

SWNCC 091 - PORTUGAL Miscellaneous

*Box 77*

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
By *AAA*  
Date

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
By *[Signature]*  
Date *5/12/75*

**DECLASSIFIED**



Q. M. C. Form 353 (Old No. 490)  
Revised July 26, 1918

## LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 091 - Portugal

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM-	DATE	TO-	SYNOPSIS
1	W.D. Leahy	1/8/45	Secretaries of War and Navy	Staff Conversations with Portugal, (C.C.S. 462/19) attached. <i>Removed 2/27/46 for Col Field's info</i>
2	J.C. Dunn	1/13/45	Joint Chiefs of Staff	Staff Conversations with Portugal.
3				Minutes of 6th Meeting SWNCC Bombing of Macao.
4	Mr. Stimson		Mr. Stettinius	Agreement between Great Britain and Portugal.
5	Mr./Stimson	2/21/45	Sect. State	Re reapture between Portugal and Japan.
6	Mr. Forrestal	3/13/45	Sect. State	Letter re Macao Bombing.
7	Mr. McCloy	2/13/45	Mr. Dunn	Letter re Macao Bombing.
8	Mr. Bard	2/28/45	Sect. State	Letter re Macao Bombing.
9	Mr. Stimson	4/5/45	Mr. Grew	Letter re attacks on SS MASBATE in harbor at Portuguese Macao.
10	C. McCarthy	5/3/45	Sec., JCS	Memo enclosing cpltr AS/S to S/W and Navy, re Draft Accords for negotiations with the Portuguese Government.
11				Excerpt from minutes of 10th Meeting of SWNCC - 16 Feb. 45 (re: Declaration of War by Portugal)
12		5/14/45		Letter attached to summary of data re Third Alleged Bombing of Macao by American Planes
13		5/29/45		SWNCC 139 - Supplemental Accords to Santa Maria Airbase Agreements (cross reference 323.3 Air Bases Azores, serial 4)
14	<del>Comm Richardson</del>	<del>5/30/45</del>	<del>Sec., JCS</del>	<del>Memo enclosing letter from Act. Sec of State to SecNav and War re Aviation Gasoline from Portugal</del>

INSTRUCTIONS.—When papers on a subject become numerous they will be numbered serially and brief entries made on this form

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LIST OF PAPERS

FILE NO. 091 Portugal

Serial No.	From	Date	To	Synopsis
14	Sec Stimson	9/10/45	Sec of State	Letter (with corres. att'chd) re: agreement submitted by the Portuguese re jurisdiction over U.S. forces in the Azores.
15	A F Richardson	10/8/45	P T Culbertson	Memo re: United States Post-War Base Requirements in Portuguese Territory.
16	Mr. Peurifoy	15 Nov 48	Mr. Saltzman	Encl. copy Proc. 60 No. 124 fm Portuguese Embassy. Govt. of Angola have requested fm US for acquisition of piece of land in Luanda for purpose of installing American Consulate. Portuguese Embassy desirous of land or buildings in any of US dependent territories for purpose of establishing Portuguese consular representation.
17	Mr. Saltzman	17 Nov 48	Mr. Peurifoy	Question of SANACC proper mechanism for obtaining views of Service Depts on matter of granting reciprocal rights to Portugal. Advised Mr. Donaldson FBO is handling this matter in your ofc has approved procedure of joint letter to Secs Army, Navy and Air Force.



*Return to HWMoseley*

*HWM*

*091 Portugal Misc.  
cross*

November 17, 1948

A - Mr. Peurifoy

I question whether SANACC is the proper mechanism for obtaining the views of the Service Departments on the matter of granting reciprocal rights to Portugal in connection with the proposed purchase of property in West Africa for consular purposes, as suggested in your letter of November 12.

SANACC is primarily used for formulating a U.S. Government position on involved politico-military matters which require considerable study on the part of the Service Departments and which also require the personal approval of Messrs. Draper, Kenney and Whitney. It is my understanding that the reference subject is not of sufficient significance to warrant such consideration in the Service Departments, and I am afraid that if it were made the subject of a SANACC paper someone in the military might misconstrue its true nature and thereby delay or withhold approval. Accordingly, I believe that the most effective way to obtain the military views on this matter is by joint letters to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and the Air Force.

I am advised that the above procedure has been discussed with Mr. Allyn Donaldson (FBO) who is handling this matter in your office, and that it is agreeable with him.

SANACC SECRETARIAT

- State Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Army Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Navy Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Air Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Ass't State Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Ass't Army Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Ass't Navy Member \_\_\_\_\_
- Ass't Air Force Member \_\_\_\_\_

Charles E. Saltzman

A true copy of the signed original. *JEN*

File

*17*

SANACC:HWMoseley:hmh

4033



ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*Handwritten signature*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
FOR OCCUPIED AREAS



1948 NOV 15 AM 9 41

November 12, 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

My dear Mr. Saltzman:

The Department of State is considering the purchase of property in Luanda, Angola, West Africa, to be used for consular purposes. The American Consul requested the local governor to agree to the purchase of this site by the Government of the United States, and the governor requested the Government of Portugal to agree to this purchase.

The enclosed copy of a note, Proc. 60 No. 124, from the Portuguese Embassy, dated October 16, states that the request for reciprocal rights in Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, Virgin Islands, Wake and Samoa "is made in order to comply with the requirements of Article 221, Paragraph 1 of the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire" etc. It is requested that the Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force indicate if they have no objection to granting the reciprocal rights requested by the Government of Portugal.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

*John E. Peurifoy*  
John E. Peurifoy  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy Proc. 60 No. 124

The Honorable  
Charles E. Saltzman,  
Chairman, State-Army-Navy-Air Force  
Coordinating Committee.

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Y

## PORTUGUESE EMBASSY

Washington

Proc. 60  
No.--124

The Government of Angola having submitted to the Ministry of Colonies the request from the United States Government for the acquisition of a piece of land in Luanda for the purpose of installing an American Consulate in that city, the Portuguese Embassy would be very grateful if the State Department would kindly inform whether authorization would be reciprocally granted to the Portuguese Government, in case it should desire to acquire land or buildings in any of the United States dependent territories such as Puerto-Rico, Guam, Hawaii, Virgin Islands, Wake or Samoa for the purpose of establishing a Portuguese consular representation.

This question is made in order to comply with the requirements of Article 221, Paragraph 1 of the Organic Charter of the Portuguese Colonial Empire which calls for reciprocity in the granting of authorization to a Foreign Government, by the National Assembly, for the acquisition of any portion of land or buildings in the colonial territory for the strict purpose of installing a consular representation and for its duration.

Washington, D. C.

October 16, 1948

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TOP SECRET

091 Portugal.

8 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. P. T. CULBERTSON  
Western European Division  
State Department.

Subject: United States Post-War Base  
Requirements in Portuguese  
Territory.

Reference: JCS 1289/1.

1. A copy of JCS 1289/1 is attached for  
your information in connection with United States  
Post-War Base Requirements in Portuguese Terri-  
tory.

