

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED
(Reclassify when filled out)

I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VC-88 (b) Based on or at USS SAGINAW BAY (c) Report No. 65
 (d) Take off: Date 7 March 1945 Time (LZT) 0530 K (Zone); Lat. 24-45 N Long. 142-10 E
 (e) Mission Special strike on Chichi Jima. (f) Time of Return 1045 K (Zone)

II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
FM-2	VC-88	4	0	4	6-3.25" rocket motor Mk 7 5" rocket body Mk 1	Mk 146

III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
FM-2	VC-82	4	USS ANZIO				
TBM	VC-82	1	USS ANZIO				

IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
			(ZONE)	NONE		
			(ZONE)			
			(ZONE)			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) _____
 Did Any Part of _____
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? _____ If so, Describe Clouds _____
 (YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)
 Time of Day and Brilliance _____
 (j) of Sun or Moon _____ (NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (k) Visibility _____ (MILES)

V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER		
			NONE		

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VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	(c) CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	(e) EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1 FM-2	VC-88	Heavy AA fire	Port wing-low-below.	Center panel of port wing torn off; size of hole 70"x 33.5" upon landing. Light AA caused small hole in fuselage, loss of auxiliary aerial. Plane Bu.No. 73685 recommended for striking.
2		Light AA fire	Auxiliary aerial and fuselage.	
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8 FM-2	VC-88	Light AA fire	Port wing, below	One bullet entered under surface of wing and emerged leading edge. Slight damage.
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

(a) NO.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
		NONE		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a) TYPE A/C	(b) MILES OUT	(c) MILES RETURN	(d) AV. HOURS IN AIR	(e) AV. FUEL LOADED	(f) AV. FUEL CONSUMED	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				(h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING
						.30	.50	20MM	MM	
FM-2	140	140	5.25	233	173			3400		3

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over		X		
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm		X		
LIGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm		X		

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

- SPEED, CLIMB,
at various altitudes

TURNS

DIVES

CEILINGS

RANGE

PROTECTION

ARMAMENT

NONE

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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Airfield, shipping, other installations - Chichi Jima (FOR SHIPS INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK) (b) Time Over Target(s) 0705-0915 K (Zone)

(c) Clouds Over Target 800-1200 1.0 Cumulus
(BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Clear (e) Visibility 8 - 10
(CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (MILES)

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type _____ Bomb Sight Used _____
(LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) (TYPE)

Bombs Dropped per Run _____ Spacing _____ Altitude of Bomb Release _____
(NUMBER) (FEET) (FEET)

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed _____ Probably Destroyed _____ Damaged 3

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 Non-operational A/C on ground	3	4 FM-2 VC-88	4 rockets 1000 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Slight
2 Fox Tare Dog	Estimated 1200 tons	1 FM-2 VC-88	4 rockets 150 rds. .50 cal.	2 rkts Strafing	Serious
3 Several luggers	50 feet	2 FM-2 VC-88	300 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Slight
4 Heavy and light AA positions, airfield		3 FM-2 VC-88	12 rockets 1000 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Slight
5 Blockhouse AA position		1 FM-2 VC-88	200 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Serious
6 AA position-bldg Omura		1 FM-2 VC-88	2 rockets 150 rds. .50 cal.	2 rkts Strafing	Serious
7 Bldgs, barracks-Omura		3 FM-2 VC-88	400 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Slight
8 Barracks 1200 yds east of airfield		1 FM-2 VC-88	200 rds. .50 cal.	Strafing	Slight

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

- One BETTY and five single engine fighters believed ZEKES on Susaki Field appeared non-operational, in varying degrees of damage. They were thoroughly strafed and were more greatly damaged after raid than before.
- Two rockets struck within five feet of waterline of FTD in Putani Harbor and believed to have caused serious damage underwater.
- Several 50' luggers in harbor were strafed but no fire resulted. Slight damage.
- Heavy AA positions, surrounded by light AA eastern side of airfield made object of determined attacks. Rockets were hitting around position and strafing going into it but heavy guns fired after attack. However, slight damage to positions believed done.
- Light AA fire seen coming from blockhouse at Hakabano Point, strafed and fire ceased.
- Two rockets struck a small building in Omura from which light AA fire was coming. Fire ceased following hits.
- Barracks in Omura strafed, with tracers going in, but no fires started.
- Barracks 1200 yards east of airfield were smoking following strafing.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

