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ESSENTIALS TO VICTORY.

1. An adequate Army and Navy.
2. Food, clothing, shelter for our fighting forces.
3. Proper care of the sick and wounded.
4. Horses and motors, with equipment, feed and fuel.
5. Priority use of railroads for military purposes.
6. Ships and convoys to carry Army to France.
7. The maintenance of our forces in action 3,000 miles from home.
8. Maintenance of essential industries and our civil population.
9. Material aid to the depleted resources of the Allies.
10. Unity of purpose, and proper distribution of war burdens.

Our first problem was to secure men for an Army of 1,600,000 soon to be increased to 2,400,000, and an adequate Navy. Follow a group of soldiers in their natural career, and most of the great problems of war will suggest themselves to you. there are no mysteries about them. When assembled at camp, they must be fed, properly clothed, sheltered, cared for if sick, etc. They must have cannon and means of transporting heavy ordnance. Horses and trucks require feed, fuel, etc. Each task is of great magnitude, with many complications. The Federal Congress has appropriated more than fourteen billions of dollars, to be spent in less than one year's time for meeting the expenses of all of these gigantic undertakings and has also provided a loan to the allies amounting to seven billions of dollars. The total of these amounts is more than four-fifths of the total previous appropriations of the Federal Congress for all Government expenses from the time of the organization of the Treasury Department under Alexander Hamilton down to the beginning of the present war. The following data will help to give one some vision of the war problems that we have to solve.

THE ALLIES MUST HAVE WHEAT.

Their Needs and the Supply.

France, Italy, United Kingdom, Belgium:

Average imports 3 years prior to war,	381	million	bushels
" production 3 years prior to war,	591	"	"
Total used,	972	"	"
They produced in 1917,	348	"	"
This production is short of normal needs,	624	"	"
Estimated export surplus in United States,	70	"	"
" " " " Canada,	138	"	"
Total in sight,	208	"	"
TOTAL ESTIMATED SHORTAGE	416	million	bushels

To transport wheat from Australia to Europe requires three and one-half times the bottoms it takes to bring it from the United States, or from Argentine twice as much. It will be nearly a year before our supply of ships will justify those long voyages.

The fate of Russia warns us of the dangers of insufficient food for the civil population. We must further share our supply with the allies, that no one of them may drop out of the conflict.

If the allies go down because of a lack of food, the consequences will bring the war to American shores. All that we have is in the balance, yet with the right attitude of mind and cooperation on the part of the public, the crisis may be passed in a few months, without any real privation to our home people. If we fail it will be our own fault.

SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF OUR PROBLEMS.

To maintain an army of 1,600,000 men one year, we will require of provisions.	1,704,320 tons
@ 40,000 pounds per car, this would be equal to	85,216 car-
@ 30,000 " " " " " " " "	113,621 loads
The grain and hay required for all army animals for one year amounts to	1,545,296 tons
@ 32,000 pounds per car, this would equal	96,624 cars
To move an army of 1,600,000 troops once requires a total of	124,180 cars
of various kinds or approximately	7,320 trains

Total - 3 items:

For food, 1 year,	113,621 cars	
" feed "	96,624 "	
" troops, one movement	124,180 "	334,425 cars,

or more than 10,000 trains of 30 cars each.

This is but a beginning of the story. In addition to these, consider the tonnage required -

1. For our great ship building program involving the expenditure of $2,000,000,000.
2. For ammunition and ordnance for Army and Navy.
3. Fuel for all Army and Navy purposes and for merchant ships carrying provisions for the Army and Allies.
4. Raw materials for munition factories and large warehouses here and in France.
5. Wharfs, railroads, camps, etc., in France, with timber, steel, machinery, etc., involved in subsidiary industries.
6. Expenditures of $900,000,000 for aeroplanes, and other sums for armored cars, tanks, etc., placing upon the transportation systems the greatest burden they have ever had to bear.

Last year approximately eighty percent of the freight of two great railroads leading to the eastern seaports was war freight. This year the Army will be larger, the output of war materials to be moved will be greater than last year.

The whole people must help solve the transportation and other problems, exercising due patience and giving proper consideration to their magnitude and complexity

RETAIL EQUIVALENT VALUES OF A BALE OF COTTON.

