

CORRESPONDENCE

WITH

MR. BRUCE,

**HER MAJESTY'S ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY**

IN

CHINA.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1860.

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Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China.

No. 1.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 1, 1859.

THE Queen having been pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, and in that capacity to exchange, at Pekin, Her Majesty's ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin with the ratification of that compact by the Emperor of China, I have now to furnish you with such general instructions as may serve for your guidance in the important mission entrusted to you by Her Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the Earl of Elgin would have returned to this country previously to your departure, that so your instructions might have been framed after personal communication with his Excellency. But it would seem that the interesting excursion up the Yang-tze-keang river, which he so judiciously determined to undertake, has occupied more time than he anticipated, and any further delay in your departure might possibly prevent you from exchanging the ratifications within the period specified in the Treaty, namely, before the 26th of June.

Arrangements have been made for providing passage for yourself and the members of your Mission in the contract steam-vessels which convey the British mails of the 10th of March from Marseilles to Alexandria, and from Suez to Singapore and Hong Kong, in case you should not find at Suez Her Majesty's ship "Furious" waiting to receive you, or at Singapore some other man-of-war appointed to convey you to China.

On your arrival at Hong Kong, you will, in virtue of the Commission as Chief Superintendent of British Trade with which you are provided, relieve Sir John Bowring of his duties in connection with this office, and you will make arrangements for transferring the general direction of British affairs in China to Shanghai, at which port it is to be carried on until such time as circumstances shall admit of its being permanently established at Pekin.

You will not remain at Hong Kong longer than is absolutely necessary, but proceed to Shanghai on your way to the Peiho.

Her Majesty's Government were fully prepared at once to carry out the provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin which admits of the permanent residence of a British Ambassador at Pekin; but the observations on this point which Lord Elgin has so ably laid before them, coupled with the fact that the French Government, on considering Baron Gros' reports, have arrived at the same conclusion, have determined Her Majesty's Government, for the present at least, to fix at Shanghai the residence of the British Mission, and only to require that it should be received occasionally at Pekin. But you will be careful to make the Chinese authorities at the capital and at Shanghai distinctly understand that Her Majesty's Government do not renounce the right of permanent residence, and, on the contrary, will instantly exercise it, if at any time difficulties are thrown in the way of communications between Her Majesty's Minister and the Central Government at Pekin, or any disposition shown to evade or defeat the objects of the Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government are prepared to expect that all the arts at which the Chinese are such adepts, will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing to the capital, even for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the

Treaty; but it will be your duty firmly, but temperately, to resist any propositions to that effect, and to admit of no excuses; and you will say that the effect of any persistence on the part of the Chinese Government in throwing obstacles in the way of your arrival at Peking, and of the presentation of your credentials to the Emperor in person, will be that Her Majesty's Government will insist on the literal fulfilment of the Treaty, and establish the Mission permanently at Peking.

You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Peking of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Peking. The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, and, indeed, it would not be wise, to lay down any definite rules to be rigidly adhered to, in regard to your approach to, and your communication with, the Chinese Court. The acquaintance which you possess with the Chinese character will enable you to judge when you may give way and when you must stand firm, bearing in mind that your treatment on your first visit to Peking will always be appealed to on the occasion of future visits, as establishing a precedent not to be departed from.

You will, of course, refuse compliance with any ceremony, or form of reception, which can in any way be construed into an admission of inferiority on the part of Her Majesty in regard to the Emperor of China; and perhaps the best method of putting a stop to any attempt to impose upon you in this respect, will be that you should distinctly declare that you will withdraw at once, even from the Presence Chamber of the Sovereign, on the slightest appearance of a disposition to treat you, and the office that you hold, with disrespect.

If any objection should be raised on the score of your credentials being those of Envoy and not of an Ambassador, you will say that the reason of their being so, is to admit of the wish of the Chinese Government that for the present the British Mission should not be permanently resident at the capital being complied with; but that if, on that ground, the Chinese Government seek to make any distinction in your reception and treatment, new credentials as Ambassador will immediately be sent to you, and, in that case, the Mission will be forthwith and permanently established at Peking.

You will, moreover, take care that the treatment awarded to you is in no degree less honourable than that awarded to the Representative of any other Power whatever. That it should be consistent with European usages, it must doubtless be more honourable than that by which Embassies from countries over whose Chiefs the Emperor assumes superiority are received; but it must be in no degree inferior to that accorded to the Representatives of other Christian nations.

Although you will insist upon your being received at Peking, and will refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place, and will further decline to make any compromise in regard to the time of your stay in the Chinese capital, or the frequency of your visits to it; Her Majesty's Government are willing to leave to your discretion the duration of your stay on the first occasion. Your primary object, after the exchange of the ratifications, will be to come to such an understanding with the Government as may ensure prompt attention being paid by proper authorities in the capital to any representations that you may see occasion to address to it; and you will particularly insist upon your right to employ messengers of your own, whether European or Chinese, for the conveyance of your communications, and upon due facilities for the performance of their journeys being secured for such messengers.

Your general language will be, that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious that the increased intercourse with the Chinese Empire, under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, may contribute to the mutual advantage of both countries; that it is Her Majesty's firm intention, while scrupulously observing the engagements which she has herself contracted, to require on the part of the Emperor of China a corresponding observance of his own; that Her Majesty's officers in the different ports of China will be directed to prevent, as far as in them lies,

any disturbance of the public peace, and any disorderly conduct on the part of British subjects; and that, on the other hand, Her Majesty expects that the Chinese authorities, both at the ports and in the interior of the country, will be required to act up to the Treaty obligations contracted by their Sovereign, and to treat with kindness and consideration the subjects of Her Majesty who may be brought in contact with them.

Without waiving or compromising, in any degree, the right of Her Majesty's Mission to reside at the capital, you may let it be understood that the frequency of its visits to Peking, if not its permanent residence there, must in a great degree depend on the manner in which the provisions of the Treaty are carried out. If no occasion is given for controversy by attempts on the part of the Chinese local authorities to evade the terms of the Treaty, and more particularly if no disposition is shown by the Government at the capital to treat with disrespect any representations Her Majesty's Minister may address to it from Shanghai, the necessity for such visits to the capital will be rare; and when they are made they will be rather complimentary than for the transaction of business. But you will say that as between the Powers of Europe direct diplomatic intercourse, and the permanent residence of Ministers at the residence of the Sovereigns to whom they are accredited, are always looked upon as an indication of friendship between States, so Her Majesty's Government hope that the day is not far distant when not only will the presence of a British Minister at Peking be viewed with satisfaction, but a Representative of the Emperor of China be accredited to Her Majesty's Court, where you will say he will be welcomed both by Her Majesty and her Government, and treated with the same distinction and consideration as the Representatives of Her Majesty's nearest allies.

No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 4, 1859.

THERE is little reliable information to be obtained here as to the reception Her Majesty's Mission is likely to meet with at Peking, and the fact of the Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana remaining at Soochow, near Shanghai though Mr. Lay has urged them to return to Peking, to be on the spot when the foreign Missions arrive there, would seem to indicate a hope on their part that some incident may enable them to avert the visit to Peking; and this view is strengthened by the rumours, more or less true, of the repair of the old forts at the mouth of the Peiho, and the construction of fresh defences along its course.

At the same time it is reported, and, in the main, no doubt truly, that a Russian Mission of some pretensions has arrived at Peking; that its members walk about the streets, in European costume, unmolested; and that discussions have taken place between its chief and the Chinese Government on matters of etiquette, in which it is reported that the Russian has receded from his first demand. The reports from Peking are sent by native Roman Catholic catechists to their Bishop, and embody probably the gossip which circulates in the streets of Peking on these subjects. Your Lordship is likely to be better informed from St. Petersburg than we are on the coast of China, of the route and character of this Russian Agent.

It became necessary for me to decide, in this state of uncertainty as to the intentions of the Chinese Government, on the force which should accompany me to the Peiho, it being desirable that it should proceed without delay to the north. By a note received from M. Bourboulon, my French colleague, I see he does not expect that Admiral Rigault will spare from the operations in Annam more than two vessels, of which one, I hope, will be able to ascend the river as far as Tien-tsin. I therefore requested Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee to confer with me on this point. As your Lordship will see by the inclosed Minute, I stated to them that the objects of my mission were—the exchange of the ratifications at Peking, the delivery of my credentials to the Emperor of China in person, and the arrival, as far as Tien-tsin, in a British ship of war. They agreed in the opinion that it would not be safe to assume that the Chinese would concede these points, and enter seriously on the consideration of the measures

required to bring the Treaty into full operation, unless I were accompanied with an imposing force, and they agreed that it should be as nearly as possible of the same strength as that which formed the expedition of last year. I hope by the demonstration to render the active employment of the force unnecessary.

In the meantime I have requested Mr. Wade to inform Mr. Lay confidentially at Shanghai of the objects and scope of the Mission, leaving it to his discretion, in which I have full reliance, to communicate it, as from himself, to the Chinese Commissioners. We may thus obtain some knowledge of their intentions on our arrival at Shanghai, which would be important as a guide in our future proceedings.

I have not decided on the terms of my communication to the Chinese Government, or on the point from which it is to be sent. I propose discussing these points with M. Bourboulon and with the American Minister.

I proceed to Canton as soon as the mail leaves for England; and on my return I shall visit Macao, where I hope to find my colleagues.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Minute of a Conference held at the Government Offices at Hong Kong, on Friday, April 28, 1859.

Present:

The Honourable F. Bruce, C.B.
Sir Charles van Straubenzee, K.C.B.
Rear-Admiral Hope, C.B.

MR. BRUCE stated that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to the effect that he was to proceed, if possible, to Tien-tsin in a British man-of-war, and thence to Peking, where the exchange of the ratifications was to be effected, and where he was to present his letters of credence to the Emperor of China in person, insisting on such a reception as was befitting his character as the Representative of a nation on an equality with that of China.

He further stated that we were not in possession of any reliable information as to the spirit in which the Chinese Government were prepared to receive this first attempt to establish direct relations on a footing of equality with the Court of Peking. That we must be guided, therefore, by the general experience we had acquired of the Chinese character, and that we might infer as the result of our past experience that the objects of this Mission were most likely to be satisfactorily and peacefully attained, if the British Minister were supported by a powerful demonstration of force at the mouth of the Peiho river.

Sir Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope concurred in this view, the latter stating that his instructions contemplated the Minister being escorted with an imposing force.

It was unanimously agreed that the expedition should, if possible, be as strong as that which accompanied the Ambassadors of England and France to the Peiho last year, and with that view Sir Charles van Straubenzee intimated his being prepared, consistently with the security of his position at Canton, to place a battalion of Marines and a company of Engineers at the disposal of Rear-Admiral Hope. This addition to the naval force would compensate for the absence of the French forces in Cochin China.

No. 3.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 6, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government approve the arrangements, as reported in your despatch of the 4th of May, which you have adopted, in concert with Sir

Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope, for the purpose of proceeding up the Peiho on your way to Peking, backed by an adequate naval and military force.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 16.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 21, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the note I have addressed to the Chinese Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, informing him of my arrival in China, of the diplomatic character I bear, and of the course I intend to pursue. M. Bourboulon has also sent a note to him couched in identical terms.

In my previous despatches, I have informed your Lordship that we can ascertain nothing as to the intentions of this Government with respect to the visit of foreign Envoys to Peking; but the Imperial Commissioners, on hearing of my arrival in China, have proceeded from Soo-chow to Shanghai—a fact of some significance, and which gives colour to the opinion that they hope to raise questions or begin negotiations at that point: otherwise they would have returned ere this to Peking, for the purpose of making preparations for our reception.

It seems to me important that I should, from the commencement, assume the new political status which I bear as a Minister accredited to the Emperor of China.

With this view I have put forward, in a prominent and intelligible shape, the character I bear, and the necessity of my proceeding direct to Peking, to present to the Emperor my credentials, in accordance with established usage, and thereby qualify myself for the discharge of my functions as Envoy to the Court of Peking. For the same reason I have addressed Kweiliang as Chief Secretary of State—not as Imperial Commissioner—as I wish to avoid any act that may be construed into an acceptance of an Imperial Commissioner at Shanghai. My language on that point will be that my acceptance of such a functionary is made contingent on a proper reception at Peking, and on arrangements being made which will secure free access and unreserved communication with the Imperial Ministers at the capital, on all matters on which I think they ought to be informed.

I hope, in this way, to compel the Chinese Government to declare itself upon those points which we know are the most unpalatable to it; and if there exists, on its part, a disposition to evade its obligations, to thrust us back, as before, on the seaboard, and refuse the reception which I cannot waive without lowering our national dignity, I trust we shall be in possession of their views when we arrive at the mouth of the Peiho, and not be left to discover them gradually at Peking. If, as is most probable, the Court of Peking is wavering, anxious to evade, but unwilling to risk a rupture, I trust that identity of views among the foreign Representatives, firm language, and an imposing demonstration of force, will secure the observance by it of the recent Treaties, and incline it to listen to moderate and pacific advisers.

In closing this despatch, I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to a letter I addressed to Admiral Hope, on a proposal by the Lords of the Admiralty to reduce further the force on this station—a measure much to be regretted, should it be carried into operation before the visit to Peking is successfully accomplished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Kweiliang, Senior Secretary of State, that Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c., has

been pleased, in furtherance of the intimate and friendly relations happily established between the two Empires by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to appoint the Undersigned to the honourable post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China.

In that capacity he is the bearer of an autograph letter from Her Majesty the Queen to His Majesty the Emperor of China, which it will be his pleasing duty to present to His Majesty in person, according to the established usage among friendly nations, and in order that he may be thereby properly qualified to undertake the duties of his office as Her Majesty's Representative to the Court of Peking.

The Undersigned has further to add that he is charged with the counterpart of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, duly ratified by Her Most Gracious Majesty, and that he will be prepared to exchange it at Peking, as agreed on in the Treaty, against one equally ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China, that relations of peace and of goodwill may be thus mutually confirmed and placed on a sure and permanent basis.

The Undersigned takes this opportunity of informing his Excellency Kweiliang, that, in compliance with the above instructions of his Sovereign, he is about to proceed without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin. He trusts that the necessary orders will be given for the conveyance of himself and his suite from thence to Peking, and for the provision of suitable accommodation for him during his residence in the capital itself in a manner befitting the dignity of the nation he represents.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 16, 1859.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

(Extract.)

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 21, 1859.

WITH reference to the despatch from the Lords of the Admiralty proposing a reduction of the force on this station, I beg to observe that the facts which have come to my knowledge since my arrival in China confirm me as to the propriety of the conclusion come to, in concert with yourself and Sir Charles van Straubenzee, viz., "That the force which is to accompany me to the North ought to be as strong as that which accompanied the Allied High Commissioners last year to Tien-tsin."

The task of supplying the deficiency caused by the diversion of the French force to Cochin China devolves exclusively on the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces here, at a time when the squadron at his disposal is considerably less than that under the command of Sir Michael Seymour last year.

No person can pretend to speak positively as to the intentions of the Chinese; but we know that they urged the modification of one clause in the Treaty, on the ground that it was extorted by force, and that there was no opportunity for discussion afforded at Tien-tsin. The same argument would hold good for the elimination of every other Article which may be disagreeable to them; and as I see that the Imperial Commissioners, instead of going to Peking to prepare for the reception of the foreign Envoys, have returned to Shanghai, I do not doubt that they are prepared to propose further modifications in the Treaty, and to raise difficulties as to my proper reception at Peking, unless they find us determined and able to carry our point.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1859.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the note which you addressed to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, of which a copy

is inclosed in your despatch of the 21st of May, and in which you announced to him your arrival in China, as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 30.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 31, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report of a conversation between the Interpreter, Mr. Hart, at Canton, and a Chinese who has just returned from Peking, representing the disposition of the Emperor as most hostile. A rumour is also current here, that the Russians established at the capital have been massacred.

On the other hand, it appears that a certain Ta-ki, a Chinese merchant at Shanghai, who deals largely with foreigners, and who, from his intimacy with the Intendant at that place, and his connection with the North, is generally well informed, states that the Chinese Government will not offer any opposition to our visit to Peking.

I do not consider that my plans ought to be influenced in any degree by these reports. If any inference is to be drawn from them it is this: that there is a strong party opposed to the concessions to foreigners, and a party resigned to them as inevitable; that the triumph of the one or of the other is possible, and will depend on the moral effect produced by the cordial union of foreign Powers, and on the fear of a fresh collision inspired by the demonstration of an imposing force in support of our demands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Memorandum.

YESTERDAY evening a Cantonese, Sen-seen-sang, who has for several years been in the habit of lending money to expectant officials, whom he accompanies when appointed to any post, called on me. He had just returned from Peking, via Shanghai, having left the former place on the 22nd of March. He informed me that at the time of his departure from Peking, the expected return of the British Ambassador to Tien-tsin, and the possibility of his visiting the capital, were subjects freely canvassed in every quarter; that the Emperor was known to be highly displeased with some of the stipulations contained in the Tien-tsin Treaty; that he was entirely averse to the Ambassador's taking up his quarters in the capital, and that he had resolved not to grant him an audience on any pretext; that military preparations were going on at Peking and Tien-tsin; that the Russians had offered the Emperor 10,000 muskets, but that His Majesty has declined to accept the present, fearing that the muskets in question might be brought to the Palace by an equal number of Russians; that the arrangement of all matters connected with the reception of the British at Tien-tsin, and the preventing of any visit to Peking, had been confided to Sung-wang-yay, a Ta-tsze-wang, son-in-law of the last Emperor; that Sung-wang-yay was at Tien-tsin with 50,000 troops, Manchoo and Mongols; that the batteries at Tien-tsin had been rebuilt, and the river staked in such a way as to render it impossible for foreign vessels to reach that city; that 30,000 "so-lo" troops, men never called out except in cases of the greatest emergency, were under orders to hold themselves in readiness to join Sung-wang-yay if called for; that Sung-wang-yay's orders were to receive the British at Tien-tsin with all civility, but at all hazards to prevent any nearer approach to Peking; that Sung-wang-yay was very desirous of gaining military renown, and that the Ambassador would be unable to reach Peking without having recourse to arms; that, according to

the opinion of some, the Ambassador, accompanied by a few people, might possibly reach Peking without bloodshed, but that a fight would certainly ensue if more than a hundred men were landed; that the country between Tien-tsin and Peking being flat, and the Chinese troops being so much more numerous than any number of men the British could land, it was the general belief that the British could be surrounded and cut to pieces before the completion of one-half the journey.

Sen-seen-sang further informed me that a Russian Ambassador had visited Peking on the 2nd March; that the Russians in the capital, more than 100 in number, roamed about just as they pleased, much to the grief of the Emperor and the anti-foreign party; and that it was feared the British, if they once effected an entrance, would take an ell for every inch the Russians had arrogated to themselves; that at Yung-chow large quantities of grain had been bought up by the Russians, but that the Emperor having become alarmed had forbidden the traffic.

(Signed) ROBERT HART, *Interpreter.*
British Consulate, Canton, May 22, 1859.

No. 7.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 31.)

(Extract.)

Victoria, Hong Kong, June 1, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Bourboulon arrived at Hong Kong on the 26th ultimo from Macao, where he had been delayed by the non-arrival of the corvette and small steamer destined to convey him to Tien-tsin. Admiral Rigault had taken all the stores, &c., out of the corvette when at Turon, and she has not yet completed her provisions, but I trust she will be ready to-morrow, on which day I likewise proceed to Shanghai direct.

I have waited for M. de Bourboulon, as I thought it advisable that every step we take in the Peking expedition should be taken by us in concert; and as I do not wish to have any communication with the Imperial Commissioners, should they be still at Shanghai, until my French colleague arrives.

No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received August 11.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, June 14, 1859.

I TOOK my departure from Hong Kong as soon as the French corvette "Duchayla" was reported ready to proceed.

Foreseeing that I should find on my arrival here questions of considerable importance, which it would be desirable to decide in concert with M. de Bourboulon, I did not think it advisable to precede him, and thereby put myself in the position either of acting in his absence, or of giving as a reason for delay that I was waiting for him.

I reached Shanghai on the evening of June 6, and M. de Bourboulon arrived on the following morning.

I found three letters from the Imperial Commissioners, proposing that, instead of proceeding to the North to effect the exchange of the ratifications, I should remain here and commence discussions on various details connected with carrying the Treaty into operation, alleging as their reason for waiting at Shanghai, that the Earl of Elgin, on proceeding to the South, had left some of these details unfinished.

On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3, 1859, addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there was nothing to justify their delay; that they were informed therein of my being the bearer of important documents to be delivered at Peking, and that they were warned that a strict adherence to the Treaty was the only method by which peaceful relations could be preserved. One of the Articles prescribes the exchange of the ratifications at Peking within a

year, and I know, from what passed last year, that it is not, in the eyes of the Chinese, one of the least important of its stipulations.

I am unable to state whether the Commissioners were acting under instructions from their Government to use every effort to prevent our proceeding to the North, or whether they adopted this expedient for the purpose of being out of the way when the visit to the capital, so unpalatable to the pride of the Chinese Government, is to take place. But that their object was to gain time—the favourite policy of this Government, in the hope that something, they know not what, might turn up, and relieve them from this visit—I could have no doubt; neither could I doubt, independently of the precise nature of my instructions, that anything which looked like hesitation or irresolution on my part, would encourage the Chinese in putting obstacles in my way, and render the object of my mission more difficult to attain without a fresh appeal to force.

I accordingly addressed to the Secretary of State, Kweiliang, the inclosed note, declaring that my resolution to proceed was inflexible; refusing to enter into any discussion of details until after the exchange of ratifications; declining to grant them an interview at this place, and holding them responsible for any consequences that might ensue from the want of due preparation at Peking for my reception.

M. de Bourboulon, who shares my opinion on the subject, transmitted a note to the same effect.

I further sent a short note, pointing out that, by employing one of the steamers lying here, they might still, if they liked, reach Tien-tsin in time.

In the meantime the squadron sailed to rendezvous at some islands a short distance off the Peiho, and Admiral Hope left on the 11th, having agreed to inform the officers in charge of the forts at the Peiho that the Ministers of England and France were coming, and to direct them, if they had received no instructions on the subject, to communicate the intelligence to Peking, and obtain a reply within a fixed number of days.

On the occasion of the Admiral's departure, I addressed to him the letter copy of which is herewith inclosed.

At this time the reports that reached us were not encouraging, and I learned from the best authority that a high Chinese official had declared that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that we should be obliged to give the Chinese Government another lesson at Tien-tsin before the Emperor would be brought to reason, and before pacific counsels would obtain the ascendancy.

This tallied with other accounts, and with the fact that the war party acquired so much influence at Peking last winter, and sent such extravagant instructions to the Commissioners, that Ho wrote back that, if affairs were to be managed in that spirit, the Emperor had better name his uncle and the other heads of the war party as Commissioners, as he would not undertake the task of bringing matters to a peaceful conclusion on such terms. To this unusual act of independence, the Emperor appended the remark, "His (Ho's) obstinacy will involve him in calamity." The paper to which I refer was obtained by Mr. Parkes, and a précis of it forwarded to the Foreign Office in the month of January.

It is clear, therefore, that a war party exists, and that the probability of resistance is a contingency not to be lost sight of; and Admiral Hope, before leaving, addressed a letter to Sir Charles van Straubenzee, requesting him to send up a second battalion of Marines to be at hand should active operations become necessary.

These steps seem to have alarmed the Commissioners, for, on the 13th, I received the inclosed reply from them, which, in its explicit and clear style, contrasts favourably with the vague and puerile tone of their former letters.

As this correspondence has been forwarded to Peking, I hope that, there as well as here, it will produce a conviction that we are not to be trifled with.

Your Lordship will observe that, though their reply is satisfactory as to the disposition of the Chinese Government, and its readiness to exchange ratifications, it makes no allusion to the interview with the Emperor, and to the presentation of the letter of credence to him. I gather from this omission that the Emperor has not instructed them on this material point; and as the question of ceremonial ought, in my opinion, to be settled before we leave Tien-tsin for Peking, it is clear that it could not have been discussed here, involving as it does the

necessity of taking the pleasure of the Emperor upon it, without the risk of losing the season altogether for the visit to Peking.

I must observe, my Lord, that in order to effect the presentation in person of my credentials to the Emperor, and to deter the Chinese from their hitherto invariable practice of subjecting foreign Envoys to petty slights and insults, which lower them and the Governments they represent in the eyes of the people, I must succeed in inspiring the Emperor and his Counsellors with a conviction that what I have once demanded I will exact, and with a wholesome dread of my readiness and power to resort to force, if my demands are not complied with.

The notes I have addressed to the Commissioners, as well as my general bearing, are, I feel certain, faithfully reported to the Emperor, and with this conviction I have purposely assumed the attitude and tone best calculated to induce him to submit quietly to very unpalatable proposals, by impressing upon him that these concessions are inevitable, unless he is prepared to draw the sword.

The considerable force collected by the Admiral will tend to strengthen this impression, and it is the more necessary at this time as the Chinese are aware of the absence of any French force from China.

Throughout many generations of our intercourse with China, we postponed considerations of national dignity to our commercial interests, and the statement "that the barbarians care for nothing but trade" appears again and again in their official papers, as the key to our character, and the principle by acting on which we are to be "soothed and controlled."

It is essential in dealing on this occasion with those questions of forms and ceremony so important to the Chinese mind; that we should disabuse them of this notion, and I believe that tenacity and firmness on these points will, by elevating our national character in the estimation of the people and of the Government, and by gaining their respect, if not their goodwill, facilitate greatly hereafter our relations with China.

For this reason, when the Commissioners the other day conveyed indirectly to me that they were ready to arrange to my satisfaction the question of the Canton indemnity, I took no notice of the overture.

I ought to add that Mr. Ward, the Minister of the United States, has insisted on exchanging the ratifications of his Treaty at Peking, and that he is prepared to accompany us to the North; he has, moreover, advanced the same claim to an interview with the Emperor. Of the intentions of the Russian Envoy, I have learned nothing as yet.

It only remains for me to add, that I purpose leaving this to-morrow morning for the Peiho, my French and American colleagues following the next day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEILIANG, &c., Hwashana, &c., Ho, &c., Imperial Commissioners, &c., make a communication.

It appears from the records, that on the 22nd day of the 12th moon of last year (January 25, 1859), a despatch was received by the Commissioners from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, in which there are the following words:—"The Undersigned has determined on proceeding to Canton to take certain steps (or to act); his business accomplished, in the course of some five or six weeks, he will name a time for his arrival at Shanghai, there to settle with the Commissioners such questions as still remain to be discussed."*

In due course of time, on the 26th day of the 2nd moon of the present year (March 30, 1859), the Commissioners received a second letter, dated the

* This is a free re-translation of the Chinese, representing the English of Lord Elgin's despatch, of which there is not a copy at hand.

29th of the 1st moon (March 3), to the effect that (Her Britannic Majesty) had appointed the Honourable Mr. Bruce to be her Representative, &c. ; and that he would arrive in China shortly: further stating that "the Undersigned, now on the point of leaving China, must take leave, on this his last opportunity of addressing them, earnestly to impress (upon the Commissioners) that the one essential to a continuance of friendly relations is the faithful observance of the Treaty," &c.

The Commissioners, in consequence of Lord Elgin's earlier letter, in which he engaged to return to Shanghai for a conference with them, have been waiting for him without moving (*lit.*, obstinately, persistently).

Lord Elgin has returned home, but Mr. Bruce, having received the commands of Her Majesty to succeed him in the administration of all things essential, and now occupying, to the great satisfaction of the Commissioners, a position identical with that of Lord Elgin, his predecessor, the proper course to be pursued is, doubtless, to appoint a day for a conference.

In faithful compliance with the engagement already entered into, and as the period appointed for the exchange of the Treaties is very near at hand, it is, of course, most expedient that all business which has to be considered should become the subject of consultation, and be proceeded with, as early as possible.

A necessary communication, addressed to Mr. Bruce, Envoy Extraordinary, &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 25th day (May 27, 1859).
(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication.

It appears from the records that on the 13th day of the 12th moon of last year (January 16, 1859), the Commissioners received from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, a communication to the effect that he was proceeding to Canton upon business, and would return to Shanghai in five or six weeks, to consider and dispose of all matters on which discussion was still pending.

Firmly persuaded of the good faith of Lord Elgin's words, the Commissioners have been waiting for him several months. His Lordship has now returned home, but as Mr. Bruce has been commanded by Her (Britannic) Majesty to replace him there with Plenipotentiary powers, his position is identical with that of his predecessor Lord Elgin.

With Mr. Bruce's permission, the Commissioners will state the questions which have been discussed with Lord Elgin, and decided, as well as those which still remain to be discussed.

As regards admission into Peking, the visit to Peking on this occasion to exchange courtesies and Treaties is exceptional: when it is over there is to be no permanent residence in the capital; some other place is to be chosen (for the Minister) to reside at. These are the words of Lord Elgin's despatch, the approval of which by Her Britannic Majesty, when Lord Elgin had the honour to receive it, was duly reported to His Imperial Majesty by the Commissioners.

As regards the navigation of the river (Yang-tze), Lord Elgin has been himself to Hankow to see the place for once. For the time to come, it will be safe and satisfactory that all arrangements be made, as of course they must be, in accordance with the Treaty.*

As regards circulation in the interior, this, without doubt, on the principle laid down by Lord Elgin, viz., that any British subject of respectability and good conduct should receive a passport from the local authorities under which he may travel, this is perfectly fair. But inasmuch as China has no means of knowing what British subjects are respectable, it is still necessary that some good adequate means be devised (to this end), that there may be no misgivings on either side.

* And consequently, here.

As regards the city of Canton, Lord Elgin engaged to go further into this question when he should return to Shanghai; but as his Lordship has returned to England, it has not been possible to consider it with him. The time for the exchange of the Treaties draws near: the Treaties once exchanged, the relations between the two countries will be more friendly than ever. Added to this, as Imperial Commissioner for the management of the five ports, His Majesty the Emperor has already substituted the Governor-General Ho, one of the Commissioners, for his predecessor (Hwang), by which appointment it is felt consultations on business between China and foreign nations will be much facilitated.* Everything is thus on a satisfactory footing. But as Canton is not yet restored, it would seem that no time should be lost in arriving at a satisfactory decision regarding it.

The Commissioners will be greatly obliged by his Excellency replying specifically to them upon the above subjects; those which have been disposed of in discussion, and those which remain to be discussed.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On the 25th instant (27th May) the Commissioners received Mr. Bruce's despatch of the 14th instant (16th May), apprising them that Her Britannic Majesty had done him the honour to appoint him her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Peking.

The Commissioners were greatly gratified at this intelligence. They are of opinion, however, that an affair of so grave importance to both nations as an exchange of Treaties cannot with propriety be hurried over. The Commissioners, having the fullest confidence in his predecessor, Lord Elgin, when he engaged them to remain at Shanghai to consider all matters not disposed of, were unable to return to Peking; and if Mr. Bruce now proceed direct to Tientsin, the Commissioners, having to travel by land, cannot reckon upon arriving there so soon. Indeed, taking into consideration the hindrance to be expected from the weather on their land journey, this will certainly occupy two months and more, as Mr. Bruce, they imagine, must be well aware.

As to the preparation of vessels, vehicles, &c., at Tientsin,† to which the letter under acknowledgment refers, and the selection of a building in proper order (for Mr. Bruce) to reside in, with the good understanding now subsisting between the two nations, the arrangements will be, of course, as liberal as it is suggested they should be.‡ But the Commissioners cannot arrive in so short a time, nor can any of these things be done at a moment's notice.

There is another consideration: not only will there be no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tientsin, as it is impossible for the Commissioners to be there against his arrival, but (there will be no one either to exchange the ratifications); the exchange of the Treaties must be effected by the hand of the Commissioners, and by their hand alone—no one can act as their substitutes; and believing, consequently, that it would be better for Mr. Bruce to defer his departure from Shanghai for a while, than to be kept waiting at the other place, where, after midsummer, the heat is excessive, they feel bound to request him, in the first place, on his arrival at Shanghai, to name a day for an interview with them, and, in the second, to appoint some other time for proceeding. This, it seems to them, would be the more satisfactory arrangement.

* This is, I think, a feeler regarding the extent to which our former relations are modified. The Chinese would prefer continually to regard them as merely commercial; the Chinese Superintendent of Trade as Foreign Minister.—T. W.

† The suitable means of transmission spoken of in Mr. Bruce's letter of the 16th of May.

‡ *Lit.*, it is certainly proper that, according to this, or after this fashion (China should be) liberal. There is a certain amount of patronage in the expression.

The Commissioners are induced to put forward this proposition by the importance they attach to the question before them, and (their desire for) the establishment of friendly relations to endure for evermore. Mr. Bruce's thorough acquaintance with the ways of the world (or the motives of men) is such that they feel sure he will appreciate their feelings, and they hope that he will at once reply to them.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, &c.
Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).
(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., begs to acknowledge the receipt of the letter addressed to him by their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, Ho Kwei-tsing, and Twau Ching-shih, in reply to that sent by him to his Excellency Kweiliang, Chief Secretary of State.

The Undersigned must remind his Excellency Kweiliang that the Treaty of Tien-tsin, signed on the 26th of June last, provides that the ratifications shall be exchanged at the capital within a year from that date; and the Imperial Commissioners themselves admit that on the 30th March last, they were apprised by the Earl of Elgin that the Undersigned was on his way to China for the purpose of fulfilling this engagement. The Commissioners were, at the same time, made aware that the Earl of Elgin was returning home, consequently that he would not revisit Shanghai. Notwithstanding this intelligence, they have thought proper to remain at Shanghai till within a month of the time appointed for the exchange of ratifications, alleging, as a reason for so doing, that various details connected with the execution of the Treaty had been only in part discussed by the Earl of Elgin, while they, at the same time, declare that they are the only authorities by whom the exchange of the ratified Treaties at Peking could be effected. They now write to inform the Undersigned that their journey to Peking will occupy above two months; that is to say, that they cannot reach the capital for upwards of a month after the day by Treaty appointed, that there will be no one to receive the Undersigned at Tien-tsin, and no one to exchange the ratifications at Peking. They accordingly request the Undersigned to delay his departure from Shanghai.

The Undersigned is determined, that, so far as it rests with him, no stipulation of the Treaty shall be violated. The exchange of the ratifications is a ceremony which records in the most solemn form that the new Treaty is the rule henceforth to be observed in conducting the intercourse of the two nations. And as the Treaty admits of no alteration or modification, the Undersigned cannot allow that the period fixed for the exchange be made in any way dependent on arrangements necessary to carry certain of its details into execution.

It is with regret that the Undersigned finds at the very outset of a Mission sent by Her Britannic Majesty as evidence of her desire for peaceful relations, that he is met, not as he had a right to expect, with a cordial and frank invitation to the capital, but with delays and hesitations, ill-calculated to cement a good understanding. The Undersigned will not, however, swerve in the least from the course he has laid down in his letter of the 18th ultimo. He is resolved to proceed forthwith to Peking, there to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty, and to deliver in person the letter intrusted to his charge by his gracious Sovereign to His Imperial Majesty, to whom it is addressed, nor will he quit the capital until satisfied that effect will be given, without reserve, to every provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

The Undersigned intends no discourtesy to the Imperial Commissioners, but he must, under these circumstances, positively decline any interview with them at this place.

His resolution to proceed to Peking without delay is inflexible.

It is at the same time his duty to warn his Excellency Kweiliang that he is prepared to insist on a reception befitting the dignity of the nation he repre-

sents, and that any failure in this respect will be attended with the most serious consequences to the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghae, June 8, 1859.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour to address a letter to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, upon the 8th instant. He has received no reply to this, and he observes that neither his Excellency nor his colleagues the Imperial Commissioners, who have informed him that it is through their hands alone that the ratifications of the Treaty can pass, are, to all appearance, making any effort to reach Peking by the day on which it is by Treaty agreed the ratifications shall be exchanged. He begs, therefore, to point out to them that there are lying in this harbour several steamers, one or two of them flying the Chinese flag, by the employment of which it is perfectly within their power to accomplish their journey before the appointed time.

Admiral Hope, the Naval Commander-in-chief, has started for the mouth of the Peiho with his squadron, charged to advise the local authorities of the immediate approach of the Undersigned and his colleague, M. de Bourboulon, the Minister of France.

The Undersigned, before leaving Shanghae, begs again to impress upon his Excellency Kweiliang, that his proceeding is in strict accordance with the Treaty provision, and he throws upon the Chinese Government the entire responsibility of any consequences that may arise from its violation.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghae, June 11, 1859.

Inclosure 6 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

Shanghae, June 11, 1859.

THE communications I have received from the Imperial Commissioners do not, I regret to say, justify me in assuming that the Chinese Government has resolved to receive my visit to Peking in a conciliatory spirit. There is manifestly a desire to treat this visit, not as the exercise of our undoubted privilege under Treaty, but as an exceptional case, the various steps of which are to be minutely arranged at this place before we are to be permitted to proceed to the North; and not satisfied with the interminable discussions to which such a course would necessarily lead, the Commissioners propose further to enter upon the details necessary for carrying into effect the provisions of the Treaty. Their letters breathe throughout the old spirit of jealousy and isolation.

It is not consistent with my instructions, nor with the express stipulations of the Treaty, that I should agree to such proposals, nor do I see how it would be possible, within reasonable time, to settle at this distance from Peking, questions of ceremonial which affect the Emperor personally, and on which his pleasure will have to be taken.

I am satisfied, on looking over the correspondence, and particularly by a reference to the Earl of Elgin's last letter to the Commissioners on leaving China, that they cannot allege, with any show of reason, that they have prolonged their stay here at his request; and however much I regret the difficulties that may arise out of their absence from the capital at this conjuncture, I do not think that I could depart from the programme contained in my first letter to them, without involving myself later in more serious complications, and without reviving hopes in the mind of the Chinese Government, that by procrastination

and discussions they may succeed ultimately in giving to this visit to Peking a character, in the eyes of the Chinese people, at variance with those principles of equality and unrestricted intercourse which it was one of the main objects of the Treaty to insure.

I have, therefore, informed them that I cannot accede to their request to remain here, and that I shall take my departure for the North without delay, in order to effect the exchange of the ratifications and the presentation of my letter and credentials to the Emperor.

At the same time I am anxious to give to the Imperial Government the opportunity, if it be so disposed, of repairing the neglect of the Commissioners, and of receiving me in a friendly manner. You will precede my arrival at the Peiho, and I beg that you will have the goodness to inform the officer in charge of the forts of the approach of the Ministers of England and France on a friendly mission, and inquire whether orders have been given to facilitate their progress to Tien-tsin. Should the reply be in the negative, I would suggest that they should be called upon to transmit the intelligence to Peking, warning them at the same time that if a reply is not received within a certain fixed period, the Imperial Government will be held responsible for the consequences.

By the time your message reaches Peking the Government will be in possession of the correspondence between his Excellency Kweiliang and the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and will be informed accurately of the objects and scope of the visit to the capital. M. de Bourboulon agrees with me as to the course to be adopted, and I am authorized by him to request that you will make the above communication in his name as well as in mine.

I intend leaving Shanghae on or about the 15th of this month.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On receipt of Mr. Bruce's letter of the 8th instant, acquainting the Commissioners that his determination to proceed forthwith to Peking to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty was unalterable, the Commissioners feeling that it would not be correct that the day appointed for that purpose, which was near at hand, should be passed, after due deliberation decided that the only course open to them was to represent the matter fully to His Majesty the Emperor, and to request him to be pleased specially to select some high officer who might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception. Their memorial was sent forward at the rate of 600 *li* (200 miles) a-day,* and would arrive at the latest in some eight or nine days at Peking, so that it might be assumed that when Mr. Bruce and the Ministers of France and America reached Tien-tsin, the Imperial Commissioners could not fail to have arrived as well, and so the exchange of Treaties in Peking would be effected by the time fixed for the purpose.

The Commissioners were in the act of addressing Mr. Bruce to the above effect when they received his second letter dated the 11th instant, expressing a wish that they should proceed by steamer. They were not unaware that a steamer would be a most expeditious (means of conveyance), but they have not received His Majesty's commands (to avail themselves of it), and they could on no account presume so to proceed on their own motion. Were they now to make the proposition the subject of the memorial (so far from any advantageous result from such a course), there would be, on the contrary, time lost in the marching and countermarching. It behoves them, therefore, in obedience to His Majesty's commands, to return post haste to the capital. As they have prayed His Majesty to detach a high officer to act as agent in the matter, Mr. Bruce will be certainly enabled to arrive at his destination by the time appointed. With the peaceful relations now established between the two nations,

* This is the form of words for the fastest rate of mail-despatch but one.

nothing certainly will be done that is not in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, and the Commissioners, accordingly, pray Mr. Bruce at once to put away all misgiving on the subject. There is no need for him to feel any anxiety. They would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (the Peiho), he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar, and then, without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, proceed to the capital for the exchange of the Treaties. His mission being a pacific one (or, as he comes speaking peace), his treatment by the Government of China will not fail to be in every way most courteous; and it is the sincere wish of the Commissioners that relations of friendship may be from this time forth consolidated, and that on each side confidence may be felt in the good faith and justice of the other.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, C.B., &c., &c.

Hien-sung, 9th year, 5th moon, 12th day (June 12, 1859).

(Received June 13, 8 A.M.)

No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13:)

My Lord,

Off the Peiho River, July 5, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to state that four days after the receipt of his Excellency Kweiliang's letter, I left Woosung for the North, taking the "Coromandel" in tow, in order to have an unarmed vessel in which to ascend the river.

On arriving at the Islands of Sha-loo-tien, the rendezvous agreed on with the Admiral, I found the squadron no longer there, and proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho on the 20th June, where the ships were assembled, the Admiral having sent the gun-boats over the bar, on account of the heavy sea running outside.

