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Government  
and Politics

# Mozambique

August 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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# MOZAMBIQUE

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*This chapter supersedes the political coverage  
in the General Survey dated August 1967.*

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# Government and Politics

## A. Summary and background (C)

Mozambique is a tightly administered overseas state of the Republic of Portugal, itself under the authoritarian regime of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. The Portuguese consider Mozambique to be constitutionally, politically, and economically an integral part of their nation. The underlying political philosophy of Portugal's administration of Mozambique is embodied in the concept of the "corporate state," according to which there are no colonial territories subject to the metropolitan community; there is only a single national community covering a territory which is juridically one, despite geographical separation. Moreover, this political philosophy contends that the regime is the best guarantor of national independence, unity, and stability and thus all important authority in Portugal's overseas possessions must reside in the executive branch of the government in Lisbon.

Psychological and economic factors also are important in the political philosophy of the "corporate state." The almost totalitarian control over Mozambique and the other overseas possessions exercised by Lisbon is viewed as essential to continued Portuguese economic and political domination of these possessions, justified in terms of a mystic vision of a Portuguese empire scattered over the world but held together by bonds of language, culture, racial integration, and shared beliefs. Spokesmen for the government often speak of Portugal's civilizing mission—an obligation to propagate in Africa a Christian, anti-Communist, multiracial society. Further, its overseas possessions are an important source of foreign exchange and provide Portuguese entrepreneurs with important areas for economic exploitation.

Mozambique's political status was first defined in the Colonial Act of 1930, the basic law for all the overseas territories. The Colonial Act was largely the product of former Prime Minister Salazar, then Finance Minister with extraordinary powers, and was designed to reverse a trend toward financial and political autonomy which had arisen in the 1920's. It

provided for a unified administration centered in Lisbon and the integration of the colonial economies with the economy of the metropole. Moreover, it stressed the duty of colonial administrators to uphold the sovereignty of Portugal. The Colonial Act was referred to in the Constitution of 1933 and a modified version, in the form of the Colonial Act of 1935, was incorporated in the revised Constitution of 1951 with the term "overseas provinces" substituted for "colonies." In addition, the 1954 Native Statute defined the political and legal status of the Africans and the conditions under which they could be granted full citizenship. The Angolan rebellion in 1961, however, prompted the Portuguese Government to reconsider many of its overseas policies, and, with the 1963 Organic Law, the government repealed the Native Statute and made all Mozambicans Portuguese citizens.

Constitutional revisions in 1971 held out the possibility of greater autonomy for Lisbon's overseas territories. However, the revised Overseas Organic Law enacted in 1972, designating Mozambique a state instead of a Province and changing the names and some of the functions of its legislative and administrative bodies, amounted to little more than cosmetic changes to mask Portugal's continued control of its African territories. Lisbon exercises effective control through its rights of approval and veto, rather than through daily supervision of Mozambique's affairs; it sets forth general policy, especially on economic matters, leaving implementation largely to the provincial government.

Most policies and important administrative decisions regarding Mozambique must be either initiated or approved by the Portuguese Government in Lisbon through the Prime Minister. He is assisted by a Council of Ministers, the minister immediately responsible being the Minister of Overseas, and by various legislative and advisory bodies. Although Mozambique sends representatives to the National Assembly in Lisbon and maintains its own partly elected legislative bodies at the state and local levels, they have little actual power.

In Mozambique, as in Portugal, political activity is carried out through government-approved organizations and social institutions. Portuguese authorities tend to view most political activity with suspicion, and the concept of a loyal opposition is alien to Portuguese political tradition. Elections are held to confirm government policies rather than to reflect popular opinion. Despite various electoral reforms—the last was in 1968—the electorate forms a small minority of the total population. Very few Africans vote or otherwise take part in the political process.

The general growth of African nationalism in the early 1960's led to the formation of a number of black Mozambican exile groups. In 1962 several of these groups merged to form the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which initiated armed insurgency against the Portuguese in 1964. Although nominally a countrywide movement, FRELIMO has thus far been limited to the northern areas of Mozambique in its military operations. It is the only organization carrying out sustained insurgency within Mozambique, although another, the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), has occasionally launched small and relatively insignificant raids in northwestern Mozambique.

To combat the FRELIMO insurgency and prevent its spread southward, the Portuguese have instituted social and economic development projects. These include the construction of hundreds of resettlement villages in the north, the construction in Tete District of the massive Cabora Bassa dam which will open new areas to settlement and development, the expansion of agricultural and industrial enterprises, and the settlement of Portuguese and Africans on newly irrigated land in the south. The government has also tried to expand health and educational facilities and improve living conditions in the countryside. Government programs have been limited, however, by inadequate resources and lack of qualified personnel.

## **B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)**

Mozambique has the honorary status of an overseas state—it is still often referred officially to as "province"—and is governed as an integral part of the Portuguese nation. Most policies and important administrative decisions must be either initiated or approved by the Portuguese Government in Lisbon, which is under the authoritarian leadership of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. The revised Overseas Organic Law enacted by the Portuguese National Assembly in April 1972 changed the names and some of the functions of Mozambique's legislative and

administrative bodies but reserved veto power to Lisbon; it designated Mozambique a state and accorded the Governor General the rank, though not the title, of minister of state with the right to attend cabinet meetings in Lisbon.

The new political-administrative statute promulgated in December 1972, implementing the revised organic law, again reaffirmed the balance of authority between Mozambique and the metropolitan Portuguese Government. Lisbon's powers to supervise and control the Governor General and his administration through the Ministry of Overseas were basically unchanged. On the other hand, there appears to be some modest increase in the power of local authorities to implement policy within Mozambique without prior clearance from Lisbon. Although the statute expanded the membership of the legislative and advisory bodies, virtually unlimited legislative authority remains vested in the Governor General, who is nominated by Lisbon.

Portugal's administration of Mozambique reflects the theory of the "corporate state," contained in the *Estado Novo* (New State) of former Prime Minister Salazar, as embodied in the Portuguese Constitution of 1933 and its subsequent revisions. The system is characterized by a strong centralized control of the government by the executive branch. This theory holds that the nation is composed of numerous social and economic institutions, ranging from the family through large industries, and that government policies reflect the interests of the individual citizen through his membership in these institutions and the national roles which these institutions play. Thus, at least half of the membership of the legislative bodies in both Portugal and Mozambique is composed of representatives of labor, financial, agricultural, commercial, religious, and cultural interests. All of these groups are expected to espouse the interests of the Portuguese nation first and only secondarily to further their own interests. In practice, however, the "corporate state" has meant rule by an influential elite made up of members of business, the military, and, to a lesser extent, the Roman Catholic Church.

### **I. Central government**

Overall responsibility for Mozambique rests with the central government in Lisbon; the administrative apparatus in Mozambique is limited to the implementation of general policies laid down by Lisbon and to those matters which are the exclusive concern of the overseas state. The structure of the Mozambique Government and its relation to Portugal are shown in Figure 1. In Lisbon, Mozambican affairs




FIGURE 1. Structure of government (U/OU)

are directed by the Prime Minister, assisted by a Council of Ministers (cabinet), and by a bicameral legislature consisting of the Corporative Chamber and the National Assembly. The legislative jurisdiction of these bodies covers measures applicable to the Portuguese nation as a whole or to any part of it.

The Portuguese official most directly concerned with Mozambique is the Minister of Overseas. He has board supervisory authority over all relations between the metropole and its overseas states. He nominates Mozambique's Governor General, who is formally appointed by the Council of Ministers in Lisbon. The Minister of Overseas has responsibility for the organization and administration of Mozambique's civil service, controls the budget, and supervises most public works planning and construction. He also has the authority to override decisions of the Governor General.

The Corporative Chamber is the highest advisory body in the Portuguese Government. Mozambique is represented by one member from its Consultative Council (formerly Economic and Social Council) and one member selected from its civil service. The chamber advises both the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers, which consults it on all bills being presented to the National Assembly as well as on many decrees. The chamber has the power to propose changes, recommend a new bill entirely, or advise against enactment of a bill under consideration.

According to the Organic Law, the National Assembly is the major source of overseas policy; in practice, however, the function of the assembly on matters affecting the overseas areas is limited to ratification of legislation submitted by the Council of Ministers and usually drafted by the Minister of Overseas. Mozambique is currently represented in the assembly by seven deputies; however, an as yet unknown number of additional seats will be apportioned in the assembly elections scheduled for October 1973. The National Assembly may also consult the Overseas Council, an advisory body of distinguished Portuguese Government officials established in 1933 as a permanent consultative body of the Minister of Overseas. Mozambique's Legislative Assembly (called the Legislative Council until 1972) elects two members and one alternate to this advisory body.

## 2. State government

The Governor General is the supreme overseas authority in Mozambique. Appointed for a 4-year term which may be extended for 2 years at a time, he has extensive powers and responsibilities for



administering the state under the terms of the Organic Law. He also is responsible for the appointment and performance of members of much of the state bureaucracy; he is the financial authority, controlling expenditures and preparing the state budget for the approval of the National Assembly in Lisbon; and in general he is responsible for the care, protection, and guidance of the indigenous population.

A Secretary General, who is nominated by the Governor General and appointed by the Minister of Overseas, assists the Governor General in his executive functions. The Secretary General has jurisdiction over a wide variety of activities, including public administration, and acts for the Governor General in the latter's absence. In addition, there are eight state secretaries, nominated by the Governor General subject to the approval of the Minister of Overseas, who are responsible for the following portfolios: Communications; Commerce and Industry; Education; Health and Welfare; Labor; Agriculture; Planning and Finance; and Public Works. Together, the Governor General and the eight secretaries form the Council of Government. Under the eight secretaries are numerous services and institutes which include regular government agencies and the autonomous services—such as the ports, railroads, and transportation services. The autonomous services are agencies which either charge for their services or are supported by special funds or taxes.

The Governor General is also assisted by a Consultative Council, which operates as a standing advisory committee. The council consists of 21 members, 13 of whom are elected by various corporative groups, 4 are ex officio, and up to 4 are designated by the Governor General. The councillors include persons with experience in administrative problems of the state, representatives of local authorities, and representatives of various economic and social interests.

