

Interr. of Matsuoka, Yosuke

DOC 4191

(3)

(173)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, _____, _____
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of _____ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Clara B. Knapp hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Clara B. Knapp

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xxx~~) John D. Shea, Lt. Cmdr., USNR,

and _____,

certify that on 13th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) MATSUOKA, Yosuke, and according to _____, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

18 March 1946
Date

J. D. Shea

4191

5 March 1946

SUBJECT: Interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke, former Foreign Minister
TO : Mr. Carlisle Higgins

1. The interrogation up to the present has shown a brief background development, indicating political views strongly ultranationalistic, identification of certain books, pamphlets, speeches, etc.
2. Interrogation is also commencing upon the dealings concerning the Tri-Partite Alliance.

JOHN D. SHEA
Lt. Cmdr., USNR

Tokyo, Japan.

INFL PROG SECTION	
CENTRAL FILES	
FILE No.	118
SERIAL No.	66

MAR 8 1946

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 5 March 1946, 1430 - 1545 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Commander John D. Shea, USNR
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by: Cmdr. Shea

Q. Mr. Matsuoka, my name is John D. Shea. I am an assistant to Mr. Joseph B. Keenan, the Chief Counsel for the International Prosecution Section of General Headquarters. It is my duty to ask you some questions bearing upon your official connection with the government of Japan, some of its governmental agencies or private corporations, and certain books, pamphlets, publications, and speeches which are attributed to your utterance or publication. Are you willing to answer questions concerning such matters?

A. Yes, this I will do to the best of my ability. Although I produced many books, I don't remember all.

Q. I observe from your background history that you are a graduate lawyer from Oregon State University, Portland, Ore., U.S.A. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That was in the year 1900?

A. Yes.

Q. I also observe from your background history that you have a fluent command of the English language.

A. Well, no -- some.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, does your qualifying answer to this question indicate that you would prefer to have an interpreter used in this questioning?

A. No, I think it is better to speak in English. I meant that I don't speak the best English.

Q. If in my questioning the questions are not understood, you may feel at liberty to interrupt at any time. Is that understood?

A. Yes, thank you.

Q. Also, in view of your physical condition you may ask to be excused or rest at any time that you feel it necessary.

A. Thank you.
Briefly

Q. ~~Essentially~~, Mr. Matsuoka, and for the reason that it is not my purpose to cover your entire official career but only covering certain definite periods from 1939 specifically to the present. Just so that the record will show certain high spots of your broad and interesting career, both in the diplomatic service and in business circles, I will touch on the highlights of that period.

A. I don't recall exact years in the foreign way. Do you know what the year of Showa was 1939?

Q. The year of Showa in 1939? Mr. Matsuoka, if you will state, for the purpose of the record, the process by which you would establish that year, it will then be understood for the purpose of this questioning that your designation of that will be the correct designation.

A. Sometimes I remember, but offhand I don't remember.

Q. But if the date were connected up with some very important incident in your career, that would refresh your recollection and be sufficient to establish the proximity of the date?

A. Yes.

Q. At any time that you feel that this divergence of calendar is apt to be confusing, you may feel at liberty to so state in your answer. You returned to Japan from the United States and passed a diplomatic service examination in the Japanese diplomatic service, about the year 1904, is that correct?

A. When I was 24. I am now 66.

Q. You progressed rapidly in this branch of the Government service?

A. Yes.

Q. I also notice that you received citations of honor from the government for your services in this department. Is that correct?

A. No, I don't think I have ever received any citations.

Q. In 1913 you were with the Foreign Office in the United States. Is that correct?

A. I was transferred from St. Petersburg to Washington, D. C., the year before the first World War. Then it was 1913.

Q. Just previous to your appointment to the American Foreign Office, you had been awarded the Commemoration Medal for the annexation of Korea. On or about August 1912?

A. I don't remember that. I was decorated after the Russo-Japanese War. Is that what you mean? Just medals given away to all people? I think that sort of thing I received.

Q. In 1921 you were appointed Director of the South Manchurian Railway, Ltd. Is that correct?

A. That was when I was 41. I was made a Managing Director.

Q. Then in 1927, or six years later, approximately, you were appointed Vice President of the South Manchurian Railway. Is that correct?

A. I was appointed Managing Director at the age of 41, and I was in the service of the South Manchurian Railway five years something, and I quit and then two years afterwards I was made vice president. What year, I don't remember very well.

Q. Accordingly, in 1929 - June 21 - you were appointed Vice Governor to the company by the Imperial Ordinance #178, is that correct?

A. Please translate vice governor. We say vice president.

Q. Vice president of the railroad?

A. Yes.

Q. In 1929 you were released from this post at your request, according to the record.

A. Two years afterward. I stayed there two years.

Q. You were elected a member of Parliament in February 1930?

A. Yes, about that time.

Q. What party did you represent at the time you were elected to the Diet?

A. Seiyukai Party.

Q. What was the characteristic of this party, from a political classification? That is, generally speaking.

A. It is kind of a conservative party., and one of the two major parties - the Mainseito and Seiyukai. Mainseito was in power then.

Q. October 11, 1930 you were appointed representative of Japan to the extraordinary meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva, Switzerland?

A. I was appointed, but what year I don't remember exactly. It was Showa 7th year. The Manchurian incident took place the sixth year of Showa, and the next year I was appointed.

Q. Do you remember having with you on that trip to Geneva an American who was attached to the Foreign Office, who accompanied you by way of an assistant?

A. He was not in the service of the Japanese Government. Hearing he was to be sent by some newspapers out to the Far East, I wired to New York, if he would not accompany me out to Geneva. That was Mr. Moore, the well-known authority on the Far East. He accompanied me - just temporarily, of course.

Q. So that, if Mr. Moore subsequently wrote in a book that he had accompanied you on this mission, that would be correct?

A. Yes. I never read that.

Q. I mean if he stated that he accompanied you on this trip, that would be correct? And it was at your request that he accompanied you?

A. Yes.

Q. You held him in rather high regard, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. When you say he was an authority on matters in the Far East, you say that with a feeling of knowledge as to his qualities, in that regard?

A. Yes.

Q. You do know that Mr. Moore wrote a book which was concluded in its writing in point of time during the final days of Admiral Nagama's ambassadorship in Washington, and the final conclusion of relations with the United States?

A. I heard about it, but I was already ill in bed.

Q. You have never read this book, then?

A. No, the doctors never allowed me to read newspapers, books or listen to radio news.

Q. Do you consider Mr. Moore to be a man whose word is worthy of belief?

A. Well, I can't say -- most of his words. But I can't subscribe to all of his words.

Q. Generally speaking, you found him to be an honest man?

A. Yes.

Q. Then if there was a difference of opinion, it was an honest difference of opinion?

A. Most of it.

Q. Now, subsequently - that is, going back again to this appointment as representative of Japan extraordinary to the League of Nations in 1931 - you resigned your seat in the Diet, is that correct?

A. Yes. After coming back from Geneva.

Q. Can you state at the present time why you resigned your seat in the Diet?

A. Yes. When I ran for a seat in Parliament, I made so many speeches that the Japanese politics are corrupt and degraded, but I hated very much to go into it, but I would like to go into it and see if I could cleanse the politics, and so I became an MP, and after some years of experience I was disgusted with the political parties -- so corrupted and degraded. That is the reason I resign. I mean not to say Seiyukai only; the Mainseite and the smaller parties were as well. There was nothing but fighting and bribing and corruption. So I gave up.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, afterwards, in 1935, you were appointed President of the South Manchurian Railroad Company, Ltd.? That was after you resigned your seat in the Diet?

A. Yes. I am not exact on the dates, but somewhere around there.

Q. But you were at one time President of the South Manchurian Railroad?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the ~~xxxx~~ nature of this corporation? Was it privately owned by entirely private capital, or was the government interested - did it subsidize or organize it?

A. Roughly speaking, half the shares were owned by the government. Those shares owned by the people can be owned, I think if my memory is correct, half of it can be owned by the Chinese citizens, and in fact at the outset the Japanese Government offered the shares, but China refused it.

Q. You mean one-half of the total, or one-half of the one-half shares?

A. One half of those shared by the people

Q. So that actually one-quarter of the shares was offered?

A. Yes, that is my memory.

Q. As distinguished from a purely private business corporation, such as you may find in America and Japan, would you not say that this corporation was one over which the Government had both design and control?

A. I think the Government was influential, but the Government alone can't have their own way over it. We have a shareholders' meeting every year, and some of the shareholders give opinions, objections, etc.

Q. Can you state how much, if any, of this stock was owned by you - in the railroad?

A. That is very small. I don't think I owned any now. It was anyhow very insignificant.

Q. Approximately, at the time you became president or when you were vice president or an official, what was the largest amount of this stock that you owned privately?

A. First I owned about 100, then maybe up to 1,000 shares. The shares were cut down, you know. First it was 100 Yen, then it was cut down to 50 Yen.

Q. What was the total authorized capitalization in shares?

A. I am afraid to say from my memory. You can easily find it out.

Q. There is considerable evidence that the Manchurian Railroad Corporation, in its operations as such, was a service primarily to the military and the expansionist movement in Manchuria, of the Japanese Government, rather than a corporation whose exploitations are of a private nature. What have you to say with respect to this wealth of evidence on that matter?

A. Even in Japan I was hearing such talks very often, but they are mistaken. By hunting up the records, I think the publication about the South Manchurian Railway when BONGOTO was president, that it was founded by the government and the people's representatives, and in founding that company it was plainly written down and I believe it, that the late General Count KODAMA, the genius of the Russo-Japanese War, was very much worried about the possibility of a second Russo-Japanese War, and how to prevent it, and he decided that by founding this company and diverting Manchurian economy peacefully, he can to a certain extent prevent, at least postpone the coming of a second Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria, and all in this way, that suppose the Government subsidized to the extent of 50,000,000 Yen a year and developed Manchurian economy -- if they think that postponed the Russo-Japanese War, a second one, say ten years, why that would be a very cheap enterprise. Suppose it prevented it say twenty years, it would be very cheap. He said that in the second Russo-Japanese War, Japan might be compelled to spend about two billion yen.

is

Q. In other words, your explanation/that the government's interest in the Manchurian Railway was to develop Manchuria in such a manner as to prevent a second Russo-Japanese War — is that ~~ix~~ correct?

A. Yes, that was the idea of General KODAMA.

Q. Did you determine this by talking with General Kodama, or is it from some writings of his?

A. Yes, some writings.

Q. Now, I am going to call your attention to a book written by yourself, entitled "Speaking About the Manchurian Railroad", and reading in part from this book: It contained essays by you on historical, industrial and diplomatic political developments in Manchuria, with particular emphasis on the role of the Manchurian Railroad. In reference to the Washington conference, you wrote, "We must never forget this gloomy conference which was held on the one hand for the fulfillment of the ~~my~~ hopes of the United States in Manchuria, and China, and on the other hand for the eradicating or diminishing Japanese international position and her special interests there. It is for the preparation of a bold step that I look back into the past and that I talk about the great men in the past." The Manchurian Incident and the Manchurian Railroad is entitled "Collaboration of the Army and the Manchurian Railroad." After asking "Did the Manchurian Railroad give its fullest cooperation to the Army at the time of the Manchurian incident?" you answer the question in the affirmative and add "At the same time it took part in the sacred task of establishing Manchukuo." This appears on page 269 of the book. Further quoting, "The Manchurian incident was indeed an expansion of the sphere of the establishment of our empire by Emperor JIRO(?) onto the Continent," from page 292. Do you recall the substance of such a statement in your essays, and if you do, will you explain now what is meant by this "establishment of our Empire by Emperor JIMU(?) onto the continent"?

A. I do not exactly recall every word, but my idea has been always to work out under the Emperor's idea — the old idea of Japan, for extending our influence so that the people always have their own place and work out their own destiny.

Q. From an ordinary interpretation of what I have just quoted from your book, would it not be fair to assume that the development of the Manchurian Railroad under this Government supervised corporation, of which you were president and vice president, was an instrumental agency in developing the occupation of Manchuria for the Japanese Army?

A. No. As I have often said elsewhere, it was instrumental in diverting and bringing benefit to all the races living there, and somewhere I cried for five races — Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian and Manchu.

Q. Well, you know as a matter of fact that Manchukuo was a puppet government, established by the armed forces of Japan. Isn't that true?

A. No, I don't think so. It belonged to the Manchu Dynasty, and not to China. Even a puppet needs a pedestal to rest on. Japanese power alone can't create that country.

Q. When you made this statement here, in the last question, concerning this book about Manchukuo, this is quoted from page 269 of the book - "AT the same time it took part in the sacred task of establishing Manchukuo." And this, according to the book, was speaking of the Manchurian Railroad. Now, Mr. Matsuko, what did you mean by that statement?

A. I believed it so, and very often in my public speeches I said that my idea in Manchuria is to raise a temple of oriental civilization, including all the oriental races there.

Q. Now, certain documentary evidence indicates that you resigned from the House of Representatives in the ~~Seiyukai~~ Seiyukai party, advocating that political parties be abolished. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. That you organized the SAITO KAISHO REME, which is for the dissolution of political parties?

A. The League for the Dissolution of political parties then existing.

Q. And to bring about the revolution, and return all power to the throne? Was that your theory?

A. That needs qualification. I got so disgusted, as I told you, with the corrupt and degraded party -- particularly the two major parties. To make you understand, I must tell you -- the honest man couldn't do business in Japan without bribing one party or another, or both at the same time. This country came to that. Mine was not the political movement; it was a spiritual and educational movement.

Q. May I interrupt at this point. Your early history shows that you came to America as a very poor boy.

A. Yes.

Q. That you struggled for your own education?

A. Yes.

Q. That you returned to Japan and by competitive examination made a career in the Foreign service or ~~the~~ diplomatic service of your nation. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

- Q. Now, your ability to do that and your opportunity to accomplish this was by virtue of the government then existing in Japan, is that correct?
- A. You can't say by virtue of the government. I struggled myself.
- Q. In other words, you were a self-made man from boyhood? Your ability had been recognized?
- A. Maybe.
- Q. In any event, the things I have outlined are true? You did succeed in this field?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, did you find it necessary to bribe officials in your career of success in the government?
- A. No.
- Q. Then why have you here so broadly denounced the people and the processes of such a government?
- A. I didn't denounce the government. The political parties.
- Q. I said the people and processes of such a government.
- A. The government officials are not so corrupt. It is the parties themselves. I was disgusted and so I cried for spiritual and educational cleanup, and people joined me in the movement and said it was not a political movement.
- Q. It was your purpose, however, to eliminate democratic processes, and put the government entirely under the authority of the throne. Isn't that correct?
- A. ~~Yes~~ No. I said like one house — that means according to tradition, old Japanese idea — you are all members of one house, and in my writings (you can get hold of them) — you may differ, you may talk in Parliament, but please stop for a while to go all over the country and fight bribery, etc.; that Japan is going to face a very critical world, and we should unite together. That is my idea.
- Q. But under your plan there was to be no independent action of political parties, as such?
- A. No. When they contended for one political party, I said no; there can be no one political party. We may differ in dozens of opinions. That is all right, but let us unite and fight it out in Parliament. You know, even very few Japanese could understand my idea, so I gave up.

Q. Now, I will ask you if you recall a book the title of which was "Yosuke Matsuoka, the Giant" written as a tribute to you, which contains quotations from statements by you. Among them are, on page 115, hailing the Manchurian Incident, the cessation from the League of Nations, the March 15 Incident, and the Blood Brotherhood System as steps on the way to the Japanese revolution of self-examination by which Japan has become independent, ideologically speaking. Do you remember making a statement of that sort?

A. I think something like that.

Q. Here is another, from one of your speeches: "Facing the great reorganization of the world, I have been foretelling of the outbreak of World War Two for several years." Now, this statement was made at a meeting of the Pacific Society in May 1941. Continuing the quotation, "Japan has not joined the war but it is inevitable that she will be involved in it indirectly, if not directly."

A. In what war?

Q. In the second World War. This was the speech made before the Pacific Society in May 1941. The "second European war and its changing aspects -- America's relations with the other countries. Japan-American relations in particular, and the future situation in the South Seas, and the Pacific Area, are the important points to be considered when we talk of the disposition of the China Incident. Is it not an historic development that these two powers should come into commission some day?" "The writer calls the military alliance the Tri-Partite Pact. This was an apparent justification on your part for the efforts which you made in obtaining the formation of the Tri-Party alliance, in this speech in May 1941 before this Pacific Society. Do you recall?

A. I don't recall exactly, but I often said something like my treating all this -- all classes of the two rising powers, America and Japan. That was in fact my telling ever since my youthhood. I was determined from my youthhood to prevent ~~the~~ it, if it was humanly possible, and the Tri-Partite Pact, that was justification -- that is so simple.

Q. In further reading from some of your addresses, particularly a statement which you made to the German press, 4 March 1933, in which you say "Germany is the one and only country the history of which shows many parallels with that of Japan, and which also fights for recognition of its place in the eyes of the world."

A. I don't recall that.

Q. If you did say that, is it true, is that your feeling on the subject, or was it at that time?

A. I don't quite make out the sense.

Q. Here is a rereading of your ~~xx~~ statement: Now, you say you don't recall having made that statement?

A. No.

Q. Well, did you in 1933 think this to be true of Germany? Would you now make that statement?

A. No.

Q. So that, if any documents were produced which quoted you as having said that as far back as March 1933, you would say that they were mistaken?

A. Yes.

Q. In another collection of addresses made by you while you were Foreign Minister in 1941, there appears the following quotations in a booklet of 37 addresses delivered by you between July 1940 and May 1941, and among which are the following: "Diplomacy of the Imperial Way" August 1 1940 — you announced that doctrine while you were then Foreign Minister. Do you recall having enunciated such a policy in August 1940?

A. No, I don't recollect the date, but I often said the "diplomacy of the Imperial way."

Q. And further quoting from the same document, "I have been insisting for many years that it is the mission of our empire to proclaim the imperial way to the world."

A. I don't recall it, but I said so many times the same thing, and in that connection let me say just a word — I was struggling to found a moral state in Japan. The imperial way must be moral.

Q. Further quoting, "At present the diplomatic policy of our nation must, first of all, be the establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, encompassing Japan, Manchuria and China, in accordance with the great spirit of the imperial way." Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I think so. That is to realize the old ideal tradition of Japan — HAKKO ICHIU. That means let the people in their sphere have each its own way, and let them work out their own destiny.

Q. This statement in August 1940 was made approximately one month before the conclusion of the Tri-Partite arrangement and alliance pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, during which time you were the Foreign Minister. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So that you were also speaking at that time as an official member of the Japanese government?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, at the same time were there not other members of your government who were making an effort to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Chinese situation between Japan and the United States?

A. I don't know. I was always for it, and after I became Foreign Minister I tried to reach Generalissimo CHANG-KAI-SHEK with an aim to bring about peace.

