

DOCUMENTS  
RELATING  
TO THE  
GREAT WAR

Selected and arranged by  
GIUSEPPE A. ANDRIULLI

With an Introduction by  
PROFESSOR GUGLIELMO FERRERO

Translated from the Italian by  
THOMAS OKEY

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DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GREAT  
WAR

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THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE WAR.**

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23 BONA FORTA



## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

PROFESSOR GUGLIELMO FERRERO, author of the Introduction to this volume, is the son-in-law and most brilliant pupil of the great criminologist, Cesare Lombroso. Among his works which have been published in English are :

*Militarism*, 1902 ; *The Greatness and Decline of Rome*, 1907 ; *Characters and Events of Roman History*, 1909 ; *The Women of the Cæsars*, 1911 ; *Ancient Rome and Modern America*. Professor Ferrero also collaborated with his master Lombroso in *The Female Offender*, 1895, and has lectured on Roman History in the Collège de France.

Signor Giuseppe A. Andriulli, the compiler of the Documents, is a well-known Italian publicist.

Documents whose originals are in English, or of which authorised English versions have been officially published, are here transcribed direct, and not retranslated from the Italian. In the case of Italian versions of the speeches and manifestos in French and German the present translator has compared his renderings with the originals and, where necessary, has brought them into closer accord with their sources. The headings throughout are translated from the Italian. The translator has added a few brief foot notes.



## INTRODUCTION

WHERE, WHEN, AND BY WHOM WAS THE EUROPEAN  
WAR DECIDED UPON ?

### I

EVERY apologist who in these days undertakes the defence of Germany asserts, on the authority of the *White Book*, that Germany is an innocent little lamb, the prey of three hungry wolves. I, too, have read this famous *White Book* in the English translation authorised by the German Government, a translation which has therefore an official value equal to the original. But I have not only read the *White Book*; I have also read the *Orange Book* published by the Russian Government, and the *Blue Book*, which the English Government has reprinted and circulated in pamphlet form, entitled, *Great Britain and the European Crisis*. Let us see if, from a comparative study of these three books, some gleam of the truth may be found.

The *White Book*, like the English pamphlet, is divided into two parts. The first and shorter portion contains a succinct narration of the events of the fateful last week of July; the second part is a collection of documents which are relied on to support and prove the

statements made in the narration. The assertion made in the *White Book* is, according to the sub-title printed on the cover, that Russia and her Sovereign "betrayed Germany's confidence"; that they forced her to take up arms by the premature mobilisation of the Russian army while the German Government was seeking to make peace between Russia and Austria. The cause, therefore, of all the evil was the Russian mobilisation. This being the argument of the *White Paper*, it is essential that we should know precisely how and when the mobilisation was decreed and carried into effect.

Now, it would seem that among all the causes which may give rise to a war, the mobilisation of an army is a cause precise and concrete enough. It is not an intention which may be dissimulated or imagined; it is a great and impressive fact visible to all. It would appear at least clear, then, whether the German contention is true or not, that the Russian Government did give orders on a certain day that its army should be placed on a war footing. But no! The reader of the *White Book* is constrained to ask himself over and over again—but, after all, *did* or *did not* Russia mobilise her army? Let us see. In the narrative part of the *White Book* we are told that the first news of the Russian mobilisation reached Berlin on the evening of July 26, as the documents numbered 6, 7 and 8 prove. The first of these, that bearing the number 6, is a telegram, despatched on the 25th by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg—as yet not re-baptised

Petrograd—to the German Chancellor. It runs thus :  
“ Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary *aide-de-camp* to the Tsar).

“ The manœuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly interrupted, and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The manœuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. . . . *I have the impression* that complete preparations for mobilisation against Austria are being made.”

Document No. 7 is another despatch from the same ambassador sent on the 26th. The military *attaché* requests the following message to be sent to the General Staff : “ *I deem* it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere.”

Document No. 8 is a laconic telegram from the German Consul at Kovno despatched on the 27th.

“ Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.”

Setting aside the last telegram, which relates to an event that happened in a remote corner of the vast Russian Empire, the first two witnesses, who are the important ones, only transmit suppositions and conjectures. “ *I have the impression,*” says the first. “ *I deem it certain,*” “ *It is doubtful, improbable,*” says the second. It will seem strange, at least, that in order to know whether a decree for mobilisation was issued or not, reliance should be placed on conjectures—a decree which must have been followed by public proclamations and brought to the knowledge of millions

of men. Anyhow, it will not appear convincing to the alert reader that the spark which caused so great a conflagration could have originated from these despatches. And such, too, was the opinion of a person who, by reason of his official position, must have been even more experienced in these matters than the most alert of readers—the Imperial Chancellor of Germany—who telegraphed on July 26 to the German Ambassador in London as follows (Document No. 10) :

“ . . . According to news received here, the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately, which is equivalent to mobilisation. If this news proves correct, *we shall be forced to counter-measures very much against our own wishes*. Our desire to localise the conflict and to *preserve the peace of Europe* remains unchanged.”

On July 26, therefore, the Chancellor was not yet certain that Russia had commenced mobilisation on the Austrian frontier, and, at any rate, thought that even if it had, Germany would only have been compelled to take some measures dictated by prudence. To reassure him still further, there arrived from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on the 27th the following telegram, No. 11 in the list of documents :

“ Military *attaché* reports a conversation with the Secretary of War.

“ Sazonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilise has

as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed towards Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against Austria, he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated his friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation, even against Austria, as very menacing."

The Russian Government, in fact, informs the German Government by the mouth of its Minister of War, that it has made the necessary arrangements for mobilising the army against Austria, but that the actual mobilisation will take effect only if Austria declares war on Serbia. Must we take the Russian Minister's word? I think so. Because only by admitting he spoke the truth can we account for the rumours and conjectures current at St. Petersburg concerning the mobilisation which were transmitted to Berlin on the 26th—rumours and conjectures followed by no actual, visible consequences which would afford any definite confirmation of the supposed mobilisation. On the other hand, the Russian Minister speaks clearly and sensibly enough. Russia never concealed the fact that she would arm if Austria attacked Serbia, and her Minister Sazonof had, indeed,

informed Austria of this fact during the Balkan crisis.

The reply of the *attaché* that mobilisation, even against Austria, would be considered "as very menacing," seems strange, because this reply accords neither with the Chancellor's opinion manifested in the telegram of July 26, nor with the opinion which the German Emperor was to give expression to on the day following. In fact the Emperor arrived at Berlin from the North Sea on July 28, and on that evening, at 10.45, sent a friendly and confident despatch to the Tsar (Document No. 20), which in every word breathes forth the steadfast purpose and certain hope of an amicable settlement. "In view of the cordial friendship," the Emperor writes, "which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia." On the evening of the 28th, therefore, the Emperor appears to see everything in a rosy light, and does not judge that peace is endangered. Nor was he wrong in so doing, as it seems to us, if matters stood as the Russian Minister of War had said they did.

But, unhappily, on that very day Austria had declared war on Serbia, and the day after, the 29th, as we are informed in the narrative part of the *White Book*, the Russian Government despatched an official communication to the German Government to the effect that a mobilisation in the four districts on the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been



ordered. The statement will appear credible to the alert reader because it accords with what the Russian Minister of War had told the German military *attaché* on the 27th; and the action of the Russian Government will not appear to him a provocative one, but merely the avowed reply of Russia to the declaration of war by Austria on Serbia. Both Austria and Germany had been loyally forewarned and—*uomo avvisato è mezzo salvato*.\* But, but—turning back some pages of the *White Book*, we happen on a telegram from the German military *attaché*, at St. Petersburg, despatched on the 29th, which runs thus:

“The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that everything has remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing, and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere had there been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man or horse, up to the present time, *i.e.*, three o’clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise the fact, that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation.

“As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different

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\* “A man forewarned is half saved.”

parts of the country, and also in Warsaw and Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour, he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm may have been given.

"I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken, in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves."

So it would appear that while the Russian Government was officially warning Berlin of its intention to mobilise against Austria, the Chief of the General Staff at St. Petersburg was saying precisely the opposite to the German military *attaché*. What does all this mean, the reader will ask? Are we to conclude with the worthy *attaché* that perfidious Russia was seeking to "betray Germany's confidence"? Nor is this all. Another surprise awaits us. At 6.30, on the evening of the 29th, the Emperor William sends a further despatch (Document No. 22), still cordial, but no longer so confident as that of the day before. And in this he professes to suspect, but not indeed to know from certain knowledge, that the Russian mobilisation may have been decreed. Among other things we read: "I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding which, as I have already telegraphed you, my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally, military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by

Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity. . . .” The Emperor seems no longer easy in his *rôle* of peacemaker ; he begins to fear that the military preparations made by Russia may endanger his efforts at mediation, all the while speaking of them, not as if they *had* been, but as if they *might* have been, made. But whatever does this mean, if the Russian Government had officially announced at Berlin that it was mobilising ?

But even this is not all. Seven hours later—one hour after midnight—the Emperor William despatches another telegram (Document 23), whose tone is wholly changed and which is couched in a dry, curt, almost menacing style. The German Emperor now almost refuses to act the peacemaker. Here is the text :

“ My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation ; I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has mobilised only against Serbia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary . . . my position as mediator . . . . becomes impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests on Your shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.”

So, then, in those seven hours the Emperor had at length persuaded himself that Russia's mobilisation against Austria would imperil the maintenance of peace, although even then he was not certain that the mobilisation had actually been commenced, since he

speaks of it as an event which *seems* to be verified. Two questions, therefore, force themselves upon us. After all said and done, *had* Russia, or had she *not*, mobilised her army on that day? And, for what reason was the German Emperor, who had still been so confident on the 28th, so uneasy during the night of the 29th, because Russia *seemed* to be mobilising against Austria; while *on the 31st*, when it was known that Russia *was* mobilising, Count Forzach, Under-Secretary of State for Austria-Hungary, informed the British Ambassador at Vienna that mobilisation was not regarded as a necessarily hostile act either by Russia or by Austria (*Blue Book*, Document 118) . . . ?

## II

The truth concerning Russian mobilisation appears to be contained in the despatch which the Tsar sent to the German Emperor on July 30 at 1.20 p.m., in reply to a telegram from the Emperor. The Tsar's despatch is as follows :

“ I thank you cordially for your quick reply. . . . The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for reasons of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope, with all my heart, that these measures will not influence, in any manner, your position as mediator.” (Document 23A.)

