

and labor instead of going to war, it will not be necessarily impossible to produce 500,000 tons of synthetic oil by the end of 1943 and increase the figures to 4,000,000 in the course of 1944. Japan's national resources are now drained and popular morale is rather lax due to the China Affair which is now in its fourth year. Therefore, the Prime Minister believes that at this juncture Japan should settle the China Affair by some means and steadily foster her resources, by going through hardship and privation with her navy in being as her hope.

4. The Navy's View

The Navy is generally believed to embrace the following view:

Japan now stands at a crossroads whether to stick to diplomatic negotiation or make up her mind to go to war. If it is to be settled through diplomatic negotiation, Japan must stick to diplomacy to the finish. She must be confidential enough to conduct diplomatic negotiation to an amicable conclusion. It is impossible to go to war, after conduction diplomatic negotiation two or three months, on the ground that there is no chance of success for diplomatic negotiation. Inasmuch as it is the Government that decides whether to depend on diplomacy or go to war, it must be left entirely to the Prime Minister's decision to take the course to the right or to the left on the part of this country.

It may be added that a pretty strong opinion prevails among Navy circles that war should be avoided as far as possible and that the best must be done to adjust the relations between Japan and America through diplomatic negotiation.

- (2) The Development of the Diplomatic Negotiation with America.

At the middle of April, this year, Mr. Sumner Welles, Secretary of State, submitted the so-called draft understanding between Japan and America to Ambassador NOMURA, telling him that the relations between the two countries will be able to be decidedly adjusted, if the situation is clarified and improved on the following points:

1. The attitude of the Governments of the two Powers toward the European war.
1. The relations of the two Governments to the China Affair.
1. Trade between the two Powers.
1. The policies of the two Governments concerning political stability of the Pacific.

Japan's counter-proposals to the American proposals were sent after they were approved by a liaison conference between the Government and the Supreme Command at the middle of May (Late in April, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA returned from his trips in Germany and Italy, and it took him a considerable time to study Japan's reply to America in the form of counter-proposals). Late in June, America submitted counter-proposals to Japan, it happened that hostilities opened between Germany and the Soviet Union late in June, adding to the gravity of the international situation. On the other hand, Japan sent her troops to South French Indo-China in accordance with treaty provisions, due to necessity in connection with the China Affair. Whereupon, however, America froze Japanese assets with the result that the situation between Japan and America grew tense. At the middle of

July, Japan sent her reply to the American counter-proposals of late June, but the second KONOYE Cabinet resigned en bloc before Ambassador NOMURA handed it to the American Government. Early in August the third KONOYE Cabinet proposed a personal interview between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister KONOYE to the American Government so as to enable them to have heart-to-heart talks on the restoration of friendly relations between Japan and America, the China question and world peace, prompted by the desire to bring the diplomatic negotiation between Japan and America to an amicable conclusion by all means. Late in August, Prime Minister sent his personal message to President Roosevelt.

An "Outline of Execution of the Empire's National Policies" was decided by the Imperial Conference of September 6, but it is clear from the circumstances before and after the Conference that the "Outline" is aimed at settling the pending question with America (and Britain) through diplomatic negotiation by all means and that recourse to war may be had only when there is absolutely no chance of success for diplomatic negotiation.

Early in September, in order to hasten the personal interview between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister KONOYE, the Japanese Government submitted to the American Government matters which might form a basis for the said interview.

Further, on September 20, the Japanese Government collected the proposals made by America and Japan's counter-proposals and arranged them in order and submitted it to the American Government.

In acknowledgement, the American Government on October 2 sent an aide-memoire to the Japanese Government. With

regard to this American^a ide-memoire, a divergence of views has developed between the Government and the Army, one holding that there is no chance of success for the diplomatic negotiation with America, as America has no goodwill sincerity to bring the negotiation to an amicable conclusion; while the other refuses to believe that there is no chance of success for the diplomatic negotiation with America and contends that the negotiation be kept up or that the terms for negotiation be somewhat modified."

I shall now continue to read the Resume of the Proceedings of the Conference of Senior Statesmen.

"All conferees then put preliminary questions. More important ones were as follows:

Mr. WAKATSUKI: Advocates of a war with America often base their arguments upon the danger of Japan's resources being gradually exhausted. Nothing could be more dangerous. Should Japan wage war with America, what would be the outcome? The question calls for study with the utmost care.

Mr. HARA: I think that the oil question seems to be the crux of the situation. I am told that the Navy's oil stock will last two years, but I should like to know how much oil the Army has in stock. To this query nobody gave a full answer.

Mr. OKADA: After all, the oil question, no matter at what length we might discuss it, would afford no conclusion.

Mr. ABE: Those advocating extremist views or those desirous of prolonging diplomatic negotiation are all prompted by the same sentiment. After all, it comes down to the question of oil. I wonder how deeply the Prime Minister has pursued his study on the subject.

Lord Keeper: It seems that the Prime Minister has duly pursued his study pretty deep, but I think he has not been able to handle the question fully.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: It goes without saying that the decision of an Imperial conference should be respected, but its handling is totally legalistic.

Even if there is little hope of attaining the objective through diplomatic negotiations, is it wise to wage war at once? As it involves risking Japan's national existence, is it not proper to pay a little more political consideration to the question?

Mr. ODADA: The Navy's contention that if we go by treaties, everything must be regulated by treaties in the thoroughgoing manner may be admissible. Has not the Navy comparatively much oil?

Mr. KIYOURA: Why must the Government decide its attitude at once when the Ambassador abroad says there is a chance of success?

Lord Keeper: As for that point, the Imperial conference fixed the date of decision in the first part of October. Therefore, there developed a divergence of views between the Government and the Army, and I think the Government could not help but be pushed to the wall.

Mr. ABE: As Mr. KIYOURA pointed out, it is incomprehensible why the Government had to quit when there was a chance of success.

Lord Keeper: That point is difficult to understand. In short, America who believes that Japan is dominated by the Army will not reveal her real intentions so easily; Prince KONOYE, on the contrary, wants to meet President Roosevelt and decide policies on broad lines in an effort to create a political situation and thereafter decide upon details. Herein lies the divergence of views. While America's final reply has not yet been forthcoming, the date of the Imperial conference is fast approaching. That is the actual situation.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: The China Incident is already four years old. Just how long do they think the war with America will last?

Mr. YONAI: The Navy says that Japan will win if she wages war with America -- which means that the Japanese Navy will win if its fights with the American fleet take place in the Pacific. No one can tell when such an engagement will take place. Our endurance is another question.

Mr. HIROTA: As we are in the midst of the China Incident, I think even politics must be conducted with the intentions of the Imperial General Headquarters at center.

Lord Keeper: Since we are in war time, it is needless to say that the intentions of the fighting services are important. Especially when a question such as risking Japan's national existence

is concerned, a perfect agreement of views between the Army and Navy is essential. It is indeed the state's minimum requirement today.

Mr. ABE: The present moment calls for a certain influence rather than a specific man.

Mr. HIROTA: The backing of the Army and Navy is necessary.

Mr. OKADA: It is necessary to enlist the services of a man who will be able to bring the Army and Navy into a harmonious relationship.

Mr. HIROTA: Is it not necessary to ask the Imperial General Headquarters' desires?

Mr. HARA: Does Mr. HIROTA mean to make the Supreme Command recommend the candidate for the next Prime Minister?

Mr. HIROTA: I think that may be one of the plans worth studying.

Mr. OKADA: I wonder if that will be advisable.

Lord Keeper: I think to make the Supreme Command recommend the candidate for the succeeding Prime Minister will be a question to be studied most cautiously. The Supreme Command may be embarrassed. It may not be able to recommend a candidate.

Mr. HIROTA: That may be quite possible.

Mr. HAYASHI: I should like to express my view. It may seem rather extraordinary, but I am laying it before you as material for study. As already explained, it is necessary by all means to establish teamwork between the Army and Navy and effect cooperation between the Government and the Supreme Command. But it is extremely difficult. How about asking a Prince of the Blood to form a succeeding Cabinet at this juncture? And judging by the prevailing situation, I think it proper to ask an Imperial Prince in naval service to form a new Cabinet.

Mr. YONAI: Theoretically, it may be a good plan, but I am afraid that practically it may not work.

Lord Keeper: To speak the truth, it is proposed in some quarters to ask an Imperial Prince to form a succeeding Cabinet. And the proposition may be a practicable plan, if the Army and Navy have given up their past contentions in favor of teamwork, also if the services of an Imperial Prince are desired as a transition step toward formally

establishing cooperation between the two fighting services which in view of the past relations might be impossible to realize on the part of a mere subject. But the prevailing situation has not reached such a stage yet. It will be a serious question therefore, to ask an Imperial Prince to tackle this vexed question. In the first place, people might wonder if subjects lack talent, indeed so much so that they might have to ask an Imperial Prince to form a new Cabinet. Second, should the new Cabinet formed by an Imperial Prince decide to wage war with America, the said Prince would be called upon to tackle a question, so difficult to solve that even a statesman of Prince KONOYE's caliber and experience has failed to manage it, leading to his failure to execute the decision of the Imperial conference. Again should the Imperial Prince fail in tackling this knotty question, the Imperial family might come in for a storm of denunciation from the people. Such being the case, I cannot agree to the plan for forming a succeeding Cabinet by an Imperial Prince.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, you must be fully acquainted with various circumstances leading up to the present situation and its development. Let us hear your view on a succeeding Cabinet.

Lord Keeper: It is a very difficult question as to who should be recommended to the Throne for a succeeding Cabinet. To state the conclusion first, I think it may be the best for the Emperor to command War Minister TOJO to form that Cabinet. Paradoxical as it may sound, and it may be difficult for you to understand, today's poisonous and irradicable source of difficulty is after all the decision of the Imperial conference of September 6. On this point I had a free and frank exchange of views with War Minister TOJO, the result being to ascertain that the Army is fully aware that it will be impossible to wage war with America without the Navy's real determination, but the Army cannot help proceeding forward in accordance with the decision of the Imperial conference unless the Navy manifests its definite intention to modify the decision of the Imperial conference. It is to be judged, therefore, that when real cooperation between the Army and Navy is still not forthcoming, the important decision of the Imperial conference was hurriedly made. This is the actual situation. If so, I think it will be the most practical way for saving the situation to command TOJO to form a succeeding Cabinet on the part of the Emperor and at the same time order him to effect real cooperation between the Army and Navy and re-examine the decision of the Imperial conference, as TOJO is fully acquainted with the development of the situation and has the difficulty of attainment

keenly driven home to himself. Even if a general or admiral not in active service is commanded to form a succeeding Cabinet, there may be fear of an unexpected result, in case his formation of the new Cabinet is restricted by a section of the public with the decision of the Imperial conference.

Mr. KIYOURA: As for the Cabinet to be formed by an Imperial Prince, some one mentioned the name of Prince HIGASHIKUNI to me, but I think the idea is not proper. This time it may be proper for one representing the military authorities to come forward and form a new Cabinet.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: The idea of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal is reasonable, but I should like to recommend General UGAKI, though I do not do so, simply because he was in the same Cabinet with me. General UGAKI is not only the Nestor of the Army but a man of strong will. He may be one of the most powerful candidates for saving the situation, though it would be embarrassing, should the militarists be opposed to him as before.

Lord Keeper: I also think General UGAKI is one of the most powerful candidates. He is outstanding, too, as the possessor of actual power. But some time ago the General declined the Imperial offer to form a succeeding Cabinet, due to the actual opposition of the military authorities. Therefore, in petitioning the Emperor to command the General to form a new Cabinet again my sense of responsibility dictates caution to me. As the present political change has occurred so suddenly, I have not yet explored the ground in that direction. According, however, to the Chief Secretary, who has inquired at two or three places, in case the General is commanded by the Emperor to form a succeeding Cabinet, I think there may not be such opposition to him from the military authorities as before; nevertheless, there has not yet been created in the Army an atmosphere in which to extend a full measure of support to him. I am inclined to believe that it will be extremely difficult for General UGAKI to restrain the militarists.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: Some of you hail from the military services. What do you think about General UGAKI?

Mr. ABE: I know General UGAKI very well, as I assisted him as Vice Minister when he held the portfolio of War. General UGAKI used to be looked upon as an influence by circles other than the military when it was desired that the Army be restrained. Therefore, the name of General UGAKI gives one an impression that he is the very man for curbing military demands. In consequence, he always finds himself in a sorry plight. I think

it may be very difficult for General UGAKI to control the situation under the prevailing circumstances.

Mr. OKADA: I have no intention to say anything personal against War Minister TOJO, but judged by the development of the present political change, the Cabinet may be regarded as having been overthrown by the Army. I am skeptical as to whether it will be proper for the Emperor to command the War Minister representative of the said Army to form a succeeding Cabinet.

Lord Keeper: My version is rather different on that point. The attitude taken by War Minister TOJO in the present political change is different from that taken by War Minister HATA under the YONAI Cabinet. On the basis of a survey of the truth of the case, it cannot be said that the Army alone is to blame.

Mr. OKADA: In any case, the Army embraces a vigorous opinion. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says that the Army fires the rifles from the rear, but I am afraid that it may develop into a gun.

Lord Keeper: It cannot be said that there is no occasion for worry on that point, but in short, the question is how useful the Navy's strength will be.

Mr. YONAI: Did not Prime Minister KONOYE quit because the Navy is not only ambiguous in attitude, but unreliable?

Lord Keeper: It cannot be said so clearly. An agreement of views between the Army and Navy and a reexamination of the decision of the Imperial Conference must be the foundation for saving the situation; it may be also a good idea to make the Navy Minister undertake the job, as he stands for prudence.

Mr. OKADA: I think it will not be absolutely proper for the Navy to recommend a succeeding Prime Minister from among its leaders at this time.

Mr. YONAI: (Was of the same opinion as Mr. OKADA)

Mr. OKADA: I think General UGAKI may be a good candidate, if the military circles can be reconciled with him.

Mr. WAKATSUKI: If War Minister TOJO is chosen I think a bad impression may be created abroad. We shall have to be prepared for a very unfavorable impression abroad.

Mr. HARA: If it is to be arranged as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal stated, I think it may be necessary for the Emperor to show the course of action clearly in issuing the Imperial command to form a new Cabinet.

Lord Keeper: I think I shall pay full consideration to that point.

Mr. HIROTA: Is it the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal's plan to make the Prime Minister concurrently assume the portfolio.

Lord Keeper: Yes.

Mr. HIROTA: Then it will be all right.

Mr. ABE: I support the Lord Keeper's plan.

Lord Keeper: I think Mr. WAKATSUKI has recommended General UGAKI. Has Mr. OKADA also recommended General UGAKI?

Mr. OKADA: No, I have not necessarily recommended General UGAKI, but I think there are some points in the Lord Keeper's plan to cause worry.

Mr. HARA: The Lord Keeper's plan cannot be said to be satisfactory, but as there is no other good plan, we cannot help proceeding forward with it.

Lord Keeper: I have now understood your views on the whole. I will fully report them to the Throne and obtain Imperial sanction.

217. In Appendix E of the Indictment, I am charged with being "present at and concurred in the decisions taken * *" at the conference of Oct. 17, 1941 (Ex-Premiers) which decision "prepared for and led to unlawful war on 7th / 8th December 1941." No such decision was made at that conference. I listened to the Senior Statesmen's opinions and expressed my opinions. It was subsequent events which led to war. At that time in recommending TOJO neither the Senior Statesmen nor I had the slightest intent to do anything or had any opinion that we doing anything preparing for or leading to war. We expressed our opinions in the hopes and expectations that the recommendation of TOJO would avoid war.

218. I reported fully the results of the Senior Statesmen's Conference to the Emperor and recommended TOJO to the Throne for the next Prime Minister. As it was evidently difficult to settle the political situation by merely setting up a new cabinet by Imperial command, I asked the Throne that special instructions as set down below, be given directly upon the issuance of the Imperial command to General TOJO, and later to Admiral OIKAWA, the navy minister, so as to make clear the Imperial wish for closer cooperation between the army and the navy, and disregarding the Sept. 6th decision. The Emperor gave his consent. I waited in the ante chamber for the return of the two ministers from the audience hall, and conveyed to them the wish of His Majesty under orders from the sovereign, thereby nullifying the resolution of the September 6 Imperial Conference, as follows:

"I presume that you have just received Imperial words in regard to cooperation between the Army and the Navy. As regards the fundamental line of national policy I am commanded to convey to you the Imperial desire that the careful considerations be taken by studying both the internal and the external situations more comprehensively and more profoundly than ever regardless of the resolution of the September 6 Imperial Conference."

219. The Imperial instructions to War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA are as follows:

Imperial Instructions,

To War Minister TOJO

"I command you to form a new cabinet. You will observe the provisions of the Constitution. I believe the country is confronted by a most serious situation. At this juncture you will see to it that the cooperation between the army and the navy is made closer than ever. I intend to tell this to the navy minister later by calling him in later."

To Navy Minister OIKAWA

"I have called in War Minister TOJO and commanded him to form a new cabinet. I told him that I believed the country is now confronted by a most serious situation, and he must see to it that the cooperation between the army and the navy is made closer than ever. You will exert yourself in conformity with my wish."