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XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" " " Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

ATTACK

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships
Concealment
Searchlights
Night Fighter Tactics
Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

Four FM-2's of VC-88, piloted by Lt. E. A. KAMP, Lt's(jg) C. S. RHODES, R.J. HENMAN and Ensign D. J. MacDONALD, on 7 March 1945 joined with four FM-2's and 1 TBM for a special early morning strike on Chichi Jima. Lt. Kamp was the flight leader. Recent information indicated the strong possibility that the enemy intended to refuel planes at Chichi Jima that day either before or following attack on the U. S. forces engaged in the capture of Iwo Jima. Top priority as targets was assigned aircraft in air, aircraft on ground and shipping.

The planes took off at 0530 K, the carrier force then being at approximately Lat. 24-45N, Long 142-10E. The 4 FM-2's rendezvoused in the dark quickly, in 7 or 8 minutes. The five planes of VC-82 were rendezvoused shortly after, and the group headed toward the target. 5 or 6 minutes later they ran into rain squalls and the ceiling dropped to 100 feet. The FM-2's of VC-82 lost contact with its only TBM which remained with VC-88 planes. However, Kamp maintained radio communications with the VC-82 fighters up to the target, giving position only by course. The VC 88 fighters and the one TBM flew at 250 feet altitude all the way to the target at 130-135 knots I.A.S., running into rain squalls most of the way. After passing 6 or 7 miles to the east of Haha Jima Kamp instructed the TBM to orbit midway between Haha and Chichi while the VF conducted their attack.

The four FM-2 began to climb, picking up speed to 165 knots. They skirted around the southwest end of Chichi, climbed to about 800 feet and had the airfield well in sight. The clouds were at 800 feet, completely overcast, ragged but it was not raining. Kamp led the planes up into the clouds and at 0705 the 4 FM-2 of VC-88 began their attack by strafing the Susaki airfield. Individual runs were begun at 1200 feet at approximately 30 degrees glide, pull outs varying but averaging 100 to 200 feet. One BETTY AND five single engine fighter planes which were believed ZEMES and appeared non-operational were strafed on this and subsequent runs. No rockets were seen to hit the planes.

A great circle pattern to the left was begun, beginning each run on the airfield from the southwest then pulling up slightly over Futani Harbor to make additional strafing or rocket runs on ships in the harbor or installations north of the harbor. Numerous aiming points were selected. Lt. Kamp, after strafing airfields on three runs, fired four rockets on a Fox Tare Dog in the harbor, two of them striking the water about 5 feet short of the waterline and believed to have caused serious damage; his other two rockets struck a small building in Omura from which light anti-aircraft fire was coming; in addition he strafed barracks and other buildings in the vicinity of Omura. At 0722 he was passing over north shore of the island, about 15 feet above the top of the hill his plane was struck by a heavy AA burst believed to be explosive, and the middle panel of his port wing was ripped off, leaving a gaping hole. Fortunately he was just passing over a high cliff to the water so that he immediately had 100 feet altitude. The plane was thrown into right bank, then the left went out of the left wing, he put on full throttle and RPM to hold altitude.

The VC-82 FM-2's had arrived at 0719 just as Kamp started his third run. After being hit Kamp called and told them to join the round robin that he had been hit and that Rhodes would lead. Henman, who had strafed the airfield and buildings north of the seaplane base in the first 6 or 7 miles south of Chichi and orbited.