Q. The United States had continually ~~is~~ opposed the expansion of Japan in Manchuria and China in its official representations to the Japanese government. Isn't that correct? That you know of?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know that the United States, early in the Manchurian Incident, requested action on the part of the then League of Nations, concerning the Manchurian Incident? Do you not know that the United States made continuous representations that this expansion was in violation of a treaty -- the so-called Nine Power Treaty -- to which Japan was a party?

A. I saw in the paper, but I don't know.

Q. Did you ever ~~mention~~ ^{condemn}, in public address or speech, ~~and~~ that the treaties existing between the United States, Great Britain and Japan, particularly the Nine Power Treaty or those treaties which bore directly upon the Japanese expansion in Manchuria and China?

A. No.

Q. Reading from the same pamphlet one of the speeches -- a speech entitled "Establishment of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" held on 10 August 1940, Matsuoka refers to the announcement of the "elimination of our fundamental foreign policy" and the above speech as clarifying the basis for Japanese foreign policy, page 6, contains the following phrase: "In establishing the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, we cooperate with nations having the same beliefs as we. Above that, we must create more countries of that type, and must eliminate all obstacles with firmness." Do you remember that?

A. Yes, I think I often said that.

Q. In a speech delivered 22 August 1940, entitled "The Original Mission of the YEMUTO(?) race" -- these speeches were made less than a month before the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance. I quote: "The emphasis is on the establishment of the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere, with Japan, Manchuria and China, as a basis, and adding to them the South Pacific region. I am convinced that this is the mission assigned to the Japanese people." That was 22 August 1940, page 9 of this document. Did you make that statement?

A. Without my book, I wouldn't recall the wording, but I think I must have said something like that.

Q. This seems to be the first evidence that you have included -- mind you, you are speaking as Foreign Minister, now -- this is the first evidence that you have publicly included, "...and adding to them the South Pacific region, I am convinced that this is the mission assigned to the Japanese people."

A. I think I said that.

Q. What did you mean at that time by the statement, "and adding to them the South Pacific region?"

A. Just generally, the southwest part of the Pacific.

Q. Would that include the Dutch Indies? And the Phillipines?

A. The Dutch Indies, not the Philippines. Burma to the east, and New Caledonia to the north.

Q. Will you please describe that again? What do you mean by the term "adding to them the South Pacific regions."?

A. Of course, the British colonies are excepted. Burma is excepted. To the east of Burma and to the north of New Caledonia. No British or American possessions are included. In a word, the uplifting of different people in that sphere.

Q. Accordingly, on 15 September 1940 you delivered a speech entitled "Looking Back at the Establishment of Manchuria," the day of 24 February 1933 marking "de facto ~~at~~ break of Japan with the League of Nations, will fight brilliantly and for a long time in the history of the world, and on that day Imperial Japan challenged bravely the hypocrisy which is characteristic of the present civilization. This is the day on which Japan set the world on the road to real peace without hypocrisy. Also, the day Japan dealt a blow to the hypocritical organization, and maintained the status quo." This was supposed to be made 15 September 1940.

A. I don't recall the date, but I think I said something like that.

Q. Having in mind that the Tri-Partite alliance was concluded on Hitler's birthday, 27 September 1940, and the relative closeness of this date, 15 September, would you recall that this statement might have been made in justification and in realization of the accomplishment of the Tri-Partite alliance?

A. No, it had nothing to do with it.

Q. Now, on 27 September 1940, you delivered a speech about the Tri-Partite pact. You advocated the alliance with Germany and Italy as "having the same policy and mental attitude of cooperation with countries which can work with us all over the world in the establishment of a new world order, as the final objective of the YEMUTO(?) race. I attribute the alliance as a tribute to the illustrious virtues of the Emperor."

A. Yes.

Q. The Tri-Partite alliance was concluded by Imperial rescript also, wasn't it?

A. Yes. Not concluded, but the edict came out when it was decided to conclude it.

Q. You personally appeared before the Emperor and argued in favor of this alliance?

A. I explained.

Q. Did you say that you were opposed or in favor of it?

A. In favor of it. In the preamble of the Tri-Party Pact, the old Japanese tradition idea was included. The universal concordia or universal peace.

Q. But the theory was the Emperor of Japan would be the guiding influence?

A. No, not necessarily. Let each nation have its own place and right to work out its own destiny. That means universal concordia.

Q. In other words, to you HAKKO ICHIU means universal concordia?

A. Yes. If Germany didn't agree with that, of course we wouldn't have concluded the treaty.

Q. This is a Japanese ~~istatary~~ ideology, isn't it?

A. Our old traditional idea. But that doesn't put Japan above the others. It is universal peace for each member. Each independent power.

Q. Further quoting from this speech, "In this time there is only one way our nation can take in how affairs, which means the establishment of a new social order, perfecting the defense status of the country, creating one spiritual unity out of one hundred million people." Do you recall that statement?

A. Not exactly, but that is my idea.

Q. Wasn't Hitler also announcing to the world a new social order?

A. Yes, and according to the Tri-Partite Pact, Germany was to establish a new order in Europe.

Q. On October 7 1940, which is after the conclusion of this alliance, in speaking to an audience, the following is reputed to have been said by you: "The Manchurian incident was an exaltation of national spirit. Also, in a way it was an explosion caused by the operation of the peaceful developments of Japan by the Anglo-European powers." This statement appears on page 32 and was made October 7 1940 to an audience, in which you asked them to devote

themselves to the Emperor. Further, "The fundamental cause of the China incident was really ideological." Do you recall making that statement?

A. I can't make out.

Q. I will reread the excerpts. . . . You had just concluded, a few days earlier, this Tri-Party alliance.

A. I can't make out the sense of the last part.

Q. "In the announcement of our national diplomatic policy, the fact that Japan is a divine country must be considered." This was made by you, and is quoted on page 43 of the same document.

A. I don't recall.

Q. How do you feel about that statement now?

A. I don't recall ever calling Japan in a particular sense, a divine country.

Q. Would you say that the translation of the word "divine" may be incorrect?

A. It may be.

Q. What is the expression in Japanese for the term "divine country"?

A. (Expression given in Japanese.) We have a belief in Japanese, "God's country never perishes." We have had that belief for a thousand years.

Q. In these documents, you were the Foreign Minister, and you made a speech to an audience, and made these statements. We assume that whoever makes a statement means what the statement says, or something closely to it.

A. Naturally.

Ex

(NOTE: Mr. Matsuo's health is not too good, and it was necessary to discontinue questioning at 1550.)

4191

INTERROGATION OF
MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 6 March 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by: Cmdr. Shea.

MATSUOKA: All my answers to your questions are subject to comparison with the original in Japanese, later on.

CMDR. SHEA: If they are used in the trial as exhibits or evidence, they will be translated publicly before your counsellors and your interpreters, and you will have a copy of it. Our rules of evidence will be followed.

MATSUOKA: It may be that my counsel will have something to say; he will scrutinize it. May I add some remarks about Manchuria, of which I spoke yesterday: It is according to my study of Manchurian history - Manchuria never became part of China. It is what we call "crown land." It is joined to China by the crown of the Manchu Dynasty, and the Manchu Dynasty always owned Manchuria, and always prevented the Chinese from emigrating to Manchuria. They were only permitted in certain numbers to emigrate.

Q. But they were characteristically a Chinese people, though, weren't they? The Manchurian Dynasty ruled all China at one time.

A. Yes, at one time.

Q. You wouldn't claim that the original Manchu Dynasty and the people of Manchuria are originally people of Japan, would you?

A. No. I don't mean that. I mean that Manchuria has always been owned by the Manchu Dynasty. I regard always Manchuria as a separate part. Another point is, my Chinese friend of my age, when they were in school in China, the Chinese map never included Manchuria as China proper. That is my historical remark.

Q. Now, in July of 1940, which would be Showa 15, you became Foreign Minister in the second Konoye Cabinet, is that correct?

A. Yes.

118-73

MAR 8 1946

- Q. With you in that cabinet, as Minister of War, was General Tojo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you, shortly after entering upon the duties of this office, have a conversation with the then German Ambassador to Japan, whose name was OTT, in which you then invited or welcomed closer cooperation with Germany?
- A. Wasn't it General Ott?
- Q. Yes, he was ambassador.
- A. He called on me at my private house. The Foreign Minister always, when he takes up his office, sees all the ambassadors and ministers.
- Q. That I understand, but did you tell Ambassador Ott at that time that you would welcome closer collaboration with Germany for your government? Did you tell him that?
- A. Well, not exactly closer cooperation or collaboration. I said the same thing to Mr. Grew and others.
- Q. In other words, what you want me to understand now is that what you said was a mere general term of cooperation with nations. You said the same thing to Mr. Grew? You did not especially make a statement to Ott that your government was now ready to enter into closer collaboration with the German government?
- A. No.
- Q. If General Ott should testify or say that you made such a representation, would he be mistaken or telling an untruth?
- A. He is not a man to tell an untruth. Perhaps he interpreted my words in his own way.
- Q. Did you ever hear of the name of a Mr. KNOLL, who was attached to the German Foreign Office? Does that name mean anything to you?
- A. No, I never knew that name.
- Q. Did you inform the then Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, Mr. KURUSU, about this conversation with General Ott, the ambassador?
- A. No, I did not.
- Q. Shortly after this alleged conversation, did a special emissary of the Hitler government, one Mr. Stahmer, arrive in Tokyo and call upon you?
- A. That is a long time afterwards. I think he called on me the early part of September. I am not exact about the date, but it was the early part.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, the record appears to indicate this, and I will outline it and see if it refreshes your recollection any -- That when this representation which I have outlined which was made to General Ott, was conveyed to Germany, the successes of the German Army at that time had been so remarkable that there was an attitude in certain quarters that they did not need or desire any collaboration or cooperation with Japan. Did you get that implication or inference from any of your official or non-official association with the German government, and the German attitude?

A. No. I see now what you are referring to. As soon as I took up my post, sometime afterward, I think I told General Ott and also wired out to Kurusu, our ambassador at Berlin, all sorts of questions about Germany, and I was informed that Von Ribbentrop and others at Berlin could not quite understand my question, and Stahmer later came out to Tokyo. As to your question, I say no.

Q. What was the nature of the questions you sent to Berlin?

A. I put about the same questions that I put later to Mr. Stahmer -- what Germany thinks of America, what the German attitude would be after the war, and questions about Soviet Russia, etc.

Q. Well, what was the principal purpose of the question? What were you seeking to determine?

A. I wanted to know what Germany was then thinking about America, and her relations with America. Then I would determine the course of Japanese actions accordingly.

Q. And that was also true of the Russian situation?

A. Yes.

Q. When Stahmer arrived here, early in September, he called on you?

A. Yes.

Q. There was already a German Ambassador here? General Ott?

A. Stahmer was only Minister Plenipotentiary, without any post.

Q. Did he explain what his mission was?

A. General Ott accompanied him to my residence. I do not exactly recall how he said it, but he came to see the general conditions in Japan, and whether it was possible to conclude a treaty, and I told them to sit down, and I started my questions.

Q. What sort of a treaty did Stahmer want to conclude?

- A. I think he wasn't very definite about it. Some close relation with Japan.
- Q. Was OSHIMA at the time the Japanese Foreign Minister in Berlin?
- A. No.
- Q. Did he, shortly after the arrival of Stahmer here, leave Japan to become again a Foreign Minister or Ambassador of Japan?
- A. Some time afterward he was appointed Ambassador to Berlin.
- Q. Some time after this conversation?
- A. Yes. After the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact.
- Q. ~~Shortly~~ After that, he was named ambassador to Berlin?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who was the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin at the time of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?
- A. Mr. Kurusu.
- Q. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Oshima worked diligently to conclude the Tri-Partite Pact or alliance, even before this time we are speaking of now?
- A. I heard about it, but not in my time. He was not consulted at all by me.
- Q. Will you tell us more in detail what this first conversation was, that you had with Stahmer?
- A. I will tell you, -- of course we spoke for an hour or two, and I don't recall now the details.
- Q. You were anxious to make such an alliance, weren't you?
- A. No, not particularly. That depended on the German answers. First, I asked Mr. Stahmer what was Germany thinking about America, and her relations with America. Now, I said that Germany was anxious to avoid any clash with America. I said now wait, from whom may I consider those words come from? Stahmer, without hesitation, replied that we might consider these words coming directly from Von Ribbentrop, the Foreign Minister of Germany. Whereupon I proceeded to question him. The second question was what Germany was thinking of her relations with America after the war. He replied that Germany wished to be on friendly terms with America and it was silly -- I think he said that it was silly -- to think Germany would attack America, that Germany needs after the war the improvement of relations between Germany and America, and peaceful pursuit. I said all right, and then I said this -- that Japan

was anxious to improve and readjust the relations between Soviet/ Russia and Japan, and to get a neutrality treaty or non-aggression treaty. There were two treaties proposed for Japan and Soviet Russia. A non-aggression treaty, and a new draft. They were already at the time taking up the matter. I was anxious to conclude one or the other. That is, in a word Japan desires to have a good close relations with Soviet Russia. Now, would it be possible for Germany to use her good offices between Soviet Russia and Japan and help Japan to do so -- to accomplish the end -- and Stahmer said yes. And some sundry things. And in the course of conversation, Stahmer expressed that Germany would also like Japan to end the Chinese thing now. I said Japan is very anxious to end the Chinese thing. And so, that is about the main points. I reported to Premier Konoye and the War Minister and Navy Minister, and after that they told me to proceed with the conversation along that line.

Q. The Tri-Party Alliance, or pact, was actually concluded 27 September of that same year, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. Wasn't that a little rapid conclusion of such a vital treaty? Having only met Stahmer early in September, and to conclude this pact on the 27th?

A. I don't think so. The so-called alliance treaty was under way in the first Konoye Cabinet, and then under the Hiramama Cabinet they deliberated twenty-four times, people say, and broke off.

Q. What brought about the fall of the first Konoye Cabinet, if you recall? Putting the question in another way -- at the time the first Konoye Cabinet fell, wasn't there negotiation under way by the Japanese Foreign Office and the Berlin Foreign Office to conclude this same pact that we are mentioning now, that was concluded in September 1940?

A. Not the same pact, no. Could I say that it was actually under negotiations? It may be, but I don't know the inside. It may be the proposal was made from Germany, and the first Konoye Cabinet doesn't do very much and fell. Why the Konoye cabinet fell, I don't know.

Q. Can you say what were the principal considerations for this Tri-Party alliance? Why did you enter into this pact?

A. That is very clear in my mind. For many reasons. First, I never disclosed to anyone lest it might leak out and give hint to Germany. I was so dreading from my youthhood that first was to prevent by all means Germany from directing American students of German origin from carrying out anti-Japanese propaganda in America. From my study of your country, I was always afraid that there were among some American students of German origin that had some societies all over the country -- amateur photograph societies, or art

societies, or literature societies, etc., but they are all united, and Americans of these German origins could be used by an order from Germany, and I was afraid of this. So one day when it suits Germany, this American students of German origin might carry out propoganda aiming at an American-Japanese war, and if it was started, I came to the conclusion that we had no means to prevent it. We would be powerless. This had been hanging like a nightmare all through my young days in your country, and in every consideration of relations between America and Japan I never lost sight of this possibility. Now, by coming to closer relations with Hitler, I might prevent that. That is the first consideration. I was so afraid of it that I never disclosed it. Second, I wanted to limit the sphere of the European war, and to prevent its spreading to East Asia. That is second. And third, by coming into closer relations, I might gradually influence Germany to end the war, in cooperation both with America, and America influencing Great Britain. And fourth, that my final aim was from the start to approach America, but in order to do so you have to have some strong stand and approach your country with dignity and some strength. And then some other sundry considerations.

Q. May I interrupt at this point. On 27 September 1940, the day upon which the Tri-Partite Pact had been concluded, did you make a speech in which you said the following, concerning the Tri-Partite Pact: "Having the same policy and mental attitude, cooperation with countries which can work with us all over the world in the establishment of the new world order, is the final objective of the Yamada race."? And you attributed the "alliance to the illustrious virtues of the Emperor."?

A. While I do not recollect the words, it is likely that I made such a statement. It is like I said yesterday in the preamble of that pact, the Haido Ichiu was the reason.

Q. Now then, on August 22 1940, previous to the conclusion of this alliance, in a speech you said -- the title of the speech was "The original mission of the Yamada race" -- you said: "The emphasis is on the establishment of a Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere, with Japan, Manchuria and China as a basis, and adding to them the South Pacific region. I am convinced that this is the mission assigned to the Japanese people." This is quoted from page 9 of the booklet of speeches which you are said to have made. This speech you made 22 August 1940.

A. I do not recollect the words. It is likely. That is my idea.

Q. Now, if that is your idea, when you concluded this Tri-Party alliance it was in furtherance of this idea that you did this, isn't that true?

A. Yes. My I continue my part? I believe that the alliance treaty under consideration was, I think, a military alliance. That I was even then against. I was a counsellor of the state, and I said more than twice in the counsellors' meeting before Hiranuma, that the fate of Japan -- or Russia, or Germany -- cannot be delegated to another man or another power, that it must be decided

by Japan, and I was against any such thing in the treaty. So I decided to conclude a Three-Party Pact because it was put on a peaceful footing. It is an anti-war pact.

Q. It was within this period of time that you first announced this Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, with Manchuria and China, and "adding to them the South Pacific regions" -- in August of 1940? August 22 is when you announced this policy, when you were Foreign Minister?

A. That was not talked about in Japan.

Q. You were at this time the Foreign Minister, and you made this statement: "The emphasis is on the establishment of a Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere, with Japan, Manchuria and China as a basis, and adding to them the South Pacific region. I am convinced that this is the mission assigned to the Japanese people." You were Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, and it was approximately one month later that you directed or concluded the Tri-Party alliance?

A. Yes, but I must tell you that past the middle of September I was one day almost on the point of breaking off. I had conversations with General Ott and Mr. Stahmer several times, and I was on the point of breaking it off.

Q. What was the understanding with respect to Germany, concerning this Tri-Party alliance? What was her purpose? Did they explain to you why they were now anxious to conclude this pact with Japan?

A. No, they don't say exactly. They said they wanted to come into closer relations with Japan.

Q. And as foreign minister, didn't you inquire into the reason for that sudden desire on the part of Hitler's government?

A. No. I put those questions, and I was satisfied with the answers, and satisfied that this pact would prevent war from spreading.

Q. Now, you visited Berlin, didn't you, and talked with Ribbentrop and Hitler, didn't you? Was that after the conclusion of the pact?

A. Yes, it came about this way -- on the day we concluded that pact, I spoke over the telephone with Von Ribbentrop and with Count Ciano. They both invited me to visit them, and I said if the conditions were right, I may do so. So, later on I went out to visit Europe. But that again -- in proper place I will explain.

Q. Before you departed on this trip to call on Hitler and Ribbentrop, did you inquire or have someone from your office inquire from the German Embassy, whether or not it would be proper for you to go first to Moscow and call upon

Stalin before you went to Berlin?