2. It is requested that this JCS publication  
be returned to the SWNCC Secretariat when you have  
finished with it.

Respectfully,

A. F. RICHARDSON.

Enclosure:  
JCS 1289/1.

SWNCO FILE

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TOP SECRET



**SECRET**

*091 Portugal*  
*W...*

SWNCC	
COL. McCARTHY	.....
COMDR. RICHARDSON	.....
MR. R. E. COX	.....
LT. COL. PENNOYER	.....
CDR. SCHMIDT	.....
MR. H. W. MOSELEY	.....
MR. J. P. GARDINER	.....
LT. COMDR. ROCKEFELLER	.....
LT. COL. V. F. FIELD	.....
MAJOR W. E. GUNTHER	.....
1ST LT. E. SPITTALL	.....
ENS. F. WHITESIDE	.....
FILE	.....

10 SEP 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I refer to your letter of 2 August 1945 inviting comment upon the draft of agreement submitted by the Portuguese Government regarding jurisdiction over United States forces in the Azores, which was contained in the airgram of 12 July from the American Embassy at Lisbon.

Detailed comments of the War Department concerning the provisions of the subject draft covering criminal jurisdiction are contained in the inclosure herewith. The Navy Department has considered these comments and has interposed no objections. I recommend that the Department of State propose to the Portuguese Government that the changes suggested in the inclosure be made in the draft and that a provision as indicated be added thereto covering apprehension of offenders.

It is noted that the Portuguese position regarding civil jurisdiction and claims is still under study. However, no mention is made concerning immunity of our forces from taxation. I wish to renew the recommendation contained in the inclosure to my letter of 19 February 1945 that the matter of tax immunity also should be covered by agreement.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

1 Incl  
Comments by JAG  
concerning Portu-  
guese draft

INFO COPY FOR SWNCC

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Comments by The Judge Advocate General Concerning Portuguese Draft of Agreement on Jurisdiction, Inclosed with State Department's Letter of 2 August 1945 (Le 811.203/7-1245).

1. The following comments are submitted with reference to the provisions of the subject draft of agreement, as indicated:

a. (Title) The title limits the application of the agreement to "the armed forces of the United States of North America established at Santa Maria Island." This country should be described by its correct style, the "United States of America." The United States has forces in substantial number in the Azores at places other than Santa Maria. So far as this department is aware, in no case in the first World War or in this, have there been two agreements concerning jurisdiction over the armed forces of one ally on the soil or in the territorial waters of another, nor has there been a territorial limitation of the operation of any agreement to troops stationed at one or more places. In every instance one agreement has been effective as to all members of the visiting armed forces who enter the host country officially, wherever they may be or be stationed in that country. In particular, the draft of a British-Portuguese agreement respecting British forces in the Azores is not territorially limited. No logical justification is perceived for subjecting U. S. personnel at one place in the Azores to one rule as to jurisdiction, and those elsewhere to another. It is recommended that the present agreement be drawn so as to cover all U. S. forces in the Azores, and therefore, that the words quoted above from the title of the agreement be changed to read, "the armed forces of the United States of America in the Azores Islands." If the agreement of 28 November 1944, mentioned in the concluding clause of the title, is limited to the troops at Santa Maria Island, the reference to it should be omitted.

b. (Par. 1) The word "implement," in line 2 of the English translation, is not a true rendering of the Portuguese "applicar." "Apply" would be more accurate.

c. (Par. 1) For the reasons stated in subparagraph a, above, the references to "Santa Maria Island" and "that island" in lines 4 and 6, respectively, of Paragraph 1 of the agreement, unduly limit its scope. It is recommended that the words "at Santa Maria Island" and all the following part of paragraph 1 be deleted, and that there be substituted "in the Azores Islands."

d. (Par. 3) For reasons already indicated, the limitation of the effect of the agreement to the forces stationed at Santa Maria is inadvisable. It is recommended that one or the other of the changes recommended below be made in paragraph 3, change (1) being deemed preferable:

(1) Strike out "who are established at Santa Maria under the aforesaid agreement of November 28, 1944"; and substitute therefor "who are officially present in the Azores Islands."

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(2) After "November 28, 1944," insert "or by other agreement with or consent of the Portuguese Government."

e. (Par. 3) It is believed that a better translation of the last clause of paragraph 3 than that given would be "with the exception of Portuguese citizens who may be serving in said forces, or employed in them in civil occupations." The meaning of the Portuguese text is not altogether clear, but it seems that it excepts two classes of persons:

(1) Military personnel of the U. S. Army who are Portuguese citizens, and

(2) Portuguese civilians employed in our forces.

No objection is seen to the exception of class (2); but, if a Portuguese citizen voluntarily enlists in our forces in the United States, or allows himself to be inducted without claiming exemption as a neutral alien, as he may do, his status should be the same as that of any other soldier or sailor, and he should be subject when in the Azores to the exclusive jurisdiction of our courts-martial. It may be that such was the intention of the Portuguese government in drawing this clause; but, unless that government so admits, it should be amended so as to put our exclusive jurisdiction over such personnel beyond question. If the clause in question were changed to read-- "with the exception of Portuguese citizens who may be employed by or serving with said forces in a civilian capacity" -- the uncertainty that now exists would be obviated.

f. (Par. 4) For reasons already stated, it is recommended that the words "established at Santa Maria," be deleted; and that there be substituted for them, "in the Azores Islands."

g. (Par. 4) The Portuguese verb "instruir" is translated "give instructions." In many places it has that meaning, but here it refers to the preliminary judicial investigation by an examining magistrate which in Latin countries precedes a criminal trial. No such proceeding is known to our military law. The nearest thing to it is the investigation required by the second paragraph of Article of War 70 (10 U. S. Code 1542). As that is already covered by the preceding verb, "investigar" or "investigate," it is recommended that the Portuguese "instruir" and the English "give instructions" be deleted.

h. (Par. 4) The clause which appears in the Portuguese text as "quando for feita prova suficiente" is rendered in the accompanying translation as "when ample conviction has been ascertained," which, in its context, does not make sense. The clause quoted should be translated, "when sufficient evidence is presented."

i. (Par. 6) The last half line of paragraph 6 limits American courts, military prisons, and houses of detention to the zone of the camp at Santa Maria. In all the other instances in the first World War and this, of the presence of troops of one nation on the soil of another friendly nation, courts-martial of the visiting forces have met wherever it was convenient for them to do so. A provision that they shall sit within American camps would

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probably cause no serious difficulty, but the limitation to the camp at Santa Maria ignores the fact that we have troops on other islands. Courts-martial must meet as near as possible in place and time to the offense. Moreover, it seems likely that the U. S. Naval authorities might wish to hold courts-martial on U. S. Naval vessels in the waters of the Azores.

Paragraph 6 also prevents the establishment of any place of detention for our soldiers elsewhere than at Santa Maria. As has been said, there are considerable bodies of U. S. troops at other places in the Azores than Santa Maria. Unfortunately every camp must have a guard house or place of detention for soldiers who misbehave themselves.