On July 25, therefore, Russia had decided to mobilise the districts of Kiev, Moscow, Odessa, and Kazan, if Austria were to make war on Serbia. But as late

as 3 p.m. on the 29th, when the Chief of the General Staff spoke with the German military *attaché*, Russia had not begun to give effect to her decision, and she did begin, as it would appear, only on the 30th. Austria having declared war on Serbia on the 28th, Russia then allowed two more days to pass, still—hesitating, before putting her threat into execution. A new proof it would seem of her long-suffering patience and pacific intentions. Nor was the German Government ignorant that this was the position of things, for otherwise the Emperor would not, in his last despatch, have spoken of the Russian mobilisation as of a measure which might still be carried into execution or not. The German Government, therefore, on the evening of July 29, was convinced that the Russian Chief of the General Staff was speaking the truth on the day of his interview with the German military *attaché*, and that the latter's suspicions were unfounded. Evidently the Tsar had good grounds for his astonishment that the German Emperor felt himself, on the 29th, embarrassed as a peacemaker by measures taken on the 25th, since on the 28th, while fully cognisant of them, he had made no allusion to them, nor believed that they would impede his efforts. And we, too, are justified in our astonishment and have the right to ask what happened on that 29th day of July to make the German Emperor so suddenly change his ideas and his tone in his despatches to the Tsar? What happened to make him fear, as a grave and imminent danger, that mobilisation against Austria

which had only been deliberated upon, while knowing all the time that Russia, after having threatened mobilisation, still hesitated before passing from words to deeds; while Austria, too, was not in the least alarmed even two days later when the mobilisation was not only threatened but had already begun?

In vain do we seek the cause of this mysterious change in the *White Book*, where immediately after this Imperial despatch the thunderbolt of an ultimatum is launched under the date July 31. On that date the Chancellor charges the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to intimate to Russia that she must stop every measure of war within twelve hours, and he begins his telegram with these words: "In spite of negotiations still pending . . . Russia *has mobilised her entire army*, hence also against us. Wherefore, etc."

General mobilisation! But this is another surprise. All the documents and information we have read up to the present in the *White Book* speak of a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. In a moment, without telling us when or how, nor by what channel the information reached the German Government, the Russian general mobilisation and the consequent German ultimatum are announced to us, at one and the same time, as if between one and the other, no greater lapse of time had passed than that which separates the lightning-flash from the thunder-clap. And thus, in fact, it was. In the narrative part of the *White Book* we are told that the Russian Govern-

ment ordered a general mobilisation on the afternoon of July 31, and that the ultimatum was delivered by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 31 at midnight—less than twelve hours afterwards! If one bears in mind the time needed for the news of the mobilisation to reach the German Embassy at St. Petersburg and from thence to be transmitted by despatch to Berlin; if one also reflects on the time necessary to telegraph the ultimatum from Berlin to St. Petersburg and to deliver it to M. Sazonof at the Russian Foreign Office, one is forced to conclude that the German Government, by its ultimatum, decided on war while one might light and smoke a cigar. So much haste and why? Was the atmosphere so threatening that no delay was possible? No. Not only did the negotiations between Austria and Russia continue on July 30 and 31, but actually on the 31st they were much more promising than they had been during the previous days. And precisely on the 31st Austria made the greatest stride towards a compromise that she had hitherto made; for she consented to discuss her Note to Serbia with Russia and the European Powers, and the Tsar telegraphed to the Emperor of Germany promising on his word of honour that so long as diplomatic discussions continued his troops should not be moved.

What, then, had happened?

Few are they that know, and they will defer speaking as long as possible—until the nations, decimated and impoverished by the war, shall demand of their

sovereigns and of their ministers an account of their every act, word, and intention. For the present we can only make surmises. But it appears to me that the key to the mystery may be found in two documents of capital importance in the *Orange Book* and the *Blue Book*. The first is the document which, in the *Orange Book*, bears the number 58, and consists of a telegram despatched by Sazonof to the Russian Ambassador at Paris on July 29; the second is the document numbered 85 in the *Blue Book*—a telegram despatched by the British Ambassador at Berlin on the evening of the 29th. Two despatches sent forth on that day on which so many strange events happened—on that day when the German Emperor, as we have seen, had sent two such different despatches to the Tsar at an interval of seven hours; one at six o'clock in the evening, the other at one hour after midnight.

The telegram which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs despatched to his Ambassador in Paris—it is to be regretted that the hour of its despatch is not given—runs thus :

“ The German Ambassador to-day informed me of the decision of his Government to mobilise if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Now, in point of fact, we only began these preparations in consequence of the mobilisation already undertaken by Austria, and owing to her evident unwillingness to accept any means of arriving at a peaceful settlement of her dispute with Serbia. As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany we have no alternative



but to hasten our own military preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable. . . .”

Now do you understand, O alert reader, what a strange kind of peacemaker the German Emperor was? On July 29 when it was known at Berlin that Russia, at the supreme moment of passing from words to deeds by mobilising against Austria, hesitated; when Austria, who must have been somewhat more interested in the matter than Germany, had not been consulted and showed no anxiety on account of the menaced Russian mobilisation, Germany intimates to Russia that she must disarm in the face of Austria, and threatens to mobilise and hence to make war if she does not. How can so singular a step be explained, concerning which the *White Book* is silent, except by attributing to the German Government the firm intention of diplomatically browbeating Russia and, if threats proved vain, to make war and constrain Austria to follow her? Does it or does it not appear to you that in this telegram Germany is surprised in a flagrant aggression? Moreover, let us now read Document 85 in the *Blue Book*, and we shall discover matters of far graver import. This document, as we have said, is a despatch sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British Ambassador at Berlin on the evening of July 29. And what does the British Ambassador telegraph to his Foreign Minister? He telegraphs that he was asked to call upon the Chancellor on that night, *who had just returned from Potsdam*. In the introductory narrative of events the information

is given that the Ambassador was sent for *late at night*.<sup>\*</sup> Grave and urgent, therefore, were the matters which the Chancellor had to communicate to the Ambassador, and matters appertaining to the discussion that had taken place in the Conciliabule or Council with the Emperor at Potsdam, since the Chancellor had scarcely returned to Berlin from Potsdam before he sent for the Ambassador, and sent for him late at night, at so unusual and inconvenient an hour ! He had, in fact, to ask him, neither more nor less, *if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a European war, on the understanding that Germany respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, and took from France only her Colonies.*

This document speaks clearly enough. It tells us that war was virtually decided upon on the evening of July 29 at that colloquy or Council between Chancellor and Emperor which was held at Potsdam, and which certainly took place between the first and the second telegram sent to the Tsar by the Emperor. Thus alone can the haste be explained with which the Chancellor on his return to Berlin sent for the British Ambassador and had that conversation with him which, as the Introductory Narrative to the *Blue Book* tells us, seemed so strange to the British Government when it was known in London.

Now, by the light of these two documents many things are clear. There was a party in Germany powerful at Court and in the Government which, for

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\* See *Blue Book*, p. vii.

ten years, had been urging Germany to take up arms. This party, probably between the 28th and the 29th, had surrounded the Emperor who, on the 28th, still appeared animated by reasonable intentions. Austria, by declaring war on Serbia, had only too effectively furnished the war party at Berlin with a terrible argument—the argument that war was inevitable. And if war could not be prevented was it not better for Germany to precipitate it? So Emperor and Government allowed themselves to be persuaded to intimate to Russia that she must disarm, and, at the same time, the Emperor changes his tone in his correspondence with the Tsar. It is not improbable that on July 29 the Emperor and the German Government still deluded themselves that Russia would yield to threats as she did in 1908 and during the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis, and the Russian Government's hesitation to mobilise may have encouraged this delusion.

But, during the afternoon, a telegram arrives at Berlin from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg which we may search in vain for in the *White Book*—the telegram which we have cognisance of from Document 58\* published in the *Orange Book*. In this telegram the conversation between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister is reported, and it is therefore now known at Berlin† that Russia

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\* See p. 20.

† The telegram was communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain, Austria, Italy and Germany.

refuses to suspend her military preparations: the German Government, in fact, understands that this time Russia will not yield to threats. The Chancellor hastens with the telegram to Potsdam, and at Potsdam the decision is taken to despatch a last and more menacing ultimatum to Russia and, if that failed of its effect, to go to war. The Chancellor returns to Berlin that same night to ask of the English Ambassador the price of British neutrality; the Emperor despatches his telegram to the Tsar, one hour after midnight, which partially reflects the answer given to the German Ambassador by Sazonof; and at two in the morning of the 30th the German Ambassador calls on Sazonof for one last fateful colloquy. Of this we have information in the document published in the *Blue Book* which relates how the German Ambassador burst into tears\* when he perceived that Russia would not give way. He understood that war was now decided upon.

Anyone who reads the *White Book* attentively, and compares it with the *Blue Book* and the *Orange Book* will inevitably be led to believe that the war was decided upon at Berlin, not, indeed, after Russia had begun her general mobilisation, *but on the evening of the 29th, and before even she had begun her partial mobilisation against Austria.* This being admitted, it is easy to explain why the ultimatum was decided upon with such haste when the news that Russia

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\* No. 97, p. 53: "German Ambassador . . . completely broke down on seeing war was inevitable."

was proceeding to mobilise the whole of her army had scarcely reached Berlin. To declare war a pretext was necessary, for it would have been strange indeed that Germany, in a dispute that had arisen between Russia and Austria—Germany who, as an ally, was only a secondary party to the quarrel—should have declared war on Russia because she was mobilising her army against Austria at a time when Austria declared that she did not interpret this measure as a threat. Even the German professors who signed the famous manifesto would then have perceived that Germany alone was the aggressor. Hence the news that arrived on the 31st of the precautionary measures taken by Russia, for a general mobilisation, came pat (and that nothing more as yet was intended on the part of Russia is proved by Document 113 in the *Blue Book*), and the pretext was immediately seized upon, since war had already been decided. *The precipitation with which the German Government despatched the ultimatum on July 31 can be explained only in two ways: either we must admit that the German Government had suddenly gone mad; or that war had already been decided upon before, namely, on that fateful evening of July 29.*

Unfortunately for Germany, precisely on that very day Austria-Hungary appears to have become terrified and hesitated. She, too, had contrived her Balkan adventure, hoping that Russia would let things drift. When she perceived that a European war was imminent she grew afraid, and she sought for time and means to

provide an escape. The precipitation with which, on July 31, the German Government seized the first pretext to hand in order to bring about a war in a conflict in which she was not directly interested rendered these good intentions of the eleventh hour vain. If Austria is perhaps more responsible than Germany for the decision taken at Potsdam, the responsibility for the ultimatum of July 31 seems to lie wholly on Germany. Germany and Austria, therefore, must share equally between them the responsibility for this unparalleled catastrophe before the world and before the Tribunal of History.