220. The Prosecution in Doc. 0003, P. 49 has stated in referring to me, "It is significant that he makes it clear in Exhibits 1196 and 2250 that he rejected the appointment suggested by WAKATSUKI and others, of General UGAKI the only man who might perhaps have averted war altogether." The Prosecution and I thus agree that an Army man was the proper choice, we only disagree on which one. As shown, at the Senior Statesmen's Conference at which WAKATSUKI, HARA, OKADA, ABE, KIYOURA, YONAI, HIROTA, HAYASHI and were present only WAKATSUKI favored UGAKI, and one, HAYASHI, suggested a Prince of the Blood. The reasons why UGAKI was not acceptable are fully set forth above. What he "might" have done is problematical and speculative. It was my considered opinion shared by others, that he would not have been able to form a cabinet, or if he did, that there would have been a revolution in Japan, and war would have resulted as he was not able to control the army. As was pointed out at the Conference, UGAKI had once before failed to form a cabinet when given the Imperial Command, because of the opposition of the military. I did not suggest TOJO until I was asked my opinion. Neither Exhibits 1196 or 2250 are authority for the Prosecution's statement.

221. The Prosecution has also stated in substance in Doc. 0003, P. 49, that I made no attempt to induce TOJO to adopt

an attitude toward peace negotiations which would offer the slightest hope of their success. In explanation of that I wish to point out that I was opposed to the Pacific war from the beginning to the end and as the Prosecution said about my advice to KONOYE on August 7, 1941 (Pros. Exh. 1130), "No doubt if his advice has been taken we should not be holding this trial today; *** ". As Lord Keeper I could not induce TOJO to take any steps.

222. The official duties of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal which I held dictated me not to interfere in national policies. Therefore, I was not in a position to give expression to my opposition publicly. When Prince KONOYE was Prime Minister he sought my views from time to time, as he was one of my very close friends. Therefore, I often took occasion to stress to him the necessity for working hard to avoid war with America by all means (Cf. My diary for August 7, 1941 & October 9, 1941 - Exh's. 1130 and 1146, both as corrected.) Meanwhile, the situation went from bad to worse. I, as one of those serving the Emperor close to him with official duties to offer assistance to him, gave the most serious and constructive thought to enable the Emperor to do his best dispassionately as sovereign under constitutional government. Put in another form, I made it a rule to petition the Emperor to make the Government study the situation as cautiously as possible from all possible angles before making a decision and for that matter to draw attention or caution the Government without reservation to anything which His Majesty may have deemed necessary, thereby putting forth all possible efforts on the part of the latter so as to have nothing to regret later. Once,

however, the Government decided on a national policy, I used to counsel the Emperor to approve it, by trusting the Government in accordance with constitutional government. When the TOJO Cabinet was formed, the Emperor commanded Prime Minister TOJO through me to scrap the decision of the Imperial conference of September 6, a line of action which had no parallel even under the reign of the Emperor Meiji, the builder of modern Japan. I presume that the Emperor had recourse to it as a last resort.

223. In explanation of the Prosecution's statement in Doc.0003, P. 49, that I, " ** induced the Emperor to give, or gave in the Emperor's name, an instruction to the Navy which could only mean that they should appoint a Navy Minister who would do whatever TOJO told them.", I wish to state that as shown above, the Emperor told both TOJO and OIKAWA. At this juncture you will see to it that the cooperation between the army and navy is made closer than ever." Neither one was told to do the bidding of the other. In view of His Majesty's desire for peace there can be no question that his thought coincided with mine, that on the part of the army it was to refrain from acting as it pleased in defiance of the intentions of the Navy which was anxious to avoid war with America and on the part of the Navy to manifest its intentions clearly so as to seek a peaceful solution of the outstanding question between Japan and America. This was the thought behind my statement at the Senior Statesmen's Conference when I advocated an instruction to TOJO as follows:

"If so, I think it will be the most practical way for saving the situation to command TOJO to form a succeeding Cabinet on the part of the Emperor and at the same time order him to effect

real cooperation between the Army and Navy and
re-examine the decision of the Imperial Conference,
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224. The Prosecution states in Doc. 0003, P. 49, "It is also significant that in Exhibit 2250 written in November, he abandoned altogether the excuse for appointing TOJO which he had given the Emperor on 2 October (Exh. 1155)." Frankly this puzzles me. I have never offered any excuse to any one at any time for TOJO's appointment. I have set forth my reasons for doing so. Furthermore Exhibit 1155 is my diary for October 18, 1941. In that entry there is no mention of any reasons why TOJO was appointed. Likewise, if the Prosecution is referring to my diary of October 2, 1941, no reasons are set forth there which was two weeks before he was even appointed. I do not know to which document the Prosecution refers and can find none to sustain any such conclusion. I had nothing to do with the appointment of any member of TOJO's Cabinet. I was never consulted by any one as to who to appoint, and I do not know with whom TOJO consulted.

225. On the evening of October 17, 1941, Prince KANIN summoned me and asked me to submit to the Throne a memorial having War Minister TOJO remain in active service and promoting him to full general. Prince KANIN said that TOJO had requested him to do so, as it was a matter relating to himself, but that Prince KANIN requested me to do so as it was a formality and an exceptional case. I merely acceded to Prince KANIN's request to transmit the memorial to the Throne the next day as appears in Prosecution Exh. 1155, diary of October 18, 1941.

226. As a result of the formation of the TOJO Cabinet,

Premier TOJO in obedience to the Emperor's instruction, cancelled the decision of the Imperial Conference on September 6 and set about re-examination of it. This consequently eased the tension for a war which had threatened to break out at any moment on October 13 and 14. His Majesty was exceedingly glad and spoke to me about it on October 20, 1941. As shown above, I had only one motive in recommending TOJO, and that was to avert war with America. Thus as shown in my diary of October 20, 1941, Pros. Exh. 1156, I sincerely felt that the war had been averted and the situation had taken a new turn for the better. His Majesty's words "Nothing ventured, nothing gained" expressed to me that he was pleased that he had succeeded in making those who held strong opinions give in to his own ideas to avert war. I told him one mistaken step taken in the present cabinet change might have needlessly plunged us^S into war, and that the recommendation I had made was the only choice possible after due consideration.

227. Following the formation of his Cabinet, Prime Minister TOJO devoted his all to the negotiation with America in pursuance of Imperial wishes. In forming his Cabinet, TOJO held the portfolio of Home Affairs concurrently. Asked why he assumed the portfolio of Home Affairs concurrently, though it might be understandable that he would hold the portfolio of war in addition to Premiership, the General told me that in case the negotiation with America was brought to an amicable conclusion, thereby adjusting the relations between the two countries, he was afraid that the country might possibly be plunged into serious confusion, in which eventually he would like to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. In joining the TOJO Cabinet I heard^d from both Finance Minister KAYA and Foreign Minister

TOJO that they asked General TOJO if his Cabinet would be a war cabinet and that they accepted the offers only after the General assured them that his Cabinet would not be a war Cabinet, but on the contrary it would devote its all to adjustment of the relations between Japan and America.

228. Since the formation of his Cabinet, General TOJO made serious efforts to overcome difficulty in the negotiation with America, by holding the Liaison Conference day after day. General TOJO proceeded to the palace almost every other day for the purpose of reporting to the Emperor. Every time he had an audience with the Emperor, he came to my office room and briefly told me about his report to His Majesty.

229. Every interview was a very short one, so that both of us had no time to have an exchange of views. Since its emergence on October 17, 1941, the TOJO Cabinet was studying the pending question from various angles. SUZUKI reported to me on October 29, 1941, the progress of the Liaison Conferences. (Diary Oct. 29, 1941, Ex. 1162). He told me at that time that the Conference was generally taking a course toward evasion of war. I expressed to him my desire to see this policy realized. He did not say anything to me about the Anti-Comintern Pact and Manoeuvres against China as is stated in Pros. Doc. 0001, p. 257. My diary for that day, Ex. 1162, shows that it was TOJO who told me about those matters, as well as stating the progress of the Liaison Conference. At that time it seemed that the fighting services were steadily pushing war preparations. It was a matter of deep concern for those who knew America and things American. I knew, and others close to me knew that if one was to come to an understanding with America, he should put forth all-out efforts for the purpose, using no bluff. When I had the

interview with Prime Minister TOJO on Oct. 29, 1941, I drew his attention to this point, Prime Minister TOJO, who apparently took a different view of the matter, told me that negotiation would be brought to an amicable conclusion only when we manifested our firm determination and that in this sense, preparations for both peace and war were necessary. 230. With its study mostly concluded on Oct. 31, 1941, the Government undertook to reach a conclusion on the basis of its study. The Prime Minister so advised me, as mentioned in my diary for Oct. 31, 1941, as follows:

"Oct. 31, 1941. . . . At 4:40 Premier TOJO came to the Palace. After conferring with the Emperor, he called on me with reports on the progress of the Liaison Conference. He said that from tomorrow the conference is going to enter upon the final stage of discussion. . . ."

On that occasion, and also on Nov. 2, 1941, the Prime Minister told me that he wanted to avoid war with America as much as possible, but as the result of studying various situations in an all-round way, the Government would be called upon to prepare for both peace and war, especially since consideration would have to be paid to the worst eventuality of a rupture in the negotiation. Therefore, I knew that the Government was preparing for both peace and war instead of for peace alone since Oct. 31, 1941 and further that it was the fundamental attitude in which the Government faced the decision of the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, 1941.

231. As shown in Pros. Ex. 1168, my diary for Nov. 5, 1941, the Imperial Conference held that day lasted 4½ hours, and it decided Japan's policy toward U.S.A., England and the Netherlands, according to the principles studied by the Liaison Conferences. I, of course, was not present at this Imperial Conference, and after it was over Premier TOJO told me of its results with little details. He told me in

effect that a final effort should be made for settling the negotiations by dispatching Mr. KURUSU to America and, on the other hand, the Southern Army should be organized in the event of eventual rupture of the negotiations.

I listened to him and made no comment.

232. The war party in Japan, which mistook the emergence of the TOJO Cabinet for the opening of hostilities between Japan and America was in high spirits for a time, but when it was disillusioned, a transformation came over the atmosphere overnight, which became a very ugly one. For instance, my home used to be guarded by some ten policemen, but about this time the number of policemen was increased to fifteen in the daytime. At night my home was guarded by 25 men, including 10 additionally detailed from the special guard. Further, I had to follow a different route every day in driving to and back from office. My views against war was the reason for this increased protection.

233. As days rolled on the situation between Japan and America showed no indication of easing. In this country, the solidarity of the young military and naval officers, who formed the mainstay of the fighting services, was further tightened with the result that an atmosphere was created in the fighting services themselves, opposing to the policy of the leaders of the Army and Navy for adjusting the relations between Japan and America.. On the other hand, news emanating from America became inflammatory, thereby stiffening the attitude of the fighting services. Meanwhile, propaganda was spread to the effect that if she further dillydallied, Japan would be attacked by America. Fretful impatience was the order of the day. I strove to prevent a Pacific war by all means. On November 19, 1941, I counselled

the Emperor to strongly deprecate entering into a state of war with the passing of the end of November as if it was a mere matter of routine business and instead handle the situation with a most cautious attitude as it was conceived that the negotiation with America might be in one of various stages. My advice is set forth in my diary of this date, Prop. Ex. 1181, as corrected by Language Section p.11,143. As is also shown in that exhibit, I advised His Majesty "when the Premier solicits his final decision, if circumstances require, the Premier should be ordered to hold the council in the Imperial presence with the participation therein of all the ^{Senior} statesman." In other words, I felt that the mere fact that the end of November was approaching did not warrant the inevitability of war as decided in the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, 1941, and I believed a re-examination should be made of this Imperial Conference decision depending on the state of negotiations with America at that time. To be frank, I secretly thought that I could bring the negotiations to an amicable conclusion at some time according to the progress of the negotiations, by invoking Imperial intervention. The situation between Japan and America failed to show any indication of improvement; while news, flashed from abroad became more and more stimulating with the passage of time. The Emperor, who was deeply concerned over the situation, expressed his desire to me to seek the views of senior statesmen on November 26, 1941, when I was received in audience. In reply I stated that His Majesty's decision this time would become a final one, there being no retreat from it, so that it was desirable that every possible measure be taken so that His Majesty might not be sorry for it later. For the purpose I counselled His Majesty to issue commands to the Prime Minister freely. This is set forth in my diary

of Nov. 26, 1941, Pros. Ex. 1190, as corrected by the Language Section, record P. 10,429, as follows:

"26 November 1941"

I met HARA, President of the ^{Senior} Privy Council, to consult with him about a ~~Statesmen's~~ Statesmen's Conference. I saw the Emperor from 11:15 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. He said that as for the future outlook of the Japanese-American talks it was feared to our regret that the worst might come to the worst. Under these circumstances, our ^{final} decisions as to the war should be carried into practice after another Senior Statesmen's conference which should be convened to have broader and more complete discussions on the matter. The Emperor also said that he wanted to tell his idea to Premier TOJO.

I answered as follows:

Once the final decision is made this time it would truly be the last and irretrievably final one. Thus if there should be any doubt or any better idea to surmount the difficulties in your Majesty's mind I pray that your Majesty be pleased to elucidate the same without the least reserve and appropriate steps which your Majesty might not repent of afterwards. I therefore pray that Your Majesty command the Premier Without reserve.

The prosecution, in Doc. 0001, p. 271, entirely omits my advice to the Emperor as set forth in this exhibit.

234. Pros. Ex. 2249 is a telegram dispatched from Washington by NOMURA and KURUSU on Nov. 26, 1941, and received in the Foreign Ministry here on the morning of Nov. 27, 1941. In it substantially, they suggest that if the condition does not change, negotiation must be given up by them; that they were humiliated at their lack of influence and in this case the only way to bridge the difficulty would be to let President Roosevelt cable the Emperor, if permission from the Foreign Office was obtained, and then ask the Emperor to answer. The telegram also discusses occupancy of Netherlands East Indies and ends with a wish that the telegram be shown to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I never saw this telegram. I have no recollection of ever talking to Foreign

Minister TOGO about it. I do not deny that he spoke to me but if he did talk to me about it, it must have been after receipt of Secretary of State Hull's message of the same date had reached Japan, which created a changed situation and minimize^d the importance of the telegram from NOMURA. I am sure, however, that I never^e had any weighty conference with TOGO about it. If he spoke to me, it must have been very slightly due to its conditional nature, and after he consulted TOJO, else I would have remembered it. I had nothing to do with Foreign Minister TOGO's answering telegram of November 28, 1941, Pros. Ex. 1193. I never saw it until this trial.

235. The formula for saving the situation by invoking Imperial intervention, which I secretly evolved in my mind, was found to be impossible of execution when Japan received Secretary Hull's document of Nov. 26, 1941. The American proposal was so strong, it being entirely beyond the pale of contingencies anticipated by me and laid before the Throne on Nov. 19, 1941, Ex. 1181, as corrected. The Government said that it was tantamount to an ultimatum.

236. Pursuant to my general suggestion to the Emperor on Nov. 19, 1941, arrangements were made, and on the morning of Nov. 29, 1941, at 9:30 a.m., the senior Statesmen met in conference at the Palace with the Government, and they listened to a full report given by the Prime Minister on the development of the negotiation with America up to date. This meeting was not attended by the Emperor, nor by me. It recessed at 1:00 p.m., at which time the Senior Statesmen some cabinet members, and I had the honor of having luncheon with the Emperor, at which time I was told what transpired in the morning.

237. After luncheon the Emperor had a one hour meeting, from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. with the senior Statesmen, at which only TOJO from the Government was present. I attended on His Majesty at this meeting solely to be at his service. I did not participate nor say anything at this meeting. The meeting was entirely different than the so-called Senior Statesmen's Conference for the selection of a new Prime Minister at a cabinet change. The Senior Statesmen gave their unreserved views to the Emperor. At the conclusion of this meeting, at 3:00 p.m., the Senior Statesmen resumed their meeting with the Government until 4:00 p.m. Neither the Emperor nor I attended this meeting. Prince KONOYE told me what transpired at this meeting when it terminated. Pros. Ex. 1196, my diary of Nov. 29, 1941, was introduced by the prosecution on Nov. 14, 1946, completely revised by the prosecution on Dec. 10, 1946, approved by the Language Section on Dec. 11, 1946, and the revised excerpt was substituted and submitted and read into the transcript on Jan. 24, 1947. Even the revised exhibit is not a complete record of my diary for that day. Parts are omitted. The complete entry is as follows:

Saturday, fine. Nov. 29, 1941.

At 9:00 A.M. saw and had a talk with Mr. IKEDA, Hideo who called on me at home. At 10:00 A.M. attended on duty and conferred with the Grand Chamberlain on the present situation. It had been arranged that the government would hold a round table conference together with the Primary Vassals of State at the Court today from 9:30 A.M. to discuss the question of the negotiations with America and the other relevant important matters of the moment and after its close all present at the conference would receive the honour of being present at the court dinner. However, the Round table Conference consecutively continued its sitting up to 1:00 P.M. and went into recess. We then finally attended the Court dinner. Such being the case it appeared that they discussed all the questions seriously.

From 2 o'clock for about an hour in the study, the Emperor listened in person to the Senior Statesmen's opinions. The following is a summary.

The Emperor remarked, The times have become very difficult, haven't they? To this Baron WAKATSUKI at once replied, in substance, as follows:

WAKATSUKI I am not worried about the spiritual strength of our people but in the matter of materials the question of whether or not we can really stand a long-range war deserves careful study.