It is recommended that there be substituted for "within the zone of the camp at Santa Maria," the words "within a camp or on board a naval vessel of the United States."

j. (Par. 7) is unobjectionable so far as it goes, but it should go further. The Portuguese word "depoimento," in subparagraph 2, line 2, is rendered in the translation sent this office as "testimony." Probably it should be translated "deposition." Though the Portuguese text is not clear, it appears to contemplate the aid of the officers of each country to the other by the collection of depositions and documentary evidence, rather than by the production of witnesses to testify in person in court. The 25th and 26th Articles of War (10 U. S. Code 1496, 1497) state when depositions may be used in the courts-martial of our army. Briefly, they may be so used only when the witness is or is about to go more than 100 miles from the place of trial, or when because of sickness or other reasonable cause, he is unable to appear personally in court. They may not be used at all for the prosecution in capital cases. In the general run of court-martial cases, the civilian witnesses whose testimony is desired will be persons living in the vicinity of the Army post or camp where the court sits, much less than 100 miles distant. Their depositions will be inadmissible over objection. Even if no objection be made, the personal testimony of a witness is clearer and more convincing than a deposition, and more likely to lead the court to a just finding and sentence. For the reasons indicated, unless the Portuguese government will state that such is the meaning of paragraph 7 as now drawn, it should be changed so as to provide, not merely for investigation and collection of depositions and documentary evidence, but also for the attendance of Portuguese witnesses before U. S. courts-martial and of members of our forces as witnesses before local Portuguese courts. It may be pointed out that sec. 3 of the act of Congress of June 30, 1944 (Public Law 384, 78th Congress), provides for the compulsory attendance of witnesses before a foreign court-martial sitting in the United States. British law makes similar provision for the compulsory attendance of British witnesses before allied courts-martial in the United Kingdom.

k. (Par. 8) The duration of this agreement should not be limited to the duration of the prior agreement with respect to our forces at Santa Maria, as some of our troops elsewhere in the Azores may possibly remain longer than those at that place. It is recommended that paragraph 8 be rewritten as follows:-

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"8. The present agreement will be in effect as long as military or naval forces of the United States are officially present in the Azores Islands pursuant to the aforementioned agreement of November 28, 1944, concerning the use of facilities at Santa Maria Island by the Air Forces of the United States, or pursuant to other agreement with or consent of the Portuguese government for the presence of U. S. forces in the Azores Islands."

2. It is further recommended that the following provisions be added with respect to apprehension:

"Officers, military police, shore patrols, or other personnel of the army or navy of the United States authorized by the law, regulations, or orders in force in the service to which they belong to do so, may, on a post, camp, air field, establishment, or installation of the United States in the Azores Islands or on a vessel of the United States in the territorial waters thereof, apprehend any person believed on reasonable grounds to have committed a crime or offense; but, unless the person arrested is a member of the forces of the United States, as defined in paragraph 3 hereof, he shall be delivered at the first convenient opportunity to the proper Portuguese authorities with a statement of the charges against him and a summary of the available evidence.

"Reciprocally, Portuguese military or naval officers, military or civil police, or other Portuguese officials authorized by the law of their country to make arrests, may anywhere in the Azores Islands except in a post, camp, airfield, establishment, or installation of the United States, or on a vessel of the United States in the territorial waters of the Azores, or in the presence of the commanding officer of the person arrested, apprehend a member of the military or naval forces of the United States who commits an offense in their presence or who they have reasonable grounds to believe has committed a serious offense; but they shall at the earliest convenient opportunity deliver the person arrested to the appropriate authorities of his own service, together with a statement of the charges against him and a summary of the available evidence.

"Officers, military police, shore patrols, or other personnel of the army or navy of the United States authorized by the law, regulations, or orders in force in the service to which they belong to do so, may apprehend military or naval personnel of the United States anywhere in the Azores Islands."

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TO:

		1	APPROVAL	
		2	SIGNATURE	
1	CHIEF OF STAFF			Pacific Thtr Sec, OPD, WDGS
2	SECRETARY OF WAR			Col Thackston 6313 /mcy

OPD 336 Portugal  
(17 Apr 45)

Third Alleged Bombing of Macao by  
American Planes

14 May 45

**SUMMARY**

1. By letter 17 April 1945, Secretary of State informed Secretary of War that the Portuguese Government protests an alleged third bombing of Macao by a plane or planes identified as American on 7 April 1945. By interim letter dated 23 April 1945, Secretary of War informed Secretary of State that cited letter had been received and that appropriate Theater Commanders were being questioned regarding this incident.

2. General MacArthur by radio Cm-In-6143 (7 May 45) reports that Navy PV-1 Search Plane under his operational control attacked a tug in this vicinity between 1105 and 1120 I time 7 April, indicating that the tug was in a position 2.2 miles from Macao and only 1.2 miles from the Jap-held island Taipai on a course of 220 degrees (toward Taipai Island and channel). That no markings, flags or identification of nationality was visible. An original strafing attack was made while tug was on course cited above; that vessel changed course after attack by 45 degrees to starboard and that bombing attack which resulted in sinking of tug took place when the tug was in a position approximately 1.8 miles from Macao and less than 1 mile from Jap-held Taipai Island. The pilot of the Navy PV-1 Search Plane had previously been briefed on neutrality of Macao and Macao Harbor. However, since at the time of original attack subject vessel was 1 mile East of the first channel marker and on a course toward Taipai, pilot considered the tug to be outside Macao Harbor.

3. It is recommended that the Secretary of War sign the attached letter to Secretary of State giving the information substantially as indicated above.

**COORDINATION**

- 4. Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Col G. Carey, Air Staff Plans, x72279)  
U.S. Navy (Capt Tonseth, Office Chief Naval Operations, Central Division x2487)

J. E. HULL  
Major General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, OPD

**3 Incls**

- 1. Proposed ltr to  
SS dtd 14 May  
45 for SW  
signature
- 2. SS to C/S dd 19 Apr  
45 w/incl
- 3. Ltr S/S to S/W dd  
17 Apr 45 w/2/incls

MAY 16 1945  
NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
W.E.T.

WILLIAM G. HIPPS  
Colonel, GSC  
Acting Deputy Chief  
Theater Group, OPD, WDGS

COPY FOR SWNCC

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**SECRET**

MAY 16 1945

**The Honorable****The Secretary of State****Dear Mr. Secretary:**

Following the receipt of your letter of 17 April I advised you on 23 April that the Theater Commanders were being queried regarding the third alleged bombing of Macao by planes identified as American on 7 April 1945.