Rhodes and MacDonald continued to attack. They had been attacking the aircraft on the field, several 50 foot luggers in Putani Harbor, a blockhouse at Hakabawe Point from which AA fire was coming before the strafing before the strafing attack but ceased thereafter. They had strafed buildings and barracks in Omura and MacDonald strafed barracks 1200 yards east of the airfield and left them smoking. No great damage could be observed but tracers indicated that hits were being made; cessation of AA fire and smoke indicated damage. In addition to Kamp's hit Heman's plane had been hit by light AA fire and a heavy AA burst came dangerously close to Rhode's plane. Rhodes and MacDonald turned their full attention to the heavy AA position on the east side of the airfield, flanked by lighter AA positions. Each fired four rockets and strafed, pressing their attack closely. Damage was probably done but Rhodes reported that he saw the heavy gun still fire after they had finished their runs. Heman returned later to shoot four more rockets and strafe this position, without observation of results.

At 0735 the FM-2's of VC-88 ceased their attack. At 0740 the VC-82 fighters ceased to attack and in rendezvousing found one fighter missing. Kamp ordered VC-82 planes to begin search through target and rendezvous areas. 15 minutes later he sent Rhodes and MacDonald out on a search. These pilots searched the harbor and made two circuits of the island, one inner and one outer but saw nothing. Rhodes recalled seeing a heavy burst from the gun at the airfield near a plane during the attack but did not see any plane go in. Kamp later sent Rhodes up above overcast to see if lost FM-2 could be there but result was again negative. Heman made another rocket run on the heavy gun while the planes of VC-82 continued the search.

At 0905 the planes were rendezvoused and started return trip. The weather had improved; a 1500 ft. ceiling the first 40 miles becoming progressively higher; visibility remained at about 5 to 6 miles. They swung along the west coast of Haha Jima at 600 feet, observing southwestern anchorage but saw no surface craft. They headed straight for Iwo Jima at 135 IAS. The skin on Kamp's plane began to rip, rivets popping. Full aileron tab and full right rudder, plus holding stick $3/4$ to the right maintained equilibrium. Kamp reported into GASCU, then tower at Iwo. He tested flaps and almost did a split S, going out of control. The left flap hadn't opened so he closed the right one. On first pass at field plane tended toward getting out of control below 110 knots. He made the second pass at 115-120 knots and landed at 110 knots heading south on the north-south runway. Two hundred yards later the lift went out of the port wing, the plane swerved to the left and, using the throttle, Kamp could not slow down so he turned west on the east-west runway just at the proper time and finally came to a stop at about 1025. The gaping hole in his wing measured 70 inches by 35 $1/2$ inches. The plane was turned over to GASCU 52 at Iwo Jima and Kamp was returned to the carrier later in the day by destroyer. The other three

XII TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA

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FM-2's, after Kamp landed, returned to base, landing at 1045 K, completing a hop of five and one quarter hours.

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XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.
Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

- Guns, Gunsights
- Turrets
- Ammunition
- Bombs, Torpedoes
- Bomb Sights
- Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

- Radio, Radar
- Homing Devices
- Visual Signals
- Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

- IFF
- Signals
- Battle Lights
- Procedures

PROTECTION

- Armor; Points and Angles
of Fire Needing Further
Protection
- Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

- Parachutes
- Life Belts, Life Rafts
- Safety Belts
- Emergency Kits
- Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

- Compasses
- Driftsights
- Octants
- Automatic Pilots
- Charts
- Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

- Flight
- Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

**CAMOUFLAGE AND
DECEPTION DEVICES**

STRUCTURE

- Airframe
- Control Surfaces
- Control System
- Dive Flaps
- Landing Gear
- Heating System
- Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

- Engines
- Engine Accessories
- Propellers
- Lubricating System
- Starters
- Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

- Auxiliary Plant
- Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

- Plane Servicing Equipment
- Personnel Facilities

No comment except that on this hop an F4U-2 proved itself a rugged fighter in performing so well in spite of the absence of the middle panel of the port wing for a period of three hours. The gaping hole was measured and found to be 70 inches by 33 1/2 inches.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

H.D. SCHWAAB, Lt. USNR, AGIO, VC-88

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

E. L. KEMPF, Lieut. USNR, Commanding

SIGNATURE

RANK AND DUTY

12 March 1945

DATE