A. No.

Q. Did you go first to Berlin, or first to Moscow?

A. I passed through Moscow, and so I stopped one day and paid my respects to Mr. Stalin, and then went to Berlin.

Q. In Berlin did you have conversations with Oshima?

A. Some casual conversations, but not on business.

Q. Do you recall, when you left Berlin to go to Moscow on the return home, that Oshima accompanied you on the train for some distance on your trip to Moscow?

A. Yes, as far as the German boundary, I think.

Q. Did Oshima try to dissuade you from entering into any non-aggression pact or agreement with Stalin or the Russian government?

A. Well, he said something about it, but I didn't pay attention.

Q. Now, you were the Foreign Minister, and he was your representative in the German government, and you were then on your way to conclude a non-aggression pact with the government of Russia, and so if your representative had talked to you and urged you not to do this, you would remember, wouldn't you?

A. Not very clearly, because sometimes I don't say anything to my ambassadors. Of course, before I left Berlin I talked with Von Ribbentrop about it.

Q. Isn't it true that the fact that Germany was about to attack Russia was withheld from you by certain officials of the German government while you were there?

A. No.

Q. While you were on this trip, did you go to a certain government official of the German government and ask him whether Germany was then intending to attack Russia, or go to war against Russia?

A. No.

Q. Are you positive that you didn't have any information, when you left Berlin, that Germany was preparing an attack on Russia?

A. No. Von Ribbentrop told me, and from the conversation I had with him, I thought the relations between Germany and Soviet Russia were becoming dangerous,

which surprised me. I thought Germany was on the best friendly terms with Soviet Russia, so she could help Japan adjust her relations with Soviet Russia. From the very first, I was asking Von Ribbentrop to use his good offices, and he tried. Naturally, when I got to Berlin, I asked Von Ribbentrop what had become of Germany's good offices. Then I learned the relations were becoming very dangerous. That very information made me redouble my efforts to conclude a non-aggression treaty or a neutrality treaty at Moscow.

Q. You were convinced, then, when you left Berlin on your trip to Moscow, when Oshima accompanied you on the train part way, that there was then existing in Germany sufficient evidence to lead you to believe that the relations between Germany and Russia were not on friendly terms?

A. Yes. But until the very last minute, I looked upon the problem as more or less Germany's bluff, and that she was not in reality going to war.

Q. Did you have a person in your office, or particularly the Vice Foreign Minister, whose name was CHASHI?

A. Yes.

Q. If Chashi should state that he called on the German Ambassador before your trip to determine whether or not the German government would be dissatisfied if you stopped first in Moscow, would he be mistaken, or telling an untruth?

A. I don't know.

Q. You didn't instruct him to do this?

A. No. May I put in a few words to clarify this? Although it is true when I said at the time that I should like to know the leaders of the German and Italian governments and also the conditions of the countries concerned, as Foreign Minister — while it is true, yet I would not have gone out to Europe if those objects were all I had. They were used as a kind of camouflage to cover my intention of concluding a non-aggression or neutrality treaty, if I could.

Q. With whom?

A. With Soviet Russia. That was my intention from the start, but I wanted to avoid the attention of the world to it. So I used Berlin and Rome as a kind of a camouflage, and so of course when I was going out I had to pay my respects to Mr. Stalin, so I paid, but I said nothing. When I was coming back, I think it was the night before I left Berlin, in a conversation with Von Ribbentrop, I said Japan was negotiating for a non-aggression treaty or neutrality treaty, and also we asked Von Ribbentrop to use his good offices and in a matter of course when I was on the way back to Tokyo, it was only a matter of course that he should take up that question. It was taken up all

through by the Japanese government with Soviet Russia, and then Von Ribbentrop said well you might better not so; it is impossible to get it, the situation is such. He said it would be very difficult. Suppose I had a chance to concede it, and I might pick it up, and he said of course in such a case.

Q. It was agreeable to him?

A. Agreeable or not I don't know, but this is my supposition. I think von Ribbentrop imagined that I would never be able to get it, so he said of course. And then I left Berlin and Mr. Stahmer, who was then ~~in~~ in Berlin, accompanied me as far as the boundary. I told Mr. Stahmer that when I went to leave Berlin, tell von Ribbentrop that I might postpone my departure by one train, and go to Leningrad where I was in my younger days, and I would try anyhow negotiations. And we parted and I said the same thing, not in so much detail, to the American ambassador. He called on me at the Embassy -- Mr. Steinhart. I said I will try to get this neutrality pact or non-aggression treaty. He also told me you can't do anything at present with Soviet Russia, it is very difficult. I said I think so too but if I succeed, America ought to welcome it as one more link for peace.

Q. Did Hitler or Ribbentrop, in their conversations with you, tell you that they were about to make an attack upon Russia?

A. No.

Q. If you received any information, you received it from other sources?

A. But from no sources, I never received any.

Q. Did Mr. Oshima tell you he had information from the Military High Command in Germany that they were about to make an attack on Russia?

A. No.

Q. Did you inform Ribbentrop and Hitler that you were intending, if possible, to make a non-aggression pact with Russia?

A. I told Von Ribbentrop. Not to Hitler. And did I not tell you that from the very start I asked von Ribbentrop to use his good offices to bring it about? He approached Mr. Molotov when he was in Berlin, for the purpose. I will add this -- that when I went out to Berlin, I still thought that Germany was able to employ good offices in this matter, and I was entirely disappointed.

Q. What was the advice of your American ambassador as to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, bearing on the Japanese relations with the U. S.?

A. He knew I was anxious to improve and maintain peace between the two countries, and that was two or three days before I left Moscow I asked him to wire out my words to the President and Mr. Hull.

Q. Did you inform the German Embassy at Tokyo, after you returned from this trip, that there were negotiations going on with Ambassador Grew concerning the settlement of the China conflict?

A. No.

Q. Did you emphasize that this course was in accordance with the three-power pact which aimed to keep America out of the war?

A. I never talked about it. And there was not negotiations with Mr. Grew.

Q. Was there any evidence after your return that Hitler and Ribbentrop had now distrusted you because of your non-aggression pact having been concluded with the Russians?

A. No.

Q. On June 22 of 1941, the German-Russian war commenced. Is that right?

A. Was it the 22nd? I don't remember the exact date, but about that time.

Q. On June 26 or thereabouts did you receive any representations from the German government, urging your government and your nation to declare war upon Russia?

A. No. I recall clearly that no such request was made.

Q. Did any representative of the German government urge you or your government to declare war upon Russia?

A. No.

Q. Did you have any conversation with any representative of the German government or any communications with them, which would indicate that the German government desired your government or yourself to go to war against Russia?

A. No.

Q. How long did you remain Foreign Minister after the declaration of war by Germany upon Russia?

A. The second Konoye cabinet fell on the 17th, was it? Until that date.

Q. The 17th of what?

A. 17th of July. 16th or 17th. I was then already ill, you know. I didn't go to the government office.

Q. Did you notify the German government that your government did not contemplate an attack on Soviet Russia?

A. Yes. I handed a memorandum, the same memorandum to the Russian ambassador and German and Italian, on the same date. That was in the early part of July.

Q. Now, at this time, were there negotiations going on between Japan and the U. S. concerning a basis for settlement of the Far Eastern situation?

A. Yes.

Q. When you returned from Moscow, these negotiations had reached a stage where they were brought to your attention and discussion by high members of the Japanese government, isn't that correct?

A. The draft of negotiations were wired out from Washington, by Ambassador Nomura.

Q. That had already reached a stage where a very definite plan or proposal had been made. Isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make a statement concerning the American proposal to this effect -- The American proposal has probably come as a result of what I said in Moscow to Mr. Steinhart, the American ambassador?

A. Yes. There I think better I put in a few words. You know, when I talked with Mr. Steinhart at Moscow, I expected some response. Steinhart also told me so. So I misconceived, and after returning to Tokyo if an opportune moment came, I had a mind to fly myself to Washington and thrash out the questions with the President and Mr. Hull, and reach a second understanding in the Pacific, and also about China proper. Without the influence or aid of your country, I could not very well withdraw Japanese from China, but my main intention was to withdraw these forces. But all of a sudden I knew that the idea of negotiations was not in response to my offer, but was going on without my knowledge.

Q. When you returned to Japan, were you met at the airfield by Prince Konoye?

A. Yes.

Q. In the automobile on the return to Tokyo, did you learn from Mr. Ohashi concerning the then serious discussions with the U. S. that were in progress?

A. Yes, and he gave me a general outline of the draft from Washington.

Q. Did you attend a liaison conference the very night upon which you returned to Tokyo?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you on that occasion explain at great length what you had said and done in Europe?

A. Yes. I reported ~~that~~ about my visit.

Q. When the question of the American proposal came up, did you then lay emphasis on the question of keeping faith with Germany?

A. No. I said something like this -- that it is a grave matter, and I must have time, I must be allowed time to study it.

Q. Did you make a statement something similar to this -- did you recall to the members present that America had entered the first World War after concluding the Lansing Agreement to safeguard her interests in the Pacific, though after the war she scrapped her agreement without reference to Japan? Quoting: "Mr. Matsuoka then asked for two weeks time to ponder the question, and left the conference at 11:00 P. M., ahead of everyone else."

A. What I referred to about the U. S. I don't recall. Anyhow, I thought then the things needs at least two weeks to study, and as I was fatigued that day from traveling in the air, I would like to be excused, and I left the meeting.

Q. You are sure your previous commitments to the German government had not been the cause of this two-week delay?

A. No, it wasn't.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, on that night at this meeting we have spoken about, did it not occur to you that the necessity for immediately considering this proposal was urgent?

A. Well, to some extent, but it was the first time I heard about it, and I knew nothing about it.

Q. Now, you said here you met Mr. Stahmer the first time early in September 1940, and by the 27th day of the same month, you had concluded with his government the Tri-Partite alliance, and at that time you didn't ask for two weeks, did you?

A. No, not two weeks. It was just Stahmer replied to my questions.

Q. Even in the ~~ordinary~~ ordinary course of events where all speed is necessary, it requires considerable time for the detail work of preparing such a thing as the Tri-Partite Alliance.

A. Yes.

Q. And you have stated here that you met Stahmer for the first time early in September, and that you had instructed Kurusu, your representative in Berlin,

to execute the Tri-Partite pact on the 27th of September. But still, at this important liaison meeting you attended on the night of your return from Moscow, urging you for action in this matter -- this proposal from the U. S. -- you pleaded fatigue and asked for two weeks.

A. You must remember the Tri-Partite pact, there were very little details. This draft included so many details and big questions, such as Prince Konoye meeting the President at Honolulu and an exchange of the Navy at Honolulu, etc., and so many grave details.

Q. You realized, as Foreign Minister at the time, that this was an urgent matter concerning the foreign policy of your government and the United States?

A. I don't think so. And then again I contracted a cold and was confined in my house for some days.

Q. Did you authorize your Vice Minister to immediately take up this matter and proceed?

A. No.

Q. Did you indicate to anyone at that meeting that you were in any way favorably disposed to this proposal of the United States?

A. It is this -- that I studied every part carefully and then it dawned on me that it was not in response.

Q. All right, now interrupting here, please. You were well informed and had carefully studied long before you met Stahmer, the purpose and intent of the Tri-Party alliance. Isn't that true?

A. No.

Q. When you executed it over this short period of time, you were well acquainted with the entire background?

A. No.

Q. It is your explanation now that on a matter of that seriousness, you met the man early in September and concluded the alliance on the 27th? Yet when this U. S. proposal is presented to you, you pleaded for two weeks time?

A. Yes, I thought it was grave enough.

Q. You are sure your commitment, secret or otherwise, in conversation with the German government, hadn't deterred you from any positive want or desire to conclude any reasonable agreement with the United States?

A. I am clear that nothing hindered me.

Q. In fact, the purpose of the Tri-Partite alliance was to neutralize the effect of the U. S. in the Pacific area? Wasn't that one of the considerations in your mind?

A. No. To neutralize Germany and Great Britain.

Q. It was understood by the members of your government and in your presence that the Japanese government and the military would have a right and privilege to follow through on their exploitation of the so-called Greater East Asia plan, while Germany would be permitted to follow through in her sphere?

A. No.

Q. If certain documents were presented to you which would indicate that members of your government and yourself discussed the new world order by which Germany and Italy and Japan would be given an opportunity to create the spheres which they had cut out for military conquest in the world -- you never heard of such a thing?

A. The new order in Greater East Asia meant welcome to all -- equal opportunity.

Q. Now, did the director of the Army Affairs Bureau, Mr. MUTO, and the director of the Navy Affairs Bureau, Mr. UKA, call upon you and urge you to send an answer at the earliest possible moment to this American proposal?

A. Yes, I read that in the Konoye memoirs, but I don't remember.

Q. You wouldn't recall if these men came to you and urged you?

A. No. I was anyhow confined more or less in the house, on account of catching cold. Although I must say that both MUTO and UKA were for the negotiations. They were in favor of the negotiations.

Q. But you don't recall that they urged you to some speed?

A. No.

Q. Now, you did rewrite the counter-proposal, or the proposal to be returned to the United States, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And you did this while you were at home?

A. Yes.

Q. You were in disagreement with many of the points set out in the original?

A. It is too simple to say all. Now, my opinion was to negotiate on a few main points and then leave the meeting of the President and Prince Konoye and the meeting of the navies etc., later on. Postpone them. To get all these

things jammed up in one document at once would be the cause of failure, so go carefully. Then I might disclose this to you -- you know, I think it took altogether ten days or so, and then I presented myself to the government, somewhat cured of my cold, and in the course of study I was surprised that there was no English draft. It was all Japanese, and some of the phrases I couldn't make out the meaning very accurately, and I called up the director of the American Bureau and asked for the English version of the draft, and he said there is no English draft. Now Mr. Hull couldn't understand these translations, they must have English translations. Then wire out and get the English version. You know, documents like this are very incomplete. It took some days. I don't know why the English was omitted, and when the English draft came, upon comparison with the Japanese and English draft, on some of the rather important points and items, the meaning differed, although I can't recall what they were.

Q. Now, "although the demand to submit the revised plan immediately to the Americans was overwhelming, Foreign Minister Matsuoka stubbornly maintained that as a test, the conclusion of a neutrality treaty should be proposed to the United States. His point was finally approved." Do you recall that?

A. I read it in the Konoye memoirs but I don't recall. I am amazed at such proposals.

Q. Was the question raised at the meeting, whether or not the German government should be notified of this proposed plan of the U. S. for the settlement of the Far Eastern situation?

A. Yes, I said that as our ally, we must inform them roughly the outline of the negotiations, when the time comes.

Q. In other words, you considered Germany an ally, for the purpose of notifying them of negotiations between yourself and the U. S.?

A. Yes, or with any country or on an important matter.

Q. Was this embodied in the Tri-Partite pact?

A. No, but I said we are morally obliged to do it.

Q. You felt morally obliged to do so?

A. Yes. But when to do and to what extent to do so, of course, that is entirely in Japan's judgment.

Q. After the meeting adjourned, did you dispatch two telegraphic instructions to Ambassador Nemura, the first a tentative reply to the American proposal, in the form of an oral statement to Secretary Hull by the Foreign Minister,

the gist of which was that the German and Italian leaders were absolutely confident about the outcome of the European war, that American participation would only prolong hostilities, and bring about the downfall of civilization, and that Japan could never act in any way injurious to allies Germany and Italy?

A. That I also read, but I don't recall. Particularly that the leaders in Germany and Italy were confident of victory, I don't recall.

Q. Well, with respect to this statement, "that Japan could never act in any way injurious to the position of her allies Germany and Italy"?

A. That is my idea, but whether I instructed or not, I don't know.

Q. What relation did your allies Germany and Italy have with this proposition concerning the U. S. and the government of Japan?

A. That is if we can come to an agreement which has nothing to do with Germany and Italy, we could do so, but I was careful not to have anything that may act injurious to our ally.

Q. In other words, the U. S., in your opinion, was in her dealings with your government concerning such matters, to be affected by the wants or desires of Germany, Italy and yourself?

A. No. To make my point clear, I take up the case now. I think in the negotiations, Mr. Hull wishes to include as an appendix his speech against Germany, denouncing her. Such a thing Japan could not agree on, denouncing Germany together with America. That is what I meant. Without including such a document you can, in my mind, I thought, reach an understanding in the Pacific and about China proper.

Q. Now then, was there anything about the Tri-Partite alliance which made of it a military alliance?

A. No, except one secret thing -- that in case Great Britain attacks Japan, Germany would aid Japan.

Q. That was a secret agreement?

A. That was a kind of secret agreement. That was about the only clause I remember, secret.

Q. There was no secret agreement with respect to the United States?

A. No. And then, you know, in drawing up that thing, I thought Great Britain would never attack Japan, so that would be innocuous clause.

Q. This attitude on your government's part, not to act without notifying Germany and Italy, would lead to a very normal conclusion that the so-called Tri-Partite pact obligated Japan to Germany and Italy in her dealings with the United States government.

A. That depended upon the subject matter of the negotiations. If we deem we are morally bound, we must do so. If we think we are not morally bound, we don't.

Q. Hadn't you on previous occasions, some years previously, publicly and in writing condemned other treaties, particularly the Nine Power Treaty that your government was a party to, with the U. S. and other nations?

A. I don't recall that.

Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Matsuoka, that your commitments after the conclusion of the Tri-Partite alliance, your visit to Berlin, and the conferences that you held there, made it obligatory on your part to consult with Germany before you would conclude any agreement concerning this matter with the U. S.?

A. No. I never made any commitments on the matter, nor did I ever think so. Except when I felt morally bound. You know, when I was a young secretary, I knew the way followed with England, with Great Britain, that even on China matters the Japanese government used to communicate with Great Britain and America before taking any steps. That is what I thought was necessary when we are morally bound to maintain international faith.

Q. Did the second dispatch instruct Ambassador Nomura to propose, as his personal idea, a simple and clear cut treaty?

A. No, I don't remember that at all. Maybe I lost my memory of it.

Q. Of course it is difficult to keep memories with respect to days and dates.

A. I never can recall that.

Q. Before leaving Tokyo on 4 May for the Ise Shrine, did you direct the director of the East Asia Bureau, SAKOMOTO, to inform, in strict confidence, both the Italian and German ambassadors that a proposal for the relations of Japan and America, made by the American government, and that the Japanese government had made the above-mentioned tentative reply, and in addition proposed a neutrality treaty?

A. I also read that, but I don't recall. Anyhow, after the dispatch of my instructions to Nomura, I myself had a talk with the German and Italian ambassadors. I gave a bare outline, and I did not give them the outline of the draft from Washington. I gave a bare outline, and I think an attitude

that I won't allow Germany to meddle with it.

Q. When you returned to Tokyo, May 6, after two days, did you inquire of the German Ambassador, who called upon you, whether or not Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had any opinions in this matter?