General MacArthur advises that a Navy PV-1 Search Plane operating under his control attacked a tug in the vicinity of Macao between 1105 and 1120 I time, 7 April. At the time of the initial attack, the tug was 2.2 miles from Macao and only 1.3 miles from the Japanese-held island Taipai and on a course of 220 degrees. The tug had no markings, flag or identification of nationality visible. The first attack by the plane was one of strafing while the tug was at position and on the course cited above. However, after the first attack, the vessel made a 45 degree turn to starboard toward Taipai Island. The second attack was one of bombing and resulted in sinking the tug in a position approximately 1.8 miles from Macao and less than 1 mile from Japanese-held Taipai Island. The pilot in command of this Navy Search Plane had been previously briefed on the neutrality of Macao and Macao Harbor. However, since subject vessel at the time of the original attack was 1 mile East of the channel marker and on course toward Taipai, the pilot considered tug to be outside of Macao Harbor.

In view of the above report, the War Department regrets this unnecessary loss of life and property but considers the incident unavoidable under the circumstances.

**Sincerely yours,****(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON****Secretary of War**

cc furnished:

Navy (Capt Tonseth) Office Chief Naval Opns, Central Division

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8. Declaration of War by Portugal

Mr. McCLOY stated that the question of the desirability of a declaration of war on the Axis by Portugal is primarily political in character. However, he suggested that there may be certain military advantages, particularly with respect to bases in the Azores, if such declaration were made. It might make the Portuguese more amenable to our military interests.

Mr. DUNN noted that action in this regard had been held up previously because Lend-Lease and other commitments would probably have resulted, but stated that this is no longer the case.

After further discussion, THE COMMITTEE: Agreed that no SWNCC action was called for on this matter.

*10<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
16 Feb. '45*

*(11)*



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09/2

3 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Draft Accords for Negotiations  
with the Portuguese Government.

1. Enclosed is a copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretaries of War and the Navy on the above subject.
2. It is requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the attached draft accords with a view of approving as requested in paragraph 3 of the attached letter.
3. Attention is invited to the high priority attached to this matter by the Department of State.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY  
Secretary

Encl.

Cy ltr fr AS/S dtd  
2 May 45 w/Encls.

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 740132  
 Date NOV 26 1976  
 BY CD/KMB

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~~SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

C-O-P-Y

*appendix*In reply refer to  
WE

May 2, 1945

SECRET

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that under the Santa Maria agreement of November 28, 1944 certain supplementary accords were to be negotiated with the Portuguese Government.

The Department recommends for your consideration, and that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, five draft accords, which are enclosed herewith, covering all of the subjects on which supplementary accords are considered desirable with a single exception. The exception is the supplementary accord on jurisdictional immunities, which is being taken up separately. The Department believes that the enclosed drafts fully meet the requirements of this Government, and would appreciate the urgent action of your Department thereon.

These drafts have already been gone over in advance with the Portuguese Government, and it is in agreement. The Department hopes that the Chiefs of Staff will see fit to approve the drafts without modification. The Prime Minister of Portugal has made it clear that it wishes the censorship system observed at Lagens to be observed at Santa Maria. As Portugal is responsible for the defense of the islands, he feels that it has an interest in what goes out of the islands. He has assured us that he has no intention of disturbing our official communications of any character. The Prime Minister thought that for private mail the Terceira system of having a Portuguese officer sit with the United States censors should be perfectly feasible. It is to be borne in mind that Portuguese workers are employed in Santa Maria and the Prime Minister desires to avoid uncensored use of our mail facilities by these workers.

I also enclose for your consideration and that of the Chiefs of Staff, a draft note which the Prime Minister of

The Honorable  
Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of War.

Portugal

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Portugal proposes to hand our Embassy in Lisbon, providing for practical adjustments as needed by the local Portuguese and American authorities.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Joseph C. Grew

Acting Secretary.

Enclosures:

1. Copies of five draft accords.
2. Copy of draft note.

~~SECRET~~



C-O-P-Y

A  
ACCORD RESPECTING THE DEFENSE OF THE FIELD AND  
OF THE PERSONNEL AND THE SECURITY OF OPERATIONS  
AT THE AIRBASE OF SANTA MARIA

Pursuant to the provisions of article fourth, subdivision a) of the accord of the 28th November 1944, the Portuguese and United States Governments have agreed upon the following:

1. The defense of Santa Maria Island, including the nearby defense of the airdrome, continues exclusively within the competence of the Portuguese Government. The aerial vigilance of the base however shall be within the competence of the American Command.
2. The provision of the first part of the foregoing number notwithstanding, the existence shall be permitted of private American police, bearing personal arms, for policing of labor elements and work sites during construction and of personnel whether in service or in transit at the airdrome during use, within the limits of the base. The use when necessary of this body of police outside the field shall depend upon agreement with the local military authority.
3. The private postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications of personnel serving at the field, during the period of construction as well as during that foreseen for its use, in harmony with article third of the principal accord, are subject to Portuguese censorship, independent of that to which they may be subject on the part of the American authorities for the purposes of their own security. The local authorities may agree that censorship of private correspondence may be entrusted to a mixed Portuguese and American Commission for compliance with the provision of this number. The private correspondence is subject to frank.
4. The private correspondence of the population of the Island and of individuals not included in the preceding



- 2 -

number, which may enter and leave the Island of Santa Maria, shall likewise be subject to Portuguese censorship, to be executed according to the norms annexed to the present accord.

5. An undertaking of secrecy relative to American installations, ships and activities in the Island, its ports and air space shall be required of crews of vessels which perforce touch at Santa Maria;

6. Travellers from the Continent or from other Islands of the Azores or from Madeira going to Santa Maria, shall obtain a special license, issued by the competent security authority, which shows the travel to be indispensable; those who wish to leave the Island shall be required to sign an undertaking of secrecy analogous to that referred to in the preceding number.

7. The disembarkation of neither passengers in transit nor crews of vessels, excepting for reasons of duty duly justified by the maritime authority, shall not be permitted.

8. If circumstances demonstrate the possibility of making less severe the standards of censorship and security service herein established, the local Portuguese and American authorities shall accord between themselves to propose their alteration.



C-O-P-Y

B  
NORMS OF CENSORSHIP SERVICE, BY THE  
TERMS OF ARTICLE FOURTH OF THE ACCORD RESPECTING  
DEFENSE AND SECURITY

1st. All telegrams and letters to and from Santa Maria shall be subject to censorship. This censorship covers the prohibition of any reference to details of location of establishments and activities or movements of American air forces which may be stationed or may pass through the island, as well as vessels which seek its ports or bays for servicing the said forces.

2nd. The use of wireless telephony stations is restricted to official service.

3rd. The use of wireless telegraphy stations is subject to censorship and limited to clear language telegrams.

4th. Portuguese or foreign newspapers or periodicals, as well as parcel post, are authorized, subject to censorship.

5th. Mail bags shall be placed on board of vessels or aircraft by the censorship service, but mail coming from the post office or any other origin shall not be accepted.

6th. Packages of correspondence, or correspondence despatched in any other form which do not come from the censorship service are prohibited.

7th. The Portuguese authorities shall exercise a control for the purpose of preventing travellers who enter or leave Santa Maria from carrying letters, newspapers, publications or any other form of correspondence or of transmitting news.