CONDITIONS BEFORE JULY, 1914, in an average year with 12¢ cotton, a $60.00 Bale is equal to:		PRESENT CONDITIONS in an exceptional year, with 30¢ cotton, a $150.00 Bale is equal to:
4 tons @ $15.00	HAY	$3\frac{3}{4}$ tons @ $40.00
80 bus. @ .75	CORN	75 bus. @ 2.00
92 " @ .65	OATS	155 " @ .97
12 bbls. @ 5.00	FLOUR	12 bbls. @ 12.50
3000 lbs. @ .02	CORN MEAL	2143 lbs. @ .07
600 " @ .10	LARD	484 " @ .31
500 " @ .12	SALT PORK	455 " @ .33
400 " @ .15	BACON	366 " @ .41
333 " @ .18	HAM	417 " @ .36
250 doz. @ .24	EGGS	333 doz. @ .45
200 lbs. @ .30	BUTTER	333 lbs. @ .45
92 bus. @ .65	SWEET POTATOES	111 bus. @ 1.35
66 " @ .90	IRISH POTATOES	75 " @ 2.00

NOTE:- Considering the great need of more food in 1918, and the real danger of lack of transportation to get food to you, in the light of the above figures, do you consider it safe to put all your land in cotton and trust to buying your food? Isn't the safe plan in 1918 to produce your own food <u>first</u> and then grow cotton as a cash crop?

HOW IN SOUTHWEST VALUES OF A BAG OF GOODS

CONSTITUENT ITEMS JULY, 1914, in an average week with 1st cost, a $60.00 bale in depot was		PRESENT CONDITIONS in an average week, 1 cent, with 40% cost, a $180.00 bale in depot was
4 pcs. @ $12.00	HAM	24 pcs. @ $40.00
40 lbs. @ .75	BEEF	75 lbs. @ .40
24 " @ .60	OATS	144 " @ .07
12 bbls. @ 6.00	FLOUR	12 bbls. @ 12.00
2000 lbs. @ .40	COARSE MEAL	2400 lbs. @ .01
600 " @ .10	LARD	480 " @ .08
600 " @ .12	SALT PEPER	480 " @ .03
400 " @ .15	BACON	300 " @ .05
400 " @ .15	HAM	400 " @ .06
250 lbs. @ .04	SUGAR	200 lbs. @ .12
200 lbs. @ .12	BUTTER	200 lbs. @ .40
36 lbs. @ .30	SWEET POTATOES	112 lbs. @ .04
4 " @ .10	IRISH POTATOES	16 " @ .04

NOTE:- Considering the great need of more food in 1917, and the great danger of lack of transportation to get food to you, in a light of the above figures, do you consider it safe to put all your in [illegible] and stock to buying your food? Isn't the safe plan in 1917 to raise your own food stuff and then grow cotton as a cash crop?

THE SOUTH MUST PRODUCE ITS OWN FOOD AND FEED.

1. That there may be no serious privation at home.

2. That we may not place an additional burden on transportation.

3. That military movements may have first consideration.

4. That the surplus grown elsewhere may be used.

   (1) To sustain necessary industrial enterprises;
   (2) To keep an army and navy in full fighting vigor;
   (3) To supplement the depleted resources of the nations associated with us in the war.

5. That we may cheerfully accede to the wishes of government authorities in important war policies, and aid in strengthening our national defense.

"The South has been almost a national asset and not a liability as to food. Another year let us have no liabilities. We must prove our worth."

"The strength of the Nation is measured by the strength of its weakest part. Let us keep the agriculture of the South strong for the sake of the strength of the Nation in this hour of its great need. Let us keep her self-sustaining and self-reliant, a national agricultural asset, able to honor drafts for food and clothing for ourselves and for the rest of the country, with a fair contribution to the larger interests of humanity itself. The call is a big one, but with the immense strides Southern farmers have made in the past ten years it is not too big a contract for them to undertake."

"For any man now to determine his business operations from the standpoint of profit alone, without regard to the nation's needs is for him wilfully to profiteer in the blood of his fellows who are fighting in France for the preservation of the republic. No man can be excused for not taking his share of the responsibility."

WHAT THE SOUTH MUST DO.

A safe farming program for the South should include:

First. A home garden for every farm family and every town and village family in the South, including potatoes and cane or sorghum for syrup, where possible, on every farm.

Second. We should sustain the production of corn in the South, for human food and feed for our live stock.

Third. We should produce the hay and forage crops necessary to amply supply the live stock on the farm for one year and an excess for the sake of safety and for city and town consumption.

Fourth. We should have an increase of peanuts, soy beans, cowpeas and velvet beans for human food as well as feed and forage.

Fifth. We ought to maintain and increase our supply of meat, eggs, and milk.

Sixth. When the living has been amply provided for and we have enough to insure food for ourselves and for our live stock, we should grow as much cotton as we can handle.

Seventh. In 1918 every farmer in the South ought to save all possible waste products on the farm: Economize on time, labor, and seed: Save in harvesting time: Use the best implements and more horse power and less hand power: Sell excess products of the farm and pay living expenses: A surplus of hogs, eggs, poultry, soy beans, peanuts, corn, or such other farm products as are adapted to his locality should be produced for sale from the farm besides the production of cotton.

Eighth. High prices of any one farm product in this plan should not tempt farmers, merchants or bankers to depart in practice or in credit influence from a safe and well balanced husbandry.

A program of safe farming may be worked out for every community along the line of these suggestions. Call on the county agent for any needed assistance or advice in agricultural practice.