A. I don't know the date, but I think I said so, and I think von Ribbentrop gave me reply, and I simply read it and left there, and never considered it.

Q. Do you remember the nature of the reply?

A. I think the nature was that Ribbentrop would have liked Japan, before proceeding with negotiations, to inquire whether America would not participate in the war. Or something like that. He wanted to make that point sure before proceeding. I read and said nothing and I did nothing.

Q. Did you make a statement to the effect that "ultimately it would prove profitable for Germany herself if we utilize America's ill-intentioned proposal and terminate the China incident." Do you recall having made that statement?

A. I don't recall. Ill what?

Q. Ill-intentioned proposal.

A. No. To the interest of Germany it would be to have the Pacific quiet and the China incident ended.

Q. On May 8, the same month we are talking about, you were received in audience by the Emperor and informed him that in case America should enter the war, Japan must stand by Germany and Italy, and that under such circumstances readjustment of the Japanese-American relations would be brought to nothing. In any case, if Japan would break faith with Germany and Italy, by paying too much attention to America's proposals, the foreign minister would be obliged to resign?

A. I never said anything of the kind.

Q. Did you appear before the Emperor on that day or not?

A. I don't know.

Q. And make any representations with respect to this matter pending between the United States and Japan?

A. Yes, I told the Emperor I would do my utmost to bring negotiations to a success. That is all I said.

Q. I will read to you this statement from Konoye's Diary or memoirs, following the question just above asked: "This the Foreign Minister himself reported to me on the 9th. On the same night I secretly summoned the Army and Navy Ministers to my house, where we held an informal discussion dealing with the Foreign Minister's attitude. We agreed that the Army and Navy should remain in close contact with me concerning the attitude to be taken by our country if America entered the war and concerning our actions if Germany opposed the Japanese-American relations. The following day I was received in audience by the Emperor. He revealed to me with great concern the substance of the Foreign Minister's report the day before." Have you any knowledge of the circumstances here outlined?

A. No. I never made such a report to Konoye, simply because I never had a talk with the Emperor.

Q. If some other person present at this meeting with the Emperor should say that you made such a representation, would he be mistaken?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the occasion for the visit to the Emperor? Did he invite you?

A. In those days I was called by the Emperor almost every other day.

Q. In this particular case, did he call you there specifically to discuss this American-Japanese relations question?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Did you go there on your own accord without notifying the Prime Minister?

A. I don't recollect. I used to go quite often in those days. Anyhow, I never made such a statement before the Emperor, and consequently I never made a report to the Premier.

Q. How much time, approximately, had passed between the 9th of May and your return to Japan when these negotiations were first brought to your attention?

A. I returned to Japan about 22nd of April.

Q. Now, did you inform the Emperor as follows: "That if America were to enter the European war, Japan would have to attack Singapore, and that since America's participation would result in a prolongation of the war, there might be the danger of a German-Soviet collision. In such an event, Japan would have to abrogate the neutrality treaty and stand by Germany and advance at least as far as Irkutsk." Did you make such a representation to the Emperor?

A. No. It is laughable, the whole thing. Anyone who knows the practice

in the Imperial Court and in the higher circles of the government, at once will know that I could not say such a thing in the presence of the Emperor. If the Foreign Minister talks about military matters, the Emperor would laugh and disregard the whole thing. I am not a military man.

Q. Well, you were, of course, the Foreign Minister in Konoye's cabinet, weren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And as such Foreign Minister, there would be -- or at least should be -- a very close relationship and collaboration on such matters as this between the two parties.

A. Two parties?

Q. Both yourself and the Prime Minister.

A. Yes. We were very close together.

Q. What did you advise the Prime Minister concerning this proposal of America's?

A. That I would try my best to bring it to a success.

Q. And did you bring it to a success?

A. No, and so before the Konoye cabinet fell I said hope is fading and I am unable to bring it to a success.

Q. And who did you report that to?

A. To Konoye. My idea then was if negotiations were successful then let it drop and wait until the next opportune moment to pick it up again and continue.

Q. On reading further from this diary: "I advised the Emperor not to be concerned, since the Foreign Minister's utterance represented only one possible plan under the worst eventuality, and even if he held such opinions, the military would have to take part in it, and the cabinet would have to be consulted about any final decision. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I advised the Throne that for the settlement of the China incident, which was a most urgent matter at present, the good offices of America would be the only recourse. The American proposal was the best and only means, and I further explained about the cabinet and the split in public opinion that might occur in such event." Did you have any conversation with the Prime Minister which might lead him to have indicated that you made these utterances or that there was such a divergence of opinion between him and yourself?

A. No. Of course I don't know what Konoye said to the Emperor. I was on very good terms until the last day. Now, here I might say this -- sometime before I left for Europe, one day in a casual talk, after finishing our business, I said in the presence of the Emperor that if Japan goes on like this endlessly, with no purpose, that one day Japan might face fire in the north and in the south at the same time, which of course by that I meant Japan would perish. This I told Prince Konoye after that, and the writer of this memoir might have been mixing this up with that occasion. It was some time before I went to Europe.

Q. But you never made any such representations to the Emperor?

A. No.

4191

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 7 March 1946, 1340 - 1605 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. Yesterday when we discontinued the questioning, I believe we were concerned with the progress which you were making concerning the American representations to Japan for a basis of a settlement of the Far Eastern situation.

A. Yes. And will you permit me to add some words in explanation of what I said yesterday?

Q. Surely.

A. I am afraid you might have an erroneous impression that I was purposely or deliberately procrastinating about or rather you might get that impression from the so-called Konoye memoirs. I think it was wrong and mistaken about it. I don't think Konoye penned that line. In the first place, you must clearly know that the negotiations so far were carried on back of me. I knew nothing about them while I was away from Tokyo. I learned of the negotiations when I came back to Tokyo, for the first time, and naturally I had to be allowed some time to give consideration on such important questions. Then you compared this Tri-Partite Pact and this American-Japanese negotiations, and in one case it was rather quickly done while the other took longer time. In the second place I must say that it depends largely on the subject matters you are dealing with. The three-party pact, for instance, was very simple -- yes or no -- while the negotiations between America and Japan had many difficult points. The China situation alone was the crux of the situation. You make a promise to withdraw your forces and you don't carry it out, that won't do. One's promise means you must stick to it and carry it out. You know, sometimes Japan doesn't.

Q. Do you mean that the accomplished facts had by that time become of such a nature that it was extremely difficult for Japan to withdraw her troops from China, and for that reason it required such more time to consider this question?

MAR 11 1946

118-75

A. Yes. The China situation in the Pacific altogether was so complicated and hardened up. Now, take for instance make comparison between the neutrality pact I concluded with Russia and these negotiations. With the Soviet it took years of negotiations and deliberations. It runs back when Hirata was our ambassador, and this neutrality pact was very simple compared to the subject matters in these negotiations, and yet it took years of discussion and negotiations. Then again the third point is upon learning that such great and important matters were negotiated without my knowledge -- the Foreign Minister of Japan, in his absence -- I was considering of resigning at once. I ought to have resigned, you know. Without the knowledge and behind the back of the Foreign Minister, such negotiations to be carried on -- that is an insult. Anyone would resign at once.

Q. You mean that none of the preliminary steps in relation to these U. S. Japanese negotiations had taken place before your departure to Berlin and Moscow? That you had absolutely no knowledge of any approach to this proposal?

A. Neither I nor the Foreign Office. The Vice Minister and others don't know, and in any ordinary time the Foreign Minister would at once hand in his resignation.

Q. May I ask this question, if you remember, which bears on this question. In relation to the conclusion of the Tri-Party Pact -- by that, I mean the final alliance between Japan and Germany, 27 September 1940-- in relation to that date, had the American diplomatic offices or State Department, or officials of the American Government, made representations to the Japanese government for a settlement of this dispute, do you know?

A. No.

Q. Just to refresh our recollection here -- On July 16 1940,

A. That was before I joined the government.

Q. Yes, on July 16 1940 the Japanese cabinet resigned. War Minister, General Hata, forced its hand by resigning because he thought renovation was necessary. Do you recall that period or incident?

A. I don't recall the date. Because that cabinet resigned, the second Konoye cabinet succeeded it.

Q. On June 29 of that same year, preceding the fall of the cabinet, Foreign Minister Hirata said Japan was a stabilizing force for the new order in Asia, and the south seas, "All mankind longs for peace but peace cannot endure unless nations have their proper place. Since this is difficult in the present state of human progress, the next best thing is for a people related geographically, racially, historically, economically, to form spheres of their own. People very closely related are destined to minister for each

other's needs for common well-being and prosperity." And, "insuring the stability of that sphere is a natural conclusion." June 30 1940 this statement was made by the then Foreign Minister Hirata. Now, at the time don't you know whether or not the German-American relations were started? At the time of the resignation of Minister Hirata, or do you remember that?

A. I don't know.

Q. At the time you took over, what was the state of German-United States relations? In your general opinion?

A. That America was sympathizing and helping Great Britain with its war equipment, but I did not at the time think of America joining directly in the war, and Germany was trying its best not to come to a clash with America. That was my general observation at the time.

Q. Did you not consider, however, that the nature of the alliance, which was one of the first official acts of your government -- the conclusion of the Tri-Party alliance -- would rightfully lead America to the conclusion that it was your intention to cooperate with the Hitler or Nazi plan of aggressive warfare?

A. No, I didn't think in that way.

Q. Did you have any conversations with representatives of the German government in which it was agreed, in substance, that in addition to the intent and purpose of the Tri-Party alliance to dissuade America from becoming active in the war, that it would also permit the continued exploitation of the Japanese military forces within the area previously announced as the Greater East Asia sphere? Was that a basis of your understanding?

A. No.

Q. To the best of your judgment, there was no discussion on that basis?

A. No discussion.

Q. If the German minister, or Minister with Special Portfolio Stahmer, said that such matters were discussed and agreed upon, he would not be telling the truth, is that correct?

A. No, he is not. I never discussed such a thing.

Q. In connection with the conclusion of the Tri-Party Pact, was there delivered between the parties, particularly General Ott and yourself or your office, an envelope containing secret or private agreements concerning this alliance?

A. No. The only secret agreement was what I told you yesterday, that in case Great Britain attacks Japan in Eastern Asia, Germany would come to help Japan. On the other hand, I think that part was not secret, that in case a third party attacks Germany in Europe, Japan upon consultation, would decide whether to join or not to join. A big difference between the two.

Q. At the time, England was already at war with Germany, so this statement was, for all practical purposes, aimed at the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, may I ask this. It is very important at this point. There is at present a statement to the effect that this reservation which you just mentioned, this right of your government to reconsider before committing itself, had been so far as you are concerned, agreed upon between the ambassador of Germany, Ott, and Stahmer, but in Berlin Hitler and Ribbentrop would not become a party to such a reservation as this, and you were notified to that effect.

A. No.

Q. Further, that when you were notified to this effect, you explained as follows: "I have already made known this secret or private understanding to the Emperor, and am not now in a position to return to him and tell him that we were mistaken." That therefore, without knowledge of Hitler and Ribbentrop, Stahmer and Ott, or either one or both, delivered to you an envelope containing these reservations, and that it is quite possible that they did so notwithstanding the knowledge of the fact that Hitler and Ribbentrop would not have agreed to this reservation, to wit that in such an event after consultation Japan might agree to enter the war. Is there any truth to the substance of this statement concerning this secret document?

A. Not a particle of truth. It is entirely fabrication. I received no envelope, and in Berlin I never discussed either with Hitler or von Ribbentrop about the possibility of America joining the war. Simply because this Tri-Party pact, as I said often, was concluded with a view to preventing America entering the war.

Q. Was it your understanding that this reservation contained in a letter or document which you have said was in existence -- that is, that in the event of an attack by a third party, Japan still reserved the right to consider it before going in? Was there a letter to that effect?

A. I had a letter or something that I do not exactly recall.

Q. But you considered it sufficient?

A. Yes.

Q. And so far as your knowledge now is concerned, at the time of the execution of these instruments it was your understanding that the Japanese government was not obligated to go immediately to war with the third party, but only after discussion and deliberation?

A. Yes. That is, in another word, the fate of Japan in such case must be decided by Japan.

Q. Now the pact itself, the formal pact, is silent on this, is it not?

A. I have no copy of the pact, so I don't remember, but anyhow I think that Japan in such case would decide whether to join the war or not after consultation was not secret but made known publicly, but in case of Great Britain's attack on Japan, of course that was secret. And then another matter kept secret was about the south seas boundary act, that they should remain in the possession of Japan after the war.

Q. Now, on 1 August 1940, according to official records, you announced — the Foreign Minister announced a new foreign policy for Greater East Asia, "The mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate the Imperial way throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of international relations, this amounts to enabling all nations and races to find each its own proper place in the world. Accordingly, the immediate aim of our foreign policy at present is to establish a Greater East Asia sphere of common prosperity, with Japan, Manchukuo and China group as one of the links. We shall thus be able to demonstrate the Imperial way in the most effective manner and pave the way toward the establishment of world peace." Is that, in substance, what you announced?

A. Yes. Practically the same as what Arita had proclaimed before.

Q. On August 9, eight days later, according to the official documents, the British withdrew their forces from Shanghai. Do you recall that?

A. Not the exact date, but sometime about that time Great Britain withdrew troops. May I now be allowed to finish my remark?

Q. Surely

A. Another point was this — you know that as soon as I got back to Tokyo I caught cold so I thought. Later on I learned that I was suffering from tuberculosis, but I thought it was a cold, and I had bad coughing.

Q. Was this the first time you discovered you had TB?

A. Yes, but I used to have often bad coughing once in a while. I was suffering from coughing so in presenting myself before the Throne, I used to take medicine to stop coughing for the time being, and this asthmatic attack. I used to have sometimes asthmatic attacks for over a month, and laid up in bed. The sea air is very bad to me, but I can't escape from sea air in

Japan. While I was traveling on the Continent I was comparatively well but when I got back to Tokyo the sea air no doubt affected me very much and I began to have asthmatic attack too, and so in going out to Ishay(?) to pay my respects, asthmatic attack and bad coughing, I could give fully one week time to deliberate about the negotiations. So you must allow for these conditions, and even Konoye Memoirs, I think was not -- at least that part -- was not the writing of the late Prince Konoye. Whoever might have been the author admits I was very earnest in making the negotiations a success, but I was suffering. So, as I compared the neutrality pact with Soviet Russia, I was not at all deliberately procrastinating about it. I did my best. That is what I wanted to correct.

Q. What I am trying to show now -- I will briefly outline international incidents of importance which occurred up to this period, which would have affected your department, and therefore would have indicated to you true world conditions at the time, and the picture as it was.

A. Yes.

Q. The next quotation we find is September 22. Japan and France concluded an agreement on air bases and troop maintenance in Indo China for Japan. Japanese military authorities delivered an ultimatum. This is quoting from Bulletin, Vol. 3 #63, page 97 of ibd 66 page 235 of pp 572 f, August 1. Next, the German-Italian ten-year military and economic alliance pact, signed on 27 September. That is correct, isn't it?

A. The day on which the pact was signed? Do you mean the founding of the pact of the three countries?

Q. Yes, the German-Italian-Japanese ten-year alliance.

A. One at Rome, one at Berlin, one at Tokyo. Yes. And I laid emphasis particularly on the exchange of new machineries and industries for peaceful industries besides exchanging intelligence about the military equipment, etc. But in Tokyo it was I, the Foreign Minister, and General Ott, the German Ambassador, and Inderi the Italian Ambassador, who were to attend the committee at Tokyo, but we never had any meeting for the simple reason that there was no committee organized while I was in office. As a matter of fact, the Army and Navy men were

Q. Interrupting here, please. You don't contend then that this ten-year military and economic pact was not signed at Berlin?

A. I don't think it was separately designed.

Q. This is a quotation from the official journal of the time.

whether

A. I don't remember, ~~and~~ it was included in the pact or separately signed but anyhow its contents I remember.

Q. Then after that, the next important incident was that the U. S. under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, issued a statement of the primary requirements of the U. S. in the Far East. Next on October 5, which is shortly afterward, Premier Konoye forecast war with the U. S., quoting his statement, "If the United States refuses to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany and Italy, in concluding an alliance for positive cooperation in creating a new world order, and persists in challenging those powers in the belief that the accord is a hostile action" -- that statement was made October 5 by the then Prime Minister Konoye, in whose cabinet you were Foreign Minister.

A. Made to who?

Q. To the United States, apparently.

A. No, I don't recall. I saw something like that as an interview with the press when I went to Kyoto, and I was so surprised and inquired and Konoye answered me that it is altogether incorrect.

Q. According to the official document, *ibid*, p. 1, of, September 12, *supra*, this is an idea of the statement. Now then, on 7 and 8 October, Ambassador Hounochi protested the refusal of export licenses for aviation gas and machine tools and the impending prohibition on iron and steel scrap to Japan. This protest was made to the U. S. by Ambassador Hounochi. Do you recall that?

A. No.

Q. Had you instructed him to make such a protest?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Do you recall at the time that there had been a refusal on the part of the U. S. Government to license the ~~many~~ sale of aviation gas to Japan?

A. No, I don't recollect these things at all.

Q. Of course, the reason I am touching on these, Mr. Matsuoka, is for the obvious reason to determine whether or not you, as Foreign Minister, were appraised of the seriousness of the situation already existing between Japan and the United States.

A. Yes, your purpose I appreciate, but really if I am speaking truth at all, I don't recall these things.

Q. Well then, for the purpose of refreshing your recollection I will read what is purported to be the official quotation of your ambassador at Washington, "In view of the fact that Japan has been for some years the principal buyer of American iron and steel scrap, the announcement of the administrative policy as well as the regulations established and the licensing system on iron and steel scrap cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and as such to be an unfriendly act." Also, a further quotation: "The discriminatory feature of the announcement that licenses will be issued to permit shipment to the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and Great Britain only, has created a widespread impression in Japan that it was motivated by a desire to bring pressure upon her." That was according to the official report which your ambassador at Washington made to the American government at the time, October 7 and 8.

A. Maybe so, but that doesn't refresh my memory. I hardly recollect any words of it.

Q. October 13 1940, "Foreign Minister Matsuo invited the U. S. to join the Axis Alliance." Do you remember issuing that invitation to the U. S.?

A. No.

Q. Quoting your message, "The new world order envisaged by the three powers is one in which economic barriers will be broken down, and the natural geographic divisions of the earth established in complementary fashion, which will make for the prosperity of all people.....We three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy will be glad to welcome other powers into our alliance, whether it be the United States or any other nation, should they desire to join the spirit of the new order." This is said to have been made by you October 13 1940.

A. Well, I had that opinion, but whether I made issue of such a representation to Mr. Grew, I don't clearly recall.

Q. On 30 November 1940, the Japanese peace treaty was signed with WANG CHENG WE's regime at Hanking, "deemed desirous that these two countries should respect their inherent characteristics and closely cooperate with each other like good neighbors under the common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ideological basis, establishing thereby a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this contributing to the peace of the world in general, and desiring for this purpose the establishment of fundamental principles to regulate relations between the two countries." This is a statement concerning the WANG CHENG WE treaty. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. That was negotiated through your office?