Admiral Hope reached the Islands of Sha-loo-tien on the 16th, and on the 16th he left the anchorage in the "Fury," attended by two gun-boats, to announce the coming of the Ministers of England and France to the authorities at the mouth of the river. The "Fury" and gun-boats anchored outside the bar, and Commander Commerell, with Mr. Mongan, the interpreter, went over the bar in the "Fury's" gig, to deliver the message. They were not allowed to land by the armed rabble on the bank, and when Captain Commerell asked for an interview with the authorities, they declared that there was no authority, civil or military, on the spot; that the barriers in the river had been made by the people at their own expense, not against us, but against the rebels; and that the garrison consisted of militia only. The chief spokesman, who called himself an engineer, or Clerk of the Works, however, offered to take any message to Tien-tsin, and bring back an answer.

On receiving the report of what had passed, Admiral Hope sent Captain Commerell in again to inform them of the arrival of the Ministers, and to request that a passage should be opened within three days to allow of their proceeding by the river to Tien-tsin.

To this they replied that they had dispatched a messenger to Tien-tsin to notify our arrival, and that a passage should be opened within the required time. Admiral Hope then returned to Sha-loo-tien.

On the 18th the squadron left for the Peiho, and the gun-boats anchored inside the bar on account of the heavy sea running outside; and on the 20th, the day of my arrival, Admiral Hope proceeded to the forts to see whether steps had been taken to open a passage for us, and to deliver a letter he had addressed to the Intendant of Tien-tsin, stating that the squadron would remain at the anchorage during our visit to Peking, and requesting that a market should be opened for the sale of fresh provisions, and arrangements made for landing of officers and men in such numbers as might not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

The same rabble came down to the bank, and opposed the landing, one of them threatening Mr. Mongan with a drawn sword when he jumped on shore. They again denied the presence of any authority, and asserted that they were militia, acting on their own responsibility. Instead of removing the obstacles,

they had further closed the passages, and when taxed with this breach of their promise, denied that they had ever offered to remove the barriers.

To give more colour to their assertions of the absence of any authority, they hoisted no flags on the forts, and no soldier was visible during the time the squadron was lying there.

It is not difficult to understand the motives of the Chinese Government in thus holding aloof, contrary to their usual custom, from all communication with the squadron and foreign Ministers. We know from the Pekin Gazettes that during the last eight months they have been studiously adding to their defences along this coast, and that Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, the head of the war party, and distinguished by his successful defence of Tien-tsin against the rebels in 1853, has been appointed Commander-in-chief of this district. It is evident that the Government were preparing for our arrival, and had instructed the garrison to represent themselves as a militia post, and to deny the presence of any constituted authority, by which arrangement they hoped to preserve an attitude which would enable them to take advantage of his success, if he were able to keep us out of the river, or to disavow his proceedings, if he failed in his efforts to do so.

After a long and anxious consultation M. de Bourboulon and I decided that we ought to adhere strictly to the course laid down in our letters to Kweiliang at Shanghae, and that we should insist, as much for the sake of our future communications with Pekin as for the successful accomplishment of the mission now confided to us, on the right of using the river as the natural highway to the capital. If, in accordance with Kweiliang's memorial, a high officer had been deputed to meet us at this place, bearing a friendly invitation from the Emperor, and satisfactory assurances as to our personal reception by him, we were quite prepared to have proceeded as far as Tien-tsin with only such vessels as were required for the accommodation of ourselves and suite, for I do not think that in any case we ought to have allowed our right to choose the only expeditious and commodious route to the capital to be questioned. But on considering the late proceedings of the Chinese Government, the persistency of Kweiliang and his colleagues in remaining in the South, instead of returning to Pekin, the proposal to effect the ratifications at Shanghae, the attempts to delay our progress to the North by raising fresh discussions on the Treaty, and, finally, the hostile and discourteous reception we have met with here, we were forced to conclude that the difficult task lay before us of carrying the Treaties into full operation, and of insuring a reception at Pekin on terms to the last degree mortifying to Chinese arrogance, while the Emperor is the hands of a party averse to concession, and relying on their preparations to resist us.

Every incident corroborated the information we obtained at Shanghae from a Chinese authority, reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 14th ultimo, that the Emperor would not accede to what we were instructed to demand except under the pressure of fear.

The question, then, for consideration was, how were we to work sufficiently on the fears of the Emperor to induce him to give way? The experience of last year showed that the presence of a squadron in the gulf was not enough to effect that object, while it equally showed that the opening of Pekin would follow on the accessibility of Tien-tsin to our ships being established. We could hardly be mistaken in inferring from the studied manner in which the Chinese officials held aloof from all communication with us, and from the repeated assertion of no authority being present at the forts, that the Government was prepared to disavow these hostile proceedings, if we succeeded in clearing a passage up the river.

We were equally justified by our past experience, and by the reluctance of the Chinese Government to allow us to proceed up the river, in assuming that they considered they would gain a great advantage by keeping the vessels outside, and by reducing us to negotiating in the gulf or in the interior, deprived of the moral support we should have acquired from the presence of our flags at Tien-tsin. Our desisting from claiming the right to go up in our own ships would have been attributed to inability to force their defences, and the ascendancy would thus have been secured to the war party in the Emperor's Councils. My conviction is, that in that case we must have abandoned all hope of a proper reception at Pekin on this occasion, and that we should have found it impossible to establish unrestricted access to the Central Government in future, or work

out in practice the clauses of the Treaty provided for circulation in the interior, and the imposition of regular duties instead of arbitrary exactions; provisions which can always be evaded, and for which we can have no other guarantee than the Emperor's dread of giving us offence.

On the 21st of June, I accordingly addressed a letter to Admiral Hope (copy inclosed), requesting him in the joint names of M. de Bourboulon and myself to take such steps as he might deem expedient to clear away the obstacles in the river, so as to admit of our proceeding at once to Tien-tsin. Nothing was done until the 24th, the Admiral being meanwhile engaged in notifying that as a passage up the river had not been opened, he should proceed to open it himself, and Mr. Ward, the American Minister, having signified his intention of proceeding on the 24th in his small steamer to the forts, and requiring a free passage up the river, in which application he was, like ourselves, unsuccessful. During that night, however, Admiral Hope caused part of the obstacles to be blown up without loss, and the attempt to pass the barriers and proceed up the river was fixed for the morning of the following day.

About 9 A.M. on the 25th, a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship "Magicienne," anchored about nine miles from the forts, and a petty mandarin came on board with a letter addressed to me by the Governor-General of Pechelee, translation of which I herewith inclose. It announced that the Governor-General had been ordered to proceed to Peh-tang-ho, an inlet or small mouth of the river, about ten miles to the northward of this anchorage, and thence to offer his services to Her Majesty's Minister. That Kweiliang and Hwashana had been summoned back to Peking, as the persons authorized to exchange ratifications, and convey the Minister to the capital. I was requested, therefore, to await their arrival, and to allow time for the withdrawal of the troops quartered at Peh-tang-ho, after which the Governor-General would come in a vessel to convey me to the landing-place, whence I should proceed to Peking by land.

This letter was dated the 23rd, and only reached me on the 25th—a delay which is inexplicable, if it had been intended to reach me in time.

As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the Treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin.

As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at 10 A.M., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations; but I should not have been deterred by the informality alluded to above, had the contents of the letter been satisfactory. It will be seen, however, on comparing it with Kweiliang's last letter to me at Shanghae, that the proposal differs so widely from the course recommended by the Commissioners, as to confirm the impression in my mind that the pacific party had lost their influence with the Emperor. Kweiliang had acknowledged the propriety of exchanging the ratifications within the stipulated period, and had proposed that a person should be named to meet me at this place, and conduct me at once to Peking; thus admitting that the Treaty was to be accepted as it stood, without further discussion.

The Governor-General of Pechelee proposes a course which is substantially a repetition of the attempts made to detain me at Shanghae, and postpone indefinitely the exchange of ratifications, thereby giving room for re-opening discussions on those points which are particularly obnoxious to the Chinese Government. In both letters it is to be remarked that a demand for a personal interview is passed over in silence; and in neither am I informed that the Imperial Government objects to our making use of the river-route to Tien-tsin.

Apart, therefore, from the considerations I have specified above, for believing that the abandonment of the right to go up the river would be fatal to the success of the mission, and would establish a precedent which would put it in the power of the Chinese Government to throw difficulties in the way of our future intercourse with Peking, I could only see in this overture a further attempt at evasion and delay, and evidence that the influence at Court of Kweiliang and his colleagues was at a low ebb. It is, moreover, a significant proof of how idle it is to expect to carry out our policy by appealing to any other motive than fear, that no communication was addressed to M. de Bourboulon; and no notice taken

of Mr. Ward, though he came to the Gulf of Pechelce at the express invitation of the Imperial Commissioners.

Answers are received at Takoo within forty-eight hours from Peking, and had the Government wished to treat foreign Ministers with courtesy, it would not have allowed eight days to elapse without taking any notice of them, and then contented itself with addressing the only Minister who happens to be supported by a considerable force.

Her Majesty's Government will be informed by Admiral Hope's despatches that on proceeding to remove the barriers on the 25th, the batteries, which had up to that time remained apparently deserted, and some of them masked, were suddenly manned, and opened with so heavy and well-directed a fire as to render the operation of removing the barriers impossible. Towards the close of the day a force was landed to storm the batteries; but failed in the attempt, owing to the nature of the ground, and the deep ditches which had to be crossed before reaching the forts. Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack, and, judging from our past experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example in the history of our contests with them, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks.

Admiral Hope having notified to me that the force under his command was unable to clear the passage up the river, M. de Bourboulon and myself agreed that we must consider the mission to Peking at an end for the present, and that we should retire to Shanghai. I accordingly addressed the inclosed letter to the Admiral, requesting him to dispose of the force in the manner best calculated to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. I thought it expedient not to address any communication to the Chinese Government upon these events, in order not to interfere in any way with the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to keep the Chinese Government as long as possible in suspense as to its ulterior intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Rear-Admiral Hope to the Taoutai of Tien-tsin.

Off the Peiho, June 20, 1859.

HAVING arrived here with a considerable squadron, in company with the Honourable Frederick Bruce, the Minister empowered by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year with His Majesty the Emperor of China, and it being my intention that the squadron shall remain here during Mr. Bruce's absence at Peking, I request that proper directions may be given that I may be permitted to purchase such supplies of fresh provisions and other articles as I require; and that the officers and men may have free communication with and access to the shore in such numbers as may not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

"Magicienne," off the Peiho, June 21, 1859.

M. DE BOURBOULON and myself having maturely considered the position of affairs, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be consistent with the course hitherto adopted by us, to delay further our attempts to reach Peking within the time specified by the Treaty for the exchange of ratifications. The Chinese Government, besides the Article of the Treaty itself, is before this in possession of the correspondence that passed at Shanghai with the Commissioners, and, had it wished to do so, could have sent orders to

facilitate our progress up the river. As you are aware, the course their officers at Takoo are pursuing bears every mark of a fixed determination to prevent our proceeding to Tien-tsin. The superior officers in charge of the forts keep out of the way to avoid making any specific declaration of their intentions until their preparations for our exclusion are completed, and their subordinates have not hesitated at positive falsehood for the same purpose.

There is considerable reason to believe that on the Mongol Prince in charge of the works the hopes of the war party repose, and that if he is defeated in his attempt to keep us out of the river, pacific counsels will prevail with the Emperor; but there is little chance of any satisfactory result while their confidence in him is unabated, or that the visit to the capital will be effected in such a manner as to impress the Chinese with a just idea of our national power and equality.

We have therefore resolved to place the matter in your hands, and to request you to take any measures you may deem expedient for clearing away the obstructions in the river, so as to allow us to proceed at once to Tien-tsin.

I have also to beg that you will act in M. de Bourboulon's name, as well as in mine.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Governor Hung to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chili, &c., &c., &c., makes a communication.

In obedience to the commands of His Imperial Majesty, the Governor-General has come to Peh-tang-ho, a port (or harbour) to the northward of Ta-koo, to be of any service (or to do the honours to) Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy.

As the negotiators of the Treaty made last year, His Majesty the Emperor has issued a Decree commanding the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, and the President of the Board of Civil Office, Hwashana, to return from Shanghae to Peking, and they may arrive any day. If the Envoy of Her Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to wait until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the Treaties (or will exchange the Treaties in the capital).

At Peh-tang-ho itself there has always been a military station and a battery for the defence of the coast. Orders have been issued to remove the troops and guns to the rear; and, as soon as this shall be effected, a vessel (or vessels) will be prepared for the Governor-General to proceed with outside the bar to welcome Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-ho, whence he can proceed by land to Peking.

A necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 5th moon, 24th day (23rd June, 1859).

[The character signifying "Her Majesty" is not on a level with that signifying the Emperor, as by the fixed rules of Chinese official composition it would be, were it employed in speaking of the Emperor himself. It marks a non-appreciation of the complete equality we claim for our Sovereign with all allies, the Emperor of China included, and I should recommend that the original be returned for correction.—T. W.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Rear-Admiral Hope to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

"Coromandel," off the Peiho, July 1, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the means at my disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles opposed to your entry at the mouth

of the Peiho; and that they are of so formidable a nature that any further operations cannot lead to successful result.

I expect the repairs of the gun-boats to be completed about the middle of next week, and I hope to be able to re-assemble the force outside the bar about that time: and under such circumstances I shall be glad to know in what way I can most forward the objects of your mission.

I have also to request that you will be so good as to forward a copy of this communication to M. de Bourboulon, and inform that gentleman how much I am indebted to Captain Tricault, of the "Duchayla," for his assistance during the engagement of the 25th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

"Magicienne," off the Peiho, July 2, 1859.

I REGRET that, in consequence of a resistance which our previous experience of Chinese warfare could not have led us to anticipate, the means at your disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles to my progress up the Peiho.

Allow me at the same time, whilst offering you my profound sympathy for the loss sustained by the squadron, to express my sincere admiration of the decision and gallantry shown in the operation undertaken for that object.

As you inform me that, in the face of this formidable resistance, further operations cannot lead to a successful result, I beg to state that I have, for the present, abandoned all attempts to reach Peking, and have resolved to refer home for instructions as to the course to be adopted. With this view Mr. Rumbold proceeds by the next mail to England to furnish Her Majesty's Government with full particulars respecting what has occurred.

Under these circumstances, I agree with you that the return of the Marines and Sappers to Hong Kong is desirable, and that the ships should be employed in the manner most conducive to the security of Her Majesty's subjects, and to the protection of their interests at the several ports.

In accordance with your request, I have communicated to M. de Bourboulon a copy of your letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 10.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, July 13, 1859.

I PROPOSE in this despatch to give a succinct account of the course I have adopted, and of the grounds on which it is based. It is necessary to allude briefly to the maxims of China in regard to intercourse with foreign nations, as they afford the key to what has taken place.

In China international relations have been always studiously ignored by the Government, and in no single instance has a Foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining admission to the capital, except on performance of the "kotow," or ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute-bearer. The subjects of foreign nations residing in China are represented as belonging to barbarous tribes, and living by trade (of all occupations the one least in repute among the Chinese), as devoid of civilization, and ignorant of the rules of reason, and by all means to be confined to the outskirts of the country.

According to the maxims of the Government, they are entitled to no rights beyond those accorded by the favour of the Emperor; and though circumstances and the weakness of the Government have led it to acquiesce in the concession of considerable privileges to foreigners in distant sea-ports, it is remarkable, as

proving how tenaciously it holds to its traditions, that it always classifies as acts of rebellion the measures of coercion adopted by foreign Governments to obtain redress for wrongs done to their subjects.

Now the British Treaty of Tien-tsin (which is much more complete in this respect than the Treaties signed at that place by the other Powers) asserts principles which are diametrically opposed to these traditional pretensions of the Chinese Government. According to it, the British Minister is to be accredited as a Representative of an independent equal Power, and the Chinese Government, in its treatment of him, is called upon finally to abandon the assumption of superiority which it asserted uncompromisingly during Lord Amherst's Embassy, and, so lately as three years ago, when Count Poutiatine first proposed to visit Peking. He is to be allowed free and unrestricted communication with the capital, not only as specified in the French and American Treaties, when he has business to transact, but whenever he wishes to visit it. His diplomatic intercourse is to be conducted according to the usages of Western nations, and he is not to be called on to perform any ceremony of a nature derogatory to his character as representing an equal and independent nation. In future, access to the capital is to be recognized as a right the Minister can insist on, instead of its being begged for as a favour, and either refused or conceded on such terms as the Chinese might choose to impose for the sake of saving their own dignity at the expense of that of the foreign Envoy in the eyes of the Chinese population.

The clauses which permit British subjects to travel in the interior, and open the Yang-tze river to British shipping, are equally subversive of the established maxims of Chinese statesmen. To push us back on the sea-board, and confine us to as few seaports as possible, to keep us outside the walls of important cities, and vilify us to the people, in order to preserve a wall of separation between the races, is the policy which the Chinese Government, from its adherence to usage, and from its indifference, if not dread of all progress, which can only be attained through novelty, would gladly follow, if it dared to do so.

It is not surprising, therefore, when the allied squadrons left the Peiho river last year, and the panic produced by their presence began to subside, that ancient maxims and prejudices should have gradually resumed the ascendant at Peking, and that the Imperial Cabinet should have entertained hopes of recovering part of the ground it had lost. There is proof of its language and feeling with regard to foreigners having undergone no change in a Decree published in the "Peking Gazette," on the 25th July, one month after the signature of the Treaty, in which allusion is made to the "barbarians suddenly rushing up the river to Tien-tsin, and retiring moved by the commands of Kweiliang and his colleague, signified with affectionate earnestness." Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, reputed to be their best General, was made Commander-in-chief of the Pechelee province, with a large force at his disposal: the forts at Ta-koo rebuilt and strengthened, and stakes and obstacles of different kinds placed across the river to efface the impression produced by the proceedings of last year, and by preventing foreign ships from arriving at Tien-tsin, to render Peking more inaccessible than ever.

While these preparations were going on, the departure of the High Officer of the Board of Revenue, who was to settle the Tariff at Shanghai, was delayed in order that he might not reach Shanghai until the season for operations in the Gulf of Pechelee had passed, and when he started he was accompanied by the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. Subsequent events leave no doubt in my mind that the statement contained in the letter of which Mr. Parkes obtained possession, is substantially correct, and that they were instructed to obtain modifications in the principal Articles of the Treaty—the residence at Peking, the opening of the Yang-tze river, and circulation in the interior, to all of which the Emperor strongly objects.

In their first letter the Commissioners advanced the principle that the Treaty having been signed under pressure, its provisions had not been fully discussed. But the determination evinced by Lord Elgin not to allow the Treaty to be called in question, seems to have convinced the Commissioners that it was advisable to rest satisfied with the concession made as to permanent residence at the capital. It is clear, however, that their remonstrances against the policy, enjoined on them from Peking, were most unpalatable to the Emperor and his counsellors, who urged them to make further efforts; and the dissatisfaction with the conduct of Ho, who seems to have pointed out most strongly the inexpediency of the course proposed, is reported to have been expressed in

the autograph rescript, that "his obstinacy would be the cause of calamity to him."

In the beginning of March, Lord Elgin, who had left Shanghai on account of the unsatisfactory state of Canton, wrote to the Commissioners, stating that Her Majesty's Government had agreed not to establish the Mission permanently at Peking, on condition of a proper reception being given to Her Majesty's Minister. He further informed them of his approaching departure from China, and of my appointment, charged with important documents to be delivered at the capital, and warned them solemnly that peaceful relations could only be maintained by a faithful observance of the Treaty. The Imperial Commissioners, in spite of this information, continued at Soo-chow, instead of returning to the capital to prepare for the reception of myself and the French Minister; and their motive in so doing was made sufficiently manifest by their attempts through a Chinese formerly in Mr. Wade's, but now in the Chinese service, to ascertain whether we would consent to exchange ratifications at Shanghai, or, at least, to be conducted from that point by land to Peking. This journey occupies two months, and I leave your Lordship to judge whether, had we adopted this route, we should not have abandoned, for all practical purposes, one great object of the Treaty, viz., free access to the Central Government.

It was only after my arrival at Hong Kong, that I heard of the Commissioners having remained in the South, and received Mr. Hart's Memorandum (inclosed in my despatch of the 30th of May), describing the hostile feeling of the Court, and throwing considerable light on the motives of this inconvenient delay of the Commissioners. I felt at once that it became necessary either to throw overboard my instructions entirely, to abandon the visit to Peking and the attempt to establish, on a proper footing, once for all, our diplomatic relations with the Court of Peking, or to declare that I would insist on exchanging the ratifications at the capital within the period stipulated in the Treaty, and on a personal reception by the Emperor for the purpose of delivering to him Her Majesty's autograph letter. I could not doubt that the task of extorting a reception at Peking in a form implying a surrender on the part of the Emperor of his pretensions to national superiority, would be more difficult than obtaining a recognition of our equality on paper; and that the Chinese Government, in accordance with its usual policy, would endeavour, by prescribing the route I was to follow, by limiting the number of my attendants, and by bad arrangements during the journey, to put me in the degrading position hitherto occupied by foreign Envoys, and recover, by this means, the prestige it had lost by our successful *coup de main* of last year. To prevent such a result, and to receive free access to the capital in future on becoming terms, I decided, after mature reflection, on proceeding by the river, the natural highway to Tien-tsin, under the British flag, as its presence at that place would establish in the eyes of the Chinese that our visits to Peking are a matter of right, not of favour.

M. de Bourboulon, whom I consulted before deciding on the course to be pursued, entertained views similar to mine, and wrote a despatch to the Commissioners in the same sense.

I could not, however, in the face of the unsatisfactory information I had received, hope that the Chinese Government would agree to such a complete revolution of its mode of dealing with foreigners, unless I was backed by a sufficient force to inspire it with alarm. I accordingly consulted with Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee on this point. Several gun-boats and part of the squadron had been dispatched by Sir Michael Seymour to Shanghai, previous to my arrival in China, to be ready to accompany me to the north. This measure had been adopted before unfavourable intelligence had been received from that quarter.

We agreed, on consultation, that the force dispatched was not large enough to produce the desired impression. It was, accordingly, strengthened, particularly in the class of vessels that can cross the bar, and brought up to an equality with that which accompanied the allied Ambassadors last year. The larger the force, the less likelihood, judging from our experience of the Chinese character, there would be of a collision.

On arriving at Shanghai, where I proceeded as soon as my French colleague was ready, I found, as I anticipated, the Commissioners armed with pretexts to detain me, and prevent my visit to the Peiho. Their letters, though moderate in tone, alluded to the three principal clauses of the Treaty, and proposed to

re-open the discussion upon them. Had I accepted this overture, and abandoned the course laid down in my letter of the 16th May, they would have inferred that I was to be "soothed and controlled," and would have postponed the ratifications with the intention of obtaining my assent to conditions which would have deprived these clauses of their practical efficacy. This view is confirmed by the fact that they were not in possession of the ratified Treaties; the Chinese Government having thus confined them to the task of gaining time, if nothing else, by renewing negotiations, reserving meanwhile in its own hands the power of exchanging the ratifications or not, as it might seem expedient, after the result of the interviews had been communicated to it.

I think that the Commissioners themselves were acting rather in obedience to their instructions from Peking, than in the expectation that their attempts to detain us here would be successful. For, as soon as they received my letter, stating that I would not enter into discussion until the ratifications were exchanged, and declining any interview with them at Shanghai, the twelve-month allowed by Treaty for the exchange having almost expired, they changed entirely their tone. They acknowledged the propriety of abiding by the terms of the Treaty, and stated that they had memorialised the Emperor to send down a high officer to Tien-tsin, whom we should find on our arrival, ready to conduct us, in time, to the capital. Though they hinted at a journey by land from the river's mouth, and wished me to anchor the squadron outside the bar, they did not state that orders had been given to prevent us entering the river, and making use of it to reach the town of Tien-tsin.

Admiral Hope left a day before the reply of the Commissioners was received, being desirous of making the passage under sail. The place of rendezvous was fixed at the Sha-loo-tien Islands, whence he was to communicate to the authorities the approaching arrival of the Ministers of England and France, *en route* for Tien-tsin, and inquire whether orders had been given for our reception.

I announced his departure the next day to the Commissioners, and suggested the propriety of their proceeding to the Peiho on board one of the steam-ships, owned by Chinese, lying here, by which means they would be able to reach it in time to receive us. They declined doing so, on the ground that they could not adopt so unusual a method of travelling without the Emperor's permission. This may be so; but I am inclined to think they shared in the feeling expressed in confidence by the most enlightened of their assistants, that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that the Emperor and his counsellors were so unreasonable that they could not be brought to terms without another lesson.

M. de Bourboulon and I left Shanghai four days after the receipt of the letter of the Commissioner, in order to afford time for the memorial to reach the Emperor, and for the necessary orders to be given, should he be inclined to accord us a friendly reception, and carry out the recommendations it contained.

Mr. Ward, the American Minister, accompanied us at their express invitation, having claimed, under the most favoured nation clause, the right to exchange the ratifications at Peking, and present his credentials to the Emperor.

My despatch of the 5th instant, which is forwarded by the present opportunity, gives in detail the events that took place at the Peiho. I have only to remark, in explanation of the course pursued, that we found ourselves off the mouth of the river, which forms the highway to Peking, within a few days of the expiration of the period fixed by the Treaty for the exchange of the ratifications. On requesting a passage to be opened for us, and explaining the peaceful objects of the mission, we were informed that there was no authority on the spot; that the fort and barriers were not constructed by order of the Government, but by the people, who had built and garrisoned them for their protection against rebels, not to keep us out of the river. In proceeding to remove them, we, therefore, violated no order of the Imperial Government, and, had we been successful, the Government could, and would, no doubt, have disavowed entirely the acts of those who opposed us. At the same time we were convinced that the repugnance of the Chinese Government to execute fully the Treaty, and to grant us the reception we were instructed to demand, could only be overcome by a sense of their inability to resist us. The preparations made since last year had given them confidence, and that feeling would have been increased, had we, on coming in presence of them, receded from the demands we had made. Under such

circumstances, to have accepted the proposal of the Governor-General of Chili would have been to enter on a path which must have ended in disgrace and failure; and nothing, in my opinion, would have justified us in consenting to it, unless the only competent authority to pronounce a judgment on such a question had expressed doubts as to the result of an attempt to force the passage of the river. But I can state, positively, that if Admiral Hope had expressed doubts on the subject, they would not have been shared by the squadron, nor by those who have had most experience of warfare in China; and, if it be decided that the means at our command were insufficient to justify us in pursuing so bold a line of policy, it is but right that I should share that responsibility with him.

The Intendant of this place has received official notice of these events from Peking, with orders, as he states, not to molest the English. But the effect of this check must be prejudicial to our interests, as in this, more than in almost any country, we are respected and considered in proportion as we are feared, and whatever may be the ultimate decision of this Government with reference to the Treaty of Tien-tsin, I do not think that its provisions can be carried out until we recover our superiority in the eyes of the Chinese.

Mr. Wade has drawn up a full and explicit Memorandum on the proceedings of the Chinese Government within the last year, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Translation of a Paper forwarded to the Earl of Elgin in Mr. Parkes' Despatch of January 15, 1859.

[*Memorandum.*—Two Chinese Clerks, perfectly unknown to each other, have suggested, the moment they read this paper, that it was the composition of a small official sent by Hwang-tsung-han to Shanghai, to watch the progress of affairs. The writer speaks of himself throughout as an official of much lower rank than the person he addresses; but I do not think that this is Hwang. The words "Governor-General" (of the Two Kwang) prefixed to Hwang's name, must have been elevated, had the letter been written to him direct.

It must have been sent to Canton after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow, and before his return to Shanghai.—T. W.]

THE Administrators-in-chief of barbarian business in the capital are the three Princes Hwui, Kung, and Ching (1).

When the four Imperial Commissioners (2) had their audience to take leave, His Majesty very positively signified to them that it was his pleasure not to allow peace to be made in this sort of way (3), and that the whole fifty-six Articles of the Treaty of Tien-tsin must be cancelled. Ho, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, received them at Chang-chow, in the 8th moon (August, September), and stoutly maintained that there must be no mention whatever of change. They were consequently at issue until their arrival at Shanghai, when, owing to the strong support given by the Treasurer Wang to the representations of Ho, the Commissioners began to incline to a compromise. Several memorials were addressed to the Throne in the joint names of the whole five, in reply to which they continued to receive, in every case, His Majesty's peremptory injunctions (to persist in the course prescribed); until, in his last decree, His Majesty declared his pleasure to be, that if peace were made with the barbarians, four conditions must be insisted on:—

Firstly, he would, on no account, allow trade from Hankow to Nankin.

(Secondly: this condition is omitted, most likely, by mistake, as the text below shows the question to have been the residence of a Minister at Peking.)

Thirdly, he would not allow (foreigners) to circulate in the different provinces.

Fourthly, he would have the provincial city of Canton evacuated at an early date.

On receipt of His Majesty's commands as above, the Commissioners had

several consultations with the barbarians. They alas! would give in on one point only, to wit, the evacuation of Canton; in the other three they held out for what had been proposed at Tien-tsin.

The Commissioners and the Governor-General Ho accordingly made up (4) another Memorial, to the effect that the barbarians had promised to evacuate Canton; that, as regarded admission into Peking, they would not be allowed to go and come in large bodies, nor to build churches there, but that the admission of four or five on any future occasion, when they might have business of importance to transact, need not be prohibited; that, as to circulation in the provinces, no one was to travel save with a passport, to be issued under the seals of the local authorities and the Consuls of the barbarians: no one would take on himself to go without one; so that, as it would still rest with the local authorities, when the time came (5), to give or withhold a passport, this point might, in their opinion, also be conceded. There thus remained no question but that of the navigation of the river up to Hankow, whither it would really be difficult to prevent barbarians from proceeding.

To this representation they received for answer from the Emperor, "Try again with all your might, and you will succeed again."

The Commissioners and Ho, after receiving this, again put their seals to the Treaties, and exchanged copies of them as concluded; and it was agreed that in the third moon (April, May), the barbarians should go into the capital again to exchange national letters (letters between the Governments). Ho, the Governor-General, returned the same day to Soo-chow; the Treasurer Wang also returned on the 5th. The English leader, Elgin, had started up the Great River on the 3rd, with five steamers, for Hankow. Just before his departure, he said, "Provided that the provincial authorities behave well to me, I shall not insist on ready money (or immediate-payment) (6) at Shanghae, and I will write to Canton, and have the city evacuated at once; but if there is any more fighting (on my journey), I must postpone action (on these points)." The Commissioners answered: "We will write to prevent any one giving you matter of offence; at the same time there are several positions along your road in the hands of the rebels, and we are not responsible for any trouble these may occasion you; nor will it be our affair if your vessels come to harm by getting aground on any of the numerous shoals in the Great River." "It does not concern you, of course," said he, "I can take care of myself;" and so he started. The following day he got aground off Fu-shan, and after transshipping his guns, &c., to a smaller vessel, on the 5th, he got off by dint of great exertions on the 8th, and was reported to have passed Nankin on the 11th. It was also said that the long-haired men (the rebels) had fired upon him, though this is not certain. On the 10th, however, a number of devils were brought back, the barbarians said, ill of the small-pox, but the people have it, wounded by the rebels. Which is the truth I know not.

In conclusion, I may remark that everything relating to the barbarians is kept so quiet that it is hard to learn the facts. To give an instance: since the Commissioners arrived here every conference they have had with the Chiefs to discuss business questions has been held either on board a steamer or in some out-of-the-way place, and, their measures agreed on (the conferring parties) have gone home to carry them out. This is for fear they might be overheard by the native servants of the different houses of business, who understand the devil language.

The Emperor has been moved to abolish the restrictions on opium, and to admit it into port at 30 taels per picul import duty, and into the interior at 15 taels transit duty. The tariff is settled; all goods pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. This is proposed as the import duty. If barbarians go into the interior to sell merchandize, they are to pay 2½ per cent. (as a transit duty), whether they pass eight barriers or ten. On tea and silk there are some augmentations and some diminutions. The rules are now in form, and as soon as the seal has been put to them, a copy shall be submitted to you.

Touching the money payment to be made to the barbarians (to the English), 6,000,000 dollars; and to the Americans, 600,000 dollars; the latter, some time ago, expressed their readiness to the Commissioners to give up 100,000 dollars; they would require only 500,000 dollars, namely, 100,000 to be paid at Shanghae, 100,000 at Foo-chow, and 300,000 at Canton, to be deducted, during three years, from the duties. The Commissioners had settled the form

of instrument, so that the American question may be looked on as decided. A despatch to this effect must (soon) reach Canton. The English indemnity will, most likely, follow a like rule of apportionment, a quota being levied on the (customs of the) places aforesaid, or the whole may be laid on the Shanghai duties, in which case the people (of Canton) need feel no alarm. These barbarians are very anxious, nevertheless, to make Canton pay the largest share. This would delight them. Indeed, so deep-seated is the ill-will with which they regard the Canton officials, gentry, and people, that they actually talk of shutting up Canton as a port altogether, and never trading there again. They have several times pressed the Commissioners, with all their might, to denounce the Governor-General (Hwang), and the three gentlemen (Lo, Lung, and Su), as a condition of peace (or, before they would treat of peace). This has not only been done by word of mouth, but there has been correspondence upon it, of which I inclose copies.

The Commissioners, I should humbly suppose, can hardly have been so stupid as to give in to everything in this way (7). They may be holding such language as a means of keeping (the barbarians) within range (8). It is impossible to say. Should they have moved the Emperor, as was suggested, His Sacred Majesty would not surely have accepted their view of the case. Never, since the world began, was there such a doctrine as that the official, instead of punishing the robber for his theft, is to conciliate him by doing whatever his malignity may dictate against the person he has robbed (9). (My remarks, I am sensible, are presumptuous.) How should an officer of my low estate and mean abilities venture on propositions at random? It is our duty to abide His Majesty's decision.

Another statement is that Ho is strongly urging an application to the Emperor to transfer the seal of High Commissioner for the Five Ports from Canton to Kiang-su, and that the Commissioners will very presently address the Emperor to that effect. After his return to Soo-chow, the Governor-General Ho addresses to the Emperor two memorials in succession, setting forth how difficult it was to negotiate peace; that after all his pains he had only got so far; that the barbarians when they had got a foot wanted ever an inch more; that they were quite ready to add something to the fifty-six Articles they now had, but would not abate a single letter. Further, he said that he knew it was in the hands of the three Princes that the direction-general lay, and if His Majesty would not agree (to what he, Ho, recommended), he must beg him to send the three Princes to manage the things for themselves. To this the Emperor, in his autograph rescript (10), rejoined, "No luck, of a truth, can attend such perversity and opinionativeness" (11).

The Treasurer Wang was, at the same time, commanded to return with all speed to Soo-chow; the Emperor would not allow him to remain at Shanghai interfering in barbarian affairs.

It was subsequently asserted that the Governor-General Ho had been deprived of his button, and five Commissioners ordered to proceed from the capital to Tsing-kiang-pu (12), whether for this or some other matter it was not clear. But (these two last statements) are but a report, which as I have not seen the documents, I do not venture to affirm is true. I purpose, as soon as I have dispatched this letter (13) (*lit.*, petition), going in person to Soo-chow to see the Treasurer Wang, and find out (14) the truth from him. I shall ask him for copies of some of the despatches, which I will forward in a separate cover.

The French were away last month at Japan and in Annam. They were not by when the English and the other nation were negotiating. Since their Chief's return to Shanghai he wanted to go to Peking to build churches there—a proposition which induced much discussion, without any satisfactory result (15). The tradespeople (or mercantile Chinese) say that no harm will come of this; they (the French) must talk in this fashion; and that when the English Chief returns (16), everything will be settled, all and sundry.

The Russians are not at Shanghai, and have taken no part (in what has passed).

The Commissioners themselves are entertaining every day, or sitting for their portraits (16A), or paying visits to the devils, taking their fill of enjoyment with nothing whatever to do.

Pwan Si-ching (Pontinqua) reached Hang-chow on the 12th of the moon,

but has not yet arrived at this place. The man the Commissioners and the barbarians really want is Howqua (17). It is a matter of indifference to them whether Pontinqua comes or not; by the time he arrives, I imagine, there will be nothing for him to do.

Another rumour is that the Commander-in-chief Yang has retaken Ngan-king (18). The Prefect Wu says that he has written full particulars of all that has been reported in this letter to Chang, the Han-lin (19), and gives me to understand, consequently, that I need not trouble your ear with a repetition of them.

I have, therefore, the honour to transmit you this summary.

Observations.

(1.) The Prince Hwui is Mien Yü, only surviving brother of the late Emperor; Kung is Yih Su, brother of the present Emperor; Ching is a Prince of the Second Order of Imperial Nobility, whose name I cannot ascertain.

(2.) Kweiliang, Hwashana, Mingsheu, and Twau Ching-shih.

(3.) *Lit.*, such a peace fashion, or such peace measures.

(4.) Made up, concocted; a certain amount of fraud is implied.

(5.) When application is made.

(6.) Immediate payment, viz., of the indemnity.

(7.) *Lit.*, a thousand consents, and a hundred compliances.

(8.) More literally employ this (language) for the purpose of tethering—a favourite word of Kiyung and others in relation to the government of foreigners.

(9.) The barbarian is the robber; Hwang, Governor-General of the Two Kwang, the master of the house, whom he has injured: will Government forget itself so far as to make terms with the barbarian by persecuting Hwang?

(10.) The despatches to the Emperor are returned to the high officers authorized to address them, with some slight observation written in red ink by the Emperor. If his answer is of great length, or requires deliberation, he writes merely, "Our placet will be given separately." In the latter case he sends down what we call an Imperial Decree to the Great Council for transmission to the officer or officers concerned.

(11.) *Lit.*, where there is this determined bias and self-opinion there is indeed no such word as happiness (or fortune).

(12.) A place near the Yellow River, at which the Governor-General Ho was to have met the Commissioners as they came down. The rumour here alluded to is probably a revival of the above, which was in circulation in August and September.

(13.) The form in which the inferior addresses the superior official.

(14.) Rather, spy out.

(15.) Baron Gros did not sign the Tariff, &c., until some days after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow. It was stated that some missionary question was under discussion between his Excellency and the Commissioners.

(16.) Returns, viz., from Hankow.

(16A.) The Commissioners sat more than once to the Honourable N. Jocelyn, who photographed them at the British Consulate.

(17.) Howqua, and some other ex-hongists, had been expected at Soochow, to advise the Commissioners regarding the amendment of the Tariff.

(18.) This report probably grew out of the collision of the Ngan-king rebels with the squadron escorting Lord Elgin, of whose approach, to judge from appearances, the Imperialist force endeavoured to make some use.

(19.) There are more than one doctor of the Han-lin of this surname at Canton.

(Signed)

T. WADE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Memorandum by Mr. Wade, intended to accompany the Translation of a Letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, from Canton, to the Earl of Elgin, on the 15th January, 1859, précis of which was inclosed to the Foreign Office.

THE letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, of the genuineness of which I see no reason to entertain any doubt, read by the light of the correspondence of the Imperial Commissioners and earlier proceedings of the Chinese Government, ever since negotiations fairly commenced at Tien-tsin, furnishes, to my mind, a clue deserving of attention to the course the Government has, in this last instance, pursued.

According to the writer, evidently an official who has access to good information, the Emperor determined, the moment our backs were turned, to cancel the whole Treaty extorted from him in June 1858, and for this purpose sent Kweiliang and his colleagues south. This accords with a rumour current at Shanghae in August; Kweiliang was said to be in deep disgrace for his negotiations, the first public notice of which by the Chinese Government was in a Decree of the 25th July, to the effect that the barbarians who "burst into the river" with their ships had retired in obedience to the affectionate commands of Kweiliang.

The use of the term "barbarian," as Lord Elgin complained in a letter to the Commissioners of the 7th September, was itself an infraction of Article LI of the Treaty, committed within one month of its signature.

The mission of Kweiliang and his colleagues, ostensibly to revise the Tariff, was remarkable as being so much more than what the Treaty required. It had been stipulated merely that a high officer of the Board of Revenue should repair to Shanghae. Two ex-Commissioners of the Canton Customs were indeed added to the Commission, but one of these was replaced by Twau Ching-shih, one of the Under-Secretaries most actively employed during the Treaty negotiations. His leave-taking memorial, also published in the "Gazette," assured the Emperor, in stock phrase, that he would be zealous in "soothing the barbarians."

Rumour, as I have said, made the object of this mission anything but a revision. Nothing, however, very positive was stated, nor did the reports on the subject command general attention.

Meanwhile, as Kweiliang and his colleagues had promised at Tien-tsin, on the 4th July, to obtain from the Emperor, as soon as they returned to Peking, a Decree appointing a Commissioner to revise the Tariff, which Decree would reach Shanghae, as soon as Lord Elgin, his Lordship, after ten days' delay at Shanghae, had written on the 21st July to complain that he was still without a line from Peking on the subject.

On the 27th he received a letter from Ho Kwei-tsing, announcing the appointment of the Commission, composed, with the addition of himself, of the members enumerated above, who, he said, would arrive about the 18th August.

Lord Elgin visited Japan, and having made his Treaty there, hurried back to Shanghae, to learn, by a letter from the Commissioners themselves, that they could not be at Shanghae before the 6th October.

It is, I repeat, quite clear that Kweiliang and Hwashana, the highest officers of the Civil establishment, were not coming to revise a Tariff. Indeed, another object of their mission was eventually stated in their own letter of the 22nd of October, to which we shall come in due time. Ho Kwei-tsing's assurance that they would be down by the 18th of August, was given, I imagine, to prevent the possibility of Lord Elgin's returning to the Peiho.

The decree he forwarded was dated the 15th of July. The prescribed time for an official journey of the distance is fifty-five days. This would have brought the Commissioners to Shanghae by the 10th of September. I presume Ho chose a middle term for safety's sake.

I attribute the Commissioners' delay of their departure from Peking, or their loitering by the way, to the one cause—the fears of the Government that, when the Commissioners had declared their errand, we might revisit the Peiho. We knew from the Gazettes that the forts were being rebuilt—this, of course, was in itself no matter of surprise; that timber was purchased to stake the river, at which we could not either be astonished; but, lastly, and this is noteworthy,

that these operations were conducted under the special authority of Sung-kolin-sin, a Mongolian prince allied by marriage to the Imperial family, distinguished as the conqueror of the rebels on the occasion of the Tai-ping incursion into Chih-li, in 1853-54, and appointed during our stay at Tien-tsin, High Commissioner of War, and Commander-in-chief of a force stationed at Tung-chow to cover the capital should we advance upon it. It is also important that his labours had proceeded with such rapidity that, by the 21st November, he was enabled to report the completion of the works on the Tien-tsin river; for which service, by a Decree of the above date, he was awarded a surcoat of honour.