The Governor General is assisted further by a partly elected consultative Legislative Assembly through which he exercises his legislative powers. The Legislative Assembly is composed of 50 members, some elected for 4-year terms and some ex officio members. The Governor General acts as the presiding officer. Figure 2 summarizes the method of election of the Legislative Assembly and of other governmental units.

The Legislative Assembly shares the right to initiate legislation with the Governor General, the Overseas Ministry, and the National Assembly. In order for a bill to become law, it must be passed by a majority vote and signed by the Governor General. Although in theory the state of Mozambique is granted administrative and financial autonomy, the role of the legislators in fiscal matters is primarily to approve budgets submitted to them by the Governor General. State legislators have some capacity to override the will of the Governor General, but all cases of disagreement are subject to the final authority of Lisbon.

The majority (30) of the elected members of the Legislative Assembly are chosen indirectly by groups or government authorities which are intended to reflect the interests of labor, business, consumers, and welfare and cultural groups. Less than half (20) of the elected members of the council (2 from each district) are elected by direct suffrage of qualified voters.

### 3. District and local government

Mozambique is divided into 10 districts, each headed by a district governor responsible to the Governor General. (As of January 1974, the District of Mocambique is to be divided into 2 new districts, bringing the total to 11.) Each district governor is assisted by a district board composed of nine members and nine alternates. Two members and two alternates

FIGURE 2. Methods of election of legislative and consultative bodies in Mozambique—Some members are chosen by direct suffrage, while others are chosen on a cooperative, or "organic," basis, that is, by and from specific social economic, administrative, cultural, and religious institutions or activities (U/OU)

|                                | TOTAL   |            | BY DIRECT SUFFRAGE |            | BY CORPORATIVE SELECTION |            | APPOINTED OR EX OFFICIO |            |
|--------------------------------|---------|------------|--------------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|-------------------------|------------|
|                                | Members | Alternates | Members            | Alternates | Members                  | Alternates | Members                 | Alternates |
| Legislative Assembly . . . . . | 50      | 0          | 20                 | 0          | 30                       | 0          | 0                       | 0          |
| Consultative Council . . . . . | 21      | 13         | 0                  | 0          | 13                       | 13         | 8                       | 0          |
| District Board . . . . .       | 0       | 0          | 2                  | 2          | 7                        | 7          | 0                       | 0          |
| Municipal Council . . . . .    | 4       | 4          | 2                  | 2          | 2                        | 2          | 0                       | 0          |
| Parish Board . . . . .         | 2       | 2          | 2                  | 2          | 0                        | 0          | 0                       | 0          |

are chosen by direct suffrage of registered voters in the district; three each by the governments of the municipalities within the district; two each by economic and professional corporate bodies; one each by religious and cultural groups; and one each by the recognized tribal authorities. District elections are held every 4 years.

Districts are divided into two types of administrative subdivisions: the circumscription (*circunscricao*) and the township (*concelho*). Areas with greater economic development (and, generally higher European population) are townships, and it is a matter of some local pride when a circumscription is elevated to the rank of township. Townships are subdivided into parishes (*freguesias*) or, when not sufficiently developed to warrant this (as is generally the case outside areas of heavy European settlement), into administrative posts (*postos*). Circumscriptions are also subdivided into *postos*, though isolated parishes can in theory be created as well. Administrative posts, whether in circumscriptions or townships, are divided into tribal areas, or *regedorias*, which may be subdivided into groups of settlements (*povoacoes*). Circumscriptions, townships, and administrative posts are presided over by an appointed and remunerated chief (*regedor*), who is normally the traditional chief of the area. Smaller villages within these areas are governed through lower level traditional chiefs called *regulos*. The *regedor* carries out functions delegated to him by his superior, the administrator of the circumscription; the *regulo* is completely subservient to the *regedor* and is expected to maintain local order, keep the Portuguese informed about village happenings, and assist in the collection of taxes.

Through this administrative structure, the Portuguese have been able to extend the authority of the government to the individual African by means of the traditional African leaders, while permitting those areas with appreciable white populations to maintain their own local political integrity without danger of being subordinated to African officials.

The seats of townships may be given municipal status as cities (*ciudades*) or towns (*vilas*). If large enough they may be subdivided into neighborhoods (*bairros*). Cities are presided over by an appointed mayor (*presidente*) and a city council (*camara municipal*) of from 4 to 10 members elected partly by direct vote and partly by corporate interests. In towns the township administrator (*administrador*) is ex officio mayor, aided by an elected municipal council (*conselho municipal*) or municipal commission (*comissao municipal*) of 4 members elected partly by direct vote and partly by major taxpayers.

#### 4. Judicial system

Mozambique's judicial system is controlled directly by the government in Lisbon. The Minister of Overseas appoints, promotes, transfers, and retires all magistrates, judges, and attorneys.

There are three types of courts: 1) regular or ordinary courts with competence in civil and criminal cases; 2) administrative courts, with jurisdiction in all administrative or fiscal matters involving an agency of the government; and 3) special courts, such as juvenile, tax, military, and courts for execution of sentences. Except for some of the special courts, each type has three levels—supreme tribunal, courts of appeal, and local courts.

The ordinary court system is headed by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (16 judges) in Portugal, which decides on points of law only in cases which have already been heard by appellate courts. Within Mozambique the ordinary courts, in ascending order, consist of courts of first instance, courts of second instance, and a High Court of Appeal. Appeals may be carried from the High Court to the Supreme Tribunal. The Attorney General of Mozambique has a permanent seat on the High Court of Appeal.

The Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law empower the Governor General of an overseas state to create special courts with exclusive competence for judging specific categories of crime, particularly those pertaining to fiscal, social, or security matters. Most of the special courts created in Mozambique have been military tribunals for trying cases of subversion, sabotage, or other crimes against the security of the state. Other special courts include courts for execution of sentence; these courts have the power to commute or change sentences imposed by the ordinary courts and to take preventive measures to "protect the general welfare."

The administrative courts are headed by the Supreme Administrative Tribunal in Lisbon, which consists of a president who is responsible to the Prime Minister, a vice president, and 12 judges who are appointed by the Council of Ministers. Administrative courts have jurisdiction in matters involving agencies of the government. Within Mozambique the highest administrative court is the Administrative Tribunal, whose jurisdiction includes such matters as appeals related to actions by the administrative authorities of the state and inspection of contracts made by administrative authorities.

Prior to 1961 the ordinary judicial system in Mozambique was divided into two parts: one administered Portuguese law, and the other

administered on the basis of African customary law. The first of these dealt with whites, mulattoes, and assimilated Africans. Those unassimilated Africans not living in traditional African society also were subject to the courts which administered Portuguese law. Civil cases involving unassimilated Africans living in tribal society were decided on the basis of custom by the administrator or chief of the administrative post, assisted by one or two Africans who acted as interpreters and gave advice on local traditions. Civil cases involving disputes between unassimilated and assimilated Africans were generally decided by Portuguese law. In all criminal cases Portuguese law applied, although judges usually took the customs and usage of tribal Africans into account in sentencing.

The abolition in 1961 of the legal distinction between assimilated and unassimilated Africans required unification of the judicial system. Municipal courts were declared to be courts of first instance for all Mozambicans in both civil and criminal cases. In these municipal courts, however, Africans may still choose to be subject to Portuguese law or to their own tribal custom and usage. The choice of Portuguese law must be made before a civil registrar and is irrevocable for the African and for his children as well. The various systems of native law have yet to be codified, however, and in practice Africans are almost invariably tried under Portuguese law.

### 5. Civil service

The Mozambican civil service is complex, highly centralized, and strictly controlled through the Minister of Overseas and the Governor General. It is composed of a civil administrative corps (line), and a secretarial corps (staff). Combined with the complexity of the civil administrative structure, centralization has resulted in frequent delays and mismanagement in the execution of administrative measures. Such deficiencies rankle those overseas Portuguese who must deal with metropolitan Portugal and spur demands for greater local autonomy. The pay of civil servants is low and has been a factor in the poor performance at lower levels of public administration. In the higher grades, however, more liberal salaries and allowances, together with the opportunity to make money from outside sources, attract the better qualified people and widen the gap in quality between the upper and lower levels.

Candidates for public administration are generally chosen by competitive examinations. Recruits are appointed by the Minister of Overseas, but their responsibilities and locations in Mozambique may be determined by the Governor General on the basis of

local needs. All appointees must meet educational requirements—many of which have recently been lowered—based on the position to be filled. Africans, as they meet the present requirements, are entering the civil administration in increasing numbers, but the majority of administrative appointments at the middle and higher levels are still held by whites.

### C. Political dynamics (C)

Political activity in Mozambique, as in Portugal, is rigidly controlled. Participation is reserved for organizations which are either under government supervision or which lend support to the government and its policies. Portuguese authorities tend to regard most other political activity as disruptive, and opposition of any kind is considered subversive. As a consequence, political activity by opposition elements in Mozambique is clandestine and, with the possible exception of FRELIMO cadres, informal and unstructured.

Most political activity by black Africans is regarded with suspicion and disfavor by the Portuguese authorities, and black participation in government is severely restricted, largely because of electoral qualifications. The low educational level of most black Africans makes it extremely difficult for them to meet the legal requirements for election or appointment to office. Virtually the only legitimate political activity available to a Mozambique African is voting, but even this is on a very limited basis. Strict police surveillance of the African population and lack of means by which Africans may work peacefully and legally to advance their interests have forced most of the more politically active individuals to flee Mozambique and join African nationalist groups based in neighboring African countries.

#### 1. Political organizations and activity

The only legal political party in Portugal and thus in Mozambique is the National Popular Action (ANP), formerly the National Union. The ANP is not classified as a party, however, but as a patriotic organization which all Portuguese citizens, regardless of their political beliefs, may join. It is essentially an instrument of government policy, designed to further the objectives of the state, insure popular electoral support for the regime, and maintain in elective offices persons who will support the political and social programs and institutions of the state.

Prime Minister Caetano is head of the ANP and exercises almost complete control over the organization. Total membership in Mozambique is not known,

but it is quite small and consists primarily of whites, although a few Africans also belong.

Important political influence in Mozambique is exerted by a small but wealthy group of businessmen and property owners in Portugal who maintain close economic and social ties with Portuguese Government leaders. Accordingly, the government takes their interests into account when formulating policy. Because of their connections with Portugal's conservative political and military oligarchy, these interests strongly favor the *status quo*, from which their privileged position derives. Another important group of businessmen, based in Mozambique, is against Lisbon's tight-fisted control over local matters and, at least on economic matters, constitutes a vocal opposition.

