgarians, Turks, Russians, and Greeks.

The present minority population of Romania is only about half that of the prewar period, but it is still the largest in Eastern Europe—larger, in fact, than the combined minority populations of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The 1930 census recognized 17 separate national minorities totaling over 5 million people. During World War II, deaths, territorial losses (Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and southern Dobruja), and transfers of population greatly reduced the size of nearly all the prewar minorities. The 1956 census—the last one to count minorities as such—identified 15 minorities totaling under 2.5 million people. The principal reductions between 1930 and 1956 were among the Germans (from 634,000 to 385,000), the Jews (from 452,000 to 146,000), and the Gypsies (from 243,000 to 104,000). Of the major prewar minorities, only the Hungarians maintained their relative and absolute numerical strength into the postwar period—1,423,000 in 1930 and 1,588,000 in 1956.

By far the largest part of Romania's postwar minority population (87.5% in 1956) is concentrated in Transilvania. Within this region the various minorities account for nearly one-third of the population, and in some sections non-Romanians may be in the majority. In the historic provinces of Moldavia and Walachia, however, minorities comprise only 2% or 3% of the population, and over wide areas non-Romanians may be entirely absent. Somewhat larger proportions, 10% to 13%, are found in the Dobruja and southern Bukovina.

According to officials who participated in the 1966 census, the Hungarian minority in Romania numbers over 1.7 million—the largest single minority group in Eastern Europe. Nearly all these Hungarians are settled in Transilvania, where they account for about one-fourth of the population, a proportion that has remained essentially the same over a period of several decades.

The Hungarians in Transilvania are concentrated in two areas of settlement that are separated by a zone in which Hungarians are more widely dispersed among the dominant Romanian population. The largest and most distinctive Hungarian group in Romania lives in a part of eastern Transilvania which is more than 100 miles from the Hungarian border. This group of about 675,000 Szeklers forms the largest bloc of Hungarians outside Hungary. In 1956 most of them were in the Regiunea Mureş-Autonomă Maghiară (Autonomous Magyar Region), where they constituted over 75% of the population. In 1968, however, as a result of the redistricting of the entire country, this whole region was gerrymandered for political reasons—to enhance the regime's control over the minorities and to promote their assimilation. Information is not yet available on the ethnic makeup of the present eight districts which were carved out of four of the old regions, including the Autonomous Magyar Region.

The second area of major Hungarian concentration is the western part of Transilvania along the border with Hungary. About 600,000 Hungarians live in this narrow border zone. The relative strength of the Hungarian population, however, is much less in the western border area than in the more densely settled area to the east. Most of the remaining Hungarians in Transilvania are found in and around Cluj. The nearly 250,000 Hungarians here constitute a tenuous link between the Szekler group and the Hungarians of the western border area. About 37,000 Hungarians live in the mining and heavily industrialized areas in and around Hunedoara in the southwest.

The Germans are the second largest national minority in Romania. Like the Hungarians, they are concentrated almost entirely in Transilvania and the Banat, where they constitute about 6% of the population. Also like the Hungarians, the Germans are divided into two major groups, Saxons and Swabians, with distinctive characteristics. The former have been established in Transilvania since the 12th century. The Saxons numbered nearly 250,000 in prewar times, but by 1956 their number had been reduced to about 180,000. About 80% live in the southern part of Transilvania, and another smaller group lives in northern Transilvania.

The second major German group, the Swabians of the Banat, numbered about 175,000 in 1956. The two groups now are approximately the same size, but in prewar times there were more Swabians than Saxons. Most of the Swabians live in a narrow border strip adjacent to the Yugoslav Vojvodina and southeastern Hungary.

If the Romanian Government were to permit large-scale emigration of the German community to West Germany, which seems only a remote possibility, the size of the German minority would decrease by 25% or more, according to West German estimates. Romania has allowed small-scale emigration throughout much

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of the postwar period, but this has not been enough to affect significantly the overall size of the German minority.

The actual number of Jews remaining in Romania is unknown to outside observers, although it is certainly much smaller than before the war. The 1956 census listed according to nationality a total Jewish population of only 146,000, but this figure is generally regarded as an understatement of the true size of the Jewish community. Estimates from Jewish and other sources for the same period range between 200,000 and 250,000. Estimates of the Jewish population are further complicated by more or less steady, and frequently heavy, Jewish emigration until the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Emigration of Jews was cut off completely by the Romanian Government immediately after the war but resumed late in October 1967; several thousand Jews are estimated to have left since then. One source estimated in mid-1968 that at least 100,000 Jews remain in Romania, which on the basis of earlier estimates would seem to be correct. It was reported in early 1970 that Bucharest was planning to allow the emigration of 30,000 to 40,000 Jews to Israel at the rate of 1,000 per month in return for a cash settlement with the International Jewish Organization. Other reports conflict with this information, however, suggesting that severe restrictions were again in force in early 1970.

The Jewish population within Romania is located mainly (95%) in urban areas and is unevenly distributed. The largest single concentration is in Bucharest. Other important areas of Jewish settlement are in northern Moldavia and in central and western Transilvania.

The Gypsy population, numbering more than 100,000, is considerably smaller than in the prewar period. Two-thirds of the Gypsies are concentrated in Transilvania, a relatively large number are in the Banat, and the rest are widely scattered throughout Romania.

For the most part, the other minority groups in Romania are essentially small remnants of much larger prewar populations found mainly in the territories lost by Romania to the U.S.S.R. and to Bulgaria at the end of World War II. Most of these small minority groups are found in the polyglot Dobruja (Turks, Tatars, Great Russians, and a few Ukrainians) and the Banat (Yugoslavs, Slovaks, Czechs, and Bulgarians). Ukrainians live primarily along the U.S.S.R. border in northern Transilvania and southern Bukovina.

The Greek minority is located chiefly in urban centers: Bucharest; the port cities of Brăila, Galaţi, and Constanţa; and the Transilvanian cities of Hunedoara and Oradea. The Poles also are widely distributed, but nearly half of them are in northern Moldavia. The Armenians, smallest of the identifiable minority groups in Romania, have been permitted to emigrate to Lebanon on a more or less regular basis since about 1963. If this movement is allowed to continue it may lead to the virtual elimination of the Armenian minority.

2. Romanian language (U/OU)

The character, origin, and development of the Romanian language are inseparable from the origins and composition of the people and of nationalism. The Romanian language has been both an academic and political issue in both domestic and foreign affairs. It has been a prime factor in the development of a national consciousness and an influence on Romania's cultural and political affiliations. Although Romanian is basically a Romance language like French, Italian, and Spanish, its true character has been obscured and its development delayed by the fact that at certain periods the official language was a form of Slavic and liturgical Greek. Until about a century ago the alphabet also was essentially Slavic.

The nature of the Romanian language and some of the language problems in Romania stem from the fact that Romanians have borrowed heavily from their Slavic neighbors in developing their language. The creation of Greater Romania after World War I introduced a number of other major and minor languages. Romania's subjection after World War II to Slavic-dominated Soviet communism introduced elements of linguistic as well as cultural, political, and economic domination. The Soviet seizure of Bessarabia, its incorporation with the existing Moldavian S.S.R., and subsequent efforts to create fictitious differences between "Moldavian" and Romanian has added to Romanians' resentment of everything Slavic.

As part of its de-Russification campaign and current emphasis on national traditions, the Romanian regime has in recent years restored certain Latin and other orthographical forms used in the Romanian language until linguistic reforms of the early postwar period struck them from official usage. The cultural press was used by the party as the vanguard of the drive to stress Romania's ties with Western civilization and to spearhead the move to return to traditional Latin forms.

Although Romanian has always been the language of the majority, the extent of this majority has varied with the frontiers and with other political and demographic circumstances within the country. The hard core of the Romanian linguistic area was and is the eastern and southern slopes of the Carpathians and the plains of Moldavia and Walachia, the original Romanian principalities (Old Kingdom). The only areas where Romanian was not spoken by a majority were the northeastern fringe (northern Bukovina and the northern edge of Bessarabia), the southeast corner (southern Bessarabia)—both lost to the U.S.S.R.—and the areas of dense Hungarian settlement.

Outside the present boundaries, Romanian is spoken by some 2 million persons in the U.S.S.R. (old and annexed portions), by about 150,000 in the Yugoslav portion of the Banat, and a few thousand in northern Bulgaria. A Romanian dialect is also spoken by Vlachs in Albania, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Furthermore, Romania has had an assimilative influence on some of the lesser extraneous ethnic elements. The general tendency has been for the minorities to learn and speak Romanian rather than the opposite, even though this has frequently been at the insistence of the regime. Although a majority of Hungarians and most Germans speak Romanian, most of these nationality-conscious peoples cling to their mother tongues.

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3. Social stratification (U/OU)

Changes in Romania's class structure have not been extensive. Before World War II the peasantry constituted more than 80% of the population. In the cities and the towns the social structure consisted of a small laboring class; a middle class including those in professional occupations, army officers, and civil servants; a commercial class; and an elite group including members of the royal family, other nobility, and large landowners. Social prestige was largely derived from birth, higher education, and governmental or professional employment.

Under the Communists, the middle and upper classes have changed in character and composition. The Communists dispossessed the industrialists, financiers, small businessmen, and artisans; compelled religious and intellectual groups to submit to state control; outlawed political opposition; and generally restricted social and economic advancement to those who could be useful to the party or could meet Communist political requirements.

A new ruling group of top administrators and policymakers, mostly Communists, displaced the old ruling group. The new elite has continued the tradition of relatively great wealth for a small ruling group, which under the Communists has included such perquisites as well-paid positions, the awarding of titles of honor, the accumulation of property through funds of shady origin and official travel to the West on expense accounts of scarce convertible currency, and other luxuries. Such obvious abuses of the Communist ideal—particularly rampant in the regime of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej—are resented by the ordinary Romanian and have occasionally been the object of attack by the present party chief, Ceausescu. The privileges of high party officials have not disappeared, but Ceausescu will probably continue to advocate a more spartan way of life.

Although some members of the former middle class entrepreneurial and professional groups retained their status under the new order, most of them have been displaced and forced into the working class by the intellectuals and managerial groups, which, together with army officers and top civil servants, constitute the second highest level in the social hierarchy. The working class is composed not only of members of the pre-World War II working class but also of large numbers of former peasants and the displaced members of the former middle and elite classes. The urban working class has become the object of glorification by the regime's propaganda; increased material rewards, however, have been reserved until very recently only for outstanding work performers, chiefly in heavy industry, who in addition to relatively high wages, receive premiums as well as decorations for fulfilling high production norms. While such workers rank high in the social order, most Romanian workers have a low level of living and no influence in political matters.

Romanian society has become somewhat more mobile than before World War II because of the industrialization program and increased educational opportunities. Party affiliation or active participation in front organizations have become crucial instruments for advancement; but now, as before World War II, professional qualifications and ability are important. Although ability is necessary to gain access to higher educational institutions, students with below average scholastic aptitude are sometimes accepted on the basis of political attitudes or the status and connections of parents. Occupations requiring intellectual skills and talents continue to be symbols of high social status.

4. National attitudes (U/OU)

Conditioned by the peculiarities of Romania's history as well as by differences with its neighbors in economic and cultural backgrounds, Romanians have not changed fundamentally in their general attitudes and outlook since the Communists took over the country. Romanians are highly nationalistic, Western oriented, proud of their country's Latin heritage, and basically anti-Communist and slavophobic. The regime has exploited this nationalism as a powerful force among the people, successfully channeling it to its own advantage. The most graphic example of this was displayed following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in 1968, which the Romanian leadership denounced in vigorous tones. The Romanian people rallied around their leaders in a strong, if somewhat ephemeral, show of unity and support, particularly since it had a strongly anti-Soviet flavor.

Implicit in this particular incident, and in Romanian nationalism generally, is a deep-seated hostility toward the Soviet Union. Traditionally fearful of Russian tsarist imperialism, Romanians discovered in recent times that the Soviet variety is no less rapacious—following World War II Bessarabia and part of Bukovina were annexed by the U.S.S.R. and a Soviet-style Communist regime imposed on Romania. Thus, the de-Russification campaign begun by the Gheorghiu-Dej regime in 1963 and continued under his successor Ceausescu has been welcomed by the populace.

The people remain favorably disposed toward the West and are especially proud of the cultural and linguistic links with France, and to a lesser extent with Italy. The attraction of France is enhanced because France acted as the country's principal patron and protector in international affairs from the time of Romanian independence in 1859 until the late 1930's. In a vivid demonstration of this sentiment, Romanians received Charles de Gaulle, then President of France, with unprecedented enthusiasm during his visit in May 1968. Only U.S. President Nixon was given a more exuberant reception when he visited Bucharest a little over a year later, in the summer of 1969. Although the regime clearly invited the President in a bold play to further its political and economic policy of independence, the Romanian people displayed what was undoubtedly a genuine interest in the United States, as well as admiration for its achievements.

Nevertheless, while nationalism is especially strong as a unifying force now, there have always been strong sociological and political undercurrents working in the opposite direction among the minorities. There is still mute dissatisfaction on the part of the large Hungarian

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minority vis-a-vis the ethnic Romanian majority. The Hungarians look down upon the Romanians as inferior—an attitude which the native Romanians bitterly resent. It can probably safely be said, however, that the Hungarians have a greater regard for the regime now than at any previous time in a long history of confrontation. The same is probably true of the German minority. This is due mainly to the leadership's enlightened and much-propagandized effort to "play fair" in handling the minorities problem, patterned after Yugoslav Marshal Tito's lifelong effort to weld his diverse peoples into a single entity. In addition, the Romanian Government appears to be making progress in overcoming basically hostile attitudes toward Hungary resulting from old disputes over territory and minority problems.

Romania has a persistent record of anti-Semitism. Although the number of Jews in Romania has fallen significantly because of deaths during World War II and emigration since then, the sentiment still exists. Jews living in present-day Romania are less discriminated against than they were in prewar days, however, as a consequence of the regime's policy of nondiscrimination against minorities. In addition, the regime has permitted intermittent emigration to the West and to Israel apparently as a means of reducing a minority considered difficult to Romanianize.

Most Romanians are believed to be opposed to communism, but more on a selective rather than a general basis, at least according to reports of defectors over the years. Romanians generally take for granted such accomplishments of the Communist regime as the extension of medical and health services as well as improved opportunities in education. They also appear to support the current regime in its pursuit of more independent and more nationally oriented political and economic policies which are tailored to Romanian needs and interests rather than to those of the country's Communist allies. They also undoubtedly appreciate such actions as the regime's divesting the secret police of some of their arbitrary powers in 1967; the police are still present and still very much in control, but not so ubiquitous as before.

Nevertheless, Romania remains a closed and controlled society. There is no evidence yet of any move either from above or below toward real liberalization. This the Romanians seem to accept with an air of Balkan fatalism but also with a sense of dignity and hope that is perhaps missing under similar conditions in other countries, in neighboring Bulgaria for example. Romanians possess a certain confidence in themselves as a nation, stemming partly from a sense of uniqueness from their neighbors, their relative economic independence, and partly from their view of themselves as a civilizing influence in the Balkans.

D. Manpower and labor

1. Planning and utilization (U/OU)

Although Romania adopted centralized planning for the allocation of manpower shortly after all large industries were nationalized on 11 June 1948, this authority was not used vigorously until 1950 when shortages of trained labor became acute. Between mid-1948 and 1950, however, the bulk of the nonagricultural labor force was transferred to the socialized sector, and management of economic enterprises was shifted to special industries and industrial ministries. Then, as now, Romania stressed the development of an industrial base.

When shortages of labor became evident, the government initiated large-scale transfers of labor from agriculture to industry as well as basic changes in manpower policy. Compulsory assignment of unskilled labor was initiated through governmental agencies to improve the utilization, distribution, and ultimately the productivity of available labor resources. Training programs were expanded, and special incentives were developed to attract female workers.

As Romania has pursued its policy of developing an industrial base it has been confronted with growing shortages of skilled manpower in some occupations and sectors. These and other deficiencies have led the regime to develop tighter central controls on the planning and allocation of manpower. Party and state leader Ceausescu has carried on a broad attack on the problem of labor allocation since 1967, primarily in an attempt to reduce inefficient management practices and personnel and to make the labor force more responsive to central authority. Using statistical analysis to point out weaknesses, he has attacked first one, then another, element in the economy to prod the bureaucracy and the workers. In May 1967, for example, he pointed out that unproductive programing of work schedules resulted in 6.8 million overtime hours being worked during the first 4 months of that year. To prevent workers from wasting time on the job, it was decreed that they should be paid only for time actually spent in productive work, excluding eating time and breaks for other purposes. In December 1968 certain enterprises started experimentation with a new wage agreement system, making wages more proportional to productivity.

A major reallocation of technical and administrative personnel appeared to be in the works in late 1969, apparently at the direct instigation of Ceausescu. In a speech at Bucharest University the party chief charged that state and local government offices and institutions employ too many unproductive "specialists and officials" who could be more useful out in the field and in the industries. He demanded, moreover, that Romania's "powerful army" of 150,000 university students should be prepared to accept practical work anywhere in Romania. The speech was followed up by a press campaign and an order to reorganize at least 15 ministries. Subsequently, in a speech in December of the same year, Ceausescu said that as a result of this reorganization the administrative apparatus was reduced by 39%. The evidence indicates that not all of these white-collar workers lost their desk jobs as such. The idea apparently was to disperse technical and scientific expertise throughout the country and to eliminate superfluous and nonproductive positions in Bucharest. Although it is clear that many people in Bucharest, and perhaps in other cities, were actually thrown out of work, it is less certain that they transferred

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to the countryside. The government reportedly showed little concern for finding housing and new jobs for those forced to leave, causing considerable resentment. In short, as Ceausescu tacitly admitted in another speech in February 1970, the program was at that point less than a complete success.

The Ministry of Labor, established in December 1967, apparently has become the central organ for coordinating the solution of problems dealing with labor. It has taken over the direction of social welfare and pension programs, previously handled by the Ministry of Health and the labor unions. Another government agency with which the Ministry of Labor works is the State Planning Committee, in charge of national economic development plans. The State Planning Committee also has ministerial status.

Presumably the Ministry of Labor also has taken over at least some of the functions of the General Directorate for the Recruitment and Assignment of the Labor Force, subordinate to the Ministry of Education. At least until this latest reorganization, the directorate's principal functions included assignment of workers to specific industries where shortages exist; active recruitment campaigns; and recruitment for temporary service. Unskilled workers were assigned on the basis of contracts made between the directorate and the appropriate economic ministries. Moreover, acting on behalf of the enterprise to which workers may be assigned, the directorate signed contracts with individual workers. Any worker who breaks this contract may be subject to prosecution.

Enterprises are permitted to recruit their own technical, clerical, and skilled personnel directly, in which case the general directorate is authorized to provide assistance. To facilitate this procedure, special committees at the regional and district levels assist the enterprises in determining labor needs and recruiting workers.

2. Manpower resources (U/OU)

The most complete manpower data are for March 1966, the date of Romania's last census. More limited Romanian data and U.S. estimates since then indicate, however, that the basic pattern and trends apparent at that time are still valid. According to the census, the Romanian labor force—large for a European country primarily because agriculture is the prevailing means of livelihood—totaled 10,362,000 persons and accounted for 54.2% of the total population and 82.1% of the working-age (15-64 years) population. The only other countries in Europe in which over 50% of the population is reported to be economically active are Bulgaria (54.3% in 1967) and the U.S.S.R. (51.5% in 1970). The comparable U.S. figure is 40.7% for 1966. Approximately two-thirds of the Romanian labor force is classified as "rural" and the remainder as "urban." The characteristics of the labor force in these two areas differ markedly, and they are treated separately in portions of the discussion below.

The age structure of the Romanian population has not impeded labor force growth in the postwar period. Although the indentations at ages 20-24 and 45-49 reflect lower birth rates, high child mortality, and casualties during World Wars I and II, the pyramid (Figure 30)



FIGURE 30. Population and labor force by age group and sex, March 1966 (U/OU)

shows greater regularity than that of many other European countries in which war casualties and emigration have been greater. A shortage of labor force entrants will occur, however, in the mid-1970's, for birth rates dropped sharply in the 1957-66 period during which abortion was legal and easy to obtain. The effect of the liberal abortion laws (which were rescinded in 1966) is evident in the narrowing of the pyramid's base.

As is true in most countries, almost all males between 20 and 59 years of age are economically active. Nearly half of those aged 15-19 are in the labor force. Among older men, the labor force participation rate (labor force as a percentage of population) does not drop below 50% until age 70. Three out of four females beween the ages of 20 and 54 are economically active. The rate for girls aged 15-19 is about the same as that for boys—50%—but in the upper age brackets the rate for females has fallen further and faster than that for males.

Approximately 61% of the total male population and 48% of the female population are economically active. Both rates rank above the European average. The exceptionally high rate reported for Romanian females is due almost entirely to the farming activities of the large number of rural women, some 55% of whom are economically active, as compared with only 36% of the urban women. Overall labor force participation rates for rural and urban males are nearly identical—61% and 60%, respectively. The participation rates of rural males in the highest and lowest age brackets, however, are roughly twice those of urban males.

The postwar industrialization drive and significant social changes have induced a slight decline in Romania's labor force participation rate. Approximately the same number of persons are now economically active as were in 1956, but they are better educated and more highly skilled, produce more, and support a larger population. The decline in labor force participation has been sharpest in the youngest and the oldest age groups, reflecting improvements in the educational and social security systems. The participation rate for 14- through 19-year-olds has

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declined to about half the 1956 rate of 79%, and that for persons aged 60 or above to about two-thirds of the earlier rate of 59%. Labor force participation in the 20-24 and 50-59 age groups has dropped, but more moderately. These declines more than offset the very slight increase among persons aged 25-49, attributable almost entirely to increased participation by urban women. The sizable rural-to-urban migration occasioned by the growth of industry is also responsible for the overall decline in labor force participation, for participation rates are lower in the urban areas than they are in the rural areas. Many farm women, lacking employable skills, leave the labor force altogether when their families move to cities or industrial centers. Young people in the urban areas tend to stay in school longer, and older workers tend to retire earlier.

Unemployment is not generally an important problem in Romania. No statistical data are available, but the number of unemployed is considered to be economically insignificant. Shifts in economic or political policy sometimes result in temporary periods of unemployment. In 1968, for example, a major territorial administrative reorganization reportedly left a large number of party activists and bureaucrats without jobs. The government set up temporary employment offices to handle their retraining and assignment to new positions and also provided for interim payment of salaries.

Underemployment is prevalent in both agriculture and industry. The problem is especially severe in agriculture, for Romania's high rate of population increase coupled with the low rate of economic development prior to World War II resulted in a considerably larger population in agriculture than could be efficiently utilized in farmwork. According to studies conducted in the prewar period, roughly half of the population engaged in agriculture was "surplus," and agricultural production would not have suffered had the labor force been cut in half. Since 1959, industry's growing demand for manpower has succeeded in reducing the level of agricultural employment, and the problem of agricultural underemployment has lessened somewhat.

According to Romanian data, since most persons capable of working are already in the labor force, Romania's labor reserve would appear to be relatively small. The remaining underemployed, particularly those in agriculture, however, provide, in effect, a considerable manpower reservoir. Additional manpower could, in a national crisis, be drawn from the economically inactive population of working age (almost 3 million persons). Most of these are housewives or students. Males account for only about one-fourth of the economically inactive population aged 15-64, and over half are in the 15-19 age group. Inactive females, though far more numerous, tend to lack employable skills and most could work only in unskilled jobs. Concerned about the diminishing labor reserves, the regime has made changes in the abortion and marriage laws to increase the future size of the population.

3. Characteristics of the labor force (U/OU)

In 1966, agriculture (including fishing, hunting, and forestry) claimed 57% of the labor force, with industry



FIGURE 31. Labor force by branch of economic activity and sex, March 1966 (U/OU)

(manufacturing, mining, and power production) comprising a distant second, 19%. Services accounted for nearly 11%, construction over 5%, and trade and transportation and communications less than 4% each (Figure 31). Primarily as a result of the steady process of collectivizing agriculture—begun in 1950 and essentially completed in 1962—the socialized labor force as a share of the total number of persons economically active rose from 39% in 1956 to 92% in 1966.

The dominant position of agriculture is gradually giving way with the expansion of employment opportunities in the nonagricultural branches. Until the mid-1950's agriculture occupied 70% or more of the labor force. The percentage is expected to fall to 48% by 1975, having already dropped to an estimated 54% by 1969. The movement out of agriculture was especially rapid in 1959 and 1960, when the government greatly accelerated the pace of collectivization. By 1969 the labor force in agriculture totaled about 5.8 million persons, compared with some 6.6 million in 1955.

The large private sector nearly disappeared during the collectivization drive, and since the early 1960's most Romanian farmers have been employed in the socialist sector. Only about one-tenth of the agricultural labor force works on farms not owned or controlled by the state. Private farming and stockraising is tolerated in areas which do not lend themselves to mechanization and large-scale operations—the mountains and Danube delta regions in particular. The area devoted to private farming has increased somewhat since 1962, most of the increase coming from land formerly farmed by agricultural associations (a low type of collective farm). By 1968,

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privately farmed land accounted for just over 9% of all agricultural land.

Of the more than 5 million agriculturalists in the socialist sector, just over 400,000 are wage and salary earners employed by state agricultural enterprises: state farms, mechanization stations, and such other units as agricultural experimental stations, agricultural subsidiaries of industrial enterprises, forestry enterprises, and state grazing land. Although these enterprises engage only 7% of the agricultural labor force, they control 30% of the agricultural land. State farms, most of which specialize in grains or livestock, contribute a relatively large proportion of total marketable agricultural output, and also serve as "model" or experimental farms. The enterprises for agricultural mechanization control most of the agricultural machinery and equipment used on collective farms and provide technical assistance of various kinds.

The great majority of farmers (81% of the agricultural labor force) belong to collectives, which, at the end of 1968, accounted for about 61% of all agricultural land. On the agricultural production cooperatives, which had more than 4.7 million members in 1966, both land and livestock are owned and worked in common; income is distributed to members chiefly according to the number of workdays contributed, with a small proportion distributed according to the amount of land brought in by each member. Agricultural associations, a looser type of cooperative that flourished in the late 1950's as an intermediate step between private ownership and full collectivization, are being phased out, most having been converted into cooperatives (although some land has reverted to private owners). They are expected to vanish altogether within a few years.

All of the nonagricultural branches have showed impressive gains in employment since 1956 and accounted for about 46% of the total labor force in 1969. Industry registered an increase of an estimated 55%, to a total of more than 2 million persons, heavy industry having grown more rapidly than light industry. Chemicals was the fastest growing branch, with an increase of more than 200%. Most other heavy industry branches increased 40% to 80%. Employment in fuel extraction and processing declined slightly.

Nearly all industrial workers are employed in the socialist sector. Most are wage or salary earners in state-owned enterprises; a much smaller number (approximately 8%) are members of state-controlled cooperatives. The private sector accounts for little more than 2% of the industrial labor force. Many cooperative members and privately employed persons are craftsmen, engaged for the most part in metalworking and repair, woodworking and cabinetmaking, tailoring, dressmaking, and shoemaking. Craft enterprises in the socialist sector have not been able to satisfy the increasing demand of the population, and the government is moving cautiously to encourage the expansion of private craft activity. A 1968 law permits private craftsmen to take on apprentices.

Government employment has declined steadily since the mid-1950's as a result of the streamlining of government operations. This process of attrition has speeded up, particularly since late 1969. The number of professional activists employed by the party-controlled mass organizations is also dropping. All other service activities have recorded substantial increases in employment, of which the largest was in municipal services. Hairdressers, barbers, and other purveyors of personal services account for nearly all of the service workers employed in the private sector.

Construction employment grew rapidly from 1956 through 1968, reflecting the high level of capital investment. Employment in transportation and communications rose 58%, and in trade, 35%. State enterprises and cooperatives employ about 98% of the work force in construction and in transportation and communications, and close to 100% of that in trade.

Seven out of 10 Romanian working women engage in agriculture. Their proportionate participation in the agricultural labor force has increased since 1956. In the private sector, nearly 62% of the agricultural work force is female, and the percentage is nearly as high on the collective farms. Only on the state farms do males outnumber females. The government views this situation with concern and is actively seeking to halt the "feminization" of agriculture by slowing the outmigration of rural youth and raising the level of agricultural technology.

Females comprise approximately 30% of the nonagricultural labor force, a somewhat larger percentage than in 1956 (26%). As in most other countries, females form a large portion of the work force in services and trade, and a very small portion in construction and transportation and communications. Romanian females enter industrial occupations, however, to a more limited extent than is the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Females account for only about 25% of the industrial work force. Female industrial employment is concentrated most heavily in light industry, and in textiles, apparel, and soap and cosmetics they comprise 50% or more of the work force. The only other branches in which females comprise as much as 25% of the work force are chemicals; glass and chinaware; leather, fur, and footwear; food, beverages, and tobacco; and graphics.

Only about 11% of the administrative, executive, and managerial positions are held by women. Women occupy over 45% of the professional and technical positions, however, chiefly because of the large number employed in teaching and health. Other nonfarm occupations in which the proportion of females is high are clerical, sales, and service occupations. Only a small proportion of manual workers in nonagricultural jobs are women.

The educational level of the labor force is quite low, despite the government's considerable effort in the postwar period to broaden educational opportunities for the entire population. Until the Communist takeover, the educational system was geared to training an urban intellectual elite, and the peasantry received a few years of primary schooling at most. Data for the labor force as a whole show that in 1966 less than 3% were university graduates; about 7% had completed regular secondary (lyceum) or technical secondary schooling, and 6% had been trained at vocational schools or schools for foremen. The remaining 84% had

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attended primary school (most of them for only 4 years, a much smaller number for 7 or 8 years), or, in some cases, had no formal schooling at all. Females are, on the whole, less well educated than males, and agricultural workers less well educated than nonagricultural workers.

Because of the rapid expansion of the industrial economy and the scarcity of nonfarm skills and adequate education in Romania's largely rural population, severe skill shortages have developed. As a result, the government devotes considerable attention to on-the-job training which enables manual workers to upgrade their skills, and to adult education programs which impart general and technical knowledge. In 1968 it was announced that the government intended to assure a more rational placement of young specialists graduating from t ' nical secondary schools, vocational schools, and institutions of higher learning. Graduates are subject to compulsory job placement for a 2- to 3-year period. The government has not, however, resolved the problem which arises from the dearth of middle-level technicians and professionals. Because of the shortage of intermediate-level personnel, many jobs at the level of draftsman, laboratory assistant, or foreman are filled by overqualified workers. University graduates, out of necessity, fill jobs which require no more than a specialized secondary education.

Official data tend to obscure the actual skill level of the labor force, for they offer only two classifications: "qualified" and "unqualified." "Qualified" workers, most of whom would be considered semiskilled in the United States, comprised about 80% of the labor force in 1969, according to Romanian officials.

4. Labor productivity, working conditions, and wages (C)

Average output per man-year remains low despite impressive gains in industrial labor productivity throughout most of the post-World War II period. Present productivity levels are linked with the inadequate educational and skill level of the work force, the poor working habits of the relatively large number of industrial workers who have but recently left traditional agricultural pursuits, and serious deficiencies in business organization and management.

Raising productivity has taken on a new urgency since the early 1969's, for current levels increasingly threaten to impede the rate of economic growth. Recent trends in labor force growth suggest that Romania will shortly be faced with a relative scarcity of new workers for industry. To sustain the present rate of economic expansion. therefore, considerable improvement is necessary in average output per worker.

Official Romanian productivity data express the relationship between gross output and the average annual number of production workers. Such data tend to obscure the extent to which increases in output are due, on the one hand, to greater labor efficiency per se and, on the other, to increases in capital investment and changes in the organizational structure of industry. According to these data, gross output per worker in all branches of socialized industry rose at an average annual rate of 8% in 1961-68, with certain branches of heavy industry having a particularly high rate, as shown in the following tabulation:

Electric power	11.6
Fuel	5.8
Ferrous metallurgy	8.0
Nonferrous metallurgy	7.4
Engineering and metalworking	9.6
Chemicals	12.5
Nonmetallic minerals and abrasives	10.1
Building materials	9.8
Lumbering and woodworking	6.8
Cellulose and paper	8.8
Glass, china, and faience	6.8
Textiles	6.0
Apparel	5.3
Leather, fur, and footwear	7.2
Food, beverages, and tobacco	4.0
Soaps and cosmetics	5.1
Printing and graphics	10.6
All branches	7.9

In its effort to improve the rate of productivity increase, the government relies chiefly on mechanization, new technology, and improvement in the organization of the production process. Measures designed to raise the qualifications of the labor force also play an important role in the productivity drive, and psychological and material incentives are employed to stimulate increased output per worker.

Technological improvements to raise the efficiency of industry embrace a multitude of measures, ranging from industrial research and the development of mass production methods to more efficient use of tools and better work methods. Romania turns to both the West and the U.S.S.R. for data on technical processes, production efficiency studies, and current labor and technical developments. An International Labor Organization (ILO) center at Otopenii de Jos, near Bucharest, provides training and technical assistance to Romanian management personnel. Its program emphasizes practical problems of enterprise management; at the request of the government, trainees at Otopenii de Jos are required to prepare studies of organizational and management problems within their own enterprises, and to submit these reports to the parent ministries.

Among the worker incentives favored by the government are the various forms of "socialist competition" in which individuals and groups of workers strive to surpass production targets. Material incentives and higher pay are generally more effective, however. The "new" wage system introduced on an experimental basis in 1968 (the government expects it to be fully implemented in 1970) is the most recent attempt to raise productivity by improving material incentives and applying judicious sanctions. Under the new system, base pay constitutes a larger proportion (up to 90%, compared with 70% to 75% under the old system) of average earnings. The proportion derived from production bonuses and other supplemental payments is correspondingly reduced. Workers benefit from this change since social security benefits are computed on the basis of base pay, exclusive of supplemental earnings. The new wage system also endeavors to reduce labor turnover by introducing,

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for the first time, a differential payment for length of service. It also provides for withholding of part of the salary if production targets are not fulfilled. Withheld salary may be released only after the targets are met.

Despite efforts by the regime, numerous obstacles to increased labor productivity characterize the Romanian industrial scene. Underutilization of labor capabilities arises from deficiencies in the method of training and allocating labor. Frequently the training has been unrelated to the needs of the economy and to the jobs the trainees are eventually assigned to fill. The allocation of labor has been dictated in general more by priorities of important economic projects than by availability of skills, so that many workers have been placed in positions for which they may be overqualified or underqualified. The general shortage of skilled labor, combined with curbs on mobility, has led to a hoarding of workers by management, and thus to poor labor utilization. In many branches, the ratio of white-collar to manual workers is disproportionately high. This problem was underscored by Ceausescu's campaign in 1969 against the abundance of unproductive "specialists and officials" in administrative and other posts.

The attitude of labor, as a whole, is not favorable toward the regime, and this militates against maximum effort by workers. Most of them are unenthusiastic about the regime's economic objectives, are disinterested in exerting any extra effort to cut production costs, and are disinclined to exert themselves to exceed quality and quantity norms. This attitude is expressed in absenteeism, low morale, lack of incentive to work, and widespread stealing and embezzlement. Unexcused absenteeism alone reportedly accounts for the loss of millions of man-days a year.

Working conditions throughout the economy are in many cases primitive by postwar European standards. The average industrial establishment continues to be reminiscent of the early stages of the industrial revolution in the West. Unsanitary working conditions, lack of safety equipment, and long working hours generally characterize the present stage of Romanian industrial development. Many small cooperative and state workshops and factories retain the extremely poor conditions which prevailed before World War II. Working conditions in the small enterprises contrast sharply with those in post-World War II plants, particularly new factories in the chemical, textile, and steel industries. New factories usually are well ventilated and well lighted, and managers have attempted to provide safety measures.

Although adequate labor-safety legislation exists, the primary emphasis on production and industrial expansion at a rapid rate prevents its full enforcement. Because constantly increasing plan goals require work at maximum capacity, replacement and modernization of machinery is slow. As a result, dangerous breakdowns are reported to have occurred. According to frequent regime complaints, funds provided for the improvement of safety are often diverted to other purposes more directly concerned with production or are embezzled. The failure of inexperienced workers to use safety devices, the unfamiliarity of labor with more modern conditions, and the absence of an organization which represents the interests of labor are among the factors which limit pressures for improvement. The government appears to be increasingly aware, however, that working conditions directly affect the level of productivity.

The Labor Code is being rewritten, and adoption of a substantially changed code is tentatively set for late 1969 or early 1970. Little change is expected, however, in the provisions on hours and leave. The Labor Code of 1958, which is still in effect, provides for a standard 8-hour workday, 6 days a week, with a 7-hour shift for nightwork. No reduction in the standard 48-hour workweek is expected until 1975 at the earliest. The day shift actually varies, by law, from 6 hours for workers engaged in hazardous or unhealthful occupations to 10 hours or more for custodial or light workers. Also, in plants which work around the clock, the regular night shift is raised to 8 hours but with a 15% pay differential. On state farms during the crop season the normal workday is 10 hours. No penalties are provided by law for the frequent violations by management of working-hours regulations. Longer workweeks may be required as a short-term measure, usually when plan fulfillment is lagging toward the end of the month or the year, or may be ordered under circumstances deemed to be in the national interest. What constitutes an emergency is couched in such broad terms that the restriction of overtime is deprived of any practical meaning. The legal limit for overtime is 120 hours annually, although this may be extended by the government.

Because of frequent machinery breakdowns, poor maintenance of equipment and buildings, the speedup needed at the end of each plan period to fulfill norms, and pledges to exceed efficiency, economy, or production goals before each major holiday, workers are frequently pressured to perform overtime labor. Workers are entitled by law to compensatory leave for overtime work beyond the standard 48-hour workweek, but in practice this rule appears to be widely disregarded. Children under 18 and pregnant women or nursing mothers may not be required to work overtime, although presumably they may volunteer to do so.

The Labor Code also contains specific regulations regarding time off for meals, vacations, and changes of shifts. One-half hour is granted for meals, but the worker is not paid for this time. Sunday is established as the normal day of rest, although there are exceptions to this ground rule. Employees who have worked without interruption for 11 months are entitled to a yearly paid vacation of at least 15 workdays. Longer vacations—up to 24 days a year—are granted to youths under 18 and to workers engaged in arduous or unhealthful jobs. Length of service also permits an extension of the annual vacation.

Income levels in Romania are decidedly low by European standards. Urban workers have a difficult time making ends meet, and the rural population lives austerely. Prices of food and consumer goods are high, relative to income, and clothing represents a major expense for most families. Real income levels today, however, compare favorably

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with those before World War II, and, for wage and salary earners, both money income and real income have increased substantially since 1960. Improvement of the wage level is expected to continue and is, indeed, one of the cardinal aims of the wage reform inaugurated in 1968. Other elements of the wage reform, which is designed to link the wage system more closely with enterprise efficiency, include longevity supplements, annual bonuses for overfulfillment of the enterprise plan, and personal bonuses for outstanding individual performance.

Persons in paid employment enjoy a higher standard of living, on the whole, than workers who receive at least part of their wages in kind. No statistics are available, however, to permit a meaningful comparison of the earnings of wage and salary earners with those of other groups. Most of the latter are members of cooperative farms. Base pay for wage and salary earners throughout the economy averaged 1,250 lei[6] monthly in 1968, and Romanian officials anticipate an increase to 1,400 lei monthly in 1970. The 1968 figure marks a 12% increase, on the average, over the 1965 pay level. Wages and salaries rose most rapidly in 1965-68 in government administration (up 23%) and in transportation (up 20%), while those in industry rose only 8%. Introduction of the new wage system in 1968 launched another round of across-the-board increases. Average earnings rose 10% to 15% in industries on the new system, with proportionately larger increases going to workers in the lowest pay categories. Government planners anticipate that completion of the wage reform in 1970 will place 24% of all wage and salary earners in a monthly earnings bracket of 1,000 lei or less; about 47% will average 1,001-1,500 lei monthly; and 29%, 1,501 lei or more. The 1971-75 Five Year Plan projects an overall increase of 16% to 20% in real wages. A May 1970 law raised the minimum wage and adjusted the tax burden by making it more progressive.

Only fragmentary data are available on actual earnings by branch of economic activity or occupation. Blue-collar workers employed in engineering and metal processing were reported to average 1,410 lei monthly in 1968 as compared with 1,025 in light industry and 982 in food, beverages, and tobacco. Base pay for a truckdriver on a state farm was 1,250 lei monthly; including supplemental payments, his average monthly earnings were 1,400 lei. Beginning teachers were reported to receive salaries comparable to those of beginning physicians, engineers, and lawyers—a minimum of 1,500-2,000 lei monthly in 1968. Teachers' salaries reportedly increase less rapidly, however, than those in other professions. Among technical-administrative personnel, monthly salaries were as high as 5,300 lei in 1968.

[6] Foreign currencies are converted to lei at artificial official exchange rates that are unrelated to the actual purchasing power of the lei. In commodity transactions, US$1 is worth 6 lei while U.S. tourists receive 18 lei per $1. In some cities it is reported that the black market value of US$1 runs up to 40 lei. The internal value of the lei varies widely for different types of goods and services, and any comparison with wages in the United States would be misleading.

5. Labor relations and trade unions (C)

Labor relations policy in Romania is ultimately made by the Communist Party and is exercised both through the state and through the trade unions. At the same time that the Ministry of Labor was established in December 1967 the head of the General Union of Trade Unions was also given a seat on the Council of Ministers. The chief of the trade unions traditionally has been an influential party man. At present, however, it appears that the Minister of Labor—currently a young protege of party chief Ceausescu—is more influential in controlling broad labor policy.

The three main functions of the trade unions have been to promote the fulfillment of national economic plans, to assist the Ministry of Labor in administering the social insurance program, and to control the enforcement of labor laws. Labor legislation consists almost wholly of restrictions and regulations designed to subordinate the worker to the political and economic objectives of the regime. In 1966 there were 11,646 trade union organizations with over 4.1 million members, an increase of 1.3 million members over 1960.

Until the Fifth Trade Union Congress in May 1966 the central trade union organization was known as the Central Council of Trade Unions. This designation was changed to the General Union of Trade Unions (GUTU), and a new set of statutes adopted. The new bylaws stripped territorial trade union councils of their former direct control of all trade union activity in their districts and transferred most of the functions of control over production and welfare matters to 12 amalgamations of trade unions organized within the branches of production. Criticism of the territorial councils at the congress implied that this change was brought about by their incompetence in dealing with specific problems of production and worker welfare and by their stifling of the "initiative" of the basic trade unions.

The new statutes give the impression that the basic unions have greater autonomy and underline the rights of workers to express their views on all subjects. The trade unions are assigned the task, moreover, of watching over the observance of the legal working hours, which have been consistently abused. These provisions undoubtedly reflect the regime's recognition of discontent among workers and the sterility of the unions as a means of alleviating it. The verbal guarantees of "autonomy," however, did not in any way weaken the control of party and government over the unions, nor is there evidence that the individual unions have gained real bargaining power vis-a-vis the enterprises.

The basic principle of organization and management of the unions, hardly touched by the new statutes, continues to be "democratic centralism," just as it is in the party. This means among other things: the election of all management organs; the subordination of lower to higher organs; the obligation to accept unquestioningly decisions from above; and the requirement that management organs operate on the principle of collective leadership. The leadership of the trade unions at the top has traditionally

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been composed of high-level party men. Thus the unions remain essentially adjuncts of the party and state. The right to strike or to bargain collectively on an equal basis with management is not even considered. Wages remain fixed and managed from the central level according to elaborate regulations, and the party ultimately decides on action concerning all workers' grievances.

Mass labor protest meetings and strikes are illegal. It would be "absurd" for the workers to strike, according to the official rationale, since, as the "owners of the means of production," they would be striking "against themselves." Antagonism toward the system and dissatisfaction with wages or job assignments usually take the form of unorganized passive resistance, deliberate slowdowns, carelessness, absenteeism, waste, theft, and malingering. The regime rarely admits to the existence of these forms of protest and has never acknowledged a strike being carried out. At least one report from a Romanian source, however, claims that workers in the industrial complexes in Reşiţa and Hunedoara have struck for as long as a week in protest over low pay or high norms and unpopular decrees such as the housing laws; another union had oilfield workers in Ploieşti "on strike" early in 1970. There is no further information to confirm or deny these reports.

Romanian workers have many justifiable complaints, even by Eastern European standards. Unsanitary working conditions, a relatively high level of industrial accidents, and long working hours generally have characterized postwar industrial development. Unable to work through legal channels to improve their work situation, workers oftentimes move around the country seeking better pay and working conditions, despite legal restrictions against labor mobility. Central authorities have recognized the problem, however, and are working to improve the situation with the introduction of modern equipment and safety programs, which are usually entrusted to the unions to carry out.

When the Ministry of Labor was set up in 1967, a state inspectorate for the protection of labor (for which legal machinery has existed since 1965) was included in it. The ministry reportedly also set up offices for the protection of labor in all the newly organized 39 counties. The local and central inspectorates are charged with correcting deficiencies in working conditions and meting out punitive measures to those enterprises not conforming to specified industrial safety standards. There is yet no indication of the progress made in this direction.

As a part of the reorganization of the management of enterprises carried out in 1968-69, "elected" management committees and workers' assemblies were set up in all enterprises (factories and economic institutions). Each management committee includes a minority of representatives from the workers and is required to make semiannual reports to the workers' assemblies. The latter have no power, however, and the management committees have virtually no influence in policymaking within the enterprises. These two new bodies appear to be strictly showpieces of "socialist democracy" and are not comparable to the workers' self-management committees in Yugoslav enterprises.

E. Health and welfare

1. General (C)

The Romanian Communist regime has considerably improved the social well-being of the people as compared with prewar conditions, but Romania still lags far behind advanced Western countries. Moreover, it is worse off in this respect than other East European countries, certainly its northern neighbors, but about on a par with the other Balkan countries. It is comparable to Spain among Western European countries. In its drive for modernization after World War II, the Communist leadership started with a very low socioeconomic material base. Even so, the government probably was capable of providing a higher standard of living for its people than has actually developed, but it preferred instead to devote the lion's share of investment to heavy industry and capital accumulation. This order of priorities still exists in Romanian economic plans and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

The average Romanian probably realizes and appreciates the enormous gains which have been made since World War II. Along with the improvement in the standard of living, however, there has also been a corresponding rise in the level of expectations among the people, and in this the government has largely disappointed most Romanians. The propaganda value of medical, educational, and social security benefits has sharply diminished, and Romanians now desire more material comforts and the time to enjoy them.

2. Nutrition, water, and sanitation (C)

Although progress has been made in improving the general nutritional level as well as public health sanitation methods, Romania is still below Western standards in these matters. Sanitary regulations for food handling, water, and sewage facilities often have been ignored, and sanitary practices are generally regarded as markedly lower than in Western Europe. In an effort to improve this situation, the Romanian Government established a State Health Inspectorate in January 1966. Attached to the Ministry of Health, the agency is assigned detailed functions which have been generalized as:

> . . . directing and controlling the unified application of antiepidemic and hygiene norms and instructions issued by the Ministry of Health as well as investigating factors in the environment which could influence the overall health of the population.

There is still no hard evidence to judge the efficacy of this organization, but it appears that the State Health Inspectorate has been unable to make significant headway in undertaking the task set before it.

Food processing and storage, refrigeration, and dairy facilities are below Western levels and standards. All livestock is supposed to be processed at state slaughterhouses and the meat inspected by veterinarians before its sale, but these regulations frequently are ignored. One abattoir at Turnu Severin has, however, received U.S. Department of Agriculture approval to export canned meat to the United States. Milk pasteurization is becoming more common, and the government is allocating considerable

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investment funds to the food-processing industry to raise the quality and variety of food products both for export and domestic consumption.

Although legislation requires markets to be inspected routinely for cleanliness and sanitation, food handling is not in accordance with good sanitary practices. Perishable foods are frequently not refrigerated (refrigeration facilities are unevenly distributed and in short supply); most fruits and vegetables are displayed in open stalls unprotected against flies, dust, and handling by customers; and the requirement that hotel, restaurant, and foodstore employees receive regular physical examinations usually results in no more than superficial inspections.

The nutritional level of the population has usually been adequate in quantity but unbalanced in content, although Romania has been and is predominantly an agricultural country. A 1965 U.S. estimate indicated that the per capita intake of food in Romania was about 3,000 calories per day, which comprised about a 3% increase over 1962. This level is relatively satisfactory—on a par with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria—but the quality is still much below that in Western Europe. The average diet is still deficient in vitamins A, C, and D as well as in manganese and iodine.

The government claimed that the 1968 overall production of the food-processing industry was 32% greater than that in 1965, but the increase probably was largely exported. A large portion of the best quality meat processed by the state abattoirs is either reserved for the party elite or exported. In addition, frequent seasonal shortages and an inefficient distribution system contribute to nutritional deficiencies. Following adverse weather conditions in 1968 and 1969, the Romanian consumer has taken the brunt of the reduction in available foodstuffs, particularly meat, since the government placed priority on trying to meet its export quotas. Normally an exporter of meat products, Romania was so short of meat in 1969 that the state was reported to be shopping for imports of meat and meat substitutes to feed the population.

The State Water Committee, established in 1958, is responsible for research on water resources and the supply of water for domestic, industrial, and agricultural use. Serious water shortages occur in the southern areas of the Dobruja and Danube plains, particularly during summer months. Romania is also beginning to experience some water supply problems as a result of rapid industrialization, the growth of cities, and the need for expanded irrigation projects. The mountain areas have a more dependable water supply, while important sources of ground water are located in the Baraganul plain and the limestone formations in Dobruja. Underground water sources are being tapped with increasing regularity.

Romania's rivers have an average annual flow of 39 billion cubic meters. This represents an available supply of only 2,000 cubic meters per person per year—a supply per unit of population considerably below that of the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, or the European U.S.S.R. Because of seasonal variation, only about 4 billion cubic meters per year are effectively available naturally, without water management. The flow of the Danube is not included in the preceding figures, but the Danube's flow is of potential benefit only to the southern part of the country. Even this potential is further limited on a seasonal basis, because the entire flow of the Danube is required to assure navigation during the low-water period.

Present drawings of water amount to an estimated 6 million cubic meters per year. By 1980, however, it is anticipated that 25 billion cubic meters of water will be needed for irrigation, human consumption, industrial use, and hydroelectric plants. In towns built during the 1960's, up to 100% of the population have piped water; this is true of only 50% to 75% of the population in the older towns. Most towns obtain their water supply from rivers, but about 20% of urban dwellers receive good-quality water from underground sources which enter the piped system without prior treatment. Although it is known that quantities are not always sufficient to meet the demand, the regime provides no information on shortages. The regime has been taking steps to increase the present and future water supply of the larger cities in order to meet the demands of the expanding urban population. Programs include construction of canals, reservoirs, and rapid sand filters for water purification.

Water delivered to the consumer in the larger cities is generally potable. Water derived from rivers and some underground sources is purified by means of sedimentation and filtration. In addition, all waterworks reportedly have equipment for chlorination. Rural residents obtain their water from springs, open wells, and streams, all of which are subject to periodic contamination.

Approximately 90% of the newer towns and from 38% to 45% of the older towns have sewers. Most sewerage systems and treatment plants are in fair physical condition and are gradually being improved. Sewerage systems in the larger cities either treat sewage with chemicals or discharge it untreated into rivers, presenting a health hazard to downriver communities. In this connection, enteric infections are directly traceable to the unsanitary disposal of human excreta.

Although the quality of water is a matter of concern to Romanians, they have barely begun to think seriously about dealing with water pollution. Despite an annual expenditure of 300 million lei on waste treatment plants, a sampling of about 2,000 sources of industrial or sewage pollution showed that only 68% of them had waste treatment plants, most of them inadequate or malfunctioning. The Romanians estimate that 6.5 billion lei will have to be spent on waste treatment plants between 1971 and 1980 to supply new enterprises and to make up for existing inadequacies. During the same period, a further 4 billion lei will have to be spent on dikes and flood control. Romania suffers an average annual loss from floods of 200 million lei. In the spring of 1970, Romania suffered its worst flood in a century.

Garbage and trash disposal is inadequate throughout most of Romania, according to Western criteria. In larger cities central collection of garbage is provided, but in rural areas waste disposal remains primitive and presents a health hazard to the potable water supply from wells and to vegetable gardens fertilized with night soil.

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3. Medical care and principal diseases (U/OU)

Progress is being made in improving the quality of health care and sanitation, but Romania still has one of the poorest records in Europe in this respect. Medical care is fully socialized and is under the rigid centralized control of the Ministry of Health. The Minister of Health is a member of and is administratively responsible to the Council of Ministers. The maintenance of a healthy working population and the application of preventive medicine are the primary objectives of the ministry. A Higher Health Council, set up under the Ministry of Health in July 1969, is charged with "periodically analyzing and discussing" problems in the field. Consisting of representatives from the fields of medical science and education, the council is to meet at least once a year. The council was set up apparently with the intention of applying the results of medical theory and research to the everyday practice of public health measures. Since its powers are limited strictly to advisory functions and it has been in effect for such a short time, however, it is difficult to tell what impact, if any, the council will have on Romania's serious public health problems.

In 1967, according to Romanian statistics, national budget allocations for public health amounted to 19.5% of total expenditures for social and cultural activities or about 4.2% of the total state budget. Although expenditures on health have been increased considerably in absolute terms since 1955, they have declined somewhat in percentage terms during this period.

Virtually all citizens have access to free medical care, although those over 16 years of age must pay at least token sums for medications. Health services are extensive and uniformly organized at the national, county, and local levels, but medical care facilities, personnel, and supplies tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Thus, medical personnel and treatment facilities are generally adequate for the people's needs in cities and towns, but not in rural areas.

The unequal distribution of medical personnel and facilities is probably the most serious problem in the country's health program, but there are other deficiencies as well. Medicines are in short supply and most are of poor quality; foreign drugs are so scarce that reportedly they are reserved for only the few hospitals catering to high party and state officials. Food in hospitals is often poor, and transportation facilities for sick people are inadequate and badly organized. Doctors and other medical personnel are grossly underpaid; a newly graduated doctor reportedly receives an income roughly comparable to that earned by a skilled worker. Doctors are now permitted private practice after working the prescribed 8 hours daily in a state institution, but many still exact bribes for their supposedly free regular state-sponsored services.

Official Romanian reports indicate 7.9 hospital beds per 1,000 population were available in 1967, as compared with 4.2 in 1950. The average annual number of graduates of medical schools is estimated to be 1,150 physicians. The number of doctors has increased from 15,583 in 1950 to 30,000 in 1967, and the ratio of inhabitants to doctors has dropped in that time from 1,047 to 643. More recent statistics are not available, but in 1962 the urban-rural distribution was one physician for every 275 city dwellers and one physician for every 1,992 rural inhabitants.

The regime's effort since 1966 to correct this glaring inequality by requiring physicians to practice 3 years in the countryside before specialization apparently has not rectified the situation. Romanian authorities admit that this policy has met stiff resistance on the part of medical students. One source said that in the 1960's 10% of those graduating from medical schools refused to accept assignments. As recently as October 1968 the leadership criticized the Ministry of Health for failing to insure an even distribution of doctors, and attacked physicians for "negative ethical and professional attitudes." In June 1969 the Minister of Health indicated that a College of Doctors and Pharmacists would be established shortly to "promote principles of high professional ethics and to assure a broader base in control of medical practices." No further information on this proposal is available.

The staggering increase in the birth rate since the new restrictions on abortions were put into effect in 1966 has aggravated existing medical problems. Hospitals and childbirth clinics are overcrowded, and the medical profession has been overtaxed. The great increase in pregnant women has disrupted the routine in factories and has caused havoc in normal family life and planning. Single girls who previously had found it easy to abort unwanted pregnancies reportedly have resorted to taking cheap excursion trips to neighboring Bulgaria to obtain abortions. According to one journalist's report, the new family laws instituted in 1966 are a major cause of discontent among Romanians, and the crassness of the regime in ignoring the immediate hardships resulting from its policies is especially resented by the majority of Romanians. This is not atypical of the regime, which often appears interested in improving health facilities for the population while at the same time it fails to make sufficiently large investments in public health to achieve its goals.

Basic research in the medical sciences has not been significant in the postwar era. Romanian physicians are at a great disadvantage in this respect because most do not have ready access to foreign medical journals and thus find it difficult to keep abreast of new developments in medicine. Medical research institutes are often poorly equipped, usually lacking even basic research equipment. Staffs are often ill trained, and their institutes depend on financial support from the government, which insists on practical application as opposed to theoretical research.

The regime appears to have become aware of problems in this area, however, and has shown interest in participating in medical exchanges with the West as a means of keeping abreast of recent medical advances, particularly in surgery, anesthetics, and therapeutics. In addition, the Communist Party established in early 1970 an Academy of Medical

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Sciences to unite all branches of medical science into a single body and to direct organized research activity. There is yet no indication whether this body has been created or whether it will receive the necessary funds in order to function as planned. Other proposals made by the party at the same time to improve the dismal situation in health care seemed vague, ill defined, and bureaucratically uninspired.

Morbidity statistics are reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) by the government, but these statistics are highly fragmentary and permit no detailed listing of causes of natural death. It seems, however, that diseases of highest incidence include tuberculosis and the respiratory ailments, intestinal and helminthic infections, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases; rheumatism and mental disorders also are admitted problems. Venereal diseases, infectious hepatitis, and many of the childhood diseases are still serious health problems, although one defector's report claims that massive vaccination with Salk serum has significantly decreased the number of poliomyelitis cases. Contributing factors are poor housing, poor personal hygiene, the disproportionate distribution of physicians, and generally inadequate sanitary methods.

Romania receives some aid from WHO in developing public health and medical training institutes, eradicating diseases such as malaria and poliomyelitis, and instituting improved maternal and child-care programs. In addition, the Romanian Red Cross still operates and remains affiliated with the International Red Cross, but its programs are almost wholly state inspired and supported. Besides providing first aid and emergency and disaster relief, the Red Cross cooperates with the Ministry of Health in organizing special courses for health and medical personnel and assists the regime in national health campaigns. The Red Cross also directs and supports nationwide blood-donor programs.

Romania's authoritarian form of government simplifies the mobilization of medical and veterinary resources to cope with emergency conditions. Although little firm information is available on emergency medical services, isolated reports provide some data. Larger hospitals are reportedly equipped to care for emergency situations, from individual cases to disaster relief and civil defense situations. It also appears that in preparation for emergency requirements hospital nursing staffs are trained to work in several departments, and doctors serve both hospital and clinic patients. Some hospitals also reportedly cater to emergency cases, emphasizing surgical and toxicological procedures.

Within the area of civil defense, major disaster contingency plans probably provide for support by utilization of the nation's railroad system as well as military hospital trains and personnel. During past epidemics, the military has released antibiotics and vaccines to civilian authorities and also has made blood donations in the event of localized emergencies. Romania is able to meet its blood and plasma requirements during peacetime and in the event of small-scale disasters but not in more serious situations, according to one U.S. estimate. Blood bank services are under the central control of the Hematological Center in Bucharest.

Medical personnel also are organized for civil defense purposes on a team basis. In Bucharest, for example, these teams are made up of doctors, nurses, and nurses' aides. Members of the team are trained by the Red Cross to recognize the effects of poison gas and atomic radiation of human beings and to give first aid to victims.

The relatively high incidence of a number of animal diseases, fostered to some extent by fodder shortages and consequent nutritional deficiencies, is a contributing factor to Romania's low output of animal products. Among the prevalent animal diseases are brucellosis in cattle, sheep, and goats, and possibly swine; foot-and-mouth disease; leptospirosis; hog cholera; both bovine and porcine tuberculosis; salmonellosis in all classes of livestock; contagious algalactia in sheep and goats; and echinococcosis. Other important animal diseases include Q fever, anthrax, trichinosis, Aujeszky's disease, swine erysipelas, Newcastle disease, poultry cholera, ornithosis, toxoplasmosis, viral pneumonia of pigs, and rabies. Rabies appears to have been nearly eradicated except in wild animals, such as foxes and wolves, which abound in the Danube delta region and certain mountainous areas.

4. Health safeguards for nonindigenous personnel (C)

Nonindigenous personnel who have received routine international immunizations before entering Romania and who are disciplined in good hygienic practices should encounter no unusual disease problems. The following diseases are, however, of potential military importance because of their prevalence: bacillary dysentery, salmonellosis, influenza, tuberculosis, hepatitis, sandfly fever, hemorrhagic fevers, anthrax, bruccellosis, and leptospirosis. Moreover, the level of control of malaria, typhus, typhoid fever, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, and rabies could break down under disaster conditions. Figure 32 shows the principal insects and animals adverse to health in Romania.

5. Level of living (C)

a. CONSUMER PRODUCTS AND COSTS—Standards of living in Romania are still low in comparison with the rest of Europe. They are improving only gradually, though the improvement since 1956 has been substantial considering the prewar level. The present slow rate of improvement is the price the Romanians are paying for their program of rapid industrialization. Since 1950 the regime has consistently allocated a minimum of resources to the production of consumer goods in order to invest heavily in capital formation. Western sources estimate that the per capita GNP of Romania in 1969 stood at US$1,050 (in 1968 prices), somewhat higher than the level in Greece or Yugoslavia but much below that in Western Europe, the northern European Communist countries, and the U.S.S.R. Per capita consumption is considerably less than in Western Europe. In all of Europe, only Albania and Portugal have lower standards of living.

It is somewhat misleading, however, to compare current living conditions in Romania with those in advanced

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FIGURE 32. PRINCIPAL INSECTS AND ANIMALS ADVERSE TO HEALTH (U/OU)

COMMON NAME	SCIENTIFIC NAME	HUMAN DISEASE TRANSMITTED	ANIMAL DISEASE TRANSMITTED
Mosquito	*Anopheles maculipennis*	Malaria	
Flies:			
Sandfly	*Phlebotomus species*	Sandfly fever and leishmaniasis	
Black flies	*Simulium reptans columbaczense*		
Housefly	*Musca domestica*	Mechanical carrier of intestinal diseases—typhoid and paratyphoid fever, dysentery and helminthiasis.	
Lice:			
Body louse	*Pediculus humanus humanus*	Epidemic typhus, trench fever, and relapsing fever.	
Fleas:			
Oriental rat flea	*Xenopsylla cheopis*	Murine typhus, tularemia, and dermatitis.	
Ticks and mites:			
Brown dog tick	*Rhipicephalus sanguineus*	Russian spring-summer encephalitis and African tick-borne typhus.	Piroplasmosis.
Wood tick	*Dermacentor pictus*	Tularemia	Piroplasmosis, tularemia, and equine encephalomyelitis.
Human itch mite	*Sarcoptes scabiei*	Dermatitis and allergenic reactions	
German cockroach	*Blatella germanica*	Mechanical transmitter of intestinal pathogens.	
Helminths:			
Roundworm	*Ascaris lumbricoides*	Ascariasis	
Pork tapeworm	*Taenia solium*	Taeniasis	
Beef tapeworm	*T. saginata*		
Reptiles:			
Vipers	*V. ammodytes*		
Rodents	*Rattus species*	Leptospirosis and encephalitis	
Mollusks:			
Snails	*Lymnaea species*		
Spiders:			
Black widow	*Latrodectus lugubris*		

Western countries. By such comparisons they appear decidedly low, but this does not reflect the very respectable improvement over prewar conditions which has been achieved for the majority of Romanians. Romanian authorities claim that the per capita consumption in 1967 was 2½ times greater than that in 1950.

Judging from regime policies the prospects for a more rapid improvement in standards of living do not appear good. In major pronouncements in December 1968 and March 1969 the leadership strongly reaffirmed its policy of continued allocation of a high proportion of the national income to cumulative investments. (During the 1966-68 period, according to the Romanians themselves, the country obtained a 12.3% average annual rate of gross industrial growth—one of the highest in the world.)

The regime appears to be aware of some dissatisfaction among the populace, however, and has taken pains to present in the best possible light the accomplishments made under socialism in raising the level of living. The regime has taken some limited steps to ease the plight of the working man, but this has been more for effect than out of a genuine desire to alleviate his burden. Moreover, the regime has been careful not to make too many specific promises for the future.

