

THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME
JAPAN, 1945-1971.

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THE POSTWAR SEA FORCES OF MARITIME JAPAN

1945-1971--Continued

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maintain, are Polaris missile submarines which have completely failed in their missions if they ever have to fire since they are supposed to be so invulnerable that they will deter a strike by a potential aggressor. Uniformed leaders are persuaded that possessing "defensive weapons only" is either an economic expedient or foolishly naïve. "Exclusively defensive" strategy is not felt adequate for a sea force even though on the ground it might be more advantageous, as von Clausewitz pointed out, because there are no long supply lines to contend with as the extended attacking enemy must do.¹⁴ On the sea, they argue, as

¹⁴It is necessary to distinguish the serious effort by civilian and military (including MSDF) leaders of the Defense Agency to implement a primarily defensive strategy from terms that have been used politically and economically like senshu boei (exclusive self-defense) and jishu boei (autonomous defense). Particularly under the administration of Director General Nakasone, jishu boei, which was in the past employed in an economic sense to encourage newly independent Japan that like jishu gaiko (autonomous diplomacy) it now also had to develop an independent capability in defense industry, has been picked up as a political term to stress that Japan needs to expand its defense strength if not to remain a "bed partner" of the United States. Nakasone's white paper used the terms senryaku shusei (strategic defense), which was adopted by some military leaders after a National Defense College professor pointed out to them that Mao Tse-tung had ridiculed the concept of exclusive self-defense as ludicrous, and jishu boei in his stated attempt to make defense

Mahan pointed out, all of a navy's advantages come from the ability to remain mobile; offensive and defensive strategies cannot be separated, the latter being rigidly fixed. A nation can either move freely on the sea with its navy and its commerce or it cannot; whether it chooses to move on the sea with offensive intentions or merely to assert its right to the use of international waters, it must have mobile ocean-going sea forces able to insure that movement against defenders or offenders, respectively, who might otherwise interfere with it. Naval leaders see some truth in Mao Tse-tung's ridicule of "exclusive self-defense." They would hate to see China with many more people but

understandable to housewives. Nakasone has also tried to advance the concept of hikaku chukyu kokka (middle class non-nuclear nation) and to change the Basic National Defense Policy to his own five principles of jishu boei. Particularly on the latter attempt he has been resisted by Kaihara; and in both cases he has so far been privately and publicly rejected by Prime Minister Sato. I am indebted to Professor Ito Kobun of the National Defense College, who delivered the lecture pointing out Mao Tse-tung's condemnation, for his detailed explanation of these terms. Interview with Professor Ito, April 20, 1971; interview with Kaihara, April 23, 1971. Sato's public disapproval of "middle class non-nuclear nation" is mentioned in The Daily Yomiuri, March 17, 1971 and of the revision of the Basic National Defense Policy in The Daily Yomiuri, March 29, 1971.

much weaker economically able to interfere with Japan's rights on the seas because Japan had limited itself to local territorial defense. They consider a Chinese clenched fist more offensive than Japanese nuclear submarines but realize that if the Chinese build nuclear submarines, the MSDF may not be able to clench its fist in defense; and they do not feel that Article 9 of the Constitution should ban clenched fists. Although Kaihara feels that some young officers of the MSDF, who do not have visions of grandeur based on past experience in the Imperial Navy, support his position, and some young officers are willing to express that view privately, there are also some young Defense Agency civilians who think along the lines just described.

But this philosophy has primarily continued because, unlike the leadership in the GSDF and ASDF which admitted many former police officials or other outside groups when they were organized, the MSDF has been led from one month after its birth by a straight line of former Imperial Navy officers who have followed their orders but have kept their options open as to the direction the MSDF

would eventually go.¹⁵ These uniformed officers have been supported politically by Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo, who entered the House of Councillors in 1954 and remained there until his death in 1964 at the age of 86 and by Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro who has been elected four times to the House of Representatives and was still an active and effective supporter in 1971 at the age of 80. In addition, these two admirals' many friends in the U.S. Navy have supported this idea of a large navy as has the general trend of U.S. government pressure on Japan throughout much of the post-Occupation era. Also, many important people in Japanese business, bureaucratic, and political circles are former Navy officers and support a naval role for maritime Japan.¹⁶ Some academicians knowledgeable in

¹⁵The Coastal Security Force (April-July, 1952), the Maritime Safety Force (August, 1952-June, 1954) and the first month of the MSDF saw leadership in the hands of Admiral Yamazaki Kogoro who had come from MSA and had no Imperial Navy experience. During this time, however, retired Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio was in the next office as advisor, as he had been in the first two years of the MSA; and Vice Admiral Nagasawa Ko, former Imperial Navy captain, as Chief of Operations Division or deputy to Yamazaki, was already in on all important decisions. Interviews with Admiral Yamamoto, December 28, 1970, and Aso Shigeru, December 14, 1970.

¹⁶For example Defense Minister Nakasone was a reserve supply officer in the Imperial Navy and worked for

the field of international politics who have served as government advisors, Foreign Ministry bureaucrats who appreciate the flexibility provided by sea power, and business men worried about the security of Japan's trade routes support a Sekino-like philosophy.

A second reason why the civilian Defense Agency position has not triumphed, however, and a more important one, because it has allowed the MSDF to keep its options open, is the reality of the "non-policy" stance which has been taken in defense. Starting from noble objectives to defend the country, the Japanese government has refused to take a position on the issues disputed by civilians in the Defense Agency and the leadership of the MSDF. Because the forces were initially very small, the lack of a policy and a strategy were not as obvious since an ability to provide any kind of defense was not available. Some maintained there was a real policy to rely on the U.S. for external defense while seeking on Japan's part, mainly to provide for internal security. But as the forces have grown so

Admiral Hoshina with whom he still has private discussions about MSDF matters. Interview with Hoshina, November 30, 1970.

that one or the other line of thinking could possibly be implemented in the future, if a policy decision were settled upon, neither direction has yet been selected for implementation. The government has remained content to allow civilian defense planners to put forth their views on a limited, effective anti-invasion security force; but it has also allowed the MSDF leadership supported by conservative politicians and business elements to build some long lead-time naval vessels which could be used for a future ocean-going navy able to protect Japan's interests in local and more distant waters. It has most of all allowed the Finance Ministry to keep defense expenditures to a very low level of the national budget and national product. By combining all three courses of action the result has been a "non-policy." No effective Japanese defense force to do anything on a sustained basis necessary for security, other than perhaps to sweep mines, which there was a capability for before the Self-Defense Forces came into being, has been achieved, a point on which Kaihara and Sekino both agree.¹⁷

¹⁷Of course there is potential to do many things, in the MSDF because long lead-time items have been built

Diplomacy has achieved varying degrees of success in obtaining United States pledges to defend Japan in time of crisis, and it can be argued that this has been an effective and cheap defense policy since the Peace Treaty, facts proven by no wars in the entire period and a productive economy made possible in part by the lack of necessity to allocate heavily for defense. If this is true and the Self-Defense Forces have merely been a diplomatic disguise to obtain defense from the outside, the Japanese government has misrepresented itself to the United States for twenty years in putting forth its intent and willingness to provide for its own external defense. Rather than criticizing the Japanese, many of the proponents of this theory credit them with having been somehow very wise in their early decision for and successful execution

and in all services because the power of Japanese industry could be applied to them. Although this monograph is concerned only with the MSDF, Kaihara has not restricted his criticism to that service alone. Despite the name, "Rikuhara," he has been critical of the GSDF and ASDF as well, maintaining that none of the services has any capability because of serious lacks of technology, ammunition, and fuel. Details of how these problems affect the MSDF are treated in Part V.

of this policy. Often these analysts say what Japan really wants is its internal security responsibility; but, without denying that any security that has been provided for post-war Japan has essentially been only that given by the United States, it is another thing to say this has been a conscious or wise policy.¹⁸ If internal security was a firm, significant desire, Kaihara's plan should have been fully adopted. What it calls for in its full scope is a balanced land-sea-air guard force to stop territorial penetration or internal rebellion. If the money that has been spent and is predicted for the very near future were allocated as a man like Kaihara has favored and would dictate if given the authorization, such kind of force could be well on its way to establishment and there would presently be a larger capability in a small force with a definite strategy and direction than there is for the now existent ambiguous-symbol force that is crying out for a policy to direct it.

As Japan regains administrative rights to Okinawa, its security guarantees from the United States, which have

¹⁸The most complete and impressive formulation of the internal security policy is that by Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy.

always been less than absolute, reach an even more limited degree. The U.S. policy for the 1950's was massive retaliation with large scale economic aid to its allies including Japan to build up their military forces; for the 1960's it was flexible response with continuing military aid and an unsuccessful attempt to keep enough General Purpose Forces (GPF) to police the world or to fight major wars in Europe and Asia and a small conflict somewhere else simultaneously; in the 1970's the U.S. has admitted that the 1960's strategy was "unrealistic," i.e., the capability was never achieved so that countries such as Japan that were relying on conventional American aid may have been more lucky than wise. Now the U.S. has promised to provide a strategic deterrent for and possible limited naval and air support in coordination with its allies like Japan.¹⁹ Without a realistic strategy of its own, be it Kaihara-style, Sekino-style, or some other, to implement, Japan must rely on some kind of ad hoc strategy in the future should a crisis arise. Without a strategy it will also take longer to achieve

¹⁹Melvin R. Laird, Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, pp. 17-19.

capability, since under the present civil-planner, uniformed-leader, finance-official limited-say, participatory Ringi or matomari system, a consensus is achieved bureaucratically; but with no substantial policy there can be no strategic implementation.²⁰ The result has been an aimless force of limited capability; and there is no better example of that lack of direction and capability than the present day Maritime Self-Defense Force. Yoshida, Hatoyama, Kishi, Ikeda, and Sato, like Ashida and Nomura, have all wanted

²⁰The Ringi system can be described as a method of achieving consensus on the bureaucratic level from the bottom up. Under this system, relatively junior executives of a particular section of a business or government organization discuss an issue until consensus is reached and expressed in a position paper. This position, when approved by the section head, is circulated among other sections who also discuss the issue extensively. Once a lower level consensus among concerned sections is reached, a paper is sent to division leaders on higher levels until finally the corporate head is presented with a paper to almost necessarily pass on to the central decision maker or president for a final decision. Matomari is a not necessarily unrelated process initiated from a higher level. A senior member of a group frequently states a problem on which others are invited to comment, each being careful not to isolate himself as an individual or offend another member by severe criticism. Members comment in a piecemeal fashion as the leader searches for consensus. If agreement cannot be reached immediately, a later meeting can be scheduled with negotiations continuing in the interim. A subsequent meeting will usually result in the all important agreement.

Japan do be defended by Japanese. They did not develop and continue some wise and unchanging policy to be defended by the United States. They have all wanted the best for Japan, and with U.S. support and some amount of good fortune they have done well. But they have never given Japan a defense policy and thus the direction of their armed forces remains unclear heading into its third era since Japan last had such a policy.²¹ What the United States

²¹Tsunoda Jun, presently a research expert of the National Diet Library and professor of Kokugakuin University, a scholar of international politics and diplomatic history who served as a young advisor to Prince Konoye and is known as an expert on the Imperial Navy which he has studied most critically and has lectured and written on extensively in Japan and the United States, has been an official advisor to the ruling party from 1952-1969 and is still sought out by many LDP leaders. Dr. Tsunoda denies the existence of any continuous defense policy. When asked what Japan's policy has been, Tsunoda replied, "I didn't know we had one." More seriously he feels that although Japan has engaged in some diplomatic maneuvering with the United States to obtain American aid, neither country has ever set a consistent policy for Japan. He thinks every prime minister he has advised has wanted defense, but none have been willing to take a serious and substantial position on defense. The main reason for this, Tsunoda offers, is the unwillingness to interfere to any significant extent with economic development. Another is the fact that since self-defense capability was required initially as the price of a Peace Treaty, it has been looked upon by many as a diplomatic effort. The only real policy, Tsunoda concludes, may come in the 1970's if there is an attempt to convert the economic power of the 1960's

and Japan have done for Japan's security will be discussed in the following pages.

D. TO COPE WITH AGGRESSION BY RECOURSE TO THE JOINT SECURITY SYSTEM WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PENDING EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PREVENTING AND REMOVING AGGRESSION

U.S. aid in terms of varied equipment has already been mentioned. There has, however, been an even more valuable contribution to Japan's naval defense which is often underestimated. As part of the Security Treaty, which went into effect simultaneously with the Peace Treaty in 1952, Japan granted the United States use of facilities and areas in Japan. Although there was no express commitment on the part of the U.S. to defend Japan, the flagship of the western Pacific striking force, the Seventh Fleet, was homeported in Yokosuka; and destroyers, minesweepers, amphibious ships, and support vessels were homeported there or in the other large U.S. Navy Fleet

into political power. "Until then what we do is rather meaningless and we have, perhaps naively, lived in the past and are living now on good faith." Interviews with Professor Tsunoda, April, 1971.

Activities base in Sasebo.²² Naval Air Station Atsugi became a convenient location to repair carrier aircraft ashore and a headquarters for land-based anti-submarine warfare patrol planes. In 1960 the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan provided for one of the most generous mutual defense arrangements the United States has ever committed itself to. Article 5 of the Treaty states:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions.²³

Most treaties contain a more mutual statement with respect to an attack on either party. For example, Article 4 of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines states:

²²This is not to say that the U.S. presence, including that of the Seventh Fleet, is not recognized and has not produced some annoyances to the Japanese. But of all U.S. support, the Seventh Fleet's strength is least noticeable since very few of its personnel are shore-based or have families in Japan.

²³Quoted in U.S. Department of State, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan," United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, TIAS 4509, 1960 edition, italics mine.

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.²⁴

The wording of Article 5 was felt essential in the case of Japan since Article 9 of the Constitution was then interpreted to mean that Japan could never send forces out of its own territory in a combat role.

Despite this limitation, the United States agreed to the mutual defense agreement; the Japanese, for their part agreed in Article 6 that:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.²⁵

Of course countries like the Philippines also gave the U.S. bases while still recognizing the necessity to act in response to an attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific area. The Japanese would do so only if U.S. forces were to be attacked in Japanese territory. The first Japanese

²⁴Ibid., "Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines," TIAS 2529, 1952 edition, italics mine.

²⁵Ibid., "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan."

defense white paper bluntly stated the privileged nature of the Japanese situation:

The United States bears the obligations for the defense of Japan. Our country, however, does not bear obligations to come to the defense of the United States forces, even if an armed attack occurs against the territories of the United States or against the United States forces stationed in the areas other than those under the administration of Japan. This arrangement is different from that adopted by the United States-Korea or the United States-China mutual defense treaties, in which the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China respectively adopts the policy of mutual defense with the United States with respect to armed attacks against either party in the Pacific areas.²⁶

In discussing the number of ships and personnel of the Seventh Fleet it must be understood that they do fluctuate considerably from day to day because of its units of all sizes transiting to and from the Western Pacific. As of 1970-1971 official U.S. Navy strength figures were approximately:

Ships:	150, including four Attack Aircraft Carriers (CVAs) and varying numbers of destroyers, minesweepers, service, submarine, and amphibious units.
Aircraft:	550

²⁶The Defense of Japan, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970 (official agency English translation), p. 44.

Personnel: 65,000, including 15,000 marines.²⁷

Although they indicate that Japan cannot have its own offensive striking force capability, its leaders often express their willingness to accept U.S. support in this field. This willingness is confirmed by both Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government leaders as well as opposition members. For example, there was no objection to a recent statement as part of an interpellation in the House of Councillors by Socialist member Maekawa Tadashi:

The Japanese Government has so far been upholding a fundamental defense policy of relying on the United States for nuclear power, while in the conventional military operations, the Self-Defense Forces are responsible for defensive operations leaving the offensive operations to the United States forces. . . .²⁸

Even though very few Seventh Fleet units have maintained their homeports, i.e., families and some supporting equipment, in Japan, Japan is in fact eligible for being protected by the entire force of some 150 ships, 550 aircraft,

²⁷Data provided by U.S. Seventh Fleet Protocol Office, Commander Naval Forces Japan Public Affairs Office, Yokosuka, Japan.

²⁸Translation of Diet interpellation of February 19, 1970, Japan Defense Agency Bulletin, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970, p. 1. The government seems not to object as the argument tends to make its actions appear wise and to make the Self-Defense Forces appear effective.

and 65,000 personnel. Defense Agency Director General Nakasone clearly stated the importance of the U.S. role; he singled out only one of the three U.S. service elements in his major speech of 1970 on the specific subject of mutual security between Japan and the United States: "The American nuclear deterrent and the U.S. Seventh Fleet are indispensable to our defense policy."²⁹

To counter the argument that the U.S. is bearing the majority of the burden, it is often argued that Japan is exposing itself to attack by having U.S. forces stationed there. It should be observed, however, that not more than 40 ships and similarly small percentages of naval aircraft and personnel have ever been homeported in Japan for lengthy periods of time. In recent years the number has been dwindling steadily to less than ten ships. On December 21, 1970, it was announced that the Seventh Fleet flagship, the guided missile cruiser USS OKLAHOMA CITY, would change its homeport to Sasebo and the large Ship Repair Facility at Yokosuka would be returned to Japanese control, many of its skilled

²⁹Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Proposals on Mutual Security Between Japan and the United States," Text of a Speech

technicians to be threatened with loss of work; this statement was partially amended on March 30, 1971, the relocation of the flagship and the closing of the shipyard delayed at least one year. An influential Japanese newspaper criticized the action as another example of the U.S. imposing its will on Japan.³⁰ It is noted, however, that the Japanese government readily agreed to the amendment; and, since the U.S. move was believed to be an economic measure to consolidate facilities, it seems unlikely that American desires for such a policy reversal were independent of Japanese requests. Further, although for the present and for the near future Japan seems quite content to accept the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella, the key to U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence, the Navy's Polaris submarine fleet, has never had one of its units enter a Japanese port for a needed repair or a refreshing rest and recreation visit. That Japan is threatened by the presence of U.S. conventional forces which are

delivered at the Washington National Press Club, September 10, 1970, official Japan Defense Agency translation, p. 8.

³⁰Asahi Shimbun, April 2, 1971.



homeported in or allowed to visit its territories seems less likely than by the nation's economic prowess, by its own miserably weak military defenses, and by its strong domination of the trade of non-communist Asia. Although Japan maintains Self-Defense Forces, no respected military analyst has publicly stated that the country is near capable of defending itself. The theory that Japan should renounce the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty and become an unarmed, neutral nation has never found wide acceptance.

Not surprisingly, though, as a result of the fact that the U.S. has homeported the headquarters unit of the Seventh Fleet in Japan and has pledged to use the fleet in the defense of Japan, the government, has frequently tended to overestimate American protection; more surprising, especially if there were a determined, fixed policy, has been its silence in relation to public mocking of the Seventh Fleet by the opposition and press.

In over 100 interviews with Japanese uniformed and civilian defense officials, this writer has often been told how vulnerable Japan's maritime sea lanes are. When asked how Japan would protect them if they were

interdicted, many replied that, since the Maritime Self-Defense Force is still very weak, the United States Seventh Fleet would have to be relied upon. While many people were quick to point out this fact, few followed it up with the warning that such defense is not called for in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security because of the Japanese insistence that the treaty be limited to defense against attack occurring in the territories under the administration of Japan. One of the few to have correctly stated the required U.S. aid to Japan as rendered by formal commitment was Commander Sekino who expressed fear concerning the unrealistic assumptions on the part of the Japanese government:

According to Article 5 of the Japan-US security treaty, the US is not obliged to use armed force to protect a Japanese merchant ship in the high seas. This is a matter of course in view of the bilateral nature of the agreement whereby Japan shirks responsibility for action beyond its territory.³¹

In addition to being correct commitment-wise, Sekino's statement is given credibility by the stated US defense

³¹ Sekino, "An Analysis of Our Maritime Self-Defense Force."

strategy for the 1970's.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. . . .

. . . We have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.

. . . At the same time, we will maintain adequate forces to meet our commitments in Asia.

It is not realistic or efficient to expect each country to develop an independent self-defense capability against all levels of non-Chinese and non-Soviet attack . . .

. . . But in escort ships, our friends and allies around the world possess a greater number than we do. . . . Therefore it is one of our goals for the 1970's that our Atlantic and Pacific allies should provide a major contribution to protecting the convoys that in war would be carrying material for their sustenance.³²

Expectations of what the Seventh Fleet can do have often been high in Japan, yet disregard for its interests has not been totally absent. After the capture of the USS PUEBLO in early 1968, the USS ENTERPRISE sortied from Sasebo harbor. Since Seventh Fleet policy does not permit public release of operational movements, the carrier's

³²Laird, Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, pp. 1, 17-19, 81-82.

destination was not provided to the press. Convinced that the ENTERPRISE was sailing to waters off North Korea, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun sent one of its aircraft to the scene with a reporter picked because he could tell the difference between a U.S. and a Soviet destroyer. The desire was a picture of the U.S. carrier and a Soviet warship together; the wish was realized.³³ Fortunately the PUEBLO incident did not result in an armed confrontation between Soviet and U.S. naval units, but at the time there could be no assurance that the Asahi picture story would help or hinder the likelihood of such a confrontation. Japan, which has not allowed any of its armed forces to deploy overseas since December, 1950, was content to allow one of its civilian aircraft to enter an area of highest political tension.

With the approach of 1972 and the Okinawa reversion, it appears that this shield of the Seventh Fleet over Japan may also be approaching the end of an era. In addition to the questioning of false assumptions with regard to the

³³ Interview with Taoka Shunji, Asahi Shimbun, July 31, 1970; Mr. Taoka was appointed to cover the story because of his expertise in the recognition of men-of-war.

protection of maritime traffic, more recently some intelligently-formulated querying of the Seventh Fleet's capabilities to defend Japan even in case of direct invasion has been heard from high level sources.³⁴ With the reduction of U.S. bases being dictated by American economic requirements and being requested by Japanese leaders, important, knowledgeable persons in Japan are wondering what advantage the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security gives the United States, particularly if restrictions are insisted upon. They immediately follow with, if there is no advantage, why keep the treaty at all, i.e., some Japanese are wondering what's in it for the United States.³⁵ One U.S. military leader who once governed Okinawa offered an opinion of the situation after "R-day":

. . . the Japanese bases are useful only so long as the United States retains free and unrestricted use of Okinawa as an operational base . . . if and when Okinawa is returned to Japanese administrative control, its use as an operational base will inevitably be impaired, and the Mutual Security Treaty will then become a net liability to the United States.³⁶

³⁴M. Yasuda, "Japan Needs to Review Strategic Environment," The Daily Yomiuri, January 5, 1971. M. Yasuda is a pen name for a high level advisor to an important Japanese Cabinet member.

³⁵Interview with Kaihara, April 23, 1971.

³⁶Quoted from United States-Japanese Political Relations. The statement reports the views of Lt. General

Defense Agency Director General Nakasone, with perhaps political motivation, has called the U.S. Japan mutual defense system "semi-permanent" but still has recommended review and possible revision of the security treaty in the course of the 1970's.³⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in his second annual, carefully-worded, lengthy white paper on defense submitted to the House of Representatives' Appropriations Committee in March, 1971, modified his statements of the previous year by adding phrases like "together with our allies" in reference to the U.S. meeting "a major communist attack in either Europe or Asia" and "minor" in reference to "contending

Caraway. Although Caraway's views are rather strong and sometimes discounted in Japan, a similar unpublished viewpoint, particularly concerning the necessity of Japan to consider America's interests as well as vice versa, written by Admiral Arleigh Burke in 1971 was read with care by Japanese government and Foreign Ministry officials.

³⁷Nakasone, "International Environment and Defense of Japan in the 1970's," Text of a speech delivered at the Harvard Club of Japan, June 30, 1970, official JDA translation, p. 24. Nakasone has frequently called for more respectful and less intimate relations with the United States and more independent defense and foreign policies on the part of Japan. He has often said Japan has been too dependent on the U.S. for defense in the past and has been reported as referring to the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho) as the "Tokyo Bureau of the U.S. State Department."

with a . . . contingency elsewhere." This strategy called "realistic deterrence," is "realistic and more effective" in that "the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends." As to U.S. commitments, Secretary Laird stated that they would be "not based exclusively on our alliances, but rather, our formal and informal obligations derive from and are shaped by our own national interests. . . ."³⁸

A Japanese analyst commenting on Secretary Laird's report stated:

Japan can expect, if lucky, limited naval-air support from the US only in case of an open, armed attack which, however, might not come unless and before a series of covert approaches have already escalated to a near success.³⁹

Judging by statements of the defense ministers of both countries, it is unlikely that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, much less Japan-U.S. friendship, will come to an end in 1972. Indeed, the strength of friendship between the two navies seems as strong as ever before in their histories. But both ministers and other

³⁸Toward a Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, pp. 17, 18, 22.

³⁹M. Yasuda, "Japan Unperturbed by 'Realistic' U.S. Policy," The Daily Yomiuri, April 2, 1971.

spokesmen also indicate that the relationship of the future will be different. U.S. protection of Japan will be strategic-nuclear with anything less requiring significant, if not primary, Japanese strength. The Seventh Fleet cannot be expected to, and may not be able to, provide quick and effective response to attacks on Japan's sea lanes or small scale incursions into Japanese territory. Thus, in the future Japan's defense strength and capabilities will be more important than ever before; however, today, many U.S. Navy authorities looking at the MSDF are shocked to find out how one-sidedly symbolic it is and how weak and vulnerable it is when viewed as an autonomous entity; again they have no stronger supporters than Messrs. Kaihara and Sekino. Although those two theorists disagree on how the MSDF should be constructed in the future, they are quite in agreement about its capability to date. It is that capability that will now be examined.

CHAPTER X

THE BUILDUP OF DEFENSIVE POWER: THE FOURTH POINT OF DEPARTURE, JUNE 14, 1957

Studies for a long-range defense program began shortly after the creation of the Safety Agency in August, 1952. In September the Committee for the Study of Systems and Organizations was established with sub-committees for defense, economics, and organization. The uniformed members of the Maritime Safety Force participated in this effort to estimate what size force Japan would need to defend herself on the sea. The committee recommendations entitled the "Report on Studies of Systems and Organizations" called for a thirteen-year buildup program envisioning U.S. aid and a Japanese expenditure of eight trillion yen (22.2 billion dollars) financed with 3.8 per cent of the national income for the initial year 1953 and estimated to cost up to 8.3 per cent of the expected national income in the final year 1965. The plan called for maritime

forces totalling 475,000 tons; and although it forbade overseas dispatch of armed forces, it contained an understandable statement of naval defense strategy:

The objective of national defense is to maintain domestic security, and to prevent the intentions of aggression by foreign power during peacetime, and in the event of aggression, to repel such aggression and to maintain supply lanes on the seas, and to preserve the independence and peace of our nation.

Maritime defense potential will be built to achieve the primary objective of maritime convoying and anti-submarine warfare. Convoys along coastal and territorial waters will be conducted in full, while one-third convoys on the high sea will be conducted.¹

When the plan was submitted to the Liberal Party "for reference," it was reportedly laughed off as a war measure.²

In the new peacetime Japan the uniformed services could no longer present their recommendations except through the civilian-controlled Safety and Defense Agencies. But even these agencies were not to determine defense planning as much as was the Finance Ministry; therefore to placate the United States the defense levels had to be negotiated diplomatically. Not surprisingly, the U.S. negotiators were from the State Department; the Japanese were from the Finance Ministry.

¹Masuhara, Nihon no Boei (Japan's Defense), p. 48.

²"Behind Defense Buildup," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, November 19, 1968.

Under the civilian control system, as it has always operated in the Defense Agency, there is a Finance Ministry representative heading the Finance Bureau of the Defense Agency. This man knows what kind of budget will be allowed for defense and his assistant for the MSDF knows how much of that budget will be given to that branch. Although an annual ritual is acted out in late December or early January when the Defense Agency budget, like all other ministry and agency appropriations, is submitted to and lowered by the Finance Ministry, the actual figure which will be made available is known well in advance and plans are made according to that amount.³ The Finance Ministry has no particular expertise in defense matters but is keenly aware of the limited size of the budget. The Defense Bureau of the Defense Agency consists of civilians who initially had no experience in defense but knew administration and thus know the place of an agency compared to a ministry. Under these dual constraints the uniformed officers have

³Occasionally, as in the program for the Third Defense Buildup Program (see below) the Prime Minister will intervene if a dispute between a requestor and the Finance Ministry is very bitter.

attempted to negotiate for defense equipment.

Director General Kimura Tokutaro of the Safety Agency submitted a civilian-planned, revised draft of the original uniformed-designed defense long-range plan in July, 1952 and the projected sea forces reflected a Finance Ministry-oriented maritime strength requirement of 143,000 tons over a five-year period. A third draft lowered the requirement to 81,000 tons.

At this time defense planning shifted to the diplomatic arena, but the Finance Ministry was still in command. Following the signing of the Yoshida-Shigemitsu communiqué in September, 1953, former Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato visited Washington to negotiate the Japanese contribution to defense buildup with the U.S. Under Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson. After a month of talks it was agreed that Japan would "with due considerations for . . . restrictive conditions (Constitution, economy, etc.) continue to make efforts to increase her defense potential." This allowed U.S. aid in providing major items for equipping the MSDF. Also, despite the fact that Japan had no official defense policy nor a long-range program for strengthening its forces, home construction of new vessels

was begun. The MSDF had a total budget of 9.5 billion yen (26.4 million dollars), 22.4 per cent of the total defense budget during the period 1953-1957. Table X-1 lists ships built in this period prior to the establishment of the first long-range defense program.

TABLE X-1
MSF/MSDF CONSTRUCTION STARTS 1953-1957

Type Ship	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	Total
DESTROYER (DD)	1		4	3	3*	11
DESTROYER ESCORT (DE)	3					3
SUBMARINE (SS)				1		1
MINESWEEPER (Coastal) (MSC)	3		2		3	8
MINESWEEPER (Boat) (MSB)		3	1		2	6
TORPEDO BOAT (PT)	6	3				9
PATROL BOAT (PC)		8			2	10
AIR RESCUE BOAT (ASH)		2	1		1	4
CABLE LAYER (ARC)	1					1
MINE LAYER (AMC)	1					1
TOTAL	15	16	8	4	11	54

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

* 2 DDs built in Japan funded by the US (OSP).

In 1955 a six-year defense development program providing for 205 ships totalling 123,900 tons was discussed by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. Their joint communiqué stated that, "Cooperative efforts would be exerted so that conditions would be established enabling Japan to assume the primary responsibility for her own defense and thus contribute to international peace and security in the Western Pacific."⁴ The program was not approved, but the last three words brought many calls in the Diet for confirmation of the fact that Japanese forces would never deploy overseas.

In August, 1956 the newly established National Defense Council prepared a five-year defense plan (1956-1960) calling for a 211-ship fleet of 111,300 tons and 223 aircraft. The nine-billion-yen (25 million dollar) increase envisioned for the maritime force was the biggest addition for any of the three services. The program was delayed, however, in view of the impending visit of Prime Minister Kishi to the United States.

⁴Quoted in Masuhara, Nihon no Boei (Japan's Defense).

Finally, on June 14, 1957, approximately three weeks after the approval of the Basic Policy for National Defense, the first long-range buildup program, essentially the last three years of the program planned in 1956 by the National Defense Council, was approved by the Cabinet. Although this program was supposed to set up the skeleton for the defense structure of Japan, its main purpose was made more clear by the Kishi-Eisenhower Joint Communiqué eight days later; "The United States expressed feelings of welcome on the defense build-up program of Japan and would contemplate within 1958 to conduct a large scale withdrawal of her troops stationed in Japan, and such a withdrawal would include a speedy withdrawal of all her ground forces."⁵ The target of "about 124,000 tons of vessels" was set for the MSDF. As to the goal of the force, the plan only stated that the program was decided "with a view to the buildup of the minimum requirement of a self-defense potential in accordance with the Basic National Defense Policy and in keeping with national resources and

⁵Ibid., pp. 51-52.

conditions."⁶ The role the force was to play was still unclear. The vagueness of the phrase: "minimum degree of defense necessary" allowed the Japanese government to maintain that it was providing for limited defense. The apparent winners of the plan were the Finance Ministry, which kept defense spending at a low level of the national budget, and Prime Minister Kishi, who won the removal of U.S. ground forces from Japan. The MSDF retained an ability only to minesweep and to train. A summary of the First Defense Buildup Program is contained in Table X-2.