The armed forces have long been a key factor in the stability of the government, both in Lisbon and overseas. The military exercises substantial power in metropolitan Portugal, where it was a major factor in Salazar's rise to power and in the approval of Caetano's succession as Prime Minister. In Mozambique, the military's traditionally influential role has been considerably expanded since the outbreak of the insurgency.

The government has also drawn extensively on the military for the administration of government affairs. For a number of years the Governor General was a high-ranking military man chosen for his ability and loyalty. In early 1973, over half of the district governors were military officers. Since the insurgency began, the army has become actively engaged in government-sponsored civic action programs to counter its spread. Regular officers of the armed services have also been used as administrators of civil districts and municipalities, chiefs of key facilities, and as senior officers in the civilian security organizations. In general, the officers detailed to these duties have been fairly well educated and have proved to be good administrators.

No information is available on relations between military and civilian authorities, but some resentment or friction probably exists because of overlapping responsibilities and because of the number of military officers occupying positions that would normally be reserved for civilians.

The Roman Catholic Church works closely with the Portuguese Government, especially in education, and in the past has given it considerable support, even though the church ostensibly remains politically neutral. Promotion of Catholicism, the traditional religion of Portugal, has been an integral part of Lisbon's "historic mission" to establish in Mozam-

bique the benefits of Portuguese civilization, one of which is Catholicism. The Catholic Church is indebted to the government for restoring many of its rights and privileges taken away shortly after Portugal became a republic in 1910. Although the church has lost some of its influence in Mozambique as a result of the government's own increased role in education, the church has retained its authority over the small Christianized rural population.

The Mozambique Catholic Church is headed by an archbishop in Lourenco Marques.<sup>1</sup> It is part of the Portuguese Catholic Church hierarchy and is organized into parishes and missions. The activities of the church are subsidized by the government, and the church is recognized as one of the basic corporative institutions of the Portuguese state. The church has representatives in the Legislative Assembly and the Consultative Council.

Most of the bishops and parish priests, predominantly Portuguese, have defended Portugal's role in Africa, though they have quietly tried to make the government ideal of racial equality more of a reality. One notable exception was the former Bishop of Beira who, until his death in 1967, openly criticized Portuguese treatment of Africans, especially discriminatory pay scales and the lack of housing, schools, and health facilities. The Bishop of Nanpula has also been outspoken in his criticism.

Most of the missionary priests belong to international religious orders, are non-Portuguese, and tend to be more critical of Portuguese policy toward the overseas territories. The government is well aware of the possible adverse effects of foreign missionaries in Portuguese Africa but has accepted this as a necessary risk because of the insufficient number of Portuguese priests available for service. In May 1971 the international Catholic Order of White Fathers announced the withdrawal of its priests as a gesture of protest against continuing social and political injustice in Mozambique. Portuguese officials immediately retaliated by claiming the missionary order had not voluntarily withdrawn but was expelled for engaging in anti-Portuguese activity.

The Mozambican press plays virtually no political role other than to support the government. Most newspapers are in fact owned or controlled by interests that are close to the government. Official censorship precludes direct criticism of government policies, though occasionally criticism of the way these policies are carried out is allowed.

<sup>1</sup>For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter, the map itself, and maps in the text.

Labor unions are also weak. They must be officially approved, and have no right to strike. Moreover, government appointees are a part of the leadership of the unions. The recent appointment of a vigorous new provincial Secretary of Labor, together with the expansion of the Labor Institute, affords some promise of positive development in this area, however.

## 2. Electoral system

The electoral system in Mozambique, as in Portugal itself, assumes that the individual is primarily represented through the social or economic group to which he belongs rather than through direct participation in the political process.

Elections are based on two types of representation, one popular and direct, the other corporative and generally indirect. Under the Portuguese system, provision is made for the direct election of all representatives to the National Assembly in Lisbon and less than half of the Mozambique Legislative Assembly, along with some members of district boards and municipal and parish councils. The constitution provides for the indirect election of the President of the Republic, the Corporative Chamber, the Overseas Council, and a majority of delegates to the Mozambique Legislative Assembly and Consultative Council through membership in one of Portugal's numerous corporate groups. Under this system, the local autonomous bodies, municipalities, and the central government, together with the various social, economic, cultural, and religious groups and institutions, are each allotted a specific number of seats in the Corporative Chamber. About two-thirds of the chamber's members are chosen by the groups they represent, while the rest are appointed by the Corporative Council, a six-man committee consisting of government officials.

Regardless of the type of selection—by direct or indirect election—the government maintains firm control over the procedure; even in elections by direct popular suffrage, the electoral machinery is tightly controlled from the time the voter is registered until the final counting of the ballots. Candidates, who are either selected or approved by the ANP, are assured of election. Although voting requirements have been liberalized, the franchise is not universal. Very few Africans appear interested in or aware of the limited political participation available to them, and few are registered voters.

In early 1973, Mozambique's registered voters were reported to number only 111,000 out of a population of approximately 8.6 million. Only a small minority of the registered voters were black. Although the National Assembly in Lisbon passed a new voting

rights law in late 1968 to liberalize voting requirements, voter participation probably has not significantly increased. The law abolished property-tax and income-tax restrictions and special restrictions on women. Moreover, all literate Portuguese citizens are now eligible to vote upon reaching majority, which consists of being at least 21 years of age or free from parental control. Despite the government's claims that these liberalized voting requirements have opened the franchise to more Africans, in early 1973 there was little evidence of any significant increase in the number of registered African voters. Only a few local officials have made any effort to increase participation of blacks. Most black Mozambicans are not politically conscious and even the whites, although more sophisticated, are limited in their means of political expression.

In the 1973 election for the Legislative Assembly, a large majority of the registered electorate turned out to vote for the 20 councilmen chosen by direct suffrage. These councilmen, two per district, were elected unopposed in single-slate elections. In addition, 30 members were chosen by various corporative groups. Of the total, 52% (26 members) were nonwhite as compared with 10% in the 1968 elections. No statistics on racial breakdown of the electorate were made available, although voter requirements insured a disproportionately high percentage of whites.

Mozambique elected seven deputies to the Portuguese National Assembly in October 1969 from an unopposed slate of candidates of the National Union. Approximately 96% of the registered voters cast ballots, but so few were registered that less than 1% of the total population of the state voted. The high turnout of eligible voters, however, does not necessarily indicate strong support of the government because 1) government employees—who constitute a high percentage of voters—are effectively pressured to vote and 2) registration officials have for years illegally refused to register many persons considered undesirable or known not to be government supporters. Moreover, the number of ballots spoiled or otherwise altered by voters opposing the regime in the 1969 election was not given. The municipal council and district board elections held in November 1972 resulted in close to 50% nonwhite membership in those bodies, as compared with an estimated 20% elected in the contest 4 years earlier.

## D. National policies (C)

The policies of the Mozambique government are determined mainly by the Government of Portugal and are primarily aimed at promoting political,

economic, and social stability as necessary preconditions for maintaining Mozambique's status as an overseas state of Portugal and an integral part of the Portuguese nation. The Portuguese Government considers all matters of policy in Mozambique in terms of the value of the state to the welfare of Portugal. It is convinced that Mozambique is of great potential economic value to Portugal, which itself is small and relatively poor. Equally important are philosophical and psychological factors. Portuguese rule of Mozambique is justified by professed concern for the welfare of the Africans. The Portuguese contend that the African must be civilized and that the Portuguese people are uniquely suited to this task. The Portuguese regard their civilizing mission with pride and look upon their African overseas territories as a national heritage. The Portuguese Government believes that the loss of its empire would not only be a national disgrace but also a national disaster which would reduce Portugal to insignificance in world politics.

#### 1. Domestic

Since early 1963 the Portuguese Government has decentralized some of its authority and permitted more local participation in government, in part to counter local white criticism of Lisbon's domination of Mozambique. The number of Mozambique delegates to the Portuguese National Assembly, for example, was increased from three to seven by the 1963 Overseas Organic Law, which also increased the number of elected officials in provincial, district, and local consultative bodies. Additional seats will be apportioned in the assembly elections scheduled for October 1973. The legislative initiative of these bodies was somewhat expanded in theory, but in fact Portugal retains ultimate control of legislation for Mozambique. Lisbon's vaunted program of overseas autonomy notwithstanding, the 1972 Overseas Organic Law has not significantly altered Portugal's continued political control of its African territories. In a further attempt to cement the relationship between Portugal and Mozambique, to assure popular support for the government's position in Africa, and to convince Portuguese citizens in Mozambique that the mother country has not forgotten them, Lisbon employs propaganda and provides financial assistance to encourage Portuguese to settle in Mozambique.

One of the main goals of the Portuguese Government is to promote stability in Mozambique and, to this end, to institute reforms that will reduce African discontent with its rule. The government has accelerated action on these reforms at least partly

because it fears that the rebellion in Mozambique may increase anti-Portuguese sentiment among the Africans in this overseas state. It is also sensitive to increased foreign criticism of Portuguese policies and to the failure of the *Estatuto Indigena*, a system of rule which rested upon the doctrine that the mass of Africans were culturally, linguistically, morally, and intellectually unprepared to exercise Portuguese citizenship. In September 1961 the government ended the legal distinction between assimilated and unassimilated Africans, giving all Portuguese Africans at least potentially the same legal and political rights as European citizens. The system of enforced contract labor, one of the deepest African grievances, was abolished in April 1962. Educational reforms were also initiated, aimed at broadening the educational base throughout the state and making educational facilities, at least at the primary school level, more accessible to the African population. A program of university studies was also established when the Lourenco Marques University opened in 1963, and a small number of Africans are now enrolled there.

In areas of insurgent activity the government has instituted special civic action programs. These programs usually entail rural resettlement projects directly supported by the army, centering on villages designed to provide the rural population with certain modern necessities for health and education and with a livelihood in agriculture. Another major objective of the rural resettlement scheme is to establish security in the northern areas of Mozambique which are directly affected by the insurgency and to deny the rebels access to the population in those areas.