8th. Official radio telegraphic communications when containing reference to American air forces or their activities shall always be in cipher.



C-O-P-Y

ACCORD ON CUSTOMS TREATMENT CONCEDED  
TO MERCHANDISE DESTINED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND  
USE OF SANTA MARIA AIRBASE

Pursuant to the provision of subdivision b) of article fourth of the accord of November 28, 1944 concluded between the Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States of America, the two said Governments have agreed upon the following:

1. The Portuguese Government shall apply to machinery, construction material, war material, food-stuffs and supplies of any kind, which may be destined for either construction or utilization of the Santa Maria airbase, and for the maintenance of its personnel, customs treatment equal to that which is applied to material and supplies destined to Portuguese forces stationed in the same island including a) exemption from importation duties and customs fees, b) all administrative facilities tending to assure maximum rapidity of customs clearance.
2. It is hereby understood that the exemption of subdivision a) does not include the clearance stamps and handling charges.
3. The imports referred to in number 1) are equally exempt from port taxes or any other charges which do not involve personal remuneration for services rendered.
4. The same exemptions and facilities applicable to imported articles by virtue of the provisions of the present accord, shall be applied to reexports.
5. The exemption from customs duties is not extended to imports or exports made on a merely personal basis by military or civilian individuals employed at the airbase.



- 2 -

6. Merchandise imported under this accord and not consumed or used shall be reexported within one month after the expiration of the period established in article third of the principal accord, or will pay the import duties to enter consumption in harmony with current law. Only under the said circumstances may imported merchandise enter for consumption by the local populace.

7. The exemptions conceded by virtue of this accord shall not extend to the tax on maritime commerce and tonnage fees which continue to be due from vessels.

Done in Lisbon, on \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_, in duplicate, in the English and Portuguese languages, both with equal value.



U-O-P-Y

D  
ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS  
OF PORTUGAL AND OF THE UNITED STATES  
RELATIVE TO THE CONDITIONS OF DELIVERY  
OF THE BASE AT SANTA MARIA AT THE END  
OF THE PERIOD OF USE

Pursuant to subdivision c) of article fourth of the accord of November 28, 1944, the Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States of America have agreed upon the following:

1. All the equipment installed in the buildings or at the airdrome of Santa Maria, or in the area of the port or in any other part of the island for the service of or the use of the airbase, and which can be removed without damage to the permanent structures, shall be considered property of the Government of the United States, without prejudice to the provisions of number 3), hereafter, in regard to the option of acquisition by the Portuguese Government.

2. The Government of the United States assumes the obligation of leaving in a good state of conservation and usability at the end of the period of the concession for use, the runways and other works paid for by the Portuguese Government and those which, although constructed for the account of the Government of the United States, constitute with the former an indivisible whole and are usable for the commercial operation of the field.

3. The Portuguese Government reserves the right to acquire, at the end of the period foreseen in article three of the accord of November 28, and for the price which shall be agreed upon with the Government of the United States, the machinery, apparatus or installations which belong to the latter under the provisions of the present accord, as well as raw materials, fuel or supplies of any type which have not been consumed or utilized.



4. The exportation of the merchandise not acquired by the Portuguese Government is conceded to the Government of the United States, free and exempt from taxes in harmony with the special accord on customs facilities.

This accord has been made in duplicate, in the English and Portuguese languages, both texts having equal value.

Lisbon.

Article 1. In emergency cases, the right of the Portuguese Government is recognized to the use of the Santa Maria Field by its military airplanes, whether combat or transport airplanes, and by its commercial airplanes.

Article 2. The airplanes which may have to use the Field shall submit themselves entirely to its discipline, and may not land or effect repairs, in case of necessity and arrival pursuant to the accompanying schedule.

This accord has been made in duplicate in the Portuguese and English languages, the two texts being of equal value.

Lisbon.



C-O-P-Y

E  
ACCORD RELATIVE TO THE POSSIBLE USE OF  
SANTA MARIA FIELD BY AIRPLANES OF THE  
PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT

Pursuant to the provision of article fourth, subdivision d) of the accord of November 28, 1944 the Portuguese Government and the Government of the United States of America have agreed upon the following:

1. In addition to emergency cases, the right of the Portuguese Government is recognized to the use of the Santa Maria airdrome by its military airplanes, whether combat or of its liaison personnel, and by its commercial airplanes.

2. The airplanes which may have to use the field shall submit themselves entirely to its discipline, and may fuel and affect repairs, in case of necessity and against payment of the corresponding amounts.

This accord has been done in duplicate in the Portuguese and English languages, the two texts being of equal value:

Lisbon.



C-O-P-Y

F

Mr. Ambassador,

There having been signed the complementary accords foreseen in subdivisions a), b), c) and d) of article fourth of the accord of November 28, 1944 (which we designate as the principal accord), and it is not being possible to foresee and set forth in the text of this last named or of the said complementary accords all the details of their execution, I have the honor to submit for the consideration of Your Excellency the following proposal which appears to me to be sufficient to remove the greater part of the difficulties:

"The practical adjustments which may become necessary will be made by agreement between the respective local Portuguese and American authorities, in the friendly and cooperative spirit which underlies these accords, but for them to become effective they shall have superior sanction, whenever the local Portuguese authority shall consider it necessary. This mode of procedure does not exclude negotiations between governments concerning matters which exceed the competence of the local authorities, in regard to matters concerning the field of Santa Maria, as is expressly foreseen in subdivision e) of article fourth of the accord of November 28, ultimo."

This note of mine and the reply of Your Excellency concurring in my proposal will constitute the accord between our two governments in regard to their content.

I avail myself of the opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my high consideration.



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE

STATE

     Mr. Cox  
     Mr. Hoseley  
     Mr. Gardiner

WAR

     Colonel McCarthy  
     Major Field  
     Lt. Massa

NAVY

     Commander Richardson  
     Lt. Condr. Rockefeller  
     Lieutenant Geilfuss  
     Ensign Whiteside

     Note  
     Circulate  
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REMARKS:

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TOP SECRET

WDOPD/73241  
Col Light/em

OPD 565 (29 Mar 45)

APR 5

*Light*

Honorable Joseph C. Grew  
Acting Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of 29 March concerning the reported attacks on 16 January and 25 February by American planes on the Panamanian SS MASBATE, while lying in the harbor at Portuguese Macao.

