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Secure Computer Systems


DARPA Cyber Colloquium
Arlington, VA

November 7, 2011







Today's Practice P4: Perimeter Protection, Patch & Pray isn't Convergent with The Threat




- It's not about better firewalls
- It's not about better virus detection
- It's not about better intrusion detection
- It's not about better programmer practices



It's about learning from biology and societies how to design secure, adaptive and resilient systems.




Humans Have Two Immune Systems: Innate and Adaptive



Fast, but inflexible, covers fixed sets of pathogen that are always present. Supports the adaptive immune system.



Slower, learns to recognize new sets of pathogens, distinguishes self from non-self, retains memory to guard against future attacks.



At least 20 – 30% of the body's resources are involved in constant surveillance and containment.



Three Big Problems




1. Systems can be easily penetrated
2. Once penetrated, cleanup is prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and unpredictable
3. If one system can be penetrated, then nearly all of them can



Mission-oriented Resilient Clouds

Using the power of a computational community to protect massively shared computational infrastructure

Your Software Lives Here



Your Software Lives On A Network with 100K Other Virtual Machines and No Firewalls



Modular Data Center Containers



Blade Server Racks



Blade Server Network



Resilient Clouds: A Community that uses the Network as a *Defensive Amplifier*

TODAY


Acting as individuals makes the enterprise weaker than the sum of its parts



- "Box" Oriented
- Vulnerable Components
- Static Sitting Duck
- Shared Vulnerabilities
- Implicit Trust is Amplifier

RESILIENT CLOUDS (CRASH++)

Acting as a community makes the enterprise stronger than the sum of its parts



- Mission Optimized
- CRASH-worthy components
- Moving Target
- Resilience through Diversity
- Collective Diagnosis is Damper



Resilient Clouds Technology Areas

Combined Goal of CRASH & Resilient Clouds

Cyber-Mission Resilience

Resilient Clouds Technologies

Mission-Aware Networking

Optimizing Mission and Resources

Innate Distributed Defense

Shared Situational Awareness, Trust Modeling, and Diagnosis

Manageable & Taskable Diversity

CRASH Technologies

Innate Immunity

Adaptive Immunity

Manageable Diversity

For more info see: <http://tinyurl.com/68w9w9w>

➔ Information flow
➔ Control flow



Secure Computer Systems

CRASH

Clean-slate design of **R**esilient, **A**daptive, **S**ecure **H**osts




CRASH Applies Biological Principles to Computation



Innate Immunity:


New hardware & operating system architectures that eliminate all common technical vulnerabilities



Adaptive Immunity

Middleware that:

- Diagnoses root causes of vulnerabilities and builds situational assessment
- Quickly adapts & reconfigures
- Learns from previous attacks and gets better at self-protection




Population Diversity

Computational techniques that:

- Increase entropy in time and space
- Make every system unique
- Raise work factor of attacker for each system




Innate Immunity: An Example Hardware Solution




Software and hybrid solutions are also possible (e.g. PROCEED)



Adaptive Immunity




System Model



4. System model is adapted with new attack-specific detector


3. System model is used to perform diagnosis (e.g. localization and characterization)



1. Hardware analog of innate immune system detects anomaly

2. Software system analog of adaptive immune system is signaled


5. Adaptive immune system synthesizes plan to get around problem and patch to remove specific vulnerability





Dynamic Diversity Makes a Single Host Different from Moment to Moment

Address Space Randomization



Code and/or data blocks are periodically repositioned in memory so that attacker has to work harder to find a target. Garbage-collected memory has the property inherently, new methods may optimize for increased entropy.


Instruction Set Randomization

Disk	Memory	ICache
Instruction-1	Encrypted-1	Instruction-1
Instruction-2	Encrypted-2	Instruction-2
Instruction-3	Encrypted-3	Instruction-3
Instruction-4	Encrypted-4	Instruction-4
Instruction-5	Injected-1	Encrypted-1
Instruction-6	Injected-2	Encrypted-1
	Encrypted-5	Instruction-5
	Encrypted-6	Instruction-6

Code is encrypted as it enters memory and Decrypted as it enters the instruction cache (or translation buffer). Injected code in native instruction set is then encrypted and not executable. Encryption key can be varied by process and time.


Functional Redundancy & Decision Theoretic Dispatch

There are multiple methods for achieving each goal ("n-version programming"). Each distinct method has different qualities of service. Method selection is driven both by preferences over QoS and by need for unpredictability.






Turn the Tables: Make The Attacker Do The Work




Innate Immunity

- Novel Hardware
- Separation OS's
- Information Flow
- Formal Methods



Adaptive Immunity

- Policy Weaving
- Automatic Patching
- Selective Playback
- Symbiotes



Dynamic Diversity


- Compiler generated Diversity
- Algorithmic Diversity
- Instruction Set Randomization



An opportunity...

Smartphone > PC shipments within 2 years

Implies very rapid, land grab evolution of internet access





Our goal...

...is to get CRASH & MRC technologies into *your* machines.

- If you make computers, operating systems, middleware...
- If you use these and can influence the people who make them
- If you think there's a great startup opportunity

- Then we want to talk with you about how to transition our technologies into the real world.
- Contact us at CrashInquiries@darpa.mil