Policies affecting Mozambique's economic development are generally formulated to benefit Portugal and to integrate Mozambique's economy with the metropole and the other Portuguese possessions, objectives which have been widely attacked as colonialist by critics of Portugal's African policy. The execution of economic policy is highly centralized. Most of the major economic enterprises in Mozambique are controlled by organizations in metropolitan Portugal, and Lisbon businessmen have a great deal of influence on the formation of Portugal's policies.

Official development plans formulated in Lisbon have generally emphasized agriculture, hydroelectric power, and road, rail, and harbor facilities. The government has also made sizable investments in communications, education, welfare, immigration, and resettlement projects. Under a new program announced in 1972, the Governor General set target goals that include enrollment of 50% of the children in

primary schools, rapid expansion of the transportation and communications network, and a minimum annual growth rate of 10% in the gross domestic product. Given Lisbon's limited resources, these official development goals will be difficult to meet. In addition, development of Mozambique is slowed by the excessive centralization of economic controls in Lisbon, the failure of absentee industrialists and businessmen to reinvest profits in Mozambique, the diversion of funds intended for development projects to the military effort against the insurgents, and a serious Mozambican trade and payments deficit.

In November 1971, Lisbon imposed new economic restrictions on its overseas possessions in an attempt to improve their unfavorable balance of trade and payments. These restrictions are likely to remain in effect for some time and will be increasingly unpopular with the business community. The restrictions and a subsequent import priority system enable Lisbon to tighten controls on foreign exchange and limit imports. While reducing imports and other transactions in accordance with priorities favoring investment and development and encouraging the establishment of some new local import substitution industries, the restrictions have caused a slowdown in trade, shortages of some goods, and substantial price rises. Although public criticism was muted as of mid-1973, there was considerable dissatisfaction in commercial circles with the restrictions, the allocation of quotas, and the bureaucratic procedures involved.

Portugal has modified its distrust of foreign investment and is beginning to encourage capital investment from international and Western sources, although legal, financial, and trade restrictions severely impede this new policy. There is minimal U.S. investment in Mozambique.

The development of an integrated society is a professed goal of Portuguese policy in Mozambique, and Portugal proudly claims that racial discrimination does not exist in the state. Social mobility is theoretically determined by social achievement rather than race. In practice, however, the opportunities for Africans to achieve significant social status are extremely limited, and there are in Mozambique only a few educated and cultured Africans, some of whom are in fact mulattoes. While nonwhites and whites theoretically enjoy equal access to educational and employment opportunities, practical considerations, such as lack of funds or distance from schools and businesses, in fact limit the ability of many Africans to take advantage of them. While some color consciousness remains, most Africans agree that race relations in everyday life have improved in recent

years. The Portuguese Government still welcomes immigrants from Portugal, but it now recognizes that the present ethnic balance in Mozambique is not likely to change significantly. Net Portuguese immigration to Mozambique averages only about 3,000-6,000 a year. The program has been expensive, and upon reaching Mozambique, many immigrants have proved to be less than self-reliant.

## 2. Foreign

Because Mozambique is an overseas state of Portugal, foreign policy is formulated and implemented by the Government of Portugal. Prime Minister Caetano is the principal architect of Portuguese foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperates closely with the Ministry of Overseas in its implementation. The primary goal of Portuguese foreign policy as it relates to Mozambique is to maintain the *status quo* and to create support for, or at least mitigate opposition to, Portugal's continued control of the area.

Portugal's determination to maintain control in Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea has created difficulties for Lisbon in its relations with African nations. Most African states regard Mozambique as an exploited colony and feel that it should have the right of self-determination, which they define as independence under majority rule. Portugal counters that Mozambique is an integral part of Portugal and that its citizens already enjoy the right of self-determination, which is defined as political participation. Despite pressure from many international sources, particularly African, Portugal has consistently refused to concede, except in theory, the possibility of eventual independence for Mozambique. The regime contrasts the relative stability in Mozambique with the early chaos in Zaire and the radicalism of other African nations, which it cites as examples of what would happen in Mozambique should Portugal leave.

Portuguese relations with the more militant African states are particularly bad. Most of these states have given overt assistance to exile Mozambican nationalist groups, and all are vociferous in their criticism of Portuguese policy. Some of the more conservative African states, such as Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Gabon, have been less outspoken in their attacks on the Portuguese, although they agree on the general principle of self-determination for Mozambique. A few independent southern African countries such as Malawi and Swaziland, with which Portugal maintains diplomatic relations, have taken a more restrained position. Portugal's relations with South

Africa and Rhodesia, with which it shares many of the problems of white minority rule in Africa, are generally good.

Relations with Zambia, which borders Mozambique on the northwest, have alternated between periods of cautious friendliness and sharp hostility caused by the presence of Angolan and Mozambican insurgent groups in Zambia. Landlocked Zambia has used rail and port facilities in Mozambique and Angola. Until mid-1969, Lisbon emphasized a conciliatory approach and held several talks with Zambian officials in an effort to work out an accommodation. These were informal *ad hoc* meetings, inasmuch as the two countries have never established formal diplomatic ties. Relations deteriorated sharply in mid-1969 as a series of border incidents and diplomatic blundering by both governments led each to suspect the other's sincerity. Zambia accused Portugal of border violations and appealed to the U.N. Security Council, which again passed a resolution censuring Lisbon. Relations between Lisbon and Zambia continued to deteriorate in 1971 following the abduction and apparent slaying of six Portuguese civilians by COREMO, a Zambian-based guerrilla organization. The Portuguese responded by arresting some Zambians and suspending transport of Zambian grain imports over Portuguese African railroads. Despite a secret agreement in June 1971 that supposedly ended the dispute, Lusaka has continued to permit nationalist groups to use Zambia as a refuge and a regrouping center, as well as a conduit for men and materiel between Tanzania and their guerrilla bases inside Portuguese territory. Lisbon remains concerned about the ability of the rebels to slip into Mozambique from Zambia for the purpose of harassing major transportation routes. The resulting dislocation has increased the human and material cost of construction of the massive Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project in northwestern Mozambique but has thus far not affected its construction schedule.

Portugal does not maintain relations with neighboring Tanzania, whose President Julius Nyerere is unalterably opposed to the white minority regimes of southern Africa and permits Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) insurgents in to receive supplies and establish bases from which to infiltrate their home territory. In contrast to landlocked Zambia, Tanzania has direct access to the sea and is in a position to pursue a more independent policy. Nevertheless, the Tanzanian Government has avoided direct intervention in support of the rebels. Relations between Portuguese authorities and Tanzania occasionally have been exacerbated by Portuguese

violation of Tanzanian airspace. In April 1972, Tanzanian anti-aircraft fire downed a Portuguese plane on a reconnaissance mission along the Mozambique-Tanzania border, and both governments protested the incident. In January 1973, Tanzania claimed that Portuguese aircraft had strafed a village near its southern border with Mozambique, but Lisbon denied the charge. The incident was dropped, presumably because neither side wanted to make a major issue out of it. There have also been several indications in the press that the Portuguese are supporting Oscar Kambona, a former Tanzanian minister now in exile, in his efforts to mobilize opposition to Nyerere.

Relations with Malawi are more satisfactory than those with other black African countries. Landlocked Malawi is dependent for its economic survival on transportation routes through Mozambique. Moreover, Malawi President Banda has long advocated contact and cooperation with the white minority regimes of southern Africa as the only way of improving relations between whites and blacks. Malawi strives to maintain neutrality in the conflict between the Portuguese and the insurgents, but it is militarily too weak to prevent either the guerrillas or Portuguese military forces from violating its territorial integrity with relative impunity. Although both the Portuguese and FRELIMO would like Malawi to adopt a more favorable policy toward them, both derive advantages from the existing situation and pay lipservice to the understandings which Malawi has worked out with the two sides. Lisbon has formal diplomatic relations with Blantyre and provides a limited training program for the Malawi Young Pioneers, a youth wing of the Malawi Congress Party, furnishing naval patrol craft, light aircraft, and instruction.

Portugal's relations with the other nations of southern Africa that are dominated by Europeans—the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia—have improved as international pressures on all three have increased. The three governments have reportedly explored, as a last resort against pressure from independent African countries, common measures of security and mutual assistance. The rebellion of black nationalists in Portuguese Africa has also encouraged some cooperation among the three countries, despite clear cultural and political differences arising from Lisbon's ostensible goal of creating a multiracial society and the policies of white supremacy practiced in South Africa and Rhodesia. All three countries have a mutual interest in preventing the spread of African nationalism in southern Africa, and South Africa and



Rhodesia strongly desire that the Portuguese territories remain a buffer between themselves and the black-ruled nations to the north.

This mutual interest has led to a certain amount of cooperation in the intelligence and defense fields. Rhodesian and Portuguese authorities have conducted joint antiguerrilla sweeps along the Mozambique border, and at the end of 1968 and again in late 1970 Rhodesian planes reportedly carried out airstrikes in conjunction with Portuguese ground operations in Tete District in northwestern Mozambique. In the intelligence field, the security chiefs from metropolitan Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Rhodesia meet on a regular basis to discuss matters of mutual security. Any closer military cooperation with South Africa and Rhodesia is unlikely so long as Portugal is able to cope with the African insurgencies. Lisbon would prefer to go it alone as much and as long as possible.

Portugal has been a member of the United Nations since 1955. Most of its activity there, particularly since 1961, has been in defense of its African policies against bitter attacks from the Afro-Asian and the Communist countries. Portuguese policies in Africa have been the target of critical resolutions in the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Trusteeship Council, and African nations have made attempts to exclude Portugal from some of the specialized agencies because of its refusal to grant independence to its overseas states. Portugal contends that Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and Angola are all integral parts of Portugal and therefore beyond the legal jurisdiction of the United Nations. Portugal's representatives have denounced U.N. encouragement of decolonization, claiming that majority rule has merely opened the door to chaos and to Communist penetration in Africa. The United Nations, on the other hand, maintains that Portugal's African territories are nonself-governing dependencies and that Portugal is responsible for making periodic reports to the Secretary General on their progress toward self-government. Portugal announced its withdrawal from the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in May 1971 because of attempts to exclude Portugal from various UNESCO-sponsored conferences, calls by member states to suspend cooperation with Lisbon on educational, scientific, and cultural matters, and allocation of UNESCO funds to rebel groups in Portuguese Africa. Portugal has also threatened on occasion to withdraw entirely from the United Nations.