My impression is confirmed, by all that has since occurred, that the arrival of the Commissioners was delayed purposely until the river defences were in a state of forwardness. For, once more, they were coming not to revise the Tariff, but, as the Canton letter states, and their own correspondence presently shows, to discuss modification, if not abrogation, of three important privileges which distinguished our Treaty from any other; to wit, the residence of a Minister at Peking, circulation of British merchants in the interior, and the navigation of the great river: also to require the rendition of Canton.

Ho Kwei-tsing, as in duty bound, went to meet the senior Commissioners as they entered his jurisdiction; and the statement in the Canton letter that it was on the strength of his representations, supported by those of his provincial Treasurer Wang, that they were led to modify materially the course prescribed by their instructions, is borne out not only by the gossip of the period, but by a communication subsequently made by an indisputable authority, which I do not feel at liberty to name, that they had come down charged to make war rather than concede the permanent residence of a Minister. The words stated to have been used by Ho, when remonstrating against such policy, were "that war would be absolute madness." I confess that, with some faith in the narrator, I believed him, at the time he stated this, guilty of a simple exaggeration, *à la Chinoise*.

It must not be forgotten that, throughout the whole of this period, from June to October, affairs in the South were in a condition that augured ill for peace.

Long after the Treaty was signed, Hwang, and a committee of three Cantonese of high standing in the class we style "the gentry," who held an Imperial Commission for the enlistment and control of Militia, were persisting in acts of war. After the tactics of 1856 and 1857, when Yeh was in power, the native servants were called home from Hong Kong, and the supplies of that colony in effect cut off by semi-official Committees established in the adjacent districts. Soldiers of the Canton garrison were kidnapped and assassinated. A proclamation under Hwang's seal, offered a high reward for Mr. Parkes's head.

Even so late as the 22nd August, Hwang had supported the Special Committee in its war-taxation, on the ground that though a Treaty had been concluded at Tien-tsin, he knew not its conditions, and that it was as necessary as ever to be ready for banditti.

I see no reason to doubt, when we read the Emperor's Decree of the 21st October, in which he rejects the Commissioners' censure of Hwang and the Committee, that the Court was encouraging the latter to persevere in their attempt to expel the allies from Canton, where by Treaty they were to remain till the indemnity agreed to was paid.

The Commissioners arrived at last on the 6th October. They had been duly apprised of the dissatisfaction occasioned by the tardiness of their movements; and having first apologized, in a private note, for not visiting Lord Elgin until the ostensible business of their mission, the Tariff revision, was *en train*, they dispatched an official letter, in a most conciliatory strain, to beg Lord Elgin to appoint Deputies who might meet their own for the revision of the Tariff. The officers they named were Wang, the Commissioner of Finance, Chief Civilian of the Province, and Sieh, for the three years previous, Taoutae or Intendant at Shanghai, one of the few Chinese I have met who, notwithstanding much ignorance and prejudice still remaining, really appreciate the power and probity of the foreigner, or who appear soberly to contemplate, without abatement of pride in their own country, the possibility of utilising barbarian ability to her advantage. He had been named to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin at Tien-tsin.

Lord Elgin met their proposals by demanding, first, an acknowledgment of two letters, written early in September, complaining of proceeding in the South, and still unnoticed.

Their reply was pacific enough: they excused Hwang's ignorance on the grounds of the distance from Peking; his hostile attitude as not being assured of our intention; and volunteered to proclaim that peace had been negotiated with England, France, America, and Russia.

It does not appear, for all that was promised on the subject, that even this meagre notice, which promulgated none of the conditions of the peace, was ever published elsewhere. At Canton, indeed, the High Committee's Militia continued to annoy the foreign garrison until January, when one of their positions at Shek-tsin was destroyed. The garrison was then made to patrol the neighbourhood, the result of which measure was a speedy restoration of order.

The Commissioners' overtures did not yet satisfy Lord Elgin. He took them to task for having allowed near four months to elapse without making known the existence of a Treaty; and he demanded the removal of Hwang, and the dissolution of the Imperial Committee, before he could consent to go into the Tariff at all.

This line of action, of course, greatly perplexed the Commissioners. As Chinese statesmen they would be slow to comprehend why the barbarian should postpone commercial considerations to any other, and they hastened to soothe him accordingly. They had already, they said, denounced Hwang, and would again denounce him, praying the Emperor, at the same time, to withdraw their powers from the Committee.

Lord Elgin, on this, engaged if they would promise to communicate to him the Imperial rescript to their memorial, to commence the discussion of the Tariff, and this promise given, named Mr. Oliphant and myself as his Deputies.

Up to this time they had not breathed a word regarding the real matter of their mission. They were doubtless in much embarrassment as to the mode of introducing it; and the opinions of Ho, who drew his inspiration from Wang and Sieh, the two Chiefs of his provincial staff, both able and intimately *liés*, had, I feel satisfied, in no way diminished their difficulty in approaching the retraction of a Treaty concession.

At length, on the 22nd October, reassured by the favourable progress of the Tariff and its concomitants, they, with evident delicacy and diffidence, declared the true object of their coming. Moralising briefly on the end of negotiations, they pointed out that those at Tien-tsin were conducted so completely under pressure of an armed force as to leave no place for deliberation; the Emperor had, accordingly, specially commissioned them to come to Shanghai, "earnestly to press a matter which would be the common advantage of both parties." Among the conditions extorted there were some of real injury to China, which there had been no opportunity of explaining. Of these they name one only—the residence, in permanence, of a British Minister at Peking. As the Queen of England has an option, by Treaty, they beg Her Majesty may be prayed to decide that the Minister shall only visit Peking on occasion. They avow that this condition is most irksome to China, and, in Chinese fashion, they strive to show how irksome it will be to us. A rude and numerous Tartar soldiery; the unacquaintance of metropolitan officials with foreign affairs; the temper of the population—these are the dangers which should incline us to forego this one—to us useless, and, for the reasons enumerated, perilous—privilege; the more readily to forego it, as, on the other hand, we are gainers to a considerable extent in the many which we should still retain.

Looking back to the Tien-tsin period, we call to mind that the Commissioners, although committed in their letter of the 11th June, 1858, to the declaration, that "to a Minister's permanent residence there was properly no objection," and to the proposition that, the recent collision considered, the Minister had better live at Tien-tsin—an official residence being assigned him at Peking—had attempted on the 21st June to recede from these proposals.

They had, they said, received a Decree, desiring them to do their best to persuade Lord Elgin to give up this invidious privilege, "the North being cold, and excessively dusty;" also with it the right to open Chin-kiang, the right to circulate in the interior before the people should have been duly warned, the right to navigate the Great River, by which we should drive the Chinese out of the field.

On all these points they again made a fight at their Conference with Mr. Bruce on the 24th June.

On the evening of the 25th they made a last effort, through Count Poutiatine and Mr. Reed, to dissuade Lord Elgin from insisting on the residence of a Minister, and the right of British merchants to circulate in the interior, pleading that, unless his Lordship gave way on those points, their lives would be forfeited.

Lord Elgin standing firm, they urged, even on the morning of the 26th itself, a modification of the text, by which the Minister might be authorized to be constantly in residence at Pekin, instead of entitled to reside there, without moving; a change which, as liberty of his movements is secured in another Article, was adopted.

These, with the addition of the surrender of Canton, are the questions on which, according to the Canton letter, the Emperor instructed the Commissioners to stand out, and it is upon these I gather, from their letters of the 27th and 28th of May, the Commissioners would have engaged Mr. Bruce in discussion, had he accorded the interview they proposed. They had, withal, another end to gain.

Lord Elgin met their request of the 22nd October by an emphatic declaration that it lay not with him to abate one tittle of the Treaty. He pointed out the real object and advantages of diplomatic relations as established in Europe, and briefly adverting to past misunderstandings between our countries, expressed his doubt that the Imperial Government could provide guarantee for the maintaining of peace, equivalent to that supplied by the presence of a Minister at Pekin.

The Commissioners, on the 28th October, admit that our Minister's right to permanent residence is incontestable, but the exercise of it will humiliate China in the eyes of her subjects. They, therefore, again pray Lord Elgin to move the Queen to use the option the Treaty leaves Her Majesty in their favour, and there is no satisfactory arrangement they are not ready to make.

Lord Elgin undertook to submit the correspondence to Her Majesty's Government, and to recommend that if Her Majesty's Minister were properly received next year, and full effect given to the Treaty in all other particulars, the Minister should be directed to choose a residence elsewhere, and to visit the capital either periodically or when business required it.

The Tariff negotiations were now brought to a close, and Lord Elgin announced his intention to proceed up the Yang-tze, to see what ports it would eventually be desirable to open.

The Commissioners acquiesced with a good grace, promised to send an officer to wait on his Lordship, and to advise the authorities of the provinces he would have to traverse of his approach.

This was partly in fulfilment of their undertaking to make any satisfactory arrangement, partly, I feel sure, from words that fell from the Judge, in the hope that we should have a profitable collision with the insurgents at Nankin.

At Hankow we found a proclamation announcing that the English, French, and American nations were come to look at the place, but not to trade; so the people need not be alarmed. There was not, it is scarcely necessary to observe, any sign of alarm, except that produced by the official runners and such persons, who at first insisted on forming our escort, and, in that capacity, unnecessarily thrashed the crowds that assembled round us, and used every effort to prevent the tradespeople from taking our money. The people themselves were here, as throughout the whole 600 miles of our journey, civil, inoffensive, and eager for trade.

I regard the policy of the Government in this to have been the same it has long adopted at Canton—to promote an aversion to foreign intercourse among the people, and to impress on foreigners that the people are hostile and hard to control. The doctrine finds its place, as we have seen, among the arguments against a Minister's residence at Pekin.

On his return to Shanghae in January, Lord Elgin found the news from Canton still far from satisfactory. Just as he was about to start for Hankow, the Commissioners had mooted the question of that city's rendition, and the payment of the indemnity, but had received no positive answer as to the course his Lordship proposed to take. They had also requested us, by letter, to adopt the same arrangement as the French. They had written, besides, a circular to

the British, French, and American Ministers, regarding the future issue of passports, and various other points which would be raised under the new Treaties. Lastly, they prayed for some settlement of the duties owing under the provisional system adopted during the occupation of Shanghai by the rebels in 1853 and 1854.

These letters had been sent in but a day or two before Lord Elgin's departure, and he, consequently, had delayed replying to them until his return. On receipt of the Canton intelligence, he recommenced correspondence by an inquiry whether the promised decree removing Hwang had been obtained. The Commissioners sent him a decree of the 21st October, acknowledging their denunciation of Hwang, "for conduct calculated to produce mischief;" defending him, however, as having acted on the offensive only until the Treaty was concluded; defended the Committee as simply engaged in keeping the peace; and concluding with the observation that it would be for the Emperor himself to deal with Hwang should he have committed himself since the Treaty was signed.

The Commissioners must have received this rebuff before Lord Elgin left Shanghai, but were, doubtless, in no haste to show how their advice had been relished by their master.

Before their reply had reached him, Lord Elgin had answered their circular of the 7th November. I need notice but two items of his answer. He undertook most readily to guarantee that every precaution would be taken to prevent the abuse of the passport system by British subjects. At the close of his letter, he replied to their remark that their queries had been put by reason of their ignorance of foreign affairs, by observing that the most evident remedy of this defect would be, in sending a Chinese Legation to England.

The Commissioners rejoined at length, but noticeably about passports, which, they observed, the Consuls would have to apply for to the Chinese authorities, to whom they must be, in due time, surrendered to be cancelled.

This was on the 14th. On the same day, Lord Elgin had written to express his serious dissatisfaction at Hwang's continuance in office. He would now call on the Commissioners to settle the indemnity in strict accordance with the provisions of the Separate Article, or, as instructed by Her Majesty's Government, he would eject the Chinese authorities from Canton.

A very crestfallen answer followed from the Commissioners. They had done their best. The Emperor alone could decide. The Canton question they had not had time to settle since Lord Elgin's return.

On the 20th of January, Lord Elgin, having received news of the Shek-tsing affair, wrote again. He reviewed his correspondence with the Commissioners since their arrival in October. He was now convinced that Canton was to them a question *ultra vires*; he should, therefore, desire our executive there to act with vigour, and when the ratifications were exchanged, the Emperor should be asked whether things at Canton had been done with or without his authority.

The Commissioners wrote to assure him that Hwang should now certainly be removed, and the Special Committee dissolved; but Lord Elgin, inclosing them a copy of the letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, announced his intention to proceed himself to Canton. On his return to Shanghai, in the course of six weeks, should he not find the Commissioners there, he would proceed to Peking.

The Commissioners wrote, roundly abusing Hwang and the Committee. The Emperor's decree must arrive in three weeks. In the interim all pending questions could be discussed. They were quite competent to deal with the Canton question. They prayed him to remain.

Lord Elgin was inexorable. The conditions of the Canton question, he wrote, 25th of January, were specified in the Treaty. Had the Emperor chosen that the Commissioners should close it, he would have given them the requisite powers. They had not kept faith about Canton. They had promised months before to effect an improvement there. None had been effected. He would himself enforce a better order of things. This done he would return to discuss whatever remained for consideration, peaceably or otherwise, as the Chinese Government might see fit.

Lord Elgin then departed, and on the 14th of February the Commissioners forwarded a decree, not, indeed, removing Hwang from the Governor-Generalship;

but still transferring his seal of Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Foreign Trade to Ho Kwei-tsing.

This decree was, doubtless, shaped so as to save the Imperial dignity. The Emperor would not disgrace the Governor-General (who has since been transferred to Sze-chuen), under pressure, and his choice of Ho, as Hwang's substitute, he had reason to believe would soothe us.

I have gone thus at length into this section* of the correspondence, from October to January, to show with what reluctance the Chinese Government took a minimum of action against an officer notoriously corrupt, and flagrantly tyrannical in his jurisdiction, and denounced by the highest in the land for a course of foreign policy prejudicial to the interests of peace. My conviction is, that the Government, or, to take a hint from the opening clause of the Canton letter, that portion of it which had the credit of establishing the Special Committee, and authorizing its operations, never abandoned the notion of recovering Canton until their defeat at Shek-tsing, a village near Canton, and other movements of the allied force, broke the spirit of the militia.

It is also my impression, however contradictory the statement may appear, that the strong language held to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin throughout this period, while it deterred them from attempting any of the changes I am persuaded they were sent southward to effect, enabled them at the same time to hold their own with the Emperor, by representing the impossibility of retracting what he is assumed to have required from people so violent and determined.

His withdrawal of the seal from Hwang was probably balanced somewhat in the Emperor's mind by the opportunity afforded him of declaring in his Decree, that our accounts from Canton (of kidnapping, assassination, &c.) surprised him much, as, in the "soothing and bridling" of foreign nations, China had never been treacherous.

Lord Elgin acknowledged the receipt of their last letter on the 3rd of March. He therein told the Commissioners of the appointment of his successor, charged with the ratified copy of the Treaty, to be exchanged at Peking, and of his own immediate departure for England. He communicated to them the consent of Her Majesty's Government to make the British Minister's residence at Peking but occasional, on the conditions before recited; and, bidding them farewell, reminded them that peace was only to be kept unbroken by a strict observance of the Treaty—by a mutual recognition of the equality of nations, between whom, he took occasion to remark, there could be no such relation as that implied in the words "soothing and bridling."

The Commissioners received this on the 29th of March. They made no move north, notwithstanding; on the contrary, on learning Mr. Bruce's arrival, they moved from Soo-chow, where they had spent the new year, to Shanghai.

Mr. Bruce's despatch to Kweiliang, of the 16th of May, announcing his arrival, and requesting that suitable preparations may be made for his reception at Tien-tsin, and his journey to Peking with the ratified Treaties and the autograph letter of Her Britannic Majesty, reached the Commissioners on the 27th, and their proceedings from this date are deserving of close attention.

Mr. Bruce found at Shanghai, on the 6th of June, three despatches from the Commissioners, the first dated the 27th of May, the day on which the second admits his letter of the 16th of May had arrived; also admits that Lord Elgin's last letter, announcing his departure, had reached them on the 29th of March. They had remained, nevertheless, because his Lordship had said he would return to discuss various questions, which they do not enumerate. His successor, who is, of course, equally competent with himself, is bound, they think, to take up the pending discussion with them, and with all speed, as the day named for the exchange of ratifications draws near.

The second, which is dated the 28th of May, acknowledging Mr. Bruce's of the 16th, urges that an important affair like the exchange of ratifications cannot be hurried through as he proposes; repeats that Lord Elgin's letters had kept them at Shanghai, the journey from which place to Peking would take two months; none but they themselves could represent the Chinese Government in the matter; there was no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, and nothing ready; they therefore propose that Mr. Bruce, instead of waiting "up there," where he will find it very hot, should put off his departure, and grant them an interview. This is accompanied by another of the same date, in which, insisting

again on Lord Elgin's engagement to return and discuss various questions, they beg to enumerate those of which he had disposed and those left unsettled.

He had agreed, they say :—

1st. That the coming visit to Peking was to be exceptional ; that the Minister was not constantly to be at Peking.

2nd. That his visit to Hankow was exceptional ; our movements were henceforth to be in accordance with the Treaty stipulations.

3rd. That none but respectable persons were to obtain passports, for the issue of which regulations must be devised. The Canton question was not settled, and Lord Elgin had promised to go further into this.

To take the last first, Lord Elgin had expressly told the Commissioners that the Canton question must be settled, and promptly, according to the Separate Article, which prescribes payment at Canton to be arranged by the Canton authorities. Before he left the south, Mr. Bruce had ascertained in May that the Canton authorities had no knowledge of this stipulation, or, if they had, were without any instructions to give it effect.

The other three are the ever-recurring clauses of difficulty ; the original modification of the first being further modified by total omission of the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government, as the Commissioners had been duly apprised in Lord Elgin's last letter, would consent to modify it. The other two are stated as they stand, I can only suppose to draw from Mr. Bruce some such acquiescence in what it would have been literally hard for him to dispute, as might preclude the possibility of his suggesting any arrangement for the anticipation of the Treaty terms—the far receding extinction of the rebels, before which no British subject can by Treaty claim to enter the region they infest.

Recalling the pertinacity with which the Commissioners have revived their objection to our enjoyment of the privileges here adverted to, the statements in the Canton letter, and in other quarters, of the Emperor's violent opposition to the concession of them, when we see them now, we should have said needlessly ; reproduced once more, we can only infer that some further limitations were contemplated.

A Chinese, last year my head clerk, but promoted after the Treaty, for his supposed knowledge of foreign affairs, to a mandarinship of the fifth grade, and now attached to Kweiliang, called twice on Mr. Lay, in the spring, first to ascertain whether we would agree to exchange ratifications at Shanghai ; secondly, if we would consent to proceed, overland, thence to Peking. The latter, be it observed, is the time-honoured form of introducing the periodical missions from Annam, Lewchew, and other dependent States, into Peking ; the form which enables China to maintain before her subjects that show of surveillance and patronage by which she has ever sought to negative a barbarian State's assumption of equality with herself. The American Treaty enables China to give the United States' Minister such a reception. So long as he does not insist on an audience, no tradition will be violated. It does not practically secure him access to Peking for any diplomatic purpose.

The above proposal accepted, our circulation under passports would infallibly have been infected by the precedent. No one would have travelled except under an official protection, resembling that proposed years ago by Kiyong for the neighbourhood of Canton—a protection so irksome and profitless to the few who availed themselves of it, that travelling, if it were to be under such auspices, was soon foregone altogether.

This is, of course, speculation ; nor is it more when I declare my belief that the Commissioners rather hoped than expected that we should halt at Shanghai, as they proposed, within three weeks of the day we were by Treaty required to be at Peking. They were, I imagine, acting under orders to try everything that might prevent our visit to the capital.

On receiving Mr. Bruce's peremptory reply of the 8th June, followed by his supplementary note of the 11th, the Commissioners laid down their arms. His letter of the 8th, they wrote, had been sent to the Emperor, who would receive it in some nine days. They had moved him to send a high officer to Tien-tsin to meet Mr. Bruce, whom they recommended to leave his ships of war outside the bar, and proceed in light marching order to Peking. They cannot themselves take steam as Mr. Bruce proposes, as the Emperor has not authorized them to do so, but in obedience to His Majesty's commands (when

received does not appear), they will go North with all speed. The suggestions respecting the anchorage of his squadron, is brought in, as it were, casually: "The Commissioners would wish," &c. There is no hint that the route by the Tien-tsin river is *condamnée*, or that the attempt to ascend it will be opposed.

Yet they must have known that opposition was imminent. The high authority, cited before, assured my informant that, so certain was he of a collision, that he should keep himself out of the way. The Court, he said, was not disabused of its invincibility, nor would it be without another defeat. It was, for all that, not too proud to be treacherous, as we have found to our cost. Admiral Hope had sailed before the Commissioners' last letter was received; but his first proceedings, it is worthy of observation, actually filled the measure of their requirement. He approached the bar on the 17th, with only one steamer and two gun-boats, and the officer sent in to communicate with the forts crossed the bar in a ship's gig.

On the 20th, finding that the people on the spot, who maintained, as on the former day, that they had closed the passage of the river without the orders of Government, had not, as they had promised, removed, but, on the contrary, had greatly multiplied the obstacles in the way of a free passage, he gave notice to the Intendant of Tien-tsin that his squadron would remain at the mouth of the river while Mr. Bruce was at Peking; he, therefore, wishes his men to land to purchase supplies. The Intendant only opposes their landing lest they should lose themselves in winding paths, amongst the camps and field-works which, he says, abound along the way between Ta-koo and Tien-tsin. He says nothing of the Government's objection to leave the river open, and he does say that the defences he alludes to are not to our address.

All this while no official, the militia and peasantry on shore affirm, is near the spot. Mr. Ward, the American Minister, is told the same story by the same people on the evening of the 24th; the batteries appear deserted until the following forenoon, when, as the foremost gun-boat, according to notice given the previous evening by Admiral Hope, attempts to pass the booms, they pour forth a fire from seventy guns, which for strength and direction is without precedent in our annals of Chinese warfare. Still no official appears at Ta-koo. On the other hand, Hang, the Governor-General of the province, does send a letter to Mr. Bruce, from a point some ten miles up the coast. It is dated the 23rd, but does not reach him till the 25th.

Now, Mr. Bruce's letter of the 9th, which had electrified the Commissioners, was to reach Peking in nine days—say before the 20th. We know by experience, that communications between Ta-koo and Peking do not take more than twenty-four hours. The Court, if it were prepared to disavow the hostile act of the Ta-koo garrison, must have forgotten that it could hardly, under the circumstances, plead ignorance of the great danger of a collision between the large force it had placed, months before, at Ta-koo, and a foreign squadron which had now been waiting since the 16th to have the river opened for the British Minister's admission. If it were *bond fide* intent on the preservation of peace, why should no official have presented himself to the Admiral at Ta-koo? or why should the only move of the character of a pacific overture been made at the eleventh hour, by a circuitous route, and with a want of alacrity at first sight inexplicable? For the despatch had been the best part of two days coming ten miles.

It invites Mr. Bruce to wait for the arrival of Kweiliang and his colleague, promising him that when he, Hang, shall have moved to the southward, the garrison and armament of the position from which he writes, he will come out to welcome him to the place, Peh-tang-ho by name, a port, if it deserve the designation, which the Americans found, in a few days, was doubtfully accessible even to a ship's boat.

I feel satisfied that, our object considered, the fulfilment of the Treaty, not in the letter, but in the spirit, we should make a mistake in approaching the capital otherwise than by its recognised highway. I do not see that the Americans can refuse to proceed to Peking by Peh-tang-ho, or by any less desirable route; Article V of their Treaty imposing on them almost all the restrictions which it is the very aim of our Articles III and IV to withstand. The American Minister may visit Peking once a year, with twenty people for a suite; he is to give intimation of his approach through the Board of Rites; and he is to complete his business without unnecessary delay; he will be held, as I have before hinted, by

the Government and people of China at precisely the same value as a Lewchewan or Siamese Envoy. This, some will say, is of little consequence. It is, at least, of this much, that little attention will be paid to the representations of an officer who takes so low a place, and it is only by insuring the attention which must be yielded when the question of equality is no longer in dispute, that we can hope for a peaceable settlement of misunderstanding with a people whose bigotry, arrogance, and insincerity are kept in check only by their fears.

To close observations which have greatly outrun their intended length, I am persuaded that its aversion to concede, even limited by the three privileges so often alluded to, is what has betrayed the Chinese Government into an act of war, which, with its usual pusillanimity, it was prepared to disavow had its forces suffered defeat. It has never accepted the changes forced upon it—the novelty, in the sense in which Western nations understand it. It was ready, *more suo*, to fend off those without fighting, and the Commissioners were, I make no doubt, to detain us at Shanghae under one pretext or another, until the year was so far spent that we might be induced, in our greed for commercial advantages, to accept an exchange of ratifications at Shanghae. Foreign relations, which in Chinese are simply synonymous with a Superintendence of Trade, would then have been handed over to Ho, whose “soothing and bridling” we are evidently assumed to prefer, and the great gain of the Treaty, the one means of preventing local misunderstandings, viz., the right of appeal to the Central Government against the acts of its subordinates, would, in default of precedent, have been as much in abeyance as though it had never been concluded.

Diplomacy failing, the Government still veiled its readiness for war—possibly from doubt in its powers, perhaps in the hope of taking us more completely unawares.

Mr. Hart’s interesting memorandum on Sungko-lin-sin’s temper and arrangements, together with Mr. Mongan’s information on the same head, are more or less corroborated by the junkmen who lay off the Peiho, lamenting grievously the interruption of their trade.

It must be noted in qualification of Sungko-lin-sin’s prowess, and of the Court’s resolution, that his victory was not adopted by the Government for some four or five days: at the end of which time the forts first showed the flags of five out of the eight banners under which the Tartar force is enrolled.

Since my return to Shanghae I have learned that many Chinese ascribe the collision altogether to Sungko-lin-sin, and entirely acquit the Emperor. They represent him as unable to restrain the Mongol, who, on learning that the Emperor was decidedly opposed to overt hostility, declared that, at all events, he would not admit the barbarian by way of Tien-tsin. The statement is very possibly the truth; it corresponds, more or less, with the report brought by M. Mouly from Peking. It would consist perfectly with the timid treachery of the Chinese Government that, having placed its responsibility, as it hoped, *à couvert*, by withdrawing its official presence from the scene, it should bide the issue of a course which, if unsuccessful, it was thus armed to condemn; and with the short-sightedness which, in my opinion, distinguishes its policy, that it should overlook the more terrible consequence of a success such as that it has obtained.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE,
Chinese Secretary.

No. 11.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Shanghae, July 15, 1859.

YOUR Lordship has been informed in my previous despatches that the American Minister, Mr. Ward, had associated himself with us in our demands to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Peking, and had further stated to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghae that he was instructed to deliver in person the letter of the President of the United States of America to the Emperor of China. He could only claim these privileges under the most favoured nation clause, and, therefore, awaited the results of the attempts made to detain us at

Shanghai. When they failed, he expressed his intention of going to the Pei and received an invitation from the Commissioners to accompany us there.

On the 24th, he crossed the bar of the Peiho in a small steamer, with the intention of proceeding to the booms, and making the attempt to advance up the river, leaving it to the Chinese to fire on him if they chose to do so. His steamer, however, grounded before reaching them, and was with difficulty got off by the gun-boats, after considerable delay. He therefore contented himself with demanding a passage, and was met by a refusal on the part of the militia, who gave themselves out as the garrison of the forts. He remained at the mouth of the river during the attack, determined to push up had we opened a way through the barriers; and it is very gratifying to me to bear testimony to the friendly feeling and assistance we derived from himself and Flag Officer Tatnall on that day.

After we had decided on abandoning the attempt to reach Peking, Mr. Ward considered himself bound to effect, if possible, the exchange of ratifications under the provisions of the American Treaty. He had received no communication since his arrival from the Imperial Government, but he addressed a letter to the Governor-General, expressing his wish to proceed to Peking and exchange the ratifications there. This letter he dispatched in his steamer to Peh-tang-ho, with his secretary and interpreter. I inclose a Memorandum, showing the nature of the approach to Peh-tang-ho, and its defences.

I have heard indirectly that when the boat from the steamer approached the shore, most of the villagers fled. With difficulty two men were found, to whom the object of the visit was explained and the letter delivered, on their undertaking to forward it to the Governor-General, whose place of residence they would not, however, divulge. They at the same time urged the bearers to return, without delay, to the boat, to avoid being attacked by the horsemen who were seen in the neighbourhood. It was fortunate that they did so; for they were chased by the cavalry, two of whom pursued them into the water.

Soon after a junk came off with provisions, and a message from the authority of the place to say that the letter had been forwarded, and that an answer would be shortly received. On the 5th of July, Mr. Ward informed me that the Governor-General had appointed Friday, the 8th, for an interview at Peh-tang-ho. Having left on the 6th, I do not, as yet, know the result.

I do not think that the Chinese will make difficulties about exchanging the ratifications of the American Treaty. The conditions under which the American Minister is alone entitled to visit the capital, contain nothing offensive to Chinese pride, or inconsistent with its claims of national superiority. The Treaty does not open the Yang-tze river, or any port to the north of Shanghai, nor does it give the right to travel in the interior of the country. It leaves also untouched the important question of transit duties. The true policy of the Chinese would be, therefore, to receive Mr. Ward in a friendly manner, in the hopes of inducing him to act as mediator.

Mr. Ward's position is one of considerable difficulty; nor do I see, after our unsuccessful attempt at the Peiho, that any course was open save the one he has adopted. He has acted cordially and frankly in the spirit of his declarations to me at Hong Kong; and it is a matter of satisfaction to me that his concert in our previous proceedings is a strong argument in favour of the line of conduct pursued by M. de Bourboulon and myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Memorandum.

THE "Toeywan" left this anchorage on Wednesday morning, 29th June, about 11 o'clock, with the parties bearing a letter addressed by me to the Governor-General of this province. After going north along the coast about six miles, they discovered junks' masts over the land, and upon approaching within four miles of the coast, it then being high spring tide, and only ten feet

water, and able to find no other channel where there was deeper water, they steered again to the northward, and went five miles farther north.

Where the junks were seen there was supposed to have been a small stream of water. This point was guarded by three forts, and there was a village in the neighbourhood. It could not be approached any nearer for want of water. About five miles north of the forts another village was seen, to which the "Toeywan" was enabled to approach within a mile and a-half, having then nine feet at half-tide.

I herewith attach a tracing of the route of the "Toeywan."

No. 12.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches of the 30th of May, 1st and 14th of June, and 5th, 13th, and 15th of July, the first three giving an account of your proceedings up to the time of your departure from Shanghai for the mouth of the Peiho, and the last three containing a report of the events which occurred on your arrival off the Peiho, and of your subsequent return to Shanghai.

The events of the first period are clear and free from all obscurity, and I am happy to convey to you Her Majesty's entire approval of your communications with the Chinese Commissioners, and of the firmness with which you resisted their attempts to dissuade you from insisting upon the strict fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. That Treaty provided for the exchange of ratifications at Peking on a day not later than the 26th of June of the present year, a time so nearly at hand as not to admit of any further delay.

You were enjoined by the instructions given you by the Earl of Malmesbury, on your departure from England, to insist upon being received at Peking, and to refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place. You were further informed that it might be advisable before your departure from Shanghai to send an intimation to Peking of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements might be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Peking. You were informed that the Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China had been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and you were instructed that unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war.

Your conduct, therefore, in insisting upon being received at Peking and in proceeding to the mouth of the Peiho, was in strict conformity with your instructions. Upon arriving at the mouth of the Peiho you were placed in circumstances of great difficulty: in selecting the course you were to pursue, you were obliged to found that course mainly upon presumptive evidence.

In these circumstances you had to weigh contingencies upon which no safe calculation could be made. I can only say, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government, without being able in the present state of their information, to judge precisely what measures it might have been most advisable for you to adopt at the moment, see nothing in the decision that you took to diminish the confidence which they repose in you.

Her Majesty deeply regrets the loss of life which attended the gallant though unsuccessful efforts of the British and French forces to clear the passage of the river. But Her Majesty has commanded preparations to be made which will enable her forces, in conjunction with those of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to support you in the execution of the instructions which will be hereafter addressed to you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 27.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, July 31, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter addressed by Ho, the Imperial Commissioner, to M. de Bourboulon, shortly after our return to this place from the North. M. de Bourboulon has communicated the letter to me, and replied, as we agreed, that we had forwarded an account of what passed to our Governments, and that we could take no further step with reference to the mission to Peking until we received fresh instructions.

The letter, as your Lordship will observe, purports to be from Ho alone, and does not profess to convey the sentiments of the Peking Government on the occurrences at the mouth of the Peiho. It mentions Peh-tang as the place to which we ought to have gone, and as I can hardly suppose that the Commissioners were ignorant of the determination of the Chinese Government to prevent our ascending the usual channel, which is called, in one of the late memorials published in the Peking "Gazette," "the highway to Peking," I infer that the Commissioners in abstaining from naming Peh-tang in their letter to me of the 12th of June, were actuated by a wish to keep me in ignorance of its intentions. In both my letters to them I had stated that I should proceed to the city of Tien-tsin by ship, and in their final reply to me, their invitation to the mouth of the river, and their allusion to the bar, pointed unequivocally to Takoo.

I ought to mention that by the former French Treaty, as well as by those made last year, vessels of war coming with pacific objects are entitled to enter any Chinese port. It may, perhaps, admit of a question whether under this clause we could claim the right of going up to Tien-tsin, but there can be no doubt that we were entitled under it to cross the bar, and claim admittance to Takoo for provisions and water; and the Russians in their new Treaty have expressly stipulated that their Minister shall, if he wishes, proceed to Peking by Takoo. Even the Americans have provided that their Minister may come to the mouth of the Peiho, and call upon the authorities at that place to provide boats for him in which to continue his journey to the capital. These provisions all point to the river as the route to Peking, the only one of which we have any knowledge, and the one followed by all our previous Embassies. If the Chinese had consented to our adopting it, they knew that they could not have reduced the number of our retinue by alleging the want of means of transport and of accommodation—pretexts they could make use of in a journey by land; and I attribute their closing it to a determination to give to our mission to Peking the character, not of an Embassy of one equal State to another, implying a personal reception by the Sovereign, and the recognition of diplomatic relations, but of a visit to the capital by an agent for the transaction of business, as conceded by Treaty to the Americans, not to be repeated except for weighty reasons, and with the consent of the Chinese Government. The important point of the recognition of international equality, and of the footing on which our future relations are to be placed, are involved in the reception to be accorded to me on this first occasion, and I confess I think it would be better that the Minister should not go to Peking at all, than that he should do so on the terms indicated in the previous letters of Kweiliang to me, and in the inclosed letter from Ho.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Governor-General Ho to M. de Bourboulon.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner superintending the trade at the ports, Guardian of the Crown Prince (Titulary), President of the Board of War, and Governor-General of the Two Kiang, makes a communication.

The correspondence which passed between your Excellency and myself in the 4th moon, when you came from Europe (*dit.*, the West), has long made us known to each other. (We have not met, for) on your arrival at a subsequent period in Shanghai, your Excellency at once proceeded towards Tien-tsin.

The Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, also at once turned homewards by land, and I did hope that the Treaties would have been exchanged, and the trade under the new regulations have opened at an early date. My anticipations have been disappointed: your Excellency and the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, have come south again; Mr. Ward, the American Minister, has, I understand, met the Governor-General of Chih-li at Peh-tang, in the Department of Tien-tsin. Visits have been exchanged between them; they are on the most friendly terms; and as soon as the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, reach Peking, the American Treaty will be exchanged as stipulated. The fact is, that the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, not being aware that Hang, the Governor-General of Chih-li, was waiting for him at Peh-tang, went in at Takoo, which he should not have done. The consequence was, certainly without intention on either side—an untoward accident, which ought not to have occurred.*

Kweiliang and his colleagues will by this time, I should say, have reached the capital; and your Excellency, it appears to me, would save time by proceeding promptly to the seaboard (or to a port) of Tien-tsin, and exchanging your Treaty simultaneously (with Mr. Ward). The British Minister, Mr. Bruce, has never been in correspondence with me in my individual capacity,† and as it would not, consequently, be correct that I should address him on the present occasion, it becomes my duty to request your Excellency to make him my best apologies, and with gentle words to persist in dissuading him‡ (from further action or violence, assuring him that) were it possible for him to accompany you to the North he might dismiss all suspicion, and that Kweiliang and his colleagues will be certain to treat him courteously at Peh-tang, in faithful fulfilment of past engagements. The friendly understanding thenceforward established, native and foreigner alike, will be steeped in advantage.

The rectitude and intelligence of your Excellency and the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, have long been well known to me. On my side, the straightforwardness of my character, and my regard for good faith and justice are, I imagine, so far known to your Excellency and Mr. Bruce that you will not look on my words as (or unsubstantiated).§ I write accordingly, that your Excellency when you have looked into the matter, may deliberate and take action. Trusting that you will reply to me, I avail myself of the occasion to wish you daily enjoyment of peace and prosperity.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency M. de Bourboulon Hien-fung, 9th year, 6th moon, 19th day (July 1859).

No. 14.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1859.

THERE are no reasons for interrupting friendly relations with the Chinese at Shanghai, Canton, and elsewhere.

Preparations are being made both in this country and in France in order that the Treaty of Tien-tsin may be fully carried into effect.

But it is to be hoped that when our conditions, and the extent of our preparations, are known to the Chinese Government, peaceful relations may be placed upon a permanent footing without further effusion of blood.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

* The word signifying that Mr. Bruce was wrong in going in at Takoo, does not make this error intentional or the reverse. The "untoward accident" is literally a shoot from the bamboo between the joints, where no shoot ought to show itself; the expression describes figuratively any occurrence at once abnormal and objectionable.

† Ho has written to Mr. Bruce with Kweiliang and his colleagues, but never singly.

‡ M. de Bourboulon is to reiterate soft words, and to recommend the separation (of combatants), or, the putting away (of wrath).

§ *Lit.*, as the milky way, misty without definite bounds, unreal.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, August 10, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a letter from Ho, Imperial Commissioner for the General Superintendence of Trade at the Ports, and of my reply thereto.

He has probably been instructed to discover whether I would consent to go to the North, with the view of exchanging the ratifications at Peking; and the friendly expressions contained in M. de Bourboulon's reply have induced him to make this second attempt. The reference to Mr. Ward indicates pretty clearly that we should be expected to conform to the treatment accorded to him.

All we know of the proceedings of the American Minister is, that on the 20th of July he was to land at Peh-tang-ho, with twenty persons, consisting of his suite and officers of the American ships, whence they were to be conveyed in the covered carts of the country to a point on the Peiho river, a few miles below Tien-tsin. They were to embark there in boats for Tung-chow. The Americans seem to apprehend that there will be a difficulty as to the conveyance from Tung-chow to Peking; they proposing sedan-chairs as the more honourable mode of travelling, the Chinese advocating the covered carts without springs.

It appears that the Russian Minister, General Ignatieff, succeeded in reaching Peking, and in exchanging the ratifications of the Russian Treaty towards the end of May. The Governor-General of Eastern Siberia (Mouravieff), in returning from Japan, has proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, and sent up despatches to Peking. His object in proceeding to Ta-koo is not known.

I have thought it advisable to take advantage of Ho's commission being confined to matters of trade, to decline entering with him into any discussion of the events that took place in the North, or answering his question as to a renewed visit in that quarter. I think this will probably lead to an overture from Peking itself, or to the despatch of Commissioners here to propose some terms of accommodation. By that time I shall have ascertained how Mr. Ward has been received, and whether he has obtained a personal interview with the Emperor, which he, in concert with M. de Bourboulon and myself, demanded in the letter addressed by him to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghai; a demand which I could not waive on this occasion without putting myself in a worse position than that occupied by Lord Macartney during his Embassy to China.

P.S.—It appears that the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana reached Peking on July 21, thirty-eight days after their departure from Shanghai, though they stated officially to Mr. Ward, before we left this place for the Peiho, that their journey would occupy more than two months.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Governor-General Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner for the General Superintendence of Trade at the Ports, Guardian of the Fleur Apparent (Titulary), President of the Board of War, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, makes a communication.

On hearing of his Excellency Mr. Bruce's arrival from Europe in the 4th moon of this year, the Imperial Commissioner, with his colleagues, Kwei, Hwa, and Twau, referring to Lord Elgin's original engagement, repaired to Shanghai. After waiting there a month without meeting Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner was informed that his Excellency had proceeded, in company with the French Minister, M. de Bourboulon, to Tien-tsin. At a late period (hearing of) the return (of the Ministers) to the South, he addressed a letter to M. de Bourboulon, that he might communicate all particulars to Mr. Bruce. To this letter he has just received a reply, by which he learns that their Excel-

lencies, Mr. Bruce as well as M. de Bourboulon, have every confidence in his the Commissioner's desire for the lasting endurance of a good understanding.

Evidence so complete of Mr. Bruce's breadth of views, (the hope it affords that) there will now be no more trouble, that weapons will be laid aside, and a good understanding established for evermore, is most gratifying to the Commissioner.

He will at the same time be obliged to Mr. Bruce to inform him whether, as the American Minister, Mr. Ward, has already gone up to Peking to exchange the ratifications of his Treaty, it will be in his Excellency's power to name a day for proceeding North with M. de Bourboulon, in order that, should it be, he may advise His Majesty the Emperor to that effect; and that he may write to the Imperial Commissioners, Kwei, Hwa, and Twau, as also to Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, to make all the necessary arrangements for their Excellencies' entrance into Peking without mistake or confusion.

As in duty bound, the Commissioner addresses this letter to the British Minister, that when he shall have informed himself of its contents he may reply thereto. He avails himself of this occasion to wish his Excellency the compliments of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.
Hien-fung, 9th year, 7th moon, 3rd day (1st August, 1859).