GUGLIELMO FERRERO.

PART I  
THE DIPLOMATIC WAR  
GERMANY KNEW . . .

*From the Preface to the German White Book*

UNDER these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government apprised Germany of this conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Serbia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.

We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance

in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe.

A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours.

We therefore permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations.

#### AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERBIA

*Ultimatum presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade to the Serbian Government at 6 p.m. on July 23, 1914. German White Book No. I.*

On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister in the Court of Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government :

*"Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the Powers*



*are going to arrive at in reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the Powers, Serbia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighbourly relations."*

The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of June 28, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in Serbia whose aim is to separate certain territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes of the Serbian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.

Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled language of the Press, the glorification of the originators of assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Serbian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its institutions.

This sufferance of which the Royal Serbian Govern-

ment made itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28 demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such sufferance. It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal authors of the outrage of June 28, that the murder at Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian officers and officials who belonged to the *Narodna Odbrana*, and that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian frontier officials.

The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy. In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, the entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and terrorising propaganda.

In order to give to these obligations a solemn char-

acter, the Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration :

*“ The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of those machinations whose aim is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.*

*“ The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have thus threatened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March 31, 1909. The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it will make every effort.”*

This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognisance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be published in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows :

1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred

of, and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity ;

2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society *Narodna Odbrana*, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under another name or in another form ;

3. Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ;

4. To remove from military service and the administration in general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the Royal Government ;

5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy ;

6. To commence a judicial investigation against the

participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government, will participate in the examinations;

7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian State officials, who have been compromised through the result of the investigation ;

8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the frontier ;

9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28.

The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal Government at the latest on Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m.

*Enclosure relating to the Results of the Investigation  
with regard to the Officers named in Clause 7*

The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28 has, so far, yielded the following results :

1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade

by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.

3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Serbian Army in Kragujevac.

4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider—(outside Belgrade).

5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organised by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other persons.

A DELAY IS REQUESTED FOR THE SERBIAN REPLY  
*Telegram from the Prince Regent of Serbia to the Tsar.*  
*Orange Book No. 6*

*Belgrade, July 24, 1914.*

We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the

position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legislation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated goodwill which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded.

*Telegram from the Russian Minister Sazonof to the Russian  
Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. Orange Book No. 4.*

*St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.*

Please convey the following message to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs :

“ The communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade affords to the Powers a period which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. In order to prevent the consequences, incalculable and equally fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian

Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared herself to be disposed to inform the Powers of the facts elicited by the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study those facts. In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer corresponding advice to the Serbian Government. A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the representations made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international comity."

*Announcement by the Russian Government. — Orange Book No. 10*

*St. Petersburg, July 25, 1914.*

Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Serbia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

*The Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna to the Russian Minister Sazonof. Orange Book No. 10*

. . . I have just heard from Macchio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time-limit of the Note.



*Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Blue Book No. 24*

July 25, 1914.

The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate.

No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would therefore be essential.

*Verbal Note handed by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Russian Minister Sazonof. Orange Book No. 18*

July 25, 1914.

The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany.

Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports

the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers justified.

### THE TARDY SERBIAN REPLY

*Reply of the Serbian Government handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*  
*Blue Book No. 39*

The Royal Serbian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina\* and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Serbian Government on the 31st March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely

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\* The Serbian Government.

satisfactory explanation. Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the Press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial

any Serbian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the *Journal Officiel*, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration :

“ The Royal Government of Serbia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Serbian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.”

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name

of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertake :

1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the *Narodna Odbrana* and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the *Narodna Odbrana* Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without delay from their public educational

establishments in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 28th June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Govern-

ment cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the Note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ciganowic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry.

8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which

according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile towards the monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present Note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on the 31st March, 1909.

*Belgrade, July 25, 1914.*

#### SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROPOSAL OF MEDIATION

*The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg. July 26, 1914. White Book Exhibit 10b.*

After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterestedness, the responsibility for a possible



disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.

*Sir Edward Grey to the English Ambassadors at Paris,  
Berlin and Rome. Blue Book No. 36*

*July 26, 1914.*

Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward  
Grey. Blue Book No. 35*

*July 26, 1914.*

Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.

GERMANY SEEKS TO GUARANTEE AUSTRIA'S IMPUNITY  
IN HER ACTION AGAINST SERBIA

*The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London.*

*White Book Exhibit No. 12*

*July 27, 1914.*

We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our ally, in his dispute with Serbia, before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. Blue Book No. 43*

*July 27, 1914.*

Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold. He thought

that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Blue Book No. 47*

July 27, 1914.

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce.

This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manœuvre leave.

*Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Orange Book No. 34*

July 27, 1914.

The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any mediation or conference.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Orange Book No. 41*

July 27, 1914.

. . . We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative

at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Serbia and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow on that country. . . .

#### DECLARATION OF WAR ON SERBIA BY AUSTRIA

*Communication from the Austro-Hungarian Government,  
July 27, 1914. Agenzia Stefani*

The Imperial and Royal Envoy, Baron von Giese, on his arrival at Vienna, July 26, has presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Serbian reply to our demands. The tendency of this reply is to make it falsely appear that the Serbian Government is disposed to fulfil, in large measure, the demands set forth by us. In reality, however, the reply is pervaded by a spirit of insincerity from which it clearly appears that the Serbian Government is not seriously disposed to make an end of its guilty toleration of the conspiracies against the Dual Monarchy which up to now it has allowed to subsist.

Concerning the general bases of our Note and the specific demands made, the Serbian reply contains so many reservations and limitations that even the concessions actually made lose all importance. Particularly, our request that Imperial and Royal delegates should participate in the enquiry for bringing to punishment those who were implicated in the plot of June 28, and who are now on Serbian territory, has been rejected,

under a vain pretext. The conditions made concerning the measures to be taken against the movements hostile to the Dual Monarchy are similarly equivalent to a rejection.

Our desire that the Royal Serbian Government should take the necessary measures to prevent the dissolved associations hostile to the Dual Monarchy from continuing their activities under another name and in another form, has not even been considered. Seeing that the demands contained in the Note of the Imperial and Royal Government represent, with regard to the attitude to be observed on the part of Serbia, the minimum necessary to create a durable tranquillity in the south-east of the Dual Monarchy, the Serbian reply must be considered insufficient. Moreover, the Serbian Government itself was conscious that its reply was unacceptable to us. This is demonstrated by the circumstance that it is proposed in the close of the reply to find a solution of the controversy by arbitration, and the fact that already three hours before the reply was handed in (which happened a few minutes before the expiry of the time-limit) the mobilisation of the Serbian army had taken place.

The Royal Government of Serbia, not having replied in a satisfactory manner to the Note which had been delivered to it by Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, which Note was dated July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself under the necessity of providing for the safeguarding of its own interests

and, to that end, to have recourse to the force of arms. Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself from this moment in a state of war with Serbia.

*The Minister for Foreign Affairs,*  
COUNT BERCHTOLD.

### COUNSELS OF MODERATION TO SERBIA

*The Tsar to the Prince Regent of Serbia, July 27, 1914.*

*Orange Book No. 40*

When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Serbia.

So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our earnest wish we are not successful, your Highness may rest assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia.

NICHOLAS.

*Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. Blue Book No. 64*

July 28, 1914.

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you :

In a long conversation this morning Serbian Chargé d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under Article 5 and Article 6, Serbia might still accept the whole Austrian Note.

As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Serbia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Serbia to accept without conditions.

*The German Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor. White Book Exhibit No. 16*

Count Berchtold requests me to express to your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Serbia, and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated.

*Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Orange Book No. 45.*

Vienna, July, 1914.

. . . Count Berchtold replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the advantages of

a frank explanation with the St. Petersburg Cabinet. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, who had only decided, much against their will, on the energetic measures which they had taken against Serbia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note. . . .

AN IGNOMINIOUS WAR AGAINST A WEAK COUNTRY.

*The Tsar to the Kaiser. White Book Exhibit No. 21*

*Peterhof Palace, July 29, 1 p.m.*

I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent [such] a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.

*The Kaiser to the Tsar. White Book Exhibit No. 20*

*July 28, 10.45 p.m.*

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Serbia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become



a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.

Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin,

WILLIAM.

*The Kaiser to the Tsar. White Book Exhibit No. 22*

*July 29, 6.30 p.m.*

I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the conservation of peace. However: I cannot—as I told you in my first telegram—consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an “ignominious war.” Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive

full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding which—as I have already telegraphed you—my Government endeavours to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which—upon Your appeal to my friendship and aid—I willingly accepted.

WILLIAM.

#### GERMANY AIMS AT THE FRENCH COLONIES

*Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. Blue Book No. 85*

*July 29, 1914.*

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace.

He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany. . . .

THE LAST ATTEMPTS OF SIR EDWARD GREY IN FAVOUR  
OF PEACE.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador  
at Rome. Blue Book No. 72*

*Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.*

The Italian Ambassador made to me to-day a communication from the Marquis di San Giuliano

suggesting that the German objections to the mediation of the four Powers, a mediation that was strongly favoured by Italy, might be removed by some change in the form of procedure.

I said that I had already anticipated this by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle, could be applied.

#### THE TWO FORMULÆ FOR AN AUSTRO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT

*The Formula dictated by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador July 30, and immediately communicated to the European Powers. Orange Book No. 60.*

“ If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has become a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum such points as violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia undertakes to stop her military preparations.”

*Modified Formula of July 31 according to the British Proposal. Orange Book No. 67*

“ If Austria will agree to check the advance of her troops on Serbian territory ; if, recognising that the dispute between Austria and Serbia has become a question of European interest, she will allow the Great Powers to look into the matter and decide what satis-

faction Serbia could afford to the Austro-Hungarian Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting attitude."