As stated in my letter of 23 March, the War Department has information from General MacArthur that on 25 February the pilot of a search Liberator overshot his target and bombs fell on the docks at Macao. Additional information has been requested concerning the reported attack on the SS MASBATE on 25 February. When reply is received from General MacArthur, you will be further advised.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

TOP SECRET

INFORMATION COPY FOR SECRETARIAT, SWNCC

9



TATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE

STATE

W. H. H. Mr. Cox  
W. H. H. Mr. Moseley  
W. H. H. Mr. Gardiner

WAR

W. H. H. Col. Hitson  
W. H. H. Col. McCarthy  
W. H. H. Major Field  
W. H. H. Lt. Massa

NAVY

W. H. H. Comdr. Nutting  
W. H. H. Comdr. Richardson  
W. H. H. Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller  
W. H. H. Lt. Geilfuss  
W. H. H. Ens. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Note  
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REMARKS:

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Secretary of the Navy

Serial No. 00018613  
 (SC)A16-3(2)  
 Op13-1/eah 2-26-45

**TOP SECRET**

28 FEB 1945

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your undated memorandum enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated 18 January 1945 from the Portuguese Embassy with regard to the alleged bombing by American planes of Macao and in which you request information to be used as a basis of a reply to the Portuguese memorandum.

The bombing and machine-gunning of installations in the city of Macao alleged in the Portuguese Embassy note of 18 January 1945 has been the subject of investigation in the theater and in the Navy Department. The findings of these preliminary investigations indicate that, through a misinterpretation of instructions, certain fighter type aircraft did attack the seaplane hangar and seaplane base installations in Portuguese territory on 18 January 1945. The record does not indicate, however, that any attacks were directed outside the seaplane base area. The seaplane base installations are reported to have been situated an appreciable distance from the city. Unfortunately camera records of these attacks are reported to have been destroyed by a subsequent bomb explosion on the aircraft carrier concerned.

The facilities at Macao have been under suspicion as a base for Japanese operations throughout Japanese occupation of that part of the China coast. For a long time the Portuguese themselves were virtually denied communication with the area. It is difficult to reconcile the numerous discrepancies between the description of the attack as reported by the Portuguese and by the forces concerned, and it is not too unlikely that the Portuguese report as to the extent of the attack may be Japanese inspired. An impartial assessment of damage is probably impossible to obtain.

The Navy Department is continuing its investigation of this incident and the Department of State will be kept informed of the additional facts which may be brought out.

Sincerely yours,

RALPH A. BARR  
 Acting

Honorable E. R. Stettinius, Jr.,  
 Secretary of State.

CC: SWNCC

8



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE

STATE ✓

\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Cox *has seen*  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Moseley  
\_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Gardiner

WAR ✓

\_\_\_\_\_ Col. Whitson *has seen*  
*JW* \_\_\_\_\_ Col. McCarthy  
\_\_\_\_\_ Major Field  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lt. Massa

NAVY ✓

*CR* \_\_\_\_\_ Comdr. Nutting  
*FG* \_\_\_\_\_ Comdr. Richardson  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller  
\_\_\_\_\_ Lt. Geilfuss  
\_\_\_\_\_ Ens. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ Note  
\_\_\_\_\_ Circulate  
\_\_\_\_\_ File

REMARKS:

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\_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_



**SECRET**

WDO&S:DS:meg

13 February 1945

Honorable James C. Dunn  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

Thru: State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

Dear Jimmy:

In answer to your inquiry at the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee meeting on January 19, 1945 as to whether any United States Army Air Forces planes participated in an alleged airplane attack on Macao on January 16, 1945, I am informed that investigations conducted by the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area and the Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, disclosed that no United States Army Forces were involved in such an attack.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) J. J. McCloy

John J. McCloy

COPY FOR SWNCC, 178, State Dept.

**SECRET**

②



12. Bombing of Macao

Mr. DUNN reported that the State Department has received a letter from the Assistant Secretary of War stating that the Army was not responsible for the bombing and a letter from Acting Secretary of the Navy Board setting forth the circumstances of the bombing by Navy planes and recommending action to be taken by the State Department. After discussion, Mr. GATES agreed to withdraw this letter and to substitute for it one which merely reports the circumstances of the attack. Mr. McCLOY suggested that the communication to the Portuguese Government should make no mention of U. S. liability, on the theory that facts may be developed which will indicate that Macao has been utilized by the Japanese for military purposes.

10<sup>th</sup> Meeting  
16 February 45



Secretary of the Navy

Serial No. 00020113  
(SC)A16-3(2)

13 MAR 1945

Op13-1/eah 3-5-45

**TOP SECRET**

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to your letter of 28 February 1945 with regard to the bombing of Macao by American aircraft. The foregoing was in reply to mine of the same date in which you were advised that the seaplane hangar and seaplane base installations in Portuguese territory were attacked by U.S. naval aircraft on 16 January 1945.

In your letter of February 28 you state that we should at the earliest possible moment express to the foreign government in question our apologies and offer monetary compensation for the damage and loss thus incurred. You indicate further that the Navy Department should make available the funds necessary to compensate for the damage.

It is understood that steps have been taken by the Department of State to obtain an estimate of the damage and the monetary compensation which should be offered. I am of the opinion that the matter of compensation presents questions which can be dealt with most effectively by the State War Navy Coordinating Committee, and I am accordingly referring it to that Committee. However, recognizing the urgent necessity of giving the Portuguese Government a reply, and subject to procedures which may hereafter be agreed upon by the above mentioned Committee, you are advised that the Navy Department will undertake to obtain an allocation of funds in the amount recommended and supported by the Department of State for the purpose of compensation.

Should investigation reveal naval responsibility for the incident referred to in the Portuguese note of 26 February 1945 the provision of the foregoing paragraph will also apply to that incident.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

*Appendix C*  
Honorable E. R. Stettinius, Jr.,

Secretary of State.

CC: Secretariat, SWNCC

⑥



SECRET

FEB 21 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The letter from the Acting Secretary of State of 15 January 1945 enclosing a paraphrase of cable No. 29 dated 5 January 1945 from the American Ambassador in Lisbon in regard to the desirability of a rupture by Portugal with Japan has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am in agreement with their conclusion that from a military point of view it is relatively unimportant whether or not Portugal decides to act against Japan. Minor advantages and disadvantages to the overall war effort are roughly compensating. Hence, the decision as to whether such action by Portugal would be welcome should be made on the basis of the political factors involved.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

SECRET

COPI FOR SWNCC

(5)



SECRET

OPD/73241  
Col Light/kma

OPD 336 Portugal (10 Jan 45)

FEB 19 1945

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of January 1, 1945 with which is inclosed copy of a dispatch (No. 1287, December 29, 1944) from the United States Embassy at Lisbon, transmitting draft of an agreement about to be executed between Great Britain and Portugal, concerning jurisdictional immunities of British military forces in the Azores. The question is asked whether that agreement may serve as a basis for the negotiation of a like agreement between the United States and Portugal.