The plan for a second buildup program of six years (1960-1965) was announced by Defense Agency Director General Akagi Munenori in Sapporo in July, 1959, but the Finance Ministry ruled that fiscal year 1960 should not become the first year in the second program but continue as originally scheduled as the final year of the first program. Debate over the amount of money to be spent for defense resulted in no formal program for 1961 at all, but the Finance Ministry policy of approving a few ships and a slightly higher total budget was continued, two

⁶Ibid., p. 52.

TABLE X-2

FIRST DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM 1958-1960

Approved by NDC:	453.2 billion yen (1.26 billion dollars)
Actually authorized:	407.4 billion yen (1.13 billion dollars) MSDF actual: 94.5 billion yen (260 million dollars)
Rate of Accomplishment:	89.9 per cent* MSDF budget pct: 23.2
MSDF Goals:	124,000 tons of ships 222 aircraft
MSDF Actual: (1 APR 1961)	99,000 (112,000 including in tons reserve and under construction)
	217

Construction Starts:	1958	1959	1960	Total
DESTROYERS (DD)	2		1	3
DESTROYER ESCORTS (DE)		2		2
SUBMARINES (SS)		2	2	4
MINESWEEPERS (MSC)	4	2	2	8
PATROL CRAFT (PC)	2	3		5
AIR RESCUE (ASH)	1			1
SUB RESCUE (MSR)		1		1
TORPEDO BOAT (PT)			1	1
ICEBREAKER (AGB)			1	1
OILER (TANKER) (AO)			1	1
TOTAL	9	10	8	27

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

* Interestingly, this fiscal criterion is the only one ever officially used in judging the "success" of a defense program.

destroyer escorts, one submarine, two coastal minesweepers and one patrol craft being authorized. On July 18, 1961 the National Defense Council officially approved the outline of the Second Defense Buildup Program, but the outline had to be even vaguer than usual because of wide disagreement between the Finance Ministry and the Defense Agency over how much money should be spent.

The National Defense Council resolution had been preceded by a June meeting between then Prime Minister Ikeda and President John Kennedy. It was the first time in a postwar high-level, binational conference at which the Japanese defense program was not an issue. The Prime Minister wished it to appear that Japan was not merely reacting to United States demands while the U.S. felt that the new level of spending indicated for the Second Buildup Plan lessened the need for direct pressure. This second plan was supposedly filling in the skeleton created by the first program, but in the case of the MSDF this was to be a quantitative as well as qualitative increase. No new mission was formally spelled out, but informally it was indicated that the goal of defense had now been established as the ability to cope with localized wars and

lesser conflicts, missions such as anti-submarine warfare and cooperation with the United States by achieving a capability to exercise control over the Sea of Japan and to block the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits frequently mentioned. Actually there was no quantitative gain in ships or aircraft at all, and the military mission was as open to doubt as ever.⁷ Finance Ministry policy continued to take preference over Defense Agency desires, and the MSDF was subject to both; within the Defense Agency, the MSDF's plans for a Japanese-built helicopter carrier were defeated in the Defense Bureau just as offers of a carrier from Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke had been rejected a few years earlier by the Finance Ministry. Both times anti-carrier reasoning argued that the idea was naïve and the supporting costs of that kind of ship, such as

⁷ Interview with Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, JMSDF (Ret.) January 27, 1971. Nakayama was Chief of Maritime Staff from August 15, 1961 to July 6, 1963. I showed him a statement attributing to him the change of mission to block the three straits. He replied that there was no official change at all but that MSDF leaders felt that with the bigger forces they were getting they should study ways to cooperate with the Seventh Fleet and felt that at least measures in the Sea of Japan should in the future be Japan's responsibility.

escorting destroyers, would be too expensive.⁸ Projected results and achievements of the plan are indicated in Table X-3. Despite the fact that there was no substantial quantitative increase in the MSDF budget share or in the tonnage of front-line ships, from 205 units totalling 110,000 tons in 1961 to 209 units aggregating 116,200 tons in 1966; that there was no effective, independent, sustained capability except for the minesweeping force which was growing, becoming modernized, and still sweeping the World War II mines; and that there was no ability to and some question of the wisdom of blocking the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits, the plan was a 97.3 per cent "success." The criterion was again the amount of money spent.

"The First and Second Defense Programs laid the foundations of Japan's defense potential. Liken it to building a house. The foundation and the pillars have been

⁸Letter to the writer from Admiral Burke, December 1, 1970; interview with Admiral Hoshina, November 4, 1970; interview with Kaihara, October 15, 1970. "Repulsion of Uniformed Men," Mainichi Daily News, "Peace and Security" series, January 6, 1969. Today when costs of a helicopter-carrying frigate are high and no U.S. aid is available, there is reportedly some regret by Finance Ministry officials.

TABLE X-3

SECOND DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM 1962-1966

Approved by NDC: 1163.5 billion yen
(3.23 billion dollars)

Actually authorized: 1142.5 billion yen
(less wage increase) (3.17 billion dollars)

MSDF actual: 303.3 billion yen
(less wage inc.) (842 million dollars)

Rate of Accomplishment: 97.3 per cent
MSDF budget pct: 22.9

MSDF Goals: c.143,700 tons (includes ships in reserve and under const)
c.120,100 tons of ships in commission
235 aircraft (including in reserve and under const)
229 aircraft in service

MSDF Actual: c.140,200 tons (includes ships in reserve and under const)
c.116,200 tons of ships in commission
239 aircraft (including in reserve and under const)
228 aircraft in service

Construction Starts:	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	Total
DESTROYERS (DD)	1	2	2	2	1	8
SUBMARINES (SS)		1	1	1	1	4
MINESWEEPERS (MSC)	2	2	2	3	2	11
PATROL CRAFT (PC)	1	1	1			3
AIR RESCUE (ASH)				1		1
TRAINING SHIP (APS)					1	1
TOTAL	4	6	6	7	5	28

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

put in place. Next comes the wall. The Third Plan is to build the wall."⁹ The wall was supposedly a qualitative improvement with a principal target of improving maritime defense power. Blocking the three straits was again mentioned as was a meaningful impetus to defense industry. Structured by the Defense Agency to be minimally achieved under optimistic conditions, the Finance Ministry chopped off a record amount some of which was restored by Prime Minister Sato to within 25 billion yen (70 million dollars) of the Defense Agency figure. The goals were spelled out in more detail than ever. A National Defense Council outline was approved by Cabinet decision on November 29, 1966 and a list of major priorities was approved by Cabinet decision on March 14, 1967. The first item on the priority listing was:

1. Strengthening of maritime defense capacity
Strengthening of defense capacity for peripheral water areas such as coasts and straits will be undertaken and at the same time capacity to insure safety of maritime transportation will be improved.

⁹Quoted in "Third Defense Plan," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, November 28, 1969.

For this purpose a total of 56 ships with an aggregate of around 48,000 tons will be constructed including fourteen (14) destroyers equipped with SAMS, [surface-to-air missiles] helicopters or others, and five (5) submarines. In addition, there will be a buildup of 60 fixed-wing anti-submarine (ASW) aircraft, 33 ASW helicopters and others.¹⁰

Table X-4 lists the progress of the program to date.

Despite the priority supposed to be assigned to the MSDF nothing much seems to have changed as far as number of ships built, percentage of budget, and continued strengthening of the already capable minesweeping force.

After three defense buildup programs, no responsible person claims that the MSDF has the ability to close or even effectively monitor the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits, but there have been some contrasting statements concerning total Self-Defense Force effectiveness, particularly that of the MSDF.

Writing in the October 1969 issue of the respected Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi uttered a statement that brought serious objections from Messrs. Kaihara and Sekino but which must have provided valuable

¹⁰National Defense Council of Japan, Tokyo: Secretariat, National Defense Council, 1970, pp. 14-15.

TABLE X-4

THIRD DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM 1967-19

Total Plan: 2340.0 billion yen (6.5 billion dollars)
 Actually authorized: 2281.0 billion yen (6.3 billion dollars)
 (less wage increase) +25 billion yen (70 million dollars)
 (for cost increase)

Rate of Accomplishment: 97.5 per cent MSDF budget: 24.9 pct
 (thru 1970)

	Number of Ships	Aggregate Tonnage	Air-craft	Escort Flotilla	Minesweep Flotilla	Submarine Flotilla	Air Group	Local Units
MSDF Goals c.200	c. 142,000	c.200	4	2	2	5	5	5
Achieved:								
1967	210	122,000	230	3	2	1	5	5
1968	210	126,000	230	3	2	1	5	5
1969	200	133,000	250	3	2	1	5	5
1970	200	139,000	260	4	2	1	5	5
1971 (projection)	200	144,000	270	4	2	2	5	5

Construction Starts: 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971(budgeted) Total

DESTROYERS (MANNED HELICOPTER (DDH)) 1 1 1 1 1 2
 DESTROYERS (DD) 1 1 1 1 1 5

TABLE X-4--Continued

Construction Starts: --Continued	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971(budgeted)	Total
DESTROYER ESCORTS (DE)	1	2	1	2	1	7
SUBMARINES (SS)	1	1	1	1	1	5
MINESWEEPERS (MSC)	2	2	2	2	2	10
MINESWEEPING BOATS (MSB)					2	2
MINELAYERS (AMC)			1			1
MINESWEEPER TENDERS			1			1
PATROL CRAFT (PC)					2	2
TORPEDO BOATS (PT)			1	1	1	3
AIR RESCUE (ASH)	1					1
SUPPORT VESSELS				1	9	10
LANDING SHIP				1		1
TOTAL	6	7	8	9	20	50

Source: Japan Defense Agency.

ammunition for American politicians favoring a curtailment of overseas commitments.¹¹ Stated Aichi:

What is feasible, as President Nixon has suggested, is for the nations of Asia to enhance their ability to shoulder their own security responsibilities. Japan's Self-Defense Forces are now making an important contribution to the keeping of the peace in East Asia because of the vital role they play in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan. As a result, the American military presence is able to devote itself to the ultimate mission which it alone is equipped to perform: the deterrence of major war. This same division of labor will be applicable to Okinawa, after reversion, when Japan will be prepared to assume full responsibility for local security against aggression. . . .

Japan's Self-defense capability is considerable. Although Japanese defense forces may not constitutionally be deployed abroad, they constitute a very effective homeland defense--285,000 strong--with conventional firepower greater than that of the Imperial forces at their wartime peak.¹²

¹¹I am indebted to Mr. Kaihara who first brought the statement to my attention.

¹²Aichi Kiichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change," Foreign Affairs, Volume 48, Number 1, October, 1969, p. 31. Presumably the Foreign Minister meant that the GSDF theoretically, if one forgets about the shortage of ammunition, has more firepower than the Imperial Army. This argument was put forth in the Diet by Defense Bureau Chief Shishido Motoo in 1970. Although Shishido didn't mention it, his predecessor and supporter, Kaihara, noted that modern armies like the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have increased their military firepower over a like period by 30 or 40 times. Regardless, Shishido privately stated, it is impossible to say the present day MSDF comes close to the peak strength of the Imperial Navy on even a one to one basis; "I was glad I was not asked in the Diet to make

Kaihara and Sekino knew that American and Soviet military attachés in Toranomom and Azabu knew that such a statement was not true and Kaihara especially questioned its value. Other members of the Defense Agency were similarly unconvinced. In October, 1970, Director General Nakasone, outlining his draft for the Fourth Defense Buildup Program which is scheduled to be applied during 1972-1976, said that if the plan is to be carried out as he envisioned (generally believed to be at a level of 5.5 trillion yen, 15.3 billion dollars) the MSDF, which is scheduled to expand to 240,000 tons, would only have achieved 50 to 60 per cent of its necessary strength to perform its mission.¹³ Commenting on the relative capacities and present capabilities as of 1970, six months after the Aichi statement, Defense Agency Vice Minister Obata Hisao stated:

Roughly speaking, I believe the GSDF and ASDF have already acquired half of the capabilities we

that comparison." Interview with Messrs. Shishido, November 11, 1970, and Kaihara, October 15, 1970. Shishido was recently promoted to head of the Director General's Secretariat.

¹³From Yomiuri Shimbun files, October, 1970.

consider to be appropriate for them, while the MSDF has acquired about one-third.¹⁴

In view of the disagreement as to how capable any of the forces are after three buildup programs, an unclassified analysis of the capabilities of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to perform the tasks that have been frequently mentioned as within its purview is hereby attempted.

Against direct invasion: If a Pearl Harbor-type combined sea and air surprise attack were to come today, without intelligence the ASDF would most likely not detect it until too late, as there is no airborne-early-warning capability and the MSDF would be almost powerless even to begin to oppose it with more than ten destroyers and submarines as a result of dispersal of the ships around Japan. The biggest concentrations presently are in Yokosuka and Kure where attack is probably least likely to come. If there were sufficient warning so that all effective anti-invasion forces, i.e., destroyers, submarines, and torpedo boats, could be assembled, the amount

¹⁴Obata Hisao, "Address at the Kogyo Club, Tokyo, April, 1970," Koho Antenna (magazine of the Japan Defense Agency), June, 1970.

of harassment that could be given to the intercepted naval force on the high seas by a maximum of some 40 Japanese ships would be seriously limited. All ships could theoretically be assembled if all other locations were to be abandoned; but in addition to maintenance problems which realistically would prevent some from an operational status, there would have to be continuous shuttling to and from port to refuel and rearm since the MSDF has only one small tanker and no ammunition ships. Ordinarily no, or very few, warshot torpedoes are carried on board destroyers; and the entire supply, as of 1971, is extremely low with no capability to produce more in an emergency; as for the present, the MSDF would be dependent on supplies from the United States. Similarly, fuel stockpiles are low nationwide and are poorly positioned, and there is no effective way to disburse fuel to a specific location swiftly in time of emergency.¹⁵ Since the MSDF is oriented primarily toward anti-submarine warfare, its effectiveness against large cruisers, destroyers, and fast guided missile boats

¹⁵See Chapter XIV; details on fuel and ammunition shortages are major features of defense articles by Mr. Kaihara.

is seriously suspect owing to improper weaponry for the task, relatively little training and no combat experience in the mission. If an attack came by nuclear-propelled submarines, the MSDF is again faced with an adversary of which it has no counterpart, little training, and no combat experience on which to rely. The Air Self-Defense Force which is charged with providing fleet air defense has no all-weather weapons capability; like the MSDF, its bases are dispersed so that concentrated forces could not be brought to bear, and there is no effective capability to switch from base to base quickly. If there was good weather during the attacking period, the ASDF could provide low-profile coverage, i.e., anti-shipping and close air support, perhaps in a radius of 150 miles from a particular base provided the pilots, who have little ocean navigational training and no combat experience, could find the surface force and distinguish friend from foe.¹⁶ Only one MSDF ship, the Tartar

¹⁶Recently there was a furor in the Diet and from the press over an ASDF aircraft that "attacked," i.e., made a simulated bombing run on, a Soviet destroyer, a practice U.S. and Soviet aircraft reportedly often jokingly engage in with each others' ships for "free" training. In this case where the formal Japanese apology must have

missile-equipped AMATSUKAZE, has a defense against an anti-ship missile such as the Soviet Kennel class which could easily be fired from a plane beyond the air radius of the ASDF. As far as the MSDF's fixed-wing and helicopter forces, many are aircraft designed to operate from an American carrier, limiting their use to close coastal areas. Furthermore most of these are outdated and are useful only for relatively unsophisticated anti-submarine warfare. Of the 118 operational ASW air platforms, it has been reliably calculated from unclassified information released by the Defense Agency that only 29 fixed-wing aircraft are available on a daily basis to conduct

brought guffaws of laughter in Moscow, the ASDF plane mistook its target for a MSDF ship with which it was to have an exercise even though the Soviet ship was 50 miles out of the exercise position. "Why Risk War Heedlessly?" The Daily Yomiuri, April 21, 1971, is an example of press reaction. No one seemed concerned that the incident revealed a lack of ability that has been apparent in numerous other "slight errors" which have been regularly observed. It is humorously remembered the time the Commander of the Fleet Escort Force became tired of waiting to be "attacked" by ASDF forces, who were due six hours earlier, and finally radioed the ASDF base to request the raid, only to be informed it had already taken place and the planes had returned to base. Only later was it discovered the "attack" was indeed delivered, on the exercise "friendly" forces. Interview with Taoka Shunji, Asahi Shimbun, April 20, 1971.

non-coastal, sophisticated ASW operations.¹⁷ The "considerable" capability "in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan" is doubtful. Especially because of fuel and ammunition shortage, even the ability to delay any sizeable force would be very limited.

Against indirect invasion: The MSDF has approximately 40 patrol craft and the Maritime Safety Agency has a little over 110 units larger than motor launches. Because of bureaucratic frictions since the days of the "Y Committee" there has never been any joint training between the two organizations. Although cooperation on the working level has not been as cool as on the civilian Defense Agency-Transportation Ministry level, incidents where coordinated operations were called for have not produced effective action.¹⁸ Because of the extreme length of Japan's

¹⁷ Captain Robert J. Harlow, USN, "A Review of Japanese Naval Air Posture 1970," as yet unpublished article, September, 1970. Captain Harlow is highly regarded as an authority on ASW by the JMSDF and the U.S. Navy and has commanded an air group on an ASW carrier has been air operations officer of an attack carrier.

¹⁸ A recent dramatic, although not atypical, incident was the so-called "California Maru Incident." This Japanese vessel with 22 crew members aboard sent an SOS

coastline, which is about to increase greatly after the reversion of Okinawa, and the country's geographical proximity to the Asian coast, defense experts concede that it is impossible to shut off infiltration.¹⁹

Against attack on Japanese merchant traffic: The MSDF has almost no capability to protect ocean shipping and very limited capability to protect coastal traffic. If Japan's naval forces have been built up to protect its ocean-going merchant shipping, it could be considered

from its sinking position approximately 170 miles off the west coast of Honshu at 10:03 PM, February 9, 1970. At 00:06 AM, February 10, two United States Air Force rescue craft arrived on the scene and directed a nearby merchant vessel to the location to rescue the crew. The first air units of the Maritime Safety Agency, alerted by the same SOS, arrived on the scene at 9:25 AM. The MSDF which was requested to help by the MSA had air units on the scene at 10:45 AM, claiming it did not come earlier because it can only react after it is requested by the MSA or by the prefectural governor. One wry comment, noting other similar cases, ridiculed the clear "external security from U.S., internal security by Japan theory," "While there is a growing opinion for establishment of an independent system of national defense, the California Maru has made it clear that the country must rely on the USAF even for rescue of crewmen of its vessels in time of peace." Asahi Shimbun, February 11, 1970, U.S. Embassy translation.

¹⁹See for example, M. Yasuda, "No Drastic About Face in Security Policy," The Daily Yomiuri, January 6, 1971. See Chapter IX, footnote 34.

that its relative progress has been negative. Given eighteen patrol frigates and eight destroyers by the United States in the 1950's, Japan had between 1500 to 3000 merchant vessels over 100 gross tons on ocean sea lanes at various times during the decade. As of 1970, when the MSDF has almost 40 destroyers, the number of merchant ships has increased to more than 8000. The destroyers of today are of course more modern, sea-worthy, and have more capability than their predecessors; but the merchant ships have made similar if not more spectacular gains in size, speed, and modernity. Of course a mere ratio of numbers is meaningless unless it can be demonstrated that it takes a certain number of ships to protect a convoy or that in fact ships are capable of protecting a convoy at all. The "Sekino Vision," described earlier, calls for 66 destroyers and 30 destroyer escorts effectively to handle the anti-submarine warfare problem although not all would be used directly in convoying.²⁰ A group of former Imperial Navy officers, including Commander Sekino, held a war game several years ago and

²⁰ Sekino, "Japan and Her Maritime Defense."

concluded that to maintain an average of twenty ships daily carrying 150,000 tons of imports by means of a convoy of 60 vessels every three days linking Japan with Guam and the Philippines would require 54 destroyers taking into account average convoy speed, maintenance, etc.²¹ A more futuristic plan by Taoka Shunji, a brilliant young military analyst of the Asahi Shimbun, contends that a force of 1500 helicopters costing approximately 750 billion yen (2.1 billion dollars) stationed on merchant ships themselves could shelter one 50-ship convoy per day between, for example, Tokyo and San Francisco, thereby supplying Japan one million tons of imports daily with which the economy could be kept viable for a smaller cost and with a greater probability than could a large destroyer force. Kaihara might maintain that this "Taoka Vision" is a kind of "beautiful dream" updated from Sekino's, but all three analysts would agree that the present day MSDF force of destroyers, submarines, and ASW aircraft cannot perform the task.²²

²¹Doba Hajime, "Maboroshi no Jishu Boei" (Visionary Autonomous Defense), Yomiuri Shimbun series, June 15, 1970.

²²Like Kaihara and Sekino, Taoka also has a comprehensive strategy for Japan which is particularly interesting,

As for coastal convoy, figures for the later 1960's showing the daily traffic between Tokyo, Osaka, Ise, northern Kyushu and the Inland Sea alone show that at least twenty ships of 5000 tons daily would have to be supported between Tokyo and Osaka, Osaka and the Inland Sea, the Inland Sea and Kyushu, etc., strictly on a tonnage basis.²³ The same group of naval officers which programmed ocean convoy needs estimated that 36 destroyers and 16 aircraft would be necessary to convoy coastal cargo ships of less than 1000 tons and another 27 destroyers would be necessary to convoy larger cargo ships in home waters. Since 40 per cent of all domestic transportation

because of his age of 29, his educational background and upbringing as the son of a renowned Japanese scholar, and his present position within the often-regarded left-wing Asahi Shimbun. Not only does "The Taoka Vision" foresee the necessity for Japan to protect its sea lanes; but it also envisions Japan breaking its formal security ties with the United States in a 20-30 year period and maintaining its position as the world's trader in a neutral status.

²³For an in depth study of the coastal convoy problem, see Commander Sato Kenzo, JMSDF, "Waga Kuni Boei jo no Senryaku Shusei ni Tsuite Kenkyu Seyo," (An Investigation of the Strategic Aspect of Self-Defense), MSDF Staff College Commanders Course Review, Volume II, May 28, 1970.

is by sea, 60 per cent of all Japanese shipping is coastal, the coast line is over 16,000 miles and about to increase, such an estimate appears to be very conservative. Obviously, the present forces of the MSDF could not handle even these requirements; and if maximum forces were assigned to that mission, there would be nothing to combat a direct invasion which would seemingly be a threat at the same time period.²⁴ As was mentioned in Chapter VIII, no Naval Control of Shipping authority or organization exists for implementation in time of emergency.

Against attacks on fishing craft: Although the total number of Japanese fishing craft has actually decreased by about 50,000 since 1950, the remaining 400,000 vessels which have a much greater range than the more numerous, smaller craft of the past are not provided any considerable degree of protection by the MSDF. In the past ten

²⁴Doba, "Maboroshi no Jishu Boei" (Visionary Autonomous Defense). Commander Sato's study referred to in the note above estimated that the entire Fleet Escort (destroyer) Force plus torpedo boats, etc., and the ships assigned to the Yokosuka Regional District could not sustain even the Tokyo-Osaka coastal route adequately.

years alone, over 1200 fishing vessels have been captured, and over a third of those have been confiscated. There have been joking reports of fishing boats fleeing when they see a MSDF patrol boat until they are able to spot the rising sun flag since they so infrequently see a Japanese patrol craft, they assume all to be hostile. The ships that fish near Soviet territories are often restrained by Japanese government order or by their own timidity as they are unsafe from foreign capture even on the high seas, whereas Soviet fishing fleets have been operating regularly in the Sea of Japan, off Kyushu, and off the Pacific coast of Japan close to Japanese territorial waters in all three locations.²⁵

Against mining of coastal ports and harbors: In this task the Maritime Self-Defense Force is as ready to go as any navy in the world. It has personnel with more than 25 years of operational experience and the world's

²⁵"Sea Power," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, December 11, 1968. In April, 1971 Japanese crab fishermen were ordered by Soviet authorities not to take their catches near Soviet-held islands off Hokkaido. Pending a settlement of the issue, fishermen were restrained from leaving ports by the Japanese government although the season was past due.

most modern minesweepers which have been constructed based on lessons learned in sweeping complex mines. Many personnel in middle and upper echelons of the command structure have served in these operations and are familiar with the time-consuming and difficult technical problems of minesweeping. Even the Finance Ministry has been unable to argue against several of these ships each year since the cost as compared with a destroyer is relatively low.

However, the more sophisticated mines which have been developed since World War II, the nature of the currents able to bring floating mines from the Asian coast, and the length of time it took to rid Japan of the less sophisticated influence mines dropped by B-29s make it obvious that the threat of mining is still a very real one. It is expected that the very wise investment that has been made in these ships and new minesweeping helicopters up to the present time will be continued in the future.

Against undetected penetration of the Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya Straits: Since the waters of the three straits are all relatively shallow, all are susceptible to defensive mining; unlike minesweepers, however, the MSDF has only two minelayers and not a great many mines are in

stockpile.²⁶ The Tsushima Strait between Japan and South Korea and the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido would seem easier to control from territorial defense aspects, but the Soya Strait presents more of a problem. Tsushima, however, is presently the domain of the Soviet Navy rather than the MSDF; a destroyer there is constantly on patrol, and combinations of destroyers and supplying tankers often approach close to Tsushima Island. On August 9, 1966, the MSDF's Kamitsushima Garrison on the northern tip of the island reported a Soviet warship within Japanese territorial waters; despite an emergency request to Sasebo, MSDF or MSA units were not available to drive it away, so that the ship, which had approached at high speed and whose sailors were allegedly reconnoitering the island, was able to steam slowly away. Many similar incidents have been reported since then.²⁷ Although the Third Defense Buildup Plan was supposed to improve the capability to monitor activity in the straits by electronic means, Japan-surrounded Tsugaru being frequently mentioned as a prime candidate, no technology with which

²⁶See Chapter XIV. Estimates of mine capability supplied by Mr. Kaihara.

²⁷"Tsushima Straits," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security," September 21, 1968.

to do so effectively has been developed despite the fact that this program is advertised as 97.5 per cent accomplished.²⁸

Although there is presently much talk of a 5.5-trillion-yen (15.3-billion-dollar) Fourth Defense Buildup Plan and a projected 250-ship, 350,000-ton MSDF ten years hence at the end of a fifth and final expansion program, the Finance Ministry and the National Defense Council still have to pass on the former. Also, recent triennial elections for the House of Councillors followed by a Cabinet reshuffle resulted in a new Director General of the Defense Agency. These and other events which will take place before the final authorized estimate for the fourth program is decided could influence the immediate and more long-range planning for defense. Emperor Hirohito will visit Europe on the first postwar overseas trip by the Japanese head of state, and the Okinawa reversion treaty, recently signed, must be submitted to the Japanese Diet and the United States Senate for ratification. Further, it is possible that Prime Minister Sato will finally step down,

²⁸Kaihara, "We Should Know Ourselves as well as Knowing Them," p. 66.

and Japan will have its first new leadership in over six years. Thus the question of whether the MSDF still cannot be decided reliably. To 1971 it has really little more in capability than the the Maritime Safety Agency in 1950: a good minesweeping force. Today it has a small number of modern ships and a growing number of ASW aircraft, but the force is short of manpower, independent defense technology, and ammunition as well as fuel. The problems of technology, fuel and ammunition can be solved. Manpower is a more difficult problem, but it is one faced by all Japanese industries at the present time. The biggest problem that must be settled before a workable naval strategy can be decided is what missions will be assigned to the sea force under the concept of self-defense. Seventeen years of not saying yes or no to anyone but allowing elements of the Finance Ministry, Defense Agency civilian bureaucracy, the National Defense Council, the uniformed MSDF leadership, and outside former Navy and business lobbyists feel they are being listened to has not produced "considerable" capability necessary for "guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan."

Many observers state that the reversion of Okinawa marks the end of an era. Japan is thereby fully restored to sovereignty at last, and the United States is no longer standing by as a guardian angel. The present MSDF leadership would like to be assigned the missions of repelling invasion, providing escort to at least a minimal amount of strategically required shipping, coastal patrol, mine-sweeping, and protection of fishing craft, missions it desired and its predecessors began planning for in 1945; once authorized for such a role it could then estimate needs and attempt to build for the required capability. Others, like Secretary General Kaihara, would like to see the mission confined to repelling direct and indirect invasions of Japan's territory and the force possessing a limited and balanced mix of ships, aircraft, technology, and logistics planned and worked out as quickly as possible to stand against attack which could come at any time. In the background are the Socialists calling for unarmed neutrality and various groups like the Communists, Komeito, and the Democratic Socialists calling for some degree of armed neutrality at some future date. Presumably the Finance Ministry will continue to attempt to

keep defense spending at a low level in the national budget. The United States, while continuing to reduce its presence in Japan and calling for Japan to share more of a burden for its own defense, is unlikely to abandon Japan nor is the reverse likely in the near future.

Presumably a strong Prime Minister and/or a strong Defense Agency Director General, if given the proper policy direction, could implement the first real maritime defense strategy Japan has had since the time of the Imperial Navy. Although such strong men may not be typical of Japanese today, it has been speculated that under certain potential prime ministers, the fortunes of Kaihara could put him in the Director General's chair in Roppongi. His claim of support from younger MSDF officers and his confidence in the sound basis of national security among the people could then be given a good test. A severe threat to Japan or an actual attack on its territory or sea lanes could call forth a more nationalistic feeling and a demand for a larger defensive capability with a return to status as a Pacific power in the military as well as economic sense. Even less likely but possible are the breaking of friendly relations with the United States over a scenario involving

Okinawa reversion, serious economic strains, etc., producing a demand for a nuclear-armed, neutral Japan, or the election of or irregular assumption of power by a Socialist or Communist government, then implementing its brand of unarmed or armed neutrality. The most likely outcome for at least the beginning of the new era might be the continuation of the past participatory consensus (matamori or Ringi) system relative to defense on the bureaucratic level hoping to remain lucky and avoid the necessity of a true defense policy until an effective capability finally evolves which can then have a strategy applied to it. Although this would seem to be an inefficient and somewhat dangerous way to provide for security, postwar Japan's first two eras of defense "non-policy" have been interesting to study. Sea forces existed throughout, first when no one even realized they were there, and then with little more capability, even once it was consciously decided to have them. Most Japanese now seem to want to have some kind of naval force. It will be interesting to see if such a force will find and establish a role and a capability to defend Japan in the third postwar era.

The remainder of this monograph will study the three next biggest problems which have faced the Maritime Self-Defense Force and continue to confront it as it enters that next era.

PART IV

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS OF THE JMSDF

After its lack of role and capability, personnel is, and is likely to remain the principal problem of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. The procurement and retention of high quality personnel are required for a modern, electronic sea-warfare-capable force. Japan is a nation which renounced the potential to wage war after a disastrous defeat blamed on military adventurism and which has experienced an enormous economic expansion resulting in an increasing demand for its working population. The growth of the population which has been slowed by a controlled birthrate has resulted in a possible threat to the existence of the MSDF from personnel shortage. With an all volunteer system, officers and enlisted personnel must be induced to join; and many must be motivated to make the military a career. The recruitment, retention, and education of MSDF personnel will be the subjects of Part IV;

however, traditions of and linkages to the past, the unusual features of military service in Japan, and the lack of effective direction covered in previous chapters must be kept in mind in discussing these subjects. The prestige of the military within the community influences the desire of young people to enter service and shapes public attitudes and behavior towards the membership, and thus affects the morale of the members themselves. This morale which is influenced additionally by individual members' pride in the present and past organizations, comradeship among themselves, and the economic and psychological compensations offered by MSDF service, determines to a large extent whether the individual serviceman will remain in the service at all, continue only to take quick, economically profitable benefits, or remain committed to a naval career until retirement age.

CHAPTER XI

RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF PERSONNEL

The requirement of modern technology requires that both officers and enlisted men sailing the new electronic fleets of postwar navies be highly skilled decision-makers and technicians. High quality personnel are needed for the MSDF as they are for civilian industry; but the rebuilding of Japan's naval forces and the industrial expansion of the national economy, both begun in earnest in the early 1950's, have not been achieved in complete harmony. Birthrates have declined from 32 per thousand in the early 1930's to 20 per thousand in 1955 to below 17 per thousand in 1961.¹ The Welfare Ministry's Population Problem Research Institute has estimated that the total population of Japan in the year 2025 will be only about 320,000 greater than in 1969. The Institute thinks that the youthful population will continue

¹Japan Statistical Yearbook, Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, Office of the Prime Minister, 1968.

decreasing until that year. Coupled with this decline has been a growing shortage of skilled and technical workers and school graduates at almost all levels. According to Labor Ministry figures, in 1964 there were 1,270,000 shortages in technical workers alone, an amount equal to 23 per cent of the total workers with these skills.²

Since the economy is expected to continue growing, even if not at as spectacular a pace as in the 1960's, the situation is not likely to improve and may get worse; e.g., while there were 1,234,000 eighteen-year-olds in Japan in 1964, lower birthrates have reduced that number to 1,120,000 in 1971; and it is projected that there will be only 770,000 of that age available in 1974. As an employer of a relatively large number of personnel, the MSDF has a big problem.