#### GERMANY FORCES THE PACE.

*The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris.*

*White Book Exhibit No. 25*

*July 31, 1914.*

. . . Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours.

*Note presented to the Russian Government by the German Ambassador in the name of his Government, August 1, 5 p.m. (Central European time). White Book Exhibit No. 26.*

"Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avait été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Pétersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.

A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne,

l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eut manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en\* sistant\* sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui suit :

Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire relève le défi et se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."

*Translation from the Orange Book No. 76*

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg ; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings

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\* Thus in the *White Book*.

on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer\*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude \*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows :

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

*The German Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor.*

*White Book Exhibit No. 27*

*August 1, 1.5 p.m.*

Upon my repeated definite enquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated.

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\* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the note. Footnote by the editor of the *Orange Book*.

*Circular of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives abroad. Orange Book No. 78*

*St. Petersburg, August 2, 1914.*

It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking general mobilisation.

The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European—nay, the world-wide—character of this dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotiations were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility.

SAZONOF.



## VIOLATION OF THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG

*Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey.*

*Blue Book No. 147*

*Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.*

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867.

The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

## THE OUTRAGEOUS ULTIMATUM TO BELGIUM

*Verbal Declaration of the French Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government, August 1. Grey Book No. 9.*

No incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country.

France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities.

*Ultimatum presented by the German Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government on August 2, 1914, at 7 p.m. Grey Book No. 20.*

(Very Confidential.)

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she

should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration :

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event Germany can undertake no obligation towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

#### THE HEROIC REFUSAL OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT

*Note handed by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the German Minister at Brussels. Grey Book No. 22.*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914, 7 a.m.*

The German Government stated in their Note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops. The German Government, therefore, considered themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government

to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The Note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This Note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations, and the Belgian Army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence with which the

German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

*Telegram from the King of the Belgians to the King of England. Grey Book No. 25*

*Brussels, August 3, 1914.*

Mindful of the numerous marks of friendship of your Majesty and of your Majesty's predecessors, as well as the friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870 and of the proofs of sympathy which she has once again shown us, I make the supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium.

ALBERT.

THE TARDY DECLARATION OF WAR BY AUSTRIA  
AGAINST RUSSIA

*Note handed by the Austrian Ambassador to the Russian  
Minister for Foreign Affairs. Orange Book No. 79.*

*August 6, 1914, 6 p.m.*

“In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment.”





PART II

THE GOVERNMENTS BEFORE THEIR  
PEOPLES

IN AUSTRIA

I ASSUME THE WHOLE BURDEN OF MY DECISION

*Autograph Letter of the Emperor Francis Joseph to  
the Minister President, July 29, 1914*

*To my devoted peoples :*

My greatest desire has ever been to consecrate the years which God's grace may yet reserve to me in works of peace, and to preserve my peoples from the grave sacrifices and the burdens of war. But Providence has otherwise decided. The conduct of an adversary, filled with hatred, has compelled me to draw the sword after long years of peace, in order to defend the honour of my Monarchy, to protect its authority and power, and to guarantee its position.

The kingdom of Serbia with mindless ingratitude—this kingdom, which from the dawn of its independence to the days just past has been favoured and protected by my ancestors and myself—had already for some years trodden the way of hostility to Austria-Hungary.

When, after thirty years of labour, blessed by peace, I extended my sovereign powers over Bosnia and the Herzegovina, this decision kindled in the kingdom of Serbia, whose rights were in nowise violated, an explosion of bitterest hatred and passion.

At that epoch, my Government made use of the fair privilege of the stronger and, in its indulgence and greater gentleness, pretended to nothing from Serbia but the reduction of the effectives of its army in peace time, and a promise that in the future she would follow the call of peace and friendship.

Animated by a spirit of moderation, my Government limited itself, when two years ago Serbia was fighting the Turkish Empire, to safeguarding the most important and vital conditions of the Monarchy.

If Serbia has been able to achieve the purpose she proposed to herself in this war, she owes it, above all, to our attitude. But the hope that the kingdom of Serbia would have recognised the patience and the love of peace of the Austrian Government, and would have kept her promises, was not fulfilled. Hatred against me and against my dynasty grew daily more violent and more bitter. Every day the tendency became more intense to rend by violence territories from Austria-Hungary which never could be allowed to be severed from her. . . . . .

In vain has my Government made a last attempt to attain its ends by peaceful means and to induce Serbia to change her attitude; she has rejected the moderate satisfactions demanded by my Government,

and has refused to do her duty—a duty which, in the life of a State, constitutes the natural and necessary conditions of peace.

I see myself constrained to obtain by force those indispensable guarantees which shall secure to my State internal tranquillity and permanent external peace.

I assume, in this grave hour, the whole burden of the decision I am taking in the face of Almighty God. I have examined all: I have weighed all. Fully conscious of my responsibility, I enter on the way indicated to me by duty. I trust in my people who, during so many storms, have always been united around my throne; . . . I trust in the army of Austria-Hungary animated, as it is, by sentiments of courage and devotion; I trust in Almighty God that He will give victory to my arms.

FRANCIS JOSEPH.

To the President of the Ministers,  
STURGKH.

## IN ITALY

*Decision of the Ministerial Council, August 2, 1914*

Certain European Powers being in a state of war, and Italy being at peace with all the belligerent parties, the King's Government, the citizens, and the subjects of the realm, are bound to observe the duties required by neutrality according to existing laws and to the principles of international right. Whoever violates

these duties will suffer the consequences of his own acts, and in such case will incur the penalties by law provided.

*The Prime Minister's Circular Note to the Prefects  
of Italy.*

Neutrality towards the belligerent States, which has been decided upon by the Government in full accord with national sentiment, imposes certain obligations on the Government itself, as well as on citizens, which must be rigorously observed. The Ministerial Council has therefore determined that all enrolments or public manifestations of a favourable or hostile nature to any belligerent State whatsoever, shall be prohibited. Any contravention of this order, which on your own responsibility you must put in full execution, must be denounced according to Article 113 of the Penal Code.

*The Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs,*  
SALANDRA.

APPEAL OF POPE PIUS X.

*Published in the "Osservatore Romano"*

While nearly all Europe is being dragged into the whirlpools of a most deadly war, whose dangers, slaughters and consequences no one can think upon without feeling oppressed with sorrow and with fright, we, too, cannot but be anxious and feel our soul rent by the most bitter grief for the safety and for the lives

of so many citizens and so many peoples for whose welfare we are supremely solicitous.

Amidst this immense perturbation and crisis we deeply feel and realise that our Fatherly Charity and our Apostolic Ministry demand of us that we direct men's minds upward to Him from whom help alone can come, to Christ, Prince of Peace, and man's most powerful Mediator with God.

Therefore we do exhort the Catholics of the whole world to turn, full of confidence, to His throne of graces and mercies ; and let the Clergy lead the way for all others by their example and by appointing special prayers in their respective parishes under the orders of their Bishops, that God may be moved to pity and remove as soon as possible the disastrous torch of war and inspire the supreme rulers of the nations *with thoughts of peace and not of affliction.*

*From the Vatican, August 2, 1914.*

POPE PIUS X.

## IN RUSSIA

FOR HOLY RUSSIA AND HER ARMY, STRONG AS A  
GRANITE WALL

*The Tsar's Appeal, August 3, 1914*

We, Nicholas II., by the Grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc.

Make known to all our subjects that Russia, related

by blood and faith to the Slav peoples and faithful to her historical traditions, has never regarded their fate with an indifferent eye ; but the fraternal sentiments of the Russian people towards the Slavs have been awakened with perfect unanimity and extraordinary force in these latter days, when Austria-Hungary has knowingly addressed to Serbia claims which are unacceptable to an independent State. Heeding not the pacific and condescending reply of the Serbian Government, she has rejected the benevolent intervention of Russia ; she has hastened to make an armed attack and commenced a bombardment of Belgrade, an open city.

Forced by the situation thus created, precautionary measures have been rendered necessary, and we have given orders that the army and navy be placed on a war footing, while using every endeavour to obtain a peaceful solution ; negotiations were therefore begun to that end, because the blood and treasure of our subjects are dear to us. Notwithstanding friendly relations with Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, contrary to all our hopes of immemorial good neighbourliness, and taking no account of our assurances that the measures adopted by us have no hostile purpose aimed at her, Germany has demanded their immediate cessation. This demand having been rejected, she suddenly declared war on Russia.

To-day it is no longer a question of providing for the protection of a kindred land which has been unjustly assailed ; we have to safeguard the honour, the dignity,

the integrity, the position of Russia among the Great Powers. We have an unshakable belief that all our faithful subjects will rise devotedly and with one accord in defence of the Russian Fatherland; that internal discord will be forgotten in this threatening hour of trial; that the union of the Tsar with his people will be closer than ever, and that Russia, rising up as one man, will repulse the enemy's attack with profound faith in the justice of her cause and with a humble trust in the providence of Almighty God.

With our prayers we invoke God's blessing on Holy Russia and on her valiant troops.

*The Tsar to the Representatives of the Army and Navy,  
at the Winter Palace, August 3, 1914*

Russia, our Great Fatherland, has received with calm and dignity the news of the declaration of war made against us.

I am confident that, at whatever cost, we shall carry on this war to the end, and I here solemnly declare that I will not make peace until the last enemy soldier shall have left our territory. I address myself to you all, representatives of my beloved troops of the Guard and of the military district of St. Petersburg here gathered together; and, in your persons I give, to the whole of my united army, unanimous and strong as a granite wall, my blessing in its work of war.

## IN FRANCE

## MOBILISATION IS NOT WAR

*Proclamation of the President of the Republic to the French Nation, August 2, 1914.*

The French people is aware that during the past days the European situation has been considerably aggravated. Notwithstanding the efforts of diplomacy the horizon at the present hour is lowering ; several States are mobilising their forces, and even States protected by their neutrality have thought it their duty to mobilise as a measure of precaution. Powers, whose constitutional military legislation does not resemble ours, have, without issuing a decree of mobilisation, begun and are elaborating measures which are equivalent to a mobilisation, and which are an anticipatory execution of those measures.

France, who gave expression to her firm desire for peace, and who in tragic days gave counsels of moderation and a living example of wisdom to Europe, by multiplying her efforts to maintain peace in the world, has made preparations for every eventuality and has now taken the first indispensable precautions for safeguarding her territory ; but our Constitution does not permit us to adopt complete measures unless a decree of mobilisation is forthcoming. Cognisant of the responsibility which lies upon us, we should fail in a sacred duty if we were to leave matters in their present condition. The Government has now issued the decree that the situation demands.