It was in this spirit that the regime raised wages in 1967, a year ahead of schedule, for 1 million employees. The minimum wage was raised at the same time, from 570 to 700 lei per month. In June 1968, however, the regime announced a change in the 5-year goal (1966-70) for an increase in real wages from one of "about 25%" to one of "20% to 25%"; but a high-level official privately projected a figure of 16% to 20%, probably a more realistic figure. This suggests that the regime has become concerned about consumer demand pressures and about not being able to live up to plans. Planned percentage increases in real income have failed to materialize in the past, as for instance, under the 1960-65 economic plan.

No statistics are available to permit a meaningful comparison of real wages since the interwar period. According to Romanian statistics, the average wage for all employees in the socialist sector increased 46% between 1960 and 1968, the annual rate of increase ranging between 4.2% (1966-67) and 5.47% (1964-65). The average wage for all wage earners in 1960 was 860 lei, while in 1965 it had risen to 1,110 lei; the average monthly income of a Romanian worker in 1969 was about 1,300 lei.

It is not clear from the Romanian data whether there are significant discrepancies in the average wages and salaries among different branches of the economy, especially since the regime systematically raised salaries sector by sector from 1968 through 1970. It appears, however, that in terms of gross income the position of administrators and other white-collar types, construction workers, and agricultural collective workers has improved more rapidly than has that of those employed in heavy industry and

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other sectors of the economy. Members of agricultural cooperatives, of course, receive their income partly in cash but mostly in kind. According to one Romanian source, the total daily wage in the agricultural production cooperatives increased by 23% between 1963 and 1968, of which payment in cash increased over 50%. Wages vary considerably from one cooperative to another, however.

As in other Communist states, the government exercises a large degree of control over personal incomes because the wages paid by state enterprises and the pensions and other social security benefits provided by the state budget are the principal monetary flows to the population. It is apparent from a breakdown of primary expenditure items in average industrial output costs that workers' salaries, wages, and benefits account for only a small proportion of the total—about 14% in 1969. Nevertheless the government claims that the social benefits derived from such things as low-cost workers' housing, free hospitalization, rest homes, free education, and recreational facilities add as much as 40% to the average worker's income. Available fragmentary data indicate that additions from these sources to the worker's real income are actually smaller than claimed. Besides, the regime has the power to set or control prices—an important lever in partially regulating the spending of the populace.

On the basis of fragmentary reports, it appears certain that the average wage earner has a difficult time making ends meet, and both husband and wife must work in order to accumulate even a modest savings account. Prices for food and clothing are extremely high. A worker with a monthly wage of 1,300 lei (average gross income) earns about 7 lei per hour. Using these figures, a quick glance at the following list of prices of representative necessities in 1969 will show that his hourly earnings do not stretch very far:

1 kilogram boneless beef or pork	26–27 lei
1 kilogram bacon	17 lei
1 kilogram bread	2 lei, and up
1 liter fresh milk	over 2 lei
1 egg	over 1 lei
1 kilogram potatoes	1.10–1.20 lei
2 kilograms coffee	78–83 lei
1 pair women's stockings	13–42 lei
1 pair women's shoes	140–335 lei

A small car, such as the one shown in Figure 33, costs from 44,000 to 54,000 lei, clearly out of the price range of the ordinary wage earner.

Thus it is probably difficult for the average family to budget for clothing and other major expenses, especially since expenditures on food probably consitute about half of the average Romanian's budget. In cases where a clothing purchase is absolutely essential, it is generally made at the expense of the already monotonous and poorly balanced diet. Shortages of quality foods, especially meat, continue to irritate the urban population.

Seasonal shortages of food also have been a continuing problem. The government suppliers frequently have been unable to supply higher quality foods such as meat, rice, vegetables, and fruits in sufficient quantities to satisfy the demands of a steadily growing urban population, whose tastes have shifted to more nutritional and sophisticated foods as the standard of living has gone up. Since Romania's economy is predominantly agricultural, it is still vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather, and some of the population frequently suffer hardships in poor crop years, as during 1968. The larger share of better quality foods is exported to help pay for imports of industrial equipment.



FIGURE 33. The Romanian motor car "Dacia 1,000"—the first of its kind built in Romania, at the Pitesti factory (U/OU)

The Romanian diet is typically Balkan, although it has always stressed starchy foods more than proteins. According to the government, attempts are being made to introduce variety foods, such as the jellied products, soft puddings, sugar cookies, superior bread specialties, superconcentrates, specialty meat products, and dietetic products manufactured for the first time in 1968. But these novel products probably will reach only a limited number of privileged urbanites; many improvements will be required in the distribution of ordinary staples before country people can expect to taste such "delicacies."

Despite the chronic shortages of many crucial consumer items, Romanian retailers have serious problems with growing stocks of unsalable good. In 1966, according to an article in an economics journal, domestic consumer stocks increased 19.5% while sales rose only 9.6%. Among the most difficult items to sell are electrical home appliances, mainly vacuum cleaners (the only available model has been produced unchanged for the last 10 years and is notorious for breakdowns), refrigerators, radios, and TV sets. A little less than half of the unwanted stocks consists of clothing, much of which has accumulated for over 6 years. This embarrassing glut of unwanted products—not uncommon throughout East Europe—is the result of arbitrary planning and sloppy distribution and, in the case of appliances and clothing, poor design, outdated styles, and bad workmanship. In April 1968 the regime cut prices on these items and also encouraged retail enterprises to hold sales on seasonal items. The red tape involved in having a sale is so cumbersome, however, that goods often completely lose their appeal in the 2 or 3 months it takes to get approval. Another reason Romanians, particularly young married couples, hesitate to invest in household appliances is simply the

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lack of housing space, probably the single most frustrating element in the Romanian's daily life, particularly in urban areas.

b. Housing—Although a limited nationalization of housing took place in the early postwar years, most individual house and apartment owners retained ownership of their residences even though they were required to divide them into smaller units and to pay relatively high property taxes. A fairly high percentage of the housing in urban centers as well as peasant housing in rural areas continues, apparently, to be privately owned, bought, sold, and inherited. According to the census of March 1966 there were 5,402,070 registered dwelling units totaling over 147.7 million square meters or an average of 7.7 square meters of living space available per Romanian citizen. This compares unfavorably with corresponding figures for neighboring Bulgaria, which in 1965 claimed about 10 square meters per person.

Housing conditions are severely crowded in urban areas. It is reported that in some buildings several families live in one apartment, and sharing of bath and kitchen facilities is a universal practice, even among those fortunate enough to have private living and sleeping quarters. This is again the result of a deliberate postwar decision to channel funds into industrialization at the expense of housing and consumer goods. The problem is now so serious that the regime can no longer ignore it. According to Romanian data, about 139,000 apartment units were made available in 1969; about 78,000 of these were built with state funds, as compares with 56,000 in 1968. The large increase in housing units built from state funds in 1969 was at least achieved in part by building smaller and cheaper apartments—euphemistically called "housing with differentiated degrees of comfort." A total of 180,000 to 200,000 apartments of this type were planned for 1969 and 1970, but, in the light of past completion records, it seems unlikely that the quota will be filled in the prescribed time. A new apartment residential district, typical of Bucharest, is shown in Figure 34.

In 1966 the regime levied selective rent increases, sometimes as much as 150%, which in some cases were retroactive for 3 years. There is evidence that in recent years persons (or married couples) whose income is above a certain maximum level have been barred from renting in state-funded housing. Their only alternative is to build or to buy.

Whether by his own choice or because he is forced into it, the Romanian citizen who contracts to have living quarters built generally finds himself in extremely unhappy circumstances. According to one Romanian source, the average private apartment has three rooms, ranging in size from 3 x 3.5 meters to 4 x 4.5 meters, and costs 100,000 to 125,000 lei, about one-fourth of this sum being required in advance. Monthly installments including interest are 400 to 500 lei over a period of 15 to 20 years (government financing in all cases). The buyer contracts for his unit in a new bloc of apartments to be built by state construction enterprises through the Office for Contracting of Privately Owned Apartments (OCLPP). By all accounts the OCLPP is the source of intense frustration for thousands of Romanians and bears the brunt of their irate complaints—officially admitted to run on the average of 300 to 400 a month in Bucharest alone. Delays of 2 years or more in construction are common, and shoddy workmanship and materials are the rule. Once in his new home—often before the construction is even completed—the new owner is likely to find broken or cracked water pipes, faucets that come off when turned,

FIGURE 34. New residential district of Pajura in Bucharest (U/OU)

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toilets that do not flush, radiators that release water instead of heat, and doors made of green wood that makes them swell shut.

In rural areas dwellings are primitive in appearance, although most seem to provide satisfactory living quarters. In contrast to urban areas, where most units are constructed or financed with state funds, it appears that many rural inhabitants live in units built with their own funds; of 68,887 housing units built with private money in 1967, over 56,000 were built in the countryside (Figure 35). The regime has encouraged private building as a means of alleviating the housing problem.

c. PUBLIC WELFARE PROGRAMS—The Communist regime places considerable emphasis on social security as a means of promoting consumer welfare and as one facet of regime policy which has consistently received popular acceptance in the postwar era. The regime does not permit welfare work by religious institutions or other private organizations. The social security program—designated social insurance by the government—is considerably more comprehensive than before the war, but it is not as all-inclusive, for example, as that in Bulgaria. Much of the present system was first codified in 1948-49 as part of Romania's first Communist Labor Code, but after years of amending it was substantially revised in Decision No. 880 of the Council of Ministers as published on 20 August 1965.

The pension law was revised again in 1966. The new law, which went into effect in January 1967, departed from the classical socialist concept of nondirect payments for social benefits by initiating a system of payroll deductions similar to that already in effect in Hungary and East Germany. The law provided a new method of computing retirement benefits, raised the minimum monthly pension by more than 40% for workers who fulfill specified longevity conditions, and removed the ceiling on pensions. Thus the average monthly pension was raised by more than 28%. Partly to offset the cost to the state of increased monthly pensions, the decree also changed the retirement age from 60 to 62 years for men, and 55 to 57 years for women.

Further modifications were introduced in late 1968—apparently the 1966-67 law had proved overgenerous, at least from the government's point of view. Reversing its previous theory that material incentives in the form of increased pensions would keep workers on the job long past retirement age, the government actually reduced pensions to discourage workers from leaving the labor force and thereby losing salaries much higher than prospective pensions. The previously allowed annual increment in pensions for working beyond retirement age was reduced by half, and a supplement for job continuity eliminated.

FIGURE 35. Newly constructed village housing in Oltenia, southwestern Romania (U/OU)

Social security amendments enacted from 1965 to 1968 generally cover all employed persons except collective farmers. The amendments include old-age and disability pensions for civilian workers and military personnel, payments for temporary disability (illness, accident, and maternity leave), children's allowances, and burial benefits. The system also provides for medical assistance; rest homes; sanitariums; homes for the aged, disabled, and mentally ill; and orthopedic, prosthetic, and similar devices. In accordance with Communist doctrine that unemployment does not exist, there is no unemployment compensation. The system, however, does provide benefits for pensioners discharged before reaching retirement age or before reaching the required length of service for retirement because of the reorganization of their enterprises.

Administration of the social security system, formerly under the general supervision of the Ministry of Health, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor. The General Union of Trade Unions and its regional organs are responsible for the program covering workers, including those working on the state farms and machine-tractor stations. Each insured worker has approximately 2% of his earnings taken out for social security, and each enterprise contributes 5% to 15% for insurance, depending on the branch of industry. In 1967, 6.4% of the state budget was allocated for social insurance, compared with 5.6% in 1965, which was more than double the 1956 level in absolute terms.

Benefits under the social security program are computed from rather complex formulations which take into account the length of employment, the branch of the economy, whether the employee is a temporary or permanent worker, and in some cases the relationship of the beneficiary to the insured. Employed expectant mothers are granted 112 days of maternity leave, of which 52 days may be taken prior to delivery. Death benefits may amount to 500 lei in the event of the death of a member of an employee's family. In the event of an employee's death, his survivors are entitled to 800 lei for burial expenses.

With the exception of death and maternity benefits, nearly all assistance is computed on the basis of a work year consisting of 2,488 hours or approximately 48 hours per week, and the amount of benefits generally increases with the length of service, although this is now less true because of the changes enacted in 1968. Maximum old-age pensions are based on 25 years of service for men and 20 years of service for women. In each case, retirement benefits range from 60% of the average earnings during the last year—or the best 5 in the last 10 years of work—of earnings in excess of 1,200 lei per month, to 90% of earnings below 500 lei per month. In early 1967 the minimum and maximum pensions were 500 lei and 1,200 per month, respectively.

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6. Social problems (C)

In a sense Romanian society—particularly in rural areas—seems to the Western observer to have changed very little in the past 25 years. Industrial progress does not seem to have made much of an imprint, partly because Romania started from such a low material base and still has such a long way to go to catch up with its envied Western friends. Nevertheless, Western technology has established a firm foothold, although in sociological terms it has had some undesirable side effects. Industrial modernization is being achieved, but at the price of eroding and discrediting the folk cultures. Young people have been set adrift, and for them the old morality has been brought into comic disrepute. This is not to say that the people, even the agricultural workers, long for the old times or for the old system, though certain of their aspects are remembered fondly. The people, especially the young people, have all become imbued with the new materialism.

Thus, postwar political and economic changes in Romania have had a profound impact on the way of life of the people, both at home and at work. The usual social tensions have arisen in the process of shifting people from agricultural to industrial activities and from rural to urban areas. Although these tensions are probably not as pronounced as those in neighboring Bulgaria, which has had a more rapid urbanization rate, they have been heightened in each case by the insensitivity of the regimes.

Cramped and unpleasant living conditions caused by housing shortages have created many social conflicts. Longtime urbanites resent having to share living quarters and household facilities with recently arrived semiliterate peasants. The latter find it even more difficult to adjust to the complexities of competitive urban life in this atmosphere of hostility. Moreover, the cohesiveness of strong family ties—a touchstone among the basic values of old Romania—has lost much of its force, especially among the peasants whose younger members go off to the cities for economic advancement. The state has established itself as the guardian of youth in much the same manner that it has taken over providing for the older generation with its social security programs. Economic necessity requires young mothers to work in order to supplement the family income, and the government encourages this practice by providing nurseries and child-care centers at the municipal and factory levels. Schools and other government and party institutions have not been fully successful, however, in providing substitutes for the authority or the moral and ethical training traditionally centered in the family.

So far, young Romanian students and workers have not shown the effects of this disruption of the old family patterns in outright rebellion, as has been the case in some Western and Asian countries. This reflects in part the firm control over youth exercised by the regime and the moderate success of its carrot and stick approach. The government has increased stipends for students and promised expanded and better dormitory facilities; there have been indications that the regime might be prepared to allow a measured degree of discussion of youth problems and a relaxation of other controls. This was effectively scotched, at least for the time being, by the Bucharest student "riots" on Christmas eve 1968. A gathering of students in Bucharest University Square began by singing Christmas carols and dancing the *hora* in the streets, grew to mob proportions, and ended up chanting anti-Soviet and antiregime slogans. Police and *Securitate* forces reacted harshly; there were numerous arrests and the students were lectured and threatened by high-level officials. These initially harsh measures were shortlived, however, and were followed by a purge and a severe crackdown. In the next few months the regime consolidated and tightened its controls over student activities, but at the same time granted a few sugared placebos. In 1969, for example, university officials announced that students would have a vacation during the traditional Christmas holiday season—though, of course, it was not referred to as such.

The students, for their part, have returned to their usual apathetic and docile ways—in itself a source of concern to the leadership. There is evidence of discontent among Romanian youth, but despite the 1968 Christmas "caroling" incident, this discontent has not taken a politically activist turn. Young students and workers alike are apolitical and bored, their main interest focused on acquiring things and imitating the Western "mod" and "hippy" subcultures, as the critical cartoon in Figure 36 illustrates. Nevertheless, the regime finds even these relatively innocuous symbols of unorthodoxy objectionable. In the spring of 1970 the press stepped up references to increasing hooliganism and nonconformism among the young. In March there was a campaign of enforced cutting of beards and long hair, and girls' miniskirts were slashed on the streets by police and Union of Communist Youth (UTC) squads.

The UTC has been severely criticized for not doing more to counteract political apathy and unorthodox mannerisms and for not implementing its role as an

Fashion.

FIGURE 36. Cartoon by Eugen Taru, mocking the youth for their slavish imitation of Western culture (U/OU)

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ideological and revolutionary organization and the party's proselytizer among youth. In trying to invigorate the UTC and to make it more relevant, the party has shown timidity and a lack of direction, giving more freedoms and a broader scope of activities with one hand and taking them away with the other. The party elite is able to see that the UTC's anachronistic, didactic, and unsophisticated methods are largely irrelevant to youth, but it insists that it must remain a vehicle for ideological indoctrination. Thus the trend has been for the party to increase its hold on the UTC and to push its influence deeper into areas such as the university campuses where previously its presence had been only lightly felt. In April 1969, for example, all Romanian student associations reportedly were formally brought under the direct control of the UTC.

The Communist Party exercises broad control over the lives of all the people. Although this control is pervasive, the regime faces day-to-day difficulty of enforcing the unending flow of decrees issued to form or regulate every facet of the new society. Most Romanians are essentially apolitical, and many have attained a high degree of perfection in circumventing and hedging on government controls and exhortations. Even in times when the regime enjoys its greatest popular support the average Romanian sees nothing wrong in trying to beat the system.

The extent and seriousness of other specific social disorders in Romania cannot be determined accurately because of the scarcity of official statistics and other valid information. There are indications that juvenile delinquency has been a problem for some time, but only recently has it been officially admitted as such. A conference on juvenile delinquency was organized and held in the autumn of 1969 in Sibiu county, where the problem is confessed to be more serious than anywhere else in the country, for reasons not entirely clear. It was revealed during the conference by the local military inspector that almost 1,000 youths were brought to trial in 1969, in a county with a population of 428,625, and that the number and boldness of juvenile delinquents are increasing year by year. Officials blame many factors: "adventurism encouraged by bad literature and certain films"; foreign and religious propaganda; failures of the teachers, schools, and the UTC; and most important, lack of parental responsibility. Since in most families both parents work, children probably do not receive proper guidance and supervision. Government authorities have taken a particularly ungenerous and unconstructive approach to the problem, however, advocating legal prosecution of irresponsible parents, increased ideological and legal education by the UTC and the schools, the establishment of town centers to deal with wayward youth, and the "mobilization of public opinion against negative behavioral phenomena."

Common adult crime in the streets—robbery, rape, and murder—apparently is not serious. Moreover, there is evidence from the new criminal code which came into effect on 1 January 1969 that the judicial system is becoming more aware of the individual's rights before the court and more scientific in examining criminal evidence. The investigation of a case, particularly in the pretrial period, is still quasi-inquisitorial but the new code does introduce the concept of the defendant's innocence until proven guilty. How faithful to this Western concept of justice the Romanian judiciary will be is still uncertain.

The regime does not officially admit the existence of prostitution, but occasional angry references in the press to such "bourgeois" practices indicate that prostitution and procuring have not been eradicated. Theft (and certainly embezzlement as well) is widespread, particularly within the nationalized enterprises, while black marketeering and bribery of officials are frequently reported, despite rather severe penalties.

There is no evidence that drug addiction is a problem, though it may eventually creep in along with other side effects of the hippy culture. Alcoholism does not appear to be the chronic problem in Romania that it is in some other East European countries; approximately four of every 100 patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals in 1965 were diagnosed as alcoholics. Alcoholism appears to be particularly prevalant in villages and small towns, where drinking provides the only relatively inexpensive relief from daily drudgery.

F. Religion (C)

In Romania, as throughout the Balkans, religion has played a significant role in the life of the people and of the nation. The predominance of the Orthodox Church sets the region off as distinct from western as well as from much of central Europe. Western observers have noted that the differences between the Western Christian churches and the Orthodox churches are compounded not only of dissimilar architecture, rituals, and customs, but in Orthodox churches there is a greater informality, while at the same time a greater sense of mystery.

The Orthodox church building is essentially a square capped by a dome beneath which the congregation stand together and move about freely, while behind the iconostasis—the painted screen that hides the sanctuary and the altar—ritualistic mysteries are played out. The church fosters an intimate companionship among members of the congregation and between the clergy and the congregation. Figure 37 shows the interior of the Three Hierarch Church in Iaşi.

This sense of community, however, is confined within narrow bounds. It has contributed greatly to rivalry among the national, independent churches—the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Romanian Orthodox Church, etc.—and to intolerance toward other religious faiths, particularly the Roman Catholic and the Jewish.

The Communists have succeeded in damping down somewhat these traditional religious animosities by their repressive religious policies. In the first few years after World War II, the Romanian Communists employed harsh measures aimed at eradicating all religious influences, in line with the Marxist-Leninist commandment on atheism.

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FIGURE 37. Interior view of the Three Hierarch Church, built 320 years ago, in Iasy (U/OU)

By the early 1950's, as Romanian officials readily admit, the state realized that its policy was failing to achieve the desired end. Since that time the regime has considerably moderated its attitude, taking the practical stance that there is no need for the state and the church to engage in philosophical or theoretical debates about first premises, and that the church can serve the state's interests to a modest degree. There is evidence that in recent years the regime has allowed religious organizations greater freedoms than before and has openly recognized their contributions to "the national impetus." As Patriarch Justinian of the Romanian Orthodox Church candidly puts it, "The moral strength of active Christians rates accordingly."

In purely religious matters the Romanian Orthodox Church and most of the smaller churches are left alone, although their financial affairs and foreign relations are still closely controlled. The regime's control of church administration stems mainly from three measures taken in 1947-48: 1) the regime assumed control of finances, properties, and governing offices; 2) the upper levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchies were packed with priests considered subservient to the party and capable of controlling the lower clergy; and 3) ties between the Romanian churches and their Western affiliates or parent bodies were severed. The Uniates—Romanian Orthodox who in the 17th century accepted Roman papal supremacy but retained their own liturgy and disciplines—were forced to merge with the Orthodox Church. In addition, the authorities imposed, and still maintain, strict censorship of all religious publications, primarily, according to regime officials, to prevent undesirable affronts to powerful foreign neighbors.

Law No. 62 of March 1948, the most important law for the state's control of religion, requires all religious organizations to provide the Department of Cults—formerly the Ministry of Cults—with inventories of their assets and revenues. The department is subordinate to the Council of Ministers, which selects the department's general secretary. The 1948 law also requires the heads of churches to take an oath of allegiance to the Romanian regime, pledging to obey and enforce regime laws and to defend the country against "any enemies from within or without." The regime additionally insures its domination of the churches by selecting or influencing the selection of leading lay and clerical personnel. No cleric can practice his ministry without the written clearance of the Department of Cults.

Romania is estimated to have over 20 religious bodies, although the state recognizes only 14 denominations. The Romanian Orthodox Church counts 14 million members and accounts for approximately 70%-75% of the population; the Roman Catholic Church has some 1 million members, mostly Hungarians, but including 200,000 Germans and 200,000 Romanians; the Hungarian Calvinists 700,000; the German Lutherans 200,000; and there are about 100,000 Jews. Muslims number around 30,000 and Unitarians and Baptists each total around 70,000. Most former adherents of the Uniate Church transferred to the Romanian Orthodox Church and the remainder to the Roman Catholic

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Church in 1948. Despite the German and Hungarian Catholic minorities, religion in Romania is almost entirely a reflection of ethnic origin. The churches serve to preserve the separate identity of the ethnic groups and ethnic pride seems stronger than religious pride. Reportedly, few ethnically mixed marriages are performed in churches, and they make almost no linguistic concessions. Lutheran services are in German, Catholic and Calvinist services in Hungarian, and Orthodox services in Romanian.

Like all Orthodox churches, the Romanian Orthodox Church is a national church which has traditionally been intimately related to the state. It underwent only minor organizational changes in 1948, despite the enactment of Law No. 62. The traditional central organs of the church—the Holy Synod, the National Church Assembly, the National Church Council, and the Patriarchal Administration—continue to function, although under the watchful eye of the party and state. The Holy Synod, composed of Patriarch Justinian (Figure 38), metropolitans, bishops, and vicars, is the highest authority for all spiritual and canonical matters. The National Church Assembly, composed of 12 clergymen and 24 laymen, represented and elected by the 12 dioceses, is the highest elective body of the Orthodox Church in Romania.

Although little is known about the internal workings of the present Orthodox Church, it obviously is prospering and reaping the rewards of faithful service to the state. It has apparently been allowed to construct a limited number of new churches. Some 500 monks and 1,500 nuns are again living in 200 monasteries (it seems that the state relented when Western tourists viewing ancient monasteries complained about finding only guides and not real monastics, as they had expected). According to a visiting American bishop, there are more practicing monastics in Romania now than there were at the end of World War II, but other Western observers question this. On 6 June 1968 the Romanian Orthodox Church observed the 20th anniversary of Patriarch Justinian's enthronement with a large complement of foreign church dignitaries, and in January 1968 it was revealed that the state press would publish 10,000 new Bibles for the Orthodox Church. The church would, of course, like to regain its strong influence over education, but in view of the party's self-proclaimed prerogatives in this regard, this is unlikely.

FIGURE 38. Patriarch Justinian, head of the Romanian Orthodox Church (U/OU)

According to the latest information available (1966), the church had 8,600 parishes with about 10,000 priests. In Bucharest alone, Patriarch Justinian claimed 290 churches served by 360 priests. At that time the Theological Institute in Bucharest attached to the University of Bucharest had 300 students, while the institute in Sibiu had 240 students. In addition, he claimed that a number of foreign theological students were studying in Bucharest.

The Roman Catholic Church is much worse off. Its prewar organization has been virtually destroyed. The regime's efforts to abrogate the authority of the Pope in favor of a national Catholic church have failed. The Catholic Church is the only major denomination which has so far refused to prepare or present internal governing regulations for approval by the state, according to the Secretary General of the Department of Cults. Although the Romanian Government currently maintains reasonably good relations with the Vatican, which has in the past denounced the former's attempt to set up an independent national Catholic Church, no settlement of differences is forthcoming. As a result of this stalemate, the Catholic Church in Romania does not function normally. Nonetheless, the Bishop of Alba Iulia was released from house arrest in early 1968 and for the first time in 20 years is being allowed to travel freely throughout his diocese. In early 1966 the Department of Cults disclosed that there were about 700 Roman Catholic priests in Romania.

Despite its efforts to promote a liberal image, the Ceausescu regime and its immediate predecessor have not permitted any official Roman Catholic representation to visit Rome to attend church conclaves, even in the case of the Vatican Council. However, the Bishop of Alba Iulia was permitted to go to Rome in the autumn of 1969. There is no Apostolic Delegate representing the Vatican in Romania.

State funds have generally been used to restore only historically or artistically important churches, including Catholic ones, but the overall material condition of most churches appears to be satisfactory by Romanian standards. Repair and maintenance work on churches is usually performed on a voluntary basis by devout parishioners. Church collections also are slight, and the clergy are paid from state funds, thus providing still another means of regime control.

Church attendance in the period 1948 to 1963 declined from prewar levels and most of those attending were of the older generation, but more recently attendance has risen considerably, and includes growing numbers of younger people. This trend is probably related both to the relaxation of the regime's attitude and to the resurgence of nationalism. The church exerts especially strong influence in rural areas.

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Unlike the Bulgarians, who have exhibited considerable religious toleration over the years, the history of interdenominational relations in Romania has been one of rancor and distrust. Tension between Romanian Orthodox adherents and Roman Catholics has been at times comparable to the bitter relations between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants. In addition, the leaders of other national Orthodox churches still show their traditional antagonism occasionally, as for instance when the Serbian patriarch snubbed the Romanian church by failing to appear at the celebrations marking the 20th anniversary of Patriarch Justinian's enthronement.

Romanians also have a long history of anti-Semitism which is still a social factor. The government has tried to counter this by an official policy of neutrality on religious matters. Nevertheless, the government practices subtle forms of anti-Semitism, particularly against highly skilled and professional Jews wishing to emigrate. The feeling of the Romanians against Jews, while never eradicated, has been deflated more than anything else by their dwindling numbers as a result of continuing emigration to Israel, the United States, and other Western countries. Internally, the government guarantees the right of Jews to freedom of worship in their synagogues and the right to maintain their ethnic identity through Yiddish-language newspapers and theaters. According to Jewish sources, however, there are no rabbinical schools in Romania, and the future of Jewish leadership there is an open question. There is no information on the number of existing synagogues in Romania, but it is claimed that there are 22 in Bucharest.

G. Education (S)

Before the Communist takeover the educational system was geared to training an urban intellectual elite. Patterned on the French and Belgian systems, it was both intellectually demanding and socially restrictive. Few if any members of the peasantry received more than the 4 years of elementary education required by the state, if even that much. All but members of the upper classes were discouraged from going on to secondary school by the limited number of institutions available and by relatively high costs. The prewar educational system reflected the traditional order in Eastern Europe in which only the socially and economically privileged were given the benefits of higher education. Educational and intellectual achievements were valued highly, and the individual with schooling commanded respect at all levels of society. In this situation, in which the upper classes monopolized education almost as a material possession, only 25% of the prewar population received more than a basic elementary education, while less than 1% of the children of peasants and industrial workers attended secondary schools.

The postwar transformation of the structure and the character of the educational system has been one of the principal objectives of Romania's Communist regimes, and the broadening of educational opportunities for the general populace has been one of the regime's popular achievements. According to the Ceausescu regime, 35% of the population was illiterate or semiliterate in 1945; illiteracy has now been eliminated. Romanians continue to hold education in high esteem and to aspire to formal education as the single means of social and economic advancement as well as of general enlightenment.

Formal education is completely under state control. The basic law on education, Decree No. 175-6 of August 1948, abolished all institutions "serving as sources of foreign influence." The 1948 law has been amended many times since its adoption, however, and the present legal basis of education is a formidable complex of decrees reflecting in large part the vicissitudes of Romania's political life and the country's economic needs. The Ministry of Education—separated in 1962 from the former Ministry of Education and Culture—is responsible for the administration of education programs.

Romanian students pay no tuition at any level. Their education is financed by allotments from the annual state budget in conformity with the overall goals of the 5-year plans. In the period 1955 to 1965 the state budget almost doubled in size, while allocations to education tripled, from 2.2 billion lei (US$366,666,067) in 1955 to 6.5 billion lei ($1,083,000,000) in 1965. The allocation for education in 1967 was 7.4 billion lei, or slightly more than 5.9% of the overall budget, down from 6.8% in 1966.

Student enrollment has increased correspondingly. A total of 4,155,472 students were enrolled for the 1967/68 school year—approximately one-fifth of the total population. Preschool children and youngsters in general education (grades I through XI) comprise about 3.7 million of this total, which compares with 1.7 million in the 1938/39 school year. The remainder is made up of enrollers in universities and professional schools, vocational and technical schools, and adult night courses. Opportunities in many of the latter kinds of education were nonexistent in the prewar period. Figure 39 compares recent enrollments at all levels with previous years.

Although the number of preschoolers and general education students more than doubled between 1938 and 1967, the number of teachers more than tripled, from about 47,000 to more than 160,000. Romanian sources indicate a substantial reduction in the teacher-student ratio for both general education and higher education schools during this period. In 1938 there was one teacher per 35 general education students (including kindergartens), while the regime claims to have reduced this by 1967 to one teacher per 23 children; in higher educational establishments, the teacher-student ratio improved from a 1938 level of about 1 to 13, to a 1967 level of 1 to 10. The expansion of education has resulted in a reduction of adult illiteracy from about 38% in 1930 to 23% in 1948, until it is presently "virtually nonexistent," according to regime claims.

Despite the favorable teacher-student ratio, quantity belies quality in this case, as with so many aspects of life under a Communist system. Communist-educated teachers probably are considerably less knowledgeable and less skilled, except perhaps in scientific areas, than their prewar counterparts, who were for the most part educated in Western Europe. Political reliability for teachers

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FIGURE 39. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS, AND TEACHERS IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, SELECTED YEARS (U/OU)

TYPE OF SCHOOL	1938/39	1948/49	1960/61	1966/67	1967/68
Kindergartens	1,577	2,998	7,375	7,794	8,649
Children enrolled	90,787	157,934	354,677	356,464	391,051
Teachers	1,819	3,951	12,533	14,088	15,672
General education:					
Schools	13,865	14,988	15,638	15,513	15,525
Pupils	1,604,481	1,846,202	2,587,861	3,327,856	3,268,707
Teachers	45,359	65,042	103,669	143,610	144,516
Special art education:					
Schools	*na*	*na*	45	51	51
Students—Total	*na*	*na*	14,530	20,634	20,800
Of whom for general education as well	*na*	*na*	12,535	11,941	11,672
Teachers	*na*	*na*	1,082	2,432	2,521
Vocational education:					
Schools	224	511	519	422	426
Students	39,250	61,372	127,224	205,197	219,401
Teachers	896	4,314	7,330	11,615	11,924
Teacher-training education:*					
Schools	55	64	25	*na***	*na***
Students	5,537	14,376	9,271	2,401	3,088
Teachers	1,067	1,063	666	2	*na***
Secondary specialty education (lyceums):					
Schools	*na*	*na*	*na*	182	186
Pupils enrolled	*na*	*na*	*na*	35,643	61,428
Teachers	*na*	*na*	*na*	2,117	3,575
Technical education (adult):					
Schools	142	454	160	220	217
Students	14,746	75,168	28,868	46,797	40,763
Teachers	3,871	6,482	2,080	3,051	2,490
Higher education:					
Faculties	33	129	131	181	185
Students—Total	26,489	48,676	71,989	136,948	141,589
Of whom foreign students number	*na*	*na*	897	729	971
Teachers	2,194	5,638	8,917	13,404	13,792

na Data not available.

*2-year teacher training schools and teacher training institutes.

**Teacher-training schools have been converted into teacher-training lyceums and included in specialty lyceums.

continues to be more important than professional qualifications, according to numerous reports. However, many teachers who were purged because of political unreliability in the first years after the Communists seized power have since been reinstated after demonstrating a willingness to orient their teaching along Communist ideological lines. Reinstatement has been most frequent at the secondary and higher educational levels, because of the lack of a sufficiently trained Communist cadre. The educational system has been plagued by teacher shortages in the past, which the regime has tried to overcome by offering various incentives to help recruit teachers. Although the present level appears to be satisfactory, the problem is likely to recur as the children born during and after the baby boom of 1967 come of school age, and as the regime pushes ahead with 10-year compulsory education. It will be further aggravated by the need for more sophisticated teachers—which probably means longer training periods—to fulfill the country's need for advanced technicians and skilled workers.

The state educational system includes all levels of instruction from preschool or kindergarten through higher educational institutions (Figure 40). Preschool education includes children from 3 through 6 years of age. Following a decision at the Eighth Party Congress in 1960, the regime gradually introduced and in 1964/65 completed adoption of an 8-year compulsory elementary program, replacing the previous 7-year system. The Romanian education system since prewar days has included a 4-year noncompulsory secondary program, but until recently it was not comprehensive. At a party plenum in April 1968, however, the party leadership stated the necessity for a 10-year compulsory system, and it was subsequently announced that this would gradually be introduced starting in 1969. Henceforth, grades 9 and 10 reportedly are to be required of all students who do not pass the entrance exam for either a general secondary school, technical secondary school, or vocational secondary school, as shown in Figure 40. The exam for general secondary school is more difficult, since this course is intended as college preparation.

Vocational schools eventually will include grades 11 and 12 and will prepare students for routine work (Figure 41). Reportedly about half of all secondary school students attend vocational schools. In the past the government has not encouraged all students to go on to secondary

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

FIGURE 40. Structure of education system (U/OU)

school; analysis of Romanian figures in 1967, for example, indicates that roughly one-third of those who achieved an eighth-grade education did not go on to secondary school. With the move toward achieving 10-year compulsory education, however, and the need for more sophisticated and specially trained workers, this is changing somewhat.

Industrial, agricultural, economic, and pedagogical (teacher-training) secondary schools, called specialty lyceums, or technical schools, were introduced in 1966/67. Apparently these schools are modeled after the secondary labor-polytechnical secondary schools established in Bulgaria in 1959 for the express purpose of coping with a shortage of trained specialists for the economy. At the time this decision was made in Romania it was implied in an official report that the existing system was not producing enough qualified young workers. In April 1968 at a party plenum the leadership indicated that this situation was still critical but expressed intitial satisfaction with prospects for improvement through the new specialty lyceums.

The educational system in general stresses technical, political, and economic subjects. According to one Romanian administrator, the first 4 years emphasize Romanian language, heritage, art, music, and physical education; grades five through eight complete the general education, concentrating on mathematics, chemistry, physics, history, and a foreign language. In September 1963 the regime eliminated the mandatory Russian language course from the curriculum. Children now select English, French, German, or Russian and continue the study for a total of 10 years if they continue their education past the eighth grade. In both elementary and secondary schools, the foundation for political education is laid exclusively within the context of historical materialism, and is underscored by the Pioneers Organization, whose activities are an integral part of the school program.

Schools (Figure 42) reportedly meet 6 days a week for about 5 hours a day. Grading appears to be quite rigid; a student must receive a grade of 5 on a scale from 1 to 10 and a grade of 6 for conduct in each area of study in order to be promoted. He is allowed to repeat one or two examinations before being required to repeat the course he failed. At the end of the 8-year program all students must take written examinations in Romanian history, geography, and literature only, while oral examinations are given in other subjects. It is at this point that the students are broken down into college preparatory, technical, pedagogical, or vocational groupings.

For those who continue their education beyond secondary school the most critical point comes at the time of qualification for entrance to a higher educational institution. A "maturity" examination must be passed upon completion of the secondary program, and also an admission examination to the desired institution. The student then enters one of four basic types of schools: universities, polytechnical institutes, specialized institutes of higher education, and teacher-training colleges. Most offer a 5-year course of study which qualifies the student for a "license" to enter the candidate stage in preparation for the doctoral degree if he wishes to carry on this far. Teacher training

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FIGURE 41. Classroom in the "Electromagnetica" vocational school in Bucharest (U/OU)



FIGURE 42. Village school, built in 1967 (U/OU)

is accomplished at three main levels requiring from 3 to 5 years to complete; pedagogical schools (incorporated into the technical school program at the secondary level) train elementary teachers; pedagogical departments at universities and teacher-training colleges train secondary teachers; and a program of graduate studies prepares professors for higher educational institutions. Bucharest University is pictured in Figure 43.

With the exception of medical schools and certain other institutions directly affiliated either with industrial-scientific enterprises or the Romanian academy of sciences (Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania), higher educational establishments are all administered by the Ministry of Education. They are geared to train Communist-educated specialists to fill state and public positions, to teach, to perform scientific research work, and to develop science and the arts on the basis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

FIGURE 43. Bucharest University (U/OU)

The party leadership has expressed concern over certain shortcomings in higher education, and the Ministry of Education has come under rather severe criticism. In July 1967 a study done by the party was published by the party daily *Scinteia* enumerating the major faults: fragmentization of education into narrow specialties; lack of long-term scientifically based planning of cadre requirements; underemphasis on economic education; centralization and rigidity in planning curriculums, courses, and textbooks; failure to keep pace with advances in scientific knowledge and the neglect of certain areas such as cybernetics and genetics; and failure to rectify the harmful effects of subordination to Russian influence. The study recommended, in effect, ruling out all remnants of Soviet influence from higher education, reviving some of the "progressive" traditions of pre-Communist Romanian education, introducing some of the modernization processes and improvements taking place in the West, and drastically reducing the time and emphasis spent on instruction in Marxism-Leninism.

The party plenum in April 1968 apparently incorporated some of these recommendations into specific directives on education, but they were never published. A comprehensive Law on Education was passed the following month. The party has emphasized the need for broader university autonomy, which if implemented could mean a strengthening of the prerogatives of faculties and deans of universities, and on general modernization of the education system. One recommendation of the study which was specifically and vigorously repudiated, however, was reducing time spent on compulsory instruction in Marxism-Leninism. The effects, if any, of the proposed reforms cannot yet be judged. It appears, however, that not much has been accomplished; in a February 1969 speech, party leader Ceausescu was still sharply critical of the laggardly progress being made by the Ministry of Education in all areas. The ministry was criticized at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1969 and the incumbent minister was replaced shortly after the congress.

Adult education, conducted through evening schools, correspondence courses, and party education, is considered important as a means of improving the literacy of older people whose education as youngsters was limited, and of keeping skilled workers and technicians up to date on new methods. Adults are able to complete their secondary education in evening classes, which offer grades 5 through 12. Evening courses at the higher educational level generally

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have operated within the framework of technical institutes, while correspondence courses at the same level have been conducted by universities, pedagogical institutes, the Institute of Economic Sciences, or at the Physcial Culture Institute. However, drastic changes proposed in the 1967 study for evening and correspondence education suggest that this type of education has had only poor results, and it is possible that the depth and breadth of these courses may be curtailed or streamlined in the interest of efficiency, although there is no hard information to this effect yet.

Romanian educators are also faced with the problem of educating minority groups. In principle, the regime holds that minorities should, and do, have the opportunity to acquire an education in their native language. In practice, however, the regime is more committed to the idea of "incorporation" or integration of the nation's minorities, and there are signs that the regime's attitude eventually may have the effect of nullifying the *raison d'être* for separate schools.

According to Romanian sources, in 1969 there were 3,165 schools of all types with instruction in minority languages, including 1,274 kindergartens, 1,779 general schools, and 112 general education and teacher-training lyceums, with a total enrollment of more than 292,000 pupils. Of the 1,891 general schools and lyceums, 682 were schools with a single minority language of instruction and 1,209 schools had sections with several languages of instruction. Their ethnic character is shown in the following tabulation:

Hungarian	1,446
German	375
Serbian	28
Slovak	29
Ukrainian	8
Czech	5
Total	1,891

The number of teachers active at the minority-language schools and sections exceeds 14,000. For the training of Hungarian-speaking teachers there is a section at the Tîrgu Mureş Pedagogic Institute, and at "Babes-Bolvai" University in Cluj a number of pedagogical and other subjects are taught in Hungarian.

Regime control over the student body in higher educational facilities is channeled through student unions on all university campuses, established by the Party Central Committee in June 1956 to simplify the complicated extracurricular system of student activities. The student unions are centralized under one basic organization, the Union of Romanian Student Associations, supervised by the party and operated by the Union of Communist Youth, which recently has been encouraged by the party leadership to participate more directly and actively in campus affairs and politics. Other organizations active on campuses include the Voluntary Association for the Support and Defense of the Fatherland, and the Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society. The activities of the latter were sharply curtailed in 1963 when Romania initiated its independent course in the Communist world. Matters relating to student discipline, other than major cases, are handled through the student unions.

So far, there are no indications that Romanian students have been infected with the virus of revolt common to many Western students over the past few years. The 1968 Christmas eve "riot" in Bucharest gives ample evidence of discontent among the young, but the quick return to passive obedience shows just as clearly that the impetus for change is not likely to come from below, at least not for some time to come.

Foreign students, particularly those from Africa, have presented special problems of both a racial and an ideological nature. Black African students have met with open hostility because of their color, their lack of "gratitude"—from the Romanian point of view—for the higher stipends they enjoy, and their lack of academic preparedness in some instances. Chinese and Cuban students have met with difficulties principally because of their militant ideological views which Romanian officials occasionally find embarrassing.

Approximately 1,261 foreign students were enrolled in Romanian institutions in 1968 according to Romanian data. It is known that the government has ordered out a number of Cubans and that Communist China and certain African countries are sending fewer students, primarily for political reasons. One source gave a breakdown in the numbers of foreign students (aside from those of Warsaw Pact countries) at Cluj University in April 1969: 100 from the East, mostly Vietnamese; at most, 13 from Western countries, including at least one from the United States; and two from Africa. Each guest student reportedly received a monthly stipend of 1,400 lei from the state in addition to free university housing and paid no student charges.

Despite the progress which has been achieved, the educational program has created some long-range problems for the regime. Overspecialization and overburdening of the students with course work are major obstacles to achieving maximum effectiveness in schools of higher education. In addition, efforts to develop mass education at the lower school levels have lowered the quality of education, and the emphasis on conformity and formalism in literature, music, law, and art during the regime's first decade or so was accomplished at the cost of sacrificing individual creativity. Until recently the regime apparently rationalized these shortcomings by taking comfort in the marked improvement and rapid expansion of technical educational facilities, with their substantial current and long-term benefits to economic development. Statements by party leaders at the 1968 April plenum and on subsequent occasions suggest that they are aware of some of the problems and are moving—slowly and hesitantly, to be sure—in the direction of meaningful reform. Nevertheless, the leadership's conservative ideological views will continue to hinder progress.

H. Public information (S)

The integration of information media into the regime's governmental structure is total and provides for absolute controls. The press section of the Directorate of Propaganda

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and Culture of the Communist Party Central Committee is the highest agency of control for public information. Its policies are implemented by the government through the State Committee for Culture and Art, which exercises direct jurisdiction over publication policies and procedures. Nothing may be printed without its "B" *(Bun de Imprimare)* stamp of approval. Subordinate to the Council of Ministers, the State Committee for Culture and Art has ministerial rank within the governmental structure. The state committee is divided into eight national councils with responsibilities for the following sectors: theaters, music, plastic arts, cultural institutions, museums, cinematography, printing houses and book distribution, and mass dissemination of cultural and scientific knowledge. This control complex was established to provide indoctrination in Communist ideology and only secondarily to provide information or to promote cultural achievement.

The press is the most pervasive domestic information medium, but radio and television probably have greater impact on public opinion. Domestic films probably rank next in importance, and may have become more effective as the Romanians have improved their technical facilities and skills and relaxed somewhat their insistence on rigid "socialist realism in scripts and filming techniques." Instead of "socialist realism," the touchstone has become "socialist humanism." Similarly, a carefully controlled expansion of thematic material and Western contacts in theater productions has increased their appeal among the public and their usefulness to the regime in promoting its nationalistic policies. The theater nevertheless reaches a much smaller audience than do films, particularly in rural areas, where over half the people reside.

The party-government apparatus informs, educates, and entertains the public also through word-of-mouth, public and private meetings, museums, displays, and posters (in approximate order of importance). Public meetings are almost invariably initiated by regime functionaries for indoctrinational purposes. These have become an important feature of the Ceausescu style. Word-of-mouth communication is particularly common in rural areas, where radio and TV sets are most thinly distributed.

According to regime statistics, there were a total of 56 "general information newspapers" in 1967, including 33 dailies, 14 weeklies, and nine newspapers appearing at odd intervals. Figure 44 lists the most important of these newspapers. Together, these newspapers had a total annual circulation in 1967 of over 1 billion copies, a substantial increase from the 1951 level of somewhat more than 555 million copies, despite a decline in the number of newspapers during this period. The party daily, *Scinteia*, alone accounts for at least 1 million copies daily. These high circulation figures, however, are not necessarily a valid indicator of the popularity of either *Scinteia* or of the press in general, since many persons are required to subscribe because of their positions in the state apparatus. In addition, the price of a subscription of *Scinteia* reportedly is deducted from the salaries of many workers.

The average newspaper consists of four to six pages. The literary style and format have changed noticeably since early 1963, when the regime began the process of weeding out Russian influences. In so doing it has restored traditional Romanian orthography and largely eliminated the use of words borrowed from the Russian language. The layout and presentation of Romanian newspapers, even party publications, is more attractive than that of their Soviet counterparts. Even the advertising has been increased and dressed up. Despite these changes, Romanian newspapers continue to follow the general substantive pattern established by the Communists following World War II. For example, *Scinteia* contains long theoretical

FIGURE 44. SELECTED ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS, 1969 (U/OU)

NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION	FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION	CIRCULATION	PUBLISHED BY	TYPE OF NEWS EMPHASIZED
ELORE (Forward)	6 per wk	Unknown	People's Councils of Romania.	General political and economic (published in Hungarian).
INFORMATIA BUCURESTIULUI (Bucharest Information), Bucharest.	*do*	*do*	Bucharest Town Committee and People's Council.	General local.
MUNCA (Labor), Bucharest	*do*	*do*	General Union of Trade Unions.	National, party, foreign, governmental.
NEUER WEG (New Road), Bucharest.	*do*	80,000	People's Councils of Romania.	General political and economic (published in German).
ROMINIA LIBERA (Free Romania), Bucharest.	*do*	Unknown	Front for Socialist Unity	General political and economic.
SCINTEIA (The Spark), Bucharest	Daily	*Approx* 1 million	Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.	National, party, governmental, and foreign.
SCINTEIA TINERETULUI (The Spark of Youth), Bucharest.	6 per wk	Unknown	Union of Communist Youth	National, youth, party, governmental, and foreign.
STEAUA ROSIE (The Red Star), Tirgu Mures.	*do*	*do*	Mureş County Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Mureş People's Council.	General political and economic (published in Hungarian).

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arguments, articles on economics, and exhortations to fulfill norms and plans, as well as regular sections on party life, agriculture, economics, letters from readers, foreign news, literature, science, art criticism, cultural events, and a sports section. In March 1964 *Scinteia* further broke with the Soviet model by introducing reprints of texts or summaries of editorials appearing in prominent foreign newspapers. Of foreign news services, the Romanians draw most heavily from *Agence France Presse* (AFP), though the majority of items continue to be from their own service, *Agerpres*.

The government publishes several dailies in minority languages, but in line with its integrationist policy it no longer publishes statistics on these newspapers. However, according to the editor of a German-language paper in Romania, 41 newspapers and reviews are published in Hungarian, German, Serbian, Ukrainian, and Armenian, with a combined circulation of over 3.5 million. Following the government's territorial-administrative reorganization in 1968, it was reported that each new district would have its own local paper, including minority-language newspapers where appropriate, but it is not known whether or not this policy was carried through.

Until mid-1964 the only foreign newspapers available in Romania were those from other Communist countries or from Communist Party presses in non-Communist countries. In January 1964, however, representatives of the International Committee of Newspaper Sales Managers, representing 44 Western newspapers, visited Romania and other Eastern European countries to study possibilities for the distribution of the Western press there. Since mid-1964, limited numbers of Western papers such as *The Herald-Tribune International, Le Figaro, Le Monde,* and *The London Times* have been placed on sale, but only in tourist areas along the Black Sea coast and in Bucharest hotels catering to Western tourists. As late as 1968 none of these newspapers was consistently available at any tourist area.

The only official Romanian news service is *Agerpres*. Attached to the Council of Ministers and subordinated to both state and party agencies, it is the official channel for government declarations on domestic and international issues. It publishes the principal summary of the Romanian press, entitled "News of the Day," a combination press release and press summary in soft-bound mimeograph format, published 6 days a week. Within *Agerpres*, a foreign editorial office prepares material for radiobroadcasts in various languages, a foreign news office translates and edits foreign news for the Romanian press, and a local news office collates, censors, and reedits local news for release to foreign countries. There is no information available on any exchange agreements between *Agerpres* and other non-Communist press services, although it is known that some form of exchange is carried on with both Associated Press and United Press International.

Romanian periodicals of all varieties have increased in number from 199 in 1950 to 490 in 1967, according to Romanian statistics. Their total circulation during this time has increased from a little over 49 million to 174.6 million. Technical periodicals have proliferated in the postwar period, together with the development of technical education and industrial technology. Official publications of the party and various mass organizations account for a large proportion of the periodicals published. A selected list of Romanian periodicals is given in Figure 45.

Romania has a variety of publishing houses, all either directly or indirectly under party control. One publishing house in Bucharest, subordinate to the foreign section of the Central Committee, is responsible for all publications intended for foreign distribution. The Scinteia Printing House (Figure 46) reportedly prints most of the avowed party publications, among them the party youth sheets, labor and union publications, the Central Committee's theoretical periodical, and the publications of *Agerpres*. Officially independent publishing houses, all with an editorial staff of party censors, include the Publication and Periodical Publishing House, which publishes the Bucharest Party Committee organ; and the cultural weekly *Contemporanul,* along with some 40 other monthlies; and the Military Publishing House, which prints armed forces publications. Another publishing house which was subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs reportedly has been liquidated. Since 1969 there has been some decentralization in publishing, by setting up new publishing houses both in Bucharest and the provinces.

The suppression of free expression and the difficulty in getting controversial material past the censors has led a few committed intellectuals to find illegal avenues for publishing their opinions, either by smuggling articles out of the country or by organizing secret discussion groups. In the past the regime has arrested and brought to trial some of these writers in retaliation for such tactics. With most writers, however, this has not been the case; the prevailing system of material incentives and special privileges as rewards for upholding "socialist humanism" has provided the regime with more than an ample number of docile hacks. This is reflected in the sharp increase in the output of state publishing houses. The number of new books and pamphlets has also increased substantially, from 1,921 titles in 1950 to 3,678 in 1967. Circulation has increased during this period, from over 60 million to almost 76 million copies, although there was a sharp drop from these levels from 1955 through 1960. This may have reflected an effort by the regime to improve the quality of Romania's literary output.

In addition to criticizing stilted and uninspired Romanian literary efforts during the later 1960's, regime authorities have complained about serious gaps in Romanian translations of world literature. Although selected works of James Fenimore Cooper, Theodore Dreiser, Jack London, and Mark Twain had been published in Romanian prior to 1964, the Romanian literary journal *Contemporanul* noted in December of that year that:

> . . . there have been no translations of works by Faulkner, Steinbeck, John Dos Passos, Caldwell, William Saroyan, Longfellow, and Carl Sandburg, or world famous playwrights such as Eugene O'Neill and Tennessee Williams . . .

Since that time, many of these authors' works have been published in Romanian. In addition, selected poems

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FIGURE 45. SELECTED ROMANIAN PERIODICALS, 1969 (U/OU)

NAME AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION	FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION	PUBLISHED BY	TYPE OF MATERIAL EMPHASIZED
ANALELE INSTITUTULUI DE ISTORIE A PARTIDULUI DE PE LINGA C.C. AL P.C.R., Bucharest (Annals of the Institute of Party History attached to the Central Committee and Romanian Communist Party).	Bimonthly.....	Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.	Theoretical and historical review.
BISERICA ORTHODOXA ROMANA (The Orthodox Church), Bucharest.	Monthly.....	Official organ of the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church.	Correspondence between the Romanian Orthodox Church and other Orthodox churches; news, studies, instructions, and debates.
CONTEMPORANUI (The Contemporary), Bucharest..	Weekly.....	State Committee for Culture and Art.	Articles on literature and the arts.
GAZETA LITERARA (Literary Journal), Bucharest..	....*do*.....	Romanian Writers Union.....	General articles on literature and the arts.
LUCEAFARUL (The Evening Star), Bucharest.....	....*do*.....	....*do*.....	General review of literature, literary criticism, and the arts.
LUMEA (The World), Bucharest.....	....*do*.....	Romanian Journalists Union...	International political developments.
LUPTA DE CLASA (Class Struggle), Bucharest.....	Monthly.....	Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.	Theoretical and political review of communism.
PROBLEME ECONOMICE (Economic Problems), Bucharest.	....*do*.....	Institute for Economic Research.	Romanian and world economic problems.
SECOLUL 20 (The 20th Century), Bucharest.....	....*do*.....	Romanian Writers Union.....	Review of world literature.
STEAUA (The Star), Cluj.....	Weekly.....	....*do*.....	Literary reviews.
TEATRUL (The Theater), Bucharest.....	Monthly.....	State Committee for Culture and Art and the Romanian Writers Union.	Theater news.
VIATA ECONOMICA (Economic Life), Bucharest....	Weekly.....	Society for Economic Sciences..	Marxist-Leninist review of economic theory of the Romanian and the world economies.
VIATA ROMANEASCA (Romanian Life), Bucharest..	Monthly.....	Romanian Writers Union.....	Review of Romanian literature and literary criticism.



FIGURE 46. The Scinteia Printing House (U/OU)

by Karl Shapiro, Richard Wilbur, Randall Jarrell, Reed Whittemore, William Safford, Howard Nemerov, and others also have been translated and presented in Romanian literary journals.

Romanian authorities also have directed considerable effort to increasing the number of museums, theaters and musical institutions, and movie houses, as well as trying to upgrade the quality of films and libraries. With the possible exception of films, however, the role of these media in shaping popular attitudes continues to be relatively minor, with the possible exception of the Museum of Party History, to which many schoolchildren are taken. In 1955 Romania had 176 museums of all types, and by 1967 the country had an additional 67; more than one-third of the total number now are historical or memorial museums. The number of public and school libraries on the other hand, has decreased, from approximately 34,000 in 1950 to over 19,000 in 1967, but regime sources claim this was the result of consolidation. The fact that the total number of volumes in all these libraries has been increased by well over half supports their contention. Moreover, the regime introduced documentary libraries in 1955 specializing in scientific and technical holdings, and, judging from the statistics, it appears that these special libraries were made up partially of former public library and higher educational holdings. In 1967 there were slightly more than 5,000 documentary units. The State Library is the largest and most important library, one of two national libraries.

Romania's film industry is under the direction of the National Council for Cinematography, subordinate to the State Committee for Culture and Art. The leadership has softened somewhat its control over the content of domestically produced films and over the importation of foreign films, though it continues to use films for political and cultural indoctrination of the people. Occasionally film makers go beyond the bounds set by the ideological watchdogs, in which case the producers and film writers, and often even the critics, are told of their errors in no uncertain terms.

Such was the case with a film released by the Bucharest Film Studio in 1967. *A Film About a Fascinating Girl*

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was acclaimed by *Contemporanul* and by other critics on television as "a fresh wind," but after only a week of showing it was withdrawn from circulation. Party cultural spokesmen publicly attacked the film, its producers, its favorable critics, and—not least of all—the State Committee for Culture and Art, for allowing the propagation of frivolous, amoral, negative views. The film undoubtedly reflected the influence of imported Western films, which have become very popular in Romania. One party critic of *A Film About a Fascinating Girl* described it as the result of "looking at our own reality through imported glasses." The experience was somewhat different with the film *Reconstituirea* which was finally released in early 1970 despite its critical comments on Romanian police and juridical institutions. It ran in Bucharest for an unprecedented 2 months despite some "inspired" attempts to give it negative critical reviews. Some of the literary press, however, ignored the official indications and acclaimed it as the best Romanian film ever produced.

In allowing Western film producers and distributors into the country, the party did not intend to undermine its ideological precepts, of course, but rather to polish a forward-looking image. Other films have been more successful in accomplishing this end. For example, *The Dacians*, a historic semispectacular somewhat in the Cecil B. DeMille tradition, was widely lauded by party and public alike. A joint Romanian-French production, *Codin*, won a medal at the 1963 Cannes Film Festival. A scene from a joint Romanian-French-West German production *Michael the Brave* is shown in Figure 47.

No recent statistics on film production are available, but in 1964 Romania produced 27 feature films, 93 documentaries, and 82 newsreels. In 1938 there were a total of 338 cinema theaters in Romania, while in 1967 this number had risen to 6,410.

FIGURE 47. Scene from the Romanian-French-West German coproduction *Michael the Brave*, produced by the Bucharest film studio (U/OU)

The Romanian theater, which is controlled in much the same way as the film industry, has experienced similar problems. Many observers consider that in no other cultural field has the penetration of Western culture into Romania been so evident as in the legitimate theater. Since 1963 the number of Western plays presented has increased markedly over both domestic and Soviet works, and this trend continues. The virtual disappearance of Soviet plays from the Romanian stage probably reflects anti-Soviet propensities, but the failure of domestic playwrights to gain a significantly greater share of the repertory reflects the poor state of Romanian literature. During the 1966-67 season not quite half of some 180 plays performed throughout Romania were written by Romanian playwrights, and attendance was down by about 500,000 from the previous year. The 1968-69 season was considered by outside observers an especially good one in both quality of original productions and in attendance, but both slumped in the following year. Theatrical and musical institutions have risen from a prewar level of 18 throughout the country to 128 in 1967 (included in these statistics are not only drama theaters but such oddities as circuses, puppet houses, and folk music bands).

Such seeming paradoxes are symptomatic of both the progress already made and problems still to be solved in the Romanian theater. Since 1965, when the party leadership signaled the virtual end of dogmatic insistence on socialist realism as the guiding theme in theatrical productions and appealed for a diversification of style and experimentation within limits, young Romanian actors and producers have been striving to modernize the legitimate theater. They have combined the talents of some of the foremost innovators and experts in stage management and scenography, and have produced plays unthinkable during the Stalinist era—including *Hamlet*, *As you Like It*, *Saint Joan*, *The Three-Penny Opera*, and *A Streetcar Named Desire*. Despite world acclaim for their successes, Romanian producers have had difficulty winning over a large Romanian audience, which had become bored and bludgeoned with lifeless political drama during the long Stalinist period.

Another hindrance is the bureaucratic and inefficient nature of the theater; the troupes, all paid by the state, are packed with many actors and hangers-on who collect salaries but never actually work. The most serious deficiency, however, is the lack of truly original playwriting—a fact bemoaned by artists, critics, and, ironically, the regime leadership itself. Although no one publicly admits it, the reason is party censorship. The government has been willing to allow small concessions for the sake of international prestige, but has banned many plays written by a contemporary Romanian playwright which honestly reflects current life.

Basic policy guidance for the highly influential and rapidly expanding media of radio and television is provided by the State Committee for Radio and Television, within the government and to the Directorate of Propaganda

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and Culture in the party. Physical facilities are built and maintained by the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications. Romania has 15 AM and eight FM home and regional radio stations. The regional stations broadcast some programs in minority languages. In addition, 23 stations broadcast for short periods of the day to foreign countries, primarily to Europe. Programing is heavily weighted in news and news commentaries but also includes music, features, and talks. Radiobroadcasting from Bucharest in foreign languages has steadily increased in recent years. Romania ceased its jamming effort against Radio Free Europe and other Western radio transmissions in 1964, as did most of the other European Communist regimes. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Warsaw Pact allies (with the exception of Hungary) resumed or intensified their jamming efforts, but Romania has continued its nonjamming policy.

The importance attached to radio and television as mass communications media is attested by the rapid expansion of physical facilities. Since 1950 radio ownership has increased from 300,000 to about 3 million. No precise figures are available on the distribution of these receivers, but probably most of them are found in urban areas. In 1967 there were 873,000 radio-relay subscriptions (loudspeaker systems, presumably most of them in the countryside) to supplement the fewer number of receiving sets. Informed observers state that the use of the loudspeaker, or "wire-diffusion" network is tapering off, and it is expected to be phased out eventually in much the same manner as in Hungary.

Television plays an increasingly important role in Romanian communication and propaganda; the regime is highly aware of the potential of this medium for developing popular support and for indoctrinating city dwellers in particular. Television is quite new to Romania, but it is expanding at a pace even faster than radio. First introduced in 1960 through six stations, TV programs are being aired over 20 TV broadcast facilities throughout the country. The number of TV sets increased from 55,000 in 1960 to 1,115,000 in January 1968, but as of 1966 coverage extended to only 50% of the country. The official 1969 estimate was over a million sets. U.S. estimates predict that this coverage could increase to 90% by 1970. Of the 16 hours of television per week broadcast in mid-1966 (the latest year for which such information is available) 19% was music, 12% news, 18% youth programs, 18% films, 9% theater, 8% sports, and the balance were miscellaneous programs for peasants, women, and booklovers. Romanian TV viewers reportedly are fond of music and news programs. They particularly look forward to the weekly series of documentaries produced by the British Broadcasting Corporation and dispatched to Romania under a 1964 agreement. The few imported serials, such as "The Saint," have proved extremely popular. Light cultural and melodramatic "canned" productions have been imported from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and West Germany.

Aside from an impressive internal development, a major technical accomplishment of Romanian television was the establishment of connections with the Intervision network, which permits not only live TV coverage from other Eastern European countries and the U.S.S.R. but also provides for a relay of TV transmissions from Western Europe via the Intervision-Eurovision hookup. This is accomplished through a direct relay from Moscow or through Budapest. Most of the programs seen through this network are of a cultural or sports nature. Within the program of TV exchanges among Communist countries Romania allegedly has curtailed the number of programs originating from Moscow. Moreover, Romania gave lavish play to the Apollo 11 moon landing in 1969 and to U.S. President Nixon's visit in the same year, providing live coverage of both events.

