

Exhibit 2914

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Excerpt from PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(United States Government Printing Office-Washington: 1946)

Vol. 20

Memoirs of Prince Konoye

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APPENDIX IX

The Details of the Cabinet Resignation and the Progress of Japan-American Diplomatic Negotiations Under the Direction of the Council of Senior Statesmen Following the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet

I. Differences between the Viewpoint of the Government and the Army.

1. Concerning the "Decisions Reached at the Council in the Imperial Presence: "Clause 3 of the Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program", as decided upon at the Council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th, states: "If by the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to--we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America, England and Holland". The Army takes the position that the progress of the negotiations with America in the early part of October impels us to decide that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to", as referred to in the said article and that, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that by the middle or end of October we "must make up our minds to ready for war".

The Cabinet contends that not only have the diplomatic negotiations not reached a hopeless state, but that in the light of the diplomatic documents which we have received from America and many other reports, the American Government also entertains considerable hope of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. However, that Government harbors certain misunderstandings and suspicions (for example, the Army's gradual infiltration into Northern Indo-China in the early part of October, though, of course, this was carried out in harmony with definite treaty stipulations); is influenced by the deliberate misrepresentations of certain Third Powers, or is carefully watching the future of the international situation, especially of the European War. There are also activities on the part of strong anti-Japanese elements in the Far Eastern Sections of the State Department, activities which have covered up the true feelings of the President and Secretary of State Hull. In view of these facts, we can not decide that there is no hope of successful negotiations even with the present conditions as suggested by us, if time is allowed for the conduct of the negotiations. Especially, if we could get our Army authorities to relax their position somewhat, namely, with reference to the withdrawal of troops, we believe that there is a good possibility of reaching an agreement.

The Army feels that although the early part of October is the ideal time for us to decide on war in harmony with the demands of the Supreme Command, it can defer it till the middle of the month but by all means not later than the latter part of the month. Otherwise, the Army feels itself seriously handicapped in the event of war. It, therefore, rigidly adheres to the middle of the month the latter part of October, as the time to decide upon war, should war be decided upon, and this is a point that must ever be kept in mind.

2. The obstacles in the negotiations with America (especially the problem of the withdrawal of troops); Diplomatic negotiations are still proceeding with America and while the true intentions of that country are not clear the following three points may be listed as the major unsolved problems:

- (1) The problem of stationing or withdrawal of troops from China.
- (2) Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Pact.
- (3) The problem of non-discriminatory trade in the Pacific area.

Among the three, it is clear to all that the outstanding problem is the withdrawal of troops. In other words, that problem is really the one problem, the negotiations with America.

A summary of the Army's attitude concerning the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

Our Government's terms for a Sino-Japanese peace, as indicated to America are very liberal, inasmuch as they include the principles of no annexation and no reparations. They merely insist on the stationing of troops in certain areas for a stipulated period in order to facilitate cooperation with China in preventing the inroads of communism and any other movements tending to disrupt the present order. It is evident that these dangers are a threat to the safety of both Japan and China and to the welfare and prosperity of the peoples of both countries. These measures are also vitally necessary for the economic development of the country. It is, of course, understood that all troops not necessary for the above purposes will be withdrawn as soon as the China Incident is brought to a close. In view of the above, the stationing of troops in China is an absolutely necessary stipulation. In other words, the Army insists that this point is a consideration of first importance and that the stationing of these troops in China is, after all, the one and only tangible result of the China Incident. It follows that the Army can not agree to any plan which envisages the giving up of the right to station troops in China. If our troops' withdrawal from China is carried out, the Army will be overcome by a spirit of defeatism and it will be impossible to preserve its morale.

On the other hand, the final position of America on this matter of stationing troops is not yet clear. It may be possible if we give time for further negotiations to have our terms for the China problem agreed to by America. Up to the present, the American position in this matter seems to be as follows:

(1) Japan is to agree in principle to the withdrawal of troops (The matter of stationing troops in China must be decided after principle has been accepted.) It is not clear at the present moment whether America will agree to the stationing of troops in China but in the light of the negotiations so far conducted, America's position does not seem to be entirely negative in the matter.

(2) America desires to be assured of Japan's sincerity in the matter of the withdrawal of troops. For instance, Under-Secretary Welles stated to Minister Wakasugi in Washington that if Japan was sincere in her decision to withdraw the troops, America was willing to give more consideration to the manner in which this should be done.

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In the light of the above, the Cabinet's position in regard to the withdrawal of troops is as follows:

(1) Diplomatic negotiations should be continued for a longer period.

(2) We understand, of course, that the stationing of troops in China is a very necessary consideration. However, if the success or failure of the present negotiations hangs on this one problem, the Cabinet holds the view that it would be better for us to agree to the American formula for the withdrawal of troops and yet secure stationing of troops in China for a specified period.