OKADA I think that today we are truly confronted with a critical situation. I am concerned as to whether we can put full confidence in our ability to supply necessary materials. There was an explanation by the Government a short while ago but I am still not convinced.

HIRANUMA His excellency WAKATSUKI has spoken of the spiritual strength of our people and I agree with him on this point. But if today, when we have already been engaged in war for four years, things should further develop into a protracted war, it would become necessary to endure hardships and privations. I therefore consider that adequate measures and efforts for bracing up public sentiment are necessary.

KONOYE I deeply regret that I have not been able to do anything toward the adjustment of Japanese-American relations despite my efforts since last April. But I beg to express my appreciation to the present cabinet for zealously striving to attain this end. To my great regret I am forced to conclude, on the basis of this morning's explanation by the Government, that further continuation of diplomatic negotiations would be hopeless. Still, is it necessary to resort to war at once even though diplomatic negotiations have been broken off? Would it not be possible, I wonder, while carrying on things as they are to later find a way out of the deadlock by persevering to the utmost under difficulties. I think that I would like to question the authorities concerned on this point later.

YONAI I do not have any data with me so I cannot express any definite opinion but if Your Majesty will permit me to use the vernacular I pray that we may take care "not to lose every-thing by trying to avoid becoming poor gradually".

HIROTA After having talked on conditions of each of the world powers since the World War, Japan has adopted every possible means to avoid the intervention of Britain and American in the China Incident. In spite of this the diplomatic situation has become so serious as it is today. According to the explanations of the Government we seem to stand now face to face with a diplomatic crisis. Though the diplomatic crisis has a close relation to the strategic moment, I think the true intentions of both sides in diplomatic negotiations

intentions of both sides in diplomatic negotiations are only revealed after passing through several crises. Why should we hastily rush into war immediately after being confronted with the present crisis? Granting that war is inevitable, I believe we should always be on the watch to seize the opportunity for a solution by diplomatic negotiations even though blows have been exchanged.

HAYASHI: I have no reference data with me but on the whole there is no alternative but to rely on the conclusions arrived at by the Cabinet after thorough cooperation and study with Imperial Headquarters.

ABE: According to the Government's explanation it seems as the continuation of diplomatic negotiations will be difficult and that we are now placed in a really grave situation. I believe that we cannot expect anything further from the Cabinet as it appears to have studied matters very minutely from every conceivable angle. But it will be necessary to carefully take into account the attitude of the Chinese people, for I believe it will be possible by one false step to lose all the gains hitherto achieved.

NAKAGAWA: We have today, I believe, arrived at a really important moment. I should like to say one thing: If it is necessary for the preservation and self defense of Empire, we must rise to arms even though the country be reduced to ashes and though we can foresee defeat. But it is dangerous indeed to execute state policy or to make use of the national strength to achieve such ideas as the "establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere" or of the "Stabilizing Power of East Asia." I pray that Your Majesty will give careful consideration to this point.

The conference of Senior Statesmen and the Government had been finished and Prince KONOYE came to see me at my office and we had a close conversation, primarily on our relations with America and on other matters of importance. At 7:00 p.m. proceeded to the Palace of H.I.H., the Prince KAYANOMIYA and attended the funeral service for the late Princess Dowager."

238. As can be seen, all the Senior Statesmen expressed very cautious and prudent opinions with respect to any decision regarding war. In Appendix E of the Indictment I am charged with having been "present at, and concurred in the decisions taken at" the conference of November 29th, 1941. (Ex-Premiers) Furthermore, in Prosecution Document 0001, Page 273, the Prosecution has completely misconstrued the meetings held on that day and very briefly summarizes my diary entry as though

there was one continuous meeting. As shown I was present only at the one hour meeting from 2 P.M. to 3 P.M. with the Emperor, Senior Statesmen and TOJO. It was called primarily for the Emperor to hear the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. TOJO spoke very briefly at this meeting but I have no recollection of what he said other than that he said generally war was inevitable. No decision was made at this meeting of the Senior Statesmen and TOJO at which the Emperor and I were present. As a matter of fact it was reported to me that no decisions were made at the other two meetings either - one in the morning and the resumed one in the late afternoon, and I was not present at either of them.

239. On November 30, 1941, the Emperor summoned me at 3:30 P.M. and said that Prince TAKAMATSU had told him in substance that the Navy appeared to be opposed to war and wanted to know what was the real intention of the Navy. I advised His Majesty that a decision at that time was of a grave nature and would be irrevocable and it was necessary for him to take every precaution. I further advised him to send for the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff to ascertain their real intentions, and also to convey the matter to the Premier. The Premier, who was planning to hold an Imperial Conference the next day, saw the Emperor a few minutes later and requested that it be called but His Majesty ^{withheld} his consent. After the Emperor spoke with the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, I was summoned and I was told that they had answered the Emperor's questions with confidence. I do not know what they told him. The Emperor then told me to advise the Premier to proceed with the Imperial Conference the next day as planned. Pros. Exh. 198 as corrected by Language Section Rec. 12, 480 my diary for November 30, 1941, is as follows:

"November 30, 1941 --

I visited the Emperor at 3:30 P.M. in response to his request.

He said that Prince TAKAMATSU had told him that the Navy's hands were full, and it appeared that they wished to avoid a Japanese-American war. But really how is it? I replied that His Majesty's decision is of such gravity that, once decided, it could not later be retracted. Hence it is felt that if there is the least uncertainty every possible precaution should be taken to do that to which His Majesty can give assent. Accordingly, I requested that the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General

Staff be called at once and the true intention of the Navy be ascertained, and that the matter be conveyed frankly to the Premier also.

At 6:35 PM, I was summoned in audience and was ordered as follows:

"The Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff have answered my question about the previous matter with considerable confidence, so instruct TOJO to proceed as planned."

In Pros. Doc. 0001, PP 273, 274, my diary for November 30, 1941, is summarized as stating that, "Later, the Emperor told KIDO that in view of the fact that the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff and given affirmative answers as to the success of war, he had told the Premier to act accordingly." This in not is accordance with the facts shown above. Furthermore, it is based on the prosecution's original translation before it was changed by the Language Section, and even at that, it is an improper interpretation of that translation. As shown, the Emperor's instructions were to proceed with the Imperial Conference, not the war.

240. The next day, December 1, 1941, the Council in the Imperial presence decided on war with America, and the Premier called on me to consult about the Imperial rescript on the Declaration of War and I reminded the Premier of His Majesty's instructions given on October 13, 1941. My diary for that day is Pros. Exh. 1210. The words "at last" (TSUINI) used in this entry is not an expression of realization of an expectation. It is simply an expression of an end result, a finality. It is an objective, not a subjective term. I used the same word in my diary of November 24, 1940, upon hearing of the death of Prince Saionji.

241. On December 6, 1941, Secretary INADA of the Cabinet consulted me about the wording of the Imperial Rescript and I offered suggestions in accordance with the Emperor's wishes. As shown in Pros. Exh. 1220, my diary for December 7, 1941, I had a conversation with HOSHINO. HOSHINO at that time merely reported to me that the Rescript had been corrected in accordance with the suggestions I gave to INADA the day before as requested by the Emperor. It was a very short interview and we discussed nothing else.

242. At 12:40 AM on the morning of December 8, 1941, Foreign Minister TOGO telephoned me and said that Ambassador Grew had brought to him a telegram from President Roosevelt, addressed to the Emperor and he asked me for my advice in handling the message. I told him that I thought he should talk with the Premier about it and that I didn't believe His Majesty would mind being disturbed even at midnight. At 1:30 AM MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial Household, also called me and told me about the telegram. I was notified that TOGO had proceeded to the Palace, so I went there at 2:40. AM. I only spoke with Foreign Minister TOGO for a few minutes. I did not see the telegram nor did he tell me of its contents and I went home, arriving there at 3:30 AM. I heard nothing in advance about the dispatch of a telegram to America, in connection with the breaking off of Japan-American negotiation. The next morning a little after 6 o'clock, one of the aide-de-camps called

me on the telephone and told me about the naval attack on Hawaii. He did not go into details. This was the first information I had about the Pearl Harbor attack. I did not know in advance or at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack when the Japanese fleet had left Japan proper for Pearl Harbor. I did not know in advance that Pearl Harbor was to be attacked, nor did I know of any plan to do so. These were all strictly military matters of the greatest secrecy and I understood later that even various military men in high places did not know of the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. This was not unusual due to the fact that I and other court officials were not in sympathy with war with America and we were not taken into the confidence of the naval officials with respect to their proposed plans. Furthermore, after the assassination of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal during the February 26, 1936 incident, the Emperor advised the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about matters pertaining to the High Command as little as possible so as to avoid any implication that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was interfering with military operations.

243. Before leaving my home I heard over the radio about the attack but few details were given. On my way to the office where I arrived at about 7:15 AM, as shown in my diary for that day, Pros. Exh. 1239, as corrected by the Language Section, P. 16, 192 of the record, I was naturally thinking of the attack on Pearl Harbor and as a patriotic Japanese I could not but wish for the

success of the attack. I heard more details of the attack when I arrived at the office. In this exhibit, prosecution has again used the words "at last" in such a manner as to indicate that I knew of the attack before it occurred. The word "Tsuini" (at last) does not appear. This was the word used in my diary of Dec. 1, 1941. The word used in my diary of Dec. 8, 1941 is "Iyo Iyo", the character used meaning "certainly" or "really". This does not connote waiting and perhaps hoping for the occurrence, and I did not so express myself. I used the word objectively.

244. After December 7, 1941, Prince KONOYE and I continued to confer with one another. As shown in my diary entry of December 16, 1941, Prosecution Exhibit 1268, he visited me on that day. Once the war against the United States of America and Great Britain was commenced, our people were as if intoxicated with brilliant victory gained at the outset. As a result, an outcry was raised against Prince KONOYE accusing him of his evading the responsibility for opening war. This weighed upon Prince KONOYE's mind. He confessed that he wanted to give up the rank and honour of peerage and retire from the active service in order to take the political responsibility. So I earnestly requested him to be discreet and said, "It is too rash for you. The prospect of war allows of no optimism. I think the time will surely come when you will have to exert yourself again."

245. My diary of December 18, 1941, Prosecution Exhibit 1269 as corrected by the Language Section Record 11351

states in part: "Premier TOJO visited me and mentioned the need for control of discussion about Prince KONOYE." This translation is not quite accurate. It was I who mentioned this need to TOJO. The cause of this discussion about Prince KONOYE is set forth above in my diary of December 16, 1941, Prosecution Exhibit 1268. Exhibit 1269 is another example of how the Prosecution has used sinister words in the translation of my diary to my detriment. When the original exhibit was served the translation of the Exhibit was. - "Premier TOJO visited me and mentioned the need for 'muzzling' Prince KONOYE." The prosecution corrected it and read it into the record P. 11, 309 as Premier TOJO "mentioned the need for muzzling Prince KONOYE" and it was then referred to the Language Section and corrected is set forth in the beginning of this paragraph.

After the Language Section corrected the Exhibit, the Prosecution was content to ignore the correction by not mentioning it in its recitation of the balance of that diary entry in Document 0001, Page 291.

246. The military achievements, attained by the Japanese armed forces at the initial stage of the war, including the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor were brilliant. For the first six months after the outbreak of the war, the nation was intoxicated, as it were, with an unbroken string of victories, gained by the Japanese armed forces at various fronts in quick succession one after another. I, as one of the Japanese nationals, shared their rejoicings but none the less I could not believe in spite of myself

that Japan would be able to emerge victorious from this war. But I inwardly thought it necessary for me to exert every effort to pave the way for peace with America and Britain. It was my belief that Japan would commit an irretrievable blunder if she went too deep in it, elated over her initial successes. This fear haunted me from the very beginning.

247. The leaders of the Army and Navy, however, apparently did not think too seriously about the matter. For instance, Marshal SUGIYAMA, Chief of Staff of the Army, in response to an Imperial inquiry on the draft agenda of the Imperial Conference of September 5, 1941, optimistically stated that the southern campaign would be finished in three months. I could not share his sanguine optimism, which made me feel apprehensive about his very strategy, both military and political. On February 5, 1942 when I was received in audience by the Emperor, the talk happened to drift in that direction. I took occasion to submit my frank views to the Throne to the following effect: "The enemy has an indomitable fighting will, though he has suffered a series of reverses. The Pearl Harbor attack has signally served not only to strengthen a feeling of hostility against Japan, but also to unify the public opinion of America. Therefore, the Pacific War will not easily end. The shortest way to peace will be to fight it out, but at the same time, we must pay due attention to construction. No less necessary will it be to seize occasion to return to peace as soon as possible for the purpose of minimizing the ravages to be wrought by the second

world war and saving humanity from further calamities. The Army and Navy have recently vauntigly stated that they have gone through elaborate preparations and training; but it is highly problematical if the picked troops, who have gone through special training, will be maintained for long in the future with replacements. It is inevitable that the time will come when a difference in the resources of the contending Powers counts. Full consideration must be paid by the leaders of the Army and Navy to this point, starting right now."

248. The Emperor seemed rather suprised at my strong note of warning which was sounded at a time when the entire nation was expecting the fall of Singapore momentarily. But His Majesty appeared to have fully understood that an alarming situation was in store for Japan in the future. Then His Majesty told the Empress what was in his mind. It caused Her Majesty great concern, so that she communicated with Deputy Grand Chamberlain KANROJI, who was worried very much came to my room and told me to that effect, when I told him all about the matter. In this connection, my diary for February 6, 1942 says:

"Friday, February 6: 1942; Deputy Grand Chamberlain KANROJI came to my room and told me that the Emperor expressed to the Empress his impressions about my views laid before the Throne yesterday. Yesterday when I was received in audience by the Emperor, I submitted my views to His Majesty that the Pacific War would not easily end and therefore that the shortest way to peace would be to fight it out, while paying due attention to construction."

249. My statement, submitted to the Throne, resulted in causing concern to the Emperor. . . But it served to help His Majesty grasp the full significance of the war. On February 12, 1942 when I was received in audience by the Emperor, His Majesty told me that he gave Prime Minister TOJO instructions, which were very pertinent, as shown in my diary for the day. I thought that my statement was not submitted to the Throne to no avail. I was struck by the Emperor's sagacity all the more strongly. My diary for February 12, 1942 says:

"Thursday, February 12, 1942 - "Had an audience with the Emperor from 10:20 to 11:05 a.m. On that occasion, the Emperor told me that when Prime Minister TOJO was received in audience the day before yesterday, he reported to the Throne that all home and foreign policies in the future would be studied by the Liaison Conference between the Government and the High Command. In that connection, His Majesty added that he told the Prime Minister to the following effect: 'I presume that you are paying full attention so as not to miss the opportunity to terminate the war. It is not desirable for the sake of humanity and peace to have the war drag on needlessly, extending the ravages, wrought by it. The longer the war goes on, the worse the troops will become in quality. It goes without saying that the question has the other party to reckon with. Its solution ~~my~~ depend on the future attitude of America and Britain. It may be also necessary to ascertain the future development of the situation between Germany and the Soviet Union. It won't do to fail to attain satisfactory results, either, in ahndling the natural resources in the south, due to half-measures, taken. By paying full consideration to all those points, you are requested to leave nothing desirable ~~undone~~'."

This it is to be seen that the Emperor following my recommendation of February 5, 1942, expressed His desire for the termination of the war as early as February 10, 1942 to Prime Minister TOJO.

250. But Singapore fell on February 16, 1942. With military successes achieved one after another in quick succession at the initial stage of the war, Army and Navy

circles, made more pronouncements to the effect that elaborate care had been taken to make war preparations. For instance, it was claimed that the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been preceded by furious mock attacks on a harbor near Kagoshima, whose topography closely resembled that of Pearl Harbor; that rigid training in jungle warfare had already been gone through; and that no less rigid training had been also gone through in landing operations. These pronouncements captured the fancy and imagination of the people, who reposed still greater confidence in the fighting services. I and others were not aware that special training had been gone through by Army and Navy units. Therefore, I felt all the more surprised at the big successes, achieved at the initial stage. The Emperor himself was not aware, either that the Army and Navy had gone through such elaborate training. In consequence, His majesty was not free from uneasiness at first. Later, however, the Army and Navy leaders seized every possible occasion to report to the Throne on special training gone through. I could not help feeling skeptical that even if it were true that picked troops had gone through elaborate training, could they maintain success for any long time. The result was uneasiness which obsessed me that a difference in the resources of the contending countries would eventually tell, so that Japan, meager in resources would come to grief. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a big success, but at the same time it went a long way for stirring up a feeling of hostility in America against Japan. I thought,

therefore, that it would be no easy task to terminate the war quickly.

251. As appears in Prosecution Exhibit 1985, diary entry of March 13, 1942, Minister of the Imperial Household MATSUDAIRA called at my office to talk about the speech delivered by the British Foreign Minister EDEN who referred to violence committed by the Japanese troops against the British war prisoners in Hong Kong. Mr. MATSUDAIRA said "As the British usage, that the Foreign Minister delivered such a kind of speech in the Parliament shows, I think, that she has taken this problem seriously. So we have to pay considerable attention to it." I reported the above effect to the Throne and, as a consequence, His Majesty consulted War Minister TOJO. The War Minister, in accordance with His Majesty's instruction, examined into the state of affairs in Hong Kong and received a report that there was no such instance as set forth in the speech and that the treatment of war prisoners was just and fair. I felt received at being informed of it and I replied to the Throne to that effect. In view of the fact that the treatment of war prisoners at the time of the Russo-Japanese War by Japan was quite proper and won praise from foreign countries, I believed the above report and even until the termination of war I was anything but dubious of this point.