I. Artistic and cultural expression (C)

1. Pre-Communist period

Since the emergence of Romania's nationalist course in 1963, the regime has allowed slightly freer artistic and cultural expression, primarily as a maneuver to give its new independent policy credence in the eyes of the world and of its own people. The relaxation admittedly has been gradual and extremely cautious, but within the permitted limits Romanian artists and intellectuals have eagerly expanded their activities along more natural lines. The official rehabilitation of many prewar writers previously rejected by the Communists has inspired a renewal of faith in the country's national heritage. Although it does not compare in intensity or scope with similar movements in Yugoslavia in the 1950's or in Czechoslovakia just prior to the 1968 invasion, this intellectual resurgence has highlighted contemporary developments in Romania and focused increased attention on its unique—for southeast Europe—Latin connections and Western predilections.

Romania was never completely severed from the West throughout its long history of foreign influences, dominations, invasions, wars, and partitions. Even Turkish control, which lasted roughly from the beginning of the 16th to the beginning of the 18th centuries, was not as severe or as long-lasting as in other areas of the European portions of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, intellectual development was continuously interrupted and retarded by the country's political misfortunes; by class, racial, and religious divisions; by its fundamentally agrarian nature, which prevented the development of a strong middle class; and by the lack of a truly national center of political, economic, and intellectual life.

Until the 19th century was well under way, Romanian cultural achievements were confined to traditional peasant and religious arts and to popular oral literature, generally characteristic of the entire Balkan peninsula. In Romania as in much of Eastern Europe it was the church which spurred the development of native arts, oftentimes in a quite unintentional way. In the 17th century when the Orthodox Church came under Greek domination, the traditional conduct of the liturgy in Slavonic was abandoned by general consent; the mass of the clergy, however, knew even less of Greek than of Slavic, and so it was found necessary to introduce the Romanian vernacular as the language of the liturgy. In 1640 the

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first Romanian book, a small code of ecclesiastical laws, was published in the principalities, and in 1688 a Romanian Bible was issued.

From that time on, Romanian literary development was virtually assured, although progress was slow indeed. In the 18th century a Romanian national school was founded. More important, it was during this period that Romania's Latin origins were uncovered by three Uniate theological students studying abroad in Rome and Vienna. Thrilled by the stories depicted on the Column of Trajan, they produced the first modern Romanian grammar in 1780, and years later one of them finally printed in Latin a "History of the Origin of the Romanians in Dacia"—the first published history by a native Romanian writer. The doctrines propounded by the author were of a highly imaginative character and sought to prove complete continuity of the Roman tradition and purity of blood in the modern "Dacians" (Romanians), according to historian Hugh Seton-Watson. In the mainstream of the historical and literary romanticism then prevalent in educated circles of Western Europe, these fanciful but appealing notions eventually became a point of departure for the newfound nationalism of central and eastern Europe. In the decades following Romanian independence they were uncritically adopted and propagated as the primary source of literary inspiration. Although a more objective approach intervened following the turn of the century, it may fairly be said that elements of the ultrapatriotic romanticism of the 19th century have been incorporated into the present regime's propaganda.

It was during the 19th century, when native princes again came to rule Romania, that Romanian intellectuals finally were introduced to the works of foreign writers, particularly those of the other Romance countries. The works of great French writers—Moliere, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Boileau, and Corneille—comprising both classic and revolutionary ideas, especially appealed to educated Romanians. The intellectuals and the wealthier classes turned increasingly to French, Italian, and German universities for their education. Romanian literature, medicine, history, and other disciplines thus followed French and other Western European patterns as Romanian intellectual activity approached its "golden age," from 1870 to 1917.

Two separate but complementary schools of literary thought arose in Romania during the late 1860's: cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Titus Maiorescu, principal exponent of the former school, believed in the necessity of a universally applicable code of esthetic principles for each literary genre. The historian Alexandru Xenopol best represented the nationalist school, maintaining that literature should be local and particularist, rooted in themes depicting the creative and national elements of Romanian civilization.

The guidance of these writers contributed much to the founding of a native literary tradition, although Xenopol's influence seems to have been felt more strongly. The first prominent Romanian writer associated with this tradition was Mihail Eminescu, father of modern Romanian poetry, whose poems served as an inspiration to a number of prose writers. It was from Xenopol, however, that Romania's greatest dramatist, Ion Caragiale, took his inspiration. Using skillful analysis and biting satire, Caragiale demonstrated the dangers inherent in a hasty and careless adoption of Western institutions and ideas. His plays and the writings of the other most prominent writers of the time all glorified Romania's historic past and its Daco-Roman origins and heritage.

Thus much of the literature produced in the period 1870-1917 was blatantly chauvinistic, but some writers concerned themselves with social conditions also. New intellectual values emerged as the composition of the Romanian intelligentsia changed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries through the inclusion of the middle class and professional elements of various national and religious backgrounds. This phenomenon paralleled in some ways what happened in England during the latter half of the 19th century, when, for instance, Dickens took up the cause of the industrial working class in his novels. In Romania, however, concern revolved naturally around the miserable conditions of the peasantry. The originator of this social-problem literature was Ion Gherea-Dobrogeanu, who maintained that literature must spring from the human environment and therefore favor social progress.

Within the generally nationalistic framework of Romania's interwar outlook, cultural and intellectual activities were generally unrestricted. As fascism developed in Germany and gained favor in Romania, however, freedom of intellectual expression became increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, acceptance of the idea of scholarship for its own sake was secure.

2. Communist period

During the first decade or so of Communist control of Romania, native traditions in the arts and letters were almost totally subordinated to Soviet values, and all forms of intellectual expression were marshalled as instruments of Communist propaganda. Artistic works considered out of step with party dogma were simply forbidden. Government censorship began in earnest in 1945; within 5 years the official list of banned titles reached 8,000, most of them written between 1917 and 1944. Communist censors did try to salvage some prewar literature for their own purposes, such as the poetry of Eminescu, which was "cleansed" by altering or omitting offensive passages.

Artists and intellectuals were told that in the new socialist order they were now working artisans whose proper use of their tools would insure the success of the party's mission. Essentially, their function was to make the fundamental social and political themes of the Communist state and society palatable to the people in a simple and understandable way. This meant instilling love and devotion for the party; unquestioning hate for its enemies, both internal and external; and slavish admiration and imitation of everything Soviet. Constant attention was to be given to the "positive character" as a sort of model for the "new man," active in the socialist society and an enemy of the old regime—an

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evocation really, of the memory of the "glorious revolutionary figures of the past."

Several contemporary authors made a genuine attempt to accommodate themselves to the new order; some of them succeeded with great astuteness, while a few failed miserably despite every effort to please. Others mistakenly believed that they would be less vulnerable by taking a neutral stance or refusing to produce, but they soon found themselves in almost as much trouble with the government as if they had openly opposed it. There were dangers even in so-called safe subjects, such as paintings of Lenin and other Communist luminaries. One artist reportedly unveiled a painting of Politburo member Ana Pauker only to discover to his horror a week later that she was being purged from the party.

Despite the overall suppressive atmosphere, however, ingenious artists occasionally found ways to circumvent officialdom, if only temporarily. During the 1950's, theater troupes sometimes produced socialist realism plays "straight" at the first few performances for the benefit of party officials and critics, but during later performances would start ad-libbing and altering the rhythm, pace, and innuendo of the dialogue for the amusement of the ordinary audiences. When found out by the authorities, of course, this practice was viciously denounced but never completely eradicated.

The regime's policies have created a dilemma which endures—although less glaringly—to the present day. The party evidently is unable or unwilling to see that, while it can decide arbitrarily what will or will not be published or accepted for public consumption, it cannot by fiat create good socialist realist literature. Indeed, by definition, there probably is no such thing. Nearly all published works of this genre were, and still are, devoid of vibrant artistry and originality, because they were created by untalented hacks, or because they were written by unenthusiastic, fearful writers who were compelled to ignore the cumulative literary tradition upon which good literature draws. In addition the sap was drawn out of decent works by censors. Still, the regime persists in berating the intelligentsia for its lack of initiative, imagination, and versatility; the new approach is constantly called for but summarily punished when it actually appears.

Nevertheless, the 1960's saw a relaxation in the rigorous control of art and literature, as Romania shifted its political position within the Soviet bloc. Contacts of all kinds were expanded with the West from early 1963. In addition, when Romania's dispute with the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance reached a climax in July 1963, circumstances increasingly impelled the regime to strike national roots, to rediscover a Romanian national identity appropriate to the nationalist and independent stance the Romanian regime was taking vis-a-vis the Communist world and the West. In the cultural sphere, the result of this regime-led introspection has been the cautious and gradual rehabilitation of a number of outstanding artistic figures of the past—particularly those belonging to the nationalist school—who had previously been rejected as "bourgeois" or worse.

Although this modest reformation of cultural policy began under the leadership of the late party chief Gheorghiu-Dej, it has been continued and intermittently advanced by his successor, Nicolae Ceausescu, who has emphasized that socialism and communism can only be built with the assistance of "the highest science and culture." Probably the most significant change in the cultural mood has been the quiet disappearance of the previous Soviet predominance. The Maxim Gorki Institute for Russian language and literary studies, a primary symbol of Soviet hegemony in Romanian postwar cultural life, has been merged into the Foreign Languages and Literature Institute at the University of Bucharest; Bucharest's Russian-language bookstore has been closed; and Russian has been eliminated as a compulsory language course in the schools.

The concomitant growth in the interest of Romanian intellectuals in Western literature has been particularly evident in the case of American literature. This interest evidently extends back over the last couple of decades; one Romanian writer admitted that during the dark Stalinist days of enforced socialist realism in the 1940's and 1950's Romanian writers, lacking precedents in their own literary tradition, looked to the exultant poetry of Americans like Carl Sandburg and Walt Whitman as an inspiration and a model.

Yet the party has not proceeded to a logical conclusion with its new policy. Instead, it apparently is seeking to maintain a delicate balance between greater permissiveness for creative artists and continuing party control. Between May 1965 and late 1969 the impression was given that a dialogue was underway between the party and the writers and the artists, with each side probing the other to see where the limits of free artistic creation were to be fixed.

In this dialogue the leadership has maintained a basically conservative stance. While not insisting on socialist realism in stylistic matters, the party still holds that the goal of literature and the arts is political. As party leader Ceausescu put it in September 1969: "In our society the entire press—be it daily or periodical, sociopolitical or cultural—must consistently and firmly promote the political line of the party." Yet the party no longer threatens authors in the way it once did; errant writers and editors are no longer imprisoned or put in concentration camps, and rarely are they summarily fired from their jobs. The leadership is permissive of many shades of cultural expression, so long as these do not challenge the primacy of the party or undermine Romania's relations with its allies. According to one Romanian editor, one can never either directly attack the U.S.S.R. or the right of the Romanian Communist Party to rule, nor admit to writing from a philosophical base other than Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, Ceausescu has maintained that those writers and artists who do not conform to party ideals are not entitled to the state financial subsidies normally received by artists.

As a result of this rather ambivalent state of affairs, there is a considerable gap between what is officially exhorted and what actually exists and is being produced. The ultimate acceptance of the celebrated short story

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The Blue Lion is a case in point. Written by D. R. Popescu and published in 1965, *The Blue Lion* created a mild sensation in Bucharest because of its sharp attack on reprehensible features of the postwar communization of Romanian schools. Ceausescu himself became involved in the case, and when he asked why the story had been allowed to be published he was informed that the story was tailored to mesh with current party policies and that the story was well written and an honest piece of work. Ceausescu reportedly ruled that Popescu and his story should receive limited praise but a note of caution should be sounded to dissuade others from pushing the liberalization of the literary scene too far or too fast. When after several months Ceausescu had assessed the impact of *The Blue Lion* on local and foreign literary circles, he apparently decided that the whole affair had had a favorable domestic and international effect and subsequently congratulated the young author.

During 1968 there was much pulling and hauling in literary circles. Several young writers dared openly to call for an end to censorship. More significantly, a provincial newspaper, the Iaşi *Cronica*, launched an unprecendented attack on the Central Committee's monthly theoretical and political journal *Lupta de Clasa*, in response to the latter's criticism of a controversial article which *Cronica* had printed. The editors of the Iaşi paper accused the anonymous writer in *Lupta de Clasa* of a "totally negativistic attitude," and complete ignorance of, or a feigned indifference to, the true state of the world. The fact that *Cronica* got away with such serious and unprecedented criticism of the authoritative *Lupta de Clasa* reflects in part the changed atmosphere in cultural life, but also the less effective censorship in the provinces as compared with that in Bucharest.

The healthy debate taking place among Romanian literateurs at this time was partly in anticipation of the upcoming Writers Union Conference, which was held in November 1968. Despite great expectations, however, the conference turned out to be rather disappointing, at least to the younger and more progressive writers. The overall tone of the meeting was conservative. Higher party leaders, while not threatening anyone, took the opportunity to warn certain elements on the literary horizon—specifically, the literary critics—that they were in grave danger of "losing control of the steering wheel," i.e. failing to orient literature ideologically. Ceausescu in a major speech called for a "militant literature to mobilize consciences," and he defined liberty under socialist democracy as "necessity understood"—hardly the trumpet note of liberalization.

Full texts of speeches by the writers were not published, but the excerpts which were made public suggest that some did voice certain criticisms. Marin Preda, a prominent writer who was among the few younger writers added to the Writers Union leadership at the conference, attacked the excesses and ill effects of totalitarianism during the Stalinist era. It was obvious that conference delegates did not question the right of the party to dictate policy, nor did they engage in any real debate on the issues separating the dogmatists from the unorthodox in cultural matters. A Romanian source reported, however, that some of the younger writers at the conference voiced objections to the railroading tactics of party officials during the election of the Writers Union officers.

The conference did take steps in the direction of decentralizing its organization. It was proposed to establish regional branches of the Writers Union and regional publishing houses, in order to break down the huge centralized publishing houses in Bucharest. The need also was recognized for a special publishing house which would cater to the "coinhabiting minorities" by publishing works of their authors as well as translations both to and from Romanian. Official plans for setting up these regional publishing houses were announced in late 1969. Seven houses are to be established throughout the country, each with a specific purpose:

Ion Creanga Publishing House for Children
Albatross Publishing House for Young People
Minerva Publishing House for the Classics
Mihail Eminescu Publishing House for Contemporary Literature and Drama
Iaşi Publishing House (whose purpose is unknown)
Dacia Publishing House for Belletristic, Social Sciences, and Other Literature in Cluj
Criterion Publishing House in Bucharest for Coinhabiting Nationalities

Administrative and financial matters for all seven are to be handled in one central location. Presumably this reorganization does not affect the main political houses such as *Scinteia* in Bucharest.

It is certain that the pace of cultural liberalization—if indeed it can be called that—continues to be slow and cautious, and for every step forward the regime often takes another backward. In late 1969 there were signs of a positive "reevaluation" of strictly socialist realist writings from the postwar Stalinist era, in sharp contrast to the nearly universal denunciation of these works over the immediately preceding several years. Probably this represents the regime's way of bluntly reminding the intellectuals that it is capable of clamping down at any time. Indeed, the evidence at the end of 1969 pointed to a trend in this direction.

If a cultural tightening is in the offing it would probably hit hardest at the literary sector; other genres of cultural expression would be struck unevenly as they usually are not so closely watched. There are no current signs that the regime has reneged on its selective acceptance of abstract art—the antithesis of "socialist realism." Abstract art was publicly exhibited for the first time in Communist Romania in 1965, and reports indicate that the public showed great interest in both abstract paintings and sculpture. The party has been, however, noticeably unenthusiastic and has resisted promoting abstractionists. It has exhibited the same grudging acquiescence in relaxing its strictures against Western jazz. The first national jazz festival was held in May 1969 and apparently will become a regular event. The regime presumably still maintains its prohibition against "hard rock" music, though it is well known and popular among the young in Bucharest.

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Popular art forms, as manifested in folk tales, dances, and handicrafts, are the oldest expressions of Romanian culture and have not been profoundly affected by the Communists. They have indeed been pushed ad nauseam by the regime in reviewing nationalist traditions. Through these media, Romanian peasants have preserved their ancient customs and traditions, despite centuries of foreign domination. These folk arts, which continue to be widely practiced, not only have provided entertainment and diversion but also have served as a means of education and artistic expression. Over the centuries these art forms became extremely variegated and localized. This is especially evident in Romanian embroidery work (Figure 48) and in some folk dances. Certain dances also have served to promote national unity, however. In this category is the "Hora of Unity," which was composed in 1859 to mark the unification of the Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia. Long banned by the Communists as too nationalistic, the "Hora of Unity" has been revived by the Ceausescu regime to develop national consciousness. It was probably a version of this dance which the students reportedly danced in the streets during the so-called Christmas demonstrations in 1968.

In theoretical science and philosophy the atmosphere has changed markedly from Stalinist days. Philosophers, for example, have been encouraged by the party to reappraise the Romanian cultural and philosophical tradition, albeit from the critical position of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, Western philosophical schools are being reappraised, which is in direct contrast to the Stalinist era when Romanian philosophers were isolated from their past and contemporary Western counterparts. Sociology has been recognized as a science, and there now exists a National Sociological Association, which is affiliated with the International Sociological Association. In mid-1965 several research institutes of the Romanian academy of sciences started conducting sociological field research on such subjects as politics, economics, law, health, ethnography, and anthropology. Although Romanian researchers use empirical methods, knowledgeable Western observers report that the state of the art among Romanian sociologists is far behind Western standards.

FIGURE 48. Elegant embroidery adorning the vests and blouses of two Magyar girls in Cluj; each region has its own distinctive designs (U/OU)

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5. Political

A. General (C)

Romania is dominated by the Romanian Communist Party, which came to power in 1945 with the aid of the U.S.S.R. Since the early 1960's the party has successfully withdrawn the country from complete Soviet domination and is now pursuing an independent national Communist course.

Movements during the 1950's in Poland and Hungary had attempted radical changes in both foreign and domestic policies. Factions in these two countries which identified themselves with national aspirations made it public knowledge that they favored a loosening of internal political and cultural reins and a relaxation of central economic controls. This was not the case in Romania. Throughout the 1950's the Romanian regime was one of the most dogmatic and orthodox, and it de-Stalinized only to a very limited extent. Partly as a result of this and partly because the Romanian party was the first to purge itself of "Muscovite" elements, the regime has not been seriously disrupted by the development of the left, right, or center varieties of factionalism common to most other East European parties. Moreover, even though the Romanian leadership began a limited relaxation of police and political-cultural controls concurrently with its initiation of an openly independent foreign policy, the two developments were not overtly linked. The party's domination and control of domestic political life is never challenged, nor is Romania's commitment to communism ever seriously questioned.

The independent foreign policy course first openly proclaimed in 1964 with the party's "declaration of independence" has gained for the Romanian party-state leadership a measure of popular acceptance. The leadership's de-Russification of Romanian society—begun in 1963 and now essentially complete—has been especially appreciated among the traditionally Russophobic Romanian people. The people have also endorsed the regime's efforts to highlight the allegedly purely Romanian and Latin heritage of their culture. These regime policies have been widely accepted since the regime demonstrated in the crisis following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 its determination to stand up to the threat of Soviet intervention in Romania.

To capitalize on the popularity of its essentially anti-Soviet policies and to develop a broad base of support both internally and externally, the regime has relaxed somewhat its political controls. In the early 1960's, for example, the regime released most political prisoners and encouraged the dissemination and discussion of Western culture and ideas.

More recently the leadership has gone a step further and has begun to denounce the earlier Stalinist excesses of the former Gheorghiu-Dej era. Although the primary purpose of the denunciation was to discredit old-guard threats to its control, the present leadership has highly touted its policy of "socialist legality," embodied in a new constitution, new party statutes, and new codes of penal and criminal procedure. These new documents theoretically guarantee that the harsh and brutal methods of the Stalinist era will not return to Romania, but at the moment the regime's attitude is the only guarantee of that.

The preoccupation of observers with Romania's pursuit of independence has obscured these and other internal changes. Although the leadership is now relatively free of factionalism, nearly all of the old-guard leaders have been shunted aside, and Nicolae Ceausescu, surrounded by a group of young and loyal and efficient proteges, has emerged in total control. The new leadership has devoted its energies to revising the structure of the political control mechanisms throughout the country to insure more efficient implementation of its policies.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)

1. Constitution

Romania's constitution stands as it was adopted in 1965, with only minor modifications since then. It replaced the "Stalinist" constitution of 1952, which had in turn replaced the 1948 document—Romania's first Communist constitution. Both the 1948 and 1952 constitutions were modeled after the Soviet style; both represented radical departures from prewar constitutions, the last of which was adopted in 1938. The Communist documents in typical fashion reflected the sociopolitical changes which had taken place since the war and the overall aims of Marxism-Leninism in the Stalinist period. The 1965 document, while maintaining the Communist viewpoint, emphasizes Romania's national traditions and in small ways harks back to prewar constitutions.

The text of the present constitution is comparatively brief. It consists of nine sections and 114 articles dealing with the socioeconomic structure; the fundamental rights and obligations of citizens; the structure, functions, and powers of state and local government; domestic and foreign policy goals; and miscellaneous provisions (specifications for the capital, flag, coat of arms, and state seal). The framers of the 1965 constitution dispensed with the preamble of the previous two constitutions,

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much of which was taken up with glorification of Romania's ties to the Soviet Union. The 1938 constitution also had no preamble.

The 1965 document, in fact, contains no references to the Soviet Union as Romania's liberator in World War II—one of several variations from the two preceding Communist constitutions. It takes a softer attitude toward the concept of class struggle and includes intellectuals and "other categories of working people" as part of the working class. There is a correlative expression of concern for humanism, though admittedly in Marxist legalist terms. The constitution is explicit on the subject of the "unblemented independence of the state," and on the unity of Romania's "inalienable and indivisible" territory, a phrase borrowed from the 1938 constitution.

An amendment in 1968 reorganized Romania's territory, formerly divided into 17 regions plus the Autonomous Magyar Region (Figure 49). Article 15 now states that the country is divided into "counties, cities, and communes" but does not specify the number, suggesting that the framers wanted to allow flexibility for possible future changes. The physical reorganization which accompanied the amendment created 39 counties *(judeţ)* and abolished the Autonomous Magyar Region (Figure 50).

Potentially the most significant aspect of the 1965 constitution concerns the procedure for declaring war. While upholding the nation's commitment to the Warsaw Pact, the subsection dealing with the Grand National Assembly's power to declare war contains an addendum to the 1952 version, which merely referred to "obligations of mutual defense deriving from international treaties." The newer document states that the Romanian parliament can declare war:

> . . . only in case of armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Romania or against some other state with which the Socialist Republic of Romania has a mutual defense obligation assumed by international treaty, provided the situation incurring an obligation to declare a state of war has been brought about.

This somewhat nebulous proviso provides a possible escape from any obligation to participate in an undesired war.

The 1965 document also introduced some small but important changes in the rights of the individual, reflecting a limited relaxation of ironhanded control exercised over Romanian society since the Communist takeover. No one, for example, is to be arrested without a warrant issued by the public prosecutor and "substantive proof or clues" that he has committed an illegal act, punishable under the law. Investigative bodies are to be prohibited



FIGURE 49. Former territorial-administrative divisions (U/OU)

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

FIGURE 50. Territorial-administrative divisions, effective in January 1968 (U/OU)

from detaining persons without charges for any longer than 24 hours. Finally, the right to defense is guaranteed for the duration of a trial.

The 1965 constitution, as did its predecessor, guarantees the right to private ownership of property and the right to inheritance, but it drops the 1952 article providing for a capitalist sector in the economy. (This is in line with Romania's claim to have reached the socialist, as distinguished from the people's democracy stage, on the path to true communism.) The 1965 constitution makes it clear that the cooperative farmer's private plot is cooperative property, and it insists on the superiority of the agricultural cooperative system; yet it recognizes that some peasants cannot or should not be collectivized and safeguards the private ownership of their land. Handicraft workers also are guaranteed ownership over their own workshops; the same guarantees may apply to private restaurants run by agents under a mandatory system instituted in 1967. Article 12 of the constitution provides an injunction against the expropriation of land or structures "except in the public interest and upon just compensation." The protection accorded to craftsmen and private farmers is similar to that given in the 1952 Polish constitution, but the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and East German constitutions provide no such cover.

Finally, the 1965 constitution in theory places all minorities and religions on an equal basis in every phase of economic, political, juridical, and sociocultural life. The 1952 constitution had granted token freedom of religious practice, but the newer constitution guarantees freedom from harassment in the exercise of religious activities. The Romanian citizen's freedom of speech and assembly, however, is circumscribed in that it "cannot be used for purposes contrary to the socialist order and to the interests of the workers"—a formulation which favors broad interpretation by the authorities.

In point of fact, the constitutionally defined rights of Romanians are often meaningless in practice. These rights may be abrogated both by government decree and by the caprice of officials. The police, though not as ubiquitous as they once were, can legally forbid any public meeting, and all political parties and organizations by law must be registered with the police. Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to public organizations, and freedom of religious worship is controlled by an official governmental agency, the Department of Cults. In short, none of these "rights" can in fact be exercised in the sense in which they are understood in the West.

The Romanian constitution, in common with other Communist documents, fulfills a different purpose in the society for which it applies than the U.S. Constitution does in American society. Unlike the U.S. Constitution—traditionally regarded by Americans as a sacred historical touchstone and by some as an instrument of sociopolitical evolution, but primarily as a restraining, conserving force in American life—the Romanian constitution is essentially

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a gauge of changes in a sharply defined system both ideologically and politically. Whereas Americans have generally regarded it as desirable, if not necessary, to make their politics fit the Constitution, Romanians appear to have ordered their legal constitutions to reflect a desired image of the current state of political and civil life.

With the advent of the 1965 Romanian constitution the discrepancy is perceptibly closing between the written word and reality in Romanian society; the empty, highflown phrases of the older version have been replaced largly by simple, down-to-earth exposition. Yet, because it is more precise in spelling out rights and duties, the newer document exposes more clearly its inherent conflicts with reality and therefore its inapplicability to evolving conditions. The frequency and ease with which the constitution is amended—requiring only a two-thirds vote of the Grand National Assembly—is symptomatic of this. Thus it will more than likely prove to be, as its predecessors have been, a transitory and not a permanent document.

2. Structure of the government

The locus of power within the government of Romania resides with the Romanian Communist Party elite, who occupy the leading positions in the state structure as well as in the party. Even the constitution is explicit on this point: "The leading political power in the whole of society in...Romania is the Romanian Communist Party." In spite of the constitution's definition of the Grand National Assembly as the "supreme organ of state power," the national legislature in reality has little voice in what happens in Romania. Basic policy decisions are made at the top levels of the party hierarchy and passed through the government by way of legislation in the Grand National Assembly or decisions and decrees from the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Because the government leadership is decided within the party, there is no constitutional provision for transfer of authority.

The party's fundamental tenet of centralized control is in harmony with the Romanian tradition of centralism, and the central or national government remains omnipotent. Its major components are the Grand National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and an extensive court system. Because Communist doctrine rejects the principle of separation of powers, the functions of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary are not clearly differentiated. In general, the Grand National Assembly retains legislative functions, the Council of Ministers has administrative duties, and the court system handles judicial problems. However, the general functions of the top-level state organs have been altered significantly since 1967, primarily at the instigation of party Secretary General Ceausescu. The Council of State (elected from among members of the Grand National Assembly to carry out its duties when the assembly is not in session) has greatly enlarged its sphere of activities since Ceausescu became its president in late 1967. The prerogatives of the Council of Ministers have been curtailed by the establishment of two new bodies, the Economic Council and the Defense Council, both now directly subordinate to the Council of State.

At about the same time he took over as president of the Council of State, Ceausescu, acting through the party National Conference in December 1967, called for sweeping changes in the organization of the party and government. He proposed a division of responsibilities among the highest party and government bodies; thus, most decisions on economic administration were to be removed from the province of the party Central Committee and made the concern of the Council of Ministers. Problems of defense, state security, foreign policy, as well as of cadres and scientific research policy would be resolved directly by the party Central Committee and its organs of collective leadership, i.e., the Executive Committee, the Permanent Presidium, and the Secretariat. In the same breath the Secretary General proposed the fusion of party and state positions—"a single comrade in the leadership should take care of a specific field of activity, both in the party and the state spheres." He applied this to the local level with the stipulation that the county party secretaries should concurrently hold chairmanships of the people's councils. The structure of the party and government as of early 1970 is illustrated in Figure 51.

It is difficult to know, particularly in the case of the internal functioning of the Central Committee, how much of Ceausescu's proposed restructuring has been carried out since 1967. Various party bodies still establish basic economic policy, and the Central Committee still has a hand in the implementation of economic policy. This is evident from establishment of a Central Committee commission for economic affairs, among others, by the December 1969 plenum. Nevertheless, much of Ceausescu's omnibus reorganization has been implemented. Figure 52 illustrates the interlocking membership of Romanian leaders in top party and governmental organs.

a. GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY—The unicameral Grand National Assembly is designated in the constitution as the sole legislative body in Romania. The 1965 constitution provided some slight increases in the assembly's powers and prestige. Its 465 members are elected for a term of 4 years by 465 equally populated constituencies throughout the country. The establishment of a permanent number of deputies to the assembly was an innovation in the 1965 constitution, in contrast to the previous practice of electing one deputy for every 40,000 people. Assembly sessions are ordinarily held twice a year, but extraordinary sessions may be convened by the Council of State or on the demand of at least one-third of the total number of deputies. Extraordinary sessions have become more frequent as the regime has launched a mass of new legislation to implement its sweeping organizational reforms and sought to demonstrate a broad base of support for its domestic programs and foreign policy. In keeping with the measures endorsed by the National Conference of the party in December 1967, the assembly's sessions have subsequently been of longer duration. The conference approved open sessions of the assembly as well as increased

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

FIGURE 51. Structure of party and government (U/OU)

debate on the floor, but only for certain kinds of measures. On at least one occasion, in December 1969, Ceausescu urged questions and "debate" during an assembly session, apparently hoping to give the appearance of truly democratic proceedings. The length of sessions is not stipulated in the constitution, but normally it has been 2 days; the 10th session of the 1968 legislature, however, lasted nearly 2 months.

Since 1961 the regular constitutional duties of the assembly have included the appointment and dismissal of members of the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Court (and the Prosecutor General), and the control of the activities of these bodies. Theoretically, the assembly also approves the state budget, comments on plans for national economic development, establishes the general line of foreign policy, and if necessary declares war and general mobilization. In addition, the constitution empowers the assembly to recall the commander of the armed forces, proclaim a state of emergency, grant amnesties, and amend the constitution. Most of these impressive-sounding powers were innovations first introduced into the 1952 constitution by an amendment in 1961.

The 1965 constitution added a clause allowing the assembly to examine the activities of the government, thereby strengthening existing rights to appoint ministers, to summon civil servants before assembly committees, and to formally question ministers about government policies or decisions. As embodied in the assembly's new operating rules and supplemented by the new constitutional clause, these measures give the assembly's nine permanent committees at least the formal authority to serve as checks on the government's executive branch, i.e., the Council of Ministers. These rules, which permit the committees to demand information from ministries and other state organs as needed to accomplish their control functions, are similar to parliamentary reforms introduced in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. An amendment in 1969 expanded further the duties and powers of the standing committees to include review of the activities of the local people's councils.

Other constitutional innovations included in 1965 were the establishment of a constitutional committee, or commission, and a permanent bureau of the assembly. The composition and function of the permanent bureau have never been made clear. The constitutional commission advises the parliament on the constitutionality of draft laws and examines proposals presented by state organs, public organizations, and private citizens involving any alleged nonconformity with the constitution. A subsequent provision states that the bureau of the assembly and the Council of State can request reports on pending bills from the constitutional commission.

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

FIGURE 52. The national leadership: members of top party bodies interlocking with the government, 1969 (U/OU)

b. Council of State—Although it has existed as corporate head of state since 1961 when it was instituted to replace the assembly's Presidium, the Council of State has assumed real significance only since Ceausescu became its president in December 1967. He has infused vigorous activity into the original concept of the council as a single centralized body having legislative, executive, and judicial powers—the first such governmental organ in Romania's history. Constitutionally, the Council of State is elected by the assembly from among its own members and is subordinate to the assembly, but in the assembly's capacity of "the supreme organ of state power functioning continuously." It is this qualifying phrase that gives the council its mandate for wide-ranging powers, which Ceausescu has put to use so effectively.

Originally consisting of a president, three vice presidents, and 15 members, it has been expanded to include four vice presidents and 22 members. Although the constitution does not stipulate it as necessary, the council now includes the chairmen of the German and Hungarian nationality councils and the president of the Writers Union, thus making it more representative of the body politic.

The powers of the Council of State are for the most part identical to those of the assembly. Among the exceptions, however, is its right of legislative initiative. It is the only agency which issues judicial decrees and, except for the Grand National Assembly, the only body that has the right to give legally binding interpretations of extant laws. The president of the Council of State also

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represents Romania in relations with other states and has the power to appoint and receive the credentials of heads of diplomatic missions and to ratify and denounce international treaties. In short, he is tantamount to the head of state in most Western countries. In this capacity Ceausescu has begun to travel widely—to Iran, Turkey, and India—on image-making visits, and he plans additional trips.

c. Council of Ministers—The importance and authority of the Council of Ministers, traditionally the seat of administrative power in the government, has been noticeably abridged by the leadership's reliance on other organs, particularly the Council of State. The Council of Ministers, which corresponds to the cabinet in most Western governmental structures, is charged by the Romanian constitution with carrying on "the general management of executive activities." Like the Council of State, it is admonished to carry on its activities according to the principle of collective leadership. It directs the daily affairs of state by supervising and controlling the operation of the numerous ministries and other executive agencies, by participating in drafting bills for acceptance by the Grand National Assembly or the Council of State, and by overseeing the implementation of governmental policy in accordance with guidelines established by the Communist Party hierarchy. Theoretically, members of the Council of Ministers are at the beck and call of the Grand National Assembly for purposes of explaining, reporting, and answering questions, but the assembly has rarely exercised this constitutional prerogative. Between sessions of the assembly, however, the Council of Ministers is legally subordinate to the Council of State, and presumably this prestigious and authoritative body does call to account the various ministers, individually and collectively.

Under the 1965 constitution, the precise structure of the ministerial system and the number of ministries and ministerial-level organs is left open. The leadership has freely exercised its penchant for rejuggling and reorganizing the ministerial structure according to the political or economic exigencies of the moment. The 1967 party National Conference forecast significant changes in the organization and primary responsibility of the ministries, which finally were put into effect late in 1969. Under the new division of responsibility, the Council of Ministers' special province is administration of the economy. In order to improve management and streamline the structure of communications and command, the new legislation sets up "collegiums" to make general decisions within each ministry, with the exception of the Ministries of Armed Forces and of Internal Affairs, and the Council of State Security. In general terms, the individual collegium is to be composed of the minister himself, acting as chairman, his deputy ministers and directors, chiefs of sections, and other "highly qualified experts" from within or outside the ministry, and also a representative of the trade unions. The collegium is to meet at least once every 3 months to examine and act on current questions. Between sessions, ministerial operations are directed by the minister and his deputies; however, the collegium is ultimately responsible for the activity of the ministry. Under previous laws the minister was principally responsible for the actions of his ministry.

The reordering of the economic enterprises in July 1969 on an experimental basis was aimed primarily at "establishing closer liaison between management and operations." Industrial enterprises—formerly under the direct control of the ministries—have been organized into "industrial centrals," groupings of related economic enterprises. The ministries, still responsible for overall economic planning, now have jurisdiction over only these industrial centrals. The centrals are charged with organizing research and development, replacing and repairing parts, and distributing and marketing products. The centrals also are in charge of supplying raw materials to their enterprises and building new plants and expanding existing ones.

Concurrent with the internal changes in the ministerial decisionmaking structure, the party-state leadership in November 1969 reorganized 13 economic ministries, in accordance with Ceausescu's decree to simplify structure and adjust the ratio between executives and production personnel. This is in keeping with his planned redistribution of the country's technical and administrative personnel as revealed in a speech he gave earlier the same year. Generally speaking, the reorganization reduced both the number of high-level officials and the number of subsections (directorates) within the ministries. Some of those officials who failed to retain their positions in the reorganization were considered superfluous or incompetent. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reorganization is to force "specialists" to move out of large urban centers—especially Bucharest—and to become directly involved in production.

Aside from the paper blueprint for the collegiums, not much is known about the internal workings of the individual ministries and semi-independent government agencies. Appearances suggest that there has been, and probably still is, significant overlapping of authority and duplication of effort. The reorganization begun in 1969 is obviously aimed precisely at these problems and at improving efficiency—a theme constantly stressed by Ceausescu. He is intent upon shaking up the rigid departmentalization which has characterized the ministerial system in the past. That type of organization, nevertheless, remains basically unchanged: a general directorate subdivided into directorates which are, in turn, subdivided into sections, offices, and service branches. Each establishment also contains a basic party organization to supervise and promote implementation of party directives.

In February 1970[7] Romania's Council of Ministers consisted of a Premier, a First Deputy Premier, seven

[7] For a current listing of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

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Deputy Premiers, and the following 24 ministers and 10 chairmen of councils and committees with ministerial rank:

- Minister of:
  - Agriculture and Forestry
  - Armed Forces
  - Chemical Industry
  - Construction Materials Industry
  - Domestic Trade
  - Education
  - Electric Power
  - Finance
  - Food Industry
  - Foreign Affairs
  - Foreign Trade
  - Health
  - Industrial Construction
  - Internal Affairs
  - Justice
  - Labor
  - Light Industry
  - Machine Building Industry
  - Metallurgical Industry
  - Mining Industry and Geology
  - Petroleum
  - Posts and Telecommunications
  - Transport
  - Wood Industry
- Chairman of:
  - National Council for Scientific Research
  - Committee for Prices
  - Committee for Local Economy and Administration
  - General Union of Trade Unions
  - National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives
  - State Committee for Culture and Art
  - State Planning Committee
  - Council of State Security
  - Committee for Nuclear Energy
- Secretary of: Union of Communist Youth (also referred to as Minister for Youth Problems)

The inclusion of the heads of the trade unions, the agricultural production cooperatives, and the youth organization as part of the Council of Ministers is a recent innovation which has been written into the constitution. The addition of these three brings the total membership of the council to 42, of which only a handful are not either full or alternate members of the party Central Committee. This naturally leads to the conclusion that the Central Committee actually determines the makeup of the Council of Ministers, despite the fact that the ministers are formally elected by and from the membership of the Grand National Assembly.

With the Premier presiding, the Council of Ministers convenes in ordinary sessions twice monthly and in extraordinary sessions whenever necessary. Problems which do not come before its plenary sessions are resolved by the Premier. Depending on their positions in the Communist Party hierarchy, individual ministers can exercise considerable power. Since the death of former party chief Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965, available evidence indicates that vacancies on the Council of Ministers have been filled primarily by those loyal to his successor, party chief Nicolae Ceausescu, or to competent younger functionaries being drawn into the Ceausescu fold.

Interim business may also be conducted by a smaller group within the Council of Ministers called the Permanent Bureau, first proposed by Ceausescu in a speech to the Grand National Assembly session which approved the new constitution in August 1965. Although a clause has been added to the constitution designating the Premier, First Deputy Premier, and Deputy Premiers as its components, there has been no public mention of the bureau as such, and if it does function it may be only in an informal capacity.

Decisions by the Council of Ministers have the same legal effect as laws passed by the parliament. The authority for the council's decisions stems from the basic laws adopted by the Grand National Assembly. Although subject to the parliament's approval or rejection, no measure adopted by the council is known to have been rejected.

A number of commissions, councils, general directorates, and other agencies function under the authority of the Council of Ministers. These subministerial agencies include:

- Romanian Press Agency (*Agerpres*)
- Office of Artistic and Theatrical Tours (OSTA)
- Chamber of Commerce
- Comturist
- Commission for Computers and Data Processing
- Department of Cults
- Commission for Economic and Technical Collaboration and Cooperation
- State Geology Committee
- State Inspectorate for Quality Control of Export Products
- General Directorate for Metrology, Standards, and Inventions
- General Directorate for the Press and Printing
- Committee for Radio and Television
- Romanian Committee for Repatriation
- Committee for Space Activities
- General Directorate for State Reserves
- National Office of Tourism

Two special-purpose bodies have been set up outside the regular ministerial framework. The Economic Council was established in February 1968 as part of the Council of Ministers, but in March 1969 it was removed from the authority of the latter and reorganized as a sort of super agency working directly under the party Central Committee and the Council of State. Its four-man directorate consists of a chairman, two vice chairmen, and a secretary general; 25 members, many of them county party officials specializing in economic matters, make up the body of the council. The council as a whole is in fact an elite corps of economic experts. It is charged with "checking on the implementation of the economic policy of the party and state" and presumably acts in a directive or advisory capacity to the Council of Ministers as well as to the Council of State and other high government organs. The establishment of the Economic Council appears to have had the effect of further diminishing the importance and authority of the Council of Ministers.

The status and purpose of the Defense Council, the second special body, are less clear. It has existed at least on paper since December 1967 but was only formally established by the Grand National Assembly in March

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1969, with Ceausescu as its chairman. The timing of this move—in view of Romania's uncertainty about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe in the spring of 1969—and the strongly nationalistic language of the council's governing laws, suggest that the Defense Council may be more important politically than functionally. Nevertheless, its composition—members of the party's Permanent Presidium plus selected ministers—assures strong centralized control over the armed forces and defense policy.

d. LOCAL GOVERNMENT—Romania's local government was substantially reorganized in early 1968, in what was essentially a return to traditional administrative units and another step in de-Russification. The new organization set up 39 counties (*judeţ*) in place of the previous 17 regions (*regiunes*) and divided the *judeţ* into municipalities, towns, and communes (Figure 50). There are now 46 municipalities, all of them except Bucharest, the capital, subordinate to the county governments. This organization corresponds closely in form to that of the pre-Communist administrative system, which existed until 1950 when it was revised along Soviet lines. Romanian central authorities had made periodic small changes in the Soviet-style administrative system, but not until 1968 was it thrown out completely.

Bucharest justified the reorganization primarily on socioeconomic grounds and carefully pointed out that it does not represent merely a return to the old "bourgeois-landlord" counties. The committee which worked out the new system reportedly included geographers, economists, sociologists, historians, and ethnographers. The system which they devised, according to Romanian claims, is more rational in terms of political and economic administration and corresponds more closely to Romanian traditions and to socialist goals than either of the old systems. The 39 counties are roughly comparable in size, averaging 6,100 square kilometers in area and 450,000 inhabitants. The committee tried to draw the boundaries so that each of the counties would include a number of towns which could play "an important role in its economic, social, and cultural progress." Ethnographic factors were also taken into consideration. Underscoring the regime's policy of egalitarian treatment of Romanians and minorities alike, the committee drew the county boundaries so as to make their populations as heterogeneous as possible, while preserving the proportional representation rights of the minorities. Thus the former Autonomous Magyar Region, which was established in 1952, no longer exists; it was, in any case, autonomous in name only. Under the new system Hungarians are in the heavy majority in only two counties, Harghita and Covasna.

The new administrative division purportedly simplifies local government by reducing the number of steps between the local basic units and the central bodies. The new counties provide the only link between the basic units (municipalities, towns, and communes) and Bucharest, whereas before there were both regional and district level governments sandwiched between the top and the bottom of the hierarchy. On paper at least, the new scheme provides for increased authority and a wider latitude of prerogatives for local government, but in actual fact it probably facilitates more direct and effective control from Bucharest.

County and local government is carried on by people's councils, similar in organization and function throughout the country. Established in 1950, these elective councils are entrusted with directing all local activity in the political, economic, cultural, medical, and social fields. Moreover, clauses added to the constitution since 1965 grant people's councils power to elect and recall local judges, and authority to control the local—not the national—economic enterprises within their jurisdiction. The position of chairman of the county people's council, however, is now filled by the first secretary of the county party organization.

Delegates are elected for a term of 4 years to the county people's councils, and the evidence indicates that the same term applies to local councils. In the March 1969 general elections, 140,000 deputies were elected to people's councils and other governing bodies in 189 towns and 2,706 communes of the country. Town, municipality, and communal people's councils are directly subordinate to the county people's councils.

The people's councils follow a mode of operation patterned after the Grand National Assembly. One-half plus one of the total membership of the people's council constitutes a quorum. Sessions are called by the executive committees, which are elected from among the members of the people's council and consist of a president, vice presidents, and other members. The executive committees, charged with the general direction of the people's councils activities, are the key factors of power within the local governing bodies. Since the membership of people's councils at all levels has usually been composed overwhelmingly of party members, it may be safely assumed that the local party organization has a comfortable influence over the executive committees.

The 1965 constitution clearly subordinates the people's councils to the Grand National Assembly, which has the power to establish regulations for their organization and operation. The assembly's permanent committee on local government can conduct investigations and reports at any time. The constitution also gives the Council of Ministers authority to control the activities of the people's councils' executive committees. To implement this power, a nonministerial-level body, the State Committee for Guidance and Control of Local State Administration Organs, was set up under the Council of Ministers in December 1965. This committee, which replaced the Directorate for the Problems of Local State Administrative Organs, was charged with exercising a greater degree of central control over the executive committees, generally regarded as the key power element within the people's councils. There has been some doubt, nevertheless, about the extent of the committee's authority, in view of the existence of other controlling authorities at a higher level.

The Council of State appears to have preempted the leading position in exercising control over the people's councils, even though it lacks specific authority from

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the constitution. In March 1969 party leader Ceausescu proposed in a speech that the "problems of general guidance of people's councils...be resolved in a single place...under the Council of State." Accordingly, a decree of the Council of State in May 1969 established a "General Directorate for People's Councils," headed by a member of the council. The directorate was given wide powers of supervision and examination of the people's councils' decisions and implementation of policy. The Council of State maintains an 18-man inspection corps, each of whom lives in the provinces and is responsible for reporting on two or three counties. At about the same time, another decree reorganized the State Committee for Local Economy and Administration—a ministerial-level organ—to confine its activities to such matters as local (i.e. nonnational) industry, housing administration, and roads, thus further limiting the Council of Ministers' direct authority in local government.

e. JUDICIARY—The judiciary in Romania is not an independent branch of the government. The Ministry of Justice, organs of the Prosecutor General, and the courts comprise the judiciary system, in which nearly all the public positions are elective. The system is subordinated to the control of the Grand National Assembly and the Council of State. It is obligated by the constitution first to defend the socialist order and secondly the rights of citizens—in the spirit of respect for the law, with the stated aim of correcting and educating citizens to prevent repeated violations of the law.

Within the court system there are the Supreme Court, county courts, and magistrate courts, and also military courts which handle those military and political cases assigned to it by law. Although current information about the makeup of the Supreme Court is lacking, it has in the past consisted of criminal, civil, and military collegiums, each headed by three judges. The military collegium, however, has been removed, presumably to be constituted separately. The Supreme Court is elected by the Grand National Assembly for the duration of the assembly's term of office, normally 4 years. It exercises general control over the lower courts and hears appellate cases from the lower courts. On the initiative of the president of the Supreme Court or the Prosecutor General, the highest court may also sit on cases of the first instance.

The system of lower courts has been modified to correspond with the new territorial administrative divisions. There are 39 county courts and an additional one in Bucharest, replacing the former 17 regional courts. These courts hear cases involving conflicts in jurisdiction among lower courts and have appellate jurisdiction over lower courts within the counties. The county courts also have original jurisdiction over cases involving more serious crimes such as murder, and civil or criminal cases where more than 100,000 lei (US$16,667) is involved. The main military court in Bucharest also serves as the court of first instance in cases involving high-ranking military officers wherever they may be stationed. To take the place of the previous 159 district courts, 100 magistrate courts have been set up, 92 in towns and eight in Bucharest. These courts have original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases except the special violations mentioned above.

A new law on the organization of the Romanian judiciary came into force on 1 January 1969. While it remains true to the Marxist-Leninist views on justice—that is, the courts cooperate in the implementation of party policy—it makes important changes which if implemented will reduce the arbitrary nature of the justice system. The most significant provision upgrades the qualifications of judges. A judge must now hold a degree of doctor, or at the least bachelor, of law, and pass a difficult examination before being allowed to sit on a bench. This requirement is in marked contrast to the situation which existed previously, when judges were turned out of "short-order" law schools with a maximum of high school education plus 1 or 2 years of formal legal training. The new law concomitantly lessens the reliance of the judicial system on people's assessors—lay judges elected by the people's councils. The institution of the assessor originally was intended to give justice a popular appearance, but in reality provided the regime a further check over the activities of the professional judges, long considered a holdover of the bourgeoisie. Under the old law the people's assessors, who rank equally with professional judges, often were able to outweigh the latter in the lower courts. The new law stipulates, however, that cases being tried for the first time (except those dealing with labor contracts) in magistrate's and county courts are to be tried by a panel of two judges, and makes no mention of people's assessors. The local assessors are now required, moreover, to have 4 years of high school; no schooling whatsoever was specified under the old law. In their right to elect all judges, however, the people's councils (and by implication, the party) still retain immeasurable control over the judges, even those professionally trained.

The Ministry of Justice handles the administration of the judicial system. It includes a legislative coordinating committee which drafts and coordinates legislation; a judicial advisory committee which reviews and initiates proposals for personnel appointments in the judicial system; and a control commission which supervises the training and activities of judges and lawyers. The Ministry of Justice does not participate directly in the trial of cases, but it may request either the Office of the Prosecutor General or the Supreme Court to review a case.

Romanian lawyers are organized into collectives called collegiums and may take cases only as assigned by the collegium, which collects the fees and pays the lawyers. Lawyers who are members of the Communist Party are assigned the better cases and therefore earn higher incomes.

A new law on the *procuratura*, or public prosecutor, came into effect in 1969 at the same time as the reorganization of the judiciary system. The *procuratura*, first introduced into Romanian law in 1952, is based on the Soviet model and has no real counterpart in Western legal systems, though it is somewhat analogous to the district attorney or state prosecutor in Anglo-Saxon law. The 1952 law

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set up the *procuratura* as a special organ designed as a constant and ubiquitous check on all private and public life, and especially all court proceedings and decisions. Its power extended over all state bodies, enterprises, and cooperative organizations, over all employees and other citizens. The personnel of the *procuratura* also had the task of conducting pretrial investigations and of supervising court activities.

Under the new law the *procuratura* no longer retains its "general supervisory" role, a change which has been reflected in an amendment to the 1965 constitution. According to both the constitution and the new law, the Office of the Prosecutor General is now confined to conducting criminal investigations, prosecuting indictments, and to watching over the courts and other bodies charged with carrying out sentences.

The head of the *procuratura,* called the Prosecutor General, is still appointed by the Grand National Assembly, and he in turn appoints individual prosecutors of the local units in the counties, municipalities, and military units. The Prosecutor General no longer has the right, however, to contest the Grand National Assembly's general directives issued for the lower courts. Nevertheless, although these legal changes in regard both to the judicial system and the *procuratura* are almost monumental in East European terms, it remains to be seen whether they will be implemented in the same spirit.

f. PENAL CODES—In June 1968 the Grand National Assembly adopted a new penal code, the first entirely new code since January 1937. The old code, modified and amended many times particularly in the early years of Communist rule, was one of the most severe in Europe. The last version of this code with amendments and additions was published in late 1960, after which it was hinted in the Romanian press that the need for a new code had been recognized. Work was actually begun on a new code in 1964, but following the Ninth Party Congress in 1965 it disappeared from public view. Issuance of the new code was probably held up by internal differences and indecision over how to handle the problem of the legality—or more correctly, the illegality—of past actions by some of Romania's leaders and the security police under their control.

Although in many respects it does not match Western concepts of justice, the code which finally appeared in 1968 resolved these differences in favor of the more progressive elements in the Romanian leadership. The public was told at the time of adoption that the new penal code is to be a guarantee against illegal arrest and illegal punishment, and that the security police would henceforth strictly observe its provisions. It may be seen as a renunciation of past abuses and a tidying up of a confused legal situation. It is also part of the process by which the party is seeking to increase the element of trust and consent in Communist rule. The new code does not, however, offer any dilution of Communist principle, nor relax in any way the grip of the party on the whole of Romanian life.

Unlike the old system of laws, whose language was abstruse and legalistic and whose very existence was often unknown to the average citizen, the new code is written for the man in the street. The code is written in simple, straightforward language, and its provisions have been reduced in number and systematized in presentation. The new code has some 360 articles, in contrast to 608 articles in the previous code. The formerly separate military code of over 100 articles has been abrogated and included in the new penal code through 25 unified articles. The new code attempts to define an offense—a deed dangerous to society—more precisely than the old code, and greatly reduces the number of deeds which are considered offenses.

By far the most important new provision is the incorporation of the principle *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege*—no crime, no penalty without law. A basic precept of Western law, this principle was orginially contained in the 1937 Romanian penal code, but after the Communist takeover it was flagrantly disregarded and finally specifically contravened. An amendment in 1949 stated that "deeds considered to be 'socially dangerous acts' may be subject to punishment even if they are not named by the law as offenses." The latter amendment was subsequently dropped in 1956, but until the early 1960's Romanian judges continued to hand out sentences for which there were no legal foundations, often construing the law by analogy—a common abuse during the Stalinist era. As a measure of the severity of the Romanian penal code, it is worth noting that some other East European countries, such as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, did not formally remove from the lawbooks the principle of "no crime without law" even in the early days of Communist rule.

Other improvements in the new penal code include the embodiment of the principle of nonretroactivity, restrictions on the length of punishment, and greater protection for the family unit. Although the code retains capital punishment for certain major offenses, it reduces the number of offenses for which the death penalty is a possibility and eliminates the death penalty as mandatory—as it was for certain offenses under the old code—always allowing imprisonment as an alternative sentence. It abolishes the life sentence, making 20 years the maximum sentence, except for repeated serious offenses when it may be extended to 25 years. It accepts the ideas that conviction and punishment should be related to the nature of the crime, that imprisonment should be not only a means of restraint but also a means of reeducation, and that imprisonment should not be decreed for minor offenses. The code fixes legal responsibility (assuming knowledge of the illegality of an act) at age 14 instead of 12 and imposes adult responsibility at age 16.

Improvements notwithstanding, the new Romanian penal code has all the characteristics of a socialist code; its defined purpose is "to protect the Socialist Republic of Romania, the sovereignty, independence, and unity of the state, socialist property, and individual citizen and his rights, the entire legal order, against offenses."

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This statement of purpose leaves no doubt that the code rates the interests of the state above the interests of the individual. The new code retains severe penalties for political offenses, which are specifically defined in 17 articles (as opposed to the previous 43 articles), and imposes especially harsh penalties for infringements against public property, which encompasses just about everything in Romania. Penalties for economic offenses, such as embezzlement, theft, robbery, and fraud, have been made, if anything, more severe than in the previous few years. Thus the death penalty for serious embezzlement, abolished in 1960, has been reinstated in the new code. Nationalist-chauvinist propaganda and activity incur imprisonment of from 5 to 20 years, which reflects the regime's policy of suppressing political agitation based on nationality differences and gradually integrating minorities.

The new penal code was followed on 1 January 1969 with a new code of criminal procedure, which gives backbone to the liberalizing aspects of the penal code. The most positive elements of the new code of criminal procedure concern the regulation of pretrial investigations and the defense's access to and presentation of evidence. The prerogatives of the security services are stipulated precisely and in general are curtailed by the new code. The services can detain a suspect only after a warrant has been issued either by the prosecutor or by the court, and pretrial detention cannot exceed a month, although in special cases it may be extended 90 days. Under the old code a suspect could be brought to trial by any investigating body, and there was no limit to the length of pretrial detention.

The defense counsel may now have access to all the material compiled during the investigation and may represent the defendant in court at every stage of the proceedings. Unlike the old legislation, the new code makes it compulsory for the defendant to appear in court at all phases, even for appeals, and allows the defense counsel to assist his client during the actual trial. Moreover, the revision of a case has been made easier, since the new code makes it compulsory that all requests for appeal be passed on by a court. Under the old system the prosecutor decided which appeals to turn over to the courts.

In addition the new code has made changes in the procedures for gathering evidence. Article 68 bans the use of force, threats, or any other means of constraint, or of incitement, in gathering evidence. The term "confession," with all its dark and foreboding connotations, has been dropped from the new code. The courts will use as evidence, however, a "declaration" by the defendant.

One of the most interesting aspects of the new code is its reinstatement of the oath in courtroom procedure. Article 85 contains the formula to be used: "I swear to tell the truth and not to conceal anything I know." The original prewar code on criminal procedure compelled the taking of a religious oath in court; following the Communist takeover the religious aspects of the oath were abolished but the oath itself was retained. A further amendment in 1956 revoked completely the practice of taking an oath, as a "remnant of religious mysticism." The reinstatement of the nonreligious oath apparently is an effort to dignify the atmosphere of the courtroom.

The Romanian regime is reportedly preparing new civil and family codes. A new labor code appeared in March 1970. It guarantees, as is done in all socialist systems, the right to work. The new code imposes on both employer and employee obligations aimed at enforcing the fulfillment of planned goals. The code includes the rule of seniority and identifies the employee's right to appeal to higher authority within his work unit in case of grievances or penalties for infractions. The weight of the code, however, is devoted to defining infractions and prescribing penalties, including situations in which an employer has the right to dismiss any employee.

Supplementing these codes is a large body of legislation covering such things as public disturbances and possession of firearms. The regime is known to have had in the past, and probably still maintains, secret regulations and decrees which are unknown to the general public and sometimes even to legal specialists.

There is an almost complete lack of reliable statistical data on the incidence of crime. It is known, however, that the rate of economic crimes is higher than that of any other type of illegal activity in the country. The regime reportedly has become alarmed over this phenomenon, and it was for this reason that the death penalty for embezzlement was revived in the 1968 penal code.

The penal system officially comprises three types of institutions: prisons, correction camps, and colonies. The regime groups four types of institutions under the category of prisons—penitentiaries, prison factories, town jails, and special secret police detention facilities.

There is little information on the exact number of prisoners. Pardons are granted by the Council of State either upon individual appeal or—more often—in the form of periodic mass amnesties. On 16 June 1964 the regime amnestied 2,400 political prisoners and announced that nearly all the remainder were to be released by 23 August 1964—the 20th anniversary of Romanian liberation. This was the largest amnesty of political prisoners in modern Romanian history. Although the purpose of the mass releases was not specified, their timing coincided with the decision to pursue an independent foreign policy. Many of the amnestied prisoners were technicians and professional people whose services were much in demand for economic development.

C. Political dynamics (C)

Romania's domination by the Romanian Communist Party, which came to power in 1945, is consistent with the country's history of authoritarian government. Following centuries of oppression under the Turkish Ottoman Empire, the main Romanian principalities of Walachia and Moldavia were united in 1878 to form the old kingdom. After World War I, Transilvania and the territory of Bukovina were added at the expense of defeated Austria-Hungary. On the northeastern front, Bessarabia, and to the southeast, part of the Dobruja, also were annexed as shown in

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

FIGURE 53. Historical changes in Romania's boundaries (U/OU)

Figure 53. These acquisitions marked the farthest extension of the boundaries of the Romanian state in modern times—hence the name Greater Romania during the interwar period.

Theoretically, a multiparty system prevailed in Greater Romania, but the refusal of contending factions to work together within it led first to the rule of the paternalistic oligarchy headed by the Bratianu family and later to royal authoritarianism. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's the central authorities were challenged from both the left and the right on the fundamental issues of agrarian reform and peasant discontent. The most serious threat to the ruling elite were the political assassinations and other terrorist acts mounted by the fanatical, Fascist "Legion of the Archangel Michael," founded in the 1920's. Passionately nationalistic and anti-Semitic, the Iron Guard, as it came to be known, had widespread support among the people of Romania and eventually was nurtured and supported from Nazi Germany. In 1938 King Carol (Figure 54), in establishing a royalist dictatorship of his own, ordered the murder of 14 of its top leaders. Despite this setback for the Iron Guard, 2 years later Romania entered World War II on the side of the Axis, and King Carol was forced to abdictate in favor of his son Michael, whose government was actually a Fascist regime dominated by Gen. Ion Antonescu.

For a brief moment in 1944 Romania was ruled by a coalition of "home-grown" Communists led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and liberal bourgeois leaders untainted by collaboration with the Nazis. The Soviet armies, already having crossed the frontiers to "liberate" the country, however, brought with them the "Muscovite band" of prewar Romanian Communists who earlier had fled to the U.S.S.R. to avoid persecution. The coalition was dissolved in short order and in early 1945 the Romanian Communists, backed by Soviet troops, set up a Communist state under the auspices of the National Democratic Front, subsequently the People's Democratic Front.

1. Party development

The Soviet occupation forces were responsible for the victory of communism in Romania, but there had long been a socialist movement in the country. The socialist movement arose in the 1870's under the leadership of Russian emigrees and was formally constituted as a party in 1893. Marxist thought exerted considerable influence within the movement.

By the turn of the century the Social Democrat Party had been organized, but like other socialist parties it

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FIGURE 54. King Carol II (left) in 1936 with his mother, Dowager Queen Marie, and his son Michael, who became king during the fascist rule during World War II (U/OU)

FIGURE 55. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (far left), chief of the Communist Party in Romania from 1944 until his death in 1965 (U/OU)

was divided internally both on tactics and ideology. One group within the Romanian party—the Maximalists—advocated revolution and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. It was this faction which in 1919 advocated joining the Third International of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), but the Romanian Social Democrat Party split on the issue. By May 1921 the Maximalists had formed their own party, the Communist Party of Romania, with some help from Moscow. Although the Ceausescu leadership looks upon the subsequent period as one of both domination by and interference from the CPSU, the date May 1921 is nevertheless regarded as the founding date of their party.

The party went underground after it was banned by Romanian authorities in 1924. The party's Central Committee and regular members went into hiding on orders from Moscow. Despite its straitened circumstances, the hard-core membership, financed from Moscow, held clandestine meetings, established front organizations, and carried on other political activities. One front organization, the United Workers and Peasants Bloc, even managed to win about 75,000 votes in the 1927 and 1931 elections. Still, the party was largely ineffective during this period, not only because of difficult operating conditions within Romania, but also as a result of internal conflicts among its varied contingents: "Bessarabians," "Romanians," "workers," and "intellectuals." Uncertainty emanating from the turmoil in Moscow over Lenin's successor also contributed to the party's instability.

During the 1930's the party began to step up its illegal activities. The revolutionary intellectuals were joined by worker elements principally from the railroad industry, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (Figure 55). The group succeeded in fomenting a series of strikes and inspiring similar activities in other industries, to such an extent that the authorities again cracked down. The strike leaders, including Gheorghiu-Dej and others, were sent to Doftana prison, while a second group—primarily of ethnic minority leaders, including Ana Pauker—went to Moscow in a prisoner exchange. It was this latter group which returned more than 10 years later in the company of the occupying Soviet Army at the end of World War II, and with the Communists who had remained behind in prison, rapidly established the Communist regime in Romania.

The period immediately following the war was spent by the Communists in consolidating their power and control in Romania, accomplished in three successive stages. In the first the Communists cooperated with several leftist political parties—the National Peasant, Liberal, and Social Democratic Parties—under a monarchical government in a short-term program which nominally included social reforms, political freedom, and a foreign policy friendly to both the U.S.S.R. and the West. This phase came to an abrupt end on 6 March 1945 when Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky forced King Michael to appoint a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza, head of the Plowman's Front, a leftist-oriented agrarian party. The Groza government marked the end of influence of the National Peasant, Liberal, and Social Democrat Parties, which were gradually extinguished by forceful intimidation and suppression of their newspapers, and by the political isolation of their leaders.

With the recession of Western Allied influence in Romania, all pretense at coalition government was abandoned, and in December 1947 the monarchy was abolished and the Romanian People's Democracy proclaimed. All that remained for the creation of a "monolithic" regime was to force the merger of the Communist Party and the rump Social Democratic Party, a political move which

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broadened the worker element in the ruling party. All opposition parties were outlawed. The new party was called the Romanian Workers Party (RWP), the name which was retained until July 1965 when the party again adopted its original name, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).

From 1945 to 1952 the Romanian party was torn by factional infighting. This struggle, as in many other East European Communist countries, resulted essentially from the divided loyalties of the two elements of leadership of the party: the "Moscow" group led by Ana Pauker, and the "nativist" group led by Gheorghiu-Dej. The latter regarded the Moscow group as essentially foreign. It was the "Muscovites," however, who inevitably dominated the party organization in this period, because they had both the support and confidence of the Soviets.