Even in the beginning of the MSDF, when the economy was still weak and jobs were not so plentiful, however, the recruitment problem was not a simple one. The problems of recruiting officers and enlisted men will be discussed separately.

²Ibid.

A. OFFICER PROCUREMENT

The MSDF's immediate forerunners, the Coastal Security Force (Kaijo Keibitai) and the Maritime Safety Force (Keibitai), had a slightly easier time than the GSDF's predecessor, the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobitai). While the Yobitai was organized hastily in 1950 with only a few carefully screened former Imperial military officers authorized, the Kaijo Keibitai's formal recruiting did not begin until October, 1951. In August of the same year the first lifting of restrictions on former Imperial military forces had depurged 11,185 Army and Navy officers.³ General Tatsumi's persuasion of Prime Minister Yoshida had produced the Cabinet decision earlier in the year to allow officers of the sixth level (equivalent to captain in the Imperial Navy) to serve in the Yobitai; this same authorization was then applied to the new naval force. Thus Captain Nagasawa Ko, Captain Yoshida Eizo, Commander Terai Yoshimori, and Captain Tamura Kyuzo could join the new organization.

³An excellent English source on the purge is Hans Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.

The selection of the first group of senior officers not surprisingly involved the United States. As was mentioned earlier, former naval officers had a firm plan for creating a new naval force within the existing Maritime Safety Agency in April, 1951 and had strong support from the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces Far East. When the "Y Committee" was organized six months later, its former Navy chairman, Rear Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, agreed to allow MSA officers to fill certain billets in exchange for the type of organization he desired, i.e., one that could be easily split off from the MSA at a future date. A few former middle level naval officers from the old grades of lieutenant commander to captain were selected by Admiral Yamamoto and Captain Nagasawa with the advice and consent of Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo. Officers known and trusted by these three men such as then Commander Nakayama Sadayoshi and then Lieutenant Commander Nishimura Tomoharu, who was also close to Nomura and who had done some research work for Nagasawa at the time of the "Y Committee," were selected. Both men later came to head the MSDF.⁴ Officers

⁴These officers, admitted in May were given brief oral examinations by Superintendent Yamazaki. Interviews

regarded as unacceptable or possibly embarrassing to the United States were not selected; renowned aviators Captain Fuchida Mitsuo and Genda Minoru, important figures in the Pearl Harbor attack, were not asked.⁵

Yanagisawa Yonekichi who had designs to head the maritime branch of the new National Safety Agency allowed his assistant Mita Kazuya to select some of the MSA's best men to enter the new organization. Yanagisawa also personally selected another assistant, Yamazaki Kogoro, as first head of the new force.⁶ Yamazaki, who originally felt Yanagisawa was too lenient to the demands of the former naval officers as to organizational structure, subsequently demanded MSA men in the most important positions in the Kaijo Keibitai organization.⁷

The first central organization reflected the desires of the MSA to dominate the organization by solidly

with Admirals Nishimura, MSDF (Ret.), January 13, 1971, and Nakayama, October 8, 1970.

⁵Interviews with Fuchida, December 5, 1970, and Genda, January 11, 1971. Fuchida was later asked and refused the position as first Chief of Staff of the ASDF. Genda did join the ASDF and later became its Chief of Staff.

⁶Interview with Yanagisawa, January 12, 1971.

⁷Interview with Yamazaki, January 6, 1971.

controlling two key items, personnel and accounts.

Chart XI-1 depicts this successful attempt.


The "Y Committee" began selecting two groups of junior officers to serve as instructors of future trainees and as the training group for a school ship as early as November, 1951. Since there was no legislation for the new organization or its ships, this initial junior officer recruitment had to be done very quietly. The following is the text of an actual letter sent to a former naval officer, Yamamoto Masuhiko, by Captain Morishita Rikuichi of the "Y Committee" on November 20, 1951:

You may have heard from your classmate Mr. Kiyama that the Maritime Safety Agency has a certain problem for which the agency needs the help of some former Navy officers. I am writing you to inquire whether you will be able to join the Maritime Safety Agency to serve as an instructor of trainees.

Since I think it is inappropriate for me to explain in this letter the circumstances under which the recruitment of personnel became necessary, I hope to have an opportunity of explaining it to you personally. I shall be grateful if you will kindly consider the agency's need for the help of former Navy officers and answer the questions that follow. Those appointed will be assigned to the former Department of the Navy or Yokosuka. Those who wish to be provided with housing may occupy official residences of the Second Demobilization Bureau for the time being. Their employment status will be permanent. They will be paid the same salary as other public servants of the same status.

CHART XI-1

SOME KEY PERSONNEL OF THE FIRST COASTAL SECURITY FORCE ORGANIZATION
(May, 1952)



Yokosuka Regional District:

Commandant: RADM YOSHIDA (CAPT IJN)
Deputy: RADM TANIGUCHI (CAPT IJN)

Source: Interviews with Admirals Nakayama and Taniguchi and Captain Abe.

1) Do you intend to accept the post on the above conditions?

2) If you intend to accept the post, when would you be able to come up to Tokyo at the earliest?

I am looking forward to receiving your reply soon.⁸

With similar letters, telegrams, and telephone calls, 30 persons were assembled in Yokosuka on January 19, 1952 to begin training under the U.S. Navy as planned by the former naval officers and Admiral Burke almost nine months earlier. The promotions of this first group of 22 former naval officers and eight MSA officials have been frequent and to high ranks: of the 29 still living, twenty have retired: five as vice admirals, two as ASDF lieutenant generals, ten as rear admirals, and two as captains; of the nine still on active duty as of April 1, 1971: one is a full admiral (Chairman Itaya of the Joint Staff Council); six are vice admirals; one is a rear admiral; and one is a captain.⁹ Two other groups of 24 and eighteen officers

⁸Quoted from Kaijo Jieitai Hatten no Omoide
(Remembrances of the Development of the Maritime Self-Defense Force).

⁹Information provided by Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office. A memoir recounting its writer's experience from the time of dissolution of the Imperial Navy to his call to join the first group of trainees is included as an appendix to this monograph. The memoir

selected by the "Y Committee" were assembled in Yokosuka to begin training under the neophyte Japanese instructors on February 18 and April 18, respectively. Most of these new recruits came from the Maritime Safety Agency.

With the formal founding of the Kaijo Keibitai on April 26, public recruitment could begin. Qualification examinations were administered, and those who knew the naval affairs best, former Imperial Navy officers, naturally had a distinct advantage. Since it was desired to build up a high quality of officers gradually rather than to duplicate the situation of mass confusion and inexperience which had occurred in the case of the National Police Reserve, obtaining relatively small numbers of officers from Imperial Navy ranks over periods of time was not difficult, the first input of 257 being admitted in July.¹⁰

Former officers who knew the naval profession better than any other provided a good number of volunteers which

is moving in itself, but is of further note now that Admiral Itaya has served as Japan's highest naval officer and as Chairman of the Joint Staff.

¹⁰Jieitai Jyunen Shi (Ten Year History of the Self-Defense Forces), p. 39. Interview with Captain Tamagawa Yasuhiro, JMSDF, September 9, 1970. Captain Tamagawa, presently Naval Attaché to the United States, was a member of the group admitted in July, 1952.

eased the early officer recruitment program. The comradery of the Imperial Naval Academy had not been lost through the war or the Occupation. Members of many classes met and decided who could do the most good outside the new Navy and who would be needed and most successful inside. Members of the 61st - 72nd classes, i.e., those who graduated from 1933-1943, provide a good example of the spirit of Etajima that still remains: this group experienced over 50 per cent casualties during the war; but to this day the surviving class members support their deceased classmates' dependent kin who need help.¹¹

Compared with the number of Army officers in the National Police Reserve, former naval officers returned

¹¹Interview with Commander Sato Hyakutaro, JMSDF, War History Office, member of the 71st class, November 5, 1970. Commander Sato provided data on each class and, along with Professor Iwashima Hisao and Oide Hisashi, now civilians, of the 74th class, detailed the great measures within means by which classes care for dependents and even help old girl friends unknown to wives of deceased officers. To attend a class reunion at Oide's large restaurant in Shimbashi or at the Memorial Hall of the Togo Shrine is a moving experience; I am indebted to Vice Admiral Taniguchi Yasumaro, JMSDF (Ret.) senior member and president of the 51st class and Masuoka Ichiro, aide to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who attends the reunions of the same class in place of his deceased father, for hosting me at one of these reunions where the strong and continuing spirit and cooperation cannot but be recognized.

in much greater percentages in the small Coastal Security Force. By the time Maritime Self-Defense Force was formed in 1954, their control of responsibility was almost complete and has remained so to the present day. Admiral Nagasawa, the first postwar military chief of service with Imperial experience, became Chief of the Maritime Staff on August 3, 1954, 33 days after the Self-Defense Forces Law went into effect. Each succeeding Chief of Maritime Staff has similarly been a former naval officer, a situation that most likely will continue until 1983, when the graduate of the 75th class from the old Etajima Naval Academy who is selected to lead the MSDF is due to retire. This control remains intact despite the fact that only fourteen per cent of the total officer membership is presently made up of former Navy men; as of 1970: sixteen of seventeen vice admirals, 30 of 43 rear admirals, 217 of 305 captains, and 461 of 758 commanders were graduates of Imperial naval schools.¹² Even larger percentages have former Navy experience. Table XI-2 shows the continuing influence.

¹²Official data of MSDF personnel classified by education as of July 30, 1970, supplied by Research Division, MSDF Staff College, Ichigaya, Tokyo.

TABLE XI-2
 IMPERIAL NAVY OFFICERS IN THE MSDF

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Number of Officers</u>	<u>Total Ex-Navy</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
1952	1040		
1953	1457		
1954	2238		
1955	2778		
1956	3340	1733	52
1957	3704	1768	48
1958	4107	1741	42
1959	4520	1715	38
1960	4877	1746	36
1961	5289	1730	33
1962	5594	1748	31
1963	5897	1695	29
1964	6023	1644	27
1965	6185	1560	25
1966	6335	1461	23
1967	6491	1363	21
1968	6611	1257	19
1969	6737	1131	17
1970	6748	945	14

1970

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total Ex-Navy</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Vice Admiral	17	17	100
Rear Admiral	43	43	100
Captain	305	293	96
Commander	758	608	80

Source: Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office.
 Ex-Navy includes those non-military school
 graduates serving in the Imperial Navy.

These officers are still referred to within the MSDF by their equivalent Etajima class graduating number.

To continue the supply of new officers after 1954, however, younger men had to be found. Since no graduates of the new Defense Academy were available until 1957, an officer candidate recruiting program seeking applicants from colleges and universities was established. Until 1957, most future ensigns were recruited from civilian university graduates. Numbers of recruits were not difficult to obtain, but getting the top graduates of the best schools, particularly in the technical fields, was not as easy. University graduates were augmented with experienced, qualified enlisted men; and, thus, the input of trainees into the Officer Candidate School (OCS) was maintained. University graduates have continued as a supplementary source of officers since the Defense Academy began graduating annual classes.

Defense Academy cadets are recruited without respect to service, and it is only after the first of their four years at Yokosuka that service designations are made. Each year 100 of the 530 cadets are selected as future MSDF officers. Although the Defense Academy's ratio of

applicants to vacancies has fluctuated from almost fifteen to one in 1953 to less than eight to one in 1970, and more candidates have had to be accepted to fill annual incoming classes, getting volunteers for the MSDF slots among the student body of the school itself is still no problem. The number of cadets wanting to be designated for the MSDF at the end of the first year has always been larger than the number allowed although recently the MSDF has lost to the ASDF its ranking as first choice of the largest percentage of students. By a very impartial system, however, cadets of similar abilities are distributed among the three services according to personal preferences and needs of the services. Unlike enlisted men, who must meet higher intelligence standards for the naval and air forces than for the ground force, a proportional share of students of all abilities are distributed among the three services.¹³ Admission to the Defense Academy is gained

¹³ Interview with Defense Academy administrators, faculty, and cadets, September 25, 1970. Of course, since abilities of applicants are of a sufficiently high level, it is not necessary to discriminate among the services using some type of intelligence quotient as it is among enlisted personnel whose abilities are more varied. The relatively more sophisticated equipment of the MSDF and ASDF generally requires a greater amount of technical aptitude.

by competitive examination among 18-21 year old graduates of high school or its equivalent and 18-23 year old enlisted men who have passed a special Defense Agency qualifying examination. The recruitment of students is indicated by the figures of Table XI-3.

University graduates are recruited directly for the MSDF, both for general line and for technical specialist positions. As with Defense Academy students, qualifying scores for a university graduate are the same for all three services. Today the Defense Academy provides less than one-half of the average requirement for new officers. Since it is still desired to promote senior petty officers to officer ranks, the number of university graduates, some of whom come from the Maritime Safety Academy, etc., is not as big a problem as is obtaining high quality graduates, particularly again in the technical fields. Table XI-4 shows the number of line and technical officers that have been acquired annually by the MSDF and their sources of supply in 1970. As can be seen, from the table, procuring officers is no particular problem; it is a question of what kind are desired. The supply of university-educated technical officers is an obvious problem, as is

TABLE XI-3
 RECRUITMENT OF DEFENSE ACADEMY STUDENTS

Year	Desired Recruitment	Applicants	Number Accepted	Number of Actual Entrants
1953	400	5680	541	408
1954	530	5214	657	532
1955	530	6578	662	508
1956	530	5437	690	546
1957	530	5714	718	524
1958	530	6656	724	538
1959	530	6872	722	511
1960	530	5734	802	537
1961	530	5334	794	534
1962	530	6043	879	540
1963	530	5611	945	525
1964	530	6053	903	520
1965	530	7087	841	541
1966	530	7394	833	512
1967	530	6456	822	495
1968	530	5358	827	578
1969	530	4831	822	519
1970	530	4121	861	555

Source: Japan Defense Agency. Number of desired recruits increased in 1954 with beginning of an air force. The naval requirement has always remained 100. Entrants are admitted in April following the calendar year shown.

TABLE XI-4

GENERAL LINE AND TECHNICAL STAFF OFFICER PROCUREMENT (1953-1970)

Year	Total Desired Input () Technical Off's	Total Applicants () Tech () Univ	Total Accepted () Tech () Univ	Total Enter Off. Acad () Tech () Univ	Total Enter Off. Cand. School
1953	590	1540		890	
1954	1035	3636		1156	
1955	1280	6505		1044	
1956	1075	4714	1434	982	(80)
1957	970	4876	1298	606	(88)
1958	810	5044	830	372	(97)
1959	410	2913	513	193	(87)
1960	280	1245	235	206	(99)
1961	250	946	243	246	(86)
1962	250	1136	285	200	(92)
1963	215	1208	259	173	(86)
1964	190	1048	202	205	(90)
1965	190	1273	249	201	(93)
1966	205	1534	243	233	(89)
1967	220	1507	272	241	(86)
1968	225	1395	269	238	(80)
1969	220	1416	267	267	(90)
1970	223	(6) (399)**	291	267	(88)
		(10)	(67)*	201	(46)*
		(5)	(1)	233	(49)
		(5)	(2)	241	(61)
		(5)	(97)	238	(80)
		(5)	(3)	267	(69)
		(5)	(5)	291	(88)**

OCS 1970 Class (As of October, 1970)

Source:

Graduates of the Defense Academy

Graduates of universities or colleges

Graduates of science, engineering or pharmaceutical schools

Petty Officers under the age of 36 who have passed the special

entrance examination

Total

100	Number
<u>265</u>	

Sources: Official data provided by Japan Defense Agency; Officer Candidate School Etajima.

* Includes technical officers, if any. ** Includes 12 medical scholarship students. Entrants are admitted in April following the calendar year shown.

the quality of general university graduates. To compensate for the former need the officer ranks have been augmented from the start by enlisted first class petty officers who become specialized duty officers, concentrating in the particular area of their expertise. To ease the situation of increasing junior general line officer requirements and to serve the urgent need of providing more opportunities for enlisted personnel, a program was designed in 1967 whereby petty officers between the ages of 30 and 35 became eligible for selection as general line officer candidates, a phenomenon unknown to the officer corps of the Imperial Navy. Upon graduation from OCS these former enlisted men serve the remainder of their service as officers. Because of their age and previous service, they will not advance above the rank of lieutenant commander. This system not only enhances promotion opportunities for young officers advancing beyond lieutenant commander but also provides for deeper experience at the junior officer level.

The difficulty of obtaining the top civilian university graduates is not too difficult to understand. First, and most important, there are increasing opportunities in private industry and government ministries and

agencies. The graduates of the best schools are eagerly sought, of course, and thus can look for the organization providing most satisfying and beneficial type of work. Since a university graduate is likely to remain in his first position for a career and since the threat of war to Japan is not considered imminent, a university graduate tends to evaluate the Self-Defense Forces as an occupation rather than as a patriotic service. Thus, the MSDF must compete for its career officers in a sellers' market. Second, the military is neither a respected profession among the people nor are its members given especially good treatment by the government. Fringe benefits, such as medical care and retirement, are not competitive with civilian industry and to some extent with other forms of government service. Salary-wise, the MSDF is not badly off as wages are adjusted annually slightly to exceed starting salaries of civilian firms and other civil branches of government; but, especially for a career executive, initial salary is not the most important consideration. Since the Defense Agency started with no housing units, it had to use the money it was allotted for that purpose to build or renovate many units quickly. Also since the

Defense Agency has been, in actual status or in prestige, on a lower scale than government ministries or other agencies, it has not always received the choicest allocations of public housing. Both the need to acquire many units quickly and the unequal treatment have combined to produce a situation that is, of course, undesirable to those already in the uniformed services, but also has little appeal to potential officer applicants.¹⁴

With no officer reserve program, no required government service, and the Japanese characteristic of remaining in the same profession for life, the question is obviously asked, what can the MSDF do for me? Prestige, housing, and retirement have already been mentioned. In addition, post-graduate education is denied to all but a few, and then the quality is not very high. The prestigious

¹⁴Interview with General Hayashi Keizo, GSDF (Ret.), January 5, 1971. General Hayashi was Chairman of the Joint Staff for ten years and was until recently President of the Japan Housing Corporation. His experience in and out of the military gives him unique qualifications to judge. A very balanced and kind man, Hayashi is less critical than most of the substandard quality of Defense Agency housing, acknowledging, however, that, particularly in peacetime, any nation's military is often not well treated. Many other officers told of their wives being asked by other women why they tolerate such conditions, i.e., why don't they persuade their husbands to quit the defense forces.

universities have recently refused to admit members of the Self-Defense Forces because of student protests.¹⁵ The Defense Academy postgraduate school is young and still weak. The chances for overseas postgraduate education, which was common in the Imperial Navy and which is guaranteed to a young foreign service officer, is unavailable.¹⁶

An example of the officer procurement situation is offered by requirements for general line officers, aviators, and medical doctors. High school graduates are offered a free, solid, technical education at the Defense Academy; candidates are readily available. University graduates who have few prospects of advanced education have declined in quality and technical aptitude to the degree that the naval service, formerly a leader in science and industry, is annually becoming weaker in advanced technical expertise. An officer program through which a high school graduate can receive five years of flight training and become an officer has had an application rate as high as to 44 to 1.

¹⁵Details are contained in the next chapter on education, pp. 451-52.

¹⁶See the next chapter, p. 454.

This program has turned out an average of over 50 pilots per year for the MSDF since 1957.¹⁷ Medical doctors are desired and urgently needed. But why should a doctor join the Self-Defense Forces organization in which he receives no special professional pay at all? Of the 818 authorized physicians for the three services in fiscal year 1969, only 278, 34 per cent of the total requirement, were on hand. Since there is a need to staff the hospitals, the shortages are most evident in the operating units which are below twenty per cent of their requirements. It is not surprising that the 1970 Etajima indoctrination course for medical officers, with an annual quota of five doctors, had no students.¹⁸

¹⁷Statistics provided by Japan Defense Agency. The 44:1 ratio of applicants to accepted candidates occurred in 1966. The popularity of this program has always been sustained or increased on the average since its inception in 1958. Statistics provided by General Affairs Section, Japan Defense Agency.

¹⁸The authorized figure of 818 is conceded privately as being unrealistic for peacetime Japan, short of doctors, even by high JDA officials. In wartime, of course, this number might be needed, but could most likely be obtained rather quickly from volunteers or through emergency legislation. Today the lack of doctors presents largely a morale problem of not being able to provide good medical care, particularly in remote locations. To alleviate this situation the Defense Agency plans to open its own medical school

Thus the MSDF must try to recruit the types of officers it wants under some very strong handicaps. If it cannot offer them an education out of high school, it must rely on a strong sense of patriotism or a love of life on the sea. So far neither of these characteristics seem to typify a large number of postwar Japanese university graduates. Psychological disarmament and repression of nationalism may no longer be as significant as in the late 1940's and 1950's; but, according to surveys, graduates of the 1970's seems to want, at least in the ideal sense, work suited to their personalities and of a type allowing them to express their individual characters; this may not augur well for big industry but neither does it give much hope to the MSDF in its search for top officer talent.

in fiscal year 1973 with a first year enrollment of 60 students. The plan is particularly interesting because it envisions requiring a pledge from each entering student that he will remain in the Self-Defense Forces for nine years upon graduation or pay back ten million yen (28 thousand dollars). So far the Education Ministry, which would have to approve the school as a bona fide medical university before it graduates could obtain government licenses as medical doctors, has objected to the plan. It will be interesting to see if there are further objections or challenges to the pledge of required service on a constitutional basis if the school is actually founded. Details of the plans and its problems are discussed in The Daily Yomiuri, April 24, 1971.

Although the defense consciousness of the public and young people has been said by some to be increasing, this does not seem yet to have been reflected in a desire by high quality graduates of Tokyo University to serve in the armed forces. In 1970, or 1370 ensigns in the MSDF, educational backgrounds were distributed as follows:¹⁹

High School Graduates	529
Middle School Graduates	382
Defense Academy Graduates	244
University Graduates	195
Junior College Graduates	20

The civilian university graduates who are presently being admitted are not from the best schools. There is presently no young officer in the MSDF capable of drawing the blueprints for the construction of a new ship.²⁰ Officers are being obtained, but the nature of the situation has changed from the days of the Imperial Navy.

¹⁹Official data of MSDF personnel by education provided by the Research Division, MSDF Staff College.

²⁰In contrast to the situation in the Imperial Navy where naval officers designed ships and had civilian experts working for them. See Chapter XIII.

B. ENLISTED PROCUREMENT

Although officer procurement has had some difficulties, it is the recruitment of enlisted men that has been becoming, and will likely continue to be, a significant problem.

As with officers, the beginnings were not as difficult. Enlisted men were never purged, and some worked in minesweeping duties from the time of the Imperial Navy through the Occupation into the Keibitai and the MSDF. Other members of the Maritime Safety Agency, particularly some involved in patrol and rescue work, joined the Coastal Security Force in large numbers; by the end of May, 1952, 726 had come; and approximately 300 more came in July. MSA procurement ceased in August with the split of Keibitai from the Transportation Ministry, and letters were then written to outstanding former Navy enlisted men, inviting their return. The first 148 volunteer recruits were obtained the same month, as the then 1761-man force grew gradually towards its authorized strength of 6038. As with officers, gradual recruitment was selected as

the method of expansion to keep efforts organized.²¹

To continue to expand recruiting had to increase and, with an expanding economy and a declining population, to continue to do so. Table XI-5 shows the yearly authorized strength of the MSDF and some relative specifics of the recruiting problem.

Through 1960, when the ratio of job openings to available new school graduates--one must be a junior high school graduate to join the MSDF--was little more than one to one, recruiting percentages were good; and the MSDF in particular never had too serious a problem. As the job availability ratio approached three to one in 1961, however, the situation became more difficult; and with almost a five to one ratio in 1969, the problem has assumed crisis proportions.²²

Table XI-6 indicates that, along with the quantity of recruits, quality is also on the decline. Both are serious problems without easy solutions. As with officers,

²¹Defense Agency, Ten Year History of the Self-Defense Forces, pp. 37-40. Jieitai Nenpyo (Chronology of the Self-Defense Forces), p. 143.

²²Japan's Labor Statistics, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of Labor, 1967, 1970.

TABLE XI-5

MSDF ENLISTED RECRUITING STATISTICS 1953-1970

YEAR	MSDF AUTH STRENGTH	MSDF ACTUAL STRENGTH	MSDF PCT ACHIEVED STRENGTH	OVERALL SDF PCT STRENGTH	MSDF PLANNED RECRUITS
1952	7,590	6,150	81.0	96.7	1960
1953	10,323	9,872	95.6	98.6	2900
1954	15,808	14,105	89.2	92.4	5500
1955	19,391	18,972	97.9	99.2	3600
1956	22,716	22,862	98.4	95.4	4600
1957	24,146	23,322	98.7	98.8	1950
1958	25,441	25,070	98.6	95.0	1780
1959	27,667	26,067	94.2	93.0	2535
1960	27,667	27,110	98.0	89.2	1650
1961	32,097	31,497	98.1	86.4	7950
1962	33,291	33,198	98.5	88.4	3450
1963	33,291	32,101	98.2	87.3	1700
1964	34,963	93,937	94.0	87.9	3250
1965	34,963	34,705	99.3	91.6	4150
1966	34,963	34,257	98.0	92.1	1835
1967	36,591	35,716	97.6	92.4	4190
1968	36,591	36,201	98.9	93.8	4312
1969	37,813	36,651	96.9	91.3	4665
1970	38,323	36,868	96.2	91.1	4850

YEAR	MSDF ACTUAL APPLICANTS	MSDF RATIO APPLICANTS/ PLANNED	OVERALL SDF RATIO	MSDF ACTUAL ENTRANTS	MSDF ENTER/ PLAN	SDF ENTER/ PLAN
1952	15,371	7.9	3.5	1970	101.5	101.8
1953	13,362	4.6	6.5	2935	101.2	88.4
1954	28,959	5.3	2.5	5255	95.5	80.8
1955	32,705	9.6	5.4	3072	90.4	95.8
1956	37,508	8.2	4.9	4079	88.1	92.9
1957	27,054	13.9	3.9	1762	90.4	91.0
1958	36,981	19.7	6.5	1858	104.4	99.0

TABLE XI-5--Continued

YEAR	MSDF ACTUAL APPLICANTS	MSDF RATIO APPLICANTS/ PLANNED	OVERALL SDF RATIO	MSDF ACTUAL ENTRANTS	MSDF ENTER/ PLAN	SDF ENTER/ PLAN
1959	26,095	10.3	6.5	2315	91.3	94.7
1960	30,195	18.3	5.9	1583	95.9	79.1
1961	37,696	4.7	4.8	6550	82.4	76.7
1962	22,836	6.6	4.7	3828	111.0	109.0
1963	5,558	3.2	3.3	1414	83.2	82.2
1964	11,600	3.6	3.1	3662	112.7	107.4
1965	14,092	3.4	3.0	4441	107.0	101.4
1966	6,949	3.8	2.3	1853	101.0	100.2
1967	9,109	2.2	2.1	4444	106.1	103.4
1968	9,920	2.3	2.1	4515	104.7	100.1
1969	8,307	1.8	1.9	4490	96.2	100.2
1970	9,548	1.9	1.9	4936	101.8	102.4

Source: MSDF Administration Division, Japan Defense Agency General Affairs Division. It is impossible to achieve 100 per cent of actual strength due to budgetary procedures, *i.e.*, pay is allotted for personnel increases or new personnel for only one-half of a fiscal year since all will not be on hand the entire year. Thus care must be taken to not exceed the total amount of money allotted for salaries.

TABLE XI-6
DECLINE IN QUALITY OF MSDF RECRUITS

Type of Test	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
INTELLIGENCE: (average High School, Junior HS score in Japan = 45-54)					
MSDF Recruit Average	44.4	43.7	42.8	42.9	41.6
Only fit for routine work, should be given no responsibility in work requiring intelligence (PCT)	10.5	12.7	14.0	14.2	16.6
Fit only for very simple work and should not work as individual	1.5	1.6	3.1	3.7	6.5
MATHEMATICAL/CLERICAL: (average score in Japan = 10)					
MSDF Recruit Average	10.70	10.15	9.79	9.76	9.34
PCT with score below 7	14.9	21.8	27.1	27.4	34.5
WORKING ABILITY					
A - Able to do the greatest amount of work (PCT)	13.9	15.7	14.4	16.5	13.8
B - Able to do an average amount	52.7	47.1	44.3	42.5	41.3
C- Able to do a small amount	28.5	29.4	30.3	28.4	27.9
D - Very small ability to work	3.9	6.6	8.8	9.8	14.2

TABLE XI-6--Continued

Type of Test	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
<u>WORKING ABILITY--Continued</u>					
E - Least ability	0.9	1.2	2.1	2.8	2.8
<u>EMOTIONAL STABILITY</u>					
Emotionally Stable	31.0	29.9	25.1	22.6	28.0
Average Stability	56.4	55.6	58.6	59.1	55.7
Emotionally Unstable	12.6	14.5	16.3	18.3	16.3
Adaptable	56.9	46.0	44.9	47.9	46.1
Semiadaptable	30.7	36.0	34.5	34.0	31.5
Unable to Adapt	12.4	18.0	20.6	18.1	22.4
Stable and Adaptable	74.5	70.4	68.2	68.3	66.3
Unstable and Unadaptable	25.5	29.6	31.8	31.7	33.7

Source: Saikan no Jakunen Taiin Jinji Kanrijyo no Shomodai ni Kansuru Sanko Siryo (1)
 (Data on the Problems in Personnel Management of Young Enlisted Men (Part I), Tokyo: Kaijo Jieitai Gyomutai Jinji Sagyo-ka, 1970.

the question of why join the Self-Defense Forces arises. Young enlisted men for the MSDF are recruited from middle school or high school graduates in their late teens for an initially-fixed period of three years. Thus housing is not the immediate consideration it might be for university graduates and it is not necessary, because of the young age of the candidates, the short, fixed term of service, and changing social patterns in Japan, that potential applicants will hesitate as much because of uncertainties of the Self-Defense Forces as a lifetime career.

Actually there has been an a certain attraction to the Self-Defense Forces because of the salary aspect. Although the situation is not as favorable as the first days of the National Police Reserve when a recruit was offered a bonus of 60,000 yen for serving two years, duty in the Self-Defense Forces has offered a middle school graduate the chance to make a salary on a par with a high school graduate. Even in the past several years when private industries' salaries have increased rapidly in the contest for new school graduates, the Self-Defense Forces have been able to remain competitive because of frequent, periodic adjustments in salary by the government based on

recommendations of the National Personnel Authority. Under this system an analysis of offices with over 50 workers in firms with over 100 total employees is continuously maintained. If a base salary of 100 is, for example, calculated as the industrial average, this base is then matched for government service employees; for members of the Self-Defense Forces this figure would be set at 118. In Nagasaki prefecture, where the MSDF has always been strong, a survey of recruits in the last half of 1970 indicated that saving money and acquiring technical skills were the two big reasons for joining, far outdistancing the motive of defending the nation. Salaries of recruits equalled those of high school graduates working in the area, and many youths expressed recognition of former Self-Defense Force members' success in finding jobs of even better salaries because of experience after leaving the service. The local recruiting effort in Nagasaki emphasized good pay and free food and actually used a slogan of "Join the defense forces and save 1,400,000 yen (3900 dollars) in four years."²³

²³"Recruits Join SDF for Material Gain," The Daily Yomiuri, April 14, 1971. Statistics compiled by

Major enticements of the present, however, are not hard to figure out: education and/or job training. Recruiters are reported to have deemphasized the military aspects of service to try to persuade young men to enter for a short period of time.²⁴ Instead of "Join the Navy and see world," these recruiters urge the equivalent of "Join the Self-Defense Forces and advance your education." Recruiting is managed by the Ground Self-Defense Force although MSDF officers and enlisted men are assigned to the effort. The MSDF's appeal to the education motive is, however, considerably weaker than that of the other two services. The MSDF does necessarily offer some high

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in 1970 show favorable wage incentives operative for personnel with experience in the Self-Defense Forces.