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Mr. Bruce to Governor-General Ho.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., begs to acknowledge the receipt of a letter dated 1st instant, from his Excellency Ho, &c., &c., requesting to be informed if the Undersigned is prepared to fix a day on which to proceed North with the French Minister, for the purpose of exchanging ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year.

From his Excellency's official title it would appear that his function as Imperial Commissioner is the superintendence of trade at the ports; and upon questions of trade the Undersigned can have no difficulty in corresponding with his Excellency.

As Governor-General of this jurisdiction, the Undersigned takes occasion to draw his Excellency's attention to the late disturbances at Shanghai, in which an unoffending Englishman was killed, and Mr. Lay and others severely wounded. Those events happened on the 29th July, and the perpetrators of the outrage have not yet been arrested.

The question which the Imperial Commissioner Ho, in his letter, has addressed to the Undersigned, does not relate to trade, nor does the Undersigned conceive himself at liberty to correspond with his Excellency upon any matter connected with the late proceedings of the Chinese Government in the North.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghai, August 9, 1859.

No. 15.

Acting Consul Winchester to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 16.)

Sir,

Canton, August 22, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Mr. Bruce, reporting on the general condition of affairs in this port and in the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES A. WINCHESTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Acting Consul Winchester to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Canton, August 22, 1859.

IT is with satisfaction I have the honour to report that uninterrupted quiet and tranquillity have prevailed to this date. We are indebted for this as much to the strong desire existing on the part of the inhabitants of Canton for the preservation of that internal peace by which their material interests have so strikingly prospered during the last few months, as to the attitude which the Provincial Government has maintained in its relations to foreigners.

This attitude, which, I doubt not, is, from personal motives, agreeable to the high officers themselves, is the result of the instructions received from Peking. The last were conveyed in the form of an edict, of which I inclose the Chinese and translation. Looking at the tone of this document, in connexion with the various considerations which render a pacific policy immediately desirable, and with the spirit displayed by the Provincial Government in its acts generally, and more particularly in the wide promulgation of the inclosed proclamation; I think we may reasonably infer that the Imperial Government is anxious that the chances of an accommodation of its difficulties with the Allied Powers, on such terms as would suit its own views, should not be imperilled by any hasty or untoward outbreak in this neighbourhood.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Imperial Edict.

(Translation.)

ON the 15th day of the 6th moon we had the honour to receive an Imperial Edict as follows:

“When the foreign ships opened fire at Tien-tsin, we directed Laou to be informed of the circumstances of the engagement. We have now heard from Sin-ko-lin-sin, who reports that the English and French troops had all left on the 12th instant; but two American ships remained at anchor at the north mouth, waiting to proceed to Peking to exchange Treaties.

“Permission to do this has been already accorded; and, should the English perchance repent, friendly relations with them even now may be restored.

“According to Laou’s last memorial, he was to have started on the 17th of the 5th moon to take up his post, and must have already reached Canton. Let him, then, carry on his Government smoothly, and keep the French and English now there quiet and respectful as heretofore; not cause them to become suspicious.

“Let this be conveyed to him for his instruction at the rate of 600 li (*Anglice* 200 miles) per diem.”

In obedience to His Majesty’s commands this letter is dispatched.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Imperial Edict.

(Translation.)

A CONSIDERABLE period has now elapsed without any Memorial reaching us, reporting the condition and aspect of affairs in Kwang-tung, and intense in consequence is our anxiety on that head.

The British (Plenipotentiary) Bruce has brought his ships of war into our (northern) waters, without having had any interview with Kweiliang, to whom he merely addressed a communication to the effect that he was on his way to Tien-tsin to exchange the Treaty ratifications. On his arrival at the port of Ta-koo, he was directed either to anchor outside the Lan-keang bar, and remain there quietly until Kweiliang’s arrival at Tien-tsin for the transaction of business, or to precede Kweiliang to Tien-tsin by the Peh-tang route, and take up his quarters for a time in the official lodge; he, however, decidedly refused to

comply with the directions, and said that he wished to do away with the various works that had been constructed for the defence of our port. He then, on the 25th of the 5th month, without waiting for any arrangement to be made, broke over the port barrier, and, advancing with his steamers and boats quite close to the forts, took the initiative in opening fire. He further landed his foot companies and provoked a collision (or challenged the occupants of the forts.) Now, inasmuch as the nation in question not having as yet interchanged the ratifications was the first to set the Treaty at distance, Sung Ko-lin-sin could not do otherwise than meet the foe, and the consequence was, that great numbers of the enemy were slain, and twelve of their vessels destroyed. The British Commander-in-chief, Admiral Hope, wounded by the falling of a mast struck by a shot from the forts, has been for some days back repairing the damages sustained by his ships, outside the Lan-keang bar; and Sung Ko-lin-sin is, of course, on his side in readiness at his post (or, is in readiness to meet the Admiral, whatever course the latter may adopt).

The nation in question has, on several occasions, been the first to originate disturbances; nevertheless, I, the Emperor, in my intercourse with foreign States, must not be too severe (or my policy is an indulgent one). If, therefore, the said country will, with repentant heart, await Kweiliang's arrival for the exchange of ratifications, the affair can be passed over, and recourse to arms prevented and stayed.

No memorial has yet been received from Laou reporting his arrival at Kwang-tung, to which place he has been removed (from Kwang-si, in the capacity of Governor), holding also the seals of Governor-General. The particulars of the Tien-tsin engagement cannot, we think, be accurately known at Kwang-tung. If the people of the nation in question behave in the usual manner at Canton, and cause no troubles, (Laou) must not take the initiative in having recourse to arms. The love of war displayed by the said country cannot be considered a sufficient reason for the adoption of measures which would interfere with the trade of the merchants of various nations, and injure them both in property and capital, and earnestly have I, the Emperor, revolved these matters in my mind!!

Let these commands be sent at the rate of 600 *li* per diem for (Laou's) information and guidance. Respect this!

In obedience to the Imperial command the orders are now transmitted.

No. 17.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 30.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, September 2, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter from the Imperial Commissioner Ho of the 13th ultimo, which I received after the departure of the last mail. It is the answer to my communication of the 9th ultimo, copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 10th ultimo.

Ho states in his letter that as the exchange of Treaties is really a question of trade, he is entitled to discuss it; thus showing that he, and those under whose orders he acts, still hold to the old principle of considering the relations of China with foreign nations as purely commercial.

As to the late disturbances, the Commissioner sees their principal cause in the acts of the foreigners, and ascribes the murder and the assaults that were committed, to mistakes of the excited populace. He then adds that he has given orders for the apprehension of the offenders.

These orders have led to no result, which I ascribe rather to the unwillingness of the Chinese authorities, than to their inability to do justice in this matter; for they have discovered several native crimps, and have summarily executed them.

I therefore again addressed his Excellency Ho on the 28th ultimo, to point

out to him that his instructions had not been carried out, and to express my belief that the authorities were not acting fairly towards us.

I beg to inclose copy of my note for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

.Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Commissioner Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, &c., makes a communication in reply.

The Commissioner is in receipt of his Excellency the British Minister's letter of the 11th instant (9th of August), to the effect that he cannot well reply to the Commissioner upon the subject of proceeding North to exchange Treaties, as he is Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade.

It is for trade* that the Treaties are exchanged (or, the exchange of Treaties is really a question of trade). When the Imperial Commissioners Kwei, Hwa, Ming, and Twau, came to Shanghae last year, the Commissioner was associated with them in all their conferences with the late British Minister Lord Elgin, and in all the correspondence his, the Commissioner's, name and title appears. So, too, in the letters received from Mr. Bruce, on his arrival at Shanghae, does the Commissioner's name and title appear,† which shows that he is, beyond doubt, a competent authority on the subject of exchanging the Treaties.

As regards the tumult among the Chinese at Shanghae, on the 30th of the 6th moon (29th of July), the forcible abduction of Chinese by foreigners, and their exportation beyond sea, had excited general indignation. The simple people knew not to what nation the kidnappers belonged, neither was it in their power to distinguish the foreigners of different nations one from the other. Hence the assault and murder of one man, and the injuries inflicted on the Inspector-General Lay. The French Consul brought the vessel loaded with men back into port, and in concert with the Intendant of the Su-Sung-Tai circuit, instituted inquiries which showed that the ship was French, and loaded for foreign parts by a Spaniard. Such being the facts, a fray having been caused by the Treaty being thus broken, the merits of the question are very plain. The assault on Mr. Lay, and the murder of the foreigner, were committed by mistake, but although the Chinese who did these acts did them not wilfully, they are still liable to punishment. The Commissioner finds that by the law of China, the persons guilty of killing the wrong man in a quarrel, or of wrongfully wounding any one standing by, are all liable to be seized, tried, and punished. The popular mind is, however, still excited, because there are still people who have been kidnapped unrecovered. The Commissioner has given positive orders to the Intendant to place himself in communication with the military authorities, and to issue instructions to the civilians of the districts in his jurisdiction, also to write to the different Consuls, that on either side due restraint may be exercised (or that native and foreigner may be controlled); on the one hand, the kidnapped men recovered, on the other, the parties guilty of murderous violence arrested and punished, each according to his deserts; to the pacification of feuds, and the manifestation of justice; of all which Mr. Bruce, residing as he does at Shanghae, so near (the scene of action), cannot fail to be exactly informed.

The Commissioner therefore replies, availing himself of the opportunity to wish that his Excellency may enjoy the blessings of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 7th moon, 15th day (August 13, 1859).

* I believe the passage to be a simple declaration of the view of foreign relations to which China desires to adhere to. So in the Commissioner's despatch of the 28th May, Ho is put forward as the officer correspondence with whom will conduce to the maintenance of a good understanding. In both instances the provision of Article V of the new Treaty is, I think purposely, ignored. There is to be no such thing as diplomatic intercourse.—T. W.

† This statement is simply untrue. In accordance with the spirit of Article V, Mr. Bruce's letter was addressed to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, alone.—T. W.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

*Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Ho.**Shanghai, August 28, 1859.*

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour to receive, on the 18th instant, the reply of his Excellency Ho, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade, &c., to his letter of the 9th instant.

His Excellency informs the Undersigned of the steps he had instructed the local authorities to take for the detection and punishment of the persons who murdered one British subject, and assaulted several others, on the 29th ultimo. His Excellency farther remarks, that the Undersigned, being resident at Shanghai, is in a position to know that such is the case.

No measure taken could, indeed, escape the notice of the Undersigned, and he is concerned to be obliged to observe, not only that the parties guilty of the murder and assault committed one month ago have not been arrested, but that no *bond fide* effort has been made to discover them. A reward, indeed, has been offered, but this attracts very little attention. The Undersigned is sufficiently acquainted with the working of the police system in China to be satisfied that, had the authorities been in earnest, the guilty might with ease have been detected. On the other hand, although the authorities, zealously assisted in every investigation they have suggested by the foreign Consuls, have utterly failed to establish a single case of kidnapping against foreigners, they have abstained from all attempt to disabuse the people of their false impression, or to contradict these reports, which, if not entirely unfounded, are, at all events, grossly exaggerated. On the contrary, day after day notifications have been issued, ostensibly to quiet the public mind, but in reality calculated to excite it against foreigners, by the announcement which invariably heads these notices, that the late disturbance was solely due to the forcible abduction of Chinese by foreign agents.

With reference to his Excellency's remark, that the letters of the Undersigned, on his arrival at Shanghai, were addressed to his Excellency in common with his colleagues, the Undersigned begs to assure him that his letters of the 8th and 11th June—letters to which his Excellency refers—were all to the address of the Senior Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, alone.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 18.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 30.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, September 3, 1859.

MR. WARD, the American Minister, returned here on the 21st August, and I inclose an account, published by the American officers who accompanied him, of the principal incidents that marked his journey, and of the treatment the Mission experienced during the fifteen days they spent at Peking.

The perusal of this account shows that the Chinese Government are still far from recognizing or respecting the rights of foreign Envoys; that, whatever they may have apparently conceded on paper, they practically refuse to admit diplomatic intercourse on a footing of national equality, and that a visit to the capital is only acceptable if it can be converted into a means of flattering the pride and acknowledging the superiority of the Emperor of China.

No purely pacific Mission could have proceeded to Peking under more favourable circumstances than that of Mr. Ward. Fear of the consequences that may ensue from the collision at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river, the favourable opportunity of establishing a precedent for the personal interview with the Emperor by negotiations conducted with an isolated Envoy, unsupported by force, and the weight such a reception would have given to their remonstrances against the conduct of M. de Bourboulon and myself as harsh and overbearing, all concurred in pointing out the expediency of a friendly and honourable reception being accorded to the American Mission. So far from this being the case,

a comparison with what took place on the occasion of previous British Embassies to China will prove that the position of the American Envoy has been markedly inferior; that there was a studied intention of making the visit so physically exhausting by the mode of conveyance adopted, and so morally irksome by the surveillance and restrictions imposed, as to render its renewal improbable; and that, when Mr. Ward's firmness disappointed the Chinese Government in its hopes of extorting concessions from him on the question of ceremonial, they crowned their insulting conduct by requiring him to return and exchange the Treaties at Peh-tang, he having been invited by an Imperial Decree to perform this ceremony at Peking. Mr. Ward has informed me that he returns more convinced than ever of the soundness of our determination to proceed to Tien-tsin under our own flags, and of the accuracy of the information we obtained at Shanghae, as to the unreasonableness of the Court, and the influence gained by the anti-foreign party in the Emperor's counsels. His opinion is, that, unless thoroughly enlightened as to the hopelessness of resistance, the Imperial Government will not consent to the establishment of relations on the footing I am instructed to demand that they should be placed. He describes as remarkable the contrast between the tone of confidence at Peking and the alarm of the authorities on the coast as to the consequences of the late collision.

To proceed with the account of Mr. Ward's visit, I may remind your Lordship that after some delay Hang-fuh, the Governor-General of Chili, wrote to him, stating that he had received the Emperor's decree authorizing Mr. Ward to proceed, after the 19th July, by way of Peh-tang, to the capital, there to await the coming of the Imperial Commissioners, on whose arrival the ratifications were to be exchanged.

On the strength of this invitation Mr. Ward disembarked at Peh-tang on the 20th, and was informed that he was to make the journey to a point ten miles above Tien-tsin, in one of the covered vehicles of the country. These carriages are drawn by a mule, sometimes coupled with a horse, sometimes with a donkey. They have no springs, the body resting on the axle-tree, and no aperture for the admission of air; and Mr. Ward described the suffering and exhaustion of this mode of travelling as intense. In fact, no one but a person in robust health could support such a journey.

In a country where every detail of life is a matter of precise regulation, the conveyance in which a traveller is carried indicates his rank and position in the eyes of the population. Your Lordship will see by the inclosed extract from Staunton's account of Lord Macartney's Embassy, that of the three modes of travelling by chair, on horseback, and in carriages, the last is the least honourable. Lord Macartney himself, and the three principal members of his suite, travelled in chairs from Tung-chow to Peking, the other gentlemen on horseback with the mandarins, and the servants and privates of his English escort in covered carts or waggons. Chairs were similarly provided for the accommodation of Lord Amherst's Embassy on their return to Tung-chow, even after his abrupt and angry dismissal by the Emperor.

The object of the Chinese authorities in proposing this conveyance to Mr. Ward, was to lower him and his nation in the eyes of the natives—a result both agreeable to the personal vanity of the high provincial authorities, and consistent with Chinese policy. I have little doubt that Mr. Ward would have refused to accept this accommodation, had the intent of the Chinese in proposing it being properly explained. But in such matters a Minister freshly arrived from the West is entirely in the hands of those who have made the language and customs of China a study. It may be true, as has been asserted, that these gentlemen are sometimes unnecessarily touchy on points of etiquette, but their exclusive education produces in other instances an exactly opposite effect, and inclines them rather to consult Chinese prejudices than to insist on what their own national dignity requires.

On leaving the river at Tung-chow, conveyances of the same kind were supplied, and the road being paved with granite slabs, and completely out of repair, the jolting became so intolerable that Mr. Ward was at length obliged to descend and commence walking under a burning sun; horses having been refused him for the performance of this part of the journey. On this the Chinese officer in command of the escort dismounted, and lent him his own horse, but resumed it on approaching Peking, which Mr. Ward accordingly entered in the carriage. I have seen a letter addressed to the Roman Catholic missionaries on the effect

produced by his entry on the crowds of Chinese collected to witness it. The letter describes the cortége as being so modest that the Chinese did not believe that the American Minister could be there. "Humilime intravit," are the Latin words by which the entry itself is described.

He was lodged in a spacious building called the "Prince's Palace," to prepare which for his reception Mr. Ward was told a large sum had been issued, though it did not appear to him that the money could have gone to its legitimate destination. A number of soldiers or police were placed round it as a mark of honour; but it soon appeared as much for the purpose of keeping the residents in, as of keeping the curious and impertinent out. Mr. Ward himself was stopped on attempting to go into the street, and it was only by threatening not to proceed to business that he obtained leave for the members of his Mission to go out on foot. His application for horses and guides, to enable them to ride and find their way about the city, was flatly refused. A foreigner in Peking allowed to go out on foot, but deprived of horses and guides, is a prisoner in everything but the name. The Chinese authorities having discovered that the Chinese steward ("comprador") had obtained for the Americans some paper-fans, on which a plan of the city is printed, threatened him with death in the event of his buying anything for them without their knowledge and permission.

When remonstrated with on this restraint, the Chinese said that as soon as business was concluded the Americans should be allowed to go about freely; but it seems that the restriction was applied not only as a means of pressure to induce the Americans to be pliant on the ceremony of presentation, but also to keep them from any communication with the Russian Mission. A Russian officer is said to have attempted to force his way into their residence, but without success, and even a letter was detained for six days before it was delivered. In the meantime every effort was made, by alternate coaxing and angry remonstrance, to obtain Mr. Ward's assent to an interview with the Emperor. The hope of inducing him to agree to a ceremony, differing sufficiently from that performed by foreign Envoys towards European Sovereigns to imply the recognition of a certain superiority in the Emperor of China, was, I have no doubt, the motive that determined the Chinese Government to admit him to Peking. For disappointed in this hope by Mr. Ward's firmness, Kweiliang, disregarding entirely the fact that Mr. Ward had come up to Peking in consequence of the Emperor's inviting him to exchange ratifications there, wrote to Mr. Ward to ask why he had come to Peking, as he had resolved to adhere so obstinately to his own opinion.

In his reply, Mr. Ward quoted the invitation he had received, and referred to his being charged with a letter from the President to the Emperor of China. The Chinese Government, which persists in considering the engagements it enters into with commercial nations as affairs of trade, to be arranged by the Commissioner appointed to superintend the open ports, not as falling within the attributions of the Imperial Cabinet, laid hold of the pretext afforded by Mr. Ward's allusion to the Presidential letter, to treat it as the sole cause of the visit to Peking. They declined, however, to accept it, unless Mr. Ward declared previously in writing that his refusal to perform the required ceremony originated in no want of respect, either on his part or on that of the President, towards the Emperor.

Having written a despatch to that effect, Mr. Ward was informed by an Imperial Decree that "the language of his letters being respectful," he was authorized to present it to Kweiliang and his colleagues. As regards the exchange of the Treaty, he was told that he ought properly to return to Shanghai, and exchange it there: still, in consideration of his long voyage, the seal was to be appended to it, and Hung-fuh, the Governor-General of Chih-li, will deliver it in exchange. Mr. Ward was then reconducted to Peh-tang, the point whence he had started, and the ceremony of exchanging ratifications was performed by Hung. Your Lordship will recollect that when it suited their purpose to delay us at Shanghai, Kweiliang stated it that he and his colleagues were the only persons by whom the exchange of ratifications could be effected.

The Chinese Government in this Decree, which has since been published in the "Peking Gazette," state, for the first time, that there was a deliberate intention on their part not to allow me to ascend the river, and that Takoo was fortified by the Emperor's orders. They affirm that this decision was communicated to the foreign Envoys by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai, and that

they were told they must go round by Peh-tang. These assertions are distinctly contrary to the truth, though I think it not improbable that the Commissioners may have represented the matter in this light to the Emperor. Neither in the letters that passed between the Commissioners and the Envoys, nor during the interviews Mr. Ward had with them, was a word said of defences at Takoo, nor was any allusion made to Peh-tang, a place of which we knew nothing until Mr. Ward landed there in July, and which Flag-Officer Tatnall assures me is not a branch of the Tien-tsin river at all. As to our firing first, it is contradicted by a memorial of Sung Ko-lin-sin which is in circulation, though it has not been officially published, and which states distinctly that his men could not be restrained from firing when they saw the gun-boats removing the stakes.

Another incident took place during the interview between Mr. Ward and the Governor-General, which deserves to be mentioned: your Lordship may recollect that that Mr. Ward, the day before the attempt was made to ascend the Peiho, steamed over the bar with the intention of advancing to the barriers, of claiming a passage through them, and of taking part in any conflict that might ensue, should the Chinese fire upon him. He was prevented from making the attempt by his steamer running aground below the stakes, and he therefore sent a boat to demand permission to go up the river. On nearing the jetty, a Tartar of distinguished appearance came down to meet it; but when Mr. Ward's card was handed to him, he refused to receive it, saying that he served in the militia, but that his rank was too low to enable him to receive the card of a Minister.

While Mr. Ward was engaged in his formal interview with the Governor-General, this same person entered abruptly, and took part for a few minutes in the conversation without invitation, and without showing any of those marks of deference with which a Governor-General is usually approached. Whether he be Sung Ko-lin-sin, as some of the Americans surmise, or not, no doubt exists in the minds of those who saw him that he is a man of considerable military rank, and held high command in the Takoo forts at the time when the Chinese asserted that there was no officer present.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to Mr. Ward's observation on the tone of confidence prevailing at Peking. The popular idea of the English among these ignorant men of the North is, that we are a seafaring people, living on barren rocks, and only formidable at sea. Having kept us out of the river, they think themselves safe in the North from the only description of attack they have to fear, and the old tone of arrogance and patronising superiority became more and more pronounced as the Mission advanced further inland. Even Kweiliang and his colleagues, who can hardly share these illusions, adopted a curt manner and imperious tone, very different from the courteous and deprecating language they used at Shanghai.

The occupation of Canton seems to have lost much of its influence; as one of the high officers, in talking to Mr. Ward, spoke of Canton in the tone of a man who had quite made up his mind to its being finally lost to the Empire.

In conclusion, I think if Her Majesty's Government decide on requiring satisfaction for the late events in the North, advantage ought to be taken to send an expedition calculated to disabuse the Emperor as to the power and resources of England, and to make a strong and durable impression.

The account given by the American officers, and by a sailor of the "Highflyer," whom they rescued from captivity, leads me to doubt the fact of there having been foreigners among them, or any other arms than those usually employed by Chinese. There were considerable bodies of Mongols armed with matchlocks and bows and arrows, and mounted on small indifferent horses.

The land force ought to be sufficient to take the forts, and to advance, supported by the gun-boats, on Tien-tsin, which there is reason to believe has been strengthened.

The more manifest our superiority the shorter will be the contest, and the more inclined will be the Emperor to abandon those pretensions of superiority which form the real obstacle to amicable relations with the Government and people of China.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Supplement to the "North China Herald" of August 22, 1859.

RETURN OF THE AMERICAN MINISTER AND SUITE FROM PEKIN.—The United States' steam-frigate "Powhatan," Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall and Captain G. F. Pearson commanding, and having on board his Excellency John E. Ward, United States' Minister, has just arrived from the Peiho, after a passage of three and a half days. From her officers we learn the following items of news:—

On the 16th ultimo, while the "Powhatan" was anchored off Peh-tang, there arrived an Imperial Edict, ordering that the American Minister and suite of twenty should be escorted with all honour to Pekin, and that they should leave Peh-tang upon any day after the 19th. This edict was in answer to a communication from the American Minister, informing the authorities that he was present, and ready to exchange his Treaty at any time and place which they might appoint.

Shortly before the arrival of this Edict, the smoke of a steamer was discovered to the southward-and-eastward, which proved to be the Russian paddle-wheel "America," having on board his Excellency Count Mouravieff, the Governor-General of Siberia, travelling *incog*. She anchored near the "Powhatan," and upon the 21st sent a courier to Pekin with communications for the Resident Minister.

Upon the 17th a Russian gun-boat also arrived, reporting that several others were to follow; but these did not make their appearance.

On the morning of the 20th Mr. Ward and suite landed at Peh-tang, where they were received by the escort, and conducted to Pekin with every show of respect. They first travelled forty-five miles across the country in covered carts, striking the Peiho at a village called Pei-tsang, some ten miles above Tien-tsin, and thence proceeded in junks to Tung-chow, distant twelve miles from Pekin, of which it is the port. There they again took carts to the capital.

The entire trip occupied eight days and a-half, five of which were passed upon the river. They passed not less than six or eight barriers between Pei-tsang and Tung-chow, none of them, however, being in repair, or backed by forts. The boatmen said that they were partly to stop the English, and partly to afford shelter to junks when the ice was breaking up.

The Legation remained in Pekin fifteen days, during which time they were confined to their quarters; not, however, as prisoners, for they were at liberty at any moment to walk out, but the Commissioners refused the use of horses and guides, leaving it optional with Mr. Ward to grant permission to walk out or not, as he saw fit. They would, doubtless, however, have closed the gates entirely, had not that gentleman taken a firm stand at the very first interview, informing Kweiliang that as soon as his movements should be at all restricted he should close all intercourse, and demand his return escort.

It seems that the Emperor was very anxious to see Mr. Ward, but that he also insisted upon his performing the "ko-tow," which, being against the principles of his Excellency, was positively refused. The result of this was, that upon the fourteenth day of their stay it was finally concluded to receive the President's letter at Pekin, and to send his Excellency back to Peh-tang to exchange the Treaty; and the next day they returned accordingly.

During their stay in Pekin they saw nothing of the Russians, but received several letters from them. The first of these was six days going from one end of the city to the other, having evidently been detained by the authorities.

Arrived at Peh-tang on the 16th the Treaties were exchanged, and an English prisoner named John Powell given up. This man, who was an ordinary seaman on board the "Highflyer," and who, with a sapper by the name of Thomas McQueen, had been captured on the 25th June, fearing for his life, had proclaimed himself to be an American. The Chinese informed Mr. Ward of this, and intimated their readiness to give him up as an American, if he would demand him. This, however, the latter could not do, as he had been taken fighting under the flag of another nation. Anxious, however, to serve the poor fellow, he intimated to them that it would be a great personal favour if they would turn him over, and as such it was done. He is now on board of the

“Powhatan.” Of the Sapper nothing more is known than that he was wounded in the arm, was doing well, and is still a prisoner.

The Chinese seemed generally anxious to know what the English would do next year.

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Extract from Sir G. Staunton's "Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China."

THE Ambassador and three gentlemen of his suite travelled in sedan-chairs, which are the usual vehicles for persons of high rank in China, even in long journeys. The other gentlemen were on horseback, as were all the mandarins: the principal among the latter rode near the chair of the Ambassador. The Chinese soldiers were on foot, and cleared the way. The servants and privates of his Excellency's guard were in rough carriages or waggons.

Inclosure 3 in No. 18.

Imperial Decree.

ON the 11th of the 7th moon of the 9th year of Hien-fung (9th August, 1859), the Inner Council had the honour to receive the following Decree:—

“Last year the ships of the Yang-kih-li (English) nation sailed into the port of Tien-tsin, and opened a fire upon our troops. We accordingly instructed the Khorchin Prince Sung Ko-lin-sin to fortify Takoo well, and the (Envoys of the) different nations coming up to exchange Treaties on this occasion, were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai, that Takoo was so fortified (or, was placed on the defensive), and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to (the shore of) Tien-tsin* in the 5th moon did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Takoo, destroying our defensive apparatus. On the 24th of the 5th moon (24th June), though his vessels came up as far as Ki-k'ou Tan, and blew up the chains (that bound the booms) with shell, our troops still did not fight. On the 25th, ten steamers and more pulled up more than ten of the iron posts (with which the river was staked), and all hoisted red flags, (in token of) a determination to fight. The Governor-General of Chih-li, Hang-fuh, sent out a letter from the Intendant of Tien-tsin, but the English would not receive it at all, and at last had the audacity to commence bombarding the forts. Our troops on this returned the fire, sunk several of their vessels, and killed several hundred of their Infantry as they were landing.

“The English troops have thus really brought this defeat upon themselves: there has been no breach of faith whatsoever on the part of China.

“Meanwhile the American Envoy, John Ward, did abide by his engagement with Kweiliang and colleague; sailed to the port of Peh-tang, and begged for permission to go up to the capital to present a letter from his Government. We accordingly authorized his admission into Peking to present it, and having this day perused the letters addressed by the American Envoy, John Ward, to Kweiliang and Hwashana, and laid before us by those Ministers, we find their language so respectful, the true-heartedness that has prompted them such, that we have authorized the Envoy in question to present the letter he is charged with from his Government to Kweiliang and his colleague, whom we have sent to receive it.

“As regards the exchange of his Treaty, he ought properly to return to Shanghai and exchange it there, but in consideration of the long voyage he has made, we (are pleased) specially to authorize that the seal be appended to the Treaty, and that it be delivered to Hang-fuh to hand it in exchange (for another copy) to the aforesaid Envoy, that from the date of the exchange there may be peace and commerce for evermore. Thus do we manifest our great desire to

* *Tsin*, to Tsin, short for Tien-tsin, that is, Tien-tsin Fu, the Department so named.

show a nursing tenderness to the men from afar, and our appreciation of good faith and right principle.

“Let Kweiliang and Hwashana signify this our pleasure to the Envoy John Ward for his information.

“Respect this!”

Inclosure 4 in No. 18.

Translation of a paper, purporting to be an Imperial Decree of the 5th July, 1859, forwarded by Mr. Parkes, from Canton. A copy has since been received at Shanghai from Soo-chow. It has not yet been published in the “Pekin Gazette.”

ON the 6th of the 6th moon of the 9th year of Hien-fung (July 5, 1859), was received the following Decree:—

“In a second Memorial this day presented by Sung Ko-liu-sin and Tsai-hang,* they urge upon us that, whereas the English barbarians have revolted from their allegiance, and the French barbarians, having allied themselves with them, have abetted their wickedness, the crime of both together is such that death were not a sufficient punishment, and that advantage ought to be taken of the present opportunity to assert our dignity, and to draw in the rein with such severity as effectually to check their perversity and truculence.

“Since the 21st year of Tau-kwang (1841), these barbarians have been constantly seeking quarrels; again and again have they set at naught the dignity of Heaven.† His late Majesty, canonized as ‘the Perfect,’ could not, for all this, endure—such was the motherly tenderness he felt for those from afar—to deal with their transgression in strict accordance with the law. Nay, he permitted them to trade at five ports, and he issued money from his treasury to soothe and console them. The bounty in which the outer nations were thus steeped was not inconsiderable. Had they had any conscience at all, they would doubtless have been impressed with a sense of gratitude for His Majesty’s Imperial benevolence, would, in peace, have pursued their callings, labouring for a livelihood, and had any cause of dissatisfaction while they were so engaged arisen, there would have been no objection to their discussion and arrangement of any case, as it presented itself, with the local authorities. Whence, then, this wilfulness, this ferocious bearing, this constant boasting of their prowess in war? They have been a virulent poison to our people; they have riotously invaded our borders; in the intolerable atrocities of every kind they have committed they have shown the extreme of ingratitude. Were we to put our forces in movement, what would prevent the immediate extermination of these *fantoccini*? Still, we bear in mind that it was by philanthropy and uprightness that our ancestors established their wide dominion; that with liberality and mildness they soothed and comforted the savage nations; that for several centuries no soldier has been lightly moved, not a ration has been vainly expended; and so the four barbarian races, as universally as the natives of the Empire, have looked up to the canonized ones, extolling their extreme philanthropy, the virtue with which they have silently‡ maintained the living multitude. Should, therefore, the barbarian chiefs change their faces, and renew themselves, making faithful tender of peaceful submission; forasmuch as with our vast estate we have inherited the counsels of our ancestors,§ in respectful accordance therewith we shall of a surety not bear too hardly upon any man; but if they continue forward, and repeat demands they have no right to make, then shall we at that moment annihilate them; not a sprout, we vow, shall be allowed to remain.

“The loyalty and courage of the Princes, whose memorial is before us, are commendable indeed, nor, assuredly, would it be easy to find amongst our Ministers and Servants, in the capital or without it, zeal such as theirs for the

* One of the immediate kin of the Imperial family. The Mien are the generation of the late Emperor; the present generation are surnamed Yih; the generation below them Tsai, according to a law regulating these matters.

† Heaven, the Celestial Empire, China.

‡ As the power of the Creator in the operations of nature.

§ Their traditionary policy.

policy of the State and the well-being of the people. We are highly gratified and delighted. But as regards (the measures they propose for) the effectual checking (of the barbarians) by a severe tightening of the rein, we are satisfied that it would not be right to take the initiative in an act of violence (literally wrong). We command, therefore, that action be not taken on this memorial, and that it be returned.

“Respect this!”

No. 19.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, September 20, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a Decree published in the “Pekin Gazette,” bestowing posthumous honours on those who fell at Takoo, and stating that the rebellious English have received a lesson which will deter them from provoking the martial dignity of China in future.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Extract from the “Pekin Gazette.”

THE paper of most interest to us is an Imperial Decree printed in the latest “Gazette.” It must have been issued in June:—

“Sung Ko-lin-sin and his colleagues have presented their report of certain details of the (late) action, as ascertained by them on inquiry to be true.

“On the 25th of the moon the vessels of the English barbarians, who would pay no attention to the reasonable commands issued to them, forced their way into the river, and opened a fire on our troops, which the latter returned. The barbarian vessels, though injured, would not withdraw, and continued the action with their infantry, until the forces of Government had killed several hundreds, and had taken two of them alive. The rest then fled and slunk back to their ships. The barbarians’ vessels that entered the river were thirteen in all, and but one escaped across the bar; the rest had suffered such damage from the fire that they were unserviceable. The barbarian leader Li (?) was also so severely wounded in the thigh that he could not move.

“The English barbarians, violent, rebellious, and unreasonable as they are, have on this occasion received such a chastisement as will not fail to make them aware of the danger (*lit.*, difficulty) of offending the military dignity of China. The officers and men, who with a common purpose and united strength achieved this great victory, have certainly shown a more than ordinary courage, and we command Sung Ko-lin-sin to ascertain the names of all who exerted themselves on the occasion, and to recommend them to our favourable consideration. We, at the same time, authorise him to distribute among them 5,000 taels, which he may take from the subscription fund. Shih Tung-chun, Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army of Chih-li, and the Brigadier Lung Ju-yuen, Commandant of Takoo, heading the fight in person, so valiant that they disregarded their own safety, and were killed in the bombardment, are, indeed, to be deplored. Let their names be handed to the proper Board, that posthumous honours may be liberally awarded them, and let shrines be raised to them in Tien-tsin, and at their respective homes. Let the Major Tsitanpu, with Takshin, Subaltern of Musketeers, in the Plain White Banner Corps, the Lieutenant Wang Shi-yang, and the Ensign Chang Wan-ping, who fell at the same time, be awarded each one the posthumous honours to which he is by regulation entitled; that their loyal spirits may be comforted.

“Respect this!”

There is also a memorial from Sung Ko-lin-sin, praying the Emperor to leave at his disposal a certain “fu-tsiang,” or brigadier, of ability, as “the business of defending the sea-coast is not yet finished.” This is in the “Gazette” of 14th August.

CORRESPONDENCE with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
in China.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1860.*

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

WITH

MR. BRUCE,

HER MAJESTY'S ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY
AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY

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Further Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary
in China.

No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 27.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, August 1, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of letters received from Sir Charles van Straubenzee, and of my reply to him.

I have in consequence addressed the Earl Canning, stating the necessity of reinforcing the garrison of Canton, and requesting him to do so at once, if possible.

The speedy arrival of even one regiment will go far to keep the south of China quiet, and a reinforcement of troops will be more useful than an augmentation of the naval force on the station.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Major-General Sir C. van Straubenzee to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Head-Quarters, Hong Kong, July 22, 1859.

HAVING heard through the public press, and from other sources, the disastrous results of the expedition to the North, I have the honour to request your Excellency will be pleased to inform me whether we are now to consider ourselves at war with China, or whether matters are to continue as at present in Canton, so long as the Chinese remain in a passive state.

I have also to request that I may be favoured with such information as may be in your Excellency's power to afford me, with regard to operations recommended, in order that I may take such necessary steps in the way of preparation as may tend to facilitate the movements of any future expedition to the north of China.

It is unnecessary for me to remind your Excellency that should it be intended to assemble a large force to proceed to the North, it will be incumbent upon me to make early preparations on a proportionate scale, the expense of which I should not feel myself justified in incurring on the mere fact of our late defeat, and without any knowledge of intentions as to the future.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. T. VAN STRAUBENZEE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Major-General Sir C. van Straubenzee to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Hong Kong, July 22, 1859.

AS the late events off the Peiho will in all probability produce a state of affairs in Canton, similar to that of last summer, I am desirous to represent to

your Excellency the very small effective European garrison in that city, viz., 688 rank and file, including artillery and engineers, but exclusive of police and otherwise employed, such as pioneers, commissariat, &c. ; to this force, I presume, will shortly be added the battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry and Company of Sappers lately employed under Admiral Hope, C.B. We have still ten or twelve weeks of summer to go through, which will cause a serious diminution in the number of effectives, more particularly if much harassed, as they must be in the event of a renewal of troubles. The Native Infantry effectives are about 1,300 rank and file. I would, therefore, beg to recommend to your Excellency that our two troop-steamers be sent for such European reinforcements as can be spared either from Ceylon or India, so that, if necessary, we may at least be in a position to strike a blow in the south of China, so soon as the cold weather admits of action. As the whole of the Marines by the first week in November will barely form one battalion effective for service, I would strongly urge that at least two regiments be applied for without delay, and if happily not required for the south of China, they will be in readiness for any operations that may hereafter be determined upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. T. VAN STRAUBENZEE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to Major-General Sir C. van Straubenzee.

Sir,

Shanghai, July 31, 1859.

I SHOULD have written to you sooner on the failure of my attempt to reach Peking had I not thought it advisable to await some indication of the course the Chinese Government intend to pursue.

As far as I can judge from a communication that has been received by M. de Bourboulon from Ho, the Imperial Commissioner, the Chinese Government has no intention of disturbing us at the ports. The letter treats the collision at the mouth of the river as unintentional on both sides, and as proceeding from our ignorance of the fact that preparations had been made at another place to receive us ; and he even goes so far as to suggest that we had better return to the North, as we shall be received with due courtesy. I have no doubt that Mr. Ward, the American Minister, will bring down some proposals for accommodation.

I do not think, therefore, that orders will be sent from Peking to commence at Canton the hostile proceedings of last year, unless we were to assume the offensive, and in that case a large force would be required ; for the blow, if struck at all, must be struck in the North, and we know that during the last year a large force has been accumulated, consisting in part of men who show considerable skill in the management of artillery, whatever may be their value as soldiers in the field. As my object is not to fetter the action of Her Majesty's Government, my language to the Chinese authorities will continue to be, that I consider my mission to Peking at an end for the present, and that I have referred home for fresh instructions.

But I shall avoid, as much as possible, doing or saying anything from which the Chinese may infer that I consider what has passed in the North as an act of war, or as necessarily leading to a rupture of friendly relations ; and, moreover, if they were to make a proper apology, and consent to receive me on becoming terms at Peking, I should not decline the overture ; though I do not anticipate, after what has taken place, that they will make any proposal which I could accept as satisfactory.

I do not think, therefore, that it would be desirable to make preparations in the South with a view to a campaign in the North, before knowing what Her Majesty's Government will determine on that point ; but it is obvious that we ought to be prepared for any contingency that may happen in Canton or its neighbourhood ; and as your Excellency seems to think that your garrison requires to be reinforced, I will address his Excellency the Governor-General of India on the subject, and forward copies of your letters to Admiral Hope, with whom it rests to dispose of the transports alluded to. One contains the wounded, and is not, I suppose, available for India. It will be advisable that

your Excellency should write your views on the amount of reinforcement required to the Commander-in-chief in India, calculating it with a view to Canton and the position of affairs in the South:

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 1.

Mr. Bruce to Earl Canning.

My Lord,

Shanghai, July 31, 1859.

YOUR Excellency will have heard ere this of the untoward issue of the attempt made by the French Minister and myself to reach Peking with a view of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty and establishing direct diplomatic relations with the Government. I will cause copies of my despatches giving an account of what took place to be sent to your Excellency by the first opportunity.

In the meantime, I beg to call your Excellency's attention to two letters received from Sir Charles van Straubenzee on his position at Canton.

Hitherto, I do not see any symptoms of an intention on the part of the Chinese Government to push matters further. They seem satisfied with having kept us out of the Peiho river, and thereby got rid of a visit, the conditions of which would have asserted effectually the principle of international equality, and laid the foundation of future diplomatic intercourse on a proper footing.

I have resolved, in concert with my French colleague, to take no further step in this mission until we receive instructions. We are not in a position to bring any effectual pressure to bear in the North, and I hope by a reserved attitude to avoid further complications until we are better prepared. But I think it advisable to bring before your Excellency's notice the position of Canton, as events in the North might encourage fresh troubles there should the garrison be reduced by sickness, or not be strong enough to act in the neighbourhood against any hostile bodies that might collect for the purpose of annoying us. I have requested Sir Charles van Straubenzee to write to the Commander-in-chief in India as to the amount of reinforcements he may think necessary. In the meantime, I cannot too strongly urge the immediate dispatch of an European regiment, should it be in your Excellency's power to spare one for this service. Its arrival will have the best effect, whatever decision Her Majesty's Government may ultimately adopt.

I do not know whether Admiral Hope will be able to dispatch one of the troop-ships now in China, to which the General alludes. The other is at present used as the hospital for the wounded, and certainly could not be made available for some time. I will communicate with him immediately; but if your Excellency has at your disposal the means of affording assistance, I think it would be advisable not to delay it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 2.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, October 29, 1859.