In general, and subject to certain exceptions, that question may be answered in the affirmative as to those parts of the British-Portuguese Agreement dealing with criminal and civil jurisdiction over British personnel (pars. 2-9, 11). However, the question must be answered in the negative as to paragraph 10, dealing with claims. The British-Portuguese Agreement is also defective in that it contains nothing as to the immunity from taxation of the visiting forces, their personnel, property, and operations; and makes no provision (par. 8) that judgment shall not be rendered against members of the visiting forces who are prevented by reason of their official duties from defending an action to which they are parties. There is inclosed a copy of memorandum by The Judge Advocate General, which has my approval, covering the above points in detail.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON

1 Incl  
Cy Memo for S/W fr JAGO,  
19 Jan 45, SPJGW 1944/12244

Secretary of War



SECRET

COPY FOR STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE

STATE ✓

     Mr. Cox  
     Mr. Moseley  
     Mr. Gardiner

WAR ✓

     Col. Whitson  
     Col. McCarthy  
     Major Field  
     Lt. Massa

NAVY

     Comdr. Nutting  
     Comdr. Richardson  
     Lt. Comdr. Rockefeller  
     Lt. Geilfuss  
     Ens. \_\_\_\_\_

     Note  
     Circulate  
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REMARKS:

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To Col. Gerhardt  
Room 4E-886

For the S-W-N-C-C  
as per your request.

Send to  
SWNCC

✓



SECRET

Col. *Shurtman*  
*3 E 941*

OPD/73241  
Col Light/kma

OPD 336 Portugal (10 Jan 45)

*091-P  
+ Phil B.*

The Honorable

The Secretary of State

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your letter of January 1, 1945 with which is inclosed copy of a dispatch (No. 1287, December 29, 1944) from the United States Embassy at Lisbon, transmitting draft of an agreement about to be executed between Great Britain and Portugal, concerning jurisdictional immunities of British military forces in the Azores. The question is asked whether that agreement may serve as a basis for the negotiation of a like agreement between the United States and Portugal.

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*copy of 091-P given to Jan 45*

Sincerely yours,

1 Incl  
Cy Memo for S/S fr JAGG,  
19 Jan 45, SPJGS 1944/12244

Secretary of War

*Incl 1*

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*4*

Inclison Section ✓



TOP SECRET

Navy member of the Latin American ad hoc committee, rather than to have the Secretary submit the problems formally to that sub-committee inasmuch as the War Department member of the sub-committee has already formulated data as to Army objectives.

8. Bombing of Macao

Mr. Dunn stated that the Portuguese Government is expected to protest the recent bombing of Macao, allegedly by U. S. aircraft. He urged that War and Navy Departments investigate the facts of the matter and agreed to circulate any further information coming to the notice of the State Department. Mr. Kane advised that the Navy is already investigating the matter.

9. Breaking the German Will to Resist

Mr. Kane introduced JCS 1218 on this subject and stated that the Secretary of the Navy wished the committee to consider whether it properly comes within its scope. After discussion, it was agreed that the matter should be left to regular channels on propaganda matters.

*6/20/49*



TOP SECRET

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

January 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Staff Conversations with  
Portugal.

Reference is made to the memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Leahy, referring to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it be determined whether the Department of State considers satisfactory the draft letter to the Department and the Foreign Office proposed in Appendix "A" of C.C.S. 462/19.

I am glad to inform you on behalf of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy that this draft letter is considered satisfactory. The State Department would appreciate, however, being advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to what extent the information set forth in the letter in question may be revealed to the Portuguese Government.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

James Clement Dunn  
Chairman

TOP SECRET


(2)



CS584



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



8 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Staff conversations with  
Portugal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the enclosed copy of C.C.S. 462/19 be referred to the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for determination as to whether the Department of State will consider the draft letter to the Department and the Foreign Office, proposed in Appendix "A" on page 4 of that paper, a satisfactory basis for reply to the Portuguese in the light of the commitments of the U.S.-Portuguese agreement with respect to Santa Maria and Timor.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure:  
CCS 462/19 (Copy No. 89).

TOP SECRET

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Y"APPENDIX "A"D R A F T*File with  
Rodriguez papers.*LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 September 1944 appointed an Anglo-American Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. The Mission has now reported its findings to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who have arrived at the following conclusions:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement as to the direct use of Portuguese forces they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.

b. The only apparent military disadvantage which would result if Portuguese forces alone should occupy Timor (in the event of a Japanese evacuation) would be the extent to which the provision of supplies and shipping for the Portuguese might detract from resources otherwise available to more forward areas in the Pacific. From a supply point of view it should be possible after the defeat of Germany to make available the equipment necessary to provide either force (see below) with the standard quantities of individual and unit equipment.

c. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.

d. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics and radio specialists.

e. Any action in respect of the assembly, shipment, training or equipping of the Portuguese force and its naval component must be deferred until after the defeat of Germany when an over-all examination must be made in the light of the operational commitments at the time.

f. There is no objection from a military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiations as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a government level.



- 2 -

g. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accepting Portuguese participation, do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.

h. Positive information that operations either are or are not contemplated against Timor could be used to an advantage by the Portuguese, and to the detriment of the interests of the Allies, for bargaining with Japan with which Portugal is still diplomatically friendly, and which virtually controls the Portuguese colony of Macao.



C  
O  
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STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

January 13, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Staff Conversations with  
Portugal.

Reference is made to the memorandum for the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Leahy, referring to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it be determined whether the Department of State considers satisfactory the draft letter to the Department and the Foreign Office proposed in Appendix "A" of C.C.S. 462/19.

I am glad to inform you on behalf of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy that this draft letter is considered satisfactory. The State Department would appreciate, however, being advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to what extent the information set forth in the letter in question may be revealed to the Portuguese Government.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN  
Chairman



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 89C.C.S. 462/19

091

Portugal

(Refer to CCS file)

3 January 1945COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFSTAFF CONVERSATIONS WITH PORTUGAL

Reference: C.C.S. 462/15



Report by the Combined Administrative Committee  
in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. To make recommendations on the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission (C.C.S. 462/15) relative to proposals for Portuguese participation in Allied operations for the recapture of Timor.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The C.C.S. 462 series covers negotiations initiated by a communication to the British Foreign Office in which Dr. Salazar expressed his willingness for Portuguese participation in operations to liberate Timor. As a result of an exchange of views between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, an Anglo-American Military Mission went to Lisbon to obtain Portuguese proposals in relation to such participation. The report of the mission contains three proposals and asks for five major decisions from Combined Chiefs of Staff. These with a discussion of them are set out in Appendix "B" (page 6).

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have indicated acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations when and if undertaken and while they have not accepted direct participation by Portuguese forces have agreed plans will be worked out. A military disadvantage would result if the provision of facilities for the Portuguese detracted from resources otherwise available to more forward areas.

4. No operation against Timor is contemplated under the existing approved strategy. It is improbable that there will be any modification of strategy which will require opposed or unopposed operations against Timor during 1945.