Mobilisation is not war, and in the present circumstances must be considered as the best means of ensuring peace with honour. The Government, protected by these necessary precautions, will now, in its ardent desire to reach a peaceful solution of the crisis, continue its diplomatic efforts; it still hopes to attain success.

The Government relies on the *sang-froid* of this noble nation not to permit itself to be drawn away by an unjustifiable emotion, and relies on the patriotism of every Frenchman. The Government knows that there is not one man but who is ready to do his duty. In this hour there are no parties. There is a France, eternal; a France, pacific and resolute. There is a Fatherland of Right and Justice, united in tranquil calm and vigilant of its own dignity.

POINCARÉ.

#### FRANCE WILL HAVE RIGHT ON HER SIDE

*Message of President Poincaré read to the Senators  
and Deputies, August 4, 1914.*

France has just been the object of a brutal and pre-meditated aggression which is an insolent defiance of the Rights of Nations. Before a declaration of war had been handed to us; before the departure of the German Ambassador, French territory has been violated, and only yesterday evening did the German Empire declare war.

For more than forty years, in their sincere love of peace, the French have repressed their desires for legitimate reparation and have given the example of a great nation which has made use of her renewed strength, of her rejuvenated energy solely in the interests of progress and for the good of humanity. From the very opening of the present crisis, France cannot be reproached with any act, any gesture, any word, that has not been conciliatory and peaceful. In the hour of the first encounters, France can solemnly and justly claim for herself that up to the last moment she made the most supreme efforts to avert the war, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear throughout history.

On the morrow of the day on which we and our Allies publicly expressed the hope of seeing the negotiations, initiated under the auspices of the Cabinet of London, peacefully pursue their course, Germany suddenly declared war against Russia; she invaded Luxemburg; she shamefully insulted the noble Belgian nation and treacherously endeavoured to surprise us during the progress of diplomatic conversations. But France, alert as she was pacific, stood ready and our covering troops will permit the orderly completion of our mobilisation.

Our fine and brave army rose, quivering with indignation, to defend the honour of our flag and the soil of our Fatherland. The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous desire of the country, expresses the admiration and the confidence of every

Frenchman to our troops by land and sea. Closely united in one and the same sentiment the nation will maintain the same *sang-froid* she has daily given proof of since the beginning of the crisis. . . . .

In the war which is now opening, France will have on her side that Right whose eternal moral force no nation can flout with impunity. She will be heroically defended by all her sons bound together in a common indignation against the aggressor and united in one and the same patriotic faith. Honourably supported by Russia and sustained by England, her loyal friend, France already beholds the sympathies and the good wishes coming towards her from all parts of the world because to-day she represents once again, Liberty, Justice and Right, in the face of the Universe.

Lift up your hearts! Long live France!

#### AN ODISIOUS AGGRESSION

*Speech of M. Viviani in the Chamber, August 4, 1914*

Gentlemen. The German Ambassador has quitted Paris after having declared to us a state of war.

The Government owes a true account to Parliament of the events which, in less than ten days, have unchained a European war and forced France, peaceful and strong, to defend her frontiers against an aggression as unforeseen as it is odious and unjust. This aggression, which has no shadow of excuse and which was begun before any declaration of war reached us,

is the last act of a policy whose origin and scope it is now my duty to explain to the democracy of France and to the whole civilised world.

In consequence of the abominable crime which cost the lives of the Hereditary Archduke of Austria-Hungary and the Duchess of Hohenburg, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade. Most of the Powers were officially informed only on Friday, July 24, the day on which the Austrian Ambassadors communicated the circular to them which has been published in the Press.

This circular aimed at explaining and justifying an ultimatum which was delivered to Serbia on the evening of the previous day by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. This ultimatum, while asserting the complicity of a number of Serbian subjects and political associations in the Sarajevo assassinations, also insinuated that Serbian authorities and officials themselves were not strangers to the crime. A reply was demanded from Serbia by 6 p.m. on Saturday, July 25.

The conditions of the satisfaction demanded by Austria, or, at least, many of them, indisputably constituted an attack on the rights of a sovereign State; yet, notwithstanding their intolerant character, Serbia, on July 25, declared she would submit to them almost unreservedly.

Counsels from France, Russia and Great Britain were, from the first, not without effect in this decision to submit, which for Austria was equivalent to a success and for Europe a guarantee of peace. These

counsels had the greater value in that the true nature of the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Foreign Ministers of the Triple Entente who had been many times assured by the Austro-Hungarian Government, during the last three weeks, that its demands were extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with pardonable astonishment, that the Cabinets of Paris, London and St. Petersburg learned that on July 26 the Austrian Minister at Belgrade had, after an examination which lasted but a few minutes, declared the Serbian reply to be unacceptable and had broken off diplomatic relations.

#### THE PRETENCE OF LOCALISING THE CONFLICT

Their astonishment was aggravated by the fact that, as early as Friday, July 24, the German Ambassador had read a *note verbale* to the French Foreign Minister wherein it was stated that the Austro-Serbian conflict must be localised, that any intervention of the Great Powers must be avoided, since otherwise "the consequences would be incalculable." An analogous step was taken on Saturday the 25th at London and St. Petersburg.

It is now necessary, Gentlemen, to indicate to you how the menacing terms employed by the German Ambassador, at Paris, contrasted with the conciliatory sentiments of which the Powers of the Triple Entente had given proof by the counsels of submission they give to Serbia. Nevertheless, without laying undue

emphasis on the abnormal nature of the German *démarche*, we, in accord with our Allies and our friends, immediately undertook a work of conciliation by inviting Germany to associate herself with us. We have had, from the first, the pain of realising that all our good intentions, all our efforts, found no echo at Berlin. Not only did Germany seem indisposed to give those friendly counsels to Austria which her position permitted her to offer, but, from that moment, and still more in succeeding days, she appeared to interpose herself between the Cabinet of Vienna and those conciliatory proposals which emanated from other Powers.

On Tuesday, July 28, Austria declared war on Serbia. Since this declaration, after an interval of only 48 hours, aggravated the condition of affairs created by the rupture of diplomatic relations, we must needs believe that there existed a premeditated intention of making war on Serbia, and a systematic programme aiming at her subjugation. Thus, not only was the independence of a brave people at stake, but the equilibrium of the Balkans, established by the Treaty of Bucharest, 1913, and consecrated by the moral adhesion of all the Great Powers, was imperilled.

#### THE EFFORTS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE FOR PEACE

Notwithstanding this, at the suggestion of the British Government (always strenuously engaged in

the maintenance of European peace), negotiations were continued, or, rather, the Powers of the Triple Entente sought to continue them. From this common desire came the proposal for concerted action, *à quatre*—Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, all intent on finding a reasonable solution of the difficulty while giving Austria every legitimate satisfaction.

On Wednesday the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent ill-success of these attempts, and in the presence of Austria's mobilisation and declaration of war, and fearing a Serbian military defeat, decided, as a precautionary measure, to mobilise her troops in four military districts, that is, the forces along the Austro-Hungarian frontier alone. And in so doing, Russia was careful to advise the German Government that the adoption of these measures, limited in scope and without any hostile intent with regard to Austria, were in no way directed against Germany. In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recognised this without any difficulty.

On the other hand, every attempt made by Great Britain, with the adhesion of Russia and the support of France, to re-establish relations between Austria and Serbia, under the moral patronage of Europe, encountered a persistent negative attitude at Berlin, and of this, diplomatic despatches furnish absolute proof. It was an alarming situation which gave grounds for suspecting the existence at Berlin of

certain ulterior motives. Some hours later these suspicions and these fears became certainties.

#### GERMAN MILITARY PREPARATION

In fact, thirty-six hours later the negative attitude of Germany was followed by positive indications alarming enough. On July 31, Germany cut off all communications between herself and the rest of Europe, thus enabling her to execute in most absolute secrecy those military preparations against France which, as you have seen, nothing could justify. Already, for several days, and under conditions difficult to explain, Germany had prepared the transition of her army from a peace to a war footing. As early as the morning of July 25, before, that is, the expiration of the time limit given by Austria to Serbia, she had strengthened the garrisons in Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed her frontier forts on a war footing. The 26th, she ordered the railways to prepare for a concentration. The 27th, she had made requisitions and placed covering troops in their positions. The 28th, she had begun to call in reservists and the units distant from the frontier had been moved nearer. Could all these measures, executed with an inexorable precision, leave us any doubt as to Germany's intentions?

This was the situation, when on the evening of July 31, the German Government which, since the 24th, had not taken any effective part in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, delivered an



ultimatum to the Russian Government on the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her army, and demanded the cessation of such mobilisation within twelve hours. This demand, the more exasperating in form in that a few hours before the Emperor Nicholas had, in a spontaneous act of confidence, requested the mediation of the German Emperor, was made manifest precisely when the Russian Government, at the request of Great Britain, and with the consent of Germany, had accepted a formula calculated to bring about a friendly solution of the Austro-Serbian dispute and of the Austro-Russian differences, by means of a simultaneous arrest of military preparations and operations. On the very same day, this unfriendly act towards Russia was aggravated by openly hostile acts against France—the rupture of communications by road, by railway, by telegraph, by telephone; the seizure of French locomotives when they reached the frontier; the placing of quick-firing guns on the interrupted railways; the concentration of troops on our frontier.

#### THE DECEITFUL PACIFICISM OF GERMANY

From that moment it was no longer permissible to believe in the sincerity of the peaceful declarations which Germany's representative continued to lavish upon us. We knew that Germany, protected by the state of war she had proclaimed, was mobilising. It came to our knowledge that six classes of reservists

had been called to the colours, and that preparations for the transport and concentration of certain army corps, stationed at a great distance from the frontier, were being made.

As these events developed, the Government, attentive and alert, took, day by day, and even hour by hour, the precautionary measure demanded by the situation—the general mobilisation of our forces by land and sea has been ordered.