FROM the terms of your despatch of the 10th August,* I infer that, at the time when you wrote it, you thought it not improbable that the Chinese Government might shortly address to you some communication with the view of inviting you to proceed to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

If any such proposal has been made to you, and if it be still unanswered when you receive this despatch, you will state, in reply, that you are not authorized to entertain it until the Chinese Government shall have made a formal

* See "Correspondence with Mr. Bruce," presented to Parliament, January 24, 1860, No. 15.

apology for the act of the troops who fired on Her Britannic Majesty's ships of war from the Takoo forts in June last.

You will add, that Her Majesty's Government require that, when you go to Peking for the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty, you shall proceed up the Peiho river to Tien-tsin in a British vessel, and that provision be made by the Chinese authorities for the conveyance of yourself and your suite with due honour from Tien-tsin to Peking.

Should the assurances given to you by the Chinese Government on these heads be satisfactory, you will make arrangements for proceeding to Peking at the earliest period at which it may be safe and convenient for you to undertake the voyage. It will be proper that a naval force should accompany you to the mouth of the Peiho, and directions to this effect will be forwarded to Admiral Hope.

Should you experience any unbecoming treatment, either at Peking, or on your journey to or from the capital, you will return to the Gulf, and place the matter in the hands of the naval Commander-in-chief.

You will take an early opportunity of apprizing the Ministers of the Emperor of China that, in consequence of the attempt made to obstruct your passage to Peking in June last, when you were proceeding thither to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, Her Majesty's Government consider that the understanding entered into between the Earl of Elgin and the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana, with respect to the residence of the British Minister in China, is at an end, and that it rests henceforward exclusively with Her Majesty, by the terms of Article II of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to decide whether or not she shall instruct her Minister to take up his abode permanently at Peking.

If, however, no pacific overtures shall have been addressed to you by the Chinese Government before the time when this despatch reaches you, you will, immediately on its receipt, communicate to the Prime Minister of the Emperor the demands of Her Majesty's Government, as stated above, and inform him that, unless, within a period of thirty days from the date of your communication, you receive from him a reply conveying to you the Emperor's unqualified assent to these demands, the British naval and military authorities will proceed to adopt such measures as they may deem advisable for the purpose of compelling the Emperor of China to observe the engagements contracted for him by his Plenipotentiaries at Tien-tsin, and approved by his Imperial Edict of July 1858.

On grounds of humanity, Her Majesty's Government would be desirous, if possible, to avoid the necessity of having to undertake military operations on a great scale against the capital of the Chinese Empire. They will learn, therefore, with satisfaction, that the measures which I have indicated have had the desired effect, and induced the Chinese Emperor to accede to the moderate terms which by this despatch you are instructed to offer for his acceptance.

It is necessary, however, to be prepared for a different result, and it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make such arrangements as will enable a considerable military force to be dispatched from the South with the change of the monsoon, if it should be then requisite to undertake operations on land.

I have only to add that it is not the intention of Her Majesty's Government that you should consider yourself to be bound by your instructions to insist on a personal interview with the Emperor. It is essential that you should correspond on terms of equality with the chief officers of the Empire, and that you should refuse to submit to any degrading ceremonial, either on the occasion of an audience with the Emperor, or on any other; but you will be guided by your own discretion, and in some degree by the practice of the Representatives of other Great Western Powers, in determining whether or not you will press the demand that the Emperor of China shall receive you, in the only manner in which you could consent to be received, namely, with the forms which on such occasions are customary in the West.

Her Majesty's Government are in communication with the Government of the Emperor of the French, in reference to the subject of this despatch.

No. 3.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 10, 1859.

SINCE my despatch of the 29th ultimo was written, I have received and laid before the Queen your despatch of the 3rd September.*

It appears by this despatch and its inclosures, that the Emperor of China now fully sanctions the resistance made by the forts at Takoo to the passage of Her Majesty's ships up the River Peiho.

He states that Takoo was fortified by his command, and that the Envoys of the different nations were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai, that Takoo was so fortified, and that they must go round by Peh-tang.

Now, although the denial of a passage to the capital by the usual and most convenient route would have been evidence of an unfriendly disposition, yet it was a matter upon which you might have remonstrated and negotiated, without having recourse to force to clear the passage.

You say, however, with regard to these alleged warnings:—"These assertions are directly contrary to the truth, though I think it not improbable the Commissioners may have represented the matter in this light to the Emperor. Neither in the letters that passed between the Commissioners and the Envoys, nor during the interviews Mr. Ward had with them, was a word said of defences at Takoo, nor was any allusion made to Peh-tang."

Thus it appears that neither you nor M. Bourboulon received any warning; nay, when the Admiral arrived at the mouth of the Peiho, so far from having an intimation, from authority, that the passage of the Envoys up the Peiho was to be resisted, he was assured that the fortifications were made by the militia of the country as a defence against pirates, and that a passage should be opened to allow of vessels proceeding by the river.

The soldiers at the forts had no doubt ascertained the correct range of the palisades and stakes where the French and British vessels were certain to be stopped, and thus they had all the benefit of a prepared ambuscade.

Whether the Emperor was cognizant of this act, or whether it was directed by his officers, it is an outrage for which the Chinese Government must be accounted responsible.

Unless, therefore, the most ample apology should be promptly made, and the other demands specified in my previous despatch shall be complied with, you are instructed to state that a large pecuniary indemnity will be demanded by Her Majesty's Government from that of China.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

* See "Correspondence with Mr. Bruce," presented to Parliament, January 24, 1860, No. 18.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE with Mr. Bruce, Her
Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary in China.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
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Correspondence with Mr. Bruce, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China.

No. 1.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, March 1, 1859.

THE Queen having been pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, and in that capacity to exchange, at Peking, Her Majesty's ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin with the ratification of that compact by the Emperor of China, I have now to furnish you with such general instructions as may serve for your guidance in the important mission entrusted to you by Her Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the Earl of Elgin would have returned to this country previously to your departure, that so your instructions might have been framed after personal communication with his Excellency. But it would seem that the interesting excursion up the Yang-tze-keang river, which he so judiciously determined to undertake, has occupied more time than he anticipated, and any further delay in your departure might possibly prevent you from exchanging the ratifications within the period specified in the Treaty, namely, before the 26th of June.

Arrangements have been made for providing passage for yourself and the members of your Mission in the contract steam-vessels which convey the British mails of the 10th of March from Marseilles to Alexandria, and from Suez to Singapore and Hong Kong, in case you should not find at Suez Her Majesty's ship "Furious" waiting to receive you, or at Singapore some other man-of-war appointed to convey you to China.

On your arrival at Hong Kong, you will, in virtue of the Commission as Chief Superintendent of British Trade with which you are provided, relieve Sir John Bowring of his duties in connection with this office, and you will make arrangements for transferring the general direction of British affairs in China to Shanghai, at which port it is to be carried on until such time as circumstances shall admit of its being permanently established at Peking.

You will not remain at Hong Kong longer than is absolutely necessary, but proceed to Shanghai on your way to the Peiho.

Her Majesty's Government were fully prepared at once to carry out the provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin which admits of the permanent residence of a British Ambassador at Peking; but the observations on this point which Lord Elgin has so ably laid before them, coupled with the fact that the French Government, on considering Baron Gros' reports, have arrived at the same conclusion, have determined Her Majesty's Government, for the present at least, to fix at Shanghai the residence of the British Mission, and only to require that it should be received occasionally at Peking. But you will be careful to make the Chinese authorities at the capital and at Shanghai distinctly understand that Her Majesty's Government do not renounce the right of permanent residence, and, on the contrary, will instantly exercise it, if at any time difficulties are thrown in the way of communications between Her Majesty's Minister and the Central Government at Peking, or any disposition shown to evade or defeat the objects of the Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government are prepared to expect that all the arts at which the Chinese are such adepts, will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing to the capital, even for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the

Treaty; but it will be your duty firmly, but temperately, to resist any propositions to that effect, and to admit of no excuses; and you will say that the effect of any persistence on the part of the Chinese Government in throwing obstacles in the way of your arrival at Peking, and of the presentation of your credentials to the Emperor in person, will be that Her Majesty's Government will insist on the literal fulfilment of the Treaty, and establish the Mission permanently at Peking.

You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Peking of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Peking. The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, and, indeed, it would not be wise, to lay down any definite rules to be rigidly adhered to, in regard to your approach to, and your communication with, the Chinese Court. The acquaintance which you possess with the Chinese character will enable you to judge when you may give way and when you must stand firm, bearing in mind that your treatment on your first visit to Peking will always be appealed to on the occasion of future visits, as establishing a precedent not to be departed from.

You will, of course, refuse compliance with any ceremony, or form of reception, which can in any way be construed into an admission of inferiority on the part of Her Majesty in regard to the Emperor of China; and perhaps the best method of putting a stop to any attempt to impose upon you in this respect, will be that you should distinctly declare that you will withdraw at once, even from the Presence Chamber of the Sovereign, on the slightest appearance of a disposition to treat you, and the office that you hold, with disrespect.

If any objection should be raised on the score of your credentials being those of Envoy and not of an Ambassador, you will say that the reason of their being so, is to admit of the wish of the Chinese Government that for the present the British Mission should not be permanently resident at the capital being complied with; but that if, on that ground, the Chinese Government seek to make any distinction in your reception and treatment, new credentials as Ambassador will immediately be sent to you, and, in that case, the Mission will be forthwith and permanently established at Peking.

You will, moreover, take care that the treatment awarded to you is in no degree less honourable than that awarded to the Representative of any other Power whatever. That it should be consistent with European usages, it must doubtless be more honourable than that by which Embassies from countries over whose Chiefs the Emperor assumes superiority are received; but it must be in no degree inferior to that accorded to the Representatives of other Christian nations.

Although you will insist upon your being received at Peking, and will refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place, and will further decline to make any compromise in regard to the time of your stay in the Chinese capital, or the frequency of your visits to it; Her Majesty's Government are willing to leave to your discretion the duration of your stay on the first occasion. Your primary object, after the exchange of the ratifications, will be to come to such an understanding with the Government as may ensure prompt attention being paid by proper authorities in the capital to any representations that you may see occasion to address to it; and you will particularly insist upon your right to employ messengers of your own, whether European or Chinese, for the conveyance of your communications, and upon due facilities for the performance of their journeys being secured for such messengers.

Your general language will be, that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious that the increased intercourse with the Chinese Empire, under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, may contribute to the mutual advantage of both countries; that it is Her Majesty's firm intention, while scrupulously observing the engagements which she has herself contracted, to require on the part of the Emperor of China a corresponding observance of his own; that Her Majesty's officers in the different ports of China will be directed to prevent, as far as in them lies,

any disturbance of the public peace, and any disorderly conduct on the part of British subjects; and that, on the other hand, Her Majesty expects that the Chinese authorities, both at the ports and in the interior of the country, will be required to act up to the Treaty obligations contracted by their Sovereign, and to treat with kindness and consideration the subjects of Her Majesty who may be brought in contact with them.

Without waiving or compromising, in any degree, the right of Her Majesty's Mission to reside at the capital, you may let it be understood that the frequency of its visits to Peking, if not its permanent residence there, must in a great degree depend on the manner in which the provisions of the Treaty are carried out. If no occasion is given for controversy by attempts on the part of the Chinese local authorities to evade the terms of the Treaty, and more particularly if no disposition is shown by the Government at the capital to treat with disrespect any representations Her Majesty's Minister may address to it from Shanghai, the necessity for such visits to the capital will be rare; and when they are made they will be rather complimentary than for the transaction of business. But you will say that as between the Powers of Europe direct diplomatic intercourse, and the permanent residence of Ministers at the residence of the Sovereigns to whom they are accredited, are always looked upon as an indication of friendship between States, so Her Majesty's Government hope that the day is not far distant when not only will the presence of a British Minister at Peking be viewed with satisfaction, but a Representative of the Emperor of China be accredited to Her Majesty's Court, where you will say he will be welcomed both by Her Majesty and her Government, and treated with the same distinction and consideration as the Representatives of Her Majesty's nearest allies.

No. 2.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 5.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 4, 1859.

THERE is little reliable information to be obtained here as to the reception Her Majesty's Mission is likely to meet with at Peking, and the fact of the Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana remaining at Soochow, near Shanghai though Mr. Lay has urged them to return to Peking, to be on the spot when the foreign Missions arrive there, would seem to indicate a hope on their part that some incident may enable them to avert the visit to Peking; and this view is strengthened by the rumours, more or less true, of the repair of the old forts at the mouth of the Peiho, and the construction of fresh defences along its course.

At the same time it is reported, and, in the main, no doubt truly, that a Russian Mission of some pretensions has arrived at Peking; that its members walk about the streets, in European costume, unmolested; and that discussions have taken place between its chief and the Chinese Government on matters of etiquette, in which it is reported that the Russian has receded from his first demand. The reports from Peking are sent by native Roman Catholic catechists to their Bishop, and embody probably the gossip which circulates in the streets of Peking on these subjects. Your Lordship is likely to be better informed from St. Petersburg than we are on the coast of China, of the route and character of this Russian Agent.

It became necessary for me to decide, in this state of uncertainty as to the intentions of the Chinese Government, on the force which should accompany me to the Peiho, it being desirable that it should proceed without delay to the north. By a note received from M. Bourboulon, my French colleague, I see he does not expect that Admiral Rigault will spare from the operations in Annam more than two vessels, of which one, I hope, will be able to ascend the river as far as Tien-tsin. I therefore requested Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee to confer with me on this point. As your Lordship will see by the inclosed Minute, I stated to them that the objects of my mission were—the exchange of the ratifications at Peking, the delivery of my credentials to the Emperor of China in person, and the arrival, as far as Tien-tsin, in a British ship of war. They agreed in the opinion that it would not be safe to assume that the Chinese would concede these points, and enter seriously on the consideration of the measures

required to bring the Treaty into full operation, unless I were accompanied with an imposing force, and they agreed that it should be as nearly as possible of the same strength as that which formed the expedition of last year. I hope by the demonstration to render the active employment of the force unnecessary.

In the meantime I have requested Mr. Wade to inform Mr. Lay confidentially at Shanghai of the objects and scope of the Mission, leaving it to his discretion, in which I have full reliance, to communicate it, as from himself, to the Chinese Commissioners. We may thus obtain some knowledge of their intentions on our arrival at Shanghai, which would be important as a guide in our future proceedings.

I have not decided on the terms of my communication to the Chinese Government, or on the point from which it is to be sent. I propose discussing these points with M. Bourboulon and with the American Minister.

I proceed to Canton as soon as the mail leaves for England; and on my return I shall visit Macao, where I hope to find my colleagues.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

Minute of a Conference held at the Government Offices at Hong Kong, on Friday, April 28, 1859.

Present :

The Honourable F. Bruce, C.B.
Sir Charles van Straubenzee, K.C.B.
Rear-Admiral Hope, C.B.

MR. BRUCE stated that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to the effect that he was to proceed, if possible, to Tien-tsin in a British man-of-war, and thence to Peking, where the exchange of the ratifications was to be effected, and where he was to present his letters of credence to the Emperor of China in person, insisting on such a reception as was befitting his character as the Representative of a nation on an equality with that of China.

He further stated that we were not in possession of any reliable information as to the spirit in which the Chinese Government were prepared to receive this first attempt to establish direct relations on a footing of equality with the Court of Peking. That we must be guided, therefore, by the general experience we had acquired of the Chinese character, and that we might infer as the result of our past experience that the objects of this Mission were most likely to be satisfactorily and peacefully attained, if the British Minister were supported by a powerful demonstration of force at the mouth of the Peiho river.

Sir Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope concurred in this view, the latter stating that his instructions contemplated the Minister being escorted with an imposing force.

It was unanimously agreed that the expedition should, if possible, be as strong as that which accompanied the Ambassadors of England and France to the Peiho last year, and with that view Sir Charles van Straubenzee intimated his being prepared, consistently with the security of his position at Canton, to place a battalion of Marines and a company of Engineers at the disposal of Rear-Admiral Hope. This addition to the naval force would compensate for the absence of the French forces in Cochin China.

No. 3.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 6, 1859.

HER Majesty's Government approve the arrangements, as reported in your despatch of the 4th of May, which you have adopted, in concert with Sir

Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope, for the purpose of proceeding up the Peiho on your way to Peking, backed by an adequate naval and military force.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 16.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 21, 1859. •

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the note I have addressed to the Chinese Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, informing him of my arrival in China, of the diplomatic character I bear, and of the course I intend to pursue. M. Bourboulon has also sent a note to him couched in identical terms.

In my previous despatches, I have informed your Lordship that we can ascertain nothing as to the intentions of this Government with respect to the visit of foreign Envoys to Peking; but the Imperial Commissioners, on hearing of my arrival in China, have proceeded from Soo-chow to Shanghai—a fact of some significance, and which gives colour to the opinion that they hope to raise questions or begin negotiations at that point: otherwise they would have returned ere this to Peking, for the purpose of making preparations for our reception.

It seems to me important that I should, from the commencement, assume the new political status which I bear as a Minister accredited to the Emperor of China.

With this view I have put forward, in a prominent and intelligible shape, the character I bear, and the necessity of my proceeding direct to Peking, to present to the Emperor my credentials, in accordance with established usage, and thereby qualify myself for the discharge of my functions as Envoy to the Court of Peking. For the same reason I have addressed Kweiliang as Chief Secretary of State—not as Imperial Commissioner—as I wish to avoid any act that may be construed into an acceptance of an Imperial Commissioner at Shanghai. My language on that point will be that my acceptance of such a functionary is made contingent on a proper reception at Peking, and on arrangements being made, which will secure free access and unreserved communication with the Imperial Ministers at the capital, on all matters on which I think they ought to be informed.

I hope, in this way, to compel the Chinese Government to declare itself upon those points which we know are the most unpalatable to it; and if there exists, on its part, a disposition to evade its obligations, to thrust us back, as before, on the seaboard, and refuse the reception which I cannot waive without lowering our national dignity, I trust we shall be in possession of their views when we arrive at the mouth of the Peiho, and not be left to discover them gradually at Peking. If, as is most probable, the Court of Peking is wavering, anxious to evade, but unwilling to risk a rupture, I trust that identity of views among the foreign Representatives, firm language, and an imposing demonstration of force, will secure the observance by it of the recent Treaties, and incline it to listen to moderate and pacific advisers.

In closing this despatch, I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to a letter I addressed to Admiral Hope, on a proposal by the Lords of the Admiralty to reduce further the force on this station—a measure much to be regretted, should it be carried into operation before the visit to Peking is successfully accomplished.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Kweiliang, Senior Secretary of State, that Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c., has

been pleased, in furtherance of the intimate and friendly relations happily established between the two Empires by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to appoint the Undersigned to the honourable post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China.

In that capacity he is the bearer of an autograph letter from Her Majesty the Queen to His Majesty the Emperor of China, which it will be his pleasing duty to present to His Majesty in person, according to the established usage among friendly nations, and in order that he may be thereby properly qualified to undertake the duties of his office as Her Majesty's Representative to the Court of Peking.

The Undersigned has further to add that he is charged with the counterpart of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, duly ratified by Her Most Gracious Majesty, and that he will be prepared to exchange it at Peking, as agreed on in the Treaty, against one equally ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China, that relations of peace and of goodwill may be thus mutually confirmed and placed on a sure and permanent basis.

The Undersigned takes this opportunity of informing his Excellency Kweiliang, that, in compliance with the above instructions of his Sovereign, he is about to proceed without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin. He trusts that the necessary orders will be given for the conveyance of himself and his suite from thence to Peking, and for the provision of suitable accommodation for him during his residence in the capital itself in a manner befitting the dignity of the nation he represents.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 16, 1859.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

(Extract.)

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 21, 1859.

WITH reference to the despatch from the Lords of the Admiralty proposing a reduction of the force on this station, I beg to observe that the facts which have come to my knowledge since my arrival in China confirm me as to the propriety of the conclusion come to, in concert with yourself and Sir Charles van Straubenzee, viz., "That the force which is to accompany me to the North ought to be as strong as that which accompanied the Allied High Commissioners last year to Tien-tsin."

The task of supplying the deficiency caused by the diversion of the French force to Cochin China devolves exclusively on the Commander-in-chief of Her Majesty's naval forces here, at a time when the squadron at his disposal is considerably less than that under the command of Sir Michael Seymour last year.

No person can pretend to speak positively as to the intentions of the Chinese; but we know that they urged the modification of one clause in the Treaty, on the ground that it was extorted by force, and that there was no opportunity for discussion afforded at Tien-tsin. The same argument would hold good for the elimination of every other Article which may be disagreeable to them; and as I see that the Imperial Commissioners, instead of going to Peking to prepare for the reception of the foreign Envoys, have returned to Shanghai, I do not doubt that they are prepared to propose further modifications in the Treaty, and to raise difficulties as to my proper reception at Peking, unless they find us determined and able to carry our point.

No. 5.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 12, 1859.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the note which you addressed to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, of which a copy

is inclosed in your despatch of the 21st of May, and in which you announced to him your arrival in China, as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of China.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 30.)

My Lord,

Victoria, Hong Kong, May 31, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report of a conversation between the Interpreter, Mr. Hart, at Canton, and a Chinese who has just returned from Peking, representing the disposition of the Emperor as most hostile. A rumour is also current here, that the Russians established at the capital have been massacred.

On the other hand, it appears that a certain Ta-ki, a Chinese merchant at Shanghai, who deals largely with foreigners, and who, from his intimacy with the Intendant at that place, and his connection with the North, is generally well informed, states that the Chinese Government will not offer any opposition to our visit to Peking.

I do not consider that my plans ought to be influenced in any degree by these reports. If any inference is to be drawn from them it is this: that there is a strong party opposed to the concessions to foreigners, and a party resigned to them as inevitable; that the triumph of the one or of the other is possible, and will depend on the moral effect produced by the cordial union of foreign Powers, and on the fear of a fresh collision inspired by the demonstration of an imposing force in support of our demands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Memorandum.

YESTERDAY evening a Cantonese, Sen-seen-sang, who has for several years been in the habit of lending money to expectant officials, whom he accompanies when appointed to any post, called on me. He had just returned from Peking, viâ Shanghai, having left the former place on the 22nd of March. He informed me that at the time of his departure from Peking, the expected return of the British Ambassador to Tien-tsin, and the possibility of his visiting the capital, were subjects freely canvassed in every quarter; that the Emperor was known to be highly displeased with some of the stipulations contained in the Tien-tsin Treaty; that he was entirely averse to the Ambassador's taking up his quarters in the capital, and that he had resolved not to grant him an audience on any pretext; that military preparations were going on at Peking and Tien-tsin; that the Russians had offered the Emperor 10,000 muskets, but that His Majesty has declined to accept the present, fearing that the muskets in question might be brought to the Palace by an equal number of Russians; that the arrangement of all matters connected with the reception of the British at Tien-tsin, and the preventing of any visit to Peking, had been confided to Sung-wang-yay, a Ta-tsze-wang, son-in-law of the last Emperor; that Sung-wang-yay was at Tien-tsin with 50,000 troops, Manchoo and Mongols; that the batteries at Tien-tsin had been rebuilt, and the river staked in such a way as to render it impossible for foreign vessels to reach that city; that 30,000 "so-lo" troops, men never called out except in cases of the greatest emergency, were under orders to hold themselves in readiness to join Sung-wang-yay if called for; that Sung-wang-yay's orders were to receive the British at Tien-tsin with all civility, but at all hazards to prevent any nearer approach to Peking; that Sung-wang-yay was very desirous of gaining military renown, and that the Ambassador would be unable to reach Peking without having recourse to arms; that, according to

the opinion of some, the Ambassador, accompanied by a few people, might possibly reach Peking without bloodshed, but that a fight would certainly ensue if more than a hundred men were landed; that the country between Tien-tsin and Peking being flat, and the Chinese troops being so much more numerous than any number of men the British could land, it was the general belief that the British could be surrounded and cut to pieces before the completion of one-half the journey.

Sen-seen-sang further informed me that a Russian Ambassador had visited Peking on the 2nd March; that the Russians in the capital, more than 100 in number, roamed about just as they pleased, much to the grief of the Emperor and the anti-foreign party; and that it was feared the British, if they once effected an entrance, would take an ell for every inch the Russians had arrogated to themselves; that at Yung-chow large quantities of grain had been bought up by the Russians, but that the Emperor having become alarmed had forbidden the traffic.

(Signed) ROBERT HART, *Interpreter.*

British Consulate, Canton, May 22, 1859.

No. 7.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 31.)

(Extract.)

Victoria, Hong Kong, June 1, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Bourboulon arrived at Hong Kong on the 26th ultimo from Macao, where he had been delayed by the non-arrival of the corvette and small steamer destined to convey him to Tien-tsin. Admiral Rigault had taken all the stores, &c., out of the corvette when at Turon, and she has not yet completed her provisions, but I trust she will be ready to-morrow, on which day I likewise proceed to Shanghai direct.

I have waited for M. de Bourboulon, as I thought it advisable that every step we take in the Peking expedition should be taken by us in concert; and as I do not wish to have any communication with the Imperial Commissioners, should they be still at Shanghai, until my French colleague arrives.

No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received August 11.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, June 14, 1859.

I TOOK my departure from Hong Kong as soon as the French corvette "Duchayla" was reported ready to proceed.

Foreseeing that I should find on my arrival here questions of considerable importance, which it would be desirable to decide in concert with M. de Bourboulon, I did not think it advisable to precede him, and thereby put myself in the position either of acting in his absence, or of giving as a reason for delay that I was waiting for him.

I reached Shanghai on the evening of June 6, and M. de Bourboulon arrived on the following morning.

I found three letters from the Imperial Commissioners, proposing that, instead of proceeding to the North to effect the exchange of the ratifications, I should remain here and commence discussions on various details connected with carrying the Treaty into operation, alleging as their reason for waiting at Shanghai, that the Earl of Elgin, on proceeding to the South, had left some of these details unfinished.

On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3, 1859, addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there was nothing to justify their delay; that they were informed therein of my being the bearer of important documents to be delivered at Peking, and that they were warned that a strict adherence to the Treaty was the only method by which peaceful relations could be preserved. One of the Articles prescribes the exchange of the ratifications at Peking within a

year, and I know, from what passed last year, that it is not, in the eyes of the Chinese, one of the least important of its stipulations.

I am unable to state whether the Commissioners were acting under instructions from their Government to use every effort to prevent our proceeding to the North, or whether they adopted this expedient for the purpose of being out of the way when the visit to the capital, so unpalatable to the pride of the Chinese Government, is to take place. But that their object was to gain time—the favourite policy of this Government, in the hope that something, they know not what, might turn up, and relieve them from this visit—I could have no doubt; neither could I doubt, independently of the precise nature of my instructions, that anything which looked like hesitation or irresolution on my part, would encourage the Chinese in putting obstacles in my way, and render the object of my mission more difficult to attain without a fresh appeal to force.

I accordingly addressed to the Secretary of State, Kweiliang, the inclosed note, declaring that my resolution to proceed was inflexible; refusing to enter into any discussion of details until after the exchange of ratifications; declining to grant them an interview at this place, and holding them responsible for any consequences that might ensue from the want of due preparation at Peking for my reception.

M. de Bourboulon, who shares my opinion on the subject, transmitted a note to the same effect.

I further sent a short note, pointing out that, by employing one of the steamers lying here, they might still, if they liked, reach Tien-tsin in time.

In the meantime the squadron sailed to rendezvous at some islands a short distance off the Peiho, and Admiral Hope left on the 11th, having agreed to inform the officers in charge of the forts at the Peiho that the Ministers of England and France were coming, and to direct them, if they had received no instructions on the subject, to communicate the intelligence to Peking, and obtain a reply within a fixed number of days.

On the occasion of the Admiral's departure, I addressed to him the letter copy of which is herewith inclosed.

At this time the reports that reached us were not encouraging, and I learned from the best authority that a high Chinese official had declared that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that we should be obliged to give the Chinese Government another lesson at Tien-tsin before the Emperor would be brought to reason, and before pacific counsels would obtain the ascendancy.

This tallied with other accounts, and with the fact that the war party acquired so much influence at Peking last winter, and sent such extravagant instructions to the Commissioners, that Ho wrote back that, if affairs were to be managed in that spirit, the Emperor had better name his uncle and the other heads of the war party as Commissioners, as he would not undertake the task of bringing matters to a peaceful conclusion on such terms. To this unusual act of independence, the Emperor appended the remark, "His (Ho's) obstinacy will involve him in calamity." The paper to which I refer was obtained by Mr. Parkes, and a précis of it forwarded to the Foreign Office in the month of January.

It is clear, therefore, that a war party exists, and that the probability of resistance is a contingency not to be lost sight of; and Admiral Hope, before leaving, addressed a letter to Sir Charles van Straubenzee, requesting him to send up a second battalion of Marines to be at hand should active operations become necessary.

These steps seem to have alarmed the Commissioners, for, on the 13th, I received the inclosed reply from them, which, in its explicit and clear style, contrasts favourably with the vague and puerile tone of their former letters.

As this correspondence has been forwarded to Peking, I hope that, there as well as here, it will produce a conviction that we are not to be trifled with.

Your Lordship will observe that, though their reply is satisfactory as to the disposition of the Chinese Government, and its readiness to exchange ratifications, it makes no allusion to the interview with the Emperor, and to the presentation of the letter of credence to him. I gather from this omission that the Emperor has not instructed them on this material point; and as the question of ceremonial ought, in my opinion, to be settled before we leave Tien-tsin for Peking, it is clear that it could not have been discussed here, involving as it does the

necessity of taking the pleasure of the Emperor upon it, without the risk of losing the season altogether for the visit to Peking.

I must observe, my Lord, that in order to effect the presentation in person of my credentials to the Emperor, and to deter the Chinese from their hitherto invariable practice of subjecting foreign Envoys to petty slights and insults, which lower them and the Governments they represent in the eyes of the people, I must succeed in inspiring the Emperor and his Counsellors with a conviction that what I have once demanded I will exact, and with a wholesome dread of my readiness and power to resort to force, if my demands are not complied with.

The notes I have addressed to the Commissioners, as well as my general bearing, are, I feel certain, faithfully reported to the Emperor, and with this conviction I have purposely assumed the attitude and tone best calculated to induce him to submit quietly to very unpalatable proposals, by impressing upon him that these concessions are inevitable, unless he is prepared to draw the sword.

The considerable force collected by the Admiral will tend to strengthen this impression, and it is the more necessary at this time as the Chinese are aware of the absence of any French force from China.

Throughout many generations of our intercourse with China, we postponed considerations of national dignity to our commercial interests, and the statement "that the barbarians care for nothing but trade" appears again and again in their official papers, as the key to our character, and the principle by acting on which we are to be "soothed and controlled."

It is essential in dealing on this occasion with those questions of forms and ceremony so important to the Chinese mind, that we should disabuse them of this notion, and I believe that tenacity and firmness on these points will, by elevating our national character in the estimation of the people and of the Government, and by gaining their respect, if not their goodwill, facilitate greatly hereafter our relations with China.

For this reason, when the Commissioners the other day conveyed indirectly to me that they were ready to arrange to my satisfaction the question of the Canton indemnity, I took no notice of the overture.

I ought to add that Mr. Ward, the Minister of the United States, has insisted on exchanging the ratifications of his Treaty at Peking, and that he is prepared to accompany us to the North; he has, moreover, advanced the same claim to an interview with the Emperor. Of the intentions of the Russian Envoy, I have learned nothing as yet.

It only remains for me to add, that I purpose leaving this to-morrow morning for the Peiho, my French and American colleagues following the next day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEILIANG, &c., Hwashana, &c., Ho, &c., Imperial Commissioners, &c., make a communication.

It appears from the records, that on the 22nd day of the 12th moon of last year (January 25, 1859), a despatch was received by the Commissioners from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, in which there are the following words:—"The Undersigned has determined on proceeding to Canton to take certain steps (or to act); his business accomplished, in the course of some five or six weeks, he will name a time for his arrival at Shanghai, there to settle with the Commissioners such questions as still remain to be discussed."*

In due course of time, on the 26th day of the 2nd moon of the present year (March 30, 1859), the Commissioners received a second letter, dated the

* This is a free re-translation of the Chinese, representing the English of Lord Elgin's despatch, of which there is not a copy at hand.

29th of the 1st moon (March 3), to the effect that (Her Britannic Majesty) had appointed the Honourable Mr. Bruce to be her Representative, &c. ; and that he would arrive in China shortly: further stating that "the Undersigned, now on the point of leaving China, must take leave, on this his last opportunity of addressing them, earnestly to impress (upon the Commissioners) that the one essential to a continuance of friendly relations is the faithful observance of the Treaty," &c.

The Commissioners, in consequence of Lord Elgin's earlier letter, in which he engaged to return to Shanghae for a conference with them, have been waiting for him without moving (*lit.*, obstinately, persistently).

Lord Elgin has returned home, but Mr. Bruce, having received the commands of Her Majesty to succeed him in the administration of all things essential, and now occupying, to the great satisfaction of the Commissioners, a position identical with that of Lord Elgin, his predecessor, the proper course to be pursued is, doubtless, to appoint a day for a conference.

In faithful compliance with the engagement already entered into, and as the period appointed for the exchange of the Treaties is very near at hand, it is, of course, most expedient that all business which has to be considered should become the subject of consultation, and be proceeded with, as early as possible.

A necessary communication, addressed to Mr. Bruce, Envoy Extraordinary, &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 25th day (May 27, 1859).
(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication.

It appears from the records that on the 13th day of the 12th moon of last year (January 16, 1859), the Commissioners received from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, a communication to the effect that he was proceeding to Canton upon business, and would return to Shanghae in five or six weeks, to consider and dispose of all matters on which discussion was still pending.

Firmly persuaded of the good faith of Lord Elgin's words, the Commissioners have been waiting for him several months. His Lordship has now returned home, but as Mr. Bruce has been commanded by Her (Britannic) Majesty to replace him there with Plenipotentiary powers, his position is identical with that of his predecessor Lord Elgin.

With Mr. Bruce's permission, the Commissioners will state the questions which have been discussed with Lord Elgin, and decided, as well as those which still remain to be discussed.

As regards admission into Peking, the visit to Peking on this occasion to exchange courtesies and Treaties is exceptional: when it is over there is to be no permanent residence in the capital; some other place is to be chosen (for the Minister) to reside at. These are the words of Lord Elgin's despatch, the approval of which by Her Britannic Majesty, when Lord Elgin had the honour to receive it, was duly reported to His Imperial Majesty by the Commissioners.

As regards the navigation of the river (Yang-tze), Lord Elgin has been himself to Hankow to see the place for once. For the time to come, it will be safe and satisfactory that all arrangements be made, as of course they must be, in accordance with the Treaty.*

As regards circulation in the interior, this, without doubt, on the principle laid down by Lord Elgin, viz., that any British subject of respectability and good conduct should receive a passport from the local authorities under which he may travel, this is perfectly fair. But inasmuch as China has no means of knowing what British subjects are respectable, it is still necessary that some good adequate means be devised (to this end), that there may be no misgivings on either side.

* And consequently, here.

As regards the city of Canton, Lord Elgin engaged to go further into this question when he should return to Shanghai; but as his Lordship has returned to England, it has not been possible to consider it with him. The time for the exchange of the Treaties draws near: the Treaties once exchanged, the relations between the two countries will be more friendly than ever. Added to this, as Imperial Commissioner for the management of the five ports, His Majesty the Emperor has already substituted the Governor-General Ho, one of the Commissioners, for his predecessor (Hwang), by which appointment it is felt consultations on business between China and foreign nations will be much facilitated.* Everything is thus on a satisfactory footing. But as Canton is not yet restored, it would seem that no time should be lost in arriving at a satisfactory decision regarding it.

The Commissioners will be greatly obliged by his Excellency replying specifically to them upon the above subjects; those which have been disposed of in discussion, and those which remain to be discussed.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On the 25th instant (27th May) the Commissioners received Mr. Bruce's despatch of the 14th instant (16th May), apprising them that Her Britannic Majesty had done him the honour to appoint him her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Peking.

The Commissioners were greatly gratified at this intelligence. They are of opinion, however, that an affair of so grave importance to both nations as an exchange of Treaties cannot with propriety be hurried over. The Commissioners, having the fullest confidence in his predecessor, Lord Elgin, when he engaged them to remain at Shanghai to consider all matters not disposed of, were unable to return to Peking; and if Mr. Bruce now proceed direct to Tien-tsin, the Commissioners, having to travel by land, cannot reckon upon arriving there so soon. Indeed, taking into consideration the hindrance to be expected from the weather on their land journey, this will certainly occupy two months and more, as Mr. Bruce, they imagine, must be well aware.

As to the preparation of vessels, vehicles, &c., at Tien-tsin,† to which the letter under acknowledgment refers, and the selection of a building in proper order (for Mr. Bruce) to reside in, with the good understanding now subsisting between the two nations, the arrangements will be, of course, as liberal as it is suggested they should be.‡ But the Commissioners cannot arrive in so short a time, nor can any of these things be done at a moment's notice.

There is another consideration: not only will there be no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, as it is impossible for the Commissioners to be there against his arrival, but (there will be no one either to exchange the ratifications): the exchange of the Treaties must be effected by the hand of the Commissioners, and by their hand alone—no one can act as their substitutes; and believing, consequently, that it would be better for Mr. Bruce to defer his departure from Shanghai for a while, than to be kept waiting at the other place, where, after midsummer, the heat is excessive, they feel bound to request him, in the first place, on his arrival at Shanghai, to name a day for an interview with them, and, in the second, to appoint some other time for proceeding. This, it seems to them, would be the more satisfactory arrangement.

* This is, I think, a feeler regarding the extent to which our former relations are modified. The Chinese would prefer continually to regard them as merely commercial; the Chinese Superintendent of Trade as Foreign Minister.—F. W.

† The suitable means of transmission spoken of in Mr. Bruce's letter of the 16th of May.

‡ *Lit.*, it is certainly proper that, according to this, or after this fashion (China should be) liberal. There is a certain amount of patronage in the expression.

The Commissioners are induced to put forward this proposition by the importance they attach to the question before them, and (their desire for) the establishment of friendly relations to endure for evermore. Mr. Bruce's thorough acquaintance with the ways of the world (or the motives of men) is such that they feel sure he will appreciate their feelings, and they hope that he will at once reply to them.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., begs to acknowledge the receipt of the letter addressed to him by their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, Ho Kwei-tsing, and Twau Ching-shih, in reply to that sent by him to his Excellency Kweiliang, Chief Secretary of State.

The Undersigned must remind his Excellency Kweiliang that the Treaty of Tien-tsin, signed on the 26th of June last, provides that the ratifications shall be exchanged at the capital within a year from that date; and the Imperial Commissioners themselves admit that on the 30th March last, they were apprised by the Earl of Elgin that the Undersigned was on his way to China for the purpose of fulfilling this engagement. The Commissioners were, at the same time, made aware that the Earl of Elgin was returning home, consequently that he would not revisit Shanghae. Notwithstanding this intelligence, they have thought proper to remain at Shanghae till within a month of the time appointed for the exchange of ratifications, alleging, as a reason for so doing, that various details connected with the execution of the Treaty had been only in part discussed by the Earl of Elgin, while they, at the same time, declare that they are the only authorities by whom the exchange of the ratified Treaties at Peking could be effected. They now write to inform the Undersigned that their journey to Peking will occupy above two months; that is to say, that they cannot reach the capital for upwards of a month after the day by Treaty appointed, that there will be no one to receive the Undersigned at Tien-tsin, and no one to exchange the ratifications at Peking. They accordingly request the Undersigned to delay his departure from Shanghae.

The Undersigned is determined, that, so far as it rests with him, no stipulation of the Treaty shall be violated. The exchange of the ratifications is a ceremony which records in the most solemn form that the new Treaty is the rule henceforth to be observed in conducting the intercourse of the two nations. And as the Treaty admits of no alteration or modification, the Undersigned cannot allow that the period fixed for the exchange be made in any way dependent on arrangements necessary to carry certain of its details into execution.

It is with regret that the Undersigned finds at the very outset of a Mission sent by Her Britannic Majesty as evidence of her desire for peaceful relations, that he is met, not as he had a right to expect, with a cordial and frank invitation to the capital, but with delays and hesitations, ill-calculated to cement a good understanding. The Undersigned will not, however, swerve in the least from the course he has laid down in his letter of the 18th ultimo. He is resolved to proceed forthwith to Peking, there to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty, and to deliver in person the letter intrusted to his charge by his gracious Sovereign to His Imperial Majesty, to whom it is addressed, nor will he quit the capital until satisfied that effect will be given, without reserve, to every provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

The Undersigned intends no discourtesy to the Imperial Commissioners, but he must, under these circumstances, positively decline any interview with them at this place.

His resolution to proceed to Peking without delay is inflexible.

It is at the same time his duty to warn his Excellency Kweiliang that he is prepared to insist on a reception befitting the dignity of the nation he repre-

sents, and that any failure in this respect will be attended with the most serious consequences to the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghai, June 8, 1859.

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour to address a letter to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, upon the 8th instant. He has received no reply to this, and he observes that neither his Excellency nor his colleagues the Imperial Commissioners, who have informed him that it is through their hands alone that the ratifications of the Treaty can pass, are, to all appearance, making any effort to reach Peking by the day on which it is by Treaty agreed the ratifications shall be exchanged. He begs, therefore, to point out to them that there are lying in this harbour several steamers, one or two of them flying the Chinese flag, by the employment of which it is perfectly within their power to accomplish their journey before the appointed time.

Admiral Hope, the Naval Commander-in-chief, has started for the mouth of the Peiho with his squadron, charged to advise the local authorities of the immediate approach of the Undersigned and his colleague, M. de Bourboulon, the Minister of France.

The Undersigned, before leaving Shanghai, begs again to impress upon his Excellency Kweiliang, that his proceeding is in strict accordance with the Treaty provision, and he throws upon the Chinese Government the entire responsibility of any consequences that may arise from its violation.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghai, June 11, 1859.

Inclosure 6 in No. 8.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

Shanghai, June 11, 1859.