"Muscovite" Pauker and her friends dominated the Politburo, the party's executive body. Although Gheorghiu-Dej, a "nativist," was titular leader of the party from 1944 on, he gave no overt evidence of opposition to the Pauker group until it was purged suddenly in May 1952.

Although factionalism continued to be a problem until 1957, when Gheorghiu-Dej consolidated his authority, no one ever represented as serious a challenge to Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership of the party as Ana Pauker before her ouster. From 1952 until Gheorghiu-Dej's death in March 1965 there were in fact very few changes in the personnel of the top leadership of the party, indicating a high degree of internal stability and strength. The party's unity stemmed partly from the homogeneity of the leadership—a small, cohesive group of "nativists"—and partly from its determination to begin running its own affairs with a minimum of interference from the Soviets. This began in the mid-1950's The Romanians first obtained the abolition of the hated SOVROMS, the joint industrial concerns through which the U.S.S.R. had milked the Romanian economy in postwar years; and in 1958 they managed to effect the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian territory, and to begin establishing limited economic relations with the West. The process of disengagement from tight Soviet control was largely unnoticed, however, until 1964, when Romania openly announced its changed position.

Despite the subtle shift in Romania's external policy during this period, the manner and form of Communist control internally remained repressive and essentially Stalinist until the early 1960's. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was a "Stalinist" in nearly every sense of the word, except that he did not have Ana Pauker's faith in Soviet models. Gheorghiu-Dej conformed to Khrushchev's dictates to "de-Stalinize" only to the extent necessary for appearance's sake. By the early 1960's, however, the party had begun to seek a broader consensus of popular support—in many ways a corollary and a result of its gradual move toward independence. In April 1962 the party made several liberalizing changes in its requirements for membership, with the result that party membership increased dramatically in the next several years. Concurrently, the formerly rigid internal security controls were relaxed in several ways, and the arbitrary use of police power was increasingly curbed. The single most dramatic evidence of the party's newfound confidence in itself and its support from the people came in 1964 with the amnesty and release of some 11,000 political prisoners.

In 1965, Nicolae Ceausescu (Figure 56) became party chief upon the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. Although Ceausescu maintains the trappings of collective leadership, he has consolidated his preeminent position in the leadership with consummate skill and speed. Of the ruling quadrumvirate—Ceausescu, Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Chivu Stoica, and Gheorghe Apostol—which emerged following Gheorghiu-Dej's death, only Ceausescu and Maurer (Figure 57) remain. Most of the other senior party men, all holdovers from the Gheorghiu-Dej era, have been demoted and pushed aside in favor of younger pragmatists handpicked by Ceausescu and considered loyal to him.

With some innovations, Ceausescu has continued the basic policies of Gheorghiu-Dej's later years of rule, but Ceausescu has made a clean break with the Gheorghiu-Dej regime per se, and particularly the most repressive Stalinist aspects of the Gheorghiu-Dej era. At a party plenum in March 1968 he went so far as to denounce the misdeeds of his predecessor and to rehabilitate some victims of the trials in the 1950's conducted under orders from Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu has exerted his personal influence in other ways, revamping the party's structure to fit his own concept of its leading role in society and reorganizing the state structure to keep it firmly under the control of the party. He has continued to defend Romania's independent foreign policy position even in the face of overt threats from the Soviet Union.

2. Party organization

The Romanian Communist Party (RCP) adopted revised party statutes in 1965, at about the same time the state adopted a new constitution for the country. Together, the two documents represent a milestone in Romania's development as a socialist state. The basic rules for the organization, functions, and membership of the party, setting out the task of guiding the country on a new nationalist course in the future, were adopted in July 1965 by the Ninth Party Congress, and have since been amended at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1969.

The latest version of the statutes does not in any way dilute the emphasis on Romania's national interests as distinct from those of the Soviet Union. The preamble states that the party "bases all its activity on Marxist-Leninist learning, applied creatively to the conditions and specific peculiarities of our country." This formulation is the theoretical core of the Romanian party's rejection of a Soviet-led monolithic bloc of socialist countries. Since 1965 the statutes have omitted all reference to the Soviet October Revolution—a dramatic break with the past practice of adulation of Soviet party heroics. The statutes are now replete with references to "patriotism" and "love of fatherland," and the most recent version contains a nationalistic clause specifying that the Romanian

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FIGURE 56. Nicolae Ceausescu, party chief since 1965, addressing the Tenth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in August 1969 (U/OU)

FIGURE 57. Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer presenting report to Tenth Party Congress, August 1969 (U/OU)

party's relations with other Communist parties are to be based on equal rights, noninterference, and the right of each party to decide its own political line. This provision clearly reflects intensified Romanian fears vis-a-vis the Soviets following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In contrast to other East European Communist Party statutes, the Romanian party statutes specifically charge that the Romanian Army is to be educated for "defending revolutionary victories, the nation's borders, independence, national sovereignty, and peace." The title of the party chief, rather than First Secretary, is Secretary General, a title shared only by the heads of the Yugoslav and Soviet parties, thus implicitly putting him on their level. Like the Yugoslav and later the Hungarian parties, the Romanian Communist Party has eliminated the status of candidate party membership, primarily to facilitate the expansion of the party's total membership.

The 1965 Party Congress made another change important in a symbolic or theoretical sense—the change in the party's official name, from Romanian Workers Party to Romanian Communist Party. The new name helped serve notice that the party considered the Romanian society and economy to have reached "the stage of the completion of socialist construction" on the path to the final goal of a pure Communist society. (Only two other East European Communist parties have claimed to reach this stage of development: Czechoslovakia in 1960 and Yugoslavia in 1963.) In conformity with this change, the constitution at the same time termed Romania a "Socialist Republic" rather than a "People's Republic," as it had been from 30 December 1947 to July 1965. These changes were designed partly to raise the prestige of the Romanian party in Communist circles since a socialist republic is ideologically a more advanced stage on the road to "pure" communism than is a people's republic, and to reiterate the country's commitment to communism.

The party directives adopted at the National Party Conference in 1967 forecast important changes in the structure and workings of the party, obviously in accord with Ceausescu's vision of how the party should operate and what it should accomplish. He proposed a fusion of the party and state leadership at certain levels and a more specific delineation of functions and duties between state and party organs at the highest levels. Thus, at his suggestion, the positions of county party first secretary and chairman of the county people's council are now held by the same individual. At the same time, Ceausescu proposed the fusion of leadership at the highest level, so that a single comrade would handle the same sphere in both the party and the state. He proposed in effect changing the functions of the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and to some extent the party Secretariat and the Central Committee to delineate more carefully than in the past their respective areas of responsibility. Some of these changes have been carried through as shall be noted later, but Ceausescu has seemed to backtrack on others.

The party continues to hold as an important goal the establishment of "close bonds with the masses," and both the 1965 and the 1969 versions of the party statutes made some concessions in this direction. In 1965 party seniority was granted to former "revolutionary" elements such as ex-Social Democrats and certain other "socialists," an estimated 13,000 of whom are now party members. All individuals who participated in the antigovernment strikes during the 1930's as well as a number of moderate leftist elements also were included

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in this group. The latest party statutes provide that lower level party conferences make nominations for election to the Central Committee, which on paper at least is more directly representational than before. Moreover, the Romanian Communist Party Congress-at-large, rather than the Central Committee, now elects the Secretary General, according to a new statute agreed to at the last congress. Provisions are also made for appeal and review of decisions to the next highest party body, and RCP organs at all levels are required to inform and consult their party *aktivs* on policy questions, to insure every party member's participation.

Despite these and other improvements, however, the Romanian party continues to operate under the principles of "internal democracy" and "democratic centralism." Members of the party governing organs are elected by secret ballot. Their decisions technically represent the will of the majority, and the minority accepts and submits to these decisions. The decisions of the higher organs are always binding on the lower, and the general party membership and the lower level party bodies merely ratify the decisions already reached by the top leadership. In theory, the membership has the right to select the leadership, but in practice the top party organs are self-perpetuating and co-opt new members when they deem it necessary. This system necessarily produces a small elite corps of policymakers at the top. Since Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's death, the leadership has professed to abide by the principle of "collective leadership," and the November 1969 Grand National Assembly session enacted a law to this effect. The 1965 party statutes stipulated that "a party member may hold only a single post of political leadership that demands permanent activity whether in party or state organs." This provision has been deleted from the latest party statutes, however; Ceausescu found it useful in consolidating his power but now finds it expedient to use multiple offices for his closest supporters. He himself assumed the office of head of state in December 1967 without relinquishing his leadership of the party.

Since the party is organized along the lines of the country's territorial and administrative subdivisions, the 1969 party statutes brought the party's structure in line with the administrative divisions adopted by the government in 1968. Thus regional, city, and district bodies have been replaced by *judeţul* (county), municipal, town, and communal units—all organized similarly and subordinated to the central apparatus in Bucharest. At the base of the party pyramid is the individual party cell or basic party organization, to be found in all factories, industrial enterprises, schools and other institutions, farms, and government offices. Within the hierarchical structure, the representative bodies proceed from the general meeting of the basic party cell, through communal, town, municipality, and county party conferences, the reintroduced National Party Conference, to the Party Congress at the top. The latest National Party Conference was held in December 1967.

As in all Communist parties, none of these representative bodies provides an effective or genuine mechanism for succession to the top party position. Although succession is theoretically assured by secret ballots, in practice it is accomplished through interaction between relative power groupings in the top echelons of the party.

a. NATIONAL LEVEL

(1) *Party Congress*—At the apex of the Romanian party is the Party Congress, described by the party statutes as the supreme organ of the party. Since coming to power the RCP has convened four Party Congresses, but in line with its recent emphasis on the historical continuity of the party, the party has renumbered them beginning with the first in 1921. Thus, the First Party Congress of 1948 has become the Sixth; the oft-postponed Second Party Congress of December 1955 is designated the Seventh; the Third Party Congress of June 1960 has become the Eighth; and the Fourth Party Congress of July 1965 was designated the Ninth. Until the Tenth Party Congress, held in August 1969, the statutes had required that a Party Congress meet at least every 4 years, but the Tenth Party Congress ordered that they be held every 5 years to coincide with the 5-year plans. As can be seen from the dates of recent congresses, this had become actual practice. The mass meeting held in Palace Square at the close of the Tenth Party Congress is shown in Figure 58.

As a collective body, the congress hears and approves reports of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, adopts and amends the bylaws (statutes) of the party, and affirms the party line on basic questions of current policy. It also elects the members of the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, and, since the last congress, also elects the Secretary General. In practice, however, the composition of these bodies is established among the top leaders before the Party Congress convenes. Thus, the Party Congress has the principal role of endorsing policy already formulated by the Central Committee and the other three main party organs.

Delegates to a congress are usually elected by county party conferences approximately 2 months before its convocation. These elections have always been strictly *pro forma*, controlled from the central party apparatus in consultation with local party leaders. Prior to the latest congress Ceausescu introduced an innovation in the election procedure by which the National Party Conference not only elected delegates to the congress but proposed slates of nominees for the Central Committee.

(2) *Central Committee*—Although the congress is nominally the supreme party organ, it is the Central Committee which carries out party work between sessions. The party statutes state that the Central Committee represents the party in its relations with other Communist parties, organizations, and institutions; administers the cash funds and material goods of the party; leads the central party press organs and other central party establishments; guards the unity and purity of the party ranks; and "insures the implementation of the leading role of the party in all fields of activity." These duties are carried out by various permanent administrative

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

FIGURE 58. Mass meeting in Palace Square at the close of the Tenth Party Congress, August 1969 (U/OU)

directorates and sections nominally under the Central Committee, which were somewhat consolidated and reduced in number in February 1967.

The remaining components cover propaganda, culture, science, economics, industry, party organization, women's rights, political orientation of troops, relations with foreign Communist parties, and other fields.

Central Committee plenums normally are held three or four times a year, with one meeting usually at the end of the year to discuss plans for the state budget for the coming year. Another plenum is customarily scheduled in the summer to review party work and political and economic conditions in the country. The party statutes stipulate that a plenum must be held at least every 4 months.

Like the Party Congress, the Central Committee does not have decisive power, although some Central Committee members exercise considerable political power and influence. Almost all full and alternate members of the Central Committee occupy important posts in the party, the government, or mass organizations. Of the 42 government ministerial-level positions extant in late 1969, 38 were occupied by Central Committee members. This arrangement is specifically intended to reinforce party control over Romanian life.

The size of the Central Committee is not established by the party statutes, but fluctuates according to the dictates of the party executives and of the Secretary General. In the last two elections it has substantially increased in numbers, primarily as a reflection of increases in total membership of the Romanian party. In 1955, full and candidate members totaled only 96, but by August 1965 this number had been increased by another 100 members. In August 1969 the Central Committee again was enlarged to 165 full and 120 alternate members—an increase proportionately larger than the increase in total party membership over the same time frame. It is, however, in line with the party's emphasis on enhanced participation in party life, and the leadership may be planning a corresponding increase in the size of the party before 1974, when the mandate of the present Central Committee will expire and a new one will be elected.

The Tenth Party Congress in 1969 elected the 285 members of the new Central Committee according to an innovation made at Ceausescu's behest. The county party conferences, in addition to selecting the delegates to the party congress, also were instructed to propose candidates for the Central Committee, a function previously exercised solely by the congress. The congress then made its selections from a total of 360 nominations made up from those proposed by the county conferences plus additional nominations by the congress. The central leadership has always closely controlled elections within the congress; reportedly, under the new system, it exerted its influence directly at the county level. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the regime went over the lists submitted to the congress by the conferences, carefully culling those which did not suit its purposes. Nevertheless, this new procedure has the advantage of appearing more democratic—"broadening internal party democracy," as Ceausescu put it—and at the same time allowing him a more thorough control at the grassroots level.

The composition of the new Central Committee exhibits both the strengthening of Ceausescu's power and control, and the broadening of the party's "mandate" to rule. All county party first secretaries now sit on the Central Committee, and the number of ministerial-level personnel and intellectuals is striking. The body as a whole is a younger and better educated group of party activists than was its predecessor. Many of the new members elected owe their other positions within the party and state apparatus to appointment by Ceausescu. From the old congress 94 members were reelected, of whom 50 are holdovers from 1960. This older contingent is probably expected to bring a measure of balance to

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the Central Committee and to imbue it with a sense of continuity, dignity, and moderated conservatism. The more powerful of the old guard, however, such as Apostol, Borila, Chivu Stoica, Draghici, and Joja, lost their positions on the Central Committee as a logical consequence of their fall from higher positions in the party leadership.

A rough analysis of the occupational status of members of the new Central Committee reveals some interesting differences from the previous committee. All 39 party county first secretaries are now Central Committee members. Still, the number of those primarily concerned in party affairs appears to have declined, from about 45% in 1965 to slightly more than 40% in 1969, while state personnel have also decreased from almost 33% in 1965 to a little over 25%. The distinction between party and state functionaries is of course in many cases an artificial one, since so often party leaders hold high-level positions in the state, and vice versa. Nevertheless, it appears that the decline in these two categories has been made up by more representatives of scientific and cultural institutions, industrial enterprises, and agricultural work. Proportionally speaking, the representation of the military and those working with youth has remained about the same.

The Romanians, as might be expected in view of their nationalities policy, have said nothing concerning the ethnic backgrounds of members of the present Central Committee. In the 1955 and 1965 committees the proportion of ethnic Romanians was lower than in the party or the population as a whole, where it is approximately 87%. This probably still holds true, although there are no statistics available to substantiate this assumption. The proportion of Jews in the leadership as a whole decreased substantially in the 1960's, and presumably this still applies to the Central Committee as well, as the Jewish population continues to decline.

(3) *Central Auditing Commission*—This body has the task of checking on the implementation of the party's budget and the management of the material goods of the party. It is separate from the Central Committee but is charged with assisting its plenary sessions; members of the Central Auditing Commission cannot at the same time be elected members of the party Central Committee. Following election of new members at the Tenth Party Congress, the commission stands at 43 members, nearly double the size of the previous commission.

(4) *Elite top-level organs*—Power in the Romanian Communist Party is not wielded directly from the larger party organs but in the three smaller elite bodies. The Secretariat, the Permanent Presidium, and the Executive Committee perform executive, administrative, and general policymaking functions when the Central Committee is not in session—which is, of course, most of the time. Together, the interlocking memberships of these organs form the collective leadership of the Romanian party. However, this collective leadership is very much dominated by one man, Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu.

Until the Ninth Party Congress in July 1965 the top party structure conformed to what is generally regarded as conventional Leninist organization, i.e., a Secretariat and a Political Bureau (Politburo). At the Ninth Party Congress the old 13-man Politburo was dissolved, and in its place two new bodies were created, the Permanent Presidium and the Executive Committee. As set up at that time the Presidium comprised seven members, while the Executive Committee contained 25 full and alternate members. According to Article 22 of the new party statutes, these two bodies and the Secretariat are formally elected by and responsible to the Central Committee. Article 22 also briefly defines their functions. The Executive Committee forms policy on government as well as party problems. The smaller Permanent Presidium is the core of the country's top leadership and handles day-to-day problems. Members of the Secretariat organize and supervise the implementation of party decisions and oversee the selection of party cadres. It should be emphasized that the functions of these three bodies are probably not as distinct as they might appear on paper and that there is a good deal of overlap among them. The Executive Committee at its inception was primarily a political tool and has since evolved in new directions from its original purpose.

The creation of these two new organs apparently caught many at the 1965 congress by surprise. This indicated to some political observers that the shuffle may have resulted from a last-minute political struggle and compromise behind the scenes. Ceausescu, who had just taken over the leadership of the party following the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March, reportedly met opposition from other party leaders when he tried to pack the Politburo with his own close supporters. In the new arrangement, the "old guardists" still dominated the Permanent Presidium and the Executive Committee, but included in the latter body were newcomers to the top leadership, most of them close supporters of the Secretary General. Subsequent developments seemed to show that, although Ceausescu faced no real opposition in the top leadership on fundamental policy matters, he was determined to replace the holdovers from the Gheorghiu-Dej coterie with younger men of his own choice.

In 1965 the only other party man besides Ceausescu who held a place on all three elite bodies was Alexandru Draghici, who had been in charge of internal security affairs under Gheorghiu-Dej and thus heavily implicated in the Stalinist trials of the 1950's. It was on this count that Ceausescu finally moved against Draghici in April 1968. At a party plenum Ceausescu openly denigrated the misdeeds of his predecessor Gheorghiu-Dej, and rehabilitated prominent victims of the Stalinist excesses of the Gheorghiu-Dej era—notably Lucretiu Patrascanu. One of the most prominent nationalist Communist leaders of the prewar and early postwar period, Patrascanu had made the mistake of cooperating with leftist "bourgeois" parties prior to the arrival of Soviet troops at the end of the war. Purged and arrested in 1948, he was finally brought to trial by Gheorghiu-Dej on trumped-up charges and executed in April 1954. Draghici was denounced at the 1968 plenum for his part in this and other trials and ousted from his party and state positions. By this action Ceausescu and his supporters also implicitly condemned others within his collective leadership who had been deeply involved in the persecutions of the Stalinist era.

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By the time of the Tenth Party Congress Ceausescu had already maneuvered several of the leading "old guardists" into less important posts, and he had gained enough political support from younger men to prevent the reelection to the Secretariat, Executive Committee, and Permanent Presidium of the most powerful of the remaining leaders from the Gheorghiu-Dej era. Only Emil Bodnaras, a former military man and now a trusted troubleshooter on relations with Communist countries; Leonte Rautu, a formerly prominent party ideologue; and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the Premier, remain in the party leadership. Ceausescu obviously finds these experienced men useful and none appears to represent a threat to his power. Thus the Secretary General has swiftly completed almost total break with the former regime and has filled in its place an impressive new leadership of young, able, and loyal supporters. Although many of his handpicked followers have economic and technical expertise, Ceausescu has avoided overdependence on technocrats in favor of party stalwarts.

The Permanent Presidium elected at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1969 consisted of nine members. One, Dumitru Petrescu, died in the next month and has not been replaced. This body, probably the most important of the three, has been described by Ceausescu himself as designed to provide a "statutory" basis for taking care of "daily problems which prolonged practice proved must be analyzed and solved by a restricted collective" without resort to "decisions made by one single person." Little information has come to light on the actual functioning of the Permanent Presidium, but, judging from its membership and Ceausescu's remarks about it, it is within this body that basic questions of general policy are answered and day-to-day crises are resolved. It is, in other words, the power center of the party and the government.

All of the members of the Permanent Presidium also sit on the Executive Committee, which is considerably larger than either of the other two elite bodies. Following the party's March 1970 plenum it stands at 21 full and 12 alternate members, including many younger proteges of the Secretary General and also the few Gheorghiu-Dej holdovers still in the leadership. Ceausescu looks to this body for support when controversial questions are considered in the Permanent Presidium. The Executive Committee is also an instrument for injecting new blood into the leadership.

The Secretariat has traditionally been and seemingly still is the executive arm of the party leadership. Its seven members all have the stamp of carefully selected Ceausescu confidants. Each is, judging by his background, responsible for a specific area which when taken together cover all phases of the political and socioeconomic life of the country; included is a secretary of Hungarian extraction who obviously acts as a link with the minorities. Several of the secretaries—including Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Gheorghe Pana, and Virgil Trofin—have risen to top party positions only in the last several years.

The Secretariat directs the chain of secretariats (the secretarial axis) which traverse the party pyramid from its summit to its base. The effectiveness of centralized party and state rule in Romania depends to a large extent upon the efficacy with which these secretariats transmit instructions and directives through each level of party and governmental organization—including instructions for the selection of delegates and legislators to conferences and congresses of the party. Each secretariat is subordinated to the secretariat above and is bound under the principle of "democratic centralism" to execute all superior directives without question, promptly and correctly.

At some level in their normal routine the three top bodies must mesh gears, but the procedure is not fully understood. It is not known, for instance, how the decisions of the Presidium and the Executive Committee are passed to the Secretariat for implementation, but probably it is accomplished rather informally. As can be seen in Figure 52, three party secretaries besides Ceausescu also sit on the Permanent Presidium and the Executive Committee. Thus all three bodies interlock through several crucial individuals, providing the unity of leadership which Ceausescu values so highly. Apparently he does make an effort to obtain the views of others in the leadership, and he also stresses individual accountability for decisions made. In this sense his leadership is indeed "collective," as it is so highly touted. Nevertheless, Ceausescu is the indisputable chief and the ultimate authority.

The 1965 congress also established another new top-level party organ—the Central Collegium. According to Article 25 of the new statutes, "the Central Committee organizes the Central Collegium." The collegium replaces the Party Control Commission, which played a key role particularly during the 1952 and 1957 purges. Unlike the Control Commission, the collegium cannot call to account those who have infringed the party rules, since the Central Committee is now responsible for the "unity and purity of the party." The collegium probably has only investigative functions.

b. Local level—The party administrative apparatus at the lower level is modeled after that of the Central Committee. Changes made in the party statutes at the Tenth Party Congress brought the local party organization in line with the new territorial administration set up in 1968, and also provided for longer terms in office for lower party bodies, in line with the longer interval between party congresses (5 instead of 4 years). Thus, county conferences, which correspond to congresses at the national level, will be held every 4 years, whereas formerly regional conferences met every 2 years and district conferences met annually. Under the new statutes, lower party organizations (i.e., municipal, town, and commune organizations) will hold such conferences and elect bureaus and committees every 2 years rather than every year, as was the case in the past. At both county and lower party levels special meetings may be convoked by a third of the membership or by the party committee at the next higher echelon.

All party bodies—including lower level organizations—are obliged by a new provision of the party statutes to "systematically" inform the party *aktivs* about internal and foreign policies of the party and important decisions adopted at a higher level and to submit for discussion

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important proposed economic and sociocultural measures before their adoption. Moreover, an individual who disagrees with adopted party policy may now appeal his objections to the immediately higher body, which has the obligation to examine the case promptly. In the meantime, however, the individual is compelled to abide by the decision in question. Despite these efforts to "democratize" the work of the party, the emphasis remains clearly focused on party discipline. "Taking a stand outside organized party channels against a decision which has been adopted," the new party statutes state, "constitutes a grave infringement of party rules and discipline."

Party conferences at each level elect delegates to the next highest conference in the party hierarchy: lower party conferences elect county conference delegates, which in turn elect delegates to the National Party Conference. County conferences now also propose lists of candidates from which the national level conference elects delegates to the Party Congress. Probably because of this novel procedure, the new party statutes specifically enumerate the requirements for election to leading offices, stressing the obligation to observe state laws and the individual officeholder's responsibility both for his own activity and for that of the collective work of the body to which he belongs. The measure parallels similar provisions for collective responsibility within higher state organs. Another new provision gives party organizations (apparently at all levels) the right to discuss the qualifications of prospective candidates for office before selecting delegates, thereby assuring the local party *aktivs* of some voice in the process.

County, city, and commune party committees are charged with assuring fulfillment of party directives. Under an additional clause in the new party statutes, they are responsible for controlling and guiding the state economic offices concerned with fulfillment of the state economic plan, a significant increase in authority at the lower level. These committees have a hand in injecting party policy into education, expenditures, personnel, economic, military, and sociological affairs within their boundaries. To carry out these broad duties the county organizations of course remain in constant touch with the Central Committee through the county party secretaries, all of whom are members of the present committee. Each county committee, like the Central Committee, has an executive arm consisting of a bureau and secretariat, which are required to report back to committee plenums on work accomplished. The county bureau is normally composed of 11 persons, and the secretariat usually of three persons. In order to be elected county secretary, a party member must have been in the party at least 5 years, and his election must be confirmed by the Central Committee. Of the 39 county first secretaries elected in early 1968 following the territorial reorganization, 13 had been regional first secretaries under the old system. These 39 county first secretaries are automatically chairmen of county people's councils. County committees also have party collegiums, presumably control and investigative bodies similar to the collegium of the Central Committee.

Municipal, town, and commune party committees supervise the activities of basic party organizations in factories and villages and on state and collective farms. They watch over party morale, keep track of membership, supervise education and fulfillment of party directives, and assign personnel. Committees are required to meet regularly and frequently and to report to the *aktiv* annually; each has a bureau to carry out executive functions, made up of seven to nine persons. Local party committees have secretaries but no formal secretariat. Secretaries must have been party members for at least 3 years. The first secretary is confirmed by the Central Committee.

Every party member is required to be a member of a basic party organization, found in schools, industry, agriculture, the armed forces, and in the state apparatus. The size of the basic organ or party cell varies from three to 300 members, with the larger organizations divided into sections. The general assembly of the basic organization elects its bureau every 2 years. When the membership is less than 10, a secretary and alternate secretary serve in lieu of a bureau. Individual party cells act as mobilizing factors in plan fulfillment, recruitment of members, and education of the youth. It is one of the most important links in the party chain since it works directly with individuals.

The party *aktivs*, elite groups which are most energetic in promoting party affairs, and individual members known as activists, are scattered throughout the country. Temporary *aktivs* may also be formed when a particularly intensive drive requires more than normal exertion of pressure on the entire population or a segment of it. Such a situation existed immediately following the Romanian leadership's denunciation of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Meetings were held throughout the country to whip up support for Bucharest's position. There are also nonparty *aktivs* at the local level called for by resolution of the Central Committee in 1950. Members of these nonparty *aktivs*, regarded as potential party members, attend open party meetings in order to discuss and to learn party work.

c. PARTY MEMBERSHIP—Romanian party membership has expanded rapidly in recent years; nearly half a million members were added during the interim between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses. The party claimed a total membership of 1,999,720 as of 1 March 1970, an increase of 139,600 over the membership on 31 December 1968. The party's membership thus comprises almost 10% of the total population. A March 1970 party plenum announced that the ethnic composition of the party membership (which roughly parallels the breakdown of the population as a whole) is: 88.81% Romanian, 8.41% Hungarian, and 1.25% German; Serb and other mixed nationalities make up the remainder. Figure 59 shows party membership trends since 1944.

The sharp increase in party membership primarily reflects liberalization of membership requirements and a persistent effort by the party leadership to broaden its base of support. In 1965 the party abolished the probationary period (candidate membership) for party membership, an unprecedented step in Eastern Europe (except in Yugoslavia). However, under the amended party statutes adopted in 1969, young people up to the age of 26 (previously age 20) must be members

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

FIGURE 59. Party membership trends (U/OU)

of the Communist youth organization to join the RCP—in effect a kind of probation. Young professionals and white-collar workers have nevertheless found admission to the party ranks considerably easier, giving the party new sources of fresh ideas, energy, and strong political support. This also enhances the party's control over this segment of the population.

These changes appear to have been at least partly responsible for variations in the composition of the party over the last several years. Between June 1960 and January 1966 the number of workers in the party declined significantly, from 51% to 39.6%; since 1966, however, their number has slowly increased. At the Tenth Party Congress it was stated that 43% of party members were workers; the same percentage was announced at the March 1970 plenum. This increase is probably partly accounted for by a corresponding decrease in the number of peasants—some of whom no doubt entered the working class when they migrated from the countryside to urban areas seeking better paying jobs. Thus party statistics in 1965 showed 34% were peasants, declining to 28% in August 1969 and to 26.5% in March 1970. By contrast, 93,000 party members in June 1960 were classed as intellectuals (educators, scientists, office workers); this figure rose to 330,000 in early 1966 (representing 22% of party membership), and to over 423,000 in August 1969 (or 23%). In average age the Romanian party is one of the youngest in Eastern Europe, with 24% of party members 30 years of age or under and 36% between 31 and 40 years old. A provision of the latest party statutes makes it difficult for retired workers to remain in the party. This is aimed at keeping down the average age of party members.

Theoretically, RCP membership is open to any working Romanian citizen "irrespective of nationality." The party has removed many onerous restrictions on joining, such as the "report on relations," essentially a party security check on the prospective member's nearest relatives. Entrance to the party is now less difficult, but all applicants are still carefully screened, both on political and moral counts. The procedure for becoming a party member reportedly involves three stages. First the prospective member fills out a simple one-sheet application form. He then returns it, along with a handwritten autobiography and recommendations from two established party members, to the secretary of the basic party cell in his place of work or residence. The cell party secretary and its bureau examine the application and report on it to the general meeting of the cell, attended by a delegate from a higher party committee. At this meeting the party members discuss the application and may question the applicant on his background. If at least a simple majority vote to approve the application, it is sent to the bureau of the next highest party committee, usually the town or municipal committee.

During this last stage the town or municipal bureau reviews the approved application and calls the applicant before a plenary session, where its members examine him orally on his knowledge of the party statutes and resolutions, and on his loyalty to the party's general political line. According to one source most new members pass this examination, but many are rejected. If his membership is confirmed he receives his membership card from his own party cell. The membership card is regarded as extremely important, and its loss is held as a serious offense; in order to keep a constant check on these cards, party secretaries require members to show their cards at monthly meetings of the basic cell and when members pay their dues.

Party dues are calculated on the basis of a percentage of monthly income and are paid through the basic party organization, according to the following progressive scale:

Monthly income	Percent of income
1,000 lei or less	0.5
1,001–2,000 lei	1.0
2,001–3,000 lei	2.0
3,001 lei and over	3.0

Except for the above information, which is contained in the 1969 party statutes, there is little reliable information available concerning the finances or financial structure of the RCP. However, the statutes provide that the party receive income from such party enterprises as publishing houses, newspapers, and theatrical entertainments.

3. Front and mass organizations

In addition to the Romanian Communist Party, some 50 mass organizations involve many segments of the

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population in various kinds of political socioeconomic, and cultural activity. Through these groups the party channels instructions and Communist indoctrination to non-RCP citizens, compartmentalizes any possible expressions of dissatisfaction, and stages mass demonstrations. Many of the organizations' leaderships interlock among themselves and with the party Central Committee. The organizations exist in conformity with a provision of the constitution which assures citizens the right to associate in trade unions and cooperative unions. Most of the organizations follow the basic structure of the party—a central committee or national council and a territorial structure.

Until the autumn of 1968 these organizations were loosely confederated under the People's Democratic Front (FDP), which was usually dormant except during the few months prior to quadrennial national elections. In October following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, the party leadership called for the dissolution of the FDP and the creation in its stead of a new organization symbolizing the country's unity behind the Romanian Communist Party in the face of a serious threat to national survival from the Soviet Union. This new superstructure, called the Front of Socialist Unity (FUS), was duly set up in November, consisting of the Romanian Communist Party and all the principal mass and civic organizations. Included among the latter were the new Councils for Coinhabiting Nationalities, proposed and established at the same time. During the process of organizing the apparatus of the new front, party leaders made it clear that they would dominate the new organization, and that the main purpose of the front was to attract increased support from the intellectuals and from the minorities.

A national council of the FUS was formed on 19 November 1968, and by "unanimous" vote Ceausescu was elected president of its executive bureau. In his speech to the council, Ceausescu expounded further on the importance of the party's leading role within the FUS and indicated that in the future the FUS would establish ties with a "series of movements and similar organizations in socialist countries as well as in other countries . . ." This function would seem to give the FUS a charter for more action and considerably more prestige than the old, largely inactive FDP. Following the formation of the national council, meetings were held throughout the country to found county councils, which followed the pattern of the people's councils in electing county Romanian Communist Party secretaries as their presidents. At the March 1970 FUS plenum, however, Ceausescu criticized the organization for having done "very little to determine how it can contribute to achieving regime programs."

One of the most important mass organizations in Romania is the Union of Communist Youth (UTC), which until August 1965 was called the Union of Working Youth. The alteration in the organization's name was made concurrently with changes in the name of its parent party and in the official name of the country. With a claimed membership of 2.3 million in August 1969, the UTC is larger than the Romanian Communist Party, although the former has not experienced the rapid growth in numbers as the latter; since March 1966 the UTC has made a net gain of only some 50,000 members, which may be partially accounted for by the siphoning off of great numbers entering the parent party. The chief propaganda organ of the UTC is *Scinteia Tineretului* (The Spark of Youth).

The importance of the UTC lies not only in its status as the probative branch of the Romanian Communist Party but also in the persistent emphasis which the Ceausescu regime places on the development of "moral qualities" in Romanian youth. The head of the UTC, for example, has been granted a ministerial level position in the government, and he now sits on the Council of Ministers. Patterned in most respects after the Komsomol in the U.S.S.R., the UTC mobilizes young people throughout the country to support party policies and objectives and sponsors delegations to world youth festivals. Most significantly, it has always been the core of future party membership, and this is particularly true now that membership in the UTC is mandatory for any young person up to the age of 26 wishing to enter the RCP.

Until early 1966 the Pioneers (ages 9-14—the Communists' answer to the Boy and Girl Scouts) were subordinate to the Union of Communist Youth. With a view to improving the ideological education of the new generation, the party transferred the Pioneers directly under its own control in March 1966, and also set up the National Council of the Organization of Pioneers, with corresponding territorial organizational units, now at the county and local level. No recent statistics are available on the total number of the Pioneers, but in 1966 approximately 70% of all children in the age 9-14 bracket were members of the Pioneers.

Aside from the youth organizations, the trade union organizations representing workers, technicians, engineers, and clerical personnel figure most importantly in the party's control of the Romanian people, particularly nonparty citizens. The trade unions are all grouped under the General Union of Trade Unions (GUTU), the largest single mass organization in the country, with a membership exceeding 5 million. The chairman of this trade union umbrella organization, like the first secretary of the UTC, also has ministerial status and sits on the Council of Ministers. The trade unions have another link with management at the national level through the Ministry of Labor, created in 1967.

4. Electoral procedures

Romania has had no elections with genuine opposition parties since 1946. All elections are preceded by a 2-month campaign glorifying socialism in terms of the theme that the elections express the people's will. The Front for Socialist Unity (FUS)—formerly the People's Democratic Front—prepares the only slate of candidates presented to the electorate. The legal voting age is 18, and the government makes much of the fact that the franchise has been extended to all irrespective of sex, nationality, race, religion, literacy level, or profession.

During the 1950's the Communist regime gradually restored the vote to so-called class enemies—various categories of people who had been disenfranchised immediately

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after the Communist takeover in 1948. Laws passed in 1948 enumerated 11 categories of persons ineligible to vote. A revised law of 1952 still excluded, both as voters and candidates, persons condemned for war crimes or "crimes against peace and humanity," industrialists, bankers, wholesalers, kulaks, employers, and former landlords. Since 1956 the only disenfranchised groups have been the insane and those deprived of their franchise by court action.

Elections for deputies to the Grand National Assembly and local people's councils are scheduled to occur every 4 years; those for commune councils are held every 2 years. The laws do not fix specific dates in advance, however, and terms of office can be loosely interpreted. By-elections also are held in off years to fill vacancies in the assembly and the people's councils.

The Council of State fixes the dates of all elections and delimits 465 equally populated districts as a territorial basis for candidates to the Grand National Assembly. The Council of State also appoints a Central Electoral Commission to supervise procedures and to verify election results. The chairman is customarily a high-ranking party member; in the 1969 elections it was the Chairman of the Constitution Commission of the Grand National Assembly. The remainder of the electoral commission is normally made up of leaders of party and mass organizations, leading intellectuals, workers, women, and collective farm chairmen. Electoral commissions are established for each electoral district.

National election results for Romania during the Communist era are shown in Figure 60. Although the entire election procedure has little meaning in the Western sense, since the degree of participation and the outcome are foregone conclusions, the regime actually extracts considerable propaganda value from national elections. The election campaign serves to "educate" a formerly largely rural citizenry never particularly concerned with politics in the past. The regime's mass campaign techniques, which include wide use of television, are designed to make every Romanian of voting age aware of the regime's achievements, of what the party stands for, and of his importance in appearing at the polls to show that the regime is "of and for the working class." Moreover, the constant reiteration of claims about the growing power of socialism, together with the regime's grip on all aspects of the election procedure, remind the public of the considerable odds against opposition and tend to silence most doubters. Finally, the elections provide a forum for developing a national consciousness.

In the latest national elections, held on 1 March 1969, 13,577,143 citizens—i.e., 99.96% of the total registered voters—elected the 465 candidates to the Grand National Assembly and 165,060 deputies to the county, municipal, town, and communal people's councils. Votes cast for the candidates of the Socialist Unity Front—the only candidates listed, of course—totaled 13,543,499, or 99.75% of the votes cast. Thus, only one-fourth of 1% of the voters opted to exercise their right to cross out the name of a candidate and write in another choice. The press announced after the election that six deputies for communal people's councils were declared not elected as they did not obtain a majority of the votes cast.

D. National policies (C)

Romania's established policy of independence within the world Communist movement formally dates back to 24 April 1964, when the party Central Committee published a resolution entitled "A Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movement." Under this somewhat forbidding title the Romanians revealed what was in effect their "declaration of independence" and an outright challenge to Moscow's authority over Romania and in the Communist world as a whole. It remains the touchstone on which Romanian leaders base all their important moves in domestic, foreign, and defense policies.

The most common explanation for Romania's defiance of the U.S.S.R. ascribes it to a conflict of economic interests. Romanian leaders were bitter, to be sure, over rapacious Soviet economic exploitation of Romania in the 1940's and 1950's and successfully opposed Khrushchev's "socialist division of labor" plan, but there is evidence that the roots of the problem go deeper, that differences with Moscow on economic matters were only part of a long-term effort to gain independence of action on a broad front. In any case, it is certain that Romanian leaders had begun quietly maneuvering to loosen the Soviet stranglehold long before they made public their intentions.

Politically, Romania's Communist regime was initially a creature of the Soviet postwar occupation, and though

FIGURE 60. RESULTS OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS (U/OU)

YEAR	REGISTERED VOTERS	PERSONS VOTING		VOTES FOR DEMOCRATIC FRONT (FRONT FOR SOCIALIST UNITY AFTER 1968)		DEPUTIES ELECTED
		Number	Percent of registered voters	Number	Percent of votes cast	
1946	6,709,428	5,709,391	*85.09*	4,766,630	*83.48*	414
1948	8,399,416	7,468,541	*88.91*	6,959,936	*93.19*	414
1952	10,574,475	10,448,721	*98.8*	10,353,469	*98.4*	423
1957	11,652,289	11,540,401	*99.04*	11,424,521	*99.09*	437
1961	12,444,977	12,417,800	*99.78*	12,388,786	*99.77*	465
1965	12,858,835	12,853,590	*99.96*	12,834,862	*99.85*	465
1969	13,582,576	13,577,143	*99.96*	13,543,499	*99.75*	465

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the Romanian Communist Party leaders shared in this creation, they were divided in their loyalties, some of them more deeply committed to Soviet than to Romanian interests. By necessity forced to live with Moscow-backed Communists in the dominant posts of the Romanian party, the "nativist" leadership harbored a deep sense of resentment and alienation against the Soviet Union. After the "nativists" had managed to expel the "Muscovites" from the leadership in the early 1950's, the "nativists" struck out on the beginnings of the tortuous course to independence.

The most important preconditions for their independent course were the dissolution of the joint Soviet-Romanian stock companies (SOVROMS) in 1954-56 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958. The next logical step was to lessen Romania's material dependence on the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1960, Romanian leaders proceeded rapidly to expand Romania's trade with Western Europe, and in the late 1960's they began extending their economic contacts even farther afield, into Latin America and the Afro-Asian countries. On the political front the Romanians have consistently exploited the differences among the members of the Communist bloc. The crack between Moscow and Peking which widened and deepened into an apparently irrevocable split in the early 1960's came as a windfall to Bucharest, affording ideal terrain for political maneuver against the weakened center of world communism. It was at this point that the popular conception of Romania as one of Moscow's most docile "satellites" disintegrated.

The 1964 declaration directly contravenes the Soviet conception of proletarian internationalism centered in Moscow. The declaration stated that the:

> . . . principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, noninterference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity, socialist internationalism . . . form the immutable law . . . of the entire world socialist system and the only basis of unity.

It applies to interstate as well as interparty relations. By this definition of the relations among Communists, Moscow becomes not the center of the world Communist movement but simply one among equals, with little control over the actions of other Communist states and parties.

Specifically, the Romanian position repudiated several pet schemes of the Soviets, such as economic integration within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). The declaration also condemned Moscow and Peking with equal force for carrying on public polemics and for dragging other parties into their quarrel. Implicit in this condemnation was Romania's disapproval of large Communist conferences, which the Romanians view as essentially instruments of Soviet coercion. The Romanians argued their case ostensibly from Marxist-Leninist premises, insisting that valid Communist ideology does not provide for "superior" or "subordinate" parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the other hand, insists that the Romanian party is pursuing a purely nationalistic, even chauvinistic, course.

Since the April 1964 declaration the Romanians have rarely missed a chance to dramatize their independent attitude to the Communist and non-Communist worlds alike. By 1967-68, the Romanians had begun to feel more confidence in themselves and in the feasibility of their policy, and they became particularly bold and assertive. In 1967 the Romanians broke ranks and became the first Warsaw Pact country other than the U.S.S.R. to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany; in the same year they refused to endorse the position of the Soviet Union, and their other allies, on the Middle East war. In February 1968 the Romanian delegation walked out of a meeting which was preparing for a Soviet-dominated international Communist conference, and in March the Romanians declined to join their Warsaw Pact allies in endorsing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (they have since ratified the treaty, with admitted reservations). When the Warsaw Pact armies led by the U.S.S.R. marched into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Romanians were not among them, and Ceausescu immediately denounced the action. A year later Bucharest added insult to injury by inviting to Romania the President of the United States. Until President Nixon's visit was announced, it had been reported that Secretary General Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders would visit Bucharest about the same time to sign the Romanian-Soviet friendship pact, which had been initialed in the spring of 1968. The Soviets had not yet come and the treaty was unsigned as of early 1970.

Despite this measured defiance of the wishes of its allies, Romania has sought every possible way of placating them on issues which do not involve matters vital to its independence. Thus Romanian party leaders consistently profess their loyalty to the idea of socialist unity and to Marxism-Leninism itself. Moreover, unlike the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs, the Romanians have never given their allies any reason to doubt the orthodoxy of party policy on internal matters; there is no argument about the Romanian party's firm control of Romanian society and the country's economy. Romania is no longer the total police state it was in the 1940's and 1950's, but the degree of control exercised by the party and security apparatus is still greater than in most other Eastern European Communist regimes. Since 1969 they have begun to initiate a slight decentralization in the economic system, but at the same time there is some evidence which suggests that this process has been accompanied by an increased role for the party in state affairs. The leadership may feel compelled to continue a hard-line policy, but these leaders are by nature pragmatic conservatives and in any event would not likely be in the forefront of a liberalizing movement.

1. Domestic

Romania has been one of the last of the Eastern European countries to abandon "Stalinism" in its internal affairs. Only with the establishment of the new independence in foreign policy has Romania made important policy changes in the direction of internal reform. This internal reform has not proceeded far enough, however, to alter

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the basic dictatorship, or the fact that political and personal freedoms are sharply limited in the Western sense, and that the economic order disregards individual rights.

While the direction and ultimate extent of domestic reforms cannot yet be determined, it appears that the evolution of cautious liberalization has picked up a certain momentum of its own. Following its renunciation of Russian support and domination—in itself a popular measure with the Romanian people—the regime was to some extent forced to look inward for a buttressing of its mandate to rule. The desires of the Romanian people, who in large part resented the harsh Communist rule, could no longer be totally ignored. Thus the regime began in the early 1960's a series of moves to enhance its appeal in the eyes of its own people as well as the non-Communist world. The Ceausescu leadership, in continuing this policy, has substantially shaken up the organization, functioning, and the personnel of the primary political control structures within the country. This extended process of manipulation has resulted partly from a simple power struggle, but essentially it appears to be a search for substitute controls in the absence of the totally arbitary and often brutal ways of the 1950's, which the leadership has renounced both personally and legally. Reforms are imposed from the top to blunt potential unrest from below, such as that which arose in past years in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In the process, the Romanian party has, if anything, increased its pervasive control, while the activities of the formerly all-powerful secret police have been somewhat curtailed.

This pattern of policy change appears with great clarity in the key domain of state security, which was reorganized in June and July 1967. In the decade of 1952-61, there had been a gradual but perceptible decline in the arbitrary use of police power as an instrument of governing, but it was not until 1962-64 that a significant relaxation of police controls began. During the first half of 1964 the government took a most important step toward assuring the population of its good intentions by releasing virtually all political prisoners, numbering over 11,000 persons. This step—followed in 1965 by a new constitution embracing increased civil rights for Romanian citizens, and adoption of more just penal and criminal procedure codes in 1969—implicitly communicated to the people that political arrests would be exercised more judiciously in the future. Moreover, since the prisoner release, most of the ex-prisoners have been socially and professionally rehabilitated, although many of the old and the infirm reportedly have had difficulty in finding means of support.

The relaxation of security policies has proceeded in a number of other ways, including a marked reduction in the visibility of the police. The system of forced domicile (exile) was largely abandoned in 1962-63, and the restrictions on internal travel were greatly reduced in 1963-64. The entry of foreign tourists into Romania was facilitated during 1964; initial steps were taken the same year toward lowering the bars to travel to the West though since then hard currency limitations and the regime's reaction to the embarrassing number of defections have acted as inhibiting factors. Overt surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel declined toward the end of 1964. The supremacy of civil authority over the secret police has been reaffirmed by the removal of Soviet agents from its membership and by the introduction of the obligation to use search warrants. In 1967-68 the omnipotence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was sharply curtailed when its intelligence and security elements were separated. Responsibility for security was passed to the newly organized Council of State Security under the Council of Ministers.

It is in economic planning that Romania remains most intransigently orthodox. Industrial administration still is tightly centralized and operates according to the classic Communist model. The economic reforms being pursued in other Eastern European countries, especially Yugoslavia and Hungary and briefly in Czechoslovakia, have found little response in Romania. Romania's industry, of course, is still relatively small in size and is in the early stages of industrialization, which permits the regime to operate a strictly centralized economy without many of the difficulties this causes for larger and more technically advanced Communist countries.

Romania's economy, moreover, has achieved the highest industrial growth rate in Europe over the past several years, which gives Romanian economic planners little impetus to change radically their system of planning and management. Nevertheless there are some indications that this extremely high growth rate is beginning to fall off, and planners are projecting a somewhat lower growth rate in coming years. They are also turning increasingly to modern analytical tools in formulating economic plans. They pay lipservice to improving the standard of living for all the people but still put priority on investment and accumulation of capital. Ceausescu has set the goal of achieving parity in industrialization with the most advanced countries. The draft directives on the 1971-75 plan call for gross industrial production to increase at an average annual rate of 8.5% to 9.5%. Gross capital investment from centralized state funds in 1971-75 is planned to be almost as great as in the preceding 10 years (i.e., to be significantly greater than in 1966-70). Ceausescu reiterated in a speech at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1969 that, as in the previous few years, Romania would cooperate with CEMA only to the extent that doing so coincides with Romania's national interests.

In his speech Ceausescu also emphasized the need to eliminate the excesses of bureaucracy and to simplify the administration. To further this goal the leadership set up industrial centrals—amalgamations of related industrial enterprises—and has been in the process of reorganizing the economic ministries. The regime has made clear its intention of cutting out deadwood in the management system and of involving its experts in the actual production process.

Unlike the case with industry, the use of a highly centralized economic system in Romanian agriculture has not been successful. Agricultural production has gone up, but not as much as planned, and production costs have steadily risen. Collectivization, with its deadening

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effect on individual incentives, and insufficient allocation of investment funds to the agricultural sector have been largely to blame. To encourage the peasant, in December 1965 the party proposed greater "democracy" within the cooperatives and called for increased material benefits. In a move running counter to liberalizing tendencies in other countries of Eastern Europe, the Romanian party had centralized the planning and direction of agriculture in a single body called the Higher Agricultural Council (HAC) in 1962. The council, however, did not have full authority to implement plans and did not last long. It was abolished in late 1969 and a Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was created, suggesting that agriculture would subsequently be treated in a manner similar to other sectors of the economy. In the spring of 1970 Ceausescu unveiled an ambitious program, including a much higher level of investments, aimed at bringing agriculture up to modern standards.

Romanian labor policies are generally consistent with those elsewhere in Communist Eastern Europe. The regime has regimented all labor in support of its economic programs by an overlapping system of party and government control of trade unions, by centralized planning for the utilization of manpower, and by regulations governing production quotas, absenteeism, and wages. The 1966 congress of the trade unions projected a larger role for unions in labor matters, including labor discipline, but the evidence since then does not indicate any real change in the traditional subservient role of the unions.

The regimes of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu have attempted to develop a policy of increased participation in national life for all national minorities. Party chief Ceausescu has made a particularly concerted effort to accelerate the achievement of this goal through the appointment of selected minority members, especially ethnic Hungarians, to high-level party and state positions. In addition, Ceausescu, accompanied by other high-level party-state leaders, has made frequent trips to minority areas in Romania where they have given numerous speeches emphasizing the unity, national cohesiveness, and equality of all Romanian citizens. Inasmuch as the animosities between members of most Romanian minority groups and ethnic Romanians have a historical basis, however, it will take considerable time for the effects of this approach to have a beneficial effect, if indeed it does. In the meantime, the regime has at least gained considerable popular support from ethnic Romanians through its independent foreign policy, especially as a result of the fear of invasion occasioned by the Warsaw Pact's armed intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The regime has given high priority in the last few years to the creation of an improved educational system, a goal which the people find especially appealing. The introduction of 4-year specialty lyceums (high schools concentrating on technological or educational training) underlined the regime's concern for developing the skills and talents needed to progress toward its goal of industrialization. The leadership has also set the wheels turning to introduce 10-year compulsory schooling into the lower educational system, which previously required only 8 years. The entire educational system, including the universities, stresses ideological training, as well as an increased sense of patriotism. At the same time, the regime apparently seeks to encourage individual willingness to accept a responsible role in solving political and civil problems. Probably with this in mind the regime permitted in the 1968/69 school year a slight enlargement of authority of faculties and administrators in higher educational institutions with regard to curriculums and other problems.

The regime's campaign to eradicate Soviet institutions and influence in Romanian society, begun in 1963-64, is virtually complete. De-Russification has had multiple aims: It underscores Romania's serious intent to be independent; it brings the point home to the traditionally Russophobic Romanian people, thereby winning considerable popular support for the party; and it frees the country's political and economic institutions from the worst aspects of Soviet meddling.

This policy has served the positive purpose of resurrecting Romanian national traditions. The names of theaters, collective farms, and public buildings have been changed to reflect Romanian rather than Soviet themes. The compulsory study of Russian has been abandoned, and Romanian orthography has returned to traditional forms by dropping many words previously incorporated from the Slavic tongues. In addition, Romanian statesmen, historians, writers, and artists of once dubious bourgeois reputation have been restored to good standing; distortions produced by nearly 20 years of subservience to Moscow have been excised from history texts; appeals to the public are increasingly made in the name of patriotism rather than socialism alone; and traditional cultural ties with the West are gradually being restored.

Concomitantly the regime has adopted a cultural policy which stresses the Communist version of traditional Romanian themes—if necessary with anti-Soviet overtones. The regime has permitted the slow infiltration of selected Western works and has encouraged a limited cultural diversity among native artists and workers. Concern with intellectual freedom, has not, however, been the moving force behind this careful policy. The restoration of Romania's "literary heritage" is a calculated effort to gain increased acceptance for the regime from its own people, and to end its isolation from the West as a former Soviet "satellite."

This cultural relaxation has affected not only literature but also music, the fine arts, scholarship, and science. Even the daily press has undergone a subtle but important transformation since mid-1963. Reporting of developments in the West has become more factual and extensive, and several leading papers regularly reprint without comment full texts of significant editorials from the Western press. Some non-Communist newspapers from the West are available in limited quantities and at selected locations in Bucharest and major tourist areas in Romania, and Romanian industries now frequently place advertisements in Western media, including *The Wall Street Journal*.

This trend will probably continue, but under very close guard by the regime's ideological watchdogs. No direct criticism of the regime is permitted, and questioning

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the party's exclusive right to rule is never allowed. Nor is direct criticism of the Soviet Union permitted, though for political rather than ideological reasons. This situation is likely to prevail indefinitely. Moreover, there are signs that the party may intend to tighten its control over the media.

Although the regime considers atheism the ideal, it also has found it expedient to use religious organizations and clergymen for the mobilization of public opinion behind Communist policies and goals. Thus, the regime seeks to harness the nationalistic traditions of the Romanian Orthodox Church to its Communist goals, while generally tolerating restricted religious services and practices so long as the religious leaders issue public statements supporting regime policies. Inasmuch as all religious activity is controlled by the state, few church leaders have failed to cooperate with the regime. They were particularly fervent in their public pronouncements of support for the leadership in the tense days following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Although the emphasis of many of the regime's social policies have changed since 1963, all social activities and organizations continue to come under party and governmental direction and scrutiny. The policy framework for social activities continues to stress universal service to the state and socialist society but now with a more traditionally Romanian orientation. In contrast to the Stalinist era, for example, when the party attempted to weaken the once closely knit family unit, current party policy reflects the realization that it is in the interest of social stability to preserve the family as an integral unit.

2. Foreign policy

Since about 1963 Romanian foreign policy has taken on an independent as well as a nationalistic hue. Instead of automatically supporting the U.S.S.R. in all matters, as had been the case since establishment of the Romanian Communist regime in 1945, Romania has developed and carefully executed a foreign policy which gives Romanian interests first priority. To maintain this order of priorities and their freedom of action the Romanians base their foreign policy essentially on three tactics: 1) gaining increased freedom of maneuver by maintaining and expanding relations with the non-Communist world and with those Communist countries which assert their independence from Moscow; 2) resisting Soviet policies which would limit Romania's freedom of maneuver; and 3) without sacrificing anything essential to this policy, giving Moscow and its allies as little justification for retaliation as possible. Thus, one way or another, all the principal aspects of Romanian foreign policy revolve around Romania's relationship with the Soviet Union. In Figure 61 Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu is shown in discussions with Soviet Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Romania's foreign policy has made Bucharest a troublesome ally of the Soviet Union. In the past several years Romania has increased its political and economic ties with the West; balked at Soviet plans for the further economic integration of Communist Eastern European states through

FIGURE 61. Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu meeting in Moscow with Soviet Premier Kosygin and Foreign Minister Gromyko, April 1969 (U/OU)

CEMA; maintained neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute; privately and publicly expressed strong criticism of certain aspects of Soviet policy; and, since early 1964, criticized the concept of "military blocs" and diminished its participation in activities of the Warsaw Pact—a mutual defense organization to which belong the Soviet Union and all Eastern European states except Yugoslavia and Albania. At the same time, Romania has maintained friendly relations with other East European countries, especially Yugoslavia, and has tried to improve its political and cultural ties with Communist China. Romania has encouraged some of the Warsaw Pact countries, both directly and indirectly, to emulate its own successes in pursuing independence—a tactic the Soviets find particularly galling.

The U.S.S.R. probably felt the Romanian thorn in its side most painfully, however, when the Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia on 20-21 August 1968. The Soviets almost certainly did not ask Romania to participate because Romanian actions during the Czechoslovak crisis had made it clear that not only would the Romanians refuse but they would probably tip off the Czechoslovaks as well. Despite universal fear for the safety of Romania's own sovereignty, Ceausescu roundly denounced the action on the day of the invasion. He said:

> It is inconceivable in today's world that a socialist state should violate the freedom and independence of another state. There is no justification whatsoever, and there can be no excuse for accepting even for a moment the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a fraternal socialist state.

By thus openly condemning the invasion, the Romanians deliberately exposed themselves to retaliatory pressure from the U.S.S.R. For Romania, survival as an independent state was at stake, along with the fundamental principle that all nations, as well as national Communist parties, are equal and therefore cannot be subjected arbitrarily by another party or state to a centralized policy.

Following their initial condemnation of the invasion, the Romanians remained silent about the issue until October, when they renewed their assertiveness. The Romanians were reasonably confident that at least for

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the time being they would not be subjected to the same treatment as Czechoslovakia, and they wished to make the point publicly that their more cooperative stance within the Communist world should not be interpreted as knuckling under on a matter of principle to the Warsaw Pact allies. Since then they have publicly let the matter drop.

At any given time, Ceausescu probably has no clear idea about long-term Soviet intentions toward Romania. The Romanians remain concerned about the new realities in Eastern Europe stemming from the Warsaw Five's invasion of Czechoslovakia and from Romania's exposed geographical position. The Romanians have not lost sight of their vulnerability to psychological and other forms of pressure from Moscow. Ceausescu's tactics since 21 August 1968 reveal his awareness that the kind of pressure the U.S.S.R. applied against Czechoslovakia might one day also be used against Romania. In September 1968 the leadership put into effect plans for armed resistance if the country should be invaded. Ceausescu has returned to this theme in several major speeches since then, and has tried to close off all channels through which the Soviet Union might seek to infiltrate the Romanian party with a coup attempt in mind.

Since the invasion, Romania's Warsaw Pact neighbors have confined their pressures to diplomatic and party channels and to occasional polemical news articles and broadcasts depicting the evils of nationalism and revisionism. Romanian leaders have worked to improve relations with Moscow in other matters, and the two countries have in general returned to the *modus vivendi* which was in effect prior to the invasion. They have, moreover, sought to normalize their relations with the other Warsaw Pact states. They retain their formal ties to the Warsaw Pact and the Moscow-dominated Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), but they tend to use their membership for gaining at least implicit toleration of their chosen course. These tactics appear to be working. Nevertheless, the surface of calm relations between Romania and the other members of the Warsaw Pact conceals significant differences going back in some cases even further than the advent of communism in Eastern Europe.

Romania's differences with its allies over the role of CEMA center on proposed reforms which would lead to closer integration of the economies of the member states and strengthen the "supranational" structure of CEMA. Romania's refusal to agree to these reforms has inhibited its efforts to improve relations with Poland, which, along with the Soviet Union, is a leading advocate of closer economic integration. Prior to the invasion, Romania had also impaired its relations with these two northern allies by its diplomatic recognition of West Germany and by its efforts to obtain capital equipment and machinery in the West. This policy has irritated the already industrialized countries of Eastern Europe—particularly East Germany—which would like to dispose of more of their industrial output on the Romanian market in exchange for food and raw materials, areas in which they have deficits. Romania has successfully resisted pressures from these countries, arguing that their industrial goods are technologically and qualitatively inferior and that such a trade pattern would retard Romania's industrialization.

Relations with Czechoslovakia during Antonín Novotný's tenure were in a similarly dismal state and for essentially the same reasons. Following the ouster of Novotný and the installment of the ill-fated Alexander Dubček, relations between the two countries improved immensely, with Ceausescu offering considerable moral support to Prague in the tense months leading up to the invasion in August 1968. As the new conservative leadership in Prague has buckled under pressure from the Soviets, relations between Czechoslovakia and Romania have become increasingly formal.

Romanian relations with Hungary were vexed not so much by economic questions as by the old bugaboo of Transilvanian irredenta and traditional national antipathies. While it is still raised occasionally, the issue of Transilvania has been papered over sufficiently that Romanian relations with Hungary are probably better than with any other Eastern European country except Yugoslavia. With Bulgaria and Albania, Romania's other Communist Balkan neighbors, relations have fluctuated from cordial to only correct, and they probably will continue to do so, according to the exigencies of the moment.

Especially since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Romania has courted the good will of the Yugoslavs (and vice versa), primarily as a tactic to gain maneuverability and support within the Communist world. Although Romania does not condone Yugoslavia's economic and internal political policies as an example for itself, the two countries have had much in common in foreign affairs. Both supported the Dubček regime in Czechoslovakia, condemned the invasion, and have had apprehensions about Soviet intentions. At least four personal meetings since January 1968 between Ceausescu and Yugoslav President Tito have served to strengthen this sense of common cause. There are signs that the two countries now consult on certain foreign policies.

Aside from the confrontation over Czechoslovakia, Romania's differences with the Soviet Union over external affairs have been most evident in its insistence on taking a neutral posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Romanian leaders studiously avoided attending a series of informal meetings at which Moscow sought to rally the support of the states in its orbit against Communist China. These meetings started with the East German Party Congress in January 1963; in March 1965 the Romanians refused to participate in a party conference in Moscow called for the purpose of condemning China. The Romanians underscored their studied neutrality in March 1964 when Premier Maurer visited Peking and was received personally by Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Figure 62). Moreover, Romania has on at least two occasions intervened on its own initiative in the Sino-Soviet dispute in ultimately futile attempts to mediate. Even in the wake of Chou En-lai's visit to Romania in June 1966, during which the Romanians prevented Chou from making public anti-

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FIGURE 62. Premier Maurer meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking, March 1964 (U/OU)

Soviet remarks, the Romanian leadership has at least outwardly adhered to its policy of avoiding criticism of the extremist position of Peking in the world Communist movement.

When the Romanians and Chinese joined hands in condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Peking announced its "moral support" for the seemingly threatened Romanians. In November the same year a high-level Chinese military delegation en route to Albania "coincidentally" stopped over in Bucharest while a Warsaw Pact staff meeting was in progress there. Apparently the Chinese suspected that the pact members were pressing Romania to permit the same kind of "maneuvers" that had been a rehearsal for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Ceausescu's measured defense in Moscow of the absent Chinese at the international Communist conference in June 1969 was partly in payment for such support. Late in the same month Romania received a new Chinese ambassador—the only Communist Chinese ambassador in East Europe since the beginning of the 1960's, aside from China's representative to its ally Albania. The Romanians have made the presence of the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest widely evident. They have been quiet, however, about the border talks between the Soviets and the Chinese which began in October 1969 in Peking. Future relations between Peking and Bucharest will certainly be colored by the outcome of these discussions. The Sino-Soviet dispute and other problems in Southeast Asia probably were the subject of discussions during the visit of Permanent Presidium member Emil Bodnaras to P'yŏngyang and Peking in June 1970.

Other problems plague Romania's relationship with its powerful nextdoor neighbor. Romania continues to resist Soviet efforts to integrate Romanian military forces into the Warsaw Pact and, heeding the lesson of Czechoslovakia, has shown extreme reluctance to allow Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its own soil. No such maneuvers have been held in Romania since 1962.

Moreover, the signing of a new Romanian-Soviet treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance to replace the old 20-year treaty, which expired in February 1968, created a great deal of mutual recriminations and hard feelings. The two sides began negotiating in 1967 and finally initialed a new draft in spring 1968, but the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia later that summer postponed a final signing. The Soviets were reportedly ready to sign it in the summer of 1969, but put off a trip to Bucharest when the Nixon visit was announced. In May 1970 Soviet party leader Brezhnev announced his intention of going to Bucharest to sign the treaty, but he backed out at the last minute and sent Premier Kosygin instead—an action interpreted by the Romanians as a deliberate slight.