²⁴In addition to making appeals such as that to saving money, recruiters are reported to have ridiculed duty to country to attract attention in talks before high school audiences, e.g.: "You don't need to think about difficult things like defense when you join the SDF. Sometimes we have praiseworthy applicants who say 'I am ready to give my life for my country.' (laughter) They are really admirable. (laughter) Yes indeed. (laughter) Since we're not going to take you to Vietnam you can join the SDF with a light heart. If you want to learn driving or electrical engineering, think of the SDF as an ordinary place of employment. Compare our treatment with private companies." Quoted from Asahi Shimbun series, "The Self-Defense Forces," March 7, 1967, U.S. Embassy translation.

quality technical education which has a value of its own; but the GSDF has this education, even if to a lesser extent, and the ASDF naturally has it also. But both the GSDF and ASDF are shore based and thus can assure middle school graduates that they can attend night school to finish their high school education; high school graduates can go to junior college or a university, etc. Positive assistance is often given in this regard. The MSDF, on the other hand, is increasingly obtaining ships with more endurance. Its units must exercise for long periods of time at sea and thus attending a full time school program is often impossible. The GSDF with its larger numbers and many bases can offer prospective applicants the chance to be stationed near their home; and although it might seem strange to Westerners in the 1970's, the so-called "my home-ism" which came into vogue in the 1960's with Prime Minister Ikeda's income-doubling plan is becoming even stronger in Japan. With no required government service and personal riches on the increase, the sentiment to look after one's personal welfare and home (my home shugi) became significant. Even the ASDF has a more credible chance to station members closer to home and to offer

more opportunities to get them there oftener than does the MSDF which stations all its enlisted men out of one of its five Regional Districts. In an attempt to solve personnel shortages, the MSDF hopes in the near future to recruit a number of women for the first time in Japanese naval history; if successful this will free more men for sea duty, again, however, not conducive to night school or family-longing produced by "my home-ism."

To try to counteract the recent unfavorable situation in recruiting where the number of applicants for the MSDF has dropped dangerously close to a one to one ratio with requirements and where, for the first time since the early days of organization, the same ratio was below that of the much larger GSDF, often said to have a more serious problem because of its large size and less technical orientation, the MSDF in late 1970 sought to revitalize its recruiting program, stressing the qualities and advantages of naval service rather than trying to talk a potential recruit into some kind of easy program.²⁵ Although

²⁵ A recruit for the MSDF and ASDF is required to achieve a score of 31 points of a maximum of 50 on an aptitude test while a score of only 22 is sufficient for admission to the GSDF.

indications were favorable in the latter part of fiscal year 1970 that such an effort was being rewarded, only future years' results will show whether the ability to attract personnel for naval service in peacetime, prosperous Japan will be successful.²⁶ For the present and immediate future it appears that the number of applicants as compared with desired recruits will stay dangerously close to a one to one ratio and that the quality of recruit will also remain dangerously low.²⁷ As a high official of an MSDF school for middle school graduates stated concerning his present students, "they are at the minimum level of ability

²⁶Figures for the first quarter of fiscal 1970 indicated MSDF might for the second straight year trail the overall SDF ratios for applicants to planned recruits and actual recruits to planned recruits, trailing in the latter category by over six percentage points. As indicated in Table XI-5, final figures showed the MSDF matching the SDF ratio for planned recruits at 1.9 and closing the initial gap in actual recruits from six points to one-tenth that figure for the entire fiscal year 1970.

²⁷It has been estimated by Defense Agency officials in the past that a three to one ratio of applications to acceptances must be maintained to keep the forces in reasonably good personnel condition. Of any group of prospective applicants: a certain percentage will fail the mental examination; an even greater percentage will fail the physical examination; and a significant percentage will refuse entry even though qualified in order to continue on to high school or to take a job in private industry. Interview with Mr. Kaihara, April 15, 1971.

we can reasonably tolerate."²⁸ Again it must be emphasized that this problem is not unique to the MSDF or even to the Self-Defense Forces. Japan as a whole is experiencing a severe labor shortage, but as a large employer whose needs may be expanded this situation is particularly critical for the MSDF.

Possible solutions to the problem are not seen as desirable or politically feasible. The Japanese economy could suffer severe setbacks, but even the most despairing recruiter would not wish and does not anticipate this will happen despite some recessions and slowdowns in the past. The Diet could enact a conscription system, but this would appear to be political suicide for the party in power in peacetime and seems even less likely than economic problems. A third possibility is a growing defense consciousness and feeling of responsibility among young people in Japan.

²⁸ Interview with high official, Youth Basic Service School, Etajima, September 7, 1970. Since its foundation this program has had an annual quota of 120 students. Starting out with over a twenty to one ratio of applicants to quota in 1955, the ratio fell to less than six to one for the class entering in April, 1971. Indicating the decline in quality, the average graduating class has fallen from 95-100 in the late 1950's, to less than 70 in the late 1960's; initial enrollment has remained constant. Official data provided by Japan Defense Agency.

Although both believers and nonbelievers in such an occurrence can be found in Japan today (Mishima Yukio certainly believed in the necessity but despaired as to the likelihood), and some young MSDF sailors reflect positively on such a development, for the most part, any drastic change in the rather apathetic if not hostile attitude of Japanese youth vis-à-vis the defense forces seems unlikely although a plan such as Funada Naka's for a large reserve force might someday be accepted. Such a likelihood is perhaps most dependent on observation of threat to Japan. Should a real danger be perceived the situation might change radically. Should an actual invasion take place a draft could be enacted although it might not even be necessary as the racially homogeneous family of Japan might react much more defense-mindedly than foreign observers might expect because of present apathy. A question is, would a reaction after attack be sufficient in modern warfare where forces in being are said to be more important than potential for the future?

Emergency measures available do not give MSDF leaders confidence that personnel requirements could be met in case of a true emergency. As one young seaman who

does worry about his country's capabilities put it, "Switzerland can mobilize 750,000 men in an emergency, the largest possible force per kilometer of border in Europe; the 'Switzerland of Asia' has no such responsible plan."²⁹

Automation is one possible way to ease the situation of personnel shortage. According to one Defense Agency civilian expert, a destroyer now carrying 210 men must in the future be made to operate with only 80. Perhaps automation can eliminate some jobs, a fact which Japan's huge supertankers have well demonstrated, but civilian planners may not realize that many functions of a warship can not be readily automated. Naval battles, intelligence collecting, and rescue at sea are tasks less readily performed by automatic controls than are those associated with straight

²⁹ Interview with Leading Seaman Yamakawa Etsuo, MSDF, December 13, 1970. Seaman Yamakawa is a good example of what the MSDF would like to see in all its enlisted men. Having been stationed on ships for three years, he was then assigned to the MSDF Staff College in Tokyo. Attending university courses five nights per week, he spends his one free day per week studying or participating in speech contests at which time his subject is often the necessity of youth to think about defense. A harsh critic of how enlisted men are treated in the MSDF, he still feels a necessity to deal with the problem of Japan's security. Recently the interest factor in his speeches was increased when he was an eye witness to the Mishima suicide.

passages ferrying cargo or oil.

The present situation is so serious that the entire concept of three forces is again being questioned, some saying that, because of the expected continuing future personnel shortages, new functional unforce concepts must be designed and put into practice.³⁰ Nearly every senior MSDF officer interviewed readily sighted the recruitment of new personnel as a most serious problem of the naval service now and in the future. The MSDF's composition of officers of over twenty per cent, compared to a ten per cent or less average for many modern navies such as the United States, makes it appear there is great potential for expansion. But should even moderate expansion be desired, it might be very difficult to obtain the required number of new recruits. Even holding the line might be difficult should recent trends continue. All other problems, one concerned officer emphasized, are being or can be solved; this one remains in doubt.³¹

³⁰For example, Our Defense Commentator, "A Need to Remain Nonprovocative," The Daily Yomiuri. The article is authored by a close advisor to a Japanese Cabinet member.

³¹Interview with Captain Tamagawa, September 9, 1970.

With the recruiting problem becoming more serious, retention of quality personnel has become all the more important for the completely volunteer MSDF.

It need not be stated that Japan's economy has expanded greatly after its near collapse in the late war and early postwar periods; however, the actual extent of the boom or "miracle" as it is something called, particularly in the past five years and its effect on employment patterns merits some elaboration. Specifically, Japan's manufacturing industry's production index has increased from a base of 100 in 1965 to 187.8 in 1969; during this same period the growth in the rate of employment was only 8.1 per cent. This growth in the productivity of labor compares with rates of 12.3 per cent in the United States, 18.6 per cent in West Germany, 12.0 per cent in Britain, and 21.4 per cent in France for the similar period.³² During this same time-frame the ratio of job openings to high school graduate applicants in Japan rose from 3.2 to 7.8; by way of contrast, in 1955 when the MSDF's recruiting

³²The Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society (Yano-Tsuneta Kinenkai) editors, NIPPON a charted survey of Japan 1970, Tokyo: Kokusei-sha, 1970, pp. 44-45

program was in its infancy, applicants exceeded jobs, the ratio standing at less than .7. Further, the ratio of general workers (excluding new school graduates) applying for jobs to numbers of positions available fell from 1.5 in 1965 to .6 in 1969; in 1955, in labor-rich Japan, this ratio stood at 5.3.³³

The effects of this rapid expansion of the economy and shrinkage of the labor market also include a weakening of the paternalistic, one-job career pattern of traditional Japanese employees and a transition from the seniority system to the modern ability or "pay according to function" wage system. Particularly the growing medium and small enterprises have been willing to pay younger people based on abilities and shortages rather than by the old seniority system.³⁴ The MSDF has been very traditional in its promotion and pay system, and today the personnel situation poses some very serious challenges.

³³Japan's Labor Statistics 1967, pp. 41, 43; 1970, pp. 45, 47.

³⁴The Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, Nippon a charted survey of Japan 1970, pp. 44, 45, 55.

C. OFFICER RETENTION

The statistics of officer retention reflect both traditional and modern tendencies. A glance again at Table XI-2 indicates how many of former Imperial Navy officers have remained in the naval service to date.

The Defense Academy provides a four-year university education and yet can require no mandatory service. In the two-week period between the academy commencement exercise and the beginning of Officer Candidate School at Etajima, a graduate can take his free education and go find a civilian job, and there has been Diet criticism of the school as a waste of money for this reason. Despite the appeal of the well-educated, physically fit academy graduate to private industries, the amazing fact to the foreign military observer from a country with a conscription system and required service for extended educational training is the high percentage of graduates who remain in service. Out of an annual average of 90-95 MSDF graduates, the most never to have reported to Etajima is eight. From 1968 thru 1971 the numbers were one, eight, four and five, respectively. Considering that some of those who did not report were cases of personal and family hardship, the

annual reporting average for the 14 classes of over 96 per cent from 1957 to 1971 is remarkable.³⁵ Several students of the English Speaking Society of the Defense Academy told this writer that they chose to enter primarily for a free university education they could not otherwise afford, a situation not too different from the prewar period of Etajima's Naval Academy. These students also said they fully intended to quit the Self-Defense Forces upon graduation. They and a freshman guidance counsellor agreed that the number of first year students initially entering the academy with similar motivation is about 50 per cent. Now as seniors, however, they all professed a willingness to enter service as a result of the high quality of their education, the comradery they felt with their classmates, and their conviction about the necessity of armed forces for Japan, feelings also probably not unlike those of the prewar graduates of

³⁵ It is interesting to speculate how many graduates of Annapolis would report to their first duty station following commencement if they were released from all obligations of required service. Several former USNA graduates and present students estimated the withdrawal percentage would be significantly larger than the Japanese rate; none thought the American figure would be even close to that of MSDF-Defense Academy graduates.

Etajima.³⁶ The overall retention rate of Defense Academy graduates who were commissioned as ensigns in the MSDF reflects great credit on their school and parent service. Out of a total of 1111 commissioned since 1957, 1051, or 95 per cent, remained in service as of September, 1970. Of commissioned members of classes graduating from 1965-1969, a total of four officers have resigned thus far.³⁷

The elite of top graduates of the Naval Academy was reported in Chapter I although it was also mentioned that the existence of such a category was always denied. Although Prime Minister Yoshida feared such an elite and there have been some attempts already to deny that there is such an elite today, such efforts are premature since it will take another ten years before the first graduates begin to occupy important high positions; however, there are already statistical aggregate indications that there is the potential for such an elite to emerge.

³⁶ Interview with students of the English Speaking Society, Defense Academy, Major Onozawa Tadao, ASDF, freshman, counsellor, September 24, 1970, and extended discussions with Cadets Kawamura Yasuyoshi, Tamogami Toshio, Watanabe Masao and Nishikawa Kinichiro.

³⁷ From official data provided by Japan Defense Agency.

The retention rate of civilian university educated officers is not as high as that of commissioned Defense Academy graduates. Comparative statistics of officer retention are presented in Table XI-7. In addition to the apparent inability since 1967 for entrants to compensate for yearly losses, the statistically higher proportional retention of Defense Academy graduates in the MSDF is becoming clear. Table XI-2 shows that Imperial Navy officers dominate all ranks above lieutenant commander. Table XI-8 shows the situation for the ranks below commander. Outside of the rank of lieutenant commander, the rank in which the first graduates of the Defense Academy are just entering, other ranks are becoming dominated by its graduates.³⁸ Should the non-Defense Academy attrition rates of 1961-1970 continue or accelerate, dominance of the senior ranks of the MSDF by Defense Academy graduates could eventually occur by default if not by design. This could produce the revival of an elite

³⁸The large number of high school and middle school graduates among lieutenant, lieutenant (junior-grade), and ensign ranks results from the petty officer promotion program. Since these officers will reach retirement age before making senior rank, they are not a threat to the higher level promotion of Defense Academy graduates.

TABLE XI-7

ATTRITION STATISTICS OF MSDF OFFICER PERSONNEL (1957-1970)

Year	Total Enter OCS	Attrition Losses	Total Losses Attrition & Retirement
1957	982	41	53
1958	606	47	64
1959	372	57	68
1960	193	99	114
1961	206	140	163
1962	246	103	158
1963	200	85	103
1964	173	142	179
1965	205	97	157
1966	201	94	181
1967	233	95	170
1968	241	126	286
1969	238	134	343
1970	267	142	379

TABLE XI-7--Continued

	1957-1970 (Ratio)		1961-1970 (Ratio)		1965-1970 (Ratio)	
ENTER OCS	Def Academy	1243	2.5	891	528	1.6
	Other	4363		2210	1385	
ATTRITION	Def Academy	3120		1319	857	
	Other	103		58	20	
		1402	12.6	1158	688	37.7
		1299		1100	668	
AVER	Def Academy		81.3			84.7
ANNUAL GAIN	Other		130.2			31.5

Source: Official Data furnished by Japan Defense Agency. Average gain computed by subtracting attrition from entrances and dividing by length of period.

TABLE XI-8
COMPOSITION OF LOWER OFFICER RANKS IN THE MSDF

Rank	Defense Academy	University Graduates	Junior College	High School	Middle School	Imperial Navy Sch
Lieutenant Cmdr	97	409	272	119	70	110
Lieutenant	452	369	72	239	476	
Lt (junior-grade)	261	184	22	507	583	1
Ensign	244	195	20	529	382	
TOTAL	1054	1137	386	1394	1311	111

Source: Statistics through June 30, 1970 provided by Research Division, MSDF Staff College.

group of academy graduates in the top echelons of the Japanese naval organization.

Every Defense Academy graduate can feel relatively certain that he will make captain or, better, that he has a good chance of making admiral in the officer-rich MSDF. If these ranks cannot be achieved, retirement must come at a very early age; retirement benefits are then insufficient and there is so far no related occupation to which to turn. Table XI-9 illustrates the situation a young officer today faces.

In the Imperial Navy a commander retiring at 50 could afford to live on his pension as an honored member of society. An admiral retired in the greatest honor and lived extremely well. Today the situation is greatly changed. A commander retiring at 50 is likely to get a retirement bonus and salary equal to or higher than a member of private industry or a government service officer, but neither amount is sufficient for full-time sustenance of a family; and getting another job is difficult at that age.³⁹ Whereas in private industry the highest executives

³⁹According to statistics comparing retirement bonuses and salaries of 50 leading companies of the

TABLE XI-9

PROSPECTS FOR A CAREER OFFICER IN THE MSDF

Rank	Present Number	MSDF Retirement Age	Imperial Navy Retire. Age
Admiral	2	60	65
Vice Admiral	15	58	62
Rear Admiral	44	55	58
Captain	321	53	54
Commander	714	50	50
Lieutenant Commander	1131	47	
Lieutenant	1682	45	
Lieutenant (jr. grade)	1491	40	
Ensign	1381	40	

Sources: Statistics as of March 31, 1971 provided by Japan Defense Agency.

often stay on till advanced age, those in civil service retire much earlier; however, like middle-level executives

machinery construction, banking, trading, life insurance, utilities, iron and steel, automobile, rubber, paper, and food industries, bonuses paid to executives ranged from 2,400,000 ¥ (\$6,666) for a Sumitomo Metal employee retiring with over 25 years service at age 47 to 13,790,000 ¥ (\$38,300) for a Mitsui Real Estate employee retiring with over 30 years service at age 55; by way of comparison a Navy commander who retired at age 50 with 29.5 years of service received 6,005,430 ¥ (\$16,800). Of the 50 civilian companies, only six, mainly insurance firms, pay a retirement salary since employees move on to other positions. Two firms that did pay salaries offered the following: Asahi Life Insurance paid retirees a bonus from

in industry, they are retired with a moderate bonus but gain further employment in a subsidiary corporation or related agency; for example, a police official might go to the Japan Housing Corporation or the Red Cross.⁴⁰

Systems vary from company to company and among government ministries, but almost everyone is taken care of. In the MSDF, a sincere attempt is made to help the retiree, e.g., every recruiting Local Liaison Office (LLO) maintains one section specifically responsible for finding employment for retiring members; but again the lack of prestige of a

6,270,400 - 7,884,000 ¥ plus 60,000 ¥ (\$166) per month for ten years and 30,000 ¥ (\$83) per month for the next ten years. Meiji Life Insurance paid 5,600,000 - 8,900,000 ¥ bonus plus 44,000 ¥ (\$122) per month from age 50 for life or 65,000 ¥ (\$180) per month from age 55 for life; by way of comparison the same commander in the MSDF had the option of 52,000 ¥ (\$144) per month from age 50 for life or 65,000 ¥ (\$180) per month from age 55 for life. Statistics provided by Commander Yamato Kunitami, Research Division, MSDF Staff College; Commander Yamato retired with 29.5 years service on April 1, 1971, after serving continuously from the Imperial Navy, through Occupation minesweeping including combat operations in Korea, into the MSDF.

⁴⁰ Even General Hayashi, a former Home Ministry official who became head of the National Police Reserve, general in the GSDF, and Chairman of the Joint Staff, was able upon retirement to assume a position affiliated with the police agency. He headed the Japan Housing Authority until 1971, at which time he moved over into the Red Cross organization. Interview with General Hayashi, January 5, 1971.

military career in the postwar era and the youth of the Defense Agency, which has yet to build up a related infrastructure adequate to handle its retiring personnel, have meant that not only is the age 50 retiree not taken care of, but also neither is the retiring admiral, who is allowed to work slightly longer, able to live on his salary or assured of another job upon conclusion of his service.⁴¹

An officer with a technical speciality can be relatively assured of an adequate position in industry, but the general line sea-going naval officer does not face bright prospects upon retirement. Some suggest that

⁴¹One captain in the Administration Division of the Maritime Staff Office has as his primary duty finding jobs for retiring vice admirals. (Others are cared for by the LLO's.) Except in special cases and for technical specialists, the job is difficult. Many retired admirals are employed as consultants but end up sitting in a corner with little responsibility, and, after one or two years, pride forces them to quit. In one case in 1967, jobs simply couldn't be found for four vice admirals who would normally have retired when their junior was selected over them as Chief of Maritime Staff. They extended on active duty causing a crisis for the new leader who felt a loyalty to these older men and resulting in a loss of face for those now working for a former subordinate. As one knowledgeable Defense Agency civilian put it, "We try much harder to take care of our personnel, but we have not yet succeeded to the degree of other government organizations and private industries because they have established systems." Interview with Nakanomyo Masami, Chief of Public Information Section, Japan Defense Agency, May 11, 1971.

an extended retirement age should be set up to improve this situation, but another look at the distribution of officers in Table XI-9 shows the excess at the lieutenant level already slowing promotion rates. This situation is partially caused by the lack of a forced retirement system, allowing a less-competent or poorly-adaptable officer to remain in service until retirement age level is reached. Any increase in retirement age would make this problem worse. While in a navy like that of the United States the reserve officer program fills many of the requirements of lower level officer grades, few of these officers remain on active duty, reducing the number of officers competing for higher grades; further, the advanced selection system allows young officers with good achievement records to be promoted ahead of their contemporaries, and a forced retirement system eliminates those who fail in promotion. In the MSDF, on the other hand, all officers are active duty and it is not uncommon that, from one year group of officers, ranks spread from lieutenant commander to captain.⁴² Although officers

⁴²Official data on officer age and education provided by Research Division MSDF Staff College.

with great ability are promoted ahead of their contemporaries, no forced retirement system makes this difficult at an early age and slows promotion even more for the average high-level performers. Whereas there are a significant number of lieutenant commanders in the MSDF up to the maximum retirement age of 47, 110 educated in Imperial military schools alone, in 1970 less than one-third of the Defense Academy graduates of 1958 in their middle 30's in age who remain in the MSDF have been promoted to lieutenant commander; members of the corresponding year group from Annapolis or the NROTC program in the U.S. Navy were either promoted to lieutenant commander from 1966 to 1969 or have been involuntarily separated. The young, non-specialist MSDF officer is thus presented with a dilemma; if he cannot feel assured of making captain, he is faced with unemployment at age 50. If he can make captain, he can at least work until 53; and his retirement salary and career responsibility will be higher. Should he be able to make admiral, his retirement age and salary will be further increased; and he will be able to enjoy a very responsible and prestigious position, at least within his own service, if not in society in general.

The Defense Academy graduates seem to have opted for the captain and admiral spots. University graduates who do enter and experience public attitudes, government indifference, substandard benefits, and note the motivation, abilities, and longevity of Defense Academy graduates understandably have more doubts about the likelihood of their promotion and about the wisdom of a naval career.⁴³ So far even the inability to match outflow with input of new officers since 1967 has not been a problem because of the already large number of officers. Quality has been a problem among officers, but the quantity problem has come in the enlisted ranks.

⁴³Data for the Defense Academy provided by Japan Defense Agency. There is hope for the Defense Agency building its own system within which to place its retired personnel; the obvious avenue is defense industry. Not surprisingly, the technical specialists have no problem going there already, and many of the top admirals have found employment also, e.g., Admiral Yamamoto Yoshio, the organization man, is president and chairman of the board of an iron works; Admiral Terai Yoshimori, the aviator, is with an aircraft company; and Admiral Tamura Kyuzo, the minesweeper, is with a company manufacturing mines. Still not able to take care of the majority of retirees, should defense industry continue growing, should projects like privately staffing the Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility, if returned to Japan by the U.S. Navy, materialize, etc., opportunities for the future could be enhanced.

D. THE PROBLEM OF PETTY OFFICERS AND NON-RATED ENLISTED MEN

The problem of maintaining the real workers, the men on whom the Imperial Navy was built according to many of its own officers, the petty officers and the sailors who must develop into those roles, is the most difficult and serious one faced in personnel. Whereas the petty officers that continued on duty from minesweeping, came from the MSA, or returned to the naval service more readily followed the traditional one lifetime employment-style, non-university graduate youths in the present environment have departed from this tradition, particularly in the time shortly after completion of their formal education. The system of the Self-Defense Forces does not make their choice of a military career particularly appealing, and, among the Self-Defense Forces, the MSDF seems to be experiencing the greatest difficulties recently adjusting to the new situation. Table XI-10 provides figures on the developing trends. Although from 1955 to 1970 actual strength has increased only by a factor of approximately two, attritions at all levels have increased by a multiple of approximately four or more. The MSDF has lost the relative

TABLE XI-10

ATTRITION STATISTICS OF MSDF ENLISTED PERSONNEL (1955-1970)

Year	MSDF Actual	Number Enter	Resign Early	MSDF PCT SDF PCT	Resign At 3 Years	Petty Off Attrition	MSDF PCT SDF PCT	MSDF Total Losses
1955	18,973	3072	661	7.3/5.8	0	123	2.4/2.3	786
1956	22,352	4079	978	8.7/5.6	0	138	2.1/4.5	1121
1957	23,811	1762	822	6.8/7.2	0	164	2.2/4.2	988
1958	25,070	1558	727	6.0/7.3	0	142	1.7/3.1	874
1959	26,067	2315	767	6.6/8.3	289	178	1.8/3.8	1266
1960	27,010	1583	1195	10.6/12.6	247	373	3.5/5.3	1818
1961	31,415	6550	1591	13.6/13.4	483	518	4.6/5.2	2602
1962	32,714	3828	2203	15.4/13.6	203	332	2.7/4.2	2758
1963	32,101	1414	1627	12.5/13.5	376	366	2.8/3.6	2369
1964	33,873	3662	1332	10.8/10.5	1239	375	2.8/3.0	2946
1965	34,705	4441	1708	12.7/9.8	847	272	2.0/1.6	2827
1966	34,207	1853	1333	10.1/10.0	801	287	2.0/1.7	2436
1967	35,716	4444	1449	11.1/9.5	1353	409	2.8/1.2	3211
1968	36,201	4515	2160	15.8/12.2	1513	473	3.1/2.5	4146
1969	36,651	4490	2452	17.4/	1034	543	3.5/	4029
1970	38,323	4936	2377	16.8/	1493	483	3.0/	4426

Source: Official Data furnished by Japan Defense Agency. Total losses include attrition and retirements. Figures are as of end of fiscal year (March 31 of following calendar year).

advantage it enjoyed with respect to the Self-Defense Forces as a whole in both petty officers and non-rated enlisted grades. Whereas in the mid-1950's the Self-Defense Forces had to encourage industries to hire servicemen who had completed their enlistment, today the forces are constantly losing personnel to civilian companies. In the daily newspaper published for SDF members, there are frequently now over 30 large advertisements by Japan's leading industrial companies soliciting applications for vacant positions in a single issue. Advanced school petty officers can easily find good employment, and younger basically-trained enlisted men are finding increasing opportunities.

That the type as well as the duration of the enlisted man is changing is indicated by Table XI-11. In the more junior grades, whose members are younger, the amount of education steadily climbs, yet it will be remembered from the figures of Table XI-6 that the quality of recruits has been continually declining. Middle school graduates, sometimes called the most sought after in Japan since they can be trained to suit a company's needs, are declining in absolute numbers as the youthful population decreases and as more students continue their education at

TABLE XI-11
COMPOSITION OF ENLISTED GRADES IN THE MSDF

Grade	High School	Middle School	Ratio HS/MS
Petty Officer 1/C	1749	2391	.7
Petty Officer 2/C	3064	2058	1.5
Petty Officer 3/C	3828	1965	1.9
TOTAL PETTY OFFICER	8461	6414	1.3
Leading Seaman	2769	1405	2.0
Seaman	4159	1834	2.3
Seaman Apprentice	2161	1252	1.7
Seaman Recruit		255	
TOTAL SEAMEN	9089	4746	1.9
TOTAL ENLISTED MEN	17,730	11,160	1.6

Source: Statistics through June 30, 1970 provided by Research Division, MSDF Staff College. Seamen recruits are students at Youth Basic Service School and must be middle school graduates.

least through high school. Those who do choose to work after completion of middle school often seek to continue their schooling while they work. The Ground Self-Defense Force, which does not have such high intelligence requirements and can offer middle school graduates the chance to

finish school during their service, has approximately 1.5 times more of those graduates among its grades equivalent to the seaman than does the MSDF.⁴⁴

Promotion rates for enlisted men are slow. Rather than promoting critically short specialists such as electronics technicians, radar and sonar operators, etc., quickly, depending on demand, as is done in the U.S. Navy, for example, where particularly qualified individuals filling a critical need can advance to petty officer second class in less than two years, the MSDF's enlisted promotion system is more traditional, most specialties advancing at similar, slow paces; petty officers second class reach this level on an average after slightly more than 19 years of service. Of course experience and training makes them excellent professional technicians and petty officers in the real sense of the word, whereas their young foreign counterparts are often particularly weak in the leadership aspect; but when these considerably older Japanese sailors travel to the United States for schooling with U.S. and other foreign navy men, they often must sweep the floors after classes while their "seniors" over

⁴⁴Official statistics provided by Japan Defense Agency.

ten years younger go on liberty.⁴⁵

Career prospects for those who do stay in the MSDF are not particularly favorable. Table XI-12 illustrates the situation. Whereas in the Imperial Navy a chief petty officer retired with enough money to purchase a home and could live comfortably as a respected member of society on his pension alone, in the MSDF he is faced with being unemployed at age 50. The best high school graduates under age 23 are encouraged to take the special examination for the Defense Academy. Until recently, almost all career first class petty officers could count on being promoted to officer status late in their terms of service. Since 1967, however, it has been necessary to allow some petty officers between the ages of 30 and 35 to become general line officers in order to provide more opportunities and incentives. This program also naturally takes the best talent; and other top performers, particularly those with technical abilities, are the ones who are being tempted to leave by opportunities in other lines of work. Thus petty officer ranks are trimmed of the best talent in several

45 Interviews with junior officers and petty officers of MSDF educated in the United States.

TABLE XI-12

PROSPECTS FOR A CAREER ENLISTED MAN IN THE MSDF

Grade	Present Number	MSDF Retirement Age	Imperial Navy Retirement Age
Warrant Officer/Chief Petty Officer	130	50	48
Petty Officer 1/C	4593	50	48
Petty Officer 2/C	5247	45	
Petty Officer 3/C	6003	43	
Leading Seaman	4084		
Seaman	5785		
Seaman Apprentice	4175		

Source: Statistics as of March 31, 1971 provided by Japan Defense Agency.
 The Imperial Navy waived all age retirements in wartime.

ways. A total of 168 petty officers retired from the MSDF in the three years from 1968-1970 having no opportunity to become officers as compared with a total of 49 in the twelve years from 1955 to 1967.⁴⁶

As can be seen from Table XI-12, as with officers, the MSDF has a large proportion of petty officers. If attrition came from older first and second class members, instead of from the young, newly-trained third class, there would not be so much worry.⁴⁷ In the early planning stages of the Fourth Defense Buildup program a system of defense high schools whose graduates would be required to serve a fixed term of service as in the proposed medical school program was considered. Since the number of first and second class petty officers is already so large, however, these graduates would have had to remain seamen or third class for a very long time. Realizing the program would be costly and would, because of limited promotion potential, have difficulty in drawing and retaining high

⁴⁶Official statistics provided by Japan Defense Agency.

⁴⁷Of 471 vacancies in authorized petty officer strength as of March 31, 1971, 419 of these occurred among third class petty officers. Of the remaining 52, 44 were among second class. Official data provided by Japan Defense Agency.

quality personnel, it has already been discarded. A warrant officer program replaced the direct first class petty officer to officer program in 1971 in order to keep technological expertise of petty officers from being diluted and to offer more opportunities to the petty officer grades for advancement to officer status before retirement; the implementing instruction designated the warrant officer as the equivalent of the Imperial Navy chief petty officer. Warrant officers will be paid and given retirement benefits of officers and will qualify to become limited duty specialist officers; but it remains to be seen if this program which was started with 130 personnel, a quota which was immediately filled, can provide enough opportunities for career petty officers now remaining in service.

Table XI-10 shows that the retention of non-rated enlisted men has become a serious problem even for the initial three years. Declines in quality and quantity threaten petty officer ability and strength in the future and make the chances for expansion appear unfavorable. Since the numbers of enlisted men are relatively greater than those of officers and non-university-educated personnel are more likely to switch occupations, the problem is

more severe. But, to keep perspective, it should be remembered that the problem is not unique to the MSDF or the Self-Defense Forces; and, amazingly to some, present strength allowances are being filled. Big industries have similar if not worse problems. Few recruits for the Self-Defense Forces come in with high expectations. Some are pleasantly surprised at the opportunity to receive an advanced education or are satisfied with the prestige of being able to become a supervisor later in their careers and stay in. Percentage-wise it is estimated that the defense forces experience a lower rate of attrition than do civilian firms which tend to overestimate, or are overestimated, as to what they can do for an individual employee.⁴⁸ It is well known that the Self-Defense forces do provide comprehensive education and training. That program is the subject of the following chapter.

⁴⁸Interviews with Defense Agency, civil service, and industrial personnel analysts.