A. Well, it is this way -- I will tell you. The whole thing was practically decided under the previous cabinet. After the second Konoye cabinet was

formed, I asked our ambassador, General ABE, and others to postpone the signing of that treaty before my approach to Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek would succeed or fail. The success or failure would determine it. And I asked for November 30 to be the limit of the time. Abe and others hesitated very much to give in, but I begged for it, and I devoted all desire to approaching Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek, to negotiate peace. Through Wang Ching, an old friend of Chang Kai Shek, who was living then in Hong Kong, and according to the information of my informants, I was succeeding pretty fairly and I did my utmost but after I failed to come to a conclusion of peace with the Chungking government before 30 November, and so I had to act as it was. My idea was to negotiate with ~~Generalissimo~~ Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek and then have Mr. Wong and Chang Kai Shek negotiate and form into one China, and establish peace within Japan and China as one unit. But I failed in that.

Q. Just for the purpose of the record, I would like to have the record show that I am quoting and reading from a book which is entitled "78th Congress, Second Session, House Document No. 541, entitled 'Events Leading up to World War II, Chronological History, 1931 - 1944.'" Now, on December 9 1940, Mr. Matsuoka, according to this document, you said war with the U. S. was inevitable but "if both of us attend to our own business, I cannot think there will be any serious clash. We have no difference that cannot be surmounted if we keep our heads cool and mind our own business. We do not pass judgment on what the U. S. does in the west, and we try to confine ourselves to this part of the world." Do you recall making an enunciation of that kind?

A. Something in that sense. I said before, when I was living in San Francisco, too.

Q. In what year was that?

A. It was the year next to that in which I went out to Geneva. I went to Geneva 7th year of Showa, and I passed through your country in the spring of the next year.

Q. You also made a speech at Chicago, didn't you?

A. Yes, Chicago and different places.

Q. Your speech in Chicago received wide publicity in the United States.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, the next important incident that appears to have occurred, on February 25, 1941, "Foreign Minister Matsuoka said the white race must cede Oceania to the Asiatics. This region has sufficient natural resources to support 600,000,000 to 800,000,000 people. I believe we have a natural right to migrate there." Do you recall making that statement?

A. I recall making the last statement in the Parliament, as words or part

of writings by an American. Not my words. I referred to a book, I said, written by an American author.

Q. Oh. Then this is not an original statement of yours?

A. Not at all. I was quoting from a book written by an American.

Q. Do you remember who the author was?

A. I forgot the name now, but he was a Bishop someone, the principal of St. Joseph's College, whom the late President Wilson believed in. I said that about 1,000 miles south and north and 1200 miles east and west. The British government -- the British ambassador at the time also reported to his government, misquoting it. When he referred to it, I corrected. It was in the book of an American.

Q. Now on March 8, Admiral Nemura disparaged the view that Japan was intent on military conquest unless compelled by the increasing embargoes from the United States, "The ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his government, and he then said that embargoes by this country are of an increasing concern and he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the increasing embargoes by this country should force his government and the mind of those in control to take further military action." So that it is apparent on March 8 1941 that the relationship between the Japanese and the American governments was such as required serious consideration and attention?

A. No, I don't feel that way.

Q. Were you Foreign Minister at the time?

A. Yes, that was in 1941, and I felt there was plenty of time yet to wait for an opportune moment to negotiate with America.

Q. And on March 8 1941, were you then on this tour from Berlin to Moscow and return, or had you left then?

A. I was on the way out to Europe.

Q. And you did not consider the relations between your country and America at a serious stage at that time?

A. No.

Q. On April 13 1941, the Japanese-Russian five-year neutrality pact was signed at Moscow, with joint declaration regarding the Japanese protectorate of Manchukuo, is that correct?

A. Manchukuo and the outer Mongolia.

Q. On May 12 1941 Japan presented a proposal for a general settlement between the U. S. and Japan. Quoting in part, "It is the sincere desire of both governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our people should be prevented from reoccurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. It is our present hope that by a joint effort our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific and by the rapid conclusion of an entente cordial arrest, if not dispell, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization." This was the tenure of a message sent by the Japanese government to the government of the United States, 12 May 1941. Do you recall that?

A. I don't recall the exact wording or date, but I do recall very clearly the sense of it.

Q. Don't you consider that the necessity for dispatching such a message between two nations must have been brought about by some previous serious condition that had existed?

A. Well, my contention all through was to reach an entente cordial of that nature.

Q. But you were absent from Tokyo on May 12 1941, weren't you?

A. No, I was back.

Q. You returned to Tokyo when?

A. April 22.

Q. And were you the author of this message to the United States?

A. I believe I was, but as I say it is far back in my memory and it is not quite sure of it. I think to clarify a little, I wish to be allowed to add something about the background when Hirota became Prime Minister of Japan. It was I who advised him to try a ten year truce in the Pacific with the United States. And I think Hirota acted on it through Mr. Saito, our ambassador, but somehow it was dropped. Some years afterwards, Hull reminded Sato of this, but nothing was coming forth of it. Now I have that idea all through, you know, to show to you.

Q. Did you think, from your experience as a member of the Foreign Office and Foreign Minister of Japan, that the conclusion of the alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan at the time, and having in mind all that had then occurred in Europe, was conducive to an amicable condition from which you could realize your all-time desire to reach an agreement with the U. S.?

A. Yes, I thought of it this way -- by concluding the three-party pact

that would strengthen the Japanese position a little, and then with the preservation of the national dignity of Japan, then to the United States as showing our sincerity I can gladly come to an understanding in the Pacific and get an agreement on China proper. That is the way that I thought it out -- that this conclusion of the tri-party pact might ruffle the feeling a little for some time, but showing our sincerity and friendliness we could gradually accomplish that. And after it was shown to you that even if we had the three-party pact, Mr. Hull and the President received us openhearted and negotiated those things. So it was not a dream altogether.

Q. On June 18 Japan discontinued negotiations with the Netherlands Indies for economic agreements. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. At that time the Netherlands Government was in exile in London, wasn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. On June 22 the German government declared war upon Russia, didn't they?

A. About that time.

Q. According to this, "Germany invades Russia June 22 1941." Also Italy declared war upon Russia June 22 or 23. Do you recall that?

A. Not the exact date, but I do recall that sometime before that I sent word to Berlin, I think through Ambassador General Ott, to tell Hitler to forebear to go to war with Soviet Russia. I was against it. I do recall some of the words. I said "Even Napoleon made faux pas and you can't tell what the future has in store" and I strongly opposed Germany's going to war with Soviet Russia. And in that connection I must tell you, you know upon my return to Tokyo and reporting to the Throne and to the Premier about my European trip, I said that the relations between Soviet Russia and Germany were rather dangerous, although I still thought that it was maybe a bluff on both sides, that after all both sides might not go to war. Nevertheless theless it was dangerous. But I took care not to commit anything, and not to discuss the situation in Germany, and the Tri-Partite Pact did not oblige us to join the war.

Q. Therefore July 8 your government told the United States government that it had not so far considered the possibility of fighting Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. According to this, on July 8 that announcement was made.

A. July 3 I think it was. I communicated the same thing to Russia, Germany and Italy's embassies.

- Q. Now on July 21, France accepted the Japanese demands for military control of French Indo China. Do you recall that?
- A. July 21? No. That is after I resigned.
- Q. When did you resign?
- A. July 16 or 17. So I don't know.
- Q. Now why did you resign, Mr. Matsuoka?
- A. Because the second Konoye cabinet failed?
- Q. Why did the cabinet fall?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Since you were one of the three or four persons originally in the formation of the cabinet that sat with Mr. Konoye, and two other of the leading ministers, and debated among yourselves the selection of the other members of the cabinet, you were in relation to the cabinet as a whole and the Prime Minister, such an important figure that you were in position to judge why the cabinet failed.
- A. I was not then. Take for instance, this Hiranuma, a member of the cabinet. Konoye never consulted me and he apologized profusely afterwards. He did those things rather freely.
- Q. It seems that the Konoye cabinet or government fell, that there was a rapid reorganization, and that you were the only minister who was eliminated from the cabinet. Is that correct?
- A. No. Several others.
- Q. May I ask you the direct question -- was the fall of the then Konoye cabinet the result of a disagreement between yourself and your foreign policy and Prince Konoye as Prime Minister?
- A. He says so in his memoirs, but no. You must know that he says once in his memoirs, but several times I told Konoye that if I stand in the way in any way about the negotiations, if he felt so, I would resign at any time not to cause any inconvenience to him. And we were rather all very intimate on terms, and so I told Konoye privately whenever he thinks it is better just tell me to resign and I will do so at once.
- Q. I want to read from a document which for the present I do not choose to identify. The purpose of the reading will be to outline to you what apparently was the ~~main~~ circumstance at the time, and I will ask you

at the conclusion, or if you reach important points, whether or not you agree with them. "During Matsuoka's absence from Tokyo his opponents, especially the pro-Anglo-Saxon circles, tried to improve Japan's relations with the United States and with Great Britain, which had been neglected and had worsened since the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact." Is it true, or in your opinion do you believe that the relations between Japan and the U. S. had worsened since the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?

A. Well, I have said that they may have a ruffled feeling somewhat, but my efforts thenceforth were to bring the two countries closer.

Q. Further reading, "Matsuoka did not disapprove such a policy or principle. On the contrary he hoped that backed by the three-power pact and the newly concluded neutrality pact with Russia, he could convince the United States and Great Britain that any further opposition against Japan's Far Eastern policy was useless, and it was to their interests to come to terms with Japan and make concessions in China. Matsuoka was wounded in his vanity, that such important steps had been taken in his absence. Nevertheless, after his return to Tokyo he took the lead in these attempts."

A. What attempts?

Q. Japanese attempts to improve relations with America.

A. That much is true, but my pride was not wounded or something like that. As I told you, as a responsible foreign minister I ought to have resigned at once. Very important diplomacy was carried on without my knowledge, but the world situation was so grave that I decided -- I considered for several days to resign -- but I made up my mind to set that aside and try my best to make the negotiations between America and Japan a success if I could, and then resign taking the whole responsibility for my, as we say it in Japanese, lack of virtue. That was my decision and in case the negotiations should fail, my intention was to drop the negotiations quietly and wait until the next opportune moment and pick them up again and try, even if I were out of the government. Of course I don't know I was suffering from TB and I would go myself personally to Washington and negotiate with the President and Mr. Hull.

Q. Further along this same line, this instrument reads, speaking of you "He informed the German government through the German ambassador in Tokyo that all negotiated aims simply grew about the settlement of the China conflict. He emphasized that this was in accordance with the three-power pact which aimed at keeping America out of the war. Hitler and von Ribbentrop, who distrusted Matsuoka since his coup at Moscow, were suspicious but could not seriously object."

A. That is mistaken. Von Ribbentrop believed in me while he distrusted the Japanese government. That is my understanding, and I never communicated to

the German ambassador about the negotiations with Mr. Grew. I never carried out negotiations with Mr. Grew.

Q. On June 22 1941 the German-Russian war had broken out. On June 28 von Ribbentrop informed the German ambassador in Tokyo that at his suggestion Ambassador Oshima would strongly urge his government to attack Soviet Russia without ~~any~~ delay. The German Embassy was instructed to influence the Japanese government for the following reasons: (1) That the German war against the Soviets will result in a total solution of the Russian question, (2) The smashing of the Russian power which could be expected very soon will make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. When Germany is in possession of Russian oil and coal, the British blockade will be ineffective. The direct land communication between Germany and East Asia will be established on the same occasion. (3) The new situation gives Japan a unique chance to eliminate the Soviet power in the Far East. (4) An attack against the British possessions in the Far East, principally Singapore, would be much safer for Japan after the defeat of Russia. (5) The quick annihilation of Soviet Russia by Germany and Japan will be the best means to convince the United States that it would be absolutely senseless to enter the war on the side of Great Britain which would be completely isolated and face the mightiest military impact in the world. (6) Since Germany's victory over Russia could be expected very soon, Japan should strike against the Soviet without hesitation." Now, did anyone in the German government or foreign office, either ambassador or some other source, ever make any such representations to you or your government?

A. No.

Q. Had you ever been urged by the German representative to request your government to enter the war against Russia?

A. No.

Q. So that if there is documentary evidence in the nature of dispatches between Berlin and Tokyo requesting such action, to wit: the going to war by Japan against Russia, they are either mistaken or false?

A. Fabrications. Of course Oshima, our ambassador, sent a wire what Japan will do. So we considered and decided not to join the war.

Q. Also Germany pointed out that if Japan delayed and went to war late with Russia, when she was prostrated, Japan would lose considerable face politically?

A. No.

Q. Reading further, "The Japanese government ~~expressly~~ replied through Mr. Matsuoka that it did not contemplate an attack against Soviet Russia. Indeed, with the exception of a few military hotheads, nobody in Japan wanted

war against Russia. Press and public opinion were puzzled and confused by the sudden German attack on the Soviet especially after the much-advertised German-Russia non-aggression pact of October 1939. The Japanese government itself had just concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet. They had no actual conflict with Russia and considered Japan not prepared for such a war. Furthermore, it hoped to find an agreement with the United States in the China question which would be impossible in case of a Japanese attack upon Soviet Russia." Do you recall making such a reply to -- well, obviously, if no such request was ever made of you, you never made such a reply?

A. No. When Oshima wired out inquiring what should Japan do, I think he had it in his telegram that Hitler said whether Japan would join or not all depends on Japan and he is not asking for Japan to decide either way. So Germany, as I said yesterday, questioned Japan's help. N

Q. Did you ever, in the presence of any other person, in an audience with the Emperor, request, demand or suggest that Japan should declare war upon Russia during your term as Foreign Minister?

A. No. Only I said at the highest liaison conference -- that is, with War Minister, Minister of the Navy, Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and some others, you know -- when someone said that they have to send our forces down to Saigon and its vicinity. I said rather than going down to the southwest with the danger of coming to clash eventually with Great Britain, I would join the Soviet-German war. By way of trick, I said, because I knew full well that the Army and Navy simply would not fight Russia. They never thought of attacking Russia. Why, if Army and Navy won't fight Russia, who would? I can't as Foreign Minister fight Russia. And they had this theory -- against Great Britain and America combined they have maybe make fight with some chance that -- there was no consideration at the time, but I knew that they had an idea that they could make fight with some chance, but if Soviet Russia joined on the other side they had no chance whatever. So, by way of trick, I said rather than go down to the south, I would join this war in the north with the hope of dissuading the military and naval men ever attempting to go down southward. I think I accomplished the end in view that I had -- that of keeping away from war with all parties -- and we came to the conclusion not to take part in that Soviet-German war, and then we presented ourselves to the Throne and reported so. This Konoye's Memoirs, in writing about myself arguing in the presence of Emperor to attack Iriki etc., is nonsense. If I did that, that very day Konoye cabinet would have fallen. As it was we agreed in the highest liaison conference, the Premier reports what agreement is reached, and no member would say anything more. Mr. Hara, the Chairman of the Privy Council, spoke at some length, I recall, but except this decision not to take part in the Soviet-German war, no one said anything. People who wrote that part, you know, don't know the practice in the Japanese presence of the Emperor. This session of war is extraordinary as the writer said in the paper. Something hard to express. We arrange things and fix up and we don't exactly in the presence of the Emperor. If we did, that means the fall of the cabinet immediately. ✓

Q. Oh, I see.

A. Of course, Harra was not a member of the government, so he could say anything he liked, but I couldn't. And then again I am not military man to talk about military matters. It would be laughed at.

Q. I will read this last paragraph here and ask you to listen and give us your answer and your best judgment as to your opinion of its truth or falsity. "To facilitate the negotiations with America, Prime Minister Konoye in July 1941 decided to dismiss Foreign Minister Matsuoka because, since the conclusion of the Three-Party Pact, Matsuoka was generally considered the symposium of all pro-German concord. He was replaced by Admiral Toyoshi, who after retirement from the Navy had a position at Sutamo. He was of the old school of the Navy and economic circles and most friendly toward cooperation with America. Toyoshi seemed well qualified for negotiations with the U. S." Is that true?

A. Maybe so. I don't know. Konoye took the initiative to replace me, but Toyoshi became a very close friend of mine.

Q. The reason I am reading these basic facts is in an attempt to refresh your recollection of the situation existing when these questions were brought up in your official cabinet position.

A. Yes.

Q. This under the title "Japan Extends Southern Control" -- "While the European war seemed to promise another generous stage for Japanese expansion, Japan in 1939 lacked freedom of action which she had in 1914. In China the Japanese Army was as far from its goal as ever, bogged down in the Chinese hinterland, and was unable to deal a decisive blow at free China and unable to withdraw without loss of face. China was the Japanese Army's own enterprise, and was proving so indecisive and unremunerative that it was not difficult for the Japanese Navy to point to the ammunition resources of oil, rubber and tin which was awaiting a new conqueror in the south seas." Having in mind the context of this statement, would you say that the Japanese military were influenced by such a consideration, and that your conduct of your foreign office was moving in a direction forced by such considerations as outlined in this statement?

A. I think the Navy was somewhat influenced by these opinions, but I don't think the Army was at the time, and the foreign office policy was to expand if we can peacefully to the south.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, all of the Japanese expansion which Japan had undertaken up to this moment was accomplished by the armed forces of Japan. Isn't that true? The army in Manchuria

A. Not always.

Q. The Manchurian incident was preceded by army action.

A. Yes, that was

Q. And the attack on Nanking, and the isolation of Chinese coastal cities were all accompanied by both army and navy action.

A. That is true.

Q. Then in the major part, at least, it might be fair to say that it was your apparent purpose to bring this peace to the world by armed force.

A. No. You must know that inside of Japan, the foreign office was really fighting against the army and navy sometimes. Fighting against it.

Q. But it is true, as a matter of fact, that such territories as Japan had gained in Manchuria and China had been gained with the armed force, with the army and navy of the Japanese nation?

A. To some extent, and sometimes true, but at another time the army people stood in the way. If they had left the situation alone,

Q. Let me ask you this: Manchuria, certain definite regions of China, French Indo China, Singapore, the Dutch Indies, Malaya, the Philippines, and all the way to Guadalcanal, was all accomplished by the military power of the Japanese nation. Isn't that true?

A. Not all.

Q. It was by military conquest that that had taken place, that they had taken possession.

A. Take, for instance, my attempt at negotiations with the Dutch East Indies. I tried to smooth the way.

Q. But it failed, didn't it?

A. Well, to some extent it succeeded.

Q. But finally it resulted in the war which Japan initiated in this area to take over its territories. Isn't that true?

A. That is true.

Q. Don't you see that it is very difficult for any person to appreciate this statement that we are getting consistently from your official capacity, that you had every intention to bring peace to the world, but still this peace was on the end of a sword, and at the mouth of cannons and battleships. Where is the consistency in this attitude and statement? Do you think the people of the Philippines believe that statement about peace? Do you think the people of the Dutch Indies believe that statement?