The United States recognizes Portuguese sovereignty over Mozambique, which it considers a nonself-

governing territory of Portugal. The Portuguese Government, disappointed by support from the United States for the independence of colonial areas in Africa and by its efforts to encourage Portugal to recognize U.S. views on the right of Mozambique and other African possessions to self-determination and future independence, considers that where the underdeveloped areas are concerned, the United States is courting world public opinion at the expense of its anti-Communist European allies. In the past, propaganda attacks inspired by the government have accused the United States of actively supporting nationalist organizations, of abandoning one of the last bastions of Western civilization to the Communists, of casting aspersions on Portuguese policies in Africa to make political gains with black voters in the United States, and even of wanting to extend its own influence over Portuguese possessions. At present, however, Portugal is soft-pedaling such criticism and apparently hopes for increased U.S. understanding of its position.

Portugal's attitude toward the major Western European countries has also been ambivalent. Although friendly relations have traditionally existed between Portugal and Great Britain, its oldest ally, these ties have been strained by such actions as London's refusal to publicly support Portugal's policies in Mozambique, the blockade of oil destined for Rhodesia, and what the Portuguese regard as Britain's abandonment of its own African possessions. Relations with France, which has refrained from attacking Portugal's position in Mozambique, are friendly. Relations with West Germany were warm during the 1960's but have cooled somewhat since a socialist government came to power in Bonn in 1969. On the other hand, trade relations between the two countries have been excellent; since 1967 Bonn has become the largest buyer of Portuguese products. Spain and Portugal have had very close ties since the Spanish Civil War, although Spain has not endorsed Portugal's African policies.

Portuguese foreign policy and propaganda take a strongly anti-Communist line; Lisbon does not maintain diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. or other Communist countries. In all Portuguese overseas possessions, Communist Party activities are regarded as subversive and illegal and have been firmly suppressed. This general hostility toward Communist countries is moderated somewhat in the case of the People's Republic of China, largely out of consideration for the security of the Portuguese possession of Macao, a virtual hostage of the mainland Chinese regime.

## E. Threats to government stability (S)

### I. Discontent and dissidence

Since the complete pacification of the interior of Mozambique in the early 20th century, there have been only sporadic internal threats to political stability, and these have generally been promptly suppressed. The maintenance of stability is facilitated by the customary respect for authority shown by both the traditionally oriented rural population and by the modern segment composed of whites and those few Africans who have gained some status in society. Nevertheless, there is evidence of latent discontent among black and white Mozambicans because of past and present grievances. However, rigid government and police controls have taught Mozambicans to exercise restraint in speech and action.

As in Portugal, some of the discontent has its roots in the authoritarianism of the Lisbon regime: the scant opportunity for free political expression or choice; harsh police measures; the lack of bargaining rights for labor; rising prices; the strict regulation of industry and commerce; and inadequate spending on education and social services. The grievances, plus the mercantilist policy followed by the metropole vis-a-vis Mozambique, have caused some white inhabitants to complain and, at least before the insurgency began in 1964, to talk in terms of varying degrees of local autonomy.

Opposition from white Mozambicans and the desire for greater autonomy began to surface in the 1950's. In the campaign for President of Portugal in 1958—at that time the President was still elected by popular vote—General Humberto Delgado, opposing the candidate favored by former Prime Minister Salazar, led a leftist coalition group in Portugal which espoused, among other things, independence for the overseas territories. Although Delgado lost the election, he was officially credited with over a fourth of the overseas votes. In Mozambique, where the vast majority of the voters were white, he possibly obtained a majority in every town except the capital.

Further agitation for autonomy was greatly muted by the outbreak of the African nationalist rebellion in 1964, particularly since insurgencies were already underway in Angola and Portuguese Guinea. Until that time there had been a loose coalition between the numerically small white opposition who wanted a predominantly black-ruled Mozambique and a much larger group of white settlers who wanted an independent Mozambique ruled by whites along the lines that existed in Rhodesia. The turn toward

violence taken by the African nationalist movement after 1964, however, convinced the white settlers that if they were to stay in Mozambique they must remain tied to Portugal. Accordingly, they abandoned opposition to the regime in favor of reform; namely, Mozambique should remain a Portuguese territory but with a more favored economic position. As a result, those whites who still opposed the regime lost all real hope that the rest of the white community would give broad support to their position, at least for the duration of the insurgency.

In early 1973, a small number of white Mozambicans, probably less than 100, remained opposed to permanent Portuguese political control of the area. They generally advocate eventual self-determination for Mozambique by peaceful means but are sharply divided over how to achieve this goal. Some advocate a takeover of power by Mozambican whites and the establishment of closer relations with South Africa and Rhodesia. Others want to cut loose from Lisbon at any price, even if this means submitting to black majority rule. They all remain ineffective as a political force; they are unable to exert any observable influence on government decisions and have no concrete program or plan of action. Furthermore, they have little or no contact with Mozambican blacks and do not appear to seek greater contact.

The Academic Association of Mozambique, the University of Lourenco Marques student organization, has on occasion expressed discontent with the university administration and government policy. The association is docile, however, compared with similar groups at American or European universities. The majority of university students are establishment oriented and disinclined to become involved in radical activity for fear that it might endanger their career prospects. As a result, by mid-1972 the association had recruited only about 200 members out of a total student body of 2,500.

The government does not hesitate to move swiftly and forcefully to squelch any student dissidence that does occur. In September 1972 the government drafted four student leaders into the military, and, accusing the Academic Association of engaging in improper activities—namely criticizing university and government policy—shut down all activities of the association except those connected with sports. When some students continued to hold meetings and distribute "illegal" posters, government authorities suspended seven more student activists for a year and closed the university cafeteria. Although these actions have increased student resentment, they may also

have the desired effect of cowing the students for the time being. The denial of a forum for student activism, however, may drive the remaining dissenters underground, where their activities would be more difficult to monitor.

Strict censorship and police control make it difficult to assess the degree of African discontent in Mozambique; however, major sources of discontent probably do exist and offer potential for future popular unrest. Africans have become increasingly aware of the need for education as a means of advancing their own interests and are likely to regard the slow progress in this area as a calculated effort by the government to perpetuate their unequal status. Although the Portuguese have taken significant steps to expand rural education for Africans, the overwhelming majority of African school enrollees are at the preprimary and primary levels. Of those who attend primary school, the vast majority eventually drop out, either unable to understand spoken Portuguese sufficiently or to keep up with the academic pace of the non-Africans. The slum areas that house urban Africans, notably in the capital and Beira, have grown rapidly as more Africans—especially young persons—seek employment in the cities; the continuing disparity in the economic position of Africans and whites, especially in the cities, has contributed to the growing resentment of Africans over their unequal status. The shortage of health and welfare facilities and the broad, often arbitrary, power exercised by the police are additional causes for resentment.

## 2. Subversion

There is no evidence of a significant subversive threat against the existing political order from either Communist or non-Communist sources. Despite the existence of discontented elements among the white population, several factors inhibit the successful organization and conduct of subversive activities on a scale which would gravely threaten the government. Foremost, perhaps, is the fact that the government and police greatly increased their security efforts throughout Mozambique following the outbreak in 1964 of the insurgency organized by blacks. In addition, the efforts of the African nationalists to force Portugal to give up its African possessions have given the regime an issue on which it has been able to successfully appeal to the national pride of the Portuguese citizenry, and, with the exception of a few powerless elements, there seems to be little opposition within the white community to Lisbon's determination to maintain its African territories.

Furthermore, most Portuguese are inexperienced in political or other associative activities which often are prerequisites for conspiratorial movements.

African subversive activity is essentially limited to northern Mozambique, where the exile nationalist group, FRELIMO, engages in guerrilla actions, and in the limited areas in which it has established a significant presence, attempts to maintain a political organization and indoctrinate the local population. The vast majority of Africans, however, remain unaffected by the insurgency and continue to live in tribal societies, largely unaware of political issues outside their immediate group.

In early 1973, the Portuguese Communist role in the efforts of scattered groups to subvert governmental processes and institutions was believed to be nonexistent or marginal at best. Communist activity is banned in Mozambique, and Communist influence is confined to what can be gained by aiding African nationalist movements in exile. The only Communist organization known to have existed in Mozambique in the past was the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), a small branch of the Portuguese Communist Party, with a nucleus trained in Portugal by the parent party. Founded in late 1961, the MDM accepted both whites and Africans as members. The organization was soon banned, and many of its leaders fled to Tanzania.

## 3. Insurgency

African nationalism has developed more slowly in Mozambique than in most other colonial territories on the continent, in part because of the watchfulness of the Portuguese authorities over the black population after the rebellion erupted in Angola in 1961. Another major reason was Mozambique's semi-isolated geographic position, cut off except in its northern sectors from land access to newly independent African countries which could have served as carriers of the seeds of nationalism. Moreover, two of the three border states to the north and west—Malawi and Zambia—were among the last African countries to achieve independence; they did not become independent until 1964, by which time the Portuguese were already cracking down on any activities by black Africans which might threaten Portugal's continued control of the area.

These obstacles hampered the rise of a nationalist movement within Mozambique but did not prevent the emergence of black exile groups which began forming in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia in the early 1960's to prepare the Mozambican population for eventual armed struggle

against Portuguese colonial rule. The nuclei of these groups were native Mozambicans educated in Lisbon or elsewhere abroad and caught up in the rising tide of nationalism in southern Africa.

Over the last decade numerous exile groups have been formed, only to abruptly disappear and reappear in a new guise as a result of the splitting, reorganizing, and regrouping that these organizations have undergone. In early 1973 there were several organizations which claimed to be active against the Portuguese but only two retained any military capability. Of these two, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was conducting all of the insurgent activity against the Portuguese. The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) had only a very limited military capability and had withdrawn from active insurgency. Three of Mozambique's 10 districts were seriously affected by insurgency, while 2 others were affected to a lesser degree. Although the insurgency had spread into new areas, especially into northwestern Mozambique, the Portuguese remained in control of the most important parts of the territory: all the cities, the coast, the railways, and the vast majority of the population and of the economically productive areas. The insurgency remained confined to remote, sparsely populated rural areas (Figure 3), and FRELIMO, despite its claims, did not permanently control any territory. In these areas of insurgency, the Portuguese are generally in a defensive posture, inasmuch as they live in and operate from towns, villages, or other strongpoints. Nonetheless, they can visit or maintain a presence in any area that they choose, provided sufficient security measures are taken.