That same evening, at 7.30, Germany, taking no heed of the acceptance on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of Great Britain's proposal, which I have already referred to, declared war on Russia. On the morrow, Sunday, August 2, disregarding the extreme moderation of France, and in contradiction to the pacific declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, German troops crossed our frontier at three points in defiance of the rules of international law.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which, bearing the signature of the Prussian monarchy, guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg, German troops invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy, and provoked a protest from the Luxemburg Government. Finally, the neutrality of Belgium was also threatened. The German Minister delivered, on the evening of August 2, an ultimatum to the Belgian Government inviting it to facilitate military operations against France in Belgium under the false pretext that Belgian neutrality was menaced by us. The Belgian Government refused, and declared it was

determined energetically to defend Belgian neutrality, which had been respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and specifically by the King of Prussia.

Thenceforward, Gentlemen, these aggressive acts have been renewed, multiplied, accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired against our soldiers and our Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German aviator hurled three bombs on Lunéville.

#### THE DECLARATION OF WAR.

The German Ambassador, to whom we communicated these facts, as we did to all the Great Powers, has neither denied nor deplored them. Indeed, he came yesterday to demand his passports, and to notify us that a state of war existed, alleging, contrary to all the truth, that hostile acts had been committed by French aviators on German territory, in the Eifel district, and even on the railways between Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

Here is the letter he handed to me on the subject :

*“ Paris, August 3, 1914.*

*“ Monsieur le Président.*

“ The German Administration and military authorities have ascertained that a certain number of hostile acts have been committed by French aviators on German territory.

“Some of these aviators have openly violated Belgian neutrality by flying over the territory of that country. One aviator has attempted to destroy certain buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the neighbourhood of the railways near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. I have the honour and the obligation to make known to your Excellency that in the presence of these aggressive acts the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France by the deed of this latter Power.

“At the same time, I have the honour to advise your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports; but that she will let them out if, within forty-eight hours, France, on her part, will guarantee full reciprocal treatment.

“My diplomatic mission being then finished, it only remains for me to beg your Excellency to furnish me with my passports and to take such measures as may seem fitting to you to ensure my return to Germany, together with the staff of the Embassy and the staffs of the Bavarian Legation and of the General Consulate of Germany at Paris.

“Pray accept, *Monsieur le Président*, the expression of my highest consideration.

“SCHOEN.”

Is it necessary, Gentlemen, to insist on the absurdity of such pretexts which are presented to us as the heads of an indictment? At no moment has any

aviator penetrated into Belgium ; no French aviator has committed any act of hostility either in Bavaria or in any part of Germany.

Public opinion in Europe has already treated these miserable inventions as they deserved.

Against this attack, which violates all laws of equity, and all rules of public right, we have already taken the necessary precautions. The execution of these measures is being carried out with rigorous efficiency and with absolute *sang-froid*.

#### THE HELP OF OUR ALLIES

The mobilisation, too, of the Russian Army, continues with admirable energy and unbounded enthusiasm (*unanimous applause*).

The Belgian Army of 250,000 men has been mobilised, and is prepared to defend the neutrality and independence of its country with magnificent ardour. The whole British Fleet is mobilised, and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces . . . . .

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has spoken of France, in the House of Commons, amid the applause of its members, in lofty and generous terms, and his words have found an echo in every French breast. In the name of the Government of the Republic I have to thank the British Government, from this tribune, for the cordiality of its words : the French Parliament reciprocates its sentiments. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made the following specific

declaration : “ In the event of a descent of the German Fleet into the North Sea, or of an attempt to pass the Straits to undertake operations against the French coast, or shipping, the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power, so that, from that moment, Great Britain and Germany would be at war.” From this time forward, therefore, the British Fleet protects our northern and western coasts against German aggression (*loud, prolonged, and unanimous applause*).

Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that in their absolute interdependence they justify the actions of the Republic. Nevertheless I desire to draw the moral from this narrative, and to emphasise the true significance of this unprecedented aggression of which France has been the victim.

#### GERMANY'S CONTINUED PROVOCATIONS

The victors of 1870 have, as you know, many times desired to repeat the blows they have dealt us. In 1875, a war, destined to give the *coup de grâce* to vanquished France, was prevented solely owing to the intervention of two Powers to whom bonds of friendship and of alliance were soon to unite us—Russia and Great Britain.

As a consequence, the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements, has succeeded in freeing herself from the yoke which, even in full peace, Bismarck had succeeded in laying heavily on Europe.

France has restored the balance of power in Europe, and guaranteed the liberty and independence of all.

Gentlemen, I know not if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that these labours of peaceful recuperation, of liberation and of dignity, which were definitely sealed in 1904 and 1907 by the cordial approval of Edward VII of England and the Government of the Crown—it is these labours, I say, which the German Empire intends to destroy at this juncture by an odious *coup de force* (*renewed applause which from this time forward underlined all the points of M. Viviani's speech to the end*).

Germany has nothing to reproach us with. We have made unprecedented sacrifices for love of peace ; we have silently borne for half a century an open wound in our side inflicted by her ; we have made other sacrifices in every dispute which, since 1904, German diplomacy has systematically provoked in Morocco or elsewhere ; in 1905 as in 1906 : in 1908 as in 1911.

Russia, too, has given proof of great moderation both during the events of 1908 and during the present crisis. She and the Triple Entente maintained a like moderation when Austria and Germany, during the Eastern crisis of 1912, formulated certain demands against Serbia and Greece—demands which, moreover, were unwarranted, as events have subsequently shown.

Useless sacrifices, barren compromises, vain efforts, since to-day in the full course of our attempts at conciliation, we and our Allies are attacked by surprise.

No one can believe, in good faith, that we are the aggressors ; Italy, with the clear conscience of her Latin genius, has notified to us her intention of remaining neutral, and this decision has evoked in the whole length and breadth of France an echo of sincerest joy. I have made myself the interpreter of this sentiment in an interview with the Italian *Chargé d'Affaires*, telling him how much I rejoice that the two Latin sisters, who have a common origin and common ideals and an equally glorious past, have no cause of quarrel.

Gentlemen, let us proclaim it from the house-tops, what is being attacked is this very independence, this dignity, this security, which the Triple Entente has achieved in a restored balance of power to Europe, and in the service of peace.

An attack is being made on the liberties of Europe whose defenders France and her Allies and her friends are proud to be. Let us gird ourselves in defence of these liberties, because it is they that are at stake, and all the rest is only a pretext (*the Deputies rise to their feet in unanimous applause*).

“ WE ARE WITHOUT REPROACH : WE SHALL BE  
WITHOUT FEAR ”

France, unjustly provoked, never desired war : she has done her utmost to avoid it. The moment it is forced upon her she will defend herself against Germany and against any other Power which, not having as yet revealed its intentions, may participate



in the war, and take its stand by Germany's side in the conflict.

A people, free and strong, that upholds an unquenchable ideal and stands united in safeguarding its very existence ; a democracy that has disciplined itself as a military force and has not flinched from increasing its military burdens in answer to its neighbour's armaments ; a nation in arms to defend its very life and the independence of Europe—this is the spectacle we honour ourselves in offering to those who are the witnesses of this formidable contest ; a contest which for some days has been prepared for with the most methodical calm.

We are without reproach : we shall be without fear. France has often proved, in less favourable conditions, that she is a most formidable enemy when she fights, as she does to-day, for Liberty and Right.

Gentlemen, in submitting our acts to you, who are our judges, and in bearing the weight of our heavy responsibilities, we are comforted by a conscience without remorse and by the certainty of a duty fulfilled (*long and unceasing ovation*).

LET US RISE AND HAIL IMMORTAL FRANCE !

*Closing Speech of M. Viviani*

The Chamber of the Senate have definitely carried the measures we have had the honour to submit for

their approval. The Chamber and the Senate have therefore reached the period for the adjournment of their sittings.

By adjourning its own sittings, the Chamber keeps the session open, and maintains the cohesion of the Government which remains at its post. All understand that it is not the Government of a Party, but a Government of National Defence (*prolonged applause on all the benches*).

Before we separate, before we clasp each other's hands, I desire, in the name of the Government, to thank the Chamber for the magnificent and comforting spectacle it has presented by proving that here National Unity has its seat (*loud applause*).

Never has that noble constitutional fiction been more true than in these solemn days, that noble fiction in whose name we declare that each one of us is the representative, not of his constituency but of France (*loud and prolonged applause*).

May I be permitted, before I descend from this tribune, to salute the noble nation whose worthy representatives you are.

I salute also all Parties who to-day are bound together in the religion of the Fatherland (*loud, prolonged and unanimous applause*).

I salute our glorious youth who, efficiently organised, are marching to the frontier with heads erect and valiant hearts (*loud applause*).

Finally, I salute France! Behold her where she

stands ! Erect, with arched breast, she bears with untrembling hand the flag that protects our hopes and our pride (*loud prolonged applause*).

And now let us rise to the height of the glorious memories of our past ; let us face our destiny ; let us be men, and on our feet hail Immortal France (*loud prolonged applause : all the Deputies, standing, acclaim the President of the Council*).

### LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC !

#### *Closing Speech of M. Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber*

The representatives of the nation, a large number of whom are setting forth to fight under her flag and repulse a monstrous aggression, associate themselves with the Government and offer to France in arms their admiration, their steadfast devotion and their trust in her indomitable courage ; for never has she risen to defend a juster cause (*loud and repeated applause*).

And let our arms on land and sea be blessed for the salvation of Civilisation and Right ! (*loud applause*).

Long live France our Mother ! Long live the Republic ! (*prolonged acclamations and cries of " Long live France ; Long live the Republic ! "*)

## IN GERMANY

## THE SPEECH FROM THE THRONE

*Read on the afternoon of August 4, 1914, in the White Hall of the Royal Palace, on the opening of the Extraordinary Session of the Reichstag.*

Gentlemen :

In an hour big with fate I have gathered the chosen representatives of the German people around me. For nearly half a century we have consistently held the way of peace. Attempts to attribute bellicose intentions to Germany and to confine her position in the world have tried to the utmost the patience of our people who, even to-day, with their steadfast desire for peace and under provocation, have pursued the development of all their moral, intellectual and economic forces as their ultimate goal. The world has borne testimony to the fact that we have indefatigably taken the lead in recalling to peoples of Europe that a war between the Great Powers would bring the heaviest perils in its train . . . . .

The assassination of my friend the Archduke Franz Ferdinand opened a great gulf at our feet. My beloved Ally, the Emperor Francis Joseph, was constrained to have recourse to arms to defend the security of his Empire against a neighbouring State, and Russia blocked the way to the Allied Monarchy that was pursuing the legitimate interests of the Empire. Not

only does our duty as an Ally call us to the side of Austria-Hungary, but it behoves us also to defend our own position against the attacks of hostile forces, as well as the old community of civilisation\* of the two Empires.