TOP SECRET

5. Portugal has not broken diplomatic relations with Japan.
6. Portugal is not a beneficiary under the Lend-Lease Act. Negotiation as to the basis for transfer of munitions is an action to be taken on a government level.
7. Allied shipping facilities are wholly allocated now and for the foreseeable future to high priority operational and supply requirements. Any diversion in support of Portuguese requirements would be uneconomical and could only be examined in the light of shipping commitments at the time.
8. The operational status of the Portuguese air component is not considered to be up to the standard required.
9. Allied escort vessels and minesweepers can be made available after the defeat of Germany although the British base facilities requested by the Portuguese cannot be guaranteed. It would be to the advantage of the Allies to provide Allied escorts for such convoys as might include Allied shipping and so ensure efficient protection.
10. No action can be taken in the training or equipping of the Portuguese forces until after the defeat of Germany. The forces offered by Portugal could be trained in the theater.
11. Air staging facilities in Portuguese territory (Azores) obtained as a result of previous negotiations are of direct military benefit to the Allies in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and the granting of these facilities should be recognized when considering the Portuguese proposals.
12. Positive information that operations either are or are not contemplated against Timor could be used to advantage by the Portuguese, and to the detriment of the Allies, for bargaining purposes with Japan with which Portugal is still diplomatically friendly and which virtually controls the Portuguese colony of Macao.



TOP SECRET

RECOMMENDATION

13. It is recommended that the letter in Appendix "A" (page 4) be forwarded to the Department of State and to the Foreign Office.



TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

D R A F T

LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND FOREIGN OFFICE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on 2 September 1944 appointed an Anglo-American Military Mission to enter into conversations with Portuguese military authorities to discuss Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. The Mission has now reported its findings to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who have arrived at the following conclusions:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement as to the direct use of Portuguese forces they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.

b. The only apparent military disadvantage which would result if Portuguese forces alone should occupy Timor (in the event of a Japanese evacuation) would be the extent to which the provision of supplies and shipping for the Portuguese might detract from resources otherwise available to more forward areas in the Pacific. From a supply point of view it should be possible after the defeat of Germany to make available the equipment necessary to provide either force (see below) with the standard quantities of individual and unit equipment.

c. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.



TOP SECRET

d. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics and radio specialists.

e. Any action in respect of the assembly, shipment, training or equipping of the Portuguese force and its naval component must be deferred until after the defeat of Germany when an over-all examination must be made in the light of the operational commitments at the time.

f. There is no objection from a military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a government level.

g. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, in accepting Portuguese participation, do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.

h. Positive information that operations either are or are not contemplated against Timor could be used to an advantage by the Portuguese, and to the detriment of the interests of the Allies, for bargaining with Japan with which Portugal is still diplomatically friendly, and which virtually controls the Portuguese colony of Macao.



TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "B"LIST OF PORTUGUESE PROPOSALS AND  
POINTS FOR DECISION--  
DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALSPROPOSALS

1. The Portuguese proposals are summarized as follows:
  - a. That Portugal shall participate in an Allied operation against Timor.
  - b. That the operation be carried out by Portuguese alone if they are in the theater (or en route thereto) and if the island\* should have been already evacuated by the Japanese.
  - c. That items supplied to the Portuguese from Allied resources should be under Lend-Lease or some similar basis.

POINTS FOR DECISION

2. If a Portuguese expeditionary force is acceptable to the Allies, the major decisions required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff are:
  - a. Which of two military forces is acceptable?  
(The regimental combat team of 4,000 or battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops are offered).
  - b. Should the air component be included?  
(The air force includes a fighter-bomber squadron of 362 men, 12 planes and 6 in reserve).
  - c. Will the Allies provide the equipment, vehicles, supplies and facilities asked for? (This will entail virtually 100 per cent provision of items required).
  - d. What Portuguese shipping will be required?  
Naval - 3 Portuguese escorts are offered and the temporary loan of 4 minesweepers and 2 more escorts has been requested.

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\* Presumed to imply whole island, i.e. inclusive of Dutch Timor.



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Merchant shipping - Two Portuguese troop transports are offered but would need to be replaced by Allied shipping to support Portuguese economy.

e. Can the force be trained in the theater?

(The Portuguese stress that additional training should take place in the theater).

DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS

3. The first proposal indicates that a Portuguese combat team could be made available for use in operations against Timor only if trained in the theater, equipped with Allied equipment, maintained from Allied supplies and transported at the expense of Allied shipping. In addition, although training could be accomplished in the theater, the report indicates that the troops offered would not attain combat efficiency without prolonged training. The token air force offered would be a hazard operating among other Allied units in local traffic and such a small unit would not justify separate facilities. Under these circumstances it is considered that either military force should only be employed in mopping up operations, at a late stage of the build-up, or as garrison forces.

4. The second proposal appears to be more feasible than the first, especially as strategic plans for the Pacific do not presently indicate that the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, will occupy Timor. Under these circumstances there appears to be no military advantage in providing facilities for the Portuguese to occupy Timor alone, following a Japanese evacuation. The only apparent military disadvantage would be the necessity for providing supplies and facilities to an extent which might result in a detraction from resources otherwise available for forward areas. However, if a decision were made



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to support an occupation of Timor by Portuguese forces alone, this could probably be accomplished following the defeat of Germany. The Combined Staff Planners have advised us that in this connection the larger force would probably be required to reestablish control over the Portuguese portion of the island. The larger force is itself so small that the additional logistic and training commitments involved by its acceptance do not provide sufficient reason for accepting the probably inadequate smaller force.

5. The third proposal, concerning the basis on which supplies would be made available to the Portuguese, raises the question of Portuguese eligibility to Lend-Lease aid which is beyond the scope of this report.



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to support an occupation of Timor by Portuguese forces alone, this could probably be accomplished following the defeat of Germany. The Combined Staff Planners have advised us that in this connection the larger force would probably be required to reestablish control over the Portuguese portion of the island. The larger force is itself so small that the additional logistic and training commitments involved by its acceptance do not provide sufficient reason for accepting the probably inadequate smaller force.

5. The third proposal, concerning the basis on which supplies would be made available to the Portuguese, raises the question of Portuguese eligibility to Lend-Lease aid which is beyond the scope of this report.



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APPENDIX "C"

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS

8 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Request for Information Concerning Possible Operations against Portuguese Timor.

Reference: a. Request from Combined Administrative Committee to Combined Staff Planners, dated 20 November 1944, above subject.

1. The following information is provided in reply to the request expressed by reference a:

a. No operation against Portuguese Timor is contemplated under the existing approved strategy. It is improbable that there will be any modification of strategy which will require opposed or unopposed operations against Timor during 1945.

b. In the absence of plans for an operation against Portuguese Timor there is no suitable basis for determining whether the forces outlined by the report of the Anglo-American Military Mission are reasonable or appropriate. However, it is considered that Portuguese troops would only be employed at a late stage of the build-up or as garrison forces. In this connection the larger forces suggested would probably be required to reestablish control over the Portuguese portion of the island.

c. There is no apparent direct military advantage in providing facilities for the Portuguese alone to occupy Timor in the event of a Japanese withdrawal. A military disadvantage would result if providing facilities would detract from resources otherwise available to more forward areas.

d. The Timor area is of lessening strategic importance as an objective in the war against Japan. The use of air and naval bases in Timor might be of advantage if and when subsidiary operations are undertaken in the East Indies.