The treaty which was finally signed in July 1970 reportedly is the one drafted and initialed in 1968. This probably explains the inclusion of an open-ended mutual defense clause that implicitly broadens the defense commitments of Romania. Bucharest is bound by the treaty to come to Moscow's aid—and vice versa—in case of an attack from "any state or group of states." In 1968 the Romanians wanted this wording in order to delete all references to West Germany, the primary target of the old treaty. Now, however, this clause—like similar ones in the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak treaties signed since 1967—potentially subjects Romania to involvement in a Sino-Soviet confrontation. Although probably chagrined and embarrassed by this connotation, Bucharest obviously judged it unwise to throw open the treaty for renegotiation, and in any case does not intend to interpret it this way. The treaty is otherwise acceptable to Bucharest because it has no language in support of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, used to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The new Romanian treaty differs from the one Moscow signed with Prague earlier in 1970 not only in this respect but also by making no reference to "socialist integration" in CEMA, thus protecting Romania's independence within this organization.

Nevertheless, the signing of the new treaty is not likely to improve the strained relations between the two countries. Premier Maurer, in a speech to the Soviet delegation following the signing, made it clear that Bucharest interprets the treaty as tacit approval for continuing its independent foreign policy. The Soviets, on the other hand, have made it clear that they see the new treaty in just the opposite light.

Romania has occasionally used indirect assertions of its historical attachment to Bessarabia (now the Moldavian S.S.R.) to embarrass Moscow. A recent delicate use of this tactic was contained in a speech in March 1970 by Miron Constantinescu, president of the Romanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences (also a candidate member of the party Executive Committee).

Romania has tried to maintain its good relations with Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, while at the same time increasing its contacts in the West, especially in Europe. The development of closer

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economic relations has been by far the most important component of this gradual shift to the West. Western European countries—West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France, in that order—claim over 50% of Romania's trade with the non-Communist world.

Although France counts less heavily than some of the other Western European countries in economic importance, it is with France that Romania has special historical and political ties. Long Romania's principal patron in Western Europe, especially during the interwar period, France traditionally has exercised considerable influence in Romania's cultural and geopolitical outlook. The Romanians thus followed their "declaration of independence" with a symbolic visit by Premier Maurer to Paris in July 1964. France returned in kind with a visit to Bucharest of then Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in April 1966—significantly, just after France's break with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The timing suggested a parallel in terms of Romania's uneasy relations with the Warsaw Pact and the troubled waters between France and NATO, and this was exploited in the propaganda of both governments. In April 1968 Charles de Gaulle, then President of France (Figure 63), made a triumphant visit to Romania, and President Ceausescu was planning a trip to France in June 1970.

Romania has consular agreements with France, Italy, and the United Kingdom and in 1967 became the first state in Eastern Europe to establish consular relations with Spain. The only Warsaw Pact country other than the U.S.S.R. to maintain diplomatic relations with West Germany (established 31 January 1967), Romania has encouraged the gradual thaw in relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe initiated by the Social Democrats in West Germany. This is in line with Romania's long-professed interest in exchanging contacts with non-Communist "progressive" forces throughout Western Europe as part of its effort to promote East-West detente. Romania's interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" has been generally more positive than the U.S.S.R.'s and largely devoid of the strident anti-Western formulas and threats which Moscow uses to balance its peaceful protestations. The Romanians also play down the Soviet contention that there can be no coexistence of ideas. They stand still further apart from the militant Chinese Communist position which denies the possibility of any form of positive cooperation with the Western "imperialist" powers.



FIGURE 63. French President Charles de Gaulle on a tour of Romania with President Ceausescu in May 1969 (C)

Although major contacts with the West were held to a minimum for a time immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Romania has continued to show keen interest in these links. In March 1969 Ceausescu visited Turkey—his first visit as Romania's national leader to a non-Communist country—and the following autumn he toured India and Iran. Romania has also entered a variety of technical, scientific, and cultural accords with individual Western countries, and has shown interest in expanding these beyond Western Europe and the United States, to countries in Latin America and Africa and Asia. Foreign Minister Manescu, for instance, made an extended tour of Latin America in the spring of 1969.

Romania has better relations with the United States than does any other East European country, aside from Yugoslavia. This situation, however, has developed fairly recently; only since 1960 have agreements been concluded for the settlement of claims of U.S. nationals arising out of war damages, nationalization of U.S. property, and commercial and financial debts. Shortly after the regime's April 1964 declaration, diplomatic representation between the two countries was raised to ambassadorial level, and economic, cultural, and political exchanges increased. The failure of the Firestone Co. negotiations with Bucharest in April 1965 contributed to a temporary disillusionment on the part of the Romanians, but since 1967 bilateral relations have steadily improved. The Vietnam war has acted as an inhibiting factor but one that Bucharest has played down. The Romanians in fact made repeated efforts to mediate for the United States in Hanoi in late 1967 and early 1968. Vietnam was virtually ignored during the official visit in August 1969 of President Richard Nixon—the first such visit to a Communist country by a U.S. President since World War II (Figure 64). The exhuberant, open-armed reception given to President Nixon by the Romanian people gave visible proof of the very great improvement in relations between Washington and Bucharest.

Romania gives every sign of desiring to continue improving contacts with the United States, especially in the economic and technical-scientific areas. The Romanian Government has sharply increased the number of scientists, technicians, and educators sent to the United States for training since early 1968. More important, Romanian officials are intensely interested in obtaining most-favored-nation status for exports to the United States (only Poland and Yugoslavia among East European countries have such a status). They look upon this as a prestige factor and an earnest of the United States' good intentions, as well as a possible source of relief for their trade deficit with the United States.

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FIGURE 64. U.S. President Nixon with President Ceausescu during his trip to Romania in August 1969 (U/OU)

Since 1963 the United Nations has also provided an arena of political maneuver for the Romanians to demonstrate their independent foreign policy. The Romanian delegation to the United Nations has broken ranks with the Soviet Union on at least three resolutions presented to the U.N. General Assembly. Romania was the only Communist country at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva in early 1966, for instance, to refrain from lambasting West Germany. Romania also supported Bonn's candidacy to the Governing Council of the U.N. Development Program in November 1965, and has on at least one occasion prevented the circulation of documents at the U.N. proclaiming East Germany's assertions of statehood. Despite these exceptions, Romania remains in substantial agreement with its socialist allies on most important substantive issues at the United Nations.

In terms of prestige alone, Romania's policy of calculated neutrality and friendship with all shades of political persuasion has paid off handsomely. The election of Romanian Foreign Minister Manescu to the presidency of the U.N. General Assembly in September 1967 represented a milestone in his country's search for international esteem. The first Communist government official to hold the office, Manescu began his acceptance speech by stressing that the confidence placed in him was "clearly addressed to his country" and emphasized the role of "small and medium-sized nations" in international affairs. Manescu's position greatly contributed to expanding Romania's contacts with less developed and non-European countries. Romania has, moreover, used the United Nations to promote the idea of a European security conclave.

3. National defense

Defense policy in Romania is formulated at the highest level of the Communist Party. Prior to the formal establishment of the Defense Council in March 1969, the Council of Ministers was responsible for the administration of defense policy, but it is doubtful that the latter body now has much to say in this respect. Romania's primary defense policy consists of maintaining a military capability sufficiently strong to defend its borders against limited attack. Romanian defense policies also lay stress on the armed forces as a symbol of national sovereignty and as an agency supporting Communist purposes for political indoctrination of virtually all able-bodied men during their term of service. In addition, the regime has assigned military manpower to such civilian activities as construction projects, harvesting, firefighting, and civil defense training.

Romania, along with all other Communist East European countries (except Yugoslavia), became a charter member of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955, shortly after West Germany's rearmament and admission to NATO. Intended as the Soviet response to NATO, the pact established a theoretically unified command under Soviet leadership and supplemented Moscow's system of bilateral alliances with its satellites. The pact legalized the presence in Eastern Europe of Soviet troops, which originally were stationed in large numbers only in East Germany and Poland, and after 1956, in Hungary. Despite the unpopularity and the obvious disadvantages of this step, the regimes of these countries have benefited from the group security provided by the pact, the Soviet guarantees of the inviolability of existing frontiers, and the assurance of support for the Communist regimes inherent in the presence of Soviet troops. Romania, however, no longer considers the pact's existence as beneficial to its national interests.

In 1958 the Romanian party leadership managed to achieve the withdrawal of the relatively small number of Soviet troops remaining on its soil since World War II. Nevertheless, from 1955 until the early 1960's Romania appears to have submitted to the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact, and the pact fulfilled its *raison d'être* as a relatively effective political and propaganda tool for the U.S.S.R. Because of political evolution in Eastern Europe, the Sino-Soviet dispute, and changes in relations between East European countries, however, Moscow began to use the Warsaw Pact as a mechanism for promoting military integration and to enhance its political role in Soviet bloc affairs. Both the political and military roles of the pact were brought into full play during the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In spite of the efficiency with which this action was carried out, the absence of Romania and the apparent reluctance of some of the other pact members to participate revealed the centrifugal forces at work within the organization.

Romania's resistance to integration of its forces in the pact and to participation in many of its activities predated the invasion of Czechoslovakia by several years. The Romanians began to drag their feet after holding only one Warsaw Pact exercise—in 1962—on Romanian territory. In May and June 1965 the regime balked Soviet efforts to require Romania to take steps to improve its air and air defense forces; communications between Romania and Soviet authorities within the pact's Joint Command reportedly have frequently broken down; and, in addition to not holding any pact maneuvers on its soil since 1962, Romania participated in maneuvers conducted elsewhere only with token forces or as an observer. Moreover,

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Romanian officials began to hint during 1965 that the regime might reduce its ties to its Warsaw Pact allies. In a speech given in May 1966 Secretary General Ceausescu directly attacked military blocs as "an anachronism incompatible with the independence and national sovereignty of the peoples and normal relations among states." It was against this background that the Soviets called a meeti f the pact's Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July 1966, where they attempted to strengthen the pact's organization and to increase integration of member country forces. At least so far as it concerned the Romanians, the meeting accomplished little in this direction. At a similar meeting in Budapest in March 1969 Bucharest subscribed to a document providing increased representation of Eastern European countries in the pact command structure. Romanian military officials have insisted, however, that this does not in any way change their exclusive control over Romanian forces.

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Romanian leadership has been generally more circumspect in its remarks regarding the pact and has attempted to smooth over relations with individual pact members. Nevertheless, the Romanian leadership has said repeatedly that, unlike the Czechoslovaks, the Romanians would resist if invaded, and, to underline its determination, it set up shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia volunteer Patriotic Guards (Figure 65) to defend the homeland. The leadership has implied that Romania could probably count on some sort of aid from Yugoslavia in the event of an attack, but this is by no means certain. These tactics are calculated to make the Soviets think twice before considering the same kind of military action taken against Czechoslovakia. Romania also has strongly resisted pressure from the Warsaw Pact to hold maneuvers on its soil, but it reportedly would agree to holding some limited pact maneuvers in Romania or to sending forces to participate in exercises in another country, provided Bucharest first obtains guarantees as to the scope, timing, and command, size, and location of participating forces. The problem with such guarantees from Romania's point of view, of course, is that of enforcement. Romanian officials have stated privately that Grand National Assembly approval is required for pact maneuvers in Romania, which would provide an obstacle to, or at least a means of delaying, such maneuvers. All of these preconditions are in effect simply stalling devices.

4. Civil defense

The basic task of civil defense is to provide protection for essential personnel and installations from weapons of mass destruction. Protection for the entire population is a secondary goal. Civil defense plans include the evacuation and dispersal of the population from threatened cities, the organization of veterinary and medical support, the protection of water and food supplies, and the development of a civil defense nucleus which in times of emergency could operate efficiently throughout the country.

FIGURE 65. Demonstration of the Patriotic Guards in May 1969 (U/OU)

The Ministry of Internal Affairs administers the civil defense program, and the basic structure of the civil defense command has been only slightly altered since its inception in 1952. Various ministries reportedly provide technical advice and personnel to help implement the overall program of building shelters and fireproofing buildings. In addition, in each county there is a civil defense organization linked to a part of the local antiaircraft defense. The civil defense organization is further subdivided into districts, industrial complexes, and residential areas.

The 1960 Civil Defense Law requiring participation by all able-bodied adults in civil defense training may have improved the defensive capabilities of the country and raised the level of popular understanding of civil defense procedures. It was not until 1962 that some instructors' handbooks on radiological survival were declassified and the information disseminated in a truly public program. This has done little to dispel public apathy, however.

Civil defense instruction is carried out several times a year. Public participation is conducted through organizations such as the Workers Guard or through mass courses at industrial plants and schools. Instruction emphasizes the effects of nuclear attack, as well as of napalm, regular incendiary bombs, and chemical weapons.

A typical civil defense course, as required in Romanian universities, covers types of aircraft, conventional bombing, atomic explosives, and personal measures to be taken against the hazards of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological warfare (CBR). Students are instructed to be alert for any bacteria-infected food parcels which might be dropped from enemy aircraft, to beware of infected animals, to boil all water, to listen for announcements of contamination sources, and to take careful note of an onset of illness and its possible causes. With respect to chemical warfare, the students are instructed about the various categories of poisonous gases, gas bombs, and other chemical weapons; the effects of gases and chemicals on the human body; and how to treat victims, clothing, and water contaminated by such chemical substances.

Such courses, while they may be conducted by a physician, consist largely of lectures and questions, with little practical training involved, and almost no proper training equipment. Defector reports indicate that more thorough training is given at major industrial installations, sometimes involving actual firefighting training. Even so, equipment, oftentimes of World War II vintage, is faulty and inadequate. Attendance by workers is mandatory, but they are so reluctant to participate that their superiors reportedly falsify attendance records to keep from having to give the lectures over and over. CBR training in depth with full equipment and intensive coordination on disaster

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situations, is limited almost entirely to military and paramilitary groups.

As in all Communist European countries, Romania's civil defense policies are designed primarily to safeguard essential personnel and vital industries, and only secondarily to protect the population from CBR effects. In the event of an emergency, alternate seats of party and government reportedly would be established at one of the three following places: under the *Scinteia* building in Bucharest, at Vasile Roaita on the Black Sea, or at Predeal in the Carpathian Mountains. For the general population, however, such long-term habitation shelters are not provided.

The administration of storage areas used in emergency situations is under the direction of the Ministry of Armed Forces. Such reserve stores are reportedly located near a source of water but away from places frequented by the general public. Generally, enough food stocks for 12 to 15 days are included. All clothing, food, and fuel storage areas are located several miles from main rail lines and highways. Rail lines to these areas are reportedly covered with approximately 3 feet of earth which can be removed by bulldozing.

E. Police and intelligence services (S)

Maintaining the Romanian Communist Party and government in power is the primary mission of the police and intelligence services. These efficient services keep the population under strict control. They concentrate on those elements of the population considered threatening or potentially threatening to government and party goals. Particular emphasis is placed on countering foreign espionage. Intelligence and security functions are vested in the organizations shown in Figure 66. The Council of State Security (commonly called the *Securitate),* the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Armed Forces are responsible for security matters and intelligence collection.

The most important of these is the *Securitate,* which corresponds to the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). In 1967 the intelligence and security elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were placed under the newly created Council of State Security, but the committee remained a part of that ministry. In April 1968 the Council of State Security was separated from the ministry and established as an entity within the executive branch of the national government, nominally subordinated to the control of the Council of Ministers. However, the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party actually exercises greater influence and control than does the government. The Ministry of Internal Affairs remains charged with carrying out party and state policy in respect to civil police functions, public safety, and civil registration.

Several other bodies are also concerned with intelligence and security matters. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, which is part of the Ministry of Armed Forces, conducts foreign intelligence operations to obtain military information. The Frontier Troops of this ministry are responsible for guarding the borders, and preventing



FIGURE 66. Structural organization of Romanian security and intelligence services (S)

unauthorized infiltration or exfiltration. The *Securitate* troops are believed to be under the direction of the Council of State Security, but their exact subordination is uncertain. They are an elite guard force, used particularly to provide shock troops in the event of serious civil disturbance and to provide security for visiting national leaders. The Political-Adminstrative Directorate of the party Central Committee is the principal advisory and coordinating body dealing with intelligence and security matters. It includes sections for the supervision of the *Securitate* and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Advisers from the KGB, who were present in the *Securitate's* headquarters until 1962 or 1963, departed at that time and liaison with the U.S.S.R. in the intelligence sphere was drastically reduced. The *Securitate* still passes information to the KGB, particularly information regarding NATO, but it does not normally pass original reports or reveal its sources to the KGB. The *Securitate* does not trace persons of interest to the KGB nor send its officers to the U.S.S.R. for training.

1. The Securitate

The *Securitate,* consisting of approximately 4,500 officers, is responsible for domestic counterintelligence and countersubversion and for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, particularly political, military, scientific, and economic information. The *Securitate's* three general directorates fulfill these responsibilities—two internally

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and one externally. In addition there are a directorate of *Securitate* Troops, county *(judeţ) Securitate* inspectorates, and administrative/support directorates which serve the operational units. The *Securitate* is headed by a chairman and five deputy chairmen. Figure 67 shows the organization of the *Securitate*.

The General Directorate for Internal Security has two subdirectorates: The Directorate for Struggle against Counterrevolution and Subversion is divided into services responsible for detecting and suppressing activities which actually or potentially threaten the government and party. It is interested in persons who were members of former political parties, former members of the armed forces who are suspect, religious denominations, scientific and cultural institutions, minority groups, and students. The Directorate for Struggle against Sabotage has services responsible for preventing sabotage throughout the economy in industry, agriculture, and transportation. The directorate utilizes agents and informants in all economic branches.

The General Directorate for Counterespionage also has two directorates. The Directorate for Territorial Counterespionage monitors the activities within Romania of representatives of foreign countries and also is concerned with Romanian emigrees abroad and frontier control. The directorate is responsible for the surveillance of foreign tourists, commercial travelers, and diplomats, including those from Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European Communist countries. It is also charged with the penetration of foreign diplomatic missions



FIGURE 67. Structure of the *Securitate* (S)

in Romania. The Directorate for Counterespionage in the Armed Forces combats subversion in the army, navy, air force, and frontier guards. This directorate uses either its own officers assigned to military units or recruits military officers and trains them as *Securitate* officers. It also uses a great number of informants in fulfilling this counterintelligence responsibility.

The General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence is charged with conducting clandestine operations against targets outside Romania and is composed of four subordinate directorates. The Directorate for Political Information has the mission of fulfilling political, economic, and military intelligence requirements. It is responsible for specific geographic areas: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Latin America; Western Europe; the Middle East; and Asia. A NATO/Military Service, which was created in 1961, is part of the Directorate for Political Information and is charged with recruiting and running sources which can report on NATO and Western military forces. The Directorate for Scientific and Technical Information has become one of the most important directorates and receives high priority. It is concerned with the collection and evaluation of industrial, chemical, nuclear, electronic, and armament intelligence. The Directorate for Illegals places *Securitate* staff officers under deep cover in foreign countries. The organization of this directorate is believed to be along geographic lines, but knowledge of the activities of this directorate is very limited, even within the *Securitate*.

The fourth directorate—for emigrees and foreign counterintelligence—is responsible for external counterintelligence and is divided into operational services as well as geographic offices. The emigree service is targeted against Romanians who have become residents of other countries. Its objective is to recruit them to work for Romanian interests, as well as to monitor any hostile activities directed from abroad against the Romanian Communist regime. The foreign counterintelligence service is charged with the penetration of foreign police, intelligence, and security services for purposes of protecting Romanian interests rather than positive intelligence collection. It also is responsible for the security of Romanian installations abroad. The service for disinformation, also a part of this directorate, produces regular and fabricated propaganda. Its main targets are emigree groups in the West. It is also responsible for helping substantiate Romania's claims to Transilvania and Bessarabia.

Additional units, also called services, in the General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence provide operational support to the general directorate. These include the following: the Exploitation of Information Service, which prepares intelligence reports; the Photographic Service; the Technical Service, which adapts technical methods to operational tasks and provides counteraudio protection to Romanian installations abroad; the Cipher Service, which provides cryptographic support for communications for all elements of the Romanian Government abroad; the Inspection Service; the Administrative Service, which provides financial, budgetary, vehicular, and safe house support; and the Personnel Service.

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In addition to the three general directorates of the Council of State Security there are separate directorates and services shown in Figure 67 which support the operational units but which are subordinate to the office of the Chairman of the Council of State Security. The Directorate for Surveillance and Investigations is composed of four services which perform the physical surveillance of individuals or targets requested by one of the general directorates. These services are responsible for foreign citizens, internal targets, foreign diplomats, and investigations. The Directorate for Pretrial Investigations prepares cases for trial after a suspect has been arrested by the *Securitate*. Its activities have been theoretically curbed by the new criminal procedure code which came into effect in January 1969. The Directorate for the Protection of Dignitaries is responsible for the personal safety of the Council of Ministers, the members of the Permanent Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and other high-ranking Communist Party personnel. It also provides personnel for guard duty at government buildings and offices. The Directorate of Mail Censorship is responsible for monitoring mail entering or leaving the country. International mail is intercepted on the basis of both a watch list and random selection. Approximately 20% of internal mail is randomly selected for censorship. The Directorate of Technical Operations supervises photographic laboratories, taps telephones, installs audio devices, forges documents, and is responsible for counteraudio efforts in overseas installations.

Three support directorates are also directly responsible to the chairman. The Personnel Directorate and the Directorate for Administration carry out the usual personnel, administrative, and financial functions. The Directorate for Records is the principal repository for files. In addition, this directorate performs routine searches of *Securitate* central records for other government agencies.

Other components directly attached to the chairman of the *Securitate* are a counterintelligence group charged with detecting disloyalty among *Securitate* staff members, an Office of Inspector General, and a secretariat for the chairman and vice chairmen.

Every county in Romania has a local directorate of the *Securitate* which maintains security within the county. The county directorates are under the direct control of *Securitate* headquarters in Bucharest and the county committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

Securitate personnel may be recruited from any sector of the Romanian population. The sons of industrial workers and peasants are generally preferred, but the sons of civil servants also are considered. Recent university graduates are sought to fill technical positions. The Secretary General of the Central Committee recommends persons, usually senior party members, to fill the top positions. Personnel are trained either at the Baneasa School, which is primarily for officers of the *Securitate* assigned to internal functions, or at a school for officers of the General Directorate for Foreign Intelligence located in the Pustnicu Forest in the Branistei-Pipera area outside of Bucharest. The latter school was established to replace the training facilities formerly provided by the KGB in Moscow. Enrollment at the Baneasa School is about 150 at a time. Language studies and training in specialized intelligence methods are conducted at other schools.

Securitate personnel are better paid and enjoy more privileges than their counterparts in industry, the civil service, and the armed forces. Details of *Securitate* allocations and expenditures are unknown.

The *Securitate* makes extensive use of informants and agents inside Romania to detect and suppress politically offensive or subversive activity. As part of the counterintelligence program, officers are placed within government offices which deal with foreigners. The *Securitate* uses a wide variety of conventional techniques and devices along with more sophisticated methods in both its internal and external clandestine operations.

The Romanian people are subjected to regimentation and rigid security controls, although these have been eased since 1967. All residents over age 15 must carry identity booklets *(Buletin de Identitate)*; males of military service age are also required to carry military booklets, while workers and employees must carry labor cards. A change of residence requires militia approval, and all persons who visit Romania for more than 90 days must register with the militia. Some telephone calls are monitored, as are all radio transmissions. The government watches over contacts by Romanian citizens with foreigners and to a great extent actively discourages such contacts. Nevertheless, Romanians are much less tightly controlled in this respect than they were in the 1950's.

2. The Intelligence Directorate (military)

The Intelligence Directorate *(Directia de Informatii* or *"DI")* of the General Staff of the Ministry of Armed Forces is charged with the collection of military intelligence and related economic and political information abroad. It also evaluates and disseminates this information within the government. Compared with the *Securitate*, the Intelligence Directorate is a smaller service, believed to be organized into six sections and three bureaus. The staff is composed of persons selected from various branches of the armed forces.

The clandestine techniques employed by representatives of the armed forces' Intelligence Directorate abroad are similar to those of the *Securitate*. Personnel serving as military attachés endeavor to obtain both secret and overt military data. Some officers of the military intelligence directorate may be abroad in official positions not overtly connected with the military. The directorate also utilizes illegals (staff officers assigned abroad under deep cover), as well as temporary visitors abroad, usually nonmilitary officers such as members of commercial or cultural delegations, tourists, and merchant seamen.

There is no operational liaison between the *Securitate* and the military intelligence directorate, and sources are not shared. Military information obtained by the *Securitate* is passed to the armed forces intelligence directorate in Bucharest.

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3. Directorate for Securitate Troops

The well-armed and mobile *Securitate* Troops (sometimes referred to in translations as Security Troops or the Internal Guard), form an elite force equipped with the best material and arms. They are trained to be utilized mainly in emergency situations which would require combating unrest and resistance to the regime. They are also trained to assist when necessary the Frontier Troops (border guards), which are part of the Ministry of Armed Forces. The *Securitate* Troops are used as shock elements in the event of disturbances. Although not highly educated, their morale and political reliability is high, and they can be depended upon in the event of civil disturbances. The wartime role of these troops probably would be to safeguard internal communications and logistics installations as well as to maintain internal security.

The Directorate for *Securitate* Troops provides guards for important industrial installations and lines of communication and transportation—including such vulnerable points as tunnels and bridges.

4. The Ministry of Internal Affairs

The ministry is under the control and guidance of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and the Council of Ministers. It is responsible for the militia, fire brigades, penitentiaries, and state archives.

Its subordinate units include a General Directorate of the Militia, which is subdivided into operational sections and regional units. Militia units investigate ordinary criminal activity, supervise the activity of discharged prisoners, handle traffic matters, insure public order at railway stations, and maintain the Population Registry Section, which controls and issues identity and domicile documents. The militia defers to the *Securitate* for action in investigations which have political implications, and *Securitate* Troops are used to quell any serious disorders. The General Directorate of the Militia is believed to have the following subordinate units: municipal police, economic police, transportation police, investigations, population registry, and traffic.

The caliber of militia personnel is generally lower than that of the *Securitate*, as militiamen are less privileged and usually less well educated. It is nevertheless considered efficient in maintaining public order.

The militia's administrative structure is similar to that of the *Securitate*. Militiamen carry sidearms and can receive other weapons if necessary.

F. Subversion (C)

There is no evidence that subversive activity exists on an organized basis in Romania. Although there is still some passive resistance to the regime by individuals, even this is reported to have diminished as the regime has successfully pursued policies reflecting national interests but which are also intended to bring about a reconciliation between the regime and the broad mass of the population.

Among the factors hindering opposition are the size and efficiency of the security police organization, common borders with the U.S.S.R., lack of organized resistance leadership, the natural deaths of many people with vested interests in the pre-Communist days, fragmentation of emigree groups abroad, and the unwillingness of the population—traditionally accustomed to a harsh central government—to risk any such activity without visible possibilities of success.

By eliminating early rival political parties, the Communists destroyed probably the most significant source of potential opposition. Through the close supervision, if not complete control, of all ecclesiastical appointments, the regime also eliminated subversive activities by organized religious groups. The development of any potential resistance leadership is doubtful. The security police operate an extensive network of informers and agents, while the regime additionally maintains watch over the people through the militia (ordinary police), factory guards, forestry and game wardens, and informers. The penal codes provide the death penalty for acts of sabotage and for treason and espionage.

No foreign governments are known to be actively engaged in trying to overthrow the Ceausescu regime, although this does not exclude the likelihood that some of them maintain espionage agents or networks for intelligence purposes or for the future overthrow of the government.

Little is known about Soviet intelligence or subversive activities in Romania, but it appears almost certain that Moscow set up an intelligence network there in the period after the early 1960's when Romania virtually cut off intelligence liaison with the Soviet Union. Secretary General Ceausescu hinted in a speech in May 1967 that the Soviets had tried to subvert the Romanian Communist Party through certain of its members, apparently without success.

Resistance to the Communist regime, albeit passive and very limited in scope, can be found in almost every class of Romanian society. Of the various nonminority socioeconomic groups, the peasants and youth are the most restive. The use of police methods, compulsory collectivization, and the denial of many basic human rights have alienated the peasantry, which in 1966 constituted nearly two-thirds of the country's total population. The peasants have retaliated from time to time by working inefficiently on collective farms and by frequent failure to plant and harvest crops on time. Although such individual resistance has not been sufficiently serious to pose a threat to the regime, it has hampered the implementation of regime policies and has delayed the achievement of Communist goals in agriculture. In an effort to gain added cooperation from the peasants, the regime has instituted limited measures to raise incentives for farmers. In late 1969, for instance, pensions for cooperative workers were raised substantially.

The youth, disillusioned with Communist promises and attracted to Western culture, remain more openly critical of the regime despite intensive indoctrination. Students have been particularly critical of the inadequate stipends and the unsatisfactory living conditions—common

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complaints of those attending higher educational institutions. Nevertheless, their disillusionment is mostly private and only rarely does it surface in minor manifestations of antiregime sentiment.

Industrial workers, theoretically the group most favored by the Communist government, also are restless and show little enthusiasm for the regime. Their chief complaints are high costs and the relatively low level of living, poor pay and long hours, and pressure for fulfillment of what they consider abnormally high production norms. Despite increasing urbanization, the industrial working class possesses little subversive potential, but apparently has become proficient at displaying dissatisfaction by common thievery and embezzlement.

The only serious remaining minority problem in Romania is that of the Hungarians, most of whom are located in Transilvania. Antagonism between Romanians and Hungarians has deep historical roots, stemming from conflicting national aspirations, as well as from linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. The Romanians regard the Hungarians as foreigners, while the Hungarians look upon the Romanians with disdain, considering them both racially and culturally inferior.

Tensions between the Hungarians and the Romanians are exacerbated by remembrances of Hungarian attempts to Magyarize the Romanian population in Transilvania before 1918, when the area was under Hungarian jurisdiction. Since the Communist takeover in Romania, the Romanians have made some attempts to "Romanianize" Hungarians living there. Although the Ceausescu regime has shown a keen interest in lessening these traditional tensions through frequent speeches citing the "equality and unity of all Romanian citizens," it remains to be seen whether this approach will contribute to improved relations. The success of this approach also may depend considerably on whether Moscow, through Hungary, privately encourages Magyar unrest in Transilvania, as has been reported by Romanian sources from time to time. Aside from the Hungarians, other ethnic minorities, such as the Germans, Gypsies, and Jews, do not constitute a significant subversive potential.

Neither Romanian social classes nor the Romanian people as a whole have a record of successful open resistance to any conqueror. Rather, the Romanian people have developed a patience, not unlike that attributed to the Asian world, of biding their time while at the same time preserving their national identity. Given this history, it seems unlikely that Romanians would be willing to jeopardize their gradually improving lot under a regime which is courting their active support.

G. Propaganda (C)

The Romanian regime attaches considerable importance to its propaganda activities. Highly developed and omnipresent, the regime's propaganda mechanism attempts to influence the population in favor of the government's domestic and foreign policies as well as to provide for the overseas dissemination of regime views. The effectiveness of domestic propaganda is difficult to ascertain because of problems in gauging public opinion in a Communist state. Nevertheless, media falling into the general category of entertainment—radio, motion pictures, and exhibitions—are generally believed more effective than printed matter or lectures in furthering the aims of the regime.

The Romanian Communist Party controls all public information media as well as all agencies concerned with propaganda, including the mass and specialized organizations that also have other functions. Proposed propaganda is channeled through the Central Committee's Directorate of Propaganda and Culture (the top party agency solely concerned with propaganda) to lower party levels, mass organizations, and governmental agencies. These in turn relay the propaganda to the appropriate administrative and operational elements. All informational media in Romania are guided by these directives or by the propaganda line established in official pronouncements of party and governmental leaders.

With this Communist monopoly of communications media, the entire Romanian population has become in effect a captive audience. Although the quality of much of the regime's propaganda is reasonably high, it is not generally up to the standards of some of the more advanced countries of Eastern Europe, such as Czechoslovakia and Poland, where the audiences are accustomed to more sophisticated fare. Ceausescu has from time to time criticized all media for ineffectiveness.

The regime's overall domestic propaganda effort is directed toward inculcating the Romanian people with Communist doctrine and creating popular acceptance of the socialist state. Some ancient traditions and beliefs are interwoven with more modern ideas to appeal to nationalism and to provide an image of communism as the protector and preserver of the Romanian heritage.

Prior to the 1960's propaganda generally followed the line of Soviet policy. After Romania began to differ with the U.S.S.R.—first over CEMA policies, then over more extensive economic and political matters, and set out on its independent course—the regime began to use its various propaganda media to explain and publicize its changed position both at home and abroad. Since about 1963 Romanian propaganda has stressed independent, nationalistic, and frequently even anti-Russian themes in an effort to gain public support. Other recent propaganda themes have been the superiority of the socialist and Communist system, the eventual victory of socialism and communism over capitalism, the peaceful aims of the Communists as contrasted with the warlike aims of the capitalist-imperialist world, and the improvement of domestic conditions in comparison with prewar conditions.

Besides the overall, broadside propaganda effort, the regime also singles out specific sectors of the population for particular emphasis upon appropriate themes. The four major target groups are party members, peasants, workers, and youth. The party ideology and general line at any particular time must be constantly dinned into the minds of members to educate them, raise their ideological level, teach them currently acceptable views, prevent them from deviating, and inspire them to action.

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The military and minority groups are also important targets, although in terms of total propaganda volume they are of less significance. Propaganda directed at these groups has the same ultimate objective as all domestic propaganda—the achievement of a socially, economically, and politically homogeneous Communist state. Within this framework, the shorter range specialized propaganda effort in each case is focused upon obtaining the fullest possible integration of the target group into the so-called new society.

The major media for disseminating propaganda are the press, radio, television, and public lectures. The agitation sections of the party disseminate propaganda to workers at industrial enterprises and brief them on the meaning of the new policy of economic and political development along nationalistic lines. Available information indicates that this program has had considerable success.

By virtue of its volume, the controlled press is a key weapon in the regime's propaganda arsenal. All newspapers and periodicals are directly controlled by the party, while *Agerpres*, the official news agency, censors and disseminates all foreign news coming into the country and decides what domestic news is to be sent out of Romania. All domestic newspapers, radio, and television are dependent on *Agerpres* for foreign news. The most important newspaper in Romania is the party daily *Scinteia* (Spark), the organ of the Central Committee, which has a daily circulation of more than 1 million. Other papers in the country take their editorial line from *Scinteia*.

Radio and TV services in Romania are administered by the State Committee for Radio and Television, which is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers. The regime has considerably expanded both systems since the early 1960's but has particularly stepped up its usage of television, which has appeared to have considerable success when used in conjunction with historic national holidays. Although Romanian radio and television prior to early 1963 carried considerable amounts of material prepared in Moscow, the regime has since virtually eliminated Soviet-prepared programs as part of its de-Russification campaign.

The regime also has used motion pictures, plays, public libraries, museums, and cultural exhibits to insure the wide dissemination of its propaganda. These media have principally stressed Romania's cultural heritage as interpreted by the regime. In addition, the educational system is employed for propaganda as well as educational purposes and extols the party's version of Romanian history and traditions. Moreover, subtle publicity has been given to renaming public buildings and streets for Romanian heroes instead of for Russians, as had been the practice until the early 1960's. Labor unions and all types of professional societies also are utilized in the promotion of regime propaganda objectives.

The most important objectives of foreign propaganda are to enhance Romania's image of independence and to characterize Romania as a modern country with a developing economy. Secondary objectives include contributing to the development of world communism. This latter objective is approached by the regime on the basis of the "equality" of all fraternal Communist parties and "noninterference in the affairs of fraternal parties."

Radio constitutes the major medium through which propaganda is disseminated abroad. Figure 68 provides an overall comparison of Romania's radio transmissions to specific foreign target countries and audiences. Between 1956 and early 1966, foreign broadcasting time increased from 93 hours and 30 minutes to 165 hours and 35 minutes weekly. Although this is a rather sharp increase, it is of about the same proportion as is evident in most of Communist Europe over the same period. By early 1969 it had further increased to 201 hours and 15 minutes.

The changed allocation of broadcast time devoted to specific geographic areas is consonant with Romanian foreign policy objectives and with Romania's emphasis on its Latin origins. Thus, although total foreign broadcasting time increased by more than 52 hours per week between 1956 and 1966, about 43 of these hours were represented by either expanded or new schedules to those countries where the Romance languages are spoken. For example, *Radio Bucharest* introduced Portuguese broadcasts, sharply expanded its French broadcasting schedule, and more than tripled its broadcast time to Spain. During the same period, Romania introduced Arabic and Persian broadcasts, and, in consonance with developing better relations with southern Europe, it expanded its broadcast schedules in Greek and Turkish.

Romania uses its legations and embassies abroad as major foreign propaganda outlets. Each diplomatic post, depending on its size and importance, has a cultural services section, a press bureau, or a press attaché. During 1962-64, when Romania initiated its move toward a more independent position within the Soviet bloc, the diplomatic posts were used to present the Romanian case to foreigners, both inside and outside the bloc. Since that time, Romanian diplomatic missions abroad have frequently been utilized to disseminate major regime policy statements on its independent course and to rebut or initiate rumors concerning its policies.

The regime also employs the Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, *Agerpres*, the State Committee for Radio and Television, the Chamber of Commerce for Foreign Trade, the National Tourist Office, and other organizations with international ties to assist in its foreign propaganda effort. All agencies engaged in this task operate under the supervision of the Directorate of Propaganda and Culture of the party's Central Committee. The regime also makes use of cultural exchanges, trade delegations, and foreign students to disseminate foreign propaganda.

Since 1962, Romania also has reduced its restrictions on Western news and cultural material circulating in the country in an effort to improve its image and its relations with Western countries. Significant examples are the permission granted the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest to circulate its *Cultural Bulletin* and the discontinuation of jamming of Western broadcasts in July 1963. Romanian news media, moreover, have tended to report developments

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

FIGURE 68. Radiobroadcasting to and from Romania, summer 1969 (U/OU)

in the West more fully and in a less biased fashion than the news media of most other Communist countries.

Since Romania initiated its independent course, Western radio stations transmitting to Romania have modified the content of their programs. In general, these stations tend to accentuate the positive aspects of the regime and to couch criticism of it in more constructive terms. One exception, from the Romanian regime's point of view, is *Radio Free Europe* (RFE); several Romanian newspapers attacked RFE in the early months of 1970 for its allegedly biased reporting on Romania. Western radio propaganda also increasingly emphasizes greater sophistication in its news and political reporting while simultaneously providing more entertainment and programs directed to specific groups—youth, workers, and women.

Although little precise information is available on Western radio listening in Romania, a recent U.S. Information Agency report indicates that broadcasts of Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, and *Radio Free Europe* enjoyed large regular audiences. More than nine of every 10 Romanians interviewed while in the West said that they tuned in each station at least once a week, usually in the evening. The listening audience of all three stations appeared to be relatively stable, but listening by most respondents averaged less than half an hour a day.

Although exact data are not available, it is known that Soviet broadcasts to Romania have been sharply reduced since the mid-1960's. In addition, Romania has sharply curtailed Soviet cultural and informational activities. *Timpuri noi*, the Romanian-language version of the Soviet foreign affairs journal *Novo Vremya* (New Times), was abolished in the fall of 1963 and replaced by *Lumea*, a largely Westward-looking Romanian foreign affairs weekly. The Institute of Romanian-Soviet Studies was closed shortly thereafter, and the Romanian-U.S.S.R. Friendship Society, ARLUS, which was once a dominant force in Romanian cultural life, has gradually been reduced to a mere shred of its former influence.

H. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

Fischer-Galati, Stephen A., *The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1967. Probably the most authoritative political treatise on postwar Romania, focuses on the origins and development of the Romano-Soviet divergence.

———. *The Socialist Republic of Rumania.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. This monograph analyzes Romania's relations with its fellow socialist states since Bucharest established an independent foreign policy course in the early 1960's. Essentially, it brings up to date Fischer-Galati's earlier work cited above.

Ionescu, Ghiţa, *Communism in Romania: 1942-1962.* Oxford University Press, 1964. A detailed and generally objective history of the subject.

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Montias, John Michael, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1967. The economic complement to Fischer-Galati's political study. Very detailed—an economist's book.

Seton-Watson, R. W., *A History of the Roumanians*. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1934. The classic political history of Romania by a Westerner, written in the old historical style. Necessary for an understanding of political development through World War I, but of little help with regard to the interplay of politics and sociology.

Statistical Pocket Book of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Bucharest: Central Statistical Board, 1968. Extensive yearly compilation of figures on all aspects of the social and economic fabric of Romania. By no means complete, however, and probably contains many inaccuracies, some of them deliberate.

Stillman, Edmund, *The Balkans* (Life World Library). New York: Time, Incorporated, 1964. Excellent firsthand treatment of the Balkan area (Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria) as a whole by a knowledgeable Western journalist. Not an in-depth study by any means, but conveys the flavor of the region and its people.

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6. Economic

A. General

1. Introduction (C)

Romania continues to achieve one of the highest rates of economic growth in Europe. The rapid growth of the past 20 years has been the result of a combination of abundant natural resources—notably petroleum, timber, and agricultural land—a large pool of surplus agricultural labor, and a determined Communist government. Romania's strong leadership, its self-sufficiency in food and fuels, and the marketability of its exports in the non-Communist world have allowed the regime to persist in nationalistic economic policies in the face of opposition from the U.S.S.R. and the other members of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA).

The main economic goals of the Communist regime have been the rapid growth of industrial capacity and output, especially in heavy industry, together with the diversification of industrial production and technological development; state ownership of industrial facilities and collectivization of agriculture; and the reduction of economic dependence on other Communist countries. Toward these ends, the regime has increased investment much more rapidly than consumption, shifted excess labor from agriculture to industry, and sought to obtain advanced technology. This last aim is reflected in the policy, begun in 1960, of rapidly expanding trade with non-Communist countries, which could provide the advanced capital equipment not available in the Communist countries.

Most of the increase in gross national product (GNP)[8] has come from the growth of industrial production, which about doubled in the 1950's and almost tripled again in the 1960's. Factors in the rapid industrial growth since 1959 have been a high rate of investment, increased availabilities of inputs from agriculture and imports, growth of the industrial labor force, and large imports of advanced technology and equipment from industrialized non-Communist countries. The sharp growth of these imports has been made possible by Romania's ability to borrow from its Western suppliers and its ability to expand exports to them—chiefly foodstuffs, timber products, and petroleum products.

The rapid expansion of imports from non-Communist countries has resulted in Romania's incurring an indebtedness to hard currency areas more than twice that of any other East European Communist country[9] except Poland. By the end of 1969 this indebtedness totaled an estimated $0.8 billion, about two-fifths more than the level of exports to the hard currency areas. Romania's hard currency indebtedness was relatively smaller than Bulgaria's, which was about double the level of its exports to hard currency areas, but relatively larger than for other East European countries. Because of the need to limit further growth of this indebtedness, the Romanians will not be able to greatly increase imports from the industrialized non-Communist countries unless they can achieve a rapid increase in the exports to these countries. This in turn will affect the investment program, which during 1971-75 calls for a 9% to 10% average annual increase of centralized investment from state funds, with emphasis to be placed on investment in new plant and equipment. The Romanians hope to reduce somewhat the share of imports in total investment in machinery and equipment; nevertheless, they will probably have to increase such imports substantially in order to obtain the new technology they want. By 1968, Romania was obtaining over two-fifths of its imports of machinery and equipment from non-Communist countries. Presumably the leaders cannot reduce this share too much and still obtain most of the desired advanced technology.

Romania also is going to require greatly expanded imports of certain raw materials, especially iron ore, metallurgical coke, crude oil, and perhaps coking coal. Additional imports of cotton and phosphates also will be needed. Because the Communist countries will be unable—or unwilling—to provide much of the increased requirements for these commodities, the Romanians will have to purchase most of the increment from non-Communist countries. In some cases—such as imports of coke and of finished steel—this will place a further strain on the country's hard currency balance of payments position.

2. Economic institutions (U/OU)

The Romanians only recently have begun to try to modify the traditional Communist system of economic planning and management. Political and economic success have permitted the regime to move very slowly in following the reforms taking place in the U.S.S.R. and the other East European Communist countries. In June 1966, party Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu admitted a need to improve the administration and operation of the economy

[8] The value, at market prices, of final output of goods and services before deduction of depreciation allowances.

[9] Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

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in order to stimulate efficiency and thus insure the continuation of rapid economic growth. He initiated a series of studies and experiments concerned with the organization of the economy. In drawing up their own program, the Romanians studied carefully the experiences of both Communist and non-Communist countries with economic planning and management. In December 1967 the Grand National Assembly approved the "Law Concerning Some Measures for Improvement of the Management and Planning of the National Economy." The new measures were to be introduced gradually through the end of 1969. Because of delayed implementation of many of these measures, the deadline for completion has been extended 1 year.

A major feature of the new measures is the establishment of new economic units between the ministerial and enterprise level, like those in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. These units have broad control over groups of enterprises and exercise many of the planning and management functions previously exercised by the central government. Such units were established in agriculture in 1967, when the primary responsibility for the day-to-day operations of state farms was transferred from the central agency to an economic unit between it and the state farm. These state agricultural enterprises comprise several state farms in the same area.

The establishment of industrial centrals on an experimental basis was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 1969. Later that year, the Romanians reorganized the economic ministries and set up about 200 industrial centrals, groups, and combines. This move was aimed primarily at streamlining the top-heavy ministerial bureaucracy and at transferring technical and administrative workers into the field. The regime also used the reorganization to make shifts in top personnel. Most of the general directorates covering specific branches of an industry were abolished and their functions taken over by the industrial centrals. Thus, the total number of directorates and similar departments under the ministries was drastically reduced. The Ministry of the Chemical Industry, for example, previously had 26 such departments and now has only 12.

The regime clearly intends to keep a firm hold on the decisionmaking process. Even though many of the functions of the ministries have been handed over to the centrals or to the enterprises themselves, control from the center probably has been strengthened by the reduction in the span of control made possible by setting up the centrals. In any event, as long as detailed economic directives continue to be handed down from the top, very little real decentralization can take place.

3. Resources and development (U/OU)

Romania's GNP in 1969 has been estimated at about US$21.1 billion (at 1968 prices) or about $1,050 per capita, which is somewhat higher than for Greece or Yugoslavia, but much below the level in Western Europe and even in the northern Eastern European Communist countries or the U.S.S.R. Second only to Poland among the East European Communist countries in area (91,700 square miles) and population (about 20 million), Romania has long been one of the important corn- and wheat-growing countries of Europe and an important producer of oil, timber, and, more recently, natural gas. Of the Balkan countries, it is the best endowed with natural resources, and it has achieved about the same degree of economic development as the others (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece). The significant focal points of economic activity are shown in Figure 69.

The country has the largest deposits of petroleum and natural gas in Europe after the U.S.S.R., substantial timber resources, considerable deposits of low-quality hard coal and lignite (although about one-third of its coking coal must be imported), and a large potential in hydroelectric power. Annual production of gold, although only about 1% of world production, probably is greater than that of any other country in Europe except the U.S.S.R. Romania also mines some uranium. Exports consist mainly of foodstuffs, petroleum and timber products, and machinery and equipment.

Romania is less well endowed with industrial materials than with sources of energy, foodstuffs, and construction materials. The country is entirely or largely self-sufficient in the production of salt, sulfur, lead, and zinc, but in general has only small resources of other metals and minerals. Imports account for about three-fifths of the supply of iron ore, a major part of requirements of copper and mercury, and all requirements of tin. Although there has been a rapid growth in steel output, rolled steel continues to be imported in significant quantities. Romania also imports much of its machinery and equipment. The chemical industry is being developed rapidly, with emphasis on petrochemicals. Textile production provides a surplus for export, but cotton supplies are imported. Figure 70 shows the degree of self-sufficiency in key items in 1968.

During 1951-69, GNP grew at an estimated average annual rate of 6%. This growth, however, was uneven. GNP grew rapidly in the early 1950's, largely because of a very rapid increase of industrial production. A period of slow growth (1954-58) followed, reflecting recurrent crop failures, a slowdown of industrial growth, and a stabilization of investment expenditures (Figure 71). A new spurt began in 1959, and by 1969 GNP was more than twice the 1958 level.

As a result of the Communist regime's emphasis on industrialization, the share of industry in GNP now surpasses the share of agriculture (Figure 72). Industry, which accounted for only an estimated one-fifth of total employment in 1969, contributed an estimated one-third to GNP. Agriculture on the other hand, contributed only an estimated one-fifth to GNP, but employed over half of the total labor force.

The backwardness of agriculture and the low productivity of agricultural labor continue to be dominant economic problems in Romania. The ample supply of farm labor, however, has been of great importance in permitting a substantial growth of the nonagricultural labor force, which increased from an estimated 28% of total employment in 1950 to an estimated 46% in 1969. Because agricultural employment has declined only slightly since 1950, whereas

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

FIGURE 69. Focal points of economic activity (U/OU)

FIGURE 70. STRATEGIC SUPPLY POSITION, 1968 (U/OU)

	UNITS	PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	APPARENT CONSUMPTION	PRODUCTION AS PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION
Electric power	Million kw.-hr	27,828	0	2,223	25,605	*108.7*
Petroleum products	Thousand metric tons	12,700	16	5,594	7,122	*178.3*
Iron ore	....do	2,747	4,546	0	7,293	*37.7*
Coking coal for oven coke	....do	1,212	672	0	1,884	*64.3*
Metallurgical coke	....do	1,133	1,570	0	2,703	*41.9*
Pig iron	....do	2,992	509	*262	3,239	*92.4*
Rolled steel**	....do	***3,390	1,552	682	4,260	*79.6*
Bauxite	....do	250	124	0	374	*66.8*
Rubber (natural and synthetic)	....do	54	38	28	64	*84.4*
Apatite concentrate (P_2O_5)	....do	0	206	0	206	*0*
Cement	....do	7,026	0	1,208	5,818	*120.8*
Grain	....do	12,770	30	1,562	11,238	*113.6*
Sugar	....do	384	50	63	371	*103.5*
Cotton (unginned)	....do	0	76	0	76	*0*
Sawn wood (softwood and hardwood)	Thousand cubic meters	5,238	0	2,083	3,155	*166.0*
Plywood	....do	228	0	112	116	*196.6*

*Including castings.
**Including pipes.
***Estimated.

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

FIGURE 71. Estimated indexes of gross national product and industrial and agricultural production (U/OU)

FIGURE 72. ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, BY SECTOR OF ORIGIN (U/OU)
(Percent of total)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1967
Industries and handicraft	19.2	19.5	24.4	30.4	32.9
Agriculture and forestry	31.3	36.3	31.8	24.2	22.0
Construction	4.1	3.6	7.6	10.2	11.1
Transportation and communications	6.6	8.8	7.6	8.4	8.8
Trade	7.4	7.8	6.5	5.9	5.4
Housing	13.8	10.1	9.2	7.8	7.0
Government and other services	17.7	14.7	12.9	13.2	12.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

mechanization of agriculture and the size of farms have increased, there probably has been an increase in underemployment in agriculture.

a. INDUSTRY—The increase in industrial production has been the primary factor in the growth of GNP. The Communist regime has stressed rapid growth and diversification of industry, which before World War II consisted mainly of petroleum, agricultural processing, and textiles. In the years 1960-68, value added in industry increased at an estimated average annual rate of 11%, compared with an estimated 8% during 1951-59. The fastest growth occurred in heavy industry, especially in the chemical, machine-building, ferrous mining and metallurgy, and electric power industries.

The most important industries are machine-building, fuels, metallurgy, chemicals, textiles and clothing, agricultural processing, and timber processing. In 1968, these together accounted for about 56% of gross industrial production and for about 78% of employment in socialized industry.[10] The structure of gross industrial production and of industrial employment in 1968 is shown in Figure 73.

Employment in industry grew at an average annual rate of 2% during 1951-59, and of about 4% during 1960-68. Labor productivity in industry, however, grew much more rapidly than employment. The estimated average annual rate of growth was higher during 1960-69 than during 1951-59 (7% as compared with 6%) in spite of acceleration in the growth of employment. Fixed assets per worker in industry grew at an average estimated annual rate of about 6% during both 1951-59 and 1960-68.

b. AGRICULTURE—Agricultural production not only covers most domestic needs but also provides about one-fourth of Romania's exports. The growth in agricultural production since 1959 has been an important factor

[10] Except where otherwise indicated, data for industrial production, agricultural production, domestic and foreign trade, and employment are from official Romanian statistical sources.

FIGURE 73. STRUCTURE OF GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY, 1968 (U/OU)

	GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, IN PERCENT	EMPLOYMENT*	
		Thousands	*Percent*
Heavy industry	56.2	964.6	51.4
Electric power	3.0	37.2	2.0
Petroleum	3.7	37.1	2.0
Coal	1.3	52.8	2.8
Ferrous metallurgy	3.4	67.8	3.6
Nonferrous metallurgy (including mining)	3.5	55.9	3.0
Machine-building and metalworking	23.3	478.1	25.5
Chemicals	3.3	112.7	6.0
Construction materials	3.3	100.6	5.4
Other	1.4	23.4	1.2
Light industry	17.3	468.2	25.0
Textiles	7.1	200.1	10.7
Clothing	4.2	104.4	5.6
Leather goods, furs, and footwear	2.3	76.5	4.1
Other	3.7	87.2	4.6
Agricultural processing	19.6	168.5	9.0
Timber processing and forest exploitation	6.9	275.2	14.7
Total	100.0	1,876.5	100.0

NOTE—Discrepancies between some of these figures and figures quoted in the text are caused by slight differences in coverage used for the selected purpose.

*Excluding approximately 35,400 persons employed in the private sector. Components may not add to totals shown because of rounding.

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in the rapid growth of industrial production in that it has permitted an increase in raw materials for industry, in food supplies for urban areas, and in exports of foodstuffs to help pay for the greatly increased imports from non-Communist countries.

Agricultural production has shown a slow upward trend since World War II, with yearly fluctuations. Not until the mid-1950's was the prewar level finally surpassed in average years, and only since 1959 has it been regularly surpassed on a per capita basis. Net agricultural production[11] is estimated to have been 27% higher on the average during 1961-68 than during 1954-60. This increase was made possible by the absence of any severe countrywide droughts (except in 1968) and by an increase in industrial inputs—for example, chemical fertilizers and farm machinery. When current industrial and agricultural inputs, together with depreciation, are subtracted from gross agricultural production, the resulting measure—value added inagriculture—shows considerably less growth. The index of net agricultural production shows the increase in availabilities of agricultural products for domestic consumption and for export. The index of value added in agriculture shows that the contribution made to GNP by the agricultural sector itself has increased only slowly over the past decade.

The process of collectivizing agriculture, which was accelerated in 1959-60 and for all practical purposes was completed in 1962, has given the regime tighter control over agricultural output and has led to increased procurements of agricultural products by the state. Through its strict control over the movement of labor, the regime prevented a precipitous flight of farm workers to urban areas during collectivization. Farmers' incentives no doubt have been reduced, but the farmers retain private plots and a substantial part of the country's livestock.

c. Foreign trade—Romania is largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs and fuels, but the development of industry is highly dependent on imports of machinery and equipment and industrial materials—especially rolled steel, iron ore, coke and coking coal, and cotton. In support of the rapid industrialization of the 6-year plan (1960-65) and the 5-year plan (1966-70), Romania has greatly expanded its trade with the non-Communist countries, primarily in order to obtain equipment of advanced technology not available from the U.S.S.R. and other East European Communist countries. During 1960-65, the Romanians imported $630 million worth of machinery and equipment from the non-Communist countries. During 1966-68 these imports totaled $880 million, or nine-tenths of the $1 billion worth the Romanians had hoped to import during 1966-70.

The commodity structure of exports—which consist largely of foodstuffs, timber products, and petroleum products—has made possible the rapid growth of trade with the non-Communist countries, which have provided a ready market for such materials. Exports of machinery and equipment, which also constitute a large share of total Romanian exports, go primarily to the Communist countries. Most Romanian machinery and equipment could be sold with difficulty, if at all, in the non-Communist world.

Between 1959 and 1969 the share of the non-Communist countries in total Romanian trade rose from 20% to 45%. The Soviet share declined from 47% to 28%, and the share of the East European Communist countries from 25% to 19%. Western European countries—especially West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France—account for the bulk of Romanian trade with non-Communist countries. In 1965, West Germany replaced Czechoslovakia as Romania's second largest trade partner. United States-Romanian trade has remained small, but is increasing.

Romanian foreign trade turnover in 1969 was seven times the 1950 level. The periods of most rapid growth of trade correspond with the investment booms of 1950-53 and 1959-69. Total trade more than tripled during 1960-69. Trade with the non-Communist countries in 1969 was seven times the 1959 level, whereas trade with the Communist countries was only 2.3 times that in 1959.

Romania has incurred deficits in its commodity trade in most years since World War II. During 1959-69, the country incurred a cumulative deficit of about $732 million on its overall trade. The cumulative deficit with non-Communist countries totaled about $815 million, whereas a cumulative export surplus of about $83 million was achieved in trade with Communist countries. Trade deficits apparently were covered chiefly by Soviet credits through 1958 and by credits from Western Europe and Czechoslovakia since 1958.

4. Intrabloc economic relations (C)

Romania's relations with other Communist countries are largely bilateral. Although a member of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA),[12] Romania has refused to participate in most multilateral activities sponsored by the organization, and its opposition has been an important factor in the failure of CEMA to achieve more multilateral economic cooperation. In 1963, Romania objected to the proposal of (then) Soviet leader Khrushchev for a central planning unit in CEMA on the grounds that planning was a national prerogative. Romanian objections were enough to defeat the proposal.

This refusal to cooperate more fully with the other CEMA countries stems from an unwillingness to relinquish any part of national sovereignty over economic policy, partly because of national pride and partly because of the conviction that Romania would be seriously disadvantaged if other members of CEMA had a voice in determining its economic goals. Romania's economic interests conflict with those of the more developed East European Communist countries. The latter are interested in expanding markets for their manufactured goods and would like to see less developed CEMA countries like Romania and Bulgaria concentrate on supplying raw materials and agricultural

[11] Gross production less feed, seed, and waste.

[12] The full members of CEMA are the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Mongolia. Yugoslavia is an associate member. Albania has not been a member since 1962.

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products rather than on expanding nonfood processing industries. The Romanian regime, however, has made it clear that it has no intention of restricting industrial development in order to accommodate other members of CEMA.

The regime's insistence on economic independence was spelled out in a statement issued in April 1964 at a plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee. This statement stressed the necessity for rapid industrialization of underdeveloped countries, cooperation on the basis of fully equal rights and of mutual advantage and assistance, observance of national sovereignty and interests, the voluntary coordination of plans on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the freedom of each country to develop its own trade relations as it sees fit, and noninterference in internal affairs.

Romania has continued to resist efforts of some of the CEMA countries—especially the U.S.S.R. and Poland—to promote "economic integration" among the members. The communique of the CEMA "summit meeting" held in Moscow in April 1969 was so worded as to be acceptable to both the U.S.S.R. and Romania. The only concrete decision was to set up a joint investment bank to finance multilateral projects. Otherwise the leaders merely agreed to go on studying the problems of economic "cooperation"—the final communique does not even use the term "integration"—and to continue to respect "national sovereignty." Thus, CEMA is as far as ever from adopting a program for the economic integration of Communist Eastern Europe.

Although Romania has turned to the West for a much larger share of its imports, the country remains quite dependent on trade with the Communist world. Many of its import needs can be obtained from Communist countries without expending hard currency, and only these countries will take any substantial quantities of Romanian exports of machinery and other manufactured goods. But even the threat of a trade embargo probably would not force the Romanians to make any concessions that severely limit the country's self-determination.

B. Sectors of the economy

1. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry (U/OU)

a. AGRICULTURE—The total land area of Romania is about 91,700 square miles. About three-fifths of this is agricultural land; more than one-fourth is forest land. The distribution of the total area at the end of 1968 is shown in Figure 74. Almost one-third of the country is mountainous. The Carpathian chain divides the country into climatic zones, characterized by extremes in temperature and rainfall. The range of climate and soils and a long growing season, however, make possible the cultivation of a wide variety of crops common to southeastern Europe.

Romania is still one of the important European producers of grain, especially corn and wheat, in spite of the loss during World War II of the fertile areas of Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and southern Dobrogea. Grains remain the predominant crop, as shown in the following tabulation



FIGURE 74. Land use, 1968 (U/OU)

on the distribution of the use of cultivated land, in percent:

	1958	1968
Grains	76.8	68.3
Industrial crops	7.6	9.5
Potatoes, beans, and other vegetables	5.8	7.7
Forage	8.7	13.4
Other	1.1	1.0

Among the grains, wheat is the staple food for the urban population. Corn (maize) is an important foodstuff for the rural population as well as a feed grain, and both wheat and corn are exported. Compared with the countries of northern Europe, Romania is not a large producer or consumer of potatoes. A small part of the production of potatoes and vegetables is exported annually. The production of sugarbeets has provided net exports of sugar in each year since 1960. Production of wine grapes is the largest among the East European Communist countries, although it has not exceeded prewar levels except in 1955 and 1968. Livestock raising has increased as a result of increased domestic demand and the attractions of exporting livestock and livestock products to the West, but it still accounts for only about 38% of the total gross value of agricultural production. As in other Balkan countries, sheep predominate in numbers among the various types of livestock, but cattle- and hog-raising are becoming more important. Figure 75 shows production and yields of major crops and Figure 76 shows the livestock numbers.

Agricultural production has shown a slow upward trend since World War II, with yearly fluctuations. Not until the mid-1950's was the prewar level finally surpassed in average years, and only since 1959 has it been regularly surpassed on a per capita basis. Net agricultural production is estimated to have been about 30% higher on the average during 1961-69 than during 1954-60. Among the key crops wheat, corn, and sunflower seed have shown the best performance in recent years, with production and yields well above the levels of both 1934-38 and 1961-65. The rise in the production of corn has been

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FIGURE 75. PRODUCTION AND YIELDS OF PRINCIPAL CROPS (U/OU)

	1934–38 AVERAGE	1951–55 AVERAGE	1956–60 AVERAGE	1961–65 AVERAGE	1966	1967	1968	1969*
Production (thousand metric tons):								
Total grain**	8,016	8,232	9,186	10,887	13,899	13,512	12,770	12,820
Of which:								
Corn	4,056	3,935	5,028	5,853	8,022	6,858	7,105	7,680
Wheat	2,630	3,121	3,300	4,321	5,065	5,820	4,848	4,350
Oats	528	409	309	154	170	163	114	160
Barley	602	497	374	414	483	531	590	504
Rye	165	217	129	95	100	71	48	45
Sugar beets	392	1,406	2,428	2,866	4,368	3,830	3,936	3,800
Potatoes	1,318	2,352	2,883	2,600	3,352	3,096	3,706	2,229
Sunflower seed	48	266	363	504	671	720	730	750
Grapes	1,049	793	895	908	954	910	1,167	1,250
Yields (quintals per hectare):								
Corn**	10.4	12.9	13.9	17.7	24.4	21.3	21.3	23.1
Wheat	10.3	11.4	11.3	14.6	16.7	20.0	17.2	15.8
Oats**	7.8	9.1	9.8	10.0	12.3	12.9	8.6	12.3
Barley**	7.2	10.5	12.9	17.5	19.6	20.7	20.2	16.4
Rye	9.2	10.5	9.4	10.8	10.9	11.3	11.0	11.0
Sugar beets	153.5	126.8	149.3	161.8	224.8	217.5	213.1	202.1
Potatoes	77.2	94.6	105.3	85.1	108.4	97.9	115.9	73.1
Sunflower seed	8.7	7.4	9.1	11.1	14.4	15.0	14.0	14.0

*Preliminary.
**Romanian data on tonnages of corn, oats, and barley include moisture and dockage.