Neither Portugal nor FRELIMO appears capable of achieving a military victory in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, both sides seem prepared for a prolonged struggle. Portugal believes its best bet lies in keeping the insurgents off balance and isolated in the northern hinterlands, where they believe the guerrillas will slowly wither on the vine. For its part, FRELIMO's strategy is to avoid direct confrontations with the superior Portuguese forces while attempting to spread its activity to new areas, hoping thereby to strengthen its claim to be the sole nationalist movement in Mozambique.

#### *a. Mozambique Liberation Front*

FRELIMO was formed in June 1962 following a merger of several exile groups which had already been in existence for one or more years. Under the leadership of its first president, the late Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the fledgling nationalist organization

began to lay the groundwork for armed action in Mozambique. About 150 men were sent to Algeria for 7 months training in guerrilla warfare; upon their return, some of these men served as officers or trained other recruits. At the same time, covert political activity was undertaken in Mozambique to win the native population over to the nationalist cause.

FRELIMO initiated armed insurgency against the Portuguese in September 1964, when about 150 guerrillas slipped across the Tanzanian border and quickly established a foothold in the extreme northeast of Cabo Delgado District. By early 1965, the insurgents had set up several sizable base camps and a supply network that ran from Tanzania into Cabo Delgado. They had also organized a small force in adjacent Niassa District and made limited reconnaissance forays into Zambezia and Tete Districts. Once this foothold was established in the northeast, however, further expansion was held back by the lack of manpower and material. For the next several years, FRELIMO's leaders directed most of their efforts toward recruiting and training cadres and canvassing African, Communist, and Western sources for arms and supplies. Insurgent tactics in Mozambique during these years followed a pattern of harassment and small-unit, hit-and-run operations. Open confrontations with Portuguese troops were generally avoided in favor of ambushing patrols and supply convoys, as well as carrying out terrorism against local inhabitants.

During the first 3 months of 1968, the frequency of FRELIMO ambushes and small-unit probes in Cabo Delgado sharply increased, apparently in large part as a diversionary tactic to draw attention away from the group's expansion into Tete District. Shortly after the end of the rainy season in the spring of 1968, FRELIMO began military operations in Tete, and by August an estimated 600 insurgents had moved into the north-central part of the district. Since then, Tete has gradually become the focal point of FRELIMO operations and propaganda, though the insurgents have maintained their activity at nearly the same level in Cabo Delgado District as well. FRELIMO pushed south of the Zambezi River in December 1970 and established operational units throughout southern Tete.

The guerrillas intensified their efforts in Tete in order to disrupt construction of the massive Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project that the Portuguese are building there. This project will cut across the Cabora Bassa gorge on the Zambezi River, about 80 miles upstream from the district capital (Figure 4). It was originally promoted as a means of accelerating





FIGURE 4. Supply routes to Cabora Bassa dam construction site have been the target of FRELIMO leaders, who realize that the project will strengthen the ability of the Portuguese to remain in Mozambique by opening new areas to settlement (U/OU)

agricultural, industrial, and mineral development along the Zambezi, but the first phase scheduled for completion in early 1975 is restricted to producing electricity. The bulk of the electricity will be exported to South Africa, whose agreement to purchase large blocks of power has made the project economically feasible for the financially strapped Portuguese who are depending on multinational financing to develop the project. In terms of ultimate capacity, Cabora Bassa will be able to generate more electricity than the combined output of Egypt's Aswan High Dam and the joint Rhodesian-Zambian Kariba project.

The guerrillas view the disruption of development in Tete as absolutely necessary if they are to weaken Lisbon's will to retain control of Mozambique. Accordingly, in September 1971 FRELIMO began a sustained campaign to harass major transport routes in Tete in the hope of delaying construction and making the project as costly as possible. Using mines and occasional ambushes, the guerrillas have managed to achieve maximum psychological impact and publicity with a minimum expenditure of resources. They have failed to cause more than temporary disruption of the roads and railway in Tete, however, and construction at Cabora Bassa remained on schedule in mid-1973. Nonetheless, insurgent harassment seemed likely to continue, if not increase, and when the transmission lines from South Africa to Cabora Bassa are built

through the insurgent-infested areas in southern Tete they will be extremely vulnerable to sabotage.

In mid-1972 FRELIMO extended its operations deeper into northwestern Mozambique. Insurgents planted mines and staged several ambushes in northern Beira District and mounted a few offensive operations in northern Vila Pery District. FRELIMO has established a permanent zone of operations in this area and by mid-1973 the rebels were within striking distance of important road and rail links between Mozambique and Rhodesia. The front also sent a recruiting mission into Zambezia District, but as of mid-1973 it had not established a foothold there.

FRELIMO celebrated its eighth anniversary of armed insurgency in Mozambique in September 1972. At that time it probably had about 7,000-8,000 armed guerrillas in the field, although perhaps only half this number were active at any given time. These insurgents were divided among three field command areas: 4,000 in Cabo Delgado, nearly 1,000 in Niassa, and 2,000-3,000 in Tete (Figure 5).

Since its inception, internal dissension has been the major factor hampering FRELIMO's effectiveness as an insurgent organization. The most troublesome issue has been the long-standing question of regional representation in the party hierarchy. All but a few of the top FRELIMO leaders, including party president Samora Machel, are from southern Mozambique,



**FIGURE 5. FRELIMO activity (a) Africans studying geography at a FRELIMO school in an insurgent zone in northern Mozambique (b) Recruits training with Chinese-supplied weapons, Niassa District (photo from official Chinese publication) (c) Guerrillas placing mines in Cobo Delgado District (C)**

while most of the rank and file are northerners (in Cabo Delgado they are largely Makonde tribesmen). The northerners' deep resentment of the generally better educated southern leadership's monopoly over the party's policies and direction has generated several power struggles and high-level defections to the Portuguese. For their part, the Portuguese have done their utmost to exploit such defectors for propaganda and intelligence purposes and to exacerbate dissension within FRELIMO. As of early 1973, factionalism along regional lines had receded into the background, though it remained a point of contention and may again disrupt the organization's stability at some point in the future.

The assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first president, in February 1969—probably the work of the Portuguese secret police in league with FRELIMO dissidents—aggravated intraparty conflicts and led to a period of severe factional infighting. Two months later a three-man collegial executive—the Council of the Presidency—was set up, consisting

of Samora Machel (Figure 6), army commander and head of the defense department; Uriah Simango, the front's vice president; and Marcelino dos Santos, the head of the foreign affairs department. Simango soon became involved in a power struggle with Machel and dos Santos and was forced out of the leadership after a few months. In May 1970, Simango was officially expelled from the party. Machel became acting president and dos Santos acting vice president. Under Machel's guidance and astute military planning—he had commanded the FRELIMO armed forces since 1966—the front has regained its momentum.

As a political organization, the principal goals of FRELIMO are the elimination of Portuguese rule in Mozambique and the establishment of an independent, black-ruled socialist state. Following the reorganization of April 1969, the main organs of FRELIMO are the Executive Committee, Central Committee, and Party Congress. The main work of running the organization from day to day is done in FRELIMO headquarters in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,



**FIGURE 6.** Samora Machel was elected president of FRELIMO by its central committee in May 1970. He has been commander of its army since 1966 and is respected as an effective military commander. Born in southern Mozambique in 1934, Machel failed to finish secondary school. (C)

by the Executive Committee, a smaller body within the 40-member Central Committee. The Executive Committee includes the President and the heads of the six departments: Defense; Security; Foreign Affairs; Education and Culture; Information and Propaganda; and Treasury, Finance, and Trade. The Central Committee is in theory the primary body serving to implement the policies and programs set by the nominally quadrennial party congress. Plenary meetings of the Central Committee are infrequent, however, because so many of its members serve outside Tanzania, including delegates assigned to represent the "nine provinces" of Mozambique.

Information on the functioning of FRELIMO's administrative units within Mozambique—in the areas where the party is active—is fragmentary and inconclusive. In general, numerous types of officials constitute the planned hierarchy, but the actual positions filled are probably few and vary from one

locale and situation to another. Nonetheless, FRELIMO attempts "to govern" the limited areas of the north where it has established a significant presence and is able to carry out its activities with some degree of freedom. One of the organization's major concerns in these areas is to meet the rudimentary social and economic needs of the people. FRELIMO claims it has opened some schools, exchanged currency, and attempted to market the northeastern area's cash crops, mainly cashew nuts. Moreover, it has tried to follow up its military presence in an area with political organization and indoctrination.

FRELIMO's capability to conduct clandestine political action appears very limited in most areas of Mozambique except those in the north. No sooner had the insurgency started than the Portuguese secret police made thousands of preventive arrests of suspect Africans, some of whom might have become FRELIMO collaborators. The party's covert action program in Lourenco Marques was hard hit in mid-1965 when many leaders of a newly installed FRELIMO network in the capital were arrested and subsequently convicted. Since then the Portuguese security police have periodically rounded up alleged FRELIMO activists and sympathizers, many of whom have turned out to be petty criminals and to have no links to the insurgents. Despite these reverses, there have been occasional indications that FRELIMO has a rudimentary organization that receives material support in Mozambique's major urban areas, in addition to maintaining a limited capability for collecting information in these centers. The party appears to have little if any operational capability in these areas, however, because of the pervasive Portuguese security apparatus.

FRELIMO has a relatively sophisticated and diversified propaganda program, which frequently reflects a strong Marxist orientation. Much of FRELIMO's propaganda effort is directed from Tanzania and includes radiobroadcasts, a bimonthly magazine, and pamphlets in various African languages that are distributed clandestinely in Mozambique and directed primarily to the chiefs and the local African teachers. In addition to presenting anti-Portuguese and occasionally anti-U.S. themes, the propaganda also appeals to the families of African soldiers in the Portuguese Army to persuade the men to desert to FRELIMO. Pamphlets are sometimes left hanging from trees for this purpose. FRELIMO propaganda has sought, with some success, to avoid racism and has not incited the African population to wage indiscriminate warfare against white Portuguese.