A. No.

Q. Do you think the people who were raped and bombed at Nanking believe it?

A. No.

Q. Do you think I believe it?

A. No.

Q. Do you believe it?

A. Well, no. But I was making my best efforts against it.

Q. There is a great difference between making best efforts and the truth of the fact that it was not accomplished in that manner but by military force. Isn't that true?

A. Yes. I would say it is true, but don't you consider it also true that there were some Japanese who were for peace and struggling against it?

Q. Indeed so. I have found records of many leading citizens who believed in a peaceful pursuance of their plans, but on the other hand I consistently find that in questioning people concerned directly with these matters that they always go with the lily in one hand and the sword in the other. We wanted to bring peace and happiness to Chinese. The Army did it. We wanted to bring peace and happiness to the Philippines and the Indies. The army did it. It isn't consistent with good logical thinking to make a statement that I wanted peace, and still -- through these statements here, as far back as 1931 and 1932 you were one of the people who were advocating this Greater East Asia business, urging this expansion. You were the person who finally made the alliance with the Axis forces in the face of an urgent need for following a different program with the U. S., and still you say that in entering into this Axis agreement you were seeking, in some way, to work out the plan to the final analysis of an equitable understanding with America. Now, can you tell me or point to any single incident where this official act of entering into this tri-party alliance with Hitler and Italy who had at the time overrun all Europe, bringing some other sort of peace -- if you can point out some single fact by which the U. S. should think you were bent upon bringing peace to the Pacific, I would be glad to hear it.

A. First of all, while in Manchuria I acted as I said. I was getting along fine with most of the Chinese and carrying on peacefully the development of Manchuria, and

Q. Excuse me. What did you have to do with the development of Manchuria?

A. Such as development of a country in general, by laying out ~~subsidies~~ railways and improving their iron foundry and steel factories and fishing

and coal collieries, etc., to benefit to a great extent the Chinese population.

Q. Now, just a moment. You say to benefit the Chinese population, but history has shown that the development of the railroad, steel and iron and coal and other resources were the prime factors used by the military in this bringing of peace to the Far East.

A. Not altogether so.

Q. In a great part so. For the military's use -- isn't that true?

A. Not only.

Q. Isn't it true in part at least? What need had the Manchurian and Chinese people for great steel mills there?

A. Well, Japan needed them.

Q. For what?

A. For building up heavy industries.

Q. Of what nature? Principally those used for this expansion, isn't that so?

A. I think it went to build up Japan and its heavy industries, particularly. Anyhow, let it pass. In the case concerning the United States, the very fact that the President and Mr. Hull openly responded to the negotiations later on, showed that I could, by skillfull maneuvering and sincerity, come around and reach an understanding with the United States. The only thing is, the second Konoze Cabinet failed, and I fell seriously ill.

Q. In view of the well-known statements of history concerning Hitler's treaties made with other governments, you had a doubt as to the sincerity of Hitler keeping any treaty, didn't you?

A. No, I didn't.

Q. Do you know how many treaties he made with countries and governments, and then broke them within a period of a year?

A. No.

Q. Did you, as Foreign Minister, ever analyse the policy of Hitler's government with respect to making treaties and keeping them?

A. I had an opinion if Germany broke a treaty, more should Japan be sincere and try to keep treaties.

Q. Yet in view of those well-known facts you were the principal agent of your government in entering into an alliance with that Government.

A. Yes, but I was careful always, and watchful.

Q. Did you know at the time that you entered into the alliance with this government, the atrocities that Hitler's armies and his political ideology had inflicted upon human lives in Europe?

A. No.

Q. The whole world knows it now.

A. Yes, but in those days when I was out of the office I concerned myself very little about politics and world cities.

Q. Do you think, as a leading citizen and statements of Japan, -- what do you think of the so-called rape of Nanking?

A. I think very bad.

Q. And you don't think that brought love and peace under an eight-cornered house with the Emperor, and inspired those people?

A. Well, I am in earnest, more earnest than ever about that principle.

Q. Oh? Doesn't it occur to you that when you sit here and attempt to make the explanation that you were motivated by love and affection and desire for peace, and that on the other hand all of these territories and millions of people who came under the Japanese government in their expansion, came under that control not by love and affection or by education, but by the sword? That is not consistent, is it?

A. No. So I used to say from my youthhood that I am dreading that one day Japan will be misled by physical power and material aggrandisement, and we must retrace our steps and form a moral state in Japan.

Q. In view of present history, would you again enter into an alliance with Hitler and Mussolini?

A. If forced to for existence.

Q. By that do you mean you were in a position where you were forced to make this alliance?

A. At the time there was no other country to enter into alliance. As I said before.

Q. Where was the necessity to enter into any alliance?

A. To limit the European war to Europe, and try our best not to spread it to the Eastern race.

- Q. But right on that point, your Government and your army in 1931 initiated wars here in the Far East. Why were you so concerned to keep the European war out of the Far East? Your forces had already taken in great territories?
- A. That is so. Yes, I was anxious to bring about peace between Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek and Japan.
- Q. Your principal interest was to persuade the U. S. from its policy against the Axis, wasn't it?
- A. During the European war? Yes. Well, then again to enlist the aid of Germany in bringing about peace between China and Japan.
- Q. What plan did you have for bringing about peace between China and Japan, and still follow this enunciated plan of yours to encompass all the south-west Pacific under the Japanese banner? Now, how do you reconcile those two statements?
- A. My intention was to uplift the people in that region.
- Q. What do you mean when you say uplift?
- A. To improve the conditions.
- Q. By that do you mean putting them into graves?
- A. No. That is my idea and again about withdrawing our forces from China.
- Q. Have you any idea how many thousands of people have gone to an early grave and a watery grave by virtue of this spirit of love and affection to "uplift" them, as you say? Have you considered that?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you see from this window the destruction of your own city, Tokyo? Has that uplifted these people any?
- A. That is the misery of war.
- Q. It hasn't uplifted anyone, has it?
- A. No.
- Q. Why do you continue to use terms such as "uplift", "spiritual development" and so on? What is meant by "spiritual development"?
- A. I am explaining what I had as an ideal before. Now that we are beaten, these things are the misery of war.

Q. Yes, but in 1940 you weren't beaten when you were the man who announced, according to the official document, that you said "Manchuria, China, and certain other territories to the South." This was, as you declared, the duty of the Yamata race, to bring it under this Hakko Ichiu -- this doctrine of spiritual love. You enunciated that policy in 1939 and 1940, and in many of your writings as far back as 1931 and 1933 you enunciated such policies.

A. And I was fighting for that ideal. Now, take for instance Manchuria --- I was always trying my best, and the Chinese there know that. I was taking rather their side against the Japanese.

Q. That may be true personally, but the Manchurian Railroad in Manchuria was primarily developed as an assistance to the military for the operations of the Japanese Army in that area. Isn't that true?

A. No, to prevent war.

Q. You were the president of that railroad, weren't you? And when you left that position you were given a bonus of two million Yen.

A. No, that is a big fabrication. That is a lie.

Q. Can you point out to us now, except for the military expansion of Japan in Manchuria, and the military operations, where any direct benefit came to the Chinese people in that area by virtue of this railroad development?

A. By opening up the country the Chinese benefitted a great deal.

Q. In what respect?

A. In their living.

Q. What was the railroad used for?

A. Opening up the country. Now, if you traveled in the Yangto territory and then to Manchuria. Even the clothes worn by the farmers is all different, one in rags and the other in decent dress. I was struck by comparing the two.

Q. And you think the railroad development in Manchuria was of benefit to the farmers in that area?

A. Yes, the farmers and the Chinese population.

Q. The same theory was expounded in the occupation of Korea by the Japanese forces?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, you have lived long enough and been close enough -- do you think the Japanese occupation of Korea has been beneficial to the people as a race?

A. I think so. There has been a great change in their life.

Q. Through what influence, if you know, were you appointed the Foreign Minister in the Prince Konoye cabinet?

A. Prince Konoye asked for me.

Q. Do you know of any third party who contacted Prince Konoye with the proposition that you be named Foreign Minister?

A. I don't know.

Q. I will read you this statement and see if you agree. "The North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were official companies controlled by the Japanese government and acquired extensive and growing monopolistic control over all phases of economic life in China. The puppet regime established China's commerce linked with Japan in such a way that with trade control of such a character that while communist funds were able to move with comparative freedom, the normal flow of commerce between Japan and the United States was seriously disrupted." What about that statement?

A. About those matters I am not conversant.

Q. What sort of treaty was made with Wong Ching We, the puppet leader of the Chinese government?

A. I think on the whole it was to return extra territorials and recognize the government as an independent government.

Q. Did you ever make the statement that the Japanese foreign policy revolved around the Tri-Partite Pact?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you mean that when you said it?

A. I meant as regards Japanese diplomacy it revolved around the Japanese allies in that section.

Q. My question is, did you ever make the statement that "Japanese foreign policy revolves around the Tri-Partite Pact."?

A. Well, so I answered. In the sense that we used to say that our foreign policy revolves around the Anglo-Saxon -- around Japanese allies.

Q. In your conversation with Ambassador Steinhart in Moscow March 24, you made a suggestion to the effect that Roosevelt or Hull did not have confidence in you. Do you recall that?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall this statement, "Regarding the southward advance by the Japanese in Manchukuo, unless circumstances later render this impossible." Did you make that statement?

A. To who?

Q. Let us say Ambassador Grew.

A. I don't recall. I may have, but I don't recall.

Q. While you were Foreign Minister, was that one of your policies, that you had every intention of advancing southward peacefully if possible, unless circumstances rendered it impossible, and then you intended to advance by force, if necessary?

A. No. My policy was to go anywhere in the world that you are permitted to go peacefully. If not, there is no other way.

Q. In a conversation with Ambassador Grew, in relation to the ~~xxx~~ ultimatum to French Indo China for the occupation of Honoye Hapong and five airports, Ambassador Grew warned you that the U. S. would regard the occupation as emphatically an infringement of the status quo which the Japanese government had pledged to observe.

A. I don't recall whether Mr. Grew said so or not, but he handed me a memorandum to such effect.

Q. In any event, this ultimatum was delivered to French Indo China, and such occupation did take place?

A. Yes. Well, not ultimatum. I negotiated and French Indo China gave permission to land there. That is, to go into China from there.

Q. During your conversations in Berlin on this trip which you made in 1941, did you discuss the possibility of Germany supplying planes, airplanes, to the Japanese armed forces?

A. No. That is not in my province. And naturally I never referred to such military matters.

Q. Did you have a hand in establishing and setting up the Manchukuo government?

A. No.

Q. You did not?

A. No, I was an MP when the government was set up.

Q. Did you consider this a violation of the Nine Power Treaty?

A. No. As I said yesterday, I always regarded Manchuria as crown land of the Manchu Dynasty.

Q. Did you consider the government that was set up a bona fide government with all the sovereignty of any free government to deal as it saw fit on all matters?

A. Yes, I was of the opinion that inasmuch as they recognized Manchukuo as an independent country, that Japan must give freedom to be so.

Q. December 16 1938 there was set up a board called the China Affairs Board. It was for the realization of the new order in East Asia. What, if anything, did you have to do with the creation of this Board, or in an advisory capacity on the Board?

A. I had no interest in it. That is a government institution? Or what institution?

Q. A Japanese government institution, apparently. The China Affairs Board, created for realizing a new order in East Asia, in 1938.

A. I never heard of it.

Q. In March 1941 what was the nature of the conversation or visit that you had with Ambassador Steinhart in Moscow?

A. I think it was when Steinhart gave me a luncheon in the Embassy. After lunch -- of course it was between ourselves as I said in a book -- your President was the biggest gambler in the States. Laughingly, you know. Now, won't he gamble with Japan just once and if he says that he can't trust Japan won't he trust me just once and tell China to negotiate directly with Japan? I will do just another fair thing by China, and I asked him to send those words out to Washington.

Q. Now, when you were Foreign Minister there was a treaty negotiated with the Nanking Government?

A. Pardon me just a moment. It was before that occasion one more occasion when he called me at our Embassy. To his question I replied frankly that I will do my best to negotiate a neutrality pact or non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia, and he said you couldn't do anything with Soviet Russia now. Well, I said might be but I will try it. It no doubt would be welcomed by America too.

Q. In November 1940 a treaty was entered into with the Nanking Government, the substance as follows: The treaty contained the provision that Japan should in order to carry out defense against communistic activities, through collaboration of the two countries, station the required forces in specific strategic areas of Nanking and North China for the natural duration." That China should "recognize that Japan may in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interest in the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and forces in specific areas within the territory of the responsibility of China. That, while considering the requirements of China the Government of the Republic of China be required to afford positive and full facilities to Japan and the Japanese subjects with respect to the utilization of its resources." Was such treaty entered into while you were Foreign Minister?

A. I think so.

Q. That was with the so-called puppet government of China?

A. Yes. All these things were practically arranged before I joined the government.

Q. Did you know a Japanese gentleman by the name of ACHIYAMA?

A. There are lots of Achiyamas.

Q. A particular friend of yours?

A. Achiyama who?

Q. His other name was Tesuki.

A. Oh, that old man. Yes, I know him.

Q. Did he propose your name, do you know, to Prince Konoye as Foreign Minister in the cabinet?

A. No, I don't know.

Q. You don't remember requesting him to?

A. No. You know, I will tell you, there are lots of men after you are given a certain post, say I recommended, I recommended, and all the things he did.

Q. Who is this man? Was he close to the Throne?

A. No, he is an old man.

Q. Then if this statement was made -- "Achiyama was originally the means by which Matsuoka gained access to Konoye," was that true?

A. No, untrue.

Q. Achiyama was also instrumental in getting a cabinet post for ACHITA, in the second Konoye cabinet. Do you know anything about that?

A. Yes. Achita was very closely connected with Achiyama. Since he was editor, I think, on a newspaper. That newspaper was owned by Achiyama and Achiyama was in those days rather close with Prince Konoye, and he might have recommended Achita or me, but I used to be close to Prince Konoye without anyone's intercession, and Achita I recommended myself to Konoye. But that doesn't exclude Mr. Achiyama from recommending.

Q. Did you ever give a sum of money to Achita to deliver to Achiyama in consideration for the cabinet appointment?

A. No. Not a sen.

Q. And it is not true that when you retired from the South Manchurian Railway, you were given a bonus of two million yen?

A. That is entirely fabrication. I got only the usual small remuneration.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, when you were Foreign Minister, did you try to get an oil ~~concession~~ concession from the Netherlands East Indies, for and on behalf of MITSUI?

A. No. I have never been interested in my life for getting any concession for anyone.

Q. Then that is untrue?

A. That is untrue altogether.

Q. Is there anything more you would like to say before we conclude this afternoon?

A. No. I have nothing more to say.

Q. Well now, Mr. Matsuoka, you can see where all of this leads us. It simply isn't logical or human logic, at least. I think we must concede at the outset that we are concerned with considering human conditions, and we will not talk about the realm of the supernatural, so that in approaching the questions and answers to these matters, we approach them in a human, natural, logical manner.

A. Yes.

Q. And what a person's intent was at the time he did a thing is finally to be judged by what he said and did at that time and place. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Don't you agree with me that it would sound silly for me to try to convince you that I was motivated by the kindest, most affectionate brotherly feeling for you, to force myself into your home and upon your property, on the theory that it was good for you?

No answer.

Q. What was the attitude of the Emperor regarding this ultranationalistic spirit of Hakko Ichiu?

A. I never heard. I never spoke with him about it.

Q. Did he ever consult with you about it?

A. No.

Q. This same spirit or ideology was also motivating a certain group in the Army. Isn't that true?

A. I think some officers.

Q. The Bushudo spirit installed in the army was along this same ideological line, that this obedience to the Emperor and it was their duty to bring this love and affection and peace to others?

A. No. Bushudo is a different thing. It is an idea about one's conduct.

Q. Well, we will just strike out the word Bushudo. But there was a group in the Army that had this same ~~idea~~ idea, in a military group. Isn't that so?

A. Well, some of the ideas were absurd. I don't quite agree.

Q. You recall, of course, in Japan's history, that these so-called incidents took place, with many public officials executed? What about that?

A. Yes.

Q. And as a matter of fact, it is known that these executions were motivated and executed by these young officers in the military.

A. Yes.

Q. And that they were imbued with some so-called spiritual motive? Is that true?

A. No. I certainly never heard about it coming from spiritualism.

Q. You considered it a practical thing, didn't you?

A. No. I have opposed executions always.

Q. You have heard of the blood brotherhood league and various organizations organized principally around the military for the dissemination and control of the government. You recall the incident where they assaulted and murdered people close to the Emperor?

A. They were murdered by mistaken young heads.

Q. Well, I think that will be sufficient for today.

4191

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 11 March 1946, 0935 -- 1130 hours

Place: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present: MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. This morning we are going to touch upon your visit to Moscow and Berlin in March of 1941, particularly your conversations with the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to subsequently as RAM. Particularly conversations that had taken place on or about March 29/1941.

A. That is when I was in Berlin.

Q. In Berlin, yes. Now, according to Document #172, for the purpose of identification, I will read you the following statement and then afterward ask you whether or not you recall such conversation on that date, or the substance of such a conversation. "The Reich Foreign Minister resumed the preceding conversations with Mr. Matsuoka."

A. Who was he?

Q. The German Foreign Minister.

A. Oh, von Ribbentrop.

Q. "Resuming his conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had previously left off." Now, did you previously have some conversations with von Ribbentrop about your conversations in Russia concerning a prospective alliance, or anything with Russia? Apparently this takes up the conversation of the day previous, or something. Had you been previously discussing with von Ribbentrop your intention to go to Russia and talk with the Russians concerning an alliance or something of the sort?

A. No. I have only referred to that subject in my conversation with von Ribbentrop the night before I left Berlin.

Q. Then you don't recall having had any conversation previous to March 29?

A. No.

MAR 13 1946

118-79

Q. "Then he expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far." Do you remember von Ribbentrop offering that suggestion?

A. No.

Q. "He did not know how the situation would develop." Meaning, of course, von Ribbentrop. Did he make that explanation to you concerning the Russians?

A. No.

Q. Now, I won't stop at each sentence in the future. I will read the whole paragraph. "The RAM resumed the preceding conversations with Mr. Matsuoka. Resuming his conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had previously left off. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussion with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop."

A. With Russia, what?

Q. Too far. "He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far." That was Ribbentrop's opinion expressed to you. Not to carry them too far.

A. No.

Q. One thing, however, was said -- namely, that Germany would strike immediately should Russia ever attack Japan. Do you remember that conversation?

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. This was Ribbentrop's assurance to you that Germany would strike immediately if Russia should attack Japan. This is March 29.