252. Meanwhile the enemy forces in Java and Boendang surrendered. A string of successes were achieved by the Japanese armed forces in quick succession, so that the people apparently became more intoxicated with victory.

Such being the case, it was no wonder that none thought of peace with the exception of a very limited number in the country.

253. Ambassador SHIGEMITSU happened to return home about that time from China. At 3:30 p.m., April 11, 1942, I met the Ambassador at my official residence to hear from him about the recent situation in China. Disclosing that the actual situation in China was not developing so satisfactorily as claimed by the Army at home, and giving a full report on the actual situation in that country, Ambassador SHIGEMITSU stressed the necessity for radical reorientation of Japan's policy toward China. In short, the Ambassador emphasized that China's independence and sovereignty be fully recognized and that China be returned to the Chinese, that the two countries should work on a cooperative rather than punitive basis. I approved the Ambassador moderate, peaceful policy unstintedly and promised to support him. With it as a turning point, I thought that it might be possible to settle the China Affair, which fact, in turn, might pave the way for the termination of the Pacific War itself. My diary for April 11, 1942 says:

"April 11, 1942.

"At 3:30 p.m., I met Mr. SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, Ambassador to China and heard from him about the recent situation in China. I can not but think that the future situation will be very grave."

254. On May 21, 1942 the Chief Aide-de-camp advised me that the flyers who had raided Tokyo on April 18, 1942 had been taken prisoners in China and that they would be dealt with in a court martial in Tokyo. As this was a

military matters, I expressed no opinion, ^{assuming} they would be given a fair trial, because the Emperor had previously reprimanded Gen. SUGIYAMA when he had suggested they be executed immediately. We also discussed air raids in general as it concerned air defense in the Imperial Palace grounds. That I had a talk with him appears in my diary of May 21, 1942, Prosecution Exhibit 1986.

255. The Midway campaign ended in a big failure early in June 1942 so that Japan's fleet air-force was swept out of existence. With her limited building capacity, it was foreseen that it would be no easy task for the Japanese Navy to build replacements. The necessity for seizing occasion at the earliest possible opportunity to save the situation was again brought home to me. My diary for June 6, 1942 says:

"June 6, 1942. "At 1:00 p.m., Aide-de-Camp SAMEJIMA came to my room and told me that a battle took place between the Japanese and American fleets off Midway and unfortunately Japan's fleet air-force suffered big damage this time. The Chief Aide-de-Camp also came to my room and told me to the same effect."

256. About this time there were found some in the intellectual classes who thought seriously about the necessity for hastening the return of peace. They were brought to my notice one after another in succession. Mr. YOSHIDA Shigeru, (Former Ambassador to England) was one of them. He called on me on June 11, 1942 when he told me about a plan to make Prince KONOYE go to Europe and sojourn in Switzerland without any definite mission so as to get in touch with leaders of various countries when an opportunity presented itself. He added that it

would be necessary not to miss the opportunity to pave the way for the termination of the war. I had no objection to his basic idea to strive to terminate the war as soon as possible for the sake of world peace, but told him in reply that I should like to think more over the propriety or otherwise of Prince KONOYE's immediate visit to Europe. Mr. YOSHIDA and I pledged each other to do our bit for the early return of peace. My diary for June 11, 1942 says:

"June 11, 1942 "At 2:30 p.m., I went to the official residence. At 3:30 p.m. Mr. YOSHIDA Shigbru called on me. He told me that he had submitted a plan of Prince KONOYE's visit to Europe to the Prince, as in the annexed paper. He sought my views on it. I replied to him that I have, of course, no objection to the basic idea that we must exert ourselves to terminate the war as soon as possible for the sake of world peace, but replied to him that I should like to think over Prince KONOYE's immediate visit to Europe."

However, nothing ever came of this.

257. Prosecution Exhibit 1273, my diary of September 1, 1942 reveals the circumstances surrounding the resignation of TOGO from the TOJO Cabinet, because the former objected to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry. As regards this problem, I did not, from the rationalistic point of view, dissent from the opinion of Foreign Minister TOGO. I thought, however, that the first thing to be avoided was a change of government under these circumstances, namely, in the course of the great war and that it would result, as it were, in reinforcing the enemy if Japan were to bring about a change of government while there was no change of the Cabinet of any of Japan's enemies. Being desirous

of evading a great political change as far as possible, I used my good offices as set forth in the diary. Abolition of the special service agencies in China was one of the purposes of establishing the Ministry of Greater East Asia.

258. The court martial of the American flyers was under the Chief of the General Staff. On October 3, 1942, Premier TOJO told me about the disposition of the American flyers. (The diary entry of October 3, 1942, Prosecution Exhibit 1987 says "treatment of American prisoners." The Japanese word I used is "Shobun", which means "disposition" I was not told of any "treatment". The Premier told me at that time that he was advised of the punishment which was going to be inflicted, that is, death, but that he caused the penalty for most of them to be reduced according to His Majesty's benevolence. At his request I reported this to the Throne, pending a report by the responsible authority - the Chief of the General Staff. I know nothing of the treatment of the flyers while they were prisoners.

259. The development of the war situation was progressing decidedly against Japan. A counter-offensive campaign against Guadalcanal Island had been started; while Japan's campaign against Port Moresby ended in a failure. With the passage of every day, the war situation further worsened against Japan. The Japanese forces in New Guinea were steadily pressed back with Rabaul completely isolated. The necessity for terminating hostilities without delay was further driven home to me. My diary for February 4, 1943 says:

"February 4, 1943. "At 3:00 p.m., went to the residence of Marquis MATSUDAIRA where I had an exchange of views with Prince KONOYE and Marquis MATSUDAIRA on the future of the political situation, the Red peril and the outlook on the war. I remained with them till shortly after six o'clock."

260. The meeting was held at the request of Prince KONOYE, who, taking an extremely pessimistic view of the war situation, repeatedly stressed the necessity for terminating the war without further delay on the ground that the Communist movement would become recrudescent if the home structure were put to strain any longer. Marquis MATSUDAIRA and I shared the Prince's concern and pledged together with the latter never to miss the opportunity to terminate the war. My diary for March 30, 1943 says:

"March 30, 1943. "Had an audience with the Emperor from 10:30 a.m. to noon when His Majesty talked about the outlook on the war and other topics for an unusually long time. I also submitted my frank views to the Throne."

His Majesty on that occasion expressed his concern over the future of the war situation, especially German's war situation and told me about the necessity for terminating the war without a moment's delay. In reply, I stated my views frankly on the basis of my talks with Prince KONOYE and Marquis MATSUDAIRA on February 4, 1943.

261. On the evening of April 20, 1943 Prime Minister TOJO called on me when he told me that he decided to reconstruct his Cabinet in the light of the home and foreign situation. As the result of this Cabinet reconstruction, Mr. MAMORU SHIGEMITSU was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. I found for the first time a partner to talk to about my peace moves in the person of

Mr. SHIGEMITSU, one of my trusted friends, who was now offered the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. From then up to Japan's surrender, I worked in close teamwork with Mr. SHIGEMITSU for the termination of the war. My diary of May 13, 1943, Prosecution Exhibit 1274 relates that we had an exchange of views on world affairs. German's submarine warfare in the Atlantic suddenly began to lose its power. In consequence, the prospect of war became extremely pessimistic. Then Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU mentioned the account of Ambassador STAHLER on the status quo of Germany. I all the more keenly felt the necessity of efforts for earlier conclusion of the war. It was at this meeting that I confided in him for the first time my idea of peace moves, one part of which was army control through a Prince of the blood. The following day, that is, May 14, 1943, when I was received by Prince TAKAMATSU, I told His Highness that "in case such a situation arises as requires peace moves, it will be most difficult to adjust the fighting services' demands with the peace terms and in such a contingency, His Highness will be requested to redouble his efforts," as mentioned in my diary for the day. Judging by the relations between the German Government and its Army during the first world war, the German Army inwardly wanted peace, and yet was thinking of terms, which would be difficult of fulfillment. Fearing that a similar situation might occur in Japan, I told Prince TAKAMATSU that in such an eventuality no solution would be forthcoming unless intervention of a Prince of the blood was invoked. MY

diary for that day states:

"May 14, 1943 "Prince TAKAMATSU called at my office and stayed from 1:40 for about an hour. At his request, I explained to him the circumstances of the reorganization of the Cabinet and gave my opinion on the prospects of the World War. He gave his comments on the subjects. Then I said that in case we should come to negotiate for peace, the hardest of hard tasks for us would be to reconcile the demands of the military with the terms of peace and that in such a case we should have to rely on the Prince's special assistance in solving the problem."

262. The turn of the year warranted no optimism, but on the contrary the outlook was a very dreary one. I wrote a memorandum on the outlook of the war and also a peace plan. On January 6, 1944 when I attended office, I had talks with Marquis MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, about Germany's destiny and Japan's policy toward the subsequent situation and asked him to make further studies on the subject. My thoughts are contained in my diary for Jan. 6th, 1944 Pros. Exh. 1276. That exhibit sets forth my ideas as expressed to Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA, that Japan should act on her own judgment in case Germany surrendered unconditionally, that if the so-called ABCD encirclement line was broken, Japan's war aim would have been fulfilled, and therefore, the Pacific War should be terminated by making large-scale concessions on Japan's part and that the peace terms should comprise: the Pacific question to be handled by a joint commission of Japan, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and America; the area under Japanese occupation to be demilitarized; the smaller nations in the Pacific area to be neutralized permanently; and the economic

policy in the Pacific area to be based on liberalism and equal opportunity. I also stated that Japan should devote the coming century to fostering her national resources at home and that during this period she should cooperate with the Soviet Union and China to provide against a general attack. In other words, Japan should build up a defense to meet the changing circumstances. I therefore arranged all my views as set forth in the diary and told them to MATSUDAIRA whom I asked to sound various circles about it. I also told Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU of this plan. His opinion was still more pessimistic than mine. He said that very serious determination was required, in other words; substantially unconditional surrender would be unavoidable. As a result, I was silent on this particular plan to Government circles after all.

263 Having exposed as it did the so-called real power of an "invincible fleet", the Navy's failure in the Saipan campaign in June 1944 exercised deep and far-reaching effects on the nation which had hitherto reposed absolute confidence on their fleet. It was entirely different in nature from the loss of a single sea-battle. The situation made me think it extremely dangerous to be led by wishful observations in defiance of realities. I had been in close touch with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about peace moves. For instance, my diary for June 26, 1944 says: "At 3:30 p.m., I went to my official residence where I had talks with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the outlook on the war and Japan's foreign policy." On that occasion, the Foreign Minister and I pieced together

various informations and had a free and frank exchange of views, as the result of which the following conclusion was reached: "The Government has no intention to take action, while the fighting services are recklessly pushing the war. There is almost no chance of success, therefore, even if peace moves are taken on these quarters. Should the secret leak out, it would defeat the purpose. Not only that, the fighting services would stiffen in their attitude, so that they might make a firm determination to die game (gyokusai). Such being the case, it will be extremely difficult to take peace moves on these quarters." In this connection, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU suggested that Senior Statesmen be made to serve the Emperor close to him so as to strengthen the Imperial Court. In reply, I said that it would be not only problematical whether Senior Statesmen would be able to render services as expected, even if they were made to serve the Emperor close to him but further stimulate the public, which might regard them as Japanese Badoglios. An agreement of views was reached by the Foreign Minister and me that there would be no course left, therefore, but to take action on the strength of Imperial decision, in case an opportunity presented itself, on the part of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, assuming full responsibility, respectively for the Imperial Court and the Government. I pledged with the Foreign Minister to do our best together for the resporation of peace.

264 Again on June 29, 1944, I had talks with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA about the measures for terminating

the war. Further, I called on Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneko
Minister of the Imperial Household, at his room and had
talks with him about the same question. At that time I
thought of peace moves the same as which I later took in
Japan's surrender. In other words, my peace plan was aimed
at negotiating direct with America, by obtaining the
Emperor's personal message and, in case of necessity,
taking charge of the negotiation on my part. In point of
execution, there was much room for study in the plan, which
failed to materialize at that time but which later was
successful. My diary for June 29, 1944 says:

"June 29, 1944. I had talks with Chief
Secretary MATSUDAIRA about the measures for
terminating the war. At 1:30 p.m., I called on
Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneko at his room and had talks
with him about the same question."

265 Senior statesmen, who worried over the rapidly-chang-
ing situation began to be more and more active. On the
other hand, a meeting of eight generals and admirals was
reported in connection with the rapidly worsening war and
political situation. On my part I had an increasing number
of visitors. I received visits from Foreign Minister
SHIGEMITSU on July 6, 1944, from Prince KONOYE on July 8,
1944, and from Minister of State KISHI, and Home Minister
ANDO on July 10, 1944. I was also acquainted with the
trend of the Cabinet. And I was aware of strong indications
of an imminent political change. My diary for July 3, 1944
says:

"July 3, 1944: I had information from Chief
Secretary MATSUDAIRA on the movements of senior
statesmen. He told me: 'Admiral OKADA called on
Baron HIRANUMA when the Admiral had talks with
the Baron about the outlook on the war. Admiral

OKADA contended that it would be necessary to change the Cabinet, while Baron HIRANUMA held that a memorial be filed by the senior statesmen with the Throne in this connection. Whereanent Admiral OKADA called on Prince KONOYE. At 12:30 p.m., I had talks with Aide-de-Camp NAKAMURA about the actual condition of the Navy. At 1:00 p.m., Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo, Minister of the Imperial Household came to my room and had talks with me about the measures for coping with the situation. At 7:30 p.m., Mr. ABE, Genki called on me, when I had talks with him about the current political situation."

266 The situation became so bad that Premier TOJO decided to reorganize his Cabinet again. At 12:20 a.m. on July 17, 1944 he called on me and handed me a paper setting forth his proposals. These are set forth in Pros. Exh. 1277 as corrected by the Language Section, which Exhibit shows I only acknowledged receipt of his paper. I made no comment on his proposals about the policies of the Cabinet, that is, the establishment of the High Command, change of the Navy Minister and renovation and strengthening of the Liaison Conference between the Government and the High Command. The Exhibit also shows that at 4:00 p.m., Prince KONOYE called on me at my official residence when I told him about the proposals of the Prime Minister. Towards evening, a meeting of some of the Senior Statesmen took place at the residence of Baron HIRANUMA, as the result of which Admiral OKADA called on me at my home at 9:30 p.m. and told me about an agreement of views, reached by the Senior Statesmen. Whereupon I asked Admiral OKADA if his talk to me was to be interpreted as information on a gathering of Senior Statesmen, that is, if he called on me by way of liaison. As his answer was in the affirmative, I received his report as such.

267 The foregoing appears in Exh. 1277 and the informal decision of the Senior Statesmen is also shown in the same exhibit as follows:

"In order to find our way through the current difficult situation, it is necessary to renew the popular mind. All people must rally and cooperate to build a powerful national Cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."

Meanwhile, Prime Minister TOJO failed in enlisting the services of General ABE and Admiral YONAI as Cabinet members, while Minister of State without Portfolio KISHI contended that now that the Cabinet failed in its efforts to reconstruct itself by enlisting the services of Senior Statesmen as Cabinet members, it should resign en bloc.

268 At 9:30 a.m. the next day, July 18, 1944, Prime Minister TOJO proceeded to the palace. I met him at the first resting room when he told me that he had made up his mind to carry out a resignation of his Cabinet en bloc. It surprised me, especially in view of the developments of the situation since yesterday morning. It was so sudden. But I refrained from making any comment, as I thought that a Cabinet change would be desirable in the light of the prevailing political situation. However, I asked Prime Minister TOJO about his idea on a succeeding Prime Minister, as I did every outgoing Premier. Prime Minister TOJO, who apparently was much dissatisfied over the Senior Statesmen's attitude replied:

"I think that the Senior Statesmen's responsibility for the present Cabinet change is heavy. In consequence, they may have already formulated their own plan. Therefore, I will not express my views."

The TOJO Cabinet resigned en bloc and in pursuance of the Imperial command, a meeting of Senior Statesmen was held at 4:00 p.m., July 18, 1944, to select a succeeding Prime Minister.

269 At the meeting of the Senior Statesmen it was thought it was necessary to modify the TOJO Cabinet's policy of strong economic policy on the one hand and on the other to exercise sufficient political ability to grasp the trend of popular sentiments. From this angle, it might be suggested to select a succeeding Prime Minister from among the civil services, but the trouble was that no suitable candidate was found in this direction. Further, in view of the war situation, which was still at its bitterest stage, the Senior Statesmen reached an agreement of views that a succeeding Prime Minister be chosen from among the fighting services, thereby smoothening the relations between the new Cabinet and the High Command. In this connection, however, it was further agreed that choice not be limited to the men in active service. Various views were advanced, but it was eventually agreed that Marshall TERAUCHI and General KOISO be chosen respectively as the first and second candidates for the next Prime Minister. On the strength of their personal knowledge of General KOISO who was their Cabinet colleague under the YONAI and HIRANUMA Cabinets, both Admiral YONAI and Baron HIRANUMA recommended the General as succeeding Prime Minister for his political vision, iron nerves and broadmindedness unlike the outgoing Prime Minister. My diary of July 18, 1944, Prosecution Exhibit 1278 sets forth in full the

Senior Statesmen's Conference. The Prosecution read a very few paragraphs of this Exhibit. The complete entry is as follows:

"July 18, 1944. (Clear)
Hottest weather of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets. At 8 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me. Received report on the circumstances of the Senior Statesmen's Conference at HIRANUMA's house. Mr. HIROSE, Hisatada, came and talked to me about the passing situation. Went to the office at 9 a.m.

Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30. Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the Senior Statesmen, principally about their meeting at HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOJO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience. Saw him and talked with him in the First anteroom. The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in order to carry out the political change smoothly, in view of the importance of the Army's position in the domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for my own information, of the succeeding Prime Minister, if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the Senior Statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the present political change; therefore, he supposed that they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed by an Imperial prince were considered, he hoped that none of the Army royalty would be taken into consideration. Received in audience from 10:05 a.m. to 10:25. Reported among other things to the Emperor about the Senior Statesmen's Conference, to be held following the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.

Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40 and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the other cabinet members.

Went to work at 1:30. In response to a summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me if HIRANUMA intended to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not. Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

The Details of the Senior Statesmen's Conference

Having been summoned by the Emperor former Prime Minister WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE,

HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in conference, at 4 p.m. on 18 July Showa /1944/. Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO having tendered his resignation. The conference was closed at 8:45 p.m.

Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, who attended the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish, notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstance which had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

The members then went into a discussion. First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as follows:

(1) At about 5:30 a.m. of the 13th Secretary AKAMITSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me. He, however, did not come, but I do not know the reason.

(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA called and urged me to join the Cabinet. Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a different matter if, for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme War Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA saying, "After deep consideration I have decided to reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

(3) A little past 9 p.m. on the 17th, SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau called on me. Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to make me change my mind.

Then the discussion began, the important questions and answers being as follows:

WAKATSUKI; What is the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal?

KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it

a good idea to consider the matter along the lines of the agreement made at the meeting at Baron HIRANUMA's residence?

HARA: What meeting ^{was} that?

WAKATSUKI: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion occurred at the time concerning a new cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to expedite the discussion. As a split between the state affairs and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think a military man on the active list will be suitable at this time. And as the Navy plays the most important role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take up the premiership? For this reason, what do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himself to the particular field of strategy and command, and it is most proper that the civil officials handle political affairs. It is wrong to appoint now from the Army and now from the Navy, like Genji and Heishi.

ABE: That's not my idea.

YONAI: If there is no suitable man among the civil officials, it will be between that an Army man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the position for a month, and judging from my past experience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion I suggest this as a tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable during wartime. At present we must rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense. Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the premiership I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that some one from the Army take the post. A premier should have political ability. In this sense, I think General UGAKI would be most competent though I do not know the latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but ---.

ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is getting along.

YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the Military should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I believe that it is for this very reason that they are strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable for politics.

WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without reason, but our country's practice is quite different from that of England and America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilian officials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking the matter practically-- /original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

MIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selection.

YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peace time.

HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The present situation is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate

with the
of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabinet influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial command will fall upon the five men ~~here~~ and they, choosing the premier from among themselves, will cooperate in administering state affairs. The situation is such that no one can undertake it.

KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far, but I believe that the practical application would be very difficult.

WAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

HIROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. We must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the highest and most powerful organization. At this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new Cabinet? I feel that a good number of Army and Navy General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

PRINCE KONOYE: A cabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present stage.

HIRANUMA: I, too, think it not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

WAKATSUKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.

OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HARA: I think so too. One man cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not be a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I can well understand what you mean, but practically speaking what do you want to do?

HARA: The Cabinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANUMA: That is the very way I feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present state, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cabinet is under direct Imperial Rule.

WAKATSUKI: That is right.

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were to do it.

HARA: That will do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

...KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will be need further discussion.

ADE: In plain words then, it had been generally agreed that a military man is preferable. However, a man who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and retired military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.

HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.

HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

KONOE: The same.

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose someone from the Army.

ABE: That will not renew the people's morale.

WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that an army man is best after all, having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.

HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the people, and the Army is on the unpopular side.

HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRANUMA: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew popular confidence.

HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is that the Army stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: There have been leftist thoughts among some men in the Army for more than ten years. Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooperation of the Military, the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so. From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an army man is better.

WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on that point for some time.

HIRANUMA: So have I.

KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next premier must be some-one popular among the Army.

WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the Army?

ABE: I do not know how popular he has been recently

YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is popular?

ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There are a few others but they are all at the front and it will be difficult to call them back.

HIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any other Navy man?

YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal has said, it might be better to choose someone from the Army.

HIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince KONOYE.

KONOYE: There are some people who recommend Mr. SUZUKI, Mantaro.

YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

HIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons, I think it proper that he take the post for the sake of the state. I know him very well and think he is an honorable man.

YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of the nation's interest.

HIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

HIRANUMA: Though he is strong he is a man who can accept other people's opinions.

HARA: I know him very well, too, after working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr. SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if commanded by His Majesty /T.N. to form a cabinet/ he would never accept it. I'm telling you this for reference.

OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an Army man is better.

HIROTA: I feel that we are in an important stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese system. Everybody should be present at the Imperial Headquarters.

HIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

HIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the Army and the Navy are firm, that is enough.

KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one of them too.

WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General UMEZU.

KIDO: How about Marshal HATA?

KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary condition that he make a change in the Army so as to renew the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

HIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

KIDO: What is the comment at the front about Mr. UGAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointment causes discontent and unrest among the soldiers at the front.

ABE: Is the idea of a Navy man in the minority?

ABE: If an army man is preferred, the next question is who?

KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HATA?

ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2) UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should be considered.

HIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

KONOYE: There is also Mr. SUZUKI, Kantaro.

KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKI?

HIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

KIDO: What other army generals are there besides these?

ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO, and then there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?

YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and courageous.

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but of smaller calibre?

ABE: Absolutely different.

KIDO: How does he get along with army men of the active list?

ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a different sort of man from TOJO.

HIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a pious one.

KIDO: What are his ideas?

WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although I don't know him.

OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well. What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. HIRANUMA? He was a member of each of your cabinets.

HIROYA: No objection.

ABE: No objection.

OKADA: Now we must reexamine the question of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet. This is an extremely important time and, as we need not come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to study the matter fully.

KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and Ministers in the Imperial Palace like the conferences of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am now studying that matters.

OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires careful thought.

HIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial order /CHOKUMEI NAIKAKU/ or a coalition cabinet of Army and Navy?

WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier in every cabinet.

KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. HARA's opinion in detail.

KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, HATA, KOISO, and a naval man.

HIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA, and a naval man.

YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA. By the way when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before, the Emperor asked for the reason.

HIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

HIROTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA.

ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, HATA.

OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that the former may support the latter.

WAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee, of course it would be very bad, but if the nominee himself wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this long discussion. I will submit your opinions in detail to the Throne.

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The meeting being closed, I was immediately received in audience by the Emperor in his study from 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the conference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire of the Army High Command whether the appointment of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would affect the military operations as he is the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor replied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I was received in audience again. His Majesty told me as follows:

Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to appoint General KOISO.

1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single day.

2) To allow the domestic political situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale, and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as well as among neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided by all means.

After asking the Emperor to summon the Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew. I was summoned and was received in audience from 10:10 to 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression that judging from the line-up at the installation ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation. It was past eleven when I returned home and at last had dinner."

270. General KOISO, who was in Korea, was summoned by the Emperor to return to Tokyo and arrived in Tokyo on July 20, 1944 at 4:15 p.m. Meanwhile on July 19, 1944, as shown in my diary for that day, - Pros. Exh. 1279 - Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi came to tell me about the political response created by the recommendation of General KOISO for premiership, but I do not retain an exact memory about his talk. If I remember correctly, however, he referred to a considerable fear entertained as to whether or not it was possible for General KOISO to meet the situation successfully.

The recommendation of General KOISO to the Throne was made upon the recommendation of the Conference of Senior Statesmen. This recommendation aroused fear in political circles as to the possibility of his tiding over the existing difficult situation. On the other hand, Prince KONOYE was of the opinion, if Admiral YONAI joined the Cabinet, as he was most informed of the general situations, he might not only help toward solving the hotly discussed problem of unifying the Supreme Command between the army and navy, but also make it possible to establish the national united front. Prince KONOYE told me Baron HIRANUMA had approved his idea. I had the same opinion and approved of it and requested Chief Secretary Matsudaira to find out the views of the other Senior Statesmen.

271. The next day, July 20, 1944, as appears in my diary for that day, Pros. Exh. 1230, Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA reported to me the views of the Senior Statesmen. General ABE was the only one who disagreed to a KOISO-YONAI coalition Cabinet. I reported to the Emperor and he approved of the coalition cabinet. Later the conference of Senior Statesmen reconvened at 4:00 p.m. and I explained the development regarding the coalition and they all concurred, General ABE withdrawing his disapproval. When General KOISO arrived at 4:15 I explained the situation to him leading to the resignation en bloc. General KOISO and Admiral YONAI received the Imperial Mandate at 5:10 as Premier and Deputy Premier respectively and as General KOISO only knew three of the Senior Statesmen, it was also his wish to meet them all, which we did together with Admiral YONAI at 5:30.

272. In addition to the conversation previously mentioned which I had with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU on June 26, 1944, about plans for peace, I had had others with him on July 6, and 15,

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1944. Therefore, Mr. SHIGEMITSU's retention of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the KOISO Cabinet made me feel very much reassured. I was since in closer touch with the Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU gave his most serious and earnest thought to Japan's mediation between Germany and the Soviet Union and the dispatch of special envoys to the Soviet Union and Germany. As in 1943, however, Germany refused to pay any attention to the question of peace with the Soviet Union, nor did the Soviet Union pay any attention to it. The opportunity was not ripe. The Soviet Union refused to approve the dispatch of special envoys from Japan to itself and Germany, because apparently it regarded the dispatch of special envoys as ballon d'essai for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. When Mr. SHIGEMITSU continued the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the KOISO Cabinet I had further free and frank exchanges of views with him on the peace formula and other questions from time to time.

273. On some occasions, I remember having heard from him that the Foreign Office received Allied protests concerning Japan's treatment of prisoners of war through the Swiss Legation. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU later assured me that the Foreign Office immediately communicated with the Army, who reported later either that the reports were not true or that in some instances efforts were being made to ameliorate the situation. I took it for granted, therefore, that efforts were really being made to ameliorate the situation, as the Foreign Office's action was only too proper. SHIGEMITSU advised me that the military were not easy to deal with in regard to this and many other matters. In dealing with them it was necessary to use great tact and diplomacy rather than try to force matters. It was at this Tribunal that I heard detailed reports for the first time to my great astonishment.

274. My diary reveals the number of talks we had about various matters and in many of these we discussed peace possibilities.

"July 27, 1944. At 9:30 a.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room, following his audience with the Emperor and had talks with me about the European situation."

"August 21, 1944. At 2:30 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU called on me to have talks with me, mostly, about the question of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union."

"August 24, 1944. At 4:00 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room after his audience with the Emperor and had talks with me about the armistice between the Soviet Union and Rumania."

"August 31, 1944. At 4:15 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was received in audience, when he reported to His Majesty on the sounding of the attitude of Germany and the Soviet Union toward peace and Rumania's armistice with the Soviet Union. Following his withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my room to have talks with me."

"September 5, 1944. At 1:30 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was received in audience. Following his withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my room when I had talks with him mostly about the worsening of the European situation."

"September 19, 1944. At 4:00 p.m. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was received in audience by the Emperor when he reported to His Majesty on the Soviet Union's attitude toward the dispatch of special envoys. Following his withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my room when I had talks with him."

"September 25, 1944. At 3:30 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was received in audience by the Emperor. Following his withdrawal from the Imperial presence, I had an interview with him."

"September 26, 1944. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., I had talks with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU at my official residence about the outlook on the war and other questions. It reminded me of much difficulty ahead."

"October 7, 1944. At 4:30 p.m., Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU proceeded to the palace and was received in audience by the Emperor. Following his withdrawal from the Imperial presence, he came to my room to have talks with me."

"October 15, 1944. On the way back to office, I went to my official residence, where I had talks with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the outlook on the war and other matters."

"November 15, 1944. After his audience with the Emperor, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU called on me when I had talks with him."

275. Before dwelling on the organized peace efforts put forth after the formation of the SUZUKI Cabinet, the successor to the KOISO Cabinet, let me refer to His Majesty's mental attitude and the senior statesmen's movements prior to that. Early in 1944, when the war situation steadily developed against Japan with no optimism warranted for the future, many of the intellectual classes felt deep concern over the future of the country. Messrs KONOYE, HIRANUMA, WAKATSUKI and OKADA of the Senior Statesmen usually met once in a month to have a free and frank exchange of views on current topics. And the central one of them was how to terminate hostilities. Admiral OKADA told Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA about their meeting every time it took place. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA in his turn told me all about it. From time to time, Prince KONOYE too told me about it, and I shared the Senior Statesmen's deep concern.

276. On January 6, 1945, the eⁿemy penetrated into Lingayen Bay, it was reported. The war situation of the Philippine Islands became very grave. The Emperor asked me if it was not necessary to seek the Senior Statesmen's views in accordance with the developments of the war situation. I advised him that he should consult the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, then members of the Cabinet and then if it is recognized as necessary "to determine the highest policy", an Imperial council of Senior Statesmen and the Cabinet should be convened. By this I was paving the way for peace in that the "highest policy" referred to meant "decision for peace", My diary for that day records this

counsel I gave:

"January 6, 1945. From 2:25 to 3:05 p.m., I was received in audience by the Emperor in the Gobunko and H.M. told me as follows: He had been informed that the American Army had begun to force their way into Luzon. The battle in the Philippines has become all the more critical, and its result might make it necessary for him to consult the senior statesmen. H.M. asked me what I thought. In reply to the above, I said something to the following effect: As H.M. says, I myself, too, think the battle in the Philippines has become quite critical and its ultimate result might become such that the circumstances which led to this must be considered seriously in view of the future guidance of the war. His Majesty must necessarily observe the transition of the war situation for the time being, and know the true resolutions of the chiefs of both the Imperial General Staff and Naval General Staff who are taking a leading part in the war. So how would it be if His Majesty calls both Chiefs at the same time and exchanges real frank opinions with them in contrast to the conventional audience which is apt to be formal. After that, His Majesty could call the members of the Cabinet concerned and inquire, in detail, and if it is recognized that it is necessary to determine the highest policy, then it would be better to hold an Imperial Council of ex-premiers and Cabinet ministers. At any rate, I wish that His Majesty would observe the transition of the situation for a few days."

277. On January 13, 1945, His Majesty again referred to a meeting with the Senior Statesmen after making an observation to me on the situation in the Philippines and French Indo-China. I advised him I would study these matters. I had been giving the question of how the Emperor could obtain the opinion of the Senior Statesmen serious thought. A meeting with them at this was fraught with danger if the military found out about it. My diary for that day is as follows:

"January 13, 1945. From 10:35 to 11:15 I was received in audience by the Emperor in the Gobunko. He told me of his opinions on the war situation in the Philippines and of the attacks on the French Indo-China coast by an enemy task force and even referred to the senior statesmen. So I replied that I would study these matters seriously."

278. In addition to the fact that the Emperor was greatly concerned over the situation, the Senior Statesmen, including Prince KONOYE shared Imperial solicitude. Therefore, I could not in

conscience, look on with folded arms. I had to do something. After consulting Mr. MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneko Minister of the Imperial Household, I made arrangements that the Senior Statesmen be received in audience separately by the Emperor to submit to His Majesty their views on the current difficult situation. This would prevent suspicion by the Military. The plan was reported to the Emperor who sanctioned it February 1, 1945. My diary for that day is as follows:

"February 1, 1945. At 9 a.m. received treatment from Mr. HAYAKAWA.

At 11:30 asked Vice-Minister SHIRANE to come to my room and requested him to obtain the consent of the Minister of the Imperial Household (now indisposed with a cold) concerning the proposed audience of the Senior Statesmen in the form of paying their respect to His Majesty. At 1 p.m., called on the Grand Chamberlain at his room to consult about the same matter.

Was received in audience by the Emperor from 1:35 to 2:10 at the Gobunko and reported to him about the audience of the Senior Statesmen in the form of paying respect to His Majesty and my attendance at the OMIYA GOSHO. (The Palace of the Empress Dowager)"

279. In accordance with my idea, the Senior Statesmen individually held audiences with the Emperor to express their views, as follows:

Baron HIRANUMA, Feb. 7, 1945; HIROTA, Feb. 9, 1945; Prince KONOYE Feb. 14, 1945; Baron WAKATSUKI, Feb. 19, 1945; Admiral OKADA, Feb. 23, 1945; and General TOJO, Feb. 26, 1945. In addition I arranged for Count MAKINO to have an audience and he did so on Feb. 19, 1945. The fact that these audiences were held appears in my diary of these dates. General ABE was in Korea at this time, General KOISO was Premier and Admiral YONAI was Vice Premier.

280. After these audiences I had a further talk with Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU about the prospects of an early peace. My diary for March 8, 1945 records this conversation.

"March 8, 1945. At 4:00 p.m. Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU called on me when I had an exchange of views with him on the outlook on the war and the lineup of those close to the Throne."