CHAPTER XII

EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE MARITIME

SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

In addition to being important as recruiting and career incentives, high quality training of both officer and enlisted personnel in naval skills, many of which are unique to the profession and which increasingly become more complex, is essential. This chapter will classify and discuss officer education and training into initial, basic, and advanced stages, trying briefly to describe the historical development and scope of each, and will comment on enlisted and operational training in the MSDF.

A. EDUCATION OF OFFICERS

Prime Minister Yoshida desired officers of his new Safety Agency to be highly educated, properly-motivated, and fully-trained career professionals; but he also feared the elitism which was characteristic of the Imperial

academies. Encouraged by people such as Masuhara Keikichi and General Hayashi Keizo, civilian and uniformed heads of the National Police Reserve, respectively, he favored and won approval in the Safety Agency Law of August, 1952 for a Safety Academy which was jointly to train 300 prospective officers for the ground and maritime forces. The law stipulated that the president of the new institution be a civilian; for that position Yoshida selected Professor Maki Tomoo, of the Faculty of Law, Keio University, who served from the founding of the academy in 1953 until January, 1965.¹

Under President Maki's leadership the Safety Academy, renamed the Defense Academy in 1954, educated its students to be "good Japanese and good members of society" above all else. Despite demands from former Army personnel who wanted "platoon leaders who can be assigned to the front at any time," Maki expressed his preference for "wide vision, scientific thinking, and rich humanity," which sounded a little bit like former Naval Academy

¹The Japan Defense Academy, Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1970, p. 2. Interviews with Masuhara, January 29, 1971, and Hayashi, January 5, 1971.

Superintendent Inoue demanding that English be continued during the war and stating the goal as providing a man with potential to grow like a tree rather than training an apprentice. Maki also disliked apprentices and stated that, "Officers trained to be only useful for combat will not last long as leaders."² President Maki's philosophy has been reemphasized by the third occupant of the presidency, Dr. Inoki Masamichi, a political scientist from Kyoto University, who has written widely on communism and was known in the past for his outspoken, liberal remarks.³ Commented Inoki shortly after his appointment:

It seems that many people confuse defense with militarism. I myself hate militarism, probably more than anyone else. But when it comes to the nation's self-defense it is entirely a different matter. . . . it is nonsense for Japan to go unarmed in this age.⁴

²Quoted in "The Postwar Generation," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, October 31, 1968.

³The second President, retired General Ohmori Kan, a former police official and retired Chief of Staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force, served from 1965-1970. During this time dissatisfaction and resignations increased. Upon General Ohmori's retirement, students and faculty of the Defense Academy reportedly petitioned Director General Nakasone to not place another ex-military man in the position, resulting in Nakasone's eventual selection of Dr. Inoki. Interview with a National Defense Academy professor.

⁴Nakao Takeo, "'Many People Confuse Defense with Militarism' Says Inoki," Mainichi Daily News, August 1, 1970.

The curriculum of the Defense Academy is demanding, the students being kept busy by academics and athletics from 6:15 in the morning until 10:15 in the evening. The basic program of a MSDF-designated student over the four years consists of:

- General Education -- humanities social studies, and natural sciences (720 hours)
- Foreign Language -- English, French, German, or Russian (240 hours)
- Physical Education -- (390 hours)
- Basic Science -- (660 hours)
- Engineering -- major in electrical, mechanical, aeronautical or major in basic engineering, applied chemistry, or applied physics (810 hours)
- Electives -- (210 hours)
- Maritime Science -- (450 hours)
- Physical Training -- (1,176 hours)

This curriculum exceeds the requirements of any U.S. service

academy or ROTC program; and although the Defense Academy is rated on a par with a technical or scientific university in Japan, whereas the Imperial Navy Academy was considered the coequal of prestigious Tokyo University, the Defense Academy's faculty point out that its students work harder than any in Japan.⁵ This writer was most impressed with the frank, articulate manner and depth of senior academy students, even when speaking in English, and felt they compared most favorably with military and civilian students in the United States and Japan.⁶

⁵The Japan Defense Academy, pp. 8-12; interviews with President Inoki, Vice Superintendent Lieutenant General Tabata Ryoichi, GSDF, and Major Onozawa Tadao, ASDF, guidance counsellor, Japan Defense Academy, September 25, 1970. Recently a plan to add international affairs and management courses in an effort to add more humanities to the Defense Academy curriculum was announced. It is anticipated that program changes will be instituted in the 1972-1973 academic year. Interview with Professor Ito Kobun, National Defense College, January 13, 1971; Professor Ito suggested many of the forthcoming changes.

⁶Interviews with the English Speaking Society Japan Defense Academy, September 25, 1970. Cadets Kawamura Yasuyoshi, Watanabe Masao, Tomogami Toshi, and Nishikawa Kinishiro were kind enough to host me at the Defense Academy graduation March 21, 1971 as well as to provide many valuable interviews throughout 1970-71.

All MSDF future officers, be they graduates of the Defense Academy, a civilian university, or petty officers passing the Defense Agency examination, must spend one year in training at Etajima's Officer Candidate School; even the graduates of the four-year Defense Academy are only midshipmen coequal to the other two groups. The formal mission of the Officer Candidate School is:

To conduct and direct the foundational education for commissioning, to give the basic technical knowledge required of all officers, and to provide physical training in order to meet the needs of JMSDF service, but an equally important mission is to instill the spirit of the Imperial Navy and its leaders are not afraid to say so.⁷ The midshipmen still study and live in the Naval Academy's red brick building constructed in 1892 with stone imported from England and considered at the time to be one of the finest buildings in Japan. The educational Museum contains the memorials of the Imperial Navy including a lock of hair of Admiral Togo, a kaiten (human torpedo),

⁷ Interview with Vice Admiral Motomura Tetsuro, Superintendent Officer Candidate School Etajima, September 7, 1970. For a stirring example of this pride see Admiral Itaya Takaichi, Sakeikai Umihari (Watch to Starboard while You Look to Port), Tokyo: Kaijojieishimbunsha, 1969. No such effort is made on behalf of the Imperial Army among GSDF cadets.

and an entire room filled with pictures, notes, and personal effects of special-duty suicide corps members. Midshipmen sing the same songs their former counterparts did at Etajima (the GSDF adopted new songs to replace Imperial Army ballads); when they encounter "spiritual trouble" they are encouraged to visit the museum to help bring peace of mind; and each night they ask themselves:

1. Have I lived up to the spirit of wholehearted devotion to duty?
2. Have I been amiss in my words and conduct?
3. Have I been lacking in vigor?
4. Have I been fulfilling my duty as I should?
5. Have I been lazy?

principles drafted in 1932 by Admiral Matsushita Hajime, President of the Naval Academy.⁸

The effect of this training inspires a respect for the Imperial Navy, but the graduates also seem to realize they are living in a different world. Most students and young officer graduates interviewed said that they valued the tradition but that it was only part of their

⁸The Maritime Officer Candidate School JMSDF, Etajima: JMSDF Officer Candidate School, 1970, p. 10: "Heritage and Tradition," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, November 2, 1968; interviews with Vice Admiral Motomura and Captain Yonemura Yasunori, MSDF, Chief of the Educational Department and Commandant of Midshipmen, Officer Candidate School, September 7, 1970.

heritage and that the new officer corps has its own history to worry about. Whereas in the days of the Imperial Navy students often visited the Educational Museum once a week or oftener, none could be found now that had ever visited more than once or twice in a year in residence. Many acknowledged the traditional value of the red brick building but wondered if a structure built in 1892 and unmodernized since the war is capable of providing the environment for the modern, scientific education necessary for staying abreast of life in the 1970's. They feel their Imperial Navy seniors are demanding dedication and hard work, but esteem for the MSDF among government leaders and the public is very low; resolving their superiors' attitudes with their treatment from the outside is an ever-present dilemma.⁹

The main course at Officer Candidate School is the general line course which lasts one year and covers the broad fields of leadership, gunnery and anti-submarine warfare, operations, seamanship, supply and accounts,

⁹Interviews with junior officer instructors, Officer Candidate School, September 7, 1970.

marine engineering and damage control, mathematics, and English (which is required since MSDF tactical radio communications are in English). Shorter courses of six months are provided for prospective pilots and limited duty officers, i.e., first class petty officers passing a special promotional examination and continuing work in their specialized area, a system carried over from the Imperial Navy. Students receive intensive physical training, as at the Defense Academy; long-distance swimming, mountain climbing, marathon running, and judo-kendo matches are included as partial requirements. At the end of March the new ensigns of the line are finally commissioned, but even then their training is really only beginning.

To enhance the international aspects of a naval education, graduation from Etajima is followed by an overseas training cruise. Although at the time the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954, the House of Councillors had adopted the no overseas dispatch resolution and that sentiment has been often repeated and has never been seriously questioned, the MSDF has sent its Training Squadron abroad annually since 1957. The first cruise went to Hawaii, wisely picked because of U.S. support for

the mission and the large Japanese population living there. Over fifteen years after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy returned with a quite different mission. Despite assurances from Vice Admiral Nakayama Sadayoshi, the first squadron commander, that the MSDF shore party had caused no incidents, Japanese reporters embarked for the cruise questioned CINCPAC, Admiral Felix B. Stump, personally as to the crews' conduct. Admiral Stump consulted all military and civilian police agencies and only then reported that even he was surprised by the investigation. No single MSDF crew member had even to be stopped in warning of a possible infraction of good conduct. Such a performance could not be remembered of any group of ships, U.S. or foreign, that had ever visited Pearl Harbor.¹⁰ And these men, as all sailors of the MSDF, could not feel threatened by any severe military court martial system.¹¹

¹⁰Interview with Admiral Nakayama, October 8, 1970.

¹¹Not surprisingly, the crew of the first Training Squadron, as all since then, were specially selected for good behavior; however, no commanding officer interviewed of any ship in the MSDF as a whole reported difficulty with this new system of discipline so far. Many stated that "loss of face" before colleagues who feel

Since the first cruise of 45 days in 1957, the overseas training period has lengthened annually until 1965 when it leveled off at approximately four months duration. Restricted in the first several years to the U.S. and Canada because of Foreign Ministry fears of repercussions, the squadron visited Mexico in 1961, Australia and New Zealand the following year and since then has visited widely in Europe, Asia, South America, and Oceania. Despite some small problems in Australia, overall reaction, even there, has been most favorable. Japanese industry has gained support in some countries immediately after the cruise; and Japanese ambassadors, once worried about such visits, now openly seek port calls to their host countries by the Training Squadron. Coupled with visits to numerous Japanese ports to build the MSDF image there, the Training Squadron now provides over eight months

the need to build an image of the MSDF with the public is more than enough to insure good conduct. Particularly in their homeports and in areas such as Sasebo where the MSDF is relatively popular, there have been few disciplinary problems. The use of drugs is, so far, an unheard of problem for the MSDF. Interviews with Captains Abe Yuzo, August 28, 1970, and Tamagawa Yasuhiro, September 9, 1970, and Commander Sato Kenzo, October 26, 1970, all former submarine or destroyer commanding officers.

valuable training experience to the new young ensigns who, upon completion, are ready to begin training for a real job as professional naval officers.¹²

Quality instruction for the new officers in basic naval subjects was felt to be a most urgent requirement by the "Y Committee." As with expansion, a repeat of the confusion that accompanied the organization of the National Police Reserve with officers and soldiers, many with no previous experience, trying to learn, lead, and follow at the same time was not desired. The formal sessions of the "Y Committee" worked on the education of new officers as its first order of business.¹³

¹² Junior officer participants of the 1962-1969 training cruises greatly extol their merits. Those visiting Australia did report one instance where MSDF ensigns riding in a bus were jeered as Japanese militarists, but this was a single instance. The 1970 cruise for the first time since the war circumnavigated the globe. The entire history from Imperial Navy times to 1970 is contained in Seno, Enyo Kokai Yowa (Episodes of the Training Squadron).

¹³ Interview with "Y Committee" members. Minutes of the "Y Committee" provided by Admiral Uchida; minutes of the MSA Advisory Group provided by Captain Abrahams. Training of the first officers picked by the "Y Committee" (see above pp. 372-75) by the U.S. Navy began in January, 1952, well before the Peace Treaty or loan of vessels. These officer trainees taught four perspective officer-enlisted groups before the formal founding of the Coastal Security Force in April.

The formal officer training school began on July 18, 1952 in Yokosuka. That school, institutionalizing the training planned by the "Y Committee" and fulfilling an April, 1951 prophecy of Admiral Arleigh Burke, was the forerunner of the officer divisions of the First and Second Service Schools, the former teaching gunnery, mine-sweeping, navigation, communications, and logistics and, the latter covering engineering, electricity, and machine tools. The actual designation as the "Service School" took place on September 16, 1953, the first classes of officers beginning on October 5. On March 2, 1956, the predecessor of the later-designated First Service School moved to Etajima as a branch of the Yokosuka school, later-designated the Second Service School. On February 1, 1960, the Third Service School, last of the major training schools of the MSDF, was established at the Shimofusa Maritime Air Base, Chiba, to teach maintenance of aircraft and equipment and aircraft navigation, communication, and electronics.¹⁴

¹⁴Jieitai Nenpyo Kaijo Jieitai (Chronology of the Maritime Self-Defense Force), pp. 144-147, 174; "Maritime Self-Defense Force Today" (unpublished, 1967), pp. 8-9.

Each of the three schools offers basic, advanced, and special courses. The basic courses are of two months' duration; and the average sea-going general line officer will attend three courses in his first four years of service, spending two months studying one particular subject such as communications, gunnery, and engineering mechanics within the category of one of each of the three main naval ship departments of operations, anti-submarine warfare, and engineering, respectively. After each course he will spend one year on a ship where his schooling can be applied on the job. At the lieutenant and lieutenant commander levels, a one-year advanced course in the operations, anti-submarine warfare, or engineering category is undertaken. Special private research courses of one year are assigned to seasoned lieutenant commanders in areas of interest to the MSDF in which the officer concerned has shown special promise.¹⁵

¹⁵Interview with Commander Sato, October 26, 1971. Commander Sato is presently chief of the Foreign Liaison Office of the Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office; he has worked in the Education and Training Section previously and has completed a special research course in ASW. His knowledge of all training systems within the MSDF was invaluable.

Prior to assuming command of the MSDF, Vice Admiral Nagasawa Ko visited the United States to confer with U.S. naval officers and study organizational procedures. He was accompanied by then Rear Admiral Nakayama who had a special assignment to study the structure of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. The Japanese equivalent, the MSDF Staff College, was established in Yokosuka on September 1, 1954, with Admiral Nakayama as President.¹⁶ The first students were admitted in March, 1955. Today the Staff College is located in Ichigaya on the site of the Imperial Army Headquarters where it moved on Christmas day 1959; it offers a twelve-month course in command and staff, training its students in staff planning and decision making, and a similar length advanced course for commanders, treating broader topics of international relations and maritime defense strategy. A four-week special course serves as a refresher for captains.¹⁷ The

¹⁶ Interview with Admiral Nakayama, October 8, 1970.

¹⁷ Jieitai Nenpyo Kaijo Jieitai (Chronology of the Maritime Self-Defense Force), pp. 151-52; interviews with Captains Ichiki Toshio, Chief of Education Division, and Captain Sahashi Morio, Chief of Research Division, MSDF Staff College, December 1, 1970.

Staff College also brings together twelve officers of the captain or commander ranks to do extended research for two years or less in specialized subjects of interest to the MSDF. Particularly at Ichigaya, research facilities are maximized: an excellent tactical library, the neighboring facilities of the GSDF, ASDF, and Joint Staff Colleges and libraries, as well as the War History Office of the National Defense College (Senshishitsu) containing the archives of the Imperial armed forces being located on the same grounds.¹⁸

The National Defense College in Ebisu, Tokyo, is the highest level domestic school studying the Self-Defense Forces in Japan. It conducts basic research on the administration and operations of the forces and provides a nine-month course for senior officers and civilian government officials. Under a civilian president and mostly civilian faculty, approximately 30 students annually, including ten MSDF captains, study international

¹⁸ Interview with Vice Admiral Ishizuka Sakae, President MSDF Staff College, August 3, 1970; Commander Yamato Kunitami, Chief of Planning Section, Research Division, and Commander Kubokawa Motoo, senior researcher, December 1, 1970.

relations, military theory, technology, domestic political affairs, and policy planning.¹⁹

In addition to local educational facilities, MSDF officers are sent abroad, particularly to the United States, to study. Beginning in October, 1954, when four officers began the U.S. Navy's Anti-submarine Warfare School in San Diego, by 1971, over 1000 officers will have received training, mostly in weapons systems' schools but also in flight training and in the officer submarine school, in the U.S. Until 1964, this training was financed entirely by the U.S. through the Military Assistance Program while since 1967 it has been paid for exclusively by Japan through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program.²⁰ Additionally, one senior officer annually attends the nine-month Naval Command Course at the War College in Newport as a guest of the United States; and approximately every

¹⁹Interviews with National Defense College Professors Iwashima Hisao, February 20, 1970; Ito Kobun, January 13, 1970; Momoi Makoto, February 2, 1971; and Kimura Kazuo, October 27, 1970. Iwashima, Ito, and Kimura provided continuing information on the MSDF and its educational institutions.

²⁰Data and information provided by Mutual Defense Assistance Office, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo.

three years, one middle-level officer attends the Royal Naval College in Greenwich.²¹

Every individual officer school cannot be mentioned here, but hopefully the outline provided offers an insight into the extensive training that MSDF officers receive. Submarine and aviation officers receive three years and two and one-half years of primary specialized training in those fields, respectively. Even basic pilot training has been an exclusively MSDF function since March, 1969. The introduction of a new combined basic/advanced trainer more tailored to the MSDF's air mission ended the joint basic training conducted by the ASDF. Under a cooperative program with civilian airline companies to reduce the hiring away of naval pilots by private firms, as many as nineteen pilots per year have been trained directly for civilian aviation by the MSDF Air Training

²¹Interviews with Captain Abe, Naval War College student 1970, February 16, 1970, and Lieutenant Commander Imaizumi Yasuaki, attending the Royal Naval College in 1971, October 15, 1970. Newport graduates have had good success in the MSDF with the former Chief of Staff and Joint Staff Chairman Itaya and Chief of Staff Uchida among former students.

Command.²²

The major weak point of officer education which must be mentioned is the lack of adequate postgraduate programs.

Not possessing its own facilities such as the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, the MSDF has had to rely on civilian universities to train its officers to keep pace technologically and in other fields. In 1957 the Defense Agency began sending 30 to 50 officers per year to universities including such prestigious institutions as Waseda, Kyoto, Osaka, and Keio. In 1967, however, organized student protests and strikes began plaguing several schools. Fearful faculty and administrations, while rendering lip-service to the Constitution's guarantee of equal opportunity of education, meekly submitted to student demands, promising in some cases not to admit SDF personnel or even Defense Agency civilians and assuring

²²Approximately three pilots per year have also been trained for the MSA. Interviews with Vice Admiral Samejima Hiroshi, Chief of the Air Training Command, January 9, 1971, and Vice Admiral Tsukudo Tatsuo, President MSDF Staff College and formerly instrumental in the formation of submarine training in the MSDF, January 27, 1971.

leftist students that they would screen applicants closely to discover SDF members who might be concealing their status.²³ The situation has deteriorated so pathetically that even Jesuit-run Sophia University, to which the MSDF formerly sent several officers annually to study English, Russian, and management, has refused them admission since 1969. Since then, these officers have attended Takushoku University, the President of which happens to be Nakasone Yasuhiro, Director General of the Defense Agency.²⁴ Some large private universities still admit small numbers of SDF officers--although some will go no further than allowing members to enroll in the undergraduate correspondence or evening divisions.²⁵

²³"Admission Into School Rejected," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, January 14, 1969.

²⁴Sophia with more English speakers among its faculty and student body produced better English speaking officers than does Takushoku which is not as highly regarded a school and with not as strong a program in English conversation. Interviews with Lieutenant Commander Imaizumi and Lieutenant Nagasawa, graduates of Sophia, and Lieutenant Tamai Akira, graduate of Takushoku, July 23, 1970.

²⁵Private schools will generally admit SDF members as undergraduates in their evening and correspondence divisions where members attend in civilian clothes and pay their own tuition. In 1970, 5300 SDF members, 2700 in evening

The Defense Academy instituted a graduate division in 1962. Begun with a program in electronics engineering, it now claims a legal maximum of 60 students admitted annually for two-year programs; additional fields of operations research, shipbuilding, and aerospace and ordnance engineering have been added to the curriculum. Although the program has been plagued with budgetary problems resulting in the lack of an adequate faculty, research equipment, and library source material, it has been making progress toward a respectable scientific education.²⁶

Solid training in the liberal arts on a graduate level is still lacking, however. With the few good Japanese universities unavailable, foreign education is greatly desired, both for badly needed experience in international politics, economics, and history, from which sound military

divisions and 2600 in correspondence divisions pursued undergraduate studies. Some schools will not even accept SDF members in these divisions and most prestigious national universities have no evening or correspondence courses. In 1970 Kumamoto National University in Kyushu accepted one SDF student whereas admission has been refused in the past. At most other national schools and many private schools of repute, all SDF applicants just happen to fail the entrance examinations. Interview with Kimura, October 26, 1970. "Admission Into School Rejected," Mainichi Daily News, January 14, 1969.

²⁶ Interview with Kimura, October 26, 1970.

strategy cannot be separated, and for career-incentive morale purposes. For the first time, in 1970, the Defense Agency sent one student to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, in Medford, Massachusetts, where Foreign Ministry officers have long been in attendance; but that one student was a civilian member of the Internal Bureau. The status of the Defense Agency with little bargaining ability as compared with Cabinet ministries for budgetary allocations makes this problem difficult. More overseas training has been promised by Minister Nakasone as an incentive to morale in the Fourth Defense Buildup Program, but an adequate graduate education program for MSDF personnel now remains a promise of the future.

B. ENLISTED AND OPERATIONAL TRAINING

As with officers, the training of enlisted personnel is not neglected. All Regional District Headquarters but Ominato maintain recruit training centers where new sailors are given four and one-half months initial training upon entry into the MSDF in order to indoctrinate

them in the basic fundamentals of military life as well as to make them familiar with MSDF customs and procedures.

During his initial three-year enlistment, a MSDF seaman receives three to six-months' basic instruction at one of the three Service Schools mentioned in the officers' training program. This schooling is in the enlisted occupation field he will specialize in as a petty officer should he remain in service. By not providing advanced technical training at this time, a great deal of time and money are not spent educating a seaman who might not subsequently make the MSDF his career.²⁷

Borrowing an idea from the Imperial Army, the MSDF began a program for middle school graduates in 1955 as part of its First Service School. Organized separately since 1967, this Young Men's Service School in Etajima trains its students for four years, granting them a high school equivalency degree and designation as a petty officer third class.²⁸

²⁷Interview with Commander Sato, October 27, 1970.

²⁸Interview with Rear Admiral Miyata Keisuke, Superintendent, Young Men's Service School, Etajima, September 7, 1971. Promotion to petty officer third class normally requires approximately eight years' service.

The petty officer, like the middle-level officer of the lieutenant or lieutenant commander grade, receives advanced schooling of approximately twelve to eighteen months, again in his enlisted speciality rating, usually at one of the three Service Schools. This training might be in the United States, related to one of the weapons systems incorporated by the MSDF; although beginning two years later, in 1956, enlisted men's training in the U.S. has exceeded the officers' total by over 300, more than 1300 scheduled to have completed training by the end of 1971.²⁹

Before concluding comments on training, a few words will be added concerning operational experience and morale. Despite the influx of former naval officers and enlisted men at the time of its founding, operational experience has remained a problem plaguing the MSDF from its earliest days. Many of the former Navy officers were

²⁹Data provided by Mutual Defense Assistance Office. The number of individual courses for enlisted men, particularly when engineering and aircraft maintenance fields are considered, outnumber even officer schools and will not be enumerated here. Details of individual courses are listed in Kaijo Jieitai Hoki Ruisyu (4) (MSDF Collected Regulations, Volume 4), Tokyo: Kaijo Bakuriyo Kanbu Somuka, 1962, as amended.

very young prior to 1945; and few of the middle-level officers had previous command experience.³⁰ In the early 1960's, a series of ship collisions and air accidents occurred as the MSDF increased its tempo of operations with newly-built vessels and MAP ships and aircraft received from the United States. Chief of Maritime Staff Nakayama was surprised to learn upon investigation how little sea experience many of his commanding officers had and instituted new procedures whereby officers were selected for command by experience rather than by rank. Additionally new aircraft safety lanes and career aircraft limitations for individual pilots were instituted.³¹

Although the situation has improved as ships and aircraft have multiplied and operational training has

³⁰The early training stages were marked by some humorous inexperience. Captain W. B. Regan, U.S. Navy, as a lieutenant junior-grade assigned to Fleet Activities Yokosuka, became commanding officer for one day of each refurbished patrol frigate and landing craft before it was given to the Japanese. Captain Regan remembers the new officers trying to apply their newly-learned American techniques to the extent of attempting to navigationaly fix their positions when the ships were still moored to the pier, giving rudder orders with direction but no amount, etc., interview with Captain Regan, March 19, 1970.

³¹Interview with Admiral Nakayama, October 8, 1970.

expanded, cases of lack of experience still exist. Even today some operational multi-unit commanders have never had individual ship command themselves. A partial reason for this has been the small number of ships in the MSDF; these are rotated among commanders as frequently as once per year to broaden the experience of a maximum number of officers. But carrying over a questionable practice of the Imperial Navy, some top members of a particular year group of officers are still kept "safely" out of command level to protect them from a collision or other accident that might end their careers and lose valuable staff members for the MSDF. While the necessity of a sound staff cannot be denied, a staff not intimately familiar with and experienced in operational matters cannot give the direction and advice needed by subordinates and seniors in the chain of command organization, respectively.

Progress is being made and good people are reaching command level in larger numbers. Unfortunately, governmental ultra-caution has made the most valuable and realistic training difficult. Only one drill has been publicly announced between MSDF destroyers and their most

challenging adversary in time of war, nuclear submarines. More drills are expected to follow; but, newspaper headlines which resulted from the first drill will, no doubt, bring great restraint.³² The incident of the false "bombing" run has already resulted in the cancellation of other unrelated, routine training activities because of a civilian-felt need to maintain a low profile of the Defense Agency for a while.³³ Japan's own submarines have not been rigged for the impact of exercise torpedoes because of official caution, fearing an accident with resultant adverse publicity. Thus the MSDF gets exercise torpedo practice with a live submarine target only on the occasions it is granted services from the Seventh Fleet whose training budget is growing slimmer.

Having these restrictions, the remarkable fact is how proficient what forces the MSDF does have for anti-submarine warfare are. U.S. Navy officers have high

³²See above, Chapter VIII, note 10; Asahi Shimbun's story written by Taoka Shunji was rather moderate. Other newspapers played the story to headlines, e.g., "Japan-US Joint Naval Drill Bared, N-Sub Snook Took Part," Mainichi Daily News, March 20, 1971.

³³See above, Chapter X, note 16.

respect for their abilities. This writer, a former Seventh Fleet destroyer operations officer, rode the JDS MAKIGUMO (DDK 114) for ten days intensive ASW training during the 1970 annual MSDF/USN combined exercises in the Sea of Japan and was deeply impressed by the morale, aggressiveness, realism, and professional competence exhibited by the entire ship's team. From May 1970 - May 1971, the MSDF did not have a single aircraft accident. The extensive schooling and improved training seems to be paying dividends.

Unfortunately, in these times of great economic opportunity, the internal psychological rewards of serving in the Self-Defense Forces are not as high as they could be, particularly in large units. Several junior and senior MSDF officers and enlisted men interviewed specifically on this problem offered some possible explanations. Many young officers graduated from the Defense Academy are more worried about their own future and traditions rather than preserving the traditions of the Imperial Navy. Former Imperial Navy officers, some in-between officers stated, were educated more rigidly, knew a much higher state of political power, economic affluence, and

social prestige. These older officers have a difficult time in the radically different conditions today and often fail to show an interest in coping with the new situation; many senior officers are more interested, some younger officers felt, in enhancing their careers than in dealing with the situation in any new innovative manner. Similarly, enlisted men interviewed complained about the treatment they received from and a complete inability to communicate with younger officers, particularly those from the Defense Academy who, the sailors felt, are still trying to exercise the authority of the Emperor in obtaining compliance from their subordinates. Several enlisted men and more-senior officers explained their view that today's officers are more flexibly educated but right from the start face a necessity to gain compliance based on ability and achievement rather than on Imperial authority as in the old Navy. Being a personal friend to or lenient with enlisted men does not gain that respect, just as treating them like animals does not necessarily gain it either, since fear of punishment does not accompany such treatment. An officer who knows his job well, requires excellence from his men, and yet provides them with the counsel they need

and desire, will have their respect. Such leadership, however, is difficult at an early age when the young officer himself is still developing. The gap between senior and junior officers thus leads to the gulf between officers and enlisted men.³⁴

Despite this rather gloomy description, to step aboard a MSDF ship is still an impressive experience today for the foreign naval observer. While the new officers and enlisted men carrying over from the Imperial Navy will offer the opinion that there is little spirit compared with former days, the morale that does exist is evident in the cleanliness and operating efficiency of the average vessel and the attitude of the crew members.³⁵ It will be

³⁴Interviews with 100-some MSDF officers and enlisted men.

³⁵The writer recorded by following experiences while riding JDS MAKIGUMO (DDK-114) for ten days in October, 1970. Commander Sato Kenzo, the commanding officer was a graduate of the equivalent of the 74th class of the Naval Academy seeing action briefly in the Imperial Navy. The damage control officer, Lieutenant So Haryushi, enlisted in the Imperial Navy in 1943 at the age of fifteen in order to fulfill his duty to the Emperor. In 1952 he joined the MSDF as a petty officer, and in 1961 he became an officer. The ship's cook, Petty Officer 1/C Kurihara Yuki-yoshi joined the Imperial Navy in 1940 and the MSDF in 1955; since he can't become an officer he will retire at age 50. He will not have to work as his wife is a

remembered that Admiral Yamamoto's memorandum to Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa in 1945 that was approved by the great statesman and moderate Navy Minister stated that a new navy, if created in Japan, should be in accordance with the character of Japan of that time rather than being strictly similar to what went before. Today, in addition to many characteristics of the Imperial Navy, there are also obvious and great differences. "Our mission requires a man's job," one MSDF destroyer skipper recently told his crew; "we do our job with human love and respect,"

hairdresser and can support him; otherwise, he reported, his retirement salary would not be adequate. All three men reported spirit was less than the fanatical loyalty of the Imperial Navy; So and Kurihara who were sometimes beaten when young seamen said the MSDF was definitely more enjoyable and sailors were happier on the ships they have been on--both had been on more than six in the MSDF. Both also said that the Imperial Navy sailor was happier in society since he was greatly respected.

Upon leaving the ship I made the mistake of asking if I might have a ship's ensign as a souvenir of my stay. Commander Sato agreed, thinking, however that I had asked for the command pennant. Hearing about this, his officers, Defense Academy and university graduates, met and asked that this symbol of Sato's command, "under which we would die for you," not be given away, "especially to a foreigner." Commander Sato explained and I readily withdrew my request. As a Navy officer and former commanding officer myself, I could not help but being impressed. The new Navy of new Japan may have less spirit than that of wartime Japan, but a healthy morale may not be lacking either. My impressions were confirmed on many other MSDF ships and by reports from other U.S. Navy observers.

he added as a second premise.³⁶ It is only through such loyalty and understanding that the MSDF may be able to continue its existence in the unique military atmosphere and economic conditions of postwar Japan. Up to the present time the MSDF has recruited an adequate number of personnel, has retained a sufficient number, and has educated them well enough to carry out its functions to date of minesweeping and training. Whether this number can be continued in a proposed expanding naval force is doubtful in the near future because of a decreasing national youthful population and a decreasing percentage of applicants for vacancies in the lower levels of the MSDF and because of increasing national economic opportunities and increasing attrition in the younger-age enlisted levels of the MSDF. Whether even the personnel that are recruited for the present organization under the unique limitations and character of the MSDF are suitable as a fighting force able to defend Japan is a controversial and untested question. The problems in the personnel field are known to civilian and uniformed leaders

³⁶ Commander Sato Kenzo to crew of MAKIGUMO, October, 1970, posted on all hands bulletin boards.

alike; their solutions, if forthcoming, will likely take a combined governmental and military effort.

PART V

SUPPORT PROBLEMS OF THE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

CHAPTER XIII

THE INDUSTRIAL-POLITICAL-military COMPLEX

IN JAPAN

Of course, compared with other major industries, it [the defense industry] is still small in scale with ¥300 billion in yearly demand.