A. He may have, but I don't remember. I don't attach much importance.

Q. You mean you attached no importance to this statement if it was made?

A. No.

Q. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance so that Japan could push forward to the south or Singapore without fear of possible complications with Russia. Do you recall the substance of this conversation?

A. No.

Q. "The largest part of the German army was on the eastern frontier of the Reich, and fully prepared to open an attack at any time. He (von Ribbentrop)

however, believed Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however, enter into conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case Japan had, of course, even less reason than ever if it wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently it need not refrain from such an understanding because of the present fears of Russia." Do you recall that conversation?

A. I never discussed with von Ribbentrop about Singapore.

Q. "He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify his present policy against Germany. He (von Ribbentrop) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible." Do you remember that conversation, or the substance of a conversation with von Ribbentrop, outlining these facts?

A. I didn't say anything but von Ribbentrop explained the situation to me.

Q. Do you recall his explaining the situation in that manner? Is that substantially what he said?

A. Substantially correct, but I did not refer to Singapore or like that. He explained fully the relations between Soviet Russia and Germany.

Q. Now, if he did say that to you, what did that indicate to you, Mr. Matsuoka? If he did say "On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible." What did you consider that to mean? You are a Foreign Minister, weighing what this man is saying to you.

A. It meant a great deal to me because one of the objects of the Tri-Partite Pact, as I explained the other day, was to ask Germany to employ good offices between Soviet Russia and Japan, to aid Japan in getting a neutrality pact or non-aggression pact with Russia and otherwise improve the relations between the two. Actually, upon the conclusion of that three-party pact, I asked von Ribbentrop to do so, and he tried to do so when Mr. Molotov went to Berlin. I think that was some time in December 1940. Molotov promised to make an advice after getting back to Moscow. And again I pressed upon von Ribbentrop by wire to try more to employ good offices, and so

Q. About what time was this?

A. That was some time next year, early the next year - just before I went out to Berlin.

Q. Just before you went to Berlin you sent a wire to von Ribbentrop urging him

to use their good offices to obtain for your government, from Russia, a non-aggression treaty?

A. Non-aggression or neutrality pact.

Q. Well now, Mr. Matsueka, why, at that time, did you consider that the non-aggression or neutrality pact with Russia was of such importance to your government?

A. That was my program from the start. It had been my contention for years to be on better terms with Soviet Russia.

Q. Why was it so important at this time that you urged the other powerful member of the tri-partite alliance to use the force of their good offices to assist you in obtaining this?

A. I thought Germany was very close and on friendly terms with Soviet Russia, and had a chance to make use of their good offices. Let me complete what I wish to say. When I reached Berlin it was I who said to von Ribbentrop whether he could use good offices concerning the subject. Then he began to explain the situation, and concluded that it was impossible for Germany, in the circumstances, to do so.

Q. Why did you find it urgent and necessary at this period in the international relations of Japan to have such a treaty with Russia?

A. Well, that was my program, and after obtaining neutrality pact or non-aggression pact, there were two drafts, you know, so that I might after adjusting the relations with Soviet Russia, avail myself of opportune moment to go to the U. S. and talk with the President and Mr. Hull about the Pacific, and about the China problem.

Q. And you did consider that this non-aggression treaty was a necessary step before negotiating the Chinese problem with the U. S.?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. So if possible to enlist the aid of Soviet Russia also to our amicable settlement with China. And I must tell you, as I said the other day, that my visit to Berlin and Rome was largely a kind of camouflage, and my real intentions from the start when I was leaving Tokyo was to conclude the neutrality pact or non-aggression treaty with Soviet Russia.

Q. Very well. Was this not inconsistent with the principles of the anti-Comintern Pact, previously entered into by your government and Germany and Italy, and other nations?

A. No, I don't regard it so. And anyhow, the Anti-Comintern Pact was as good as dead then.

Q. Before you had negotiated this non-aggression pact with Russia, you and Prime Minister Konoye had already announced to the world your intentions of expansion in Greater East Asia, is that correct?

A. Not exactly expansion. It ^{is} the policy the same as previously, the previous cabinet announced to the world.

Q. On September 27 1940, which was the day on which the Tri-Party alliance was signed, you made a speech advocating the alliance and the establishment of a "new world order as the final objective of the Yamato race." Isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. In a speech on August 10 1940 you enunciated, "The establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and further stated, "In establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, we cooperate with nations having the same beliefs as we. Above that, we must create more countries of this type and must eliminate all obstacles with firmness," in a speech 10 August 1940. Is that correct?

A. Yes. It was this, that I wished all over the world the same principle.

Q. Now, may I ask this question. Since this was your announced policy, was that not the principal purpose and reason controlling your desire for this so-called non-aggression treaty with Russia?

A. No, not particularly.

Q. Not particularly?

A. No, it may contribute toward it but I had not this treaty with Russia particularly in mind in that connection.

Q. Now, your announced policy of expansion in this Greater East Asia thing did not include in its expansion of Greater East Asia, parts of Russia, did it?

A. No, that is what I say. That I hold the principle of Hakko Ichiu all over the world. Let every nation or race have its own place and work out each its own destiny. But I announced the Greater East Asia policy simply as a start, to begin with. To begin in the nations near to us. It is not an expansion, but it is peace.

Q. Isn't it true that the purpose for your urgent and immediate necessity for this treaty with Russia was after consultation with the other members of the cabinet, particularly these factions of the government, the military, who were

about to carry out this expansion to secure your territories in the north and such territories as bordered upon Russia against interference from the Russian government or forces, while your other military forces were engaged in following out this expansion which you had enunciated in China and to the southward, and the so-called Pacific areas?

A. No.

Q. Well, it is true, isn't it, that if you were not certain as to Russia's disposition in the matter, the question of the expansion would have to consider this factor in its undertaking. Isn't that true?

A. Oh no, I wouldn't say. My contention was this peaceful move and Russian attitude doesn't concern me, nor did I ever discuss with the military about the matter. And as I repeated the other day, my hope to be on better terms with Soviet Russia I had for years, and the negotiations with Soviet Russia took years before we reached the stage of concluding the pact. It was not all of a sudden, at all.

Q. Now, at the time you made this request of Germany, to use their good offices in this manner, did you have any knowledge that Germany was then preparing for an attack upon Russia?

A. No. Instead I thought Germany was on the best of terms on account of Hitler's visiting Moscow and concluding a pact.

Q. Therefore, when von Ribbentrop made this statement to you, "On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict even if it were not probable would have to be considered possible," did that indicate to you at the time that the relationship between Germany and Russia was not friendly?

A. Was not friendly? Therefore I made up my mind to double my efforts on my return trip to get the pact myself.

Q. Now, as a matter of fact, according to that statement, then you did negotiate the pact with the Russian Government without the aid or assistance of Germany. Is that correct?

A. We were for years

Q. No, I want an answer to this question -- you did conclude this without the good offices of Germany.

A. Yes, you are correct.

Q. You are sure, in presenting your reasons for obtaining this treaty, with Russia, that you did not outline to the Russians that you had recently

discovered that Germany was about to attack Russia, in any event?

A. No sir.

Q. Let me finish. And that it would be to Russia's advantage to conclude this treaty with you, inasmuch as you were a party to the Tri-Party alliance, and you would find it quite agreeable under those circumstances to join the war also with Germany against Russia?

A. No. I never referred to Germany.

Q. Now, since you found it so difficult over such a long period of time, you had even urged as you say, von Ribbentrop by telegram to use his good offices to assist in getting this treaty, -- how do you account for the fact that in the final analysis you were able to conclude this treaty in a short period of time without, as you say, the good offices of Germany?

A. I think if I could see Stalin in person, I don't think I could ever have gotten that pact otherwise. I had two or three conferences with Mr. Molotov but I despaired. At the last, Mr. Stalin was to see me, and I talked straight with him and I reminded him that mine was not an improvised policy but that he perhaps knew I was working for more relations, better relations between Soviet Russia and Japan -- or, I should say between Russia and Japan because there was no Soviet Russia long many tens of years ago. That I had that policy for more than thirty years, and he knew it, Mr. Stalin.

Q. Now, further reading

A. I have to remind you, my left ear is deaf sometimes and I can't hear.

Q. Continuing to read from Document 172, concerning the same conversation of March 29, you had with von Ribbentrop, "Next the RAN turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese, of possible attack by submarines based at the Philippines and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean home fleet, he had again discussed the situation with General Admiral Raeder, the latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands full in the English home waters and that meant it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General Admiral Raeder had described the U. S. submarine as so bad that Japan did not need to bother about it at all. Matsuka replied that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of a threat from the British Navy. It also held the view that in the event of a clash with America, and the American Navy, they would be able to smash it without trouble. However, he was afraid that the U. S. Navy would not take up the conflict with the fleet; thus the conflict might be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan." Do you remember that?

A. I remember as clearly as anything that I never discussed with either von

Ribbentrop or Raeder, military matters -- and you must know that the Japanese Foreign Minister seldom discusses any military matters.

Q. You would not have me understand, Mr. Matsuoka, that you, acting as Foreign Minister, would act in any regard concerning the Japanese nation, without having knowledge of what the military implications were that would result from these dealings?

A. Yes, but he doesn't discuss it.

Q. You claim that you have no knowledge of military matters, or have never discussed anything with military matters involved. Do you want me to understand that in your dealings with other nations, you were never controlled by implications of military matters or situations?

A. I mean that urgent military matters I had to refer to the competent authorities and get their opinion first. Also to possess or impart, to say anything about military matters.

Q. You mean you have never discussed military implications or aid or circumstances -- from Germany to the Japanese nation -- you, as Foreign Minister?

A. No.

Q. Had you ever instructed Oshima to discuss these questions?

A. No.

Q. Then you would have us understand that your whole dealings with the German Foreign Minister was absolutely void of any conversation having to do with the military forces of your nation, Germany, or other nations which you might consider would be affected one way or another?

A. No.

Q. Reading further from the same document, "The RAN replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan for, while on the one hand she could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan. For the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the lack of rearmament, he would have nothing to replace this loss."

A. Who said, von Ribbentrop? No.

Q. Did you have such a conversation at any other time than 29 March?

A. No. I never touched upon the possibility of America coming into the war.

Q. With anyone, officially or unofficially?

A. No.

Q. Reading further, "In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key possession of England in the East; therefore it might appear to be friendly in words and acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day they would suddenly open the attack on Singapore." Did you ever have such a conversation with von Ribbentrop?

A. No, that is all fabrications.

Q. You are sure about this?

A. Yes.

Q. "In this connection, Mr. Matsuoka, stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow ("Nothing succeeds like success" the RAN remarked) and continuing, "he followed here the example of the words of a famous statesman, addressed to the Japanese nation at the outbreak of the Russian-Japanese war, "You open fire and then the nation will be united." Japan needed to be awakened. After all, as an Oriental he believed in that, things which would come would come whether you wanted it or not." Did you have such a conversation?

A. No, fabrications.

Q. Reading further, "Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance. The RAN replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore, in order that the Fuehrer who probably must be considered the greatest expert of military questions at the present time, could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal. They could draw up a report based on European experiences, for the Japanese, on the use of dive bombers from airfields in the vicinity, against the British fleet at Singapore. Thus, the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately. Matsuoka remarked that Japan was least concerned with the British fleet, but with the sure capture of the fortifications."

A. I do not remember anything of the kind.

Q. "The RAN replied that here too the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attack on strongly fortified positions such as the Maginot Line, which he could make available to Japan." Did he offer that?

A. No.

Q. "Matsuoka replied, in this connection, that some of the younger expert Japanese naval officers were close friends of his." Do you recall making that statement?

Q. "These officers were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed six months. If the capture of Singapore required more time, and if the operations would drag for a year, the situation with America would be extremely critical, and he did not as yet know how to meet it." Did you make such statements or representations to von Ribbentrop?

A. All fabrications. I am wondering who fabricated so.

Q. Continuing, "If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, as he was afraid in case of Japanese attack in this area, the oil fields would be set afire and could be brought into operation again only after one or two years."

A. No.

Q. "The RAN added that Japan would get decisive influence over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore." You don't recall any such conversation as we have outlined here?

A. No.

Q. "Regarding the discussions between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the presence of the RAN and the Minister of State, Weisner, in Berlin, 4 April 1941," -- do you recall that? April 1941 you had a discussion with the Fuehrer, the Foreign Minister of Germany, and one Mr. Weisner, Minister of State in Berlin.

A. I don't know the exact date, or Minister Weisner, who he is. I went to say goodbye and tender thanks to the Fuehrer before entraining for Rome, before I left Berlin.

Q. This was a conversation in which these persons above-mentioned and yourself were present. To refresh your recollection, I will read, "Matsuoka further mentioned that he was induced to make these endeavors for peace particularly

in view of the personality of Cardinal Gaspari. Furthermore, he had endeavored to convince the Pope that the U. S. and particularly the American President, would prolong the war in Europe and China. It was not a question to determine if America and the President were right or wrong; they certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the reason, or right or wrong, one had to state the facts. In regard to China, he had tried to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely Bolshevism, which threatened to spread in China and the entire East. It is regretful that America and England aided Bolshevism." Do you recall making that conversation? Reporting to them what you had discussed with the Pope or Cardinal Gaspari?

A. I don't discuss with Cardinal Gaspari, therefore there is no reason why I should talk about my conversation with him, but my conversation with the Pope, of course, I just carefully told Hitler that I projected myself to his Holiness and I sought his aid for peace, and I don't think I said that Great Britain and America aided the Chinese in Bolshevism. But I ~~said~~ ^{pleaded} to His Holiness I besought his Holiness the Pope to use his Catholic influence in improving and maintaining peace -- maintaining and preserving peace between America and Japan.

Q. Did you tell Hitler and von Ribbentrop and Weisner that, on 4 April 1941?

A. Well, whether I told it in such detail I don't recall, but I said more the purpose of calling on the Pope, I told Hitler. And also that I sought aid of his Catholic influence to induce China to come to peace with Japan.

Q. Do you remember at that time that Hitler interrupted by stating that both countries had also aided Spain with Bolshevism?

A. No.

Q. Now, further reading from this same meeting with Hitler, April 4 1941, -- "With reference to that from this same document, -- "Matsuoka then expressed the request that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broadmindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning the U-boat warfare which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of war as well as all the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid war with the U. S. In case that the country should attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy of course had to be prepared for a fight with the U. S., because in that case America probably would fight with Great Britain, and he (Matsuoka) personally believed that the U. S. could be refrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, counted on the worst situation; that is, with the war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer, and would take the form of a guerilla warfare in the Pacific, and would be fought out in the South Seas. For this reason, German experience in guerilla warfare is of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted, and how all

the technical improvements of submarines in all details, such as periscopes, etc., could be exploited by Japan. To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that proper German authorities would place at the disposal of Japan these inventions concerning the Army and Navy which were desired by the Japanese." Did you make such a request of the Fuehrer?

A. I should say by discussing these military matters in detail

Q. That is what I am trying to find out.

A. No. Maybe I asked -- I might have asked the Fuehrer to instruct that German authorities come and give new inventions on machineries to the Japanese. But to discuss,

Q. You mean new inventions of machinery of the Army and Navy?

A. Yes, and also for peaceful development, too.

Q. You say you might have talked of this on other occasions, but not on the occasion mentioned here?

A. Yes. I may have said just a few words on it. A general request, although I don't remember.

Q. You don't remember requesting this sort of assistance from the German government?

A. From Hitler just in a general way -- just aiding Japan with new inventions.

Q. Was von Ribbentrop present when you made this suggestion?

A. I do not know if von Ribbentrop was present on the 4th, but he was present when I first called on Hitler.

Q. Did you ever instruct Oshima to make similar explanations or requests of the German government?

A. No, I never made such request.

Q. Do you know, to your knowledge, did he make such a request?

A. No.

Q. What, in your best judgment, is the time or date that you made these representations? Was that while you were in Berlin on this visit before the signing of the non-aggression pact with Russia?

A. So.

Q. So? By that you mean yes?

A. Yes. Just making general request.

Q. And these requests did have to do with the military inventions, designs and uses which the Germans had experienced by their use of such things as submarines etc.?

A. No, I never touched on submarines at all.

Q. What did you touch on?

A. That is a request relating to our agreement with the Tri-Partite Pact, when it was signed.

Q. What was that agreement?

A. Founding of a committee, you know.

Q. You mean a military commission?

A. Military and peaceful.

Q. And there was an agreement to establish a military commission, wasn't there?

A. Not only military but it included economic.

Q. What was the purpose of the formation of this?

A. Well, for development of the Far East. New inventions and machineries.

Q. To carry on the development in the Far East, the new East Asia program?

A. Even in Japan.

Q. Well, was it designed to carry on military operations, if necessary?

A. No. That I had nothing to do with.

Q. What, for example, was it designed to do? Give us some idea. On how to grow better rice or better wheat, or what?
~~xxxxxx~~

A. Particularly this -- heavy industries and manufacture.

Q. Of what?

A. Manufacture of different kinds.

Q. For example, what?

A. To develop the manufacture of cotton goods. Japan was already well developed, but we wanted some better machines.

Q. What sort of machines?

A. For developing this peaceful industry.

Q. Peaceful industry? What nature? What do you call peaceful industries?

A. Some of the heavy industries.

Q. Well, for example, name some of them.

A. Well, some light industries. For instance in the line of heavy industry you might mention this -- steel work or iron foundry and again this collieries, machines, etc.

Q. What was your need for these things at that time?

A. Well, not at that time. We always be needing new machines and inventions all through.

Q. Do you consider submarines a peaceful machinery?

A. No, no.

Q. Further reading from this same document, "The Fuehrer promised this, and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the U. S. undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contribution would depend upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is contingent upon the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not only against England but also against America. Germany had made preparations so that no Americans could land in Europe. She would conduct a most emphatic fight against America with her U-Boats and Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience which would still have to be acquired by the U. S., she would be vastly superior, and quite apart from that fact, the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American." Did he say such as that in this meeting?

A. No. I said I never discussed.

Q. I asked you whether or not Hitler made that statement in your presence?

A. No.

Q. "In the further course of the discussion, the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequence if Japan would get involved with the U. S." Did he say that to you?

A. No.

Q. "It did not matter with whom the U. S. would first get involved with, Germany or Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding without the other country. It would subsequently be liquidated. Therefore, Germany would strike without delay in case of conflict between Japan and America because of the strength of the Tri-Power Pact which lies in joint action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be taken individually." Did he make that representation to you?

A. No, except the last part. I think he said that to me. About the Three-Party powers adopting a strong united front in order to achieve one of the objectives of the Tri-Partite Pact; that is, to be of any effect in preventing America in joining the European war.

Q. Then he did have that much of the conversation in your presence?

A. Yes.

Q. What gave rise to this remark on Hitler's part?

A. Perhaps he heard, I suppose, that Japan was not adopting a strong united front.

Q. Against whom?

A. Against the world.

Q. Well, particularly America? He said here he was concerned about America.

A. Well, that will naturally include America, because the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded, that was one of the objectives, to prevent America from joining the war.