With a heavy heart it has been my duty to mobilise my army against a neighbour together with whom we have fought on many a battlefield. With sincere grief I must break a friendship maintained with German fidelity. The Russian Government, yielding to Nationalist pressure, has taken the field in support of a State that has provoked the misfortune of so great a war by favouring criminal acts.

The fact that France has declared herself among our enemies has not surprised us. Too often have our efforts to open up pacific relations with the French Republic clashed with old hopes and old rancours.

Gentlemen, all that power and prevision have been able to effect in order that a people should be armed to meet a supreme decision has been achieved with the aid of your patriotism. Hostilities which for some time have been smouldering in the East and the West have burst into flame. The present crisis has not arisen from a trivial conflict of interests: it arises from the ill-will against the growing power and prosperity of the German Empire which has ruled for so many years.

We are moved by no desire of conquest. We are animated by an unshaken will to maintain the position

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\* *Kulturgemeinschaft.*

which God has placed us in, to maintain it for ourselves and all future generations.

In the documents that have been placed before you, it will be seen that my Government has above all multiplied its efforts up to the very last moment to avert the extreme peril of war ; but, impelled by the necessity of self-defence, and with a clear conscience and a clean hand, we now draw the sword.

My cry is to the peoples and to the races of the German Empire. Defend with your neighbours in fraternal accord what we have created by our peaceful labours, pursuing your duties with steadfast faith, sincere and chivalrous, humble before God and joyous in battle before the enemy.

Thus we confide in Eternal and Almighty God that He will sustain us in our defence and direct it to a happy end.

On you, honourable gentlemen, are fixed the eyes of the whole German folk, who are pressing around their princes and leaders. Let your decisions be rapid and unanimous ; this is my desire.

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR ACCORDING TO THE  
CHANCELLOR

*Speech of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Reichstag on the afternoon of August 4, 1914*

A formidable crisis has fallen upon Europe. Since, by virtue of its arms, the German Empire arose in the

world, we have lived in peace for forty-four years, and have preserved peace in Europe.

With patience, only too long-suffering, we have tolerated the development in West and East of hostile feelings, and the forging of fetters against us, under the pretence that Germany was seeking war. The whirlwind that was sown has now burst upon us.

We desired to live in peaceful labour, and from the Emperor to the youngest conscript it seemed as if a silent oath had been solemnly sworn never to unsheath the sword save in the defence of a righteous cause (*loud approval from all parts of the Chamber*). The day when we must draw the sword has come; come against our will. Russia, having no regard to our strenuous and sincere efforts, has kindled the incendiary torch. We are forced into a war with Russia and France. Gentlemen, a series of documents has been laid before you, collected in the feverish rush of events. Permit me to dwell on some facts that will make our attitude plain.

From the beginning of the Austro-Serbian crisis we have never ceased to strive, both with word and deed, to localise the dispute between Austria and Serbia. Every Cabinet, and more especially the British Cabinet, shared our efforts and our desires: Russia alone declared that her voice must be heard in its settlement. Then we were confronted with the danger of European complications. Immediately the first authentic news reached us of Russian military

preparations, we caused it to be known at St. Petersburg in friendly but precise terms that any military preparations directed against Austria would bring us to the side of our ally, and that military preparations aimed against us would make similar measures necessary on our part. From mobilisation to war there is but a step. Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and informed us that her military preparations were in no way directed against us. Meanwhile, Great Britain seeks to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and we lend her our support. On July 28, the Emperor sends a despatch to the Tsar, begging him to consider that Austria has the right, and that it is her duty to protect herself against Serbian plots which menace her existence. The Emperor at the same time calls the Tsar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of the sovereigns of Europe in face of the Sarajevo assassinations, and expresses the hope that the Tsar will lend him his aid in the efforts he is making to eliminate all cause of friction between Russia and Austria.

Almost at the same moment, and before he received this telegram, the Tsar earnestly prays the Emperor to help him, and desires him to counsel moderation at Vienna. The Emperor girds himself to his task of mediator, but scarcely has he begun to move when Russia mobilises all her forces against Austria (*murmurs of disapprobation*).

Austria herself had only mobilised against Serbia, and



had directed but two army corps to the north, and these far from the Russian frontier. Russian mobilisation had already been fully decided upon even before the Tsar had addressed himself to the Emperor (*sensation*).

The Emperor pointed out to the Tsar that his rôle as peacemaker was becoming difficult, if not entirely useless, in consequence of this general mobilisation against Austria.

Notwithstanding this, we pursued our mediation at Vienna up to the limits compatible with our obligations as an ally. In the meantime Russia spontaneously renewed her assurances that her military preparations were in nowise directed against us.

We were then at the last day of July; the decision had to come from Vienna. Our intervention had had this result:—Vienna, through our insistent representations, again opened up direct negotiations with St. Petersburg. But before Vienna had come to a decision, information reached us that Russia had mobilised all her military forces, and therefore against us too (*cries of "Incredible!"*). The Russian Government, which knows quite well, by reason of our repeated warnings, what mobilisation against us means, gave us no notification, no reasonable explanation, of this (*"Hear, hear!"*).

Only during the afternoon did a telegram from the Tsar reach the Emperor, assuring him that his army had no aggressive purposes towards us. Nevertheless, Russian mobilisation at our frontier had been in full progress since the night of July 30 (*sensation*). Thus,

while we were interceding at Vienna at the prayer of the Russian Government, the military forces of Russia were being mobilised along the whole of our frontier, which is almost an open frontier. France was not yet mobilising, but, as we came to know, was hastening her military preparations.

And we, during all this time, of set purpose, had not called a single reservist to the colours through our care for the peace of Europe (*sensation*). Were we to prolong our patient waiting until the Powers that hemmed us in were able to choose the time to strike their blow? (*prolonged cries of "No, no!"*).

#### GERMAN PRECIPITATION

To expose Germany to such peril would have been a crime (*general approval*). Therefore, on July 31, we intimated to Russia that she must suspend her mobilisation since this was now the sole means of preserving the peace of Europe. We, moreover, charged our Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to declare to the Russian Government that, in the event of our proposal being rejected, we should consider ourselves in a state of war with Russia. Our Ambassador discharged his duty. We are still ignorant of what the Russian answer to our ultimatum may be (*sensation*). No telegraphic communications on that matter have reached us from St. Petersburg, although the wires have brought us messages far less important. Such

being the case, the Emperor saw himself constrained, at 5 p.m. on August 1, the time-limit being long passed, to order a mobilisation of our forces.

At the same time it was necessary we should know what would be the attitude of France. We therefore asked her if she would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. Her reply was that she would do what her interests demanded (*sensation*). This was equivalent to a negative answer to our demand.

#### VIOLATIONS OF THE FRONTIER

Notwithstanding this, the Emperor gave orders that the French frontier should be respected in every way; his orders, with one isolated exception, have been rigorously observed. France, who had mobilised at the same time as ourselves, declared she would respect a frontier zone of ten kilometres. And what really happened? French aviators have thrown bombs, cavalry patrols and companies of foot have penetrated our territory. Thus France has broken the peace and effectively attacked us without war having been declared.

As to the isolated case I have referred to, I have here the following report from the Chief of our German Staff:

“Concerning complaints from the French Government as to violation of territory on our part, I know only of one. Notwithstanding express orders, a

patrol of the Fourteenth Army Corps, probably led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2. It was almost wiped out, since only one man returned. But long before this single violation of a frontier, French aviators threw bombs on our railways and French troops attacked ours in the Schlucht pass. Up to the present our troops have, according to orders given them, stood on the defensive."

#### HOW THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS ARE TRODDEN UNDER FOOT

Thus the General Staff.

Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity\*, and necessity knows no law (*repeated applause*). Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory (*applause*). That is contrary to the rights of nations. It is true the French Government has declared at Brussels that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the enemy respected it. But we know that France was ready for the aggression. France could wait; we could not. A French attack on our flank in the lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. Thus we have been forced to brush aside the just protests of Luxemburg and of the Belgian Government. The wrong we have thus done them we will make good the moment our military ends have been attained (*prolonged applause*). When one, menaced as we are, is fighting for all that is most

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\* The necessity of self-defence (*Notwehr*).

sacred, he can think of one thing and one thing alone—how to hew his way through at any cost (*prolonged and sustained applause*).

#### THE FORTY YEARS OF MOLTKE.

Gentlemen, Austria and ourselves march shoulder to shoulder (*prolonged applause*). As to the attitude of Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey clearly stated yesterday in the House of Commons the British Government's point of view. We have given the assurance that so long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet will abstain from attacking the northern coast of France, and that we will respect the territorial integrity and the independence of Belgium. This declaration I now repeat here publicly in the face of the whole world, and I can add that so long as Great Britain remains neutral, we are ready, in the event of reciprocal assurances being given, to undertake no hostile action against French merchant ships (*applause*).

I repeat the Emperor's words: "Germany goes into the fight with a clean conscience" (*general approval and applause*). We are fighting to safeguard the fruits of our peaceful labours, to defend the heritage of a glorious past, and for our future. The fifty years that Moltke spoke of, during which he said we should have to stand arms in hand to defend our conquests of 1870, have not yet passed.

The tragic hour of trial has now struck for our people,

but we behold its approach with a steadfast heart (*loud approval*). Our army is on the march ; our fleet is ready for action ; and behind them stands the whole German people (*bursts of applause, which is prolonged for several minutes, from all parts of the Chamber and from the public galleries*).

There is no need to detail the provisions of the Bills before you, and I beg you to pass them quickly. The whole nation is as one man. And you, gentlemen, know the whole of your duty (*sustained and prolonged applause*).

#### THE ADHERENCE OF THE SOCIALISTS.

*Speech of the Socialist leader, Haase, on August 4, 1914,  
at the second sitting of the Reichstag.*

It is my duty to make the following declaration in the name of my Party :

We find ourselves in an hour marked out by Fate. The results of an Imperialistic policy, which has brought in its train a continual increase in armaments and has embittered national antagonisms, have burst upon Europe like a hurricane. The responsibility for this lies on the protagonists of such policy ; we are its opponents (*applause from the Socialists*). Social Democracy has opposed this sinister development with all its might, and we have striven up to the last moment, in accord with our French brethren, to ensure the maintenance of peace by means of impressive

manifestations in all countries (*applause from the Socialists*).