Its share in the nation's total mining and manufacturing production is about 0.5 per cent, or the same as that of the leather industry.¹

It is to be noted, however, that Japan has made striding progress in heavy chemical industries of late, and her iron and steel production, in particular, already caught up with the United States and the Soviet Union several years ago. Thus Japan can be numbered today among the world's top military nations in terms of her war potential in that her industrial power can be readily converted to armaments the moment the national policy should make a sudden turn. It may be concluded, therefore, that future developments in Japan's defense expenditures largely depend on the policy of the Government facing the changes in political circumstances, both domestic and international.²

¹Quoted from "Japan's Defense Industry Growing Fast," Mainichi Daily News, November 4, 1970.

²The Tsuneta Yano Memorial Society, editors, Nippon a charted survey of Japan 1970, pp. 341-342.

The two statements above indicate variant perspectives on Japan's defense industry, yet spokesmen often follow the first statement with the second in a single speech or article.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces find themselves in the position of having ships, aircraft, and missiles without sufficient factories and technology for supply and repairs, respectively; they also have firearms and naval and air delivery systems but insufficient stockpiles of ammunition and fuel, respectively; and they have to rely on resources outside the nation for critical logistics, yet in some cases men have chosen to label their forces "considerable" capability "guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan." One statement of "considerable capability" came from a politician. Uniformed sources are less often quoted; but when they are heard, they do not speak of their effectiveness but only of their weaknesses.

Industrial leaders are naturally reluctant to enter the defense market unless they can be assured that a profitable outcome, a promising future or worthwhile technological advances will be the result. Profitable markets are difficult to achieve because of the small size

of armament in Japan itself and because of government restrictions on the export of arms abroad. Technological advances have been pursued through military contracts; but some projects are of little commercial interest; and the great costs of some endeavors require government subsidies which have been limited by budgetary constraints. In some cases where military capability in a certain area has been completely lacking, uniformed leaders have favored purchasing certain weapons systems from a foreign source, only to be rebuffed, though the cost of foreign purchase would have been less and the time lag meant continuing vulnerability, because of local industrial desires to work a specific project. Not denying the necessity of political supremacy over military affairs, uniformed leaders still question the wisdom of some of the decisions being made. Still, no postwar military leader has been willing to resign as a protest against government action or inaction.

No firm policy has ever been formulated as to what kind of equipment is necessary, how much of it is within Japan's capability to produce, how much outside equipment should be purchased, what kind of logistic stockpiles are

necessary to support that equipment, and what amounts of ammunition and fuel must be available on a continuing basis in order to be ready for an emergency. Afraid such a policy, if adopted, might require large expenditures of money, the government has ignored the issue which 25 years of peace has allowed. Industry has taken on the projects that have been in the interests of individual firms. Not wanting to spend the little money they have on support items, the leadership of the Maritime Self-Defense Force has favored buying the large, long lead-time items that give promise for an ocean-going navy of the future, meantime relying on the U.S. Navy for logistics. Civilian bureaucrats like Kaihara Osamu have begun to question what, if anything, such results have accomplished. U.S. partial withdrawal from Asia brings into question the amount of support in the future; even some Japanese civilian analysts are now beginning to ask serious questions about what Japan is and ought to be capable of in defense. Industrial and political concerns have great weight in today's Japan; uniformed interests have been kept in check, at least in the immediate past and for the present, by civilian

bureaucrats.³ What defense industry has accomplished and what it is capable of doing if a naval defense policy is forthcoming are the subjects of this chapter. Ammunition and fuel will be taken up separately in Chapter XIV.

A. MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

After the first two directives ordering Japan's disarmament, SCAP Directive Number Three, issued September 20, 1945, ordered the closing of all munitions factories. This order was extended not only to installations specializing in ordnance manufacture which were stripped or destroyed; it was recommended as late as 1947 that even oil refineries be stripped and sold for scrap. It was idealistically believed by some Occupation authorities that the munitions productive capability of Japan was rendered powerless.

Through personnel records kept by the demobilization organization, the whereabouts of the leaders of

³As one foreign observer of the postwar Japanese scene put it, "The military man is no longer at the geisha party and wants to get back in; the politicians, industrialists, and bureaucrats, reflecting on prewar experiences, are bent on keeping him out."

Japan's former naval arsenal were still known. The talent of the Imperial Navy had moved into private industry but was not completely lost.

About the time that Vice Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro began working with Dr. Watanabe Tatsuo on a military-industrial rearmament study in March, 1951, he asked Dr. Ishikawa Ichiro of the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) to initiate a defense industry plan. Such early plans often foresaw the restructuring of a complete military complex with industrial complement, one famous example being the 3-3-3 plan with its parallel industrial counterpart, plans which were unrealistically ambitious because of failure to realize that Japan was going to have a security treaty with the United States.⁴

Ships for the Maritime Safety Agency began to be constructed in 1949, and the Far Eastern Commission's ban on merchant ships over 5000 tons was removed a year later to allow full-scale ship construction to be renewed. With the formation of the National Police Reserve the same


⁴ Interview with Senga Tetsuya, Managing Director, Keidanren, January 6, 1971, and Admiral Hoshina, November 4, 1970.

year an Institute Organizing Preparatory Office, the forerunner of the later Technical Research Institute of the National Safety Agency and present Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) of the Defense Agency, was established.

The TRDI, which was formally so-designated in 1958, has undergone several reorganizations during its history as facilities were returned by the United States or new sites were established. Presently the Institute has four divisions or internal bureaus of ground, naval, air, and guided missile development, each under respective deputy directors for development. The directors coordinate basic and applied research at five research centers and five test centers with techniques and projects of private enterprises to achieve practical applications for the Self-Defense Forces and industry. Their positions as intermediaries between the Defense Agency and civilian industry are theoretically very critical in determining the contribution of defense research to private industry and vice versa. The organization as it exists today is outlined in Chart XIII-1. The Director of the TRDI is by law a civilian and the present and past full-time

CHART XIII-1

Organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute



Source: Outline of the Technical Research and Development Institute, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo: Reimeisha, 1970, p. 5.

directors have all come from the ranks of distinguished scholars. It is interesting, however, that the third director, Hori Yasushi, in office in 1971, was formerly a torpedo officer, rising to the rank of commander in the Imperial Navy after graduating from Tokyo University. The Deputy Director for Naval Development is a technical specialist vice admiral of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Of the more than 100 technical advisers, over 80 per cent are specialists in ship design. Of particular interest to the MSDF are the First Research Center, which uses almost all facilities of the Imperial Navy Technical Institute in Meguro in conducting research on arms, ships, and communications equipment, and the Fifth Research Center in Kurihama, Yokosuka, which conducts oceanographic research on sonar and underwater weapons on an advanced level.⁵ The authorized personnel strength of the entire institute is 1256.

The formal mission of the TRDI is to make technical surveys and to perform research, design, planning,

⁵ Interview with Captain Matsuda Yoshiteru, MSDF, Planning Division, TRDI, October 12, 1970.

manufacture, and test functions on equipment required for the Self-Defense Forces. The extremely small size of the JDA research and development budget and the lack of firm policy have been major limitations through the first three defense buildup programs, forcing the MSDF to follow the designs and desires of industry rather than allowing the intended role of the Deputy Director for Naval Development, planning the implementation of a government design. A more definite plan has been tentatively decided for the Fourth Defense Buildup Program.

To get an idea of the size of research and development spending to date, the size of total Japanese defense spending, and the size of research and development spending within that figure, must be considered. Table XIII-2 contains information on past expenditures. Not only is Japan's defense budget extremely small in comparison to its gross national product and general account disbursement, but its research and development costs are an extremely small percentage of defense spending. When the amount of funds available for spending on actual industrial prototypes is examined, item "G" in the table, the extremely small size of past funding is more apparent. Although

Defense Expenditures in Comparison with Government and Industrial Indices

Year	A GNP	B Industrial Production	C National Budget	D Defense Budget	E Defense* Prdctn	F TRDI Budget	G TRDI Spent In Industry	D/A	D/C	E/B	F/D
1954	78,246		9,999	1,350		7.06	4.04	1.73	13.5		0.9
1955	88,646		10,133	1,349		13.63	7.95	1.52	13.3		1.6
1956	99,509		10,897	1,429		17.99	11.13	1.44	13.1		1.8
1957	112,489		11,846	1,436		15.40	7.42	1.28	12.1		1.5
1958	117,850	92,464	13,331	1,485	1,016	19.12	7.89	1.26	11.1	1.1	1.6
1959	136,089	132,312	15,121	1,556	1,003	21.13	8.25	1.14	10.3	0.8	1.6
1960	162,070	169,068	17,652	1,500	1,158	21.39	7.69	0.99	9.1	0.7	1.4
1st Defense Plan Total	416,009	393,844	46,104	4,641	3,177	61.64	23.83	1.11	10.1	0.8	1.5
1961	198,528	202,992	21,074	1,835	1,035	26.13	12.87	0.92	8.7	0.5	1.5
1962	211,992	203,498	25,631	2,138	1,201	27.02	13.23	0.99	8.3	0.6	1.4
1963	244,640	227,140	30,568	2,475	1,287	30.29	14.33	0.97	8.1	0.6	1.3
1964	288,379	266,379	33,405	2,808	1,610	32.86	15.11	0.95	8.4	0.6	1.2
1965	317,869	281,827	37,447	3,054	1,417	39.64	20.95	0.94	8.2	0.5	1.3
1966	365,445	326,388	44,771	3,451	1,476	48.39	25.76	0.91	7.7	0.5	1.5
2nd Defense Plan Total	1,428,305	1,305,232	171,822	13,926	6,991	178.20	89.38	0.97	8.1	0.5	1.3
1967	430,963	396,623	52,034	3,870	1,723	64.97	40.28	0.86	7.4	0.4	1.8
1968	510,774	462,845	59,173	4,221	1,708	84.77	56.21	0.80	7.1	0.4	2.1
1969	599,022		69,309	4,838	2,264	91.35	59.86	0.79	7.1		2.0
1970	724,400		79,498	5,695		108.48	71.14	0.79	7.1		2.0
1971			94,143	6,709		120.62	79.06		7.1		2.0
3rd Defense Plan Total			354,137	25,324		470.19	306.55		7.2		1.9
US 1969	3,355,200			287,640		28,800					10.1
UK 1969	392,400			19,500		3,300					16.9

Sources: GNP up to 1969 from Economic Planning Agency Annual Report on National Income Statistics; 1969 from EPA Spot Report on National Income Statistics for 1969; 1970 from EPA Outlook and Basic Attitudes for Economic Management. Budget data provided by Japan Defense Agency. All units are \$100 million (\$1.3 billion).
 *Includes special procurement of U.S. Forces.

Great Britain spends an unusually high percentage of its defense budget for research and development, some perspective is gained by noting that, even though its GNP is considerably smaller than Japan's, the former's spending for military research and development alone in 1969 was approximately half the entire 1971 defense budget of Japan, the United States' total for the same year being greater than the entire military budget spent in the Third Defense Buildup Program.

The government has adopted rather severe restrictions on the export of weapons abroad since the mid-1950's. According to a statement issued by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) at that time:

It is GOJ [Government of Japan] policy not to produce arms solely for export. Such arms as are manufactured in Japan must be for SDF use, be intended for such use, or have a reasonable possibility of being for such use.

Assuming arms are manufactured in Japan, they cannot be sold to:

1. communist countries
2. countries under U.N. sanction
3. belligerents, or those about to become belligerents.⁶

⁶MITI policy statement furnished by U.S. Embassy, Tokyo.

The second category prohibits arms sales to South Africa, and the latter one excludes the United States because of involvement in Vietnam, as far as lethal equipment goes, although there is sometimes difficulty in determining just what is lethal equipment. Table XIII-3 indicates the small nature of the weapons export business.

Because only small amounts of the defense budget are available for research and development and because the local defense market is less than one per cent of total production and is constrained by restrictions on overseas sales, both the activities of the TRDI and the number of firms engaged in defense industry have been rather limited.

In the early days with a very small budget, the TRDI limited its projects mainly to research on the improvement of the equipment Japan was given by the United States. Even with larger budgets in continuing years, the greatest majority of research and development has been conducted by civilian firms. Although the roles have changed since the days of the Imperial forces, however, the methods are similar. Then, a Navy munitions factory, research center, shipyard, etc. led industry in developing prototypes, new

TABLE XIII-3

EXPORT OF WEAPONS (1953-1968)

Year	Countries	Item	Units	Amount (\$)
1953	Thailand Thailand	37mm. grenade armor piercing	35,000 15,000	401,150
1954	Burma	6.5mm rifle	50,000	4,700
1955	Taiwan Burma	7.5mm grenade 6.5mm rifle bullet	100,000 1,500	214,000 460
1956	Burma	6.5mm rifle bullet	899,000	84,150
1957	Burma Taiwan Brazil South Vietnam South Vietnam	6.5mm rifle bullet torpedo type 91 9mm pistol rifle bullets bullet plant	100,000 20 1 24,000 1	8,570 500,000 45 6,480 900,000
1958	South Vietnam	rifle bullet	24,000	7,200
1959	Indonesia	fire control system	1	83,000
1960	Indonesia India	machine gun compon. practice mine	2	36,200 12,975
1961	Indonesia	machine gun compon.		125,000
1962	USA, West Germany	pistol	800	9,300
1963	USA, Colombia, Brazil, Indonesia	pistol machine gun compon.	3,000	37,500 24,000

TABLE XIII-3--Continued

Year	Countries	Item	Units	Amount (\$)
1964	USA, Switzerland, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, Sweden	pistol	5,000	66,000
1965	Thailand	hunting gun	5,000	540,000
	Thailand	rifle bullets	2,500,000	230,000
1966	USA, Philippines, Thailand, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Venezuela	pistol	7,000	97,000
	Thailand	hunting guns	5,000	540,000
1967	USA, Switzerland, Cambodia, Norway, England	pistol	8,000	132,000
	USA	pistol	12,000	
1968	USA Philippines	pistol bullet plant (reparation)	15,000	6,000,000

Source: Information provided by Japan Defense Agency.

techniques, etc.; today the MSDF is dependent on private technology to take the lead; but because of the advanced level of that technology, the results of the change, within the limited amounts that have been budgeted, have not been tremendously significant. However, because of the highly classified nature of some projects, extreme requirements for small size and weight because of military applications, or the need of integrated systems, purely military research and development is becoming more necessary; and, since modern projects involving guided missiles and aircraft demand the most advanced technology which is scarce in Japan, the costs are becoming extremely high.⁷

Projects which have been handled by the naval development division of the TRDI include the plans for Japan's postwar domestically-produced destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol boats, icebreakers, fire control systems, communications equipment, etc. Direct benefit to civilian industry has come from projects studying pressure resistant steel materials for submarines which led to the standardization of silicon-manganese

⁷ Interview with TRDI Director Hori, Kokubo (The National Defense), May, 1971, p. 48.

anti-tension steel, utilizing techniques on hull forms and propeller designs for high speed marine craft which were not common in civilian industry, and developing a 4000-ampere submarine battery which contributed to the improvement of Japanese commercial batteries.⁸ Current projects include research on hydrofoils, deep-sea minesweeping gear, high-speed torpedoes, long-range sonar detectors, submarine fuel cells, and high-powered diesel engines.⁹

Since the amount of money that has been spent on defense production has not reached significant proportions of total Japanese industrial production, the number of firms willing or able to take the risks and expenses involved have not been numerous. Up to the present time, defense industry has been an essentially exclusive market of big business, heavy machinery and heavy equipment manufacturers ranking high in the production of weapons. In 1969, for example, defense contracts totaled 226,360,000,000 yen (628,777,777 dollars); contracts of

⁸"JDA Technical Development Advances (Part III)," Nikkon Kogyo Shinbun, October 4, 1967, U.S. Embassy translation.

⁹Interview with Captain Matsuda, October 12, 1970.

the five biggest manufacturers totaled 57 per cent of the entire amount. The grouping of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Mitsubishi Electric Equipment together totaled 36 per cent. Of the 9623 Defense Agency contracts, less than one-half of one per cent of the total value was for individual contracts of less than one billion yen (2.8 million dollars); the remaining 4775 contracts were controlled by 33 companies. Even with the contractors which are involved, the share of defense business is very small within individual firms' total sales. The relative status of the top twenty defense manufacturers for 1969 is listed in Table XIII-4.

Since defense industry does not make up even fifteen per cent of the volume of the firm with the largest relative percentage of its business in that market, and since critics point out that even the present figures show artificial strength, many weapons merely being assembled in Japan under a license system, plans and supplies necessarily imported from a foreign country, why are there already fears of a military-industrial complex, terms like the "Mitsubishi arsenal," and cries of banning of employment of military officers in firms with defense

TABLE XIII-4

LEADING DEFENSE CONTRACTORS (JAPAN FISCAL YEAR 1969)

Leading Defense Contractors	<u>A</u> Sum of Contracts	Rate of Total Contracts	<u>B</u> Total Sales	<u>A/B</u>
Mitsubishi Heavy Indus.*	701.3	30.9	7,071.5	9.9
Kawasaki Heavy Indus.*	214.1	9.5	2,159.5	9.9
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus.*	191.7	8.5	3,365.9	5.4
Mitsubishi Electric Machine	113.6	5.0	3,761.3	3.0
NEC	59.0	2.6	1,957.0	3.0
Toshiba	47.5	2.1	5,502.0	0.9
Hitachi, Ltd.	38.2	1.7	6,750.8	0.6
Komatsu Mfg.	36.4	1.6	2,076.4	1.8
Japan Aircraft Mfg.	28.2	1.2	---	
C. Itoh & Co.	23.8	1.1	2,564.3	0.1
Shimazu Mfg.	23.5	1.0	326.1	7.2
Daikin Industry	23.3	1.0	403.6	5.8
Fuji Heavy Industries	23.1	1.0	975.9	2.4
Maizuru Heavy Indus.*	22.6	1.0	---	
Sumitomo Heavy Machinery*	21.8	1.0	904.8	12.4
Mitsui Shipbuilding*	17.9	0.8	1,179.1	1.5
Tokyo Precision Instrument	17.9	0.8	144.7	2.4
Isuzu Motors	17.9	0.8	1,948.8	0.9
Oki Electric Industry	16.5	0.7	575.2	2.9
Fujitsu Ltd.	16.2	0.7	1,194.2	1.4

* Indicates builder of destroyers or submarines for the MSDF.

Source: "Reality of Defense Industry in Its 20th Year," Toyo Keizai Shimbun, September 19, 1970, U.S. Embassy translation. Contract units are ¥ 100 million (\$.3 million).

contracts?¹⁰

The reason for concern is, of course, the potential of defense industry in Japan. In July, 1970 the Japan Defense Agency attempted to formulate a basic policy concerning defense production since, despite past calls for "self-reliant" defense, the JDA has never taken a firm policy regarding what equipment would be procured locally and what might be procured abroad. One statement summarized the key points of the new policy as follows:

- (1) to rely on the technological and production capabilities of private enterprises for development and production of defense facilities and equipment and to step up the development and home production of these facilities and equipment in accordance with the conditions peculiar to Japan;
- (2) to encourage competition among defense enterprises so that defense production will not be concentrated in the hands of a few specific enterprises; and

¹⁰For an example of criticism of the state of Japan's true defense industry capability, see Kaihara, "My Private Opinion of Defense Industry," Kokubo (The National Defense) August, 1969, pp. 41-50. The Mitsubishi arsenal, military-industrial complex is often mentioned in press reports, e.g., Mainichi Shimbun, April 28, 1971. The Self-Defense Force Establishment Law amendment passed by the House of Representatives May 17, 1971 called for a council to be set up to review the employment of former SDF men in private industry and to discuss ways to prevent former high officials of the SDF from seeking positions in defense industries, thereby checking the formation of industrial-military conglomerates. It is expected that this group, if created, will find no danger in present practices.

(3) to bar foreign capital from the field of defense production so that such production will be carried on by Japanese enterprises alone.¹¹

On April 1, 1971, the Defense Agency announced it would spend twelve billion yen (33 million dollars) to develop an airborne-early-warning (AEW) aircraft of Japan's own design under a six-year project rather than buy U.S.-made AEW's as recommended by the Air Staff Office in the Fourth Defense Plan at a cost of seven-nine billion yen (19-25 million dollars) per plane. Despite the fact that the Japanese-designed planes might well cost more per unit six years from now after a very expensive research effort and Japan will have no interim AEW capability in the meantime, the decision, which is in conformity with the policy statement of July, 1970, was made, much regret being expressed by the ASDF and MSDF. Japanese aircraft and electronics companies felt quite differently, of course. On the other hand, eight MSDF ships budgeted at 32 billion yen (89 million dollars) in fiscal year 1970 almost had to be carried over into fiscal 1971 because of the reluctance of

¹¹"Defense Industry Meeting New Stage (Section 3-Conclusion)," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 21, 1970, U.S. Embassy translation.

shipbuilders to take the work supposedly because of fears of lack of profitable returns. Although contracts were negotiated at the last moment, the solution, as in past cases, was not to provide more money, which would result in opposition from the Finance Ministry, or to put pressure on the builders to take the contracts as development projects, which might hurt corporate profits, but to eliminate systems from the ships to lower the costs to where they become more financially attractive despite subsequent losses of military capability. A Japanese monthly recently carried an interesting story detailing the problems of South Korea which finds itself faced with increasing debts to foreign nations yet recently was cut off from all but agricultural aid from the U.S. In order to maintain its growth-rate, Korea has recently allowed foreign countries to make 100 per cent investments, formerly limited to 49 per cent; the rate of investment in that country by large Japanese enterprises including the Mitsubishi group immediately jumped, one Mitsubishi firm extending loans of over 38 million dollars to a certain iron works which was politically important although economically doubtful, for which reason the World Bank disapproved an international

loan from U.S. and European countries. Commenting on the fact that the loan was then taken over by Japan and that the Koreans fear the U.S., which has not made good on promises made in the fall of 1965 when Korean troops were sent to Vietnam, the article maintains that South Korea has begun to desire that Japan becomes its arsenal, taking the place of the U.S. which is going to withdraw from South Korea:

This was why the ROK side demanded, and the Japanese side complied with the construction of four plants to produce special steel, heavy machines, and foundry pig iron, and to build ships, respectively, at the 4th Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference held in Seoul for three days from July 21 this year. The Japanese Ministers, in order not to irritate the Opposition Parties, are repeatedly emphasizing, "These four plants are to be constructed just to utilize the Pohang Iron Complex (1.03 million tons of blister steel is to be produced) as its related industries. It will be our pure economic co-operation." On the contrary, ROK newspapers emphasize that these factories' industries can be converted to the defense plants at any time.¹²

The case of the AEW aircraft, the MSDF ships, and the Korean iron works all involved Japanese industry, politics, and associated military considerations. It is said that the

¹²"Korean Peninsula and Japanese Munitions Industry," Gendai No Me, October, 1970, partial U.S. Embassy translation.

Korean President was committed to the iron works project due to defense considerations which are important to South Korea. The project was economically and politically attractive to Japan. In the two Japanese military cases, the ASDF's and MSDF's considerations were not taken so seriously. A military-industrial complex does not seem to exist at present, and military interests seem subordinated to political and industrial concerns. The future is more uncertain.

Recently much speculation has taken place concerning how long and how far Japan's economic "miracle" will continue. The most controversial prediction is perhaps that by Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute who, while presenting several scenarios for Japan's economic growth, offers his "best estimate" that Japan will pass the United States in per capita income around 1990 and will equal the U.S. in gross national product by about the year 2000.¹³ Not choosing to comment on the likelihood of Kahn's political and economic predictions, which have reportedly disturbed and brought official denials from the Japanese

¹³Information provided by Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute.

government, this monograph merely points out in Table XIII-5 that his early predictions are not too far different from official and private Japanese projections. They indicate the potential of defense industry even without any suddenly emergent government policy but just from a continuation of recent economic expansion trends and past relative amounts of defense spending. Should any of Kahn's predictions prove accurate for the year 2000 and defense spending continue at the lowest of two rates estimated by Keidanren for the near future, the lowest of the budget forecasts would mean a more than six-fold increase in defense spending.¹⁴ In the case of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for example, should the rate of defense spending in industry and the company's relative rate of contracts remain the same, again using the lowest Kahn and FEO estimates, its business in defense in that year would nearly equal its total strength as listed in Table XIII-4. Should Kahn's best or high estimate prove true and the low rate of defense spending and Mitsubishi

¹⁴Of course, these proportions need not continue and an absolute amount of annual spending could theoretically be decided upon.

Projections of Economic Growth and Defense Spending

Year	New Economic and Social Plan GIP	Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)			Herman Kahn					
		Def Spend	Low Estimate	Def Spend	Best Estimate	Def Spend	Low	Official	Medium	High
1972	85-90		8,348	76	9,539	95				
1973	95-100		9,183	87	10,970	109				
1974	105-110		10,101	101	12,615	126				
1975	120-125	14,199	11,111	116	14,508	145	10,800	11,800	12,600	14,400
1976	135-140		12,222	133	16,684	167				
4th Defense Plan Total	540-565		513		64,316	642				

Kahn's Estimates with FEO's Rates of High (1) 1% GNP and Low (2) .8% GNP Defense Spending Applied

Year	Kahn Low (1)	(2)	Kahn Official (1)	(2)	Kahn Medium (1)	(2)	Kahn High (1)	(2)
1980	16,200	130	19,800	158	21,000	168	27,000	216
1985	21,000	168	29,700	238	36,000	288	46,800	374
2000	54,000	432	72,000	576	108,000	864	162,000	1296

Sources: New Economic and Social Plan from Toyo Keizai Shimbun, September 19, 1970; FEO Statistics furnished by Keidanren Defense Production Committee

Kahn's medium estimate is his "best" estimate, noting that EPA estimates, "official" have always been low. Units are \$10 billion (\$28 million).

share were to continue, its defense share would be more than 150 or 200 per cent, respectively, of the total sales figure previously listed.

As the year 1972 and the Fourth Defense Buildup Program approach, Japanese experts concerned acknowledge that the nation's defense research and development will enter a new phase. They claim Japan will no longer desire nor possibly be able to import as much foreign military technology as it has in the past. Instead of following in the footsteps of other countries, performing studies they have already conducted ten years ago, the first true research and development in defense in the postwar period should hopefully be forthcoming.¹⁵ Projects of the Third Defense Buildup Program will apparently reach fruition under the fourth program which may more than double its predecessor in expenditure. Research and development costs are presently programmed to more than triple; however--and a fifth program has already been

¹⁵Research and development for the MSDF in the Fourth Defense Buildup Program is discussed in Watanabe Eiichi, "Shindankai Mukaeru Kaijo Boei Kiki Kaihatsu" (The Development of Maritime Defense Equipment Stepping Into a New Stage) Kokubo (The National Defense), August, 1970, pp. 82-88.

announced as following--it could be, as the seeds of the third program have nurtured the draft of the fourth, an even greater expansion later is anticipated by industry following increased future-oriented research in the upcoming program. The remainder of this chapter will discuss four cases where military research and development has combined with private industry to produce or maintain major equipment for the MSDF to date.

B. SHIPBUILDING

Although Japan found itself behind in some areas of technology because of interruptions of the Occupation, shipbuilding was not a particular problem. In shipbuilding, as in other industries, the Navy's engineers led civilian technology. In 1948, 40 engineers, mainly former members of the Imperial Navy's constructor corps, founded the International Naval Engineering Company (Kokusai Sempaku Komusho) as a consulting firm. With customers such as Mitsubishi and Ishikawjima Heavy Industries, the consultants designed the first ships for the Maritime Safety Agency which were begun in 1949 as well as many different

kinds of merchant vessels. In 1953 when the National Safety Agency embarked on warship construction, the group offered its services in assistance; but a commercial company was not deemed appropriate by the Safety Agency so the group was reorganized as the Naval Planning Association (Semoaku Sekei Kyokai), a type of special foundation whose members served as technical advisers to the Technical Research Institute of the Safety and Defense Agencies and subsequently designed the first 54 ships for the MSDF from 1953-1957. These ships, enumerated in Table X-1, included the first postwar submarine and finally the OSP destroyers funded by the United States. The group finally disbanded in 1958, many of its members then rejoining civilian industry.¹⁶ Thus even though there was an

¹⁶As Imperial Navy officers these men were respected; but, since they did not see combat, they never had the prestige of Etajima-graduated naval heroes. Some graduated from the naval engineering school in Maizuru and some came from top civilian universities. A typical example is Makino Shigeru, 1925 graduate of Tokyo University who was a captain in the constructor corps and officer in charge of drawing plans for the battleship YAMATO. After the war Captain Makino farmed for a while before becoming the Managing Director of Kokusai Sempaku Komusho at its founding. Stated Makino, now a Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' advisor, "Some new civilian ship-designers have come to the fore in the last ten years. In the early period civilian and Navy ships were designed by

apparent change from prewar times, all ships including prototypes being built by civilian industry, the change was really not very radical.


In 1953 the Safety Agency conducted qualifying examinations for shipbuilding companies desiring to build vessels for the MSDF. A slowdown in world maritime trade, combined with a large and cheap work force in Japan, made building ships for the new Navy an attractive opportunity for expansion and advancement of technology. Five firms were authorized to build destroyers, the most complex and generally the largest warships in the MSDF fleet to date. The five: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Mitsui Shipbuilding, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, and Maizuru Heavy Industries have had arrangements since the beginning to receive orders by turns so, until recently, there has been little competition.

Chart XIII-6 outlines the procedural steps involved in the planning and construction of a new vessel for the MSDF. Unlike a merchant ship which can be rapidly produced

Imperial Navy officers. You (this writer) can say there is continuation of the Imperial Navy in the MSDF through naval activities and organization. I know there is continuation in shipbuilding." Interview with Captain Makino, April 2, 1971.

Chart VII-6

Procedures for Construction of MSDF Vessel



Source: Technical Division Maritime Staff Office (MSO)

STR = Supervisory Technical Representative Office

in less than a year, a warship frequently takes three years or more to be completed. For the MSDF there is the frustrating problem that any change in the design of the hull, equipment, or a weapons control system must receive the approval of the Internal Bureau of the Defense Agency. Such decisions are made by lower level bureaucrats, often having no particular expertise in shipbuilding or ordnance engineering although their power to veto any innovation is almost complete. For every new idea they demand a performance prediction which is, of course, difficult to produce, except on paper, for a new idea. Those ideas which are approved are very closely monitored; and if the expected result is not forthcoming on schedule, the project is frequently stopped. Since Internal Bureau staff members have frequently come from outside the agency and have rotated every two to three years, new members are not familiar with decisions approved by others. This has resulted in research work being constantly scheduled on a year-to-year basis and MSDF technical expertise not advancing but always rushing to catch up with the advances in technology of civilian industry.¹⁷

¹⁷Interviews with a civilian bureaucrat, Japan Defense Agency, and a technical officer, MSDF.

Within the civilian shipyard the builder is forced to make many changes, particularly in prototype models. These are paid for by the MSDF, but they involve great expenditures in time and manpower which increasingly the shipbuilders have been unwilling to give because of a shipbuilding boom which now finds one-half of the world's bottoms being constructed in Japan. Merchant ships of 200,000 tons, one being larger than the entire MSDF, are becoming commonplace. In the Fourth Defense Buildup Program 100,000 to 130,000 tons of ships are scheduled to be built during a period when the shipbuilding boom is expected to continue unabated. Although this amount of shipping will only account for four per cent of total sales turnover, seven per cent of the labor force will be necessary. "Constructing 100,000 to 130,000 displacement-tons of warships during five years--in other words, 20,000 to 26,000 displacement tons a year--requires as much manpower as needed for building ten 200,000-ton tankers every year."¹⁸

So far from a cost standpoint building MSDF ships theoretically has not been a profitable venture for

¹⁸Japan Press Exchange Aviation Report Weekly, June 25, 1970, p. 8.

shipyards. Figures prepared by the Defense Production Committee of Keidanren shows that the budget cost has often been lower than the price of the finally settled contract and even the latter amount has on the average failed to match the net production cost, average losses running around twenty per cent for research and development and five per cent for construction.¹⁹ Using the rotational system, contracts are offered to individual shipyards and have often failed to take into account inflationary price rises over the span of the contract. To compensate for the failure of the budget to meet the contract price, a common solution has been to delay or delete weapons systems from one vessel or to take the money allocated for another vessel or system to make up the difference. Since 1969 the Defense Agency has more carefully considered likely inflationary trends before settling on a budget

¹⁹Research and development cost comparisons listed in Watanabe, "The Development of Maritime Defense Equipment Stepping Into a New Stage," p. 88. Actual production costs in Boei Sobi Kokusan Kondankai (Study Group on the Domestic Production of Defense Equipment, Boeisobi Kokusanka Kondankai Ikenshu (Collection of Opinions on the Domestic Production of Defense Equipment), Tokyo: Keidanren, 1965, pp. 59-67. For another view of the situation with respect to profits see footnote 20 below.

figure, but in 1970 the Japan Shipbuilders' Association still called for rationalization of the price of ships to current costs and for a change from the present tender system of contracts to an optional acceptance method. One big problem, of course, is the fact that the total amount of money for defense programs has been decided in five-year increments, and the costs of the last two years are often considerably out of line with original estimates. To the present it has been very difficult to change the original amount. An extra amount of money was allocated in the Third Defense Buildup Program (see again Table X-4). Still, budget allocations have not been adequate; desired characteristics continue to be deleted, and small ships drop out in order to make up for increased costs on larger vessels. Of course the programs still appear successful because the intended amount of money has been spent. Overall capability seems to be a secondary interest.