Of all the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa, FRELIMO has been the most successful in securing support from a wide variety of sources—the Soviets, the Chinese, and the West. The African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity has provided several hundred thousand dollars over the past 8 years. Tanzania has been the most helpful of the African nations, providing sanctuary, transit privileges, staging areas, training camps, and serving as a conduit for foreign military support. Zambia has also granted FRELIMO sanctuary and transit rights. The bulk of the organization's military aid comes from China and the Soviet Union; the Russians are the major supplier of arms and provide advanced training in the U.S.S.R. The Chinese have provided an increasing amount of small arms, in addition to some 20 instructors and basic training for a large number of insurgents at FRELIMO training camps in southern Tanzania.

Various Western organizations have provided support to FRELIMO, primarily for humanitarian purposes. Most Western supporters have refused to endorse violence to bring about change in Portuguese Africa, but direct humanitarian and in some cases political support has developed and increased since 1968. Such support has come primarily from the Scandinavian governments, from a growing number of church and philanthropic organizations in Europe and the United States, and from specialized agencies of the United Nations. The lion's share of these contributions, either direct or channeled through the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, has been used to purchase nonmilitary supplies such as medicines, food, clothing, and books. All of these nonmilitary supplies and contributions are received and administered by the Mozambique Institute, located in a suburb of Dar es Salaam and headed by Mrs. Janet Mondlane, widow of FRELIMO's first president, Eduardo Mondlane, and a U.S. citizen. Mrs. Mondlane is an active and regular consultant to the FRELIMO Executive Committee. An able administrator, she is effective as director of the Mozambique Institute and is not a figurehead. She also has been effective in raising funds for the nonmilitary aspects of the Mozambique liberation movement, having personally raised over \$500,000 in money or supplies for the Mozambique Institute since 1968. In addition to administering nonmilitary supplies and contributions, the Mozambique Institute handles FRELIMO publicity and operates two schools and two hospitals in Tanzania as well as related facilities inside Mozambique. In the early 1960's, the Ford Foundation underwrote the initial costs of the

institute. Other private U.S. organizations have made more modest contributions. In addition, a number of FRELIMO students have been granted scholarships to various U.S. universities.

#### *b. Mozambique Revolutionary Committee*

The Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), headed by Paulo Gumane, has never achieved the effectiveness of FRELIMO either as a political-military organization or as a threat to the Portuguese. Formed in June 1965 by a breakaway group from FRELIMO and based in Zambia, the organization has suffered from almost constant internal dissension ever since. It has never gained much stature as a fighting organization primarily because it has always been overshadowed by FRELIMO. The latter began fighting first and subsequently sustained the major insurgent effort, thus commanding broader support from abroad and from tribes in Mozambique. In early 1973, COREMO probably had no more than 100 to 200 militants in Zambia with no known plans for sustained field operations.

COREMO's only known area of activity in Mozambique has been in Tete District north of the Zambezi River, where occasional operations were mounted from 1966 to early 1968. Even then, much of its energies were directed to rudimentary political organization rather than anti-Portuguese operations. COREMO was effectively squeezed out of Tete by FRELIMO in 1968 and has limited itself since then to modest one-shot, cross-border operations that have generally been more of a nuisance than a threat. An exception to this general pattern occurred in early 1971, when a small band of COREMO guerrillas infiltrated Tete and kidnaped six Portuguese agricultural technicians. One of the six died en route to Zambia and the other five were presumably executed by COREMO. This affair precipitated a Portuguese-Zambian crisis that lasted for several months, with Lisbon blaming Lusaka for not protecting the lives of the Portuguese civilians.

COREMO has always been handicapped by a shortage of financial and material assistance, as well as by the active opposition of FRELIMO. External support for the organization has been limited, coming mainly from Zambia and China. Peking was originally attracted by COREMO's pro-Maoist line but later became disenchanted by its poor performance and has provided only token support over the past few years.

## F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

### 1. Police

The Public Security Police (PSP) is responsible for normal police functions such as deterring crime, maintaining public order, and protecting lives and property. In December 1972 a new law revised the PSP and subordinated the intervention militia as an auxiliary to the PSP, thereby giving it a direct paramilitary responsibility. The PSP operates under authority of the Minister of Interior in Lisbon, who coordinates with the Minister of Overseas. The PSP general headquarters is located in Lourenco Marques and is headed by an army colonel. Each district has its own PSP administrative council and command, including numerous divisions, posts, and squads. All PSP officers are regular army officers on detached duty from the combat branches.

The authorized strength of the PSP in early 1973 was 21,422 men, including the nearly 15,300-man intervention militia, which is used in antiguerrilla operations and patrols. More than two-thirds of the PSP are Africans. This force also includes the administrative police and four mobile police companies from the metropole. These mobile units have a total of about 600 men and are trained in riot control to provide a quick reaction capability in case of urban disorders. Men in the mobile units are routinely assigned to general police duties and are mobilized into special units only when an emergency arises.

The Fiscal Guard (also called Customs Guard) is a specialized unit responsible for preventing smuggling and controlling the payment of customs duties at the principal transportation and frontier centers. The force is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Finance and Economy in Lisbon. The strength of the guard is estimated to be about 700. Officers are drawn from the army, and enlisted men are both white and black.

The Port and Railroad Police was established in April 1972 to improve security on the rail lines and in port areas, especially the rail line in Tete District, which is subject to insurgent harassment. The strength of this force is approximately 500. It works closely with the armed forces in performing its duties in areas of insurgent activity.

The Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense of Mozambique (OPVDCM) is a volunteer organization created in 1964 primarily for civil defense. It has 163 paid officers and staff personnel as well as unpaid volunteers estimated to number no more than a few thousand. Its commander

is an army lieutenant colonel. Overall responsibility for the OPVDCM program is held by the Governor General, who exercises control through the district governors. Although the district governor is formally in command of OPVDCM units in his district, he divides this responsibility with the military. In addition to civil defense, the units are trained to handle such functions as first aid, firefighting, communications, mass evacuation, and disaster relief. They also operate a warning-alert system. The OPVDCM is believed to operate primarily in urban areas, although it is known to provide some logistical support to militia units in northern Mozambique. In December 1972, self-defense militia units (volunteer groups formed in the villages) and protection militia were subordinated to the OPVDCM, thereby giving it a more active role in the counterinsurgency effort.

The honesty and efficiency of the Portuguese police vary with the different organizations. Except for high-ranking leaders, most personnel are from the lower strata of society. Low pay and slow promotion tend to impair morale and to make some individuals susceptible to bribery and other corrupting influences. Dishonesty, however, does not seem to be a characteristic of the police, at least in the larger cities.

### 2. Intelligence and security services

The Directorate General of Security (DGS) is the principal intelligence and security arm of the Portuguese Government in Mozambique. The DGS is charged with gathering intelligence on and controlling subversive political activity, maintaining border and immigration control, conducting surveillance of aliens, and performing security investigations of government employees. The DGS was formerly known as the International and State Defense Police (PIDE), but PIDE had acquired such an unsavory reputation for violating civil rights that in November 1969 the government nominally abolished it and substituted the DGS in an effort to improve the security service's public image.

The activities of the DGS in Mozambique are nominally supervised by the Governor General, the Portuguese Minister of Interior, and the Minister of Overseas. In fact, the DGS in Mozambique reports directly to and is supervised by DGS headquarters in Lisbon. Moreover, the DGS has always had direct access to the Prime Minister, who depends on it for his personal safety and protection. In Mozambique, the organization's headquarters is in Lourenco Marques, with suboffices and posts throughout the state. There were 1,008 DGS personnel in Mozambique in early 1973. In addition to regular DGS personnel, there are

an unknown number of informers and other covert personnel working for the organization.

Because of the authoritarian nature of the Portuguese state, the DGS has very broad powers. Suspects may be detained for up to 6 months without a specific charge or court warrant. The DGS may also ban meetings, search residences, and close places that are suspected of being used to support subversive activities. In those overseas territories such as Mozambique where "grave subversive acts" are occurring, it also has the power to prolong the detention of political prisoners.

With the spread of insurgency in northern Mozambique, the principal targets of the DGS are African nationalists, principally FRELIMO insurgents and sympathizers, and the black African governments that support them, notably Tanzania. To collect intelligence on these targets, the DGS relies on an extensive network of paid, part-time agents and informers, both white and black, including former insurgents. Most regular DGS agents are Portuguese, born either in Portugal or Mozambique. The security service makes extensive use of surveillance operations, has postal intercept and radio monitoring sections, and engages in psychological warfare operations.

The majority of DGS personnel are recruited from the armed forces, although some of its members have had no previous military experience. Some new recruits are secured through a voluntary enlistment program, the first step of which entails the successful completion of a qualifying examination. Recruits are then enrolled in a basic training course in Lisbon. Emphasis is placed on improving the general education of the recruits, for most of them come from poor families and have little education. Completion of the course and receipt of security clearances permit the recruit to receive additional special training or a direct field assignment.

The DGS maintains fairly close liaison with the South African and Rhodesian security services in order to exchange information concerning the insurgency threat to southern Africa. For this purpose, periodic meetings are held in Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Pretoria, Salisbury, and Lisbon.

The DGS is considered a relatively effective organization and appears free of corruption and other influences that would lessen its efficiency. Some of its effectiveness derives from the fear its powers and actions have instilled in the people. The DGS has also proved efficient in intelligence gathering.

The Service for the Centralization and Coordination of Information in Mozambique (SCCIM) was set

up in 1961 to serve under the direction of the Governor General as a unifying body to coordinate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to the policies, administration, and defense of the state. Personnel can be either civilian or military and are selected by the Governor General. The director of SCCIM is in theory the central contact in the state government for intelligence matters. He is responsible to the Governor General, who in turn reports directly to Lisbon. Since 1966 the director has been an army officer, and the SCCIM works closely with the military. The SCCIM is estimated to have only 60 employees, a third of whom are clerical personnel.

The SCCIM is generally regarded as less competent than the DGS or the military intelligence components. It collects foreign intelligence in some neighboring countries but is not known to have an intelligence-gathering apparatus of its own in Mozambique and thus has been almost entirely dependent on the much greater resources and efficiency of the other intelligence bodies.

The military intelligence sections of the three armed services generally operate independently of each other and other intelligence bodies and devote most of their efforts to collecting order of battle information. Their respective strengths are unknown.