FIGURE 76. LIVESTOCK INVENTORY AND OUTPUT OF PRODUCTS (C)

	1937	1950	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969*
Number of livestock (in thousands, end of year):								
Horses	1,581	1,002	1,110	689	705	715	703	680
Cattle	3,653	4,502	4,450	4,935	5,198	5,332	5,136	5,034
Hogs	2,761	2,197	4,300	5,365	5,400	5,752	5,853	5,971
Sheep	10,087	10,222	11,200	13,125	14,109	14,380	14,298	13,836
Goats	364	498	415	807	828	732	632	540
Poultry	27,325	17,610	37,000	40,085	43,966	47,148	47,618	47,400
Output of livestock products:								
Red meat (carcass weight)** (thousand metric tons)	***341	269	382	462	500	542	592	587
Milk† (thousand metric tons)	***1,495	1,517	2,203	2,302	2,674	2,971	2,745	2,755
Wool (thousand metric tons)	***15	16	21	25	26	29	31	28
Eggs (million units)	***1,354	1,100	2,160	2,630	2,814	3,011	3,113	3,110

*Preliminary.
**Estimated; includes beef, veal, pork, mutton, and goat.
***1938.
†From cows.

smaller because of a decrease in the sown area, which largely offset a significant increase in the average yield of corn in the 1960's. Output of industrial crops and of fodder crops also has been higher since 1959 than before World War II and in earlier postwar years, because of increases in both acreage and yield. The increase in supply of fodder has permitted an increase in the number of livestock and in output of meat and milk, after several years of stagnation or decline.

The gradual upward trend in agricultural output reflects primarily gradual increases in yields, for there has been very little increase in the sown area, and emphasis on high-value crops and livestock. The increase in yields has resulted largely from the increased use of improved seed, better cultivation techniques, greater application of chemical fertilizer, and stabilization of farm organizations. The application of chemical fertilizer was about eight times as large in 1968 as in 1960. Application per hectare, however, remains among the lowest in Europe, and in 1968 only totaled 57 kg. of active nutrients per hectare of arable land as compared with 175 kg. in Bulgaria and 70 kg. in Yugoslavia. Average yields are likewise low by European standards.

The large increase in investment since 1957 has also helped to raise agricultural production, especially in the state farm sector. During 1960-68, investment in agriculture was 4.5 times the amount invested during the preceding 9 years and accounted for 17% of total investment,

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compared with 13% during 1951-59. The inventory of tractors in 1968 was 164% over 1959, and the number of grain combines was 280% greater. Much of the investment in agriculture, however, has been used to support the restructuring of agricultural holdings—from small-scale to large-scale farming enterprises. This has reduced the effectiveness of investment in raising agricultural output, at least in the short run.

The steady process of collectivizing agriculture that began in 1950 was greatly accelerated in 1959-60 and was completed for all practical purposes by March 1962. The share of total agricultural land in the cooperative and state sectors rose from 57% in 1958 to 73% in 1959 and to 94% in 1962. Since that time, the area allocated to private farmers has increased, with most of the increase coming from land formerly held by the agricultural associations. In 1968, privately farmed land accounted for 9% of all agricultural land.

The state farm sector, which has accounted for 30% of the agricultural land since 1963, includes 352 state agricultural enterprises, together with such other nationalized units as agricultural experiment stations, agricultural subsidiaries of other state enterprises, and state-owned grazing land. In 1967, state farms were consolidated under state agricultural enterprises. Thus, the number of units was reduced by more than one-half. These enterprises, most of which specialize in the cultivation of grains or in the raising of livestock, are an important source of agricultural products for the state. In addition, they are intended to serve as model farms, demonstrating the superiority of large mechanized units, and as experimental farms. A basic characteristic of state farms is that workers receive fixed money wages.

Until 1962 there were two major types of collective farms, as follows: Agricultural production cooperatives of the Soviet type, in which both land and livestock are owned and worked in common, except for small private plots; and agricultural associations, which are loose cooperatives in which the farmers retain their livestock and nominal ownership of their land but carry on many farming operations in common. During 1955-59, the regime gave priority to agricultural associations as an intermediate step toward full collectivization; thereafter, they were rapidly converted into agricultural production cooperatives. In 1968, the agricultural associations held only 0.2% of agricultural land, compared with 24% in 1959. At the end of 1968, the 4,673 agricultural production cooperatives accounted for 61% of the agricultural land.

Most of the agricultural machinery and equipment used on collective farms is controlled by the 290 enterprises for agricultural mechanization, which until recently also served as an instrument of political control over the peasants. The operations of these enterprises, which not only manage the agricultural machinery pools but also provide technical assistance of various kinds, are hampered by inefficiency, poorly trained mechanics, and a shortage of spare parts. As a result, operating costs are high and the quality of work poor. They are mostly paid in kind for their services. These payments are an important means of channeling agricultural products into the state's central fund.

The growth of production, together with the increase in control over supplies made possible by collectivization, has permitted a rapid growth of state procurements of agricultural products. This in turn has contributed to a rapid rise during the past decade in exports of grain and other foodstuffs, which are of particular importance in trade with non-Communist countries. In 1967, exports of foodstuffs were over six times the level of 1959 and accounted for 29% of total Romanian exports and for 43% of exports to the non-Communist countries. In 1968, however, severe drought forced a 15% drop in exports of foodstuffs, due mainly to a 39% drop in grain exports. Grain accounted for about 29% of exports of foodstuffs in 1966-68, fruit and vegetables for about 17%, meat and meat preparations for 14%, wine and other alcoholic beverages for about 10%, and animal and vegetable fats and oils for about 9%. In 1961-68, average yearly exports of grain, which consist primarily of corn, came to some 12% of the total grain output, compared with only 5% during 1958-60.

Most of the increase in procurement of agricultural products has come from the agricultural production cooperatives, on the basis of contracts that are nominally voluntary but often are compulsory in practice. State agricultural enterprises, over which the state has complete control, have also contributed significantly. In 1965 and 1967 the regime raised the procurement prices for a number of agricultural products—including cattle, sheep, hogs, milk, milk products, alcohol, and wine—in an effort to stimulate deliveries and output.

The Romanian diet is adequate in terms of quantity, but among the lowest in quality of the East European Communist countries. It is estimated that the average daily availability of food per capita currently amounts to the equivalent of 3,000 calories. However, the diet is heavily weighted with starchy foods, such as grain. Some improvement in variety and quality of the diet occurred in the latter half of the 1960's, but shortages of animal products and vegetables were still prevalent in 1969. The growth in demand for these foods greatly exceeded that of output in the last 3 years (1967-69). Recent rounds of wage increases for both industrial and farm workers will put additional pressure on insufficient supplies of animal products in 1970.

b. Fisheries—The fishing industry is of minor importance in the economy, and fish is not an important element in the diet. Consumption in 1963-64 was higher than in the prewar period, but amounted to only about 7 pounds per person. Imports of fresh and canned fish have increased considerably since 1958, and in 1968 amounted to 36,000 tons.[13] An effort has been made to bring about self-sufficiency in the production of fish. Fish hatcheries have been set up, training courses initiated, and new fish processing factories opened. Inland fishing predominates, but deep-sea fishing in the Black Sea and the Atlantic Ocean has been increasing in importance. Fishing operations in the Atlantic Ocean began in 1965, following the purchase in 1964 of two fish-factory trawlers from Japan. Since 1968, Romania has purchased several

[13] Metric measures are used in this section unless otherwise noted.

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trawlers from Poland. The total catch in 1967 amounted to about 48,400 tons, compared with only 11,300 tons in 1950 and 44,300 tons in 1965.

c. FORESTRY—Romania has substantial timber resources. With 6.3 million hectares (1ha. =2.47 acres) of forests and a timber stock of some 1,260 million cubic meters, it ranks fourth in forest resources among the European countries—after the U.S.S.R, Sweden, and Finland. Exports of timber and timber products are an important source of foreign exchange, particularly in trade with non-Communist countries. There has been very little increase in the average annual cutting of timber—which amounted to about 23 million cubic meters in 1968—since 1950. The Romanians have, however, met with considerable success in raising the share of industrial wood, which in the first half of 1968 accounted for more than 73% of the total cut, compared with 59% in 1959 and 49% in 1951. During the period 1950-68, 1.3 million hectares were reforested through direct planting and seeding. The Romanians are aware of the need to conserve forests, which were carelessly exploited in the past. They plan to continue reforestation, including the planting of fast-growing species, careful regulation of cutting, and expansion of the road network so as to be able to exploit previously inaccessible areas.

2. Fuels and power (C)

Romanian reserves of petroleum and natural gas are among the most important in Europe. In 1968 these commodities together accounted for about five-sixths of domestic output of energy from primary sources (Figure 77), and exports of petroleum products were an important source of foreign exchange. In that year, both the output and consumption of energy were more than three times the 1950 level. The 10-year plan (1971-80) for the development of energy and electric power calls for consumption of energy to total 96-98 million tons of standard fuel in 1980 as compared with 49 million tons in 1968. Figure 78 shows production of electric power and of other principal sources of energy.

a. SOLID FUELS—Romania is unique among East European countries in that it does not depend on solid fuels for a major share of its energy supply. The low-grade domestic coal resources are large, with total possible reserves estimated at about 4.5 billion tons, and the regime has encouraged the use of coal in order to conserve petroleum reserves. Nevertheless, coal continues to account for only about 12% of the energy supply, as before World War II. Because domestic hard coal is relatively difficult to mine, most of the increase in postwar coal production has consisted of lignite. In 1968, output of coal of all types reached 17 million tons, of which hard coal made up 7 million tons and brown coal and lignite 10 million tons.

One important deficiency in Romanian natural resources is the small reserve of coking coal—especially of grades suitable for manufacturing metallurgical coke, for which demand has been increasing rapidly. In 1961 output of coking coal was about 12 times the 1938 level, but growth has stagnated since then. About two-fifths of

FIGURE 77. ENERGY POSITION, 1968 (U/OU)

SOURCE OF ENERGY	PERCENT OF TOTAL
Production:	
Crude oil	34.5
Natural gas	49.0
Hard coal*	7.3
Brown coal and lignite*	4.9
Fuelwood**	3.3
Hydroelectric power	1.0
Total	100.0
Consumption:	
Oil products	22.1
Natural gas	55.2
Hard coal	8.3
Hard coal imports	1.4
Brown coal and lignite	5.5
Fuelwood**	3.7
Coke imports	2.7
Hydroelectric power	1.1
Total	100.0

*Gross output.
**Estimated.

FIGURE 78. ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION AND OTHER PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF ENERGY (U/OU)

	UNIT	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Electric power	Million kilowatt hours	4,340	6,824	17,215	20,806	24,769	27,828	31,491
Thermal	....do	4,017	6,526	16,210	19,771	23,293	26,266	*na*
Hydroelectric	....do	323	298	1,005	1,035	1,476	1,562	*na*
Crude oil	Thousand metric tons	10,555	11,438	12,571	12,825	13,206	13,285	13,246
Gasoline	....do	2,635	2,698	2,458	2,349	2,296	2,636	2,620
Diesel fuel	....do	1,626	2,277	3,600	3,746	4,025	4,368	4,593
Residual fuel oil*	....do	4,037	3,947	3,773	3,952	3,946	3,624	3,915
Natural gas	Million cubic meters	6,307	9,473	17,452	18,789	20,694	21,935	24,087
Oil gas**	....do	2,197	3,523	4,414	4,537	4,658	4,709	5,021
Methane gas	....do	4,110	***5,950	13,038	14,252	16,036	17,226	19,066
Coal†	Thousand metric tons	6,104	7,977	12,095	13,451	15,019	17,020	19,152

na Data not available.
*Includes 50% special fuel and residual fuel used in refineries.
**Before extraction of condensable gases.
***Approximate.
†Raw, uncleaned coal.

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the coal used in domestic production of oven coke is imported. Domestic production of coke now covers less than two-fifths of the requirements. Most Romanian imports of coke and coking coal traditionally have come from other East European Communist countries and the U.S.S.R., chiefly the latter. Increasing amounts now are coming from the non-Communist countries, which in 1968 supplied 7% of coke and about 15% of coking coal imports. In 1969, Romania obtained about 15% of its coke imports from non-Communist countries.

Romania's ambitious program for expanding its iron and steel industry will continue to lead to rapidly increasing reliance on imports of coke. In 1968—when a new 1,700 cubic meter blast furnace started operation at Galaţi—domestic coke output covered only about 42% of requirements as compared with 55% in 1965 and 60% in 1960. A second new 1,700 cubic meter furnace began operation at Galaţi in December 1969. Thus, in 1970 requirements for imported coke may total at least 2.4 million tons as compared with 1.6 million tons in 1968. Because coke is in short supply throughout the world, the Romanians encountered difficulties in securing sufficient coke supplies for 1969 and 1970. In late September 1969 the Romanian Ambassador requested the aid of the U.S. State Department in purchasing U.S. coke. He sought 180,000 tons of coke for immediate delivery and 300,000 tons a year during 1970-79. Preliminary data indicate that the United States shipped about 117,000 tons of coke to Romania in 1969.

b. Petroleum and natural gas—The crude oil reserves of Romania are estimated (as of 1969) at 150 million tons and reserves of natural gas at 230 billion cubic meters. In 1968 Romania ranked 14th in world production of crude oil and fourth in production of natural gas; it ranked second in Europe (after the U.S.S.R.) in output of both commodities. Romanian output of crude oil was more than four-fifths of the total production of the East European Communist countries and 4% of the total for these countries plus Soviet production. In 1969 about 13.2 million tons of crude oil and 24.1 billion cubic meters of natural gas (about 19.1 billion cubic meters of methane—dry gas—and 5.0 billion cubic meters of associated gas) were produced in Romania. In 1968, petroleum products accounted for about 22% of domestic energy consumption, in terms of standard fuel, and natural gas for about 55%.

Crude oil output recovered from wartime disruption in the period 1949 to 1955. Subsequent efforts to discover new oil deposits have met with little success, and output grew slowly during 1956-68. The Romanians plan to increase production of crude oil little if at all during 1971-75 and intend to import crude oil to supplement domestic output. Production in 1969 was 100% greater than in 1938 but only 25% greater than in 1955. The increase in natural gas production has remained rapid. As the pipeline network for gas distribution is extended, gas is to become even more important in meeting domestic energy requirements and as a raw material for the manufacture of chemicals. (Oil fields and pipelines are shown on the basic resources and processing inset on the Summary Map, Figure 108.)

The capacity of the refineries—about 15 million tons—has surpassed the domestic output of crude oil and crude oil is now being imported from the Middle East (on a barter basis) to be refined in Romanian refineries, principally for export to non-Communist countries to increase foreign exchange earnings. About three-fourths of the refinery capacity is located in and near Ploieşti; the remainder is in the Bacău area. The first catalytic cracking units, of Soviet design, were installed in 1960, and the first catalytic reforming units, built by the West German affiliate of a U.S. firm, were put into operation in 1961. In 1966-67, the Romanians purchased from the United States a catalytic cracking plant for installation at the Brazi (Brazii de Sus) petrochemical combine. These and other investments underway are designed to improve the yield and quality of products such as gasoline and diesel fuel and to provide raw materials needed by the petrochemical industry, which is now small but is expanding rapidly.

Imports of crude oil began in late 1968. So far, most of the crude has come from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. Romania has signed agreements with Iran, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia to import substantial quantities of crude oil over the next 10 years. Beginning in 1970, these imports could average 3 million tons a year and thus augment domestic production by about one-fourth.

Romania exports about two-fifths of its output of petroleum products. Of these, about seven-tenths go to non-Communist countries. In 1968, petroleum products accounted for 9% of total exports. Romania exported 38% of its output of gasoline, 52% of its output of diesel fuel, and 46% of its output of fuel oil. Diesel fuel and fuel oil represent more than four-fifths of the exports of petroleum products to non-Communist countries, whereas gasoline is the major product sent to the U.S.S.R.

A 61% drop in exports of gasoline between 1959 and 1968 resulted in a 5% decline in the quantity of exports of petroleum products. Exports of gasoline to the U.S.S.R. dropped 80%. Because the decline in exports was in a relatively high-priced petroleum product, the value of Romanian exports of petroleum products declined 28% during 1960-68. Exports of petroleum products to non-Communist countries about doubled between 1959 and 1968. The share in total exports to these countries, however, declined from over one-third to about one-tenth. Of exports to non-Communist countries, about three-fourths went to the industrialized countries in 1968.

c. Electric power—Electric power plays a significant role in the rapidly growing economy, providing illumination, motive power, and the base for many industrial processes. At the end of 1969 the total installed capacity was 6.4 million kilowatts (kw.), and production during the year amounted to 31.5 billion kilowatt-hours (kw.-hr.). The generating capacity has increased almost 2½ times since 1965 and is capable of meeting the needs of all classes of users. The electric power industry occupies a significant position among the nation's industries with

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respect to invested capital. Its development has required the expenditure of about 15% of the total industrial investment for the past few years. The output of the electric power industry amounts to 3% of the gross value of industrial production. Romania is a net exporter of electricity and maintains international connections with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the U.S.S.R. Large amounts of electricity, 2 billion kw.-hr. per year since 1967, are exported to Czechoslovakia through the U.S.S.R. in exchange for powerplant equipment. Other exports of power are minor in quantity and go to consumers in local border areas.

Industry is the largest and most significant user of electric power, accounting for over 75% of the total consumption. Principal industrial consumers are the chemical, fuel, machine-building, metallurgical, and cellulose and paper industries. The major nonindustrial use of electric power occurs in urban areas and is primarily for illumination. The agricultural, commercial, public utility, and transportation sectors are supplied with enough electricity to meet their basic needs. About one-third of the rural areas have no electric power connections, and only about two-thirds of the people have electricity in their homes.

Thermal powerplants account for 5,550,000 kw. or 87% of the total generating capacity, and the remainder is supplied by hydroelectric installations. Approximately 75% of the thermal output is fueled by natural gas, coal contributes about 23%, and oil most of the remainder. Almost all of the thermal capacity is near sources of fuel and the main consuming centers in the southern half of the country. The total hydroelectric potential capable of economic development is about 24 billion kw. hr., but only about 5% of the available waterpower potential has been harnessed. This lack of development may be attributed to the uneven flow on many of the country's rivers as well as high investment costs. Hydroelectric facilities are concentrated on the Bistriţa river in the northeast and on other streams in the central part of the country. The largest thermal installation is the 980,000-kw. Craiova powerplant. The Căpăţineni-Ungureni hydroelectric powerplant, with a capacity of 220,000 kw., is the largest hydroelectric installation.

The transmission network extends over much of the country and serves all economically significant areas. All of the country's important powerplants are connected to the network, which is also used for the international exchange of electricity. The greatest density of transmission facilities connects the central part of the country with Hunedoara in the west, Craiova and Slatina in the south, and Bucharest in the east. This area is interconnected by a 400-kv. line, the largest transmission line used in the country.

By the end of the 10-year energy and electric power development plan ending in 1980, the Romanians hope to increase total electric power capacity to about 20 million kw. and production to 80-85 billion kw.-hr. The largest project currently under construction is a joint Yugoslavia-Romania hydroelectric project at Gura Văii (Iron Gate) on the Danube River. The plant was scheduled for initial operation in 1970, with total capacity to be reached in 1971. Romania's share of its capacity will be 1,125,000 kw. The principal thermal plants under construction are two plants in the 1 million-kw. class that are designed to burn low-grade coal. The Romanians hope to construct by 1980 nuclear powerplants with an aggregate capacity of 1.8-2.4 million kw. In May 1970, the Romanians agreed to import from the Soviet Union a nuclear powerplant which will operate on enriched uranium. Negotiations are taking place with Canada for the purchase of a 600,000-kw. natural uranium reactor and with the United States for a heavy water plant to provide the moderator and the coolant for the reactor.

3. Minerals and metals (C)

a. Ferrous metals and minerals—Crude steel production in 1969 amounted to 5.5 million tons, or about 15% of the total production of East European Communist countries. Because of the small amount and low quality of domestic steelmaking materials, Romania is dependent upon imports for about 62% of the iron ore—as compared with 39% in 1960 and 45% in 1965—and about 58% of the metallurgical coke used in the industry. The U.S.S.R. is the chief supplier of iron ore, but its share in total Romanian imports has declined from 93% in 1960 to 69% in 1968. Non-Communist countries—especially Algeria and India—have become much more important as sources of supply and in 1968 accounted for 29% of the imports. Romania also is completely dependent on outside sources for alloying materials. It ranks second to Hungary among the East European Communist countries in the production of manganese ore, but this for the most part is not of metallurgical grade. In 1967 Romania exported about two-fifths of its output of manganese ore.

Substantial additions to capacity, together with more efficient use of existing capacity, have made possible large increases in steel production. In recent years West Germany has been an important supplier of metallurgical equipment, including a billet mill, two structural mills, a wire mill, and a blooming mill for the metallurgical combine in Hunedoara; a spiral-weld tube mill for the pipe-fabricating plant in Bucharest; and a basic oxygen furnace steel plant for the new iron and steel combine in Galaţi. Between 1959 and 1969 output of crude steel nearly quadrupled and estimated output of rolled steel more than quadrupled. Nevertheless, the country remains a net importer of rolled steel, especially of tube billets and flat-rolled products. Exports of rolled steel consist mainly of tubular products, sections, and semifinished steel. Production of pig iron increased 310% during 1960-69. Imports—nearly all from the U.S.S.R.—accounted for 16% of apparent consumption of pig iron in 1968.

The three largest iron and steel producing facilities are the Hunedoara, Galaţi, and the Reşiţa Metallurgical Combines. These combines account for about nine-tenths of the country's output of crude steel and finished steel (excluding pipes).

The first section of the Galaţi combine, which is about 12 miles from the Soviet border, went into operation in 1968. This combine, with a planned capacity

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of 4 million tons, has been the subject of heated controversy between Romania and other members of CEMA. The U.S.S.R. in particular apparently considered the construction of such a facility in Romania to be unwise because of the inadequate domestic resources of iron ore and coking coal. Nevertheless, the Soviets have provided some equipment and a considerable part of the iron ore for the combine. The first sections of this plant went into operation in 1968. Most of the equipment is coming from Western firms. In 1965 a British-French consortium delivered a heavy plate-rolling mill. In addition, the Romanians have purchased a basic oxygen furnace steel plant from West Germany and two air-separation plants from the United Kingdom. A contract has been arranged with a West German firm for the purchase of a continuous wide cold strip mill for the Galaţi combine. The Soviets supplied a slabbing mill for the combine and in early 1970 were helping to construct a hot strip mill. Production of metals and minerals is shown in Figure 79.

b. NONFERROUS METALS AND MINERALS—Romania produces a variety of nonferrous metals and minerals, mostly in small amounts. It is entirely or largely self-sufficient in salt, bauxite, aluminum, sulfur, lead, and zinc. Imports are the source of most other nonferrous metals and minerals, including all of the required supply of apatite concentrate and tin, the major part of the supply of mercury, and more than half of the supply of refined copper. Romania is the only significant producer of gold in Eastern Europe.

Until recently, Romania relied entirely on imports for its supply of primary aluminum but is now in a position to export some. The first plant for the production of primary aluminum began operation in 1965. This plant, located at Slatina, was built with French technical assistance. Part of the equipment came from West Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. The capacity of the plant reached 90,000 tons a year in 1969. The Romanians hope to be producing 180,000 to 200,000 tons of aluminum a year by 1975. An alumina plant recently constructed at Oradea apparently makes use of both domestic and imported bauxite. The quality of Romanian ore is believed to be poor. Bauxite reserves reportedly amount to 20 million tons, far less than those in Hungary. In 1968, imports—mostly from Yugoslavia—accounted for one-third of apparent consumption of bauxite. Romania also imports part of the alumina used in the plant at Slatina.

In 1968 Romania produced 39,000 tons of lead and 35,500 tons of refined zinc. The new lead and zinc smelter completed in 1966 at Copşa Mică made possible the increase in domestic output of lead and zinc combined by 50,000 tons annually. This smelter was purchased from the United Kingdom and employs the Imperial smelting process.

Romania's substantial salt deposits are of a very pure content and are important to the chemical industry. The country ranks second (1966) among the East European Communist countries in the production of salt. About one-fifth of total output is exported.

Production of gold exceeds that of any other country in Europe except the U.S.S.R., although it amounts to only about 1% of world production. Output of gold reportedly has amounted to $25 million a year in recent years. Romania's production of gold has permitted the accumulation of substantial reserves for a country its size. These reserves, together with expected production of gold over the next few years, help to strengthen the nation's position in trade and credit negotiations with non-Communist countries.

Uranium mining started in 1953, when a joint Soviet-Romanian stock company was formed to control all the mining and processing of uranium ore in Romania. This company has been returned to the Romanians, and uranium apparently is no longer being sent to the U.S.S.R. but is being stockpiled by Romania for eventual use in nuclear powerplants.

4. Manufacturing and construction (C)

a. MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT INDUSTRIES—The machinery and equipment industries, which together with the metal products industry account for 25% of employment in socialized industry, have been developed

FIGURE 79. OUTPUT OF SELECTED MINERALS AND METALS INDUSTRY PRODUCTS (S)
(*Thousand metric tons*)

	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Iron ore	637	1,064	2,479	2,681	2,797	2,747	2,999
Pig iron	570	846	2,019	2,198	2,456	2,992	3,477
Crude steel	766	1,420	3,426	3,670	4,088	4,751	5,540
Rolled steel (including pipe)*	498	822	2,350	2,590	2,910	3,393	3,816
Metallurgical coke	144	609	1,135	1,103	1,131	1,133	939
Bauxite	37	71	12	15	200	250	*na*
Primary aluminum and aluminum alloys	0	0	9	47	53	76	90
Lead**	11	12	12	20	39	39	*na*
Zinc	10	12	15	23	36	36	*na*
Refined copper	3	5	15	17	19	21	*na*
Salt	566	840	2,016	2,046	2,059	2,368	*na*

na Data not available.
*Estimated.
**Probably including some secondary metal.

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primarily to support agriculture, the petroleum industry, and the railroads. Since the mid-1950's, machinery and equipment have become important sources of foreign exchange, but only in trade with other Communist countries. Between 1955 and 1968, total Romanian exports in this category increased from $26 million to $313 million, and as a share in total exports rose from 6% to 21%. The major exports of machinery and equipment are oilfield equipment (16% of the total in 1968), freight cars and locomotives (15%), tractors and spare parts for tractors (12%), motor vehicles and trailers (12%), and ships and marine equipment (11%). Romanian plans call for a substantial increase in exports of machinery and equipment during 1971-75. Most of these exports will continue to go to other Communist countries, but there are hopes of increasing exports to non-Communist countries, chiefly those that are less developed.

Romania is a substantial producer of some types of agricultural machinery and tractors, of petroleum equipment, and of rolling stock. Domestic supply of most other lines of equipment falls short of meeting requirements and contributes only a small part of total U.S.S.R.-East European Communist countries production. Output of the major types of machinery and equipment is shown in Figure 80.

Most of the important types of agricultural machinery are produced. The two largest plants are located in Bucharest; 14 other plants are scattered throughout the southern part of the country. In 1968 Romania was the third largest producer of agricultural tractors among the East European Communist countries, with output amounting to 21,200 units, or about 21% of total production in the area. Production, which increased to 24,895 units in 1969, consists primarily of wheeled tractors of medium horsepower. A new 130-horsepower tracklaying tractor was introduced in 1963, and a new 65-horsepower model in 1965. All tractors are produced by the Braşov Tractor Works. In 1967-68 Romania exported 46% of its output of tractors.

Sufficient petroleum equipment (oilfield and refinery) is produced to meet nearly all requirements of the large petroleum industry and to provide a sizable volume of equipment for export. Romania is outranked in the Soviet-Communist Eastern Europe area as a producer of oilfield equipment only by the U.S.S.R., whose production far exceeds that of Romania. In 1968, exports of oilfield equipment totaled $49 million. Exports of refinery equipment totaled only $5 million as compared with $15 million in 1965. Most exports of oilfield equipment now go to the other Eastern European Communist countries, but considerable effort is being made to develop markets in non-Communist countries. The petroleum equipment manufactured in Romania is good, although inferior to similar U.S. equipment.

Production of oilfield equipment is concentrated in the 1 May Plant in Ploieşti and the Tîrgovişte Plant. The petroleum equipment industry is still largely dependent on imports of instruments and control equipment, geophysical devices, and other equipment of advanced design, such as catalytic cracking units. Assistance from the U.S.S.R. has been a major factor in the development of oilfield equipment; and the Romanians have been dependent on both Soviet and Western technology for the latest design and processing techniques in refining.

Among East European Communist countries, Romania ranks second to Poland in the production of freight cars and of trucks, and second to Czechoslovakia in the production of locomotives. Freight cars are assembled in three plants; the largest of these is the Arad Railroad Car Plant, which is also the only producer of passenger cars for railroad. In 1959 Romania shifted from the manufacture of steam locomotives to the production of diesel-electric locomotives, which are being constructed under a Swiss license. The locomotive beds are cast at the Reşiţa Metallurgical Combine; assembly takes place at the Electrical Equipment Works at Craiova. About two-fifths of freight car production and one-third of locomotive production are exported.

FIGURE 80. OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS OF THE MACHINE-BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY (U/OU)

	UNIT	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Metalcutting machine tools	Units	2,086	*na*	7,163	8,522	9,689	11,693	13,578
Bearings	Thousand units	1,668	3,532	13,572	15,299	17,443	20,105	22,182
Electric generators	Thousand kv.-a	54	61	295	310	416	421	376
Electric transformers	*do*	309	1,259	4,134	4,586	5,272	6,120	7,010
Electric motors (0.25 kw. and over)	Thousand kw	147	467	1,255	1,507	1,679	1,989	2,412
Internal combustion engines	Units	5,869	5,588	11,398	12,331	15,916	16,932	16,104
Drilling rigs	*do*	12	72	74	64	47	43	*na*
Petroleum refinery equipment	Thousand metric tons	2	5	23	8	6	9	*na*
Chemical equipment	*do*	*na*	12	36	32	40	41	*na*
Metalworking equipment	*do*	4	20	41	48	51	59	*na*
Tractors	Units	3,500	11,000	15,836	18,500	17,571	21,200	24,895
Tractor-drawn grain drills	*do*	1,428	6,870	3,024	4,507	5,212	5,673	*na*
Tractor-drawn combine harvesters	*do*	0	3,400	2,012	4,049	4,950	7,518	*na*
Main-line diesel and electric locomotives	*do*	0	0	110	125	133	167	214
Freight cars*	*do*	1,370	3,584	8,581	7,609	8,030	8,267	*na*
Motor vehicles	*do*	3,028	9,513	22,795	26,973	31,801	38,838	56,998
Radio receivers	Thousands	89	167	323	325	367	388	428

na Data not available.
*Standard gage.

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The other branches of the machine-building industry lag behind. There is some production of machine tools, electrical and telecommunication equipment, motor vehicles, ships, chemical equipment, and aircraft. The output of these industries is aimed largely at satisfying domestic requirements and must be supplemented by imports. The chemical equipment industry, which has developed rapidly in recent years, still ranks only fifth in the Soviet-Communist Eastern Europe area. Romania exports some chemical equipment but still relies heavily on imports of equipment of advanced design. Production of machine tools is limited almost entirely to metalcutting types, such as engine lathes, milling machines, vertical drills, shapers, and a few grinders. The major items of electrical equipment manufactured are transformers of sizes up to 200,000 kv.-a. and electric motors of sizes up to 1,600 kw.

Production of motor vehicles consists mostly of trucks, jeeps, and buses: in 1968 Romania accounted for about 9% of the vehicle output of the East European Communist countries. The first plant to assemble automobiles was purchased from Renault of France and began operation in 1968. The plant, which the Romanians originally hoped would attain its full capacity of 50,000 vehicles a year by 1970, is running behind schedule. In 1969 Romania signed a 10-year contract with the West German firm of *Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg A.G.* (MAN) for licensing and cooperation in the production of 17 types of trucks and buses in Bucharest and Braşov. The vehicles are to be equipped with Saviem engines, which will be delivered by the French partner of MAN. Heretofore Romania has produced only gasoline-engine trucks; these latest cooperative agreements will provide a diesel output, which is especially desired for the export market.

In 1967-68, Romania exported 20% of its output of trucks and 64% of its output of jeeps. Of total exports of trucks, four-fifths went to Communist China. In the same year, Romania imported 13,591 passenger cars and a number of trucks, buses, and motorcycles.

The shipbuilding industry produces primarily small river and coastal vessels. Since World War II about three-fourths of new ships constructed have been exported, primarily to the U.S.S.R. Romania is dependent on imports for large cargo ships and for tankers. Since 1965 the country has received eight bulk cargo ships and two tankers from Japan and two dry cargo ships from the United Kingdom.

Aircraft production consists of small numbers of light utility, sport, and trainer aircraft and a few gliders. In 1968 the British Aircraft Corporation received a contract for the delivery to the Romanian national airline TAROM of six BAC-111 twin-jet airliners (four have been delivered). Associated with this agreement is a protocol for cooperation between British and Romanian industries. The Britten Norman firm entered a cooperation agreement whereby it will provide two Romanian enterprises with kits of parts for the Islander light transport aircraft. They are to assemble the aircraft and then fly them back to Britten Norman. The Romanians are to build 200 to 250 Islanders at a rate of about 50 a year. The first eight Islanders were completed in 1969.

b. CHEMICALS—The chemical industry is small; in East Europe it ranks below those of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It accounts for only 6% of industrial employment in Romania; yet it has expanded rapidly and there is a favorable raw material base for further increases in production. In 1968 the gross output of the chemical industry was 36 times the 1950 level. This rapid growth was achieved with the help of equipment and technical assistance from the U.S.S.R. and other East European Communist countries, and, in the 1960's, from non-Communist countries. Production data for the chemical industry are shown in Figure 81.

Development of the chemical industry continues to receive high priority, with special emphasis on petrochemicals. The Romanians plan to increase the gross output of the chemical industry about 85%-92% during 1971-75. By 1980 the machine-building and chemical industries together are to represent about 45% of gross industrial production, as compared with 32% in 1968. Major emphasis is to be placed on increasing the output of petrochemicals, synthetic fibers, plastics, fertilizers, and soda products. Should these ambitious plans be achieved, Romania could surpass Czechoslovakia and approach Poland in output of the chemical branch.

FIGURE 81. OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (U/OU)

	UNIT	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Phosphorous fertilizer (100% P_2O_5)	Thousand metric tons	7	44	126	155	165	182	720
Nitrogen fertilizers (100% N)	do	3	8	166	264	372	421	
Soda ash (100% Na_2CO_3)	do	50	104	350	370	384	471	*593
Caustic soda (100% NaOH)	do	23	62	233	252	260	276	*313
Sulfuric acid (100%)	do	92	199	541	619	679	773	838
Calcium carbide	do	24	49	123	134	148	148	152
Benzol	do	*Insig*	7	45	62	64	64	*na*
Plastics and synthetic resins (100%)**	do	1	7	75	95	108	130	137
Chemical fibers and threads	do	3	3	21	34	47	53	56
Synthetic rubber	do	0	0	31	35	51	54	55
Motor vehicle tires***	Thousand units	171	312	1,222	1,510	1,660	1,829	2,147

na Data not available.
*Approximation.
**Excluding resins used for synthetic fibers.
***Excluding tires for motorcycles and bicycles.

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In order to reach its long-term goals for the production of chemicals, especially petrochemicals, Romania will have to continue to import large amounts of technology and equipment from non-Communist countries because of the backwardness of the Soviet-East European Communist countries in this area. Among the chemical plants the Romanians hope to import from industrialized non-Communist countries are an ammonia and synthetic gas installation based on natural gas (West Germany), a urea plant (Belgium), and a polyisoprene rubber plant for which no contract had yet been signed in early 1970.

Romania still is a net importer of chemicals (including rubber and rubber products), with imports and exports totaling $101 million and $90 million, respectively, in 1968. The most important imports of chemicals are natural rubber, apatite concentrate, agricultural chemicals, plastics, and dyes. Major exports of chemicals are soda products, tires and tubes, fertilizers, synthetic rubber, lampblack, lacquers and varnishes, synthetic resins, and calcium carbide. Exports of some products may be at the expense of domestic consumption. In 1968 and 1969, for example, Romania exported about one-half of its output of synthetic rubber, although domestic consumers probably could have absorbed the total production. The Romanians hope to expand exports of chemicals nearly 80% during 1971-75.

The chemical industry is concentrated in the city of Bucharest and in the counties or former regions of Bacău, Prahova, Braşov, Timiş, and Neamţ. Plants located in Bucharest accounted for one-fourth of chemical production in 1968, while the plants located in the five counties together accounted for about two-fifths.

c. Light industry—Light industry, which accounted for 25% of employment in socialized industry in 1968, includes the textile, clothing, leather and footwear, cellulose, paper, and miscellaneous industries. It has grown at a considerably slower rate than industry as a whole since 1950. The textile, clothing, and leather and footwear industries are the principal branches (in that order), together accounting for about four-fifths of employment in light industry. Romania exported 15% of its output of cotton textiles and 19% of its output of leather footwear in 1968, and 36% of its output of readymade clothing in 1969. Some cotton textiles are imported; thus net exports for 1968 amounted to 7% of output. Clothing, textiles, and leather shoes contributed 7% of total Romanian exports in 1968. A substantial part of some of the raw materials (including all of the cotton and much of the leather) for light industry is imported.

Light industry is widely dispersed. The largest concentration of the textile, clothing, and leather and footwear industries is in the city of Bucharest, which accounted for about 30% of the output in 1968. Much of the light industry consists of small establishments. The importance of private craftsmen and those employed in small-scale private industry has declined sharply, and in 1968 they accounted for an estimated 3%-4% of total employment in light industry, compared with about two-fifths in 1958. Output of the light industry along with timber products is shown in Figure 82.

d. Timber processing industry—Romania's vast forests provide the basis for a sizable timber industry. In 1968 this industry accounted for 6% of gross industrial production and—together with forest exploitation—for 15% of employment in the socialized sector. Timber products other than furniture are an important export to non-Communist countries, and in 1968 represented 14% of such exports as compared with 6% of exports to Communist countries. Exports of furniture—which go primarily to Communist countries—accounted for 4% of total exports in 1968.

Production of industrial wood, which accounts for about two-thirds of wood production, averaged an estimated 13 million cubic meters a year during 1960-65, compared with 11 million cubic meters during 1954-59. Output of wood manufactures (such as plywood and veneer) and of finished products (such as furniture) has grown much faster than output of sawn wood, which rose only 46% during 1960-69. The heaviest concentration of woodworking plants is in the counties or former regions of Suceava, Argeş, Bacău, Harghita, Neamţ, and Mureş-Autonomă Maghiară, and in the city of Bucharest.

e. Agricultural processing industries—Agricultural processing industries account for about 9% of employment in socialized industry and for 20% of gross industrial production. Output has grown steadily and by 1968 was about 4½ times the 1950 level. Some of the increase,

FIGURE 82. OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS OF LIGHT INDUSTRY (U/OU)

	UNIT	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Cotton and cotton-type fabrics	Million square meters	243	218	319	339	357	377	410
Wool and wool-type fabrics	do	31	28	41	44	50	52	55
Natural and artificial silk fabrics	do	21	23	32	32	35	38	43
Linen, hemp, and mixed fabrics	do	11	18	39	42	46	47	53
Knit goods*	Million pieces	24	30	78	86	96	104	122
Socks and stockings	Million pairs	47	64	96	111	118	118	*na*
Footwear*	do	18	28	43	46	57	62	63
Paper	Thousand metric tons	109	127	244	287	336	380	398
Sawn wood (softwood and hardwood)	Thousand cubic meters	3,218	3,614	5,004	5,399	5,311	5,238	5,262
Plywood	do	31	53	200	210	221	228	*na*
Veneer wood	Million square meters	4	9	25	31	35	43	*na*

na Data not available.
*Excluding production of the private sector.

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to be sure, reflects merely a shift from home or handicraft production to commercial processing rather than an increase in the total volume of production. Special emphasis has been placed on canning, meat processing, and dairy products, and attention also has been given the building of refrigeration facilities in order to support the enlarged meat industry, which is one of the most important branches of food processing. Milling and sugar refining are also important, and Romania is the largest producer of wine among the East European Communist countries. In 1968 two sugar processing factories—one in Buzău and one in Oradea—purchased from West Germany were put into operation. Each of these has a capacity of ,000 tons of sugar beets a day. A similar unit at Corabia was under construction in 1969. Production data for the agricultural processing industries are shown in Figure 83. Exports of processed foods consist mainly of meat and meat preparations, alcoholic beverages, edible animal and vegetable oils and fats, and vegetables and fruit.

f. Construction—The construction industry accounts for about 7% of civilian employment. In 1968 the volume of construction[14] was more than three times the 1959 level and more than 10 times the 1950 level. The program has concentrated resources on industrial construction. Inefficient planning, poor management, idle equipment, and shortages of skilled labor and high-quality materials remain acute problems. Unnecessary lags in completions are a constant problem and often result in long delays in installation of machinery, including that for which the government has expended hard currency.

Romania's construction industry is highly socialized. Private activity in the sector is limited mainly to housing construction. During 1960-69 some 493,000 dwelling units were built with state and cooperative funds. Private construction of housing declined between 1958 and 1969, from about four-fifths of all new housing (in terms of floorspace) in 1958 to about two-fifths in 1969. According to the census of March 1966, the total stock of housing in Romania totaled 5.4 million units with 147.7 million square meters of living space. Thus, the Romanians have available only about 7.7 square meters of living space per person as compared with 18.6 square meters in East Germany (1968) and 10.6 square meters in Bulgaria (1965).

[14] Data exclude construction financed by individuals from their own funds.

C. Economic institutions and policies (U/OU)

1. Economic institutions

a. Economic planning and administration—The Romanian regime is experimenting with administrative decentralization and has undertaken a general reorganization of its system of economic management. In June 1966 Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu stated:

> Measures are being worked out, on the basis of instruction by the Ninth Party Congress (held in July 1965), for improving the economic leadership, in which the broadening of the jurisdiction of enterprises plays an important role. Undoubtedly, enterprise leadership must have more freedom of movement in financial and economic problems, because it is only in this way that they will be able to make constant progress.

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In late 1969 the Romanians reorganized the economic ministries and replaced many of the general directorates of the industrial ministries with about 200 industrial centrals. The reorganization of the ministries was aimed primarily at streamlining the top-heavy ministerial

FIGURE 83. OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS OF THE AGRICULTURAL PROCESSING INDUSTRY (U/OU)

	UNIT	1955	1959	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Meat*	Thousand metric tons	221	241	308	345	399	429	417
Meat products (excluding canned meat)	do	34	50	59	67	75	83	91
Bread**	do	1,122	1,162	1,755	1,756	1,662	1,715	*na*
Fresh milk (including powdered milk)***	Thousand hectoliters	860	1,236	2,706	3,197	3,554	3,879	4,003
Cheese***	Thousand metric tons	22	36	53	54	53	59	68
Butter***	do	7	11	22	28	30	29	31
Edible oils and fats†	do	48	77	172	206	256	268	291
Sugar (refined)	do	130	242	402	442	445	384	428
Canned vegetables	do	22	27	99	107	128	147	300
Canned fruit	do	64	54	78	83	97	102	

na Data not available.

*Estimated output in slaughterhouses, not including lard.

**Retail sales through socialized trade networks. Data include flour distributed in some workers' centers instead of bread. Data on production of bread are not available.

***Industrial output.

†Excluding output of peasants' presses, but including output from imported raw materials.

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bureaucracy and at transferring technical and administrative workers into the field. By mid-December 1969, more than 8,900 positions in the industries had been abolished. This represented a reduction in staffing of 39%. The regime also used the reorganization to make shifts in top personnel. Even though many of the functions of the ministries have been handed over to the centrals or to the enterprises themselves, control from the center probably has been strengthened by the reduction in the span of control made possible by setting up the centrals. In any event, as long as detailed economic directives continue to be handed down from the top, very little real decentralization can take place. And the regime clearly intends to keep a firm hold on the decisionmaking process.

The law establishing industrial centrals on an experimental basis was approved by the Council of Ministers in April 1969. By the end of 1969 most industrial enterprises, still the basic units of management, were grouped under industrial centrals, combines, trusts, or groups.[15] The centrals consist of several enterprises grouped in one or more of the following ways: Vertically by product, horizontally by product, and territorially by product. Many officials have been sent from the ministries to the industrial centrals and enterprises and to agricultural units. The Romanians consider the present organization of the industrial centrals to be experimental and plan to make revisions as the need arises.

The industrial centrals are to make proposals for annual and long-term plans and to oversee fulfillment of these plans. The centrals will be responsible for insuring supplies for the enterprises and for the sale of goods on the domestic market. They eventually will play some role in foreign trade, although in foreign trade matters they apparently cannot act independently. In late 1969 and early 1970 steps were being taken to move many of the foreign trade enterprises from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to the production ministries, which are also responsible for the industrial centrals. Also, they apparently will coordinate the research and modernization activities of the enterprises. The centrals are to have some latitude in administering the wage fund, in the use of material and financial means available to them, and in the selection, hiring, promotion, and training of personnel.

There have also been changes in agricultural organization. The establishment of the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives in 1966 led to a substantial increase in central control over the agricultural producer cooperatives. In March 1967 the Romanians decided to reorganize the state farm sector. The primary responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the state farms was transferred from the central agency (then called the Higher Agricultural Council) to an economic unit between it and the state farm. These state agricultural enterprises comprise several state farms in the same area.

Finally, there have been organizational changes in the local economy. Local governments are responsible for directing many small-scale state enterprises producing consumer goods, construction materials (such as bricks and timber), and metal products; for directing cooperative and private enterprises; and for directing organizations providing such municipal services as local transportation and water supply. The local governments in turn are now responsible to the State Committee for Local Economy and Administration. This committee was formed in May 1969 to insure the coordinated implementation of party and state policy in the local economy. It replaced the less powerful Committee on Local Administrative Problems.

Another feature of the Romanian "improvements" of the economic system has been the establishment of collective leadership at several levels of command. In May 1968 management committees were established in state economic enterprises and organizations. These committees comprise the manager of the enterprise, other supervisory personnel, chief engineers and other experts, the chairman of the trade union committee, and one to five representatives of the employees. The management committees, at least in name, have taken over the responsibilities for general policy previously exercised by plant managers and their assistants. These committees meet once a month, oftener if necessary, to encourage a sense of employee participation. Semiannual general assemblies of employees were established, at which the enterprise presents to the ministers and other top officials reports on current progress and shortcomings.

At the time of the general reorganization in late 1969 the principle of collective leadership was extended to the economic ministries. These include industrial ministries, such as the Ministry of the Machine Building Industry, and those in charge of other economic sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, banking, domestic and foreign trade, and transportation and communications. Each of these is now to be directed by a "collegium," consisting of the minister and his deputies; leaders of organizational sections of the ministry and of certain units under the jurisdiction of the ministry; specialists from within or from outside of the ministry; and representatives of the trade unions. The collegiums, which could increase the political pressures on economic ministers, are to meet at least once a quarter.

Operations of state enterprises are planned in considerable detail, in accordance with the role assigned to each in the national economic plan. The management of enterprises and of industrial centrals participates in the drawing up of the plans, but both the guidelines for the plans and their final form are imposed by the political leadership. In the final plan the enterprise is given instructions on the following: What to produce and how much, what prices to charge, and what equipment to install. Central allocation of controlled materials and investments largely dictates what enterprises can buy and what customers they can sell to.

Final authority for economic planning rests with the Council of Ministers, which, of course, must honor the general economic policy and goals established by the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party. The State Planning Committee, which is directly subordinate to

[15] The industrial centrals, combines, trusts, and groups all operate on the basis of the statute establishing industrial centrals. References to "industrial centrals," therefore, will include the combines, trusts, and groups.

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the Council of Ministers, drafts the plan on the basis of its own studies and the submissions of the economic ministries and other institutions. When the plan has been approved by the Council of Ministers, the party leadership, and the Grand National Assembly, the State Planning Committee assigns each economic ministry its tasks, and the ministries in turn break these down among their subordinate units.

An Economic Council was established in 1968 to study the economy and to make proposals for the solution of major economic problems. A law adopted in 1969 strengthened and expanded the role of the Economic Council, and consequently of the State Council, by making it responsible for checking on the implementation of economic policy established by the party and state and by transferring it from the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers to that of the Communist Party and the State Council.

b. FINANCE—Because the economy is planned and managed primarily by direct orders and physical allocations, financial institutions such as banks have little policymaking authority. The drawing up of financial instruments such as the state budget reflects rather than influences economic policy. The supply of money, including credit, is not a key factor in economic decisions. Where direct state controls are weakest—especially in the consumer market and in agriculture—the state relies heavily on financial means to achieve its ends. Workers have some mobility, employers have some leeway on paying wages, and consumers can spend their incomes freely. Therefore, prices of consumer goods must be adjusted periodically to balance supply and demand. Also, changes in agricultural prices sometimes have a marked affect on agricultural production and on marketing of agricultural products. Within the state-owned sector, however, prices are mainly a basis for accounting and money is a reflection, but not a regulator, of economic activity.

The function of financial institutions is to facilitate the execution of the economic plan. At present there are five banking institutions (all state-owned): The National Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank, the Investment Bank, and the Savings and Loan Bank. The National Bank is the only bank of issue; it regulates currency circulation and acts as fiscal agent for the government—in other words, it serves as the central bank. The bank also monitors the activities of nonagricultural enterprises, to determine whether money is being spent for prescribed purposes and to bring infractions of regulations to the attention of the state and party authorities. This monitoring function is exercised through the bank's control over short-term credits to enterprises and control over enterprise accounts. The Agricultural Bank, established in March 1968, performs the same functions for the agricultural sector. Currency is used only for payments to the population. Except for small reserves, all currency receipts of enterprises must be turned in promptly to the National Bank.

The handling of international financial transactions has been transferred from the National Bank to the Foreign Trade Bank. The latter was established in 1968 primarily to facilitate trade operations, especially exports, by means of credits, in lei or foreign currency, to the Romanian producing enterprises and foreign trade companies.

The Investment Bank acts mainly as a transfer agent for investment funds provided for in the state budget. The Savings and Loan Bank (CEC) provides banking services to the population; stores their valuables; makes payments to the public for pensions, death benefits, and family aid; receives payments from the public for taxes, insurance premiums, and rents on state-owned apartments; and maintains individual savings accounts. By 1969 deposits in the CEC's were 11 times the 1960 level.

Insurance (except social insurance, discussed in 4. Sociological, under Public Welfare) is under the jurisdiction of the State Insurance Administration. The system covers individuals, cooperative farms, supply and sales cooperatives, artisan production cooperatives, and state enterprises of local interest. State enterprises of national interest are not formally insured, because compensation for damage or loss sustained by them is covered by the state budget.

The state budget is the main financial document embodying the regime's key economic policies. Budgetary expenditures and revenues are designed to accomplish the following: 1) Absorb the excess of enterprise receipts over and above production costs and other legitimate outlays, 2) absorb the excess of the public's money income over and above the money value of available consumer goods, and 3) in general, redistribute purchasing power among elements in the economy in such a way as to support the regime's policies on investment, defense, and consumption. In 1968 local governments accounted for about 15% of total expenditures in the national budget but covered only about 43% of these expenditures from their own receipts. The difference is made up by subsidies from the central budget.

The state obtains the bulk of its income by setting the prices of most consumer goods at levels much higher than costs of production. Some of the differences between prices and costs are accounted for by the turnover tax—a differentiated sales tax—which provided 26% of total receipts in the state budget in 1968 and came to 43% of the value of retail trade. The remainder of the difference between prices and costs consists of enterprise profits, the bulk of which are also transferred to the budget. Enterprise profits accounted for 28% of total budget receipts in 1968.

Receipts from personal income taxes, which are moderately progressive, increased very little between 1955 and 1962 but nearly doubled from 1962 to 1968, when they represented only 6% of total receipts of the state budget. Social insurance receipts and expenditures represent 5% and 7%, respectively, of total national budget receipts and expenditures.

Of total receipts of the state budget, 35% are derived from unspecified sources. Most of these probably come from the following sources: Profits from imports and profits resulting from discriminatory pricing by trading enterprises between private and state buyers, progressive

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and discriminatory agricultural taxes charged private farmers and progressive taxes on cooperative farms, and income taxes on cooperatives.

About two-thirds of total national budget expenditures in 1968 went to finance production, transportation, and trade under the category "financing the national economy." A new regulation provides that the enterprises shall retain a larger share of their profits to be used in investments. Thus, the 1970 budget plan calls for only about two-fifths of the financing for capital investment from state funds to come from the budget. Through 1969 this share was about two-thirds. This category also covers subsidies to enterprises suffering losses on current account, grants to cover planned increases in inventories and cash balances of enterprises, additions to state reserves of materials, and expenditures for unspecified purposes.

Expenditures for social-cultural purposes represent the second largest outlay of the budget, accounting for 23% of total expenditures in 1968. "Open" expenditures on defense increased little between 1954 and the 1969 plan, with the result that their share in total expenditures dropped from 10% to 4%. The 1970 budget calls for outlays on defense to be 10% greater than in 1969. Because of the drop in total expenditures (and receipts) due to the retention by enterprises of a greater share of profits, the share of defense in 1970 is to be 5%. Additional expenditures on defense are carried under scientific and industrial budgets. Expenditures on state administration have ranged between 2% and 4% of total expenditures since 1951. Figure 84 shows the breakdown of budget receipts and expenditures for 1968.

2. Economic policy

The main goals of the regime in the field of economic policy have been the rapid growth and diversification of industrial production, the extension and consolidation of state control over the economy, and, especially since 1963, the assertion of Romanian independence and self-interest. The rapid expansion of economic relations with the non-Communist countries since 1959 has been of considerable importance in promoting economic growth and in helping to support the regime's policy of greater independence from other members of CEMA.

The principal means of achieving rapid industrialization have been a much more rapid increase in investment than in consumption, the movement of surplus labor from agriculture to industry, and the importation of advanced technology, mainly from Communist countries until recent years. The regime places particular emphasis on the development of heavy industry, especially the chemical, machine-building and metalworking, electric power, and ferrous metallurgy industries. In pursuit of these industrial goals, the Romanian leaders in the past have tended to slight the needs of agriculture; since 1958, however, this sector has received a higher priority. As in many other Communist countries, the attempt to industrialize by neglecting agriculture has been self-defeating, since higher agricultural production is needed to supply raw materials to industry, to feed the growing urban population, and to earn foreign currency in world markets.

Long-term planning aimed at achieving the regime's policy goals began in Romania in 1951 with the institution of the first 5-year plan (1951-55) which, like the succeeding plans, gave priority to the development of heavy industry. Because of underfulfillment in some of the major sectors, the first plan was revised in 1953—there was a general cutback in planned investments except in the consumer goods industries and in agriculture. The second 5-year plan (1956-60) was revised slightly in favor of the consumer and of agriculture after the Hungarian uprising and the Polish riots of 1956. This plan, too, ran behind schedule and was abandoned in 1960 with adoption of the 6-year plan for 1960-65. This plan was completed without major revisions. The 5-year plan for 1966-70 probably also will be completed successfully in most of its aspects.

Because of the frequent changes in plans in the 1950's, the periods appropriate for an analysis of economic policy do not coincide with the periods of the various long-term plans. There have been three policy periods since the end of reconstruction following World War II. The first period, from the late 1940's through 1953, was characterized by rapid growth of industrial investment, especially for new plants (Figure 85). This first postwar investment boom was based in large part on substantial increases in employment in construction and in production and on rapidly rising imports of machinery and equipment. During 1951-53, investment in industry grew at an average annual rate of more than 41%, or at about twice that for investment in agriculture. Industry received 57% of total investment, while agriculture and forestry received only 9% (Figure 86).

The second policy period (1954-58) was one of economic readjustment characterized by wide fluctuations in investment, slow growth of foreign trade, greater attention to increasing the efficiency of existing industrial capacity, and somewhat greater concern for the requirements of the consumer and of the agricultural sector. Although production of machinery and equipment continued to grow rapidly, imports of these products and employment in construction declined. Value added in industry grew slightly more rapidly than in the previous period, with an estimated average annual increase of about 8%. This growth was achieved with the help of new capacity in plants whose construction had been started during the period 1949-53. Investment in industry increased very little, while investment in agriculture increased more than 150%, largely in support of the transition from private to socialized farming enterprises.

The third policy period (since 1959) has been characterized by accelerated growth in industrial production and a renewed boom in investment. Greatly expanded imports of machinery and equipment and of industrial materials from the non-Communist countries contributed to the sharp rise in industrial production during 1960-69. Between 1959 and 1969 the share of non-Communist countries in total Romanian imports rose from 20% to 45%. Value of Romanian imports of machinery and equipment from non-Communist countries during 1960-68 totaled about $1,530 million, compared with only $81 million during 1952-59.

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

FIGURE 84. State budget, by distributive shares, 1968 (U/OU)

During 1960-68, value added in industry increased at an estimated average annual rate of 11% and net agricultural production at an estimated rate of 2%. Total investment grew at an average annual rate of 14%, with rapid growth in investments in both industry and agriculture. Investment in imported machinery and equipment increased at an average annual rate of 23%. The share of agriculture in total investment rose to 18% for the period as a whole, while the share of investment in industry dropped to 51%. Heavy industry continued to receive the bulk of investment within the industrial sector. Greater emphasis than in the past was placed on investment in the chemical industry, while the share going to the petroleum industry declined substantially (Figure 87).

Since 1959 foreign trade has increased at an average annual rate of 13%, with the most rapid growth occurring in trade with the non-Communist countries. Romania has met with considerable success in carrying out the major goals of the plans for 1960-65 and 1966-70 for industry, investments, and foreign trade. The goals in agriculture, however, were highly unrealistic, and production fell far short of the plan for 1960-65 and probably will fall short of the plan for 1966-70, notwithstanding the ample labor supply and the rapid growth of investment in agriculture during he 1960's.

The most important factors contributing to the rapid industrial growth during 1960-69 were growing employment in industry; a high rate of investment, with greater concentration than in the previous period on investments in machinery and equipment; and large imports of equipment and technical skills from industrialized non-Communist countries. Improved agricultural production and increased state procurement of agricultural products (especially grains) also contributed to industrial expansion by improving urban food supplies and increasing the volume of exports that could be used to pay for imported capital equipment. Although per capita personal consumption appears to have increased substantially, the bulk of the increase in industrial and agricultural output was used to raise investments.

The Romanians apparently plan to continue in the 1970's the same pattern of economic development pursued in the 1960's, and emphasis is again to be placed on rapid accumulation and the development of heavy industry. On the other hand, less reliance hopefully will be placed on imports of machinery and equipment. They are perhaps putting even greater stress than before on increasing the efficiency of economic operations. The regime seems especially concerned with the low level of utilization of imported capital equipment. Considerable slowdown in the growth of industrial production and foreign trade is anticipated by the leadership—no doubt because the Romanians have used up some of the possibilities for achieving rapid growth, i.e., surplus labor has become less plentiful and it is getting harder to expand sales of Romanian finished goods at home and abroad.



NOTE: *Except for the total, data exclude investment by individuals from their own funds.*
Investment data used were in 1959 prices for 1950-65 and 1963 prices for 1965-68.

FIGURE 85. Growth and structure of gross fixed investment (U/OU)

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

FIGURE 86. Distribution of gross fixed investment, by economic sector (U/OU)

The draft directives of the 1971-75 plan and guidelines for economic development during 1976-80 were published in June 1969 and approved by the 10th Congress of the Communist Party in August. Gross industrial production is to grow at an average annual rate of 8.5% to 9.5% during 1971-75, as compared with the rate of 12% achieved during 1966-69. Gross agricultural production during 1971-75 is to be 28% to 31% higher than during 1966-70. Centralized investment from state funds in 1971-75 is to be almost as great as in the preceding 10 years. The average annual rate of growth of investment, assuming a constant rate, will thus be about 9% to 10%, compared with the 11% achieved during 1966-69. Foreign trade during the 5-year plan is to be 40% to 45% greater than during 1966-70. Thus, trade is to grow at an average annual rate of only 7% as compared with the rate of 12% achieved during 1966-69.

In spite of the expected slowdown in the growth of imports, Romania should be able to realize its 1975 goal for industrial production. A large number of plants under construction or in the early stages of operation will come into full production during the 1971-75 plan. The outlook for agricultural production is less promising, however, because the Romanians will encounter increasing difficulties in raising productivity in that sector.

3. Labor force

A major factor in economic growth has been the flow of surplus agricultural labor into the nonagricultural labor force. Improved production in the farm sector and increased state procurement of its products have contributed to the growth of the nonagricultural labor force by improving the urban food supply. The ample supply of agricultural labor has helped to compensate for the slow growth of the population.

The agricultural labor force is still about as large as in the prewar period (within the same boundaries), and additional workers can readily be obtained when needed. The increase in mechanization of agriculture since 1950 and the shift to large farming enterprises in conjunction with only a small decline in agricultural employment has resulted in an increase in underemployment in agriculture. Growth of the nonagricultural labor force was rapid during 1951-55, very slow during 1956-59,

FIGURE 87. DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT IN INDUSTRY* (U/OU)
(Percent of total)

	1951–53 AVERAGE	1954–58 AVERAGE	1959–65 AVERAGE	1966–68 AVERAGE	1966	1967	1968
Electric power	13.9	10.4	12.8	15.1	18.0	14.6	13.5
Coal	6.6	6.7	4.2	4.0	4.5	4.0	3.7
Petroleum	30.7	25.2	14.9	11.8	14.6	11.2	10.4
Methane gas (extraction)	1.4	1.1	3.0	2.1	2.8	2.1	1.7
Ferrous metals**	7.1	10.1	9.8	10.8	10.8	10.7	10.8
Nonferrous metals**	4.6	6.7	5.9	3.8	4.0	4.3	3.1
Machine-building and metal-working	8.6	6.4	8.3	10.6	8.0	9.5	13.5
Chemicals	6.2	8.7	14.0	15.1	10.8	16.8	16.8
Construction materials	5.3	4.2	3.7	3.9	4.1	3.8	3.8
Timber***	4.8	6.7	6.8	4.8	5.3	4.9	4.5
Cellulose and paper†	1.3	1.7	5.0	1.8	3.3	1.7	0.7
Textiles	1.8	2.0	2.7	4.2	3.7	4.6	4.3
Food processing	3.7	6.0	5.6	6.3	5.9	5.9	7.0
Other	4.0	4.3	3.2	5.7	4.4	5.9	6.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Data percentages for 1951–65 are based on data in 1959 prices, whereas those for 1966–68 are based on data in 1963 prices.

**Mining and metallurgy.

***Exploitation and processing.

†Including exploitation of reeds.

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and again rapid during the industrialization drive of 1960-68. Total nonagricultural (socialized and nonsocialized) employment has increased about 95% since 1950, while total agricultural employment has declined slightly, as shown in the following tabulation (thousands of persons on 1 July):

	Total	Agriculture	Nonagricultural sectors
1950	9,170	6,648	2,522
1955	9,673	6,587	3,086
1959	9,939	6,689	3,250
1965	10,273	5,958	4,315
1966	10,382	5,896	4,486
1967	10,506	5,852	4,654
1968	10,622	5,821	4,801
1969	10,739	5,788	4,951

The faster growth of socialized nonagricultural employment (132% between 1950 and 1968) than of total nonagricultural employment reflects the socialization of handicrafts and other private establishments. Employment in industry grew at an average annual rate of 2% during 1951-59 and of about 4% during 1960-69.

Shortages of skilled labor and managerial personnel persist, and the increasing use of advanced technology makes the problem even more acute. The regime is expending great effort on training workers, both in school and on the job. In 1968 a center for training management personnel was established at Otopeni, near Bucharest. This school was set up with the help of the U.N. Development Program. The number of engineers, technicians, and skilled workers employed in the socialized sector (excluding cooperative farms) has grown no faster than total employment in the sector. At the end of 1968 the number in this category was an estimated 55% higher than at the end of 1959 but represented only 17% of those employed in the socialized sector. Training in Romania is decidedly inferior to training in the developed countries of the West. Greatly increased use of foreign (especially Western) technicians to install new industrial plants and train Romanian workers in their operation has helped to compensate for the shortage of skilled manpower. At the same time, the installation of machinery incorporating advanced technology from the West has increased even more the need for skilled workers and highly trained managers.