One case in the Third Defense Buildup Program exemplifies the situation. The MSDF had been granted permission to build two 1800-ton submarines in fiscal 1967 and 1968 and a third was programmed for 1969. The latest model,

however, involved a drastic departure from previous submarine designs, including for the first time a modern underwater navigation system. The 1969 budget granted an increase of 649 million yen (1.8 million dollars) over the amount allocated for the 1968 submarine but 420 million yen (1.1 million dollars) short of the MSDF's cost estimate. Since most of the increase had to be used to cover labor price rises and other construction costs beyond control of the MSDF, the only place to recoup differences was in the deletion of performance requirements.²⁰

The Defense Agency's 1970 call for competition among defense contractors does not have an immediately

²⁰ Japan Press Exchange Aviation Report Weekly, January 22, 1969, pp. 11-12. Outside industry sources doubt the veracity of the shipowners' claims of low profits, pointing out that, despite complaints, ship contracts are accepted, and efforts of a sixth contractor with good qualifications for destroyer-building were opposed and frustrated by other shipbuilders in the recent past. It is noted that accounting can make a firm's best product look unprofitable and vice versa. A recent British industry fact-finding team spent six months in Japan trying to learn the true cost of building a merchant ship, only to go home upon conclusion with no answer. When foreign dumping of Japanese goods such as color television sets is alleged, Japanese businessmen always reply that their domestic business procedures are very different and make it difficult to determine true price. The shipbuilders are certainly not losing in technological advances, in future long-term markets when and if the building boom

bright prospect in the shipbuilding industry. In recent cases where the attempt to play one shipyard against the other was tried, the results have not been successful. Again an example from the Third Defense Buildup Program with the shipbuilding industry enjoying a boom in sales:

The industry's request [in the case of a destroyer escort contract] for increased allocations (which has often been backed by the Central Procurement Office in the pre-contract cost calculation sessions) was first ignored by the Finance Bureau of the Defense Agency, then by the Finance Ministry. On the other hand, the Equipment Bureau, the Maritime Staff Office, and the Central Procurement Office could do practically nothing to speak for the industry against the Finance Bureau and the Finance Ministry.

The Defense Agency was almost losing its head to find a way out of the budgetary fix; for example, when the contract negotiations with Mitsui Shipbuilding & Engineering and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (who won an open bid) in the DE program were deadlocked, the agency first sounded out the three others (who lost the bid) on the possible take-over, then asked Mitsui if it would like to monopolize the DE program. The outcome was that the three others refused to accept the offer and Mitsui said no.²¹

Despite difficulties, a respectable number of reliable shipbuilders for the MSDF vessels has been built up. Table XIII-7 shows major shipbuilders, their areas of competence,

ceases and jealously guard defense contracts. Their current profit losses might be questionable also.

²¹Japan Press Exchange Aviation Report Weekly, April 23, 1969.

TABLE XIII-7

SHIPBUILDERS OF MSDF VESSELS

Company	Type of Ship	$\frac{A}{\text{Sales MSDF}}$	% of Ship Sales MSDF	$\frac{B}{\text{Total Sales Vol.}}$	$\frac{A/B}{A/B}$
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Yokohama Shipyard Nagasaki Shipyard	CABLE LAYER (ARC), SUMARINE RESCUE (ASR) DESTROYER (DD) DESTROYER ESCORT (DE), PATROL CRAFT (PC) DD, SUBMARINE (SS) TORPEDO BOAT (PT), AIR RESCUE (ASH)	15,721	33.1	1,808,775	0.87
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Tokyo No. 2 Shipyard Kure No. 1 Shipyard	DD, DE, TRAINING SHIP (APS), MINE-SWEEP TENDER (MST) PC	7,223	7.4	719,160	1.01

TABLE XIII-7--Continued

Company	Type of Ship	$\frac{A}{\text{Sales MSDF}}$	% of Ship Sales MSDF	$\frac{B}{\text{Total Sales Vol.}}$	$\frac{A}{B}$
Mitsui Shipbuilding Tamano Shipyard (Okayama)	DD, DE	3,492	7.4	203,982	1.72
Fujinagata Ship- yard (Osaka)	PC				
Sumitomo Heavy Machin- ery (Kanagawa)	DD, PC, OILER (AO), MINELAYER (AMC)	3,912	8.2	93,982	4.20
Maizuru Heavy Indus- tries (Kyoto)	DD, DE, PC	2,880	6.2	41,467	6.93
Kawasaki Heavy Indus- tries (Hyogo)	DD, DE, PC, SS	6,093	12.9	221,272	2.75
Sasebo Heavy Industries	PC, Miscellaneous Vessels	1,606	3.4	82,604	1.94
Hitachi Shipbuilding (Kanagawa)	COASTAL MINESWEEPER (MSC), MINESWEEP BOAT (MSB), PT	2,681	5.7	340,395	0.79
Nippon Kokan (Kanagawa)	MSC, MSB, ICEBREAKER (AGB), Miscellaneous Vessels	3,857	8.1	1,025,982	0.38

TABLE XIII-7--Continued

Other Firms Building Miscellaneous Vessels

Hayashikane Shipyard (Yokosuka, Shimonoseki)	Miho Shipyard (Shizuoka)
Hakodate Dockyard	Yoshiura Shipyard (Hiroshima)
Ujina Shipbuilding (Hyogo)	Kasado Dockyard (Yamaguchi)
Narasaki Shipyard (Hokkaido)	Kanasashi Shipyard (Kanagawa)
Andon Iron Works (Tokyo)	Namura Shipyard (Osaka)
Nokonkai Heavy Industries (Toyama)	Ishikawajima Zosen Kakoki (Tokyo)
Maehata Zosen (Nagasaki)	Shinuki Shipyard (Osaka)
Sumidigawa Shipbuilding (Tokyo)	Watanabe Seikojo (Tokyo)
Yokohama Dockyard	Onomichi Shipyard (Hiroshima)
Tokoku Shipyard (Miyagi)	Shikoku Dockyard (Takamatsu)

Sources: Research Section, MSDF Staff College; Yo Kuji, "Kanzen Kenzo wa Doshite Akagi ka?" (Why is Naval Shipbuilding in Deficit? Cause and Background) Kokubo (The National Defense) August, 1969, p. 232. Sales units in ¥1 million (\$2.8 thousand) and sales period covers Second Defense Buildup Program (1962-1966).

and percentage of defense business. The number of contractors for individual types of ships indicates the obvious capability to mass produce should the decision ever be made to accelerate naval shipbuilding.

Presently Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries has completed the hull for the first nuclear-powered merchant ship, the MUTSU, and Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industries, Inc. is working on the reactor system. In addition to the extensive growth predicted for the merchant marine through 1975, another recent report predicts that 50-60 nuclear power merchant ships will be built at Japanese shipyards by 1990 and that the number will increase to 280 by the year 2000.²² Defense Minister Nakasone has repeatedly said:

It will be all right to build nuclear-powered submarines when nuclear-powered merchant ships become universal. In other words, when propulsion by nuclear power becomes the normal means for ordinary transportation and shipping methods, they can be built. However, until then, we do not intend to build them.²³

²²The report by the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum is reviewed in "Switch to N-Ships Seen," The Japan Times, April 9, 1971.

²³Interview with Director General Nakasone, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 17, 1971, U.S. Embassy translation.

Furthermore Japan's merchant ships are annually becoming faster as well as larger. Once a convoy of individual ships can be sent above 25 knots economically (and such ships are already under construction in Japan), they will be unable to be protected by destroyers. It could be that navies of the future will be measured by the strengths of ocean-going merchant and fishing fleets, providing their own protection with their own speed and with helicopters, collecting intelligence by electronic and manual means. Amount of miles steamed and number of ports visited could become among the most important considerations. Naval officers could act primarily as advisers of merchant masters and serve as convoy commanders, route coordinators, in addition to carrying out secondary tasks of anti-invasion patrol, coastal surveillance, mine-sweeping, etc. Japan's present preparation indicates the country would be one of the most powerful naval nations if such forces ever becomes the criteria. For the present, naval shipbuilding is being conducted under different circumstances, but not with altogether different results, from former days. A slightly different situation does exist with respect to repair of naval vessels.


C. SHIP REPAIR

As well as building the first two ships of each new prototype for the Imperial Navy, its shipyards dry-docked and repaired all of its many types of vessels. For repair, as for construction, the MSDF is dependent upon civilian industry. This has proved more difficult than in the case of shipbuilding. Each repair necessitates contracting with increasingly busy shipyards, a process that is tedious and time-consuming. With the Defense Agency as a commercial customer, repairs must be delayed until the customer can be serviced. Such a system causes immediate problems of delays in peacetime and arouses fears for an emergency situation since presently no existing legislation provides for priority service when it might be needed. Work on ships' hulls and engineering plants, including work for submarines which are serviced by Mitsubishi and Kawasaki yards in Kobe, has generally been satisfactory; but for exclusively naval equipment, particularly ordnance systems, there have been more problems.

Imperial Navy and private shipyards' locations are shown on the map on the following page. The three great

LOCATION OF SHIPYARDS

- ◎ JMSDF Regional Head Quarters
- Supervisory Technical Representative Office
- Private Company's Shipyard
(Warship building Shipyard)




naval shipyards were located at Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo; a smaller yard at Maizuru and a dockyard at Ominato were also utilized. The shipyard at Yokosuka was largely taken over by the U.S. Navy and still serves as its Ship Repair Facility (SRF) today. Kure was divided up among several industrial shipbuilding firms, and Sasebo and Maizuru were taken over by Sasebo and Maizuru Heavy Industries, respectively. The wooden dock at Ominato was not operational at the end of the war and the facility for repair was not extensive; it was given to the Maritime Self-Defense Force. At each of its Regional District Headquarters the MSDF maintains a repair facility to perform minor repairs and provide liaison for the drydocking, overhaul, repair, alteration, and conversion of MSDF ships at civilian shipyards. Since the repairs which can be accomplished at the headquarters' repair shops are very limited, mainly to portable equipment and small boats, most of the work is performed by civilian yards. Chart XIII-8 shows the outline of procedures for repair of MSDF vessels.

The problems of personnel and budget inhibit improving the present situation with respect to ship repairs. The Ominato dockyard is being gradually refurbished and

Chart VIII-8

Procedures for Construction of MSDF Vessel



Source: Technical Division, Maritime Staff Office

will be utilized; but to perform major repairs on a large scale basis, a more extensive facility is needed. On December 28, 1970, the U.S. government announced it was returning Yokosuka's SRF to Japan as of June 30, 1971. This decision has been subsequently delayed for one year. The MSDF strongly desires to have Yokosuka to repair and drydock its ships, and it is believed the U.S. Navy would like to know the SRF is still capable of the high quality work it has been famous for among Seventh Fleet officers since the war in case of any contingency in the area. For the MSDF to take over custody of the physical facilities is not a problem; but to maintain and continue the standard of technology presently at the SRF will require a larger budget or the influx of new personnel with that ability. One anticipated solution to the budget problem is the channeling of funds now going to private shipyards for repairs to a future MSDF Ship Repair Facility at Yokosuka which would in turn take over the work. Some kind of joint use with the U.S. Navy or the establishment of a naval repair facility for work on ships of regional navies is also a possibility. Should the MSDF once lose Yokosuka to civilian interests, chances of its own

shipyard in the future which would involve great costs, if an appropriate location for such a facility could be found at all, seem very small. Until the Yokosuka question is settled, repair of MSDF ships will remain largely a civilian enterprise.

D. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

Japan's aircraft industry suffered perhaps the greatest technological loss of any scientific field because of the Potsdam Declaration's complete prohibition of not only aircraft manufacturing but also even of scientific research on aviation technology for seven years, during which time other countries' engineers made revolutionary breakthroughs which brought forth the jet engine, advances which made the high technological aircraft standards of prewar Japan pale in significance.

The Korean War and the so-called "special procurement" for U.S. Forces made possible the revival of the aircraft industry with Japanese companies even going into the production of jet planes under U.S. guidance. On July 15, 1952 the Air Law was published permitting regular

production of aircraft; and from 1952 to 1953 the industry increased in size by a factor of 65, from 40 million yen (111 thousand dollars) to 2600 million yen (7.2 million dollars), approximately 75 per cent of the increase coming from demands of special procurement. In 1954 special procurement still accounted for 1670 million yen (4.6 million dollars) or 70 per cent of total volume.²⁴

In 1955 the biggest customer for the Japanese aircraft industry changed from the United States to the Japan Defense Agency, U.S. special procurement falling to about ten per cent, mostly for repairs. By 1957 almost 90 per cent of newly-built planes were for the Defense Agency, the reversal between the U.S. Forces and the JDA as customers of the aircraft industry almost in complete cycle since the revival of the industry five years earlier.²⁵

Despite the rapid advance of the aircraft industry which achieved a sales strength total of 96 billion yen (267 million dollars) in 1970, the Defense Agency still by far the largest customer with 52.6 per cent of the

²⁴"Japan's Aircraft and Munitions Industries," The Japan Times, June 24, 1959.

²⁵Ibid.

business, the industry has still been largely dependent on the United States. Most of the major combat aircraft are now domestically manufactured in Japan but under a license system with U.S. manufacturers, a situation that will continue through the Fourth Defense Buildup Program. Even the aircraft which are not produced under U.S. license are sometimes Japanese versions of an American aircraft system, a good example being the Japanese version of Lockheed's P2V-7, Kawasaki's P-2J ASW patrol plane.

Table XIII-9 lists aircraft built in Japan for the MSDF.

Research and development in aircraft is costly; and since Japan lags in technology in the field and has rather limited geographical areas and frequent climatologically unfavorable conditions, some question the feasibility of its presence in this field; Japanese civil aviation is almost exclusively reliant on foreign-purchased aircraft. The decision to develop domestically the airborne-early-warning aircraft, however, is one indication of the decision to press on; and two examples in the MSDF show the possible rewards of domestic production and the danger of reliance on foreign markets.

TABLE XIII-9

DOMESTIC AIRCRAFT OF THE MSDF

Type of Aircraft	Manufacturer	Other Users	First Produced	Final 1970 Inventory
P2V-7 ASW Patrol*	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	None	1959	48
KM-2 Basic Trainer**	Fuji Heavy Industries	None	1962	25
YS 11 ASW Trainer	Nihon Aeroplane Manuf. Co.	Civil Indus, ASDF, MSA	1964	5
PS-1 Flying Boat	Shin Meiwa Industries	None	1967	2
P-2J ASW Patrol**	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	None	1969	14

HELICOPTERS

Bell 47 Basic Trainer*	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	GSDf, Civil Indus	1953	10
S-55 Rescue Helicopter*	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Civil Indus, GSDf, ASDF	1958	0
HSS-1 ASW Helicopter*	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Civil Indus, MSA	1959	11

TABLE XIII-9--Continued

Type of Aircraft	Manufacturer	Other Users	First Produced	Final 1970 Inventory
<u>HELICOPTERS--Continued</u>				
V-107 Twin Engine Helicopter (Minesweeping)*	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	Civil Indus, GSDF, ASDF	1962	2
S-61 Rescue Helicopter* (Antarctic Service)	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Civil Indus	1963	2
S-62 Rescue Helicopter*	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Civil Indus, MSA, ASDF	1963	8
HSS-2 ASW Helicopter*	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Civil Indus	1964	31

* Built in Japan under U.S. license.

** Japanese design based on U.S. aircraft model

Sources: John W. E. Taylor, editor, Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1970-71, London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1970. Official data provided by Japan Defense Agency.

It was mentioned briefly in Chapter I that the American Navy took possession of the latest model Japanese flying boat. The flight of that aircraft from Takuma in Shikoku to Yokohama was reportedly the last flight made by a Japanese aircraft until the post-Occupation period. Kawanishi Aircraft Manufacturing Co., the developer of the Model-2 Big Boat (Nishiki Taitei) was reconstituted after the Korean War in 1950 as Shin Meiwa Kogyo Co.; and in 1952 a group of ten engineers headed by Dr. Kikuhara Shizuo, chief designer of the Model-2 for Kawanishi and the Imperial Navy, went back to work. The team started with basic research, setting its sights on a plane that could land in rough seas. Although the U.S. Navy gave up on the idea of using a flying boat around 1960 after a considerable expenditure of money, the MSDF at about the same time began speculating on the use of such craft for ASW operations. Then Captain Hitsuji Tsuneo of the MSDF, who as an Imperial Navy lieutenant commander had made the last flight in 1945, thought Shin Meiwa's claims of an 80 to 550-knot flying boat able to land in water three meters high was a "beautiful dream"; but Dr. Kikuhara of Shin Meiwa explained how his team had discovered a unique

wave dissipation system designed from observing fish taking and discharging water through gills. The MSDF came out in favor of Shin Meiwa, but the Defense Agency was most cautious about the Japanese aircraft industry which the bureaucrats estimated was ten years behind the rest of the world. Finally it was decided to purchase an American military flying boat and resell it to Shin Meiwa for redesign and testing. Captain Hitsuji was put in charge of the trials. A high-lift wing developed in a ten-year research project of the Technical Research and Development Institute was adopted; and a boundary-layer-control to release compressed air doubling the wing size on landing, the first practical application of this concept in aviation history, was added. The first prototype construction began in 1965, and a maiden flight took place in 1967. On April 23, 1968, as Dr. Kikuhara and Rear Admiral Hitsuji watched from an MSDF destroyer, the 34-ton PS-1 landed at 55 knots in four-meter seas without a bounce and stopped in less than eight seconds; a half hour later it took off in less than ten seconds time. The PS-1 will be mass produced in the Fourth Defense Buildup for ASW, and the MSA and U.S. Coast Guard are reportedly interested in it for rescue

purposes. It was the first real contribution of the Japanese aircraft industry to postwar aeronautics, and is another example of the Imperial Navy's continuation in the MSDF.²⁶

In 1965 the U.S. government gave the MSDF three drone anti-submarine helicopters (DASH) as MAP Grant Aid, Japan subsequently purchasing 22 more of the craft from the Gyrodyne Corporation; the total project with training devices and supplies cost 1500 million yen (4.2 million dollars). In 1966 the first MSDF ship fitted for DASH sent a team of officers to train aboard the Yokosuka-homeported USS DEHAVEN (DD-727) whose DASH officer, Ensign David G. Anderson was rated as the top drone pilot in the U.S. Navy and who possessed a true enthusiasm for the trouble-plagued system. Anderson taught the MSDF officers that the DASH will work well when it is maintained meticulously and flown carefully but that otherwise experience had proven that it will have many problems. Within a week Anderson had the Japanese officers making night

²⁶"Birth of PS-1," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, October 19, 1968.

landings with the drone.²⁷ The U.S. Navy, which had ordered 534 DASH drones and had lost almost half of them in crashes finally abandoned the system in the late 1960's. (The Government Accounting Office in 1970 strongly criticized the Navy for its action in keeping a defective system so long.) The sale to Japan was made even after Defense Secretary Robert S. MacNamara had cut DASH funding to one-third of its original allocation because of the high cost and already inferior performance. To date the MSDF has lost six drones; however, applying the care and skill emphasized by Anderson, it has found the results with the DASH to have become very satisfactory recently and only reluctantly has had to give up the project after 1971 because spare parts will no longer be available from Gyrodyne after the U.S. Navy's cancellation. Meanwhile new ships have been fitted for DASH and a promising project must be cancelled.²⁸

²⁷This writer was Operations Officer aboard the DEHAVEN at the time of the MSDF training.

²⁸Domestic production is not considered economical because of future plans for small manned helicopters. Diet and press criticism of the DASH "scandal" was feared to have made necessary the resignation of Joint Staff Council Chairman Itaya who was Chief of Maritime Staff in 1965 when the DASH contract was sealed. Despite strong civilian

The Defense Agency draft of the Fourth Defense Buildup Program allots three twin engine jet C1 transports designed and built for the ASDF by Nihon Aeroplane Manufacturing Co. for the MSDF as minelayers. The future aircraft of interest, however, is next generation ASW plane, a four engine turbofan 50-ton experimental land-based patrol aircraft (PXL) being managed presently by the TRDI at a reported cost of 1500 million yen (4.2 million dollars) for basic design work in 1971 alone; expected costs over the next ten years total 35 billion yen (97.2 million dollars).²⁹ If that aircraft materializes and the MSDF is successful in getting an anti-air/anti-submarine fixed-wing aircraft such as the Japanese version of the F4 Phantom or the British VTOL Harrier past the conceptual stage for use on the 8000-ton helicopter destroyer to be built in the new

control a military man was to pay for the adverse publicity. The MSDF saved the day, however, with an operational exhibition of DASH's capabilities before a seasick, multi-party Diet group in late March, many of whom thought the drone was incapable of flying even in calm weather. The imminent April 1 retirement of Admiral Itaya never took place. A sensational account of the DASH "exposure" is contained in Shukan Shincho, March 20, 1971; a more reasoned account is "'Useless' Weapon Purchase Blasted," The Daily Yomiuri, January 7, 1971.

²⁹ Japan Press Exchange Aviation Report Weekly, August 17, 1970.

defense program, the MSDF would come closer to being the naval air force its original designers of April, 1951 desired.

E. WEAPON LAUNCHERS

The preceding parts of this chapter have pointed to the possible potential for Japan's defense industry while revealing some present weaknesses. Nowhere are the present-day weaknesses and lack of policy more apparent than in fields of weapon launchers, their ammunition, and fuel supply, the subjects of this section and the next chapter.

"The MSDF looks like it has been purchased out of a Sears and Roebuck Catalog," one foreign naval officer only half-jokingly remarked; "of course if things got serious, they'd just strip off those weapons they have and put on good ones." The present MSDF is indeed a collection of ships and aircraft, most now domestically built and designed, but still almost totally strewn with MAP weapons, those built in Japan under U.S. authorization, or produced locally under foreign license.

Four destroyers, two still on loan from the U.S. and two of Japanese design, have old single 5-inch 38-caliber

slow-fire guns given under MAP; others carry the U.S. Navy's 5-inch 54-caliber anti-aircraft gun, first provided under MAP, purchased by Japan under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program, and subsequently authorized for Japanese production by Japan Steel Works. The 3-inch 50-caliber rapid-fire twin mount carried by destroyer escorts and some destroyers was similarly furnished first under MAP and then authorized for Japan Steel production. All smaller caliber 20 and 40-mm. guns and rocket launchers for ships and ASW aircraft were provided through MAP, some being still on hand for installation on new minesweepers. These guns are also sometimes removed from retired vessels and placed on new ships.³⁰

Anti-submarine weapons launchers range from the most elementary to those with more potential than Japan presently chooses to employ. "Y" and "K" Gun depth charge launchers received under MAP are still carried by several older destroyer types and patrol craft. A short

³⁰ Kaijo Jietai Kantei to Kokui Shu (Maritime Self-Defense Force Ships and Aircraft) Tokyo: Kaijo Jietai Shimbun, 1971. Raymond V. B. Blackman, Jane Fighting Ships 1970-1971, London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1970. Interview with Commander Ishihara Kazumi, First Weapons Section, Technical Division, Maritime Staff Office, May 26, 1971.

range depth bomb "Hedgehog" was received under MAP and was manufactured in Japan but is now obsolete and no longer manufactured. Two medium-range rocket launchers are still employed; the U.S. Mark 108 "Weapon Alpha" was received under MAP, and a Swedish quadruple rocket launcher is made in Japan under license from the Bofors Company by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nagasaki. Short-range Mark 32 torpedo tubes were initially received under MAP, domestic production by Watanabe Iron Works being subsequently authorized. Because of initial U.S. reluctance to provide Japan submarines and Japan's previous ability in the torpedo field, a Japanese submarine torpedo tube was designed, later models being capable of firing long-range U.S. or Japanese torpedoes. The DASH is a long-range torpedo launcher received then purchased from the United States. Japan also received the Anti-Submarine Rocket (ASROC) under MAP, and Mitsubishi, Nagasaki has subsequently been authorized with American Machine and Foundry to produce this U.S. Navy ASW weapon capable of firing atomic depth charges.³¹ The Japanese, of course,

³¹Ibid.

have never chosen nuclear armament but should this decision, which the government has already declared to be constitutional, be made, this is one delivery system that would immediately be available.³² Some military experts are known to believe atomic depth charges are the best example available of tactical nuclear weapons and believe that such weapons are the only realistic tactic in a wartime scenario against a nuclear-powered submarine. Since the submarine is Japan's most likely enemy in a wartime naval operation, this launcher is one of the most interesting and capable in the MSDF arsenal, i.e., one that would not necessarily be "stripped off" in an emergency, should it be given an adequate payload.

Guided missiles have been a very weak point of the MSDF even when equipment purchased from the U.S. is considered. Although research and development has been carried out and continues on a surface-to-surface missile and other advanced models, presently only the U.S.-purchased single Tartar missile aboard JDS AMAZUKASE is available.

³²See p. 254, item "f."

Certain types of radar, sonar, fire control, and electronic countermeasures equipment have in some cases been received under MAP but are largely produced in Japan. Electronic warfare is regarded by one military expert as the likely determiner of victory in a future war in the way in which the battleship and the carrier were major factors in World War I and World War II. Great amounts of money for research and development are necessary for this task; the Japanese have so far not put the stress on military applications, although the electronics industry is among the nation's strongest. Since capabilities in this field are highly classified, the exact present strength and potential to switch from civilian expertise to naval applications in this field are unknown. Should the Japanese choose to neglect it, one observer commented that the MSDF in 1985 might find itself very capable of fighting a 1970 war, analagous to the way in which the Imperial Navy of 1941 was prepared for an earlier type war.

CHAPTER XIV

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROBLEMS OF THE JMSDF

Japan's self-defense capability is considerable. . . .

In short we can now rely substantially on our own means for our national security, apart, of course, from total war, whether conventional or nuclear.¹

There is perhaps no other clearer example of the unusual situation of postwar armed forces in Japan than present logistic levels, which, despite statements similar to that just quoted or the often heard remark that the Self-Defense Forces are designed and have the capability to hold out for 30 days, seem, when submitted to analysis, to indicate that the forces might be fortunate to hold out for a matter of hours.

A consideration which no doubt lies behind the above statement and others like it is a failure to see a

¹Aichi Kiichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change," p. 31.

threat to Japan and the feeling, naïve or otherwise, that should such a threat arise there will be ample time to build up adequate supplies to meet it. In addition, however, there seems to be among civilians a tendency to ignore unpleasant or costly problems of defense and a tendency on the part of the leadership of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to leave these problems to the United States in order to build up front-line strength.

Although the status of exact logistic levels is classified information, this chapter will try to point out basic problems of the MSDF in this area that are well known yet given surprisingly little attention, even with increasing signs of U.S. withdrawal from Japan and with more and more lip-service being given to "self-reliant" defense.

A. AMMUNITION

The ships of the MSDF are generally new and well kept; the aircraft are being replaced with newer models with increased frequency of late. Future plans call for increased vessel and airframe construction, but little

is heard about whether funds are being set aside to arm these systems for an emergency.

Each year when new budget proposals are being drafted, the need for adequate ammunition is pointed out and a reasonable share of money is allotted for the purpose, but, by the time the budget is finalized, this item has always been forced to give way to the more urgently felt need to build front-line items such as warships. Even the amount that is approved by the Maritime Staff Office is not always as big as it appears and meets opposition from reviewing authorities. To cite one example:

The Maritime Self-Defense Force has been allocated ¥4,155 million in the fiscal year [1968] for ammunition (¥2,603 million, with the follow-on disbursement of ¥1,552 million). The MSDF will actually have only ¥2,809 million of the total at its disposal since it must clear a ¥1,346 million follow-on disbursement account incurred in fiscal 1967.

It has been reported that the MSDF's request to buy depth charges and mines has been approved as originally proposed, but that the Finance Ministry has cut back on projectiles by about 30%, torpedoes by 50%, and anti-submarine ammunition by more than 30%.²

²Japan Press Exchange, Army Navy Supplement,
February 21, 1968, p. 13.

In actuality, with the possible exception of mines, the MSDF has only training allowances with no war reserves in ammunition.

The reasons for this situation are not difficult to deduce. With no firm goals set for defense, MSDF leaders have pursued their objectives of building an ocean-going naval force. Although they realize the danger inherent in low reserves, they are also aware that, since their weapons systems are basically of American design and since Japan is an ally of the U.S., in case of emergency they will probably be able to obtain critical supplies from the United States. Civilian leaders have generally recognized the lack of any immediate threat and, being less experienced in military matters, they have not been aware of the need of stockpiles. Some leaders, not realizing the inherent weaknesses of the present situation, have made rather naïve statements about present capability; others, feeling that force size should be balanced by capability, have come to appreciate the meaning of the present situation and have made more critical evaluations.³

³One of the most outspoken critics of the present low capability in ammunition is National Defense Council

The present situation is satisfactory for a training situation or in any situation where Japan can rely upon immediate assistance from the United States, but it is far from self-reliant.

Ammunition for large and small-caliber guns is one example of the situation to date. For the three-inch and five-inch guns installed on every destroyer in the fleet, ammunition was initially received under MAP and later purchased under the Foreign Military Sales Program. Presently it is authorized for manufacture by one company, Dai Kin of Osaka, in amounts to sustain training. Ammunition for 20-mm. or 40-mm. guns carried by minesweepers, some destroyers, patrol craft, etc., is almost as unavailable domestically as are the guns themselves. The former is still available only in the supply originally furnished under MAP with some armor-piercing tracers having been purchased under the FMS Program; the latter is now manufactured in

Secretary General Kaihara Osamu. His book, Senshi ni Manabu (Lessons from World War II), and many speeches and articles stress the lack of capability resulting from ammunition supply levels and past and present naiveté with respect to this subject. The manuscript of IJN Commander Chihaya, referred to in Chapter I, also criticized past unrealistic supplies and naïve estimates.

Japan by Dai Kin alone, a company whose main business is not ammunition manufacture.⁴

If guns are considered out of date, something the U.S. Navy, which took most guns off its new ships seemed to believe prior to the Vietnam War, the above situation might not be considered too significant; but one would expect to see more emphasis on torpedo capability since ASW is the MSDF's major field of concentration. For short-range purposes, the U.S. Navy's Mark 44 torpedo was provided under MAP and was subsequently authorized for production in Japan, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries purchasing drawings and manufacturing limited supplies of this weapon which can be fired from a conventional tube or from an ASROC launcher. The longer-range Mark 37 torpedo was originally purchased under the FMS Program but later was also produced locally by Mitsubishi. Japanese-designed high-speed long and short-range torpedoes are under development at the present time and will be manufactured by Mitsubishi, Nagasaki, the sole producer of torpedoes in Japan.⁵

⁴Interview with Commander Ishihara Kazumi, MSDF, First Weapons Section, May 26, 1971.

⁵Ibid.

One problem with domestic production has been the small size of the annual order, resulting in a lack of incentive for the manufacturer to set up mass production capability. Enough for the yearly training allowances of approximately six per ship and submarine, and for the 18-month allowance of two per aircraft training team are produced under non-precision processes resulting in low reliability of the torpedoes that are manufactured. If all torpedoes for one defense program were ordered at once, critics point out, the manufacturer would have an incentive to automate his production line, hopefully increasing precision and reliability.⁶ The export of torpedoes to other countries in volume is another possible solution to the problem which so far has not been chosen.