Q. By any means?

A. No.

Q. "Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of Japan the latest improvements and inventions which are of interest to them because Japan's navy had to prepare immediately for conflict with the U. S." Did you make that representation?

A. No, not entirely true. I made a general request to make to strengthen the original agreement, but I don't refer to Navy or Army.

Q. Did you say "because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for conflict with the U. S.?"

A. No.

Q. What was the necessity for this request then, to make, as you say, make these things available to you?

A. Well, that was included in the Three-Party Pact.

Q. The Three-Party Pact does not say anything about an exchange of inventions or knowledge and materials etc., concerning military aids, does it?

A. So, yes. Whether it says in so many words or not. The founding of this commission meant that. Through Rome and Berlin to exchange new inventions and machineries.

Q. Further reading, "As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the U. S. would be unavoidable if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His arguments went, so why should Japan therefore not decisively strike at the right moment, and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with a dangerous thought. He, however, stated that if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway, and that this would then be under less favorable conditions and circumstances than at present." Do you recall making that representation?

A. No.

Q. Reading further, "The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in a similar situation (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of the sovereignty of armed forces.) He was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and action conditions." Further, "How right he was, and his attitude was proven by the events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who did not let danger come to them but who would bravely face danger." Do you recall any of that?

A. No.

Q. "Matsuoka replied that the U. S., or rather their ruling politicians, had recently attempted a mass movement toward Japan by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas, provided Japan gave free passage of rubber, tin etc., to America, to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation, naturally, did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because the education oriented along English lines which many had received." Do you recall that conversation?

A. No.

Q. Had there been any representations made to your government by America concerning this free passage of tin and rubber from the Indies?

A. No.

Q. Then the whole text of this statement is false, is it?

A. I don't know whether made or not made, but I never made it.

Q. The whole thing is false?

A. Yes.

Q. "The Fuehrer commented on this, that the attitude of America did not mean anything but that the U. S. had the hope that as long as the British world empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas in case of a collapse of the world empire they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan."

A. No.

Q. The Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, at this point interjected, "The Americans under all circumstances want to maintain the powerful forces of England in the East Asia, but that on the other hand it is proved by this attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany." Do you recall von Ribbentrop making that conversation?

A. No.

Q. "Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him on secrecy; that Matsuoka, as Foreign Minister, could not utter a single word in Japan of all he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the RAN, regarding his plan." Did you tell him that?

A. No. Only I said in some conversation that secret is liable to leak out in Japanese government.

Q. What secret?

A. Any secret.

Q. Particularly what secret did you have in mind?

A. No. I made general comment.

Q. To whom?

A. I think it was Hitler.

Q. That the Japanese government is a government that cannot keep any secret?

A. Yes.

Q. What secret did you have in mind when you said that?

A. I don't have any particular subject.

Q. What prompted you to say that to him?

A. Simply that we must be very cautious

Q. About what?

A. About anything, any secret.

Q. What secret, for example?

A. I said I don't bear in my mind any particular secret.

Q. You are talking about something you didn't have anything in mind about, is that right?

A. No. But in a conversation with anyone like Hitler, to remind him nothing can be kept secret you have to be very cautious to tell that to the Japanese government.

Q. Further reading from the same paragraph, "This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, of telling a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors which he had to oppose very energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances, he could not indicate how soon he could report on the questions discussed, to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study, in the first place, the development in Japan so as to make a decision at a favorable moment. To make a clean breast of his plans to the Emperor and Prince Konoye, and then the decision would have to be made within a few days because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk."

A. That is one of the thoughts I had, but on that occasion I had nothing to say about it.

Q. Do you recall pointing out to Hitler and von Ribbentrop the necessity for keeping secret your conversation with them? Setting forth the reasons that have been enunciated in this paragraph I have read?

A. No. I had nothing to report about.

Q. You previously said you asked them to protect these secrets.

A. No, I said generally, and about American authorities.

Q. I am not talking about American authorities. I want to know whether you said to Hitler and von Ribbentrop, "Keep our conversation secret because if it leaks out in Japan I would be ruined politically."

A. To that I say no.

Q. Further, "Should he (Matsuoka) fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof he was lacking in influence, in power, and in technical capability. However, should he succeed, it would prove he had great influence in Japan. He had great confidence he would succeed."

A. No. I said nothing of the kind.

Q. "Upon his return, and being questioned -- this is you -- he would indeed admit to the Emperor and the Premier and the Ministers of the Army and Navy, that Singapore had been talked about. He would, however, state it was only on a hypothetical basis." Did you make that representation?

A. No.

Q. "Besides this, he made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to feel that by cabling something would leak out. If necessary, he would send a courier."

A. No.

Q. "The Fuehrer agreed and assured Matsuoka that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence. Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately he could not say the same for Japan." Did you make that statement?

A. Well, in a general way, yes. I envied the reticence of Germany.

Q. "At this point, discussion was terminated after exchange of some personal parting words, in the City of Berlin, 4th day of April 1941." Do you recall that date, for example?

A. No, I do not recall.

Q. But you do recall having such a meeting?

A. I feel that I said one or two things from your reading, but I think that was at the first meeting I had with Hitler.

Q. On 5 April, the next day, you continued some conversation with von Ribbentrop, didn't you?

A. What day did I leave Berlin? It was the night before I left Berlin.

Q. On 4 April, were the conversations with Hitler, von Ribbentrop, this other gentleman and yourself held? Now, on the next day, there are notes of talks between the RAM and the Japanese Foreign Minister, 5 April. Reading from pages 2 and 3, I will read you, "Matsuoka then spoke on the generally high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works."

A. I don't know the name, but I visited one works.

Q. A large factory?

A. Yes.

Q. What were they making there?

A. I think heavy industry.

Q. What were they making -- automobiles, pens, washing machines, airplanes, battleships, or what?

A. I think they were turning out cannon balls.

Q. Shells, you mean?

A. Shells, in the company of Dr. Ley.

Q. "He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not yet advanced as far as in Germany, and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence." Do you remember that?

A. No.

Q. But you do remember visiting this works?

A. Yes.

Q. Further, "The RAM replied that at best a nation which has realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. Intellectuals had ruined France and in Germany had already started their pernicious activities when mass Bolshevism put a stop

to it. It will be the cause of the downfall of freedom which is to be expected with certainty." Did he tell you that?

A. Who?

Q. von Ribbentrop. The same day that you visited this plant, when you commented on the general attitude of the Germans. Did you say that?

A. I may have.

Q. But you don't recall von Ribbentrop making this statement to you about parasites?

A. No.

Q. "In answer to a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was now awakening, and according to the Japanese temperament would take action quickly. After a lengthy deliberation, the RAM replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept certain risks in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of the sovereignty of armament, and the resignation from the League of Nations." Do you remember that?

A. No.

Q. "The RAM replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of ancient traditions of Holy Roman Empire, which in its time was the only example for the European nations."

A. I do remember, not in that conversation but sometime while I was in Berlin, that it was Frederick the Great, and Bismarck, and now Hitler, who made modern Germany.

Q. "In conclusion, the RAM once again summarized points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan -- 1) that Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year, the world would realize this, even England would have to concede it, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact." Do you recall that statement?

A. No.

Q. "2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan would be predominant in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and North Africa." Do you recall that statement on 5 April 1941, in your conference with von Ribbentrop?

A1 No. I don't remember hearing Ribbentrop in that conversation, but I do vaguely remember Ribbentrop was making a remark something like that.

Q. To you?

A. Yes.

Q. And was it while you were there on this trip, while you were Foreign Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. Your only doubt is as to the date, but you do recall his making a statement of that nature?

A. Yes.

Q. "Point 3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war, but it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan -- a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia." Do you remember that?

A. No, I never heard such a thing.

Q. Well, you remember point two having been said?

A. Yes, sometime.

Q. But you don't recall point three or point one?

A. No.

Q. "Matsuka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation should be offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was now confronting such an opportunity. She would have to assume the risk connected with it and would have to act decisively at the right moment, in order that she could take advantage of this unique opportunity."

A. No, on the contrary von Ribbentrop said a man like Hitler would come out rarely, and the fate of Germany might be determined for the coming one thousand years, and I said nothing to that.

Q. Well, what did you agree upon with the Fuehrer and von Ribbentrop at these meetings held in Berlin?

A. In Berlin the first time I called on Hitler, he immediately broached the Singapore question, and by way of joking and bluff, I said like Japan would take Singapore before she allied herself with Germany, but saying that was a joke. In conclusion I said but as a matter of fact that question that is whether -- I am talking to you the sense of the thing -- whether Japan would take Singapore or when she would take Singapore, that must be left to Japan alone to decide. Whereupon Hitler saw the point, you know, that I meant by saying that that it was included in Greater East Asia, and Germany had nothing to do with it. Whereupon Hitler dropped the question and never referred to it again, and von Ribbentrop on that occasion said nothing in the presence of Hitler and the rest of them and the time was devoted largely to the describing by Hitler of war conditions in Europe, particularly western Europe. With Hitler or von Ribbentrop I never discussed about the possibility of war with America.

Q. Well, as a matter of fact, the Japanese Army and Navy did attack Singapore, didn't they?

A. Oh, that is on different ground.

Q. That is not the question. I just want an answer to that question,--as a matter of fact, Singapore was one of the first places the Japanese military forces attacked?

A. I think they attacked Pearl Harbor and Singapore at the same time, didn't they?

Q. Well, did they?

A. Which preceded, I don't know.

Q. When did you leave the Foreign Ministry Office? What date? In July 1941, do you remember the exact date?

A. I left the office? I handed in my resignation I think on the 16th July and I was relieved of my post next day.

Q. There was an important conference held July 2, wasn't there, in 1941? Here in Japan?

A. I was in Tokyo then.

Q. The Imperial conference, July 2, 1941, which decided on the Imperial policy for coping with changing situations, where certain policies were adopted. Did you attend that conference?

A. I don't remember exactly the date, but 2nd, or 3rd or 4th.

Q. According to record, the Imperial conference of 2 July -- at this conference the principal points of Imperial policy for the changing situation were adopted. The policy that Japan would adhere to the establishing of the Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. Do you recall such a policy?

A. No.

Q. 2) that Japan would endeavor to dispose of the China Incident and move southward to establish a forward base for herself and selfexistence. Do you recall that?

A. I clearly recall that such a thing was not decided in the presence of the Emperor.

Q. The principal points were 1) to defeat China, pressure will be increased from the south by fighting, propaganda, and diplomatically. 2) Advance south shall be reinforced, and the policy decided regarding Indo China and Thailand executed. 3) Referring to the Russo-German war, the spirit of the non-aggression pact shall be maintained and every effort made to deal with the situation in our own way with diplomatic negotiations. 4) Every effort will be made to avoid war with the U. S. but if need be, we will act in accordance with the Tri-Partite Pact, and decide when and how such matters will be handled.

A. No, I do not recall.

Q. Did you attend the meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. You were Foreign Minister?

A. Yes.

Q. What was it about?

A. It was reporting to the Throne that we, in the highest Liaison Conference in the government agreed not to participate in the Soviet-German war. That was the chief item.

Q. Now on 14 July, according to official records, your office sent a message to their Foreign Office in Washington, D. C., as follows (reading from Document #15) "1) Recent mobilisation order expresses irrevocable decision by Japan to end Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her expansion. 2) Occupation of Indo China (a) Achieve our purpose there and (b) base to launch a rapid attack. Next will be ultimatum to Netherlands Indies. In seizing Singapore navy will play principal part, army one division but two to seize

Netherlands East Indies. Air arms in Spratley Islands, Pare, Singora, Portuguese Timor and Indo China. Sub fleet in south mandated islands. Holland islands and Indo China will at once move to crush Anglo-American military pact. Troops to soon occupy Indo China will reorganise as 25th Army Corps." Do you recall a message of that kind?

A. Do you mean a telegram sent from the Foreign Office to our Embassy at Washington?

Q. Yes.

A. No, not only that I do not recall, but I clearly know.

Q. This is an intercepted diplomatic message sent by your government, 14 July 1941.

A. Yes. I clearly know I never sent anything of the kind.

Q. Were you Foreign Minister on the 14th of July?

A. Yes, although I was sick and confined at my home. I know that no such thing happened.

Q. Well, had those things happened on that day? Was there a recent mobilisation order, etc.?

A. No.

Q. The occupation of Indo China for rapid attack?

A. No.

Q. Was an ultimatum delivered to the Netherlands East Indies?

A. No.

Q. Was Singapore seized?

A. No.

Q. Was it a plan to seize Singapore, that you know of?

A. No.

Q. Did you resign from the cabinet as Foreign Minister as a result of this conference of July 21?

A. No.

Q. What was the reason for your resignation?

A. That Konoye asked me to resign. As I have told you, I was thinking of resigning because of the things carried on behind my back.

Q. You began by that, the dealings with the U. S.?

A. Yes.

Q. And you objected to that?

A. No, I objected -- not I alone, but any Foreign Minister -- to such grave matters carried on without his knowledge, he would resign. But I don't resign because the situation was so grave and I made my best efforts to make them a success and then after that, I was determined to resign.

Q. Did you make an attempt while you were Foreign Minister to settle the Chinese question directly with the Chinese government, Chang Kai Shek's government?

A. Soon after I took up the portfolio.

Q. You also had a government set up in China, didn't you, which you had recognized?

A. Well, that is as I told you. It was practically determined before the second Konoye cabinet came into office, and I asked for postponement until I make efforts with Generalissimo Chang Kai Shek to come to peace.

Q. Did you know a Major General WACHI of the Japanese Army?

A. Wachi? He was then still Colonel, I think.

Q. Now, when you returned from your trip to Berlin and Moscow, in April 1941, did you make an address at Hibya Hall in Tokyo shortly thereafter?

A. Yes.

Q. And as a part of the speech, did you state as follows: "Last February I foretold that the Italian Army would stage a comeback in the near future. Many people were doubting this. Then Italy began to conquer in both the Balkans and North Africa. I knew it. Behind the scenes there was a mutual understanding. Since I knew about it, I told you of this conclusion." Do you remember that?

A. No.

Q. Further from that same speech, "So after I came back from Geneva, I advocated the dissolution of political parties. I was called crazy but I

told the young men that a race without ideals will perish. Today we talk of a history of 2600 years and Hakko Ichiu (idea of unification of the world under the Japanese Emperor) but we believe only we will be of service to it." Do you remember that?

A. I don't recall. I may have made such a statement, but I don't recall. And by the way, Hakko Ichiu as interpreted there in English is not my interpretation.

Q. This speech was made after you returned from Berlin and made the Moscow treaty.

A. Yes.

Q. Apparently the purpose of this excerpt from the speech was to explain away the apparent bad fortunes of the Italian Army, which was one of the nations of the Tri-Partite Alliance, and the second paragraph urging your audience to a realization of this new world order as you outlined it. Isn't that true?

A. No, I never spoke about the Italian defeat, or anything like that.

Q. Did you also state, in regard to relations with Russia, "We must hit if we think we should, and if not we must shake hands." Did you make that statement?

A. In that speech? No.

Q. "The rest of the nationalistic propaganda, after our incomparable nation struck," -- do you recall that statement?

A. No, I don't recall. Might I interject a little? That speech was a report about the conditions of Germany and Italy, and also I said that America and England and others are making all supreme efforts to strengthen their country, and I think there is a pamphlet in Japanese about that speech. You can translate it.

Q. Now, in a booklet which you wrote, entitled "The Appeal to the Japanese People" after seceding from the party, reading from page 59 of that booklet, "Benito Mussolini is the only one who is sowing the seed for a new era. Mussolini says the individual should sacrifice himself for the good of the nation. The Western civilization is worthless without this sacrifice. Mr. Hitler is making progress along the same philosophy. What is the whimsical civilization of Europe and America? All symptoms of the corrupted civilization of today. We cannot profit by digesting the remnants of Western civilization." Do you remember that?

A. I don't remember, but if it is in my book and directly translated.

Q. Well, you were at that time, at least, an admirer of Hitler and Mussolini in their program?

A. Well, of their effort to unite their nations.

Q. Is there anything more that you would like to add concerning questions you have been asked this morning, particularly with respect to this conversation with Hitler, Ribbentrop and this request to make available the inventions for heavy industries, etc.

A. Thank you. As I said the other day these treaties were not as a matter of fact, actually overnight. Might I speak just a short time about what you said the other day, is it all right? That I can't make myself agree to the sneaking and one-sided observation about the so-called expansion of Japan. The historical facts contradict it. That while we opened the country to the rest of the world, we saw Korea even behaving disdainfully toward Japan, and not to say of China, you know. And later we made an agreement, as perhaps you know, with China to respect the independence of Korea. Now, if we opened a map, the Korean peninsula is an arrow right against the heart of Japan. Now, China always disregarded that agreement as to the independence of Korea, and regarded Korea as her own vassal state, and at last China sent in troops, you know, and in spite of Japan making protest against it. So Japan had to put in her forces.

Q. I don't like to interrupt, but what I wanted you to comment on is what we covered this morning, concerning these conversations between yourself and Hitler and von Ribbentrop.

A. But that is finished. That part is finished, and that is why I asked your permission to speak about this other matter. So we were compelled to fight China, but in those days I think the world thought that Japan would be beaten by China easily. Nevertheless, we had to fight, and with pathetic determination we entered Korea and fought, and we won the war. Well, we were ever on the alert, watching the mainland, and then in 1900 Russia came down into Manchuria and in spite of Japan's protests, repeated protests, Russia continued to stay on.

Q. We will take this up the very next time we come out.

A. Thank you.

4191

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 12 March 1946, 1345 -- 1400 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Lt. Cmdr John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. Now, for the purpose of outlining to you, Mr. Matsuoka, what we will take up this afternoon, I will attempt to go again into your relations with Germany concerning the Tripartite Alliance, particularly your visit to Germany and Moscow in March of 1941.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, did you receive any instructions from the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, concerning this visit which you made to Berlin and Moscow?

A. No.

Q. Did you discuss your departure with him?

A. Yes.

Q. What did he have to say with respect to this trip?

A. He doesn't care to have an opinion about it, but he agreed to my visiting Europe and I told him I was merely making my visit to Berlin and Rome more a kind of camouflage in my attempt to conclude the Tri-Partite Pact or non-aggression treaty with the Russians, and otherwise improv the relations between Soviet Russia and Japan.

Q. Now, you mentioned the Tri-Partite Pact. Was that an error?

A. That was a mistake. I meant neutrality pact. I have trouble sometimes to repeat those two treaties. Nevertheless, we had two drafts under discussion with our Ambassador at Moscow, and Mr. Molotov. That is why I always refer to two.

Q. What was the Prime Minister's attitude with respect to the conclusion of this neutrality pact with Russia?

118-80

MAR 14 1946