D. Trade

1. Domestic (U/OU)

Domestic trade in Romania is planned and controlled by the state. Except in the free market—where products for the most part are sold to the population at uncontrolled prices by farmers and by private craftsmen and enterprises—the state determines the types, quantities, and prices of all commodities flowing through trade channels. About 7% of the socialized labor force outside agriculture is employed in retail and wholesale trade.

Producer goods are distributed to industrial enterprises both by the wholesale trading enterprises of the various economic ministries and by other industrial enterprises. Consumer goods are distributed through the socialized wholesale and retail trade networks operated by the Ministry of Domestic Trade and the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives. State stores and cooperative eating places carry on most of the retail trade in urban areas, whereas the consumer cooperative network is responsible for trade in rural areas, villages, and some small towns. The executive committees of the regional and local councils administer the farmers' markets.

State procurement agencies, under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, are responsible for supplying agricultural products for urban consumption and for industrial and export requirements. Since 1957, when compulsory deliveries were abolished, the procurement agencies have dealt with state farms and agricultural production cooperatives on the basis of detailed contracts. The agricultural production cooperatives are permitted to sell in the farmers' market output of products—mostly fruits and vegetables—in excess of that contracted for by the state, together with products that are raised on the members' own plots.

The retail trade network is inadequate. At the end of 1968 there were 45,102 retail outlets and 12,419 eating places (excluding canteens in enterprises, institutions, and health resorts). Of total retail outlets and eating places, about 10% are set up as kiosks. Most of the shops are small. In urban areas nearly all the shops are specialized so that customers still have to go to several shops to make their purchases. In rural areas, on the other hand, about three-fifths of the retail outlets are mixed and general stores. No private retail outlets have been licensed by the state since 1960.

Retail sales (in constant prices) increased by about 109% in the years 1961-68. In the latter year, sales of food accounted for 35% of total retail trade, sales of manufactured consumer goods for 52%, and sales of public eating places for 12%. Textiles and clothing constitute about one-half the sales of manufactured consumer goods. Official statistics on retail sales exclude sales on the farmers' market, above-plan sales by producing enterprises, and sales by private craftsmen and by other private enterprises made directly to the public.

Personal consumption has improved much less rapidly than official data on socialized retail sales suggest. A large part of consumption (especially that of farmers) comes from the consumers' own production, from payments in kind, and from the free market—categories that grew very slowly as a result of urbanization and of state policies. Farmers, for example, are encouraged to buy an increasingly greater share of their food in retail outlets.

The assortment of goods available has improved during the past few years, but there still is not a wide range from which to select. The distribution network is inadequate, especially in storage space. Large amounts of perishable goods are lost every year because of a scarcity of refrigeration facilities. The draft plan for 1971-75 calls for measures to improve the quality, assortment, and distribution of goods, but the rate of growth of retail trade is to decline considerably, averaging 5% to 6% per year as compared with 9% during 1966-68.

2. Foreign (S)

a. Policy and development—The development of Romanian industry is highly dependent on imports of machinery and equipment and of industrial materials.

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

FIGURE 88. Growth of foreign trade, by geographic area (U/OU)



FIGURE 89. Percentage distribution of foreign trade, by geographic area (U/OU)

In support of the rapid industrialization of the 1960's, Romania has greatly expanded its trade with the non-Communist countries (Figure 88), primarily in order to obtain machinery and equipment of advanced technology not available from the U.S.S.R. and other East European Communist countries. Between 1959 and 1967 the share of the non-Communist countries in total Romanian trade rose from 20% to 48%. This share dropped to 45% in 1968 and to about 44% in 1969. Figure 89 shows the geographic distribution of Romanian exports and imports. Exports consist chiefly of foodstuffs, timber products, and petroleum products, all readily salable in the West—a factor of great importance in the rapid growth of trade with the non-Communist countries. Even so, Romania has had to rely heavily on credits from its non-Communist trade partners to finance a substantial trade deficit with these countries.

The expansion of trade with the non-Communist countries had its roots in the regime's intense desire to loosen the ties that bound it to the U.S.S.R. and the more developed East European Communist countries. The Romanians had ample reason to resent Soviet domination during and after World War II. Soviet charges for reparations and other exactions amounted to roughly $2 billion through June 1948 and $3.7 billion by December 1953. The U.S.S.R. also retained direct control over much of the Romanian economy through the SOVROMS—in effect, Soviet owned and operated companies—which were established in many fields, including the petroleum, coal, uranium mining, timber, chemical, and shipbuilding industries; river and ocean shipping; and banking. The first step toward giving the Romanian Communists full control over their own economy occurred in 1954-56, when all of the SOVROMS were returned to Romanian ownership. The U.S.S.R.'s cancellation in 1956 of much of the outstanding debt and the withdrawal of its troops in 1958 left the Romanians at last in control of their own affairs.

The Romanians felt that the U.S.S.R. and the more developed East European Communist countries were exploiting them in their regular commercial trade. In the 1950's they felt they were exchanging their traditional exports—which could be marketed anywhere—for industrial goods that were inferior to those available in the West. The assortment of goods and the accompanying services (such as the supply of spare parts) also were poor, and the Romanians charged that prices were discriminatory.

Further conflict with the U.S.S.R. broke out with the introduction of the 6-year plan (1960-65), which called for large investment, rapid industrial growth, and the development of a broad industrial base. Shortly after adoption of this plan, it became evident that the U.S.S.R. and at least some of the other members of CEMA opposed the development of a diversified industrial sector in Romania. The more industrialized East European Communist countries had an obvious interest in keeping Romania as a supplier of agricultural products and basic materials and as a market for their manufactures. Accordingly, these countries, together with the U.S.S.R., were displeased with Romania's growing concentration on trade with the non-Communist countries.

As external objections to their economic policy became public, the Romanians in turn defiantly proclaimed their

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intention to carry out their program. In March 1963, the Romanian Workers' Party (now called the Romanian Communist Party) issued a communique that emphasized a policy of "observance of national independence and sovereignty, of full equality of rights, comradely mutual aid, and mutual benefit." Romania's policy of nationalism was definitively stated in a declaration issued in April 1964. A joint communique issued in September 1965 during the visit of a high-level Romanian delegation to the U.S.S.R. indicated that Romania had gained a greater degree of Soviet acceptance for its policy of national economic independence.

Two factors accounted for Romania's success in expanding its imports of advanced capital equipment and high-quality industrial materials from the non-Communist countries. One was the ability to increase exports to these countries; the other was the greatly increased interest of such countries in trade with Romania and their willingness to extend medium- and long-term credits to it to purchase major new installations.

In 1969 Romanian trade with the non-Communist countries was seven times the 1959 level, whereas trade with the Communist countries was only twice that in 1959. This development was in sharp contrast to the 1956-59 period, when trade with the non-Communist countries rose only an estimated 32% and trade with the Communist countries rose an estimated 12%. Total trade grew at an average annual rate of 13% during 1960-69, compared with a rate of 4% during 1956-59.

The draft plan calls for a reduced rate of growth for foreign trade during the next 5-year plan (1971-75). Turnover during the 5-year period is to be only 40%-45% greater than during the 1966-70 period. Assuming a constant rate of growth, this means trade is to grow at an average annual rate of only 7% as compared with a planned rate of 9% for 1966-70 and an actual rate of 12% for 1966-69. The Romanians have not specified the planned growth for trade by geographic area. The share of trade with the non-Communist countries probably will stay at about 45% through 1970, as Romania needs to hold down imports in order to reduce its hard currency indebtedness. With the start of a new, fairly ambitious investment program in 1971—and the consequent upsurge in the demand for machinery and equipment—the growth of imports from non-Communist countries may pick up again. Nevertheless, because of reluctance to allow further large increases in indebtedness to hard currency areas, the share of the industrialized West probably will not increase much between 1970 and 1975.

Import policy will continue to be directed largely toward the purchase of machinery and equipment of the highest technological level. There is hope, however, of cutting back on total imports of machinery and equipment, which grew exceedingly rapidly during 1960-67 but stagnated in 1968. On the other hand, the Romanians expect total imports to grow considerably because of the sharp rise expected in requirements for imported raw materials and semimanufactures. The regime recognizes the need to exert stronger controls over imports in order to improve the balance of payments position with the industrialized West, and it is therefore trying to cut out the least useful purchases. Furthermore, the regime intends to shift as much as possible to domestic production for more of what is now being imported.

The sharp rise in requirements for raw materials will result from the planned rapid expansion of capacity in industries for which domestic resources are already very limited or are being used up. Even the petroleum and petrochemical industries are affected. Romania has recently begun to import crude oil. Also affected are the steel and machine-building industries. Thus, Romanian requirements for imports of iron ore, metallurgical coke, high-grade finished steel, and crude oil will increase substantially. At the same time Romania will have to continue to import coking coal, cotton, and apatite concentrate in at least as large amounts as in recent years. The less developed non-Communist countries probably will be the principal source of increased imports of iron ore and crude oil and will continue to satisfy much of the need for other imports of raw materials, such as cotton. Increased imports of coke and of finished steel probably will come mostly from the industrialized non-Communist countries. The other Communist countries will not be able—and willing—to supply much of the increased requirements for industrial materials.

To help pay for the planned expansion of imports, export policy will continue to be directed toward increasing the range and quality, as well as the quantity, of products available. Plans call for pushing exports of machinery and equipment, chemicals, processed foods, and manufactured consumer goods. The Romanians hope to increase the share of these items to three-fourths of total exports by 1975 as compared with about three-fifths in 1968. Thus, it appears that the value of exports of petroleum products, timber products, and food raw materials as a group will stagnate. The draft directives for the 1971-75 plan call for:

> Timely measures . . . to establish the volume of products and assortments of goods that will be exported and the units producing them, so that a guaranteed fund of products for export be set up which corresponds to the requirements of the foreign market. It is necessary to establish new capacities and to continue with the specialization of works, factories or sections producing goods exclusively, or to the largest extent, for exports.

The intensive drive toward irrigation planned for 1971-75 is in large part aimed at increasing exports while at the same time providing for growing domestic needs for agricultural products.

Besides attempting to increase exports by traditional methods, the Romanians are also looking into the possibility of getting Western firms to take as partial payment a share of the output of plants they install. Other steps being taken to increase net foreign exchange earnings are the promotion of tourism and the building up of the merchant fleet, which in 1975 is to total about 1.2 million d.w.t., compared with over 497,000 d.w.t. in 1969 and a planned 570,000 d.w.t. in 1970.

b. Organization and control—Romania hopes to improve the operation of its foreign trade activities through measures designed to assign to production ministries,

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industrial centrals, and enterprises a large part of the authority and responsibility for assuring the success of export goals and greatly expanded contacts with foreign buyers and suppliers. The Romanians are in the process of moving many of the foreign trade enterprises from the Ministry of Foreign Trade to the production ministries. Some of these new responsibilities taken over by the production ministries probably will be handed down to the industrial centrals under their jurisdiction. Major decisions regarding foreign trade activities will, however, remain under central control.

Trade is transacted at world market prices with non-Communist countries and at negotiated prices, which are generally somewhat above world market prices, with other Soviet-Communist Eastern European countries. There is no direct connection between foreign trade prices and domestic prices and the differences are cleared through the state budget. Because of this dual set of prices, the value of the *leu valută*—the unit of account for foreign trade statistics, which represents values in foreign currency converted to lei (plural of leu) at the artificial official exchange rates—is unrelated to the actual purchasing power of the leu in Romania. In commodity trade transactions, US$1 is worth 6 lei. The internal value of the leu is generally much lower, varying widely among different types of goods and services. U.S. tourists until 15 June 1964 received 15 lei for $1 to make purchases in Romania and since have received 18 lei.

c. Geographic distribution—Since 1959, Romania's foreign trade has shifted toward the non-Communist countries. In 1969 trade with these countries accounted for about 44% of total trade as compared with about 20% of total trade in the 1950's, 31% in 1961, and 35% in 1965. By 1966 Romania had surpassed Poland in the share of its trade with non-Communist countries. The share of these countries in the trade of other East European Communist countries in 1969 ranged from 20% for Bulgaria to 34% for Poland.

Trade with the U.S.S.R. accounted for about half of Romanian trade in the 1950's, for somewhat more than 33% during 1960-66, and for somewhat less than 30% during 1967-69. Trade with the East European Communist countries accounts for about 20% of the total, Czechoslovakia and East Germany being the most important of these trading partners. Trade with Communist China dropped sharply during 1961-62, largely as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but by 1968 far exceeded the 1960 level, a unique record for a member of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. Figure 90 tabulates the value of foreign trade by geographic area.

Trade with the industrialized non-Communist countries has grown faster than trade with the less developed countries. In 1968, 72% of Romania's trade with the non-Communist countries was with the industrialized countries of Western Europe, 23% was with the less developed countries, while only 4% was with Japan and the United States. Romania's leading trade partners among non-Communist countries were West Germany (20% of total trade with this group), Italy (13%), the United Kingdom (11%), France (9%), Switzerland (6%) and Austria (5%). In 1965 West Germany replaced Czechoslovakia as Romania's second largest trade partner.

The United States has played little part in the reorientation of Romanian trade. In 1968 trade between these two, although still small ($26 million), was more than 3 times the level at the time of the trade talks held in Washington in 1964. As a result of these talks, the U.S. Government agreed to establish a procedure under which most nonstrategic commodities may be exported to Romania without an individual license. In addition, the United States agreed to grant licenses for a number of individual industrial facilities containing advanced technology in which Romania is interested. To facilitate the financing of Romanian purchases in the United States, the Export-Import Bank was given authority to guarantee U.S. commercial credits to Romania. In March 1968, however, this authority was withdrawn in compliance with the Fino Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Charter legislation, which denied the Bank's services to Communist countries supplying North Vietnam. The Romanians have provided military as well as economic aid to North Vietnam.

The only large Romanian purchase of equipment from the United States since the 1964 trade talks involved a catalytic cracking plant for the Brazii petrochemical combine. Corning Glass International is supplying technical data and part of the equipment for a plant designed to produce, under Corning license, glass envelopes for black and white TV picture tubes. Inter-Continental Hotel Corporation, a subsidiary of Pan American World Airways, is now cooperating in the building of a large hotel in Bucharest.

The development of a substantial amount of U.S.-Romanian trade will continue to be hampered by 1) the weak competitive position of Romanian products in the U.S. market, 2) the existence of excellent alternative sources of supply in Western Europe, 3) Romania's opportunity in some instances to buy desired capital equipment at lower prices in Western Europe, 4) the inexperience of U.S. firms in trading with Romania, and 5) substantial public sentiment in the United States against trade with Communist countries. Even if the Romanians were granted most-favored-nation status, the outlook for exports to the United States would not be much brighter because of the poor prospects for Romania's breaking into the U.S. market.

In late 1969, the Romanians submitted to the U.S. Government a list of equipment they might wish to purchase. The value of the proposed imports could run as high as $200 to $300 million. Among the items on the list were a plant to supply heavy water for nuclear power stations, facilities for coating steel plates, a plant for production of aluminum foil and sheets, and a share of the extensive irrigation projects planned for the next 6 years. The Romanians stressed that a decision to purchase any of this equipment from the United States was dependent upon the availability of suitable credit. Thus if the Fino Amendment continues in force, the prospects for large Romanian purchases from the United States are not very favorable. The Romanians may, therefore, continue to find it more expedient to buy only the know-how

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FIGURE 90. VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA (U/OU)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Turnover	950.0	1,024.4	1,364.9	1,607.2	1,759.1	1,937.0	2,168.2	2,178.6	2,399.3	2,941.4	3,077.5
Non-Communist countries	211.4	206.8	368.0	502.8	565.3	603.3	685.8	763.2	969.8	1,398.3	1,377.7
U.S.S.R.	489.1	484.8	547.4	650.0	713.8	812.2	914.9	844.6	803.9	829.4	882.7
East European Communist countries	190.2	257.0	361.8	378.8	428.1	433.0	485.8	469.9	494.2	554.8	614.9
Other Communist countries*	59.4	75.9	87.7	75.5	51.8	88.6	81.7	101.0	131.5	159.0	202.2
Imports	481.7	502.0	647.9	814.7	941.1	1,022.0	1,168.1	1,077.1	1,213.2	1,546.1	1,609.0
Non-Communist countries	99.9	98.1	174.2	266.6	307.0	327.7	373.6	417.5	519.0	792.1	782.4
U.S.S.R.	253.8	234.7	265.9	298.8	370.5	399.3	493.0	406.2	394.1	396.5	427.0
East European Communist countries	106.1	135.2	173.2	210.4	233.0	254.4	262.6	210.3	243.6	289.9	309.9
Other Communist countries	21.8	34.1	34.5	38.9	30.7	40.6	38.9	43.2	56.6	67.6	89.6
Exports	468.3	522.4	717.0	792.5	818.0	915.0	1,000.1	1,101.5	1,186.1	1,395.4	1,468.6
Non-Communist countries	111.4	108.7	193.8	236.2	258.4	275.6	312.2	345.6	450.8	606.2	595.3
U.S.S.R.	235.3	250.1	281.4	351.2	343.3	412.9	421.8	438.4	409.8	432.9	455.7
East European Communist countries	84.1	121.8	188.6	168.4	195.1	178.5	223.1	259.6	250.6	264.8	305.0
Other Communist countries	37.5	41.8	53.2	36.6	21.2	48.0	42.9	57.8	75.0	91.4	112.6
Trade balance**	−13.4	20.5	69.2	−22.2	−123.2	−107.0	−168.1	24.4	−27.1	−150.7	−140.4
Non-Communist countries	11.5	10.7	19.6	−30.3	−48.6	−52.1	−61.4	−71.8	−68.2	−185.9	−187.1
U.S.S.R.	−18.5	15.4	15.5	52.4	−27.2	13.6	−71.2	32.3	15.7	36.4	28.7
East European Communist countries	−22.0	−13.3	15.4	−41.9	−37.9	−75.9	−39.5	49.3	7.0	−25.0	−4.9
Other Communist countries	15.7	7.7	18.7	−2.4	−9.5	7.4	4.0	14.7	18.4	23.8	23.0

NOTE—Discrepancies between items and totals in the table are due to rounding.
*Albania, Communist China, Cuba, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.
**A minus sign indicates net imports; absence of sign indicates net exports.

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for a particular line of equipment from a U.S. firm and to purchase the machinery from a West European firm.

d. Commodity composition

(1) *Imports*—The structure of Romanian imports has been affected by the growth of industrial production, which has increased requirements for imports of industrial materials, and by the growth and fluctuations in investment, which largely determines the level of imports of machinery and equipment. The most important imports other than machinery and equipment are rolled steel, iron ore, coking coal and coke, and cotton fibers.

Imports of machinery and equipment grew rapidly during both postwar investment booms (1950-53 and 1959-68) and in 1968 accounted for 47% of total imports (Figure 91). By the early 1960's, non-Communist countries had replaced the U.S.S.R. as the major supplier of machinery and equipment to Romania. In 1967, imports of machinery and equipment from industrialized countries in this group accounted for 61% of total imports from this source and for about one-half of total Romanian imports of machinery and equipment. During 1960-68 Romania purchased approximately $1,530 million worth of machinery and equipment from the non-Communist countries, compared with only $81 million during 1952-59. During 1966-68 alone these imports totaled about $880 million. Thus, the Romanians should be able to more than realize their hope of importing during 1966-70 $1 billion worth of machinery and equipment from the non-Communist countries.

Among the plants purchased from the non-Communist countries since 1959 are a catalytic reforming installation (United States, France, Italy, West Germany); a catalytic cracking plant (United States); two nitrogen fertilizer plants (Belgium, France, United Kingdom, West Germany); a vinyl chloride plant (West Germany); a synthetic fiber plant (West Germany); a polyester fiber plant (West Germany); a polyethylene plant (United Kingdom); an olefin plant (West Germany); a rayon tire cord plant (Italy); a rayon fiber and papermill (West Germany, Switzerland, Austria); a papermill (France); two papermills (United Kingdom); equipment for the Hunedoara metallurgical combine (West Germany); a heavy plate-rolling mill for the Galaţi iron and steel combine (France, United Kingdom); a basic oxygen furnace steel plant for Galaţi (West Germany); a primary aluminum plant (France, West Germany, Italy, and Switzerland); two 300-megawatt generators and four boilers for the Craiova electric powerplant (France, West Germany); a plant for the production of radios and television sets (France); an automobile plant (France); electric locomotives, parts, and technology (Sweden); seven ore carriers and two tankers (Japan); two cargo ships (United Kingdom); and automatic telephone exchanges (Belgium).



FIGURE 91. Commodity composition of foreign trade (U/OU)

Imports of fuels, industrial raw materials, and semifinished products, which in 1968 accounted for 44% of total imports, have grown more slowly but at a much more steady pace than imports of machinery. In the 1960's the non-Communist countries became an increasingly important source of these imports, especially of rolled steel, iron ore, and cotton. In 1968, for example, these countries accounted for about one-fourth of Romanian imports of rolled ferrous metals (including pipes) and for three-fifths of imports of cotton (Figure 92).

Imports of foodstuffs and of consumer goods are of relatively little importance to Romanian consumption, although imports of manufactured consumer goods are growing rapidly. The principal commodities imported for personal consumption are textiles, household appliances, and luxury foods and beverages. Romania has long been a net exporter of foodstuffs; in 1968 for example, exports in this category were six times imports in terms of value. Imports of manufactured consumer goods increased 265% during 1960-63, following many years of no growth and increased another 43% during 1965-68. Figure 93 shows

FIGURE 92. SHARE OF SELECTED IMPORTS COMING FROM NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES* (U/OU)
(Percent of total value)

	1960	1966	1967	1968
Machinery and equipment	*26*	*45*	*56*	*48*
Fuels, minerals, and metals	*18*	*25*	*30*	*33*
Of which:				
Coking, coal, and metallurgical coke	*na*	*4*	*6*	*8*
Iron ore	*na*	*14*	*19*	*25*
Rolled ferrous metals**	*na*	*19*	*27*	*28*
Apatite concentrate	*na*	*5*	*18*	*20*
Rubber	*na*	*86*	*89*	*89*
Cotton (unginned)	*na*	*55*	*55*	*60*
Manufactured consumer goods	*11*	*23*	*43*	*na*
Total	*27*	*22*	*51*	*49*

na Data not available.
*Many of these data are approximations or estimates.
**Including pipe.

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FIGURE 93. COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA* (U/OU)
(*Percent of total*)

	COMMUNIST COUNTRIES				NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES				TOTAL
	1960	1966	1967	1968	1960	1966	1967	1968	1968
Machinery and equipment	33	39	44	47	31	43	53	46	47
Fuels, minerals, and metals	40	37	36	36	24	17	14	19	27
Of which:									
Coking coal and metallurgical coke	na	5	5	5	na	Insig	Insig	Insig	3
Iron ore	na	3	3	4	na	1	1	1	3
Rolled steel**	na	20	18	16	na	6	6	7	12
Cotton (unginned)	na	3	3	3	na	6	4	4	4
Manufactured consumer goods	6	10	8	14	2	4	6	31	6
Other	na	11	9		na	30	23		16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

na Data not available.
*Many of the data are approximations or estimates.
**Including pipe.

FIGURE 94. IMPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES (U/OU)

	UNIT	1959	1961	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968
Machinery and equipment	Million U.S. dollars	163	330	427	419	497	755	752
Of which:								
Equipment and materials for complete enterprises.	....do	64	118	174	142	180	345	126
Electrical and power equipment	....do	9	15	20	26	40	51	44
Equipment for the chemical industry	....do	1	3	6	5	9	10	69
Automobiles	Units	1,351	1,308	3,934	11,880	16,107	17,841	13,591
Agricultural equipment	Million U.S. dollars	4	7	5	8	7	15	21
Iron ore	Thousand metric tons	815	1,258	2,236	2,623	2,854	3,360	4,546
Coking coal	....do	192	441	698	706	723	793	672
Metallurgical coke	....do	700	480	918	930	1,102	1,089	1,570
Rolled steel (including pipe)	....do	701	973	1,081	1,158	1,269	1,384	1,552
Ferroalloys	....do	20	28	34	53	51	68	76
Apatite concentrate (P_2O_5)	....do	55	80	150	174	207	220	206
Natural and synthetic rubber	....do	15	24	36	24	32	36	38
Cotton (unginned)	....do	42	61	65	67	77	72	76
Raw hides	....do	9	5	6	14	21	22	18
Fresh and canned fish	....do	5	14	28	27	22	29	36

the commodity structure of imports by geographic area, and Figure 94 shows imports of selected commodities.

(2) *Exports*—Changes in the structure of exports since World War II reflect the growing diversification of Romanian industry. The most important exports are petroleum products, foodstuffs, timber and timber products, and machinery and equipment. All but the last have been of particular importance in the development of Romania's trade with the non-Communist countries.

Fuels, raw materials, and semifinished products still represent the most important category of exports, but in 1968 accounted for only 42% of total exports compared with 68% in 1959 (Figure 91). Within this category, exports of petroleum products, which have declined in recent years, accounted for only 9% of total exports in 1968 compared with 34% in 1959. Romanian exports of petroleum products to non-Communist countries in 1968 accounted for about one-tenth of total exports to these countries and for about one-half of total exports of petroleum products in terms of value (Figures 95 and 96). Exports of timber and timber products (excluding furniture) have declined somewhat since 1966 and in 1968 accounted for an estimated 10% of total exports. In the latter year, exports of timber and timber products to non-Communist countries accounted for about 14% of total exports to these countries and for at least 57% of total exports of timber and timber products. Exports of rolled steel (which consist chiefly of primary forms) rose rapidly in the early 1960's, hitting a peak of 735,000 tons in 1963. Since then these exports have fluctuated between 508,000 and 685,000 tons. In 1968, exports of rolled steel accounted for 7% of total exports but for only about [illegible] exports to non-Communist countries. Communist countries received about nine-tenths (in terms of value) of all Romanian exports of rolled steel. Among the fastest growing exports have been those of chemicals, which in 1968 were 7½ times the 1959 level.

Foodstuffs accounted for 22% of total exports in 1968. Grain accounted for about 25% of exports in this class

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FIGURE 95. COMMODITY STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA* (U/OU)
(Percent of total)

	COMMUNIST COUNTRIES				NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES				TOTAL	
	1960	1966	1967	1968	1960	1966	1967	1968	1960	1968
Machinery and equipment	20	26	25	31	8	4	11	10	17	21
Fuels, minerals, and metals	40	25	23	22	30	23	17	21	37	21
Of which:										
Petroleum products	na	8	7	6	na	13	10	11	24	9
Rolled ferrous metals**	na	12	10	10	na	2	1	1	na	7
Chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber	2	6	6	na	2	6	7	na	2	6
Construction materials and inedible raw materials of animal and vegetable origin	14	12	13	12	26	26	19	19	17	15
Of which:										
Timber and timber products***	na	7	7	6	na	19	14	13	na	10
Food and food raw materials	17	16	16	13	31	36	43	36	21	22
Manufactured consumer goods	7	15	17	na	3	5	3	na	6	15
Of which:										
Furniture	na	6	6	6	na	Insig	1	1	1	4
Clothing†	na	5	5	6	na	1	1	1	1	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

na Data not available.
*Many of the data are approximations or estimates.
**Including pipes.
***Excluding furniture.
†Including knit goods.

FIGURE 96. SHARE OF EXPORTS GOING TO NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES* (U/OU)
(Percent of total value)

	1960	1966	1967	1968
Machinery and equipment	13	8	25	14
Fuels, minerals, and metals	22	35	37	39
Of which:				
Petroleum products	na	48	53	56
Rolled ferrous metals**	na	8	8	8
Chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber	23	39	47	na
Construction materials and inedible raw materials of animal and vegetable origin	40	58	52	53
Of which:				
Timber and timber products***	na	61	58	59
Food and food raw materials	40	58	67	66
Manufactured consumer goods	14	18	13	na
Total	27	38	43	41

na Data not available.
*Many of these data are approximations or estimates.
**Including pipe.
***Excluding furniture.

in 1968, vegetables and fruit for about 18%, meat and meat preparations for about 15%, wine and other alcoholic beverages for about 11%, and edible animal and vegetable oils and fats for 9%. Exports of foodstuffs declined 35% between 1955 and 1959 because of the poor harvest in 1958. By 1967, however, these exports were six times above the 1959 level. Because of the severe drought in 1968, and the consequent 33% drop in exports of grain, total exports of foodstuffs declined 15%. About 67% of total exports in the category went to non-Communist countries in 1968, compared with about two-fifths in 1960. Increased exports of these commodities were responsible for two-fifths of the total increase in exports to the non-Communist countries between 1960 and 1968. The share of foodstuffs in total exports to non-Communist countries rose from 32% in 1960 to 43% in 1967 but dropped to about 36% in 1968 because of the poor harvest.

Since the mid-1950's, machinery and equipment have become an important export, but only in trade with other Communist countries. In 1968 these exports were 12 times the 1955 level, and their share in total exports was 21% as compared with 6% in 1955. Romanian machinery and equipment are generally of too inferior a quality to find a ready market in the non-Communist countries. Thus, most of these exports will continue to go to the Communist countries and to the less developed non-Communist countries. Exports of machinery and equipment consist mainly of agricultural machinery, equipment for the petroleum industry, and transportation equipment.

Exports of manufactured consumer goods have risen substantially and in 1968 accounted for 14% of total exports, compared with only 1% in 1955. Exports of furniture, clothing, and leather footwear accounted for 28%, 32%, and 10%, respectively, of total exports of manufactured consumer goods in 1968. The U.S.S.R. is by far the largest purchaser of these manufactured consumer goods. Of total Romanian exports of furniture and clothing, for example, four-fifths went to the U.S.S.R. in 1968. Somewhat less than 15%—compared with only 7% in 1966—of exports of furniture and clothing went to non-Communist countries. Of total exports to the latter countries in 1967, only 3% represented exports of manufactured consumer goods. Figure 97 shows exports of selected commodities.

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FIGURE 97. EXPORTS OF SELECTED COMMODITIES (U/OU)

	UNITS	1959	1961	1963	1965	1966	1967	1968
Machinery and equipment	Million U.S. dollars	78	127	151	204	206	265	313
Of which:								
Equipment for the petroleum industry	do	15	37	47	55	42	43	54
Freight cars	Units	2,350	1,570	2,103	2,860	2,572	3,193	3,345
Ships and marine equipment	Million U.S. dollars	10	9	13	17	19	29	33
Agricultural machinery	do	7	15	17	20	24	36	43
Of which:								
Tractors	Units	3,018	6,687	5,925	3,405	4,433	8,603	9,384
Petroleum products	Thousand metric tons	5,887	6,156	5,921	5,813	5,769	5,553	5,594
Of which:								
Gasoline	do	2,566	2,077	1,793	1,444	1,181	957	989
Diesel fuel	do	1,391	1,768	1,609	1,979	1,950	2,091	2,288
Fuel oil	do	986	1,304	1,644	1,639	1,960	1,790	1,678
Rolled steel (including pipes)	do	188	580	735	577	685	503	682
Caustic soda	do	31	74	97	108	94	70	66
Soda ash	do	31	136	202	167	183	185	250
Cement	do	1,065	1,109	1,264	1,538	1,636	1,369	1,208
Sawn wood (softwood and hardwood)	Thousand cubic meters	921	1,347	1,834	1,977	2,248	2,208	2,083
Plywood	do	15	39	67	112	109	120	112
Veneer	Thousand square meters	1,230	3,021	6,470	5,527	5,944	4,523	8,382
Grains*	Thousand metric tons	223	1,208	1,409	882	1,303	2,339	1,562
Edible vegetable oils and animal fats	do	7	43	48	53	121	159	163
Fresh fruit and vegetables**	do	91	208	241	305	241	272	335
Canned fruit and vegetables	do	60	97	128	112	133	141	128
Wine	do	24	31	27	43	46	53	58
Furniture	Million U.S. dollars	7	14	28	42	47	55	60
Cotton textiles	Million square meters	13	21	43	34	30	26	57
Clothing	Million U.S. dollars	5	11	17	39	39	44	68
Leather footwear	Million pairs	*Negl.*	1	1	3	4	5	7

*Excluding grain for seed.
**Including grapes.

3. Balance of payments and foreign aid (S)

Romania has incurred deficits in its commodity trade in most years since World War II. During 1959-69 a cumulative deficit of about $732 million was incurred on overall trade. The cumulative deficit with non-Communist countries totaled about $815 million, of which about two-thirds was with West Germany. A cumulative export surplus of about $83 million was achieved in trade with Communist countries. Romanian trade deficits apparently were covered chiefly by Soviet credits through 1958 and by credits from industrialized non-Communist countries and Czechoslovakia since 1958.

Little balance of payments information is available on items other than trade and credits extended. Because of the small size of its merchant fleet, Romania incurs sizable deficits on freight and insurance. Sales of gold since 1948 have amounted to an estimated $105-$124 million, and all known sales were made to non-Communist countries, principally France, Switzerland, and Argentina. Romania's gold reserves are substantial for a country of its size and at the end of 1969 amounted to an estimated $165 million. Income from tourism, although still small, has risen rapidly. Total earnings in 1967 reportedly amounted to about $33 million—of which an estimated $16 million was from tourists from non-Communist countries—as compared with about $6 million in 1960. The Romanians hoped to push total earnings up to $70 million by 1970. Net receipts from other sources—such as transfer payments, short-term credits, and changes in reserves—have not been sufficient to offset the substantial deficit on current account. Thus, there has been a heavy reliance on credits from both Communist and non-Communist countries. Repayments and interest on these credits have added substantially to Romania's expenditures.

Soviet credits extended to Romania have been considerably smaller than those Moscow extended to the other East European Communist countries: the U.S.S.R. extended $95 million in credits to Romania in 1956 and another $28 million in 1965. Credits received from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary were extended mainly since 1955. These countries have extended at least $128 million in credits, of which about $95 million was for projects undertaken during 1960-65.

Credit extensions by non-Communist countries were concentrated in the period 1947-49—when the United States, Switzerland, and Argentina provided more than $102 million for reconstruction—and in the years since 1959. It is probable that only a part of the credits extended during 1947-49 was used. Commercial credits received from the industrialized non-Communist countries have been of great importance in permitting the rapid growth of Romanian imports since 1959. Repayment periods on these credits go up to 10 years. During 1959-69, non-Communist countries extended to Romania medium- and long-term credits estimated at more than $1.8 billion, of which an estimated $1.4 billion was drawn. Repayments

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totaled an estimated $0.6 billion. Thus, at the end of 1969 Romania owed the industrialized non-Communist countries an estimated $0.8 billion. Interest payments made on these credits during 1959-69 probably totaled somewhat less than $0.2 billion.

Romania has extended credits amounting approximately to $153 million to other Communist countries and $390 million to less developed non-Communist countries. Of credits extended to the latter, only some $83 million had been drawn by the end of 1969.

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7. Scientific

A. General (S)

Although Romania has made considerable progress in science and technology, its scientific research and development capabilities remain small. The lack of a broad scientific tradition and limited research experience have contributed to the relatively low level of scientific achievement, which is well below that of the leading Eastern European countries. Romania has produced few outstanding scientists, and much of its research lacks originality and is concerned with catching up with Western and Soviet science and technology. Most of the scientific effort is oriented toward the solution of technological problems in the development of the national economy. The needs of the Romanian industrialization program have resulted in a concentration on applied research to the detriment of fundamental research, although both have suffered from inadequate facilities and equipment, a lack of proper materials, and a shortage of well-qualified scientists and engineers.

Since 1960 the government has made a strong effort to organize science programs and establish specific objectives. In an effort to improve the guidance and coordination of scientific research and to expedite the applications of research results to production, the government late in 1965 established the National Council for Scientific Research upon recommendation of the Ninth Party Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, which stressed the improvement and expansion of the scientific and technical effort. Greater cooperation between the government, industry, educational institutions, and research centers has been promoted with the objective of stimulating the economy. The government has criticized the overreliance on high-cost foreign technology. The organizational changes have been designed to stimulate the development of native technology by providing a central organization to coordinate basic and applied research.

The Romanian Government has promoted the concept of contract research for much of the scientific activity in the country. A law passed by the Grand National Assembly in December 1969 calls for the reorganization of scientific research in an effort to make research results more applicable more quickly to the needs of the economy, mainly through contracts between production enterprises and research institutes. As a result, much of the research is in applied areas, and basic research has tended to be neglected, although some effort is being made to introduce contract research into certain basic areas of chemistry and physics.

Romania participates actively in international scientific affairs and is a member of such organizations as the United Nations World Health Organization, the International Geological Union, the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics, the International Association of Physical Oceanography, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. A particular effort has been made to maintain strong scientific ties with other Communist countries. A protocol was signed during 1965 with Czechoslovakia setting out areas of scientific-technical cooperation especially in chemistry, power engineering, light industry, and agriculture. The Academies of Science of Romania and Communist China signed a cooperative agreement in 1965 which provided for further development of scientific relations involving mutual study trips and exchanges of experience, publications, and other specialized material. Romania has long been a member of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) at Dubna in the U.S.S.R. but has threatened to withdraw if the reduced Romanian support is not accepted. Formerly contributing 5.6% of the JINR operating costs, Romania recently has refused to provide more than 1%. The Romanians feel they are not getting research results commensurate with the funds contributed to the JINR.

The vice president of the National Council for Scientific Research expressed regret in October 1968 over the relatively low level of scientific cooperation with the United States and stated his desire to have more Romanian scientists receive training in the United States and more U.S. scientists visit Romania. He stressed the council's view that Romania can best share in the rapid advances of science by entering into joint projects with other countries. The United States and Romania have inaugurated a broad program encouraging mutual grants of fellowships, exchanges of scientists and scientific information, and attendance at scientific conferences. Participation of Romanian scientists in international scientific affairs is approved by the National Council for Scientific Research in consultation with the Romanian Council of Ministers. Higher educational institutions engaged in scientific research maintain contact with foreign scientists through the exchange of publications and by attendance at international scientific meetings.

B. Organization, planning, and financing of research (S)

Party control over all scientific and technical research is exercised through the Science and Education Section of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. The National Council for Scientific Research, established in December 1965 under the Council of Ministers, is the primary governmental agency for coordinating scientific research undertaken within the framework of

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the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania (ARSR), Bucharest, as well as in facilities of the institutions of higher education under the Ministry of Education, other ministries, and other governmental organizations. Nuclear energy research is coordinated by the Commission for Nuclear Energy, established in 1955 under the Council of Ministers. (Figure 98 shows the organization of Romanian scientific and technical research.)

Basic research in mathematical, physical, chemical, and biological sciences is delegated formally to the ARSR and to university faculties; applied research is conducted by institutes under the ministries and by laboratories within the government-owned industrial enterprises. The ARSR is on the same level in the organizational hierarchy as the ministries but has a more important role in the total scientific effort. There has been a trend, however, toward decreased overall authority for the ARSR. Its membership comprises the most distinguished scientists and technologists in Romania, and it is the country's highest scientific organ. Research is conducted in approximately 56 research institutes, experimental stations, and other facilities, most of which are under the eight sections of the ARSR concerned with natural, technical, biological, and medical sciences. There are branches of the ARSR at Iaşi and Cluj and research centers at Timişoara and Tîrgu Mureş. The ARSR is empowered to conduct research both on its own initiative and at the request of other institutions, either in its own organizational units or, on the basis of an agreement, in other institutions. Although the activity of the ARSR is in general limited to the laboratory stage and only in exceptional cases expanded to the pilot plant stage, the ARSR cooperates with the ministries and the National Council for Scientific Research in order to transfer the results of research to production. The ARSR has its own scientific documentation center, library, publishing house, and research apparatus production center.

The National Council for Scientific Research was established at the request of party leaders who sharply attacked serious deficiencies in the organization and orientation of Romanian research. It was reorganized in July 1969 and its role as coordinator of all the country's research was reaffirmed. In addition, its legal responsibilities cover the establishment of national research priorities and the importation of scientific material. It is also responsible for working out a unified program for scientific research for the country and for expediting the application of research results to production. It also recommends financing of research, approves of the distribution of funds, and insures the maximum utilization of scientific personnel and facilities. The council is a large group consisting of 80 to 90 members selected from the members of the ARSR; faculty members of the institutes of higher education; research workers in the institutes of the ARSR, ministerial institutes and industrial and pilot plant laboratories; specialists in economic and sociocultural organizations; and management personnel in ministries and central governmental bodies.

Research in higher schools is conducted in approximately 34 research institutes and centers under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The various chairs and departments conduct research in their own laboratories in cooperation with research institutes of the ARSR and the industrial ministries. Higher educational institutions have concentrated on teaching at the expense of research and have been criticized for this by the Communist Party.



FIGURE 98. Organization of scientific and technical research in Romania, 1969 (C)

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Nuclear energy research is coordinated by the Committee for Nuclear Energy, established in 1955 under the Council of Ministers. Research is carried out by the Institute of Atomic Physics (IFA), Măgurele; it is subordinate to the ARSR and has four main laboratories that are concerned with elementary processes, isotope separation, isotope applications, and investigation of catalysts.

Most of the institutes conducting medical research are subordinate to the Ministry of Health and are administered by its Scientific Council. The Academy of Medical Sciences, established in August 1969 under the ministry, coordinates medical research. Certain medical research institutes are under joint control of the ministry and the ARSR.

Industrial research is conducted in about 48 industrial institutes, laboratory research centers, and plant laboratories and is coordinated by technical directorates of the various industrial ministries. Most of the research is applied, although some fundamental studies are carried out.

The planning of research is controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party through its substantive sections. One of the principal tasks of the National Council for Scientific Research is the formulation of short- and long-range research plans with the emphasis on the solution of major problems related to the economy. When recommended by the National Council, scientific projects are incorporated into the national economic plan by the State Planning Committee. The 5-year plan for 1966-70 incorporated 480 research themes of importance to the economy, which were chosen by the National Council. The preponderance of these areas of research emphasis is in the industrial and engineering fields, especially metallurgy, electric power, machine building, petroleum, and electrical and electronics industries. Research in chemistry, physics, mathematics, medicine, and agriculture and forestry also has been stressed.

The financing of research is provided for in the state budget. As of January 1969, institutes involved in applied research were expected to conduct 60%-70% of their research based on specific contracts with organizations which ordered and paid for that research. The remainder would be financed directly out of the government budget. The transition to this arrangement, which places more of the burden for research expenditures on the government-owned industrial enterprises, will take 2 to 3 years.

Less than 1% of the country's total investments are spent for research and development. Since 1965 the increases in expenditures for science have amounted to only about 5% per year. The state budgets for 1965 and 1966 provided 1.7% of the total funds for science and culture. In 1966 this amounted to 1,794 million lei. (The commercial rate of exchange is 6 lei=US$1; a more realistic rate is 25 lei=US$1.) The Ministry of Finance allocated 3.2 billion lei for financing research during the 3-year period 1966-69. The annual investment in research facilities has ranged from 260 million lei to 400 million lei. During the 5-year period 1961-65, the government spent a total of 5.5 billion lei on scientific activities, excluding funds for geological prospecting and for the activities of research institutes under the Higher Council of Agriculture. Of this amount, 900 million lei was allocated to the ARSR and over 4,020 million lei to ministerial institutes and laboratories.

The ARSR and its subordinate IFA are major recipients of funds for scientific research. For the years 1963, 1964, and 1965, the budgets of the ARSR were 182.4 million lei, 185.6 million lei, and 208.8 million lei, respectively. Of the totals, exact and natural sciences received approximately 46%; social sciences and the humanities, 13%; other scientific activities, 10%; publications, 17%; and administration, 14%. The IFA has an annual budget of about 60 million lei.

C. Scientific education, manpower, and facilities (S)

Scientific education is available at six universities and six polytechnic institutes under the direction of the Ministry of Education. Approximately 140,000 students are receiving higher education, but only about half of these are receiving the equivalent of a college-level education. Enrollments in universities and polytechnic institutes totaled about 73,000 in 1968. The quality of Romanian education is on a par with neighboring countries and, although improving, remains below that of advanced Western European countries.

Since November 1965 only three types of advanced degrees have been awarded: Doctor of Sciences, Docent-Doctor of Sciences, and Doctor Honoris Causa. The Doctor of Sciences degree is awarded after 3 to 5 years of specialized study in a given scientific field. Instruction is given in universities, polytechnic institutes, agricultural or other specialized schools, and in about 25 research institutes of the ARSR. Doctoral candidates are admitted on the basis of competitive examinations. The other two degrees are honorary in nature and are awarded by higher educational institutions with the approval of the Council of Higher Education. The Docent-Doctor of Sciences degree is granted to persons who have demonstrated long dedication and effective contributions to the progress of science, technology, or culture. The degree of Doctor Honoris Causa may be awarded to a Romanian or foreigner who has distinguished himself through important contributions to science, technology, or culture benefiting Romania or other areas of the world.

A shortage of well-trained scientific and technical personnel persists in spite of increased enrollments and expanded curriculums in higher schools. In 1966 a total of 29,000 scientific research workers of all grades was employed in 255 research units, including institutes of the ARSR and the research institutes and laboratories subordinate to the ministries; 11,000 of the research workers had higher education. In 1967 there were 33,000 research workers in 289 research units; 12,400 of the workers had higher education. By 1968 about 40,000 research workers were employed in 317 research units.

There is an inadequate number of skilled technicians in Romania to supply the increasing needs of industry. The Deputy Minister of Chemical Industry has stated that the ever-increasing demands for skilled labor in the chemical trades require continuous action to raise the professional level of existing personnel and to provide for the thorough training of new personnel. In early 1966 the Minister of Education announced the enactment of measures to provide training during 1966-70 of at

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least 310,000 skilled workers and 130,000 intermediate-level specialized technicians. The ministries and other central governmental bodies have been exerting considerable effort to equip technical schools with the necessary teaching materials and workshops with newer machines and apparatus. The Grand National Assembly passed a law in July 1966 providing for the establishment of 109 specialized secondary schools to train technical specialists for industry and agriculture, with emphasis on mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. The schools were to start operation in the 1966/67 school year. Because the training period covers 5 years, the results of this program will not be evident for several years.

Romanian research facilities generally are inadequately equipped because of a shortage of funds to purchase equipment. Certain areas of physics research are hampered by the low quality of Romanian-built spectrometers. One of the best equipped facilities is the IFA; even this facility, however, lacks certain necessary equipment.

D. Major research fields (S)

1. Air, ground, and naval weapons

Romania does not have the scientific and technical competence to develop modern air, ground, and naval weapons of native design. Efforts are directed toward the development of more effective modification of military equipment already issued to the armed forces. The country is almost totally dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for its operational military systems.

There are no aircraft research and development programs with military application underway in the country. Romania builds only light transport, agricultural, and sport aircraft, special hydrogliders, and ground effect aircraft. The Traian Vuia Institute of Fluid Mechanics of the ARSR in Bucharest, one of the best equipped aeronautical research facilities in Eastern Europe, conducts aerodynamics research and has subsonic, transonic, and supersonic tunnels, as well as shock tubes, available for small-scale experimental testing. Although emphasis has been placed on meeting domestic industrial needs, basic research has been conducted in collaboration with the Institute of Mechanics in Moscow. Some of the studies produced from the late 1950's to the mid-1960's had application to missile shell analysis, and the results indicated a significant Romanian capability in this field. Romania has no missile research and development program, however. Space activity is confined to observations and satellite tracking. A Commission on Astronautics was established to promote and coordinate research and education in astronautics, but its activities have been limited to participation in international astronautical meetings and to publication of papers in the field. Ground weapons research is meager. Copies of Soviet infantry antitank grenade launcher and ammunition, mines, and explosives are produced. Some research is underway on military clothing and dehydrated foods. No naval weapons research is done.

2. Biological and chemical warfare

Romania has no known offensive biological warfare (BW) program. Defensive BW is of rather recent interest and is patterned after the Soviet program. Romanian BW defensive efforts were initiated by the Warsaw Pact BW defense program and are funded by the Romanian Ministry of Health. New and expanded facilities of the Institute of Inframicrobiology of the ARSR, Bucharest, were opened in 1962 for studies in virology, identification of epidemic and epizootic foci, and the preparation of some biological viral products for use in the prevention and diagnosis of inframicrobiotic (viral and rickettsial) diseases. The institute also has trained specialized cadres. The Cantacuzino Institute of Microbiology, Parasitology, and Epidemiology of the Ministry of Health in Bucharest has the most advanced equipment and instrumentation available to Romanian microbiologists and has the capability to produce significant quantities of pathogenic microorganisms should the need arise.

Romanian chemical warfare (CW) research efforts are principally defensive. The specific organization responsible for CW research and development has not been definitely identified. The Chemical Directorate of the Ministry of Armed Forces probably supervises laboratories which conduct CW research, development, and testing. The Ministry of Armed Forces' Laboratory in Bucharest may be the center of CW research and development. A substantial amount of CW defensive research effort in Romania is directed toward the development of antidotes for nerve agents. Romanian scientists, with Soviet support, reportedly have developed an oxime-type antidote for soman known as RP-20. This antidote is composed of a mixture of atropine, oximes, and procaine and is alleged to have a far greater effectiveness as an antidote than atropine alone and to have a prophylactic effect if injected prior to a suspected nerve agent attack.

Other possible nerve agent antidote research work includes experiments with various compounds such as atropine derivatives, the phenacyl oxime of largactil (chlorpromazine hydrochloride), benactyzine, and the phenacyl and acetyl oximes of pyridine, both of which provide therapy for organophosphorus poisoning. The latter reportedly are superior to 2-pyridine aldoxime methiodide (2-PAM) for reactivating cholinesterase but may have undesirable side effects for field administration.

Romania's leading CW specialist, I. Popa (also known as I. Popa-Zeletin), has published a series of papers on the pharmacodynamics of diphenyl and diphenyl-(hydroxy)-acetic acid hydrazides. Coupled with that of military medical personnel, his work indicates a concern for CW defense, particularly with therapy for nerve agents.

There is no evidence that the Romanians are doing any original research on defensive materiel. Military laboratories confine efforts to testing the effectiveness of protective masks and clothing, and detection and decontamination equipment produced domestically from Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovakian models.

The Romanians apparently are not conducting any research on toxic agents or munitions. Romanian scientists, however, are familiar with the chemical structure and methods of synthesis of the G- and V-agents. Organophosphorus insecticides are investigated on a limited scale, and scientific papers have been published on the nature and properties of nerve agents with emphasis on V-agents. Researchers have shown an interest in

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psychochemicals, suggesting a possible military interest. A study has been made on the technical and tactical advantages of neuroparalytic and neuropsychic CW agents. This study also compares their physical and chemical properties, mechanisms of action, and physiological effects.

3. Atomic energy

Romania has established a small nuclear energy program devoted to basic research, the use of radioisotopes, and the development of nuclear energy for the production of electric power. Romania is dependent upon foreign assistance in its nuclear energy program and has no capability of developing a program for nuclear weapons.

The nuclear energy program was initiated in 1955 following the conclusion of the Romanian-Soviet bilateral agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The program is carried out under the auspices of the ARSR, which established the Institute of Atomic Physics (IFA) with the main research center located at Măgurele, about 18 miles southwest of Bucharest. A small branch of the IFA was set up at Cluj in 1956.

The IFA research center at Măgurele is the major nuclear energy establishment in Romania. One of the principal facilities of this center is the Soviet-supplied research reactor which went into operation in July 1957. The reactor, a tank type using enriched uranium fuel, was designed for a power level of 2 megawatts, but changes have been made permitting the power to be increased to 3.5 megawatts. The Romanians constructed a subcritical assembly for use in reactor studies which was put into operation in March 1962. This assembly is graphite moderated and fueled with enriched uranium in elements identical to those used in the reactor. The enriched uranium fuel for the research reactor and the subcritical assembly was supplied by the U.S.S.R. In addition to the reactor, Romania has several accelerators in operation. The principal accelerator is a variable 3.5 to 13 MeV (proton) Soviet-supplied cyclotron, which went into operation in June 1958. The IFA also has a 25 MeV betatron, in operation since August 1959, and a small Van de Graaff accelerator, which went into operation in May 1960. The IFA is purchasing a large tandem Van de Graaff accelerator from a U.S. engineering firm.

The IFA has established research programs in nuclear physics and radiochemistry, and a rather ambitious cosmic ray program is underway. High-energy nuclear physics research is being conducted using emulsions exposed at high altitudes and in high-energy accelerators such as the Soviet accelerators at Dubna and the CERN accelerators in Switzerland. In addition, work in cosmic ray physics is being carried out in collaboration with Hungary and Bulgaria, with the facilities of each country available for use by the others.

The branch of the IFA at Cluj is concerned entirely with research on stable isotopes. There are activities both on the separation of stable isotopes, prepared in the reactor at Măgurele, and on the application of such isotopes. Work on methods of analysis of isotopes includes mass spectrometry, gas chromatography, and spectroscopic isotope shift.

The only application of nuclear energy in Romania is the use of radioisotopes and radiation in research, medicine, agriculture, and industry. However, Romania is considering the construction of nuclear power stations, and negotiations have been held with several Western countries on their possible assistance in the construction of such stations.

Uranium mining started in 1953 with the discovery of medium-grade uranium deposits in the western part of the country. Most of the uranium deposits are located in west-central Romania, and a number of uranium mining areas have been reported. The only known uranium processing plant is located near Steiu. Initially, a joint Soviet-Romanian stock company was formed to administer all uranium ore mining and processing operations in Romania. Control of the company has since been transferred to Romania. Uranium apparently is no longer being sent to the U.S.S.R. but is being stockpiled by Romania for eventual use in nuclear powerplants.

4. Electronics

Romanian electronics research and development resources are limited and only a few institutes are accomplishing significant work in the field. The primary interests appear to be in semiconductors and to some extent in analog and digital computer development. The Romanians have developed telecommunications equipment, including antennas, carrier equipment, and transmitters and receivers for both radio and television. Routine development of gas and solid-state lasers has been carried on.

Around 1961 Romania was selected by CEMA as the location for a new radio parts and semiconductor plant which in turn was to supply transistors to the European Communist countries. CEMA authorities apparently felt that Romanian semiconductor research, development, and engineering could support such a factory. R. Grigorovici of the Institute of Physics in Bucharest and his staff have worked with the Soviets on component studies in amorphous semiconductor materials. The research is of general interest because of the potential use of the material in semiconductor devices.

The Romanians place relatively strong emphasis on computer technology. The Commission for Computer and Data Processing, set up in November 1967 under the Council of Ministers, is composed of computer specialists and high-ranking government officials who are responsible for the centralization and control of all computer activities in the country. The Romanians have developed four models of computers, using mostly components from other Eastern European countries. The computers are of poor quality, and efforts are being made to enter into licensing agreements with Western countries, especially France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Both digital and analog computers have been built for use in research and for teaching purposes. The IFA has been a leading facility in the development of computers and in 1960 developed the first Romanian digital computer, CIFA-1, which was based on earlier Soviet designs. The IFA also developed the CET series of computers. The Polytechnic Institute of Timişoara designed the MEICIPT series. The most recent Romanian computer development is the DACICC-200, a medium-scale machine used primarily

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in data processing. The leading personality in Romanian computer developments is Dr. Victor Toma, the technical director of the First Institute for Computer Projects, Utilization, and Computer Equipment in Bucharest. He formerly directed computer research at the IFA.

5. Medical sciences, including veterinary medicine

Very little biomedical research is significant or original. Research programs are designed to exploit foreign discoveries for improving the diagnosis, therapy, and prophylaxis of disease, particularly in cardiovascular, neural, oncological, and nutritional disorders. This application of already established technology also is contributing to the solution of major public health problems. Inadequate facilities, lack of modern equipment, poor coordination of individual efforts, and an insufficient number of scientists continue to handicap research progress. An Academy of Medical Sciences was established under the Ministry of Health in 1969 to coordinate medical and pharmaceutical research throughout the country. Areas of major biomedical research are microbiology, biochemistry, and pharmacology.

Most of the microbiological, parasitological, and virological research in Romania is being directed toward public health problems and the control of communicable diseases. This effort has contributed to the development and production of effective serums and vaccines. Occupational health studies stress the maintenance of the health and protection of the workers. Emphasis is placed on the alleviation of environmental contamination, noise, and allergic problems. Radiotelemetric instrumentation has been developed for the study of the physiology of exercise and the assessment and control of cardiovascular activity. Physiological research is essentially of an applied nature and is conducted in such varied fields as oncology, cardiology, and gerontology. Some basic physiological research is directed at neurocerebral physiology and to renal function.

Research in biochemistry has included studies on the relationship of the endocrine dysfunction to nitrogen metabolism, the influence of drugs on the activity of tissue enzymes, the role of hypothermia in the metabolism of hormones, and the analysis of the kinetics of protein synthesis. Gerontological studies are stressed but have not produced unique results. One area has been the investigation of potassium metabolism in relation to age.

Nothing essentially new has been achieved in Romanian pharmaceutical research. Areas of importance to Romania have included the exploitation of indigenous medicinal plants which have been a traditional source of drugs. Work is empirical and emphasis is on the improvement of methodology and duplication of foreign research in such areas as the prophylactic role of drugs in irradiated animals.

Radioisotope scintigraphy is receiving increased attention. Radiological studies include investigations of beta-emitting isotopes for the treatment of skin infections and the clinical use of isotopes for evaluation of organ functions. Routine studies are underway on the effect of radiation on the synthesis of protein in cellular tissue and the protective action of radiation for bone marrow transplants.

Veterinary research is primarily applied and oriented to the control and eradication of animal diseases of economic and public health importance to the country. The major animal disease epizootics of economic importance have been reduced significantly, and adequate professional veterinary services are available to support the animal economy. Research is devoted principally to the development of biologicals for the diagnosis, prevention, and control of animal disease epizootics. The most economically important diseases are foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax, hog cholera, Newcastle disease, swine influenza, Aujeszky's disease, and hemorrhagic septicemia. The diseases of public health importance include rabies, leptospirosis, psittacosis, tuberculosis, and brucellosis. The principal veterinary research facilities are the N. Balcesu Agricultural Institute, the Institute of Inframicrobiology of the [redacted] the Pasteur Institute of Veterinary Research and [redacted] Production, the Institute of Zootechnical [redacted] Institute for Animal Pathology and Hygiene, all in Bucharest.

6. Other sciences (S)

a. CHEMISTRY AND METALLURGY—Romanian [redacted] abilities for conducting advanced chemical research and development are, with few exceptions, well below those of technically advanced Western or Communist countries of comparable size and population. Although research goals have been limited to the development of known products of conventional techniques, there is a good potential for increased capabilities and modest progress has been made. The extensive proved reserves of crude oil and natural gas provide Romania with a favorable economic base for the development of many organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and synthetic fibers.

The Romanians are moderately active in organic chemical research. Research is directed toward the use of local natural resources of crude petroleum and natural gas (methane) with the primary goal of making the organic chemical industry as self-sufficient as possible by copying or modifying known processes. One of the most outstanding researchers in organic chemistry is Costin D. Nenitzescu, chairman of the chemistry section of the ARSR and professor of organic chemistry of the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest. He has been active in research on catalytic reactions of aluminum chloride (Friedel-Crafts reaction), polymerization reactions, rearrangements, isomerizations, organic syntheses generally, and the chemistry of cyclobutanes. Researchers at the University of Bucharest have done considerable organic chemical research on the syntheses of heterocyclic compounds. The university is doing strong research in physical organic chemistry. Two of the foremost facilities engaged in organic chemical research are the Institute of Organic Chemistry and the Research Center of Physical Chemistry, both in Bucharest and under the ARSR. These facilities and the laboratories at the university are well equipped, although in general Romanian organic chemical research facilities lack modern instrumentation.

The Romanians are active in research in inorganic and analytical chemistry. Some of the best work in these fields is done at the University of Bucharest, where Prof.

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Grigore Popa, dean of the Faculty of Chemistry at the University of Bucharest, has developed methods for gravimetric, colorimetric, and spectrophotometric determination of a wide variety of metals. Prof. Petru Spacu, also at the university, has done extensive research on cobalt and other complexes, the separation of rare earths, refractometry as applied to the study of the formation of complex halides of rare earths, and the coordination of chemistry of platinum group metals. High quality research is underway at the University of Cluj in inorganic and analytical chemistry under the direction of Prof. Raluca Ripan, who is also director of the Institute of Chemistry of ARSR at Cluj. He is engaged in the development of a variety of analytical techniques and works extensively on heteropolyacids and their salts. Candin Liteanu, professor of analytical chemistry at the University of Cluj, is concerned with photometric, colorimetric, and complexometric titration techniques, and with paper chromatographic procedures.

Some competence is shown in physical chemistry, particularly at the higher educational institutions and at the Research Center of Physical Chemistry of the ARSR. Prof. I. G. Murgulescu, director of this research center and professor of physical chemistry at the University of Bucharest, is a prominent Romanian chemist who has done excellent work on the physical and thermodynamic properties of molten salts, thermal decomposition reactions, vapor pressures, heats of mixing, and heats of solution. Research is done at the University of Bucharest on the physical properties of solid catalysts and at the University of Cluj on the kinetics and mechanism of substitution reactions of complexes.

Research in macromolecular chemistry lacks depth. The main facility for research in this field is the Institute of Macromolecular Chemistry of the ARSR in Iaşi.

The main institutes conducting applied chemical research are the Institute for Chemical Industry Projects (IPROCHIM), Bucharest; the Institute of Chemical Research (ICECHIM), Bucharest; and the Institute of Petroleum Chemicals Research, Ploieşti.

The status of metallurgical technology in Romania is below the average for the European Communist countries, although there has been an increase in the metallurgical research effort since 1967. Research is primarily applied and has concentrated on areas of immediate industrial application such as the extraction of metals from indigenous ores and the development of new alloy steels using indigenous metals as the alloying elements. The principal metallurgical research facility is the Institute for Metallurgical Research in Bucharest. It is subordinate to the Ministry for Metallurgical Industry and is responsible for studying new metallurgical processes and their possible adoption by the Romanian metallurgical industry. Typical research has concerned minerals beneficiation, iron ore reduction, blast furnace operations, heat treatment of engineering steels, the development of stainless and electrical steels, corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking studies, and powder metallurgical studies.

Research with applications to steel mill operations, including sintering studies, blast furnace operations, slag-metal reactions, electric furnace melting, and steel fabrication, is undertaken at the Siderurgic Combine in Reşiţa. Extensive research in gray iron, directed at the tractor and farm implement industry, has been carried out by the Autocamioane Plant in Braşov and the Braşov Polytechnic Institute. The Bucharest Polytechnic Institute has undertaken research on vacuum steelmaking, the thermal-mechanical treatment of engineering steels, and the addition of nitrogen to austenitic stainless steels. The Timişoara Research Institute is engaged in welding research which has covered electric arc studies, electrode core wire investigations, coating and flux studies, as well as weldability investigations. Research on nonferrous metals is carried out at the Bucharest Rare and Nonferrous Metals Research Institute.

b. PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS—The Romanians have only a modest capability for physics research, ranking well below Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Most of the research is of an applied nature closely associated with the aim for improving technological capabilities. Although some good research is done, most programs lack comprehensiveness. About half of the effort in physics research is related to the nuclear and atomic sciences with the major emphasis on low-energy nuclear physics. Most of the research is centered at the IFA and is related to reactor physics, design, and operation. After failing in its attempts to develop techniques for producing low-cost heavy water economically to support the atomic energy program, the IFA is concentrating its efforts on studies of isotopic exchange processes that occur between gaseous and liquid states. Scientists of the ARSR conduct research in theoretical high-energy physics. Experimental high-energy physics work is done at the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna in the U.S.S.R.

Solid state physics research deals chiefly with techniques for development of semiconductor materials and experimentation in ferromagnetic principles. The main obstacle in the technology of semiconductor devices is the lack of proper natural resources and facilities for producing crystals of sufficient purity. Research, therefore, is directed toward developing methods for purification of silicon and germanium factory wastes by chemical reaction processes and distillation. The Romanians have produced a limited number of silicon-lithium-drift devices which are employed as nuclear radiation detectors in neutron spectrometers. Some progress is evident in transistor and diode developments. Along with studies for semiconductor devices, efforts are being devoted to developing thin-film technology. The Romanians have marginal capabilities in quantum electronics. Laser research is growing and is concerned with the application of methods and systems developed elsewhere.