Both moored and influence mines were purchased under the FMS program; Mark 57 moored mines are presently authorized for production by Ishikawa Works. Japanese designed K-5 moored mines, K-15 moored antenna mines, and K-16 bottom influence mines having properties similar to U.S. mines were designed recently; production contracts

⁶Interview with MSDF destroyer and submarine commanding officers.

were authorized in 1970 with Ishikawa and Hitachi Works. Under the Third Defense Buildup Program, the MSDF planned the mass procurement of both moored and influence mines for stockpile purposes.⁷

Although mines are thus possibly the only kind of ammunition with some amount of war reserve, even they, along with torpedoes, are limited by the present state of ordnance equipment and technology in the MSDF. Although mine and torpedo shops are maintained by four of the five Regional District Headquarters, complete adjustments cannot be made to torpedoes except at one location.⁸

Detonators for mines are generally not available and require factory assistance before enabling (being made ready to fire) can be achieved. Of the less than 400 torpedoes in the total stockpile, present conditions allow for calibrating approximately one-third on a 90-day notice; to calibrate the entire supply would take six months. Of

⁷Interview with Commander Ishihara, May 26, 1971.

⁸Sasebo did not have such a facility as of 1970. The U.S. Navy maintained a homeported mine flotilla at Sasebo having mine ordnance technicians assigned. The flotilla has been gradually withdrawn, the last unit having left in December, 1970.

the some 4000 mines presently stockpiled, it would take four months to enable approximately one-half of them. When a foreign naval officer, surprised to learn that a Japanese ASW destroyer on an exercise in the Sea of Japan was carrying no ready-torpedoes--a situation common to all MSDF units--asked the commanding officer what he would do if he were suddenly torpedoed or asked to go protect an attacked Japanese merchantman he candidly replied, "I would return to port and hope the U.S. Navy would give me torpedoes."⁹

For the one missile ship in its arsenal, the MSDF imports Tartar missiles from the United States as local production is obviously uneconomical. Presently a supply of approximately 50 missiles, which have an individual firing time of approximately one second, are maintained. As one critic asked, "Is that considered a 30-day supply?"¹⁰

In addition to inadequate stockpiles, stowage space is not presently available for holding large amounts

⁹ Interview with MSDF destroyer commanding officer.

¹⁰ Interview with Kaihara, May 13, 1971. ASW aircraft ammunition such as sonobuoys, rockets, etc. are similarly stockpiled only at training levels with some paper plans for future larger holdings.

of ammunition. Again the problem is basically one of budget. Stowage areas of the Imperial Navy in caves and other secure locations are available but are generally under need of repair. One area near Kure that was renovated was so-improved from belief that the U.S. Navy was going to give Japan wartime reserve ammunition, a program that was cancelled without the ammunition ever actually being transferred. The MSDF would understandably like to get the U.S. Navy's 880-acre ammunition depots near Yokosuka and 140-acre stowage facility at Yokosuka should those locations be returned to Japan, since costs of new facilities or other renovations would be high.¹¹

Even return of U.S. facilities would not guarantee solution to the problem if the MSDF is forced to observe the letter of the gunpowder control law, enacted before the Self-Defense Forces were inaugurated, to control reckless use of fireworks and industrial explosives.¹² The U.S.

¹¹"Consolidated Report of USFJ REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS" furnished by U.S. Embassy Tokyo.

¹²Law Number 149 of 1950. Article 106 of the Self-Defense Forces Law does exempt the forces from some provisions of the law, but there are problems.

Forces were naturally exempt from the law, but the Defense Agency has never sought to have its forces excluded from it. This has led to problems for the MSDF:

An example is the ammunition depot of the Maritime Self-Defense Force at Yokosuka. The permissible amount of ammunition to be stored there is about 500 tons in terms of TNT. But at present only 140 tons are in the depot. This is because the ammunition depot has to respect the regulations of the gunpowder control law which restrict the amount of gunpowder to be stored near residential areas. The MSDF is planning to purchase a 9,000 square-meter piece of land around the depot to prevent civilian houses from being built near the depot. Even with this step, the amount of ammunition at the depot must be reduced by 40 tons, according to the law.

However, the gunpowder control law is not applicable to U.S. ammunition depots in Japan. As much ammunition as they please [the U.S. Navy does have strict ammunition stowage regulations of its own] can be stored in U.S. depots here. Therefore, Japanese officers are inclined to opine that in time of emergency Japan would be allowed to use ammunition in U.S. depots.

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates that the two countries must help each other in the fields of materials and weapons. However, no definite arrangements have been made about the matter. It is not clear to what extent Japan can expect assistance from the United States.¹³

Similarly unexplored has been any requirement for the few companies which are capable of producing ammunition

¹³"Supply," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, December 17, 1968.

to do so on a mass production basis in time of emergency. Like other industries involved in defense production, the relative amount of business of any present manufacturer is approximately ten per cent or less. The munitions industry had temporarily revived in the early 1950's, as U.S. special procurement created annual markets of five billion yen (14 million dollars) to fifteen billion yen (42 million dollars) for four years, only to drop suddenly to less than 150 million yen (420,000 dollars) and then to vanish until the small procurements of the Defense Agency began.¹⁴ Large orders could possibly expand the industry again, although in a more prosperous Japan, producers might be more hesitant unless an imminent threat were seen. In the meantime, no government production of critical items nor emergency procurement legislation seems to be in immediate plans. Until this situation changes, Japan's "considerable capability" to provide for "our own national security" by "our own means" will be somewhat in doubt. Japan's own civilian defense experts have acknowledged the obvious: "Having firearms but no ammunition,

¹⁴"Japan's Aircraft and Munitions Industries," The Japan Times, June 24, 1959.

aircraft but no fuel, or having to depend on resources outside the nation for repairs would render such equipment entirely useless."¹⁵ In fuel and other critical supplies, the situation is not too much better.

B. PETROLEUM

The Imperial Navy claimed to have a two-year oil supply prior to the commencement of World War II; this estimate proved incorrect and operations had to be curtailed. The Self-Defense Forces generally claim a three-month supply at local bases; more is said to be available if commercial stowage facilities are considered. The problem with the figures, however, results from the criteria used and from locations of the supply. The Maritime Staff Office lists present peacetime use as 12,600 kiloliters of oil per month. To live within present stocks, ships steam at twelve knots and consume approximately 150,000 tons of fuel annually. Should the average destroyer run full speed, consumption would rise

¹⁵Masuhara Keikichi, editor, Nihon no Boei (Japan's Defense), p. 298.

as much as twelve times. But MSDF estimates for wartime count on only an increase four times present rate.¹⁶ The entire nation of Japan is realistically estimated to have less than a one-month supply of oil.¹⁷

Location is another critical factor in assessing present capability. All three services presently stow the greatest amount of petroleum at a former Imperial Navy facility near Kure. Although the MSDF's readiness levels call for only a 19 per cent supply of fuel at Kure, 43 per cent is in fact kept there, Yokosuka, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Ominato all having shortages in required stowage capacity.¹⁸ With so much of the present stock located in one place, that supply is naturally vulnerable to quick knockout as the site would understandably be a priority target in wartime. Even barring loss of the main

¹⁶ Interview with Kaihara, May 13, 1971. Present stockpiles at various bases provide slightly more than a three month supply at the four times rate if wartime usage standards are reliable.

¹⁷ Most estimates place the actual reserve capability at about three weeks. Despite MITI's attempt to increase the supply to 45 days following the closing of the Suez Canal, soaring consumption rates have stymied any improvement in the situation.

¹⁸ Official data for 1970, Japan Defense Agency.

supply, transportation from Kure, where all torpedoes must presently be adjusted also, could be a problem since transportation routes are primarily coastal and are vulnerable to interdiction.¹⁹

U.S. Army and Navy stowage facilities near Yokosuka and Sasebo provide possible future petroleum storage facilities should they be returned, and Ominato has ample room for such stowage facilities to be built. Presently, except for Kure, emergency supply would have to come from commercial facilities, by truck or rail from Kure, or from U.S. supply depots.

C. SUPPLY SUPPORT AND SUPPORT SHIPS

On paper the home island support facilities of the MSDF look very favorable. Regional District Headquarters coordinate local supply matters; supply depots are linked by a Supply Demand Control Point in Tokyo having materials computerized for easy access. Individual ships carry onboard spares of some high use items and airbases also

¹⁹"Supply," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series.

keep supplies available. In any case supply support for the many different classes of destroyers that have been built with different equipment and for complex ASW aircraft is expensive and demanding. The U.S. Navy has provided critical supplies and repair technology in times of need, but MSDF officers interviewed were generally critical of numerous changes in plans and designs of various systems and of abilities to supply the different equipment presently on hand. As one officer put it:

The SDF have sufficient strength to cope with a frontal attack, but its supply setup is very poor, although it is unreasonable to compare the SDF with the U.S. forces which are always prepared for action.²⁰

A truly sea-going navy also has to be able to support its ships at sea, however, in order to maintain sustained operations. The Seventh Fleet, for example, keeps its ships supplied with fuel, ammunition, food, general purpose and equipment supplies, and provides frequent official and personal mail service to its units. Whereas the Imperial Navy was always concerned about sufficient support ships, the MSDF has almost none to worry about.

²⁰Quoted in "Ammunition and Petroleum," Mainichi Daily News "Peace and Security" series, October 16, 1968.

Presently it has one small tanker as its almost sole vehicle of underway replenishment. Of course, it can be argued that such ships are not necessary because of the fact that Japan's Self-Defense Forces are not authorized for overseas deployment; but essentially the lacks question any ability to keep a sizeable force at sea for any extended period of time.²¹ However, Japanese ships show good skill at underway replenishment techniques when exercising with U.S. support vessels; and it could be that in an emergency situation, provided the necessary emergency legislation and adequate protection could be obtained, Japan's merchant fleet could be used in support of the MSDF's front-line units.

²¹The annual overseas training cruise is carefully planned to island hop, now around the world. Officers and sailors alike complained that they never received mail away from home-ports, even in Japan.

CONCLUSION

This monograph has attempted a study of the history and problems of Japan's postwar naval forces drawing largely on the living participants in the activities and events making up that history, a subject area largely neglected in academic research to date.

The examination concludes that, despite the ideals and directives of the Occupation, Japan was never fully stripped of naval forces and that, more important, some people were not fully convinced of the possibility and desirability of perpetual disarmament. Plans for eventual rearmament began to be formulated even before the almost complete disarmament was achieved. In fact, specific rearmament studies and plans were being made by the very persons who were exempt from Occupation purge directives in order to work in the government on disarmament. Rather than trying to effect any type of conspiracy, these persons were, instead, acting sincerely for what they thought best for their country and were at least sympathetically

encouraged throughout much of the Occupation by important Japanese political figures and influential U.S. naval officers.

Although Article 9 of the Japanese postwar Constitution called for a ban on war as a sovereign right of the nation and on maintaining land, sea, and air forces, an idea that may have been originated by Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara, it was an idea that did not appear in other drafts of the new Constitution and it was opposed from the outset by some conservative politicians and former military leaders who thought it dangerous for Japan's security. General Douglas MacArthur, who was responsible for the inclusion of the article in the Constitution, if not its authorship, maintained that he never meant for the provision to ban armed self-defense measures; and it appears that the man immediately responsible for the drafting, General Courtney Whitney, understood the amendments to Article 9 as proposed by Dr. Ashida Hitoshi, who was advised that that the Americans might interpret the changes to allow rearmament for self-defense in the future, to mean exactly that. In any event, such allowance for future armed self-defense was not explained to the

Japanese Diet reviewing the Constitution in 1946; and the government's official explanation, which has always maintained that regular armed forces, war potential, and the right of belligerency, a term found to have no meaning in international law, were forbidden, has led to efforts to live within the confines of Article 9 and still have armed forces only for self-defense, to maintain special civilians in military uniforms conducting military activities, and by ever-changing, increasing estimates of what constitutes self-defense and what is not war potential to give opposition parties the opportunity to credibly argue that the entire idea of armed self-defense has from the beginning been unconstitutional.

Less than one year after the new Constitution went into effect, a new organization conducting naval activities under the advice and actual participation of naval personnel was formed with little opposition other than from a few American Occupation officials and Soviet representatives on various Allied postwar commissions; although the Maritime Safety Agency was called a non-military force, its activities were from the outset, though limited, military in nature. In October, 1950, when the world thought occupied

Japan had no naval forces, 46 of its ships were ordered into combat, the only such deployment in the nation's post-war history to date.

Since recovering independence, the Japanese formed a National Safety Agency in 1952, incorporating a police reserve force founded after the outbreak of the Korean War because of the removal of American ground units and a naval guard unit formed within the Maritime Safety Agency. In 1954 the name of the Safety Agency was changed to the Defense Agency; the explicit mission of defending the country against external aggression was added. Also, a third unit with an air defense role was added so that the three forces resembled the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, which provided their Japanese counterparts with equipment and training. The National Defense Council, to be the Prime Minister's top advisory body on national security matters, was constituted in 1956; and a year later a basic national defense policy, unchanged to the present, was adopted after Council and Cabinet approval. A very small percentage of the gross national product and a usually declining portion of the national budget, although gradually increasing in absolute amount, has been annually allotted

to defense since 1952, but little more than a training capability has ever been achieved. Especially taking into account advancements made by other nations and considering the greatly increasing tempo of its commercial maritime activities, Japan may be relatively less able at present to provide for its naval defense than before. Never given the power to conscript and with postwar military activity constitutionally doubtful and unpopular, the ability to attract and hold young recruits has dwindled under conditions of advanced economic prosperity, including nearly full employment with attendant categorical shortages, in the postwar era. A small portion of the modest budget for defense has been annually earmarked for research and development with the result that Japan's forces have so far been dependent on sometimes outmoded foreign technology or on ideas of interest and benefit to domestic industry for weaponry. Adequate stockpiles of fuel and ammunition or logistic support for any type of sustained defense capability have never been accumulated or maintained so that claims of autonomous or even considerable defense capability seem quite weak from a military point of view.

Critical questions about the present situation come to mind. In light of statements from responsible officials that the Japanese now have or are approaching autonomous defense capability, just how effective does the Japanese government believe its Maritime Self-Defense Force to be? In view of U.S. military cutbacks, how effectively and quickly does Tokyo believe the United States Seventh Fleet can aid Japan? Under what conditions will the U.S. aid Japan beyond explicit territorial invasion commitments? Is it possible American and Japanese estimates of each other's naval strength are different and in both cases are overly optimistic about the other's capabilities? Is it possible that Prime Minister Sato, plagued by domestic political considerations, and President Nixon with the same considerations and intent on applying the Guam Doctrine in Asia don't really wish to know the true situation and/or are content with vaguely optimistic reports? Perhaps the answers to these questions are known but classified for reasons of national security. Whether such is the case or not, the answers do not seem to be publicly available.

The theory that Japan has had an unchanged, wise defense policy of relying on the United States for external security while providing for its own internal security, a

thesis best expressed by Martin Weinstein, has been subject to criticism in this discussion. Actually this writer agrees with many of Weinstein's arguments concerning the lack of capability of the Self-Defense Forces which, perhaps against external invasion, tend only to raise the threshold of attack making the probability of American assistance in time of emergency greater, but he cannot agree that some fundamental policy was decided upon in 1947 which has been consistently maintained up to the present time. To look back and see the low level of spending and the lack of war could indicate that there was such a successful and wise policy; but it is the conclusion of this writer that, rather than finding the answer in 1947, the Japanese are still trying to define the problem in 1971. Rearmament planning began in 1945, and an at least quasi-military organization for external maritime defense was organized in 1948. Sympathies then as now favored protection of Japan by Japanese; but there were problems of economic privation, failure to agree on what was the threat and what was to be protected, and Occupation directives against rearmament which have been replaced only recently with foreign fears of resurgent Japanese

remilitarization. Japanese reaction to announced cuts in U.S. military bases in late 1970 included fears and doubts of American willingness and capability to defend Japan in the future; even if past policy was reliance upon the United States, there is now question as to whether this will be reliable in the future. According to U.S. statements, its capabilities have been exaggerated and its goals have not been attained in the period of the 1960's, which could be interpreted as implying that countries like Japan might have been lucky rather than wise in relying on conventional American aid. With an unusually fast economic recovery and growth which has catapulted Japan into third place in national aggregate economic strength, greater amounts of money have become and are likely to be made available for defense in the future even if the small relative rates of gross national product and national budget should be maintained. Lack of public interest in defense matters, difficulty in finding a threat, and fears of foreign reaction, however, continue to hamper definition of the problem much less developing solutions.

A conventional proposal offered by a former naval officer, Sekino Hideo, has been presented as one possible

solution to the problem, one that essentially carries forward the ideas of men such as Ashida, Nomura Kichisaburo, Hatoyama Ichiro, and the leadership of the Maritime Self-Defense Force which, at the top, has almost exclusively been drawn from former Imperial Navy officers. It posits the Soviet Union and Mainland China as the primary threats and asserts that Japan must have a capability against such jeopardy, which on the sea means a capability to defend against submarines attempting to cut the vital sea lanes on which travel Japan's critically-needed resources. On an even higher level the plan calls for a joint or independent capability to defend Japan with nuclear weapons so that the nation is not subject to nuclear blackmail from a third power, specifically Mainland China, when the U.S. might be reluctant to aid Japan because of mutual deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Objections to the plan include: positing an unlikely occurrence, requiring excessive cost and/or having little likelihood of effectiveness, initiating a personnel demand that labor-short Japan cannot fill or requiring conscription which is politically and popularly unacceptable, and eliciting foreign fears of Japanese militarism projected abroad.

A second and more limited solution whose author regards himself as a realist in appraising Japan's natural limitations and present and future capabilities is that of Kaihara Osamu, former Defense Agency civilian and presently staff member of the National Defense Council who represents a view popular among some civilian officials and military commentators with whom he has been associated throughout the postwar history of the Safety and Defense Agencies. This plan calls for a limited but capable force to delay or disrupt territorial invasion utilizing a large militia in an emergency and having a naval guard force even in peacetime trained and capable of interdicting an invading sea force but not attempting to accomplish the essentially impossible mission of protecting Japan's world-wide sea lanes. Such a plan gives the United States liberal concessions for its aid to Japan and relies on the United States exclusively for nuclear protection which Japan is unable realistically to provide itself. Objections to the plan include: its limited scope which, in the eyes of sea-going officers, calls for a coast guard not a navy, its admission that Japan is unable to provide for its own defense against any great power, even though Japan might

foolishly try to do so, and its willingness to rely heavily on the United States far into the future. Recently a political gesture to call Japan a "middle class non-nuclear nation" drew opposition because of dislike of the term middle class applied to the nation. Although the expression was unrelated to Kaihara's ideas, his plan takes a very limited view of Japan's present and future capabilities.

A third idea of a young journalist and military commentator, Taoka Shunji, was briefly described as a futuristic plan for providing a significant degree of defense including the protection of sea lanes utilizing ideas such as high-speed merchant ships carrying ASW helicopters. Although the idea has not been formally subject to criticism as yet, for it has been unofficially and hypothetically proposed, it might well meet some of the same objections as those of other large-scale defense plans.

In the future it seems that Japan has at least three choices with respect to defense. It could disband its present forces and adopt the formula of unarmed neutrality which is advocated particularly by the Japan Socialist Party; the advocacy of this policy has been

claimed to have already contributed to political setbacks for the JSP, and the chance of such a plan ever being adopted in the future is regarded as most unlikely. Japan could continue to search for a policy, meanwhile continuing the very slow buildup of defense power, hoping to buy time until a consensus policy and real capability are achieved, maintaining the present Self-Defense Forces or some modification thereof without attempting any basic change such as in the status of the members as extraordinary civilians; this seems like the most ready course through the 1970's unless some external threat arises, the United States completely withdraws from Asian commitments, or a significant setback is experienced by the Liberal Democratic Party which has ruled Japan since the end of the Occupation.

A third possibility is a firmer defense posture which could aim at achieving specific capabilities such as proposed by Kaihara, building the strong navy advocated by Sekino, changing the Defense Agency to a Defense Ministry, revising the Constitution specifically legalizing forces for self-defense or authorizing military forces per se, making the decision to develop nuclear arms alone

or in conjunction with some other country, and deciding to go it alone in armed neutrality by terminating the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and ending other forms of military cooperation with the United States. The emergence of a real threat or an actual attack upon Japan might be one stimulant to such options under the third possibility, some observers already feeling that the threat of Mainland China will become an increasingly significant issue of the 1970's following the reversion of Okinawa as Japan enters its new postwar era. Also the presence of currents of nationalism and anti-Americanism is admitted to exist by most observers, some believing that the two elements could be dangerously fused by events such as failure of the U.S. to allow the reversion of Okinawa, economic difficulties resulting in significant American restrictions against Japanese goods with resultant serious economic repercussions in Japan, and ugly incidents involving U.S. servicemen stationed at bases in Japan.

Presently, even the immediate status of continuing defense buildup efforts hinges on events such as Okinawa negotiations, the overseas trip of the Emperor, and a

possible change in Prime Minister. A Navy with a highly capable minesweeping force exists in Japan in 1971 as it did during the Occupation and before the Maritime Self-Defense Force came into existence. Whether there will be a postwar navy with a significant capability for other roles remains to be decided later in the history of maritime Japan.

A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX

WRITER KITABAYASHI TOMA'S PROPHECY

by Itaya Takaichi

Several days after Japan's surrender in August, 1945, I was summoned to the Bureau of Naval Affairs. At that time, I was on the staff of the Combined Fleet and lived in a dormitory on Keio University's Hiyoshi campus. The bureau reassigned me to the Yokohama Liaison Office as a liaison officer of the Imperial Navy.

Yokohama was in great confusion at that time as construction work on barracks for Occupation forces, ordered by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, was in progress all over the city. The liaison office was also ordered to gather more than 800 vehicles in Atsugi. In the first two weeks of my assignment to the liaison office, I could hardly sleep because of pressure of the work.

There was a middle-aged woman typist called Kitabayashi-san in my office. She was kind, quick to

understand orders and refined. I respected her and we soon became friends. Unlike other younger typists, she was not flattered or ridiculed by people visiting my office. Shortly after this, General MacArthur's headquarters moved from Yokohama to Tokyo; and the headquarters of the Eighth Army took charge of civil administration.

When the city became a little quieter, Kitabayashi-san invited me to her home. I did not know whether she was married or not.

Shortly afterwards, I decided to resign the service and return to Kyushu to join my family. My family had evacuated Tokyo toward the end of the war when air raids on Tokyo intensified. My wife's illness prompted me to quit the service. Before leaving Tokyo, I visited Kitabayashi-san's home near the Kairakuen Gardens in Chojacho, Isogo-ku, Yokohama, to bid farewell. Her home stood near the beach and commanded a clear view of Tokyo Bay. American warships, destroyers and other military ships could be seen sailing up and down the bay from her home.

I was greatly impressed by the nice food and beer served in her home. At that time, Japan was suffering from

an acute shortage of food. Her kind hospitality overwhelmed me. But I was most surprised to learn that she was married to famous writer Kitabayashi Toma. Mr. Kitabayashi told me that he had just returned from Burma where he worked as a war correspondent. He eloquently spoke of his experience in Burma. We also discussed the future of Japan. I told him that I was going to resign the Navy to make a fresh start in my life as a civilian. I also spoke of my uneasiness about my future.

Mr. Katabayashi said: "Don't worry. In five years or so, the U.S. will lend those destroyers to Japan and ask you to command one of them." I thought to myself that such a thing would never happen. I said that I could not think of such a thing and did not ask why Mr. Kitabayashi thought so. In fact, I thought to myself that he was either joking or a little crazy or had no insight into the realities of life.

In 1952, it was decided to organize the Coastal Safety Force and I was ordered to Yokosuka to join Group A. There I was told for the first time that the U.S. had promised to lend 18 PFs and 50 LSSLs to Japan. This reminded me of Mr. Kitabayashi's word.

His prediction came true. Did anyone else in Japan make such a prediction immediately after the war? None of the Americans could have made such a prediction, either. I still do not know on what basis Mr. Kitabayashi made the prediction. Only a man of great wisdom could make such a prediction in the confusion of the defeat in the war. I greatly admire Mr. Kitabayashi's insight.

Source: Quoted in Kaijo Jieitai Hatten no Omoide (Remembrances of the Development of the Maritime Self Defense Force). Reproduced with the permission of Admiral Itaya.

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The greatest source of information supporting this research came from personal interviews, most of which were conducted in Tokyo between July, 1970 and February, 1971. Many of the persons questioned spoke excellent English; however, an interpreter was usually available to reduce misunderstandings and in all cases where the source did not have command of or wish to speak in English. Dates of interviews are as specified; those persons listed with an asterisk were consulted on a continuing basis during the writer's stay in Tokyo from July, 1970 through June, 1971.

A multitude of statistics was made available by various units of the Japan Defense Agency, the Ministry of Transportation, the Japan Whaling Association, the Japan Shipowners' Association, the Economic Planning Agency, the Finance Ministry, the Maritime Safety Agency, the United States Embassy in Tokyo, the Mutual Defense Assistance Office, USIS, Commander Naval Forces Japan, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet Protocol Office. Due to the unusual situation of classified information control in Japan, most information that might ordinarily be classified in other countries becomes available here. In some cases this writer was given information which would have been useful but he did not use due to knowledge that, although it was not specifically classified, wide dissemination was not desired either.

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- General GENDA Minoru, JASDF (Retired), former Chief of Air Staff, presently member of the House of Councillors, National Diet, Japan, January 11, 1971.
- Lieutenant Commander Charles A. GERTNER, Jr., USN, Chief of Navy Section, Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan.*
- Mr. Donald C. GORHAM, Naval Intelligence Command, February 23, 1971.
- Lieutenant Al GUILD, USN, Retail Sales Officer, Yokosuka Navy Exchange, April 14, 1971.
- Captain Robert J. HARLOW, USN, member U.S. Military Representative Okinawa Negotiating Team.*
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Vice Admiral HOSHINA Zenshiro, IJN (Retired), November 4, 1970; November 30, 1970.

Captain ICHIKI Toshio, JMSDF, Chief, Education Division, MSDF Staff College.*

Lieutenant Commander IMAIZUMI Yasuaki, JMSDF, former aide to the Chief of Maritime Staff, presently student at Royal Naval College, Greenwich.*

Dr. INOKI Masamichi, Superintendent, Defense Academy, September 25, 1970.

Rear Admiral INOUE Tatsuaki, JMSDF, Chief, Intelligence Division, Maritime Staff Office.*

Vice Admiral ISHIDA Suteo, JMSDF, Vice Chief of Maritime Staff, February 1, 1971.

Commander ISHIHARA Kazumi, JMSDF, First Weapons Section, Technical Division, Maritime Staff Office, May 26, 1971.

Rear Admiral ISHIKAWA Seiichi, JMSDF (Retired), former secretary to the "Y Committee," November 17, 1970.

Vice Admiral ISHIKUMA Tatsuhiko, JMSDF, Commander, Fleet Escort Force, Self-Defense Fleet, December 30, 1970.

Mr. ISHIWATA Koji, editor Sekai no Kansen (Ships of the World), September 30, 1970.

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Admiral ITAYA Takaichi, JMSDF, Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, May 14, 1971.

Professor ITO Kobun, National Defense College.*

Professor IWASHIMA Hisao, National Defense College.*

Mr. Herman KAHN, Director, Hudson Institute, July 2, 1971.

Mr. KAIHARA Osamu, Secretary General, National Defense Council.*

Lieutenant KATO Takehiko, JMSDF, grandson of Admiral KATO Kanji, IJN, October 29, 1970.

Mr. KATO Yozo, former Chief of the Defense Bureau, Japan Defense Agency, presently member of the House of Representatives, National Diet, January 20, 1971.

Cadet KAWAMURA Yasuyoshi, student, Defense Academy.*

Rear Admiral KIKUCHI Yoshinaga, JMSDF, Inspector General of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, September 21, 1970.

Mr. KIMURA Kazuo, research assistant, National Defense College.*

Mr. KIMURA Tokutaro, former Director General, Japan Defense Agency, December 17, 1970.

Professor KOSAKA Masataka, Kyoto University, national security analyst, September 5, 1970.

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Commander KUBOKAWA Motoo, JMSDF, Research Section, MSDF Staff College.*

Professor KUMAGI Akira, National Defense College, May 14, 1971.

Rear Admiral KUNISHIMA Kiyonori, JMSDF, Chief, Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office.*

Petty Officer First Class KURIHARA Yukiyoshi, JMSDF, JDS MAKIGUMO (DDK 114), October 28, 1970.

Mr. KUSUMI Tadao, military analyst, Chairman, Security Problem Research Council, former Commander IJN, July 24, 1970.

Mr. MAKINO Shigeru, Adviser, Shipbuilding Headquarters, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, former Captain, Constructor Corps IJN, April 2, 1971.

Rear Admiral Redfield MASON, USN (Retired), first Chief of Navy Section, MAAG, Japan, March 23, 1970 (letter).

Mr. MASUHARA Keikichi, first civilian head of the National Police Reserve, former Administrative Vice Minister, Japan Defense Agency, presently member of the House of Councillors, National Diet, January 29, 1971.

Mr. MASUOKA Ichiro, Secretary to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.*

Captain MATSUDA Yoshiteru, JMSDF, Planning Division, Technical Research and Development Institute, October 12, 1970.

Mr. Scribner McCOY, former interpreter Navy Section MAAG, Japan, presently Japan Manager, Grumman International Inc.*

Captain Gordon McGOWAN, USCG (Retired), member Maritime Safety Agency Advisory Group, December 29, 1970 (letter).

Captain Frank M. MEALS, USCG (Retired), January 15, 1971 (letter); January 18, 1971 (letter).

- Vice Admiral MIKAMI Sakuo, JMSDF (Retired), Adviser, Mitsubishi Electric Company, former Commander, Self-Defense Fleet, December 2, 1970.
- Mr. MITA Kazuya, former Chief, Patrol and Rescue Division, Deputy Director, Maritime Safety Agency, member of "Y Committee," November 19, 1970; December 7, 1970.
- Rear Admiral MIYATA Keisuke, JMSDF, Superintendent, Young Men's Service School, Etajima, September 7, 1970.
- Mr. MIYAZAKI Shigeo, Executive Director, Japan Shipowners' Association, December 11, 1970.
- Rear Admiral MIZOGUCHI Tomoji, JMSDF, Director of MSDF training, Defense Academy, September 25, 1970.
- Lieutenant Commander MIZUMOTO Ikuo, JMSDF, instructor, Officer Candidate School, Etajima, September 7, 1970.
- Mr. Roy A. MLYNARCHIK, U.S. Embassy, Japan, Press Translation Branch.*
- Professor MOMOI Makoto, National Defense College, February 2, 1971; April 1, 1971.
- Vice Admiral MOTOMURA Tetsuro, JMSDF, Superintendent Officer Candidate School, Etajima, September 7, 1970.
- Lieutenant NAGASAWA Kazunami, JMSDF, Foreign Liaison Office, Maritime Staff Office.*
- Rear Admiral NAKAMURA Teiji, JMSDF, Chief Operations Division, Maritime Staff Office, March 20, 1971.
- Mr. NAKANOMYO Masami, Chief, Public Relations Section, Japan Defense Agency, April 30, 1971.

Minister of State NAKASONE Yasuhiro, Director General, Japan Defense Agency, Member of the House of Representatives, National Diet, January 18, 1971.

Admiral NAKAYAMA Sadayoshi, JMSDF (Retired), former Chief of Maritime Staff, October 8, 1970; January 27, 1971.

Captain NAKUHARA Satoru, JMSDF, Ship Section, Technical Division, Maritime Staff Office, August 27, 1970.

Cadet NISHIKAWA Kinichiro, student, Defense Academy.*

Mr. NISHIYAMA Sen, Program and Research Division, United States Information Service, Tokyo, January 4, 1971.

Lieutenant (junior-grade) OHBA Asato, JMSDF, Instructor, Officer Candidate School, Etajima, September 7, 1970.

Mr. OHNO Yasuchika, Foreign Liaison Officer, Administrative Management Section, Maritime Safety Agency, November 13, 1970.

Captain OI Atsushi, IJN (Retired), military writer, September 23, 1970.

Mr. OIDE Hisashe, graduate of the 74th class Naval Academy, September 25, 1970.

Lieutenant Commander OKADA Satoshi, JMSDF, Personnel Section, Administration Division, Maritime Staff Office, September 10, 1970.

Vice Admiral OKAWA Sushiro, JMSDF, Superintendent First Service School, Etajima, September 7, 1970.

Mr. OKUBO Takeo, first Director General of the Maritime Safety Agency, presently Member of the House of Representatives, National Diet, Japan, December 17, 1970.

Lieutenant General OKUMIA Masatake, JASDF (Retired),
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Mr. OKUMURA Katsuzo, former ambassador and interpreter for
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Cadet WATANABE Masao, student, Defense Academy.*

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Mr. Joseph A. YAGER, Deputy Director, International and Social Studies Division, Institute of Defense Analysis, April 18, 1971.

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