281. Meanwhile, the KOISO Cabinet was taking moves on Chungking for the purpose of settling the China Affair. In other words, it was planning to open negotiations direct with Chiang Kai-shek. Early in September, 1944, the plan was referred to the Supreme Council for Direction of War, which decided on the guiding principle for the purpose. But no tangible result was produced. In March, 1945, Prime Minister KOISO dispatched Colonel YAMAGAYA to China to invite to Mr. Liao Pin to Japan for the purpose of opening direct negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek through the letter. Now, by that time, the Philippines Islands and Yiojima Island had been almost captured by the enemy. The adverse turn of the war situation against Japan must have been fully known to Chungking. It was beyond conception that China who had been entirely dependent upon America and Britain should make peace separately with Japan without consulting them. Further, judging by his record, Mr. Liao Pin, himself was said to be not fully reliable. In consequence, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU, War Minister SUGIYAMA, Navy Minister YONAI and General UMEZU, Chief of Staff of the Army, were opposed to the projected peace moves toward Chungking either as leaders of the Government or members of the High Command. But Prime Minister KOISO was very enthusiastic and on April 2, 1945 proceeded to the palace and reported to the Throne on his plan for direction peace negotiation with Chungking through the intermediary of Mr. Liao Pin. The Emperor referred the matter to the Three Ministers of War, the Navy and Foreign Affairs, as the result of which it was ascertained that the opportunity was not ripe yet. Therefore, the matter was dropped. In order to cope with a sudden deterioration of war situation, Prime Minister KOISO sought his reinstatement in active service and his concurrent appointment as War Minister for

the purpose of redoubling his efforts for the prosecution of the war, but his plan failed to materialize, due to the Army authorities' objection. This and other reasons were responsible for the collapse of the KOISO Cabinet.

282. On April 4, 1945 Premier KOISO told me that he intended to resign. In addition to a written report which he gave me, he explained his reasons. Both his oral explanation and written report are set forth in my diary for that day, Pros. Exhibit 1281 as corrected by the Language Section, Record, Page 11941. No opinion of mine is set forth in this Exhibit as I expressed none to him. At that time, feeling the imperative necessity of taking immediate steps to end the war, I considered this a golden opportunity and one which should not be lost. I had previously made known to the Chief Aide-de-Camp that day my intentions in the event of a cabinet change, which appeared imminent, to meet with the two Chiefs of Staffs as well as with the two Ministers, War and Navy, to find out what the Supreme Command was thinking. When Premier KOISO later mentioned that he thought an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet should be formed, I seized this opportunity to request permission from His Majesty that I would like to see the Minister of Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff, prior to the Senior Statesmen's Conference. This, and the Emperor's permission to do so appears in Exhibit 1281 as corrected. By Imperial Headquarters Cabinet is meant, a cabinet in which the Premier assumes the power of the Chiefs of Staff to direct the conduct of the War.

283. The next morning April 5, 1944, Premier KOISO resigned at 10:30 a.m., I was later summoned in audience and shown his resignation. As previously arranged I conferred with Chief of

the Army General Staff Umezu at 11:35 a.m., Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55 a.m., War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1 p.m. and Chief of the Naval General Staff OIKAWA at 2 p.m. This, and the reports I received from each of them appears in Pros. Exh. 1282 as corrected, Record PP 11351, 16, 195, my diary of that day. Of these reports the Prosecution only read General UMEZU's Prosecution's summary Doc. 0001, P. 316 of Umezu's report is wrong. UMEZU did not stress the "need of a special cabinet". As shown in the Exhibit, Umezu doubted the practicability of a special cabinet (Imperial Headquarter's Cabinet) saying it was worth considering but "it is difficult to link together the supreme command and state affairs." No opinion of mine is expressed in any of these reports. As the result of these conversations, I ascertained that all of them were generally opposed to a change of the Cabinet's character, holding that a clear line of demarcation be drawn between the High Command and the conduct of State affairs by the Government as done in the past. And it was highly problematical in the light of the situation, then prevailing, whether the adverse war situation would be retrieved even if a new Cabinet was formed under General KOISO's conception. Further, judging by the actual home situation, that is, the people's war-weariness and emasculation as well as the acute food situation, the country could not afford to make such a trial. The vital necessity for effecting a drastic reorientation was driven home to me, so that I thought it dangerous to translate into practice Prime Minister KOISO's idea. When I talked with Admiral YONAI, I asked his opinion about a successor to Premier KOISO. He approved Admiral SUZUKI as shown in my diary. The reason I asked YONAI his opinion at this time was because although he

was a Senior Statesman, he would be unable to be present at the coming Senior Statesmen's Conference because he was Navy Minister of the outgoing Cabinet.

284. With such a frame of mind, I attended the Conference of Senior Statesmen at 5 p.m. that day. They, too, opposed an Imperial Headquarter's Cabinet. It was contended on that occasion that a man free from any commitment in the past or a man with iron nerves, capable of taking a long-range view of the situation be selected this ^{time} as succeeding Prime Minister and also that choice be not necessarily limited to a general or admiral in active service. But General TOJO was the only exception among the conferees. He contended that Marshal H.T. be chosen as succeeding Prime Minister on the ground that the war situation had entered upon a state in which a decisive battle would have to be fought in the Japanese mainland and therefore, that the next Prime Minister must be a general or admiral in active service. Whereupon, I stated that if a decisive battle was to be fought in the Japanese mainland, it would be political power behind the gun that counted, as it would involve millions of innocents in its wake. Pointing out the Army's extreme unpopularity among the people, I said that it would be better to choose a non-Army man. General TOJO would not yield. On the contrary, he went the length of saying that if such a thing was done, the Army might look the other way, (meaning a coup d'etat by the Army). I retorted that the nation would look the other way if an army man was chosen. It was quite "a scene". No conferee touched upon peace moves explicitly for fear that in view of General TOJO's presence at the conference, any tactless remark might stimulate the Army to an unscrupulous countermeasure. But all conferees except General TOJO had a tacit understanding

on this point, which was given expression in their desires for "a man free from any commitment in the past", as expressed by KONOYE and HIRANUMA. Baron SUZUKI said that he would like to decline the offer, as Premier as he had hitherto professed never to take part in politics.

285. Pros. Exh. 1282 as corrected purports to include the full proceedings of the Senior Statesmen's Conference held on April 5, 1945. But it omits part of the conference and none of the proceedings has been read to the Tribunal. The sketchy summary of this Conference (Pros. Document 0001, Page 311, creates an erroneous impression. The full proceeding is as follows:

"The meeting of Senior Statesmen was held in the front Reception Room from 5:00 P.M. on 5 April 1945.

KONOYE, HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, HIROTO, KIDO, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, TOJO (Baron WAKATSUKI attended from 6 o'clock

The Grand Chamberlain made formal address -- the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal explained the situation leading to the political change and after reading KOISO's resignation, passed it around.

TOJO: The resignation states that both the state affairs and supreme command require revision. What is the meaning /of this statement/?

KIDO: There was no particular explanation given by Premier KOISO.

TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on April 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first.

OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the total power of the country. Such a problem as war or peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe we must first carefully study these problems before determining this question.

HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no way out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this sudden political change and it would have been desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers /L 58/ KOISO and YONAI but since the resignations have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered" obliterated/ it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any preparation, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as their Excellencies have presented.

KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total resignation would occur but I heard thereafter that it was changed to the policy of reorganizing and both Field Marshals, SUGI* Y.M.A. and H.T.A. were to be transferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it became necessary to change the War Minister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinet, General ANAMI as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect reorganization now and then to execute a total resignation a little later on would be betraying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is meant by this). So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and I, myself, am much perplexed.

OKADA: Before giving out names, how about discussing the total power concentration and powerful cabinet.

HIRANUMA: Formerly, the Premier was first of all decided, and that Premier was to recommend the ministers to the portfolio to the Throne, etc., at this time, if the principal ministers are not decided, the cabinet will not become powerful. If we adhere to the conventional way on Army, Navy Peace Preservation, etc., we shall reach no conclusion.

TOJO: If we decide the cabinet ministers, then, doesn't it mean that the Emperor is to bear the responsibilities after the formation?

HIRANUMA: It would not be right for the Emperor to give orders directly.

TOJO: Avoid having the good and bad of the cabinet formation falling back on the Emperor.

HIRANUMA: From the point of formalities, it is as you say, but what I meant to say was that how about deciding it after soliciting our opinions a little more.

HIROTA: We must win by any means. Although there

are pessimistic views, in this current war, no country has so far been winning straight through from the start. All of them have been, one time or another, on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back again. The next cabinet should be one that would fight through to win the war. I think it was really an appropriate action of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to have interviewed the leaders of the Army and Navy authorities, but don't you think that it is necessary to ascertain the intentions of the Army and Navy authorities, a little more?

KIDO: I did ask them considerably but there was no special opinions expressed.

HIRANUMA: Speaking outright, Mr. KOISO's cabinet formation was a failure. He should have consulted us a little more. The reorganization, if speaking candidly was a failure. Speaking of formalities, it is as His Excellency TOJO said, but in actuality, he should have consulted us a little more without being apprehended by theories.

KIDO: It is as you say. In the case of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, too, after he has made his recommendation, he is to keep his mouth shut regarding the formation of the cabinet. And when it does not go well, he is criticized on the score of his responsibility for recommending. It is really a curious system. I believe this ought to be corrected, but only we are compelled to continue the practice in the absence of no other formula."

(The Exhibit as corrected does not accurately set forth what I said. The foregoing paragraph more accurately sets forth my statement. I am merely referring to the fact that the public often criticized my recommendation of a new Prime Minister, which was my responsibility to the Throne, if the Cabinet failed, yet I had no voice in the selection of the Cabinet members) -

Continuing the Exhibit:

"HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek more advice.

OKADA: Some people say that considerable surplus power still exists in our country and ask why we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Before amassing the total power of military officials, government officials, and civilians, unity among the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we study as to whether the procedure we have followed until today is right or wrong.

HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in this room and

the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes an informal report to the Throne, a situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do as he pleases, I wonder.

KONOYE: Although you are right, the problem is in what form it should be carried out.

KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer unity among the leaders.

HIRNUMA: Setting aside discussions from the legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think it is better to have closer contact in the organization of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

OKADA: I agree.

SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons. I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever the occasion demanded, Prince SAIONJI sought the advices of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet-Admiral TOGO. After obtaining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MAKINO?

KIDO: You are right, But the procedure nowadays is different from the days of Prince SAIONJI. The procedure has been decided upon in accordance with His Majesty's desire that the membership of the conference should consist of those who, enjoying the full confidence of His Majesty, had taken the reins of government at least once. It will be impossible to request for Count MAKINO's participation here now."

(The foregoing paragraph is complete-Prosecution's Exhibit states some Japanese characters illegible.) Continuing the Exhibit:

"HIROTA: Unification in the upper-classes is indeed most necessary, and I think that it would be better to have such person as Count MAKINO participate. In the case the cabinet changes, will the Supreme War Guidance Council still continue? And speaking of the Premier attending the Imperial General Headquarters, was this permitted only to KOISO or that hereafter, the Prime Minister will always be able to attend it?

KIDO: At present there are opinions that since the Premier attends the Imperial General Headquarters, the Supreme War Guidance Council is unnecessary. This is a problem that should be considered in future. The next question in that although I do not know the details, I think that hereafter the Premier will be able to attend Imperial General Headquarters.

TOJO: The Premier will attend as a participator in the war council, and will witness the manipulation of troops in national defense.

SUZUKI: Although I can understand the case of Count MAKINO by your explanation, I dare say that only when we include him the scope will not become obscure but that I think there is no other qualified person similar to Count MAKINO.

WAKATSUKI: I don't understand the purport of the resignation. It is a very queer resignation to explain the character of the forthcoming cabinet.

KONOE: Since the case was so sudden, I have no idea. I think that, in regard to the opinion of His Excellency TOJO, it cannot be decided at this stage when the Supreme Command is not represented here. At this meeting, as at the time of the last meeting, first of all how about gradually limiting the field /in choosing the Premier/, whether it must be from the military circles, and whether it will be from the Army or from the Navy.

TOJO: I do not mean to say that the Premiers should be decided at this meeting. I meant that it should be submitted as a material to His Majesty so that he can prepare himself.

WAKATSUKI: The purport of His Imperial summons was to have us choose the Premier for the succeeding cabinet, and I believe it is against His Imperial will to discuss on things which TOJO mentioned. To discuss whether we should fight the war to the last, or whether we should seek peace halfway is an out of way question. I think it goes too far.

SUZUKI: According to Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion, we must now fight this war to its bitter end. I think this problem must be settled first. Therefore, if the leader of the succeeding cabinet does not possess this will, I think he is unsuitable.

WAKATSUKI: I thought I was requested to state my opinion regarding this.

TOJO: It is not so. It is meant to be merely an assumption.

KIDO: Today when the situation is such that the homeland is about to be a battlefield, the actual national conditions give rise for grave concern. The public does not always cooperate earnestly with the measures taken by the government. A large number tend to be indifferent. Viewed from the food problem, production increase problem and peace preservation problem, the incoming cabinet must be one that will place confidence in the people. Of late, anti-militarism tendencies have appeared substantially and I think this also must be given careful attention.

HIRANUMA: The basic idea is that eminent subjects of the state should be held responsible to the Throne.

WAKATSUKI: Twenty years have already elapsed since I had once been a premier so I have no knowledge of the

present men. I really sense deep trepidation in feeling incapable of fulfilling my duty. I am willing to take all responsibilities but in regards to this duty, I believe that I am most unsuitable. I request that the system itself also be given consideration.

If the opinions of Baron HIR. NUMA should be adopted, (select principle cabinet members beforehand) nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will thoroughly restrict the activities of the premier. I cannot express any opinion as to whether the purport of Premier KOISO's resignation could be carried out or not.

KONOYE: On the previous occasion, the matter of state affairs and supreme command was also the focus of consideration. For this purpose, a military man was thought to be most appropriate and was decided after boiling down the issue. Would it not be better to use the process?

WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, I was the one that suggested it but the purport of his resignation is different.

KIDO: This resignation is but an expression of Premier KOISO's opinion, and it does not necessarily mean that we should stick to this.

HIROTA: It is better to have either the War Minister or the Navy Minister be the chief of the new cabinet.

HIR. NUMA: There are two phases of opinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the war. At this time we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the Premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed for peace and cessation of hostilities. From the point of formalities, it is as what Mr. WAKATSUKI stated, but actually, they are inseparable.

In the manifestation of the ~~whole~~ national strength influential persons from the civilian populace must be employed.

KIDO: We must formulate a system whereby the people will follow us.

HIR. NUMA: Viewed from the relations between state affairs and supreme command, do you mean that the Premier must be a soldier in active military service?

HIROTA: After all, difficult situations may arise if the premier was not a soldier of the active military service, but that is not always necessary if he is authorized to present himself at the Imperial General Headquarters.

HIR. NUMA: At the least, he must be in the first or second reserve.

SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese War we had Premier ITO. The Premier need not always be a soldier.

HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless, the premise is that, if it is to be fought, it must be fought out.

OKADA: Through the conversations carried until now, it seems that the character of the Premier, in general, is distinctive.

KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who will fight it out.

HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI.

WAKATSUKI: Actually, I am unqualified--I fear that I may say something thoughtless. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory. If we propose peace now, it will, evidently lead to unconditional surrender.

HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme command and state affairs, I think, we need a man from the Army or the Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has been clarified but how about its application?

HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

KONOYE: A person that has no connection hitherto should be recommended.

HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, as seen from the public and people.

WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was decided to be from the Army and although a certain person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion, Mr. OKADA?

OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but gathered here are men from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal approve of this measure?

KIDO: Yes.

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you would state your unreserved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. SUZUKI?

SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto Senior Statesmen make an effort. We have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. The resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. After that, we all will try. How about the four trying first? I have heard that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HARA also made this suggestion. A week before the former President /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimately heard him talk on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed. I suggest he accept by all means.

KONOYE: Then it differs from aforementioned fundamental principle.

HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a military man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should be one with no previous connections. With the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall we appoint him after consulting him? In the present situation, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without consulting him.

KONOYE: So do I.

WAKATSUKI: That will be perfect. Nothing could be better.

SUZUKI: As I have said to His Excellency OKADA, I believe that for soldiers to meddle in politics is to ruin the country. It is proved by the fall of Rome, the eclipse of the Kaiser, and also the fate of the Romanoffs. As a matter of my principle I am prevented from entering into politics. Moreover, my hearing is bad. I beg to decline.

HIRANUMA: I have heard from President HARA about it, too. But the circumstances of today do not permit us to indulge in such talks. A man without involvement is desirable. Admiral SUZUKI is a soldier, but he enjoys His Majesty's deepest trust as a civil official. And the nation believes that he has no involvements, and he is a man of loyalty without a peer.

TOJO: The attitude of Admiral SUZUKI is truly fine. The developments of the war are beyond conjecture. The ~~enemy~~^{enemy} is getting impatient. He will try a bold strategy. He is likely to attempt landing somewhere on Japan proper. Home defense then will become the vital point. The government and the command must be fused into one. Here the army must be considered as the principal body. In this sense, we must have a soldier on the active list. Historical instances have been cited, but Japan is different from the countries of Europe. In their case, the command got into the government. The character of our command is naturally different. From this standpoint I believe Marshall HATA is suitable.