Considerable competition and friction arising from conflicts in jurisdiction and authority have existed between the DGS and the other intelligence organizations. The SCCIM reportedly feels that the DGS and the military intelligence units operate in its sphere, while the latter two claim that the work would not be done if left to the SCCIM. Military resentment of the DGS stems from the fact that the DGS has jurisdiction over the investigation of subversion in the armed forces. Additionally, the DGS has a tendency to withhold information and report directly to Lisbon. This has resulted in an uneven flow of intelligence.

In mid-1972, the General Command for Security was established to assure coordination of security information and operations and alleviate interservice competition. An army brigadier was appointed director. He will have authority to coordinate the activities of the PSP, the Port and Railroad Police, the Fiscal Guard, and the OPVDCM. Representatives of all the police and security services were included on this new command staff. Although the DGS will also have a representative on the staff, it seems to have a special status in this umbrella command and is likely to remain autonomous as in the past.

### 3. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities

The paramilitary police and intelligence services of Mozambique play a vital role in the government's multifaceted counterinsurgency program. Under a December 1972 law the PSP absorbed the intervention militia. Fiscal Guard personnel are stationed in many resettlement villages (*aldeamentos*) in the areas of insurgent activity in northern Mozambique. These policemen, in addition to serving an intelligence function by integrating themselves into village life, provide leadership and share with the army, the PSP, and the OPVDCM the task of training the local militia.

In early 1973, the DGS was authorized to recruit and train its own militia force consisting of 10 groups of 60 men each. The new DGS-run force will be recruited largely from former FRELIMO guerrillas. Although little information is available, it seems that the special force will be modeled after the DGS militia in Angola called *plechas*. Each group will receive special training in counterinsurgency tactics and will be assigned initially as a rapid-response mobile strike unit in Tete District. The DGS also assists the counterinsurgency effort through liaison with the military. It collects information on the organization, tactics, and movements of insurgents for use by the military in field operations. DGS agents also accompany military units into the bush to interrogate captured insurgents.

In early 1973 there were three main types of militia units in Mozambique made up almost exclusively of Africans. The most militarily significant force is the PSP intervention militia, which has an estimated strength of nearly 15,300 men. The mission of the intervention militia is to patrol and engage insurgent forces within a given area, usually their home district. The protection militia (under the OPVDCM), with an estimated strength of 15,000 armed, uniformed volunteers, has a more limited and defensive role. These groups perform guard duties in *aldeamentos*, protect workers in the surrounding fields, and guard installations such as bridges. Self-defense units, also under the jurisdiction of the OPVDCM, constitute the third type of militia. They operate in those villages and dispersed farms where protection militia groups have not been formed, particularly in southwestern Niassa. These units are staffed by unpaid, armed volunteers who take time off from their regular duties to defend their own homesteads and villages. The strength of these units is unknown.

In addition to a military response, the government is waging an ambitious psychological action program

designed to deny insurgents ready access to the local population and food supply, win the support of the Africans, and improve living conditions. The major focus of this program is to establish resettlement villages, or *aldeamentos*, where the population of an insurgent area can be relocated (Figure 7). Most of these villages are provided with protection militia and are situated near roads to permit rapid assistance by Portuguese forces if attacked. They usually have a primary school, a health dispensary, and occasionally a central water supply.

*Aldeamentos* are of varying types depending on the location and possibility of attack. Those in combat zones are fortified villages, with militia patrolling the area by day and lookouts providing security at night. Such villages usually have basic fortifications, cleared fields of fire, barbed-wire fencing, trenches, and occasionally earthen bunkers. In areas that are relatively unaffected by the insurgency there are few if any fortifications; preventive security for the future, which may include training for militia is of more importance than current defense measures or fortifications.

This network of villages has cut FRELIMO off from much of the population for purposes of recruitment, subversion, and supply. Begun in 1965 in Cabo Delgado District, the *aldeamento* program has since been virtually completed in Niassa and extended into Tete. It is also being started in Beira, Vila Pery, and Zambezia Districts, with about 450 *aldeamentos* involving nearly 300,000 persons planned for these areas. In early 1973 there were about 330 *aldeamentos* in Cabo Delgado, 130 in Niassa, and some 155 in Tete. The program in Tete is considerably behind schedule, however. FRELIMO had already established a foothold there and propagandized the local population before any *aldeamentos* were started. Moreover, the population is widely scattered, composed of many tribes, and thus difficult to bring together or influence.

Although the Portuguese believe the *aldeamento* program is their most effective weapon in the struggle for the support of the African populace, it may also create new problems. One such problem is that of African expectations. In establishing the *aldeamentos*, the Portuguese have broken, perhaps irrevocably, the basic patterns of traditional tribal life. For the present, they are relying on schools, medical care, and other amenities to overcome the African's unhappiness at being forced to abandon his isolated life in the bush. As time goes on, however, the expectations of resettled Africans are likely to generate new demands for



FIGURE 7. Panguia, resettlement village in Cabo Delgado District. (top) Aerial view of village. Note zigzag trench and barbed-wire fence at right. (bottom) Side street in the village. (C)

increased services. In addition, as more people are clustered in villages, less land for cultivation will be available within convenient walking distance. In the short run there is probably sufficient land nearby for villagers, but the generally poor fertility of the tropical soil in some areas will necessitate frequent shifting of fields and long fallow periods.

The government and the military have had varying success with other psychological warfare programs. The government has had a measure of success with its "open arms" policy, which offers land and food to refugees who return to Mozambique or come out of the bush. The authorities also use leaflets (scattered by planes or tacked to trees) to offer money to insurgents who defect and bring their arms with them. In an effort to offset the effect of African nationalist broadcasts to Mozambique, the Portuguese make regular radiobroadcasts in several African languages.

### G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

Abshire, David, and Samuels, Michael (ed.). *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*. New York: Praeger, 1969. Mozambique is one of the three Portuguese African territories discussed. A useful interdisciplinary study of the social, historical, political, and economic development of Portuguese Africa.

American University, Foreign Area Studies, *Area Handbook for Mozambique*. Washington: U.S. Gov. Print. Off. 1969. A comprehensive, detailed survey of Mozambique but somewhat dated.

Bruce, Neil. "Portugal's African Wars," *Conflict Studies*, March 1973. Good discussion of insurgency in Mozambique and Portuguese countermeasures.

Duffy, James. *Portugal in Africa*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1962. Old, but still the basic work on the history of Portugal's role in Africa.

Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Baltimore: Penguin Books. 1969. Interesting, firsthand account of the origin, development, and goals of FRELIMO through the eyes of the libera-

tion movement's first president, the late Dr. Mondlane.

"Between Africa and Europe: A Survey of Portugal," *The Economist*, 26 February 1972, pp. 1-28 in Survey. Although the article is primarily about metropolitan Portugal, it also examines the Portuguese conception of their "African destiny" and the debate that it has aroused in the outside world.

## Chronology (u/ou)

- 1498**  
 Vasco da Gama lands at Mozambique Island in first Portuguese contact with Mozambique.
- 1885-86**  
 Treaty of Berlin fixes boundaries of Mozambique and other Portuguese territories in Africa putting an end to period of Portuguese expansionism in Africa.
- 1926**  
**May**  
 Military coup overthrows parliamentary government in Portugal.
- 1930**  
 Colonial Act of 1930 defines Mozambique's political status.
- 1932**  
**July**  
 Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar becomes Prime Minister and dictator of Portugal.
- 1933**  
**July**  
 Portuguese constitution embodying theory of "corporate state" comes into force.
- 1951**  
**June**  
 Portuguese constitutional revision incorporates Colonial Act of 1935, which is a modification of the 1930 act, and restores to overseas possessions their former status of Overseas Provinces.
- 1955**  
**July**  
 Statutes issued by Minister of Overseas Provinces provide for limited amount of administrative decentralization for Overseas Provinces.
- 1961**  
**September**  
 Moreira reforms abolish legal distinction between "assimilated" and "nonassimilated" Africans.
- 1962**  
**April**  
 New rural labor code abolishes the system of enforced contract labor in Mozambique.
- June**  
 Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) formed by several African exile groups.
- 1964**  
**January**  
 New 1963 Organic Law for Portuguese Overseas Provinces goes into effect, repealing the Native Statute and making all Mozambicans Portuguese citizens.
- September**  
 FRELIMO begins military phase of operations in northeastern Mozambique.
- 1965**  
**June**  
 COREMO formed by a breakaway group from FRELIMO.
- 1968**  
**May-June**  
 FRELIMO begins operations in northwestern Mozambique.
- September**  
 Marcello Caetano succeeds Salazar as Portuguese Prime Minister following the latter's stroke.
- 1969**  
**November**  
 Government reorganizes PIDE, renaming it the Directorate General of Security (DGS).
- 1970**  
**July**  
 Former Prime Minister Salazar dies.
- 1971**  
**July**  
 Constitutional changes provide possibility of increased local autonomy for overseas territories.
- 1972**  
**April**  
 New revised Organic Law for the Overseas continues Lisbon's control.
- December**  
 New political-administrative statute gives Mozambique honorary status of a state within the unitary Portuguese nation.
- 1973**  
**March**  
 Majority of nonwhites elected for first time to Legislative Assembly.

SECRET

### Glossary (u/ou)

| ABBREVIATION | PORTUGUESE  | ENGLISH  |
|--------------|---|--|
| ANP.....     | <i>Acao Nacional Popular</i> .....  | National Popular Action  |
| COREMO.....  | <i>Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique..</i>                                      | Mozambique Revolutionary Committee   |
| DGS.....     | <i>Direccao Geral de Seguranca</i> .....  | Directorate General of Security  |
| FRELIMO....  | <i>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique...</i>                                      | Mozambique Liberation Front  |
| MDM.....     | <i>Movimento Democratico de Mocambique.</i>                                       | Democratic Movement of Mozambique  |
| OPVDCM.....  | <i>Organizacao Provincial dos Voluntarios<br/>e de Defesa Civil de Mocambique</i> | Provincial Organization of Volunteers<br>for the Civil Defense of Mozambique         |
| PIDE.....    | <i>Policia Internacional e de Defesa do<br/>Estado</i>                            | International and State Defense Police   |
| PSP.....     | <i>Policia de Seguranca Publica</i> .....   | Public Security Police   |
| SCCIM.....   | <i>Servicos de Centralizacao e Coordenacao<br/>de Informacoes de Mocambique</i>   | Service for the Centralization and<br>Coordination of Information in Mo-<br>zambique |

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