Studies in plasma physics, ionization of gases, and direct current electrical discharges apparently are interrelated and are directed toward the development of capabilities for establishing a foundation for vacuum tube technology, for producing high temperatures for cutting hard metals, and for thermoelectric conversion. Some research is underway at the Institute of Physics of the ARSR in Bucharest to increase the knowledge of Romanian plasma specialists for controlling and containing plasma in various configurations

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through use of magnetic fields. Modest but significant efforts are being expended in such areas as microwave physics and electromagnetic propagation, neutron and gamma spectroscopy, thermal conduction and stress phenomena, fluorescence, and luminescence.

The Romanians have a large mathematical research effort covering a wide spectrum of subjects. The research, however, lacks originality and appears to be extensions of known methods. Although considerable emphasis is placed on applied mathematics, pure mathematical research is still pursued; analysis, algebra, and geometry are the major subjects of study. Topics of analysis research include theory of functions, differential equations, operators, series, and complex variables. In algebra, research is being performed on the topics of sets and logic, linear algebra, group theory, and the theory of numbers. Most of the effort in geometry concerns differential geometry, although there is a noticeable effort in topology. Since 1968 activity in statistics and in the mathematics of computation has shown a marked increase. Although the research is not original it shows a good comprehension of recent development in Western countries. Most of the mathematical research is carried out in the universities, the Institute of Mathematics of the ARSR in Bucharest, the Mathematics Center at Iaşi, and the Institute of Applied Mathematics in Cluj. The Society of Mathematical and Physical Sciences, Bucharest, publishes four mathematical journals. The Romanians place great stress on publication by mathematicians, not only in their own journals but in journals all over the world.

c. ASTROGEOPHYSICAL SCIENCES—Much of the Romanian meteorological research has been routine and directed toward a description of climatic conditions, the development of aids for improving the accuracy of operational weather forecasts, and support of agriculture. Most meteorological research is done by the Central Meteorological Institute, which is composed of sections for aerology, agricultural meteorology, atmospheric physics, aviation meteorology, climatology, instrumentation, and synoptic meteorology. Research has been done on numerical weather prediction and extended range forecasting. An atmospheric physics laboratory is nearing completion at Afumaţi, near Bucharest. The development of weather stations, a number of which are operational, also has been stressed.

Upper atmospheric research has been very limited and of low quality. A few visual observations of auroras have been made, and a few ionospheric measurements have been taken. The Romanians are active in artificial earth satellite tracking. The National Astronomical Observatory in Bucharest and its subsidiary observatory at Cluj are the principal facilities engaged in satellite tracking. A tracking station also is located at Timişoara. The tracking activities of the observatories began in 1957 when equipment was furnished by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The data obtained by visual observations, used for the determination of satellite ephemerides, are cabled to the Cosmos center in Moscow, and monthly tabulations are sent to the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Independent Tracking Coordination Program in Washington, D.C. Since 1964 the data has been sent to Nanking, Communist China. The tracking activity at Cluj also is related to the Soviet Interobs program for determination of the density of the high atmosphere. Emphasis has been placed on geodetic applications of the data obtained in these and other visual and photographic tracking programs. The Romanians also have engaged in the theoretical study of orbital mechanics, partly by personnel of the astronomical observatories.

Romania has some experience in seismology, exploration geophysics, and geodesy, and in general these sciences are developed adequately to care for the country's needs. An effort is being made to improve research in deep exploration drilling techniques and exploration geophysics in order to find new petroleum reserves. Research in deep drilling techniques is well above that of all other bloc countries except the U.S.S.R. but below such Western European countries as the United Kingdom and Italy. The Institute of Geology and Geography, Bucharest, of the ARSR, and the Hydrocarbon Geological-Industrial Research and Design Institute, of the Ministry of Petroleum, conduct topographic, gravimetric, electrometric, magnetometric, and seismic surveys. Some studies are underway on the seismicity and geologic structure of the Carpathian Mountains. Capabilities in geomagnetism and geoelectricity are low. Research is routine, and field operations consist primarily of general magnetic and geoelectric surveys.

Romania has never made a major contribution in geodesy, but the intervention of the U.S.S.R. into Romanian scientific fields has brought about an increased interest in geodetic research. Geodetic programs in recent years have included experiments with various types of modern electronic distance-measuring equipment, minor innovations in surveying and modest research in the field of satellite geodesy. Observations of U.S. geodetic satellites and studies based on these observations are conducted both nationally and in cooperation with other East European countries. No significant research has been done in triangulation or leveling, although some work has been done on the development of a single and homogeneous net for each order of triangulation and on precise leveling for studying movements of the earth's crust.

Hydrologic and hydraulic research capabilities are fair and will probably improve slowly over the next few years. Research is mainly of an applied nature and is directed toward full utilization of major rivers for hydropower, navigation, irrigation, and water supply, and an increase in the acreage of reclaimed land in the Danubian lowland and along the lower reaches of the Şiretul and Prut rivers. Hydrologic research is concentrated on studies of daily and seasonal flow variations, extreme discharges, and seepage phenomena of nonstationary infiltration in levees along the Danube. In hydraulic research, model tests and field investigations have been made on newly designed outlets, spillways, and diversion canals. Romanian engineers are compiling field data on infiltration-evaporation phenomena in the Dobruja region as part of an irrigation project. Some progress has been made in instrumentation with the design of a new photoelectric colorimeter and infiltration meter.

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Coastal engineering research is confined principally to the construction of new harbor facilities and protective works along the Black Sea coast and to the building of additional beach resort areas. This research is conducted by the Institute for Studies and Hydrotechnical Research of the State Water Commission, Bucharest, and by the Joint Scientific Council for the Coordination of Romanian Research in the Black Sea. Specific tasks include model tests for river and sea harbor construction, tests on artificial sanding as a method of protecting seacoasts, tests on groins along beaches, and research on the refraction of waves as they affect the littoral drift of the Black Sea coast.

Romania has little oceanographic capability, and it is unlikely that it will be increased in the foreseeable future. Most of the oceanographic research is oriented toward descriptive marine biology in relation to fisheries and nearshore sediment studies in the Black Sea. In addition, research is planned on sediment transport and coastal morphology in the Black Sea. The Romanians use classical oceanographic methods in their investigations. Oceanographic efforts are under the direction of the Joint Scientific Council for the Coordination of Romanian Research in the Black Sea. Most of the research is conducted by the Marine Station "Prof. I. Borcea" of the Laboratory of Oceanology at Agigea; the Institute of Biological Research "Tr. Savulescu" at Constanţa of the Academy of Sciences; and the Oceanographic Research Station at Constanţa of the Institute of Hydrotechnical Research of the State Committee of Water. The Marine Station "Prof. I. Borcea" has a research ship, *Emil Racovita*, but no details regarding it are available. The Institute of Biological Research recently acquired the *Palmedion*, a 24-meter steel-hulled converted research ship for use in the Black Sea; the institute also has at its disposal a 100-ton ship, *Marea Neagra*, that conducts surveys along the Romanian coast. The ARSR jointly conducts oceanographic research with the Institute of Biological Research, and there appears to be close collaboration among various other laboratories in such research. A limited amount of marine biological research has been accomplished in the Black Sea as a result of a cooperative plan between the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania. The objective of the plan is to increase the yield of marine fisheries for these countries.

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8. Armed Forces

A. General

The Romanian military establishment consists of ground, naval, and air and air defense forces subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces. The armed forces total about 186,000 men and, among the Warsaw Pact countries, are smaller only than those of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. The ground forces, the largest of the three components, furnish the bulk of the capabilities of the armed forces. Although military proficiency is generally less than that in several other Warsaw Pact countries, the armed forces are reasonably well trained, organized, and equipped, and could make a significant contribution to overall Warsaw Pact operations. In wartime the armed forces could be reinforced by the militarized security forces—the Frontier Troops, including the Maritime Frontier Guard, and the Security Troops—with a total strength of about 45,000. (S)

Large-scale combat actions, sustained combat, or extensive mobilization would require Soviet logistic support, but some units have sufficient equipment, supplies, and personnel to be immediately effective; the remaining units could be made effective in a relatively short period, utilizing existing equipment stocks and reserve fillers. (S)

Troop reliability probably has improved somewhat in recent years, as the increased stability of the Communist regime and reduced direct Soviet control have eliminated primary sources of discontent. (C)

Romanian participation in Warsaw Pact exercises, and the increased alert status and war readiness during both the Berlin crisis in the fall of 1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962, reflect Warsaw Pact contingency plans. Based on Warsaw Pact exercises, it appears that Soviet utilization of Romanian forces in the event of war probably would be in such areas as Greek and Turkish Thrace and Yugoslavia. (S)

Immediately following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Romanian Government, apprehensive for its own security, instituted home defense units called the Patriotic Guard. This force, formed from civilian volunteers, was organized as part of the Romanian response to rumors of Soviet intervention and manifests the Romanian desire to resist. (C)

1. Historical (C)

The Romanians do not have a strong national military tradition. The armed forces have been influenced historically by the countries with which they were allied. Chief among these were France and Germany prior to 1944 and the U.S.S.R. since that time.

From 1878 until 1916, after an initial period under Russian tutelage, Romania was under German influence. The Romanian ruler during most of this period was Carol I, a Prussian prince and officer. In 1916, however, Romania joined the World War I Allies. Incompetent leadership, inadequate training, and inept strategy resulted in a disastrous military defeat for the Romanian forces (1916-17) at the hands of the Central Powers. From 1917 to 1939 the armed forces were primarily under the influence of the French and, to a lesser extent, the British. In 1940 the U.S.S.R. occupied Bessarabia, and, under German pressure, territories were ceded to both Bulgaria and Hungary.

Following serious internal political changes, German troops entered Romania, and German influence again became dominant. Romania joined the Axis attack on the U.S.S.R. in June 1941, and for 3 years, under increasingly adverse conditions, the armed forces fought reasonably well. In August 1944 Soviet forces entered Romania, and King Michael removed the pro-German government and allied his country with the U.S.S.R. The Romanians then fought with the Soviets in actions against the Germans during the closing months of the war. A number of Romanian line divisions fought under Soviet command during this period, but no naval or air units were utilized.

Immediately after World War II the Romanian armed forces, severely limited by peace treaty terms, were allowed to deteriorate; in December 1947 a rebuilding process was begun along Communist lines. Emil Bodnaras, a loyal and longtime Communist, was appointed Minister of Armed Forces. He instituted a program of Sovietization and revitalization of the armed forces. Many of the officers who had served before and during World War II had been purged prior to Sovietization, and further purges of the officer corps occurred under Bodnaras. The emerging new Romanian military establishment employed basically the same organizational concepts, training methods, equipment, and tactics as the Soviet Armed Forces. A large Soviet military mission supervised the reorganization, and emphasis in the early days was on the selection of officers with proven loyalty to the Communist cause. A program of intensive political indoctrination was also introduced as a regular part of the military training program. The armed forces were supplied with Soviet equipment, including virtually all types of conventional ground weapons, jet fighters (beginning in 1951), and Soviet-built naval ships (as early as 1955).

The Soviet military mission provided an effective substitute for the experienced and capable leaders lost during the war and by postwar purges. The mission exercised direction and control, amounting at times almost to command, at every echelon in the armed forces structure. As the Romanian officers improved in ability and became familiar with the new organization, equipment, and training methods, the mission gradually relinquished its functions and was reduced steadily in size. A few high-ranking Soviet officers remain in Bucharest, but their exact mission is unknown.

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Romania is a signatory of the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration, and Mutual Assistance—the Warsaw Pact—signed in May 1955. The pact supplemented a system of bilateral treaties which the Soviets had with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. It established a unified command in Moscow for the Soviet Armed Forces and those of the signatory nations. The Romanian Minister of Armed Forces is a titular deputy commander in chief of this unified command; its commander in chief always has been a Soviet marshal.

2. Defense organization (S)

Military policy on the highest level is established by the Council of Ministers in close coordination with the Communist Party leadership. The structure of the military high command, similar to that in the U.S.S.R., provides for highly centralized control over all ground, naval, and air and air defense forces.

Full military authority is exercised by the Minister of Armed Forces, assisted by a personal staff and five deputy ministers. At ministry level there is a single general staff, three main directorates, several administrative agencies, and the branch directorates (Figure 99). All components of the ministry, except the branch directorates, are unified and serve the armed forces as a whole.

The Minister of Armed Forces exercises direct command over the area and operational commands. Territorial administration is exercised by the headquarters of the military regions, which also control the bulk of the tactical ground forces units. Separate operational headquarters include the Navy Command and the Air and Air Defense Forces Command. The Air and Air Defense Forces Command controls an integrated force comprising all air units and the ground forces antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile, and air control and warning units assigned to the home air defense mission. Of the militarized security forces, the Frontier Troops, including the Maritime Frontier Guard, are under direct control of the Minister of Armed Forces, and the Security Troops are subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs. However, these forces are trained, organized, and equipped in much the same manner as the military forces.

3. Military manpower and morale (S)

a. MANPOWER—There were approximately 5,014,000 Romanian males of military age (15 to 49 years inclusive) in January 1970. Of these, an estimated 3,565,000 were considered fit for full military service. The number of males reaching conscription age (the year of their 20th birthday) will average 180,000 annually during the 5-year period 1970-74. The following tabulation gives a breakdown, by age groups, of the estimated available military manpower:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15–19	915,000	885,000
20–24	749,000	700,000
25–29	681,000	620,000
30–34	772,000	670,000
35–39	778,000	625,000
40–44	733,000	530,000
45–49	591,000	380,000
Total	5,219,000	4,410,000



FIGURE 99. Organization of the Romanian armed forces (S)

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The armed forces are supported by a system of compulsory military service. Conscription is accomplished under provisions of the 3 October 1957 Law on Military Service, as amended, which provides that youths are eligible for military conscription during the year of their 20th birthday or, in the case of secondary school graduates, as early as the year of their 18th birthday. The number of fit males reaching conscription age annually exceeds the requirements for all military and militarized security forces. Those qualified individuals not drafted are carried in the reserves, along with conscripts who have completed their military service, until they reach 50 years of age.

About 98,300 conscripts are inducted annually into the armed forces as follows: ground forces, 95,000 (including 24,000 for militarized security forces); naval forces, 1,600; and air forces, 1,700. Some of the fit males in each class are not accepted because of political or other reasons. Some are deferred temporarily because they are studying in selected fields, working in essential industries, or supporting dependents of certain categories. Individuals remain eligible for conscription until they are 26 years of age.

In November 1964 an amendment to the basic 1957 Law on Military Service established the length of military service at 1 year, 4 months—the shortest conscription term of any Warsaw Pact country—for all conscripts except those serving in the navy or Maritime Frontier Guard, who serve 2 years. The amendment continued authorization of the Minister of Armed Forces and the Council of Ministers to extend conscript service for periods of 3 and 6 months, respectively (a total of 9 months), if deemed necessary during periods of crisis.

The conscription system has permitted the formation of a large body of trained reservists. Since the Sovietization of the armed forces began in 1947, the number of trained reservists who have served in the armed forces and who have remained fit has grown to an estimated 1,321,950. Most of these men have received some refresher training since their release, are relatively young, and would be effective with little or no additional training after being mobilized.

Conscripts are hardy and generally amenable to discipline, although perhaps lacking the martial character of the personnel of some other European countries. In the past, their educational standards and their proficiency in technical and mechanical skills were considered low by Western European standards. Under the rigid control of the Communist regime, however, much of this lag has been overcome, and the typical recruit is capable of mastering many of the skills in military specialist, technical, and mechanical fields.

b. MORALE—Morale in the officer corps is believed to be good. There is no significant opposition to the regime as political reliability has been a prime criterion of officer selection. Moreover, the regime's nationalistic stance in recent years has gained popular support from the officer cadre as well as other segments of the Romanian populace. Most officers are members of the party and other Communist organizations. In addition, most of the officers have been drawn from the labor and peasant classes, groups which generally had little opportunity to enter the military profession in pre-Communist days.

Morale is relatively high among noncommissioned officers as well. They are usually selected after having served a term as a conscript soldier, and the criteria for their retention includes a favorable political attitude and a liking for military service.

The conscript soldier has generally lower morale, probably ranging from fair to good in most instances. Although not ordinarily enthusiastic about military service, he probably accepts it as a necessary part of his life.

4. Strength trends (S)

The strength of the armed forces reached its highest peak early in the 1960's when there was a temporary increase in personnel to more than 259,000 men during the Berlin (1961) and Cuban (1962) crises. Since 1965, personnel strengths have decreased; as of July 1969, the total strength of the military force was about 186,000 men. The ground force strength increased from 150,000 to 170,000 in response to the Czechoslovakian crisis and a continued threat of invasion of Romania by other Warsaw Pact forces. Some reductions can be attributed to reorganization and modernization of the armed forces. Not included in the ground force organization is a labor troop force of 15,000 to 25,000 that is used for military and civil construction and maintenance, and 45,000 men (20,000 Frontier Troops and 25,000 Security Troops) comprising the militarized security forces. Although labor troops are organized as units, and conscripts are assigned, they do not have any immediate military capabilities. The estimated sizable reduction in the security troop strength since 1965 is based on continuing reports of fewer personnel sightings in recent years.

Romania has a sufficient manpower reserve of military age to maintain its armed forces at current levels with relative ease, even if industrial development requirements increase. The estimated strengths of the armed forces since the World War peak of 1944 are shown in Figure 100. Military strengths probably will continue at about current levels unless negative developments take place in the domestic economy or in the political or international sectors.

5. Training (S)

Military training is supervised at the Ministry of Armed Forces level by the Main Directorate of Training. The level and standard of training appear to be somewhat below those in most other Warsaw Pact countries, although definite improvement has been noted. Training methods are basically the same as those employed by the Soviet Armed Forces, and most training manuals are direct translations of Soviet manuals. During the early period of rebuilding the armed forces, the Soviet military mission exercised especially close supervision over all aspects of training. Selected Romanian officers still attend staff schools and academies in the U.S.S.R. at which basic Soviet tactics and concepts for training are taught.

Preoperational training and some reserve training are conducted in the Voluntary Association for the Support and Defense of the Fatherland (AVSAP), which bears a close resemblance to the Soviet Voluntary Society for

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FIGURE 100. ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL STRENGTHS (S)

DATE	ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES				MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES		
	Ground	Naval	Air	Total	Frontier troops	Security troops	Total
Aug. 1944	500,000	21,000	18,500	539,500	...	56,000	56,000
Jan. 1950	186,000	7,500	13,000	206,500	26,000	13,000	39,000
Jan. 1955	215,000	9,200	12,000	236,200	35,000	43,000	78,000
Jan. 1960	200,000	11,000	10,500	221,500	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1961	200,000	11,000	10,500	221,500	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1962	240,000	10,000	9,000	259,900	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1963	200,000	9,000	8,700	217,700	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1964	200,000	9,000	8,000	217,900	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1965	200,000	9,000	8,000	217,000	20,000	40,000	60,000
Jan. 1966	175,000	8,000	8,000	191,000	20,000	25,000	45,000
Jan. 1967	150,000	8,000	8,000	166,000	20,000	25,000	45,000
Jan. 1968	150,000	8,000	8,000	166,000	20,000	25,000	45,000
Jan. 1969	150,000	8,000	8,000	166,000	20,000	25,000	45,000
Jul. 1969	170,000	8,000	8,000	186,000	20,000	25,000	45,000

... Not pertinent.

Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet (DOSAAF). The bulk of reserve training is received during periods of recall to duty.

Regular active duty training has been intensive and thorough. Highlights since 1962 have included participation by Romanian ground and air forces, and probably naval forces, in Warsaw Pact exercises with Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Soviet troops. Additionally, air and ground units of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command participated in air defense exercises conducted by Warsaw Pact countries to improve cooperation and coordination in an overall air defense. The change in the term of service law has influenced training since the beginning of 1965. Small unit training has generally remained the same. However, no exercises have been noted above division level. Romanian forces played a prominent role in the Warsaw Pact exercise "Rhodope," held in Bulgaria in 1967, but subsequent participation has been either with token forces or as an observer.

6. Economic support and military budget (S)

a. ECONOMIC SUPPORT—Romania currently produces only a limited quantity and range of military equipment. There are, however, numerous industrial enterprises now engaged in commercial activities which have a history of manufacturing materiel and conceivably could be reconverted to military production. Moreover, in view of the government's concentration on industrial development, Romania will probably have the capability in the near future to produce a substantially larger output and variety of military items.

Romania produces infantry weapons, mortars, ammunition, and explosives in quantities sufficient for peacetime needs. The principal weapons plant, at Cugir, has the capacity to produce over 100,000 assault rifles a year. Antitank grenade launchers are assembled at Braşov, at an estimated rate of 10,000 a year; and mortars, both 82- and 120-mm, are reportedly made at Plopeni. Signal equipment manufactured is of relatively simple types such as man-pack radios, field telephones, and switchboards.

Since 1951, naval ship construction has been limited to small minesweepers, medium landing craft, and other miscellaneous naval craft. Romania, however, does have the capability to perform major hull and machinery repairs to combat ships.

The aircraft industry is small, and only light utility planes are built; some small transports are assembled under license. The country has no missile industry.

The Soviet Union supplies most of Romania's military equipment; of a total of US$660 million in materiel estimated to have been delivered since 1955, the U.S.S.R. has provided equipment valued at $645 million, Poland $10 million, and Czechoslovakia $5 million. Equipment furnished includes armored vehicles, infantry weapons, radar, missiles, and fighter and transport aircraft.

b. MILITARY BUDGET—The military budget is drafted by the Ministry of Armed Forces in coordination with the State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Finance. Following approval by the Council of Ministers, the budget is rubber stamped by the Grand National Assembly and enacted into law.

Announced military allocations by Communist countries are not equivalent to their actual outlays, but they nevertheless illustrate the general trend of their defense spending. Romania's announced defense expenditures, after rising slowly during most of the 1960's, sharply increased during 1968. In fact, planned defense expenditures for 1969 are over 24% higher than reported outlays for 1967. However, despite this recent jump, the proportion of military outlays to total national expenditures is still well below the 1965 ratio, and, as a percentage of gross national product, they have remained virtually constant.

It is conjectured that the recent marked increase in Romania's announced defense spending is chiefly a manifestation of apprehensions arising from the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. These fears translated into actual military developments have resulted in the formation of a Patriotic Guard, and it is believed that the costs of arming and training this force have been included in the defense budget.

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In addition, Romania may have embarked on a program to increase its production of light armaments. Another explanation, but probably a pretext for the buildup, is that Romania is finally submitting to Soviet pressure to bring its military capabilities up to Warsaw Pact standards and consequently has had to step up purchases of sophisticated foreign military equipment. Announced defense expenditures for the years 1965 through 1969 are shown in Figure 101.

7. Logistics (S)

The armed forces are heavily dependent on the U.S.S.R. for logistic support. They would be unable to mobilize totally or conduct sustained military operations without Soviet provision of significant quantities of many types of major weapons, specialized items of supply and equipment, and replacement parts. Military supplies and equipment from the U.S.S.R. are received by members of the Romanian Army Acceptance Commissions at points along the Romania-U.S.S.R. border. The Romanians pay for the Soviet military equipment by exporting the equivalent value in manufactured goods to the U.S.S.R.

The procurement system is patterned after that of the U.S.S.R. on both the governmental and the military level. Overall military procurement policy is determined by the Council of Ministers. Military procurement requirements to implement the plans and programs of the Ministry of Armed Forces are coordinated and supervised by the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Rear. The combat arms and technical branches work out the details of their specialized requirements in coordination with the Main Directorate of the Rear; procurement of common-use items is the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Rear. The General Staff drafts the overall procurement plan which is given final approval by the Minister of Armed Forces.

The general system of supply and issue conforms to that of the Soviet Armed Forces. Representatives of the Main Directorate of the Rear are at lower command echelons to direct and coordinate the storage, transportation, and issue of all supplies and equipment.

B. Ground forces (S)

The ground forces are patterned after those of the U.S.S.R. Most units are organized along Soviet tactical lines, that is, with armor-heavy, mobile-type equipment. Although good-quality World War II-type equipment is standard in all units, it is being replaced gradually with Soviet postwar equipment. The quality of training is steadily improving, and there is a corresponding increase in the ground forces overall capabilities to carry out the mission of territorial defense. With extensive Soviet logistic support, the ground forces could participate in limited independent actions, or they could furnish a substantial force to Warsaw Pact operations in southeastern Europe. In the Warsaw Pact, the Romanian ground forces rank third in size among the Eastern European countries; the Czechoslovakian and Polish ground forces are larger.

FIGURE 101. ANNOUNCED DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (U/OU)
(*Millions of lei*)

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969*
Defense expenditures	4,735	4,927	5,146	5,751	6,400
Defense as percent of national budget	*5.1*	*4.7*	*4.1*	*4.4*	*4.2*
Defense as percent of GNP	*3.4*	*3.3*	*3.3*	*3.5*	*na*

na Data not available.
*Planned defense expenditure.

1. Organization

The Minister of Armed Forces exercises direct control of the ground forces through the chiefs of the two military regions (MR). Control of ground forces units assigned to the home air defense mission is exercised through the Chief of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command.

There were formerly three military regions, but one (MR I) was eliminated several years ago and only MR II and MR III remain. Their boundary roughly divides the country in half along the topographic crest of the Carpathian Mountains and the Transylvanian Alps. The headquarters of the military regions are not tactical headquarters in the ordinary sense, but they are in the chain of command to the tactical ground forces units. The region commanders are generally responsible for the state of training and combat readiness of the units in their areas, as well as for administrative, logistic, housekeeping, conscription, and mobilization matters. There is no tactical headquarters higher than division, but one could be established rapidly by drawing staff elements from the regional headquarters.

The basic line unit is the motorized infantry division. Although not completely standardized because of shortages of some of the more modern items, the organization closely resembles that of the Soviet motorized rifle division. Substitution of older models of equipment is practiced to maintain operational effectiveness. The division contains three motorized infantry regiments, one medium tank regiment, one artillery regiment, and divisional support and service elements.

The tank division organization is the same as that of the Soviet Union, less one medium tank regiment—that is two medium tank regiments, one motorized infantry regiment, one artillery regiment, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, and divisional support and service elements.

Nondivisional units include artillery brigades, a parachute regiment, and several independent artillery and motorized infantry regiments, as well as independent combat support and service units.

Ground forces elements of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command comprise antiaircraft artillery regiments, surface-to-air missile units, and aircraft control and warning radar units.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition [16]

The personnel strength of the ground forces, estimated at 170,000, represents seven motorized infantry divisions,

[16] For detailed current information see *Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces* and *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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FIGURE 102. SCUD surface-to-surface missile. This type has been displayed on each Liberation Day parade in Bucharest since 1963. (C)

two tank divisions, two artillery brigades, two missile brigades (Figure 102), one mountain infantry brigade, one parachute regiment, one artillery regiment.

In addition to the active forces, there are approximately 1,300,000 physically fit males in the ground reserves. Most of these are relatively young men who have received military training only since the program for Sovietizing the army started in the late 1940's.

Major combat units are disposed throughout the country—three motorized infantry divisions and one tank division in the northwest (MR III) and four motorized infantry divisions and one tank division fairly well dispersed throughout MR II. The divisions vary in strength and not all are fully combat ready. Five of the infantry divisions and both tank divisions are considered available for commitment. The remaining two infantry divisions are manned and equipped at reduced levels but could be made effective by calling up reserves, or they could be broken up to support mobilization of additional units in a much larger force.

3. Training

The level and standard of training have improved during the past several years. Romanian participation in at least six Warsaw Pact exercises between 1962 and 1969, one of which was commanded by the Romanian Minister of Armed Forces, tested proficiency in an area in which the Romanian officer corps was considered weak—the tactical employment of large, combined-arms forces.

Ground force training generally follows the annual training used by the Soviet Ground Forces. Individual and small unit training occurs twice yearly, shortly after the induction of conscripts in winter and summer; it culminates with regimental-level training about 6 months later. Division-level training exercises are generally held once yearly in midwinter. All training is intensive, thorough, and realistic. A conscript normally passes through one complete annual training cycle, with unit exercises at all levels. Through the term of service for conscripts, 16 months, is the shortest of all the Warsaw Pact countries, the comprehensive and repetitive nature of the tactical training permits the leadership cadres and troops to become proficient in the tactical employment of their unit under varying combat conditions.

Special forms of combat are stressed in training, including river crossing; night fighting; winter warfare; city combat; chemical, biological, and radiological defense; and techniques of combat under nuclear warfare conditions. Most training is directed toward the conduct of offensive operations.

The military school system, based on the Soviet pattern, is divided into the following general categories: military high schools; branch officer candidate schools; branch basic and advanced officer schools; and a single high command and staff school—the General Military Academy. Training of NCO's and other enlisted men is conducted in branch schools and specialist schools.

4. Logistics

The procurement, storage, and issue of general supplies and equipment is the responsibility of representatives of the Chief of the Main Directorate of the Rear at lower command echelons through regiment. Military equipment and supplies are usually sent to central storage depots. They are then transported, usually by rail, to the depots and supply bases of the major units.

Wartime supply and movement would follow Soviet principles and, at the higher levels, probably would be tied in with a Soviet-controlled logistic system for the Warsaw Pact countries as a whole. The Soviet principle of delivery forward probably would be used, with higher echelons responsible for moving supplies to the lower echelon depots and staging areas. This system makes possible a strict priority system to provide a relatively larger and steadier flow to vital sectors than to less important parts of the line.

There is sufficient equipment of good quality on hand to equip the current divisions but not to supply a larger force. Expansion or combat would require extensive Soviet logistic support.

C. Naval forces (S)

The naval forces are inferior in equipment and overall effectiveness to those of any other Warsaw Pact country. Except for five large guided-missile patrol boats, virtually all ships are at least obsolescent and many are obsolete. Over the years some older ships have been gradually replaced with newer, but still not modern, units. The decommissioning of all of the remaining destroyers and submarines left the navy with ships of a size suitable only for local offshore defensive operations; however, the smaller ship types are better suited to Romanian needs.

Within the framework of a local defensive mission, the naval forces are adequately equipped to conduct minesweeping operations in key maritime areas, but they could not guarantee the safety of all coastal sealanes simultaneously. Patrol forces (Figures 103 and 104) are less adequate, even for routine wartime demands, but they have been substantially improved as a result of the acquisition of missile-armed units. Antisubmarine warfare capabilities are negligible. The naval forces would require extensive Soviet support in the face of any significant hostile threat.

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

FIGURE 103. A Soviet large submarine chaser of the Kronshtadt class similar to those operated by the Romanian navy (C)



FIGURE 104. A Yugoslav large guided-missile patrol boat of the Osa class, similar to those in operational units of the Romanian navy (U/OU)

The fact that the navy does not seem to be developing into a force capable of protecting the entire coastline suggests a goal of spot defense or, at best, convoy operations. The disproportionate number of service craft in comparison with the number of ships requiring support (5 to 3 ratio) is another indication that the navy would assume a local responsibility for escorting Warsaw Pact convoys in coastal waters and for providing logistic support to Bulgarian and Soviet units fighting to the south.

1. Organization

Within the highly integrated armed forces structure, the naval forces enjoy a degree of autonomy because their headquarters on the shore of Lacul Mangalia are geographically separated from armed forces headquarters in Bucharest. Naval forces are represented in Bucharest by officers who are attached to sections of the General Staff and who serve in various main directorates of the Ministry of Armed Forces. The commandant of the navy probably participates in deliberations of the high command affecting naval forces. Ordinarily, however, he presides over the naval headquarters organization at Mangalia.

Under the commandant, naval headquarters is organized into four administrative groupings, each headed by a chief who serves as a deputy to the commandant. The most influential of these is the Chief of the Political Directorate, who is the principal official link between the Romanian Communist Party and the naval forces. His mission is to assure the loyalty of naval personnel to the regime. Most important militarily is the Chief of Main Naval Staff, who is responsible for routine operational and general administrative matters. Logistic support is directed by the Chief of Naval Rear Services, while the Chief of Naval Technical Services controls the repair and maintenance of ships and equipment.

The operating forces are organized into three principal groupings—the Maritime Command, the River Command, and the Coast Defense Command. Most of the combatant naval ships, all of the auxiliaries, and most service craft are assigned to the Maritime Command, which operates primarily out of the Mangalia Naval Base. Some ships are based at the Sulina Naval Station. River units are based at the Galaţi and Tulcea Naval Stations. The Coast Defense Command, which controls the coast artillery and coastal observation networks, is divided into four regional sectors, with headquarters at Constanţa, Mangalia, Mihail Kogălniceanu, and Tulcea.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition[17]

Ship strength as of October 1969 consisted of 24 patrol ships, 32 minesweepers, eight landing craft, nine auxiliaries, and 95 service craft (including 27 patrol craft).

Ships of the Maritime Command stationed at Mangalia include five large guided-missile patrol boats, three large submarine chasers, 13 motor torpedo boats, four fleet minesweepers, 10 medium minesweepers, and a variety of auxiliaries and service craft. Another 10 medium minesweepers of the Maritime Command operate out of the Sulina Naval Station.

Eight minesweeping boats and half of the service craft of the River Command are assigned at Tulcea; three river monitors and eight mechanized landing craft are at Galaţi.

The personnel strength of the navy totals about 8,000 officers and enlisted men, including 2,700 afloat, 2,500 in staff and support functions ashore, 1,500 in coast artillery, 500 at coastal observation stations, and 800 trainees. The greatest concentration of afloat personnel is at Mangalia, where there are about 1,700. Another 400 afloat personnel of the Maritime Command are located at Sulina. The 600 afloat personnel of the River Command are divided approximately evenly between Tulcea and Galaţi. Staff and support personnel are distributed in approximately the same proportions after allowance is made for some 500 attached to naval headquarters. Some 500 trainees are at Mangalia and another 300 are at Brăila. Coast artillery units and coastal observation stations are spread fairly evenly along the entire Black Sea coastline.

3. Training

Naval training is directly supervised by the Bureau of Operations of the navy staff. General review is exercised by the Main Directorate for Personnel and Training of the Ministry of Armed Forces. Training is fundamentally in accordance with Soviet standards and procedures. Although great emphasis is placed on political indoctrination at the expense of professional matters, training is adequate. In spite of an apparently lethargic attitude towards naval development on the part of the Romanian Government, the navy has been allowed a conscript service obligation which is somewhat longer (approximately 30%) than that of the other services. However, the current 2-year

[17] For detailed current information see *Automated Naval Order of Battle* and *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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term of naval conscript service represents a reduction from the 3-year period in effect until 1964, and it does not provide sufficient time to acquire and make practical use of the technical skills required for naval service aboard ship.

Basic training for recruits of the afloat forces is believed to be conducted at Brăila. Specialty and petty officer training for all enlisted personnel probably is carried out at Mangalia. Personnel return to school periodically for more advanced training as they rise through the ranks. Officer candidates, including those enrolled in the 5-year engineering course, are educated at the Higher Naval School in Mangalia. Coast artillery officers probably are trained at ground forces schools. Advanced officer training is provided at the General Military Academy in Bucharest and, on occasion, at advanced schools in the Soviet Union.

It has been the practice of the navy to emphasize shipboard training. Beginning with naval theory and ship maintenance, training-year programs progress to individual-ship underway training and fleet exercises. Joint exercises with Bulgarian or Soviet forces are held from time to time, but at least annually. Cadet underway training includes exercises in the sail training ships *Mircea* and *Rasaritul*.

Reserve personnel through age 50 are recalled every 2 or 3 years for 1 to 2 months of active duty training. Recall in certain special cases may be extended up to 9 months.

Current naval developments and order of battle would seem to indicate that the navy is stressing training in mine warfare, underway logistic support, and convoy escort and patrol operations.

4. Logistics

At the naval service level, procurement is performed by the five bureaus of the Rear Services Directorate, which procure, store, and distribute naval materiel; operate workships; construct and maintain facilities; and supervise the repair of ships and equipment. The navy is dependent, to a large degree, on logistic support from the U.S.S.R. This is particularly true with respect to ships, equipment, and ordnance. Other types of supplies are available through the local economy.

Primary supply depots are located at or near the naval bases, while subsidiary stores are situated at the smaller naval stations. Ship repairs are performed at Constanţa, Mangalia, or Tulcea. Shipyards are capable of repairing all types of ships operated by the naval forces. Limited building programs could be undertaken, but apparently it has been considered more practical to take over surplus Soviet ships rather than undertake significant local construction.

D. Air and air defense forces (S)

The air force is the aviation component of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command. This command comprises the air force and an integrated force of aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAM), antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and air control and warning (ACW) radar units. The mission



FIGURE 105. GUIDELINE (SA-2) surface-to-air missile. This type has been seen in the Liberation Day parade in Bucharest since 1961. (C)

of the air and air defense forces is to defend home territory and coastal waters against intrusion by hostile aircraft. The air force has a secondary mission of close support of the ground forces.

The six fighter regiments of the air force are committed principally to the task of air defense. Aircraft have a fair capability for interception and destruction of intruders under conditions of daylight and good visibility, but all-weather intercept capability is limited. About 33% of the fighters are all-weather types.

SAM's (Figure 105) supplement fighters in air defense coverage, and AAA provides low-altitude local defense for priority targets. The addition of newer high-performance radars to the ACW radar system is increasing the capability for detection of modern aircraft.

1. Organization

The Air and Air Defense Forces Command is directly subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces. The commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command, who is also a deputy minister of the armed forces, additionally is commander of the Territorial Defense Command. The Territorial Defense Command and the Air Force Command are subordinate to the Air and Air Defense Forces Command.

For air defense purposes Romania constitues a single, centrally controlled district within the overall Warsaw Pact system that is coordinated by the Soviet air defense (PVO) headquarters in Moscow. Control of air defense operations is exercised through a national headquarters and two zonal headquarters. These zonal headquarters coordinate home air defense operations of fighter aviation, SAM, and AAA, and provide communications and warning information. There is an exchange of air defense information with other Warsaw Pact countries and with PVO headquarters in Moscow.

The commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command has operational control, through the air defense zones, over the integrated forces of aviation, SAM, AAA, and ACW radar units. Some degree of control of the

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air units when committed to tactical operations apparently is exercised by the General Staff and the commander of the Warsaw Pact forces.

The commander of the Air Force Command, a major general, is directly subordinate to the commander of the Air and Air Defense Forces Command. On instructions from the appropriate deputy minister, the commander of the Air Force Command is responsible for the operational readiness, technical and flying training, supply, and day-to-day administration of the air force, but he apparently has no operational control over assigned personnel.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition [18]

Personnel strength of the air force is about 8,000 of whom some 300 to 400 are pilots. Aircraft in military operational units total about 310, of which about 280 are jet. The remainder are transport aircraft and helicopters which are used for logistic and administrative purposes.

The air force contains six fighter regiments and a BEAGLE (Il-28)—equipped reconnaissance unit. While the FRESCO (MiG-17) is still the predominant fighter, there are now about 110 FISHBED (MiG-21) fighter aircraft (Figure 106). The Romanian air force was probably the first non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air force to receive the Soviet all-weather interceptor, FISHBED J and was credited late in 1969 with at least 12 of these aircraft.

Air force units are deployed along the western and southern land boundaries and along the Black Sea approaches to the country, with fighter regiments based at the following airfields: Caracal New, Cocargeaua, Craiova, Kogalniceanu, Timisoara Northeast and Ianca.

Personnel and equipment that make up the air defense force are drawn from the air and ground forces. Personnel and equipment for SAM, AAA, and ACW radar units are contributed by the ground forces, and the total is included in the ground forces strength. There are about 11,000 men in the SAM and AAA units and about 2,200 in the ACW radar units.

There are five SAM regiments consisting of 18 SAM battalions. These are disposed to defend metropolitan areas of Bucharest, Ploieşti, Braşov, and the Hunedoara industrial area in western Romania. The five AAA regiments are disposed throughout the country. About 150 radars at 43 ACW sites are positioned primarily to detect aircraft approaching from the south and west.

[18] For detailed current information see *European Communist Aircraft Order of Battle* and the *Military Intelligence Summary*, published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. For information on airfields, see 3. Transportation and Telecommunications, of this General Survey.

FIGURE 106. Romanian FISHBED fighter aircraft (S)

3. Training

a. PREOPERATIONAL (AIR)—The most important institution for premilitary aviation training is the Voluntary Association for the Support and Defense of the Fatherland (AVSAP). The directors are officers in the armed forces, and the instructors are either regular or reserve officers. AVSAP offers courses of about 6 months' duration in flying, parachuting, radio, small arms firing, civil defense, and first aid. Members of AVSAP who are potential aircrew applicants receive training in glider flying, followed by training in powered aircraft such as MULE (Po-2), MAX (Yak-18), and MOOSE (Yak-11). Enrollment in AVSAP starts with the 16th birthday. Upon graduation, licensed students are sent to Aurel Vlaicu Higher Military School for air force officers, the only significant flying school in Romania, located at Buzau and Zilisteanca Airfields. The course at Aurel Vlaicu lasts 4 years. Flight training includes 100 hours in MAX and MOOSE trainer aircraft, and 150 hours in MIDGET (UMiG-15), FAGOT (MiG-15), and probably MAYA (L-29). Normally, cadets fly 35 to 40 hours per month, but the number of months of flying per year is unknown.

After completion of advanced flight training at Aurel Vlaicu, pilots probably receive transition training in FARMER (MiG-19), FISHBED, and FRESCO aircraft at Buzau, Ianca, and Zilisteanca Airfields on a seasonal and weather basis. When pilots have undergone transition training, they are assigned to an operational regiment. After 100 hours training with their regiment, pilots receive their pilot second-class rating. They must have a minimum of 300 hours and pass a written examination and a thorough physical before they can qualify for their first-class rating.

Technical and engineering officers attend the Aurel Vlaicu Higher Military Officers School at Zilisteanca (airfield) or Tecuci for 2 years of fundamental courses. They then transfer to the School for Air Technical Officers in Sibiu for another 2 years of specialized study with courses in jet and piston engine aircraft maintenance, radio, armament, instruments, and aircraft electrical and electronic systems.

A technical school with a 2-year course for radar officers of the Territorial Air Defense Command is located in Braşov.

Noncommissioned officer technicians necessary for the operation of the Territorial Air Defense Command are trained at Galaţi and Mediaş. The center at Galaţi trains aircraft mechanics, instrument specialists, aircraft armorers, meteorological technicians, and other ground-support personnel. The larger training center at Mediaş prepares the above types of specialists as well as communications maintenance specialists, electronic technicians, missile repairmen, and precision instrument technicians.

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b. Operational (air)—Operational training procedures and systems within the air force are carried out on an annual basis through syllabuses prepared by the Air and Air Defense Forces Command. Tactical air units have two basic training groups. The first group consists of inexperienced pilots from the pilot training school, Aurel Vlaicu. Because of the elementary nature of the preoperational training, a heavy burden falls on the operational units to further train new aircrews from the schools. They are considered proficient only in daylight flying, but they probably can carry out simple instrument flying.

The second group is for pilots who have completed a year of training in an operational unit. The syllabus for the latter group is similar in scope to that of the first group, but provides less flying time. It is designed primarily for maintenance of combat proficiency and includes academic, pilot, aircrew, mechanic, and ground specialist training. Pilots in these operational units probably average no more than 6 to 8 hours' flying time per month, somewhat less than for pilots of the other Eastern European Communist air forces.

Pilots are divided into the following three classes according to the number of hours of flying time with which they are credited and other qualifications:

> Class 1—Pilots who have completed over 1,000 hours of flying time and who can fly all types of military aircraft under any weather conditions, including night flying.
>
> Class 2—Pilots who have completed 500 to 1,000 hours of flying time, who can fly only certain types of aircraft in all types of weather, including night flying, and who have approximately 200 hours of night flying.
>
> Class 3—All other pilots who have up to 500 hours of flying time.

The air force participates in limited combined exercises with the Bulgarian Air Force and with Soviet units. Combined maneuvers with Romanian, Bulgarian, and Soviet ground forces also take place at infrequent intervals. Only the more advanced pilots are assigned to these tasks. No Romanian air force participation with other Warsaw Pact forces has been noted since 1964.

Advanced courses for officers are offered by the General Military Academy at Bucharest. The General Military Academy is organized into two sections: a command and staff-level school for senior officers (Section One) and an engineering school for younger officers (Section Two). The purpose of Section One is to train officers in the grades of captain through lieutenant colonel for command positions at regimental and battalion level and for staff positions up to and including divisional level. The academy also trains political activists. Section Two is under the direct supervision of an electronics engineer, a major general. This section trains technical officers for entrance into the regular armed forces. Trainees have the minimum rank of lieutenant, and reportedly they attend the academy for 6 years. Additionally, the Minister of Armed Forces may organize courses of less than 1 year for instruction in technical specialties and to provide refresher training to active duty officers.

c. Surface-to-air missiles—Surface-to-air missile training is limited to the Soviet SA-2 SAM system, which is the only SAM in the hands of Romanian troops. Training programs and methods are based on Soviet techniques, and extensive use is made of Soviet manuals and equipment. Although the SAM training program was organized originally by the Soviets, it appears that a substantial portion of the program is now a responsibil. of Romanian authorities.

Technical training for specialists in such subjects as electronics, command and control, or maintenance support is accomplished through formal schooling. Those personnel not attending specialist schools receive extensive on-the-job training at the unit level.

SAM regiment and battalion-level training programs provide instruction in general military subjects as well as in technical and operational matters. Individual and unit proficiency is insured by participation in alert crew drills, air defense exercises, live-missile firings, and field-mobility exercises. The air defense exercises are often a vehicle for joint SAM/fighter unit training and can be expected to be held in conjunction with Warsaw Pact exercises as well as on a routine basis at lower echelons of air defense command and control. The live-missile firings are conducted by selected units using the Soviet facilities at Ashuluk, U.S.S.R. Additional live firings could be conducted on the Black Sea coast.

4. Logistics

a. Air—The Air Force Services Command is the logistic element under the Air Force Command responsible for air technical supply. Common-use supplies, as well as engineer support and transportation services, are provided to the air units through the military regions in coordination with the Territorial Air Defense Command. Air technical supplies, including aircraft and associated equipment and replacement spares, are obtained from the Soviet Union. The Brasov Air Force Depot Cristian is the largest known storage installation for air technical equipment.

An airfield service battalion is assigned to each operational military airfield to perform base installation administrative, security, and housekeeping services and to provide logistic supply and ground transport support for the assigned flying unit. An airfield service battalion maintains on-base storage facilities, usually separated according to class of supply—rations, ammunition, POL, and air technical spares.

Aircraft maintenance and repair are the responsibility of the Chief Engineer of the Air Force Command. A counterpart of the Chief Engineer is located at all operating levels down through the air regiment. The aircraft maintenance system is patterned after that of the Soviet Air Forces. Aircraft maintenance is divided into field maintenance and depot maintenance. Field maintenance includes performing basic aircraft maintenance and servicing functions and making minor repairs. Field maintenance is accomplished by the maintenance personnel of the operational air units. Depot maintenance consists of making complete overhauls and repairs of aircraft which exceed

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the capability of the maintenance personnel and resources available at the divisional and regimental levels. The Bacău Aircraft Repair Base, which is believed to be under the control of the Technical Department of the Air Force Command, is responsible for performing overhauls and major repairs on all jet aircraft. The Bucuresti Aircraft Repair Base at Băneasa, which is identified by the Romanians as the Enterprise for Repair of Aeronautical Material (IRMA), is responsible for performing overhauls and major repairs of reciprocating-engine military transport aircraft, helicopters, and utility aircraft.

The logistic system functions effectively in peacetime. Logistic methods and procedures are similar to those used in the Soviet Air Forces and are carefully devised and relatively efficient. Difficulties reported in maintaining combat aircraft are generally attributed to shortage of and delays in obtaining replacement parts. The air force's dependence on Soviet sources for air technical material, particularly aircraft spares, would undoubtedly constitute a much more serious limitation in capability in wartime.

b. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES—The organization for surface-to-air missile logistics is dependent upon Soviet concepts and assistance for effective operation. Crucial electronic parts for the Soviet-produced SA-2 SAM systems are obtained from the Soviets. However, some of the general-purpose vehicles and equipment are manufactured in Romania.

The basic logistic unit is the SAM support facility, a battalion-size unit which is generally located with each SAM regimental headquarters. A support facility receives and stores component parts; performs missile assembly, fueling, and checkout procedures; and delivers missiles for as many as five SA-2 sites. On-site logistic activities appear limited to routine supply, maintenance, and testing procedures, which is a recognized limiting factor in sustaining combat operations.

There is no known special SAM depot for countrywide SAM support. SAM resupply items on complete components may be shipped directly from the U.S.S.R. through Air and Air Defense Forces Command depots to the SAM support facilities.

E. Militarized security forces (S)

Romanian militarized security forces are composed of Frontier Troops, including the Maritime Frontier Guard, and the Security (*Securitate*) Troops. The former are under the control of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the latter under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The militarized security forces are reliable, well trained, and efficient. They are subject to military discipline and wear military uniforms; their weapons and much of their training are comparable to those of infantry troops. In addition to their primary functions, the Frontier Troops constitute, in effect, auxiliary ground forces troops. Should the situation require, the units could also be used as combat troops. Units of the Maritime Frontier Guard would be attached to the naval forces in wartime.



FIGURE 107. A Romanian border guard watchtower along the Danube River on the Romanian-Soviet border (C)

1. Frontier Troops

The ground elements of the 20,000-man Frontier Troops force are organized into seven brigades which are made up of units ranging in size from company to battalion. Their function is to control legal traffic and to prevent illegal traffic into and out of the country. Foot patrols are maintained along the border and are assisted by watchtower observers (Figure 107) and dogs. Frontier Troops wear army uniforms distinguished by green collar tabs, shoulderboards, and green piping on the cap. They are armed with infantry type weapons.

2. Maritime Frontier Guard

The Maritime Frontier Guard, which is roughly comparable to the U.S. Coast Guard, operates 10 motor gunboats, three river gunboats, 40 patrol craft, and 19 other miscellaneous service craft. Personnel of this force number 1,000 officers and enlisted men. Responsibilities of the guard include the prevention of smuggling, interception of illegal entrants and escapees, and control of ship movements in coastal and Danube waters. Its activities are coordinated with the navy, and in time of war it would be integrated into the naval forces.

3. Security Troops

The Security Troops, numbering approximately 25,000, are organized into three brigades stationed throughout highly populated, industrialized, and strategic centers of Romania in units ranging in size from company to regiment. Security Troops, selected primarily on the basis of their loyalty to the regime, have two functions—to provide security for important nonmilitary government installations, and to provide a force capable of suppressing incidents of unrest and resistance to the regime. Security Troops are armed with infantry weapons. They wear army uniforms distinguished by bright blue collar tabs, shoulderboards, and blue piping on the cap.

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AREA BRIEF

LAND (U/OU)
- About 91,700 sq. mi.; 44% arable, 19% other agriculture, 27% forest, 10% other

PEOPLE (U/OU)
- Population: 20,283,000 (1 July 1970 estimate); density is about 221 persons per square mile; males 15-49: 5,014,000; 3,565,000 fit for military service; 180,000 reach military age (20) annually
- Ethnic divisions: 87% ethnic Romanian; 8% Hungarian; 2% German; 3% other
- Religion: 14 million Romanian Orthodox; (70% to 75% of total population); 1 million Roman Catholics; over 1 million Protestants; 100,000 Jews; 30,000 Muslims
- Language: Romanian, Hungarian, German
- Literacy: 98%-99%
- Labor force: 10,362,000 persons working, or 54.2% of total population; 57% agriculture; 19% industry; 11% services; 5% construction; 4% trade; and 8% transportation and communication (1966 census data)

GOVERNMENT (U/OU)
- Capital: Bucharest
- Regional breakdown: 39 counties
- Communist dictatorship since 1948 originally modeled after the U.S.S.R.; theoretically, government is unicameral parliamentary system, presided over by supreme Council of State
- Branches of government: Council of State; Grand National Assembly under which are Office of Prosecutor General and Supreme Court; Council of Ministers (comparable to European cabinet)
- Government leaders: Nicolae Ceausescu, President of Council of State; Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Premier as chairman of Council of Ministers
- Suffrage: Universal over age 18
- Political parties and leaders: Romanian Communist Party only legal party; 1,924,500 members; Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General
- Member of: United Nations (IAEA, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU, ITU, WMO), CEMA, Warsaw Pact

ECONOMY (U/OU)
- Agriculture: Net exporter; main crops are corn, wheat, oilseed
- Major industries: Machinery, metals, fuels, chemicals, textiles, food processing, timber processing
- Electric power: Capacity, 6.4 million kw.; production, 31.5 billion kw.-hr. (1969)
- Exports: Foodstuffs, timber products, petroleum products, and machinery and equipment
- Imports: Machinery and equipment, industrial materials, textile fibers
- Exchange rate: 6 lei=US$1 (commercial); 12 lei=US$1 (noncommercial)

COMMUNICATIONS (S)
- Railroads: 6,850 route miles—6,430 miles standard gage (4′8½″), 400 miles narrow gage (mainly 2′6″), 20 miles broad gage (5′0″); single track except for 420 miles double trackage; electrification, 146 miles, mostly standard gage; government-owned; additional 2,850 miles narrow gage industrial trackage, mainly 2′6″ gage
- Highways: 48,000 miles; about 7,600 miles paved, 16,300 miles crushed stone or gravel, 24,100 miles earth
- Inland waterways: 1,445 miles navigable, mostly on the Danube and branches
- Pipelines: 4,700 miles; crude oil about 1,700 miles, refined products about 500 miles, natural gas estimated 2,500 miles; a 240-mile product pipeline believed under construction from Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej refinery to Constanţa
- Ports: 1 principal (Constanţa), 3 secondary (Brăila, Galaţi, Mangalia), 4 minor
- Merchant marine: 49 ships of 1,000 g.r.t. or over, totaling 343,192 g.r.t. and 497,416 d.w.t.; 1 training, 1 passenger, 4 tanker, 10 bulk, 33 dry cargo ships
- Civil air: 41 major transport aircraft
- Airfields: 66 total; 22 have permanent-surface runways; 9 have runways 8,000-11,999 feet, and 25 have runways 4,000-7,999 feet; no seaplane stations
- Telecommunications: Supports basic needs of government, with limited service to general public; international facilities adequate; radio and TV reception available to all sections of country; about 550,000 telephones (1969); about 3,000,000 (1969) radiobroadcast and 1,115,000 (1968) TV receivers

DEFENSE FORCES (S)
- Personnel: Ground forces, 170,000; naval forces, 8,000; air force, 8,000; Frontier Troops, 20,000; Security Troops, 25,000
- Ground forces units: 9 divisions (7 motorized infantry, 2 tank), 2 artillery brigades, 2 SCUD (SS-1) tactical missile brigades; 1 mountain infantry brigade; 1 parachute regiment; 1 artillery regiment, 3 antiaircraft artillery regiments (the antiaircraft artillery regiments are assigned to air and air defense forces)
- Naval vessels: 24 patrol ships; 32 minesweepers; 8 landing craft; 9 auxiliaries; 95 service craft
- Aircraft: 310 in combat operational units
- SAM: 5 SAM regiments (18 SA-2 SAM battalions)
- Supply: Most military equipment imported from U.S.S.R.; small quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition, artillery ammunition, explosives, and chemical warfare defensive materiel, medium trucks and jeeps, small naval craft produced locally

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ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

—— County (*Judeţ*) boundary

• County administrative center

INDEX TO COUNTIES

1. Satu Mare
2. Maramureş
3. Bistriţa-Năsăud
4. Suceava
5. Botoşani
6. Bihor
7. Sălaj
8. Cluj
9. Mureş
10. Harghita
11. Neamţ
12. Iaşi
13. Bacău
14. Vaslui
15. Arad
16. Hunedoara
17. Alba
18. Sibiu
19. Braşov
20. Covasna
21. Vrancea
22. Galaţi
23. Timiş
24. Caraş-Severin
25. Mehedinţi
26. Gorj
27. Vîlcea
28. Argeş
29. Dîmboviţa
30. Prahova
31. Buzău
32. Brăila
33. Tulcea
34. Dolj
35. Olt
36. Teleorman
37. Ilfov
38. Ialomiţa
39. Constanţa







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PLACES AND FEATURES REFERRED TO IN TEXT (U/OU)

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

BASIC RESOURCES AND PROCESSING

- Principal coal and lignite area
- Oilfield
- Gasfield
- Crude oil or products pipeline
- Gas pipeline
- Oil refining
- Iron and steel

Au Gold PbZn Lead and zinc
B Bauxite NoCl Salt

INDUSTRIAL CENTERS

- Ferrous and nonferrous mining and metallurgy
- Machinery, metal goods, transportation equipment
- Chemicals, petroleum products, construction materials
- Timber processing, paper and pulp
- Food processing
- Textiles, clothing, leather goods



LAND UTILIZATION

- Forest
- Marsh, swamp, river meadows

CULTIVATED LAND

- Cereal farming (mainly wheat and corn), sugarbeets, sunflowers, vegetables
- Orchards, vineyards
- Market gardening
- Mixed farming, pasture



ROMANIA

Railroad
Road
Airfield

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INDUSTRIAL CENTERS

- Ferrous and nonferrous mining and metallurgy
- Machinery, metal goods, transportation equipment
- Chemicals, petroleum products, construction materials
- Timber processing, paper and pulp
- Food processing
- Textiles, clothing, leather goods



LAND UTILIZATION

- Forest
- Marsh, swamp, river meadows

CULTIVATED LAND

- Cereal farming (mainly wheat and corn), sugarbeets, sunflowers, vegetables
- Orchards, vineyards
- Market gardening
- Mixed farming, pasture



ROMANIA

- Railroad
- Road
- Airfield

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	°	'N.	°	'E.
Aujud	46	06	27	10
Afumaţi	44	31	26	16
Agigea	44	05	28	37
Aiud	46	18	23	43
Alexandria	43	59	25	20
Apahida	46	46	23	45
Arad	46	11	21	19
Arges (*former Region*)	44	50	24	40
Arieşeii-Rahtivani	44	57	25	50
Ashuluk, U.S.S.R.	47	19	47	24
Avrig	45	43	24	23
Bacău (*former Region*)	46	40	26	40
Bacău	46	34	26	54
Baia Mare	47	40	23	35
Băicoi	45	02	25	51
Barboşi	45	24	27	59
Bazinş	44	48	21	24
Bazna	46	12	24	17
Belgrade, Yugoslavia	44	50	20	30
Bel'tsy, U.S.S.R.	47	46	27	56
Beregovo, U.S.S.R.	48	13	22	39
Berettyóújfalu, Hungary	47	13	21	33
Bistriţa (*strm*)	46	30	26	57
Boldeşti	45	02	25	02
Bolgrad, U.S.S.R.	45	41	28	37
Brăila	45	16	27	59
Braşov	45	38	25	35
Brazii de Sus	44	52	26	01
Bucharest	44	26	26	06
Budapest, Hungary	47	30	19	05
Buzău	45	09	26	50
Byala, Bulgaria	43	27	25	44
Calafat	43	59	22	56
Căpăţîneni-Ungureni	45	20	24	38
Caracal	44	07	24	21
Caransebeş	45	25	22	13
Carpathian Mountains (*mts*)	47	00	25	30
Cernavodă	44	22	28	01
Cetatea de Baltă	46	15	24	10
Chilia Veche	45	25	29	17
Clinic	45	20	21	52
Cîmpina	45	08	25	44
Cluj	46	46	23	36
Colibaşi	44	56	24	54
Constanţa	44	11	28	39
Copşa Mică	46	07	24	15
Corabia	43	47	24	30
Craiova	44	19	23	48
Crişul Alb (*strm*)	46	42	21	16
Cugir	45	50	23	22
Danube (*strm*)	45	30	29	40
Danube Delta (*delta*)	45	30	29	25
Dărmăneşti	46	22	26	29
Deva	45	53	22	54
Diósgyör, Hungary	48	06	20	41
Dorneşti	47	52	26	01
Făurei	45	04	27	14
Filimon Sîrbu	45	05	27	16
Galaţi	45	27	28	03
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej	46	15	26	45
Giurgeni	44	46	27	53
Giurgiu	43	53	25	58
Gura Ocniţei	44	56	25	35
Gura Şuţii	44	45	25	31
Gura Văii	44	40	22	33
Hagieni	44	39	27	47
Halmeu	47	58	23	01
Harşnita (*commune*)	46	25	25	45
Hunedoara	45	45	22	54
Ialomiţa (*strm*)	44	42	27	51
Iaşi	47	10	27	36
Ilia	45	56	22	39
Iron Gate (*gorge*)	44	41	22	31
Isaccea	45	16	28	28
Ismail, U.S.S.R.	45	21	28	50
Jiu Paroşeni	45	22	23	15
Kishinëv, U.S.S.R.	47	00	28	50
Lugoj	45	41	21	55
Măgurele	44	21	26	02
Mamaia	44	17	28	37
Măneşti	44	52	25	51

	°	'N.	°	'E.
Mangalia	43	48	28	35
Mangalia, Lacul (*lake*)	43	48	28	33
Mediaş	46	10	24	21
Mihail Kogălniceanu	44	22	28	27
Moineşti	46	28	26	29
Moldavia (*region*)	46	30	27	00
Moldavian Carpathians (*mts*)	47	00	26	00
Moraviţa	45	16	21	16
Moreni	44	59	25	39
Mureş-Autonomă Maghiară (*former Region*)	46	40	25	00
Mureşul (*strm*)	46	15	20	12
Nadeş	46	19	24	44
Neamţ (*county*)	47	00	26	10
Nikopol, Bulgaria	43	42	24	54
Noul-Săsesc	46	07	24	36
Oltenia (*region*)	44	30	23	30
Oradea	47	04	21	56
Orşova	44	42	22	25
Otopeni de Jos	44	33	26	05
Palas (*rr sta*)	44	11	28	36
Piteşti	44	51	24	52
Ploieşti	44	57	26	01
Plopeni	45	04	25	59
Prahova (*county*)	45	10	26	00
Prut (*strm*)	45	30	28	12
Războieni (*rr sta*)	46	25	23	53
Reni, U.S.S.R.	45	27	28	17
Reşiţa	45	18	21	55
Ruse, Bulgaria	43	50	25	57
Sărmăşel	46	45	24	11
Şaroş	46	15	24	20
Sculeni	47	19	27	37
Sebeş	45	58	23	34
Sibiu	45	48	24	09
Sighetul Marmaţiei	47	56	23	53
Şincai	46	35	24	23
Singeorgiu de Pădure	46	26	24	50
Sînnicolaul Mare	46	05	20	38
Siretul (*strm*)	45	24	28	01
Slatina	44	26	24	22
Someşu Cald (*strm*)	46	44	23	22
Steiu	46	28	22	46
Suceava	47	38	26	15
Suceava (*former Region*)	47	40	25	10
Sulina	45	09	29	40
Sulina, Braţul (*strm*)	45	09	29	41
Szeged, Hungary	46	15	20	10
Tecuci	45	52	27	25
Ţicleni	44	53	23	24
Timiş (*county*)	45	40	21	30
Timuş	48	02	26	59
Timişoara	45	45	21	13
Tîrgovişte	44	56	25	27
Tîrgu Mureş	46	33	24	34
Transylvanian Alps (*mts*)	45	30	24	15
Transylvanian Basin (*plateau*)	46	30	24	30
Tulcea	45	10	28	48
Turnu Măgurele	43	45	24	52
Turnu Severin	44	38	22	40
Ungeny, U.S.S.R.	47	12	27	48
Ungheni-Prut	47	12	27	47
Urziceni	44	43	26	38
Vadu Oii	44	44	27	52
Vidin, Bulgaria	43	59	22	52
Vinţu de Jos (*rr sta*)	45	59	23	30
Vršac, Yugoslavia	45	07	21	18
Zău de Cîmpie	46	36	24	08

SELECTED AIRFIELDS (C)

Arad/Cealu	46	11	21	16
Bucharest/Kanesas	44	30	26	06
Bucharest/Otopeni	44	34	26	06
Caracal New	44	05	24	25
Cocargeaua	44	24	27	44
Constanta/Mihail Kogalniceanu	44	22	28	29
Craiova	44	19	23	53
Iasca	45	10	27	26
Luizi Calugara	46	31	26	55
Timisoara Northeast	45	49	21	20
Zilistea	45	13	26	59

POPULATION

Persons per square mile
0 130 194 259
0 50 75 100
Persons per square kilometer

Based on 1966 census data







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

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

SUMMARY MAP FIGURE 108

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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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