KIDO: What is the view of Mr. HIROTA?

HITOTA: I think a central figure in the armed services should take the post. That has been my wish always. But I do not know the person. Anyone who can control both army and navy will be all right.

KIDO: What is the view of Mr. OKADA?

OKADA: I cannot state my view since I know nobody.

HIROTA: At this time of a grave situation state ministers should be appointed by Imperial order. An Imperial command ^{is} designation by name. I doubt if it is a procedure suited to the consent as has been practiced hitherto. I believe it proper for His Majesty to make direct appointments according to the cabinet members' list, without any consultation having been carried on in advance with the persons concerned.

WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.

WAKATSUKI: Do you mean to say that we shouldn't accept their private consent?

HIROTA: I didn't mean that we must not accept.

KIDO: I shall also give my opinion. As I had said previously now that the Japanese soil is on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening of the government has become all the more necessary, and therefore an imposing and sedate cabinet which has the confidence of the people must be established. From this point, I think the opinion of His Excellency TOJO is plausible but, personally, I hope to have His Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion.

TOJO: At the present when our land is about to become a battlefield we must take special care, or else there is a fear that the Army may take an aloof standing. If the Army takes an aloof standing, the cabinet will collapse.

KIDO: At this time it will be most grave if the Army takes an aloof standing. Is there any omen or premonition of it?

TOJO: Can't say there is none.

KIDO: As I have said a little while ago, the anti-militaristic sentiments are quite strong and there are possibilities of having the people take an aloof standing.

OKADA: At this occasion when we are confronted with a grave situation, a national crisis -- what do you mean by "taking an aloof standing" to a person who received the Imperial Command! Whose responsibility is the national defense? Are they not the Army and Navy?

TOJO: Because of that apprehension, I said to take care.

WAKATSUKI: If there is such apprehension now, it is a serious matter. I believe that insofar as the Japanese people are concerned, there isn't a bit of such a thing.
Meeting adjourned at 8:00 P.M.

286. The Prosecution's Exhibit 1282 as corrected says "At the conclusion of the meeting, the Senior Statesmen were asked to affix their private seals." This is not translated properly. The correct translation is "At the conclusion of the meeting the Senior Statesmen were given a dinner by the Emperor!" The Emperor did not attend. Because Baron SUZUKI had stated that he would like to decline the offer as the next Premier, after all the conferees took dinner, therefore, I invited him to the audience chamber where the Conference of Senior Statesmen had taken place and entreated him to accept it without being trammelled by his past professions or protestations if he was commanded by the Emperor to form a succeeding Cabinet. Before that I explained to him the development of the war situation up to the present. On that occasion, I dwelt on the gravity of the war situation and made an allusion to the necessity for a volteface in policy. Baron SUZUKI said he fully understood me and told me that if he was commanded by the Emperor to form a succeeding Cabinet, nothing else would be his mission. I felt greatly reassured. He accepted the Imperial Mandate at 10 P.M. after I had fully explained the meeting of the Senior Statesmen to His Majesty, and had recommended Baron SUZUKI as Premier.

287. Within a month of the formation of the SUZUKI Cabinet, Germany collapsed and surrendered unconditionally to the Allies.

Up to Germany's surrender, it was thought that it would be open to criticisms from the viewpoint of international faith to make peace proposals on the part of the Emperor even if the

time had virtually come for the purpose, especially since Japan concluded a non-separate-peace treaty with Germany. Now that Germany was gone, I believed that it would be desirable for the Emperor to make up his mind at this juncture, as peace would be restored to the world according to Japan's attitude.

288. That the war situation of the Okinawas was hopeless, that with the bombing attacks by B-29's being intensified, many middle and small towns were burnt and a large number of people were rendered homeless, that production of aircraft and other munitions recorded a sharp drop, that the home forces, who would engage the invading Americans in a decisive battle in the Japanese mainland were poorly equipped -- all this had gradually come to the knowledge of His Majesty, who was greatly concerned over the situation, His Majesty asked me if there was no way of retrieving the situation. I understood that His Majesty asked Prime Minister SUZUKI the same question. In this direction, however, the Cabinet took no special measure.

And events took their course of their own.

On April 21, 1945, when the new Foreign Minister TOGO called on me, I had the first of a number of talks with him on the question of peace negotiations. Since then, I had free and frank exchanges of views with him on measures for saving the situation from time to time. Many people, not in government circles, called on me to express their views, feeling deep concern over the situation. For instance, Professors MINAMIHARA and TAKAGI of the Imperial University of Tokyo called on me several times and gave me very useful suggestions. I had heart-to-heart talks with them. The various talks I had with the foregoing and others are mentioned in my diary for April, May and June, 1945.

289. The SUZUKI Cabinet decided to open the Diet early in June.

In view of the fact that a strong war sentiment used to be the keynote of Diet speeches in the past, I did not think that a Diet held at this juncture would have desirable effects on the outside world as it would hamper peace moves. Therefore, I inwardly embraced misgivings about the developments of the Diet situation. Prior to the opening of the Diet, however, the military petitioned the Emperor to hold an Imperial conference in the presence of His Majesty in connection with the future direction of war. The military did not mean to terminate hostilities, but instead wanted to continue warlike operations so as to make a bid for a decisive battle on the Japanese mainland, while admitting difficulty in the prosecution of war on the basis of Japan's resources. The Imperial conference was held in the presence of the Emperor on June 8, 1945. I was deeply moved by Imperial solicitude, so that I was convinced that there was no time to be lost. On June 8, 1945, therefore, I made up my mind and drafted a tentative peace plan for saving the situation (Jikyoku shushuno taisaku shian). It was my intention to effect a great reorientation for terminating the war, by stressing to Prime Minister SUZUKI, and the three Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs my tentative peace plan. My plan appears in my diary for that day as follows:

"June 8, 1945

Drafted a tentative plan of counter-measures against this national crisis (separate sheets).

(1) It is apparent that the fighting at Okinawa will, contrary to our expectations, end most unhappily on our part. Moreover, it is almost sure that the end will come in the very near future.

(2) The statistics for our national power, appended for reference on the bills for the council in the Presence of the Emperor, reveal the fact that after the latter half of the year we shall practically completely lose our power in every way for prosecuting war.

(3) Needless to say, that layman as I am in this field, I am not in a position to judge correctly what strategy the enemy will take in the future. Judging, however, by the formidable power displayed by the enemy air force's mass attacks with incendiary bombs, it would no be difficult, nor would it take much time, to make a holocaust of all towns and villages throughout this country. If the enemy resorts to tactics to destroy dwelling houses, loss of spare clothes and food stocks will follow in its wake. Farm villages have not been accustomed to air raids. Therefore, if they are suddenly subjected to aerial attacks, they will lose their all, especially since it will be extremely difficult for them to disperse their belongings and stocks in advance. There are but meager anti-air raid defences in small towns and villages. Therefore, in case they are subjected to aerial attacks, their losses will be all the greater.

(4) If my above assumption is not grossly mistaken, a keen shortage of food and clothes will occur throughout the country in and after the latter half of this year. This, coupled with the advent of winter will cause social unrest of alarming proportions. I fear that the situation may get out of control.

(5) From the above angle, I think Japan is called upon to take a resolute move for restoring peace, by terminating hostilities. By what method and step shall this object be attained, then? This is the question, which calls for the most cautious study.

(6) It is almost certain in the light of various announcements, speeches and essays, made public by the enemy by way of a peace offensive that it is the enemy's major object to overthrow the so-called gumbatsu or militarists in this country.

(7) I believe, therefore, that the orthodox way of opening peace negotiation will be to propose peace on the part of the fighting services and then decide on a peace plan and open peace negotiation on the part of the Government. But it will be almost impossible to do so at this juncture, judging by Japan's actual conditions. Further if we wait for the opportunity to ripe for it, it may become possible too late and Japan may share Germany's fate, so that even security of the Imperial family and vindication of the national polity, Japan's minimum demands, may not be guaranteed.

(8) In the light of precedents, it will be exceptional and we shall be struck with awe and trepidation to do so, but I believe that there will be no other courses left to us but to petition for Imperial intervention for the sake of the people and take peace moves, by terminating hostilities in accordance with the following policy.

(9) Negotiation will be started with the intermediary Power in pursuance of the Emperor's personal message. It may be a good idea to open peace negotiation direct with

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... America and Britain, if possible, but it may be more advisable to ask the Soviet Union, which maintains neutrality with Japan, to mediate between Japan and the allies with some latitude allowed to this country.

(10) The keynote of the Emperor's personal message will follow that of the Imperial Rescript on the declaration of war, emphasizing His Majesty's constant concern for peace and his decision to conclude peace with general terms in view of war ravages and for the sake of world peace, by bearing the unbearable. The limit of peace terms Honorable peace (it may be inevitable that this will be the minimum term).

If guarantee is obtained that the Pacific be made true to its name, in view of the object of Japan's declaration of war, Japan will renounce her right of occupation and claim of leadership for those areas now under her occupation, if only the nations and peoples there attain their independence. The Japanese armed forces, stationed in the areas under occupation will be withdrawn by Japan, at her own initiative. (In this case, some Japanese forces may be compelled to abandon their arms on the spot, but it may be left to future negotiation).

(11) As for armament reduction, Japan must be prepared to make a pretty heavy reduction in armament, which she will be demanded to effect. There will be no alternative for Japan but to be content with a minimum armament, required for her national defence. This is my personal opinion, which is candidly expressed. It contains only the essential points. It goes without saying that terms of negotiation and others will have to be adjusted by seeking the views of experts in various quarters."

290. With my tentative peace plan being decided as shown above, I showed it to Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA the next day, that is, June 9, 1945 and had a full exchange of views with him on it. Prior to this, I had been secretly in touch with Mr. KASE of the Foreign Office and Colonel MATSUTANI of the War Ministry through Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA in connection with peace moves or measures for terminating the war. If my tentative peace plan was to be put into practice, therefore, it was necessary to seek their views. So I asked Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA to get in touch with them immediately. At 1:30 p.m., the same day, I had an audience with the Emperor when I fully reported to His Majesty on my tentative peace plan and obtained

Imperial sanction to consult the Prime Minister, and the three Ministers - War, Navy and Foreign Affairs thereanent. His Majesty, who was as deeply concerned as anybody else over the adverse developments of the War situation was greatly satisfied with my memorial, especially since His Majesty grieved that many medium and small open towns were reduced to ashes by bombing attacks one after another in quick succession, with a large number of innocent people being rendered homeless. His Majesty commanded me to set my hand to the tentative peace plan immediately. My diary for June 9, 1945 states:

"June 9, 1945. At 11 a.m., I had a full exchange of views with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA on the counter-measures against the pending national crisis. From 1:30 to 2 p.m., I had an audience with the Emperor at Gobunko, when I fully reported to the Throne on the measures for saving the national situation. His Majesty was pleased to tell me his intentions."

291. The Diet happened to be in session, so that Prime Minister SUZUKI and all other Cabinet Ministers were very busy. So I refrained from approaching them with the peace plan. It was on June 13, 1945, the day when the Diet was formally closed, that I had talks with Prime Minister SUZUKI and Navy Minister YONAI about the peace plan. At 10 a.m., June 13, 1945 Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the Palace when I met and told him my idea roughly. I promised him to meet him again later. Then, Navy Minister YONAI proceeded to the Palace when I met and told him my idea, stressing to him that a survey of the outlook on the war situation showed that there was no time to be lost. I was acquainted with Navy Minister YONAI's frame of mind through Mr. HIROSE, Hisatada so that I did not anticipate any opposition to my idea from the Navy Minister. When he heard my plan, Navy Minister YONAI entirely agreed with me. But he complained that the Prime Minister's real intentions were not yet fully known to him and, therefore, that he could not launch a movement for peace while he was a Cabinet Minister. Pointing out that I had an appointment with the Prime Minister to see him later, I

assured Navy Minister YONAI that I would ascertain the Prime Minister's real intentions and let him know. I pledged with Navy Minister YONAI to be in closer touch henceforth and do our best together for attainment of the common object.

292. At 3:30 p.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI came to my room when I had a talk with him about the outlook on the war situation. I asked him how long he thought Japan's fighting power would last. The Prime Minister replied that August would witness a sharp drop in Japan's fighting potential. Thereupon, I told him my idea. After telling him about the details of my report to the Throne on my tentative peace plan which was approved by His Majesty, I laid bare my heart to him and urged him to do his best for termination of the war for the sake of the Imperial family's security and safeguarding of the national polity. My appeal struck a sympathetic chord in the Prime Minister who emphatically pledged to do his bit. I felt greatly reassured. On that occasion, I told him about my interview with Navy Minister YONAI which had just preceded my meeting with the Prime Minister, and said that the Navy Minister was afraid that the Prime Minister might be pretty vigorous in his sentiment. The Prime Minister smiled and said: "Is that so? On my part, I thought YONAI was pretty strong in his sentiment." This episode brought to light that both the Prime Minister and the Navy Minister were likeminded. It was very lucky for the smooth progress of the task. My diary for June 13, 1945 records:

"June 13, 1945 My gracious!
Had an interview with Navy Minister YONAI in His Majesty's library when I had talks with him about counter-measures to save the situation. At 3:30 p.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI came to my room to have talks with me about the same topic. I felt assured to learn that he was as anxious as I."

293. Navy Minister YONAI on June 15, 1945 came to my room and

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told me about his interview with the Prime Minister. He said that he advised Prime Minister SUZUKI, who was scheduled to visit the Grand Shrines at Ise on June 16, to strengthen his determination, by reporting it to the Sun Goddess. On my part, I told the Navy Minister about my own interview with the Prime Minister. I took occasion to express my hope that Navy Minister YONAI would not only fully cooperate with Prime Minister SUZUKI, but also to encourage him. I also had an interview with Foreign Minister TOGO in my room at 10 a.m., June 15, 1945, when I asked him to formulate a definite peace plan, after telling him about my tentative peace plan, which was approved by the Emperor. I had talks with Foreign Minister TOGO before about this question. In principle, he was not opposed to my tentative peace plan, but pointing out the vigorous war decision just recently adopted at the Imperial conference in the presence of the Emperor, he wondered how to adjust the peace plan with it. He feared that from the viewpoint of conducting routine business, the Foreign Office would be in a very difficult position. I was not unaware of it. On the contrary, the very decision, adopted by the Imperial conference, impelled me to make an extraordinary determination, as I was convinced that it would not serve any purpose. Assuring him that I would do my best so as to facilitate the Foreign Minister's work, I requested Mr. TOGO to formulate a definite peace plan without delay. My diary for June 15, 1945 states:

"June 15, 1945

At 10:00 Foreign Minister TOGO called at my office to discuss measures for saving the situation. At 11:00 Navy Minister YONAI called and gave me detailed reports of his interview with the Prime Minister."

294. On the other hand, War Minister ANAMI happened to call on me on some other business on June 18, 1945. I took occasion to

ask for his approval of my tentative peace plan, after telling him about the steps taken for terminating the war. The War Minister was generally of the same opinion as I concerning the outcome of the Okinawa campaign and the outlook on the war situation, but argued that it would be better to take peace moves after dealing the enemy a telling blow in case he undertook landing operations on the Japanese mainland. In reply, I said:

"The enemy will not hurry to undertake landing operations on the Japanese mainland. It is almost certain that prior to undertaking landing operations, the enemy will make a holocaust of medium and small towns throughout the country to demoralize the Japanese people. The Americans are now taking great pains for deployment as preliminary to their landing operations on the Japanese mainland. When this deployment is completed, their terms will not be easy ones. If so, the Japanese will have no other course left to them but to fight to the bitter end. In such an eventuality, there will be little hope of safeguarding of the national polity. This is the point about which the Emperor is most solicitous."

295. It was with difficulty that I persuaded War Minister ANAMI to approve my tentative peace plan. Although I tried to keep my efforts for peace as secret as possible, the Army suspected what I was doing and there was some talk they wanted to oust me as Lord Keeper. War Minister ANAMI spoke to me about this. My diary for June 18, 1945 says:

"June 18, 1945
At 11:00, War Minister ANAMI called and spoke the progress of the Diet session, his connection with GOKOKU DOSHI KAI Society, the rumor regarding the change of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Chinese policy, the Yen-an operations (for an armistice), etc. I then brought out the question of the measures to be taken in the present situation."

296. On his return from Ise where he visited the Grand Shrines, Prime Minister SUZUKI toward the evening of June 18, 1945 called a meeting of the component members of the Supreme Council for Direction of War and had free and frank exchanges of views with them on the termination of the war. On June 20, 1945 Prime Minister

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Minister SUZUKI told me about the said meeting. In short, the War Minister and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy expected much of the imminent decisive battle on the mainland. They argued that it would be better to start peace negotiation on top of the military achievements to be attained on that occasion. It was understood, however, that agreement of views was reached by all conferees that efforts be put forth to seize an opportunity for restoring peace. In consequence, I had an audience with the Emperor at 1:50 p.m., when I reported to His Majesty on what the Prime Minister told me. Now that everything had gone on so smoothly, I suggested His Majesty to summon the component members of the Supreme Council for Direction of War and command them to terminate the war, especially since Foreign Minister TOGO felt so apprehensive about the recent decision of the Imperial conference. My suggestion was approved by His Majesty. My diary reports:

"June 20, 1945. Wednesday.. Fine.