THE communications I have received from the Imperial Commissioners do not, I regret to say, justify me in assuming that the Chinese Government has resolved to receive my visit to Peking in a conciliatory spirit. There is manifestly a desire to treat this visit, not as the exercise of our undoubted privilege under Treaty, but as an exceptional case, the various steps of which are to be minutely arranged at this place before we are to be permitted to proceed to the North; and not satisfied with the interminable discussions to which such a course would necessarily lead, the Commissioners propose further to enter upon the details necessary for carrying into effect the provisions of the Treaty. Their letters breathe throughout the old spirit of jealousy and isolation.

It is not consistent with my instructions, nor with the express stipulations of the Treaty, that I should agree to such proposals, nor do I see how it would be possible, within reasonable time, to settle at this distance from Peking, questions of ceremonial which affect the Emperor personally, and on which his pleasure will have to be taken.

I am satisfied, on looking over the correspondence, and particularly by a reference to the Earl of Elgin's last letter to the Commissioners on leaving China, that they cannot allege, with any show of reason, that they have prolonged their stay here at his request; and however much I regret the difficulties that may arise out of their absence from the capital at this conjuncture, I do not think that I could depart from the programme contained in my first letter to them, without involving myself later in more serious complications, and without reviving hopes in the mind of the Chinese Government, that by procrastination

and discussions they may succeed ultimately in giving to this visit to Peking a character, in the eyes of the Chinese people, at variance with those principles of equality and unrestricted intercourse which it was one of the main objects of the Treaty to insure.

I have, therefore, informed them that I cannot accede to their request to remain here, and that I shall take my departure for the North without delay, in order to effect the exchange of the ratifications and the presentation of my letter and credentials to the Emperor.

At the same time I am anxious to give to the Imperial Government the opportunity, if it be so disposed, of repairing the neglect of the Commissioners, and of receiving me in a friendly manner. You will precede my arrival at the Peiho, and I beg that you will have the goodness to inform the officer in charge of the forts of the approach of the Ministers of England and France on a friendly mission, and inquire whether orders have been given to facilitate their progress to Tien-tsin. Should the reply be in the negative, I would suggest that they should be called upon to transmit the intelligence to Peking, warning them at the same time that if a reply is not received within a certain fixed period, the Imperial Government will be held responsible for the consequences.

By the time your message reaches Peking the Government will be in possession of the correspondence between his Excellency Kweiliang and the foreign Plenipotentiaries, and will be informed accurately of the objects and scope of the visit to the capital. M^r de Bourboulon agrees with me as to the course to be adopted, and I am authorized by him to request that you will make the above communication in his name as well as in mine.

I intend leaving Shanghai on or about the 15th of this month.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure 7 in No. 8.

Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On receipt of Mr. Bruce's letter of the 8th instant, acquainting the Commissioners that his determination to proceed forthwith to Peking to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty was unalterable, the Commissioners feeling that it would not be correct that the day appointed for that purpose, which was near at hand, should be passed, after due deliberation decided that the only course open to them was to represent the matter fully to His Majesty the Emperor, and to request him to be pleased specially to select some high officer who might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception. Their memorial was sent forward at the rate of 600 *li* (200 miles) a-day,* and would arrive at the latest in some eight or nine days at Peking, so that it might be assumed that when Mr. Bruce and the Ministers of France and America reached Tien-tsin, the Imperial Commissioners could not fail to have arrived as well, and so the exchange of Treaties in Peking would be effected by the time fixed for the purpose.

The Commissioners were in the act of addressing Mr. Bruce to the above effect when they received his second letter dated the 11th instant, expressing a wish that they should proceed by steamer. They were not unaware that a steamer would be a most expeditious (means of conveyance), but they have not received His Majesty's commands (to avail themselves of it), and they could on no account presume so to proceed on their own motion. Were they now to make the proposition the subject of the memorial (so far from any advantageous result from such a course), there would be, on the contrary, time lost in the marching and countermarching. It behoves them, therefore, in obedience to His Majesty's commands, to return post haste to the capital. As they have prayed His Majesty to detach a high officer to act as agent in the matter, Mr. Bruce will be certainly enabled to arrive at his destination by the time appointed. With the peaceful relations now established between the two nations,

* This is the form of words for the fastest rate of mail-despatch but one.

nothing certainly will be done that is not in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, and the Commissioners, accordingly, pray Mr. Bruce at once to put away all misgiving on the subject. There is no need for him to feel any anxiety. They would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (the Peiho), he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar, and then, without much baggage, and with a moderate retinue, proceed to the capital for the exchange of the Treaties. His mission being a pacific one (or, as he comes speaking peace), his treatment by the Government of China will not fail to be in every way most courteous; and it is the sincere wish of the Commissioners that relations of friendship may be from this time forth consolidated, and that on each side confidence may be felt in the good faith and justice of the other.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, C.B., &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 5th moon, 12th day (June 12, 1859).

(Received June 13, 8 A.M.)

No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Off the Peiho River, July 5, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to state that four days after the receipt of his Excellency Kweiliang's letter, I left Woosung for the North, taking the "Coromandel" in tow, in order to have an unarmed vessel in which to ascend the river.

On arriving at the Islands of Sha-loo-tien, the rendezvous agreed on with the Admiral, I found the squadron no longer there, and proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho on the 20th June, where the ships were assembled, the Admiral having sent the gun-boats over the bar, on account of the heavy sea running outside.

Admiral Hope reached the Islands of Sha-loo-tien on the 16th, and on the 16th he left the anchorage in the "Fury," attended by two gun-boats, to announce the coming of the Ministers of England and France to the authorities at the mouth of the river. The "Fury" and gun-boats anchored outside the bar, and Commander Commerell, with Mr. Mongan, the interpreter, went over the bar in the "Fury's" gig, to deliver the message. They were not allowed to land by the armed rabble on the bank, and when Captain Commerell asked for an interview with the authorities, they declared that there was no authority, civil or military, on the spot; that the barriers in the river had been made by the people at their own expense, not against us, but against the rebels; and that the garrison consisted of militia only. The chief spokesman, who called himself an engineer, or Clerk of the Works, however, offered to take any message to Tien-tsin, and bring back an answer.

On receiving the report of what had passed, Admiral Hope sent Captain Commerell in again to inform them of the arrival of the Ministers, and to request that a passage should be opened within three days to allow of their proceeding by the river to Tien-tsin.

To this they replied that they had dispatched a messenger to Tien-tsin to notify our arrival, and that a passage should be opened within the required time. Admiral Hope then returned to Sha-loo-tien.

On the 18th the squadron left for the Peiho, and the gun-boats anchored inside the bar on account of the heavy sea running outside; and on the 20th, the day of my arrival, Admiral Hope proceeded to the forts to see whether steps had been taken to open a passage for us, and to deliver a letter he had addressed to the Intendant of Tien-tsin, stating that the squadron would remain at the anchorage during our visit to Peking, and requesting that a market should be opened for the sale of fresh provisions, and arrangements made for landing of officers and men in such numbers as might not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

The same rabble came down to the bank, and opposed the landing, one of them threatening Mr. Mongan with a drawn sword when he jumped on shore. They again denied the presence of any authority, and asserted that they were militia, acting on their own responsibility. Instead of removing the obstacles,

they had further closed the passages, and when taxed with this breach of their promise, denied that they had ever offered to remove the barriers.

To give more colour to their assertions of the absence of any authority, they hoisted no flags on the forts, and no soldier was visible during the time the squadron was lying there.

It is not difficult to understand the motives of the Chinese Government in thus holding aloof, contrary to their usual custom, from all communication with the squadron and foreign Ministers. We know from the Pekin Gazettes that during the last eight months they have been studiously adding to their defences along this coast, and that Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, the head of the war party, and distinguished by his successful defence of Tien-tsin against the rebels in 1853, has been appointed Commander-in-chief of this district. It is evident that the Government were preparing for our arrival, and had instructed the garrison to represent themselves as a militia post, and to deny the presence of any constituted authority, by which arrangement they hoped to preserve an attitude which would enable them to take advantage of his success, if he were able to keep us out of the river, or to disavow his proceedings, if he failed in his efforts to do so.

After a long and anxious consultation M. de Bourboulon and I decided that we ought to adhere strictly to the course laid down in our letters to Kweiliang at Shanghae, and that we should insist, as much for the sake of our future communications with Pekin as for the successful accomplishment of the mission now confided to us, on the right of using the river as the natural highway to the capital. If, in accordance with Kweiliang's memorial, a high officer had been deputed to meet us at this place, bearing a friendly invitation from the Emperor, and satisfactory assurances as to our personal reception by him, we were quite prepared to have proceeded as far as Tien-tsin with only such vessels as were required for the accommodation of ourselves and suite, for I do not think that in any case we ought to have allowed our right to choose the only expeditious and commodious route to the capital to be questioned. But on considering the late proceedings of the Chinese Government, the persistency of Kweiliang and his colleagues in remaining in the South, instead of returning to Pekin, the proposal to effect the ratifications at Shanghae, the attempts to delay our progress to the North by raising fresh discussions on the Treaty, and, finally, the hostile and discourteous reception we have met with here, we were forced to conclude that the difficult task lay before us of carrying the Treaties into full operation, and of insuring a reception at Pekin on terms to the last degree mortifying to Chinese arrogance, while the Emperor is the hands of a party averse to concession, and relying on their preparations to resist us.

Every incident corroborated the information we obtained at Shanghae from a Chinese authority, reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 14th ultimo, that the Emperor would not accede to what we were instructed to demand except under the pressure of fear.

The question, then, for consideration was, how were we to work sufficiently on the fears of the Emperor to induce him to give way? The experience of last year showed that the presence of a squadron in the gulf was not enough to effect that object, while it equally showed that the opening of Pekin would follow on the accessibility of Tien-tsin to our ships being established. We could hardly be mistaken in inferring from the studied manner in which the Chinese officials held aloof from all communication with us, and from the repeated assertion of no authority being present at the forts, that the Government was prepared to disavow these hostile proceedings, if we succeeded in clearing a passage up the river.

We were equally justified by our past experience, and by the reluctance of the Chinese Government to allow us to proceed up the river, in assuming that they considered they would gain a great advantage by keeping the vessels outside, and by reducing us to negotiating in the gulf or in the interior, deprived of the moral support we should have acquired from the presence of our flags at Tien-tsin. Our desisting from claiming the right to go up in our own ships would have been attributed to inability to force their defences, and the ascendancy would thus have been secured to the war party in the Emperor's Councils. My conviction is, that in that case we must have abandoned all hope of a proper reception at Pekin on this occasion, and that we should have found it impossible to establish unrestricted access to the Central Government in future, or work

out in practice the clauses of the Treaty provided for circulation in the interior, and the imposition of regular duties instead of arbitrary exactions; provisions which can always be evaded, and for which we can have no other guarantee than the Emperor's dread of giving us offence.

On the 21st of June, I accordingly addressed a letter to Admiral Hope (copy inclosed), requesting him in the joint names of M. de Bourboulon and myself to take such steps as he might deem expedient to clear away the obstacles in the river, so as to admit of our proceeding at once to Tien-tsin. Nothing was done until the 24th, the Admiral being meanwhile engaged in notifying that as a passage up the river had not been opened, he should proceed to open it himself, and Mr. Ward, the American Minister, having signified his intention of proceeding on the 24th in his small steamer to the forts, and requiring a free passage up the river, in which application he was, like ourselves, unsuccessful. During that night, however, Admiral Hope caused part of the obstacles to be blown up without loss, and the attempt to pass the barriers and proceed up the river was fixed for the morning of the following day.

About 9 A.M. on the 25th, a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship "Magicienne," anchored about nine miles from the forts, and a petty mandarin came on board with a letter addressed to me by the Governor-General of Pechelee, translation of which I herewith inclose. It announced that the Governor-General had been ordered to proceed to Peh-tang-ho, an inlet or small mouth of the river, about ten miles to the northward of this anchorage, and thence to offer his services to Her Majesty's Minister. That Kweiliang and Hwashana had been summoned back to Peking, as the persons authorized to exchange ratifications, and convey the Minister to the capital. I was requested, therefore, to await their arrival, and to allow time for the withdrawal of the troops quartered at Peh-tang-ho, after which the Governor-General would come in a vessel to convey me to the landing-place, whence I should proceed to Peking by land.

This letter was dated the 23rd, and only reached me on the 25th—a delay which is inexplicable, if it had been intended to reach me in time.

As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the Treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin.

As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at 10 A.M., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations; but I should not have been deterred by the informality alluded to above, had the contents of the letter been satisfactory. It will be seen, however, on comparing it with Kweiliang's last letter to me at Shanghai, that the proposal differs so widely from the course recommended by the Commissioners, as to confirm the impression in my mind that the pacific party had lost their influence with the Emperor. Kweiliang had acknowledged the propriety of exchanging the ratifications within the stipulated period, and had proposed that a person should be named to meet me at this place, and conduct me at once to Peking; thus admitting that the Treaty was to be accepted as it stood, without further discussion.

The Governor-General of Pechelee proposes a course which is substantially a repetition of the attempts made to detain me at Shanghai, and postpone indefinitely the exchange of ratifications, thereby giving room for re-opening discussions on those points which are particularly obnoxious to the Chinese Government. In both letters it is to be remarked that a demand for a personal interview is passed over in silence; and in neither am I informed that the Imperial Government objects to our making use of the river-route to Tien-tsin.

Apart, therefore, from the considerations I have specified above, for believing that the abandonment of the right to go up the river would be fatal to the success of the mission, and would establish a precedent which would put it in the power of the Chinese Government to throw difficulties in the way of our future intercourse with Peking, I could only see in this overture a further attempt at evasion and delay, and evidence that the influence at Court of Kweiliang and his colleagues was at a low ebb. It is, moreover, a significant proof of how idle it is to expect to carry out our policy by appealing to any other motive than fear, that no communication was addressed to M. de Bourboulon, and no notice taken

of Mr. Ward, though he came to the Gulf of Pechelee at the express invitation of the Imperial Commissioners.

Answers are received at Takoo within forty-eight hours from Peking, and had the Government wished to treat foreign Ministers with courtesy, it would not have allowed eight days to elapse without taking any notice of them, and then contented itself with addressing the only Minister who happens to be supported by a considerable force.

Her Majesty's Government will be informed by Admiral Hope's despatches that on proceeding to remove the barriers on the 25th, the batteries, which had up to that time remained apparently deserted, and some of them masked, were suddenly manned, and opened with so heavy and well-directed a fire as to render the operation of removing the barriers impossible. Towards the close of the day a force was landed to storm the batteries, but failed in the attempt, owing to the nature of the ground, and the deep ditches which had to be crossed before reaching the forts. Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack, and, judging from our past experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example in the history of our contests with them, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks.

Admiral Hope having notified to me that the force under his command was unable to clear the passage up the river, M. de Bourboulon and myself agreed that we must consider the mission to Peking at an end for the present, and that we should retire to Shanghai. I accordingly addressed the inclosed letter to the Admiral, requesting him to dispose of the force in the manner best calculated to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. I thought it expedient not to address any communication to the Chinese Government upon these events, in order not to interfere in any way with the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to keep the Chinese Government as long as possible in suspense as to its ulterior intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Rear-Admiral Hope to the Taoutai of Tien-tsin.

Off the Peiho, June 20, 1859.

HAVING arrived here with a considerable squadron, in company with the Honourable Frederick Bruce, the Minister empowered by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year with His Majesty the Emperor of China, and it being my intention that the squadron shall remain here during Mr. Bruce's absence at Peking, I request that proper directions may be given that I may be permitted to purchase such supplies of fresh provisions and other articles as I require; and that the officers and men may have free communication with and access to the shore in such numbers as may not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

"Magicienne," off the Peiho, June 21, 1859.

M. DE BOURBOULON and myself having maturely considered the position of affairs, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be consistent with the course hitherto adopted by us, to delay further our attempts to reach Peking within the time specified by the Treaty for the exchange of ratifications. The Chinese Government, besides the Article of the Treaty itself, is before this in possession of the correspondence that passed at Shanghai with the Commissioners, and, had it wished to do so, could have sent orders to

facilitate our progress up the river. As you are aware, the course their officers at Takoo are pursuing bears every mark of a fixed determination to prevent our proceeding to Tien-tsin. The superior officers in charge of the forts keep out of the way to avoid making any specific declaration of their intentions until their preparations for our exclusion are completed, and their subordinates have not hesitated at positive falsehood for the same purpose.

There is considerable reason to believe that on the Mongol Prince in charge of the works the hopes of the war party repose, and that if he is defeated in his attempt to keep us out of the river, pacific counsels will prevail with the Emperor; but there is little chance of any satisfactory result while their confidence in him is unabated, or that the visit to the capital will be effected in such a manner as to impress the Chinese with a just idea of our national power and equality.

We have therefore resolved to place the matter in your hands, and to request you to take any measures you may deem expedient for clearing away the obstructions in the river, so as to allow us to proceed at once to Tien-tsin.

I have also to beg that you will act in M. de Bourboulon's name, as well as in mine.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Governor Hang to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chili, &c., &c., &c., makes a communication.

In obedience to the commands of His Imperial Majesty, the Governor-General has come to Peh-tang-ho, a port (or harbour) to the northward of Ta-koo, to be of any service (or to do the honours to) Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy.

As the negotiators of the Treaty made last year, His Majesty the Emperor has issued a Decree commanding the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, and the President of the Board of Civil Office, Hwashana, to return from Shanghae to Pekin, and they may arrive any day. If the Envoy of Her Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to wait until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the Treaties (or will exchange the Treaties in the capital).

At Peh-tang-ho itself there has always been a military station and a battery for the defence of the coast. Orders have been issued to remove the troops and guns to the rear; and, as soon as this shall be effected, a vessel (or vessels) will be prepared for the Governor-General to proceed with outside the bar to welcome Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-ho, whence he can proceed by land to Pekin.

A necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 5th moon, 24th day (23rd June, 1859).

[The character signifying "Her Majesty" is not on a level with that signifying the Emperor, as by the fixed rules of Chinese official composition it would be, were it employed in speaking of the Emperor himself. It marks a non-appreciation of the complete equality we claim for our Sovereign with all allies, the Emperor of China included, and I should recommend that the original be returned for correction.—T. W.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Rear-Admiral Hope to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

"Coromandel," off the Peiho, July 1, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the means at my disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles opposed to your entry at the mouth

of the Peiho; and that they are of so formidable a nature that any further operations cannot lead to successful result.

I expect the repairs of the gun-boats to be completed about the middle of next week, and I hope to be able to re-assemble the force outside the bar about that time: and under such circumstances I shall be glad to know in what way I can most forward the objects of your mission.

I have also to request that you will be so good as to forward a copy of this communication to M. de Bourboulon, and inform that gentleman how much I am indebted to Captain Tricault, of the "Duchayla," for his assistance during the engagement of the 25th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

Sir,

"*Magicienne*," off the Peiho, July 2, 1859.

I REGRET that, in consequence of a resistance which our previous experience of Chinese warfare could not have led us to anticipate, the means at your disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles to my progress up the Peiho.

Allow me at the same time, whilst offering you my profound sympathy for the loss sustained by the squadron, to express my sincere admiration of the decision and gallantry shown in the operation undertaken for that object.

As you inform me that, in the face of this formidable resistance, further operations cannot lead to a successful result, I beg to state that I have, for the present, abandoned all attempts to reach Peking, and have resolved to refer home for instructions as to the course to be adopted. With this view Mr. Rumbold proceeds by the next mail to England to furnish Her Majesty's Government with full particulars respecting what has occurred.

Under these circumstances, I agree with you that the return of the Marines and Sappers to Hong Kong is desirable, and that the ships should be employed in the manner most conducive to the security of Her Majesty's subjects, and to the protection of their interests at the several ports.

In accordance with your request, I have communicated to M. de Bourboulon a copy of your letter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 10.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, July 13, 1859.

I PROPOSE in this despatch to give a succinct account of the course I have adopted, and of the grounds on which it is based. It is necessary to allude briefly to the maxims of China in regard to intercourse with foreign nations, as they afford the key to what has taken place.

In China international relations have been always studiously ignored by the Government, and in no single instance has a Foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining admission to the capital, except on performance of the "kotow," or ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute-bearer. The subjects of foreign nations residing in China are represented as belonging to barbarous tribes, and living by trade (of all occupations the one least in repute among the Chinese), as devoid of civilization, and ignorant of the rules of reason, and by all means to be confined to the outskirts of the country.

According to the maxims of the Government, they are entitled to no rights beyond those accorded by the favour of the Emperor; and though circumstances and the weakness of the Government have led it to acquiesce in the concession of considerable privileges to foreigners in distant sea-ports, it is remarkable, as

proving how tenaciously it holds to its traditions, that it always classifies as acts of rebellion the measures of coercion adopted by foreign Governments to obtain redress for wrongs done to their subjects.

Now the British Treaty of Tien-tsin (which is much more complete in this respect than the Treaties signed at that place by the other Powers) asserts principles which are diametrically opposed to these traditional pretensions of the Chinese Government. According to it, the British Minister is to be accredited as a Representative of an independent equal Power, and the Chinese Government, in its treatment of him, is called upon finally to abandon the assumption of superiority which it asserted uncompromisingly during Lord Amherst's Embassy, and, so lately as three years ago, when Count Poutiatine first proposed to visit Peking. He is to be allowed free and unrestricted communication with the capital, not only as specified in the French and American Treaties, when he has business to transact, but whenever he wishes to visit it. His diplomatic intercourse is to be conducted according to the usages of Western nations, and he is not to be called on to perform any ceremony of a nature derogatory to his character as representing an equal and independent nation. In future, access to the capital is to be recognized as a right the Minister can insist on, instead of its being begged for as a favour, and either refused or conceded on such terms as the Chinese might choose to impose for the sake of saving their own dignity at the expense of that of the foreign Envoy in the eyes of the Chinese population.

The clauses which permit British subjects to travel in the interior, and open the Yang-tze river to British shipping, are equally subversive of the established maxims of Chinese statesmen. To push us back on the sea-board, and confine us to as few seaports as possible, to keep us outside the walls of important cities, and vilify us to the people, in order to preserve a wall of separation between the races, is the policy which the Chinese Government, from its adherence to usage, and from its indifference, if not dread of all progress, which can only be attained through novelty, would gladly follow, if it dared to do so.

It is not surprising, therefore, when the allied squadrons left the Peiho river last year, and the panic produced by their presence began to subside, that ancient maxims and prejudices should have gradually resumed the ascendant at Peking, and that the Imperial Cabinet should have entertained hopes of recovering part of the ground it had lost. There is proof of its language and feeling with regard to foreigners having undergone no change in a Decree published in the "Peking Gazette," on the 25th July, one month after the signature of the Treaty, in which allusion is made to the "barbarians suddenly rushing up the river to Tien-tsin, and retiring moved by the commands of Kweiliang and his colleague, signified with affectionate earnestness." Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, reputed to be their best General, was made Commander-in-chief of the Pechelée province, with a large force at his disposal; the forts at Ta-koo rebuilt and strengthened, and stakes and obstacles of different kinds placed across the river to efface the impression produced by the proceedings of last year, and by preventing foreign ships from arriving at Tien-tsin, to render Peking more inaccessible than ever.

While these preparations were going on, the departure of the High Officer of the Board of Revenue, who was to settle the Tariff at Shanghai, was delayed in order that he might not reach Shanghai until the season for operations in the Gulf of Pechelée had passed, and when he started he was accompanied by the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. Subsequent events leave no doubt in my mind that the statement contained in the letter of which Mr. Parkes obtained possession, is substantially correct, and that they were instructed to obtain modifications in the principal Articles of the Treaty—the residence at Peking, the opening of the Yang-tze river, and circulation in the interior, to all of which the Emperor strongly objects.

In their first letter the Commissioners advanced the principle that the Treaty having been signed under pressure, its provisions had not been fully discussed. But the determination evinced by Lord Elgin not to allow the Treaty to be called in question, seems to have convinced the Commissioners that it was advisable to rest satisfied with the concession made as to permanent residence at the capital. It is clear, however, that their remonstrances against the policy, enjoined on them from Peking, were most unpalatable to the Emperor and his counsellors, who urged them to make further efforts; and the dissatisfaction with the conduct of Ho, who seems to have pointed out most strongly the inexpediency of the course proposed, is reported to have been expressed in

the autograph rescript, that "his obstinacy would be the cause of calamity to him."

In the beginning of March, Lord Elgin, who had left Shanghai on account of the unsatisfactory state of Canton, wrote to the Commissioners, stating that Her Majesty's Government had agreed not to establish the Mission permanently at Peking, on condition of a proper reception being given to Her Majesty's Minister. He further informed them of his approaching departure from China, and of my appointment, charged with important documents to be delivered at the capital, and warned them solemnly that peaceful relations could only be maintained by a faithful observance of the Treaty. The Imperial Commissioners, in spite of this information, continued at Soo-chow, instead of returning to the capital to prepare for the reception of myself and the French Minister; and their motive in so doing was made sufficiently manifest by their attempts through a Chinese formerly in Mr. Wade's, but now in the Chinese service, to ascertain whether we would consent to exchange ratifications at Shanghai, or, at least, to be conducted from that point by land to Peking. This journey occupies two months, and I leave your Lordship to judge whether, had we adopted this route, we should not have abandoned, for all practical purposes, one great object of the Treaty, viz., free access to the Central Government.

It was only after my arrival at Hong Kong, that I heard of the Commissioners having remained in the South, and received Mr. Hart's Memorandum (inclosed in my despatch of the 30th of May), describing the hostile feeling of the Court, and throwing considerable light on the motives of this inconvenient delay of the Commissioners. I felt at once that it became necessary either to throw overboard my instructions entirely, to abandon the visit to Peking and the attempt to establish, on a proper footing, once for all, our diplomatic relations with the Court of Peking, or to declare that I would insist on exchanging the ratifications at the capital within the period stipulated in the Treaty, and on a personal reception by the Emperor for the purpose of delivering to him Her Majesty's autograph letter. I could not doubt that the task of extorting a reception at Peking in a form implying a surrender on the part of the Emperor of his pretensions to national superiority, would be more difficult than obtaining a recognition of our equality on paper; and that the Chinese Government, in accordance with its usual policy, would endeavour, by prescribing the route I was to follow, by limiting the number of my attendants, and by bad arrangements during the journey, to put me in the degrading position hitherto occupied by foreign Envoys, and recover, by this means, the prestige it had lost by our successful *coup de main* of last year. To prevent such a result, and to receive free access to the capital in future on becoming terms, I decided, after mature reflection, on proceeding by the river, the natural highway to Tien-tsin, under the British flag, as its presence at that place would establish in the eyes of the Chinese that our visits to Peking are a matter of right, not of favour.

M. de Bourboulon, whom I consulted before deciding on the course to be pursued, entertained views similar to mine, and wrote a despatch to the Commissioners in the same sense.

I could not, however, in the face of the unsatisfactory information I had received, hope that the Chinese Government would agree to such a complete revolution of its mode of dealing with foreigners, unless I was backed by a sufficient force to inspire it with alarm. I accordingly consulted with Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee on this point. Several gun-boats and part of the squadron had been dispatched by Sir Michael Seymour to Shanghai, previous to my arrival in China, to be ready to accompany me to the north. This measure had been adopted before unfavourable intelligence had been received from that quarter.

We agreed, on consultation, that the force dispatched was not large enough to produce the desired impression. It was, accordingly, strengthened, particularly in the class of vessels that can cross the bar, and brought up to an equality with that which accompanied the allied Ambassadors last year. The larger the force, the less likelihood, judging from our experience of the Chinese character, there would be of a collision.

On arriving at Shanghai, where I proceeded as soon as my French colleague was ready, I found, as I anticipated, the Commissioners armed with pretexts to detain me, and prevent my visit to the Peiho. Their letters, though moderate in tone, alluded to the three principal clauses of the Treaty, and proposed to

re-open the discussion upon them. Had I accepted this overture, and abandoned the course laid down in my letter of the 16th May, they would have inferred that I was to be "soothed and controlled," and would have postponed the ratifications with the intention of obtaining my assent to conditions which would have deprived these clauses of their practical efficacy. This view is confirmed by the fact that they were not in possession of the ratified Treaties; the Chinese Government having thus confined them to the task of gaining time, if nothing else, by renewing negotiations, reserving meanwhile in its own hands the power of exchanging the ratifications or not, as it might seem expedient, after the result of the interviews had been communicated to it.

I think that the Commissioners themselves were acting rather in obedience to their instructions from Peking, than in the expectation that their attempts to detain us here would be successful. For, as soon as they received my letter, stating that I would not enter into discussion until the ratifications were exchanged, and declining any interview with them at Shanghai, the twelve-month allowed by Treaty for the exchange having almost expired, they changed entirely their tone. They acknowledged the propriety of abiding by the terms of the Treaty, and stated that they had memorialised the Emperor to send down a high officer to Tien-tsin, whom we should find on our arrival, ready to conduct us, in time, to the capital. Though they hinted at a journey by land from the river's mouth, and wished me to anchor the squadron outside the bar, they did not state that orders had been given to prevent us entering the river, and making use of it to reach the town of Tien-tsin.

Admiral Hope left a day before the reply of the Commissioners was received, being desirous of making the passage under sail. The place of rendezvous was fixed at the Sha-loo-tien Islands, whence he was to communicate to the authorities the approaching arrival of the Ministers of England and France, *en route* for Tien-tsin, and inquire whether orders had been given for our reception.

I announced his departure the next day to the Commissioners, and suggested the propriety of their proceeding to the Peiho on board one of the steam-ships, owned by Chinese, lying here, by which means they would be able to reach it in time to receive us. They declined doing so, on the ground that they could not adopt so unusual a method of travelling without the Emperor's permission. This may be so; but I am inclined to think they shared in the feeling expressed in confidence by the most enlightened of their assistants, that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that the Emperor and his counsellors were so unreasonable that they could not be brought to terms without another lesson.

M. de Bourboulon and I left Shanghai four days after the receipt of the letter of the Commissioner, in order to afford time for the memorial to reach the Emperor, and for the necessary orders to be given, should he be inclined to accord us a friendly reception, and carry out the recommendations it contained.

Mr. Ward, the American Minister, accompanied us at their express invitation, having claimed, under the most favoured nation clause, the right to exchange the ratifications at Peking, and present his credentials to the Emperor.

My despatch of the 5th instant, which is forwarded by the present opportunity, gives in detail the events that took place at the Peiho. I have only to remark, in explanation of the course pursued, that we found ourselves off the mouth of the river, which forms the highway to Peking, within a few days of the expiration of the period fixed by the Treaty for the exchange of the ratifications. On requesting a passage to be opened for us, and explaining the peaceful objects of the mission, we were informed that there was no authority on the spot; that the fort and barriers were not constructed by order of the Government, but by the people, who had built and garrisoned them for their protection against rebels, not to keep us out of the river. In proceeding to remove them, we, therefore, violated no order of the Imperial Government, and, had we been successful, the Government could, and would, no doubt, have disavowed entirely the acts of those who opposed us. At the same time we were convinced that the repugnance of the Chinese Government to execute fully the Treaty, and to grant us the reception we were instructed to demand; could only be overcome by a sense of their inability to resist us. The preparations made since last year had given them confidence, and that feeling would have been increased, had we, on coming in presence of them, receded from the demands we had made. Under such

circumstances, to have accepted the proposal of the Governor-General of Chili: would have been to enter on a path which must have ended in disgrace and failure; and nothing, in my opinion, would have justified us in consenting to it, unless the only competent authority to pronounce a judgment on such a question had expressed doubts as to the result of an attempt to force the passage of the river. But I can state, positively, that if Admiral Hope had expressed doubts on the subject, they would not have been shared by the squadron, nor by those who have had most experience of warfare in China; and, if it be decided that the means at our command were insufficient to justify us in pursuing so bold a line of policy, it is but right that I should share that responsibility with him.

The Intendant of this place has received official notice of these events from Peking, with orders, as he states, not to molest the English. But the effect of this check must be prejudicial to our interests, as in this, more than in almost any country, we are respected and considered in proportion as we are feared, and whatever may be the ultimate decision of this Government with reference to the Treaty of Tien-tsin, I do not think that its provisions can be carried out until we recover our superiority in the eyes of the Chinese.

Mr. Wade has drawn up a full and explicit Memorandum on the proceedings of the Chinese Government within the last year, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Translation of a Paper forwarded to the Earl of Elgin in Mr. Parkes' Despatch of January 15, 1859.

[*Memorandum.*—Two Chinese Clerks, perfectly unknown to each other, have suggested, the moment they read this paper, that it was the composition of a small official sent by Hwang-tsung-han to Shanghai, to watch the progress of affairs. The writer speaks of himself throughout as an official of much lower rank than the person he addresses; but I do not think that this is Hwang. The words "Governor-General" (of the Two Kwang) prefixed to Hwang's name, must have been elevated, had the letter been written to him direct.

It must have been sent to Canton after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow, and before his return to Shanghai.—T. W.]

THE Administrators-in-chief of barbarian business in the capital are the three Princes Hwui, Kung, and Ching (1).

When the four Imperial Commissioners (2) had their audience to take leave, His Majesty very positively signified to them that it was his pleasure not to allow peace to be made in this sort of way (3), and that the whole fifty-six Articles of the Treaty of Tien-tsin must be cancelled. Ho, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, received them at Chang-chow, in the 8th moon (August, September), and stoutly maintained that there must be no mention whatever of change. They were consequently at issue until their arrival at Shanghai, when, owing to the strong support given by the Treasurer Wang to the representations of Ho, the Commissioners began to incline to a compromise. Several memorials were addressed to the Throne in the joint names of the whole five, in reply to which they continued to receive, in every case, His Majesty's peremptory injunctions (to persist in the course prescribed); until, in his last decree, His Majesty declared his pleasure to be, that if peace were made with the barbarians, four conditions must be insisted on:—

Firstly, he would, on no account, allow trade from Hankow to Nankin.

(Secondly: this condition is omitted, most likely, by mistake, as the text below shows the question to have been the residence of a Minister at Peking.)

Thirdly, he would not allow (foreigners) to circulate in the different provinces.

Fourthly, he would have the provincial city of Canton evacuated at an early date.

On receipt of His Majesty's commands as above, the Commissioners had

several consultations with the barbarians. They alas! would give in on one point only; to wit, the evacuation of Canton; in the other three they held out for what had been proposed at Tien-tsin.

The Commissioners and the Governor-General Ho accordingly made up (4) another Memorial, to the effect that the barbarians had promised to evacuate Canton; that, as regarded admission into Peking, they would not be allowed to go and come in large bodies, nor to build churches there, but that the admission of four or five on any future occasion, when they might have business of importance to transact, need not be prohibited; that, as to circulation in the provinces, no one was to travel save with a passport, to be issued under the seals of the local authorities and the Consuls of the barbarians: no one would take on himself to go without one; so that, as it would still rest with the local authorities, when the time came (5), to give or withhold a passport, this point might, in their opinion, also be conceded. There thus remained no question but that of the navigation of the river up to Hankow, whither it would really be difficult to prevent barbarians from proceeding.

To this representation they received for answer from the Emperor, "Try again with all your might, and you will succeed again."

The Commissioners and Ho, after receiving this, again put their seals to the Treaties, and exchanged copies of them as concluded; and it was agreed that in the third moon (April, May), the barbarians should go into the capital again to exchange national letters (letters between the Governments). Ho, the Governor-General, returned the same day to Soo-chow; the Treasurer Wang also returned on the 5th. The English leader, Elgin, had started up the Great River on the 3rd, with five steamers, for Hankow. Just before his departure, he said, "Provided that the provincial authorities behave well to me, I shall not insist on ready money (or immediate payment) (6) at Shanghae, and I will write to Canton, and have the city evacuated at once; but if there is any more fighting (on my journey), I must postpone action (on these points)." The Commissioners answered: "We will write to prevent any one giving you matter of offence; at the same time there are several positions along your road in the hands of the rebels, and we are not responsible for any trouble these may occasion you; nor will it be our affair if your vessels come to harm by getting aground on any of the numerous shoals in the Great River." "It does not concern you, of course," said he, "I can take care of myself;" and so he started. The following day he got aground off Fu-shan, and after transshipping his guns, &c., to a smaller vessel, on the 5th, he got off by dint of great exertions on the 8th, and was reported to have passed Nankin on the 11th. It was also said that the long-haired men (the rebels) had fired upon him, though this is not certain. On the 10th, however, a number of devils were brought back, the barbarians said, ill of the small-pox, but the people have it, wounded by the rebels. Which is the truth I know not.

In conclusion, I may remark that everything relating to the barbarians is kept so quiet that it is hard to learn the facts. To give an instance; since the Commissioners arrived here every conference they have had with the Chiefs to discuss business questions has been held either on board a steamer or in some out-of-the-way place, and, their measures agreed on (the conferring parties) have gone home to carry them out. This is for fear they might be overheard by the native servants of the different houses of business, who understand the devil language.

The Emperor has been moved to abolish the restrictions on opium, and to admit it into port at 30 taels per picul import duty, and into the interior at 15 taels transit duty. The tariff is settled; all goods pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. This is proposed as the import duty. If barbarians go into the interior to sell merchandize, they are to pay $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. (as a transit duty), whether they pass eight barriers or ten. On tea and silk there are some augmentations and some diminutions. The rules are now in form, and as soon as the seal has been put to them, a copy shall be submitted to you.

Touching the money payment to be made to the barbarians (to the English), 6,000,000 dollars; and to the Americans, 600,000 dollars; the latter, some time ago, expressed their readiness to the Commissioners to give up 100,000 dollars; they would require only 500,000 dollars, namely, 100,000 to be paid at Shanghae, 100,000 at Foo-chow, and 300,000 at Canton, to be deducted, during three years, from the duties. The Commissioners had settled the form

of instrument, so that the American question may be looked on as decided. A despatch to this effect must (soon) reach Canton. The English indemnity will, most likely, follow a like rule of apportionment, a quota being levied on the (customs of the) places aforesaid, or the whole may be laid on the Shanghai duties, in which case the people (of Canton) need feel no alarm. These barbarians are very anxious, nevertheless, to make Canton pay the largest share. This would delight them. Indeed, so deep-seated is the ill-will with which they regard the Canton officials, gentry, and people, that they actually talk of shutting up Canton as a port altogether, and never trading there again. They have several times pressed the Commissioners, with all their might, to denounce the Governor-General (Hwang), and the three gentlemen (Lo, Lung, and Su), as a condition of peace (or, before they would treat of peace). This has not only been done by word of mouth, but there has been correspondence upon it, of which I inclose copies.

The Commissioners, I should humbly suppose, can hardly have been so stupid as to give in to everything in this way (7). They may be holding such language as a means of keeping (the barbarians) within range (8). It is impossible to say. Should they have moved the Emperor, as was suggested, His Sacred Majesty would not surely have accepted their view of the case. Never, since the world began, was there such a doctrine as that the official, instead of punishing the robber for his theft, is to conciliate him by doing whatever his malignity may dictate against the person he has robbed (9). (My remarks, I am sensible, are presumptuous.) How should an officer of my low estate and mean abilities venture on propositions at random? It is our duty to abide His Majesty's decision.

Another statement is that Ho is strongly urging an application to the Emperor to transfer the seal of High Commissioner for the Five Ports from Canton to Kiang-su, and that the Commissioners will very presently address the Emperor to that effect. After his return to Soo-chow, the Governor-General Ho addresses to the Emperor two memorials in succession, setting forth how difficult it was to negotiate peace; that after all his pains he had only got so far; that the barbarians when they had got a foot wanted ever an inch more; that they were quite ready to add something to the fifty-six Articles they now had, but would not abate a single letter. Further, he said that he knew it was in the hands of the three Princes that the direction-general lay, and if His Majesty would not agree (to what he, Ho, recommended), he must beg him to send the three Princes to manage the things for themselves. To this the Emperor, in his autograph rescript (10), rejoined, "No luck, of a truth, can attend such perversity and opinionativeness" (11).

The Treasurer Wang was, at the same time, commanded to return with all speed to Soo-chow; the Emperor would not allow him to remain at Shanghai interfering in barbarian affairs.

It was subsequently asserted that the Governor-General Ho had been deprived of his button, and five Commissioners ordered to proceed from the capital to Tsing-kiang-pu (12), whether for this or some other matter it was not clear. But (these two last statements) are but a report, which as I have not seen the documents, I do not venture to affirm is true. I purpose, as soon as I have dispatched this letter (13) (*lit.*, petition), going in person to Soo-chow to see the Treasurer Wang, and find out (14) the truth from him. I shall ask him for copies of some of the despatches, which I will forward in a separate cover.

The French were away last month at Japan and in Annam. They were not by when the English and the other nation were negotiating. Since their Chief's return to Shanghai he wanted to go to Peking to build churches there—a proposition which induced much discussion, without any satisfactory result (15). The tradespeople (or mercantile Chinese) say that no harm will come of this; they (the French) must talk in this fashion; and that when the English Chief returns (16), everything will be settled, all and sundry.

The Russians are not at Shanghai, and have taken no part (in what has passed).

The Commissioners themselves are entertaining every day, or sitting for their portraits (16A), or paying visits to the devils, taking their fill of enjoyment with nothing whatever to do.

Pwan Si-ching (Pontinqua) reached Hang-chow on the 12th of the moon,

but has not yet arrived at this place. The man the Commissioners and the barbarians really want is Howqua (17). It is a matter of indifference to them whether Pontinqua comes or not; by the time he arrives, I imagine, there will be nothing for him to do.

Another rumour is that the Commander-in-chief Yang has retaken Nganking (18). The Prefect Wu says that he has written full particulars of all that has been reported in this letter to Chang, the Han-lin (19), and gives me to understand, consequently, that I need not trouble your ear with a repetition of them.

I have, therefore, the honour to transmit you this summary.

Observations.

(1.) The Prince Hwui is Mien Yü, only surviving brother of the late Emperor; Kung is Yih Su, brother of the present Emperor; Ching is a Prince of the Second Order of Imperial Nobility, whose name I cannot ascertain.

(2.) Kweiliang, Hwashana, Mingsheu, and Twau Ching-shih.

(3.) *Lit.*, such a peace fashion, or such peace measures.