Our efforts have been in vain. Now we find ourselves in the presence of this iron fact—WAR—and we are menaced by the horrors of a hostile invasion. We have no longer to decide for or against war, but on the means necessary to defend our country; we have to think of the millions of the men of the people who, without their fault, have been plunged into this calamity. It is they who have most to suffer from the horrors of war. . . . Our people and our liberties would have much, if not all, to fear from a victory of that Russian despotism which is stained with the blood of the best of its subjects (*outburst of applause*). We must fend off this danger and secure the civilisation and independence of our country (*loud applause*).

Therefore we act as we have always foretold we should: in the hour of danger we will never leave our Fatherland in the lurch (*renewed applause*). In this we believe we are in accord with the *Internationale*, which has always recognised the right of every people to defend its independence at any time, even if it condemns wars of conquest.

We ask, as soon as our security is guaranteed and the enemy disposed to make peace, that an end shall be put to the war by means of a treaty of peace, which shall render friendly relations possible with neighbouring peoples. We ask this, not only in the name of international solidarity which we have always supported, but also in the interests of the German people.

\*We hope that the cruel school of war will re-awaken a horror of this scourge in the hearts of millions of men who will then be won over to the Socialist ideal and will evermore consecrate their lives to its service\*.

Inspired by these principles we support the credits asked for (*renewed applause*).

*To estimate the action of the German Socialist Party in the Reichstag at its true worth, we here reproduce the appeal published by the Party during the last days of July.*

Proletariat of Germany !

The Balkan fields are still red with the blood of the slain, the wreck of sacked cities ; the smoking ruins of burnt villages still cry aloud, and amid this devastation, workless, wounded and starving men, and weeping widows, wander. Once again the many-headed hydra of war is loosed by Austrian Imperialism and threatens death and desolation over the whole of Europe.

Although we, too, have condemned the intrigues of Serbian Nationalists, we cannot refrain from protesting, with all our might, against Austria's frivolous provocation. The brutal demands of the Austrian Government are without precedent in the history of nations.

The whole proletariat of Germany lifts up its voice in burning protest, and in the name of Humanity,

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\* Passage omitted in the official report published in the *Chronik des Deutschen Krieges*. Munich, 1914.



against the war-mongers of Austria-Hungary, and charges the German Government to use all its influence at Vienna to make Austria pause ; and, if unhappily war should actually break out, to take no part whatsoever in an armed conflict. Not a drop of German blood must be sacrificed on the altar of Austrian Imperialism.

Comrades, we invite you to attend mass meetings and there to express your unshaken will that, at any cost, peace must be maintained. The dread hour has struck ; an hour that has not struck for decades. We stand at a tragic parting of the ways. An international conflagration is at our doors. Call to the ruling classes, who in times of peace enslave, exploit, oppress you—We will not have war ! Down with war ! Long live the brotherhood of nations !

## GERMAN UNITY

### *The Chancellor's Closing Speech*

Gentlemen :

At the moment of closing this brief but momentous sitting, let me say one word more. It is not the gravity alone of your decision which gives the sitting its importance ; it is the spirit which animates it—the spirit of German unity born of an unquenchable confidence, a confidence common to us all and without shrinking in life or in death (*applause*).

Whatever the destiny may be that awaits us, the fourth of August, 1914, will remain for all eternity one of the greatest days of the German Fatherland (*bursts of applause from all the benches*).

His Majesty the Emperor and his august Allies have charged me to thank Parliament (*applause*).

*Closing Speech of Dr. Kaempf, President of the Reichstag*

Gentlemen :

After what our Chancellor has said it only remains for us to repeat once again that the German people are united and to the last man will vanquish or die on the battlefield in the defence of German honour and German unity (*repeated applause on all sides*).

We separate to the cry of " Long live his Majesty the German Emperor ! Long live the German people and the German Fatherland ! " (*Hoch, hoch, hoch !* ")

WILLIAM—THE PEACEFUL

*Appeal to the German People*

To the German People !

From the foundation of our Empire my highest endeavour and that of my ancestors has been, during forty-three years, to maintain peace in the world and

peacefully to continue our mighty progress. But our enemies are jealous of the success of our labours. Up to now we have borne all the enmity, avowed or concealed, from East and West and from across the seas, conscious as we are, of our responsibility and of our power.

But now it is sought to humiliate us; we are to stand looking on with folded arms while our enemies are arming for the most treacherous of surprises. They will not admit that we stand faithfully bound to our ally, who is fighting for her existence as a Great Power; with whose abasement our power and our honour too, would perish. So the sword must decide. In full peace the enemy attack us. To arms therefore! Any hesitation, any delay, would be an act of treachery to the Fatherland. The existence of our Empire is imperilled, the Empire which our fathers have built up anew. The existence or the non-existence of German power, of German ideals, is at stake.

Young and old we will defend ourselves to the last breath of man and horse; we will face a whole world in arms against us. So long as she remains united, Germany will never be vanquished. Forward with God, Who will be with us as He was with our fathers.

WILLIAM.

*Berlin, August 6, 1914.*

*Manifesto to the German Army and Navy*

After a period of forty-three years of peace I call the armed forces of Germany to battle. We have to

defend our most sacred possession—our Fatherland, our home—against a wicked assault on every side.

The peculiar situation and the arduous struggle will demand heavy sacrifices. I am confident that the warlike spirit of old still survives in the German people; that potent military spirit which attacks the enemy wherever it is seen, and at whatever cost, and which in the past has always struck fear and terror in our foes. I trust in you, German soldiers; in each one of you there burns the ardent, the indomitable will to conquer. Each and every one of you will know, if necessary, how to die a hero's death. Remember our glorious past. Remember you are Germans. Let God be our aid!

WILLIAM.

*Given at our Royal Castle at Berlin, August 6, 1914*

## IN GREAT BRITAIN

### SIR EDWARD GREY'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE

*Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in the House of Commons, August 6, 1914*

In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago. He stated—and I do not think

any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered—the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power. (*Cheers.*) But, Sir, the Papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands of hon. members will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. (*Hear, hear.*) If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries—universal peace. These Papers which are now in the hands of hon. members show something

more than that. (*Hear, hear.*) They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality.

#### GERMANY DESIRES TO BUY BRITISH NEUTRALITY

I trust that not only the members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the published Paper. I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir Edward Goschen goes on :

“ He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government ”——

Let the House observe these words :

“ aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.”

Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question :

“ I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies ”——

What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions and possession of France outside the geographical area of Europe :

“ and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect.” (*Cheers and laughter.*)

#### QUESTION OF THE SMALL STATES

Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States :

“ As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Germany’s adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty’s Government an assurance that she would do likewise.” (*Loud cheers.*)

Then we come to Belgium :

“ It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter

upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium there was no mention of neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added :

" Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances "——

the assurances I have read out to the House :

" might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired." (*Laughter.*)

What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this : That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as



she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. (*Loud and prolonged cheers.*) The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. (*Cheers.*) Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. (*Loud cheers.*) What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? (*Loud and prolonged cheers.*) Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more (*laughter*); a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. (*Cheers.*)

## THE FRENCH COLONIES

I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper, puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says :

“ His Majesty’s Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view ”——  
My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language :

“ such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.”

That is the material aspect. But he proceeded :

“ Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us

to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."

He then says :

" We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require."

And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate :

" You should . . . add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object this Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

" If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it"—

The statement was never more true :

" as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present

crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (*Cheers.*)

That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language, the attitude of this Government. (*Cheers.*) Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation—and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer—(*cheers*)—can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. gentleman, who had already earned the title—and no one ever more deserved it—of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? (*Cheers.*) I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country—(*cheers*)—I speak not for a party, I speak for the country as a whole—that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. (*Cheers.*)

#### WHY ARE WE FIGHTING?

What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the

terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took, we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if—in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war—we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause. (*Hear, hear.*)

If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-

respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. (*Cheers.*) I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. (*Loud cheers.*)

#### FOR THE COST OF THE WAR

With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let us now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object may be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee—to make the very unusual demand upon it—to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000*l.*

(*Loud cheers.*) I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it, into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supplementary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much higher point of view than that. If it were necessary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to the temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military operations, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confidence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade, industry, business, and communications—whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise—for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of the House. I think it would be a great pity—in fact, a great disaster

—if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision—provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days—for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the Great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them.

LORD KITCHENER, WAR MINISTER

I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War—a position which I held until this morning—for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in the minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that the condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. (*Loud cheers.*) I believe that is the case; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between



that Department and another, still less that the First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. (*Hear, hear.*) I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. (*Loud cheers.*) Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. (*Hear, hear.*) His association with the Government as a member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions. (*Cheers.*)

#### INCREASE OF THE ARMY

I am asking on his behalf for the Army, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case,

but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions, spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in money, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. (*Loud cheers.*) Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family. (*Loud cheers.*)

Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said, I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our case or in my general description of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not my purpose—it is not the purpose of any patriotic man—to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite international animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. (*Hear, hear.*) We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it. (*Loud and prolonged cheers.*)

#### SUPPORT OF THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION

##### *Close of Mr. Bonar Law's Speech*

. . . Everyone would desire to help. There will be a great deal of work to be done which cannot be

done by the Government. I was glad the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right honourable friends the members for West Birmingham and the Strand. They gladly came. But I am sure I speak not for this bench but for the whole of our party when I say that the Government has only to requisition any one of us and we will serve them and our country to the best of our ability. (*Loud cheers.*)

## IN BELGIUM

## MIGHT IN THE SERVICE OF RIGHT

*The King's Appeal to his troops on their departure for the frontier.*

Without a shadow of provocation on our part a neighbour, swollen with the pride of his own strength, has torn into shreds treaties signed with his own hand, and has violated the land of our fathers because we have refused to stain our honour. He has assailed us. The world looks on at our loyal attitude in admiration ; let its esteem and its respect comfort you. Seeing her independence menaced the whole nation has been thrilled ; her children have hastened to her frontier.

Valiant soldiers ! I salute you in the name of Belgium. You will triumph because you are Might in the service of Right. Glory to you soldiers of Liberty, Defenders of your threatened hearths and homes.

ALBERT.

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*Wyman & Sons Ltd., Printers, London and Reading.*

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