At 9 a.m. Mr. KIMURA, Masayoshi called and spoke on the conditions in SHIKOKU. At 11:30 Premier SUZUKI spoke to me about the meeting held on the 18th inst. From 1:50 to 2:15, attended on the Emperor at Gobunke and reported on the latest state of progress in our 'saving the situation' attempt.

At 2:30 called in the Chief Aide-de-Camp at his office and talked with him on the same subject. At 3:30 Mr. IWANAMI, Director of the Bureau of the Imperial Treasury, called. At 3:45 Foreign Minister TOGO called and we had a close talk over our 'saving the situation' measures."

297. On June 21, 1945 I had a talk with Prince KONOYE about the war and the necessity for strenuous efforts for an early peace. I also had an audience with His Majesty and upon being asked about the coming meeting of the Supreme Council for Direction of War, I advised him that he should state that the previous decision of June 8, 1945 should not hamper peace efforts. I told the Chief Aide-de-Camp there was to be a meeting of the Supreme Council in the presence of the Emperor. My diary for that day says:

"June 21, 1945

Thursday, Fine.

On duty at 10 a.m. At 12:30 Prince KONOYE called and spoke on the transition of the war situation. From 2:15 to 2:50 attended on the Emperor and presented my advice regarding the remarks His Majesty should make at the coming meeting of the Supreme War Directing Council. At 3:00, called the Chief Aide-de-Camp at his office and communicated with him about His Majesty's summons for a meeting of the War Directing Council."

298. On June 22, 1945, I made an arrangement with the Chief Aide-de-Camp to call the Council. They were summoned by the Emperor at 3 p.m., when Imperial wishes for the termination of the war were conveyed to them. My diary states:

"June 22, 1945. Friday. Fine.

On duty at Gobunko from 12:30 to 1:00. At 9:00 a.m.

Mr. SATO, Mitsugu called.

From 1:25 to 1:55 attended on the Emperor at Gobunko. Made arrangements for the meeting of the War Directing Council with the Chief Aide-de-Camp at 2:00 and with the Grand Chamberlain at 2:15. At 2:45, Premier SUZUKI called to get in touch with me about the same matter. At 3:00 His Majesty summoned the members of the Supreme War Directing Council and communicated to them his desire regarding the conclusion of war. Attended on Emperor at Gobunko from 3:50 to 4:05 and obtained the reports of the meeting as shown in the annexed paper.

At 5:00 returned home. Mr. AIKAWA, Katsuroku called.

(Appended Note, dated June 22, 1945)

At 3:50 p.m., attended on the Emperor at Gobunko in response to his call. His Majesty spoke on the meeting of the members of the Supreme War Directing Council which he had summoned at 3:00 p.m. His Majesty said to the effect: The basic policy for directing the War had been decided on at a previous council in the presence of the Emperor. For the measures for bringing the war to a close, it is also desired that we should, without being hampered by traditional ideas, study

subject in this

concrete means and strive for their prompt realization. When the Emperor asked for the opinion of the Premier, the Premier replied that the measures should be taken as His Majesty desired. Then Navy Minister YONAI, prefacing that he was probably intruding on the competence of the Foreign Minister in making such remarks, said that he had this mind as the third item of the plan he had ready at the previous council in the presence of the Emperor, but that the time was now pressing for its quick realization. Foreign Minister TOGO endorsed and supplemented the Navy Minister's answer. Finally His Majesty asked the opinion of General UMEZU, Chief of the General Staff, who answered that though he had no objection to the plan, great caution must be used to carry it out. Thereupon the Emperor, after submitting the necessity of caution asked if, being too cautious, we might not miss the chance. The Staff Chief answered definitely that we needed promptness."

299. Baron Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council, called on me on June 25, 1945, when I obtained his approval of my tentative peace plan, after telling him about the developments of the situation up to date. Prior to this, the Government at the instance of Foreign Minister TOGO had opened secret negotiations with the Soviet ambassador in Tokyo through Mr. KOKI HIROTA, but they made no progress at all. On the other hand, the Supreme Council for Direction of War in pursuance of Imperial wishes had been studying peace terms and others, but no agreement of views was reached. It would appear that time was wasted all around. The Emperor was deeply concerned over the situation, so that His Majesty told me about it. On my part, when I met Prime Minister SUZUKI and Foreign Minister TOGO, I urged them to hurry up. I happened to be ill and was confined to my home for several days. On July 3, 1945, the Grand Chamberlain under Imperial command called on me to seek my views. In response, I asked the Grand Chamberlain to submit my views to His Majesty that it would be proper for His Majesty to urge the Prime Minister to hurry up. As result, the Emperor on July 7, 1945, summoned Prime Minister SUZUKI to the palace and commanded him to enter into peace negotiation immediately. My diary for July 7, 1945 says;

"July 7, 1945. At 2:00 p.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI came to my room and told me as in the annexed paper:

(Annexed paper):

"I was just received in audience by the Emperor who summoned me to the palace. His Majesty asked me how the negotiation with the Soviet Union was since going on. His Majesty went on:

'It will not do to miss the opportunity by sounding the Soviet Union's real intentions. How about frankly asking the Soviet Union now for her mediation? How about dispatching a special envoy there with my personal message?'
I was moved by His Majesty's wise decision."

300. It may be seen from the extracts from my diary that the Government was too much engrossed in sounding the Soviet Union's real intentions with the result that the peace negotiation, which was most important made no progress at all. With the Imperial reminder to the Prime Minister, the peace negotiation apparently got under way. Foreign Minister TOGO on July 10, 1945, and Prime Minister SUZUKI on July 11, 1945, told me about the subsequent development of the situation, when I spoke with them on the peace plan. The Government referred the question of dispatching a special envoy to the Soviet Union to the Supreme Council for Direction of War, which decided that Prince KONOYE be sent to the Soviet Union as special envoy. On the morning of July 12, 1945, Prime Minister SUZUKI told me to that effect when he expressed his desire that as the matter required urgency, His Majesty personally should command Prince KONOYE to accept the mission. I was happy to hear of his proposal. Prince KONOYE chanced to return to Tokyo from Karuizawa the same day and proceed to the palace, so that the Emperor on that occasion summoned the Prince and commanded him to accept the mission. Thereupon, the Government instructed Ambassador SATO in Moscow to make a demarche to the Soviet Government about the dispatch of Prince KONOYE. The negotiation with the Soviet Union appeared to hold out hope. My diary for July 12, 1945, records:

"July 12, 1945. At 9:20 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI called and told me about the matter, mentioned in the annexed paper. From 10:10 to 10:50 a.m. I had an audience with the Emperor in his library. From 10:55 to 11:50 a.m., I had another audience with the Emperor when I submitted my views to His Majesty on the question as to who should be present at the audience to be granted to Prince KONOYE and obtained Imperial sanction.

At 11:30 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the palace. Before he was received in audience, I had an interview with him in His Majesty's library. At 2:00 p.m., Prince KONOYE came to my room when I told him about developments of the situation. At 2:50 p.m., I had an audience with the Emperor. Then, Prince KONOYE was received in audience. From 3:35 to 3:50 p.m., I had another audience with the Emperor, when His Majesty told me about his audience granted to Prince KONOYE. At 4:00 p.m., Navy Minister YONAI came to my room when I had a talk with him.

(Annexed paper)

At 9:20 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI called on me suddenly and told me to the following effect: 'I had talks with the Foreign Minister about the special envoy to be dispatched to the Soviet Union, but I should like to enlist the services of Prince KONOYE at this juncture as special envoy to the Soviet Union. Originally, Prince KONOYE was to have come up to Tokyo yesterday, so I wanted to persuade him personally to accept the offer. But he changed his plan, and it is expected that he will come up to town this morning. As there is no time to be lost, it will be better for the Emperor to command or ask Prince KONOYE directly to accept the special mission to the Soviet Union, which will be an honor to the Prince, than to waste time in persuading the Prince to accept the offer on my part. I should like to submit my views to the Emperor to that effect informally this morning.' Thereupon, I told the Prime Minister that the Emperor was now so enthusiastic over the matter that His Majesty made up his mind to send his personal message. I approved his proposal, saying that it would be rather a good idea. At 10:10 a.m., I had an audience with the Emperor in his library when I reported to His Majesty on the matter in advance. His Majesty was graciously pleased to approve of it, and decided to summon Prince KONOYE this afternoon. At 10:55 a.m., I had another audience with the Emperor when I suggested His Majesty that Prince KONOYE be received in audience without anyone being present at it, as exception. Recalling the inception of the practice that those other than the Minister of State must be received in audience by the Emperor in the presence of somebody else, the Emperor said that when the salary cut question arose during the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet, a certain TSUTSUMI, former classmate of Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI, who was then serving with the Railway Ministry, was reported to have submitted his personal report to the Throne. It came in for a storm of criticisms. Hence, His Majesty remarked, it was formally established that audiences be granted to those other than the Ministers of State in the presence of somebody else. In the case of Prince KONOYE, therefore, His Majesty said that there would be no necessity for it, and took my suggestion.

At 11:00 a.m., Prime Minister SUZUKI proceeded to the Palace. Before he was received in audience by the Emperor, I had an interview with him. On that occasion, the Prime Minister told me that as the result of subsequent to cable to Ambassador SATO in Moscow about the dispatch of a special envoy to the Soviet Union with regard to the termination of the war for communication to the Soviet Government as immediate steps. It was suggested (by Mr. SHIDEHARA and other) to defer the communication of the name of the special envoy and the Imperial message to another occasion. The Prime Minister also expressed his desire that His Majesty seek Prince KONOYE's views on the termination of the war and ask the latter to accept the possible offer in the event of a special envoy being sent to the Soviet Union, thereby reserving some latitude for his choice.

(Annexed paper)

At 2:00 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace and visited me at my office. I informed him of the progress of affairs since this morning. At 2:50, prior to the scheduled audience of Prince KONOYE with the Emperor, I proceeded before the Throne, and by way of precaution, reported on the matter of which Premier SUZUKI had told me this morning. At 3:00 Prince KONOYE was received in audience by His Majesty, and retired from the Imperial presence at 3:15. Then he came to my office and spoke with me to the following effect:

'At the audience, His Majesty asked my opinion on the question of putting an end to the War.' To this, I replied as follows:

'Recently, I have often heard explanations, from Army personnel, of the possibility of the execution of the War. These explanations might not be wholly groundless, granted that the figures cited by the exponents be trustworthy. But, on the other hand, explanations on the part of the Navy suggest the untrustworthiness of such figures. Meanwhile, the morale of the general public cannot be said to be high. The only remaining hope of the people is that the Emperor may do something for them in some way or other as a last resort. Moreover, there are signs, though as yet sporadic, that show resentment in some circles towards His Majesty. In view of these tendencies, I believe it imperative to terminate the War as early as possible. Thereupon, His Majesty remarked that He has the intention eventually to send me to the Soviet Union as a special envoy, and asked me to be prepared for it. I accepted the order respectfully.'

In response to an Imperial Summons, I proceeded before the Throne (in the Gabunko) at 3:35. At this audience, the Emperor told me follows:

"I have roughly disclosed my opinion to KONOYE and asked his opinion on the future course of the War. He

replied that it is necessary to end the War. Therefore, I asked him if he would comply with my desire to send him to the Soviet Union. Thereupon, he replied that he is ready to sacrifice his life in order to comply with my will making me recall how I had told him, at the time of the formation of the Second KONOE Cabinet, to share both joy and grief with me. This time he seems to be firmly determined."

301, It transpired later that it was one day before the departure of Stalin and Molotov for the Potsdam Conference that the Government's instruction reached the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. No definite reply was forthcoming from the Soviet Government which communicated to the Japanese Embassy that it would give its reply after the return of Stalin and Molotov from Potsdam. Thus, prior to the Soviet Union's reply to Japan's demarche, the Potsdam Declaration was issued by the Allies at Potsdam all of a sudden. Now that things came to such a pass, I could not but foresee that Japan's peace problem would be confronted with difficulty of no small proportions. On August 6, 1945, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb at Hiroshima, nearly reducing the entire city to ashes at a stroke. Japan had been on tiptoe of expectation of a reply from the Soviet Union. It was anticipated that Stalin and Molotov would return to Moscow on August 6 or 7 when they would reply to Japan's demarche, as promised. But Japan's expectation was nullified. Not only that, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and a state of war began to exist between the two countries on August 9, 1945.

302, On that morning I had an audience with the Emperor when I advised him that there was no alternative left to Japan at this juncture but to accept the Potsdam Declaration and terminate the war as already decided by His Majesty. The Emperor who was like minded commanded me to have a full talk with the Prime Minister, as it might be necessary to study and decide a termination of the war without loss of time. The events of August 9, :

1945

are recorded in my diary for that day. The Prosecution introduced only six lines of my diary for August 9, 1945, (Exh. 1263.), the complete entry being as follows:

"August 9, 1945, At 9:00 a.m., Mr. Yutaka Oshima and Mr. Mitsugi Saito called on me when I listened to their views on the policy toward the Soviet Union. From 9:55 to 10:00 a.m., I had an audience with the Emperor in his library when His Majesty commanded me to have full talks with the Prime Minister about the peace plan or termination of the war, which it might be necessary to study and decide without loss of time, after pointing out that the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and a state of war began to exist between the two countries today. Fortunately as I had an appointment to meet the Prime Minister this morning, I replied to His Majesty that I would confer with the Prime Minister immediately.

At 10:10 a.m., Prime Minister Suzuki came to my room when I conveyed Imperial wishes to him. I took occasion to stress the necessity for making peace, by taking advantage of the Potsdam Declaration. I also asked the Prime Minister to explain to the Senior Statesmen the situation in advance, reminding him that the Emperor wanted to seek their view of the importance of the matter. The Prime Minister left me, saying that they would like to decide Japan's attitude, by holding the Supreme Council for Direction of War at 10:30 a.m. I had another audience with the Emperor in his library from 10:55 to 11:45 a.m. when I reported my talks with the Prime Minister to His Majesty.

At 1:00 p.m., Prince Konoye came to my room when I had a free and frank exchange of views with him on the situation. At 1:30 p.m., Prime Minister Suzuki came to my room when he told me that the Supreme Council for Direction of War decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the following four conditions:

- (1) Preservation of the Imperial House.
- (2) Withdrawal of the Japanese troops on Japan's own initiative.
- (3) Those responsible for the war - be dealt with by the Japanese Government.
- (4) No guarantee occupation be carried out."

(The entry of 1:30 p.m. is contained in Exhibit 1263.)

My statement is erroneous. I found out recently that the Supreme Council for Direction of War did not make the decision mentioned. They had it under discussion.) My diary continues:

"At 2:00 p.m., the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my room when I received information on the war situation along the border between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union. At 2:45 p.m., His Highness Prince Takamatsu personally telephoned me, expressing his fear that a conditional acceptance might be regarded by the Allies as refusal as well as his views on measures to save the situation. From 3:15 to 3:20 p.m., I had an audience with the Emperor in his library to report to His Majesty on the apprehension, voiced by His Highness Prince Takamatsu.

As Prince Liqin was killed when Hiroshima was bombed,

I visited his palace to express my condolences. At 4:00 p.m., Shigemitsu came to my room when he urged me to act tactfully, contending that the peace negotiation was sure to break down in case Japan submitted the four conditions in accepting the Potsdam Declaration.

From 4:35 to 5:10 p.m., I had another audience with the Emperor in his library. At 6:30 p.m., I returned home. At 8:00 p.m., I attended office again. From 10:50 to 10:53 p.m., I had still another audience with the Emperor to report to His Majesty on a change in the Cabinet's countermeasures."

(It was at this time that the Cabinet being unable to arrive at a decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the sole condition of preservation of the Imperial House, decided to submit it to the Emperor for decision. As explained above, the Supreme Council had not made a decision at 1:30 p.m., so this was not a change of decision). My diary continues:

"Prime Minister Suzuki was received in audience when he petitioned His Majesty to hold an Imperial conference and to permit Baron Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council to attend the said conference. From 11:25 to 11:37 p.m., I had another audience with the Emperor. The Imperial Conference was held in the presence of His Majesty in the room attached to his library from 11:50 p.m. August 9 to 2:20 a.m., Aug. 10 when it was decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration on the sole condition of reaffirmation of the Emperor's sovereignty and the Imperial House, the draft plan prepared by the Foreign Minister, thanks to His Majesty's decision."

303, My diary for the next day, Aug 10, 1945 follows:

"Aug. 10, 1945:

Following the close of the Imperial Conference, I was summoned by the Emperor and had an audience with His Majesty from 2:32 to 2:38 a.m., when His Majesty told me about the Imperial decision. I listened, filled with emotion and trepidation. The memorable Imperial decision is as follows in substance:

'The Army vigorously advocates the necessity of giving a decisive battle to the invading enemy on the homeland. But fortifications on Iujukuri-hama (beach), which are most important are not yet completed, nor is equipment of the division of the Army which will give the said decisive battle to the enemy complete. I understand the division's equipment will not be completed before the middle of September. Nor is the increased production of aircraft going on smoothly. Planning is not followed by practice on all occasions. Such being the case, how can we win the war? Needless to say that I could not bear the sight of our loyal troops being disarmed or those responsible for the war being punished, especially since they were unswerving in their devotion and unalloyed in their loyalty to me. But I think that now is the time to bear the unbearable. Recalling the Emperor Meiji's feeling when he was confronted with the Triple Intervention, I repress my tears and approve the draft plan.