(4.) Made up, concocted; a certain amount of fraud is implied.

(5.) When application is made.

(6.) Immediate payment, viz., of the indemnity.

(7.) *Lit.*, a thousand consents, and a hundred compliances.

(8.) More literally employ this (language) for the purpose of tethering—a favourite word of Kiyung and others in relation to the government of foreigners.

(9.) The barbarian is the robber; Hwang, Governor-General of the Two Kwang, the master of the house, whom he has injured: will Government forget itself so far as to make terms with the barbarian by persecuting Hwang?

(10.) The despatches to the Emperor are returned to the high officers authorized to address them, with some slight observation written in red ink by the Emperor. If his answer is of great length, or requires deliberation, he writes merely, "Our placet will be given separately." In the latter case he sends down what we call an Imperial Decree to the Great Council for transmission to the officer or officers concerned.

(11.) *Lit.*, where there is this determined bias and self-opinion there is indeed no such word as happiness (or fortune).

(12.) A place near the Yellow River, at which the Governor-General Ho was to have met the Commissioners as they came down. The rumour here alluded to is probably a revival of the above, which was in circulation in August and September.

(13.) The form in which the inferior addresses the superior official.

(14.) Rather, spy out.

(15.) Baron Gros did not sign the Tariff, &c., until some days after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow. It was stated that some missionary question was under discussion between his Excellency and the Commissioners.

(16.) Returns, viz., from Hankow.

(16A.) The Commissioners sat more than once to the Honourable N. Jocelyn, who photographed them at the British Consulate.

(17.) Howqua, and some other ex-hongists, had been expected at Soochow, to advise the Commissioners regarding the amendment of the Tariff.

(18.) This report probably grew out of the collision of the Nganking rebels with the squadron escorting Lord Elgin, of whose approach, to judge from appearances, the Imperialist force endeavoured to make some use.

(19.) There are more than one doctor of the Han-lin of this surname at Canton.

(Signed) T. WADE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Memorandum by Mr. Wade, intended to accompany the Translation of a Letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, from Canton, to the Earl of Elgin, on the 15th January, 1859, précis of which was inclosed to the Foreign Office.

THE letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, of the genuineness of which I see no reason to entertain any doubt, read by the light of the correspondence of the Imperial Commissioners and earlier proceedings of the Chinese Government, ever since negotiations fairly commenced at Tien-tsin, furnishes, to my mind, a clue deserving of attention to the course the Government has, in this last instance, pursued.

According to the writer, evidently an official who has access to good information, the Emperor determined, the moment our backs were turned, to cancel the whole Treaty extorted from him in June 1858, and for this purpose sent Kweiliang and his colleagues south. This accords with a rumour current at Shanghae in August; Kweiliang was said to be in deep disgrace for his negotiations, the first public notice of which by the Chinese Government was in a Decree of the 25th July, to the effect that the barbarians who "burst into the river" with their ships had retired in obedience to the affectionate commands of Kweiliang.

The use of the term "barbarian," as Lord Elgin complained in a letter to the Commissioners of the 7th September, was itself an infraction of Article LI of the Treaty, committed within one month of its signature.

The mission of Kweiliang and his colleagues, ostensibly to revise the Tariff, was remarkable as being so much more than what the Treaty required. It had been stipulated merely that a high officer of the Board of Revenue should repair to Shanghae. Two ex-Commissioners of the Canton Customs were indeed added to the Commission, but one of these was replaced by Twau Ching-shih, one of the Under-Secretaries most actively employed during the Treaty negotiations. His leave-taking memorial, also published in the "Gazette," assured the Emperor, in stock phrase, that he would be zealous in "soothing the barbarians."

Rumour, as I have said, made the object of this mission anything but a revision. Nothing, however, very positive was stated, nor did the reports on the subject command general attention.

Meanwhile, as Kweiliang and his colleagues had promised at Tien-tsin, on the 4th July, to obtain from the Emperor, as soon as they returned to Peking, a Decree appointing a Commissioner to revise the Tariff, which Decree would reach Shanghae as soon as Lord Elgin, his Lordship, after ten days' delay at Shanghae, had written on the 21st July to complain that he was still without a line from Peking on the subject.

On the 27th he received a letter from Ho Kwei-ting, announcing the appointment of the Commission, composed, with the addition of himself, of the members enumerated above, who, he said, would arrive about the 18th August.

Lord Elgin visited Japan, and having made his Treaty there, hurried back to Shanghae, to learn, by a letter from the Commissioners themselves, that they could not be at Shanghae before the 6th October.

It is, I repeat, quite clear that Kweiliang and Hwa-shana, the highest officers of the Civil establishment, were not coming to revise a Tariff. Indeed, another object of their mission was eventually stated in their own letter of the 22nd of October, to which we shall come in due time. Ho Kwei-ting's assurance that they would be down by the 18th of August, was given, I imagine, to prevent the possibility of Lord Elgin's returning to the Peiho.

The decree he forwarded was dated the 15th of July. The prescribed time for an official journey of the distance is fifty-five days. This would have brought the Commissioners to Shanghae by the 10th of September. I presume Ho chose a middle term for safety's sake.

I attribute the Commissioners' delay of their departure from Peking, or their loitering by the way, to the one cause—the fears of the Government that, when the Commissioners had declared their errand, we might revisit the Peiho. We knew from the Gazettes that the forts were being rebuilt—this, of course, was in itself no matter of surprise; that timber was purchased to stake the river, at which we could not either be astonished; but, lastly, and this is noteworthy,

that these operations were conducted under the special authority of Sung-ko-lin-sin, a Mongolian prince allied by marriage to the Imperial family, distinguished as the conqueror of the rebels on the occasion of the Tai-ping incursion into Chih-li, in 1853-54, and appointed during our stay at Tien-tsin, High Commissioner of War, and Commander-in-chief of a force stationed at Tung-chow to cover the capital should we advance upon it. It is also important that his labours had proceeded with such rapidity that, by the 21st November, he was enabled to report the completion of the works on the Tien-tsin river; for which service, by a Decree of the above date, he was awarded a surcoat of honour.

My impression is confirmed, by all that has since occurred, that the arrival of the Commissioners was delayed purposely until the river defences were in a state of forwardness. For, once more, they were coming not to revise the Tariff, but, as the Canton letter states, and their own correspondence presently shows, to discuss modification, if not abrogation, of three important privileges which distinguished our Treaty from any other; to wit, the residence of a Minister at Peking, circulation of British merchants in the interior, and the navigation of the great river: also to require the rendition of Canton.

Ho Kwei-ting, as in duty bound, went to meet the senior Commissioners as they entered his jurisdiction; and the statement in the Canton letter that it was on the strength of his representations, supported by those of his provincial Treasurer Wang, that they were led to modify materially the course prescribed by their instructions, is borne out not only by the gossip of the period, but by a communication subsequently made by an indisputable authority, which I do not feel at liberty to name, that they had come down charged to make war rather than concede the permanent residence of a Minister. The words stated to have been used by Ho, when remonstrating against such policy, were "that war would be absolute madness." I confess that, with some faith in the narrator, I believed him, at the time he stated this, guilty of a simple exaggeration, *à la Chinoise*.

It must not be forgotten that, throughout the whole of this period, from June to October, affairs in the South were in a condition that augured ill for peace.

Long after the Treaty was signed, Hwang, and a committee of three Cantonese of high standing in the class we style "the gentry," who held an Imperial Commission for the enlistment and control of Militia, were persisting in acts of war. After the tactics of 1856 and 1857, when Yeh was in power, the native servants were called home from Hong Kong, and the supplies of that colony in effect cut off by semi-official Committees established in the adjacent districts. Soldiers of the Canton garrison were kidnapped and assassinated. A proclamation under Hwang's seal, offered a high reward for Mr. Parkes's head.

Even so late as the 22nd August, Hwang had supported the Special Committee in its war-taxation, on the ground that though a Treaty had been concluded at Tien-tsin, he knew not its conditions, and that it was as necessary as ever to be ready for banditti.

I see no reason to doubt, when we read the Emperor's Decree of the 21st October, in which he rejects the Commissioners' censure of Hwang and the Committee, that the Court was encouraging the latter to persevere in their attempt to expel the allies from Canton, where by Treaty they were to remain till the indemnity agreed to was paid.

The Commissioners arrived at last on the 6th October. They had been duly apprised of the dissatisfaction occasioned by the tardiness of their movements; and having first apologized, in a private note, for not visiting Lord Elgin until the ostensible business of their mission, the Tariff revision, was *en train*, they dispatched an official letter, in a most conciliatory strain, to beg Lord Elgin to appoint Deputies who might meet their own for the revision of the Tariff. The officers they named were Wang, the Commissioner of Finance, Chief Civilian of the Province, and Sieh, for the three years previous, Taoutae or Intendant at Shanghai, one of the few Chinese I have met who, notwithstanding much ignorance and prejudice still remaining, really appreciate the power and probity of the foreigner, or who appear soberly to contemplate, without abatement of pride in their own country, the possibility of utilising barbarian ability to her advantage. He had been named to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin at Tien-tsin.

Lord Elgin met their proposals by demanding, first, an acknowledgment of two letters, written early in September, complaining of proceeding in the South, and still unnoticed.

Their reply was pacific enough: they excused Hwang's ignorance on the grounds of the distance from Peking; his hostile attitude as not been assured of our intention; and volunteered to proclaim that peace had been negotiated with England, France, America, and Russia.

It does not appear, for all that was promised on the subject, that even this meagre notice, which promulgated none of the conditions of the peace, was ever published elsewhere. At Canton, indeed, the High Committee's Militia continued to annoy the foreign garrison until January, when one of their positions at Shek-tsin was destroyed. The garrison was then made to patrol the neighbourhood, the result of which measure was a speedy restoration of order.

The Commissioners' overtures did not yet satisfy Lord Elgin. He took them to task for having allowed near four months to elapse without making known the existence of a Treaty; and he demanded the removal of Hwang, and the dissolution of the Imperial Committee, before he could consent to go into the Tariff at all.

This line of action, of course, greatly perplexed the Commissioners. As Chinese statesmen they would be slow to comprehend why the barbarian should postpone commercial considerations to any other, and they hastened to soothe him accordingly. They had already, they said, denounced Hwang, and would again denounce him, praying the Emperor, at the same time, to withdraw their powers from the Committee.

Lord Elgin, on this, engaged if they would promise to communicate to him the Imperial rescript to their memorial, to commence the discussion of the Tariff, and this promise given, named Mr. Oliphant and myself as his Deputies.

Up to this time they had not breathed a word regarding the real matter of their mission. They were doubtless in much embarrassment as to the mode of introducing it; and the opinions of Ho, who drew his inspiration from Wang and Sieh, the two Chiefs of his provincial staff, both able and intimately *liés*, had, I feel satisfied, in no way diminished their difficulty in approaching the retraction of a Treaty concession.

At length, on the 22nd October, reassured by the favourable progress of the Tariff and its concomitants, they, with evident delicacy and diffidence, declared the true object of their coming. Moralising briefly on the end of negotiations, they pointed out that those at Tien-tsin were conducted so completely under pressure of an armed force as to leave no place for deliberation; the Emperor had, accordingly, specially commissioned them to come to Shanghai, "earnestly to press a matter which would be the common advantage of both parties." Among the conditions extorted there were some of real injury to China, which there had been no opportunity of explaining. Of these they name one only—the residence, in permanence, of a British Minister at Peking. As the Queen of England has an option, by Treaty, they beg Her Majesty may be prayed to decide that the Minister shall only visit Peking on occasion. They avow that this condition is most irksome to China, and, in Chinese fashion, they strive to show how irksome it will be to us. A rude and numerous Tartar soldiery; the unacquaintance of metropolitan officials with foreign affairs; the temper of the population—these are the dangers which should incline us to forego this one—to us useless, and, for the reasons enumerated, perilous—privilege; the more readily to forego it, as, on the other hand, we are gainers to a considerable extent in the many which we should still retain.

Looking back to the Tien-tsin period, we call to mind that the Commissioners, although committed in their letter of the 11th June, 1858, to the declaration, that "to a Minister's permanent residence there was properly no objection," and to the proposition that, the recent collision considered, the Minister had better live at Tien-tsin—an official residence being assigned him at Peking—had attempted on the 21st June to recede from these proposals.

They had, they said, received a Decree, desiring them to do their best to persuade Lord Elgin to give up this invidious privilege, "the North being cold, and excessively dusty;" also with it the right to open Chin-kiang, the right to circulate in the interior before the people should have been duly warned, the right to navigate the Great River, by which we should drive the Chinese out of the field.

On all these points, they again made a fight at their Conference with Mr. Bruce on the 24th June.

On the evening of the 25th they made a last effort, through Count Poutiatine and Mr. Reed, to dissuade Lord Elgin from insisting on the residence of a Minister, and the right of British merchants to circulate in the interior, pleading that, unless his Lordship gave way on those points, their lives would be forfeited.

Lord Elgin standing firm, they urged, even on the morning of the 26th itself, a modification of the text, by which the Minister might be authorized to be constantly in residence at Peking, instead of entitled to reside there, without moving; a change which, as liberty of his movements is secured in another Article, was adopted.

These, with the addition of the surrender of Canton, are the questions on which, according to the Canton letter, the Emperor instructed the Commissioners to stand out, and it is upon these I gather, from their letters of the 27th and 28th of May, the Commissioners would have engaged Mr. Bruce in discussion, had he accorded the interview they proposed. They had, withal, another end to gain.

Lord Elgin met their request of the 22nd October by an emphatic declaration that it lay not with him to abate one tittle of the Treaty. He pointed out the real object and advantages of diplomatic relations as established in Europe, and briefly adverting to past misunderstandings between our countries, expressed his doubt that the Imperial Government could provide guarantee for the maintaining of peace, equivalent to that supplied by the presence of a Minister at Peking.

The Commissioners, on the 28th October, admit that our Minister's right to permanent residence is incontestable, but the exercise of it will humiliate China in the eyes of her subjects. They, therefore, again pray Lord Elgin to move the Queen to use the option the Treaty leaves Her Majesty in their favour, and there is no satisfactory arrangement they are not ready to make.

Lord Elgin undertook to submit the correspondence to Her Majesty's Government, and to recommend that if Her Majesty's Minister were properly received next year, and full effect given to the Treaty in all other particulars, the Minister should be directed to choose a residence elsewhere, and to visit the capital either periodically or when business required it.

The Tariff negotiations were now brought to a close, and Lord Elgin announced his intention to proceed up the Yang-tze, to see what ports it would eventually be desirable to open.

The Commissioners acquiesced with a good grace, promised to send an officer to wait on his Lordship, and to advise the authorities of the provinces he would have to traverse of his approach.

This was partly in fulfilment of their undertaking to make any satisfactory arrangement, partly, I feel sure, from words that fell from the Judge, in the hope that we should have a profitable collision with the insurgents at Nankin.

At Hankow we found a proclamation announcing that the English, French, and American nations were come to look at the place, but not to trade; so the people need not be alarmed. There was not, it is scarcely necessary to observe, any sign of alarm, except that produced by the official runners and such persons, who at first insisted on forming our escort, and, in that capacity, unnecessarily thrashed the crowds that assembled round us, and used every effort to prevent the tradespeople from taking our money. The people themselves were here, as throughout the whole 600 miles of our journey, civil, inoffensive, and eager for trade.

I regard the policy of the Government in this to have been the same it has long adopted at Canton—to promote an aversion to foreign intercourse among the people, and to impress on foreigners that the people are hostile and hard to control. The doctrine finds its place, as we have seen, among the arguments against a Minister's residence at Peking.

On his return to Sbanghae in January, Lord Elgin found the news from Canton still far from satisfactory. Just as he was about to start for Hankow, the Commissioners had mooted the question of that city's rendition, and the payment of the indemnity, but had received no positive answer as to the course his Lordship proposed to take. They had also requested us, by letter, to adopt the same arrangement as the French. They had written, besides, a circular to

the British, French, and American Ministers, regarding the future issue of passports, and various other points which would be raised under the new Treaties. Lastly, they prayed for some settlement of the duties owing under the provisional system adopted during the occupation of Shanghai by the rebels in 1853 and 1854.

These letters had been sent in but a day or two before Lord Elgin's departure, and he, consequently, had delayed replying to them until his return. On receipt of the Canton intelligence, he recommenced correspondence by an inquiry whether the promised decree removing Hwang had been obtained. The Commissioners sent him a decree of the 21st October, acknowledging their denunciation of Hwang, "for conduct calculated to produce mischief;" defending him, however, as having acted on the offensive only until the Treaty was concluded; defended the Committee as simply engaged in keeping the peace; and concluding with the observation that it would be for the Emperor himself to deal with Hwang should he have committed himself since the Treaty was signed.

The Commissioners must have received this rebuff before Lord Elgin left Shanghai, but were, doubtless, in no haste to show how their advice had been relished by their master.

Before their reply had reached him, Lord Elgin had answered their circular of the 7th November. I need notice but two items of his answer. He undertook most readily to guarantee that every precaution would be taken to prevent the abuse of the passport system by British subjects. At the close of his letter, he replied to their remark that their queries had been put by reason of their ignorance of foreign affairs, by observing that the most evident remedy of this defect would be, in sending a Chinese Legation to England.

The Commissioners rejoined at length, but noticeably about passports, which, they observed, the Consuls would have to apply for to the Chinese authorities, to whom they must be, in due time, surrendered to be cancelled.

This was on the 14th. On the same day, Lord Elgin had written to express his serious dissatisfaction at Hwang's continuance in office. He would now call on the Commissioners to settle the indemnity in strict accordance with the provisions of the Separate Article, or, as instructed by Her Majesty's Government, he would eject the Chinese authorities from Canton.

A very crestfallen answer followed from the Commissioners. They had done their best. The Emperor alone could decide. The Canton question they had not had time to settle since Lord Elgin's return.

On the 20th of January, Lord Elgin, having received news of the Shek-tsing affair, wrote again. He reviewed his correspondence with the Commissioners since their arrival in October. He was now convinced that Canton was to them a question *ultra vires*; he should, therefore, desire our executive there to act with vigour, and when the ratifications were exchanged, the Emperor should be asked whether things at Canton had been done with or without his authority.

The Commissioners wrote to assure him that Hwang should now certainly be removed, and the Special Committee dissolved; but Lord Elgin, inclosing them a copy of the letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, announced his intention to proceed himself to Canton. On his return to Shanghai, in the course of six weeks, should he not find the Commissioners there, he would proceed to Peking.

The Commissioners wrote, roundly abusing Hwang and the Committee. The Emperor's decree must arrive in three weeks. In the interim all pending questions could be discussed. They were quite competent to deal with the Canton question. They prayed him to remain.

Lord Elgin was inexorable. The conditions of the Canton question, he wrote, 25th of January, were specified in the Treaty. Had the Emperor chosen that the Commissioners should close it, he would have given them the requisite powers. They had not kept faith about Canton. They had promised months before to effect an improvement there. None had been effected. He would himself enforce a better order of things. This done he would return to discuss whatever remained for consideration, peaceably or otherwise, as the Chinese Government might see fit.

Lord Elgin then departed, and on the 14th of February the Commissioners forwarded a decree, not, indeed, removing Hwang from the Governor-Generalship,

but still transferring his seal of Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Foreign Trade to Ho Kwei-tsing.

This decree was, doubtless, shaped so as to save the Imperial dignity. The Emperor would not disgrace the Governor-General (who has since been transferred to Sze-chuen), under pressure, and his choice of Ho, as Hwang's substitute, he had reason to believe would soothe us.

I have gone thus at length into this section of the correspondence, from October to January, to show with what reluctance the Chinese Government took a minimum of action against an officer notoriously corrupt, and flagrantly tyrannical in his jurisdiction, and denounced by the highest in the land for a course of foreign policy prejudicial to the interests of peace. My conviction is, that the Government, or, to take a hint from the opening clause of the Canton letter, that portion of it which had the credit of establishing the Special Committee, and authorizing its operations, never abandoned the notion of recovering Canton until their defeat at Shek-tsing, a village near Canton, and other movements of the allied force, broke the spirit of the militia.

It is also my impression, however contradictory the statement may appear, that the strong language held to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin throughout this period, while it deterred them from attempting any of the changes I am persuaded they were sent southward to effect, enabled them at the same time to hold their own with the Emperor, by representing the impossibility of retracting what he is assumed to have required from people so violent and determined.

His withdrawal of the seal from Hwang was probably balanced somewhat in the Emperor's mind by the opportunity afforded him of declaring in his Decree, that our accounts from Canton (of kidnapping, assassination, &c.) surprised him much, as, in the "soothing and bridling" of foreign nations, China had never been treacherous.

Lord Elgin acknowledged the receipt of their last letter on the 3rd of March. He therein told the Commissioners of the appointment of his successor, charged with the ratified copy of the Treaty, to be exchanged at Peking, and of his own immediate departure for England. He communicated to them the consent of Her Majesty's Government to make the British Minister's residence at Peking but occasional, on the conditions before recited; and, bidding them farewell, reminded them that peace was only to be kept unbroken by a strict observance of the Treaty—by a mutual recognition of the equality of nations, between whom, he took occasion to remark, there could be no such relation as that implied in the words "soothing and bridling."

The Commissioners received this on the 29th of March. They made no move north, notwithstanding; on the contrary, on learning Mr. Bruce's arrival, they moved from Soo-chow, where they had spent the new year, to Shanghai.

Mr. Bruce's despatch to Kweiliang, of the 16th of May, announcing his arrival, and requesting that suitable preparations may be made for his reception at Tien-tsin, and his journey to Peking with the ratified Treaties and the autograph letter of Her Britannic Majesty, reached the Commissioners on the 27th, and their proceedings from this date are deserving of close attention.

Mr. Bruce found at Shanghai, on the 6th of June, three despatches from the Commissioners, the first dated the 27th of May, the day on which the second admits his letter of the 16th of May had arrived; also admits that Lord Elgin's last letter, announcing his departure, had reached them on the 29th of March. They had remained, nevertheless, because his Lordship had said he would return to discuss various questions, which they do not enumerate. His successor, who is, of course, equally competent with himself, is bound, they think, to take up the pending discussion with them, and with all speed, as the day named for the exchange of ratifications draws near.

The second, which is dated the 28th of May, acknowledging Mr. Bruce's of the 16th, urges that an important affair like the exchange of ratifications cannot be hurried through as he proposes; repeats that Lord Elgin's letters had kept them at Shanghai, the journey from which place to Peking would take two months; none but they themselves could represent the Chinese Government in the matter; there was no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, and nothing ready; they therefore propose that Mr. Bruce, instead of waiting "up there," where he will find it very hot, should put off his departure, and grant them an interview. This is accompanied by another of the same date, in which, insisting

again on Lord Elgin's engagement to return and discuss various questions, they beg to enumerate those of which he had disposed and those left unsettled.

He had agreed, they say :—

1st. That the coming visit to Peking was to be exceptional ; that the Minister was not constantly to be at Peking.

2nd. That his visit to Hankow was exceptional ; our movements were henceforth to be in accordance with the Treaty stipulations.

3rd. That none but respectable persons were to obtain passports, for the issue of which regulations must be devised. The Canton question was not settled, and Lord Elgin had promised to go further into this:

To take the last first, Lord Elgin had expressly told the Commissioners that the Canton question must be settled, and promptly, according to the Separate Article, which prescribes payment at Canton to be arranged by the Canton authorities. Before he left the south, Mr. Bruce had ascertained in May that the Canton authorities had no knowledge of this stipulation, or, if they had, were without any instructions to give it effect.

The other three are the ever-recurring clauses of difficulty ; the original modification of the first being further modified by total omission of the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government, as the Commissioners had been duly apprised in Lord Elgin's last letter, would consent to modify it. The other two are stated as they stand, I can only suppose to draw from Mr. Bruce some such acquiescence in what it would have been literally hard for him to dispute, as might preclude the possibility of his suggesting any arrangement for the anticipation of the Treaty terms—the far receding extinction of the rebels, before which no British subject can by Treaty claim to enter the region they infest.

Recalling the pertinacity with which the Commissioners have revived their objection to our enjoyment of the privileges here adverted to, the statements in the Canton letter, and in other quarters, of the Emperor's violent opposition to the concession of them, when we see them now, we should have said needlessly, reproduced once more, we can only infer that some further limitations were contemplated.

A Chinese, last year my head clerk, but promoted after the Treaty, for his supposed knowledge of foreign affairs, to a mandarinship of the fifth grade, and now attached to Kweiliang, called twice on Mr. Lay, in the spring, first to ascertain whether we would agree to exchange ratifications at Shanghai ; secondly, if we would consent to proceed, overland, thence to Peking. The latter, he observed, is the time-honoured form of introducing the periodical missions from Annam, Lewchew, and other dependent States, into Peking ; the form which enables China to maintain before her subjects that show of surveillance and patronage by which she has ever sought to negative a barbarian State's assumption of equality with herself. The American Treaty enables China to give the United States' Minister such a reception. So long as he does not insist on an audience, no tradition will be violated. It does not practically secure him access to Peking for any diplomatic purpose.

The above proposal accepted, our circulation under passports would infallibly have been infected by the precedent. No one would have travelled except under an official protection, resembling that proposed years ago by Kiyong for the neighbourhood of Canton—a protection so irksome and profitless to the few who availed themselves of it, that travelling, if it were to be under such auspices, was soon foregone altogether.

This is, of course, speculation ; nor is it more when I declare my belief that the Commissioners rather hoped than expected that we should halt at Shanghai, as they proposed, within three weeks of the day we were by Treaty required to be at Peking. They were, I imagine, acting under orders to try everything that might prevent our visit to the capital.

On receiving Mr. Bruce's peremptory reply of the 8th June, followed by his supplementary note of the 11th, the Commissioners laid down their arms. His letter of the 8th, they wrote, had been sent to the Emperor, who would receive it in some nine days. They had moved him to send a high officer to Tien-tsin to meet Mr. Bruce, whom they recommended to leave his ships of war outside the bar, and proceed in light marching order to Peking. They cannot themselves take steam as Mr. Bruce proposes, as the Emperor has not authorized them to do so, but in obedience to His Majesty's commands (when

received does not appear), they will go North with all speed. The suggestions respecting the anchorage of his squadron, is brought in, as it were, casually: "The Commissioners would wish," &c. There is no hint that the route by the Tien-tsin river is *condamnée*, or that the attempt to ascend it will be opposed.

Yet they must have known that opposition was imminent. The high authority, cited before, assured my informant that, so certain was he of a collision, that he should keep himself out of the way. The Court, he said, was not disabused of its invincibility, nor would it be without another defeat. It was, for all that, not too proud to be treacherous, as we have found to our cost. Admiral Hope had sailed before the Commissioners' last letter was received; but his first proceedings, it is worthy of observation, actually filled the measure of their requirement. He approached the bar on the 17th, with only one steamer and two gun-boats, and the officer sent in to communicate with the forts crossed the bar in a ship's gig.

On the 20th, finding that the people on the spot, who maintained, as on the former day, that they had closed the passage of the river without the orders of Government, had not, as they had promised, removed, but, on the contrary, had greatly multiplied the obstacles in the way of a free passage, he gave notice to the Intendant of Tien-tsin that his squadron would remain at the mouth of the river while Mr. Bruce was at Peking; he, therefore, wishes his men to land to purchase supplies. The Intendant only opposes their landing lest they should lose themselves in winding paths, amongst the camps and field-works which, he says, abound along the way between Ta-koo and Tien-tsin. He says nothing of the Government's objection to leave the river open, and he does say that the defences he alludes to are not to our address.

All this while no official, the militia and peasantry on shore affirm, is near the spot. Mr. Ward, the American Minister, is told the same story by the same people on the evening of the 24th; the batteries appear deserted until the following forenoon, when, as the foremost gun-boat, according to notice given the previous evening by Admiral Hope, attempts to pass the booms, they pour forth a fire from seventy guns, which for strength and direction is without precedent in our annals of Chinese warfare. Still no official appears at Ta-koo. On the other hand, Hang, the Governor-General of the province, does send a letter to Mr. Bruce, from a point some ten miles up the coast. It is dated the 23rd, but does not reach him till the 25th.

Now, Mr. Bruce's letter of the 9th, which had electrified the Commissioners, was to reach Peking in nine days—say before the 20th. We know by experience, that communications between Ta-koo and Peking do not take more than twenty-four hours. The Court, if it were prepared to disavow the hostile act of the Ta-koo garrison, must have forgotten that it could hardly, under the circumstances, plead ignorance of the great danger of a collision between the large force it had placed, months before, at Ta-koo, and a foreign squadron which had now been waiting since the 16th to have the river opened for the British Minister's admission. If it were *bonâ fide* intent on the preservation of peace, why should no official have presented himself to the Admiral at Ta-koo? or why should the only move of the character of a pacific overture been made at the eleventh hour, by a circuitous route, and with a want of alacrity at first sight inexplicable? For the despatch had been the best part of two days coming ten miles.

It invites Mr. Bruce to wait for the arrival of Kweiliang and his colleague, promising him that when he, Hang, shall have moved to the southward, the garrison and armament of the position from which he writes, he will come out to welcome him to the place, Peh-tang-ho by name, a port, if it deserve the designation, which the Americans found, in a few days, was doubtfully accessible even to a ship's boat.

I feel satisfied that, our object considered, the fulfilment of the Treaty, not in the letter, but in the spirit, we should make a mistake in approaching the capital otherwise than by its recognised highway. I do not see that the Americans can refuse to proceed to Peking by Peh-tang-ho, or by any less desirable route; Article V of their Treaty imposing on them almost all the restrictions which it is the very aim of our Articles III and IV to withstand. The American Minister may visit Peking once a year, with twenty people for a suite; he is to give intimation of his approach through the Board of Rites; and he is to complete his business without unnecessary delay; he will be held, as I have before hinted, by

the Government and people of China at precisely the same value as a Lewchewan or Siamese Envoy. This, some will say, is of little consequence. It is, at least, of this much, that little attention will be paid to the representations of an officer who takes so low a place, and it is only by insuring the attention which must be yielded when the question of equality is no longer in dispute, that we can hope for a peaceable settlement of misunderstanding with a people whose bigotry, arrogance, and insincerity are kept in check only by their fears.

To close observations which have greatly outrun their intended length, I am persuaded that its aversion to concede, even limited by the three privileges so often alluded to, is what has betrayed the Chinese Government into an act of war, which, with its usual pusillanimity, it was prepared to disavow had its forces suffered defeat. It has never accepted the changes forced upon it—the novelty, in the sense in which Western nations understand it. It was ready, *more suo*, to fend off those without fighting, and the Commissioners were, I make no doubt, to detain us at Shanghai under one pretext or another, until the year was so far spent that we might be induced, in our greed for commercial advantages, to accept an exchange of ratifications at Shanghai. Foreign relations, which in Chinese are simply synonymous with a Superintendence of Trade, would then have been handed over to Ho, whose “soothing and bridling” we are evidently assumed to prefer, and the great gain of the Treaty, the one means of preventing local misunderstandings, viz., the right of appeal to the Central Government against the acts of its subordinates, would, in default of precedent, have been as much in abeyance as though it had never been concluded.

Diplomacy failing, the Government still veiled its readiness for war—possibly from doubt in its powers, perhaps in the hope of taking us more completely unawares.

Mr. Hart's interesting memorandum on Sungko-lin-sin's temper and arrangements, together with Mr. Mongan's information on the same head, are more or less corroborated by the junkmen who lay off the Peiho; lamenting grievously the interruption of their trade.

It must be noted in qualification of Sungko-lin-sin's prowess, and of the Court's resolution, that his victory was not adopted by the Government for some four or five days: at the end of which time the forts first showed the flags of five out of the eight banners under which the Tartar force is enrolled.

Since my return to Shanghai I have learned that many Chinese ascribe the collision altogether to Sungko-lin-sin, and entirely acquit the Emperor. They represent him as unable to restrain the Mongol, who, on learning that the Emperor was decidedly opposed to overt hostility, declared that, at all events, he would not admit the barbarian by way of Tien-tsin. The statement is very possibly the truth; it corresponds, more or less, with the report brought by M. Mouly from Peking. It would consist perfectly with the timid treachery of the Chinese Government that, having placed its responsibility, as it hoped, *à couvert*, by withdrawing its official presence from the scene, it should bide the issue of a course which, if unsuccessful, it was thus armed to condemn; and with the short-sightedness which, in my opinion, distinguishes its policy, that it should overlook the more terrible consequence of a success such as that it has obtained.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE,
Chinese Secretary.

No. 11.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, July 15, 1859.

YOUR Lordship has been informed in my previous despatches that the American Minister, Mr. Ward, had associated himself with us in our demands to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Peking, and had further stated to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghai that he was instructed to deliver in person the letter of the President of the United States of America to the Emperor of China. He could only claim these privileges under the most favoured nation clause, and, therefore, awaited the results of the attempts made to detain us at

Shanghai. When they failed, he expressed his intention of going to the Peiho, and received an invitation from the Commissioners to accompany us there.

On the 24th, he crossed the bar of the Peiho in a small steamer, with the intention of proceeding to the booms, and making the attempt to advance up the river, leaving it to the Chinese to fire on him if they chose to do so. His steamer, however, grounded before reaching them, and was with difficulty got off by the gun-boats, after considerable delay. He therefore contented himself with demanding a passage, and was met by a refusal on the part of the militia, who gave themselves out as the garrison of the forts. He remained at the mouth of the river during the attack, determined to push up had we opened a way through the barriers; and it is very gratifying to me to bear testimony to the friendly feeling and assistance we derived from himself and Flag Officer Tatnall on that day.

After we had decided on abandoning the attempt to reach Peking, Mr. Ward considered himself bound to effect, if possible, the exchange of ratifications under the provisions of the American Treaty. He had received no communication since his arrival from the Imperial Government, but he addressed a letter to the Governor-General, expressing his wish to proceed to Peking and exchange the ratifications there. This letter he dispatched in his steamer to Peh-tang-ho, with his secretary and interpreter. I inclose a Memorandum, showing the nature of the approach to Peh-tang-ho, and its defences.

I have heard indirectly that when the boat from the steamer approached the shore, most of the villagers fled. With difficulty two men were found, to whom the object of the visit was explained and the letter delivered, on their undertaking to forward it to the Governor-General, whose place of residence they would not, however, divulge. They at the same time urged the bearers to return, without delay, to the boat, to avoid being attacked by the horsemen who were seen in the neighbourhood. It was fortunate that they did so; for they were chased by the cavalry, two of whom pursued them into the water.

Soon after a junk came off with provisions, and a message from the authority of the place to say that the letter had been forwarded, and that an answer would be shortly received. On the 5th of July, Mr. Ward informed me that the Governor-General had appointed Friday, the 8th, for an interview at Peh-tang-ho. Having left on the 6th, I do not, as yet, know the result.

I do not think that the Chinese will make difficulties about exchanging the ratifications of the American Treaty. The conditions under which the American Minister is alone entitled to visit the capital, contain nothing offensive to Chinese pride, or inconsistent with its claims of national superiority. The Treaty does not open the Yang-tze river, or any port to the north of Shanghai, nor does it give the right to travel in the interior of the country. It leaves also untouched the important question of transit duties. The true policy of the Chinese would be, therefore, to receive Mr. Ward in a friendly manner, in the hopes of inducing him to act as mediator.

Mr. Ward's position is one of considerable difficulty; nor do I see, after our unsuccessful attempt at the Peiho, that any course was open save the one he has adopted. He has acted cordially and frankly in the spirit of his declarations to me at Hong Kong; and it is a matter of satisfaction to me that his concert in our previous proceedings is a strong argument in favour of the line of conduct pursued by M. de Bourboulon and myself.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Memorandum.

THE "Toeywan" left this anchorage on Wednesday morning, 29th June, about 11 o'clock, with the parties bearing a letter addressed by me to the Governor-General of this province. After going north along the coast about six miles, they discovered junks' masts over the land, and upon approaching within four miles of the coast, it then being high spring tide, and only ten feet

water, and able to find no other channel where there was deeper water, they steered again to the northward, and went five miles farther north.

Where the junks were seen there was supposed to have been a small stream of water. This point was guarded by three forts, and there was a village in the neighbourhood. It could not be approached any nearer for want of water. About five miles north of the forts another village was seen, to which the "Toeywan" was enabled to approach within a mile and a-half, having then nine feet at half-tide.

I herewith attach a tracing of the route of the "Toeywan."

No. 12.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 26, 1859.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches of the 30th of May, 1st and 14th of June, and 5th, 13th, and 15th of July, the first three giving an account of your proceedings up to the time of your departure from Shanghae for the mouth of the Peiho, and the last three containing a report of the events which occurred on your arrival off the Peiho, and of your subsequent return to Shanghae.

The events of the first period are clear and free from all obscurity, and I am happy to convey to you Her Majesty's entire approval of your communications with the Chinese Commissioners, and of the firmness with which you resisted their attempts to dissuade you from insisting upon the strict fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. That Treaty provided for the exchange of ratifications at Peking on a day not later than the 26th of June of the present year, a time so nearly at hand as not to admit of any further delay.

You were enjoined by the instructions given you by the Earl of Malmesbury, on your departure from England, to insist upon being received at Peking, and to refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place. You were further informed that it might be advisable before your departure from Shanghae to send an intimation to Peking of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements might be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Peking. You were informed that the Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China had been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and you were instructed that unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war.

Your conduct, therefore, in insisting upon being received at Peking and in proceeding to the mouth of the Peiho, was in strict conformity with your instructions. Upon arriving at the mouth of the Peiho you were placed in circumstances of great difficulty: in selecting the course you were to pursue, you were obliged to found that course mainly upon presumptive evidence.

In these circumstances you had to weigh contingencies upon which no safe calculation could be made. I can only say, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government, without being able in the present state of their information, to judge precisely what measures it might have been most advisable for you to adopt at the moment, see nothing in the decision that you took to diminish the confidence which they repose in you.

Her Majesty deeply regrets the loss of life which attended the gallant though unsuccessful efforts of the British and French forces to clear the passage of the river. But Her Majesty has commanded preparations to be made which will enable her forces, in conjunction with those of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to support you in the execution of the instructions which will be hereafter addressed to you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 27.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, July 31, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a letter addressed by Ho, the Imperial Commissioner, to M. de Bourboulon, shortly after our return to this place from the North. M. de Bourboulon has communicated the letter to me, and replied, as we agreed, that we had forwarded an account of what passed to our Governments, and that we could take no further step with reference to the mission to Peking until we received fresh instructions.

The letter, as your Lordship will observe, purports to be from Ho alone, and does not profess to convey the sentiments of the Peking Government on the occurrences at the mouth of the Peiho. It mentions Peh-tang as the place to which we ought to have gone, and as I can hardly suppose that the Commissioners were ignorant of the determination of the Chinese Government to prevent our ascending the usual channel, which is called, in one of the late memorials published in the Peking "Gazette," "the highway to Peking," I infer that the Commissioners in abstaining from naming Peh-tang in their letter to me of the 12th of June, were actuated by a wish to keep me in ignorance of its intentions. In both my letters to them I had stated that I should proceed to the city of Tien-tsin by ship, and in their final reply to me, their invitation to the mouth of the river, and their allusion to the bar, pointed unequivocally to Takoo.

I ought to mention that by the former French Treaty, as well as by those made last year, vessels of war coming with pacific objects are entitled to enter any Chinese port. It may, perhaps, admit of a question whether under this clause we could claim the right of going up to Tien-tsin, but there can be no doubt that we were entitled under it to cross the bar, and claim admittance to Takoo for provisions and water; and the Russians in their new Treaty have expressly stipulated that their Minister shall, if he wishes, proceed to Peking by Takoo. Even the Americans have provided that their Minister may come to the mouth of the Peiho, and call upon the authorities at that place to provide boats for him in which to continue his journey to the capital. These provisions all point to the river as the route to Peking, the only one of which we have any knowledge, and the one followed by all our previous Embassies. If the Chinese had consented to our adopting it, they knew that they could not have reduced the number of our retinue by alleging the want of means of transport and of accommodation—pretexts they could make use of in a journey by land; and I attribute their closing it to a determination to give to our mission to Peking the character, not of an Embassy of one equal State to another, implying a personal reception by the Sovereign, and the recognition of diplomatic relations, but of a visit to the capital by an agent for the transaction of business, as conceded by Treaty to the Americans, not to be repeated except for weighty reasons, and with the consent of the Chinese Government. The important point of the recognition of international equality, and of the footing on which our future relations are to be placed, are involved in the reception to be accorded to me on this first occasion, and I confess I think it would be better that the Minister should not go to Peking at all, than that he should do so on the terms indicated in the previous letters of Kweiliang to me, and in the inclosed letter from Ho.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Governor-General Ho to M. de Bourboulon.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner superintending the trade at the ports, Guardian of the Crown Prince (Titulary), President of the Board of War, and Governor-General of the Two Kiang, makes a communication.

The correspondence which passed between your Excellency and myself in the 4th moon, when you came from Europe (*lit.*, the West), has long made us known to each other. (We have not met, for) on your arrival at a subsequent period in Shanghai, your Excellency at once proceeded towards Tien-tsin.

The Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, also at once turned homewards by land, and I did hope that the Treaties would have been exchanged, and the trade under the new regulations have opened at an early date. My anticipations have been disappointed: your Excellency and the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, have come south again; Mr. Ward, the American Minister, has, I understand, met the Governor-General of Chih-li at Peh-tang, in the Department of Tien-tsin. Visits have been exchanged between them; they are on the most friendly terms; and as soon as the Imperial Commissioners, Kweiliang and his colleagues, reach Peking, the American Treaty will be exchanged as stipulated. The fact is, that the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, not being aware that Hang, the Governor-General of Chih-li, was waiting for him at Peh-tang, went in at Takoo, which he should not have done. The consequence was, certainly without intention on either side—an untoward accident, which ought not to have occurred.*

Kweiliang and his colleagues will by this time, I should say, have reached the capital; and your Excellency, it appears to me, would save time by proceeding promptly to the seaboard (or to a port) of Tien-tsin, and exchanging your Treaty simultaneously (with Mr. Ward). The British Minister, Mr. Bruce, has never been in correspondence with me in my individual capacity,† and as it would not, consequently, be correct that I should address him on the present occasion, it becomes my duty to request your Excellency to make him my best apologies, and with gentle words to persist in dissuading him‡ (from further action or violence, assuring him that) were it possible for him to accompany you to the North he might dismiss all suspicion, and that Kweiliang and his colleagues will be certain to treat him courteously at Peh-tang, in faithful fulfilment of past engagements. The friendly understanding thenceforward established, native and foreigner alike, will be steeped in advantage.

The rectitude and intelligence of your Excellency and the British Minister, Mr. Bruce, have long been well known to me. On my side, the straightforwardness of my character, and my regard for good faith and justice are, I imagine, so far known to your Excellency and Mr. Bruce that you will not look on my words as (or unsubstantiated).§ I write accordingly, that your Excellency when you have looked into the matter, may deliberate and take action. Trusting that you will reply to me, I avail myself of the occasion to wish you daily enjoyment of peace and prosperity.

A necessary communication addressed to his Excellency M. de Bourboulon Hien-fung; 9th year, 6th moon, 19th day (July 1859).

No. 14.

Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1859.

THERE are no reasons for interrupting friendly relations with the Chinese at Shanghai, Canton, and elsewhere.

Preparations are being made both in this country and in France in order that the Treaty of Tien-tsin may be fully carried into effect.

But it is to be hoped that when our conditions, and the extent of our preparations, are known to the Chinese Government, peaceful relations may be placed upon a permanent footing without further effusion of blood.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

* The word signifying that Mr. Bruce was wrong in going in at Takoo, does not make this error intentional or the reverse. The "untoward accident" is literally a shoot from the bamboo between the joints, where no shoot ought to show itself; the expression describes figuratively any occurrence at once abnormal and objectionable.

† Ho has written to Mr. Bruce with Kweiliang and his colleagues, but never singly.

‡ M. de Bourboulon is to reiterate soft words, and to recommend the separation (of combatants), or, the putting away (of wrath).

§ *Lit.*, as the milky way, misty without definite bounds, unreal.

Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 16.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, August 10, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a letter from Ho, Imperial Commissioner for the General Superintendence of Trade at the Ports, and of my reply thereto.

He has probably been instructed to discover whether I would consent to go to the North, with the view of exchanging the ratifications at Peking; and the friendly expressions contained in M. de Bourboulon's reply have induced him to make this second attempt. The reference to Mr. Ward indicates pretty clearly that we should be expected to conform to the treatment accorded to him.

All we know of the proceedings of the American Minister is, that on the 20th of July he was to land at Peh-tang-ho, with twenty persons, consisting of his suite and officers of the American ships, whence they were to be conveyed in the covered carts of the country to a point on the Peiho river, a few miles below Tien-tsin. They were to embark there in boats for Tung-chow. The Americans seem to apprehend that there will be a difficulty as to the conveyance from Tung-chow to Peking; they proposing sedan-chairs as the more honourable mode of travelling, the Chinese advocating the covered carts without springs.

It appears that the Russian Minister, General Ignatieff, succeeded in reaching Peking, and in exchanging the ratifications of the Russian Treaty towards the end of May. The Governor-General of Eastern Siberia (Mouravieff), in returning from Japan, has proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, and sent up despatches to Peking. His object in proceeding to Ta-koo is not known.

I have thought it advisable to take advantage of Ho's commission being confined to matters of trade, to decline entering with him into any discussion of the events that took place in the North, or answering his question as to a renewed visit in that quarter. I think this will probably lead to an overture from Peking itself, or to the despatch of Commissioners here to propose some terms of accommodation. By that time I shall have ascertained how Mr. Ward has been received, and whether he has obtained a personal interview with the Emperor, which he, in concert with M. de Bourboulon and myself, demanded in the letter addressed by him to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghai; a demand which I could not waive on this occasion without putting myself in a worse position than that occupied by Lord Macartney during his Embassy to China.

* P.S.—It appears that the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana reached Peking on July 21, thirty-eight days after their departure from Shanghai, though they stated officially to Mr. Ward, before we left this place for the Peiho, that their journey would occupy more than two months.

Inclosure 1 in No. 15.

Governor-General Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner for the General Superintendence of Trade at the Ports, Guardian of the Heir Apparent (Titulary), President of the Board of War, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, makes a communication.

On hearing of his Excellency Mr. Bruce's arrival from Europe in the 4th moon of this year, the Imperial Commissioner, with his colleagues, Kwei, Hwa, and Twau, referring to Lord Elgin's original engagement, repaired to Shanghai. After waiting there a month without meeting Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner was informed that his Excellency had proceeded, in company with the French Minister, M. de Bourboulon, to Tien-tsin. At a late period (hearing of) the return (of the Ministers) to the South, he addressed a letter to M. de Bourboulon, that he might communicate all particulars to Mr. Bruce. To this letter he has just received a reply, by which he learns that their Excel-

lencies, Mr. Bruce as well as M. de Bourboulon, have every confidence in his the Commissioner's desire for the lasting endurance of a good understanding.

Evidence so complete of Mr. Bruce's breadth of views, (the hope it affords that) there will now be no more trouble, that weapons will be laid aside, and a good understanding established for evermore, is most gratifying to the Commissioner.

He will at the same time be obliged to Mr. Bruce to inform him whether, as the American Minister, Mr. Ward, has already gone up to Pekin to exchange the ratifications of his Treaty, it will be in his Excellency's power to name a day for proceeding North with M. de Bourboulon, in order that, should it be, he may advise His Majesty the Emperor to that effect; and that he may write to the Imperial Commissioners, Kwei, Hwa, and Twau, as also to Hang, Governor-General of Chih-li, to make all the necessary arrangements for their Excellencies' entrance into Pekin without mistake or confusion.

As in duty bound, the Commissioner addresses this letter to the British Minister, that when he shall have informed himself of its contents he may reply thereto. He avails himself of this occasion to wish his Excellency the compliments of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.
Hien-fung, 9th year, 7th moon, 3rd day (1st August, 1859).

Inclosure 2 in No. 15.

Mr. Bruce to Governor-General Ho.

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., begs to acknowledge the receipt of a letter dated 1st instant, from his Excellency Ho, &c., &c., requesting to be informed if the Undersigned is prepared to fix a day on which to proceed North with the French Minister, for the purpose of exchanging ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year.

From his Excellency's official title it would appear that his function as Imperial Commissioner is the superintendence of trade at the ports; and upon questions of trade the Undersigned can have no difficulty in corresponding with his Excellency.

As Governor-General of this jurisdiction, the Undersigned takes occasion to draw his Excellency's attention to the late disturbances at Shanghai, in which an unoffending Englishman was killed, and Mr. Lay and others severely wounded. Those events happened on the 29th July, and the perpetrators of the outrage have not yet been arrested.

The question which the Imperial Commissioner Ho, in his letter, has addressed to the Undersigned, does not relate to trade, nor does the Undersigned conceive himself at liberty to correspond with his Excellency upon any matter connected with the late proceedings of the Chinese Government in the North.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Shanghai, August 9, 1859.

No. 16.

Acting Consul Winchester to Mr. Hammond.—(Received October 16.)

Sir,

Canton, August 22, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Mr. Bruce, reporting on the general condition of affairs in this port and in the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

CHARLES A. WINCHESTER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Acting Consul Winchester to Mr. Bruce.

(Extract.)

Canton, August 22, 1859.

IT is with satisfaction I have the honour to report that uninterrupted quiet and tranquillity have prevailed to this date. We are indebted for this as much to the strong desire existing on the part of the inhabitants of Canton for the preservation of that internal peace by which their material interests have so strikingly prospered during the last few months, as to the attitude which the Provincial Government has maintained in its relations to foreigners.

This attitude, which, I doubt not, is, from personal motives, agreeable to the high officers themselves, is the result of the instructions received from Peking. The last were conveyed in the form of an edict, of which I inclose the Chinese and translation. Looking at the tone of this document, in connexion with the various considerations which render a pacific policy immediately desirable, and with the spirit displayed by the Provincial Government in its acts generally, and more particularly in the wide promulgation of the inclosed proclamation, I think we may reasonably infer that the Imperial Government is anxious that the chances of an accommodation of its difficulties with the Allied Powers, on such terms as would suit its own views, should not be imperilled by any hasty or untoward outbreak in this neighbourhood.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Imperial Edict.

(Translation.)

ON the 15th day of the 6th moon we had the honour to receive an Imperial Edict as follows:

“When the foreign ships opened fire at Tien-tsin, we directed Laou to be informed of the circumstances of the engagement. We have now heard from Sin-ko-lin-sin, who reports that the English and French troops had all left on the 12th instant; but two American ships remained at anchor at the north mouth, waiting to proceed to Peking to exchange Treaties.

“Permission to do this has been already accorded; and, should the English perchance repent, friendly relations with them even now may be restored.

“According to Laou’s last memorial, he was to have started on the 17th of the 5th moon to take up his post, and must have already reached Canton. Let him, then, carry on his Government smoothly, and keep the French and English now there quiet and respectful as heretofore; not cause them to become suspicious.

“Let this be conveyed to him for his instruction at the rate of 600 li (*Anglice* 200 miles) per diem.”

In obedience to His Majesty’s commands this letter is dispatched.

Inclosure 3 in No. 16.

Imperial Edict.

(Translation.)

A CONSIDERABLE period has now elapsed without any Memorial reaching us, reporting the condition and aspect of affairs in Kwang-tung, and intense in consequence is our anxiety on that head.

The British (Plenipotentiary) Bruce has brought his ships of war into our (northern) waters, without having had any interview with Kweiliang, to whom he merely addressed a communication to the effect that he was on his way to Tien-tsin to exchange the Treaty ratifications. On his arrival at the port of Ta-koo, he was directed either to anchor outside the Lan-keang bar, and remain there quietly until Kweiliang’s arrival at Tien-tsin for the transaction of business, or to precede Kweiliang to Tien-tsin by the Peh-tang route, and take up his quarters for a time in the official lodge; he, however, decidedly refused to

comply with the directions, and said that he wished to do away with the various works that had been constructed for the defence of our port.* He then, on the 25th of the 5th month, without waiting for any arrangement to be made, broke over the port barrier, and, advancing with his steamers and boats quite close to the forts, took the initiative in opening fire. He further landed his foot companies and provoked a collision (or challenged the occupants of the forts.) Now, inasmuch as the nation in question not having as yet interchanged the ratifications was the first to set the Treaty at distance, Sung Ko-lin-sin could not do otherwise than meet the foe, and the consequence was, that great numbers of the enemy were slain, and twelve of their vessels destroyed. The British Commander-in-chief, Admiral Hope, wounded by the falling of a mast struck by a shot from the forts, has been for some days back repairing the damages sustained by his ships, outside the Lan-keang bar; and Sung Ko-lin-sin is, of course, on his side in readiness at his post (or, is in readiness to meet the Admiral, whatever course the latter may adopt).

The nation in question has, on several occasions, been the first to originate disturbances; nevertheless, I, the Emperor, in my intercourse with foreign States, must not be too severe (or my policy is an indulgent one). If, therefore, the said country will, with repentant heart, await Kweiliang's arrival for the exchange of ratifications, the affair can be passed over, and recourse to arms prevented and stayed.

No memorial has yet been received from Laou reporting his arrival at Kwang-tung, to which place he has been removed (from Kwang-si, in the capacity of Governor), holding also the seals of Governor-General. The particulars of the Tien-tsin engagement cannot, we think, be accurately known at Kwang-tung. If the people of the nation in question behave in the usual manner at Canton, and cause no troubles, (Laou) must not take the initiative in having recourse to arms. The love of war displayed by the said country cannot be considered a sufficient reason for the adoption of measures which would interfere with the trade of the merchants of various nations, and injure them both in property and capital, and earnestly have I, the Emperor, revolved these matters in my mind!!

Let these commands be sent at the rate of 600 *li* per diem for (Laou's) information and guidance. Respect this!

In obedience to the Imperial command the orders are now transmitted.

No. 17.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 30.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, September 2, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter from the Imperial Commissioner Ho of the 13th ultimo, which I received after the departure of the last mail. It is the answer to my communication of the 9th ultimo, copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 10th ultimo.

Ho states in his letter that as the exchange of Treaties is really a question of trade, he is entitled to discuss it; thus showing that he, and those under whose orders he acts, still hold to the old principle of considering the relations of China with foreign nations as purely commercial.

As to the late disturbances, the Commissioner sees their principal cause in the acts of the foreigners, and ascribes the murder and the assaults that were committed, to mistakes of the excited populace. He then adds that he has given orders for the apprehension of the offenders.

These orders have led to no result, which I ascribe rather to the unwillingness of the Chinese authorities, than to their inability to do justice in this matter; for they have discovered several native crimps, and have summarily executed them.

I therefore again addressed his Excellency Ho on the 28th ultimo, to point

out to him that his instructions had not been carried out, and to express my belief that the authorities were not acting fairly towards us.

I beg to inclose copy of my note for your Lordship's information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) **FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 17.

Commissioner Ho to Mr. Bruce.

(Translation.)

HO, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, &c., makes a communication in reply.

The Commissioner is in receipt of his Excellency the British Minister's letter of the 11th instant (9th of August), to the effect that he cannot well reply to the Commissioner upon the subject of proceeding North to exchange Treaties, as he is Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade.

It is for trade* that the Treaties are exchanged (or, the exchange of Treaties is really a question of trade). When the Imperial Commissioners Kwei, Hwa, Ming, and Twau, came to Shanghae last year, the Commissioner was associated with them in all their conferences with the late British Minister Lord Elgin, and in all the correspondence his, the Commissioner's, name and title appears. So, too, in the letters received from Mr. Bruce, on his arrival at Shanghae, does the Commissioner's name and title appear,† which shows that he is, beyond doubt, a competent authority on the subject of exchanging the Treaties.

As regards the tumult among the Chinese at Shanghae, on the 30th of the 6th moon (29th of July), the forcible abduction of Chinese by foreigners, and their exportation beyond sea, had excited general indignation. The simple people knew not to what nation the kidnappers belonged, neither was it in their power to distinguish the foreigners of different nations one from the other. Hence the assault and murder of one man, and the injuries inflicted on the Inspector-General Lay. The French Consul brought the vessel loaded with men back into port, and in concert with the Intendant of the Su-Sung-Tai circuit, instituted inquiries which showed that the ship was French, and loaded for foreign parts by a Spaniard. Such being the facts, a fray having been caused by the Treaty being thus broken, the merits of the question are very plain. The assault on Mr. Lay, and the murder of the foreigner, were committed by mistake, but although the Chinese who did these acts did them not wilfully, they are still liable to punishment. The Commissioner finds that by the law of China, the persons guilty of killing the wrong man in a quarrel, or of wrongfully wounding any one standing by, are all liable to be seized, tried, and punished. The popular mind is, however, still excited, because there are still people who have been kidnapped unrecovered. The Commissioner has given positive orders to the Intendant to place himself in communication with the military authorities, and to issue instructions to the civilians of the districts in his jurisdiction, also to write to the different Consuls, that on either side due restraint may be exercised (or that native and foreigner may be controlled); on the one hand, the kidnapped men recovered, on the other, the parties guilty of murderous violence arrested and punished, each according to his deserts; to the pacification of feuds, and the manifestation of justice; of all which Mr. Bruce, residing as he does at Shanghae, so near (the scene of action), cannot fail to be exactly informed.

The Commissioner therefore replies, availing himself of the opportunity to wish that his Excellency may enjoy the blessings of the season.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable Mr. Bruce, &c., &c..

Hien-fung, 9th year, 7th moon, 15th day (August 13, 1859).

* I believe the passage to be a simple declaration of the view of foreign relations to which China desires to adhere to. So in the Commissioner's despatch of the 28th May, Ho is put forward as the officer correspondence with whom will conduce to the maintenance of a good understanding. In both instances the provision of Article V of the new Treaty is, I think purposely, ignored. There is to be no such thing as diplomatic intercourse.—T. W.

† This statement is simply untrue. In accordance with the spirit of Article V, Mr. Bruce's letter was addressed to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, alone.—T. W.

Inclosure 2 in No. 17.

*Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Ho.**Shanghai, August 28, 1859.*

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour to receive, on the 18th instant, the reply of his Excellency Ho, Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Trade, &c., to his letter of the 9th instant.

His Excellency informs the Undersigned of the steps he had instructed the local authorities to take for the detection and punishment of the persons who murdered one British subject, and assaulted several others, on the 29th ultimo. His Excellency farther remarks, that the Undersigned, being resident at Shanghai, is in a position to know that such is the case.

No measure taken could, indeed, escape the notice of the Undersigned, and he is concerned to be obliged to observe, not only that the parties guilty of the murder and assault committed one month ago have not been arrested, but that no *bona fide* effort has been made to discover them. A reward, indeed, has been offered, but this attracts very little attention. The Undersigned is sufficiently acquainted with the working of the police system in China to be satisfied that, had the authorities been in earnest, the guilty might with ease have been detected. On the other hand, although the authorities, zealously assisted in every investigation they have suggested by the foreign Consuls, have utterly failed to establish a single case of kidnapping against foreigners, they have abstained from all attempt to disabuse the people of their false impression, or to contradict these reports, which, if not entirely unfounded, are, at all events, grossly exaggerated. On the contrary, day after day notifications have been issued, ostensibly to quiet the public mind, but in reality calculated to excite it against foreigners, by the announcement which invariably heads these notices, that the late disturbance was solely due to the forcible abduction of Chinese by foreign agents.

With reference to his Excellency's remark, that the letters of the Undersigned, on his arrival at Shanghai, were addressed to his Excellency in common with his colleagues, the Undersigned begs to assure him that his letters of the 8th and 11th June—letters to which his Excellency refers—were all to the address of the Senior Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, alone.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

No. 18.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received October 30.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, September 3, 1859.

MR. WARD, the American Minister, returned here on the 21st August, and I inclose an account, published by the American officers who accompanied him, of the principal incidents that marked his journey, and of the treatment the Mission experienced during the fifteen days they spent at Peking.

The perusal of this account shows that the Chinese Government are still far from recognizing or respecting the rights of foreign Envoys; that, whatever they may have apparently conceded on paper, they practically refuse to admit diplomatic intercourse on a footing of national equality, and that a visit to the capital is only acceptable if it can be converted into a means of flattering the pride and acknowledging the superiority of the Emperor of China.

No purely pacific Mission could have proceeded to Peking under more favourable circumstances than that of Mr. Ward. Fear of the consequences that may ensue from the collision at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river, the favourable opportunity of establishing a precedent for the personal interview with the Emperor by negotiations conducted with an isolated Envoy, unsupported by force, and the weight such a reception would have given to their remonstrances against the conduct of M. de Bourboulon and myself as harsh and overbearing, all concurred in pointing out the expediency of a friendly and honourable reception being accorded to the American Mission. So far from this being the case,

a comparison with what took place on the occasion of previous British Embassies to China will prove that the position of the American Envoy has been markedly inferior; that there was a studied intention of making the visit so physically exhausting by the mode of conveyance adopted, and so morally irksome by the surveillance and restrictions imposed, as to render its renewal improbable; and that, when Mr. Ward's firmness disappointed the Chinese Government in its hopes of extorting concessions from him on the question of ceremonial, they crowned their insulting conduct by requiring him to return and exchange the Treaties at Peh-tang, he having been invited by an Imperial Decree to perform this ceremony at Peking. Mr. Ward has informed me that he returns more convinced than ever of the soundness of our determination to proceed to Tientsin under our own flags, and of the accuracy of the information we obtained at Shanghai, as to the unreasonableness of the Court, and the influence gained by the anti-foreign party in the Emperor's counsels. His opinion is, that, unless thoroughly enlightened as to the hopelessness of resistance, the Imperial Government will not consent to the establishment of relations on the footing I am instructed to demand that they should be placed. He describes as remarkable the contrast between the tone of confidence at Peking and the alarm of the authorities on the coast as to the consequences of the late collision.

To proceed with the account of Mr. Ward's visit, I may remind your Lordship that after some delay Hang-fuh, the Governor-General of Chili, wrote to him, stating that he had received the Emperor's decree authorizing Mr. Ward to proceed, after the 19th July, by way of Peh-tang, to the capital, there to await the coming of the Imperial Commissioners, on whose arrival the ratifications were to be exchanged.

On the strength of this invitation Mr. Ward disembarked at Peh-tang on the 20th, and was informed that he was to make the journey to a point ten miles above Tien-tsin, in one of the covered vehicles of the country. These carriages are drawn by a mule, sometimes coupled with a horse, sometimes with a donkey. They have no springs, the body resting on the axle-tree, and no aperture for the admission of air; and Mr. Ward described the suffering and exhaustion of this mode of travelling as intense. In fact, no one but a person in robust health could support such a journey.

In a country where every detail of life is a matter of precise regulation, the conveyance in which a traveller is carried indicates his rank and position in the eyes of the population. Your Lordship will see by the inclosed extract from Staunton's account of Lord Macartney's Embassy, that of the three modes of travelling by chair, on horseback, and in carriages, the last is the least honourable. Lord Macartney himself, and the three principal members of his suite, travelled in chairs from Tung-chow to Peking, the other gentlemen on horseback with the mandarins, and the servants and privates of his English escort in covered carts or waggons. Chairs were similarly provided for the accommodation of Lord Amherst's Embassy on their return to Tung-chow, even after his abrupt and angry dismissal by the Emperor.

The object of the Chinese authorities in proposing this conveyance to Mr. Ward, was to lower him and his nation in the eyes of the natives—a result both agreeable to the personal vanity of the high provincial authorities, and consistent with Chinese policy. I have little doubt that Mr. Ward would have refused to accept this accommodation, had the intent of the Chinese in proposing it being properly explained. But in such matters a Minister freshly arrived from the West is entirely in the hands of those who have made the language and customs of China a study. It may be true, as has been asserted, that these gentlemen are sometimes unnecessarily touchy on points of etiquette, but their exclusive education produces in other instances an exactly opposite effect, and inclines them rather to consult Chinese prejudices than to insist on what their own national dignity requires.

On leaving the river at Tung-chow, conveyances of the same kind were supplied, and the road being paved with granite slabs, and completely out of repair, the jolting became so intolerable that Mr. Ward was at length obliged to descend and commence walking under a burning sun; horses having been refused him for the performance of this part of the journey. On this the Chinese officer in command of the escort dismounted, and lent him his own horse, but resumed it on approaching Peking, which Mr. Ward accordingly entered in the carriage. I have seen a letter addressed to the Roman Catholic missionaries on the effect

produced by his entry on the crowds of Chinese collected to witness it. The letter describes the cortége as being so modest that the Chinese did not believe that the American Minister could be there. "Humilime intravit," are the Latin words by which the entry itself is described.

He was lodged in a spacious building called the "Prince's Palace," to prepare which for his reception Mr. Ward was told a large sum had been issued, though it did not appear to him that the money could have gone to its legitimate destination. A number of soldiers or police were placed round it as a mark of honour; but it soon appeared as much for the purpose of keeping the residents in, as of keeping the curious and impertinent out. Mr. Ward himself was stopped on attempting to go into the street, and it was only by threatening not to proceed to business that he obtained leave for the members of his Mission to go out on foot. His application for horses and guides, to enable them to ride and find their way about the city, was flatly refused. A foreigner in Peking allowed to go out on foot, but deprived of horses and guides, is a prisoner in everything but the name. The Chinese authorities having discovered that the Chinese steward ("comprador") had obtained for the Americans some paper-fans, on which a plan of the city is printed, threatened him with death in the event of his buying anything for them without their knowledge and permission.

When remonstrated with on this restraint, the Chinese said that as soon as business was concluded the Americans should be allowed to go about freely; but it seems that the restriction was applied not only as a means of pressure to induce the Americans to be pliant on the ceremony of presentation, but also to keep them from any communication with the Russian Mission. A Russian officer is said to have attempted to force his way into their residence, but without success, and even a letter was detained for six days before it was delivered. In the meantime every effort was made, by alternate coaxing and angry remonstrance, to obtain Mr. Ward's assent to an interview with the Emperor. The hope of inducing him to agree to a ceremony, differing sufficiently from that performed by foreign Envoys towards European Sovereigns to imply the recognition of a certain superiority in the Emperor of China, was, I have no doubt, the motive that determined the Chinese Government to admit him to Peking. For disappointed in this hope by Mr. Ward's firmness, Kweiliang, disregarding entirely the fact that Mr. Ward had come up to Peking in consequence of the Emperor's inviting him to exchange ratifications there, wrote to Mr. Ward to ask why he had come to Peking, as he had resolved to adhere so obstinately to his own opinion.

In his reply, Mr. Ward quoted the invitation he had received, and referred to his being charged with a letter from the President to the Emperor of China. The Chinese Government, which persists in considering the engagements it enters into with commercial nations as affairs of trade, to be arranged by the Commissioner appointed to superintend the open ports, not as falling within the attributions of the Imperial Cabinet, laid hold of the pretext afforded by Mr. Ward's allusion to the Presidential letter, to treat it as the sole cause of the visit to Peking. They declined, however, to accept it, unless Mr. Ward declared previously in writing that his refusal to perform the required ceremony originated in no want of respect, either on his part or on that of the President, towards the Emperor.

Having written a despatch to that effect, Mr. Ward was informed by an Imperial Decree that "the language of his letters being respectful," he was authorized to present it to Kweiliang and his colleagues. As regards the exchange of the Treaty, he was told that he ought properly to return to Shanghai, and exchange it there: still, in consideration of his long voyage, the seal was to be appended to it, and Hung-fuh, the Governor-General of Chih-li, will deliver it in exchange. Mr. Ward was then reconducted to Peh-tang, the point whence he had started, and the ceremony of exchanging ratifications was performed by Hung. Your Lordship will recollect that when it suited their purpose to delay us at Shanghai, Kweiliang stated it that he and his colleagues were the only persons by whom the exchange of ratifications could be effected.

The Chinese Government in this Decree, which has since been published in the "Peking Gazette," state, for the first time, that there was a deliberate intention on their part not to allow me to ascend the river, and that Takoo was fortified by the Emperor's orders. They affirm that this decision was communicated to the foreign Envoys by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai, and that

they were told they must go round by Peh-tang. These assertions are distinctly contrary to the truth, though I think it not improbable that the Commissioners may have represented the matter in this light to the Emperor. Neither in the letters that passed between the Commissioners and the Envoys, nor during the interviews Mr. Ward had with them, was a word said of defences at Takoo, nor was any allusion made to Peh-tang, a place of which we knew nothing until Mr. Ward landed there in July, and which Flag-Officer Tatnall assures me is not a branch of the Tien-tsin river at all. As to our firing first, it is contradicted by a memorial of Sung Ko-lin-sin which is in circulation, though it has not been officially published, and which states distinctly that his men could not be restrained from firing when they saw the gun-boats removing the stakes.

Another incident took place during the interview between Mr. Ward and the Governor-General, which deserves to be mentioned: your Lordship may recollect that that Mr. Ward, the day before the attempt was made to ascend the Peiho, steamed over the bar with the intention of advancing to the barriers, of claiming a passage through them, and of taking part in any conflict that might ensue, should the Chinese fire upon him. He was prevented from making the attempt by his steamer running aground below the stakes, and he therefore sent a boat to demand permission to go up the river. On nearing the jetty, a Tartar of distinguished appearance came down to meet it; but when Mr. Ward's card was handed to him, he refused to receive it, saying that he served in the militia, but that his rank was too low to enable him to receive the card of a Minister.

While Mr. Ward was engaged in his formal interview with the Governor-General, this same person entered abruptly, and took part for a few minutes in the conversation without invitation, and without showing any of those marks of deference with which a Governor-General is usually approached. Whether he be Sung Ko-lin-sin, as some of the Americans surmise, or not, no doubt exists in the minds of those who saw him that he is a man of considerable military rank, and held high command in the Takoo forts at the time when the Chinese asserted that there was no officer present.

I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to Mr. Ward's observation on the tone of confidence prevailing at Peking. The popular idea of the English among these ignorant men of the North is, that we are a seafaring people, living on barren rocks, and only formidable at sea. Having kept us out of the river, they think themselves safe in the North from the only description of attack they have to fear, and the old tone of arrogance and patronising superiority became more and more pronounced as the Mission advanced further inland. Even Kweiliang and his colleagues, who can hardly share these illusions, adopted a curt manner and imperious tone, very different from the courteous and deprecating language they used at Shanghai.

The occupation of Canton seems to have lost much of its influence; as one of the high officers, in talking to Mr. Ward, spoke of Canton in the tone of a man who had quite made up his mind to its being finally lost to the Empire.

In conclusion, I think if Her Majesty's Government decide on requiring satisfaction for the late events in the North, advantage ought to be taken to send an expedition calculated to disabuse the Emperor as to the power and resources of England, and to make a strong and durable impression.

The account given by the American officers, and by a sailor of the "Highflyer," whom they rescued from captivity, leads me to doubt the fact of there having been foreigners among them, or any other arms than those usually employed by Chinese. There were considerable bodies of Mongols armed with matchlocks and bows and arrows, and mounted on small indifferent horses.

The land force ought to be sufficient to take the forts, and to advance, supported by the gun-boats, on Tien-tsin, which there is reason to believe has been strengthened.

The more manifest our superiority the shorter will be the contest, and the more inclined will be the Emperor to abandon those pretensions of superiority which form the real obstacle to amicable relations with the Government and people of China.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Supplement to the "North China Herald" of August 22, 1859.

RETURN OF THE AMERICAN MINISTER AND SUITE FROM PEKIN.—The United States' steam-frigate "Powhatan," Flag Officer Josiah Tattnall and Captain G. F. Pearson commanding, and having on board his Excellency John E. Ward, United States' Minister, has just arrived from the Peiho, after a passage of three and a half days. From her officers we learn the following items of news:—

On the 16th ultimo, while the "Powhatan" was anchored off Peh-tang, there arrived an Imperial Edict, ordering that the American Minister and suite of twenty should be escorted with all honour to Pekin, and that they should leave Peh-tang upon any day after the 19th. This edict was in answer to a communication from the American Minister, informing the authorities that he was present, and ready to exchange his Treaty at any time and place which they might appoint.

Shortly before the arrival of this Edict, the smoke of a steamer was discovered to the southward-and-eastward, which proved to be the Russian paddle-wheel "America," having on board his Excellency Count Mouraviëff, the Governor-General of Siberia, travelling *incog*. She anchored near the "Powhatan," and upon the 21st sent a courier to Pekin with communications for the Resident Minister.

Upon the 17th a Russian gun-boat also arrived, reporting that several others were to follow; but these did not make their appearance.

On the morning of the 20th Mr. Ward and suite landed at Peh-tang, where they were received by the escort, and conducted to Pekin with every show of respect. They first travelled forty-five miles across the country in covered carts, striking the Peiho at a village called Pei-tsang, some ten miles above Tien-tsin, and thence proceeded in junks to Tung-chow, distant twelve miles from Pekin, of which it is the port. There they again took carts to the capital.

The entire trip occupied eight days and a-half, five of which were passed upon the river. They passed not less than six or eight barriers between Pei-tsang and Tung-chow, none of them, however, being in repair, or backed by forts. The boatmen said that they were partly to stop the English, and partly to afford shelter to junks when the ice was breaking up.

The Legation remained in Pekin fifteen days, during which time they were confined to their quarters; not, however, as prisoners, for they were at liberty at any moment to walk out, but the Commissioners refused the use of horses and guides, leaving it optional with Mr. Ward to grant permission to walk out or not, as he saw fit. They would, doubtless, however, have closed the gates entirely, had not that gentleman taken a firm stand at the very first interview, informing Kweiliang that as soon as his movements should be at all restricted he should close all intercourse, and demand his return-escort.

It seems that the Emperor was very anxious to see Mr. Ward, but that he also insisted upon his performing the "ko-tow," which, being against the principles of his Excellency, was positively refused. The result of this was, that upon the fourteenth day of their stay it was finally concluded to receive the President's letter at Pekin, and to send his Excellency back to Peh-tang to exchange the Treaty; and the next day they returned accordingly.

During their stay in Pekin they saw nothing of the Russians, but received several letters from them. The first of these was six days going from one end of the city to the other, having evidently been detained by the authorities.

Arrived at Peh-tang on the 16th the Treaties were exchanged, and an English prisoner named John Powell given up. This man, who was an ordinary seaman on board the "Highflyer," and who, with a sapper by the name of Thomas McQueen, had been captured on the 25th June, fearing for his life, had proclaimed himself to be an American. The Chinese informed Mr. Ward of this, and intimated their readiness to give him up as an American, if he would demand him. This, however, the latter could not do, as he had been taken fighting under the flag of another nation. Anxious, however, to serve the poor fellow, he intimated to them that it would be a great personal favour if they would turn him over, and as such it was done. He is now on board of the

“Powhatan.” Of the Sapper nothing more is known than that he was wounded in the arm, was doing well, and is still a prisoner.

The Chinese seemed generally anxious to know what the English would do next year.

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Extract from Sir G. Staunton's "Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China."

THE Ambassador and three gentlemen of his suite travelled in sedan-chairs, which are the usual vehicles for persons of high rank in China, even in long journeys. The other gentlemen were on horseback, as were all the mandarins: the principal among the latter rode near the chair of the Ambassador. The Chinese soldiers were on foot, and cleared the way. The servants and privates of his Excellency's guard were in rough carriages or waggons.

Inclosure 3 in No. 18.

Imperial Decree.

ON the 11th of the 7th moon of the 9th year of Hien-fung (9th August, 1859), the Inner Council had the honour to receive the following Decree:—

“Last year the ships of the Yang-kih-li (English) nation sailed into the port of Tien-tsin, and opened a fire upon our troops. We accordingly instructed the Khorchin Prince Sung Ko-lin-sin to fortify Takoo well, and the (Envoys of the) different nations coming up to exchange Treaties on this occasion, were told by Kweiliang and Hwashana at Shanghai, that Takoo was so fortified (or, was placed on the defensive), and that they must go round by the port of Peh-tang. The Englishman Bruce, notwithstanding, when he came to (the shore of) Tien-tsin* in the 5th moon did not abide by his original understanding with Kweiliang and his colleague, but actually forced his way into the port of Takoo, destroying our defensive apparatus. On the 24th of the 5th moon (24th June), though his vessels came up as far as Ki-k'ou Tan, and blew up the chains (that bound the booms) with shell, our troops still did not fight. On the 25th, ten steamers and more pulled up more than ten of the iron posts (with which the river was staked), and all hoisted red flags, (in token of) a determination to fight. The Governor-General of Chih-li, Hang-fuh, sent out a letter from the Intendant of Tien-tsin, but the English would not receive it at all, and at last had the audacity to commence bombarding the forts. Our troops on this returned the fire, sunk several of their vessels, and killed several hundred of their Infantry as they were landing.

“The English troops have thus really brought this defeat upon themselves: there has been no breach of faith whatsoever on the part of China.

“Meanwhile the American Envoy, John Ward, did abide by his engagement with Kweiliang and colleague; sailed to the port of Peh-tang, and begged for permission to go up to the capital to present a letter from his Government. We accordingly authorized his admission into Peking to present it, and having this day perused the letters addressed by the American Envoy, John Ward, to Kweiliang and Hwashana, and laid before us by those Ministers, we find their language so respectful, the true-heartedness that has prompted them such, that we have authorized the Envoy in question to present the letter he is charged with from his Government to Kweiliang and his colleague, whom we have sent to receive it.

“As regards the exchange of his Treaty, he ought properly to return to Shanghai and exchange it there, but in consideration of the long voyage he has made, we (are pleased) specially to authorise that the seal be appended to the Treaty, and that it be delivered to Hang-fuh to hand it in exchange (for another copy) to the aforesaid Envoy; that from the date of the exchange there may be peace and commerce for evermore. Thus do we manifest our great desire to

* *Lat.*, to Tsin, short for Tien-tsin, that is, Tien-tsin Fu, the Department so named.

show a nursing tenderness to the men from afar, and our appreciation of good faith and right principle.

“Let Kweiliang and Hwashana signify this our pleasure to the Envoy John Ward for his information.

“Respect this!”

Inclosure 4 in No. 18.

Translation of a paper, purporting to be an Imperial Decree of the 5th July, 1859, forwarded by Mr. Parkes, from Canton. A copy has since been received at Shanghai from Soo-chow. It has not yet been published in the “Pekin Gazette.”

ON the 6th of the 6th moon of the 9th year of Hien-fung (July 5, 1859), was received the following Decree:—

“In a second Memorial this day presented by Sung Ko-lin-sin and Tsai-hang,* they urge upon us that, whereas the English barbarians have revolted from their allegiance, and the French barbarians, having allied themselves with them, have abetted their wickedness, the crime of both together is such that death were not a sufficient punishment, and that advantage ought to be taken of the present opportunity to assert our dignity, and to draw in the rein with such severity as effectually to check their perversity and truculence.

“Since the 21st year of Tau-kwang (1841), these barbarians have been constantly seeking quarrels; again and again have they set at naught the dignity of Heaven.† His late Majesty, canonized as ‘the Perfect,’ could not, for all this, endure—such was the motherly tenderness he felt for those from afar—to deal with their transgression in strict accordance with the law. Nay, he permitted them to trade at five ports, and he issued money from his treasury to soothe and console them. The bounty in which the outer nations were thus steeped was not inconsiderable. Had they had any conscience at all, they would doubtless have been impressed with a sense of gratitude for His Majesty’s Imperial benevolence, would, in peace, have pursued their callings, labouring for a livelihood, and had any cause of dissatisfaction while they were so engaged arisen, there would have been no objection to their discussion and arrangement of any case, as it presented itself, with the local authorities. Whence, then, this wilfulness, this ferocious bearing, this constant boasting of their prowess in war? They have been a virulent poison to our people; they have riotously invaded our borders; in the intolerable atrocities of every kind they have committed they have shown the extreme of ingratitude. Were we to put our forces in movement, what would prevent the immediate extermination of these *fantoccini*? Still, we bear in mind that it was by philanthropy and uprightness that our ancestors established their wide dominion; that with liberality and mildness they soothed and comforted the savage nations; that for several centuries no soldier has been lightly moved; not a ration has been vainly expended; and so the four barbarian races, as universally as the natives of the Empire, have looked up to the canonized ones, extolling their extreme philanthropy, the virtue with which they have silently‡ maintained the living multitude. Should, therefore, the barbarian chiefs change their faces, and renew themselves, making faithful tender of peaceful submission; forasmuch as with our vast estate we have inherited the counsels of our ancestors,§ in respectful accordance therewith we shall of a surety not bear too hardly upon any man; but if they continue froward, and repeat demands they have no right to make, then shall we at that moment annihilate them; not a sprout, we vow, shall be allowed to remain.

“The loyalty and courage of the Princes, whose memorial is before us, are commendable indeed, nor, assuredly, would it be easy to find amongst our Ministers and Servants, in the capital or without it, zeal such as theirs for the

* One of the immediate kin of the Imperial family. The Mien are the generation of the late Emperor; the present generation are surnamed Yih; the generation below them Tsai, according to a law regulating these matters.

† Heaven, the Celestial Empire, China.

‡ As the power of the Creator in the operations of nature.

§ Their traditionary policy.

policy of the State and the well-being of the people. We are highly gratified and delighted. But as regards (the measures they propose for) the effectual checking (of the barbarians) by a severe tightening of the rein, we are satisfied that it would not be right to take the initiative in an act of violence (literally, wrong). We command, therefore, that action be not taken on this memorial, and that it be returned.

“Respect this!”

No. 19.

Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell.—(Received November 10.)

(Extract.)

Shanghai, September 20, 1859.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation of a Decree published in the “Pekin Gazette,” bestowing posthumous honours on those who fell at Takoo, and stating that the rebellious English have received a lesson which will deter them from provoking the martial dignity of China in future.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Extract from the “Pekin Gazette.”

THE paper of most interest to us is an Imperial Decree printed in the latest “Gazette.” It must have been issued in June:—

“Sung Ko-lin-sin and his colleagues have presented their report of certain details of the (late) action, as ascertained by them on inquiry to be true.

“On the 25th of the moon the vessels of the English barbarians, who would pay no attention to the reasonable commands issued to them, forced their way into the river, and opened a fire on our troops, which the latter returned. The barbarian vessels, though injured, would not withdraw, and continued the action with their infantry, until the forces of Government had killed several hundreds, and had taken two of them alive. The rest then fled and slunk back to their ships. The barbarians’ vessels that entered the river were thirteen in all, and but one escaped across the bar; the rest had suffered such damage from the fire that they were unserviceable. The barbarian leader Li (?) was also so severely wounded in the thigh that he could not move.

“The English barbarians, violent, rebellious, and unreasonable as they are, have on this occasion received such a chastisement as will not fail to make them aware of the danger (*lit.*, difficulty) of offending the military dignity of China. The officers and men, who with a common purpose and united strength achieved this great victory, have certainly shown a more than ordinary courage, and we command Sung Ko-lin-sin to ascertain the names of all who exerted themselves on the occasion, and to recommend them to our favourable consideration. We, at the same time, authorise him to distribute among them 5,000 taels, which he may take from the subscription fund. Shih Tung-chun, Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army of Chih-li, and the Brigadier Lung Ju-yuen, Commandant of Takoo, heading the fight in person, so valiant that they disregarded their own safety, and were killed in the bombardment, are, indeed, to be deplored. Let their names be handed to the proper Board, that posthumous honours may be liberally awarded them, and let shrines be raised to them in Tien-tsin, and at their respective homes. Let the Major Tsitanpu, with Takshin, Subaltern of Musketeers, in the Plain White Banner Corps, the Lieutenant Wang Shi-yang, and the Ensign Chang Wan-ping, who fell at the same time, be awarded each one the posthumous honours to which he is by regulation entitled; that their loyal spirits may be comforted.

“Respect this!”

There is also a memorial from Sung Ko-lin-sin, praying the Emperor to leave at his disposal a certain “fu-tsiang,” or brigadier, of ability, as “the business of defending the sea-coast is not yet finished.” This is in the “Gazette” of 14th August.

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CHINA.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH MR. BRUCE, HER MAJESTY'S
ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PENITENTIARY
IN CHINA.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1860.*

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